Are Pakistan-India relations doomed forever?

Pakistan-India ties find themselves in a strange place. The relationship is strained, the leadership is
estranged, and the people are aloof. A state of ominous peace prevails, but neither country is pushed to do
anything about it.
Enmity does not require permission, but friendship is by mutual consent — something that both India and
Pakistan have consistently lacked for the last several decades. The last and longest search for such a
consent was conducted during President Musharraf and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s tenures as
chronicled by Ambassador Satish Lambah in his memoirs, In Pursuit of Peace: India-Pakistan Relations
under Six Prime Ministers (2023). The search remained incomplete, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi
has shown little interest in its revival, much less fulfilment.
The past oppresses the present
Traditionally, there have been a host of factors blocking the road to peace between India and Pakistan.
First, the shadow of history has darkened the neighbours’ view of each other. Both countries’ objectives
and policies collide and their relationship remains marred by lingering tensions, rooted in religion, culture
and identity, and by conflicting versions of history. Pakistan has desired normalisation but as an equal,
and regards Kashmir as the defining issue for peace and friendship. India, for its part, rejects these
assumptions.
Meanwhile, each country has remained an indelible fixture of the other’s domestic politics. Weak
governments on both sides have found it politically difficult to normalise relations. A strong government
in India felt it could talk but only on its terms, while in Pakistan the civil-military power play prevented
the consensus on India.
It is no wonder then that only a strong government in India and a military ruler in Pakistan found it
possible to have any meaningful dialogue. But even that did not succeed. Any other talks have been a
dialogue to nowhere, often ending before they even began.
Enter Modi
Modi clearly had a plan for relations with Pakistan, and it was unlike anything seen before. It was part of
a new paradigm of India’s domestic and foreign policies. His foreign policy fortified the trend that began
around 1991 to enhance engagement with great powers, especially the United States, to help raise India’s
economic weight, military potential, and diplomatic stature. This served shared interests of both India and
the US by advancing India’s hegemony in the region, and by furthering US policies towards Pakistan and
China.
There were, no doubt, important domestic stimuli too at work; the Pakistan policy represented the
historical RSS view of Muslims, Pakistan and Kashmir that provided the ideological underpinnings of
Modi’s mindset. But his support in the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) went much beyond his Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) — a Hindu nationalist organisation — base. Marketing-savvy and skilled in
the use of digital tools, Modi has tapped into the party’s traditional nationalist ideology, and by bundling
it with his populist economic agenda and Pakistan policy, not only broadened his own support base in the
BJP, but also that of the party across the country.
Ambassador Lambah had hoped he would continue his back channel role under Prime Minister Modi.
After being kept on hold, he was told thanks, but no thanks. Modi’s plan was not to talk but to fix
Pakistan — and for that, he did not need Lambah, but Ajit Doval.
The plan was put in operation in a piecemeal manner. It began with a charm offensive, as Modi had come
into power with a controversial image internationally — in 2005, Modi who was then chief minister of
India’s Gujarat state had his US visa revoked and was denied permission to enter the country — and was
not sure how he would be received by the US. So he started with good optics and friendly posturing
towards Pakistan, aimed at the international community, India’s liberal intelligentsia, and non-BJP
domestic electorate. He wanted to build wider support for his Pakistan policy within India, and sufficient
tolerance for it internationally.
Knowing well the power of the modern media, Modi began by inviting Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to
his swearing in. The media just ran away with the news, convinced that something new and exciting was
happening that would make a good story. In reality, however, the invitation was no more than a public
relations exercise. All the Saarc leaders had been invited to what was essentially a ceremonial occasion.
Similarly, the air dash to Lahore on Nawaz’s birthday in December 2015 had no substantive outcome, but
had a dramatic impact internationally, especially in Washington. All this projected Modi as keen for good
relations with Pakistan.
The public relations exercise was, no doubt, also targeted at the debate in Pakistan over relations with
India. Modi may have hoped that if Nawaz Sharif could deliver by agreeing to India’s terms of
engagement, well and good. If not, at least it would have advanced the case of those who favoured normal
relations with India. In this particular event, Nawaz Sharif lost the debate — and his job.
Meanwhile, internationally, Modi had managed to convince many that he had done his best to normalise
relations with Pakistan, but the latter did not respond in kind. And Pakistan, with its lack of strategy for
India, principally because of the civil-military discord over the definition of relations with India, gave
ample opportunities to Modi to paint Pakistan exactly the way it would suit his plan — to seek US
backing and domestic support to his hardline policies.
These opportunities came in the way of the alleged actions of militant groups over which Pakistan had
either lost control or lacked the political will or capacity, or both, to control them. The terrorist attacks
in Pathankot in January 2016 and Uri in September 2016, played right into Modi’s hands.
By avoiding a military response to these attacks, he skilfully showed Pakistan as the spoiler to peace with
India. The cancellation of talks with Pakistan and sabotage of the Saarc summit brought the focus on
Pakistan’s ‘behaviour’, while earning India praise internationally for its ‘restraint’. The US’ displeasure
over Pakistan’s role in the failing Afghanistan war and with its closeness to Beijing, Indian policies were
now beating to the same rhythm.
Modi’s real intentions and policies were the exact opposite to his theatrics of inviting Nawaz Sharif and
visiting him in Lahore given the fact that he used the flimsiest of excuses, such as the Pakistan High
Commissioner to India’s meeting with Kashmiri leaders in August 2014 to call off the planned Foreign
Secretaries talks. Meanwhile, the terrorism incidents helped him shut the door on Pakistan completely,
which he did not have to do. India and Pakistan could have still talked, but Modi chose not to, for his own
purposes.
At home, the terrorist attacks, exploited by Modi through social media and friendly electronic media,
triggered an enormous emotional response from the Indian citizenry. His non-military response made
India look like a victim. The terrorism issue helped Modi with the military too as it broadened the scope
of conflict with Pakistan and enlarged the concept of national security, elevating the military’s national
profile. On Pakistan, Modi managed to bring everyone on the same page.
Here comes Jaishankar
Modi, whose own approach to Pakistan was based on raw power, wielded with the help of an increasingly
assertive military capability and confident bureaucratic institutions of a rising India, got intellectual
underpinning with the arrival of Subrahmanyam Jaishankar as the foreign minister in May 2019.
Jaishankar’s strategic acumen, combined with a correct understanding of the emerging geopolitics, has
enabled India to maximise opportunities and minimise risks. According to C Raja Mohan, a noted Indian
analyst who is close to Jaishankar, “the Modi government has broken out of … [a] defensive and
deferential mindset”.
Jaishankar has pursued “India-First” policies, aimed at making no new enemies and losing no old friends,
while turning the emerging geopolitics greatly to India’s advantage. He has done this by making use of
the great power rivalry without being caught up in it. A rising India is now not only a vital player in US
foreign policy, but also an increasingly attractive partner to others, partly due to reality and partly due to
an illusion — the reality of the economic and strategic opportunities that India offers, and the illusion of
being a “democratic counterweight to China”. Nevertheless, India is going to host a number of high-
profile summits, including the upcoming SCO meet and the G20 summit later this year.
While India’s relations with the rest of the world continue to march forward, the ties with Pakistan have
gone into “virtual dormancy” since 2019 — when isolating Pakistan had run its course. Modi found from
his forward policy in the Pulwama incident that aggression worked as it helped highlight Pakistan as
having provoked the Indian response and thus responsible for provoking the risk of conflict. It would put
the spotlight on Pakistan as a reckless actor, endangering peace in the region. Modi did not want to do
anything more — he did not need to.
It was now time for India to cash in on the achievements of the Pakistan policy. Emboldened by the fact
that he had gotten away with all his overreach so far, at home and abroad, was enough for Modi to assume
that his August 5, 2019, action in occupied Kashmir would not cause any stir in the international
community, both because of India’s rising importance and Pakistan’s diminished standing.
At the same time, Pakistan had been severely constrained by the FATF, a struggling economy, a troubled
Afghanistan and strained relations with Washington. A focus on combatting external challenges at the cost
of internal order, prolonged neglect of the economy, and an obsession with geopolitics had weakened
Pakistan at home and made it less influential abroad. Finally, by revoking Indian-occupied Kashmir’s
special autonomy, Modi put the dispute beyond Pakistan’s diplomatic reach.
For India, it was time to move on from trying to isolate Pakistan to ignoring it. By treating Pakistan as
irrelevant, India’s calculus was not to focus too much on the region to avoid a situation that might distract
from its new found global profile. That was partly the reason for the February 2021 ceasefire
agreement in Kashmir.
The ceasefire no doubt helped ease tensions along the LOC and helped the Kashmiris on both sides. At
the same time, it enabled India to shift some of its forces to its border with China as well as draw
applause abroad. But any hopes of better relations between India and Pakistan emerging from the
Kashmir ceasefire were overblown. The agreement had promised no such thing.
Kashmir is now India’s ‘core issue’
India has a foreign policy and it has a Pakistan policy. They do intersect, but largely run parallel to each
other. Factors playing on the foreign policy are not always the same as those that impact the ‘Pakistan
policy’. Hindutava runs the latter. The corporate sector and business interests are a factor in the foreign
policy but not much in the relations with Pakistan, where the normalisation of India’s control of Kashmir
is the priority now. In some strange way, Kashmir may have become India’s core issue.
India will not talk with Pakistan unless it stops insisting on pre-conditions related to occupied Kashmir.
That is the condition for the talks. Any progress in the talks is also linked to Kashmir. India’s foremost
objective from any form of normalisation will be to make Pakistan accept the new power realities and the
absorption of Kashmir by India — after a decent interval, if not now. In other words, India will open the
door to normalisation by shutting the door to Kashmir. Secondly, India feels it cannot rise under the threat
of destabilisation by non-state actors from across the border, and Pakistan would have to address that
issue as well if it desires friendly relations.
The fact of the matter is that India feels it is not missing anything from a lack of normalisation, including
economic benefits. Pakistan’s real value as an economic partner will not show up until Afghanistan is
stabilised and Pakistan becomes a hub for pipelines and trade with Central Asia. Such a prospect is years,
if not decades, away.
So for India, there is neither the compulsion nor an incentive to normalise relations with Islamabad in the
immediate future. For now, India is quite comfortable with what Mohan has termed as “minimalism in its
relations with Pakistan”. Courting an economic disaster, the compulsion may now be Pakistan’s to
normalise relations with India, or to have some form of economic cooperation to say the least
In recent years, while India may have thought it did not gain anything from normalisation, Pakistan felt it
did not lose anything from the lack of it. But Pakistan may now be having second thoughts. Prime
Minister Shehbaz Sharif has called for dialogue thrice within his nine months in office.
Strategic parity alone does not resolve critical nation and state building challenges. It is just one element
of national strength, whose totality consists of security, economic progress and political stability.
Look at Pakistan’s internal security challenges: Baloch insurgents are getting more active and the threat
from the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), emboldened by the return of the Afghan Taliban to power, has
become even more grave. In 2022, terrorism-related deaths in Pakistan rose by 120 per cent to more than
600 in over 100 attacks sponsored and led by the TTP and some separatist groups — a number slightly
higher than that in Afghanistan. Peace with India may undercut the suspected external support of these
groups.
Pakistan could start with the offer to open up economic relations with India, at least in some select areas.
That may not be of much help to Pakistan’s economy as it has structural issues but will at least not require
Pakistan to impose any pre-conditions regarding occupied Kashmir. It will, however, give Islamabad
some leverage. “Regional trade builds peace constituencies,” wrote former foreign secretary Aizaz
Ahmad Chaudhry in this publication. That may now be the only way to help the Kashmiris as any armed
leverage of Pakistan over Kashmir has long become a thing of the past and is no longer an option, if it
ever was.
A group of former Indian envoys to Pakistan, at a recent event held in Delhi to discuss Lambah’s book,
has advised India to at least take small steps such as the posting of High Commissioners, relaxation of
visa regime to help people-to-people contact, and resumption of trade talks. Speaking at the event, Shiv
Shankar Menon, former High Commissioner to Pakistan and National Security Adviser (2010-2014) gave
an important advice to India: “Ultimately, it will be harder to prosper and grow if the neighbourhood is in
chaos.”
Unfortunately, no movement in the current stalemate, whether in economic relations or any other area,
seems possible for at least the foreseeable future. As another former High Commissioner of India to
Pakistan, TCA Raghavan, said at the event, “while India-Pakistan talks are needed, it is clear that there is
little appetite [for it] in India”.
The upcoming elections in Pakistan in 2023 and in India in 2024 will keep the relations in the current
holding pattern. A hardline approach towards Pakistan has helped Modi’s electoral politics in the past. He
may, therefore, like to keep the relations at the current neutral level, where gears can be changed easily
and tensions can be ratcheted up if and when needed.
Pakistan, meanwhile, has to remain on its guard while keeping the hopes alive of a much-needed
improvement in relations after the Indian elections. The interim period should be an opportunity to set the
house in order, without which neither India-Pakistan relations nor Pakistan itself will get anywhere.

The two countries have exchanged greetings in the past in elections held in each
other’s country. In fact, when Modi was first elected as Prime Minister of India
in May 2014, he got a call from then Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.
Similarly, Imran Khan called Modi over his election victory in May 2019 despite
the two countries being on the verge of a full scale war a few months before that.
When Shehbaz replaced Imran in April 2022, Modi also congratulated the
younger Sharif. The felicitation message was more explicit and warm at the time.
Modi, while greeting Shehbaz, did mention the need for regional peace as well as
a reference to terrorism. Shehbaz responded in kind. While Modi raised the issue
of terrorism, Shehbaz mentioned the longstanding Kashmir dispute. But this
time when Modi posted a message on X, he neither talked about the future of ties
nor referred to terrorism. Pakistani policymakers took time to respond to Modi’s
message. There were consultations about the response of the Prime Minister
given Modi’s brief statement. All agreed that Shehbaz should thank Modi but
with a terse message matching the Indian Prime Minister’s statement.
In diplomacy, what you say is important but at times what you don’t say is even more
telling. The message of Modi can be interpreted in many ways. Optimists believe that
despite stalemate in the bilateral ties, Modi’s move to greet Shehbaz suggested he
wanted to keep the window for talks open. His terse statement may have to do with
the upcoming elections in India. Some analysts think that weeks before the crucial
parliamentary polls, Modi does not want to send any message to his electorate that
portrays a softening of his stance towards Pakistan. The other perspective is that while
Modi congratulated Shehbaz, his brief statement indicated the nature of relationship
India wants with Pakistan. Making no mention of future ties or other issues suggested
that India was no more keen to have any meaningful engagement with Pakistan. India,
under BJP, wants to continue with the stalemate. The policymakers in New Delhi
think India can sustain this policy as done in the last several years. Pakistani
diplomatic circles believe that India would never allow any breathing space to
Islamabad given our current economic and political predicaments. Prospects of any
rapprochement are dim, they say. One aspect that makes people take a grimmer view
is the absence of Nawaz Sharif as Prime Minister. Prior to the elections, there were
hopes that if elder Sharif returned as PM, that might pave the way for some
engagement with India.
Meanwhile, India, under Modi, is following a clear new strategy to sidestep Pakistan
over the issue of Kashmir. Modi travelled to Srinagar for the first time since he
revoked the special status of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019. In what seems a
calculated move, Modi neither mentioned Pakistan nor terrorism in his speech to the
public rally in the valley. He described the disputed Kashmir region as the “crown’ of
India. Since the repeal of Article 370, India has tried to portray normalcy in Kashmir.
It organised investment conferences, took foreign diplomats to the valley and recently
arranged a visit to the occupied region of cricket legend Sachin Tendulkar to show to
the world that all is well. But India’s own think tanks say that despite claims, the
Article 370 abrogation has not brought normalcy to the disputed region. India is trying
to change the goalpost on Kashmir. This is a real challenge for Pakistan, which is
grappling with economic and political problems, to counter the Indian move.
Pakistan-India Relations Summary:

Overview:

 Strained Relations: Enmity is easy, friendship requires mutual consent, which has been
lacking for decades.
 Historical Obstacles: Long-standing tensions rooted in religion, culture, and conflicting
histories.
 Kashmir Issue: Central to Pakistan’s desire for peace, while India rejects this premise.
 Domestic Politics: Both nations' internal politics hinder normalization efforts.

Key Events and Developments:

 Modi's Approach: Initially aimed at improving international image, including inviting

Nawaz Sharif to his swearing-in and a dramatic visit to Lahore.
 Pathankot and Uri Attacks: Used by Modi to portray Pakistan as a peace spoiler,
avoiding military responses to gain international praise.
 August 5, 2019: Revocation of Kashmir's special autonomy by India, marking a
significant shift.

Recent Dynamics:

 Modi and Jaishankar: Strengthening India's global profile, focusing on power and
strategic interests.
 Kashmir Policy: India insists on Pakistan accepting new realities in Kashmir for any
normalization talks.
 Economic Relations: Limited prospects due to political and security issues.

Current Status:

 Ceasefire Agreement (2021): Eased tensions but did not promise improved relations.
 Strategic Shifts: India's focus on sidelining Pakistan, elevating its own global position.
 Internal Challenges: Pakistan's internal security issues, economic struggles, and political
instability.

Future Prospects:

 Election Impacts: Upcoming elections in both countries likely to maintain the status
quo.
 Dialogue Hopes: Limited optimism for meaningful engagement or normalization in the
near future.
 Economic Cooperation: Potential but distant due to structural and political barriers.