MORBI BRIDGE CASE REPORT

A SEMINAR REPORT
Submitted by
ANSH DWIVEDI (U22CE039)

In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of

BACHELOR OF TECHNOLOGY
In
CIVIL ENGINEERING

Under the supervision of

Dr. Dilip Patel

(Professor)

DEPARTMENT OF CIVIL ENGINEERING

SARDAR VALLABHBAI NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF T ECHNOLOGY, S U R A T

NOVEMBER 2024

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 CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the project report MORBI BRIDGE CASE REPORT
submitted by Ansh Dwivedi (U22CE039) to the Sardar Vallabhbhai National
Institute of Technology, Surat, in the partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the award of the degree of Bachelor of Technology in Civil Engineering is a
bonafide record of work carried out by the student under my supervision. The
contents of this report, in full or in parts have not been submitted to any other
Institute or University for the award of any degree or diploma.

Head of Department Dr. Dilip Patel

Civil Engineering, SVNIT, Surat Professor
Department of Civil Engineering
SVNIT, Surat

Place: Surat
Date:

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 CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL

This is to certify that the Seminar report entitled submitted by ANSH DWIVEDI
(U22CE039) to the Sardar Vallabhbhai National Institute of Technology Surat,
in the partial fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree of
Bachelor of Technology in Civil Engineering has been accepted by the
examination committee and that the student has successfully completed the
examination held today.

(Internal Examiner) (External Examiner)

Place: Surat
Date:

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

I would like to express my heartfelt gratitude to Dr. Dilip Patel, Professor at

SVNIT, for his invaluable guidance and support throughout my academic
journey. His expertise and dedication have significantly enriched my
understanding of the subject matter and inspired me to strive for excellence.

His insightful feedback and constructive criticism have helped me grow both
personally and academically. The passion he brings to teaching has ignited my
own enthusiasm for learning, making even the most complex topics accessible
and engaging.

I am deeply appreciative of the time and effort he invested in mentoring me,

often going beyond the call of duty to ensure I understood the material fully. His
belief in my potential has motivated me to push my boundaries and reach new
heights. The skills and knowledge I gained under his guidance will undoubtedly
serve me well in my future endeavours.

Lastly, I would like to extend my heartfelt thanks to my family, especially my

mom and dad, for their unwavering support and encouragement.

Thank you all for your support.

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 ABSTRACT

The Morbi Bridge collapse of 2022 was a tragic incident that highlighted the interplay
of media coverage, judicial scrutiny, technical aspects of bridge engineering, and
corporate negligence. The collapse occurred due to the failure of critical maintenance
activities by the contracted repairing company. Media played a pivotal role in raising
public awareness and intensifying the demand for accountability. Court judgments
scrutinized the negligence and lack of adherence to safety protocols, exposing systemic
flaws in infrastructure management and the regulatory oversight of such structures.

From a technical perspective, the disaster emphasized the importance of rigorous

structural assessments, especially in aging infrastructure. Experts pointed to lapses in
the timely assessment of load-bearing capacities and material fatigue. The repairing
company’s negligence, including poor-quality workmanship and missed inspections,
was a key factor in the catastrophe, raising questions about corporate responsibility and
the enforcement of engineering standards.

Incorporating Heinrich’s Domino Theory could prevent such accidents by addressing

failures at multiple stages. Identifying unsafe conditions, enforcing proactive
inspections, and ensuring accountability in each phase of maintenance can prevent
disasters by breaking the chain of failure. Improved oversight, regular audits, and
stricter safety regulations could effectively interrupt the negligent actions leading to
such incidents.

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Table of Contents

ABSTRACT.................................................................................................................................................5
INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................8
ROLE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATION TEAM (SIT):.......................................................................................11
TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MORBI BRIDGE COLLAPSE.......................................................................14
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE INFRASTRUCTURE..........................................................................17
GUJARAT HIGH COURT AND MEDIA ON COLLAPSE:...............................................................................18
OREVA STATEMENTS:.............................................................................................................................21
HIENRICH DOMINO SEQUENTIAL MODEL...............................................................................................24
REFERENCES...........................................................................................................................................26

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Table of Figures

Figure 1 Image of accident........................................................................................................................2

Figure 2 Bridge structure..........................................................................................................................3
Figure 3 Pre-renovation. Distorted aluminum deck plates on the Morbi Bridge. Picture from Eng-
Tips.com...................................................................................................................................................4
Figure 4 Times of India on Administrative Lapses and Negligence...........................................................6
Figure 5 Load distribution on bridge.........................................................................................................6
Figure 6 Aftermath of bridge accident......................................................................................................6
Figure 7 Graph of structural performance vs time....................................................................................7
Figure 8 Application of SHM.....................................................................................................................9
Figure 9 Newspaper clippings regarding Morbi Bridge Collapse...............................................................9
Figure 10 Newspaper Ahmedabad Mirror clipping.................................................................................10
Figure 11 Hindustan Times published in its Annual Magazine................................................................11
Figure 12 Hindustan Times clipping on Morbi Bridge Hearing................................................................11
Figure 13 ANI Official Article..................................................................................................................12
Figure 14 Domino effect in case of accident...........................................................................................14
Figure 15 Figure illustration regarding removal of accident causing factor............................................14

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 INTRODUCTION

On October 30, 2022, a catastrophic failure occurred when the 141-year-old suspension
bridge spanning the Machchhu River in Morbi, Gujarat, collapsed. Known as "Jhulto Pul"
(the Swinging Bridge), this tragedy resulted in 135 fatalities and left 56 people injured.
The bridge had been under the management of the Oreva Group, which was contracted
by the local municipality to handle its maintenance and operations.
At the time of the collapse, there were approximately 400 people on the bridge, far
exceeding its safe capacity. As the suspension cables gave way, many individuals fell
into the river, with some feared to be trapped beneath the wreckage. This horrific event
attracted widespread media attention and led to judicial involvement, as the public
began questioning the accountability of both the responsible authorities and the
company entrusted with the bridge’s upkeep.
This report will analyze the various factors contributing to this disaster, including the
role of the media, the legal rulings, engineering deficiencies, and the negligence
displayed by the company in charge of the bridge’s maintenance. By evaluating these
elements, the goal is to identify the underlying failures that allowed the incident to
happen and suggest measures to prevent similar occurrences in the future.
The Oreva Group, which primarily manufactures clocks and electrical appliances, was
assigned the responsibility of repairing and maintaining the historic bridge. Despite
having no prior experience in large-scale infrastructure or civil engineering, the
company was selected for the critical task. This decision raised concerns about the
appropriateness of awarding such a significant project to a company without a track
record in infrastructure, sparking debate about the transparency of the tendering
process.
Most of the renovation work was outsourced to smaller firms with limited expertise,
and reports suggest that vital structural elements, particularly the suspension cables,
were either overlooked or inadequately addressed during the renovation process. The
restoration focused mainly on superficial aspects, such as painting and resurfacing the
deck, without a thorough inspection of the essential load-bearing components.
Furthermore, the bridge was reopened to the public without proper safety
certifications, and the load tests performed were insufficient to determine whether the
structure could safely handle the weight of pedestrians.
The collapse triggered intense media scrutiny and judicial intervention, leading to
questions about the responsibilities of the Oreva Group and the local authorities. This
report will examine the various dimensions of the incident, from media influence to
court judgments, engineering lapses, and the company's failure to ensure adequate
maintenance. Through this analysis, the report seeks to pinpoint the key mistakes that
led to the tragedy and recommend strategies to ensure such an incident does not repeat
in the future.

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 Figure 1 Image of accident

Oreva subcontracted significant amounts of the rehabilitation work to firms that had
minimal experience. It was accused of failing to, or inadequately dealing with, key
refurbishment aspects such as suspension cable replacement and many structural
elements. The renovation focused most on aesthetic touch-ups, such as repainting and
resurfacing the deck, but the integrity of the significant load-carrying structural
elements of the bridge was never put to the test. Furthermore, Oreva reopened public
access to the bridge without attainment of suitable safety certifications or conducting
proper load assessment, which contributed to the subsequent disaster.
DETAILS:
1) Bridge made by British in 20th Feb 1879 by Mumbai governor. Cost that time was 3.5
lackh rupee as per britishers that was quite high in those years.

2) Municipality of Morbi formed in 1961 from those earlier days bridge overall
functioning and maintenance was under municipality they used to state that only 15
persons can stand on the bridge at a time with 1 rupee ticket fee.

3) From 2008 to 2018 Oreva group got involved and at the time of 2018 their contract
got expired and did not renew their license; they were having disputes with a
municipality to increase fee charges of tickets rate from 10 to 15 rupee.

4) June 3rd 2020 proposed contract to the municipality, which includes a statement that
all the renovation and maintenance are under their work while the overall pandemic,
2022 signed the contract. The Ajanta manufacturing private limited company is solely
responsible for all the work related to the bridge.
5) The conversation was not about the ability of people to stand the bridge as
constructed. A design based on compression and tension must also be engineered to
take into account lateral forces such as wind and seismic activities, along with the load

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placed by the deck.

On the evening of October 30, 2022, a 143-year-old pedestrian suspension bridge

spanning the Machchhu River in Morbi, Gujarat, collapsed just four days after reopening
following six months of renovation. At the time of the incident, approximately 250
people were on the bridge, exceeding its safe capacity. Reports suggested that while the
bridge was damaged, it may still have been capable of supporting up to 125 individuals.
Some victims were believed to have impacted the riverbed, which is approximately 10
feet below the surface near the riverbanks and reaches a depth of 30 feet in the center,
according to the National Disaster Response Force on site. Unlike all suspension
bridges, which can vary in design, the Machchhu Bridge had a swaying structure, unlike
more rigid suspension bridges such as the Bandra-Worli Sea Link.

Figure 2 Bridge structure

Public Perceptions:

1. Some residents and observers speculated that the Morbi Bridge may have
sustained damage from the Bhuj earthquake, even though the epicenter was
approximately 150 km away.

2. Concerns were raised about the bridge frequently holding crowds larger than its
intended capacity, which could have played a role in its failure.

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 3. It was pointed out that certain sections of the bridge were left unrepaired
following minor maintenance efforts, and additional reinforcing steel was
installed. This measure, while aimed at fortification, unintentionally increased
the bridge’s overall weight—a practice typically advised against.

Figure 3 Pre-renovation. Distorted aluminum deck plates on the Morbi Bridge. Picture from Eng-Tips.com.

Role of the Special Investigation Team (SIT):

Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice Pranav Trivedi highlighted the absence of an
Action Taken Report (ATR) and expressed concern that the government had not taken
significant action. This observation followed the SIT's report presented in court, which
pointed out failures and negligence by Morbi Nagarpalika officials, particularly those in
leadership positions during the incident.
In response, the Gujarat High Court directed the state government to submit a detailed
report on measures taken against Morbi municipality officials after the bridge collapse
in October 2022, which resulted in 135 fatalities. A man who lost two family members
in the tragedy petitioned the court for the restoration of the historical bridge and
personalized compensation, while Chief Justice Agarwal noted that an ATR based on the
SIT's findings had yet to be provided.

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One key aspect drawing attention was a clause in the maintenance contract indicating
limited municipal oversight over bridge operations. This point gained traction among
the public and officials. While there were calls for further investigation led by a sitting
or retired judge, no decisive action had been taken by the state government at that time.
The Morbi Bridge, constructed during the British colonial period, was originally
intended to support a limited number of people, approximately a few dozen. However,
on the day of the incident, an estimated 200 individuals were on the bridge when it gave
way. The Oreva Group, responsible for the bridge's operation and maintenance, faced
scrutiny over their renovation practices and crowd management protocols. Criticism
was also directed at the local administration for inadequate oversight and delegation of
responsibility to a private company for managing a popular and often crowded
structure.
The bridge, which had been closed for over seven months for maintenance, collapsed on
the fourth day after reopening. Eyewitnesses reported that many visitors had gathered
due to the Diwali holiday and weekend, contributing to the overcrowding. Following the
collapse, the crowd's density caused people to fall over each other.
The contract between Oreva Group and Morbi municipality included no requirement for
consulting experts or obtaining civic approval before assigning major repair work to
Dev Prakash Solutions. Additionally, there were no limitations on the number of people
allowed on the bridge at any given time or restrictions on ticket sales, further
exacerbating the situation.

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Corroded Cables and Welded Suspenders Behind Morbi Bridge Collapse:
Preliminary SIT Report
The Special Investigation Team (SIT) reported that nearly 300 individuals were on the
Morbi Bridge at the time it collapsed—significantly exceeding its designed load capacity.
According to the SIT's December 2022 findings, one of the main cables showed
extensive corrosion, with almost half of its wires potentially broken before the final
snap.
The SIT, composed of five members, identified that corrosion on nearly half of the main
cable wires, combined with the welding of old suspenders to new ones, were key
contributors to the disaster. The report confirmed that the upstream main cable gave
way, triggering the collapse. Appointed by the Gujarat government, the SIT's
preliminary investigation highlighted these major faults as crucial factors in the bridge's
failure, which resulted in 135 casualties.
One of the primary causes pointed out was overcrowding, with the bridge’s capacity
estimated to support only 50-100 people safely. On the day of the incident, this limit
was vastly surpassed. Additionally, the structure was not properly inspected before
reopening to the public.
The report further stated that the collapse was due to administrative lapses, non-
compliance with established government procedures, and a lack of technical expertise
in bridge repairs and pre-operational testing. Despite completing repair work, Oreva
Company did not secure a fitness report or consult with the municipality before opening
the bridge to the public, the SIT noted, as highlighted by Advocate General Kamal
Trivedi in court.
Several shortcomings were found in the bridge’s repairs, ongoing maintenance, and
operational practices. Originally built in 1887 during the British colonial era, the
bridge’s failure on October 30, 2022, marked a tragic moment for the state. These
insights were part of the ‘Preliminary Report on Morbi Bridge Incident,’ submitted in
December 2022 and later shared with the Morbi Municipality by the state Urban
Development Department.

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Figure 4 Times of India on Administrative Lapses and Negligence

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The contract for maintaining and operating the bridge had been granted to Ajanta
Manufacturing Limited (Oreva Group), which oversaw its management and upkeep at
the time of the disaster.

Significantly, the bridge had been reopened only a few days prior to the collapse,
following a closure of approximately seven months for major renovation and repair
work.

TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MORBI BRIDGE COLLAPSE

Structural Overview

Built in the late 19th century, the Morbi Bridge was a suspension structure featuring a
cable-supported design. This type of bridge depends on cables to hold the deck and
distribute the load efficiently. Due to the age of such structures and the materials they
were constructed with, like steel and concrete, consistent maintenance and inspections
are crucial to preserve their structural soundness.

Figure 5 Load distribution on bridge

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Figure 6 Aftermath of bridge accident

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Factors Contributing to the Collapse:

1. Excessive Load:

o When the collapse occurred, the bridge was reportedly heavily congested,
with estimates indicating it was supporting a weight far beyond its
intended capacity.

o Suspension bridges are designed with a specific maximum load limit, and
exceeding this capacity can place undue strain on the cables and
structural joints.

2. Material Degradation:

o Due to the bridge's age, it was likely experiencing the effects of material
deterioration, including:

 Corrosion of Steel Cables: Over time, steel can weaken from

prolonged exposure to environmental elements, diminishing its
ability to support weight.

 Structural Fatigue: Ongoing usage without proper inspections may

have resulted in small fractures and weaknesses in vital
components.

3. Inadequate Maintenance:

o While recent renovations had been carried out, they may not have
involved comprehensive evaluations of crucial structural elements.

o Reports suggested that safety protocols were not up to standard, and

essential checks might have been overlooked or conducted inadequately.

4. Design Flaws:

o As an older bridge, the original design likely didn't account for modern
load demands or current safety regulations.

o The bridge's design might have lacked redundancy, which is a key feature
in contemporary engineering. Redundancy allows for alternative load
paths if one part of the structure fails.

5. External Conditions:

o Environmental factors such as strong winds or vibrations caused by the

crowd might have further stressed the structure.

o The movements of the crowd could have created dynamic loads, which
often exert more force than static loads.

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Analysis of the Collapse Mechanism:

1. Initial Stress Response:

o As the bridge experienced loads exceeding its design limits, stress began
to concentrate in vulnerable areas, especially at the joints and anchorage
points.

2. Progressive Failure:

o The failure of one structural component, such as a cable or support, could

trigger a chain reaction. For example, if a cable broke under excessive
strain, the remaining cables and the deck might not have been able to
redistribute the load, leading to a catastrophic collapse.

3. Resonance and Dynamic Effects:

o If the crowd moved in sync (e.g., through cheering or swaying), this could
have created resonance, amplifying the forces acting on the structure.
Suspension bridges are particularly sensitive to resonance, which can
cause oscillations that exceed the bridge’s safe operating limits.

4. Total Collapse:

o Once critical elements failed, the structure lost its ability to support the
weight, leading to the deck collapsing into the river below.

Figure 7 Graph of structural performance vs time

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19
Suggestions for Improving Future Infrastructure:

 Routine and Detailed Inspections: Establish a systematic inspection schedule for

aging infrastructure, especially bridges, ensuring they undergo comprehensive
assessments regularly.
 Advanced Load Monitoring Technology: Utilize cutting-edge technology to
monitor real-time stress and load data on bridges, providing early warnings of
potential risks.
 Revised Maintenance Guidelines: Update maintenance protocols to comply with
current engineering standards and safety norms, ensuring that structures remain
safe for public use.

This review highlights the intricate factors behind structural failures and emphasizes
the need for robust maintenance systems and engineering practices to mitigate the risk
of future disasters.

Current Developments in the Morbi Bridge Case:

1. Ongoing Investigations: Authorities are conducting in-depth investigations to

determine the cause of the collapse. This includes examining the quality of the
recent repairs and the accountability of those involved.
2. Legal Actions: Legal proceedings have been initiated against several individuals,
including local officials and contractors. Arrests have been made, and trials will
follow as more information comes to light.
3. Statewide Infrastructure Review: The government of Gujarat has launched a
review of safety protocols for infrastructure across the state, focusing on the
condition of older bridges and public buildings. New plans are being developed
for regular evaluations and maintenance.
4. Support for Affected Families: Various organizations are providing ongoing
assistance to the victims’ families and the local community in the aftermath of
the disaster.
5. Improved Regulatory Measures: Calls for more stringent safety regulations and
enforcement for public infrastructure are increasing, with the aim of preventing
similar incidents in the future.

As investigations continue, further updates will likely emerge from both the legal
proceedings and the ongoing review of infrastructure safety.

Structural Health Monitoring (SHM) Approach:

Key parameters to be assessed on bridges include environmental conditions,

operational loads, and structural reactions.

Real-time responses to live loads—such as stress, vibrations, displacements, and the

inclinations of different components—can be monitored by deploying sensors at key
locations on the structure. Additionally, corrosion levels should be closely tracked.
Sensors designed to measure corrosion can be installed at vulnerable points to detect
degradation early.

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This type of sensor technology can be used across all civil infrastructure, including
bridges, to proactively identify potential issues. The data gathered by these sensors is
either stored offline or uploaded online, with real-time updates sent to designated
personnel via mobile or desktop platforms. If any monitored values exceed predefined
limits, alarms will be triggered, prompting timely maintenance or repairs to avoid
further damage.

In India, there are approximately 39,000 railway bridges over 100 years old, according
to 2019 data. The Indian Railways is carrying out an annual inspection process for these
bridges, which is a commendable initiative to ensure their continued safety.

Through SHM, vast amounts of data are collected, which, with the help of Artificial
Intelligence, can be analyzed to predict the future condition of the structure and
anticipate when maintenance or upgrades will be needed.

Figure 8 Application of SHM

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Gujarat High Court and Media on the Bridge Collapse:

The state government has been instructed to present a report detailing the actions
taken against the officials of the Morbi Municipality, following a Special Investigation
Team's (SIT) findings that pointed to serious lapses in the aftermath of the October
2022 bridge collapse that resulted in 135 fatalities.

During a hearing, the division bench, led by Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice
Pranav Trivedi, observed that the government had failed to provide an Action Taken
Report (ATR), despite the SIT's revelations of negligence by Morbi Nagar Palika officials,
including its then-chief officer.

In a related development, a man who lost two family members in the collapse has
approached the high court, requesting orders for the restoration and repair of the
historic British-era bridge, along with compensation for the affected families. While
hearing a suo motu Public Interest Litigation (PIL), Chief Justice Agarwal remarked that
the state government had not yet submitted an ATR based on the SIT's conclusions
regarding the negligence of the Morbi Nagar Palika officials. The SIT's final report was
officially submitted on October 9, 2023.

Figure 9 Newspaper clippings regarding Morbi Bridge Collapse

According to the NBT official news updated on 5th November 2022 after court orders.

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Figure 10 Newspaper Ahmedabad Mirror clipping

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Justice Samir Dave of the Gujarat High Court decided to recuse himself from hearing the
bail plea of Devang Parmar, a key accused in the Morbi bridge collapse case, on Friday.
The judge stepped down after observing that the victims' lawyer was not present during
the proceedings. As a result, the case will now be referred to the Chief Justice, who will
assign it to a different bench.
The tragic collapse in October 2022 claimed 135 lives. So far, the High Court has granted
bail to nine out of the ten individuals involved in the case. Devang Parmar, who runs
Dev Prakash Solutions in Dhrangadhra, had been a subcontractor for the bridge's repair
work, which was overseen by the Oreva Group. In a related development, the Supreme
Court recently granted bail to Jaysukh Patel, the Chairman and Managing Director of
Oreva.

Figure 11 Hindustan Times published in its Annual Magazine

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Figure 12 Hindustan Times clipping on Morbi Bridge Hearing

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Statements from Oreva:

Oreva, a company traditionally known for manufacturing clocks and electrical goods,
was given the responsibility for the restoration and maintenance of the historic
suspension bridge. However, despite having no substantial experience in handling
major infrastructure or civil engineering projects, Oreva secured the contract for
renovating the 143-year-old bridge. This has sparked doubts regarding the
appropriateness of the tendering process and the company's qualifications to manage
such an important task.
In order to complete the project, Oreva subcontracted the majority of the repair work to
less experienced companies. Reports suggest that critical elements of the renovation—
such as replacing suspension cables and addressing the structural components—were
either ignored or insufficiently handled. The focus of the renovation appeared to be on
superficial improvements, like repainting and resurfacing the deck, while the essential
structural components of the bridge were not properly inspected. Additionally, Oreva
made the decision to reopen the bridge to the public without acquiring the required
safety certifications or conducting necessary load testing, which contributed to the
tragic incident.
During court proceedings, one of the Oreva managers (who was arrested in connection
with the collapse) claimed that the incident was caused by an "Act of God," as stated by
Adv. HS Panchal, the Additional Public Prosecutor for Morbi.

Figure 13 ANI Official Article

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Advocate HS Panchal stated that one of the two managers of the company, who have
been detained, made this disclosure in a Gujarat court. He mentioned that another
crucial detail was that the cable wires of the bridge were "rusting away" and not in
proper condition for public use.
Referring to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) report, Panchal said that the
Investigating Officer (IO) noted the bridge's cables were deteriorating. "The IO
mentioned that only the bridge's flooring had been worked on, while the cables were
not replaced or maintained, with no oiling or greasing done," Panchal stated, as
reported by ANI. He added that, based on an FSL officer’s preliminary assessment, it
appeared that the cables were old.
Of the four individuals placed in police custody, two were managers from Oreva Co.,
while the other two were responsible for the bridge's fabrication work. Panchal noted
that five additional individuals, including security staff and ticket sellers, were
remanded to judicial custody. He further indicated that, according to the Investigating
Officer's report, the contract was awarded directly to the firm without a tender process.
On Wednesday, a court in Morbi, Gujarat, ordered four of the nine individuals arrested
in connection with the October 30 collapse of the century-old suspension bridge to be
held in police custody. The remaining five were placed in judicial custody until
November 5.
It is important to note that at least 135 people, including women and children, lost their
lives in the incident, while more than 100 others are currently undergoing treatment for
injuries sustained when the cable suspension bridge in Morbi town gave way.

Accusations over repairs

Many are now questioning how such a large-scale tragedy could occur and why it was not
prevented. The bridge had been reopened to the public to mark the Gujarati New Year.

Just a day before the incident, Jaysukh Bhai Patel, the owner of Oreva Group—the company
responsible for the bridge’s maintenance and operation since 2008—stated at a press
conference that the renovation work had cost 20 million rupees (approximately $242,000 or
£211,200). He had confidently remarked, "The bridge will be fine for the next 8-10 years. If
used properly, it won’t need repairs for 15 years."

Patel reportedly praised the quality of the renovation, the equipment used, and the
contractor involved in the project.

Following the tragic incident on Sunday, police detained nine individuals linked to Oreva.
This group includes two managers, two ticket clerks employed by the company, as well as
two contractors and three security personnel hired by the firm. They are currently being
investigated for charges of culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

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HEINRICH DOMINO SEQUENTIAL MODEL

Heinrich’s domino model of accident causation:

Herbert W. Heinrich, a key figure in occupational safety research, detailed his findings in
the 1931 publication Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach. His work,
based on the analysis of extensive accident data from his employer, a large insurance
company, spanned over 30 years. Heinrich identified key causes of industrial accidents,
including “unsafe acts by individuals” and “unsafe mechanical or physical conditions.”
Heinrich is most well-known for introducing the “Safety Pyramid” and developing the
“five domino model” of accident causation. This sequential model has had a lasting
influence on occupational safety theories. The “domino theory” conceptualizes an
accident as a chain reaction, where each event is represented by a domino. The fall of
one domino sets off a sequence that causes the others to topple. A similar metaphor was
used during the Cold War in geopolitical discussions, where it was believed that if one
nation fell to communism, neighboring nations could follow. This concept was employed
by the U.S. government to justify interventions around the world.

Figure 14 Domino effect in case of accident

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Heinrich viewed a "preventable injury" as the final result of a chain of events, much like
a line of dominos arranged so that when the first one falls, it causes the next to topple,
and this continues until all the dominos have fallen. If this chain is broken by removing
even one of the contributing factors, the injury can be prevented, as demonstrated in the
figure below.

Figure 15 Figure illustration regarding removal of accident causing factor

Accident prevention through disrupting the accident sequence was highlighted in the 1950
edition of Industrial Accident Prevention: A Scientific Approach. In Heinrich’s initial 1931 model, he
identified five key elements:
 Domino 1: Ancestry and social environment of the worker, which shape their skills,
attitudes, and characteristics. Heinrich noted that traits like "recklessness, stubbornness,
or greed" could be inherited, influencing behavior in the workplace. This perspective
shares similarities with the eugenics-based idea that certain traits can be passed down
and affect work performance.
 Domino 2: Personal flaws or carelessness of the worker, which can cause them to be less
attentive to their tasks (related to the concept of “accident-proneness”).
 Domino 3: Unsafe acts or physical/mechanical hazards. This could include human errors,
such as standing beneath a suspended load or activating machinery without alerting
others, as well as issues like equipment malfunctions or insufficient safety measures on
machinery.
 Domino 4: The occurrence of the accident itself.
 Domino 5: The resulting injuries or losses that follow the accident.

By addressing and removing any of these factors, the chain can be broken, preventing the
accident from occurring.

CONCLUSION:

The collapse of the Morbi bridge was likely caused by a combination of factors,
including excessive load, material deterioration, poor maintenance, and potential design
flaws. A comprehensive investigation is necessary to identify the exact causes and hold
those responsible accountable. Moving forward, the lessons learned from this tragedy
should inform improvements in inspection, maintenance, and design standards for
aging infrastructure.

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In particular, the Morbi Suspension Bridge should never have been subjected to
excessive loading, such as having more than 200 people on it, especially with the added
factor of the swinging motion. Additionally, 42 corroded wires and the installation of
heavy aluminum deck slabs increased the overall weight of the bridge, further stressing
its capacity.
The pre-opening inspection of the bridge, as noted by the court and higher authorities,
was not thorough. Signs of corrosion were still present, and the bridge’s ultimate load-
bearing capacity had not been properly assessed, which contributed to overcrowding.
The fee charged for access to the bridge, along with the business-focused approach of
Oreva, a watchmaking company with no prior experience in the construction industry,
also played a role in this oversight.
Moreover, there was no re-evaluation or proof-checking of the bridge's condition after
the inspection, before it was opened for public use.

REFERENCES

1. Saafan, A. S., Theoretical analysis of suspension bridges, Proc. ASCE, 92, ST4,1966.
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