Jane's Defence Weekly
Jane's Defence Weekly
The Americas
US Army identifies testing of weapons during pandemic as a potential challenge
Europe
Lockheed Martin contracted to deliver F-16s to Bulgaria
Asia Pacific
South Korea adopts new port surveillance system
Middle East/Africa
Libya’s GNA says Jordan sold Chinese UAVs to its enemy
Business
Covid-19: Lockdowns hit Asia-Pacific defence-industrial bases
Analysis
RUSI calls for UK defence review
Interview
Major Aaron Celaya Deputy Branch Chief, Concepts, Doctrine, Policy, and Strategy,
US Space Force
Headlines
The largest warships that Iran currently builds are its Mawj frigates
(referred to as destroyers by the IRIN), which are a local development of
the Alvand-class light frigates that were delivered in the 1970s and which
displace approximately 1,400 tonnes. Adm Rastegari said that the Mawj-
class ships displaced about 1,500 tonnes.
He said that the next in this class would be Dena, which will join the IRIN
in the month of Bahman (20 January to 18 February 2021). He added that
the ship would have a vertical launch system, a phased-array radar, major
changes in its propulsion system, as well as a new communications
system.
He also said that the Kamand close-in weapon system first seen on Mawj-
class ship Sahand when it was launched in December 2018 was being
rolled out across the fleet. The Kamand has not been clearly displayed as
yet, but there has been speculation that it is derived from the Russian AK-
630: a system that is not currently in IRIN service.
Adm Rastegari said the IRIN had requested another Mawj-class frigate,
but this does not appear to have been approved as yet. This would
presumably be in addition to the one that is being constructed at Banda-e
Anzali on the Caspian Sea to replace Damavand, which sunk after hitting
the port’s breakwater in January 2018.
Analysis
Other developments noted by the admiral included the construction of a new
minesweeper that has a length of about 30 m and is made entirely of composite
materials. He said the vessel is currently being fitted out and will soon be delivered
to the IRIN.
A new type of flying boat is being developed for the Islamic Revolution Guards
Corps Navy and should be unveiled soon. Adm Rastegari said that this would be
heavily armed and would “definitely be effective in the Islamic Revolution Guards
Corps naval combat organisation”.
A new hovercra called the Piroozan (Victors) will be delivered to the IRIN in the
near future. This will be armed with surface-to-surface missiles and anti-submarine
torpedoes, according to Adm Rastegari.
Iran unveiled what it called the domestically produced Tondar hovercra armed
with anti-ship missiles and a multiple-rocket launcher in 2012. This may have been
one of the Winchester hovercra that was built for Iran in the 1970s by the British
Hovercra Corporation.
A fast-attack boat that can reach a speed of around 170 km/h (92 kt) is currently
being tested, Adm Rastegari said. This might be derived from the Bladerunner: a
high-speed boat that Iran obtained in the 2000s. It unveiled a domestically
produced version called the Seraj-1 in 2010, saying that it can reach a speed of 60
kt.
Headlines
Industry sources said the Russian Navy has three ‘Kilo’-class hulls at its
naval base in the port city of Murmansk that are about the same age as
those of the IN’s fleet of ‘Kilo’-class boats, the latter of which were
commissioned between 1986 and 2000.
They said refurbishing the Russian hulls would not only be “economical
and quick” but would also not incur any additional costs related to
instructing IN personnel on the SSKs or creating additional infrastructure
to support the platforms after induction.
The proposed SSKs that are due for an MRLC are INS Sindhukirti (pennant
number S 61), INS Sindhuvijay (S 62), and INS Sindhushastra (S 65). The
boats entered service in 1990, 1991, and 2000 respectively.
The IN’s problems are further aggravated as the service does not
anticipate any major additions to the force shortly after the remaining
four of six Kalvari (Scorpène)-class SSKs currently being licence-built in
Mumbai are delivered to the navy between 2022 and 2023.
Comment
Official sources said Russia’s ‘three plus three’ offer to sell the IN three refurbished
‘Kilo’-class hulls and upgrade three others currently in service is modelled on lines
similar to Moscow’s proposal to the Indian Air Force (IAF) in early 2019 regarding
the sale of 21 mothballed MiG-29 ‘Fulcrum’ fighters for about USD850 million.
The IAF, which operates three MiG-29 squadrons, is progressing the purchase as its
fighter squadron numbers are depleting quickly.
Headlines
The 1st Aviation Brigade stood up on 1 April and took over command of
the Attack Helicopter Force at Wattisham Flying Station in Suffolk and the
Aviation Reconnaissance Force at Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton in
Somerset.
“Fantastic to see the formation of the 1st Aviation Brigade,” said AVM
Colman. “A potent JHC force for defence and the army. A true 21st-
century addition to the line of battle and immediately on UK operations in
the fight against coronavirus.”
The brigade also activated its own Twitter account on 1 April, saying,
“Today saw the formation of 1st Aviation Brigade. This provides defence
with deployable and scalable aviation command and control.”
According to AAC officers involved in the project, the new brigade has
taken command of 3 and 4 Regiments AAC at Wattisham, currently
equipped with 50 Apache AH1 attack helicopters, and 1 Regiment AAC at
Yeovilton, equipped with 34 Wildcat AH1 reconnaissance helicopters.
The UK has declared IOC with its P-8A Poseidon MRA1 MMAs
Two of nine aircra on order are now operational in Scotland
The UK declared initial operating capability (IOC) with its Boeing P-8A
Poseidon MRA1 maritime multimission aircraft (MMA) on 3 April.
Aircraft ZP801 Pride of Moray and ZP802 City of Elgin arrived at Kinloss
Barracks on 4 February and 13 March respectively. Both of these aircraft
and the remaining seven to be delivered will be operated from RAF
Lossiemouth, a short distance away from Kinloss, when construction of
new facilities is completed later in the year. Operations are set to
commence during the fourth quarter, with the type being flown by 120
Squadron and 201 Squadron (to be stood-up later this year), with 54
Squadron serving as the training and Operational Conversion Unit (OCU).
The long-awaited arrival of the first RAF Poseidons does not just mark a
major milestone for the UK, but also for NATO. In particular, the alliance is
looking to use its latest MMA to more effectively monitor the GIUK-Gap
that runs between Greenland, Iceland, and the UK following a dramatic
increase in Russian submarine activity in the North Atlantic over recent
years.
The move comes after the RoKAF deployed another PAC-3 missile battery
near South Korea’s presidential house – the Blue House – in early
January.
Additional upgrades were made in South Korea in April 2014 for the
deployment of the PAC-3 system, after which the launchers were
upgraded by MBDA and Hanwha Defense, and the radar and control
stations by Raytheon and LIG Nex1.
The system now deployed at the Cheongju airbase is known as the PAC-3
Cost Reduction Initiative (CRI), which entered RoKAF service in 2019.
The Taliban said that ever since signing the agreement with Washington
in Doha, Qatar, they have “only” attacked outposts of the Afghan
National Defense and Security Forces (ANSDF) in rural areas while
refraining from launching assaults against international forces and ANDSF
troops in cities and “major military centres”.
“USFOR-A has upheld, and continues to uphold, the military terms of the
US-TB [Taliban] agreement; any assertion otherwise is baseless,” said Col
Leggett. “USFOR-A has been clear: we will defend our ANDSF partners if
attacked, in compliance with the agreement.”
The US-Taliban agreement, under which all foreign troops could leave
Afghanistan within 14 months if conditions are met, is aimed at facilitating
intra-Afghan talks to reach a political settlement and end the conflict in
Afghanistan. According to the US-Taliban deal up to 5,000 captured
Taliban fighters and up to 1,000 Taliban-held government personnel were
initially expected to be released by 10 March in a prisoner exchange.
The MoFA said the fishermen have all returned safely to Vietnam, but
accused the CCG of not only “violating Vietnam’s sovereignty over the
Paracels” but also of causing loss of property and endangering “the
lives, safety and legitimate interests of the Vietnamese fishermen”.
Hanoi stated that the actions by the Chinese vessel “run counter to the
common understandings reached between high-level leaders of the two
countries on the humane treatment of fishermen and the Vietnam-China
Agreement on the Basic Principles guiding the Settlement of Sea Issues”.
It also said that the CCG’s move “contravened” the spirit of the
Declaration of Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and
“complicated the situation”.
That same day the MoFA in Beijing provided a different account of events.
Spokesperson Hua Chunying said the CCG vessel had spotted the
Vietnamese boat fishing “illegally” in the “inland waters off China’s
Xisha [Paracel] islands”, after which it immediately ordered it to leave.
According to Hua, the boat’s crew refused to leave, after which the boat
“suddenly veered sharply” and struck the CCG vessel at the bow. The
collision resulted in the fishing boat taking in water and sinking, said
Beijing, adding that the CCG vessel “immediately carried out a rescue
operation … and let the fishermen go after fulfilling the necessary
investigation and evidence-collection procedures”.
Hua said that Beijing conveyed its “grave concern” to Hanoi over the
incident and demanded that Vietnam “earnestly inform its fishermen and
regulate their fishing activities to make sure they will not invade the
relevant waters of China’s Xisha islands or make hazardous moves
against China’s law enforcement”.
Headlines
The 2019 contract was signed with funding arranged by the Export–Import
Bank of Korea and is scheduled to complete by 2026. Under this contract
one vessel would be built in Surabaya as part of a technology transfer
programme. This arrangement is similar to one that was undertaken in the
earlier contract.
Jane’s understands from the same sources that the defence ministry has
convened a committee to re-visit the offering from Turkey’s Golcük
Shipyard for a variant of the Reis (Type 214)-class SSK. However, a
planned visit has been postponed indefinitely in light of the Covid-19
outbreak.
The decision to sign up for a second contract for three submarines came
while Indonesia’s defence ministry was under the stewardship of
Ryamizard Ryacudu. Indonesia appointed Prabowo Subianto as the
country’s new defence minister in October 2019. Prabowo was a career
soldier who last held the rank of lieutenant general and held several
command appointments in various Indonesian Army units. He is known to
have a close relationship with the military and holds a reputation for being
more cognisant of issues in the country’s defence procurement
programmes.
The ongoing Covid-19 outbreak across the country is also expected to put
a dent in other defence procurement projects. A decision on whether to
proceed with the submarine programme may be taking this into
consideration.
Headlines
The variant is also fitted with small stub-pylons mounted above the front
landing gear for external stores, a ‘bubble’ observation side window,
and what appears to be provision for a dipping sonar to be deployed from
below the aircraft.
The images, which only emerged in early April but were probably taken in
2019, also appear to show an additional mounting point – probably for
weapons – that is in a similar location to the mount on the SH-60 used for
carrying torpedoes.
The first images of the utility/ multirole Z-20S that were made publicly
available came from the 5th China Helicopter Exposition held in Tianjin in
October 2019. This Z-20 variant is expected to be equipped with a search/
surveillance radar, although the current configuration is unclear.
It seems likely that the Z-20S will be China’s answer to the Sikorsky MH-
60R Seahawk. The variant was also photographed last year carrying what
appears to be eight short-range air-to-surface missiles mounted outboard
of the forward undercarriage sponson.
As for the Z-20F, this variant is likely to become the standard naval
helicopter embarked on the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s Type 055
and stretched Type 052D destroyers.
The Americas
US Army officials have said that the Covid-19 pandemic could affect the
production and testing of new weapon systems
Contract modifications can be agreed, they said
The duo emphasised that their analysis is The US Army recently test fired an Interim Maneuver
Short Range Air Defense (IM-SHORAD) system
evolving day to day and there are no prototype at White Sands Missile Range in New
Mexico. Testing on another prototype at Aberdeen
insurmountable hurdles to overcome at Proving Ground in Maryland has been delayed due to
Covid-19. US Army:1771658
this time, while encouraging industry to
come forward if contracting changes need
to be made.
“If any of the primes should find that they have a specific Covid-19
impact … they need to come in for a contract modification and or
consideration. They just need to go through the regular channels, and
we’ll get that done,” Jette said, noting that the service is keeping a 21-
page running tab on programme projections out to 30, 60, and 90 days.
While the service continually updates this list, Gen Murray said a few
programmes may be changed.
“But we’re looking through each of the primary programmes and doing
everything we possibly can to keep things on track,” he said. “Right
now, there may be small interruptions but … I’m really focused on the
major milestones we have to hit to keep the overall programmes on
track.”
Testing for the Joint Assault Bridge is also slipping and will need to be
rescheduled owing to concerns about getting the equipment and testers
together “in very close quarters”, Jette said. He also noted that Joint
Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) fielding could see changes.
The Americas
Modly had been the acting navy secretary since November, when then
secretary Richard Spencer also resigned after Esper lost “trust and
confidence in [Spencer] regarding his lack of candour over conversations
with the White House involving the handling of Navy SEAL Eddie
Gallagher”, the Defense Department said at the time.
On the evening of 6 April Modly apologised for those comments, but said
Capt Crozier had gone outside the command chain in such a way to
intentionally make those concerns public. Modly had told the Roosevelt
crew such an action would violate the uniform code of military justice.
Modly, Esper wrote in a statement, “resigned on his own accord, putting
the navy and the sailors above self so the USS Theodore Roosevelt, and
the navy as an institution, can move forward”. Esper said he had briefed
President Donald Trump on his conversation with Modly.
Previously, he also served as the 22nd general counsel of the army from
January 2020 where he was charged with determining the service’s
position on all legal questions. Prior to that McPherson served as the
executive director of the National Association of Attorneys General and
the DoD’s general counsel for counter-intelligence field activity.
The Americas
Lockheed Martin has conducted two flight tests with its PrSM bid and will be
awarded an E-TMRR contract soon
Raytheon le the competition a er it was not able to conduct a flight test of
its DeepStrike missile
For the V-22 Boeing builds the main fuselage at its Philadelphia plant and
has outstanding orders for the US Navy and Japan to complete as well as
upgrade work on in-service tiltrotors.
The KC-46A’s fuel system is designed to flex and move as the aircraft
flies, so there are many flexible valves from which fuel will slowly leak if
they are not properly installed.
The USAF announced on 31 March that the KC-46A’s fuel system was
leaking excessively in 16 aircraft and that the issue was being upgraded to
the most serious deficiency: Category 1. The fuel system is equipped with
redundant protection for fuel containment and aircraft maintenance crews
were finding fuel between the primary and secondary fuel protection
barriers.
Burgess said that maintainers found ounces of fuel present between the
two protection barriers and that they are required to check this space for
fuel frequently. The KC-46A’s fuel system, he said, is designed to carry
just over 90,718 kg of fuel for an aerial-refuelling mission, which is 30%
more than carried in a standard 767 commercial aircraft.
Burgess said the fuel system’s design was new for the KC-46A and had
never before been fully implemented in its current form. It leveraged
similarities with the fuel system in the KC-767 tankers the company
designed for Japan and Italy. Burgess said Boeing is using a technology-
based solution for the leaky U Cup seals to improve the company’s
manufacturing and assembly technique for the KC-46A fuel system.
The USAF first knew about the leaky fuel system in June 2019, but the
issue was recently raised to the most serious deficiency category because
it was creating a lot of extra work that cannot be done in the field.
The Americas
The new RVS, which USAF Assistant Secretary for Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics (AT&L) Will Roper described on 2 April as a completely transformative
design, will include 4K high-definition colour cameras with proper viewing geometry,
operator stations with larger screens, a laser range-finder for refuelling aircraft
distance measurement, and boom assistance augmented reality.
Roper said that this RVS redesign will bring the KC-46A closer to tanking
autonomously or semi-autonomously. The USAF, with the help of scientists and
engineers from both enterprises, will lead design reviews and approve specifications to
drive the partnership toward initial fielding in 2023.
The USAF is also providing Boeing with USD882 million from withheld payments for
previous non-compliance in 33 KC-46A deliveries. This withhold release is in line with
USAF and Pentagon policies to maximise cash flow, where prudent, to combat
coronavirus impacts on the industry base, according to a service statement.
The USAF and Boeing will conduct an expedited process within 120 days to determine
final specification compliance or non-compliance. Roper said this agreement does not
prevent the air force from withholding further payments from Boeing in the future.
Jamie Burgess, Boeing KC-46A tanker vice president and programme manager, told
reporters on 2 April that, although the USD882 million in returned withheld payments
and the RVS revamp were two separate agreements, the money could be indirectly
used to fix the RVS.
Europe
Allied foreign ministers authorised activation of RAM for the first time on 2 April
SACEUR was to co-ordinate with allied militaries on technical details for RAM
implementation
Responding to the Covid-19 crisis, allied foreign ministers authorised activation for the
first time on 2 April of NATO’s new fast-track Rapid Air Mobility (RAM) clearance
mechanism for military aircraft carrying medical supplies through Europe’s airspace.
General Tod D Wolters, Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), was to
coordinate with allied militaries on 6–10 April on the technical details for
implementing the decision, NATO officials said.
“RAM is about facilitating air transport, whether in times of peace or crisis, and how
to do that at the speed of relevance,” NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence
Investment Camille Grand told Jane’s on 3 April. “Right now, we’re talking about a
super-fast track process for a short period. ”
Grand’s policy unit led NATO’s talks for the past two years with the European
Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (Eurocontrol) for RAM’s creation, which
was formally approved by allied defence ministers in October 2019.
RAM consists of two main components. One is its OAN call sign – a unique group of
characters used to identify aircraft during air-ground communications and traffic
control – for temporary application to NATO-designated platforms. The other will be
its planned 24-hour diplomatic clearance procedure to enable the allies’ aircraft to
overfly borders across Europe. This has still to be worked out on a permanent basis,
however, and is supposed to be resolved by the end of this year.
“We’re activating RAM for a crisis that, of course, we didn’t foresee,” observed
Grand. “But you don’t want to delay a flight due to bureaucratic diplomatic
clearance procedures. Indeed, this crisis underscores the problems that bureaucratic
frictions have caused in the past for [aviation] diplomatic clearances.”
The award, which is understood not to include The F-16V is the latest variant of the Fighting Falcon,
engines, is part of a total F-16V procurement and and will replace the ageing MiG-29 in Bulgarian
support package for Bulgaria that will be valued service. Lockheed Martin: 1567516
at approximately USD1.3 billion. As the aircraft
are listed as being Block 70 rather than Block 70/72, they will be single-seaters. As
such, pilot training will likely take place on US Air Force or other NATO twin-seat
aircraft.
With the first F-16V set to enter service in 2023, the Bulgarian Air Force (BuAF) will be
in a position to retire its ageing MiG-29 ‘Fulcrum’ fighters, only four of which are
believed to still be serviceable.
As the most up-to-date version of the Fighting Falcon, the F-16V features the
Northrop Grumman AN/APG-83 active electronically scanned array-radar (derived
from the F-16E/F Block 60 AN/ APG-80 and also known as the Scalable Agile Beam
Radar). The variant also includes a new Raytheon mission computer, the Link 16
datalink, modern cockpit displays, an enhanced electronic warfare system, and a
ground-collision avoidance system.
Europe
In 2016 the country acquired a further 12 new-build CH-47F Chinooks through the US
Department of Defense Foreign Military Sales programme and two further helicopters
were added to the order the following year, for a total order of 14. With the CH-47Ds
due to be retired, the six CH-47Fs are being upgraded to serve alongside the 14 new-
build CH-47Fs to give the RNLAF a fleet of 20 commonly configured Chinooks to be
used for troop movement, medical evacuation, aircraft recovery, parachute drops,
search and rescue, disaster relief, firefighting, and heavy construction support.
This common configuration will include the fully integrated Common Avionics
Architecture System (CAAS) ‘glass’ cockpit, digital automatic flight controls, and
‘advanced’ cargo handling capabilities. As well as providing for a common fleet
across the RNLAF, it will also align the service with the US Army and other allies. As
noted by Boeing, Chinooks are in service or under contract with 20 international
defence forces, including the US Army and US Special Operations Forces.
Europe
Their homecoming ended a four-year mission against the Islamic State (IS), starting
from Incirlik, Turkey, in January 2016, and continuing from Al-Asraq starting in October
2017. During that period four Luftwaffe Tornados clocked up 7,500 flying hours during
2,467 missions, including more than 870 from Al-Asraq, collecting about 114,000
images for Operation ‘Inherent Resolve’, according to the Bundeswehr.
The German Ministry of Defence said on its website on 26 March that the Tornado
reconnaissance mission would be taken over by other coalition partners after
previously specifying Italy.
The Luftwaffe will continue to provide aerial refuelling to the anti-IS coalition with an
A400M air-to-air refuelling (AAR) version deployed to Al-Asraq since July 2019, which
is the only German aircraft remaining there.
The AAR mission has also been conducted by a Luftwaffe Airbus A310 Multi Role
Tanker Transport (MRTT). Germany will provide AAR to coalition aircraft until the end
of October, which was approved by the German parliament on 25 March when it voted
in favour of extending the mandate for the country’s participation in the fight against
IS.
The extension of Germany’s mandate also includes providing the coalition with a
Bundeswehr air surveillance radar to give an operational picture of the area.
Europe
The South Korean Ministry of National Defense (MND) is planning to improve the
overall performance of the Republic of Korea Army’s (RoKA’s) K1A2 main battle
tanks (MBTs).
The agency is also looking to increase the platform’s protection against anti-tank
missiles by removing the existing armour and installing a new high-performance
special armour. Moreover, the DATQ is considering equipping the tank with an active
defence system capable of intercepting such missiles.
The crew’s protection against chemical, biological, and radiological threats is set to
be enhanced through a combined environmental control system that will moderate
the temperature within the vehicle.
The DATQ is also examining the feasibility of integrating a remote weapon station.
The agency did not reveal when the upgrade work is expected to begin, but Jane’s
understands that it may commence as early as 2021.
The RoKA currently operates about 480 K1A2 MBTs, the first of which entered service
in 2014.
Asia Pacific
The allocation will be used to fund the procurement of up to 79 BT-3F units; the
vehicles will be ordered from Russia’s JSC Rosoboronexport once formalities are in
place, Jane’s understands.
The BT-3F has a combat weight of 18.5 tonnes and can carry up to 14 fully armed
troops, with a crew complement of three. The vehicle is based on the chassis of the
BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) and features armoured protection against
projectiles such as heavy machine gun rounds.
The vehicle is 7 m long, 3.3 m wide, and 3 m high. It is powered by a 500 hp diesel
engine and can reach a top road speed of 70 km/h, a water speed of 10 km/h, and has
an operational range of 600 km.
The vehicles were ordered under a contract signed in December 2019 between CSG
and the Indonesian Ministry of Defence (MoD), according to a recently issued
statement by the group.
The Indonesian Army will receive the armoured IFVs between 2021 and 2022, said the
statement, adding that each of the vehicles will be equipped with the Ares UT30MK2
unmanned turret mounting a 30 mm cannon.
The value of the contract was not revealed, with the group stating only that the deal is
“worth billions of Czech crowns”. However, sources have told Jane’s on condition
of anonymity that the deal is worth about CZK2.5 billion (USD100 million).
Kuběna also pointed out that “with the prospect of extending the contract to
hundreds of vehicles, the Indonesian company might be involved even more
intensively in the production of Pandur II 8×8 vehicles in the future”. It is believed
that the TNI-AD would like to operate up to 250 Pandur II IFVs.
Excalibur Army is the exclusive partner of General Dynamics European Land Systems
for the Pandur II family of vehicles. In 2015 the company acquired the production and
sales rights for the vehicles in Eastern Europe and Asia until 2039.
According to Jane’s World Armies, the Indonesian MoD and PT Pindad signed a letter
of intent in April 2019 to support the production of Czech-made Pandur II IFVs, which
are referred to locally as ‘Cobra’ IFVs. Jane’s understands that PT Pindad will
assemble initial vehicles from kit form, with full licensed production to follow,
depending on the size of the future orders.
Asia Pacific
Depending on the port and the surrounding marine environment, it is possible to use
locally developed underwater sensors and electro-optical equipment to increase the
probability of early detection, stated the DAPA, pointing out that, once a suspicious
object is detected, the system will share the information with the military in real time.
Asia Pacific
Libya’s GNA has accused Jordan of transferring Wing Loong UAVs to the LNA
Jordan has denied the allegation, saying it does not have Wing Loongs, but it has put its
CH-4s on sale
Libya’s Government of National Accord (GNA) has said that Jordan has sold Chinese-
made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to the Libyan National Army (LNA): a powerful
faction led by former general Khalifa Haftar.
He added that Jordanian UAVs had been delivered to Baninah (Benina) Airport in
Benghazi aboard an Il-76TD cargo aircraft that arrived from Amman at 1710h on 28
March.
Flight tracking data shows an Il-76TD operated by Kazakhstan’s Jenis Air was flying
from Amman towards Benghazi when its transponder stopped transmitting after
1500h GMT (1700h Libyan time). The aircraft, UP-17652, has made several flights from
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Jordan to Libya in recent weeks.
Jordan’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Sima Bahous, denied the allegation,
saying it was “spurious and completely devoid of truth. Jordan does not possess that
type of aircraft and has not sent it to Libya”.
Bahous added that Jordan “rejects any attempt at foreign intervention of any sort
[and] is committed to all Security Council resolutions on Libya without exception,
including those concerning the sanctions regime”.
Jordan is not known to have Wing Loong UAVs. However, the Royal Jordanian Air
Force (RJAF) acquired CH-4B UAVs in 2016 along with AR-1 laser-guided missiles and
FT-9 guided bombs. These are capable of operating beyond line of sight as they are
fitted with satellite communications equipment.
The RJAF put a statement on its website in June 2019 saying it was looking to sell six
CH-4Bs.
Jordanian-made armoured vehicles have already been seen in service with the LNA,
with the KADDB Al-Wahsh mine-resistant, ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle
seemingly being the type transferred in the largest number.
Analysis
The Jordanian CH-4s may have been transferred to the LNA to partially compensate for the
redeployment of the Wing Loong II UAVs that the UAE sent to Libya to support the rebel army.
Jane’s reported in February that satellite imagery appeared to show that the Wing Loong IIs had
been moved from both Al-Khadim airport, east of Benghazi, and Al-Jufrah Air Base further to the
west to Uthman/ Siwa Air Base in western Egypt. The HAWK surface-to-air missile system that
was deployed to protect AlKhadim was withdrawn sometime between 3 and 12 January,
although the one at Al-Jufrah was still in place on 28 March.
The Wing Loong IIs still have the range to reach the front lines in western Libya from Uthma/Siwa
Air Base, but their redeployment significantly reduces their loiter time.
Middle East/Africa
The Qatari Ministry of Defence released footage on 1 April showing Exercise ‘Al-
Adheed 2020’ that included brief clips of a Bayraktar TB2 taxiing and taking off. The
UAV was not carrying weapons, but the video implied that it carried out precision
strikes during live firing at the Qurayn Abu al-Bawl training area in the south of the
country.
The UAV took off from a runway with a newly laid surface and a single solid line down
the middle. This does not match those at either Al-Udeid or Doha airbases, but may
have been the new Dukhan Air Base. Dukhan was officially opened by Qatar’s emir in
June 2019, but satellite imagery shows it was far from complete at that time.
Qatar’s order for six Bayraktar TB2s, three ground control stations, and a training
simulator was announced during the 2018 DIMDEX show held in Doha.
The Turkish manufacturer Baykar Makina announced in February 2019 that the six
UAVs had completed their factory acceptance tests and that it had trained 55 Qatari
military personnel at its Keşan facility in Erdirne province.
Baykar Makina also plans to establish a UAV operations centre and create a national
geographic information system for the Qatari Armed Forces.
Middle East/Africa
Iraqi Ministry of Defence (MoD) spokesman Brigadier General Yehia Rasool used
Twitter to announce that the coalition had also withdrawn from the presidential palace
complex in Mosul on 30 March and a site at the military HQ in Baghdad after French
advisors left that location.
Col Caggins retweeted the latter announcement, saying a compound at Abu Ghraib
had been transferred due to the Iraqi military’s success against the Islamic State and
that France remains part of the coalition.
Like other coalition members, France has withdrawn its personnel from Iraq due to the
cessation of coalition training due to the Covid-19 pandemic.
About 1,900 coalition personnel departed in total from Al-Qaim, K1, Al-Qayyarah, and
Al-Habbaniyah, according to factsheets released by CJTF-OIR.
The vast majority were Americans and included infantry, cavalry, and artillery units
from the US Army’s 1st Stryker Brigade Combat Team, marines from the 1st Marine
Expeditionary Force and elements of the Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task
Force.
The non-Americans included an unspecified number of Italian Carabinieri and
Canadians at Al-Habbaniyah, as well as an unspecified number of French at Al-
Qayyarah West.
Middle East/Africa
The FAMa announced details of the crash later that day, saying it happened near
Sévaré Camp in central Mali. The Malian Air Force’s Base Aérienne 102 is located at
Sévaré Airport.
Chief of Staff of the Air Force Brigadier General Souleymane Doucouré held a press
conference during which he identified the aircraft (TZ-04) and the two Malian pilots
who were killed.
He said TZ-04 was flying in close formation with TZ-02, another Super Tucano, as they
returned to Sévaré after carrying out a reconnaissance mission over the FAMa’s
Sector 3 (Timbuktu) and lost control during landing. A technical commission has been
established to carry out an independent and transparent investigation, he added.
Embraer announced in 2015 that Mali had ordered six Super Tucanos, but ultimately
only four were delivered and formally inducted into the air force in July 2018. A
Brazilian source told Jane’s at the time that Mali had struggled to finance the aircraft
and find the pilots for conversion training. These are the FAMa’s only fixed-wing
strike aircraft.
Middle East/Africa
Fincantieri has extended its production pause at Italian shipyards into April
Work stopped in March because of the Covid-19 pandemic
Italian shipbuilder Fincantieri, which suspended production in its home country for two
weeks in March due to the coronavirus disease (Covid-19), has extended the stoppage
into April.
Meanwhile, with its cruise shipbuilding business facing a potentially long road to
recovery due to Covid-19 outbreaks on several passenger vessels, Fincantieri is
“doubling [its] efforts to effectively secure new opportunities in the naval business”,
said Giuseppe Dado, the company’s chief financial officer. It is also looking to
diversify into such areas as electronics and infrastructure.
Fincantieri has said that revenue in its naval vessels business area grew by 4.8% to
EUR1.5 billion (USD1.6 billion) in 2019, fuelled by activity for the Italian Navy and the
Qatari Ministry of Defence and in US subsidiary Fincantieri Marine Group. The business
area accounted for 23% of the company’s total revenue.
For all of Fincantieri revenue rose by 8% to a record high of EUR5.8 billion in 2019, but
due to a “negative performance” in Vard, a Norwegian subsidiary that builds vessels
for the oil and gas industry, the company suffered a loss of EUR148 million last year,
compared with a profit of EUR69 million in 2018. Fincantieri is restructuring Vard to
spur a recovery.
Fincantieri said Covid-19 is hurting its 2020 performance but that if the outbreak ends
in a “reasonable timeframe”, its finances “will be able to face the impacts”.
Business
The company is also suspending its common share dividend and share repurchase
plan, slashing capital expenditures and research and development, and instituting pay
cuts, including 50% for the CEO and his executive team, CAE said on 6 April.
The 2,600 furloughed staff include the 465 employees whose temporary layoffs were
announced last month. More than half of the furloughed employees are in Canada.
The employees with reduced hours will work two to four days a week, depending on
their roles.
“Our civil aviation operations are most affected by the unprecedented disruption of
the global air transportation system,” said Marc Parent, CAE’s president and CEO.
“At the same time our defence and security operations are less impacted because
CAE provides mission-critical services worldwide.”
CAE said it hopes to receive help from government assistance programmes and “will
do everything it can to recall as many employees as possible.”
Business
As of early April the impact of the virus has forced many regional defence firms to halt
industrial activities, while companies in East Asia are ramping up work close to pre-
pandemic levels. And like in many sectors, working from home has become the norm.
Firms currently feeling the hardest impact are those in Australia, South Asia, and
Southeast Asia: regions in which cases of Covid-19 have increased in recent weeks.
Disruption in these countries is also likely being felt by Western companies that have
increased their profiles and partnerships in these regions. A Boeing spokesperson told
Jane’s, “Our operations are continuing across the Asia region. The exception would
be India, where our offices and sites are currently closed per the national lockdown.”
In India the 21-day lockdown ordered by government on 24 March has forced several
companies that have expanded their global supply-chain profiles – including Tata and
Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) – to down tools. On 2 April the state government
of Karnataka announced a move to allow defence companies to resume work, which
may alleviate some of the disruption.
Within India the lockdown is also affecting deliveries of major platforms, including
HAL’s supply to the Indian armed forces of Tejas combat aircraft and Dhruv
helicopters. The delivery schedules of other platforms are also likely to be pushed
back, particularly if the lockdown is extended.
Some Indian state enterprises have also been allowed to remain operational to make
‘essential’ equipment such as disinfectants and personal protective equipment.
Despite this, the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) said in late March that it will extend
deadlines for all defence tenders until May in response to growing industry concern.
In Australia, where social distancing rules have been introduced, most defence
companies are operating at near-normal tempo, although concerns about the effect
on supply chains are growing as cases of Covid-19 rise.
In other Southeast Asian countries most defence enterprises are working at near-
normal tempo. In Indonesia, for instance, industry sources told Jane’s that production
projects are continuing as normal.
Covid-19-related restrictions in Australia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia have only
recently been rolled out and could, over the coming weeks, be expanded if virus cases
continue to increase. The effect of such a move on regional defence companies could,
accordingly, be severe.
In South Korea and Japan major defence corporations – such as Korea Aerospace
Industries (KAI), Hanwha and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) – have told Jane’s
that the impact on their respective defence activities has been minimal. All expect
international marketing operations to be affected, but national defence production
programmes are continuing at near-normal capacity.
Analysis
A Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) report has argued that the United Kingdom
should delay completion of its integrated defence, security, and foreign policy review
until 2021. The paper also proposes significant shifts in the defence posture and force
structure required to underpin the policy.
Alongside the usual challenges in matching policy and plans to the ambition of a
farreaching review, the RUSI report said that the consequences of the Covid-19
pandemic “are likely to require a wholesale rethink of both the timing and substance
of the review – both delaying its conclusion until the crisis has abated and requiring a
more radical restructuring of national capabilities for security and defence”.
While arguably reflecting the spending strictures that are likely to follow the Covid-19
crisis, the report said that any review seeking radical restructuring “should be based
on a doctrine of enlightened national interest” under which “the first priority for the
armed forces should be the defence of the UK homeland and its immediate
neighbourhood”.
In this context the report said, “The shape of expeditionary forces should be
determined primarily through the need to work closely with NATO allies for the
defence of Europe.”
The review should also reassess the decision-making criteria behind choices to
conduct expeditionary interventions at distance, RUSI added.
Policy baseline
As well as addressing the consequences of Covid-19 and focusing on security risks in
the immediate Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood, RUSI’s report stressed that the review
must create a policy that assesses the security implications of increased international
turbulence, including the emergence of ‘sub-threshold, grey zone’ challenges. It
must also consider the increasing uncertainty over the UK’s relationships with key
partners, particularly after the country leaves the EU.
“In response to these challenges defence should adjust the balance of its forward
programme to invest more in capabilities for responding to ‘grey area’ threats,
especially in Europe and its neighbourhood, in concert with allies but, if necessary,
without the United States,” the report said.
RUSI argued that the ‘doctrine of international engagement’ that has shaped UK
policy for 20 years is no longer supportable as “almost every assumption
underpinning this doctrine no longer applies”. Declining economic prospects, less
stable UK-US relations, increasing US ambivalence regarding NATO’s future under
the Trump administration, Brexit, the Covid-19 pandemic, and greater insecurity in the
UK’s neighbourhood all negate these assumptions.
Given this changed and shifting backdrop, the report suggested UK policy should be
more flexible. “If the UK wants to prosper in a difficult world, it now needs to become
more focused in its approach to pursuing national interests, more able to change
approach when circumstances require, and more transactional in its relationships with
other states,” RUSI argued. Although beneficial multilateral agreements should be
pursued where possible, the report said, “the UK needs to be prepared to protect its
interests through working with smaller groups of like-minded states”.
Force structure
This policy baseline mandates that “the first priority for the armed forces should be
the defence of the UK homeland and its immediate neighbourhood”, RUSI asserted,
with non-state- and state-based threats driving this focus. On state-based threats the
report highlighted emerging challenges from Russia, including “more aggressive
espionage operations, emerging threats to satellite systems on which the UK’s
military and national prosperity depend, unrelenting attempts at cyber penetration
into UK systems, new missile systems that increase the risk to key UK-based assets,
and probing of the underwater cables that are key to the country’s international
connectivity”.
“The diverse range of security risks posed by Russia will continue to be of primary
concern,” Malcolm Chalmers, RUSI’s deputy director-general and one of the
report’s co-authors, told Jane’s. “Insofar as Covid-19 leads to tougher trade-offs in
future capability choices, the UK should focus on threats closer to home, of which
those posed by Russia are most important.”
The resultant force structure defined in the report included more robust integrated
airdefence capabilities, including against conventional ballistic and cruise missile
threats; improved coastal defences; greater infrastructure protection; increased anti-
submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, including to secure the UK’s independent
strategic nuclear deterrent; and the re-shaping of UK expeditionary forces for greater
integration with more immediate neighbours.
Regarding specific defence domains, the report noted several issues. In the air domain
the planned development of an air group delivering combat, transport, and
surveillance capabilities “should be recalibrated by rationalising air transport
capabilities and helicopters and by making more extensive use of unmanned platforms
for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasks”, said the report.
On the ground, to support policy and operational flexibility, the report stated, “It
would make sense for the United Kingdom to optimise its ground forces (British Army
and Royal Marines) for responding rapidly against a wide range of hybrid and limited
threats across Europe’s periphery, while drawing down those forces that are
designed primarily for holding a segment of NATO’s fully mobilised front line”.
While noting this could create difficult conversations with European allies about the
division of labour along NATO’s central front, the report noted, “The UK’s
continuing commitment to [NATO’s 2%-of-GDP defence spending] target – and its
good track record on modernising its forces – can help to create the space for a
mature conversation about the need for sustainable burden sharing between
European allies.”
Other land sector issues addressed included how the UK should best generate
adivisionsized force to support NATO collective defence and whether the UK should
re-baseline until 2030 the plans drawn up in the 2015 Strategic Defence and Security
Review (SDSR) to deliver a 50,000-strong expeditionary force by 2025.
At sea, the report said the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carrier-based maritime task
group “will remain the backbone of the RN’s [Royal Navy’s] plan”, but argued
that its offensive and defensive capabilities should be strengthened and that
unmanned capabilities should be added.
Overall, the report noted, developing a carrier strike capability “has been a major
strategic investment programme, which will mean that UK carrier strike capabilities are
second only to those of the United States in the decade ahead”.
The RN’s North Atlantic ASW capability should also be reinforced to ensure the UK
maintains an operational edge until 2030, it added.
Dr Lee Willett
is the Editor of Jane’s Weapons: Strategic, based in London
First published online: 06/04/2020
Briefing The changing role of special forces
US Air Force operators from the 22nd Special Tactics Squadron prepare to survey an airfield during a culmination exercise at Yakima,
Washington, on 12 March. USSOCOM is shi ing its focus from countering terrorists and insurgents to countering peer and high-
capability adversaries. USAF/Staff Sgt Ridge Shan: 1766975
“The nature of war is unchanging; the character of war has evolved,” Gen McKenzie
said. “The joint force must posture globally with the ability to balance multiple
priorities and tasks, from combat with peer competitors to expeditionary counter-
terrorism operations, understanding that the nation’s top defence priority must
relentlessly focus on adversarial great powers that possess the power and means to
destroy our country.”
He noted that Iran “lacks the capability to destroy” the United States, but warned,
“Its regime’s hatred of the US and growing arsenal of ballistic missiles, cyber reach,
and the depth and breadth of its terror networks clearly position it as a priority,
although clearly and inarguably not the main one.”
Any shift away from counter-terrorism and COIN missions towards more conventional
state-on-state operations against China, Iran, North Korea, or Russia will have
significant implications for USSOCOM and the international special forces community.
Multi-national concern
Special forces leaders from across NATO convened in Ottawa, Canada, in October 2019
to discuss the role of international special forces in peer-state competition, crisis, and
conflict. Led by the outgoing commander of NATO Special Operations Headquarters
(NSHQ), US Navy (USN) Vice Admiral Colin Kilrain, the event was designed to urge SOF
partners from across the alliance to put the “meat on the bones and get at the heart
of competition”.
In an after-action review Vice Adm Kilrain disclosed how SOF employment in the
context of great-power competition had first been discussed by NSHQ and its partner
forces at a similar meeting in Dublin, Ireland, six months earlier. “SOF’s ability to
think outside the box, be the tip of the spear, and thrive in contested spaces makes
NATO SOF the perfect contributor to an overall alliance solution,” he said. “We set
the stage in Ireland and made a compelling case that we need to provide SOF advice
for this [great-power competition] challenge.”
Tor Bukkvoll, senior research fellow at the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment,
said international SOF units have an important role to play in supporting operations in
the context of great-power competition. While acknowledging that great-power
competition is “significant” in Europe, he claimed that Russia is an “assertive”
power rather than a “resurgent” one, in contrast to China.
“[Russian] foreign policy has become far more proactive and aggressive despite a
stagnant economy,” he noted. “This state of affairs is likely to continue, not
necessarily because Russia wants to be in conflict with the other European powers, but
because the country demands to be treated like a 19th century great power. Few
countries in Europe are ready to do that in 2020.”
Despite the contrasts between China and Russia, Bukkvoll highlighted common
threads between the countries’ activities, including around the spreading of
information online and diplomatic and military interventions.
“Trying to plant ideas into people’s heads is justifiable, even for Russia and China,”
he said. “The problems start when they either do something that is illegitimate, such
as meddling in the US elections or increasing their influence by lying on an industrial
scale, or outright illegal, such as invading Ukraine or organising a coup in Montenegro.
European SOF would probably have arole mostly in the two latter cases, and largely in
the last case.”
Bukkvoll added that the main role for special forces in the European theatre of great-
power competition is in using its power incrementally. When Russia acts in such a
manner the “best response” involves “fast, professional, and small-footprint
forces”, Bukkvoll said. “That is, forces that can counter and neutralise Russian
aggressive moves without escalating to war. Here SOF probably has no competition.”
The analyst also warned against relying on historical doctrine; concepts of operation
(CONOPS); or tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) acquired by special forces
during nearly two decades of counter-terrorism and COIN operations, especially in
Afghanistan and Iraq. Some SOF literature regarding the forces’ role in the great-
power competition starts from this premise, he said. “I question whether that is the
best approach. This seems to me to start with the solution rather than the problem.”
Indo-Pacific contest
The re-emergence of great-power competition throws up similar concerns in the Indo-
Pacific theatre where the US Special Operations Command Pacific (USSOCPAC) and
local special forces partners continue to ponder how best to deal with threats
emerging from China and North Korea.
De Wijk reiterated how Western special forces have previously focused on stabilisation
and peacekeeping operations in the Middle East and North Africa. “All of a sudden
we have to consider state-on-state warfare and nuclear weapons. There is no clear
answer yet but Chinese and Russian behaviour will lead to systemic crises,” he said.
According toDe Wijk, countries that lead the way in the development and employment
of ‘fourth industrial revolution’ technologies – including artificial intelligence (AI),
machine learning (ML), the Internet of Things (IoT), and 5G and 6G communications –
will “define” the new world order and control critical infrastructure and its access. In
this respect China has been making inroads through Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative
of infrastructure investment throughout Africa, Asia, and Europe, as well as Huawei’s
5G drive into Europe and the rest of the world.
“In the 21st century China is probably going to take the lead and rule global affairs.
This will allow China to control global supply chains and global value chains, thereby
presenting enormous implications for the West,” De Wijk predicted.
“SOF will play a hugely important role in this through ‘strategic reconnaissance’
tasks to identify political appetite and leadership thinking, as well as sabotage
operations,” De Wijk said. “But the asymmetric response is only part of the solution.
Traditional SOF missions will remain important but more emphasis should be placed
upon interstate conflict and peer competition.”
Additionally, De Wijk suggested special forces will have a critical role in conducting
operations in anti-access/area denial (A2AD) environments against Chinese and
Russian adversaries who are willing to take humans out of the decision-making
process to “dramatically” shorten OODA loops and sensor-to-shooter cycles. “We
must [engage] differently and in a clever way and we need SOF for that,” he said.
Central to the event was the role of special forces during great-power competition,
with a focus on China and Russia across the European and Indo-Pacific theatres.
Programme objectives included increasing operational-level understanding and
dialogue through information exchange, enhanced co-operation, strengthened
planning capabilities, and sharing of best practices and lessons learned to “meet
shared security challenges”.
TRWG participants included representatives from Australia, Canada, Estonia, France,
Georgia, Japan, Mongolia, New Zealand, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Ukraine, and
the United Kingdom, as well as multiple agencies from across USSOCOM, the wider US
Department of Defense (DoD), and other government agencies. Speaking to Jane’s
after the event, USSOCPAC Commander Major General Jonathan Braga described how
the event increased awareness of comparative great-power competition strategies
from China and Russia.
“The relationships between the great powers of the region are becoming more and
more competitive,” he said. “For decades we [the US] have used our considerable
power to sponsor rules and institutions that have benefitted countries of all sizes and
provided stability. Stability through rules-based international order is what enables
shared growth and prosperity throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
The commander also described the TRWG as an invaluable opportunity to meet with
partners from across the Indo-Pacific region and further afield to collaborate over
resilience and resistance. “A mix of European and Indo-Pacific partner nation
presenters afforded the participants a unique experience to hear how countries are
competing in the [great-power competition] that transcends areas of responsibility.
Cross-boundary discussions highlighted shared experiences and identified areas of
additional focus,” he said.
“Every partner nation country has their own laws, policies, and cultural sensitivities
that drive their actions and policies. We are working with each nation to identify where
we can best complement efforts and work together toward shared goals.”
Discussing potential roles for special forces within the context of great-power
competition, Maj Gen Braga described aseries of operational demands that could be
fulfilled by USSOCOM, as well as international SOF units. These include non-military
mission sets such as humanitarian aid/disaster relief (HADR); support and influence
tasks such as those enabled through training, advising, and assisting operations; and
strategic intelligence gathering.
“SOF will continue to focus on their core mission sets of working by, with, and
through partner nations to build partner capacity and to prepare for any crisis. Specific
mission sets are always conditions dependent but SOF always stands ready to support
in crisis and in humanitarian aid and disaster relief situations,” he said.
“SOF commanders continuously reassess and refocus priorities based on the threat to
our nation and partner nations. SOF’s ability to remain agile and flexible allows us to
rapidly assess and refocus to changes in our operating environment. Through our
persistent global engagements, SOF continues to assure our partners and allies of our
commitment.”
However, with heavy demand placed on US and international special forces partners as
part of ongoing counter-terrorism and COIN campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq,
defence sources remain concerned that wider special forces units could be
overstretched with more demands to undertake training and operations associated
with great-power competition. According to Maj Gen Braga, this multi-tasking should
not be a restriction for international special forces, particularly given their historic
capability to force multiply components in theatre.
“SOF has always taken on multiple roles. Although we have been heavily invested in
the [counter-terrorism] fight for the past 20 years, we haven’t lost our focus on
[greatpower competition],” he said. He added that, as SOF policy begins to shift away
from counter-terrorism towards great-power competition, the forces will balance the
requirements “based on priorities informed by assessments”.
Maj Gen Braga also disclosed that the US and wider international special forces
community must do better at catching up with China in terms of information
operations. “I think the US military in particular has a blind spot when it comes to
what I will call ‘virtual occupation’. China’s Belt and Road Initiative is a great
example,” he said.
“The fact is that the world is changing and our vision of what constitutes a threat
needs to change accordingly. We have to discover and exploit new ways to respond to
some of these actions. Unlike past conflicts, the reality is that this does not end with us
shooting somebody.”
A member of the US 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne) and Thai soldiers with the Special Operation Unit, King’s Guard, practise
combat marksmanship at a 25 m flat range at Erawan Camp, Thailand, on 22 February. USSOCPAC and its Indo-Pacific partners are
dealing with an increasingly powerful China. US Army/Sgt Anthony Bryant: 1766979
Concepts of operations
How best to conduct operations in the context of great-power competition remains a
critical decision point for SOF commanders at USSOCOM and across international
units.
Some of these CONOPS associated with special operations during great-
power competition were considered by the US Joint Special Operations University
(JSOU) in the May 2019 report ‘Support to Resistance: Strategic Purpose and
Effectiveness’. The report discussed how special forces must augment more
traditional unconventional warfare skillsets with support to resistance capabilities,
enabling them to influence and shape great-power competition. To achieve this the
report suggested USSOCOM exploit wargames, simulations, exercises, and study
groups to identify the best CONOPS, TTPs, and technologies to support operations.
“History shows that [support to resistance] can be a powerful foreign policy tool if
properly planned and resourced and when carried out with commitment,
perseverance, and competence. It provides a way for the US government to address
threats to national interests by leveraging indigenous opposition elements rather than
through direct and costly large-scale armed confrontation,” the report explained.
As JSOU’s dean, Michael McMahon highlighted in the report that the re-emergence
of great-power competition presents significant opportunities for special operations in
contemporary and future operating environments. “Unfolding world events are
indicative of the need for [special forces] to maintain and enhance traditional
unconventional warfare skills,” he suggested, asking how education, training, and
doctrine should be changed to increase mission success in the future.
The report was followed by another JSOU publication in December 2019 that
discussed how special forces could be used to manipulate and direct unarmed, armed,
and violent civil resistance operations amid great-power competition. ‘How Civil
Resistance Works (And Why It Matters to SOF)’ described how US SOF units could
employ “low-visibility, small-footprint means of intervention, providing effective and
positive influence while avoiding escalation to large-scale armed conflict”.
Specifically, the report described how North Korea continues to “accumulate and
threaten the use of nuclear and biological weapons of mass destruction”, noting that
“widespread civil unrest could put the control of these weapons at risk”. The report
also highlighted how Iran continues to “nurture militias and terrorists” in Iraq,
Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen.
The December 2019 JSOU report also demanded a greater role for special forces
within information operations. “Topics worthy of further study by SOF include
popular mobilisation and network development via social media, persuasion theory
and science, clandestine communications, and tradecraft,” it said.
Training
Military assistance and foreign internal defence operations that focus on training,
advising, and assisting indigenous security forces look set to remain a critical capability
set for SOF operating amid great-power competition.
In the Indo-Pacific region regular examples of such collaboration include the biennial
‘Rim of the Pacific’ (‘RIMPAC’) exercise, which is due to run between June and
July, again featuring a multi-national special forces training programme conducted on
the island of Oahu, Hawaii.
During the session a ‘resistance tabletop exercise’ tested “US and allied strategic
and operational-level decision making to support the planning and execution of
resistance operations”, official sources disclosed in a public statement. “In the
scenario resistance is clearly defined as the national effort to regain sovereignty after
the illegal incursion, invasion or occupation by an aggressor state,” according to one
of the lead USSOCEUR planners for the event. Defence sources confirmed to Jane’s
how the exercise had been designed to reflect potential CONOPS open to NATO
special forces in the event of a Russian incursion similar to that conducted in Crimea in
2014.
Speaking afterwards, the USSOCEUR Commander, US Air Force Major General Kirk
Smith, said, “I cannot overstate the value of an event like this. The resistance
operating concept promotes critical thinking on resistance and creates a basis for
collaboration and understanding with our allies and partners. It brings academics,
diplomats, civil servants, and military together to discuss the total defence of our
allies.”
Conducted annually since 2014, the exercise invites participation forces to think, train,
and be prepared for the unknown, as well as encouraging a ‘whole-of-society’
approach to combating threats during great-power competition with co-operation
from government, non-government, military, and civilian agencies. “The concept
promotes whole-of-society resistance as a legal means of national defence in Europe
and is planned for publication within the year,” the USSOCEUR statement added.
However, Maj Gen Smith disclosed that special forces were only part of a larger
strategy. “While we provide unique capabilities and readiness, we’re not the sole
solution,” he said. “Our greatest value is the network of relationships we’ve built
over decades engaged in Europe.”
In August 2019 SOF components from across NATO also supported the ‘Combined
Resolve XII’ exercise, which highlighted a series of CONOPS suitable for supporting
special operations within the context of great-power competition. Featuring a 140-
strong Special Operations Task Group (SOTG) from Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and
the US, the exercise aimed to recreate ongoing operations in the Donbass in Ukraine
against Russian-backed separatist forces. Ukrainian special forces were part of an
opposing force, given their recent combat experience at home.
The SOF element of the exercise, conducted in Hohenfels, Germany, saw the SOTG
collaborating with the Lithuanian National Defence Volunteer Forces to focus on
“core special operations missions such as surveillance and reconnaissance, direct
action on targets, and co-ordinating operations between multiple small teams
operating simultaneously”, exercise sources explained.
“Their goal was to improve co-ordination between conventional forces and provide
unique special operations capabilities to the combined joint force,” the sources
added. “The exercise culminated with a large operation that included all of the SOF
elements working together to conduct a raid as a final test of the skills and
relationships they built over the previous 16 days.”
Andrew White
is a JDW Correspondent, based in London
First published online: 06/04/2020
Comment
Although specific SOF operations targeting adversaries during a great-power competition are
likely to remain highly classified, uniformity in effort and thought leadership throughout
international special forces units appears to have been cemented.
Nonetheless, the future effectiveness of special forces to conduct unconventional warfare,
conventional warfare, and information operations will rely heavily on ongoing collaboration
between partner nation forces, as well as a wider whole-government and multi-lateral approach.
Interview
The US Space Force (USSF) was created and signed into law on 20
December 2019 as part of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2020 (FY 2020). According to Major Aaron Celaya,
the new force’s deputy branch chief of concepts, doctrine, policy,
and strategy, it provides a critical capability, given that
maintaining space superiority is vital for military operations and
civilian capabilities such as international trade, diplomacy, and USSF: 1771465
navigation.
The increasingly important role of the USSF in space is often misunderstood by the
public, the major believes. “When the US Space Force was created a few months ago,
many people did not understand or appreciate the role that space has in their lives or
even in their military missions. Ironically, space systems underpin virtually every
weapon system in our arsenal. For the US to fully exploit the potential benefits of
space, the Space Force had to be created,” he said.
The United States and NATO have respectively recognised space as warfighting and
operational domains. “Given the international impact of space on both the civilian
and military sectors, the need for security in space through space superiority is even
more important today than it was 10 years ago,” Maj Celaya said.
Before the USSF was created space doctrine was incorporated into US Air Force (USAF)
doctrine. The USSF will focus on creating a service-specific doctrine and finding
relevant staff. Doctrine, concepts, policy, and strategy are distinct but interrelated
“when done properly”, Maj Celaya said.
These aspects for the new USSF military branch will need to be integrated into
operational planning, training, and so on. However, Maj Celaya noted that one of the
challenges from a USSF perspective “is that some of these ideas... are still catching up
with the establishment of the newest service”.
The USSF will need to build its own space intelligence capabilities, in part through
leveraging artificial intelligence (AI). AI’s use across the US Department of Defense
(DoD) has been directed by both senior national and military leaders in official
strategic documents. The Air Force Warfighting Integration Capability (AFWIC)
established a cross-functional team (CFT) dedicated solely to AI, for example.
From a strategic space perspective the ‘No one wants a conflict that
key question for the USSF is how it gets
to full, AI-enabled capabilities in space
extends into space, especially a
operations. Maj Celaya believes the shooting conflict’
foundation for such capabilities, based
on machine learning (ML), should be
established through “aggressive automation”.
He noted that one key limiting factor with AI is a lack of access to appropriate data.
Although some argue that the US armed forces have too much data, he said this is
usually mission output data, or what he termed “the right[-hand] side of the
equation”. The other side comprises human operator inputs and actions that are not
automated or recorded, which he believes is “one of the biggest missing pieces from
the AI data puzzle”.
“In order to capture the inputs from the left[-hand] side of the equation we need to
start automating what we can now,” he said. An example would be a simple, rules-
based automated agent that organises data.
Space surveillance will be key to protecting assets in space, being more than
cataloguing objects in orbit. “It’s about maintaining custody of threats and
supporting the command and control of our national security assets in space,” Maj
Celaya said. “As more countries, companies, and other organisations field space
capabilities and benefit from the use of space systems, it is in our collective interest to
act responsibly and to enhance overall spaceflight safety and the long-term
sustainability, stability, safety, and security of the space environment.”
He added that US space capabilities underpin the DoD’s ability to defend the
country, deter aggression, and project power. “With increased numbers of orbiting
objects in space, there is an increased necessity for tracking those objects to preserve
the safety” of space, he said.
Contests over the space environment will increase in the future alongside the
deployment of space surveillance assets. Maj Celaya noted that these assets need to
work together to characterise emerging threats to the US and its allies. “This allows
collection and other assets to respond to threats as they emerge in a rapidly changing
environment,” he said. “Detecting and characterising adversary actions early on
gives national leaders more latitude in making decisions.”
Potential adversaries could hack, jam, or weaponise satellites and carry out other
hostile activities, with Maj Celaya saying that the best way to avoid war is deterrence.
“If an adversary considers action then we must be able to either deny their aim or be
able to impose a cost greater than what they seek. The result of utilising deterrence is
that the benefit of restraint outweighs the benefit of hostile action,” he added. Should
deterrence fail, the major concluded, the US “must be prepared to fight”. “No one
wants a conflict that extends into space, especially a shooting conflict that creates
debris in space. It would pollute the environment and make it unusable for everyone,”
the major said. He asserted, however, that “US and allied dependence on space
demands that we are prepared to protect and defend our interests there”.
Melanie Rovery
is Co-Editor of Jane’s Land Warfare Platforms: Logistics, Support & Unmanned, based
in London
First published online: 07/04/2020