The Epistemology of “Text” Meaning:

The Context is the Proof-Conditions Upon Which We Prove

the Truth of Our Interpretation of the Text
Dan Nesher, Haifa, Israel

1. Introduction: Can We Have Text without language-game? We face a Fregean difficulty because if
the criterion is a private-subjective experience how do we
Context?
know that persons experience the same phenomenon?
The Oxford Dictionary defines Text as "the original words And if the criterion is external to the language-game and to
of author" and Context as "parts that precede or follow a our experience, how do we know that our experience rep-
passage and fix its meaning; ambient conditions." If we resents it truly (Wittgenstein, 1969; Guignon, 2002)? Thus
explicate text as any cognitive sign operation, as verbal we have to revise Wittgenstein's Grammatico-
and non-verbal cognitive behavior and creations, and con- Phenomenological conception of criteria with the pragmat-
text as the conditions upon which we interpret the meaning icist theory of meaning and truth. The criterion of meanings
of the text, then a text without context has no meaning should be the proof or quasi-proof, as with perceptual
(Eco, 1979). So what is the context and its function in con- judgments, of the truth of their interpretation in proposi-
ducing fixed meaning to text? The question is how to un- tions that make them clear by being true representations of
derstand the concept of context; how upon the "ambient reality. However, without confrontation with and represen-
conditions" we fix the meaning of the text, which cannot be tation of reality independently of the text and its context we
done without the context (Searle, 1979). In discussions of cannot explain the operation of interpretation, its truth, and
context the usual explanations are very general and vague how we fix the meaning of the text. Yet if we can know the
so we have to fix the meaning of context (Stout, 1982). meaning of a text only through the context, then the con-
The common knowledge is that we fix meanings by inter- text must be the conditions of our instinctive and practical
pretation, but how may we explicate the interpretation of quasi-proofs or rational proofs of the truth of our interpreta-
text in context? I will discuss some major problems of text tion of the text. In my pragmaticist theory the criterion of
and context in theories of interpretation and how to over- the true interpretation of meanings must be the proof-
come the predicaments of "hermeneutic universalism" and conditions of the text which are its specific truth-conditions,
"hermeneutic contextualism." If universalism means that the mental and social conditions of the speaker, scientist,
everything is interpretation we are apparently involved in or the artist creating the artwork, and the proof method,
an indefinite series of interpretations, and contextualism (with epistemic logic not just formal deduction), namely the
implies that truth is relative to some interpretive vicious procedure to prove or quasi-prove the true interpretation of
circle since there are no external or outside grounds that the text upon its truth-conditions (Nesher, 2005).
would warrant the validity of interpretation (Hiley, 1991;
Bernstein, 1983; Palmer, 1969).
3. Different Contexts of the Same Text Can
[1] The Two Phenomenological Predicaments in In- Allow Different True Interpretations of Its
terpretation of Cognitive Signs:
Meaning.
This understanding of interpreting text also solves an es-
sential difficulty in the theories of interpretation: are inter-
pretations a matter of opinions and always relative to the
interpreters, so that different interpretations of the same
text are incompatible (Garcia, 1999)? Ricoeur suggests
Assuming that every cognitive operation involves in- understanding text as an entity, a kind of semantic auton-
terpretation, the question is if we can interpret, understand, omy, as if language and even actions have meanings in-
and explain the meaning of the text without being entan- dependent of their agents, as in the Fregean-Russellian
gled in the paradoxes of phenomenological hermeneutics formal semantic conception of the sentence (Ricoeur,
(Heidegger, 1930; Craige, 1983; Guignon, 2002; Nesher, 1976; Wimsatt and Beardsley, 1954; Barthes, 1971;
2002-2005). Hirsch, 1967). Ricoeur accepts the formal semanticist posi-
tion when the autonomous text refers by itself to the world
through "the genuine referential power of the text" (Ric-
2. Can the Language-game be the Context oeur, 1976), since otherwise there is only the interpreter's
of the Textual Meaning? subjective meaning or the author's subjective intentional
meaning in creating the text, which we cannot reach (Fish,
Wittgenstein understood the difficulties of an endless se-
1980). Without any criterion for interpretation of the text
ries of interpretation and attempted to find a solution to this
how do we know that we understand the genuine referen-
predicament by rejecting the function of interpretation in
tial power of the text "disclosing a world that constitutes
understanding the meaning of text and looking into criteria
the reference of the text?" We must know this "world" in
for teaching and learning the meaning of words through
order to interpret the text because otherwise we enter ei-
their use in the language-games (Wittgenstein, 1953). In
ther into indefinite interpretations or into a vicious circle of
analyzing Wittgenstein's conception of explanation of
hermeneutics. However, we can know the world repre-
meaning of a word in its use in the language it can be
sented by the text through our knowledge of the world of
shown that knowledge of the meaning of words must pre-
the creator of the text. We learn the initial meaning of texts
cede their use in language, otherwise we cannot know
by being ostensively taught the language in our culture
how to use them (Nesher, 1992). What can be the criterion
through true interpretation of our perceptual experience
for teaching and learning the meaning of the word in the

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 The Epistemology of ―Text‖ Meaning: The Context is the Proof-Conditions Upon Which We Prove the Truth of Our Interpretation of the Text — Dan Nesher

representing our world. And when we encounter a text that 5. The Context as the Proof-Conditions to
belongs to our culture we interpret it instinctively in the
Prove the Truth of Our Interpretation of the
common way, what Ricoeur calls a "guess" (Ricoeur,
1976; Hirsch, 1967). Sometimes, when we are not certain Text.
about our initial interpretation of the text, we continue on, The proof of the true interpretation of the text upon its
explaining it by a rational interpretation called exegesis proof-conditions is by its true representation of reality. This
(Fish, 1980; Stecker, 2003). Our knowledge of the proof- can be explained only through confrontation with reality,
conditions, which include the author's intentional spirit and both physical and psychical, such that interpretation of
the images and emotions embedded in her language, is cognition and representation of reality are the twin compo-
always relative and develops with the inquiries the inter- nents of the cognitive operation of mind.
preters make about them (Jakobson, 1987; Wimsatt and
Beardsley, 1954; Hirsch, 1967; Barthes, 1968; Carroll, [2] Siamese Twins of Interpretation of Meaning and
1997). Therefore, based on different methods of inquiry Representation of Reality:
operating upon different truth-conditions, the interpreters
can prove true different interpretations of the same initial
meaning of text. Thus the same text can have different
true interpretations if they are based upon different con-
texts, so that they intersect but do not contradict (Hirsch,
1967; Margolis, 2002). Therefore, there is no "conflict of
interpretations" between different true interpretations since
they are based on different proof-conditions of the same
text (Hirsch, 1967; Ricoeur, 1969; Stout, 1982; Barnes,
1988; Thom, 2000). However, since there can also be
false and doubtful interpretations, only different true inter- We cannot represent physical reality without repre-
pretation are compatible (Krausz, 2002). senting our own cognitive minds, and vice versa. So we
represent physical reality when we prove it cognitively and
we represent psychological reality when we prove its inter-
4. Hirsch on Validity in Interpretation pretation on the constraints of physical reality. Thus the
without Truth. interpretation of mind's cognitive signs is the essential twin
component of the representation of both physical and psy-
The question is how can context stabilize the meaning of chical reality (Iser, 2000; Thom, 2000). With this under-
the text as its significance. According to Hirsch the main standing of our cognitive minds we can avoid both the
criterion for the validity of the interpretation of the text is indefinite series of interpretations of "hermeneutic univer-
the coherence of its components' meanings (Hirsch, 1967, salism" and the vicious circle of "hermeneutic contextual-
1976). The problem is how to find the coherence of the ism" (Habermas, 1998). Through confrontation with reality
initial meaning of the text since the interpreter's coherence with our reflective self-control of interpretation of the initial
of its meaning may deviate from the author's intended vague meaning we can continue to quasi-prove or prove,
coherent meaning of the text. The principles or laws of "the locally, the truth of our cognitive interpretation and repre-
criterion of coherence" operating our interpretation of the sentation of reality on specific proof-conditions. One can
text cannot be formal artificial ones since they have to call the instinctively and practical interpreted meaning the
explain human cognitive behavior of interpretation whose meaning, and the rationally proven true interpretation of
truth depends on the true representation of reality. To un- the initial meaning, its exegesis, significance (Gadamer,
derstand the original meaning of the text we have to un- 1960; Hirsch, 1967, 1984). Yet interpretation can go be-
derstand the author's meaning and the truth of his text in yond the initial meaning of the text, into its Reconstruction
representing reality (Nesher, 2004). Hirsch's basic difficul- according to our knowledge of the author's intended spirit
ty is with accepting the Husserlian phenomenological epis- of the text. Still, we have to distinguish between the inter-
temology which cannot explain human confrontation with pretation of the initial meaning of the original text as Signif-
reality, hence also the proof of the truth of our interpreta- icance and its Application to new historical proof-
tion of the initial meaning, the "verification" of its signifi- conditions which might be foreign to the author of the text
cance (Hirsch, 1984). So interpretation is thoroughly circu- (Gadamer, 1984; Hirsch, 1984). To explain the conception
lar: "the context is derived from the submeanings and the of context as the proof-conditions we can start with our
submeanings are specified and rendered coherent in ref- perceptual judgments as our basic factual knowledge and
erence to the context" (Hirsch, 1967). Validation of the ask what is context for their meanings (Peirce, CP). The
interpretation of the meanings as the Husserlian experien- proof-conditions of perceptual judgment are the method of
tial-intentional objects should place an independent re- quasi-proving the perceptual judgment upon its truth-
striction on finding common ground between the meaning conditions (Nesher, 2002:V, X).
of the author's text and its interpreter's. Moreover, Hirsch
holds the Popperian conception of absolute truth, namely [3] The Context of Perceptual Judgment Text Is Its
that since we cannot prove it but only refute our hypothet- Proof-conditions
ical theories we will never know whether the truth has been
reached. Thus he rejects the possibility of verifying the
truth of our interpretations of texts, and thereby of stabiliz-
ing their meanings. The question is how we prove the truth
of interpretation of the text, which is always limited and
relative to its known proof-conditions.

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