Case

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Article 21 – 88
Relate to:
R.A. 9346 (Prohibiting the Death Penalty Imposition)
Act 4103 (The Indeterminate Sentence Law)
P.D. 968 (The Probation Law, as amended)

PEOPLE vs. ARROJADO

G.R. No. 130492
January 31, 2001

FACTS:

On or about June 1, 1996, the accused, armed with a knife, with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, attack, assault, and stab one Mary Ann Arrojado, on the
different parts of the body. Thereby inflicting upon her serious and mortal wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of her death. That by reason of her death, her heirs incurred actual and
moral damages. The information was read and explained to accused-appellant in his native dialect,
after which he pleaded not guilty.

Prosecution’s Version

Accused-appellant Salvador Arrojado and the victim Mary Ann Arrojado are first cousins,
their fathers being brothers. The victim's father, Alberto Arrojado, who was living in Canada,
suffered a stroke for which reason he decided to come home to Roxas City and financially supported
by the victim's sister Asuncion.

Starting February 15, 1996, accused-appellant lived with the victim and her father. He
helped care for the victim's father, for which he was paid a P1,000.00 monthly salary.

In the early morning of June 1, 1996, accused-appellant went to the house of his cousin,
Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo, and reported that the victim had committed suicide. The victim,
who was bloodied, was lying on her left side facing the bedroom door with her hands clasped
together. On her bed was a rosary and a crucifix. Near her was a knife. Erlinda recognized it to be
the knife kept in the kitchen. Erlinda also noticed that the electric fan was turned on full blast, while
all the windows were closed except the window on the east side which was slightly open.

As he went to the other room, where the victim's father stayed, accused-appellant told
Erlinda that he was afraid he might be suspected as the one responsible for the victim's death. The
police noticed that the victim's room "was very neat as if nothing happened." The police saw no
signs of forcible entry. They made a sketch of the victim's position in relation to the whole house
and took pictures of her.

Dr. Lourdes Roldan, of the Roxas City Health Office, conducted the post-mortem examination
of the victim at 1:30 p.m. of June 1, 1996. Her findings revealed that the victim sustained the
following stab wounds 10 stab wounds, 5 of which are fatal.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
1
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Dr. Roldan listed "hemorrhagic shock” as the victim's immediate cause of death and
"multiple stab wounds" as the antecedent cause.

Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo testified that the relationship between the victim and accused-
appellant had been strained as the victim constantly picked on accused-appellant even for the
slighest mistake. Erlinda remembered the scolding that the victim gave accused-appellant on May
27, 1996 over the loss of keys. The victim also entrusted her jewelries and bank accounts to Erlinda,
but later returned the same thereafter.

Another relative, Thelma Arrojado, corroborated Erlinda's testimony that she knew the
latter to be a snob ("suplada") and overly strict. Because they did not get along with the victim,
Thelma and her husband eventually left. She testified that accused was angry at the victim and in
fact passed by her store thrice complaining to her of the victim's maltreatment of him.

Accused’s Version/Defense

Accused testified in his behalf. He told that Alberto Arrojado asked him for food, so accused
went to the kitchen to find out if the victim had already prepared breakfast. When he found that the
victim was not in the kitchen, he proceeded to the victim's room. From the doorway, he saw the
victim lying on her bed, bloodied. He thought that the victim had committed suicide because the
victim had told him that she felt tied down taking care of her father. She in fact once remarked
that "It would be better that my father and I commit suicide."

Accused said that the victim scolded him only once and that was for buying rotten cabbage.
He said that the victim was the one who was constantly being scolded by her father who often
found fault with her.

Crime charged: murder

RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the heinous crime of murder

In the service of his sentence consisting of deprivation of liberty, the accused, who is a
detention prisoner and not otherwise disqualified, shall be credited with the full time of his
confinement under preventive imprisonment, provided he voluntarily agrees in writing to abide by
the same disciplinary rules imposed on convicted prisoners, pursuant to Art. 29 of the RPC.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in finding that Mary Ann Arrojado was stabbed
ten times at her home (NO)

2) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in ruling that Mary Ann Arrojado could not have
committed suicide (NO)

3) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in finding that the house of Mary Ann Arrojado
was totally closed and locked against intruders (NO)

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
2
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

4) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in finding that accused-appellant was abused and
oppressed by Mary Ann Arrojado that led accused-appellant to kill Mary Ann Arrojado (NO)

HELD:

1) Accused’s contention has no merit. The victim indeed sustained ten stab wounds.

That accused-appellant only saw one wound while Erlinda Magdaluyo saw two wounds on
the victim does not necessarily mean that the other wounds were inflicted upon the victim
afterwards. The two might have simply missed seeing the other wounds. In accused-appellant's
case, it may be because he did not go inside the room but only viewed the body from a distance. Dr.
Roldan, who conducted a post-mortem examination, testified that the victim actually sustained ten
wounds.

Accused-appellant also argues that the varying depths of wound despite the fact that they
had the same surface length of 3 cm. could only mean that after the victim was found dead, she was
again stabbed with a knife or knives other than the one beside her. The contention is without merit.
The variance in depth does not necessarily mean that more than one weapon was used.

2) The victim did not commit suicide.

Somewhat inconsistently with his claim that the victim committed suicide, accused-
appellant disputes the trial court's conclusion that only one of those residing in the house could
have killed the victim because the police found no sign of a break-in. Accused-appellant says that in
the morning of June 1, 1996, he found that the kitchen door leading outside was open.

Accused-appellant's contention must fail. Accused-appellant admitted that it did not occur
to him that an intruder was in the house in the evening of May 31, 1996 because "No person could
get inside because the windows were closed and besides the doors were closed." Accused-appellant
never told Erlinda that the kitchen door was open that morning. Indeed, Erlinda testified that "it is
not possible that somebody would enter the house as the doors were securely locked… with additional
barrel bolts, and the windows have grills."

3) The house of Mary Ann Arrojado was totally closed and locked against intruders.

To be sure, the evaluation of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses will not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that it overlooked certain facts or circumstances.

In sum, the following circumstances point to accused-appellant as the perpetrator of the

crime:
1. Accused-appellant, the victim, and the latter’s father were the only ones living in the
house in which the crime was committed in the evening of May 31, 1996.
2. No one from the outside can gain entry since all doors of the house were locked
and the windows had grills.
3. Accused-appellant had access to the victim’s bedroom because the bedroom doors
were left unlocked so that the victim could check on her father’s condition during the
night. Accused-appellant sleeps in the same bedroom as the victim’s father.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
3
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

4. The murder weapon was a kitchen knife readily accessible to the occupants of the
house. As the Solicitor General observed, common sense dictates that if an outsider
entered the house with the intent to kill the victim, he would have brought his own
weapon to ensure the execution of his purpose.
5. None of the victim’s belongings was missing or disturbed, indicating that the motive
for the crime was not gain but revenge.
6. Judging from the number and severity of the wounds (10 stab wounds, half of which were
fatal), the killer felt deep-seated resentment and anger toward the victim. Accused-
appellant had admitted those feelings to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo and Thelma
Arrojado.
7. Aside from accused-appellant, no one was known to harbor a grudge against the
victim.
8. As the Solicitor General also pointed out, accused-appellant’s behavior in the morning of
June 1, 1996 was inconsistent with someone who had just found his cousin and
employer, a person he claims to get along with, dead. By his testimony, he did not even
go inside the room to check on her condition on the lame excuse that he was afraid. He
also did not inform his neighbors about the incident for the equally flimsy reason that
he did not know them nor did he go to the police.

Under Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient for
conviction if:
a. there is more than one circumstance;
b. the facts from which the inference are derived are proven; and
c. the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

As the foregoing discussion shows, these requisites have been established in this case.

4)
RTC correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery against accused-
appellant. Anent the first requisite, Dr. Roldan testified that based on her findings, the victim
was not in a position to fight the assailant and that she might have been stabbed while she was
asleep. As regards the second requisite, the number and nature of the wounds sustained by the
victim lead to no other conclusion that accused-appellant employed means in killing the victim which
tended directly and specially to ensure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense;
so many wounds, a total 10, half of which were fatal, if he had not deliberately adopted such
manner of attack.

Abuse of superior strength also attended the killing since accused-appellant, a man and
armed with a knife, attacked the victim, an unarmed and defenseless woman. However, since
abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery, there is no need to appreciate it separately
as an independent aggravating circumstance.

The trial court correctly held that there was no proof of evident premeditation since the
requisites thereof have not been established in this case.

No generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling since the latter and the victim lived in
the same house.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
4
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence is present. For this aggravating

circumstance to exist, it is essential to show that the confidence between the parties must
be immediate and personal such as would give the accused some advantage or make it easier
for him to commit the criminal act. The confidence must be a means of facilitating the
commission of the crime, the culprit taking advantage of the offended party's belief that the former
would not abuse said confidence. In this case, while the victim may have intimated her fear for her
safety for which reason she entrusted her jewelry and bank book to Erlinda Arrojado Magdaluyo,
her fears were subsequently allayed as shown by the fact that she took back her personal effects
from Erlinda. Thinking that accused-appellant would not do her any harm, because he was after all
her first cousin, the victim allowed accused-appellant to sleep in the same room with her father and
left the bedroom doors unlocked.

Death Penalty(moot) and Retroactivity of the Law/Rules of Court

The murder in this case took place after the effectivity of R.A. 7659 on December 31,
1993 which increased the penalty for murder from reclusion temporal maximum to death
to reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence and in accordance with Art. 63(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the trial court should have
imposed the penalty of death on accused-appellant.

However, on December 1, 2000, the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure took effect,
requiring that every complaint or information state not only the qualifying but also the
aggravating circumstances. This provision may be given retroactive effect in the light of the well
settled rule that "statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent." The aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence
not having been alleged in the information, the same therefore could not be appreciated to raise
accused-appellant's sentence to death.

In People vs. Lucas, the penalty of reclusion perpetua remains

indivisible notwithstanding the fixing of its duration from twenty (20) years and one (1) day to
forty (40) years, the trial court erred in imposing on accused-appellant the penalty of 30 years
of reclusion perpetua. In line with the ruling in Lucas, accused-appellant should suffer the entire
extent of forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.

Civil indemnity for the crime of murder should be reduced from P60,000.00 to P50,000.00,
while the award of moral damages in the amount of P80,000.00 should be reduced to P50,000.00.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
5
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

PEOPLE vs. NELMIDA

G.R. No. 184500
September 11, 2012

FACTS:

On June 5, 2001, Mayor Tawan-tawan of Salvador, Lanao del Norte, together with his
security escorts composed of some members of the Philippine Army, Philippine National Police
(PNP) and civilian aides went home to Salvador, Lanao del Norte, on board the yellow pick-up
service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan with Plate No. JRT 818 driven by Juanito. Sitting at the
passenger seat of the aforesaid vehicle was Mayor Tawan-tawan while those at the back seat were
Mosanip, Jun, and Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind Juanito. Those seated on a
wooden bench installed at the rear (open) portion of the said yellow pick-up service vehicle were
PFC Tomanto, PFC Angni, PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco. PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni were
sitting beside each other facing the right side of the road while PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco
were both seated behind PFC Tomanto and PFC Angni facing the left side of the road.

At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, appellants, together with their aforenamed co-accused,
brought Samuel to a waiting shed in Purok 2, San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, the one located on
the left side of the road going to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was instructed by to stay in the
said waiting shed while they assembled themselves in a diamond position on both sides of the road,
which is more or less five (5) meters away from the shed. Then, appellants and their co-accused
surreptitiously waited for the vehicle of the group of Mayor Tawan-tawan. A few minutes later,
Samuel saw the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor Tawan-tawan approaching towards the
direction of Salvador, Lanao del Norte. The moment the yellow pick-up service vehicle of Mayor
Tawan-tawan passed by the aforesaid waiting shed, appellants and their co-accused opened fire
and rained bullets on the vehicle using high-powered firearms.

Both Macasuba, who was sitting immediately behind the driver, and PFC Tomanto, who was
then sitting on the rear (open) portion of the yellow pick-up service vehicle, saw appellant
Wenceslao on the right side of the road firing at them in a squatting position using an M-16 armalite
rifle.

Macasuba was also able to identify appellants Ricardo, Pedro, Eduardo, Sr., Eduardo, Jr.,
Brigido and Alfredo as among the ambushers. Mayor Tawan-tawan ordered Juanito to keep on
driving to avoid greater casualties. The vehicle stopped upon reaching the army and Civilian Armed
Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU) detachment in Curva, Miagao, Salvador, Lanao del Norte. Mayor
Tawan-tawan then asked assistance therefrom.

Immediately after the ambush, appellants and their co-accused ran towards the house of
Samuel’s aunt located, more or less, 10 meters away from the site of the ambush to get their bags
and other stuff.

On the occasion of the ambush, two security escorts of Mayor Tawan-tawan, namely, PO3
Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, died, while others suffered injuries.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
6
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Mayor Tawan-tawan, Macasuba and the members of the CAFGU went back to the site of the
ambush but appellants and their co-accused were no longer there. SPO4 Medrano and his troops,
then, conducted an investigation during which he noticed Samuel at the scene of the crime. Upon
interrogation, Samuel denied any involvement in the ambush. Even so, SPO4 Medrano still
found Samuel suspicious, hence, he and his fellow police officers arrested him and turned him over
to a certain SPO4 Micabalo, Chief of Police of Lala, Lanao del Norte. Samuel was then brought to Lala
Municipal Jail in Lanao del Norte. Samuel then was released and was utilized as State Witness.

Samuel executed his sworn statement identifying appellants and their co-accused as the
persons responsible for the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his companions.

Appellants denied having any involvement in the ambush. Appellant Wenceslao

testified that on June 5, 2001, he was in their house with his family. Other defense witnesses,
namely, Armida, Jeffrey and Luzviminda, who are appellant Wenceslao’s wife, nephew and niece,
respectively, corroborated appellant Wenceslao’s testimony on all material points. They all denied
that appellant Wenceslao has something to do with the ambush of Mayor Tawan-tawan and his
group. Nonetheless, Armida admitted that there is a road connecting San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del
Norte, to Salvador, Lanao del Norte. There are also vehicles for hire plying the route of Salvador,
Lanao del Norte, to San Manuel, Lala, Lanao del Norte, and vice-versa.

Appellant Ricardo, for his part, maintained that on June 5, 2001, he was also in his house in
Purok 5, Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, attending to his wife and children because his wife
had just given birth in April 2001. In the afternoon thereof, he heard a gunburst somewhere in
Poblacion, Salvador, Lanao del Norte, followed by some commotion in the street. Later, his brother,
Joji Ajok, arrived and informed him that appellant Wenceslao was shot in his house.

Crime charged: double murder with multiple frustrated murder and double attempted
murder

RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged and imposed upon them the penalty
of reclusion perpetua

CA: affirmed and denied separate appeals of the appellants

ISSUE:

Whether or not Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code (Complex Crime) is applicable (NO)

HELD:

Appellants should be convicted not of a complex crime but of separate crimes of two (2)
counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder as the killing and wounding of the
victims in this case were not the result of a single act but of several acts of the appellants, thus,
making Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code inapplicable.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
7
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

The deadly successive shots of the appellants and their co-accused did not allow the hapless
victims, i.e., PO3 Dela Cruz and T/Sgt. Dacoco, any opportunity to put up a decent defense. The
attack was executed by appellants and their co-accused in such a vicious manner as to make the
defense virtually impossible. Under the circumstances, it is very apparent that appellants had
murder in their hearts when they waylaid their unwary victims.

The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, cannot be

appreciated as it is deemed absorbed in treachery.

Since the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident premeditation,
the circumstance cannot likewise be appreciated.

The concept of a complex crime is defined in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which
explicitly states that:

ART. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing
the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be
applied in its maximum period.

In a complex crime, two or more crimes are actually committed, however, in the eyes
of the law and in the conscience of the offender they constitute only one crime, thus, only one
penalty is imposed. There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as compound
crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies while the other is
known as complex crime proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet results in the death of two or more
persons. A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a number killed.
Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various victims expire from separate shots, such acts
constitute separate and distinct crimes.

Evidently, there is in this case no complex crime proper. And the circumstances
present in this case do not fit exactly the description of a compound crime.

From its factual backdrop, it can easily be gleaned that the killing and wounding of the
victims were not the result of a single discharge of firearms by the appellants and their co-
accused. To note, appellants and their co-accused opened fire and rained bullets on the vehicle
boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group. As a result, two security escorts died while five (5)
of them were wounded and injured. The victims sustained gunshot wounds in different parts of
their bodies. Therefrom, it cannot be gainsaid that more than one bullet had hit the victims.
Moreover, more than one gunman fired at the vehicle of the victims.

As held in People vs. Valdez, each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective
firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts
which cannot give rise to a complex crime.

Obviously, appellants and their co-accused performed not only a single act but several
individual and distinct acts in the commission of the crime. Thus, Article 48 of the Revised Penal
Code would not apply for it speaks only of a "single act."

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
8
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

There are, however, several rulings which applied Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code
despite the fact that several acts were performed by several accused in the commission of the crime
resulting to the death and/or injuries to their victims.

In People vs. Lawas, the members of the Home Guard, upon order of their leader, Lawas,
simultaneously and successively fired at several victims. As a result, 50 persons died. It was there
held that the killing was the result of a single impulse as there was no intent on the part of the
accused to fire at each and every victim separately and distinctly from each other. In this case, the
Court was merely forced to apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code because of the impossibility of
ascertaining the number of persons killed by each accused. Since conspiracy was not proven
therein, joint criminal responsibility could not be attributed to the accused. Each accused could not
be held liable for separate crimes because of lack of clear evidence showing the number of persons
actually killed by each of them.

Conspiracy is very much evident from the afore-enumerated actuations of the

appellants and their co-accused. Clearly, their acts were coordinated. They were synchronized in
their approach to riddle with bullets the vehicle boarded by Mayor Tawan-tawan and his group.
They were motivated by a single criminal impulse – to kill the victims. Indubitably, conspiracy is
implied when the accused persons had a common purpose and were united in its execution.
Spontaneous agreement or active cooperation by all perpetrators at the moment of the commission of
the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility.

With the presence of conspiracy in the case at bench, appellants and their co-accused had
assumed joint criminal responsibility – the act of one is the act of all. The ascertainment of who
among them actually hit, killed and/or caused injury to the victims already becomes immaterial.
Collective responsibility replaced individual responsibility.

With all the foregoing, this Court holds appellants liable for the separate crimes of two (2)
counts of murder and seven (7) counts of attempted murder.

As to penalty, under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty imposed for the crime
of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating
circumstance, the penalty to be imposed upon appellants is reclusion perpetua for each count,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellants are also guilty of seven (7) counts of attempted murder. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law in the case of attempted murder, the maximum shall be taken from the
medium period of prision mayor, which is 8 years and 1 day to 10 years, while the minimum shall be
taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., prision correccional, in any of its periods, the range
of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. This Court, therefore, imposed upon the appellants the
indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 10
years of prision mayor, as maximum, for each count of attempted murder.

As to damages, when death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded:
(1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3)
moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate damages.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
9
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

PEOPLE vs. PUNZALAN

G.R. No. 199892
December 10, 2012

FACTS:

In August 2002, Seaman 1st class (SN1) Arnulfo Andal, SN1 Antonio Duclayna, SN1 Evelio
Bacosa, SN1 Cesar Domingo, SN1 Danilo Cuya, and SN1 Erlinger Bundang were among the members
of the Philippine Navy sent for schooling at the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) at
San Miguel, San Antonio, Zambales. On August 10, 2002, at around 5:00 or 6:00 in the afternoon,
they went to the “All-in-One” Canteen to have some drink. Later at around 10:00 in the evening, they
transferred to a nearby videoke bar, “Aquarius” where they continued their drinking session. Shortly
thereafter, a heated argument between SN1 Bacosa and appellant ensued regarding a flickering
light bulb inside “Aquarius”. When SN1 Bacosa suggested that the light be turned off (“patayin and
ilaw”), appellant who must have misunderstood and misinterpreted SN1 Bacosa’s statement
belligerently reacted, asking, “Sinong papatayin?,” thinking that SN1 Bacosa’s statement was
directed at him. SN1 Cuya tried to pacify SN1 Bacosa and appellant, while SN1 Bundang apologized
to appellant in behalf of SN1 Bacosa. However, appellant was still visibly angry, mumbling
unintelligible words and pounding his fist on the table.

To avoid further trouble, the navy personnel decided to leave “Aquarius” and return to
NETC camp. They walked in two’s with each group at one arm’s length distance from the other.
Along the way, they passed by the NETC sentry gate which was being manned by SN1 Noel de
Guzman and F1EN Alejandro Dimaala at that time. SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna even stopped by to
give the sentries some barbeque before proceeding to follow their companions.

Soon after the navy personnel passed by the sentry gate, SN1 De Guzman and F1EN Dimaala
flagged down a rushing and zigzagging maroon Nissan van. The sentries approached the van and
recognized appellant, who was reeking liquor, as the driver. Even before he was given the go signal
to proceed, appellant shifted gears and sped away while uttering, “papatayin ko yang mga yan!”
While F1EN Dimaala was writing the van’s plate number and details in the logbook, he suddenly
heard a loud thud. Meanwhile, SN1 De Guzman saw how the van sped away towards the camp and
suddenly swerved to the right hitting the group of the walking navy personnel prompting him to
exclaim to F1EN Dimaala, “Chief, binangga ang tropa!” SN1 De Guzman then asked permission to go
to the scene of the incident and check on the navy personnel.

When they were hit by the vehicle from behind, SN1 Cuya and SN1 Bacosa were thrown
away towards a grassy spot on the roadside. They lost consciousness. SN1 Cuya tried to resuscitate
SN1 Duclayna, while SN1 Bacosa tried to chase the van.

SN1 Domingo was not hit by the van as he was in the first group and was pushed away from
the path of the speeding van. He was able to see the vehicle’s plate number.

SN1 De Guzman found SN1 Cuya administering CPR on SN1 Duclayna. He also saw the
misshapen body of SN1 Andal lying some 50 meters away, apparently dragged there when the
speeding van hit SN1 Andal. SN1 Cuya instructed SN1 De Guzman to get an ambulance but the car of

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
10
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

the officer on duty at that time arrived and the boarded SN1 Duclayna’s injured body to the vehicle
to be brought to the hospital.

A post-mortem exam was conducted on the bodies of SN1 Andal and SN1 Duclayna by
Jericho Cordero of Camp Crame Medical Division. Dr. Cordero’s findings were that the injuries
sustained by SN1 Andal were fatal and caused by a hard blunt object that hit his body. The force of
the impact was such that the internal organs were fatally injured. SN1 Andal died of cardio
respiratory arrest as a result of massive blunt traumatic injuries to the head. SN1 Duclayna
sustained fatal injuries to the head and liver.

As regards the other navy personnel, SN1 Cuya suffered lacerated wounds on the head and
different parts of the body for which he was confined for eighteen days. SN1 Bacosa sustained
injuries on his knee and left hand and stayed in the infirmary for a day and SN1 Bundang sufferred
injuries to his right foot.

RTC: found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of double
murder qualified by treachery with attempted murder attended by aggravating circumstance of
use of motor vehicle and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua

CA: affirmed the RTC’s decision with modification as to payment of civil indemnity, moral
damages, temperate damages, and exemplary damages as well as payment for the loss of earning
capacity of one of the victims, SN1 Andal

ISSUE:

Whether or not the appellant is guilty of the complex crime of murder with attempted
murder (YES)

HELD:

The SC affirmed the findings of the RTC and the CA, as both found the evidence presented
and offered by the prosecution credible and that the witnesses had overwhelmingly proved beyond
reasonable doubt the culpability of accused-appellant. The SC has combed through the records of
the case and found no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial and appellate courts. There is
nothing that would indicate that the RTC and the CA ignored, misconstrued, misunderstood or
misinterpreted cogent facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered, will alter the
outcome of the case.

The felony committed by appellant as correctly found by the RTC and the CA, double
murder with multiple attempted murder, is a complex crime contemplated under Article 48 of
the RPC.

Appellant was animated by a single purpose, to kill the navy personnel, and committed a
single act of stepping on the accelerator, swerving to the right side of the road and ramming
through the navy personnel. The crimes of murder and attempted murder are both grave

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
11
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

felonies as the law attaches an afflictive penalty to capital punishment (reclusion perpetua to death)
for murder while attempted murder is punished by prision mayor, an afflictive penalty.

Under Article 248 of the RPC, as amended, murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Article 63 of the same Code provides that if the penalty prescribed is composed of two
indivisible penalties, as in the instant case, and there is an aggravating circumstance, the
higher penalty should be imposed. Since use of vehicle can be considered as an ordinary
aggravating circumstance, treachery, by itself, being sufficient to qualify the killing, the proper
imposable penalty- the higher sanction- is death. However, in view of the enactment of R.A. 9346,
prohibiting imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of the killing of each of the two victims
is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. The penalty of reclusion perpetua
thus imposed by the Court of Appeals on appellant for the complex crime that he committed is
correct.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
12
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

PEOPLE vs. DULAY

G.R. No. 194629
April 21, 2014

FACTS:

In the evening of December 30, 2002, Junior, a child about six years of age, was outside the
kitchen of their house. His father, the late Orlando Sr., was also somewhere in the yard and was
asking Junior to hand him a chair.

Wondering why the dog was barking loudly, Mrs. Engracia Legaspi peeped from inside the
kitchen and noticed Dulay’s dog in the vicinity. She surmised that its master, Dulay, was also
present. Junior’s elder sister, Melanie went out to look for the dog–leash to transfer the mutt to
another area.

Using the flashlight he was constantly prohibited from playing with, Junior directed a beam
towards the grassy area where he discovered Dulay. Melanie also saw Dulay as he was staring at
Orlando Sr. Their uncle Dulay suddenly threw something that resembled a ball, towards the
cemented part of the yard. It turned out to be a grenade, and it landed about seven meters from
where Junior and his father were. Dulay then went away on his bicycle towards the direction of his
house.

When the grenade exploded, Junior was hurt in his pelvic area, while his father was fatally
hit by shrapnel, causing his death. Melanie rushed to the succor of her bloodied father, barely
noticing Junior who was likewise lying on the ground, but was still conscious and crying. Engracia
hollered for help from the neighborhood. Because of the firecrackers in that New Year’s Eve, people
did not readily render assistance, until they realized the intensity of the explosion that shook the
ground.

Orlando Sr. was rushed to the hospital but he expired shortly thereafter.

RTC: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with attempted murder
1. He is further ordered to pay the heirs of Orlando Legaspi Sr., the sum of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
2. Also he must pay P30,000.00 pesos as moral damages to Orlando Legaspi, Jr.
3. P115,956.00 as actual expenses/damages for the hospitalization of the two victims,
namely: Orlando Legaspi, Sr., and Orlando Legaspi, Jr.

CA: affirmed RTC with modification; Dulay is guilty of the complex crime of murder and
frustrated murder and is sentenced to suffer:
1. penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole;
2. award of actual damages in the amount of P115,956.00 for the hospital expenses of the
two victims;
3. award of civil indemnity for the death of Orlando Sr., in the increased amount of
P75,000.00;

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
13
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

4. award of moral damages in the respective amounts of P75,000.00 and P55,000.00 for
Orlando Senior and Junior; and
5. award of exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 each for both Orlando Senior
and Junior

The CA held that pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of death which would
have been imposable is properly reduced to reclusion perpetua but the RTC erred in stating in
the body of the decision that Dulay was guilty as well of “frustrated murder” as charged in the
Information with respect to the bomb–injured Orlando Legaspi, Jr. (Junior), and yet convicted him in
the dispositive part only of “attempted murder.”

The prosecution was able to establish that all acts of execution, not merely preparatory acts,
were performed to produce the felony as a consequence, but Junior nevertheless survived for
reasons independent of the will of the perpetrator; that is, the timely medical assistance to him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that Dulay is guilty of the complex crime of murder
and frustrated murder (YES)

HELD:

It is settled that the Court will not interfere with the trial court’s assessment of the
witnesses' credibility, absent any indication or showing that the trial court overlooked some
material facts or gravely abused its discretion, especially where, as in this case, such assessment is
affirmed by the CA. In the present case, the Court sees no compelling reason to disturb the factual
findings of the courts a quo.

As regards the crime committed against Junior, the Court is in accord with the CA’s
conclusion that Dulay is guilty of frustrated murder.

The requisites of a frustrated felony are:

1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the
felony; and
2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator’s will.

Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, Dulay has performed all acts of execution in
throwing the grenade which could have caused Junior’s death as a consequence, but because of
immediate medical assistance, a cause independent of Dulay’s will, Junior survived.

The Court thus affirms the CA decision, with modification on the awarded indemnities.
Dante Dulay is ordered:
1. To pay the heirs of Orlando Legaspi, Sr. the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity;
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;
2. To pay Orlando Legaspi, Jr., the amount ofP50,000.00 as moral damages and
P20,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
14
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

3. To pay P115,956.00 as actual damages for the hospital expenses of both Orlando
Legaspi, Sr. and Orlando Legaspi, Jr. An interest of six percent (6%) per annum is
imposed on the award of civil indemnity and all damages from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
15
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

SANTIAGO vs. GARCHITORENA

228 SCRA 214
December 2, 1993

FACTS:

Petitioner Miriam Defensor-Santiago, the then Commission of Immigration and Deportation

(CID) Commissioner, was charged in Criminal Case No. 16698 of the Sandiganbayan with violation
of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, allegedly committed by her favoring "unqualified" aliens with the benefits of the
Alien Legalization Program wherein Santiago, approved the application for legalization of the stay
of about 32 aliens who arrived in the Philippines in violation of Executive Order No. 324 which
does not allow the legalization of the same, thereby causing undue injury to the government and
giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to said aliens in the discharge of the official and
administrative functions of said accused.

She filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 16698 on the ground that said case was intended solely to
harass her as she was then a presidential candidate. She also moved to inhibit Sandiganbayan
Presiding Justice Garchitorena from the case and to defer her arraignment pending action on her
motion to inhibit. Her motion was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

Santiago filed a motion for a bill of particulars stating that while the Information alleged
that she had approved the application for legalization of "aliens" and gave them indirect benefits
and advantages it lacked a list of the favored aliens. According to her, unless she was furnished with
the names and identities of the aliens, she could not properly plead and prepare for trial.

She contended in this case that the public prosecutors filed 32 Amended
Informations against her, after manifesting to the Sandiganbayan that they would only file one
Amended Information. She also questioned in her opposition to the motion to admit the 32
Amended Informations, the splitting of the original information.

She even claimed that the Amended Informations filed against her did not charge any
offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019 because the official acts complained of
therein were authorized under E.O. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization of spouses and
unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even though they had arrived in the Philippines after
December 31, 1983. She concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to
quash the Informations.

ISSUE:

Whether or not there was only one crime that was committed in Santiago’s case wherein
there should only be one Information to be filed against her (YES)

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
16
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

HELD:

Technically, there was only one crime that was committed in petitioner Santiago's case,
and hence, there should only be one Information to be filed against her.

The 32 Amended Informations charge what is known as delito continuado or "continued

crime" and sometimes referred to as "continuous crime”.

Where only one single criminal act of approving the application for legalization of 32
aliens was committed on the same period of time, the 32 Informations should be
consolidated into only one. In the case at bench, the original Information charged petitioner
Santiago with performing a single criminal act — that of her approving the application for
legalization of aliens not qualified under the law to enjoy such privilege.

The original Information also averred that the criminal act committed by petitioner: (i) was
in violation of a law—Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988, (ii) caused an undue injury to
one offended party, the Government, and (iii) was done on a single day, i.e., on or about October 17,
1988. The 32 Amended Informations reproduced verbatim the allegation of the original
Information, except that instead of the word “aliens” in the original information, each Amended
Information states the name of the individual whose stay was legalized.

The 32 Amended Informations aver that the offenses were committed on the same period of
time, i.e., on or about October 17, 1988. The strong probability even exists that the approval of the
application for the legalization of the stay of the 32 aliens was done by a single stroke of the pen, as
when the approval was embodied in the same document.

For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period
of time; unity of penal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that
two or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or
resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. A delito continuado
consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the
perpetrator.

The concept of delito continuado, although an outcrop of the Spanish Penal Code, has been
applied to crimes penalized under special laws. Under Article 10 of the Revised Penal Code, the Code
shall be supplementary to special laws, unless the latter provide the contrary. Hence, legal
principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws. The question surrounding the concept of delito continuado is that
whether a series of criminal acts over a period of time creates a single offense or separate offenses.

At the hearing of the motion for a bill of particulars, the public prosecutors manifested that
they would file only one Amended Information embodying the legalization of stay of the 32 aliens.

Hence, in this case, the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman is
directed to consolidate the 32 Amended Informations (Criminal Cases Nos. 18371 to
18402) into one information charging only one offense under the original case number, No.
16698.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
17
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

PEOPLE vs. QUIACHON

G.R. No. 170236
August 31, 2006

FACTS:

Information alleged that the accused, by means of force and intimidation have sexual
intercourse with one Rowena Quiachon y Reyes, his daughter, 8 years old, a deaf-mute minor,
against her will and consent.

Prosecution's Version

Rowel, son of Roberto, testified that he saw his father on top of his sister Rowena and they
were covered by a blanket or "kumot". His father's buttocks were moving up and down, and Rowel
could hear Rowena crying. He could not do anything, however, because he was afraid of their father.

Rowel remained in the room but the following morning, he told his mother's sister
Carmelita Mateo. Together, Carmelita and Rowel went to the police to report what had transpired.

Defense

Appellant claimed that Rowena is not deaf but only has a minor speech handicap. He denied
raping Rowena and alleged that Virginia Moraleda and Carmelita Mateo, both sisters of his
deceased common-law wife, held a grudge against him because he abandoned his family and was
not able to support them.

Crime charged: qualified rape

RTC: found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and sentenced
him to suffer the maximum penalty of death, including its accessory penalties, and to indemnify
the offended party in the amount of P75,000.00 as compensatory damages.

The case was automatically elevated to the Supreme Court by reason of the death
penalty. However, pursuant to our ruling in People vs. Mateo, the case was transferred and
referred to the CA.

CA: affirmed the RTC ruling

According to the CA, the qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her
relationship to the offender were alleged in the Information and were duly proved during trial.
These circumstances, i.e., minority of the victim and her relationship to appellant, are special
qualifying circumstances in the crime of rape that warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty
of death.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
18
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court correctly imposed the penalty of death

HELD:

The RTC and the CA correctly found appellant guilty of rape pursuant to Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code. The special qualifying circumstances of the victim's minority and her
relationship to appellant warrant the imposition of the supreme penalty of death.

However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 on June 24, 2006 prohibiting
the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in
accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads:

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code

The aforequoted provision of R.A. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in
criminal law, favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to
accused are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised
Penal Code, which provides as follows:

Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar
as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is
serving the same.

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition
in R.A. 9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the ratiocination
in People vs. Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death
penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty attended the commission of the offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00
shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal perception of the penal law and the financial
fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure of the court of the incidence of heinous
crimes against chastity.”

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
19
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

PEOPLE vs. SALOME

G.R. No. 169077
August 31, 2006

FACTS:

Sometime in July of 1997, Sally, then thirteen years old, was sleeping with her three-year
old brother inside their house when appellant entered their house. She was awakened by the
presence of the latter who, allegedly, was poking a knife at the base of her neck. While holding the
knife with one hand, appellant undressed her with his other hand. He threatened her that he would
kill her and her family if she would tell anyone about the incident. After undressing her, appellant
forced her to lie down. He removed his shorts and underwear. He then spread her legs and inserted
his penis into her vagina.

According to Sally, she just closed her eyes while appellant had his way with her. She did not
call for help because she was afraid that nobody would be in the next house which was about 800
meters away.

She cannot remember how long appellant remained on top of her but before he left, he
reiterated his threat to kill her and her family if she told anybody of what happened. After that, she
would frequently see appellant but the latter never spoke to her.

Fearful for her life and for her family’s safety, she did not inform anyone of the incident.
Although it entered her mind that she could be pregnant, she left her province to work as a
domestic helper in the house of SPO2 Constantino B. Saret in West Crame, San Juan, Manila.

On November 12, 1997, she had a pelvic ultrasound examination which confirmed her
pregnancy. Upon learning this, she reported the rape incident to the police on November 17, 1997.
She executed a sworn statement and filed a complaint.

During the trial, Salome offered the defense of alibi in court claiming that he went fishing at
the time of the incident.

RTC: convicted Salome of rape with the use of a deadly weapon, committed inside the
dwelling of the offended party, as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659; sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death

ARTICLE 335. When and how rape is committed. –

xxx
Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death.
xxx

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
20
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

(Due to the imposition of death penalty on appellant, the case was directly elevated to the Supreme
Court for review. Subsequently, however, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals
for intermediate review pursuant to the Court’s ruling in People vs. Mateo.)

CA: affirmed the conviction and imposition of death penalty with modifications as to damages

Pursuant to A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure to
govern Death Penalty Cases) which took into effect on October 15, 2004, the case is elevated and
certified to the Supreme Court for its automatic review.

ISSUE:

Whether or not death penalty shall be imposed (NO)

HELD:

The Court affirmed the Decision of the CA with regard to the conviction of Salome and
amount of damages. The sentence that shall be imposed upon appellant, however,
is modified. In view of Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty,
appellant is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua without parole.

Since the crime of rape was committed by appellant with the use of a deadly weapon,
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death, the presence of the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling, without the presence of any mitigating circumstance, justified the trial court’s
imposition of the death penalty.

The above ruling is in accordance with Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code which provides
that in all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties,
the greater penalty shall be applied when an aggravating circumstance, such as dwelling in this
case, is present in the commission of the offense.

The Court of Appeals, in affirming the conviction of herein appellant and the imposition of
the death penalty, concluded that:

The Court, therefore, has no recourse but to apply the law and affirm the trial court’s
imposition of the death penalty. This is without prejudice, of course, to the provisions of Section 25,
R.A. 7659 regarding the possible exercise of the pardoning power of the Office of the President upon
the finality of the death sentence.

In light, however, of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, entitled “An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines,” which was signed into law by President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo on June 24, 2006, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited.
The law provides:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited.

Accordingly, R.A. No. 8177, otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
21
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Injection, is hereby repealed. R.A. No. 7659, otherwise known as the Death Penalty
Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the
death penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the
nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use
of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

SECTION 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion

perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this
Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the evaluation of the evidence
by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Pursuant to the new law, even as the Court
sustains the conviction of appellant, the penalty imposed upon him should be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, but appellant shall not be eligible for parole under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
22
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

COLINARES vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 182748
December 13, 2011

FACTS:

Complainant Rufino P. Buena (Rufino) testified that at around 7:00 in the evening on June
25, 2000, he and Jesus Paulite (Jesus) went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. On their way,
Jesus took a leak by the roadside with Rufino waiting nearby. From nowhere, Arnel Colinares
(Arnel) sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 ½ inches
in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as Jesus fled.

Ananias Jallores (Ananias) testified that he was walking home when he saw Rufino lying by
the roadside. Ananias tried to help but someone struck him with something hard on the right
temple, knocking him out. He later learned that Arnel had hit him. Paciano Alano (Paciano) testified
that he saw the whole incident since he happened to be smoking outside his house. He sought the
help of a barangay tanod and they brought Rufino to the hospital.

Dr. Albert Belleza issued a Medico-Legal Certificate showing that Rufino suffered two
lacerated wounds on the forehead, along the hairline area. The doctor testified that these injuries
were serious and potentially fatal but Rufino chose to go home after initial treatment.

The defense presented Arnel and Diomedes Paulite (Diomedes). Arnel claimed self-
defense. He testified that he was on his way home that evening when he met Rufino, Jesus, and
Ananias who were all quite drunk. Arnel asked Rufino where he supposed the Mayor of Tigaon was
but, rather than reply, Rufino pushed him, causing his fall. Jesus and Ananias then boxed Arnel
several times on the back. Rufino tried to stab Arnel but missed. The latter picked up a stone and,
defending himself, struck Rufino on the head with it. When Ananias saw this, he charged towards
Arnel and tried to stab him with a gaff. Arnel was able to avoid the attack and hit Ananias with the
same stone. Arnel then fled and hid in his sister’s house. On September 4, 2000, he voluntarily
surrendered.

Diomedes testified that he, Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attended a pre-wedding party on the
night of the incident. His three companions were all drunk. On his way home, Diomedes saw the
three engaged in heated argument with Arnel.

Crime charged: frustrated homicide

RTC: guilty of homicide

CA: Arnel, invoking self-defense and, alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of
attempted homicide with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him, the CA entirely
affirmed the RTC decision.

NOTE: Arnel taking the position that he should be entitled to apply for probation in case the Court
metes out a new penalty on him that makes his offense probationable. The language and spirit of the

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
23
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Probation Law warrants such a stand. The Solicitor General, on the other hand, argues that under
the Probation Law no application for probation can be entertained once the accused has perfected his
appeal from the judgment of conviction.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not Arnel acted in self-defense when he struck Rufino on the head with a stone
(NO)

2) Assuming he did not act in self-defense, whether or not Arnel is guilty of frustrated homicide
(NO, attempted homicide only)

3) Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower offense and a reduced
probationable penalty, whether or not he may still apply for probation on remand of the case to
the trial court (YES)

HELD:

1)
Arnel claims that Rufino, Jesus, and Ananias attacked him first and that he merely acted in
self-defense when he hit Rufino back with a stone.

If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has
nothing to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis
for being appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected
attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not
enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon.

Here, the lower courts found that Arnel failed to prove the element of unlawful
aggression. He alone testified that Jesus and Ananias rained fist blows on him and that Rufino and
Ananias tried to stab him. No one corroborated Arnel’s testimony that it was Rufino who started it.
Arnel’s only other witness, Diomedes, merely testified that he saw those involved having a heated
argument in the middle of the street. Arnel did not submit any medical certificate to prove his point
that he suffered injuries in the hands of Rufino and his companions.

2) The Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted, not frustrated, homicide.

The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accused’s intent to take
his victim’s life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every
possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other
things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his
victim.

The Court is inclined, however, to hold Arnel guilty only of attempted, not frustrated,
homicide. In Palaganas vs. People, it was ruled that when the accused intended to kill his victim, as
shown by his use of a deadly weapon and the wounds he inflicted, but the victim did not die

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
24
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

because of timely medical assistance, the crime is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide. If the
victim’s wounds are not fatal, the crime is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.

Taken in its entirety, there is a dearth of medical evidence on record to support the
prosecution’s claim that Rufino would have died without timely medical intervention. Thus, the
Court finds Arnel liable only for attempted homicide and entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender.

3) Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he having appealed
from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated homicide.

But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted homicide and
holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be lowered to imprisonment of
four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With this new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for
probation upon remand of the case to the RTC.

Some in the Court disagrees. They contend that probation is a mere privilege granted by the
state only to qualified convicted offenders. Section 4 of the Probation Law (P.D. 968) provides: "That
no application for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal
from the judgment of conviction." Since Arnel appealed his conviction for frustrated homicide, he
should be deemed permanently disqualified from applying for probation.

But, firstly, while it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that Arnel has
the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is the right to apply for that
privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the
Court allows him to apply for probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial
judge to decide whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the
full circumstances of his case.

Secondly, it is true that under the Probation Law the accused who appeals "from the
judgment of conviction" is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of probation. But, as it
happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to Arnel: one, a conviction for
frustrated homicide by the Regional Trial Court, now set aside; and, two, a conviction for
attempted homicide by the Supreme Court.

The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco vs. Court of Appeals that the probation
law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of
probation. But there is a huge difference between Francisco and this case.

In Francisco, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati found the accused guilty of
grave oral defamation and sentenced him to a prison term of one year and one day to one year and
eight months of prision correccional, a clearly probationable penalty. Probation was his to ask! Still,
he chose to appeal, seeking an acquittal, hence clearly waiving his right to apply for probation.
When the acquittal did not come, he wanted probation. The Court would not of course let him. It
served him right that he wanted to save his cake and eat it too. He certainly could not have both
appeal and probation.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
25
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that an accused must not have
appealed his conviction before he can avail himself of probation. This requirement "outlaws
the element of speculation on the part of the accused—to wager on the result of his appeal—that
when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the
service of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’ thus rendering
nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction."

Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him to
apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He was not in a
position to say, "By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for probation." The stiff penalty that the
trial court imposed on him denied him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now
seek probation under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in
Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they
have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.

Besides, in appealing his case, Arnel raised the issue of correctness of the penalty imposed
on him. He claimed that the evidence at best warranted his conviction only for attempted, not
frustrated, homicide, which crime called for a probationable penalty. In a way, therefore, Arnel
sought from the beginning to bring down the penalty to the level where the law would allow him to
apply for probation.

In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide, but
only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a
probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start, it would have found him guilty
of the correct offense and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four months
maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no
fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such
philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded
as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its
letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be
applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent purpose.

One of those who dissent from this decision points out that allowing Arnel to apply for
probation after he appealed from the trial court’s judgment of conviction would not be consistent
with the provision of Section 2 that the Probation Law should be interpreted to "provide an
opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender." An accused like Arnel who appeals from a
judgment convicting him, it is claimed, shows no penitence.

This may be true if the trial court meted out to Arnel a correct judgment of conviction. Here,
however, it convicted Arnel of the wrong crime, frustrated homicide, which carried a penalty in
excess of 6 years. How can the Court expect him to feel penitent over a crime, which as the Court
now finds, he did not commit? He only committed attempted homicide with its maximum penalty
of 2 years and 4 months.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
26
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Ironically, if the Court denies Arnel the right to apply for probation under the
reduced penalty, it would be sending him straight behind bars. It would be robbing him of the
chance to instead undergo reformation as a penitent offender, defeating the very purpose of the
Probation Law.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
27
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

VILLAREAL vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 151258
December 1, 2014

FACTS:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School
of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They
were Caesar “Bogs” Asuncion, Samuel “Sam” Belleza, Bienvenido “Bien” Marquez III, Roberto
Francis “Bert” Navera, Geronimo “Randy” Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo “Lenny” Villa
(neophytes).

They went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on
what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical
beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled to last for three
days. After their “briefing,” they were brought to the Almeda Compound in Caloocan City for the
commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults
from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota
court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them.

The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan “initiation rites” that
includes inflicting physical pain. During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the
fraternity principles. They survived their first day of initiation.

On their second day, February 9, 1991, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and
proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the
same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however,
he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then
subjected the neophytes to “paddling” and to additional rounds of physical pain.

Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to
the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes
started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they thought he
was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold, some of the
Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
28
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was
pronounced dead on arrival.

Crime charged: homicide

RTC: rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code

CA: set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified the criminal liability of
each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed
away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants were acquitted – Victorino, Sabban, Lledo,

Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada,
Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) as their
individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants – Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio

Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime
of slight physical injuries.

3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA
sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years
of reclusion temporal.

The OSG in its MR, concedes that the mode in which the accused committed the crime was
through fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have been equivalent
to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised Penal Code. It argues that
the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence attributable to the accused was so gross
that it shattered the fine distinction between dolo and culpa by considering the act as one
committed with malicious intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the initiation rites in such
a malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates and was thus
equivalent to malice aforethought.

Respondents Tecson et al. filed their respective motions, essentially seeking a clarification
as to the effect of the Supreme Court’s Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of
sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after
the CA rendered its Decision lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which
carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable
sentence. Tecson et al. contend that, as a result, they have already been discharged from their
criminal liability and the cases against them closed and terminated.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
29
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for
intentional felonies (NO)

2) Whether or not the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their probation
discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases against them
(NO)

HELD:

1) The Court disagrees with the OSG. The law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
existence of malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged liable
for committing an intentional felony.

The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the imposable penalties as regards felonies
committed by means of culpa on the one hand and felonies committed by means of dolo on the
other in the context of the distinctions it has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article
365 (Imprudence and Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a person occurs as a result
of the imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the penalties outlined in Articles 246 to
261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically invoked if the death was a result of the commission of a
forbidden act accompanied by a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are statutory,
mandatory, and not subject to the discretion of the court. The Court has already resolved – and
the OSG agrees – that the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus
interficendi nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, the
imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

2)
Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. The law
requires that an application for probation be filed with the trial court that convicted and sentenced
the defendant, meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and
sentenced Tecson et al. of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the
Caloocan City RTC. Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson et al. in their
pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special authority that would clarify why
the Applications for Probation had not been filed with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC
Branch 121.

The probation proceedings were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, thus,

the Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, CA
had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took
cognizance of the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their
respective applications while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before the CA and the
records were still with that court.

The Court finds that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on the probation
applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to suspend their sentence,

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
30
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

place them on probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare the case against them
terminated.

In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied
for it. They had filed an appeal with the CA and the Court emphasized that Section 4 of the
Probation Law offers no ambiguity and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or
exception. What is clear is that all offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of
their reason for appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation.

The orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the
probation applications of Tecson et al. are null and void for having been issued without
jurisdiction.

Accused Bantug asserts that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been
extinguished as a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual termination of the
criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130.

A void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally speaking, it is as if no

judgment had been rendered at all. Considering the annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that
technically do not exist.

In any event, Tecson et al. cannot invoke Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, as it is
inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is precisely to “suspend the
execution of the sentence,” and not to replace the original sentence with another.
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al. remains.

In light of the Court’s recent Decision in Colinares vs. People, Tecson et al. may now
reapply for probation.

The Court set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al. ultimately liable
for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. While the Court cannot recognize
the validity of the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which granted the Applications for Probation, it cannot
disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous
probation program and have eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for
probation, the trial court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service
in resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in determining the
terms, conditions, and period thereof.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
31
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

PEOPLE vs. CA
G.R. No. 154954
December 1, 2014

FACTS:

In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School
of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity). They
were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez III, Roberto
Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and Leonardo "Lenny" Villa
(neophytes).

On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the Aquila
Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all proceeded to Rufo’s
Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan,
who briefed the neophytes on what to expect during the initiation rites. The latter were informed
that there would be physical beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites
were scheduled to last for three days. After their "briefing," they were brought to the Almeda
Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.

Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and insults
from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and walked towards the pelota
court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans delivered physical blows to them.

The neophytes were then subjected to traditional forms of Aquilan "initiation rites."
These rites included:
1. Indian Run – which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes;
2. Bicol Express – which obliged the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against
the wall and their legs outstretched while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over
their legs;
3. Rounds – in which the neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries"
(the Aquilans charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation
rites), while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows
on their thighs by two Aquilans; and
4. Auxies’ Privilege Round – in which the auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict
physical pain on the neophytes.

During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles. They
survived their first day of initiation.

On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to
present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to memorize and recite
the Aquila Fraternity’s principles. Whenever they would give a wrong answer, they would be hit on
their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and
proceeded to torment them physically and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
32
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

same manner of hazing that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the
initiation for the day officially ended.

After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon (Dizon)
and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The head of initiation rites,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however,
he reopened the initiation rites. The fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then
subjected the neophytes to "paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain.

Lenny received several paddle blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to
the ground. The neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the
auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes
started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.

After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
incoherent mumblings.1avvphi1 Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, as they
thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really feeling cold,
some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his clothes and helped him through a
sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the
hospital. Lenny was pronounced dead on arrival.

Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Aquilans:
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) In Criminal Case No. C-38340
1. Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) 1. Manuel Escalona II (Escalona)
2. Artemio Villareal (Villareal) 2. Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca)
3. Efren de Leon (De Leon) 3. Anselmo Adriano (Adriano)
4. Vincent Tecson (Tecson) 4. Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos)
5. Junel Anthony Ama (Ama) 5. Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
6. Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda) 6. Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
7. Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug) 7. Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
8. Nelson Victorino (Victorino) 8. Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
9. Eulogio Sabban (Sabban) 9. Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
10. Joseph Lledo (Lledo)
11. Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
12. Michael Musngi (Musngi)
13. Jonas Karl Perez (Perez)
14. Paul Angelo Santos (Santos)
15. Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman)
16. Antonio General (General)
17. Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
18. Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim)
19. Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo)
20. Santiago Ranada III (Ranada)
21. Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza)
22. Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero)
23. Amante Purisima II (Purisima)
24. Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez)
25. Adel Abas (Abas)
26. Percival Brigola (Brigola)

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
33
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly tried. On
the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal Case No. C-38340 was held
in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be resolved first.

RTC: rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code

A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November 1993, Criminal
Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced anew.

CA: set aside the finding of conspiracy by the trial court and modified the criminal liability of
each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused De Leon had by then passed
away, so the following Decision applied only to the remaining 25 accused, viz:

1. Nineteen of the accused-appellants were acquitted – Victorino, Sabban, Lledo,

Guerrero, Musngi, Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada,
Mendoza, Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) as their
individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.

2. Four of the accused-appellants – Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio

Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the crime
of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They were also
ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000 as indemnity.

3. Two of the accused-appellants – Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal – were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the CA
sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17 years
of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the
heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of P50,000 and to pay the additional amount of
P1,000,000 by way of moral damages.

Respondents Tecson et al. filed their respective motions, essentially seeking a clarification
as to the effect of the Supreme Court’s Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of
sentence are concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after
the CA rendered its Decision lowering their criminal liability from the crime of homicide, which
carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight physical injuries, which carries a probationable
sentence. Tecson et al. contend that, as a result, they have already been discharged from their
criminal liability and the cases against them closed and terminated.

This outcome was supposedly by virtue of their Applications for Probation on various dates
in January 2002 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the
Probation Law. They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already
granted their respective Applications for Probation on October 11, 2002 and, upon their completion
of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from probation and declared the criminal case
against them terminated on various dates in April 2003.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
34
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

ISSUE:

Whether or not the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their
probation discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated the cases
against them (NO)

HELD:

In their separate motions, respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA finding them
guilty of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a result of their respective
availments of the probation program and their ultimate discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that
they can no longer be convicted of the heavier offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part
and parcel of our criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court to adjudicate
and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and capacity of the tribunal to hear,
try, and decide a particular case or matter before it. That power and capacity includes the
competence to pronounce a judgment, impose a punishment, and enforce or suspend the execution
of a sentence in accordance with law.

The OSG questions the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of Tecson et
al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not have competence to take
cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not the court of origin of the criminal case.
The OSG points out that the trial court that originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-
38340(91) was Branch 121 of the Caloocan City RTC.

The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for reference:

SECTION. 4. Grant of Probation. — Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial
court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon
application by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and
upon such terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application
for probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the
appeal from the judgment of conviction.

It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for
probation be filed with the trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, meaning the court
of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and sentenced Tecson et al. of the crime of
homicide was Branch 121 – not Branch 130 – of the Caloocan City RTC. Tecson et al. thus
committed a fatal error when they filed their probation applications with Caloocan City RTC Branch
130, and not with Branch 121. Applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they
may seek probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation Law is substantive
and not merely procedural.

Second, the records of the case were still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged with the court in which the

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
35
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

criminal action has been properly instituted. If a party appeals the trial court’s judgment or final
order, jurisdiction is transferred to the appellate court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed
insofar as the appealing party is concerned. The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the
entire case the moment the other party’s time to appeal has expired. Any residual jurisdiction of the
court of origin shall cease – including the authority to order execution pending appeal – the
moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the appellate court. Consequently, it is
the appellate court that shall have the authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case
before it, as well as to enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and
authority shall remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction
cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first place.

According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, "No penalty shall be executed except by
virtue of a final judgment." A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting the accused of the
offense charged becomes final under any of the following conditions among others:
a. after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal;
b. when the accused waives the right to appeal;
c. upon the grant of a withdrawal of an appeal;
d. when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served; or
e. when the accused applies for probation.

A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its jurisdiction
over the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of the Applications for Probation
of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their respective applications while a motion for
reconsideration was still pending before the CA and the records were still with that court.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act
on the probation applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority to
suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge, and eventually declare
the case against them terminated.

In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied
for it. Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified offenders who
immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. In view of their acceptance
of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an
incarceration record by making them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major
purposes of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding and
self respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with the community.

It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it is an
act of grace or clemency conferred by the state.

The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et al. It
points out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by the RTC, they thereby
made themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968
(Probation Law). Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must
not have appealed the conviction.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
36
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

An order placing defendant on "probation" is not a "sentence" but is rather in effect a

suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an
"interlocutory judgment" in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted defendant
under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a final judgment of
discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or by a final judgment of sentence if
the conditions are violated.

The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use of
authority, so gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice. As a consequence,
the RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. and thereafter discharging
them from their criminal liability must be deemed to have been issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Whether for lack of jurisdiction or for grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, the Court declares all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan City RTC
Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and void for having been
issued without jurisdiction.

However, following the new ruling in the case of Colinares vs. People, the Supreme Court
stated “The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no
fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such
philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory provisions. As
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded
as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its
letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be
applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent
purpose.”

Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson et al., the Court
rules that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon was convicted of the
same crime, Dizon is also eligible for probation.

While the Court cannot recognize the validity of the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which
granted the Applications for Probation, it cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et al. have fulfilled
the terms and conditions of their previous probation program and have eventually been discharged
therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, the trial court may, at its discretion,
consider their antecedent probation service in resolving whether to place them under
probation at this time and in determining the terms, conditions, and period thereof.

They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisión correccional, as
maximum. In this instance, the Court further finds it important to clarify the accessory penalties
inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al.

By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding

accessory penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal penalty
outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof. The applicable accessory penalty is determined by using as
reference the principal penalty imposed by the court before the prison sentence is computed in

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
37
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. This determination is made in spite of the two
classes of penalties mentioned in an indeterminate sentence. It must be emphasized that the
provisions on the inclusion of accessory penalties specifically allude to the actual "penalty" imposed,
not to the "prison sentence" set by a court. The Court believes that the ISL did not intend to have the
effect of imposing on the convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same offense. The
two penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the minimum imprisonment period is concerned,
after which the convict may apply for parole and eventually seek the shortening of the prison term.

If the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months, they shall furthermore suffer a
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. Under Article 32 of the Revised
Penal Code, if this accessory penalty attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the exercise of their
right (a) to vote in any popular election for any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c)
to hold any public office. Any public office that they may be holding becomes vacant upon finality of
the judgment. The aforementioned accessory penalties can only be wiped out if expressly remitted
in a pardon.

Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant of

probation, should the trial court find them eligible therefor. The grant of probation suspends the
execution of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties.
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold
for the duration of the probation. During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the
penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
38
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

SUYAN vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 189644
July 2, 2014

FACTS:

Information was filed against petitioner, charging him with violation of Section 16, Article
III of R.A. No. 6425 (Possession and Use of Dangerous Drugs). During arraignment, he pleaded
guilty to the charge. The RTC thereafter proceeded with trial.

Petitioner was convicted of the crime, for which he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of
six (6) years of prision correccional and to pay the costs. On even date, he filed his application for
probation.

RTC issued a Probation Order covering a period of six (6) years. While on probation,
petitioner was arrested on two occasions for violating Section 16, Article III of R.A. No. 6425. Two
separate Informations were filed against him.

Atty. Navarro, then the Chief Probation and Parole Officer, filed a Motion to Revoke
Probation. Atty. Navarro alleged that petitioner has been apprehended twice for drug possession
while on probation. The former further alleged that petitioner was considered a recidivist, whose
commission of other offenses while on probation was a serious violation of the terms thereof. Atty.
Navarro also pointed out that petitioner was no longer in a position to comply with the conditions
of the latter’s probation, in view of his incarceration.

RTC issued an order revoking the probation of petitioner and directing him to serve the
sentence imposed upon him. It denied his Motion for Reconsideration.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Rule 65 Petition with the CA, wherein he assailed the revocation
of his probation. He argued that he was denied due process as he was not furnished with a copy of
the Motion to Revoke; and when the motion was heard, he was not represented by his counsel of
record.

The CA granted the Rule 65 Petition by annulling and set aside RTC’s revocation of
petitioner’s probation. The CA ruled that the trial court had not complied with the Probation Law
and the procedural requisites for the revocation of probation under the Revised Rules on Probation
Methods and Procedures, enumerated as follows:

1) No fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations was conducted by the Probation

Officer.
2) The Probation Office should have reported to respondent court the result of said
investigation, if any, upon its completion.
3) There was no Violation Report under P.A. Form No. 8, the contents of which are
enumerated under Section 38 of the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.
4) No warrant of arrest was issued by respondent court after considering the nature and
seriousness of the alleged violations based on the report, if any.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
39
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

5) The petitioner should have been brought to respondent court for a hearing of the violations
charged, during which petitioner – with the right to counsel – should have been informed of
the violations charged and allowed to adduce evidence in his favor.

The CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings, for the
purpose of affording petitioner his right to due process pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No.
968, and the Revised Rules on Probation Methods and Procedures.

In compliance with the CA Decision, the RTC conducted a hearing on the Motion to
Revoke. A Violation Report was filed by the Dagupan City Parole and Probation Office
recommending the revocation of probation. The Violation Report provides in part:

At the outset of his probation period, probationer showed manifested negative attitude
by incurring absences and not attending rehabilitation activities despite constant
follow-up by his supervising officers. He continued with his illegal drug
activities despite counselling and warning from this Office.

Obviously, probationer has failed to recognize the value of freedom and second chance
accorded him by the Honorable Court, his conduct and attitude bespeaks of his
deviant character, hence he is unworthy to continuously enjoy the privilege of
probation.

The RTC issued an Order revoking the probation. It ruled that it had granted petitioner
due process by affording him the full opportunity to contest the Motion to Revoke; but that instead
of rebutting the Violation Report, he merely questioned the absence of a violation report when his
probation was first revoked. The RTC further held that there was positive testimony and
documentary evidence showing that petitioner had indeed violated the conditions of his
probation. He never rebutted the fact of his commission of another offense and conviction therefor
while on probation. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but it was denied.

The CA denied his appeal. With regard to the procedural issues discussed in the assailed
Decision, it ruled that petitioner was afforded due process. A full-blown trial was conducted
precisely to allow him to refute the allegations made in the Motion to Revoke. It added that the
procedural infirmities in the Motion to Revoke were cured when the RTC conducted a hearing in
accordance with the directive laid down in the first CA Case.

With regard to the substantive issue of revocation, the CA ruled that, for having
been apprehended twice for the commission of two offenses similar in nature,
petitioner violated one of the conditions prescribed in the Probation Order. He even admitted
to having served out his sentence for those offenses.

Defense

Aggrieved yet again, petitioner filed an appeal with this Court. On procedural grounds, he
alleges that there was no fact-finding investigation of the alleged violations conducted by the
probation officer, and thus no results were furnished him. Likewise, no warrant of arrest was issued
by the RTC. Neither was he afforded any opportunity to adduce evidence in his favor with the
assistance of counsel.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
40
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

On substantive grounds, petitioner alleges that he already showed repentance after his
conviction. In his first case, he readily admitted his accountability by pleading guilty to the charge.
Thus, he was convicted and he subsequently applied for probation. He further alleges that, of the
two cases filed against him, one was ordered dismissed; he has already served his sentence for the
other. Since then, no derogatory information has been received either by the probation office or the
trial court. Petitioner points out that he has already reformed his ways and is thus entitled to the
grace of law. He contends that the CA should have ordered him to resume his probation pursuant to
the Positivist Theory adopted in our criminal justice system.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the probation was validly revoked (YES)

HELD:

The probation of petitioner was validly revoked.

On the procedural grounds, the Court does not subscribe to petitioner’s contention that his
right to due process was violated after the RTC had already conducted a full-blown trial on the
Motion to Revoke, in compliance with the directive of the CA. Based on record, he had ample
opportunity to refute the allegations contained in the Violation Report.

On substantive grounds, the Court believes that there was sufficient justification for the
revocation of his probation.

Petitioner does not deny the fact that he has been convicted, and that he has served out his
sentence for another offense while on probation. Consequently, his commission of another
offense is a direct violation of Condition No. 9 of his Probation Order, and the effects are clearly
outlined in Section 11 of the Probation Law.

Section 11 of the Probation Law provides that the commission of another offense shall
render the probation order ineffective. Section 11 states:

SECTION 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. - A probation order shall take effect
upon its issuance, at which time the court shall inform the offender of the
consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure to comply with any of the
conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense, he shall
serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on
probation.

As probation is a mere discretionary grant, petitioner was bound to observe full

obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of
revocation of this privilege. Regrettably, petitioner wasted the opportunity granted him by the RTC
to remain outside prison bars, and must now suffer the consequences of his violation. The Court's
discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society and
only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having the power to grant probation, it follows

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
41
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

that the trial court also has the power to order its revocation in a proper case and under
appropriate circumstances.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
42
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

ALMERO vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 188191
March 12, 2014

FACTS:

The MTC Ruling in Criminal Case No. 96-6531

Petitioner is the accused in Criminal Case No. 96-6531 for reckless imprudence resulting
in homicide and multiple physical injuries. After private respondents reserved the right to
institute a separate action for damages, trial ensued. On January 8, 2007, the MTC of Labo,
Camarines Norte found petitioner guilty and sentenced him to suffer prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods.

Petitioner filed an Application for Probation on September 7, 2007, reasoning that he was
informed of his conviction only upon being served the warrant for his arrest. Prosecutor Velarde
opposed his application on the ground that he was known to be uncooperative, habitually absent,
and had even neglected to inform the court of his change of address. On February 22, 2007, the MTC
denied his application, prompting petitioner to file a special civil action with the RTC. While his
first Petition raised the sole issue of the denial of his application for probation, he filed a
Supplemental Petition which assailed the validity of the promulgation of the January 8, 2007
judgment.

The RTC Ruling in Special Civil Action No. 07-0012

In his supplemental Petition, petitioner stated that upon close scrutiny, he discovered that
the judgment itself was premature and flawed, because the MTC never ruled upon his Formal Offer
of Exhibits. The RTC found that the MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering
judgment without first ruling on his Formal Offer of Exhibits since, technically, petitioner had not
yet rested his case. It also ruled that the promulgation of judgment was similarly tainted with grave
abuse of discretion, because petitioner was not present at the time, in violation of Section 6, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court. Without addressing the issue of probation, the RTC granted the Petition
for Certiorari. The RTC set aside and nullified the judgment of the MTC (issued February 22,
2007), and it also remanded the case to the MTC of Labo, Camarines Norte for further
proceedings. Furthermore, it ordered the release of Almero from detention by virtue of the
property bond posted by him for his provisional liberty in Criminal Case No. 96-6531.

The CA Ruling

The CA ruled that the RTC should have confined itself to determining whether or not the
MTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s application for probation. Since no
appeal or other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law is available
against the denial of probation, a Rule 65 petition is clearly the appropriate remedy. However, the
trial court erred in taking cognizance of supplemental grounds assailing the judgment of
conviction, because an application for probation is a waiver of the right to appeal from the
judgment of conviction and effectively renders the same final. The CA ruled that even assuming

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
43
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

petitioner failed to be present at the promulgation of judgment, he had no one but himself to blame
for failing to inform the MTC of his change of address.

The CA also found that petitioner filed his application for probation only on September 7,
2007, or more than one month after he received notice of the judgment of conviction. Inasmuch as
the grant of probation rests solely on the discretion of the court, the denial thereof cannot be
considered grave abuse. CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, and another is
entered ordering the dismissal of appellee’s Petition for Certiorari.

ISSUES:

1) Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in ruling that the RTC reversibly erred in
nullifying petitioner’s judgment of conviction (NO)

2) Whether or not the CA committed an error of law in ruling that petitioner is not entitled to
probation (NO)

HELD:

(SC affirmed the ruling of the CA)

Petitioner’s arguments are brought by an erroneous understanding of the nature of

probation and shall be discussed jointly.

Probation is not a right but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency conferred by
the State, and may be granted by the court to a deserving defendant. Accordingly, the grant of
probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court. It is to be exercised primarily for the
benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.

In Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, the Court explained:

Probation is a special privilege granted by the state to a penitent qualified offender. It

essentially rejects appeals and encourages an otherwise eligible convict to immediately admit his
liability and save the state of time, effort and expenses to jettison an appeal. The law expressly
requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction before he can avail of
probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the part of the accused — to wager on the
result of his appeal — that when his conviction is finally affirmed on appeal… he now applies for
probation as an "escape hatch" thus rendering nugatory the appellate court's affirmance of his
conviction.

Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the rationale for
the treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies is that they rest on
diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused applying for probation is deemed to have
accepted the judgment. The application for probation is an admission of guilt on the part of
an accused for the crime which led to the judgment of conviction. This was the reason why the
Probation Law was amended: precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
44
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

conviction – even if the sentence is probationable – for the purpose of securing an acquittal and
applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.

Similarly, in the present case, petitioner cannot make up his mind whether to question the
judgment, or apply for probation, which is necessarily deemed a waiver of his right to appeal. While
he did not file an appeal before applying for probation, he assailed the validity of the conviction in
the guise of a petition supposedly assailing the denial of probation. In so doing, he attempted to
circumvent P.D. No. 968, as amended by P.D. 1990, which seeks to make appeal and probation
mutually exclusive remedies.

The assignment of errors in the Petition before us reflects the diametrically opposed
positions taken by accused petitioner. On the one hand, he bewails the defects committed by the
trial court during the promulgation of the judgment, thus casting doubt on the judgment itself. Yet
in the same breath, he persists in his application for probation, despite the waiver and admission of
guilt implicit in any procedure for probation – precisely the unhealthy wager the law seeks to
prevent.

Petitioner applied for probation beyond the reglementary period, yet the trial court still
allowed the filing before ultimately denying it for lack of merit. Regarding this delay and the other
defects imputed by petitioner to the RTC, we concur with the findings of the CA:

There was no grave abuse of discretion in denying appellee’s application for

probation. Granted that appellee had not received the notice of the January 8, 2007 decision, it
appears from the record that appellee had no one but himself to blame for the procedural quagmire
he subsequently found himself in. In denying appellee’s motion for reconsideration of the
September 18, 2007 denial of the application for probation, CA distinctly ruled as follows:

x x x x The application has been filed out of time as accused himself admitted in the motion. He
blames Atty. Dizon, his former counsel, for not notifying the court of his change of address but Atty.
Dizon himself had been trying to contact accused since 2001 even before he filed his formal offer of
evidence since all notices sent to the accused’s given address have been returned to this court since
2001. If it is true that he moved to Cavite only in 2003, why were said notices returned with
notations ‘unknown,’ ‘unclaimed,’ or ‘moved’.

The Court will not countenance pleas for liberality in adverse outcomes caused by the
negligence and evasiveness of the parties themselves.

In view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is denied for lack of merit. The CA Decision
and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP No. 103030 dated 26 September 2008 and 29 May 2009 are hereby
affirmed, respectively.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
45
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

MORENO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 168550
August 10, 2006

FACTS:

Norma L. Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno from running for Punong
Barangay on the ground that the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime of
arbitrary detention and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 4 Months and 1 Day to 2
Years and 4 Months by the RTC.

Moreno filed an answer averring that the petition states no cause of action because he was
already granted probation. The imposition of the sentence of imprisonment, as well as the accessory
penalties, was thereby suspended. Moreno also argued that under Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of
1976, the final discharge of the probation shall operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or
suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed. The
order of the trial court allegedly terminated his probation and restored to him all the civil rights he
lost as a result of his conviction, including the right to vote and be voted for.

The Investigating Officer recommended that Moreno be disqualified from running for
Punong Barangay. The COMELEC First Division adopted this recommendation.

On Motion for Reconsideration filed with the COMELEC en banc, the Resolution of the
First Division was affirmed. According to the COMELEC en banc, Sec. 40(a) of the Local
Government Code provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years
after serving sentence, are disqualified from running for any elective local position. Since Moreno
was released from probation on December 20, 2000, disqualification shall commence on this date
and end two (2) years thence. The grant of probation to Moreno merely suspended the
execution of his sentence but did not affect his disqualification from running for an elective
local office. The COMELEC en banc also held that the provisions of the Local Government Code take
precedence over the case of Baclayon vs. Mutia cited by Moreno and the Probation Law because it is
a much later enactment and a special law setting forth the qualifications and disqualifications of
elective local officials.

Moreno argues that the disqualification under the Local Government Code applies only to
those who have served their sentence and not to probationers because the latter do not serve the
adjudged sentence. The Probation Law should allegedly be read as an exception to the Local
Government Code because it is a special law which applies only to probationers. Further, even
assuming that he is disqualified, his subsequent election as Punong Barangay allegedly constitutes
an implied pardon of his previous misconduct.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that conviction for an offense involving moral
turpitude stands even if the candidate was granted probation. The disqualification under Sec. 40(a)
of the Local Government Code subsists and remains totally unaffected notwithstanding the grant of
probation.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
46
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

Moreno alleges that he applied for and was granted probation within the period specified
therefor. He never served a day of his sentence as a result. Hence, the disqualification under Sec.
40(a) of the Local Government Code does not apply to him.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Moreno is disqualified from running for Punong Barangay (NO)

HELD:

NO, Moreno is not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay.

The phrase "within two (2) years after serving sentence" should have been interpreted and
understood to apply both to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude and to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment. The placing of the comma (,) in the provision
means that the phrase modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.

In Dela Torre vs. COMELEC, the Court’s declaration on the effect of probation on Sec. 40(a) of
the Local Government Code ought to be considered an obiter in view of the fact that Dela Torre was
not even entitled to probation because he appealed his conviction to the RTC which, however,
affirmed his conviction. It has been held that the perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the
alternative remedy of availing of the Probation Law, the purpose of which is to prevent speculation
or opportunism on the part of an accused who, although already eligible, did not at once apply for
probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal.

Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code appears innocuous enough at first glance. The
phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general and common sense, means the confinement
of a convicted person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court. This seemingly clear and
unambiguous provision, however, has spawned a controversy worthy of this Court’s attention
because the COMELEC, in the assailed resolutions, is alleged to have broadened the coverage of the
law to include even those who did not serve a day of their sentence because they were granted
probation.

Moreno argues that he should not have been disqualified because he did not serve the
adjudged sentence having been granted probation and finally discharged by the trial court.

The accessory penalties of suspension from public office, from the right to follow a
profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage,
attendant to the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation.

During the period of probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from running
for a public office because the accessory penalty of suspension from public office is put on
hold for the duration of the probation.

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
47
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

The period within which a person is under probation cannot be equated with service
of the sentence adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law specifically provides that the grant of
probation suspends the execution of the sentence. During the period of probation, the
probationer does not serve the penalty imposed upon him by the court but is merely required to
comply with all the conditions prescribed in the probation order.

Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code unequivocally disqualifies only those who have
been sentenced by final judgment for an offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1) year or
more, within two (2) years after serving sentence. Those who have not served their sentence by
reason of the grant of probation, which, as reiterated, should not be equated with service of
sentence, should not likewise be disqualified from running for a local elective office because the
two (2)-year period of ineligibility under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code does not
even begin to run.

The fact that the trial court already issued an order finally discharging Moreno fortifies his
position. Sec. 16 of the Probation Law provides that "the final discharge of the probationer shall
operate to restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully
discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to the offense for which probation was
granted." Thus, when Moreno was finally discharged upon the court’s finding that he has fulfilled
the terms and conditions of his probation, his case was deemed terminated and all civil rights
lost or suspended as a result of his conviction were restored to him, including the right to run
for public office.

The Court’s function, in the face of this seeming dissonance, is to interpret and harmonize
the Probation Law and the Local Government Code. Interpretare et concordare legis legibus est
optimus interpretandi.

Probation is not a right of an accused but a mere privilege, an act of grace and clemency or
immunity conferred by the state, which is granted to a deserving defendant who thereby escapes
the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he was convicted. Thus,
the Probation Law lays out rather stringent standards regarding who are qualified for probation.

It is important to note that the disqualification under Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government
Code covers offenses punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, a penalty which
also covers probationable offenses. In spite of this, the provision does not specifically disqualify
probationers from running for a local elective office. This omission is significant because it offers a
glimpse into the legislative intent to treat probationers as a distinct class of offenders not covered
by the disqualification.

The Court agrees with Moreno that the Probation Law should be construed as an
exception to the Local Government Code. While the Local Government Code is a later law which
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of local elective officials, the Probation Law is a
special legislation which applies only to probationers. It is a canon of statutory construction that a
later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a prior special statute, will ordinarily not
affect the special provisions of such earlier statute.

In construing Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code in a way that broadens the scope of
the disqualification to include Moreno, the COMELEC committed an egregious error which the Court

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
48
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.
 Case
CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia] Digests

here corrects. Moreno was not disqualified to run for Punong Barangay of Barangay Cabugao,
Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections. Finally, the Court notes that Moreno was the incumbent Punong Barangay at the time of
his conviction of the crime of Arbitrary Detention. He claims to have obtained a fresh mandate from
the people of Barangay Cabugao, Daram, Samar in the July 15, 2002 elections. This situation calls to
mind the poignant words of Mr. Justice now Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban in Frivaldo vs.
COMELEC where he said that "it would be far better to err in favor of popular sovereignty than to be
right in complex but little understood legalisms."

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Bose. Candelaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Hermogenes. Maranan.
49
Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.