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Chapter 9
Helping other people

What to look for

� Nature, nurture and being helpful

� The roles of empathy, learning and attribution
� Theoretical models of helping: bystander-calculus, cognitive
� Helping in an emergency
� People who are very helpful
� Encouraging people to be helpful
� Volunteers as dedicated helpers
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Focus questions
1. Arthur spots this headline in his local newspaper: ‘Altruistic dolphin pushes child away from
shark!’ Fascinating, he thinks, but that’s not altruism . . . or is it?
2. Vincenzo is fit and healthy, his whole life ahead of him. His twin brother’s future is uncertain. He
now needs dialysis more than once a week. After months of thinking, some of it agonising,
Vincenzo’s mind is made up – he will donate a kidney to his brother. Would you want to help your
really close kin? Does Vincenzo’s choice have implications for evolutionary theory?
3. Lily is 13 years old and tall for her age. One afternoon, she confronts a suspicious-looking
stranger loitering near a young girl playing in the local park. The stranger takes to his heels
when Lily challenges him. It’s the talk of the neighbourhood, and there’s mention of a medal for
bravery. Hearing this, your social psychology classmate points out: ‘It’s just as well that Lily’s
usual playmates were not around, or that little girl might not have received any help.’ What
could your classmate mean? For an experimental re-enactment of a similar scenario go to
EB

W
Chapter 9 of MyPsychLab at www.mypsychlab.co.uk.
4. You turn the corner of a city street to see a man sprawled across the footpath in front of you.
What do you do? What things might you want to know more about before deciding on how to act?
Source: Ismail Zaydah / Reuters
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262 CHAPTER 9 HELPING OTHER PEOPLE

his chapter stands in contrast to Chapter 8, which dealt with the human

T potential to be negative and aggressive. In Chapter 9 we now turn to the

positive and altruistic aspect of human nature. Whether we behave
aggressively or prosocially, our capacity to do so has both biological and
social roots. One would be forgiven for concluding that people are basically full of
hatred and aggression. Was the philosopher Thomas Hobbes right to call us nasty
and brutish? At times we are not. We now ask why, when and how people decide
to help others even if they in turn pay the ultimate sacrifice.

What is prosocial behaviour?

Prosocial behaviour Acts that benefit another person are referred to as prosocial behaviour, helping
Acts that are positively behaviour or altruism. Some use these terms interchangeably, but there are distinc-
valued by society. tions and differences as they are used in the research literature.

Prosocial behaviour can be varied

Prosocial behaviour is a broad category of acts that are valued positively by society
– contrast it with antisocial behaviour. Wispé (1972) defined prosocial behaviour
as behaviour that has positive social consequences, and contributes to the physical
or psychological well-being of another person. It is voluntary and has the intention
to benefit others (Eisenberg et al., 1996). Being prosocial includes both being help-
ful and altruistic. It also embraces acts of charity, cooperation, friendship, rescue,
sacrifice, sharing, sympathy and trust. What is thought to be prosocial is defined
by a society’s norms.
Helping behaviour Helping behaviour is a subcategory of prosocial behaviour. Helping is inten-
Acts that intentionally
tional and it benefits another living being or group. If you accidentally drop £10
benefit someone else.
and someone finds it and uses it, you have not performed a helping behaviour. But
if you gave £10 to Connie who really needed it, you have helped her. On the other
hand, making a large public donation to a charity because you wanted to appear
generous is not helping behaviour. Some corporate donations to a good cause may
Altruism even be driven by product image, e.g. looking for a long-term increase in profit.
A special form of Helping can sometimes be antisocial, e.g. overhelping, when giving help is designed
helping behaviour, to make others look inferior (Gilbert & Silvera, 1996).
sometimes costly, that Altruism is another subcategory of prosocial behaviour, and refers to an act that
shows concern for is meant to benefit another rather than oneself. In this respect, Dan Batson (1991)
fellow human beings proposed that true altruism is selfless, although there is some difficulty with the
and is performed
concept. Can we demonstrate that an act does not stem from a long-term ulterior
without expectation of
personal gain.
motive, such as ingratiation?
While the literature dealing with altruism is controversial, the broader topic of
nature–nurture acting prosocially is difficult to explain using traditional theories of human behav-
controversy iour. Many commentators regard human behaviour as egoistic: self-interest reigns
Classic debate about supreme. Therefore, to call some behaviour prosocial is unusual because this sug-
whether genetic or
gests it does not rely on reinforcement. It also highlights an optimistic and positive
environmental factors
determine human
view of human beings. How can effort and sacrifice for another person be reinforc-
behaviour. Scientists ing in the usual sense?
generally accept that it In dealing with aggression in Chapter 8, we referred to the nature–nurture con-
is an interaction of both. troversy – the debate over the roles of biological versus learned determinants of
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BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES 263

behaviour. It is relevant to the origins of, and situational factors involved in, pro-
social acts. The question of why people help others is important. First, we address
two seemingly opposing views, evolutionary theory and social learning theory.
Next, we look at biosocial views that reflect an interplay of empathy, cognition,
and the context in which help is either given or not.

Biological approaches
In this section we commence with an approach that is grounded in evolutionary
theory and draws analogies between animal and human behaviour. We then con-
sider the nature of empathy to find that both cognitive and social factors are
involved and therefore move us towards a biosocial approach.

A phenomenon of nature?
Put simply, the biological position is that humans have innate tendencies to eat,
drink, mate and fight – and to help others. This could be why humans have been so
successful in an evolutionary sense. The question whether altruism has evolution-
ary survival value has been asked by the social psychologist Dennis Krebs (1975),
the sociobiologist Edward Wilson (1978), and the evolutionary social psychologists
David Buss and Doug Kenrick (1998). Consider the next example given by Dan
Batson (1983).
A small child, Margaret, and her friend, Red, were seated in the back seat of
Margaret’s parents’ car. Suddenly the car burst into flames. Red jumped from the
car but realised that Margaret was still inside. He jumped back into the burning
car, grabbed Margaret by the jacket and pulled her to safety. Can we trace this
sequence to an altruistic impulse inherited from our ancestors? The fact that Red
was an Irish setter – yes, a dog! – lends weight to the argument that there is a
genetic aspect to altruism and prosocial behaviour (see the first focus question
about the dolphin). It also begs the question: can other animals be ‘altruistic’?
Jeffrey Stevens and his colleagues (Stevens, Cushman & Hauser, 2005) distin-
guished two reliable explanations of cooperative behaviour in animals and humans:
• Mutualism – cooperative behaviour that benefits the cooperator as well as
others; a defector will do worse than a cooperator.
• Kin selection – in which a cooperator is biased towards blood relatives because
it helps propagate one’s own genes; the lack of direct benefit to the cooperator
indicates altruism.
Kin selection is the obvious candidate to be an evolutionary account of human
altruism. Is there any such evidence?
Eugene Burnstein and his colleagues investigated ‘decision rules’ for being altru-
istic that might deal with genetic overlap between persons. Participants rated how
likely they would be to help others in several situations (see Figure 9.1). People
favoured the sick over the healthy in everyday situations but favoured the healthy
over the sick in life-or-death situations. They gave more weight to kinship in every-
day situations and the healthy in life-or-death situations. Finally, people were more
likely to assist the very young or the very old in everyday situations, but under
famine conditions people are more likely to help 10-year-olds or 18-year-olds than
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264 CHAPTER 9 HELPING OTHER PEOPLE

Figure 9.1
Helping kin who are either healthy or sick: life-or- 3
death versus everyday situations.
• There is an interaction between health, kinship Sick/everyday
and willingness to help.

Tendency to help (4-point scale)

• Participants chose between people who varied in
kinship in two conditions: healthy versus sick 2
individuals, and giving help in a situation that
was life-or-death versus merely ‘everyday’.
• They were generally more willing to help closer
kin than more distant kin.
• They also preferred to help people who were 1 Healthy/life-or-death
sick rather than healthy in an everyday situation,
but who were healthy rather than sick in a Sick/life-or-death
perilous situation.
Healthy/everyday
Source: Burnstein, E., Crandall, C., & Kitayama, S. (1994). Some
neo-Darwinian decision rules for altruism: Weighing cues for
0.0
inclusive fitness as a function of the biological importance of the One-half One-quarter One-eighth
decision. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 773–789,
Reproduced with permission from Professor Eugene Burnstein and Degree of kinship
the American Psychological Association (APA).

infants or older people. These data are consistent with, if not fully convincing, the
idea that close kin will get crucial help when ‘the chips are down’. (See the second
focus question about Vincenzo’s choice.)
A biological predisposition to help others, as well as kin, is a fascinating notion.
However, few social psychologists accept an exclusively evolutionary explanation
of human prosocial behaviour, though may accept an evolutionary basis to a lim-
ited extent.
A problem with evolutionary theory as a sole explanation of altruism is the lack
of convincing human evidence; on the contrary, a case such as the failure to help
the murder victim Kitty Genovese considered later (see Box 9.2) is difficult to
explain at a biological level. Another criticism is the scant attention afforded by
evolutionary theorists to the work of social learning theorists, in particular to the
role of modelling, as we shall see.
Ross Buck and Benson Ginsburg (1991) argued that altruism depends upon the
capacity for both humans and animals to communicate. Communication allows
some species to pick up emotional signals (see Chapter 11), and to form social
bonds (see Chapter 10), and to act prosocially based on empathy. These ideas have
merit but they are a long way from an extreme evolutionary view, such as the exis-
tence of an ‘altruistic gene’. Later, we will look at the practical value of social
structures that promote prosocial behaviour.

Empathy Do helpers feel empathic?

Ability to feel another
Here we consider a biosocial approach, a less extreme account of prosocial behav-
person’s experiences;
identifying with and iour than an evolutionary one. As Sam Gaertner and John Dovidio have pointed
experiencing another out, a common experience before acting prosocially is a state of arousal followed
person’s emotions, by empathy (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977). Empathy is an emotional response to
thoughts and attitudes. someone else’s distress, a reaction to witnessing a disturbing event. Adults and
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BIOLOGICAL APPROACHES 265

children respond empathically to signs of a troubled person, implying that watch-

ing someone suffer is unpleasant. Have you ever looked away when a film shows
someone being tortured? At first glance this suggests that when we help we are
merely trying to reduce our own unpleasant feelings. This points to the need for an
extra ingredient, empathy – an ability to identify with someone else’s experiences,
particularly their feelings (Krebs, 1975). See how this has been formalised in a the-
oretical model in the next section.

Doing the maths

The bystander-calculus model of helping involves body and mind, a mixture of Bystander-calculus
physiological processes and cognitive processes. According to sociologist Jane model
Piliavin, when we think someone is in trouble we work our way through three In attending to an
emergency, the
stages, or sets of calculations, before we respond (Piliavin et al., 1981). First, we
bystander calculates
are physiologically aroused by another’s distress. Second, we label this arousal as
the perceived costs and
an emotion. Third, we evaluate the consequences of helping. See Box 9.1. benefits of providing
If the bystander-calculus model is applied strictly, it implies that ‘altruism’ is a help compared with
misnomer because it is really motivated by self-interest, or egoism (see Maner et those associated with
al., 2002). However, Batson’s view is that an act is truly altruistic only if the not helping.
helper is not feeling highly distressed, such as having second thoughts and turning
back to help a stranded motorist. In a German study, Hans-Werner Bierhoff and
Elke Rohmann (2004) have supported this line of thinking, that true altruism will
reveal itself when the potential helper could easily not help, such as just quietly
slipping away.

Research and applications 9.1

Steps in the bystander-calculus model

There are three steps in Jane Piliavin’s model, which is arousal play a critical role in determining the nature of
supported by the work of others: the emotions they feel. Sometimes our response is
also to feel distressed. Dan Batson suggested further
1. Physiological arousal that situational cues often trigger another set of
Our first reaction to someone in distress is physiological, responses, empathic concern (Batson & Coke, 1981).
an empathic response. The greater the arousal, the He also argued that when bystanders believe they are
more chance that a bystander will help. How quickly we similar to a victim they are more likely to experience
react is related to the level of our body’s response: e.g. empathic concern.
the quicker our heartbeat the quicker we respond
(Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977). There is also a cognitive 3. Evaluating the consequences
aspect. As the victim’s plight becomes clearer and more Finally, bystanders evaluate the consequences of
severe our physiological arousal increases. acting before they help a victim, choosing an action
that will reduce their personal distress at the lowest
2. Labelling the arousal cost (a cost–benefit analysis is also used in a social
Being aroused is one thing, but feeling a specific exchange approach to close relationships; see Chapter
emotion (fear, anger, love) is another. Generally, 10). The main costs of helping are time and effort: the
arousal does not automatically produce specific greater these costs, the less likely that a bystander will
emotions; people’s cognitions or thoughts about the help (Darley & Batson, 1973).
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266 CHAPTER 9 HELPING OTHER PEOPLE

Perspective taking
Empathic concern To experience empathic concern requires us to demonstrate perspective taking –
An element in Batson’s being able to see the position of another person from that person’s point of view.
theory of helping According to Jean Decety and Klaus Lamm (2006), this capacity has evolutionary
behaviour. In contrast to
significance. Some non-human primates respond to the feelings of others, but
personal distress
(which may lead us to
humans can both feel and act intentionally on behalf of others. It is this capacity
flee from the situation), that may account for why empathic concern is thought by theorists such as Batson
it includes feelings of to be crucial for altruism.
warmth, being soft- Batson and his colleagues (Batson, Early & Salvarini, 1997; Batson, van Lange,
hearted, and having Ahmad & Lishner, 2003) made a further distinction concerning perspective taking:
compassion for a between understanding and experiencing how another person feels and how you
person in need. would feel in the same situation. Different kinds of empathy lead to different kinds
of motivation to help. Their study showed that actively imagining how another
feels produces empathy, which leads to altruistic motivation. However, actively
imagining how you would feel produces empathy, but it also produces self-oriented
distress, and involves a mix of altruism and egoism. Perhaps people who have
experienced something stressful will empathise more with a person who is in a sim-
ilar situation. For example, people who have been homeless or extremely ill may
empathise more with a person in the same condition.

Are women more empathic?

We have seen several times in this book (e.g. Chapters 6, 7 and 8) that socialisation
can shape behaviour differently for men and women in many societies. This is
emphasised in social role theory, an approach that gives little credence to a biologi-
cal explanation, for example, in terms of hormonal factors. Is there any evidence of
a gender difference in the tendency to show empathy?
Batson and his colleagues took up this question. In their study, people read a
same-sex adolescent’s description of a stressful life event, such as being the object
of ridicule and teasing because of acne, or being betrayed and rejected (Batson et
al., 1996). Women reported more empathy with a same-sex teenager when they
had had similar experiences during their adolescence, an effect not found with
men. Batson accounted for this gender difference in terms of socialisation: women
value interdependence and are more other-oriented, while men value independence
and are more self-oriented. See Figure 9.2.
We return to the topic of gender differences in a later section when we consider
the question whether some people are more helpful than others. But next we deal
with several approaches to prosocial behaviour whose origins lie squarely within
social psychology.

Social approaches
In this section, we look at the role of learning. Recall that in Chapter 8 we noted
how social learning theorists such as Bandura emphasised that children have a
knack of learning to be aggressive and readily mimic appropriate models who act
out violent sequences. A similar argument applies here: if children can learn to be
aggressive in some contexts they can surely learn to be prosocial in others (see
Figure 8.4 in Chapter 8). We also look at the how attributional processes can play
a part, and that there are social norms for helping.
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SOCIAL APPROACHES 267

Figure 9.2
Differences between men and women in empathising
No prior experience
with a distressed teenager.
5 Had prior experience
• We might expect that people with prior experience of
a stressful situation would empathise more with
a same-sex teenager undergoing that same

Empathic response (range 1 to 9)

experience. 4
• In this study, only women with prior experience
showed an increase in empathy.

1
Women Men
Sex of empathiser

Learning to be helpful
A major explanation of helping is that displaying prosocial behaviour is intricately
bound up with becoming socialised: it is learned, not inborn. Various theorists have
argued that the processes of classical conditioning, instrumental conditioning and
observational learning all contribute to being prosocial. In dealing with child devel-
opment, Nancy Eisenberg noted a strand of research directed to the way that
prosocial behaviour is acquired in childhood (Eisenberg et al., 1999). The applica-
tion of learning theory to prosocial behaviour has been vigorously pursued within
developmental and educational research fields in recent years.
However, traditional research carried out with adults in earlier decades, some of
it experimental, dealt with a variety of conditions that control the display of help-
ing. These are covered later in this chapter. First, we deal with studies of childhood,
the period in which so much important learning takes place. Carolyn Zahn-Waxler
has studied the development of the emotions in children. She concluded that how
we respond to distress in others is connected to the way we learn to share, help and
provide comfort, and that these patterns emerge between the ages of 1 and 2
(Zahn-Waxler, Radke-Yarrow, Wagner & Chapman, 1992). There are several ways
in which these actions can be learned:
• Giving instructions. In her studies of parenting, Joan Grusec found that simply
telling children to be helpful to others actually works (Grusec, Kuczynski,
Rushton & Simutis, 1978). Telling a child what is appropriate establishes an
expectation and a later guide for action. However, preaching about being good
is of doubtful value unless a fairly strong form of advice is used (Rice & Grusec,
1975). Furthermore, telling children to be generous if the ‘preacher’ behaves
inconsistently is pointless: ‘do as I say, not as I do’ does not work. Grusec
reported that when an adult acted selfishly but urged children to be generous,
the children were actually less generous.
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268 CHAPTER 9 HELPING OTHER PEOPLE

• Using reinforcement. Acts that are rewarded are more likely to be repeated.
When young children are rewarded for offering to help, they are more likely to
offer help again later. Similarly, if they are not rewarded, they are less likely to
offer help again (Grusec, 1991). J. Philippe Rushton has studied this field inten-
sively. See an example of his work in Figure 9.3.
• Exposure to models. In his review of factors that influence children to give help,
Rushton (1976) concluded that while reinforcement is effective in shaping
Modelling behaviour, modelling is even more effective. Watching someone else helping
Tendency for a person another is a powerful form of learning. This approach can be extended to other
to reproduce the contexts. Take the case of young Johnny who first helps his mummy to carry
actions, attitudes and
some shopping into the house and then wants to help in putting it away, and
emotional responses
then cleans up his/her bedroom. Well, maybe not the last bit!
exhibited by a real-life
or symbolic model. Also
called observational
learning. The impact of attribution
People make attributions about helping or not helping others. To continue being
helpful on more than one occasion requires a person to internalise the idea of
‘being helpful’ (see self-perception theory, Chapter 3). Helpfulness can then be a
guide in the future when helping is an option. A self-attribution can be even more
powerful than reinforcement for learning helping behaviour: young children who
were told they were ‘helpful people’ donated more marbles to a needy child than
those who were reinforced with verbal praise, and this effect persisted over time
(Grusec & Redler, 1980). Indeed, David Perry and his colleagues found that chil-
dren may experience self-criticism and bad feelings when they fail to live up to the
standards implied by their own attributions (Perry et al., 1980).
If we are wondering if we should offer help to someone in need we usually try to
figure out who or what this person might be. Some observers may even blame an

Figure 9.3
The effects of reward and punishment on children’s
Positive reinforcement
willingness to be generous. 8
No consequences
• Boys aged 8–11 years watched an adult who played Punishment
Number of tokens donated

a game to win tokens.

6
• Then the adult generously donated some by putting
them in a bowl to be given later to a child pictured
in a poster, a boy who was ‘poor little Bobby, who
4
had no Mommy or Daddy to look after him’.
• Next, the child played the game. In one condition,
the adult used verbal reinforcers as rewards or
punishments for behaving generously (e.g. either 2
‘good for you’, or ‘that’s kind of silly . . . now you
will have less tokens for yourself’).
• Both tactics had strong effects on how the boys 0
Immediate test Two-week retest
behaved, immediately and after a two-week interval. Time period
• While this study employed reinforcement principles,
it clearly also featured the effects of watching a
model.
Source: Based on Rushton & Teachman (1978).
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SOCIAL APPROACHES 269

Exposure to models. Young children soon learn the value of

sharing and helping one another.
Source: Pearson Online Database (POD)

innocent victim. According to the just-world hypothesis proposed by Melvin Just-world

Lerner and Dale Miller (Lerner & Miller, 1978), people need to believe – perhaps hypothesis
for their own security – that the world is a just place where people get what they According to Lerner,
people need to believe
deserve (see Chapter 2). Therefore, if some victims deserve their fate, we can think
that the world is a just
‘Good, they had that coming to them!’ and not help them. Perhaps a rape victim place where they get
‘deserved’ what happened because her clothing was too tight or revealing? what they deserve.
Accepting that the world must necessarily be a just place begins in childhood and is Examples of undeserved
a learned attribution. suffering undermine this
Fortunately, most of us respond to evidence that suffering is undeserved. belief, and people may
Accepting this undermines the power of belief in a just world and allows justice to conclude that victims
be done. A necessary precondition of actually helping is to believe that the help will deserve their fate.
be effective. Miller (1977) isolated two factors that can convince a would-be
helper: (1) the victim is a special case rather than one of many, and (2) the need is
temporary rather than persisting. Each of these allows us to decide that giving aid
‘right now’ will be effective.

Norms for helping

Often we help others simply because ‘something tells us’ we should. Help that little
old lady cross the street, hand in a wallet we found in the supermarket, help a
crying child. An important influence that develops and sustains prosocial behav-
iour is a cultural norm. Norms provide a steady check for how we should act (see
Chapters 5 and 6) and are quintessentially learned rather than innate. A norm is a
standard that specifies what is expected, ‘normal’ or proper.
Almost every culture shares a norm that ‘concern for others is good; selfishness
is bad’. An unwritten rule is that when the cost is not very great and another
person’s need is high, we should help. If a norm of social responsibility is universal,
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270 CHAPTER 9 HELPING OTHER PEOPLE

it means that it is functional and that it facilitates social life. One way to account
for why we help others, therefore, is to say that it is normative. There are social
rewards for behaving in accord with the norm and sanctions for violating the
norm. Sanctions may range from mild disapproval to incarceration or worse,
depending on the threat posed to the existing social order.
Two norms have been proposed as a basis for altruism:
Reciprocity norm 1. The reciprocity norm. We should help those who help us. It is said that this
The principle of ‘doing norm, also referred to as the reciprocity principle, is as universal as the incest
unto others as they do taboo. However, the extent to which we should reciprocate varies. Abraham
to you’. It can refer to Tesser found that we feel deeply indebted when someone freely makes a big sac-
returning a favour,
rifice for us but much less so if what they do is smaller and expected (Tesser,
mutual aggression or
mutual help. Gatewood & Driver, 1968). Further, people might help only in return for help
given in the past or anticipated in the future. People driven by egoism are more
likely to act prosocially when they believe their reputations are at stake
(Simpson & Willer, 2008).
Social responsibility 2. The social responsibility norm. We should give help freely to those in need with-
norm out regard to future exchanges. Members of a community are often willing to
The idea that we should help the needy, even when they remain anonymous donors and do not expect
help people who are
any social reward (Berkowitz, 1972b). In practice, people usually apply this
dependent and in need.
It is contradicted by
norm selectively, e.g. to those in need through no fault of their own rather than
another norm that to callers at the front door. The extent to which people internalise as a norm
discourages interfering beliefs about the future of our planet has been linked to environmental activism
in other people’s lives. (Stern, Dietz & Guagnano, 1995; Fielding, McDonald & Louis, 2008).
Neither norm can realistically explain prosocial behaviour in animals (Stevens,
Cushman & Hauser, 2005). If reciprocity applies to humans then it is distinctive to
humans; and there is no room for a social responsibility norm in animals.
The next approach is also social psychological but gives greater emphasis to cog-
nitive factors. Because of the huge effect it had on research in the field of prosocial
behaviour we highlight it in a separate section.

Bystander
Bystander apathy
intervention
This occurs when an Recall that in the 1980s Jane Piliavin and her colleagues wanted to know how
individual breaks out of empathy impacted on whether people chose to help or not help in an emergency.
the role of a bystander However, this field of research has an older history. A single event gave it a major
and helps another impetus – the murder of a young woman called Kitty Genovese in New York in
person in an 1964. Her murder appalled New York residents (see Box 9.2).
emergency.
The initial frenzy of research that followed Kitty Genovese’s murder focused on
Bystander effect the situational factors that affect bystander intervention rather than on how help-
People are less likely to ing behaviour is learned. Failure to intervene fairly naturally invited a focus on
help in an emergency people’s thinking processes, leading to developing a cognitive model of helping.
when they are with
What has this revealed? We now know that a lone bystander is more likely to help
others than when alone.
The greater the number, than any of several bystanders, a phenomenon known as the bystander effect.
the less likely it is that (Perhaps this applies to Lily; see the third focus question.) The most influential
anyone will help. research was that of Latané and Darley (1970).
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BYSTANDER APATHY 271

Real world 9.2

The Kitty Genovese murder: a trigger for research on
bystander intervention

Late one night in March 1964, Kitty Genovese was on her failed to act. It is perhaps understandable that some
way home from work at the time she was attacked by a had not rushed out into the street for fear of also being
knife-wielding maniac. The scene was the Kew Gardens in attacked, but why did they not at least call the police?
the borough of Queens in New York, a respectable This particularly tragic and horrific event received
neighbourhood. Her screams and struggles drove off the national media attention in America, all asking why
attacker at first but, seeing no one come to the woman’s
none of the neighbours had helped. Not surprisingly,
aid, the man attacked again. Once more she escaped,
there was heightened interest from social psychologists,
shouting and crying for help. Yet her screams were to no
including Latané and Darley (1976, p. 309):
avail and she was soon cornered again. She was stabbed
eight more times and then sexually molested. In the half- This story became the journalistic sensation of the decade.
hour or so that it took for the man to kill Kitty, not one of ‘Apathy,’ cried the newspapers. ‘Indifference,’ said the
her neighbours helped her. columnists and commentators. ‘Moral callousness’,
About half an hour after the attack began, the local ‘dehumanisation’, ‘loss of concern for our fellow man’,
police received a call from an anonymous witness. He added preachers, professors and other sermonisers. Movies,
reported the attack but would not give his name television specials, plays and books explored this incident
because he did not want to ‘get involved’. The next and many like it. Americans became concerned about their
day, when the police interviewed the area’s residents, lack of concern.
thirty-eight people openly admitted to hearing the Read how the story of Kitty’s murder first broke at
screaming. They had all had time to do something but http://kewgardenshistory.com/ss-nytimes-3.html

Bystander intervention. It is an irony that your best chance of being helped in an

emergency is when only one bystander is present.
Source: Pearson Online Database (POD)
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272 CHAPTER 9 HELPING OTHER PEOPLE

Helping in an emergency
Stemming directly from the wide public discussion and concern about the
Genovese case, Bibb Latané and John Darley began a programme of research
(Darley & Latané, 1968), now considered a classic in social psychology. Surely,
these researchers asked, empathy for another’s suffering, or at the very least a sense
of civic responsibility, should lead to an intervention in a situation of danger?
Furthermore, where several bystanders are present, there should be a correspond-
ingly greater probability that someone will help. Before dealing with this theory,
Emergency situation consider the elements of an emergency situation:
Often involves an
unusual event, can vary • It can involve danger, for person or property.
in nature, is unplanned, • It is an unusual event, rarely encountered by the ordinary person.
and requires a quick • It can differ widely in nature, from a bank on fire to a pedestrian being mugged.
response. • It is not foreseen, so that prior planning of how to cope is improbable.
• It requires instant action, so that leisurely consideration of options is not feasible.
It would be easy to label the failure to help a victim in an emergency as apathy,
but Latané and Darley reasoned that more rational processes were involved. An
early and crucial finding was that failure to help occurred more often when the size
of the group of witnesses increased. Latané and Darley’s cognitive model of
bystander intervention proposes that whether a person helps depends on the out-
comes of a series of decisions. At any point along this path, a decision could be
made that would terminate a tendency to help. The steps in this model are
described in Box 9.3, and the decision process is illustrated in Figure 9.4.
In one experiment (Latané & Rodin, 1969), male students were led to believe
that someone had been injured. They were either alone or in pairs filling in a ques-
tionnaire when they heard what sounded like a woman in another room struggling
to open a filing cabinet. Then they heard a loud crash, followed by a cry of pain
and moans and groans. Those who were alone helped 70 per cent of the time but
those in pairs only 40 per cent of the time. Participants who were with a passive
confederate, a manipulation that suggested the situation was not critical, helped
only 7 per cent of the time.
A major outcome of these studies is that personal responsibility is enhanced
when there is just one onlooker in an emergency. (Again, this is relevant to Lily’s
case described in the third focus question.) Latané and Darley proposed several
psychological processes that can trigger the reluctance to help when others are
present. In a variety of experiments they delivered cogent evidence that all of these
can account for bystander apathy, and that their effects are cumulative:
• Diffusion of responsibility. Other onlookers give an opportunity to transfer the
responsibility for acting, or not acting, on to them. We may not actually see
Fear of social them. It is necessary only that they be available, somewhere, for action. People
blunders who are alone are most likely to help a victim because they believe they carry the
The dread of acting entire responsibility for action. The presence of just one other witness allows dif-
inappropriately or of fusion of responsibility to operate.
making a foolish
• Audience inhibition. Other onlookers can make people self-conscious about an
mistake witnessed by
others. The desire to
intended action; people do not want to appear foolish by overreacting. In the
avoid ridicule inhibits context of prosocial behaviour, this process is sometimes referred to as a fear of
effective responses to social blunders. Have you felt a dread of being laughed at for misunderstanding
an emergency by little crises involving others? What if things are not as they seem? What if some-
members of a group. one is playing a joke?
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BYSTANDER APATHY 273

Research classic 9.3

Steps in Latané and Darley’s cognitive model:
When will we help?

1 Do we even notice an event where helping may be knows that there are other onlookers but cannot
required, such as an accident? see their reactions. This was clearly the case in
the Genovese incident. Sometimes the decision
2 How do we interpret the event? We are most likely
to assume responsibility is determined by how
to define a situation as an emergency, and most
competent the bystander feels in the particular
likely to help, when we believe that the victim’s
situation. For both steps 2 and 3, the influence
condition is serious and is about to deteriorate
of other people is clearly a determining factor.
rapidly. Findings show that people are more likely to
help in emergencies (e.g. someone needs an insulin 4 What do we decide to do?
shot for diabetes) than in non-emergencies (e.g.
5 Is help given? If we doubt whether the situation is
needing some allergy medicine). Verbal distress
an emergency, or we do not know what to do if it
cues (e.g. screaming) are particularly effective and
is, the behaviour of others around us can influence
increase the likelihood of bystander intervention.
how we respond.
Bystander apathy is markedly reduced once people
interpret a situation as an emergency. Source: Based on Darley & Latané (1968).
3 Do we accept personal responsibility for helping?
Sometimes a person witnessing an emergency

Attend to what Define event as Assume Decide what

is happening + emergency + responsibility + can be done

Give help

Figure 9.4
Deciding whether to help in Latané and Darley’s cognitive model.
Source: Based on Latané & Darley (1970).

• Social influence. Other onlookers provide a model for action. If they are passive
and unworried, the situation may seem less serious.
Generally speaking, bystander apathy characterises the behaviour of strangers, and
is most evident when they know they will not interact later and possibly need to
explain their lack of action. When bystanders know each other, help is much more
likely to be given, particularly if the victim is an acquaintance, friend or relative, or
is a child being abused in a public place (Christy & Voigt, 1994).
We suspect you have already thought of this question: are there some people
who are usually more helpful than others? Let us see.
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274 CHAPTER 9 HELPING OTHER PEOPLE

Who are the helpful people?

There is a psychological maxim that ‘behaviour is a product of the individual and
the environment’. Are there personal characteristics that are relatively independent
of the situation? There is a potpourri of research findings dealing with mood and
several individual differences. These include the following:
• Mood. When people feel good, they are more sensitive to the needs of others and
therefore more helpful. For example, this can happen if you have performed well
in a task and have a ‘warm glow of success’ (Isen, 1970). The opposite holds for
people in a bad mood. In either case, giving help leads to a good mood!
• Personality measures. These have little or no bearing on being helpful. Further,
there is no stand-alone, altruistic personality (Latané & Darley, 1970). At most,
someone’s personality might interact with particular aspects of the situation or
of the victim.
• The ‘Good Samaritan’. Supporting evidence is weak (Schwartz, 1977). However,
people who are consistently helpful tend to be taller, heavier and physically
stronger, and better trained to cope with crimes and emergencies (see Huston,
Ruggiero, Conner & Geis, 1981).
• Attachment style. People who are secure are somewhat more compassionate and
altruistic (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2005). We deal with attachment style in more
detail in Chapter 10.
We continue by considering three other factors that have intriguing links to the
topic of helping: a gender difference in playing the ‘helper’ role; being competent to
do so; and the possibility that people who live in big cities care somewhat less
about what happens to others.

Gender differences
Are men destined to be ‘knights in shining armour’? The literature of romance but
also of science indicates that men are more likely to help women than vice versa.
Examples of research contexts include helping a motorist in distress (flat tyre,
stalled car), or offering a ride to a hitchhiker (Latané & Dabbs, 1975). When the
person in need of such help is female, passing cars are much more likely to stop
than for a man or for a male–female pair. Those who stop are typically young men
driving alone. A meta-analysis by Alice Eagly showed that the strongest combin-
ation was that of males being more helpful to women – and importantly, despite a
baseline difference of women showing more empathy generally than men (Eagly &
Crowley, 1986). Read about an interesting study that explored a connection
between sexual arousal and the likelihood of helping someone of either sex who is
in trouble (see Box 9.4 and Figure 9.5.)

Competence: ‘have skills, will help’

Feeling competent to deal with an emergency makes it more likely that help will be
given; there is the awareness that ‘I know what I’m doing’ (Korte, 1971).
Specific kinds of competence have increased helping in these contexts:
• People who were told they had a high tolerance for electric shock were more
willing to help others move electrically charged objects (Midlarsky & Midlarsky,
1976).
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WHO ARE THE HELPFUL PEOPLE? 275

Research and applications 9.4

Prosocial behaviour and male-female interactions

Might men be motivated by sexual attraction to help Przybyla noted that both men and women reported
women in trouble? Probably so, according to Peter degrees of arousal when viewing the erotic tape. The
Benson who found that more physically attractive more aroused the man felt, the longer he spent
women received more help (Benson, Karabenick & helping a woman, an effect not extended to another
Lerner, 1976). David Przybyla (1986) clarified the effect man. In contrast, the more aroused women spent less
of sexual arousal more directly. Male and female time helping anyone. It is possible that male altruism
students watched either an erotic or non-erotic video, or towards women is confounded with a desire to be
none at all. When leaving the laboratory, they passed romantic. However, women are less likely to initiate
either a male or a female confederate who ‘accidentally’ interactions with strangers (especially men), due
knocked over a stack of papers and cried out ‘oh no!’ perhaps to socialisation experiences. This is a social
Will the passer-by help to clean up the mess? The results role explanation of cross-gender helping and has been
are shown in Figure 9.5. Almost all the males who had supported in a recent study by Lori Karakashian
seen an erotic tape were motivated to help a female. (Karakashian, Walter, Christopher & Lucas, 2006).
They also spent a relaxed six minutes helping a woman,
but a man in need got short shrift – thirty seconds!

Figure 9.5
Helping an opposite-sex stranger as a 100
Men
function of sexual arousal.
Women
• Male and female students watched
80
either an erotic or non-erotic video,
Percentage helping

or none at all.
• The use of erotic material was to 60
induce sexual arousal and explore its
consequences on helping others.
• They then saw either a male or a 40
female confederate who needed
some help.
20
• There was one huge sex-difference:
males, but not females, were very
ready to help an opposite-sex 0
stranger. None Non-erotic Erotic
Kind of video seen
Source: Based on data from Przybyla (1986).

• People who were told they were good at handling rats were more likely to help
recapture a ‘dangerous’ laboratory rat (Schwartz & David, 1976).
• The competence effect may even generalise beyond a restricted context. Kazdin
and Bryan (1971) found that people who thought they had done well on a
health examination, or even on a creativity task, were later more willing to
donate blood.
Certain ‘packages’ of skills are perceived as relevant to some emergencies. In react-
ing to a stranger who was bleeding, people with first-aid training intervened more
often than those who were untrained (Shotland & Heinold, 1985).
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276 CHAPTER 9 HELPING OTHER PEOPLE

Competence in an emergency. ‘Trust us – we know what we’re doing.’

Source: Pearson Online Database (POD)

Pantin and Carver (1982) improved the level of students’ competence by showing
them a series of films on first aid and emergencies. Three weeks later, they had the
chance to help a confederate who was apparently choking. The bystander effect was
reduced by having previously seen the films. Pantin and Carver also reported that the
increase in helping persisted over time. This area of skill development is at the core of
Red Cross first-aid training courses for ordinary people in many countries.
The impact of skill level was tested experimentally by comparing professional
help with novice help (Cramer, McMaster, Bartell & Dragna, 1988). The partici-
pants were two groups of students, one being highly competent (registered nurses)
and the other less competent (general-course students). In a contrived context, each
participant waited in the company of a non-helping confederate. The nurses were
more likely than the general students to help a workman, seen earlier, who had
apparently fallen off a ladder in an adjoining corridor (a rigged accident replete
with pre-recorded moans). In responding to a post-experimental questionnaire, the
nurses specified that they felt they had the skills to help.
To sum up: situations highlighting the fact that a person possesses relevant skills
implies that these skills should be used. The self-perception is: ‘I know what to do,
so I have the responsibility to act’. Competence may be situation-specific, but there
is the tantalising possibility that it may last over time and also generalise to non-
related situations.

Living in big cities

Latané and Darley (1970) found that fairly obvious demographic variables, such as
a parent’s occupation and number of siblings, were not correlated with helping
behaviour. However, there was the intriguing suggestion that size of one’s home
town might be connected. People from small-town backgrounds were more likely
to help than those from larger cities, a finding replicated by Gelfand, Hartmann,
Walder and Page (1973).
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18
WHAT MOTIVATES PEOPLE TO BE PROSOCIAL? 277

Paul Amato (1983) studied size of population in a direct fashion. He investi-

gated people’s willingness to help in fifty-five Australian cities and towns, focusing
on acts such as picking up fallen envelopes, giving a donation to charity, giving a
favourite colour for a student project, correcting inaccurate directions that are
overheard and helping a stranger who has hurt a leg and collapsed on the footpath.
With the exception of picking up the fallen envelope, the results showed that as
population size rose (i.e. in the larger towns and cities), acts of helping decreased.
The results for four of the helping measures are shown in Figure 9.6. Best-fit
regression lines for each set of data points are shown. You can see that there is a
consistent trend downwards for helping a stranger as the population level rises.
Various reasons have been advanced for rural–urban differences in helping or
not helping. Perhaps rural people care more because they feel less crowded, less
rushed and less affected by noise; and generally feel less ‘urban overload’ and envi-
ronmental stress than their fellows in a big and bustling city (Bonnes & Secchiaroli,
1995; Halpern, 1995).

What motivates people to be prosocial?

In the preceding sections we have dealt with major theories and relevant research
into the nature and origins of prosocial behaviour. Let us now explore how we
might unlock and even promote the tendency of people to help their fellows.

The keys to being helpful

Dan Batson has argued that what prompts helping is a question of motivation, and
motives involve goals. Is the action an instrumental goal, an intermediate step on the
way to a person’s ultimate self-interest? Or is it an ultimate goal in its own right, with
any self-benefit as an unintended side effect? We summarise his ideas in Box 9.5.

100
Percentage of people giving help

80

Figure 9.6
60
Effect of population level on Colour request
willingness to help a stranger.
40
• In cities with large Correcting directions
populations, strangers can
expect less help from the 20
inhabitants.
Hurt leg
• Regression lines have been Charitable donation
fitted to the original data 0
Under 1 000– 5 000– 20 000– Over
points for each helping 1 000 4 999 19 999 300 000 1 000 000
measure. Population level
Source: Based on data from Amato
(1983).
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278 CHAPTER 9 HELPING OTHER PEOPLE

Research and applications 9.5

Four motives for helping others

His research over many years has led Dan Batson to 3 Collectivism – prosocial acts contribute to the welfare
conclude that four motives control prosocial of a social group, e.g. one’s family, ethnic group or
behaviour. How often we help, and the various ways country. Of course, actions that benefit one’s ingroup
that we might help, depend on one of the following: may harm an outgroup (see Chapter 7).

1 Egoism – prosocial acts benefit one’s self. We may 4 Principlism – prosocial acts follow a moral principle,
help others to secure material, social and self- such as ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’.
reward; and to escape punishment. Although the link between moral reasoning and
prosocial behaviour is not strong, the two processes
2 Altruism – prosocial acts contribute to the welfare
are at least related (Underwood & Moore, 1982).
of others. Acting altruistically does not imply that
someone should reciprocate. This kind of prosocial Sources: Based on Batson (1994); Batson, Ahmad & Tsang,
motivation is esteemed in many cultures. (2002).

Of Batson’s four motives, one serves self-interest (an instrumental goal) but the
other three are linked to altruism (an ultimate goal). Next, we take some examples
of where the promotion of prosocial behaviour has been dealt with in research. We
should bear in mind that while all involve prosocial acts, not all are necessarily
altruistic. An abiding interest for social psychologists is how to promote ideas that
encourage people to be involved in their communities and how they might benefit
the common good.

Promoting prosocial behaviour

We consider two particular ways that can encourage people to act prosocially. The
first is how we might prevent crime by persuading people to take some personal
responsibility. The second is a major issue in the educational sector: how can we
reduce cheating in examinations?

Crime prevention
An interesting line of research has focused on the causes and prevention of petty
and non-violent crime, such as property theft and shoplifting. Preventing crime
can involve a class of prosocial behaviour. The development of neighbourhood
watch schemes and accompanying media campaigns are examples of how it might
be promoted.
People are most likely to engage in non-violent crime if the benefits are high and
the costs are low. For example, offenders often perceive fraud and tax evasion in
this way (Hassett, 1981; Lockard, Kirkevold & Kalk, 1980). A riskier crime is
property theft, which is statistically more common among younger men. As indi-
viduals mature, their assessment of the costs and benefits change. Older people are
more likely to deceive a customer or lie about a product or service than to actually
steal something. However, research into property theft illustrates two important
phenomena related to prosocial behaviour: responsibility and commitment.
People are much more likely to help others if they have a feeling of responsibility
for providing assistance. For example, we now know that people feel responsible if
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20
WHAT MOTIVATES PEOPLE TO BE PROSOCIAL? 279

they are the only witness to a crime or accident, or if they have been trained to deal
with emergencies. Feeling responsible for providing aid increases the likelihood of
prosocial behaviour. This is called prior commitment, a specific form of responsi- Prior commitment
bility that can induce a prosocial act. An individual’s
In a series of real-life encounters based on staged thefts, Thomas Moriarty agreement in advance
to be responsible if
(1975) chose individuals who were sitting alone on a crowded New York beach
trouble occurs: for
and then sat next to them with a radio and blanket. Shortly afterwards, he talked
example, committing
to his new neighbour and either simply asked for a match (smoking was prevalent oneself to protect the
in those days!), or asked them to watch his things while he went for a short walk. property of another
All participants agreed to the second request, thereby committing themselves to be person against theft.
responsible bystanders. Then a ‘thief’ (confederate) came along, picked up the
radio and quickly walked away. Of participants who were only asked for a match,
just 20 per cent took action by intervening, compared with 95 per cent for those
specifically asked to be responsible. Most of those who helped even ran after the
thief, demanding an explanation, with some even grabbing the thief’s arm. Who
said New Yorkers don’t care!
The powerful effect of being committed has been demonstrated in other ways:
for example, watching a stranger’s suitcase in a laundrette or a student’s books in
a library.

Taking responsibility
Earlier in this book we noted that Dariusz Dolinski (2000) explored how being
committed to someone enhanced the tendency to act responsibly towards them as
well. His study was conducted on a street in Poland. People tried to handle a
simple request but were unable to comply because it was actually impossible.
Nevertheless, this trivial level of commitment led them to help with a larger but
possible request. (See Figure 5.7 in Chapter 5.)
A variation on the theme of competence, commitment and responsibility has
been explored in the context of acting as a leader. We might think that a leader is,
by definition, more generally competent than followers and more likely to initiate
all kinds of action (see Chapter 6), including helping in an emergency. The skills
component of leadership could probably be used to account for some helping out-
comes. Even so, a study by Roy Baumeister and his colleagues specified an
additional feature of the leadership role that goes beyond the ‘have skills, will help’
explanation: simply being a leader acts as a cue to generalised responsibility. In an
emergency situation, Baumeister hypothesised, the leader does not experience the
same degree of diffusion of responsibility as ordinary group members. Read how
they tested for this in Box 9.6.

Can we discourage exam cheating?

Exam cheating in schools and universities has been an interesting topic to social
psychologists. These days, cheating extends to plagiarising other people’s work,
including material downloaded from the Internet. In a massive American survey
(Gallup, 1978), about two-thirds of the population admitted that they had cheated
in school at least once. Donald McCabe’s review of more recent surveys confirms
this trend (McCabe, Trevino & Butterfield, 2001). The link between cheating and
personality measures is not strong, suggesting that transgressions are related to sit-
uational factors.
One short-term situational effect is arousal – a feeling of excitement or a thrill
from taking a chance. Why not cheat, at least when there is little chance of being
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280 CHAPTER 9 HELPING OTHER PEOPLE

Research and applications 9.6

Acting like a leader counteracts diffusion of responsibility:
‘Who’s in charge around here?’

A major requirement of effective leadership is to guide silent. The experimenter met those who came out of
decision making for a group (see Chapter 6) and, in an the test room to help, telling them there was no
emergency, to provide control and direction for action. problem. All were later debriefed.
In an experiment by Baumeister, Chesner, Senders and Those designated as leaders were much more likely to
Tice (1988) thirty-two male and female students help than assistants: as high as 80 per cent (twelve of
(seven others were dropped because they suspected a fifteen) leaders helped, but only 35 per cent (six of
deception) were led to believe they had been allocated seventeen) followers did so.
to four-person groups, in which one member was
Now, the leaders in this study were randomly allocated
supposedly randomly assigned to act as leader. The
to their role, so the outcome cannot be explained in
students were told that their task was to decide which
terms of their merely having a set of personal skills. In
survivors of a nuclear war should be allowed to join
Baumeister’s view, acting as a leader brings with it a
the group in its bomb shelter. The assistants could
generalised responsibility, which:
make recommendations, but their designated leader
would make the final decision. � goes beyond the immediate requirement of the
Participants were actually tested individually, half as group task to involve other external events;
leaders and half as followers, and group discussion
� provides a buffer against the usual process of
was simulated using tape recordings over an
diffusion of responsibility to which ordinary
intercommunication system. At a critical point, each
members are prone, and which can mediate the
participant was exposed to a simulated emergency,
seeming indifference to helping a victim.
when the recorded voice of a male group member
faltered and said, ‘Somebody come help me, I’m Source: Based on Baumeister, Chesner, Senders & Tice (1988).
choking!’ He then had a fit of coughing and went

caught? Arousal, such as being in an exam room, may even increase cheating. The
clinical psychologists Robert Lueger (1980) and Gerald Heisler (1974) have cast
light on this issue. Lueger suggested that arousal is distracting and makes us less
able to regulate our behaviour. In his experiment, participants saw either an arous-
ing film or a relaxing one and then had the chance to cheat while taking a test. In
the relaxed condition 43 per cent cheated, but in the aroused condition 70 per cent
cheated. Paradoxically, as Heisler found, warning students about to sit an exam of
the penalties for being caught cheating may actually increase cheating, perhaps
because they are also more aroused.
How can we discouraging cheating? A traditional reaction is to increase the
severity of punishments available. However, one estimate is that only about one in
five self-reported cheaters are ever caught (Gallup, 1978). McCabe’s review pro-
vided some contextual clues: less cheating occurred at universities with smaller
campuses, where fewer peers cheated and where an honour code and standards of
academic integrity had been highlighted. This is consistent with Batson’s ideal of
principlism built on moral reasoning.
People usually agree that cheating is wrong, and those who do cheat disapprove as
strongly as those who do not (Hughes, 1981). Richard Dienstbier has noted that
some institutions have introduced programmes to raise the ethical awareness of their
pupils and to promote prosocial behaviour in various ways (Dienstbier, Kahle, Willis
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22
WHAT MOTIVATES PEOPLE TO BE PROSOCIAL? 281

& Tunnell, 1980). This study reported some success by focusing less on students’
assumed lack of morality and more on how to make ethical standards salient.
Our final section in this chapter is clearly devoted to one’s community and the
common good.

Volunteers: the ultimate helpers

Many people now take an interest in another form of spontaneous helping – volun-
teering, an activity that has become more and more important for the common
good in times of government retrenchment. Gil Clary and Mark Snyder have noted
that retaining a high level of volunteering in any community involves earmarking
situations of opportunities and enhancing a sense of personal control among the
volunteers (Clary & Snyder, 1991, 1999). Volunteers commonly offer to others a
sense of community, or civic participation (Omoto & Snyder, 2002). This can show
itself by being a companion for the elderly, counselling troubled people, tutoring
the illiterate, making home visits to the terminally ill through the hospice move-
ment, or acting as a support person for AIDS victims. In the United States in 1998,
more than one million people gave 3.5 hours per week acting in these and similar
ways. Mark Davis and his colleagues have shown that voluntary activities that
entail some distress, which is an example of a response invoking empathy discussed
earlier, require well-designed training programmes to prepare the volunteer (Davis,
Hall & Meyer, 2003).
Sometimes the idea of volunteering involves high-profile individuals who can
and have done much good for many people. The humanitarian gestures of Bob
Geldof, the founder of Live Aid, and of Bono spring to mind. We must add that
even what is arguably the noblest of motives, altruism, continues to be questioned.
Is it real? Even volunteers, it seems, may in some senses be self-serving.
Batson allows that community involvement can be driven by an egoistic motive
(Batson, Ahmad & Tsang, 2002), but argues that it is just one of four, as we have
discussed earlier; and that all four have both strengths and weaknesses. In recruiting

The ultimate helpers. Volunteering is a praiseworthy form of spontaneous helping –

sometimes it takes a little reminder.
Source: The Advertising Archives
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282 CHAPTER 9 HELPING OTHER PEOPLE

volunteers, an effective strategy is to steer them to supplement egoism with addi-

tional reasons based on altruism, principlism, or both. Evert van der Vliert and his
colleagues also pointed to other very broad features, not located within the person as
such, that affect whether egoism or altruism comes into play. In a cross-cultural com-
parison of volunteers in thirty-three countries, they found the two motives can be
separated in some countries but not in others. The picture they paint is complex. Put
simply, the weight given to each motive depends on a country’s ecology (the climate)
and its overall wealth (van de Vliert, Huang & Levine, 2004).
In closing, let us reflect on what we have covered in this and the preceding chap-
ter. We have seen that both brutal and charitable aspects of humanity – hurting
others versus helping others – entail strong physical reactions that are rooted in our
biology. There are ways that we can reduce aggression and promote prosocial
behaviour. Moreover, acting in ways that contribute to the common good can be
learned and, more importantly, entrenched as social norms. One thing that social
psychologists can do is to spread this message.

Summary

� When we act prosocially we do things that are posi- learned. Other emphases in a strongly social approach
tively valued by society. This includes being helpful are the roles of attribution and of norms.
and altruistic. Helping is acting intentionally in a way
� The Kitty Genovese murder had a huge influence on
that benefits someone else.
research dealing with human prosocial behaviour
� We are altruistic when we want to benefit another and unravelled the nature of bystander apathy. A
person without expecting personal gain. It is difficult theory emerged that favoured cognitive, decision-
to identify acts of pure altruism in someone else making processes thought to underlie how we
because their motives or rewards are often private. respond to emergencies.
� Theories of prosocial behaviour have different and � Situational factors generally outweigh personal factors
occasionally contrary arguments. At the extremes in accounting for prosocial behaviour. However, there
are heavily biological and heavily social viewpoints. are some personal attributes that enhance people’s
� A biological approach grew from ethology that con- willingness to help others. These include good mood
centrated on animals in their natural environment. and a high level of competence in an individual.
Later, evolutionary theory tried to account for ‘altruism’ � There are important gender differences. Women are
in animals and to argue for a genetic explanation of usually more sensitive to the needs of others. In a
human altruism as well. mixed-sex context, men are more likely to help a
� A moderate biosocial approach was the basis for woman in need than vice versa.
focusing on physiological arousal and empathy, � Research fields dealing with prosocial behaviour have
brought together in the bystander-calculus model.
provided good examples of how social psychology can
� In social learning theory, prosocial behaviour is treated be usefully applied. These include studies of how to pre-
similarly to aggressive behaviour. As the name of the vent academic cheating, and how to involve people
theory suggests, both kinds of behaviour can surely be more in their community through volunteering activities.
 24

Prosocial
Behavior
and Altruism
Whoever destroys a single life is as guilty as though
he had destroyed the entire world; and whoever
rescues a single life earns as much merit as
though he had rescued the entire world.
—The Talmud

When Irene Gut Opdyke was growing up in Poland during the 1930s, she Key Questions
could never have imagined the fate that the future had in store for her. Irene As you read this chapter,
was born in a small village in Poland on May 5, 1922. Early in her life she find the answers to the
decided to enter a profession that involved helping others, so she enrolled following questions:
in nursing school. However, Irene had to flee her home when the Nazis
1. What is altruism and how
invaded Poland in 1939. Irene eventually joined a Polish underground unit is it different from helping
but was beaten and raped by a group of Russian soldiers who found her behavior? Why is the
group in the woods. difference important?
Next, Irene decided to try to find her family and began making her way 2. What are empathy and
back home. She was captured in a church by the Germans and forced to egoism, and how do they
work in a munitions plant. The work was physically demanding, and one relate to altruism?
day Irene collapsed under the burden of her work. Because of her youth, 3. What about the idea that we
Aryan appearance, and good looks, Irene caught the eye of a German may help to avoid guilt or
major named Eduard Rugemer. Rugemer arranged for Irene to work in a shame?
local hotel that catered to German army and SS officers. Her primary duties 4. What role does biology play
involved serving the officers their meals. in altruism?
It was during her period of employment at the hotel that she first noticed 5. How do social psychologists
what was happening to Jews. She saw firsthand the treatment the Jews explain helping in an
endured in the ghetto behind the hotel. She saw a baby flung into the air emergency situation?
and shot by a Nazi. She then decided that she had to do something. One 6. What factors affect the
of her first helping acts was to save table scraps and leave them for the decision to help?
starving dwellers of the ghetto. As the war progressed, the Germans were
7. If you need help, how can
forced to move their munitions plant to Ternopol, Poland. Here Irene resumed you increase your chances of
her duties serving meals. Major Rugemer also put Irene in charge of the receiving help?
laundry where she met a family of Jews and befriended them. Irene started

401
402 Social Psychology 25

helping them by giving them food and blankets. Around this time Major Rugemer
8. Other than traditional also made Irene his personal housekeeper. One day while serving a meal to the
helping in emergency German officers she overheard a conversation indicating that more and more
situations, what other
Jews were to be rounded up and killed. Her friends in the laundry were clearly
forms of helping are
there? in danger. So, Irene made a momentous decision. She decided to hide the Jews
to save them from extermination.
9. How do personality
characteristics relate to
At first she hid the group behind a false wall in the laundry area. Then she hid
helping? them in a heating duct in Major Rugemer’s apartment. When Major Rugemer moved
to a large villa with servant’s quarters in the cellar and a bunker beneath the house,
10. What situational and
personality variables
Irene took her charges and hid them in the cellar of Major Rugemer’s villa.
played a role in the One day Irene was at the marketplace in town when the Gestapo herded
decision to help Jews in everyone into the town center. There a Polish family was hanged along with the
Nazi-occupied Europe? Jewish family they were hiding. Usually when Irene returned home, she locked the
11. What factors contribute door and left the key turned in the lock so nobody could come in unexpectedly.
to a person’s developing Irene was so shaken by what she had witnessed that she locked the door, but
an altruistic personality? pulled the key out of the lock. Two members of the Jewish family, Fanka Silberman
12. What is the and Ida Bauer, came out of the cellar to help Irene with her chores. The three
interactionist view of were in the kitchen when Major Rugemer came home unexpectedly and found
altruism? them. Irene had been caught and the Jews were in danger. Major Rugemer,
13. How does long-term visibly angry, retreated to his study. Irene followed him and made a plea for her
helping relate to models Jewish friends. Major Rugemer agreed to let the Jews stay, but at a cost. Irene
of emergency helping? would have to become his mistress.
14. What factors influence Eventually, Ternopol was liberated by the advancing Russian army. Irene and
a person’s likelihood of her charges fled into the woods to await liberation. Irene Opdyke’s courageous
seeking and receiving acts were directly responsible for saving Fanka Silberman, Henry Weinbaum,
help? Moses Steiner, Marian Wilner, Joseph Weiss, Alex Rosen, David Rosen, Lazar
15. What reactions do Haller, Clara Bauer, Thomas Bauer, Abram Klinger, Miriam Morris, Hermann
people show to Morris, Herschel Morris, and Pola Morris. Without Irene’s help they all surely
receiving help? would have ended up in labor and/or death camps. After the war Irene’s story
was verified and she was designated a righteous rescuer by the state of Israel.
What motivated Irene Opdyke? Why did she risk her relatively secure
position with Major Rugemer for people she had only recently befriended?
And, what about Major Rugemer’s decision to allow Irene to continue hiding
the Jews at his villa? Was his action altruistic, or did he have another reason for
his behavior? Why do we care about the fate of other people? Indeed, do we
care at all? These are fundamental questions about human nature. Theologians,
philosophers, evolutionary biologists, and novelists all have suggested answers.
Social psychologists have suggested answers, too, contributing their empirical
findings to the discussion.
Irene Opdyke’s behavior was clearly out of the ordinary. Very few Poles were
willing to risk their lives to save Jews. A notable aspect of Irene’s behavior was that
she expected nothing in return, neither material nor psychological rewards. In fact,
rescuers such as Irene Opdyke typically shy away from the hero status awarded
them. In her mind, she did what had to be done—end of story. Regardless, her
actions were purely altruistic. So Irene was an unusual human being—but not
unique. Others, albeit few, have performed equally selfless acts.
In this chapter we consider why people help others, when they help, and what
kinds of people help. We ask, what lies behind behavior such as Irene Opdyke’s?
Does it spring from compassion for her fellow human beings? Does it come from
 Chapter 1126
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 403

a need to be able to sleep at night, to live with ourselves? Or is there some other
motivation? What circumstances led Opdyke to offer the help she did, and what
process did she go through to arrive at this decision? Or was her decision more
a function of her character, her personal traits? Was she perhaps an example of
an altruistic personality? And what about the people Irene Opdyke saved? How
did receiving her help affect them? What factors determined how they responded
to that help? These are some of the questions addressed in this chapter.

Why Do People Help?

There are two types of motives for behaviors such as Irene Opdykeʼs. Sometimes we
help because we want to relieve a personʼs suffering. Behavior motivated by the desire
to relieve a victimʼs suffering is called altruism. Other times we help because we hope altruism Helping behavior
to gain something from it for ourselves. We may give to a charity to get a tax deduc- motivated purely by the desire
tion, for example, or we may give because we think it makes us look good. Often, we to relieve a victim’s suffering
and not by the anticipation of
experience personal satisfaction and increased self-esteem after helping. When we give
reward.
help with an eye on the reward we will get, our behavior is not really altruistic. It falls
into the category of behaviors known simply as helping behavior.
Notice that the distinction between altruism and helping behavior lies in the moti-
vation for performing the behavior, not the outcome. A person who is motivated purely
by the need to relieve the suffering of the victim may receive a reward for his or her
actions. However, he or she didnʼt perform the actions with the expectation of receiv-
ing that reward. This marks the behavior as altruistic.
The distinction between altruism and helping behavior may seem artificial because
the outcome in both cases is that someone in need receives help. Does it matter what
motivates the behavior? Yes, it does. The quality of the help given may vary according
to the motivation behind the behavior. For example, there were others besides Irene
Opdyke who helped rescue Jews, but some of them were paid for their efforts. The
Jews who paid their helpers were not necessarily treated very well. In fact, Christians
in Nazi-occupied Europe who helped hide Jews for pay did not extend the same level
of care as those who were not paid. Jews hidden by “paid helpers” were more likely
to be mistreated, abused, and turned in than were those hidden by the more altruistic
“rescuers” (Tec, 1986).
The question posed by social psychologists about all of these acts is, What motivates
people to help? Is there really such a thing as altruism, or are people always hoping for
some personal reward when they help others? Researchers have proposed a number of
hypotheses to answer this question.

Empathy: Helping in Order to Relieve Another’s Suffering

Social psychologist C. Daniel Batson (1987, 1990a, 1990b) suggested that we may
help others because we truly care about them and their suffering. This caring occurs
because humans have strong feelings of empathy—compassionate understanding of how
the person in need feels. Feelings of empathy encompass sympathy, pity, and sorrow
(Eisenberg & Miller, 1987).
What cognitive and/or emotional experience underlies empathy? Batson, Early,
and Salvarani (1997) suggested that perspective taking is at the heart of helping acts.
According to Batson and colleagues, there are two perspectives that are relevant to
404 Social Psychology 27

helping situations: imagine other and imagine self. An imagine-other perspective oper-
ates when you think about how the person in need of help perceives the helping situ-
ation and the feelings that are aroused in that situation. An imagine-self perspective
operates when you imagine how you would think and feel if you were in the victimʼs
situation. Batson and colleagues predicted that the perspective taken affects the arousal
of empathy or personal distress.
Batson and colleagues (1997) conducted an experiment in which participants were
told to adopt one of three perspectives while listening to a story about a person in need
(Katie). In the objective-perspective condition, participants were instructed to be as objec-
tive as possible and not to imagine what the person had been through. In the imagine-other
condition, participants were instructed to try to imagine how the person in need felt about
what had happened. In the imagine-self condition, participants were told to imagine how
they themselves would feel in the situation. Batson and colleagues measured the extent
to which the manipulation produced feelings of empathy or personal distress.
Batson and colleagues (1997) found that participants in both imagine conditions
felt more empathy for Katie than did those in the objective condition. Furthermore,
they found that participants in the imagine-other condition felt more empathy than did
those in the imagine-self condition. Participants in the imagine-self condition were more
likely to experience personal distress than empathy. Thus, two emotional experiences
were produced depending on which perspective a person took.
How does empathy relate to altruism? Although attempts to answer this question have
been somewhat controversial, it appears that empathy, once aroused, increases the like-
lihood of an altruistic act. This is exactly what is predicted from Batson and colleaguesʼ
empathy–altruism (1997) empathy-altruism hypothesis. Psychologists, however, have never been com-
hypothesis An explanation fortable with the idea that people may do selfless acts. The idea of a truly altruistic act
suggesting that the arousal runs contrary to the behaviorist tradition in psychology. According to this view, behavior
of empathy leads to
altruistic acts.
is under control of overt reinforcers and punishers. Behavior develops and is maintained
if it is reinforced. Thus, the very idea of a selfless, nonrewarded act seems farfetched.

Empathy and Egoism: Two Paths to Helping

When we see or hear about someone in need, we often experience personal distress.
Now, distress is an unpleasant emotion, and we try to avoid it. After all, most of us
do not like to see others suffer. Therefore, we may give help not out of feelings of
empathy for victims but in order to relieve our own personal distress. This motive
for helping is called egoism. For example, if you saw the suffering after Hurricane
Katrina and thought, “If I donʼt do something, Iʼll feel terrible all day,” you would
be focused on your own distress rather than on the distress of the victims. Generally,
egoistic motives are more self-centered and selfish than empathic motives (Batson,
Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987). Thus, there are different paths to helping, one involving
empathy and the other personal distress. These two competing explanations of helping
are shown in Figure 11.1.
How can we know which of these two paths better explains helping behavior? Note
that when the motivation is to reduce personal distress, helping is only one solution.
Another is to remove ourselves from the situation. But when the motivation is altruistic,
only one solution is effective: helping the victim. The egoist, motivated by reducing
personal distress, is more likely to respond to someone in need by escaping the situa-
tion if possible. The altruist, motivated by empathy for the victim, is not.
Batson designed some experiments to test the relative merits of the personal distress
versus the empathy-altruism explanations by varying the ease with which subjects
 Chapter 1128
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 405

Figure 11.1 Helping as

could avoid contact with the person in need. In one study, subjects watched someone a function of ease of escape
(apparently) experiencing pain in response to a series of electric shocks (Batson, 1990a). and empathy. Participants
Some subjects were told that they would see more of the shock series—the difficult- high in empathy are likely to
escape condition. Others were told that they would see no more of the shock series, help a person in need, even
although the victim would still get shocked—the easy-escape condition. if escape is easy. Participants
The personal distress reduction explanation predicts that everyone will behave the low in empathy help only if
same in this situation. When escape is easy, everyone will avoid helping—we all want to escape is difficult.
relieve our feelings of personal distress. When escape is difficult, everyone will help— From. Batson, Fultz, and Schoenrade (1987).

again, we all want to relieve our feelings of personal distress. The empathy-altruism
explanation, on the other hand, predicts that people will behave differently, depending
on their motivation. This will be particularly apparent when it is easy to escape. Under
these conditions, those motivated by egoistic concerns will escape. Those motivated
by empathy will help even though they easily could have escaped.
Batsonʼs research confirmed the empathy hypothesis, which predicts that empathic
feelings matter very much. Some people chose to help even when escape was easy,
indicating that it was their caring about the victim, not their own discomfort, that drove
their behavior (Figure 11.2). In a recent replication of Batsonʼs original experiment
employing all female participants the same pattern of results was found (Bierhoff &
Rohmann, 2004). When escape was easy empathic individuals were more likely to help
than egoistic individuals. No such difference emerged for the difficult escape condition.
Other research shows that it is the helperʼs empathic feelings for the person in need that
are the prime motivators for helping (Dovidio, Allen, & Schroeder, 1990).
In a different test of the empathy-altruism hypothesis, Batson and Weeks (1996)
reasoned that if a person aroused to empathy tries to help a person in distress and fails,
there should be a substantial change in the helperʼs state of mind to a negative mood.
They reasoned further that less negative mood change would result when little or no
empathy was aroused. The results of their experiment confirmed this. Participants in
the high-empathy condition experienced greater negative mood shifts after failed help
than participants in the low-empathy condition.
Interestingly, empathy does not always lead to an increase in altruism. Batson and
colleagues (1999) demonstrated that both egoism and empathy can lead to reduced
helping or, what they called a “threat to the common good.” Batson and colleagues
gave participants the opportunity to divide resources among a group or keep them for
themselves (egoism). In one group-allocation condition, one of the group members
aroused the empathy of the participants. In a second group-allocation condition, there
was no group member who aroused empathy. In both group conditions, participants
could choose to allocate resources to the group as a whole or to an individual member
of the group. Batson and colleagues found that when a participantʼs allocation scheme
406 Social Psychology 29

Ease of Escape
Easy Hard

100

80

Percentage Helping
60

40

20
Figure 11.2. The
relationship between the
0
emotion experienced, ease
of escape and helping. Egoism Empathy
Based on data from Batson, et al. (1988) Dominant Emotion Reported

was private, he or she allocated fewer resources to the group than the self. This was
true regardless of whether the empathy-arousing victim was present. Conversely, when
allocation strategies were public, participants allocated fewer resources to the group as
a whole only when the empathy-arousing victim was present. The research from Batson
and colleagues suggests that both egoism and empathy can threaten the common good.
However, potential evaluation by others (the public condition) strongly inhibits those
motivated by egoism but not empathy.
Empathy appears to be a powerful emotion that can lead to helping even when the
altruistic individual has been treated badly by another. In an imaginative experiment
by Batson and Ahmad (2001), female participants took part in a game involving an
exchange of raffle tickets. The participant was given three tickets worth +5, +5 and –5.
The participant was told that her partner in the game (there was no partner; the partnerʼs
behavior was determined by the experimenter) had the same tickets (+5, +5, and –5).
Batson and Ahmad aroused high empathy for the partner for some participants and
low empathy for others. On the first exchange the “partner” gave the participant the
–5 raffle ticket, meaning that the partner was in effect trying to keep as many tickets
as possible. The measure of altruism was the number of participants who would give
a +5 ticket to the partner. The empathy-altruism hypothesis predicts that participants
experiencing high empathy for the partner should be willing to give the partner posi-
tive raffle tickets, despite the defection by the partner. The results were consistent with
this prediction: 45% of the high-empathy participants gave the defecting partner the
+5 ticket, whereas only 10% of the low-empathy participants gave the +5 card.
Finally, empathy is an emotion that is not directed equally to all individuals in
need. Empathy has been found to be a stronger predictor of helping when an in-group
member needs help than if an out-group member needs help (Sturmer, Snyder, &
Omoto, 2005).
 Chapter 1130
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 407

Challenging the Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis

Everett Sanderson was standing on a subway platform one day when a woman fell onto
the tracks. Sanderson leapt down onto the tracks and pulled the woman to safety just
moments before a train rushed into the station. When asked why he went to a strangerʼs
aid, he replied that he would not have been able to live with himself had he not helped.
Perhaps people help because not helping would violate their view of themselves as
moral and altruistic and would make them feel guilty. Or, perhaps they are concerned
with what others may think if they do not help, and they would experience shame. The
notion that people may help because of the shame and guilt they will feel if they do not
help—known as the empathy-punishment hypothesis—presents a challenge to the empathy–punishment
empathy-altruism hypothesis. hypothesis A hypothesis
suggesting that helping occurs
Batson accepted the challenge of this hypothesis. He thought that people who help
because individuals are
to avoid guilt or shame should help less when provided with a good justification for not motivated to avoid the guilt
helping. After all, if you can plausibly justify not helping to other people (avoid shame) or shame brought about by
and to yourself (avoid guilt), then no punishment occurs. If, however, your motive for failure to help.
helping is purely altruistic, then reduction of the victimʼs distress is the issue, not good
rationalizations for not helping.
Batson and his colleagues (1988) designed research to pit the empathy-altruism
hypothesis against the empathy-punishment explanation. There were two variables in this
experiment: the subjectʼs level of empathy for the victim (high or low) and the strength
of the justification for not helping (strong or weak). Subjects listened to a simulated news
interview in which a college senior (Katie) was interviewed about her parentsʼ and sisterʼs
recent deaths in an automobile accident and her current role as sole supporter of her
younger brother and sister. Empathy was manipulated by instructing subjects either to
pay attention to the “technical aspects” of the news program (low empathy) or to “try to
imagine how the person who is being interviewed feels” (Batson et al., 1988, p. 61).
After hearing the news program, the subjects read two letters left by the profes-
sor in charge of the experiment. The first letter thanked the subjects for participating
and indicated that it occurred to him that some subjects might want to help Katie. The
second letter was from Katie herself, outlining ways that the subjects could help her
(e.g., babysitting, helping around the house, helping with fundraising projects). Subjects
indicated their willingness to help on a response form that was used for the justification
manipulation. The response form had eight spaces for individuals to indicate whether
they would help Katie. In all cases, seven of the eight spaces were already filled in with
fictitious names. In the low justification for not helping condition, five of the seven
individuals on the list had agreed to help Katie. In the high justification for not helping
condition, only two of the seven agreed to help.
The empathy-punishment explanation predicts that when there is a strong justifica-
tion for not helping, the amount of empathy aroused wonʼt matter. The empathy-altruism
hypothesis predicts that empathic motivation matters most when justification for not
helping and empathy are high. Only when people fail to empathize with the person in
need does high justification for not helping have an effect on helping. The results of the
research support the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson, 1990a; Batson et al., 1988).
If a person has empathic feelings and truly cares about the person in need, rationaliza-
tions, however strong, do not stop him or her from helping.
Yet another challenge to the empathy-altruism hypothesis comes from research
by Cialdini and his colleagues. Cialdini suggested that the data supporting the
empathy-altruism hypothesis can be reinterpreted with changes in oneʼs sense of self
that occur in empathy situations. Cialdini and colleagues argued that in addition to
408 Social Psychology 31

arousing empathic concern about a person in distress, helping situations also arouse
a greater sense of self-other overlap. Specifically, the helper sees more of himself or
herself in the person in need (Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997). When
this occurs, the helper may engage in helping because of a greater sense of closeness
with the victim than with the arousal of empathic concern alone.
Cialdini and colleagues (1997) conducted three experiments to test the self-other
oneness hypothesis. They found that when the self-other-oneness dimension was con-
sidered along with empathy arousal, the relationship between empathy and altruism was
weakened substantially. Furthermore, they found that empathy increases altruism only
if it results in an increase in self-other oneness. According to Cialdini and colleagues,
empathic concern for a victim serves as an emotional cue for the increase in self-other
oneness. Additionally, as suggested by Neuberg and colleagues, because empathy is an
emotion, it may only be important in deciding between not helping or providing minimal
or superficial help (Newberg, Cialdini, Brown, Luce, & Sagarin, 1997).
However, the matter was not resolved, because Batson (1997) pointed out that the
methods used by Cialdini and colleagues were questionable. In fact, Batson and col-
leagues (1997) found that when more careful procedures were used, there was little
evidence that self-other oneness was critical in mediating the empathy-altruism link. As
to whether empathy arousal leads only to superficial helping, Batson pointed out that
the empathy-altruism hypothesis only states that empathy arousal is often associated
with an altruistic act and does not specify the depth of the act. Batson, however, does
acknowledge that there may be limits to the empathy-altruism relationship.
Where do we stand currently on these hypotheses about helping? Although the
research of Batson and others supports the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Batson
et al., 1988; Dovidio et al., 1990), other research does not. For example, a strong rela-
tionship has been found between feeling and giving help, a finding that does not support
the empathy-altruism hypothesis (Cialdini & Fultz, 1990). If we give help when we
feel sad, it seems more likely that we are helping to relieve personal distress than out
of pure altruism.
It is apparent that the empathy-altruism hypothesis remains a point of controversy
in social psychology. Batson (1997) suggested that the controversy exists mainly over
whether there is enough clear evidence to justify acceptance of the empathy-altruism
hypothesis. There is agreement, according to Batson, that empathy can be a factor in
altruistic behavior. At this point, it is probably best to adopt a position between the com-
peting hypotheses. People may be motivated by empathic altruism, but they seem to need
to know that the victim benefited from their help (Smith, Keating, & Stotland, 1989).
This allows them to experience empathic joy for helping the victim. Empathic joy simply
means that helpers feel good about the fact that their efforts helped someone and that
there was a positive outcome for that person. Helpers get a reward: the knowledge that
someone they helped benefited. Additionally, helping situations may arouse a greater
sense of closeness or oneness with the helper and the victim. In any event, empathy
does appear to be an important emotion involved in altruism.

Biological Explanations: Helping in Order to Preserve Our

Own Genes
As mentioned earlier, some psychologists have been skeptical about the existence of
purely altruistic behavior, because they believe behavior is shaped and regulated by
rewards and punishments. But there is another reason psychologists have been skepti-
cal about the existence of pure altruism, and that reason is biological: People or animals
 Chapter 1132
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 409

that carry altruism involving personal danger to its logical conclusion will sometimes
die. Because self-preservation, or at least the preservation of oneʼs genes (i.e., oneʼs
children or relatives), is a fundamental rule of evolutionary biology, pure altruism stands
on some shaky grounds (Wilson, 1978). Self-sacrificing behavior is very rare. When
it occurs, we reward it extravagantly. The Medal of Honor, for example, is given for
extraordinary bravery, behavior that goes beyond the call of duty.
Evolutionary biologists find altruistic behavior fascinating, because it presents a bio-
logical paradox: In light of the principle of survival of the fittest, how can a behavior have
evolved that puts the individual at risk and makes survival less likely (Wilson, 1975)?
The principle of natural selection favors selfish behavior. Those animals that take care
of themselves and do not expend energy on helping others are more likely to survive
and reproduce their genes. The basic measure of biological fitness is the relative number
of an individualʼs offspring that survive and reproduce (Wilson, 1975).
The evolutionary biologistʼs answer to the paradox is to suggest that there are no
examples of purely altruistic, totally selfless behavior in nature. Instead, there is behav-
ior that may have the effect of helping others but also serves some selfish purpose. For
example, consider the white-fronted bee eater, a bird living in eastern and southern Africa
(Goleman, 1991b). These birds live in complex colonies consisting of 15 to 25 extended
families. Family units consist of about four overlapping generations. When breeding
time arrives, some family members do not breed. Instead, they serve as helpers who
devote themselves to constructing nests, feeding females, and defending the young.
This helping is called alloparenting, or cooperative breeding.
How could such behavior have evolved? The bee eaters who do not breed lose
the opportunity to pass on their genes to offspring. However, their behavior does help
to ensure the survival of the whole colony and, specifically, the family members with
whom they share genes. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the bee eater
helpers provide cooperative help only to their closest relatives. Birds that could have
provided help but do not turn out to be “in-laws”—birds that have no genetic connec-
tion with the mating pairs. Although the helping behavior does not further the survival
of the individualʼs genes, it serves to preserve the individualʼs gene pool.
Do humans differ significantly from animals when it comes to altruism? According
to sociobiologists, human social behavior is governed by the same rules that order all
animal behavior. A central problem of sociobiology is to explain how altruism can exist
even though such behavior endangers individual fitness and survival (Wilson, 1975, 1978).
However, there is ample evidence that altruism among humans flourishes and endures.
One possible resolution to this apparent paradox lies in the idea that human sur-
vival, dating to the beginnings of human society, depends on cooperation. Human
beings, smaller, slower, and weaker than many other animal species, needed to form
cooperative groups to survive. In such groups reciprocal altruism may be more impor-
tant than kin altruism. In reciprocal altruism, the costs of behaving altruistically are
weighed against the benefits. If there is greater benefit than cost, an altruistic response
will occur. Also, reciprocal altruism involves a kind of tit-for-tat mentality: You help
me, and Iʼll help you.
Cooperation and reciprocal altruism (helping one another) would have been selected
for, genetically, because they increase the survival of human beings (Hoffman, 1981).
Unlike animals, humans do not restrict their helping to close genetic relatives. Instead,
humans can maintain the gene pool by helping those who share common characteris-
tics, even if they are not close kin (Glassman, Packel, & Brown, 1986). Helping nonkin
may help one preserve oneʼs distinguishing characteristics in the gene pool in a manner
analogous to helping kin.
410 Social Psychology 33

Social psychologists acknowledge that biology plays a role in altruistic behavior.

Altruism does not occur as often or as naturally as aggression, but it does occur. However,
social psychology also points out that altruistic behavior in humans is determined by
more than the biological dimension of our nature.

Helping in Emergencies: A Five-Stage

Decision Model
Irene Opdykeʼs decision to help the Jews in Ternopol is an example of helping involv-
ing a long-term commitment to a course of action. We refer to this as long-term helping.
Opdykeʼs help involved a commitment that was extended over a period of months and
required a great investment of effort and resources. However, there are many other
situations that require quick action involving a short-term commitment to helping. For
example, if you saw a child fall into a pond, you probably would rescue that child.
We refer to this type of helping as situation-specific helping. This helping, most likely
in response to an emergency, does not require a long-term investment of effort and
resources.
Emergency situations in which bystanders give help occur quite often. But there are
also many instances in which bystanders remain passive and do not intervene. This is
true even when a victim is in clear need of help. One such incident captured the atten-
tion not only of the public but also of social psychologists: the tragic death of Kitty
Genovese on March 13, 1964.
Genovese, a 24-year-old waitress, was coming home from work in Queens, New
York, late one night. As she walked to her apartment building, a man wielding a knife
attacked her. She screamed for help; 38 of her neighbors took notice from their apart-
ments. One yelled for the man to stop. The attacker ran off, only to return when it was
obvious that nobody was coming to her aid. He stabbed Genovese repeatedly, eventually
killing her. The attack lasted 40 minutes. When the police were called, they responded
within 2 minutes. More than 40 years later, this tragedy continues to raise questions
about why her neighbors did not respond to her cries for help.
The Genovese tragedy and similar incidents that occur all too frequently have raised
many questions among the public and among social scientists. Dissatisfied with expla-
nations that blamed life in the big city (“urban apathy”), social psychologists Darley
and Latané began to devise some explanations about why the witnesses to Genoveseʼs
murder did nothing to intervene. Darley and Latané sketched out a social psychologi-
cal model to explain the bystandersʼ behavior.
The model proposed that there are five stages a bystander must pass through, each
representing an important decision, before he or she will help a person in need (Latané,
& Darley, 1968). In their original formulation of the model, Latané and Darley (1968)
suggested that a bystander must notice the situation, label the situation correctly as an
emergency, and assume responsibility for helping. Darley and Latané proposed that
there is a factor even beyond assuming responsibility: The individual must decide how
to help. Help, according to these researchers, could take the form of direct interven-
tion (Irene Opdykeʼs behavior) or indirect intervention (calling the police). The general
model proposed by Latané and Darley (1968; Darley & Latané, 1968), along with an
additional stage, is shown in Figure 11.3.
At each stage of the model, the individual must assess the situation and make a “yes”
or “no” decision. At any point in the decision process, a “no” decision will lead to failure
 Chapter 1134
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 411

No
Help provided
Yes
Implement No
decision
Yes
Decide how No
to help Figure 11.3 The five-
stage model of helping.
Yes
The path to helping
Assume No begins with noticing an
responsibility emergency situation. Next,
Yes a potential helper must
label the situation correctly
No as an emergency and
Label correctly
then assume responsibility
Yes for helping. A negative
decision at any point will
Notice No help provided lead to nonhelping.
Based on Darley and Latané (1968) and
Latané and Darley (1968).

to help. A “yes” decision itself does not guarantee intervention; it simply allows the person
to move to the next stage of the model. According to the model, help will be given only
if a “yes” decision is made at each stage. Letʼs consider each of the five stages.

Stage 1: Noticing the Situation

Before we can expect a person to intervene in a situation, that person must have noticed
that an emergency exists. If, for example, an accident occurred 10 miles from where
you are presently sitting, you would not be expected to help because you are unaware
of the accident. Before you can act, you must be aware that something has occurred.
For example, Kitty Genoveseʼs neighbors were aware of what was happening to Kitty.
Noticing was not a problem for the witnesses.
Noticing is purely a sensory/perceptual phenomenon. If the emergency situation
catches our attention, we will notice the situation. As such, noticing involves the basic
laws of perception, such as the figure-ground relationship. This fundamental relationship
is manifested when a stimulus stands out against a background. For example, when you
go to a museum and look at a painting hanging on the gallery wall, the painting is the
figure and the gallery wall is the background. We pay most attention to the figure (so when
you tell a friend about your trip to the museum, you will describe the painting and not
the gallery wall). In general, we are particularly likely to notice a stimulus that is brightly
colored, noisy, or somehow stands out against a background. This is also true when notic-
ing an emergency. Our chances of noticing an emergency increase if it stands out against
the background of everyday life. For example, we are more likely to notice an automobile
accident if there is a loud crash than if there is little or no sound. Anything that makes the
emergency more conspicuous will increase the probability that we will attend to it.
412 Social Psychology 35

Stage 2: Labeling the Situation as an Emergency

If a person notices the situation, the next step is to correctly label it as one that requires
intervention. One very important factor at this stage is whether there is ambiguity or
uncertainty about what has happened. For example, imagine that you look out the window
of your second-floor apartment one day and notice immediately below the window a car
with its driverʼs side door open and a person laying half in and half out of the car. Has
the person collapsed, perhaps of a heart attack or a stroke? Or is the person changing
a fuse under the dashboard or fixing the radio? If you decide on the latter explanation,
you will turn away and not give it another thought. You have made a “no” decision in
the labeling stage of the model.
Recognizing an emergency situation can be highly ambiguous because there is often
more than one interpretation for a situation. Is the woman upstairs beating her child or
merely disciplining her? Is the man staggering down the street sick or drunk? Is that person
slumped in the doorway injured or a drunken derelict? These questions must be resolved
if we are to correctly label a situation as an emergency requiring our intervention.
When two 10-year-old boys abducted a 2-year-old from a shopping center in
Liverpool, England, in 1993 and subsequently killed him, they walked together for
2 miles along a busy road congested with traffic. Thirty-eight people remembered
seeing the three children, and some said later that the toddler was being dragged or
appeared to be crying. Apparently, the situation was ambiguous enough—were they
his older brothers, trying to get him home for dinner?—that no one stopped. A driver
of a dry-cleaning van said he saw one of the older boys aim a kick at the toddler, but it
looked like a “persuading” kind of kick such as one might use on a 2-year-old (Morrison,
1994). The driver failed to label the situation correctly.

The Ambiguity of the Situation

Research confirms that situational ambiguity is an important factor in whether people
help. In one study, subjects were seated in a room and asked to fill out a questionnaire
(Yakimovich & Salz, 1971). Outside the room, a confederate of the experimenter was
washing windows. When the experimenter signaled, the confederate knocked over his
ladder and pail, fell to the pavement, and grabbed his ankle. In one condition (the ver-
balization condition), the confederate screamed and cried for help. In the other condition
(the no-verbalization condition), the confederate moaned but didnʼt cry for help.
In both conditions, subjects jumped up and went to the window when they heard
the sound of the crash. Therefore, all subjects noticed the emergency. In the verbal-
ization condition, 81% (13 of 16) tried to help the victim. In the no-verbalization
condition, however, only 29% (5 of 17) tried to help. The clear cry for help, then,
increased the probability that people would help. Without it, it wasnʼt clear that the man
needed help.
Note also that the potential helpers had all seen the victim before his accident. He
was a real person to them. Recall in the Genovese case that the witnesses had not seen
her before she was stabbed. Given this fact and that the murder took place in the fog of
the early morning hours, ambiguity must have existed, at least for some witnesses.

The Presence of Others

The presence of other bystanders also may affect the labeling process. Reactions of
other bystanders often determine the response to the situation. If bystanders show
little concern over the emergency, individuals will be less likely to help. When we
are placed in a social situation (especially an ambiguous one), we look around us to
 Chapter 1136
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 413

see what others are doing (the process of social comparison). If others are not con-
cerned, we may not define the situation as an emergency, and we probably will not
offer to help.
In one study, increasing or decreasing the availability of cues from another bystander
affected helping (Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973). Subjects were tested either alone or
in groups of two. Those participating in groups were either facing each other across a
table (face-to-face condition) or seated back-to-back (not-facing condition). An emer-
gency was staged (a fall) while the subjects worked on their tasks. More subjects who
were alone helped (90%) than subjects who were in groups. However, whether subjects
were facing each other made a big difference. Subjects who were facing each other
were significantly more likely to help (80%) than subjects not facing each other (20%).
Consider what happens when you sit across from someone and you both hear a cry for
help. You look at her, she looks at you. If she then goes back to her work, you probably
will not define the situation as an emergency. If she says, “Did you hear that?” you are
more likely to go investigate.
Generally, we rely on cues from other bystanders more and more as the ambiguity
of the situation increases. Thus, in highly ambiguous emergency situations, we might
expect the presence of others who are passive to suppress helping. The fact that the wit-
nesses to Genoveseʼs murder were in their separate apartments and did not know what
others were doing and thinking operated to suppress intervention.

Stage 3: Assuming Responsibility to Help: The Bystander Effect

Noticing and correctly labeling a situation as an emergency are not enough to guarantee
that a bystander will intervene. It is certain that the 38 witnesses to Genoveseʼs murder
noticed, to one degree or another, the incident and probably labeled it as an emergency.
What they did not do is conclude that they had a responsibility to help. Darley and Latané
(1968), puzzled by the lack of intervention on the part of the witnesses, thought that the
presence of others might inhibit rather than increase helping. They designed a simple
yet elegant experiment to test for the effects of multiple bystanders on helping. Their
experiment demonstrated the power of the bystander effect, in which a person in need bystander effect The social
of help is less likely to receive help as the number of bystanders increases. phenomenon that helping
Subjects in this experiment were told it was a study of interpersonal communica- behavior is less likely to occur
as the number of witnesses to
tion. They were asked to participate in a group discussion of their current problems. an emergency increases.
To ensure anonymity, the discussion took place over intercoms. In reality, there was
no group. The experimenter played a tape of a discussion to lead the subject to believe
that other group members existed.
Darley and Latané (1968) varied the size of the group. In one condition, the subject
was told that there was one other person in the group (so the group consisted of the
subject and the victim); in a second condition, there were two other people (subject,
victim, and four others). The discussion went along uneventfully until it was the vic-
timʼs turn to speak. The actor who played the role of the victim on the tape simulated
a seizure. Darley and Latané noted the number of subjects who tried to help and how
long it took them to try to help.
The study produced two major findings. First, the size of the group had an effect on
the percentage of subjects helping. When the subject believed that he or she was alone in
the experiment with the victim, 85% of the subjects helped. The percentage of subjects
offering help declined when the subject believed there was one other bystander (62%)
or four other bystanders (31%). In other words, as the number of bystanders increased,
the likelihood of the subject helping the victim decreased.
414 Social Psychology 37

The second major finding was that the size of the group had an effect on time
between the onset of the seizure and the offering of help. When the subject believed
he or she was alone, help occurred more quickly than when the subject believed other
bystanders were present. In essence, the subjects who believed they were members of
a larger group became “frozen in time” by the presence of others. They had not decided
to help or not to help. They were distressed but could not act.
Interestingly, the “other bystanders” need not be physically present in order for the
bystander effect to occur. In one experiment conducted by Garcia, Weaver, Moskowitz,
and Darley (2002), participants were asked to imagine that they had won a dinner for
either themselves and 30 friends, 10 friends, or just for themselves (alone condition).
Later participants were asked to indicate how much money they would be willing to
donate to charity after they graduated college. Garcia et al. found that participants indi-
cated the lowest level of donations in the 30 friends condition, and the most in the alone
condition (the 10-friends condition fell between these two groups). This effect extends
to computer chat rooms (Markey, 2000). Markey found that as the number of partici-
pants in a chat room increased, the time it took to receive requested help also increased.
Interestingly, the chat room bystander effect was eliminated when the person making
the request personalized the request by singling someone out by name.

Why Does the Bystander Effect Occur?

diffusion of responsibility The best explanation offered for the bystander effect is diffusion of responsibility
An explanation suggesting (Darley & Latané, 1968). According to this explanation, each bystander assumes that
that each bystander assumes another bystander will take action. If all the bystanders think that way, no help will be
another person will take offered. This explanation fits quite well with Darley and Latanéʼs findings in which the
responsibility to help.
bystanders could not see each other, as was the case in the Genovese killing. Under
these conditions, it is easy to see how a bystander (unaware of how other bystanders are
acting) might assume that someone else has already taken or will take action.
What about emergency situations in which bystanders can see one another? In
this case, the bystanders could actually see that others were not helping. Diffusion of
responsibility under these conditions may not explain bystander inaction (Latané &
Darley, 1968). Another explanation has been offered for the bystander effect that centers
on pluralistic ignorance, which occurs when a group of individuals acts in the same
manner despite the fact that each person has different perceptions of an event (Miller
& McFarland, 1987). In the bystander effect, pluralistic ignorance operates when the
bystanders in an ambiguous emergency situation look around and see each other doing
nothing; they assume that the others are thinking that the situation is not an emergency
(Miller & McFarland, 1987). In essence, the collective inaction of the bystanders leads
to a redefinition of the situation as a nonemergency.
Latané and Darley (1968) provided evidence for this explanation. Subjects filled
out a questionnaire alone in a room, with two passive bystanders (confederates of the
experimenter) or with two other actual subjects. While the subjects were filling out the
questionnaire, smoke was introduced into the room through a vent. The results showed
that when subjects were alone in the room, 75% of the subjects reported the smoke,
many within 2 minutes of first noticing it. In the condition in which the subject was in
the room with two passive bystanders, only 10% reported the smoke. In the last condi-
tion, in which the subject was with two other subjects, 38% reported the smoke. Thus,
the presence of bystanders once again suppressed helping. This occurred despite the
fact that subjects in the bystander conditions denied that the other people in the room
had any effect on them.
 Chapter 1138
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 415

In post-experimental interviews, Latané and Darley (1968) searched for the under-
lying cause for the observed results. They found that subjects who reported the smoke
felt that the smoke was unusual enough to report, although they didnʼt feel that the
smoke was dangerous. Subjects who failed to report the smoke, which was most likely
to occur in the two-bystander condition, developed a set of creative reasons why the
smoke should not be reported. For example, some subjects believed that the smoke was
smog piped into the room to simulate an urban environment, or that the smoke was truth
gas designed to make them answer the questionnaire truthfully. Whatever reasons these
subjects came up with, the situation was redefined as a nonemergency.
Is diffusion of responsibility, dependent on the number of bystanders present,
always the underlying cause for the bystander effect? Although diffusion of responsi-
bility is the most widely accepted explanation, it is not the only explanation. Levine
(1999) suggests that there are situations in which diffusion of responsibility based on
the presence of bystanders cannot explain nonintervention. Instead, Levine suggests
that if a bystander assumes that a social category relationship exists between parties social category
in a potential helping situation, intervention is unlikely. A social category relationship is relationship A relationship
one in which bystanders assume that the parties involved belong together in some way. in which bystanders assume
that the parties involved
For example, a spousal relationship would fit this definition because the two individu- belong together in some way.
als are seen as belonging together in the relationship. Levine argues that when we are
confronted with a situation in which a social category relationship exists or is assumed,
a social norm of nonintervention is activated. In short, we are socialized to keep our
noses out of family matters. In fact, there is research that shows that bystanders are
less willing to intervene in an emergency situation when a social category relationship
exists (Shotland & Straw, 1976). Shotland and Straw, for example, found that 65% of
participants were willing to intervene in an argument between a male and female who
were strangers, but only 19% were willing to intervene when the male and female were
said to be married.
Levine (1999) provides further evidence for this effect. He analyzed the trial transcript
of the trial of two 10-year-old boys who murdered a 2-year-old child in London in 1993
(we briefly described this crime earlier in this chapter). The two older boys, Jon Thompson
and Robert Venables, abducted James Bulger and walked Bulger around London for over
2 hours. During this time, the trio of boys encountered 38 witnesses. Some witnesses
were alone, whereas others were with other bystanders. In a situation reminiscent of the
Kitty Genovese murder, none of the 38 witnesses intervened. Based on his analysis of
the trial transcript, Levine concluded that the nonintervention had little or nothing to do
with the number of bystanders present, or diffusion of responsibility. Instead, statements
of witnesses during trial testimony indicated that the witnesses assumed (or were told by
the older boys) that the older boys were Bulgerʼs brothers taking him home. According
to Levine, the assumption that a social category relationship existed among the boys was
the best explanation for why the 38 witnesses did not intervene.
As a final note, we need to understand that category relationships can extend
beyond social categories. We may assume that a relationship exists between people and
objects. For example, imagine you are going to your car after work and see another car
parked next to yours. You see that the hood is open and there is someone tinkering with
something under the hood. What would you think is going on? Most likely you would
assume that the person tinkering under the hood owns the car and is fixing something.
You would then be surprised to learn the next day that the car was stolen and the man
tinkering under the hood was a thief! Assuming that such relationships exist can be a
powerful suppressant to intervention.
416 Social Psychology 39

Limits to the Bystander Effect

Increasing the number of bystanders does not always suppress helping; there are excep-
tions to the bystander effect. The bystander effect does not hold when intervention is
required in a potentially dangerous situation (Fischer, Greitemeir, Pollozek, & Frey,
2006). In this experiment participants watched what they believed was a live interaction
between a male and female (actually the participants viewed a prerecorded videotape).
In the high-potential-danger condition, the male was shown to be a large, “thug-like”
individual who made progressively more aggressive sexual advances toward the female,
culminating in sexually aggressive touching of the female and the female crying for
help. At that point the tape went blank. In the low-potential-danger condition, the male
was shown as a thin, short male who engaged in the same sexually aggressive behavior
with the same victim reactions. Half of the participants watched the interaction alone
(no bystander) and the other half watched it in the presence of a confederate of the
experimenter (bystander). The experimenters measured whether the participant tried
to help the female in distress. As shown in Figure 11.4, the bystander effect was repli-
cated in the low-danger situation: Fewer participants attempt to help when a bystander
is present than when the participant is alone. In the high-danger situation, however, the
bystander effect was not evident.
In another experiment, a reversal of the typical bystander effect was shown with
a potentially dangerous helping situation. One group of researchers staged a rape on
a college campus and measured how many subjects intervened (Harari, Harari, &
White, 1985). The subjects had three options in the experimental situation: fleeing
without helping, giving indirect help (alerting a police officer who is out of view of the
rape), or giving direct help (intervening directly in the rape).
Male subjects were tested as they walked either alone or in groups. (The groups
in this experiment were simply subjects who happened to be walking together and not
interacting with one another.) As the subjects approached a certain point, two actors
staged the rape. The woman screamed, “Help! Help! Please help me! You bastard! Rape!
Rape!” (Harari et al., 1985, p. 656). The results of this experiment did not support the

Bystander Condition
Alone Bystander

60

50
Figure 11.4 Bystanders
Percentage Helping

who are alone are likely 40

to help in high and low
danger situations. The 30
presence of another
bystander increased 20
helping in the high danger
but not low danger 10
situation; a clear reversal
0
of the usual bystander
effect. High Low
Based on data from Fischer, et al. (2006). Situation Danger Level
 Chapter 1140
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 417

bystander effect. Subjects walking in groups were more likely to help (85%) than sub-
jects walking alone (65%). In this situation—a victim is clearly in need and the helping
situation is dangerous—it seems that bystanders in groups are more likely to help than
solitary bystanders (Clark & Word, 1974; Harari et al., 1985).
The bystander effect also seems to be influenced by the roles people take. In another
study, some subjects were assigned to be the leaders of a group discussion and others
to be assistants (Baumeister, Chesner, Senders, & Tice, 1988). When a seizure was
staged, subjects assigned the role of leader were more likely to intervene (80%) than
those assigned the role of assistant (35%). It appears that the responsibility inherent in
the leadership role on a specific task generalizes to emergencies as well.
Finally, the bystander effect is less likely to occur when the helping situation
confronting us involves a clear violation of a social norm that we personally care about.
Imagine, for example, you see a person throw an empty bottle into the bushes at a public
park. In such a situation you may engage in social control behaviors (e.g., confront the
offender, complain to your partner). Contrast this with a situation where private property is
involved (e.g., painting graffiti in an elevator in a building owned by a large corporation).
You may be less likely to engage in social control behaviors. Chekroun and Brauer (2001)
wondered if the bystander effect would operate differently in these two situations. They
hypothesized that the bystander effect would hold for situations involving low personal
implications (e.g., graffiti in the elevator), but not in situations involving high personal
implications (e.g., littering in a public park). In the low-personal-implication condition
a confederate of the experimenters entered an elevator in a shopping center parking lot.
As soon as the door closed, the confederate began scrawling graffiti on the wall with a
magic marker. This was done under two conditions: a participant alone in the elevator
with the confederate (no bystanders) or two or three naïve individuals in the elevator
with the confederate. In the high-personal-implications condition a confederate of the
experimenters threw an empty plastic bottle into some bushes in a public park in front
of one participant or a group of two or three participants. In both situations the reaction
of the participant(s) was (were) recorded on a scale ranging from no social control to
an audible negative comment. As you can see in Figure 11.5, social control was most

70

60
Percent Social Control

50

40 Figure 11.5 Social

control behaviors are more
30 likely if a behavior has
high personal implications
20 (littering in a public park)
10 than if the behavior has
low personal implications
0 (graffiti in a privately-
owned elevator).
Graffiti Littering
Based on data from Checkroun and Brauer
Deviant Behavior (2002).
418 Social Psychology 41

likely to occur when other bystanders were present in the park-littering situation (high
personal implications). Less social control was shown by the groups of participants in
the graffiti situation (low personal implications).

Stage 4: Deciding How to Help

The fourth stage of the five-stage model of helping is deciding how to help. In the
staged rape study, for example, subjects had a choice of directly intervening to stop the
rape or aiding the victim by notifying the police (Harari, Harari, & White, 1985). What
influences decisions like this?
There is considerable support for the notion that people who feel competent, who
have the necessary skills, are more likely to help than those who feel they lack such
competence. In a study in which subjects were exposed to a staged arterial bleeding
emergency, the likelihood of providing effective help was determined only by the exper-
tise of the subjects (some had Red Cross training; Shotland & Heinhold, 1985).
There are two reasons why greater competence may lead to more helping. First, feel-
ings of competence increase confidence in oneʼs ability to help and to know what ought
to be done (Cramer, McMaster, Bartell, & Dragna, 1988). Second, feelings of compe-
tence increase sensitivity to the needs of others and empathy toward victims (Barnett,
Thompson, & Pfiefer, 1985). People who feel like leaders are probably also more likely
to help because they feel more confident about being able to help successfully.
Many emergencies, however, do not require any special training or competence.
Irene Opdyke had no more competence in rescuing Jews than anyone else in Ternopol.
In the Genovese case, a simple telephone call to the police was all that was needed.
Clearly, no special competence was required.

Stage 5: Implementing the Decision to Help

Having passed through these four stages, a person may still choose not to intervene. To
understand why, imagine that as you drive to campus, you see a fellow student standing
next to his obviously disabled car. Do you stop and offer to help? Perhaps you are late
for your next class and feel that you do not have the time. Perhaps you are not sure it is
safe to stop on the side of the highway. Or perhaps the student strikes you as somehow
undeserving of help (Bickman & Kamzan, 1973). Or perhaps the place where the help
is needed is noisy (Moser, 1988). These and other considerations influence your deci-
sion whether to help.

Assessing Rewards and Costs for Helping

Social psychologists have found that peopleʼs evaluation of the rewards and costs
involved in helping affect their decision to help or not to help. There are potential rewards
for helping (gratitude from the victim, monetary reward, recognition by peers) and for
not helping (avoiding potential danger, arriving for an appointment on time). Similarly,
there are costs for helping (possible injury, embarrassment, inconvenience) and for not
helping (loss of self-esteem). Generally, research indicates that the greater the cost of
helping, the less likely people are to help (Batson, OʼQuin, Fultz, & Vanderplas, 1983;
Darley & Batson, 1973; Piliavin & Piliavin, 1972; Piliavin, Piliavin, & Rodin, 1975).
In a study of this relationship, Darley and Batson (1973) told seminarians taking
part in an experiment at Princeton University that a high school group was visiting the
campus and had requested a seminarian speaker. Half the subjects were told they had
little time to get across campus to speak to the high school group, and the other half
were told they had plenty of time. Additionally, some subjects were asked to speak
 Chapter 1142
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 419

about the meaning of the parable of the Good Samaritan. The seminarians then left the
building to give their talk, and lo and behold, while walking down a narrow lane, they
saw a young man collapse in front of them. What did they do?
Now, do you recall the story of the Good Samaritan? A traveler is set on by robbers
and left by the side of the road. A priest and a Levite, people holding important positions
in the clergy of the time, walked by swiftly without helping. But a Samaritan, passing
along the same road, stopped and helped. We might say that, for whatever reasons, helping
was too costly for the priest and the Levite but not too costly for the Samaritan.
What about the seminarians? The “costly” condition in this experiment was the
tight schedule: Stopping to help would make them late for their talk. Was helping too
costly for them? Yes, it was. Subjects who were in a hurry, even if they were thinking
about the story of the Good Samaritan, were less likely to stop and help than were sub-
jects who were not in a hurry.
In an attempt to “capture” the effects of various costs for helping and nonhelping,
Fritzsche, Finkelstein, and Penner (2000) had participants evaluate scenarios containing
three costs for helping (time required to help, the discomfort involved in helping, and
the urgency of the help) and three costs for not helping (victim responsibility, ability
to diffuse responsibility, and victim deservingness). Participants read the scenarios in
which these six variables were manipulated and were instructed to play the role of the
individual receiving the request for help. For each scenario, the participant indicated
his or her likelihood of helping the person making the request for help.
Fritzsche et al. (2000) found confirmation for the effects of cost on helping. In the
scenarios where costs for helping were high, participants expressed lower willingness to
help. Fritzsche et al. evaluated the importance of each of the six variables in determining
willingness to give help. They found that the cues varied in importance with respect to
helping. There was no significant gender difference in how the variables affected will-
ingness to help. The following list shows the importance of the six variables (in order
starting with the most important one):
1. Victim responsibility
2. Urgency of the help
3. Time required for help
4. Diffusion of responsibility
5. Discomfort involved in helping
6. Victimʼs deservingness
As is the case in decision-making research, there was a discrepancy between what
participants believed would be important in determining helping and what actually turned
out to be important. Participants believed that victim deservingness, time required to
render help, and ability to diffuse responsibility would be the most important factors
driving willingness to help. However, as you can see from the previous list, only one
of those factors was near the top of the list (time required for help). Finally, there was
a gender difference in this finding. Males were more accurate than females in identify-
ing the importance of the variables.

The Effect of Mood on Helping

Likelihood of helping can even be affected by the bystanderʼs mood. The research of
Isen (1987) and her coworkers has shown that adults and children who are in a positive
mood are more likely to help others than people who are not. People who had found a
420 Social Psychology 43

dime in a phone booth in a shopping mall were more likely to pick up papers dropped by
a stranger than people who had not found a coin. Students who had gotten free cookies
in the library were more likely to volunteer to help someone and were less likely to
volunteer to annoy somebody else when asked to do so as part of an experiment.
Although positive mood is related to an increase in helping, it does not lead to more
helping if the person thinks that helping will destroy the good mood (Isen & Simmonds,
1978). Good moods seem to generate good thoughts about people, and this increases
helping. People in good moods also are less concerned with themselves and more likely
to be sensitive to other people, making them more aware of other peopleʼs needs and
therefore more likely to help (Isen, 1987).
Music, it is said, can soothe the wild beast. Can it also make you more likely to help?
North, Tarrent, and Hargreaves (2004) investigated this question. Participants in a gym
were exposed to either soothing or annoying music during their workout periods. After
the workout, participants were asked to help in a low-cost (sign a petition) or high-cost
(help distribute leaflets) situation. North et al. found that when the soothing music had
been played during the workout, participants were more likely to help in the high-cost
situation than if the annoying music had been played. There was no difference between
the two types of music for the low-cost helping situation.

Gratitude and Helping

Another factor that can affect helping is whether an individual received help when he
or she needed help. Gratitude is an emotional state that has three functions relating to
prosocial behavior (McCullough, Kilpatrick, Emmons, & Larson, 2001). First, grati-
tude acts as a sort of “moral barometer,” indicating a change in oneʼs state of mind after
receiving help. Second, gratitude can function as a “moral motivator,” impelling the
recipient of help to reciprocate to his or her benefactor or strangers. Third, gratitude
can serve as a “moral reinforcer.” When someone expresses gratitude after receiving
help, it increases the likelihood that the recipient of the gratitude will engage in proso-
cial behavior in the future. Taken together, these three functions suggest that gratitude
will increase helping. But does it?
The answer to this question is yes. A feeling of gratitude tends to enhance helping
(Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006; Tsang, 2006). In Bartlett and DeStenoʼs experiment, par-
ticipants were led to believe that they would be performing a group task with another
participant. Actually, the “other participant” was a confederate of the experimenter. The
real participant and confederate performed tasks on separate computers. In the “grati-
tude” condition, after completing a task and while waiting for scores to be displayed,
the confederate surreptitiously kicked the real participantʼs monitor plug out of a power
strip. The confederate then “helped” the participant by finding and fixing the problem.
In the “amusement” condition, participants watched a brief, amusing video clip (to in-
duce positive affect unrelated to gratitude) after completing the task (the confederate
did not kick out the plug nor offer help). In the “neutral” condition the confederate did
not kick the plug out and only carried on a brief conversation with the real participant.
Sometime later the confederate approached the participant and asked the participant to
complete a long and tedious problem-solving survey. As shown in Figure 11.6, Bartlett
and DeSteno found that participants were more willing to help in the gratitude condi-
tion than in either the amusement or neutral conditions. Thus, it was the gratitude itself
and not just positive feelings that might be generated by receiving help that increased
helping. Bartlett and DeSteno conducted some follow-up studies to determine if grati-
tude merely activates the norm of reciprocity (you should help those who help you),
 Chapter 1144
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 421

25

20

Mean Helping
15

10
Figure 11.6 Gratitude
and not just positive
5 emotions increase helping.
Gratitude seems to have
0 special qualities that
increase helping.
Gratitude Amusement Neutral
Based on data from Bartlett & DeSteno
Emotion Condition (2006)

thus leading to an increase in helping. Based on their results, Bartlett and DeSteno con-
cluded that it was, in fact, the feeling of gratitude experienced by the real participants
that increased helping, and not the norm of reciprocity.

Characteristics of the Victim

A decision to help (or not to help) also is affected by the victimʼs characteristics. For
example, males are more likely to help females than to help other males (Eagly &
Crowley, 1986; West, Whitney, & Schnedler, 1975). Females, on the other hand, are
equally likely to help male and female victims (Early & Crowley, 1986). Physically
attractive people are more likely to receive help than unattractive people (Benson,
Karabenick, & Lerner, 1976). In one study, a pregnant woman, whether alone or with
another woman, received more help than a nonpregnant woman or a facially disfigured
woman (Walton et al., 1988).
Potential helpers also make judgments about whether a victim deserves help. If
we perceive that a person got into a situation through his or her own negligence and is
therefore responsible for his or her own fate, we tend to generate “just-world” thinking
(Lerner & Simmons, 1966). According to the just-world hypothesis, people get what just-world hypothesis
they deserve and deserve what they get. This type of thinking often leads us to devalue A hypothesis that we believe
a person whom we think caused his or her own misfortune (Lerner & Simmons, 1966). people get what they deserve
Generally, we give less help to victims we perceive to have contributed to their own and deserve what they get.
fate than to those we perceive as needy through no fault of their own (Berkowitz, 1969;
Schopler & Matthews, 1965).
However, we may relax this exacting standard if we perceive that the person in need
is highly dependent on our help. In one experiment, subjects received telephone calls
at home in which the caller mistook them for the owner of “Ralphʼs Garage” and told
them that her car had broken down (Gruder, Romer, & Korth, 1978). The caller says
either that she meant to have the car serviced but forgot (help needed due to victimʼs
negligence) or that the car was just serviced (no negligence). In one condition, after the
subject informs the caller that she has not reached Ralphʼs Garage, the caller says that
she has no more change to make another call (high dependency). In another condition,
no mention is made of being out of change. In all conditions the caller asks the subject
to call Ralphʼs Garage for her. The researchers found that subjects were more likely
422 Social Psychology 45

to help the negligent victim who had no more change than the negligent victim who
presumably had other ways to get help (Figure 11.7). It seems that high dependence
mediates just-world thinking. Regardless of whether the victim deserves what she gets,
we canʼt help but take pity on her.
Just-world thinking also comes into play when we consider the degree to which a
victim contributed to his or her own predicament. If you, as a helper, attribute a vic-
timʼs suffering to his or her own actions (i.e., make an internal attribution), you will be
less likely to help than if you attribute the suffering to some external cause (Schmidt
& Weiner, 1988). When making judgments about individuals in need of help, we take
into account the degree to which the victim had control over his or her fate (Schmidt
& Weiner, 1988). For example, Greg Schmidt and Bernard Weiner (1988) found that
subjects expressed less willingness to help a student in need of class notes if he needed
the notes because he went to the beach instead of class (a controllable situation) than if
he had medically related vision problems that prevented him from taking notes (uncon-
trollable situation).
Why do perceptions of controllability matter? Schmidt and Weiner (1988) reported
that the emotions aroused are important factors in oneʼs reaction to a person in need. If
a victimʼs situation arouses anger, as in the controllable situation, we are less likely to
give help than if the victimʼs situation arouses sympathy (as in the uncontrollable situ-
ation). Apparently, we are quite harsh when it comes to a victim whom we perceive as
having contributed to his or her own plight. We reserve our sympathy for those victims
who had little or no control over their own fates.
In an interesting application of this effect, Weiner and his colleagues (Graham,
Weiner, Giuliano, & Williams, 1993; Weiner, 1993; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988)
applied this analysis to victims of various illnesses. Subjects tended to react with pity
(and less anger) toward victims of conditions over which the victims had little control
(Alzheimerʼs disease, cancer). Conversely, subjects tended to react with anger (and

Figure 11.7 The

effect of dependency and
victim fault on helping. In
Gruder’s “Ralph’s Garage”
experiment, participants
were more likely to help a
victim high in dependency
who was at fault for his
predicament.
Based on data from Gruder, Romer, and
Kroth (1974).
 Chapter 1146
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 423

less pity) for victims of supposedly controllable conditions (AIDS, obesity; Weiner,
1993; Weiner et al., 1988). The emotion tied to the victimʼs situation (pity versus anger)
mediated willingness to help. Subjects indicated less willingness to help victims with
controllable problems than those with uncontrollable problems (Weiner et al., 1988).
Additionally, subjects assigned greater responsibility to a person with a disease (AIDS)
if the victimʼs behavior was perceived to have contributed to his or her disease than if
the victimʼs behavior was not perceived to have contributed. For example, if a person
with AIDS contracted the disease via a blood transfusion, less responsibility is assigned
to the victim than if the person contracted the disease via a sexual route (Graham
et al., 1993).
Does this concept of the deserving versus the nondeserving victim hold across cul-
tures? In an interesting study conducted by Mullen and Stitka (2000), U.S. and Ukranian
participants were compared. Participants read profiles about individuals who needed
organ transplants. Half the individuals were portrayed as having contributed to their
own problems (practicing poor health behaviors), whereas the other half were said to
have their condition because of a genetic disorder. Two other variables were manipu-
lated. One was the degree to which the individual needing the transplant contributed
to society (high or low), and the other was the degree of need for the new organ (i.e.,
95% versus 80% chance of dying if a transplant was not performed). Mullen and Stitka
found clear evidence for a cultural difference in the variables that mediate helping. U.S.
participants mainly based their helping decisions on the degree to which an individual
contributed to his or her own problems. That is, less help is likely to be given to the
person who practiced poor health habits than to the person who suffers from a genetic
disorder. Ukranian participants, on the other hand, placed more weight on oneʼs con-
tributions to society than on the other factors. However, both American and Ukranian
participants were influenced by the other variables. U.S. participants were influenced
by contribution to society and need, in that order, following personal responsibility.
Ukranian participants also were influenced by personal responsibility and need, in that
order, after contributions to society.
There is evidence that characteristics of the helper may interact with perceived
controllability in determining affective responses to victims and helping behavior. In an
analysis of reactions to individuals living in poverty, Zucker and Weiner (1993) found
that politically conservative individuals were likely to blame the victim for being in
poverty, attributing poverty to characteristics of the victim. Consequently, these indi-
viduals tend to react with anger and are less willing to help. On the other hand, more
liberal individuals see poverty as driven by societal forces, not under control of the
victim, and react with pity and are more willing to help.
Finally, social categorization also affects oneʼs decision to help (Levine &
Thompson, 2004; Levine, Cassidy, Brazier, & Reicher, 2002; Levine, Prosser, Evans,
& Reicher, 2005; Sturmer, Snyder, & Omoto, 2005). That is, we are more likely to
help someone in need who is from our “in-group” as opposed to someone from an
“out-group.” In one study that demonstrated this effect, Levine and Thompson (2004)
had participants read two scenarios depicting natural disasters (a flood and an earth-
quake). The scenarios depicted disasters of equal severity and elicited similar helping
responses. Each disaster was said to have occurred either in Europe or South America.
Participants were British students enrolled at Lancaster University in England. Levine
and Thompson manipulated the “social identity” of the participants. Some partici-
pants were induced into adopting a “British social identity” and others a more general
“European social identity.” After reading the scenarios, participants were asked the
extent to which they would be willing to help the victims of the natural disasters.
424 Social Psychology 47

Consistent with the notion that we are more likely to help members of an in-group,
participants who were induced into a European social identity expressed a greater
willingness to help European victims of either disaster than those who adopted the
British social identity. Less help was extended to victims of a South American disaster,
regardless of the identity induced. Thus, members of an out-group were least likely
to be helped. In another experiment Levine et al. (2005) found that soccer fans were
more likely to help someone in need who was wearing their teamʼs jersey than someone
wearing a rival teamʼs jersey.

Race and Helping Behavior

Another characteristic of the victim investigated by social psychologists is race. Are
blacks more or less likely than whites to receive help when they need it? If you base
your answer on stories on television and in the newspapers, you might think that blacks
and whites in our society never help each other. But this is simply not true. Many
blacks risked their lives to save whites during the Los Angeles riots in 1992. A group of
African American residents of South Central Los Angeles helped get Reginald Denny
to the hospital, saving his life. Interracial helping does occur. What does the social
psychological research say about this issue?
A meta-analysis of the literature in this area (Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005)
found that race and helping present a rather complex picture. According to Saucier et
al., the meta-analysis did not show any overall, universal bias against black victims in
need of help. Black and white victims, given the same helping situation, are equally
likely to receive help. However, racial bias did emerge when specific variables were
examined. Most specifically, variables relating to aversive racism (see Chapter 4) did
show bias. Saucier et al. found that blacks are less likely to receive help than whites
under the following conditions:
1. When the help required longer commitments of time
2. When the help was more risky
3. When the help was more difficult
4. When the distance between the helper and victim increased
5. When a white helper could rationalize away nonhelp
In terms of specific studies, there have been numerous studies conducted to inves-
tigate aspects of interracial helping (Benson, Karabenick, & Lerner, 1976; Dovidio &
Gaertner, 1981; Gaertner, Dovidio, & Johnson, 1982). In one, for example, white sub-
jects, assessed as either high or low in prejudice, were given an opportunity to help
either a black or a white victim (Gaertner et al., 1982). The subjects were either alone
(subject and victim) or with four others (three bystanders and the victim). The researchers
recorded the amount of time subjects took to give the victim aid. Their results showed
that white victims were helped more quickly than black victims, especially by prejudiced
subjects, when bystanders were present. Blacks and whites were helped equally quickly
when no bystanders were present. Thus, the bystander effect is stronger for black than
for white victims (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977; Gaertner et al., 1982).
Given the opportunity to diffuse responsibility, bystanders will avail themselves of
the opportunity more with black than with white victims (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977)
This may occur because when multiple bystanders are present, a black victim is seen
as less severely injured than a white victim (Gaertner, 1975). When there is a single
bystander, there is no such differential assessment of injury severity (Gaertner, 1975).
 Chapter 1148
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 425

Other factors also influence the help given to black versus white victims. In another
study, white subjects were given an opportunity to help either a black or white male
(Dovidio & Gaertner, 1981). This person was introduced as the subjectʼs “supervisor”
or “subordinate” and was said to be of either higher or lower cognitive ability than the
subject. When given an opportunity to help, white subjects helped the black subordinate
(lower status) more than the black supervisor (higher status), regardless of the ability
level. However, African American subjects gave help based more on ability than on
status. According to this study, status is relevant in whitesʼ decision to help blacks, with
more help given to lower-status blacks (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1981). Ability is more
relevant in blacksʼ decision to help whites, with more help given to high-ability than
low-ability whites.
The relationship between race and helping behavior is complex and involves
numerous situational factors as well as racial attitudes. A review of the literature by
Crosby, Bromley, and Saxe (1980) found mixed results. These researchers drew three
conclusions:
1. Bias exists against African American victims, but the bias is not extreme. Clear
discrimination against African American victims was reported in 44% of the
studies reviewed; 56% showed no discrimination or reverse discrimination.
2. Whites and blacks discriminate against the opposite race at about the same level.
3. Whites discriminate against black victims more under remote conditions
(over the telephone) than in face-to-face situations.
In another study, researchers investigated race differences in the level of help given
to elderly individuals who lived at home (Morrow-Howell, Lott, & Ozawa, 1990). They
analyzed a program in which volunteers were assigned to help elderly clients shop and
provide them with transportation, counseling, and telephone social support. This study
found very few differences between black and white volunteers. For example, both
black and white volunteers attended training sessions at equal rates and were evaluated
equally by their supervisors.
There was, however, one interesting difference between black and white volunteers
when the race of the client was considered. According to client reports, volunteers who
were of a different race than the client spent less time with clients than did volunteers
of the same race. Additionally, when the volunteer and client were of the same race,
the client reported that there were more home visits and that the volunteer was more
helpful than if the volunteer and client differed in race.
A few cautions are in order here, however. There was no independent measure
of the amount of time volunteers spent with clients or the quality of service rendered.
The data on the volunteersʼ performance were based on client reports. It could be that
same-race clients were simply more inclined to rate their volunteers positively than
were different-race clients. Nevertheless, the study documented a program of helping
in which altruistic tendencies transcended racial barriers.

Sexual Orientation and Helping

The sexual orientation of a person in need influences willingness to help (Gore, Tobiasen,
& Kayson, 1997; Shaw, Bourough, & Fink, 1994). For example, Gore and colleagues
(1997) had either a male or female victim make a telephone call to participants. When
the participant answered, the victim made it clear that he or she had dialed the wrong
number. Implied sexual orientation was manipulated by having the victim tell the par-
ticipant that he or she was trying to reach his or her boyfriend or girlfriend. They also
426 Social Psychology 49

told the participant that they had either used their last quarter (high urgency) or had no
more change (low urgency). Participants were asked to call a number to report the emer-
gency (which was actually the experimenterʼs number). The proportion of participants
who returned the victimʼs call to the experimenter within 60 seconds was the measure
of helping. The results showed that heterosexuals were more likely to get help (80%)
than homosexuals (48%). Additionally, even when homosexuals were helped, it took
longer for the participants to call back than when the victim was heterosexual.

Increasing the Chances of Receiving Help

We have been looking at helping behavior from the point of view of the potential helper.
But what about the person in need of help? Is there anything a victim can do to increase
the chances of being helped? Given all the obstacles along the path of helping, it may
seem a small miracle that anyone ever receives any help. If you are in a position of
needing help, however, there are some things you can do.
First, make your plea for help as loud as possible. Yelling and waving your arms
increase the likelihood that others will notice your plight. Make your plea as clear as
possible. You do not want to leave any room for doubt that you need help. This will
help bystanders correctly label the situation as an emergency.
Next, you want to increase the chances that a bystander will assume responsibility
for helping you. Donʼt count on this happening by itself. Anything you can do to increase
a bystanderʼs personal responsibility for helping will increase your chances of getting
help. Making eye contact is one way to do this; making a direct request is another.
The effectiveness of the direct-request approach was graphically illustrated in a
field experiment in which a confederate of the experimenter approached subjects on a
beach (Moriarty, 1975). In one condition, the confederate asked the subject to watch his
things (a blanket and a radio) while the confederate went to the boardwalk for a minute
(the subject is given responsibility for helping). In another condition, the confederate
simply asked the subject for a match (social contact, but no responsibility). A short time
after the confederate left, a second confederate came along and took the radio and ran
off. More subjects helped in the personal-responsibility condition (some actually ran
the second confederate down) than in the nonresponsibility condition. Thus, making
someone personally responsible for helping increases helping.

Courageous Resistance and Heroism

A vast majority of research on altruism in social psychology has focused on helping in
emergency situations. Typically, this type of help requires an immediate decision to a
specific situation. However, not all helping falls into this category. There are helping
situations that may involve nonemergencies (e.g., volunteering in a hospital) and may
courageous resistance require a more deliberative decision than is required in an emergency situation. For
Selfless behavior involving risk example, if you are trying to decide whether to volunteer your time for a certain cause,
to a helper (and/or family) you may take time to consider all aspects of your decision. One category of such
that is sustained over time, is
a product of a deliberative
helping is called courageous resistance (Shepela et al., 1999). According to Shepela
process, and involves a et al., courageous resistance is “selfless behavior in which there is a high risk/cost to
moral calling.
 Chapter 1150
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 427

the actor, and possibly to the actorʼs family or associates, where the behavior must be
sustained over time, is most often deliberative, and often where the actor is responding
to a moral calling” (p. 789).
Courageous resistors can be found in a wide range of situations. For example,
William Lawless was put in charge of waste disposal at the Savannah River reactor,
even though he had little experience in radioactive waste disposal. He became aware
that liquid radioactive wastes were being dumped into shallow trenches. When he started
asking questions, he was told to keep quiet about it. Instead, Lawless went public, and
as a result, massive cleanup efforts were undertaken to remove radioactive waste dis-
posed of improperly. From the political world is Nelson Mandela, founder of the African
National Congress in South Africa. Mandela took a stand against apartheid (the system
in South Africa that separated whites and blacks socially, economically, and linguisti-
cally). For his efforts he spent 28 years in prison. Eventually, he was released and went
on to become the leader of that country.
Sometimes individuals arise as courageous resistors that surprise us. Two examples
are John Rabe and Albert Goering. Rabe was a Nazi businessman in Nanking, China.
After the Japanese invaded Nanking and began murdering Chinese civilians, Rabe
used his Nazi credentials and connections to save nearly 250,000 Chinese by protect-
ing them in a German compound, often facing down armed Japanese soldiers only with
his Nazi credentials. Albert Goering, the half-brother of Hermann Goering (the second
highest official in Nazi Germany), is credited with saving hundreds of persecuted Jews
during World War II. He would forge his brotherʼs name on transit documents and use
his brotherʼs influence if he got caught. Despite having grown up in the same house as
his brother Hermann, Albert emerged as a much different person, dedicated to helping
persecuted Jews escape those his brother sent to persecute them.
A concept closely related to courageous resistance is heroism. Heroism is any heroism Helping that
helping act that involves significant risk above what is normally expected and serves involves significant risk above
some socially valued goal (Becker & Eagly, 2004). The two elements of this definition what is normally expected
and serves some socially
require some elaboration. There are many jobs that require considerable risk such as
valued goal.
police officer and firefighter. We expect individuals in these roles to accept a degree of
risk. So, for example, we expect a firefighter to enter a burning building to save victims.
Such behavior is not necessarily heroic because it is expected of firefighters. However,
if a firefighter goes back several times into a building on the verge of collapse to rescue
victims, that would qualify as heroic. The second requirement of a heroic act is that it
serves some valued goal. Saving lives is certainly a valued goal, as is putting oneʼs job
on the line to expose a wrong.
As you can see, heroism and courageous resistance have common elements. They
have one important difference: A heroic act need not involve an extended commitment.
A heroic act can be a one-shot occurrence involving a quick decision made on the spot.
For example, Rick Rescorla (head of security for a firm at the World Trade Center),
who reentered the World Trade Center to help stragglers get out and died when one of
the towers collapsed, would be considered heroic. His behavior clearly involved risk
and served the higher goal. It did not, however, involve the deliberative process over
time and the long-term commitment to a course of action. So, one can be heroic without
being a courageous resistor.
Finally, a heroic act need not always be motivated by empathy for a victim or altru-
ism. There can be a number of motives for a heroic act. For example, a firefighter might
act in a heroic way to gain recognition and secure a promotion. His or her egoistic moti-
vations do not diminish the heroic nature of any act he or she performs.
428 Social Psychology 51

In this section of the chapter we shall focus on one particular example of coura-
geous resistance and heroism: Ordinary people who, under extraordinary circumstances,
helped rescue Jews from the Nazis during World War II. You should keep in mind that
what these individuals did was exceedingly dangerous. Anyone caught helping Jews
was dealt with harshly, including being sent to death camps or summarily hanged.
Because of prevailing anti-Jewish attitudes and the threat of punishment, engaging in
rescue activity was relatively rare, especially in Eastern Europe. However, there were
those who risked their lives to help others, in some cases for years.
Before we begin our discussion of rescuers, it is important to note that the relationship
between altruism and courageous resistance may, at times, be tenuous. Not all altruistic
individuals are courageous. For example, undoubtedly there were many Christians who
deplored what the Nazis were doing to Jews and felt empathy for the Jews. However,
because of fear of being caught and executed, many of these individuals did not translate
their empathic concern into tangible action to help. Likewise, not all courageous people
are altruistic. For example, Tec (1986) reports that some people who helped the Jews
were “paid helpers” who helped Jews primarily for the money. These individuals were
not motivated by empathy or altruism. As a result, the quality of care received by Jews
helped by paid helpers was far lower than those helped by rescuers (Tec, 1986).

Explaining Courageous Resistance and Heroism: The Role

of Personality
Much of the research on helping behavior that we have discussed suggests that whether
people help depends on situational factors. For example, research shows that the costs
of helping, the degree of responsibility for helping, the assumed characteristics of the
victim, and the dangerousness of the situation all affect helping behavior. None of these
factors are under the control of the potential helper; they are part of the situation.
Situational factors seem to be crucial in situations that require spontaneous helping
(Clary & Orenstein, 1991). The situations created in the laboratory, or for that matter
in the field, are analogous to looking at a single frame in a motion picture. Recall the
seminarians. They were in a hurry, and although thinking of the parable of the Good
Samaritan, they practically leapt over the slumped body of a person in need of their help.
Is this unexpected event a fair and representative sample of their behavior? It was for
that particular situation. But, unless we look at what comes before and after, we cannot
make judgments about how they would behave in other situations. Looking at these
single-frame glimpses of helping can lead us to overlook personality variables.
Although personality factors come into play in all forms of altruism, they may be
more likely to come to the fore in long-term helping situations. Helping on a long-term
basis, whether it involves volunteering at a hospital or Albert Goering helping Jews,
requires a degree of planning. This planning might take place before the help begins. Or
it may occur after help begins. For example, rescuers of Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe
often did not plan their initial helping acts (Tec, 1986). However, their continued helping
required thought and planning. During planning, helpers assess risks, costs, and priori-
ties, and they match personal morals and abilities with victimsʼ needs.
History teaches us that in times of great need, a select few individuals emerge to
offer long-term help. What is it about these people that sets them apart from others who
remain on the sidelines? Midlarsky, Fagin Jones, and Corley (2005) compared rescuers
and nonrescuers on a number of personality dimensions. They found that the rescuers
possessed a cluster of personality characteristics that distinguished them from nonrescuers.
These characteristics were: “locus of control, autonomy, risk taking, social responsibility,
empathic, concern, and altruistic moral reasoning” (p. 918). Rescuers, compared to
 Chapter 1152
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 429

nonrescuers, were more internally motivated, were more independent, were more likely
to take risks, showed higher levels of social responsibility, had more empathic concern
for others, and were more likely to be driven by internal moral/altruistic values. Further,
they found that altruistic moral reasoning was the strongest correlate of rescue activity.
So, there is evidence for an altruistic personality, or a cluster of personality traits, altruistic personality
including empathy, that predisposes them to great acts of altruism. However, we also A cluster of personality traits
must remain mindful that situational forces still may be important, even in long-term that predisposes a person to
acts of altruism.
helping situations. In the sections that follow, we explore how situational factors and
personality factors combine to influence altruism. We begin by considering the factors
that influenced a relatively small number of individuals to help rescue Jews from the
Nazis during their World War II occupation of Europe.

Righteous Rescuers in Nazi-Occupied Europe

As Hitlerʼs final solution (the systematic extermination of European Jews) progressed,
life for Jews in Europe became harder and more dangerous. Although most of Eastern
Europeʼs and many of Western Europeʼs Jews were murdered, some did survive. Some
survived on their own by passing as Christians or leaving their homes ahead of the
Nazis. Many, however, survived with the help of non-Jews who risked their lives to
help them. The state of Israel recognizes a select group of those who helped Jews for
their heroism and designates them as righteous rescuers (Tec, 1986). righteous rescuer
Sadly, not as many individuals emerged as rescuers as one might wish. The number The designation bestowed by
of rescuers is estimated to have been between 50,000 and 500,000, a small percentage Israel on non-Jews who helped
save Jews from the Nazis
of those living under Nazi rule (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). In short, only a minority of during World War II.
people were willing to risk their lives to help others.
It should not be too surprising that the majority did not help the Jews. Those caught
helping Jews, even in the smallest way, were subjected to punishment, death in an exter-
mination camp, or summary execution. In other cases, especially in Poland, rescuing
Jews amounted to flying in the face of centuries of anti-Semitic attitudes and religious
doctrine that identified Jews as the killers of Jesus Christ (Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Tec,
1986). The special problems facing Polish rescuers are illustrated in the following quo-
tation from one: “My husband hated Jews. . . . Anti-Semitism was ingrained in him. Not
only was he willing to burn every Jew but even the earth on which they stood. Many
Poles feel the way he did. I had to be careful of the Poles” (Tec, 1986, p. 54).
Because Polish rescuers violated such powerful social norms, some social psycholo-
gists have suggested that their behavior is an example of autonomous altruism, selfless autonomous altruism
help that society does not reinforce (Tec, 1986). In fact, such altruism may be discour- Selfless altruism that society
aged by society. Rescuers in countries outside Poland may have been operating from a does not support or might
even discourage.
different motive. Most rescuers in Western Europe, although acting out of empathy for
the Jews, may have had a normocentric motivation for their first act of helping (Oliner
& Oliner, 1988). A normocentric motivation for helping is oriented more toward a group
(perhaps society) with whom an individual identifies than toward the individual in need.
In small towns in southern France, for example, rescuing Jews became normative, the
accepted and expected thing to do. This type of altruism is known as normative altru-
ism, altruism that society supports and encourages (Tec, 1986).
Finally, it is important to understand that not only were general attitudes throughout
Europe related to the frequency and type of rescue activity, but so were specific cultural
and social forces within specific regions of Europe. For example, Buckser (2001) points
out that the large-scale rescue of Danish Jews is best understood within the cultural context
of Denmark and its relationship to its Jewish population. Buckser points out that in many
areas the Danish population did not resist German occupation. However, when it came to
430 Social Psychology 53

the Jewish population, Danes came together to save all but a few Danish Jews. Buckser
believes that Danes rose up to help the Jews because of Grundtvigian Nationalism,
which essentially placed Danish national and cultural identity above differences among
people. In Denmark, Jews had successfully assimilated into the larger Danish culture.
So, when the Germans invaded and tried to portray the Jews as threatening outsiders, it
didnʼt work well. Instead, the German characterization of the Jews activated the unique
Danish Nationalism, and Danes who otherwise acquiesced to the Germans actively took
part in the large-scale evacuation of Danish Jews to Sweden.

The Oliners and the Altruistic Personality Project

One family victimized by the Nazis in Poland was that of Samuel Oliner. One day in
1942, when Samuel was 12 years old and living in the village of Bobawa, he was roused
by the sound of soldiersʼ boots cracking the predawn silence. He escaped to the roof and
hid there in his pajamas until they left. When he dared to come down from his rooftop
perch, the Jews of Bobawa lay buried in a mass grave. The village was empty.
Two years earlier, Samuelʼs entire family had been killed by the Nazis. Now he
gathered some clothes and walked for 48 hours until he reached the farm of Balwina
Piecuch, a peasant woman who had been friendly to his family in the past. The
12-year-old orphan knocked at her door. When Piecuch saw Samuel, she gathered him
into her house. There she harbored him against the Nazis, teaching him what he needed
to know of the Christian religion to pass as a Polish stable boy.
Oliner survived the war, immigrated to the United States, and went on to teach
at Humboldt State University in Arcata, California. One of his courses was on the
Holocaust. In it, he examined the fate of the millions of Jews, Gypsies, and other
Europeans who were systematically murdered by the Nazis between 1939 and 1945.
In 1978, one of his students, a German woman, became distraught, saying she couldnʼt
bear the guilt over what her people had done.
At this point, Oliner realized that the history of the war, a story of murder, mayhem,
and sadism, had left out a small but important aspect: the accomplishments of the many
altruistic people who acted to help Jews and did so without expectation of external
rewards (Goldman, 1988; Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Oliner and his wife, Pearl, estab-
lished the Altruistic Personality Project to study the character and motivations of those
altruists, whom the Oliners rightly call heroes.

Situational Factors Involved in Becoming a Rescuer

Oliner and Oliner (1988) and Tec (1986) investigated the situational forces that influ-
ence individuals to become rescuers. These situational factors can be captured in the
five questions for which the Oliners wanted to find answers:
1. Did rescuers know more about the difficulties the Jews faced than nonrescuers?
2. Were rescuers better off financially and therefore better able to help?
3. Did rescuers have social support for their efforts?
4. Did rescuers adequately evaluate the risks, the costs of helping?
5. Were rescuers asked to help, or did they initiate helping on their own?
The Oliners interviewed rescuers and a matched sample of nonrescuers over the
course of a 5-year study and compared the two groups. The Oliners used a 66-page ques-
tionnaire, translated into Polish, German, French, Dutch, Italian, and Norwegian and
 Chapter 1154
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 431

used 28 bilingual interviews. Results indicate that the situational differences between
rescuers and nonrescuers were not as significant as expected. For example, rescuers
were not wealthier than nonrescuers. Tec (1986) reported that the greatest number of
Polish helpers came from the peasant class, not the upper class of Poles. Additionally,
rescuers and nonrescuers alike knew about the persecution of the Jews and knew the
risks involved in going to their aid (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).
Only two situational variables were relevant to the decision to rescue. First, family
support was important for the rescue effort (Tec, 1986). Sixty percent of the rescuers in
Tecʼs sample reported that their families supported the rescue effort, compared to only
12% who said that their families opposed rescue efforts, a finding mirrored in Oliner
and Olinerʼs study. Evidence suggests that rescue was made more likely by the rescu-
ersʼ being affiliated with a group that supported the rescue effort (Baron, 1986). We can
conclude that support from some outside agency, be it the family or another support
group, made rescue more likely.
The second situational factor was how the rescuer first began his or her efforts.
In most cases (68%), rescuers helped in response to a specific request to help; only
32% initiated help on their own (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Tec reported a similar result.
For most rescuers the first act of help was unplanned. But once a rescuer agreed to help
that first time, he or she was likely to help again. Help was refused in a minority of
instances (about 15%), but such refusal was related to specific risks involved in giving
help. Most rescuers (61%) helped for 6 months or more (Tec, 1986). And 90% of the
people rescuers helped were strangers (Goldman, 1988).
These situational factors—the costs of helping, a request for help, and the support
of other bystanders in a group of which the rescuer was a member—also have been
identified in research as important in influencing the decision to help.

Personality Factors Involved in Becoming a Rescuer

The results of the work by Oliner and Oliner (1988) suggest that rescuers and nonrescuers
differed from each other less by circumstances than by their upbringing and personali-
ties. The Oliners found that rescuers exhibited a strong feeling of personal responsibility
for the welfare of other people and a compelling need to act on that felt responsibility.
They were moved by the pain of the innocent victims, by their sadness, helplessness,
and desperation. Empathy for the victim was an important factor driving this form of
altruism. Interestingly, rescuers and nonrescuers did not differ significantly on general
measures of empathy. However, they did differ on a particular type of empathy called
emotional empathy, which centers on oneʼs sensitivity to the pain and suffering of others
(Oliner & Oliner, 1988). According to the Oliners, this empathy, coupled with a sense
of social responsibility, increased the likelihood that an individual would make and
keep a commitment to help.
Beyond empathy, rescuers shared several other characteristics (Tec, 1986). First, they
showed an inability to blend in with others in the environment. That is, they tended to be
socially marginal, not fitting in very well with others. Second, rescuers exhibited a high
level of independence and self-reliance. They were likely to pursue their personal goals
even if those goals conflicted with social norms. Third, rescuers had an enduring commit-
ment to helping those in need long before the war began. The war did not make these people
altruists; rather, it allowed these individuals to remain altruists in a new situation.
Fourth, rescuers had (and still have) a matter-of-fact attitude about their rescue
efforts. During and after the war, rescuers denied that they were heroes, instead saying
that they did the only thing they could do. Finally, rescuers had a universalistic view
of the needy. That is, rescuers were able to put aside the religion or other characteris-
432 Social Psychology 55

tics of those they helped. Interestingly, some rescuers harbored anti-Semitic attitudes
(Tec, 1986). But they were able to put those prejudices aside and help a person in need.
These characteristics, along with high levels of empathy, contributed to the rescuersʼ
decision to help the Jews.
The research on rescuers clearly shows that they differed in significant ways from
those who were nonrescuers (Oliner & Oliner, 1988) or paid helpers (Tec, 1986). How
can we account for these differences? To answer this question, we must look at the
family environments in which rescuers were socialized.

Altruism as a Function of Childrearing Style

In Chapter 10, we established that inept parenting contributes to the development
of antisocial behaviors such as aggression. Oliner and Oliner (1988) found that the
childrearing styles used by parents of rescuers contributed to the development of
prosocial attitudes and behaviors. The techniques used by parents of rescuers fostered
empathy in the rescuers.
Research shows that a parental or adult model who behaves altruistically is more
likely to influence children to help than are verbal exhortations to be generous (Bryan
& Walbek, 1970). Additionally, verbal reinforcement has a different effect on childrenʼs
helping, depending on whether a model behaves in a charitable or selfish manner
(Midlarsky, Bryan, & Brickman, 1973). Verbal social approval from a selfish model
does not increase childrenʼs donations. However, social approval from a charitable
model does.
Models obviously have a powerful effect on both aggressive and prosocial behav-
iors. Why, however, do you think that a prosocial model has more effect on younger
children than older children? What factors can you think of to explain the fact that a
modelʼs behavior is more important than what the model says? Based on what you
know about the effect of prosocial models on childrenʼs altruism, if you were given
the opportunity to design a television character to communicate prosocial ideals, what
would that character be like? What would the character say and do to foster prosocial
behavior in children? Similarly, what types of models should we be exposing adults to
in order to increase helping? Parents of rescuers provided role models for their chil-
dren that allowed them to develop the positive qualities needed to become rescuers
later in life. For example, rescuers (more than nonrescuers) came from families that
stressed the universal similarity of all people, despite superficial differences among
them (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). Families stressed the aspect of religion that encour-
aged caring for those in need. Additionally, families of rescuers did not discuss nega-
tive stereotypes of Jews, which was more common among families of nonrescuers.
As children, then, rescuers were exposed to role models that instilled in them many
positive qualities.
It is not enough for parents simply to embrace altruistic values and provide posi-
tive role models (Staub, 1985); they must also exert firm control over their children.
Parents who raise altruistic children coach them to be helpful and firmly teach them
how to be helpful (Goleman, 1991a; Stab, 1985). Parents who are warm and nurturing
and use reasoning with the child as a discipline technique are more likely to produce
an altruistic child than cold, uncaring, punitive parents (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989).
This was certainly true of families of rescuers. Parents of rescuers tended to avoid
using physical punishment, using an inductive style that focused on verbal reasoning
and explanation.
 Chapter 1156
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 433

As important as the family is in the socialization of altruism, it cannot alone account

for a child growing up to be an altruistic individual. Recall that Albert and Hermann
Goering grew up in the same household yet went down very different paths in adult-
hood. The childʼs cognitive development, or his or her capacity to understand the world,
also plays a role.

Altruism as a Function of Cognitive Development

As children grow, their ability to think about and understand other people and the world
changes. The cognitive perspective focuses on how altruistic behavior develops as a
result of changes in the childʼs thinking skills. To study altruism from this perspective,
Nancy Eisenberg presented children with several moral dilemmas that pit one personʼs
welfare against another personʼs welfare. Here is one example: Bob, a young man who
was very good at swimming, was asked to help young crippled children who could not
walk to learn to swim so that they could strengthen their legs for walking. Bob was the
only one in his town who could do this job well, because only he had both life-saving
and teaching experiences. But helping crippled children took much of Bobʼs free time
left after work and school, and Bob wanted to practice hard as often as possible for an
upcoming series of important swimming contests. If Bob did not practice swimming in
all his free time, his chances of winning the contests and receiving a paid college educa-
tion or sum of money would be greatly lessened (Eisenberg & Mussen, 1989, p. 124).
The dilemma pits Bobʼs needs against those of other people. The children in
Eisenbergʼs study were asked several questions about what Bob should do. For example,
“Should Bob agree to teach the crippled children? Why?” Based on their responses, chil-
dren were classified according to Eisenbergʼs levels of prosocial reasoning. Eisenbergʼs
findings show that as children get older, they are more likely to understand the needs
of other people and are less focused on their own selfish concerns. The research sug-
gests that this is a continual process and that peopleʼs altruistic thinking and behavior
can change throughout life.
The idea that the development of altruism is a lifelong process is supported by the
fact that rescuers did not magically become caring and empathic at the outset of the
war. Instead, the ethic of caring grew out of their personalities and interpersonal styles,
which had developed over the course of their lives. Rescuers were altruistic long before
the war (Huneke, 1986; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Tec, 1986) and tended to remain more
altruistic than nonrescuers after the war (Oliner & Oliner, 1988).

Becoming an Altruistic Person

Altruism requires something more than empathy and compassionate values
(Staub, 1985). It requires the psychological and practical competence to carry those
intentions into action (Goleman, 1991). Goodness, like evil, begins slowly, in small
steps. Recall from the Chapter 7 discussion on social influence that we are often eased
into behaviors in small steps (i.e., through the foot-in-the-door technique). In a similar
manner, many rescuers gradually eased themselves into their roles as rescuers. People
responded to a first request for help and hid someone for a day or two. Once they took
that first step, they began to see themselves differently, as the kind of people who
rescued the desperate. Altruistic actions changed their self-concept: Because I helped,
I must be an altruistic person. As we saw in Chapter 2, one way we gain self-knowl-
edge is through observation of our own behavior. We then apply that knowledge to
our self-concept.
434 Social Psychology 57

This is how Swedish diplomat Raoul Wallenberg got involved in rescuing Hungarian
Jews during World War II (Staub, 1985). The first person he rescued was a business
partner who happened to be a Hungarian Jew. Wallenberg then became more involved
and more daring. He began to manufacture passes for Jews, saying that they were citi-
zens of Sweden. He even handed out passes to Jews who were being put in the cattle
cars that would take them to the death camps. Wallenberg disappeared soon after, and
his fate is still unknown. Apparently, there is a unique type of person who is likely to
take that very first step to help and to continue helping until the end (Goleman, 1991).
Wallenberg and the other rescuers were such people.

Gender and Rescue

Research suggests that a small majority of the rescuers were women (Becker &
Eagly, 2004). For example, in Poland 57% of rescuers were women. In France 55.6%
were women. And in the Netherlands, 52.5% were women (Becker & Eagly, 2004).
Becker and Eagly report that women rescuers who were not part of a couple (e.g.,
husband-wife team) significantly exceeded the number of such women in the general
population. Further, the motivation underlying male and female rescue differed. Women
were more likely to be motivated by interpersonal caring and a relationship orientation
than men (Anderson, 1993).
Anderson (1993) content analyzed the questionnaire and interview data collected
by Sam and Pearl Oliner (1988). Anderson evaluated information on socialization expe-
riences, the family histories, and self-concepts of male and female rescuers. Anderson
found very different socialization experiences for male and female rescuers. She found
that men tended to be socialized toward civic life, had at least a high school education,
and were socialized to be autonomous. Women were more likely to be socialized to be
family oriented, were less likely to have had an education, and were socialized for altru-
ism. Anderson points out that these different socialization experiences related to different
forms of rescue activity for men and women. Men, reflecting their socialization toward
autonomy, were more likely to work alone, rescuing large numbers of people, one at a
time. Male rescue was also more likely to be brief and repetitive (e.g., smuggling people
out of dangerous areas). Female rescuers, on the other hand, were more likely to work
with others in helping networks and help the same people over a longer period of time.
Anderson also found that women tended to be motivated by guilt and expressed depres-
sion and doubts about their ability to help. Men were more motivated to protect the inno-
cent and were less socially connected than women.

A Synthesis: Situational and Personality Factors in Altruism

We have seen that both situational and personality factors influence the development and
course of altruism. How do these factors work together to produce altruistic behavior?
Two approaches provide some answers: the interactionist view and the application of
the five-stage decision model to long-term helping situations.

The Interactionist View

interactionist view of The interactionist view of altruism argues that an individualʼs internal motives (whether
altruism The view that an altruistic or selfish) interact with situational factors to determine if a person will help
individual’s altruistic or selfish (Callero, 1986). Romer and his colleagues (Romer, Gruder, & Lizzadro, 1986) identi-
internal motives interact with
situational factors to determine
fied four altruistic orientations based on the individualʼs degree of nurturance (the need
whether a person will help. to give help) and of succorance (the need to receive help):
 Chapter 1158
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 435

1. Altruistic—Those who are motivated to help others but not to receive help
in return
2. Receptive giving—Those who help to obtain something in return
3. Selfish—Those who are primarily motivated to receive help but not give it
4. Inner-sustaining—Those who are not motivated to give or receive help
In their study, Romer and colleagues (1986) led people to believe that they either
would or would not be compensated for their help. On the basis of the four orientations
just described, these researchers predicted that individuals with an altruistic orientation
would help even if compensation was not expected; receptive givers would be willing to
help only if they stood to gain something in return; selfish people would not be oriented
toward helping, regardless of compensation; and those described as inner-sustaining
would neither give nor receive, no matter what the compensation.
Romerʼs (1986) results confirmed this hypothesis. Figure 11.8 shows the results
on two indexes of helping: the percentage of subjects who agree to help and the
number of hours volunteered. Notice that altruistic people were less likely to help
when compensation was offered. This is in keeping with the reverse-incentive effect
described in Chapter 6. When people are internally motivated to do something, giving Figure 11.8 Helping
them an external reward decreases their motivation and their liking for the activity. behavior and hours
There is also evidence that personality and the situation interact in a way that can volunteered as a function
reduce the bystander effect. In one study, researchers categorized subjects as either of helping orientation and
“esteem oriented” or “safety oriented” (Wilson, 1976). Esteem-oriented individuals compensation. Participants
are motivated by a strong sense of personal competency rather than by what others whose orientation was
do. Safety-oriented individuals are more dependent on what others do. Subjects receptive giving were more
were exposed to a staged emergency (a simulated explosion that supposedly hurt the likely to help when they
experimenter), either while alone, in the presence of a passive bystander (who makes received compensation.
no effort to help), or in the presence of a helping bystander (who goes to the aid of Altruistic participants were
the experimenter). willing to help regardless
of whether they were
compensated.
From Romer, Gruder, and Lizzadro (1986).
436 Social Psychology 59

Figure 11.9
The relationship between
personality characteristics,
presence, and type of
bystander on the likelihood
of helping. Esteem-oriented
participants were most
likely to help, regardless
of bystander condition.
Safety-oriented participants
were most likely to help
if they were alone or
if there was a helping
bystander present.
Based on data from Wilson (1976).

The study showed that esteem-oriented subjects were more likely to help than
safety-oriented subjects in all cases (Figure 11.9). Of most interest, however, is the fact
that the esteem-oriented subjects were more likely to help when a passive bystander
was present than were the safety-oriented subjects. Thus, subjects who are motivated
internally (esteem oriented) are not just more likely to help than those who are exter-
nally motivated (safety oriented); they are also less likely to fall prey to the influence
of a passive bystander. This suggests that individuals who helped in the classic experi-
ments on the bystander effect may possess personality characteristics that allow them
to overcome the help-depressing effects of bystanders.
We might also expect that the individualʼs personality will interact with the costs
of giving help. Some individuals help even though the cost of helping is high. For
example, some subjects in Batsonʼs (1990a) research described earlier in this chapter
helped by offering to change places with someone receiving electric shocks even though
they could have escaped the situation easily. And rescuers helped despite the fact that
getting caught helping Jews meant death. In contrast, there are those who will not help
even if helping requires minimal effort.
The degree to which the personality of the helper affects helping may depend on the
perceived costs involved in giving aid. In relatively low-cost situations, personality will
be less important than the situation. However, in high-cost situations, personality will be
more important than the situation. As the perceived cost of helping increases, personality
exerts a stronger effect on the decision to help. This is represented in Figure 11.10. The
base of the triangle represents very low-cost behaviors. As you move up the triangle,
the cost of helping increases. The relative size of each division of the triangle represents
the number of people who would be willing to help another in distress.
An extremely low-cost request (e.g., giving a stranger directions to the campus
library) would result in most peopleʼs helping. Peopleʼs personalities matter little when
it costs almost nothing to help. In fact, probably more effort is spent on saying no than
 Chapter 1160
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 437

Figure 11.10
The relationship between
personality and likeliness
of helping in different
helping situations. Nearly
everyone would help if
cost were very low. As
the cost of the helping act
increases, fewer and fewer
individuals are expected
to help. Only the most
altruistic individuals are
expected to help in very
high cost situations.

on directing the passerby to the library. When the cost of helping becomes high, even
prohibitive, as in the case of rescuing Jews from the Nazis, fewer people help. However,
there are those who successfully overcome the situational forces working against helping,
perhaps due to their altruistic personalities, and offer help.

Applying the Five-Stage Decision Model

to Long-Term Helping
Earlier in this chapter we described a five-stage decision model of helping. That model
has been applied exclusively to the description and explanation of helping in sponta-
neous emergencies. Now that we have explored some other aspects of helping, we can
consider whether that model may be applied to long-term and situation-specific spon-
taneous helping. Letʼs consider how each stage applies to the actions of those who
rescued Jews from the Nazis.

Noticing the Situation

For many rescuers, seeing the Nazis taking Jews away provoked awareness. One
rescuer, Irene Opdyke, first became aware of the plight of the Jews when she hap-
pened to look through a hotel window and saw Jews being rounded up and taken
away (Opdyke & Elliot, 1992). Oliner and Oliner (1988) reported that rescuers were
438 Social Psychology 61

motivated to action when they witnessed some external event such as the one Opdyke
witnessed. Of course, however, many nonrescuers also saw the same events yet did
not help.

Labeling the Situation as an Emergency

A critical factor in the decision to rescue Jews was to label the situation as one serious
enough to require intervention. Here, the differences between rescuers and nonrescu-
ers became important. Apparently, rescuers were more likely to see the persecution of
the Jews as something serious that required intervention. The persecutions appeared to
insult the sensibilities of the rescuers. Nonrescuers often decided that Jews must truly
have done something to deserve their awful fate. They tended to blame the victim and
by so doing relieved themselves of any responsibility for helping.
Rescuers also had social support to help because they belonged to groups that valued
such action. This is consistent with the notion that encouragement from others may make
it easier to label a situation as one requiring intervention (Dozier & Miceli, 1985).

Assuming Responsibility to Help

The next step in the process is for the rescuer to assume responsibility to help. For rescuers,
the universalistic view of the needy, ethics of justice and caring, and generally high levels
of empathy made assuming responsibility probable. In fact, many rescuers suggested that
after they noticed the persecution of Jews, they had to do something. Their upbringing
and view of the world made assumption of responsibility almost a given rather than a
decision. The main difference between the rescuers and the nonrescuers who witnessed
the same events was that the rescuers interpreted the events as a call to action (Oliner &
Oliner, 1988). For the rescuers, the witnessed event connected with their principles of
caring (Oliner & Oliner, 1988) and led them to assume responsibility.
Another factor may have come into play when the rescuers (or a bystander to an
emergency situation) assumed responsibility. Witnessing maltreatment of the Jews may
have activated the norm of social responsibility in these individuals. This norm involves
the notion that we should help others without regard to receiving help or a reward in
exchange (Berkowitz, 1972; Schwartz, 1975).

Deciding How to Help

Rescuers helped in a variety of ways (Oliner & Oliner, 1988). They had to assess the
alternatives available and decide which was most appropriate. Alternatives included
donating money to help Jews, providing false papers, and hiding Jews. It appears that,
at least sometimes, perceived costs were not an issue. For example, Opdyke hid several
Jews in the basement of a German majorʼs house in which she was the housekeeper,
even after she witnessed a Polish family and the family of Jews they were hiding hanged
by the Nazis in the town marketplace.

Implementing the Decision to Help

The final stage, implementing the decision to help, includes assessing rewards and
costs for helping and potential outcomes of helping versus not helping. When Everett
Sanderson rescued someone who had fallen onto the subway tracks, he said he could
not have lived with himself if he had not helped. This is an assessment of outcomes.
For Sanderson, the cost for not helping outweighed the cost for helping, despite
the risks.
 Chapter 1162
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 439

It is quite probable that the altruistic personalities we have been studying made similar
assessments. Because of their upbringing and the events of their lives that defined them
as altruistic people, they decided that helping was less costly to them than not helping.
Most of them engaged in long-term helping. This suggests that they assessed the outcome
of their initial decision to help and decided that it was correct. This was certainly true of
Balwina Piecuch. It was also true of the Polish woman in the following example, which
illustrates the interactionist nature of helping—the interplay of situational and personal-
ity factors and the combination of spontaneous and long-term events:
A woman and her child were being led through Cracow, Poland, with other Jews to a
concentration station. The woman ran up to a bystander and pleaded, “Please, please save
my child.” A Polish woman took the young boy to her apartment, where neighbors became
suspicious of this sudden appearance of a child and called the police. The captain of the
police department asked the woman if she knew the penalty for harboring a Jewish child.
The young woman said, with some heat, “You call yourself a Pole, a gentleman, a man of
the human race?” She continued her persuasive act, claiming that one of the police in the
room had actually fathered the child “and stooped so low as to be willing to have the child
killed” (Goldman, 1988, p. 8). Both the woman and the young boy survived the war.

Altruistic Behavior from the Perspective

of the Recipient
Our discussion of altruism to this point has centered on the helper. But helping situations,
of course, involve another person: the recipient. Social psychologists have asked two
broad questions that relate to the recipient of helping behavior: What influences an indi-
vidualʼs decision to seek help? What reactions do individuals have to receiving help?

Seeking Help from Others

The earlier discussion of helping in emergencies may have suggested that helping behav-
ior occurs when someone happens to stumble across a situation in which help is needed.
Although this does happen, there are also many situations in which an individual actively
seeks out help from another. Many Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe approached poten-
tial helpers and asked for help. And today, we see many examples of people seeking
help: refugees seeking entrance to other countries, the homeless seeking shelter, the
uninsured seeking health care.
Seeking help has both positive and negative aspects. On the positive side, the help
a person needs will often be forthcoming. For example, medical care may be given for a
life-threatening condition. On the negative side, a person may feel threatened or suffer loss
of self-esteem by asking for help (Fisher, Nadler, & Whitcher-Algana, 1982). In Western
society, a great premium is placed on being self-sufficient and taking care of oneself.
There is a social stigma attached to seeking help, along with potential feelings of failure.
Generally, seeking help generates costs, as does helping (DePaulo & Fisher, 1980).

A Decision Model for Seeking Help

Researchers have suggested that a person deciding whether to seek help may go through
a series of decisions, much like the helper does in Darley and Latanéʼs five-stage deci-
sion model. According to Gross and McMullen (1982, p. 308), a person asks three
questions before seeking help:
440 Social Psychology 63

1. Do I have a problem that help will alleviate?

2. Should I seek help?
3. Who is most capable of providing the kind of help I need?
Gross and McMullen (1982) developed a model to describe the process of help
seeking. The model works in the following way: Imagine that you have begun to have
trouble falling asleep at night. Before you will seek help, you must first become aware
that there is a problem. If you had trouble falling asleep only a few times, you probably
will not identify it as a problem, and you will not seek help. But if you have trouble
falling asleep for a few weeks, you may identify it as a problem and move to the next
stage of help seeking.
Now you must decide if the situation is one that requires help. If you decide that
it is not (the problem will go away by itself), you will not seek help. If you decide that
it is, you move on to the next stage, deciding on the best way to alleviate the problem.
Here you can opt for self-help (go to the drugstore and buy some over-the-counter drug)
or help from an outside party (a physician or psychologist). If you choose self-help and
it is successful, the problem is solved and no further help is sought. If the self-help is
unsuccessful, you could then seek help from others or resign yourself to the problem
and seek no further help.
The likelihood that you may ask for and receive help may also depend on the
nature of the groups (and society) to which you belong. Members of groups often
behave altruistically toward one another (Clark, Mills, & Powell, 1986) and are often
governed by communal relationships. Members benefit one another in response to
each otherʼs needs (Williamson & Clark, 1989). These relationships are in contrast to
exchange relationships, in which people benefit one another in response to, or with the
expectation of, receiving a benefit in return. Communal relationships are character-
ized by helping even when people cannot reciprocate each otherʼs help (Clark, Mills,
& Powell, 1986).

Factors Influencing the Decision to Seek Help

Clearly, the decision to seek help is just as complex as the decision to give help. What
factors come into play when a person is deciding whether to seek help?
For one, individuals may be more likely to ask for help when their need is low than
when it is high (Krishan, 1988). This could be related to the perceived “power” rela-
tionship between the helper and the recipient. When need is low, people may perceive
themselves to be on more common footing with the helper. Additionally, when need is
low, there is less cost to the helper. People may be less likely to seek help if the cost to
the helper is high (DePaulo & Fisher, 1980).
Another variable in this decision-making process is the person from whom the help
is sought. Are people more willing to seek help from a friend or from a stranger? In one
study, the relationship between the helper and the recipient (friends or strangers) and the
cost to the helper (high or low) were manipulated (Shapiro, 1980). Generally, subjects
were more likely to seek help from a friend than from a stranger (Figure 11.11). When
help was sought from a friend, the potential cost to the helper was not important. When
the helper was a stranger, subjects were reluctant to ask when the cost was high.
There are several possible reasons for this. First, people may feel more comfortable
and less threatened asking a friend rather than a stranger for costly help. Second, the
norm of reciprocity (see Chapter 7) may come into play in a more meaningful way with
friends (Gouldner, 1960). People may reason that they would do it for their friends if they
 Chapter 1164
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 441

Figure 11.11 Help

seeking as a function of
the cost of help and the
nature of the potential
helper. Participants were
likely to seek help from a
friend in both low-cost and
high-cost helping situations.
However, help was more
likely to be sought from a
stranger if the cost of help
were low.
Based on data from Shapiro (1980).

needed it. Thus, the expectation of reciprocity may make it easier to ask for high-cost
help from a friend. Third, people may perceive that they will have more opportunities
to reciprocate a friendʼs help. They may never see a stranger again.
A final variable that comes into play in deciding to seek help is the type of task
on which the help is needed. If someone is doing something easy (but needs help), the
person is less likely to seek help than if the task is hard (DePaulo & Fisher, 1980). And
if the task is something in which the person has ego involvement, he or she is also less
likely to seek help. So, for example, accountants would be unlikely to seek help prepar-
ing their own taxes, even if they needed the help.

Reacting to Help When It Is Given

When we help someone, or we see someone receiving help, it is natural to expect that the
person receiving the help will show gratitude. However, there are times when received
help is not appreciated or when victims complain about the help that was received. After
Hurricane Katrina, for example, many displaced New Orleans residents complained
about the living accommodations and other support provided weeks after the hurricane
struck. Why do people who receive help not always react positively toward that help?
We shall explore this topic in this section.
Receiving help is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, people are grateful for
receiving help. On the other hand, they may experience negative feelings when they
are helped, feelings of guilt, lowered self-esteem, and indebtedness. Jews who were
hidden by rescuers, for example, probably were concerned about the safety of their
benefactors; they also may have been disturbed by the thought that they could never
reciprocate the help they received.
Generally, there are four potentially negative outcomes of receiving help. First, an
inequitable relationship may be created. Second, those who are helped may experience
psychological reactance; that is, they may feel their freedom is threatened by receiving
442 Social Psychology 65

help. Third, those who receive help may make negative attributions about the intent of
those who have helped them. Fourth, those who receive help may suffer a loss of self-
esteem (Fisher et al., 1982). Letʼs look at two of these outcomes: inequity and threats
to self-esteem.

The Creation of an Inequitable Relationship

Recall from Chapter 9 that we strive to maintain equity in our relationships with others.
When inequity occurs, we feel distress and are motivated to restore equity. Helping
someone creates inequity in a relationship (Fisher et al., 1982), because the recipient feels
indebted to the helper (Leventhal, Allen, & Kemelgor, 1969). The higher the cost to the
helper, the greater the inequity and the greater the negative feelings (Gergen, 1974).
Inequity can be reversed when the help is reciprocated. Generally, a recipient
reacts more negatively to that help and likes the helper less if he or she does not have
the ability to reciprocate (Castro, 1974). Recipients are also less likely to seek help
in the future when they have not been able to reciprocate, especially if the cost to the
helper was high.
The relationship between degree of indebtedness and need to reciprocate is a
complex one. For example, if someone helps you voluntarily, you will reciprocate more
than if someone is obliged to help you as part of a job (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966).
You also are likely to reciprocate when the cost to the donor is high (Pruitt, 1968).
Interestingly, the absolute amount of help given is less important than the cost incurred
by the helper (Aikwa, 1990; Pruitt, 1968). For example, if a person who makes $100,000
per year gave you $1,000 (1% of the income), you would feel less indebted to that
person than if you received the same $1,000 from someone who makes $10,000 per
year (10% of the income).
Finally, we need to distinguish between the obligation and sense of gratitude a
person receiving help might experience and how that relates to reciprocity. Obligation
is a feeling of “owing” someone something. So, if I help you with a difficult task, you
might feel that you owe it to me to reciprocate the favor to restore equity. Gratitude
is an expression of appreciation. So, if I help you with that difficult task, you may
express your appreciation by reciprocating the favor. In an interesting study by Goei
and Boster (2005), obligation and gratitude were found to be conceptually different and
affected reciprocity differently. Goei and Boster found that doing a favor for someone,
especially a high-cost favor, increased gratitude but not obligation. In response to
increased gratitude, participants were then willing to comply with a request for help.
So, it may be a response to a feeling of gratitude that drives the restoration of equity
after receiving help.

Threats to Self-Esteem
Perhaps the strongest explanation for the negative impact of receiving help centers on
threats to self-esteem. When people become dependent on others, especially in Western
society, their self-esteem and self-worth come into question (Fisher et al., 1982). Under
these conditions, receiving help may be a threatening experience.
threat to self-esteem There is considerable support for the threat to self-esteem model. In one study,
model A model explaining subjects who received aid on an analogy task showed greater decrements in situational
the reactions of victims to self-esteem (self-esteem tied to a specific situation) than subjects not receiving help
receiving help, suggesting
that they might refuse help
(Balls & Eisenberg, 1986). In another study, researchers artificially manipulated sub-
because accepting it is a jectsʼ situational self-esteem by providing them with either positive or negative informa-
threat to their self-esteem. tion about themselves (Nadler, Altman, & Fisher, 1979). The researchers then created
 Chapter 1166
Prosocial Behavior and Altruism 443

a situation in which the individual either received or did not receive aid. Subjects who
received self-enhancing information (positive self-information) showed more negative
affect when aid was offered than when no aid was offered. Subjects who received nega-
tive self-information showed positive affect when they were helped.
Thus, subjects who had positive thoughts about themselves were more negatively
affected by help than those who had negative thoughts about themselves. The offer of
help was a greater threat to those with high self-esteem than to those with low self-esteem.
In other words, not only does receiving help threaten self-esteem but also the higher a
personʼs self-esteem is, the more threatened that person is by offers of help. For example,
if you consider yourself the worldʼs best brain surgeon, asking for assistance on a case
would be more disturbing to you than if you saw yourself as an average brain surgeon.
When someone with high self-esteem fails at a task, that failure is inconsistent with
his or her positive self-image (Nadler, Fisher, & Streufert, 1976). Help offered in this
situation is perceived as threatening, especially if it comes from someone who is similar
(Fisher & Nadler, 1974; Nadler et al., 1979). Receiving help from someone similar may
be seen as a sign of relative inferiority and dependency (Nadler et al., 1979).
Conversely, when a person with high self-esteem receives help from a dissimilar
person, he or she experiences an increase in situational self-esteem and self-confidence.
When a person with low self-esteem receives help from a similar other, that help is
more consistent with the individualʼs self-image. For these individuals, help from a
similar other is seen as an expression of concern, and they respond positively (Nadler
et al., 1979).
A model to explain the complex relationship between self-esteem and receiving
help was developed by Nadler, Fisher, and Ben Itchak (1983). The model suggests that
help from a friend is more psychologically significant than help from a stranger. This
greater significance is translated into negative affect if failure occurs on something that
is ego involving (e.g., losing a job). Here, help from a friend is seen as a threat to oneʼs
self-esteem, and a negative reaction follows.
Receiving help can be particularly threatening when it is unsolicited and imposed
by someone (Deelstra et al., 2003). Deelstra et al. had participants work on a task that
did not present a problem, a task that involved a solvable problem, and a task that pre-
sented an unsolvable problem. In each condition, a confederate either did or did not
provide unsolicited help. The results showed that participants had the strongest nega-
tive reaction to the help imposed when they perceived that no problem existed or that
a solvable problem existed. There was also a significant change in the participantʼs
heart rate that paralleled this finding. Participants showed the most heart rate increase
when help was imposed in the no-problem or solvable-problem conditions. Apparently,
receiving unwanted help is not only psychologically threatening, but it is also physi-
ologically arousing!
A study conducted in France investigated how a recipientʼs age (young, middle,
or older adult) and degree of control over a situation affected reactions to receiving
help (Raynaud-Maintier & Alaphillippe, 2001). Participants worked on an anagram
task and received varying amounts of help. The researchers found that, consistent with
the threat to self-esteem model, receiving help was threatening, especially when the
help was offered by an older adult or a helper with high self-esteem. The more control
participants had over the situation, the less threatening the help was and the older the
participant, the lower the threat of receiving help.
There are also gender differences in how people react to receiving help. In one
study, males and females were paired with fictitious partners of comparable, superior,
or inferior ability and were offered help by that partner (Balls & Eisenberg, 1986).
444 Social Psychology 67

Females paired with a partner of similar ability showed greater reductions in situational
self-esteem than males paired with a similar partner. Thus, females perceived help as
more threatening to self-esteem than did males. Females, however, were more satis-
fied than males with the help they received. Females were also more likely than males
to express a need for help.
Reactions to receiving help, then, are influenced by several factors, including the
ability to reciprocate, the similarity or dissimilarity of the helper, self-esteem, and gender.
Other factors can play a role as well. For example, if the helper has positive attributes
and is seen as having good motives, the person receiving help is more likely to feel posi-
tive about the experience. A positive outcome is also more likely if the help is offered
rather than requested, if the help is given on an ego-relevant task, and if the help does
not compromise the recipientʼs freedom (e.g., with a very high obligation to repay the
helper). Overall, we see that an individualʼs reaction to receiving help is influenced by
an interaction between situational variables (for example, the helperʼs characteristics)
and personality variables (Fisher et al., 1982).

Irene Opdyke Revisited

Irene Opdyke offered help to people she hardly knew and put her life at great risk. Opdyke
was undoubtedly an empathic person who felt the suffering of the Jews. In deciding
to help, she almost surely went through something similar to the process described in
this chapter. She noticed the situation requiring help when she heard about the liquida-
tion of the ghetto. She labeled the situation as one that required help, and she assumed
responsibility for helping. She knew what she had to do to help: find a place to hide the
Jews. Finally, she implemented her decision to help. Irene Opdykeʼs behavior fits quite
well with the five-stage decision model for helping.
Opdykeʼs decision was also similar to the decisions made by hundreds of other res-
cuers of Jews. Opdyke and the other rescuers put their lives on the line to save others.
We know something about Irene Opdyke and her commitment to helping people. After
all, she was studying to be a nurse before the war. It is obvious that Irene Opdyke had
empathy for those in need and was able to translate that empathy into tangible action.
Irene Opdyke provides us with an inspiring example of an altruistic person who put the
welfare of others above her own.

Chapter Review
1. What is altruism and how is it different from helping behavior? Why is the
difference important?
Altruism is behavior that helps a person in need that is focused on the victim
and is motivated purely by the desire to help the other person. Other, similar
behaviors may be motivated by relieving oneʼs personal distress or to gain
some reward. These behaviors are categorized as helping behavior. The
motivation underlying an act of help is important because it may affect the
quality of the help given.
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68 PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 105

BERKOWITZ, L.& LEPAGE, A. (1967). Weapons as aggression-eliciting stimuli.

Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 7, 202–207.

GUNTER, B. & MCALEER, J. (1997). Children and television. London: Routledge.

Looks at the effects of television and considers both sides of the
debate.

ZILLMAN, D.(1996). Cognition-excitation interdependencies in aggressive

behaviour. Aggressive Behaviour, 14, 51–64.

http://www.medialit.org/Violence/indexviol.htm Links to the discussion

on media violence.

http://www.yorku.ca/dept/psych/classics/Bandura/bobo.htm Covers
Bandura’s bobo doll study.

2.10
prosocial behaviour

Core Areas

• Altruism • Empathy arousal hypothesis

• Bystander-calculus model • Evaluation apprehension
• Cognitive model of bystander intervention • Pluralistic ignorance
• Diffusion of responsibility

Learning Outcomes

By the end of this chapter you should be able to:

• define key terms;

• understand the reasons/explanations given for helping behaviour;
• show an awareness of the reasons for bystander behaviour; and
• describe and evaluate research studies relevant to this area.
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106 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 69

Running Themes

• Compliance • Socio-centred approach

• Majority social influence • Social norms
• Collective mind • Deindividuation

Introduction

Prosocial behaviour is seen by Wispe (1972) as any actions that benefit

another regardless of the benefits or self sacrifices of the actor.
Altruism is a type of helping/prosocial behaviour that is “voluntary,
costly to the altruist and motivated by something other than the expec-
tation of material or social reward” (Walster & Piliavin, 1972).

The key difference when distinguishing between these definitions is that prosocial
behaviour is that which is valued positively by society and aims to improve a situation
whereas altruism is more personal because there is a desire to benefit another
individual, derived from perspective taking or empathy.

Explanations for Altruism/Helping Behaviour

Biological/evolutionary approach
Only by helping others have humans ensured survival. Sometimes altruistic/
sacrificial behaviour will occur because it increases the chance of the
species/gene pool surviving. Two specific explanations are offered: that of
kin selection, where altruism occurs in closest relatives to increase the
reproduction of relative genes; and reciprocity among non-relatives,
where help is offered to others when costs to the self are low but benefits
to the recipient are high. The idea behind this is that others will then reci-
procate such help and thus survival is more likely to continue. So, socio-
biologists believe that one is biologically predisposed to help others
because by doing so one enables one’s genes to carry on and this “altru-
istic gene” must therefore exist since there are no other obvious rewards.

Social learning
This theory believes that helping behaviour is simply learnt through
socialisation (being taught what is the correct social behaviour either
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70 PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 107

directly or indirectly, from modelling the behaviour of others). This

occurs when helpful behaviour is encouraged in children, is reinforced
by offering rewards for altruistic acts and also by observing and then
imitating helpful behaviours/attitudes in others. Thus norms/social
expectations play an important part in determining altruism, specifi-
cally the reciprocity norm where one feels obliged to help those who
have, or will, help us, and the social responsibility norm where one
learns to offer help to those who are perceived to be in need. Tests
have indeed found that personality types who score highly on scales
of social responsibility are more likely to be perceived as helpful
individuals.

Just world hypothesis

Whether or not we offer help to others may depend on the attribu-
tion we make about ourselves, that is, whether one believes one is a help-
ful person or not, and then act accordingly. Furthermore, attributions
about the person in need determine whether or not we will offer help.
According to Lerner and Miller’s just world hypothesis (1978), people get
what they deserve and therefore help will only be offered if one feels this
is not the case, such that help is offered to try to remove a perceived
injustice.

Mood
Good moods are more likely to produce helpful behaviour as they
arouse positive thoughts and activities such as prosocial behaviour.
According to Schwarz’s affect-as-information model (1990), positive mood
tells an individual that an environment is safe and as a result help is
more likely to be offered than if it is perceived as dangerous. In contrast,
being in a bad mood means that a person becomes more self-focused
and is less likely to offer help to others/behave in a prosocial way as a
result.

Motivation
Batson (1994) outlines four motives for helping others, including: egoism,
where help is offered to benefit oneself, to secure material and social
rewards and avoid punishment; altruism, where help benefits another
individual: collectivism, where prosocial behaviour aids the welfare of a
social group; and principalism, where help is offered in order to sustain
moral principles.
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108 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 71

Handy Hints for Evaluating Explanations

for Prosocial Behaviour

If you recall, it is not sufficient just to know the relevant theories, but
you also need to be able to think about them critically. You may there-
fore want to consider the following:
• Do the explanations offered by sociobiologists apply as well to human behav-
iour as animals, or is it the case that prosocial behaviour in humans is deter-
mined by more complex social and cognitive processes in addition to basic
biology?
• Is social learning simply a passive process, which means you learn and
behave only according to social norms? Could it be that cognitions and social
experiences play an equal role in determining our prosocial behaviour?
• Is a belief in a just world sufficient to precipitate helping, or is it the case that
help will only be offered when one felt it was possible to completely solve a
problem, and therefore truly redress an unjust balance (as believed by Miller,
1977)?
• Since moods are often short-lived, is it surely not too difficult to determine
the overall prosocial tendencies of an individual?
• Is it not very hard to separate types of motivation when looking at prosocial
behaviour, for example, when one is motivated to help others rather than one-
self if the end result is simply to make oneself feel “better”?

REMEMBER

Explanations for Helping

Help is offered because:

It ensures survival of one’s genes

Norms learnt in childhood indicate that this is how one should behave

Belief in a just world means that help is offered to maintain a sense of
justice

Good mood encourages positive/helping behaviour

Motivation benefits oneself, another individual, group or societies principles
BUT
not one of these explanations is sufficient on its own to explain prosocial
behaviour.
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72 PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 109

Key Thinkers

Batson’s empathy arousal (1994)

Recognised that empathy is an emotion consistent with someone else’s
feelings, it is something that allows us to identify with another’s emotions
and therefore, according to Batson, one helps others because of empathy, so
one identifies with another’s distress and is then motivated to help in order
to stop this feeling. This process involves perspective taking (seeing some-
one else’s viewpoint), personal distress (feeling emotional) and empathic
concern. Help is then offered because it is only by seeing someone else’s
viewpoint that one “experiences” their feelings and therefore helps.

Latane & Darley’s cognitive model (1970)

Examined bystander intervention, which can be described as interven-
ing behaviour offered by those witnessing an emergency. This is because
research found that people are actually less likely to help in an emer-
gency situation if in the presence of others (known as the bystander
effect). The model suggests that a bystander makes a series of decisions
before deciding whether or not to offer help to a victim. This includes
initially noticing an event/that someone needs help, interpreting the
situation as an emergency, deciding whether or not to assume responsi-
bility, knowing what to do and then implementing a decision.

REMEMBER

Cognitive Factors that Determine Prosocial Behaviour

Latane & Darley’s model (1970) indicates that there are three main factors
that affect helping behaviour:

Diffusion of responsibility, such that less help is offered, the more
people present, as responsibility for helping is divided or “diffused”
between them because each person assumes someone else will help.

Pluralistic ignorance, where other bystanders’ behaviour is used as a
reference for defining the situation as an emergency, so if one person
does define it as an emergency and offers help, then this guides further
prosocial behaviour. A decision on intervention is therefore made by
using others as a guide.
(Continued)
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110 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 73

(Continued)

Evaluation apprehension, because the presence of others makes the
bystander feel anxious about intervening and they may be less likely to offer
help. However, it may also increase prosocial behaviour if the bystander feels
competent and uses others as an incentive to demonstrate competence.

Piliavin, Piliavin, Dovido, Gaertner & Clark

bystander-calculus model (1981)
Proposes that bystanders will offer help depending on their level of
arousal and on the costs and rewards of potential actions. It involves three
stages: experiencing physiological arousal; interpreting and labelling that
arousal; and evaluating the consequences (rewards/costs) of offering help.
It therefore encompasses the situation, characteristics of the victim and
on the cognitive processes involved in decision making. Help is most
likely to be offered if it reduces arousal and involves few costs.

Handy Hints for Evaluating the Work

of the Key Thinkers

• Empathy may not be a good explanation for helping behaviour because it may
simply be the case that people help only because they would otherwise feel
bad for not helping.
• The presence of others in the situation is only one of many factors accounting
for bystander behaviour and Latane & Darley’s model (1970) fails to account
for the range of other factors that might influence the decision-making process.
The model is therefore too simplistic and does not explain why any of the decisions
may be made.
• Not all bystanders either experience arousal or have time to consciously weigh
up the rewards and costs of helping in an emergency situation.

Key Research

Batson (1994)
Students watched ‘Elaine’ receiving mild electric shocks and were then
asked to take her place after being told they were either free to leave the
room or would have to stay and watch her even if they did not want to
substitute themselves. They were all given a placebo drug and misled
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74 PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 111

about its effects so that they would either feel empathic concern or
personally distressed. Most of those who felt empathic concern offered
to take Elaine’s place.

This study supports Batson’s empathy altruism model because it shows that those
students who identified with Elaine were more likely to offer to take her shocks because
they felt empathic concern and they did this for unselfish reasons, whereas those
experiencing personal distress were only motivated to help for personal reasons such as
fear of social disapproval. The study did, however, lack experimental realism and so the
results may reflect the fact that participants did not take the situation entirely seriously
and behaved in the way that they thought was expected of them (demand characteristics).

Latane & Darley (1970)

Students were left in a room completing a questionnaire when smoke
began to pour in. It was found that 75 per cent of those who were alone
in this situation sought help, and this decreased to less than 40 per cent
if there were two others present.

Latane & Rodin (1969)

When male participants, left filling in a questionnaire, heard a woman
having difficulty opening a filing cabinet, followed by a crash and
moaning, they offered help 70 per cent of the time if alone but only 40
per cent of the time if with just one other participant.

Darley & Latane (1968)

Student participants were led to believe that they either were alone with
another student (who would later appear to have an epileptic fit) or were
accompanied by one or four other students beside the “seizure” victim.
Help was offered 85 per cent of the time if the bystander thought they
were the only person to help, and this prosocial behaviour decreased the
greater the presence of others.

This supports the idea that diffusion of responsibility and pluralistic ignorance exist
because help was less likely to be offered and was slower to happen when people
believed that other potential helpers were present and responsibility therefore diffused.
Since the study was, however, carried out in a laboratory, and not in a real-life setting,
it lacks ecological validity.
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112 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 75

Piliavin, Rodin & Piliavin (1969)

This study found that how a person was portrayed affected whether or
not help was offered. If a victim collapsed on a subway train, they were
more likely to be helped if they were perceived to be ill (carrying a cane)
rather than drunk (carrying a brown paper bag), and also if the race of
the victim matched that of the bystander.

In order to complete an examination question on this topic, you will need to

understand how each of these research studies supports a model of prosocial/
bystander behaviour. This has been done for you in a couple of the examples
above, but you will need to expand on each example if writing an essay. Doing so
will also allow you to check your understanding both of the research and of the
theory itself.

Handy Hints for Evaluating Research Studies

• When evaluating studies, the key thing to consider is the research methods
used (look back on the section “Basics in Social Psychology”).
• Is it suitable to research social behaviour in a laboratory environment or does
this lead to unnatural reactions?
• Are the aims of the studies carried out so obvious that the results are simply
due to demand characteristics?
• What are the ethical issues involved in recording the reactions of participants
who are not aware of their own participation, for example, in Piliavin et al.’s
(1969) subway study?

Tasks

1 Complete Table 4 on explanations for, and evaluation of, altruism.

2 Complete Exercise 1 (at the end of this section) on key research on

altruism.

3 Go back to each study on bystander inter vention and summarise

how these studies might provide suppor t for cognitive and
bystander-calculus models. Then write a list of bullet points criticising
each study using the Handy Hints provided.
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76 PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR 113

“Consider both explanations and research studies relating to

altruism/prosocial behaviour.
”
To answer this question you will need to cover the key definitions involved in this
topic such as altruism, empathy/empathic concern, just world belief, prosocial
behaviour, social responsibility, and show an understanding of the reasons/
explanations given for helping behaviour including evolutionary/biological expla-
nations, social learning theory, belief in a just world, the influence of mood and
types of motivation. Don’t forget to add some evaluation – good and bad – of
these explanations. You must also be able to describe and evaluate research
studies relevant to this area, including Batson’s “shock” study, before drawing
conclusions about research into this area as a whole.

“Outline and evaluate psychological research into bystander behaviour.”

In the course of your essay it should be clear that you understand the key terms
bystander effect, bystander intervention, diffusion of responsibility, evaluation appre-
hension and pluralistic ignorance. You also need to show an awareness of the rea-
sons for bystander behaviour, particularly diffusion of responsibility, pluralistic
ignorance and evaluation apprehension, and demonstrate an understanding of cogni-
tive and bystander-calculus models involved in this process. Since the essay title asks
you to evaluate, you must consider the strengths and weaknesses of these models
and included within this must be the fact that there is some support for their exis-
tence as shown in the work of Latane & Darley (smoke experiment), Latane & Rodin
(lady in distress study), Darley & Latane (epileptic fit study) and Piliavin et al. (subway
study). Remember, however, that these studies can be criticised for their methodol-
ogy and you should be willing to acknowledge and expand on a discussion of this.

Common Pitfalls

• Do not mix up the key terms prosocial behaviour, altruism and bystander
behaviour, as they all have similar meanings but are quite different.
• You must be clear which explanations are relevant to altruism and which are
explanations for bystander behaviour, particularly as one focuses on why people do
help and the other on why they may not!
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114 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 77

• Diffusion of responsibility, pluralistic ignorance and evaluation apprehension are

central to research into bystander behaviour, but it is crucial that you relate these
specifically to the cognitive model, whilst acknowledging that other models also
look at the situation and person variables.
• There are common elements in the supporting studies in that they all seek to
support the reasons for helping behaviour, nevertheless they offer different
explanations and you must be clear and precise about which experiment supports
which explanation – making it clear to your examiner that you understand this and
are not just quoting studies with no real idea of their relevance.
• Do not just outline research, but remember to evaluate it – say why it has been
useful or what the pitfalls are.

Tex t b o o k g u i d e

BATSON, C. D. (1991). The altruism question. Toward a social-psychological

answer. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. Considers altruism in its historical
context.

DARLEY, J. M.& LATANE, B. (1968). Bystander intervention in emergencies:

Diffusion of responsibility. Journal of Personality & Social Psychology,
8, 377–383.

LATANE, B. & RODIN, J. (1969). A lady in distress: Inhibiting effects of friends

and strangers on bystander Intervention. Journal of Experimental Social
Psychology, 5, 189–202.

PILIAVIN, I., RODIN, J.

& PILIAVIN, J. A. (1969). Good Samaritanism: an underground
phenomenon? Journal of Personality & Social Psychology, 13, 289–299.

SCHROEDER, D. A., PENNER, L. A., DOVIDIO, J. F. & PILIAVIN, J. A. (1995). The psychol-
ogy of helping and altruism. New York: McGraw-Hill. Comprehensive cover-
age on prosocial behaviour offered.

http://www.socialpsychology.org?social.htm#prosocial Links to research

on prosocial behaviour.
 9
78

l Beh a v ior
Prosocia
he r s e s t f or O t
t ’s B
Do ing W h a
Tradeoffs
The Prisoner’s
Dilemma
tives 312
Objec
Le arning f prosocia
l
e d if fe re nt kinds o b e d ie nc e Money Matters
n d c o ntrast th fo rm it y a nd o
1 pare a
LO Conmd explain why behaviors lik
ec o n
Money, Prosocial
a Behavior, and
behavior, prosocial.
n b e c la ssified as uity, and Self-Sufficiency
c a
s p o n sibility, eq
socia l re otiva-
reciprocity, a te dif ferent m 313
LO 2 Dif fe
d e
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x
n ti a te
plain how
these con
ce p ts c re
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equalit
lp others. Food for
tions to he a game is u
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m m
the prison
er’s d ile Thought
LO 3 E xplain how
d w h y p e o p le cooperate
.
Restaurants, Rules,
d how an
understan nces of and the Bad Taste
a ti v e c o ns e q u e e
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describe s of Nonconformity
LO 4D ebate the
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319
rg ive n e s s in long-t rg ive ness.
fo
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condition s th s to help-
n im a l contribute
being a cu
ltura l a helping. The Social
o w ti v ations for
LO 5
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te egoistic
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otivations
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d e v a b o th m
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E xplain ho who is mo
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and Friends
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327
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ontex ts.
What Makes
five steps dif ferent c Us Human
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c re a s e d in

e s c ri b e h ow helpin Putting the

d
Cultural Animal
in Perspective
337
y
odick a/Alam
© Er w in W

303

Copyright 2012 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved. May not be copied, scanned, or duplicated, in whole or in part. Due to electronic rights, some third party content may be suppressed from the eBook and/or eChapter(s). Editorial review has
deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
 79
During World War II, members of the German Nazi “He who saves one life, it is as
if he saves the world entire.”
Party killed about 6 million civilian Jews. More than 99% of Polish
~ Jewish Talmud
Jewish children were killed. Yet one member of the Nazi Party is buried
in his factory. Others called his factory
in a cemetery on Mount Zion in Jerusalem. The Council of the Yad
workers Schindlerjuden (Schindler Jews),
Vashem planted a carob tree on the Avenue of the Righteous in honor but he called them “my children.”
Although Schindler was busy in
of this Nazi, with a plaque calling him a Righteous Gentile—a title the factory during the day, at night he
entertained Nazi Schützstaffel (SS)
reserved for “Extending help in saving a life; endangering one’s own life; officers to get on their good side, and
it worked. For example, during an
absence of reward, monetary and otherwise, and similar considerations inspection of Schindler’s factory, an SS
officer told an elderly Jew named Lamus,
which make the rescuer’s deeds stand out above and beyond what can “Slip your pants down to your ankles
and start walking.” Lamus did what
be termed ordinary help.”1 Who was this Nazi? His name was Oskar
he was told. “You are interfering with
all my discipline here,” Schindler said.
Schindler.
“The morale of my workers will suffer.
Production for das Vaterland (the father
Oskar Schindler was born April 28, Nor was he a brilliant businessman; country) will be affected.” The officer
1908, in what is now the Czech Republic. the Schindler family business went took out his gun. “A bottle of schnapps
His father and mother, Hans and Louisa bankrupt in 1935. After that low point, if you don’t shoot him,” Schindler said.
Schindler, were devout (and wealthy) Oskar Schindler sought work in nearby Grinning, the officer put the gun away
Catholics. However, their strict religious Poland. When Nazi Germany invaded and went to Schindler’s office to collect
teachings did not seem to affect their Poland, he joined the Nazi Party to get his liquor. 2
son. At a young age, Oskar became a some of the economic and political In the summer of 1942, Schindler
gambler, drinker, and womanizer, and he benefits given to card-carrying Nazis. In witnessed a German raid on the Jewish
retained these habits throughout his life. 1939 he followed the occupying forces to ghetto. The Jews that remained alive
At age 20, Oskar married Emilie Pelzl, Krakow, the capital of German-occupied were sent on a train to a concentration
but he continued to have affairs with Poland, where he bought a factory that camp to be killed. Schindler was very
other women, thereby fathering at least made mess kits and field kitchenware for moved by what he saw, and said, “I
two children out of wedlock. By societal the German army. He used cheap Jewish was now resolved to do everything
standards, he was certainly not a saint. labor from the Krakow ghetto as workers in my power to defeat the system.” 3
For example, he convinced a German
Oskar Schindler (third from left) with German army officers.
general that the nearby Plaszow camp
could be used for war production.
The general agreed, and Plaszow was
officially transformed into a war-essential
“concentration camp.” Schindler made a
list of all the workers he would need for
Courtesy of United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

his camp.
By the spring of 1944, the Germans
retreated on the Eastern Front and
ordered that all camps be emptied.
Schindler knew that if his workers were
moved to another camp, they would be
killed. He bribed, pleaded, and worked
desperately to save his workers. Finally,
Schindler was authorized to move 1,000
workers from the Plaszow camp to a

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deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
 80
Oskar Schindler’s grave. The Hebrew inscription reads:
“A Righteous Man Among the Gentiles.” The German
inscription reads: “The Unforgettable Savior of the Lives of
1200 Hunted Jews.”

with the Talmudic verse: “He who saves

one life, it is as if he saved the world
entire.” After the war, a survivor asked
Schindler whatever happened to his gold
rbis
ex anian/ Co

ring. “Schnapps,” Schindler replied. He

was still no conventional saint!
. Nub ar Al

On October 9, 1974, Oskar Schindler

died of liver failure in Frankfurt, Germany,
whether he would accept two railway cars at age 66 (too much Schnapps!). His
factory in Brnenec. The other 25,000 full of Jews that no other concentration wish to be buried in Israel was honored.
people at Plaszow were sent to the gas camp would accept. The cars had been He was buried at the Catholic cemetery
chambers and furnaces at Auschwitz. frozen shut at a temperature of 5°F (–15°C) on Mount Zion in Jerusalem. On his
Ostensibly the new factory was and contained almost a hundred sick men tombstone are written the following words
producing parts for V2 bombs, but who had been locked inside for 10 days. in Hebrew: “A Righteous Man Among the
Schindler told the workers to produce Schindler quickly agreed to accept the Gentiles.” The German inscription reads:
only defective parts so the bombs Jews as workers in his factory. Thirteen “The Unforgettable Savior of the Lives of
wouldn’t kill anyone. Jews escaping from of the men were already dead. For 1200 Hunted Jews.”
the transports fled to Schindler’s factory. many days and nights, Oskar and Emilie Death was the punishment for helping
Schindler even asked the Gestapo Schindler nursed the rest back to health. Jews during the Holocaust. Perhaps
to send him all intercepted Jewish Only three more men died. The Jews who that is why less than 1% of the non-
fugitives “in the interest of continued died were given a proper (secret) Jewish Jewish population in Nazi-occupied
war production.” 4 Almost 100 additional burial, paid for by Schindler. Europe attempted to save any Jews.
people were saved in this way. Schindler World War II ended in Europe on May Yet Schindler spent millions of dollars,
spent all of his money and traded all of 8, 1945. In the early morning of May 9, including his life’s savings, and risked his
his possessions (and his wife’s jewelry!) 1945, Oskar and Emilie fled to Austria’s own life to save a group of people whom
for food, clothing, medicine, and liquor to U.S. Zone (dressed in prison garb, under the Nazis called “vermin” and “rats.” In
bribe SS officers. Because the workers the “protection” of eight Schindlerjuden, this chapter we examine why humans
dreaded the SS visits that might come and with a letter in Hebrew testifying behave in helpful and cooperative ways,
late at night, Oskar and Emilie Schindler to their life-saving actions). Before they even when, as the Schindler story shows,
slept in a small room in the factory. left, Schindler received a ring made it may not be in their own self-interest to
Late one evening, Schindler received a from Jews’ gold fillings as a gift from his do so. ●
phone call from the railway station asking grateful “children.” The ring was inscribed

What Is Prosocial Behavior?

Prosocial behavior is defined as doing something that is good for other people or
for society as a whole. Prosocial behavior includes behavior that respects others or
allows society to operate. Culture is a whole that is more than the sum of its parts,
but only if people cooperate and follow the rules will culture be able to yield its
benefits. In a nutshell, prosocial behavior builds relationships. It is the opposite of
antisocial behavior, which means doing something bad for others or for society.
Antisocial behavior usually destroys relationships (see Chapter 10).
Social psychologists have had a peculiar love/hate relationship with prosocial
behavior. Most social psychology textbooks feature helping as the main prosocial prosocial behavior doing something
behavior, while belittling other behaviors. When they discuss conformity, obedi- that is good for other people or for society
ence, and other forms of following the rules, textbooks have often been sharply as a whole

What Is Prosocial Behavior? | 305

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deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
 81
c­ ritical, suggesting that these are bad things. It is true that obedience and conformity
can be bad—mindless obedience to a demented leader such as Hitler can produce all
sorts of terrible consequences. For the most part, however, obedience and conformity
are good things. Society would collapse if people didn’t follow most of the rules most
of the time. For example, consider what would happen if people decided to ignore
traffic rules, such as “Stop,” “Wrong Way,” “Yield,” and “Speed Limit” signs. Traffic
accidents and fatalities would increase sharply! Likewise, imagine what would hap-
pen if most people just took things from stores without paying, or ignored the tax
laws, or if restaurant employees did not wash their hands after using the bathroom,
or if grocery stores disobeyed health regulations and sold rotten food.
Obeying the rules, conforming to socially accepted standards of proper behavior,
and cooperating with others are important forms of prosocial behavior. Helping—
which most social psychology textbooks treat as the quintessential form of prosocial
behavior—is actually something of an “extra” or a luxury. Heroic acts like those of
Oskar Schindler are impressive and memorable, but rare. Society and culture can
still bring immense benefits if people do not perform altruistic, self-sacrificing acts
of helping. If no one obeys the rules, however, society will fall apart and chaos will
reign. Following rules is essential. Helping is less essential, though certainly help-
ing makes the world a much nicer place, and some forms of helping (such as what
parents do for their small children) are probably vital for the survival of the species.
We rely on other people to follow their own self-interest while obeying the rules.
They sell us their food in exchange for our money, which is good for them and for us.
No helping or self-sacrifice on their part is necessary, but it is vital that they obey the
rules by not selling us spoiled meat or committing other fraudulent acts.
Imagine two societies, one in which people are happy and healthy, and another in
which people are fearful, poor, and desperate. What might account for the difference?
The happy society is likely full of people who cooperate with each other, respect each
other, follow the rules, and contribute to the general welfare. The unhappy society is
likely full of people who break the rules; its social life is marked by crime, corruption,
distrust, betrayal, and wide-ranging general insecurity.
A society in which people respect and follow the rules is said to have an effec-
tive rule of law. If there are no laws, or if laws exist but are widely ignored and dis-
obeyed, the rule of law is said to be lacking. The rule of law may occasionally seem a
problem, such as when you get a speeding ticket, but in reality the rule of law is usu-
ally a huge boost to the quality of life. If you lived in a society where the rule of law
had broken down, or had not yet appeared, you would find life hard and dangerous.
Indeed, researchers have found a positive correlation between happiness and rule of
law, across a number of different societies.5
Fairness and justice are also important factors in predicting prosocial behavior. If
employees perceive the company they work for to be fair and just, they are more likely
to be good “company citizens.”6 For example, they are more likely to voluntarily help
others in the workplace and more likely to promote the excellence of their employer,
without any promise of reward for these behaviors. This pattern of doing what’s best
for the organization, without necessarily gaining selfish benefits, has been called the
“good soldier” syndrome.7 The crucial point is that people behave better when they
think the rules are fair.
The presence of others can stimulate prosocial behavior, such as when someone
acts more properly because other people are watching. Dogs will stay off the furni-
ture and out of the trash when their owners are present, but they blithely break those
rules when alone. Humans may have more of a conscience, but they also still respond
to the presence or absence of others. Public circumstances generally promote pro-
social behavior, as shown by the following experiments. Participants8 sat alone in a
room and followed tape-recorded instructions. Half believed that they were being
observed via a one-way mirror (public condition), whereas others believed that no
one was watching (private condition). At the end of the experiment, the tape-recorded
rule of law when members of a society instructions invited the participant to make a donation by leaving some change in
respect and follow its rules the jar on the table. The results showed that donations were seven times higher in

306 | Chapter 9 Prosocial Behavior: Doing What’s Best for Others

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deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
 82
the public condition than in the private condition. Appar-
ently, one important reason for generous helping is to
make (or sustain) a good impression on the people who
are watching.
One purpose of prosocial behavior, especially at cost
to self, is to get oneself accepted into the group, so doing
prosocial things without recognition is less beneficial. Self-
interest dictates acting prosocially if it helps one belong
to the group. That is probably why prosocial behavior
increases when others are watching. Other studies have
shown that favors increase compliance in both private and
public settings, but compliance is greater in public settings.9
It may seem cynical to say that people’s prosocial
actions are motivated by wanting to make a good impres-

. Steve Skjold/Alamy
sion, but one can see this pattern in a positive light. One
theme of this book has been that people travel a long road
to social acceptance. People do many things to get others
to like them, and prosocial behavior is no exception.
Others will see how much you
Born to Reciprocate contribute.
Reciprocity is defined as the obligation to return in kind what another has done for
us. Folk wisdom recognizes reciprocity with such sayings as “You scratch my back,
and I’ll scratch yours.” Reciprocity norms are found in all cultures in the world.10 If I
do something for you, and you don’t do anything back for me, I’m likely to be upset
or offended, and next time around I may not do something for you. If you do some-
thing for me, and I don’t reciprocate, I’m likely to feel guilty about it. Reciprocity is
also found in animals other than humans. For example, social grooming (cleaning
another animal’s fur) is reciprocated in many species.
The reciprocity norm is so powerful that it even applies to situations in which
you do not ask for the favor. Phil Kunz, a sociology professor at Brigham Young Uni-
versity in Provo, Utah, sent 578 Christmas cards to a sample of complete strangers reciprocity the obligation to return in kind
living in Chicago.11 When somebody sends you a card, you feel obligated to send one what another has done for us
back. Does this apply even to complete strangers? Apparently so, because Dr. Kunz
received a total of 117 cards from people who had no idea who he was. He
also received several unexpected long-distance telephone calls from peo-
ple who had received one of his Christmas cards. Although most of the
cards just contained signatures, a significant number of them contained
handwritten notes, long letters, and pictures of family and pets. Only 6
of the 117 people who sent Kunz cards said they couldn’t remember him.
Most often people consider reciprocity to be direct—you help some-
one who may help you later. However, scientists have argued that some
reciprocity may be indirect—help someone and receive help from some-
one else, even strangers who know you only through reputation.12 Help-
ing someone or refusing to help has an impact on one’s reputation within
Reprinted by permission of Atlantic Feature Syndicate/Mark Parisi.

the group. We all know people who are consistently helpful, and others
who are not.
Does reciprocity apply to seeking help as well as giving help? Often
you might need or want help, but you might not always accept help and
certainly might not always seek it out. People’s willingness to request
or accept help often depends on whether they think they will be able to
pay it back (i.e., reciprocity). If they don’t think they can pay the helper
back, they are less willing to let someone help them.13 This is especially
a problem among the elderly because their declining health and income
are barriers to reciprocating.14 As a result, they may refuse to ask for help
even when they need it, simply because they believe they will not be able
to pay it back.

What Is Prosocial Behavior? | 307

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 83
The novel (and later film) Pay It Forward offers an interesting variation on the reci-
procity norm. A 12-year-old boy does favors for three individuals and, when asked
how they can repay him, tells them to “pay it forward” by doing favors for three oth-
ers, who then are to be instructed to pay it forward to three more recipients. Many
people have been inspired by the novel and movie. Indeed, the “pay it forward” con-
cept has become a worldwide movement. For example, a 26-year-old named Dean
Young from California decided to start giving a homeless man leftover homemade
chocolate chip cookies from the restaurant he worked at, rather than throwing them
away. Dean learned that when the man came back from serving overseas in the mili-
tary, he discovered that his wife had sold everything he owned, emptied their joint
bank account, and moved to Mexico with another man. He had no family either. After
giving the man cookies for about a month, Dean took the man to a motel, gave him
a small bag of toiletries (e.g., razor, toothbrush, scissors), and told him to get cleaned
up and get a good sleep because they were going to find him a job the next day.
When Dean dropped the man off at the motel he had “long scraggly beard and mane
of mangy hair and so much dirt crusted on his skin it made him look 80!” When
he returned the next day, Dean was shocked to see how good the 25-year-old man
looked. Dean bought the man a new suit and found him a good job working with
computers, a skill the man possessed. The only problem was the job was in downtown
Los Angeles. Dean said, “I’ll pay your motel, meals, and get you passes for the Green
Line to get to and from work until you can support yourself again.” When he offered
to pay the money back, Dean replied, “Tell you what, when you get to the point where
you’re back on your feet and financially secure enough to pay me back for what I’ve
done for you, turn and go the opposite direction away from where I am. Keep going
until you come across someone that can benefit from your kindness, your charity,
your friendship and help them the way I helped you or anyway they need you to
help them.” A few years later, Dean saw the man at the restaurant where he worked.
The man vigorously shook Dean’s hand, and told him how he “paid it forward.” The
former homeless man met an inner city boy from a broken home. He became a big
brother father figure for the boy. The boy loved baseball. The man helped the boy and
his friends form a baseball team, bought them uniforms and equipment, and even
became their coach. He also took them to several Dodger games. Someday that inner
city boy might also “pay it forward” by helping someone else in need.
Social scientists call this “pay it forward” concept “upstream reciprocity,” defined
as passing benefits on to third parties instead of returning benefits to one’s benefac-
tors.15 Using computer simulation, researchers have shown that if the population has
already evolved for direct reciprocity, gratitude may motivate upstream reciprocity.
Gratitude is defined as a positive emotion that results from the perception that one
has benefited from the costly, intentional, voluntary action of another person.16
People often have an acute sense of fairness when they are on the receiving end of
someone else’s generosity or benevolence, and they prefer to accept help when they
think they can pay the person back. We discuss this sense of fairness in the next
section.

gratitude a positive emotion that results Born to Be Fair

from the perception that one has benefited
from the costly, intentional, voluntary action The central theme of this book is that human beings are cultural animals, that the
of another person impulse to belong to culture is in our genes. Fairness is a cultural norm. Norms
are standards established by society to tell its members what types of behavior are
norms standards established by society to
tell its members what types of behavior are typical or expected. Norms that promote fairness can have an important influence
typical or expected on whether people contribute to the common good.17 Two such norms are equity and
equality. Equity means that each person receives benefits in proportion to what he or
equity the idea that each person receives
benefits in proportion to what he or she she has contributed (e.g., the person who does the most work gets the highest pay).
contributes Equality means that everyone gets the same amount. Both kinds of fairness are used
and understood much more widely by humans than by any other animal.
equality the idea that everyone gets the
same amount, regardless of what he or she According to some evolutionary theories, an individual’s ability to reproduce
contributes depends largely on his or her position within the social group.18 In order to maintain

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 84
fitness-enhancing relationships, the individual must continually invest time, energy,
and resources in building good relationships with others in the social group. To take
without giving something back runs the risk that others might resent you and might
ultimately reject or exclude you from the group. After all, few groups can afford to
have lots of members (other than babies, perhaps) who take and take without contrib-
uting anything. It will be hard to pass on your genes to the next generation when the
people you want to mate with shun you.
People are designed by nature (so to speak) to belong to a system based on fairness “…it’s better in fact to
and social exchange. As one sign of the importance of fairness to human nature, the
feeling that one has no value to others—that you are a taker rather than a giver—is be guilty of manslaughter
a major cause of depression.19 To be sure, there are plenty of obnoxious people who than of fraud about what
take more than they give, but most of them don’t see themselves that way. People
who do see themselves as taking more than they give may become depressed. To is fair and just.”
avoid depression, people may seek to contribute their fair share. ~Plato, The Republic and
Some suicides may reflect the same concern with being fair and reciprocal. We Other Works
saw in Chapter 4 that human beings differ from most other animals in that they
commit suicide. One reason some people commit suicide is that they think they are a
burden on other people—that others do things for them that they cannot reciprocate,
so the others would be better off if they were dead.20,21 Of course, people are not better
off when someone commits suicide. Suicide has numerous negative effects on those
left behind. Not only do the survivors miss the dead person, they may even blame
themselves for the suicide.
The concern with fairness makes people feel bad when they don’t contribute their
fair share, but it can also affect people who think that their good performance makes
others feel bad. When we outperform others, we may have mixed emotions. On the
one hand, we may feel a sense of pride and pleasure because we have surpassed
the competition. On the other hand, we may feel fear and anxiety because those we
have outperformed might reject us or retaliate. Interpersonal concern about the con-
sequences of outperforming others has been called sensitivity about being the tar-
get of a threatening upward comparison.22 Outperformers often become distressed
when they believe that others are envious that they did not perform as well. In real-
ity, however, losers have more to worry about than winners. Recent research shows
that participants are more aggressive against someone they outperformed (i.e., los-
ers) than against someone who outperformed them (i.e., winners).23
Is reciprocity unique to humans? More simply, do animals understand the con-
cept “fairness”? A study of monkeys provides a fascinating answer.24 The researchers
trained monkeys to fetch rocks. Each monkey was rewarded with a slice of cucumber
for each rock collected. The monkeys could see each other getting these rewards, and
they soon learned to keep bringing rocks to get cucumber slices. Then, however, the
researchers randomly gave some monkeys a grape instead of a cucumber slice for
their rocks. To a monkey, a grape is a much better treat than a slice of cucumber. The
monkeys who got the grapes were very happy about this. The other monkeys were
mad, however. They acted as if it were unfair that they only got the cucumber slice for
the same act that earned other monkeys a grape. The ones who didn’t get the grapes
protested, such as by refusing to bring more rocks (“going on strike”) or by angrily
flinging the cucumber slice away. This study attracted international media attention,
with the implication being that monkeys understand fairness and object to unfairness.
Do they really? Perhaps the study was overinterpreted. Yes, a monkey is smart
enough to protest when it is treated unfairly. If, however, unfairness per se is the
problem, then the monkeys who received the grapes should have protested too. But sensitivity about being the
they didn’t. Researchers who study fairness distinguish between two kinds of unfair- target of a threatening upward
ness, namely being underbenefited (getting less than you deserve) and being over- comparison interpersonal concern about
benefited (getting more than you deserve). Monkeys and several other animals seem the consequences of outperforming others
to have an acute sense of when they are underbenefited. Only humans seem to worry underbenefited getting less than you
about being overbenefited. A full-blown sense of fairness, one that encompasses both deserve
aspects, is found only among humans. For people to be truly fair, they must object to overbenefited getting more than you
being overbenefited as well as to being underbenefited (even if the latter is stronger). deserve

What Is Prosocial Behavior? | 309

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 85
People (unlike other animals) do feel guilty when they are overbenefited. In lab
studies, people feel guilty if they receive a larger reward than others for performing
the same amount or same quality of work.25 Getting less than your fair share pro-
vokes anger and resentment, but getting more than your fair share produces guilt.26
People who harm others (perhaps without meaning to do so) prefer to do some-
thing nice for the person they harm, and they prefer the nice act to exactly match
the harm they did, so that fairness and equity are restored.27 They act as if the harm
they did creates a debt to that person, and they desire to “pay it back” so as to get the
relationship back on an even, fair footing.
The term survivor guilt was coined to refer to the observation that some people felt
bad for having lived through terrible experiences in which many others died, such
as the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Japan, or the death camps in Nazi-occupied
Europe.28,29 People especially felt guilty about family members and other relationship
partners who died while they survived. Some gay men who survived AIDS like-
wise reported feeling guilty at being spared at random from the disease that killed
so many of their friends and lovers.30 In business, when corporations are forced to
fire many employees as part of downsizing, the ones who keep their jobs often feel
survivor guilt feeling bad for living
guilty toward friends and colleagues who have lost theirs.31 All these findings sug-
through a terrible experience in which many gest that the human psyche has a deep sensitivity to unfairness, and that people
others died (unlike almost any other animals) feel bad even if the unfairness is in their favor.

Quiz 1. Henrietta helped Maurille when her first child was born. When Henrietta
has her first child, Maurille thinks she ought to help Henrietta. This type of
Yourself helping illustrates the norm of _____.
a b c d

What Is Prosocial equity reciprocity social justice social responsibility

2. Albert thinks that because he has more job experience than others on his
Behavior? shift, he should make more money than they do. This illustrates the norm of
_____.
a b c d
equality equity reciprocity social responsibility
3. At the local soup kitchen, volunteers give everyone one bowl of soup
regardless of how much money they have or how hungry they are. This type
of helping illustrates the norm of _____.
a b c d
equality equity reciprocity social responsibility

4. Some people feel bad for having lived through terrible experiences in which
many others died. This feeling is called _____.
a b c d
overbenefited posttraumatic stress sensitivity about survivor guilt
disorder being the target of a
threatening upward
answers: see pg 339 comparison

Cooperation, Forgiveness, Obedience,

Conformity, and Trust
Cooperation
cooperation when each person does his Cooperation is a vital and relatively simple form of prosocial behavior. Cooperation
or her part, and together they work toward a is based on reciprocity: You do your part, and someone else does his or her part, and
common goal together you work toward common goals. Cooperating is vital for social groups to

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 86
succeed, especially if they are to flourish in the sense of the whole being more than
the sum of its parts.
Psychologists have studied cooperation by using the prisoner’s dilemma, which
forces people to choose between a cooperative act and another act that combines
being competitive, exploitative, and defensive. The prisoner’s dilemma, a widely
studied tradeoff, is discussed in detail in Tradeoffs.
Political scientist Robert Axelrod once held a computer tournament designed
to investigate the prisoner’s dilemma situation using the payoff matrix shown in
Table 9.1. Contestants in the tournament submitted computer programs that would
compete in a prisoner’s dilemma game for 200 rounds. These followed many differ-
ent strategies, such as being antagonistic every round, cooperating every round, or
deciding each move at random.
The strategy that gained the most points for the player was tit-for-tat:32 Just do
whatever the other player did last time. If the other player cooperated, then you
should cooperate too. If the other player defected, then you should too. Obviously tit-
for-tat is closely based on reciprocation, and it is no accident that reciprocation works
so well: It promotes cooperation when the other person is cooperative, but it also
protects you from being taken advantage of when the other person is competitive.
Undoubtedly some people are more cooperative than others. One difference lies
in how people interpret the situation. Cooperators see the prisoner’s dilemma and
related situations as an issue of good versus bad behavior (with cooperation being
good). Competitors see it as weak versus strong, with cooperation being weak.33,34 It
is hardly surprising that people are more prone to cooperate if they think of coopera-
tion as a sign of moral goodness than as a sign of weakness.
What happens when people with different approaches are matched in the pris-
oner’s dilemma game? Sadly, the results show that exploitation trumps coopera-
tion.35,36,37 When both players favor cooperation, not surprisingly, they both tend to
cooperate (and do pretty well). When both lean toward competition, then the game
soon degenerates into everyone choosing the competitive response on every trial,
and no one ends up doing well. When there is one of each, the game likewise degen-
erates into mutual exploitation and defensiveness. Thus, two virtuous people can do
well by each other, but if either one plays selfishly, trust and cooperation are soon
destroyed. This is an important and profound insight into how people relate to each
other. If both people want to cooperate, they can succeed in doing so, for mutual bene-
fit. If either one is not cooperative, then cooperation is typically doomed. Cooperation
is a fragile tendency, easily destroyed. This probably reflects the facts of evolution:
Across most species, competition is the norm and cooperation is rare. For example,
research has shown that pigeons usually defect during a tit-for-tat condition of a
prisoner’s dilemma game even though it means earning only one-third of the food
that they could have earned if they had cooperated.38 The pigeons choose smaller but
more immediate rewards rather than larger but delayed rewards. Humans are much
better at cooperating than most other animals, but this should be regarded as small
progress in overcoming the naturally competitive tendencies that are still alive and
well (and strong) in humans too. prisoner’s dilemma a game that forces
Although it is commonly believed that women are more cooperative than men, people to choose between cooperation and
a recent meta-analysis of 50 years of research involving 31,642 participants in 18 competition

Table 9.1
Prisoner’s Dilemma: Computer Tournament

Player 1 (Antagonistic) Player 2 (Cooperative)

Player 2 (Antagonistic) Both get 1 point Player 1 gets 0 points

Player 2 gets 5 points

Player 2 (Cooperative) Player 2 gets 0 points Both get 3 points

Player 1 gets 5 points

Cooperation, Forgiveness, Obedience, Conformity, and Trust | 311

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 87
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
TRADEoffs The prisoner’s dilemma
is a classic tradeoff that
many psychologists have
police will be able to get Mack convicted of the
robbery, and he will get a long prison sentence
(the worst possible outcome for Mack). Of
(if you both betray each other). But the best
outcome for both partners is achieved if you
both refuse to confess. This is the dilemma
adapted for use in research. course, the outcomes are reversed if Bart of human cultural life in a nutshell: whether to
The dilemma arises in a holds out and Mack confesses. selfishly pursue your own impulses, regardless
story about two criminals, The last possibility is that both confess. of the rules and other people’s welfare, or
whom we will call Bart and The police then do not have to give anyone a instead to do what is best for all.
Mack. They are arrested free pass because both men have incriminated The prisoner’s dilemma is called a non-
on suspicion of having themselves. Both will go to prison for zero-sum game, a term from game theory
committed armed robbery, moderately long sentences, though perhaps with important implications for social life.
and sure enough they not as long as the sentence that one gets if the Zero-sum games are those in which the
are found to be carrying other betrays him. winnings and losings add up to zero. Poker
concealed weapons, but the On a more personal note, the dilemma is zero-sum, because a certain amount of
police do not have enough is thus whether to confess and betray your money changes hands, but there is no net
evidence to link them to partner or to hold out and cooperate with change in the amount; what some people
the robbery. Accordingly, him. In a broader sense, your choice between lose is precisely equal to what the others win.
the police question them a cooperative response and an antagonistic Likewise, tennis and chess are zero-sum, in
separately. Both men are response. Confessing betrays your partner the sense that one player wins (+1) and the
invited to confess to the for your own benefit, and it also protects you other loses (–1), so the sum is zero. But in the
crime and hence betray the in case your partner seeks to betray you. prisoner’s dilemma, both players can win, or
other. What happens to either Cooperating (refusing to confess) involves both can lose. If more of human social life
of them depends on how taking a risk that could bring a good outcome can be put on a non-zero-sum basis, so that
both of them react. for both people, but leaves you vulnerable to everyone can win or gain something, life might
One possibility is that neither man the longest sentence if your partner chooses be better overall.39 Put more simply, when
confesses to the crime. This is the prosocial to confess. Put another way, you will both social interactions are zero-sum, my gain is
option (well, prosocial when crime isn’t be better off if both cooperate and refuse to your loss, so you and I are inevitably working
involved!): They cooperate with each other and confess because you both get light sentences against each other. Non-zero-sum interactions
reject the police’s deals. If this happens, they (see Table 9.2). However, you can get the offer the possibility that we can both win,
can only be convicted of the minor charge of best outcome for yourself by confessing while such as if we cooperate to help each other or
carrying concealed weapons. Both men will your partner holds out, so many people will be solve each other’s problems. Competing and
get a light jail sentence. tempted to try that route. fighting are often zero-sum because one side
Another possibility is that one man Yet another way of understanding the wins at the other’s expense. Love, however, is
will confess and the other will not. If Bart tradeoff is that it is between what is best for often non-zero-sum because two people who
confesses and Mack holds out, then the police you versus what is best for everyone. What is love each other both gain benefits from the
will let Bart turn state’s evidence. In reward best for you is to confess because you either relationship and are better off.
for his testimony against Mack, Bart can go get off totally free (if your partner holds out)
free (the best possible outcome for Bart); the or get a medium rather than a long sentence

Table 9.2
Prisoner’s Dilemma: Original Story Version: What Would You Choose?

Mack Confesses Mack Stays Loyal

Bart Confesses Medium prison terms for both Bart goes free; Long prison term for Mack

Bart Stays Loyal Mack goes free; Long prison term for Bart Light prison sentences for both

­ ifferent countries concluded that overall men are just as cooperative as women.40
d
There are some interesting gender differences in cooperation. Male–male interac-
non-zero-sum game an interaction in tions are more cooperative than female–female interactions. In mixed-sex interac-
which both participants can win (or lose) tions, however, women were more cooperative than men. These findings make sense
zero-sum game a situation in which one from an evolutionary perspective.41 Ancestral men needed to cooperate to acquire
person’s gain is another’s loss resources, such as food and property. For example, if men did not cooperate during

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 88
Money, Prosocial Behavior, and Self-Sufficiency

MONEY
M at t e r s
Human beings derive plenty of money, they hire professional movers they were assigned to work on puzzles that
many benefits from instead of needing their friends to do the work. were quite difficult. They were told they could
cooperation, helping, The findings showed that the effects of ask for help if they needed it. Participants who
forgiveness, and other money on self-sufficiency come from merely had been primed with the idea of money were
prosocial acts. Money, making people think about money. The less likely than others to ask for help and were
however, can enable manipulations included sitting participants in slower to ask for help if they did ask.
people to purchase front of a computer that had a screen saver Thus, money seemed to increase self-
many of the same display with dollar bills (as compared to a blank sufficiency: It made people less likely to
benefits. Money may screen or a display of fish), having participants give help or to ask for help. In a final study,
therefore make people unscramble groups of words to make participants were asked whether they wanted
less prone to engage in sentences that referred to money (as opposed to work together with someone or alone. Those
prosocial behavior. to neutral topics), and even simply displaying who had been primed with money were more
The idea that money promotes self- a stack of play money to participants. People likely than others to choose to work alone.
sufficiency was put forward and tested in a who had been reminded of money were less Money is a purely cultural phenomenon, but
clever and well-designed set of experiments.42 likely than others to give help to someone cultural attitudes toward money have always
They started with a common observation. in the experiment, even when that person resulted in mixed feelings (e.g., regarding the
When one doesn’t have much money (such specifically asked for help. They were even less love of money as the “root of all evil”). The
as when one is a student!) and has to move likely to help a confederate who spilled a box self-sufficiency findings suggest why that may
to a new apartment, one depends on the of pencils and had to pick them up. be. Money provides benefits, but it also seems
help of friends. Perhaps the person who is It wasn’t just that money made people to pull people apart and reduce their prosocial
moving buys pizza and beer for the group, and selfish or self-centered, however. In other inclinations.
everyone helps carry boxes and furniture to studies in the same investigation, participants
the new place. In contrast, when people have found themselves in difficulty, such as when

hunting and warfare, nobody would get any food, and wars would be lost. Ances-
tral women usually migrated between groups, and they would have been interact-
ing mostly with women who tended not to be relatives. Such social interactions
were likely rife with sexual competition, which could explain lower cooperation in
female–female interactions.
Successful cooperation also seems to depend on communication. If communica-
tion is difficult, there is less cooperation.43 Communication allows for the emergence
of cooperation.44 Cooperation drops sharply when partners avoid discussion during
a prisoner’s dilemma game.45 Can money reduce cooperation and helping? To find
out, see Money Matters.

Forgiveness
Forgiveness is an important category of prosocial behavior.46 Forgiveness refers to
ceasing to feel angry toward and ceasing to seek retribution against someone who
has wronged you. According to theories of fairness, reciprocity, and equity, if some-
one does something bad to you, that person owes you a kind of debt—an obligation
to do something positive for you to offset the bad deed. Forgiveness in that context
involves releasing the person from this obligation, just as one might cancel a mon-
etary debt. This does not mean that you condone what the person did. It just means
that you won’t hold it against him or her.
As we have seen, human beings have longer-lasting relationships than most other
animals, and forgiveness is an important contributor to this. When people hurt, dis-
appoint, or betray each other, the bad feelings can damage the relationship and drive
the people to leave it. Forgiveness can help heal the relationship and enable people
to go on living or working together.47 The more strongly someone is committed to a forgiveness ceasing to feel angry toward
particular relationship, the more likely he or she is to forgive an offense by the other or seek retribution against someone who
partner.48 has wronged you

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 89
Forgiveness is an important part of a successful romantic or mari-
tal relationship, as is increasingly recognized by both researchers and
spouses themselves.49,50 Couples that forgive each other have higher
levels of relationship satisfaction.51,52 But what causes what? Research-
ers have recently begun tracking couples over time, to see which comes
first.53 Partners who forgave each other for doing something wrong were
happier than other couples six months later. In contrast, earlier satisfac-
tion with the relationship did not predict later forgiveness. This pattern
of findings indicates that forgiveness leads to better relationships, not
vice versa.
The benefits of forgiveness have been well documented in research,
even attracting attention from the positive psychology movement. It is
fairly obvious that being forgiven is beneficial to the person who did
something wrong because the person no longer needs to feel guilty or

. Edgar Argo/CartoonStock
owes a debt to the one who has been hurt. Perhaps more surprisingly,
forgiveness also has great benefits for the forgivers. They report better
physical and mental health than victims who hold grudges.54,55,56
The downside of forgiveness may be that it invites people to offend
again. So far, research has yielded mixed results. Some findings indicate
that offenders are glad to be forgiven and often feel grateful, which may
motivate them to perform more good deeds. For example, participants in one study57
were led to believe they had accidentally broken some laboratory equipment. They
received a message of forgiveness, or retribution, or both, or neither. Later, the experi-
menter asked for a favor. Those who had been forgiven were most willing to do the
favor. Thus, instead of inviting repeat offenses, forgiveness led to more prosocial
behavior. On the other hand, a recent study of married couples found that refusing to
forgive a partner led to long-term declines in aggression. Spouses who were readily
forgiven continued to engage in hurtful actions toward their partners.58
Mostly, though, forgiveness leads to more satisfying relationships. One pathway
is that when someone refuses to forgive a loved one for doing something wrong, this
tends to come up again in future conflicts, making them harder to resolve.59 “It’s just
like when you forgot my birthday last year!” When each new conflict prompts the
couple to bring up unforgiven old grudges, minor arguments quickly become major
fights, and this sets the couple on the downward spiral that is typical of unhappy,
problem-filled relationships (see Chapter 12). Forgiveness can help prevent this
destructive pattern from starting.
Forgiveness is linked to seeing the other person’s perspective and hence avoid-
ing some cognitive biases that can drive people apart. When any two people have a
conflict, especially if one does something to hurt the other, people tend to perceive
and understand it in biased ways. The victim tends to emphasize all the bad con-
sequences (“That really hurt my feelings”), whereas the perpetrator may focus on
external factors that reduce his or her blame (“I couldn’t help it”). Hence, they don’t
understand or sympathize with each other. People in highly satisfying dating rela-
tionships don’t show those biases.60 Instead, they see the other person’s point of view
better (“I know you couldn’t help it”). Couples who think that way are more willing
to forgive each other and hence better able to recover from a misdeed. Forgiveness
helps couples get past even such relationship-threatening events as sexual infidelity,
enabling the relationship to survive and recover.61
Why don’t people forgive? Research has identified several major barriers that
reduce willingness to forgive. One fairly obvious factor is the severity of the offense:
The worse the person treated you, the harder it is to forgive.62 Another is a low level
of commitment to the relationship.63 In a sense, forgiving is making a generous
offer to renounce anger and claims for retribution as a way of helping to repair and
strengthen the relationship, and people are more willing to do this for relationships
that are more important to them. Apologies also help elicit forgiveness. When some-
one has wronged you but is sincerely remorseful and expresses an apology, you are
much more willing to forgive than when no such apology or remorse is expressed.64,65

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deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
 90

Associated Press, Vatican

. Reuters/Corbis
In a 1981 internationally notorious hate crime, Mehmet Ali Agca shot Pope John Paul II four times. While still in the
hospital, the pope publicly forgave the man who had tried to kill him. He even visited the man in prison. Although he
was an old man when he was shot, the pope recovered from his wounds and went on to live a very active life for many
years. Religious people tend to be more forgiving than others, and forgiving is good for the health of the forgiver.

Inner processes also can lead toward or away from forgiveness. In particular, how
the person thinks about the transgression can be decisive. If you think that you
might easily have performed a similar offense, you become more willing to forgive.66
In contrast, ruminating about what someone did to you can increase anger, which in
turn makes forgiveness less likely.67
Some persons are also more forgiving than others. Religious people forgive more
readily than nonreligious people,68 in part because religions generally promote and
encourage values that help people live together, and in fact some religions promi-
nently extol forgiving as an important virtue. For example, the most famous and
widely repeated prayer in the Christian religion couples a request for forgiveness
with a promise to forgive others: “And forgive us our debts, as we forgive our debt-
ors” (Matthew 6:12).
Forgiving others requires inhibiting impulses to lash out aggressively at those
who have harmed us. Cognitive executive functions are the mental abilities that help
us attend to, organize, plan, and achieve goals. They also help us inhibit inappropri-
ate behaviors. It is therefore not surprising that people with more advanced cognitive
executive functions are more forgiving of others.69 In addition, people high in trait
self-control are also more forgiving of others.70
In contrast, narcissistic individuals are less likely than others to forgive when they
have been offended.71,72 These conceited and self-centered individuals have a broad
belief that they deserve special, preferential treatment, and they are outraged when
someone offends them. They are easily offended and generally think they deserve
some major compensation before they will consider forgiving.

Obedience
Obedience to orders can be prosocial, and in many respects it is highly desirable that
people carry out the orders of their superiors. Large groups such as military units,
corporations, and sports teams cannot function effectively without some degree of
obedience. If people refuse to follow the leader’s directions, the group degenerates
into an ineffective collection of individuals.
Social psychologists have generally taken a dim view of obedience. This atti- obedience following orders from an
tude can be traced to one of the classic studies in the field. In 1963, Stanley Milgram authority figure

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 91
published a report called “Behavioral Study of Obe-
dience.”73 His research interest, like that of many psy-
chologists at the time, was shaped by the disturbing
events of World War II, including large-scale mas-
sacres of civilians by Nazi German troops. After the
war, the international outcry against these atrocities
presented an ongoing challenge to social science to
account for how seemingly ordinary, decent, well-
intentioned individuals could do such things. Many
of the killers defended themselves by saying “I was
only following orders.” The odds are that if someone
asked you whether you might have helped kill Jews,
homosexuals, Roma (gypsies), communists, and

Obedience . 1965 Stanley Milgram

other defenseless civilians if you had lived in Nazi
Germany, you would say no. Most people would
say that they would have behaved more like Oskar
Schindler than like the Nazi soldiers (see the story at
the beginning of this chapter).
Milgram set up a study to see whether Americans
would in fact follow orders that might injure or possi-
Conducting the Milgram study, bly kill someone. Participants were recruited for a study on learning, and when they
the experimenter attaches shock arrived they were told that they would play the role of a teacher who would deliver
electrodes to the wrists of the electric shocks as punishment for mistakes made by a learner. They met the learner:
“learner” (actually a confederate) a mild-mannered, middle-aged man who was actually a confederate. The man men-
while the “teacher” (the real tioned that he had a heart condition.
participant) helps out. The experimenter showed the participant an impressive-looking shock delivery
apparatus, which had a row of switches with labels running from “Mild shock” up
to “Danger: Severe shock” and then even “XXX.” The experimenter said that each
time the learner made a mistake, the participant should flick a switch, starting from
the mildest shock (15 volts) and working upward toward the most severe shock (450
volts), in 15-volt increments. The experimenter said that although the shocks were
painful, they would not be lethal.
They started the exercise, and the learner kept making mistakes. The participant
sat by the experimenter, who instructed him or her to deliver shocks. Although the
learner was in another room, the participant could still hear him. (Subsequent studies
showed that people were less willing to deliver severe shocks if the learner was in the
same room with them, as opposed to being out of sight.) If the participant hesitated,
the experimenter had a standard series of prods that commanded the participant to
continue. To make it harder to continue, the learner followed a script that included
groaning, screaming in pain, banging on the wall, and shouting that he had a heart
condition, that his heart was starting to bother him, and that he did not want to con-
tinue the study. Eventually the learner stopped responding at all, so for all the par-
ticipant knew, the learner had passed out or died. The experimenter, however, said
to treat no response as a mistake and therefore to continue delivering higher shocks.
Before he ran the study, Milgram surveyed a group of psychiatrists for predic-
tions as to what would happen. How many participants would go all the way and
deliver the most severe shock of 450 volts? The psychiatrists had faith that the partici-
pants would resist authority, and they predicted that only 1 in 1,000 would be willing
to deliver the most severe shocks. In the actual study, the majority of participants
(62.5%) went all the way up to the maximum shock (see Figure 9.1)! To be sure, this
wasn’t easy for them: Many showed acute signs of distress, such as sweating, making
sounds, and sometimes having fits of nervous laughter that seemed out of control,
but they still did what they were told.
In 2009, social psychologist Jerry Burger replicated Milgram’s findings and found
nearly identical results, although he had to stop at 150 volts for ethical reasons.74 Even
after hearing cries of pain, 70% of participants kept shocking (Milgram found that
80% of participants kept shocking after 150 volts).

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 92
100
Learner complains of pain
Figure 9.1
Results from the Milgram experiment, showing
90
Percent of subjects still obedient
that most participants (62.5%) would deliver severe
Pleads to be let out shocks to someone even if it harmed that person.
80
Screams and refuses
70 to answer

60

50

0
0 75 150 225 300 375 450
“Moderate” “Strong” “Very strong” “Intense” “Danger “XXX”
severe”

© Cengage Learning
Increasing (intensity)

Shock level
(From Milgram, 1965)

Much has been said and written about Milgram’s studies (including some serious
debates as to whether it is ethical for researchers to put their participants through such
experiences). The intellectual community was deeply shocked (no pun intended) to
learn how far American citizens, despite the moral lessons of Nazi Germany, would
obey orders to hurt another person.
Milgram’s research has given obedience a bad name. His study was published in
the early 1960s, and the rest of that decade saw a broad countercultural movement in
which many young and some older people became hostile to authority and asserted
that disobedience was a positive good, a right, and even an obligation. Bumper stick-
ers such as “Question Authority!” abounded.
Yet, again, obedience can usually be a good thing. As we have already noted, very
few organizations can function properly without obedience. Even families would
fall apart if children refused to obey their parents’ rules. Milgram’s study focused
on a peculiar situation in which obedience has morally bad outcomes, but this is
exceptional. In most situations, obedience produces good outcomes. For example,
how could a football team win a game if the pass receivers refused to obey the quar-
terback’s play calling, or indeed if they disobeyed the orders of the referees? What
would happen if people refused to obey traffic signals?
The fact that people obeyed Milgram’s instructions may reveal an important fact
about human nature, and one that depicts it as less morally bankrupt than is often
said. People are naturally inclined to belong to groups, to seek social acceptance,
and to put other people first. When a seemingly legitimate authority figure gives
them commands, they tend to obey. This tendency does contain some danger, such
as when a misguided, power-hungry, or irresponsible leader gives immoral com-
mands. But the willingness to obey authority figures is probably an important and
positive aspect of human psychology that enables people to live effectively in large
groups (and hence in culture). Obedience is ultimately prosocial behavior because
it supports group life and helps cultures to succeed. Milgram’s studies provide cau-
tionary evidence that obedience can be abused and can, under extraordinary circum-
stances, lead to immoral actions. But those circumstances are rare exceptions, and
they should not blind us to the (mostly) prosocial benefits of obedience.
In a sense, participants who refused to obey the authority figure in a Milgram
study were still obeying some rules—typically moral rules. Human cultural life
sometimes contains conflicting rules, and sometimes people obey the wrong ones. If
your professor tells you that obedience is bad, then try this: During the next exam,

Cooperation, Forgiveness, Obedience, Conformity, and Trust | 317

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 93
discuss the questions in a loud voice with the students seated near you, and if the
professor objects, bring up the Milgram study’s ostensible lesson that obedience to
authority is bad. You’re likely to see the professor suddenly change her or his tune
about the value of obeying rules! (Don’t actually try this. You might get expelled
from your university!)

Conformity
Conformity is going along with the crowd (see Chapter 8). Like obedience, confor-
mity has had a bad reputation among social psychologists, and this stems in part
from influential early studies that depicted people doing foolish, irrational, or bad
things in order to conform. The broader point, however, may be that conformity is
prosocial, insofar as the studies show how peo-
ple put other people first and exhibit a strong
desire to get along with others. If people put
themselves first, by being selfish, prosocial
behavior decreases.75
People conform to the behavior of others

CIAgent/funnytimes.com
more, and in general conform to social norms
more, when others are watching.76 For example,
do people wash their hands after using the toilet
in a public restroom? One study found that most
women (77%) did—but only if they thought
someone else was in the restroom too.77 Among the women who thought they were
alone, only a minority (39%) washed their hands. Presumably men would act about the
same. (So if your date goes to the bathroom alone, you might think twice about hold-
ing hands!) The motivation behind socially desirable behavior (such as washing hands
after using the toilet) can be to gain acceptance and approval from others.
Research shows that the presence of conformists dramatically increases the group
size for which cooperation can be sustained.78 In other words, a tendency toward
conformity helps people to function well in large groups. Large groups are good for
culture because there are more people (than in small groups) with which to share
information, cooperate, exchange goods and services, and so forth.
Cultures vary in the degree to which they value conformity. A recent study79 com-
pared conformity in several dozen countries and concluded that pressures to con-
form were strictest in places where the risk of disease was highest. Because many
diseases are contagious, people can interact safely only if they trust that others are
following safe practices to restrict disease (such as being clean). In places where there
are few germs around, cultures tend to let people do whatever they want, but that
sort of tolerant individualism risks allowing unsafe practices and spreading disease
when there are many germs.
To learn more about conformity as it relates to restaurants, see Food for Thought. It
includes information that might change the way you order your food for years to come.

Trust
Trust is a strong belief in the reliability and validity of someone or something. Trust
is another vital part of prosocial behavior among humans. Trust enables strangers
and other nonrelatives to cooperate. Economists say that every economic transac-
tion involves some degree of trust. (After all, when you buy something online, you
are giving money to strangers you have not even glimpsed, and you trust that they
will send you some goods.) Trust links past, present, and future, and in that sense
is particularly important for the kinds of cooperation that comprise human culture
and social life.
conformity going along with the crowd Social psychologists have recently begun to study trust.80 Like the European prov-
trust a strong belief in the reliability and erbs saying that trust “comes by foot and leaves by horse,” it is slow to build up and
validity of someone or something then quick to unravel. The prisoner’s dilemma game, for example, relies on trust: You

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 94
Restaurants, Rules, and the Bad Taste of Nonconformity

Food
THOUGHT
Earlier in this chapter “I’ll have the chicken.” someone else order a particular beer, they
we suggested that “Hey, I was going to order the chicken! But switched to order something different.
conforming to rules that’s OK, I’ll order something else.” This impulse to order something different
is an important form Have you ever heard such an exchange? makes people less satisfied with their food or
of prosocial behavior, When people eat together in a restaurant, they drink. The researchers found that when diners
without which society often act as if there were only one of each ordered in secret (and therefore often ordered
would disintegrate item on the menu and feel some obligation the same thing), they were pretty happy with
into chaos. The not to order the same food that someone else what they had. When they ordered aloud, the
for Outback Steakhouse in the party has already ordered. Of course, person who ordered first (and therefore got
restaurant has for there is no need to order different things. The what he or she wanted) was also pretty happy.
years advertised “No Rules” as its slogan. restaurant almost certainly has enough chicken But things weren’t so good for the people who
Do they really mean no rules apply? If you for everyone who wants it. Nonetheless, ordered later and often made a point of not
and six friends ate an ample meal there and people seem to order different things. ordering the same item that the first person
then refused to pay, citing “no rules” as your A careful research project confirmed that had ordered. Those individuals were less
justification, would the restaurant managers people do in fact order different foods.81 In satisfied with what they got.
approve? Or how about if you grabbed food their first study, they tracked the orders of It’s not entirely clear why people feel the
off the plates of other diners, or decided to hundreds of diners at a restaurant, to see urge to order something different. Perhaps
run naked through their kitchen (violating Food how often people ordered the same versus they just think that conformity is bad, so they
and Drug Administration rules, which are in different entrees. They then used a computer try to avoid conforming to what someone else
force regardless of the restaurant’s advertising simulation to form other groups at random, has done. But conformity is not really so bad.
slogans or policies). If you were to try any or for comparison purposes. This comparison The people who order the same item, when
all of these behaviors at the nearest Outback showed that people who eat together order it is their first choice, end up enjoying it more
Steakhouse, you’ll quickly discover that they different foods more often than they would by than the ones who switch to a second choice
have plenty of rules after all. chance. just to be different.
Not all restaurant behavior involves In a second experiment, they let people Apparently, the best practice is just to order
conforming. In fact, psychologists have order from a menu of different beers. By your first choice, even if somebody else has
recently documented a curious pattern of random assignment, some of the groups had already ordered it. Your second choice really
deliberate nonconformity among restaurant to order in secret, while the others ordered won’t taste as good, on average. Instead of
diners. The surprising thing, though, is that it aloud in the usual manner. When diners didn’t trying to be different and nonconforming, just
often leaves people less satisfied with their know what the others were having, they often order what you would like best!
meal than they might otherwise have been. ordered the same beer, but when they heard

make a cooperative play in the expectation that the other person will do likewise
instead of betraying you for a bigger reward (see Tradeoffs box for a description of the
prisoner’s dilemma game). When people play the game over many rounds, trust is
built up slowly as both continue to cooperate. A betrayal of trust early in the game
usually spells the end of trust. If the same happens later in the game, after some trust
has been established, it can recover.82
In general, people tend to be trusting, perhaps a bit more than is entirely safe. The
“trust game” developed by behavioral economists proceeds by giving participants
some money and telling them they can keep it or send any part of it off to someone
else. Whatever they send will be tripled by the experimenter, and then the recipient
can decide whether to keep it all or send part of it back. Obviously sending it off
increases the money, and if the other person can be trusted to share the benefits, both
people are better off. But there is no guarantee that you will get anything back, so
trust is risky. In general, people send off a substantial amount of money, and others
(strangers) generally reward their trust by splitting what they get.83
Although this work is in its early stages, some interesting facts have emerged.
People trust others with good self-control, presumably because they can be expected
to behave properly and resist selfish impulses.84 People tend to distrust atheists, pos-
sibly because people think the fear of God is an important source of virtue.85 Trust is
an important factor in building commitment in close relationships.86,87 Lonely people
are much less trusting than other people.88

Cooperation, Forgiveness, Obedience, Conformity, and Trust | 319

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 95
Quiz 1. Psychiatrists predicted that _____ participants would go all the way in
Milgram’s experiment, giving the maximum shock level (450 volts) to the
Yourself confederate.
a b c d

Cooperation, 1 in 10 1 in 50 1 in 100 1 in 1,000

2. A hockey coach orders a player to injure an opposing team’s star player.

Forgiveness, Although the player is personally opposed to intentionally injuring other
players, he follows the coach’s order. This illustrates _____.
Obedience, a b c d

Conformity, 3.
conformity compliance
The results from Milgram’s experiments are generally taken to show that
cooperation obedience

and Trust _____.

a c
b d
males are more people can be people often are situational pressures
physically sadistic resistant to situational can overwhelm
aggressive than pressures individual differences
females
4. The tendency for people to go along with the crowd is called _____.
a b c d
answers: see pg 339 compliance conformity cooperation obedience

Why Do People Help Others?

In a 1964 interview, Oskar Schindler was asked why he helped the Jews. He answered:
The persecution of Jews in occupied Poland meant that we could see horror
emerging gradually in many ways. In 1939, they were forced to wear Jewish
stars, and people were herded and shut up into ghettos. Then, in the years
‘41 and ‘42 there was plenty of public evidence of pure sadism. With people
behaving like pigs, I felt the Jews were being destroyed. I had to help them.
There was no choice.
Several Schindlerjuden (Schindler Jews) survivors were asked the same question
about Oskar Schindler’s motives for helping them. Here are some of their responses:89
“He was an adventurer. He was like an actor who always wanted to be center
stage. He got into a play and he could not get out of it.”—Johnathan Dresner
“Schindler was a drunkard. Schindler was a womanizer. His relations with
his wife were bad. He often had not one but several girlfriends. Everything he
did put him in jeopardy. If Schindler had been a normal man, he would not
have done what he did.”—Mosche Bejski
“We owe our lives to him. But I wouldn’t glorify a German because of what
he did for us.”—Danka Dresner
“I couldn’t make him out . . . I think he felt sorry for me.”—Helen Rosenz-
weig
“I don’t know what his motives were, even though I knew him very well.
I asked him and I never got a clear answer. But I don’t give a damn. What’s
important is that he saved our lives.”—Ludwik Feigenbaum
People might have several different motives for helping. The Jews who were saved
by Schindler during World War II attributed to him several different motives. Some
thought he was selfish, some thought he was altruistic and heroic, and some thought
he was crazy. In this section we explore some of the possible reasons why people help
others.

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 96
Evolutionary Benefits
It is clear that receiving help increases the likelihood of passing one’s genes on to the
next generation, but what about giving help? In the animal world, the costs of helping
are easy to spot. A hungry animal that gives its food to another has less left for itself.
Selfish animals that don’t share are less likely to starve. Hence evolution should gen-
erally favor selfish, unhelpful creatures. Indeed, Richard Dawkins (1976/1989) wrote
a book titled The Selfish Gene.90 According to Dawkins, genes are selfish in that they
build “survival machines” (like human beings!) to increase the number of copies of
themselves. In a 2011 interview, Dawkins said: “Genes try to maximize their chance
of survival. The successful ones crawl down through the generations. The losers, and
their hosts, die off. A gene for helping the group could not persist if it endangered
the survival of the individual.”91 The helpfulness of people like Schindler likewise
carries risks; he would probably have been imprisoned and executed if he had been
caught.
One way that evolution might support some helping is between parents and chil-
dren. Parents who helped their children more would be more successful at passing
on their genes. Although evolution favors helping one’s children, children have less
at stake in the survival of their parents’ genes. Thus, parents should be more devoted
to their children, and more willing to make sacrifices to benefit them, than children
should be to their parents. In general, we should help people who have our genes, a
theory known as kin selection.92,93 For example, you should be more likely to help a
sibling (who shares one-half of your genes) than a nephew (who shares one-fourth
of your genes) or a cousin (who shares one-eighth of your genes). Plenty of research
evidence suggests that people do help their family members and close relatives more
than they help other people. In both life-or-death and everyday situations, we are more Figure
likely to help others who share our genes.94 However, life-or-death helping is affected As genetic relatedness increases,
9.2
more strongly by genetic relatedness than is everyday helping (see Figure 9.2). helping also increases, in both
Research has shown that genetically identical twins (who share 100% of their everyday situations and life-or-death
genes) help each other significantly more than fraternal situations. Source: Burnstein et al. (1994).
twins (who share 50% of their genes).95 Likewise, survi-
cues for inclusive fitness as a function of the biological importance of the decision,”

3.0
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 773-789. Copyright © 1994 by the
From Burnstein et al., “Some neo-Darwinian decision rules for altruism: Weighing

vors of a fire at a vacation complex said that when they

realized the complex was on fire, they were much more 2.8
likely to search for family members than for friends.96 2.6
Thus, the natural patterns of helping (that favor fam-
American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

ily and other kin) are still there in human nature. How- 2.4
Tendency to help

ever, people do help strangers and non-kin much more 2.2

than other animals do. People are not just like other
2.0
animals, but they are not completely different either.
Humans are cultural animals, selected by nature to 1.8
participate with nonrelatives in a larger society. Our 1.6
natural inclinations to help kin have been amplified Everyday
via emotional responses to translate into more far- 1.4
Life or death
reaching actions, such as empathy. 1.2
Empathy is an emotional response that corresponds 0% 12.5% 25% 50%
to the feelings of the other person. When people see Genetic relatedness
a person in distress, they usually feel that person’s
distress; when they see a person who is sad, they feel that person’s sadness. The
sharing of feelings makes people want to help the sufferer to feel better. Empathy is
an especially important emotion when it comes to understanding why people help.
Dramatic evidence for this was provided in a study of 18-month-old toddlers.97 When
the adult researcher dropped something, the human toddlers immediately tried to
help, such as by crawling over to where it was, picking it up, and giving it to him. kin selection the evolutionary tendency
(The babies also seemed to understand and empathize with the adult’s mental state. to help people who have our genes
If the researcher simply threw something on the floor, the babies didn’t help retrieve empathy reacting to another person’s
it. They only helped if the adult seemed to want help.) The researchers then repeated emotional state by experiencing the same
this experiment with chimpanzees. The chimps were much less helpful, even though emotional state

Why Do People Help Others? | 321

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 97
the human researcher was a familiar friend. This work suggests that humans are
hardwired to cooperate and help each other from early in life, and that this is some-
thing that sets humans apart from even their closest animal relatives.
Unfortunately, some evidence suggests empathy levels are decreasing in college
students. A recent review examined 72 studies of 14,000 college students between
1979 and 2009.98 Empathy scores dropped 40% over those 30 years. Compared with
college students of the late 1970s, current students are less likely to agree with state-
ments such as “I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how
things look from their perspective,” and “I often have tender, concerned feelings for
people less fortunate than me.” The authors speculated, “College students today may
be so busy worrying about themselves and their own issues that they don’t have time
to spend empathizing with others.”99

Two Motives for Helping: Altruism and Egoism

The 19th-century philosopher Auguste Comte (1875) described two forms of helping
based on very different motives. One form he called egoistic helping, in which the
helper wants something in return for offering help. The helper’s goal is to increase
his or her own welfare (such as by making a friend, creating an obligation to recipro-
cate, or just making oneself feel good). The other form he called altruistic helping, in
which the helper expects nothing in return for offering help. The helper’s goal in this
case is to increase another’s welfare. Psychologists, philosophers, and others have
debated this distinction ever since.
These two different types of helping are produced by two different types of
motives (see Figure 9.3). Altruistic helping is motivated by empathy. The sharing of
feelings makes people want to help the sufferer to feel better.
The ability to experience another person’s pain is characteristic of empathy. One
study used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to assess brain activity
while participants experienced a painful shock (represented by green in Figure
9.4).100 They then compared it to the brain activity while participants watched a loved
one experience a painful shock (represented by red in Figure 9.4).
The researchers used couples as participants because couples are likely to feel
empathy for each other. The study found that the brain’s reaction was about the same
for receiving shocks oneself as for watching one’s lover receive shocks. Brain activa-
tion also correlated with individual empathy scores—the more empathic people said
they were, the more brain activity they experienced while watching their partner
egoistic helping when a helper seeks to
increase his or her own welfare by helping suffer.
another According to the empathy–altruism hypothesis101 empathy motivates people to
reduce other people’s distress, as by helping or comforting them. How can we tell
altruistic helping when a helper seeks
to increase another’s welfare and expects the difference between egoistic and altruistic motives? When empathy is low, people
nothing in return can reduce their own distress either by helping the person in need or by escaping the
situation so they don’t have to see the person suffer any longer. If empathy is high,
empathy–altruism hypothesis the idea
that empathy motivates people to reduce however, then simply shutting your eyes or leaving the situation won’t work because
other people’s distress, as by helping or the other person is still suffering. In that case, the only solution is to help the victim
comforting feel better.

Adopt other’s
Emotion Motive Behavior
perspective

Reduce other’s
Yes Empathy Altruism
distress (help)
Figure 9.3 Perception that someone
. Cengage Learning

Two routes to helping: The top needs help

route is motivated by altruism, Personal Reduce own
No Egoism
whereas the bottom route is distress distress (help?)
motivated by egoism

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deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
 98
Nechama Tec, a sociology professor and a survivor of the Nazis
102

Reprinted with permission from: Singer T., Seymour B., O’Doherty J., Kaube H., Dolan R.J., Frith C.D. “Empathy for pain involves the affective
in Poland, has extensively studied non-Jews who rescued Jews. She
concluded that the rescuers had “universalistic perceptions of the
needy that overshadowed all other attributes except their depen-
dence on aid.” Schindler said this about the Jews he helped: “I had
to help them. There was no choice.” On the face of it, the statement
is wrong: Of course he had a choice. But in another sense, he felt
he didn’t. He cared about the Jews as fellow human beings, and he
felt their suffering. Turning his back or shutting his eyes would not
have been enough to make him forget their situation, so he felt he
had to help them.

but not the sensory components of pain” Science, Vol. 303, p. 1157–1162, February 2004.
Stanislaw Dobrowolski, the director of a council to save Polish
Jews in Nazi-occupied Krakow, dismissed Schindler’s altruistic
motives altogether.103 In his view, Schindler’s heroism was more
about his own ego trip than about any altruistic concern to reduce
the suffering of others.
Untangling these different motives for helping has been an
ongoing challenge for social psychologists. One study104 was pre-
sented to participants as a test of the effects of stress on task perfor-
mance. Through a rigged lottery, the “other participant” (actually
a confederate named Elaine) was assigned to perform 10 trials of a
task while receiving random electric shocks (the stressor) on each
trial. The real participant watched Elaine over a closed-circuit TV.
Before the study began, the participant overheard a conversation in
which Elaine told the experimenter that she was afraid of receiving
the shocks because as a child she had been thrown from a horse
into an electric fence. Ever since that experience, she had been ter-
rified of electricity. The experimenter apologized but said Elaine
would have to receive the shocks anyway because she had lost the Figure 9.4
coin toss. Pain-related activation associated
To increase empathy, the researchers told half of the participants that Elaine’s with either experiencing pain oneself
values and interests were very similar to their own (high-empathy condition). The (green) or observing one’s partner
other participants were told that Elaine’s values and interests were quite different feeling pain (red). Source: Singer et al. (2004).
(low-empathy condition). People feel more empathy toward those they believe are
similar to themselves than toward dissimilar people. To test for egoistic motives for
helping, the researchers also manipulated how difficult it was to escape. In the easy-
escape condition, participants were told that they could leave after watching Elaine
get shocked on the first two trials. In the difficult-escape condition, participants were
told that they would have to watch all 10 trials. Participants who were only concerned
Easy-escape Difficult-escape
about their own feelings would not have to help Elaine in the easy-escape condition.
Instead they could just walk away and forget about her suffering.
High empathy

After watching Elaine suffer through two trials, the participant was asked whether 90% 82%
she would be willing to trade places with Elaine as a way of helping her avoid further
suffering. Consistent with empathy–altruism theory, almost all the participants in
the high-empathy group traded places with Elaine, regardless of whether it was easy
Low empathy

. Cengage Learning
or difficult to escape (see Figure 9.5). In the low-empathy group, participants left
18% 65%
if it was easy for them to escape the unpleasant task of watching Elaine suffer. If it
was difficult to escape, more than half of them traded places with Elaine (rather than
watch her suffer longer).
This study provided evidence for both kinds of helping. In the low-empathy con-
dition, people helped only to make themselves feel good. If they could walk away Figure 9.5
and ignore the victim’s suffering, many chose that path. In contrast, people who People in the high-empathy group
felt high empathy helped regardless of whether they were allowed to escape. High- helped regardless of whether escape
empathy helping is centered on the victim’s needs, not on one’s own prospects for was easy or difficulty. In the low-
feeling good. empathy group, people helped mainly
There are two alternative hypotheses to the empathy–altruism hypothesis in when they could not escape. Source:
which helping is triggered by empathy but may still reflect selfish motives, although Batson et al. (1981).

Why Do People Help Others? | 323

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 99
a series of five experiments ruled them out.105 According to the empathy–specific
reward hypothesis, empathy triggers the need for social reward (e.g., praise, honor,
pride) that can be gained by helping. According to the empathy–specific punish-
ment hypothesis, empathy triggers the fear of social punishment (e.g., guilt, shame,
censure) that can be avoided by helping.
There is another alternative hypothesis to the empathy–altruism hypothesis.
When people see someone suffering, they feel bad too. According to the negative
state relief hypothesis,106 people help others in order to relieve their own distress.
This view holds that people help mainly to make themselves feel better. However, a
meta-analytic review of the literature found little support for the negative state relief
hypothesis.107

Is Altruism Possible?
As they conducted research on whether helping is driven by empathy and sympa-
thy for victims or by the selfish desire to feel better, social psychologists gradually
became involved in a centuries-old debate about whether people are basically good
or evil—or, more to the point, basically good or selfish. Many philosophers have
asked whether people really perform morally good actions such as altruistic helping
if they are motivated by a desire to feel good. In a nutshell, the argument is this: If
you donate money to charity or help a needy victim because it makes you feel good
to do so, aren’t you really just being selfish and self-serving? Ultimately the question
becomes: Is genuine altruism even possible?
Social psychologists have split on this debate. Nobody disputes that some help-
ing is egoistical, in the sense that people sometimes help in order to gain benefits
for themselves such as improved mood or a good reputation. They disagree as to
whether egoism is the only motive. Some point out that people will help even when
they could feel better by other, simpler means, such as by escaping the situation (as in
the previous study with Elaine). They also think it is sad to dismiss so much genuine
helping as mere selfishness—after all, helping someone for selfish reasons deserves
empathy–specific reward to be recognized as something more positive and socially desirable than not helping
hypothesis the idea that empathy or hurting someone for selfish reasons! If we dismiss Schindler’s actions as those of
triggers the need for social reward (e.g.,
a self-centered glory hound, do we not make the world an uglier, less heroic place—
praise, honor, pride) that can be gained by
helping and possibly discourage others from taking such heroic risks in the future? Others
have argued, however, that even empathic helping is a way to make oneself feel bet-
empathy–specific punishment
ter. The debate goes on today.
hypothesis the idea that empathy
triggers the fear of social punishment (e.g., Our view is that the debate cannot be resolved because it asks the wrong ques-
guilt, shame, censure) that can be avoided tion. It may well be true that people feel better when they help, and that these good
by helping feelings promote helping. But instead of supporting a negative conclusion about
negative state relief hypothesis the people—that people are always basically selfish—this should foster a more positive,
idea that people help others in order to optimistic view. Isn’t it great that natural selection selected human beings to be able
relieve their own distress to get pleasure from helping others?

© 1995 Watterson. Dist. by Universal Press Syndicate.

Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.

Although people assume that altruistic helping exists, it might not.

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 100
The conflict between selfish impulses and social conscience has been one theme
of this book. Often people have to be socialized to resist selfish impulses so as to do
what is best for society and culture.108 Children must be taught to share, to take turns,
and to respect the property of others, for example. The fact that nature has enabled
people to feel empathy for the suffering of others and to feel good when they lend
help is one (very welcome and constructive) way to avoid that conflict. The social
conscience is there to make people do what is best for others (and best for society at
large) even when doing so means overriding selfish impulses. The fact that people
can get satisfaction from helping others makes it easier for the social conscience to
accomplish this. If no one ever got any satisfaction from doing good deeds, there
would probably be far fewer good deeds.
Selfishness may be part of human nature, but so is helpfulness. Human beings
help their children and kin, their friends, and sometimes even total strangers. It is
unfair to call them selfish just because this helping is often motivated by the fact
that helping feels good. The innately prepared pleasure we get from helping is one
important element in the basic goodness of human nature.109,110
Are some people more likely to help than others? If so, who are they? We discuss
this topic in the next section.

1. Jean Luc’s house is on fire. His grandparents, wife, children, and cousins
are in the house. Based on kin selection theory, whom should he save first?
Quiz
a b c d Yourself
His children His cousins His grandparents His wife

2. Eliza trips, falls, and begins to cry. When Mariah sees Eliza crying in pain, Why Do People
she starts to cry too. Mariah’s response is called _____.
a b c d Help Others?
altruism egoism empathy reactance
3. After seeing a victim of misfortune, empathy motivates us to _____.
a b c d
gain the approval of gain the approval of reduce our own reduce the
bystanders the victim discomfort discomfort of the
victim
4. After seeing a victim of misfortune, personal distress motivates us to _____.
a b c d
gain the approval of gain the approval of reduce our own reduce the
bystanders the victim discomfort discomfort of the
victim answers: see pg 339

Who Helps Whom?

Before we look at specific factors that differentiate who helps whom, let us consider
the big picture. One thing that is special and remarkable about humans is their will-
ingness to help others, even unrelated others. Imagine that you were offered a chance
to get some nice reward for yourself, maybe money or good food. You could either
get it just for yourself, or you could get a duplicate of your reward delivered to some-
one you had known for 15 years (and still get your own full reward). Which would
you choose? Most people would eagerly choose to benefit a friend or acquaintance,
especially if they could do so without cost to themselves.
Yet when this exact experiment was tried on chimps, the results were quite dif-
ferent. Chimps are closely related to human beings,111 but they did not show any
interest in helping their longtime (15-year) acquaintances. They took the reward for

Who Helps Whom? | 325

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 101
themselves, but they did not do the kind favor for others.112 Thus, the basic motive to
bring help and benefits to others who aren’t blood relatives appears to be something
that sets human beings apart from our closest animal relatives.

Helpful Personality
Eva Fogelman studied the family backgrounds of rescuers of Jews and found some
common denominators: “a nurturing, loving home: an altruistic parent or beloved
caretaker who served as a role model for altruistic behavior; a tolerance for people
who were different”113 Other researchers studied 231 Gentiles who rescued Jews in
Nazi Europe and 126 nonrescuers of the same age, gender, education, and geographic
location during the war.114 Rescuers had higher ethical values, had stronger beliefs in
equity, had greater empathy, and were more likely to see all people as equal.
In a typical questionnaire measure of altruistic personality,115 respondents are
asked to indicate the frequency with which they have engaged in specific prosocial
behaviors within the past year, such as helping or offering to help others (e.g., “I have
donated blood”) and giving to charity (e.g., “I have given money, goods, or clothes to
a charity”). This scale, called the Self Report Altruism Scale, has been shown to corre-
late with peer ratings of altruism, completion of an organ donor card, and paper-and-
pencil measures of prosocial orientation.116 The altruistic personality also appears to
have a genetic component.117

Similarity
Research has shown that people are more likely to help similar others than dissimi-
lar others. The similarity bias especially works for outward symbols that are readily
identifiable, such as apparel. For example, in one study, hippies were more likely to
help other hippies than nonhippies.118

Gender
Research indicates that males are more helpful than females in the broader pub-
lic sphere, toward strangers, and in emergency settings.119 For example, since 1904
the Carnegie Hero Fund Commission has given awards to “heroes,” defined as “a
civilian who voluntarily risks his or her own life, knowingly, to an extraordinary
degree while saving or attempting to save the life of another person.”120 More than
90% of the individuals who have received Carnegie medals have been men. Women
are more helpful in the family sphere, in close relationships, and in situations that
require repeated contact over a long period of time such as in volunteering.121 Com-
pared to males, females tend to feel more sympathy and empathy for people who
need help.122,123
When it comes to receiving help, females are more likely to receive help than are
males, regardless of whether the helper is male or female. If a car has a flat tire, for
example, people are more likely to stop and help if the owner is female than if the
owner is male.124,125
Males and females also differ in the types of help they offer their friends and rela-
tives in sexual relationships. Read The Social Side of Sex to find out how.

Beautiful Victims
One of the most robust findings in the helping literature is that people are more
likely to help attractive individuals than unattractive individuals. This holds true
for male and female helpers and for males and females in need of help. This find-
ing has been shown in both laboratory and field settings.126 It has been shown in
emergency situations and in nonemergency situations. In one study,127 for example,
people using phone booths at airports found a completed application form in the

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deemed that any suppressed content does not materially affect the overall learning experience. Cengage Learning reserves the right to remove additional content at any time if subsequent rights restrictions require it.
 102
Helping, Sex, and Friends

  SEX
A sexual relationship may and friends to find partners. People even use to stay out late or even sleep on the beach if
seem like a private matter online dating services to find sex partners.129 someone was there having sex.) The women,
between two people, but A 2002 article from Wired magazine stated: in contrast, made agreements to help each
in fact people depend on “Twenty years from now, the idea that other avoid having sex. They usually agreed
help from their friends and someone looking for love without looking for that their goal was to refrain from sex, unless
relatives in multiple ways. it online will be silly, akin to skipping the card one happened to find true love. They promised
Just meeting sex partners is catalog to instead wander the stacks because each other, for example, that if one of them
often a matter of relying on
Social
Side of
‘the right books are found only by accident.’ got drunk and was being “hit on” (that is,
one’s network. One landmark Serendipity is the hallmark of inefficient targeted with romantic or sexual advances) by
study of sexual practices markets, and the marketplace of love, like it a particular man, the others would swoop in
found that less than half the or not, is becoming more efficient.”130 This and bring her safely away. If they were sharing
people met their sex partners prediction is accurate and seems to have a room, they might promise not to leave one of
or marriage partners by
THE
come true before the 2022 target date. them alone in it with a man. Thus, males and
introducing themselves, Helping is also apparent in how people females differ dramatically in how they help
such as by approaching act on spring break, which for many college their friends in sexual situations.
someone at a bar.128 (Also, self-introductions students is a brief, exciting time of intense Why? The most likely explanation is rooted
were most likely to lead to short-term affairs partying and sexual opportunity. A team of in the social exchange theory of sex (see
rather than long-term relationships.) In researchers followed a sample of Canadian Chapter 12).132 In that view, society treats sex
contrast, many people were introduced to students who traveled to Florida for one spring as something that men want from women,
their lovers by friends, coworkers, or relatives. break.131 They found that most traveled in so men give women other resources (love,
Family members were responsible for bringing same-sex groups. On the way down, many of commitment, respect, attention, money) in
together relatively few sex partners, but the these groups made pacts or other agreements exchange. Spring break sex is typically “free”
likelihood of those relationships lasting was to help each other during the week. These sex that is not accompanied by commitment
especially high, probably because your family agreements differed by gender. The men or other resources. From the exchange
knows you and will only introduce you to generally promised to help each other find a perspective, free sex signifies a good deal for
someone who is likely to be a good match. partner to have sex with. They would agree men and a bad one for women. That is why
If your mother or brother introduces you to that they all wanted to have sex and that they men will try to support and help each other to
someone, it is probably not for the sake of would support each other’s efforts. If they engage in free sex, whereas women will try to
casual sex but rather someone with whom you were sharing a room, they would make plans support and help each other to avoid that sort
might have a long-term relationship. as to how to keep it discreetly available in case of sex.
Online dating services, however, have one of them wanted to bring a woman there
reduced the need to rely on family members for sex. (For example, the others might agree

booth, a photograph of the applicant, and an

addressed, stamped envelope. Half of the
photos depicted an attractive applicant; the
other half depicted an unattractive appli-
cant. Callers were much more likely to mail
applications for attractive applicants than for
unattractive applicants. In another study,133
male college students walking by the student
health center were approached by a woman
who said she desperately needed money for a
tetanus shot. Male students were more likely
to give the woman money if she was attractive
than if she was unattractive.
Maxi Spreewald/Getty Images

Belief in a Just World Women, especially

beautiful women, are
When the British marched a group of German most likely to receive
civilians around the Belsen ­ concentration help.

Who Helps Whom? | 327

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 103
camp at the end of World War II to show them what their soldiers had done, one
civilian said, “What terrible criminals these prisoners must have been to receive such
treatment.”134 This statement was not made by a guard who was trying to justify his
behavior; it was made by an innocent civilian. Why was this person blaming the
victim? One possible explanation is that the person believed that the world is a just
place where people get what they deserve and deserve what they get, a phenomenon
referred to as belief in a just world.135,136,137
One unfortunate consequence of belief in a just world is that it leads people to
blame the victim. They assume that those who suffer a bad fate had it coming to
them. For example, people assume that rape victims must have behaved or dressed
provocatively, that poor people are lazy, and that sick people are responsible for their
illness. On the other hand, “blaming the victim” has become such a taboo and con-
demned response in the social sciences that many people today will refuse to blame
a victim even when the victim does bear some of the blame. Research on violence
and aggression has frequently shown, for example, that many violent acts stem from
incidents in which both people provoked or attacked each other. Two patrons in a bar
may start by exchanging insults, move along to shoving and hitting, and end up in
a violent fight in which one is injured or killed. The killer is certainly to blame, but
the so-called victim also deserves some blame under those circumstances. Victims
generally deserve sympathy, and some are indeed entirely free from blame, but other
victims do share responsibility for what happened to them.
People who believe the world is just (fair) will help others, but only if they think
those people deserve the help.138 People who believe in a just world are not helpful
toward victims who are perceived to be responsible for their own predicament.139
People who believe most strongly in a just world express more negative attitudes
toward helping the elderly because they believe that the elderly are responsible for
meeting their own social, economic, and health needs.140
Belief in a just world can sometimes promote helping because the helper desires to
deserve good outcomes. Again, the essence of believing in a just world is that people
deserve what they get and get what they deserve. By extension, if you help others,
you are a good and deserving person, so you can expect good things to happen to
you. This can take on an almost superstitious aspect, as when people perform good
or helpful acts in the expectation that they will be rewarded later.
Students sometimes show this sort of superstitious helping. Students at one col-
lege were asked to volunteer to do a good deed, such as serving as a reader for blind
students or doing extra psychology experiments.141 During the routine parts of the
semester, helping was fairly low, and it made no difference whether the students
had high or low belief in a just world. However, when the request came just before
exam time, the students who believed in a just world were significantly more will-
ing to help. Presumably they thought at some level that their good deeds would be
rewarded by better luck and a better grade on the exam. If good things happen to
good people, then it may help to do good deeds so as to become a good person.

Emotion and Mood

In general, positive feelings increase helping. Research has shown that helping
is increased by all kinds of pleasant situations, such as sunny weather,142 eating a
cookie,143 and imagining a Hawaiian vacation.144 One possible explanation for this
phenomenon is that people want to maintain a good mood, and acting helpfully
toward another person may allow them to sustain their good feelings (see Chapter 6).
On the other hand, bad emotions can sometimes increase helping. One way to
resolve these findings is to suggest that some negative emotions may promote help-
ing more than others. (Thus, perhaps guilt motivates helping, whereas shame or
belief in a just world the assumption
that life is essentially fair, that people
anger makes people unhelpful.) Another possibility is that the same emotion can
generally get what they deserve and have different effects. Focusing on yourself versus the victim can make a big differ-
deserve what they get ence, for example, even when the emotion is the same.

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 104
1. The trait that produces helping across a wide variety of settings is called the
_____ personality.
Quiz
a b c d Yourself
altruistic egoistic narcissistic overbenefited

2. When it comes to receiving help, males are more likely to help _____ and Who Helps Whom?
females are more likely to help _____.
a b c d
females; females females; males males; females males; males
3. People are especially inclined to help someone who is _____.
a b c d
altruistic authoritarian low in status physically attractive

4. People are especially likely to feel unsympathetic to a victim of misfortune if

they _____.
a b c d
are in a good mood believe in a just feel overbenefited feel underbenefited
answers: see pg 339
world

Bystander Helping in Emergencies

On March 13, 1964, a young woman named Kitty Genovese was attacked by a knife-
wielding rapist outside her apartment in Queens, New York. News reports said her
screams for help aroused 38 of her neighbors. Many watched from their windows
while, for 35 minutes, she tried to escape. None called the police or sought to help in
any other manner. In fact, her attacker left her twice and then returned each time; if
someone had come to help her into the building during those intervals, she would
have lived. Some of the witnesses didn’t help because they thought it was a lover’s
quarrel. The New York Times article that described the event was titled “Thirty-Eight
Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call the Police.”
The incident made the national news and ignited a storm of controversy. How
could people just sit by and let a woman be murdered? Talking heads weighed in
with their theories about urban decay, alienation, and other roots of the seemingly
heartless indifference of the onlookers. Although some facts of this case have been
disputed,145 it led to a long line of social psychology studies on why bystanders might
The New York Times/Redux

fail to help a victim in an emergency.

Most of the intellectuals who appeared on the news to discuss the Genovese mur-
der assumed that the reasons for failing to help lay within the person. In a sense, they
made what Chapter 5 described as the “fundamental attribution error”: They under-
estimated the importance of situational factors and assumed behavior reflected the
values and traits of the person. Even so, no news reporters could induce any of the On March 13, 1964, Kitty Genovese
bystanders to say, “I really didn’t care whether that young woman lived or died.” It was attacked by a knife-wielding
fell to social psychologists to show that the special power of such emergency situa- rapist outside her apartment in
tions could explain what came to be known as the bystander effect: People are less Queens, New York, while several of
likely to offer help when they are in the presence of others than when they are alone. her neighbors watched from their
windows.
Five Steps to Helping
Two social psychologists, John Darley and Bibb Latané, whose offices were a few min-
utes from the site of the Genovese murder, took the lead in studying the bystander
effect. Gradually they came to recognize an absurd aspect of the controversy: the
assumption that helping would be the normal, natural response. Instead, they pro- bystander effect the finding that people
posed that there are at least five steps to helping in an emergency situation (see are less likely to offer help when they are in a
­ igure 9.6). These amounted to five possible reasons that people would not help.
F group than when they are alone

Bystander Helping in Emergencies | 329

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 105
Figure 9.6

From Latane, B & Darley, J., “Group inhibition of bystander intervention in emergencies,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 10 (p.
Step 5 Obstacles to helping
Five steps to helping and the Provide help
Audience inhibition
obstacles encountered at each step.
I’ll look like a fool.
Source: Latane & Darley (1970).
Costs exceed rewards
What if I do something
Step 4 wrong? He’ll sue me!
Decide how to help

Lack of competence

215-221). Copyright © 1968 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

I’m not trained to handle this,
and who would I call?

lp
Step 3

he
Take responsibility

ng
i
vid
for providing help Diffusion of responsibility

pro
Someone else must have

to
called 911.
th
Pa
Step 2
Interpret event as Ambiguity
an emergency Is she really sick or just drunk?
Relationship between attacker and victim
They’ll have to resolve their own
Step 1 family quarrels.
Notice that something Pluralistic ignorance
is happening No one else seems worried.

Distraction
Stop fooling around, kids, we’re here to eat.
Emergency! Self-concerns
I’m late for a very important date!

A victim would only get help if the bystander resolved all five of these steps in the
optimal way. Crucially, the presence of a crowd can interfere with helping at each of
the five steps.

Step 1: Notice That Something Is Happening

The first step is to notice that something is happening. One obstacle to noticing the
incident is being distracted: People who are busy or preoccupied are less likely to
notice what is happening around them. Of course, people are more distracted when
others are around than when alone. In one study,146 male college students completed
a questionnaire in a room, either alone or with two strangers. While they were work-
ing, smoke started pouring into the room through a wall vent. Students who were
alone noticed the smoke right away. In contrast, those in groups took about four
times as long to notice the smoke (even though there were more people there to notice
it!). The difference may be crucial in some emergency situations, such as a fire.

Step 2: Interpret Meaning of Event

Once you have noticed something is happening, the second step is to interpret the
meaning of the event. Is it an emergency or not? Few people encounter emergencies
on a regular basis, and emergencies do not usually come with obvious labels. How
someone interprets these ambiguous situations can be decisive. For example, you
notice a man stagger down the street and then slump onto the ground. Is he having
a heart attack, so that your timely intervention might be needed to save his life? Or is
he merely drunk, so that if you rush over to him your reward might be nothing more
than having him puke on your shoes?
Sometimes it is hard to tell whether an event is an emergency. In 1993 in the United
Kingdom, a 2-year-old boy named James Bulger was dragged out of a shopping mall,

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 106
kicking and screaming, by two 10-year-old boys. The older boys dragged Bulger two
and a half miles (4 kilometers) from the shopping mall to a railroad track, where they
beat him to death. Sixty-one people said they had seen the boys dragging Bulger
out of the mall, but none intervened. As one witness said, he thought the boys were
“older brothers taking a little one home.”
When it is easy to tell, people are more likely to intervene. To show the power of
interpretations, researchers staged a physical fight between a man and a woman.147
Bystanders offered help 65% of the time when she shouted, “Get away from me; I
don’t know you.” Bystanders offered help only 19% of the time when she shouted
“Get away from me; I don’t know why I ever married you.” Perhaps they interpreted
the event as a marital spat rather than as an emergency. Some of the bystanders who
witnessed the Kitty Genovese murder thought it was only a lover’s quarrel.
What are the obstacles to helping at this step? People often look to others for clues
about how to behave. We think that others might know something that we don’t
know. If others do not react to an event, we conclude that it is not an emergency
because otherwise they would be reacting. This phenomenon of collective misin-
terpretation is called pluralistic ignorance. We forget that others, in turn, might be
looking to us for clues about how to behave. They assume that we know more than
they do. Nobody reacts, because everybody assumes that others know more than
they do, when in reality nobody knows anything. Everybody is certain that nothing
is wrong, when actually the event is an emergency!
Pluralistic ignorance is not restricted to emergency situations. Have you ever sat
through a class feeling completely lost and confused about the material being pre-
sented? You want to ask a question, but you’re too embarrassed to ask it. No one else
is saying anything, so you assume that everybody else understands the material. In
fact, the other students are probably just as confused as you are. Pluralistic ignorance
in the classroom can prevent learning, just as in an emergency situation it can pre-
vent helping. Others often don’t know as much as we give them credit for.

Step 3: Take Responsibility for Providing Help

The third step is taking responsibility for providing help. You might notice that
something is happening, and decide that it is an emergency, but that is not enough.
You must be willing to take responsibility for helping. The obstacle to this step of
pluralistic ignorance looking to
helping is called diffusion of responsibility. With several potential helpers around, others for cues about how to behave,
the personal responsibility of each bystander is reduced. If you are the only person while they are looking to you; collective
present, 100% of the responsibility for providing help rests on your shoulders; if two misinterpretation
people are present, each has 50% responsibility; if four people are present, each has diffusion of responsibility the
25% responsibility; and so on. In crowds, people think, “Perhaps someone else will reduction in feeling responsible that occurs
help; perhaps someone else has already called for help.” With everyone thinking that when others are present
someone else will help or has helped, nobody helps.
Reprinted by permission of Universal Press Syndicate, Inc.

Pluralistic ignorance in the classroom can interfere with learning.

Bystander Helping in Emergencies | 331

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 107
Eva Fogelman, who studied rescuers of Jews during World War II, found that a
bystander was much less likely to intervene on behalf of Jews if he or she was in a
crowd. Fogelman wrote,
It appears to be a human proclivity to assume that someone else, the person
beside you in a crowd, will be the one to intervene. It is not my responsibility,
a bystander explains. Someone else will take care of it. Thus, by way of a “dif-
fusion of responsibility,” a bystander’s conscience is assuaged, permitting the
bystander to carry on his or her way.148
The importance of diffusion of responsibility was demonstrated in lab experi-
ments by Darley and Latané.149 Participants believed they were taking part in a group
discussion over an intercom system. During the session, another participant (actu-
ally a prerecorded voice) apparently started having a seizure and called for help.
Participants who thought they were part of a six-person group generally did not
help because they thought someone else would do so. In contrast, if the participant
thought he or she was the only one who knew about the victim’s seizure, the partici-
pant helped almost every time.

Step 4: Know How to Help

The fourth step is deciding how to help. Having assumed the responsibility to help,
the person must now figure out what to do. An obstacle to offering direct help is the
feeling of lack of competence—people don’t feel qualified to help, or they think that
somebody else is more qualified to help than they are. Researchers have shown that
there is no effect for those who feel competent to intervene directly. In one study,150
female participants were either registered nurses or general education students. On
their way to the lab, participants passed by a workman (actually a confederate) who
was standing on a ladder, fixing a light fixture. In the lab, participants worked on
a task either alone or with a confederate who was pretending to be another par-
ticipant and whose instructions were to sit still and do nothing during the upcom-
ing accident. In the hall, participants heard the ladder fall over, they heard a thud,
and then they heard the workman groaning in pain. The vast majority of nurses
helped, regardless of whether they were working alone or with a passive bystander.
For them, lack of competence was no obstacle to helping. General education students
were much more likely to help if they were working alone than if they were working
with a passive bystander.
People who don’t feel competent to offer direct help can still offer indirect help,
which involves calling someone else to help. In the age of cell phones, offering indi-

. Paula Wright 2012

332 | Chapter 9 Prosocial Behavior: Doing What’s Best for Others

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 108
Table 9.3
Some Costs and Benefits of Helping

Helping Not Helping

Costs Lose time Guilt

Injury Social disapproval

Legal liability Legal liability

Worsen situation

Benefits Self praise Avoid risk of injury

Reward Avoid risks of helping

Social approval

rect help is quite easy, and it may often be the wisest and safest course of action. Phys-
ical injuries are best handled by people with medical training, such as ambulance
workers. Dangerous situations are best handled by people with proper training, such
as police officers. Stalled motorist problems are best handled by people with proper
training, such as the highway patrol. Calling others for help is still being helpful.

Step 5: Provide Help

The fifth and final step is to take action by offering help (see Table 9.3). There are
obstacles to helping at this step also. One obstacle is called audience inhibition—
people don’t want to feel like a fool in front of others if they offer help and the person
does not want help. People also might not help if the costs outweigh the benefits.151
For example, people might not want to get their hands or clothes dirty, or they might
not have enough time. We discuss the issue of lack of time being an obstacle to help-
ing in the next section.

Too Busy to Help?

One of the more moving and memorable stories from the New Testament in the Bible
has come to be known as the parable of the Good Samaritan. It goes like this:
A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell among thieves,
which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded him, and departed, leaving
him half dead. And by chance there came down a certain priest that way: and
when he saw him, he passed by on the other side. And likewise a Levite, when
he was at the place, came and looked on him, and passed by on the other side.
But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed, came where he was: and when he
saw him, he had compassion on him. And went to him, and bound up his
wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought
him to an inn, and took care of him. And on the morrow when he departed,
he took out two pence, and gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take
care of him; and whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will
repay thee. (Luke 10:30–35, King James Version)
Would the parable of the Good Samaritan actually prompt bystanders to help in an
emergency? To find out, researchers recruited students at the Princeton Theological
Seminary who were studying to be ministers.152 Half of them came to the psychology
building expecting to give a talk about the Good Samaritan parable, so that the issue audience inhibition failure to help in
of helping needy victims should have been prominent in their minds. The remaining front of others for fear of feeling like a fool if
students were told to give a talk on job opportunities for seminary students. one’s offer of help is rejected

Bystander Helping in Emergencies | 333

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 109
Does being in a hurry make bystanders less likely to help in an emergency? To
find out, students were also divided into low, moderate, and high “hurry” condi-
tions. When they arrived at the lab for their appointment, they were told that their
talk would be given in an auditorium in another building and were sent on their way.
Those in the low-hurry condition were told that they were ahead of schedule and had
plenty of time. Those in the moderate-hurry condition were told that they were right
on schedule. Those in the high-hurry condition were told that they were late and that
their audience was waiting for them. On the way to give their speech, all participants
passed a man (actually a confederate) who was slumped in a doorway, coughing and
groaning. The measure of helping was whether students stopped to help the man.
The results showed that the topic of the speech—and thus whether they were
thinking about career prospects or about the New Testament’s most famous story
of bystander helping—had no effect on helping. Several seminary students going to
give a talk on the parable of the Good Samaritan literally stepped over the victim as
they hurried on their way! Time pressures, however, had a significant effect on help-
ing. Participants in the low-hurry condition were more than six times more likely to
help than were participants in the high-hurry condition. The more time people had,
the more likely they were to help.

Quiz 1. As the number of witnesses present at an emergency situation increases,

the probability of any given individual helping _____.
Yourself a b c d
decreases increases increases then levels off remains the same

Bystander Helping 2. The fire alarm goes off. Nina doesn’t move because she’s uncertain about
what’s going on. She assumes that other people don’t move because they
in Emergencies know it’s just a fire drill. Nina’s thoughts illustrate _____.
a b c d
diffusion of the discounting normative social pluralistic
responsibility principle influence ignorance
3. When Dick sees a neighbor’s house on fire with a crowd of people standing
around it, he doesn’t call the fire department. He assumes that other
neighbors who also saw the fire have already called the fire department.
Dick’s thoughts illustrate _____.
a b c d
diffusion of the discounting normative social pluralistic ignorance
responsibility principle influence
4. In the Good Samaritan study,153 participants varied in the amount of help that
they offered to an (apparently) unconscious man as a function of their _____.
a b c d
free time gender major religiosity
answers: see pg 339

How Can We Increase Helping?

Getting Help in a Public Setting
People aren’t cold and uncaring when it comes to helping others; they are just uncer-
tain about what to do. If you need help in an emergency setting, your best bet is to
reduce the uncertainties of those around you concerning your condition and their
responsibilities.154 If you need emergency help when in a crowd of people, pick a face

334 | Chapter 9 Prosocial Behavior: Doing What’s Best for Others

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 110
out of the crowd. Stare, speak, and point directly at that person. Say, “You, sir, in the
red T-shirt, I need help. Call an ambulance now.”
With that one statement you have reduced all the obstacles that might prevent or
delay help.

• He notices you (reduces distraction).

• He understands that help is needed (reduces pluralistic ignorance).
• He understands that he, not someone else, is responsible for providing help
(reduces diffusion of responsibility).
• He understands exactly how to provide help (reduces concerns about lack of
competence).
• He should not be inhibited by an audience (reduces audience inhibition).

Decades of research have shown that if you follow this advice, you will maximize
the likelihood of receiving help in a public setting.
Once people understand the situational factors that interfere with helping in
emergency situations, they should be more likely to help. In one study,155 students
heard a lecture on why bystanders often don’t help. Other students heard a differ-
ent lecture or no lecture at all. As part of a different study in a different location,
students found themselves walking with an unresponsive confederate past someone
sprawled beneath a bicycle. The group that heard the lecture was much more likely
to help (67% vs. 27%). The researchers replicated the study by separating the lecture
and the opportunity to help by two weeks. Two weeks later, when encountering a
person slumped over, the group that had heard the lecture was still much more likely
to help (43% vs. 25%).

Provide Helpful Models

If unresponsive models interfere with helping, as often occurs in public when “Example is not the main
bystanders fail to offer help, can helpful models increase helping? The answer is a
resounding yes. In one study,156 fourth- and fifth-graders played a bowling game in thing in influencing others.
which gift certificates could be earned. The gift certificates could be traded for candy It is the only thing.”
and toys. Near the bowling game was a box labeled “Trenton Orphans Fund.” The
~Albert Schweitzer, humanitarian,
box also contained pictures of orphans in ragged clothing. Half the students were
theologian, missionary, organist,
exposed to a helpful adult model, and half were not. Each time the adult model won
and medical doctor
gift certificates, he put half of them in the orphan box and said, “If you would like to
give some of your gift certificates to them you can, but you do not have to.” Students
who were not exposed to the model were told the same thing. The students were
then left alone to play the game. The results showed that 48% of students who were
exposed to the adult model helped the orphans, whereas 0% of students who were not
exposed to the adult model helped the orphans. If the researchers had included a child
model condition, donations might have been even higher than for the adult model
condition because people are more influenced by similar others.
The models don’t need to be live either. Filmed models also work. Research has
shown that prosocial television programs such as Lassie, Mr. Rogers’ Neighborhood,
Barney, and Sesame Street increase helpful behavior in children.157 Prosocial video
games158 and music with prosocial lyrics159 can also increase prosocial behavior.
Another way to model helpful behavior is to be a volunteer. More than 55% of
American adults volunteer.160 Americans volunteer an average of 19 billion work
hours each year, and contribute $226 billion each year.161 Volunteering is a planned,
long-term, nonimpulsive decision. Significant events can have a large effect on volun-
teer rates. For example, volunteering increased substantially after terrorists bombed
New York in September 2001 (see Figure 9.7).162 However, the rate of volunteering volunteering a planned, long-term,
returned to normal levels three weeks later. nonimpulsive decision to help others

How Can We Increase Helping? | 335

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 111
Figure 9.7 14,000

things better or worse?” Journal of Social Issues, 60, 645-666. Reprinted

Adapted from Penner, L.A., “Volunteerism and social problems: Making
2000
2001
Volunteer rates increased sharply 12,000
just after September 11, 2001 (no
comparable increase occurred in 10,000

Number of volunteers
2000). Source: Adapted from Penner (2004).
8,000

by permission of John Wiley and Sons, Inc.

6,000

4,000

September 11, 2001

2,000

0
1 3 5 7 8 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51
Weeks

Teach Moral Inclusion

Often people sort others into “us” (people who belong to the same group or category
as we do, called ingroup members) and “them” (people who belong to a different
group or category than we do, called outgroup members). (Chapter 13 describes the
distinction between ingroups and outgroups in more detail.) One way to increase
helping is to make everybody on this planet a member of your “ingroup.” People,
regardless of how they differ from us (e.g., ethnic background, gender, sexual orien-
tation, religion), are still part of the human family and are worthy of our help.

Quiz 1. At which stage do potential helpers weigh the costs of helping versus not
helping before making their decisions?
Yourself a b c d
Assuming Providing help Interpreting the Noticing the

How Can We responsibility to help situation as an

emergency
emergency

Increase Helping? 2. TV programs such as Barney, Lassie, and Mr. Rogers’ Neighborhood have
been shown to _____ helpful behavior in children.
a b c d
decrease increase have no effect on Not enough
research has
been conducted
to answer this
question.
3. Volunteerism is to other forms of helping as _____ is to _____.
a b c d
altruistic; egoistic egoistic; altruistic impulsive; nonimpulsive; impulsive
nonimpulsive
4. Treating everyone as a member of your ingroup is known as _____.
a b c d
answers: see pg 339 diffusion of responsibility moral inclusion kin selection pluralistic ignorance

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 112

Human ?
What Makes Us
Putting the Cultural Animal in Perspective

T
his chapter has given you a look at the brighter side of hu- alone, and they can apply them to novel situations, making follow-
man nature (but get ready for the darker side in the next ing rules a vital form of prosocial behavior.
chapter!). Prosocial behavior shows people doing things that Obedience is related to following rules. Again, many animals can
bring benefits to others and help their culture and society to operate learn to obey specific commands. Only humans expect each other
successfully. Traditionally, social psychologists have emphasized to tell the difference between legitimate and wrongful authority and
helping, but there are many other important forms of prosocial be- to obey only the former. Even the military has come around (after
havior. We may be inspired by the heroic acts of people like Oskar atrocities such as the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War
Schindler, but society’s successful functioning depends less on that and the Abu Ghraib prison abuses during the Iraq War) to advocat-
sort of occasional, spectacular heroism than on everyday prosocial ing that soldiers have a duty to disobey orders that are improper.
behavior like following rules, cooperating, reciprocating, forgiving, Studies such as Milgram’s164 have shown that it is hard for people
taking turns, and obeying legitimate authority. If most people do to disobey direct orders from seemingly legitimate authority figures,
those things most of the time, the cultural system can succeed but it can be done. The human being is (sometimes, at least) an
in making everyone better off. Recent centuries of human history autonomous, thinking, moral agent, even when receiving orders.
have gradually seen power shift from individuals (such as kings Conformity is simpler and cruder than following rules because
who could command or decree whatever they wanted) to the rule all it requires is the ability to see what others are doing and the
of law, and in the process life has gotten safer and happier for most desire to do the same. Many animals exhibit a herd instinct sort of
people. Even today, happiness levels are higher in countries with a conformity, in which they unthinkingly copy the behavior of others.
strong rule of law than in those that lack the rule of law.163 Unlike other animals, people exchange information with each other
Perhaps the most sweeping and important difference in proso- and rely on what others tell them to learn about the world.
cial behavior between humans and other animals is that humans Likewise, the beginnings of reciprocity can be seen among
will do prosocial things for others who are not family members. As animals, but typically this involves sharing with kin. Humans can
with most animals, human helping gives first priority to family mem- reciprocate with strangers. Cooperation, too, is more advanced in
bers and loved ones, but human beings will also do nice things humans than in many other species. Some animals seem to coop-
for total strangers. Sharing your food with your mother or your son erate, in that they do complementary things, but mostly these are
does not indicate anything special about your humanity—many fixed action patterns. Humans can decide to cooperate or not, and
other animals would do the same. But donating money or blood to often they decide to cooperate.
benefit people you will never meet is distinctively, and remarkably, Reciprocity and cooperation indicate some understanding of
human. In fact, we saw that 18-month-old human toddlers will even fairness. (If you don’t pay it back, you’re not being fair.) Some other
help non-kin voluntarily, and that they are more helpful than older animals have a crude understanding of fairness, but mostly they are
chimps in similar situations. Nature seems to have prepared people upset when they are underbenefited. Humans often feel guilty or
to understand and care about each other and to offer help when uncomfortable when they are overbenefited too.
possible. Last, empathy may be more centrally important to human
Some animals can learn to follow rules, but usually these are helping than to the prosocial behavior of other animals. People
very specific rules, made and enforced by another (typically bigger) are much better than most other creatures at understanding what
animal whose presence is often essential for enforcing the rules. someone else is feeling, and this capacity to appreciate someone
Rule following took a big leap with human evolution. People can else’s pain and suffering is an important factor in promoting helping
follow laws, moral principles, and other rules even when they are behavior.

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 113

CHAPTER

14
Altruism and
Cooperation

I
n a few seconds on January 2nd, 2007, Wesley Autrey became a national hero. O U TLI N E
The 50-­year-​­old construction worker was waiting with his two young daughters
Altruism
to catch a subway train at the 137th and Broadway station in New York City. As
they waited, a young film student, Cameron Hollopeter, collapsed to the ground, Cooperation
suffering from what appeared to be a seizure. Autrey and two women rushed to
help the young student, who was twisting and convulsing on the ground. With
a borrowed pen, Autrey managed to pry Hollopeter’s mouth open and clear his
respiratory passages so he could recover his breath and strength.
Autrey’s heroics were just beginning. Hollopeter stood up, staggered to the
platform’s edge, and then fell onto the tracks, landing face down between two rails.
The lights of an oncoming train appeared. Autrey had to make a ­split-​­second deci-
sion: jump onto the tracks with his daughters waiting nearby, or let the train run
over Hollopeter. Autrey chose to jump. He landed on the tracks and lay on top of
Hollopeter. The train’s brakes screeched, but it could not stop in time: five cars
of the train rolled over Autrey and Hollopeter. As the crowd screamed and cried,
Autrey called out, asking those nearby to tell his two young daughters that their
father was okay. The train had missed Autrey by one inch, leaving grease smears
on his blue cap.
In the aftermath of the event, Autrey was celebrated as a hero. He appeared on
the daily television shows, was named one of TIME Magazine’s 100 most influential
people, received a standing ovation at President George W. Bush’s State of the
Union address, and was awarded the Bronze Medallion, New York City’s highest
award for excellence in citizenship. Autrey modestly remarked: “I don’t feel like I
did something spectacular; I just saw someone who needed help. I did what I felt
was right.”
523
 114

(B)

Extraordinary Altruism
Wesley Autrey jumped on the New York subway tracks to
save a fallen man in the face of an oncoming train. He is
pictured here (A) with his children and (B) at President
(A)
Bush’s State of the Union address.

Altruism
Reports of people risking their lives for strangers in need, as Autrey did, are not
rare. Even during the unspeakable violence of the Rwandan genocide, discussed
in Chapter 13, individuals engaged in inspiring acts of concern for others. Paul
Rusesabagina, a Hutu, was the acting manager of the Mille Collines, the most
prestigious hotel in the capital city of Kigali. As the massacres unfolded, he hid
over a thousand people (both Tutsis and moderate Hutus) at the hotel. Each day,
the Hutu interahamwe (militia) would arrive and demand to take some of the
Tutsis away. And each day Rusesabagina would plead and ply them with beer
and money to prevent further massacres. Around the clock he frantically called
and faxed influential contacts, appealing for their help. Often risking his own
life and those of his children and wife, he pleaded and schemed tirelessly for the
survival of his guests.
Autrey’s and Rusesabagina’s actions are clear examples of ­altruism —​­unselfish
Altruism in Rwanda
behavior that benefits others without regard to consequences for oneself. Humans
Paul Rusesabagina, acting manager of are prone to feelings of compassion that lead us to behave in ways that benefit
the Mille Collines Hotel in Kigali, Rwanda, others who are suffering, often at a cost to ourselves. At the same time, we don’t
saved over a thousand people from mas- always act on such prosocial feelings. Many forces can inhibit altruistic action,
sacre by sheltering them at the hotel,
including basic tendencies toward ­self-​­preservation and fear of embarrassment
bribing the local militia, and appealing to
influential contacts. (like misinterpreting a mundane situation as an emergency). When do we act
altruistically, and when don’t we?

Empathic Concern: A Case of Pure Altruism?

During the Los Angeles riots of 1992, Reginald Denny, a white truck driver,
was being beaten severely by four black youths. Several black residents who lived
altruism Unselfish behavior that
near the area saw the beating live on television and rushed to the scene to save
benefits others without regard to Denny’s life, risking their own lives in the process. What motivates this kind of
consequences for oneself. action?

524 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

 115

(A) (B)

Compassion from Strangers

Strangers will often respond to an individual’s distress and offer aid without thought of danger or reward. (A) During the riots in Los Angeles in 1992, Reginald
Denny was pulled from his truck and severely beaten. (B) Upon seeing the incident on TV, Bobby Green (pictured here) and several other local residents
rushed to the scene to rescue Denny.

In an important line of research, Daniel Batson has made a persuasive case “[Sympathy] will have
for a selfless, o­ ther-​­oriented state that motivates altruistic behavior like that dis- increased through natural
played by Autrey, Rusesabagina, and Denny’s saviors (Batson & Shaw, 1991). selection; for those communi−
Batson begins by proposing that in any altruistic action, several motives are ties which included the greatest
likely to be in play. Two of these motives are essentially selfish (egoistic); a third number of the most sympa−
is more purely oriented toward unselfishly benefiting another person. thetic members, would flourish
The first selfish motive is social ­reward —being esteemed and valued by oth- best, and rear the greatest
ers, in the form of praise, an award, or acknowledgement in the mass media number of offspring.”
or social media, such as Facebook and Instagram. Those motivated by social —charles darwin, the descent
of man (1871)
rewards act altruistically to enjoy the positive regard of others (Campbell, 1975;
Nowak, Page, & Sigmund, 2000). Recent neuroscientific studies find that being
esteemed by others activates circuits in the brain associated with rewards and
personal safety (Inagaki & Eisenberger, 2013). In fact, social rewards can be so
potent that they can trigger arms races of altruism, referred to as competitive
altruism (Hardy & van Vugt, 2006). People will try to outdo one another in
their altruistic acts, all in the service of being the most highly esteemed. For
example, in many ­hunter-​­gatherer cultures, it’s the individual who gives away the
most ­food—​­seal meat among the Inuit of Alaska, yams in h ­ unter-​­gatherer tribes
in New G ­ uinea—who enjoys the greatest status. In laboratory studies, group
members will give greater social status to other group members who act altruisti-
cally (Hardy & van Vugt, 2006; Nowak & Sigmund, 2005). Social rewards are
a powerful motive for altruism, but an egoistic one. social reward A benefit, such as
praise, positive attention, something
A second selfish motive for helping is personal distress; people are motivated
tangible, or gratitude, that may be gained
to help others in need in order to reduce their own distress (Cialdini & Fultz, from helping others, and serves a motive
1990; Cialdini & Kenrick, 1976). This behavior starts very early in life. In one for altruistic behavior.
study, for instance, newborn infants heard a tape recording of their own crying, personal distress A motive for
the crying of another d ­ ay-​­old, or the crying of an 11-­month-​­old (Martin & Clark, helping others in distress that may arise
1982). The newborns cried the most in response to the cries of another newborn. from a need to reduce one’s own distress.

Altruism  525
 116

Later in life, too, when we see someone crying, experiencing

physical pain, or stuck in an embarrassing situation, we usually
experience our own feelings of personal distress. Neuroscien-
tific studies find that when we watch someone else experience
pain, the pain regions of the brain are activated (Singer et al.,
2004). The resulting feelings lead us to act in ways that return
us to a more peaceful state. The most direct way to alleviate
our own personal distress is to reduce the distress of the other
person, and helping behavior is one way to do it.
The third motive is empathic concern, the feeling people
experience when identifying with someone in need, accompa-
nied by the intention to enhance the other person’s welfare.
When we encounter somebody else in need or in pain, we not
only experience our own feelings of distress but also imagine
Empathy among Newborns what that person must be experiencing. Taking the other’s perspective in this way
When newborn babies hear another results in an empathic state of concern, which motivates us to help that person
newborn cry, they feel the distress of the address the needs and thus enhance his or her welfare, even at our own expense.
other baby and will also begin to cry, as
seen in this photo of infants in a hospital
According to Batson’s reasoning, this experience of empathic concern is fast
nursery. and intuitive and produces a selfless or ­other-​­oriented altruism. It is the ­split-​
­second feeling that led Autrey to help the young student on the subway tracks,
empathic concern Identifying with and caused Rusesabagina to risk his life and the lives of his family to help the
someone in need, including feeling
Tutsis. One recent study examined the reasons extreme altruists gave for why they
and understanding what that person
is experiencing, accompanied by the risked their own lives to save others (Rand & Epstein, 2014). Most typically,
intention to help the person. they referred to an automatic, ­emotion-​­like impulse to help others in explaining
their l­ife-​­imperiling acts of altruism.

Empathy vs. Personal Distress Now comes the tricky part: How can research-
ers document that altruistic action can be motivated by empathic concern alone,
independent of the desire for social rewards or to reduce personal distress? Daniel
Batson and his colleagues have carried out studies in which participants encoun-
ter another person in distress for whom they feel empathic concern (Batson &
Shaw, 1991). At the same time, egoistic motives are manipulated to make helping
behavior less likely. Participants might be allowed to reduce their personal dis-
tress without helping. Or in the experiment there may be no social rewards for
helping, which should reduce the likelihood of altruistic action. If participants
still help in these circumstances, it’s highly likely there’s an ­empathy-​­based form
of helping that’s not selfishly motivated.
An initial study pitted empathic concern against the selfish motive of reduc-
ing personal distress by allowing participants to simply leave the experiment
(Batson, O’Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983). Participants were told they’d
interact with another participant of the same sex, who would complete several
trials of a ­digit-​­recall task and receive a shock after each mistake. In the ­easy-​
e­ scape condition, the participant had to watch the confederate receive only two
of the ten shocks, and was then free to leave the experiment while the confed-
erate finished the study. In the ­difficult-​­to-​­escape condition, the participant was
told it would be necessary to watch the other person take all ten shocks.
After the first two trials, the confederate, made up to look a little pale, asked
for a glass of water, mentioned feelings of discomfort, and recounted a traumatic
shock experience from childhood. At this point, participants reported on their
current feelings, which were used to divide participants into those who were

526 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

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feeling egoistic distress and those who were feeling empathic concern.
The experimenter then turned to the participant to ask whether he or she
would be willing to take some of the confederate’s shocks. If there is such
a thing as altruism based on empathic concern, the researchers reasoned,
then they should see substantial levels of altruism (agreeing to sit in for
the confederate) on the part of participants who felt empathic concern
for the confederate, even when they could simply leave the experiment
and escape their empathic distress. In keeping with this reasoning, those
participants who mostly felt distress and could escape the situation took
few shocks on behalf of the confederate. Those participants who felt
empathic concern, however, volunteered to take more shocks, even when
they could simply leave the study.
Those still skeptical about the idea of pure altruism based on empathic
concern might have a few reservations about this first study. First of all,
empathic concern was not manipulated; instead, Batson and his col-
leagues identified empathic participants according to their s­elf-​­reports.
Perhaps there was a selection bias in this s­ tudy—​­that is, the h
­ igh-​­empathy
participants might just be more helpful in general for reasons other than
a selfless response to the confederate in need. Second, the experimenter
knew how the participant acted, so a social rewards account of this study
cannot be ruled out. Perhaps participants who took more shocks on
Altruism in Animals and
behalf of the confederate hoped to impress the experimenter, or wanted to avoid
Humans
embarrassing themselves by leaving a person in obvious need. It would be much Taking care of others is seen in many non-
more telling to show that there are substantial rates of helping when doing so is human species, such as these elephants
completely anonymous. That notion motivated Batson’s next study. helping a younger elephant.

Anonymous Altruism In this study, Batson and his colleagues had female par-
ticipants interact with another person, a communicator, seated in another cubicle
(Fultz, Batson, Fortenbach, McCarthy, & Varney, 1986). The communicator, a
student confederate who called herself Janet Arnold, wrote two notes to the par-
ticipant, expressing supposedly honest information about herself. The task of the
listener (the actual participant) was to form as accurate an impression of Janet
as possible. This time, empathic concern was manipulated. In the ­low-​­empathy
condition, the participant was told to be as objective as possible when reading the
notes, to concentrate on the facts at hand. In the ­high-​­empathy condition, the
participant was told to imagine as vividly as possible how the c­ ommunicator—​
­the other ­person—​­felt. In the first note to the participant, Janet confessed to
feeling out of place at her new home at the university. In the second note, Janet
expressed a strong need for a friend, and asked the participant if she’d like to
hang out a bit.
After receiving the second note, the participant was told Janet had finished
and left the study. The experimenter then gave the participant a form that
described another “­long-​­term relationship study” and asked whether the par-
ticipant would like to spend time at some later date with Janet Arnold. In the
­low-​­social-​­evaluation condition, Janet’s notes were delivered in sealed envelopes,
and the experimenter did not read them. Similarly, the participant indicated
how much time she would spend with Janet on a form enclosed in a sealed
envelope to be sent to the professor conducting the study (who was never to
meet the participant). Neither the experimenter nor Janet would know of the
participant’s response. In contrast, in the h ­ igh-​­social-​­evaluation condition, both

Altruism  527
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Hours participant the experimenter and the participant read Janet’s notes, and Janet and the
would spend
with Janet
experimenter would know how much time the participant said she would
be willing to spend with Janet. The critical dependent measure was the
3.0
number of hours the participant volunteered to spend with Janet. As Fig-
Low empathy
2.5 ure 14.1 shows, participants in the h
­ igh-​­empathy condition volunteered to
High empathy
spend more time with her, even when no one would know of their action.
2.0

1.5
Physiological Indicators of Empathy One final study is especially help-
ful in assessing whether, as Batson supposes, some kind of selfless state
1.0 motivates altruistic behavior. Strong evidence for such a motive would
0.5 be a demonstration that empathic concern is associated with a distinct
physiological pattern that predicts whether a person will act altruistically.
0.0 To study this question, Nancy Eisenberg and her colleagues showed
Low social High social
evaluation evaluation a videotape of a woman and her children who had recently been in an
accident to ­second-​­graders, ­fifth-​­graders, and college students (Eisenberg
Figure 14.1
Empathy and Altruism
et al., 1989). The children in the video missed school while they recovered
This study showed that when participants empa- from their injuries in the hospital. As the participants watched this mov-
thize with someone who is in need, they engage in ing story, their facial expressions were recorded and continuous measures
more altruistic action, even when their sacrifice is of heart rate were taken. After watching the video, the participants had
anonymous.
the chance to help by taking homework to the recovering children during
SOURCE: Adapted from Fultz et al., 1986. their recess (and thus sacrificing their own playtime). The researchers
found that both the facial expressions of the participant children and college
students who felt sympathy for the accident victims (or empathic concern, in
Batson’s terms) had eyebrows pulled in and upward and a concerned gaze, as well
as heart rate ­deceleration—​­a physiological response the opposite of the acceler-
ated heart rate associated with a ­fight-​­or-​­flight response. These participants were
also more likely to help. In contrast, participants who reported distress while
watching the video had a pained wince in the face and heart rate acceleration,
and they were less likely to help. Thus, empathic concern produces more helping
behavior than distress; it also appears to do so in part through a different pattern
of physiological responses.
Empathic Concern and Volunteerism Batson’s research shows that feelings
of empathic concern and sympathy increase the likelihood that people will act
altruistically, helping those who suffer. These feelings also appear to be a primary
determinant of other prosocial behaviors. For example, Allen Omoto and Mark
Snyder have studied volunteerism, which they define as nonmonetary assistance;
“I have shewed you all things, people help out with no expectation of receiving any compensation (Omoto &
how that so labouring ye ought Snyder, 1995; Penner, Dovidio, Piliavin, & Schroeder, 2005). In the United
to support the weak, and to States, estimates indicate that over 61 million ­people—​­close to 30 percent of
remember the words of the the ­population—​­volunteer, providing companionship to older adults, mentor-
Lord Jesus, how he said, It is ing troubled children, feeding those in poverty, or assisting the sick and dying
more blessed to give than to (Omoto, Malsch, & Barraza, 2009). As with altruism, volunteerism has many
receive.” motives, including a desire for social rewards and a desire to reduce personal
—acts 20:35 distress. But Omoto and his colleagues have found that ­self-​­reports of feelings of
empathic concern also predict the likelihood that an individual will engage in
volunteerism (Omoto et al., 2009).
Recent evidence suggests that volunteering is good for your health. Stephanie
volunteerism Assistance a person
regularly provides to another person
Brown and her colleagues studied a sample of 423 elderly married couples over
or group with no expectation of the course of 5 years and found that volunteerism increases longevity (Brown,
compensation. Nesse, Vinokur, & Smith, 2003). At the beginning of the study, the researchers

528 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

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BOX 14.1 FOCUS ON HUMAN NATURE

Are We Wired to Care and Share?

Batson’s studies of empathic concern Waal, 1996). They also regularly share the toddler saw an adult try to open
were some of the first to document food with ­non-​­kin in their community, a closed doors of a cabinet, again unsuc-
with scientific precision that humans basic form of altruistic action (de Waal cessfully. In each situation, the toddler
may act altruistically, guided by a more & Lanting, 1997). could readily offer assistance. In the
selfless motivational ­state—​­in his ter- If a selfless form of altruism is part control conditions, the 18-­month-​­
minology, empathic concern. Since this of our evolutionary heritage, we might olds encountered the same ­stimuli—​­a
important line of research, social psy- also expect to observe it in young chil- dropped pen or doors that couldn’t be
chologists have made several discover- dren, much as children reliably show ­opened—​­but the adult nearby did not
ies that further suggest we are wired other ­species-​­defining tendencies, express any need associated with the
to care and share (Keltner, Kogan, Piff, such as the fear of strangers, the abil- stimulus. Impressively, across these
& Saturn, 2014). One kind of evidence ity to learn language, and theory of types of situations, 40–60 percent of
comes from our primate relatives. If mind. Work by Felix Warneken and the children helped the adult strang-
empathic concern is a basic motive Michael Tomasello provides impres- ers in need, but they did not engage in
for human action, then we might sive evidence of the altruistic tenden- the helpful actions in the control con-
expect other primates to show rudi- cies of young children (Warneken & ditions. These findings suggest that
mentary forms of altruistic behavior. Tomasello, 2006). In this research, beginning quite early in development,
Indeed, observations of chimpanzees 18-­month-​­olds encountered adults in children will respond altruistically to
and bonobos find that they do occa- need. For example, in one situation, others in need, thus providing still
sionally provide care to those in need, the toddler saw an adult drop a pen more evidence that we are wired to
such as fellow primates that have lost and attempt, unsuccessfully, to pick it care and share.
their eyesight or who are crippled (de up from the floor. In another situation,

assessed the degree to which each partner offered help to other people, by doing
errands, shopping, or providing childcare for neighbors. The participants also
indicated how often they received this kind of help from
people other than their spouses, to capture how much
they were the beneficiaries of volunteerism. Following
the participants over the course of 5 years, the research-
ers kept track of who died (as 145 of them did during
the study). Remarkably, people who gave more to others
were less likely to die during the 5 years of the study,
when controlling for the participant’s initial health, gen-
der, and social contacts. And how about the recipients of
help? They were no less likely to die than people who did
not receive help. It may indeed be better to give than to
receive.
What cultivates empathic concern in people? What
produces the Wesley Autreys and Paul Rusesabaginas of
the world, or the g­ ood-​­hearted citizens who make sac-
rifices and volunteer for others? One answer comes from the remarkable work Volunteering and Better
of the Oliners, who interviewed over 100 rescuers from World War II, individ- Health
Volunteering takes many forms, includ-
uals who risked their lives to save Jews during the Nazi Holocaust (Oliner & ing serving food to the homeless in
Oliner, 1988). (Samuel Oliner himself was saved by such a person in Poland as soup kitchens, which can contribute to
a young boy.) In the course of these interviews, rescuers reported that altruism ­improving the volunteer’s health.

Altruism  529
 120

and compassion were highly valued in their homes. Rescuers reported that their
parents and grandparents frequently told stories from their own lives and from
their culture in which altruism was a theme. Altruism was a central theme in
the books the family read and the teachings they discussed. In their d­ innertime
conversations about the events of the day, they discussed things through the lens
of altruism and concern for other people. Altruism was explicitly invoked as an
important ethical principle. Empathic concern apparently is a powerful force for
good in human societies, and can be passed from parents to children.

Situational Determinants of Altruism

People don’t always act on the basis of their empathic impulses. Consider the
horrifying tragedy that befell Kitty Genovese on March 13, 1964, when Winston
Moseley stalked her as she walked home in Queens, New York. He attacked her
near her apartment and stabbed her in the chest. As she screamed for help, lights
went on and several windows opened in the surrounding apartments. From his
­seventh-​­floor window, one neighbor yelled, “Let that girl alone!” Moseley left
but returned soon, stalking his screaming victim to a stairwell in her building,
then stabbed her eight more times and raped her. New York police got a call 30
minutes after the cries of distress first awakened neighbors. By the time they
arrived, Kitty Genovese was beyond help. Th ­ irty-​­eight neighbors admitted to
hearing screams, and many must have felt the pangs of empathic concern. But no
one intervened aside from the neighbor who yelled from afar. Not a single ­person
intervened. Instead, investigators heard explanations such as “I was tired”; “We
thought it was a lover’s quarrel”; “We were afraid.” One couple watched the
assault from behind curtains in their dimly lit apartment.
The Genovese incident shocked the American public. Like Milgram’s studies
of obedience to authority (see Chapters 1, 5, and 9), the episode also raises fun-
damental questions about human nature. Are we really that indifferent to the
suffering of others? The research findings on empathic concern, altruism, and
volunteerism suggest not. Kitty Genovese’s murder moved several social psy-
chologists to attempt to understand the processes that dampen our empathic
concern, inhibit altruistic action, and make people reluctant to intervene during
emergencies.
Darley and Batson’s Good Samaritan Study No research better reveals the
powerful situational determinants of altruism than a classic study by John Dar-
ley and Daniel Batson from 1973 (discussed briefly in Chapter 1). Their study
was modeled on the timeless tale of the Good Samaritan, which concerns dif-
ferent reactions to a man who has been robbed, stripped, and left in a ditch. In
the Bible story, a busy priest first walks by. Despite being a religious leader and
supposedly concerned with those in need, he fails to stop and help the man.
Next a Levite, another religious functionary, arrives and also avoids the man.
Finally, a resident of Samaria, a member of a group that followed different reli-
Failing to Intervene in an gious customs and was despised by mainstream society, sees the h ­ alf-​­dead man.
Emergency The Samaritan stops, helps the man, takes him to an inn, and provides money
Kitty Genovese was a young woman who for clothes and food to restore his strength. Darley and Batson’s study, inspired
was stalked and killed at her apartment
in Queens, New York, as her neighbors
by the Good Samaritan parable, makes an even better story than the classic tale
watched from their windows and failed to itself. The lesson is that subtle situational factors, such as whether you’re on time
intervene. or late, powerfully determine whether you’ll help someone in need.

530 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

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The researchers had students attending Princeton Theological Seminary give a bystander intervention Assistance
given by a witness to someone in need.
talk to undergraduates at another location on the Princeton campus (Darley & Bat-
son, 1973). In one condition, the seminary students were told the topic would be the diffusion of responsibility A
jobs that seminary students typically find upon graduating. In a second condition, reduction of the sense of urgency to
help someone involved in an emergency
the topic would be the tale of the Good Samaritan. The experimenter than gave par- or dangerous situation, based on the
ticipants a map of the campus and showed them where they’d give their talk. In one assumption that others who are present
condition, the ­no-​­hurry condition, participants were told they had plenty of time to will help.
get to the designated room. In the m ­ oderate-​­hurry condition, the students would
have to hustle to be on time. In the h­ igh-​­hurry condition, the seminarians were told
they were already a bit late for the students waiting to hear their words of wisdom.
As the seminarians crossed the Princeton campus, their path led them past
a man (actually a confederate) who was slumped over and groaning in a pas-
sageway. When the students got within earshot, the man complained that he
was having trouble breathing. The man was visibly and audibly in distress. The
question was: What proportion of seminary students in the various conditions
would stop to help the man?
The topic of the talk had no statistically significant effect on the seminary stu-
dents’ likelihood of helping the man in distress. The largest effect was produced
by the most subtle of variables: whether or not the students were late. Those who
were not in a hurry were more than six times as likely to stop and attend to the
suffering man as those who were in a hurry to give a talk. Only 10 percent of the
students in the h­ igh-​­hurry condition stopped to help (see Figure 1.1 in Chapter 1).
Like so many of the classic studies in social psychology, this one offers lasting
lessons about how powerful situations can be. Being late made it unlikely that
the very people expected to exhibit a­ ltruism—​­students studying to be spiritual
­leaders—​­would do so. The study itself has many compelling features: the use of
seminary students as participants, the naturalistic setting, the assessment of real
behavior as the dependent measure. Let’s now look at other kinds of situational
determinants of altruistic behavior.

The Presence of Other People One important factor that influences whether
people will stop to offer help to others in need is the presence of other ­people.
Bystander intervention refers to helping someone when people are witness to an
emergency. Researchers who have studied this behavior
have found that ­people are less likely to help when other
people are around (Latané & Nida, 1981). In part, the
presence of other bystanders at emergencies reduces the
likelihood of helping because of a diffusion of respon-
sibility; knowing others have seen the situation, each
bystander tends to assume they will intervene, indeed
may be better positioned to intervene, and thus each per-
son feels less responsibility for helping out. The witnesses
of the Genovese murder may have seen other apartment
dwellers’ lights go on, or might have seen others in the
windows, thereby assuming someone else would help.
The end result is a disturbing lack of action.
One of the ­best-​­known studies on the effect of other people’s presence on Diffused Responsibility
Humans often fail to help someone in
altruistic behavior was inspired by the Genovese tragedy (Darley & Latané, obvious need, because they may not
1968). College students sat in separate cubicles discussing the problems asso- interpret the situation as an emergency
ciated with living in an urban environment. They engaged in this conversation or assume others will help.

Altruism  531
 122

over an intercom system, which allowed only one participant to talk at a time.
One of them, a confederate (one of the authors of this book, as it happens),
described his difficulties in adjusting to urban life and mentioned he had prob-
lems with seizures from time to time, especially when under stress. Then, after
everyone else had spoken, the confederate took his second turn. As he did so, he
became increasingly loud and incoherent; he choked and gasped. Before falling
silent, he uttered the following words:

If someone could help me out it would it would er er s­ -​­s-​­sure be sure be good . . . ​because
er there er er a cause I er I uh I’ve got a a one of the er s­ ei-​­er-​­er things coming on and and
and I could really er use some help so if somebody would er give me a little ­h-​­help uh ­er-​­er-​
e­ r-​­er-​­er ­c-​­could somebody er er help er uh uh uh (choking sounds) . . . ​I’m gonna die er er
I’m gonna die er help er er seizure er (chokes, then quiet). (Darley & Latané, 1968, p. 379)

In one condition, participants were led to believe that their discussion group
consisted of only two people (the participant and the victim). In another con-
dition, the conversation was among three people (the participant, the future
victim, and another person). And in a final condition, the audience was the larg-
est: the conversation apparently involved six people (the participant, the victim,
and four other people). The question, of course, was whether the other students
would leave their cubicles to help the victim, who was presumably suffering from
a potentially lethal epileptic seizure. The presence of others had a strong effect on
helping rates. ­Eighty-​­five percent of the participants who were in the ­t wo-​­person
condition, and hence the only witness of the victim’s seizure, left their cubicles
to help. In contrast, 62 percent of the participants who were in the ­three-​­person
condition and 31 percent of those in the s­ ix-​­person condition attempted to help
the victim.
Several types of studies have pursued this question: whether people are less
likely to help someone out when other people are around or when they are alone
(for a review, see Latané & Nida, 1981). In these studies, the participant might
witness a victim in danger, or someone passed out in the subway, or a theft
occurring in a store. Across these kinds of studies, 75 percent of people helped
when they were alone compared with 53 percent who helped when they were in
the presence of others.
These studies have focused on the presence of strangers. But what about the
presence of friends? Many ­real-​­world observations would suggest that the pres-
ence of friends might boost levels of altruism. For example, soldiers readily risk
their lives to save their combat buddies. Good friends in grade school often stand
up to bullies on the playground when their friends are nearby.
Mario Mikulincer and Phil Shaver have collected evidence suggesting that
the presence of friends may indeed increase altruistic action (Mikulincer, Shaver,
Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005). In their study, participants first completed a task
in which they judged whether ten strings of letters made up actual words. In
the midst of this task, they were shown the name of a casual acquaintance or
another person, usually a friend, to whom they felt strongly attached. In the
third condition, the investigators reasoned, the prosocial tendencies associated
with a sense of a secure attachment should be activated by viewing the name of
a close friend (see Chapter 10). Participants then moved on to “another study”
in which they evaluated another participant, actually a confederate, who had to
complete a sequence of upsetting tasks. They watched the confederate look over

532 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

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BOX 14.2 FOCUS ON DAILY LIFE

The Likelihood of Being Helped

A typical bystander is less likely to two bystanders, each of them with a (probability of receiving help = 1  .695
help in an emergency situation if other 62-­percent chance of intervening, the = .85).
bystanders are around. But what are victim would have received help 86 per- Does this mean it doesn’t matter
the chances of someone receiving help cent of the ­ time—​­virtually identical whether there are many or few peo-
from any of the bystanders? When to the rate of receiving help with one ple around? Not so fast. These studies
there are more bystanders, there are bystander (probability of receiving help have also measured how quickly people
more people who might help. Consider = 1  .382 = .86). When participants come to the aid of someone in distress,
the “seizure” study described in this thought there were four other people and they have consistently found that
chapter. When participants thought who might render assistance, they inter- single bystanders act more quickly than
they were alone, they helped 85 per- vened 31 percent of the time. Again, the quickest person to react in a group
cent of the time. When they thought had there really been five bystanders, of bystanders. And when somebody’s
there was one other person who each of them with a 31-percent chance in an emergency situation, a lack of
might help, they intervened 62 percent of intervening, the victim would have speed can be deadly.
of the time. If there really had been received help 85 percent of the time

gory photos, hold a rat, hold her arm in ­near-​­freezing water, and finally handle a
large, hairy tarantula. In the middle of this last task, the confederate gave up and
asked whether a participant might be able to take over. Those participants who
had seen their close friend’s name felt more empathic concern for the confederate
than the ones who saw the other names. They were also more likely to volun-
teer to hold the spider. Whereas groups of strangers appear to inhibit altruistic
responses to emergencies, friends can evoke our nobler tendencies.
Victim Characteristics Needless to say, altruism is not blind, nor is it indis-
criminate. People are most likely to help when the harm to the victim is clear
and the need is unambiguous (Clark & Word, 1972; Gaertner & Dovidio,
1977). Researchers have studied altruistic intervention when a person in need
either screams or remains silent. Bystanders help victims who scream and make
their needs known 75–100 percent of the time, but they help silent victims only
20–40 percent of the time.
That said, one powerful determinant of helping is whether anything about the
victim suggests it might be costly to render assistance. The greater the costs asso-
ciated with helping, the less inclined people are to act altruistically. In one study
on this theme, carried out on a subway train, a “victim” (actually a confederate)
staggered across the car, collapsed to the floor, and then stared up at the ceiling
(Piliavin & Piliavin, 1972). In one condition, a trickle of blood flowed from the
victim’s chin. In the other condition, there was no blood. When the victim was
bleeding and the associated costs of helping were high, he received help 65 per-
cent of the time; when he was not bleeding, he received help 95 percent of the
time. Even though the bleeding victim’s need was more apparent, the perceived
costs of helping inhibited altruistic intervention.
More enduring characteristics of the victim also influence rates of helping.
For example, people are more likely to help similar others (Dovidio, 1984;
­Dovidio & Gaertner, 1981), including those from their own racial or ethnic group

Altruism  533
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(Latané & Nida, 1981). In recent work by Joan Chiao and her colleagues,
­A frican-​­Americans responded with greater empathy and more altruistic
inclinations when viewing the suffering of ­A frican-​­Americans as opposed
to E­ uropean-​­Americans. Only the suffering of participants’ own group
members activated a brain region (the medial prefrontal cortex) that is
involved in empathic response (Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2011).
Other species appear to respond altruistically only to their own group
as well. Several nonhuman primates will give up the opportunity to eat
and partially starve themselves if their action will terminate a shock that
is being administered to a member of their own ­species—​­something they
will not do for members of other species (Preston & de Waal, 2002).

Construal Processes and Altruism

What would go through your mind if you encountered a person slumped
over in a hallway while on your way to a talk, or if you witnessed some-
one passing out on the subway? What is it about being late, or hearing
Cross-​­Species Helping obvious cries of distress, or being in the presence of others that influences our
Altruism between different species inclination to help? In other words, what are the construal processes that influ-
occurs with surprising frequency. This ence whether we help or not?
Rhodesian ridgeback adopted a tiny piglet
In everyday life, many instances of distress are surprisingly ambiguous. A
when it was rejected by its mother, and
went so far as to feed it with milk from loud apparent dispute between a man and a woman overheard on the street
her own body. might be careening toward violence and require intervention. But perhaps it’s a
­non-​­threatening lovers’ spat, or just two thespians acting out a dramatic scene
from a play. A group of adolescent boys may be pummeling a smaller b­ oy—​­or
perhaps they’re just playfully wrestling.
Helping in Ambiguous Situations Given the ambiguity of
many emergencies, the decision to offer help means the poten-
tial helper first has to believe assistance is actually needed, based
on clues from the victim’s behavior. As discussed earlier, when
people in need vocalize their distress with loud cries, they are
much more likely to be helped (Clark & Word, 1972; Schroeder,
Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 1995). Similarly, another study
found that people are more likely to provide assistance when
they are vividly aware of the events that led to the victim’s dis-
tress (Piliavin, Piliavin, & Broll, 1976). In the study, participants
saw a confederate who was unconscious. In the more vivid con-
dition, participants saw the confederate faint and slowly regain
consciousness. In the less vivid condition, the participant saw
only the aftermath of the i­ ncident—​­a confederate just regaining
consciousness. Participants were much more likely to come to
the individual’s aid (89 percent versus 13 percent) when they
Pluralistic Ignorance
If someone’s in trouble, bystanders may
saw the entire drama unfold, so that they could understand the full nature of
do nothing if they aren’t sure what is the problem.
happening and don’t see anyone else The surrounding social context also influences whether bystanders will think
responding. This crowd of children may help is needed. A form of pluralistic ignorance occurs when people are unsure
collectively conclude the boys are just
about what is happening and assume nothing is wrong because no one else is
playing, when bullying might be taking
place, given the ambiguous responses of responding or appears concerned (see Chapter 4). Staying calm and collected
other kids. in public, especially during emergencies, is dictated by established social norms.

534 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

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It’s embarrassing, after all, to be the one who loses composure when there is no
actual danger. When everyone in a potentially dangerous situation behaves as if
nothing is wrong, each person will tend to mistake the others’ calm demeanor as
a sign that there’s no emergency (Latané & Darley, 1968).
In one study that examined the role of pluralistic ignorance in bystander
intervention, researchers asked participants to fill out a stack of questionnaires
(Latané & Darley, 1968). There were three conditions: alone, in a room with two
passive confederates exhibiting the calm demeanor intended to produce plural-
istic ignorance, or with two other genuine participants. As participants in these
three conditions completed their questionnaires smoke started to filter in from
beneath a door, filling the room. When participants were alone and had no
input from other participants as to what was happening, 75 percent of them left
the room and reported the smoke to the experimenter. (What could the other
25 percent of the participants have been thinking?) In the two other condi-
tions, pluralistic ignorance took hold, and participants were less likely to assume
that something was amiss. With three real participants, only 38 percent of the
participants left to report the smoke. And remarkably, with two
passive confederates showing no signs of concern, only 10 percent
reported the smoke to the experimenter.
Anecdotal evidence from this study suggests that participants
construed the smoke differently in the three conditions. Partici-
pants who did not report the smoke to the experimenter consis-
tently told the experimenter they didn’t believe it was dangerous.
One participant ventured the hypothesis that it was truth gas!
The students who did report the smoke construed it as a sign of
imminent danger.

Combating Pluralistic Ignorance Bystanders are less likely to

fall prey to pluralistic ignorance when they can clearly see one
another’s initial expressions of concern (and before their initial “I said, ‘I’m not on duty! I just came back to get my
expressions are covered up out of the desire to seem less alarmed). ­flip-​­flops.’”
This hypothesis was tested in a study in which participants were led through a
­construction-​­filled hallway to a lab (Darley, Teger, & Lewis, 1973). Along the
way, they passed several stacks of wooden frames used in construction and a
workman (actually a confederate) doing repairs. Once in the lab room, the par-
ticipants began the ostensible task of the experiment: doing their best drawing of
a model horse. Darley and his colleagues varied the degree to which participants
would be able to see others’ nonverbal expressions, those reliable signals of con-
cern about a possible emergency. In the control condition, the participant was
alone. In another condition, two participants were seated facing each other as
they drew the model horse, and could see each other’s immediate, spontaneous
expressions of emotion when the emergency occurred. In a final condition, par-
ticipants were seated ­back-​­to-​­back. Here they had no visual access to each other’s
immediate reactions.
As the participants labored over their drawings, they suddenly heard a loud
crash and the workman crying out in obvious pain, “Oh, my leg!” The results
of this study make it clear that seeing others’ spontaneous emotional expres-
sions reduces the effects of pluralistic ignorance: 90 percent of those who were
alone left the room to help the workman; 80 percent of those who were seated
­face-​­to-​­face did so as well. But only 20 percent of the participants who were

Altruism  535
 126

seated ­back-​­to-​­back left to help. Not having others’ initial, unguarded reactions
to help interpret the incident as a true emergency, these participants collectively
assumed nothing was wrong.
How do you improve the chances of getting help when you need it? Accord-
ing to Darley, who studied the factors affecting bystander intervention for
more than a decade, two things are likely to be effective: (1) make your need
­clear—“I’ve twisted my ankle and I can’t walk; I need help”; and (2) select a
specific ­person—“You there, can you help me?” By doing so, you overcome the
two greatest obstacles to intervention: you prevent people from concluding there
is no real emergency (thereby eliminating the effect of pluralistic ignorance), and
you prevent them from thinking someone else will help (thereby overcoming
diffusion of responsibility).

Culture and Altruism

Suppose it’s late at night, and you need assistance. Where do you think you’d be
more likely to get help: in a large metropolis or a small rural town? In a poor or a
rich neighborhood? Near a church, or far away from a place of worship? Each of
these questions involves the influence of different kinds of c­ ulture—​­geographical
region, social class, and ­religiousness—​­on altruism. The prevalence of altruistic
behavior varies in dramatic and sometimes surprising ways with these types of
cultural influences.
Altruism in Urban and Rural Settings All across the world, people are moving
out of small villages in the country to large cities. And recent studies suggest
that the communities they are leaving behind might be kinder and more altru-
istic. Survey research indicates that people in rural areas report higher levels
of empathic concern (Smith, 2009). Does that translate to different levels of
altruistic behavior? To investigate this question, Nancy Steblay (1987) reviewed
35 studies that permitted comparisons of helping rates in rural and urban envi-
ronments. She looked at the helping rates in communities of different sizes,
ranging from fewer than 1,000 to more than 1 million. In all, 17 opportunities
to offer assistance were created experimentally, typically in naturalistic settings.
Researchers examined whether people would grant simple requests (such as giv-
ing the time of day), whether they would intervene to stop a crime, and whether
they would help people in need (an injured pedestrian, for instance).
Steblay’s analysis showed that strangers are significantly more likely to be
helped in rural communities than in urban areas (Figure 14.2). The effect of pop-
ulation size was particularly pronounced in towns with populations between
1,000 and 50,000. Thus, you’re much more likely to be helped in a town of 1,000
than 5,000; in a town of 5,000 than 10,000; and so on. Once the population rises
above 50,000, however, there is little effect of increasing population.
Let’s examine this finding a bit. You might ask which matters most: a person’s
current context or the context in which the person was brought up. For exam-
ple, if you were brought up in a small rural town but currently live in a big city,
which setting is more likely to influence whether you will help someone in need?
The current situation ­wins—​­hands down. In analyzing the 35 studies, Steblay
found that the participant’s current context, rural or urban, was a much stron-
ger predictor of helping behavior than the person’s rural or urban background
(Steblay, 1987). This finding is another nod to the power of the current situation.

536 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

 127
Percentage of
participants People are more likely to engage in a variety of
who respond helpful acts in rural as opposed to urban settings.

90
Urban
80
Rural
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Figure 14.2
0 Altruism in Rural and Urban
Correct Help injured Help lost Tell your Give
overpayment pedestrian child name donation Environments
People in rural communities are more
involved in helping others than people in
SOURCE: Adapted from Steblay, 1987. urban settings.

What accounts for this r­ural-​­urban difference in helping rates? Researchers

have offered four explanations. Milgram (1970) attributed it to stimulus over-
load. The amount of stimulation in modern urban environments is so great that
no one can register all of it. As you walk down a city street, for example, the traf-
fic, the construction, the swarms of people are, in combination, too much to take
in fully. You narrow your focus, in terms of attention and what circumstances
you recognize as having a claim on your thoughts, feelings, and actions. There
are simply too many inputs, so you shut down a bit and are less likely to attend
to the needs of others and less likely to act altruistically.
A second explanation might be labeled the diversity hypothesis. Earlier we
noted that people are more likely to help others who are similar to themselves.
Urban areas, of course, are made up of more diverse populations. Thus, on aver-
age, you’re more likely to encounter someone similar to yourself in a rural envi-
ronment than in an urban environment. This may contribute to the observed
­urban-​­rural difference in helping rates. A third explanation is that more people
are generally around to help in urban areas than in more rural environments, so

(A) (B)

Helping in the Country

(A) People living in rural settings are more likely to help others than people in the city (B), as shown here in the different responses to people in need.

Altruism  537
 128

“Again I say to you, it is easier a diffusion of responsibility could discourage people from helping out in urban
for a camel to pass through the settings. Finally, it’s probable that in rural settings, people’s actions are more
eye of a needle, than for a rich likely to be observed by people who know them, and who can comment on their
man to enter the Kingdom of reputation to others. Later we’ll learn how powerful reputational concerns are as
God.” triggers of prosocial behavior.
—matthew 19:25
Social Class and Altruism In June 2010, Bill Gates of Microsoft and invest-
ment guru Warren Buffet launched the Giving Pledge, a campaign to encourage
the wealthiest people in the world to make a commitment to donate most of their
wealth to philanthropic causes. They asked that the richest people in the United
States give at least half of their wealth to charity. Buffet, a billionaire, pledged to
give away 99 percent of his fortune by the end of his life. More than 40 of Amer-
ica’s richest individuals soon followed suit, including Larry Ellison of Oracle and
Mark Zuckerburg and Sheryl Sandberg of Facebook. By some estimates, if the
wealthiest Americans honored the Giving Pledge, charities would receive some
$600 billion.
How does social class influence levels of altruism? Are the Gates and Buf-
fets and Sandbergs of the world the rule, or the exception to the rule? When
it comes to altruism, it turns out that those who have less give more, at least
in terms of the proportion of their income they donate to charity. Nationwide
surveys of charitable giving in America find that wealthy individuals give away
smaller proportions of their income to charity than people who are less ­well-​­off
(Greve, 2009). For example, a study by the organization Independent Sector
(2002) found that people making less than $25,000 per year gave away an aver-
age of 4.2 percent of their income, whereas those making over $100,000 per year
donated only 2.7 percent. It would seem that people like Gates and Buffet are
exceptions.
What investigators have learned about empathic concern and altruism sheds
light on why the poor may give more than the rich. Specifically, Michael Kraus,
Paul Piff, and their colleagues reason that a relative scarcity of resources leads
­lower-​­class individuals to be empathically attuned to others, and they build
strong relationships to help them adapt to their more unpredictable, taxing,
and sometimes threatening environments (Kraus, Piff, & Keltner, 2011). U ­ pper-​
­class people, by contrast, enjoy more abundant resources and opportunities that
enable them to be more independent. In keeping with this theorizing, ­lower-​­class
people prove to be more empathetic than ­upper-​­class people in a variety of ways
that assess empathy: they are better judges of the emotions of a stranger with
whom they’ve just interacted, they are better judges of a friend’s emotions, and
they are more accurate in their inferences about the emotions revealed in photo-
graphs (Kraus, Côté, & Keltner, 2010).
Given these social class differences in empathy, are l­ower-​­class people more
likely to act in a prosocial fashion? Indeed, Piff and his colleagues have found
that they are (Piff, Kraus, Côté, Cheng, & Keltner, 2010). In one study, for
example, people from different class backgrounds played the dictator game, an
economic game in which they received 10 points and were asked to give some
portion of those points to a stranger. The points participants had at the end of
the experiment determined their chances in a lottery conducted after all partic-
ipants had completed the study. On average, participants gave away 41 percent
of their points, and l­ower-​­class participants gave away more of their points to a
stranger than did members of the upper class.

538 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

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A second study tied the tendency for ­lower-​­class people to Task minutes Neutral
act more prosocially to their tendency to feel more empathic 13 Compassion

concern for strangers in need (Piff et al., 2010). Participants 12

were given the chance to help an obviously distressed confed- 11
erate who had arrived late for the experiment and therefore 10
needed the participant’s assistance to complete required tasks. 9
Before this opportunity to provide help, participants watched 8
7
either a neutral film clip (a relatively uninteresting scene from 6
the movie All the President’s Men) or a moving portrayal of Low social class High social class
the suffering of children living in poverty. Showing the film Figure 14.3
about poor children was intended to induce u ­ pper-​­class par- Social Class and Altruism
ticipants to feel the same level of empathic concern typical This study demonstrated that ­lower-​­class people help more than
of ­lower-​­class participants, which the investigators predicted ­upper-​­class people, except when both groups are made to feel
would lead them to help more. The findings supported these compassion.
predictions. Figure 14.3 shows the class difference in prosocial SOURCE: Piff et al., 2010.
behavior discussed earlier: after watching a neutral film clip,
­lower-​­class participants offered to do more of the other participant’s tasks than
­upper-​­class participants did. When ­upper-​­class people are made to feel compas-
sion, however, they respond in the same prosocial fashion as their l­ower-​­class
counterparts.
Religion, Ethics, and Altruism People throughout the world define themselves
in terms of ­religion—​­Muslims, Protestants, Methodists, Unitarians, Jews, Cath-
olics, Mormons, Buddhists, Hindus, Sikhs, and so on. Many others who don’t
have a religious affiliation are spiritual people who believe in forces that tran-
scend the physical laws of nature. Like social class, religion can shape almost
every facet of social life, ranging from moral beliefs to marriage partners.
The world’s major religions emphasize compassion, altruism, and treating
others, even strangers and adversaries, with kindness (Table 14.1). This conduct
is seen in such religious practices as tithing and tending to those who suffer,
and in moral codes such as the golden rule: treating others as we would like to
be treated ourselves. It’s demonstrated in the texts of the major religions, which

TABLE 14.1 THE GOLDEN RULE ACROSS CULTURES AND RELIGIONS

Matthew 7:12 “In everything, therefore, treat people the same way you want
them to treat you, for this is the Law and the Prophets.” (New
American Standard Bible, 1995)
Sextus the Pythagorean “What you wish your neighbors to be to you, you will also be
to them.”
Buddhism “Putting oneself in the place of another, one should not kill
nor cause another to kill.”
Tibetan Buddhism “If you want others to be happy, practice compassion. If you
want to be happy, practice compassion.” (Dalai Lama)
Hinduism “One should never do that to another which one regards as
injurious to one’s own self.” (Mahabharata)
Muhammad “Hurt no one so that no one may hurt you.”
Taoism “He is kind to the kind; he is also kind to the unkind.”

Altruism  539
 130
Proportion of encourage a prosocial stance toward others through fables
participants
making gift and t­ ime-​­honored passages. Admittedly, many of the world’s
to stranger religions include stories of taking revenge, putting people to
60 death for seemingly trivial offenses, and treating nonbeliev-
Give nothing
ers in cruel ways. Still, these troublesome elements aside, all
Give half
50 religions stress compassion and the need to treat o­ thers—​­at
least some ­others—​­well.
40 Does exposure to religious concepts make people more
prosocial? Research by Ara Norenzayan and Azim ­Shariff
30 addresses this question (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008;
­Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). In a first study, participants
20 were shown sequences of five words, randomly arranged,
and asked to generate sentences using four of those words. In
10 a religion prime condition, the five words always included at
least one word with religious meaning, such as spirit, divine,
0 God, sacred, and prophet. For example, in this condition
Religion prime Neutral prime
Content primed within sentence
participants would read “Felt she eradicate the spirit” and
create the sentence “She felt the spirit.” In a neutral prime
Figure 14.4 condition, participants did the same task of unscrambling
Religion and Altruism sentences, but none of the words had religious meaning.
As this study showed, being primed with religious concepts leads to
greater generosity.
P
­ articipants then received 10 Canadian dollars and were
asked to give some amount away to a stranger. Figure 14.4
SOURCE: Adapted from Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008. shows the powerful effect of being primed by religious con-
cepts like “divine” or “sacred.” ­Participants in the neutral prime condition were
more than twice as likely to give nothing to a stranger, compared to those in the
religion prime ­condition (36 percent versus 16 percent). By contrast, people who
were primed with r­ eligious concepts were more than four times as likely to treat
a stranger as an equal by giving half of the money to the stranger (52 percent
versus 12 percent).
Shariff and Norenzayan also examined whether secular, nonreligious con-
cepts related to kindness and ethical behavior generate similar levels of gener-
osity (Shariff & Norenzayan, 2007). In what they called a “civic” condition,
participants unscrambled sentences that included words related to the secular
institutions and ideas that build more cooperative societies, such as civic, jury,
court, police, and contract. These words also generated high levels of generos-
ity in the economic ­game—​­as much generosity, in fact, as the religious words
prompted. It seems that the emphasis on fairness and cooperation and equality,
seen in both religious traditions and secular treatments of ethics, can do a great
deal to elicit prosocial behavior.
Shinobu Kitayama and his colleagues have gathered evidence showing that
the sense of being watched, so prominent in religions of different kinds, increases
altruism. In fact, so powerful is this effect, it can be achieved by simply seeing an
­upside-​­down triangle of three dots, which capture the geometric arrangement of
the eyes and mouth of a human face. Seeing this arrangement of dots evokes the
sense that someone is looking at you, and, the reasoning goes, triggers more
cooperative behavior. In the relevant study, participants played the dictator
game. They were given a sum of money and asked to write down on a sheet of
paper the amount, including none at all, they wanted to give to a stranger
­(Rigdon, Ishii, Watabe, & Kitayama, 2009). On the paper, they saw one of two
sets of dots, shown in Figure 14.5. In one condition, participants saw the pattern

540 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

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BOX 14.3 FOCUS ON CULTURE

Prosocial Behavior and the Sense of Being Watched

Common to many religions is the idea on the surface. You might have a simi-
that God is watching over people as lar experience when visiting the Sistine
they carry on with their mundane lives Chapel, Michelangelo’s famous painted
on Earth. The Greeks believed their ceiling in the Vatican in Rome. There,
gods guided their everyday actions. if you look up into the center of the
The same is true for many Christians ceiling, you’ll see God looking down
today, who refer to being watched by upon Adam and Eve, in one of the
Jesus in the sky. And in many religions, most ­well-​­known works of art from the
this idea of being observed translates Renaissance.
directly into religious iconography
and architecture. For example, if you
travel to Nepal and visit its temples,
such as the ­fifth-​­century bce temple The Swayambhuntha Temple
Swayambhuntha, you’ll have the dis- The eyes painted on the surface toward the top
tinct impression of being watched, of the temple give visitors the feeling they’re
because of the prominence of the eyes being watched.

of three dots evocative of the human face (the pattern on the left). In a second
condition, participants saw the same dots but configured ­upside-​­down (the pat-
tern on the right). When presented with dots ­upside-​­down on the response sheet,
40 percent of the participants decided to keep all the money for themselves. This
selfish tendency dropped to 25 percent when the dots representing the face were
on the response sheet.

Evolution and Altruism

Few behaviors are more problematic to explain from an evolutionary perspective
than altruism. Natural selection favors behaviors that increase the likelihood
of survival and reproduction. Altruistic behavior, by its very nature, is costly;
it devotes precious resources to others that could be used for ourselves or our

Figure 14.5
Being Watched
A simple triangular arrangement of dots is a reminder of the human face (the three dots to the left), and the
associated sense of being observed can encourage cooperation.

Altruism  541
 132
kin selection An evolutionary strategy genetic relatives. The costs of altruism can include the ultimate sacrifice. Con-
that favors the reproductive success of
sider the fates of four friends who took a day off from their jobs at a summer
one’s genetic relatives, even at a cost to
one’s own survival and reproduction. camp to relax at a swimming hole near some scenic waterfalls. While walking
down a steep path to get there, one of them slipped and fell into a whirlpool.
When he was sucked down under the raging, foamy water, each of his three
friends was moved by altruistic concerns and, in succession, jumped into the
river to save the others. They all died. Individuals guided by unbounded altruism
would not have fared well in evolutionary history. How, then, have evolutionary
theorists accounted for altruistic behavior, which surely exists? Two evolutionary
explanations have been offered: kin selection and reciprocity.
Kin Selection Kin selection is an evolutionary strategy that favors behaviors that
increase the chance of survival of genetic relatives (Hamilton, 1964). Recall from
Chapter 13 that inclusive fitness is the fitness of an individual based on repro-
ductive success and the passing on of genes to future generations. Thus, from the
perspective of kin selection, people should be more likely to help those who share
more of their genes, helping siblings more than first cousins, first cousins more
than second cousins, and so on. By helping relatives survive, people help their
own genes pass to future generations.
The most obvious prediction from kin selection theory is that we should direct
more of our helping behavior toward kin than toward ­non-​­kin. There is support
“A chicken is only an egg’s way for this hypothesis in studies of nonhuman species as well as humans. Here are
of making another egg.” two examples in the animal world. Mockingbirds have been observed to feed
—samuel butler, life and hungry nestlings that are not their own but that are more closely related than
habit other hungry nestlings (Curry, 1988). Ground squirrels, when sensing a preda-
tory coyote or weasel is in the vicinity, seem to emit an alarm call, thus putting
“An organism is a gene’s way of themselves in danger by calling the predator’s attention to their own location,
making another gene.” in order to warn a genetic relative or a squirrel they have lived with, rather than
—richard dawkins warn unrelated squirrels or squirrels from other areas (Sherman, 1985).
In humans, genetic relatedness seems to influence helping behavior as well.
Across many cultures, people report receiving more help from close kin than
from more distant relatives or nonrelatives (­Essock-​­Vitale & McGuire, 1985).
When hypothetical situations are described to them, people report being more
willing to help close relatives (especially those young enough to have chil-
dren) than more distantly related people or strangers (Burnstein, Crandall, &
­K itayama, 1994). In a study of kidney donations, donors were about three times
as likely to engage in this altruistic act for a relative (73 percent) than for nonrel-
atives (27 percent) (Borgida, Conner, & Manteufel, 1992). In a puzzle task that
required cooperation, identical twins, who share all their genes, were found to
cooperate about twice as often (94 percent) as fraternal twins (46 percent), who
share only half of their genes (Segal, 1984; see also Burnstein, 2005).
Reciprocity Genetic relatedness, then, is a powerful determinant of altruistic
behavior. But what about helping those who are not our kin? We often go to
great lengths to help our friends. We give them money, let them sleep at our
apartment and eat out of our refrigerator, help them move, and so on. And some-
times we put our lives on the line to help them, as did the young people who died
trying to save their friend from drowning. Even more compelling, perhaps, is
how often we help total strangers. People will dive into icy waters to save people
they’ve never met, donate money anonymously to charities, and engage in all
sorts of more ordinary, less costly behaviors, such as giving up a seat on a bus or

542 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

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taking the time to help someone cross a street. Such actions can be accounted for
in part by reciprocity and cooperation, which form the basis of the second major
evolutionary explanation for altruism.
In traditional, preliterate societies, individuals living in groups were best
able to survive when they cooperated with one another. To explain how coop-
eration evolved, evolutionary theorists generally use the concept of reciprocal
­altruism —​­helping other people with the expectation that they’ll help in return
at some other time (Trivers, 1971). Cooperation among n ­ on-​­kin provides many
benefits that increase the chances of survival and reproduction for both parties.
Reciprocal altruism reduces the likelihood of dangerous conflict, helps overcome
problems arising from scarce resources, and offers a basis for people to form
alliances and constrain more dominant individuals (Preston & de Waal, 2002). Reciprocal Altruism
There is some evidence for the mutual helping that is the essence of reciprocal Vampire bats will regurgitate blood to
feed starving bats that have given blood
altruism in nonhuman species. Vampire bats need blood meals to survive and to them in the past, but they will not give
may starve to death if they do not have a blood meal after 60 hours. Researchers blood to bats that have not helped them
have found that satiated bats will regurgitate blood to feed bats that have given in the past. Thus, reciprocally a­ ltruistic
to them in the past, but will not make a donation to a bat that has not been a behavior is observed in nonhuman
­species as well as humans.
donor itself (Wilkinson, 1990). In his observations of chimpanzees and bonobos,
Frans de Waal (1996) has found that primates are disposed to share food with
other primates who share with them, to look after each other’s offspring, and to
systematically groom other primates who have groomed them earlier.
In humans, the impulse to reciprocate is a powerful motive, and the tendency reciprocal altruism Helping others
to return favors a likely human universal (Gouldner, 1960). In ­hunter-​­gatherer with the expectation that they will
probably return the favor in the future.
societies around the world, meat gained from hunts is carefully divided up and
shared with others, on the assumption that present acts of generosity will be paid
back at some later date (Flannery & Marcus, 2012). In studies using games where
players can either cooperate or compete with one another, people are more likely
to seek out and cooperate with individuals who have cooperated on the previous
round of the game (Rand, Arbesman, & Christakis, 2011).
Perhaps an even more dramatic illustration of our tendency to reciprocate
is the following experiment. Researchers mailed Christmas cards to numerous
complete strangers. About 20 percent reciprocated by sending their own Christ-
mas cards back to the senders, whom they had never met
(Kunz & Woolcott, 1976). Either the participants had
too few friends to accommodate the stacks of Christmas
cards they bought, or they felt compelled by the norm
of reciprocity to respond with a Christmas card to the
sender.
Adam Grant and Francesca Gino have made the case
that expressions of gratitude act as social rewards, and
are a powerful trigger of subsequent cooperation, which
is in keeping with the reciprocal altruism thesis (Grant &
Gino, 2010). More specifically, they propose that an act
of appreciation functions like a gift; the recipient feels
socially valued. Feeling rewarded, the recipient should be
more inclined to reciprocate, and behave altruistically.
And that’s exactly what Grant and Gino have found. Food Sharing
In cultures around the world, the shar-
In one study, participants helped an experimenter edit a letter online (Grant &
ing of food is a way that people build
Gino, 2010). In the gratitude condition, participants were thanked via ­e-​­mail. In and maintain cooperative relationships.
the control condition, participants received a polite message of equal length, but These Masai men in Africa share beef.

Altruism  543
 134

without a note of thanks. When asked if they would help the experimenter edit a
second letter, those who were thanked responded affirmatively 66 percent of the
time compared to 32 percent in the control condition. In a similar study out in
the work world, university fundraisers who were thanked directly by their super-
visor, compared to individuals in a control condition, were observed to increase
their fundraising calls dramatically over the course of the next week (Grant &
Gino, 2010).

LOOKING BACK
Altruistic tendencies are the unselfish behaviors that benefit others. People may act altruis-
tically for selfish motives, such as reducing distress or gaining social rewards, but some acts
of altruism are based on a more selfless state of empathic concern. Situational determinants
influence whether or not people help others. The presence of bystanders may lead to a diffu-
sion of responsibility, in which everyone assumes someone else will help. Characteristics of
the victim can affect whether people will help: people are more likely to help similar others.
Construal processes also influence helping; pluralistic ignorance can lead people to be less
likely to help. People in rural settings and those from ­lower-​­class backgrounds are more likely
to help than people in urban settings or from u ­ pper-​­class backgrounds. Two evolutionary
concepts that can account for the existence of altruism are kin selection and reciprocity.

Cooperation
Cooperating with others is part of our evolutionary heritage. The profound vul-
nerability and dependence of our offspring, who have a long period of complete
reliance on adults for food and protection, required cooperative child care; both
parents shared the burdens of raising children who were entirely dependent on
them (Konner, 2003). From archaeological studies of the bones of animals our
hominid predecessors killed for food, we know that early humans hunted in
cooperative groups (Mithen, 1996). The inclination to cooperate for common
goals is almost a defining attribute of humans.
One of the most striking aspects of human relations is how quickly adversar-
ial relationships can become cooperative (and vice versa). In World War II, the

Cooperation between
­Wartime Enemies
During World War I, instances of cooper-
ation took place between enemy soldiers,
as during this informal Christmas truce in
1914. Soldiers from both sides emerged
from their trenches and fraternized in
no-​­man’­s-​­land. This lithograph was
­published in 1915.

544 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

 135

mortal enemies of the United States were the Germans and Japanese. Shortly prisoner’s dilemma A situation
involving payoffs to two people, who
after the end of the war, the United States became strong allies with these former
must decide whether to cooperate or
enemies. During the Rwandan genocide, Hutus sought to annihilate Tutsis; since defect. In the end, trust and cooperation
then, the two groups have become more collaborative. It is an important lesson of lead to higher joint payoffs than mistrust
history, how readily people shift from competition and aggression to cooperation. and defection.

The Prisoner’s Dilemma

Core principles that account for how and why humans cooperate have been
examined through the use of an experimental paradigm known as the prison-
er’s dilemma, also referred to as a type of economic game. Imagine being in an
experiment in which you’re ushered into a small cubicle; the experimenter tells
you there’s another participant (whom you will never meet) in a cubicle nearby.
Both you and the other participant are required to make a simple decision: inde-
pendently, you must choose to “cooperate” with each other (do what will benefit
both of you) or “defect” (do what will disproportionately benefit yourself). You
will be paid for your participation, and your compensation will depend on the
choices you make. If both of you cooperate, you’ll each receive $5. If both of you
defect, you’ll each get $2. If one cooperates and the other defects, the defector
will receive $8, and the cooperator will not receive anything. The experimenter
says you’ll be paid as soon as each of you makes your choice, and reiterates that
you and the other person will never meet. What do you do?
From the perspective of maximizing your own s­ elf-​­interest, the best, or “ratio-
nal,” choice is to defect. Whatever your partner does, you make more money
by defecting than by cooperating. To see this, consult the summary of payoffs
presented in Figure 14.6. If your partner cooperates, you receive $8 by defecting
but only $5 by cooperating. If your partner defects, you receive $2 by defecting
and nothing by cooperating. Defection thus “dominates” cooperation. So why
not defect?
Here’s the catch: the payoffs are the same for both players, so if both reason
this way and choose to defect, they receive only $2 rather than the $5 that would
be theirs through mutual cooperation. The “best” choice for each person (defec-
tion) is a terrible choice from the standpoint of the two people in combination.
On the surface, the prisoner’s dilemma game seems to hold little promise
for teaching anything significant about real human interaction. Unlike many
­real-​­world situations, the game offers no range of cooperative
YOUR PARTNER
to competitive behaviors to choose from; instead, there are
only two ­behaviors—​­cooperate or defect. In addition, par- Cooperate Defect
ticipants are not allowed to discuss the choices beforehand, $5 0
and they are never permitted to explain or justify them after- Cooperate
$5 $8
ward. Overall it seems too limited, too artificial, to demon- YOU
strate anything significant about ­real-​­world cooperation and $8 $2
Defect
0 $2
competition.
Looks may be deceiving, however. As simple as the pris-
oner’s dilemma seems, it nevertheless captures the essential Your payoffs are Your partner’s payoffs
features of many significant situations in life (Dawes, 1980; represented by the are represented by the
numbers in blue. numbers in green.
Schelling, 1978). Let’s consider a r­eal-​­world analogue. India
and Pakistan have been engaged in an arms race for decades. Figure 14.6
Like nearly all such struggles, the contest is ultimately futile The Payoff Matrix for the Prisoner’s Dilemma
because its structure is that of the prisoner’s dilemma. Each Game

Cooperation  545
 136

BOX 14.4 FOCUS ON NEUROSCIENCE

The Cooperative Brain

Cooperation is vital to human survival, (Rilling et al., 2002). They have shown r­ eward-​­related regions of the brain (the
but as a social strategy it can incur that during acts of cooperation, our nucleus accumbens, ventral caudate,
certain costs. When we cooperate, brain fires as if we are receiving rewards. and ventromedial/orbitofrontal cortex)
we also risk being exploited by others. In their study, 36 women played an exhibited increased activation when
Often, the rewards of cooperation will online version of prisoner’s dilemma the women cooperated. These brain
be enjoyed much later, as when we with another person. Using fMRI tech- regions are rich in dopamine recep-
cooperate with colleagues on a ­long-​ nology, the researchers scanned the tors and are activated by all sorts of
t­ erm project. James Rilling and his col- brains of the participating women rewards, such as sweet tastes, pleasant
leagues have found that the brain may when they cooperated with the online smells, pictures of tropical vacations,
be wired to enable cooperation in the ­stranger—​­which was their most and pleasing touches. Cooperation, it
face of these kinds of uncertainties common choice. They found that seems, is inherently rewarding.

country must decide whether to spend more on armaments or to stop spending

money on more arms and enjoy a significant economic “peace dividend,” as the
United States did following the breakup of the Soviet Union. However, regard-
less of what the other does, it is “better” to acquire more arms. (If India freezes
its acquisition of weapons, Pakistan can achieve an edge by spending more. If
India builds up its arsenal, Pakistan has to spend more to avoid vulnerability.)
Nonetheless, because the new weapons systems developed by one side are quickly
matched by the other, the net effect is waste. The two countries pay dearly for a
military balance that was attainable for less expense.
Thus, although the prisoner’s dilemma may seem like a sterile and artificial
paradigm on the surface, it captures many difficult ­real-​­world choices between
cooperation and competition. Thousands of studies using
the prisoner’s dilemma game have yielded some valuable
insights about how people make these difficult choices,
illuminating why people or groups or countries would be
likely to defect or cooperate, and suggesting what might
be done to foster cooperative relations.

Situational Determinants
of Cooperation
The prisoner’s dilemma game sets up the simplest of sit-
uations: participants are involved in just one round with
Developing Cooperative
someone they don’t even know. Of course, our social
Relationships lives are much more complex. Very often we interact repeatedly over time with
Cooperation can emerge between the people, in our careers and our relationships. Are we more cooperative when we
most violent of enemies and in the most interact repeatedly with the same person over time, compared to a ­one-​­shot inter-
extreme circumstances. Here, members action? Indeed we are. David Rand and Martin Nowak have reviewed numerous
of two rival gangs in El Salvador, ­MS-​­13
and 18th Street, stand next to each other,
studies that varied the number of rounds people played prisoner’s dilemma with
in a spirit of cooperation created by a each other. The evidence is clear: as the likelihood of interacting with someone in
truce signed a year earlier. the future rises, we become more cooperative (Rand & Nowak, 2013).

546 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

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In daily life, we interact with people we know, and, often, whose reputations reputation The collective beliefs,
evaluations, and impressions people
we know from others. Reputation refers to the collective beliefs, evaluations, and
hold about an individual within a social
impressions about an individual’s character that develop within a group or social network.
network (Emler, 1994). Studies of people at work find that they quickly develop
reputations for being good citizens (cooperators) or “bad apples” (defectors), and “It takes many good deeds to
that these reputations spread through the organization and persist over time build a good reputation, and
(Burt, Kilduff, & Tasselli, 2013). Very often, when you interact with someone, only one bad deed to lose it.”
say in a dorm or at work, you are likely to know a bit about that person’s reputa- —benjamin franklin
tion. Does such knowledge influence levels of cooperation?
To answer this question, some researchers have added a twist to the prisoner’s
dilemma game: prior to playing, participants are told about their partner’s repu-
tation, as being someone who cooperates or defects. As you would expect, partic-
ipants will readily cooperate and give resources to an interaction partner whom
they know to have a reputation for cooperation, but they will defect and choose
not to give resources to interaction partners known to be greedy (­ Wedekind &
Milinski, 2000).
These findings raise an intriguing question: How do we come to know each
other’s reputation? One idea is that reputations spread through gossiping, some-
thing most people are reluctant to admit to doing, but certainly enjoy when
they do. Gossip is a communicative act in which one person comments on the
reputation of another who is not present (Feinberg, Willer, Stellar, & Keltner,
2012). One of the primary reasons we gossip is to figure out the reputations of
other people; through gossip, we investigate whether other group members are
inclined to act in ways that strengthen the group (like by being civil, fair, and
cooperative) or in ways that might create friction and ill will. This analysis yields
what might strike us as a counterintuitive prediction: we might expect groups
in which gossip takes place to actually be more cooperative. And indeed, that’s
what Matthew Feinberg and his colleagues have found.
In their study, participants played an economic game in which they could give
some money to other people in their group (Feinberg, Willer, & Schultze, 2014).
In one condition, they were allowed to gossip about each other’s generosity (or
lack thereof). In a second condition, no such opportunity to gossip was afforded.
Over the course of several iterations, the groups whose members could gossip
became more cooperative than the groups who were not allowed to gossip. The
threat of gossip makes people aware of what might happen to their reputations
should they choose to act selfishly, thus encouraging more cooperative behavior.

Construal Processes and Cooperation

Construal processes matter a great deal in shaping interactions toward more
cooperative or competitive outcomes. In a compelling demonstration of the
power of construal to influence levels of cooperation, Steve Neuberg (1988) had
male undergraduates participate in a standard prisoner’s dilemma experiment.
Before doing so, however, the participants were subliminally “primed” with one
of two different sets of stimulus words, ostensibly as part of another experi-
ment. For one group, Neuberg flashed 22 hostile words (such as competitive,
hostile, unfriendly) for 60 ­milliseconds—​­too fast for anyone to “see” them and
consciously register what they were, but long enough for them to leave a sub-
conscious impression. He showed another group a list of neutral words (house,
looked, always) for an equally brief period. The question was whether exposure to

Cooperation  547
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Not So Fast
! Critical Thinking about Generalizing to
B OX 14 . 5 the Real World

Much of our discussion about coopera- the real world. Third, in lab studies ­people of their day and mail the letter to Alexan-
tion thus far has come from studies using are acutely aware of being scrutinized, der? Indeed it did. People who gave more
the prisoner’s dilemma and related games, and scrutiny strengthens the likelihood of in the dictator game were more likely to
such as the dictator game (collectively cooperative behavior. return the misdirected letter.
known as economic games). Their struc- The best response to concerns about A second way to address concerns
ture captures a basic tension between the external validity of a paradigm is two- about the external validity of economic
cooperating and defecting in relation- fold. First, researchers can ask whether games is with field experiments that seek
ships of many kinds, from negotiations behavior observed in the lab, such as to replicate findings observed in the lab.
between adversarial nations to the daily cooperation in the prisoner’s dilemma Recall that field experiments are studies
lives of romantic partners. If you’re skep- game, predicts actual behavior out in the conducted outside the lab, observing ­real-​
tical about the external validity of these world. On this question, there is mount- ­world behavior. Here again the evidence
­games—​­that is, the extent to which they
ing evidence that a person’s behavior in supports the principles of cooperation
generalize to cooperative behavior out-
economic games predicts forms of char- that have been uncovered with economic
side the ­lab—​­you’re not alone.
ity and working to help others (Levit & games. In one study, the researchers
Critics describe three kinds of doubts
List, 2007). For example, in one study, wanted to encourage residents in 15
about the external validity of economic
participants first played the dictator homeowners associations to agree to
games (Levitt & List, 2007). First are
the stakes involved: people are given game (Franzen & Pointner, 2013). They a more e­ nergy-​­efficient use of their air
money for cooperating or defecting, or were given 10 euros, and then they chose conditioners (Yoeli, Hoffman, Rand, &
they give away money that’s been given an amount to give to a stranger, under Nowak, 2013). They did so by having par-
to them in an experiment. People are anonymous conditions. Some 4–5 weeks ticipants sign up on a sheet posted on a
dealing with “play” money and not actual later, participants got a letter that actually kiosk near the mailboxes for the homes
money they’ve earned, which raises the was meant for another student, whom or apartments. In one condition, partici-
question of whether we would observe they didn’t know. When they opened up pants wrote their names on the sheet; in
similar patterns of cooperation when the the envelope, addressed to them, they a second condition, they signed up with a
money is real, earned, and costly to sacri- discovered a letter from a grandmother numerical code. When people are aware
fice. Second, critics suggest that being in to another student, Alexander, congrat- of their own reputations, they’re more
a laboratory makes norms of cooperative ulating him on doing well academically. cooperative in economic games of dif-
behavior more salient. Therefore, sim- Inside the envelope were 10 euros and ferent kinds. Would this effect of reputa-
ply signing up for an experiment, getting Alexander’s correct address, which gave tion replicate in ­energy-​­saving but costly
there on time, and following instructions participants the opportunity to mail cooperation out in the world? Yes. When
from an experimenter are all acts guided the misdirected letter to Alexander. Did participants signed up using their names,
by norms of cooperation, again suggesting the amount the participants shared in the they were three times more likely to sign
that patterns of cooperation observed dictator game 4 weeks earlier predict up for the service than when they did so
in the lab may diverge from those out in whether or not they would take time out anonymously.

the hostile words would lead participants to look out for their own interests, on
the assumption that “it’s a d
­ og-​­eat-​­dog world out there.”
Exposure to the hostile words affected the participants’ actions. E
­ ighty-​­four
percent who were exposed to the hostile words defected on a majority of the
trials in the subsequent prisoner’s dilemma game; only 55 percent who saw the
neutral words did so. This study raises concern about the kinds of stimuli to

548 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

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BOX 14.6 FOCUS ON POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY

Is Cooperation Contagious?
Popular movies and clever advertise- an entirely new set of participants. In
ments have used the “pay it forward” each round, the participant was given
concept: when we cooperate, we 20 money units (MUs) and allowed to
inspire others to be more cooperative give some amount, between 0 and 20,
in subsequent situations. Is cooper- to the group. Each MU the participant
ation contagious? For years, James gave to the group was translated to an
Fowler and Nicholas Christakis have increase of 0.4 MU for each of the four
been gathering evidence on the con- group members. This means that each
tagious nature of human behavior, and gift of 1 MU would cost the giver 0.6
have discovered that smoking, anxiety, MU personally but benefit each other
happiness, and obesity, for example, group member. If participants kept all
spread through communities from one their MUs, they would end the game Paying It Forward
The popular movie Pay It Forward focuses on
person to another (Christakis & Fowler, with 20 MUs. If they each gave all their
the theme of how one person’s generosity
2009). We are a mimetic species, MUs to the group, each member would
leads to other acts of generosity.
prone to imitating the behaviors of end the game with 32 MUs.
others around us. Using an economic This method created the usual
game, Fowler and Christakis found that ­dilemma—​­that behaviors costly to the found that for every MU a player gave,
cooperative acts inspire others to be self are beneficial for the ­group—​­and his or her partners would give 0.19 MUs
more cooperative in ensuing situations allowed Fowler and Christakis to exam- more on average to a new set of play-
(Fowler & Christakis, 2010). ine how cooperative gifts to other ers in the next round, and 0.07 MUs
In the study, participants played players by a player in one round might on average to still other players in the
several rounds of an economic game influence those other players’ levels of round after that, two times removed
in groups of four; each round involved generosity in subsequent rounds. They from the original round.

which people are commonly exposed. The ideas in the ­air—​­the competitive and
aggressive images we see in the media, in video games, in ­films—​­may foster a
more competitive society.
Based on the results of Neuberg’s study (1988), it might seem that the way we
explicitly label situations could influence levels of competition and cooperation.
If we think of international crises as buildups to war, diplomatic solutions may
become less likely. When lawyers treat divorce settlements as adversarial, and as
opportunities to get their client the best outcome at the expense of the estranged
spouse, entrenched bitterness seems inevitable.
In a striking demonstration of the power of labels, Liberman, Samuels, and
Ross (2002) conducted a study in which they labeled the prisoner’s dilemma
game in one of two ways. Half the participants were told they were going to play
the “Wall Street” game, and the other half were told it was the “community”
game. Everything else about the experiment was the same for the two groups.
What might seem to be a trivial change of labels had a dramatic effect on the
participants’ behavior. Those playing the community game cooperated on the
opening round twice as often as those playing the Wall Street game. Moreover,
these initial differences were maintained throughout the subsequent rounds of
the experiment. The Wall Street label doubtless made the participants adopt a

Cooperation  549
 140

perspective that made maximizing their own profits paramount. In contrast,

the community label conjured up a different set of images and motives that
increased the appeal of maximizing the participants’ joint outcomes.

Culture and Cooperation

Given how ­labels—​­and therefore ­construals—​­shape levels of cooperation, you
might expect cultural factors to have a similar influence on the inclination to
either cooperate or defect. Let’s consider the influence of a relatively specific sub-
culture on cooperation: the discipline you choose to study in college and even-
tually apply in your career. One of the most popular majors at many American
campuses is economics. Economic theory assumes that people are rational actors
who always act in ­self-​­interested ways, attempting to maximize their own gains.
Many people think this is a cynical view of the human condition; but in keep-
ing with the ideas of ­eighteenth-​­century philosopher Adam Smith, economists
have assumed that people and society are best served if individuals are allowed
to selfishly pursue their own ends. The storekeeper and restaurateur will succeed
to the extent that they serve their patrons well, simultaneously improving their
customers’ lives and doing well themselves by charging as much as a competitive
market will allow.
Does training in the discipline of economics encourage people to act more
selfishly? The results of several studies indicate that it does (Carter & Irons, 1991;
Frank, Gilovich, & Regan, 1993; Marwell & Ames, 1981). In one study, under-
graduates majoring in economics and in a variety of other disciplines partici-
pated in a s­ingle-​­trial prisoner’s dilemma game in which researchers took great
pains to ensure that each person’s response remained anonymous (Frank et al.,
1993). ­Seventy-​­two percent of the economics majors defected on their partners,
whereas only 47 percent of those majoring in other disciplines defected. In a
random sample of over 1,000 professors in 23 disciplines, participants were asked
how much money they gave annually to public television, the United Way, and
other charitable causes (Frank et al., 1993). The economists were twice as likely
as all the others to take a free ride on the contributions of their fellow citizens;
in other words, giving nothing to charity, while presumably enjoying services
such as public television to the same extent as everyone else. The subculture in
which people are immersed appears to powerfully influence their inclination to
cooperate with others or look only after themselves.
To study the prevalence of cooperation in different cultures around the world,
Joseph Henrich and his colleagues recruited individuals from 15 different small
societies to play the ultimatum game, a close relative of the prisoner’s dilemma
game (Henrich et al., 2001). In the original version of the ultimatum game, one
player, the allocator, is given a certain amount of money (say, $10); he keeps a
certain amount and allocates the rest to a second participant, the responder. The
responder can then choose to either accept or reject the allocator’s offer. If the
responder accepts, he receives what was offered and the allocator keeps the bal-
ance. If the responder rejects the offer, neither player receives anything.
In the Henrich team’s version of the study, the participants were foragers,
­slash-​­and-​­burn farmers, nomadic herding groups, and individuals in settled,
agriculturalist societies in Africa, South America, and Indonesia. What they
were allowed to offer an anonymous stranger differed. In some cultures it was

550 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

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(A) (B)

Cooperation in Different Cultures

(A) The Machiguenga of Peru collaborate little with others outside their family and gave little in the ultimatum game (described in the text). (B) The Lamerala
of Indonesia collaborate extensively in fishing and gave a lot.

money, in others a cherished good such as tobacco. In all cases, the researchers “Every individual . . . ​
attempted to make rewards equal to approximately the same fraction of a daily ­endeavors as much as he
wage in each culture. can . . . ​to employ his capital
The first finding of note was how cooperative humans are in the variety of in the ­support of domestic
cultures studied (Henrich et al., 2001). An economist of the rational s­ elf-​­interest ­industry, and so to direct that
view might argue that the sensible offer of the allocator is a small amount, such industry that its produce may
as 10 percent of the good ($1 if the allocator has been given $10). This approach be of greatest value; every
would advance the material wealth of both allocator and responder. In contrast, individual necessarily labours
the researchers observed a pattern of results that would puzzle Adam Smith. In to render the annual revenue
the 15 cultures, allocators offered, on average, 39 percent of the good to anon- of the ­society as great as he
can. He . . . ​neither intends to
ymous strangers. (In other research across Western cultures, 71 percent of the
promote the public interest,
allocators offered the responder 40–50 percent of the money; Fehr & Schmidt,
nor knows how much he is
1999.) Of course, it’s important to bear in mind that there are strategic rea-
­promoting it. By . . . ​directing
sons for participants making initial generous offers that have nothing to do with
that industry in such a ­manner
altruistic tendencies. Most notably, they probably anticipated that the respon- as its produce may be of
dent would reject unfair, trivial offers. ­greatest value, he intends only
Henrich and his colleagues then looked closely at the 15 cultures to deter- his own gain, and he is in this,
mine what cultural factors predict the likelihood of cooperative generosity in as in many other cases, led by
the ultimatum game (Henrich et al., 2001). One factor stood out: how much the an invisible hand to promote
individuals in a culture needed to collaborate with others to gather resources to an end which was no part of his
survive. The more the members of a culture depended on one another to gather intention.”
food and meet other survival needs, the more they offered to a stranger when —adam smith (1776)
they were allocators in the ultimatum game. For example, the Machiguenga
people of Peru rarely collaborate with members outside of their family to pro-
duce food. Their average allocation in the ultimatum game was 26 percent of
the resource. The Lamerala of Indonesia, by contrast, fish in highly collaborative
groups of individuals from different families. Cooperation is essential to their
livelihood and subsistence. Their average gift in the ultimatum game was 58 per-
cent. Thus, interdependence increases people’s cooperation and generosity with
anonymous others.

Cooperation  551
 142

Evolution and Cooperation: Tit for Tat

In The Evolution of Cooperation (1984), political scientist Robert Axelrod asked
the following question: How might cooperation emerge in competitive environ-
ments governed by the ruthless pursuit of ­self-​­interest? In the context of human
evolution, how might ­non-​­kin begin to act with an eye toward advancing the
welfare of others?
Axelrod assumed that cooperation was part of our evolutionary heritage,
given its universality and its emergence in even the most unlikely of social con-
texts. For example, in the trenches of World War I, British and French soldiers
were separated from their enemies, the Germans, by a few hundred yards of
­no-​­man’­s-​­land (Axelrod, 1984). Brutal assaults by one side were typically met
with equally fierce counterattacks by the other. And yet even here cooperation
frequently emerged, allowing soldiers to eat meals peacefully, to enjoy long peri-
ods of nonconfrontation, and even to fraternize with one another. The two sides
would fly special flags, make verbal agreements, and fire deliberately misguided
shots, all to signal and maintain peaceful cooperation between episodes of attack
in which each side was bent on exterminating the other.
Axelrod conducted a study that helps illuminate the evolutionary origins
of cooperation. Although simple in design, this study yields profound lessons.
Axelrod ran a tournament in which ­players—​­academics, ­prize-​­winning mathe-
maticians, computer hackers, and common ­folk—​­were invited to submit com-
puter programs that specified what choices to make on a round of the prisoner’s
dilemma game, given what had happened on previous rounds (Axelrod, 1984).
In the first tournament, 14 strategies were submitted. Each strategy played 200
rounds of the prisoner’s dilemma game with every other strategy. The points
were tallied, and the most effective strategy was announced. The winner? It was
a ­so-​­called ­tit-​­for-​­tat strategy, submitted by mathematical psychologist Anatol
Rapaport.
The ­tit-​­for-​­tat strategy is disarmingly simple. It cooperates on the first round
with every opponent and then reciprocates whatever the opponent did on the
previous round. An opponent’s cooperation was rewarded with immediate
cooperation; defection was punished with immediate defection. In other words,
start out cooperatively, and reciprocate your partner’s previous move. Axelrod
held a second tournament that attracted the submission of 62 strategies. All the
entrants knew the results of the first r­ound—​­that the t­it-​­for-​­tat strategy had
won. In the second tournament, the ­tit-​­for-​­tat strategy again prevailed. Note
that the t­it-​­for-tat strategy did not win every round when pitted against all the
different strategies. Instead, it did better overall against the diversity of strategies.
What makes the ­tit-​­for-​­tat strategy special, and why might it be relevant to your
own life?
Axelrod contends that the ­tit-​­for-​­tat strategy is based on a set of valuable prin-
ciples for applying when forming friendships, dealing with a difficult personality
at work, negotiating with bosses, maintaining ­long-​­term romantic relationships,
­tit-​­for-​­tat strategy A strategy in and raising children. Five factors make it an especially compelling strategy. (1) It
the prisoner’s dilemma game in which is cooperative, and thus encourages mutually supportive action toward a shared
the player’s first move is cooperative; goal. (2) It is not envious; a partner using this strategy can do extremely well
thereafter, the player mimics the other
person’s behavior, whether cooperative
without resorting to competitive behavior. (3) It is not exploitable, meaning it’s
or competitive. This strategy fares well not blindly prosocial; if you defect on the t­ it-​­for-​­tat, it will defect on you. (4) It
when interacting with other strategies. is forgiving; that is, it is willing to cooperate at the first cooperative action of

552 CHAPTER 14 Altruism and Cooperation

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the partner, even after long runs of defection and competition. (5) It is easy to
read; it shouldn’t take long for others to know that the ­tit-​­for-​­tat strategy is being
played. Being nice, stalwart, forgiving, and ­clear—​­that’s a good set of principles
to live by.

LOOKING BACK
Cooperation is part of our evolutionary heritage. The prisoner’s dilemma game models the
many situations in everyday life when defection is the best solution for each person sep-
arately, but cooperation benefits the two together. Situational factors, such as the likeli-
hood of repeated interactions and whether your reputation is on the line, influence levels
of cooperation and competition. So, too, do construal processes: people can be primed to
cooperate or defect. Studies of cultures in remote parts of the world reveal that cooperation
is a human universal, and that cultures characterized by economic interdependence show
greater cooperation. The t­ it-​­for-​­tat strategy involves initial cooperation and then reciproca-
tion of an adversary’s behavior, in order to encourage mutual cooperation.

Cooperation  553
 144

chapter 9

Prosocial Behavior:
Doing What’s Best
for Others
Tradeoffs: The Prisoner’s
Dilemma p. 262
Money Matters: Money,
Prosocial Behavior, and
Self-Sufficiency p. 263
Food for Thought:
Restaurants, Rules, and
the Bad Taste of
Nonconformity p. 269
The Social Side of Sex:
Helping, Sex, and
Friends p. 276

Doug Benc/Getty Images for WTA

What Makes Us
Human? Putting the
Cultural Animal in
Perspective p. 284

WHAT IS PROSOCIAL WHY DO PEOPLE HELP BYSTANDER HELPING IN

BEHAVIOR? p. 257 OTHERS? p. 269 EMERGENCIES p. 278
Born to Reciprocate p. 259 Evolutionary Benefits p. 270 Five Steps to Helping p. 278
Born to Be Fair p. 259 Two Motives for Helping: Too Busy to Help? p. 281
COOPERATION, Altruism and Egoism p. 271 HOW CAN WE INCREASE
FORGIVENESS, Is Altruism Possible? p. 273 HELPING? p. 282
OBEDIENCE, AND WHO HELPS WHOM? p. 274 Getting Help in a Public
CONFORMITY p. 261 Helpful Personality p. 275 Setting p. 282
Cooperation p. 261 Similarity p. 275 Educate Others p. 282
Forgiveness p. 264 Gender p. 275 Provide Helpful Models p. 282
Obedience p. 265 Beautiful Victims p. 275 Teach Moral Inclusion p. 283
Conformity p. 267 Belief in a Just World p. 276 CHAPTER SUMMARY p. 285
Emotion and Mood p. 277

255

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 145

He who saves one life, it is as if he saves the world entire.

—Jewish Talmud |||||

d During World War II, members of the German Nazi Party

killed millions of civilian Jews. More than 99% of Polish
Jewish children were killed. Yet one member of the Nazi
Party is buried in a cemetery on Mount Zion in Jerusa-
lem. The Council of the Yad Vashem planted a carob tree
on the Avenue of the Righteous in honor of this Nazi,
with a plaque calling him a Righteous Gentile—a title
reserved for “Extending help in saving a life; endanger-
ing one’s own life; absence of reward, monetary and
otherwise, and similar considerations which make the
rescuer’s deeds stand out above and beyond what can
Nor was he a brilliant businessman; the Schindler
family business went bankrupt in 1935. After that low
point, Oskar Schindler sought work in nearby Poland.
When Nazi Germany invaded Poland, he joined the Nazi
Party to get some of the economic and political ben-
efits given to card-carrying Nazis. In 1939 he followed
the occupying forces to Krakow, the capital of German-
occupied Poland, where he bought a factory that made
mess kits and field kitchenware for the German army.
He used cheap Jewish labor from the Krakow ghetto as
workers in his factory. Others called his factory workers
be termed ordinary help” (Gutman, 1995). Who was this Schindlerjuden (Schindler Jews); Schindler called them
Nazi? His name was Oskar Schindler. “my children.”
Oskar Schindler was born April 28, 1908, in what is Although Schindler was busy in the factory during
now the Czech Republic. His father and mother, Hans the day, at night he entertained Nazi Schützstaffel (SS)
and Louisa Schindler, were devout (and wealthy) Cath- officers to get on their good side, and it worked. For
olics. However, their strict religious teachings did not example, during an inspection of Schindler’s factory, an
seem to affect their son. At a young age, Oskar became SS officer told an elderly Jew named Lamus, “Slip your
a gambler, drinker, and womanizer, and he retained pants down to your ankles and start walking.” Lamus
these habits throughout his life. At age 20, Oskar mar- did what he was told. “You are interfering with all my
ried Emilie Pelzl, but he continued to have affairs with discipline here,” Schindler said. “The morale of my work-
other women, thereby fathering at least two children. ers will suffer. Production for das Vaterland (the father
By societal standards, he was certainly not a saint. country) will be affected.” The officer took out his gun.
“A bottle of schnapps if you don’t shoot him,” Schindler
said. Grinning, the officer put the gun away and went to
Schindler’s office to collect his liquor (Gutman, 1995).
In the summer of 1942, Schindler witnessed a Ger-
man raid on the Jewish ghetto. The Jews that remained
alive were sent on a train to a concentration camp to be
killed. Schindler was very moved by what he saw, and
said, “I was now resolved to do everything in my power
Courtesy of United States Holocaust Memorial Museum

to defeat the system” (Gutman, 1995). For example, he

convinced a German general that the nearby Plaszow
camp could be used for war production. The general
agreed, and Plaszow was officially transformed into a
war-essential “concentration camp.” Schindler made a
list of all the workers he would need for his camp.
By the spring of 1944, the Germans retreated on
the Eastern Front and ordered that all camps be emp-
tied. Schindler knew that if his workers were moved to
another camp they would be killed. He bribed, pleaded,
Oskar Schindler (third from left) with German army officers. and worked desperately to save his workers. Finally,

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 146
Schindler was authorized to move 1,000 workers from
the Plaszow camp to a factory in Brnenec. The other
25,000 people at Plaszow were sent to the gas cham-
bers and furnaces at Auschwitz.
Ostensibly the new factory was producing parts for
V2 bombs, but Schindler told the workers to produce
only defective parts so the bombs wouldn’t kill anyone.
Jews escaping from the transports fled to Schindler’s
factory. Schindler even asked the Gestapo to send him
all intercepted Jewish fugitives “in the interest of contin-
ued war production” (Gutman, 1995). Almost 100 addi-
tional people were saved in this way. Schindler spent all
of his money and traded all of his possessions (and his
wife’s jewelry!) for food, clothing, medicine, and liquor

© Nubar Alexanian/Corbis
(to bribe SS officers). Because the workers dreaded the
SS visits that might come late at night, Oskar and Emilie
Schindler slept in a small room in the factory.
Late one evening, Schindler received a phone call
from the railway station asking whether he would
accept two railway cars full of Jews that no other con- Oskar Schindler’s grave. The Hebrew inscription reads: “A Righteous Man Among
centration camp would accept. The cars had been fro- the Gentiles.” The German inscription reads: “The Unforgettable Savior of the Lives
zen shut at a temperature of 5 °F (–15° C) and contained of 1200 Hunted Jews.”
almost a hundred sick men who had been locked inside
for 10 days. Schindler quickly agreed to accept the Jews
as workers in his factory. Thirteen of the men were On October 9, 1974, Oskar Schindler died of liver
already dead. For many days and nights, Oskar and Emi- failure in Frankfurt, Germany, at age 66 (too much
lie Schindler nursed the rest back to health. Only three Schnapps!). His wish to be buried in Israel was honored.
more men died. The Jews who died were given a proper He was buried at the Catholic cemetery on Mount Zion
(secret) Jewish burial, paid for by Schindler. in Jerusalem. On his tombstone are written the follow-
World War II ended in Europe on May 8, 1945. In the ing words in Hebrew: “A Righteous Man Among the
early morning of May 9, 1945, Oskar and Emilie fled to Gentiles.” The German inscription reads: “The Unforget-
Austria’s U.S. Zone (dressed in prison garb, under the table Savior of the Lives of 1200 Hunted Jews.”
“protection” of eight Schindlerjuden, and with a letter Death was the punishment for helping Jews during
in Hebrew testifying to their life-saving actions). Before the Holocaust. Perhaps that is why less than 1% of the non-
they left, Schindler received a ring made from Jews’ gold Jewish population in Nazi-occupied Europe attempted to
fillings as a gift from his grateful “children.” The ring was save any Jews. Yet Schindler spent millions of dollars and
inscribed with the Talmudic verse: “He who saves one risked his life to save a group of people whom the Nazis
life, it is as if he saved the world entire.” After the war, called “vermin” and “rats.” In this chapter we will examine
a survivor asked Schindler whatever happened to his why humans behave in helpful and cooperative ways,
gold ring. “Schnapps,” Schindler replied. He was still no even when, as the Schindler story shows, it may not be in
conventional saint! their own self-interest to do so.

What Is Prosocial of antisocial behavior, which means doing something

bad for others or for society. Antisocial behavior usu-
Behavior? ally destroys relationships (see Chapter 10).
Social psychologists have had a peculiar love/hate
Prosocial behavior is defined as doing something relationship with prosocial behavior. Most social psy-
that is good for other people or for society as a chology textbooks feature helping as the main proso-
whole. Prosocial behavior includes behavior that cial behavior, while belittling others. When they
respects others or allows society to operate. Culture discuss conformity, obedience, and other forms of
is a whole that is more than the sum of its parts, but following the rules, textbooks have often been sharply
only if people cooperate and follow the rules will cul- critical, suggesting that these are bad things. It is true
ture be able to yield its benefits. In a nutshell, proso-
cial behavior builds relationships. It is the opposite PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR doing something that is good for other people or for society as a whole

W H AT I S P R O S O C I A L B E H AV I O R ? • 257

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 147
that obedience and conformity can be bad—mindless rules by not selling us spoiled meat or doing some-
obedience to a demented leader (e.g., Hitler) can pro- thing else fraudulent.
duce all sorts of terrible consequences. For the most Imagine two societies, one in which people are
part, however, obedience and conformity are good happy and healthy, and another in which people are
things. Society would collapse if people didn’t follow fearful, poor, and desperate. What might account
most of the rules most of the time. For example, con- for the difference? The happy society probably has
sider what would happen if people decided to ignore people who cooperate with each other, respect each
traffic rules, such as “Stop,” “Wrong Way,” “Yield,” other, follow the rules, and contribute to the general
and “Speed Limit” signs. Traffic accidents and fatali- welfare. The unhappy society is likely full of people
ties would increase sharply! Likewise, imagine what who break the rules; its social life is marked by crime,
would happen if most people just took things from corruption, distrust, betrayal, and wide-ranging gen-
stores without paying, or ignored the tax laws, or if eral insecurity.
restaurants and grocery stores disobeyed health regu- A society in which people respect and follow the
lations and sold rotten food. rules is said to have an effective rule of law. If there
Obeying the rules, conforming to socially accepted are no laws, or laws exist but are widely ignored and
standards of proper behavior, and cooperating with disobeyed, the rule of law is said to be lacking. The
others are important forms of prosocial behavior. rule of law may occasionally seem a problem, such
Helping—which most social psychology textbooks as when you get a speeding ticket, but in reality the
treat as the quintessential form of prosocial behav- rule of law is usually a huge boost to the quality of
ior—is actually something of an “extra” or a luxury. life. If you lived in a society where the rule of law had
Heroic acts like those of Oskar Schindler are impres- broken down, or had not yet appeared, you would
sive and memorable, but rare. Society and culture can find life hard and dangerous. Indeed, researchers
still bring immense benefits if people do not perform have found a positive correlation between happiness
altruistic, self-sacrificing acts of helping. If no one and rule of law, across a number of different societies
obeys the rules, however, society will fall apart and (Veenhoven, 2004).
chaos will reign. Following rules is essential. Helping Fairness and justice are also important factors in
is less essential, though certainly helping makes the predicting prosocial behavior. If employees perceive
world a much nicer place, and some forms of helping the company they work for to be fair and just, they
(such as what parents do for their small children) are are more likely to be good “company citizens” (Lee,
probably vital for the survival of the species. 1995). For example, they are more likely to volun-
We rely on other people to follow their own self- tarily help others in the workplace and more likely
interest while obeying the rules. They sell us their to promote the excellence of their employer, with-
food in exchange for our money, which is good for out any promise of reward for these behaviors. This
them and for us. No helping or self-sacrifice on their pattern of doing what’s best for the organization,
part is necessary, but it is vital that they obey the without necessarily gaining selfish benefits, has been
called the “good soldier” syndrome (Organ, 1988).
The crucial point is that people behave better when
they think the rules are fair.
Much prosocial behavior is stimulated by others,
such as when someone acts more properly because
other people are watching. Dogs will stay off the
furniture and out of the trash when their owners
are present, but they blithely break those rules when
alone. Humans may have more of a conscience, but
they also still respond to the presence or absence
of others. Public circumstances generally promote
prosocial behavior. Participants in one study sat alone
in a room and followed tape-recorded instructions
(Satow, 1975). Half believed that they were being
observed via a one-way mirror (public condition),
© Steve Skjold/Almay

whereas others believed that no one was watching

(private condition). At the end of the study, the tape-
recorded instructions invited the participant to make
a donation by leaving some change in the jar on the
Others will see how much you contribute. table. The results showed that donations were seven
times higher in the public condition than in the pri-
RULE OF LAW when members of a society respect and follow its rules vate condition. Apparently, one important reason

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 148
for generous helping is to make (or sustain) a good
impression on the people who are watching.
One purpose of prosocial behavior, especially at
cost to self, is to get oneself accepted into the group,
so doing prosocial things without recognition is less
beneficial. Self-interest dictates acting prosocially if it
helps one belong to the group. That is probably why
prosocial behavior increases when others are watch-
ing. Other studies have shown that favors increase
compliance in both private and public settings, but
compliance is greater in public settings (Whatley,
Image not available due to copyright restrictions
Webster, Smith, & Rhodes, 1999).
It may seem cynical to say that people’s prosocial
actions are motivated by wanting to make a good
impression, but one can see this pattern in a positive
light. One theme of this book has been that people
travel a long road to social acceptance. People do
many things to get others to like them, and prosocial
behavior is no exception.

BORN TO RECIPROCATE
Reciprocity is defined as the obligation to return in
kind what another has done for us. Folk wisdom rec-
ognizes reciprocity with such sayings as “You scratch someone or refusing to help has an impact on one’s
my back, and I’ll scratch yours.” Reciprocity norms are reputation within the group. We all know people who
found in all cultures in the world (Triandis, 1978). If I are consistently helpful, and others who are not.
do something for you, and you don’t do anything back Does reciprocity apply to seeking help as well as
for me, I’m likely to be upset or offended, and next giving help? Often you might need or want help,
time around I may not do something for you. If you but you might not always accept help and certainly
do something for me, and I don’t reciprocate, I’m likely might not always seek it out. People’s willingness to
to feel guilty about it. Reciprocity is also found in ani- request or accept help often depends on whether
mals other than humans. For example, social groom- they think they will be able to pay it back (i.e., reci-
ing (cleaning fur) is reciprocated in many species. procity). If they don’t think they can pay the helper
The reciprocity norm is so powerful that it even back, they are less willing to let someone help them
applies to situations in which you do not ask for the (Fisher & Nadler, 1976). This is especially a problem
favor. Phil Kunz, a sociology professor at Brigham among the elderly because their declining health and
Young University in Provo, Utah, sent 578 Christ- income are barriers to reciprocating (Dowd, 1975).
mas cards to a sample of complete strangers living in As a result, they may refuse to ask for help even when
Chicago (Kunz & Woolcott, 1976). When somebody they need it, simply because they believe they will
sends you a card, you feel obligated to send one back. not be able to pay it back.
Does this apply even to complete strangers? Appar- People often have an acute sense of fairness when
ently so, because Dr. Kunz received a total of 117 they are on the receiving end of someone else’s gen-
cards from people who had no idea who he was. He erosity or benevolence, and they prefer to accept help
also received several unexpected long-distance tele- when they think they can pay the person back. We
phone calls from people who had received one of his discuss this sense of fairness in the next section.
Christmas cards. Although most of the cards just con-
tained signatures, a significant number of them con-
tained handwritten notes, long letters, and pictures of BORN TO BE FAIR
family and pets. Only 6 of the 117 people who sent The central theme of this book is that human beings
Kunz cards said they couldn’t remember him. are cultural animals, that the impulse to belong to
Most often people consider reciprocity to be culture is in our genes. Fairness is part of culture.
direct—you help someone who may help you later. Fairness starts with reciprocity. Norms are standards
However, scientists have argued that some reciproc-
ity may be indirect—help someone and receive help RECIPROCITY the obligation to return in kind what another has done for us
from someone else, even strangers who know you NORMS standards established by society to tell its members what types of behavior are typical
only through reputation (Ferriere, 1998). Helping or expected

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 149
established by society to tell its members what types do the survivors miss the dead person, they may even
of behavior are typical or expected. Norms that pro- blame themselves for the suicide.
mote fairness can have an important influence on The concern with fairness makes people feel bad
whether people contribute to the common good when they don’t contribute their fair share, but it
(Biel, Eek, & Gärling, 1999). Two such norms are can also affect people who think that their good per-
equity and equality. Equity means that each person formance makes others feel bad. When we outper-
receives benefits in proportion to what he or she has form others, we may have mixed emotions. On the
contributed (e.g., the person who does the most work one hand, we may feel a sense of pride and pleasure
gets the highest pay). Equality means that everyone because we have surpassed the competition. On the
gets the same amount. Both kinds of fairness are used other hand, we may feel fear and anxiety because
and understood much more widely by humans than those we have outperformed might reject us or retali-
by any other animal. ate. Interpersonal concern about the consequences
According to some evolutionary theories, an indi- of outperforming others has been called sensitivity
vidual’s ability to reproduce largely depends on his or about being the target of a threatening upward
her position within the social group (Buss, 1999). In comparison (Exline & Lobel, 1999). Outperformers
order to maintain fitness-enhancing relationships, the often become distressed when they believe that oth-
individual must continually invest time, energy, and ers are envious that they did not perform as well.
resources in building good relationships with others Is reciprocity unique to humans? More simply,
in the social group. To take without giving some- do animals understand “fairness”? A study of mon-
thing back runs the risk that others might resent you keys provides a fascinating answer (de Waal & Davis,
and might ultimately reject or exclude you from the 2003). The researchers trained monkeys to fetch rocks.
group. After all, hardly any groups can afford to have Each monkey was rewarded with a slice of cucumber
lots of members (other than babies, perhaps) who for each rock collected. The monkeys could see each
take and take without contributing anything. It will other getting these rewards, and they soon learned
be hard to pass on your genes to the next generation to keep bringing rocks to get cucumber slices. Then,
when the people you want to mate with shun you. however, the researchers randomly gave some mon-
People are designed by nature (so to speak) to keys a grape for their rock. To a monkey, a grape is a
belong to a system based on fairness and social much better treat than a slice of cucumber. The mon-
exchange. As one sign of the importance of fairness keys who got the grapes were very happy about this.
to human nature, the feeling that one has no value to The other monkeys were mad, however. They acted as
others—that you are a taker rather than a giver—is a if it were unfair that they only got the cucumber slice
major cause of depression (Allen & Badcock, 2003). for the same act that earned other monkeys a grape.
To be sure, there are plenty of obnoxious people who The ones who didn’t get the grapes protested, such as
take more than they give, but most of them don’t see by refusing to bring more rocks (“going on strike”)
themselves that way. People who do see themselves as or by angrily flinging the cucumber slice away. This
taking more than they give may become depressed. study attracted international media attention, with
To avoid depression, people may seek to contribute the implication being that monkeys understand fair-
their fair share. ness and object to unfairness.
Some suicides may reflect the same concern with Do they really? Perhaps the study was over-
being fair and reciprocal. We saw in Chapter 4 that interpreted. Yes, a monkey is smart enough to
human beings differ from most other animals in that protest when it is treated unfairly. But if unfair-
they commit suicide. One reason some people com- ness per se is the problem, then the monkeys who
mit suicide is that they think they are a burden on received the grapes should have protested too. They
other people—that others do things for them that didn’t. Researchers who study fairness distinguish
they cannot reciprocate, so the others would be bet- between two kinds of unfairness, namely being
ter off if they were dead (Filiberti et al., 2001; Joiner underbenefited (getting less than you deserve) and
et al., 2002). Of course, people are not better off being overbenefited (getting more than you deserve).
when someone commits suicide. Suicide has numer- Monkeys and several other animals seem to have an
ous negative effects on those left behind. Not only acute sense of when they are underbenefited. Only
humans seem to worry about being overbenefited.
A full-blown sense of fairness, one that encompasses
EQUITY the idea that each person receives benefits in proportion to what he or she contributes both aspects, is found only among humans. For peo-
EQUALITY the idea that everyone gets the same amount, regardless of what he or she contributes ple to be truly fair, they must object to being over-
SENSITIVITY ABOUT BEING THE TARGET OF A THREATENING UPWARD COMPARISON interper- benefited as well as to being underbenefited (even if
sonal concern about the consequences of outperforming others the latter objection is stronger).
UNDERBENEFITED getting less than you deserve People do feel guilty when they are overbenefited.
OVERBENEFITED getting more than you deserve In lab studies, people feel guilty if they receive a

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 150
larger reward than others for performing the same 4. Some people feel bad for having lived through
amount or same quality of work (Austin, McGinn, terrible experiences in which many others died.
& Susmilch, 1980). Getting less than your fair share This feeling is called _____.
provokes anger and resentment, but getting more (a) overbenefited
than your fair share produces guilt (Hassebrauck, (b) posttraumatic stress disorder
1986). (c) sensitivity about being the target of a threatening
People who harm others (perhaps without mean- upward comparison
ing to do so) prefer to do something nice for the per- (d) survivor guilt
son they harm, and they prefer the nice act to exactly
match the harm they did, so that fairness and equity
are restored (Berscheid & Walster, 1967). They act
as if the harm they did creates a debt to that person, Cooperation,
and they desire to “pay it back” so as to get the rela-
tionship back on an even, fair footing. Forgiveness, Obedience,
The term survivor guilt was coined to refer to
the observation that some people felt bad for hav-
and Conformity
ing lived through terrible experiences in which many
others died, such as the atomic bombing of Hiro- COOPERATION
shima, Japan, or the death camps in Nazi-occupied Cooperation is a vital and relatively simple form of
Europe (Lifton, 1967; Niederland, 1961). People prosocial behavior. Cooperation is based on reci-
especially felt guilty about family members and other procity: You do your part, and someone else does his
relationship partners who died while they survived. or her part, and together you work toward common
Some gay men who survived AIDS likewise reported goals. Cooperating is vital for social groups to suc-
feeling guilty at being spared at random from the ceed, especially if they are to flourish in the sense of
disease that killed so many of their friends and lov- the whole being more than the sum of its parts.
ers (Wayment, Silver, & Kemeny, 1995). In business, Psychologists have studied cooperation by using
when corporations are forced to fire many employees the prisoner’s dilemma, which forces people to
as part of downsizing, the ones who keep their jobs choose between a cooperative act and another act
often feel guilty toward friends and colleagues who that combines being competitive, exploitative, and
have lost theirs (Brockner, Davy, & Carter, 1985). defensive. The prisoner’s dilemma, a widely studied
All these findings suggest that the human psyche tradeoff, is discussed in detail in Tradeoffs.
has a deep sensitivity to unfairness, and that people Political scientist Robert Axelrod once held a com-
(unlike almost any other animals) feel bad even if the puter tournament designed to investigate the prison-
unfairness is in their favor. er’s dilemma situation using the payoff matrix shown
in ▶ TABLE 9.1. Contestants in the tournament
[ QUIZ YOURSELF ]
submitted computer programs that would compete
in a prisoner’s dilemma game for 200 rounds. These
What Is Prosocial Behavior? followed many different strategies, such as being
1. Henrietta helped Maurille when her first child was antagonistic every round, cooperating every round,
born. When Henrietta has her first child, Maurille or deciding each move at random.
thinks she ought to help Henrietta. This type of
helping illustrates the norm of _____.
(a) equity (b) reciprocity ▶ TABLE 9.1 Prisoner’s Dilemma: Computer Tournament
(c) social justice (d) social responsibility Player 1 (Antagonistic) Player 2 (Cooperative)
2. Albert thinks that because he has more job
Player 2 (Antagonistic) Both get 1 point Player 1 gets 0 points
experience than others on his shift, he should make Player 2 gets 5 points
more money than they do. This illustrates the norm
of _____. Player 2 (Cooperative) Player 2 gets 0 points Both get 3 point
(a) equality (b) equity Player 1 gets 5 points
(c) reciprocity (d) social responsibility
3. At the local soup kitchen, volunteers give everyone
one bowl of soup regardless of how much money SURVIVOR GUILT feeling bad for having lived through a terrible experience in which many
others died
they have or how hungry they are. This type of
COOPERATION when each person does his or her part, and together they work toward a
helping illustrates the norm of _____.
common goal
(a) equality (b) equity
PRISONER’S DILEMMA a game that forces people to choose between cooperation and
(c) reciprocity (d) social responsibility competition

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 151
The Prisoner’s Dilemma
Tradeoffs
The prisoner’s dilemma themselves. Both will go to prison
is a classic tradeoff that for moderately long sentences,
many psychologists though perhaps not as long as the
have adapted for use in research. The dilemma sentence that one gets if the other
arises in a story about two criminals, whom we betrays him.
will call Bart and Mack. They are arrested on The dilemma is thus whether
suspicion of having committed armed robbery, to confess and betray your partner,
and sure enough they are found to be carrying or to hold out and cooperate with
concealed weapons, but the police do not have him. In a broader sense, it is a choice
enough evidence to link them to the robbery. between a cooperative response
Accordingly, the police question them separately. and an antagonistic response. Con-

PhotoDisc
Both men are invited to confess to the crime and fessing betrays your partner for your
hence betray the other. What happens to either own benefit, and it also protects you
of them depends on how both of them react. in case your partner seeks to betray you. Coop- nutshell: whether to selfishly pursue your own
One possibility is that neither man confesses erating (refusing to confess) involves taking a impulses, regardless of the rules and other peo-
to the crime. This is the prosocial option (well, risk that could bring a good outcome for both ple’s welfare, or instead to do what is best for all.
prosocial when crime isn’t involved!): They coop- people, but leaves you vulnerable to the longest The prisoner’s dilemma is called a non-
erate with each other and reject the police’s sentence if your partner chooses to confess. Put zero-sum game, a term from game theory with
deals. If this happens, they can only be convicted another way, both men are better off if both important implications for social life. Zero-sum
of the minor charge of carrying concealed weap- cooperate and refuse to confess, because they games are those in which the winnings and los-
ons. Both men will get a light jail sentence. both get light sentences (see ▶ TABLE 9.2). ings add up to zero. Poker is zero-sum, because
Another possibility is that one man will However, you can get the best outcome for a certain amount of money changes hands,
confess and the other will not. If Bart confesses yourself by confessing while your partner holds but there is no net change in the amount; what
and Mack holds out, then the police will let Bart out, so many people will be tempted to try that some people lose is precisely equal to what
turn state’s evidence. In reward for his testimony route. the others win. Likewise, tennis and chess are
against Mack, Bart can go free (the best pos- Yet another way of understanding the zero-sum, in the sense that one player wins (+1)
sible outcome for Bart); the police will be able to tradeoff is that it is between what is best for one and the other loses (–1), so the sum is zero. But
get Mack convicted of the robbery, and he will person versus what is best for everyone. What is in prisoner’s dilemma, both players can win, or
get a long prison sentence (the worst possible best for you is to confess, because you either get both can lose. If more of human social life can
outcome for Mack). Of course, the outcomes are off totally free (if your partner holds out) or get a be put on a non-zero-sum basis, so that every-
reversed if Bart holds out and Mack confesses. medium rather than a long sentence (if you both one can win or gain something, life might be
The last possibility is that both confess. The betray each other). But the best outcome for better overall (Wright, 2000). Put more simply,
police then do not have to give anyone a free both men is achieved if both refuse to confess. when social interactions are zero-sum, my gain
pass, because both men have incriminated This is the dilemma of human cultural life in a is your loss, so you and I are inevitably working
against each other. Non-zero-sum interactions
▶ TABLE 9.2 Prisoner’s Dilemma: Original Story Version: What Would You Choose? offer the possibility that we can both win, such
as if we cooperate to help each other or solve
Mack Confesses Mack Stays Loyal each other’s problems. Competing and fighting
Bart Confesses Medium prison terms for both Bart goes free; long prison term for are often zero-sum, because one side wins at
Mack the other’s expense. Love, however, is often non-
zero-sum, because two people who love each
Bart Stays Loyal Mack goes free; long prison term Light prison sentences for both
other both gain benefits from the relationship
for Bart
and are better off.

The strategy that gained the most points for Obviously tit-for-tat is closely based on reciproca-
the player was tit-for-tat (Axelrod, 1980): Just do tion, and it is no accident that reciprocation works
whatever the other player did last time. If the other so well: It promotes cooperation when the other
player cooperated, then you should cooperate too. person is cooperative, but it also protects you from
If the other player defected, then you should too. being taken advantage of when the other person is
competitive.
NON-ZERO-SUM GAME an interaction in which both participants can win (or lose) Undoubtedly some people are more coopera-
ZERO-SUM GAME a situation in which one person’s gain is another’s loss tive than others. One difference lies in how people

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 152
Money, Prosocial Behavior, and Self-Sufficiency
MONEY
Matters Human beings derive computer that had a screen saver display with
many benefits from dollar bills (as compared to a blank screen or a
cooperation, helping, display of fish), having participants unscramble
forgiveness, and other prosocial acts. Money, groups of words to make sentences that referred
however, can enable people to purchase many to money (as opposed to neutral topics), and Image not available due
of the same benefits. Money may therefore make even simply displaying a stack of play money to to copyright restrictions
people less prone to engage in prosocial behavior. participants. People who had been reminded of
The idea that money promotes self- money were less likely than others to give help
sufficiency was put forward and tested in a to someone in the experiment, even when that
clever and well-designed set of experiments person specifically asked for help. They were even
(Vohs, Mead, & Goode, 2006). They started with less likely to help a confederate who spilled a box
a common observation. When one doesn’t have of pencils and had to pick them up. help or to ask for help. In a final study, partici-
much money (such as when one is a student!) It wasn’t just that money made people self- pants were asked whether they wanted to work
and has to move to a new apartment, one ish or self-centered, however. In other studies together with someone or alone. Those who had
depends on the help of friends. Perhaps you buy in the same investigation, participants found been primed with money were more likely than
pizza and beer for the group, and everyone helps themselves in difficulty, such as when they were others to choose to work alone.
carry your boxes and furniture to the new place. assigned to work on puzzles that were quite Money is a purely cultural phenomenon, but
In contrast, when people have plenty of money, difficult. They were told they could ask for help cultural attitudes toward money have always
they hire professional movers instead of needing if they needed it. Participants who had been resulted in mixed feelings (e.g., regarding the
their friends to do the work. primed with the idea of money were less likely love of money as the “root of all evil”). The self-
The findings showed that the effects of than others to ask for help and were slower to sufficiency findings suggest why that may be.
money on self-sufficiency come from merely ask for help if they did ask. Money provides benefits, but it also seems to
making people think about money. The manipu- Thus, money seemed to increase self- pull people apart and reduce their prosocial
lations included sitting participants in front of a sufficiency: It made people less likely to give inclinations.

interpret the situation. Cooperators see the pris- cooperate, they can succeed in doing so, for mutual
oner’s dilemma and related situations as an issue of benefit. If either one is not cooperative, then coop-
good versus bad behavior (with cooperation being eration is typically doomed. Cooperation is a fragile
good). Competitors see it as weak versus strong, tendency, easily destroyed. This probably reflects the
with cooperation being weak (Beggan, Messick, & facts of evolution: Across most species, competition
Allison, 1988; Liebrand, Wilke, & Wolters, 1986). is the norm and cooperation is rare. For example,
It is hardly surprising that people are more prone to research has shown that pigeons usually defect dur-
cooperate if they think of cooperation as a sign of ing a tit-for-tat condition of a prisoner’s dilemma
moral goodness than as a sign of weakness. game even though it means earning only one-third
What happens when people with different of the food that they could have earned if they had
approaches are matched in the prisoner’s dilemma cooperated (Green, Price, & Hamburger, 1995). The
game? Sadly, the results show a familiar pattern: bad pigeons choose smaller but more immediate rewards
is stronger than good (Kelley & Stahelski, 1970; rather than larger but delayed rewards. Humans are
Miller & Holmes, 1975; Misra & Kalro, 1979). much better at cooperating than most other animals,
When both players favor cooperation, not surpris- but this should be regarded as small progress in over-
ingly, they both tend to cooperate (and do pretty coming the natural competitive tendencies that are
well). When both lean toward competition, then still alive and well (and strong) in humans too.
the game soon degenerates into everyone choosing Successful cooperation also seems to depend on
the competitive response on every trial, and no one communication. If communication is difficult, there
ends up doing well. When there is one of each, the is less cooperation (Steinfatt, 1973). Communica-
game likewise degenerates into mutual exploitation tion allows for the emergence of cooperation (Miller,
and defensiveness. Thus, two virtuous people can Butts, & Rodes, 2002). Cooperation drops sharply
do well by each other, but if either one plays self- when partners avoid discussion during a prisoner’s
ishly, trust and cooperation are soon destroyed. dilemma game (Kiesler, Sproull, & Waters, 1996).
This is an important and profound insight into how Can money reduce cooperation and helping? To find
people relate to each other. If both people want to out, see Money Matters.

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 153
2005). Couples that forgive each other have higher
levels of relationship satisfaction (e.g., Kachadourian,
Fincham, & Davila, 2004, 2005). But what causes
what? Researchers have recently begun tracking
couples over time, to see which comes first (Paleari,
Regalia, & Fincham, 2005). Partners who forgave
each other for doing something wrong were happier
than other couples six months later. In contrast, ear-
lier satisfaction with the relationship did not predict
later forgiveness. This pattern of findings indicates
Image not available due to copyright restrictions that forgiveness leads to better relationships, not vice
versa.
The benefits of forgiveness have been well docu-
mented in research, even attracting attention from
the positive psychology movement. It is fairly obvi-
ous that being forgiven is beneficial to the person
who did something wrong, because the person no
longer needs to feel guilty or owes a debt to the one
who has been hurt. Perhaps more surprisingly, for-
giveness also has great benefits for the forgivers. They
report better physical and mental health than victims
who hold grudges (Coyle & Enright, 1997; Freed-
FORGIVENESS man & Enright, 1996; Witvliet, Ludwig, & van der
Forgiveness is an important category of proso- Laan, 2001).
cial behavior (e.g., Exline, Worthington, Hill, & The downside of forgiveness may be that it invites
McCullough, 2003). Forgiveness is complicated to people to offend again. So far, research has suggested
define, but in general it refers to ceasing to feel angry that this is not typical. If anything, it seems that
toward and ceasing to seek retribution against some- offenders are glad to be forgiven and often feel grate-
one who has wronged you. According to theories ful, which may motivate them to perform more good
of fairness, reciprocity, and equity, if someone does deeds. In a study by Kelln and Ellard (1999; see also
something bad to you, that person owes you a kind Wallace, Exline, & Baumeister, 2008), participants
of debt—an obligation to do something positive for were led to believe they had accidentally broken
you to offset the bad deed. Forgiveness in that con- some laboratory equipment. They received a message
text involves releasing the person from this obliga- of forgiveness, or retribution, or both, or neither.
tion, just as one might cancel a monetary debt. This Later, the experimenter asked for a favor. Those who
does not mean that you condone what the person had been forgiven were most willing to do the favor.
did. It just means that you won’t hold it against him Thus, instead of inviting repeat offenses, forgiveness
or her. led to more prosocial behavior.
As we have seen, human beings have longer- How does forgiveness lead to more satisfying rela-
lasting relationships than most other animals, and tionships? One answer is that when someone refuses
forgiveness is an important contributor to this. When to forgive a loved one for doing something wrong,
people hurt, disappoint, or betray each other, the bad this tends to come up again in future conflicts, mak-
feelings can damage the relationship and drive the ing them harder to resolve (Fincham, Beach, &
people to leave it. Forgiveness can help heal the rela- Davila, 2004). “It’s just like when you forgot my
tionship and enable people to go on living or work- birthday last year!” When each new conflict prompts
ing together (McCullough, Pargament, & Thoresen, the couple to bring up unforgiven old grudges, minor
2000). The more strongly someone is committed to a arguments quickly become major fights, and this sets
particular relationship, the more likely he or she is to the couple on the downward spiral that is typical of
forgive an offense by the other partner (Finkel, Rus- unhappy, problem-filled relationships (see Chapter
bult, Kumashiro, & Hannon, 2002). 12). Forgiveness can help prevent this destructive
Forgiveness is an important part of a success- pattern from starting.
ful romantic or marital relationship, as is increas- Forgiveness is linked to seeing the other person’s
ingly recognized by both researchers and spouses perspective and hence avoiding some cognitive biases
themselves (Fenell, 1993; Fincham, Hall, & Beach, that can drive people apart. When any two people
have a conflict, especially if one does something to
FORGIVENESS ceasing to feel angry toward or seek retribution against someone who has hurt the other, people tend to perceive and under-
wronged you stand it in biased ways. The victim tends to emphasize

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 154

Associated Press, Vatican

© Reuters/Corbis
In a 1981 internationally notorious hate crime, Mehmet Ali Agca shot Pope John Paul II four times. While still in the hospital, the pope
publicly forgave the man who had tried to kill him. He even visited the man in prison. Although he was an old man when he was shot, the
pope recovered from his wounds and went on to live a very active life for many years. Religious people tend to be more forgiving than
others, and forgiving is good for the health of the forgiver.

all the bad consequences (“That really hurt my feel- have performed a similar offense, you become more
ings”), while the perpetrator may focus on external willing to forgive (Exline, Baumeister, Zell, Kraft, &
factors that reduce his or her blame (“I couldn’t help Witvliet, 2008). In contrast, ruminating about what
it”). Hence they don’t understand or sympathize someone did to you can increase anger, which in turn
with each other. People in highly satisfying dat- makes forgiveness less likely (McCullough, Bono, &
ing relationships don’t show those biases (Kearns & Root, 2007).
Fincham, 2005). Instead, they see the other person’s Some persons are also more forgiving than oth-
point of view better (“I know you couldn’t help it”). ers. Religious people forgive more readily than non-
Couples who think that way are more willing to for- religious people (e.g., Tsang, McCullough, & Hoyt,
give each other and hence better able to recover from 2005), in part because religions generally promote
a misdeed. Forgiveness helps couples get past even and encourage values that help people live together,
such relationship-threatening events as sexual infidel- and in fact some religions prominently extol forgiv-
ity, enabling the relationship to survive and recover ing as an important virtue. (For example, the most
(Hall & Fincham, 2006). famous and widely repeated prayer in the Christian
Why don’t people forgive? Research has identified religion couples a request for forgiveness with a
several major barriers that reduce willingness to for- promise to forgive others: “And forgive us our debts,
give. One fairly obvious factor is the severity of the as we forgive our debtors” (Matthew 6:12).) In con-
offense: The worse the person treated you, the harder trast, narcissistic individuals are often “too proud
it is to forgive (Exline et al., 2003). Another is a low to let go” when they have been offended (Exline,
level of commitment to the relationship (Finkel et Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004).
al., 2002). In a sense, forgiving is making a gener- These conceited and self-centered individuals have
ous offer to renounce anger and claims for retribu- a broad belief that they deserve special, preferential
tion as a way of helping to repair and strengthen the treatment, and they are outraged when someone
relationship, and people are more willing to do this offends them. They are easily offended and generally
for relationships that are very important to them. think they deserve some major compensation before
Apologies also help elicit forgiveness. When some- they will consider forgiving.
one has wronged you but is sincerely remorseful and
expresses an apology, you are much more willing to
forgive than when no such apology or remorse is OBEDIENCE
expressed (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982; Gonzales, Obedience to orders can be prosocial, and in many
Haugen, & Manning, 1994). Inner processes also respects it is highly desirable that people carry out
can lead toward or away from forgiveness. In particu- the orders of their superiors. Large groups such as
lar, how the person thinks about the transgression
can be decisive. If you think that you might easily OBEDIENCE following orders from an authority figure

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 155
a mild-mannered, middle-aged man who was actu-
ally a confederate. The man mentioned that he had a
heart condition.
The experimenter showed the participant an
impressive-looking shock delivery apparatus, which
had a row of switches with labels running from
“Mild shock” up to “Danger: Severe shock” and then
even “XXX.” The experimenter said that each time
the learner made a mistake, the participant should
flick a switch, starting from the mildest shock (15
volts) and working upward toward the most severe
shock (450 volts), in 15-volt increments. The experi-
menter said that although the shocks were painful,

Obedience © 1965 Stanley Milgram

they would not be lethal.
They started the exercise, and the learner kept
making mistakes. The participant sat by the experi-
menter, who instructed him or her to deliver shocks.
Although the learner was in another room, the par-
ticipant could still hear him. (Subsequent studies
Conducting the Milgram study, the experimenter attaches shock electrodes to showed that people were less willing to deliver severe
the wrists of the “learner” (actually a confederate) while the “teacher” (the real shocks if the learner was in the same room with
participant) helps out. them, as opposed to being out of sight.) If the par-
ticipant hesitated, the experimenter had a standard
series of prods that commanded the participant to
military units, corporations, and sports teams cannot continue. To make it harder to continue, the learner
function effectively without some degree of obedi- followed a script that included groaning, screaming
ence. If people refuse to follow the leader’s directions, in pain, banging on the wall, and shouting that he
the group degenerates into an ineffective collection had a heart condition, that his heart was starting to
of individuals. bother him, and that he did not want to continue
Social psychologists have generally taken a dim the study. Eventually the learner stopped respond-
view of obedience. This attitude can be traced to ing at all, so for all the participant knew, the learner
one of the classic studies in the field. In 1963, Stan- had passed out or died. The experimenter, however,
ley Milgram published a report called “Behavioral said to treat no response as a mistake and therefore to
Study of Obedience.” His research interest, like that continue delivering higher shocks.
of many psychologists at the time, was shaped by the Before he ran the study, Milgram surveyed a
disturbing events of World War II, including large- group of psychiatrists for predictions as to what
scale massacres of civilians by Nazi German troops. would happen. How many participants would go
After the war, the international outcry against these all the way and deliver the most severe shock of 450
atrocities presented an ongoing challenge to social sci- volts? The psychiatrists had faith that the participants
ence to account for how seemingly ordinary, decent, would resist authority, and they predicted that only 1
well-intentioned individuals could do such things. in 1,000 would be willing to deliver the most severe
Many of the killers defended themselves by saying shocks. In the actual study, the majority of partici-
“I was only following orders.” The odds are that if pants (62.5%) went all the way up to the maximum
someone asked you whether you might have helped shock (see ▶ FIGURE 9.1)! To be sure, this wasn’t easy
kill Jews, homosexuals, Roma (gypsies), communists, for them: Many showed acute signs of distress, such
and other defenseless civilians if you had lived in Nazi as sweating, making sounds, and sometimes having
Germany, you would say no. Most people would say fits of nervous laughter that seemed out of control.
that they would have behaved more like Oskar Schin- But they still did what they were told.
dler than like the Nazi soldiers (see the story at the Social psychologist Jerry Burger recently repli-
beginning of this chapter). But would they really? cated Milgram’s findings and found nearly identical
Milgram set up a study to see whether Ameri- results, although he had to stop at 150 volts for ethi-
cans would in fact follow orders that might injure cal reasons (“People,” 2008). Even after hearing cries
or possibly kill someone. Participants were recruited of pain, 70% of participants kept shocking (Milgram
for a study on learning, and when they arrived they found that 80% of participants kept shocking after
were told that they would play the role of a teacher 150 volts).
who would deliver electric shocks as punishment for Much has been said and written about Milgram’s
mistakes made by a learner. They met the learner: studies (including some serious debates as to whether

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 156
it is ethical for researchers to put their participants 100
through such experiences). The intellectual commu- Learner complains of pain
nity was deeply shocked (no pun intended) to learn 90

Percent of subjects still obedient

how far American citizens, despite the moral lessons Pleads to be let out
of Nazi Germany, would obey orders to hurt another 80
person. Screams and refuses
Milgram’s research has given obedience a bad 70 to answer
name. His study was published in the early 1960s,
and the rest of that decade saw a broad countercul-
60
tural movement in which many young and some
older people became hostile to authority and asserted
50
that disobedience was a positive good, a right, and
even an obligation. Bumper stickers such as “Ques-
tion Authority!” abounded. 0
0 75 150 225 300 375 450
Yet, again, obedience can usually be a good thing. “Moderate” “Strong” “Very strong” “Intense” “Danger “XXX”
As we have already noted, very few organizations can severe”
function properly without obedience. Even fami- Increasing (intensity)
lies would fall apart if children refused to obey their
parents’ rules. Milgram’s study focused on a peculiar Shock level
situation in which obedience has morally bad out- (From Milgram, 1965)

comes, but this is exceptional. In most situations, ▶ FIGURE 9.1 Results from the Milgram experiment, showing that most
obedience produces good outcomes. For example, participants (62.5%) would deliver severe shocks to someone even if it harmed
how could a football team win a game if the pass that person.
receivers refused to obey the quarterback’s play call-
ing, or indeed if they disobeyed the orders of the ref-
erees? What would happen if people refused to obey
traffic signals?
The fact that people obeyed Milgram’s instruc-
tions may reveal an important fact about human
nature, and one that depicts it as less morally bank-
rupt than is often said. People are naturally inclined
to belong to groups, to seek social acceptance, and to
put other people first. When a seemingly legitimate
authority figure gives them commands, they tend to
obey. This tendency does contain some danger, such
as when a misguided, power-hungry, or irresponsible
leader gives immoral commands. But the willing-
ness to obey authority figures is probably an impor-

© Bill Aron/PhotoEdit
tant and positive aspect of human psychology that
enables people to live effectively in large groups (and
hence in culture). Obedience is ultimately prosocial
behavior, because it supports group life and helps cul-
tures to succeed. Milgram’s studies provide caution- In the 1960s bumper stickers like this appeared everywhere.
ary evidence that obedience can be abused and can,
under extraordinary circumstances, lead to immoral
actions. But those circumstances are rare exceptions, lesson that obedience to authority is bad. You’re likely
and they should not blind us to the (mostly) proso- to see the professor suddenly change her or his tune
cial benefits of obedience. about the value of obeying rules! (Don’t actually try
In a sense, participants who refused to obey the this. You might get expelled from your university!)
authority figure in a Milgram study were still obeying
some rules—typically moral rules. Human cultural
life sometimes contains conflicting rules, and some- CONFORMITY
times people obey the wrong ones. If your professor Conformity is going along with the crowd (see
tells you that obedience is bad, then try this: During Chapter 8). Like obedience, conformity has had
the next exam, discuss the questions in a loud voice a bad reputation among social psychologists, and
with the students seated near you, and if the profes-
sor objects, bring up the Milgram study’s ostensible CONFORMITY going along with the crowd

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 157

© Joseph Farris/ CartoonStock

© Laurence Mouton/PhotoAlto/Corbis
this stems in part from influential early studies that
depicted people doing foolish, irrational, or bad
things in order to conform. The broader point, how-
ever, may be that conformity is prosocial, insofar as
the studies show how people put other people first
and exhibit a strong desire to get along with others.
If people put themselves first, by being selfish, proso-
cial behavior decreases (Silfver, Helkama, Lönnqvist, Most women wash their hands after using a public
& Verkasalo, 2008). restroom—but only if they think someone else is
People conform to the behavior of others more, watching!
and in general conform to social norms more, when
others are watching (Insko, Smith, Alicke, Wade, &
[ QUIZ YOURSELF ]
Taylor, 1985). For example, do people wash their
hands after using the toilet in a public restroom? Cooperation, Forgiveness,
One study found that most women (77%) did—but Obedience, and Conformity
only if they thought someone else was in the rest-
room too (Munger & Harris, 1989). Among the 1. Psychiatrists predicted that _____ participants
women who thought they were alone, only a minor- would go all the way in Milgram’s experiment,
ity (39%) washed their hands. (So if your date goes giving the maximum shock level (450 volts) to the
to the bathroom alone, you might think twice about confederate.
holding hands!) The motivation behind socially (a) 1 in 10 (b) 1 in 50
desirable behavior (such as washing hands after using (c) 1 in 100 (d) 1 in 1,000
the toilet) can be to gain acceptance and approval 2. A hockey coach orders a player to injure an
from others. opposing team’s star player. Although the player is
Recent research shows that the presence of con- personally opposed to intentionally injuring other
formists dramatically increases the group size for players, he follows the coach’s order. This illustrates
which cooperation can be sustained (Guzmán, _____.
Rodríguez-Sickert, & Rowthorn, 2007). In other (a) conformity (b) compliance
words, tendency toward conformity enables people (c) cooperation (d) obedience
to function better in larger groups. Larger groups 3. The results from Milgram’s experiments are
are good for culture because larger groups produce generally taken to show that _____.
more culture (e.g., art, music, science) than smaller (a) males are more physically aggressive than
groups. females
To learn more about conformity and restaurants, (b) people can be sadistic
see Food for Thought. It includes information that (c) people often are resistant to situational pressures
might change the way you order your food for years (d) situational pressures can overwhelm individual
to come. differences

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 158

Food Restaurants, Rules, and the Bad Taste of Nonconformity

for
Thought Earlier in this chapter same food that someone else in the party
we suggested that has already ordered. Of course, there is
conforming to rules no need to order different things. The
is an important form of prosocial behavior, restaurant almost certainly has enough
without which society would disintegrate into chicken for everyone who wants it. None-
chaos. The Outback Steakhouse restaurant has theless, people seem to order different
for years advertised “No Rules” as its slogan. things.
Do they really mean no rules apply? If you and A careful research project by Ariely
six friends ate an ample meal there and then and Levav (2000) confirmed that people
refused to pay, citing “no rules” as your justifica- do in fact order different foods. In their

PhotoDisc
tion, would the restaurant managers approve? first study, they tracked the orders of
Or how about if you grabbed food off the hundreds of diners at a restaurant, to see
plates of other diners, or decided to run naked how often people ordered the same ver-
through their kitchen (violating Food and Drug sus different entrees. They then used a computer (and therefore got what he or she wanted) was
Administration rules, which are in force regard- simulation to form other groups at random, for also pretty happy. But things weren’t so good for
less of the restaurant’s advertising slogans or comparison purposes. This comparison showed the people who ordered later and often made a
policies). If you were to try any or all of these that people who are together ordered different point of not ordering the same item that the first
behaviors at the nearest Outback Steakhouse, foods more often than they would by chance. person had ordered. Those individuals were less
you’ll quickly discover that they have plenty of In a second experiment, they let people satisfied with what they got.
rules after all. order from a menu of different beers. By random It’s not entirely clear why people feel the
Not all restaurant behavior involves con- assignment, some of the groups had to order urge to order something different. Perhaps they
forming. In fact, psychologists have recently in secret, while the others ordered aloud in the just think that conformity is bad, so they try to
documented a curious pattern of deliberate non- usual manner. When diners didn’t know what the avoid conforming to what someone else has
conformity among restaurant diners. The surpris- others were having, they often ordered the same done. But conformity is not really so bad. The
ing thing, though, is that it often leaves people beer, but when they heard someone else order people who order the same item, when it is their
less satisfied with their meal than they might a particular beer, they switched to order some- first choice, end up enjoying it more than the
otherwise have been. thing different. ones who switch to a second choice just to be
“I’ll have the chicken.” Perhaps surprisingly, this impulse to order different.
“Hey, I was going to order the chicken! But something different makes people less satis- Apparently, the best practice is just to order
that’s OK, I’ll order something else.” fied with their food or drink. The researchers your first choice, even if somebody else has
Have you ever heard such an exchange? When found that when diners ordered in secret (and already ordered it. Your second choice really
people eat together in a restaurant, they often therefore often ordered the same thing), they won’t taste as good, on average. Instead of trying
act as if there were only one of each item on the were pretty happy with what they had. When to be different and nonconforming, just order
menu and feel some obligation not to order the they ordered aloud, the person who ordered first what you would like best!

4. The tendency for people to go along with the forced to wear Jewish stars, and people were
crowd is called _____. herded and shut up into ghettos. Then, in
(a) compliance (b) conformity the years ‘41 and ‘42 there was plenty of
(c) cooperation (d) obedience public evidence of pure sadism. With people
behaving like pigs, I felt the Jews were being
destroyed. I had to help them. There was no
choice.
Why Do People
Several Schindlerjuden (“Schindler Jews”) sur-
Help Others? vivors were asked the same question about Oskar
Schindler’s motives for helping them. Here are some
In a 1964 interview, Oskar Schindler was asked why of their responses (cited in Aberly, 2004):
he helped the Jews. He answered:
He was an adventurer. He was like an actor
The persecution of Jews in occupied Poland who always wanted to be center stage. He got
meant that we could see horror emerging into a play and he could not get out of it.
gradually in many ways. In 1939, they were —Johnathan Dresner

WHY DO PEOPLE HELP OTHERS? • 269

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 159
what about giving help? In the animal world, the

From Burnstein et al., “Some neo-Darwinian decision rules for altruism: Weighing cues
for inclusive fitness as a function of the biological importance of the decision,” Journal
3.0

of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 773-789. Copyright © 1994 by the American
costs of helping are easy to spot. A hungry animal
2.8
that gives its food to another has less left for itself.
2.6 Selfish animals that don’t share are less likely to
2.4
starve. Hence evolution should generally favor self-
Tendency to help

ish, unhelpful creatures. Indeed, Richard Dawkins

2.2 (1976/1989) wrote a book titled The Selfish Gene.

Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

2.0 According to Dawkins, genes are selfish in that they
build “survival machines” to increase the number of
1.8
copies of themselves. The helpfulness of people like
1.6 Schindler likewise carries risks; he would probably
Everyday have been imprisoned and executed if he had been
1.4
Life or death caught.
1.2
0% 12.5% 25% 50%
One way that evolution might support some
helping is between parents and children. Parents who
Genetic relatedness
helped their children more would be more successful
▶ FIGURE 9.2 As genetic relatedness increases, helping also increases, in both at passing on their genes. Although evolution favors
everyday situations and life-or-death situations (Burnstein et al., 1994). helping one’s children, children have less at stake in
the survival of their parents’ genes. Thus, parents
should be more devoted to their children, and more
Schindler was a drunkard. Schindler was willing to make sacrifices to benefit them, than chil-
a womanizer. His relations with his wife dren should be to their parents. In general, we should
were bad. He often had not one but several help people who have our genes, a theory known as
girlfriends. Everything he did put him in kin selection (Darwin, 1859/n.d.; Hamilton, 1964).
jeopardy. If Schindler had been a normal man, For example, you should be more likely to help a sib-
he would not have done what he did. ling (who shares 1/2 of your genes) than a nephew
—Mosche Bejski (who shares 1/4 of your genes) or a cousin (who
shares 1/8 of your genes). There is plenty of research
We owe our lives to him. But I wouldn’t
evidence that people do help their family members
glorify a German because of what he did
and close relatives more than they help other people.
for us.
In both life-or-death and everyday situations, we
—Danka Dresner
are more likely to help others who share our genes
I couldn’t make him out . . . I think he felt (Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994). How-
sorry for me. ever, life-or-death helping is affected more strongly
—Helen Rosenzweig by genetic relatedness than is everyday helping (see
▶ FIGURE 9.2).
I don’t know what his motives were, even
Research has shown that genetically identical twins
though I knew him very well. I asked him
(who share 100% of their genes) help each other sig-
and I never got a clear answer. But I don’t give
nificantly more than fraternal twins (who share 50%
a damn. What’s important is that he saved
of their genes) (Segal, 1984). Likewise, survivors of a
our lives.
fire at a vacation complex said that when they real-
—Ludwik Feigenbaum
ized the complex was on fire, they were much more
People might have several different motives for likely to search for family members than for friends
helping. The Jews who were saved by Schindler dur- (Sime, 1983).
ing World War II attributed to him several different Thus, the natural patterns of helping (that favor
motives. Some thought he was selfish, some thought family and other kin) are still there in human nature.
he was altruistic and heroic, and some thought he However, people do help strangers and non-kin much
was crazy. In this section we explore some of the pos- more than other animals do. People are not just like
sible reasons why people help others. other animals, but they are not completely differ-
ent either. Humans are cultural animals, selected by
nature to participate with nonrelatives in a larger
EVOLUTIONARY BENEFITS society. Our natural inclinations to help kin have
It is clear that receiving help increases the likelihood been amplified via emotional responses to translate
of passing one’s genes on to the next generation, but into more far-reaching actions.
Empathy is an especially important emotion
when it comes to understanding why people help.
KIN SELECTION the evolutionary tendency to help people who have our genes Dramatic evidence for this was provided in a study

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 160
that this is something that sets humans apart from
even their closest animal relatives.

TWO MOTIVES FOR HELPING:

ALTRUISM AND EGOISM
The 19th-century philosopher Auguste Comte
(1875) described two forms of helping based on
very different motives. One form he called egoistic
helping, in which the helper wants something
in return for offering help. The helper’s goal is to
increase his or her own welfare. The other form he
called altruistic helping, in which the helper expects
nothing in return for offering help. The helper’s goal
in this case is to increase another’s welfare.
These two different types of helping are produced
by two different types of motives (see ▶ FIGURE
9.3). Altruistic helping is motivated by empathy, an
emotional response that corresponds to the feelings
of the other person. When people see a person in
© JupiterImages/Brand X/Alamy distress, they usually feel that person’s distress; when
they see a person who is sad, they feel that person’s
sadness. The sharing of feelings makes people want
to help the sufferer to feel better.
The ability to experience another person’s pain is
characteristic of empathy. One study (Singer, Sey-
Research indicates that we are more likely to help mour, O’Doherty, Kaube, Dolan, & Frith, 2004)
others who have our genes. used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to assess brain activity while participants experienced
of 18-month-old toddlers (Warneken & Tomasello, a painful shock (represented by green in Figure 9.4).
2006). When the adult researcher dropped some- They then compared it to the brain activity while
thing, the human toddlers immediately tried to help, participants watched a loved one experience a pain-
such as by crawling over to where it was, picking it ful shock (represented by red in ▶ FIGURE 9.4).
up, and giving it to him. (The babies also seemed The researchers used couples as participants
to understand and empathize with the adult’s men- because couples are likely to feel empathy for each
tal state. If the researcher simply threw something other. The study found that the brain’s reaction was
on the floor, the babies didn’t help retrieve it. They about the same for receiving shocks as for watching
only helped if the adult seemed to want help.) The
researchers then repeated this experiment with chim-
panzees. The chimps were much less helpful, even EGOISTIC HELPING when a helper seeks to increase his or her own welfare by helping another
though the human researcher was a familiar friend. ALTRUISTIC HELPING when a helper seeks to increase another’s welfare and expects nothing
This work suggests that humans are hardwired to in return
cooperate and help each other from early in life, and EMPATHY reacting to another person’s emotional state by experiencing the same emotional state

Adopt other’s
Emotion Motive Behavior
perspective

Reduce other’s
Yes Empathy Altruism
distress (help)
Perception that someone
needs help
Personal Reduce own
No Egoism
distress distress (help?)

▶ FIGURE 9.3 Two routes to helping: The top route is motivated by altruism, whereas the bottom route is
motivated by egoism.

WHY DO PEOPLE HELP OTHERS? • 271

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 161
needy that overshadowed all other attributes except
their dependence on aid.” Schindler said about the
Jews he helped: “I had to help them. There was no
choice.” On the face of it, the statement is wrong: Of
course he had a choice. But in another sense, he felt
he didn’t. He cared about the Jews as fellow human
beings, and he felt their suffering. Turning his back
or shutting his eyes would not have been enough to
make him forget their suffering, so he felt he had to
help them.
Stanislaw Dobrowolski, the director of a council
to save Polish Jews in Nazi-occupied Krakow, dis-
missed Schindler’s altruistic motives altogether (cited
in Aberly, 2004). In his view, Schindler’s heroism was
Image not available due to copyright restrictions more about his own ego trip than about any altruis-
tic concern to reduce the suffering of others.
Untangling these different motives for helping has
been an ongoing challenge for social psychologists.
One study (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, &
Birch, 1981) was presented to participants as a test
of the effects of stress on task performance. Through
a rigged lottery, the “other participant” (actually a
confederate named Elaine) was assigned to perform
10 trials of a task while receiving random electric
shocks (the stressor) on each trial. The real partici-
pant watched Elaine over a closed-circuit TV. Before
the study began, the participant overheard a conver-
sation in which Elaine told the experimenter that she
was afraid of receiving the shocks because as a child
she had been thrown from a horse into an electric
fence. Ever since that experience, she had been terri-
one’s lover receive shocks. Brain activation also cor- fied of electricity. The experimenter apologized, but
related with individual empathy scores—the more said Elaine would have to receive the shocks anyway
empathic people said they were, the more brain because she had lost the coin toss.
activity they experienced while watching their part- To manipulate empathy, the researchers told half
ner suffer. of the participants that Elaine’s values and interests
According to the empathy–altruism hypothesis were very similar to their own (high-empathy con-
(Batson, Batson, Slingsby, Harrell, Peekna, & Todd, dition). People feel more empathy toward someone
1991), empathy motivates people to reduce other they believe is similar to themselves. The other par-
people’s distress, as by helping or comforting them. ticipants were told that Elaine’s values and interests
How can we tell the difference between egoistic and were quite different (low-empathy condition). To
altruistic motives? When empathy is low, people can test for egoistic motives for helping, the researchers
reduce their own distress either by helping the per- also manipulated how difficult it was to escape. In
son in need or by escaping the situation so they don’t the easy-escape condition, participants were told that
have to see the person suffer any longer. If empathy they could leave after watching Elaine get shocked
is high, however, then simply shutting your eyes or on the first two trials. In the difficult-escape condi-
leaving the situation won’t work because the other tion, participants were told that they would have to
person is still suffering. In that case, the only solu- watch all 10 trials. Participants who were only con-
tion is to help the victim feel better. cerned about their own feelings would not have to
Nechama Tec (1986), a sociology professor and a help Elaine in the easy-escape condition. Instead they
survivor of the Nazis in Poland, has extensively stud- could just walk away and forget about her suffering.
ied non-Jews who rescued Jews. She concluded that After watching Elaine suffer through two tri-
the rescuers had “universalistic perceptions of the als, the participant was asked whether she would
be willing to trade places with Elaine as a way of
helping her avoid further suffering. Consistent with
EMPATHY–ALTRUISM HYPOTHESIS the idea that empathy motivates people to reduce other empathy–altruism theory, almost all the participants
people’s distress, as by helping or comforting in the high-empathy group traded places with Elaine,

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 162
regardless of whether it was easy or difficult to escape Easy-escape Difficult-escape
(see ▶ FIGURE 9.5). In the low-empathy group,

High empathy
participants left if it was easy for them to escape the
unpleasant task of watching Elaine suffer. If it was dif- 90% 82%
ficult to escape, more than half of them traded places
with Elaine (rather than watch her suffer longer).

Low empathy
The Batson et al. (1981) study provided evidence
for both kinds of helping. In the low-empathy con- 18% 65%
dition, people helped only to make themselves feel
good. If they could walk away and ignore the victim’s
suffering, many chose that path. In contrast, people
who felt high empathy helped regardless of whether
▶ FIGURE 9.5 In the Batson et al. (1981)
study, people in the high-empathy group helped
they were allowed to escape. High-empathy helping
regardless of whether escape was easy or difficult.
is centered on the victim’s needs, not on one’s own
In the low-empathy group, people helped mainly
prospects for feeling good.
when they could not escape.
There are two alternative hypotheses to the
empathy–altruism hypothesis in which helping is trig-
gered by empathy but may still reflect selfish motives
(Batson et al., 1988). According to the empathy– selfish and self-serving? Ultimately the question
specific reward hypothesis, empathy triggers the becomes: Is genuine altruism even possible?
need for social reward (e.g., praise, honor, pride) Social psychologists have split on this debate.
that can be gained by helping. According to the Nobody disputes that some helping is egoistical, in
empathy–specific punishment hypothesis, empa- the sense that people sometimes help in order to gain
thy triggers the fear of social punishment (e.g., benefits for themselves such as improved mood or a
guilt, shame, censure) that can be avoided by help- good reputation. They disagree as to whether egoism
ing. Both of these hypotheses can easily explain the is the only motive. Some point out that people will
results from the Batson et al. (1981) study described help even when they could feel better by other, sim-
above. Batson and his colleagues (1988), however, pler means, such as by escaping the situation (as in
conducted five additional studies and found support the previous study with Elaine). They also think it
for the empathy–altruism hypothesis but not for the is sad to dismiss so much genuine helping as mere
empathy–reward or empathy–specific punishment selfishness—after all, helping someone for selfish
hypotheses. reasons deserves to be recognized as something more
There is another alternative hypothesis to the positive and socially desirable than hurting someone
empathy–altruism hypothesis. When people see for selfish reasons! If we dismiss Schindler’s actions as
someone suffering, they feel bad too. According to those of a self-centered glory hound, do we not make
the negative state relief hypothesis (Cialdini, Darby, the world an uglier, less heroic place—and possibly
& Vincent, 1973), people help others in order to discourage others from taking such heroic risks in
relieve their own distress. This view holds that people the future? Others have argued, however, that even
help mainly to make themselves feel better. However, empathic helping is a way to make oneself feel better.
a meta-analytic review of the literature found little The debate goes on today.
support for the negative state relief hypothesis (Carl- Our view is that the debate cannot be resolved
son & Miller, 1987). because it puts the question the wrong way. It may
well be true that people feel better when they help
and that these good feelings promote helping. But
IS ALTRUISM POSSIBLE? instead of supporting a negative conclusion about
As they conducted research on whether helping is people—that people are always basically selfish—this
driven by empathy and sympathy for victims or by should foster a more positive, optimistic view. Isn’t it
the selfish desire to feel better, social psychologists great that natural selection selected human beings to
gradually became involved in a centuries-old debate be able to get pleasure from helping others?
about whether people are basically good or evil—or,
more to the point, basically good or selfish. Many
philosophers have asked whether people really per-
EMPATHY–SPECIFIC REWARD HYPOTHESIS the idea that empathy triggers the need for social
form morally good actions such as altruistic helping reward (e.g., praise, honor, pride) that can be gained by helping
if they are motivated by a desire to feel good. In a EMPATHY–SPECIFIC PUNISHMENT HYPOTHESIS the idea that empathy triggers the fear of social
nutshell, the argument is this: If you donate money punishment (e.g., guilt, shame, censure) that can be avoided by helping
to charity or help a needy victim because it makes NEGATIVE STATE RELIEF HYPOTHESIS the idea that people help others in order to relieve their
you feel good to do so, aren’t you really just being own distress

WHY DO PEOPLE HELP OTHERS? • 273

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 163

Image not available due to copyright restrictions

The conflict between selfish impulses and social 2. Eliza trips, falls, and begins to cry. When Mariah sees
conscience has been one theme of this book. Often Eliza crying in pain, she starts to cry too. Mariah’s
people have to be socialized to resist selfish impulses response is called _____.
so as to do what is best for society and culture (a) altruism (b) egoism
(Baumeister, 2005). Children must be taught to (c) empathy (d) reactance
share, to take turns, and to respect the property of 3. After seeing a victim of misfortune, empathy
others, for example. The fact that nature has enabled motivates us to _____.
people to feel empathy for the suffering of others and (a) gain the approval of bystanders
to feel good when they lend help is one (very wel- (b) gain the approval of the victim
come and constructive) way to avoid that conflict. (c) reduce our own discomfort
The social conscience is there to make people do (d) reduce the discomfort of the victim
what is best for others, and for society at large, even 4. After seeing a victim of misfortune, personal distress
when doing so means overriding selfish impulses. motivates us to _____.
The fact that people can get satisfaction from help- (a) gain the approval of bystanders
ing others makes it easier for the social conscience to (b) gain the approval of the victim
accomplish this. If no one ever got any satisfaction (c) reduce our own discomfort
from doing good deeds, there would probably be far (d) reduce the discomfort of the victim
fewer good deeds.
Selfishness may be part of human nature, but so
is helpfulness. Human beings help their children and
kin, their friends, and sometimes even total strangers. Who Helps Whom?
It is unfair to call them selfish just because this help-
ing is often motivated by the fact that helping feels Before we look at specific factors that differentiate
good. The innately prepared pleasure we get from who helps whom, let us consider the big picture. One
helping is one important element in the basic good- thing that is special and remarkable about humans is
ness of human nature (see also Peterson & Seligman, their willingness to help others, even unrelated oth-
2004; Snyder & Lopez, 2002). ers. Imagine that you were offered a chance to get
Are some people more likely to help than others? some nice reward for yourself, maybe money or good
If so, who are they? We discuss this topic in the next food. You could either get it just for yourself, or you
section. could get a duplicate of your reward delivered to
someone you had known for 15 years (and still get
your own full reward). Which would you choose?
[ QUIZ YOURSELF ]
Most people would eagerly choose to benefit a friend
Why Do People Help or acquaintance, especially if they could do so with-
Others? out cost to themselves.
Yet when this exact experiment was tried on
1. Jean Luc’s house is on fire. His grandparents, wife, chimps, the results were quite different. Chimps are
children, and cousins are in the house. Based on kin closely related to human beings, but they did not
selection theory, whom should he save first? show any interest in helping their longtime (15-year)
(a) His children (b) His cousins acquaintances. They took the reward for themselves,
(c) His grandparents (d) His wife but they did not do the kind favor for others (Silk et

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 164
al., 2005). Thus, the basic motive to bring help and More than 90% of the individuals who have received
benefits to others who aren’t blood relatives appears Carnegie medals have been men. Females are more
to be something that sets human beings apart from helpful in the family sphere, in close relationships,
our closest animal relatives. and in situations that require repeated contact over
a long period of time such as in volunteering (e.g.,
Aries & Johnson, 1983). Females tend to feel more
HELPFUL PERSONALITY sympathy and empathy for people who need help
Eva Fogelman studied the family backgrounds of than do males (Eisenberg & Lennon, 1983; Hoff-
rescuers of Jews and found some common denomi- man, 1977).
nators: “a nurturing, loving home: an altruistic par- When it comes to receiving help, females are
ent or beloved caretaker who served as a role model more likely to receive help than are males, regardless
for altruistic behavior; a tolerance for people who of whether the helper is male or female. If a car has a
were different” (cited in Robinson, 1995). Similarly, flat tire, for example, people are more likely to stop
Oliner and Oliner (1988; also Midlarsky, Jones, & and help if the owner is female than if the owner
Corley, 2005) studied 231 Gentiles who rescued is male (e.g., Penner, Dertke, & Achenbach, 1973;
Jews in Nazi Europe and 126 nonrescuers matched Pomazal & Clore, 1973).
on age, gender, education, and geographic location Males and females also differ in the types of help
during the war. Rescuers had higher ethical values, they offer their friends and relatives in sexual relation-
had stronger beliefs in equity, had greater empathy, ships. Read The Social Side of Sex to find out how.
and were more likely to see all people as equal.
In a typical questionnaire measure of altruis-
tic personality (Rushton, Fulker, Neale, Nias, & BEAUTIFUL VICTIMS
Eysenck, 1986), respondents are asked to indicate One of the most robust findings in the helping lit-
the frequency with which they have engaged in spe- erature is that people are more likely to help attrac-
cific prosocial behaviors within the past year, such tive individuals than unattractive individuals. This
as helping or offering to help others (e.g., “I have holds true for male and female helpers and for males
donated blood”) and giving to charity (e.g., “I have and females in need of help. This finding has been
given money, goods, or clothes to a charity”). This shown in both laboratory and field settings (e.g.,
scale, called the Self Report Altruism Scale, has been Harrell, 1978). It has been shown in emergency situ-
shown to correlate with peer ratings of altruism, ations and in nonemergency situations. In one study
completion of an organ donor card, and paper-and- (Benson, Karabenick, & Lerner, 1976), for example,
pencil measures of prosocial orientation (Rushton, people using phone booths at airports found a com-
Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981). The altruistic personal- pleted application form in the booth, a photograph
ity also appears to have a genetic component (Rush- of the applicant, and an addressed, stamped envelope.
ton et al., 1986). Half of the photos depicted an attractive applicant;
the other half depicted an unattractive applicant.
Callers were much more likely to mail applications
SIMILARITY for attractive applicants than for unattractive appli-
Research has shown that people are more likely to cants. In another study (West & Brown, 1975),
help someone who is similar to them than someone male college students walking by the student health
who is different. The similarity bias especially works center were approached by a woman who said she
for outward symbols that are readily identifiable, such
as apparel. For example, in one study (Emswiller,
Deaux, & Willits, 1971), hippies were more likely to
help other hippies than non-hippies.

GENDER
Research indicates that males are more helpful than
females in the broader public sphere, toward strang-
ers, and in emergency settings (Eagly & Crowley,
M. Llorden/Getty Images

1986). For example, since 1904 the Carnegie Hero

Fund Commission has given awards to “heroes,”
defined as “a civilian who voluntarily risks his or
her own life, knowingly, to an extraordinary degree
while saving or attempting to save the life of another
person” (Carnegie Hero Fund Commission, 2002). Women, especially beautiful women, are most likely to receive help.

WHO HELPS WHOM? • 275

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 165
the Helping, Sex, and Friends
Social
Side of A sexual relationship that most traveled in same-sex groups. On the
SEX may seem like a private
matter between two
way down, many of these groups made pacts or
other agreements to help each other during the
people, but in fact people depend on help from week. These agreements differed by gender. The
their friends and relatives in multiple ways. Just men generally promised to help each other find
meeting sex partners is often a matter of relying a partner to have sex with. They would agree that
on one’s network. One landmark study of sexual they all wanted to have sex and that they would
practices found that less than half the people support each other’s efforts. If they were shar-
met their sex partners or marriage partners by ing a room, they would make plans as to how to
introducing themselves, such as by approaching keep it discreetly available in case one of them
someone at a bar (Laumann, Gagnon, Michael, wanted to bring a woman there for sex. (For
& Michaels, 1994). (Also, self-introductions were example, the others might agree to stay out late
most likely to lead to short-term affairs rather or even sleep on the beach if someone was hav-
than long-term relationships.) In contrast, many ing sex in the hotel room.) The women, in con-
people were introduced to their lovers by friends, trast, made agreements to help each other avoid
coworkers, or relatives. Family members were having sex. They usually agreed that their goal
responsible for bringing together relatively was to refrain from sex, unless one happened
few sex partners, but the likelihood of those to find true love. They promised each other, for
relationships lasting was especially high, prob- example, that if one of them got drunk and was

Paul Viant/Getty Images

ably because your family knows you and will being “hit on” (that is, targeted with romantic or
only introduce you to someone who is likely sexual advances) by a particular man, the others
to be a good match. If your mother or brother would swoop in and bring her safely away. If they
introduces you to someone, it is probably not for were sharing a room, they might promise not to
the sake of casual sex but rather someone with leave one of them alone in it with a man. Thus,
whom you might have a long-term relationship. males and females differ dramatically in how money) in exchange. Spring break sex is typically
Helping is also apparent in how people act they help their friends in sexual situations. “free” sex that is not accompanied by commit-
on spring break, which for many college stu- Why? The most likely explanation is rooted ment or other resources. From the exchange per-
dents is a brief, exciting time of intense partying in the social exchange theory of sex (see Chap- spective, free sex signifies a good deal for men
and sexual opportunity. A team of researchers ter 12; also Baumeister & Vohs, 2004). In that and a bad one for women. That is why men will
followed a sample of Canadian students who view, society treats sex as something that men try to support and help each other to engage in
traveled to Florida for one spring break (Maticka- want from women, so men give women other free sex, whereas women will try to support and
Tyndale, Herold, & Mewhinney, 1998). They found resources (love, commitment, respect, attention, help each other to avoid that sort of sex.

desperately needed money for a tetanus shot. Male this person blaming the victim? One possible expla-
students were more likely to give the woman money nation is that the person believed that the world is
if she was attractive than if she was unattractive. a just place where people get what they deserve and
deserve what they get, a phenomenon referred to as
belief in a just world (Furnham, 2003; Lerner &
BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD Miller, 1978; Lerner & Simmons, 1966).
When the British marched a group of German civil- One unfortunate consequence of belief in a just
ians around the Belsen concentration camp at the world is that it leads people to blame the victim. They
end of World War II to show them what their soldiers assume that those who suffer a bad fate had it coming
had done, one civilian said, “What terrible criminals to them. For example, people assume that rape vic-
these prisoners must have been to receive such treat- tims must have behaved or dressed provocatively, that
ment” (Hewstone, 1990). This statement was not poor people are lazy, and that sick people are respon-
made by a guard who was trying to justify his behav- sible for their illness. On the other hand, “blaming
ior; it was made by an innocent civilian. Why was the victim” has become such a taboo and condemned
response in the social sciences that many people today
BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD the assumption that life is essentially fair, that people generally get will refuse to blame a victim even when the victim
what they deserve and deserve what they get does bear some of the blame. Research on violence

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 166
and aggression has frequently shown, for example,
that many violent acts stem from incidents in which

© The New Yorker Collection 1981 Robert Mankoff from cartoonbank.com All rights
both people provoked or attacked each other. Two
patrons in a bar may start by exchanging insults,
move along to shoving and hitting, and end up in a
violent fight in which one is injured or killed. The
killer is certainly to blame, but the so-called victim
also deserves some blame under those circumstances.
Victims generally deserve sympathy, and some are
indeed entirely free from blame, but other victims do
share responsibility for what happened to them.
People who believe the world is just will help oth-
ers, but only if they think those people deserve the
help (Zuckerman, 1975). People who believe in a just
world are not helpful toward victims who are per-

reserved.
ceived to be responsible for their own predicament
(DePalma, Madey, Tillman, & Wheeler, 1999). Peo- The big fishes (such as rich, powerful individuals) believe the world is a just place where people
ple who believe most strongly in a just world express get what they deserve and deserve what they get.
more negative attitudes toward helping the elderly,
because they believe that the elderly are responsible
for meeting their own social, economic, and health
needs (MacLean & Chown, 1988). to maintain their good mood, and acting helpfully
Belief in a just world can sometimes promote toward another person may allow them to sustain
helping because the helper desires to deserve good their good feelings (see Chapter 6).
outcomes. Again, the essence of believing in a just On the other hand, bad emotions can sometimes
world is that people deserve what they get and get increase helping. One way to resolve these findings is
what they deserve. By extension, if you help oth- to suggest that some negative emotions may promote
ers, you are a good and deserving person, so you can helping more than others. (Thus, perhaps guilt moti-
expect good things to happen to you. This can take vates helping, whereas shame or anger makes people
on an almost superstitious aspect, as when people unhelpful.) Another possibility is that the same emo-
perform good or helpful acts in the expectation that tion can have different effects. Focusing on your-
they will be rewarded later. self versus the victim can make a big difference, for
Students sometimes show this sort of superstitious example, even when the emotion is the same.
helping. Students at one college were asked to volun-
teer to do a good deed, such as serving as a reader for [ QUIZ YOURSELF ]
blind students or doing extra psychology experiments
(Zuckerman, 1975). During the routine parts of the
Who Helps Whom?
semester, helping was fairly low, and it made no dif- 1. The trait that produces helping across a wide
ference whether the students had high or low belief variety of settings is called the _____ personality.
in a just world. However, when the request came just (a) altruistic (b) egoistic
before exam time, the students who believed in a just (c) narcissistic (d) overbenefited
world were significantly more willing to help. Pre- 2. When it comes to receiving help, males are more
sumably they thought at some level that their good likely to help _____ and females are more likely to
deeds would be rewarded by better luck and a better help _____.
grade on the exam. If good things happen to good (a) females; females (b) females; males
people, then it may help to do good deeds so as to (c) males; females (d) males; males
become a good person. 3. People are especially inclined to help someone
who is _____.
(a) altruistic (b) authoritarian
EMOTION AND MOOD (c) low in status (d) physically attractive
In general, positive feelings increase helping. 4. People are especially likely to feel unsympathetic to
Research has shown that helping is increased by all a victim of misfortune if they _____.
kinds of pleasant situations, such as sunny weather (a) are in a good mood
(Cunningham, 1979), eating a cookie (Isen & Levin, (b) believe in a just world
1972), and imagining a Hawaiian vacation (Rosen- (c) feel overbenefited
han, Salovey, & Hargis, 1981). One possible expla- (d) feel underbenefited
nation for this phenomenon is that people want

WHO HELPS WHOM? • 277

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 167

Henry Groskinsky/Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images, The New York Times/Redux
Image not available due to copyright restrictions

On March 13, 1964, Kitty Genovese was attacked

by a knife-wielding rapist outside her apartment in
Queens, New York, while several of her neighbors
watched from their windows.

Bystander Helping
in Emergencies
On March 13, 1964, a young woman named Kitty Most of the intellectuals who appeared on the
Genovese was attacked by a knife-wielding rapist news to discuss the Genovese murder assumed that
outside her apartment in Queens, New York. News the reasons for failing to help lay within the person.
reports said her screams for help aroused 38 of her In a sense, they made what Chapter 5 described as
neighbors. Many watched from their windows while, the “fundamental attribution error”: They underesti-
for 35 minutes, she tried to escape. None called the mated the importance of situational factors. Even so,
police or sought to help in any other manner. In fact, no news reporters could induce any of the bystand-
her attacker left her twice and then returned each ers to say “I really didn’t care whether that young
time; if someone had come to help her into the build- woman lived or died.” It fell to social psychologists
ing during those intervals, she would have lived. Some to show that the special power of such emergency sit-
of the witnesses didn’t help because they thought it uations could explain what came to be known as the
was a lover’s quarrel. The New York Times newspaper bystander effect: People are less likely to offer help
article that described the event was titled “Thirty- when they are in the presence of others than when
Eight Who Saw Murder Didn’t Call the Police.” they are alone.
The incident made the national news and ignited
a storm of controversy. How could people just sit FIVE STEPS TO HELPING
by and let a woman be murdered? Talking heads
weighed in with their theories about urban decay, Two social psychologists, John Darley and Bibb
alienation, and other roots of the seemingly heartless Latane, whose offices were a few miles from the site
indifference of the onlookers. Although the facts of of the Genovese murder, took the lead in study-
this case have been disputed (e.g., Manning, Levine, ing the bystander effect. Gradually they came to
& Collins, 2007), it led to a long line of social psy- recognize an absurd aspect of the controversy: the
chology studies on why bystanders might fail to help assumption that helping would be the normal, natu-
a victim in an emergency. ral response. Instead, they proposed that there are at
least five steps to helping in an emergency situation
(see ▶ FIGURE 9.6). These amounted to five possible
BYSTANDER EFFECT the finding that people are less likely to offer help when they are in a group reasons that people would not help. A victim would
than when they are alone only get help if the bystander resolved all five of these

278 • C H A P T E R 9 P R O S O C I A L B E H AV I O R : D O I N G W H AT ’ S B E S T F O R O T H E R S

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 168
Step 5 Obstacles to helping

From Latane, B. & Darley, J., Group inhibition of bystander intervention in emergencies, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 10, 1968,
Provide help
Audience inhibition
I’ll look like a fool.
Costs exceed rewards
What if I do something
Step 4 wrong? He’ll sue me!
Decide how to help

Lack of competence
I’m not trained to handle this,
and who would I call?

lp
he
Step 3
ng
vid
i Take responsibility
for providing help Diffusion of responsibility
pro

p. 215-221. Reprinted by permission of the American Psychological Association.

Someone else must have
to
th

called 911.
Pa

Step 2
Interpret event as Ambiguity
an emergency Is she really sick or just drunk?
Relationship between attacker and victim
They’ll have to resolve their own
Step 1 family quarrels.
Notice that something Pluralistic ignorance
is happening No one else seems worried.

Distraction
Stop fooling around, kids, we’re here to eat.
Emergency! Self-concerns
I’m late for a very important date!

▶ FIGURE 9.6 Five steps to helping and the obstacles encountered at each step (Latane & Darley, 1968).

steps in the optimal way. Crucially, the presence of a slump onto the ground. Is he having a heart attack,
crowd can interfere with helping at each step. so that your timely intervention might be needed to
save his life? Or is he merely drunk, so that if you
Step 1: Notice That Something Is Happening. rush over to him your reward might be nothing more
The first step is to notice that something is happening. than having him puke on your shoes?
One obstacle to noticing the incident is being dis- Sometimes it is hard to tell whether an event is
tracted: People who are busy or preoccupied are less an emergency. In 1993 in the UK, a 2-year-old boy
likely to notice what is happening around them. Of named James Bulger was dragged out of a shopping
course, we are more distracted when others are around. mall, kicking and screaming, by two 10-year-old boys.
In one study (Latane & Darley, 1968), male college The older boys dragged Bulger two and a half miles
students completed a questionnaire in a room, either from the shopping mall to a railroad track, where they
alone or with two strangers. While they were work- beat him to death. Sixty-one people said they had seen
ing, smoke started pouring into the room through a the boys dragging Bulger out of the mall, but none
wall vent. Students who were alone noticed the smoke intervened. As one witness said, he thought the boys
right away. In contrast, those in groups took about were “older brothers taking a little one home.”
four times as long to notice the smoke. The difference When it is easy to tell, people are more likely
(between 5 and 20 seconds, in this case) may be cru- to intervene. To show the power of interpretations
cial in some emergency situations, such as a fire. (Shotland & Straw, 1976), researchers staged a phys-
ical fight between a man and a woman. Bystanders
Step 2: Interpret Meaning of Event. Once you offered help 65% of the time when she shouted “Get
have noticed something is happening, the second step away from me; I don’t know you.” Bystanders offered
is to interpret the meaning of the event. Is it an emer- help only 19% of the time when she shouted “Get
gency or not? Few people encounter emergencies on away from me; I don’t know why I ever married you.”
a regular basis, and emergencies do not usually come Perhaps they interpreted the event as a marital spat
with obvious labels. How someone interprets these rather than as an emergency. Some of the bystanders
ambiguous situations can be decisive. For example, who witnessed the Kitty Genovese murder thought it
you notice a man stagger down the street and then was only a lover’s quarrel.

B Y S TA N D E R H E L P I N G I N E M E R G E N C I E S • 279

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 169

Image not available due to copyright restrictions

What are the obstacles to helping at this step? people are present, each has 50% responsibility; if
People often look to others for clues about how to four people are present, each has 25% responsibility;
behave. We think that others might know something and so on. In crowds, people think, “Perhaps some-
that we don’t know. If others do not react to an event, one else will help; perhaps someone else has already
we conclude that it is not an emergency because oth- called for help.’’ With everyone thinking that some-
erwise they would be reacting. This phenomenon one else will help or has helped, nobody helps.
of collective misinterpretation is called pluralistic Eva Fogelman, who studied rescuers of Jews dur-
ignorance. We forget that others, in turn, might be ing World War II, found that a bystander was much
looking to us for clues about how to behave. They less likely to intervene on behalf of Jews if he or she
assume that we know more than they do. Because was in a crowd. Fogelman wrote,
everybody assumes that others know more than he
It appears to be a human proclivity to assume
or she does, when in reality nobody knows anything,
that someone else, the person beside you in
nobody reacts. Everybody is certain that nothing is
a crowd, will be the one to intervene. It is
wrong, when actually the event is an emergency!
not my responsibility, a bystander explains.
Pluralistic ignorance is not restricted to emergency
Someone else will take care of it. Thus, by way
situations. Have you ever sat through a class feeling
of a “diffusion of responsibility,” a bystander’s
completely lost and confused about the material being
conscience is assuaged, permitting the
presented? You want to ask a question, but you’re too
bystander to carry on his or her way.” (cited in
embarrassed to ask it. No one else is saying anything,
Robinson, 1995)
so you assume that everybody else understands the
material. In fact, the other students are probably just The importance of diffusion of responsibility
as confused as you are. Pluralistic ignorance in the was demonstrated in lab experiments by Darley and
classroom can prevent learning, just as in an emer- Latane (1968). Participants believed they were taking
gency situation it can prevent helping. Others often part in a group discussion over an intercom system.
don’t know as much as we give them credit for. During the session, another participant (actually a
prerecorded voice) apparently started having a sei-
Step 3: Take Responsibility for Providing zure and called for help. Participants who thought
Help. The third step is taking responsibility for pro- they were part of a six-person group generally did
viding help. You might notice that something is hap- not help, because they thought someone else would
pening and decide that it is an emergency, but that is do so. In contrast, if the participant thought he or
not enough. If you are to help, you must be willing she was the only one who knew about the victim’s
to take responsibility for helping. The obstacle to this seizure, the participant helped almost every time.
step of helping is called diffusion of responsibility.
With several potential helpers around, the personal Step 4: Know How to Help. The fourth step is
responsibility of each bystander is reduced. If you are deciding how to help. Having assumed the respon-
the only person present, 100% of the responsibility sibility to help, the person must now figure out what
for providing help rests on your shoulders; if two to do. An obstacle to offering direct help is the feeling
of lack of competence—people don’t feel qualified to
PLURALISTIC IGNORANCE looking to others for cues about how to behave, while they are look- help, or they think that somebody else is more quali-
ing to you; collective misinterpretation fied to help than they are. Researchers have shown
DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY the reduction in feeling responsible that occurs when others are that there is no effect for those who feel competent to
present intervene directly. For example, female participants

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 170
in a study by Cramer, McMaster, Bartell, and Dragna ▶ TABLE 9.3 Some Costs and Benefits of Helping
(1988) were either registered nurses or general edu-
cation students. On their way to the lab, each one Helping Not Helping
passed by a workman (actually a confederate) who Costs Lose time Guilt
was standing on a ladder, fixing a light fixture. In the
lab, participants worked on a task either alone or with Injury Social disapproval
a confederate who was pretending to be another par- Legal liability Legal liability
ticipant and whose instructions were to sit still and do
nothing during the upcoming accident. In the hall, Worsen situation
participants heard the ladder fall over, they heard a Benefits Self-praise Avoid risk of injury
thud, and then they heard the workman groaning in
pain. The vast majority of nurses helped, regardless Reward Avoid risks of helping
of whether they were working alone or with a pas- Social approval
sive bystander. For them, lack of competence was no
obstacle to helping. General education students were
much more likely to help if they were working alone
him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in
than if they were working with a passive bystander.
oil and wine, and set him on his own beast,
People who don’t feel competent to offer direct
and brought him to an inn, and took care of
help can still offer indirect help, which involves call-
him. And on the morrow when he departed,
ing someone else to help. In the age of cell phones,
he took out two pence, and gave them to the
offering indirect help is quite easy, and it may often
host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and
be the wisest and safest course of action. Physical
whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come
injuries are best handled by people with medical
again, I will repay thee. (Luke 10:30–35)
training, such as ambulance workers. Dangerous sit-
uations are best handled by people with proper train- Would the parable of the Good Samaritan actually
ing, such as police officers. Stalled motorist problems prompt bystanders to help in an emergency? To find
are best handled by people with proper training, such out, researchers recruited students at the Princeton
as the highway patrol. Calling others for help is still Theological Seminary who were studying to be min-
being helpful. Before cell phones, however, people isters (Darley & Batson, 1973). Half of them came to
faced much more difficult choices: either try to help the psychology building expecting to give a talk about
in person or do nothing at all. the Good Samaritan parable, so that the issue of help-
ing needy victims should have been prominent in
Step 5: Provide Help. The fifth and final step is their minds. The remaining students were told to give
to take action by offering help. There are obstacles a talk on job opportunities for seminary students.
to helping at this step also. One obstacle is called Does being in a hurry make bystanders less likely to
audience inhibition—people don’t want to feel like help in an emergency? To find out, students were also
a fool in front of others if they offer help and the per- divided into low, moderate, and high “hurry” condi-
son does not want help. People also might not help tions. When they arrived at the lab for their appoint-
if the costs outweigh the benefits (see ▶ TABLE 9.3; ment, they were told that their talk would be given in
e.g., Piliavin, Piliavin, & Rodin, 1975). an auditorium in another building, and they were sent
on their way. Those in the low-hurry condition were
TOO BUSY TO HELP? told that they were ahead of schedule and had plenty
of time. Those in the moderate-hurry condition were
One of the more moving and memorable stories from
told that they were right on schedule. Those in the
the Judeo-Christian Bible has come to be known as
high-hurry condition were told that they were late
the “Parable of the Good Samaritan.” It goes like this:
and that their audience was waiting for them. On the
A certain man went down from Jerusalem way to give their speech, all participants passed a man
to Jericho, and fell among thieves, which (actually a confederate) who was slumped in a door-
stripped him of his raiment, and wounded way, coughing and groaning. The measure of helping
him, and departed, leaving him half dead. was whether students stopped to help the man.
And by chance there came down a certain The topic of the speech—and thus whether they
priest that way: and when he saw him, he were thinking about career prospects or about the
passed by on the other side. And likewise a Bible’s most famous story of bystander helping—had
Levite, when he was at the place, came and no effect on helping. Several seminary students going
looked on him, and passed by on the other to give a talk on the parable of the Good Samaritan
side. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed,
came where he was: and when he saw him, AUDIENCE INHIBITION failure to help in front of others for fear of feeling like a fool if one’s offer of
he had compassion on him. And went to help is rejected

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 171
literally stepped over the victim, as they hurried on emergency help when in a crowd of people, pick a
their way! Time pressures, however, had a significant face out of the crowd. Stare, speak, and point directly
effect on helping. Participants in the low-hurry con- at that person. Say, “You, sir, in the blue sweatshirt, I
dition were more than six times more likely to help need help. Call an ambulance now.”
than were participants in the high-hurry condition. With that one statement you have reduced all the
The more time people had, the more likely they were obstacles that might prevent or delay help.
to help. • He notices you. (reduces distraction)
• He understands that help is needed. (reduces
[ QUIZ YOURSELF ] pluralistic ignorance)
Bystander Helping • He understands that he, not someone else, is
responsible for providing help. (reduces diffusion
in Emergencies of responsibility)
1. As the number of witnesses present at an
• He understands exactly how to provide help.
emergency situation increases, the probability of
(reduces concerns about lack of competence)
any given individual helping ______.
(a) decreases • He should not be inhibited by an audience.
(b) increases (reduces audience inhibition)
(c) increases then levels off Decades of research have shown that if you follow
(d) remains the same this advice, you will maximize the likelihood of
2. The fire alarm goes off. Nina doesn’t move because receiving help in a public setting.
she’s uncertain about what’s going on. She assumes
that other people don’t move because they know
it’s just a fire drill. Nina’s thoughts illustrate _____.
EDUCATE OTHERS
(a) diffusion of responsibility Once people understand the situational factors
(b) the discounting principle that interfere with helping in emergency situations,
(c) normative social influence they should be more likely to help. Students in one
(d) pluralistic ignorance experiment (Beaman, Barnes, & Klentz, 1978) heard
3. When Dick sees a neighbor’s house on fire with a lecture on why bystanders often don’t help. Other
a crowd of people standing around it, he doesn’t students heard a different lecture or no lecture at all.
call the fire department. He assumes that other As part of a different study in a different location,
neighbors who also saw the fire have already called students found themselves walking with an unre-
the fire department. Dick’s thoughts illustrate sponsive confederate past someone sprawled beneath
_____. a bicycle. The group that heard the lecture was much
(a) diffusion of responsibility more likely to help (67% vs. 27%). The researchers
(b) the discounting principle replicated the study by separating the lecture and the
(c) normative social influence opportunity to help by two weeks. Two weeks later,
(d) pluralistic ignorance when encountering a person slumped over, the group
4. In the Good Samaritan study (Darley & Batson, that had heard the lecture was still much more likely
1973), participants varied in the amount of help to help (43% vs. 25%).
that they offered to an (apparently) unconscious
man as a function of their _____.
(a) free time (b) gender
PROVIDE HELPFUL MODELS
(c) major (d) religiosity Example is not the main thing in influencing
others. It is the only thing.
—Albert Schweitzer: humanitarian, theologian,
missionary, organist, and medical doctor
How Can We Increase If unresponsive models interfere with helping, as
Helping? often occurs in public when bystanders fail to offer
help, can helpful models increase helping? The
answer is a resounding yes. Fourth- and fifth-graders
GETTING HELP IN A PUBLIC SETTING in a classic study by Rosenhand and White (1967)
People aren’t cold and uncaring when it comes to played a bowling game in which gift certificates
helping others. They are just uncertain about what could be earned. The gift certificates could be traded
to do. If you need help in an emergency setting, for candy and toys. Near the bowling game was a box
your best bet is to reduce the uncertainties of those labeled “Trenton Orphans Fund.” The box also con-
around you concerning your condition and their tained pictures of orphans in ragged clothing. Half
responsibilities (Cialdini, 1993, p. 113). If you need the students were exposed to a helpful adult model,

282 • C H A P T E R 9 P R O S O C I A L B E H AV I O R : D O I N G W H AT ’ S B E S T F O R O T H E R S

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 172
14,000

better or worse? Journal of Social Issues, 60, 645-666. Reprinted by permission of

Adapted from Penner, L. A., Volunteerism and social problems: Making things
2000
2001
12,000

10,000

Number of volunteers
8,000

6,000

4,000

Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

September 11, 2001
2,000

0
1 3 5 7 8 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51
Weeks

▶ FIGURE 9.7 Volunteer rates increased sharply just after September 11, 2001;
no comparable increase occurred in 2000 (adapted from Penner, 2004).

However, the rate of volunteering returned to nor-

© Kay Nietfeld/dpa/Corbis mal levels three weeks later.

TEACH MORAL INCLUSION

Often people sort others into “us” (people who
Prosocial television programming increases helpful
belong to the same group or category as we do, called
behavior in children.
ingroup members) and “them” (people who belong
to a different group or category than we do, called
and half were not. Each time the adult model won outgroup members). (Chapter 13 describes the dis-
gift certificates, he put half of them in the orphan tinction between ingroups and outgroups in more
box and said, “If you would like to give some of detail.) One way to increase helping is to make every-
your gift certificates to them you can, but you do body on this planet a member of your “ingroup.”
not have to.” Students who were not exposed to the People, regardless of how they differ from us (e.g.,
model were told the same thing. The students were ethnic background, gender, sexual orientation), are
then left alone to play the game. The results showed still part of the human family and on that basis may
that 48% of students who were exposed to the adult still be worthy of our help.
model helped the orphans, whereas 0% of students
who were not exposed to the adult model helped [ QUIZ YOURSELF ]
the orphans. If the researchers had included a child How Can We Increase
model condition, donations might have been even
higher than for the adult model condition, because Helping?
people are more influenced by similar others. 1. At which stage do potential helpers weigh the costs
The models don’t need to be live either. Filmed of helping versus not helping before making their
models are also effective. Research has shown that decisions?
prosocial television programs such as Lassie, Mr. Rog- (a) Assuming responsibility to help
ers’ Neighborhood, Barney, and Sesame Street increase (b) Providing help
helpful behavior in children (Hearold, 1986). (c) Interpreting the situation as an emergency
Another way to model helpful behavior is to be (d) Noticing the emergency
a volunteer. More than 55% of Americans over 18 2. TV programs such as Barney, Lassie, and Mr. Rogers’
volunteer to do some prosocial helping (Penner, Neighborhood have been shown to _____ helpful
2002). Americans volunteer an average of 19 bil- behavior in children.
lion work hours each year, and they contribute $226 (a) decrease
billion each year (Penner, 2002). Volunteering is a (b) increase
planned, long-term, nonimpulsive decision. Signifi- (c) have no effect on
cant events can have a large effect on volunteer rates. (d) Not enough research has been conducted to
For example, the number of people who volunteered answer this question.
more than tripled the week after the September 11
terrorist bombing (Penner, 2004; see ▶ FIGURE 9.7). VOLUNTEERING a planned, long-term, nonimpulsive decision to help others

HOW CAN WE INCREASE HELPING? • 283

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 173
3. Volunteerism is to other forms of helping as _____ 4. Treating everyone as a member of your ingroup is
is to _____. known as _____.
(a) altruistic; egoistic (a) diffusion of responsibility
(b) egoistic; altruistic (b) moral inclusion
(c) impulsive; nonimpulsive (c) kin selection
(d) nonimpulsive; impulsive (d) pluralistic ignorance

WHAT MAKES US HUMAN? Putting the Cultural Animal in Perspective

This chapter has given you a look at the brighter side of human nature (but get ready people to disobey direct orders from seemingly
for the darker side in the next chapter!). Prosocial behavior shows people doing things legitimate authority figures, but it can be done.
The human being is (sometimes, at least) an
that bring benefits to others and help their culture and society to operate success- autonomous, thinking, moral agent, even when
fully. Traditionally, social psychologists have emphasized helping, but there are many receiving orders.
other important forms of prosocial behavior. We may be inspired by the heroic acts of Conformity is simpler and cruder than follow-
people like Oskar Schindler, but society’s successful functioning depends less on that ing rules, because all it requires is the ability to
see what others are doing and the desire to do
sort of occasional, spectacular heroism than on everyday prosocial behavior like follow- the same. Many animals exhibit a herd instinct
ing rules, cooperating, reciprocating, forgiving, taking turns, and obeying legitimate sort of conformity, in which they unthinkingly
authority. If most people do those things most of the time, the cultural system can suc- copy the behavior of others. Unlike other ani-
ceed in making everyone better off. Recent centuries of human history have gradually mals, people exchange information with each
other and rely on what others tell them to learn
seen power shift from individuals (such as kings who could command or decree what- about the world.
ever they wanted) to the rule of law, and in the process life has gotten safer and happier Likewise, the beginnings of reciprocity can be
for most people. Even today, happiness levels are higher in countries with a strong rule seen among animals, but typically this involves
of law than in those that lack the rule of law (Veenhoven, 2004). sharing with kin. Unlike most animals, humans
can reciprocate with strangers. Cooperation, too,
is more advanced in humans than in many other
Perhaps the most sweeping and impor- enforced by another (typically bigger) animal species. Some animals seem to cooperate, in that
tant difference in prosocial behavior between whose presence is often essential for enforcing they do complementary things, but mostly these
humans and other animals is that humans will the rules. Rule following took a big leap with are fixed action patterns. Humans can decide
do prosocial things for others who are not family human evolution. People can follow laws, moral to cooperate or not, and often they decide to
members. As with most animals, human helping principles, and other rules even when they are cooperate.
gives first priority to family members and loved alone, and they can apply them to novel situ- Reciprocity and cooperation indicate some
ones, but human beings will also do nice things ations, making following rules a vital form of understanding of fairness. (If you don’t pay it
for total strangers. Sharing your food with your prosocial behavior. Following rules even without back, you’re not being fair.) Some other animals
mother or your son does not indicate anything someone watching your every move is an impor- have a crude understanding of fairness, but
special about your humanity—many other ani- tant basis for human culture. mostly they are upset when they are underbene-
mals would do the same. But donating money Obedience is related to following rules. Again, fited. Humans often feel guilty or uncomfortable
or blood to benefit people you will never meet is many animals can learn to obey specific com- when they are overbenefited too.
distinctively, and remarkably, human. In fact, we mands. Only humans expect each other to tell Last, empathy may be more centrally impor-
saw that 18-month-old human toddlers will even the difference between legitimate and wrongful tant to human helping than to the prosocial
help non-kin voluntarily, and that they are more authority and to obey only the former. Even the behavior of other animals. People are much bet-
helpful than older chimps in similar situations. military has come around (after atrocities such ter than most other creatures at understanding
Nature seems to have prepared people to under- as the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War what someone else is feeling, and this capacity
stand and care about each other and to offer and the Abu Ghraib prison abuses during the to appreciate someone else’s pain and suffer-
help when possible. Iraq War) to advocating that soldiers have a duty ing is an important factor in promoting helping
Some animals can learn to follow rules, but to disobey orders that are improper. Studies such behavior.
usually these are very specific rules, made and as Milgram’s (1963) have shown that it is hard for

284 • C H A P T E R 9 P R O S O C I A L B E H AV I O R : D O I N G W H AT ’ S B E S T F O R O T H E R S

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 174

chapter summary
WHAT IS PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR? • A majority of participants in Milgram’s • Positive moods generally increase help-
• Prosocial behavior involves doing good experiments delivered extreme shocks to ing, but some bad moods, such as guilt,
for others or society; it builds relation- a screaming victim in obedience to an can also promote helping.
ships and allows society to function. authority figure.
• Obeying rules, conforming to norms, • Although mindless obedience can be bad, BYSTANDER HELPING IN
cooperating, and helping are all forms of in most cases society is better off if people EMERGENCIES
prosocial behavior. obey society’s rules. • The bystander effect is the finding that
• Public circumstances generally promote • Conformity means going along with the people are less likely to offer help when
prosocial behavior. That is, people behave crowd. It can be good or bad. they are in a group than when they are
better when others are • Conformity and obedience can be proso- alone.
watching and know cial behaviors, in that they make it easier • The five steps to helping during an emer-
who they are. to get along with others and for society gency are:
• Reciprocity is the obli- to function. • Notice that something
gation to return in WHY DO PEOPLE HELP OTHERS? is happening.
kind what another has done for us. • The evolutionary theory of kin selection • Interpret the event as
• Equity means that each person receives suggests that we prefer to help others an emergency.
benefits in proportion to what he or who are related to us. • Take responsibility for
she did. Equality means that every- • Altruistic helping is motivated by empa- providing help.
one gets the same amount, regardless of thy, an emotional response that cor- • Know what to do.
performance. responds to the feelings of the other • Take action and provide help.
• A full sense of fairness, recognizing both person, because it motivates people to • Pluralistic ignorance involves thinking
underbenefits and overbenefits, is impor- reduce others’ distress. others know something that we don’t
tant in humans but probably absent in • Egoistic helping is motivated by the know, even if others don’t know it either.
other animals. desire to reduce one’s own distress, • Diffusion of responsibility refers to the
according to negative state relief theory. reduction in helping that occurs when
COOPERATION, FORGIVENESS, multiple bystanders all assume that oth-
OBEDIENCE, AND CONFORMITY WHO HELPS WHOM? ers will take the responsibility of helping.
• Prisoner’s dilemma is a game that con- • Many people get pleasure from helping • People who are in a hurry help less than
sists of tradeoffs between cooperation and others. those who aren’t, even if those in a hurry
competition. • People are more likely to help similar are thinking about the Good Samaritan.
• Zero-sum games are those in which the others than dissimilar
winnings and losings add up to zero, so others. HOW CAN WE INCREASE HELPING?
that one’s gain is another’s loss. • Males are more help- • Helping can be increased by:
• If one member of a pair is not cooperative, ful than females in • Reducing uncertainties
then cooperation is typically doomed. the broader public sphere, toward strang- • Educating others about bystander
• Communication improves the chances of ers, and in emergencies, whereas females indifference
cooperation. are more helpful in the family sphere, in • Providing helpful models
• Forgiveness helps repair relationships and close relationships, and in volunteering. • Teaching moral inclusion (making oth-
provides health benefits to both the for- • Females are more likely to receive help ers a part of the ingroup)
giver and the forgiven person. than are males, regardless of whether the
• Forgiveness is more likely when the helper is male or female. WHAT MAKES US HUMAN?
offense or hurt was minor and when the • People are more likely to help attractive PUTTING THE CULTURAL
offending person apologizes. People who individuals than unattractive individuals. ANIMAL IN PERSPECTIVE
are religious, are committed to the rela- • Belief in a just world refers to the find- • Humans, unlike other animals, fre-
tionship, and are not ing that people believe that the world is quently act in a prosocial manner toward
self-centered or nar- mostly fair and that people usually get others who are not family members.
cissistic are more will- what they deserve. • Rule following, obedience, and confor-
ing to forgive than • People who believe the world is just will mity are often depicted as negative acts,
other people. help others, but only if they think those but for the most part are prosocial acts.
people deserve the help.

CHAPTER SUMMARY • 285

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 175

128 Social Psychology

• strengthen social nonns against aggression (by rewarding non-

aggressive responses and not rewarding aggressive ones, for
instance);
• reduce the accessibility of aggressive actions in memory by
reducing overall exposure to aggressive models. In this way
feelings of anger will not be so likely to 'prime' aggressive action.

Self-assessment Questions
1. Describe some of the different explanations of aggression,
including biological, biosocial and social psychological explana-
tions. Is it possible to say that anyone approach provides a
complete explanation?
2. Is it plausible to say that some individuals are naturally more
aggressive than others?
3. List some factors which seem to contribute to aggressive
behaviour. Is there good evidence for the 'long hot summer'
factor?
4. Is there convincing evidence that watching violence on TV may
make children more aggressive?
5. Identify some ways in which aggressive behaviour may be
reduced. Do you think that Berkowitz's neo-associationistic
model might contribute to this?

SECTION III PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOUR

Wispe (1972) defined prosocial behaviour as behaviour which has

social consequences which contribute positively to the psychological
or physical well-being of another person. This encompasses a very
wide spectrum of behaviour. At this time consideration will be
limited to the following:

• Helping behaviour;
• Altruism - that is, giving or sharing with no obvious self-gain;
• Bystander intervention.

Helping Others and Altruism

There are three approaches which have been taken to explain human
helping behaviour:
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Conflict and Cooperation 129

1. Biological approaches.
2. What might be termed biosocial approaches.
3. Social learning approaches.

Biological Explanations

Biologists take the view that that just as there is an innate need in
humans to eat or to drink, there is also a need to help others and this
has been taken as one explanation for the comparative success of the
human species. In particular, sociobiologists have drawn attention
to the evolutionary benefits of altruistic behaviour (Krebs and
Miller, 1985; Wilson, 1978). As we have seen, sociobiologists
approach human (as well as animal) behaviour from the point of
view of genetic and evolutionary survival. The basic proposition is
that humans, in common with all animals, have one pre-eminent
goal which is the survival of the genes. Human beings will be
predisposed to help relatives because in so doing they are furthering
the survival of the genes which they share with those relatives. Your
son, because of his parentage, shares genes with you. If your
paramount interest lies in ensuring that your genes are passed on
to succeeding generations, you have a vested interest in your son's
survival. Not quite as much as in your own, perhaps, but more than
an unrelated stranger's. Then again, if I myself have passed the time
of life when I can myself reproduce, gene survival may be ensured to
an even greater extent if I can ensure my son's survival. Hence there
may be circumstances when a person might sacrifice them self for
their children.
Reciprocal altruism takes this one stage further. Trivers (1971)
has used reciprocal altruism as an explanation for 'Good Samaritan'
behaviour. A man dives into a river to save another from drowning.
The man has a 50:50 chance of drowning. The chances of the rescuer
dying in the attempt are perhaps one in 20. If at some future date the
roles are reversed, both will have benefited. Each will have traded a
1:2 chance of dying for a 1: 10 chance. Within the population as a
whole, such reciprocally altruistic behaviour will have enhanced
each individual's personal genetic 'fitness'. There is a fuller discus-
sion of altruism, including reciprocal altruism, in Comparative
Psychology in the same series as this book (Malim et al., 1996).
The main problems with this sociobiological approach to helping
behaviour are:
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130 Social Psychology

• That there have been no good studies done with human

participants which have supported the biological explanation
of helping.
• That the extensive research done by social learning theorists into
helping behaviour has been ignored.

Learning Approaches to Helping Behaviour

These can be divided into two, those based upon basic learning
theory and those which depend upon social learning and modelling.
Both of these approaches contend that there is no innate tendency to
help others but that this behaviour needs to be learned. Classical
conditioning and instrumental learning represent the basic learning
theory approach; observational learning and modelling represent
the social learning approach. These processes of learning are part of
the socialisation process during childhood. Straightforward telling,
reinforcement and modelling each have a part to play. Grusec et al.
(1978) have found that it increases a child's helpfulness just to tell
him or her what the right behaviour is. Children learn to expect
people to be helpful. But to instruct children to help others is less
helpful unless there is evidence that the instructor is practising what
he or she preaches.
Reinforcements such as praise also work as Fischer (1963) found.
Where children are praised or reinforced with bubblegum for
sharing what they had, they learnt to share with other children.
Vicarious reinforcement also plays a part. Where children saw
another person behaving generously to a third person they tended
to imitate.

Modelling Behaviour

There is evidence that people learn to be helpful by observing others

helping. Grusec and Skubiski (1970) found that where children won
tokens in games and then saw an adult giving away tokens to a
needy child, they were more likely to behave generously. Children's
attitudes to pro social behaviour also improved where they watched
prosocial behaviour on television (Coates et al., 1976). An experi-
ment described in Box 4.5 illustrates this modelling effect.
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Conflict and Cooperation 131

BOX 4.5
Modelling Prosocial Behaviour (Bryan and Test, 1967)

Bryan and Test (1967) demonstrated that adult behaviour a well

could be influenced by modelling. They set out to te t whether the
presence of a model would influence the number of motorists who
stopped to belp a woman who bad had a puncture. Thi wa an
experiment where there were two conditions

1. In the experimental condition motorists first pas ed a car by the

side of the road whose driver (a woman) wa being a i ted to
change a wbeel by a male motorist who had stopped to help her. A
short way along the road there was another car with a puncture,
again with a woman driver. In thi case he was alone and clearly
needed help.
2. In the second condition (control) there were only the econd car
and its woman driver. There was no model.

Results sbowed that more than 50 per cent more motorists were
prepared to stop and help in the experimental condition (that is, wbere
there was a model).

Vicarious Experience
The outcomes, so far as the model is concerned, have been found by
Bandura (1973) to make a crucial difference. Where the model is
seen to have been reinforced for helping, the model is much more
likely to have been effective in influencing behaviour; where the
outcomes are negative, models will be much less effective. This was
borne out in a experiment conducted by Hornstein (1970). Partici-
pants who observed an individual returning a lost wallet and having
a good reception were found to be more likely to help on another
occasion than those who witnessed someone returning the wallet
and having either an indifferent or a hostile reception.

Theories Relating to Helping Behaviour

Attribution Processes
In the section on 'self in Chapter 2, we discussed Bern's theory of
self-attribution (p. 68). In the present context it is suggested that
individuals may develop self-attributions of helpfulness. A person
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132 Social Psychology

may see himself or herself as helpful and this self-attribution will

serve to focus behaviour onto the helping option where there is a
choice of possible behaviours. An old man slips on a loose paving
stone and falls. The choices available to us, as passers by, are either
to assist or to leave it to someone else. If our self-attributions lead us
to see ourselves as helpful persons we will be more likely to take the
choice of helping rather than leaving it to someone else. Grusec and
Redler (1980) found that such self-attributions of helpfulness pro-
vided a stronger reinforcement for helpful behaviour than external
reinforcements such as verbal praise. Where they fail to live up to
their self-imposed standards of helpfulness, Perry et al. (1980) found
that children experience bad feelings.

Just World Hypothesis

According to the just world hypothesis developed by Lerner (Lerner,
1977; Lerner and Miller, 1978) there is a strong link between cause
and effect (see Chapter 2) People have the feeling that they get what
they deserve. In these circumstances a cynical view might be that
people will be less likely to come to another's assistance. In rape
cases it has sometimes been said of the victim, 'she had it coming to
her'. Either she was out too late at night, or she was dressed
provocatively. On the other hand, the Buddhist view would be to
welcome the opportunity to help as a good deed which will
eventually be to our benefit. In which direction we view the justc
world hypothesis will depend on developmental influences, particu-
larly in childhood. Also, others might argue that evidence of
undeserved suffering gives the lie to the just-world hypothesis.
Who can really argue that the class of infants in Dunblane, gunned
down by a psychopath deserved what they got?

Social Norms of Behaviour

In childhood, social norms of behaviour are acquired through learn-
ing. These norms specify what behaviour is expected as normal and
what is abnormal. They are the product of the culture in which we
have grown up and they lay down what behaviour is expected within
that culture. In almost every culture there is a norm which specifies
that to be selfish is wrong; to be helpful is right. In most cultures it is
prescribed that we do what we can to help other people.
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Conflict and Cooperation 133

Two social norms in particular have been cited as responsible for

altruism:

1. The principle ofreciprocity. This is the 'do as you would be done

by' norm. Individuals have an obligation to reciprocate help
which has been given them; the more so, if the help given is freely
given and involves some sacrifice. The greater the sacrifice the
greater the obligation it lays on us to reciprocate (Tesser et al.,
1968; Wilke and Lanzetta, 1970).
2. The social responsibility norm. People have a social obligation to
afford help to those who need it. Membership of a community
imposes upon individuals to help, without any expectation that
this help will be reciprocated or rewarded. Such help is
frequently given anonymously. Charity collectors call at your
front door and if you do not give to them there are feelings of
guilt. Of course, the just world hypothesis lays down that you
give the most help to those whom you perceive as being in
greatest need of help. You are more likely to contribute
generously for poor children than to support a local football
team. You are less obligated to help in the rehabilitation of drug
addicts, perhaps, than in the support of disabled people. The
former might be seen as having brought their misfortunes on
themselves and so are less-deserving. The concept of the deser-
ving poor, prevalent in Victorian times and re-emerging more
recently, reflects this.

Culture and Altruism

It is evident that some cultures are far more pro social than others.
Child-rearing practices, religious training and education (in the
broadest sense) may determine the extent to which people are
motivated to help others. If people are led to believe that there is
'no such thing as society', but just individuals looking after their
own interests, prosocial behaviour will not readily be fostered.
Eisenberg and Mussen (1989) summarised cross-cultural research
on children's prosocial tendencies and concluded that American
children typically were less kind, considerate and cooperative than
those reared in Mexican villages, Hopi Indian children reared on
reservations, or Israeli children reared in Kibbutzim. There seem to
be two separate kinds of cultures in this respect
 181

134 Social Psychology

• Individualist cultures, such as the USA, Canada, Australia and

some European countries, where less emphasis is placed upon
the responsibility each individual has for the welfare of others;
more on the freedom individuals have to pursue their own goals.
• Collectivist cultures which include Japan and some other Asian
countries, those from the former Communist block, many Latin
American and native American cultures where the good of the
group is held to be more important than individual wishes.

Empathy
Empathy, the vicarious experiencing of another's emotions, and its
relationship with altruism, has been the basis for the empathy-
altruism hypothesis developed by Batson and his colleagues (Batson,
1987, 1990; Batson and Oleson, 1991). Batson has suggested that
empathy can produce genuinely altruistic motivation to help as
distinct from egoistically-motivated helping. A person may be
'personally distressed' at seeing the suffering that someone else is
experiencing, and their motivation for helping may be an egoistic
one, to relieve their own distress. Alternatively, there may be
genuine empathy, a sympathetic focus on the other person's suffer-
ing and a motivation to reduce it. Batson and his colleagues have
demonstrated several times in experiments that participants who are
genuinely aroused empathetically continued to help, when they
could quite easily have relieved their own distress by escaping from
the situation. The difficulty is to rule out other egoistically-based
motives for helping (how you appear to other people, for example,
or the good feelings which assisting someone in trouble may give
you). Batson's later studies cast some doubt on whether apparently
genuinely empathetic people might have such ulterior motives as
these.
However, an alternative to the empathy-altruism hypothesis is
Cialdini's negative-state relief model (Cialdini et at., 1973, 1987).
This model has suggested that people learn in childhood that it is
gratifying to help, and that this gratification can help them to
overcome sadness and guilt (that is, personal distress at the suffering
of others and guilt that they are all right while someone else is
suffering). These feelings of sadness are experienced also by those
who empathise with the victim, but they help in order to reduce their
own sadness rather than through an altruistic desire to relieve the
victim's suffering. Cialdini's experiments were designed to test
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Conflict and Cooperation 135

whether other means of lifting the negative feelings (sadness) -

aroused by watching someone else suffer - might break the altru-
ism-empathy link. He arranged for participants to receive - in one
condition - an unexpected gift of money, or, in another, lavish
praise. In yet another study participants were led to believe that
their mood of sadness had been 'fixed' by a drug, so that even
helping the victims would not relieve it. Schaller and Cialdini (1988)
tried to relieve the 'sadness' using a comedy tape.
The results of these studies challenged the empathy-altruism
hypothesis. While the surprise gift of money di·d not make any
difference, the other attempts to relieve negative arousal states
(lavish praise, belief that the feelings had been fixed, or a comedy
tape) did lessen the motivation to help. Schroeder et al. (1988),
however, found with highly empathetic individuals none of such
mood-relieving strategies altered their motivation to help.
It has to be said that some of these studies are of somewhat
doubtful ecological validity. Not only Cialdini's, but Batson's
studies involved laboratory tests, where students (not, perhaps, a
typical sample of the population at large) watched other students
being given electric shocks (not something you see often everyday in
real life). However, his research has led Batson to say that if research
continues to suggest that empathetically aroused people often help
for altruistic rather than egoistic reasons, present views about hu-
man nature and human capacity for caring need to be revised
radically. That said, genuine concern for others is a 'fragile flower,
easily crushed by egoistic concerns' (Batson et al., 1983, p. 718).
When highly empathetic people were asked to take a victim's place
to receive painful shocks, but were perfectly free to leave if they
wished to, 86 per cent opted to leave (Batson et at., 1983).

Deciding Whether to Help

Two processes operate side by side to determine whether or not we

give help when it appears to be needed:

1. Cognitive processes: this includes an evaluation and interpreting

of the situation, weighing up the consequences of alternative
courses of action.
2. Emotional processes which act as motivators to spur people on to
action.
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136 Social Psychology

Piliavin's Bystander Calculus Model

Piliavin et al. (1981) have developed an arousal/cost-reward model

(also termed a bystander calculus model) to explain what happens
when decisions are taken as to whether to give assistance in
emergencies. This consists of five distinct stages:

1. Becoming aware that someone needs help. This may be some-

thing quite clear-cut such as screams, cries for help or smoke
billowing out of an upstairs window in a house. But often the
cues are ambiguous. It may be quite difficult to decide whether
the noise heard from within a house represents an emergency
situation.
2. Having become cognitively aware that there is an emergency
and someone may need help there will a degree of emotional
arousal. Physiologically, this will represent itself by a quickened
pulse, butterflies in the stomach, and the other manifestations
of strong emotion. (There is a full discussion of emotion in
Malim et al., 1992, Perspectives in Psychology, in this series:
pp. 92-100.)
3. The bystander will need to interpret the physiological changes
experienced, using cues from within the total environment.
Piliavin stresses that arousal is a distressing thing which we are
motivated to reduce. This is egoistic motivation rather than
altruism. However, arousal might be due to empathy with the
distress of the victim, which accords with Batson's empathy-
altruism hypothesis. Arousal and our interpretation of it are
important in determining whether or not we go to help. The
more highly aroused we are the quicker we are to help, as
evidenced by an a emergency staged by Gaertner and Dovidio
(1977). Chairs appeared to have crashed down on a woman in
the next room. Those bystanders who were most highly aroused
(those who had the fastest heart rate and said that they felt most
upset) were the quickest on the scene to help. But the arousal had
to be labelled as a response to the 'emergency'. Gaertner and
Dovidio tested this by giving one group of the bystanders a
'drug' (in fact a placebo), and telling them it would cause them to
be aroused; while another group were told that the 'drug' they
were given would not cause them to be aroused but might give
them a dull headache. The former group attributed their arousal
to the drug and were slower to help.
 184

Conflict and Cooperation 137

4. The next stage represents a cost-benefit analysis. What are the

likely consequences of either helping or not helping? Costs might
include some of the following:

• Effort and time expended;

• Loss of resources, including any benefits or rewards we might
have to forego. (We might, for instance, have a train to catch.)
• Risks involved - of actual harm, of embarrassment, of social
disapproval or emotional reaction to interacting with the
victim.

On the other side of the balance sheet we weigh up the rewards:

• Monetary rewards for heroism.

• Increased self-esteem which comes from living up to the
moral standards we have set ourself.
• Social approval.

And what about helping indirectly rather than directly

(phoning the police or the fire service rather than going in
ourselves)? or escaping from the scene? We weigh up the
potential costs and benefits of these options as well as w.e
perceive them.
The perceptions people make of the costs and benefits are
individual ones, influenced perhaps by knowledge of their own
abilities. There may also be some distortion, exaggerating the
costs of helping or of not helping.

5. The decision stage: we decide whether or not to help.

Figure 4.9 shows a flow chart illustrating Piliavin's cost/arousal

model.

A Commentary on Piliavin's Model

There is doubt whether people really do calculate in this detached
way when there is an emergency. Latane and Darley (1970) have
said that the very nature of most emergencies is that they are
dangerous and unforeseen and consequently produce very high
levels of arousal. Bystanders are less likely to take account of all
the cues in the situation and then calmly weigh up costs and benefits
 185

138 Social Psychology

FIGURE 4.9
Piliavin's Cost/Arousal Model

Become cognitively
Stage 1 aware of
Awareness need of help

t
Emotional
Stage 2 arousal
Arousal (physiological changes
and feelings)

t
Interpretation of
Stage 3 changes and feelings
Interpretation on light of
environmental cues

t
Cost/Benfit
Stage 4 analysis
Cost/Benefit Weigh up perceived
analysis costs and benefits
of each option

+
Stage 5 Decision

Source: Based on Pi1iavin et al. (1981).

than to act in an impulsive fashion, doing what to someone not

directly involved might be seen as irrational. There is a distinction to
be drawn between routine help and what happens in cases of
emergency. There is not a great deal in common between, for
instance, a routine commitment a person may have taken-on to
get their elderly relative out of bed every morning, and reacting to
smoke billowing from the windows of a house they happen to be
passing.
 186

Conflict and Cooperation 139

Influences on Prosocial Behaviour

These include:

• Situational influences; what kind of a need is it?

• What is the relationship between the helper and the helped?
• What other people do.
• Personal influences (for instance, are men or women more
helpful? do people receive more help in towns or in the country?).

Influences of the Situation

Latane and Darley conducted a series of experiments to determine

what the situational factors might be which determine bystander
intervention in emergencies. The stimulus to this research was the
shocking affair of Kitty Genovese. In a respectable neighbourhood
of New York city, Kitty Genovese was on her way home from work
late at night. She was suddenly attacked by a man with a knife. At
first her screams alarmed the man and he ran off. But when no one
came to her aid, he returned, sexually assaulted her and stabbed her
eight times. In the half hour during which the attack lasted, no one
came to help her. After about half an hour an anonymous resident
called the police but would not give his name, because 'he did not
want to get involved'. The next day police interviewed neighbouring
residents. No fewer than 38 people admitted hearing the screaming.
The affair became a cause celebre, exciting the attention, not only of
the media but of social psychological researchers. Apathy, callous-
ness, indifference and a loss of concern for others were cited (Latane
and Darley, 1976).
Latane and Darley (1970) developed a cognitive model to deter-
mine whether or not bystanders decide to help in an emergency. This
too had five stages:

1. Noticing the event and realising that help may be needed.

2. Interpretation: is the event a serious emergency? Are there cues
which indicate distress, screaming, for example? .
3. Responsibility: is it anything to do with me? Does the bystander
accept responsibility? This may include factors such as other
witnesses to the event, and also perception by the bystander of
his or her competence to deal with the situation.
 187

140 Social Psychology

4. Decision: this might include direct intervention, indirect inter-

vention (for example calling the police, perhaps) escape, or to do
nothing.
5. Action: this will depend on the nature of the situation (emergency
or not), knowledge of what to do, and the behaviour of other
people.

Figure 4.10 represents a flow chart illustrating Latane and Darley's

model
Latane and Darley's development of this modelled to a series of
experiments. In the first of these, participants (male students) were
interviewed ostensibly about problems which they faced as students
in a large university. They were given, to begin with, a questionnaire
to complete and while they were doing this smoke began to pour
from a vent in the wall. This continued for six minutes by which time

FIGURE 4.10
Latane and Dadey's Cognitive Model of Bystander Intervention

Noticing the event and

Stage 1 realising the need

Stage 2

Stage 3

Stage 4

Stage 5

Source: Based on Latane and Darley (1970).

 188

Conflict and Cooperation 141

the room was full of smoke. In relation to the question of what

influence other people have on decisions taken in such situations
there were three conditions:

1. They were alone;

2. They were with two other participants whom they did not know;
3. They were with two confederates of the experimenter who
ignored the smoke.

The hypothesis was that in such situations other people present

exercise a crucial influence on decisions which are taken. Results
supported this hypothesis. Of those who were alone, 75 per cent
took positive action, reporting the matter. Of those in the company
of two other strangers (condition 2) only 38 per cent took action. In
the third condition, where there were two other people present who
had had instructions to ignore the smoke, only 10 per cent took
action.
Latane and Darley suggested that the presence of other people
inhibits action; the more people the more inhibition. Where those
who were present obviously ignored what was happening, the
inhibition was greatest of all. There appear to be three issues which
affect the decisions taken:

• Diffusion of responsibility: In a group, people will off-load their

responsibility on to others (social loafing). In an emergency, the
fact that there are others watching provides an ideal opportunity
for social loafing. In fact they do not even have to be there
watching or visible. The knowledge that others are around
somewhere is enough.
• Audience inhibition. The presence of other people has another
effect as well, to make people afraid of appearing foolish. They
become self-conscious, and frightened that they are going to
make a mistake.
• Social influence: People will look to others as models for what
they should do; Chapter 6 will deal in greater detail with issues of
social influence.

Latane and Darley (1976) set out in their most elaborate experi-
ment to test each of these three issues. This became known as the
'three in one experiment' and is detailed in Box 4.6.
 189

142 Social Psychology

BOX 4.6
Latane and Darley's (1976) Three in One Experiment
Four conditions varied the communications between the participants
and other bystanders:

1. Where they could see and be een;

2. Where they could see but not be seen;
3. Where they could not see but be seen;
4. Where they could neither see nor be seen.

These conditions were achieved by means of television monitor and

cameras. Participants were recruited to take part in a study of
repression. The props used were a supposedly antique and unreliable
shock generator. An emergency situation was created when the
experimenter apparently received a violent shock from this generator,
screamed, jumped into the air, threw himself again t the wall and then
fell to the floor out of camera range with his feet sticking up. Then he
began to moan softly until help arrived or for about six minutes. The
conditions used were as follows

• Control or baseline condition: no one is present with the participant.

The video camera in the participant's room is pointed at the ceiling
(the participant cannot be seen) and the monitor shows the ceiling
of the second room (the participant cannot see).
• Diffusion of responsibility: the participant knows there is another
person there but otherwise the same conditions apply (the camera
points to the ceiling, the monitor shows only a ceiling).
• Diffusion plus social influence: the participant can see in the monitor
another person working on a questionnaire. The camera still points
to the ceiling. (the participant can see but not be seen).
• Diffusion plus audience inhibition: The camera points to the parti-
cipant (he or she knows he/she can be seen), but the monitor just
shows the next room's ceiling.
• Difli ion plus social influence plus audience inhibition: Each person
is visible to the other via cameras and monitor .

Results

The results showed a cumulative effect. Where the participant was

alone there was the greatest readiness to help. With just diffusion of
responsibility there was slightly less readiness. With diffusion as well as
inhibition (or influence) there was still less readiness. With diffusion as
well as inhibition and influence there was least readiness of aU.
The results supported Latane and Darley's sugge tion that the
factors of diffusion, influence and inhibition were additive.
 190

Conflict and Cooperation 143

Individual Differences in Helping Behaviour

Latane and Darley (1970) did not find any personality measure
which accurately predicted whether someone would help. Attempts
by other researchers (Bar-Tal, 1976; Schwartz, 1977) to single out
Good Samaritans from the rest of the population have not been
successful. There is some evidence, though, that there is a relation-
ship between possession of specific skills and willingness to use them
to help others (Midlarsky and Midlarsky, 1973; Schwartz and
David, 1976). In a more general sense, the possession of emergency
skills (first-aid training, for instance) makes it more likely that
someone will intervene in an emergency.

Leadership and Followership

There is some evidence that some people are more likely to take the
initiative in all kinds of action than others. There is clearly a skills
component in this but, apart from this, Baumeister et al. (1988) have
identified a more specific quality of leaders that they do not suffer to
the same degree as do followers from diffusion of responsibility. But
leadership and followership is the subject of Section 2 in Chapter 6.

Gender and Helping

Males are more likely to help females than vice versa. Cars are more
likely to stop for a female than a male hitchhiker, or for a male and
female pair (Pomazal and Clore, 1973). Those who are more
physically attractive are likely to get more help. Przybyla (1985)
manipulated the sexual arousal of participants by showing them
sexually explicit videos. Seeing an erotic video made a male parti-
cipant more likely to help a female in trouble, while when it was a
male who was in trouble, participants were less likely to help and
spent less time on it. Females, on the other hand, when aroused by
an erotic video spent less time helping anyone, male or female.
The type of situation which presents itself makes a crucial
difference. In dangerous emergencies men are more likely to inter-
vene. It is conceived as part of the male role to act heroically in
dangerous situations (Eagly and Crowley, 1986). Moreover, because
men are in general stronger and more likely to have relevant skills,
they perceive the costs of intervening as being lower than women do;
 191

144 Social Psychology

whereas women are more likely to provide help where emotional

support is needed (Brody, 1990; Eagly and Crowley, 1986).

Town and Country

There seems to be something in the crowded noisy hectic environ-

ment of the big city which inhibits helping. Milgram (1970) pro-
posed what he termed the urban overload hypothesis to explain why
people in rural areas and in small towns are more helpful than those
in big cities. In large cities, people had to be selective in the help they
gave. The general levels of stimulation were so high that people had
sometimes to ignore others in need and to be choosy about those
they helped. Amato (1983) studied helping behaviour in different
sizes of communities, and found that as the population of a
community increased so helping decreased.

Mood and Helping

All kinds of things may put you into a 'good mood', being successful
in something, having some good fortune, being happy, or even good
weather. Isen (1987) manipulated the success factor and showed that
it did indeed make participants more likely to help. George (1991)
found that happy sales-people were more likely to go beyond the call
of duty to be helpful. There is no doubt that the present trend
towards more aggressive management and consequent unhappiness
and insecurity do not make for helpful people. If we focus on our
own good fortune we are more likely to be helpful, but if the focus
rests on someone else's fortune then that makes you less helpful.
Rosenhan et al. (1981) found that happiness at a good posting (to
Hawaii) increased helpfulness; but the thought of a friend getting the
posting actually decreased it.
Bad mood or ill-fortune do not seem to have the same effect. A
feeling of guilt may stimulate helping behaviour (Carlson and Mill-
er, 1987). As has been seen sadness can motivate people to help
(Cialdini et ai., 1973). But if we are preoccupied with our own woes
we will not be likely to help anyone else (Aderman and Berkowitz,
1983). What seems to matter is where the focus of attention is. If we
focus on the misfortunes of others, we will be more likely to help;
but if we focus on your own unhappiness, then we will not help
others.
 192

Conflict and Cooperation 145

Some Conclusions

How can we have a more pro social society? Maybe we need to start
with how children are brought up. Young children are naturally
egoistic but may become more pro social as they grow up. They
discover that adults approve of children who help others. Also, as
they grow up they become more able to empathise with others, as
their cognitive abilities improve. Piaget saw children becoming less
egocentric as they grew older (see Birch, 1997, Developmental
Psychology). Children can be encouraged to act more pro socially
if they are reinforced for prosocial behaviour. But they need to
develop intrinsic motives, and rewarding all good behaviour may
inhibit this intrinsic motivation. Parents are the ideal models; where
they practise what they preach and clearly set out the norms of
behaviour which are expected they will encourage children to be
prosocial (Eisenberg and Mussen, 1989). In the same way that
violence on television may foster aggression, so television portrayals
of people behaving pro socially may increase prosocial behaviour
(Liebert and Sprafkin, 1988; Roberts and Maccoby, 1985). Children
should have real opportunities to help, looking after younger
brothers or sisters, helping with the cleaning and the washing-up
and so on. We have already noted that individualist cultures foster
less pro social behaviour than do collectivist ones.
Adults, too, can be encouraged to be more pro social. The ways in
which charity fund-raisers increase the rewards of helping behaviour
while minimising the costs could be studied. They give us little prizes
and opportunities to win things. They make it easy. Just phone up
with a credit card number. They put us in a good mood by putting
on a show (Bob Geldofs 'Band Aid' was an example). Social
approval can be mobilised. Jason et al. (1984) found that on a
campus 31 per cent of students volunteered to give blood if they
were directly approached by friends, while only 14 per cent volun-
teered when approached by people they did not know. When they
do give blood, a good experience initially will encourage them to do
it again until they become intrinsically and altruistically motivated.

Self-assessment Questions

1. Describe the sociobiological explanation of altruism. Do you

find it convincing?
 193

146 Social Psychology

2. Outline and compare Batson's empathy-altruism hypothesis with

Cialdini's negative state relief model. Which of these seems to be
the best explanation of why people help others?
3. List the factors which Latane and Darley found inhibit bystan-
ders from helping in emergencies. Does their complex 'three in
one' experiment support the view that these factors are additive?
4. Is it possible to identify ways in which pro social behaviour may
be encouraged?

FURTHER READING

M. A. Hogg and G. M. Vaughan, Social Psychology: An Introduction,

Chapter 13 (London: Prentice-Hall, 1995).
K. Deaux, F. C. Dane and L. S. Wrightsman, Social Psychology in the 90s,
Chapter 11 (Pacific Grove, Cal.: Brooks Cole, 1993).
 194
Journal oj Personality and Social Psychology
1969, Vol. 13, No. 4, 289-299

GOOD SAMARITANISM:
AN UNDERGROUND PHENOMENON? 1
IRVING M. PILIAVIN JUDITH RODIN
University of Pennsylvania Columbia University
2
AND JANE ALLYN PILIAVIN
University of Pennsylvania

A field experiment was performed to investigate the effect of several variables

on helping behavior, using the express trains of the New York 8th Avenue
Independent Subway as a laboratory on wheels. Four teams of students, each
one made up of a victim, model, and two observers, staged standard col-
lapses in which type of victim (drunk or ill), race of victim (black or white)
and presence or absence of a model were varied. Data recorded by observers
included number and race of observers, latency of the helping response and
race of helper, number of helpers, movement out of the "critical area," and
spontaneous comments. Major findings of the study were that (a) an appar-
ently ill person is more likely to receive aid than is one who appears to be
drunk, (b) race of victim has little effect on race of helper except when the
victim is drunk, (c) the longer the emergency continues without help being
offered, the more likely it is that someone will leave the area of the emergency,
and (d) the expected decrease in speed of responding as group size increases—
the "diffusion of responsibility effect" found by Darley and Latane—does not
occur in this situation. Implications of this difference between laboratory and
field results are discussed, and a brief model for the prediction of behavior
in emergency situations is presented.

Since the murder of Kitty Genovese in ings indicate that under certain circumstances
Queens, a rapidly increasing number of social there is not "safety in numbers," but rather
scientists have turned their attentions to the "diffusion of responsibility." Darley and
study of the good Samaritan's act and an Latane (1968) have reported that among by-
associated phenomenon, the evaluation of standers hearing an epileptic seizure over
victims by bystanders and agents. Some of earphones, those who believed other witnesses
the findings of this research have been pro- were present were less likely to seek as-
vocative and nonobvious. For example, there sistance for the victim than were bystanders
is evidence that agents, and even bystanders, who believed they were alone. Subsequent
will sometimes derogate the character of the research by Latane and Rodin (1969) on
victims of misfortune, instead of feeling com- response to the victim of a fall confirmed this
passion (Berscheid & Walster, 1967; Lerner finding and suggested further that assistance
& Simmons, 1966). Furthermore, recent find- from a group of bystanders was less likely
1 to come if the group members were strangers
This research was conducted while the first au-
thor was at Columbia University as a Special Na- than if they were prior acquaintances. The
tional Institute of Mental Health Research Fellow field experiments of Bryan and Test (1967),
under Grant 1-F3-MH-36, 328-01. The study was on the other hand, provide interesting findings
partially supported by funds supplied by this grant that fit common sense expectations; namely,
and partially by funds from National Science one is more likely to be a good Samaritan
Foundation Grant GS-1901 to the third author. The
authors thank Virginia Joy for allowing the experi- if one has just observed another individual
mental teams to be recruited from her class, and performing a helpful act.
Percy Tannenbaum for his reading of the manuscript Much of the work on victimization to date
and his helpful comments. has been performed in the laboratory. It is
2
Requests for reprints should be sent to Jane commonly argued that the ideal research
Allyn Piliavin, Department of Psychology, University
of Pennsylvania, 3813-1S Walnut Street, Philadelphia, strategy over the long haul is to move back
Pennsylvania 19104. and forth between the laboratory, with its
289
 195
290 I. M. PILIAVIN, J. RODIN, AND J. A. PILIAVIN

advantage of greater control, and the field, creases in group size led to decreases in fre-
with its advantage of greater reality. The quency and increases in latency of responding.
present study was designed to provide more In these studies, however, the emergency was
information from the latter setting. only heard, not seen. Since visual cues are
The primary focus of the study was on the likely to make an emergency much more
effect of type of victim (drunk or ill) and arousing for the observer, it is not clear that,
race of victim (black or white) on speed of given these cues, such considerations as
responding, frequency of responding, and the crowd size will be relevant determinants of
race of the helper. On the basis of the large the observer's response to the emergency.
body of research on similarity and liking as Visual cues also provide clear information as
well as that on race and social distance, it to whether anyone has yet helped the victim
was assumed that an individual would be or if he has been able to help himself. Thus,
more inclined to help someone of his race in the laboratory studies, observers lacking
than a person of another race. The expecta- visual cues could rationalize not helping by
tion regarding type of victim was that help assuming assistance was no longer needed
would be accorded more frequently and when the victim ceased calling for help.
rapidly to the apparently ill victim. This Staging emergencies in full view of ob-
expectation was derived from two considera- servers eliminates the possibility of such
tions. First, it was assumed that people who rationalization.
are regarded as partly responsible for their To conduct a field investigation of the
plight would receive less sympathy and conse- above questions under the desired conditions
quently less help than people seen as not required a setting which would allow the re-
responsible for their circumstances (Schopler peated staging of emergencies in the midst
& Matthews, 1965). of reasonably large groups which remained
Secondly, it was assumed that whatever fairly similar in composition from incident to
sympathy individuals may experience when incident. It was also desirable that each
they observe a drunk collapse, their inclina- group retain the same composition over the
tion to help him will be dampened by the course of the incident and that a reasonable
realization that the victim may become dis- amount of time be available after the emer-
gusting, embarrassing, and/or violent. This gency occurred for good Samaritans to act.
realization may, in fact, not only constrain To meet these requirements, the emergencies
helping but also lead observers to turn away were staged during the approximately 7-J-
from the victim—that is, to leave the scene minute express run between the 59th Street
of the emergency. and 125th Street stations of the Eighth Ave-
Aside from examining the effects of race nue Independent (IND) branch of the New
and type of victim, the present research York subways.
sought to investigate the impact of modeling
in emergency situations. Several investigators METHOD
have found that an individual's actions in a Subjects
given situation lead others in that situation About 4,450 men and women who traveled on the
to engage in similar actions. This modeling 8th Avenue IND in New York City, weekdays be-
tween the hours of 11:00 A.M. and 3:00 P.M. during
phenomenon has been observed in a variety the period from April 15 to June 26, 1968, were
of contexts including those involving good the unsolicited participants in this study. The racial
Samaritanism (Bryan & Test, 1967). It was composition of a typical train, which travels through
expected that the phenomenon would be Harlem to the Bronx, was about 45% black and
observed as well in the present study. A final 55% white. The mean number of people per car
during these hours was 43; the mean number of
concern of the study was to examine the people in the "critical area," in which the staged
relationship between size of group and fre- incident took place, was 8.5.
quency and latency of the helping response, Field situation. The A and D trains of the 8th
with a victim who was both seen and heard. Avenue IND were selected because they make no
stops between 59th Street and 125th Street. Thus,
In previous laboratory studies (Darley & for about H minutes there was a captive audience
Latane, 1968; Latane & Rodin, 1969) in- who, after the first 70 seconds of their ride, became
 196
GOOD SAMARITANISM: AN UNDERGROUND PHENOMENON? 291

Adjacent Area Critical Ares

Observer 2 —- »O Exit
Doors
Exit
Doors

Remainder Doors
of
D to
e

Atf
Car \ Vic
tim Next
Car

c)bserver
i
i
Exit Exit Mot or -
Doors 0 Doors man' s
box

FIG, I. Layout of adjacent and critical areas of subway car.

bystanders to an emergency situation. A single trial they appeared sober and carried a black cane (cane
was a nonstop ride between 59th and 125th Streets, condition). In all other aspects, victims dressed and
going in either direction. All trials were run only behaved identically in the two conditions. Each
on the old New York subway cars which serviced victim participated in drunk and cane trials. 3
the 8th Avenue line since they had two-person Model. Four white males between the ages of 24
seats in group arrangement rather than extended and 29 assumed the roles of model in each team.
seats. The designated experimental or critical area All models wore informal clothes, although they were
was that end section of any car whose doors led not identically attired. There were four different
to the next car. There are 13 seats and some model conditions used across both victim conditions
standing room in this area on all trains (see (drunk or cane).
Figure 1), 1. Critical area—early. Model stood in critical area
and waited until passing fourth station to assist
Procedure victim (approximately 70 seconds after collapse).
2. Critical area—late. Model stood in critical area
On each trial a team of four Columbia General
and waited until passing sixth station to assist victim
Studies students, two males and two females, boarded
(approximately 150 seconds after collapse).
the train using different doors. Four different teams,
3. Adjacent area—early. Model stood in middle of
whose members always worked together, were used
car in area adjacent to critical area and waited until
to collect data for 103 trials. Each team varied the
passing fourth station.
location of the experimental car from trial to trial.
4. Adjacent area—late. Model stood in adjacent
The female confederates took seats outside the criti-
area and waited until passing sixth station.
cal area and recorded data as unobtrusively as pos-
When the model provided assistance, he raised the
sible for the duration of the ride, while the male
victim to a sitting position and stayed with him
model and victim remained standing. The victim
for the remainder of the trial. An equal number of
always stood next to a pole in the center of the
trials in the no-model condition and in each of the
critical area (see Figure 1). As the train passed the four model conditions were preprogrammed by a
first station (approximately 70 seconds after depart- random number table and assigned to each team.
ing) the victim staggered forward and collapsed.
Until receiving help, the victim remained supine on
3
the floor looking at the ceiling. If the victim re- It will be noted later that not only were there
ceived no assistance by the time the train slowed more cane trials than drunk trials, they were also
to a stop, the model helped him to his feet. At the distributed unevenly across black and white victims.
stop, the team disembarked and waited separately The reason for this is easier to explain than to cor-
until other riders had left the station. They then rect. Teams 1 and 2 (both white victims) started
proceeded to another platform to board a train the first day in the cane condition. Teams 3 (black)
going in the opposite direction for the next trial. and 4 (white) began in the drunk condition. Teams
From 6 to 8 trials were run on a given day. AH were told to alternate the conditions across days.
trials on a given day were in the same "victim They arranged their running days to fit their sched-
condition." ules. On their fourth day, Team 2 violated the
Victim. The four victims (one from each team) instruction and ran cane trials when they should
were males between the ages of 26 and 35. Three have run drunk trials; the victim "didn't like" play-
were white and one was black. All were identically ing the drunk! Then the Columbia student strike
dressed in Eisenhower jackets, old slacks, and no tie. occurred, the teams disbanded, and the study of
On 38 trials the victims smelled of liquor and carried necessity was over. At this point, Teams 1 and 3
a liquor bottle wrapped tightly in a brown bag had run on only 3 days each, while 2 and 4 had
(drunk condition), while on the remaining 65 trials run on 4 days each.
 197
292 I. M. PILIAVIN, J. RODIN, AND J. A. PILIAVIN

TABLE 1 likely to happen with the drunk victim. In

PERCENTAGE OE TRIALS ON WHICH HELP WAS GIVEN, many cases, the early model was able to
BY RACE AND CONDITION OF VICTIM, AND TOTAL intervene, and in a few, even the delayed
NUMBER OF TRIALS RUN IN
EACH CONDITION model could act (see Table 1 for frequencies).
A direct comparison between the latency
White victims Black victim of response in the drunk and cane conditions
might be misleading, since on model trials
Cane Drunk Cane Drunk
one does not know how long it might have
No model 100% 100% 100% 73% taken for a helper to arrive without the
Number of trials run 54 11 8 11 stimulus of the model. Omitting the model
Model trials 100% 77 — 67%,
Number of trials run 3 13 0 3 trials, however, would reduce the number of
Total number of trials 57 24 8 14 drunk trials drastically. In order to get
around these problems the trials have been
Note.—Distribution of model trials for the drunk was as
follows: critical area: early, •!; late, 4; adjacent area: early, 5; dichotomized into a group in which someone
late, 3. The three model trials completed for the cane victim helped bejore 70 seconds (the time at which
were all early, with 2 from the critical area and 1 from the
adjacent area. the early model was programmed to help)
and a group in which no one had helped by
Measures. On each trial one observer noted the this time. The second group includes some
race, sex, and location of every rider seated or stand- trials in which people helped the model and
ing in the critical area. In addition, she counted the
total number of individuals in the car and the total a very few in which no one helped at all.4
number of individuals who came to the victim's It is quite clear from the first section of
assistance. She also recorded the race, sex, and loca- Table 2 that there was more immediate,
tion of every helper. A second observer coded the spontaneous helping of the victim with the
race, sex, and location of all persons in the adjacent
area. She also recorded the latency of the first
cane than of the drunk. The effect seems to
helper's arrival after the victim had fallen and on be essentially the same for the black victim
appropriate trials, the latency of the first helper's and for the white victims.5
arrival after the programmed model had arrived. What of the total number of people who
Both observers recorded comments spontaneously helped? On 60% of the 81 trials on which the
made by nearby passengers and attempted to elicit
comments from a rider sitting next to them. victim received help, he received it not from
one good Samaritan but from two, three, or
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION even more.0 There are no significant differ-
As can be seen in Table 1, the frequency 4
If a comparison of latencies is made between
of help received by the victims was impres- cane and drunk nonmodel trials only, the median
sive, at least as compared to earlier laboratory latency for cane trials is 5 seconds and the median
results. The victim with the cane received for drunk trials is 109 seconds (assigning 400 seconds
as the latency for nonrespondents). The Mann-
spontaneous help, that is, before the model Whitney U for this comparison is significant at
acted, on 62 of the 65 trials. Even the drunk p < .0001.
5
received spontaneous help on 19 of 38 trials. Among the white victim teams, the data from
The difference is not explicable on the basis Team 2 differ to some extent from those for Teams
of gross differences in the numbers of poten- 1 and 4. All of the cane-after 70 seconds trials are
accounted for by Team 2, as are 4 of the S drunk-
tial helpers in the cars. (Mean number of before 70 trials. Median latency for cane trials is
passengers in the car on cane trials was longer for Team 2 than for the other teams; for
45; on drunk trials, 40. Total range was 15- drunk trials, shorter. This is the same team that vio-
120.) lated the "alternate days" instruction. It would ap-
pear that this team is being rather less careful—that
On the basis of past research, relatively the victim may be getting out of his role. The data
long latencies of spontaneous helping were from this team have been included in the analysis
expected; thus, it was assumed that models although they tend to reduce the relationships that
would have time to help, and their effects were found.
6
could be assessed. However, in all but three The data from the model trials are not included
in this analysis because the model was programmed
of the cane trials planned to be model trials, to behave rather differently from the way in which
the victim received help before the model was most real helpers behaved. That is, his role was to
scheduled to offer assistance. This was less raise the victim to a sitting position and then appear
 198
GOOD SAMARITANISM: AN UNDERGROUND PHENOMENON? 2Q3

TABLE 2
TIME AND RESPONSES TO THE INCIDENT

Total number % of trials on which 1 + % of trials on which 1 -}- Mean number of

of trials persons left critical area b comments were recorded 5 comments
Trials on which
help was offered :
White Black White Black White Black White Black
victims victim victims victim victims victim victims victim

Before 70 sec.
Cane 52 7 4% M% 21% 0% .27 .00
Drunk S 4 20% 0% 80% 50% 1.00 .50
Total 57 11 5% 9% 26% 18% .33 .18
After 70 sec.
Cane 5 1 40% — 60% .80
Drunk 19 10 60% 100% —
70% 2.00 —
.90
42%
Total 24 11 42% 64% 96% 64% 1.75 .82
a 36.83 a
x 2
X timo = 23.19 2
X timo = 31.45
P •C001 <.03 p < .001 p < .001
2 2
X cana-drunk = 11.71 X oano-drlmk = 37.95
p < .001 p < .001

Note.—Percentage and means not calculated for n's less than 4.

a
bFisher's exact test, estimate of two-tailed probability.
Black and white victims are combined for the analyses of these data.

ences between black and white victims, or the average, 60% of the people in the critical
between cane and drunk victims, in the area were males. Yet, of the 81 spontaneous
number of helpers subsequent to the first first helpers, 90% were males. In this
who came to his aid. Seemingly, then, the situation, then, men are considerably more
presence of the first helper has important likely to help than are women (x2 = 30.63;
implications which override whatever cogni- p < .001).
tive and emotional differences were initially Turning now to the race variable, of the
engendered among observers by the charac- 81 first helpers, 64-% were white. This per-
teristics of the victim. It may be that the centage does not differ significantly from the
victim's uniformly passive response to the expected percentage of 55% based on racial
individual trying to assist him reduced ob- distribution in the cars. Since both black and
servers' fear about possible unpleasantness in white victims were used, it is also possible to
the drunk conditions. Another possibility is see whether blacks and whites are more likely
that the key factor in the decisions of second to help a member of their own race. On the
and third helpers to offer assistance was the 65 trials on which spontaneous help was of-
first helper. That is, perhaps assistance was fered to the white victims, 68% of the helpers
being offered primarily to him rather than to were white. This proportion differs from the
the victim. Unfortunately the data do not expected 55% at the .05 level (xa - 4.23).
permit adequate assessment of these or other On the 16 trials on which spontaneous help
possible explanations. was offered to the black victim, half of the
first helpers were white. While this proportion
Characteristics of Spontaneous First Helpers does not differ from chance expectation, we
Having discovered that people do, in fact, again see a slight tendency toward "same-
help with rather high frequency, the next race" helping.
question is, "Who helps?" The effect of two When race of helper is examined separately
variables, sex and race, can be examined. On for cane and drunk victims, an interesting
although nonsignificant trend emerges (see
to need assistance. Most real helpers managed to Table 3). With both the black and white cane
drag the victim to a seat or to a standing position
on their own. Thus the programmed model received victims, the proportion of helpers of each race
somewhat more help than did real first helpers. was in accord with the expected
 199
294 I. M. PILIAVIN, J. RODIN, AND J. A. PILIAVIN
TABLE 3
SPONTANEOUS HELPING OP CANE AND DRUNK BY RACE OP HELPER AND RACE VICTIM

White victims Black victim All victims

Cane Drunk Total Cane Drunk Total Cane Drunk Total

Same as victim 34 10 44 2 6 8 36 16 52
Different from victim 20 1 21 6 2 8 26 3 29
Total 54 11 65 8 8 16 62 19 81

Note.—Chi-squares are corrected for continuity. White victims, x~ = 2.11, p. = 1 6 ; black victim, p = .16 (two-tailed esti-
mate from Fisher's exact probabilities test); all victims, x2 = 3.26, p = .08.

split, With the drunk, on the other hand, it the increase in prejudice towards blacks was
was mainly members of his own race who more than twice that towards whites.
came to his aid.7
This interesting tendency toward same-race Modeling Effects
helping only in the case of the drunk victim No extensive analysis of the response to
may reflect more empathy, sympathy, and the programmed model could be made, since
trust toward victims of one's own racial there were too few cases for analysis. Two
group. In the case of an innocent victim analyses were, however, performed on the
(e.g., the cane victim), when sympathy, effects of adjacent area versus critical area
though differentially experienced, is relatively models and of early versus late models within
uncomplicated by other emotions, assistance the drunk condition. The data are presented
can readily cut across group lines. In the case in Table 4. While the area variable has no
of the drunk (and potentially dangerous) effect, the early model elicited help signifi-
victim, complications are present, probably cantly more than did the late model.
blarne, fear, and disgust. When the victim is
Other Responses to the Incident
a member of one's own group—when the
conditions for empathy and trust are more What other responses do observers make
favorable—-assistance is more likely to be to the incident? Do the passengers leave the
offered. As we have seen, however, this does car, move out of the area, make comments
not happen without the passing of time to about the incident? No one left the car on
think things over. any of the trials. However, on 21 of the 103
Recent findings of Black and Reiss (1967) trials, a total of 34 people did leave the
in a study of the behavior of white police critical area. The second section of Table 2
officers towards apprehended persons offer an presents the percentage of trials on which
someone left the critical area as a function
interesting parallel. Observers in this study
of three variables: type of victim, race of
recorded very little evidence of prejudice victim, and time to receipt of help (before
toward sober individuals, whether white or or after 70 seconds). People left the area on
black. There was a large increase in prejudice a higher proportion of trials with the drunk
expressed towards drunks of both races, but than with the cane victim. They also were far
7 more likely to leave on trials on which help
It is unfortunate from a design standpoint that
there was only one black victim. He was the only was not offered by 70 seconds, as compared
black student in the class from which our crews to trials on which help was received before
were recruited. While it is tenuous to generalize from that time.8 The frequencies are too small to
a sample of one, the problems attendant upon at-
8
tributing results to his race rather than to his indi- Individuals are also somewhat more likely to
vidual personality characteristics are vitiated some- leave the area with the black victim than with the
what by the fact that response latencies and fre- white victims (x 2 = 3.24, £<.08). This race effect
quencies of help to him in the cane condition fall is most probably an artifact, since the black victim
between responses to Teams 1 and 4 on the one ran more drunk trials than cane trials, the white
hand and Team 2 on the other. victims, vice versa.
 200
GOOD SAMARITANISM: AN UNDERGROUND PHENOMENON? 295
TABLE 4
FREQUENCY OF HELP AS A FUNCTION OF EARLY (70 SECONDS) VEKSUS LATE (ISO SECONDS)
AND ADJACENT VERSUS CRITICAL AREA PROGRAMMED MODELS

Critical area Adjacent area Both areas

Help
Early Late Both Early Late Both Early Late Total

Received 4 2 6 5 1 6 9 3 12
Not received 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 4 4

Total 4 4 8 5 3 8 9 7 16
Note.—-Early versus late: p < .04 (two-tailed estimate from Fisher's exact test). All three cane-model trials were early
model trials; two critical area, one adjacent. Help was received on all. Table includes drunk trials only.

make comparisons with each of the variables appropriate. Many women, for example, made
held constant. comments such as, "It's for men to help him,"
Each observer spoke to the person seated or "I wish I could help him—I'm not strong
next to her after the incident took place. She enough," "I never saw this kind of thing
also noted spontaneous comments and actions before—I don't know where to look," "You
by those around her. A content analysis of feel so bad that you don't know what to do,"
these data was performed, with little in the
way of interesting findings, The distribution A Test of the Diffusion of Responsibility
of number of comments over different sorts Hypothesis
of trials, however, did prove interesting (see In the Darley and Latane experiment it
Section 3 of Table 2). Far more comments was predicted and found that as the number
were obtained on drunk trials than on cane of bystanders increased, the likelihood that
trials. Similarly, most of the comments were any individual would help decreased and the
obtained on trials in which no one helped latency of response increased. Their study
until after 70 seconds. The discomfort ob- involved bystanders who could not see each
servers felt in sitting inactive in the presence other or the victim. In the Latane and Rodin
of the victim may have led them to talk study, the effect was again found, with by-
about the incident, perhaps hoping others standers who were face to face, but with
would confirm the fact that inaction was the victim still only heard. In the present

TABLE S
MEAN AND MEDIAN LATENCIES AS A FUNCTION OP NUMBER OF MALES IN THE CRITICAL AREA

Cane Drunk

No. males in critical area

White Black Total White Black Total
victims victim victims victim
1-3
M 16 12 15 — 309 309
Mdn. 7 12 7 — 312 312
N 17 2 19 4 4
4-6
M 20 6 18 155 143 149
Mdn. 5 4 5 105 70 73
,.1 N 23 4 27 4 4 8
and up
M 3 52 9 107 74 97
Mdn. 1 52 1.5 102 65 84
N 14 2 16 7 3 10
Kruskal-Wallis Test (H) 5.08 6.01
P .08 .05
Note,—Means and medians in seconds. Model trials omitted; no response assigned 400 seconds.
 201
296 I. M. PILIAVIN, J. RODIN, AND J. A. PILIAVIN

Legend
, 6Hypothetical 3-person groups
• • Natural 3-person groups
,,«,...» Hypothetical 7-person groups
e—,.__, Natural 7-person groups

Cn
a
•H
-0

afi
w
B
Ul
P.

4-1
0
c
0
•H
4J
H
a
ft*
_| 1 1 1 f,—! j , 1 r , 1 1 , r—| 1 j
1 2 3 4 5 6 1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18

Seconds from occurence of collapse to

helping response from one member of group
FIG. 2. Cumulative proportion of groups producing a helper over time (cane trials, white victims, male
helpers from inside critical area).

study, bystanders saw both the victim and faster for the 7 or more groups compared to
each other. Will the diffusion of responsibility the 1 to 3 groups.9
finding still occur in this situation? As Darley and Latane pointed out, how-
In order to check this hypothesis, two ever, different-size real groups cannot be
analyses were performed. First, all nonmodel meaningfully compared to one another, since
trials were separated into three groups ac- as group size increases the likelihood that one
cording to the number of males in the critical or more persons will help also increases. A
area (the assumed reference group for spon- second analysis as similar as possible to that
taneous first helpers). Mean and median used by those authors was therefore per-
latencies of response were then calculated for formed, comparing latencies actually obtained
each group, separately by type and race of 9
The total number of people in the car was
victim. The results are presented in Table 5. strongly related to the number of males in the
There is no evidence in these data for dif- critical area. Similar results are obtained if latencies
fusion of responsiiblity; in fact, response are examined as a function of the total number of
times, using either measure, are consistently people in the car.
 202
GOOD SAMARITANISM: AN UNDERGROUND PHENOMENON? 297

for each size group with a base line of hypo- with other considerations any tendency to
thetical groups of the same size made up by diffuse responsibility. Second, the present
combining smaller groups. In order to have findings may indicate that even if diffusion
as much control as possible the analysis was of responsibility is experienced by people
confined to cane trials with white victims and who can actually see an emergency, when
male first helpers coming from the critical groups are larger than two the increment in
area. Within this set of trials, the most fre- deterrence to action resulting from increasing
quently occurring natural groups (of males the number of observers may be less than the
in the critical area) were those of sizes 3 increase in probability that within a given
(n = 6) and 7 (n = 5). Hypothetical groups time interval at least one of the observers
of 3 (n = 4) and 7 (n= 25) were composed will take action to assist the victim. Clearly,
of all combinations of smaller sized groups. more work is needed in both natural and
For example, to obtain the hypothetical laboratory settings before an understanding
latencies for groups of 7, combinations were is reached of the conditions under which dif-
made of (a) all real size 6 groups with all fusion of responsibility will or will not occur,
real size 1 groups, plus (b) all real size S
groups with all real size 2 groups, etc. The CONCLUSIONS
latency assigned to each of these hypothetical In this field study, a personal emergency
groups was that recorded for the faster of the
occurred in which escape for the bystander
two real groups of which it was composed. was virtually impossible. It was a public,
Cumulative response curves for real and hypo- face-to-face situation, and in this respect dif-
thetical groups of 3 and 7 are presented in
fered from previous lab studies. Moreover,
Figure 2.
since generalizations from field studies to lab
As can be seen in the figure, the cumula-
research must be made with caution, few
tive helping response curves for the hypo-
comparisons will be drawn. However, several
thetical groups of both sizes are lower than
conclusions may be put forth:
those for the corresponding real groups. That
is, members of real groups responded more 1. An individual who appears to be ill is
rapidly than would be expected on the basis more likely to receive aid than is one who
of the faster of the two scores obtained from appears to be drunk, even when the immediate
the combined smaller groups. While these help needed is of the same kind.
results together with those summarized in 2. Given mixed groups of men and women,
Table 5 do not necessarily contradict the and a male victim, men are more likely to
diffusion of responsibility hypothesis, they help than are women.
do not follow the pattern of findings obtained 3. Given mixed racial groups, there is some
by Darley and Latane and are clearly at vari- tendency for same-race helping to be more
ance with the tentative conclusion of those frequent. This tendency is increased when the
investigators that "a victim may be more victim is drunk as compared to apparently ill.
likely to receive help . . . the fewer people 4. There is no strong relationship between
there are to take action [Latane & Darley, number of bystanders and speed of helping;
1968, p. 221]." the expected increased "diffusion of respon-
Two explanations can be suggested to ac- sibility" with a greater number of bystanders
count for the disparity between the findings was not obtained for groups of these sizes.
of Table 5 and Figure 2 and those of Darley That is, help is not less frequent or slower
and Latane and Latane and Rodin. As indi- in coming from larger as compared to smaller
cated earlier in this paper, the conditions of groups of bystanders; what effect there is, is
the present study were quite different from in the opposite direction.
those in previous investigations. First, the 5. The longer the emergency continues
fact that observers in the present study could without help being offered (a) the less impact
see the victim may not only have constrained a model has on the helping behavior of ob-
observers' abilities to conclude there was no servers; (b) the more likely it is that indi-
emergency, but may also have overwhelmed viduals will leave the immediate area; that
 203
298 I. M. PlLIAVIN, J. RODIN, AND J. A. PlLIAVIN

is, they appear to move purposive!}' to an- 2. Women help less because costs for help-
other area in order to avoid the situation; ing are higher in this situation (effort,
(c) the more likely it is that observers will mainly) and costs for not helping are lower
discuss the incident and its implications for (less censure from others; it is not her role).
their behavior. 3. Same-race helping, particularly of the
drunk, can be explained by differential costs
A model of response to emergency situa- for not helping (less censure if one is of op-
tions consistent with the previous findings is posite race) and, with the drunk, differential
currently being developed by the authors. It costs for helping (more fear if of different
is briefly presented here as a possible heu- race).
ristic device. The model includes the following 4. Diffusion of responsibility is not found
assumptions: Observation of an emergency on cane trials because costs for helping in
creates an emotional arousal state in the general are low and costs for not helping are
bystander. This state will be differently inter- high (more self-blame because of possible
preted in different situations (Schachter, severity of problem). That is, the suggestion
1964) as fear, disgust, sympathy, etc., and is made that the diffusion of responsibility
possibly a combination of these. This state effect will increase as costs for helping in-
of arousal is higher (a) the more one can crease and costs for not helping decrease.
empathize with the victim (i.e., the more one This interpretation is consistent with the
can see oneself in his situation—Stotland, well-known public incidents, in which possible
1966), (b) the closer one is to the emergency, bodily harm to a helper is almost always
and (c) the longer the state of emergency con- involved, and thus costs for helping are very
tinues without the intervention of a helper. high, and also with previous research done
It can be reduced by one of a number of with nonvisible victims in which either (a) it
possible responses: (a) helping directly, (b) was easy to assume someone had already
going to get help, (c) leaving the scene of the helped and thus costs for not helping were
emergencv, and (d) rejecting the victim as reduced (Barley & Latane) or (b) it was
undeserving of help (Lerner & Simmons, possible to think that the emergency was
1966). The response that will be chosen is minor, which also reduces the costs for not
a function of a cost-reward matrix that in- helping (Latane & Rodin).
cludes costs associated with helping (e.g., 5. All of the effects of time are also con-
effort, embarrassment, possible disgusting or
sistent with the model. The longer the emer-
distasteful experiences, possible physical
harm, etc.), costs associated with not helping genc}' continues, the more likely it is that
(mainly self-blame and perceived censure observers will be aroused and therefore will
from others), rewards associated with helping have chosen among the possible responses.
(mainly praise from self, victim, and others), Thus, (a) a late model will elicit less help-
and rewards associated with not helping ing, since people have already reduced their
(mainly those stemming from continuation of arousal by one of the other methods; (b)
other activities). Note that the major motiva- unless arousal is reduced by other methods,
tion implied in the model is not a positive people will leave more as time goes on, be-
"altruistic" one, but rather a selfish desire to cause arousal is still increasing; and (c) ob-
rid oneself of an unpleasant emotional state. servers will discuss the incident in an attempt
In terms of this model, the following after- to reduce self-blame and arrive at the fourth
the-fact interpretations can be made of the resolution, namely a justification for not
findings obtained: helping based on rejection of the victim.
1. The drunk is helped less because costs Quite obviously, the model was derived
for helping are higher (greater disgust) and from these data, along with data of other
costs for not helping are lower (less self- studies in the area. Needless to say, further
blame and censure because he is in part work is being planned b}' the authors to test
responsible for his own victimization). the implications of the model systematically.
 204
GOOD SAMAEITANISM: AN UNDERGROUND PHENOMENON? 299

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Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 4, 609-
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Personality and Social Psychology, 1968, 8, 377-
383. STOTLAKD, E. A theory and experiments in empathy.
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LATANE, B., & DARLEY, J. Group inhibition of by- Psychological Association, New York, September
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