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SPROJ - Research #1

Haniel Barazarte

Panagiotis Kondylis and the Question of “Legal Universalism”

Books:

- The Decline of the Bourgeois Thought-Form and Life-Form.

- Afterword to Karl Vorländer’s History of philosophy, v. 3 (or: The multi-dimensional

Enlightenment).

- Montesquieu and the Spirit of the Laws.

- Power and Decision

- Conservatism
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1. Methodology

I find it essential to begin this piece by making certain clarifications regarding Panagiotis

Kondylis' method. First, because it's a method I personally share and will be using in my thesis,

and second, because it explains the Greek’s approach when discussing 'legal universalism.' This

way, I can avoid over-explaining why Kondylis says x or y, saving myself from having to write

even more.

a) Polemology

In Power and Decision, Kondylis refers to his philosophy (which subsumes his methodology) as

"descriptive decisionism," in contrast to both normativism (Kant, moralism at large) and

prescriptive decisionism (Nietzsche). It's worth discussing the difference between these two

forms of decisionism: the descriptive merely asserts that behind any decision lies a "claim to

power," which, in one way or another, hides beneath "norms"; the prescriptive, on the other hand,

implies a "positive nihilism" in Ernst Jünger’s terms, meaning the often voluntaristic call to

destroy existing norms. Descriptive decisionism, then, seeks to adopt what Weber called

"value-freedom."

Now, I do not intend to exhaustively discuss the philosophical assumptions of descriptive

decisionism here. However, I will focus on one of its primary aspects that directly relates to my

research, namely, polemology.

For Kondylis, life—and therefore ideas—are of an agonistic nature: to think, for our author, is to

think against someone or something and in favor of someone or something. In this way,

Kondylis elevates Schmitt’s distinction, which is meant to be exclusively political, between

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friend and enemy to an essential methodological distinction. Kondylis also gives it a Marxist

sense: ideas have their "social bearers."

Therefore, the content and forms of ideas are ultimately determined by the polemical nature of

existence. Kondylis' methodology is thus primarily of an agonistic, polemical nature.

b) Formalism

I would like to begin the discussion of Kondylis' methodological formalism directly with the

following quote:

“The polemical-negative agreement regarding the invocation or appeal to Reason against

Revelation and Authority was not translated inside of the Enlightenment into a positive

agreement over the content of Reason” (Afterward to Karl Vorlander´ History of

Philosophy, 15)

The quote in question is timely, primarily because it highlights the issues involved in reducing a

multivariate phenomenon—such as the concept of Reason in the Enlightenment—to the specific

idea that one or several Enlightenment authors had of Reason. A concrete example would be the

reduction of Enlightened Reason to instrumental reason, which in some measure defined the

research program of the Frankfurt School.

Thus, the concept of Enlightened Reason requires "a multi-dimensional apprehension" (23), due

to the variety of its content. For this reason, it is necessary to seek a form—an "ideal type"—that

encompasses this typically opposing diversity of Enlightened Reason.

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So, how does this sort of formal unity of Enlightened Reason emerge? The formal unity, as it

could only be, is a polemical formal unity, one that stands in opposition to the "formal unity" of

scholastic thought, whose centrality lies in the theologically-centered perspective of existence.

The idea of Enlightened Reason is thus forged within "Enlightenment’s rehabilitation of the

senses and the sensorial" (18), against the intellectualist asceticism of the Aristotelian-Thomistic

view that elevates the vita speculativa over the vita activa.

The methodological lesson we derive is this: the content of the authors will not be the organizing

principle of our study but rather one more object of knowledge. This material variety must be

consolidated formally through the creation of an ideal type, a type forged in polemic with others.

c) The Discontinuity of Concepts

Kondylis is to Conceptual History what Thomas Kuhn is to the History of Science. For Kondylis,

there is no conceptual continuity between one period and another. The idea of citizenship in

Montesquieu is not the same as the idea of citizenship (in the sense of legal universalism) held

by the French Revolutionaries, and even less so the idea of citizenship upheld by the legal

philosophy of the civil rights movement in the United States.

Kondylis establishes the following periodization: Pre-Modern, Modern, Post-Modern. Each

period corresponds to distinct forms of thought: Theological-Centric, Synthetic-Harmonizing,

and Analytic-Combinatory. And each period has its own “social bearers”: aristocracy,

bourgeoisie/proletariat, and managers/masses.

Kondylis’ position is also my own.

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2. Kondylis and Legal Universalism

a) Towards a Definition of Legal Universalism

Before discussing Kondylis' conception of legal universalism, it is first necessary to define what

we mean by the term. Although Kondylis never used this term explicitly, it is still possible to

offer a general and minimal definition, based on a reading of his work, of what we commonly

refer to as "legal universalism." Our definition is as follows:

A legal doctrine that emerges in opposition to an estate-based society and assumes the

equality—whether formal or material—of citizens before the law.

This minimal definition arises from two key aspects of the concept of legal universalism as it

functions in Kondylis' work: its polemical nature in opposition to the Ancien Régime and,

consequently, its historical character. In a disjunctive sense, it also encompasses both the formal

defense of liberalism and its radical, material (economic) version in 19th-century socialism

(social-democracy). However, for the purposes of this text, we will focus on its

"liberal-bourgeois" version.

The polemical-historical nature of this definition is already present in nuce in Kondylis' book

Montesquieu and the Spirit of the Laws. Here, Kondylis seeks to position the Frenchman as an

intermediary figure between what he calls societas civilis (the Ancien Régime) and bourgeois

liberalism.

Naturally, Kondylis must discuss legal universalism here, and he introduces it precisely to

highlight the discontinuity between what Montesquieu defended and what the French

revolutionaries promoted, asserting that the latter, in contrast to Montesquieu:

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"Manufactured and established a close connection between the realization of political

freedom and the equality of all before the law." (95)

We understand that the liberal principle of equality under the law presupposes a connection

between two values: political freedom and equality. This unity is realized through "legislation [as

the embodiment of national sovereignty], which was intended to apply to all citizens regardless

of their social status" (96).

In bourgeois liberalism, political freedom also constitutes a "function of the social composition

of a land" (96), standing in opposition to Montesquieu's idea, which situates political freedom

precisely in social and legal inequalities (95).

Kondylis does not provide a concrete definition of what political freedom entails, whether in its

liberal sense or its earlier form. Rather than posing a problem, this omission opens the door to a

new line of inquiry. What is clear, however, is that Kondylis associates legal universalism with

the legal principle of legislative sovereignty, a concept we will explore further later on.

b) Historical Context

As I previously stated, Kondylis places all eidetic problems within a historical-polemical

framework: legal universalism, in this sense, is an expression of the extension of the state

principle over the estate-based society (societas civilis).

Here, Kondylis adopts the thesis of continuity between absolutism and liberalism: both, in one

way or another, shared the same enemy, namely the "feudal anarchy" with its notion of plural

sovereignty, which constituted a "loose sum of separate competences and prerogatives"

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(Conservatism, 75), in contrast to the new (modern) sovereignty, i.e., a "unified competence that

encompasses and justifies all other individual rights of the sovereign" (Conservatism, 76).

The social bearer of "conservatism" was, then, the aristocrats, who were always in tension with

absolutism, that is, with the expansion of the state apparatus over the estate-based society, which

was sustained under a plural and subsidiary principle of power.

Kondylis dedicates the early chapters of his book Conservatism to explaining this tension.

Suffice it to say that the aristocracy, despite maintaining their social privileges within absolutism,

always feared the administrative expansion of the state. Undoubtedly, this thesis is worth

exploring further, and I would add that its clearest expression was not so much in the European

theater but rather in the extra-European context, with the reaction (resentment) of Spaniards and

Englishmen in the New World toward the respective modernizing reforms promulgated by their

metropolises.

The social nature behind social universalism must be explored because it determines its genesis,

which is always of a polemical nature. This genesis is prefigured, as we previously affirmed, in

absolutism; it is enough to read Hobbes's atomic view of society in the political body to confirm

this, a view later inherited by liberalism in its legislative form.

Kondylis sees, as could not be otherwise, the conflict between legal universalism and legal

particularism within the framework of class struggle: legal universalism is tied to the bourgeoisie

(and later to the proletariat in its socialist form), while the defense of legal prerogatives and

privileges is tied to the aristocracy. Undoubtedly, Kondylis recognizes the simplifying nature of

this interpretive framework, and similarly seeks to identify certain fissures in the continuity
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between ideology and social class. Nevertheless, class struggle remains central in his work when

explaining the polemical nature of the eidetic world.

c) The Metaphysical and Scientific Prefiguration for Legal Universalism

Here we fully enter the theoretical plane without any direct reference to the social. It’s important

to affirm, though this may sound trivial, that legal universalism did not emerge ex nihilo but is

part of a series of theoretical developments that had been germinating since the 17th century.

In fact, our author establishes a strong connection between legal universalism and the changes

occurring in the field of science during the 17th century. Here, we are referring, among other

things, to Newtonian physics, which, in contrast to Aristotelian physics, redefined our

understanding of Nature. There are several points to consider: first, the autonomy of Nature in

relation to God and the search for self-regulating laws. Second, how this autonomy is linked

to the Enlightenment’s rehabilitation of the senses and the question of voluntarism.

All of these arguments are scattered throughout Kondylis's work: the task here is to synthesize

them. With that said, let us begin with:

- The Autonomy of Nature

This is a point that Kondylis repeatedly emphasizes when interpreting "bourgeois thought,"

perhaps because the autonomy of Nature implied a significant shift at the level of the "ontic": the

most "generalizable" sphere of systematic thought.

By "autonomy of Nature," Kondylis refers to the development of the "mathematical natural

sciences" in their search for laws within Nature that determine its internal functioning
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independently of God. It's worth noting that independence does not equate to atheism: rather,

God became a sort of watchmaker, a "prime mover" in Aristotelian terminology.

Kondylis then mentions Newton and the importance the Englishman had, particularly regarding

the question of Nature's regulatory laws. However, Kondylis's explanation of Newton is not

exhaustive, but far from being a problem, this presents an opportunity for my own project to

delve deeper into the History of Science.

What is important for our purposes is that this autonomy of Nature (in relation to God) led to a

generalized turn toward the immanent. As Kondylis states: "man from now on chooses this world

as the main area or realm of activity" (The Multi-Dimensional Enlightenment, 18).

This shift toward immanence, Kondylis argues, corresponds with the transition in the ethical

sphere toward the vita activa, in contrast with the transcendentalism underlying the ascetic

morality of Christian origin. This turn toward the immanent involved a certain primacy of the

anthropic: man is now also seen from the perspective of his own immanence, in light of

naturalism. As Kondylis states:

“Main is increasingly looked at as a natural being whose spirit takes root in the

biostructure and is co-shaped by other sensorial factors” (The multi-dimensional

Enlightenment, 18).

- Rehabilitation of the Senses

The autonomy of nature thus elevated the view of man as a sensory being, opposing the elevation

of the intellective element (over the volitional) in Christian morality. Kondylis associates this
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shift toward will with the action-centered philosophies characteristic of "Modernity," referencing

figures as varied in content as Nietzsche, Marx, and pragmatism. I won't delve here into the

actual tension between legalistic determinism and voluntarism; it’s enough to state that

voluntarism gained significant momentum following the collapse of the theological mindset

associated with societas civilis.

That said, it’s important to note that Kondylis does not adopt a one-dimensional interpretation of

the Enlightenment: Will does not stand in opposition to a cold, instrumental Enlightened Reason.

On the contrary, the elevation of the volitional—of emotions and passions—is a direct result of

the developments born within the heart of the Enlightenment, in opposition to the supremacy of

the ascetic intellect (spirit).

3) The Thought-Form of Legal Universalism

Kondylis’ book The Decline of the Bourgeois Thought-Form and Life-Form serves as one of the

main theoretical bases for my project, particularly because it addresses “holotic theory”—that is,

the philosophy concerning the relationship between parts and the whole. This focus aligns with

the distinct totalization of society introduced by the French Revolution, which brought about a

new way of structuring society’s parts into a cohesive whole.

As I previously mentioned, Kondylis distinguishes between the thought-form of bourgeois

society and that of mass democratic “civilization”: the former corresponds to a

“synthetic-harmonizing” thought form, and the latter to an “analytico-combinatory” approach.

Although discussing the mass democratic thought form could be useful for a final chapter, my

primary emphasis here is this: that the synthetic-harmonizing thought form serves as the

foundation for legal universalism

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Kondylis defines the bourgeois thought form in the following term:

“The part exists inside of the whole, and it finds its determination by contributing to the
harmonic completeness and perfectness of the whole, but not by denial of, but by the
development and unfolding of its own individuality”

There are a few key points to emphasize here. First, the individual parts—though they may exist
in a state of difference, or more precisely, discontinuity (and perhaps even contradiction)—must
be harmonized into a whole. In Hegelian terms, this harmonizing could be described as a
speculative moment. Secondly, the parts are perceived in their individuality, which relates to the
question of voluntarism, as individuals will overcome the constraints of tradition. This view is,
of course, opposed to how parts were conceived under the Ancien Régime: parts were not
“atomical” but “anatomical”—guilds, nobles, peasants, etc. Lastly, Kondylis asserts that “things
are thought about and contemplated on the basis of their function.” He does not explore this
claim further, which opens a new line of inquiry for us: how does the idea of function—and, by
extension, substance—relate to revolutionary legal universalism?