Microsoft General - Cloud Implementation Guide
Microsoft General - Cloud Implementation Guide
Abstract
When electric utilities and other registered entities deploy applications to Microsoft Azure or Azure
Government, they inherit security controls from the underlying cloud platform. Registered Entities are
ultimately responsible for meeting their NERC CIP compliance obligations; however, Microsoft’s existing
independent third-party certifications and attestations such as FedRAMP can be leveraged to help
Registered Entities with their own compliance obligations.
The purpose of this document is to provide technical guidance to assist Registered Entities with NERC
audits for assets deployed to Azure or Azure Government. The attestation vehicle applicable to Azure
and Azure Government is FedRAMP, a comprehensive and rigorous US government assessment and
authorization program. FedRAMP does not replace NERC CIP standards and it does not eliminate the
responsibility that Registered Entities have for NERC CIP compliance obligations. Rather, a Cloud Service
Provider’s existing FedRAMP authorization delivers assurance that NIST-based control evidence mapped
to NERC CIP requirements owned by cloud service provider has already been examined by an accredited
FedRAMP auditor. Registered Entities and NERC CIP auditors are expected to rely on FedRAMP
authorizations rather than conduct their own individual audits of Azure or Azure Government. It would
be infeasible for a Cloud Service Provider to submit to an audit and furnish control evidence each time a
Registered Entity undergoes a NERC audit.
This document provides control mapping between the current set of NERC CIP standards requirements
and NIST SP 800-53 Rev 4 control set that forms the basis for FedRAMP. Moreover, a complete set of
Reliability Standard Audit Worksheets (RSAWs) with Azure control implementation details is provided to
assist Registered Entities.
July 2019
https://aka.ms/AzureNERCGuide
Acknowledgments
Author: Stevan Vidich
Reviewers: Larry Cochrane, Garima Jain, Erin Nord
(c) 2019 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. This document is provided ”as-is”. Information and views expressed in this
document, including URL and other Internet Web site references, may change without notice. You bear the risk of using it.
This document does not provide you with any legal rights to any intellectual property in any Microsoft product. You may copy
and use this document for your internal, reference purposes.
Contents
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 4
NERC CIP standards ....................................................................................................................................... 4
FedRAMP....................................................................................................................................................... 6
NERC audit guidance ..................................................................................................................................... 7
Summary ....................................................................................................................................................... 9
Appendix A: Control mapping between NERC CIP requirements and NIST SP 800-53 R4 control set ....... 10
Appendix B: Reliability Standard Audit Worksheets (RSAWs) .................................................................... 45
CIP-002-5.1 – Cyber Security – BES Cyber System Categorization ......................................................... 46
CIP-003-6 – Cyber Security – Security Management Controls................................................................ 50
CIP-004-6 – Cyber Security – Personnel & Training ................................................................................ 58
CIP-005-5 – Cyber Security – Electronic Security Perimeter(s) ............................................................... 87
CIP-006-6 – Cyber Security – Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems ................................................... 99
CIP-007-6 – Cyber Security – System Security Management ............................................................... 116
CIP-008-5 – Cyber Security – Incident Reporting and Response Planning ........................................... 141
CIP-009-6 – Cyber Security – Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems................................................... 152
CIP-010-2 – Cyber Security – Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments .... 165
CIP-011-2 – Cyber Security – Information Protection........................................................................... 180
CIP-014-2 – Physical Security ................................................................................................................ 187
Introduction
The purpose of this Guide is to assist electric utilities and other Registered Entities subject to NERC CIP
compliance obligations with NERC audits involving assets deployed to the cloud. Prior to reading this
Guide, Registered Entities should review a companion white paper titled “NERC CIP Standards and Cloud
Computing”. The white paper provides an overview of Azure and Azure Government, discusses NERC
CIP compliance considerations for cloud computing, and addresses common security and isolation
concerns pertinent to registered entities considering cloud adoption.
This Cloud Implementation Guide provides detailed technical information for Registered Entity
compliance officers to streamline NERC audits for data and workloads deployed to the cloud. The
existence of this Guide does not diminish the responsibility of Registered Entities for their NERC audits
which are still required to address NERC CIP compliance obligations; instead, the Guide is meant to
furnish Microsoft security control information relevant to NERC CIP requirements by leveraging existing
FedRAMP authorizations for Azure and Azure Government. FedRAMP is a comprehensive and rigorous
assessment and authorization program mandated by the US government and intended for cloud
services. Because the security controls implemented by Microsoft in a given cloud environment are the
same for all cloud tenants, relying on FedRAMP authorization provides a scalable and efficient approach
for addressing audit needs of Registered Entities. It would be infeasible for a Cloud Service Provider to
submit to an audit and furnish control evidence each time a Registered Entity undergoes a NERC audit.
Registered Entities and NERC CIP auditors are expected to rely on existing FedRAMP authorizations
rather than conduct their own individual audits of Azure or Azure Government.
Appendix A provides a control mapping between the current set of NERC CIP standards requirements
and NIST SP 800-53 Rev 4 control set that forms the basis for FedRAMP. This mapping is useful to gain
insight into how NERC CIP standards requirements align with FedRAMP controls and to define the
concept of shared responsibility between Registered Entities and Microsoft. Moreover, a complete set
of Reliability Standard Audit Worksheets (RSAWs) with Azure control implementation details is provided
in Appendix B. Registered Entities are expected to leverage this information as assurance that NERC CIP
requirements for which Microsoft is responsible have been properly assessed and authorized by the
FedRAMP program using the corresponding NIST 800-53 controls.
NERC develops and enforces reliability standards known as NERC CIP standards. In the United States,
FERC approved the first set of CIP standards in 2007 and has continued to do so with every new revision.
In Canada, the Federal, Provincial, and Territorial Monitoring and Enforcement Sub-group (MESG)
develops provincial summaries for making CIP standards enforceable in Canadian jurisdictions.
As shown in Figure 1, there are currently 11 NERC CIP standards subject to enforcement.
To help Registered Entities assess compliance with NERC CIP standards, NERC has developed Reliability
Standard Audit Worksheets (RSAWs). The RSAWs can assist Registered Entities identify the types of
evidence that would be required as proof of compliance in the course of a NERC audit. However, the
existence of RSAWs does not obviate the need for Registered Entities to examine actual requirements
stated in NERC CIP standards, and entities should always prioritize the language contained in NERC CIP
standards. Moreover, RSAWs contain excerpts from FERC orders and other regulatory references that
should be considered by Entities, but the actual FERC orders take precedence over RSAWs in case of any
discrepancies. Adherence to sample evidence contained in RSAWs does not automatically constitute
compliance with NERC CIP standards.
FedRAMP
The US Federal Risk and Authorization Management Program (FedRAMP) was established in December
2011 to provide a standardized approach for assessing, monitoring, and authorizing cloud services. It
became operational in June 2012, and it is mandatory for certain US federal procurement programs.
Cloud Service Providers (CSPs) desiring to sell services to a federal agency requiring FedRAMP can take
three paths to demonstrate FedRAMP compliance: 1) earn a Provisional Authorization to Operate (P-
ATO) from the Joint Authorization Board (JAB); 2) receive an Authorization to Operate (ATO) from a
federal agency; or 3) work independently to develop a CSP Supplied Package that meets program
requirements. Each of these paths requires a stringent technical review by the FedRAMP Program
Management Office (PMO) and an assessment by an independent third-party assessor organization
(3PAO) that is accredited by the program.
FedRAMP is based on the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) SP 800-53 Rev 4
standard. Table 1 provides a summary of the NIST SP 800-53 Rev 4 control families. FedRAMP
authorizations are granted at three impact levels based on the NIST FIPS 199 guidelines—Low,
Moderate, and High. Both Azure and Azure Government maintain P-ATOs at the High impact level for
the in-scope services listed at the Trust Center.
The JAB is the primary governance and decision-making body for FedRAMP. Representatives from the
Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and General Services
Administration (GSA) serve on the board. The board grants P-ATO to CSPs that have demonstrated
FedRAMP compliance. It’s important to note that FedRAMP is not a point-in-time certification but an
assessment and authorization program that also comes with provisions for continuous monitoring
mandated by DHS. A CSP is required to furnish a variety of evidence on a monthly basis to demonstrate
continuous compliance, including system inventory reports, vulnerability scans, plan of action and
milestones, etc. FedRAMP is one of the most rigorous and demanding audits that a CSP can undergo.
Appendix B contains a complete set of Reliability Standard Audit Worksheets (RSAWs) with Azure
control implementation details. This information is based on the current FedRAMP System Security Plan
(SSP) that Registered Entities can download under a non-disclosure agreement from the Service Trust
Portal (see the FedRAMP Reports section). The SSP provides control requirements, as well as the
framework for capturing the system environment, system responsibilities, and the status of baseline
controls required for the system at a given impact level.
Registered Entities are expected to leverage this information as assurance that controls for which CSP is
responsible that are pertinent to NERC CIP requirements are assessed and authorized by the FedRAMP
program. It would be infeasible for a CSP to submit to an audit and furnish control evidence each time a
Registered Entity undergoes a NERC audit. Rather, a CSP’s existing FedRAMP authorization delivers
assurance that NIST-based control evidence mapped to NERC CIP requirements owned by CSP has
already been examined by an accredited FedRAMP auditor. Registered entities and NERC CIP auditors
are expected to rely on FedRAMP authorizations rather than conduct their own individual audits of
Azure or Azure Government.
There are many valid reasons why a Registered Entity subject to NERC CIP compliance obligations might
want to leverage an existing FedRAMP P-ATO or ATO when assessing the security posture of a cloud
services platform:
• Reinventing the established NIST SP 800-53 standard and FedRAMP assessment and
authorization program would be a significant undertaking.
• FedRAMP is already in place, and it is an adopted framework for US Government agencies when
assessing cloud services.
• In the United States, FERC approves NERC CIP standards. As a US federal agency, FERC relies on
FedRAMP when assessing cloud services for their own cloud computing needs. The choice of
FedRAMP as a compliance path for CSPs would be consistent with the approach adopted by
FERC and other US government agencies.
• In Canada, the Federal, Provincial, and Territorial Monitoring and Enforcement Sub-group
develops provincial summaries for making CIP standards enforceable in Canadian jurisdictions.
The Government of Canada has aligned their security control profile for cloud-based services to
the FedRAMP Moderate security control profile to maximize both the interoperability of cloud
services and reusability of the authorization evidence produced by CSPs.
• FedRAMP relies on an in-depth audit with mandatory provisions for continuous monitoring, and
it provides strong assurances to Registered Entities that audited controls are operating
effectively.
• NERC is interested in enabling Registered Entities to adopt new technologies, including cloud
computing. Given the number of Registered Entities that are subject to NERC CIP compliance
obligations, it would be infeasible for a CSP to accommodate audits initiated by individual
customers. Instead, relying on an existing FedRAMP authorization provides a scalable and
efficient approach for addressing NERC audit requirements for CSPs.
Customers operating Bulk Electric Systems are wholly responsible for ensuring their own compliance
with NERC CIP standards. Neither Azure nor Azure Government constitutes a Bulk Electric System
(BES) or BES Cyber Asset. As stated by NERC, CIP standards apply to the BES. Moreover, according to
the current set of CIP standards and NERC’s Glossary of Terms, BES Cyber Assets perform real-time
functions of monitoring or controlling the BES, and would affect the reliable operation of the BES within
15 minutes of being impaired. To properly accommodate BES Cyber Assets and Protected Cyber Assets
in cloud computing, existing definitions in NERC CIP standards would need to be revised. However,
there are many workloads that deal with CIP sensitive data and do not fall under the 15-minute rule,
including the broad category of BES Cyber System Information (BCSI).
The NERC ERO Enterprise released a Compliance Monitoring and Enforcement Program (CMEP) practice
guide to provide guidance to ERO Enterprise CMEP staff when assessing a Registered Entity’s process
to authorize access to designated BCSI storage locations and any access controls the Registered Entity
implemented. Moreover, NERC reviewed Azure control implementation details and FedRAMP audit
evidence related to NERC CIP-004-6 and CIP-011-2 standards that are applicable to BCSI. Based on the
ERO issued practice guide and reviewed FedRAMP controls to ensure Registered Entities encrypt their
data, no additional guidance or clarification is needed to deploy BCSI and associated workloads in the
cloud; however, Registered Entities are ultimately responsible for compliance with NERC CIP standards
according to their own facts and circumstances. Registered Entities should review the Guide for help
with documenting their processes and evidence used to authorize electronic access to BCSI storage
locations, including encryption key management used for BCSI encryption in Azure and Azure
Government.
Both Azure and Azure Government are suitable for Registered Entities deploying certain workloads
subject to NERC CIP standards, including BCSI workloads. The overarching objective of this Guide is to
provide practical, standardized guidelines to Registered Entities on meeting NERC CIP compliance goals
with CSPs. Registered Entities should be able to document what information is needed from a CSP in
support of a NERC audit and refer to appendices in this Guide for that information. Additional
engagement with a CSP in the course of a NERC audit should not be expected; instead, the mapping of
existing audited FedRAMP controls to the goals set forth by NERC CIP standards provides a complete
picture of CSP’s security posture relevant for NERC audits. However, for questions or clarifications
regarding NERC audits, Registered Entities can request assistance by contacting their Microsoft
representative or opening a ticket with Azure Support.
Summary
The purpose of this document is to provide technical, how-to guidance to assist Registered Entities with
NERC audits for assets deployed to the cloud. The attestation vehicle applicable to Cloud Service
Providers is FedRAMP, a comprehensive and rigorous US government assessment and authorization
program. FedRAMP does not replace NERC CIP standards and it does not eliminate the responsibility
that Registered Entities have for NERC CIP compliance obligations. Rather, a Cloud Service Provider’s
existing FedRAMP authorization delivers assurance that NIST-based control evidence mapped to NERC
CIP requirements owned by Cloud Service Provider has already been examined by an accredited
FedRAMP auditor. It would be infeasible for a Cloud Service Provider to submit to an audit and furnish
control evidence each time a Registered Entity undergoes a NERC audit. Registered Entities and NERC
CIP auditors would be expected to rely on existing FedRAMP authorizations rather than conduct their
own individual audits of a Cloud Service Provider.
This document provides a control mapping between the current set of NERC CIP standards requirements
and NIST SP 800-53 Rev 4 control set that forms the basis for FedRAMP. Moreover, a complete set of
Reliability Standard Audit Worksheets (RSAWs) with cloud control implementation details is provided to
assist Registered Entities.
CIP-006-6 Table R3 – Physical Access Control System Maintenance and Testing Program
Part Requirements Measures NIST SP 800-53 R4 Responsibility
3.1 Maintenance and testing of each Physical Access Control An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, a PE-3 Physical Access Cloud Provider
System and locally mounted hardware or devices at the maintenance and testing program that provides for testing Control
Physical Security Perimeter at least once every 24 calendar each Physical Access Control System and locally mounted
months to ensure they function properly. hardware or devices associated with each applicable Physical
Security Perimeter at least once every 24 calendar months
and additional evidence to demonstrate that this testing was
done, such as dated maintenance records, or other
documentation showing testing and maintenance has been
performed on each applicable device or system at least once
every 24 calendar months.
CIP-008-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing
Part Requirements Measures NIST SP 800-53 R4 Responsibility
2.1 Test each Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) at least Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, IR-3 Incident Shared
once every 15 calendar months: dated evidence of a lessons-learned report that includes a Response Testing
• By responding to an actual Reportable Cyber Security summary of the test or a compilation of notes, logs, and
Incident; communication resulting from the test. Types of exercises
• With a paper drill or tabletop exercise of a Reportable may include discussion or operations based exercises.
Cyber Security Incident; or
• With an operational exercise of a Reportable Cyber Security
Incident.
2.2 Use the Cyber Security Incident response plan(s) under Examples of evidence may include, but are not limited to, IR-3 Incident Shared
Requirement R1 when responding to a Reportable Cyber incident reports, logs, and notes that were kept during the Response Testing
Security Incident or performing an exercise of a Reportable incident response process, and follow-up documentation
CIP-008-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing
Part Requirements Measures NIST SP 800-53 R4 Responsibility
Cyber Security Incident. Document deviations from the that describes deviations taken from the plan during the
plan(s) taken during the response to the incident or exercise. incident or exercise.
2.3 Retain records related to Reportable Cyber Security Incidents. An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, IR-8 Incident Shared
dated documentation, such as security logs, police reports, Response Plan
emails, response forms or checklists, forensic analysis results,
restoration records, and post-incident review notes related
to Reportable Cyber Security Incidents.
CIP-008-5 Table R3 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Review, Update, and Communication
Part Requirements Measures NIST SP 800-53 R4 Responsibility
3.1 No later than 90 calendar days after completion of a Cyber An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to, all IR-8 Incident Shared
Security Incident response plan(s) test or actual Reportable of the following: Response Plan
Cyber Security Incident response: 1. Dated documentation of post incident(s) review
3.2.1. Document any lessons learned or document the meeting notes or follow-up report showing lessons
absence of any lessons learned; learned associated with the Cyber Security Incident
3.2.2. Update the Cyber Security Incident response plan response plan(s) test or actual Reportable Cyber
based on any documented lessons learned associated with Security Incident response or dated documentation
the plan; and stating there were no lessons learned;
3.2.3. Notify each person or group with a defined role in 2. Dated and revised Cyber Security Incident response
the Cyber Security Incident response plan of the updates to plan showing any changes based on the lessons
the Cyber Security Incident response plan based on any learned; and
documented lessons learned. 3. Evidence of plan update distribution including, but not
limited to:
• Emails;
• USPS or other mail service;
• Electronic distribution system; or
• Training sign-in sheets.
3.2 No later than 60 calendar days after a change to the roles or An example of evidence may include, but is not limited to: IR-8 Incident Shared
responsibilities, Cyber Security Incident response groups or 1. Dated and revised Cyber Security Incident response Response Plan
individuals, or technology that the Responsible Entity plan with changes to the roles or responsibilities,
determines would impact the ability to execute the plan: responders or technology; and
3.2.1. Update the Cyber Security Incident response plan(s); 2. Evidence of plan update distribution including, but not
and limited to:
3.2.2. Notify each person or group with a defined role in • Emails;
the Cyber Security Incident response plan of the updates. • USPS or other mail service;
• Electronic distribution system; or
• Training sign-in sheets.
MICROSOFT CONFIDENTIAL – NDA REQUIRED 29
Cloud Implementation Guide for NERC Audits
In a multi-tenant cloud such as Azure or Azure Government, the underlying physical infrastructure resources are shared
by multiple tenants. For examples, Virtual Machines (VMs) belonging to multiple tenants can run on the same physical
server. Moreover, hyper-scale cloud platforms are designed to anticipate and recover from failure at any given time. This
means that VMs or storage accounts belonging to a RE can be migrated from unhealthy to healthy nodes at any given
time. This process is fully automated and completely transparent to Registered Entities. Tenant separation is achieved
via logical isolation across compute, storage, and networking resources. Registered Entity is responsible for maintaining
an inventory of assets under customer control, e.g., customer Virtual Machines within Azure and physical assets outside
Azure. Microsoft does not inspect or approve applications that customers deploy in Azure. Consequently, Microsoft does
not know how BES Cyber Systems are designed, deployed, and operated, or even what resources comprise a BES Cyber
System. Neither Azure nor Azure Government constitutes a BES Cyber System or BES Cyber Asset.
Azure Infrastructure maintains an inventory of information system components. The inventory is documented and
maintained in an inventory database system, which keeps the inventory accurate and up to date through new installations
and decommissioning of devices. Inventory information is provided to the FedRAMP Joint Authorization Board (JAB) to
meet Microsoft’s FedRAMP Continuous Monitoring obligations.
For all asset types, the inventory is consistent with the FedRAMP authorization boundary because it is kept up to date with
new installations and decommissioning of devices. The inventory for all Azure Infrastructure assets includes the following
details where applicable:
• IP address
• Name
• Property Group
• Serial Number
• ID
• Datacenter
• Collocation
• Location
• Rack
• Slot Number
• Environment
• Manufacturer
• Model
• OS Version
• OS Service Pack Version
• Item Type
However, inventory information maintained by Microsoft is not correlated to BES Cyber Systems as Microsoft has no
knowledge how a BES Cyber System is designed and operated or even which virtual resources provisioned by a Registered
Entity constitute a BES Cyber System.
Moreover, Azure maintains a set of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that are reviewed by the FedRAMP auditor
(3PAO) in the course of a FedRAMP audit. These SOPs cover Azure policies corresponding to CIP-003-6 R1 requirements,
as documented in the table below. There is no counterpart to 1.1.9 Declaring and responding to CIP Exceptional
Circumstances because Registered Entity is expected to be solely responsible for such policy.
Section 1. Cyber Security Awareness – NIST 800-53 AT-1 Security Awareness and Training Policy and Procedures:
Microsoft Azure has implemented security awareness and training policy and procedures through the development of a
program that requires all employees to take the required training and any additional training based on individual job
requirements. Microsoft personnel are required to take part in a Microsoft corporate sponsored security-training program
and are to be recipients of periodic security awareness updates. Security education is an on-going process and is
conducted regularly through mandatory and optional trainings, brown bag sessions and external trainings.
For all Microsoft Azure assets, the Azure Education and Awareness SOP was developed as a component of the overall
Azure Awareness and Training Program. The program requires all personnel responsible for Microsoft Azure development
and operations to take essential trainings as well as any additional training based on individual job requirements. These
procedures provide a standard approach, tools, and techniques used to implement and sustain the awareness program.
As described under CIP-004-6 R1.1 and covered by NIST 800-53 AT-2, Microsoft has implemented a security awareness
program called STRIKE that provides monthly e-mail communication to all Azure engineering personnel about security
awareness and allows employees to register for in-person or online security awareness training. STRIKE offers a series of
security training events as well as STRIKE Central, which is a centralized online resource for security awareness, training,
documentation, and community engagement.
Section 2. Physical Security Controls – NIST 800-53 PE-1 Physical and Environmental Protection Policy and Procedures:
Because Registered Entity does not have physical access to any resources in Azure datacenters, all physical and
environmental protection controls are implemented and managed by Azure.
Microsoft Azure has implemented a physical and environmental policy and procedures to allow for the secure operation
of Azure networks and datacenters. The Microsoft Security Program Policy (MSPP), Physical and Environmental Security
Standard, Asset Classification Standard, and Asset Protection Standard, are all maintained by Azure Infrastructure – C+E
Security State Engineering (SSE) and reviewed and published annually. These documents address the purpose, scope,
roles, responsibilities, compliance requirements, and required coordination among the various Azure organizations that
provide physical and environmental support to Microsoft’s online services. The objective of the physical and
environmental security policy in the Microsoft Security Program Policy (MSPP) is to prevent unauthorized access, damage
or interference to Azure datacenters. For more information, see RSAW narratives for CIP-006-6 requirements.
Section 3.1 Electronic Access Controls – NIST 800-53 SC-7 Boundary Protection: Microsoft Azure implements boundary
protection using controlled devices at the network boundary and at key points within the Microsoft Azure infrastructure.
The overarching principle within Microsoft Azure is to allow only connection and communication that is necessary for
systems to operate, blocking all other ports, protocols and connections by default. Azure employs a defense in depth
strategy for boundary protection, including secure segmentation of network environments through several methods
including VLAN segmentation, ACL restrictions, and encrypted communications for remote connectivity (SSL VPN and
Remote Desktop Gateway access) to the environment. Furthermore, techniques like control plane policing security are
used to isolate services. The key boundaries included as part of Azure’s Infrastructure include the Global Infrastructure
LAN used to support infrastructure supporting services and the external boundary of the RD Gateway and SSL VPN
boundary used to support remote access to the environment.
Section 3.2 Electronic Access Controls for Dial-up Connectivity: Not applicable because dial-up access is not provided
through Microsoft Azure.
Section 4. Cyber Security Incident Response – NIST 800-53 IR-1 Incident Response Policy and Procedures: Microsoft Azure
has implemented the incident response policy control through the publishing of the Microsoft Security Program Policy
(MSPP). Azure addresses its incident management policy as part of the Microsoft Security Program Policy (MSPP). The
policy, addresses the following:
• Purpose of providing rules and requirements to applicable personnel
• Scope covering properties and services
• Roles and responsibilities for those involved with the policy
• Management commitment through coordination with security organizations, property security groups, and Microsoft
corporate functions
• Compliance by requiring all employees to adhere to the policy and applicable standards and follow approved procedures
Microsoft Azure has developed and implemented the Microsoft Azure Incident Management Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP). The SOP provides a high-level approach for how the incident response capability fits into the overall
organization and describes the structure and organization of the incident response capabilities. The SOP covers:
1 of the Azure System Security Plan, and they or their designated representatives work with the FedRAMP Joint
Authorization Board (JAB) or other customer entities to authorize operation of the Azure system. These designations
address Microsoft responsibilities for naming system owners pursuant to FedRAMP requirements. Microsoft does not
have the equivalent of a CIP Senior Manager on staff; this assignment is specific to Registered Entities.
R1 Part 1.1
1.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems Security awareness that, at least An example of evidence may include, but is
once each calendar quarter, not limited to, documentation that the
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
reinforces cyber security practices quarterly reinforcement has been provided.
(which may include associated Examples of evidence of reinforcement may
physical security practices) for the include, but are not limited to, dated copies
Responsible Entity’s personnel who of information used to reinforce security
have authorized electronic or awareness, as well as evidence of
authorized unescorted physical distribution, such as:
access to BES Cyber Systems. • direct communications (for
example, e-mails, memos,
computer-based training); or
• indirect communications (for
example, posters, intranet, or
brochures); or
• management support and
reinforcement (for example,
presentations or meetings).
• STRIKE Confidential – a large 1,500+ participant event which includes a series of Microsoft Confidential presentations.
This event is offered twice a year.
• STRIKE Day – a single day multi-track event where participants are able to self-select specific track sessions to attend.
This event is offered six times a year.
• STRIKE Expo – additional offerings designed to meet a specific security need or group of participants. These events are
offered as needed throughout the year.
The following STRIKE security training schedule shown for FY19 is representative of STRIKE annual cadence:
Because of Azure STRIKE monthly communication cadence about security awareness and information about available
security training events and online training resources, Microsoft exceeds the NERC requirement for quarterly
reinforcement of cyber security practices.
R2 Part 2.1
2.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Training content on: Examples of evidence may include,
their associated: 2.1.1. Cyber security policies; but are not limited to, training
1. EACMS; and 2.1.2. Physical access controls; material such as power point
2. PACS 2.1.3. Electronic access controls; presentations, instructor notes,
2.1.4. The visitor control program; student notes, handouts, or other
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
2.1.5. Handling of BES Cyber System training materials.
with External Routable Connectivity
Information and its storage;
and their associated:
2.1.6. Identification of a Cyber Security
1. EACMS; and
Incident and initial notifications in
2. PACS
accordance with the entity’s
incident response plan;
2.1.7. Recovery plans for BES Cyber
Systems;
2.1.8. Response to Cyber Security
Incidents; and
2.1.9. Cyber security risks associated with
a BES Cyber System’s electronic
interconnectivity and
interoperability with other Cyber
Assets, including Transient Cyber
Assets, and with Removable Media.
also covers the security requirements and expectations for elevated privileges in production environments. Engineering
personnel participate in on-going role-based security training through the STRIKE program. STRIKE provides regular 200-
400 level sessions, labs and online courses to engage, educate and empower engineers to securely design and operate
services.
STRIKE offers a series of security training events throughout the year as well as STRIKE Central, which is a centralized online
resource for security awareness, training, documentation, and community engagement. As of Dec-2018, STRIKE online
security training (internal link) contains 32 courses covering all topics listed above in CIP-004-6 R2.1 except for:
• 2.1.9 Cyber security risks associated with a BES Cyber System’s electronic interconnectivity and interoperability with
other Cyber Assets, including Transient Cyber Assets, and with Removable Media.
Registered Entities would be solely responsible for administering this training to their employees. Microsoft does not
inspect, approve, or monitor customer applications in Azure. Microsoft does not know how a BES Cyber System is designed
and operated. Neither Azure nor Azure Government constitutes a BES Cyber System or BES Cyber Asset. Microsoft
engineers are not required to understand how customer applications deployed in Azure are interconnected or what
dependencies they have.
NIST 800-53 CP-3 Contingency Training: All employees with a contingency planning role receive training within 10 days of
being assigned this role and on an annual basis (rolling 365 from the last training date). Upon completion of the training,
each employee certifies that they have been trained electronically via email (e-signature) which is then stored by the
Business Continuity Management System (BCMS) operator for verification. The process is documented in the Azure
Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery SOP. Evidence of training is stored on the Azure BCM SharePoint Site under
the training folder.
Incident managers receive training in the incident response workflow following the Incident Management SOP. Disaster
recovery follows the same workflow as incident response. Service team Business Continuity Management (BCM) owners
and crisis communications managers receive training by participating in simulated events, including regular recovery
testing and disaster recovery drills. This training occurs at least annually and prior to assuming a contingency-related role,
as well as whenever system changes occur.
NIST 800-53 IR-2 Incident Response Training: As documented in the Microsoft Azure Incident Management SOP, managers
ensure that all personnel, including new hires, are trained on incident handling procedures and protocols consistent with
assigned roles and responsibilities. Security training, including specifics on incident response, is provided annually to all
Azure Infrastructure personnel (employees, contractors, and third party providers) as a part of the Microsoft security
awareness training. Service team and feature team on-call personnel receive additional, in-place, training on their incident
response roles and responsibilities through mandatory exercises conducted annually.
Incident Management Incident Management 2018.01 8/23/2018 25-26 Covers CIP-004-6 R2.1.6 and
SOP 2018.01.docx SOP R2.1.8
R2 Part 2.2
2.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Require completion of the training Examples of evidence may include,
their associated: specified in Part 2.1 prior to granting but are not limited to, training
1. EACMS; and authorized electronic access and records and documentation of
2. PACS authorized unescorted physical when CIP Exceptional
access to applicable Cyber Assets, Circumstances were invoked.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems with except during CIP Exceptional
External Routable Connectivity and Circumstances.
their associated:
1. EACMS; and
2. PACS
NIST 800-53 AT-3 Role-Based Security Training: FedRAMP requires under AT-03 that the organization provide role-based
security training to personnel with assigned security roles and responsibilities before authorizing access to the information
system or performing assigned duties. Azure security training is classified into one of two types: Role-Based and Required.
Role-Based Training
Role-Based training is mandatory security and awareness education that is deemed helpful in the facilitation of
understanding security processes and procedures for a particular role an individual is placed in and is directly related to
the job responsibilities of the individual. Role-Based training is offered to full-time employees and suppliers. Role-Based
training includes the STRIKE program for engineering disciplines providing Level 200-400 security training and best
practices.
Required Training
Required training is mandatory security and awareness education that Microsoft has specifically identified and defined as
appropriate for Azure personnel based upon their organization. Required annual training includes:
• Security and Privacy Foundations for new hires and non-engineering FTEs
• STRIKE program for engineering FTEs
As part of the security awareness and training program, Microsoft defines required and elective role-based training to
help facilitate understanding of security processes and procedures for an individual’s role and responsibilities before
authorizing access to Microsoft Azure’s Infrastructure.
NIST 800-53 AT-4 Security Training Records: Microsoft Azure utilizes Success Factors Learning Management System (LMS)
to document and monitor security training. The LMS provides reporting to effectively manage and track security training
participation. Each employee has access to their own account, which includes courses taken and elective courses that are
suggested. A report can be generated from this tool to show what courses were taken by a specific employee. Security
training records for the training described in AT-3 are documented, monitored, and retained for at least five years.
R2 Part 2.3
2.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Require completion of the training Examples of evidence may
their associated: specified in Part 2.1 at least once include, but are not limited to,
1. EACMS; and every 15 calendar months. dated individual training
2. PACS records.
• Security and Privacy Foundations course – Azure new hire personnel are required to take the Security Foundations
course within 30 days of employment, and annually thereafter for non-engineering personnel.
• STRIKE – Azure engineering personnel are required to participate in STRIKE training at least annually through in-person
events, sessions, labs, and online courses. STRIKE provides Level 200-400 training to engage, educate, and empower
engineers to securely design and operate services.
• Standards of Business Conduct Training – an online course updated annually, providing information intended to raise
awareness in the areas of anti-trust, corruption, unauthorized entry/theft, business policy, and applicable laws and
regulations. This training is required during orientation and annually thereafter for all employees.
Microsoft also administers security awareness activities throughout the course of a year to all employees, vendors and
contingent staff through “brown bag sessions”, seminars, distribution lists, external trainings and posters that are
distributed and published through all the buildings housed by Microsoft employees, vendors, and contingent staff.
Security training is also required when there is a significant change to the system environment. Employees can check their
security training status via personalized STRIKE security compliance dashboards. The following security education is
offered to Azure personnel:
service access.
Standards of FTE Annual Online course updated annually, providing
Business Conduct information intended to raise awareness in
the areas of anti-trust, corruption,
unauthorized entry/theft, business policy,
and applicable laws and regulations.
Security & Privacy FTE New Hires On hire Required for all FTE new hires within 30 days
Foundations of hire and prior to assignment.
Non- Engineering Annual All non-engineering disciplines are required
to take the annually updated Security &
Privacy Foundations course.
Engineering Annual Required annually or in combination with
STRIKE.
Suppliers out of Annual Suppliers outside the scope of the SCoC
SCoC scope program are required to completed Security
and Privacy Foundations training.
Role Based STRIKE Engineering Twice a Large 1,500+ participant event which includes
Security Confidential year a series of “Microsoft confidential”
Training presentations.
STRIKE Day Engineering Six times a Single day multi-track event where
year participants are able to self-select specific
track sessions to attend.
STRIKE Expo Engineering As needed Additional offerings designed to meet a
specific security need or group of
participants.
Security Security FTE and Suppliers Quarterly Training on recognizing and reporting
Awareness Awareness potential indicators of insider threat.
Campaigns
NIST 800-53 AT-3 Role-Based Security Training: As part of the Azure Awareness and Training program, personnel are
required to take Role-Based and Required security and awareness training before access is granted to Microsoft Azure,
and annually thereafter. The Microsoft System Administrator training is tracked in Learning Central and personnel are
required to retake it annually.
NIST 800-53 AT-4 Security Training Records: Microsoft Azure utilizes Success Factors Learning Management System (LMS)
to document and monitor security training. The LMS provides reporting to effectively manage and track security training
participation. Each employee has access to their own account, which includes courses taken and elective courses that are
suggested. A report can be generated from this tool to show what courses were taken by a specific employee. Security
training records for the training described in AT-3 are documented, monitored, and retained for at least five years.
R3 Part 3.1
3.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Process to confirm identity. An example of evidence may
their associated: include, but is not limited to,
1. EACMS; and documentation of the Responsible
2. PACS Entity’s process to confirm
identity.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
with External Routable Connectivity
and their associated:
1. EACMS; and
2. PACS
As described in the Personnel Screening Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), all new employees are subject to the
Microsoft Background Check, which includes identity verification as part of the 7-point verification process, including:
R3 Part 3.2
3.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems Process to perform a seven-year An example of evidence may include,
and their associated: criminal history records check as part but is not limited to, documentation of
1. EACMS; and of each personnel risk assessment the Responsible Entity’s process to
2. PACS that includes: perform a seven-year criminal history
3.2.1 current residence, regardless records check.
Medium Impact BES Cyber of duration; and
Systems with External Routable 3.2.2 other locations where, during
Connectivity and their the seven years immediately
associated: prior to the date of the
1. EACMS; and criminal history records
2. PACS check, the subject has
resided for six consecutive
months or more.
If it is not possible to perform a full
seven-year criminal history records
check, conduct as much of the seven-
year criminal history records check as
possible and document the reason the
full seven-year criminal history records
check could not be performed.
The process to perform personnel background screening, including a 7-yr criminal history records check is described in the
Personnel Background Screening SOP.
Personnel background screening is conducted by Truescreen on behalf of Microsoft. The process includes a 7-yr criminal
history records check as specified by Microsoft, as well as verification of the current and prior residences over the past 7
years. As part of the Social Security Number verification, Truescreen has implemented a Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA)-
compliant search using bureau data to help confirm applicant’s identity, reveal his or her address history, and uncover
alias or AKA names. The results are compared against the applicant’s data, including the 7-yr criminal records search, to
identify any discrepancies. More information about the process is available from Truescreen.
R3 Part 3.3
3.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Criteria or process to evaluate An example of evidence may
their associated: criminal history records checks for include, but is not limited to,
1. EACMS; and authorizing access. documentation of the
2. PACS Responsible Entity’s process to
evaluate criminal history
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems records checks.
with External Routable Connectivity
and their associated:
1. EACMS; and
2. PACS
The criteria and process for evaluating the results of personnel background screening, including the criminal history
records checks for authorizing access, are described in the Personnel Screening SOP. Cloud Screen typically takes 7
business days to complete from the time the employee endorses the online agreement and submits all required
information. If anything of concern is identified through Cloud Screen, the employee will receive a letter from Global
Security outlining the steps to meet with a representative from their team to provide the employee with information
about the issue of concern. Global Security will then work with HR to evaluate the issue and make a pass/fail decision. If
an individual fails the Cloud Screen, they may be ineligible to work at Microsoft and could be terminated from
employment.
Every case is reviewed and adjudicated on an individual basis with many variables to consider such as:
These parameters are applicable to the criminal component of the Cloud Screen. For new hire background checks,
education and employment history are two other major components that can lead to fail decisions based on negative
information or other discrepancies discovered.
R3 Part 3.4
3.4 High Impact BES Cyber Systems Criteria or process for verifying that An example of evidence may
and their associated: personnel risk assessments include, but is not limited to,
1. EACMS; and performed for contractors or service documentation of the Responsible
2. PACS vendors are conducted according to Entity’s criteria or process for
Parts 3.1 through 3.3. verifying contractors or service
Medium Impact BES Cyber vendors personnel risk assessments.
Systems with External Routable
Connectivity and their associated:
1. EACMS; and
2. PACS
The criteria and process for evaluating the results of personnel background screening for contractors or service vendors
are described in the Personnel Screening SOP. Cloud Screen typically takes 7 business days to complete from the time the
employee endorses the online agreement and submits all required information. If anything of concern is identified
through Cloud Screen, the vendor will receive a letter from Global Security outlining the steps to meet with a
MICROSOFT CONFIDENTIAL – NDA REQUIRED 70
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representative from their team to provide the vendor with information about the issue of concern. Global Security will
then work with HR to evaluate the issue and make a pass/fail decision. If an individual fails the Cloud Screen, they may be
ineligible to work at Microsoft and their contract could be terminated. Background screening requirements are clearly
identified to vendors as part of the Statement of Work (SOW).
R3 Part 3.5
3.5 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Process to ensure that individuals with An example of evidence may
their associated: authorized electronic or authorized include, but is not limited to,
1. EACMS; and unescorted physical access have had a documentation of the
2. PACS personnel risk assessment completed Responsible Entity’s process for
according to Parts 3.1 to 3.4 within the ensuring that individuals with
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems last seven years. authorized electronic or
with External Routable Connectivity authorized unescorted physical
and their associated: access have had a personnel risk
assessment completed within
1. EACMS; and
the last seven years.
2. PACS
The following table summarizes Microsoft background screening requirements and time horizons:
The Microsoft Background Check is completed upon hire to Microsoft. It is based on a 7-point check, including Education
and Employment verification. The Microsoft Cloud Screen is the same as the Microsoft Background Check with the
omission of the Education and Employment verification. The Microsoft Cloud Screen is performed upon hire or transfer
into the role and then every 2 years thereafter. It is required for all Azure and Azure Government employees in the United
States with potential access to Customer Data.
Personnel risk assessment is conducted upon background screening completion. If anything of concern is identified, the
employee or vendor will receive a letter from Microsoft Global Security outlining the steps to meet with a representative
from their team to provide the employee or vendor with information about the issue of concern. Global Security will then
work with HR to evaluate the issue and make a pass/fail decision. If an individual fails the Cloud Screen, they may be
ineligible to work at Microsoft and could be terminated from employment.
R4 Part 4.1
4.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Process to authorize based on need, An example of evidence may
their associated: as determined by the Responsible include, but is not limited to,
1. EACMS; and Entity, except for CIP Exceptional dated documentation of the
2. PACS Circumstances: process to authorize electronic
access, unescorted physical access
4.1.1 Electronic access;
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems in a Physical Security Perimeter,
with External Routable Connectivity 4.1.2 Unescorted physical access into and access to designated storage
and their associated: a Physical Security Perimeter; and locations, whether physical or
electronic, for BES Cyber System
1. EACMS; and 4.1.3 Access to designated storage
Information.
2. PACS locations, whether physical or
electronic, for BES Cyber System
Information.
Data. For the majority of support scenarios, access to Customer Data is not needed and the workflow should not require
Azure Lockbox.
NIST 800-53 AC-2 Account Management: Microsoft Azure leverages Microsoft corporate Active Directory (AD), managed
by Core Services Engineering (CSE, formerly MSIT), to control access to key information systems. Azure personnel are
assigned unique corporate AD accounts by CSE as part of a standard new employee onboarding to Microsoft. From a
Microsoft Azure perspective, ‘new user accounts’ refers to accounts of existing Microsoft users using their unique
corporate AD accounts, who require access to Azure systems, including production systems containing customer compute
and storage resources. New user account requests and access approvals are managed through the internal account
management tool RAMWeb, which provides an automated workflow to track the process from account request, approval,
creation, modification, and deletion. All Azure access is granted based on personnel employment verification and business
justification. Membership to access control security groups is limited based on job function (role-based access) within
RAMWeb.
By default, accounts do not have active elevated permissions to the production environment. Such access is not needed
to operate Azure and Azure Government. Elevation requires the user to request temporary Just In Time (JIT) access
through the JIT portal. Temporary JIT access is tracked by the live site team (WALS) in Team Foundation Services (TFS) and
is revoked by WALS prior to closing of the service request. JIT access is short lived and terminated per the JIT policy settings
for the access request.
NIST 800-53 PE-2 Physical Access Authorization: Access to a Microsoft datacenter must be approved by the Data Center
Management (DCM) team through the Data Center Access Tool (DCAT). DCAT is the authoritative source listing all
personnel with authorized access to a specific datacenter. DCAT is linked with the datacenter’s physical security access
control devices and authorizes access based on access levels that are approved by the DCM team. Access levels are
assigned in DCAT to either a user’s Microsoft issued badge or a temporary access badge that is assigned at the datacenter
by the Control Room Supervisor (CRS). Access levels are approved by the DCM team. Besides credentials assigned to
physical badges, some areas of datacenter require enrollment of the user’s biometric data (hand geometry or fingerprint),
as well as badge authentication to gain authorized entry.
The Azure DCM of a leased datacenter is responsible for conducting the same access review as they would for a fully-
managed Azure datacenter. Instead of reviewing the access levels for the entire datacenter, the DCM would request the
access list for the Microsoft areas from the datacenter's security team. The DCM is responsible for ensuring that both the
landlord's access system and DCAT reflect the same data. At a leased datacenter, DCAT is still considered the authoritative
source for access to Microsoft areas within the datacenter. All access request approvals are first processed in DCAT and
then emailed to the leased datacenter's security team. The leased datacenter's security team only authorizes access to
Microsoft areas to individuals with an approved DCAT request. Besides credentials assigned to physical badges, some
areas of datacenter require two- factor authentication employing the user’s biometric data (hand geometry or fingerprint),
as well as badge authentication to gain authorized entry.
R4 Part 4.2
4.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Verify at least once each calendar Examples of evidence may include,
their associated: quarter that individuals with active but are not limited to:
1. EACMS; and electronic access or unescorted
• Dated documentation of the
2. PACS physical access have authorization
verification between the system
records.
generated list of individuals who
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems have been authorized for access
with External Routable Connectivity (i.e., workflow database) and a
and their associated: system generated list of personnel
1. EACMS; and who have access (i.e., user account
2. PACS listing), or
• Dated documentation of the
verification between a list of
individuals who have been
authorized for access (i.e.,
authorization forms) and a list of
individuals provisioned for access
(i.e., provisioning forms or shared
account listing).
NIST 800-53 PE-2 Physical Access Authorizations: On a quarterly basis, the Data Center Management (DCM) team for each
datacenter is required to perform a review of the personnel with authorized access to their datacenter. The review consists
of reviewing reports from security showing personnel with current access to the datacenter. The DCM determines the
access changes to be made and communicates a request to security to have the changes performed. After the changes
have been made, the DCM team reviews reports verifying that the changes have been completed. The quarterly access
review is documented in a work ticket that includes the reports that were reviewed by the DCM team. These tickets are
reviewed as part of quality control / quality assurance process. The DC quarterly access review process is documented in
the DCS SOP.
The Azure DCM of a leased datacenter is responsible for conducting the same quarterly access review as they would for a
fully managed Azure datacenter. Instead of reviewing the access levels for the entire datacenter, the DCM would request
the access list for the Microsoft areas from the datacenter's security team. The DCM is responsible for ensuring that both
the landlord's access system and DCAT reflect the same data.
R4 Part 4.3
4.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and For electronic access, verify at least once An example of evidence may
their associated: every 15 calendar months that all user include, but is not limited to,
1. EACMS; and accounts, user account groups, or user documentation of the review that
2. PACS role categories, and their specific, includes all of the following:
associated privileges are correct and are
1. A dated listing of all
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems those that the Responsible Entity
accounts/account groups or roles
with External Routable Connectivity determines are necessary.
within the system;
and their associated:
1. EACMS; and 2. A summary description of
2. PACS privileges associated with each
group or role;
3. Accounts assigned to the group
or role; and
4. Dated evidence showing
verification of the privileges for
the group are authorized and
appropriate to the work function
performed by people assigned to
each account.
R4 Part 4.4
4.4 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and their Verify at least once every 15 calendar An example of evidence may
associated: months that access to the designated include, but is not limited to, the
1. EACMS; and storage locations for BES Cyber System documentation of the review that
2. PACS Information, whether physical or includes all of the following:
electronic, are correct and are those that
1. A dated listing of authorizations
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems the Responsible Entity determines are
for BES Cyber System information;
with External Routable Connectivity necessary for performing assigned work
and their associated: functions. 2. Any privileges associated with
1. EACMS; and the authorizations; and
2. PACS 3. Dated evidence showing a
verification of the authorizations
and any privileges were confirmed
correct and the minimum
necessary for performing assigned
work functions.
NIST 800-53 AC-2 Account Management: Accounts that have access to Microsoft Azure systems must be reviewed every
90 days by Azure group owners. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) is used to identify and control the access privileges of
each Azure service team personnel. Access privileges vary depending on the role a specified team member has within the
service team. Access privileges are defined in the RAMWeb tool and enforced by Microsoft corporate Active Directory.
NIST 800-53 PE-2 Physical Access Authorizations: On a quarterly basis, the Data Center Management (DCM) team for each
datacenter is required to perform a review of the personnel with authorized access to their datacenter. The review consists
of reviewing reports from security showing personnel with current access to the datacenter. The DCM determines the
access changes to be made and communicates a request to security to have the changes performed. After the changes
have been made, the DCM team reviews reports verifying that the changes have been completed. The quarterly access
review is documented in a work ticket that includes the reports that were reviewed by the DCM team. These tickets are
reviewed as part of quality control / quality assurance process. The DC quarterly access review process is documented in
the DCS SOP.
The Azure DCM of a leased datacenter is responsible for conducting the same quarterly access review as they would for a
fully-managed Azure datacenter. Instead of reviewing the access levels for the entire datacenter, the DCM would request
the access list for the Microsoft areas from the datacenter's security team. The DCM is responsible for ensuring that both
the landlord's access system and DCAT reflect the same data.
R5 Part 5.1
5.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems A process to initiate removal of an An example of evidence may include,
and their associated: individual’s ability for unescorted but is not limited to, documentation of
1. EACMS; and physical access and Interactive Remote all of the following:
2. PACS Access upon a termination action, and
1. Dated workflow or sign-off form
complete the removals within 24 hours
verifying access removal associated
Medium Impact BES Cyber of the termination action (Removal of
with the termination action; and
Systems with External Routable the ability for access may be different
Connectivity and their than deletion, disabling, revocation, or 2. Logs or other demonstration
associated: removal of all access rights). showing such persons no longer have
1. EACMS; and access.
2. PACS
NIST 800-53 PS-4 Personnel Termination: Microsoft HR ensures personnel termination is handled appropriately. On the
last day of employment, the employee is terminated from the HR system via a Termination Transaction ticket entered in
HeadTrax and approved by the HR Assistant or Business Administrator. Once the transaction has been keyed in and
approved, Microsoft Accounts and Security teams are notified and access to information systems is disabled. For
involuntary terminations an urgent request for access termination is submitted via email from HR and access is disabled
immediately. When an employee is terminated, the employee is removed from the Human Resources Information System
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(HRIS). When a service team user is marked as terminated in HRIS, this information propagates to Microsoft Active
Directory, which then automatically removes/revokes any authenticators/credentials associated with the individual. Upon
termination, building access badges are collected.
NIST 800-53 AC-2 Account Management: When a user leaves the company, notification of the leave is sent to their
respective manager and the Microsoft Azure group HR administrator. The HR administrator notifies Core Services
Engineering (CSE, formerly MSIT) and Global Security of the employees last working day. The HR administrator enters the
employee’s last day of work into the HR system HeadTrax to ensure accounts tied to their corporate credentials are
disabled on the employee’s last working day. As a result, user accounts get disabled on Microsoft Azure information
systems upon the employee’s last working day. Additionally, the access privileges tool RAMWeb is linked to HeadTrax,
and if users change organizations their access to resources provided as part of their RAMWeb membership is automatically
revoked depending on the policy specified in the associated RAMWeb project.
NIST 800-53 AC-2(3) Account Management | Disable Inactive Accounts: User accounts are automatically evaluated to
determine if they are actively being used by Microsoft users. The One Identity Life Cycle Management process is used to
disable any user accounts within Azure-managed domains (including Azure Infrastructure domain for Azure environment)
on a daily basis if there are no associated HR records (terminations). One Identity Life Cycle Management receives a daily
HR feed of employees, which it compares to the list of Azure-managed domains users. Any user accounts that do not have
a matching HR record, or have been flagged as inactive are then disabled by this process.
NIST 800-53 PE-2 Physical Access Authorizations: The physical security team and the Data Center Management (DCM)
team conduct a quarterly review of the access control list in order to remove/update individual access as necessary.
Additionally, the Datacenter Access Tool (DCAT) system performs real time comparisons of access authorization and
automatically removes access when access tickets expire naturally, and/or upon manual closure/termination of an access
ticket or the termination of a Microsoft employee or vendor via the Human Resources system HeadTrax. When access is
no longer required, it is the standard procedure for security officers at the datacenter or the DCM team to manually
request the termination of access. Terminations are handled immediately through a DCAT termination process.
R5 Part 5.2
5.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems For reassignments or transfers, An example of evidence may include,
and their associated: revoke the individual’s authorized but is not limited to, documentation
1. EACMS; and electronic access to individual of all of the following:
2. PACS accounts and authorized unescorted
1. Dated workflow or sign-off form
physical access that the Responsible
showing a review of logical and
Medium Impact BES Cyber Entity determines are not necessary
physical access; and
Systems with External Routable by the end of the next calendar day
Connectivity and their following the date that the 2. Logs or other demonstration
associated: Responsible Entity determines that showing such persons no longer have
1. EACMS; and the individual no longer requires access that the Responsible Entity
2. PACS retention of that access. determines is not necessary.
NIST 800-53 PE-2 Physical Access Authorizations: The physical security team and the Data Center Management (DCM)
team conduct a quarterly review of the access control list in order to remove/update individual access as necessary.
Additionally, the Datacenter Access Tool (DCAT) system performs real time comparisons of access authorization and
automatically removes access when access tickets expire naturally, and/or upon manual closure/termination of an access
ticket or the termination of a Microsoft employee or vendor via the Human Resources system HeadTrax. When access is
no longer required, it is the standard procedure for security officers at the datacenter or the DCM team to manually
request the termination of access. Terminations are handled immediately through a DCAT termination process.
R5 Part 5.3
5.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems For termination actions, revoke the An example of evidence may include,
and their associated: individual’s access to the designated but is not limited to, workflow or sign-
1. EACMS; and storage locations for BES Cyber System off form verifying access removal to
2. PACS Information, whether physical or designated physical areas or cyber
electronic (unless already revoked systems containing BES Cyber System
Medium Impact BES Cyber according to Requirement R5.1), by the Information associated with the
Systems with External Routable end of the next calendar day following terminations and dated within the
Connectivity and their associated: the effective date of the termination next calendar day of the termination
1. EACMS; and action. action.
2. PACS
NIST 800-53 PS-4 Personnel Termination: On the last day of employment, the employee is terminated from the HR system
via a Termination Transaction ticket entered in HeadTrax and approved by the HR Assistant or Business Administrator.
Once the transaction has been keyed in and approved, Microsoft Accounts and Security teams are notified and access to
information systems is disabled. For involuntary terminations an urgent request for access termination is submitted via
email from HR and access is disabled immediately. When an employee is terminated, the employee is removed from the
Human Resources Information System (HRIS). When a service team user is marked as terminated in HRIS, this information
propagates to Microsoft Active Directory, which then automatically removes/revokes any authenticators/credentials
associated with the individual. Upon termination, building access badges are collected. This process is described and
already covered under CIP-004-6 R5.1.
NIST 800-53 AC-2 Account Management: Accounts that have access to Microsoft Azure systems must be reviewed every
90 days by Microsoft Azure group owners. Additionally, when a user is promoted or transferred to another group, user
role and access rights are automatically reviewed and revoked according to the access policy defined with the RAMWeb
tool. The user profile is changed after proper approvals and authorization from the respective group owners. Since
RAMWeb is linked to the corporate Human Resources (HR) tracking tool Headtrax, if users change organizations, their
access to resources provided as part of their RAMWeb membership is automatically revoked depending on the policy
specified in the associated RAMWeb project. Furthermore, the RAMWeb tool will automatically terminate access
depending on the rules configured for the project. The user is required to resubmit a request for access when that
individual’s access is close to expiring.
R5 Part 5.4
5.4 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and For termination actions, revoke the An example of evidence may include,
their associated: individual’s non-shared user but is not limited to, workflow or sign-
• EACMS accounts (unless already revoked off form showing access removal for
according to Parts 5.1 or 5.3) within any individual BES Cyber Assets and
30 calendar days of the effective software applications as determined
date of the termination action. necessary to completing the revocation
of access and dated within thirty
calendar days of the termination
actions.
R5 Part 5.5
5.5 High Impact BES Cyber Systems For termination actions, change Examples of evidence may include,
and their associated: passwords for shared account(s) but are not limited to:
• EACMS known to the user within 30 calendar
1. Workflow or sign-off form showing
days of the termination action. For
password reset within 30 calendar
reassignments or transfers, change
days of the termination;
passwords for shared account(s)
known to the user within 30 calendar 2. Workflow or sign-off form showing
days following the date that the password reset within 30 calendar
Responsible Entity determines that the days of the reassignments or
individual no longer requires retention transfers; or
of that access.
3. Documentation of the extenuating
If the Responsible Entity determines operating circumstance and workflow
and documents that extenuating or sign-off form showing password
operating circumstances require a reset within 10 calendar days
longer time period, change the following the end of the operating
password(s) within 10 calendar days circumstance.
following the end of the operating
circumstances.
NIST 800-53 AC-2(10) Account Management | Shared / Group Account Credential Termination: Microsoft Azure only
allows the use of shared or group accounts when those accounts are required for a clearly-defined administrative purpose
that cannot be fulfilled with individual accounts. The credentials for these accounts must be stored in one of the approved
Secret Stores, which tracks and monitors access to secrets. Account owners are required to rotate shared account
credentials at least every 70 days. Additionally, account owners are required to rotate shared account credentials
whenever an employee leaves the group.
R1 Part 1.1
1.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and All applicable Cyber Assets An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: connected to a network via a not limited to, a list of all ESPs with all
• PCA routable protocol shall reside within uniquely identifiable applicable Cyber
a defined ESP. Assets connected via a routable protocol
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
within each ESP.
and their associated:
• PCA
• Deployment network: Each deployment can be isolated from other deployments at the network level. Multiple Virtual
Machines (VMs) within a deployment can communicate with each other through private IP addresses.
• Virtual network: Each virtual network is isolated from other virtual networks. Multiple deployments inside the same
subscription can be placed on the same virtual network, and then communicate with each other through private IP
addresses.
Registered Entity is wholly responsible for configuring their VNETs and segmenting applications deployed inside those
networks. For more information, see section titled Networking Isolation in “NERC CIP Standards and Cloud Computing”.
Specifically, Registered Entity is responsible for:
• Monitoring and controlling communications at and within the boundaries of the customer-deployed system.
• Implementing subnetworks for customer-deployed resources to logically separate publicly accessible resources from
internal resources.
• Restricting connections to external networks or systems through managed interfaces, consisting of boundary protection
devices arranged in accordance with the customer’s security architecture.
Microsoft does not inspect, approve, or monitor customer applications deployed in Azure. Microsoft does not know which
Azure resources provisioned by customers constitute a BES Cyber System, or which ports and protocols need to be enabled
for a properly functioning BES Cyber Asset. Neither Azure nor Azure Government constitutes a BES Cyber System or BES
Cyber Asset. Registered Entity is wholly responsible for complying with CIP-005-5. The information provided below is
meant primarily to demonstrate controls that Microsoft has in place across Azure for secure segmentation of network
environments.
NIST 800-53 SC-7 Boundary Protection: Microsoft Azure implements boundary protection using controlled devices at the
network boundary and at key points within the Microsoft Azure infrastructure. The overarching principle within Microsoft
Azure is to allow only connection and communication that is necessary for systems to operate, blocking all other ports,
protocols and connections by default. Azure employs a defense in depth strategy for boundary protection, including
secure segmentation of network environments through several methods including VLAN segmentation, ACL restrictions,
and encrypted communications for remote connectivity (SSL VPN and Remote Desktop Gateway access) to the
environment. Furthermore, techniques like control plane policing security are used to isolate services. The key boundaries
included as part of Azure’s Infrastructure include the Global Infrastructure LAN used to support infrastructure supporting
services and the external boundary of the RD Gateway and SSL VPN boundary used to support remote access to the
environment.
The combination of the following components acts as Azure Infrastructure’s boundary protection:
• Edge Routers
• Access Routers
• Load Balancers
• Layer 2 Aggregation
• TOR
• ACL Restrictions
• Monitoring
The only publicly accessible components of Microsoft Azure are the load balancers and the public-facing server roles. All
non-publicly accessible Azure components connect to the load balancers via physically separate network interfaces on
subnets that are logically separated from internal subnets.
Azure connects to external networks or information systems only through Azure Networking’s managed networks and
edge routers. The network interfaces provide boundary protection at the edge router network level and are arranged in
accordance with organizational security architecture. Additional measures in place to help protect Azure information
systems from malicious activities include:
• Packet filtering
• Host-based firewalls
• VLAN isolation
• Jump boxes
All traffic at the boundary is restricted to authorized connections. Public access to the system is strictly prohibited.
R1 Part 1.2
1.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems with All External Routable Connectivity An example of evidence may include, but is
External Routable Connectivity and must be through an identified not limited to, network diagrams showing
their associated: Electronic Access Point (EAP). all external routable communication paths
• PCA and the identified EAPs.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
with External Routable Connectivity
and their associated:
• PCA
For network diagram, see Figure 9-16: Microsoft Azure Network Architecture on Page 51 in the FedRAMP Moderate
System Security Plan. Figure 10-1: Production Network Access Mechanism (Page 55) illustrates the access mechanism to
the core production network where Azure resides. For different layers of network isolation provided to Azure customers,
see Isolation in the Azure cloud.
NIST 800-53 SC-7 Boundary Protection: The only publicly-accessible components of Microsoft Azure are the load balancers
and the public-facing server roles. All non-publicly-accessible Azure components connect to the load balancers via
physically-separate network interfaces on subnets that are logically separated from internal subnets.
Microsoft Azure connects to external networks or information systems only through Azure Networking managed networks
and edge routers. The network interfaces provide boundary protection at the edge router network level and are arranged
in accordance with organizational security architecture.
R1 Part 1.3
1.3 Electronic Access Points for High Require inbound and outbound An example of evidence may include, but is
Impact BES Cyber Systems access permissions, including the not limited to, a list of rules (firewall, access
reason for granting access, and deny control lists, etc.) that demonstrate that
Electronic Access Points for Medium
all other access by default. only permitted access is allowed and that
Impact BES Cyber Systems
each access rule has a documented reason.
NIST 800-53 SC-7(5) Boundary Protection | Deny by Default / Allow by Exception: The over-arching principle of Microsoft
Azure network security is deny-by-default, which means allowing only connection and communication that is necessary
for systems to operate, blocking all other ports, protocols, and connections by default. Azure only allows connections and
communication that are necessary to operate the system. Connections are managed at the system boundary using Azure
Networking boundary protection devices. Connections within the boundary are managed using:
• IP Filtering
• VFP Filtering (for virtual machines)
• Host-based firewalls
• Guest firewalls (for virtual machines)
R1 Part 1.4
1.4 High Impact BES Cyber Systems with Where technically feasible, perform An example of evidence may include, but
Dial-up Connectivity and their authentication when establishing is not limited to, a documented process
associated: Dial-up Connectivity with applicable that describes how the Responsible Entity
• PCA Cyber Assets. is providing authenticated access through
each dial-up connection.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
with Dial-up Connectivity and their
associated:
• PCA
R1 Part 1.5
1.5 Electronic Access Points for High Have one or more methods for An example of evidence may include, but
Impact BES Cyber Systems detecting known or suspected is not limited to, documentation that
malicious communications for both malicious communications detection
Electronic Access Points for Medium
inbound and outbound methods (e.g. intrusion detection system,
Impact BES Cyber Systems at Control
communications. application layer firewall, etc.) are
Centers
implemented.
NIST 800-53 SC-7(12) Boundary Protection | Host-Based Protection: Microsoft Azure implements the following host-
based boundary protection mechanisms:
• IP Filtering
• VFP Filtering (for virtual machines)
• Host-based firewalls
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The servers within MFA are protected through NAT mechanisms and access controls are suitably established by Azure’s
Infrastructure at the network layer. The access to the MFA production infrastructure is restricted to minimal number of
ports, protocols and services required for the service. MFA also scans and monitors the servers periodically for any
unauthorized / intrusive activities and takes action to remediate the underlying immediately with the help of 24x7 on-call
operations team.
NIST 800-53 SI-4(4) Information System Monitoring | Inbound and Outbound Communication Traffic: Microsoft Azure
inbound and outbound communications are monitored continually using centralized monitoring, correlation, and analysis
systems that manage the large amount of information generated by devices within the environment. Geneva Monitoring
provides automated logging and alerting capabilities by utilizing Monitoring Agents (MAs) throughout the system. The
Azure Alarm and Incident Management Service (AIMS) is used to generate alerts for service teams.
R2 Part 2.1
2.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems Utilize an Intermediate System such Examples of evidence may include, but are not
and their associated: that the Cyber Asset initiating limited to, network diagrams or architecture
• PCA Interactive Remote Access does not documents.
directly access an applicable Cyber
Medium Impact BES Cyber
Asset.
Systems with External Routable
Connectivity and their
associated:
• PCA
NIST 800-53 AC-17 Remote Access: Microsoft authorizes remote access for Azure service team users. Before service team
personnel can connect to Azure remotely, they must first be approved for remote access by an authorized manager. This
process is automatically enforced through RAMWeb and Account Management Tool, as described under CIP-004-6 R4.1.
Microsoft internal user connections originate in the Corporate Network (CorpNet) passing via the CorpNet firewall through
Azure-managed load balancers. Authorized Azure personnel utilize Microsoft-issued information systems (Secure Access
Workstation, SAW) and connect remotely to the Azure cluster from CorpNet. Users are identified via two-factor
authentication based on a unique Active Directory (AD) identifier and password from the Corporate domain in
combination with a smart card. SAW use and operation policy is available (internal link). SAWs are security devices that
provide users with privileged or elevated access to Azure production systems for platform troubleshooting and
maintenance. A SAW is designed to protect users from credential theft/misuse and malware attacks. SAWs are monitored
by Microsoft.
R2 Part 2.2
2.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems For all Interactive Remote Access An example of evidence may include, but is not
and their associated: sessions, utilize encryption that limited to, architecture documents detailing
• PCA terminates at an Intermediate where encryption initiates and terminates.
System.
Medium Impact BES Cyber
Systems with External Routable
Connectivity and their
associated:
• PCA
NIST 800-53 AC-17(2) Remote Access | Protection of Confidentiality / Integrity Using Encryption: For all asset types,
Microsoft Azure uses cryptographic controls to protect the confidentiality and integrity of sensitive data while in transit
or at rest. To ensure confidentiality, Azure uses both symmetric and asymmetric keys for encrypting sensitive data to
prevent access from unauthorized parties. To ensure integrity, Azure uses asymmetric keys to protect unauthorized
modification to sensitive data during transmission across components.
Azure Remote Desktop Gateways and SSL VPN services are configured to use FIPS 140-02 validated TLS 1.2 encryption for
remote access. Encryption is required for all remote access connections. PKI certificates are utilized within Azure on the
internal RD gateways and are obtained through the Azure Infrastructure PKI and SSL certificates utilized by remote access
solutions.
R2 Part 2.3
2.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems Require multi-factor authentication An example of evidence may include, but is not
and their associated: for all Interactive Remote Access limited to, architecture documents detailing
• PCA sessions. the authentication factors used.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Examples of authenticators may include, but
Systems with External Routable are not limited to,
Connectivity and their • Something the individual knows such
associated: as passwords or PINs. This does not
• PCA include User ID;
• Something the individual has such as
tokens, digital certificates, or smart
cards; or
• Something the individual is such as
fingerprints, iris scans, or other
biometric characteristics.
NIST 800-53 AC-17 Remote Access: Microsoft internal user connections originate in the Corporate Network (CorpNet)
passing via the CorpNet firewall through Azure-managed load balancers. Authorized Azure personnel utilize Microsoft-
issued information systems (Secure Access Workstation, SAW) and connect remotely to the Azure cluster from CorpNet.
Users are identified via two-factor authentication based on a unique Active Directory (AD) identifier and password from
the Corporate domain in combination with a smart card. SAWs are security devices that provide users with privileged or
elevated access to Azure production systems for platform troubleshooting and maintenance. A SAW is designed to protect
users from credential theft/misuse and malware attacks. SAWs are monitored by Microsoft.
NIST 800-53 IA-2 Identification and Authentication (Organizational Users): Microsoft Azure personnel accessing the Azure
environment are uniquely identified by their Microsoft corporate Active Directory username and authenticated using
eAuth Level 4 and FIPS 140-2 compliant Gemalto smart cards or approved eAuth Level 4 and FIPS 140-2 compliant Trusted
Platform Modules (TPM). Active Directory strictly enforces unique identifiers.
R1 Part 1.1
1.1 Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems Define operational or procedural An example of evidence may include, but is
without External Routable controls to restrict physical access. not limited to, documentation that
Connectivity operational or procedural controls exist.
Physical Access Control Systems
(PACS) associated with:
• High Impact BES Cyber
Systems, or
• Medium Impact BES Cyber
Systems with External
Routable Connectivity
Main access to Azure datacenter facilities is restricted to a single point of entry that is manned 24x7 by security personnel.
Emergency exits are alarmed and under video surveillance. Electronic access control devices are installed on doors
separating the reception area from the facilities’ interior to restrict access to approved personnel only. Azure datacenters
have a security operations desk located in the reception area and in line of sight of the single entry point. The datacenter
lobbies have man-trap portal devices that require access card and biometric hand geometry or fingerprint authentication
to pass beyond the lobby. Areas within Microsoft datacenters that contain critical systems (e.g., colocations, critical
environments, Main Distribution Frame MDF rooms, etc.) are further restricted through various security mechanisms such
as electronic access control, biometric devices, and anti-pass back controls. Additionally, doors are alarmed and under
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video surveillance.
R1 Part 1.2
1.2 Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems Utilize at least one physical access An example of evidence may include, but is
with External Routable Connectivity control to allow unescorted physical not limited to, language in the physical
and their associated: access into each applicable Physical security plan that describes each Physical
1. EACMS; and Security Perimeter to only those Security Perimeter and how unescorted
2. PCA individuals who have authorized physical access is controlled by one or more
unescorted physical access. different methods and proof that
unescorted physical access is restricted to
only authorized individuals, such as a list of
authorized individuals accompanied by
access logs.
Azure datacenters (leased and fully-managed) utilize physical access devices such as metal detectors, perimeter gates,
electronic access badge readers, biometric readers, man-traps/portals, anti-tailgate devices (in leased datacenters), and
anti-pass back controls, as well as security officers to control access to datacenters. As an additional security measure for
leased datacenters, Azure has required that anti-tailgating alarms be deployed at the doors to Microsoft colocation rooms.
R1 Part 1.3
1.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Where technically feasible, utilize An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: two or more different physical not limited to, language in the physical
1. EACMS; and access controls (this does not security plan that describes the Physical
2. PCA require two completely independent Security Perimeters and how unescorted
physical access control systems) to physical access is controlled by two or more
collectively allow unescorted different methods and proof that
physical access into Physical Security unescorted physical access is restricted to
Perimeters to only those individuals only authorized individuals, such as a list of
who have authorized unescorted authorized individuals accompanied by
physical access. access logs.
Azure datacenters (leased and fully-managed) utilize physical access devices such as metal detectors, perimeter gates,
electronic access badge readers, biometric readers, man-traps/portals, anti-tailgate devices (in leased datacenters), and
anti-pass back controls, as well as security officers to control access to datacenters. As an additional security measure for
leased datacenters, Azure has required that anti-tailgating alarms be deployed at the doors to Microsoft colocation rooms.
R1 Part 1.4
1.4 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Monitor for unauthorized access An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: through a physical access point into not limited to, documentation of controls
1. EACMS; and a Physical Security Perimeter. that monitor for unauthorized access
2. PCA through a physical access point into a
Physical Security Perimeter.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
with External Routable Connectivity
and their associated:
1. EACMS; and
2. PCA
CCTV is employed to monitor physical access to the datacenter and the information system. The CCTV is linked to the
building alarm monitoring system to provide physical access monitoring of alarm points. Cameras are positioned to
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monitor perimeter doors, facility entrances and exits, all colocation rows and aisles, all racks, caged areas, high-security
areas, shipping and receiving, facility external areas such as parking lots and other areas of the facility.
R1 Part 1.5
1.5 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Issue an alarm or alert in response to An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: detected unauthorized access not limited to, language in the physical
1. EACMS; and through a physical access point into security plan that describes the issuance of
2. PCA a Physical Security Perimeter to the an alarm or alert in response to
personnel identified in the BES Cyber unauthorized access through a physical
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
Security Incident response plan access control into a Physical Security
with External Routable Connectivity
within 15 minutes of detection. Perimeter and additional evidence that the
and their associated:
alarm or alert was issued and
1. EACMS; and
communicated as identified in the BES
2. PCA
Cyber Security Incident Response Plan, such
as manual or electronic alarm or alert logs,
cell phone or pager logs, or other evidence
that documents that the alarm or alert was
generated and communicated.
the Secure Operations Center (SOC). During a response situation, the Control Room Supervisor utilizes cameras in the area
of the incident being investigated to give the responder real-time information.
R1 Part 1.6
1.6 Physical Access Control Systems Monitor each Physical Access An example of evidence may include, but is
(PACS) associated with: Control System for unauthorized not limited to, documentation of controls
• High Impact BES Cyber physical access to a Physical Access that monitor for unauthorized physical
Systems, or Control System. access to a PACS.
• Medium Impact BES Cyber
Systems with External
Routable Connectivity
NIST 800-53 PE-3 Physical Access Control: Physical access devices within Azure datacenters are inventoried on at least an
annual basis. Keys and temporary access badges are inventoried multiple times a day at the beginning of each shift. Access
badge readers and similar access devices are linked to the physical security system where status is continuously
represented.
NIST 800-53 PE-6 Monitoring Physical Access: Physical access is monitored by implementing security devices and processes
at the datacenters. Examples include 24x7 electronic monitoring of access control, alarm and video systems, as well as
24x7 on-site security patrols of the facility and grounds. A Control Room Supervisor is located in the Secure Operations
Center (SOC) at all times to provide monitoring of physical access in the datacenter. The Control Room Supervisor monitors
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live camera feeds within the datacenter as well as the alarm monitoring system reports from all physical security access
devices within the datacenter. Physical access is reported in the alarm monitoring system as approved or failed. Failed
access results in an alarm status that requires action by the Control Room Supervisor. The Control Room Supervisor can
dispatch a responder for further investigation if needed. The physical access logs in the alarm monitoring system are
reviewed continuously, but are also available log files for subsequent investigative review.
CCTV is employed to monitor physical access to the datacenter and the information system. The CCTV is linked to the
building alarm monitoring system to provide physical access monitoring of alarm points. Cameras are positioned to
monitor perimeter doors, facility entrances and exits, all colocation rows and aisles, all racks, caged areas, high-security
areas, shipping and receiving, facility external areas such as parking lots and other areas of the facility.
R1 Part 1.7
1.7 Physical Access Control Systems Issue an alarm or alert in response to An example of evidence may include, but is
(PACS) associated with: detected unauthorized physical not limited to, language in the physical
• High Impact BES Cyber access to a Physical Access Control security plan that describes the issuance of
Systems, or System to the personnel identified in an alarm or alert in response to
• Medium Impact BES Cyber the BES Cyber Security Incident unauthorized physical access to Physical
Systems with External response plan within 15 minutes of Access Control Systems and additional
Routable Connectivity the detection. evidence that the alarm or alerts was issued
and communicated as identified in the BES
Cyber Security Incident Response Plan, such
as alarm or alert logs, cell phone or pager
logs, or other evidence that the alarm or
alert was generated and communicated.
NIST 800-53 PE-6(1) Monitoring Physical Access | Intrusion Alarms / Surveillance Equipment: In addition to the 24x7 onsite
security, Azure datacenters (leased and fully-managed) also utilize alarm monitoring systems. This provides real-time
alarm and video monitoring. Datacenter doors have alarms that will report when being opened or when they remain open
passed a programmed length of time. Doors can also be programmed to display the live CCTV image when a door alarm is
triggered. Additionally, the Control Room Supervisor constantly monitors a live feed of camera views from high security
and high traffic areas. Datacenter Access Tool (DCAT) is used to control access badge management (creation and
modification). Access card and biometric hand geometry and fingerprint readers are programmed and monitored through
the alarm monitoring system. Alarms are monitored and responded to by the Control Room Supervisor stationed 24x7 in
the Secure Operations Center (SOC). During a response situation, the Control Room Supervisor utilizes cameras in the area
of the incident being investigated to give the responder real-time information.
R1 Part 1.8
1.8 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Log (through automated means or An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: by personnel who control entry) not limited to, language in the physical
1. EACMS; and entry of each individual with security plan that describes logging and
2. PCA authorized unescorted physical recording of physical entry into each
access into each Physical Security Physical Security Perimeter and additional
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
Perimeter, with information to evidence to demonstrate that this logging
with External Routable Connectivity
identify the individual and date and has been implemented, such as logs of
and their associated:
time of entry. physical access into Physical Security
1. EACMS; and
Perimeters that show the individual and the
2. PCA
date and time of entry into Physical Security
Perimeter.
DCM team. Access to areas within the datacenter is granted based on the least privilege principle. Before a person can be
granted physical access to a datacenter, they must have a DCAT request approved by the DCM team. The DCM team
reviews the request for a valid business justification and for appropriate access levels. Upon arriving at the datacenter,
the individual on the request must have their identification verified by the security against a Microsoft identification badge
or government issued identification card. All accesses to Azure datacenter facilities are logged and audited.
NIST 800-53 PE-6 Monitoring Physical Access: To access an Azure datacenter, a person must have a Datacenter Access
Tool (DCAT) request approved by the Datacenter Management (DCM) team. In order to enter an Azure datacenter, a
person must check-in with the Security Operations Center (SOC) that is manned 24x7. A person’s physical access within
the datacenter is reviewed continuously by the Control Room Supervisor in the SOC. The Control Room Supervisor
monitors live camera feeds within the datacenter as well as the alarm monitoring system reports from all physical security
access devices within the datacenter. Physical access is reported in the alarm monitoring system as approved or failed.
Failed access results in an alarm status that requires action by the Control Room Supervisor. The Control Room Supervisor
can dispatch a responder for further investigation if needed. The physical access logs in the alarm monitoring system are
reviewed continuously but are also available in log files for subsequent investigative review.
R1 Part 1.9
1.9 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Retain physical access logs of entry An example of evidence may include, but
their associated: of individuals with authorized is not limited to, dated documentation
1. EACMS; and unescorted physical access into each such as logs of physical access into
2. PCA Physical Security Perimeter for at Physical Security Perimeters that show the
least ninety calendar days. date and time of entry into Physical
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
Security Perimeter.
with External Routable Connectivity
and their associated:
1. EACMS; and
2. PCA
NIST 800-53 AU-11 Audit Record Retention: For Infrastructure, Azure implements audit record retention through
maintaining all audit records for a minimum of one year. C+AI Security has developed an archiving infrastructure to
securely store audit records on servers dedicated to archival purposes. The servers are designed to verify the integrity of
archived files and allows authorized user to browse to an archive location. Audit records are stored in centralized log
servers that are protected against alteration.
NIST 800-53 PE-3 Physical Access Control: Access authorizations at Azure datacenters are managed through the
Datacenter Access Tool (DCAT). DCAT contains the authorized access lists of personnel who have been approved by the
DCM team. Access to areas within the datacenter is granted based on the least privilege principle. Before a person can be
granted physical access to a datacenter, they must have a DCAT request approved by the DCM team. The DCM team
reviews the request for a valid business justification and for appropriate access levels. Upon arriving at the datacenter,
the individual on the request must have their identification verified by the security against a Microsoft identification badge
or government issued identification card. All accesses to Azure datacenter facilities are logged and audited.
NIST 800-53 PE-6 Monitoring Physical Access: To access an Azure datacenter, a person must have a Datacenter Access
Tool (DCAT) request approved by the Datacenter Management (DCM) team. In order to enter an Azure datacenter, a
person must check-in with the Security Operations Center (SOC) that is manned 24x7. A person’s physical access within
the datacenter is reviewed continuously by the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) in the SOC. The CRS monitors live camera
feeds within the datacenter as well as the alarm monitoring system reports from all physical security access devices within
the datacenter. Physical access is reported in the alarm monitoring system as approved or failed. Failed access results in
an alarm status that requires action by the CRS. The CRS can dispatch a responder for further investigation if needed. The
physical access logs in the alarm monitoring system are reviewed continuously but are also available in log files for
subsequent investigative review.
R1 Part 1.10
environment are labeled appropriately and protected against interception or damage. Power and information system
cables are separated from each other at all points within an environment to avoid interference. Power cables are run
under the floors, overhead in cable trays and within cabinets for protection from moving parts and accidental damage. All
electrical spaces are behind card readers or additional key locks as appropriate. Access hallways as well as exterior
entrances and equipment yards approaching the protective spaces are all monitored via video surveillance.
Power systems also utilize redundancy as a form of protection. Datacenters utilize multiple power/utility feeds into the
facility as well as redundant configurations of generators and UPS systems. Generator and UPS system components
undergo regular maintenance procedures to maintain the systems in proper working order.
R2 Part 2.1
2.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Require continuous escorted access An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: of visitors (individuals who are not limited to, language in a visitor control
1. EACMS; and provided access but are not program that requires continuous escorted
2. PCA authorized for unescorted physical access of visitors within Physical Security
access) within each Physical Security Perimeters and additional evidence to
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
Perimeter, except during CIP demonstrate that the process was
with External Routable Connectivity
Exceptional Circumstances. implemented, such as visitor logs.
and their associated:
1. EACMS; and
2. PCA
R2 Part 2.2
2.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Require manual or automated An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: logging of visitor entry into and exit not limited to, language in a visitor control
1. EACMS; and from the Physical Security Perimeter program that requires continuous escorted
2. PCA that includes date and time of the access of visitors within Physical Security
initial entry and last exit, the visitor’s Perimeters and additional evidence to
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
name, and the name of an individual demonstrate that the process was
with External Routable Connectivity
point of contact responsible for the implemented, such as dated visitor logs that
and their associated:
visitor, except during CIP Exceptional include the required information.
1. EACMS; and
Circumstances.
2. PCA
and if necessary can be correlated to the visitor for future review. Visitor access is being reviewed continuously by the
assigned escort and by the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) via CCTV and the alarm monitoring system.
Visitors with an approved DCAT access request will have their access request reviewed at the time their identification is
verified against a form of government issued ID or Microsoft issued badge. Visitors approved for escorted access are issued
a self-expiring sticky badge. Additionally, when a visitor concludes their visit by returning their sticky badge to the CRS,
the CRS terminates the visitor’s DCAT access record during a final review. In the event that a visitor leaves with their visitor
badge, the badge expires automatically within 24 hours and the words “VOID” appear in red.. Azure maintains visitor
access records within the DCAT database for possible future investigations.
R2 Part 2.3
2.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Retain visitor logs for at least ninety An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: calendar days. not limited to, documentation showing logs
1. EACMS; and have been retained for at least ninety
2. PCA calendar days.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
with External Routable Connectivity
and their associated:
1. EACMS; and
2. PCA
NIST 800-53 AU-11 Audit Record Retention: For Infrastructure, Azure implements audit record retention through
maintaining all audit records for a minimum of one year. C+AI Security has developed an archiving infrastructure to
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securely store audit records on servers dedicated to archival purposes. The servers are designed to verify the integrity of
archived files and allows authorized user to browse to an archive location. Audit records are stored in centralized log
servers that are protected against alteration.
NIST 800-53 PE-8 Visitor Access Records: Visitor datacenter access records are maintained in Datacenter Access Tool
(DCAT) in the form of approved DCAT requests. DCAT requests can only be approved by the Datacenter Management
(DCM) team. All visitor access requests to Azure datacenters is recorded in DCAT and is available for future possible
investigations. Visitors are required to be escorted at all times and are not granted any access to Azure datacenters. The
escort’s access within the datacenter is logged within Lenel Onguard Alarm Monitoring System and if necessary can be
correlated to the visitor for future review. As described in PE-2, datacenter access is reviewed quarterly. Microsoft stores
Azure datacenter physical access logs for authorized individuals and visitors within the DCAT database for possible future
investigations and retains them for 3 years. This policy is maintained by the DCAT Operations team.
R3 Part 3.1
CIP-006-6 Table R3 – Physical Access Control System Maintenance and Testing Program
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
3.1 Physical Access Control Systems Maintenance and testing of each An example of evidence may include, but is
(PACS) associated with: Physical Access Control System and not limited to, a maintenance and testing
• High Impact BES Cyber locally mounted hardware or devices program that provides for testing each
Systems, or at the Physical Security Perimeter at Physical Access Control System and locally
• Medium Impact BES Cyber least once every 24 calendar months mounted hardware or devices associated
Systems with External to ensure they function properly. with each applicable Physical Security
Routable Connectivity Perimeter at least once every 24 calendar
months and additional evidence to
Locally mounted hardware or devices
demonstrate that this testing was done,
at the Physical Security Perimeter
such as dated maintenance records, or
associated with:
other documentation showing testing and
• High Impact BES Cyber maintenance has been performed on each
Systems, or applicable device or system at least once
• Medium Impact BES Cyber every 24 calendar months.
Systems with External
Routable Connectivity
NIST 800-53 PE-3 Physical Access Control: Physical access devices within Azure datacenters are inventoried on at least an
annual basis. Keys and temporary access badges are inventoried multiple times a day at the beginning of each shift. Access
badge readers and similar access devices are linked to the physical security system where status is continuously
MICROSOFT CONFIDENTIAL – NDA REQUIRED 114
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represented.
R1 Part 1.1
1.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Where technically feasible, enable Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: only logical network accessible ports not limited to:
1. EACMS; that have been determined to be • Documentation of the need for all
2. PACS; and needed by the Responsible Entity, enabled ports on all applicable
3. PCA including port ranges or services Cyber Assets and Electronic Access
where needed to handle dynamic Points, individually or by group.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
with External Routable Connectivity
ports. If a device has no provision • Listings of the listening ports on
for disabling or restricting logical the Cyber Assets, individually or by
and their associated:
ports on the device then those ports group, from either the device
1. EACMS;
that are open are deemed needed. configuration files, command
2. PACS; and
output (such as netstat), or
3. PCA network scans of open ports; or
• Configuration files of host-based
firewalls or other device level
mechanisms that only allow
needed ports and deny all others.
For network devices, the Azure Networking Standards and Architecture team sets the configuration baseline standards
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for all network devices, using recommended configurations specific to each hardware vendor, and makes updates
periodically based upon recommendations from the vendor. These base configurations include essential functions, ports,
protocols, and services. All other functions, ports, protocols, and services are disabled by default.
NIST 800-53 CM-7(1) Least Functionality | Periodic Review: Microsoft Azure software and hardware configurations and
Access Control Lists (ACLs) are reviewed at least monthly to identify any unnecessary or non-secure functions, ports,
protocols, and services. Any function, port, protocol, or service identified as unnecessary or non-secure during the review
process is disabled.
NIST 800-53 SC-7(5) Boundary Protection | Deny by Default / Allow by Exception: The over-arching principle of Microsoft
Azure network security is deny-by-default, which means allowing only connection and communication that is necessary
for systems to operate, blocking all other ports, protocols, and connections by default. Azure only allows connections and
communication that are necessary to operate the system. Connections are managed at the system boundary using Azure
Networking boundary protection devices. Connections within the boundary are managed using:
• IP Filtering
• VFP Filtering (for virtual machines)
• Host-based firewalls
• Guest firewalls (for virtual machines)
R1 Part 1.2
1.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Protect against the use of An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: unnecessary physical input/output not limited to, documentation showing
1. PCA; and ports used for network connectivity, types of protection of physical input/output
2. Nonprogrammable console commands, or Removable ports, either logically through system
communication components Media. configuration or physically using a port lock
located inside both a PSP or signage.
and an ESP.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at
Control Centers and their associated:
1. PCA; and
2. Nonprogrammable
communication components
located inside both a PSP
and an ESP.
NIST 800-53 CM-8(3) Information System Component Inventory | Automated Unauthorized Component Detection: Azure
does not wait to disable network access for unauthorized components/devices in the information system. When network
devices are deployed, ports are turned off by default. Unassigned ports are put into a Virtual Local Area Network (VLAN)
that is not configured at the Layer 3 and has no provisioned servers in it. Therefore, even if ports were enabled, there
would be no access to any provisioned servers, and traffic would not have the ability to leave the subnet. To prevent IP
spoofing, Azure uses Access Control Lists (ACLs) on the Layer 3 to deny packets sourced by the subnet from entering that
subnet.
Additionally, physical access controls are employed in the datacenters to mitigate the unauthorized addition of new
devices into the environment. Physical access to the devices to add additional ports is also disabled within the
environment.
R2 Part 2.1
2.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and A patch management process for An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: tracking, evaluating, and installing not limited to, documentation of a patch
1. EACMS; cyber security patches for applicable management process and documentation
2. PACS; and Cyber Assets. The tracking portion or lists of sources that are monitored,
3. PCA shall include the identification of a whether on an individual BES Cyber System
source or sources that the or Cyber Asset basis.
Responsible Entity tracks for the
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems release of cyber security patches for
and their associated: applicable Cyber Assets that are
1. EACMS; updateable and for which a patching
2. PACS; and source exists.
3. PCA
C+AI Security has developed a comprehensive methodology to verify the status of software updates installed in the Azure
environment. Azure uses automated vulnerability scanning tools to determine whether a required security flaw has been
remediated properly and the date of installation of security updates. These tools collect information from each server and
compare it to the requirements defined for each security update or vulnerability ID.
R2 Part 2.2
2.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and At least once every 35 calendar days, An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: evaluate security patches for not limited to, an evaluation conducted by,
1. EACMS; applicability that have been released referenced by, or on behalf of a Responsible
2. PACS; and since the last evaluation from the Entity of security-related patches released
3. PCA source or sources identified in Part by the documented sources at least once
2.1. every 35 calendar days.
systems to access Microsoft Azure. Moreover, Registered Entity is responsible for patching base operating system images
in guest Virtual Machines (VMs) under its control, e.g., Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) images provisioned from the image
gallery or deployed directly by the Registered Entity. Microsoft does not have access to customer Azure IaaS VMs and
cannot automatically patch these VMs. Customers should review Update Management Solution in Azure for guidance on
how to configure an automated patching schedule for Azure IaaS VMs.
R2 Part 2.3
2.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and For applicable patches identified in Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: Part 2.2, within 35 calendar days of not limited to:
1. EACMS; the evaluation completion, take one • Records of the installation of the
2. PACS; and of the following actions: patch (e.g., exports from
3. PCA • Apply the applicable automated patch management
patches; or tools that provide installation date,
• Create a dated mitigation verification of BES Cyber System
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems plan; or Component software revision, or
and their associated: • Revise an existing registry exports that show
1. EACMS; mitigation plan. software has been installed); or
2. PACS; and • A dated plan showing when and
3. PCA Mitigation plans shall include the
how the vulnerability will be
Responsible Entity’s planned actions
addressed, to include
to mitigate the vulnerabilities
documentation of the actions to be
addressed by each security patch
taken by the Responsible Entity to
and a timeframe to complete these
mitigate the vulnerabilities
mitigations.
addressed by the security patch
and a timeframe for the
completion of these mitigations.
Information collected from C+AI Security monitoring efforts or an increase on the risk level faced by Azure servers may be
used to expedite remediation of outstanding security vulnerabilities after the original deadline was set.
C+AI Security has developed a comprehensive methodology to verify the status of software updates installed in the Azure
environment. Azure uses automated vulnerability scanning tools to determine whether a required security flaw has been
remediated properly and the date of installation of security updates. These tools collect information from each server and
compare it to the requirements defined for each security update or vulnerability ID. Tools are updated at least on a
monthly basis to keep abreast of the changing threat environment.
NIST 800-53 CA-5 Plan of Action and Milestones: Microsoft Azure develops Plan of Action and Milestones (POA&M) in
accordance with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance and FedRAMP requirements. The POA&M is
submitted as part of the Microsoft Azure Security Authorization Package provided to FedRAMP.
Microsoft updates the POA&M on at least a monthly basis based on the findings of the security control assessments and
ongoing continuous monitoring activities, including vulnerability scanning. Microsoft includes an action step to remediate
any high and medium items from ongoing assessments and vulnerability scans (if any) in the monthly POA&M submission.
For any high and medium items noted, Microsoft provides a high-level description of the issue and the remediation plan.
The raw scan reports contain details on any issues noted and are made available to FedRAMP on a monthly basis.
R2 Part 2.4
2.4 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and For each mitigation plan created or An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: revised in Part 2.3, implement the not limited to, records of implementation of
1. EACMS; plan within the timeframe specified mitigations.
2. PACS; and in the plan, unless a revision to the
3. PCA plan or an extension to the
timeframe specified in Part 2.3 is
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
approved by the CIP Senior Manager
and their associated:
or delegate.
1. EACMS;
2. PACS; and
3. PCA
Microsoft updates the POA&M on at least a monthly basis based on the findings of the security control assessments and
ongoing continuous monitoring activities, including vulnerability scanning. Microsoft includes an action step to remediate
any high and medium items from ongoing assessments and vulnerability scans (if any) in the monthly POA&M submission.
For any high and medium items noted, Microsoft provides a high-level description of the issue and the remediation plan.
The raw scan reports contain details on any issues noted and are made available to FedRAMP on a monthly basis.
NIST 800-53 SI-2 Flaw Remediation: C+AI Security has developed a comprehensive methodology to verify the status of
software updates installed in the Azure environment. Azure uses automated vulnerability scanning tools to determine
whether a required security flaw has been remediated properly and the date of installation of security updates. These
tools collect information from each server and compare it to the requirements defined for each security update or
vulnerability ID. Tools are updated at least on a monthly basis to keep abreast of the changing threat environment.
R3 Part 3.1
3.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Deploy method(s) to deter, detect, An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: or prevent malicious code. not limited to, records of the Responsible
1. EACMS; Entity’s performance of these processes
2. PACS; and (e.g., through traditional antivirus, system
3. PCA hardening, policies, etc.).
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
and their associated:
1. EACMS;
2. PACS; and
3. PCA
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R3 Part 3.2
3.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Mitigate the threat of detected Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: malicious code. not limited to:
1. EACMS; • Records of response processes for
2. PACS; and malicious code detection
3. PCA • Records of the performance of
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems these processes when malicious
and their associated: code is detected.
1. EACMS;
2. PACS; and
3. PCA
Anti-malware tools detect files determined to be malicious and send alerts to Microsoft Azure administrators, which
triggers the incident response process. Customers, including government customers and US-CERT, will be notified as
required.
Azure by default quarantines malicious code identified from the anti-virus software system and does not immediately
delete them. Falsely identified malicious code is put in a quarantined folder on the system. System administrators can roll-
back quarantined files if they are falsely determined to be malicious code, in order to resolve impact to operations in the
system.
When anti-malware tools detect malware, they block the malware and an alert is generated and sent to Microsoft Azure
service team personnel, Microsoft Azure Security, and/or C+AI Security. The receiving personnel initiate the incident
response process. Incidents are tracked and resolved, and post mortem analysis is performed, as discussed in the Incident
Response (IR) family of controls (see CIP-008-5 Cyber Security – Incident Reporting and Response Planning).
R3 Part 3.3
3.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and For those methods identified in Part An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: 3.1 that use signatures or patterns, not limited to, documentation showing the
1. EACMS; have a process for the update of the process used for the update of signatures or
2. PACS; and signatures or patterns. The process patterns.
3. PCA must address testing and installing
the signatures or patterns.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
and their associated:
1. EACMS;
2. PACS; and
3. PCA
NIST 800-53 SI-2 Flaw Remediation: Testing of software updates related to flaw remediation must follow the standard
change management process. Testing of possible changes to the environment must be conducted in order to understand
possible impacts to the security and operations of the system. Testing must be conducted prior to approval, which is
necessary before changes to the production environment are implemented.
R4 Part 4.1
4.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Log events at the BES Cyber System Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: level (per BES Cyber System not limited to, a paper or system generated
1. EACMS; capability) or at the Cyber Asset level listing of event types for which the BES
2. PACS; and (per Cyber Asset capability) for Cyber System is capable of detecting and,
3. PCA identification of, and after-the-fact for generated events, is configured to log.
investigations of, Cyber Security This listing must include the required types
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
Incidents that includes, as a of events.
and their associated:
minimum, each of the following
1. EACMS;
types of events:
2. PACS; and
4.1.1. Detected successful login
3. PCA
attempts;
4.1.2. Detected failed access
attempts and failed login
attempts;
4.1.3. Detected malicious code.
events, object access, policy change, privilege functions, process tracking, and system events. For Web applications: all
administrator activity, authentication checks, authorization checks, data deletions, data access, data changes, and
permission changes. Customers can use Azure Security Center to prevent, detect, and respond to threats. Using Microsoft
global threat intelligence, security-related events from across customer’s Azure deployments are automatically collected
and analyzed to identify actual threats, offer insight into attacks, and suggest ways to remediate issues. Customers can
also leverage extensive logging capability built into Azure.
NIST 800-53 SI-4 Information System Monitoring: Service teams have deployed active monitoring solutions that generate
alerts and audit logs. All service teams upload their logs to Geneva Monitoring, where they are aggregated and processed.
Reports are generated using Security Logging and Monitoring (SLAM). SLAM uses heuristics to identify unauthorized use
of the operating system. SLAM examines records to confirm that the system is functioning in an optimal, resilient, and
secure state. All servers act as monitoring devices and are configured to log all security-relevant events. Microsoft Azure
monitors all hosts in the environment. Suspicious events generate alarms and notifications to service team staff and
appropriate contingent staff. Any log event that indicates a potential violation of the Microsoft Azure Security Policy must
be immediately brought to the attention of Microsoft Azure Security.
R4 Part 4.2
4.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Generate alerts for security events Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: that the Responsible Entity not limited to, paper or system-generated
1. EACMS; determines necessitates an alert, listing of security events that the
2. PACS; and that includes, as a minimum, each of Responsible Entity determined necessitate
3. PCA the following types of events (per alerts, including paper or system generated
Cyber Asset or BES Cyber System list showing how alerts are configured.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
capability):
with External Routable Connectivity
4.2.1. Detected malicious code
and their associated:
from Part 4.1; and
1. EACMS;
4.2.2. Detected failure of Part 4.1
2. PACS; and
event logging.
3. PCA
Security incident and event management tool rules are generally tuned to alert on events of immediate concern, events
that need little correlation to prompt a preliminary investigation and attention of C+E SOC Tier 2 personnel. These audit
settings are deployed for all Azure supporting servers for the Azure Security Authorization Boundary.
NIST 800-53 SI-4(5) Information System Monitoring | System-Generated Alerts: Microsoft Azure Security has defined
requirements for active monitoring. Service teams configure active monitoring tools in accordance with these
requirements. Active monitoring tools include the Monitoring Agent (MA) and System Center Operations Manager
(SCOM), which are configured to provide real time alerts to Service Engineer Operations personnel in situations that
require immediate action. The indications of compromise or potential compromise are documented in the Microsoft Azure
Incident Response Plan.
R4 Part 4.3
4.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Where technically feasible, retain Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: applicable event logs identified in not limited to, documentation of the event
1. EACMS; Part 4.1 for at least the last 90 log retention process and paper or system
2. PACS; and consecutive calendar days except generated reports showing log retention
3. PCA under CIP Exceptional configuration set at 90 days or greater.
Circumstances.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at
Control Centers and their associated:
1. EACMS;
2. PACS; and
3. PCA
NIST 800-53 AU-4 Audit Storage Capacity: Audit records for each of the Microsoft Azure services are captured by the
Monitoring Agents (MAs) and retained in Azure Storage. Each Storage account is allocated sufficient storage capacity for
the retention of at least 90 days’ worth of logs and is monitored for usage by the service component teams. If an account
is near capacity, service teams are notified by the Storage team and the appropriate component teams are then required
to create an additional storage account to expand the capacity. Before adding security-related events/logs, service teams
re-evaluate service Storage capacity because OS events and Internet Information Services (IIS) logs can be potentially
large. It is each service team’s responsibility to take care of capacity planning. Service teams must allocate a Storage
account.
NIST 800-53 AU-11 Audit Record Retention: Logs are retained in a central repository for at least 90 days to support
investigations of security incidents and to meet regulatory retention requirements.
R4 Part 4.4
4.4 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Review a summarization or sampling Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: of logged events as determined by not limited to, documentation describing
1. EACMS; and the Responsible Entity at intervals no the review, any findings from the review (if
2. PCA greater than 15 calendar days to any), and dated documentation showing the
identify undetected Cyber Security review occurred.
Incidents.
R5 Part 5.1
5.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Have a method(s) to enforce An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: authentication of interactive user not limited to, documentation describing
1. EACMS; access, where technically feasible. how access is authenticated.
2. PACS; and
3. PCA
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at
Control Centers and their associated:
1. EACMS;
2. PACS; and
3. PCA
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
with External Routable Connectivity
and their associated:
1. EACMS;
2. PACS; and
3. PCA
use Active Directory Federation Services (ADFS) or the Azure Active Directory (AD) service for identity management.
Customers should review online documentation for Azure Active Directory.
R5 Part 5.2
5.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Identify and inventory all known An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: enabled default or other generic not limited to, a listing of accounts by
1. EACMS; account types, either by system, by account types showing the enabled or
2. PACS; and groups of systems, by location, or by generic account types in use for the BES
3. PCA system type(s). Cyber System.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
and their associated:
1. EACMS;
2. PACS; and
3. PCA
There are no local user accounts and groups on customer Azure PaaS Virtual Machines (VMs) and the default Windows
Administrator account is disabled. Remote access to customer PaaS VMs is not possible without first creating a local user
account and then initiating a Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) session for access.
For Azure IaaS VMs, customers have full control over remote access. Customers have sole control over creating local
accounts to facilitate remote access via RDP. The default account is Administrator (the name can be changed by the
customer) and the customer has sole control over assigning the password that is known only to the customer. Customers
can also change the default port number for incoming RDP requests. Customers provision IaaS VMs from the Azure
Marketplace or bring their own VM images.
R5 Part 5.3
5.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Identify individuals who have An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: authorized access to shared not limited to, listing of shared accounts
1. EACMS; accounts. and the individuals who have authorized
2. PACS; and access to each shared account.
3. PCA
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
with External Routable Connectivity
and their associated:
1. EACMS;
2. PACS; and
3. PCA
R5 Part 5.4
5.4 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Change known default passwords, Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: per Cyber Asset capability not limited to:
1. EACMS; • Records of a procedure that
2. PACS; and passwords are changed when new
3. PCA devices are in production; or
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems • Documentation in system manuals
or other vendor documents
and their associated:
1. EACMS; showing default vendor passwords
2. PACS; and were generated pseudo-randomly
3. PCA and are thereby unique to the
device.
Default authentication credentials are often well known, easily discoverable, and present a significant security risk.
Therefore, they are changed upon installation. The local administrator account is renamed and disabled. Default
passwords are changed for the local admin account and root accounts for network devices (including SNMP community
strings).
Vendor supplied default passwords must be changed prior to use of associated application/service/system in Online
Services environments. Individual service owners are responsible for implementing policies and processes to change these
vendor-supplied defaults prior to service enablement.
R5 Part 5.5
5.5 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and For password-only authentication for Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: interactive user access, either not limited to:
1. EACMS; technically or procedurally enforce • System-generated reports or
2. PACS; and the following password parameters: screen-shots of the system-
3. PCA 5.5.1. Password length that is, at enforced password parameters,
least, the lesser of eight including length and complexity; or
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
and their associated:
characters or the maximum • Attestations that include a
length supported by the reference to the documented
1. EACMS;
Cyber Asset; and procedures that were followed.
2. PACS; and
5.5.2. Minimum password
3. PCA
complexity that is the lesser
of three or more different
types of characters (e.g.,
uppercase alphabetic,
lowercase alphabetic,
numeric, non-
alphanumeric) or the
maximum complexity
supported by the Cyber
Asset.
NIST 800-53 IA-5(1) Authenticator Management | Password-based Authentication: In accordance with C+AI Security
policy, Microsoft Azure and Azure Infrastructure enforce case-sensitive passwords with a minimum password length of 14
characters and at least one each of upper-case letters, lower-case letters, numbers, and special characters. Additional risk
mitigating measures are in place for access to Azure or Azure Government production systems in the form of mandatory
two-factor authentication and use of Microsoft issues Secure Access Workstations.
R5 Part 5.6
5.6 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Where technically feasible, for Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: password-only authentication for not limited to:
1. EACMS; interactive user access, either • System-generated reports or
2. PACS; and technically or procedurally enforce screen-shots of the system-
3. PCA password changes or an obligation enforced periodicity of changing
to change the password at least once passwords; or
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
every 15 calendar months. • Attestations that include a
with External Routable Connectivity
and their associated: reference to the documented
1. EACMS; procedures that were followed.
2. PACS; and
3. PCA
These requirements are defined and managed by C+AI Security and enforced in Active Directory. Users must change
passwords every 70 days.
R5 Part 5.7
5.7 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Where technically feasible, either: Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: • Limit the number of not limited to:
1. EACMS; unsuccessful authentication • Documentation of the account-
2. PACS; and attempts; or lockout parameters; or
3. PCA • Generate alerts after a • Rules in the alerting configuration
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at threshold of unsuccessful showing how the system notified
Control Centers and their associated: authentication attempts. individuals after a determined
1. EACMS; number of unsuccessful login
attempts.
2. PACS; and
3. PCA
Once a user is locked out after five (5) invalid access attempts, the user must either:
• Take action to unblock and reset the PIN using the PIN Unblock Tool. This will notify the user’s direct manager that a PIN
unblock was requested.
• Contact an administrator through the help desk to manually unblock and reset the PIN.
Azure has implemented compensating controls described below to alert security personnel to instances where brute force
password guessing is attempted, and apply additional authentication mechanisms to reduce the usefulness of an account
password acquired through brute force guessing (or any other method). These compensating controls meet the objective
of the original control and address additional risk.
• There are two entry points into the Azure Infrastructure. In each case, either an additional authentication factor (i.e. a
smartcard) or a completely separate user account must be used in order to gain access to the environment.
• For entry via the corporate network, a user must first successfully authenticate against one of the corporate domains.
• For connections directly to the Azure Infrastructure Server environment via un-trusted locations (primarily the internet),
in addition to user name and password combinations dual factor authentication (smartcard) is required.
• In addition to implementing these forms of dual or multi-factor authentication, an account password policy is enforced
for the domains including strong password complexity, password expiration, password history, and minimum password
length (refer to IA-05 for further details under CIP-007-6 R5.5).
R1 Part 1.1
The Microsoft Azure Incident Management process includes multiple stages throughout the resolution of an incident.
Incidents may be managed with the Crisis Management or Security Breach Incident sub-processes of the Incident
Management process. When incidents become triaged as a high severity event (Severity 2 or higher, Severity 0 being the
highest) they are managed with the Crisis Management sub-process. The incident management process for incident
handling includes steps for preparation, detection and analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery and post-incident
activity.
NIST 800-53 IR-8 Incident Response Plan: Microsoft Azure has developed and implemented the Microsoft Azure Incident
Management Standard Operating Procedure (SOP). The SOP provides a high-level approach for how the incident response
capability fits into the overall organization and describes the structure and organization of the incident response
capabilities. The incident response SOP does the following:
• Describes the end-to-end process of security incident response, and how it is executed across the various functional
groups within Microsoft.
• Defines a methodical approach that may be applied to resolve security incidents and escalate incidents to the proper
internal authorities.
The SOP provides guidance for classifying the incidents and assigning severity. It also provides the characteristics that
could be associated with incidents to help categorize the incidents.
R1 Part 1.2
1.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems One or more processes to determine Examples of evidence may include, but are
if an identified Cyber Security not limited to, dated documentation of
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
Incident is a Reportable Cyber Cyber Security Incident response plan(s)
Security Incident and notify the that provide guidance or thresholds for
Electricity Sector Information determining which Cyber Security Incidents
Sharing and Analysis Center (ES- are also Reportable Cyber Security Incidents
ISAC), unless prohibited by law. and documentation of initial notices to the
Initial notification to the ES-ISAC, Electricity Sector Information Sharing and
which may be only a preliminary Analysis Center (ES-ISAC).
notice, shall not exceed one hour
from the determination of a
Reportable Cyber Security Incident.
the subscription Administrators and Co-Administrators. Registered Entity should notify relevant authorities if a breach
occurs entirely within the Registered Entity’s scope of responsibility, e.g., if a customer Virtual Machine (VM) is breached
due to a poor password.
The Assess stage begins when an Incident Engineer acknowledges ownership of an event and ends when an event has
been classified using a Classify, Escalate, Notify (CEN) and assigned the appropriate severity in the Ticket. The severity can
change throughout the troubleshooting process as more information becomes available. Incident Engineers leverage
application monitoring and instrumentation to validate impact before severity assignment occurs.
The Escalation and Notification phase begins in the Assess stage as soon as severity assignment occurs. The CEN defines
the escalation and notification requirements for each severity level. The first escalation point is the Incident Manager.
Notification will continue throughout the remaining phases of the process. During this phase, the Security Incident
Manager completes the following tasks:
1. Make the final determination whether an event impacts system or data security.
2. Mobilize additional security response and investigation personnel.
3. Alert Communications, CELA, privacy team or additional LiveSite personnel as necessary.
4. Decide in coordination with CELA whether to begin execution of the Security Incident Notification Sub-Process.
5. Engage a Crisis Manager if warranted by the significance of the issue (as defined by the CEN)
NIST 800-53 IR-6 Incident Reporting: The Azure Security team will notify the appropriate contacts (FedRAMP, customer,
and the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team US-CERT) of an incident, incident updates, and resolution.
Azure reports security incidents involving customer data per the timelines and process documented in the Microsoft Azure
FedRAMP Incident Response Plan.
• Reporting to US-CERT
The Azure Information System Security Officer (ISSO) will make the report using the US-CERT Incident Reporting System
interface or through the US-CERT report form and based on federal incident reporting guidelines to report incidents within
the time periods defined in the Azure FedRAMP Incident Response Plan.
• Reporting to Customers
Customers will receive notification of security incidents involving the confirmed breach of their customer data in email
sent by the ISSO, through updates to the Service Health Dashboard, or the customer’s Microsoft Azure Management Portal
within the time periods defined in the Microsoft Azure FedRAMP Incident Response Plan.
R1 Part 1.3
R1 Part 1.4
# Phase Description
1 Detect Origination of an event
2 Assess To assess the event, a small team performs preliminary analysis, data classification and
determines if the issue needs to be diagnosed.
3 Diagnose To understand the potential impact, severity and classification, the team determines and
secures expertise needed. At any time during diagnosis, if the issue is deemed a potential
security incident, the team establishes response priorities and reviews roles and
responsibilities and initiates notification protocols. If the issue is deemed to be a potential
security breach incident, the incident is managed with the Security Breach Response sub-
process.
4 Stabilize and recover To stabilize the situation for customer-impacting incidents, the Communications Manager
releases internal and external communications and status updates until the issue is
resolved. The Technical Team conducts technical investigation, identifies containment,
mitigations and workaround strategies and implements the recovery strategy.
5 Close For all Customer-impacting, Security Breach and Emergency Incidents, the internal parties
involved in the incident response will conduct a Post Incident Response to identify
technical lapses, procedural failures, manual errors, process flaws and communication
glitches that might have caused the incident or that were identified during the response.
R2 Part 2.1
CIP-008-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
2.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems Test each Cyber Security Incident Examples of evidence may include, but are
response plan(s) at least once every not limited to, dated evidence of a lessons-
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
15 calendar months: learned report that includes a summary of
• By responding to an actual the test or a compilation of notes, logs, and
Reportable Cyber Security communication resulting from the test.
Incident; Types of exercises may include discussion or
• With a paper drill or operations based exercises.
tabletop exercise of a
Reportable Cyber Security
Incident; or
• With an operational
exercise of a Reportable
Cyber Security Incident.
R2 Part 2.2
CIP-008-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
2.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems Use the Cyber Security Incident Examples of evidence may include, but are
response plan(s) under Requirement not limited to, incident reports, logs, and
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
R1 when responding to a Reportable notes that were kept during the incident
Cyber Security Incident or response process, and follow-up
performing an exercise of a documentation that describes deviations
Reportable Cyber Security Incident. taken from the plan during the incident or
Document deviations from the exercise.
plan(s) taken during the response to
the incident or exercise.
R2 Part 2.3
CIP-008-5 Table R2 – Cyber Security Incident Response Plan Implementation and Testing
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
2.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems Retain records related to Reportable An example of evidence may include, but is
Cyber Security Incidents. not limited to, dated documentation, such
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
as security logs, police reports, emails,
response forms or checklists, forensic
analysis results, restoration records, and
post-incident review notes related to
Reportable Cyber Security Incidents.
R3 Part 3.1
3.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems No later than 90 calendar days after An example of evidence may include, but is
completion of a Cyber Security not limited to, all of the following:
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
Incident response plan(s) test or 4. Dated documentation of post
actual Reportable Cyber Security incident(s) review meeting notes or
Incident response: follow-up report showing lessons
3.2.1. Document any lessons learned associated with the Cyber
learned or document the Security Incident response plan(s) test
absence of any lessons or actual Reportable Cyber Security
learned; Incident response or dated
3.2.2. Update the Cyber Security documentation stating there were no
Incident response plan lessons learned;
based on any 5. Dated and revised Cyber Security
documented lessons Incident response plan showing any
learned associated with changes based on the lessons
the plan; and learned; and
3.2.3. Notify each person or 6. Evidence of plan update distribution
group with a defined role including, but not limited to:
in the Cyber Security • Emails;
Incident response plan of • USPS or other mail service;
the updates to the Cyber • Electronic distribution system;
Security Incident or
response plan based on • Training sign-in sheets.
any documented lessons
learned.
covered. The Incident Response plan is revised to address system/organizational changes or problems encountered during
plan implementation, execution, or testing.
After changes have been made to the Microsoft Azure Incident Response Plan, it is made available for review to the
incident response personnel as identified by role in the Microsoft Azure Incident Response Plan via a centralized
SharePoint site.
R3 Part 3.2
3.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems No later than 60 calendar days after An example of evidence may include, but is
a change to the roles or not limited to:
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
responsibilities, Cyber Security 3. Dated and revised Cyber Security
Incident response groups or Incident response plan with changes
individuals, or technology that the to the roles or responsibilities,
Responsible Entity determines would responders or technology; and
impact the ability to execute the 4. Evidence of plan update distribution
plan: including, but not limited to:
3.2.1. Update the Cyber Security • Emails;
Incident response plan(s); • USPS or other mail service;
and • Electronic distribution system;
3.2.2. Notify each person or or
group with a defined role • Training sign-in sheets.
in the Cyber Security
Incident response plan of
the updates.
R1 Part 1.1
CIP-009-6 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Conditions for activation of the An example of evidence may include, but is
1.1
their associated: recovery plan(s). not limited to, one or more plans that
1. EACMS; and include language identifying conditions for
2. PACS activation of the recovery plan(s).
The Microsoft Azure Business Continuity Plan (BCP) and Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) provides the detailed processes for
contingency planning for Microsoft Azure. This document identifies essential missions and business functions and
associated contingency requirements. It serves as a guide for Microsoft Azure to respond, recover and resume operations
during a serious adverse event. The BCP covers the key personnel, resources, services and actions required to continue
critical business processes and operations. This plan is intended to address extended business disruptions. The
development of the BCP follows Microsoft’s Enterprise Business Continuity Management (EBCM) implementation
standards.
The DRP covers the key personnel, resources, services and actions required to continue critical technology processes and
operations. This plan is intended to address extended service disruptions. The development of the DRP follows Microsoft’s
EBCM implementation standards.
R1 Part 1.2
CIP-009-6 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Roles and responsibilities of An example of evidence may include, but is
1.2
their associated: responders. not limited to, one or more recovery plans
1. EACMS; and that include language identifying the roles
2. PACS and responsibilities of responders.
The BCP covers the key personnel, resources, services and actions required to continue critical business processes and
operations. This plan is intended to address extended business disruptions.
The DRP covers the key personnel, resources, services and actions required to continue critical technology processes and
operations. This plan is intended to address extended service disruptions.
R1 Part 1.3
CIP-009-6 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
High Impact BES Cyber Systems and One or more processes for the An example of evidence may include, but is
1.3
their associated: backup and storage of information not limited to, documentation of specific
1. EACMS; and required to recover BES Cyber processes for the backup and storage of
2. PACS System functionality. information required to recover BES Cyber
System functionality.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
and their associated:
1. EACMS; and
2. PACS
For user level information stored in Azure SQL DB, data is replicated synchronously across three SQL Database storage
nodes within a region. This data is also automatically geo-replicated to the alternative storage site in a different geographic
region. If the datacenter hosting the customer data fails, the customers can utilize the Microsoft Azure Management Portal
or programmatic API to restore their data from the geo-replicated backup to any geographic region of their choice.
R1 Part 1.4
CIP-009-6 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
High Impact BES Cyber Systems and One or more processes to verify the An example of evidence may include, but is
1.4
their associated: successful completion of the backup not limited to, logs, workflow or other
1. EACMS; and processes in Part 1.3 and to address documentation confirming that the backup
2. PACS any backup failures. process completed successfully and backup
failures, if any, were addressed.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at
Control Centers and their associated:
1. EACMS; and
2. PACS
NIST 800-53 CP-9(1) Information System Backup | Testing for Reliability / Integrity: Azure monitors all backups of the
system OS and the customer image(s) on a monthly or continuous basis using system generated alerts which notify Azure
operations team of any failed or incomplete backups. If a backup continuously fails, Azure will create an Incident
Management (ICM) incident to track and resolve the issue. In addition to system-generated alerts, restoration tests of
customer-requested restores are performed using the BCDR Manager tool. The integrity of data is automatically confirmed
upon completion of the backup. The restoration tests are captured and stored in BCDR Manager in order to generate
reports and perform root-cause analysis, as needed.
At any one time, Azure SQL DB keeps multiple replicas of data running: one primary replica and two secondary replicas.
Microsoft Azure SQL DB uses a quorum-based commit scheme where data is written to the primary and one of the
secondary replicas before the transaction is considered committed. If the hardware fails on the primary replica, Azure SQL
DB detects the failure and fails over to a secondary replica. In case of a physical loss of a replica, Azure SQL DB creates a
new replica automatically. Therefore, there are at least two physical transaction-consistent copies of customer images in
the datacenter at all times. Azure SQL DB will not write transactions to the database unless primary and secondary replicas
are made.
Additionally, Azure SQL DB utilizes warm backup site technology, as well as replication of the Azure SQL DB code, for the
Azure SQL DB service. Information within the system is therefore continuously replicated to the Azure Infrastructure
datacenters, eliminating the need for physical backup tapes.
R1 Part 1.5
CIP-009-6 Table R1 – Recovery Plan Specifications
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
High Impact BES Cyber Systems and One or more processes to preserve An example of evidence may include, but is
1.5
their associated: data, per Cyber Asset capability, for not limited to, procedures to preserve data,
1. EACMS; and determining the cause of a Cyber such as preserving a corrupted drive or
2. PACS Security Incident that triggers making a data mirror of the system before
activation of the recovery plan(s). proceeding with recovery.
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems Data preservation should not
and their associated: impede or restrict recovery.
1. EACMS; and
2. PACS
NIST 800-53 CP-9 Information System Backup: The DPS policies and procedures describe the Data Protection Services
(DPS) roles, responsibilities, and services. It also describes in detail the backup standards, retention policies, monitoring,
and reports available to customers.
All disks are maintained under security of the various datacenters. All disks are stored within the datacenter if recyclable,
or recalled for recovery, and are tracked on backup software by the disk number. Facilities are responsible for maintaining
the security of the disks while stored within the datacenter.
Backup disks are moved to an off-site facility for long term storage. The scalar (disk backup library), encryption device and
servers are located in the datacenter. Facility security monitors access to media (disks) and the disk scalars. All disks are
placed in off-site containers and locked for off-site transport to the secure storage facility. Disks are stored in open racks
and can be recalled by a single disk.
R2 Part 2.1
CIP-009-6 Table R2 – Recovery Plan Implementation and Testing
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Test each of the recovery plans An example of evidence may include, but is
2.1
their associated: referenced in Requirement R1 at not limited to, dated evidence of a test (by
1. EACMS; and least once every 15 calendar recovering from an actual incident, with a
2. PACS months: paper drill or tabletop exercise, or with an
• By recovering from an operational exercise) of the recovery plan at
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at actual incident; least once every 15 calendar months. For
Control Centers and their associated: • With a paper drill or the paper drill or full operational exercise,
1. EACMS; and tabletop exercise; or evidence may include meeting notices,
2. PACS • With an operational minutes, or other records of exercise
exercise. findings.
Registered Entity is responsible for testing its recovery plans at least once every 15 months. Customers should review
Azure documentation on availability and resiliency.
As stated in the Microsoft Enterprise Business Continuity (EBCM) Disaster Recovery (DR) Standard, Disaster Recovery
Plans (DRPs) cannot be considered reliable nor can a “critical for recovery” technology/system be considered capable of
recovery until DRPs have been validated. Validating develops teamwork, competency, confidence, and knowledge and
must include those who may be required to execute the procedures.
The purpose of the DR validation is to assess the effectiveness and usability of DRPs. It also provides validation of Recovery
Time Capability (RTC) and Recovery Point Capability (RPC), that Microsoft Security Policy guidelines are not compromised
and identifies areas for improvement by uncovering gaps in processes or procedures.
DR validations must be realistic and carefully planned so there is minimal risk of disruption to business operations or an
incident occurring as a direct result of the DR validation. DRPs must be validated within 12 months of the previous
validation date or anytime there is a significant change in personnel, technology/system, or procedures
R2 Part 2.2
CIP-009-6 Table R2 – Recovery Plan Implementation and Testing
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Test a representative sample of
2.2 An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: information used to recover BES
not limited to, operational logs or test
1. EACMS; and Cyber System functionality at least
results with criteria for testing the usability
2. PACS once every 15 calendar months to
(e.g. sample tape load, browsing tape
ensure that the information is
contents) and compatibility with current
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at useable and is compatible with
system configurations (e.g. manual or
Control Centers and their associated: current configurations.
automated comparison checkpoints
1. EACMS; and
between backup media contents and
2. PACS An actual recovery that incorporates
current configuration).
the information used to recover BES
Cyber System functionality
substitutes for this test.
NIST 800-53 CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing: Testing reports are created for all tests, reviewed by the BCP team, and
entered into the BCDR Manager database. The BCP Team ensures that testing happens as per the defined schedule.
R2 Part 2.3
CIP-009-6 Table R2 – Recovery Plan Implementation and Testing
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
High Impact BES Cyber Systems Test each of the recovery plans
2.3 Examples of evidence may include, but are
referenced in Requirement R1 at
not limited to, dated documentation of:
least once every 36 calendar months
through an operational exercise of • An operational exercise at least once
the recovery plans in an every 36 calendar months between
environment representative of the exercises, that demonstrates recovery
production environment. in a representative environment; or
• An actual recovery response that
An actual recovery response may
occurred within the 36 calendar month
substitute for an operational
timeframe that exercised the recovery
exercise.
plans.
NIST 800-53 CP-4 Contingency Plan Testing: The Business Continuity Plan (BCP) Team schedules end-to-end recovery tests,
drives execution of the tests, identifies recovery gaps, and communicates test results. At least one major end-to-end
scenario is tested annually. In addition, each component team performs tests to exercise their scenario(s) listed in the
Azure Business Continuity Plan (BCP) and Disaster Recovery Plan (DRP) annually. These include every component and
critical process listed in the Azure BCP and DRP. Also, functional exercises are completed in real-time on an ongoing basis
as incidents occur. All systems that are tested are classified as high impact systems.
As stated in the Microsoft Enterprise Business Continuity (EBCM) Disaster Recovery (DR) Standard, Disaster Recovery
Plans (DRPs) cannot be considered reliable nor can a “critical for recovery” technology/system be considered capable of
recovery until DRPs have been validated. Validating develops teamwork, competency, confidence, and knowledge and
must include those who may be required to execute the procedures.
The purpose of the DR validation is to assess the effectiveness and usability of DRPs. It also provides validation of Recovery
Time Capability (RTC) and Recovery Point Capability (RPC), that Microsoft Security Policy guidelines are not compromised
and identifies areas for improvement by uncovering gaps in processes or procedures.
DR validations must be realistic and carefully planned so there is minimal risk of disruption to business operations or an
incident occurring as a direct result of the DR validation. DRPs must be validated within 12 months of the previous
validation date or anytime there is a significant change in personnel, technology/system, or procedures
R3 Part 3.1
CIP-009-6 Table R3 – Recovery Plan Review, Update and Communication
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
High Impact BES Cyber Systems and
3.1 No later than 90 calendar days after An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated:
completion of a recovery plan test or not limited to, all of the following:
1. EACMS; and
actual recovery:
2. PACS 4. Dated documentation of identified
3.1.1. Document any lessons
deficiencies or lessons learned for
learned associated with a
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at each recovery plan test or actual
recovery plan test or actual
Control Centers and their associated: incident recovery or dated
recovery or document the
1. EACMS; and documentation stating there were no
absence of any lessons
2. PACS lessons learned;
learned;
3.1.2. Update the recovery plan 5. Dated and revised recovery plan
based on any documented showing any changes based on the
lessons learned associated lessons learned; and
with the plan; and
6. Evidence of plan update distribution
3.1.3. Notify each person or
including, but not limited to:
group with a defined role in
the recovery plan of the • Emails;
updates to the recovery
• USPS or other mail service;
plan based on any
documented lessons • Electronic distribution system; or
learned.
• Training sign-in sheets.
As stated in the Business Continuity and Disaster Recover SOP, the BCP and DRP documents are reviewed on annual basis
or when required to address changes to the organization, information system, or environment of operation and problems
encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing. This review and revision ensure that the information
included in the documents is accurate and up-to-date. Evidence of review is captured in the version history section of the
documents. In addition, the BCP and DRP documents are updated after major releases or updates. Whenever there are
major changes to the BCP document, the BPD also communicates the updated document to the key personnel involved in
the BCP process. The BCP is distributed in hardcopy to the Microsoft Azure NOC and is available on the Microsoft Azure
Business Continuity SharePoint site. The Microsoft Azure Operations Managers alias is notified when changes are made.
This alias includes all core personnel responsible for leading the platform recovery.
As stated in the Microsoft Enterprise Business Continuity Management (EBCM) Disaster Recovery (DR) Standard, within
14 days of completing a DR validation – planned or real outage - the recovery team must review the validation activities
and document a list of action items for remediation / improvements in an After Action Review (AAR) report. Issues
uncovered should be included as action items with owners assigned, along with scope, objectives, outcome, and mitigation
timelines; however, all action items in the AAR do not have to be finalized within the 14 days.
R3 Part 3.2
CIP-009-6 Table R3 – Recovery Plan Review, Update and Communication
Part Applicable Systems Requirements Measures
High Impact BES Cyber Systems and
3.2 No later than 60 calendar days after An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated:
a change to the roles or not limited to, all of the following:
1. EACMS; and
responsibilities, responders, or
2. PACS 3. Dated and revised recovery plan
technology that the Responsible
with changes to the roles or
Entity determines would impact the
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems at responsibilities, responders, or
ability to execute the recovery plan:
Control Centers and their associated: technology; and
1. EACMS; and 3.2.1. Update the recovery plan;
4. Evidence of plan update
2. PACS and
distribution including, but not
3.2.2. Notify each person or limited to:
group with a defined role in
the recovery plan of the • Emails;
updates. • USPS or other mail service;
• Electronic distribution system;
or
As stated in the Business Continuity and Disaster Recover SOP, the BCP and DRP documents are reviewed on annual basis
or when required to address changes to the organization, information system, or environment of operation and problems
encountered during plan implementation, execution, or testing. This review and revision ensure that the information
included in the documents is accurate and up-to-date. Evidence of review is captured in the version history section of the
documents. In addition, the BCP and DRP documents are updated after major releases or updates. Whenever there are
major changes to the BCP document, the BPD also communicates the updated document to the key personnel involved in
the BCP process. The BCP is distributed in hardcopy to the Microsoft Azure NOC and is available on the Microsoft Azure
Business Continuity SharePoint site. The Microsoft Azure Operations Managers alias is notified when changes are made.
MICROSOFT CONFIDENTIAL – NDA REQUIRED 163
Cloud Implementation Guide for NERC Audits
This alias includes all core personnel responsible for leading the platform recovery.
R1 Part 1.1
1.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Develop a baseline configuration, Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: individually or by group, which shall not limited to:
1. EACMS; include the following items: • A spreadsheet identifying the
2. PACS; and 1.1.1 Operating system(s) required items of the baseline
3. PCA (including version) or configuration for each Cyber Asset,
firmware where no individually or by group; or
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems independent operating • A record in an asset management
and their associated: system exists; system that identifies the required
1. EACMS; 1.1.2 Any commercially available items of the baseline configuration
or open-source application for each Cyber Asset, individually
2. PACS; and
software (including version) or by group.
3. PCA intentionally installed;
1.1.3 Any custom software
installed;
1.1.4 Any logical network
accessible ports; and
1.1.5 Any security patches
applied.
Microsoft Azure applies baseline configurations using the Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) process for
Microsoft Azure software components and bootstrap configuration process for hardware and network device components
entering Microsoft Azure production environment.
Baseline configurations of Microsoft Azure components/roles are documented, managed and maintained along with the
source code in the Source Depot and Git version control repositories. Access to Source Depot and Git is restricted using
the RAMWeb tool.
R1 Part 1.2
1.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Authorize and document changes Examples of evidence may include, but are
their associated: that deviate from the existing not limited to:
1. EACMS; baseline configuration. • A change request record and
2. PACS; and associated electronic authorization
3. PCA (performed by the individual or
group with the authority to
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems authorize the change) in a change
and their associated: management system for each
4. EACMS; change; or
5. PACS; and • Documentation that the change
6. PCA was performed in accordance with
the requirement.
Baseline configurations of Microsoft Azure components/roles are documented, managed and maintained along with the
source code in the Source Depot and Git version control repositories. Access to Source Depot and Git is restricted using
the RAMWeb tool.
Changes to the Microsoft Azure component/role baseline configurations are deployed to the production environment
using the change and release management process. The change and release management process validates that the build
moves from one environment to the other with designated sign-offs by appropriate Microsoft Azure component team
personnel. Access to migrate changes to production is restricted.
NIST 800-53 CM-3 Configuration Change Control: Changes to operational systems, other than security patches, can only
be made when there is a valid business reason (e.g. a planned upgrade to the system). Changes implemented within the
production environment are categorized into Request for Change (RFC) types to appropriately schedule, align resources,
and provide change metrics back into the change process for continuous improvement. In general, the Microsoft Azure
services teams use the following change types: Major Release, Minor Release, and Revision Release.
All changes to the system under configuration control are reviewed, and approved or disapproved with explicit
consideration for security impact analysis.
R1 Part 1.3
1.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and For a change that deviates from the An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: existing baseline configuration, not limited to, updated baseline
1. EACMS; update the baseline configuration as documentation with a date that is within 30
2. PACS; and necessary within 30 calendar days of calendar days of the date of the completion
3. PCA completing the change. of the change.
Provide a brief explanation, in your own words, of how you comply with this Requirement. References to supplied
evidence, including links to the appropriate page, are recommended.
Registered Entity Responsibility: Yes
Registered Entity is responsible for
Microsoft Azure reviews and updates the applicable baseline configurations as part of the new OS or component-specific
release and upgrades. Azure publishes new OS configuration baselines every 30 days, internally. The new baselines are
intended to be implemented across Azure in as near to real time as possible.
R1 Part 1.4
1.4 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and For a change that deviates from the An example of evidence may include, but is
their associated: existing baseline configuration: not limited to, a list of cyber security
1. EACMS; 1.4.1 Prior to the change, controls verified or tested along with the
2. PACS; and determine required cyber dated test results.
3. PCA security controls in CIP-005
and CIP-007 that could be
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems impacted by the change;
and their associated: 1.4.2 Following the change, verify
1. EACMS; that required cyber security
2. PACS; and controls determined in 1.4.1
3. PCA are not adversely affected;
and
1.4.3 Document the results of the
verification.
Additionally, for all asset types, changes are analyzed as part of the standard change management process, both prior to
and after implementation, to verify that what was modified resulted in expected output. Prior to the change being
implemented, information security impact analysis is performed and reviewed by each service team using their individual
processes.
R1 Part 1.5
Changes to the Microsoft Azure component/role baseline configurations are deployed to the production environment
using the change and release management process. The change and release management process validates that the build
moves from one environment to the other with designated sign-offs by appropriate Microsoft Azure component team
personnel. Access to migrate changes to production is restricted.
R2 Part 2.1
2.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems Monitor at least once every 35 An example of evidence may include, but is not
and their associated: calendar days for changes to the limited to, logs from a system that is
1. EACMS; and baseline configuration (as described monitoring the configuration along with
2. PCA in Requirement R1, Part 1.1). records of investigation for any unauthorized
Document and investigate detected changes that were detected.
unauthorized changes.
NIST 800-53 CM-2(1) Baseline Configuration | Reviews and Updates: Microsoft Azure reviews and updates the applicable
baseline configurations as part of the new OS or component-specific release and upgrades. Azure publishes new OS
configuration baselines every 30 days, internally. The new baselines are intended to be implemented across Azure in as
near to real time as possible.
NIST 800-53 CM-3 Configuration Change Control: Microsoft Azure service teams use TFS, Source Depot and Git to
document evidence of approval and track all changes. These tools provide an auditing capability to any changes to the
baselines or configuration changes within the tools. Microsoft Azure uses Source Depot and Git as the versioning systems
for software code. Both of these tools track the identity of the person who checks code out, the time of the change, and
what changes are made to what files. Software and hardware changes are tracked through TFS. In addition, an annual
external audit is performed on the Microsoft Azure change management process as part of annual Microsoft Azure
security assessment. As part of the audit, a sample of changes are selected and reviewed to determine if the change
management process is consistently being followed.
NIST 800-53 CM-5 Access Restrictions for Change: Microsoft Azure service teams define, document, approve, and enforce
logical access restrictions associated with changes by using Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) enforced by Active Directory
(AD). All accounts created in support of Microsoft Azure are role-based. Service team personnel request access to, and if
approved, are placed in the appropriate security groups according to their roles for supporting the system and using the
principle of least privilege. Access to the production environment is only allowed to members of specific security groups
after approval. This process ensures that no unauthorized changes are made to baselines.
R3 Part 3.1
3.1 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and At least once every 15 calendar Examples of evidence may include, but
their associated: months, conduct a paper or active are not limited to:
1. EACMS; vulnerability assessment. • A document listing the date of the
2. PACS; and assessment (performed at least once
3. PCA every 15 calendar months), the
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems controls assessed for each BES Cyber
and their associated: System along with the method of
assessment; or
1. EACMS; • A document listing the date of the
2. PACS; and assessment and the output of any
3. PCA tools used to perform the
assessment.
Any new deficiencies that are identified from the security control assessments are documented in the POA&M. The
POA&M is continuously updated and used to report on the security state of the information system as part of monthly
reviews. POA&M updates are reviewed and validated by Microsoft Azure’s third-party assessor organization (3PAO), and
are provided to customers and the FedRAMP Joint Authorization Board (JAB) monthly, consistent with FedRAMP
requirements.
• Microsoft performs vulnerability scanning of operating systems within the Microsoft Azure environment monthly, as
discussed in RA-5.
• Microsoft performs vulnerability scanning of databases and web applications within the Microsoft Azure environment
monthly, as discussed in RA-5.
MICROSOFT CONFIDENTIAL – NDA REQUIRED 173
Cloud Implementation Guide for NERC Audits
• As part of the annual reassessment of the Microsoft Azure FedRAMP package, Microsoft Azure employs a Third-Party
Assessor Organization (3PAO) to perform scans of the environment on an annual basis.
NIST 800-53 CA-8 Penetration Testing: An independent penetration testing team within Microsoft’s security organization
conducts annual unannounced penetration testing. Tests may be coordinated with Microsoft Azure management
personnel in order to mitigate risk to the availability of Microsoft Azure; however, Microsoft Azure management personnel
do not notify operational/technical personnel in these cases.
NIST 800-53 RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning: Microsoft Azure implements vulnerability scanning by actively scanning server
operating systems, physical servers, network devices, web applications, and databases in the Azure inventory with
authenticated scans. All scans are performed on a monthly basis. The vulnerability scanning tools provide reporting data
based on a number of existing, well-used, open standards that itemize software flaws, security configurations, and various
product names, including the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) and Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS).
R3 Part 3.2
3.2 High Impact BES Cyber Systems Where technically feasible, at least An example of evidence may include, but
once every 36 calendar months: is not limited to, a document listing the
3.2.1 Perform an active vulnerability date of the assessment (performed at
assessment in a test least once every 36 calendar months),
environment, or perform an the output of the tools used to perform
active vulnerability assessment the assessment, and a list of differences
in a production environment between the production and test
where the test is performed in environments with descriptions of how
a manner that minimizes any differences were accounted for in
adverse effects, that models conducting the assessment.
the baseline configuration of
the BES Cyber System in a
production environment; and
3.2.2 Document the results of the
testing and, if a test
environment was used, the
differences between the test
environment and the
production environment,
including a description of the
measures used to account for
any differences in operation
between the test and
production environments.
Any new deficiencies that are identified from the security control assessments are documented in the POA&M. The
POA&M is continuously updated and used to report on the security state of the information system as part of monthly
reviews. POA&M updates are reviewed and validated by Microsoft Azure’s third-party assessor organization (3PAO), and
are provided to customers and the FedRAMP Joint Authorization Board (JAB) monthly, consistent with FedRAMP
requirements.
• Microsoft performs vulnerability scanning of operating systems within the Microsoft Azure environment monthly, as
discussed in RA-5.
• Microsoft performs vulnerability scanning of databases and web applications within the Microsoft Azure environment
MICROSOFT CONFIDENTIAL – NDA REQUIRED 175
Cloud Implementation Guide for NERC Audits
NIST 800-53 CA-8 Penetration Testing: An independent penetration testing team within Microsoft’s security organization
conducts annual unannounced penetration testing. Tests may be coordinated with Microsoft Azure management
personnel in order to mitigate risk to the availability of Microsoft Azure; however, Microsoft Azure management personnel
do not notify operational/technical personnel in these cases.
NIST 800-53 RA-5 Vulnerability Scanning: Microsoft Azure implements vulnerability scanning by actively scanning server
operating systems, physical servers, network devices, web applications, and databases in the Azure inventory with
authenticated scans. All scans are performed on a monthly basis. The vulnerability scanning tools provide reporting data
based on a number of existing, well-used, open standards that itemize software flaws, security configurations, and various
product names, including the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) and Common Vulnerability Scoring System
(CVSS).
R3 Part 3.3
3.3 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Prior to adding a new applicable An example of evidence may include, but
their associated: Cyber Asset to a production is not limited to, a document listing the
environment, perform an active date of the assessment (performed prior
1. EACMS;
vulnerability assessment of the new to the commissioning of the new Cyber
2. PCA Cyber Asset, except for CIP Asset) and the output of any tools used
Exceptional Circumstances and like to perform the assessment.
replacements of the same type of
Cyber Asset with a baseline
configuration that models an existing
baseline configuration of the
previous or other existing Cyber
Asset.
Provide a brief explanation, in your own words, of how you comply with this Requirement. References to supplied
evidence, including links to the appropriate page, are recommended.
Registered Entity Responsibility: Yes
Registered Entity is responsible for vulnerability assessment of their applications deployed in the cloud. Customers should
review documentation on vulnerability assessment in Azure Security Center and penetration testing.
Additionally, for all asset types, changes are analyzed as part of the standard change management process, both prior to
and after implementation, to verify that what was modified resulted in expected output. Prior to the change being
implemented, information security impact analysis is performed and reviewed by each service team using their individual
processes.
R3 Part 3.4
3.4 High Impact BES Cyber Systems and Document the results of the An example of evidence may include, but
their associated: assessments conducted according to is not limited to, a document listing the
1. EACMS; Parts 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 and the action results or the review or assessment, a list
2. PACS; and plan to remediate or mitigate of action items, documented proposed
3. PCA vulnerabilities identified in the dates of completion for the action plan,
assessments including the planned and records of the status of the action
Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
date of completing the action plan and items (such as minutes of a status
and their associated:
the execution status of any meeting, updates in a work order system,
1. EACMS; remediation or mitigation action items. or a spreadsheet tracking the action
2. PACS; and items).
3. PCA
Registered Entity is responsible for vulnerability assessment of their applications deployed in the cloud. Customers should
review documentation on vulnerability assessment in Azure Security Center and penetration testing.
Microsoft updates the POA&M on at least a monthly basis based on the findings of the security control assessments and
ongoing continuous monitoring activities, including vulnerability scanning. Microsoft includes an action step to remediate
any high and medium items from ongoing assessments and vulnerability scans (if any) in the monthly POA&M submission.
For any high and medium items noted, Microsoft provides a high-level description of the issue and the remediation plan.
The raw scan reports contain details on any issues noted and are made available to FedRAMP on a monthly basis.
via an access request. Microsoft Azure monitors for all unauthorized use of mobile devices in the Microsoft Azure
environment and performs investigations accordingly. Mobile computing and data recording devices include PDAs,
portable hard drives, laptop computers, flash drives, other recordable media, etc. Monitoring of unauthorized connections
of mobile devices to servers is implemented by security officers that observe that all mobile devices used on servers must
have corresponding entries in the DCAT system. Additionally, a green/red sticker system is used to identify authorized
devices.
NIST 800-53 MP-4 Media Storage: Microsoft Azure digital media assets are physically and securely stored within Microsoft
Azure datacenter colocation rooms. Microsoft Azure datacenters have multiple layers of physical access controls (access
badge, biometrics – see PE-03 in CIP-006-6 for further details on physical access controls) and video surveillance in place
to provide secure storage. Digital media includes servers, network devices, and magnetic tapes used for backup. Non-
digital media is not used by Microsoft Azure in the datacenter environment. Facilities define controlled areas as
appropriate for their footprint and layout. Any areas containing digital media assets are considered controlled regardless
of facility layout and are protected by the physical and environmental controls implemented in the PE family.
NIST 800-53 MP-7 Media Use: Asset owners are required to assign their assets with an asset classification and no assets
are exempt from this requirement. In the Microsoft Azure datacenter environment, assets refer to servers, network
devices, and magnetic tapes. Other digital media like USB flash/thumb drives are managed by policies and procedures that
are specific to those devices. CD/DVDs are not used. Non-digital media is not used in the datacenter. The usage of digital
media in Microsoft Azure datacenter environments is monitored 24x7 via CCTV coverage. Please see PE-06 in CIP-006-6
for more details. Media that is personally owned or has no identifiable owner is prohibited in any production area as noted
in the Microsoft Datacenter Work Rules and Regulations document.
Microsoft Tools and Removable Media Security Procedure provides guidelines for securing high-value tools and
removable media to comply with audit requirements in Microsoft Security Program Policy 04-03 Asset Handling (internal
link). This document also discusses proper auditing for the tools and removable media, to ensure they are on-site and in
working condition. Microsoft-furnished USB drives should be strictly used for the listed purposes and only Microsoft-
owned USB drives are allowed in the production space. These guidelines and criteria apply to all personnel, including
Microsoft employees and vendors within all Microsoft datacenters.
R1 Part 1.1
NIST 800-53 MP-1 Media Protection Policy and Procedures: Microsoft Azure has implemented media protection policy
through the publication of Microsoft Security Program Policy (MSPP) maintained by C+AI Security which describes how
important organizational records relating to the organization’s Information Security Program, independent of media type,
must be retained, stored, protected, and, if appropriate, destroyed according to the established information handling
procedures for the records. The Microsoft's Asset Classification Standard and Asset Protection Standard define
appropriate handling and protection procedures of assets based on their classification.
R1 Part 1.2
transit. Customers should review Azure best practices for the protection of data in transit and configure HTTPS endpoints
for their resources provisioned in Azure to ensure that all traffic going to and from their Virtual Machines is encrypted.
Customers should also use HTTPS to access their storage accounts. Storage Account Key (SAK) controls all access to a
storage account, and access to data in a specific account is granted only to entities having the secret key for that account.
Storage keys are 512-bit long, and they are generated randomly when the storage account is created (or later at the
request of the customer). Registered Entity is responsible for safeguarding the SAKs in order to protect access to Azure
Storage.
Azure provides extensive options for data encryption at rest to help customers safeguard their data and meet their
compliance needs using both Microsoft managed encryption keys, as well as customer managed encryption keys.
Encryption support is in place for customer IaaS Virtual Machines (both Windows and Linux) and for customer data storage
repositories.
Azure SQL Database provides Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) at rest by default. TDE performs real-time encryption
and decryption operations on the data and log files. Database Encryption Key (DEK) is a symmetric key stored in the
database boot record for availability during recovery. It is secured via a certificate stored in the master database of the
server or an asymmetric key called TDE Protector stored under customer control in Azure Key Vault, which is Azure’s cloud-
based external key management system. Azure Key Vault supports Bring Your Own Key (BYOK), which enables customers
to store TDE Protector in Key Vault and control key management tasks including key rotation, permissions, deleting keys,
enabling auditing/reporting on all TDE Protectors, etc. See Always Encrypted for more information. Note that Always
Encrypted is a feature of Azure SQL Database designed specifically to protect sensitive data by allowing clients to encrypt
data inside client applications and never reveal the encryption keys to the Database Engine. In this manner, Always
Encrypted provides separation between those who own the data (and can view it) and those who manage the data (but
should have no access).
Key Vault uses FIPS 140-2 Level 2 validated Hardware Security Modules. Key Vault is designed, deployed, and operated
such that Microsoft personnel are precluded from accessing, using, or extracting any data stored in the Key Vault
service, including customer’s cryptographic keys.
Similarly, Azure Storage Service Encryption for Data at Rest ensures that data is automatically encrypted before persisting
it to Azure Storage and decrypted before retrieval. All data written to Azure Storage is encrypted through 256-bit AES
encryption, and the handling of encryption, decryption, and key management in Storage Service Encryption is transparent
to customers. However, customers can also use their own encryption keys for Azure Storage encryption at rest and
manage their keys in Azure Key Vault. Storage Service Encryption is enabled for all new and existing storage accounts and
cannot be disabled. Customers should review the Azure Storage security guide.
NIST 800-53 MP-4 Media Storage: Microsoft Azure digital media assets are physically and securely stored within Microsoft
Azure datacenter colocation rooms. Microsoft Azure datacenters have multiple layers of physical access controls (access
badge, biometrics – see PE-03 in CIP-006-6 for further details on physical access controls) and video surveillance in place
to provide secure storage. Digital media includes servers, network devices, and magnetic tapes used for backup. Non-
digital media is not used by Microsoft Azure in the datacenter environment. Facilities define controlled areas as
appropriate for their footprint and layout. Any areas containing digital media assets are considered controlled regardless
of facility layout and are protected by the physical and environmental controls implemented in the PE family.
NIST 800-53 MP-5 Media Transport: Digital media at Microsoft Azure datacenters consist of servers, network devices, and
magnetic backup tapes and discs, where appropriate. Microsoft Azure datacenters do not use non-digital media. Microsoft
Azure utilizes 3 methods to protect media that is being transported outside the datacenter: 1) Secure Transport, 2)
Encryption, and 3) Cleanse, Purge, or Destroy. Microsoft Azure restricts the activities of asset transport to authorized
personnel through the protection of the chain of custody. The use of locks, tamper proof seals, and requiring validation of
the asset inventories ensures that only authorized personnel are involved in the asset transport.
NIST 800-53 MP-7 Media Use: Asset owners are required to assign their assets with an asset classification and no assets
are exempt from this requirement. In the Microsoft Azure datacenter environment, assets refer to servers, network
devices, and magnetic tapes. Other digital media like USB flash/thumb drives are managed by policies and procedures that
are specific to those devices. CD/DVDs are not used. Non-digital media is not used in the datacenter. The usage of digital
media in Microsoft Azure datacenter environments is monitored 24x7 via CCTV coverage. Please see PE-06 in CIP-006-6
for more details. Media that is personally owned or has no identifiable owner is prohibited in any production area as noted
in the Microsoft Datacenter Work Rules and Regulations document.
R2 Part 2.1
Azure datacenters use data erasure processes to cleanse/purge data in a manner consistent with NIST SP 800-88 R1. For
assets requiring destruction, Azure utilizes onsite asset destruction services.
R2 Part 2.2
Azure datacenters use data erasure processes to cleanse/purge data in a manner consistent with NIST SP 800-88 R1. For
assets requiring destruction, Azure utilizes onsite asset destruction services.
• At least once every 30 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has identified in its
previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) one or more Transmission
stations or Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in
instability, uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection; or
• At least once every 60 calendar months for a Transmission Owner that has not identified in its
previous risk assessment (as verified according to Requirement R2) any Transmission stations or
Transmission substations that if rendered inoperable or damaged could result in instability,
uncontrolled separation, or Cascading within an Interconnection.
1.2. The Transmission Owner shall identify the primary control center that operationally controls each
Transmission station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment.
M1. Examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic documentation
of the risk assessment of its Transmission stations and Transmission substations (existing and planned to be in
service within 24 months) that meet the criteria in Applicability Section 4.1.1 as specified in Requirement R1.
Additionally, examples of acceptable evidence may include, but are not limited to, dated written or electronic
documentation of the identification of the primary control center that operationally controls each Transmission
station or Transmission substation identified in the Requirement R1 risk assessment as specified in Requirement
R1, Part 1.2.
• An entity or organization with electric industry physical security experience and whose review
staff has at least one member who holds either a Certified Protection Professional (CPP) or
Physical Security Professional (PSP) certification.
• An entity or organization approved by the ERO.
• A governmental agency with physical security expertise.
• An entity or organization with demonstrated law enforcement, government, or military physical
security expertise.
6.2. The Transmission Owner or Transmission Operator, respectively, shall ensure that the unaffiliated third-
party review is completed within 90 calendar days of completing the security plan(s) developed in
Requirement R5. The unaffiliated third-party review may, but is not required to, include recommended
changes to the evaluation performed under Requirement R4 or the security plan(s) developed under
Requirement R5.
6.3. If the unaffiliated third-party reviewer recommends changes to the evaluation performed under
Requirement R4 or security plan(s) developed under Requirement R5, the Transmission Owner or
Transmission Operator shall, within 60 calendar days of the completion of the unaffiliated third-party
review, for each recommendation: