OF WORDS AND THEIR MEANINGS:

INTRODUCING THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE1

Napoleon M. Mabaquiao, Jr.

The limits of my language mean the limits of my world.

--Ludwig Wittgenstein
Tractatus logico-philosophicus

OBJECTIVES:
After studying this article, the students should be able to:
1. Identify and explain the three kinds of disagreements;
2. Distinguish between the philosophy of language and linguistic philosophy;
3. Discuss the difference between the ideal-language philosophy and the ordinary-
language philosophy; and
4. Compare and contrast certain theories of meaning.

INTRODUCTION

The philosophy of language is mainly engaged in the activity of clarifying the meanings of our
linguistic expressions. The relevance of this activity can be immediately seen in the role it plays
in resolving disagreements or disputes. Disagreements are generally classified into the following
kinds: disagreements in belief, disagreements in attitude, and merely verbal disagreements (see
Copi 2002: 88-89). Disagreements in belief are disagreements about facts, which are properly
resolved by verifying the facts at issue. The verification of facts can be done either by directly
observing the facts, by examining relevant documents, or by appealing to appropriate
authorities. An example of a disagreement of this kind is the one over whether a certain
politician stole money from the government. Disagreements in attitude, on the other hand, are
disagreements over preferences; and they are usually resolved by persuasion, if not by
compromise. In the case of persuasion, it can be done either logically, such as when one’s
arguments are consistent with the valid rules of deduction, or illogically, such as when one’s
arguments commit the so-called informal fallacies. An example of a disagreement of this kind is
the one over whether divorce should be legalized in our country. Lastly, merely verbal
disagreements are disagreements that arise out of the misunderstanding of the meanings of our
linguistic expressions; and they are properly resolved by clarifying the meanings of the
misunderstood linguistic expressions. An example is when two friends are arguing over which
movie to watch together only to find out later that they have the same movie in mind.

Disagreements in belief and in attitude are considered genuine or real disagreements,

while the merely verbal ones are not. This is so because, strictly speaking, there are no
disagreements in the merely verbal disagreements; it is just thought that there are. As such,
merely verbal disagreements are needless and a waste of time and energy. (It is a pity that some
relationships are ruined just because of merely verbal disagreements.) In this light, what we
have to be on guard the most are the merely verbal disagreements, for disagreements that are
thought to be in belief or in attitude may turn out to be merely verbal. In other words, if we find
ourselves in a disagreement, before we begin to argue, it would be better to make sure first that

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we really have a disagreement. And the proper way to do it is by clarifying the meanings of the
critical terms involved in the disagreement.

When the philosophy of language became the dominant branch of philosophy in the
analytic tradition (also known as the Anglo-American tradition) during the first half of the 20th
century, it became almost synonymous with linguistic philosophy, which was then the
philosophical method used by the analytic philosophers in dealing with philosophical issues. But
philosophy of language should not be confused with linguistic philosophy. As John Searle (1977:
4) clarifies, “philosophy of language” is the name of a branch of philosophy that attempts “to give
philosophically illuminating descriptions of certain general features of language, such as
reference, truth, meaning, and necessity”; while “linguistic philosophy” is the name of a
philosophical method for solving philosophical problems by analyzing the language of those
problems. The difference between the philosophy of language and linguistic philosophy can also
be seen in the fact that there are linguistic philosophers (philosophers using linguistic
philosophy) working in other branches of philosophy such as ethics, philosophy of mind,
philosophy of religion, and philosophy of science. Philosophy of language and linguistic
philosophy, however, are significantly related in that linguistic philosophers use the theories
and concepts in the philosophy of language as their framework in analyzing the language of
philosophical problems.

In this essay, I shall examine the two influential movements in the philosophy of
language in the analytic tradition; namely, the ideal-language philosophy and the ordinary-
language philosophy. More specifically, I shall examine the various theories of meaning put
forward by the major philosophers identified with each movement. Since these philosophers of
language are analytic philosophers, they are also identified as linguistic philosophers. As such,
their theories of meaning are not just explanations of some general features of language, but are
ways of resolving philosophical issues as well.

I. IDEAL-LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY

Ideal-language philosophy investigates how language in its descriptive or representative

function works, or how language is able to represent the world. The main focus of analysis is the
meaning of statements or propositions (the basic units of linguistic description that are either
true or false) and of the words that make up these statements, such as proper names, definite
descriptions, and predicate expressions. The main objective is to make the language used in
philosophizing logically perfect by ridding it of the vagueness and ambiguities that characterize
ordinary language. This objective is partly inspired by the observation that one of the reasons
for the development of the sciences is their use of the language of mathematics in their
investigations and formulation of theories. The belief is that unless the language of philosophy is
logically perfect, there will always be the suspicion that philosophical issues may just be results
of some linguistic confusion that is brought about by the logical imperfections of language. For
instance, there arises the suspicion that philosophical statements that allegedly describe the
world may not really be descriptions of the world, but are simply mistaken to be such because of
the failure to distinguish between the logical and the grammatical structures of language. Under
this school, I shall examine the theories of meaning of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, Ludwig
Wittgenstein (the “Early Wittgenstein”2), and the logical positivists.

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Sense-Reference Theory of Meaning

Gottlob Frege’s theory of meaning basically claims that the meaning of a linguistic expression
has two aspects: its sense and reference. The reference of a linguistic expression is the object this
expression identifies or represents while its sense is the mode of presenting or identifying its
reference. This theory develops as a result of the inadequacy of two earlier theories of meaning:
the ideational theory of meaning and the object theory of meaning. The ideational theory of
meaning, attributed to John Locke, states that the meaning of a word is the idea that it
represents; on the other hand, the object theory of meaning, attributed to John Stuart Mill, claims
that the meaning of a proper name (generally corresponding to a proper noun) is solely the
object it represents. Frege argues that these theories of meaning fail to account for certain
features of language. For the object theory of meaning, Frege shows that this theory fails to
account for the nature of identity statements and the fact that some words though having no (or
uncertain to have) references are still meaningful. For the ideational theory of meaning, Frege
shows that this theory fails to account for the objectivity of meanings—the fact that meanings
are public and sharable.

In his classic essay, “On sense and reference” (1960), Frege begins by arguing that the
meaning of a linguistic sign or any referring expression cannot simply consist of its reference;
for otherwise one cannot explain the difference between the following two forms of identity
statements: “a = a” and “a = b,” where “a” and “b” refer to the same object. This difference
concerns their cognitive significance (that is, their value in terms of providing knowledge): we
do not need further investigation to know that “a = a” is true and knowing it to be true does not
provide additional information to what we already know; on the other hand, we need further
investigation to know whether “a = b” is true and knowing it to be true provides additional
information to what we already know. Using Frege’s own example, take the expressions
“morning star” and “evening star,” which both refer to the same object—the planet Venus. The
identity statements “The morning star is the morning star” and “The morning star is the evening
star” are both true but they are different in the way explained above. That the morning star is
the same as the evening star was an astronomical discovery while that the morning star is the
morning star was not. Under the object theory, where meaning consists solely of the reference of
a proper name, the identity statements “a = a” (e.g., “the morning star is the morning star”) and
“a = b” (e.g., “the morning star is the evening star”) have the same cognitive significance. But
these identity statements, as shown above, do not have the same cognitive significance. So the
object theory is mistaken.

Frege then introduces the concept of sense, which refers to a linguistic sign’s mode of
presentation, or the particular way in which the reference of the sign is identified. In this light,
the particular way in which the reference of the expression “morning star”—namely the planet
Venus—is identified thus constitutes the expression’s sense. This becomes clearer if we call
attention to the fact that though “evening star” and “morning star” have the same reference,
they, however, identify their reference in different ways (for simply, “evening star” identifies
Venus only in the evening while “morning star” identifies Venus only in the morning), and thus
having different senses. Now since identifying a sign’s reference is done by pointing to a
property or set of properties of the reference, knowing the sense of a sign therefore also means
knowing the identifying properties of the sign’s reference. In this light, to know the sense of
“morning star” is to know the properties of Venus when it appears in the morning; while to
know the sense of “evening star” is to know the properties of Venus when it appears in the
evening.

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 Frege clarifies how sense and reference relate to one another as follows. First, while a
single sense only identifies a single reference, various senses can identify one and the same
reference. For instance, “Jose Rizal” refers to only one person, but this same person can also be
identified, among others, as “the author of Noli me tangere” and as “the Philippine national hero.”
Second, while a sign that has a reference necessarily has a sense (for without the sense, the
reference cannot be identified), a sign that has a sense does not necessarily have a reference (for
what the sense identifies may not exist at all). This last point, incidentally, is the other linguistic
feature that Frege thinks cannot be explained by the object theory—that an expression that has
no reference can still be meaningful. To illustrate, take the word “unicorn.” This word has a
sense, and hence is meaningful, since we know the kind of entity that it identifies (as we know
this entity’s properties) even though this entity does not exist. That it has sense that we know is
proven by the fact that if a unicorn (or an entity that has the properties of a unicorn) would
appear before our eyes we would be able to identify it to be of such type of an entity. Frege, for
his part, gives the example “the celestial body most distant from our planet.” We know the sense
of this expression though we do not know whether it really has a reference.

As regards the ideational theory of meaning, Frege objects to this theory when he
clarifies that senses should not be confused with ideas. An idea, as a mental image of an object, is
subjective and private to the individual that has the idea. It is subjective in that it is colored or
influenced by the personal experiences and attitudes of the person who has it. The mental image,
for instance, that Person A and Person B have of Person C, who happens to be Person A’s father
but Person’s B’s employer, will be influenced by their own personal experiences with and
attitudes towards Person C. On the other hand, an idea is private in that the person who has the
idea is the only one who has direct access to or direct knowledge of this idea; and other people
can only infer that this person has such an idea from his/her linguistic or behavioral
expressions. In contrast, sense is objective and public. It is objective in that it is not influenced by
our personal experiences and attitudes. Whether we hate or love the person referred to by a
certain name, for instance, we agree on who the person identified by such a name is. And sense
is public in that it is directly accessible to the people who share a common language. If we
identify the reference of a certain name correctly even without communicating with one
another, this can only mean that we share a common language that enables us to individually
know the sense of this name directly. In sum, given that the meaning of a word is objective and
public, as its sense and reference are, meaning therefore cannot be the idea that the word
allegedly represents because ideas are by nature subjective and private.

Finally, Frege turns to the senses of statements, which he identifies as the thoughts
expressed by statements. Thoughts, for Frege, more specifically refers to the truth conditions of
statements. The truth conditions of a statement in turn refer to the circumstances that must
obtain in the world to make the statement true. In this light, knowing the sense of a statement
therefore means knowing under what conditions it is true and under what conditions it is false.
If I know, for instance, the sense of the statement “Snow is white” it means that I also know what
must obtain in the world to make such a statement true or false. Consequently, if a statement has
no truth conditions then it also has no sense. As we shall see later, this view of Frege about the
sense of statements or propositions has influenced the theories of meaning of the early
Wittgenstein and the logical positivists.

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Theory of Definite Descriptions

We normally understand the subject of a statement as referring to a particular entity while the
predicate as referring to a property that is being attributed to the entity referred to by the
subject. Grammar, however, allows us to use predicate expressions also as subjects of
statements (and vice versa) as long as we observe its rules. Thus, if grammar will be the basis for
saying what types of entities certain statements are about, we will most likely run into some
form of confusion. One form of confusion concerns the relation between proper names and
definite descriptions, which Bertrand Russell (1956, 1994) in his theory of definite descriptions
addresses. In this theory, Russell basically clarifies the logical functions of proper names and
definite descriptions in contrast to their grammatical functions.

Proper names correspond to what we normally call “proper nouns,” which refer to
particular persons, places, or things, such as “Andres Bonifacio,” “Manila,” and “Mayon Volcano.”
On the other hand, definite descriptions are expressions of the form “the so and so,” which
attribute exclusive properties to particular entities, such as “the leader of the Katipunan,” “the
capital of the Philippines,” and “the national hero of the Philippines.” These descriptions are
definite in that they are attributed to one and only one entity. (An indefinite description, in
contrast, is of the form “a so and so,” which attributes a non-exclusive property to an entity. For
instance, “a man” can be said of any man.) Now consider the statement “Jose Rizal is the national
hero of the Philippines.” Here, the subject term is a proper name whose logical function is to
refer to particular entity, while the predicate expression is a definite description whose logical
function is to attribute an exclusive property to the entity referred to by the proper name.
However, due to the flexibility of grammar we can also use the definite description as a subject of
another statement as in “The national hero of the Philippines is the author of Noli me tangere.”
What is now the function of the definite description here? Is it to substitute for a proper name
such that its function now is to refer to a particular entity? If this is how we interpret its
function, Russell argues that we will run into some form of logical contradiction. Russell uses
several cases to demonstrate this, but for present purposes we shall only discuss one of them.

We know that the statement “Manila is the capital of the Philippines” is true, and it is
because the particular place referred to by the proper name “Manila” exists and the definite
description “the capital of the Philippines” is a correct description of this place. But now, take the
statement “The present datu of Manila does not exist.” We also know that this statement is true,
for obviously Manila is no longer run by datus. If we regard the definite description “The present
datu of Manila” as a substitute for a proper name and thus functions as a proper name, then our
explanation of why it is true should be the following: there exists a particular person referred to
by the expression “the present datu of Manila” and that the predicate expression “does not exist”
is a correct description of this entity. But what we have just said is a logical contradiction—that
something exists and does not exist at the same time. Thus, for Russell, even if a definite
description appears as a subject in a statement, it does not change its logical status—it is still a
predicate expression whose logical function is to describe and not to refer. In this context,
grammar is misleading; and what is needed is to translate the statement whose subject is a
definite description into a form which clearly shows the logical function of the definite
description in that statement—that it is a predicate expression or that it attributes a property.
Being a logician, Russell would translate the statement “The present datu of Manila does not
exist” into the following: “There is not at least one x such that x is the present datu of Manila.”

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 Some philosophers fail to see that the logical contradiction is a result of a confusion
between the logical and the grammatical structures of language. Thus, they offer a different
solution to explain away the logical contradiction. Meinong, for instance, explains that what the
statement allegedly states is that there exists a particular entity (the entity allegedly referred to
by “the present datu of Manila”) in the abstract world (i.e., non-physical but extra-mental world),
which does not exist in the physical world. For requiring to believe in some abstract reality,
Russell argues that this solution violates the scientific principle of parsimony (also known as
Ockam’s Razor), which states that one should not multiply entities beyond necessity.

Now what about expressions that look like proper names but which do not really refer to
particular entities that exist in the world, like Santa Claus and Snow White? Russell claims that,
logically speaking, they are not proper names but are abbreviated (or truncated) definite
descriptions. The word “Santa Claus,” for instance, is simply an abbreviated form of a definite
description, which may be of the form “the white, fat, and bearded person who happily gives
gifts to children around the world during Christmas using a sleigh pulled by flying reindeers as a
means of transportation.”

The Picture Theory of Propositions

We normally assume that we can use language to adequately describe or represent anything in
the world. This assumption is implicit in the claim of each of the many and diverse accounts of
scientists, philosophers, and others, of what the world consists of: the claim that each of such
accounts presents the correct, most faithful, or ultimate description of the world. Ludwig
Wittgenstein, in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1974), evaluates this assumption by looking
into the conditions that make linguistic representation possible. One of his important
conclusions is that the representative function of language has limits, and that it is only within
these limits that linguistic representations of the world are meaningful. Wittgenstein further
claims that the limits of what language can represent are imposed by the very properties of
language. Let us try to demonstrate what Wittgenstein means here.

Take, for instance, two sets of objects, Set A and Set B. Supposing we want to use the
objects in Set A to represent possible combinations of the objects in Set B. To do this, we need to
adopt some conventions, like object 1 in Set A corresponds to object 1 in Set B, and so on; and
when we combine some objects in Set A in a certain way, it means that the corresponding
objects in Set B are combined in certain way. When the necessary conventions are already in
place, we will then be able to say whether a representation of an event (referring to a
combination of objects) in Set B using objects in Set A is correct or wrong. But suppose we later
on find out that the objects in Set A lack the necessary properties to represent certain events in
Set B. What we have now are the limits of Set A in representing some events in Set B. Now, think
also of the limits of using toy cars to represent an accident involving actual cars, or the limits of
maps to represent geographical locations. Within the limits of representation, a representation
is meaningful for there is a way to say whether such a representation is correct or not; but
outside these limits, a representation is meaningless, for there is no way to determine whether it
is correct or not.

In his analysis of linguistic representation, Wittgenstein focuses on propositions (more

specifically, elementary propositions—referring to the simplest type of propositions), which
represent states of affairs or possible combinations of objects in the world; and he proposes a
simple and concrete method to determine whether a given proposition is within the limits of
linguistic representation and hence is meaningful. This method, which has come to be known as

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the picture theory of propositions, simply states that for a proposition to be meaningful it should
be a picture of a possible state of affairs. That is to say, the proposition should give us a clear
idea of what state of affairs we should look for in the world to verify the truth of the proposition;
otherwise, the proposition is meaningless.

There are actually two possible reasons why a given proposition fails to be a picture of a
possible state of affairs. The first is that the alleged proposition is not really a proposition
(meaning, not really a linguistic representation); it is just mistaken to be one because of its
grammatical form. In this case, there really is nothing to represent. The second, which is what
Wittgenstein emphasizes, is that the proposition tries to represent what it cannot represent. In
this case, there is something to represent; however, this something, which Wittgenstein calls the
“mystical,” is beyond the limits of what can be represented by means of language. As
Wittgenstein writes: “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make
themselves manifest. They are what is mystical” (Tractatus 6.522). And since to talk about the
mystical would only result in meaningless linguistic expressions,3 the proper attitude towards it,
according to Wittgenstein, is silence. “What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence”
(Tractatus 7), as he famously puts it.

The Verificationist Theory of Meaning

Logical Positivism, also known as Logical Empiricism, is a philosophical movement that was
established in the 1920’s whose members were philosophers who had training in the sciences.
Its leader was Moritz Schlick but Rudolf Carnap, a former physicist, was the most influential of
the members. The primary objective of this school was to unify the sciences. The idea behind this
objective was that since there is only one physical world then we should ideally have only one
scientific system to describe and explain this world. But this is not the case for there are
different kinds of sciences with their own theories and methods to investigate and explain
particular types of physical phenomena (see Joergensen 1967: 76). The disunity among the
sciences was attributed by the logical positivists to the impurities that the sciences allegedly still
contain—referring to the metaphysical or non-scientific contents of the sciences. Thus, the first
step towards the unification of the sciences is to rid the sciences of these impurities, which
would require a theory of meaning that would identify such impurities. This is where the
verficationist theory of meaning came in. Its original job was to identify the non-scientific or
metaphysical statements in the sciences, but later on the logical positivists also used it to show
the meaninglessness of metaphysical statements in philosophy. By “meaningless,” the logical
positivists specifically meant devoid of cognitive significance.

In general, the verificationist theory of meaning claims that a statement is meaningful if

and only if there is some objective method to verify its truth. There are thus for the logical
positivists only two types of meaningful statements; namely, analytic statements, which are
about relations of concepts, and empirical statements, which are about facts in the world. The
truth of analytic statements is verified by the laws of logic, while the truth of empirical
statements is verified by the methods of the natural sciences. Examples of analytic statements
are definitions such as “A triangle has three sides” and mathematical statements like “2 + 2 = 4”;
while examples of empirical statements are scientific statements such as “The earth revolves
around the sun” and everyday descriptions of facts like “The book is on the table.”

Consider now the difference between the following two statements: “Physical object X
expands when heated” and “Permanent things are what truly exist in the world.” According to
the logical positivists, the first statement is meaningful while the second one is not. In the case of

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the first statement, there is an objective method to verify the truth of what it claims, like an
experiment can be done to perform the verification. But in the case of the second statement,
there is none; it is inconceivable what must obtain in the world for it to be true. According to the
logical positivists, this statement, as in the case of all other metaphysical statements, makes
sense only if understood as an expression of a certain attitude towards life or the world in
general, like, perhaps, the attitude that gives more value to things that are long-lasting than to
those that are fleeting. But if understood as a description of the world, it is meaningless.

II. ORDINARY-LANGUAGE PHILOSOPHY

If ideal-language philosophy focuses on the descriptive function of language, ordinary-language

philosophy examines the variety of linguistic functions as applied in ordinary life. If ideal-
language philosophy focuses on the language-world relationship, ordinary-language philosophy
focuses on the language-user relationship. Ordinary-language philosophy thus challenges the
privileged status given by ideal-language philosophy to the descriptive function of language. For
ordinary-language philosophy, the descriptive function is on equal footing with the other
functions of language. Consequently, the theories of meaning of ordinary-language philosophers
are more comprehensive in that they account for a wider variety of linguistic functions.
Furthermore, ordinary-language philosophers regard philosophical problems not as results of
the failure to distinguish between genuine and pseudo propositions but as products of the
deviations of philosophy from the ordinary uses of language. Such uses of language are believed
to be embedded in what Wittgenstein calls forms of life; and it is when language separates from
these forms of life (when “language goes on holiday,” as Wittgenstein puts it) that philosophical
issues arise. Under this school, I shall examine the theories of meaning of G. E. Moore, Ludwig
Wittgenstein (the “Later Witttgenstein”), and J. L. Austin.

The Views of Common Sense

G. E. Moore is considered as the philosopher who has laid the foundations of ordinary-language
philosophy (see Malcolm 1970). Moore’s ordinary-language philosophy is best seen in the
peculiar manner in which he refutes certain philosophical theses. Take, for instance, the
philosophical thesis that says, “We cannot be certain that material objects exist.” Moore refutes
this by simply saying that he is certain that he has two hands. According to Moore, if it is true
that we are not certain that there are material objects, then it should also be true that we cannot
be certain that we have two hands, for surely, the statement “We cannot be certain that there are
material objects” implies the statement “We cannot be certain that we have two hands” (for
obviously, hands are material objects). But in the context of ordinary life, it is simply ridiculous
to say that we cannot be certain that we have two hands. Let us take another philosophical
thesis: “Time is unreal.” Moore simply refutes this by saying that he had breakfast in the morning
and had lunch at noon. Moore’s point is that if time were indeed unreal then he should have not
been able to distinguish the time he had his breakfast from the time he had his lunch.

The method used by Moore to refute some philosophical theses may strike us as
unsophisticated. But the main point of Moore is actually profound: if these philosophical theses
were indeed true then they should make sense once translated into ordinary language or the
language of ordinary life—for where else should they be meaningful if not in the context of
ordinary life? For Moore, the fact that some philosophical theses become ridiculous once
expressed in ordinary language already proves that they are wrong. Moore elaborates that
embedded in ordinary language are the views of common sense. The philosophical theses that

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cannot meaningfully be translated into ordinary language, for Moore, are views that deviate
from the views of common sense—either by contradicting these views, by adding to them, or by
both contradicting and adding to them.

In his book, Some main problems of philosophy (1955), Moore identifies the following as
the views of common sense on the nature of the Universe: “(1) The only substantial kinds of
things which we certainly know to be in the Universe are: (a) material objects in space, and (b)
acts of consciousness of men and animals on Earth. (2) There may possibly be others, but we
certainly do not know whether or not there really are.” And Moore refutes the philosophical
theses that deviate from these views by showing that they cannot be translated into the language
of ordinary life without sounding ridiculous.

The Use Theory of Meaning

In his second influential book, the Philosophical investigations (1962, henceforth, P. I.), Ludwig
Wittgenstein presents another theory of meaning. This time, Wittgenstein believes that it is the
use of a word in a language-game (roughly corresponding to a context) that determines the
meaning of such a word. This theory of meaning is generally a reaction to the referential theory
of meaning, according to which the meaning of a word is the object it refers to. 4 Wittgenstein’s
specific reaction to the referential theory of meaning is the latter’s claim to generality—that the
meanings of words are always explained in terms of their references. Wittgenstein presents
many counter-examples to this claim (instances where the said theory does not work). The
following is a modified version of one of these counter-examples (see P. I., sec. 1). Let us suppose
that you want your younger brother to buy five eggs from a nearby sari-sari store. For this
purpose, you give him a piece of a paper bearing the expression “five eggs” and then you instruct
him to give the piece of paper to the seller together with the money that you also give him. Your
brother does exactly what you tell him to do, and after a while goes home with five eggs. The
question now is: how is it possible that the seller understands “five eggs” to mean that your
brother is buying five eggs without your brother saying anything? This cannot be explained by
appealing only to the reference of “five eggs”, for it involves, first and foremost, the fact that such
an expression is used in the context or language-game of buying and selling.
Wittgenstein’s use of the word “language-game” is meant to highlight the fact that the
activity of speaking a language, like the activity of playing a game, is governed by rules that are
conventional and public. Being conventional, these rules are results of human agreement. Like
the rules of the games that we play, the rules of language-games are just instituted by humans.
This means that words do not have meanings other than the uses that we make of them
according to the rules that we have instituted. Wittgenstein, however, clarifies that there is a
very important difference between speaking a language and playing a game; and that is, a
language-game is necessarily part of a form of life. A form of life generally refers to a set of
concrete activities in one’s everyday life (see P. I., sec. 19). For instance, the language-game of
the sari-sari store seller is part of the concrete activity of buying and selling. This feature of
language-games dispels the idea that Wittgenstein’s use of the term “language-game” makes the
use of language frivolous. But more importantly, it enables Wittgenstein to criticize
philosophical discussions that have no bearing on our everyday lives (see P. I., sec. 116).

With this theory of meaning, Wittgenstein challenges some deep assumptions that have
shaped most controversies in philosophy. Two of these controversies concern the meaning of
general and mental (or psychological) terms. Regarding general terms, such as “man” and
“animals”, their meaning is traditionally understood as the single property shared by all the
members of a certain class. This is undoubtedly true in the case of general terms used in the

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natural sciences. For instance, “mammals” mean that all mammals have mammary glands. But it
is big mistake to think, or to assume, that all general terms work this way. Some, Wittgenstein
shows, only have what he calls “family resemblances,” which is a collection of traits shared in
varying degree by the members of a certain class—analogous to the physical resemblances of
family members. Wittgenstein’s example is the term “game”. If we look at the various kinds of
games, there seems to be no single property common to all of them; they seem to only have
family resemblances.

As regards mental terms, we normally believe that the meanings of such expressions are
the mental states that they refer to. For instance, we normally take the meaning of the word
“headache” as the particular pain that we feel in our head. But mental states are private in that
only the person who has certain mental states can directly know these mental states, other
people can only infer that he/she has such states from his/her behavior and verbal report. So if
the meaning of a mental expression is a mental state that is by nature private, the meaning of the
mental expression should have been private as well—should be understandable only to the
person who uses such an expression. But this is not the case for we understand one another in
using mental expressions. This can only mean, for Wittgenstein, that the meaning of mental
terms is determined solely by the rules of the language-game in which such terms are used.
Wittgenstein’s argument here has popularly been called the private language argument.

Speech Act Theory

The speech act theory was developed by J. L. Austin and his student, John Searle. Austin started
the work and laid the foundations while Searle further systematized it. In this essay, I shall,
however, limit our discussion to some of Austin’s contributions to the theory. Austin begins by
inquiring into whether a clear distinction can be made between the following two types of
utterances: the constative and the performative. The constatives refer to linguistic expressions
that are used to describe states of affairs in the world. They correspond to what we normally
refer to as “statements,” whose distinctive feature is that they are either true or false. On the
other hand, performatives, which are also called speech acts, refer to linguistic expressions that
are used to perform actions. They are the kind of expressions wherein we perform certain
actions while saying them. For instance, in saying “I advise you to consult with your mentor” I
am already performing the act of advising; or in saying “I order you to wash the dishes” I am
already performing the act of making an order.

If a constative is either true or false depending on whether the state of affairs it describes
obtains in the world or not, a performative, according to Austin, is either happy or unhappy
depending on whether the performance of an action in using a performative is successful or not.
Austin identifies three conditions under which performatives are considered unhappy. The first
condition refers to the inappropriateness of the persons involved (the speaker and the hearer) and
circumstance in the utterance of a performative. Under this condition, we say that a performative
is null and void. For instance, if the person who says “I now pronounce you husband and wife” is
not authorized to marry people, say he is not a priest, a pastor, or a judge, then his performative
is null and void. But let us say he is a priest but he is talking to the wrong persons or to persons
not qualified to get married, then the performative is likewise null and void. Still, let us say that
the speaker and the hearers are appropriate but the circumstance is not (it is not in a wedding
ceremony that the performative is uttered), then the performative is null and void.

The second condition refers to the insincerity of the speaker in uttering a performative.
Insincerity here refers to the inappropriateness of the mental state of the speaker while uttering

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a performative. Under this condition, we say that a performative is abused. For instance, in
saying “Congratulations” to someone, I should be happy for this person; otherwise, I am not
sincere, and hence I have abused the performative. Or in saying “I apologize...” to someone I
should not feel happy about the injury I have caused this person; otherwise, I am not sincere,
and hence I have abused the performative. And the third condition refers to the failure to
perform some future action that one commits to in uttering a performative. Under this condition,
we say that there is a breach of commitment. For instance, in saying “Welcome” to a guest in a
party that we are hosting we are committing ourselves to treat the person nicely till the end of
the party. But if later on during the party we treat the person rudely then there is a breach of
commitment.

Austin later on finds out that a clear distinction cannot be made between constatives and
performatives, for constatives are actually performatives as well (for describing is itself an act)
and the conditions that explain the unhappiness of performatives also apply to constatives (see
Austin 1971). Austin then investigates the logical structure of performatives, and he discovers
that performatives are of three basic kinds; namely, the locutionary act, illocutionary act, and
perlocutionary act. The locutionary act refers to the mere utterance of the performatives. This
act consists of the phatic act (the act of producing mere noises or sounds), the phonetic act (the
act of producing sounds that are recognizable as words from a certain vocabulary and
grammar), and the rhetic act (the act of using words with meanings or with sense and
reference).

The illocutionary act, on the other hand, refers to the act that is being done in uttering a
performative. For instance, in uttering a performative a speaker may perform the illocutionary
act of making a promise, of asking a question, of issuing a command, etc. Illocutionary acts can
either be explicit or implicit. An explicit illocutionary act is one where it is clear from the
performative alone what illocutionary act is being performed. For instance, in saying “I advise
you to consult with your mentor” it is clear from the performative alone that I am performing
the illocutionary act of advising. On the other hand, an implicit illocutionary act is one where it is
not clear from the performative alone what illocutionary act is being performed. For instance,
suppose I say “I will be there,” from this performative alone I may be interpreted to be
performing the illocutionary acts of making a promise, expressing an intention of being there, or
simply making a prediction of some future event. In this case, what will determine the kind of
illocutionary act that I have performed is the context of my utterance of the performative.

Lastly, the perlocutionary act refers to the act of producing an effect on, or of eliciting a
response from, the hearer. For instance, a husband in asking her wife “How are you?” may want
her wife to feel that he cares for her, or in some cases, he may want her to feel guilty for not
caring enough for him. The actual effect, however, of a performative on the hearer may be
intended or not. For instance, in uttering a particular performative I may desire that my hearers
will feel insulted, but because of my manner of uttering the performative they instead take it as a
joke that they happen to appreciate.

CONCLUSION

In giving an overview of the philosophy of language as a discipline, we are constrained to focus

on the pioneers of the discipline and to limit our discussion to the main contentions of their
theories of meaning. There are of course other philosophers who have also contributed
significantly to the development of the discipline, which include, among others, Mill, Kripke,

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Searle, Quine, Dummett, Davidson, and Chomsky. Philosophy of language has raised our
sensitivity to the limits of what language can express, and has made us realize and appreciate the
value of clarity in the expression of philosophical ideas. We have, as a result, become suspicious
of the alleged profundity of some obscure linguistic expressions in philosophy. The difficulty of
understanding these expressions is not necessarily due to the profundity of the ideas that they
are trying to express, for it may just be caused by the complicated or strange way by which these
expressions are formulated. As Wittgenstein remarks, “The problems arising through a
misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth” (P. I., sec. 111). One
critical task of philosophy, therefore, is to study how language works in order to guard our
intelligence from certain misleading influences of language.

NOTES
------------------------
1. This is a revised version of the essay “Words and meaning: An overview of the philosophy of
language” by the same author in The philosophical landscape, 5th Edition (R. Gripaldo, ed.
2008. Quezon City: C & E Publishing Inc.).
2. Scholars refer to the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1974) as the “Early
Wittgenstein,” while to the Wittgenstein of the Philosophical investigations (1962) as the
“Later Wittgenstein.”
3. Wittgenstein considers the very propositions that he makes in his book, the Tractatus, also
as meaningless for having themselves gone beyond the limits of language—for representing
how language represents the world. But he qualifies that his propositions are nevertheless
necessary to the aims of the Tractatus (or as some scholars put it, the meaningless
propositions of the Tractatus are nonetheless illuminating). Thus (Tractatus: 6.54):
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands
me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to
climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has
climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world
aright.
4. The referential theory of meaning comes in various forms in the history of philosophy. Take,
for instance, the debate between the realists and the nominalists on the meaning of general
terms. Realists believe that the meanings of such terms are the abstract entities that they
refer to. In contrast, the nominalists believe that these terms are reducible to simple terms
whose meanings are the particular physical objects that they refer to. We can see that both
theories operate within the framework of the referential theory of meaning.

REFERENCES

Austin, J. L. 1971. Performative-Constative. In The philosophy of language. Edited by John

Searle. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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_________. 1989. How to do things with words. Edited by J. O. Urmson and Marina Sbisa.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carnap, Rudolf. 1937. The logical syntax of language. Translated by Smeaton. London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Copi, Irving and Carl Cohen. 2002. Introduction to logic. 11th ed. Singapore: Pearson
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Dummett, Michael. 1973. Frege: The philosophy of language. New York: Harper and Row
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Frege, Gottlob. 1960. On sense and reference. In Translations from the philosophical writings
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_______. 1994. The thought: A logical inquiry. In Basic topics in the philosophy of language.
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________. 1994. On denoting. In Basic topics in the philosophy of language. Edited
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QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION

1. In light of the various theories of meaning discussed in the essay, how would you analyze the
meaning of religious expressions?
2. Do you agree with the idea that there are limits to what language can express? Explain your
answer.
3. Do you have your own way of distinguishing between meaningful and meaningless
expressions? Elaborate.

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