Global South

Perspectives
on Diplomacy

Yolanda Kemp Spies

Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy
 Yolanda Kemp Spies

Global South
Perspectives
on Diplomacy
Yolanda Kemp Spies
University of Johannesburg
Johannesburg, South Africa

ISBN 978-3-030-00529-0 ISBN 978-3-030-00530-6 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00530-6

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018954968

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG, part of Springer Nature 2019
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction
on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and
information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication.
Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied,
with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have
been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published
maps and institutional affiliations.

Cover image: © ANDRZEJ WOJCICKI/Science Photo Library/Getty Images

Cover design: Tom Howey

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 I always learn from my students. The younger ones—unencumbered by the
baggage of life experience—are adventurous, naïve and often irreverent
about the norms and conventions of older generations. They entice me to
think in new ways and to peel back layers of my own cynicism. My mature
students all have a story to tell, a lived experience that gives wider context to
whatever I bring to the classroom. Wherever I have taught, in Africa and
beyond, I have gained insights from them, which in turn impacted many of
the ideas in this book.
Several people—a combination of academics and diplomats, some of them
serving ambassadors—were approached to review draft chapters of this book.
Kingsley Makhubela, Dayanand Naidoo, Mxolisi Nkosi, Dirk Kotzé and
Louise Lepan gave me advice and gently corrected me where I strayed off
course. Thank you so much, colleagues! I relished the opportunity to draw on
your combined experience of diplomacy and diplomatic studies.
I wish to dedicate the book in its entirety to two other diplomatic experts: my
husband, Hannes, and my son, Simon. Hannes founded the South African
Foreign Service Institute (now the Diplomatic Academy) in 1995 and
trained the first cohort of ambassadors for the ‘new South Africa’, before
he served in two ambassadorial postings. We share a love of diplomacy, a
passion for Africa and a dedication to lifelong education.
Simon grew up immersed in diplomatic culture, and his world is large,
exquisitely diverse and bursting with ideas. He sharpens my diplomatic skills
on a daily basis! May you always live fiercely, my son. I know you will never
bow to anyone, except God.
 Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 Bilateral Diplomacy: The Perennial Basics of Diplomacy 11

1 Introduction 11
2 Representing the Sending State 12
2.1 To Represent, or Not … 12
2.2 Representative Behaviour 14
2.3 Representing Multiple Identities and Interests 16
2.4 Representing with Legality and Legitimacy 17
2.5 Innovative Bilateral Representation 20
3 Protecting Interests 26
3.1 Public Interest(s), Public Service 26
3.2 Security Interests 29
3.3 Ethics and Political Interests 30
3.4 Economic Interests 33
3.5 Development—A Primary Interest 35
4 Negotiating 37
4.1 A Negotiated World 37
4.2 A Very Specific Skill 38
4.3 Why Diplomats? 39
4.4 ‘Virtual’ Negotiations 41
5 Information Gathering and Reporting 42
5.1 Ascertaining What? 42

vii
viii    Contents

5.2 Only ‘by All Lawful Means’! 43

5.3 Information ‘Management’ 44
5.4 The Imperative of Reporting 45
5.5 Reporting for Posterity 47
6 Promoting and Developing Relations 47
6.1 The Human Element 47
6.2 The ‘Official’ Friendly Relations 49
6.3 Public Diplomacy 50
6.4 Cultural and Other Niche Public Diplomacy 52
6.5 E-Diplomacy 54
6.6 Beyond Bilateral Relations 56
7 Conclusion 56
Sources Used 59

3 Multilateral Diplomacy: Diplomacy in Congress 65

1 Introduction 65
2 Manifestations of Multilateral Diplomacy 66
2.1 Conference Diplomacy 66
2.2 Parliamentary Diplomacy 68
2.3 Bloc Diplomacy 71
2.4 Minilateral and Club Diplomacy 73
2.5 Associative Diplomacy 75
3 Catalysts of Multilateral Diplomacy 77
3.1 Normative Ideals of International Society 77
3.2 Symbolic Membership of International Society 79
3.3 Global Governance: Legitimacy and Participation 80
3.4 Regional Integration 82
3.5 State Pragmatism 83
4 Intergovernmental Organisations and Diplomatic Practice 84
4.1 The Nature and Roles of Intergovernmental
Organisations 84
4.2 Intergovernmental Organisations as Diplomatic Actors 86
4.3 Secretariats: The Multilateral Counterpart of Foreign
Ministries 88
4.4 The IGO CEO: Secretaries-General et al. 91
4.5 Extensions of IGO CEOs: Special Representatives,
Commissions and High-Level Panels 92
5 Foreign Ministries and Multilateral Diplomacy 94
 Contents    ix

5.1 Foreign Ministry Organisation of Multilateral

Diplomacy 94
5.2 Even Greater Bureaucratic Management of Foreign
Policy 97
5.3 Multifaceted Representative Roles 98
5.4 Mastering the Rules of the Game 100
5.5 Multilateral Socialisation of States 101
6 Conclusion 102
Sources Used 105

4 Third-Party Diplomacy: The Diplomacy of Peace

and Intercession 109
1 Introduction 109
2 Good Offices 111
2.1 A Diplomatic Institution 111
2.2 The Role of Neutral States 113
3 Pacific Settlement of Disputes 115
3.1 Chapter VI of the UN Charter: Legal Instruments 116
3.2 Chapter VI of the UN Charter: Diplomatic
Instruments 117
3.3 The Diplomacy of UN Mediation 120
3.4 Keeping the Peace: Chapter ‘VI 1/2’ 122
4 New Diplomatic Conceptualisation of Peace and Conflict 124
4.1 The New Profile of Conflict 124
4.2 The New Profile of Peace 128
4.3 Profiling and Equipping the Peacemakers 130
5 Peace as a Diplomatic Project 132
5.1 Peacebuilding 132
5.2 Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development 135
5.3 Peace as a Regional Project 137
5.4 The Peace Project and (the Problem of) Justice 138
6 States and Third-Party Niche Diplomacy 141
6.1 States That Specialise in ‘the Business of Peace’ 141
6.2 Special State Envoys 142
6.3 Foreign Ministry Implications of Third-Party
Diplomacy 143
7 Conclusion 146
Sources Used 149
x    Contents

5 Polylateral Diplomacy: Diplomacy as Public–Private

Collaboration 153
1 Introduction 153
2 The Privatisation of Diplomacy 154
2.1 Degovernmentalisation of Diplomacy 154
2.2 People-to-People Diplomacy 156
2.3 ‘Privatised’ Foreign Ministries 158
3 Diplomacy and the Global Commons 159
3.1 Global Public Goods 159
3.2 Technology and Information as Public Goods 161
3.3 The Watchdogs: Transnational Social Movements 163
4 Non-state Actors in the Diplomatic Arena 165
4.1 Non-governmental Organisations 165
4.2 Multinational Corporations 167
4.3 The Media 169
4.4 Individuals and Celebrity Diplomacy 171
5 The Comparative Advantages of Non-state Actors 173
5.1 Proactive, Single-Issue Focus 173
5.2 Grass-Roots Connectivity 174
5.3 Organisational Efficiency and Resources 175
5.4 Influence and Policy Impact 176
5.5 The Moral High Ground? 178
6 Foreign Ministries and Polylateral Diplomacy 180
6.1 The Rationale for Polylateralism 180
6.2 Official Joint Ventures: Some Examples 182
6.3 Institutional Foreign Ministry Adjustments 186
6.4 Embracing Media Diplomacy 188
6.5 Polylateral Human Resources Management 189
7 Conclusion 191
Sources Used 194

6 Structural Diplomacy: Development, Participation

and Governance 201
1 Introduction 201
2 Diplomatic Arena Under Construction 202
2.1 The Insecurity of Globalisation and Global
Governance 202
2.2 Fluid Polarity 203
 Contents    xi

2.3 Fragmentation and Regional Microcosms 206

2.4 The New Kids on the Block: Emerging Powers 208
3 The Diplomacy of the ‘Middle’ 212
3.1 Constitutive Elements: Traditional and Emerging
Middle Powers 212
3.2 Behavioural Aspects of Middle Power Diplomacy 213
3.3 Declaratory Statements About (Middle) Power 217
4 The New Diplomacy of Development 219
4.1 Status Check: End of the Cold War and an Uneven
Playing Field 219
4.2 A New Development Narrative 220
4.3 The South-South Aid Discourse 226
4.4 Institutionalising Development at Foreign Ministry
Level 229
5 Transformation and Reformation 231
5.1 Starting at the Top: Reform of the UN Security
Council 231
5.2 The Financial and Economic Arena of Global
Governance 236
6 Conclusion 240
Sources Used 245

7 Conclusion 251

Index 261
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Diplomacy has been practised since the beginning of human evolution,

and it carries enormous practical and symbolic value. Yet historically,
it received scant academic attention. The culprit is its arcane image: it
is seen by many people, including academics, as elitist and politically
manipulated. Sadly this is not altogether untrue. To some or other
extent, diplomacy has always been concealed from public scrutiny. It is
only in recent decades that diplomatic studies have surged, driven by
demands for democratic accountability and boosted by more accessible
information in the public domain.
Ideationally, however, diplomacy remains a slippery notion. Many
people use the term without understanding what it means and end up
confusing it with a range of other concepts. Foreign policy, negotia-
tion, international politics, even exploitative tactics such as espionage
and propaganda, are frequently conflated with diplomacy. As a diplo-
matic practitioner-turned-academic, I am vested in the institution and
rather protective of its conceptual demarcation. So let me start off by
offering a definition of diplomacy, to set it apart from all other inter-
national engagements: it is a peaceful and continuous process of com-
munication that involves international relations among states or other
collectivities, on the basis of intermediation, reciprocity and formal rep-
resentation. As implied by the definition, diplomacy cannot be unilateral;
it exists only by mutual participation. The formal dimension is equally
important, because all the prestige and interests of an international actor
are at stake when it confers authority to an official representative. Under

© The Author(s) 2019 1

Y. K. Spies, Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00530-6_1
2 Y. K. SPIES

international law, states are held accountable for what their diplomats
do, hence the extensive international legal framework that protects and
guides the practice of diplomacy.
In international studies, the agency of individual diplomats is gener-
ally under-appreciated because their work—even on high profile issues—
is done in a discreet, low profile manner, thereby blending into the
bureaucratic ‘white noise’ of global relations. It deserves to be studied
much more attentively, because diplomats constantly weave a safety net
for the preservation of international society. Consider, for a moment,
the distinction made in Ancient Greece between two types of interna-
tional envoys, ‘heralds’ and ‘diplomats’. Heralds, regardless of their sta-
tus, could only convey news about imminent war. They were respected
individuals, but they were only messengers. Diplomats, on the other
hand, communicated messages but also had the leeway to negotiate trea-
ties. This manoeuvring space continues to define the institution of diplo-
macy. Contrary to what cynics allege, diplomats have a mandate that
far exceeds the simple communication of preset messages. They have to
bargain, ‘think out of the box’, create common ground, add value and
engineer peace where none exists. The work is never done: new fissures
appear; new generations of politicians forget the lessons learnt. The
profession’s duty, and its strength, lies in its continuity of communica-
tion. After all, the world we live in is largely a product of diplomacy: the
peace treaties, charters of international organisations, even the borders
of sovereign states result from deals struck by diplomats. Diplomacy out-
lives empires and ideologies, trends and fads, and all the many ways we
humans find to undermine each other.
In this book, the modalities used by diplomats will be investigated, so
as to provide a framework for analysis of diplomacy. I should add that the
book complements a predecessor, Global Diplomacy and International
Society, which provided wider contextual perspective on diplomatic prac-
tice and theory. Theoretical, historical, legal, bureaucratic and cultural
frameworks for diplomacy were variously discussed in the previous book.
I should also make it clear why the title of this book refers to Global
South perspectives. Most scholarly work on diplomacy originates in the
industrialised countries of the Global North. The rest of the world is yet
to make a definitive mark on diplomatic studies, and as proud African
and Global Southerner, I want to see this rectified. Diplomacy is truly
global; it does not belong exclusively to any part of humanity, it is uni-
versally practised and universally institutionalised. For that reason, we
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

have to study it in its totality: not just the content of what we analyse,
but also the perspectives we engage. It makes practical as well as theoret-
ical sense to do so.
Ironically, the Global South itself is still understudied in the field of
international relations (IR). This is astounding, given that it includes the
bulk of humanity and the most ancient of civilisations. Yet even the name
people use for the world beyond the highly industrialised Western coun-
tries is contested. The many labels (‘Developing World’, ‘Third World’,
‘Global South’, ‘Periphery’ and so forth) all seem to be imprecise as a
collective term, because the constituent units of the Global South are
hugely dissimilar; much more so than those of the Global North. They
range from desperately poor states such as Haiti and Bangladesh and
failed states like Somalia; to newly industrialising middle-income coun-
tries like Mexico and Turkey; and even the world’s aspirant superpower,
China. While the Global South label implies that most of its members
are physically located in the southern hemisphere, this is of course not
necessarily the case. Australia and New Zealand are both in the south-
ern hemisphere, but are categorised as Global North. By the same token,
many states in the northern hemisphere, such as Uzbekistan, Mongolia
and North Korea, are part of the Global South. The latter label is more
political than geographical, but it is not an entirely subjective identity.
States in the Global South tend to have unconsolidated or very uneven
socio-economic development; authoritarian or only recently evolved
democracies; and usually a history of colonisation. They are vulnerable to
the political and economic policies of the rich industrialised states; their
development dependent on access to the markets, investment and tech-
nology of the Global North. To this extent, they perceive themselves to
be subjugated or dictated to; treated as second-class members of interna-
tional society. The Global South is therefore mostly defined in negative
terms, namely by what it is not (yet).
What this separate ‘world’ has accomplished is to have inserted devel-
opment onto the global diplomatic agenda. Since the first generation
of development diplomacy appeared in the late 1950s, an alternative
diplomatic narrative gained momentum and in today’s world the issue
of development is more ‘mainstreamed’ than ever before. It should
be emphasised that for the Global South, diplomacy is primarily about
development, the countering of asymmetry in the global economy. For
the most marginalised of these countries, diplomacy is the only viable
foreign policy tool with which to wage an existential struggle. Countries
4 Y. K. SPIES

that lack comparative advantage in alternative foreign policy instruments,

especially ‘hard’ military or economic power, have a disproportionately
high interest in successful diplomacy to advance their national interests.
At the same time, it is an unfortunate reality for many of the world’s
states that the weight of their national bargaining power is inversely pro-
portionate to the size of their developmental needs. Their diplomats
are routinely outnumbered, out-trained and out-(hard)powered in the
global diplomatic arena. Often their domestic realities are as unpredicta-
ble as the dynamics within international relations.
The plight of struggling diplomats motivates me to bring their views
in from the cold, not to reinforce an identity of ‘otherness’ but to ensure
that the puzzle of diplomacy features a complete picture. Hence this
book, which includes cases from around the world (not just the Global
South), highlights the particular challenges experienced by struggling
states.
The focus is on ‘contemporary’ diplomacy, an elastic time frame
but one which I consider to indicate essentially the post-Cold War era.
Nevertheless, historical elements infuse all the chapters, because an
ancient, constantly evolving profession like diplomacy draws on prece-
dent as well as innovation.
The methodological approach of the book, as mentioned, involves
a modal analysis of diplomacy. I distinguish among four main
modes: bilateral, multilateral, third-party and polylateral diplomacy.
Diplomatic modes are determined by the number and identity of par-
ties that are involved, and the nature of the relationship that ties them
together. Modes are not mutually exclusive, and they can be conducted
simultaneously.
An important clarification is that modes are not synonymous with issue
specialisation in diplomacy. A plethora of issues punctuate present-day
books on diplomacy: nuclear proliferation, human rights, the environment,
trade, energy, migration and so forth. It is not uncommon for diplomats
to specialise in an issue-field, because it requires knowledge of specific
processes and jargon, and networking with exclusive epistemic commu-
nities. Foreign ministries might even recruit technical experts to become
diplomats, if a given issue is a foreign policy priority. Nonetheless, what-
ever the specialisation, it is still practised by means of a diplomatic mode
(one or more, or a combination). To illustrate: Egypt’s economic diplo-
macy can be bilateral (if conducted with one other state, such as Kenya)
or multilateral (if conducted with several others states simultaneously,
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

for instance within the World Trade Organisation or Organisation of

Islamic Cooperation). It can also be polylateral, if one or more non-state
parties (such as Nestlé or Samsung) collaborate in reaching the Egyptian
objectives.
Like much of diplomatic theory, there is no uniformity when it
comes to identification of modes. There is broad agreement that bilat-
eral diplomacy is the oldest, most traditional form of diplomacy, and that
it is distinct from a more recent practice, namely for clusters of actors
to conduct ‘multilateral’ diplomacy. Some authors do not include third-
party diplomacy as a separate mode, on account of its indirect nature:
it indicates that there is a problem between parties that prevents them
from having normal diplomatic relations. Intercession by a third party
is therefore required, but only on a consensual basis. In a best-case sce-
nario, the third-party role will be short-lived: it should end when the
problem is resolved and the primary parties return to a normal diplo-
matic relationship.
Polylateral diplomacy—where state and non-state actors cooperate in
diplomatic processes—is absent from traditional, state-centric diplomatic
literature. Contrarily, it dominates recent diplomatic texts from authors
who hail from liberal democracies. Summitry, the practice where political
executives interact directly and visibly, is treated as a separate diplomatic
mode by authors such as Geoff Berridge; whereas I see summitry as a
technique that can occur in any of the main modes. My own identifica-
tion of and differentiation among four modes are simply what I perceive
to be most practical for analytical purposes.
Another caveat regarding modes of diplomacy should be noted.
Diplomatic practice might seem rigidly constrained by rules and tra-
dition, but the opposite is true. It has survived and grown in scope
through all the ages precisely because diplomacy evolves in tandem with
international society. Polylateral diplomacy is a testimony to the influ-
ence and agency of non-state actors, and it is often used in hybrid form
with other modes. When the African Union cooperates with France in
post-conflict reconstruction and development in Côte d’Ivoire, and
they outsource implementation of certain projects to the International
Committee of the Red Cross, they are engaging in a hybrid of third-
party, multilateral and polylateral diplomacy. The overlap between modes
is indicative of a larger, integrated picture that I hope the book will
reveal. Nevertheless, I separate out the modes in structuring the book,
for ease of study.
6 Y. K. SPIES

Chapter 2 deals with bilateral diplomacy, the foundation of diplomatic

practice as we know it, the oldest and most traditional mode, where two
entities engage directly with each other. The chapter’s contents are what
I term the ‘perennial basics’ of diplomacy, because the principles, tech-
niques and institutions of bilateral diplomacy are replicated in all the
other modes of diplomacy. The discussion is structured according to
the five functions of diplomatic missions, which are listed in Article 3 of
the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. These functions
are (a) representation of a sending state; (b) protection of the sending
state’s interests (and by implication, promotion of those same interests);
(c) negotiation with host state authorities; (d) information gathering
and reporting thereon to own authorities; and (e) promotion of friendly
interstate relations. International relations have obviously changed signif-
icantly since the early 1960s when the Vienna Convention was adopted,
but these generic functions were selected for good reason: they are a suc-
cinct summary of the timeless duties of diplomats.
In the discussion, attention is given to the way in which these func-
tions have expanded in recent decades, how they manifest when states
do not have resident embassies to perform the stated tasks, and how less-
er-endowed (struggling) states deal with the challenges of their capac-
ity deficit. An important consideration is the impact of information and
communication technology (ICT) on diplomacy’s core tasks of commu-
nicating and handling information. Another key aspect is the abundance
of new actors that are stakeholders in diplomacy and need to be engaged
by official diplomats. These include all levels of intra-state governance,
as well as non-state actors. In the post-Cold War era, there is also the
increasing imperative for diplomats to interact with the public of a host
state, not just its authorities. And, to return to my Global South perspec-
tive, the issue of development assistance has become core bilateral busi-
ness for states; for donors, recipients and especially those Global South
states that are at the same time aid beneficiaries and aid benefactors.
Multilateral diplomacy, the focus of Chapter 3, encompasses everything
that bilateral diplomacy does, but involves three or more states (and/
or organisations) doing so simultaneously. Multilateral diplomacy is not
merely a matter of larger numbers, however, even though the quantitative
expansion of international society has fed the phenomenon. It has evolved
for a combination of practical, normative and symbolic reasons; ergo its
proliferation (in volume and in diversity) since the end of World War I.
The reasons for its exponential growth are explored in some detail.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

In the chapter, the contemporary manifestations of multilateral diplo-

macy are identified: the traditional distinction between conference and
parliamentary diplomacy; new concepts such as ‘minilateral’, ‘network’
and ‘club’ diplomacy; as well as multilateral-within-multilateral diplo-
macy, i.e. different forms of ‘plurilateral’ diplomacy. Attention is also
given to the role of intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) because
they create hubs of multilateral diplomacy. IGOs such as the World
Trade Organisation, United Nations and European Union are not
merely passive meeting venues for states and other organisations. When
they transcend the sum of their parts, as they tend to do, they morph
into independent diplomatic actors. The distinctive contribution of IGOs
to diplomatic practice is discussed, as is the role of their staff—the inter-
national civil servants that take on supranational diplomatic identity.
Of interest in the same chapter is the organisational impact of mul-
tilateral diplomacy on foreign ministries. State bureaucratisation of this
mode of diplomacy is very recent but it happened swiftly, and by the end
of the twentieth century all foreign ministries had institutionalised mul-
tilateral diplomacy. Among the implications that are considered are the
placement and capacity building of states’ resident embassies at IGOs,
the intra-state management and coordination of multilateral foreign pol-
icy, and the complex representative mandate(s) and technical require-
ments of diplomats in multilateral postings.
In Chapter 4, the modal lens is that of third-party diplomacy. It is
largely a mode of conflict management, reduction and resolution. For
that same reason, it happens to be the diplomatic mode that attracts the
most vehement criticism, because there is little opportunity for diplomats
to prove their success: a prevented conflict (or a prevented escalation in
conflict) is counterfactual. On the other hand, third-party diplomacy
speaks to the very raison d’être of diplomacy. The pursuit of peace fits
the profile of brokerage, or intermediation, that underpins the institution
of diplomacy. It also requires constant innovation, because in third-party
mode space has to be created for diplomacy precisely when circumstances
dictate against it.
The chapter starts off by examining the phenomenon of ‘good offices’
where a third party’s institutional facilities are provided to enable diplo-
macy between actors that are unable or unwilling to deal with each other
directly. So-called neutral states have historically provided good offices,
and in the contemporary era, multilateral organisations fulfil the same
role. In fact, during the past century many IGOs were founded with
8 Y. K. SPIES

the goal of fostering peace and security. The United Nations Charter
provides for the legal use of force by its Security Council, but of more
interest to diplomatic practice are the options for third-party diplomacy
enumerated in Chapter VI of the UN Charter.
The pacific (peaceful) settlement of disputes, including mediation, is
contextualised within the changing profile of global peace and conflict.
Peace is no longer contingent on once-off agreement among politi-
cal executives; it requires multi-stakeholder buy-in and long-term ‘pro-
ject management’ when conflict-ravaged societies need to be rebuilt.
Third-party diplomacy is therefore increasingly tied to peacebuilding and
post-conflict reconstruction and development. In the process, diplomats
are confronted with an ethical dilemma: the contradiction between polit-
ical settlement (the usual diplomatic route) and judicial closure (the legal
imperative).
Chapter 5 addresses polylateral diplomacy and explains the catalytic
processes that constitute this interface of official diplomacy with pri-
vate initiatives. The book thereby moves beyond traditional state-cen-
tric perspectives, into the context of a diplomatic arena that is pluralistic,
dynamic and networked. Geopolitical location and formal authority have
far less impact on the activities of non-state actors—multinational com-
panies, ethnic diaspora, celebrities, trade unions, the media, religious
groups and many more—that operate at domestic, transnational, inter-
national and global levels. The de facto diplomacy of these actors often
happens in parallel to the governments of sovereign states, challenging
their jurisdiction.
The intersection of state and societal interests is of key interest to
diplomats, all the more so when it concerns global public goods. The
‘global commons’ comprises human interests that transcend sovereign
borders. As is the case at the domestic level, at the global level the provi-
sion of services requires transparency and accountability, and diplomacy
thereby assumes characteristics of legislative, representative governance—
hence the term ‘global governance’. It is a historically unprecedented
element of diplomacy, and possibly a new mode in the making.
The chapter identifies the main types of non-state actors and their
‘diplomacy’, with a discussion of their comparative advantages vis-à-vis
traditional (state-centric) actors. This is followed by a discussion of the
impact that diplomatic ‘civilcraft’ has on the traditional statecraft focus of
foreign ministries. Examples of polylateral partnerships, from around the
world, are provided.
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

Chapter 6, the final substantive chapter of the book, is titled ‘struc-

tural diplomacy’ and deals with a hybrid approach rather than a distinct
mode. Structural diplomacy is geared (in purpose as well as methodol-
ogy) towards the terms of interaction in the international system. It con-
fronts the discrepancies between notions of global ‘democracy’ and the
actual, entrenched hierarchies of power. It focuses on the power-diplo-
macy nexus, a political connection that is, of course, truly timeless. What
has changed in recent times is that a far greater section of the world
has become vocal about systemic flaws, and is insisting on equity in the
forums of global governance.
The fast-evolving diplomatic arena is one that is ‘under construction’,
and new emerging powers are using the rules of the game to challenge
those same rules of the game. These powers are spearheading a second
generation diplomacy of development, a discourse that invokes new nor-
mative and legal assumptions about world order.
Chapter 6 also considers the ‘diplomacy of the middle’, exhibited by
states that (by choice rather than necessity) prioritise diplomacy over
other tools of statecraft. ‘Middlepowermanship’, a status based on diplo-
matic behaviour and leadership, was traditionally associated with certain
Western states, but in recent decades several Global South states have
joined the category. Their niche diplomacy is discussed alongside that of
the traditional middle powers.
Chapter 7, the conclusion, reflects on the key findings of the book. It
addresses the question whether international society is being discounted
by ‘alternative’ voices from the Global South. The discussion returns to
where it started, namely the role of diplomacy, and the need to study it
in more depth, with greater perspective.
I welcome feedback on the book; also criticism (contestation is part of
the territory of academic enterprise, and it certainly induces diplomacy!)
to enrich future incarnations of the book. It would be a real honour if it
inspires more contributions from peers in the Global South. Our views
should no longer be considered peripheral.
As an African scholar, I particularly look forward to diplomatic schol-
arship from the continent. Africa is, after all, the cradle of humankind,
and therefore also the birthplace of diplomacy! There is so much wisdom
and experience locked up in this extraordinary continent. It needs to be
published for consumption by a global audience.
 CHAPTER 2

Bilateral Diplomacy:
The Perennial Basics of Diplomacy

1   Introduction
Up till the beginning of the twentieth century, the history of diplomacy
was largely the history of bilateral diplomacy. This mode of diplomacy—
also referred to as ‘traditional’, ‘old’ or ‘the French system’—represents
the foundation of diplomatic practice as we know it. It became synon-
ymous with the institution of resident embassies when the latter origi-
nated in fifteenth-century Italy and spread throughout Europe before
becoming a universal phenomenon.
The important symbolism of bilateral diplomatic relations is that the
two political entities acknowledge each other’s relevance as diplomatic
actors. In the conventional sense, ‘they are in principle prepared to con-
duct any necessary business by direct communication through official
representatives’ (Berridge 1995: 19). Diplomacy is rooted in reciprocity
and the term ‘bilateral’ (literally meaning two-sided) emphasises the fact
that it can exist only by mutual participation. Contact is done through
institutionalised communication channels, ordinarily the respective for-
eign ministries and their networks of diplomatic missions. However, the
exchange of resident diplomatic missions is by no means a precondition
for bilateral relations: many states maintain warm and regular diplo-
matic interaction without representative offices in each other’s territo-
ries. In some cases, the physical representation may be maintained by one
side only—once again, without necessarily reflecting negatively on the
relationship.

© The Author(s) 2019 11

Y. K. Spies, Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00530-6_2
12 Y. K. SPIES

When the generic functions of diplomatic missions were codified

into diplomatic law by Article 3 of the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations, it did more than articulate the reasons why states
maintain resident diplomatic missions. In essence, it confirmed inter-
national consensus on the broad functions of diplomats per se. I have
therefore selected the five de jure functions listed in Article 3—rep-
resentation of a sending state; protection of its interests; negotiation with
host authorities; information gathering and reporting thereon; and pro-
motion of friendly interstate relations—as a framework for this chapter’s
discussion of diplomatic practice. This holistic picture includes consid-
eration of activities that were not covered by the Vienna Convention,
because the operating environment of diplomats has obviously changed
significantly since the early 1960s when the Convention was concluded.
It is important to note that the generic functions of diplomacy are
not restricted to the bilateral mode. They pervade all the other modes
of diplomacy, hence the subtitle of this chapter: ‘the perennial basics of
diplomacy’. Subsequent chapters on multilateral, third-party and polylat-
eral diplomacy will therefore build on these basics.

2  Representing the Sending State

‘Representing the sending state in the receiving state’ (VCDR 1961: Art. 3a)

Like a sacrament, diplomacy’s symbols are often the reality they signify.
(Filipino Ambassador José Lino Guererro 1999, at the conclusion of his
posting in Ankara, Turkey)

2.1   To Represent, or Not …

A diplomat’s representative role is a constitutive element of diplomatic
activity, and most diplomatic duties evolve from this responsibility (Calvet
de Magalhães 1988: 103). Representation encompasses not only the diplo-
mat’s symbolic presence at events—being clearly ‘visible on behalf of’, or
what diplomats light-heartedly refer to as ‘flying the flag’—but also his/
her substantive representation, which literally requires ‘acting on behalf of’
a state’s leadership. Even the most energetic and charismatic leaders can
only be in one place at a time, and the advantage of having official repre-
sentatives based around the world to execute symbolic duties on a contin-
uous basis is one of the oldest arguments for resident embassies.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 13

Ceremonial events such as state funerals, commemoration ser-

vices, inauguration of heads of state, military parades and so forth hold
national importance to host states. The presence of the diplomatic
corps at such events is carefully managed and monitored. Any unex-
plained absence can be construed as a political message. Actually, in cer-
tain instances non-attendance of events (or a visible ‘walk-out’ midway)
can be a deliberate diplomatic strategy. On 17 April 2013, Argentina’s
Ambassador to the UK was conspicuous by her absence from the offi-
cial state funeral of former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. The
event at St. Paul’s Cathedral in London was attended by scores of heads
of state and ambassadors accredited to the UK. Ambassador Alicia Castro
had declined the official invitation to attend the funeral and did not del-
egate the duty to any of her staff members either, in a clear demonstra-
tion of lingering tension between the two countries. Thatcher’s role in
the 1982 war over the islands that the British refer to as The Falklands
(known as Las Malvinas in Argentina) continues to irk Argentina. The
Argentine boycott was also in protest at the fact that their President at
the time, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, was not invited to the event,
apparently at the explicit request of the Thatcher family. The latter had
taken umbrage at her series of provocative statements about the UK’s
continued ‘colonial’ rule in the islands.
A rather common diplomatic strategy is for a state to ‘recall’ its
ambassador when the host state has angered it in some or other way. It
is never done discreetly, because the move is meant to be highly sym-
bolic. During June 1981, in protest against the Netherlands’ sale1 of two
submarines to Taiwan, China downgraded bilateral diplomatic relations
by replacing its Ambassador in The Hague with a chargé d’affaires (i.e.
a lower-level official who takes charge in the temporary or long-term
absence of an ambassador). It has reacted in similar diplomatic manner
towards other states that indulged Taiwan to an extent the Chinese deem
inappropriate.
As in the case of China and Taiwan, Turkey also has a longstand-
ing diplomatic nemesis and its neighbour, Armenia. The historical ten-
sion has impacted negatively on Turkey’s otherwise cordial relations
with the non-Muslim world; an inclusive diplomatic strategy evidenced
most symbolically in the bilateral relations Turkey has maintained with
the Holy See (Vatican) since 1868. It was thus provocative when, on 12
April 2015 at a service in Rome, Pope Francis referred to2 Turkey’s mass
killing of Armenians (under Ottoman rule during the World War I) as
14 Y. K. SPIES

the ‘first genocide of the 20th century’. His comment so infuriated the
Turkish government that it recalled its Ambassador to the Vatican. (The
Ambassador was reinstated, but only ten months later.) Turkey has also
recalled its Ambassadors from various other states—among them France
in 2011 and Germany in 2016—after their respective national legisla-
tures intentionally labelled the Armenian killings as ‘genocide’.
Sometimes a state has a similar bilateral diplomatic spat with several
other states at the same time, and this can lead to simultaneous withdraw-
als of more than one ambassador from a host state. It happened when
Indonesian authorities sentenced convicted drug smugglers to death
(among them members of an Australian drug-trafficking ring in the infa-
mous ‘Bali-9’ case) during early 2015. The presence of foreign nation-
als among the condemned prisoners caused an international outcry. In
addition to the lobbying of various non-state groups, the governments of
Brazil, the Netherlands and Australia all appealed to the Indonesian gov-
ernment to commute the death sentence of their nationals.
When the executions took place despite the bilateral diplomatic
efforts, the three states recalled their respective ambassadors from
Indonesia. But diplomatic symbolism can only achieve so much—a sov-
ereign state’s legal jurisdiction within its own territory is a principle of
international law. The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs tersely con-
firmed this right, in a statement on 22 February 2015:

As a democratic sovereign state with its own sovereign, independent and

impartial justice system, no foreign country nor party can and may inter-
fere with the implementation of Indonesia’s prevailing laws within its juris-
diction, including in the enforcement of laws to address drug trafficking.
(Otto 2015)

As in most instances where such symbolic measures are resorted to, the
three countries soon after normalised their diplomatic relations with
Indonesia.

2.2   Representative Behaviour

With representation at the core of diplomacy’s raison d’être, a diplo-
mat has to represent his/her sending state continuously and unambig-
uously. The task can be mundane but can also range from glamorous
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 15

(being chauffeur-driven, mixing with heads of state and walking red

carpets) to humiliating (being expelled from a host state in a fit of
political pique or being pelted with tomatoes by protesters because
one’s government has done something offensive). Diplomats have to
absorb all the sentiment their sending states, and specifically their gov-
ernments, conjure up in a foreign domain. Regardless of their behav-
iour as individuals, they might attract adulation or hostility simply
because they represent a certain political entity. It is a heavy responsi-
bility, hence the prestige of the profession and the intricate attention
within diplomatic law to the immunities and privileges of individual
diplomats.
The corollary is that diplomats are held to high standards of personal
conduct. Skills training in etiquette, protocol and personal grooming is
routinely part of diplomatic training, and most foreign ministries allo-
cate special ‘representative’ allowances to their diplomats to ensure that
they can afford to dress elegantly. The subtext is always that a diplo-
mat has to project the most favourable image of his/her sending state.
There are no ‘office hours’ to the responsibility of representing one’s
country, and diplomats have to mind their conduct even when officially
‘off duty’. This explains why, despite worldwide democratic imperatives
for foreign ministries to reflect the social reality of society, the diplo-
matic environment continues to be marked by conservative parameters
for personal behaviour. It also accounts for the continuing elitist instinct
in the recruitment of individuals who are physically, intellectually, and
in terms of personality and refinement, the most agreeable ‘face’ of a
country.
Unacceptable behaviour includes anything that draws negative atten-
tion to the individual and, by extension, the sending state, such as inap-
propriate sexual conduct, substance addiction, domestic violence and
so forth. Diplomats (and their accompanying family members) who
behave in an uncouth manner—even if they are within the host state’s
legal parameters—can be reported to the sending state’s authorities with
the request that they be disciplined or recalled. In many cases, the with-
drawal will be a proactive measure done by a sending state when its for-
eign ministry realises that an employee is acting outside of diplomatic
norms. Unless the media had covered a particular incident, the with-
drawal usually takes place in a discreet manner so as not to impact the
bilateral state-to-state relationship.
16 Y. K. SPIES

2.3   Representing Multiple Identities and Interests

Representation is an existential challenge that defines the diplomatic
profession. It starts with the individual: even the most professional dip-
lomat is never just a ‘generic’ functionary. An African-American US dip-
lomat is obviously a member of a minority population group, just as a
Christian Syrian diplomat is part of a minority religion in that country.
Yet, their official duty is to represent their states, even if at the personal
level each of them (as does any diplomat) has a multifaceted identity
which he/she consciously or unconsciously represents. Something else
all diplomats share is that they represent an institution of international
society—diplomacy itself—which is imbued with global norms and
conventions.
The uniqueness of the diplomatic profession is that it requires indi-
viduals to transcend their personal identity and values so as to represent
a state and its people in their entirety. This task is difficult enough when
a diplomat represents a single ‘nation’. But the majority of the world’s
states do not resemble the classical ‘nation state’, where a single nation
inhabits a single geopolitical unit. A South African diplomat, for exam-
ple, represents a country that is hugely diverse: multiracial, multi-ethnic,
multilingual, multi-religious; and featuring deep socio-economic and
political schisms. It is a non-negotiable package deal: an individual South
African diplomat may not ‘cherry-pick’ the parts of the country that he/
she wishes to represent.
As South African diplomats experienced during the 1990s, the official
representatives of states in transition have to make additional representa-
tive leaps: from one domestic political culture to another, and from one
international state identity to another. Diplomats whose careers survive
the transition are products of a defunct old order and like the rest of
their compatriots are materially and emotionally affected by the instabil-
ity and unpredictability of constitutional ‘revolution’. They nevertheless
have to represent, to the outside world, the identity of a state with its
very nature in flux. By the same token, their new colleagues who had
fought against the previous order are required to represent the new state
in its totality, including the institutional remnants of the past. The dip-
lomats of new states face a similar challenge, and their representative
responsibility takes on a critical dimension because the brand-new inter-
national actor (their sending state) displays its international identity pri-
marily through diplomatic visibility.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 17

State identity itself can be multidimensional, and diplomats have

to simultaneously represent the existential nuances, and all the linked
interests, in the course of their work. A Turkish Ambassador rep-
resents a state that is predominantly Muslim, secular, developing, a
donor as well as recipient of development assistance, a North Atlantic
Treaty Organization member, an aspiring European Union member,
an emerging power, a geographically Eurasian territory, a neighbour
to conflict-ridden Syria, to name but a few of its ‘identity-interests’.
He/she will thus have to draw on different dimensions of represent-
ative instinct and foreign policy interests at various times, playing up
the positive elements and potential of a specific affiliation, depending
on the diplomatic setting. But at all times, he/she will have to keep
an holistic perspective and ensure that there are coherence and con-
tinuity—and representation of Turkey, above all—in the diplomatic
interaction.
It is important to note that representatives of the same state might
advance different bureaucratic identities and interests. The governments
of states are not monolithic institutions, and the contemporary trend is
for numerous state agencies to be represented abroad under the aegis of
individual diplomatic missions. The manifold concerns of development
corporations, investment agencies, trade and tourism offices, ministries
of finance, agriculture and so forth can cause duplication or rivalry, mul-
tiple channels of information to principals in sending state and general
problems of foreign policy coordination (Barston 2006: 22–23).

2.4   Representing with Legality and Legitimacy

Diplomats work within the parameters of international law, and the
legal element of their work is a perennial theme in diplomatic studies.
The formal requirements of diplomacy are essential, for good reason.
The full title of a resident ambassador is ‘Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary’ with the term ‘plenipotentiary’ indicating full author-
ity to act on behalf of his/her head of state. In theory, therefore, an
ambassador can declare war! This representational weight also explains
why an ambassador ‘presents credentials’ to the head of the host state
during a face-to-face meeting, rather than sending the document to a
designated functionary in the host government. This ceremonial require-
ment can be frustrating, as newly arrived ambassadors sometimes have
to wait for months before they can see the head of the host state for the
18 Y. K. SPIES

presentation of credentials. Until such time as they had done so, they
may not assume their duties officially.
Diplomacy takes place in a very political arena, among constantly
evolving international actors, and ideally, all diplomats need to oper-
ate with both legality and legitimacy on their side. In reality, however,
diplomacy continues even when (or precisely because) there is a deficit in
either.
A lack of legitimacy can result from representational ambiguity,
something that can occur during the process of state creation or state
disintegration, when the very identity of a state is questioned. It is debil-
itating for diplomats to operate in a legal void, and the process can be
contentious, drawn-out and harrowing. The truncation of Yugoslavia
during the 1990s, and anarchy in Libya immediately after the interna-
tional intervention of 2011, left the diplomats of those states in a pro-
fessional vacuum. They suffered harrowing uncertainty about personal
circumstances, career progression and physical safety. Until such time
as the international community bestows political recognition on a state,
its diplomats cannot be quite sure what they represent and diplomatic
law does not suffice, at the professional level, to protect ‘orphaned’
representatives.
Unconventional (de facto rather than de jure) diplomacy is required
when international actors do not have official diplomatic relations.
The sovereign status of one or both parties might be disputed or hos-
tility between them might prevent initialisation or resumption of for-
mal diplomatic relations. They can conduct diplomacy either indirectly
(facilitated by a third party) or directly, in which case it is usually not
acknowledged publicly. Liberation movements are great practitioners
of de facto diplomacy, which they conduct under the banner of being
legitimate ‘governments-in-waiting’ or ‘governments-in-exile’. Thus,
the African National Congress (ANC), the Pan-Africanist Congress
of Azania (PAC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party were all represented
abroad, before they became part of normalised democratic politics in
post-apartheid South Africa.
Unconventional bilateral diplomacy can also become institutionally
entrenched and in some cases enjoy partial (restricted to certain states/
regions) legality and legitimacy. Contested states fit into this category,
and their enthusiasm for the representational aspects of diplomacy is a
common denominator. The fact that statehood entails membership of a
society of which the chief medium of communication is diplomacy has
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 19

underlined the importance of representatives being visible, and thus

being seen as participating, in the symbolism of diplomacy. The unrelent-
ing efforts of aspiring sovereign entities to spread their diplomatic rep-
resentation are because they ‘continue to believe that securing diplomatic
recognition in many ways precedes achieving political independence and
goes a long way to constituting it’ (Sharp 1999: 42). Western Sahara,
for example, as of July 2017 was ‘recognised’ diplomatically by 84 of the
UN member states. The Ambassador of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic, based in Algiers, enjoys full diplomatic recognition, immunities
and privileges but ‘loses’ all of that when leaving Algeria and crossing
the border into Morocco, where Western Sahara’s claim to sovereignty is
rejected outright.
Depending on the warmth of relations with the host state, the con-
tested state might be fully recognised, in which case it could open a resi-
dent embassy in the capital of the host state. Even if it is not recognised,
it could be given permission to maintain a representative office in order
to conduct de facto diplomacy. This is the case with Palestine, which
has embassies in many states around the word, even in states where its
nemesis, Israel, also maintains embassies. The case of Taiwan is slightly
different. States that ‘recognise’ the People’s Republic of China can-
not also ‘recognise’ Taiwan (Republic of China), for the simple reason
that both states claim representation of the same entity: greater China.
Under international law, they can therefore not be recognised simultane-
ously, hence the imperative for other states to make a diplomatic ‘choice’
between PRC and ROC. South Africa maintained diplomatic relations
with Taiwan until 1996, when it ‘switched’ recognition to China. Until
1996, the Taiwanese office in Pretoria thus operated as a full ‘embassy’,
but the reversal of South Africa’s recognition meant that Taiwan had
to remove the diplomatic designation of its representative office. It was
subsequently renamed the ‘Taipei Liaison office in the RSA’, and the
Taiwanese Ambassador was no longer allowed to use his title within
South Africa.
The diplomats of contested states deal with their own unique chal-
lenges: from not being recognised by third states to playing an activist
role for broader diplomatic recognition, a position taken for granted
by diplomats from undisputed sovereign states. Like other contested
states, Western Sahara suffers continuous ups and downs in recognition.
India established diplomatic relations with the aspirant state in 1985,
but withdrew its recognition in 2000. Paraguay rescinded its diplomatic
20 Y. K. SPIES

relations with Western Sahara at the end of 2013, but during the same
year Honduras established relations with the contested state. It cannot
be easy when uncertainty dogs the very existence of a diplomat’s rep-
resentative duties. As a result, the diplomats of contested states tend to
be unusually resilient: they practise a very conventional profession under
very unconventional circumstances.

2.5   Innovative Bilateral Representation

The Vienna Convention of 1961 was drafted with bilateral, resident dip-
lomatic missions in mind, but the point should be reiterated that bilateral
diplomacy has never been dependent on resident missions. In the latter
part of the twentieth century, many critics3 wrote ‘obituaries’ for the res-
ident embassy, claiming that the practice had become redundant in an
age of rapid, ubiquitous ICT and transport infrastructure. They argued
that permanent diplomatic missions imposed unnecessary tax burdens
while also presenting security hazards to the sending state. The point was
made that competing agencies could perform similar services as well as, if
not more efficiently than, traditional diplomatic establishments.
The debate had particular resonance in the integration-oriented
politics of Europe, with many commentators asking why EU member
states needed to maintain bilateral embassies in each other’s capitals.
At the turn of the century, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer
was so vexed by the debate that he commissioned a high-level investiga-
tion into the relevance of resident bilateral missions (Sucharipa 2003).
Headed by former German Ambassador and UN Under-Secretary-
General for Internal Oversight Services, Karl Theodor Paschke, a study
was undertaken into the operations of German diplomatic missions in
14 different European states. Paschke’s 2000 report concluded that
Germany’s bilateral embassies within Europe had not diminished in
importance but had, to the contrary, taken on additional functions.
Some of the missions even had to be enlarged, in the light of their bur-
geoning workload. He noted:

In no member country to date does the term ‘European Union’ carry

the positive emotional connotations associated with such words as ‘home
country’ or ‘native land’. Yet the relationship between two European
countries or nations always has an emotional side, as is obvious not only
from international football matches. (Paschke 2000)
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 21

His findings echoed the sentiments of most contemporary writers on

diplomacy, who emphasise the deeply symbolic relevance of state rep-
resentation in international relations. Wide-ranging physical and ide-
ational changes in global relations have also not eroded the practical
importance of resident missions. Rather, as Geoff Berridge (1995:
34–35) summarises it succinctly, the existence of permanent embassies
continues to broaden a state’s representative options and its repertoire of
verbal and non-verbal signals. When Kenya’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
and International Trade announced that it would establish eight new
embassies and six new consulates starting July 2014, it did so fully cog-
nisant of the developing country’s prohibitive economic constraints. The
substantive expansion in Kenya’s diplomatic presence was deemed neces-
sary precisely to counter the country’s marginalisation in the global arena
(Mutai 2013).
However, there is no state with universal diplomatic representation—
it is economically unjustifiable (especially to a voting public), even in
the rare exception that a state (the neutral Switzerland would be one)
is politically ‘welcome’ everywhere. Very poor or small states have only
the bare minimum of diplomatic missions abroad. These states, as do all
states, have several alternatives to conduct bilateral diplomacy without
resident diplomats.

Ad hoc Special Missions

The diplomatic profession does not have its historical roots in resident
missions—all diplomacy started off as ad hoc special missions. The send-
ing entity would dispatch a delegation of duly mandated officials, led by
an ambassador, to travel to another political unit in order to perform
official duties. The advent of resident missions was based simply on rec-
ognition that continuity in the performance of diplomatic duties held
distinct advantages.
Special missions, which are temporary and short term, remain com-
mon diplomatic practice. They are undertaken not only when a sending
state lacks diplomatic representation in a host state, but also to reinforce
existing representation for an ad hoc purpose beyond the scope of rou-
tine relations. The visiting team could be comprised of experts required
for negotiation of a new bilateral agreement; official observers invited
to attend an election in the host state; head office-based staff who need
to shore up the logistical support for a presidential visit; and so forth.
The VCDR of 1961 makes provision for ad hoc special missions, and
22 Y. K. SPIES

the members of such delegations, for the duration of the visit, enjoy the
same privileges and immunities as the members of a resident embassy
(Switzerland FDFA 2008: 34).

Non-resident Ambassadors and Multiple Accreditations

An ambassador can be accredited to a host state without being resident
in that state, and he/she can be accredited to more than one state at a
time, regardless of where he/she is resident. In Romania, there are no
diplomatic missions of either Angola or Mozambique, but both African
states have ambassadors accredited to Romania: in Angola’s case, its
Ambassador is resident in neighbouring Serbia, while the Mozambican
Ambassador to Russia (resident in Moscow) is also accredited to
Romania. Indeed, there is no limit on the number of states that a single
ambassador can be accredited to—as long as the host states agree indi-
vidually to be part of the multiple accreditations. Thus, the Ambassador
of the Philippines to Nigeria, based in Abuja, is simultaneously accred-
ited to no fewer than 18 African states.4
While an ambassador is usually based in one of the states to which he/
she is accredited, this is also not a precondition. Some states (for reasons
of human resources availability or economic constraints) keep ambas-
sadors based at head office, and these individuals travel to their host
state(s) as and when required. The Finish Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
for example, has head office-based ambassadors for Central Asia, South
Caucasus and South Asia, with multiple accreditations in each of those
regions.
If the non-resident ambassador’s sending state happens to maintain a
resident mission in any state to which he/she is accredited, that office
would of necessity have to be managed on a routine basis by a chargé
d’affaires. This is in keeping with diplomatic law, which requires that a
diplomatic mission always be headed by a single, identified individual.

Ambassadors-at-Large
Contemporary ambassadorial assignments have taken on board a more
flexible approach to accommodate the many new roles that diplomats
assume. Larger powers in particular (whether those with a global role,
such as the USA and China or states that have a regional leadership pro-
file, such as Indonesia) often appoint individuals of high standing to
ambassadorial positions that are not defined by bilateral accreditation
to a state or multilateral accreditation to an organisation. Instead, these
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 23

ambassadors are tasked to represent the state’s foreign policy prioritisa-

tion of a specialised issue, such as nuclear non-proliferation, women’s
rights. They could also cover a designated geographical area, often as a
result of conflict in that region. Denmark, for example, has a head office-
based ‘Arctic Ambassador’, and Australia announced in November 2016
that it would appoint an ‘Ambassador for Cyber Affairs’. As such, these
ambassadors travel as expert representatives to participate in diplomatic
processes and engage, if required, in ‘shuttle diplomacy’. They also coor-
dinate the involvement of their own colleagues who might overlap on
the same thematic issue in their bilateral or multilateral work.
Within diplomatic law, ambassadors-at-large enjoy the same rights
and privileges as resident ambassadors. In practice, they tend to be con-
fidants of their own political principals and their standing is the same, if
not higher, than their resident peers. Individuals who hold or previously
held positions as ambassadors-at-large are often well known in the inter-
national arena: Ahmet Davutoğlu and Stavros Lambrinidis respectively
became Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece after serving their coun-
tries as ambassadors-at-large.
Ambassadors-at-large are also referred to as ‘special envoys’ or
‘roving5 ambassadors’. Taken to its extreme, they could be considered
peripatetic or itinerant—a notion of nomadic employment that is not
incompatible with diplomacy. Indeed, most career diplomats think
of themselves as professional nomads, considering even head office a
mere temporary posting. Just as their role could encompass a global
dimension, ambassadors-at-large could also have a domestic role,
advising key stakeholders and garnering popular support for a govern-
ment’s policy on a given issue.

Using Multilateral Venues or Third-Party Hosts

During the second half of the twentieth century, multilateral venues (ad
hoc conferences and permanent headquarters of international organisa-
tions such as ASEAN, UN, AU and EU) became a regular feature of the
global diplomatic arena. Member states of an organisation usually have
a resident mission at the organisation’s headquarters, and for reasons
of economy, a state might officially use that same mission for bilateral
work as well. Swaziland’s Embassy in Addis Ababa, for example, dou-
bles as embassy to Ethiopia and as permanent mission to the African
Union (AU) (it is also accredited bilaterally to various other states in the
region). The simultaneous presence of many state representatives in any
24 Y. K. SPIES

one location offers lots of opportunities to engage in all the different

modes of diplomacy, and it is universal practice for states to use the com-
mon arena for bilateral diplomacy, as and when required.
This is a particularly attractive option when states do not have rep-
resentation in each other’s territories. For poorer states with limited
bilateral representation, it can be a diplomatic lifesaver, but diplomats
who handle both bilateral and multilateral responsibilities have a heavy,
complex workload. It is made even more strenuous by the fact that inter-
national organisations attract so many visits by state leaders to attend
plenary sessions or other summits, and additional ad hoc visits by civil
servants from a state’s foreign ministry and other domestic ministries to
attend technical meetings. Ironically, therefore, the numerous oppor-
tunities for direct bilateral ‘side’ meetings between political principals
have contributed to the phenomenal growth of multilateral diplomacy in
recent decades (Berridge 1995: 32–33).
Another option is for bilateral diplomacy to take place within a third-
party host state. Cambodia and Mauritius do not maintain embassies in
each other’s territories, and it would thus be convenient for their dip-
lomats in Paris, where both states maintain resident embassies, to meet
each other for bilateral meetings. Third-party location also allows for
surreptitious contact between hostile states. Israel and Iran both have
embassies in Moscow, and they could use, if they were so inclined, their
simultaneous presence there to conduct bilateral diplomacy.

Shared Missions
The phenomenon of shared embassies under ‘normal circumstances’
is very limited, despite pragmatic pleas for pooled resources among
like-minded countries. During the late 1980s, Colombia, Mexico
and Venezuela experimented with joint embassies in the Caribbean,
Africa and Asia, ‘in order to maximize their presence’, as Rozental and
Buenrostro (2013: 239) explain. However, the joint ventures were
short-lived.
Canada and the UK. In September 2012, the two governments signed
an agreement to share certain embassy facilities in third countries, but
they were at pains to emphasise that they would not, anywhere in the
world, be represented by a single, joint head of mission. As UK Foreign
Minister William Hague phrased it ‘it is not about any diplomat trying
to work for two countries at the same time’ (UK HC in Ottawa 2012).
Rather, the cooperation would only reduce administration costs, for
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 25

example through sharing of the same building in a foreign capital, or by

pooling security and consular services. The Nordic countries have several
such shared arrangements in host states.
There are, however, various instances where a state takes care of
another state’s bilateral diplomatic interests as a result of economic or
political circumstances. But this proxy diplomacy usually denotes a prob-
lem in the foreign relations of the state that is taken care of. As a ‘third
party’ (rather than bilateral) mode of diplomacy, it will be discussed in
Chapter 4.

Virtual Representation
The twenty-first century’s new universe of virtual life is irresistible to
diplomatic practice. Foreign ministries and embassies—like other state
institutions, companies, NGOs and human enterprise in general—used
to require a distinctive physical address that legitimised their existence. A
‘geographical’ address continues to be important, but in the current era
that same entity becomes almost invisible if it does not have an Internet
address. To a lesser extent, this applies also to the platforms offered
by (proliferating) social media such as Facebook, Twitter, Google+,
YouTube, Instagram and so forth. Internet websites allow for a univer-
sal ‘presence’ and have therefore become an essential part of diplomatic
representation. For this reason, the websites of foreign ministries and
embassies need to be professionally developed and maintained. Their
content, security, ‘user-friendliness’ and accurate projection of a state’s
foreign policy priorities are as important as the effort put into design and
staffing of a physical embassy in a host state (Sucharipa 2003).
In a diplomatic practice ‘first ever’, during 2011 the US Department
of State developed a website called ‘Virtual Embassy of the United States
to Iran’. The initiative was taken in the absence of formal diplomatic
relations that would have allowed the USA to open a physical embassy in
Teheran. The virtual US Embassy, formally launched in December 2011,
resembles an ordinary embassy website, with the difference that other
websites are projections of actual resident embassies in host states. As the
DoS notes on the website itself:

This website is not a formal diplomatic mission, nor does it represent or

describe a real US Embassy accredited to the Iranian Government. But, in
the absence of direct contact, we hope it can serve as a bridge between the
American and Iranian people. (US DoS 2016)
26 Y. K. SPIES

Radu Cucos (2012), writing about the significance of this unprecedented

virtual diplomatic presence in lieu of an actual mission, says the virtual
embassy ‘does not have the full functionality of a traditional embassy or
consulate but it is the next best thing when such an embassy or consulate
does not exist’.
ICT-based diplomacy can also support a more integrated grid of
resources and expertise that can feed into the foreign policymaking
process. As Hocking et al. (2013: 4) explain, ‘the effective use of ICT
should allow skills and knowledge on a specific issue to be tapped wher-
ever they reside in the diplomatic network’. ICT therefore enlarges,
rather than replaces, the diplomatic representation of international
actors.

3   Protecting Interests

‘protecting in the receiving state the interests of the sending state and of its
nationals within the limits permitted by international law’ (VCDR 1961:
Art. 3b)

The most important national interest of any state is its citizens. (Kenyan
Ambassador Dan Nanjira 2010 [Vol. 1]: 135)

3.1   Public Interest(s), Public Service

States continue to maintain resident diplomatic missions across the
world based on the view that those offices protect and pursue interests
that cannot be delegated on an ad hoc basis to other agencies. Zakaria
Ahmad (1999: 128) writing about Malaysian diplomacy expressed it
thus:

The role of traditional diplomacy is still important in securing support

and agreement for Malaysia’s ideas and initiatives, an area of activity no
other agency can come close to in terms of results. For all the more initia-
tives and a more complex world, it is still the number of missions abroad,
staffed by the Wisma Putra officials, that can help to realise Malaysia’s
external interests. This indicates that the Wisma Putra officer is still
the man or woman at the front line defending or promoting Malaysia’s
national interests, and not therefore playing a diminished role in the
changed international circumstances.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 27

Career diplomats are civil servants, first and foremost; therefore, their
protective duty lies with the interests and rights of their own states’ cit-
izens. Much of this public service manifests in consular activity: assis-
tance to citizens who are living, travelling or working abroad and who
need access to own authorities for legal or administrative purposes.
Consular work essentially concerns the services that citizens would ordi-
narily obtain from other state agencies in their domestic environment.
Traditionally, such services were considered distinct from diplomacy,
hence the separately concluded Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(1963). The trend since then has been towards integration, rather than
segregation, of the two fields.
Consular work often transcends routine service and includes crisis
assistance during man-made and natural disasters. Not only designated
consular officers, but diplomats in general (if they are committed to their
profession!) stay alert to the plight of fellow nationals in the international
environment. This sense of loyalty prompts them to reach out to pris-
oners, destitute and other vulnerable persons through discretionary ges-
tures, based on public goodwill rather than prescribed duty.
Under international law, there is no ‘right’ to consular services and
governments are not obliged to provide public service outside their bor-
ders. The extent to which a state provides consular services outside its
borders depends on its resources, its network of diplomatic missions and
the profile of its own citizenry: their international movement and the
expectations they have of government service. This is not just a phenom-
enon in ‘open’ societies or liberal democracies. Maaike Okano-Heijmans
(2013: 479) gives the example of China’s largest ever consular evacua-
tion, during March 2011, involving more than 30,000 Chinese nation-
als who were stranded in war-torn Libya. She (2013: 473) observes that
public expectations across the world have become higher ‘as citizens
became more assertive, news reporting more international, and public–
private interaction more diverse’.
The massive increase in mobility of private individuals through migra-
tion, tourism, business and other travel is one of the reasons that resident
embassies remain vital in the contemporary world. Indeed, the sheer
volume of human travel and interaction across sovereign borders has
multiplied the amount of consular and technical assistance required of
embassy personnel. Investigating what it termed ‘Australia’s Diplomatic
Deficit’, the Sydney-based Lowy Institute for International Policy in
2009 issued a report on Australia’s diplomatic capacity in relation to
28 Y. K. SPIES

public expectations of service delivery. It found that the number of con-

sular cases handled by Australian resident missions in the period between
1996 and 2008 rose from 58,000 to almost 185,000 per annum.
Commenting on the report, Daniel Flitton (2010) cites the October
2002 bombings in Bali and the massive December 2004 Indian Ocean
tsunami, both of which highlighted emergency public service6 rendered
by Australian diplomatic missions. The downside of the commenda-
ble public service, he points out, is that the country’s ‘foreign service is
straining under the weight of expectations to help Australians who end
up in trouble abroad’, in part because the achievements of the foreign
service are manipulated by politicians to boost their domestic ratings.
Foreign services usually have a separate career-path for specially
trained administrative personnel who perform consular work in diplo-
matic missions (the work can also be done by specialist attachés who are
seconded from the relevant domestic ministries). But governments can
(and do) also delegate the appropriate legal and administrative author-
ity to career diplomats. The foreign ministry of Azerbaijan, for instance,
ensures that every one of its diplomatic missions is staffed with at least
two individuals who can perform consular duties—one being a dedicated
consular official, and the other a diplomat with the requisite training so
that he/she can temporarily, in case of leave or incapacitation, replace
the consular official. The US State Department goes a step further, by
requiring of all US diplomats to do consular service during their first
posting abroad. The importance of public service as part of diplomacy
also explains why countries such as India and France demand a general
civil service qualification of recruits to the foreign service.
Protecting and promoting the interests of a state’s own citizens are
not limited to consular services, and a bilateral embassy can have a wider,
community-building role regarding expatriates who live in the host state.
Chané Rama Dahya, who conducted research on the social role of bilat-
eral diplomatic missions in South Africa’s administrative capital, Pretoria,
observes the following:

Urban sociology has frequently critiqued social organisation in the city

for being characterised by alienation, estrangement, indifference and sol-
itude of the individual. Foreign missions however counteract this by the
role they play in community maintenance and formation. They create plat-
forms for the appreciation and expression of national, ethnic and cultural
belonging turning them into a bastion for community in a city of loosely
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 29

associated cityzens. This initiative to form enclaves of subcultures in the city

shapes the urban space uniquely. (Dahya 2015)

3.2   Security Interests

The debate on the extent to which resident diplomatic missions protect
state interests has inspired research by numerous state and non-state
entities, one of which was a study by Georgetown University’s Institute
for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD). In a June 1997 report called ‘Who
needs Embassies? How US Missions abroad help shape our world’, the ISD
concluded that the erosive effect of globalisation on sovereign borders
has amplified, rather than diminished, the necessity for resident embas-
sies. Problems that were previously dealt with sufficiently within the
context of a given state’s municipal law—organised crime, illegal immi-
gration and traffic in narcotics, arms, etc.—increasingly necessitate trans-
governmental collaboration on a continuous basis.
At individual state level, the need for integrated security efforts
explains the diplomatic practice of stationing representatives from vari-
ous government agencies under the aegis of a single embassy. Strobe
Talbott (1997: 77) says it is typical for US diplomats in key regional
embassies like those in Moscow and Bangkok to work alongside Justice
Department personnel to negotiate bilateral extradition agreements
and information-sharing deals related to criminal investigations. He
adds that all American consular officers, wherever they are stationed
across the world, cooperate with agents from the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), the Immigration and Naturalisation Service and
the intelligence community ‘to track suspected drug smugglers, ter-
rorists, and criminals and deny them entry into the United States’. For
the security agents of states, the advantage of working with (or as part
of) an embassy is that diplomatic missions are comprehensively pro-
tected by international law. This allows the representatives of a state to
tend to security interests in an organised, continuous and stable working
environment.
In addition to vigilance about the security of the premises, resources
and information that are entrusted to them, diplomats also need to con-
cern themselves with the security of their own nationals who are abroad.
For this reason, many embassies issue travel warnings to their citizens
(on issues of security, health, etc., in the host state) and in extreme cases
arrange the evacuation of their nationals from dangerous areas. But
30 Y. K. SPIES

travel warnings can be contentious, and not all states do so. Negative
travel advisories are seen by host states as damaging to bilateral relations.
When the US Embassy in Pretoria issued a travel warning to US citi-
zens during June 2016, citing threats of terror attacks in South Africa,
the host government was furious, especially because the warnings were
subsequently reiterated by the UK and Australian High Commissions
in Pretoria. After issuing a strongly worded press release questioning
the veracity of the intelligence reports that were used, the South African
foreign ministry summoned the ambassadors of the three countries to
express dissatisfaction with the manner in which the alerts were handled.
A growing security concern related to resident missions (and a reason
why many critics oppose the continued practice of resident diplomacy) is
that such offices are security hazards. On the one hand, they tend to end
up in the crossfire when a host country or its immediate region experi-
ences instability or conflict. Of even greater concern is that embassies are
becoming specific targets for violent attacks, especially by international
actors that do not abide by international law.

3.3   Ethics and Political Interests

Protection of a state’s interests is very closely related to promotion of
those same interests. Marshall (1997: 154) says ‘in essence, the business
of diplomacy is advocacy’. A diplomat is expected to influence interlocu-
tors in such a way that their decisions and actions are favourable to the
sending state’s foreign policy agenda. This is also how alliances are built
around specific foreign policy initiatives: even if the goal is a multilateral
venture, most of the preparation work involves bilateral diplomacy, with
various stakeholders lobbied on a one-to-one basis.
When a state pursues a prestigious goal, such as a bid to host a world
summit or international sporting event (Olympics, FIFA World Cup,
etc.), diplomats are put to the task of rallying support in the interna-
tional arena. The same applies when a state puts forward an own national
as candidate for an executive position within an international govern-
ance institution. During 2011 and early 2012, Africa witnessed a frac-
tious election campaign for the Chair of the AU Commission, after
South Africa announced the candidacy of its Home Affairs Minister
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. She challenged the incumbent Jean Ping,
a former Gabonese Foreign Minister who had only served one term in
the coveted AU post and whose expected second term was supported
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 31

by Francophone Africa. Dlamini-Zuma would be the first woman, first

Anglophone and first Southern African ever to lead the AU Commission,
and South African embassies all over the world (not just on the conti-
nent) were instructed to lobby African peers for support. Critics of the
South African candidature pointed out that the country had broken an
unspoken continental understanding that the influential position should
not be awarded to a candidate from a hegemonic state. But the effort
was successful (she was elected and assumed the post in January 2012),
bolstered by the intense and persuasive diplomatic campaign.
Protection (and promotion) of interests in the global arena can also
manifest in a state’s diplomatic ‘activism’. Official political or ideolog-
ical positions on international issues can be contentious, as diplomats
encounter when they have to voice a sending state’s concern about
human rights and governance issues in a host state. Certain states—in
particular middle powers, such as the Scandinavian countries—consider
advocacy of normative principles (good governance, democracy, human
rights and rule of law) to be part of their international diplomatic image.
Such considerations prompted Norway to shut its embassy in Lusaka
during April 2016. Norwegian Ambassador to Zambia at the time, Arve
Ofstad, declared that it was pointless to continue with elaborate devel-
opment involvement in a country with rampant corruption and a lack
of commitment to managing its own resources (Funga 2016). The offi-
cial announcement on the website of the Norwegian Embassy in Lusaka
was worded in a more temperate manner. In typical diplomatic jargon,
it cited ‘continuous adjustments and restructuring in light of budgetary
constraints and new priorities’ (Norway, Embassy in Lusaka 2015).
A bilateral diplomatic gesture can also be a congratulatory move: dur-
ing the first year of his US presidency, in July 2009 Barack Obama vis-
ited7 a single sub-Saharan African country: Ghana. His choice of state to
visit—no doubt at the behest of his top diplomatic advisors—was discon-
certing to Kenya, where his father hailed from, and sub-Saharan Africa’s
two giants, Nigeria and South Africa. The implicit political message
was that the USA considered (the much lower profile) Ghana, rather
than any of the other, to be an African model of good governance and
democracy.
The distinction between matters that are exclusively subject to
national jurisdiction and issues that transcend into the domain of global
ethics can be blurred. A sending state might profess to look out for
more than just its own political interests by instructing or allowing its
32 Y. K. SPIES

diplomats to campaign also for the human rights of the local population.
When the diplomats of a sending state sympathise with opposition to
the government of the host state, any related diplomatic activity can be
provocative. The privileges and immunities of diplomats give them con-
siderable leeway to interact with the population of a host state, and any
support (vocal or otherwise) for opposition groups can be perceived as
interference in the domestic affairs of the host, in contravention of the
1961 VCDR.
It is difficult for third-party observers to know whether alleged dip-
lomatic interference is real or conjured up by the host government for
reasons of political expediency. The USA and Bolivia have had tense
bilateral relations since 2006, when trade unionist Evo Morales was
elected President of the South American country. As part of his trade-
mark anti-Western rhetoric, Morales accused the superpower of using
its embassy in La Paz to support rebel groups in eastern Bolivia. When
anti-government demonstrations in eastern Bolivia turned violent dur-
ing September 2008, the country promptly expelled the US Ambassador,
Philip Goldberg, and declared him persona non grata. Two separate
US government agencies that worked under the auspices of the US
Embassy in La Paz, the US DEA and the US Agency for International
Development (USAID), were also subsequently expelled, the former
during October 2008 and the latter during May 2013. Both of them
were accused of political subversion.
Real or perceived political interference is often a function of a send-
ing state’s involvement with diaspora in a host state: Russia’s relations
with the Russian minority in Ukraine and France’s relations with its
expatriates in all the Francophone states of Africa are just two examples
of how bilateral relationships can have incestuous elements. These spe-
cific cases also remind us that the nature of a bilateral diplomatic rela-
tionship hinges on the relative power of the two parties vis-à-vis each
other.
At the individual level, bilateral diplomacy can be deftly wielded
through so-called visa diplomacy: denying visas to certain individuals in
order to make a political point. In such cases, the process is only consular
in terms of its implementation, as Okano-Heijmans (2013: 483) points
out. The act itself is tactical and part of a larger foreign policy strategy.
Thus, during October 2016, Alexander Yakovenko, Russian Ambassador
to the UK, accused the British government of ‘shrinking’ his embassy in
London by delaying the granting of visas to Russian Embassy staff. His
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 33

allegation came amidst souring relations between the two states: earlier
that same month, the outspoken British Foreign Minister Boris Johnson
had told parliament that Russia was at risk of becoming ‘a pariah nation’
(BBC 2016).
An ongoing visa dilemma concerns the Tibetan Dalai Lama, who lives
in exile in India but travels extensively around the world, sponsored by
human rights groups. When he is denied a visa by a state, it is almost
without exception as a result of Chinese pressure to do so: China regards
it as interference in its domestic affairs when the Dalai Lama is allowed
entry to a foreign country and much more so when he is granted official
audience there.

3.4   Economic Interests

Article 3 of the 1961 VCDR mentions the economic dimension of diplo-
macy only as part of the function of building friendly relations. I have
chosen to discuss it under interests protection/promotion, because the
surge in economic diplomacy since the 1960s indicates a more compel-
ling, interests-driven function of diplomacy.
Representation of traders’ interests was the foundation of the consular
institution, and as such, until well into the twentieth century, it was con-
ducted separately from the ‘high politics’ of diplomacy (Okano-Heijmans
2013: 479). Diplomats spurned trade as being infra dig8 (beneath their
station), and the British dictum, ‘trade follows the flag’, encapsulated
this traditional hierarchy of interests.
By the 1960s, however, economics had become a fundamental dip-
lomatic concern, and to their credit, the British were among the first
to acknowledge the changed imperatives for diplomats. Two sepa-
rate government investigations—summarised in the Plowden Report
of 1964 and the 1996 Duncan Report—both called for British diplo-
mats to be trained in economics (Hamilton and Langhorne 1995: 220).
Subsequent economic events with global ramifications for diplomacy,
notably the oil shocks of the 1970s, confirmed the gist of the British
reports.
While most of the activities that were traditionally performed by
consular posts can be defined as commercial diplomacy, the new phe-
nomenon of economics as instrument of foreign policy manifested in
strategic economic diplomacy. Brendan Vickers (2012: 112) describes
economic and commercial diplomacy respectively as the ‘high and low
34 Y. K. SPIES

politics of a country’s international economic relations’. Commercial

diplomacy entails practical support for a state’s business sector through
facilitation of investment, promotion of exports, tourism, promotion of
joint ventures, mobilisation of external resources, participation in trade
fairs and exhibitions, etc. The concept of economic diplomacy is wider
than that because it addresses the regulatory frameworks within which
markets function, i.e. the politics of economics. A useful explanation is
‘decision-making and negotiation in core issues affecting international
economic relations’, as Woolcock and Bayne (2013: 385) define eco-
nomic diplomacy.
With the possible exception of states that are embroiled in violent
conflict, the foreign policy agendas of most countries in the world are
now dominated by economic concerns. This priority reflects in the prac-
tice of all modes of diplomacy. India, for example, launched a national
flagship programme called ‘Make in India’ during 2014, described as ‘a
comprehensive and unprecedented overhaul of out-dated processes and
policies’ (India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry 2016). The cam-
paign was subsequently integrated into the work of all India’s diplomatic
missions.
In many embassies, the pursuit of economic interests overshadows
all other concerns. Whereas mercantile interests were traditionally
handled by consular officials, the trend is now for embassies to have
a designated commercial or economics division, where economists
and other experts from home departments are seconded as attachés.
Relevant ministries include those responsible for agriculture, interna-
tional trade, minerals and energy, whatever the economic priorities of
the sending state. These attachés rather than the (traditionally tasked)
consular officials will handle issues related to economics, such as bilat-
eral trade disputes (Okano-Heijmans 2013: 480). Their networked
access in the host state is particularly helpful when complex legislation
or culturally unusual practices threaten to intimidate business people
from the sending state.
Most countries also have government (or quasi-government, even
non-governmental) investment promotion agencies (IPAs) that supple-
ment the work of economic diplomats. In recognition of the importance
of IPAs, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) established the World Association of Investment Promotion
Agencies (WAIPA) during 1995. Headquartered in Istanbul, as of April
2018, it had more than 170 members from 130 countries.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 35

Whether or not a diplomat works in the commercial section of an

embassy, he/she will invariably be confronted with economic ques-
tions on a regular basis. The majority of interlocutors will want to
be convinced of sound economic indicators in the diplomat’s send-
ing state. Rozental and Buenrostro (2013: 234) make the point that
although more economists than ever before are entering the profession
of diplomacy, traditional diplomatic skills are still required to deal with
the complex negotiations across international lines. Diplomats have to
advance their countries’ interests—the entire spectrum of interests—in
the face of fierce international competition and limited opportunities.
They are trained to counter negative perceptions and to provide holis-
tic context: not only legal-procedural, but also ethical, cultural, polit-
ical and even environmental. The corollary, as mentioned earlier, is
that diplomats need to be well grounded in economic diplomacy. As
Geun Lee (1998) observed in the wake of the Asian financial crisis,
the region’s diplomats were poorly equipped to understand the impli-
cations of debt management, structural adjustment and issues such as
labour market flexibility, risk analysis and investment and export envi-
ronments. Comprehensive training in economic diplomacy, not only in
economics per se, was subsequently introduced in diplomatic training
curricula across Asia.

3.5   Development—A Primary Interest

Economic development is a primary imperative for the majority of states
in the world. For diplomats from developing countries, the scope of this
concern transcends the economic diplomacy practised by their peers
from industrialised states, because they are at the frontline of their indi-
vidual states’ struggle against global marginalisation.
Robert Mudida (2012: 96) says the economic diplomacy of African
states amounts to ‘a diplomacy of development’, and his statement rings
true for the entire Developing World. In the case of Ethiopia, the late
Prime Minister Meles Zenawi drafted a Foreign Affairs and National
Security Policy and Strategy in 2002 and placed the pursuit of economic
development at the core of Ethiopian diplomats’ duties. He foresaw
that the country’s foreign service would be organised, trained and coor-
dinated with this overall imperative. But diplomatic implementation of
economic foreign policy goals is decidedly more difficult than the (polit-
ical) formulation of those same goals. Although Ethiopian diplomacy
36 Y. K. SPIES

subsequently became more assertive in support of the ‘developmental

state’ objective, critics maintain that a decade later, the state’s economic
diplomacy continued to suffer from inadequate resources and focus
(Addis Fortune 2013).
The challenges are formidable. Developing state diplomats have to
compete for their sending states’ access to markets, international finance
and investment in the same pool of limited opportunities available to
highly industrialised states. Their official ‘interests protection’ duty also
takes on an ethical-economic dimension: they have to counter the trade
protectionism of much stronger states and ensure that the terms of trade,
aid and investment are conducive to sustainable development in their
sending states.
Diplomats from aid recipient countries based in donor host states
operate in an environment of beholden relations, as they seek assis-
tance and have to account for the utilisation of whatever aid had been
granted. Beyond their obvious state development objectives, they
have to try and move the bilateral relationship beyond that of glaring
asymmetry. This is a tough call because the international discourse
around development is fraught with political undercurrents. Donors of
development aid are often suspected of being politically or commer-
cially motivated while receivers can be seen as cynical and ungrateful
(Berridge 1995: 50). The mutual suspicion makes bilateral interaction
stressful.
Resident missions of the donor states play a key role in the
aid-granting relationship. Diplomats ‘on the ground’ can monitor
implementation of the assistance to ensure that the sending govern-
ment’s foreign policy objectives are achieved. In situ they are also in
a good position to coordinate the efforts of the various entities that
are involved in the process. Most aid-granting countries have special-
ised agencies that deal with development assistance and diplomats can
advise on the bilateral political relations. But diplomats from donor
states are also faced with unrealistic expectations because they are seen,
at the personal level, as wielders of distributive power. This means that
they are likely to be approached by public as well as civil entities who
want assistance in some form or another, and who expect that a diplo-
mat from an affluent country acts as gatekeeper to resources. It is obvi-
ous why Berridge (1995: 50–51) describes donor–recipient relations as
‘notoriously delicate’.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 37

4  Negotiating
‘negotiating with the government of the receiving state’ (VCDR 1961: Art. 3c)

The diplomatic profession, moreover, is a repository of specialist skills and

techniques in the business of negotiation. (Australian scholar Hedley Bull
1977: 174)

4.1   A Negotiated World

The world of international relations is a tapestry of negotiation out-
comes. Constitutions, charters, peace agreements, sovereign borders,
alliances—we live by countless results of human ‘deals’. Hampson et al.
(2013: 320) observe that the many options available for states to address
interstate disputes (inter alia arbitration, adjudication and judicial
means) have not diminished the inclination of states to resort to direct,
bilateral negotiations. ‘This is because states are often reluctant to let
themselves be governed by extranational legal institutions even if they
have formally agreed to submit themselves to the legal rules and norms
of those institutions’.
Diplomatic negotiations preceded most of the landmark interna-
tional events in history—think of the historic peace treaty concluded
between Egypt and Israel in 1979, following the Camp David talks; or
the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, wherein Germany and the
Soviet Union secretly agreed to enlarge their territorial ‘spheres of influ-
ence’. Counterfactual evidence does not exist, but it is widely accepted
that diplomatic negotiations have averted cataclysmic events. The frantic
talks during the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, when nuclear war
between the USA and USSR seemed imminent, are a poignant example.
The vast bulk of diplomatic negotiations that take place around
the world on a daily basis concerns much less dramatic agreements.
Bilateral—in addition to multilateral, third party and polylateral—nego-
tiations continue to shape the world as we know it. Many diplomatic
negotiations are informal or do not result in formal agreements such
as treaties and memoranda of understanding (MOUs). When a formal
agreement is concluded, its ‘packaging’ depends entirely on the objec-
tives of the signatories and the consequences, including international
legal obligations, can be considerable. The diplomats who negotiate the
38 Y. K. SPIES

deals are therefore required to be particularly skilled and work in close

cooperation with the legal component that all foreign ministries have.

4.2   A Very Specific Skill

William Zartman (2013: 106) defines negotiation as ‘… the process of
combining divergent positions into a joint decision’. This skill (or art, or
both!) has always been such an integral part of diplomatic practice that
many authors use the two concepts interchangeably. Geoff Berridge, a
British scholar and diplomatic historian, dedicates a substantive part of
his widely used textbook Diplomacy Theory and Practice9 to analysis of
‘The Art of Negotiation’, thereby confirming diplomacy’s innate purpose
as a bridging endeavour.
Not surprisingly then, negotiation skills have been elaborated upon in
countless books, manuals and treatises throughout the recorded history
of diplomacy. Much international research has gone into the effective
teaching of negotiating techniques, focusing on the procedural as well as
contextual and socio-psychological aspects. The resultant body of exper-
tise has impacted also the contemporary bargaining techniques that are
used in the corporate world.
MFAs typically offer, or encourage their diplomats to attend, special-
ist courses in negotiation skills. The focus tends to be on the thematic
areas that feature prominently in the state’s foreign policy, such as devel-
opment aid, nuclear non-proliferation. These areas change as global or
regional politics evolves. The Asian financial crisis, as earlier mentioned,
did not just play up the need for economic diplomatic skills but specifi-
cally indicated a dearth of skills in the conduct of economic negotiations
with international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the IMF, foreign
banks and even domestic actors (Lee 1998). The UK’s ‘Brexit’ move,
following its referendum on 23 June 2016 to leave the European Union,
is likely to have a similar implication for British diplomats. For the dura-
tion of the country’s EU membership, its multilateral trade negotiations
were handled by EU negotiators rather than a corps of British experts.
In some instances, diplomats might need to adjust their techniques to
accommodate new structural realities. Mexico’s inclusion in the trilateral
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that came into oper-
ation during 1994 necessitated a more assertive negotiating approach
by its diplomats, given the size and diplomatic capacity of the other
two NAFTA members, the USA and Canada (Rozental 1999: 138).
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 39

Mudida (2012: 106) cites the training that Kenyan diplomats have
undergone in recent years, specifically in the domain of economic diplo-
macy, so as to articulate and bargain better the development interests of
their country. The skill is required not only vis-à-vis donor states but also
in order to coordinate diplomatic strategy with their peers from other
developing countries.

4.3   Why Diplomats?

Diplomats, by virtue of their representational status, bring to a negotiat-
ing table all the power and prestige of their political principals. This, in
essence, is why negotiation is codified through international law into a
core function of diplomacy. Critics of the profession tend to argue that
any serious negotiations ought to happen directly between political prin-
cipals, but there are distinct advantages to having professional intermedi-
aries doing the negotiations. Politicians may pride themselves on being
cosmopolitan and having close relationships with leaders of other states,
but as the Paschke report noted, this is often simply an ‘illusion of famili-
arity’ (Sucharipa 2003).
Diplomacy offers subtlety, confidentiality and perseverance, the ele-
ments required in negotiation to incubate delicate, complex international
relations. Moreover, diplomats have first-hand experience of the host
state conditions that affect the negotiations. In a spirited defence of the
resident ambassador, Berridge (1995: 40) argues that the expert on the
ground is in a far better position to manage state-level communication
in the course of routine duties, all the more so when a negotiation pro-
cess is protracted. He points out that interstate communication some-
times specifically needs discreet and unhurried conduct, so as not to raise
public concern about matters that may be resolved diplomatically. Sasson
Sofer (1988: 203) concurs:

Politicians are no substitute for the accumulative experience of professional

diplomats abroad. Agreements concluded between top-ranking statesmen
must be maintained, nurtured, and subjected to periodic reassessment.

Indeed, the outcome of a high-level summit meeting between political

executives is usually just the pinnacle of extensive diplomatic ground-
work, the preparations by officials that enable political executives to ‘sign
on the dotted line’. When they shake hands in front of flashing cameras,
40 Y. K. SPIES

politicians tend to be credited with the achievement, whereas the public

meeting is just a symbolic gesture to legitimise the process. And, as Sofer
indicated, any summit requires diplomatic follow-up and implementa-
tion, done at a functional level beyond the impatient glare of the media.
Political summits are not necessarily an indication of diplomatic suc-
cess, but they are always confirmation of executive endorsement of the
diplomatic process. In some cases, they are used to establish a perma-
nent, institutionalised mechanism (supplementary to the normal dip-
lomatic channels) to prioritise the bilateral diplomatic process. One
example is the creation of a joint committee to handle a specific prob-
lematic issue. During November 2014, China and Japan concluded a
four-point agreement related to the bilateral dispute over islands10 in the
East China Sea. In typically diplomatic language, the agreement called
on both sides to engage in diplomatic, political and security dialogue to
improve bilateral relations. Importantly, the negotiators agreed to create
a ‘crisis management mechanism’ to mitigate any future conflict on the
issue (Tiezzi 2014).
Institutionalised diplomatic negotiations also manifest in bilateral joint
commissions with a wider mandate to resolve sticking points between
two countries. The bilateral relationship is usually a high priority for
both states, and the joint commission is established to iron out disagree-
ments that might arise as relations expand. For instance, a bilateral agree-
ment on the avoidance of double taxation might have to be negotiated
within the commission.
If the VCDR were to be revised, the 1961 description of the nego-
tiation function would probably expand on the interlocutors stipulated.
‘Negotiating with the government of the receiving state’ is somewhat of
an understatement in the contemporary era. Diplomats in bilateral post-
ings negotiate with a huge range of foreign policy actors, including non-
state entities such as corporations, and the diplomats of third states. John
Hemery (2002: 143) adds that diplomatic negotiation also has a crucial
domestic element. In the course of developing internal policy in MFAs,
diplomats engage with their own colleagues in the process of clarifying
objectives, setting priorities and focusing on essentials as part of foreign
policy formulation and implementation. This also applies to wider inter-
action with peers in the rest of an own government in order to coordi-
nate strategy that normally involves a range of domestic ministries, as is
often the case with economic development (Barston 1997: 15).
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 41

It is true that much international negotiation nowadays happens

between ‘technocrats’ rather than diplomats. Specialists from other gov-
ernment departments regularly engage in the technical negotiations that
determine agreements on specialised themes. But even so, the ground-
work for the negotiations is still the preserve of diplomats. As Rozental
and Buenrostro (2013: 233) express it, diplomats ‘still play a key role in
getting countries to the very point of negotiating an agreement’.

4.4   ‘Virtual’ Negotiations

Technological innovation has made it possible for diplomats to meet
and interact, whether separated by corridors or continents. By the same
token, ICT can facilitate the function of negotiation. Draft documents
can be circulated electronically via e-mail or other communication
applications, the sharing and group editing of documents on websites,
‘clouds’ and so forth. Negotiations can be done where participants see
and hear each other in real time, by means of video-conferencing, Skype
and other platforms.
Sucharipa (2003), drawing on his own experience as Austrian diplo-
mat in complex negotiation processes, recommends that wider use be
made of technology-supported negotiation. Beyond the many practical
advantages (not least of which the fact that a negotiating partner need
not be physically present), however, there are pitfalls to the world of vir-
tual negotiations. Brian Hocking and Jan Melissen (2015) emphasise
the crucial element of trust in any negotiation process and the need to
nurture the human relationships that anchor the process. As they point
out, ‘in digital settings access to online resources permitting face-to-face
interaction is diminished, which makes it harder to ‘read’ interlocutors
and measure their sincerity’. Technology-assisted negotiations also tend
to be accompanied by social media exposure, as negotiators or their sup-
port staff take to ‘tweeting’, ‘blogging’, ‘vlogging’ or otherwise sharing
images, commentary and updates on the process, with resultant reaction
(and impact on the process) from a wider range of actors.
Successful Internet-based negotiation, to an even larger extent than
traditional, face-to-face negotiations, therefore demands a common
understanding of the ground rules of the process. Most importantly, it
requires trust in the bona fides of the negotiating partners (Sucharipa
2003).
42 Y. K. SPIES

5   Information Gathering and Reporting

‘ascertaining, by all lawful means, conditions and developments in the
receiving state and reporting thereon to the government of the sending state’
(VCDR 1961: Art. 3d)

One of a diplomat’s essential abilities is knowing where to find needed infor-

mation, how to acquire and interpret it speedily and accurately, and then to
make imaginative use of it. (British diplomatist Ernest Satow 1979: 79)

5.1   Ascertaining What?

A classic role of diplomats is to be ‘hunter gatherers’ of information, and
the Vienna Convention indicates that the area of inquiry concerns ‘con-
ditions and developments in the receiving state’. This focus is fundamental
but the information that is useful and advantageous to a sending state
can be extracted and supplemented from a much wider target area.
All the knowledge a diplomat so constantly collects needs to be con-
textualised within various perspectives: a sending state’s own needs and
interests; the needs and interests of the receiving state; and broader
regional or global trends and imperatives. Thus, a Mozambican diplomat
in Lisbon would be on the lookout for information about Mozambique
itself; monitor the evolving political, economic and social situation of
the host state, Portugal; and stay informed about international relations
also beyond the scope of the bilateral relationship. Information about
Mozambique (in addition to the newsfeed from home) can be gleaned
from interaction with expatriates and foreign nationals, officials, organ-
isations and companies that have links to Mozambique, and monitoring
of local media coverage. Regarding Portugal, the conditions and develop-
ments in the receiving state will impact Portugal’s foreign policy towards
the rest of the world, and the Mozambican diplomat will be interested
not only in the host state’s policies towards Mozambique specifically, but
by extension also its relations with areas of the world that Mozambique
identifies with. These could range from the Southern African region, the
continent of Africa, the Lusophony (Portuguese-speaking countries) and
the wider Developing World.
Moreover, the bilateral relationship will be impacted by events beyond
the obvious information ‘catchment’ area. Portugal’s relations with its
immediate neighbours, the Mediterranean region, the European Union,
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 43

NATO and so forth might all be of interest, especially if there are spill-
over implications for the country’s relations with the rest of the world.
The same Mozambican diplomat will therefore have to stay informed
on a wide spectrum of issues, so as to have a global perspective. Indeed,
constant ‘information vigilance’ is required of all diplomats, wherever
they are and whomever they represent, in order to contextualise dip-
lomatic reporting on a given relationship or issue. A multidimensional
perspective elucidates the areas of sensitivity, potential areas of coopera-
tion or conflict, and broader regional and multilateral concerns that are
shared in a diplomatic relationship.

5.2   Only ‘by All Lawful Means’!

Diplomats find information in myriad ways: personal interaction with
policymakers, bureaucrats or opinion leaders; participation in local
events; reading of media, books and material that might not be generally
available; attendance of briefings, seminars and workshops; and obser-
vation of events such as elections, rallies and so forth. Opportunities
abound, especially in ‘open’ societies with freedom of association and
expression. The description of diplomats’ information-gathering function
contains a crucial caveat; however, they may do so only by lawful means.
If they break the laws of a host state in their efforts to collect informa-
tion, they veer into the murky world of espionage.
In a competitive world, the stakes are high and the information
‘shopping’ range is huge, covering not only political issues but also the
industrial and technological advances of foreign states. Some state rep-
resentatives access or buy information covertly, and when host gov-
ernments suspect such ‘undiplomatic’ activity, they have the option
of expelling the diplomats involved. It is unfortunately not a rare phe-
nomenon, and many states have been involved in such incidents.
During March 2011, the Iranian Ambassador to Kuwait and several of
his embassy staff members were accused of spying and were promptly
expelled from the host state. A few months later, in May 2011, the same
fate befell Colonel Vadim Leiderman, Israeli military attaché in Moscow.
The Russian foreign ministry accused him of soliciting secret informa-
tion from a Russian citizen, and he was declared persona non grata. In
both these examples, as indeed in the vast majority of similar diplomatic
‘spying’ incidents, the sending state vehemently denied the allegations.
For external observers, it is difficult to know whether individuals who are
44 Y. K. SPIES

accused of being undercover spies had erred or not—the very nature of

espionage is obscure. Resultant bilateral tension is often vented by means
of ‘tit-for-tat’ expulsions.

5.3   Information ‘Management’

In the past, just getting access to information was a major preoccupation
of diplomats, but in today’s world information is abundantly accessible,
and to more people than ever before. The omnipresence of the media
means that (in theory, at least) a government should have no problem
accessing information on any subject of its choice—and critics argue that
this has diminished11 the need for information gathering and reporting
by diplomats. But the sheer volume of information in the public domain,
and the reality that much of what is available is sensationalised, outdated,
simplistic, one-sided, contradictory or simply factually inaccurate, means
that there is more need than ever for proper information management.
Diplomats with comprehensive understanding of their own countries’
foreign policy priorities are best placed to gather relevant, accurate and
authoritative information, and to add value to the information through
critical analysis thereof.
The presence of diplomats in host societies allows them to acquire
additional insights. Certain perspectives and ‘off the record’ remarks can
only be obtained through personal contact. Advance warning of a confi-
dential strategy and opinions that might be controversial or reflecting a
minority or opposition insider view are unlikely to be available in print.
Personal diplomatic information-gathering procedures—the traditional
techniques—are even more necessary in ‘closed’ societies where resident
embassies (inter alia on account of their immunities and privileges) have
more access to information than do media.
Information management is a crucial diplomatic skill, because indi-
vidual diplomats, like anybody else, can fall victim to information over-
load. If that happens, they risk becoming overwhelmed, lost in irrelevant
detail, and ultimately strategically disoriented. If this happens, they will
also lose sight of their other core duties.
For diplomats from struggling states, the challenge might be the
opposite—whereas advances in technology have variously challenged
and assisted diplomatic missions, it is the very lack thereof that confronts
diplomats from the least developed states. Insufficient ICT infrastruc-
ture results in them struggling to compete with the speed of political
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 45

developments that are observed, reported on and reacted to by other

diplomatic actors.

5.4   The Imperative of Reporting

The diplomatic function twinned with information gathering is to
report back to an own sending state. Reporting is not the same as sim-
ply relaying information, and diplomats who neglect this duty are pro-
fessionally redundant. States need representatives ‘on the ground’ who
can sift, select, compare and analyse information, enrich it with observa-
tions gleaned in other settings and then compile succinct, useful reports.
Political executives need to understand the actual or potential impact of
international developments. This requires diplomats to provide proper
context, identify trends and advise on appropriate proactive or reactive
foreign policy actions. Their reports, moreover, should be sent in good
time and to the right recipients: the stakeholders who need the informa-
tion and who are mandated to act on it.
Diplomats traditionally sent their reports to a single anchoring ‘desk’
within a sending state’s foreign ministry, from where appropriate fol-
low-up action would be coordinated. But electronic mass communica-
tion has made it possible, even essential, for reports to be transmitted
simultaneously to a number of stakeholders. Some of these might be
outside the foreign ministry, even outside government. The very action
of selecting recipients has therefore become more complicated, as intra-
departmental hierarchies and interdepartmental sensitivities need to be
taken into account. A diplomat’s networking skills among his/her own
colleagues are therefore as important as skills that target foreigners.
The sending of diplomatic reports has a security element, hence the
obligatory classification of reports on a continuum stretching from ‘en
claire’ (literally, not encoded and thus safe for anybody to see) through
to ‘top secret’. In between the two extremes, foreign ministries can assign
any number of classification labels to indicate how sensitive the informa-
tion is and who the authorised recipients might be. Classified information
is treated as such because its indiscriminate use can harm relations with
the host (or other) state or otherwise impact negatively on the interests of
the sending state. The 1961 and 1963 Vienna Conventions emphasised
that diplomatic communications should be free from interference, but the
conventions were drafted before ICT advances opened up myriad ways in
which electronic communications can be manipulated.
46 Y. K. SPIES

The implied role that diplomats assume when they report to their
own governments is that of being official advisors. This duty—rooted in
diplomats’ official representation of a political entity—is indispensable.
Although diplomats do not formulate foreign policy, the latter often
reflects their advice on whether existing policy is sufficient or appro-
priate, achievable and how far a government should go towards real-
ising foreign policy objectives. The sincerity of such advice is crucial if
a diplomat is to serve his/her country with professional commitment.
Sadly, the counsel of a diplomat is not always welcomed. Abba Eban
(1998: 98), himself a seasoned diplomat, cautioned: ‘while govern-
ments may sometimes have suffered through taking too much notice of
ambassadors, a greater affliction has arisen from taking too little notice
of them’. Diplomats do not control the actions of their principals but
must avoid the easy option of sycophancy, or risk becoming profession-
ally superfluous. A diplomat’s honesty and discretion are also crucial
in communications with a host state and third parties, not only for the
sake of his/her own credibility, but also in service of the positive image
of the sending state.
The advice from diplomats is not always intentionally shunned—
in some cases, a foreign ministry’s lack of capacity leads to inade-
quate liaison between the head office and the network of diplomatic
missions. Hamilton and Langhorne (1995: 212) point out that in
such a situation, diplomats’ ‘reports may be neglected, their advice
ignored, and such intelligence as they have gathered left uncollated
and unutilised’. The foreign ministries of ‘struggling’ states experi-
ence compounded challenges, and these impact negatively on the abil-
ity of their diplomats to perform the core functions that the VCDR
encoded.
Quite another problem presents when a state chooses not to have
bilateral representation in a state or region where it has strategic inter-
ests. In an article on the US’ often dismissive attitude to global diplo-
matic culture, Geoffrey Wiseman (2005) cites the absence of a resident
US Embassy in Baghdad as one of the reasons the USA misread the
political signals coming from the Saddam Hussein regime. According
to Wiseman, for 29 of the 36 years before (including the twelve years
immediately prior to) the Iraq invasion, there was no American Embassy
in Baghdad. This meant that the US Administration did not rely suffi-
ciently on human intelligence from Iraq (read diplomats on the ground)
before invading the state in 2003.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 47

5.5   Reporting for Posterity

The wide-spectrum knowledge that diplomats are required to have, and
their constant gathering of information, explains why they are the quin-
tessential ‘specialist generalists’ of international relations. They constitute
a unique epistemic community and their communications and activities
are constantly recorded and archived, as per requirement of official pub-
lic service.
The value added by diplomats to the knowledge industry is a long-
term, global reality—a fact that is not always appreciated by observers.
From time to time, and not always by official design, their contribution
becomes prematurely public. As Malone (2013: 125) says ‘very few dip-
lomatic dispatches amount to works of literary or analytical genius, but
the WikiLeaks trove – alongside national archives and some diplomatic
diaries – reveal a number of diplomatic writers as deeply thoughtful, inci-
sive, elegant, and convincing’.
Throughout the ages, therefore, diplomatic records have constituted
a major source of recorded history and foreign ministries are veritable
treasure chests of information on developments within and among states.
Their implicit role as ‘historians’ bestows particular importance on the
reports, minutes of meetings and other routine recordings of diplomats’
professional activity.

6   Promoting and Developing Relations

‘promoting friendly relations between the sending state and the receiv-
ing state and developing their economic, cultural and scientific relations’
(VCDR 1961: Art. 3e)

while the single-minded pursuit of self-interest may seem to work in the

short term, it never does in the long term. (former IAEA Director General
Mohamed El Baradei 2008)

6.1   The Human Element

It is the very nature of diplomacy to navigate cross-cultural schisms or
as Cohen (1999: 16) phrases it eloquently: ‘to work on the bound-
ary between cultures as an interpretative and conjunctive mechanism’.
Wherever they happen to be, and under all circumstances, diplomats
48 Y. K. SPIES

initiate and nurture contacts—and these networks ideally become

self-sustainable. The advantage of personal interaction on a continuous
basis is one of the most compelling arguments in favour of the institution
of resident embassies. Major corporations also establish representative
offices abroad to benefit from ‘knowledge on the ground’, but diplomats
have a much more holistic role than salespeople. Berridge (1995: 35–36)
says the diplomat ‘on the spot’ has a remedial role in interstate commu-
nications, by identifying and rectifying errors, including unintended (but
all too frequent) misunderstandings among different political principals.
ICT, as discussed, offers exciting complementary options for diplo-
mats to do their work, but direct human interaction remains indispensa-
ble in the business of building international relations. Indeed, Burt and
Robison’s (1998: 61) forward-looking report Reinventing diplomacy in
the information age cautioned against ‘a zealous embrace of unstable and
complicated technology that leads diplomats away from the societies in
which they specialise to the false comfort of a virtual world’. Diplomats
must be personally engaged within the host state environment in order
to build the mutual trust that underpins international cooperation.
Jon Alterman, a former policy planning official at the US State
Department, noted that even with guaranteed flexibility, secrecy and
informality, an electronic messaging system can never be a substitute for
direct human contact. ‘It still matters if you are in the room with some-
one. It’s hard to read body language from a text message. Text doesn’t
communicate intonation at all’, he said. ‘The challenge of text-based
communication is that people read into it what’s not there, and miss
what is there’ (Borger et al. 2016).
In some cases, the direct human approach is not only advisable, but
the only option. In its 1997 report, the ISD warned that it is easy for crit-
ics in affluent countries to argue that ICT advances have made resident
embassies redundant, but they forget that technological progress is asym-
metrical. Certain countries, while being of strategic diplomatic impor-
tance, may not feature as prominently on international airline routes or
be as ‘linked to the web’ as others that are strategically less important.
It is therefore of relatively more importance for states to have resident
embassies in those ‘obscure’ capitals. Belgium, for example, maintains an
embassy in Kinshasa, but not in Wellington. New Zealanders are among
the world’s most active Internet users12 but clearly the Democratic
Republic of Congo, which has among the least active Internet usage in
the word, holds much more strategic value for the Belgians.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 49

6.2   The ‘Official’ Friendly Relations

The gist of the VCDR is that diplomats nurture state-to-state relations.
It is therefore of primary importance for diplomats to ensure good,
and increasingly closer, ‘official’ relations between a sending state and
the host. Manifestations thereof can be seen, inter alia, in the level at
which diplomats are received by a host government (routine access to
senior decision-makers) and the legal-institutional links that are created
(cooperation agreements, binational commissions, enlarged diplomatic
representation, etc.). Diplomats generally encourage visits at every level
between their own and the host country, and the physical presence of
dignitaries from one state in another is a positive sign. Facilitation of
high-level visits (‘VIP’ visits) both to and from a sending state has been
dismissed by critics as ‘travel agency’ work, but effective diplomats use
such contact opportunities to maximum effect. They brief and debrief
opinion makers and thus contribute to the ongoing and multidimen-
sional process of foreign policymaking and implementation.
In the contemporary era, neither the sending nor the host govern-
ment can be treated as a monolithic entity. Apart from navigating the
many components (with related interests) of an own sending govern-
ment, a diplomat needs to engage with a complex host government—
its various sectors, quasi-institutions and governance bodies at national
as well as subnational levels. Diplomats cannot restrict their engagement
to the confines of a capital city, they have to reach out and network
with decision-makers wherever the latter are, often in other provinces
or metropoles and in rural areas. Moreover, global democratisation has
elevated the importance of representative entities. At the official level,
‘parliaments are now essential allies of diplomats, making lobbying a sig-
nificant part of their job’ (Rozental and Buenrostro 2013: 230). In fact,
a recent trend is for parliaments to have direct relations with peer insti-
tutions in other countries, with or without the intermediation of diplo-
mats. This transgovernmental ‘diplomacy’ is part of a wider process that
challenges the coordinating role of foreign ministries.
From a bilateral relations perspective, the high point of a diplomat’s
posting is when a head of state visit takes place. Not all visits are equal
in terms of one’s foreign policy objectives—there are obviously certain
heads of state who, by virtue of personal charisma or the political/eco-
nomic weight of his/her country, are more ‘in demand’ than others.
Nevertheless, from a protocol point of view, any state visit is accorded
50 Y. K. SPIES

the highest attention and the preparations need to be immaculate.

During such a high-level visit, the diplomat is expected not only to
arrange all details of the programme (in consultation with the host coun-
try’s protocol division) but also to tend to the visitors in every respect.
From accompanying them, sometimes interpreting for them, taking
them sightseeing, taking minutes in meetings, arranging press confer-
ences and itineraries for accompanying delegations, arranging concur-
rent receptions, exhibitions, etc., a state visit entails enormous effort. So
much so that until recently, it was practice for British Ambassadors to
be knighted after a successful state visit of the Queen to their country of
accreditation!
Similarly, when the head of state of a diplomat’s host country decides
to visit the sending state, the embassy will be involved in the planning of
the visit in cooperation with its own foreign ministry and the host state
authorities. It is also standard practice for the ambassador to travel back
to his/her sending state so as to be there while the foreign head of state
is visiting.

6.3   Public Diplomacy

The term ‘public diplomacy’13 was formalised by Edmund Gullion, at
that stage Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts
University (Cull 2006) when he established an Edward R. Murrow
Center of Public Diplomacy in 1965. It refers to an instrument used by
governments who, in the process of pursuing their own values and inter-
ests, engage with, influence and mobilise the publics rather than govern-
ments of their own and/or other states. The strategy can also be pitched
at a transnational level, focusing on regional or even global civil society.
In rare cases (Switzerland is one), a state directs its public diplomacy
towards its own citizens or, at least, defines public diplomacy as a policy
that is primarily home-bound. In other cases, only the foreign public is
targeted. The US Foreign Service, for example, excludes liaison with its
domestic public from the notion of public diplomacy (Smith 1998: 96).
But increasingly, the public—wherever it is—is appreciated as a stake-
holder in foreign policy. Both the USA and UK learnt this lesson during
mid-2013 when polls revealed their respective publics to be opposed to
an armed intervention in Syria. The executive branches of both countries
had to back down from their stated intentions to proceed with the mili-
tary campaign.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 51

Since the end of the Cold War, the concept of ‘public diplomacy’ has
become a focus point of renewed interest in research on diplomacy, stim-
ulated by the growing demand by civil society for transparency and inclu-
sivity in areas that were traditionally the preserve of officialdom. The
rhetoric of public diplomacy is very much a liberal contention: building
sustainable, inclusive and long-term relationships, conducting a ‘conver-
sation’ rather than a one-way broadcast, emphasising the idea of respect
and consultation.
Beyond the niceties, however, public diplomacy is every bit as utilitarian
as other areas of diplomacy. Former Prime Minister Mahathir’s instruction
to Malaysian diplomats was to ‘go beyond traditional diplomacy and “sell”
Malaysia’, as Ahmad (1999: 123–124) recounts. It has also penetrated the
debate on hard versus soft power, as the USA (traditionally not enthusias-
tic about diplomacy in general) had to reconsider its foreign policy options
in the wake of the post 9/11 ‘War on Terror’. It became apparent that
hard power was only entrenching negative perceptions of the USA, and a
different approach was required in order to ‘win hearts and minds’. As US
Under-Secretary of State, Ambassador Karen Hughes testified before the
US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations during March 2010:

America’s engagement with foreign publics is actually a vital foreign policy

and national security priority that seeks to promote our national ideals and
interests and to undermine our enemies … for our national interests we
have to do a lot more thinking and planning about our conversations and
interactions with publics across the world.

Ambassador Hughes (2010) made the point that the USA should extract
more publicity from its already existing engagement across the world,
specifically in the domain of development cooperation. She gave the
examples of the USNS Comfort (a seafaring medical treatment facility)
and HIV/AIDS programmes in Africa as opportunities to conduct ‘pub-
lic diplomacy that communicate who we are’.
Not only in the USA but all over the globe ministries of foreign
affairs are dedicating resources to conducting public diplomacy. Various
names are used to refer to these specialist units: corporate communi-
cations, information, public affairs, community liaison and so forth.
Governments have used expertise acquired by the corporate world to
develop strategies linked to marketing, image building, branding, public
relations and opinion polling (Melissen 2011).
52 Y. K. SPIES

For smaller or poorer states, public diplomacy is required to ‘put them

on the map’. Citizens of the host state might otherwise only learn about
those countries through sensationalist media coverage—natural disasters
or other (usually negative) ad hoc events. Although they might lack the
resources of bigger states, McDowell (2008: 11) points out that smaller
countries are better able to ‘control’ the message they convey through
public diplomacy. The large countries, or great powers, have to contend
with ‘broadly held stereotypes, as well as a flood of cultural, economic,
and other information flowing from the home country that may be
impossible to channel’.
Whatever the circumstances, diplomats ignore the public at their own
peril. Burt and Robison (1998: 53) noted that a collaborative relation-
ship with the public is increasingly required to plug the gaps in dip-
lomatic performance and to prevent embassies from becoming ‘the
monasteries of the 21st century’.
A readily available avenue to use for the conduct of public diplomacy
is through the performance of public service beyond a state’s borders—
the ‘consular’ work that was discussed earlier in this chapter. Consular
diplomacy offers an opportunity to communicate with an own and for-
eign public, to promote the image of a particular state and to attract
tourists, potential investors and other positive engagement. For many
people, the first contact with a foreign country is through bureaucratic
liaison with consular officials who issue visas, work permits and travel
advice. (Even though the issuance of visas to foreign nationals is not
strictly speaking ‘consular’ work, many foreign ministries treat it as an
integral part of consular activity, considering it as outgoing rather than
incoming public service.) Okano-Heijmans (2013: 485) observes that
governments have recognised ‘the potential marketing value of consular
affairs’, a realisation that has thrusted consular diplomacy into the realm
of public diplomacy.

6.4   Cultural and Other Niche Public Diplomacy

New diplomatic specialisations (inter alia cultural, educational, sport,
even science and technology diplomacy) attest to the need for diplomats
to interact purposefully with specific sectors of a host state’s civil society.
An increasing number of states institutionalise such diplomacy by means
of quasi-state organisations whose objectives serve the foreign policy
objectives of the state. France’s Alliance Française (founded in 1883),
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 53

Germany’s Deutche Akademie (founded in 1925 and reconceptualised in

1951 as the Goethe-Institut) and the UK’s British Council (established
in 1934) are some of the oldest manifestations. More recent examples
include Spain’s Cervantes Institute and South Korea’s Korea Foundation
(both of which were established in 1991); China’s Confucius Institutes
(proliferating rapidly since 200414); and Russia’s Russkiy Mir Foundation
(founded in 2007). These institutions promote the social aspects of the
country through a range of state-sponsored activities, such as international
exhibitions, cultural and educational exchanges, and language training.
States often physically accommodate the representative offices of
these entities within embassies or—if they choose to have the organisa-
tion keep some strategic ‘distance’—maintain a very close working rela-
tionship with it. In the latter case, special bilateral arrangements with the
host state can be concluded to ensure that the staff of the organisation
enjoy a measure of ‘diplomatic’ privilege.
These state-sponsored instruments tend to frame their public diplo-
macy mission as educational, because ‘educational exchanges are generally
acknowledged to be one of the most powerful and long-lasting influ-
ences on attitudes’ (British Council 2013: 27). Some of the most well-
known exchange projects are the US Fulbright scholarships and the UK’s
Chevening scholarships. While the USA and Europe traditionally took the
lead in ‘educational diplomacy’, the situation is changing. A 2013 study
commissioned by the British Council (2013: 27) reported that, by 2009,
the top ten destinations for foreign study in the world included five new-
comers: Australia, China, Japan, Russia and South Africa.
Closely related to ‘educational diplomacy’ is the public diplomacy
specialisation known as ‘cultural diplomacy’. Geoff Pigman (2010: 180)
observes that ‘culture is both a leading cause of the need for diplomacy
to mediate estrangement between nation-states and an important dip-
lomatic vehicle for mediating that estrangement’. In the latter regard,
culture can and does become an indispensable part of soft power, when
the ‘human character’ of a state is attractively projected onto the global
stage. The increase in states’ placement of cultural attachés within
embassies attests to this, as does the growing body of research on cul-
tural diplomacy and the establishment of entities such as the Institute for
Cultural Diplomacy in Berlin.
In India, the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, based in New
Delhi and funded by the Ministry of External Affairs, deftly ‘exports’ the
global allure of Indian art, fashion and ‘Bollywood’ films. Many other
54 Y. K. SPIES

states also wield their soft power through cultural diplomacy. During
2006, Norway celebrated ‘Ibsen Year’, marking 100 years since the death
of acclaimed Norwegian playwright and poet, Henrik Johan Ibsen. The
government organised ‘8059 separate events across 83 countries from
all continents … constructed around the playwright’s themes of corrup-
tion, the contemporary and gender equality (which is known in China as
“Norwegianism”)’ (DEMOS 2007: 93).
At a more formal diplomatic level, there is the tradition in Latin
America to appoint renowned novelists and poets as ambassadors—
personalities like Carlos Fuentes and Octavio Paz (both from Mexico)
and Pablo Neruda (Chile). Even when they are not acting in an offi-
cial capacity, the ‘visit of a single, well known artist can do more, if well
managed and handled, to boost the image and standing of a nation
abroad than the visits of myriad cabinet ministers or captains of industry’
(Rozental and Buenrostro 2013: 235).
New Zealand, a state that has deliberately inserted its indigenous cul-
tural heritage into its diplomatic image, has added another public diplo-
macy niche to its soft power arsenal: that of ‘sport diplomacy’. During
2013, its government declared that it wanted to expand its bilateral rela-
tions with African states, and Foreign Minister Murray McCully under-
took a tour of the continent. In Namibia, a country with which New
Zealand has very little in common, McCully announced that his country
would assist with the development of rugby—a passion the two coun-
tries share. ‘Sport diplomacy’ was thus skillfully used to connect the two
states.

6.5  E-Diplomacy
The ICT revolution of the late twentieth century introduced the idea
of ‘e-diplomacy’ (or ‘virtual diplomacy’) to the communication-driven
world of diplomacy. But e-diplomacy in interactive forums such as
Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, Instagram or LinkedIn was definitely not
(and could not have been) foreseen by the VCDR, drafted as the latter
was in the pre-personal computer era.
Social media have since taken the world by storm and have provided
new opportunities—as well as the inevitable challenges—for the way in
which diplomacy is conducted. As Radu Cucos (2012) explains: ‘Foreign
services are now competing for virtual influence on top of geopolitical
influence, and one can imagine a scenario where virtual supremacy could
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 55

someday be more important than geopolitical supremacy’. ‘E-diplomacy’

does not only have the advantage of reaching the masses, it is also inex-
pensive and not limited by time and space constraints. Thus, geograph-
ically remote states such as New Zealand stand to gain hugely from it
(Bryant 2012).
A recent development in diplomacy is the active, and increasingly
routine, social media profile of professional diplomats. Andrew Cooper
(2017: 2) gives the example of US Ambassador to Russia Michael
McFaul who, while based in Moscow from 2012 to 2014, had a fol-
lowing of 60,000 on Twitter. Ambassador McFaul’s tweeting was par-
ticularly effective, as he did so in Russian. In other cases, social media
obviate the need for diplomatic intermediaries. Karl Ritter (2011)
recounts how Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt spontaneously used
Twitter when he failed to get hold of his counterpart in Bahrain through
traditional communication channels. ‘Trying to get in touch with you
on an issue’, was the message he tweeted. Asked by the Associated Press
about his public style of doing diplomacy, Bildt answered laconically ‘It
shows that in the modern world you can seek contact in modern ways’.
He also confirmed that the communication was successful: Khalid bin
Ahmed Al Khalifa noticed the tweet and contacted him, as requested.
A very convenient electronic application for diplomatic communi-
cation is WhatsApp—the Wi-fi-supported instant messaging, voice and
video service. The notion of ‘WhatsApp diplomacy’, even ‘WhatsApp
summitry’, has come into use because the platform is so ubiquitous.
Diplomats can sit in meetings and committees and inconspicuously
exchange views, instructions on strategy, or arrange other meetings
and events without leaving their seats or interrupting the proceedings.
WhatsApp (and similar platforms that have been and are being devel-
oped) offers secure communication that, in some cases, trumps the
safety of foreign ministry intranet systems. Its accessibility and con-
venience make it a natural go-to tool for diplomats, and it can be used
bilaterally as well as multilaterally. It can be inclusive for a maximum
audience or exclusive when small groups of like-minded partners are
created. It can therefore be as discreet as required (Borger et al. 2016).
Nevertheless, like all social media its very ease of use is, in itself, a poten-
tial problem: once anything has been communicated it is officially ‘out
there’, on somebody’s records. Diplomats are trained to think before
they speak—they should also think carefully before their fingers hit the
‘send’ button.
56 Y. K. SPIES

Brian Hocking and Jan Melissen (2015: 35) explain the impact of a
broader digitalised environment on diplomacy. They make the point that
negotiation processes are impacted fundamentally when subjected to
public scrutiny, and the digital revolution has multiplied opportunities
for external influences on state-to-state negotiations. This has increased
the importance of discreet pre-negotiations, so as to anchor a discourse
before it becomes framed by a wider, often public debate that could
detract from its substance. The use of social media carries specific risks,
but also advantages: ‘data-driven diplomacy’ has instant access to mul-
tiple sources. Social media are particularly useful when a range of stake-
holders needs to be kept in the loop or consulted.

6.6   Beyond Bilateral Relations

While the VCDR only referred to friendly relations between the send-
ing state and the receiving state, it is clear that resident embassies reach
beyond the bilateral sphere. All states have some or other multilat-
eral affiliation (usually numerous) and this means that in a given capi-
tal co-members of a designated multilateral group (intergovernmental
organisation or region) will have opportunity to network among each
other.
Indeed, it is common practice for a diplomatic corps to have distinct
subgroups that meet regularly and even host receptions jointly. In Seoul,
for example, the African ambassadors hold frequent meetings where mat-
ters of concern to their region, or the AU, are discussed. They are also
targeted as a group for liaison with think tanks, the Korean government
and other stakeholders in diplomacy.
Their group affiliation, even when based in a bilateral embassy,
allows diplomats to coordinate multilateral lobbying efforts. They act as
‘agenda setters, issue raisers, coalition builders, regime or order builders
and catalysts of collective action generally within the capitals and coun-
tries to which they are accredited’ (Sharp 1999: 41).

7   Conclusion
Bilateral diplomacy comprises the basics of diplomacy, what Cohen
(1999: 1–4) calls its ‘irreducible functions’. States, regardless of the
nature of their political relations, generally seek opportunities to engage
each other through this most direct and traditional mode of diplomacy.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 57

Implicit to any discussion of bilateral diplomacy is consideration

of the continued need for resident embassies in a transformed diplo-
matic arena. Many critics have declared the flagship institution of tradi-
tional diplomacy obsolete, citing advances in ICT and transport and the
involvement of powerful non-state actors in the diplomatic arena. This
chapter did not make a specific case for the reprieve of resident embas-
sies (diplomacy is not dependent on the institution), but it is clear that
the raison d’être of diplomacy—linking people through communication
and using information as currency—is served in many ways through the
continuous, stable and formal agency of resident missions. The resident
embassy provides an umbrella for wide-ranging activities that reflect the
complexity and multiple stakeholders of the modern diplomatic profes-
sion. Importantly—and symbolic of the perennial relevance of bilateral
diplomacy—embassies offer opportunity for the conduct of all the vari-
ous modes of diplomacy.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations is the legal bedrock
of bilateral diplomacy, but even in the early 1960s, when the Convention
became operational, its list of diplomatic functions was not considered
exhaustive. In diplomatic practice, the five main functions contained in
Article 3 are reflected in, and supplemented by, a host of related activ-
ities. These de facto diplomatic roles have only increased with ICT
advances, the growth of multilateralism and the worldwide ‘democrati-
sation’ of diplomacy. An important new reality is that diplomats delib-
erately and increasingly target the public of a host state (as well as their
own publics) in the pursuit of diplomatic objectives. This is a significant
departure from the traditional assumption (as contained in the VCDR)
that diplomats interact only with other diplomats and the governing elite
of a host state.
Increasing congestion in the global diplomatic arena and in domestic
foreign policy communities means that diplomats are no longer the sole
agents of the core functions outlined by the VCDR. With the possible
exception of representation, all these functions can be performed either
on an ad hoc or on permanent basis by other actors. However, diplo-
mats have a distinct and unique role. They are professionally required to
assume any of these roles, alone or in combination with the other roles,
at any time of their careers, never for personal commercial gain and
always within the holistic context of a sending state’s broader foreign
policy objectives.
58 Y. K. SPIES

Notes
1. The Netherlandseventually concluded an agreement with China in 1984,
banning the sale of military materiel and technology to Taiwan. However,
the agreement allowed for pre-existing orders to be delivered (AFP, 27
April 2001).
2. Pope Francis was not the first pontiff to do so: in September 2001, Pope
John Paul II also referred to the Armenian killings as ‘genocide’.
3. See, for example George Modelski’s strident critique of traditional diplo-
macy in his Principles of World Politics (1972), pp. 187–190. More
recently, David Malone (2013: 125) who served as Canadian Permanent
Representative to the United Nations and as High Commissioner to
India referred to ‘the pretence and expense of bilateral embassy level
representation’.
4. As of June 2013, the information was conveyed verbally by the deputy
foreign minister of the Philippines at a seminar held at the University of
Pretoria, on 27 June 2013.
5. Some foreign ministries, such as that of Finland, use the term ‘roving
ambassador’ for ambassadors who are based at head office while main-
taining multiple bilateral accreditation within a certain region.
6. Flitton gives the example of the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war in southern
Lebanon, when the Australian ‘government came under sustained criti-
cism for ‘not doing enough’ to help Australians caught up in the fight-
ing. A costly evacuation with hired passenger ships did not dull the
complaints’. Flitton calls on political leaders to scale back these expecta-
tions or—failing that—to capacitate diplomatic missions to deliver on the
duties demanded of them.
7. During the same year, Obama visited one other African (but not sub-Sa-
haran) state, namely Egypt.
8. ‘Beneath one’s dignity (from the Latin phrase infrā dignitātem)
9. Originally published in 1995, by 2015 the 5th edition of the book was
published. In the first three editions, the section on ‘the art of negotia-
tion’ comprises one of the two parts of the book.
10. The Chinese refer to the islands as Diaoyu, while the Japanese call them
Senkaku. In Taiwan, the islands are known as Tiaoyukai.
11. The revolutionary ICT impact of the Internet is not new in sparking
allegations of diplomatic redundancy. Sucharipa (2003) says the nine-
teenth-century introduction of the telegraph was just as ominous: ‘When
the first dispatch sent by cable reached his desk in Whitehall, Lord
Palmerston is reported to have exclaimed: “This is the end of diplomacy”.
Similarly, Queen Victoria, when consulted whether the British Legation
in Rome should be elevated to the status of full Embassy, is said to have
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 59

immediately rejected this proposal because, in her assessment, given the

new telecommunication techniques, the time for ambassadors, their pre-
tensions and privileges were definitely over’.
12. According to 2017 data published by Internet World Stats, 88.6% of New
Zealand’s population uses the Internet, while only 6.1% do so in the
Democratic Republic of Congo. https://www.internetworldstats.com/
pacific.htm. Accessed on 25 June 2018.
13. Nicolas Cull (2006) mentions that the first recorded use of the term
public diplomacy dates back to a leader piece in the London Times of
January 1856; criticising political posturing by US President Franklin
Pierce. According to Cull, the term public diplomacy ‘was used merely as
a synonym for civility’.
14. The British Council (2013: 17) observes that Confucius institutes
increased ‘from nothing to a presence in 104 countries’ within a period
of just seven years.

Sources Used
Addis Fortune. (2013, April 28). Ethiopian Foreign Missions Need Urgent
Restructuring. Distributed by All Africa Global Media. http://allafrica.com/
stories/201304300257.html?viewall=1. Accessed on 2 May 2013.
Agence France-Presse (AFP). (2001, April 27). Dutch Refuse to Sell
Submarines. Taipei Times. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/local/archi
ves/2001/04/27/0000083358.
Ahmad, Z. H. (1999). Change and Adaptation in Foreign Policy: Malaysia’s
Foreign Ministry. In B. Hocking (Ed.), Foreign Ministries: Change and
Adaptation. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Barston, R. P. (1997). Modern Diplomacy. London: Longman.
Barston, R. P. (2006). Modern Diplomacy (3rd ed.). London: Pearson/Longman.
BBC. (2016, October 22). Russia Accuses UK over ‘Shrinking’ London Embassy.
BBC News. Available at http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-37735848.
Berridge, G. R. (1995). Diplomacy: Theory and Practice. London: Prentice Hall.
Borger, J., Rankin, J., & Lyons K. (2016, November 4). Why Do Diplomats
Use This-Alien Whatsapp Emoji for Vladimir Putin? The Rise and Rise of
International Diplomacy by WhatsApp. The Guardian. Available at https://
www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/nov/04/why-do-diplomats-use-
this-alien-whatsapp-emoji-for-vladimir-putin?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.
British Council. (2013). Influence and Attraction: Culture and the Race for Soft
Power in the 21st Century. Available at https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/
default/files/influence-and-attraction-report.pdf. Accessed on 3 November 2016.
60 Y. K. SPIES

Bryant, N. (2012, July 18). E-Diplomacy: Foreign Policy in 140 Characters. BBC.
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-18856295E-diplomacy. Accessed on
23 October 2014.
Bull, H. (1977). The Anarchical Society. London: Macmillan.
Burt, R., & Robison, O. (1998). Reinventing Diplomacy in the Information Age.
Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Calvet de Magalhães, J. (1988). The Pure Concept of Diplomacy (B. F. Pereira,
Trans.). New York: Greenwood.
Cohen, R. (1999). Reflections on the New Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500
BC to 2000 AD. In J. Melissen (Ed.), Innovation in Diplomatic Practice.
Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Cucos, R. (2012). Virtual Diplomacy—A New Way of Conducting International
Affairs? Information and Communications for Development (IC4D) Internet
Blog. http://blogs.worldbank.org/ic4d/blogs/radu-cucos. Accessed on 8
June 2013.
Cull, N. J. (2006, April 18). “Public Diplomacy” Before Gullion: The Evolution
of a Phrase. USC Centre on Public Diplomacy. https://uscpublicdiplomacy.
org/blog/public-diplomacy-gullion-evolution-phrase.
Cooper, A. F. (2017, February). The Disintermediation Dilemma and Its Impact
on Diplomacy (Working Paper No. 4: Project Diplomacy in the 21st Century).
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP) German Institute for International
and Security Affairs.
Dahya, C. R. (2015, April 21). The City, Community and the Corps: Locating the
Cultural Additives of Foreign Diplomatic Representation in Pretoria. Paper
Presented at a Conference on ‘Changing Capital Cities in Latin America, the
Caribbean and Southern Africa’, held at the University of Pretoria.
Debrah, E. M. (1996, April 29–May 3). Structuring a Regional Diplomatic
Training Programme. Keynote Address by Former Ambassador of Ghana and
Commonwealth Consultant on Diplomatic Training, to the Southern African
Regional Seminar on Diplomatic Training. Pretoria.
DEMOS. (2007). Cultural Diplomacy (Report Compiled by K. Bound,
R. Briggs, J. Holden, & S. Jones). London: DEMOS.
Eban, A. (1998). Diplomacy for the Next Century. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
El Baradei, M. M. (2008, November 17). Diplomacy and Leadership in a
Turbulent World. Statement by the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency to the ‘Leaders in Dubai’ 2008 Business Forum.
Dubai, UAE.
Ethiopia, Federal Democratic Republic. (2002, November). Foreign Affairs and
National Security Policy and Strategy. Released by the Ministry of Information,
Press and Audiovisual Department. http://www.ethiopiaembassy.ru/pages/
docs/Foreign_Police_English.pdf. Accessed on 20 August 2016.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 61

Flitton, D. (2010, July 28). The Unseen Art. Sydney Morning Herald. http://m.
smh.com.au/federal-election/the-unseen-art-20100727-10t9k.html.
Funga, M. (2016, April 10). It’s Pointless to Keep Funding a Country That
Can’t Manage Its Own Resources—Ofstad. The Post. http://www.postzam-
bia.com/news.php?id=17200. Accessed on 18 July 2016.
Hamilton, K., & Langhorne, R. (1995). The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution,
Theory and Administration. London: Routledge.
Hampson, F. O., Crocker, C. A., & Aall, P. (2013). Negotiation. In A. F.
Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern
Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hemery, J. (2002). ‘Educating Diplomats’, in Academics, Practitioners and
Diplomacy: An ISP symposium on the Theory and Practice of Diplomacy.
International Studies Perspectives, 3(2), 140–145.
Hocking, B., & Melissen, J. (2015, July). Diplomacy in the Digital Age
(Clingendael Report). Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Clingendael.
Hocking, B., Melissen, J., Riordan, S., & Sharp, P. (2013, April). Whither
Foreign Ministries in a Post-Western World? (Clingendael Policy Brief No. 20).
Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.
Hughes, K. (2010, March 10). Written Testimony of Ambassador Karen Hughes.
Submitted to the US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Washington, DC.
India, Ministry of Commerce and Industry. (2016). Make in India. Website
Maintained by the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. http://
www.makeinindia.com/home. Accessed on 19 August 2016.
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD), Georgetown University. (1997).
Who Needs Embassies? How US Missions Abroad Help Shape Our World.
Internet Web-Site. http://sfswww.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isd/files/
books/findings.htm. Accessed on 3 October 1998.
Jaques, I. (2003, January 13–16). The Role of Diplomats in the Modern World.
Report of the 697th Wilton Park Conference on the Role of Diplomats in
the Modern World. Internet Web-Site. http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/web/
conferences/reportprintwrapper. Accessed on 13 January 2004.
Lee, G. (1998, September). Education on International Political Economy for
Diplomats: Think Holistic, Act Artistic. Presentation by Professor Geun Lee of the
Republic of Korea’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS) to
the 26th International Forum on Diplomatic Training (IFDT). Seoul.
Lino Guererro, J. (1999, March 25). Farewell Speech by Retiring Filipino
Ambassador Jose Lino Guererro. Ankara. Quoted in South African Department
of Foreign Affairs In-House Publication Meintjieskop Dithaba 1999(1): 17.
Lowy Institute for International Policy. (2009, March). Australia’s Diplomatic
Deficit: Reinvesting in Our Instruments of International Policy (Report by the
Blue Ribbon Panel). Lowy Institute, Sydney.
62 Y. K. SPIES

Malone, D. M. (2013). The Modern Diplomatic Mission. In A. F. Cooper, J.

Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Marshall, P. (1997). Positive Diplomacy. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
McDowell, M. (2008). Public Diplomacy at the Crossroads: Definitions and
Challenges in an ‘Open Source’ Era. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs
32(3) (Special Ed.): 7–15.
Melissen, J. (2011, October). Beyond the New Public Diplomacy. (Clingendael
Paper No. 3). Netherlands Institute of International Relations.
Modelski, G. (1972). Principles of World Politics. New York: Free Press.
Mudida, R. (2012). Emerging Trends and Concerns in the Economic Diplomacy
of African States. International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy, 1(1),
95–109.
Mutai, E. (2013, November 24). State to Spend Sh2bn in New Missions. Business
Daily. http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/State-to-spend-Sh2bn-in-new-
missions/-/539546/2086714/index.html. Accessed on 25 November 2013.
Nanjira, D. D. (2010). African Foreign Policy and Diplomacy from Antiquity to
the 21st Century (2 Vols.). Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger.
New Zealand, High Commission in Pretoria. (2013, March–May). New Zealand
Eyes Africa’s Potential and Agricultural Resources for Mutual Benefit.
Newsletter of the New Zealand High Commission in Pretoria, Southern
Africa File.
Norway, Kingdom of: Embassy in Lusaka. (2015, October 8). Press Release
from the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Lusaka. Norway—The Official Site
in Zambia. http://www.norway.org.zm/News_and_events/News-and-
Events/Press-Release-from-the-Royal-Norwegian-Embassy-in-Lusaka/#.
V4zdP2h97IU. Accessed on 18 July 2016.
Okano-Heijmans, M. (2013). Consular Affairs. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R.
Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Otto, B. (2015, February 22). Diplomatic Row Heightens as Indonesia Recalls
Ambassador from Brazil. The Wall Street Journal. http://www.wsj.com/
articles/diplomatic-row-heightens-as-indonesia-recalls-ambassador-from-bra-
zil-1424574371.
Paschke, K. T. (2000, September). Report on the Special Inspection of 14 German
Embassies in the Countries of the European Union. Federal Foreign Office,
Berlin.
Pigman, G. A. (2010). Contemporary Diplomacy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Ritter, K. (2011, May 26). Twitter Diplomacy: The New Face of Foreign
Relations. Mail & Guardian. http://mg.co.za/article/2011-05-26-twitter-di-
plomacy-as-the-new-face-of-foreign-relations. Accessed on 4 December 2016.
 2 BILATERAL DIPLOMACY: THE PERENNIAL BASICS OF DIPLOMACY 63

Rozental, A. (1999). Mexico: Change and Adaptation in the Ministry of Foreign

Affairs. In B. Hocking (Ed.), Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation.
Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Rozental, A., & Buenrostro, A. (2013). Bilateral Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper,
J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Satow, E. M. (1979). Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice (5th rev. ed., L. Gore-
Booth & D. Pakenham, eds.). New York: Longman.
Sharp, P. (1999). For Diplomacy: Representation and the Study of International
Relations. International Studies Review, 1999(1), 33–57.
Smith, P. (1998). Public Diplomacy. In J. Kurbalija (Ed.), Modern Diplomacy.
Malta: Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta.
Sofer, S. (1988). Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited. Review of
International Studies, 14(3), 195–211.
Sucharipa, E. (2003, January). 21st Century Diplomacy. Paper Delivered
by the Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, at the Wilton Park
Conference on “The Role of Diplomats in the Modern World”, UK.
Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). (2008). The ABC of
Diplomacy. Bern.
The Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute. (2016, September 27). Common
Declaration of His Holiness John Paul II and His Holiness Karekin II at Holy
Etchmiadzin, Republic of Armenia. Website of the Museum. http://www.
genocide-museum.am/eng/Common_Declaration_of_His_Holiness_John_
Paul_II_and_His_Holiness_Karekin_II_at_Holy_Etchmiadzin.php#sthash.
rNGid4r2.dpuf. Accessed on 8 July 2016.
Talbott, S. (1997). Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Perspective.
Foreign Policy, 108 (Autumn): 68–83.
Tiezzi, S. (2014, November 7). A China-Japan Breakthrough: A Primer on Their
4 Point Consensus. The Diplomat. http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/a-chi-
na-japan-breakthrough-a-primer-on-their-4-point-consensus/. Accessed on
13 July 2016.
United Kingdom, High Commission in Canada. (2012, September 22).
Foreign Secretary William Hague: ‘For Us, the Relationship with Canada Is
Invaluable’. Statement Issued by the British High Commission in Canada.
https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/foreign-secre-
tary-william-hague-for-us-the-relationship-with-canada-is-invaluable.
United States, Department of State. (2016). Web-Site of the ‘Virtual Embassy of the
United States to Iran’. http://iran.usembassy.gov/. Accessed on 13 July 2016.
Vickers, B. (2012). South Africa’s Economic Diplomacy in a Changing Global
Order. In C. Landsberg & J. Van Wyk (Eds.), South African Foreign Policy
Review (Vol. 1). Pretoria: AISA and IGD.
64 Y. K. SPIES

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). (1961).

Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR). (1963).
Wiseman, G. (2005). Pax Americana: Bumping into Diplomatic Culture.
International Studies Perspectives, 6, 409–430.
Woolcock, S., & Bayne, N. (2013). Economic Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J.
Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zartman, I. W. (2013). Chapter 6: Diplomacy as Negotiation and Mediation. In
P. Kerr & G. Wiseman (Eds.), Diplomacy in a Globalizing World: Theories and
Practices (pp. 103–119). New York: Oxford University Press.
 CHAPTER 3

Multilateral Diplomacy: Diplomacy

in Congress

1   Introduction
Any graph capturing the global volume of diplomatic activity will show
a sharp rise over the past century. Much of this increase can be attrib-
uted to the growth of multilateral diplomacy, a mode that involves the
simultaneous conduct of diplomacy among three or more states and/
or organisations. Regardless of the form in which it manifests, the con-
cept multilateral diplomacy implies that there are explicit or implicit (or a
combination of both) rules of engagement over and above the usual laws
that govern the conduct of diplomacy. There is also a need for coordina-
tion of diplomatic responses to issues in the international realm.
A term that is often used interchangeably with multilateral diplo-
macy is multilateralism. These two concepts are not synonymous.
Multilateralism presupposes a normative approach to the conduct of
international relations: a preference for inclusive, voluntary and cooper-
ative diplomacy to address international problems and an emphasis on a
rules-based international system. Implicit to multilateralism as a foreign
policy approach is the rejection of unilateralism and/or hegemony in
international affairs. Proponents are typically critical of a single state or
region dominating the rest of the world, and states such as Russia, South
Africa and China have therefore elevated multilateralism to a doctrine of
foreign policy. (Whether or not they practise what they preach is a matter
of opinion, of course, as is the extent to which their multilateralism is
normative rather than merely tactical.)

© The Author(s) 2019 65

Y. K. Spies, Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00530-6_3
66 Y. K. SPIES

But this chapter will not address multilateralism per se—the politics
of multilateral diplomacy will be investigated in the chapter on structural
diplomacy. Rather, the focus will be on the practice of multilateral diplo-
macy. The many contemporary manifestations of multilateral diplomacy
will be categorised, followed by consideration of the various catalysts of
this mode: in essence, accounting for the massive and increasing volume
of diplomatic practice within the multilateral domain. Thereafter, the
institutional manifestation of state-centric multilateral practice, namely
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs), will be discussed. IGOs such
as the United Nations leave an indelible mark on diplomacy and a brief
discussion of their dynamics is essential to this chapter. Finally, on a state
level of analysis, the implications of multilateral diplomacy on contempo-
rary foreign ministries will be considered.

2  Manifestations of Multilateral Diplomacy

Multilateral diplomacy is of such recent origin, and evolving so rapidly,
that it is difficult to provide a definitive classification of all its manifes-
tations. The use of multilateral concepts such as ‘minilateral’, ‘network’
and ‘club’ diplomacy—even by authoritative practitioners and theorists—
can therefore be confusing, as there does not (yet) exist consensus on
exactly what these terms imply. Nevertheless, this section will provide a
working classification of multilateral diplomacy so as to frame our dis-
cussion of this ‘sunrise industry’, as Singaporean academic and former
ambassador Kishore Mahbubani (2013: 248) calls it. Several of the cate-
gories will involve ‘plurilateral’ diplomacy, i.e. multilateral within multi-
lateral diplomacy.

2.1   Conference Diplomacy

Conference diplomacy is the oldest form of multilateral diplomacy and,
until the nineteenth century, was practised mainly as a mechanism to
end wars. The 1648 Peace of Westphalia, for example, resulted from a
series of peace treaties concluded between May and October of that year
at congresses held in the Westphalian cities of Münster and Osnabrück.
Similarly, the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815) was a landmark event, as
it redrew the borders of Europe after the Napoleonic Wars. Diplomatic
conferences remained ad hoc and rare, however, until the contemporary
era. Kalevi Holsti (2004: 191) observes that in the mid-1800s there were
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 67

only some three or so international conferences per year. Within the next
century and a half, the annual number had multiplied by a thousand.
The reasons for conferencing had evidently become not just more diverse
(covering an astounding range of issues) but also more ordinary.
In some cases, a multilateral gathering evolves into a series of follow-up
conferences to check the progress made on commitments and to maintain
or build momentum for related initiatives. The landmark series of ‘Earth
Summits’, where environmental protection is discussed within the frame-
work of sustainable socio-economic development, started out as an ad hoc
United Nations conference (the UN Conference on Environment and
Development, UNCED) held during 1992 in Rio de Janeiro. It resulted
in major follow-up conferences at decade-long intervals.
Inclusive conferences at the global level are usually referred to as
‘world summits’ and happen under the aegis of the United Nations.
An inclusive conference at the regional level would include all the states
belonging to that region. Conferences can also be exclusive, in which
case the host state and/or convener organisation(s) determine the crite-
ria for attendance. Thus, when US President Obama took an initiative to
hold a Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, during April 2010,
his team decided on the list of invitees. By the same token, when a fol-
low-up conference took place in Seoul two years later, the South Korean
Government invited a select group of participants.
A definitive characteristic of conference diplomacy is its use of consen-
sus decision-making. This means that each participant carries an implicit
‘veto’. Consensus should not be confused with unanimity, though.
Rather, it implies that matters are not put to a vote because decisions
are reached by dialogue, a process that requires extensive consultation
among all parties. Skilled mediators and negotiators—often the des-
ignated chairpersons—can play a crucial role in the process of building
consensus. Jönsson and Hall (2005: 83) explain how conference diplo-
macy has spawned particular diplomatic techniques and practices to build
consensus, one of which is the use of a ‘single negotiation text’ (SNT).
They explain the SNT model as follows:

After listening to the stated positions of all the parties, one participant, in
a mediator or leadership role (most often the chairperson), drafts a text,
which is then circulated for criticism, modifications and refinements.
Successive rounds of redrafting and feedback may eventually produce an
agreed document.
68 Y. K. SPIES

Consensus can be obtained even if states register their reservations, as

long as they do not expressly declare their opposition to the decision.
Not surprisingly, this form of diplomacy is unlikely to yield any dramatic,
fast or surprising outcomes, because the reality is that consensus tends
to rely on a minimum common denominator. The advantage, of course,
is that conference consensus carries considerable normative weight.
Successive and incremental reinforcement of decisions in follow-up con-
ferences, or in a single extended effort, helps to build the legitimacy
that is associated with customary law. It also facilitates the codification
thereof.
The Law of the Sea is an example: in 1958, the First United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I) produced four treaties.
Various legal matters remained unresolved and necessitated the Second
UNCLOS, convened in 1960. It was largely unsuccessful and did not
produce any meaningful consensus because the (ostensibly multilat-
eral) negotiation process was dominated by bilateral Cold War tension
between the USA and Soviet Union. When the Third UNCLOS was
launched in New York during 1973, the process was handled differ-
ently: it was marked by explicit, if painfully slow, consensus building, so
as to ensure a lasting and inclusive agreement. The eventual 1982 treaty
replaced the four 1958 treaties and proved to be a solid achievement.
Even though conference diplomacy is distinct from the permanent
form of multilateral diplomacy that results in tangible IGOs (which have
headquarters, legally contracted staff and codified powers) it would be
incorrect to assume that it is not institutionalised per se. As Bouchard
and Peterson (2011: 12) advise, ‘by definition, all multilateral coopera-
tion is essentially institutionalised’. The Non-Aligned Movement and the
G20 are both examples of institutions that have assumed a permanent
character, even if they have neither permanent staff nor headquarters,
and maintain conference-style consensus.

2.2   Parliamentary Diplomacy

Parliamentary diplomacy is associated with permanent multilateral
institutions such as the United Nations. Its name is derived from the
constituency-based style of negotiation in a public venue, with contin-
uous representation by many different delegations. In the case of the
UN, its General Assembly (UNGA) resembles a ‘world parliament’.
Indeed, several IGOs—the European Union and the African Union are
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 69

examples—have a distinct (often primary) organ that is actually referred

to as the organisation’s ‘parliament’. Like conference diplomacy, parlia-
mentary diplomacy can be inclusive (universal, or making up an entire
region, by default) or exclusive. Membership of the European Union is
exclusive because it is conditional (certain requirements need to be met
before a state can join) and mere geographical location in Europe is
therefore not sufficient to guarantee membership.
The decision-making process in a parliamentary diplomatic venue
may involve consensus-building initiatives, but ultimately resolutions are
adopted by majority1 vote. This explains the proclivity of analysts to keep
track of member states’ voting patterns in such forums. Consistent vot-
ing in certain ‘company’ (siding with certain other countries or blocs),
and a persistent position regarding a specific issue, can paint a picture of
a give state’s foreign policy implementation.
The charter (constitution) of an IGO usually elaborates on the voting
system: the method of voting (open voting such as a roll-call or show of
hands, as opposed to an anonymous vote by means of ballot) and the
required majority margins for a decision to stand. In the UNGA, most
resolutions are adopted by means of a simple majority vote. There are
exceptions, however, and in terms of Article 18 of the UN Charter, cer-
tain key decisions of the General Assembly require a two-thirds majority
of ‘members present and voting’ (i.e. abstentions are not considered in
the tally).
Some organisations use weighted voting so as to distinguish among
states on the basis of economic size, population or financial contribu-
tions to the organisation. In effect, this means that certain states have
more say in the organisation than other members. The International
Monetary Fund and World Bank are examples of where financial contri-
butions ensure bigger voting weight. Veto rights within an organisation,
such as the UN Security Council, can also constitute qualified majority
voting (Karns and Mingst 2013: 145). When the Security Council votes
on substantive cases (i.e. on political decisions; the rule does not apply
to procedural matters), nine affirmative votes out of the total of fifteen
are required to secure the decision. However, the catch is that these nine
affirmative votes must include those of the P-5 members (Russia, China,
UK, France and the USA). When P-5 members abstain from voting, they
effectively allow a decision to pass because only an explicit ‘no’ vote con-
stitutes a veto. Interestingly, while it is commonly assumed that the UN
Charter provides for the right of veto within the Security Council, this is
70 Y. K. SPIES

not the case. The word is not even mentioned in the Charter. The idea
of a veto is merely implied by the prescribed voting requirement for sub-
stantive matters on the Security Council agenda.
The particular method of voting has an obvious impact on the out-
come of the decision-making process. When delegations are obliged
to take a visible stand it forces them to articulate a specific position, as
Kaufmann (1996: 27) notes, and to consider their voting more care-
fully. The accompanying debate is more dynamic and inclusive—and the
outcome more legitimate—when all states reveal their positions, rather
than being mere ‘passengers’ in the process through abstaining or hiding
behind secret voting.
The importance of procedure in parliamentary settings means that
diplomats do not only engage in coalition-building around substantive
matters; they also resort to procedural tactics in order to steer the out-
come of decisions. This could include lobbying for specific individuals
to chair sessions, pressing for sessions to be held at times when oppo-
nents will be distracted or less capacitated (or an own team better capac-
itated) and so forth. Delaying debate on a specific issue is a well-known
manoeuvre, especially when a delegation is not sure of its mandate from
head office, or when the position of the wider regional (or other multi-
lateral interests-group) still needs to be finalised.
Voting on procedural issues might sound like a mere bureaucratic
formality, but—as Robert Keohane (1967) observed about the General
Assembly more than four decades ago—it can have as much impact as
voting on the actual substantive matter it is associated with. Procedural
votes are easier to defend, and easier to gather support for, precisely
because procedures have a (deceptively) technical, neutral connotation.
Agenda-setting is a case in point. Inclusion of a specific issue on the
agenda can be as significant as an issue being deliberately kept away from
the agenda. During its first-ever stint (2007/2008) on the UN Security
Council as a non-permanent member, South Africa was bitterly criticised
by human rights activists for arguing that human rights contraventions
by governments should not be heard by the Security Council. The South
African delegation argued that the situations in Burma (Myanmar) and
Zimbabwe, among various others, required scrutiny by the UN Human
Rights Council rather than the Security Council and voted to keep the
humanitarian crises in these countries off the agenda. Critics accused
South Africa of using procedural tactics to shield ideological peers rather
than heeding its own liberal constitution. South Africa countered that
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 71

the legitimacy of other UN bodies was being undermined by the Security

Council’s burgeoning agenda. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (2007), at the
time South Africa’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, explained it thus:

… there is a growing tendency to undermine multilateral and other insti-

tutions of the UN by taking issues to the Security Council that should be
handled by the relevant UN institutions. The adoption of this resolution
would have set a precedent for the work of the Council because any mem-
ber of the Council could bring any country for consideration, even though
they may not pose a threat to regional and international peace and security.

A related tactic is to press for a certain issue to be designated an ‘impor-

tant question’ in terms of Article 18 of the UN Charter, Chapter IV.
This status requires a two-thirds majority for adoption within the
UNGA, as opposed to the routine simple majority. The higher threshold
makes it less likely for the resolution to be passed, even if the ‘important
question’ label seems to suggest a priority designation.
The pluralist voting system of a parliamentary forum means that, in
simple terms, ‘numbers count’. Within the General Assembly, bloc vot-
ing has been used as a strategic diplomatic tool by developing countries
to counter marginalisation in world affairs and to express solidarity with
each other. Africa is a poignant example. When the UN was conceptu-
alised, the continent was for the most part still under colonial rule. Of
the 51 founding members of the UN, only four were African: Egypt,
Ethiopia, Liberia and South Africa. Yet by 2013, 54 African states were
members of the UN, thus comprising more than a quarter of UN mem-
bership. The continent had moved from being the most underrepre-
sented region within the UNGA, to the largest (numerically speaking);
making it the most courted voting bloc in the UNGA when a quantita-
tive majority is sought.

2.3   Bloc Diplomacy

In theory, multilateral diplomacy is supposed to offer a kind of ‘democ-
racy’ at the international level, i.e. a voluntary and transparent forum
where every participant has equal standing and decisions are jointly made
(or, at least, reflect the majority view). The reality of multilateral practice
is less utopian. The sheer size and diversity of many multilateral settings,
whether ad hoc conferences or permanent organisations, make it difficult
72 Y. K. SPIES

for decisions to be reached. This has necessitated the formation of ‘blocs’

otherwise referred to as contact group and caucus diplomacy.
Bloc diplomacy is exclusive by nature because it involves restricted
multilateral engagements within an otherwise inclusive forum. At large
conferences or within IGOs it is typical for delegations to congregate
in such smaller ‘conferences’ outside of formal proceedings, so as to
harmonise their approaches to issues on the agenda. This creates con-
centric circles of diplomacy, or ‘secondary’ levels of multilateral diplo-
macy, based on states’ shared interests. Within the African Union, the
Francophonie constitutes a specific interest group that stretches beyond
linguistic affiliation—these states share bureaucratic and political tra-
ditions that set them apart from other blocs in the same organisation.
They are therefore likely to reach out to each other within the larger
forum of the AU, or even in other forums (UN, NAM, etc.) where they
are represented.
The universal membership of the UN lends itself particularly to bloc
diplomacy: likeminded states routinely build momentum or devise a
common strategy around a particular issue on the agenda. This was
demonstrated during 2009 when, as part of the General Assembly’s
debate on the operationalisation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P),
the ‘Group of Friends of R2P’ emerged: a coalition of some thirty
pro-R2P states chaired by Canada and Rwanda, to deliberate on pro-
motion of the new norm. Such issue-based groups can exist for the dura-
tion of an ad hoc negotiation or can manifest for an extended period.
The Uniting for Consensus2 (UfC) group, rallied around a common
approach to Security Council reform, has been in existence since 1995.
Geographically defined blocs are, by definition, more ‘fixed’ in nature
and include blocs such as the Group of Latin American and Caribbean
Countries in the UN (GRULAC).
When a bloc exists over an extended period of time, it could acquire
certain customs and characteristics and even a semblance of permanence.
The Group of 77 (G77) within the UN has been in existence now for
five decades. It has allowed the growing number of developing member
states of the organisation the opportunity to negotiate among themselves
and build consensus within their own ranks, so as to strengthen their
negotiation weight vis-à-vis stronger, developed states. The operational
parameters of the G77, as in the case of other blocs, do not form part of
the formal legal framework of the umbrella organisation (in this case, the
UN). In general, therefore, these organised interest groups tend to be
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 73

more informal and flexible in terms of rules and procedures. They also
use consensus as decision-making mechanism, precisely because their aim
is to consult and harmonise policy approaches.

2.4   Minilateral and Club Diplomacy

Minilateralism, another form of plurilateral diplomacy, is undertaken
when a few key actors in a large multilateral forum become convinced
that they are the right combination of strategic partners to reach the
required consensus that will break a deadlock. (Of course, critics would
argue that such actors often impose their positions on the rest, by enter-
ing into short- or longer-term deals with one another.) The deliberate
constitution of such a ‘critical mass’ happened on 28 November 2009
in China, during a preparatory meeting for COP 15. The 15th World
Summit of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change was
scheduled to take place the following month, in Copenhagen. The
BASIC group, as it became known, comprised of four newly industri-
alised, emerging powers: Brazil, South Africa, India and China. They
anticipated—correctly—that the Copenhagen Summit would be fraught
with disagreement and amidst subsequent diplomatic paralysis in the
negotiations, met with the USA in a minilateral attempt to make a break-
through. The resultant deal saved the conference by offering an outcome
the rest of the participants could agree on, resulting in the Copenhagen
Accord. Moises Naim (2009: 135) calls such a strategic form of exclusive
multilateral diplomacy ‘minilateralism’s magic number’. He describes it
as ‘… a smarter, more targeted approach [that brings] to the table the
smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible
impact on solving a particular problem’.
Äkshan De Alwis (2016), writing from a security studies perspective,
sees minilateralism as ‘a hybrid form of alignment’ that ‘… overcomes
the values-diversity problem often found in large and unwieldy multilat-
eral associations’. This means that minilateralism tends to be driven by
shared interests rather than shared norms, even if the parties involved
tend to share similar values. By nature, it is a flexible method because
states enter into minilateral groups as and when required.
Related to the idea of minilateralism,3 is club diplomacy. Diplomatic
‘clubs’ generally refer to small and exclusive diplomatic groups that
exist independent of other multilateral settings. Often marked by sum-
mitry, it is not a new phenomenon—the nineteenth-century Concert of
74 Y. K. SPIES

Europe was an early example. The member states of diplomatic clubs

align themselves so that they can prioritise relations among each other,
often on a specified range of specific shared interests. This close rela-
tionship can also be used, as required, for synergy to pursue common
foreign policy objectives in various multilateral forums where the parties
happen to be represented. While a diplomatic club is therefore not pri-
marily convened to operate within a larger multilateral setting, its very
nature makes its flexible enough to be conducted on the margins of
multilateral events.
Examples of diplomatic clubs abound in the contemporary global
arena, and some have a long track record. The Paris Club, an associa-
tion of development aid creditors that meets at (and is chaired by) the
French Treasury, dates back to 1956. In fact, since the financial shocks
of the 1970s the diplomacy related to international financial concerns
has seen the establishment of an increasing number of clubs. In 1974,
the USA created the informal ‘Library Group’ (so-called because the
finance ministers met in the library of the White House, in Washington,
DC) a meeting of finance ministers from five key economies: France,
Japan, the USA, UK, and West Germany. The group expanded gradu-
ally, adding Italy and Canada, and finally became the G8 when Russia
joined in 1998.
As will be discussed in the chapter on ‘structural diplomacy’, the G7/
G8 wielded such enormous influence in the global economy that it was
increasingly pressurised to make the ‘club’ more diverse. Activists, espe-
cially from the Global South, insisted that the G8 lacked the legitimacy
to engage in global economic governance. As from 2009 (following the
global financial crisis of 2007/2008), the club morphed into a larger
group, the G20, which reflected a larger critical mass required to serve
as engine of the global economy. The G7/8 did not cease to exist, how-
ever, and continues to act as diplomatic club for the most industrialised
states of the Northern Hemisphere. However, the creation of the G20
showed that global ‘finance diplomacy’ had taken on the strategic impor-
tance traditionally limited to security. As David Malone (2013: 128) says,
it now extends ‘well beyond immediate firefighting requirements’, so
much so that it ‘has become a pillar of international relations’.
While the G-prefix before a numeral typically indicates a diplomatic
club or minilateral group, the names of diplomatic clubs can vary from
the quaint to the straightforward. A recent trend is to use acronyms of
member state names. IBSA, the India-Brazil-South Africa forum, was
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 75

launched during September 2003, leveraging the leadership of three

vibrant democracies from three continents in the Developing World.
BRIC—Brazil, Russia, India and China—expanded itself into BRICS
when South Africa joined the club during December 2010. MIKTA is
an initiative taken in 2013 by Mexico, Indonesia, (South) Korea, Turkey
and Australia, to facilitate informal consultation and collaboration among
the five middle powers.
In some cases, the acronym name can be less indicative of an actual
club than of a projected economic or political grouping (often coined
by investment firms, following Goldman Sachs’ invention of the term
BRIC in 2001). Thus analysts play with names such as MIST (Mexico,
Indonesia, South Korea and Turkey); CIVETS (Colombia, Indonesia,
Vietnam, Egypt, Turkey and South Africa); MINT (Mexico, Indonesia,
Nigeria and Turkey) without these necessarily indicating distinct and
exclusive new multilateral groupings.
Some clubs solidify their association by concluding a treaty among
the members and thereby transform into fully fledged IGOs with
legal personality. In this way, the initial loose association known as the
Shanghai Five (formed in 1996) was formalised into a treaty organisa-
tion, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), at a summit in St.
Petersburg on 7 June 2002.

2.5   Associative Diplomacy

A fairly recent but fast-growing phenomenon involves multilateral diplo-
macy where one (or more) of the parties is an international organisation,
rather than a state. Barston (2006: 8) refers to this form of multilateral
diplomacy as ‘functional associative diplomacy’. The European Union
conducting diplomacy with a potential member state such as Turkey,
or even with another international organisation such as the League of
Arab States, would resort under this form of multilateral diplomacy.
Associative diplomacy is particularly important in cases where inter-
national peace and security is threatened. In June 1992, when UN
Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali issued his seminal Agenda for
Peace report, he implicitly called for this kind of multilateral diplomacy.
He reminded the UN community of the need to implement Chapter
VIII of the Charter, which encourages regional organisations to deal
with international peace and security in their own neighbourhoods and
to do so in cooperation with the UN.
76 Y. K. SPIES

Continuous associative multilateral diplomacy can become institution-

alised and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) offers
a good example. The 10-member IGO has customised relations with
a range of diplomatic actors, inter alia the ASEAN Plus Three (APT)
mechanism that (since 1997) places the organisation in a formal relation-
ship with China, Japan and South Korea. ASEAN also conducts separate
‘bilateral’ associative diplomacy with each of these three Northeast Asian
states, in each of which case the diplomatic relationship is referred to as
‘ASEAN + 1’. In addition to its outreach to Northeast Asia, the organisa-
tion also has formalised relationships with pivotal individual states such
as the USA, Russia, India, Australia and New Zealand (thus by 2010 the
associative configuration had been stretched to ASEAN + 8), as well as
organisations such as the EU.
Within a given IGO associative diplomacy can also occur at a pluri-
lateral level, as negotiations take place within and among various inter-
est groups and blocs. To illustrate, at the meetings of the African Union
at its Headquarters in Addis Ababa, the formation and consolidation of
group positions take place in the context of the five official politi-
cal regions of Africa: Southern Africa, East Africa, West Africa, Central
Africa and North Africa. At any given stage, intra-AU lobbying happens
among the representatives of these regions.
The diplomacy of development has spawned a range of associa-
tive diplomatic initiatives, some of which are legally binding. The
Cotonou Agreement, concluded in June 2000, provides a coopera-
tion framework between the EU and the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States (the ACP countries). The treaty is the suc-
cessor to a series of four Lomé Conventions, the first of which was
concluded in 1975 between the then European Community and 464
independent ACP states.
While the Cotonou Agreement in particular has a long history,
momentum for associative multilateral diplomacy in the field of devel-
opment really only developed after the end of the Cold War. In 1993
the government of Japan launched the Tokyo International Conference
on African Development (TICAD), aimed at strengthening development
cooperation. Since then, Japan has hosted successive TICAD meetings in
cooperation with international organisations such as the United Nations
Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. This type of
networked engagement has become a major feature of contemporary
diplomacy.
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 77

It can also happen at an ad hoc and less formal level, which may or
may not develop into a long-term association. When the 12th Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit of Heads of State or Government
was held during August/September 1998 in Durban (South Africa),
delegates from the EU and G8 also attended the summit. They did so
for the first time ever—the NAM had always been known for its viru-
lent anti-West rhetoric—and their presence signalled a more pragmatic
approach to development partnerships with the Global South. In the
same vein, the G8 invited five leading emerging economies to participate
in its 2005 Gleneagles Summit in Scotland. The invitees—Brazil, China,
India, Mexico and South Africa—became known as the G8 + 5,5 repre-
senting their regions’ developmental interests at G8 summits.
The networking diplomacy implied by associative multilateral diplo-
macy has also taken on board diplomacy with non-governmental organ-
isations (NGOs), transnational movements and business groups. This
wider, more-inclusive-than-ever diplomacy is essential to deal with the
complexity of many issues on the global diplomatic agenda, and will be
discussed further in the chapter on polylateral diplomacy.

3   Catalysts of Multilateral Diplomacy

Proliferation in all forms of multilateral diplomacy over the past century
confirms that this mode of diplomacy has unique advantages for states.
The demographic explosion in (and greater heterogeneity of) interna-
tional society has certainly fuelled the phenomenon, but the catalysts of
multilateral diplomacy involve a range of symbolic, practical and norma-
tive considerations.

3.1   Normative Ideals of International Society

Multilateral diplomacy was born of attempts to guarantee peace in a
dangerous world. As mentioned earlier, its oldest manifestation was ad
hoc conferences to end wars. The pursuit of lasting peace was the rea-
son for the founding of the first organisation that sought universal state
membership—the League of Nations—as well as the first organisation
that actually achieved that membership target—the United Nations. The
European Union also has its roots in attempts to ward off war (through
economic integration), just as many other regional organisations were
founded to counter conflict ‘infection’.
78 Y. K. SPIES

The annual Nobel Peace Prize was originally intended to honour out-
standing contributions by individuals to international peace and security,
but it is instructive that since it was awarded the first time in 1901 (and
as of 2017) no fewer than 23 organisations—some of them more than
once—were recipients. In 2012, the EU received the coveted prize. The
Norwegian Nobel Committee noted that its decision was based on the
critical role the EU had played in stabilising Europe and transforming it
from a continent of war to a continent of peace (Alfred Nobel Memorial
Foundation 2016).
Whatever critics might say about the shortcoming of multilat-
eral diplomacy, there can be no doubt that its forums incubate aspira-
tional goals for humanity. The adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights by the General Assembly in 1948 was a ‘leap’ for man-
kind, as Mahbubani (2013: 249) puts it. By the same token, the General
Assembly’s agreement during 2000 on eight Millennium Development
Goals (MDGs), and its agreement 15 years later on 17 successor goals
(the Sustainable Development Goals) provided a joint agenda for the
world to tackle issues of common concern. Over the past century, multi-
lateral attention to matters as diverse as the environment and children’s
rights has created new norms and codified many of them into for-
mal international law, thereby building the institutions of international
society.
The implication is that multilateral diplomacy offers forums where
diplomatic actors become socialised to the principles of multilateralism
per se (Bouchard and Peterson 2011: 10). China’s November 2001
admission to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), after a difficult 15
year-long negotiation process and substantive reform to the Chinese
economy, is an apt illustration. The process embodied China’s construc-
tion of a new international profile in the post-Cold War era. Multilateral
settings, including the economic hubs presented by the WTO, World
Intellectual Property Organisation and others, are instrumental in setting
benchmarks, exchanging information about and eventually demanding
best practice application by members. This feeds into the idea of diplo-
macy as a transcendent culture that moulds participants into a society
with shared norms. While international regimes are not enforceable in
the manner that municipal law is, the incentive to comply is huge. The
WTO membership, for example, demands compliance with its regulatory
framework. States that transgress risk sanctions and the legal obligation
to compensate aggrieved parties.
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 79

Certain states distinguish themselves in multilateral forums, by acting as

‘sherpas’ to other states, guiding the latter into normative behaviour. This is
a form of niche diplomacy,6 often associated with the particular diplomacy
of so-called middle powers. It will be discussed in more detail when I will
deal with diplomacy aimed at addressing structural issues of global power.

3.2   Symbolic Membership of International Society

The significance of recognition within a multilateral setting is of huge sig-
nificance to new states. This is particularly true in the case of the United
Nations, which according to Sasson Sofer (1988: 205) ‘constitute[d] the
most significant attempt to make the principle of the sovereign equality7
of states coexist with the absence of parity witnessed in reality’.
Of all the IGOs in the world, the United Nations has been the most
magnetic to states. When it was founded in 1945 it had 51 members; in
1962, at the height of the Cold War, it had 110 members and by 2011,
when South Sudan joined, that number had swelled to 193. At any
given moment, there are entities lined up, hoping to become full mem-
bers. The UN’s General Assembly—the main deliberative, policymaking
and representative of the organisation’s six main organs—is the closest
international society has ever come to producing a world parliament. For
weak or new states, membership of the UN offers symbolic affirmation
of their sovereignty and acceptance as fully fledged members of interna-
tional society.
Multilateral diplomacy within a parliamentary style forum where
majority voting is used, such as the UN General Assembly, offers even
the most obscure state an opportunity to be visible in the global arena,
and to cast an equal vote. The natural strategy for weaker states is there-
fore to band together and seek strength in numbers, so as to amend the
international agenda to reflect their own priorities. It is precisely this
strategy that has thrust Developing World issues to such a prominent
position within the UN. As Sofer (1988: 201) puts it, bloc formation
within multilateral forums has been a ‘chosen means of struggle’ for
the bulk of the world’s states. It has been an expression of political sol-
idarity at a symbolic level, and a real opportunity to increase bargaining
strength in negotiations that challenge the structure of global power. In
neo-Marxist language, it has enabled the ‘periphery’ to challenge the
‘core’ and to force the attention of the latter to pay attention to issues
that they would otherwise be likely to ignore.
80 Y. K. SPIES

3.3   Global Governance: Legitimacy and Participation

The collective management of global human concerns bestows legit-
imacy on multilateral diplomacy, much as domestic governance derives
legitimacy from a democratically elected government. Multilateral diplo-
macy, per definition, is evidenced by multi-stakeholder involvement,
continuity and transparent processes, and the resolutions adopted by a
large international gathering command moral authority and ensure mass
buy-in. The resultant policy frameworks make it easier for states to resist
pressure from more powerful states to act according to the latter’s for-
eign policy interests.
The reality that an increasing number of global issues are regulated by
multilateral diplomacy has given rise to the idea of ‘governance’ diplo-
macy. The related concept of ‘global governance’ can be described as
continuous cooperative ventures within international society, aimed at
delivering global public goods through the establishment of regulatory
frameworks, and institutionalising mechanisms to monitor compliance
and ensure universal implementation (Karns and Mingst 2010: 4).
According to Cooper et al. (2008: 1) the term implies ‘…an open-
ended way of looking at and navigating in the world, with a high degree
of inclusiveness about whom and what is included in its machinery and
agenda’. This means that even weak states can have a say in global policy;
a major reason why multilateral diplomacy is so attractive to states that
would otherwise have minimal say vis-à-vis bigger powers in bilateral or
regional relations.
Once a state is a member of an IGO, it has opportunity to exert dip-
lomatic influence through engaging in ‘insider-activism’. Andrew Hurrell
(2004) explains:

This involves working intensively within the institutions: being a cata-

lyst for diplomatic efforts, doing a lot of the behind the scenes work in
organising meetings and promoting follow-up meetings; getting groups of
experts together to push the agenda forward; exploiting what one might
call the institutional platforms and the normative niches that create room
for manoeuvre and shape how problems are understood.

This opportunity to impact the agenda of global governance is enjoyed

by all member states, regardless of how isolated they might otherwise be
as a result of geopolitical realities. On the other hand, there is a restrict-
ing reality: global governance implies that the foreign policy of individual
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 81

states can no longer be formulated or implemented in complete isola-

tion. This is specifically prevalent in the domain of economic and finance.
As Langhorne and Wallace (1999: 16, 17) point out, there is a grow-
ing tendency towards multilateral consultation on economic policies, and
this regulation of state policies has fed into centralisation of global eco-
nomic management.
The WTO, one of the youngest but also fastest-growing IGOs,
plays a central role in the world of economic governance. Its main rai-
son d’être is to ensure that international trade flow freely, fairly and pre-
dictably, through administration of trade agreements and facilitation of
new agreement negotiations. It has an advisory role in the domain of
trade policy, especially to developing countries that need technical assis-
tance and training. The WTO also monitors the trade policies of indi-
vidual states and assists with dispute settlement among member states.
Importantly, WTO membership commits states to resolving their trade
disputes through multilateral mechanisms, rather than unilaterally or
bilaterally.
Mahbubani (2013: 250) says the WTO and its predecessor the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) have been ‘spec-
tacularly successful’, allowing world trade to grow three times faster
than world output growth in the period from 1950 to 2005. Whereas
trade accounted for only 5% of the world’s GDP in 1950, by 2007 it
accounted for almost 20% of the world’s total GDP.8 The crisis in the
Doha Round negotiations during 2008 has somewhat dulled the global
momentum of economic multilateralism, but as Malone (2013: 127)
mentions, economic global governance is still evident in continuing
efforts to consolidate many bilateral and regional free (or preferential)
trade agreements.
Another domain that has benefited tremendously from global gov-
ernance, is human security. In this regard, the specialised agencies of
the UN system, such as the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the
UN Environment Programme (UNEP); and special programmes such
as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) have been doing a
massive amount of international problem-solving. They pool expertise
and databases and guide governments in their implementation of regula-
tory frameworks. The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO),
for example, established the hugely successful World Food Programme
(WFP) during 1961 and has convened global summits on food security
since the early 1970s.
82 Y. K. SPIES

Just as states are held accountable by an international public for

adherence to multilateral regimes, their domestic constituencies also
increasingly expect of states to uphold international standards. For
states in democratic transition, this typically involves United Nations or
regional IGO endorsement of governance processes. International elec-
tion monitoring, for instance, has become a growth industry, as states tap
into the legitimacy of validation by global governance institutions. This
is the case even in regions such as Latin America, where state sovereignty
has always been jealously protected (Mathews 1997: 60).
It is important to emphasise that global governance is not driven
exclusively by state and state-based organisations. The involvement of
the private sector, through subnational, transnational and global mech-
anisms, is an integral characteristic of the governance grid that scaffolds
contemporary international society.

3.4   Regional Integration

One of the most distinct catalysts of multilateral diplomacy has been
regional integration initiatives. Deliberate fragmentation of the global
diplomatic arena into regional zones is a relatively new phenomenon in
international politics and has only really gathered momentum since the
end of the World War II.
In the Developing World, first generation regional integration schemes
represented the ideal of restoring pre-colonial territorial integrity and
forging political9 unity. This has been the case particularly in Africa,
which has the oldest regional integration scheme in the Developing
World: the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) that dates back to
the turn of the twentieth century. Pan-Africanism has indeed generated
more enthusiasm for regional integration than witnessed in any other
developing region. The result has been a bewildering number of regional
integration schemes in Africa—almost half of the total number world-
wide—and overlapping membership. Ironically, this multiplicity has been
counterproductive to the objectives of African integration: it has strained
resources, divided political loyalties and created additional legal-bureau-
cratic complexity in coordination of policy.
Apart from political objectives, the economic success of regions such as
Europe has inspired developing countries to pursue integration as a devel-
opment strategy. Industrialisation-driven development was indeed the driv-
ing force behind the wave of Latin American integration initiatives during
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 83

the 1960s, such as the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR)

and the Latin American Integration Association (LAIA). The core theory
behind economic integration is that the pooling of resources is a strategic
choice for economies of scale, as integration boosts the competitiveness
of less developed states: even the smallest state in an integrated region can
benefit from the comparative advantage of the bigger geopolitical unit.
Multilateral diplomacy plays a catalytic role in terms of agenda-setting
and policy implementation related to regional integration, and this in
turn impacts the delivery of public goods (commodities, services and the
enabling system of rules and policies) within geopolitical regions. At the
global level, regional IGOs such as the AU, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and
the EU pursue common political and economic positions, thereby trans-
forming their respective regions into autonomous international ‘actors’.

3.5   State Pragmatism

Multilateral diplomacy is an ‘umbrella mode’ because it allows oppor-
tunity for all the other modes of diplomacy—bilateral, polylateral and
third-party diplomacy—to happen under its aegis. These additional
modes can be exercised officially as well as unofficially: multilateral
forums famously afford states that do not have diplomatic relations,
opportunity to engage with one another. The presence of political adver-
saries within the same venue allows them to work together without
direct confrontation, and the organisational infrastructure that (per defi-
nition) facilitates international dialogue, is an ideal excuse for ‘unofficial’
diplomatic encounters of a more substantive nature.
By the same token, at large multilateral forums states have opportunity
to engage with NGOs, IGOs to which they don’t belong, and transnational
networks, turning the host forum into a ‘one-stop-shop’ for diplomacy.
These bonus opportunities make multilateral diplomacy a cost-effective
choice. Not a single state is represented in all capitals of the world, and
especially states with insufficient resources and diplomatic infrastructure
battle to maintain sufficient diplomatic representation across the globe. At
a strategically placed multilateral mission, especially at the United Nations
headquarters in New York, a state can conduct a sizable amount of its bilat-
eral diplomacy in addition to its multilateral activities. Even well-developed
states, increasingly subject to public scrutiny of expenses, are rationalising
diplomatic representation by cutting down on the size and number of bilat-
eral missions—and making more efficient use of multilateral representation.
84 Y. K. SPIES

4   Intergovernmental
Organisations and Diplomatic Practice
The discussion in this section will focus on IGOs as a sub-category of the
more generic category of international organisations (IOs). IOs include
international non-governmental organisations and hybrid organisations,
but diplomats have a greater stake in the organisations where govern-
ments per se are represented, i.e. where the members interact based on
nationally defined foreign policy. IGOs have increasingly become hubs
of diplomacy, and they tend to be microcosms of the structural politics
within their membership scope (their ‘catchment area’). This is the case
whether they have a universal character, such as the UN or WTO, or a
regional character, such as the EU or MERCOSUR. But they also tran-
scend the sum of their parts, and it is their distinctive contribution to
diplomatic practice that will now be considered.

4.1   The Nature and Roles

of Intergovernmental Organisations
There is not sufficient space in this chapter to discuss the detailed the-
ory of international organisation (as a political process) and the individ-
ual characteristics of the thousands of international organisations (distinct
entities) that exist in the early twenty-first century. Each of these organi-
sations exists because of distinct aims that are reflected in its membership
and structure. International organisations (IOs) are non-profit entities,
with budgets that are contributed by members, and in this sense they
differ notably from multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Nestlé
or Shell. IOs usually have states as members, but depending on their
purpose they can also be comprised of entities such as individuals, busi-
nesses, charities and government agencies. This means that IOs in the
widest sense can be transnational (NGOs such as Amnesty International),
transgovernmental (e.g. INTERPOL) and intergovernmental (such
as the Organisation of American States and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation).
An IO operates based on certain common interests of the members,
and these are codified in a formal constitution (also referred to as a
‘constitutive act’ or a ‘charter’) which is established by treaty. The con-
stitution endows on the organisation permanent, continuous and auton-
omous structures and an elected governing body. This means that an
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 85

IO is not simply a series of conferences on a certain theme. Even if not

stipulated in its constitution, in terms of treaty law the decisions of the
organisation are considered to be binding on all its members.
Clive Archer (1992: 68), in a useful theoretical examination of inter-
national organisations, identified three distinct roles of IOs within the
diplomatic environment. In the first place, they can serve rather passively
as arenas, or permanent venues, for interaction among actors, much as
a sports field would be customised to accommodate specific organised
games. In this regard, the rules of procedure are pivotal. There would be
paralysing chaos in the proceedings of an IO without a common under-
standing of things such as meeting dates and venues, order of speaking
during debates and rules about chairing.
Secondly, and also in a somewhat passive sense, international organ-
isations can be used as instruments. As such, they can serve as tools in
the pursuit of the narrow foreign policy objectives of individual member
states or a minilateral group within an organisation. Karns and Mingst
(2013: 146) give the example of the IMF’s weighted voting system,
which ensures that Canada, Japan, Europe and the USA command more
than 60% of the institution’s votes. The ‘instrument’ role is understand-
ably controversial, and the ends to which IOs are manipulated can be at
variance with those they were intended for.
The Security Council of the UN is an even more dramatic example.
Its mandate is to ensure international peace and security, yet since its cre-
ation in 1945 the world has witnessed its members trying to frustrate
each other’s ambitions, posturing for a global audience, and at times pur-
suing decidedly non-peaceful agendas. In Africa, the saying goes ‘when
elephants fight, the grass gets trampled’,10 and this can be observed in
any organisation that falls prey to instrumental abuse by its big powers.
The founding constitution of an IO usually has some or other provi-
sion to reduce the opportunity for hegemony, but one should not make
the mistake of thinking that only powerful states try to manipulate the
organisations they are members of. Neither is it fair to say that instru-
mental use of an IO is necessary to the detriment of the organisation and
its aims. It all depends on the context, and the balance between fairness
(representation of all members’ input) versus efficacy (the ability to reach
and execute decisions). I will revert to this point in a discussion on the
reform of global governance in the chapter on structural diplomacy.
Archer notes, in the third place, that IOs can also be independent
actors, as they assume distinct legal identity and participate in global
86 Y. K. SPIES

politics as unitary entities. It is this role that has grown significantly over
the past few decades, and which I will now discuss in more detail. The
focus will be on IGOs.

4.2   Intergovernmental Organisations as Diplomatic Actors

As subjects of international law IGOs assume distinct identities that are
shaped not only by their membership structure but also by their unique
procedures, agendas and relational experiences in the global arena. Thus,
despite the fact that their existence depends on their member states,
IGOs ‘have a dynamic of their own that exceeds their original mandate
of representing member-states interests’ (Langhorne 2005: 335). That
same dynamic gains momentum as the context within which they oper-
ate, evolves; and as they each establish a unique institutional culture.

Supranational Mandate
As autonomous diplomatic actors, IGOs sometimes take decisions
that do not reflect the policy of all of their member states. Such poli-
cies could even be in conflict with international law and UN practice.
Western Sahara, politically known as the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR) is a full member state of the African Union, despite
the fact that the disputed territory is not recognised as sovereign by the
United Nations—and, indeed, not recognised as such by many of the
AU’s own member states. There is even a difference between political
maps used by the AU and those used elsewhere in the world (with the
exception of some Muslim state that do recognise the SADR). AU maps
show Western Sahara as a sovereign country, hence the relative smaller
cartographic size of Morocco. This geopolitical anomaly only emphasises
the fact that the AU has actor-like11 abilities to formulate and enact inde-
pendent policy.
IGOs have not only been delegated authority over aspects of their
member states’ foreign policy, but also increasingly over economic,
social, environmental and other issues that have hitherto been exclu-
sively within the domain of domestic policy. The regimes produced by
IGOs feed into global governance, an issue that will thread through
several subsequent chapters. They even (especially since the 1960s)
exert the power to create other fully fledged IGOs (Karns and Mingst
2013: 143)
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 87

IGOs Represented in Individual States

The fact that international organisations interact independently with
other international actors in many cases results in them formalising and
institutionalising their diplomatic relations. Like sovereign states, they
accredit their own diplomatic representatives to individual states. One
difference is that the head of an organisation’s mission is not referred to
as an ‘ambassador’, but as a ‘resident representative’. An IGO’s resident
representative is a member of the local diplomatic corps, but—as in the
case of bilateral consuls—is accredited to the host country’s government
rather than the head of state. He/she therefore ranks below the status
of bilateral ambassadors when it comes to formal diplomatic precedence.
ECOWAS, for instance, maintains resident representatives in the capi-
tals of a number of states, such as Monrovia (Liberia). The ECOWAS
delegation’s mandate would come from Abuja (Nigeria), where the
organisation is headquartered. On the other hand, Sierra Leone—which
is a founding member of ECOWAS—also maintains an embassy in
Monrovia, and receives its instructions from Freetown, Sierra Leone’s
capital. Its mandate is therefore not subsumed by the ECOWAS mission.

Range of Representation at a Given IGO

The active diplomatic role of a given IGO means that even states without
aspiration or potential to be members of the organisation might choose
to maintain official relations with it. This sentiment was evident when
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu addressed an ECOWAS
Summit on 4 June 2017 in Monrovia. He started his speech by saying
‘this has been a dream to come here to this organisation in West Africa’.
Beyond the political rhetoric, a concrete indication of a particular
organisation’s global standing is the phenomenon of non-member states
requesting diplomatic accreditation. The USA, for example, maintains a
separate mission to the AU, based in Addis Ababa, alongside its bilat-
eral embassy to Ethiopia. In the same way, Japan maintains a mission
to ASEAN headquarters in Jakarta, alongside its bilateral embassy to
Indonesia. This trend does not only affect the ‘big’ IGOs, and increas-
ingly smaller or subregional IGOs are also courted by states outside its
obvious area of influence. Thus the Finnish Ambassador to Nigeria is
also officially accredited to ECOWAS, and ‘hands over credentials’ to the
President of the ECOWAS Commission, in a ceremony similar to that of
‘handing over credentials’ to the Nigerian President.
88 Y. K. SPIES

IGOs Represented at Other IGOs

IGOs can also have independent diplomatic representation at other
IGOs: the African Union maintains a permanent mission to the
European Union, in Brussels, just as the EU maintains a mission to the
AU, in Addis Ababa. An IGO’s representation to another IGO happens
regardless of the number of its own members that have representation
at the other IGO, and its representative mandate can be vastly differ-
ent from that of its component states. The sending IGO does not enjoy
the same privileges of membership (notably voting rights) as individual
member states of the receiving IGO, but it is able to participate sub-
stantively in a continuous, structured manner. Representation allows the
sending IGO to observe most if not all aspects of the receiving IGO’s
proceedings and in some instances its representatives are allowed to
address the committees or plenary session they attend. They are also, as a
matter of routine, provided with all the official documentation that gets
circulated to member states. Importantly, they have opportunity to par-
ticipate fully in the lobbying and negotiations behind the public gather-
ings that are a hallmark of multilateral diplomacy.

IGOs Being Members of Other Multilateral Groups

Moving yet further in the diplomatic actorness domain, IGOs (like
states) can also be individual members of other multilateral forums. The
G20 has 20 members, but only 19 of these are individual states: the EU
is its 20th member (this despite the fact that the G20 includes four12
states that are also members of the EU). By the same token, the Middle
East Quartet (formed in 2002 in Madrid, to give momentum to the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process) comprises of four members: two states,
the USA and Russia; and two organisations, the EU and the UN. In this
case also, there is an obvious membership overlap, as both the USA and
Russia are also members of the UN.

4.3  Secretariats:
The Multilateral Counterpart of Foreign Ministries
The independent ‘life’ of an IGO in the global arena necessitates an
institutional management mechanism similar to a state’s Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (MFA). The responsibility to manage an IGO’s affairs is
vested in a secretariat or ‘commission’, as some organisations call their
secretariats. Like MFAs, the functions of secretariats are wide-ranging
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 89

and include technical support, administration, archive management, legal

support, protocol services, public relations, financial management as well
as ‘political’ work.
The growth (both in size and in number) of IGO secretariats has pro-
duced a new genre of professional diplomats: what can be called ‘inter-
national civil servants’. These officials, who are not state bound, have
international legal status, provide public functions and work exclusively
and continuously for international organisations such as the UN. A huge
and increasing number of civil servants work in the global arena—the
UN’s secretariat, alone, comprises of more than 40,000 staff members.
They are entitled to the same privileges and immunities as conventional
diplomats, and their legal status is usually enshrined in the constitution
of the organisation they serve. In fact, one of the first duties of a newly
established IGO secretariat is to negotiate with the city/state where its
headquarters are based so as to capture the privileges and immunities of
the organisation’s permanent staff in a legal contract.
Secretariat staff perform duties that are in many aspects identical to
those of career diplomats, and the latter are often recruited to work in
IGO secretariats precisely because of their foreign ministry experience.
They manage the daily affairs of the organisation and implement its poli-
cies by collecting and disseminating information, preparing policy advice,
writing speeches, managing agendas, overseeing the organisation’s prin-
cipal organs, monitoring political and socio-economic trends, organising
conferences and preparing reports, to name just a few. The qualities that
are sought after in these officials are essentially the same as when tradi-
tional diplomats are recruited, ranging from intercultural sensitivity and
multilingual ability, to intellectual acumen and practical experience in
negotiation and project management.
Esprit de corps is particularly desirable in the cosmopolitan environ-
ment of international civil service, and in order to secure employment
parity (to reflect the scope of membership), IGOs typically implement
quota systems based on nationality. The tendency of diplomats to foster
a diplomatic culture that transcends that of their sending state is evident
in IGOs as well, and international civil servants develop a sense of loyalty
and association with the organisation’s ethos and culture that creates a
sense of non-territorial belonging. It is thus not surprising that the UN
Charter (Article 100) commits member states ‘to respect the exclusively
international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General
and the staff and not to seek to influence them in the discharge of their
90 Y. K. SPIES

duties’. Staff members answer to the UN alone and take an oath not to
seek or receive instructions from any government or outside authority.
The distinct identity of an IGO is actively nurtured by the organ-
isation’s secretariat. The latter usually employs dedicated officials to
compile and disseminate information about the organisation and to
promote its image and interests. In the case of the United Nations,
its Department of Public Information (DPI) handles all the organi-
sation’s promotion material and public archives and employs a range
of contemporary media to communicate the UN’s objectives to the
world. Like a mini-foreign service in its own right, it presides over a
network of Information Centres (UNICs) across the world. As of June
2018, there were 63 of these offices. Their staff (as in the case of dip-
lomatic missions, a combination of transferred and locally recruited
officials) network within the foreign policy communities where they are
based. They have a strong educational mission, which includes assist-
ing schools and universities with the development of ‘Model United
Nations’ projects.
IGOs tend to be attractive employers and are inclined to uphold
labour standards that reflect best practice in their member states—in
some cases even exceeding those standards. But the unique environ-
ment of an IGO offers its own challenges to a multinational staff com-
ponent. Caterina Carta (2014: 36), writing about the European Union,
explains:

Despite some analogies with MFAs, the [EU] Commission is a non-state

diplomatic actor characterised by the existence of specific sources of con-
flict (apart from the sectoral, ideological and personal rivalries common to
all MFAs), such as those stemming from the need to reconcile different
constituencies, administrative cultures and strategic priorities in the man-
agement of external relations.

The European External Action Service (EEAS), as the EU’s ‘foreign

service’ is known, is a particularly well-developed network of IGO rep-
resentation. The EEAS resulted from the Treaty of Lisbon and has been
in operation since December 2010. By 2016 it maintained 140 missions
across the world, and combined with its head office staff, had become
one of the largest foreign services in the world. For all intents and pur-
poses, the EU diplomats function exactly like their counterparts from
national governments.
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 91

4.4   The IGO CEO: Secretaries-General et al.

IGOs have various names for the position of ‘chief executive officer’—a
common title is Secretary-General (UN, NATO, ASEAN, SCO, OECD,
Arab League) and equivalent terms are Chairperson (ECOWAS; SADC);
Executive Director (APEC; IEA) ‘Director-General’ (WTO), ‘President’
(World Bank Group), and so forth. As the ‘face’ of the organisation, the
CEO plays a crucial role, and the position is sought after by member
states who vie to have their national candidates elected to the prestigious
position.
The world’s most influential international civil servant is the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. The UN Charter is surpris-
ingly vague on the issue of eligibility for the position that was described,
in 1945, as ‘chief administrative officer’. The job itself would, in due
course, prove to be intensely political. Rather gloomily, the first-ever UN
Secretary-General, Norwegian statesman Trygve Lie, declared it to be
the most difficult job in the world.
The politics starts with the very selection of the SG. In terms of the
UN Charter (Article 97), the UN Security Council has to recommend
the nominee, who then has to be appointed by the General Assembly.
He/she therefore has to enjoy the support not merely of the majority of
member states, but also the politically incompatible permanent members
of the Security Council. Ramesh Thakur (2011: 84) says:

This immediately changes the thrust from selecting someone who com-
mands the widest following to someone who is least unacceptable to the
major powers. The procedure places a premium on a non-activist, pliant
Secretary-General.

It is therefore customary within the UN to select candidates from smaller

or middle-sized states, usually states with a good track record in terms of
abiding by international law and multilateral norms. There is an informal
attempt to observe regional rotation, and it is practice (not specifically
prescribed by the Charter) that the candidate will serve no more than
two five-year terms.
Over the years, many analysts13 have used a play on words in the
title of the UN’s top diplomat, to debate whether the job requires a
‘secretary’ (clerk) rather than a ‘general’ (strategic leader), vice versa,
or a combination of both. An important consideration is that the SG
92 Y. K. SPIES

participates in the deliberations of the Security Council—and this in itself

places him (or ‘her’, perhaps in future!) at the table of the most powerful
legal entity in the history of mankind.
But as Brian Urquhart (a former UN Undersecretary-General) (2007:
15) points out, the Charter was unambiguous on the need for independ-
ence in the professional conduct of any SG candidate. Some of the SGs
have shown tremendous statesmanship, perhaps nobody more so than
the Swede Dag Hammarskjöld.14 He was a fearless advocate for the cause
of marginalised states and people and worked under immense political
pressure at the height of the Cold War. Pressurised by the Soviet Union
to resign during 1961, he refused with these defiant words:

It is very easy to bow to the wish of a big power. It is another matter to

resist it. If it is the wish of those nations who see the organisation their
best protection in the present world, I shall do so again. (UPI 1961)

Hammarskjöld’s ‘norm-entrepreneurship’ was recognised when he was

awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1961. 40 years later, in 2001, a suc-
cessor SG, the Ghanaian Kofi Annan, would once again be lauded by
the Nobel Committee.15 Hammarskjöld and Annan both proved that
the individuals who hold this impossible job ‘can rise well above the
formal mandates of their positions’ as David Malone (2013: 132) says,
and thereby prove ‘the difference that individuals can make within large,
faceless international bureaucracies’.

4.5   Extensions of IGO CEOs:

Special Representatives, Commissions and High-Level Panels
Presiding over a global diplomatic agenda that is ever enlarging makes it
humanly impossible for any incumbent SG to tend to all the hot spots of
the organisation’s work. This has resulted in the practice of the UN SG
appointing a ‘Special Representative of the Secretary-General’ (SRSG)
as troubleshooter in a specific matter. As an executive extension of the
Secretary-General, this appointee can specialise in a particular thematic
area or case, and consolidate the organisation’s diplomatic efforts on the
matter. The deployment of SRSGs, initially an unusual occurrence, has
spread widely within the UN system and beyond, to other IGOs, and
now includes a large range of thematic areas: human rights, food secu-
rity, gender issues, and migration, to name just a few.
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 93

Apart from appointing special representatives (and the option of sim-

ply enlarging the bureaucracy of a given secretariat) to assist with a wid-
ening array of responsibilities, another practice that has grown within
IGOs is the executive establishment of ad hoc commissions and high-
level panels. Gareth Evans (2013: 278) explains that high-level pan-
els consist of individuals (rather than representatives of governments or
organisations) who are internationally recognised for their expertise in a
particular area of international concern, and who serve in their personal
capacity. The panel is usually constituted in terms of a specific mandate
and time frame, budget and administrative support and delivers a report
to the CEO of the organisation.
Within the UN it has become common for the SG to commission a
high-level panel in anticipation of a key report that needs to be deliv-
ered to the plenary of the organisation (in the UN’s case, to the General
Assembly). In September 2003, UN SG Kofi Annan announced the
establishment of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change
to examine the critical peace and security challenges of the organisation.
The panel’s recommendations regarding institutional responses, captured
in its 2004 report ‘A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility’
was the basis of Annan’s seminal 2005 report (coinciding with the UN’s
60th anniversary) titled ‘In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All’.
The UN practice of executive-appointed ad hoc panels has spread
to a number of other IGOs and is becoming an integral feature of the
networked diplomacy that marks the twenty-first century. It allows for
expertise and ‘outsider’ opinions to invigorate an organisation’s stra-
tegic introspection. When Robert Zoellick, President of the World
Bank Group, commissioned an investigation into the governance stand-
ards of his organisation, he asked Ernesto Zedillo, Director of the
Yale Centre for the Study of Globalisation, to head up the High-Level
Commission on Modernising the Governance of the World Bank Group.
The commission produced a major strategic report during 2009, titled
‘Repowering the World Bank for the 21st Century’, that addressed
concerns about the institutional dynamics of this influential organisa-
tion in the field of development. In a letter to Zedillo, Zoellick (2009)
thanked him for his leadership in the work of the commission and for
assisting the organisation to embark ‘on a set of reforms to improve
the legitimacy, efficiency, effectiveness and accountability of the World
Bank Group…’.
94 Y. K. SPIES

5  Foreign Ministries and Multilateral Diplomacy

Worldwide growth in multilateral relations has impacted the institutional
framework of diplomacy, and this has been mirrored in individual state
bureaucracy. Foreign ministries have developed specialised structures to
allow for multilateral specialisation within a foreign service, both at head
office and in terms of foreign representation. While the bureaucratic
management of multilateral diplomacy is not unique per se, the nature
of multilateral work adds layers of compounded challenges to the perfor-
mance of foreign ministries.

5.1   Foreign Ministry Organisation

of Multilateral Diplomacy
In organisational terms, foreign ministry management of a multilateral
diplomatic mission is essentially the same as that of a bilateral one. One
peculiar difference is that the head of a multilateral mission (usually with
the personal rank of ambassador) is referred to as a ‘permanent repre-
sentative’. It mirrors the name of the embassy itself, which is known as
a ‘permanent mission’. Whereas an ambassador to a foreign state will
present his/her credentials to the head of the foreign state, at an inter-
national organisation credentials are presented to the CEO of that insti-
tution. Therefore, in the case of ASEAN, the United Nations and many
other IGOs, the permanent representatives of the member states present
credentials to the organisation’s Secretary-General.
In general, multilateral missions tend to have a more diverse and
larger staff component, because the agenda of multilateral relations is so
much wider than that of bilateral relations. Diplomatic staff at a mission
are joined by transferred officials from other areas of government with
strategic interest in multilateral processes. Tanzania, for example, has a
military attaché at its UN mission in New York. (The fact that this rel-
atively poor state also has a defence attaché at its bilateral Embassy in
Washington, DC, indicates the priority it places on security concerns in
its foreign policy.) As in the case of attachés at bilateral missions, these
seconded civil servants are accorded diplomatic rank.
Under the customary international law, and in the absence of a spe-
cific international legal convention on the status of multilateral diplo-
mats, the latter enjoy essentially the same privileges and immunities as
their counterparts serving in bilateral missions. The secretariat of an
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 95

IGO usually agrees—with a host government—on the status of its mem-

ber states’ representatives when it negotiates the diplomatic status of its
own staff. It is custom to invoke all the provisions of the 1961 Vienna
Convention on Diplomatic Relations (which was drafted with bilateral
diplomacy in mind) in such contracts.
A state’s multilateral diplomacy is anchored in the specialised multilat-
eral division(s) of its foreign ministry, as the latter coordinate the imple-
mentation of diplomatic strategy within the state’s foreign service and
more widely within government bureaucracy. All states therefore conduct
their multilateral diplomacy essentially from the institutional base of head
office, regardless of the extent to which they maintain permanent multilat-
eral missions abroad. This does not only apply to policy direction. Head
office-based officials frequently travel abroad to attend ad hoc conferences
or to bolster sessional capacity of their resident multilateral missions, for
example, during the General Assembly’s annual plenary sessions in New
York. These temporary missions are referred to as ‘delegations’ and mem-
bers receive accreditation to participate only in the proceedings of a spec-
ified meeting, or series of meetings. A state might also decide to appoint
any number of head office-based ‘roving’ ambassadors to deal with specific
multilateral issues, regions or organisations, on an ongoing basis.
It is custom, though, for all foreign ministries to have at least one per-
manent16 mission accredited to an international organisation. If a state
can afford only one such mission, it would be at the United Nations
headquarters in New York, because the UN offers the most comprehen-
sive diplomatic umbrella with unlimited opportunity for minilateral and
bilateral diplomacy. Beyond a mission at the UN, the number and loca-
tion of permanent multilateral missions depend on the individual state’s
foreign policy priorities, its membership of IGOs and, of course, its dip-
lomatic capacity.
It is here where the reality of asymmetrical capacity once again rears
its head. Less developed states are disproportionately vulnerable to the
outcomes of multilateral processes, yet their enthusiasm about the prac-
tical and symbolic value of multilateral diplomacy is not matched by the
capacity to participate on equal terms. This is illustrated in the example
of the three decades of negotiations around the first Lomé Convention
and each of its successor agreements. The process has revealed the
dearth of capacity within the dozens of ACP countries in contrast to the
ability of the European Union to conduct protracted, highly technical
negotiations.
96 Y. K. SPIES

Within IGOs the range and complexity of issues on the agenda, and
participation in the panoply of committees, mini-lateral groups and coor-
dinating meetings can be beyond the capacity of under-resourced MFAs.
Diplomats from smaller missions are therefore forced to be ‘generalists’,
and they cannot build up specialised expertise to the extent that their
peers in better capacitated missions do. They stretch themselves thin and
can easily become exhausted as a result. Jones and Whittingham (1998:
6), noting the problem many poor countries have in sustaining com-
plex trade negotiations with more powerful, developed states, quote a
Zimbabwean ambassador to the UN who remarked:

When we go for negotiations you find that America, for example, has 90
trade officers and poor Zimbabwe just has three officers who are expected
to negotiate around the clock … that’s why you find African officials end
up sleeping, when others are negotiating. It’s not because they are lazy,
they are human too and they get tired.

Meaningful participation in international conferences increasingly

requires the participation of technocrats from other domestic ministries,
notably those dealing with economic policy. In the case of poor coun-
tries, their small pool of experts on development issues is usually already
over-stretched, to the extent that key personnel cannot be spared by
domestic government departments. This leaves MFA staff ill-equipped
to handle the technical aspects of negotiations. Under-representation in
multilateral forums leaves diplomats vulnerable to the powerful teams
deployed by rich states. Their dilemma is exacerbated by a lack of ade-
quate telecommunications infrastructure which is required to consult
with experts in the sending state. The result, as John Hemery (2002:
142) phrases it, is that the diplomatic teams of poor states often end up
being ‘a mere object of negotiation’, rather than dynamic partners in
multilateral forums.
Other problems related to MFA capacity deficits include insufficient
head office direction to multilateral diplomatic missions. This can cause
unnecessary abstention or non-participation in voting on resolutions
within organisations. Moreover, diplomats who are ignorant or insecure
as a result of deficient policy guidance (or diplomatic training) tend to
genuflect to colleagues from stronger negotiation teams in multilateral
coalitions. Financial constraints also affect the ability of states to partici-
pate effectively in multilateral forums, and defaulting on the payment of
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 97

membership and other dues to an IGO can lead to suspension of voting

rights within the organisation. Effectively, that means yet more margin-
alization in the global diplomatic arena.

5.2   Even Greater Bureaucratic Management of Foreign Policy

Since the end of the twentieth century, foreign ministries have found
their traditional monopoly on the conduct of diplomacy increasingly
eroded. They are rivalled by a panoply of other actors at supranational,
national, subnational and transnational levels. This challenge is, if any-
thing, even more pronounced at the multilateral level. From the head
office of a foreign ministry, officials interact with counterparts in the rest
of government, think tanks, academic institutions, the business commu-
nity, the diplomatic corps, media and NGOs—all the entities that com-
prise a state’s local ‘foreign policy community’. The complex nature of
multilateral diplomacy, its massive agenda and sheer global reach of deci-
sion-making mean that its conduct needs to be vetted (to a much greater
extent than bilateral diplomacy) among a large range of stakeholders and
legal experts.
This is particularly true within the domain of economic multilater-
alism. Leguey-Feilleux (2009: 221) explains how, at the International
Labour Organisation (ILO), government representatives from the labour
sector participate and vote independently of their counterparts represent-
ing the foreign ministry. To add yet more complexity, the representatives
of employees and those of employers also participate in the same forums.
In the same vein, Geoff Pigman (2010: 64) points out that WTO diplo-
macy around farm subsidies and negotiations within the UN Food and
Agriculture Organisation, an issue field that is notoriously difficult, have
seen ministries of agriculture becoming key diplomatic actors. While at
the WTO it is expected of ministries responsible for international trade
and industry to dominate negotiations, at the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank ministries of finance and central banks take
the lead, as they represent their governments in the highly technical
domain of global financial management. The reality is that the domain is
also deeply political. At best, foreign ministries will provide guidance on
the state’s overarching foreign policy framework and enrich negotiation
strategy with networked knowledge of the international political environ-
ment. At worst, foreign ministries can be marginalised or become entan-
gled in ‘turf battles’ with other domestic ministries.
98 Y. K. SPIES

It stands to reason that preparation for such multilateral engagement

requires much coordination of policy at the intra-governmental level.
This is further compounded by the many other levels on which policy
coordination is needed. As Devin and Törnquist-Chesnier (2010: 65)
observe, diplomats must also reconcile multiple domestic stakeholder
interests with the normative framework of the multilateral environment.
When matters of trade and industry are negotiated, for instance, issues
of human rights and environmental concerns cannot be excluded from
consideration. The bureaucratic management of multilateral foreign pol-
icy thus requires intricate networking among stakeholders to ensure that
state positions are coherent, legitimate and practical.

5.3   Multifaceted Representative Roles

Multilateral forums give advance notice of agendas and this requires a
different form of strategising by the foreign ministries of sending states.
States plan their voting behaviour around all or most of the issues on
the agenda in advance, as is the case when preparations are made by
states for the annual UN General Assembly session. Even if specific vot-
ing behaviour has not been dictated, multilateral diplomats act ‘under
more or less comprehensive instructions from their governments about
the goals that they should seek, the opinions they should express and the
general line of conduct they should follow’ (Peterson 1986: 284). This
could be a challenge for diplomats who have to contend with a dynami-
cally changing negotiation milieu, and who may then have to revert back
to principals, thereby losing time and facing the risk of being overtaken
by events (Kaufmann (1996: 155).
The opposite may also be true, especially when issues are not of funda-
mental importance to a sending state, in which case diplomats may have a
relatively free hand in exercising their vote. They may simply have a broad
mandate to vote in line (or ‘vote in good company’, as the traditional dip-
lomatic saying goes) with voting blocs, regional groups or other allies.
The ‘give-and-take’ nature of multilateral negotiation makes it a balanc-
ing act between national interests and reaching outcomes that are accept-
able to a wide range of stakeholders who might have mutually exclusive
agendas (Smith 2006: 41). Like representation of interests, mandates in
multilateral negotiation derive also from supranational and transnational
commitments. Such commitments require harmonisation of voting behav-
iour. Negotiation at a multilateral forum is therefore a continuous process,
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 99

as diplomats strategise and seek support for evolving policies at multiple

levels, based on amalgamated multilateral interests. In many cases, these
interests are agreed at bilateral level with key partners.
The implication is that multilateral diplomats promote the complex
interests not only of their sending states, but also those of the mul-
tilateral associations prioritised in their governments’ foreign policy.
Economic diplomacy, in particular, requires of diplomats to consider the
trade and investment opportunities for entire regions and/or other trad-
ing blocs. In the daily execution of their duties, diplomats thus need to
heed compound foreign policy interests. A diplomat from Angola would
have to consider the larger agenda of the Southern African Development
Community (SADC) as well as that of the African Union. There are also
many other overlapping loyalties: the same Angolan diplomat would
implicitly represent shared interests of the Lusophone17 countries, both
those in Africa and beyond. Also at issue would be the interests of the
powerful OPEC group (which oil-rich Angola joined in 2007) despite
the fact that OPEC has little focus on the developmental issues that
underpin Angola’s diplomacy.
In practice, however, a given state’s foreign policy objectives might
not be in line with those of the regional IGO(s) to which it belongs, or
for that matter other multilateral groups it might be aligned with (Saner
and Yiu 2003: 10). The clash of national interest versus wider multilateral
interest can be contentious: the 2009 Copenhagen Accord mentioned
earlier in this chapter, saw a bitter reaction to South Africa’s minilateral
deal with Brazil, China, India and the USA. The Sudanese representa-
tive, who also spoke in his capacity as leader of the G-77 group (of which
South Africa is a member), openly accused18 South Africa of betraying
Africa’s interests by siding with foreign powers.
Multilateral diplomatic representation takes on an additional dimension
when a state belongs to a supranational organisation, and both the state
and that organisation are represented at another state or IGO. The EU and
its member states offer a prime example of such parallel representation. In
Islamabad (Pakistan), Czechia19 maintains a bilateral embassy regardless of
the fact that the EU, of which it is a member state, is also represented there.
Geoff Pigman (2010: 61) explains that such overlapping representation can
produce ‘diplomatic synergies’ when the bilateral and multilateral diplomats
have a shared strategic vision of their diplomatic objectives. On the other
hand, ‘parallel representation can also lead to conflicts of emphases and pri-
orities, if not policies, between the EU and its member states’.
100 Y. K. SPIES

Yet another dimension to compounded representative roles, is the idea

that sovereign states are stakeholders in the very identity of an IGO to
which they belong, and therefore, to an extent diplomats ‘represent’ the
organisation as well. As David Malone (2013: 132), a former Permanent
Representative of Canada, says, within an IGO ‘the ambassadors rep-
resent shareholders as well as stakeholders’. This dual role becomes
pronounced when sovereign state representatives assume rotational pres-
idency of organs within an IGO, such as the UN’s Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC). Within the UN system, temporary multilateral
leadership positions are typically20 allocated to smaller or medium-sized
states. This arguably reinforces the idea that these states are multilateral-
ist by inclination.
A state’s representative within an IGO also assumes a wider represent-
ative role when he/she takes on the mantle of dean of a regional bloc,
or minilateral group. An individual state representative could also, on an
ad hoc basis, be tasked with representing a particular bloc in conducting
liaison with the organisation’s secretariat (Leguey-Feilleux 2009: 219).
Individuals with good reputation, experience and skills are singled out
because they are deemed able to aggregate, communicate and negotiate
their bloc’s collective position vis-à-vis the IGO management.

5.4   Mastering the Rules of the Game

Participation in multilateral diplomatic processes demands knowl-
edge of the structures, rules of procedure, jargon, institutional culture,
modus operandi and legal framework of a particular multilateral setting.
Command of these knowledge areas is required in addition to traditional
diplomatic skills, in order to exploit all opportunities and resources, and
to avoid the many pitfalls of multilateral diplomacy.
Whereas in bilateral diplomacy time frames are determined on an ad
hoc basis and by mutual agreement, large IGOs necessarily enforce strict
deadlines to coordinate and regulate proceedings. Missing a deadline for
submission of member state policy papers, or not attending a key meet-
ing, can have major implications. A poignant historical example is the
Security Council’s Resolution to become militarily involved in the Korean
War (1950–1953), a decision that left a major legacy in the geopolitics of
East Asia. On the day, the Security Council adopted Resolution 84—to
intervene in order to defend the Southern part of the divided country—
the representative from the Soviet Union was not present. His absence
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 101

was due to a Soviet boycott of the Council that had started in January
of that year, to protest against the Republic of China (Taiwan) rather
than the People’s Republic of China (PRC) holding a permanent seat on
the Security Council. Thus on 7 July 1950, when the Council voted to
declare war on the invading forces from the North (an invasion that was
supported by the Soviet Union and the PRC), there was no North Korea-
supporting permanent member to veto the decision. The decision-mak-
ing crisis related to the Korean War sent shockwaves through the UN
community. During November of that same year, the General Assembly
adopted the ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution. It enables the Assembly to
take action if the Security Council fails to act, in which case the Assembly
can consider the matter immediately and recommend collective measures
to maintain or restore international peace and security.
Operational skills in multilateral diplomacy also differ from that of
bilateral diplomacy. This could range from drafting resolutions; ‘lobby-
ing’ interlocutors; mobilising political coalitions; conceptualising, nego-
tiating and packaging treaties; to chairing sessions in such a manner that
maximum advantage is achieved by the sending state and its allies. Junior
diplomats need these skills as much as their seniors, because the UN
General Assembly cascades its agenda items to six committees, and mem-
ber states decide, depending on the importance they attach to the the-
matic area of a committee’s work, at what level of seniority they wish to
be represented. This means that the First Committee (on Disarmament
and International Security) might be attended simultaneously by the
Permanent Representative (Ambassador) of France, while Peru, which
has less interest in the theme of the First Committee, might send only a
third secretary to take note of developments. As Leguey-Feilleux (2009:
226) points out, this system affords junior diplomats opportunity to
interact with much more senior diplomats from other member states.
It departs from the traditional (bilateral) practice of upholding a rather
rigid hierarchy in the peer-to-peer interaction of diplomats.

5.5   Multilateral Socialisation of States

Multilateral diplomacy is ‘brought home’ rather spectacularly when a
state hosts a major international conference. It has become custom for
the host state to be allocated the presidency of an ad hoc conference and
this gives the host opportunity not just to boost national prestige, but at
a substantive level to leave a lasting impact on the proceedings (Berridge
102 Y. K. SPIES

2010: 149). Rio de Janeiro’s hosting of the June 1992 UN Conference

on Environment and Development cemented Brazil’s association with
this multilateral project, through the enduring reference to the sum-
mit as the ‘Rio Earth Summit’. The 1992 summit was attended by
more than a hundred world leaders, and thousands of NGO represent-
atives with consultative status participated in a parallel ‘Global Forum’.
During 2012 the 20-year follow-up summit (commonly referred to as
the Rio+20) was also held in Rio de Janeiro, with even larger numbers
present in all categories of attendees.
Head office-based diplomats are instrumental in the planning and
implementation of such conferences. The complex and long-term plan-
ning that goes into the project results in officials being ‘socialised’ into
the multilateral arena. Large numbers of diplomats from the host state,
including also very junior officials, have opportunity to participate in
some way or another and this builds expertise and networks, and a more
assertive multilateral presence in other forums.
MFA head offices are most dramatically ‘socialised’ when states join
regional integration arrangements. Within the EU, membership carries the
imperative that states make specific organisational changes21 within their
respective foreign ministries. Ernst Sucharipa (2003) explains that the most
important steps concern organisational capacity to cope with the EU’s
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). This requires the use of the
secure COREU communications system that links all EU members, for the
dissemination and implementation of policy. Each MFA has to establish a
‘European Correspondent Unit’ within its political department and ‘ensure
optimal coordination on EU related matters and the capacity to fulfill all
the responsibilities concomitant with the function of the EU Presidency’.
Membership opens up opportunities for diplomats from various states to
undergo joint training, or to be seconded to the regional organisation’s
headquarters. This in itself has a spillover effect on individual foreign min-
istries, as standards and trends are diffused across the union.

6   Conclusion
In the contemporary era the bulk of diplomacy is multilateral in nature,
concerns multilateral issues or occurs within multilateral forums. The
original multilateral phenomenon, namely ad hoc conferences to end
wars, made way for a plethora of diplomatic gatherings where the inter-
ests of states and humanity at large are negotiated.
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 103

Multilateral diplomatic activity is constantly evolving and manifests in

supple forms of plurilateral diplomacy (the bounded multilateral meet-
ings within the framework of bigger multilateral forums) and associative
diplomacy. Ad hoc conferences as well as permanent (parliamentary style
or club type) forums socialise participants into the norms of international
society and provide umbrellas under which all other modes of diplomacy
flourish. The ubiquitous nature of twenty-first-century multilateral diplo-
macy offers states the opportunity to engage in ‘à la carte’ diplomacy as
Richard Haass (2008: 55) calls it, or ‘forum-shopping’ in the words of
Karns and Mingst (2013: 149).
There are several catalysts in the prevalence of contemporary multilat-
eral diplomacy, starting with quantum changes in the number of actors
on the world stage and their insistence on ‘global democracy’: transpar-
ency, inclusivity and accountability in the global arena. The reality of the
contemporary diplomatic arena is that human concerns have been glo-
balised and therefore require multi-stakeholder solutions and cooperative
management—the bedrock of multilateralism.
In many ways, multilateral diplomacy mirrors the nature of interna-
tional society not only its trends and norms but also its challenges and fis-
sures. IGOs, in particular, reveal microcosms of international society in the
arenas they create at regional and global levels. Their instrumental use, by
powerful or wily members, is hugely controversial but they also transcend
the sum of their membership components to become important actors in
their own right. The fact that IGOs acquire a unique institutional identity
contributes to their historically unprecedented, high-profile role in inter-
national relations. They have also spawned an entirely new breed of diplo-
mat: international civil servants who serve supranational interests.
Foreign ministries have been impacted both in form and sub-
stance by the growth in multilateral diplomacy. It should be reiterated,
though, that diplomatic functions do not change fundamentally within
a multilateral framework. Even though the 1961 Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations was drafted with bilateral diplomacy in mind, the
basic functions of diplomatic missions, as enshrined in Article 3, apply
equally to multilateral missions. However, additional challenges are
embedded in the operational milieu of multilateral diplomacy, notably
the more complex representation and negotiation of stakeholder inter-
ests. Permeating everything is the sheer diversity of cultures and diplo-
matic styles, a ‘tower of Babel’ effect that makes all diplomatic functions
more unpredictable and complex than in bilateral forums.
104 Y. K. SPIES

Building on the normative element of multilateral diplomacy, the next

chapter will address ‘third party’ diplomacy—a mode of diplomacy that is
also (per definition) multilateral, but which is defined by crisis in a bilat-
eral relationship.

Notes
1. ASEAN is an exception: its 2007 Charter (Article 20) confirms that
ASEAN bases all its decision-making on ‘consultation and consensus’.
2. The Uniting for Consensus is a coalition that includes inter alia
Pakistan, Italy, Canada, Mexico, Turkey, South Korea, the Netherlands,
Spain, Argentina and China. The UfC states are reluctant to change
the permanent core of the UN Security Council and insist on reaching
consensus within the United Nations, before any structural changes are
affected.
3. Thomas Wright (2013: 182), for example, discusses the G20 as a manifes-
tation of minilateralism.
4. The number of ACP countries grew significantly since then, and by 2000,
78 ACP countries were signatories to the Cotonou Agreement.
5. Also referred to as the ‘Outreach-Five’ (O5), the ‘Plus Five’ and ‘Group
of Five’ (G-5).
6. The term was coined by Gareth Evans while he served as Foreign Minister
of Australia.
7. Rather soberly, Sofer (1988: 205) also noted that implementation of this
principle was unlikely, as it ‘would bring the great powers to an incon-
ceivable procedural inferiority’.
8. Mabubani quotes statistics from the World Trade Report 2007 (p. 244,
‘World exports and world GDP, 1870–2005’) issued by the World Trade
Organisation. Available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/book-
sp_e/anrep_e/wtr070b_e.pdf.
9. Blomqvist et al. (1993: 54) notes the irony thereof that it has been the
lack of political solidarity (the prime consideration in the Developing
World RIAs) that has undermined the majority of these initiatives.
Regional agendas require common values and geopolitical interests, but
newly sovereign states have been particularly hesitant to limit national
sovereignty in favour of a regional organisation.
10. From the Swahili proverb: Ndovu wawili wakisongana, ziumiazo ni nyika.
Variations of this proverb exist in many other African languages as well.
11. Cynics might say these examples prove the African Union was used as an
instrument by specific states, to pursue their foreign policy agendas.
12. France, Germany, Italy and the UK (pre-Brexit!).
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 105

13. See, for example, the compilation of essays in the book Secretary or

General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007) edited by Simon Chesterman.
14. Hammarskjöld was UN Secretary-General from April 1953 to September
1961, when he died in a plane crash in Southern Africa, while on a medi-
ation mission.
15. Kofi Annan and the United Nations were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize of 2001.
16. Or observer mission, in the case of contested states such as Taiwan.
17. Lusophone countries have Portuguese as an official language; they include
Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and
Sao-Tome and Principe, Timor-Leste and non-sovereign territories such
as Macau and Goa.
18. Note that the Sudanese representative, Lumumba Stanislaus Di-Aping,
later apologised for his tone.
19. During September 2016, the Government of the Czech Republic
requested that the shorter name ‘Czechia’ be used in (English language)
reference to the sovereign state.
20. The Security Council offers an exception, as presidency is rotated among
all the members of the Council.
21. See David Spence’s discussion on The Evolving Role of Foreign Ministries
in the Conduct of European Union Affairs, pp. 19–36, in Hocking and
Spence’s (eds.) 2003 book Foreign Ministries in the European Union.

Sources Used
Alfred Nobel Memorial Foundation. (2016). Official Internet Web-Site of the
Nobel Prize. https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/.
Annan, K. A. (2005). In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and
Human Rights for All: Report of the Secretary-General. New York: United
Nations, Department of Public Information.
Archer, C. (1992). International Organizations (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). (2007). Charter of ASEAN.
Barston, R. P. (2006). Modern Diplomacy (3rd ed.). London: Pearson/Longman.
Berridge, G. R. (2010). Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (4th ed.). Hampshire
and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Blomqvist, H. C., Lindholm, C., Lundahl, M., & Schauman, S. (1993). Some
Experiences from Regional Cooperation Between Third World Countries. In
B. Odén (Ed.), Southern Africa After Apartheid: Regional Integration and
External Resources (Seminar Proceedings No. 28). Uppsala: Scandinavian
Institute of African Studies.
106 Y. K. SPIES

Bouchard, C., & Peterson, J. (2011, January). Conceptualising Multilateralism:

Can We All Just Get Along? (MERCURY E-Paper No. 1). http://www.mer-
cury-fp7.net/.
Carta, C. (2014). The Diplomatic System of a Non-State Actor: The
Commission’s Entry into the Diplomatic Scene. In D. Dialer, H. Neisser, &
A. Opitz (Eds.), The EU’s External Action Service: Potentials for a One Voice
Foreign Policy (pp. 33–45). Innsbruck: Innsbruck University Press.
Chesterman, S. (Ed.). (2007). Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in
World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cooper, A., Hocking, B., & Maley, W. (Eds.). (2008). Global Governance and
Diplomacy: Worlds Apart. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
De Alwis, A. (2016, June 7). A New Age of Minilateralism: Potential Solutions
for the South China Sea Conundrum. Diplomatic Courier. http://www.
diplomaticourier.com/2016/06/07/new-age-minilateralism-potential-
solutions-south-china-sea-conundrum/.
Devin, G., & Törnquist-Chesnier, M. (2010). Burst Diplomacy—The
Diplomacies of Foreign Policy: Actors and Methods. Brazilian Political
Science Review, 4(2), 60–77.
Dlamini-Zuma, N. (2007). Comment by the South African Minister of Foreign
Affairs Regarding ‘South African Vote in the United Nations Security Council’.
Internet Site of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs: DFA News
and Events. http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/2007pq/pq22.htm. Accessed on 5
January 2008.
Evans, G. (2013). Commission Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R.
Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
G20. (2009, September 24–25). Leaders’ Statement, Pittsburgh Summit. http://
www.g20.org/Documents/pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.
pdf. Accessed on 9 June 2010.
Haass, R. N. (2008, May/June). The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow US
Dominance. Foreign Affairs, 87(3), 44–56.
Hemery, J. (2002). ‘Educating Diplomats’: In Academics, Practitioners and
Diplomacy: An ISP Symposium on the Theory and Practice of Diplomacy.
International Studies Perspectives, (3)2: 140–145.
Holsti, K. J. (2004). Taming the Sovereigns: Institutional Change in
International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hurrell, A. (2004, March). Working with Diplomatic Culture: Some Latin
American and Brazilian Questions. Paper Prepared for International Studies
Association, Conference in Montreal.
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).
(2001). The Responsibility to Protect. Ottawa: International Development
Research Centre.
 3 MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY IN CONGRESS 107

Jones, E., & Whittingham, P. (1998, October). Understanding the World Trade
Organisation: Implications and Possibilities for the South. Foundation for
Global Dialogue (Occasional Paper No. 13).
Jönsson, C., & Hall, M. (2005). Essence of Diplomacy. Houndsmill: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Karns, M. P., & Mingst, K. A. (2010). International Organisations: The Politics
and Processes of Global Governance (2nd ed.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Karns, M. P., & Mingst, K. A. (2013). International Organizations and
Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kaufmann, J. (1996). Conference Diplomacy. London: Macmillan Press.
Keohane, R. O. (1967). The Study of Political Influence in the General
Assembly. International Organisation, 21(2), 221–237.
Langhorne, R. (2005). The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors. Diplomacy &
Statecraft, 16(2), 331–339.
Langhorne, R., & Wallace, W. (1999). Diplomacy Towards the Twenty-First
Century. In B. Hocking (Ed.), Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation.
Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Leguey-Feilleux, J.-R. (2009). The Dynamics of Diplomacy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.
Mahbubani, K. (2013). Multilateral Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R.
Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Malone, D. M. (2013). The Modern Diplomatic Mission. In A. F. Cooper, J.
Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mathews, J. T. (1997, January–February). Power Shift. Foreign Affairs, 76(1), 50–66.
Naim, M. (2009, June 21). Minilateralism: The Magic Number to Get Real
International Action. Foreign Policy. http://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/
minilateralism/.
Netanyahu, B. (2017, June 4). Speech by the Prime Minister of Israel to the
ECOWAS Africa-Israel Summit, Monrovia (Liberia). Press Release by Israeli
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Peterson, M. J. (1986). The General Assembly in World Politics. Boston: Allen & Unwin.
Pigman, G. A. (2010). Contemporary Diplomacy: Representation and
Communication in a Globalised World. Cambridge: Polity.
Saner, R., & Yiu, L. (2003, January). International Economic Diplomacy:
Mutations in Post-modern Times. Netherlands Institute of International
Relations ‘Clingendael’ (Discussion Paper No. 84).
Smith, C. B. (2006). Politics and Process at the United Nations: The Global
Dance. London: Lynne Rienner.
Sofer, S. (1988). Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited. Review of
International Studies, 14(3), 195–211.
108 Y. K. SPIES

Spence, D. (2003). The Evolving Role of Foreign Ministries in the Conduct

of European Union Affairs. In B. Hocking & D. Spence (Eds.), Foreign
Ministries in the European Union. New York: Palgrave.
Spies, Y. K. (2013). Chapter 15: Multilateral Diplomats in the Early Twenty-
First Century. In B. Reinalda (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of International
Organization. London: Routledge.
Sucharipa, E. (2003, January). 21st Century Diplomacy. Paper Delivered
by the Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, at the Wilton Park
Conference on “The Role of Diplomats in the Modern World”.
Thakur, R. (2011, January–August). The United Nations and the Quest for World
Peace. Crossroads: The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal, II(4), 81–93.
United Nations. (2004). A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility: Report
of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change.
New York: United Nations, Department of Public Information.
United Nations. (1945, October 24). ‘Charter of the United Nations’, 1 UNTS
XVI, Available at http://www.unwebsite.com/charter.
United Press International (UPI). (1961). Year (1961) in Review. UPI Audio
Archives. http://www.upi.com/Archives/Audio/Events-of-1961/Death-of-
Dag-Hammarskj/. Accessed on 5 August 2014.
Urquhart, B. (2007). The Evolution of the Secretary-General. In S. Chesterman
(Ed.), Secretary or General? The United Nations Secretary-General in World
Politics (pp. 16–32). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van Wyk, J.-A. (2016). High-Level Panels as Diplomatic Instruments: The
African Union Panel of the Wise and the Emergence of an African Peace
Diplomacy Architecture. Journal for Contemporary History / Joernaal vir
Eietydse Geskiedenis, 41(1), 57–79.
Varghese, P. (2013, November 7). The Challenges of Multilateralism: Sir James
Plimsoll Lecture. Delivered by the Secretary of the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Australia. https://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/
department/131107-plimsoll.html#site-header.
World Bank Group. (2009). Repowering the World Bank for the 21st Century.
Report by the High-Level Commission on Modernising the Governance of
the World Bank Group.
Wright, T. (2013). Chapter 10: Bilateral and Multilateral Diplomacy in Normal
Times and in Crises. In P. Kerr & G. Wiseman (Eds.), Diplomacy in a
Globalizing World: Theories and Practices (pp. 175–191). New York: Oxford
University Press.
Zoellick, R. B. (2009, October 20). Letter from the President of the World Bank
Group, to Dr. Ernesto Zedillo. Director of the Yale Centre for the Study
of Globalization, New Haven, CT. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/
NEWS/Resources/WBGovernanceCOMMISSIONREPORT.pdf.
 CHAPTER 4

Third-Party Diplomacy:
The Diplomacy of Peace and Intercession

1   Introduction
In 1981, the United Nations General Assembly decided to dedicate a
specific day—21 September—to the annual commemoration of peace.
Laudable as this initiative was, the establishment of an International
Day of Peace highlighted the sad reality that, most of the time in many
parts of the world, peace is nothing more than a ‘wish’. In literature on
diplomacy, the (elusive) quest for global peace and security is a constant
subtext. It is fitting for an institution that pivots on intermediation, an
activity that implies the reduction, management or resolution of conflict1
between and among actors. It is such a strong theme in diplomacy that
‘a number of writers have raised the possibility that diplomacy’s identity
as a discrete practice may be subsumed under broader notions of con-
flict resolution and bargaining’ (Sharp 1998: 59). To be sure, any effort
to broker or maintain international peace has cooperative ventures at its
core, and in this regard the profession of diplomacy, by its very raison
d’être, fits the job description exactly.
Many multilateral organisations were founded with this goal in mind.
The SADC Treaty (1992) and the ASEAN Charter (2007), like so many
other IGO constitutions, both have the ‘peaceful settlement of disputes’
enshrined as fundamental objectives. Indeed, during the twentieth cen-
tury it became common within organisations to institutionalise the inter-
cessionary diplomacy that is required to address disputes. The trend was

© The Author(s) 2019 109

Y. K. Spies, Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00530-6_4
110 Y. K. SPIES

carried into the twenty-first century, facilitated by the growing phenom-

ena of regionalisation and global governance.
Third-party diplomacy, as the name indicates, involves more than two
entities, and it is therefore essentially multilateral in nature. However, as
this separate chapter demonstrates, I choose to treat it as a mode distinct
from multilateral diplomacy. What sets third-party diplomacy apart—not
just from multilateral diplomacy but from the other modes as well—is its
circumstantial, indirect application. It is employed in a situation where
two entities are finding it difficult to have normal bilateral diplomatic rela-
tions. This can be the result of tension between the two parties, mutually
exclusive foreign policy goals, even actual violent conflict. Yet, their mutual
need for diplomacy opens up space for a temporary, remedial element in
the relationship—the ‘third party’. The latter can present itself, or can be
invited, to become involved in the fractious relationship and to create, as a
minimum, a mechanism where they can work together peacefully. The par-
ticular intercession can range from minimal to extensive: at the one end of
the spectrum, the third party can act as a mere go-between (a sort of ‘post
office’) and at the other end of the spectrum it can be expected to actively
reconcile the adversaries and facilitate a post-conflict dispensation.
The third party can be a state, an individual, an organisation or even
a group of actors working together. This explains why the processes of
third-party diplomacy can (and often do) amount to a hybrid diplomatic
mode. It can incorporate one or more of the other modes of diplomacy,
whether multilateral, bilateral or polylateral. To be sure, third-party
diplomacy requires innovative, flexible and inclusive techniques, because
per definition it has to create opportunities for diplomacy when circum-
stances dictate against it.
In this chapter, the changing nature of global peace and conflict will
provide the backdrop for discussion of the contemporary practice of
third-party diplomacy. The historical provision of ‘good offices’ by neu-
tral or impartial external actors will be examined briefly, before a discus-
sion of the legal framework (as contained in the United Nations Charter)
that guides the pacific settlement of disputes. The notion that peace
requires some form of diplomatic ‘project management’ will guide the
discussion on peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction and devel-
opment. The troubling idea that peace and justice might be mutually
exclusive in some instances will also be explored. The chapter will con-
clude with consideration of the practice, by certain states, to turn third-
party diplomacy into a foreign policy niche area.
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 111

2  Good Offices
The term ‘good offices’ is diplomatic jargon for third-party facilitation
of diplomacy between two entities that have a problematic or conflict-
ual relationship, through the use of the third-party’s institutional facil-
ities. The term does not necessarily imply that the third party seeks to
reconcile the two parties, but rather that it provides logistical space for
meetings or activities that would otherwise occur under the umbrella of
bilateral relations. It is therefore, in a sense, a more passive manifesta-
tion of third-party diplomacy than, for example, mediation, because the
‘good officer’ does not participate in negotiations. The practice of good
offices therefore stops when the conflicting parties resume direct negoti-
ations. It is conditional on consent and is neither obligatory nor binding
on the parties.

2.1   A Diplomatic Institution

Throughout history, political actors have occasionally broken off diplo-
matic relations as a symbolic gesture to emphasise the extent of bilateral
animosity. In the overwhelming majority of cases, these same diplomatic
actors would seek opportunities to resume the communication that is
inherent in diplomacy, often through the ‘good offices’ of a third party.
Recorded examples of influential individuals and leaders providing good
offices date back to antiquity, and in many cases the facilities and good-
will of the third party evolved into more active third-party diplomacy,
such as conciliation and mediation. Jönsson and Hall (2005: 82) recount
how in Ancient China princes or ministers frequently offered their good
offices for the management of conflicts. The practice remains ‘deeply
embedded within Chinese life, enabling crowded societies to con-
tinue in peaceful coexistence’. Another enduring good office is that of
the Vatican. The Pope was particularly instrumental during the middle
ages, when the Papacy was a communication platform used by disputing
Christian rulers in Europe.
In the state-centric era, the idea of good offices became synonymous
with the role of a ‘protecting power’. The latter designation was formally
bestowed by the 1929 Geneva Convention in relation to humanitarian
obligation during armed conflict. The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations (1961) confirmed that the term is also valid during peacetime,
when a state can choose to use its diplomatic facilities in a host state to
112 Y. K. SPIES

protect the interests of another (the protected) state’s citizens within

that same country. Of course, as is the nature of diplomatic law, this can
only happen when the host state consents to the arrangement.
In Pyongyang (North Korea), for instance, Sweden2 officially acts as
a protective power for the USA, Canada and Australia. In practice, this
amounts to the delivery of consular services: the full range of (non-political)
bureaucratic, legal, commercial and humanitarian services to citizens of the
protected state(s). Article 8 of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations expressly allows for this:

Upon appropriate notification to the receiving State, a consular post of

the sending State may, unless the receiving State objects, exercise consular
functions in the receiving State on behalf of a third State.

Under international customary law, it is not required that a country have

only one protecting power. During World War II, Japan asked three dif-
ferent states—Spain, Sweden and Switzerland—to protect its interests in
the USA. It is also not required that two disputing states should resort
to the same protecting power. During the 1982 Falklands (Malvinas)
War between the UK and Argentina, the two warring parties’ interests
were protected respectively by Switzerland and Brazil (Barston 2013:
27). The protection relationship is flexible, voluntary and legal as long as
all the concerned parties agree to it.
Switzerland is perhaps the best known example of a protecting power
and has acted in this capacity since the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–
1871. This was when the country first assumed a neutral international
position and used its diplomacy to facilitate humanitarian assistance to
both sides in the conflict. During the World War II, Swiss embassies
famously represented the interests of the dozens of countries on both
sides of the war—no mean feat if one considers the scale and destruction
of the war. Switzerland has continued to service several such mandates.
One of the longest lasting good offices was Switzerland’s handling of
relations between the USA and Cuba. (The hostile relationship between
the two states resulted in the severance of diplomatic ties in 1961.) As
from 1977, the Swiss Embassy in Havana represented US interests in
Cuba, while its Embassy in Washington, DC attended Cuban interests.
Over time the situation became less tense and eventually an informal
arrangement was made whereby Cuban staff could work in an ‘inter-
ests section’ (conveniently using the old Cuban Embassy in Washington,
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 113

DC) while still resorting officially under the Swiss Embassy to the USA.
When the USA and Cuba eventually restored their diplomatic relations
on 20 July 2015, their respective flags were raised ceremonially in each
other’s capitals. Both nations were effusive in their praise of the Swiss
diplomacy that had anchored their relationship for almost four decades.
‘Good offices’ is a diplomatic courtesy rather than a political act. It is
also a rather elastic concept, with the ambiguity permitting ‘considerable
freedom of action for those who have chosen to provide it’ (Collins and
Packer 2006: 12). In the post-World War II era, the term has become
synonymous with the unique mandate of executive international civil
servants, notably the UN Secretary-General, to offer institutionalised
services in the cultivation of peace among states. As Ramesh Thakur
(2011: 83) observes, ‘the pacific settlement of disputes under Chapter 6
[of the UN Charter] is potentially among the Secretary-General’s most
valuable political roles with respect both to conflict prevention and con-
structive collaboration’.
A pivotal requirement for any institution or person to provide good
offices is to command respect. Reputation is more important than the rel-
ative power of the third party, and certain institutions lend themselves
to a ‘good offices’ profile more than others. Within the African Union,
the Panel of the Wise fulfils this function as part of the wider African
Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The panel is independent,
representative of all major regions of the continent, yet small enough
(it has only five members) to be flexible and agile in its operations. It
has no ‘power’ as such, but it is invested with legitimacy. By drawing
on the reputation of seasoned (usually retired) statesmen and women,
the panel perpetuates a traditional aspect of African governance and jus-
tice: the veneration of the wisdom of elders. It is a practice that has also
been institutionalised by various sub-regional organisations in Africa:
ECOWAS, COMESA and SADC have their own committees of elders,
to assist with peace processes.

2.2   The Role of Neutral States

Third party diplomacy tends to conjure up the notion of neutrality3
or impartiality. Craig Collins and John Packer (2006: 10–11) use the
term ‘dis-interest’ to indicate how third-party diplomacy4 differs from
other modes of diplomacy and describe it as ‘a party acting with no
interest other than a mandated and typically public one’ The idea that
114 Y. K. SPIES

a third party has no interest whatsoever in the resolution or otherwise of

the conflict is, of course, an idealistic notion, as the authors observe. The
substance of the conflict may be (and usually is) very important to the
third party, which might be somewhat partial in its relations with the two
conflicting sides.
The term ‘neutrality’, on the other hand, carries a very specific legal
meaning, and states that are officially ‘neutral’ have historically been in
the best position to render good offices. Legal neutrality refers to the
internationally declared and recognised (usually through treaty) position
of a state, in which it renounces any part in armed conflict. Neutrality
has a long tradition within international customary laws of war, and the
practice was codified in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. The
status includes both rights (notably continuation of economic activities)
and obligations (strictly forbidding the use of its territory, troops or any
other facilities as part of the conflict) regarding the neutral state’s rela-
tions with belligerents. Throughout history, many states have chosen this
option to allow them a measure of ‘immunity’ within a dangerous region
or during a specific war. Thus states such as Laos, Turkey, Denmark, and
Portugal were at various times officially neutral, but opted to change
their status as their international context assumed a new profile. A state’s
neutral status can however be permanent, in which case it is constitu-
tionally enshrined. Examples are Costa Rica, Switzerland, Liechtenstein
and the Vatican. It can also be bestowed through United Nations recog-
nition, as in the case of Turkmenistan: on 12 December 1995, in a first-
ever resolution of its kind, the General Assembly unanimously confirmed
the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan.
The very useful ABC of Diplomacy, published by the Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs of Switzerland (2008), explains that inter-
national law on neutrality denotes primarily a restriction on a state’s
military activity. This leaves scope for normal, national interest-led inter-
national relations. For instance, the neutral state is not expected to con-
duct its economic relations in a neutral manner and may participate in
economic sanctions taken by a group of states or an intergovernmental
organisation. It may join international organisations such as the UN,
WTO and so forth but not organisations that are based on a military
alliance. Thus, Switzerland is a member of the UN, WTO, OECD and
many other organisations, but not of NATO. If Switzerland wanted to
join NATO, it follows that the country would have to renounce its neu-
trality. Also, when the international community through an institution
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 115

such as the UN imposes military sanctions on a state that is violating

international law, the neutral state cannot be exempted from implement-
ing the sanctions, because the action is in accordance with international
law, and intended to restore peace and security.
A neutral status can support a diplomatic role that is bigger than a
state’s relative power in international relations. Neutral states tend to
‘specialise’ in diplomacy, offering their human resources and facilities
to enhance diplomatic processes at regional and even global levels. They
acquire a very specific diplomatic profile: low key but active in facilitation
of diplomatic processes during peacetime, and a more pronounced ‘safe
haven’ role during times of conflict. They are also nurturing territory for
the operations of semi-state and non-governmental organisations in the
business of peace. Switzerland’s aegis over the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC), based in Geneva, would arguably not have been
possible if Switzerland had not been a neutral state. Conversely, the Swiss
position in the 1870–1871 Franco-Prussian war was probably facilitated by
the 1863 (then recent) founding of the ICRC. Even though the ICRC
was a non-governmental initiative, it proceeded to engage the support of
the Swiss and other governments, and Switzerland by association became
synonymous with the organisation’s a political humanitarian actions.
In the case of the Vatican, apart from its own active role in offering
good offices, its neutrality lends weight to the work of ‘Church public
lay associations’ that operate with the Vatican’s official endorsement.
One such association is The Community of Sant’Egidio, which was instru-
mental in the Mozambican peace negotiations that led to Frelimo and
Renamo signing the General Agreement of Rome on 4 October 1992.
Apart from Mozambique, the Community has also been active in peace
processes in Algeria, the Balkans and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and elsewhere (Hampson et al. 2013: 322).

3   Pacific Settlement of Disputes

The UN, founded as it were on the quest for world peace, made the set-
tlement of disputes an integral part of its Charter. Whereas Chapter VII
concentrated on the legal use of force by the UN’s powerful Security
Council, Chapter VI addressed the pacific (peaceful) settlement of dis-
putes. Article 33(1) obliges states to resort to any of a number of mech-
anisms in the case of a ‘dispute, the continuance of which is likely to
endanger the maintenance of international peace and security’. These
116 Y. K. SPIES

instruments include ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbi-

tration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements,
or other peaceful means of their own choice’—a list that contains both
diplomatic and technically legal options. The reference to ‘resort to
regional agencies or arrangements’ implies essentially a multilateral, and
hence diplomatic, solution. Nevertheless, any or all of the before-men-
tioned diplomatic and legal mechanisms for pacific settlement of dis-
putes, could be facilitated by a regional IGO. Several regional judicial
instruments are already available, such as the European Court of Justice
and the ECOWAS Court of Justice. In South America, MERCOSUR has
the intention of establishing a regional Court of Justice, and so does the
African Union, in Africa.

3.1   Chapter VI of the UN Charter: Legal Instruments

Judicial settlement falls outside the diplomatic domain and is the most
formal, legal instrument contained in Article 33(1). It happens when
states in dispute agree to submit their case to a permanent, established
court, whose findings will be binding on all concerned parties. In this
regard the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the primary judicial
organ of the United Nations, is the most reputable and accessible inter-
national court based on its universal membership and long track record
of independent judicial pronouncement.
Enquiry is listed as a dispute settlement mechanism because interna-
tional conflicts often hinge on different perceptions of events, and this
necessitates the establishment of facts. Disputing parties might then
agree to appoint an impartial body (it could be an ad hoc constituted
body) to assist with settling contested facts, so as to pave the way for a
negotiated settlement. The United Nations, regional or other IGO can
also appoint a commission of enquiry in order to assist its own mem-
ber states with decisions about remedial or punitive actions, such as
sanctions. The disputing parties are not under an obligation to resort
to enquiry or to accept the findings of such a body, but in practice the
conclusions are usually accepted. Nevertheless, in some cases the results
can be controversial. During 2009, Judge Richard Goldstone issued a
UN-commissioned report on the Israel-Gaza war and his report, seen as
sympathetic to the Palestinian side, caused outrage in Israel. The enquiry
became even more polemical in 2011 when Goldstone expressed regret
about ‘inaccuracies’ in the report.
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 117

Like enquiry, arbitration is also semi-judicial in nature, but unlike

enquiry it is binding on both parties. Arbitration happens when parties
to a dispute nominate a third party to act as an ad hoc tribunal. The con-
flicting parties agree to the panel of arbitrators and the terms of the rul-
ing, which then assumes legal standing—the process actually resembles a
court case, and the outcome cannot be appealed. Not surprisingly, arbi-
tration is seldom used to solve political disputes; it is much better suited
to deliberate on issues where the technicalities of legal commitments are
at stake. The findings of an arbitration panel are delivered in camera, and
if an award is granted to one of the parties as part of the settlement, its
details are confidential. Arbitration results may only be made public if
both parties agree to do so.
Jönsson and Hall (2005: 82, 83) explain that arbitration was an estab-
lished practice in the Greek city states of antiquity, ‘to regulate conflict
and facilitate coexistence both internally and externally’. Treaties then,
as they still do, often included mutual commitments to the use of arbi-
tration for dispute settlement. Indeed, many treaties provide for a per-
manent arbitration tribunal to strengthen the legal framework of the
relationship. For specialised organisations such as the World Trade
Organisation, arbitration tribunals are integral to dispute resolution. The
WTO does not have a permanent arbitration panel, rather a special panel
is constituted for each individual dispute. This allows flexibility in terms
of the specialised substance and scope of a particular dispute. The WTO
Secretariat provides the technical support, legal resources and continuity
to anchor the various arbitration processes.
The most popular international arbitration body is the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, based in The Hague (Netherlands). It dates back
to 1899 and was an outcome of the first Hague Peace Conference. The
Court survived both world wars and eventually became part of the UN
system, where it continues to serve the UN community in the field of
dispute resolution. Apart from arbitration the Court also offers concilia-
tion, fact-finding commissions and commissions of enquiry, good offices
and mediation services—a very wide range of third-party services.

3.2   Chapter VI of the UN Charter: Diplomatic Instruments

The ‘pure diplomatic’ mechanisms mentioned in Article 33(1) are con-
ciliation, mediation and negotiation. Negotiation will not be discussed
in this chapter. The historical art (and some would say science) of
118 Y. K. SPIES

diplomatic negotiation has generated a vast body of literature and it is by

far the most ideal way for parties to resolve their differences. However,
it is also the most direct and traditional bilateral mechanism to address
disputes and is therefore not third-party diplomacy per se. In terms of
the provisions of Article 33(1), conciliation and mediation are of spe-
cific interest because they are both classical manifestations of third-party
diplomacy.
Conciliation resembles a legal process, but it has no formal legal
standing. It entails that a third party is approached, or volunteers, to
seek concessions from parties that are in conflict. The conciliator inves-
tigates the facts of the dispute, consults with the parties separately (this
often involves lengthy and dedicated ‘shuttle diplomacy’) and aims to
reconcile or at least narrow the gap between the objectives of the two
parties. It is sometimes referred to as ‘proximity talks’ when the hos-
tile parties agree to be in close proximity at a certain venue, for instance
in the same hotel, yet not actually facing each other around one table.
Conciliation is therefore an indirect approach, allowing the adversaries
to ‘retain full control over the process… and the outcome’ (Collins and
Packer 2006: 15). It follows that the recommendations of a conciliator
are of a non-binding nature.
The fact that conciliation does not involve direct principal-to-principal
meetings means that the process happens at a more discreet level, avoid-
ing the political rhetoric, aggression or fear of ‘losing face’ that can sub-
vert direct negotiations. It carries its own risks, as South Africa found
when it was widely criticised for using ‘quiet diplomacy’ during the polit-
ical crisis in Zimbabwe (circa 2008). South African leaders insisted that
their diplomacy required utter discretion, patience and confidentiality,
while their detractors accused them of conducting opaque, backchan-
nel diplomacy, at best lacking vigour and at worst, being done in bad
faith (i.e. not as an honest broker, but biased in favour of the Mugabe
regime). Collins and Packer (2006: 11), in explaining the aims of quiet
diplomacy, note that it avoids the temptation to play to a domestic con-
stituency or yield to international pressure, by creating ‘conditions in
which parties feel comfortable to act, in particular allowing parties calmly
to evaluate positions and interests, to weigh options and consider inde-
pendent and impartial advice’. It does seem to have specific advantage
when one or more of the parties is skittish about the process.
Interestingly, the term ‘conciliation’ is seldom used by diplomats,
negotiators or officials to describe their work. This might be because it is
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 119

a hazy area, easily feeding into or overlapping with better defined official
approaches such as good offices and mediation. During South Africa’s
third-party involvement in Zimbabwe, then President Thabo Mbeki’s
quiet diplomacy was arguably conducted simultaneously with a more
open and official mediated process, which produced the Global Political
Agreement of 2008.
Mediation is a much more comprehensive and direct process of dia-
logue and negotiation in which a third-party assists two or more dispu-
tant parties, with their consent, to negotiate a way out of their conflict.
Even though the mediator is more active (in comparison to conciliation)
in the actual negotiations and would usually suggest terms of settlement,
his/her proposals are not binding on the disputing parties.
As in the case of conciliation, mediation can be used in the most dire
of diplomatic conditions. It can even be done during war, when adver-
saries are locked into mutually exclusive, politically fixed positions, dis-
trust or do not recognise as legitimate each other’s representatives, or
have insurmountable cultural or other differences. The goal, in short, is
to help the parties reach agreements that they find satisfactory and are
willing to implement. As Barston (2006: 234) describes it, the media-
tor is ‘either indirectly or directly attempting to promote a temporary or
permanent solution based on a conception of outcomes likely to receive
joint or widespread acceptance by the parties in dispute’.
The specific goals of mediation—the ‘conception of outcomes’—
depend on the nature of the conflict and the expectations not only of
the parties, but also of the mediator. Not surprisingly, the process of
mediation is notoriously delicate. As William Zartman (1989) postu-
lated, a given conflict is only ‘ripe’ for resolution when disputing parties
reach a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’. This means that both parties must
acknowledge that they cannot emerge as winners and that the painful
deadlock can only be resolved by an alternative to conflict, such as medi-
ation. They must also be convinced of the mediation’s potential to yield
a mutually acceptable agreement.
Mediation can be done discreetly but the often long-term and
hands-on involvement of a third party is likely to increase the public pro-
file of the process. As will be discussed later in this chapter, there are
institutions, individuals and states that take great pride in their reputa-
tion for successful mediation. Third-party conflict resolution—anchored
in the art and science of mediation—has become a major preoccupa-
tion of contemporary diplomatic practice, and many intergovernmental
120 Y. K. SPIES

organisations commit institutional resources to mediation within their

membership community. Thus, the African Union established ‘High
Level Panels’ for Libya (2011), Sudan (2009), and Burundi (2015) to
mediate crises in those respective states. Likewise, the Organisation of
American States (OAS) has a long-standing tradition of mediating con-
flicts in Latin America, including Guatemala (1995/1996), Peru (2000),
Colombia-Venezuela (2010) and so forth.
Just like diplomacy more generally, the range of actors involved in
mediation has become hugely diverse. Apart from states and IGOs, non-
state actors are active in the field and religious groups (driven by mis-
sionary zeal, literally!) are ubiquitous in peace processes. One example
is the efforts by a conglomeration of religious entities to secure peace in
South Sudan. Their activities are spearheaded by the Council of Anglican
Provinces in Africa (CAPA) and the South Sudan Council of Churches.
Non-state involvement in diplomacy (mediation, specifically) gained
an IR ‘handle’ when Joseph Montville coined the term, ‘track two’
diplomacy, in 1981. He wanted to use an umbrella term for unofficial
conflict resolution attempts made outside of governments (i.e. attempts
outside of the traditional, ‘track one’ diplomacy) all over the world. The
related term ‘multi-track’ diplomacy (making use of different tracks,
simultaneously) was coined by Louise Diamond, during 1985. She did
so in the context of a symposium convened to take forward Montville’s
ideas for conflict resolution (Lee 1996). These terms have become part
of mediation jargon, expanding the voluminous ‘vocabulary’ that is asso-
ciated with third-party diplomacy.

3.3   The Diplomacy of UN Mediation

The United Nations personifies the contemporary role of intergovern-
mental organisations in ‘peace diplomacy’. In keeping with its founding
mandate, the organisation’s earliest specialisation was in the field of con-
flict resolution, and its institutionalised third-party diplomacy has seen
many of its Secretaries-General build up a track record of personal medi-
ation. During the 1980s, for example, the UN’s fifth Secretary-General,
Javier Perez de Cuellar, used his two terms to mediate in a range of
conflicts that plagued the twilight years of the Cold War. The Peruvian
statesman pursued peaceful solutions to crises in Afghanistan, Cambodia,
Cyprus and Namibia, to name just a few, and negotiated a ceasefire to
end the Iraq-Iran War.
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 121

The massive workload that international mediation entails, especially

since the mid-1980s, has necessitated a widening of the Secretary-
General’s good offices and delegation of high-level mediation responsi-
bilities. The result has been the appointment of Special Representatives
of the Secretary-General (SRSGs). As mentioned in the previous chap-
ter on multilateral diplomacy, this initially rare and ad hoc practice has
become common. Appointment of a SRSG as a troubleshooter in a spe-
cific conflict situation has also become a standard provision in Security
Council resolutions. The individuals selected for these roles—people
such as Martti Ahtisaari, who received the 2008 Nobel Peace Prize for
his mediation in several conflicts—are usually highly respected diplomats
with a track record of ‘norm entrepreneurship’.
Sadly, their profile also leaves them vulnerable to personal attacks. In
August 2003 the SRSG to Iraq, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, was targeted
together with his mission and killed in the Canal Hotel bombing in
Baghdad. The widely respected Brazilian diplomat, who had more than
three decades experience working with the UN and dealt successively with
crises in Lebanon, Kosovo and East Timor before he was assigned to Iraq,
had been touted as a possible future Secretary-General of the organisation.
Just like Secretaries-General and other high-level mediators, the work
of special representatives is intense and complex. Karns and Mingst
(2013: 154) explain:

Being in the field, charged with carrying out the Security Council’s man-
date for a mission on behalf of the secretary general, requires extensive,
multilevel diplomacy with parties to a conflict as well as with commanders
of military and paramilitary forces, and various UN agencies and NGOs
involved in humanitarian aid and peacebuilding activities.

It goes without saying that these missions tend to be protracted, and in

some cases end in failure. In April 2015, the escalating humanitarian cri-
sis in Yemen prompted SRSG Jamal Benomar to resign after four years of
efforts to broker a peace deal. Likewise, in the face of a deepening crisis,
Lakhdar Brahimi resigned as SRSG to Syria during May 2014. The sea-
soned former Algerian diplomat and foreign minister had actually held
a ‘Joint Special Representative’ position, mandated by both the United
Nations and the League of Arab States, to seek a solution to the Syrian
conflict. Unfortunately, in his case and so many others, the power poli-
tics of the UN Security Council stifled third-party diplomacy.
122 Y. K. SPIES

Regional and other IGOs have followed the lead of the UN in

appointing SRSGs, and the trend is increasingly standard within organ-
isations such as the AU, EU, NATO and others. Interestingly, ASEAN
has not done so thus far. It might be symptomatic of the organisation’s
careful, ‘hands-off’ and low-key approach to the politics of its very
diverse member states.

3.4   Keeping the Peace: Chapter ‘VI 1/2’

It is only since the founding of the United Nations that it has become
common to see foreign troops in a third-party role, mandated to ‘keep
the peace’ in a conflict zone. Peacekeeping implies that there is, in
fact, a ‘peace’ to keep and takes place in anticipation of a political set-
tlement to the dispute. The activity therefore relies on a pre-existing
ceasefire between conflicting parties and agreement that an interna-
tional force be allowed to enter their territories. Traditionally, peace-
keepers are not allowed to use force, with the exception of legitimate
self-defence actions. The concept is therefore distinct from the idea of
peace ‘enforcement’.
It follows that peacekeeping, even if authorised in terms of Chapter
VII of the United Nations Charter, is fundamentally different from
UN Security Council combat operations. Military interventions do
not require prior consent of the conflicting parties; thus the Security
Council-mandated multinational coalitions that intervened in the Korean
War during the early 1950s and in the Persian Gulf War forty years later,
are not examples of third-party diplomacy.
The notion of ‘blue helmets’ (or ‘blue berets’) has become synon-
ymous with UN peace operations, and dozens such deployments have
taken place all over the world. Each is known by a specially coined acro-
nym: UNOMIG, UNYOM, UNMIH, UNAMIC and so forth. Ironically,
given its proliferation since 1945, the activity of ‘peacekeeping’ is not
stipulated in the UN Charter. Its broad parameters within conventions
of ‘consent’, ‘impartiality’ and ‘non-use of force’ are merely implied by
the Charter. It was Dag Hammarskjöld, second Secretary-General of
the UN, who situated peacekeeping operations in the increasingly grey
area between Chapter VI (pacific settlement) and Chapter VII (military
enforcement) of the Charter, with the expression ‘Chapter VI 1/2’.
Peacekeepers are soldiers, not diplomats, and therefore their participation
in ‘third party diplomacy’ does not fit in either Chapter VI of VII.
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 123

The first de facto UN peacekeeping mission was deployed to the

newly established State of Israel in 1948. Unfortunately, the Israeli-Arab
conflict which has simmered ever since then has been a harbinger of the
UN’s general performance in the field of peace operations. There are
many reasons for the organisation’s chequered record, and the Cold War
certainly paralysed much of the organisation’s potential during the first
four decades of its life. Many UN missions have been stalled, discred-
ited or undermined by the realpolitik of the Security Council. Within the
broader UN community, the lack of political will to confront crises has
manifested in chronic lack of funding for peacekeeping missions.
In general, after World War II international society had to learn how
to ‘do’ the new third-party diplomacy of peacekeeping. It is easy to
ascribe problems to the politics and bureaucracy of the United Nations,
but all intergovernmental organisations involved in peacekeeping have
been confronted by a similar set of problems in situ: training and behav-
iour (including disputed impartiality) of peacekeeping troops; cultural
and language misunderstandings between peacekeepers and the local
people (even among peacekeepers themselves); lack of communication
infrastructure; time differences between field operations and headquar-
ters of the organisation; weak infrastructure in states where the missions
are deployed, insufficient knowledge of terrain (maps); command and
control of aviation routes; insecure supply routes—the list is long.
As the Cold War wound down, the UN was freed up to intervene in
more situations and the late 1980s and early 1990s saw an expansion in
the organisation’s peacekeeping presence in various parts of the world.
In 1988, the Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to United Nations peace-
keepers, with the Nobel Committee commending ‘…the young people
of many nations, who, in keeping with their ideals, voluntarily take on a
demanding and hazardous service in the cause of peace’.
At an organisational level, however, the UN was plagued by peace-
keeping challenges and commentators agreed that its bureaucracy
lacked the suppleness to deal with an expanding global profile. In
1992, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali released a report called
‘Agenda for Peace’. The report introduced a new institutional mecha-
nism, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) to oversee
a more integrated UN approach to strengthen its role in peace oper-
ations. Unfortunately, Boutros-Ghali’s aspiration to establish a perma-
nent UN standby force was not realised. It was not the first attempt
to establish a standing army for the UN: in 1957, Canadian statesman
124 Y. K. SPIES

Lester B. Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his role in the
creation of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF). Its purpose
was to defuse the Suez crisis of 1956 after the UK, France and Israel
invaded Egyptian territory. A second UNEF was implemented during
1973 to supervise the ceasefire between Israeli and Egyptian forces after
the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.5 UNEF did not morph into a permanent
peacekeeping force, however, and the organisation continued to rely on
national contingents of peacekeepers in the field.
Despite Boutros-Ghali’s attempts to beef up UN peacekeeping, the
organisation reached an all-time low in its credibility during the mid-
1990s, with commentators agreed on a ‘crisis of peacekeeping’. Member
states were increasingly reluctant to commit resources to seemingly
doomed operations. The organisation was arguably overwhelmed by the
sheer number of new (and new types of) conflicts in the aftermath of the
end of the Cold War. Bloody encounters in Somalia (1993) and geno-
cide in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica, Bosnia (1995) were some of the
most visible and appalling failures of the UN. The apparent inability of
the UN to deal with the conflicts on its agenda was a function of the new
profile of international conflict, and it is to this that I now turn.

4  New Diplomatic Conceptualisation of Peace

and Conflict

The end of the Cold War heralded a new geopolitical context for third-
party diplomacy. Approaches to international conflict resolution had to
be adapted to reflect a change in the very profile of conflict and, as a cor-
ollary, the broader discourse on intercessionary diplomacy took on board
a new conceptualisation of ‘peace’ itself.

4.1   The New Profile of Conflict

Traditionally, analysts of international conflict focused on the behaviour
of the big political-military powers. The great powers could stabilise
and destabilise the world, directly or by proxy, and they were expected
to take the great decisions—ergo the constitution of the UN Security
Council. Peace could be achieved around formal tables, brokered by
heads of state who could decide there and then on the ending of a war.
The implementation of peace agreements was facilitated by clear hierar-
chy in the command structures of formal armies.
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 125

No so the new6 generation of conflicts. Since the end of the Cold

War, the political geography of war itself has changed: as opposed to a
generation ago the majority of wars now start as domestic conflicts, then
spill-over borders. The ‘infection’ caused by intra-state conflicts can dest-
abilise entire regions for prolonged periods of time.
The nature of the new wars is particularly disturbing. Targets are
selected indiscriminately and violence is marked by seemingly senseless
brutality. Often, civilians are the primary targets. Whereas a century ago
the killing of civilians was ‘collateral damage’, not even approaching the
scale of combatant deaths, today the situation has reversed.7 Even more
compelling is the long-term toll on survivors: with economies and envi-
ronments destroyed, the social fabric of societies disintegrates. Most of
these conflicts happen in the world’s poorest nations and the toll on the
lives and livelihoods of people results in the elimination, even reversal, of
developmental gains. The wars, even when terminated, leave a legacy of
trauma, fear and hatred.
The task of peacemakers is made infinitely more difficult by the fact
that the combatants are not restricted to formal armies. As Carne Ross
(2010: 57) notes:

The UN Security Council was constituted in 1945 to deal with conflict

between states. Today more than three-quarters of its agenda involves
so-called nonstate actors—guerrilla groups, separatists, the remnants of
decaying states, and the kernels of new ones.

There is little centralised control over the activities of nebulous groups

and peace can therefore not be decreed by official executive order.
Moreover, the issues at stake are seldom geopolitical, as is the case with
traditional wars. Causes overlap and combine, so that the very symptoms
of a conflict become roots for the next one. Mediation in the new wars is
difficult because the conflict tends to be asymmetrical: weaker actors fear
the advent of so-called peace (a return to the situation that gave rise to
the conflict in the first place) and are reluctant to co-operate with even
the best-intentioned peacemakers.
Weak states are the typical breeding ground for these kinds of conflict.
Their state institutions are neither developed nor trusted, and their gov-
ernments do not have a monopoly on organised force. Fragile states are
found across the Developing World, and most of them have a history of
sovereignty being arbitrarily declared or suspended. Africa, in particular,
126 Y. K. SPIES

has been plagued by intra-state conflict. The continent’s artificial polit-

ical boundaries and extended periods of foreign domination have been
anathema to the post-independence social cohesion of African states. The
state-building project has been undermined by the abuses of post-colonial
elites, many of whom simply perpetuated the structural violence they inter-
nalised during colonial oppression.
During the Cold War, the so-called Third World became a conven-
ient arena for the proxy wars of superpowers. Unstable states, even ille-
gitimate regimes, were armed and propped up to serve the ideological
balance of power. This happened with scant regard for human rights
or the plight of marginalised communities in the client states, and con-
flicts simmered. When the Cold War came to an unexpected end in
the late 1980s, the client states were abandoned to tend to their myr-
iad repressed issues—hence the eruption of intra-state conflicts. Fueling
the intractable nature of many of the conflicts is cynical exploita-
tion of rich natural resources. ‘Blood-diamonds’ are just one example
of the ‘resource curse’ suffered by states such as Sierra Leone and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
Violence rooted in identity politics is a major root cause and cata-
lyst of the new wars, and contributes to its obdurate nature. It is not
a new phenomenon: the Commission on Human Security (2003: 21)
notes that ‘an estimated 190 million people were killed directly or indi-
rectly as a result of the 25 largest violent conflicts in the 20th century,
often in the name of religion, politics, ethnicity or racial superiority’. Yet,
many simmering conflicts were kept dormant under the sheer weight of
the Cold War, and when the large ideological war ended smaller iden-
tity conflicts once again flared up. In the process, secessionist movements
such as those in Catalonia, Kurdistan, Somaliland, Caprivi, Xinjiang,
Chechnya and elsewhere, have taken on an international profile. In a few
post-Cold War cases, ethnic tension culminated in genocide, as happened
in Darfur (Sudan), Rwanda and Bosnia.
Related to identity conflicts is the worldwide problem of religious
fundamentalism, largely but not exclusively Muslim extremism. Death-
defying policies, and seemingly indiscriminate transnational violence com-
mitted by groups such as Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, Islamic State and
Al Qaeda, pose an unprecedented dilemma for third-party diplomacy.
Religion in a fundamentalist form is always dismissive of secular author-
ities, and this includes the state-centric international system. The insti-
tution of diplomacy is rejected, by extension, and so is any third-party
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 127

attempt to bring conflict to an end. To the contrary, a ‘third party’ is fair

game for groups that reject the very notion of peaceful coexistence.
Involvement by foreign actors has exacerbated many conflicts,
whether inter or intra-state. Perceptions of interference (real or
imagined) problematizes the moral obligation on international actors
to assist with the eradication of a given conflict. Formal (state-to-state)
involvement becomes yet more difficult when the top-down hierarchy of
authority in a given state has been destroyed by a conflict situation. The
anarchical situation that defined Somalia since the late 1980s is just one
such example. Despite large-scale international efforts to restore order in
the country, a permanent central government was only installed by 2012
and has since faced gargantuan challenges to govern the fragile state. The
controversy and difficulty of trying to solve crises with complex causes
and suspicions about the motives of external actors tend to make interna-
tional third parties wary about involvement.
The reality, however, is that conflict is everybody’s concern. As the
UN’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change noted
in a 2004 report, we live in ‘an age of unparalleled interconnection
among threats’ and of ‘mutual vulnerability between weak and strong’
(UN 2004: 6). Mohamed ElBaradei,8 then Director-General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) said in 2008:

We must always bear in mind that all drivers of insecurity are intrinsi-
cally linked and that insecurity anywhere can easily turn into insecurity
everywhere.

On the third-party diplomatic agenda can no longer be only military

concerns, but myriad ‘low political’ issues that impact conflict, from
transnational crime to environmental degradation and health pandem-
ics. The latter is a novel concern for the UN Security Council to con-
sider, but it did exactly that when on 18 September 2014, responding to
a public health crisis for the first time ever,9 it unanimously declared that
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa ‘constitute[d] a threat to international
peace and security’ (S/RES/2177).
In essence, the new profile of conflict has prompted a redefinition of
international security. The inability of international society (through the
UN or otherwise) to contain the global spill-over effects of ‘need, greed,
and creed’ conflicts (Zartman 2000) has necessitated a reconceptualis-
ation of peace itself.
128 Y. K. SPIES

4.2   The New Profile of Peace

Peace studies have a long intellectual track record in international
relations, but during the Cold War era such studies were considered
anti-establishment and even radical, especially from a Western per-
spective. The study of structural violence, pioneered in the 1960s by
Norwegian academic Johan Galtung, emphasised reconciliation on the
basis of human rights and social, economic and political justice. Galtung
postulated that peace could be negative, implying merely an absence of
violent conflict, or positive, in other words stable and trusted. His the-
oretical framework has been mainstreamed since the end of the Cold
War as the surge in new types of intractable, multi-dimensional conflict
necessitated more nuance in conflict resolution strategies. According
to Galtung’s theory, negative peace is fragile and temporary, and it can
prevail immediately pre-conflict or post-conflict, or both simultane-
ously. It is therefore a harbinger of potential disaster. Positive peace, on
the other hand, is sustainable because it reflects social solidarity within a
society: a sense of us, of having shared interests and destiny. The African
concept of Ubuntu is a good description of this mindset. Where it is
absent, it needs to be cultivated deliberately.
For conflict settlement to be followed by positive peace, it requires
co-operative, inclusive problem-solving and the use of compromise
and flexibility in seeking solutions: in short, a win-win solution. The
emphasis is therefore on common goals and creative solutions; not
just ‘slicing the cake’, but ‘baking a bigger one’. The approach recog-
nises that the ostensible ‘end’ of a certain conflict can, in fact, be the
breeding ground of another conflict. Peace processes have to be part
of a cycle, rather than once-off projects on a linear continuum pro-
gressing from conflict to peace. Root causes are therefore of extreme
importance. If not addressed they can be, at best, just dormant dur-
ing a negative peace, and at worst, foster more conflict. The diagnos-
tics of conflict resolution embrace a very wide range of issues that
are catalysts, causes or consequences—or all of these, in concert.
Geopolitical considerations must be supplemented with perspectives
on gender, environment and ethnicity among others. Furthermore,
the chronology of conflict resolution necessitates an historical per-
spective as well as medium and long-term implications. The simplistic
resort to military intervention by third parties can make the conflict
infinitely worse.
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 129

A crucial part of the new conceptualisation of international peace is

the recognition that the security of states (the traditional notion of
‘national security’) is not necessarily inclusive of individuals’ security. The
need for an in-depth investigation into the implications of the new con-
cept of human security was raised at the UN’s Millennium Summit of
2000. The Government of Japan subsequently sponsored the establish-
ment of an independent Commission for Human Security (CHS), which
published its report ‘Human Security Now’ in 2003. The commission,
co-chaired by Sadako Ogata and Amartya Sen, explained the need for a
security paradigm shift, as follows:

… in the 21st century, both the challenges to security and its protectors
have become more complex. The state remains the fundamental purveyor
of security. Yet it often fails to fulfil its security obligations—and at times
has even become a source of threat to its own people. (CHS 2003: 2)

Two important implications of the ‘state dilemma’ can be discerned

for diplomacy. First, the reality that some diplomats represent pred-
ator states—a dilemma further highlighted by the evolving doctrine of
‘Responsibility to Protect’. The legitimacy of such diplomats is compro-
mised when they defend state sovereignty to the detriment of the people
they represent. Second, the fact that states, and state-based institutions,
cannot on their own solve human security problems—they need cooper-
ative ventures with non-state actors and civil society in general.
The agenda associated with achieving human security is much wider
than concern about the political-military factors that exacerbate conflict.
In much of the Developing World, it is also clear that under-development,
poverty and economic and political marginalisation are root causes of con-
flict. A broad spectrum of measures is therefore required to ensure peace.
It is not enough to defuse an existing conflict—recurring conflict needs to
be forestalled by the very manner in which the conflict is settled. The pro-
cess needs to be followed by stability and security, with good and inclu-
sive governance, adherence to human rights and broad-based economic
development.
The new approaches to peace have yielded their own jargon. One of
the new terms in peace processes is ‘road map’, with the metaphor indi-
cating a strategic route to lead parties out of a given conflict. The term
was first used in a June 2002 speech by US President George W. Bush
and subsequently applied by the Middle East Quartet, in reference to
130 Y. K. SPIES

resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Several other strategic peace

plans have also been dubbed ‘road maps’ and the African Union in par-
ticular has adopted official ‘road maps’ for various conflict resolution
processes on the continent, among them Darfur and Libya.
The concept of peace processes has also been complicated by the
‘grey’ area that was previously referred to—the combination of
non-violent and forceful methods in the process of securing peace
in complicated multi-actor conflicts. In recent years, some peace-
keeping operations have therefore assumed hybrid characteristics.
MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo since 1999, was given more combat power
when the Security Council, during March 2013, authorised the
deployment of an ‘intervention brigade’ within the mission. The deci-
sion to allow MONUSCO to ‘neutralise armed groups’ was based on
the ongoing attacks by ‘M23’ rebels on MONUSCO personnel.

4.3   Profiling and Equipping the Peacemakers

Brokering peace in the face of the new profile of conflict is such a special-
ised domain that the study thereof has become a niche area of research.
It straddles an interdisciplinary range of inter alia psychology, law, pol-
itics, history, sociology and even theology; depending on the nature of
the conflict and the parties involved. Over the past three decades many
specialised institutes, both private and public, have been established to
train mediators and to serve as repositories for the advice of experts.
Within the United Nations, this is done by the Mediation Support Unit.
The Unit was established in 2006 and two years later also assembled a
Standby Team of Mediation Experts who are ‘on call’ to be deployed,
at short notice, where capacity is required (UN DPA 2017). The UN’s
mediators work in close cooperation with similar units within NGOs,
governments and regional organisations.
The institutional support is crucial, because mediation in any violent
conflict is notoriously politicised and fraught with impediments. The pro-
cess can be drawn out, as confidence needs to be built among the adver-
saries and common ground has to be found (even created) to the point
where disputing parties become stakeholders in the success of the process
itself. This makes the knowledge and skills-set of a mediator of the utmost
importance: he/she must draw on in-depth analysis of the conflict and
the positions of the various stakeholders. In an era of media transparency,
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 131

the public image of the process can also be pivotal to its success. Any
aspersion cast on the motives or ability of the mediator could potentially
derail the process.
The imperatives that mediators need to contend with in order to over-
come these challenges have been addressed in many recent publications,
much as profiling of the ‘perfect’ negotiator was a focus in traditional
literature on diplomacy. In a 2008 essay called ‘In Pursuit of Sustainable
Peace: The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation’, Lakhdar Brahimi and
Salman Ahmed compiled a list of mistakes that third parties need to
avoid. Based on their personal experience of UN conflict resolution, they
named the following as ‘deadly sins’ in a mediation process: ignorance;
arrogance; partiality; impotence; haste; inflexibility and false promises.
They point out the challenges facing special representatives when they
are charged with leading multinational missions: mediating between
obvious adversaries is challenging enough, but the mediator will also be
required to negotiate with his/her own staff. Moreover, the amount of
leverage that can be exerted on the protagonists in a conflict situation
is constrained by the (sometimes contradictory) interests of donors, the
broad UN community and regional and local actors.
A poorly mediated settlement can have devastating and long-term
implications. Gilbert Khadiagala (2016) insists that the quality of nego-
tiated settlements is a condition for peace. His view is supported by the
research of practitioners and analysts, including Laurie Nathan (2006),
Marieke Kleiboer (1996) and Brahimi and Ahmed (2008) who have all
emphasised the pivotal role of comprehensive peace deals. When underly-
ing political motives are ignored and certain stakeholders are marginal-
ised, peace-deals end up being signed in bad faith: Sierra Leone (1999),
Mozambique (1992), Darfur (2006), and Côte d’Ivoire (2002) are just a
few of many unfortunate examples.
Requisite resources for the performance of mediators are crucial, and
these include institutional backing and independent credibility, based
on a track record in conflict resolution (Collins and Packer 2006: 12).
Institutional confidence in the ability of an individual explains why the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) chose South
African politician Cyril Ramaphosa to mediate in a crisis in Lesotho dur-
ing 2014. Ramaphosa (who became South Africa’s President during
2018) had built up an impressive legacy through—among other achieve-
ments—his leadership in the negotiation process that resulted in South
Africa’s peaceful transition to democracy.
132 Y. K. SPIES

5   Peace as a Diplomatic Project

From the before-going discussion on the new profile of conflict and
peace, it is clear that peace is much more than a once-off achievement. It
requires investment, time and continuous commitment—not just by the
conflicting parties, but by third parties as well. It is a long-term project,
especially when entire societies need to be rebuilt. And, as will be dis-
cussed, peace as a project is invariably highly politicised and could even
clash with the simultaneous pursuit of justice.

5.1  Peacebuilding
The idea that peace can be ‘built’ entered the United Nation lexicon
through the previously mentioned 1992 ‘Agenda for Peace’. In this
report, Boutros-Ghali put the case for pro-active peace operations, and
added to the three traditional instruments of UN peace operations—pre-
ventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping—a fourth, namely
peacebuilding. It differed from the three older concepts in the sense that
it did not primarily focus on existing wars and the settlement of conflicts
but implied instead a complex, long-term commitment.
At the core of peacebuilding lies the transformation of negative peace
into positive peace: a very ambitious project because it entails the con-
struction of a new socio-economic and political environment. To achieve
this holistic transformation, a peacebuilding system needs to address
simultaneously at least five distinct dimensions (1) security; (2) political
transition, governance and democratisation; (3) socio-economic develop-
ment; (4) human rights, justice and reconciliation; and (5) coordination,
management and resource mobilisation (Alam 2009: 6). Adding to the
complexity is the fact that each peacebuilding situation is uniquely con-
stituted. It is determined by historical factors—the proximate and root
causes of the conflict, and the events that culminated in the eventual
peace agreement—as well as the identities, interests, actions, perceptions
and roles of all relevant internal and external stakeholders.
Boutros-Ghali’s ‘Agenda for Peace’ remained an abstract ideal as the
1990s quickly descended into a crisis for UN peacekeeping, and at a
personal level the Egyptian was pressurised to leave his office after serv-
ing only one term as Secretary-General. The report, however, was sem-
inal, and planted the seeds for crucial post-Cold War introspection by
the United Nations. A new commitment to the project of peace gained
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 133

momentum, and towards the end of the 1990s the UN and various
regional organisations were supporting complex transitional arrange-
ments in post-conflict Timor Leste, Kosovo and Sierra Leone, among
others.
In anticipation of the Millennium Summit of the United Nations dur-
ing 2000, Secretary-General Kofi Annan commissioned another report
on UN peace operations. The investigating panel was chaired by Algerian
diplomat Lakhdar Brahimi, who as mentioned earlier had headed sev-
eral high profile third-party diplomacy missions during the 1990s. The
‘Brahimi Report’ of 2000 contained wide-ranging recommendations on
institutional reforms to improve the UN’s peace operations in terms of
timing, mandate, capacity and logistical management. Many of the rec-
ommendations were incorporated into the Millennium Declaration that
was adopted later that year by the Millennium Summit.
Importantly, the Brahimi Report called for institutionalised peace-
building. Coherence and long-term strategy in the UN’s conflict reso-
lution had become urgent in the light of the poor track record of the
organisation’s peace efforts. As veteran UN peace operations commander
Mujahid Alam (2009: 7–8) explained, up to half of post-conflict coun-
tries relapse into conflict within the first five years following a peace
agreement. Peacebuilding therefore entails, as Ramesh Thakur (2011:
89) defines it:

actions undertaken to consolidate peace and prevent violent conflicts from

arising, intensifying (vertical proliferation), spreading to new theatres or
actors (horisontal proliferation), persisting, or recurring,

It took another five years for the United Nations to institutionalise

the recommendations of the Brahimi Report. In 2005, UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan released his report ‘In larger freedom: Towards
development, security and human rights for all’. It conceptualised
an advisory body to focus attention on, harness resources and stake-
holder involvement and coordinate strategies in efforts to recon-
struct and develop countries and regions emerging from conflict. It
was specifically aimed at bringing coherence to the often ad hoc and
uncoordinated international involvement in post-conflict situations
(Alam 2009: 7–8). Annan’s report finally triggered the overdue struc-
tural changes in the UN peace and security architecture, and the UN
Peacebuilding Commission was established the following year (2006).
134 Y. K. SPIES

To support its activities and to enable capacity building for related activ-
ities, a Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) and the Peacebuilding Support Office
(PBSO) were also established, and the three entities became known col-
lectively as the UN Peacebuilding Architecture (PBA).
The first decade of the PBA’s existence proved to be a steep learn-
ing curve. With its agenda dominated by African cases, various projects
were disappointments for the Commission. The Central African Republic
(CAR), for example, was invited during 2008 to become a partner of the
PBC, and a strategic peacebuilding plan was proposed for the country.
Yet only three years later, vicious conflict erupted. By the same token,
Burundi which has been on the PBA agenda since the latter’s concep-
tion has seen a downward slide into conflict despite the efforts of the
Commission. South Sudan has perhaps been the most devastating dis-
appointment for the PBA. The UN’s youngest member state returned
to civil war just two years after its 2011 independence, despite massive
international efforts to guide the country into a sustainable peace.
Thus far, two institutional reviews have been done on the work of
the Peacebuilding Commission. The first report, a five-year review
in 2010, was critical of the PBA for its perceived lack of effectiveness,
but focused on the technical aspects of peacebuilding and neglected
the innate political nature of peacebuilding. The challenges to peace-
building were more comprehensively addressed in the second, ten-year
‘Review of the United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture’, done in
2015 by the Secretary-General’s Advisory Group of Experts (AGE).
This second review examined five case studies—Burundi, the Central
African Republic, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste—to
extract the AGE recommendations. The publication of their report
overlapped with another high-profile UN report on peace operations,
the ‘Hippo’ (High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations)
report of 16 June 2015, titled ‘Uniting our Strengths for Peace:
Politics, Partnership and People’.
Both reports delved into the political problems in the realm of peace
operations, going beyond analysis of the symptoms and arguing that
more emphasis should be placed on addressing the root causes of con-
flict. The point was made that peacebuilding needs to be holistic rather
than a simple linear process, because it requires not just a post-conflict
response but also a proactive, conflict prevention project. The findings
echoed a statement of Boutros-Ghali in his original 1992 Agenda for
Peace (III/23), when he insisted that:
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 135

The most desirable and efficient employment of diplomacy is to ease ten-

sions before they result in conflict – or, if conflict breaks out, to act swiftly
to contain it and resolve its underlying causes.

Indeed, the findings pointed to a widespread underestimation, within the

UN community, of what peacebuilding actually entails. The AGE Report
urged the international community to share responsibility in peacebuild-
ing efforts, because as it noted rather bluntly:

… the shortcomings in efforts to fill the ‘gaping hole’ in the UN’s institu-
tional machinery for building peace are systemic in nature. They result from a
generalised misunderstanding of the nature of peacebuilding and, even more,
from the fragmentation of the UN into separate ‘silos’. (UN 2015a: 7)

A warning voiced by both the HIPPO and the AGE reports related to
peacebuilding efforts that lack sufficient local ownership. As Khadiagala
(2016) also pointed out, evidence shows that the most successful peace-
building efforts over the past 25 years have involved diminishing inter-
national involvement. ‘Inclusive national ownership’ (UN 2015a: 8) of
a peacebuilding project is therefore essential, because an enduring peace
cannot be imposed by elites or third parties.

5.2   Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development

Post-conflict reconstruction and development (PCRD) is a third-party
peace project that flows from, and is contingent upon, an existing peace
settlement. As will become evident, the transformative aims of PCRD
make it integral to larger peacebuilding projects.
When a state has been destroyed by conflict, a peace-settlement
agreement does not repair the damage: it only signals opportunity for
the rebuilding to begin. A spectrum of concerns needs to be addressed,
simultaneously: security sector reform; repairing (or creating from
scratch) the necessary infrastructure for development, education and
healthcare; immediate poverty relief, support for nascent civil society
institutions and the establishment of accountable, inclusive government
structures. Often this amounts to state-building. Issues that would tra-
ditionally have been outside the purview of third-party diplomacy, such
as the return and integration of refugees and exiles, therefore need to be
part of a comprehensive peace deal.
136 Y. K. SPIES

Ideally, a peace-process involves short, medium and long-term pro-

grammes that concurrently address both the causes and consequences
of a conflict. Taken to its logical conclusion, this involves the idea of
developmental involvement, ‘which aims to achieve sustainable levels of
human security through a combination of interventions aimed at accel-
erating capacity building and socio-economic development’ and implies
‘restoring or unlocking the potential of local capacities to deliver on
human security needs in an efficient, democratic and sustainable man-
ner’ (Nganje 2013: 2). Third-party engagement thus becomes a much
longer-term endeavour, as it contends with the need for linking ‘imme-
diate post-conflict efforts on the one hand and long-term recovery and
development efforts on the other…. so that international attention does
not wane during the crucial post-conflict years’ (Alam 2009: 8). This
is especially important once the international media have moved on to
another hot spot, and the adversaries are no longer kept in check by the
pressure of public attention. Brahimi and Ahmed (2008) point out that
the challenge of ensuring that the adversaries stick to the terms of the
peace agreement, in itself, requires a continuous mediation—sometimes
even necessitating additional, subsidiary peace agreements.
The process to rebuild traumatised, polarised and marginalised com-
munities can take decades and this requires a longer-term commitment
by all stakeholders. An external third party who may have brokered the
peace is often unprepared for the implications (not the least of which
are financial) of protracted PCRD. Parties to the conflict might consider
the mediator to be sufficiently powerful to guarantee the peace through
PCRD. When mediators broker a peace deal they have to, therefore,
also clarify the limitations of their own material involvement in the
post-conflict situation.
The tabula rasa of a post-conflict environment holds enormous
potential but at the same time, the involvement of a multitude of
actors can lead to overlapping, counterproductive or deficient involve-
ment when not properly managed. Multilateral and bilateral diplomatic
involvement, domestic and foreign initiatives, public and private invest-
ment—all stakeholders need to ‘be on the same page’ so to speak, or at
least work towards a broad, overarching common goal.
Post-conflict societies are notoriously unstable, and therefore para-
doxically also conducive to entrepreneurship. Lack of central control
over resources, in combination with former combatants that are sud-
denly without a ‘job’ (but typically still armed) and ordinary people
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 137

desperate to make a living, attract more than just altruism from the
international community. Sadly, criminal syndicates, unscrupulous busi-
nesses and other (sometimes even state-sponsored) predators flock to
an environment where the opportunities for involvement abound. Even
something as seemingly innocuous as food aid, can be problematic or
counterproductive. Research by Nathan Nunn and Nancy Qian (2014)
revealed a causal link between US food aid to countries with a recent
history of civil war. Food aid is fungible and a ‘positive shock’ to gov-
ernment revenues, and controlling elites can easily monetise the food to
fund conflict.
The realisation of a PCRD agenda could thus, paradoxically, engen-
der yet a new set of conflict indicators. Brahimi and Ahmed (2008: 2)
use the example of Angola (1992) to illustrate how a constitutional pro-
cess can breed new problems, especially if the results of an election are
rejected by one or more parties. Even after a democratically elected gov-
ernment has been installed, as in the case of Timor-Leste (2006), latent
political tensions can surface. This point relates to an unfortunate mis-
conception among many liberal theorists, namely that elections herald
the onset of democracy. The truth is that democratic elections do not
necessarily bring ‘democrats’ to power. The democratic electoral triumph
of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) which came to power in Algeria dur-
ing 1991, and the electoral victory of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt
in 2012 were both nullified when military coups took place ‘to protect
democracy’. Experiences in Côte d’Ivoire, Zimbabwe and elsewhere
have also shown that elections can provide a semblance of legitimacy
for tainted leaders to continue their dominance in an unstable, conflict
prone country.

5.3   Peace as a Regional Project

Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a significant increase in
conflict resolution within the catchment area of regional and sub-regional
organisations. Hampson et al. (2013: 322) explain that this is one of the
reasons for the quantitative rise in third-party diplomacy. On the one
hand, regional organisations have taken on a much more dynamic profile
within global politics and specifically vis-à-vis the peace and security of
their member states. The APSA, for example, has been institutionalised
by the African Union to an extent that far exceeds the reach of the organ-
isation’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).
138 Y. K. SPIES

On the other hand, the very nature of peacebuilding and PCRD

demands inclusive stakeholder involvement. Regional organisations can
tap into regional linkages, resources and expertise. They are ideally posi-
tioned to support country-focused projects, and to help counter the
cross-border spill-over dimensions of intrastate conflicts (Alam 2009: 3).
More and more regional and sub-regional organisations are thus posi-
tioning themselves to ensure that their neighbourhoods enjoy positive
peace. A recent trend is to do so in tandem with the United Nations.
Joint venture UN peace operations were initiated for the first time dur-
ing 2004 in response to the conflict in Darfur (Sudan), when UN peace-
keepers joined forces with peers from the African Union’s Mission in
Sudan (AMIS) to form the Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID).
The operation had mixed results: despite the obvious advantages to
sharing resources and using each institution’s comparative advantage,
UNAMID revealed that hybrid operations in highly politicised circum-
stances can cause ambiguity about responsibilities and lines of command
(Aboagye 2007; Brahimi and Ahmed 2008: 4).
The closer cooperation between the UN and regional organisations
was foreseen in 1945 when the UN Charter was drafted. Chapter VIII
encourages ‘regional arrangements’ to ensure peace and security, ‘pro-
vided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consist-
ent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations’ (Art. 52).
During the four decades of the Cold War, coinciding with the first four
decades of the UN’s existence, such cooperation was not feasible, but it
has become essential in the more complex geography of conflict that has
followed the Cold War.

5.4   The Peace Project and (the Problem of) Justice

As discussed earlier, the UN Charter provides for both diplomatic and
legal mechanisms to settle disputes peacefully. While this chapter and the
book in general focus on diplomacy, the legal context cannot be over-
looked: judicial processes are historically integral to conflict resolution.
Law within a given society reflects consensus on the limits of acceptable
behaviour, and international law represents a similar consensus within
international society. The remedies (and deterrence) offered by interna-
tional law are therefore of much importance to third-party diplomacy.
Unfortunately, the state-centric international legal framework that
supports diplomacy is ill-fitted to the new, borderless wars of the world.
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 139

The influx of refugees from the Middle East and North Africa into
Europe, the seemingly endless human trauma in the Great Lakes region
of Africa and international terrorism defy not only third-party diplo-
macy but also the legal mechanisms available to international society.
Traditional UN rules, designed to deal with interstate conflicts, do not
apply to intra-state wars because so many of the actors are not recognised
as subjects of international law. As David Malone and Ramesh Thakur
(2001) explain, in ‘soldierless’ wars many of the actors act with impu-
nity because regulatory frameworks, including arms control and disarma-
ment, cannot be enforced on them.
Another challenge to the diplomatic-cum-legal settlement of interna-
tional conflicts is the idea of ‘justice’, a concept that is integral to both
law and politics. Associated goals of fairness and accountability are widely
used in narratives on human and humanitarian rights, and the last few
decades have seen codification of these rights in a rapidly growing body
of law. The implications for conflict resolution have been far-reaching. At
the state level, normative regimes such as the Responsibility to Protect
(R2P) have been encroaching on a legal anchor of international society—
state sovereignty—because of the notion that international involvement
is justified when a government is unable or unwilling to protect its citi-
zens. Not surprisingly, third-party diplomacy that invokes these norma-
tive goals has come under attack for being interventionist and politically
motivated. This was aptly demonstrated by the verbal war throughout
the 2000s between Zimbabwe’s Zanu-PF regime and the Western states
that sought to mediate the country’s intra-state conflict.
At the individual level, state sovereignty has also been checked by
evolving notions of justice. The 1990s, ravaged as that decade was with
humanitarian catastrophe in different parts of the world, and building on
the liberal internationalist fervour that followed the Cold War, convinced
a significant number of states that the time had arrived for a permanent
international criminal court. The establishment of the International
Criminal Court through the Rome Statute of 1998 was nothing less than
revolutionary: it exceeded customary international law in the sense that
the Treaty mandated the Court to indict even incumbent heads of state.
For third-party diplomacy, this unprecedented legal framework her-
alded new opportunities and challenges. African leaders, concerned
about the fact that the Court has been fixated on African cases ever since
it started its operations in 2002, have baulked at the indictment of sitting
presidents (Omar Al-Bashir of Sudan during March 2009, and Uhuru
140 Y. K. SPIES

Kenyatta of Kenya during March 2011). They claim that the sovereignty
of these states is being undermined as part of selective justice. Two
arguments are presented: first, that the ICC does not10 have universal
membership; and second, that the UN Security Council has the power
to refer cases to the ICC or to suspend a case before the Court. The
latter issue is particularly galling, because three out of the five perma-
nent members of the Security Council (China, Russia and the USA) are
not members of the ICC, yet have the power to refer other states to the
Court—and can veto any similar effort by other states. Thus, while the
authority of the ICC is no doubt a deterrent for despots, it only applies
to the member states of the Court, or the states that fall foul of certain
great powers.
A compelling consideration from the perspective of third-party diplo-
macy is that the ICC’s pursuit of international criminal justice relies only
on retributive justice. This means that the emphasis is on punishment
rather than reconciliation. This approach contrasts with the prioritisa-
tion of restorative (rehabilitative) justice that is found in many traditional
systems. In these systems, crime is considered a problem for the com-
munity to solve and the rehabilitation of offenders is therefore sought,
through reconciliation with victims who take an active role in the pro-
cess. Reparations and apologies are typically involved. Examples of this
approach can be found in the East African Gacaca courts which played
an instrumental role in justice and reconciliation after the genocide in
Rwanda.
The systems approach that is central to the new generation of con-
flict resolution requires inclusive processes and a holistic view of causes
and catalysts. It therefore builds on the idea of restorative justice rather
than retributive justice. Sometimes referred to as transformative justice,
the systems approach takes the principles of restorative justice beyond11
the criminal justice system to accommodate an all-encompassing effort
to build new relationships. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC) that followed the end of apartheid in South Africa is an example.
The lasting settlement that was reached in South Africa (against tremen-
dous odds!) confirms the importance of local ownership12 in a peace pro-
cess. If prominent incumbent South African leaders had been indicted by
an international court, simultaneous to the constitutional negotiations,
the results of the peace process might have been different. The ten-
sion between legal and diplomatic conflict resolution, it seems, is a real
dilemma.
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 141

6  States and Third-Party Niche Diplomacy

Conflict resolution is becoming integral to the foreign policy formula-
tion of the majority of states in the world. It could result from a state’s
own involvement in conflict, participation in mediation or peacekeeping,
or deliberations in the United Nations (or other multilateral forum) on
operationalisation of international norms such as R2P. Diplomats are
uniquely placed to engage in conflict resolution: they have institutional-
bureaucratic support, international legal protection, global linkage net-
works and the moral authority of public accountability.

6.1   States That Specialise in ‘the Business of Peace’13

Not all states practice third-party diplomacy, but it is possible for almost
any state, regardless of its resources and relative power, to specialise in
this form of diplomacy. For large powers, it is a way to strengthen their
credentials as benign hegemons and to secure their continuous influ-
ence in fluid circumstances. The world’s superpower, the USA, occa-
sionally undertakes third-party roles in areas of the world where it has
strategic interests. The Middle East is one such area. A particular tri-
umph of US-sponsored mediation was the Camp David negotiations,
which paved the way for the historic 1979 peace treaty between Egypt
and Israel.
For smaller powers that style themselves as ‘good international citi-
zens’, third-party diplomacy is part of the ‘job-description’. States like
the Netherlands, New Zealand and Norway actively seek an international
role associated with mediation, engaging great powers and peripheral
states with equal dedication. Some analysts refer to them as the ‘middle
powers’ of the world. As Hampson et al. (2013: 322) express it,

from the Middle East to Central America to Africa and the Asia Pacific
region, these countries played key roles in instigating negotiations between
warring sides, backstopping negotiations once they got underway, and
ensuring that the parties remained committed to the peace process once a
negotiated settlement was concluded.

Norway is a prime example, with its facilitation of peace processes in the

Middle East (the Oslo Process), Colombia, Guatemala and Sri Lanka,
the Philippines and the Balkans, and its sponsorship of the annual Nobel
Peace Prize.
142 Y. K. SPIES

Middle power behaviour is not limited to the liberal democracies of

the West. A range of new, ‘emerging’ middle powers has seen third-party
diplomatic specialisation in the international arena. The oil-rich Gulf
state of Qatar, for instance, has constructed a high-profile international
presence in a range of sectors: sport, education and media (it hosts the
influential news network Al-Jazeera), to name but a few. The wealth of
this small14 nation has allowed it to be a generous benefactor and host,
with peace brokering services offered to several states in recent years,
ranging from Yemen to Sudan’s restive Darfur region. A notable success
has been Lebanon. The 2008 crisis that threatened to plunge Lebanon
back into civil war, saw Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani
assemble leaders of the various factions in Doha. His mediation yielded a
political settlement that eluded similar efforts by major powers, the Arab
League and the United Nations.
For poorer states, third-party diplomacy offers foreign policy prestige
as well as an economic opportunity when they participate in remunerated
UN peace operations. The employment of their nationals is a prime rea-
son why the top ten providers of military personnel and civilian police to
United Nations missions, are developing states: as of April 2018, the top
providers were (in descending order of quantity): Ethiopia, Bangladesh,
India, Rwanda, Pakistan, Nepal, Egypt, Indonesia, Tanzania and Ghana
(UN 2018).

6.2   Special State Envoys

Involvement in third-party diplomacy has prompted states to insti-
tutionalise a new category of diplomatic designations, namely spe-
cial envoys to conflict zones. (They are sometimes referred to as
roving ambassadors; a variation on the traditional resident ambassador
in the sense that they are head-office-based while tasked with a thematic
mission.) As done by the CEOs of intergovernmental organisations, a
head of state can also appoint a special representative, usually referred to
as a special envoy, to mediate in a conflict situation. The special envoy is
not only a mediator: he/she is the designated representative of the head
of state and the position is a long-term diplomatic assignment. In some
cases, the designated envoy is a career diplomat, but this is not a pre-
requisite as long as he/she enjoys the trust of the sending head of state
and has the experience to deal with a complex conflict situation. The
appointment is an indication of the priority a state attaches to a specific
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 143

situation, within the context of its foreign policy. South Africa, which
since the end of apartheid has emphasised the centrality of an ‘African
Agenda’ in its foreign policy, has appointed several special envoys to
conflict areas in the continent.
External powers have also nominated special envoys to African situ-
ations. The Great Lakes region, where seemingly intractable conflict
continues to inflict massive humanitarian suffering, has ‘attracted’ spe-
cial envoys from as far afield as Belgium and the USA. Darfur is another
example, and the third-party diplomacy of China is interesting because
it happened almost unintentionally. During 2007, the year before
China’s hosting of the 2008 Olympics, a worldwide drive took place to
draw attention to the humanitarian disaster in Darfur. China, which at
that stage supplied arms to the discredited government of Sudan, came
under intense criticism and a shaming campaign (led by various civil soci-
ety movements and celebrities) ensued. Much to the chagrin of China,
the impending sporting event was labelled the ‘genocide Olympics’, and
the country was forced to do damage control to its image. During May
2007 it appointed a highly experienced diplomat, Liu Guijin, as China’s
Special Envoy to Darfur (China, 2008). Liu’s personal efforts made a
significant difference to China’s image and the country ended up con-
tributing to peacebuilding efforts in the region, an experience that is
feeding into China’s new, more assertive and engaged public diplomacy
at the global level.

6.3   Foreign Ministry Implications of Third-Party Diplomacy

If there is one diplomatic goal that is most frequently vilified, it is the
third-party objective of resolving conflict. Quantifying the success of dip-
lomats in preventing conflict is a counter-factual effort, and it is there-
fore easy to dismiss their efforts. However, there is substance to the idea
that diplomats, in general, have inadequate knowledge of conflict reso-
lution techniques, including the crucial analysis and prognosis of immi-
nent conflict. As Luc Reychler (1996: 4, 6–7) has noted, the result has
been that third-party diplomacy has mostly been reactive rather than pro-
active. Horrific incidents of genocide that happened before the eyes of
international media and UN peacekeepers, such as the slaughter of Tutsi
in Rwanda and Muslims in Srebrenica, are examples of outrages that,
in Reychler’s opinion, have ‘diminished the prestige of the diplomatic
profession’.
144 Y. K. SPIES

In order to be optimally effective, diplomats need to be equipped

with normative, legal and practical guidelines for conflict resolution.
The study field encompasses not only diagnostic, but also preventive
and remedial approaches to international peace and security. Foreign
ministries are increasingly addressing the skills deficit by offering train-
ing in aspects such as early warning, preventive diplomacy and media-
tion. The training is cost effective from a national interest perspective,
especially if the third-party state is in the same region. As Alam (2009)
noted, investment in diplomatic capacity building is so much less expen-
sive than addressing the long-term consequences of conflict and anarchy
in regions where problems spill-over borders.
It also makes sense from a more strategic diplomatic perspective,
because involvement in the post-conflict building of states allows the
third party a lasting influence. With this in mind, Japanese diplomats
have over the past decade been positioned to become more ‘engaged’
in peace processes across the world. It forms part of a more assertive,
norm-driven Japanese foreign policy. The country does so not only in
a multilateral context (as part of United Nations peace operations) but
also in a bilateral context, where peacebuilding has become a major part
of Japan’s official development assistance (ODA). A June 2010 review
of ODA, prepared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, lists ‘investing
in peace’ as one of the ‘Three Pillars of Development Cooperation’
(Japan MOFA 2011). Thus Japanese diplomats receive specialised train-
ing in conflict resolution skills, with similar training presented to their
peers from post-conflict countries, as part of Japanese development
cooperation.
It would seem obvious that ministries of foreign affairs are institution-
ally geared towards the diplomacy of intercession, given the perennial
nature of diplomacy as a bridge-building endeavour. But contemporary
third-party diplomacy has additional implications—political as well as
bureaucratic—for a given foreign ministry.
In the first instance, it requires specialised operational training in cases
where foreign ministries (as is becoming the norm) follow up on a medi-
ation process with long-term involvement in post-conflict reconstruction
and development. MFA staff will be deployed to situations in transition in
environments that are often physically hazardous. They will be called on
to oversee the implementation of ‘technical’ matters such as infrastructure
rebuilding, human capacity training and so forth—activities that are vastly
different from what diplomats are traditionally required to do.
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 145

This responsibility is not only bureaucratic-technical but demands

careful political management. Many different branches of the third-party
government can be involved in the recipient state’s capacity building,
and their efforts need to be aligned with those of civil society, elected
officials who might be visiting the transitional state and businesses
that take up the opportunities inherent to PCRD. A military interven-
tion in Haiti during 1994 by a US-led international coalition, backed
by the UN Security Council in response to a military coup d’etat in the
island state, precipitated such a scenario. Former US Ambassador Strobe
Talbott (1997: 77) explains how the US stabilised Haiti. It did so by
means of:

an innovative, unified political military operations plan. Its purpose was to

ensure that the civilian and military aspects of the operation were imple-
mented in concert and with equal precision. As a result, when the peace-
keepers disarmed members of the Haitian military, USAID had programs
in place to help the demobilised soldiers develop the skills they would need
to reintegrate into civilian society.

The bureaucratic management of a state’s post-conflict development has

yet another dimension, which is the simultaneous involvement of other
foreign actors. Bilateral and multilateral engagement by other states and
organisations requires an extensive networking and coordination role by
diplomats (Ditchley Foundation 2010).
Take the example of Operation Barkhane in North Africa. It suc-
ceeded Operation Serval, the UN Security Council-mandated French
military intervention in Mali, which wrapped up its operations in July
2014. Operation Barkhane started in August 2014 and allows for a
3000 strong French force to fight terrorism in the Sahel region. The
project involves five states—Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and
Niger—all of them former French colonies. The French presence, not-
withstanding multilateral deployments by the African Union and United
Nations in the same region, is indicative of strong bilateral relations
with each of those governments. It is also testimony to the historical
success of French peace operations in Africa. This is, however, prob-
lematic at a practical as well as a political level. The parallel, bilateral
peacekeeping initiatives of the French sometimes ‘cross’ mandates with
their multilateral counterparts, with whom they typically share logisti-
cal spaces. Politically speaking, the success and ubiquitous presence
146 Y. K. SPIES

of the French raise uncomfortable questions about sovereignty in

Francophone Africa. These are issues that French diplomats have to deal
with on a daily basis.
When it comes to post-conflict reconstruction and development,
third-party diplomacy also involves extensive consultation with local
actors, in addition to multilateral–bilateral management. In a tran-
sitional situation, the authorities of the target state might be deeply
insecure, and the sensitive nature of PCRD lends itself to contention.
The possibility of subjective agendas of third parties—economic gain,
political patronage and so forth—can breed resentment within a nas-
cent government that wishes to exert its authority as soon as possible
(Brahimi and Ahmed 2008). Moreover, the lingering mistrust among
former adversaries in a post-conflict situation demands extraordinary
risk management. For diplomats working in post-conflict countries,
the peacebuilding process is one of ongoing conflict resolution. It
brings to mind Chester Crocker and his co-editors (1999) reference
to the complexity of contemporary mediation—they said it is like
‘herding cats’.
Finally, third-party diplomacy also has implications in terms of domes-
tic accountability. ‘Policymaking must be opened to broader debate,
both within government and more widely with civil society’ as Hocking
et al. (2013: 3) remind us. Diplomats have to contextualise, focus
and direct the debate about their own state’s third-party involvement.
Crucially, they have to guide other domestic stakeholders towards work-
ing within the parameters of their state’s foreign policy agenda.

7   Conclusion
Globalisation of all human activity has made conflict anywhere the busi-
ness of diplomats everywhere. There are compelling practical consider-
ations to practice the related mode of ‘third party’ diplomacy: conflict
inhibits development and has a contagious quality that ignores political
borders. Fittingly, Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter makes it
incumbent upon states to bring unresolved disputes to the attention of
the organisation, so that remedial action can be taken. Whereas the other
modes of diplomacy are therefore completely voluntary decisions by
states, the argument can be made that third-party diplomacy is, to some
extent, a normative imperative.
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 147

While the profile of conflict and peace might have changed in

recent human memory, the activity of third-party diplomacy—at its
minimum, the extension of ‘good offices’ to parties in conflict—is
as ancient as the profession. A dependable fair intermediary between
adversaries is always welcome in a world teeming with conflicting for-
eign policy agendas. What has changed dramatically is the expectation
that third parties should commit also to the facilitation of post-conflict
dispensations. Mediators now have to contend with the reality that a
peace agreement could signal their own long-term investment in the
process: they end up ‘owning’ the peace or, if it fails, the ongoing
conflict.
The point is that peace itself has become a long-term diplomatic pro-
ject—that much is clear from the idea that peace needs to be built. In
many instances, peacebuilding amounts to assisted state-building, and it
is no surprise that its practical implementation has been so difficult. The
enormous scope of its aims makes peacebuilding one of the most elusive
undertakings of international society, as the UN has learnt through the
underachievements of its Peace-building Architecture.
The related activity of post-conflict reconstruction and development
has brought even greater technical-bureaucratic and legal-political impli-
cations to third-party diplomacy. Amidst tense and delicate situations on
the ground, diplomats have to facilitate international involvement in the
transition of post-conflict countries, and balance the interests of a broad
range of internal and external actors—including government, civil soci-
ety, the private sector, international institutions and agencies and inter-
national NGOs. They also have to deal with multiple short, medium and
long-term programmes that simultaneously address both the causes and
consequences of a conflict. As in the case of the other modes of diplo-
macy, third-party diplomacy therefore requires extensive management
and coordination by foreign ministries.
But how capable are diplomats—the specialist–generalists of the
global arena—to drive these complex processes? They clearly cannot
do so in isolation, hence the proliferation of diplomatic ‘privatisa-
tion’ in the field of conflict resolution. In the next chapter, I will
look at the new diplomatic mode that has developed in response
to the need for governments to coordinate their diplomatic strate-
gies (and not only those pertaining to conflict resolution) with civil
society.
148 Y. K. SPIES

Notes
1. Conflict, in this sense, denotes large-scale, orchestrated violence or threat
thereof and does not refer to the more generic, and ubiquitous, clash of
human interests.
2. In addition, in Pyongyang the Swedish Embassy also ‘has consular responsi-
bility for all Nordic citizens, and handles Schengen visa applications on behalf
of Italy, Spain and the Nordic countries’ (Kingdom of Sweden 2017).
3. Neutrality should not be confused with ‘non-alignment’. As a foreign pol-
icy choice, non-alignment is essentially political/ideological; it requires
only a unilateral state decision and has no legal implications.
4. Collins and Packer (2006) describe essentially the same mode of diplomacy,
but use the term ‘quiet diplomacy’ rather than third party diplomacy.
5. The Arab-Israeli War is also known as the ‘Yom Kippur’, ‘Ramadan’ or
‘October’ War.
6. For a comprehensive discussion of the new wars, see Mary Kaldor’s
(2008) ‘New and Old Wars’.
7. Adam Roberts, in a 2010 article, points out that during the last two dec-
ades various commentators had put the ratio of civilian to combatant
deaths in the new wars, as high as 9:1 (the exact opposite of the situation
a century ago). However, Roberts is critical of these estimates and cites
research that casts doubt on the high ratio. He concludes that a more
realistic ratio is 5:1.
8. For his own efforts to secure peace in a volatile world, ElBaradei and the
IAEA were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005.
9. The Security Council previously mentioned HIV/Aids in its resolutions
on 17 July 2000 (S/RES/1308) and 7 June 2011 (S/RES/1983) but
without emphatically calling it a threat to international peace and security.
10. Only states that have ratified the 1998 Rome Statute (or, after 2000,
acceded to it in a single step) are members of the International Criminal
Court. As of May 2018, there were 123 ICC members, as opposed to the
193 members of the UN.
11. Transformative justice can be applied within areas as diverse as environ-
mental law, corporate law, labour relations, bankruptcy and debt counsel-
ling and family law.
12. The South African conflict was not mediated by third parties. The peace
process was a function of direct and inclusive negotiation among the dif-
ferent parties to the conflict.
13. The term is borrowed from Stuart Murray (2009) who refers to diplo-
macy as ‘the business of peace’.
14. Just exceeding two-and-a-half million people, as of May 2018, and main-
taining one of the highest per capita incomes in the world.
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 149

Sources Used
Aboagye, F. (2007, November 3–5). The AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur:
Challenges, Lessons and Implications for Regional Peacekeeping Training.
Presented at the SADC Workshop on Peace Support Operations, SADC
Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre, Harare.
Alam, M. (2009, September 16). UN Peacebuilding Operations and Diplomacy.
Presentation by the Head of the MONUC liaison office in Pretoria.
University of Pretoria.
Annan, K. A. (2005, March 21). In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General (A/59/2005).
Barston, R. P. (2006). Modern Diplomacy (3rd ed.). London: Pearson and
Longman.
Barston, R. P. (2013). Modern Diplomacy (4th ed.). Harlow: Pearson.
Boutros-Ghali, B. (1992, June 17). An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy,
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. Report of the Secretary-General, United
Nations GA and SC (A/47/277, S/24111).
Brahimi, L., & Ahmed, S. (2008). In Pursuit of Sustainable Peace: The Seven
Deadly Sins of Mediation. New York: New York University, Center on
International Cooperation.
Collins, C., & Packer, J. (2006). Options and Techniques for Quiet Diplomacy.
The Folke Bernadotte Academy, Conflict Prevention Handbook Series.
Stockholm: Edita.
Commission on Human Security (CHS). (2003). Human Security Now. http://
www.un.org/humansecurity/sites/www.un.org.humansecurity/files/chs_
final_report_-_english.pdf. Accessed on 23 October 2017.
Community of Sant’Egidio. (2017). Official Web-Site. http://www.santegidio.
org/pageID/1/langID/en/idLng/1064/HOME.html. Accessed on 23
October 2017.
Crocker, C. A., Hampson, F. O., & Aall, P. A. (Eds.). (1999). Herding Cats:
Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World. Washington, DC: United States
Institute of Peace Press.
Ditchley Foundation. (2010, March 4–6). A Note by the Director, Following a
Conference on “The Functions and Purposes of Modern Diplomacy”. Ditchley, UK.
http://www.ditchley.co.uk/conferences/past-programme/2010-2019/2010/
modern-diplomacy. Accessed on 29 January 2013.
ElBaradei, M. M. (2008, November 17). Diplomacy and Leadership in a
Turbulent World. Statement by the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency to the ‘Leaders in Dubai’ 2008 Business Forum.
Dubai, UAE.
Galtung, J. (1996). Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development
and Civilisation. London: Sage.
150 Y. K. SPIES

Galtung, J. (2013). A Theory of Peace: Building Direct Structural Cultural Peace.

Oslo: Kolofon Press.
Hampson, F. O., Crocker, C. A., & Aall, P. (2013). Negotiation. In A. F.
Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern
Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hocking, B., Melissen, J., Riordan, S., & Sharp, P. (2013, April). Whither
Foreign Ministries in a Post-Western World? (Clingendael Policy Brief No.
20). Clingendael Institute.
Japan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA). (2011, December 28). Japan’s
Seamless Efforts for Peacebuilding: One of Japan’s Key Diplomatic Initiatives.
Website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. http://www.mofa.go.jp/
announce/jfpu/2011/12/1228-02.html. Accessed on 21 March 2017.
Jönsson, C., & Hall, M. (2005). Essence of Diplomacy. Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Kaldor, M. (2008). New and Old Wars (2nd ed.). Stanford: Stanford University
Press.
Karns, M. P., & Mingst, K. A. (2013). International Organizations and
Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Khadiagala, G. M. (2016, July 29). Comments During Seminar on Peacebuilding
in Africa. Hosted by the Centre for Governance Innovation (GovInn),
University of Pretoria.
Kingdom of Sweden. (2017). Official Website of the Swedish Embassy in
Pyongyang, North Korea. http://www.swedenabroad.com/en-GB/
Embassies/Pyongyang/About-us/About-the-Embassy/.
Kleiboer, M. (1996). Understanding Success and Failure of International
Mediation. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 4(2), 360–389.
Lee, J. (1996). Multi-track Diplomacy. Diplomatic Studies Programme
Newsletter. Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, University of Leicester.
Malone, D. M., & Thakur, R. (2001, January–March). UN Peacekeeping:
Lessons Learned? Global Governance, 7(1), 11–17.
Murray, S. (2009). Towards an Enhanced Understanding of Diplomacy as
the Business of Peace. In N. Gertz (Ed.), War Fronts: Interdisciplinary
Perspectives on War, Virtual War and Human Security. Oxford: Inter-
Disciplinary Press.
Newsom, D. D. (Ed.). (1990). Diplomacy Under a Foreign Flag: When Nations
Break Relations. Washington, DC: Georgetown University, Institute for the
Study of Diplomacy.
Nathan, L. (2006). No Ownership, No Peace: The Darfur Peace Agreement. Crisis
States Research Centre (Working Paper No. 5), 2.
Nathan, L. (2010, May). Towards a New Era in International Mediation. Crisis
States Research Centre, Policy Directions. London: LSE.
 4 THIRD-PARTY DIPLOMACY: THE DIPLOMACY OF PEACE … 151

Nganje, F. (2013, May). Decentralised South-South Cooperation and South

Africa’s Post-conflict Support in Africa: What Role for SADPA? Africa Institute
of South Africa Policy Brief No. 87.
Nobel Committee. (1988). Press Release: The Nobel Peace Prize 1988. http://
www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1988/press.html.
Nunn, N., & Qian, N. (2014). US Food Aid and Civil Conflict. American
Economic Review, 104(6), 1630–1666.
People’s Republic of China. (2008, February 28). Major Activities of Chinese
Envoy to Darfur Since His Appointment Last May. Statement by the National
People’s Congress. http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/news/Focus/2008-
02/28/content_1400606.htm.
Reuters. (2010, June 6). Wealthy Qatar Building a Niche as Conflict Mediator.
Taipei Times, p. 6.
Reychler, L. (1996). Beyond Traditional Diplomacy. Leicester: Centre for the
Study of Diplomacy.
Roberts, A. (2010, June–July). Lives and Statistics: Are 90% of War Victims
Civilians? Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, 52(3), 115–136.
Ross, C. (2010, January–February). Independent Diplomacy. Harvard Business
Review, 88(1), 57.
Sharp, P. (1998). Who Needs Diplomats? The Problem of Diplomatic
Representation. In J. Kurbalija (Ed.), Modern diplomacy. Msida:
Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta.
Switzerland, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA). (2008). The ABC of
Diplomacy. Bern.
Talbott, S. (1997). Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Perspective.
Foreign Policy, 108(Autumn), 68–83.
Thakur, R. (2011, January–August). The United Nations and the Quest for World
Peace. Crossroads: The Macedonian Foreign Policy Journal, II(4), 81–93.
United Nations (UN). (1945). Charter of the United Nations.
United Nations (UN). (2000, August 21). Report of the Panel on United
Nations Peace Operations (‘The Brahimi Report’, A/55/305 and
S/2000/809).
United Nations (UN). (2004, December 2). A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility. Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges
and Change (Document A/59/5652004). UN Department of Public
Information.
United Nations (UN). (2010, July 21). Review of the United Nations
Peacebuilding Architecture (A/64/868; S/2010/393).
United Nations (UN). (2014, September 18). Meeting of the Security Council to
Consider the Ebola Pandemic in West Africa (S/RES/2177).
United Nations (UN). (2015a, June 29). The Challenge of Sustaining Peace.
Report of the Advisory Group of Experts [AGE] on the 2015 Review of the
152 Y. K. SPIES

United Nations Peacebuilding Architecture. www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/

pdf/150630%20Report%20of%20the%20AGE%20on%20the%202015%20
Peacebuilding%20Review%20FINAL.pdf.
United Nations (UN). (2015b, June 16). Uniting Our Strengths for Peace:
Politics, Partnership and People. Report of the High-Level Independent Panel
on Peace Operations (HIPPO).
United Nations (UN). (2018). Ranking of Military and Police Contributors
April 2018. https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/2_country_
ranking_0.pdf.
United Nations (UN) & Department of Political Affairs (DPA). (2017). Prevention
and Mediation. http://www.un.org/undpa/en/diplomacy-mediation.
United Nations (UN) & Peacebuilding Commission (PBC). (2017). http://
www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/pbso/faq.shtml#q4.
Zartman, I. W. (1989). Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Zartman, I. W. (2000, Spring). Mediating Conflicts of Need, Greed, and Creed.
ORBIS, 44(2), 255–266.
 CHAPTER 5

Polylateral Diplomacy: Diplomacy

as Public–Private Collaboration

1   Introduction
Something that has been implicit to the preceding chapters is the eclectic
and interdependent nature of the contemporary diplomatic arena. More
sovereign states are interacting with more intergovernmental organisa-
tions than ever before, and at state level, the diplomacy of central gov-
ernments is supplemented by that of cities, provinces, federal states and
quasi-government bodies. The range of actors in the ‘global village’ is
boosted exponentially by the number of non-state actors that operate
at domestic, transnational, international and global levels: trade unions,
political parties, religious groups, human rights activists, think tanks,
academia, business enterprises, artists—the list goes on and on.
The phenomenon of actors other than governments conducting
‘diplomacy’ is variously referred1 to as second track diplomacy (track
one diplomacy being the traditional diplomacy conducted by sovereign
states); para-diplomacy; unofficial diplomacy; unconventional or alter-
nate diplomacy; and civilian (or citizen) diplomacy. Non-state ‘diplo-
macy’ might occur simultaneously with official government diplomacy,
even in the same functional or geographical area. When separate dip-
lomatic processes coincide, aimed at the same goal, it is referred to as
multitrack2 diplomacy.
Many non-state actors interact in a de facto diplomatic manner
with states, organisations and other non-state actors. They are increas-
ingly confident about their international relations, and many of them

© The Author(s) 2019 153

Y. K. Spies, Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00530-6_5
154 Y. K. SPIES

demand inclusion in official diplomatic processes. Geoffrey Wiseman

(1999) devised the term ‘polylateral’ diplomacy to describe the cata-
lytic processes that constitute this interface of official diplomacy with the
initiatives of private entities. This most recent evolution in diplomatic
modes—public–private collaboration in the domain of diplomacy—will
be the focus of this chapter. The scene will be set with a discussion, first,
of the phenomenon that diplomacy is being ‘privatised’, followed with
consideration of the ‘global commons’ where ‘global public goods’ are
at stake. Thereafter, different categories of non-state diplomatic actors
will be identified, as also their comparative advantages vis-à-vis tradi-
tional (state-centric) actors. As was done in the previous two chapters,
the modal impact on foreign ministries will be discussed in conclusion of
the chapter.

2  The Privatisation of Diplomacy

Richard Langhorne (2005: 332) describes the contemporary emer-
gence of ‘a wide range of human activities which owe little or nothing
to geographical location, time of day and, most important of all, to gov-
ernment permission or regulation’. On the one hand, this hive of activ-
ities contains an intersection of state and societal interests. But as Brian
Hocking (1999: 26, 32–33) notes, there is also the growing capacity of
non-governmental interest groups to rival the authority of governments
by operating in parallel to them in the international arena. The result is
that ‘competing and multiple sovereignties, at macro and micro levels
of sovereignty’ (Vale 1993: 15) challenge the traditional, vertical juris-
diction of governments. The challenge extends to the very conduct of
diplomacy.

2.1   Degovernmentalisation of Diplomacy

The diplomatic role of non-sovereign entities is by no means a new phe-
nomenon: recall that the ‘traditional’ state-centric arena of diplomacy is
only a few centuries old. Preceding the Westphalian system, the diplo-
matic dominance of the Catholic Church was far more significant than
that of any political unit during the Middle Ages (Cohen 1999: 2; Lee
1996). Even after the Peace of Westphalia, and lasting throughout the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a chartered company, the Dutch
East India Company, dominated the spice trade in Europe and Asia. The
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 155

trading giant acted like a state in many ways: it negotiated treaties, dis-
patched and received envoys and even waged wars and established colo-
nies. Commonly referred to by its Dutch acronym, VOC (for Vereenigde
Oostindische Compagnie), the Dutch East India Company is considered
by many to be the first multinational corporation in the international
arena. During the same period, the British East India Company domi-
nated the Indian subcontinent and laid the foundations for the British
Empire. It was less imposing than the Dutch East India Company, which
it outlived by another century, but its impact was massive and its reach
global.
Coinciding with the ‘corporate diplomacy’ of the Modern Era were
various international campaigns by civil society groups. Some of the
most prominent normative movements were anti-slavery (the abolition-
ist movement that eventually led to worldwide criminalisation of slav-
ery) and anti-war efforts. Transnational activism in pursuit of peace is
probably the oldest form of citizen diplomacy, and women’s3 organisa-
tions have made important contributions. Daniel Hucker (2015: 407)
recounts how, during the late 1890s, the Russian Tsar issued a call for a
peace conference among the great powers. Despite the prevailing politi-
cal environment that dictated against such an initiative, over one million
Europeans signed a petition in support thereof. The petition was organ-
ised by a women’s league, the Ligue des Femmes pour le Désarmement
International. Hucker (2015: 405) argues that the 1899 Hague Peace
Conference was at least in part a result of such peace activism. It paved
the way for closer public scrutiny of states’ international relations and
reflected a growing confidence that global civil society could guide states
into building international society.
It took longer for overt democratisation of the foreign policy deci-
sion-making process, starting to manifest only during the 1970s in the
Western democracies, and in the immediate post-Cold War era in the rest
of the world. Vladimir Petrovsky (1998: 23) refers to the process as the
‘degovernmentalisation of foreign affairs’, a term that implies a certain
measure of ‘domestication’ of diplomacy as various domestic pressure
groups stake a claim in diplomacy. Non-state involvement in the realm
of foreign policy has also fomented the principle of subsidiarity which
presupposes the devolution of political authority to lower levels of gov-
ernment and the wider society. Proponents of devolution believe that
governance becomes more legitimate when its processes are more inclu-
sive, responsive and transparent.
156 Y. K. SPIES

According to Fritz Nganje (2014: 90), ‘arguments of economic

expediency or the preservation of cultural diversity in an increasingly
globalised and interdependent world’ have been used to justify the terri-
torial decentralisation of diplomacy. He explains that governance reforms
in the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America during the
1990s saw policies and legal frameworks being decentralised. This also
happened in the foreign policy domain and offered ‘a unique window
for grass-roots communities to gain greater awareness of and partici-
pate directly in international affairs, thereby increasing their aptitude to
engage with national foreign policy processes’.
Non-state diplomacy became markedly more prominent when the end
of the Cold War opened up opportunities for innovative international
relations. Stuart Murray (2006: 111) explains that non-state actors have
‘capitalised on state deficiencies, to promote their agenda, their posi-
tion in the IR hierarchy and their alternate but effective techniques at
tackling global problems, which states have been reluctant or unable to
address’. These entities are bolstered by innovation in information and
communications technologies (ICT), which inform and connect them in
unprecedented ways.
A caveat should be noted, however. The privatisation and decentral-
isation of diplomacy within sovereign borders is not universal: under
authoritarian regimes and in states where democracy is just nascent,
diplomacy is still largely the preserve of the governing elites.

2.2   People-to-People Diplomacy

The British think tank DEMOS in a 2007 report (pp. 16–17) explained
that international cultural interaction was traditionally only elite-to-elite:
between royal courts and the ambassadors that represented them. As
mass communication tools were developed, governments started to target
foreign audiences via broadcasting on a unilateral ‘elite-to-many’ level,
often as part of propaganda. The latter comprises the ‘public diplomacy’
that was discussed in Chapter 2 (Bilateral Mode).
In the contemporary era, fuelled by mass travel and social media,
international relations have become more horizontal and have prolif-
erated ‘beyond anyone’s imagination’ (The British Council 2013: 7).
International peer-to-peer interaction has become so ubiquitous in all
spheres of human activity that the term ‘people-to-people diplomacy’
has entered the lexicon of diplomacy. In some cases, these relations
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 157

occur despite, rather than as a result of, official diplomatic relations.

Sport and culture are particularly powerful unifiers of people across bor-
ders and despite official schisms, as can be seen in South Asia where the
game of cricket is a collective passion (Malone 2013: 127).
A classic example of diplomacy-following-sport was the so-called ping-
pong diplomacy between the USA and China during the early 1970s.
For the first half of the Cold War and intensifying during the Korean
War (1950–1953), the USA and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
had no diplomatic relations whatsoever. Their frosty relationship coin-
cided with the period during which one of the five permanent UN
Security Council seats was held by Taiwan, rather than the PRC, because
Western countries considered the Taiwanese government as China’s
‘government-in-exile’. During its years of diplomatic isolation, the PRC
nevertheless ensured that its athletes enjoyed international opportuni-
ties to compete, by propagating an official policy of ‘Friendship First,
Competition Second’.
A major breakthrough occurred when table tennis (‘ping-pong’)
teams from both the USA and China participated in the World Table
Tennis Championships in Nagoya, Japan, during April 1971. The
Chinese team invited the Americans to visit, and when the invitation was
unexpectedly endorsed by the Chinese authorities, it paved the way for
formal bilateral relations. The USA lifted its embargo on relations with
China just two months later, and the following year, in 1972, President
Nixon and his formidable Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, paid their
historical visit to China. The humble ‘ping-pong’ diplomacy thus paved
the way for a lasting and formal bilateral relationship.
The divisive political climate of the Cold War saw its share of peo-
ple-to-people diplomacy also in the arts. American jazz bands travelled
the globe, including the Soviet Union where they were enthusiasti-
cally received, despite the exact opposite treatment of public officials.
Cynthia Schneider (2009: 1), a former US Ambassador and professor at
Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, explains that jazz’s
diplomatic power stemmed from the inherent tension created by black
musicians trumpeting American values during the era of segregation.
This remains the case, and hip-hop artists and sport stars from the USA
tend to be welcome even in places where the USA is seen as an enemy
state. During 2013, US basketball star Dennis Rodman visited North
Korea (at that stage a no-go area for US diplomats) and struck up a
friendship with the country’s young dictator, Kim Jong-un. Rodman
158 Y. K. SPIES

subsequently returned to North Korea to help train its national basket-

ball team, angering critics of the isolated state’s human rights record
and belligerent foreign policy. Unfortunately, the ‘basket-ball diplo-
macy’ was not as successful as the ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ of the early
seventies, and despite a series of visits to Pyongyang, Rodman’s involve-
ment did not lead to a thaw4 in the bilateral relationship.

2.3   ‘Privatised’ Foreign Ministries

The dearth of diplomatic capacity in certain issue fields and within the
administrations of poor states has prompted diplomatic entrepreneurs to
make their services available on a private basis. In the world of state-cen-
tric sovereignty, this phenomenon is very interesting. Yet, when one con-
siders the amount of expertise and bureaucratic skills that oil the wheels
of foreign services, it is clear why a demand should exist for ‘private for-
eign ministries’. Political analysis in the field of conflict resolution is a
case in point. As David Malone (2013: 125) says, ‘embassy analysts are
hard-pressed to improve on the analytical reports of such research and
advocacy organisations as the International Crisis Group on farflung,
often conflict prone countries’.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) which he refers to is a private,
non-profit organisation based in Brussels. Founded in 1995, it focuses
on early warning and analysis of global crises, and (as it says of its own
mission) supplementing the work of foreign ministries and embassies,
especially those that have fewer resources or limited presence in inter-
national capitals (ICG 2017). The ICG employs multinational teams of
political analysts, many of them academics, journalists or former diplo-
mats. During 2009, Louise Arbour, then President of the ICG, explained
the role of her organisation as follows:

I have now made a bold move to enter a civil society organisation that
operates in the last chasse-gardée of state monopoly: the field of interna-
tional peace and security. This forces me to reflect on our role in this less
than occupied field as we purport to be not only policy analysts, but field-
based actors, prescriptive players and opinion-makers, interveners, in every
way we can, to advance what we believe is a broad public interest in pre-
venting, containing or solving deadly conflict.
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 159

The services of well-trained and experienced former diplomats are par-

ticularly sought after by diplomatic actors that lack capacity and infra-
structure. During 2004, Carne Ross, a former UK diplomat, founded
Independent Diplomat, a non-profit advisory group based in New York,
to offer exactly such services. His clients have included small states
and non-state entities, inter alia Kosovo, the Burmese opposition and
Western Sahara. As he commented:

Power is shifting, and marginalised players need help. Excluding them

increases the risk of conflict. Most important to me is helping (and urg-
ing) others to move beyond a naïve reliance on governments to control the
forces and events that affect our lives. (Ross 2010: 57)

Another example is DiploFoundation (or ‘Diplo’ as it is called), based

in Geneva. The non-profit organisation was created in November 2002
as a joint venture of the governments of Malta and Switzerland. Headed
by a former Yugoslav diplomat and ICT security expert, Jovan Kurbalija,
Diplo offers online as well as contact training and capacity building
programmes, often customised for less developed states. Diplo’s role
was acknowledged by the United Nations when it was granted Special
Consultative Status with the United Nations Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC) during 2006.

3  Diplomacy and the Global Commons

Much as democracy has forced national policy processes to become more
deliberative and inclusive of civil society input, international relations
have seen the growth of ‘diplomacy without borders’: diplomacy rooted
in human interests regardless of sovereign orders and driven by non-state
actors. It is based on the idea of a global commons, or ‘global public goods’.

3.1   Global Public Goods

At the domestic level, the concept of ‘public goods’ has traditionally
been considered a responsibility of governments. However, the priva-
tisation of public services has created a grey area within the traditional
public–private divide. Businesses are assuming responsibility for deliv-
ery of public goods and services in areas such as education, security,
160 Y. K. SPIES

healthcare and even utilities such as electricity, water and sanitation. But
as James Muldoon (2005) cautions, provision of these services has wider
socio-economic, political and environmental implications and require
transparency and accountability in decision-making.
The idea of public goods at the international level is a much more
recent construct.5 Global public goods describe goods that are ‘nonrival’
in their consumption and have no excludable benefits (Kaul et al. 1999).
There are many of these: conflict resolution; the prevention of environ-
mental degradation; nuclear disarmament; the eradication of scourges
such as communicable diseases and the trafficking of drugs, arms and
people and socio-economic development are among the many tangible
and intangible commodities that comprise global public goods. Their
benefits transcend physical borders, time zones and political and cultural
differences (Sucharipa 2003).
The management of public goods in forums of ‘global governance’
increasingly sees mobilisation of international networks that comprise of
both public and private actors. Karns and Mingst (2013: 156) describe
this phenomenon as ‘networked diplomacy’. They mention the UN’s
use of independent commissions and ad hoc panels to investigate key
issues, as an example of public–private collaboration in multilateral diplo-
macy. Indeed, one of the most striking changes in the global diplomatic
arena is the growth of hybrid authorities in global governance. Mathews
(1997: 62) cites the International Union for the Conservation of Nature
and the International Telecommunications Union, among several others,
where ‘businesses or NGOs take on formerly public roles’.
As can be expected, the simultaneous involvement of a multiplicity of
actors in arenas of global governance creates ambiguity about account-
ability for the spill-over effects when global public goods are not effec-
tively managed. In response, an increasing number of normative and
regulatory conventions—derived at within ‘multi-polylateral’ diplomatic
forums—check the behaviour of non-state international actors.
One such initiative is the United Nations Global Compact, estab-
lished in July 2000 under the leadership of (then) Secretary-General Kofi
Annan. The Compact provides a framework for partnerships between
the UN, international enterprises, governments, civil society and labour
organisations. The driving aim is to encourage corporate social responsi-
bility (CSR) through policies and practices. In return for embracing the
stipulated ethical obligations, firms benefit from UN facilities and the use
of the UN logo, and in this way, mutually beneficial joint ventures are
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 161

undertaken. According to the UN, as of 2017 the Global Compact had

over 12,000 corporate participants and other stakeholders from over 170
countries, making it ‘the world’s largest corporate sustainability initiative’
(UN Global Compact 2017).

3.2   Technology and Information as Public Goods

The technological revolution that marked the past century has been the
most corrosive variable in the raison d’être of diplomacy. Global civil
society’s access to voluminous information and its ability to generate and
manipulate such information have eroded the monopoly that diplomats
had in interstate communication (Kurbalija 1999: 172). Exponential
advances in ICT have not only swept aside barriers of time and space,
but also contributed to levelling the playing field in terms of structural
hierarchy. The decentralised, horizontal ICT-enabled networks have
challenged governments, which are ‘quintessential hierarchies, wedded
to an organisational form incompatible with all that the new technolo-
gies make possible’ (Mathews 1997: 52).
Adding to the challenge are changes in the profile of global power. As
Kurbalija (1999: 174–175) notes, there is a ‘steady shift of power from
traditional elements such as control of territorial and physical resources
towards information as a source of power’. The ICT revolution is there-
fore affecting not just the conduct but also the content of diplomacy in
the evolving international arena (Murray 2006: 68 at footnote 167).
Technology has also spawned new issues of global concern—ethical
dilemmas of ownership and accountability, as is evident in the debate
around the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (‘drones’) to conduct espio-
nage or war.
A specific ethical issue of concern is the very access to ICT. The Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) has, since 1976, called for the creation of a
new international order in the field of information and mass communica-
tions, arguing that it is as urgent as a new international economic order.
A year later, in 1977, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) set up the International Commission
for the Study of Communication Problems, comprised of media experts
from 16 different countries. The Commission released its lengthy
report (the so-called MacBride Report, named after the Commission’s
chair, Seán MacBride from Ireland) in 1980. It was highly controversial,
because it highlighted the close interrelation between the international
162 Y. K. SPIES

media and the foreign policy and image of states and appealed for a
reduction in the weight of the ‘media imperialism’ of the great powers.
The report was widely hailed for its progressive views, but it made many
governments uncomfortable. The UK and the USA rejected it, to the
extent that both states subsequently withdrew6 from UNESCO.
Information is a powerful global commons, and at the cusp of the
twenty-first century, the Internet presented an innovative and visible ‘ter-
ritory’ where masses of information could be sourced and shared. The
UN General Assembly duly recognised that access to the Internet is a
major element of the ‘digital divide’ between the haves and have-nots of
ICT. During December 2001, it unanimously adopted a resolution that
called for a World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). The first
WSIS was subsequently held in Geneva during 2003. The opening para-
graph of the Summit’s Declaration of Principles declared the participants’

common desire and commitment to build a people-centred, inclusive and

development-oriented Information Society, where everyone can create,
access, utilise and share information and knowledge, enabling individuals,
communities and peoples to achieve their full potential in promoting their
sustainable development and improving their quality of life. (UN WSIS 2003)

The second phase of the project was a summit held in Tunis, during
2005, and in December 2015, the process culminated in the ‘WSIS + 10’
summit of the UN General Assembly.
Access to information (as a core human right) and the democratic
as well as economic implications of the Internet are concerns shared by
the public and private sectors. Governance of the Internet therefore did
not take long to enter the global diplomatic agenda (Kavanagh et al.
2014: 34). In 2006, resulting from the processes set in motion by the
deliberations within the WSIS, the United Nations institutionalised this
domain of global governance through the establishment of the Internet
Governance Forum.
A related concern is access to the information that governments col-
lect and (usually) keep away from public scrutiny. ‘Open data’ is a theme
in discourses on transparency and accountability, as is the problem of
‘openwashing’—the deceptive marketing of an entity as being open to
scrutiny, when in fact it conceals information. Many states have joined
the global push by transnational and subnational actors to make offi-
cially held data accessible to civil society and to ensure that it is done
so in practice, not just on paper. In this regard, a cooperation platform
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 163

between states was launched during 2011, as the Open Government

Partnership. The eight founding governments (Brazil, Indonesia,
Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, the UK, and the USA)
were soon joined by dozens of others and as of June 2017, ‘75 OGP
participating countries and 15 subnational governments have made over
2,500 commitments to make their governments more open and account-
able’ (OGP 2017). In a first for the Steering Committee of the OGP, on
4 May 2016, the OGP membership of Azerbaijan was declared ‘inactive’
(i.e. susended). The country’s government was found to be insufficiently
vigilant about protection of civic space.
The challenges related to information and technology as global pub-
lic goods are bound to increase as the world experiences the Fourth
Industrial Revolution. The World Economic Forum (WEF) states that
this revolution is already underway, overlapping with the Third Industrial
Revolution (marked by electronics, information technology and auto-
mated production) that started in the late 1960s. The Fourth Revolution,
the WEF warns, has no historical precedent. Its scope, speed, velocity and
impact on human systems exceed anything that has gone before, in areas
that include big data, artificial intelligence and neuromorphic technology
(computer chips that mimic human brain functions), to name just a few
(Nicol 2015). It will create new frontiers for the global commons and
new diplomatic challenges in the domain of global governance.

3.3   The Watchdogs: Transnational Social Movements

While forums of global governance are mandated to deal with the global
commons, the ‘grassroots’ watchdogs representing international civil
society tend to manifest as transnational social movements (TSMs), also
referred to as ‘transnational issue networks’. These movements spread their
operations across national borders and usually comprise of a collectivity of
smaller groups that use the shared platform to amplify their activism vis-
à-vis firms, governments and other wielders of power. The goals of TSMs
can be long-term (to tackle endemic problems such as corruption and
gender inequality in governance structures) or be organised around a sin-
gle, ad hoc issue (such as the removal of a dictatorship in a given country)
in which case the group dissolves when the issue is resolved. The global
struggle against apartheid was one such issue. Thus, when Nelson Mandela
delivered his first-ever speech to the UN General Assembly as president
of democratic South Africa, he thanked the global audience for ‘the new
South Africa which you helped to bring into being’ (Mandela 1994).
164 Y. K. SPIES

The importance of TSMs lies in the fact that they act as ‘the conscience of
a global civil society’, as Eduard Jordaan (2003: 170–171) phrases it. Just
like the involvement of domestic civil society lends legitimacy to the work
of governments, at the international level the work of TSMs introduces a
democratic element into otherwise anarchic global relations.
The operations of TSMs are greatly facilitated by the use of social
media, as was demonstrated by the transnational movement that gave
momentum to the Arab Spring during 2011 in North Africa and the
Middle East. Activists used media accessible to millions of people, includ-
ing even the lowest-income sectors of societies, to organise social move-
ments and cyber-networks that toppled entrenched regimes across the
region. In 2011, Time Magazine even named the generic ‘protester’
as its annual Person of the Year. The magazine cited the democratic
agency of civil protests worldwide: among others the Arab Spring, the
Indignants Movement, the Occupy Movement(s) and the Tea Party
movement, as well as protests in Chile, Greece, India and Russia.
Some TSMs are based almost entirely in cyberspace. This non-geo-
graphical, ubiquitous presence enables them to rally support, spread
instantaneous messages to millions and stream video footage and images
captured in real time by ordinary people, even children, using cell
phones. An example is Avaaz, an ‘online advocacy community’ founded
in 2007, with members in more than 30 countries. It claims that:

Avaaz’s online community can act like a megaphone to call attention to

new issues; a lightning rod to channel broad public concern into a specific,
targeted campaign; a fire truck to rush an effective response to a sudden,
urgent emergency; and a stem cell that grows into whatever form of advo-
cacy or work is best suited to meet an urgent need. (Avaaz 2017)

Not surprisingly, the activities of online groups such as Avaaz and other
TSMs can be controversial, especially when they sway public opinion
against governing elites and when their activism thwarts official diplo-
matic or governance processes. The Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protests
that started in September 2011 in the financial district of New York City
spawned a global movement against capitalism-induced economic ine-
quality. The impact of this and other transnational movements has fed
into a global anti-establishment narrative, evident in the rhetoric of the
campaigns that led to ‘Brexit’ in 2016 and the election of the populist
Donald Trump in the US Presidential election during that same year.
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 165

4  Non-state Actors in the Diplomatic Arena

Historically, at least in the state-centric Westphalian international sys-
tem, diplomacy was the prerogative of sovereign actors. But clearly, this
is changing, and Geoffrey Wiseman (1999: 10) urges professional dip-
lomats to understand that there is ‘a further layer of diplomatic interac-
tion and relationships’. These actors—as diverse as trade unions, political
parties, terrorist groups, migrant communities and humanitarian relief
organisations—have risen in prominence and are no longer restricting
their activities to the fringes of the international arena. They conduct
diplomacy among each other as much as they engage states and IGOs.

4.1   Non-governmental Organisations

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are non-profit7 organisations
that function independent of governments at local, national, regional
or international level. Petrovsky (1998: 23) calls them the most salient
‘intruders’ into the sphere of diplomacy. Thousands of NGOs oper-
ate at the international level, but it is difficult to determine exactly how
many there are at any given time. As Jessica Mathews (1997: 53) has
cautioned, the published statistics are misleading because it is impossible
to measure such a swiftly growing sector with such a vast array of causes
and interests. To complicate statistics further, the sector derives funding
from a panoply of sources: fees, donations, the sale of products and ser-
vices, contributions from foundations, governments and international
organisations and many more.
Some NGOs, especially the larger, politically prominent ones like
Greenpeace, Amnesty International, Médecins sans Frontières and Human
Rights Watch are known across the world, but there are myriad others
that differ vastly in terms of almost every quantifiable and qualifiable
characteristic. Devin and Törnquist-Chesnier (2010: 67) rightly observe
that ‘the world of NGOs is no less heterogeneous than that of states’.
They give the example of French NGOs such as International Federation
for Human Rights8 (FIDH) that employ one or two lawyers, while the
Amnesty International office in London, in sharp contrast, maintains an
entire legal department.
NGOs often work in tandem to form powerful international grids with
the ability to impact on world politics. Moreover, their relations with gov-
ernments and IGOs cover the full spectrum, from deliberate confrontation
166 Y. K. SPIES

to strategic cooperation. Their need to network with and lobby a range

of actors can see them recruiting public relations experts and developing
strategies that resemble those used by sovereign states. Some of the larger
NGOs even have de facto diplomatic infrastructure. The Russian Orthodox
Church, for example, has a head of external relations, which is a position
similar to that of a foreign minister. In some cases, NGOs rival the actions
of states in terms of agenda setting and campaigning for specific outcomes
of diplomatic processes. The massive financial resources of private philan-
thropic foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the
Rockefeller Brothers Fund allow them to play significant roles in develop-
ment projects, alongside IGOs and donor states.
A distinctly diplomatic strategy has been to ensure a continuous pres-
ence at multilateral diplomatic hubs: participating in conferences and
seeking a permanent presence at intergovernmental organisations. The
oldest example of multilateral participation by non-governmental actors
is the International Labour Organisation (ILO), founded in 1919 at the
Versailles Peace Conference. The ILO provides for parallel representation
of states, workers and organisations of employers. The UN Charter fol-
lowed in this tradition by making provision for participation, albeit lim-
ited, by international non-state actors in the activities of the Economic
and Social Council (ECOSOC). Article 71 allows for the Council to
‘…make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-governmen-
tal organisations which are concerned with matters within its compe-
tence’. As the surge of NGO activity became clear in the post-Cold War
era, ECOSOC adopted a resolution to broaden its associative relations
with NGOs, based on ‘the breadth of non-governmental organisations’
expertise and the capacity of non-governmental organisations to support
the work of the United Nations’ (UN ECOSOC 1996/31). Thus, to an
even greater extent than before, representatives of accredited NGOs are
given opportunity to engage with the official diplomatic community at
the United Nations. This can include the distribution of briefing docu-
ments, access to UN resources and secretariat support and even speaking
opportunities at plenary sessions or committee meetings.
At an even higher level of diplomatic representation are NGOs that
have been accorded official observer status at the UN. Among these are
the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Inter-Parliamentary
Union (IPU) and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC
or ‘Red Cross’). Of these, the status of the ICRC is the most promi-
nent, owing to its unique authority within humanitarian law. It is one
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 167

of the oldest NGOs that is still active, dating back to 1863 when it was
founded in Switzerland by Henry Dunant and Gustave Moynier. In
1919, the organisation diversified to allow for a federative union with the
International Committee of the Red Crescent—an astute ‘diplomatic’
move that facilitated the ICRC’s operations in the Muslim world. At
present, a full century later, the ICRC is a massive humanitarian organi-
sation with almost universal representation in the states of the world. It
actually presides over a bigger residential representative network than
most states of the world, and at the United Nations, the organisation’s
representatives often address summits and Security Council meetings.
Since the early 1990s, the Security Council has also developed closer
working relations with non-state actors and individuals. It started to do
so under the so-called Arria formula, named after Diego Enrique Arria
Salicetti, a former Permanent Representative of Venezuela to the United
Nations (and later advisor to Secretary-General Kofi Annan). He initi-
ated the working method so that the Council can consult informally and
confidentially with stakeholders in situations on its agenda.
The practice has spread throughout the United Nations system, and in
Geneva, the UN Human Rights Council gives extensive opportunity for
NGOs to participate in its annual sessions (Murray 2006: 371). The World
Bank also interacts with non-state actors in institutionalised ways. Likewise,
the World Trade Organisation’s secretariat has, since 1996, organised sym-
posiums for NGOs, a practice that subsequently turned into regular infor-
mation briefings. For its part, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
allows NGOs with legal expertise or field experience to file amicus curiae
(friend of the court) procedures and thereby take part in ICJ dispute settle-
ment (Devin and Törnquist-Chesnier 2010: 68). Regional IGOs have also
replicated the practice of maintaining associative relations with NGOs.

4.2   Multinational Corporations

Multinational corporations (MNCs) have proliferated in the course
of the twentieth century, especially since the end of the World War II.
Also referred to as Transnational Commercial Organisations (TCOs) or
Transnational Corporations (TNCs), they are business enterprises that
are headquartered in a certain state, but with interests—including staff,
production facilities and other infrastructure and assets—spread across
various countries. Companies such as Microsoft and Nestlé control mas-
sive assets, often dwarfing the economies of sovereign states. Apple, the
168 Y. K. SPIES

US-based multinational company that specialises in consumer electron-

ics, illustrates this point rather spectacularly: its financial results for the
fiscal 2017 first quarter (ending 31 December 2016) was a staggering
$78.4 billion (Apple Inc. 2017)—equivalent to the GDP of countries
such as Portugal and Chile.
Like sovereign states, MNCs have to manage complex relations to
protect and promote their interests in the international domain. The
de facto diplomacy of MNCs is referred to as ‘corporate diplomacy’ or
‘business diplomacy’. This entails the building of cooperative, long-term
relationships at the international level, resembling the diplomatic strat-
egies of sovereign states. Corporate diplomacy can also be multilateral.
An example is the World Business Council for Sustainable Development
(WBCSD), a CEO-led organisation that as of May 2017 comprised of
over 200 international businesses. Such organisations represent the com-
mon interests of their members vis-à-vis governments, NGOs and IGOs
(Langhorne 2005: 337).
The executives of international enterprises are required to engage
‘diplomatically’ with authorities at various levels: state governments,
multilateral organisations involved in global governance, private business
in the states where they operate, fellow MNCs, NGOs—actually all the
other actors in the diplomatic arena. CEOs of corporations such as Tata,
Samsung and Petrobras are received by governments and intergovern-
mental organisations with pomp and ceremony not very different from
that accorded to heads of state. In practice, their visits are often priori-
tised above those of heads of state from small or poor countries.
In some cases, MNCs adopt foreign policy positions that differ from,
even contradict, those of the state in which they are based. As from 1
May 2013, the US-based multinational corporation Google (known
most widely for its Internet search engine) announced that it would
replace the words ‘Palestinian Territories’ with ‘Palestine’ across all
its products. This followed Palestine’s upgraded UN status to that of
‘non-member observer state’. Google’s ‘foreign policy’ presented a stark
contrast with that of its host state, the USA, which has historically held
Palestine at arms-length. Google also did so well before Sweden became
the first Western Government to recognise the statehood of Palestine,
during October 2014.
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 169

The sheer economic power of large MNCs allows them so much

influence in the economies of small and developing states that these
companies, like powerful states, have to counter the image of neocolo-
nialism. Activists are infuriated by exploitation of cheap labour to fuel
massive corporate profits which are then repatriated rather than invested
in local development. Another controversial issue is the environmental
impact when source materials are extracted from vulnerable ecosystems:
Shell and BP, to name but two companies, have experienced the fallout
of human rights and environmental politics in the business of oil extrac-
tion. In the restive Niger Delta in Nigeria, Shell’s alleged destruction of
agrarian lifelihood, including fishing creeks and farmland, has alienated
the local population and seen a violent backlash by organised militant
groups. Of course, in most cases activists target not only the errant com-
panies, but also the permissive governments they strike deals with.
The reality of MNC engagement with the world of diplomacy means
that these companies need diplomatic know-how. With distinct interests
and global reach, they also have to develop representational mechanisms.
It is therefore common for companies to have a dedicated public rela-
tions team with international relations specialists to provide analysis and
advice on the management of relations. Former diplomats are popular
recruits to these teams, on account of their experience in the field.

4.3   The Media

Many media enterprises are also MNCs, but it is worth looking at their
diplomatic role separately because it has been such a dynamic phenome-
non in the global diplomatic arena. Within democracies, the role of free
media (the so-called Fourth Estate within the realm of representative
governance) has traditionally been cherished as a bulwark of accountabil-
ity. This has extended also to the foreign policy of states, and increasingly
so as the ICT revolution expanded the reach and agility of the media.
Commentators often refer to ‘The CNN effect’: the impact on foreign
policy perceptions and decisions caused by news media’s round-the-clock
live streaming of events to a global audience. Twenty-four hour satel-
lite news service was pioneered by the US-based Cable News Network
(CNN), and since 1980, it has covered historical events such as the fall
of the Berlin Wall. Former US Ambassador Strobe Talbott (1997: 68–70)
170 Y. K. SPIES

recounts a lengthy telephone conversation he had with the Russian Deputy

Foreign Minister Georgi Mamedov, on 4 October 1993, both of them
in their offices, respectively in Washington, DC and Moscow, and both
watching live CNN coverage. As the two men talked, they witnessed the
exact same images of tanks storming the Russian Parliament in a dramatic
standoff between the country’s president and its legislature. This was ‘the
famous “CNN effect” at its most emblematic’, in Talbott’s words (p. 70).
Of course, the intense pressure of media scrutiny has challenged the
exclusivity and discretion traditionally associated with diplomacy. It has
impacted public opinion to such an extent that contemporary diplomacy
is forced to engage the public on a continuous basis.
This pressure has produced positive as well as negative effects. On
the positive side, media coverage has an educational effect. It also con-
tributes to transparency in governance, by increasing civic participation
in and awareness of world events. When post-election violence in 2008
threatened to derail Kenya’s democracy, the Ushahidi9 Crowdsourcing
Platform, a media platform for social activism, collected and mapped cit-
izens’ eyewitness reports of violence. The project assisted local as well as
international peacemakers to address the geospatial hot spots and gave
ordinary citizens a sense of agency in the resolution of the conflict.
Citizen awareness is however not always conducive to peace and sta-
bility. As Talbott (1997: 71) observed:

there are satellite dishes in the slums of the world’s megacities, and the
signals they suck in from Hollywood and Madison Avenue can trigger
resentment and anger: The communications revolution has the potential to
foment revolutions of a different sort.

The media delivers the world to everybody’s living room, but only vir-
tually so. Frustration among the poor is only increased by the visual evi-
dence of their marginalisation.
While ubiquitous media has destroyed the monopoly of governments
in the dissemination of information, the media is rife with monopolies
of its own. Economic or even political interests can be at stake. Editorial
bias, arbitrary selection of issues to cover and a particular pitch of cov-
erage, what Mohamed ElBaradei (2008) calls ‘the vagaries of media
coverage’, can all contribute to a subjective role. Perhaps even more dis-
turbing is the recent proliferation of ‘fake news’,10 used to derail or sway
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 171

political campaigns (as alleged in the course of the 2016 presidential

elections in the USA). Clearly, propaganda and blatant lies about inter-
national relations are not the prerogative of governments alone.
Whether lacking in integrity or not, the media is capable of manipu-
lating not only public opinion but also the diplomatic agenda of states.
In 1971, Vietnam War activist Daniel Ellsburg leaked the so-called
Pentagon Papers to a group of newspapers, among them The New York
Times. The top-secret documents revealed controversial facts about
the USA’s involvement in the Vietnam War and confronted the US
Administration with public indignation about its accountability in mat-
ters of life and death for ordinary Americans. The incident was echoed
four decades later in the acts of Edward Snowden, a computer pro-
grammer who worked on contract for various US intelligence agencies.
Snowden, who had access to classified information from the National
Security Agency (NSA), leaked documents to various newspapers in the
USA and Europe during 2013. The information about global surveil-
lance programmes, including programmes that targeted US allies, was
acutely embarrassing to the US Government and necessitated a massive
diplomatic campaign to do damage control.

4.4   Individuals and Celebrity Diplomacy

Individual agency has always been important in diplomacy, hence the
emphasis on the sought-after qualities in individual diplomats. But diplo-
macy is not only conducted by professional diplomats. Among political
leaders, there are always some individuals that stand out for their diplo-
matic aptitude, or their personal ability to impact international relations
regardless of the relative power of their own states. Charismatic leaders
like Fidel Castro, Robert Mugabe, Winston Churchill and Muammar
Gaddafi have made indelible marks on the world of diplomacy, as have
religious leaders such as Pope Francis, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and
Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th Dalai Lama. Their ranks are swelled by busi-
ness tycoons like Microsoft founder Bill Gates, Facebook founder Mark
Zuckerberg and South-African-born entrepreneur Elon Musk. Even
journalists have joined the ranks of distinguished personalities who
enjoy preferential access in diplomatic circles—people like Christiane
Amanpour, Hu Shuli, Zeinab Badawi, and talk-show hosts like Trevor
Noah and Oprah Winfrey.
172 Y. K. SPIES

Eminent individuals in political and economic even religious governance

and the media are expected to have diplomatic gravitas, but in recent times,
the de facto diplomat category has been stretched to include so-called
celebrity diplomats. Musicians such as Bono (lead singer of the Irish band
U2) and actors like Angelina Jolie use their stardom to attract attention to
political issues. Celebrity diplomacy has proven to be remarkably influen-
tial (at least on single-issue policy areas) in the field of humanitarian action.
In 1986, Irish rock star Bob Geldof was awarded a British knighthood for
his role in organising fund-raising concerts for poverty relief in Africa. In
1984, he famously (with Midge Ure) launched ‘Band Aid’, a charity super-
group. Their song ‘Do they know its Christmas?’, composed in support of
anti-famine efforts in Ethiopia, was an instant success and topped the music
charts that same year.
A striking example of celebrity diplomacy occurred in advance of
the 2005 G8 summit in Scotland. The London Live 8 concert was con-
vened to take place on 2 July 2005, just days before the G8 meeting at
Gleneagles, and intended to rally public pressure on the G8 leaders for
a more drastic commitment to poverty relief in Africa. The star-studded
line-up of entertainment icons at the event ensured unprecedented pub-
lic monitoring of the G8 summit. The latter, did, indeed, commit to his-
torically unprecedented debt relief for impoverished states.
Andrew Cooper (2008), who has researched the phenomenon of
celebrity diplomacy, suggests that these new actors in the diplomatic arena
have an important role to play. He goes further and argues that they are
changing the way diplomacy is conducted. Their public support, ability to
attract media attention and huge personal fortunes guarantee them access
to policymakers and allow them opportunity to impact policy agendas.
Even the stoic Chinese foreign policy has not been immune to the phe-
nomenon. In the run-up to China’s hosting of the Olympics in 2008, sev-
eral celebrities (American actor Mia Farrow took a leading role) launched
a public shaming campaign to protest China’s support for the Sudanese
regime. The campaign forced a change in China’s policy towards a more
instrumental role in addressing the humanitarian crisis in Darfur.
The United Nations has skilfully harnessed the advantages of celeb-
rity diplomacy. Ever since 1954, the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) has appointed ‘Goodwill Ambassadors’ and used the attrac-
tion of the arts, culture and sport to reach a global civil audience.
Among its current (as of 2017) Goodwill Ambassadors are personalities
such as Lionel Messi, Gavin Rajah, Shakira, Serena Williams, Femi Kuti,
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 173

Jackie Chan and Priyanka Chopra. These celebrities are in an ideal posi-
tion to bring awareness to the values of the United Nations and child-re-
lated issues because they have the attention of millions of fans across the
world. Following the example of UNICEF, various other UN agencies
have also adopted the practice of appointing Goodwill Ambassadors.

5  The Comparative Advantages of Non-state Actors

When compared to states, non-state actors have certain diplomatic
advantages; distinct benefits accruing from their ‘non-stateness’. They
have the luxury of focusing on narrower agendas and channelling their
resources towards well-defined goals. These attributes, in combination
with their ‘pure’ raison d’ être, can give them considerable influence in
the policy domain, and in some cases even the moral high ground on
issues that are of key concern to states.

5.1   Proactive, Single-Issue Focus

The diplomatic agenda now comprises of a dizzying array of issues.
Human rights, financial regulation, medical concerns, environmental
degradation—almost anything that moves across a border finds its way
into diplomacy. One of the bonuses of being a non-state actor is the abil-
ity to select specific, clearly demarcated issues to focus on. A clear-cut
mission makes it easier to dedicate time and resources to research and to
obtain funding for in-depth, proactive involvement. Even when the goals
are not achieved, the work of such groups can benchmark international
practice. The 2017 Nobel Peace Prize, for example, was awarded to the
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), in recogni-
tion of its decade-long campaign to rid the world of nuclear arms.
NGOs employ researchers, activists and lawyers specialising in narrow
issue fields, and these personnel frequently have the legal expertise and
information to trump that of diplomats (Devin and Törnquist-Chesnier
2010: 66; Murray 2006: 14–16). For non-state actors, it is therefore
much easier to mobilise public opinion around a single message. In turn,
intense public pressure on a specific issue is more likely to influence a
given government or IGO.
The single-issue freedom of non-state actors contrasts starkly to the
work of foreign ministries, which have to contend with the full range
of issues that are pertinent to national interest, at the domestic as well
174 Y. K. SPIES

as international levels. Moreover, democratic accountability demands

that foreign ministries coordinate their actions with the rest of gov-
ernment bureaucracy. This imperative adds time and complexity to the
approval of funding and the implementation of policy. Small wonder
that foreign ministries so often have to play ‘catch-up’ when it comes
to breaking news on events abroad and end up being reactive rather
than proactive.

5.2   Grass-Roots Connectivity

Non-state actors characteristically enjoy connectivity at ‘grass-roots’
level. This makes them crucial partners in an assortment of diplomatic
processes, ranging from early warning to policy implementation and
monitoring of diplomatic commitments. This is especially true for pro-
jects with a humanitarian or developmental mission (Pigman 2010: 60).
The Red Cross’ role in securing the 2017 release of 82 ‘Chibok girls’
(part of a group that was abducted by Boko Haram in north-eastern
Nigeria during April 2014) is a case in point. The intermediation of the
ICRC between the hardline militants and the Nigerian government was
informed by the organisation’s acquaintance with local communities
and experience of the conditions on the ground. A similar bridging role
would not have been possible for external mediators if they had been
‘parachuted’ into the crisis.
In the domain of peace and security, the current inclination towards
conflict transformation (rather than a simple, and often merely tempo-
rary, halt to violence) is one of inclusivity—that is to engage as many
stakeholders as possible. Most of these tend to be non-state actors, espe-
cially in the new, asymmetrical conflicts that characterise contemporary
war. Churches, community groups, schools and so forth connect at a
deeper, more personal level than governments.
NGOs in particular use their connectivity to create and entrench net-
works, build solidarity around specific issues and then mobilise people
into action. As Jessica Mathews observed, these entities contribute across
a very wide spectrum:

They breed new ideas; advocate, protest, and mobilise public support;
do legal, scientific, technical, and policy analysis; provide services; shape,
implement, monitor, and enforce national and international commitments;
and change institutions and norms”. [Their ability to reach] “behind other
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 175

states’ borders forces governments to consider domestic public opinion in

countries with which they are dealing, even on matters that governments
have traditionally handled strictly between themselves. (Mathews 1997: 54)

In situations, where official information is unreliable or unavailable, espe-

cially in volatile or undeveloped areas, non-state actors are indispensa-
ble sources. Patrick Dzimiri, who investigated international responses to
Zimbabwe’s ‘crisis decade’11 (2000–2010) concludes that domestic and
international civil society organisations, rather than any external govern-
ment or state-based organisation, monitored and critiqued the regime’s
actions on an ongoing basis. This was done ‘despite numerous efforts
by the Mugabe regime to create a media blackout in order to silence
criticism of its instrumental role in the crisis afflicting Zimbabwe, and
attempts to vilify critics as “Western spies”’ (Dzimiri 2016: 113). He
lists Amnesty International, Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights,
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum, Doctors without Borders,
Zimbabwe Economic Support Network, Physicians for Human Rights,
Human Rights Watch, the Zimbabwe Peace Project, Freedom House
and Genocide Watch, among others, who ensured global awareness
about human rights violations in the Southern African country.
Grass-roots connectivity also explains why the most comprehensive
statistics on deaths in the ongoing violence in the Democratic Republic
of Congo (DRC) have been forthcoming from the Catholic Church,12
rather than any state or intergovernmental organisation (Reuters, 20
June 2017).

5.3   Organisational Efficiency and Resources

Single-issue focus and grass-roots connectivity contribute to the organi-
sational advantages of non-state actors: they are faster, more agile, leaner
and frequently more efficient (notably in their use of ITC) than govern-
ments. This allows them not only to compete with government action,
but also to compensate for government inaction (Kelley 2010: 294).
Mathews (1997: 53) explains how ‘in many countries they are delivering
the services – in urban and rural community development, education,
and health care – that faltering governments can no longer manage’.
The result is that they offer facilities and assume roles that are tradition-
ally associated with sovereign states. By the same token, like states, they
engage diplomatically with other actors.
176 Y. K. SPIES

Langhorne (2005: 332) says at the international level, particularly in

the transnational issue areas of humanitarian and environmental con-
cerns, many landmark international agreements would not have hap-
pened without the involvement of civil society organisations. This is
because they often provide ‘levels of efficiency and responsiveness that
transcend the constraints of the state’.
The sheer amount of resources that large non-state actors are able to
mobilise certainly allows them to take governments to task. Greenpeace
is a notable example. The environmental organisation has a long his-
tory of taking on the powerful French nuclear industry, often deploy-
ing its own fleet of ships to monitor and obstruct French nuclear
testing operations. The physical threat posed by Greenpeace infamously
resulted in the 10 July 1985 bombing (by French intelligence agents)
of Greenpeace’s flagship, the Rainbow Warrior. The ship was on its way
to protest nuclear testing in the South Pacific, and its sinking, while
anchored in the New Zealand port of Auckland, turned out to be a pub-
lic relations disaster for the French Government. At the same time, the
fallout of the sabotage was a moral (and actual) victory for Greenpeace:
France halted its nuclear testing in the Pacific for at least a decade after
the debacle.

5.4   Influence and Policy Impact

There are two common ways in which non-state agents get involved in
official policy processes: they can be contracted to carry out elements
of policy implementation, or their activism can jolt governments into
action. Cooper and Hocking (2000: 370) call the latter role that of
kick-starter, ‘by which the activity of NGOs stimulates corresponding or
complementary activities by governments’.
But powerful non-state entities also have the ability to be policy
entrepreneurs, as Kelley (2010: 294) reminds us. And increasingly, they
are an integral part of policy drafting itself. An example is the Ottawa
Process, which led to a worldwide ban on anti-personnel landmines.
The process was unique in the sense that disarmament conferences—
focused as they are on ‘high politics’ and the strategic interests of great
powers—had traditionally been off-limits to non-state actors. However,
the Ottawa Process proved to be a game-changer because it was spear-
headed and orchestrated by an NGO, the International Campaign to
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 177

Ban Landmines (ICBL). Successful ‘diplomatic’ lobbying by the ICBL

attracted a critical mass of states and IGOs and the involvement of hun-
dreds of NGOs, who participated directly in the substantive negotiations.
Indeed, government officials were joined in plenary sessions not just by
representatives of non-state entities, but by the very subjects of the dis-
cussions—mine victims themselves (Davis 2004: 2).
The process resulted in the 1997 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines
and on their Destruction. It was a seminal polylateral process. Julian Davis
(2004: 4) recalls UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan saying at the signing
ceremony that ‘one does not have to be a global superpower to affect the
future of international peace and security’. For their extraordinary achieve-
ment, the ICBL and its chief strategist, activist Jody Williams, received the
Nobel Peace Prize in 1997. Accepting the award, Williams remarked that
not only had ‘we won the Nobel Prize but we changed the way diplomacy
is done’ (Cooper and Hocking 2000: 365).
The Ottawa Process was certainly not the first polylateral achieve-
ment in the diplomatic arena, but its extraordinary success on a tradi-
tional, state-centric security issue signalled a new, participatory era in
global politics. This trend has been most visible in the area of develop-
ment assistance, where it makes sense for non-state-actors—with their
grass-roots networks and technical experience in situ—to be partners in
joint ventures. An additional consideration is the rising incidence of non-
state agents as donors, alongside states and IGOs. Multinational corpora-
tions, philanthropists, international NGOs and civil society at large have
become major stakeholders in the development discourse. At the multi-
lateral diplomatic level, this change has been demonstrated by the chang-
ing demographics of the summits called by the OECD’s Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) to determine international aid effective-
ness. At the OECD’s 2003 summit in Rome, only donor states were for-
mally invited. Two years later, a follow-up summit in Paris saw donor
states and recipient states invited.
Then, in 2008, representatives of civil society were also formally
invited by the DAC (in addition to donors and recipients) to the sum-
mit in Accra—for the first time ever. The trend was consolidated three
years thereafter, when more than 3000 delegates participated in the
2011 summit in Pusan and adopted the Global Partnership on Effective
Development Cooperation.
178 Y. K. SPIES

The same happened when the Lomé Conventions (between the

European Union and African, Caribbean and Pacific states) were rene-
gotiated in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement. In a departure from the series
of predecessor agreements, and as part of its Fundamental Principles, the
agreement stipulates in Article 2 that:

…apart from central government as the main partner, the partnership shall
be open to ACP parliaments, and local authorities in ACP States and dif-
ferent kinds of other actors in order to encourage the integration of all sec-
tions of society, including the private sector and civil society organisations,
into the mainstream of political, economic and social life.

Moreover, it adds in Article 4 that:

Non-State actors and local decentralised authorities shall, where appropri-

ate, be provided with financial resources, under the conditions laid down
in this Agreement in order to support local development processes; [and]
be involved in the implementation of cooperation project and programmes
in areas that concern them or where these actors have a comparative
advantage.

5.5   The Moral High Ground?

In conflict resolution, non-state actors often enjoy legitimacy not as a
result of any claim to representation, but because they are seen as hon-
est brokers. This is especially the case when they are non-partisan in their
mission. Faith-based organisations, as discussed in the previous chapter,
are popular intermediaries in peace processes. An historical example,
cited by Clive Archer (2015: 5) is the humanitarian work of the Order
of Malta.13 It arose in the early twelfth century and is still in existence,
making it the oldest chivalric organisation in the world. During medie-
val times, it was headquartered in various states, inter alia the island of
Rhodes, over which it claimed sovereignty. In keeping with that sover-
eign identity, the Order colonised several Caribbean Islands—the small-
est group ever to colonise areas beyond Europe. Notwithstanding that
imperialist history, the military-religious Order is better known for its
charitable work during the time of the Crusades. It operated hospitals in
the Holy Land and thereby became a forerunner to modern humanitar-
ian international organisations.
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 179

Research institutions, epistemic communities (knowledge networks)

and academia offer similar credence to diplomacy in the domain of
peace and security. Berridge and James (2003: 18) recount how the
September 1993 settlement between Israel and the Palestinian Liberation
Organisation (PLO) was in large part the result of ‘back-channel’ diplo-
macy. It was conducted between representatives of the PLO and Israeli
academics ‘at discreet Norwegian locations while formal Middle East
talks were being held, unproductively, in Washington’.
Of course, there are always exceptions, and critics insist that no
organisation or group can ever be 100 per cent neutral. NGOs can even
have destructive influence and subvert or block diplomatic agreements.
Former US Ambassador Stuart Eizenstat (2004: 18) recalls the dev-
astating impact of violent NGO protests on World Trade Organisation
(WTO) negotiations during November 1999, in Seattle. He says ‘those
protests — made possible by those same networks that had sprung up to
do so much good worldwide — had the tragic effect of slowing a pro-
cess that held far greater promise for alleviating global poverty than any
plan articulated by the protesters’. Quainton (2000) observes that the
US government was ‘unprepared for this transgression of established
diplomatic negotiating norms’. The process was derailed and negatively
affected also the subsequent Doha Development Round in 2003, which
was held in Cancun, Mexico. Eizenstat observes that it was only five years
later, in 2004, that global trade negotiations managed to get back on
track. The narrow agendas of non-state actors, one of their advantages
in the conduct of international relations, can thus ironically cause tunnel
vision in their objectives and prevent rather than foment compromise, one
of the key elements of diplomacy.
Perhaps the most pressing concerns about the diplomatic presence of
non-state actors are related to their accountability and representativity.
While critics point out that NGOs are not elected and therefore lack rep-
resentational legitimacy, proponents insist that NGOs are increasingly seen
as representing the civic politics of the world. Yet, while they form part
of global civic pressure for transparency in governance, they are, incon-
gruously, not necessarily transparent in their own operations or financial
management. This has met with genuine concern, and some governments
do not hesitate to block their activities. During 2014, after a spate of vio-
lent attacks within Kenya, the government ordered the closure of more
than 500 non-governmental organisations. While some critics alleged
180 Y. K. SPIES

trumped-up charges (inter alia an anti-Islam agenda), the government

insisted that its actions constituted a crucial security crackdown on terror-
ist activity. The organisations were accused of criminal activity, failure to
provide financial audit returns and in some instances of being conduits for
the financing of terror in the Horn of Africa (AFP, 16 December 2014).
While many NGOs welcome mechanisms to audit the integrity of
their work, the humanitarian-finance nexus lends itself to inevitable con-
cerns about ethical ambiguity. Peter Maurer, a former Swiss diplomat and
since 2012 the President of the ICRC, was warned about this scenario
in 2017 when he announced a new funding model for the organisation.
The Humanitarian Impact Bond14 was designed to attract private capital
to conflict zones. The rationale of the new model is that investors get a
return on their money while vulnerable populations benefit from profes-
sional services. (The pilot project earmarked funding for rehabilitation
centres in Nigeria, Mali and the Democratic Republic of Congo, to care
for disabled victims of conflict.) It marked the first time the ICRC had
launched a large-scale project to attract funding for humanitarian aid from
the corporate world, rather the usual donors, i.e. philanthropic organisa-
tions and governments (ICRC 2017). It remains to be seen how effective
the project will be, from the perspective of investors, recipients, the ICRC
and, of course, those observers who are cynical about capitalism in con-
flict zones. If the Humanitarian Impact Bond is a success, it will transform
(as Mauer pledged) the global financing model of humanitarian aid.

6  Foreign Ministries and Polylateral Diplomacy

The idea that official diplomacy has a public constituency stretches the con-
cept of diplomacy, traditionally considered a tool of statecraft, to embrace
‘civilcraft’ as well (McDowell 2008: 7). Foreign ministries, already under
pressure to balance the demands and intrusions of the rest of national gov-
ernment, supranational and subnational entities, have little choice but to
take on board the additional imperative to partner purposefully with non-
state actors, in other words to resort to polylateral diplomacy.

6.1   The Rationale for Polylateralism

The idea of large-scale ‘publicisation of foreign policy’ (Hocking 2004:
149) was not foreseen when the Vienna Conventions were drafted. Over
the past few decades, however, the phenomenon has grown rapidly as
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 181

foreign ministries around the world have recognised the need for grass
roots support in the formulation and implementation of foreign pol-
icy. In many cases, a symbiosis between ‘unofficial’ and ‘official’ diplo-
macy develops: active cooperation and networking that Hocking (1999)
calls ‘catalytic diplomacy’. It does not replace traditional diplomacy, but
enhances it because it provides legitimacy and practical impetus to the
implementation of foreign policy.
The need for legitimacy is driven by contemporary demands (tradi-
tionally limited to domestic policy) for democratic accountability, trans-
parency and inclusivity in the foreign policy dominion. Having said
that, the need for public–private collaboration in diplomacy is not only
normative. At a practical level, it makes sense (and not only for poorer
states!) to share expertise, pool resources and work with non-state actors
in pursuit of common interests. Issues on the diplomatic agenda can be
so technical that know-how from outside government becomes essential.
Joint ventures allow governments to draw on the intellectual resources
of the non-state actors and, in turn, those actors get to impact official
policy processes. The Nordic states were the first to do so officially in
the conduct of diplomacy: they pioneered the practice of including rep-
resentatives of civil society in official delegations to international confer-
ences (Mathews 1997: 55; Wiseman 2004: 51).
Economic diplomacy lends itself particularly well to polylateralism.
In most states, it has become routine for government officials to con-
sult with big business before formulating economic objectives. Woolcock
and Bayne (2013: 390) warn, however, that a government must be
vigilant to avoid being ‘captured’ by the special interests of firms. In
the case of South Africa, so-called state capture became a bitter politi-
cal issue during the second term of President Jacob Zuma. Zuma and
a group of associates in government and South African parastatals were
accused of corruption in relation to the role of the wealthy Gupta family.
A report published by the South African Public Protector in November
2016, aptly named ‘The State of Capture’, called for a judicial commis-
sion of enquiry into the allegations of systemic corruption. In May 2017,
the report was supported by an in-depth academic study that revealed
endemic state corruption led by a criminal, public–private oligarchy
(State Capacity Research Project 2017)
Woolcock and Bayne (2013: 390) say the business pressure can be
offset ‘by consulting more widely with academic experts, who may be
more neutral, and civil society think tanks and advocacy groups, who
182 Y. K. SPIES

can provide an alternative perspective’. The relationship between gov-

ernments and companies is deeply symbiotic, however, and the interna-
tional success of firms contributes directly to the economic weight of
their own states. The reverse is true also, as many US enterprises found
when they were bailed out by the US Administration during the global
financial crisis of 2007/2008.
For foreign ministries of poorer states, polylateral strategies have an
added advantage. John Hemery (2002: 144) observes that strategic
cooperation and networking with influential international NGOs, while
targeting the publics of wealthier, more powerful states ‘can do more for
less than much formal diplomatic activity’, because most donor states are
democratic societies whose governments are susceptible to public pres-
sure. He recounts how East Timor used just such a (polylateral) strategy
in its campaign for independence from Indonesia and reaped the awards
of its diplomatic ‘imagination, determination and professionalism’.
China, a latecomer to public diplomacy, recognised the necessity for
polylateral diplomacy when, in October 2003, it announced a strategic
shift in its diplomatic philosophy. Hu Jintao, General Secretary of the
Communist Party of China (CPC), had presented a policy paper titled
Scientific Outlook of Development, to the Third Plenary Session of the
16th CPC Central Committee. The paper espoused a ‘people first diplo-
macy’ concept, recognising the power of the (Chinese) people in driv-
ing diplomatic ventures, and the necessity for the Chinese government to
engage with the people (civil society) abroad so as to realise diplomatic
objectives. The concept was officially embraced by the governing CPC,
which duly announced a shift from state-centrism to people-centrism in
Chinese foreign policy (Jin and Liu 2010).

6.2   Official Joint Ventures: Some Examples

Governments have always on an ad hoc basis supported, or engaged
in joint ventures with, selected non-state actors. The reasons were (as
they still are) mostly pragmatic. A spectacularly successful example was
the Marshall Plan, launched by the USA in the aftermath of the World
War II to reconstruct the economy of Western15 Europe. The plan
encompassed a significant number of public–private joint ventures in
the international arena.
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 183

Andrew Hurrell (2004) makes the point that countries with plural-
ist politics are better at building the new kinds of inclusive, innovative
public–private coalitions in diplomacy. Political pluralism implies a cul-
ture of tolerance for, and constitutional protection of, political diver-
sity. It is usually associated with competitive party politics in liberal
democracies. Canada is a prime example and has a track record of using
polylateral diplomacy to address complex issues. Its instrumental role in
the 1997 Ottawa Convention (on landmines) was a responsibility that
very few individual states would have taken on: a contentious and very
‘high political’ issue that impacts the security and economic policies of
a large number of powerful states would typically rather be left to the
agenda of a global governance forum. However, as Eytan Gilboa (2009:
25) explains, at the time the appropriate forum—the UN Conference on
Disarmament—was paralysed by lack of political will among key actors,
including the P-5 (Permanent Five members of the Security Council),
to enforce a ban on landmines. Canada stepped into the vacuum and
performed ‘a diplomatic tour de force’, in Julian Davis’ (2004) words. It
rallied a coalition of like-minded states, ensured unprecedented oppor-
tunity for NGOs to participate in the actual negotiations, and in record
time, a comprehensive treaty was achieved.
Similarly, during the negotiations that led up to the 1998 adoption
of the Rome Statute that established the International Criminal Court,
the Canadian and Australian governments both involved NGOs in their
policy deliberations. They followed through on this inclusivity by includ-
ing NGOs in their formal diplomatic delegations to the summit in Rome
(Devin and Törnquist-Chesnier 2010: 66). Their propensity for inclu-
sivity in diplomatic ventures has earned both states the label of ‘middle
power’—i.e. diplomatic norm-entrepreneurship by states that are not
great powers.
The successful Kimberley Process is another example of polylat-
eral diplomacy that was driven by middle powers and non-state actors.
The global strategy to clamp down on the lucrative trade in diamonds
sourced from war zones—the so-called conflict diamonds16 or blood dia-
monds17—started in 1998 when a British-based NGO, Global Witness,
published an investigative exposé called ‘A Rough Trade: The Role of
Companies and Governments in the Angolan Conflict’. The report drew
attention to the role of diamonds in fuelling conflict in Angola and
184 Y. K. SPIES

exposed states as well as companies that were flouting UN Security

Council sanctions against the rebel group UNITA. ‘A Rough Trade’ cre-
ated a stir in UN circles and led to the Fowler Commission being set
up to investigate the matter. Its March 2000 report confirmed the link
between the illicit diamond trade and conflict in resource-rich poor
countries such as Sierra Leone, Angola, the Democratic Republic of
Congo and others.
A major polylateral response ensued, and just two months later, dur-
ing May 2000, states and non-state actors attended a conference on the
management of the diamond trade in the South African mining town
Kimberley. Participants included all the major rough diamond produc-
ing, exporting and importing countries, as well as the international firms
that participate in the diamond trade and the civil society organisations
that monitored humane practices in the sector. The poly-multilateral
efforts to formulate a normative regime to prevent ‘conflict diamonds’
from entering the mainstream rough diamond market resulted in the
2002 adoption of a certification scheme for rough diamonds, and during
2003, the UN General Assembly formally adopted the Kimberley Process
Certification Scheme (KPCS) by means of Resolution 55/56. The foreign
ministry of South Africa (an emerging power with middle power creden-
tials) played a catalytic role in driving the process from its inception, and
after UN endorsement continued to chair the implementation process.
Diplomatic norm-entrepreneurship by middle powers and polylateral
success in areas that were historically exclusively state-centric explain the
principle behind the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI). It involves cooper-
ation between seven international NGOs and a number of middle power
governments, in order ‘to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons
states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers, and
commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons’ (MPI 2017). The
MPI was particularly active in the preparation phase leading up to the
2010 NPT Review Conference and in the aftermath, assisted states with
implementation of the commitments they made. It also played a facilitating
role in the 2015 NPT Review Conference.
An ongoing polylateral project is the financial support given (again
mostly by middle powers such as Norway, Switzerland, Belgium, South
Korea and others) to Internet information platforms on diplomacy. In
the case of two such platforms, ‘Security Council Report’ and ‘What’s In
Blue’, the aim is to keep the public abreast of complex developments and
diplomatic deliberations of the UN Security Council. The information is
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 185

posted online in as close to real time as possible, to maximise the sense

of public exposure. The Carnegie Corporation, Humanity United and
The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation all contribute to
the two diplomatic information platforms, thus enhancing the polylateral
nature of the initiatives.
Not all foreign ministries are as yet comfortable with polylateral diplo-
macy, as Hurrell (2004) notes, on account of ‘domestic political sensi-
tivities or … inherited traditions of very statist foreign policymaking’.
Over the past two decades, though, several more ministries of foreign
affairs (MFAs) have warmed to the practice. Hurrell gives the example
of Brazil, which he notes ‘has moved a long way from the 1980s when
human rights or environmental NGOs were regularly denounced as
subversive’.
Likewise, in the case of Mexico, the end of the twentieth century
saw an enhanced relationship, changing from adversarial to coopera-
tive, between the foreign policy establishment and NGOs. According to
Andrés Rozental (1999: 146):

Where originally the ministry was deeply suspicious of NGOs – often

seen as external agents provocateur – it now has a daily working relation-
ship with the principal groups dealing with human rights, the environ-
ment, narcotics and women’s issues, among others … a case in point is
the preparatory process that takes place prior to major international sum-
mit meetings … NGO representatives now join governmental delegations
and participate fully in the drafting of position papers and conference
documents.

A partner that lends itself ‘naturally’ to polylateral diplomatic initia-

tives is the diaspora of a given state—especially when the foreign-based
community is influential and cohesive. When a government appeals to
the patriotism of such a community to achieve diplomatic objectives,
it can rightly be called ‘diaspora diplomacy’. Shaun Riordan (2016)
gives the example of the Irish-American community which, in the after-
math of the ‘9–11’ bombings, was instrumental in convincing the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) to relinquish its military struggle.
But Rirodan warns that ‘diaspora diplomacy’ can be a double-edged
sword. Some diasporas can be in self- or government-imposed exile,
or simply resent any attempt at being manipulated into advancing an
incumbent government’s interests. An exiled community might also
186 Y. K. SPIES

have a foreign policy agenda of its own. Riordan cites the case of the
(Spanish) Basque Country: successive Basque presidents have visited
Latin American states and federal states in the USA and had full head-of-
state protocol bestowed on them, despite the indignant opposition of the
Spanish government to such diplomatic ‘recognition’.

6.3   Institutional Foreign Ministry Adjustments

Over the past few decades, foreign ministries have come under tremen-
dous pressure to respond to the many new stakeholders in diplomacy.
Institutional rationalisation has inter alia been done through outsourc-
ing of traditional foreign ministry functions. The private entities that
perform those functions do so in direct fulfilment of foreign ministry
objectives, and their contractual obligations often amount to full-blown
public–private partnership (PPP, or P3). In Washington, DC many for-
eign governments—usually via their embassies—employ US law firms to
negotiate with the host state’s central and federal agencies (Cohen 1999:
2). The same applies to lobbying of Congress. There is a plethora of US
consultancies available to assist foreign governments, firms, etc. to navi-
gate the intricate web of legislation, bureaucracy and political know-how
that epitomises the US Administration.
Immigration services are another domain, closely associated with for-
eign ministries, that have benefited from polylateral arrangements. VFS
Global is one such service provider. It is an ‘outsourcing and technology
services specialist for governments and diplomatic missions worldwide’
that was established in 2001, in Mumbai and thereafter headquartered
in Dubai. The company provides immigration services to the public,
including the facilitation of visas, work and residence permits and other
areas of ‘identity management’ (VFS Global 2018).
The company’s success in managing the consular services of cli-
ents such as Denmark and New Zealand convinced the South African
Government to outsource to it, also. Since May 2014, visa and per-
mit applications for South Africa (those that are submitted within the
country) are processed by VFS Global. The service is available in every
South African province and all of the country’s major cities. The final
assessment of immigration applications remains with the parent gov-
ernment’s Department of Home Affairs, thereby firmly establishing the
joint venture parameters.
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 187

The practical value of the polylateral venture is evidenced by VFS-

Global’s growth: by June 2018, it was doing its ‘public service’ on behalf
of no fewer than 59 client governments (VFS Global 2018). The out-
sourcing of consular services has not been without controversy, however,
as the company has experienced. As an integral part of civil service, and
regardless of whether final political control rests with governments, con-
sular assistance invariably raises issues of security and accountability, and
any problem tends to be politicised. This confirms the crucial oversight
role of foreign ministries in polylateral diplomatic ventures.
In terms of representation, foreign ministries are also challenged
to rethink the way they treat powerful non-state actors as opposed to
sovereign states. In Chapter 2 (Bilateral Diplomacy), I discussed the
innovative new forms of representation that foreign ministries are
resorting to, including the use of ‘virtual embassies’ and head office-
based ‘roving ambassadors’. Representative innovation can target a
polylateral area of foreign policy, as demonstrated when the US State
Department during September 2009 confirmed the appointment
of Farah Pandith as its first-ever ‘Special Representative to Muslim
Communities’.
The USA, like several other countries, also has a tradition of encour-
aging retired ambassadors to take up positions in the private sector,
where they can continue to serve broader national interest. The corporate
world is of obvious priority. Thus, during June 2013, the US Chamber of
Commerce—the world’s largest business federation18—announced that
Donald H. Gips, who served as US Ambassador to South Africa from
2009 to 2013, would henceforth serve as chair of the US-South Africa
Business Council. At the same time, he would be the honorary co-chair
of the Chamber’s Africa Business Initiative. In that way, Gips’ wealth of
diplomatic experience would continue to be used, specifically to promote
the economic interests of the USA in (South) Africa.
Denmark took corporate diplomacy a step further in January 201719
when it announced the imminent appointment of ambassadors to tech-
nology giants such as Microsoft, Apple and Google. Explaining the
move, Danish foreign minister Anders Samuelsen said:

These companies have become a new kind of nation, and we need to

address that … They are companies that influence Denmark as much as
other nations do. (The Local 2017)
188 Y. K. SPIES

Samuelsen added that firms such as Apple and Google were so large that
if they had been sovereign states, they would be close to consideration
for membership of the G20.

6.4   Embracing Media Diplomacy

The media, as mentioned earlier, is a powerful actor in the global dip-
lomatic arena. Rozental and Buenrostro (2013: 234) put it bluntly,
insisting that the media ‘legitimises and empowers the art of modern
diplomacy and to a large extent determines its success or failure’. ‘Media
savvy’ foreign ministries therefore embrace the media as a polylat-
eral partner while also using its advantages as instrument and arena for
diplomacy.20
Most MFAs and large, well-staffed diplomatic missions have special-
ised units that conduct media liaison. (Some missions contract private
firms to conduct media campaigns.) With or without special resources
and infrastructure, a classical diplomatic task is to monitor the media
in host states, to identify trends, assess over- or under-reporting on
specific issues and undertake appropriate counter-measures. Often,
the same media is used to conduct ‘diplomatic journalism’ (Barston
2006: 23). During 2013, when the debate in the Security Council on
possible military intervention against the regime of Syrian President
Bashar al-Assad became acrimonious, Russian President Vladimir Putin
resorted to writing in The New York Times. He wanted to convince
Americans of his arguments against an intervention and explained as
follows:

Recent events surrounding Syria have prompted me to speak directly to

the American people and their political leaders. It is important to do so
at a time of insufficient communication between our societies. (Putin
2013)

In addition to the shrewd diplomatic journalism by state leaders, the

media diplomacy of non-state actors can also be instructive to foreign
ministries. Davis (2004: 2–3) recounts the extent to which the suc-
cess of the Ottawa Process relied on NGO mobilisation of public sup-
port through the use of media campaigns. The techniques included
letters-to-the-editor placed in the world’s most prominent newspapers,
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 189

and television imagery: documentaries featuring experts and high-profile

champions of the cause, such as the UK’s Princess Diana. In the face of
mounting public interest in the diplomatic process, governments had lit-
tle choice but to join the momentum.
Polylateral ventures with the media can allow foreign ministries to
professionalise their public diplomacy. In late 2013, the South African
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO)
launched a 24-hour online radio service called Ubuntu (the Nguni word
for ‘humanity’), under the slogan ‘South Africa’s Public Diplomacy in
Action’. DIRCO staffed the station with a line-up of media personalities
and explained the polylateral rationale as follows:

One of its winning formula has been the ability to attract the best and well
known credible and “independent thinking” South Africans as On-Air
Personalities/anchors. These individuals most of whom have a huge fol-
lowing in their own right have attracted big audiences for the radio station
and have also helped to build the Ubuntu Radio platform as a credible
debate/conversation platform which can’t be associated with the tag of
‘government propaganda tool’. (SA DIRCO 2014)

6.5   Polylateral Human Resources Management

One of the ways in which foreign ministries have responded to contempo-
rary challenges involves ‘revolving door’ practices. It is usually done at head
office, through staff exchanges with other sectors of government—coun-
tries such as Brazil, the Philippines and Mexico actively do so to allow for
closer intra-bureaucracy cooperation. When it comes to the private sector,
revolving door exchanges can entail diplomatic postings for individuals with
expertise in a particular field. International scholarly recognition is a particu-
lar advantage: Harvard Professor Joseph Nye served in the US Government
at various times, including a stint as Under-Secretary of State during the late
1970s. China has taken longer to warm to the practice. In December 2014,
the country for the first time appointed a scholar as ambassador, when
Qu Xing—Director of the China Institute of International Studies—was
appointed Ambassador to Belgium (Wang 2015).
Although still a rare phenomenon, polylateral human resources
management by foreign ministries can involve the input of civil soci-
ety regarding staff appointments. Vale (1993: 35) cites the functional
approach of Norway’s foreign ministry, where:
190 Y. K. SPIES

recruits are interviewed by a panel representing trade unions, the employ-

er’s federation, the universities etc. These are the users of the foreign ser-
vices and it is agreed that they should have a say in the kind of people who
will serve them.

Diplomatic training by MFAs as well as diplomatic studies at academic

institutions is also ideal for polylateral ventures. (In the case of poor
states, it is an imperative because of the widespread lack of capacity
to conduct diplomatic training.) The MSc in International Relations
and Diplomacy offered by Leiden University in The Netherlands draws
extensively on the practical input by the Clingendael Institute (based
in The Hague). Clingendael’s specialisation in international negotia-
tion skills complements the otherwise academic content of Leiden’s
curriculum. Likewise, the International Federation of Red Cross and
Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) assists foreign ministries, IGOs and
other entities to design and present courses in humanitarian issues.
DiploFoundation, for example, offers a popular online course called
‘Humanitarian Diplomacy’, which is delivered in cooperation with the
IFRC.
Diplomatic studies across the world have become attractive to a far
wider clientele than just professional diplomats, and the inclusion of pri-
vate individuals is no longer unusual. Broader, more diverse participation
strengthens the interdisciplinary perspective and practical relevance of the
programmes, and assists in polylateral initiatives and networking. But pro-
fessional diplomats and international bureaucrats also need to be taught
how to interact more effectively with the non-state world. This was rec-
ognised by the United Nations in 1998, when (then) Secretary-General
Kofi Annan announced that all staff training done by the United Nations
Staff College, would henceforth include a module on cooperation with
civil society (Annan 1998).
Despite its enduring elitist image, the world of diplomacy has taken
on board many of the skills and techniques of the non-state sector and
the corporate world in particular. Management skills, project manage-
ment, budgeting, marketing and so forth are now part of diplomats’ job
description. On the other hand, the non-state world has always appreci-
ated the expertise of diplomatic negotiators, their finesse in written and
verbal communications, holistic knowledge of world affairs and ability to
connect across cultural divides.
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 191

7   Conclusion
State interests are increasingly interconnected, transnational and prolif-
erating on a horizontal axis, forming a web rather than a hierarchy of
human concerns. A barrage of issues—many of them complex, technical
and outside the traditional domain of diplomacy—crowd the diplomatic
agenda but cannot be solved by states, or even universal IGOs like the
United Nations, on their own.
In addition to the diplomatic agenda, the diplomatic arena is also con-
gested. A multitude of de facto diplomatic actors share interests with states,
and their assertive participation in diplomatic processes brings an element of
‘deliberative democracy’ to international society. The result is that ‘the lines
between public and private goods, and between public and private actors,
become blurred’ (Sucharipa 2003); with states and non-state actors ‘…
more aware of one another’s ethos, skills and agenda’ (Murray 2006: 203).
The proactive focus and flexibility, grass-roots experience and access
to dedicated resources often allow non-state actors to be operational in a
given situation well before states and IGOs have overcome the bureaucracy
and politics of their institutions, to address crisis situations. In conflict-rid-
den regions, unstable or underdeveloped areas, and in the Developing
World in general, this is a major advantage. The fact of the matter is that
these actors conduct diplomacy, as they interact strategically with states and
associations of states and other non-state actors. The diplomatic arena itself
has therefore experienced something akin to democratisation.
The pressure on governments (and IGOs) for accountability and
transparency has prompted foreign ministries to redefine their relations
with the numerous non-state actors that are active in the field of diplo-
macy. In a growing trend, governments are synchronising their diplo-
macy with the activities of non-state actors, producing a complementary,
even symbiotic relationship in the field.
Two decades into the twenty-first century, it is difficult to imagine how
this process can be reversed. As Kelley (2010: 289) says, ‘diplomacy is
now well beyond the point of opening itself to the public — it is becom-
ing enmeshed within the public domain’. The inevitable question that
arises is whether professional, state-centric diplomacy remains relevant.
Sasson Sofer (1988: 206) makes a strong case in this regard. According
to him, the relevance of professional diplomats has been enhanced, rather
than diminished, in the more tightly integrated diplomatic arena. He says
‘the diplomat is the liaison between the various perspectives, ensuring the
192 Y. K. SPIES

primacy of political considerations in relations among nations’. Regardless

of the expertise that non-state actors bring to the table, state governments
remain pivotal, as they have legal gravitas in the negotiation of international
agreements, and they command enforcement authority at the domes-
tic level. Most importantly, states are manifestations of a social contract
between citizens and those who govern them—and the representatives of
those states are therefore accountable to the people.
The intrinsic diplomatic function of representation will be the theme
of the next chapter, as I will explore the structural (power-political)
dimension of the global diplomatic arena.

Notes
1. Murray (2006: 111) refers to the phenomenon as ‘nascent diplomacy’.
2. The term ‘multi-track diplomacy’ was coined by Louise Diamond, during
1985, in the context of conflict resolution.
3. Hucker (2015: 417) makes the point that men did not always publicly
display the same moral fervour as women. In many cases—as for exam-
ple during the controversial Boer Wars in South Africa, at the cusp of the
twentieth century—British men were more likely than women to be stig-
matised as cowards by their compatriots. They were therefore less likely to
speak out against their government’s aggression at the international level.
4. Ironically, it was another (albeit government-to-government) round of sport
diplomacy that produced a thaw in the United States-North Korea relation-
ship. During February 2018, North Korea and South Korea announced
that their teams would march under one flag, at the opening ceremony of
the Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang. The unprecedented show of unity
led to a series of direct meetings between the North and South Korean
leaders, and in turn facilitated the 12 June 2018 summit between US
President Donald Trump and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.
5. Notably through research documented in the 1999 book Global Public
Goods; International Cooperation in the 21st Century, edited by Inge
Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg and Marcus Stern.
6. The UK rejoined UNESCO in 1997, while the USA took another six
years to rejoin, in 2003. During October 2017, the USA withdrew again,
this time citing the organisation’s (alleged) anti-Israel bias.
7. Hence the use of the term non-profit organisation (NPOs) by some authors.
8. By 2016, the FIDH represented 184 human rights organisations in more
than 100 countries.
9. Ushahidi means ‘testimony’, in Swahili.
10. For better or for worse, the media’s ‘actorness’ was brought to the
fore when the White House controversially excluded major media
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 193

establishments (inter alia CNN, BBC, The New York Times and The
Guardian) from a February 2017 media briefing. It followed President
Trump’s track record of abrasive relations with the media: in Twitter out-
bursts and in various public statements throughout his presidential cam-
paign and thereafter, Trump accused these media houses of deliberately
spreading ‘fake news’. He went a step further in a speech to the annual
Conservative Political Action Conference on 24 February 2017 when he
called them the ‘enemy of the American people’ (Trump 2017).
11. Zimbabwe’s so-called crisis decade stretched roughly from 2000, when
the government introduced a calamitous Fast Track Land Reform
Programme (FTLRP), until 2010, when the situation seemed to stabilise
(albeit under governance of the same authoritarian regime, and amidst
dire economic conditions).
12. While the Catholic Church in its totality is a non-state actor, the Vatican,
of course, is recognised as a sovereign entity. It even has observer-state
status at the United Nations. Interestingly, there is an active civil society
campaign underway to overturn this position, because it is perceived to
bestow undue privilege to the Catholic Church in its entirety.
13. The Order of Malta is known by various other names as well; the
‘Hospitallers’ and the ‘Order of Knights of the hospital of Saint John of
Jerusalem’ are two of the most common.
14. The ‘Humanitarian Impact Bond’ is strictly speaking not a bond, but
rather a private placement. In Switzerland, the facility is legally known as
the ‘Program for Humanitarian Impact Investment’.
15. Participation in the Marshall Plan was offered to Eastern Europe as well,
but the Soviet Union refused, fearing that it would give the Americans
too much influence.
16. Note that the terms ‘conflict diamonds’ and ‘illicit diamonds’ are not syn-
onymous. ‘Illicit’ simply means that there is no valid certificate of origin.
17. The issue of conflict diamonds is the inspiration behind the 2006 film
‘Blood Diamond’, set in Sierra Leone.
18. According to the US Chamber of Commerce (2013), it represents ‘the
interests of more than 3 million businesses of all sizes, sectors, and
regions, as well as state and local chambers and industry associations. Its
International Affairs division includes more than 50 regional and policy
experts and 25 country- and region-specific business councils and initia-
tives. The U.S. Chamber also works closely with 116 American Chambers
of Commerce abroad’.
19. The idea germinated at a conference hosted by the Danish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs on 27 January 2017, titled ‘The Future Foreign Service’.
20. I have borrowed Clive Archer’s (1992: 68) analytical framework for exam-
ination of international organisations, in this discussion of the media’s
role in public diplomacy.
194 Y. K. SPIES

Sources Used
AFP. (2014, December 16). Kenya Closes Down Hundreds of NGOs. Aljazeera.
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/12/kenya-closes-down-hun-
dreds-ngos-20141216124722577348.html. Accessed on 15 May 2017.
Annan, K. (1998). Guest Editorial by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Go Between 67. December 1997/January 1998. Published on the Internet
by the Global Policy Forum. Internet Web-Site. http://www.globalpolicy.
org/ngos/docs97/annan.htm. Accessed on 25 September 2000.
Apple Inc. (2017). Apple Financial Results. Press Release on Apple’s Financial
Results for the Fiscal 2017 First Quarter, Ending 31 December 2016.
Issued on 31 January 2017. Cupertino, CA. https://www.apple.com/
newsroom/2017/01/apple-reports-record-first-quarter-results/.
Arbour, L. (2009, September 30). Civil Society and Public Interest Diplomacy.
Address by the President and CEO of the International Crisis Group, to
Georgetown University at the 28th Annual Trainor Award for Distinction in
the Conduct of Diplomacy, Washington, DC. http://www.crisisgroup.org/
home/index.cfm?id=6341&l=1. Accessed on 14 October 2009.
Archer, C. (1992). International Organizations (2nd ed.). London: Routledge.
Archer, C. (2015). International Organizations (4th ed.). London: Routledge.
Avaaz. (2017). The Avaaz Way: How We Work. Item Posted on 9 June 2011.
Internet Home Page. https://secure.avaaz.org/page/en/about/. Accessed
on 11 April 2017.
Barston, R. P. (2006). Modern Diplomacy (3rd ed.). London: Pearson.
Berridge, G. R., & James, A. (2003). A Dictionary of Diplomacy (2nd ed.). New
York: Palgrave Macmillan.
British Council. (2013). Influence and Attraction: Culture and the Race for Soft
Power in the 21st Century. Compiled by John Holden and Chris Tryhorn.
Available at https://www.britishcouncil.org/sites/default/files/influence-
and-attraction-report.pdf.
Cohen, R. (1999). Reflections on the New Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500
BC to 2000 AD. In J. Melissen (Ed.), Innovation in Diplomatic Practice.
Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Cooper, A. F. (2008). Beyond One Image Fits All: Bono and the Complexity of
Celebrity Diplomacy. Global Governance, 14(3), 265–272.
Cooper, A. F., & Hocking, B. (2000). Governments, Non-governmental
Organisations and the Re-calibration of Diplomacy. Global Society, 14(3), 361–376.
Cotonou Agreement. (2000). Official Name: ‘The Partnership Agreement
Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States
of The One Part, and the European Community and Its Member States of the
Other Part’. Signed in Cotonou on 23 June 2000. Revised in Luxembourg
on 25 June 2005, and revised in Ouagadougou on 22 June 2010.
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 195

Davis, J. (2004). The Campaign to Ban Landmines: Public Diplomacy, Middle

Power Leadership and an Unconventional Negotiating Process. Canadian
Institute of International Affairs Occasional Papers 1(1).
DEMOS. (2007). Cultural Diplomacy. (Report Compiled by K. Bound,
R. Briggs, J. Holden, & S. Jones). London: DEMOS.
Devin, G., & Törnquist-Chesnier, M. (2010). Burst Diplomacy—The
Diplomacies of Foreign Policy: Actors and Methods. Brazilian Political
Science Review, 4(2), 60–77.
Dzimiri, P. (2016). Application of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ Norm in the
International Community’s Response to the Humanitarian Crises in Zimbabwe
and Darfur (Unpublished D.Phil Thesis) University of Pretoria, Pretoria.
ElBaradei, M. M. (2008, November 17). Diplomacy and Leadership in a
Turbulent World. Statement by the Director General of the International
Atomic Energy Agency to the ‘Leaders in Dubai’ 2008 Business Forum.
Dubai, UAE.
Eizenstat, S. E. (2004). Nongovernmental Organizations as the Fifth Estate.
Seton Hall Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 5 (Summer/
Fall), 15–28.
Gilboa, E. (2009). The Public Diplomacy of Middle Powers. Public Diplomacy
Magazine, 2(Summer), 22–28.
Global Witness. (1998). A Rough Trade: The Role of Companies and Governments
in the Angolan Conflict. London: Global Witness Ltd. Available at https://
www.globalwitness.org/en/archive/rough-trade/.
Hanson, F. (2012). Revolution@State: The Spread of Ediplomacy. Lowy
Institute for International Policy.
Hemery, J. (2002). ‘Educating Diplomats’: In Academics, Practitioners and
Diplomacy: An ISP Symposium on the Theory and Practice of Diplomacy.
International Studies Perspectives, 3(2), 140–145.
Hocking, B. (1999). Catalytic Diplomacy: Beyond “Newness” and “Decline”. In
J. Melissen (Ed.), Innovation in Diplomatic Practice. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Hocking, B. (2004). ‘Privatizing Diplomacy?’ In ISP Policy Forum: The
Privatisation of Diplomacy and Security. International Studies Perspectives, 5,
147–152.
Hucker, D. (2015). British Peace Activism and ‘New’ Diplomacy: Revisiting the
1899 Hague Peace Conference. Diplomacy & Statecraft, 26, 405–423.
Hurrell, A. (2004). Working with Diplomatic Culture: Some Latin American and
Brazilian Questions. Paper Prepared for ISA Meeting, Montreal, March 2004.
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). (2017, September 6). The
World’s First “Humanitarian Impact Bond” Launched to Transform Financing
of Aid in Conflict-Hit Countries. ICRC News Release. Available at https://
www.icrc.org/en/document/worlds-first-humanitarian-impact-bond-
launched-transform-financing-aid-conflict-hit.
196 Y. K. SPIES

International Crisis Group (ICG). (2017). Internet Home Page. Available at

https://www.crisisgroup.org/.
Jin, C., & Liu, S. (2010). On the “People First” Diplomacy in China. Foreign
Affairs Review, 3, 46–62.
Jönsson, C., & Aggestam, K. (1999). Trends in Diplomatic Signalling. In
J. Melissen (Ed.), Innovation in Diplomatic Practice. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Jordaan, E. (2003, November). The Concept of a Middle Power in International
Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers.
Politikon, 30(2), 165–181.
Karns, M. P., & Mingst, K. A. (2013). International Organizations and
Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford
Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kaul, I., Grunberg, I., & Stern, M. A. (Eds.). (1999). Global Public Goods:
International Cooperation in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University
Press.
Kavanagh, C., Maurer, T., & Tikk-Ringas, E. (2014). Baseline Review: ICT-
Related Processes & Events Implications for International and Regional
Security (2011–2013). Geneva: ICT for Peace Foundation and Cyber Policy
Issues Brief.
Kelley, J. R. (2010). The New Diplomacy: Evolution of a Revolution. Diplomacy
& Statecraft, 21(2), 286–305.
Kurbalija, J. (1999). Diplomacy in the Age of Information Technology. In
J. Melissen (Ed.), Innovation in Diplomatic Practice. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Langhorne, R. (2005). The Diplomacy of Non-state Actors. Diplomacy &
Statecraft, 16(2), 331–339.
Lee, J. (1996). Multi-track Diplomacy. Diplomatic Studies Programme
Newsletter: Centre for the Study of Diplomacy, University of Leicester.
Malone, D. M. (2013). The Modern Diplomatic Mission. In A. F. Cooper,
J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mandela, N. (1994, October 3). Address by the President of South Africa to the
Forty-Ninth Session of the UN General Assembly. New York. www.anc.org.
za/ancdocs/speeches/un49th.html. Accessed on 2 September 2011.
Mathews, J. T. (1997, January–February). Power Shift. Foreign Affairs, 76(1), 50–66.
McDowell, M. (2008). Public Diplomacy at the Crossroads: Definitions and
Challenges in an ‘Open Source’ Era. The Fletcher Forum of World Affairs,
32(3) (Special ed.), 7–15.
Middle Powers Initiative (MPI). (2017). Internet Home Page. http://www.mid-
dlepowers.org/. Accessed on 13 May 2017.
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 197

Muldoon, J. P. (2005). The Diplomacy of Business. Diplomacy and Statecraft,

16, 341–359.
Murray, S. (2006). Reordering Diplomatic Theory for the Twenty-First Century: A
Tripartite Approach (D.Phil Thesis, Bond University).
Nganje, F. (2014). Paradiplomacy and the Democratisation of Foreign Policy in
South Africa. South African Journal of International Affairs, 21(1), 89–107.
Nicol, M. (2015, September 10). What Can We Expect from the Next Industrial
Revolution? Article Published on the Website of the World Economic Forum.
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/09/navigating-the-next-industri-
al-revolution2/. Accessed on 27 October 2017.
Open Government Partnership. (2017). Official Website of the OGP. https://
www.opengovpartnership.org/about/about-ogp. Accessed on 13 June 2017.
Petrovsky, V. (1998). Diplomacy as an Instrument of Good Governance. In
J. Kurbalija (Ed.), Modern Diplomacy. Malta: Mediterranean Academy of
Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta.
Pigman, G. A. (2010). Contemporary Diplomacy. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Putin, V. (2013, September 12). A Plea for Caution from Russia. The New York
Times, p. A31.
Quainton, A. C. E. (2000, March 14–18). Diplomacy in the 21st Century:
Dead But It Won’t Lie Down. Paper Delivered at the International Studies
Association 41st Annual Convention, Los Angeles, CA.
Reuters. (2017, June 20). DR Congo Kasai conflict: ‘Thousands Dead’ in
Violence. BBC Website. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.com/news/
world-africa-40344115.
Riordan, S. (2016, June 6). Diaspora Diplomacy: A Double Edged Sword.
Personal Internet Blog. http://www.shaunriordan.com/?p=279. Accessed
on 3 August 2016.
Ross, C. (2010, January–February). Independent Diplomacy. Harvard Business
Review, 5, 57.
Rozental, A. (1999). Mexico: Change and Adaptation in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. In B. Hocking (Ed.), Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation.
Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Rozental, A., & Buenrostro, A. (2013). Bilateral Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper,
J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schneider, C. P. (2009). Cultural Diplomacy: It’s the Culture, Stupid.
Reinventing Diplomacy. World Politics Review, 1–4.
Security Council Report. (2017). Internet Website. Available at http://www.
securitycouncilreport.org/.
198 Y. K. SPIES

Sofer, S. (1988). Old and New Diplomacy: A Debate Revisited. Review of

International Studies, 14(3), 195–211.
South Africa, Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO).
(2014, February 9). Website: News and Events. New Talent for Ubuntu
Radio. Available at http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/2014/ubuntu0210.html.
State Capacity Research Project. (2017, May). Betrayal of the Promise: How South
Africa Is Being Stolen. http://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/.
Sucharipa, E. (2003, January). 21st Century Diplomacy. Paper Delivered
by the Director of the Diplomatic Academy of Vienna, at the Wilton Park
Conference on “The Role of Diplomats in the Modern World”, UK.
Talbott, S. (1997). Globalization and Diplomacy: A Practitioner’s Perspective.
Foreign Policy Autumn, 108, 68–83.
The Local. (2017, January 27). In World First, Denmark to Name a ‘Digital
Ambassador’. https://www.thelocal.dk/20170127/in-world-first-denmark-to-
name-a-digital-ambassador.
Trump, D. J. (2017, February 24). Remarks by President Trump at the Conservative
Political Action Conference, Gaylord National Resort & Convention Center.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/02/24/remarks-
president-trump-conservative-political-action-conference.
UNESCO. (1980). Many Voices One World: Towards a New More Just and
More Efficient World Information and Communication Order. Report by the
International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems (The
‘MacBride Report’). London: Kogan Page.
United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). (1996, July 25).
Consultative Relationship Between the United Nations and Non-governmental
Organizations. Resolution 1996/31.
United Nations Global Compact. (2017). https://www.unglobalcompact.org/
what-is-gc. Accessed on 7 May 2017.
United Nations, World Summit on the Information Society. (2003, December 12).
Document WSIS-03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E. http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/
groups/public/documents/un/unpan021751.pdf.
United States Chamber of Commerce. (2013, June 19). Gips to Help Lead U.S.
Business Community’s Economic Engagement in South Africa. Press Release
by the US Chamber of Commerce. Available at https://www.uscham-
ber.com/press-release/us-chamber-announces-former-ambassador-don-
ald-h-gips-chair-us-south-africa-business.
Vale, P. (1993, January 12–14). Workshop Summary. The Changing World and
Professional Diplomacy: A Workshop Report. Centre for Southern African
Studies (CSAS) and the International Studies Unit (ISU), Cape Town.
VFS Global. (2018). Internet Website. http://www.vfsglobal.com/about_us/
company_profile.asp. Accessed on 3 June 2018.
 5 POLYLATERAL DIPLOMACY: DIPLOMACY … 199

Wang, S. (2015, January 8). A Revolving Door Era for China? The Diplomat.
https://thediplomat.com/2015/01/a-revolving-door-era-for-china/.
Accessed on 12 December 2017.
What’s In Blue. (2017). Internet Website. Available at http://www.whatsinblue.org/.
Wiseman, G. (1999, November). Polylateralism and New Modes of Global
Dialogue. Discussion Paper No. 59. Diplomatic Studies Programme, Centre
for the Study of Diplomacy, University of Leicester.
Wiseman, G. (2004). ‘Polylateralism’ and New Modes of Global Dialogue. In
C. Jonsson & R. Langhorne (Eds.), Diplomacy III. London: Sage.
Woolcock, S., & Bayne, N. (2013). Economic Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper,
J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 CHAPTER 6

Structural Diplomacy:
Development, Participation and Governance

1   Introduction
Having spent the last four chapters looking at distinct modes of diplomacy,
I will now widen the instrumental perspective to an inter-modal approach
that focuses on the ‘architecture’, or structure, of the diplomatic arena. In
the discipline of international relations, structural power implies the capac-
ity of an actor to impact (determine, change, inhibit, etc.) significantly the
terms of interaction in the international system. The structure of power
thus concerns the distribution of power, patterns of interdependence,
claims to power and, importantly, perceptions about all of those elements.
I chose to name the chapter ‘structural diplomacy’ because a signifi-
cant amount of diplomacy is expended on confronting the discrepancies
between notions of global ‘democracy’—participation and inclusion in
processes of governance—and the actual power that is wielded by a hand-
ful of international actors. Of interest is therefore ideas about who’s in
charge, who’s making the rules and who’s pushing back against the exist-
ing system of command and control. The context will be the evolving
diplomatic arena where unprecedented attempts are underway to govern
the global commons. Particular attention will be paid to the agency of
new emerging powers that are positioning themselves to challenge hier-
archies and norms in global governance. Some of these powers are associ-
ated with the ‘diplomacy of the middle’—the bridge-building leadership
shown by states that prioritise diplomacy rather than other tools of state-
craft. Their efforts have bolstered a new discourse on development, an

© The Author(s) 2019 201

Y. K. Spies, Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00530-6_6
202 Y. K. SPIES

issue that defines the existential struggle (hence also the diplomacy) of
the majority of states in the world. Since the first generation of develop-
ment diplomacy appeared in the late 1950s, development has become a
fixture on the global diplomatic agenda. The current tenor as well as sub-
stance of the debate, now in its second generation, will be discussed.
The chapter will conclude with consideration of the efforts to reform
and transform the system, and reflection on whether the drivers of such
change are, in fact, succeeding in shifting the traditional power-diplomacy
paradigm.

2  Diplomatic Arena Under Construction

The idea of an arena, like that of a stage, conjures up images of partici-
pants, spectators, referees, managers, activities and strategies, even stage
‘props’. Importantly, there are rules of engagement, and within interna-
tional society, the institution of diplomacy has always been a stabiliser, a
means to maintain order. However, the contemporary diplomatic arena
has become fluid, even combustible, and much of this has to do with the
fact that the arena itself seems to be impaired.

2.1   The Insecurity of Globalisation and Global Governance

Even though it predates the twentieth century, the pace and scale of glo-
balisation over the past few decades have accelerated to such an extent that
traditional sociopolitical systems struggle to contain its effects. The process
is inherently anarchical, with scant respect for established norms, traditions
and institutions, and heeding no equity in terms of costs and benefits. As
Copeland (2013: 2) asserts, it ‘socialises costs while privatising benefits’.
From the perspective of smaller and weaker states, globalisation can have
terrifying implications for economic and financial, even political, security.
The meta-phenomenon of globalisation is not, as many would argue,
an entirely natural and spontaneous symptom of human progress. It may
be fuelled by the information and communications technology (ICT)
revolution and a ‘shrinking’ world due to real and virtual linkages, but
it is also actively fomented through liberal capitalism: trade and finan-
cial liberalisation, industrial deregulation, privatisation and a dimin-
ished role for the state. This worldview is not embraced universally.
While proponents laud the opportunities created by globalisation, critics
warn that it forces all states, regardless of their individual constraints, to
compete within the liberal international market system. The inevitable,
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 203

unmitigated impact is to widen the financial, technological and produc-

tive schism between the most and least developed states—even between
less and more affluent societies within states (Annan 2000; Vom Hau
et al. 2012). The perceived inability of powerful actors to deal with (or,
perhaps even more galling, their indifference about) the negative effects
of globalisation has fuelled mass action by civil society. This has mani-
fested in demonstrations during the meetings of international financial
institutions and in the ‘growth of an anti- and then an alter-globalisation
movement’ (Weiss and Wilkinson 2014: 209).
The interdependence wrought by globalisation demands a con-
vergence of state policy on an ever-growing list of human challenges.
Relations among states are therefore progressively managed at a global
level through international regimes. Under global public scrutiny, state
policies are being subjected to international standards and obligations, in
a process known as ‘global governance’.1
The moral imperatives of global governance have been discussed at
length in the chapter on multilateral diplomacy. In short, it provides a
safety net in an otherwise unpredictable global order (Haass 2008: 44).
But if global governance is a normative project, premised on ‘…inclu-
siveness about whom and what is included in its machinery and agenda’
(Cooper et al. 2008: 1) why is there so much tension about the rules
of the game, and why are there constant subtexts of transformation,
even rebellion against the status quo? Cooper et al. (2008: 4) hint at the
answer when they observe:

By placing such considerable emphasis on norms and values – most nota-

bly justice and equity – the [global governance] project lost its apprecia-
tion of the power dimension in world affairs. A huge gap exists between
the professed goal of global governance and modes of credible operational
commitment.

The issue of power is indeed pivotal to the problem. In order to explore

it deeper, it is necessary to look at the structure of power in the diplo-
matic arena.

2.2   Fluid Polarity

When IR scholars refer to ‘polarity’ they are talking about the distri-
bution of power in the international system, more specifically, the struc-
ture of such power distribution. Over the course of the past century,
204 Y. K. SPIES

the world has experienced various manifestations of polarity: ‘unipolar-

ity’, ‘bipolarity’, ‘multipolarity’ and, as I will argue, a current state of
‘polypolarity’.2
Unipolarity (often referred to as ‘empire’, either real or alleged)
sees one superpower in domination of world affairs. This was the case
for a few years just after the end of World War II, when the USA was
the world’s only nuclear power and the political and economic guaran-
tor of the post-war order. In a system of bipolarity, as the name indi-
cates, two superpowers balance each other and all other states are lesser
powers, usually aligned in some or other way to either of the two super-
powers. The Cold War was a quintessential bipolar system. Then, there
is multipolarity, where there is no single superpower (or two superpow-
ers that keep each other balanced) but rather several ‘great’ powers that
keep checks on each other. The period prior to World War I saw such a
system, when a group of European powers for all intents and purposes
‘ruled’ the world.
When the end of the Cold War caused the demise of the relatively
stable bipolar system that had anchored global politics for half a cen-
tury, analysts initially expected a return to unipolarity. Francis Fukuyama
(1989) famously referred to the triumph of capitalism as the ‘End
of History’. But analysts were soon searching for new labels, as global
interdependence and the diplomatic response to it, global governance,
seemed to challenge traditional notions of polarity.
Many theorists postulated that the new global order resembled some
or other incarnation of multipolarity. In 1999, in an article called ‘The
lonely superpower’, Samuel Huntington described the polarity of the
emerging world order as a hierarchical structure, with multiple tiers of
powers that amount to a hybrid system of polarity. He dubbed the new
order ‘uni-multipolarity’. Many other commentators concluded that
global power was settling into multipolarity, noting the ascent of pow-
ers such as Russia and China, and the assertive unitary actorness of the
European Union (EU).
But at the start of the twenty-first century, increasingly diffuse and
fluid power relations in the global system seem to defy easy classification.
Daryl Copeland (2013) uses the term ‘heteropolarity’ while Richard
Haass (2008) prefers the expression ‘nonpolar’ to describe this asym-
metric situation: a world where power and influence are not necessarily
linked, and where power manifests in different forms. A variety of cen-
tres exercise the power, rather than it being limited to a single power
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 205

or balanced among a few great powers. Haas (2008: 44) explains that
the state-centric polarity of the twentieth century had been stretched
to include new nodes of power: non-state actors such as NGOs, MNCs
and a growing number of IGOs exert influence. He made the point that
inclusive, globalisation-driven interdependence actually undermines the
control of the major powers, because a growing number of issues on the
global diplomatic agenda can only be addressed by forums of global gov-
ernance. (The power of global governance structures lies in peer pressure
rather than legal enforcement authority over sovereign states.)
Drawing on the above interpretations, I prefer to call the emerging
structure of global power polypolar, because various centres of gravity can
be identified at any given moment, and not all of them are fixed. Indeed,
the ‘poles’ can even intersect because membership of international organ-
isations and strategic associations overlap and change. In the twenty-first
century, power is therefore situational and issue-specific, meaning that it
can manifest on an ad hoc basis, depending on the context.
Turkey, the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
offer an explanatory scenario. In a theoretically multipolar model, NATO
and/or the EU would feature prominently: the sheer military might of
NATO includes three nuclear power states, and the overlapping EU is a
massive, formidable trade block. Turkey, on the other hand, is a develop-
ing state in a very unstable neighbourhood, sandwiched between the polit-
ical and economic transition of Eastern Europe and the intractable conflicts
of the Middle East. For the past few years, Turkey has also been politi-
cally unstable—it has become more and more authoritarian in the wake of
a failed coup d’état in July 2016. A global polarity model would therefore
clearly not include Turkey as a great power, let alone a fixed pole.
Yet recent events have played up weakness in both NATO and the
EU, whereas Turkey has confounded observers with its influence relative
to much greater powers. Despite its membership3 of NATO, Turkey has
managed to build a close relationship with Russia. (Russia, on the one
hand, and NATO and the EU, on the other, have of course historically
irritated and demonised each other.) Amid worldwide concern about the
rise in fundamentalist Islam, Turkey is playing a major role in the Muslim
world and is confidently engaging the Shia–Sunni conflict, as well as
Israel, in the Middle East. The country has even become a wily ‘sluice’
for the migration crisis that sees waves of desperate refugees streaming
into Europe. In all these policy areas, NATO and the EU seem bewil-
dered, at best, and at worst, impotent. At the same time, NATO and the
206 Y. K. SPIES

EU have been confronted with political uncertainty, with Britain choos-

ing to leave the EU and the USA (under the Trump Administration)
reconsidering its commitments to NATO.
An event that aptly illustrated NATO’s power-diplomacy conundrum
was the 2011 military intervention in Libya. NATO was asked by the
UN Security Council (UNSC) to lead the intervention on humanitar-
ian grounds, but faced a worldwide backlash for ‘mandate creep’ when
it ended up exceeding its legal mandate by pushing for regime change in
Libya. Fairly or unfairly, NATO was accused of neocolonial imperialism
in oil-rich Libya. The total marginalisation of the African Union (AU)—
the IGO of which Libya is a member and which is mandated to oversee
peace and security in Africa—was cited as further evidence of toxic global
power relations. The point is that NATO was unable to ‘solve’ even the
neatly demarcated Libyan problem. As an IGO ‘great power’ it is there-
fore in some cases less than the sum of its parts.
As discussed in the previous chapter, non-state actors have become
such influential diplomatic actors that they are, depending on the issue
and situation, sometimes more successful than (even very powerful)
states. The notion of polypolarity encapsulates such situational and mer-
curial notions of power in the emerging world order. The absence of
the ‘predictable fixed structures and relationships’, as Haass (2008: 44)
refers to traditional types of polarity, challenges diplomacy in unprece-
dented ways.

2.3   Fragmentation and Regional Microcosms

The growth of globalisation has spawned an alter ego phenome-
non, fragmentation. Although the two terms sound mutually exclu-
sive, both work against the Westphalian consensus on state sovereignty.
As the Ditchley Foundation (2010) explained, there is a global ‘trend
towards smaller units in global politics, all of them with a capacity for
independent action, but all of them also dependent on others for their
overall security and prosperity’. Contemporary ‘club diplomacy’, as dis-
cussed in Chapter 3 (Multilateral Diplomacy), is a manifestation thereof.
It explains the 2003 formation of the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA)
group, when the three leading emerging powers banded together in the
wake of the Doha Development Round’s collapse. The simultaneous
efforts by universal organisations (such as the UN and WTO) that try to
address global problems and smaller groups (the G8, G20, and others)
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 207

that seek to address the same problems create a constant tension in inter-
national relations (Mahbubani 2013: 248).
One of the most common expressions of fragmentation is regionali-
sation. It is a buffering reaction against the savage competition in world
affairs and involves regions pooling their economic and/or security
assets to shore up their relative weight in the global arena. Some of these
regional organisations have assumed supranational characteristics, with
the EU the most pertinent example of a forum where sovereign states
cede some of their political and economic power. These ‘regional worlds’
(Acharya 2008) are acting as the new stabilisers of global power rela-
tions, i.e. acting as ‘poles’.
But if regions increasingly act as epicentres of power at the global level,
they are also microcosms of structural power. States known as ‘regional
powers’ assume the role of ‘poles’ in the regional context, where the
same types of polarity can exist, as does at global level (Buzan and Wæver
2003: 34; Nolte 2007: 8). From this perspective, Brazil is a scale-model
‘superpower’ within the region of South America, whereas the multipo-
larity within ASEAN is anchored in several regional ‘great powers’ such
as Indonesia, Malaysia and Vietnam. In the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation (SCO), the polarity could be described as bipolar, with Russia
and China being the relative ‘superpowers’ that balance each other.
The African Union is somewhat more difficult to label: in terms of
decision-making, and the declared foreign policies of major African
powers (Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, to name a few), the Union aspires to
be ‘multipolar’, yet the post-apartheid foreign policies of South Africa
have invoked a structure that resembles Huntington’s (1999) idea of
uni-multipolarity. South Africa in many ways acts like a ‘superpower’ rel-
ative to the continent and is variously expected to or accused of doing
so. It offers a gateway to a huge, resource-rich continent with a market
of almost a billion people, and in political terms, it represents 53 other
(vote-wielding!) members of the UN General Assembly—more than a
quarter of the organisation’s membership. Thus, when South Africa was
included as the only African member of the G20 and BRICS, despite
its obvious lack of economic credentials to be in the league of either of
those two clubs, the country benefited from ‘its representational role as a
regional power’ (Shaw et al. 2009: 36).
It is a role that the country has battled with, on occasion. All hegem-
ons, whether at the global or regional levels, are regarded with a meas-
ure of suspicion. Regional hegemons, like superpowers, are often in a
208 Y. K. SPIES

Catch-22 situation: expected to provide stability and security, yet sus-

pected of exploiting the relative weakness of ‘the rest’. But as Oliver
Stuenkel (2016: 48) says, regional powers seek ‘regional exceptionalism’,
i.e. ‘the capacity to break rules when necessary on a regional level’, in the
same way that global powers seek ‘global exceptionalism’. On the other
hand, regional hegemony is not necessarily anathema to regional multi-
lateralism. As Habib and Selinyane (2006: 181) argue, pivotal responsi-
bility, multilateralism, partnership and even moral leadership can be part
of hegemony. Indeed, they add that:

[hegemons often have a] political and socioeconomic vision of their trans-

national environments and a political willingness to implement such a
vision. If that vision is one of security, stability and development, as is often
the case, then the hegemon undertakes to underwrite the implementation
of these goals.

This is a nuance that South African diplomats have been at pains to

articulate. Rather than any sinister ambitions vis-à-vis the rest of the
continent, South African foreign policy statements have a track record
of genuflection to the collective will of the African Union. The latter,
however, battles its own structural power problems, both internally and
externally—as its marginalisation in the 2011 Libya intervention proved.
During that same year, the Union was also marginalised by one of its
own regional components, when its authority in matters of continental
peace and security took a back seat to that of the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS). The 2010/2011 crisis in Côte d’Ivo-
ire saw ECOWAS taking the lead, even approaching the UN Security
Council (rather than its parent organisation, the AU) directly to request
intervention in the humanitarian emergency.

2.4   The New Kids on the Block: Emerging Powers

Since the 1990s, global economic power has been in flux, with an appar-
ent shift from West to East and from Global North to Global South.
Economists have been intrigued by the rise of ‘emerging markets’: coun-
tries that have rapidly industrialised and experienced substantive, consistent
economic growth over extended periods, thereby enlarging their share of
global production and trade. Some of them have become highly developed
in a matter of decades—the ‘Asian tigers’ (Hong Kong, Singapore, South
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 209

Korea and Taiwan) come to mind—and have built up massive foreign cur-
rency reserves through assertive, government-led economic diplomacy.
Most emerging markets are however not (yet) in the league of the indus-
trialised Western ‘developed states’, as they battle with elements of under-
development. Even so, states such as Russia and China are major energy
consumers with their own significant energy reserves (Qobo 2011: 9).
Most emerging markets are also known as emerging powers because
their economic weight is matched by geopolitical impact. The four states
that have received most attention are Brazil, Russia, India and China.
(It might actually be more appropriate to call China and Russia ‘re-
emerging’ powers, because Russia is a former superpower and China his-
torically held empire status.) In 2003, they became collectively known
as BRIC when a Goldman Sachs report, ‘Dreaming with BRICs: The
Path to 2050’, highlighted their combined economic power and pre-
dicted that they were poised to become the engine of the global
economy (Wilson and Purushothaman 2003). Notwithstanding vast
differences among the four states, they had in common a rapidly trans-
forming socio-economic profile: large population size (combined 40% of
the world’s population) with a growing middle class, positive economic
fundamentals, significant own resources and trading in the global energy
market, and strategically driven investment in research and development
(R&D). Over the past decade, their regional dominance has been repli-
cated at the global level, where they are considered key players in eco-
nomic and political global governance.
None more so than China, whose economic growth has been
unmatched in recorded history. The country overtook the USA dur-
ing 2011 as the largest manufacturer in the world, and the demand for
resources to fuel its massive manufacturing sector, has added to its gar-
gantuan development objectives. Thus, during November 2001 China
took the revolutionary step—for an authoritarian state—to liberalise its
international trade when it joined the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
Its economic experiment paid off: during 2007, it overtook Germany as
the third largest economy in the world, and only three years later, during
2010, China took Japan’s place as second largest economy. It is widely
expected that the country’s economy will outpace that of the USA
within a few decades.
India is another case in point. As Vom Hau et al. (2012) observe,
it has joined China in ‘reversing the century-long trend towards rising
world income inequality between nations’. India’s prominence in the
210 Y. K. SPIES

WTO (it is a long-standing member, having been a founding member

of the organisation’s predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade) has prompted the state to implement large-scale market reforms
in order to integrate itself into the global economy. Its WTO profile has
also, importantly, provided India with a platform to agitate for reform
of global governance. The populous (second only to China) country
has invested massively in R&D, and two decades into the twenty-first
century ‘the sun never sets’ on the Indian ICT empire. As British and
American customers who phone their local banks can attest, they are
likely to be assisted by somebody in a call centre4 in Mumbai.
At this stage, it should be cautioned that there are large differences
within the category ‘emerging powers’. The economic and political
characteristics listed in my description are not shared exhaustively by all
the states I mention. Certainly, there is no single list of emerging pow-
ers that all commentators agree on. Depending on the prominence of
their markets and/or diplomatic traction in forums of global governance,
several other countries have also been labelled as emerging powers. In
2007, Goldman Sachs identified the next projected cohort of emerg-
ing economies, the so-called Next-11 as Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia,
Iran, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, South Korea, Turkey,
and Vietnam (Wilson and Stupnytska 2007). The countries were selected
based on a number of considerations, inter alia their development and
use of infrastructure, technology, and energy and demographic dynamics
such as urbanisation. Their ranks have been joined, in various other pro-
jections (and interpretations) of emerging power, by states as diverse as
Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.
Mzukisi Qobo (2011: 5) says the rise of emerging powers is signalling
a fundamental change in the global system, arguably as momentous as
the demise of the Cold War. Shaw et al. (2009: 29) agree and contend
that the BRIC and the Next-11 states are the new ‘global middle’ which
‘is already giving rise to the reordering of actual global relations and
highlighting the need to rethink definitions and practices of global gov-
ernance’. The authors maintain that emerging power status will depend
inter alia on whether a state has ‘the ability to identify and advance new
international priorities as well as an alternative agenda for international
cooperation’ (Shaw et al. 2009: 35).
Many emerging powers are called thus because they have not limited
their ambitions to the economic domain, but exert influence in their
own regions and demonstrate mounting confidence in global political
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 211

forums. They use the full spectrum of power tools and militarily many of
them compete to accumulate hard power—even nuclear weapons, as in
the case of India, Russia, China, Pakistan and Iran. During 2015, Saudi
Arabia spent a massive 13.5% of its annual GDP on its military budget—
the largest military spending as percentage of GDP in the world, and
more than twice as much as Israel, which is historically known for its
military vigilance (SIPRI 2017). In May 2017, this hard power inclina-
tion was boosted when the newly elected Donald Trump chose the Saudi
Kingdom as destination for his first foreign visit as US President. The
visit coincided with the largest ever bilateral military deal—a stagger-
ing US$ 350 billion. Saudi Arabia’s boosted hard power confidence was
flaunted immediately thereafter, when it spearheaded a far-reaching eco-
nomic and diplomatic embargo5 on rival Gulf-state Qatar.
While emerging powers do not form a clear-cut collective and are
not ‘a coherent force with a well-defined view of the world’ (Qobo
2011: 6) they ‘seek a reorientation of power towards multipolarity’
(Shaw et al. 2009: 27) and use multilateralism to leverage their influ-
ence. In this regard, they do not differ much from their traditional
counterparts. As Stuenkel (2016: 40) argues, emerging powers use
multilateral organisations in much the same way as the West did after
World War II, ‘simply to institutionalise6 their newfound power’. They
also band together in the new, supple multilateral diplomacy that can
best be described as club diplomacy. TIP, for example, is an initiative of
three major emerging economies in Southeast Asia; Thailand, Indonesia
and the Philippines. Another organisation anchored in emerging pow-
ers is the SCO (SCO), founded in 2001. The SCO is comprised of
more than half of the global population and some of the world’s larg-
est energy producing and exporting nations. Its eight treaty mem-
bers7 are China, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan. The BRICS is another powerful example: it became a dip-
lomatic club during June 2009 when the heads of state of the BRIC
quartet convened a summit to launch its joint agenda. It became
known as BRICS when SA was invited to join, as its fifth member, at
the end of 2010.
The most poignant recognition of the importance of emerging powers
to the world economy has been the creation of the G20, following the
financial crisis 2007/2008, with the inclusion of leading emerging pow-
ers. The impact of the G20 on the structure of global economic power
will be discussed towards the end of the chapter.
212 Y. K. SPIES

3  The Diplomacy of the ‘Middle’

A chapter on the diplomacy of ‘structure’ could not be conceived with-
out looking at the intriguing diplomacy of the ‘middle’. The middle of
the world’s political geography might seem like a tangible, quantifiable
domain, but the discourse is more nuanced than that. Although constitu-
tive elements play a role in defining middle powers, the essence of ‘mid-
dlepowermanship’8 is a given state’s behaviour rather than its attributes.
States that earn the label9 exert influence at the global level because they
consistently assume leadership in diplomatic forums regardless of their
hard power. They are known for ‘punching above their weight’ and dis-
tinguishing themselves as diplomatic brokers. This role is strengthened
because they tend to project, at the global level, their excellent domestic
democratic credentials. Having said that, it is important to note a recent
widening of the concept, and this warrants a look at two broad types of
middle power: the traditional and the emerging.

3.1   Constitutive Elements:

Traditional and Emerging Middle Powers
Traditional middle powers are states such as Canada, The Netherlands,
New Zealand and the Scandinavian countries. They have certain attrib-
utes in common: stable, peaceful societies that are highly developed
(compared to the bulk of the rest of the world); entrenched democra-
cies; and societies that tend to be affluent as well as egalitarian. Their
public bureaucracies are respected for a low incidence of corruption.
To illustrate the point: Transparency International’s (2016) Corruption
Perceptions Index listed the following states as the ten least corrupt in
the world: the joint first place was held by Denmark and New Zealand,
followed by Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, Norway, Singapore, the
Netherlands, Canada and Germany.
These states do not seek positions of regional dominance. Rather, they
display a low-key, functional approach in their respective regions. There
is good reason why traditional middle powers consistently top world
‘happiness’ indexes: they have achieved conditions of living for the vast
majority of their citizens, that other states (including superpowers!) can
only aspire to. As I will discuss shortly, however, in the diplomatic arena
it is the behaviour of these states that earn them the label of middle pow-
ers. For this reason, analysts have begun to include a range of states that
are less idyllic in their domestic profile.
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 213

Within the Global South, several emerging powers have taken on the
additional mantle of middle powers: leader states such as South Africa,
Brazil, Malaysia and India, among others, can be described as ‘emerg-
ing middle powers’. Judged only on their constitutive (material) attrib-
utes, they seem to have little in common with their traditional, Western
counterparts. Eduard Jordaan (2003: 167) who developed the concept
in some detail explains that emerging middle powers face huge devel-
opmental challenges on account of them being developing rather than
developed states. For instance, Brazil and South Africa are both notori-
ous for their income cleavages, and together with India continue to bat-
tle pockets of severe poverty. In this sense, they are markedly different
from the egalitarian traditional middle powers. Moreover, emerging mid-
dle powers are newcomers to the political culture of democracy (most
of them), having achieved this status only after the end of the Cold War.
In ‘measurable’ terms, they also differ from their Western counterparts
because they are inclined to be hegemonic in their respective regions,
and they pursue conspicuous regional agendas. This is arguably a reflec-
tion on the condition of their geographical neighbourhoods, which tend
to be comparatively unstable and/or less developed.
Australia, usually analysed as part of the traditional middle power
group, is an interesting and possibly hybrid case. Some analysts have
remarked on its proclivity for ‘heroic’ diplomacy (Evans 2011), in other
words an inclination to portray itself as exceptional. The country cer-
tainly seems to have a more gung-ho approach to conflict resolution (it
is a staunch ally of the USA), and its policy towards migrants is much
less welcoming than that of traditional middle powers like Sweden or
Canada. Moreover, its regional role is hegemonic—with the exception of
New Zealand, the rest of the region in the South Pacific lags far behind
Australia in terms of development. New Zealand arguably assumes
the role of ‘traditional’ middle power in the microcosm of Australia’s
regional hegemony.

3.2   Behavioural Aspects of Middle Power Diplomacy

Traditional middle powers have a reputation for exerting moral leader-
ship in diplomatic forums, where they act as role models for other states.
This has earned them respect for being the ‘good citizens’ of the inter-
national system because they promote at the international level what they
practise at the domestic level: peace, orderliness, rule of law, good gov-
ernance and adherence to human rights (Cooper et al. 1993: 19).
214 Y. K. SPIES

Their ‘footprint’ on the diplomatic agenda is therefore dispropor-

tionately large, compared to their actual, measurable impact. Canada
has shown this with its norm entrepreneurship in the domain of human
security. When, in 2000, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for
the international community to reconsider the traditional understanding
of sovereignty and non-intervention, the Canadian Government imme-
diately took up the challenge and sponsored the establishment of the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS).
The commission’s subsequent report on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’
made a sea change in the debate on humanitarian intervention. Canada
continued its commitment to the campaign to limit sovereign abuse and
was joined by Australia in committing diplomatic and other resources to
socialise other states into R2P adherence (Bellamy 2010: 436).
Middle powers ‘weave the fabric of regional and global political, eco-
nomic and social cooperation’, as Vella (1998: 16) puts it. By the same
token, emerging middle powers act as diplomatic ‘sherpas’ by convincing
other states to abide by the norms of international society. It follows that
a core tenet of middle power diplomacy is inclusivity—the exact oppo-
site of unilateralism. At the interstate level, this implies a penchant for
multilateralism and manifests in their rallying other states into joining
collective and transparent efforts to tackle problems with an international
dimension.
The inclusive and participatory processes of multilateral diplomacy are
used to constrain the power of the mighty, while boosting the impact of
the weak. As Peter Varghese, Australian Secretary of the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade, said during November 2013:

The story of multilateralism is the constant quest to expand the reach of

the former and constrain the raw power of the latter. It works best when
states with power accept that their broader interests are served by a system
of international rules and norms which apply to all.

Diplomatic inclusivity also implies collaborative ventures with non-state

actors. Canada’s instrumental role in forging collaborative ventures with
a range of non-state actors in the negotiations that produced the 1997
Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and on their Destruction; South
Africa’s catalytic role in the Kimberley process and the polylateral diplo-
macy that resulted in the 1998 adoption of the Rome Statute and the
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 215

2000 adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are

all examples of the multi-stakeholder participation sought by middle
powers.
Not surprisingly, the inclination of middle powers to prioritise mul-
tilateral solutions to global problems prompts them to participate
enthusiastically in multilateral organisations, where they induct other
members into the diplomatic ‘culture’ of the organisation. They person-
ify the organisational ethos through their loyalty and activity within the
organisation, their diligent payment of membership dues and readiness
to serve on committees. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of
New Zealand has, for example, since 1949 published an annual ‘United
Nations Handbook’, which it distributes free of charge within the UN
community. Former Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon hailed the hand-
book as ‘yet another sign of New Zealand’s dynamic presence in the
world organisation’ (New Zealand 2011/2012, back cover).
In forums of global governance, middle powers are known to network
with like-minded actors and build coalitions to stabilise global order
and legitimise global public policy. The main difference between emerg-
ing middle powers and their traditional peers is that the former have an
unapologetic reformist instinct in forums of global governance, com-
pared to the concessionary attitude displayed by traditional middle pow-
ers (Jordaan 2003: 165–167). Emerging middle powers such as South
Africa, Mexico, Brazil and India are therefore vocal in the debates about
transformation of global governance. They are acutely aware of their
own developmental challenges, and as self-styled representatives of the
Global South their diplomacy is assertive, even confrontational. It is vis-
ible in the strident tenor of their diplomacy, such as Mexico displayed
in its WTO activism and its championing of migration issues (Cooper
2009: 30, 33).
Like traditional middle powers, emerging middle powers project their
domestic norms onto the global stage. As former Brazilian Ambassador
Eduardo Brigidi de Mello (2014: 245–246) explains about his country,
Brazil’s pride in its young democracy is reflected in the country’s diplo-
macy. Its activism for equitable global governance and a levelling of the
playing field between rich and poor states is therefore a ‘democratic mir-
ror’ of domestic priorities. There is an added advantage for emerging
middle powers in straddling the development schism at their domestic
level, in the sense that it enables them to act as bridge-builders between
developed and developing countries in multilateral negotiations.
216 Y. K. SPIES

All middle powers are renowned for placing diplomacy at the cen-
tre of their foreign policy, by choice rather than compulsion. In line
with this priority, they display an aversion towards competitive mili-
tary rankings and go further than that—they coalesce around issues of
arms control. In the early 1990s, South Africa set itself on a course for
middlepowerhood when it became the first-ever country to disman-
tle its nuclear arsenal unilaterally. It subsequently secured Developing
World support for the 1995 indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and played a leading role in the adoption
of the Treaty of Pelindaba that established an African Nuclear Weapon
Free zone in 1996. The following year, it was a driver state in the Ottawa
Process on the banning of landmines, and in 1998, it joined other10 mid-
dle powers to establish the New Agenda Coalition. This group revived
the momentum for nuclear disarmament that was lost when the immi-
nent danger of superpower war dissipated at the end of Cold War. It is
the only state-based group that keeps pressure on the nuclear weapon
powers to honour their commitments under the disarmament pillar of
the NPT (New Zealand 2014). Australia, another champion for disar-
mament, established the multilateral Australia Group as part of its diplo-
matic campaign against chemical and biological weapons.
It should be pointed out, though, that the group of emerging mid-
dle powers is less united on the issue of demilitarisation than their tra-
ditional counterparts. As mentioned, the emerging powers that are also
middle powers tend to be dominant in their respective regions, and the
Developing World regions they lead are often unstable. As regional pow-
ers they are therefore (usually) expected to guarantee regional security.
India is the most extreme example of a middle power that has accumu-
lated military power, because it is—since 1974—a nuclear-weapon state.
It has thus far refused to sign up to the NPT. Its argument is compelling:
the treaty is discriminatory because the five permanent members of the
UN Security Council have arrogated to themselves, and nobody else, the
right to have nuclear weapons.
Notwithstanding the accrual of military power by some middle
powers, they all earn their reputation inter alia because they commit
significant (military and other) resources to international peace pro-
jects—UN peacekeeping in particular. The diplomatic flexibility and
commitment to finding compromise positions that distinguish the
diplomacy of middle powers also make them sought-after mediators.
Switzerland’s provision of good offices between the USA and Cuba and
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 217

Norway’s bridge-building diplomacy in the Middle East are typical of

middlepowermanship.
The impact that middle powers make at the global level is done
through focusing their diplomacy, rather than stretching themselves too
thinly. Gareth Evans, while serving as Australian foreign minister, coined
the term ‘niche diplomacy’ to describe the selective specialisation of
states in areas where they have specific expertise or comparative advan-
tage. It is important to emphasise that niche diplomacy is by no means
peculiar to middle powers, as any state can resort to it for strategic rea-
sons. Middle powers are just more prone, as a matter of foreign policy
principle, to maximise their diplomatic impact. Brazil, for example, has,
since the 1990s, had a health focus in its foreign policy, taking on pow-
erful pharmaceutical companies in order to promote universal access to
antiretrovirals in the treatment of HIV/Aids.
The altruistic internationalism that is often associated with middle
power diplomacy also manifests in their approach to official development
assistance (ODA). Not only are they renowned for granting assistance
to states in need, but they consistently ‘out-aid’ states with far more
resources. In fact, the only states that have consistently met targets of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)
are middle powers: Denmark, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands
(OECD 2016). Emerging middle powers are also growing in stature as
donors, specifically within the context of South–South relations.

3.3   Declaratory Statements About (Middle) Power

In 1942, midway through the World War II, Canada became the first11
state ever to refer to itself as a ‘middle power’. Ever since then, Canadian
diplomacy has been associated with ‘middlepowerhood’ (Chapnick 2000:
189). Two decades into the twenty-first century, there are some 30-odd
states that are regarded as middle powers. They typically make declar-
atory statements about this status, ‘employing a type of shorthand for
a pre-defined and generally agreed set of foreign policy behaviours’, as
Carl Ungerer (2007: 539) explains about Australia.
The variables that make up middle power diplomatic identity, as dis-
cussed above, can thus become a self-fulfilling prophesy, as these states
seem to demonstrate behaviour consistent with the identity they seek
to project. This does not mean that there is universal agreement on the
idea of middlepowerness; much less so on the identity and number of
218 Y. K. SPIES

states that could be classified thus. To be sure, the new emerging mid-
dle powers have brought much more diversity (and some would say
ambiguity) to the concept. A key consideration is the balance between
morality and national interest. Emerging middle powers are often faced
with a conundrum because their relative power in a weak neighbour-
hood turns them into regional hegemons. South Africa, for example,
has used its middle power weight to advance an ‘African Agenda’, with
the (normative) aim of uplifting the continent both politically and eco-
nomically. Yet, South Africa’s post-apartheid economic expansion in
Africa has also attracted accusations of predatory behaviour vis-à-vis its
fellow African states.
Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon observed in
2013 that ‘India seemed to use multilateralism for its values and bilat-
eralism for its interests’. Stating that India struck a balance between its
domestic and foreign policies, he said:

Others tell us, in the articulation of our foreign policy we are normative,
moralistic and academic. This has not changed. Our diplomatic engage-
ment is marked by circumspection. Judged by the outcome, it has served
us well. Modesty and patience has marked Indian diplomacy so far. (The
Hindu 2013)

Like South Africa, India exploits its geopolitical gravitas to demand more
structural leadership (leadership in forums of global governance), where
it can consolidate its prestige and influence. As Jordaan (2003: 167)
explains, emerging middle powers seek reform (or transformation) of
the global order only where a shift in the balance of power will work
to their national advantage. States such as India, Brazil and South Africa
are all self-appointed and ambitious candidates for permanent member-
ship of the UN Security Council. They also, at times, break ranks with
regional and other blocs within multilateral forums, to advance their own
agendas.
By contrast, traditional middle powers consider the Security Council
a forum of great powers, outside the domain of middlepowerhood.
Actually, during pre-1945 negotiations on the structure of the envisaged
Security Council of a new ‘United Nations’ organisation, Canada pro-
posed that ‘middlepowerness’ should be a key criterion for states’ elec-
tion to the non-permanent seats on the Council. The proposal was not
implemented, however, and the practice of regional nomination was
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 219

adopted instead (Chapnick 2000: 189). Since then, several middle pow-
ers (Australia, e.g.) have rejected outright the notion of taking up a per-
manent seat, even if offered.

4  The New Diplomacy of Development

After the World War II—with colonial powers engrossed in their own
reconstruction and development—those areas of the world that were
still under colonial rule swiftly obtained independence. The domino-like
process gave birth to the new diplomatic phenomenon of a Developing
World (or Global South) that sought to insert development on the
global agenda. The first generation of the ‘diplomacy of development’
was however hamstrung by the Cold War, because it imposed an East–
West schism along ideological lines. In the late 1980s, the Cold War
ended and attention turned to the most glaring, ongoing division in the
world, namely the development gap. The second generation of develop-
ment diplomacy was about to start.

4.1   Status Check:

End of the Cold War and an Uneven Playing Field
During the 1980s, it seemed as though the diplomacy of development
had lost steam. In the midst of a crisis of multilateralism, the world’s
‘haves’ were displaying donor fatigue and the transformative demands
of the ‘have nots’ sounded increasingly futile. Even the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), founded in 1964
precisely to drive the mission of development, appeared to have had
become an irrelevant organisation (Calvert and Calvert 1996: 222).
The sudden end to the Cold War revived the development discourse
with the reality that an even greater number of states—the newly sov-
ereign countries of the former East Bloc—were now officially identify-
ing as ‘developing’. The development debate also became much wider,
involving hitherto neglected aspects of human security. A flurry of global
summits sought to address these issues: the 1994 Population Summit
in Cairo, the 1995 Women’s Summit in Beijing, the 1995 World Social
Summit in Copenhagen, and many others tried to give direction to
global governance related to development.
The ‘traditional’ diplomatic assemblies of the Developing World—
the multilateral catalysts for solidarity and collective advancement of
220 Y. K. SPIES

development—were the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).

Ronald Barston (2006: 88) explains that the raisons d’être of these two
overlapping Developing World forums—respectively, economic develop-
ment and ideological non-alignment—were placed on a collision course
when the end of the Cold War left the world with an essentially capi-
talist system. ‘Alignment’ as such had become obsolete. The NAM thus
had to shift its focus to the economic agenda of the Global South, some-
thing that up till then had been the ambit of the G77. In 1995, the over-
lap and rivalry prompted leaders from the two groups to set up a Joint
Coordinating Committee in order to redefine the distinct objectives of
the two groups. The Committee would seek to strengthen coordina-
tion of, and cooperation on, their common agenda. This led to the first
‘South Summit’, held in Havana during April 2000.
Henceforth, the idea of a ‘Global South’ agenda, and renewed
emphasis on South-South cooperation (SSC), gained traction. In the
various South-South forums, developing countries continued to express
their frustration at an international economic and political order expe-
rienced as inequitable and exploitative. The development aid debate
encapsulated the frustration, marked as it was with vertical, patronis-
ing relationships and unilateral policy imposition on recipient states. A
bitter complaint continued to be that the West moved the goalposts—
introducing conditionalities to development that they themselves had
not adhered to during their industrialisation. (Western powers pursued
rapacious policies in the course of their industrialisation during the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries, and their economic development caused
environmental damage far beyond their own sovereign borders. A cen-
tury later, however, normative and regulatory frameworks prohibited
non-Western countries from being equally bloody-minded in their eco-
nomic expansion.)
Critically needed was a global consensus on development.

4.2   A New Development Narrative

The landmark Rio Earth Summit that was held in 1992 did more than
launch a series of conferences to tackle the practicalities of sustainable
socio-economic development: it also confirmed development as a moral
imperative. The target that the OECD had set itself twenty years earlier,
for ODA of donor states to comprise 0.7% of Gross National Income,
was now endorsed at a universal level. Two years later, in 1994, UN
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 221

Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali submitted his report ‘An

Agenda for Development’. It was intended, as he pointed out in the
Preface, ‘to revitalize the vision of development and to stimulate an
intensified discussion of all its aspects’.
The post-Cold War development dialogue had entered its sec-
ond generation and was gaining momentum. During 1996, the HIPC
Initiative—a debt-cancelling scheme for 41 states that were identified as
the most heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) in the world—was
announced by the World Bank and the IMF (CADTM 2016). State and
non-state actors alike were trying to ‘turn the corner’ on the fractious
and fractured debate on development.
Some of the most entrenched North-South development aid relation-
ships started to mature, adopting new rules of engagement. An exam-
ple was the European Union’s hitherto asymmetrical relations with the
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States. In June 2000, the
Cotonou Agreement12 was concluded as a treaty between the EU and
78 ACP countries, replacing the series of Lomé Conventions that had
governed increasingly problematic donor–recipient relations between the
two groups since 1975. An important element of the 2000 Agreement
concerned Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), designed to
enhance the ACP states’ development and integration into the world
economy. It was intended specifically to enhance their comparative trade
capacity, in line with the new development cooperation mantra of ‘trade
rather than aid’ (Mudida 2012: 107). The Cotonou Treaty provided
for revision of the agreement every five years and in 2010, new chal-
lenges were added to the cooperation agenda: aid effectiveness, climate
change, food security, regional integration and state fragility (European
Commission 2017). These reflected a much more holistic appreciation of
the complexities of development assistance.
At the turn of the century, consensus was growing that in the past,
the economic dimension of development had been accentuated to the
detriment of human security. Thus, when UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan presented his ‘Millennium Report’ in 2000, he addressed a spec-
trum of international society’s tangible and intangible assets: human,
social, financial, physical and environmental. Annan pointedly included
sustainable development as a fundamental human freedom. His report
inspired the ‘Millennium Declaration’, adopted in September 2000 by
the Millennium Summit of the UN General Assembly. It launched an
extraordinary agreement: a ‘global compact’ to address the development
222 Y. K. SPIES

concerns of the world, thereby achieving the pinnacle of development’s

institutionalisation on the global diplomatic agenda. The Millennium
Declaration embraced a comprehensive, collective approach to sustain-
able development and condensed the overall mission into realistic and
measurable objectives. For this purpose, eight development targets were
articulated, called MDGs13 (MDGs). The year 2015 was set as target for
achievement of these goals across the world. In terms of the new lan-
guage of development aid, a fundamental principle was contained in
Goal Eight, namely to develop a ‘global partnership for development’.
The notions of ‘partnership’ and ‘ownership’ in development had
become key tenets of the new development discourse. It prioritised the
notion of cooperation rather than ‘aid’, as recipient states were beginning
to insist on horizontal relationships with donors. This attitudinal change,
a maturing of the donor–recipient relationship, was reflected in the nam-
ing of Africa’s flagship programme for continental development: the
New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), adopted during
2001 by the African Union.
The year 2001 also marked the start of the Doha Development
Round within the framework of the WTO. The organisation’s 4th
Ministerial Meeting in Doha during November 2001 resolved to launch
a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, placing development at
the centre of trade deliberations, and making the WTO more relevant to
development. Unfortunately, the subsequent trade talks collapsed rather
dramatically during September 2003 in Cancun, Mexico, as a result of
structural tension within the multilateral trade community.
A more positive tone was adhered to at the March 2002 International
Conference on Financing for Development14 in Monterrey (Mexico). In
the ‘Monterrey Consensus’, donors committed to a new development aid
paradigm. It would mean greater representation of previously marginal-
ised states in all the forums where development is impacted, and a con-
sultative, rather than prescriptive, partnership in development. Echoing
the prevailing trend in the development discourse, the consensus encour-
aged horizontal South-South development cooperation, so as to share
resources, experiences and strategies. When the Monterey Consensus was
reviewed some years later, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon lauded it
for having introduced ‘a new era of cooperation, bridging the old North-
South divide’ (United Nations News Service 2008).
Also during 2002, the G8 adopted the Africa Action Plan at its
Kananaskis Summit, committing the G8 to the objectives of NEPAD
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 223

(G8 2002). Three years later, in 2005 (during the same year, the UN
held its Millennium + 5 Summit), the G8 at its Gleneagles Summit
accorded a key place on it primary agenda to the issue of poverty in
Africa.
At the OECD’s 2005 summit in Paris, recipient states were invited for
the first time ever to join the world’s major donor states in their delib-
erations. In fact, the ‘Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness’ of 2005
marked the first time that donors and recipients both agreed to com-
mitments and to hold each other accountable for achieving these. The
Declaration acknowledged upfront that the development landscape was
rapidly changing, inter alia with the role of new donor states from the
Developing World, and non-state as well as sub-state actors active in
the field of development aid. The Declaration then set out a detailed,
action-oriented plan to improve the quality of aid and to ensure that
its impact on development would be more beneficial. For instance, it
specified that bilateral aid should not be tied to services supplied by the
donor, thereby addressing a long-time grievance of recipients. It also
provided for harmonised monitoring and implementation of aid pack-
ages, so as to ensure transparency and mutual ownership. Importantly,
the Declaration called for aid to be allocated and implemented in line
with national development strategies of the recipient countries.
The year 2005, the year that the United Nations celebrated its 60th
anniversary, was also the year when development officially entered the
UN’s agenda of high politics. Confronted with unprecedented chal-
lenges to global security and the UN itself, Secretary-General Kofi
Annan released a seminal report, titled ‘In larger Freedom: Towards
Development, Security and Human Rights for all’. In this assessment
of mankind’s well-being, Annan made it clear that human security had
become inextricably linked to human development. This necessitated
integrated approaches to issues such as migration, health, environment,
crime and terrorism (Annan 2005). Annan’s report drew on the find-
ings of his High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, which
released its report ‘A more secure world: our shared responsibility’, in
December 2004. It identified development itself as an essential founda-
tion for a collective (UN) security regime. This conceptualisation of the
development-security nexus effectively merged the security agenda of
the Global North with that of the Global South. Recognising this nexus,
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in an address to Georgetown
University’s School of Foreign Service on 18 January 2006 said:
224 Y. K. SPIES

it is impossible to draw neat, clear lines between our security interests, our
development efforts and our democratic ideals. American diplomacy must
integrate and advance all of these goals together. (Stimson Centre 2011: 16)

Since then (and notwithstanding many hurdles and lingering frustrations

about the so-called pledge paradox15), the global development debate
has assumed new semantics that seek to replace the supercilious, unilat-
eral traditional discourse associated with development aid. The preferred
term now is International Development Cooperation (IDC), which
implies a relationship of mutual accountability. The two defining aspects
of the new relationship are ownership and partnership. ‘Ownership’ pre-
supposes that the starting point must be country-owned development
strategies based on good governance and sound policies. ‘Partnership’
denotes development as global collaboration in which all stakeholders are
respected. The latter consideration implies that the developmental ben-
efits flow both ways: many developing countries have physical resources
as well as specialised know-how and skills to share with their donor part-
ners. Relationships need to be flexible and in tune with the development
circumstances of individual regions and states. In turn, these dynamic
relationships provide scope for joint ventures and innovative forms of
cooperation: technology transfer, capacity building, environmentally
friendly assistance and so forth.
The global financial crisis of 2007/2008 prompted the formal estab-
lishment of the G20 in 2009, and civil society organisations immedi-
ately started to lobby for a new development consensus within its global
economic governance framework. With the support of the Korean
Government, the November (2010) G20 Summit in Seoul adopted the
Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth. It differs fundamentally
from the traditional Washington Consensus, in the sense that it allows
a larger role for state intervention in development16—with developing
countries in charge of the design of appropriate reform policies so that
development interventions can resonate with the requirements of indi-
vidual countries.
At the same time, a G20 Development Working Group (DWG) was
established to work with countries and assist them to draw up work
plans. South Korea also hosted the Fourth High-Level Forum on Aid
Effectiveness the year thereafter, during December 2011. It adopted
the Global Partnership on Effective Development Cooperation that con-
tinued the trend in OECD/DAC deliberations to embrace a new
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 225

development paradigm. (The OECD/DAC meetings had been pro-

gressively inclusive and holistic in scope, as is evident in the outcomes
of the three High-Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness that preceded the
2011 High-Level Forum: The Rome Declaration of February 2003, the
Paris Declaration of February 2005 and the Accra Action Agenda of
September 2008.)
In the interim, the Millennium Development Goals were approach-
ing their expiration date, and critics agreed that achievements had
been uneven. Emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil had
been the most successful in meeting their targets, while sub-Saharan
Africa lagged behind. Unforeseen obstacles—among them the world
financial crisis and the Arab Spring—had interfered with the devel-
opment trajectory. At the core of disappointing outcomes remained
the question of political buy-in. In 2012, at the Rio+20 Conference,
a process was launched to develop a set of successor development
goals. The intergovernmental process was deliberately structured to
be more inclusive and more transparent, and in March 2013, the UN
established an Open Working Group (OWG), co-chaired by Kenya
and Hungary, to work on a roadmap for the post-2015 development
agenda.
From 13–16 July 2015, in Addis Ababa, the United Nations held its
Third International Conference on Financing for Development. Member
states adopted the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, which set a foundation
for implementing the global SDGs that world leaders were expected to
adopt later that same year, in New York. The Action Agenda contained a
series of measures to overhaul global practice in the finance sector and to
generate the resources for tackling the economic, social and environmen-
tal challenges that are associated with development (UNGA 2015a).
In September 2015, as the sun set on the MDGs, the General
Assembly adopted a resolution called Transforming our world: the
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Commonly referred to as
the SDGs, the successor programme to the MDGs embraced an even
more inclusive strategy to development. It articulated 17 goals, divided
into 169 measurable targets, to tackle the lingering schisms in global
development. The year 2015 proved to be a good year for global mul-
tilateralism. Unfortunately, 2016 saw the world lurch into more unfa-
miliar terrain, with protectionism, nationalism and general anxiety
about global governance marking Brexit and the presidential election
in the USA.
226 Y. K. SPIES

4.3   The South-South Aid Discourse

One of the most interesting changes in the development discourse is the
extent to which development assistance has taken on a horizontal dimen-
sion within the Global South. What has become known as SSC involves
emerging powers, themselves recipients of development assistance, taking
on the role of major donors.
The cooperation is driven by the long-standing ideological goal of
self-reliance to reduce aid dependency on the Global North and has
been accelerated by the change in economic geography of the world.
A primary consideration is that many previous Low-Income Countries
(LICs) have entered the bracket of Middle-Income Countries (MICs).
Some of them are emerging powers with significant financial and tech-
nical resources to share, on concessional as well as non-concessional
terms, with other states. As they increase their economic reach and mar-
ket share, they take practical advantage of exploiting complementarities
in a wide area of socio-economic development. In response, donor states
in the Global North have had to redefine their relations with the new
MICs, changing the traditional (vertical) donor–recipient relations to
(horizontal) development partnerships, often joint ventures and trilateral
projects involving aid to LICs. In Africa, for example, South Africa is the
leading provider of development cooperation, even if it does not have
the same expendable resources as traditional donors. Brendan Vickers
(2012b: 535) explains that what makes South Africa an ideal partner in
trilateral development joint ventures is its comparative advantage: it is
more in tune with Africa’s needs and understands Africa’s ‘security/gov-
ernance/development nexus’.
The notion of SSC has therefore entered the international develop-
ment strategies of developing and developed countries alike, as Fritz
Nganje (2013: 1) observes. The OECD’s changing interaction with
emerging power donors has been illustrative. During 2007, OECD
members voted to institutionalise relations with five emerging donor
states: Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and South Africa; as ‘key partners’
of the organisation. The rationale was that these countries ‘contribute to
the OECD’s work in a sustained and comprehensive manner’ (OECD
2017b). The membership of the OECD has also been swelled, since
the end of the Cold War, with emerging donor states such as Mexico,
Chile, South Korea and several Eastern European states that were, until
recently, net recipients of development aid.
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 227

Within the context of the United Nations, SSC has received renewed
institutional support. In 2003, the UN’s High-Level Committee on
the Review of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries
(which had been in existence since December 1980, but mostly only in
a symbolic capacity) was reconstituted by the General Assembly as the
High-Level Committee on SSC. The General Assembly also proclaimed
an annual17 United Nations Day for SSC. The High-Level Committee
convened a major conference on SSC in Nairobi (Kenya) from 1 to 3
December 2009. (The date coincided with the 30th anniversary of the
1978 UN Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing
Countries.) The conference produced a detailed outcome document
with proposals for the wider international community, not only develop-
ing countries, to support and institutionalise SSC.
As the Nairobi Outcome Document emphasised, development is
increasingly a regional imperative that cannot be handled effectively by
individual states or generic global forums. Africa has been a trailblazer
for institutionalisation of regional diplomatic approaches to the devel-
opment dialogue, and since the turn of the century, it has become
a trend for individual donor states to engage the continent as a diplo-
matic unit. This is evidenced by the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC), which was launched in 2000; the Korea–Africa Cooperation
Forum, launched in 2006; the India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS),
which was first held in 2008; and the Turkey–Africa Cooperation
Summit, also first held in 2008—to name just a few.
As the African summit examples show, there are many individual
states within the Global South that have developed niche diplomacy
around the issue of development assistance. They tend to use the rhet-
oric of ‘Global South solidarity’ to explain their development coopera-
tion. When a catastrophic earthquake devastated Haiti during January
2010, Qatar was one of the first countries to send humanitarian assis-
tance, inter alia 50 tonnes of disaster relief material. Like the other
oil-rich Arab Gulf States, it has become a prominent donor, not only
(as can be expected) within the Muslim world, but within the wider
Developing World.
In the case of China, the state’s ever more sophisticated economic
diplomacy has been skilfully merged with a South-South development
agenda. It has also started to act outside of its image as a monolithic
centralised state, by encouraging Chinese local governments to act inde-
pendently of the national government in their South-South economic
228 Y. K. SPIES

engagements (Mudida 2012: 101; Nganje 2013: 3). China’s sheer size
and hard power vis-à-vis other developing states is an obvious asym-
metrical challenge, but South-South development assistance in general
can face normative challenges similar to that associated with traditional
North-South development aid.
The Developing World embraces an enormous spectrum of diversity,
including not just least developed, contested and micro-states, but also
assertive and influential emerging powers that rival their Western coun-
terparts. The donor–recipient schism that marks North-South diplomacy
is thus replicated in this group. South-South development partnerships,
and in some cases blatant political or economic hegemony, have become
part of the diplomacy of development. Stuenkel (2016: 39) says emerg-
ing powers often use global law and global governance ‘to institutional-
ise new hierarchies and selective gradations of sovereignty in the case of
developing countries’.
Despite their comradely rhetoric, developing donor states are as prone
as any other donor states to pursue national interest in their develop-
ment cooperation. Inoue and Vaz (2012: 507) explain that Brazil, which
became a major donor within the Global South since the late 1990s
(especially under the Lula Presidency, 2003—2009), has been at pains
to declare that its ‘development assistance is moved not by national eco-
nomic or political interests, but by international ‘solidarity’, and does not
reproduce the North–South traditional aid relations’. But, as the authors
suggest, ‘it is not completely divorced from national, sub-national or sec-
toral interests and cannot be viewed apart from Brazil’s broader foreign
policy objectives’. By the same token, there is not a single other emerg-
ing power that can convincingly make the argument that it is involved
in development assistance for purely altruistic reasons. Chinese dip-
lomats are quick to point out that their country has had ample oppor-
tunity, in the course of many centuries of contact, to colonise parts of
Africa, yet chose not to do so. But China’s proliferating presence in
Africa is watched with some alarm by many observers. When the Chinese
Government dispatched members of its People’s Liberation Army during
July 2017 to establish its first foreign military base in Djibouti, in the
Horn of Africa, it set off alarm bells about the scope of the Asian giant’s
ambitions in Africa (AP Beijing 2017). Indeed, for Africans the question
arises whether emerging powers in general have joined the new ‘scram-
ble for Africa’ and are exploiting the resource-rich continent purely for
self-interest.
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 229

4.4   Institutionalising Development at Foreign Ministry Level

In recent years, several states have renamed their foreign ministries to
reflect a development cooperation agenda (as recipients, donors or both)
in their foreign policy. The Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste and the
Republic of South Sudan, both of the new states, established, respec-
tively, a ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation’ and a ‘Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation’. South Africa, during
2009, renamed its ‘Department of Foreign Affairs’ to ‘Department of
International Relations and Cooperation’.
A related trend is to bring institutional coherence to development
assistance within foreign ministries. This is done not only by MFAs of
aid recipient countries, but also by those of the traditional and emerging
powers that pride themselves on making development assistance a cor-
nerstone of foreign policy. In some cases, a national aid agency is merged
with the foreign ministry to enhance the broader diplomatic strategy.
This is also in line with foreign ministries’ role in fostering cooperation,
coordination and coherence in the making and implementation of for-
eign policy. This was the reason the Chilean International Cooperation
Agency (AGCI) was integrated with the country’s foreign ministry
during 2005: to provide overarching strategic vision to the increasing
emphasis on South-South collaboration in Chile’s diplomacy.
Australia’s foreign ministry, the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade, incorporates the country’s official development agency, AusAID
(the Australian Agency for International Development). The coun-
try characterises itself as being ‘one of the world’s most generous aid
donors’ (Australia 2014). Announcing a ‘new aid paradigm’ in June
2014, foreign minister Julie Bishop noted that she had established ‘a
new development innovation hub in the Department of Foreign Affairs
and Trade to engage creative thinkers from inside and outside the public
sector, from Australia and overseas, to look at new ways to deliver aid’
(Australia 2014).
Likewise, the US Department of State has invested considerable
resources in redesigning its approach to development assistance. As in
the case of other Western donors, the USA has been heavily criticised
for the conditionalities attached to its aid programmes. Its African
Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), adopted in May 2000, cuts tar-
iffs and provides economic incentives only to selected reforming Sub-
Saharan African nations. Mudida (2012: 107) notes that AGOA has
230 Y. K. SPIES

been criticised for violating WTO rules, but a greater concern is that
the programme (and its subsequent extensions) was negotiated with lit-
tle input from the beneficiary states. The State Department has taken
on board such criticism and as from 2009 compiles a ‘Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review’ (QDDR), which provides stra-
tegic planning on the development-diplomacy nexus. Importantly, it
was modelled on the US Defense Department’s ‘Quadrennial Defense
Review’. This signified the intention (at least by the then Obama
Administration) to elevate development diplomacy to a higher strategic
level in US foreign policy.
The USA has chosen not to integrate its foreign ministry with the
federal development agency, USAID. A merger can have political rami-
fications and even when such institutions are not amalgamated, they can
still be perceived as such. This happened in May 2013 when the Bolivian
government expelled USAID from the country, citing political interfer-
ence under the umbrella of the US Embassy. The UK has also elected to
keep the Department for International Development (DFID), which has
a poverty reduction mandate, separate from the political ‘contamination’
of its Foreign and Commonwealth Office.
Beyond the donor states, foreign ministries of recipient states have
an obvious interest in institutionalising development, as it is intrinsic to
their diplomatic agenda. For poor and new states, development policy is
virtually inseparable from foreign and national security policy, as Barston
(2006: 20–21) points out. However, as he observes, foreign ministries
of developing countries have generally found it difficult to accommodate
and coordinate international economic policy in line with the interna-
tional trend for MFAs to do so. Capacity is a major concern, both at
head offices and in the diplomatic missions of these states, where diplo-
mats compete for and negotiate the terms of assistance their countries
need.
Development cooperation—whether from the perspective of recipi-
ents or donors—involves so many technical issues and such complex con-
textual insight, that diplomats need an enhanced skills-set to deal with
it. Customised diplomatic training in this regard has been pioneered by
the Swiss-funded DiploFoundation: since 2008, it has offered courses in
‘development diplomacy’. These courses (and others that have followed
suit) reinforce the contention that development is part of the global
commons, and as such it must be a fixture on the global diplomatic
agenda.
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 231

5  Transformation and Reformation
The end to the Cold War’s ideological rivalry opened up space for
debate about the structure of the emerging order, specifically about rep-
resentation and decision-making in the forums of global political gov-
ernance. In 1992, the Swedish government, with the support of UN
Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, established the Commission on Global
Governance so as to investigate the case for collective management of
international challenges. The commission’s (1995)18 report, ‘Our Global
Neighbourhood’, proposed wide-ranging reform of existing institutions.
The United Nations, it argued, had a much larger role to play in the
incipient world order. The report’s emphasis on state interdependence
was controversial, however, as it seemingly called for a reduction in state
sovereignty vis-à-vis increased supranational powers of the UN.
The report itself did not lead to any specific institutional changes, but
it was symbolic of a debate that was rapidly gathering pace and intensity:
the idea that the international system was systemically flawed and that its
established practices and principles were based on questionable intellec-
tual, legal and normative assumptions (Varghese 2013).

5.1   Starting at the Top: Reform of the UN Security Council

The Security Council of the United Nations is a unique phenomenon in
the institutions that mankind has invented and the most powerful multi-
lateral entity in the world. Under international law (Chapter VII of the
UN Charter), it is the only institution that can authorise the use of force
to deal with threats to international peace and security. It is also the only
organ of the UN that can compel all member states to abide by its deci-
sions. The first and most obtrusive implication of this power is that the
Council may overrule Article 2(7) of the Charter, which guarantees the
traditionally untouchable Westphalian principles of state sovereignty and
non-interference.
The structure of the Council is therefore of crucial concern, because
the profile of a political body’s membership determines its (invaria-
bly subjective) decisions. Ten out of fifteen Security Council seats are
elected by the General Assembly: candidates serve two-year terms on
a revolving basis, according to equitable geographic distribution. The
semblance of democratic representation is, however, limited to these ten,
non-permanent members. At the core of the Council are five permanent
232 Y. K. SPIES

members: Russia, USA, China, UK and France. Each of them wields a

de facto ‘veto’ over substantive issues on the Council’s agenda. These
five states were never elected, but the Charter allows them to serve in
perpetuity. This means that (two decades into the twenty-first century)
the Security Council still reflects the geopolitical hierarchy of the imme-
diate post-World War II era. In the more than 70 years of its existence,
only one change was made to its structure: in 1963, as a direct response
to mass decolonisation, the non-permanent component was enlarged
from six to ten seats.
There has always been criticism of the structure of the Security
Council, but the opportunity for reform only really loomed when the
Cold War came to an end. A growing chorus of actors started to raise
‘[q]uestions of equity, representation, transparency and accountabil-
ity’ (Luck 2006: 115). Germany and Japan—the two great power ‘los-
ers’ of World War II that were deliberately excluded from the Council
in 1945—were demonstrably rehabilitated and had developed into some
of the UN’s most prolific sponsors. In the early 1990s, they teamed up
with two emerging powers, India and Brazil, to form the Group of Four
(G4), a minilateral pressure group demanding permanent seats for its
four members.
The groundswell of calls for Council reform prompted the General
Assembly to adopt a resolution (47/62 of 11 December 1992) calling
for an investigation into possible transformation of the Security Council.
The following year, the Assembly established an ‘Open Ended Working
Group’ on how to proceed. The debate, already politicised, became
mired in the technicalities of competing formulae (hence the rather pes-
simistic nickname ‘Never-Ending Working Group’). A large coalition of
states, the Uniting for Consensus (UfC) group, opposed the G4 bid and
declared that a global consensus was required for any structural change
to the Council. Significantly, the UfC included states that had histori-
cal enemies among the G4 countries (or concerns about some of them):
Pakistan opposing India; Italy worried about inclusion of Germany;
China and South Korea opposing Japan; Argentina being wary of Brazil;
and so on.
Amid the fractious debate, the African Union came up with the only
proposal that represented a unified regional position on the Security
Council’s reform. It was expressed through the AU’s (2005) Ezulwini
Consensus19 which claims two permanent seats with full veto powers and
no fewer than five non-permanent seats for African states.
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 233

When the USA by-passed the UN Security Council in March 2003

and invaded Iraq, it ignited a crisis in the authority of the Council. That
same year Secretary-General Kofi Annan set up his High-Level Panel
on Threats, Challenges and Change, partly to find ways in which the
Council’s efficacy and legitimacy could be strengthened. The panel con-
sidered the various proposals that were in circulation and came up with
two models that could be put to a General Assembly vote (a two-thirds
majority would be required to change the Charter provisions). Both of
the proposed models would see the Council enlarged to 24 members,
but its size and membership selection proved to be the easy part of the
formulae: the real problematic issue remained the issue of weighted vot-
ing. The high-level panel recommended that the veto should remain
limited to the traditional P-5, regardless of whether new permanent
members were appointed. The reason cited was the ‘divisiveness’ caused
by the use of the veto—an understatement for the bitter power politics it
is notorious for.
As the 2005 World Summit approached, hopes for institutional
reform dwindled. The various state coalitions could not overcome dis-
agreements about the veto issue, and when the General Assembly went
into session that year, not a single resolution on Security Council reform
was even put to the vote. The fact of the matter is that global realpoli-
tik finds its apex in the UN Security Council. The P-5 members, each
of whom relishes its own legally entrenched hegemony, are comfortably
watching the doomed debate. They have all paid lip service20 to the idea
of reform, knowing that it is well-nigh impossible for the almost 200 UN
members to agree on a solution.
Apart from the obvious fear and resentment that certain states har-
bour against others, the unique mandate of the Security Council com-
plicates potential alternatives to its structure. A recurring concern is that
of efficacy versus representativeness. Critics have warned that an enlarged
Security Council might become just another unwieldy ‘talk-shop’, a
change that would undermine its raison d’être of acting swiftly and deci-
sively in global crises. As UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon said, in a
comment related to wider UN multilateralism:

As the spokesperson for the world’s most universal body, I am, naturally,
an advocate for greater inclusivity in international decision-making … But
let me be clear – inclusiveness doesn’t mean we just expand the number
after the letter ‘G’. (Ban 2008)
234 Y. K. SPIES

Another concern is the jurisdiction of the Security Council. The Global

South, which generally considers the General Assembly to be the ‘parlia-
ment’ of the UN, wants to strengthen the oversight role of that ‘legisla-
tive’ organ. As expressed by the Non-Aligned Movement, the General
Assembly has to be accorded the ‘central role and position as the chief
deliberative, policy making and representative organ of the UN in all
matters, including those relating to international peace and security’
(NAM 2006: par. 39.3). (The NAM’s position is somewhat ironic, given
that the organisation accommodates the explicit ambitions of many states
who want to share in the power and prestige of the Security Council
vis-à-vis that of the General Assembly.)
The Security Council is often accused of encroaching on the politi-
cal jurisdiction of the General Assembly and other UN bodies, such as
the Human Rights Council and the Peace-Building Commission. Even
opponents of structural reform have conceded that the Council needs
more transparent and inclusive working methods. In a highly intercon-
nected world, its relations with the rest of the UN system and other
international actors are crucial, and nowhere more so than vis-à-vis
regional organisations. In line with this idea, the UfC group came up
with a proposal, tabled during April 2009, for a new (additional) cat-
egory of longer-term non-permanent seats to be assigned to regional
groups. The example of the AU’s marginalisation during the 2011
Libya intervention confirmed the imperative of regional groups’ role in
Security Council deliberations. Regional ‘ownership’ is increasingly con-
sidered necessary for legitimacy and at a practical level allows for imple-
mentation of the subsidiarity21 principle.
At a practical level, the issue of a given state’s eligibility to take up a
permanent UNSC seat has been hotly debated. The UN Charter actually
does not specify any criteria, and critics warn that meaningful structural
reform should not just be quantitative (expanding the Council to make
it more representative) but also qualitative, so that the Council can per-
form what it was designed to do. This means that members should be
strong and stable with the capacity (funds, troops, diplomatic infrastruc-
ture) to underwrite international interventions. Since the creation of
the UN, several states (Germany and Japan come to mind, but there are
more) have proven themselves exceptional in terms of building the UN’s
diplomatic, financial and peacekeeping capacity. This much was acknowl-
edged in the high-level report of 2004: it proposed that eligibility criteria
be widened to include the states that contribute generously to the UN
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 235

while not necessarily finding themselves in the same league as the P-5
when it comes to hard power.
The most elusive criterion is probably political will. A state that
declares itself willing and able to take up a permanent seat should have
the will to take on the full responsibility of the job—because it entails
extremely difficult decisions. As Qobo (2011: 10) notes:

The short history of the current global governance mechanism is replete

with lessons on the necessity and burdens of leadership. It is a position that
is impossible without responsibility and cost.

After the disappointment of the 2005 World Summit, the debate on

Security Council reform lost much of its steam, but it continues never-
theless. For as long as the Council takes life and death decisions about
millions of people, its structure will be contested and it will be a magnet
for ambitious states.
It is rare for a state to decline an opportunity to serve in the most
powerful institution on earth, but on 18 October 2013, Saudi Arabia
did exactly that. The previous day it (together with Chad, Chile,
Lithuania and Nigeria) had been elected by the UN General Assembly
as a non-permanent Security Council member for the 2014–2015 term.
However, to the astonishment of the UN members, the foreign ministry
of Saudi Arabia announced that the country would not take up the seat.
It declared the move a protest against ‘the manner, the mechanisms of
action and double standards’ of the Council (What’s In Blue 2013).
Rather than devising formulae for a physical change in the Security
Council, analysts and strategists are increasingly observing and propos-
ing alternative approaches to deal with global political governance. As
discussed in previous chapters, it is now a given that multilayered mul-
tilateralism takes place in the diplomatic arena, and in practice, this
means that the Security Council, notwithstanding its legal mandate,
cannot take decisions in isolation. At any given stage, consultations take
place—informally in the back rooms and corridors, and formally in the
boardrooms—with a multitude of state and non-state stakeholders. The
emerging modus operandi is that negotiations on the most difficult issues
take place outside of the Security Council until such time as a consensus
or feasible majority is achieved, at which time the Council meets to take
a formal decision. The Council thus acts as a sort of high-level ‘summit’
that ratifies the diplomatic groundwork done prior to and outside of its
236 Y. K. SPIES

actual meeting. This has been ‘a matter of pragmatic evolution’ (Ditchley

Foundation 2010).
Moreover, in the mandate field of the Security Council—international
peace and security—regional actors are emerging as the most legiti-
mate actors. This development demands, as Björn Hettne and Fredrik
Söderbaum (2006: 231) argue, that the Security Council evolve from its
traditional but ‘undemocratic plurilateralism’ towards a ‘horizontal com-
bination of regional and global agencies’.

5.2   The Financial and Economic Arena of Global Governance

From a Global South perspective, demands for transformation of the
global system are rooted in historical grievances about the enforce-
ment of international market-capitalism, the terms of which are seen
as rigged in favour of the economies that control the system: the rich
Western states of the Global North. During his first, lengthy stint as
Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad (1999) bluntly accused
the West of ‘insidious’ economic hegemony, calling it ‘colonisation by
another name’. The economic ‘struggle’ to correct fundamental imbal-
ances has therefore manifested in attempts to establish an accountable,
equitable and predictable, rule-based global trade regime with develop-
ment at its core.
As from the end of World War II, economic global governance was
centred in the Bretton Woods system, predominantly the World Bank
and IMF. As international society became larger and more diverse
towards the end of the twentieth century, the weighted voting system
and entrenched practices in leadership selection of these two institutions
grew in contention. Much as the Security Council did in the domain of
political governance, the Bretton Woods institutions reflected structural
power and minority domination in the ‘architecture’ of economic global
governance, mirroring the immediate post-World War II era. By virtue
of a Western ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ (decided within the exclusive con-
text of the G7), the World Bank’s president has historically been a USA
candidate, whereas the IMF’s managing director has been European.
Not surprisingly, critics have argued that the process is illegitimate when
nationality rather than merit is the qualifying consideration, and when
the selection process is opaque (Bradlow 2012).
In the aftermath of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis, the global
consensus was that the domain of economic governance needed to be
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 237

strengthened and legitimised. Western powers seemed to heed the calls

for reform in the leadership selection process of the two institutions, but
just a few years later, in 2011, France’s Christine Lagarde was selected
to replace Dominic Strauss-Kahn (also from France) who had suddenly
resigned. Her appointment riled critics, especially from the ranks of
emerging powers. The same critics were outraged just a year later, in July
2012, when Robert Zoellick stepped down as President of the World
Bank simply to be replaced by yet another US candidate, Jim Yong Kim.
In the latter case, several very competent and respected candidates from
the Global South had been nominated, including Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala,
a former finance minister of Nigeria who had served as managing direc-
tor of the World Bank from 2007 to 2011.
In both instances, valuable opportunities were lost to make these
institutions more responsive to the evolving needs of its diverse stake-
holders (Bradlow 2012). Qobo (2011: 14) observes that Western sup-
port for an emerging country candidate would have been ‘a sign of
maturity and … a willingness to embrace reform of global governance
institutions and a commitment to building bridges with the emerging
powers’. Evidently, Western hegemony in these two institutions contin-
ues to be deeply entrenched.
Within the context of the OECD, there has been more progress in
governance transformation. Long considered a club of rich Western
states, the organisation was consistently headed by candidates from the
Global North until 2006, when Ángel Gurría, a Mexican economist and
former foreign minister, became the first ‘Southern’ Secretary-General of
the organisation. During May 2015, the OECD members voted to renew
his contract until 2021, a clear vote of confidence in Gurría’s competence
and authority by the (then) 34 powerful members of the OECD.
Another contested forum of global economic governance is the
World Trade Organisation. When the organisation was launched in 1995
(resulting from the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations
that transformed the GATT), it established unprecedented multilateral
regulation of all forms of international trade. The WTO’s dispute set-
tlement mechanism and its mandate to enforce sanctions allowed weak
states for the first time ever to obtain redress against big powers when
threatened with unilateral action. Woolcock and Bayne (2013: 392) con-
clude that the economic diplomacy within the WTO has demonstrated
how the world has become multipolar, because agreements have to be
inclusive—in contrast to the GATT era when OECD countries, under
238 Y. K. SPIES

leadership of the USA, could determine the agenda and outcomes of

trade negotiations. Moreover, emerging economies such as China, India
and Brazil have real influence and they have proven themselves willing to
use it in order to counter Western hegemony.
The need for global and regional representativeness at the executive
level was acknowledged in 2013 when Roberto Azevêdo from Brazil
was elected as WTO Director-General. He promptly announced his
four Deputy Directors-General, respectively, the candidates from China,
Germany, Nigeria and the USA; thereby ensuring that the top deci-
sion-making level represented five different continents.
The notoriously difficult trade negotiations within the ambit of the
WTO have started to rival the intensity of the United Nations as a
global diplomatic arena. Nonetheless, the most significant manifestation
of transformation in global economic governance has been the devel-
opment of the G20. It was conceived when the Asian financial crisis of
1997/1998 sounded alarm bells about the ability of existing multilat-
eral institutions to address structural financial and economic problems.
As a result of the crisis, the G20 was established during 1999 as a caucus
group of finance ministers and central bank governors to meet within the
context of global governance institutions. The objective was to facilitate
pre-emptive as well as remedial discussions about international economic
challenges.
In 2000, the South Summit mandated a group of leaders from the
ranks of the Global South to interact with the G8 in a more strategic
manner. The delegation consisted of South Africa’s Thabo Mbeki in his
capacity as joint chairman of NAM and the Commonwealth; Abdelaziz
Bouteflika of Algeria as outgoing chairman of the Organisation of
African Unity, Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria as chairman of the G77
and Thailand’s Chuan Leekpai as chairman of UNCTAD. The result was
that the G8 summit held in Okinawa during July of that same year was
addressed—for the first time in the summit’s history—by a delegation
representing the Global South. The summit outcome was a historic com-
mitment by G8 leaders to make poverty reduction the focus of global
relations during the twenty-first century (G8 2000).
The first step was taken in 2005 when the G8 at its Gleneagles
Summit formalised its annual deliberations with five leader states from
the Developing World: Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa,
the so-called Outreach Five. The associative diplomatic partner-
ship became known as the G8+5 and was regularised when the 2007
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 239

Heiligendamm Summit in Germany established a schedule for regular

ministerial meetings. It was ‘a transitional step in the direction of inclu-
siveness’, as Gordon Smith (2011: 5) puts it.
Very soon after its inception, the G8+5 was faced with a massive chal-
lenge, when during 2007 it became apparent that the world was enter-
ing a financial crisis of epic proportions. It had started in the developed
Western economies and therefore, as Hocking et al. (2013: 3) phrase
it, ‘called into question the worth of previously dominant western eco-
nomic theories and systems’. The financial implosion of Greece, in the
belly of the previously unassailable EU, threatened to destabilise the
most egalitarian, stable and affluent region in the world.
The G8 on its own was not able to resolve or even manage the cri-
sis: its own members were badly hit, while the emerging powers were
weathering the storm far more easily (Woolcock and Bayne 2013: 397).
Beyond the issue of the G8’s legitimacy (as an exclusive ‘Northern’
club), at a practical level it was now clear that the global economy
required interventions beyond the capacity of the G8. At this point, the
G20, previously only a ‘technical’ support group, moved centre stage.
During November 2008, the group addressed the global crisis at heads
of state level in Washington, DC. In their outcome declaration, the
assembled leaders announced:

We are committed to advancing the reform of the Bretton Woods

Institutions so that they can more adequately reflect changing economic
weights in the world economy in order to increase their legitimacy and
effectiveness. In this respect, emerging and developing economies, includ-
ing the poorest countries, should have greater voice and representation.
(G20 2008)

A year later, at its Pittsburgh Summit in September 2009, the G20, com-
prised of the systemically most important economies from the industrial-
ised as well as developing worlds, formally supplanted the G8 as engine
of global economic governance (G20 2009). Its various working groups
set out to realise wide-ranging reform in, and replenish the resources of,
the World Bank, IMF and other forums of global economic governance.
From the outset, the G20 worked on regulatory reform and coor-
dination of the macroeconomic policies of its members so as to correct
the balance of payment problems that had ignited the crisis. Woolcock
and Bayne (2013: 398) observe that the G20—in contrast with the G8,
240 Y. K. SPIES

which had become ‘detached’—ensured a close working relationship

with the IMF. This allowed for negotiations on expanding voting rights
of emerging economies, while reducing the European dominance of the
IMF’s Executive Board. It also exerted its influence to ensure strength-
ening of the authority of the two regulating bodies (the financial ‘sta-
bility nets’), namely the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) vis-à-vis the private banks
and other actors (Woods 2010: 51; Woolcock and Bayne 2013: 398).
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the G20’s evolu-
tion. Mahbubani (2013: 251) says the first two G20 Summits, during
November 2008 and April 2009, respectively, ‘played a critical role in
saving the world from going over a financial precipice’. The organisation
succeeded because of its inclusion of a range of leader states that could
act decisively, mobilise resources and design action plans with speed
(Woods 2010: 63). The assumption of a global economic engine role
also allowed the G20 to drive changes in the decision-making processes
(if not yet leadership profile!) of the IMF and the World Bank.
Coinciding with the rise of the G20 has been a ‘wave of institutional
entrepreneurship’ and ‘forum shopping’ by the emerging powers, as
Stuenkel (2016: 38, 45) describes it. As mentioned, various diplomatic
clubs have emerged that connect emerging powers in the Global South.
Within the BRICS, in particular, there have been efforts to challenge the
hegemony of the Bretton Woods institutions. The most notable initiative
has been the creation, during July 2014, of the New Development Bank
(NDB). It was established by treaty and entered into force in July 2015,
with its headquarters in Shanghai, China.22

6   Conclusion
The structure of power in the early twenty-first-century diplomatic arena
is immensely complex: multiple overlapping, transient and situational cen-
tres of power, both geopolitical and means-centred, coincide with older,
enduring patterns of hegemony. This reality brings uncertainty, but also
scope for innovation, in the forums where world affairs are determined.
One of the most significant changes to the (still by and large) US-led
order is the distribution of economic power. In this regard, the diplomacy
of emerging powers has had a major impact on global economics and,
inevitably, also on global politics. But while they are wresting power away
from the Global North, these new powers are reproducing microcosms of
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 241

global structural power within the Global South. As semi-peripheral states

they display hugely different economic agendas and concomitant diplo-
matic strategies, from that of their peripheral counterparts—the many
poor and weak states of the world. Therefore, while emerging powers
advocate for systemic change, many observers wonder whether the power
game they play is simply one of ‘musical chairs’.
Some emerging powers simultaneously display the traits of ‘middle
powers’: states that take leadership through, and prioritise the use of,
diplomacy; not because they lack recourse to other instruments of for-
eign policy, but because they see themselves as (and are perceived by oth-
ers to be) the sherpas of international society. They socialise other states
into the norms of international society, herd them towards inclusive mul-
tilateralism and polylateralism and encourage them to disarm. In forums
of global governance, they are the class captains and the peace brokers.
Middle power therefore finds expression in behaviour rather than quanti-
fiable capabilities.
Middle powers have also guided the global community of states
towards making the long-time quest of the Developing World a global
mission. Since the end of the Cold War, the discourse on develop-
ment cooperation has been mainstreamed in global diplomacy, and the
semantics and practice thereof have matured. The approach is much
more pragmatic, and the emphasis is on partnership and sustainability.
Importantly, the previously disconnected global agendas on security and
development have been linked, and this implies a much more compre-
hensive effort to address the challenges facing humankind.
A goal that remains elusive is the reform of institutionalised structural
power. The world faces a barrage of problems that are clearly impossi-
ble to address by states on their own, and the case for inclusive multilat-
eral management of the global commons seems obvious. Why then does
global governance—in particular political global governance—prove so
impervious to reform? Weiss and Wilkinson (2014: 213) offer a succinct
argument: ‘Everything is globalised—that is, everything except politics.
The policy, authority, and resources necessary for tackling such prob-
lems remain vested in individual states rather than collectively in univer-
sal institutions’. The supremely powerful UN Security Council has been
particularly immune to structural change.
In the domain of global economic governance, there have been mixed
results to reform initiatives. The emergence of the G20, with its synergy
among leader states from across the world, has been the most significant.
242 Y. K. SPIES

The 2007/2008 global financial crisis demonstrated definitively that a

Western diplomatic club cannot ‘manage’ the world economy. Lessons
can be learned here as concerns the deadlock on UNSC reform: just
as G8 partnerships with emerging powers paved the way for a G8-G20
transition, the Security Council is also in de facto transition through its
increasing reliance on associative diplomacy with other organisations,
regional organisations specifically. The de facto power of the anachronis-
tic Council will eventually be eroded by ‘elastic multilateralism’, as for-
mer Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon (2008) refers to the pragmatic turn
in global governance.
Diplomacy, the bedrock of international society, paradoxically also
remains its strongest vehicle for change. As Paul Sharp (2009:34) says:
‘Indeed, in this sense, it may be claimed that diplomacy and diplomats
have been at the heart of every profound transformation in the structures
and processes of international relations that has ever taken place’. In the
contemporary era, this notion is encapsulated by structural diplomacy, as
it prioritises development, participation and governance.

Notes
1. Weiss and Wilkinson (2014: 208) decry the analytical murkiness of the
term global governance, noting that it has become ‘a new analytical cot-
tage industry’ and that it is ‘used and abused by academics and policy-
makers’ because it is applied indiscriminately, to just about any institution
with global reach.
2. Caution is required: in the extreme sense of the word, polypolarity could
imply a paradox in that poles would be considered randomly interchange-
able. This is obviously not (yet) the case in a global system where the sov-
ereignty of states continues to be the bedrock of international law.
3. Turkey’s NATO membership is an opportunistic inclusion, given that
the Muslim state has consistently been denied entry into the European
Union for political and economic (and, one could argue, religious)
reasons.
4. In 1998, Indian entrepreneur Pramod Bhasin had the groundbreaking
idea that English-speaking Indians, working from India, could answer
customer calls coming into US businesses. He set up India’s first call
centre ‘with just 18 employees taking calls in an office where the booths
were divided by saris hanging from the ceiling’ (BBC 2015). Bhasin’s
idea was an instant success, because he offered a competitive service by
charging just a fraction of the price asked in the home country.
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 243

5. Saudi Arabia led the embargo against Qatar, joined by Bahrain, UAE and
Egypt (certain other Muslim states joined the effort, later). The four
countries claimed that Qatar had been meddling in their internal affairs;
supported political Islamic groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood;
funded terror groups; and was in cahoots with Iran.
6. Stuenkel (2016: 39) makes the interesting observation that China, in its
enthusiasm for establishing multilateral banks, is allowing itself to be more
rather than less constrained by other states. It therefore chooses the mul-
tilateral rather than the unilateral option, just as the USA did after World
War II.
7. India and Pakistan, previously observer states, became full members of the
SCO on 9 June 2017. As of June 2017, the following states held SCO
observer status: Afghanistan, Belarus, Iran and Mongolia.
8. The term can be attributed to Robert Cox (1989), who investigated the
role of intermediate states in the order of global power.
9. Note that in IR literature there is no firm analytical bracket for middle
power. Some analysts dispute the label, and some prefer to use terms such
as ‘pivot’ states.
10. As of June 2018, the New Agenda Coalition comprised of Brazil, Egypt,
Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand and South Africa.
11. The middle power debate predates the twentieth century. Evidence of
writing on middle power behaviour can be traced back as far as classical
antiquity in the writings of Kautilya and during the Renaissance in the
writings of Machiavellia and Botero. In the nineteenth century, it was
evident in Carl von Clausewitz’ philosophising on moral aspects of mili-
tary positioning. The common thread in these musings was the profile of
a ‘good neighbour’, buffer states that kept enemies apart on account of
themselves being neither too small nor too powerful.
12. Named after the place where it was signed, Cotonou (Benin), the Treaty
entered into force in 2003.
13. The eight MDGs were as follows: Goal one: Eradicate extreme poverty
and hunger; Goal two: Achieve universal primary education; Goal three:
Promote gender equality and empower women; Goal four: Reduce
child mortality; Goal five: Improve maternal health; Goal six: Combat
HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; Goal seven: Ensure environ-
mental sustainability; Goal eight: Develop a global partnership for
development.
14. The follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development
to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus was held
in Doha (Qatar) from 29 November to 2 December 2008. As could be
expected, the conference was somewhat overshadowed by the impact of
the global financial crisis.
244 Y. K. SPIES

15. The ‘pledge paradox’ implies inversely proportionate size of promised aid,

compared to that which actually arrives. One example: during 2005, the
G8 at Gleneagles and the UN Millennium + 5 committed $80bn, to rise
to $130bn by 2010, with 60% earmarked for Africa. Not even one-third
was realised.
16. The Seoul Development Consensus identifies nine areas in developing
countries that are most in need of attention: 1) infrastructure, 2) private
investment and job creation, 3) human resource development, 4) trade,
5) financial inclusion, 6) resilient growth, 7) food security, 8) domestic
resource mobilisation and 9) knowledge sharing.
17. The date selected was 19 December, but during 2011 the General
Assembly agreed to change the date to 12 September to mark the
day in 1978 when the Buenos Aires Plan of Action for Promoting and
Implementing Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries was
adopted (UN 2017).
18. Weiss and Wilkinson (2014: 208) observe that the 1995 report coincided
with the first issue of the journal Global Governance, produced by the
Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACUNS). Evidently,
the issue of governance was ‘trending’ at the global level.
19. The word ‘consensus’ in the title is somewhat misleading. The AU’s July
2005 Sirte Declaration, which endorsed the Ezulwini Consensus, was
adopted by majority decision, not by consensus. The misnomer has been
played out in robust debate within Africa on realising Security Council
reform (beyond mere rhetoric) and attempts (thus far not successful) to
seek a less rigid, more feasible strategy to seat Africa at the highest table
of global political governance.
20. Russia and China have expressed their support for the aspirations of
South Africa, India and Brazil (BRICS: Sanya Declaration 14 April 2011:
par. 8), and other P-5 members have also expressed support for one or
more prospective candidates: the UK and France both make conciliatory
noises about Africa (their colonial backyard) and the USA has expressed
support for India (explicitly during President Obama’s 2010 state visit to
India).
21. Subsidiarity is a political principle and holds that the central authority in
any system should only do what cannot be done by lower authorities.
Decisions should therefore be taken at the lowest possible level, closest to
where they are to apply.
22. China also initiated the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB).
Proposed in 2013, it was established in October 2014 as a multilateral
initiative. As of July 2017, it had 56 member states.
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 245

Sources Used
Acharya, A. (2008, September 17–20). Regional Worlds in a Post-Hegemonic
Era. Keynote Speech, 3rd GARNET Annual Conference, Bordeaux.
African Union (AU). (2005, March 7–8). The Common African Position on
the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: “The Ezulwini Consensus”.
Executive Council of the African Union, 7th Extraordinary Session, Addis
Ababa. Ext/Ex.Cl/2 (VII).
Annan, K. (2000, April 3). We the Peoples. Secretary-General’s Statement to
the United Nations General Assembly on the Occasion of His Delivery of
the Millennium Report. New York, NY. Internet Web-Site. Accessed on 25
September 2000. http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/state.htm.
Annan, K. (2005, March 21). In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security
and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General Prepared for the
General Assembly’s Millennium + 5 Summit. New York.
Associated Press (AP), Beijing. (2017, July 11). China Sends Forces to
1st Military Base Abroad, in Djibouti. ABC News. Available at http://
abcnews.go.com/International/wireStor y/china-dispatches-militar y-
personnel-djibouti-base-48564707.
Australia, Commonwealth of Minister of Foreign Affairs. (2014, June 18). The
New Aid Paradigm. Media Release. Available at http://foreignminister.gov.
au/releases/Pages/2014/jb_mr_140618.aspx.
Ban Ki-Moon. (2008, November 29). Secretary-General Calls for Genuine,
‘Elastic Multilateralism’ to Tackle Global Challenges Simultaneously. UN Press
Release at the International Conference on Financing for Development, Doha.
Barston, R. P. (2006). Modern Diplomacy (3rd ed.). London: Pearson and
Longman.
BBC. (2015, January 13). The Man Who Opened India’s First Call Centre.
BBC News, Magazine: ‘Witness’. http://www.bbc.com/news/av/magazine-
30729450/the-man-who-opened-india-s-first-call-centre.
Bellamy, A. J. (2010). The Responsibility to Protect and Australian Foreign
Policy. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 64(4), 432–448.
Boutros-Ghali, B. (1994, May 6). An Agenda for Development. Report by the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. A/48/935.
Bradlow, D. (2012, March 9). We Must Lead in Putting Africa First. Mail
and Guardian. Available at http://mg.co.za/article/2012-03-09-we-
must-lead-in-putting-africa-first.
BRICS. (2011, April 14). Sanya Declaration. BRICS Leaders Meeting, Sanya,
Hainan, China. Available at https://www.saiia.org.za/images/stories/
research/chap/sanya_declaration_brics_april_2011.pdf.
Buzan, B., & Wæver, O. (2003). Regions and Powers: The Structure of
International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
246 Y. K. SPIES

Calvert, S., & Calvert, P. (1996). Politics and Society in the Third World: An
Introduction. London: Prentice Hall.
Chapnick, A. (2000). The Canadian Middle Power Myth. International Journal,
55(2) (Spring), 188–206.
Commission on Global Governance. (1995). Our Global Neighbourhood. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Committee for the Abolition of the Third World Debt (CADTM).
(2016). Internet Home Page of the CADTM. http://cadtm.org/
Heavily-Indebted-Poor-Countries.
Cooper, A. F. (2009). Middle Powers: Squeezed Out or Adaptive? Public
Diplomacy Magazine, 2 (Summer), 29–34.
Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R. A., & Nossal, K. R. (Eds.). (1993). Relocating Middle
Powers. Vancouver: UBC Press.
Cooper, A. F., Hocking, B., & Maley, W. (2008). Introduction: Diplomacy and
Global Governance: Locating Patterns of (Dis)Connection. In A. F. Cooper,
B. Hocking, & W. Maley (Eds.), Global Governance and Diplomacy: Worlds
Apart? London and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Copeland, D. (2013, August). Diplomacy, Globalization and Heteropolarity: The
Challenge of Adaptation. Policy Paper, Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs
Institute.
Cox, R. (1989). Middlepowermanship, Japan and Future World Order.
International Journal, 44(4), 823–862.
de Mello, E. B. (2014, January–June). New Independent Foreign Policy, a
Matter of Emphasis. Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International
Relations, 3(5), 245–269.
Ditchley Foundation. (2010, March 4–6). A Note by the Director, Following a
Conference on The Functions and Purposes of Modern Diplomacy, Ditchley.
http://www.ditchley.co.uk/conferences/past-programme/2010-2019/2010/
modern-diplomacy. Accessed on 29 January 2013.
European Commission. (2017). ACP—The Cotonou Agreement. Internet
Website of the European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/
regions/african-caribbean-and-pacific-acp-region/cotonou-agreement_en.
Accessed on 30 June 2017.
Evans, G. (2011, June 29). Middle Power Diplomacy. Inaugural Edgardo
Boeninger Memorial Lecture by Gareth Evans at the Chile Pacific
Foundation, Santiago. Internet: http://www.gevans.org/speeches/
speech441.html. Accessed on 11 August 2014.
Fukuyama, F. (1989). The End of History? The National Interest, 16(Summer),
3–18.
G8. (2000, July 21–23). Communiqué Following the 26th Summit by the
Leaders of the G8. Okinawa. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/sum-
mit/2000/documents/index.html. Accessed on 7 July 2017.
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 247

G8. (2002, July 27). Africa Action Plan. Summit of the Heads of State and
Government of the G8. Kananaskis. www.g7.utoronto.ca/summit/2002ka-
nanaskis/africaplan.html.
G20. (2008, November 15). Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets
and the World Economy. Washington, DC. http://www.un.org/ga/presi-
dent/63/commission/declarationG20.pdf. Accessed on 6 July 2017.
G20. (2009, September 24–25). Leaders’ Statement. G20 Pittsburgh Summit.
Accessed via Internet on 9 June 2010, at http://www.g20.org/Documents/
pittsburgh_summit_leaders_statement_250909.pdf.
G20. (2010, November 12). Seoul Development Consensus for Shared Growth.
G20 Leaders’ Summit in Seoul, South Korea.
Geldenhuys, D. (2006). South Africa’s Role as International Norm
Entrepreneur. In W. Carlsnaes & P. Nel (Eds.), In Full Flight: South African
Foreign Policy After Apartheid. Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue.
Gilboa, E. (2009). The Public Diplomacy of Middle Powers. Public Diplomacy
Magazine, 2(Summer), 22–28.
Haass, R. N. (2008, May/June). The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow US
Dominance? Foreign Affairs, 87(3), 44–56.
Habib, A., & Selinyane, N. (2006). Constraining the Unconstrained: Civil
Society and South Africa’s Hegemonic Obligations in Africa. In W. Carlsnaes
& P. Nel (Eds.), In Full Flight: South African Foreign Policy After Apartheid
(pp. 175–181). Midrand: Institute for Global Dialogue.
Hettne, B., & Söderbaum, F. (2006, July). The UN and Regional Organisations
in Global Security: Competing or Complementary Logics? Global Governance:
A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations, 12(3), 227–232.
Hocking, B. Melissen, J. Riordan, S., & Sharp, P. (2013, April). Whither
Foreign Ministries in a Post-Western World? Clingendael Policy Brief No. 20,
Clingendael Institute.
Holbraad, C. (1984). Middle Powers in International Politics. London:
Macmillan Press.
Huntington, S. P. (1999, March/April). The Lonely Superpower. Foreign
Affairs, 78(2), 35–49.
Inoue, C. Y. A., & Vaz, A. C. (2012). Brazil as ‘Southern Donor’: Beyond
Hierarchy and National Interests in Development Cooperation? Cambridge
Review of International Affairs, 25(4), 507–534.
Jordaan, E. (2003, November). The Concept of a Middle Power in International
Relations: Distinguishing Between Emerging and Traditional Middle Powers.
Politikon, 30(2), 165–181.
Luck, E. C. (2006). UN Security Council: Practice and Promise. Abingdon:
Routledge.
Mahathir, M. (1999, October 26). Speech by the Prime Minister of Malaysia to
the Africa-Asia Business Forum. Kuala Lumpur.
248 Y. K. SPIES

Mahbubani, K. (2013). Multilateral Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper, J. Heine, &

R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Malone, D. M. (2013). The Modern Diplomatic Mission. In A. F. Cooper, J.
Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mudida, R. (2012). Emerging Trends and Concerns in the Economic Diplomacy
of African States. International Journal of Diplomacy and Economy, 1(1),
95–109.
New Zealand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2011). United Nations
Handbook 2011/2012. Wellington: MOFAT.
New Zealand, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade. (2014). Official Website.
http://www.mfat.govt.nz/Foreign-Relations/1-Global-Issues/Disarmament/0--
Nuclear/0-new-agenda-coalition.php. Accessed on 7 August 2014.
Nganje, F. (2013, May). Decentralised South-South Cooperation and South
Africa’s Post-conflict Support in Africa: What Role for SADPA? Africa Institute
of South Africa Policy Brief No. 87.
Nolte, D. (2007, May 7–12). How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical
Concepts and Research Topics. GIGA German Institute of Global and Area
Studies, Hamburg. Paper Prepared for Delivery at the ECPR Joint Session of
Workshops, Helsinki.
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). (2006, September 11–16). Plan of Action:
2006–2009. Policy Adopted by the XIV Summit of Heads of State or
Government of the NAM. Havana.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2016).
Information Note: History of the 0.7% ODA Target. (Original Text from
DAC Journal 2002, 3(4), III-9–III-11; Revised March 2016.) Internet
Website of the OECD. https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ODA-history-of-
the-0-7-target.pdf. Accessed on 19 July 2017.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2017a).
The Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Five Principles for Smart Aid.
OECD Internet Website. Available at http://www.oecd.org/development/
effectiveness/45827300.pdf.
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2017b).
Global Relations, Key Partners. Website of the OECD. Available at http://
www.oecd.org/globalrelations/keypartners/. Accessed on 25 July 2017.
Qobo, M. (2011, September). Emerging Powers and the Changing Global
Environment: Leadership, Norms and Institutions. SAIIA Occasional Paper.
No. 91.
Shaw, T. M, Cooper, A. F., & Chin, G. T. (2009, April). Emerging Powers and
Africa: Implications for/from Global Governance? Politikon, 36(1), 27–44.
 6 STRUCTURAL DIPLOMACY: DEVELOPMENT, PARTICIPATION … 249

Smith, G. S. (2011, May). G7 to G8 to G20: Evolution in Global Governance.

CIGI G20 Papers No. 6.
Spies, Y. K. (2008, May). The Multilateral Maze and (South) Africa’s Quest for
Permanent United Nations Security Council Representation. Strategic Review
for Southern Africa, 1, 96–122.
Spies, Y. K. (2010). South Africa’s Multilateral Challenges in a ‘Polypolar’
World. The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs,
45(4), 73–91.
Stimson Centre. (2011, February). Forging a 21st-Century Diplomatic Service
for the United States Through Professional Education and Training. Report
for the Henry L. Stimson Center, American Foreign Service Association, and
American Academy of Diplomacy.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). (2017). SIPRI
Military Expenditure Database. Website of SIPRE. Avaliable at https://www.
sipri.org/databases/milex. Accessed on 25 July 2017.
Stuenkel, O. (2016). The BRICS: Seeking Privileges by Constructing and
Running Multilateral Institutions. Global Summitry, 2(1), 38–53.
The Hindu. (2013, November 25). Indian Diplomacy Has Delivered in Spite of
Frugal Means: NSA. Available at http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/
tp-national/tp-newdelhi/indian-diplomacy-ha.
Transparency International. (2016). Website of Transparency International.
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_
index_2016. Accessed on 1 November 2017.
Ungerer, C. (2007). The ‘Middle Power’ Concept in Australian Foreign Policy.
Australian Journal of Politics and History, 53(4), 538–551.
United Nations (UN). (2004, December). A More Secure World: Our Shared
Responsibility. Report of the Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on
Threats, Challenges and Change, A/59/565.
United Nations (UN). (2017, September 12). United Nations Day for South-
South Cooperation: Background. Official Website of the UN. Available at
http://www.un.org/en/events/southcooperationday/background.shtml.
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (1992, December 11). Question
of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security
Council. Resolution. 47/62.
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (2000, September 8). United
Nations Millennium Declaration. Resolution 55/2, Adopted by the United
Nations Millennium Summit of Heads of State or Government. New York.
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (2009, December 1–3). Report of
the High-Level United Nations Conference on South-South Cooperation.
Nairobi. A/CONF.215/2.
250 Y. K. SPIES

United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (2015a, July 13–16, 27). Addis
Ababa Action Agenda. Outcome Document of the Third International
Conference on Financing for Development, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Endorsed
by the General Assembly in Its Resolution 69/313.
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). (2015b, September 25).
Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
Resolution A/RES/70/1.
United Nations News Service. (2008, November 29). In Doha, Ban Urges
‘Bold’ Steps to Prevent Financial Turmoil Becoming Human Crisis. Published
On-Line on by the UN News Centre. http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.
asp?NewsID=29125#. Accessed on 25 July 2017.
Varghese, P. (2013, November 7). The Challenges of Multilateralism. Sir James
Plimsoll Lecture, Delivered by the Secretary of the Department of Foreign
Affairs and Trade, Australia. https://www.dfat.gov.au/media/speeches/
department/131107-plimsoll.html#site-header.
Vella, G. F. (1998, February). Opening Address by Dr. G. F. Vella, Deputy
Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Environment of
Malta, to the International Conference on Modern Diplomacy, Malta. In
J. Kurbalija (Ed.), Modern Diplomacy. Malta: Mediterranean Academy of
Diplomatic Studies, University of Malta.
Vickers, B. (2012 b). Towards a New Aid Paradigm: South Africa as African
Development Partner. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 25(4), 535–556.
Vom Hau, M., Scott, J., & Hulme, D. (2012). Beyond the BRICs: Alternative
Strategies of Influence in the Global Politics of Development. European
Journal of Development Research, 24, 187–204.
Weiss, T. G., & Wilkinson, R. (2014). Rethinking Global Governance? Complexity,
Authority, Power, Change. International Studies Quarterly, 58, 207–215.
What’s In Blue. (2013, October 18). Security Council Elections: Options After
Saudi Arabia Rejects Its Seat. http://www.whatsinblue.org/2013/10/secu-
rity-council-elections-options-after-saudi-arabia-rejects-its-seat.php. Accessed
on 21 October 2013.
Wilson, D., & Purushothaman, R. (2003, October 1). Dreaming with BRICS:
The Path to 2050. Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper (99).
Wilson, D., & Stupnytska, A. (2007). The N-11: More Than an Acronym. In
J. O’Neill (Ed.), BRICS and Beyond (Chapter 11). Goldman Sachs Global
Economics Research Paper Collection.
Woods, N. (2010, January). Global Governance After the Financial Crisis: A
New Multilateralism or the Last Gasp of the Great Powers? Global Policy,
1(1), 51–63.
Woolcock, S., & Bayne, N. (2013). Economic Diplomacy. In A. F. Cooper,
J. Heine, & R. Thakur (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
 CHAPTER 7

Conclusion

Diplomacy, the currency of international society, allows practitioners to

traverse a diverse and diversifying world. This assertion sounds conclu-
sive and positive, but it is not unproblematic. Diplomacy is an under-
studied institution, international society is a contested notion, and the
diversifying world, frankly, is bewildering in its complexity. I will flesh
out my contention by first looking at the practical nature of the diplo-
matic domain, before I revisit salient points of the book and end with a
summative perspective on diplomacy.
When one looks at the contemporary diplomatic arena, a first obser-
vation is its density. It is, in a word, crowded. In the early twenty-first
century, there are more sovereign states than ever before, and each of
them deploys diplomats. The numbers range from a few dozen, in the
case of micro-states, to several thousand, in the case of large powers such
as China and France. The practical implication is that an unprecedented
number of formal—official, or de jure—diplomats are operating in the
world.
If formal diplomats are those that are subject to diplomatic law, interna-
tional civil servants must also be included. This is a diplomatic category that
has evolved only during the past century; a symptom of the proliferation
of international organisations. Most of these organisations have secretariats
that are staffed in a similar way as foreign ministries, and many of them rep-
licate the foreign ministry practice of establishing representative missions to
states or (other) organisations. This additional layer of diplomacy further
fuels the sheer number of diplomats active at any given time.

© The Author(s) 2019 251

Y. K. Spies, Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00530-6_7
252 Y. K. SPIES

While the contemporary era sees a record number of de jure dip-

lomats at work, an even greater number of de facto diplomats oper-
ate within the global domain. They signify what is variously called the
‘democratisation’, ‘publicisation’ or ‘degovernmentalisation’ of diplo-
macy. A growing number of actors other than sovereign states and
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) demand, and end up provid-
ing, inputs in diplomatic processes. At the intra-state level, their ‘diplo-
macy’ is handled by officials who promote the international relations
of other government departments, quasi-state entities and sub-state
authorities such as municipalities and provinces. By the same token,
multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs),
civil movements, and a host of other actors perforate and transcend
political borders in the course of conducting their global relations. If
they were historically discounted in the state-centric Westphalian inter-
national system, they are now all part of the transnational quilt that
diplomacy has become.
If the absolute quantity of diplomatic activity has increased exponen-
tially, a further observation is that the quality of diplomatic interactions
has also changed dramatically. Styles and techniques have been affected
by the number and variety of actors that compete for influence, making
the institution of diplomacy more varied and representative of interna-
tional society’s ‘demographics’.
A third observation is that the agenda of diplomacy has ballooned.
Whereas diplomatic issues were limited to ‘high politics’ (traditional
political and security concerns of governments) until the end of the Cold
War, a massive range of ‘low-political’ issues are now found on the global
diplomatic agenda. Trade, environmental protection, migration, health,
agriculture, religion and crime are just some of the myriad topics that
enter the inboxes of diplomats, wherever they are based and whomever
they represent.
The abovementioned scenario allows us to contextualise the various
modes of diplomatic practice. The two most traditional modes are bilat-
eral (direct, state-to-state) diplomacy and third-party (intercessionary, to
assist with an abnormal relationship) diplomacy. Both these have adapted
to the new realities and use innovative techniques to deal with the infla-
tion in the diplomatic arena and agenda. Both bilateral and third-party
diplomacy are also overlapping, or happening in parallel, with multilat-
eral and polylateral diplomacy—the two most recently evolved modes of
diplomacy.
 7 CONCLUSION 253

The basic tasks of diplomacy have always been encapsulated by the

practice of bilateral diplomacy. These functions were codified in the 1961
Vienna Convention, a treaty that is still universally adhered to despite
the passing of more than half a century. The Convention was crafted
around the (then) norm of bilateral, resident diplomatic missions. As
the twentieth century drew to a close, many critics denounced this prac-
tice, claiming that other agencies were as well equipped as (if not better
than) embassies to perform the requisite public service. Physical embas-
sies were accused of being security hazards and heavy tax burdens on
sending states. In some instances, the criticism of resident embassies was
conflated with scorn of (especially bilateral) diplomacy itself. The main
assertion was that the intermediation of diplomats had become unnec-
essary in an era of sophisticated communications, information and trans-
port infrastructure–all their tasks could be outsourced to private entities,
performed domestically by other civil servants or done directly by politi-
cians in the course of international relations.
The critics were somewhat hasty in their claims of redundancy, on
both accounts. Bilateral diplomacy has never been dependent on resident
missions—ad hoc diplomatic visits are the original (millennia-old) way of
‘doing’ diplomacy, and it continues to be used, with or without resident
embassies. The roles of embassies have morphed in tandem with those of
diplomats, and in today’s world, they are nodal points for the manage-
ment of statecraft and international networking. The proof lies in their
undiminished and continued use by all states, for reasons of practical as
well as symbolic necessity. Diplomacy itself, as mentioned, is more prac-
ticed than ever before, and bilateral diplomacy is conducted in myriad
ways, not only through resident embassies but also directly from head
offices, at venues offered by third parties or multilateral organisations,
and even by means of virtual representation.
The timeless nature of bilateral diplomacy is matched by that of third-
party diplomacy, because the need for it has always existed. Third-party
diplomacy is an indirect mode and happens when two actors are una-
ble or unwilling to conduct normal bilateral diplomacy. The third party
offers itself as, or is invited to be, a diplomatic ‘bridge’. This creates a
space where the two adversaries can work together peacefully, while offi-
cially not doing so. Third-party intercession can range from minimal
(acting just as a ‘post office’) to extensive, in which case the benefac-
tor will be expected to reconcile the adversaries and even to facilitate a
post-conflict dispensation.
254 Y. K. SPIES

Many states are making third-party diplomacy an integral part of their

foreign policy, because it offers opportunities to build soft power. The
agency of diplomats is crucial in this regard, and they are uniquely placed
to engage in the peace processes that third-party diplomacy entails. Their
institutional-bureaucratic support, global linkage networks, international
legal protection and the moral authority of public accountability enable
them to do so.
As a distinct mode, third-party diplomacy happens to be multilateral
in nature (because it requires a minimum of three parties) but multilat-
eral diplomacy is a broader concept and entails direct contact among the
participating parties. Such diplomacy is therefore categorised as a sepa-
rate mode.
Multilateral forums have grown so rapidly that the bulk of (official)
contemporary diplomacy now occurs under their auspices. This is a
stunning change from just a century ago, when multilateral diplomacy
was a rarity, limited to ad hoc conferences aimed at ending wars. The
original conflict-management imperative has widened to embrace the
full range of international society aspirations. When diplomacy is con-
ducted ‘in congress’ it bestows symbolic membership of international
society, opportunity for communal projects and practical relief for coun-
tries reeling under the impossible task of being represented universally.
The accommodating quality of multilateral diplomacy has added to the
groundswell in diplomacy, because multilateral forums provide umbrellas
under which all modes of diplomacy can be conducted.
It has also facilitated the phenomenon of global governance, a subject
that lends itself to much contestation when one approaches it from a
Global South perspective. In international relations, it has become a cliche
to talk about globalisation—a pervasive enabler, and often scapegoat, for
every kind of challenge that humankind faces. But transnational connec-
tivity and fluidity of all human endeavours are realities of the present-day
diplomatic arena. The territorial state no longer has a monopoly on the
flow in knowledge, people, goods and services; and most security threats
are not deterred by political borders. In response, multilateral organisa-
tions have taken on a governance role that was historically vested only in
sovereign entities. In forums of global governance, international regimes
are established and large areas of international relations are regulated
and managed. The domestic policies of states—even the most isolated or
radical states—are increasingly scrutinised and subjected to international
standards, trends and obligations.
 7 CONCLUSION 255

The most obvious examples of global governance are suprana-

tional organisations such as the European Union, where state mem-
bership requires a certain pooling of sovereignty. But even without
supranational authority most IGOs tend to be ‘greater than the sum
of their parts’, and their assumption of actor-like roles attests to this.
Importantly, they socialise their members into the diplomatic culture
that prevails in international society. In some cases, the socialisation
reflects regional rather than universal international societies, because
IGOs tend to be microcosms of the structural politics within their
membership scope.
For diplomats, the multilateral diplomatic terrain is complex to nav-
igate. While the bureaucratic management of multilateral diplomacy
is not unique per se (it is modelled on bilateral diplomatic practice)
the nature of multilateral work adds layers of compounded challenges.
Generic diplomatic skills need to be complemented by specific multilat-
eral skills and competence in operating with multiple, sometimes over-
lapping, representative mandates. Moreover, all multilateral forums have
their own rules of engagement and institutional cultures, and diplomats
who work in these settings need a firm understanding of the particular
institution. These are just the basic requirements—multilateral diplomats
must also be au fait with the substance of the (usually large) agenda of
the forum where they are deployed.
The extensive range and specialised nature of issues that have become
relevant to diplomacy—a key motivation for multilateral diplomacy—has
also necessitated the involvement of non-diplomats in diplomatic pro-
cesses. In response, a distinct new diplomatic mode has evolved: ‘polylat-
eral diplomacy’. It occurs when traditional sovereign actors establish
cooperative, functional relationships with non-sovereign stakeholders in
the pursuit of diplomatic objectives. The mode affirms the growing role
of the public in matters that were traditionally handled exclusively by
diplomats, and the attendant demand for transparency and interconnec-
tivity within diplomacy. Polylateral diplomacy does not replace traditional
diplomacy, but enhances it because it provides legitimacy and practical
impetus to the implementation of foreign policy.
Polylateral diplomacy is therefore a symbiosis between official and
private diplomacy. Not only states but many IGOs, the United Nations
foremost among them, have embraced the contribution of non-state
actors, to the extent that some of them are allowed to establish de facto
diplomatic missions. Especially in the field of development and human
256 Y. K. SPIES

security, their role is crucial: they are closer to the people, more con-
nected at grassroots level, more focused, sometimes even commanding
more legitimacy than governments of states. The inroads made by non-
state actors in the diplomatic domain have caused diplomacy to take on
a more fluid horizontal, networked profile, as opposed to the traditional
vertical, top-down order that was dominated by political executives.
Partnerships with non-state actors add yet another layer of complexity to
the management role of foreign ministries, which are already obliged to
balance the demands and intrusions of the rest of national government,
subnational and supranational entities.
A compelling cause of diplomacy’s recent modal evolution can be
found in the nature of contemporary global conflict. Conflict is integral
to human behaviour, and diplomacy has always had a subtext of conflict
resolution. It is to diplomacy that states have always turned during and
after war, to end hostilities and to negotiate a post-war modus vivendi.
But conflict has taken on a new profile that defies the traditional trajec-
tory of third-party diplomacy. Most international conflicts now start as
intra-state violence and then spillover borders. Wars are asymmetrical,
unconventional and civilians, rather than soldiers, are the primary tar-
gets. Collapsed or threatened state structures cannot provide human
security and the vast range of stakeholders in the new conflicts (subna-
tional, national, transnational, regional, global) makes third-party diplo-
macy exceedingly difficult. New-generation diplomatic approaches to
conflict resolution have therefore taken on board extensive hybrid and
multimodal approaches that involve cooperative ventures with IGOs and
state as well as non-state entities. The scope has also enlarged in a tem-
poral sense: peace and security require ‘building’; hence a long-term,
continuous commitment by all diplomatic actors involved.
The bustling, fast evolving arena of diplomacy suggests an emerging
world order that is more flux than ‘order’. Political, social and economic
changes on a scale never experienced before have caused a condition pf
‘polypolarity’, or ‘polycentricity’. Any sense of structure is indeed tenuous,
because power is increasingly fragmented, diffuse and transient. Various
centres of political gravity exist: some of them are states, regions or other
groups of states, and some are non-state actors. The centres overlap, and
their power is situational, because what constitutes power in one situation
might not be valid in another. Influence can be linked to hard power as
well as soft power, and often it is an ad hoc combination of actors—a crit-
ical mass—that determines the outcomes of a global deal.
 7 CONCLUSION 257

The fluidity in global power relations has created a world with sig-
nificant challenges and opportunities for diplomacy. Tactical manoeuvres
available to states include plurilateral diplomacy (multilateral-within-mul-
tilateral) and joint ventures with non-state actors, i.e. the polylateral
diplomacy I mentioned earlier. Longer term strategies include the cul-
tivation of niche diplomacy and alliances with strategic partners through
bilateral or club diplomacy. The trend is to pursue ‘à la carte’ diplomacy,
multi-level and multi-mode. It is driven by pragmatism and innovation
rather than tradition.
The states, that are diplomatically the most agile in the polypolar
world, are the so-called middle powers. States with this label earn their
reputation through their behaviour, rather than any quantifiable, mid-
dle-ranking hard power. They punch above their weight by assuming
leadership roles in multilateral settings, where they act as sherpas to induct
other states into diplomatic culture and international society. Typically,
they practise niche diplomacy, not stretching themselves too thin but
focusing on areas where they can add maximum value. If states could be
deemed ‘experts’, middle powers would be the diplomatic specialists! It is
important to note that their ranks have been swelled by emerging powers
from the Global South, ever since the end of the Cold War.
The fact that middle power influence is not linked to tangible power,
demonstrates how conditional the diplomacy-power intersection has
become. It remains a critical nexus, however, and for many states, diplo-
macy has become a tool through which to transform the very structure of
global relations.
A first consideration is the matter of development, and this brings
me to the plight of the Global South, or Developing World. However
narrowly or broadly defined, state-centric or otherwise, it comprises
the majority of sovereign states in the world and the bulk of humanity.
Until the second half of the twentieth century, these states had effectively
been excluded from traditional, Euro-centric diplomacy. Thereafter,
they obtained only nominal equality, and a schism has persisted between
their formal equality (as subjects of international law), and their lag-
ging socio-economic conditions. With development as leitmotiv, they
use diplomacy to address an international structural order that is experi-
enced—frustratingly—as entrenched, inequitable and exploitative.
The development discourse is historically ‘new’ to diplomacy but it
has already impacted both the form and substance of diplomacy. The
tenor of the discourse has changed markedly since the end of the Cold
258 Y. K. SPIES

War, arguably because of the new distribution of global economic power.

It has become evident that development is of critical concern to the
entire world, not just the Global South. Like peace and security, devel-
opment is part of the global commons. Problems rooted in development
migrate across borders—literally.
In 2000, the UN Millennium Summit adopted a landmark ‘global
compact’ to address the development concerns of the world, thereby
mainstreaming the diplomatic struggle to address the root causes of
the development gap. Just five years later, in 2005, development offi-
cially entered the UN’s agenda of high politics. The Secretary-General’s
Report, ‘In larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human
Rights for all’ linked the previously disconnected global agendas on secu-
rity and development. This paved the way for a more comprehensive—
more ‘global’ than ever before—effort to address the challenges facing
humankind. The process was ratcheted up a notch with the adoption of
the Sustainable Development Goals in 2015.
One effect has been a change in the previously patronizing discourse
on development assistance. The new semantics are studded with ideas
of ownership and partnership; and development is explicitly linked to
long-term, sustainable goals. The power dynamics of the discourse
have changed in other ways as well. Many leader states of the Global
South, the so-called emerging powers, have taken on the role of donors.
Development assistance relations are therefore no longer just vertical,
but also happening on a south–south axis.
Emerging powers feature large and dynamically in structural diplo-
macy. They employ the full spectrum of power tools—hard, soft, smart—
in their international relations, and do not shrink back from leadership
roles, despite their own developmental challenges. It is a credit to their
persistence in agitating for transformation of structural power, that several
forums of global economic governance have become more representative.
In this regard, the formation of the G20, as engine of global economic
relations, has been nothing short of revolutionary. To be sure, the world
financial crisis of 2007/2008 marked the end of the western-centric eco-
nomic order. It certainly dispelled the immediate post-Cold War trium-
phalism about capitalism, given the need for state intervention in bailing
out major companies around the world.
The struggle to correct fundamental imbalances in the economy of
the world has been mirrored in attempts to tackle the forums of global
political governance, but here the progress has been less impressive.
 7 CONCLUSION 259

At the apex of anachronistic global political governance remains the

UN Security Council. It has resolutely resisted structural change.
Even here though, reality has been catching up and the Council is
increasingly steered by dynamics beyond its permanent core. One such
imperative is regionalism. States in many different geopolitical regions
pool resources to boost their relative weight (economic, security) in
global affairs; and in the process, they cultivate vibrant mini-inter-
national societies. It is increasingly impossible for the UN Security
Council, or any great or super power on its own, to ‘solve’ interna-
tional peace and security problems without the cooperation, even
guidance, of regional organisations. The UN Charter, which makes
provision for ‘regional arrangements’ in Chapter VIII, would have
been much more explicit about regional diplomacy, had the Charter
been drafted in the twenty-first century.
By the same token, the traditional centres of power in the Global
North can no longer sustain their global reach without engaging
the emerging powers from the Global South. This might seem like
a welcome flattening of the international playing field, but the ‘new
kids on the block’ are not immune to the lure of structural power.
Many of them reproduce hierarchies of power in their own regions
and in the wider Global South. They might empathise with develop-
ment challenges, but their relative power is such that they lord it over
the really peripheral states of the world. This raises questions about
the alternative global system that some of the leaders from the Global
South conjure up in their diplomatic rhetoric. Do they really seek
to impose different values and rules, or are they simply interested in
dominating the main tables of power? If emerging powers oppose the
prevailing liberal Western order, they seem to find the western lead-
ership of that order far more irritating than any of its so-called princi-
ples. On the other hand, the leadership of the Global North is rather
fractious at the current juncture, and might not ‘prevail’ much longer.
It is all part of the ebb and flow of international structural relations.
Plus ça change…?
This book has confirmed that international society is not monolithic,
nor is it a settled notion. It is a work in progress. Alternative views on
its norms and conventions are integral to the institution and its evolu-
tion. And diversity and tension are precisely why diplomacy is perennially
needed by all the members of this society—even those that temporarily
stray away under the illusion that they can ‘go it alone’.
260 Y. K. SPIES

As central institution within the society of states, diplomacy provides

continuity and procedural structure to international relations. Diplomats,
through their continuous networking and intermediation, weave a safety
net to preserve international society, regardless of bifurcating existential
discourses and messy politics. We should study (and teach!) diplomacy
much more, and we should enlist as many perspectives as possible in
strengthening scholarship on this vital institution.
 Index

A Agenda for Peace, 75, 123, 132, 134

Abolitionist movement, 155 Agenda-setting, 70, 83
Addis Ababa Action Agenda, 225 Agents provocateur, 185
Ad hoc special missions, 21 Agriculture, 17, 34, 97, 252
Afghanistan, 120, 243 Ahmed, Salman, 131, 136–138, 146
Africa Action Plan, 222 Ahtisaari, Martti, 121
Africa Business Initiative, 187 al-Assad, Bashar, 188
African Agenda, 143, 218 Al-Bashir, Omar, 139
African-American, 16 Algeria, 19, 115, 137, 238
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP), Al-Jazeera, 142
221 Alliance Française, 52
countries, 76, 95, 104, 221 Al Qaeda, 126
states, 178 À la carte’ diplomacy, 103, 257
African Growth and Opportunity Act Al-Shabaab, 126
(AGOA), 229 Amanpour,Christiane, 171
African National Congress (ANC), 18 Ambassador Extraordinary and
African Peace and Security Plenipotentiary, 17
Architecture (APSA), 113, 137 Ambassador for Cyber Affairs, 23
African Union (AU), 5, 23, 56, 68, Ambassadors-at-large, 22, 23
72, 76, 83, 86, 88, 99, 113, American jazz bands, 157
116, 120, 122, 130, 137, 145, Amicus curiae, 167
206–208, 222, 232, 234, 244 Amnesty International, 84, 165, 175
African Union (AU) Commission, 30 An Agenda for Development, 221
African Union’s Mission in Sudan Ancient Greece, 2
(AMIS), 138 Angola, 22, 99, 105, 137, 183, 184

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license 261
to Springer Nature Switzerland AG, part of Springer Nature 2019
Y. K. Spies, Global South Perspectives on Diplomacy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-00530-6
262 Index

Annan, Kofi, 92, 133, 160, 167, 177, Basel Committee on Banking
190, 203, 214, 221, 223, 233 Supervision (BCBS), 240
Anti-establishment, 128, 164 BASIC group, 73
Anti-personnel landmines, 176 Basketball, 158
Apartheid, 18, 140, 143, 163 Basket-ball diplomacy, 158
Apple, 167, 187 Belgium, 48, 143, 184, 189
Arab Spring, 164, 225 Benomar, Jamal, 121
Arbitration, 37, 116, 117 Berlin Wall, 169
Arbitration tribunal, 117 Bilateral diplomacy, 4–6, 11, 18, 20,
Arctic Ambassador, 23 24, 30, 32, 56, 57, 83, 95, 97,
Argentina, 13, 104, 112, 232 100, 101, 103, 187, 253, 257
Armenia, 13, 58 without resident diplomats, 21
Arria formula, 167 Bilateral joint commissions, 40
Artificial intelligence, 163 Bildt, Carl, 55
ASEAN Plus Three (APT), 76 Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,
Asian financial crisis, 35, 38, 238 166
Asian tigers, 208 Bipolarity, 204
Association of Southeast Asian Nations Bloc diplomacy, 71, 72
(ASEAN), 23, 76, 83, 87, 91, 94, Bloc voting, 71
109, 122, 207 Blood-diamonds, 126
Associative diplomacy, 75, 76, 103, Blue helmets/Blue berets, 122
242 Boko Haram, 126, 174
Asymmetrical capacity, 95 Bolivia, 32, 230
Attachés, 28, 34, 53, 94 Bombings in Bali, 28
Australia, 3, 14, 23, 27, 53, 76, 104, Bono, 172
112, 183, 213, 216, 217, 219, Bosnia, 124, 126
229 Bouteflika, Abdelaziz, 238
Austria, 41 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 75, 123, 132,
Authoritarian regimes, 156, 193 134, 221, 231
Avaaz, 164 BP, 169
Azerbaijan, 28, 163 Brahimi, Lakhdar, 121, 131, 133,
Azevêdo, Roberto, 238 136–138, 146
Brahimi Report, 133
Brazil, 14, 73, 77, 99, 102, 105, 112,
B 163, 185, 189, 207, 209, 213,
Back-channel diplomacy, 179 215, 217, 218, 226, 228, 232,
Badawi, Zeinab, 171 238, 243, 244
Bahrain, 55 Brazil, Russia, India and China
Bali-9 case, 14 (BRIC), 75, 209–211
The Balkans, 115, 141 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South
Band Aid, 172 Africa (BRICS), 75, 207, 209,
Bangladesh, 3, 142, 210 211, 240, 244
Ban Ki-Moon, 215, 222, 233, 242 Bretton Woods, 236, 239, 240
 Index 263

Brexit, 38, 164, 225 Chibok girls, 174

British Council, 53, 59, 156 Chile, 54, 164, 168, 210, 226, 229,
British East India Company, 155 235
Bureaucratic management, 94, 98, China, 3, 13, 22, 27, 33, 40, 53, 54,
145, 255 58, 65, 69, 73, 76–78, 99, 104,
Burkina Faso, 145 111, 140, 143, 157, 172, 182,
Burma (Myanmar), 70 189, 204, 207, 209–211, 226,
Burmese opposition, 159 228, 232, 238, 240, 243, 244,
Burundi, 120, 134 251
Bush, George W., 129 Chopra, Priyanka, 173
Business diplomacy, 168 Christian Syrian, 16
Churchill, Winston, 171
Church public lay associations, 115
C Civilcraft, 8, 180
Cable News Network (CNN), 169, Civilian (or citizen) diplomacy, 153
193 Classification, 45, 66, 204
Call centre, 210 Clingendael Institute, 190
Cambodia, 24, 120 Club diplomacy, 7, 66, 73, 206, 211,
Camp David, 37, 141 257
Canada, 24, 38, 72, 74, 85, 100, 104, The CNN effect, 169
112, 183, 212–214, 217, 218 Coalition-building, 70
Canal Hotel bombing, 121 Cold War, 51, 68, 76, 79, 92, 120,
Caprivi, 126 123–126, 128, 132, 137–139,
Caribbean Islands, 178 155–157, 204, 210, 213, 216,
Carnegie Corporation, 185 219–221, 226, 231, 232, 241,
Castro, Alicia, 13 252, 257, 258
Castro, Fidel, 171 Colombia, 24, 141
Catalonia, 126 Colombia, Indonesia, Vietnam,
Catalytic diplomacy, 181 Egypt, Turkey and South Africa
Catholic Church, 154, 175, 193 (CIVETS), 75
Caucus diplomacy, 72 Colombia-Venezuela, 120
Celebrity diplomacy, 171, 172 Colonisation, 3, 236
Central Africa, 76 Commercial diplomacy, 33
Central African Republic (CAR), 134 Commission for Human Security
Ceremonial events, 13 (CHS), 129
Cervantes Institute, 53 Commission on Global Governance,
Chad, 145, 235 231
Challenges and Change, 93, 127, 223, Committees, 55, 88, 96, 101, 113,
233 215
Chapter ‘VI ½’, 122 Common Foreign and Security Policy
Chargé d’affaires, 13, 22 (CFSP), 102
Chechnya, 126 The Community of Sant’Egidio, 115
Chevening scholarships, 53 Communist Party of China (CPC), 182
264 Index

Comprehensive peace deals, 131 D

Concert of Europe, 73 Darfur (Sudan), 126, 130, 131, 138,
Conciliation, 111, 116–118 142, 143, 172
Conditionalities, 220, 229 Davutoğlu, Ahmet, 23
Condoleezza Rice, 223 Dean, 50, 100
Conference diplomacy, 66–69 de Cuellar, Javier Perez, 120
Conflict diamonds/Blood diamonds, de facto diplomacy, 8, 18, 168
183 Definition of diplomacy, 1
Conflict management, 7 Degovernmentalisation of diplomacy,
Conflict resolution, 109, 119, 120, 154
124, 128, 130, 131, 133, de Kirchner, Cristina Fernández, 13
137–140, 143, 144, 146, 147, de Mello, Sérgio Vieira, 121
158, 160, 178, 192, 213, 256 Democratic Republic of Congo
Confucius Institutes, 53, 59 (DRC), 48, 59, 115, 126, 130,
Congress of Vienna, 66 175, 180, 184
Consensus decision-making, 67 Democratisation of diplomacy, 57
Consular work, 27, 28 Denmark, 23, 114, 186, 187, 212,
Contact group, 72 217
Contested states, 18, 19, 105 Department for International
Copenhagen Accord, 73, 99 Development (DFID), 230
COREU, 102 Department of Peacekeeping
Corporate diplomacy, 155, 168, 187 Operations (DPKO), 123
Corporate social responsibility (CSR), Department of Public Information
160 (DPI), 90
Corruption Perceptions Index, 212 Deutche Akademie, 53
Côte d’Ivoire, 5, 131, 137, 208 Developing countries, 35, 39, 71, 81,
Cotonou Agreement, 76, 104, 178, 82, 156, 215, 220, 224, 227,
221 228, 230, 244
Council of Anglican Provinces in Developing World, 3, 35, 42, 75, 79,
Africa (CAPA), 120 82, 104, 125, 129, 191, 216,
Cradle of humankind, 9 219, 223, 227, 228, 238, 239,
Cricket, 157 241, 257
Crisis decade, 175, 193 Developmental state, 36
Crisis of multilateralism, 219 Development assistance, 6, 17, 36,
Crisis of peacekeeping, 124 177, 221, 226–229, 258
Crusades, 178 Development Assistance Committee
Cuba, 112, 216 (DAC), 177, 224
Cuban missile crisis, 37 Development diplomacy, 3, 202, 219,
Cultural diplomacy, 52, 53 230
Customary international law, 94, 139 Development Working Group (DWG),
Customary law, 68, 112, 114 224
Cyprus, 120 Diamond, Louise, 120, 192
 Index 265

Diaspora, 8, 32, 185 East Timor, 121, 182

Diaspora diplomacy, 185 Ebola, 127
Diego Enrique Arria Salicetti, 167 Economic Community of West African
Digital divide, 162 States (ECOWAS), 87, 91, 113,
DiploFoundation, 159, 190, 230 116, 208
Diplomacy of development, 9, 35, 76, Economic diplomacy, 4, 33–35, 39,
219, 228 99, 181, 209, 227, 237
Diplomatic arena, 4, 8, 9, 23, 57, 82, Economic Partnership Agreements
97, 103, 160, 168, 169, 172, (EPAs), 221
177, 188, 191, 201–203, 212, e-diplomacy, 54
235, 238, 240, 251, 252, 254 Educational diplomacy, 52, 53
Diplomatic corps, 13, 56, 87, 97 Egypt, 4, 37, 71, 137, 142, 207, 210
Diplomatic journalism, 188 ElBaradei, Mohamed, 127, 170
Diplomatic law, 12, 15, 18, 22, 23, Ellsburg, Daniel, 171
112, 251 Emerging middle powers, 212–218
Diplomatic missions, 12, 17, 20–22, Emerging powers, 9, 17, 73, 184,
25–29, 34, 44, 46, 90, 94, 96, 201, 206, 208, 210, 211, 213,
103, 186, 188, 230, 253, 255 216, 226, 228, 229, 232, 237,
functions of, 6 239–242, 257–259
Diplomatic rank, 94 Empire, 2, 155, 204, 209, 210
Diplomatic studies, 1, 2, 17, 190 End of History, 204
Diplomatic symbolism, 14 Enquiry, 116, 117, 181
Diplomatic training, 15, 35, 96, 190, Epistemic community, 47
230 Espionage, 1, 43, 161
Distributive power, 36 Ethiopia, 23, 35, 71, 87, 142, 172
Dlamini-Zuma, Nkosazana, 30, 71 Europe, 11, 20, 53, 66, 78, 82, 85,
Doctors without Borders, 175 111, 139, 154, 171, 178, 182,
Doha Development Round, 179, 206, 193, 205
222 European Correspondent Unit, 102
Doha Round, 81 European External Action Service
“Do they know its Christmas?”, 172 (EEAS), 90
Drones, 161 European Union (EU), 7, 17, 20, 38,
Dunant, Henry, 167 42, 68, 75, 77, 88, 90, 95, 178,
Duncan Report, 33 204, 221, 242, 255
Dutch East India Company, 154 Exceptionalism, 208
Ezulwini Consensus, 232, 244

E
Early warning, 144, 158, 174 F
Earth Summits, 67 Facebook, 25, 54, 171
East Africa, 76 The Falklands, 13
East China Sea, 40 Fake news, 170
266 Index

Falklands (Malvinas) War, 112 Gacaca, 140

Finance diplomacy, 74 Gaddafi, Muammar, 171
Financial crisis, 211, 225, 239, 258 Galtung, Johan, 128
Financial Stability Board (FSB), 240 Gates, Bill, 171
Finland, 22, 87, 212 GDP, 81, 104, 168, 211
Fischer, Joschka, 20 Geldof, Bob, 172
Flying the flag, 12 General Agreement of Rome, 115
Food aid, 137 General Agreement on Tariffs and
Food and Agriculture Organisation Trade (GATT), 81, 210, 237
(FAO), 81, 97 General Assembly, 68, 70–72, 78, 79,
Foreign ministries, 4, 7, 8, 11, 15, 24, 91, 93, 95, 98, 101, 109, 114,
25, 28, 30, 38, 45–47, 49, 52, 162, 163, 184, 207, 221, 225,
66, 94, 95, 97, 102, 103, 144, 227, 231–233, 235, 244
147, 154, 158, 173, 174, 180, Geneva Convention, 111
182, 185–191, 229, 230, 251, Genocide, 14, 58, 126, 143
256 Genocide in Rwanda, 124, 140
Foreign policy community, 97 Genocide Olympics, 143
Foreign policy coordination, 17 Genocide Watch, 175
Forum on China–Africa Cooperation Germany, 14, 20, 37, 53, 209, 212,
(FOCAC), 227 232, 234, 238, 239
Forum-shopping, 103 Ghana, 31, 142
Fourth Estate, 169 Gips, Donald H., 187
Fourth Industrial Revolution, 163 Global commons, 8, 154, 159, 162,
Fowler Commission, 184 163, 201, 230, 241, 258
Fragile state, 125, 127 Global Compact, 160, 221, 258
France, 5, 14, 28, 32, 52, 69, 74, 101, Global economic governance, 74, 224,
104, 124, 176, 232, 237, 244, 237–239, 241, 258
251 Global financial crisis, 74, 182, 224,
Francophone Africa, 31, 146 236, 242, 243
Franco-Prussian War, 112, 115 Global governance, 80, 160, 201
Freedom House, 175 Globalisation, 29, 93, 146, 202, 203,
The French system diplomacy, 11 205, 206, 254
Fuentes, Carlos, 54 Global North, 2, 3, 208, 223, 226,
Fukuyama, Francis, 204 236, 237, 240, 259
Fulbright scholarships, 53 Global Partnership on Effective
Development Cooperation, 177,
224
G Global Political Agreement, 119
G20, 68, 74, 88, 104, 188, 206, 207, Global public goods, 8, 80, 154, 159,
211, 224, 238, 239, 241, 258 160, 163
G8, 74, 77, 172, 206, 222, 238, 239, Global South, 2, 3, 6, 9, 74, 77,
242, 244 208, 213, 215, 219, 220, 223,
 Index 267

226–228, 234, 236–238, 240, High-Level Independent Panel on

254, 257–259 Peace Operations (HIPPO)
Global Witness, 183 report, 134
Goethe-Institut, 53 High-Level Panel on Threats, 93, 127,
Goldberg, Philip, 32 223, 233
Goldman Sachs, 75, 209, 210 High level panels, 93, 120, 233
Goldstone, Richard, 116 High politics, 33, 176, 223, 252, 258
Good offices, 7, 110, 111, 113–115, HIPC Initiative, 221
117, 119, 121, 147, 216 HIV/AIDS, 51, 148, 217, 243
Goodwill Ambassadors, 172, 173 Holy Land, 178
Google, 168, 187 Holy See (Vatican), 13
Governance diplomacy, 80 Honduras, 20
Governance of the Internet, 162 Honest brokers, 178
Greece, 23, 164, 239 Hong Kong, 208
Greenpeace, 165, 176 Horn of Africa, 180, 228
Group of 77 (G77), 72, 220, 238 Hughes, Karen (Ambassador), 51
Group of Four (G4), 232 Hu Jintao, 182
Group of Friends of R2P, 72 Humanitarian Diplomacy, 190
Group of Latin American and Humanitarian Impact Bond, 180, 193
Caribbean Countries in the UN Humanitarian intervention, 214
(GRULAC), 72 Humanity United, 185
Guatemala, 120, 141 Human rights, 4, 31–33, 70, 92, 126,
Gupta family, 181 128, 129, 132, 153, 158, 162,
Gurría, Ángel, 237 169, 173, 185, 213
Gyatso, Tenzin, 171 Human Rights Council, 234
Human Rights Watch, 165, 175
Human security, 81, 126, 129, 136,
H 214, 219, 221, 223, 255, 256
Hague Conventions, 114 Hungary, 225
Hague Peace Conference, 117, 155 Huntington, Samuel, 204, 207
Hague, William, 24 Hu Shuli, 171
Haiti, 3, 145, 227 Hussein, Saddam, 46
Hammarskjöld, Dag, 92, 105, 122 Hybrid authorities, 160
Head of state visit, 49
Hegemony, 65, 85, 208, 213, 228,
233, 236–238, 240 I
Heralds, 2 Ibsen Year, 54
Heteropolarity, 204 Identity management, 186
High-Level Commission on Modernising Identity politics, 126
the Governance of the World Bank Immunities and privileges, 15, 19, 22,
Group, 93 32, 44, 89, 94
268 Index

Important question, 71 International Campaign to Ban

Independent Diplomat, 159 Landmines (ICBL), 176
India, 19, 28, 33, 34, 53, 58, 73, 76, International civil servants, 7, 89, 91,
77, 99, 142, 164, 209, 211, 213, 103, 113, 251
215, 216, 218, 226, 232, 238, International civil society, 163, 175
242–244 International Commission for the Study
India–Africa Forum Summit (IAFS), of Communication Problems, 161
227 International Commission on
India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSA), 74, Intervention and State
206 Sovereignty (ICISS), 214
India-Brazil-South Africa forum, 74 International Committee of the Red
Indian Council for Cultural Relations, Crescent (ICRC), 167, 174, 180
53 International Committee of the Red
Indian Ocean tsunami, 28 Cross (ICRC or ‘Red Cross’), 5,
Indignants Movement, 164 115, 166
Indonesia, 14, 22, 87, 142, 163, 182, International Court of Justice (ICJ),
207, 210, 226 116, 167
Industrialisation, 82, 220 International Criminal Court, 139,
Information and communications 148, 183
technology (ICT), 6, 20, 26, 41, International Crisis Group (ICG), 158
44, 45, 48, 57, 58, 156, 159, International Day of Peace, 109
161, 162 International Development
revolution, 54, 161, 169, 202 Cooperation (IDC), 224
Information Centres, 90 International Federation for Human
Information management, 44 Rights (FIDH), 165, 192
Inkatha Freedom Party, 18 International financial institutions
In larger Freedom: Towards (IFIs), 38, 203
Development, Security and International identity, 16
Human Rights for all, 93, 133, International Labour Organisation
223, 258 (ILO), 97, 166
Instagram, 25, 54 International law, 2, 14, 17, 19, 27,
Institutional identity, 103 29, 30, 39, 78, 86, 91, 114, 138,
Institute for Cultural Diplomacy, 53 139, 231, 242, 257
Intergovernmental organisations International Monetary Fund (IMF),
(IGOs), 7, 56, 66, 84, 86, 103, 38, 69, 85, 97, 221, 236, 239
114, 119, 120, 123, 142, 153, International Olympic Committee
166, 168, 175, 252, 255 (IOC), 166
Intermediation, 1, 7, 49, 109, 174, International organisations (IOs), 2,
253, 260 23, 24, 76, 84, 85, 87, 89, 114,
International Atomic Energy Agency 165, 178, 193, 205, 251
(IAEA), 47, 127, 148 International regimes, 78, 203, 254
International Campaign to Abolish International relations (IR), 1, 3, 4,
Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), 173 6, 21, 37, 39, 42, 47, 48, 65, 74,
 Index 269

103, 114, 115, 128, 153, 155, K

156, 159, 169, 171, 179, 201, Kazakhstan, 211
207, 242, 252–254, 258, 260 Kenya, 4, 21, 31, 140, 170, 179, 207,
International society, 2, 3, 5, 6, 9, 16, 225
77–80, 82, 103, 123, 127, 138, Kenyatta, Uhuru, 139
147, 155, 191, 202, 214, 221, Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa, 55
236, 241, 242, 251, 252, 254, Kimberley, 184
257, 259 Kimberley process, 183, 214
International Telecommunications Kimberley Process Certification
Union, 160 Scheme (KPCS), 184
International Union for the Kim Jong-un, 157, 192
Conservation of Nature, 160 Kissinger, Henry, 157
Internet, 25, 48, 58, 59, 162, 168, 184 Korea–Africa Cooperation Forum, 227
Internet Governance Forum, 162 Korea Foundation, 53
Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU), 166 Korean War, 100, 101, 122, 157
INTERPOL, 84 Kosovo, 121, 133, 159
Investment promotion agencies Kurbalija, Jovan, 159, 161
(IPAs), 34 Kurdistan, 126
Iran, 24, 43, 210, 211, 243 Kuti, Femi, 172
Iraq, 121, 233 Kuwait, 43
Iraq invasion, 46 Kyrgyzstan, 211
Iraq-Iran War, 120
Irish Republican Army (IRA), 185
Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), 137 L
Islamic State, 126 Lagarde, Christine, 237
Israel, 19, 24, 37, 43, 87, 116, 123, Lambrinidis, Stavros, 23
124, 179, 205, 211 Laos, 114
Israel-Gaza war, 116 Las Malvinas, 13
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, 88 Latin American Integration
Issuance of visas, 52 Association (LAIA), 83
Italy, 11, 74, 104, 148, 232 Law of the Sea, 68
League of Arab States, 75, 121
League of Nations, 77
J Legal jurisdiction, 14
Jackie Chan, 173 Leiden University, 190
Japan, 40, 53, 74, 76, 85, 87, 112, Leiderman, Vadim, 43
129, 144, 157, 209, 232, 234 Lesotho, 131
Jim Yong Kim, 237 Liberation movements, 18
The John D. and Catherine T. Liberia, 71, 87
MacArthur Foundation, 185 Library Group, 74
Johnson, Boris, 33 Libya, 18, 27, 120, 130, 206, 208, 234
Jolie, Angelina, 172 Ligue des Femmes pour le Désarmement
Judicial settlement, 116 International, 155
270 Index

LinkedIn, 54 Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey

Lithuania, 235 (MINT), 75
Liu Guijin, 143 Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea and
Local ownership, 140 Turkey (MIST), 75
Lomé Conventions, 76, 178, 221 Mexico, Indonesia, (South) Korea,
London Live 8 concert, 172 Turkey and Australia (MIKTA),
Low-Income Countries (LICs), 226 75
Low political, 127 Microsoft, 167, 171, 187
Lula, 228 Middle East, 139, 141, 164, 179, 205,
Lusophony, 42 217
Middle East Quartet, 88, 129
Middle-Income Countries (MICs), 3,
M 226
MacBride Report, 161 Middlepowermanship, 9, 212, 217
Majority vote, 69 Middle powers, 9, 31, 75, 79, 141,
Make in India, 34 183, 184, 212, 213, 215–218,
Malaysia, 26, 207, 210, 213, 236 241, 243, 257
Mali, 145, 180 Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), 184
Malta, 159 Midge Ure, 172
Mamedov, Georgi, 170 Military budget, 211
Mandela, Nelson, 163 Millennium Declaration, 133, 221
Marshall Plan, 182, 193 Millennium Development Goals
Maurer, Peter, 180 (MDGs), 78, 215, 222, 225, 243
Mauritania, 145 Millennium Report, 221
Mauritius, 24 Millennium Summit, 129, 133, 221,
Mbeki, Thabo, 119, 238 258
McCully, Murray, 54 Minilateral diplomacy, 7, 66, 73, 95
McFaul, Michael, 55 Minilateralism, 73, 104
Médecins sans Frontières, 165 Minority, 16, 32, 44, 236
Media campaigns, 188 Model United Nations, 90
Media imperialism, 162 Mohamad, Mahathir, 51, 236
Mediation, 8, 105, 111, 116, 117, Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 37
119–121, 125, 136, 141, 142, Mongolia, 3, 243
144, 146 Monterrey Consensus, 222, 243
Mediation Support Unit, 130 Montville, Joseph, 120
Members present and voting, 69 MONUSCO, 130
Memoranda of understanding Morales, Evo, 32
(MOUs), 37 Morocco, 19, 86
Messi, Lionel, 172 Moynier, Gustave, 167
Mexico, 3, 24, 38, 54, 104, 163, 185, Mozambique, 22, 42, 105, 115, 131
189, 210, 215, 222, 226, 238, Mugabe, Robert, 171
243 Multifaceted identity, 16
 Index 271

Multilateral diplomacy, 4–7, 12, 24, Netanyahu, Benjamin, 87

65, 66, 68, 73, 75–80, 82, 83, Network diplomacy, 7, 66
88, 94, 95, 97, 100, 101, 103, Networked diplomacy, 93, 160
110, 121, 160, 203, 206, 211, Neuromorphic technology, 163
214, 254, 255 Neutrality, 113–115, 148
Multilateralism, 57, 65, 78, 81, 97, Neutral states, 7, 113, 114
103, 208, 211, 214, 218, 225, New Agenda Coalition, 216
233, 235, 241, 242 New Development Bank (NDB), 240
Multinational corporations (MNCs), New international economic order,
84, 167–169, 177, 205, 252 161
Multiple accreditation, 22 New Partnership for Africa’s
Multipolarity, 204, 207, 211 Development (NEPAD), 222
Multitrack, 153 New states, 16, 79, 229, 230
Multi-track diplomacy, 120 New wars, 125, 126, 148
Musk, Elon, 171 The New York Times, 171, 188
Muslim Brotherhood, 137, 243 New Zealand, 3, 48, 54, 55, 59, 76,
Muslim extremism, 126 141, 176, 186, 212, 213, 215,
Mutually hurting stalemate, 119 243
Next-11, 210
Niche diplomacy, 9, 79, 217, 227, 257
N Niger, 145
Namibia, 54, 120 Niger Delta, 169
Napoleonic Wars, 66 Nigeria, 22, 31, 75, 87, 169, 174,
National development strategies, 223 180, 207, 210, 235, 237, 238
National interest, 4, 26, 51, 98, 99, Noah, Trevor, 171
144, 173, 187, 218, 228 Nobel Peace Prize, 78, 92, 105, 121,
National ownership, 135 123, 124, 141, 148, 173, 177
National Security Agency (NSA), 171 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), 68,
Need, greed, and creed, 127 72, 77, 161, 220, 234, 238
Negative peace, 128, 132 Non-governmental organisations
Negotiation, 1, 6, 12, 21, 34, 35, 37, (NGOs), 25, 77, 83, 84, 97, 115,
38, 40, 41, 56, 68, 72, 73, 76, 121, 130, 147, 160, 165–168,
78, 79, 81, 88, 89, 95–98, 103, 173, 174, 176, 177, 179,
111, 115–118, 131, 140, 141, 182–185, 205, 252
148, 177, 179, 183, 184, 190, Nonpolar, 204
192, 214, 215, 218, 222, 235, Non-resident ambassadors, 22
237, 238, 240 Non-state actors, 5, 6, 8, 57, 120,
Nepal, 142 129, 153, 156, 159, 166, 167,
Neruda, Pablo, 54 173–176, 178–184, 187, 188,
Nestlé, 5, 84, 167 191, 205, 206, 214, 221, 255,
The Netherlands, 13, 14, 58, 104, 256
141, 190, 212, 217 Nordic countries, 25, 148
272 Index

Nordic states, 181 Operation Barkhane, 145

Norm entrepreneurship, 92, 121, 183, Operation Serval, 145
184, 214 Order of Malta, 178, 193
North Africa, 76, 139, 145, 164 Organisation for Economic
North American Free Trade Co-operation and Development
Agreement (NAFTA), 38 (OECD), 91, 114, 177, 217,
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 220, 223, 224, 226, 237
(NATO), 17, 43, 91, 114, 122, Organisation of African Unity (OAU),
205, 206, 242 137, 238
North Korea, 3, 101, 112, 157 Organisation of American States
Norway, 31, 54, 141, 163, 184, 189, (OAS), 84, 120
212, 217 Organisation of Islamic Cooperation,
Norwegianism, 54 5
NPT Review Conference, 184 Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of the Use, 177, 214
(NPT), 216 Ottawa Process, 176, 177, 188, 216
Nuclear Security Summit, 67 Our Global Neighbourhood, 231
Nuclear testing, 176 Outreach Five, 238
Nuclear weapons, 184, 211, 216 Outsourcing, 186
Nye, Joseph, 189 Overlapping representation, 99

O P
Obama, Barack, 31, 58, 67, 244 P-5 members, 69, 233, 244
Obasanjo, Olusegun, 238 Pacific settlement of disputes, 110,
Obituaries for the resident embassy, 20 113, 115
Occupy Movement, 164 Pakistan, 104, 142, 210, 211, 232,
Occupy Wall Street (OWS), 164 243
Official development assistance Palestine, 19, 116, 168
(ODA), 144, 217, 220 Palestinian Liberation Organisation
Ofstad, Arve, 31 (PLO), 179
Ogata, Sadako, 129 Palestinian Territories, 168
Okonjo-Iweala, Ngozi, 237 Pan-Africanism, 82
Old diplomacy, 11 Pan-Africanist Congress of Azania
Olympics, 30, 143, 172 (PAC), 18
OPEC, 99 Pandith,Farah, 187
Open data, 162 Panel of the Wise, 113
Open Ended Working Para-diplomacy, 153
Group, 232 Paraguay, 19
Open Government Partnership, 163 Paris Club, 74
Openwashing, 162 Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness,
Open Working Group (OWG), 225 223
 Index 273

Parliamentary diplomacy, 7, 68 Polylateral diplomacy, 4, 5, 8, 12, 77,

Parliaments, 49, 178 83, 154, 180, 182, 183, 185,
Paschke’s 2000 report, 20 214, 252, 255, 257
Paz, Octavio, 54 Polypolarity, 204, 206, 242, 256
Peacebuilding, 8, 110, 121, 132–135, Pope Francis, 13, 58, 171
138, 143, 144, 146, 147 Population Summit, 219
Peace-Building Commission, 234 Portugal, 42, 105, 114, 168
Peacekeeping, 122, 123, 130, 132, Positive peace, 128, 132, 138
141, 145, 216, 234 Post-conflict reconstruction and devel-
Peace of Westphalia, 66, 154 opment (PCRD), 5, 8, 110, 135,
Peace operations, 122, 123, 132–134, 144, 146, 147
138, 142, 144, 145 Power, hierarchies of, 9, 259
Peace studies, 128 Pre-negotiations, 56
Peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, Presents credentials, 17
37, 141 President Nixon, 157
Pearson, Lester B., 124 Preventive diplomacy, 132, 144
Pentagon Papers, 171 Princess Diana, 189
People first diplomacy, 182 Privatisation of diplomacy, 154
People-to-people diplomacy, 156, 157 Privatised foreign ministries, 158
People’s Liberation Army, 228 Procedural tactics, 70
People’s Republic of China (PRC), 19, Production and Transfer of
101, 157 Antipersonnel Mines and on their
Periphery, 3, 79 Destruction, 177, 214
Permanent Court of Arbitration, 117 Protecting power, 111
Permanent mission, 23, 88, 94 Proximity talks, 118
Permanent representative, 58, 94, 100, Proxy wars, 126
101, 167 Public diplomacy, 50–54, 143, 156,
Persian Gulf War, 122 182, 189
Persona non grata, 32, 43 Public–private partnership (PPP, or
Person of the Year, 164 P3), 186
Petrobras, 168 Putin, Vladimir, 188
The Philippines, 22, 58, 141, 163,
189, 210
Physicians for Human Rights, 175 Q
Ping, Jean, 30 Qatar, 142, 211, 227
Ping-pong diplomacy, 157, 158 Quadrennial Defense Review, 230
Pledge paradox, 224, 244 Quadrennial Diplomacy and
Plowden Report, 33 Development Review (QDDR),
Pluralist voting, 71 230
Plurilateral diplomacy, 7, 66, 73, 103, Quiet diplomacy, 118, 119, 148
257 Quota systems, 89
Policy entrepreneurs, 176 Qu Xing, 189
274 Index

R Rome Statute, 139, 183, 214

Rainbow Warrior, 176 Root causes of conflict, 126, 128, 129,
Rajah, Gavin, 172 132, 134, 258
Ramaphosa, Cyril, 131 Rotational presidency, 100
Recall its ambassador, 13 Rugby, 54
Reciprocity, 1, 11 Rules of engagement, 65, 202, 221,
Regional integration, 82, 102, 221 255
Regionalisation, 110, 207 Russia, 22, 32, 53, 55, 65, 69, 74,
Regional organisations, 75, 77, 113, 76, 88, 140, 164, 204, 205, 207,
130, 133, 137, 207, 234, 242, 209, 211, 232, 244
259 Russian Orthodox Church, 166
Regional powers, 207, 216 Russkiy Mir, 53
Religious fundamentalism, 126 Rwanda, 72, 126, 142, 143
Representation, 1, 6, 11, 12, 16, 17,
19, 21, 24, 26, 33, 46, 49, 57,
58, 68, 83, 85, 88, 90, 94, 96, S
98, 99, 103, 166, 178, 187, 192, Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
222, 231, 239 (SADR), 19, 86
Representational ambiguity, 18 Samsung, 5, 168
Representative allowances, 15 Saudi Arabia, 210, 235, 243
Representative behaviour, 14 Scandinavian countries, 31, 212
Republic of China (Taiwan), 101 Scramble for Africa, 228
Research and development (R&D), Second track diplomacy, 153
209 Secretariat, 88, 89, 93, 94, 100, 117,
Resident embassies, 6, 7, 11, 12, 19, 166, 167, 251
22, 24, 25, 27, 29, 44, 48, 56, Secretary-General, 20, 89, 91, 92, 94,
57, 253 105, 113, 120–123, 132, 133, 160,
Resident representative, 87 167, 177, 190, 214, 215, 221,
Resource curse, 126 222, 231, 233, 237, 242, 258
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), 72, Security Council, 8, 70, 72, 85,
129, 139, 214 92, 100, 105, 115, 121, 123,
Review of the United Nations 130, 148, 167, 183, 188, 218,
Peacebuilding Architecture, 134 232–236, 242, 244
Revolving door, 189 Security Council Report, 184
Rhodes, 178 Sen, Amartya, 129
Rio+20, 102, 225 Seoul Development Consensus for Shared
Rio Earth Summit, 102, 220 Growth, 224
Ripe for resolution, 119 Serbia, 22
Risk management, 146 The Seven Deadly Sins of Mediation,
Road map, 129 131
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, 166 Shakira, 172
Rodman, Dennis, 157 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
Romania, 22 (SCO), 75, 84, 91, 207, 211
 Index 275

Shared missions, 24 Spain, 53, 112

Shell, 84, 169 Special envoys, 23, 142
Sherpas, 79, 214, 241, 257 Special Representative of the Secretary-
Shuttle diplomacy, 23, 118 General (SRSG), 92, 121
Sierra Leone, 87, 126, 131, 133, 134, Sport diplomacy, 52, 54, 192
184, 193 Srebrenica, 124, 143
Singapore, 208, 212 State-building, 126, 135, 147
Single Negotiation Text (SNT), 67 State capture, 181
Skills training, 15 Statecraft, 8, 180, 201, 253
Snowden, Edward, 171 State identity, 16, 17
Social media, 25, 41, 54, 55, 156, 164 States in transition, 16
Soft power, 51, 53, 54, 254, 256 Stockpiling, 177, 214
Somalia, 3, 124, 127 Strauss-Kahn,Dominic, 237
Somaliland, 126 Structural diplomacy, 9, 66, 74, 85,
South Africa, 16, 18, 19, 28, 30, 31, 201, 242, 258
53, 65, 70, 71, 73, 77, 99, 118, Structural power, 201, 207, 208, 236,
131, 140, 143, 163, 181, 184, 241, 258, 259
186, 189, 207, 210, 213, 215, Structural violence, 126, 128
216, 218, 226, 229, 238 Struggling states, 4, 44
South African Department of Sub-Saharan Africa, 31, 225
International Relations and Subsidiarity, 155, 234, 244
Cooperation (DIRCO), 189 Subsidiary peace agreements, 136
South African Public Protector, 181 Substantive representation, 12
Southern Africa, 76, 105 Sudan, 99, 105, 120, 139, 142, 143,
Southern African Customs Union 172
(SACU), 82 Suez crisis, 124
Southern African Development Summit, 24, 39, 75, 77, 81, 87, 102,
Community (SADC), 91, 99, 167, 172, 177, 183, 185, 192,
109, 113, 131 211, 219, 223, 224, 235, 239
Southern Cone Common Market Summitry, 5, 73
(MERCOSUR), 83, 84, 116 Suspension of voting rights, 97
South Korea, 53, 67, 75, 76, 104, Sustainable development, 36, 162,
184, 192, 208, 210, 224, 226, 221
232 Sustainable Development Goals
South–South Cooperation (SSC), 226, (SDGs), 78, 225, 258
227 Swaziland, 23
South Sudan, 79, 120, 134, 229 Sweden, 55, 112, 168, 212, 213, 217,
South Sudan Council of Churches, 231
120 Switzerland, 21, 50, 112, 114, 115,
South Summit, 220, 238 159, 167, 184, 212, 216
Soviet Union, 37, 68, 92, 100, 101, Syria, 17, 50, 121, 188
157 Systems approach, 140
276 Index

T Travel warnings, 29
Taiwan, 13, 19, 157, 209 Treaty of Pelindaba, 216
Tajikistan, 211 Trump, Donald, 164, 173, 192, 193,
Talbott, Strobe, 29, 145, 169 206, 211
Tanzania, 94, 142 Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Tata, 168 (TRC), 140
Tea Party movement, 164 Turkey, 3, 12, 13, 17, 23, 75, 114,
Terror attacks, 30 205, 210
Terrorism, 139, 145, 223 Turkey–Africa Cooperation Summit,
Thailand, Indonesia and the 227
Philippines (TIP), 211 Turkmenistan, 114
Thatcher, Margaret, 13 Tutsi, 143
The 14th Dalai Lama, 33, 171 Tutu, Desmond (Archbishop), 171
Third Industrial Revolution, 163 Twitter, 25, 54, 193
Third-party diplomacy, 4, 5, 7, 8, 12,
83, 110, 111, 113, 118, 120,
121, 123, 124, 126, 133, 135, U
137–144, 146, 147, 252–254, U2, 172
256 Ubuntu, 128, 189
Third World, 3, 126 Ukraine, 32
Time Magazine, 164 Unanimity, 67
Timor-Leste, 133, 134, 137, 229 UN Conference on Environment and
Tokyo International Conference on Development (UNCED), 67, 102
African Development (TICAD), Under-development, 129
76 UN Environment Programme
Track one diplomacy, 120, 153 (UNEP), 81
Track two diplomacy, 120 UN Framework Convention on Climate
Trade disputes, 34, 81 Change, 73
Traditional diplomacy, 11, 26, 51, 57, UN Human Rights Council, 70, 167
120, 153, 181, 255 UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur
Transforming our world: the (UNAMID), 138
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Uni-multipolarity, 204, 207
Development, 225 Unipolarity, 204
Transition to democracy, 131 UNITA, 184
Transnational Commercial United Kingdom (UK), 13, 24, 30,
Organisations (TCOs), 167 32, 50, 53, 69, 74, 104, 112,
Transnational Corporations (TNCs), 124, 159, 162, 163, 189, 192,
167 230, 232, 244
Transnational issue networks, 163 United Nations (UN), 7, 23, 58, 66,
Transnational social movements 68, 71, 72, 75, 77, 79, 81–86,
(TSMs), 163, 164 88, 90–96, 98, 104, 105, 109,
Transparency International, 212 114–117, 120–124, 130, 132,
 Index 277

133, 135, 138, 141, 142, 144, UN Peacebuilding Architecture

145, 147, 159, 160, 162, 166, (PBA), 134
167, 172, 190, 193, 218, 222, UN Peacebuilding Commission, 133
223, 225, 227, 231, 238, 255 UN Security Council (UNSC), 69,
United Nations Charter, 8, 69, 71, 70, 91, 104, 121, 124, 127, 140,
89, 91, 110, 113, 116, 117, 122, 145, 157, 184, 206, 208, 216,
138, 146, 166, 231, 234, 259 218, 233, 241, 259
United Nations Children’s Fund US Agency for International
(UNICEF), 81, 172 Development (USAID), 32, 145,
United Nations Conference on the 230
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 68 US Chamber of Commerce, 187, 193
United Nations Conference on Trade US Drug Enforcement Administration,
and Development (UNCTAD), 32
34, 219, 238 Ushahidi, 170, 192
United Nations Development USNS Comfort, 51
Programme (UNDP), 76 US-South Africa Business Council,
United Nations Economic and Social 187
Council (ECOSOC), 100, 159, US State Department, 28, 48, 187
166 Uzbekistan, 3, 211
United Nations Educational, Scientific
and Cultural Organisation
(UNESCO), 161 V
United Nations Emergency Force Vatican, 111, 114, 115, 193
(UNEF), 124 Venezuela, 24, 167
United Nations Handbook, 215 VFS Global, 186
United Nations Staff College, 190 Vienna Convention on Consular
United States of America (USA), 22, Relations, 27, 112
25, 31, 32, 37, 38, 46, 50, 51, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
53, 68, 69, 73, 74, 76, 85, 88, Relations (VCDR), 12, 21, 26,
99, 112, 140, 141, 143, 157, 32, 33, 40, 42, 46, 47, 49, 54,
162, 163, 168, 171, 182, 186, 56, 57, 95, 103, 111
187, 192, 204, 206, 209, 213, Article 3 of the 1961, 6, 12
216, 225, 229, 230, 232, 233, Vietnam, 75, 171, 207, 210
236–238, 243, 244 VIP visits, 49
Uniting for Consensus (UfC), 72, Virtual diplomacy, 54
104, 232, 234 Virtual Embassy of the United States
Uniting for Peace, 101 to Iran, 25
Universal Declaration of Human Virtual negotiations, 41
Rights, 78 Virtual representation, 25, 253
Unmanned aerial vehicles, 161 Visa diplomacy, 32
278 Index

Voting behaviour, 98 World Trade Organisation (WTO), 5,

Voting in certain company, 69 7, 78, 81, 84, 97, 104, 114, 117,
Voting patterns, 69 167, 179, 209, 215, 222, 230,
237
World War I, 6, 13, 204
W World War II, 82, 112, 113, 123, 167,
War, 2, 13, 77, 78, 114, 119, 124, 182, 204, 211, 217, 219, 232,
139, 161, 171, 174, 183, 216 236, 243
War on Terror, 51
Washington Consensus, 224
Weighted voting, 69, 85, 233, 236 X
West Africa, 76, 87, 127 Xinjiang, 126
Western Sahara, 19, 86, 159
West Germany, 74
WhatsApp, 54, 55 Y
WhatsApp diplomacy, 55 Yakovenko, Alexander, 32
WhatsApp summitry, 55 Yemen, 121, 142
What’s In Blue, 184, 235 Yugoslavia, 18
WikiLeaks, 47
Williams, Jody, 177
Williams, Serena, 172 Z
Winfrey, Oprah, 171 Zambia, 31
Winter Olympics, 192 Zanu-PF, 139
Win-win solution, 128 Zartman, William, 38, 119, 127
Women’s Summit, 219 Zedillo, Ernesto, 93
World Association of Investment Zenawi, Meles, 35
Promotion Agencies (WAIPA), 34 Zimbabwe, 70, 96, 118, 119, 137,
World Bank, 69, 76, 91, 93, 97, 167, 139, 175
221, 236, 237, 239 Zimbabwe Economic Support
World Business Council for Sustainable Network, 175
Development (WBCSD), 168 Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO
World Food Programme (WFP), 81 Forum, 175
World Health Organisation (WHO), Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights,
81 175
World Intellectual Property The Zimbabwe Peace Project, 175
Organisation, 78 Zoellick, Robert, 93, 237
World Social Summit, 219 Zuckerberg, Mark, 171
World Summit, 30, 67, 73, 233, 235 Zuma, Jacob, 181
World Summit on the Information
Society (WSIS), 162