Security Policy SSG-300 ScreenOS 6 2
Security Policy SSG-300 ScreenOS 6 2
Copyright © 2009 Juniper Networks, Inc. May be reproduced only in its original entirety [without revision].
Juniper Networks, the Juniper Networks logo, NetScreen, NetScreen Technologies, GigaScreen, and the NetScreen logo are
registered trademarks of Juniper Networks, Inc. SSG 520M, SSG 550M, NetScreen-5XP, NetScreen-5XT, NetScreen-25,
NetScreen-50, NetScreen-100, NetScreen-204, NetScreen-208, NetScreen-500, NetScreen-5200, NetScreen-5400,
NetScreen-Global PRO, NetScreen-Global PRO Express, NetScreen-Remote Security Client, NetScreen-Remote VPN Client,
NetScreen-IDP 10, NetScreen-IDP 100, NetScreen-IDP 500, GigaScreen ASIC, GigaScreen-II ASIC, and NetScreen
ScreenOS are trademarks of Juniper Networks, Inc. All other trademarks and registered trademarks are the property of their
respective companies.
Juniper Networks, Inc.
ATTN: General Counsel
1194 N. Mathilda Ave.Sunnyvale, CA 95014
FCC Statement
The following information is for FCC compliance of Class A devices: This equipment has been tested and found to comply with
the limits for a Class A digital device, pursuant to part 15 of the FCC rules. These limits are designed to provide reasonable
protection against harmful interference when the equipment is operated in a commercial environment. The equipment
generates, uses, and can radiate radio-frequency energy and, if not installed and used in accordance with the instruction
manual, may cause harmful interference to radio communications. Operation of this equipment in a residential area is likely to
cause harmful interference, in which case users will be required to correct the interference at their own expense.
The following information is for FCC compliance of Class B devices: The equipment described in this manual generates and
may radiate radio-frequency energy. If it is not installed in accordance with NetScreen’s installation instructions, it may cause
interference with radio and television reception. This equipment has been tested and found to comply with the limits for a Class
B digital device in accordance with the specifications in part 15 of the FCC rules. These specifications are designed to provide
reasonable protection against such interference in a residential installation. However, there is no guarantee that interference
will not occur in a particular installation.
If this equipment does cause harmful interference to radio or television reception, which can be determined by turning the
equipment off and on, the user is encouraged to try to correct the interference by one or more of the following measures:
Reorient or relocate the receiving antenna.
Increase the separation between the equipment and receiver.
Consult the dealer or an experienced radio/TV technician for help.
Connect the equipment to an outlet on a circuit different from that to which the receiver is connected.
Caution: Changes or modifications to this product could void the user's warranty and authority to operate this device.
Disclaimer
THE SOFTWARE LICENSE AND LIMITED WARRANTY FOR THE ACCOMPANYING PRODUCT ARE SET FORTH IN THE
INFORMATION PACKET THAT SHIPPED WITH THE PRODUCT AND ARE INCORPORATED HEREIN BY THIS
REFERENCE. IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO LOCATE THE SOFTWARE LICENSE OR LIMITED WARRANTY, CONTACT YOUR
JUNIPER NETWORKS REPRESENTATIVE FOR A COPY.
The general components of the SSG 320M and 350M include firmware and hardware. The main
hardware components consist of a main processor, memory, flash, 10/100 Mbps Ethernet interface,
console interface and power supply.
The entire case is defined as the cryptographic boundary of the module. The SSG 300 series
physical configuration is defined as a multi-chip standalone module. The chips are production-grade
quality and include standard passivation techniques. The SSG 300 series conforms to FCC part 15,
class A.
Validation Level
The following table lists the validation level for each FIPS 140-2 area.
• Configuration: Configure firewall policies (including the bypass service), VPN encryption
and digital signature options, network interface options, routing tables, protocol support,
authentication servers, logging options and system time. Clear dynamic system information
such as statistics or VPN security associations.
• Status: View firewall policies, VPN configuration, traffic and performance statistics, firmware
version, network interface status and system logs. Perform ping and trace-route.
• Zeroize: Overwrite all CSP values with three alternating bit patterns, then reset the
configuration to the factory default values. Also occurs when placing the device into or
removing it from FIPS mode.
• Manage: Create new users.
• Self-tests: Invoke cryptographic algorithm and system integrity self-tests.
The module allows concurrent Admin users, either User or Read-Only User roles. It provides the
following services for each role:
Authentication
The security appliance supports identity-based authentication. Operators must be authenticated
using user names and passwords. All operators can be authenticated locally (within the security
appliance). Based on his identity, an operator assumes the correct role.
The module supports identity-based authentication through the local database for the Cryptographic
Officer Role, the User Role, and the Read-Only User Role. The use of an external authentication
server for admin authentication is not supported in FIPS mode.
In order for authentication data to be protected against disclosure, substitution and modification,
passwords are not echoed during entry. A separate session is assigned to each successful
administrator login. On power down, previous authentications are erased from memory and need to
be re-authenticated again on power-up.
The first time an operator logs on to the module, the operator uses the default user name and
password which is “netscreen”, “netscreen”. This user is assigned the Crypto-Officer role.
Strength of Authentication
User names and passwords are case-sensitive. The password consists of at least six alphanumeric
characters. Since there are 26 uppercase letters, 26 lowercase letters, and 10 digits, the total number
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of available characters is 62. The probability of someone guessing a password is 1/(62 ) =
1/56,800,235,584 , which is far less than a 1/1,000,000 random success rate. This also applies to the
RADIUS shared secret, as well as authentication through the SSH protected channel.
If three login attempts from the console fail consecutively, the console will be disabled for one minute.
If three login attempts from Telnet or the WebUI (through VPN with AES encryption) fail
consecutively, any login attempts from that source will be dropped for one minute. Since a user is
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locked our after three contiguous login failures, the random success rate per minute is 1/(62 ) + 1/
6 6 6
(62 ) + 1/(62 ) = 3/(62 ), which is far less than 1/100,000.
• Console port – RJ-45 serial port connector (Data Input, Data Output, Status IN, Control
OUT). This port allows initial access to the Command Line Interface (CLI).
• Modem port – RJ-45 serial port connector. Disabled in FIPS mode.
• USB port. Disabled in FIPS mode.
• Power interface: AC or DC.
• The SSG has four status LEDs:
• Hardware reset button: After the user follows this sequence—press for 5 seconds,
release for 5 seconds, press again for 5 seconds, and release again for 5 seconds—the
device erases all configurations and restores the default factory settings (Control Input).
• The SSG 320M has three physical interface module (PIM) slots; the SSG 350M has five
PIM slots.
• Both modules were validated using only the fixed ethernet interfaces on the chassis.
The security appliance provides an interface for an operator to configure the device through the
Console or Network ports. For initial configuration, the operator must directly connect a VT-100
terminal or a non-networked device that can emulate a VT-100 terminal to the Console port via a
serial cable.
By default, the security appliance is in non-FIPS mode on the first power-up. The first time an
operator logs on to the appliance, the operator uses the default user name and password which is
“netscreen”, “netscreen”. This user is assigned the Crypto-Officer role.
Once the device is operating in FIPS mode, the operator should perform the minimum configuration
necessary to establish a management connection via SSH (i.e. configure a network interface and
enable SSH management through that interface), then disable the console connection using the set
console disable CLI command. If the console is re-enabled in FIPS mode, the device will
automatically zeroize itself and return to non-FIPS mode.
Prior to placing the device in FIPS mode, the administrator must load the Juniper firmware
authentication DSA public key, imagekey.cer, using the save image-key CLI command. When this
public key is present on the device, the integrity and authenticity of the firmware is checked at system
start and when firmware is loaded. If the DSA signature appended to the firmware is verified, the
device allows it to be loaded.
If the device is not already running a FIPS validated version of the firmware, the administrator should
load it using the save software CLI command. Loading a new version of firmware completely
replaces any existing firmware.
The firmware is signed by a well-protected 1024 bit modulus DSA private key, which provides 80 bits
of security. The generated signature is attached to the firmware. In order for the device to accept an
authorized image, the image has to have a correct signature.
The cryptographic module provides identity-based authentication. Until the operator has been
authenticated to the module to assume a valid role, the operator does not have access to any
cryptographic services.
Data output is inhibited during key generation, self-tests, zeroization, and error states. Status
information does not contain CSPs or sensitive data that if misused could lead to a compromise of
the module. The module does not support a maintenance mode.
The module performs key agreement as per the guidelines in NIST SP 800-57.
Self tests
On failure of any self-test, the module enters and stays in a permanent error state with the following
characteristics:
• The console displays an error message of the format: “XXX test failed: error code N”.
• The status LED flashes red.
• All traffic processing halts.
Bypass tests are performed as a conditional test. The bypass state occurs when the administrator
configures the module with a non-VPN policy and an incoming packet whose source address,
destination address and service matching this policy arrives at the network port. The bypass enabled
status can be found by retrieving the entire policy list. Two internal actions must exist in order for
bypass to happen: (1) a non-VPN policy is matched for this traffic, and (2) a routing table entry exists
for the traffic that matches this non-VPN policy.
For every usage of the module’s random number generator, a continuous RNG self-test is performed.
Note that this is performed on both the FIPS approved RNG and non-FIPS approved RNG.
At any time the cryptographic module is in an idle state, the operator may command the device to
perform the self-tests.
The module supports the following communication protocols which are allowed in FIPS mode:
• SSL v3.1
• SSH v2
• IPSec
Zeroization
All keys and unprotected security parameters can be individually zeroized through the Unset, Clear,
Delete, and Reset commands. Pressing the hardware reset button or issuing the “unset vendor-def”
CLI command will cause the zeroization of all CSPs by reseting the device configuration to the factory
default values.
1. Confirm that the product received matches the version that is validated as FIPS 140-2
compliant.
2. The outside packaging does not show damage or evidence that is has been opened. If
the cardboard shows damage that would allow the device to be removed or exchanged,
this may be evidence of tampering.
3. Each box is packaged with custom tape to indicate that the device was packaged by
Juniper Networks or an authorized manufacturer. The tape is unique, with the words
Juniper Networks printed repeatedly along the tape. If the tape is not present, the
device may have been tampered with.
4. The internal packaging does not show damage or evidence of tampering. The plastic
bag should not have a large hole and the label that seals the plastic bag should not be
detached or missing. If the bag or seal are damaged in any way, the device may have
been tampered with.
The security appliance is contained within a metal production-grade enclosure that is opaque to
visible spectrum radiation. The enclosure includes a removable cover that must be protected by a
tamper-evident seal.
The administrator must seal the metal enclosure of the device with tamper-evident tape and inspect
the seals on a periodic basis to ensure that they are intact. Seals are available for order via part
number JNPR-FIPS-TAMPER-LBLS. If a seal is missing or damaged, the device may have been
tampered with. Tamper-evident seals should be applied as described below.
• The front of the SSG 320M and 350M across both edges of each of the installed interface
cards, or slot covers, extending on to the chassis and removable cover of the device, as
shown in figures 2 and 3.
• The rear of the device across the CompactFlash card cover, extending over the edge of the
removeable cover and the bottom of the chassis, as shown in figure 4.
• The rear of the SSG 350M across the removable dust filter tray, extending on to the rear and
side of the chassis, as shown in figure 4.
To replace or install the dust filter in the SSG 350M, remove the tamper-evident seal from the dust
filter tray, replace the previous filter and apply a new tamper-evident seal across the dust filter tray,
as shown in figure 3.
To replace or install the dust filter in the SSG 320M, remove the tamper evident seals that extend on
to the removable cover, open the cover and install the dust filter along the edge of the device
opposite to the ventilation fans, close the cover and apply new tamper-evident seals across the edge
of the removable cover, as shown in figure 1. Tamper-evident seals must not be re-used.
• Firmware Authentication Key: Used by the device to verify DSA signatures over
firmware images.
• CA DSA/RSA Public Key: Used by IKE to authenticate a peer’s certificate.
• Local DSA/RSA/ECDSA Public Key: Used by the IKE peer to verify digital signatures.
• SSH Server/Host DSA Public Key: Used by the SSH client to verify digital signatures.
• SSH Client DSA Public Key: Used by the device to verify digital signatures.
• Diffie Hellman Public Key Components: Used by the DH Key Agreement protocol.
The following matrices define the set of services to the CSP of the module, providing information on
generation, destruction and usage. They also correlate the User roles and the Crypto-Officer roles to
the set of services to which they have privileges.
The matrices use the following convention:
• G: Generate
• D: Delete
• U: Usage
• N/A: Not Available
Table A: Crypto-Officer
1. The Crypto-Officer is authorized to change all authorized operators' user names and passwords, but the user is only
allowed to change his/her own user name and password
2. The Crypto-Officer is authorized to remove all authorized operators.
IPSEC HMAC SHA-1 Key May be either entered directly at the CLI
by the administrator, or generated
internally via ANSI X9.31 RNG as a result
of IKE protocol exchanges.
IPSEC ESP Key “
IKE Pre-shared Key Entered directly at the CLI by administrator
IKE Encryption Key Internally via ANSI X9.31 RNG, as a result
of IKE protocol exchanges
IKE HMAC SHA-1 Key “
Password Entered directly at the CLI by administrator
SSH Server/Host DSA Private Key Internally via ANSI X9.31 RNG when DSA
key-pair is generated.
SSH Encryption Key Internally via ANSI X9.31 RNG, as a result
of Diffie-Hellman key exchange during
SSH session establishment.
SSH HMAC SHA-1 Key “
HA Key Entered directly at the CLI by administrator
IKE RSA/DSA/ECDSA Private Key Internally via ANSI X9.31 RNG
Diffie Hellman Private Key “
Components
PRNG Seed and Seed Key Initial generation via entropy gathered from
a variety of internal sources.
RADIUS Secret Key Entered directly at the CLI by administrator