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Islamic Research and Training Institute

A Member of the Islamic Development Bank Group

ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE
DEVELOPMENT
Challenges and Initiatives

Policy Dialogue Paper No. 2

Electronic
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C Islamic Development Bank, 2008
King Fahd National Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Obaidullah, Mohammed, Khan Tariqullah


Islamic Microfinance Development: Challenges and Initiatives/ Mohammed
Obaidullah and Tariqullah Khan – Jeddah, 2008

65 p, 17 × 24 cm
ISBN: 978-9960-32-180-6
1- Islamic Finance 2- Islamic Economy
1- Title
330-121 dc 1429/2739

Cover Design by Mohammad Ali Asiri

L.D. no. 1429/2739


ISBN: 978-9960-32-180-6

Electronic
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THE ISLAMIC DEVELOPMENT BANK (IDB)
Purpose
The purpose of the Bank is to foster the economic development and social progress of member
countries and Muslim communities individually as well as jointly in accordance with the principles of
Shariah (Islamic Law).
Functions
The functions of the Bank are to participate in equity capital and grant loans for productive
projects and enterprises besides providing financial assistance to member countries in other forms of
economic and social development. The Bank is required to establish and operate special funds for
specific purposes including a fund for assistance to Muslim communities in non-member countries, in
addition to setting up trust funds.
The Bank is authorized to accept deposits and to raise funds in any other manner. It is also
charged with the responsibility of assisting in the promotion of foreign trade, especially in capital
goods, among member countries, in providing technical assistance to member countries, in extending
training facilities for personnel engaged in development activities and in undertaking research for
enabling economic, financial and banking activities in Muslim countries to conform to the Shariah.
Membership
The present membership of the Bank consists of 56 countries. The basic condition for
membership is that the prospective member country should be a member of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference (OIC) and be willing to accept such terms and conditions as may be decided upon
by the Board of Governors.
Language
The official language of the Bank is Arabic, but English and French are additionally used as
working languages.

THE ISLAMIC RESEARCH AND TRAINING INSTITUTE (IRTI)


Purpose
The purpose of the Institute is to undertake research for enabling the economic, financial and
banking activities in Muslim countries to conform to Shariah, and to extend training facilities to
personnel engaged in economic development activities in the Bank’s member countries.
Functions
The functions of the Institute are:
(i) to organize and coordinate basic and applied research with a view to developing
models and methods for the application of Shariah in the fields of economics,
finance and banking;
(ii) to provide for the training and development of professional personnel in Islamic
Economics to meet the needs of research and Shariah-observing agencies;
(iii) to train personnel engaged in development activities in the Bank’s member
countries.
(iv) to establish an information center to collect, systematize and disseminate
information in fields related to its activities; and
(v) to undertake any other activities which may advance its purpose.
Location
The Institute is located in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
Address
P.O. Box 9201, Jeddah 21413
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Telephone: 966-2-6361400, Fax: 966-2-6378927, 6366871
Telex: 601407, 601137 ISDB SJ, Cable: BANKISLAMI
e-mail: [email protected]
Web Site: www.isdb.org

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Contents
Foreword
Acknowledgement
Executive Summary
1. Introduction 1
1.1. Models of MF 1
1.2. Key Principles of MF 4
1.3. Enhancing Inclusiveness through Islamic MF 6
1.4 Objectives 8
2. The Poor in the Islamic World 9
2.1. Poverty Levels in the Islamic World 9
2.2. Exclusion in the Islamic World 9
2.3. Understanding the Needs of the Poor 11
3. Foundations of Islamic Microfinance (IsMF) 15
3.1. Approach to Poverty Alleviation 15
3.2. Shariah-Compliant Instruments of IsMF 18
3.2.1. Instruments for Mobilization of Funds 18
3.2.2. Instruments of Financing 19
3.2.3. Instruments of Risk Management 22
4. Micro Level: Islamic MF Providers 23
4.1. Landscape 23
4.1.1. Informal MF Providers 23
4.1.2. Member-Based Organizations 24
4.1.3. Non-Government Organizations 24
4.1.4. Formal Financial Institutions 24
4.2. Islamic MF Providers across the Globe 25
4.2.1. Middle-East North Africa 25
4.2.2. South Asia 26
4.2.3. South-East Asia 27
4.2.4. Sub-Saharan Africa 30
4.2.5. Central Asia 30
4.3. Challenges 30
4.3.1. Diverse Organizational Structures 30
4.3.2. Shariah Compliance 31
4.3.3. Lack of Product Diversification 33
4.3.4. Linkages with Banks and Capital Markets 33
4.4. Strategic Response 34
4.4.1. Collective Resolution of Shariah Issues 34

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vi

4.4.2. A Diverse Range of Products 35


4.4.3. Banks’ Participation in Microfinance 36
4.4.4. Capital Market Participation 38
5. Meso Level: Islamic MF Infrastructure 41
5.1. Landscape 41
5.2. Challenges 42
5.2.1. Payment Systems 42
5.2.2. Transparency and Information Infrastructure 42
5.2.3. Education and Training 42
5.2.4. Networking 42
5.3. Strategic Response 43
5.3.1. Payment Systems 43
5.3.2. Transparency and Information 44
5.3.3. Education and Training 44
5.3.4. Networking 45
5.3.5. Technical Assistance through Awqaf and Zakah Funds 46
6. Macro Level: Islamic MF Regulatory and Supervision 47
Framework
6.1. Macroeconomic Stability 48
6.2. Liberalized Financial Market Rates 48
6.3. Banking Sector Regulation and Supervision 48
6.3.1. Issues in Prudential Regulation and Supervision 49
6.3.2. Issues Related to Dual System 50
6.4. Strategic Response 51
7. Role of Donors and Development Financial Institutions 53
8. Recommendations 57
Annexure I: Poverty in IsDB Member Countries 60
Annexure II: Access to Financial Services in IsDB Member Countries 64
Annexure III: Regulatory Framework for MFIs and IFIs in IsDB 66
Member Countries
List of Boxes 77
List of Abbreviations 77
Glossary of Arabic Terms 78

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FOREWORD

Access of the poor to financial services is indeed important for the success of
market based and sustainable poverty alleviation programs. In this regard,
microfinance has been recognized worldwide as an important policy instrument.
However, the Islamic financial services industry although has progressed
significantly during the last 3 decades, but has yet to develop Islamic microfinance
services. Therefore, the Islamic Research and Training Institute during the last two
years has addressed the subject of Islamic microfinance development through
various activities.

First, a stock-taking of the existing knowledge regarding Islamic microfinance


services was undertaken by organizing the 'First International Conference on
Islamic Inclusive Financial Sector Development' in collaboration with the
University of Brunei Darussalam. Second, the Institute addressed the 'Role of
Microfinance in Poverty Alleviation' through a case study of three member
countries of IsDB. Finally, as a companion of the above two works this paper on
'Islamic Microfinance Development: Challenges and Initiatives' has been prepared
as a strategic framework for systematically addressing the main challenges relating
to policy initiatives to develop Islamic microfinance services.

It is hoped that together these three works will bridge the existing gap in the
area of Islamic microfinance. Comments and observations are invited to improve
the knowledge in this important area. It is expected that these efforts will contribute
to initiatives in removing the barriers to accessing financial services by the poor.

Bashir Ali Khallat


Director General, IRTI

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The need to prepare this document was felt during the consultation process on
the “Ten-Year Framework and Strategies for Development of the Islamic Financial
Services Industry” a joint initiative of the IsDB/IRTI and the Islamic Financial
Services Board (IFSB) and other stakeholders.

The document was prepared by an internal cross-functional team anchored by


IRTI and discussed in the meeting of IRTI Working Group on Islamic Financial
Sector Development held in the IsDB headquarters on April 14, 2007. The revised
document was presented to the "Islamic Financial Sector Development Forum
2007 (Islamic Microfinance Development: Challenges and Initiatives)" held in
Dakar, Senegal on May 27, 2007 organized by IRTI and General Council of
Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (CIBAFI) in sideline of the IsDB BoG
Meetings. Subsequently, the revised paper was reviewed by 3 technical experts.
Hence the paper has benefited from the ideas, observations and comments of a
large number of policy makers, practitioners and scholars, of whom, the following
need special mentioning.

1. H. E. M. Abdoulaye DIOP, Minister of Finance, Senegal


2. H. E. Dr. Ahmad Mohamed Ali, President, the Islamic Development Bank
Group
3. H. E. Shaikh Saleh Abdullah Kamel, Chairman, General Council of
Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions, Dallah Al-Barakah Group and the
Islamic Chamber of Commerce and Industry
4. H. E. Dr. Amadou Bobacar Cisse, Vice President (Operations), IsDB
5. H. E. Ms. Abda Y. El-Mahdi, Ex-Minister of State, Managing Director,
UNICONS Consultancy Sudan
6. Professor Dr. Rifaat Ahmed Abdel Karim, Secretary-General Islamic
Financial Services Board
7. Prof. Dr. Volker Nienhaus, President, University of Marburg, Germany
8. Mr. V. Sundararajan, Director and Head of Financial Practice, Centennial
Group Holdings Washington DC, USA
9. Dr. Tariqullah Khan, Division Chief, Islamic Banking and Finance, IRTI
contributing as Anchor
10. Dr. Marwan Hassan Seif-eddine, Advisor, Office of the President, IsDB
Group
11. Dr. Habib Ahmed, Senior Economist, IRTI
12. Mr. Abdulaziz Slaoui, Senior Microfinance Specialist, COD3, IsDB
13. Mr. Rabbih Mattar, Senior Microfinance Specialist, COD1, IsDB
14. Mr. Oumar Diakite, Project Officer, COD2, IsDB
15. Mr. Wasim Abdul Wahab, Project Officer, AMD, IsDB

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16. Dr. Mohammad Obaidullah, Economist, IRTI, contributing as Principal


Author.
17. Mr. Jamil Al Wahidi, Microfinance Advisor, Grameen Abdul Latif Jameel
Initiative, Jeddah
18. Mr. Sephudin Noer, Director, Baitulmaal Muamalat, Bank Muamalat,
Indonesia
19. Mr. Nurul Islam, Executive Vice President, Islamic Bank, Bangladesh
20. Mrs. Ishrag Dirar, Director, Microfinance, Bank of Sudan
21. Mr. Dwiyanto, Director Microfinance, Bank Indonesia
22. Mr. Imran Ahmed Joint Director, Islamic Banking Department, State Bank
of Pakistan
23. Mr. Mahmoud Asaad, Project Director, SANADEQ, UNDP Rural
Community Jabal Al-Hoss, Syria
24. Mr. Mohannad Mohammad M. Alrashdan, Director, Jordan Loan
Guarantee Corporation Amman-Jordan
25. Mr. Kais Aliriani, Executive Director, SANABEL, Microfinance Network
of Arab Countries, Egypt
26. Dr. Dadang Muljawan Islamic Financial Services Board [IFSB] Kuala
Lumpur-Malaysia
27. Mr. Naser Al Ziyadat, Director (Strategy), General Council of Islamic
Banks and Financial Institutions, Bahrain
28. Dr. Mehmat Barca, Economist, Statistical, Economic and Social Research
and Training Centre for Islamic Countries (SESRTCIC), Ankara, Turkey
29. Mr. Jamal Abbas Zaidi, Chief Executive Officer, International Islamic
Rating Agency
30. Dr. Azmir Agel, Director Product Development, International Islamic
Financial Market, Bahrain
31. Ms. Zabidah Ismail, Amanah Ikhtiar Malaysia
32. Mr. El hadj Abdourahmane Bah, Directeur Général, Agence Autonome
d'Assistance Intégrée aux Entreprises, Guinea-Conakry
33. Mrs. Samia Mansour, Deputy General Director of Microenterprise
Development, Tunisia
34. Mr. Mamadou OUEDRAOGO Directeur de PRODIA Ouagadougou
Burkina Faso
35. Mrs. Hiba Qasas Barakat, Programme Analyst, Employment Generation/
Productive Capital, UNDP/PAPP, Palestine
36. Mr. Ihsan Solmaz, Adviser to the President, KOSGEB-Turkey
37. Mr. MD. Fariduddin Ahmad, Executive President, Islamic Bank
Bangladesh
38. Mr. Abdulgabbar Hayel Saeed, Chairman, Tadhamon International Islamic
Bank – Yemen
39. Mr. Rene AZOKLI, Director General, PADME (Projet d’Appui au
Développement des Micro-Entreprises), Benin
40. Mr. MAYORO Loum, Director General, ACEP, Senegal

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41. Dr. Savas Alpay, Director General, Statistical, Economic and Social
Research and Training Centre for Islamic Countries, Ankara, Turkey
42. Mr. Anass El Hasnaoui, Managing Director, International Business
Finance Group, Morocco
43. Mr. Sambou COLY, Country Manager Oikocredit, Senegal

Dr. Tariqullah Khan


Division Chief IBFD, IRTI
Jeddah, 6/5/1429H (11/5/2008)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Poverty alleviation and development of Islamic Financial Services Industry
(IFSI) are two key strategic objectives of the Islamic Development Bank Group in
addition to enhancing economic cooperation among the member countries. These
are also enshrined in the IsDB Vision 1440H and the OIC 10-Year Work Plan. In
implementing the IFSI development objective, during 2006 IRTI anchored the
preparation of “Ten-Year Framework and Strategies (TYFS) for Development of
the Islamic Financial Services Industry”, a joint initiative of the IsDB Group and
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB). After an extensive consultation process
with all stakeholders, the IFSB Council approved the document in its Meeting held
in Kuala Lumpur on March 26, 2007. During the consultation process on the TYFS
document and at the IFSI Development Forum held in Kuwait as a side activity of
the 2006 IsDB BoG meetings, and organized jointly by IsDB/IRTI, IFSB and
General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (CIBAFI), it was
widely felt that there is a need to focus on Islamic Microfinance Development as
top priority initiative in order to align IFSI development with poverty alleviation.

Despite progress in all significant segments, the IFSI has not addressed the
challenge of poverty alleviation by making financial services accessible to the
poor. This document is being developed with a view to forming the basis for a
dialogue among the various stakeholders, including, scholars, academicians,
regulators, policy makers, the IFSI and multilateral institutions. The document uses
a structure similar to one used in the well-known study “Access to the Poor” – a
comprehensive work undertaken by the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP), the multi-donor consortium dedicated to advancing microfinance. The
study examines the landscape and challenges confronting Islamic microfinance at
three levels – the micro level, the meso level and the macro level and suggests
strategic initiatives as solutions to the challenges.

The document highlights the importance of microfinance as a tool to fight


poverty. It presents the “best practices” models of microfinance and the consensus
principles of the microfinance industry. It goes on to argue that diverse approaches
are needed to minimize exclusion and that the cultural and religious sensitivities of
Muslim societies must be given due emphasis in any attempt to build inclusive
financial systems in order to bring a very large segment of the world’s poor
population into the fold of formal financial systems. It undertakes an analysis of the
levels of poverty in the IsDB member countries and also juxtaposes measures of
financial access to highlight the extent of exclusion in these countries. It highlights
the Islamic approach to poverty alleviation through microfinance and underscores
the need for a dual approach: a zakah and awqaf-based charity program for the
destitute, disabled and “unbankable” and a micro-finance program of wealth
creation. Some of the principles inherent in the latter are access of the poorest of

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xiv

the poor to the program; careful assessment of the financial health of the poor;
enquiry blended with empathy; insistence on contribution and beneficiary stake;
transformation of unproductive assets of the beneficiary into income-generating
ones through valuation (on the basis of price discovery through auction method);
involvement of the larger community in the process; meeting of basic needs on a
priority basis and investment of the surplus in a productive asset; direct
involvement of the program in capacity building in the run-up to income generation
and technical assistance to the beneficiary; commitment of top management of the
program; technical assistance in the form of imparting requisite training to the
beneficiary for carrying out the business plan/ income-generating project;
monitoring through a time-bound schedule and impact assessment through a feed-
back mechanism; and finally, transparent accounting of operational results. In
short, the Islamic approach to poverty alleviation is more inclusive than the
conventional one. The entire gamut of Islamic financial contracts for deposit
mobilization, financing and risk management in a Shariah compliant framework
are also reviewed.

The document examines Islamic microfinance at three levels – micro level


(microfinance institutions, contracts/products and resources), meso level (financial
infrastructures) and macro level (policy and regulatory framework). The landscape
is analyzed, followed by discussing the major challenges and offering strategic
solutions to the challenges.

At a micro level the major challenges to microfinance providers emanate from


their diverse organizational structures, issues relating to Shariah compliance, lack
of product diversification and poor linkages with banks and capital markets. Some
strategic initiatives are suggested as solutions, such as, a move towards collective
resolution of Shariah issues, enhancement of product range through research and
financial engineering and increased participation of banks in microfinance through
provision of credit guarantees and safety nets. Meso level initiatives constitute
provision of education and training, better coordination and networking, technical
assistance through Awqaf and Zakah Funds, provision of rating services specific to
Islamic microfinance institutions in view of their unique risks through creation of a
rating fund. Macro level initiatives constitute development of an enabling
regulatory and policy environment. It is observed that the IsDB member countries
that have Islamic-finance-specific regulations do not have micro-finance-specific
regulations with a few exceptions. A number of regulatory and policy issues have
been identified for further deliberation and implementation.

The document envisages that Multilateral institutions like the IsDB can play a
major role in micro-, meso- as well as macro-level initiatives to strengthen the
Islamic microfinance industry. Some specific initiative that would go a long way in
strengthening the Islamic MF sector are:

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1. At a micro-level
i. Participate in equity of Islamic financial institutions with a view to
creating specialized MF Divisions;
ii. Create Qard al-Hasan-specific Funds to support various qard al-hasan
based microfinance institutions across the globe;
iii. Create refinance facility to act as a whole-seller of Islamic
microfinance products for a chain of Islamic and conventional
microfinance retailers;
iv. Participate in equity of takaful and retakaful companies with a view to
developing micro-takaful products and services;
v. Design a Credit Guarantee Scheme for Islamic microfinance providers;
and
vi. Promote dialogue among Shariah scholars for collective resolution of
fiqhi issues related to microfinance.

2. At a meso level
i. Develop knowledge base through research in issues pertaining to
building Islamic inclusive financial systems;
ii. Document, collate and translate best-practices from across the world of
microfinance;
iii. Undertake training and education programs to impart microfinance
related special skills to bankers and training of trainers;
iv. Encourage formation of apex and regional industry associations with a
view to develop of Islamic microfinance through human resource
development, technical assistance, operational standardization and
financial product development, facilitation of vertical and horizontal
communication among Islamic financial institutions, advocacy and
participation in policy dialogue;
v. Create Zakah and Awqaf Funds at a global level dedicated exclusively
for poverty alleviation and linked to microfinance institutions
downstream; and
vi. Help create rating mechanism in member countries for Islamic
microfinance institutions.

3. At a macro level
i. Assist member countries to develop a regulatory framework for
Islamic microfinance;
ii. Support policy makers to ensure an enabling policy framework
conducive to the development of Islamic microfinance;
iii. Support and facilitate the integration of zakah and awqaf in financial
sector reforms and
iv. Build an effective alliance and forum of Islamic microfinance
providers and other stakeholders.

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1. INTRODUCTION
Microfinance (MF) is a powerful poverty alleviation tool. It implies provision
of financial services to poor and low-income people whose low economic standing
excludes them from formal financial systems. Access to services such as, credit,
venture capital, savings, insurance, remittance is provided on a micro-scale
enabling participation of those with severely limited financial means. The
provision of financial services to the poor helps to increase household income and
economic security, build assets and reduce vulnerability; creates demand for other
goods and services (especially nutrition, education, and health care); and stimulates
local economies. A large number of studies on poverty however, indicate that
exclusion of the poor from the financial system is a major factor contributing to
their inability to participate in the development process. In a typical developing
economy the formal financial system serves no more than twenty to thirty percent
of the population. The vast majority of those who are excluded are poor. With no
access to financial services, these households find it extremely difficult to take
advantage of economic opportunities, build assets, finance their children’s
education, and protect themselves against financial shocks. Financial exclusion,
thus, binds them into a vicious circle of poverty. Building inclusive financial
systems therefore, is a central goal of policy makers and planners across the globe.
These concerns are reflected in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) set by
the United Nations in the year 2000 and the international initiatives that have
followed. (See Box I)

1.1. Models of MF

Microfinance operating along conventional lines has witnessed enormous


growth during the last couple of decades. IsDB member countries that have led the
microfinance revolution are Bangladesh (with world leaders like Grameen and
BRAC), Indonesia and Morocco. Among non-member countries India, Sri Lanka
have sizable Muslim population. These countries have witnessed some of the
pioneering experiments to eliminate poverty.

Microfinance institutions provide to the entrepreneurial poor financial services


that are tailored to their needs and conditions. Good microfinance programs are
characterized by small, usually short-term loans; streamlined, simplified borrower
and investment appraisal; quick disbursement of repeat loans after timely
repayment; and convenient location and timing of services.

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Box I. MDGs, Poverty Alleviation and MF

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are eight goals to be achieved by 2015
that respond to the world's main development challenges. The MDGs are drawn from
the actions and targets contained in the Millennium Declaration that was adopted by
189 nations-and signed by 147 heads of state and governments during UN Millennium
Summit in September 2000.

• Goal 1: Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger: Halve, between 1990 and
2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than one dollar a day;
Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from
hunger
• Goal 2: Achieve universal primary education
• Goal 3: Promote gender equality and empower women
• Goal 4: Reduce child mortality
• Goal 5: Improve maternal health
• Goal 6: Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
• Goal 7: Ensure environmental sustainability
• Goal 8: Develop a Global Partnership for Development

Towards achieving the goals the United Nations General Assembly adopted 2005 as the
International Year of Microcredit to “address the constraints that exclude people from
full participation in the financial sector.” At the World Summit at the United Nations in
September 2005, Heads of State and Government recognized “the need for access to
financial services, in particular for the poor, including through microfinance and
microcredit.” The Monterrey Consensus that Heads of State and Government adopted
at the International Conference on Financing for Development in 2002 explicitly
recognized that “microfinance and credit for micro, small and medium enterprises…as
well as national savings schemes are important for enhancing the social and economic
impact of the financial sector.” They further recommended that “development banks,
commercial banks and other financial institutions, whether independently or in
cooperation, can be effective instruments for facilitating access to finance, including
equity financing, for such enterprises….”

It should be noted here that access to credit, savings, or other financial services is only
one of a series of strategies needed to reduce poverty and achieve the MDGs. Financial
services need to be complemented by access to education, health care, housing,
transportation, markets, and information.

Microfinance institutions thus have distinct characteristics that make them


specialized components of the formal financial system. The main point of departure
of microfinance from mainstream finance systems is its alternative approach to
collateral that comes from the concept of joint liability. In this concept individuals
come together to form small groups and apply for financing. Members of these
small groups are trained regarding the basic elements of the financing and the

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requirements they will have to fulfill in order to continue to have access to funding.
Funds are disbursed to individuals within the group after they are approved by
other members in the group. Repayment of the financing is a shared responsibility
of all of the group’s members. In other words they share the risk. If one defaults,
the entire group’s members face a set back. This is a basic but effectual credit
scoring mechanism that may mean a provisional suspension from the program and
therefore no access to financing for the group or other penalties. In most cases,
microfinance programs are structured to give credit in small amounts and require
repayment at weekly intervals and within a short time period– usually a month or a
few months. The beneficiary looks forward to repetitive financing in a graduated
manner and this also helps mitigate risk of default and delinquency.

The model that has popularized the above methodology and has been replicated
in many countries in a wide variety of settings is the Grameen Bank model. The
model requires careful targeting of the poor through means tests comprising mostly
of women group. The model requires intensive fieldwork by staff to motivate and
supervise the borrower groups. Groups normally consist of five members, who
guarantee each other’s loans. A number of variants of the model exist; but the key
feature of the model is group-based and graduated financing that substitutes
collateral as a tool to mitigate default and delinquency risk. An early Grameen
replication that sought to offer Shariah-compliant MF is Amana Ikhtiar Malaysia
(AIM).

A second model that has been widely replicated mainly in Latin America and
Africa, but with substantially less total outreach than the many Grameen Bank
replications is the Village Bank model. The model involves an implementing
agency that establishes individual village banks with about thirty to fifty members
and provides “external” capital for onward financing to individual members.
Individual loans are repaid at weekly intervals over four months, at which time the
village bank returns the principal with interest/ profits to the implementing agency.
A bank repaying in full is eligible for subsequent loans, with loan sizes linked to
the performance of village bank members in accumulating savings. Peer pressure
operates to maintain full repayment, thus assuring further injections of capital, and
also encourages savings. Savings accumulated in a village bank is also be used for
financing. As a village bank accumulates sufficient capital internally, it graduates
to become an autonomous and self-sustaining institution (typically over a three-
year time period). This model has been very successfully implemented in a
Shariah-compliant manner in Jabal al-Hoss, Syria. A new experiment by FINCA in
Afghanistan also seeks to implement this model.

The third type of MF model is a Credit Union (CU). A CU is based on the


concept of mutuality. It is in the nature of non-profit financial cooperative owned
and controlled by its members. CUs, mobilize savings, provide loans for productive
and provident purposes and have memberships which are generally based on some

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common bond. CUs generally relate to an apex body that promotes primary credit
unions and provides training while monitoring their financial performance. CUs are
quite popular in Asia, notably in Sri Lanka,

A fourth model originating in India is based on Self-Help Groups (SHGs).


Each SHG is formed with about ten-fifteen members who are relatively
homogeneous in terms of income. An SHG essentially pools together its members’
savings and uses it for lending. SHGs also seek external funding to supplement
internal resources. The terms and conditions of loans differ among SHGs,
depending on the democratic decisions of members. Typical SHGs are promoted
and supported by NGOs, but the objective (as with village banks) is for them to
become self-sustaining institutions. Some NGOs act as financial intermediaries for
SHGs, while others act solely as ‘social’ intermediaries seeking to facilitate
linkages of SHGs with either licensed financial institutions or other funding
agencies. The SHG model is a good platform for combining microfinance with
other developmental activities.

Conventional microfinance over the years has witnessed a paradigm shift - from
the traditional donor-based approach to a for-profits approach in building inclusive
financial systems. The underlying assumption is that the demand for these services
is simply too great to be filled by government and donor funds on a sustained basis.
The excess demand will, need to be met by commercial capital available at a “fair”
market price. The focus therefore, has sharply shifted from charity to profits. Of
all the models above1, the Grameen model and the village bank model that are the
more structured than the rest have been able to enhance their outreach. Indeed the
Grameen model has now become the text-book model of microfinance.

1.2. Key Principles of MF

A major initiative towards achieving the MDGs is formation of the Consultative


Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), a multi-donor consortium dedicated to
advancing microfinance. It is a consortium of 31 public and private development
agencies working together to expand access to financial services for the poor,
referred to as microfinance. CGAP envisions a world in which poor people
everywhere enjoy permanent access to a range of financial services that are
delivered by different financial service providers through a variety of convenient
delivery channels. It is a world where poor and low-income people in developing
countries are not viewed as marginal but, rather, as central and legitimate clients of
their countries’ financial systems. In other words, this vision is about inclusive
financial systems, which are the only way to reach large numbers of poor and low-

1
The four-model classification is based on John D Conroy, “The Challenges of Micro-
financing in South-East Asia”, Financing Southeast Asia's Economic Development,
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 2003.

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income people. As a way forward to realize this vision, CGAP has come up with
eleven key principles of MF2 based on decade-long consultations with its members
and stakeholders. These are as follows:

1. Poor people need a variety of financial services, not just loans. In addition
to credit, they want savings, insurance, and money transfer services.
2. Microfinance is a powerful tool to fight poverty. Poor households use
financial services to raise income, build their assets, and cushion themselves
against external shocks.
3. Microfinance means building financial systems that serve the poor.
Microfinance will reach its full potential only if it is integrated into a
country’s mainstream financial system.
4. Microfinance can pay for itself, and must do so if it is to reach very large
numbers of poor people. Unless microfinance providers charge enough to
cover their costs, they will always be limited by the scarce and uncertain
supply of subsidies from governments and donors.
5. Microfinance is about building permanent local financial institutions that
can attract domestic deposits, recycle them into loans, and provide other
financial services.
6. Microcredit is not always the answer. Other kinds of support may work
better for people who are so destitute that they are without income or means
of repayment.
7. Interest rate ceilings hurt poor people by making it harder for them to get
credit. Making many small loans costs more than making a few large ones.
Interest rate ceilings prevent microfinance institutions from covering their
costs, and thereby choke off the supply of credit for poor people.
8. The job of government is to enable financial services, not to provide them
directly. Governments can almost never do a good job of lending, but they
can set a supporting policy environment.
9. Donor funds should complement private capital, not compete with it. Donor
subsides should be temporary start-up support designed to get an institution
to the point where it can tap private funding sources, such as deposits.
10. The key bottleneck is the shortage of strong institutions and managers.
Donors should focus their support on building capacity.
11. Microfinance works best when it measures—and discloses—its
performance. Reporting not only helps stakeholders judge costs and
benefits, but it also improves performance. MFIs need to produce accurate

2
Brigit Helms, Access to All: Building Inclusive Financial Systems, Consultative Group to
Assist the Poor, World Bank, 2006, P XI

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and comparable reporting on financial performance (e.g., loan repayment


and cost recovery) as well as social performance (e.g., number and poverty
level of clients being served).

To sum up, the principles broaden the definition of MF from micro-credit to


provision of an array of financial services, such as, savings, insurance and
remittance. They emphasize that access to MF and not cost of MF should be under
focus in designing and implementing a poverty alleviation strategy. The strategy
should aim at sustainability through a shift from a charity-based donor-dependent
approach to a market-based for-profits approach emphasizing systemic efficiency
and transparency and restricting use of donor funds to capacity building. The
principles also underscore inclusiveness and integration of MF with the formal
financial system.

1.3. Enhancing Inclusiveness through Islamic Microfinance (IsMF)

Even while the principles reflect a consensus, they do not imply or advocate a
single and uniform approach to microfinance. As CGAP emphasizes, "diverse
approaches are needed—a one-size-fits-all solution will not work. Diverse channels
are needed to get diverse financial services into the hands of a diverse range of
people who are currently excluded. Making this vision a reality entails breaking
down the walls—real and imaginary—that currently separate microfinance from
the much broader world of financial systems."3 In the context of Muslim societies,
building inclusive financial systems would most certainly require integration of
microfinance with Islamic finance.

Microfinance and Islamic finance have much in common. Islam emphasizes


ethical, moral, social, and religious factors to promote equality and fairness for the
good of society as a whole. Principles encouraging risk sharing, individual rights
and duties, property rights, and the sanctity of contracts are all part of the Islamic
code underlying the financial system. In this light, many elements of microfinance
are consistent with the broader goals of Islamic finance. Both advocate
entrepreneurship and risk sharing and believe that the poor should take part in such
activities. Both focus on developmental and social goals. Both advocate financial
inclusion, entrepreneurship and risk-sharing through partnership finance. Both
involve participation by the poor.4

There are however, some points of difference, discomfort and discontentment.


Conventional microfinance is not for the poorest of the poor. There is a sizeable

3
Brigit Helms, Access to All: Building Inclusive Financial Systems, Consultative Group to
Assist the Poor, World Bank, 2006, P2
4
Rahul Dhumale and Amela Sapcanin, An Application of Islamic Banking Principles to
Microfinance, Technical Note, Regional Bureau for Arab States, UNDP

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substratum within the rural poor whose lives are unlikely to be touched, let alone
improved by financial services. They are not "bankable" in their own or their
neighbor's eyes, even when the bank is exclusively for poor people. Yet they
desperately need some sort of assistance. An Islamic microfinance system, on the
other hand, identifies being the poorest of the poor as the primary criterion of
eligibility for receiving zakah. It is geared towards eliminating abject poverty
through its institutions based on zakah and sadaqah.

Most conventional microfinance providers charge rates of interest that are found
to be high when benchmarked against mainstream banking rates. Several reasons
are usually given in defense. First, returns on investment in micro-enterprise are
very high, by the standards of banks and other investors – the reason being the
miniscule size of investments compared to the earnings numbers. Hence,
entrepreneurs can “afford” to pay high interest rates as cost of funds
(sometimes as high as sixty-seventy percent) as long as the same are lower than
rates of return. And that interest rates are much less important to micro-enterprises
than access, timeliness and flexibility. Second, interest rates on microfinance are
pegged relatively higher, since they entail higher administrative charges,
monitoring costs and are by definition, riskier than a traditional financing portfolio.

There is indeed a general agreement on the issue that administrative and


monitoring costs are higher with micro-financing. While this helps explain the
differential in cost of financing of an MF portfolio as compared to a traditional
portfolio, the method of financing need not be interest-based.

It is commonly believed that rates of returns on micro-projects tend to be very


high. However, the same is true only for the “successful” projects passing through
“good times” and not true of all projects at all times. Interest related liability can
compound and accentuate the financial problems of a project experiencing bad
times and hasten its failure. The pace, frequency and intensity of such failure is
directly related to the levels of interest rates. In case of Islamic profit-sharing
mechanisms on the other hand, there is a clear alignment between profitability of
the project and cost of capital. The latter rises and falls in line with the realized
profits of the venture. In case of Islamic debt financing too, the negative effects of
financial risk arising out of use of fixed-rate financing are limited as compared to
interest-based debt. This is because the former does not allow for compounding of
the debt in case of possible default.

Interest rate – high or low, is rejected by large sections of the Muslim societies
as tantamount to riba – something that is prohibited in no uncertain terms by the
Islamic Shariah.

One of the potential benefits of microfinance in Muslim societies is the


empowerment of Muslim women. While the ability of microfinance institutions to

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deliver financial services to rural women in gender-segregated societies is


commendable, working with Muslim women is a sensitive issue that often raises
accusations of meddling with social codes. Some IsMF institutions seek to
overcome this through a shift in their focus from “women empowerment” to
“family empowerment”. In a few other IsMF programs, a culturally appropriate
way has been found of empowering women through gender-segregated ownership
of the financing entity and involving separate appraisal of loan applications by
women who develop their own gender-sensitive products and strategies for the
future.

From the above, it is clear that the cultural and religious sensitivities of the
Islamic world are somewhat unique and these must be given due emphasis in any
attempt to build inclusive financial systems and bring the over one-billion Muslims
into the fold of formal financial systems.

1.4 Objectives

The objectives of the document are to:

1. Examine the challenges facing the development of Islamic microfinance


services with a view to promoting dialogue among the various stakeholders
to integrate Islamic microfinance services in national financial sector
development policies of member countries.
2. Integrate Zakah, Awqaf and Islamic financial contracts in the financial
sector development strategies with a view to making financial services
relevant for the masses;
3. Facilitate policy, financial infrastructure and financial institution
development with a view to making financial services accessible and
affordable to the masses and
4. Promote cooperation and knowledge sharing in the development of Islamic
microfinance services.

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2. THE POOR IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD
In this section we measure the extent of poverty and of exclusion in the Islamic
world. We also seek to understand the needs of the poor as clients of Islamic
microfinance.

2.1. Poverty Levels in the Islamic World

The Islamic world is enormous with over 1.2 billion people, stretching from
Senegal to the Philippines – comprising six regions: North Africa, Sub-Saharan
Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Except for a
handful of countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, there are high and
rising poverty levels in both urban and rural parts of most Muslim countries.
Poverty levels have also been associated with high inequality alongside low
productivity. In Indonesia alone with world’s largest Muslim population, over half
of the population - about 129 million are poor or vulnerable to poverty with
incomes less that US$2 a day. Bangladesh and Pakistan account for 122 million
each followed by India at approximately 100 million Muslims below poverty line.
Annexure I provides a snapshot of poverty in the IsDB member countries.

An analysis of data provided in Annexure I reveals that only five of the member
countries – Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nigeria and Egypt account for over
half a billion (528 million) of the world’s poor with incomes below $2 a day or
national poverty line. All these countries except Nigeria have Muslims constituting
over ninety-five percent of their respective population. With another five countries
- Afghanistan, Sudan, Mozambique, Turkey and Niger, they account for over 600
million of the world’s poor. If one considers another comprehensive measure of
poverty – the Human Development Index compiled for 120 developing countries
by UNDP, it is observed that a large number of IsDB member countries rank
extremely low in the 1-120 rank. Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad have ranks below
100 at 102, 101 and 100 respectively, closely followed by Niger and Guinea at 99
and 96.

Among IsDB non-member countries with significant Muslim population are


India at 180 million and Russia at 28 million. A large percentage of Muslim
population in these two countries is poor. India alone accounts for over 100 million
Muslims that live below the national poverty line.

2.2. Exclusion in the Islamic World

While poverty is widespread, access to financial services in the Islamic world is


either inadequate or exclusive. In an attempt to measure access to financial services
some studies have made use of sample surveys of households or individuals.

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However, the number of countries covered by these studies is very small and
excludes much of the Islamic world. Further, questions about the reliability some
of the data collected in these studies have been raised. A second set of studies have
used a different method of collecting data on the number of accounts maintained at
financial institutions. This has been done in respect of microfinance in 148
developing countries by Christen et al. (2004) of CGAP,5 building on earlier
compilations. This study covers specialized microfinance institutions, savings and
credit cooperatives, credit unions and other socially-oriented intermediaries
including some microfinance-oriented commercial banks. More recently, Peachey
and Roe (2006)6 have augmented the CGAP database with figures for a number of
additional savings banks (members of the World Savings Banks Institute), which
had not been included by Christen et al. The most recent study however, is by
Honohan (2007)7 that provides indication of access for more than 160 countries
using a composite measure. The measure is an estimate of the fraction of the adult
population using formal financial intermediaries.

Annexure II provides values of this composite measure of access to financial


services for 44 of the 56 IsDB member countries. It reveals that out of the 44
countries for which the estimate is available, in as many as 17 countries only one-
fifth or less of their adult population have access; in 21 countries one-fourth or less
have access and in 31 countries one third or less have access to formal financial
services. The countries that fare well with over half of their population with access
are Lebanon (79 percent), Saudi Arabia (62 percent) and Malaysia (57 percent).
Five other countries Kazakhstan, Turkey, Tunisia, Egypt and Indonesia rank next
with over 40 percent of their adult population having access. Though there is no
data available, countries like Bahrain, UAE, Kuwait and Qatar are likely to figure
in this category.

Among non-member countries with significant Muslim population India and


Russia provide for better access at 48 and 69 percent. However, these numbers
should be interpreted with caution as the national percentage may not be
representative of the percentage of their respective Muslim population.

5
Christen, Robert Peck, Veena Jayadeva and Richard Rosenberg (2004) “Financial
Institutions with a Double Bottom Line: Implications for the Future of Microfinance”
Occasional Paper No. 8. Washington DC: CGAP
6
Peachey, Stephen and Alan Roe (2006) “Access to Finance, Measuring the Contribution
of Savings Banks”, World Bank Savings Institute.
7
Honohan, Patrick (2007) “Cross-Country Variations in Household Access to Financial
Services”, World Bank Conference on Access to Finance

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2.3. Understanding the Needs of the Poor

The needs of the poor in Islamic countries are no different from the poor in
other societies except that these are conditioned and influenced by their faith and
culture in a significant way. They need financial services because they are often
faced with events that call for spending more money than might be available
around the house or in the pocket. Rutherford in his path-breaking book, The Poor
and Their Money, points to three main categories of such events: life-cycle events,
emergency needs, and investment opportunities. Life-cycle events include those
once-in-a-lifetime occurrences (birth, marriage, death, home building, old age) or
recurrent incidents (expenditure related to education, festivals, harvest time) that
every household faces. Emergencies include personal crises like sickness or injury,
the death of a bread winner or the loss of employment, and theft. Opportunities to
invest in businesses, land, or household assets also come up periodically. To come
up with the financial outlays required by life-cycle events, emergencies, and
opportunities, micro-credit is needed. However, the poor need more than credit.
They need a range of options, from credit (beyond enterprise finance), to savings,
to money transfer facilities, and insurance in many forms.

Micro-credit: Micro-credit as offered by conventional MFIs in Muslim


countries violates the fundamental prohibition of riba that the Islamic Shariah
mandates. While some poor Muslims, devoid of options and hard-pressed for cash
avail of interest-bearing credit, many prefer to stay away. The Islamic MFIs offer
micro-credit using a variety of Shariah-nominate mechanisms, such as, qard al-
hasan (with recovery of actual costs of service), murabahah with bay-bithaman-
ajil, ijarah, bay-salam etc. Less popular are partnership-based financing based on
mudarabah and musharakah. (see the following section for more details)

Micro-savings: Poor people want to save, and many of them do save. But they
are constrained by the multiple demands on their low incomes and a lack of
available deposit services that matches their needs expectations. The importance of
savings is underscored by the fact that there are four times as many savings
accounts as loans, as uncovered by CGAP’s 2004 survey8 of “alternative” financial
institutions around the world. Poor people want secure, convenient deposit services
that allow for small balances and transactions and offer easy access to their funds.
Poor people in Islamic countries like their counterparts elsewhere, prefer high
returns. They also want their deposits to score high on safety, security and
liquidity. However, there is an additional dimension to their needs and expectations
in the matter of deposits. They want the returns to be halal even while they may be
using interest rates as a benchmark for comparison. A hotly debated issue relates to

8
Christen, Robert Peck, Veena Jayadeva and Richard Rosenberg (2004) “Financial
Institutions with a Double Bottom Line: Implications for the Future of Microfinance”
Occasional Paper No. 8. Washington DC: CGAP

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expected behavior of savers when faced with a trade-off between returns and
Shariah compliance. Indeed, many Islamic FIs seek to artificially smoothen returns
on their deposits on the basis of a fear of losing clients if “realized” volatile returns
are passed on to savers. Arguably, there is not enough understanding of savings
behavior in Islamic societies. What is certain however is that deposit products that
are free from riba, but score equal on other dimensions would certainly be the
preferred choice. Recent experience of Islamic MFIs in the matter of offering
Shariah-compliant deposit products (refer to subsequent section for details) also
shows that they are yet to gain an adequate understanding of the needs of their
clients.

Micro-transfers: Money transfers encompass more than just remittances, which


are defined as the portion of migrant-worker earnings sent to family members or
other individuals in their place of origin. Remittances include both domestic and
international transfers. Massive numbers of poor people have relatives living in
other countries or cities and face serious constraints to sending and receiving this
money. Some mainstream Islamic FIs, with emphasis on technology and strategic
partnerships have been quite successful in offering this service that is efficient,
economical and also Shariah-compliant. A case in point is the Al-Rajhi Banking
and Investment Corporation catering to migrant workers in the Gulf. However, few
Islamic MFIs offer such services to their clients.

Micro-Insurance: Few poor households have access to formal insurance against


such risks as the death of a family breadwinner, severe illness, or loss of an asset
including livestock and housing. These shocks are particularly damaging for poor
households, because they are more vulnerable to begin with. Micro-insurance is the
protection of low-income people against specific perils in exchange for regular
monetary payments (premiums) proportionate to the likelihood and cost of the risk
involved. As with all insurance, risk pooling allows many individuals or groups to
share the costs of a risky event. To serve poor people well, micro-insurance must
be responsive to priority needs for risk protection (depending on the market, they
may seek health, car, or life insurance), easy to understand, and affordable. Several
different types of insurance might be relevant for poor and low-income clients.
Credit life insurance is the most common and it protects the lenders from the death
of their clients. Term life or personal accident insurance is often offered alongside
credit life insurance to cover the family if a borrower dies. Savings life insurance is
often offered by credit unions and stimulates savings. Property insurance is nearly
always linked to a loan and may help a borrower continue repaying his or her loan
only if something happens to the property (usually livestock). In some cases,
replacement of the property is also covered. Endowment policies combine long-
term savings and insurance with emergency loans against the savings balance. In
this case, the premium payments accumulate value. Though there is great demand
for health insurance and agricultural insurance among the poor, it is difficult to

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provide this insurance viably in a commercial mode.9 Micro-insurance, as is


discussed in the subsequent section, takes the form of micro-takaful in the Islamic
framework.

Provision of the above financial services to the poor is expected to lead to


poverty alleviation. However, available research evidence shows that the poor must
have access to such services over a fairly long-term before the real impact can be
seen. It takes time and repeated use of financial services, often combined with
other services, to make a dent in poverty. It should also be noted here that
microfinance is not the sole solution for reducing poverty. Financial services, and
especially credit, are not usually appropriate for the destitute (for instance, those
who go hungry or without a cash income). It is sometimes forgotten that the other
word for credit is debt. Loans to the destitute may in fact make the poor poorer if
they lack opportunities to earn the cash flow necessary to repay the loans. Basic
requirements like food, shelter, and employment are often more urgently needed
than financial services and should be appropriately funded by government and
donor subsidies.10 Microfinance should not be seen as a substitute for investments
in basic education, health, and infrastructure.

9
Latortue, Microinsurance: A Risk Management Strategy
10
Robinson, The Microfinance Revolution. Vol. 1, Sustainable Finance for the Poor.

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3. FOUNDATIONS OF ISLAMIC MICROFINANCE
3.1. Approach to Poverty Alleviation

Zakah and sadaqah as instruments of charity occupy a central position in the


Islamic scheme of poverty alleviation. Zakah is the third among five pillars of
Islam and payment of zakah is an obligation on the wealth of every Muslim based
on clear-cut criteria. Zakah has been variously described by scholars as a tool of
redistribution of income, a tool of public finance, and of course, as a mechanism of
development and poverty alleviation. Rules of Shariah are fairly clear and elaborate
in defining the nature of who are liable to pay zakah and who can benefit from
zakah. The first and foremost category of potential beneficiaries is the poor and the
destitute. A greater degree of flexibility exists with respect to beneficiaries of
sadaqah.

The primary issue with zakah and sadaqah-dependent institutions is the issue of
sustainability as they are essentially rooted in voluntarism. Funds mobilized
through charity could fluctuate from time to time and may not lend themselves to
careful planning and implementation.

The issue of sustainability is addressed in the institution of awqaf through


creation of permanent and income-generating physical assets. Awqaf has
historically been the major vehicle for creating community assets. On the flip side,
the restrictions on development and use of assets under waqf for pre-specified
purposes introduce rigidity into the system.

While estimates of actual zakah collected in Muslim countries reveal that the
quantum is grossly inadequate to meet the financing needs of the poor, the impact
of zakah and sadaqah on poverty alleviation, once their full potential is realized,
remains to be seen. If charity-based funds are inadequate, then recourse must be
found in a commercial approach. Islamic microfinance institutions should be able
to mobilize resources, either through accepting savings deposits or obtaining funds
from local Islamic banks for onward financing or from the capital market. This
commercial approach entails charging and sharing of profits and is quite consistent
with Islamic Shariah.

While Islam strongly encourages charity from the giver’s point of view, it seeks
to minimize dependence on charity from the beneficiary’s point of view and
restricts the benefits to flow to the poorest of poor and the destitute, who are not in
a position to generate any income and wealth. This is evident from the following
hadith about sadaqah.

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Narrated Ubaydullah ibn Adl ibn al-Khiyar: Two men informed me that they
went to the Prophet (peace be upon him) when he was at the Farewell
Pilgrimage while he was distributing the sadaqah and asked him for some of it.
He looked us up and down, and seeing that we were robust, he said: If you wish,
I shall give you something, but there is nothing spare in it for a rich man or for
one who is strong and able to earn a living. (Sunan Abu Dawood, Kitab al-
Zakah, Book 9, Number 1629)

Another famous hadith not only underscores the essence of the above hadith,
but also demonstrates how to design and implement a strategy of poverty
alleviation. The hadith is broken down into numbered statements so as to highlight
the key principles of such a strategy that follow from them.

Narrated Anas ibn Malik: A man of the Ansar came to the Prophet (peace be
upon him) and begged from him. (#1)
He (the Prophet) asked: Have you nothing in your house? He replied: Yes, a
piece of cloth, a part of which we wear and a part of which we spread (on the
ground), and a wooden bowl from which we drink water. (#2)
He said: Bring them to me. He then brought these articles to him and he (the
Prophet) took them in his hands and asked: Who will buy these? A man said: I
shall buy them for one dirham. He said twice or thrice: Who will offer more
than one dirham? A man said: I shall buy them for two dirhams. (#3)
He gave these to him and took the two dirhams and, giving them to the Ansari,
he said: Buy food with one of them and hand it to your family, and buy an axe
and bring it to me. (#4)
He then brought it to him. The Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him) fixed a
handle on it with his own hands (#5)
and said: Go, gather firewood and sell it, and do not let me see you for a
fortnight. (#6)
The man went away and gathered firewood and sold it. When he had earned ten
dirhams, he came to him and bought a garment with some of them and food
with the others. (#7)
The Apostle of Allah (peace be upon him) then said: This is better for you than
that begging should come as a spot on your face on the Day of Judgment.
Begging is right only for three people: one who is in grinding poverty, one who
is seriously in debt, or one who is responsible for compensation and finds it
difficult to pay. (Sunan Abu Dawood, Kitab al-Zakah, Book 9, Number 1637).

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The components of the hadith can be seen to emphasize the following


fundamental conditions of a successful microfinance program:

1. Access of the poorest of the poor to the program


2. Careful assessment of the financial health of the poor; enquiry blended with
empathy; insistence on contribution and beneficiary stake;
3. Transformation of unproductive assets of the beneficiary into income-
generating ones through rigorous valuation (on the basis of price discovery
through auction method); Involvement of the larger community in the
process;
4. Meeting of basic needs on a priority basis and investment of the surplus in a
productive asset;
5. Direct involvement of the program in capacity building in the run-up to
income generation and technical assistance to the beneficiary; Commitment
of top management of the program;
6. Technical assistance in the form of imparting requisite training to the
beneficiary for carrying out the business plan/ income-generating project;
monitoring through a time-bound schedule and impact assessment through a
feed-back mechanism; and
7. Transparent accounting of operational results and liberty to use part of
income to meet higher needs.

In short, the Islamic approach to poverty alleviation is more inclusive than the
conventional one. It provides for the basic conditions of sustainable and successful
microfinance, blending wealth creation (as in section 1.3) with empathy for the
poorest of the poor. There are certain aspects of the Islamic approach that need
added emphasis.

One, transparency through meticulous accounting and proper documentation is


a fundamental requirement of financial transactions in the Islamic framework. As
the holy Quran asserts:

“O ye who believe! When you deal with each other, in transactions involving
future obligations in a fixed period of time, reduce them to writing” and “Let a
scribe write down faithfully as between the parties” (2:282)

The import and significance of this verse is often not fully understood. Indeed,
lack of proper documentation and accounting by beneficiaries is a major challenge
confronting microfinance.

Two, as discussed earlier, a common feature of successful microfinance


experiments is group-based financing and mutual guarantee within the group. This

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is a highly desirable feature of Islamic societies. Mutual cooperation and solidarity


is a norm central to Islamic ethics. The second verse of Surah Al Maida in the holy
Quran says:

"Assist one another in the doing of good and righteousness. Assist not one
another in sin and transgression, but keep your duty to Allah" (5:2)

The following hadith by the Prophet (pbuh) reinforces this principle of


cooperation and mutual assistance.

“Believers are to other believers like parts of a structure that tighten and
reinforce each other." (Al-Bukhari and Muslim)

The Islamic approach to poverty alleviation needless to say, must also be free
from riba, gharar, jahl and darar.

3.2. Shariah-Compliant Instruments of Microfinance

Prohibition of riba, gharar, jahl, darar and other constraining norms in Islamic
finance does not constitute an obstacle in building sound microfinance products.
On the contrary, the need for Shariah compliance has led to considerable research
into product development. While the conventional system provides for simple
interest-based deposits, donations and loans, the Islamic financial system
comprises an array of instruments for mobilization of funds, financing and for risk
management.

3.2.1. Instruments for Mobilization of Funds

Instruments for mobilization of funds may be broadly divided into (1) charity
that includes zakah, sadaqah, awqaf; gifts that include hiba and tabarru; (2)
deposits that may take the form of wadiah, qard al-hasan and mudarabah and (3)
equity that may take the form of classical musharakah or the modern stocks.

3.2.1.1. While sadaqah, hiba and tabarru have parallels in conventional


microfinance, such as, donations or contributions, zakah and awqaf have a special
place in the Islamic system and are governed by elaborate fiqhi rules. Zakah is one
of the five pillars of Islam and is meant to finance the poorest of the poor. These
sections of the society are unlikely to have positive-NPV projects in need of
financing and hence, are “unbankable”. Awqaf creates and preserves long-term
assets that generate income flows or indirectly help the process of production and
creation of wealth. By targeting its benefits towards the poor, awqaf can play an
important role in poverty alleviation. Though there has been significant
improvement in management of zakah and awqaf in recent years, their role as
vehicles of microfinance and poverty alleviation is grossly underestimated. Their

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growing popularity evidenced through establishment of many a zakah fund and


awqaf fund is an indication of their vast potential in Muslim societies.

3.2.1.2. Deposits in the form of wadiah, qard al-hasan and mudarabah have their
parallel in savings, current and time deposits respectively and are a regular source
of funds for Islamic microfinance institutions, especially those in South-East Asia.
Wadiah deposits attract gifts to compare favorably with returns available on
interest-bearing deposits. Qard-based deposits do not provide any return and in
some cases, involve a charge. Mudarabah deposits are based on profit-loss sharing
with the depositor as rabb-al-mal and the microfinance institution as the mudarib.
Available empirical evidence from Indonesia asserts that Islamic microfinance
institutions have lagged far behind their conventional counterparts in raising funds
through deposits. Clearly there is a need to redesign many of the deposit products
by taking into account customer needs and preferences.

3.2.1.3. Microfinance institutions also have the option of raising funds through
participatory modes, such as, musharakah or modern equity. There is one
microfinance program that has successfully demonstrated the practicality of the
Islamic participatory approach of risk and profit-sharing: the village-bank-like
Sanadiq program in Jabal Al Hoss, Syria. Here, villagers buy shares and become
owners of the program. Financing of course is made using the murabahah
methodology and dividends are distributed annually to the shareholders if profits
are sufficient.

3.2.2. Instruments of Financing

Instruments of financing may be broadly divided into (1) participatory profit-


loss-sharing (PLS) modes, such as, mudarabah and musharakah; (2) sale-based
modes, such as, murabahah; (3) lease-based modes or ijarah and (4) benevolent
loans or qard with service charge. (See Box II)

3.2.2.1. Real-life experience shows that murabahah is preferred over mudarabah


primarily because it eliminates the need for written records, often unavailable at the
micro enterprise level or if available, the client may be unwilling to share them.
Further, in case of murabahah a well-defined contract exists, with pre-defined
amounts; a fixed contract creates a less complicated process and a lower
implementation cost to the institution.

3.2.2.2. A microfinance program has to make several trade-offs when selecting an


appropriate financing methodology based on Islamic finance principles. The
program must account for the administrative costs and risks of a particular
methodology not only to the program but also to borrowers. Often the choice could
depend on the nature of the client. As practiced in Indonesia, clients may be
broadly divided into two categories: (i) clients with existing businesses and

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successful operations for at least two years. (ii) new entrepreneurs without prior
business experience. The vast majority of clients are those with existing businesses
and a good track record; they can be financed through such financial products as
murabahah, musharakah and mudarabah, which involve some form of profit-
sharing. New clients without a track record are considered very risky and represent
but a small minority; they can be financed through qard al-hasan, soft loans
without any charge or profit-sharing. Consumer loans and loans for speculative
investments, which could be ruinous to the borrower, are excluded from the range
of permissible purposes of financing.

3.2.2.3. Unlike mainstream Islamic finance that does not quite treat qard al-hasan
as a financing mechanism, Islamic microfinance has found this mechanism to be a
“pure and effective” way of financing the poor. Many Islamic microfinance
programs are modeled solely using qard al-hasan - both as an effective fund-
raising and financing mechanism. Qard al-hasan has a much stronger religious
undertone than other “halal” mechanisms, being directly ordained by the holy
Quran.

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Box II: Instruments of Financing in Islamic Microfinance


Instrument Suitable Cost of Risk to Risk to Remarks
for capital Borrower Institution
Mudarabah/ Fixed Very Low Very high Costs of loan administration and
Musharakah assets, high monitoring are high given the
working complexity of the repayment
capital schedule and lack of proper
(Declining accounting;
form Perceived to be ideal but not
suitable for popular in practice
housing
and
equipment
finance)
Ijarah Fixed Moderate High Moderate Costs of loan administration and
assets monitoring are low given simple
repayment schedule allowing for
flexibility and customization
based on client preferences;
Popular among Islamic MFIs
and potential for easy adaptation
by conventional MFIs
Murabahah Fixed Moderate High Moderate Costs of loan administration and
assets and monitoring are low given simple
Working repayment schedule; multiplicity
capital of transactions in working
capital financing can push up
costs;
Highly popular in practice
notwithstanding popular
perception of it being a close
substitute of riba-based lending
Qard All- Very low Very low Moderate Charity-based usually combined
purpose with voluntarism; low
overheads;
Popular because perceived to be
the purest form of financing
Salam Working High High High Back-to-back nature creates risk
capital of lack of double coincidence;
Untried

Istisna Fixed High High High Back-to-back nature creates risk


assets of lack of double coincidence;
Untried
Istijrar Working Moderate Moderate Moderate Ideal for micro repetitive
capital transactions; Complexity not
easily understood by parties;
hence not a popular mechanism
Such programs popularly known as Bait-ul-Maals are administered often
through mosques and Islamic centers resulting in low overheads, leading to low
service charge. A combination of financing with Islamic teachings and oaths

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administered in mosques helps reduce defaults and delinquencies to the minimum.


Ulama in rural settings wield considerable influence over the masses and are some
times used as “factors” entrusted with the task of collection of debt.
3.2.3. Instruments of Risk Management
Instruments of risk management and insurance in Islamic microfinance are
based on the concept of guarantee (kafalah) and collateral (daman). In case of
financing individuals, guarantee is used as an alternative to collateral (e.g. kafalah
or guarantee by two persons is considered adequate by Pakistan-based Akhuwat)
and as a tool to manage the risk of default and delinquency. As stated earlier, in
case of financing groups; mutual guarantee (kafalah) is used by almost all
microfinance institutions – both conventional and Islamic.
3.2.4.1. A relatively smaller number of Islamic microfinance institutions require
collateral in the form of physical assets (e.g. the Lebanon based Hasan Fund and
the Indonesian BMTs).
3.2.4.2. For protection against unforeseen risks by borrowers/ members, micro-
insurance would take the form of micro-takaful based on mutual guarantee.
However, micro-takaful products are yet to appear in the market place. In the
absence of micro-takaful products, real life projects seek to protect their members
in a variety of ways that are informal and perhaps inefficient. For example, in case
of the Syria-based Sanadiq, members facing adversities are provided the option of
a short-term emergency loan against payment of a fixed fee. Of course, such a loan
is not automatic and requires careful deliberation between project management and
the sanadiq central committee. Sanadiq also require their members and their family
members to go for conventional life insurance. The life insurance not only
contributes to social security, but also serves as loan protection when a borrower
dies. Recourse to conventional insurance obviously raises Shariah-related concerns.
Another known Islamic microfinance program – the Hodeidah program has created
an insurance fund out of contributions from borrowers. This fund compensates
borrowers who face emergencies—such as fire, flood, and death—that affect their
businesses. Borrowers are eligible for compensation from the insurance fund if
group members and the responsible loan officers approve.
3.2.4.3. The risks confronting individual and group borrowers translate into risk of
default and delinquency for the MFI. One way to mitigate this on the part of the
MFI is to insist that borrowers participate in a micro-takaful program. However,
this may not be enough to convince a mainstream FI to go for microfinance. The
mainstream Islamic banks and financial institutions financing large corporations
and high networth individuals may not be comfortable with the unique risks with
microfinance. This highlights the need for a “safety net” or guarantee offered by a
third party. This product can be offered in the framework of al-kafalah.

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4. ISLAMIC MF PROVIDERS: MICRO LEVEL
Islamic microfinance providers who offer services at a micro-level directly to
poor and low-income clients constitute the backbone of the system. In the Islamic
countries, current and potential providers of Islamic MF are likely to be either the
conventional MFIs expanding the scope of their services to include Islamic MF or
the Islamic FIs expanding the scope of their services to include MF. In section 4.1
we briefly survey the disparate categories of MF providers across the globe
highlighting their pros and cons. In section 4.2 we present an exhaustive set of
cases of Islamic MF experiments undertaken in IsDB member countries and in
selected non-member countries with significant Muslim minorities.

4.1. The Landscape

Globally, MF providers may be discussed in two categories- informal and


formal.

4.1.1. Informal MF Providers

Most poor people obtain financial services through informal arrangements with
friends and neighbors. Interestingly, these informal arrangements take on similar
forms and can be divided into two rough categories: individual providers and
collective clubs or associations.

Individual informal providers include friends and relatives, moneylenders,


savings collectors, pawnbrokers, traders, processors, and input suppliers. Loans in
the Islamic framework must based on qard al-hasan and this rules out the
“commercial” moneylender. Savings collectors can operate on the basis of fee
(ujrat). Pawn-brokering is a form of informal lending, although in many countries
this practice has become more formal and regulated. Pawnbrokers lend on the basis
of collateral. Unlike other lenders, though, they take physical possession of the
collateral. In South East Asian countries, Shariah-compliant pawn-brokering on the
basis of the concept of al-rahn has generated considerable interest. In agriculturally
dependent rural areas, traders, processors, and input suppliers are important sources
of credit for farmers. In the Islamic framework such financing may be extended on
the basis of bay-salam and bay-istijrar.

Collective forms of informal service providers include rotating savings and


credit associations (ROSCAs). These are defined as associations of participants
who make regular contributions to a central “pot.” The pot is given, in whole or in
part, to each contributor in rotation or chosen by lottery. The funds are managed by
the members themselves. The functioning of these need to be carefully evaluated
from Shariah point of view.

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Many of the above informal services, while appealing and useful for many
reasons, are also very expensive, rigid, highly risky, less transparent. Also informal
financial services are vulnerable to collapse or fraud, where people can lose their
money, whether because of corruption, lack of discipline, or collective shocks like
a natural disaster or a bad harvest.

4.1.2. Member-Based Organizations

Member-based organizations typically rely on their members’ own savings as


the main source of funds. Members often share some common bond, such as where
they work or live. The village banks, self-help-groups, credit unions discussed in
section 1.1 fall in this category. Financial cooperatives (sometimes called credit
unions or savings and credit cooperatives) are more formal organizations than
others. In many countries, some financial cooperatives have evolved into large,
successful financial institutions. Unlike banks who make money for shareholders,
credit unions and financial cooperatives return some earnings in excess of
operational costs to their members. These benefits come in the form of dividends
on member shares, increased returns on savings, decreased costs of financing, or
new and better services. In most financial cooperatives, each member has one vote:
power is not distributed according to the proportion of shares held. As discussed in
the next section, many successful Islamic MF experiments are member-based.

4.1.3. Non-Government Organizations

NGOs usually have multiple bottom lines and pursue social objectives in
addition to microfinance. NGOs have clearly led the way in the development of
microfinance. They are often donor dependent, particularly the smaller ones,
because many were launched with donor funds. Their governance structures are
unsuited for bearing fiduciary responsibility, since board members do not represent
shareholders or member-owners with money at stake. The range of financial
services they can offer is restricted. NGOs cannot usually mobilize savings legally;
this function is limited to banks and other intermediaries supervised by banking
authorities. The Zakah and Sadaqah-based organizations fall in this category.
Among conventional NGOs, the recent trend has been a move towards greater
commercialization in the interest of sustainability, with some NGOs even
transforming themselves to formal financial institutions. This has put the issue of
“mission drift” on the front burner.

4.1.4. Formal Financial Institutions

Formal financial institutions hold enormous potential for making financial


systems truly inclusive. This is more so for banks with some social mission, such
as, the Islamic banks. Islamic banks often have wide branch networks; the ability to

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offer a range of services, including savings and transfers; and the funds to invest in
systems and technical skills. They can use these strengths to reach massive
numbers of poor people, both on their own and in partnership with other financial
service providers, including NGOs. Among the conventional banks that have
traditionally shown interest in the microfinance sector are state-owned banks,
agricultural and postal banks who are generally observed to be inefficient in the
matter of credit-delivery, but quite successful in savings mobilization. Among
private financial institutions are: small community or rural banks, NBFIs,
specialized microfinance banks, and full-service banks with microfinance as a line
of business. The first three categories of financial institutions are more likely to see
poor clients as a key market. Full-service commercial banks have been slower to
realize the potential of poor clients. NBFIs include mortgage lenders, leasing
companies, consumer credit companies, insurance companies, and certain types of
dedicated MFIs.

4.2. Islamic MF Providers across the Globe

Cases of successful Islamic microfinance experiments in Muslim societies are


small in number. Further, these institutions are not integrated into the formal
financial systems, with the notable exception of Indonesia. In most cases these are
in the nature of experimental projects initiated by international donor agencies,
religious or political groups. Cases of Islamic banks practicing microfinance are
even fewer. Islamic microfinance institutions display wide variations in the models,
instruments and operational mechanisms. While, in terms of reach, penetration and
financial prowess, Islamic microfinance institutions lag far behind their
conventional counterparts they certainly score better in terms of richness and
variety. Islamic microfinance institutions similar to conventional microfinance
institutions, use group financing as a substitute to collateral, have a high
concentration of women beneficiaries and aim at alleviation of poverty in all its
forms.

4.2.1. Middle East North Africa (MENA)

It was a microfinance initiative in Egypt - the Mit Ghamr project that laid the
foundation of modern Islamic banking, notwithstanding the short lifespan of the
project. In the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region several successful
experiments have been undertaken recently: (i) the Sanadiq project at Jabal al-Hoss
in Syria; (ii) the Mu’assasat Bayt Al-Mal in Lebanon; and the (iii) Hodeidah
Microfinance Program in Yemen.

4.2.1.1. The Jabal Al Hoss “Sanadiq” (village-banks) in Syria is an excellent model


worth replication. Some of the unique features of this model are: (i) musharakah-
type structure owned and managed by the poor; (ii) financing based on the concept
of murabahah – high profit rates with net profits shared among members; (iii) good

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governance through committees with sound election and voting procedures; (iv)
project management team responsible for creating awareness of microfinance
practices, training of committee members; (v) financial management of the funds
based on standardized by-laws and statutes for each of the village funds resulting in
“fair” credit decisions and low transaction costs. (vi) financially viable operations
with repayment rates close to cent percent (vii) equal access to both men and
women as owners and users; (viii) sanadiq apex fund for liquidity exchange and
refinancing; and (ix) support from UNDP in the form of matching grant equal to
minimum share capital of village fund.

4.2.1.2. The Mu’assasat Bait Al-Mal in Lebanon is an affiliate of a political party –


the Hezbollah and comprises the Hasan Loan Institution (Al-Qard Al-Hasan) and
its sister organization called Al-Yusor for Finance and Investment (Yusor lil-
Istismar wal Tamweel). The former provides qard al-hasan financing while the
latter provides financing on a profit-loss-sharing mode. The uniqueness of the
Mu’assasat Bait Al-Mal is its emphasis on voluntarism. It has maintained a very
close relationship with the people and is seen as a very creditable organization with
volunteers entirely taking care of collection and disbursal of funds. It has a network
of donors with complete confidence in the activities of the Institution and also
enjoys high repayment rate. Financing is backed by collateral in the form of capital
assets, land, gold, guarantor and bank guarantee.

4.2.1.3. The Hodeidah Microfinance Program in Yemen predominantly uses group


and graduated financing methodology that was successfully pioneered by Grameen.
Unlike Grameen however, it uses a murabahah mode for financing.

4.2.2. South Asia

Among South Asian countries Bangladesh leads the group with organizations
like Islami Bank Bangladesh, Social and Investment Bank Bangladesh, Al-Fallah
and Rescue. Akhuwat in Pakistan is notable for it unique mosque-based model.
India with its second largest Muslim population in the world has witnessed some
experiments largely outside its formal financial system, such as, AICMEU and
Bait-un-Nasr.

4.2.2.1. The Islamic microfinance institutions in Bangladesh have been primarily


using deferred-payment sales (bay mu’ajjal) mode of financing. They have been
facing tough competition from conventional giants like Grameen Bank and BRAC.
Though according to some studies, Islamic microfinance institutions have
displayed better financial performance than their conventional counterparts, the
latter have a far greater outreach. Indeed, institutions like Grameen and BRAC
have pioneered models of microfinance that are replicated across the globe. (see
Box III)

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4.2.2.2. In Pakistan a model of micro-financing that has generated considerable


interest among observers is Akhuwat. The financing is in the nature of small
interest free loans (qard al-hasan) in a spirit of Islamic brotherhood where most
activities are performed by volunteers. There is no funding from international
donors or financial institutions. All activities revolve around the mosques and
involve close interaction with the community. There are no independent offices;
loans are disbursed and recovered in mosque and therefore involve low overheads.
It uses collateral-free group and individual financing based on mutual guarantees.
Loans are disbursed in a mosque, which also attaches a religious sanctity to the
oath of returning it on time.

4.2.3. South East Asia

In South East Asia Malaysia made an early beginning with Tabung Haji aimed
at financing the Hajj related expenditure of poor Malaysian farmers who used to
sell their only source of livelihood - agricultural land for the purpose. Tabung Haji
was primarily a savings-and-investments-institution and has since grown into a
large specialized finance house. Indonesia has largely followed Malaysia in the
development of the Islamic financial sector including the microfinance sector.
Cases of Islamic microfinance projects have also been documented for Thailand,
Brunei and Philippines.

4.2.3.1. With its rather developed Islamic banking system and capital markets,
Malaysia has established several organizations under the aegis of government
agencies to finance small and medium scale enterprises using a wide range of
Islamic financial instruments.

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Box III: Replicating the Grameen Model in Muslim Societies

The pioneering contribution of Grameen and its founder Professor Muhammad Yunus
towards poverty alleviation can hardly be overemphasized. Recipients of Nobel Peace
Prize for the year 2006, Grameen and Prof Yunus have provided a model of
microfinance that is being replicated through one of the largest international networks
of microcredit organizations for the poor in the world. There are currently eighty-six
Grameen type credit and savings programs in twenty-eight countries. The key features
of Grameen model, such as, entrepreneurship development among the poor, lending to
groups based on mutual guarantee, small sized recurring loans, have all now become
features of the text-book model of microfinance.
With widespread poverty in the Islamic world, the Grameen methodology has naturally
attracted proponents of Islamic finance who share a common goal. However, the major
discomfort in replication of the Grameen model in Muslim societies is its interest-
bearing product portfolio. Though Grameen is part of the conventional interest-based
system, it is very different from the conventional banking system. In the words of its
founder, Grameen model “is almost the reverse of the conventional banking
methodology.” Some major points of departure are as follows:
“There is no legal instrument between the lender and the borrower in the Grameen
methodology. There is no stipulation that a client will be taken to the court of law to
recover the loan, unlike in the conventional system. There is no provision in the
methodology to enforce a contract by any external intervention. When a client gets into
difficulty, conventional banks get worried about their money, and make all efforts to
recover the money, including taking over the collateral. Grameen system, in such cases,
works extra hard to assist the borrower in difficulty, and makes all efforts to help her
regain her strength and overcome her difficulties. Further, in conventional banks there is
compounding of interest; in Grameen, no interest is charged after the interest amount
equals the principal. All interests are simple interests. Conventional banks do not pay
attention to what happens to the borrowers' families as a result of taking loans from the
banks. Grameen system pays a lot of attention to monitoring the education of the
children, housing, sanitation, access to clean drinking water, and their coping capacity
for meeting disasters and emergency situations. Grameen system helps the borrowers to
build their own pension funds, and other types of savings. In case of death of a
borrower, Grameen system does not require the family of the deceased to pay back the
loan. There is a built-in insurance program which pays off the entire outstanding
amount with interest. No liability is transferred to the family.”
The points of departure perhaps push Grameen very close to Islamic ideals. It appears
that with some modification, especially with a financial engineering approach to
development of Shariah-compliant products, the Grameen model has all the potential
for eradication of poverty from Muslim societies in a manner that is compatible with
Islamic Shariah – both in letter and spirit.

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Box IV: Shariah Compliance with Spiritual Treatment

Indonesia has a long history of microfinance. Its strong emphasis on its Islamic roots
has enabled itself to experiment with a dual system of Islamic finance and a system of
microfinance that is not just Shariah-compliant, but actually uses Islamic “spiritual
treatment” along with financial and technical assistance to develop its micro-enterprises
and work towards elimination of poverty. A recent pilot study conducted by Bank
Indonesia (BI) divided beneficiaries into groups based on those receiving: (i) financial
assistance only; (ii) financial and technical assistance only; and (iii) financial and
technical assistance along with spiritual treatment. It was observed that group (iii)
outperformed all other groups highlighting the importance of spiritual treatment. BI
plans to use the findings to develop a model of microfinance that is not only integrated
but also uses spiritual treatment as an important intervention.
In Indonesia, at the grassroots level, the Baitul Maal wal Tamwils (BMTs) are a large
network of over two thousand institutions serving millions of poor Indonesian
Muslims. These BMTs are floated by a wide variety of organizations including Islamic
banks, BPRS and are at times backed by Islamic organizations, such as, Nahdatul
Ulama and Muhamadiyah that currently have over hundred million members. Zakah
funds are also an integral part of the BMTs.
Unlike many single-product (murabahah or qard al-hasan based) Islamic microfinance
programs and projects in other regions, the financing portfolios of Indonesian IsMFIs
are reasonably balanced with an array of products – based on mudarabah, musharakah,
murabahah, ijarah and qard al-hasan.

4.2.3.2. Islamic microfinance institutions in Indonesia may be placed in three


categories- the microfinance divisions of Islamic banks, the Islamic rural banks
(BPRS) a subcategory of the rural banks (BPR); and the Islamic financial
cooperatives that are not part of the formal financial sector. They are generally
referred to as Baitul Maal wal Tamwil (BMT). (see Box IV)

Islamic microfinance institutions (IsMFIs) in Indonesia have displayed their


sustainability and robustness in the face of grave financial crises even when the
mainstream banks had to depend on governmental assistance to tide over serious
financial problems. It should be noted that Indonesian BMTs at the grassroots
largely fall outside the financial regulatory mechanism since they operate as
member-based cooperative organizations (similar to a musharakah structure)
without governmental assistance or intervention. These organizations have been
found to be less vulnerable to systemic risks that arise due to interdependence, as
each BMT is an independently operating entity. As such, the system poses a
serious challenge to the regulator – how to strike a balance between the need to
strengthen the linkage between formal financial system and the BMTs while
retaining the benefits of flexibility and independence.

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4.2.4. Sub-Saharan Africa

In Sub-Saharan Africa the only Islamic microfinance program that has been
documented well operates in Northern Mali. It was borne out of a development
project by the GTZ (German Technical Cooperation) and KfW (German Financial
Cooperation) in the former civil war areas of Timbuctu’, Mali. The aim of the
project, inter alia, was to provide financial services to all the tribes of the area, the
Moors, the Tuareg and various black African groups. It was felt that a bank that
would be acceptable to all previous civil war opponents had to be an Islamic one
and this led to establishment of the Azaouad Finances plc. The bank operates
primarily on a PLS basis, is linked with the SWIFT international payments system,
thus giving a fillip to local trade and commerce in a big way.

4.2.5. Central Asia

Out of the countries with large Muslim populations in Central Asia -


Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrghizstan only the
former two have witnessed experiments in Islamic microfinance.

4.2.5.1. The only Islamic microfinance program being run in Afghanistan is by


FINCA. The program involves qard al-hasan with service charge that is not related
to amount of financing as a percentage and that is charged upfront as a fee.
FINCA’s Village Banking methodology targets the working poor with its
“solidarity” group guaranteed loans. FINCA Afghanistan also plans to launch a
Murabahah Compliant Loan (MCL) to provide larger loans for loan capital and
fixed assets for individual clients interested in more traditional methods of Islamic
financing.

4.3. Challenges

4.3.1. Diverse Organizational Structures

The majority of microfinance institutions in the MENA and South Asia are set
up as NGOs (Societies, Trusts, Foundations and Associations etc.). Generally,
NGOs are allowed to make profits but not to take profits. This would be
inconsistent with a partnership-based model as in case of Sanadiq in Syria, which
pays dividends to its shareholders using a profit-sharing scheme. The for-profit
institutions generally seek registration under the company law in their country, as a
preferred institutional option. Banks that are into microfinance are naturally
governed by the respective banking laws. A significantly large number of
microfinance institutions (especially in Indonesia) are organized as cooperatives
registered under the Cooperatives Act and come under the purview of the
Ministries of Cooperation and not the Ministries of Finance. Many are not

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registered at all and operate in an informal manner, especially where they perceive
additional hassles subsequent to the registration (such as, in Palestine Occupied
Territories for political reasons). Registration however, brings with itself many
benefits, such as, the ability to raise funds from the formal banking and financial
system. The non-registered entities may also suffer from low credibility as large-
scale cases of fraud (as with pyramid schemes and ROSCAs) are reported in this
sector.

4.3.2. Shariah Compliance

Shariah compliance is indeed the differentiating factor between a conventional


and Islamic microfinance institution. Islamic microfinance institutions must not
only conform to Shariah in all their products, processes and activities, they should
be perceived to be so by their clientele.

4.3.2.1. Shariah Boards

Mainstream Islamic financial institutions provide comfort to their stakeholders


that they conform to Islamic finance principles by setting up Shariah supervisory
board (SSB)s. The members of SSBs are usually distinguished scholars and experts
of fiqh who confirm the compliance of financial products and consistency of
operations with Shariah. A review of Islamic microfinance institutions reveals that
none of them have instituted SSBs. A simple reason may be that this approach is
costly. The challenge before Islamic microfinance institutions is therefore to seek
alternatives to the above approach.

4.3.2.2. Fiqhi Issues

Divergence of views among Shariah scholars on many issues needs no


elaboration and continues to be a major challenge to development of Islamic
finance. The problem becomes particularly acute in the context of Islamic
microfinance. The local nature of the practices in microfinance allows for many
variations from the standardized set of contracts discussed in fiqh literature and can
open up rooms for debate.

Unlike mainstream Islamic bankers, many Islamic microfinance providers with


multiple bottom-lines are not comfortable with techniques like murabahah and
ijarah (lease-purchase and financial lease variety) and view them as interest-based-
loan-substitutes. The Islamic alternative to them is qard al-hasan – what attracts
them is its benevolent nature. Use of qard al-hasan where only the “actual” service
charge is recovered from the beneficiary, does not allow the portfolio of financings
to grow while inflation is likely to erode their real value, seriously threatening their
long-term survival. Some suggestions like linking the loan amount to a physical
commodity have been made; but without much of a consensus.

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On another level, many interest-based loans would like to be treated as Shariah-


compliant because of their “benevolent” nature. For instance, successive
governments in India have routinely provided through a network of microfinance
outfits loans at interest rates grossly below the prime lending rate in the economy
and would, at periodic intervals, waive the entire loan amount in the face of
hardships (such as crop failure, or even small enterprises becoming sick);
consequently claiming to be more equitable than profit and loss sharing. Another
instance is the Grameen system that cites the following features of its loans to be
labeled differently than interest-bearing conventional loans: (i) cap on the total
interest due; (ii) no recovery in case of project failure; (iii) no formal contract for
interest payments; (iv) no shareholder-owner(s) as counterparty to receive interest
etc. Such variations naturally lead to renewed discussions on the existence or
otherwise of riba in such financing modes.

Issues, such as, dealing with delays and delinquencies through penalties
invariably lead to divergent views. Besides, many other unresolved issues in
mainstream Islamic finance also are a challenge to Islamic microfinance.

4.3.2.3. Divergent Perceptions

Client perceptions towards mudarabah, murabahah, qard al-hasan which are


predominant forms of Islamic microfinance in the Islamic world show wide
variations and this can pose a major challenge for the Islamic microfinance sector.
At times, such perceptions are rooted in the ignorance of the clients about fiqhi
rules governing the various riba-free mechanisms.

It is pertinent to note a few survey findings on attitude of Muslim borrowers


towards alternative modes of financing. One, borrowers display an initial
preference for the profit-sharing mechanism—that is, mudarabah as it is perceived
to be more Islamic in spirit. Two, only some borrowers understand that the profit-
sharing mechanism may, under certain designs, be more expensive for them than
other alternatives within Islamic banking. Three, only some borrowers recognize
the potential for conflict between the microfinance program and the borrower in
determining profit. Four, some borrowers do not like the profit-sharing of
mudarabah because they do not want to reveal their profits to the program (and
their group). Five, borrowers initially express doubts about the appropriateness of
the “buy-resell” mechanism (murabahah) because it appears too similar to the
forbidden practice of fixed interest rates (riba). But once the mechanism is
properly explained to borrowers and local religious leaders, it is accepted. Six,
borrowers accept that a microfinance program incurs costs and that these costs
have to be recovered in order for the program to continue offering financial
services. Seven, borrowers also appreciate the simplicity and transparency of the
“buy-resell” model, which allows repayments in equal installments. It is easier to

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administer and monitor. This “blow-hot-blow-cold” attitude of the clients towards


alternative modes creates major problems for professionals engaged in product
development for the Islamic microfinance sector.

Client perception towards qard al-hasan is no less worrisome. It is perceived to


be “free” by many borrowers even when Shariah clearly distinguishes between
qard al-hasan and sadaqah. There are still others who are aware of the difference
and realize the need to repay the loan; but assert that qard al-hasan in its “pure”
form provides them with flexibility (right) in deciding when to repay.

4.3.3. Lack of Product Diversification.

Islamic microfinance in spite of the richness of fiqh literature remains highly


murabahah-centric. Even ijarah has not witnessed many takers unlike mainstream
Islamic finance. Profit-loss-sharing, though highly acclaimed as “ideal” is hardly
used (with a few exceptions, such as, in Indonesia). The “actual” number of
institutions based on zakah, awqaf and qard al-hasan is nowhere near the vast
potential these institutions and instruments offer. Voluntary savings, deposits
services, insurance, remittance and other fee based services are generally not
offered.

Agency problems with Profit-Loss-Sharing (PLS) in mainstream Islamic


finance have already been highlighted as a matter of grave concern that pushes
Islamic FIs to opt for debt-based products. They become particularly acute in rural
settings. Other problems that are usually cited with PLS-based modes as compared
to sale and lease based modes are as follows: One, PLS mechanisms require long-
term involvement by the microfinance institutions in the form of technical/
business assistance which raises the cost of implementation. Two, the uncertainty
about profits is a major drawback of the PLS models. Although microfinance
programs have information on local market behavior, weekly profits fluctuate.
Fluctuating profits make it extremely difficult for institutions to predict their cash
flows. Micro-entrepreneurs make the job doubly difficult by not keeping accurate
accounts. Three, the PLS model is difficult to understand for loan officers and
borrowers alike. Even in the hypothetical situation that profits were known, the
borrower has to repay a different amount each period (and the loan officer has to
collect a different amount each period). This lack of simplicity—relative to equal
repayment installments—is a source of confusion for borrowers and loan officers.

4.3.4. Linkages with Banks and Capital Market

If microfinance is to help build inclusive financial systems, it must develop


strong linkages with the formal banking sector and the capital markets. The
absence of such linkages except in certain economies like Malaysia and Indonesia

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constitutes a major challenge to policy makers interested in bringing the


“excluded” and “non-bankable” into the fold of formal financial systems.

4.3.4.1. While Islamic financial institutions have experienced phenomenal growth


in terms of numbers, funds mobilized and managed, their activity in the
microfinance sector leaves much to be desired. They have mostly been catering to
high-networth individuals leaving out the poor. Indeed they have much to learn
from commercial banks that have dedicated microfinance divisions.

An important factor contributing to the lack of interest in microfinance is the


absence of institutional credit guarantee systems in most Muslim countries. The
individual borrower guarantee that is prevalent lifts the burden of loss of the
business due to natural hazards, death or disability of the borrower. Nevertheless,
the “portfolio” guarantee approach, whereby the guarantor covers whole or part of
the default of the microfinance institution according to a specific agreement, is
non-existent.

Commercial banks – both Islamic and conventional have generally accorded


low priority to microfinance perhaps because its distinct features. For example, the
reliance on reputational collateral and lack of physical collateral are not easily
comprehended as sound banking by traditional bankers.

4.3.4.1. There is hardly any capital market activity by Islamic microfinance


providers. Capital markets in modern times provide the efficient alternative to raise
capital. Lack of liquidity and capital are among the perpetual problems confronting
the Islamic microfinance players. Conceptually, the problem may be overcome
through profitable and performing microfinance providers being able to raise
additional resources from the capital market or through processes of asset
securitization. Securitization may be attempted, if necessary, after creating single
agency to pool together cash-flow-earning assets of several microfinance providers
together. The absence of any real capital market activity by Islamic microfinance
providers may be due to various possible reasons, such as, the lack of awareness on
the part of microfinance providers and/or lack of conducive legal and economic
environment. Rating agencies that play an important role in raising of debt capital
by providing indicators of default risk are also conspicuous by their absence in the
Islamic microfinance sector.

4.4. Strategic Response

4.4.1. Collective Resolution of Shariah Issues

4.4.1.1. A problem with instituting individual Shariah Supervisory Boards (SSBs)


in line with mainstream Islamic financial institutions is that it is costly. As an
alternative, Islamic microfinance institutions may consider pooling together their

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resources and forming associations of organizations which could then set up a joint
SSB.

4.4.1.2. The issue of unresolved fiqhi issues may be addressed by initiating a


dialogue on a common forum on the same. In the past many a divergence of views
has been resolved through the process of dialogue. The Annual Fiqh Seminars
organized by Dallah Al Baraka or those organized under the aegis of Islamic Fiqh
Academies have successfully resolved many intricate and complex issues in the
past. These and other institutions should be routinely approached by microfinance
providers jointly through their associations to resolve on specific matters pertaining
to microfinance.

4.4.1.3. The issue of divergent perceptions is directly related to lack of proper


education among the clients and beneficiaries. Microfinance providers may seek
the help of local religious leaders to convey the exact nature of Islamic instruments
and also to influence them for timely servicing of debt.

4.4.2. A Diverse Range of Products

There is need and considerable scope for Islamic microfinance providers to


develop new products as solutions to a variety of financial problems. However, the
right approach to product development is a strategic one that takes a holistic view
of microfinance as a composite product meeting the needs for financing, savings-
and-investment, insurance, remittance and other services.

4.4.2.1. A rational response to the agency problem with profit-loss-sharing


financing would be to reduce uncertainty around profits by generating information.
Given that microfinance projects deal with local products and markets, often
dealing with a few known types of commodities and assets (such as, poultry, bee-
keeping, fisheries, dairy), it is possible on the part of the financier to generate
reliable business forecasts and develop products with realistic sharing ratios and
expected returns. While cases of negligence of mudarib leading to losses are taken
care of in mudarabah, proper systems should evolve to establish such negligence
and ascribe the losses to the mudarib. Further, accounting skills could be imparted
to the mudarib and made a pre-condition to financing (as in case of the Sanadiq
project).

4.4.2.2. Financing products using bay-istijrar (typically suitable for micro-


transactions), salam, istisna and other permissible contracts are but a few of the
potential products that offer a challenge to microfinance-engineers.

4.4.2.3. It is important that deposit products using mudarabah should use realistic
financial projections and a variety of product or sector-specific mudarabah
products could be designed to raise resources and provide a realistic return to

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depositors. Similarly, in lieu of simple qard al-hasan, a linking of the same with
specific physical commodities available locally (commodity selected after careful
evaluation of price volatility) could be more attractive as a hedge against inflation.
A problem typical to small deposits is that these savings do not qualify for
investment, even at a micro level, and savers from the "economically active poor"
with adequate amounts to be invested, in most cases, lack the know how and
professional ability to decide on who to invest with. The answer to this problem is
to treat micro savings as a pool for investment funds to be operated on the basis of
mudarabah, thereby yielding profits to savers.

4.4.2.4. Micro-insurance developed and offered successfully in many regions has


shown the way to development of micro-takaful along similar lines instead of
inefficient holding of cash to meet unforeseen adversities. Given the overwhelming
importance of risk management, micro-takaful is in urgent need of development.
There is clearly a possibility of eestablishing community-based micro-takaful
schemes with the involvement of NGOs, zakah funds and donor agencies. Support
from the mainstream takaful sector could come in the form of technical expertise,
financial assistance. The partner-agent model as in mainstream takaful could also
be used for micro-takaful. A beginning has already been made in this regard by a
handful of organizations, such as, Amana Takaful of Sri Lanka and Takmin of
Indonesia,

4.4.3. Banks’ Participation in Microfinance

The formal banking system, as it is structured at present, is not designed to


serve the financing needs of the poorer segments of the Muslim society. A strategic
response to this would call for a review of Central Bank policies in Muslim
countries policies to encourage banks to engage in microfinance. This would
necessitate formulation of modified banking regulations to accommodate special
characteristics of the microfinance sector. The regulations should license new
banks dealing exclusively with microfinance; prescribe capital requirements,
capital adequacy norms and limits on unsecured lending and provisioning of loans.
The regulations should also encourage more effective microfinance delivery
through establishment of new specialized formal non-bank microfinance
institutions, expansion of branch network for existing institutions, possible
restructuring of existing banks to serve as rural specialized microfinance banks and
allow for banks wholesaling to non-bank microfinance institutions and using the
non-profit organizations with social agenda to reach out to poor.

The limited provision of bank finance to micro-enterprises is mainly attributed,


among other factors, to the absence of a legal, policy and regulatory framework for
collaterals and guarantees appropriate for microfinance. The new framework
should therefore allow for greater flexibility in determining the type of non-
conventional collateral that is more appropriate for micro credit. It should require

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that microfinance institutions, in general, and banks, in particular, change their


procedures and branch structures to accommodate such changes.

It also requires more reliance on reputational collateral that can be generated by


credit bureaus through the provision of clients’ repayment history that could aid in
assessment of risks. The different nature of the procedures with microfinance also
requires a change in mindset of physical-collateral-inclined traditional banker
community.

A strategic response to increase the attractiveness of microfinance to


commercial banks is establishment of credit guarantee schemes with the purpose
of sharing credit risk with banks. Realizing the need for this product, some recent
MFIs have opted to specialize in this product. A case in point is the Grameen-Jamil
Initiative for development of microfinance in the MENA region. (see Box V). As
indicated earlier, this product can be made Shariah-compliant in the framework of
al-kafalah. According to accepted fiqhi opinion of scholars, the guarantor is
allowed to receive a fee for the guarantee provided (according to some, the fee
should neither be too high, nor in proportion to quantum of debt guaranteed).
Another alternative form of a credit guarantee scheme is possible via a zakah fund
(since zakah may legitimately be used to pay-off unpaid debt of the poor).
However, care must be taken to ensure that the coverage of such a scheme is
restricted to the extremely poor and the destitute only.

Box V: A Guarantee Product by Grameen-Jameel Initiative

The Grameen-Jameel Initiative, an innovative collaboration between Grameen


Foundation and the Abdul Latif Jameel Group to fight poverty in the Arab World
through microfinance as its first transaction provided a $2 million guarantee to
Dakahlya Businessmen Association for Community Development (DBACD), a leading
microfinance institution (MFI) enabling it to secure a local currency loan of $2.5
million from BNP Paribas. With this new funding, DBACD can provide much-needed
loans to 16,000 poor Egyptians. This deal negotiated by the Grameen-Jameel Initiative
utilizes a $1 million guarantee from Grameen Foundation’s Growth Guarantee
Program. The other $1 million guarantee comes from the Mohammad Jameel
Guarantee Fund, established in favor of the Grameen-Jameel Pan Arab Initiative. Both
the Grameen Foundation Growth Guarantees Program and the Jameel Fund provide
guarantees for MFIs to receive local currency financing from local commercial banks.
The guarantees of $1 million each were issued by Citibank and Banque Saudi Fransi. In
another first, this transaction is the only one to date where an Egyptian MFI has
received leveraged funding from a commercial bank. Historically, banks in Egypt have
required a 100 percent guarantee. By providing credit enhancement and with the
partial guarantee, Grameen-Jameel was able to interest international banks in lending to
DBACD for its microfinance programs.

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4.4.4. Capital Market Participation

In an ideal world with inclusive financial systems, domestic capital markets in


addition to the banking sector would supply the bulk of the funding for
microfinance. Financial service providers would rely on savings from the public,
loans from the commercial banking sector, bond issues, and domestic stock
markets. A capital market product that has facilitated flow of funds to MFIs is a
micro-finance fund. The number of such funds that invest in bond, equities and
quasi-equities or convertibles of conventional MFIs are on the rise. These include
equity funds, funds associated with MF networks, and the socially-responsible
funds. In a similar manner, dedicated funds could be established to invest in
Islamic MFIs. The creation of such funds would involve a mechanism similar to
that of the Islamic mutual funds in the framework of mudarabah or wakalah.

Box VI: World’s First Micro-Credit Securitization

BRAC one of the world’s largest NGOs with over 5mm borrowers and 100,000
employees, has closed World’s first micro-credit securitization structured by RSA
Capital, Citigroup, FMO and KfW. This groundbreaking transaction, denominated in
Bangladesh Taka (BDT), will provide an aggregate of BDT 12.6 BN (US$180mm
equivalent) of financing for BRAC over a period of six years. Under the program, BDT
1 BN (US$15mm equivalent) will be disbursed every six months to BRAC, with a
maturity of one year. The transaction is a securitization of receivables arising from
micro-credits extended to low-income individuals by BRAC, primarily in rural
communities not reached by Bangladesh’s commercial banks. The structure involves
the creation of a special purpose trust which purchases the receivables from BRAC and
issues certificates to investors representing beneficial interest in such receivables. The
securitization will allow BRAC, to diversify its funding sources, reduce its on-balance
assets and also disburse more funds to a larger number of micro entrepreneurs. The
transaction brings the global financial markets to the doorsteps of nearly 1.2mm
households in Bangladesh. It will also help in the development of Bangladesh’s local
capital markets, as it marks the first such securitization in the market and also the first
AAA rated local certificates issue in Bangladesh, rated by the Credit Rating Agency of
Bangladesh. The transaction was very well received by the local investors. BRAC will
be the Originator as well as the Service Provider for the transaction. The Trustee for
this transaction will be Eastern Bank Limited of Bangladesh. Citibank, N.A.
Bangladesh is the Account Bank for the trust. The transaction required the creation of a
software to track a dynamic pool of receivables, which was created by MF Analytics.
Clifford Chance, and Lee Khan and Partners are acting as legal advisors.

A process opposite to that of establishment of a Fund is securitization.


Microfinance institutions that are liquidity-starved may explore approaching the
capital market and raise capital through Islamic securitization. For example it
should be conceptually possible to establish an SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle) as a
mudarabah or on the basis of wakalah that would purchase small ijarah portfolios

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of microfinance providers and create a large enough portfolio against which


securities could be issued in the capital market. Practical implementation of this is
certainly a challenge, given that it is yet to be attempted. Indeed much of the
challenge to Islamic microfinance emanates from the fact that it is untried and
unproven. A beginning has already been made in securitization of micro-credit in
the domain of conventional microfinance by BRAC, Bangladesh. (see Box VI).

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5. ISLAMIC MF INFRASTRUCTURE:
MESO LEVEL
The meso level of the financial system includes the basic financial infrastructure
and the range of services required to reduce transaction costs, increase outreach,
build skills, and foster transparency among IsMF providers. It includes a wide
range of players and activities, such as, auditors, rating agencies, professional
networks, trade associations, credit bureaus, transfer and payment systems,
information technology, technical service providers and trainers. These entities
obviously can transcend national boundaries and include regional and global
organizations.

5.1. Landscape

The frenetic pace of growth of Islamic finance has witnessed several landmark
developments, such as, the establishment of the Islamic Financial Services Board
(IFSB), the Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institution
(AAOIFI), the International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA), the General Council of
Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (GCIBIFI) at the international level and
many other agencies at regional levels to provide meso-level services to IFIs.
However, presently these do not provide services specific to the Islamic MF sector.
With entry of more and more IFIs into MF, the scenario is expected to change
however. As far as the MFIs in Muslim countries are concerned, presently there are
a handful of regional networks. In the MENA region, SANABEL among other
things (see Box VII), is seeking to develop a resource center with documents and
training material in Arabic language. In Indonesia, the ASBISINDO, Asosiasi
Bank Syariah Indonesia is an association of rural Islamic banks (BPRS) and also
Islamic commercial banks. Its objective is the development of Islamic banking in
Indonesia through human resource development, technical assistance, operational
standardization and financial product development, facilitation of vertical and
horizontal communication among Islamic financial institutions, advocacy and
participation in policy dialogue.

The most important player providing meso-level services, such as, financial and
technical assistance to its member countries is the Islamic Development Bank. The
IsDB has in the recent past undertaken a number of financial and technical
assistance programs in member countries, such as, Palestine, Sudan and Yemen
among others. The Islamic Research and Training Institute, a member of the IsDB
Group has undertaken a number of research and training programs relating to the
field and has several ambitious plans currently in this regard.

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5.2. Challenges

5.2.1. Payment Systems

Payments systems allow the transfer of money among participating financial


institutions, usually banks. Though safe, efficient, and reliable payments systems
are critical to the effective functioning of the financial system most of Islamic
MFIs or their conventional counterparts do not have access to such systems. In the
IsDB member countries, only some top Islamic banks have access to systems such
as, electronic funds transfer and real time gross settlement system. The smaller
microfinance institutions working for the poor may not be in a position to institute
the systems themselves.

5.2.2. Transparency and Information Infrastructure

Financial transparency is defined as the widespread availability of relevant,


accurate, timely, and comparable information about the performance of financial
institutions. Transparency also attracts funders. Accurate, standardized information
allows private investors and public donors to make informed funding decisions.
Finally, transparency also better informs clients, which could lead to increased
competition among financial service providers as clients gain knowledge and
comparison shop among their options. Transparency and its benefits depend
critically on the availability of a suite of related services and tools, ranging from
reliable information software to high-quality auditors and rating agencies, to credit
bureaus that capture clients’ credit histories. Unfortunately, these services are
scarcely available to Islamic microfinance institutions.

5.2.3. Education and Training

Lack of education and training among clients and organization personnel


constitutes a major challenge for the Islamic microfinance sector. Lack of trained
manpower is a major constraint for its growth, expansion and consolidation.
Presently there are only a handful of resource centers; and fewer training programs
in native languages. There is an urgent need to develop resource centers and
training material in native languages.

5.2.4. Networking

Lack of effective networking is another challenge. Networks are important


because a large number of activities that cannot be undertaken individually can be
done collectively by a network due to economies of scale and scope - such as,
initiating dialogue on legal frameworks, regulations and taxes; creating and
updating information base; conducting training programs etc. The Islamic world
does not have an apex coordinating body in the area of Islamic microfinance. There

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are a few regional networks though. Compared to the size of the Islamic world,
however, their number is quite small, and there is little coordination between them,
resulting in duplication and lack of effectiveness.

Box VII: Arab Microfinance Gateway by CGAP, Sanabel and Grameen-A LJ


Initiative

Arabic speakers now have a portal for information on microfinance. The Consultative
Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP), the Grameen-Abdul Latif Jameel Initiative, and
Sanabel recently launched the Arabic Microfinance Gateway:
www.arabic.microfinancegateway.org, which is the fist major online resource for
microfinance in the Arab world. More than a hundred specialized microfinance
documents were translated into Arabic for the launch of the site. With this new access
to resources and information, microfinance institutions in the Arab World will be better
able to reach more clients and provide a better and wider range of services. In addition,
potential donors and other interested in microfinance in the region will develop a
deeper understanding of the industry. The Arabic Microfinance Gateway will be a one-
stop shop for microfinance in the Middle East. With news and opinion, and a
significant library of microfinance documents in Arabic, the Arabic Microfinance
Gateway will become a key resource for anyone seeking to learn more about
microfinance. Following the model of the English and French versions of the
Microfinance Gateway, it is also intended to become a community portal, offering
discussion groups and a job bank for consultants.

5.3. Strategic Response

In formulating a strategic response to the challenges, an important question


needs to be answered - whether infrastructure and services should be microfinance-
specific or whether microfinance skills should be absorbed by existing mainstream
providers, that work more broadly with mainstream IFIs - institutions like IFSB,
AAOIFI, GCIBIFI and IIRA. As conventional microfinance markets mature and
begin to integrate into the financial system, the mainstream service providers
(rating agencies, auditors, management consultants, and bank training institutes,
among others) are starting to adapt to meet the needs of financial institutions that
serve poor clients. A similar development in the Islamic finance sector should take
care of the meso-level requirements of Islamic MF sector. The need for specialized
microfinance support services should also be carefully assessed, particularly when
microfinance is not as well integrated into the financial system.

5.3.1. Payment Systems

As noted earlier, in the IsDB member countries, some top Islamic banks have
access to systems such as, electronic funds transfer and real time gross settlement

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system. Though the smaller microfinance institutions working for the poor may not
be in a position to institute the systems themselves, they may work through the
larger Islamic FIs by forging alliances with them.

5.3.2. Transparency and Information

An important meso-level initiative would be to provide for rating services


specific to Islamic microfinance. Presently a number of conventional rating
agencies undertake rating of credit quality, such as, CRISIL, JCR-VIS in South
Asia. There are other agencies which take up overall risk assessment, such as, M-
CRIL, Microfinanza, Micro Rate and Planet Rating in South Asia, South East Asia,
MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa. It is important that such agencies develop rating
methodology for Islamic microfinance instruments. In order to encourage such
agencies institutions like Islamic Development Bank can play a proactive role and
establish a rating fund similar to one established by CGAP, Inter-American
Development Bank and EU. (see Box VIII). This fund could initially reimburse to
Islamic MFIs the entire cost of getting themselves rated by an Islamic rating
agency, such as, IIRA. Subsequently the share of the cost of rating borne by the
Fund could be reduced with an increasing share passed on the MFIs concerned.
The ratings would substantially reduce information costs and help Islamic MFIs to
obtain financing from the market.

5.3.3. Education and Training

Education and training are imperatives for an effective strategy for the growth
and rejuvenation the Islamic microfinance sector. Since traditional banking is ill-
suited for collateral-free entrepreneurship-oriented microfinance, there is a need to
create a cadre of microfinance experts by imparting training to persons with
diverse experiences such as, in banking, finance, investments, entrepreneurship
development and community development. Even there is a need for education for
the clients in subjects like basic accounting and management; accounting is
important because of the unavoidable need to calculate profits in case of
participatory financing methods, such as, mudarabah and musharakah.

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Box VIII: Microfinance Rating and Assessment Fund

This is a joint initiative of the Inter-American Development Bank (IsDB), the


Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the European Union. The primary
objectives of the Rating Fund are:
1. Market-building for MFI rating and assessment services by encouraging
greater demand from MFIs for professional external evaluations, as well as
strengthening the quality of supply.
2. Improved transparency of MFI financial performance, as a basis for improved
performance and increased flow of commercial funding to MFIs.
To this end, the Rating Fund is based on the following principles:
1. Transparency: Promote and facilitate the public disclosure of MFI performance
information through the increased use of ratings and assessments.
2. Availability of Information: Promote information-sharing to increase the
amount of reliable information on MFI performance, for example, through the
Rating Fund and MIX Market (www.mixmarket.org) web sites. (The MIX
Market is a website that links MFIs with investors.)
3. Quality of Information: Ensure that ratings and assessments financed by the
Rating Fund contain enough information to enable investors to make informed
decisions about MFI performance.
4. Cost-Sharing/Value Realized: Require MFIs to bear an increasing portion of
the cost of a rating or assessment so that they recognize the benefits of
undertaking a rating exercise and build it into their normal business costs.
Source: www.cgap.org

5.3.4. Networking

Since coordination between institutions offering microfinance services and


those with different mandates (banks, NGOs, social funds, and rural development
projects) is extremely limited, there is strategic need for a coordinating body
dedicated to development of the Islamic microfinance sector. As pointed out
earlier, networks are important because a large number of activities that cannot be
undertaken individually can be done collectively by a network due to economies of
scale and scope. Such regional networks and associations should further be
networked at a global level. The global network and its regional member-networks
can perform a variety of functions, such as, (i) initiating dialogue on legal
frameworks, regulations, taxes (ii) resolution of divergence of views on Shariah
compliance; (iii) providing exposure to worldwide microfinance good practices
through development of resource center; (iv) designing and conducting training
programs in microfinance facilitation and management; (v) development and
maintenance of information base for use by member organizations; (vi) creation of
infrastructure, such as, credit rating facility for microfinance etc. It can play a
major role in development of financially sustainable microfinance institutions by

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promoting efficiency, self-sufficiency and sustainability goals for them by building


both financial and managerial capacities.

5.3.5. Technical Assistance through Awqaf and Zakah Funds

As a strategic meso-level initiative to develop Islamic microfinance, it is


important to institutionalize voluntary giving in order to guarantee sustainability of
assets and their income generating abilities. While the primary purpose of the
institutions of awqaf and zakah is poverty alleviation and improvement in the
quality of life, there is a need to ensure that the benefits realized from any such
activity are sustainable.

In the context of awqaf, it is important to preserve and develop assets under


waqf to add to productive capacity and create capabilities for wealth creation.
Awqaf may also be created specifically to impart knowledge and skills in
entrepreneurship development among the poor as microfinance alone cannot create
wealth unless combined with entrepreneurial skills. Indeed all technical assistance
programs can be organized as awqaf.

While zakah funds must be distributed to the destitute and poorest of poor, this
institution could be integrated with microfinance. This may be attempted by
seeking to push such individuals through zakah distribution out of dire poverty to
levels, where they are not longer regarded as “unbankable” by MFIs. Therefore,
Islamic MFIs and zakah funds would be performing two distinct roles which
supplement each other. A scheme of proper integration of the two types of
institutions would do away with issues related to the desirability or otherwise of
zakah funds being invested in speculative wealth-creating assets in stead of getting
spent on immediate needs of the poorest of the poor, or issues of ethics - of Islamic
microfinance institutions seeking profits and ignoring the “unbankable”.

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6. ISLAMIC MF REGULATORY AND POLICY
FRAMEWORK: MACRO LEVEL
The government has a positive role to play in building inclusive financial
systems. Some governments see a major role for them in credit delivery itself.
Experience has shown that government credit schemes for the poor are usually
heavily subsidized. They could be in the nature of direct credit delivery by state-
owned banks or indirectly through wholesale “apex” funds that pass on those
resources to retail financial institutions. The following concerns usually go with
these subsidized lending schemes. One, they are vulnerable to political patronage,
often diverting credit to better-off (and more politically connected) borrowers.
Two, borrowers often view soft government money as grants or gifts and are less
likely to repay loans from subsidized programs. This is especially true in countries
with a history of forgiveness programs for agricultural or other lending. Low
interest rates in government programs mean that lending institutions cannot cover
their costs and thus require continuous government or donor subsidies to survive.
Also, government credit programs are often limited to specific, preferred sectors,
regions, or populations. This targeting means that credit does not necessarily reach
the most dynamic sectors of the economy. Even worse, directed credit does not
always reach the intended beneficiaries.11 In short, governments are not good at
offering credit directly to poor people, even while government-owned banks, such
as, postal banks are fairly successful in savings mobilization or money transfer.

There is a growing consensus that the government’s best role is to offer a policy
environment that allows competitive and diverse financial service providers to
flourish. A good policy environment allows a range of financial service providers
to coexist and compete to offer higher-quality and lower-cost services to large
numbers of poor clients. Some IsDB member countries, such as, Bangladesh,
Jordan and Uganda, have developed microfinance strategies that clearly
demonstrate what the appropriate role of government should be relative to the
private sector.

Government sets policies that affect the financial system. These policies include
ensuring macroeconomic stability, liberalizing interest rates, and establishing
banking regulation and supervision that make viable microfinance possible. Other
policies have an impact on microfinance, but their exact relationship is not as well
known. These policies include establishing a favorable legal environment related to
issues like contract enforcement, business registry, collateral confiscation, property
rights, and taxation. More recently, the rules against money laundering and
countering the financing of terrorism have also come under increasing focus.

11
Caprio and Honohan, Finance for Growth, CGAP.

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6.1. Macroeconomic Stability

Probably the most important single thing that governments can do to facilitate
microfinance is to make sure inflation remains low. Additionally, regulators and
policy makers should ensure that volatility in financial markets – bonds, equity,
exchange rates, and other prices in the economy, remains in check. Though Islamic
MFs during the South East Asian crisis fared far better than their conventional
counterparts in withstanding the shocks, every effort should be made to keep
speculative forces in check.

6.2. Liberalized Financial Market Rates

In the era of dual banking, interest rates are used as benchmarks for setting rates
of murabahah, ijarah and other Islamic instruments. A powerful case is often made
in favor of doing away with any cap or limit on the level of interest rates that
financial service providers can charge on loans.12 The purpose of these limits, or
ceilings, existing in some IsDB member countries, such as, Algeria Armenia,
Libya, Syrian Arab Rep, Tunisia, UEAC and UMOA countries, is to protect
consumers from unscrupulous lenders and excessively high interest rates. It is
pointed out that interest rate ceilings unintentionally hurt poor people in the end by
making small transaction financial services unattractive to NGOs and financial
institutions. It costs much more to make many small loans than a few large loans,
and governments normally set ceilings with mainstream commercial banks in
mind, not the more costly microcredit. These ceilings can make it difficult for
micro-lenders to cover their costs, driving them out of the market (or keeping them
from entering in the first place). Poor clients are either left with no access to
financial services or must revert to informal credit markets, such as local
moneylenders, which are even more costly. These arguments are relevant for
murabahah and ijarah rates too. In an Islamic economy, these rates should be
freely determined by forces of demand and supply. However, this does not rule out
concerns about the high costs of microfinance and predatory lending practices.
Competition, is the single most effective way to reduce both microcredit costs and
the debt market rates. Policies to promote competition among credit providers,
combined with relevant consumer protection measures are imperatives.

6.3. Banking Sector Regulation and Supervision

The growing maturity of microfinance across the globe has kept the issue of
regulation and supervision of MFIs in the front burner. It is generally felt that MFIs
like the mainstream FIs should also be licensed and supervised by the central bank

12
Helms and Reille, Interest Rate Ceilings and Microfinance: The Story So Far, CGAP

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49

and other financial authorities. In most countries, this shift requires some
adjustment of existing banking regulations.

A country-wise analysis of IsDB Member countries and the status of


microfinance and Islamic finance in them has some interesting revelations.
Arguably, the existence or otherwise of a sector-specific regulatory framework is a
reliable indicator of the status accorded to that sector by policy makers and
regulators in a given country. The results for micro-finance institutions (MFIs) and
Islamic financial institutions (IFIs) are presented in Annexure III. There are as
many as 25 member countries that have enacted laws and regulations specifically
to govern MFIs and there are as many as 13 member countries that have enacted
laws and regulations specific to IFIs. While Islamic MF requires both sets of laws,
only one country Pakistan fulfills this requirement. The State Bank of Pakistan has
also recently issued guidelines pertaining specifically to Islamic MF.

In the matter of Islamic finance, there are as many as 13 member countries that
have enacted laws and regulations specific to IFIs. While some of these countries
have witnessed a growing IF sector (e.g. UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar), they are
fortunate enough not to experience pervasive poverty among their populace and
therefore, the need for Islamic microfinance has not been felt.

6.3.1. Issues in Prudential Regulation and Supervision

Prudential regulation aims to ensure the financial soundness of regulated


institutions to prevent system-wide financial instability and protect depositors from
losing their money. When a deposit-taking institution collapses, it cannot repay its
depositors, which could undermine public confidence and stimulate a run on
deposits causing even previously solvent institutions to fail. Examples of prudential
regulation include capital adequacy norms and reserve and liquidity requirements.
However, prudential regulation means little without effective prudential
supervision.

Supervision involves monitoring to verify compliance with prudential


regulations and taking steps to shore up the solvency of a regulated institution
when compliance becomes doubtful. Prudential regulation and supervision are
generally complex, difficult, expensive, and invasive. They require a specialized
financial authority for their implementation. For those financial institutions that
capture deposits from the public (and thus would generally be subject to prudential
regulation), some standard banking regulations need to be adjusted to
accommodate microfinance Governments should apply the more burdensome
prudential regulation only when the financial system and depositor’s money is
potentially at risk. Otherwise non-prudential norms and regulatory approaches
should be sufficient. Non-prudential regulations include measures like registration
with some authority for transparency purposes, keeping adequate accounts,

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prevention of fraud and financial crimes, and various types of consumer protection
measures.

It is asserted by some that specialized microcredit institutions that do not take


retail deposits should not be subjected to prudential regulation. Some countries,
prohibit unlicensed non-bank institutions (including NGOs) from lending. This is
an unnecessary restriction that can stifle experimentation with microcredit. In these
cases, reforms subjecting those that offer microcredit to non-prudential regulation
may be a relatively simple and effective means of freeing up the development of
large-scale micro-lending.

Some commentators caution against the “rush to regulate” microfinance through


the introduction of laws creating new regulatory categories of depository financial
institutions. They point to the more successful microfinance markets in
Bangladesh, and Indonesia, where microfinance was born and matured without
special microfinance regulation.13

6.3.2. Issues Related to Dual System

Some regulatory issues arise because of the existence of a dual system in most
Islamic countries – an Islamic financial system co-existing with a conventional
system. In such a scenario, the need for transparency and disclosure and the need to
maintain a wall of segregation between the two subsystems is crucial. The
following is a list of essential concerns and components that need to be addressed
by such a framework. It should be noted here that most of these would involve
further debate on their desirability or otherwise.

1. Define products and scope of activities clearly ensuring Shariah-


compatibility, free from interest (riba) and complexity (gharar); enable
institutions to engage in fee-based activities;
2. Ensure transparency and disclosure; importance increases many-fold for
PLS-based financings;
3. Monitor end-use of financing;
4. Ensure clear choice by market participant between Islamic and
conventional techniques;
5. Free of murabahah and ijarah rates or linking them to a Shariah-
acceptable benchmark;
6. Require institutions to clarify goals - single or multiple social goals other
than microfinance;
7. Standardize Shariah compliant financing norms and procedures;

13
The preceding discussion is based on Christen, Lyman, and Rosenberg, Guiding
Principles on Regulation and Supervision of Microfinance, CGAP.

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8. Standardize Fiqh rulings


9. Prescribe ways to dealing with default and delinquency in debt repayment
in a Shariah compliant manner;
10. Permit mature and larger institutions only to invite deposits; and
11. Require compulsory takaful for members and family members etc.
12. Require MF Providers to create and maintain reserves such as profit-
equalization-reserve to minimize depositor risk arising out of profit
volatility.

6.4. Strategic Response

The regulatory and policy framework governing Islamic MF is in urgent need of


development. The orientation towards considering microfinance as an integral part
of mainstream finance and recent developments in the regulation of Islamic finance
can provide guidance in developing the regulatory framework for IsMF.
Specifically, the developments brought about by the activities of the Accounting
and Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the
Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) are worth mentioning. The former, an
international self regulatory organization, issues accounting standards and auditing
guidelines as well as provides advisory services. The IFSB is an international
regulatory standard setter founded by central banks. It is concerned notably with
capital adequacy, risk management, corporate governance, supervision,
transparency and market discipline as well as liquidity management.

In a number of countries, authorities remain concerned with the possible


diversion of resources mobilized at the grass root level. Accordingly they hesitate
to permit microfinance organizations to offer resource mobilization services,
including deposit-taking thus limiting the scope of services to small clients. Recent
progress in the policy framework to fight money laundering and terrorism
financing should provide guidance in the matter of selecting the downstream
organizations, such as, NGOs that function as retailers of microfinance.

An idea that needs further examination is to consider development of a


regulatory system for the Islamic microfinance sector in three stages. Stage one - to
make the Islamic microfinance institutions appreciate the need for certain common
performance standards; stage two - making it mandatory for the Islamic
microfinance institutions to get registered with identified or designated institutions
and stage three - to encourage development of network of Islamic microfinance
institutions which could function as quasi Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) at
a later date or identifying a suitable organization to handle the regulatory
arrangements.

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7. ROLE OF DONORS AND DEVELOPMENT
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Donor institutions with a social mission to alleviate poverty have played and
continue to play a significant role in shaping the microfinance industry through
their policy, technical and financial support at macro, messo and micro levels.
According to a recent survey of CGAP member donors, the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank, and the European
Commission are among the largest public funders of microfinance. In the domain
of Islamic microfinance, the Islamic Development Bank is perceived to be the most
important player. A few other international organizations, such as, the United
Nations Development Program (UNDP), KfW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau),
FINCA have been instrumental in initiating Islamic microfinance programs (in
Syria and Palestine, Northern Mali and Afghanistan respectively).

Donor agencies support microfinance using a variety of tools, such as, policy
support, technical assistance, grants, loans, quasi-equity, equity investments and
guarantees. Using these mechanisms, donors assume the role of enablers through
funding credit and investment portfolios of MFIs; providing guarantees and safety
nets to MFIs, capacity building; facilitating MFI's access to domestic capital
markets; building the skill sets of technical service providers, rating agencies,
consulting firms, training facilities; and supporting the operations of networks and
associations. In the context of Islamic microfinance, the tools are not-only Shariah-
compliant, but also are more diverse and inclusive of those directed at the
extremely poor and the destitute.

Many donors, particularly the multilateral development banks, are able to work
only with governments, usually with soft loans. While this instrument might be
valid for traditional aid activities like building roads, hospitals, and schools, it is
less suitable for supporting the financial system in the private-sector domain.
Governments, as pointed out earlier, often have a poor track record in the matter of
offering financial services. As the CGAP Donor Guidelines14 assert, such programs
are often characterized by lack of accountability and distort markets by displacing
domestic commercial initiatives with cheap or free money.

Donor agencies have a significant role to play, particularly in regions


characterized by large-scale conflicts and crises. A mission-based approach
replaces market –based approach to microfinance under such abnormal conditions
wherein poverty levels keep rising along with increasing business and operational

14
Building Inclusive Financial Systems: Donor Guidelines on Good Practice in
Microfinance, CGAP

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54

risks for the micro-enterprises as well as for the MFIs. A case in point is the DEEP
Initiative in Palestine by the Islamic Development Bank and the UNDP. (See Box
IX).

Box IX. The DEEP Initiative

The Deprived Families Economic Empowerment Program (DEEP) aims to develop a


comprehensive package of financial and non-financial services to meet the needs of the
poor and very poor families of Palestine, who are the target group. The program aims to
transform the target beneficiaries from being recipients of humanitarian assistance to
providers of income for their own families, thus enabling them to sustain their
livelihoods. The program will provide financial and technical support to intermediaries,
including microfinance institutions and Business Development Service (BDS)
providers, who will in turn provide financial and promotional safety net services to the
target group.

The program is financed by the Islamic Development Bank and the United Nations
Development Program and will initially operate as a pilot project for 30 months before
being transformed into a legal entity that will operate as an autonomous organization on
a sustainable basis.

The DEEP program will have three main components, as follows:


• Delivery of financial and promotional safety net interventions;
• Capacity building of intermediary organizations; and
• Development of the program management unit into a sustainable organization.

Financial services will be delivered by microfinance institutions. The program will


promote international best practices in its work with MFIs. Promotional safety net
interventions, which will include enterprise development and livelihood activities, will
be delivered by partner intermediaries. In both cases, the Program Management will
consider poverty targeting, outreach, institutional experience and track record, etc., as
main factors for selecting partner intermediaries.

Funding to MFIs will be in the form of loans, and grants and a credit guarantee scheme
would be established at a later stage to guarantee loans from commercial banks to
MFIs. Funding will cover the loan portfolio, operational deficits and capacity building
for MFIs. Funding to promotional safety net intermediaries will be in form of grants for
capacity building, program activities and operational costs.

MFIs will use their usual methods of selecting clients to lend to. However, the DEEP
funds will be used to finance loan products that target the poor and very poor clients,
such as solidarity group lending. In the case of promotional safety net interventions,
targeting and selection of beneficiaries will be done with utmost care and objectivity in
order to ensure that the people benefiting from the program are only the poor and very
poor.
Contd…

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The package of interventions for the target group would include the following:

1. Protective Social Safety Net Intervention: Maintenance of current livelihood


assistance; provision of health insurance and savings products;
2. Promotional Social Safety Net Intervention: Provision of a wide array of non-
financial services critical to the entry, survival, productivity, competitiveness,
and growth of micro and small scale enterprises run and owned by the poor
and very poor;
3. Financial Services Intervention: Maximizing the outreach of the lending
activities to the Palestinian poor and very poor people, contributing to the
MFIs' capacity building; introducing Islamic lending Products; maximizing
the outreach of savings activities to the poor; introducing micro insurance
products
The program would also seek to provide capacity building interventions aimed to
strengthen the various intermediaries that will provide financial and promotional safety
net interventions to the targeted poor and very poor households. Other Capacity
building activities will be directed to the government staff to improve their knowledge
and capacity in areas related to the DEEP program.

The unique feature of this program is the introduction of Islamic lending products,
based on murabahah, musharakah, mudarabah, ijarah-to-own and wakalah.

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8. RECOMMENDATIONS
Access of the public to financial services enables it to participate in the
development process and benefit from it. Islamic finance makes financial services
relevant for a large segment of the world population. However, despite progress in
different segments of the Islamic financial services industry, Islamic microfinance
institutions have an extremely limited presence and outreach. In order to enhance
the reach and richness of Islamic microfinance it is imperative to examine the
major challenges confronting this sector in a holistic manner and find in
partnership with the various stakeholders strategic solutions to redress the
challenges.

The primary aim of the present document is to develop a framework for


organized dialogue and facilitate formulation of effective policies supporting the
delivery of a diverse range of financial services that are widely available, client
responsive, reasonably priced and Shariah compliant. The products and services are
not limited to credit but also include savings, cash transfers and insurance. The
overall goal of the strategy is to develop a microfinance industry that is
institutionally and financially sustainable, and integrated within the broader formal
financial sector and that respects the cultural and religious sensitivities of a Muslim
society. This strategy views Islamic microfinance as an essential tool of
intervention within the broader approach for poverty alleviation and socio-
economic development in Muslim societies.

An effective strategy for development of microfinance would require concerted


efforts by all stakeholders - the poor, the cooperatives/ NGOs, the Islamic banks,
the awqaf / zakah funds, the apex bodies, IsDB and IsDB-sponsored institutions as
well as the government agencies, such as, Ministries of Finance, Cooperation, the
monetary authority and the capital market authority. The dialogue shall effectively
address the need for change of perceptions, strategies and policies at the level of
the various stakeholders:

1. As far as the poor are concerned, they should perceive formal savings, credit
and financial services as safer and more attractive; develop entrepreneurial
abilities and acquire relevant education and skills and consider charity as
temporary support only.
2. The cooperatives/ NGOs should act as catalysts of change involving
community assets; combine social and economic agenda with synergized
effect; recognize sustainability as the core factor in development and
develop linkages with banks and capital markets.
3. The Islamic banks should develop linkages with non-profit organizations for
reaching out to poor, recognize microfinance as an additional segment with

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58

its distinct risk-return and other features and engage in direct and indirect
finance, facilitate participation of microfinance providers in capital markets,
initiate and participate in dialogue with policy makers and regulators.
4. The awqaf / zakah funds should institutionalize voluntary giving in order to
guarantee sustainability of assets and their income generating abilities,
preserve and develop assets under waqf to add to productive capacity and
create capabilities for wealth creation and distribute zakah funds to destitute
and poorest of poor who are not bankable.
5. The apex bodies, IsDB and IsDB-sponsored institutions should enhance
mutual cooperation and coordination in matters of common interest and
initiate and participate in dialogue with policy makers and regulators.
6. Finally, the government agencies, such as, Ministries of Finance,
Cooperation, the monetary authority and the capital market authority should
formulate supportive policy and regulatory environment and create
supportive infrastructure.

Multilateral institutions like IsDB can play an effective role in improving


services to the Islamic MFI sector at all levels. Some specific initiative that would
go a long way in strengthening the Islamic MF sector are:

At a micro-level

o Participate in equity of Islamic financial institutions with a view to creating


specialized MF Divisions;
o Create Qard al-Hasan-specific Funds to support various qard al-hasan
based microfinance institutions across the globe;
o Create refinance facility to act as a whole-seller of Islamic microfinance
products for a chain of Islamic and conventional microfinance retailers;
o Participate in equity of commercial takaful companies with a view to
developing micro-takaful products services; also of retakaful companies.
o Design a Credit Guarantee Scheme for Islamic microfinance providers;
o Promote dialogue among Shariah scholars for collective resolution of fiqhi
issues related to microfinance

At a meso level

o Develop knowledge base through research in issues pertaining to building


Islamic inclusive financial systems;
o Document, collate and translate best-practices from across the world of
microfinance; Undertake training and education programs to impart
microfinance related special skills to bankers;
o Undertake training of trainers to impart managerial and accounting skills to
users of microfinance

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o Encourage formation of apex and regional industry associations whose


objective is the development of Islamic microfinance through human
resource development, technical assistance, operational standardization and
financial product development, facilitation of vertical and horizontal
communication among Islamic financial institutions, advocacy and
participation in policy dialogue;
o Create Zakah and Awqaf Funds at a global level dedicated exclusively for
poverty alleviation and linked to microfinance institutions downstream;
and
o Help create rating mechanism in member countries for Islamic
microfinance institutions.

At a macro level

o Assist member countries to develop a regulatory framework for Islamic


microfinance;
o Support policy makers to ensure an enabling policy framework conducive
to the development of Islamic microfinance,
o Support and facilitate the integration of zakah and awqaf in financial sector
reforms and
o Build an effective alliance and forum of Islamic microfinance providers
and other stakeholders.

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Annexure I: Poverty Levels in IsDB Member Countries

Name of Member Income Poverty Index


Country Population Below
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$2 a National
Human Poverty Index day Poverty Population
Rank $1 a day (%) (%) Line In Millions No of Poor in Millions
Islamic Republic of
1 Afghanistan 53 31.06 16.5
2 Republic of Albania 25 3.58 0.9
Democratic and
Popular Republic of
3 Algeria 46 2 15.1 25 32.93 5.0
4 Azerbaijan Republic 49 7.96 3.9
5 Kingdom of Bahrain 0.7
People’s Republic of
6 Bangladesh 85 36 82.8 45 147.37 122.0
7 Republic of Benin 90 30.9 73.7 33 7.86 5.8
8 Brunei Darussalam 0.38
9 Burkina Faso 101 27.2 71.8 45 13.9 10.0
10 Republic of Cameroon 61 17.7 50.6 48 17.34 8.8
11 Republic of Chad 100 80 9.94 8.0
12 Union of Comoros 56 60 0.7 0.4
Republic of Côte
13 d'Ivoire 82 14.8 48.8 37 17.65 6.5
14 Republic of Djibouti 52 50 0.49 0.2
15 Arab Republic of 44 3.1 43.9 20 78.89 34.6
61
Name of Member Income Poverty Index
Country Population Below
$2 a National
Human Poverty Index day Poverty Population
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Rank $1 a day (%) (%) Line In Millions No of Poor in Millions


Egypt
16 Republic of Gabon 50 1.42
Republic of the
17 Gambia 86 59.3 82.9 1.64 1.4
18 Republic of Guinea 96 40 9.69 3.9
Republic of Guinea
19 Bissau 92 1.44
20 Republic of Indonesia 41 7.5 52.4 17.8 245.45 128.6
Islamic Republic of
21 Iran 35 2 7.3 40 68.69 5.0
22 Republic of Iraq 26.78
Hashemite Kingdom of
23 Jordan 11 2 7 30 5.91 0.4
Republic of
24 Kazakhstan 19 15.23 2.9
25 State of Kuwait 2.42
26 Kyrgyz Republic 40 5.2 2.1
27 Republic of Lebanon 20 28 3.8 1.1
Great Socialist
People’s Libyan Arab
28 Jamahiriyah 7.4 5.9 0.4
29 Malaysia 15 2 9.3 8 24.39 2.3
62
Name of Member Income Poverty Index
Country Population Below
$2 a National
Human Poverty Index day Poverty Population
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Rank $1 a day (%) (%) Line In Millions No of Poor in Millions


30 Republic of Maldives 36 21 0.36 0.1
31 Republic of Mali 102 72.3 90.6 64 11.72 10.6
Islamic Republic of
32 Mauritania 81 25.9 63.1 40 3.18 2.0
33 Kingdom of Morocco 59 2 14.3 19 33.24 4.8
Republic of
34 Mozambique 94 37.8 78.4 70 19.69 15.4
35 Republic of Niger 99 60.6 85.8 63 12.53 10.8
36 Republic of Nigeria 76 70.8 92.4 60 131.5 121.5
37 Sultanate of Oman 3.1
Islamic Republic of
38 Pakistan 65 17 73.6 24 165.8 122.0
39 State of Palestine 8 45.7 3.8 1.7
40 State of Qatar 13 0.89
Kingdom of Saudi
41 Arabia 27.02
42 Republic of Senegal 84 22.3 63 54 11.99 7.6
Republic of Sierra
43 Leone 95 74.5 68 6.01 4.5
44 Republic of Somalia 8.86
45 Republic of Sudan 54 40 41.24 16.5
46 Republic of Suriname 23 70 0.44 0.3
63
Name of Member Income Poverty Index
Country Population Below
$2 a National
Human Poverty Index day Poverty Population
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Rank $1 a day (%) (%) Line In Millions No of Poor in Millions


47 Syrian Arab Republic 29 11 18.88 2.1
48 Republic of Tajikistan 64 7.32 4.7
49 Republic of Togo 72 32 5.55 1.8
50 Republic of Tunisia 39 2 6.6 7.4 10.18 0.7
51 Republic of Turkey 21 3.4 18.7 20 70.41 13.2
Republic of
52 Turkmenistan 58 5.04 2.9
53 Republic of Uganda 35 28.2 9.9
54 United Arab Emirates 34 2.6
55 Republic of Uzbekistan 28 27.31 7.6
56 Republic of Yemen 77 15.7 45.2 45.2 21.46 9.7
Notes:
1. HDI Ranks are based on UNDP Human Development Report for 120 developing countries;
2. Data on Income is extracted from SSERTC Database and refer to the most recent year available during 1990-2004
3. Data on Population and estimates of the percentage of the population falling below the national poverty line are extracted from
CIA Fact Book. Definitions of poverty vary considerably among nations. For example, rich nations generally employ more
generous standards of poverty than poor nations.
4. No of beneficiaries is estimated by multiplying the percentage of population below $2 a day with the population figures. Where
the former values are not present, percentage below national poverty lines are used.
64
Annexure II: Access to Financial Services in IsDB Member Countries

Serial # Name of Country Access Percentage Serial # Name of Country Access Percentage
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Islamic Republic of Islamic Republic of


1 32 16
Afghanistan Mauritania
2 Republic of Albania 34 33 Kingdom of Morocco 39
Democratic and Popular
3 31 34 Republic of Mozambique 12
Republic of Algeria
4 Azerbaijan Republic 17 35 Republic of Niger 31
5 Kingdom of Bahrain 36 Republic of Nigeria 15
People’s Republic of
6 32 37 Sultanate of Oman 33
Bangladesh
Islamic Republic of
7 Republic of Benin 32 38 12
Pakistan
8 Brunei Darussalam 39 State of Palestine 14
9 Burkina Faso 26 40 State of Qatar
10 Republic of Cameroon 24 41 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 62
11 Republic of Chad 42 Republic of Senegal 27
12 Union of Comoros 20 43 Republic of Sierra Leone 13
13 Republic of Côte d'Ivoire 25 44 Republic of Somalia
14 Republic of Djibouti 45 Republic of Sudan 15
15 Arab Republic of Egypt 41 46 Republic of Suriname 32
16 Republic of Gabon 39 47 Syrian Arab Republic 17
17 Republic of the Gambia 21 48 Republic of Tajikistan 16
65
18 Republic of Guinea 20 49 Republic of Togo 28
19 Republic of Guinea Bissau 50 Republic of Tunisia 42
20 Republic of Indonesia 40 51 Republic of Turkey 49
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21 Islamic Republic of Iran 31 52 Republic of Turkmenistan


22 Republic of Iraq 17 53 Republic of Uganda 20
Hashemite Kingdom of
23 37 54 United Arab Emirates
Jordan
24 Republic of Kazakhstan 48 55 Republic of Uzbekistan 16
25 State of Kuwait 56 Republic of Yemen 14
26 Kyrgyz Republic 01
27 Republic of Lebanon 79 1 India 48
Great Socialist People’s
28 27 2 Russia 69
Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah
29 Malaysia 57 3 Netherlands 100
30 Republic of Maldives 4 USA 91
31 Republic of Mali 22 5 UK 91
Adapted from: Patrick Honohan, Cross-Country Variations in Household Access to Financial Services, World Bank
Conference on Access to Finance, March 15-16, 2007
66
Annexure III: Regulatory Framework for MFIs and IFIs in IsDB Member Countries

Name of Member Country MFIs IFIs Status


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Islamic Republic of Law of Banking in Afghanistan Conventional MF through


Afghanistan Includes Regulations for Deposit-taking international donor
MFIs agencies;

Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and New experiment in Islamic


Development Coordinates Micro-Lending microfinance
by International Donors
No IFIs
Republic of Albania Law on the Bank of Albania 1997; Banking Conventional MF by banks
Law 1998; Regulation on the Licensing of and NGOs
the Financial Activity of the Non-banking
Institutions,1999 Regulation on No IFIs
Cooperative Banks 2000;
Law on Cooperative Associations 1996;
Law on Credit Savings Associations 2001;
Law for Not-for-profit Organizations 2001
Democratic and Popular Order 03-11 on Currency and Credit (OMC A few MF programs linked
Republic of Algeria 03-11) of the Currency and Credit Council to Government-run social
(CMC) service programs
Law Covers MF as Any Other Financing
Activity No IFIs
67
Name of Member Country MFIs IFIs Status
Azerbaijan Republic Law About the National Bank 1996; Law New experiment in Islamic
About Banks and Banking Activity 1996, finance
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1998, 1999
Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other No IFIs
Financing Activity
Kingdom of Bahrain Central Bank of Bahrain Rule Book; No Central Bank of A mature IFI sector
Specific Rules for MF Bahrain Rule Book
for Islamic Banks
People’s Republic of Bank Companies Act 1991; Prudential Banking Leader in micro finance
Bangladesh Regulations for Banks; Financial Regulations Cover sector with IFIs practicing
Institutions Act 1993; Cooperative IFIs MF
Societies Ordinance 1984 and Rules 1987;
Micro Credit Regulatory Authority Act
2006 and Rules 2007
Republic of Benin Law to Govern MFIs in Member Countries No IFIs
of West Africa Monetary Union (UMOA)
called the PARMEC Law 1997
Brunei Darussalam Banking Act 1995 Emergency
Finance Companies Act 1995 (Islamic Bank)
Pawn Brokers Act Order, 1992
Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other Emergency
Financing Activity (Islamic Trust
Fund), Order 1991
68
Name of Member Country MFIs IFIs Status
Burkina Faso Law to Govern MFIs in Member Countries No IFIs
of West Africa Monetary Union (UMOA)
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called the PARMEC Law 1997


Republic of Cameroon Microfinance regulations developed by the No IFIs
Commission Bancaire de l'Afrique Centrale
(COBAC) of the BEAC (Banque des Etats
de lAfrique Centrale) the Central Bank of
Central African Economic and Monetary
Community (CEMAC)
Republic of Chad Microfinance Regulations developed by the No IFIs
Commission Bancaire de l'Afrique Centrale
(COBAC) of the BEAC (Banque des Etats
de lAfrique Centrale) the Central Bank of
Central African Economic and Monetary
Community (CEMAC)
Union of Comoros Guidelines of the Central Bank, the Banque No IFIs
Centrale des Comores (BCC) Cover MF as
Any Other Financing Activity
Republic of Côte d'Ivoire Law to Govern MFIs in Member Countries No IFIs
of West Africa Monetary Union (UMOA)
called the PARMEC Law 1997
Republic of Djibouti Central Bank of Djibouti (BCD) No IFIs
Regulations Cover MF as Any Other
Financing Activity
69
Name of Member Country MFIs IFIs Status
Arab Republic of Egypt Law of the Central Bank, the Banking Banking
Sector and Money 2003; Regulation covers
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Executive Regulations of the Law of the IFIs; No IFI-


Central Bank, the Banking Sector and Specific Law
Money 2003
Law Covers MF as Any Other Financing
Activity
Republic of Gabon Microfinance Regulations developed by the No IFIs
Commission Bancaire de l'Afrique Centrale
(COBAC) of the BEAC (Banque des Etats
de lAfrique Centrale) the Central Bank of
Central African Economic and Monetary
Community (CEMAC)
Republic of the Gambia MF-Specific Rules and Guidelines by Banking New experiment in Islamic
Central Bank of Gambia Regulation covers finance
IFIs; No IFI-
Specific Law
Republic of Guinea The Central Bank of Guinea (BCRG) Banking New experiment in Islamic
Guidelines Cover MF as Any Other Regulation covers micro finance
Financing Activity IFIs; No IFI-
Specific Law
Republic of Guinea Bissau Law to Govern MFIs in Member Countries No IFIs
of West Africa Monetary Union (UMOA)
called the PARMEC Law 1997
70
Name of Member Country MFIs IFIs Status
Republic of Indonesia Banking Law 1992, 1998; Law Concerning Banking A Network of Islamic
Cooperatives 1992; Regulation Micro-Finance
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Law on Cooperatives 1967 Includes IFI- Institutions


Specific Laws and
Regulations

Mature IFI sector


Islamic Republic of Iran The Monetary and Banking Law of Iran, The Law for Usury Islamic Micro-Finance
1972; The Law for Usury (Interest) Free (Interest) Free Projects Governed by IFI-
Banking 1983 Banking 1983 specific Laws
Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other The Law for the
Financing Activity Issuance of
Participation
Papers 1997
Republic of Iraq Conflict Zone
No IFIs
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan Banking Law of 1999; Development and Banking Law Mature Islamic banking and
Employment Fund (DEF) is governed by Includes IFI- micro finance sectors;
Law No. 33, 1992; Specific National Microfinance
Other agencies are governed by their own Regulations Bank created in 2006
particular laws.
71
Name of Member Country MFIs IFIs Status
Republic of Kazakhstan Law on Banks and Banking Activity 2001; Banking New Islamic finance
Law on Microlending Organizations 2003 Regulation covers experiment
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IFIs; No IFI-
Specific Laws or
Regulations
State of Kuwait Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other Banking Law
Financing Activity Includes IFI-
Specific Laws and
Regulations
Kyrgyz Republic Law on Banks and Banking Activity; Law Banking New Islamic finance
On Microfinance Organizations 2002; Regulation covers experiment
Temporary Regulation on Activities of IFIs; No IFI-
Micro Credit Companies and Micro Credit Specific Laws or
Agencies; Law on Credit Unions Regulations
Republic of Lebanon Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other Banking Law Experiment in Islamic
Financing Activity Includes IFI- Micro-finance
Specific Laws and
Regulations
Great Socialist People’s Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other No IFIs
Libyan Arab Jamahiriyah Financing Activity
Malaysia Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other Islamic Banking Mature IFI sector
Financing Activity Act 1983, Takaful
Act 1984
72
Name of Member Country MFIs IFIs Status
Republic of Maldives Regulations for Banks and Financial No IFIs
Institutions 1981 Covers MF as Any Other
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Financing Activity
Republic of Mali Law to Govern MFIs in Member Countries Experiment in Islamic
of West Africa Monetary Union (UMOA) Micro-finance
called the PARMEC Law 1997
Islamic Republic of Central Bank of Mauritania (BCM) No IFIs
Mauritania Guidelines for MF
Kingdom of Morocco Law Regarding the Activities of Credit Banking New Experiment in Islamic
Establishments and their Control 1993; Regulation covers finance
Law Relating to Microfinance 1997 IFIs; No IFI-
Specific
Regulations
Republic of Mozambique Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other No IFIs
Financing Activity
Republic of Niger Law to Govern MFIs in Member Countries No IFIs
of West Africa Monetary Union (UMOA)
called the PARMEC Law 1997
73
Name of Member Country MFIs IFIs Status
Republic of Nigeria Central Bank of Nigeria Act 1991; Banks Banking New IF Experiment
and Other Financial Institutions Act 1991; Regulation covers
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Regulations for Community/ Micro Banks; IFIs; No IFI- New Micro finance Policy
Cooperative Societies Law 1973; Specific Framework for Micro-
Cooperative Societies Regulation; State Regulations finance Banks
Laws
Microfinance Policy Framework of CBN
Sultanate of Oman Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other No IFIs
Financing Activity
Islamic Republic of Pakistan Microfinance Institutions Ordinance 2001; Banking Mature IFI and MF sectors
Prudential Regulations for Microfinance Regulation with Islamic MF-
Banks/Institutions; Includes IFI- experiments
NGO/RSPs/Cooperatives-Transformation Specific Laws and
Guidelines Draft, 2005; Societies Regulations
Registration Act, 1860; Voluntary Social
Welfare Agencies Ordinance, 1961; Guidelines for
Companies Ordinance 1982 Islamic Banking
Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 Draft Guidelines
for Islamic
Microfinance
State of Palestine Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other Banking
Financing Activity Regulation
Includes IFI-
Specific Laws and
Regulations
74
Name of Member Country MFIs IFIs Status
State of Qatar Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other Banking
Financing Activity Regulations
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Include IFI-
Specific Provisions
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other Banking Control
Financing Activity Law

Banking
Regulations
Include IFI-
Specific Provisions
Republic of Senegal Law to Govern MFIs in Member Countries No IFIs
of West Africa Monetary Union (UMOA)
called the PARMEC Law 1997
Republic of Sierra Leone Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other No IFIs
Financing Activity
Republic of Somalia Conflict Zone
No IFIs
Republic of Sudan Banking Law Covers MF as Any Other Banking Mature Islamic banking and
Financing Activity Regulation covers micro-finance sectors
IFIs; No IFI-
Specific
Regulations
75
Name of Member Country MFIs IFIs Status
Republic of Suriname Bank Act 1956 Covers MF as Any Other No IFIs
Financing Activity
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Syrian Arab Republic Law to create MFIs introduced in 2007 Banking Experiment in both Islamic
Regulation covers banking and Islamic MF
IFIs; No IFI-
Specific
Regulations
Republic of Tajikistan Law on Banks and Banking Activities, No IFIs
1998; Law On the National Bank of
Tajikistan, 1996
Law On Microfinance Organizations, 2004
Republic of Togo Law to Govern MFIs in Member Countries No IFIs
of West Africa Monetary Union (UMOA)
called the PARMEC Law 1997
Republic of Tunisia Central Bank of Tunisia (BTS) Micro- Banking New experiment in Islamic
Credit Law 1992 Regulation covers banking
IFIs; No IFI-
Specific
Regulations
Republic of Turkey Banking Act 1999, 2003 and The Law on Banking New experiment in Islamic
The Central Bank of Turkey Covers MF as Regulation covers banking
Any Other Financing Activity IFIs; No IFI-
Specific
Regulations
76
Name of Member Country MFIs IFIs Status
Republic of Turkmenistan Presidential Decrees Absence of legal structure
No IFIs
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Republic of Uganda Financial Institutions Act 2004; Micro No IFIs


Finance Deposit-Taking Institutions (MDI)
Act 2003; Micro Finance Deposit-taking
Institutions (MDI) Regulations 2004
United Arab Emirates Banking Laws Covers MF as Any Other Federal Law Mature Islamic banking
Financing Activity Regarding Islamic sector
Banks, Financial
Institutions and
Investment
Companies 1985
Republic of Uzbekistan Presidential Decrees Absence of legal structure
No IFIs
Republic of Yemen Banking Law 1998 Covers MF as Any Banking Experiments in IF, MF and
Other Financing Activity Regulation covers Islamic MF
IFIs; No IFI-
Specific
Regulations
77

LIST OF BOXES

Box I. MDGs, Poverty Alleviation and MF 2


Box II: Instruments of Financing in Islamic Microfinance 21
Box III: Replicating Grameen Model in Muslim Societies 28
Box IV: Shariah Compliance with Spiritual Treatment 29
Box V: A Guarantee Product by Grameen-Jameel Initiative 37
Box VI: World’s First Micro-Credit Securitization 38
Box VII: Arab Microfinance Gateway by CGAP, Sanabel and 43
Grameen-Jameel Initiative
Box VIII: Microfinance Rating and Assessment Fund 45
Box IX: The DEEP Initiative 54-55

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAOIFI Accounting and Auditing Organization of Islamic Financial


Institution
ADB Asian Development Bank
AIM Amana Ikhtiar Malaysia
ASBISINDO Asosiasi Bank Syariah Indonesia
BI Bank Indonesia
BRAC Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee
BMT Baitul Maal wat Tamweel
BPRS Bank Perkreditan Rakyat Syriah
CIBAFI General Council of Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions
CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
CU Credit Union
DEEP Deprived Families Economic Empowerment Program
IIRA International Islamic Rating Agency
IsDB Islamic Development Bank
IFI Islamic Financial Institutions
IFSB Islamic Financial Services Board
IsMF Islamic Micofinance
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MFI Microfinance Institution
NBFI Non-Banking Financial Institution
SHG Self-Help Groups
SSB Shariah Supervisory Board
NGO Non Governmental Organization
ROSCA Rotating Savings and Credit Associations
UNDP United Nations Development Program

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78

GLOSSARY OF ARABIC TERMS

Word Definition
Akhuwat Brotherhood.
Al-rahn Collateral
Awqaf Plural of waqf. For meaning, see below.
Bait-ul-Maal Public treasury, Also used for a charitable institution meant
to help the poor and needy.
Bay mu’ajjal Sale on credit, i.e. a sale in which goods are delivered
immediately but payment is deferred.
Bay salam A sale in which payment is made in advance by the buyer
and the delivery of the goods is deferred by the seller.
Bay-bithaman- Another term used for bay mu’ajjal.
ajil
Bay-istijrar Recurring sale or purchase
Damanah Guarantee, security.
Darar Damage, harm, injury.
Fiqhi Refers to the whole corpus of Islamic jurisprudence. In
contrast with conventional law, fiqh covers all aspects of life,
religious, political, social, commercial or economic. The
whole corpus of fiqh is based primarily on interpretations of
the Qur’an and the sunnah and secondarily on ijma
(consensus) and ijtihad (individual judgement). While the
Qur’an and the sunnah are immutable, fiqhi verdicts may
change due to changing circumstances.
Gharar Literally, it means deception, danger, risk and uncertainty.
Technically it means exposing oneself to excessive risk and
danger in a business transaction as a result of uncertainty
about the price, the quality and the quantity of the counter-
value, the date of delivery, the ability of either the buyer or
the seller to fulfil his commitment, or ambiguity in the terms
of the deal; thereby, exposing either of the two parties to
unnecessary risks.
Hadith Sayings, deeds and endorsements of the Prophet Muhammad
(peace be upon him) narrated by his Companions.
Halal Things or activities permitted by the Shariah.

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79

Hiba Gift.
Ijarah Leasing. Sale of usufruct of an asset. The lessor retains the
ownership of the asset with all the rights and the
responsibilities that go with ownership.
Istijrar Same as Bai-Istijrar
Istisna Refers to a contract whereby a manufacturer (contractor)
agrees to produce (build) and deliver a well-described good
(or premise) at a given price on a given date in the future. As
against salam, in istisna the price need not be paid in
advance. It may be paid in instalments in step with the
preferences of the parties or partly at the front end and the
balance later on as agreed.
Jahl Ignorance, lack of knowledge. In contracts, it refers to lack
of information with respect to the subject of the contract or
the terms and conditions of the contract.
Kafalah A contract whereby a person accepts to guarantee or take
responsibility for a liability or duty of another person.
Mudarabah A contract between two parties, capital owner(s) or
financiers (called rabb al-mal) and an investment manager
(called mudarib). Profit is distributed between the two parties
in accordance with the ratio upon which they agree at the
time of the contract. Financial loss is borne only by the
financier(s). The entrepreneur’s loss lies in not getting any
reward for his services.
Mudarib An investment manager in a mudarabah contract.
Murabahah Sale at a specified profit margin. The term, however, is now
used to refer to a sale agreement whereby the seller
purchases the goods desired by the buyer and sells them at an
agreed marked-up price, the payment being settled within an
agreed time frame, either in instalments or in a lump sum.
The seller bears the risk for the goods until they have been
delivered to the buyer. Murabahah is also referred to as bay
mu’ajjal.

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80

Musharakah Partnership. A musharakah contract is similar to a


mudarabah contract, the difference being that in the former
both the partners participate in the management and the
provision of capital, and share in the profit and loss. Profits
are distributed between the partners in accordance with the
ratios initially set, whereas loss is distributed in proportion to
each one’s share in the capital.
Qard Hasan A loan extended without interest or any other compensation
from the borrower. The lender expects a reward only from
God.
Qur'an The Holy Book of Muslims, consisting of the revelations
made by God to the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon
him). The Qur’an lays down the fundamentals of the Islamic
faith, including beliefs and all aspects of the Islamic way of
life.
Rabb al-Mal Capital owner (financier) in a mudarabah contract.
Riba Literally, it means increase or addition or growth.
Technically it refers to the ‘premium’ that must be paid by
the borrower to the lender along with the principal amount as
a condition for the loan or an extension in its maturity.
Interest as commonly known today is regarded by a
predominant majority of fuqaha’ to be equivalent to riba.
Sadaqah An act of charity.
Salam The short form of bay al salam.
Shariah Refers to the corpus of Islamic law based on Divine guidance
as given by the Qur’an and the sunnah and embodies all
aspects of the Islamic faith, including beliefs and practices.
Tabarru Actions/contracts the purpose of which is not commercial but
is seeking the pleasure of Allah.
Takaful An alternative for the contemporary insurance contract. A
group of persons agree to share certain risk (for example,
damage by fire) by collecting a specified sum from each. In
case of loss to anyone of the group, the loss is met from the
collected funds.
Ujrat Fee, remuneration
Ulama Scholars.

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81

Wadiah A contract whereby a person leaves valuables with someone


for safekeeping. The keeper can charge a fee, even though in
Islamic culture it is encouraged to provide this service free of
charge or to recover only the costs of safekeeping without
any profit.
Wakalah Contract of agency. In this contract, one person appoints
someone else to perform a certain task on his behalf, usually
against a fixed fee.
Waqf Appropriation or tying up a property in perpetuity for
specific purposes. No property rights can be exercised over
the corpus. Only the usufruct is applied towards the
objectives (usually charitable) of the waqf.
Zakah The amount payable by a Muslim on his net worth as a part
of his religious obligations, mainly for the benefit of the poor
and the needy. It is an obligatory duty on every adult Muslim
who owns more than a threshold wealth.

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