tech leadership

Plan’s based on Chinese threat inflation – that becomes self-fulfilling,

makes war inevitable
Swaine ’22 [Michael; June 2; director of QI’s East Asia program, is one of the most
prominent American scholars of Chinese security studies, he comes to QI from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he worked for nearly twenty
years as a senior fellow specializing in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-
China relations, and East Asian international relations, senior policy analyst at the
RAND Corporation; “Threat Inflation and the Chinese Military,”
https://quincyinst.org/report/threat-inflation-and-the-chinese-military]
Threat inflation is a major problem in evaluating China’s military capabilities a nd
the military security-related intentions of China’s leadership. With some notable exceptions, U.S.
authoritative assessments (and especially nonauthoritative ones) often employ
inadequate, distorted, or incorrect evidence, use grossly hyperbolic language , display
sloppy or illogical thinking, or rely on broad-brush assertions that seem to derive more from narrow political,
ideological, or emotional impulses than from any objective search for truth.
Framing the military challenge Beijing poses in categorical and exceedingly alarmist,
worst-case ways removes the need to determine the limits of Chinese threats.
China becomes 10 feet tall, undeterred from wanting to destroy the United States except by a
massive U.S. counterforce. Such threat inflation also undermines those voices
within China that favor moderation, significantly raises the danger of Sino–
American crises and military conflict and diverts huge amounts of U.S. resources away from
desperately needed nonmilitary uses at home and abroad.
In such an environment, historical disputes over Taiwan, or maritime issues in the
South China Sea, become fundamental zero-sum strategic struggles requiring ever-
more forceful pushback. All this closes off opportunities for mutual accommodation
or policy moderation, which become labeled as appeasement or worse, and makes it virtually impossible for a U.S.
administration to speak publicly about the need, not just the possibility, for cooperating meaningfully with Beijing
on critical issues. In an inflated threat environment, other pressing national security concerns, such as climate
change, become secondary and in many cases are interpreted only in the context of a grand “great power
competition” between the U.S. and China.
Regardless of the prospects for improving or at least stabilizing the security relationship with China, the United
States is not going to build its way out of the current deepening military competition with China, nor develop a
successful long-term China strategy based on inflated threats. It will need to accept the logic of balance over
dominance in many areas, fashion credible strategies designed both to deter and reassure Beijing in both the
regional and global arenas, and strengthen its capacities at home. This will demand a fundamental reassessment
of current American policies in the light of realistic assessments of both threats and opportunities, real capacities,
and reasonable aspirations. It will also involve some risks. But the alternatives would generate far worse risks.

China’s rise is peaceful---their evidence is based upon mirror-imaging---

they only fear China’s military spending on AI because the US is spending
a ton on military AI. There’s no actual evidence that shows China is
aggressive---China’s military modernization is about parity not
dominance---that’s [Swaine].

Err negative on China:

a. History – China’s never started a war – the US by comparison regularly

bombs countries – that’s Mahbubani

b. Motive – China’s primary goal is status – Xi wants to be seen as a

peaceful, responsible great power – which means he avoids wars of choice
Andrew Scobell, 22 - Ph.D., distinguished fellow with the China program at the
U.S. Institute of Peace. “China Is Not Russia. Taiwan Is Not Ukraine.” 3/4,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/03/china-not-russia-taiwan-not-ukraine
Although China has also been active and assertive in the use of its armed forces
beyond its borders in recent years, Beijing has eschewed large-scale combat
operations. Around its periphery, China has engaged in provocations,
confrontations and even violent clashes. But China, unlike Russia, has refrained
from massive interventions, invasions or occupations of other countries since it
invaded Vietnam in 1979. China’s largest deployments of troops overseas in the
post-Cold War era have been on U.N. Peacekeeping missions. Whereas Russia has
more than 20 military installations beyond its borders, to date, China has only one
official military base on foreign soil — in Djibouti (established in 2017) — and a
handful of other facilities it does not formally acknowledge.
Of course, Beijing has a history of using its potent armed forces and muscular
coercive apparatus within China’s borders to repress vigorously peaceful
protesters, political dissidents and disaffected ethnic minority peoples. The
locations of these operations include Beijing, Tibet and Xinjiang, as well as Hong
Kong. China has also not hesitated to employ armed force and a wide array of
coercive instruments around its periphery. This includes building roads and
bunkers in remote frontier areas of the high Himalayas along its contested border
with India and constructing artificial islands and military installations in disputed
waters of the South China Sea. In recent years, China’s armed forces have also
engaged in deadly clashes and violent confrontations with Indian army units along
the disputed Line of Actual Control and harassed and rammed the fishing boats
and coast guard vessels of Vietnam, the Philippines and other countries.
Putin appears to relish projecting the image of a strongman who is routinely
willing to thumb his nose at the rest of the world. By contrast, Xi — at least to date
— has mainly sought to cultivate a statesmanlike image on the global stage. At
times he has given speeches attempting to cast China as a more responsible, less
meddlesome and values-free version of the United States. And Xi has invested a lot
of time and resources in promoting a set of high-profile international efforts
intended to demonstrate that China is a constructive and proactive great power.
Employing positive rhetoric touting “win-win” solutions and aspirations to build a
“community with a shared future for mankind,” China under Xi’s leadership has
launched ambitious efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank.

c. Capability is not intent – China’s investment in military capability is

defensive and it’s substantially less than what the US invests
Swaine ’22 [Michael; June 2; director of QI’s East Asia program, is one of the most
prominent American scholars of Chinese security studies, he comes to QI from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he worked for nearly twenty
years as a senior fellow specializing in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-
China relations, and East Asian international relations, senior policy analyst at the
RAND Corporation; “Threat Inflation and the Chinese Military,”
https://quincyinst.org/report/threat-inflation-and-the-chinese-military]
Each of these broad descriptions of Chinese military capabilities and their
application is hyperbolic and likely designed to alarm. Beijing’s supposed threats
to freedom of navigation are limited to portions of disputed seas near China, are
relevant only during wartime, and in peacetime involve differences between the legal stances regarding
the maritime transit rights of warships asserted by China and several other coastal nations, and those positions
taken by the U.S. and other nations.65
China’s militarization of the South China Sea involves the creation of air and naval defense
facilities on several recently formed artificial islands in the Spratly Islands group and increases in the number of
has been
Chinese coast guard, naval, and maritime militia vessels operating across a vast area. This
undertaken to protect China’s SLOCs and the approaches to China’s sensitive nuclear submarine
base on Hainan Island, and to support China’s disputed claims in the area, albeit sometimes in excessive and
The reference to the Chinese supposedly “targeting” countries
repressive ways.66
“throughout the Indo–Pacific” implies an aggressive intent that remains unclear. It
is true that Beijing has increasingly deployed weapons systems (primarily missile and naval) in the region that
could reach nearby countries. But the U.S. has also possessed the capability to “target”
the entire region for many years. Should the same aggressive intent be implied
in the case of the U.S. on the basis of such a fact?
d. Investment – China has an economic and political stake in maintaining
the current global order – the only thing that can reverse that is attempts
like the plan to contain Chinese power
Swaine ’22 [Michael; June 2; director of QI’s East Asia program, is one of the most
prominent American scholars of Chinese security studies, he comes to QI from
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where he worked for nearly twenty
years as a senior fellow specializing in Chinese defense and foreign policy, U.S.-
China relations, and East Asian international relations, senior policy analyst at the
RAND Corporation; “Threat Inflation and the Chinese Military,”
https://quincyinst.org/report/threat-inflation-and-the-chinese-military]
Although no one can predict with confidence what China’s ultimate strategic goals might be, there is again no
evidence of such a Chinese intention of regional (much less global) military
conquest, and little evidence that Taiwan is necessarily a vital and logical jumping-off
point for such an ambitious objective.124 The only factor that could cause Beijing to
conclude that it would be worth taking the enormous risks involved in goose-
stepping militarily across Asia (and possibly beyond) would be a clear U.S., Japanese, and
larger Western commitment to contain, weaken, and eventually destroy the PRC
regime and collapse China economically by controlling Asia and cutting off vital imports. Some
observers, such as Elbridge Colby, argue that China is likely to undertake such a Chinese drive for hegemony, and
that the only way to counter it is to create an Asian–wide, anti–China coalition with the clear ability to militarily
deter any such moves.125 But this is supposed to happen without causing the Chinese to fear that the coalition
arrayed against it wishes to weaken China and overthrow the PRC regime.
One of the most egregious examples of a threat-inflating yet also deeply erroneous and misleading,
nonauthoritative source on overall Chinese military strategy and intentions is a book, The Hundred-Year
Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower, by Michael Pillsbury, a former
Trump administration defense official and longtime China observer.126
This study, widely admired among some U.S. military officers, relies heavily on inaccurate and distorted
interpretations of Chinese sources to argue that China “developed a secret plan in the 1950s to surpass the
United States within 100 years, and that it has been systematically implementing that plan ever since.”127 In
truth, the book provides no verifiable evidence of such a plan, whether secret or public. To the contrary, the
author in places distorts (or misinterprets) the meaning of the Chinese sources he cites to make his argument.128
Another vastly more credible, yet still in some ways highly questionable, nonauthoritative source, written by the
current China director on the National Security Council, is The Long Game by Rush Doshi. This study, regarded by
some serving U.S. officials and others in Washington as the final word on Chinese security intentions, is far more
legitimate and well-researched than the Pillsbury book. It includes many useful and insightful, evidence-based
assessments about Chinese security perceptions and Beijing’s strategy for countering what it sees as U.S.
containment efforts.
Doshi argues that Beijing has been pursuing a systematic, staged, and well-integrated strategy to “displace
American order” both regionally and globally since at least the early 90s, moving from initial efforts to “blunt”
U.S. power, then “build” China’s own power, and finally to “expand” its own power both regionally and globally at
U.S. expense. While offering plentiful evidence for Beijing’s desire to reduce the capacity of the U.S. to contain
and subjugate China, the book provides few sources to substantiate the notion that these three stages of Chinese
foreign policy exist as a coherent, systematic strategy, and even less that the Chinese leadership has committed
itself as a necessity to replacing the U.S. as a global military, political, and economic hegemon.129
The book relies heavily on the nonauthoritative comments of a small number of Chinese scholars,130 and a shaky
interpretation of the meaning of Chinese leadership phrases such as “great changes unseen in a century” to
support that point.131 Equally important, it fails to provide clear evidence in Chinese statements of an intention
for China to become “the” leading global power, as opposed to “a” leading global power.132
In fact, some scholars who have closely examined many Chinese sources on China’s
desired role in the global order stress that the language used indeed reflects a
Chinese interest in playing “a” leading role in reforming current arrangements,
not displacing them.133
None of the above proves that Chinese leaders do not seek to replace the U.S. as a regional or
global military hegemon. But it does show that perhaps the most influential studies purporting
to conclusively establish such a goal as a long-term Chinese plan in fact do no
such thing in any conclusive and convincing manner. Hence, assuming such a vital Chinese goal
in formulating U.S. policy toward China is inadvisable and potentially dangerous.

China’s rise is motivated by status---misdiagnosing them as an inherently

revisionist state in need of containment makes them more aggressive and
causes war.
Murray 19, Associate Professor of Political Studies; Director of Global Initiatives
@ Bard College. PhD in International Relations @ University of Chicago (Michelle,
The Struggle for Recognition in International Relations: Status, Revisionism, and
Rising Powers, Oxford University Press, pp. 207-215)
Identity, Insecurity, and China’s Place in the World
China’s view of, and future place in, the international order are importantly
connected to its experiences during the Century of Humiliation and the dual
concepts of national humiliation and national rejuvenation that constitute its self-
understanding. The Century of Humiliation began with the first Opium War in
1839, when Britain forced China to open its ports to the opium trade, and did not
end until the success of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in the civil war of
1949. During this time, China was the target of repeated international
interventions, lost large pieces of its territory to Western powers and Japan, saw
the collapse of its millennia old imperial system, and was torn apart by internal
uprisings.44 According to the national humiliation narrative, the first Opium War
represents a distinct turning point in Chinese history, when a powerful and
successful ancient civilization was forced into a semi-colonial position at the hands
of foreign interventions. National humiliation is an active part of contemporary
Chinese collective identity. It serves as an important resource for those cultivating
Chinese nationalism, unifying the Chinese people against foreign others who
perpetrated these past humiliations and legitimating the CCP, the party seen as
leading China’s reemergence as a major power.
The Century of Humiliation, however, is not just about recounting a particular
interpretation of the past. Rather, it actively informs beliefs about how the world
works and is used to interpret the dynamics of international relations today.45
Specifically, the national humiliation narrative constructs China’s self-
understanding and its place in the international system, shaping its interests and
aspirations as a rising power. First, the narrative of national humiliation
represents China as a victim of Western subjugation. When articulated in the
context of current international relations, this representation works to breed
suspicion of outside actors, including the United States, and gives an emotional
valence to seemingly inconsequential interactions. For example, in 2001 a US spy
plane collided with a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea, sparking an
international incident and inflaming tensions between China and the United States.
As the incident played itself out, it became apparent that “resolving this problem
did not involve military retaliation or economic reparations so much as symbolic
recognition: China demanded a public apology from the United States.”46 Thus,
understood through the prism of national humiliation, interactions with the West
are always contextualized in a history where China suffered humiliating losses at
the hands of Western expansion, and where Western power is, in and of itself, the
instrument of that subjugation.
Second, the narrative of national humiliation constructs Chinese understandings of
its military power and that of the United States by imposing a moral subtext to
power politics. Building from its treatment during the Century of Humiliation, the
international community’s actions toward China are viewed as unjust , reinforcing
suspicion of foreign powers’ intentions.47 Within this frame, a self–Other dynamic
is created, whereby Chinese history is reimagined as one of benevolent hegemony,
when China governed and projected its influence in peaceful ways. This is
positioned in contrast to the use of force and coercion common to Western
hegemony. Today these self–Other representations guide Chinese understandings
about the purpose and meaning of Chinese and American power. In China’s eyes,
its burgeoning military power is consistent with its history and thus is not
threatening. These representations are at work in Chinese rhetoric that
characterizes its growing power as its “peaceful rise.” As Zheng Bijan argued,
China’s rise will be different than that of previous major powers, as “China will
transcend ideological differences to strive for peace, development, and cooperation
with all countries of the world.”48 At the same time, US foreign policy is
contextualized within this narrative by reference to Western aggression during the
Century of Humiliation. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has more
forcefully criticized China’s human rights record, undermined its bid to host the
2000 Olympics, increased arms sales to Taiwan, and strengthened its presence in
the region.49 While US foreign policy has been couched in the language of
engagement, many in China view this as a simple euphemism for containment.50
This is especially the case with the Obama administration’s recent “strategic
rebalancing,” known popularly as the “pivot to Asia.” As a consequence, any
attempt by the United States to contain or limit Chinese power is seen as an act of
misrecognition and an unjust and aggressive attempt to subjugate China once
again.
Finally, the narrative of national humiliation highlights China’s “historical
experience with territorial loss and intrusion,” thus placing the maintenance of
sovereignty at the center of China’s national identity.51 The Century of
Humiliation is understood to be representative of a loss of sovereignty, where
outside forces were able to expose the state’s weakness and delegitimize its
institutions. Therefore, any perceived infringement of China’s sovereignty is read
through the lens of national humiliation and understood to be an existential
threat to China’s security. Importantly, these threats are not material in nature,
for China’s physical security is not in doubt. Rather, they represent a symbolic
threat, suggesting that China continues to be vulnerable to outside influence.
Moreover, sovereignty is the cornerstone of the current international order. Thus
any perceived violation of sovereignty is understood to be another subjugation of
China, refusing it the rights and privileges that other states in the system enjoy.
This narrative of national humiliation operates alongside the goal of national
rejuvenation, which provides the motivation for China’s contemporary foreign
policy interests. If national humiliation recounts the losses China suffered at the
hands of the West and Japan, national rejuvenation promises to restore for China
the status it lost during the Century of Humiliation. In articulating China’s self-
understanding in these terms, China’s major power status is understood as a right:
respect that China should regain by virtue of its former status as a great nation.52
Thus, China’s rise to major power status is not about obtaining something new or a
gaining an advantage over others, but rather as a “restoration of fairness.”53
These discourses of humiliation and rejuvenation infuse Chinese foreign policy,
shaping a range of behaviors from its voting record in the United Nations Security
Council to its regional relationships to its burgeoning leadership role in the global
economy.
Constructing China’s (Un)Peaceful Rise
China’s rise, guided by the twin narratives of national humiliation and
rejuvenation, is likely inevitable. What this means for the international order will
be a function of China’s interactions with the United States and the
representations that animate that relationship. US foreign policy toward a rising
China is often cast as a choice between engagement and containment. So-called
“optimists” call for increased engagement by integrating China deeply into the
global economy and institutional architecture of the international order, whereas
“pessimists” see future security competition as an inevitable outgrowth of Chinese
power and advocate a policy of containment.54 Both containment and engagement
strategies, however, are built off of assumptions about China’s material needs and
do not pay sufficient attention to China’s distinct identity needs. Thus, both
approaches risk exacerbating China’s dilemma of social insecurity, and
constructing China’s unpeaceful rise.
Proponents of containment do not have a sanguine view of China’s rise and argue
that as China grows more powerful it is likely to lead to an intense security
competition with the United States.55 Containment is a straightforward
application of realist understandings of international politics, and presumes that
under all conditions China will seek to overturn the international order and thus its
power must be preemptively checked. China is motivated, as are all emerging
major powers, by security and the related desire for power. In this view, the
anarchic structure of international system forces states seeking only security to
behave aggressively toward one another in an attempt to gain more power and
alter the international status quo. Rising powers are revisionist powers.56 China’s
economic power and influence will be the springboard for military dominance in
the region because economic power is the basis of military power. China is
building a blue-water navy that will allow it to project naval power well beyond the
Chinese coast “from the oil ports of the Middle East to the shipping lanes of the
Pacific, where the United States Navy has long reigned as the dominant force.”57
Moreover, China’s integration in regional politics is indicative of its growing
influence. As it becomes less susceptible to American economic pressure, China
will have increasing leverage over weaker Asian countries and the United
States.58 In short, while China is not in a position to militarily challenge the
United States at the present, a much more powerful China should be expected to
take increasing steps to push the United States out of the Asia–Pacific region and
challenge the terms of the US-led international order.59 Therefore, US foreign
policy must be reoriented to contain the impending threat that China poses to the
United States’ security and economic interests.
Containment, however, is based on the faulty assumption that China harbors
revisionist intentions. It is not an impartial assessment of actual Chinese
objectives and therefore runs a real risk of producing a self-fulfilling
prophecy.60 The more militarily aggressively the United States behaves, the more
threatened China will feel and thus the more likely it will be to respond
aggressively to the United States. A potentially severe security dilemma is
almost certain to emerge and intensify through a containment strategy, therefore
reproducing international relations’ fraught history with power transitions.
Moreover, containment is a deterrent strategy, designed to raise the costs of
Chinese expansionism and in doing so to limit Chinese power. Deterrent strategies
assume that revisionist intentions emerge within states—not from their
interactions with other states, and thus ignore China’s recognition-needs. But,
as the struggle for recognition highlights, treating a socially insecure state as if
it were greedy will only exacerbate its insecurity, fuel its interest in
revisionism, and construct China’s unpeaceful rise.

China-led LIO good. Pax Sinica solves waves of secessionist conflict

Griffiths ’16 [Ryan; 2016; Senior Lecturer, University of Sydney, PhD Columbia;
Security Studies, “States, Nations, and Territorial Stability: Why Chinese
Hegemony Would Be Better for International Order,” Volume 25, Issue 3]
How would a future period of Chinese hegemony compare with the current international order or orders of the
Chinese hegemony would privilege territorial integrity at the
past? I have argued that
expense of self-determination. The result would be an international order that would resemble earlier
periods in some ways and be unique in others. Sovereign norms would once again be dominant and liberal norms
would be subordinated to the right of states. One result of this shift would be a decline, if not disappearance, in
since a Chinese hegemon is likely to hold on to the
nonconsensual secession. However,
territorial integrity norm, conquest would also remain rare. The overall result
would be a surprisingly stable international order, a Pax Sinica. To consider this
argument it is useful to place this Pax Sinica in historical perspective (See Table 1). Given its emphasis on
sovereignty and its internal fragmentary pressures, China would shift the normative balance to a point where
secession is only legal in the presence of sovereign consent. Importantly, that move would jettison the constitutive
process of statehood, since self-determination would be elevated to a positive right only in the presence of
consent. The difficult decision of choosing who counts would be simplified by effectively allocating that choice to
sovereign states. Not unlike the pre-Napoleonic era, sovereignty would prevail and the arc of history would bend
back toward the right of states. Importantly, this would not simply be a return to the 1800s. The politics of
recognition in the 19th century possessed a liberal undercurrent and, as Fabry argues, the United States and UK
would often disregard the sovereignty of states when recognizing breakaway regions that had prevailed over their
Chinese hegemony would resemble the 18th century more
central governments. In truth,
than the 19th, when states hewed closely to the sovereign principle that
recognition should only be given in cases of consent. The notion that minority nations should
be able to self-determine, that individuals selecting into a group should have rights, was not yet on the map. The
The Pax
liberal tradition was only just emerging and the sovereign tradition was relatively unchallenged.
Sinica would bear those same conservative features. However, Chinese hegemony
would also bear modern features. The main difference is the very conception of sovereignty and the
corollary development of the norm of territorial integrity. Should the norm of territorial integrity
be supported by a Chinese power, state death would remain a rare occurrence .
Unlike the 18th and 19th centuries where the number of states was gradually reduced through conquest and
Thus
accession, very few states would exit the system unless they voluntarily chose to unify with other states.
the Pax Sinica would be rather stable. The number of states may gradually increase, but it
would be limited to those cases where the sovereign gave its consent—that is, controlled proliferation. This
anticipated focus on territorial stability under Chinese hegemony is consistent with both contemporary and
The Confucian emphasis on a strong and stable state is echoed
historical political doctrine.
in recent political slogans like “Stability and Harmony.” There are conservative,
statist overtones in China's policies without any commensurate emphasis on liberal
norms. Unlike the United States, Chinese exceptionalism does not promote
a set of universal values in its foreign policy. Meanwhile, recent scholarship has
looked into the past to examine what previous periods of Chinese regional
dominance say about patterns in international order. One common finding is that
imperial China tended to emphasize patterns of informal rule where other polities
remained sovereign, yet informally subordinate. Indeed, David C. Kang finds that the China-
centered international order that existed in East Asia from the 14th to the 19th
centuries—the so-called Tribute System—was characterized by stable borders and
infrequent wars of conquest, at least where recognized political units like Vietnam and Korea were
concerned. The hegemon showed little tolerance for unrecognized, tribal, and/or institutionally dissimilar groups,
especially on the western and northern frontiers. Of course, past behavior is not a perfect indicator of future
performance, but that approach to international order privileges recognized states and emphasizes the sovereign
territorial grid in a manner where the hegemon can exert power and influence without formal conquest.
Essentially, there is continuity between China's imperial past and what this paper predicts for the future should it
become a hegemon. I began the article by claiming that the Pax Sinica would be better for international order. In
making this claim I define “better” in narrow terms emphasizing territorial stability, which can be assessed in
several ways. How often do either external aggressors or internal separatists shift sovereign borders through
violence? What is the frequency of secessionist civil war? How much international discord is there on the topic of
secession and recognition? This is the ledger I use when comparing the Pax Sinica with the post-1945 American-
led order. There are many other factors, to be sure, and critics might point to a number of ways in which Chinese
hegemony would be worse. For example, they may question the support for human rights under Chinese
I do not argue that Chinese hegemony would be better in all ways—there
leadership.
are pros and cons to any order—but I contend that there are net benefits where
territorial stability is concerned. Analyzed under these terms the key differences
between the American order and the imagined Chinese order have to do
with the politics of secession and sovereign recognition. International order
matters because it determines diplomatic practices and shapes behavior. It sets
the rules of the game. The American-led order over the last seventy years has
attempted to balance the norms of territorial integrity and self-determination by
establishing rules for what nations are eligible for independence. But, as Fabry notes, that is an enormously
challenging project because developing clear rules that separate the lucky from the unlucky requires that states
derive agreed-upon criteria in a constitutive process. Given the politics and conflicting principles of international
life (and the evolving nature of normative arguments), inconsistency, ambiguity, and accusations of hypocrisy are
The resulting political space creates uncertainty for states and nationalist
unavoidable.
movements over when self-determination applies and when it should be
subordinated to territorial integrity. Incidents like the Ukrainian crisis cast a
shadow over separatist crises elsewhere. The leadership in Azerbaijan detects double standards in
American policy, wondering why it “punishes Russia for annexing Crimea, but not Armenia for similar behavior in
Karabakh.” Such uncertainly can makes states feel vulnerable, as it has in Azerbaijan, change the incentives for
Secessionist civil war is a common feature
key actors, and increase the chance of conflict.
of contemporary times. Scholars estimate that at least half of the civil wars since 1945
have involved secessionism, and Barbara F. Walter argues that secessionism is the chief source of
violence in the world today. Erica Chenowith and Maria Stephan find that secessionism is one of the few (if only)
forms of political protest where violent tactics are more effective than nonviolent. Meanwhile, Tanisha Fazal and I
identify fifty-five secessionist movements as of 2011 and record that many of these movements feel they have a
reasonable chance of gaining independence in light of the somewhat flexible practices surrounding recognition.
Given the strategic environment in which secessionists operate, where violence
can be effective and where sovereignty is thought to be obtainable, it should come
as no surprise that conflict is common. In regard to territorial stability, the concern of contemporary
times is not traditional territorial conquest, but the threat posed by state fragmentation. This is where
Chinese hegemony ought to improve international order. That is not to say
secessionist conflict would completely disappear during the Pax Sinica. Some committed groups may fight the
state because they hope to pressure the government into giving concessions ranging from full sovereign
recognition to lesser forms of local autonomy to increased political participation. Some disillusioned groups may
even redirect secessionist efforts toward regime change. Many of the causes of civil war would remain. The
difference is that secessionists would no longer perceive that they could bypass the central government and
convince the international community that they meet one of the criteria for recognition. This possibility has very
real implications. For example, a secessionist conflict on the island of Bougainville during the 1990s resulted in
the deaths of an estimated twenty thousand people (ten percent of the population). During that period the
secessionist leadership networked with other secessionist movements like the East Timorese and explored
different ways to secure international recognition that would circumvent the government of Papua New Guinea
(PNG). They first highlighted their imperial/administrative history, trying to make the case that they were eligible
for independence via the rules surrounding decolonization. When that failed they mounted a publicity campaign
that aimed to win international sympathy, especially in Australia, by documenting civilian casualties. That
campaign, and the international pressure it brought to bear on the PNG government, helped Bougainville to win a
 Although
peace agreement in 2001 that promised autonomy and a future referendum on independence.
every conflict has a local dimension, the strategies and tactics employed, and the
very willingness of groups to continue fighting, are shaped by the possibilities
inherent in the international recognition regime. Relative to a consent-based order,
the current constitutive regime creates incentives to challenge the state in ways
that can yield both wanted and unwanted violence. One could argue that I undervalue the
merits of flexibility and ambiguousness, and that from a design perspective the ideal international recognition
regime ought to temper a clear set of rules with a degree of latitude to cover exceptional cases. After all, every
independence movement is unique in its own way and it will be difficult if not impossible to develop a decision rule
that is fair to all. I concede that the ideal regime would balance clarity with flexibility, but the contemporary
regime does not meet this ideal. The current order is not the design of some normative architect, but the product
of the push and pull of politics and diplomacy. Ultimate recognition is not bestowed by some overarching legal
body; it rests in the hands of individual sovereign states with diverse interests. The Chinese order I forecast
is far from ideal, but it has advantages over the current order. By necessity this is a somewhat
conjectural argument because gross comparisons of international orders, especially orders in the future, do not
permit tight counterfactual analysis. In that sense, mine is a thought experiment not unlike Fabry's comparison
between a recognition regime based on de facto statehood and one built on a constitutive process. I advance a
plausible argument by highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of different international orders, and argue for
A strengthening of the
the superiority of one over the other given a specified ledger of comparison.
territorial integrity norm, and a clear, unambiguous set of rules that removes the
constitutive process of recognition, and permits independence only in cases of
sovereign consent, would make for a better international order.

Secessionism goes global and nuclear.

Fearon ‘4 [James; 2004; Department of Political Science at Stanford; “Separatist
Wars, Partition, and World Order,” https://web.stanford.edu/group/fearon-
research/cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Separatist-Wars-Partition-
and-World-Order.pdf]
Civil wars of separatist nationalism raged around the globe in the 1990s, in the
Balkans, India, Russia, Azerbaijan, Sudan, Indonesia, Britain (Northern Ireland), Turkey,
Georgia, the Philippines, and Burma, to name only some of the more prominent examples. These
wars have caused considerable loss of life, massive refugee crises, economic
devastation, significant strains on great power relations and important international
institutions like NATO and the United Nations, and a significant risk of nuclear war in South
Asia. What should be done? Thus far, the western powers’ approach has been ad hoc, with
little public discussion of the broader implications of particular cases and the
problems for the international system posed by separatist nationalism.1 At least five
sorts of ad hoc responses can be identified: 1. The imposition of weak international protectorates by stronger
states through international organizations, as at Dayton, over Kosovo, Northern Iraq, and, earlier, Cyprus. 2.
Disapproval but little or no direct action, either due to lack of interest (Kurds in Turkey, Tamils in Sri Lanka,
Southerners in Sudan, Tuaregs in Mali, and many other such cases) or due to the power of the states involved
(Russia/Chechnya, China/Tibet, India/Kashmir). 3. Weak international attempts to facilitate partition when this is
by mutual consent of some sort (East Timor, Eritrea, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the West Bank in a halting
way). 4. Stable cease-fires and de facto partitions, as in Nagorno-Karabagh and Somaliland. 5. Some efforts to
help negotiate power-sharing agreements, as in Northern Ireland and Angola (the latter with a largely ethnic but
not separatist war). That international responses to wars of separatist nationalism have been ad hoc is not
surprising. International relations is the realm of the ad hoc, and even if it were possible it is hard to imagine a
general, one-size-fits-all approach that would make sense. But the lack of discussion about the broader
implications of different possible policies in particular cases is surprising. Here is a possible explanation. For the
western powers, separatist nationalism is so perplexing and fundamental a problem that it has to be ignored as a
general phenomenon. The problem is that the overwhelmingly accepted diagnosis of the cause of separatist
nationalism implies a policy remedy no major power can stomach. In brief, the standard diagnosis is Wilsonianism,
the theory that separatist nationalism stems from bad borders and incompatible cultures. Wilsonianism holds that
violent separatism arises when state borders are not properly aligned with national groups, which are fixed,
preexisting entities. Separatism is due to the injustice of depriving proper nations of proper states. If one accepts
this, then the remedy for nationalist wars is obvious. Just redraw the borders. Impose partitions. And indeed
with each nationalist war foreign policy analysts in the U.S. and elsewhere have called for
partition as the obvious and proper solution.2 In the wake of the intense killing and brutality in Bosnia and
Kosovo, partition has often seemed, reasonably, “inevitable.” Even if these people lived together once, analysts
say, how can they live together now? If one accepts the general diagnosis, the argument for partition seems
inescapably strong. So why not do it? Why aren’t the major powers leaping on partition as the obvious solution,
rather than setting up costly and ineffectual protectorates? Are there any good reasons to oppose partition, or are
the western powers just misguided, cowardly, or transfixed by a naive and dangerous commitment to
multiculturalism (Mearsheimer and Van Evera 1995; Mearsheimer and Pape 1993)? I argue in this paper that
there are indeed good reasons to be skeptical of partition as a general solution to nationalist wars. The most
ad hoc partition applied
important of these, and the least explored, are two types of incentive effects. First,
may help produce more violent separatist nationalist movements
to one trouble spot
elsewhere, in addition to making existing nationalist wars more difficult to resolve .
The Wilsonian diagnosis is wrong. The world is not composed of a fixed number of true nations, so that peace can
be had by properly sorting them into states. Rather, there is literally no end of cultural difference in the world
suitable for politicization in the form of nationalist insurgencies. As long as controlling a recognized state
apparatus is a desirable thing and “nationhood” is understood to ground claims to a state, ambitious individuals
will try to put together nationalist movements to claim statehood. A (de facto) policy of partition that says, in
effect, “You may get a state if you can get a bloody enough nationalist insurgency going” provides the wrong
incentives. The more general point is that whether partition is good idea depends in part on one’s theory of what
causes separatist nationalism. I will argue that the dominant theory of Wilsonianism is misleading, and implies ad
hoc “solutions” that states are right to shy away from.

China mulitaleralism is based on mutually beneficial cooperation, instead

of coercion. Ensures long-term sustainability.
Zhimin Chen 17, School of International Relations and Public Affairs, Fudan
University, “Facilitative Leadership and China’s New Role in the World,” Chinese
Political Science Review, 3.1, 10-27
Facilitative international leadership emphasizes that key actors should lead
collectively in a cooperative way. In the past, there were cases when one country
led a country bloc. For example, during the Cold War, the two superpowers had dominance in their blocs, respectively.
After the end of the Cold War, the US and its allies regarded the world as a unipolar system and could pursue a US-centric
However, US international leadership is losing its power base in
international leadership.
politics and economy as well as its legitimacy. The world needs cooperative
leadership. The G20 is a new institution that contrasts to unilateral leadership. Facilitative leadership
demands plural leaders and tries to have collective leadership. With the rise of the emerging
countries, the international system is becoming multipolarized or de-centered to such an extent that any attempt to restore
unilateral leadership will be dampened, and stronger collective leadership will be demanded to address the risks and challenges in
this transitional period. As a signatory state of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), China has made substantial contributions to
nuclear non-proliferation and to dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue along with other major powers such as the US, Russia and
Germany (Pang 2012, 210). In global economic governance, faced with economic stagnation, rising protectionism, and a wider gap
between rich and poor, China has promoted inclusive development through the G20 summit in Hangzhou in 2016.
Facilitative leadership is win–win leadership to promote common goals of the
international community. In the past, international leadership usually served the
leader’s own national interest, especially its pursuit of power. Even when a country
tries to get recognition as leader by providing international public goods, this
leadership is still a solipsistic leadership if the country’s purpose is to establish its
powerful status. This kind of solipsistic leadership’s sustainability and
legitimacy remain uncertain. Unlike solipsistic leadership, win–win
leadership is more sustainable and legitimate, which can assist other
countries’ development. Chinese President Xi Jinping said at his speech when he visited the Parliament of
Mongolia in 2014 that ‘‘you can take a ride on our express train or just make a hitchhike, all are welcome’’ and ‘‘we will never do
things that could result in ‘one wins and the other loses’ or ‘one wins more and the other gets less’. We will take into consideration
the other side’s interests in some specific projects’’.8 Under the facilitative leadership, the establishment of a leader is based on
In an ideal situation, the
the promotion of the win–win development of the leading country and all other countries.
leader will also update international norms and each and every country’s interest.
For example, the ideas of ‘‘a community of common destiny’’ and ‘‘inclusive
growth’’ proposed by China focus on a higher level of cooperation to achieve win–
win development. Facilitative leadership mainly uses attraction to influence and
lead. Economic attraction constitutes the main source of China’s global attraction .
China can use its enormous domestic market to provide opportunities for others’ exports and investment via mutually beneficial
cooperation. It can also use China’s capital and technology to help others develop and, at the same time, promote its own
development. Based on this idea, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been welcomed by more and more countries, which
shows China’s economic attractive leadership. China should also pay attention to its institutional leadership. In the past few years,
China has helped to establish the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, both of them having their
headquarters in China. It has played a key role in the Paris agreement on climate change and the UN 2030 Sustainable
Development Agenda. China has sent most military personnel to UN peacekeeping as a permanent member of UN Security
Council, and is the third largest financial contributor to the UN regular budget and the second largest donor to the UN peace-
keeping budget. Being actively involved in these institutions can strengthen China’s institutional leadership in international
affairs. In addition, China should be an important leader in providing solutions. In the G20 China Summit and International
Economic Forum in Davos, China has demonstrated that it could and does want to assume that role. As for leadership
style, China should be an empowering leader, not a hierarchical patronal leader. A
hierarchical patronal leader not only establishes new common goals for the others,
but also believes that they have the solutions to all problems. In the post-Cold War period,
western countries claimed that domestic problems could be easily solved by
adopting the western economic and political system. When such a system is not
working, western countries propose global governance to replace national
governance. In the 21st century, western interventions have brought chaos to a
number of developing countries. The results prove that a hierarchical
patronal leadership cannot really solve the problems. China should be an empowering
leader and recognize the differences among countries. A foreign country cannot impose its solutions
onto other countries, and should respect the primary role of other countries in
managing their own problems. Therefore, an empowering leader respects others’
sovereignty, supports capability building in other countries and helps other
countries to develop problem-solving solutions of their own. Through empowering and providing
support, such a facilitative leadership will be much easier for others to accept. Facilitative international
leadership needs legitimacy to ensure its effectiveness. A legitimate leader should
have more or less voluntary endorsement from others. A country that aspires to
lead will lose legitimacy if it only forces others to follow , since this kind of
followership is forced, and does not represent a willing choice. Once the
coercion is weakened, the coercive leadership can neither sustain nor
achieve its goals.
That’s necessary to solve a litany of global problems.
Shen Yamei 18, Deputy Director and Associate Research Fellow of Department for
American Studies, China Institute of International Studies, 1-9-2018, "Probing into
the “Chinese Solution” for the Transformation of Global Governance," CAIFC,
http://www.caifc.org.cn/en/content.aspx?id=4491
As the world is in a period of great development, transformation and adjustment,
the international power comparison is undergoing profound changes, global
governance is reshuffling and traditional governance concepts and models are
confronted with challenges. The international community is expecting China to
play a bigger role in global governance, which has given birth to the Chinese
solution. A. To Lead the Transformation of the Global Governance System. The “shortcomings” of the existing
global governance system are prominent, which can hardly ensure global
development. First, the traditional dominant forces are seriously
imbalanced. The US and Europe that used to dominate the global governance system have been beset with
structural problems, with their economic development stalling, social contradictions intensifying, populism and secessionism rising, and states trapped in
internal strife and differentiation. These countries have not fully reformed and adjusted themselves

well, but rather pointed their fingers at globalization and resorted to retreat for
self-insurance or were busy with their own affairs without any wish or ability to
participate in global governance, which has encouraged the growth of “anti-
globalization” trend into an interference factor to global governance . Second, the
global governance mechanism is relatively lagging behind. Over the years of
development, the strength of emerging economies has increased dramatically,
which has substantially upset the international power structure, as the developing
countries as a whole have made 80 percent of the contributions to global economic
growth. These countries have expressed their appeal for new governance and
begun policy coordination among themselves, which has initiated the transition of global governance form “Western governance”
to “East-West joint governance”, but the traditional governance mechanisms such as the World

Bank, IMF and G7 failed to reflect the demand of the new pattern, in
addition to their lack of representation and inclusiveness. Third, the global
governance rules are developing in a fragmented way, with governance deficits
existing in some key areas. With the diversification and in-depth integration of international interests, the domain of global governance has continued
to expand, with actors multiplying by folds and action intentions becoming complicated. As relevant efforts are usually temporary

and limited to specific partners or issues, global governance driven by requests of

“diversified governance” lacks systematic and comprehensive solutions. Since the
beginning of this year, there have been risks of running into an acephalous state in
such key areas as global economic governance and climate change. Such
emerging issues as nuclear security and international terrorism have
suffered injustice because of power politics. The governance areas in
deficit, such as cyber security, polar region and oceans, have “reversely
forced” certain countries and organizations to respond hastily . All of these
have made the global governance system trapped in a dilemma and call urgently
for a clear direction of advancement. B. To Innovate and Perfect the International Order. Currently, whether the developing countries or
the Western countries of Europe and the US are greatly discontent with the existing international order as well as their appeals and motivation for changing the order are
unprecedentedly strong. The US is the major creator and beneficiary of the existing hegemonic order, but it is now doubtful that it has gained much less than lost from the existing

order, faced with the difficulties of global economic transformation and obsessed with economic despair and political dejection. Although the developing
countries as represented by China acknowledge the positive role played by the
post-war international order in safeguarding peace, boosting prosperity and
promoting globalization, they criticize the existing order for lack of inclusiveness in
politics and equality in economy, as well as double standard in security, believing it
has failed to reflect the multi-polarization trend of the world and is an exclusive
“circle club”. Therefore, there is much room for improvement. For China, to lead the transformation of the global
governance system and international order not only supports the efforts of the
developing countries to uphold multilateralism rather than unilateralism, advocate
the rule of law rather than the law of the jungle and practice democracy rather
than power politics in international relations, but also is an important subject
concerning whether China could gain the discourse power and development space
corresponding to its own strength and interests in the process of innovating and
perfecting the framework of international order. C. To Promote Integration of the Eastern and Western Civilizations. Dialog
among civilizations, which is the popular foundation for any country’s diplomatic proposals, runs like a trickle moistening things silently. Nevertheless, in the existing

international system guided by the “Western-Centrism”, the Western civilization

has always had the self-righteous superiority, conflicting with the interests and
mentality of other countries and having failed to find the path to co-existing
peacefully and harmoniously with other civilizations. So to speak, many problems
of today, including the growing gap in economic development between the
developed and developing countries against the background of
globalization, the Middle East trapped in chaos and disorder, the failure of
Russia and Turkey to “integrate into the West”, etc., can be directly
attributed to lack of exchanges, communication and integration among
civilizations. Since the 18th National Congress of CPC, Xi Jinping has raised the concept of “Chinese Dream” that reflects both Chinese values and China’s pursuit,
re-introducing to the world the idea of “all living creatures grow together without harming one another and ways run parallel without interfering with one another”, which is the
highest ideal in Chinese traditional culture, and striving to shape China into a force that counter-balance the Western civilization. He has also made solemn commitment that “we
respect the diversity of civilizations …… cannot be puffed up with pride and depreciate other civilizations and nations”; “facing the people deeply trapped in misery and wars, we
should have not only compassion and sympathy, but also responsibility and action …… do whatever we can to extend assistance to those people caught in predicament”, etc.

China will rebalance the international pattern from a more inclusive civilization
perspective and with more far-sighted strategic mindset, or at least correct the
bisected or predominated world order so as to promote the parallel development of
the Eastern and Western civilizations through mutual learning, integration and
encouragement. D. To Pass on China’s Confidence. Only a short while ago, some Western countries had called for “China’s responsibility” and made it an inhibition

Today, China has become a source of stability in an

to “regulate” China’s development orientation.

international situation full of uncertainties. Over the past 5 years, China has made
outstanding contributions to the recovery of world economy under relatively great
pressure of its own economic downturn. Encouraged by the “four confidences”, the
whole of the Chinese society has burst out innovation vitality and produced
innovation achievements, making people have more sense of gain and more optimistic about the national development prospect. It is the heroism of the
ordinary Chinese to overcome difficulties and realize the ideal destiny that best explains China’s confidence. When this confidence is passed on in the field of diplomacy, it is expressed
as: first, China’s posture is seen as more forging ahead and courageous to undertake responsibilities ---- proactively shaping the international agendas rather than passively accepting
them; having clear-cut attitudes on international disputes rather than being equivocal; and extending international cooperation to comprehensive and dimensional development rather
than based on the theory of “economy only”. In sum, China will actively seek understanding and support from other countries rather than imposing its will on others with clear-cut
Chinese characteristics, Chinese style and Chinese manner. Second, China’s discourse is featured as a combination of inflexibility and yielding as well as magnanimous ---- combining
the internationally recognized diplomatic principles with the excellent Chinese cultural traditions through digesting the Chinese and foreign humanistic classics assisted with

the Chinese solution is

philosophical speculations to make “China Brand, Chinese Voice and China’s Image get more and more recognized”. Third,

more practical and intimate to people as well as emphasizes inclusive cooperation,

as China is full of confidence to break the monopoly of the Western model on
global development, “offering mankind a Chinese solution to explore a better social
system”, and “providing a brand new option for the nations and peoples who are
hoping both to speed up development and maintain independence”. II.Path Searching of the “Chinese
Solution” for Global Governance Over the past years’ efforts, China has the ability to transform itself

from “grasping the opportunity” for development to “creating opportunity” and

“sharing opportunity” for common development, hoping to pass on the longing of
the Chinese people for a better life to the people of other countries and promoting
the development of the global governance system toward a more just and rational
end. It has become the major power’s conscious commitment of China to lead the
transformation of the global governance system in a profound way. A. To Construct the Theoretical
System for Global Governance. The theoretical system of global governance has been the focus of the party central committee’s diplomatic theory innovation since the 18th National
Congress of CPC as well as an important component of the theory of socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era, which is not only the sublimation of China’s interaction with
the world from “absorbing and learning” to “cooperation and mutual learning”, but also the cause why so many developing countries have turned from “learning from the West” to
“exploring for treasures in the East”. In the past 5 years, the party central committee, based on precise interpretation of the world pattern today and serious reflection on the future
development of mankind, has made a sincere call to the world for promoting the development of global governance system toward a more just and rational end, and proposed a series
of new concepts and new strategies including engaging in major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, creating the human community with common destiny, promoting the
construction of new international relationship rooted in the principle of cooperation and win-win, enriching the strategic thinking of peaceful development, sticking to the correct
benefit view, formulating the partnership network the world over, advancing the global economic governance in a way of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing,

The Chinese solution

advocating the joint, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security concept, and launching the grand “Belt and Road” initiative.

composed of these contents, not only fundamentally different from the old roads of
industrial revolution and colonial expansion in history, but also different from the
market-driven neo-liberalism model currently advocated by Western countries and
international organizations, stands at the height of the world and even mankind,
seeking for global common development and having widened the road for the
developing countries to modernization, which is widely welcomed by the
international community. B. To Supplement and Perfect the Global Governance System. Currently, the international
political practice in global governance is mostly problem-driven without creating a
set of relatively independent, centralized and integral power structures, resulting
in the existing global governance systemcharacterized as both extensive and
unbalanced. China has been engaged in reform and innovation, while maintaining
and constructing the existing systems, producing some thinking and method with
Chinese characteristics. First, China sees the UN as a mirror that reflects the
status quo of global governance, which should act as the leader of global
governance, and actively safeguards the global governance system with the UN at
the core. Second, China is actively promoting the transforming process of such
recently emerged international mechanisms as G20, BRICS and SCO, perfecting them through
practice, and boosting Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and the development of economic globalization. China is also promoting the construction of regional security mechanism
through the Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, Boao Forum for Asia, CICA and multilateral security dialog mechanisms led by ASEAN so as to lay the foundation for
the future regional security framework. Third, China has initiated the establishment of AIIB and the New Development Bank of BRICS, creating a precedent for developing countries
to set up multilateral financial institutions. The core of the new relationship between China and them lies in “boosting rather than controlling” and “public rather than private”, which
is much different from the management and operation model of the World Bank, manifesting the increasing global governance ability of China and the developing countries as well as

Thus, in leading the transformation

exerting pressure on the international economic and financial institution to speed up reforms.

of the global governance system, China has not overthrown the existing
systems and started all over again, but been engaged in innovating and
perfecting; China has proactively undertaken international responsibilities,
but has to do everything in its power and act according to its ability. C. To Reform
the Global Governance Rules. Many of the problems facing global governance today are deeply

rooted in such a cause that the dominant power of the existing governance system
has taken it as the tool to realize its own national interests first and a platform to
pursue its political goals. Since the beginning of this year, the US has for several times requested the World Bank, IMF and G20 to make efforts to
mitigate the so-called global imbalance, abandoned its commitment to support trade openness, cut down investment projects to the middle-income countries, and deleted commitment
to support the efforts to deal with climate change financially, which has made the international systems accessories of the US domestic economic agendas, dealing a heavy blow to the

On the contrary, the interests and agendas of China, as a major power

global governance system.

of the world, are open to the whole world, and China in the future “will provide the
world with broader market, more sufficient capital, more abundant goods and
more precious opportunities for cooperation”, while having the ability to make the
world listen to its voice more attentively. With regard to the subject of global
governance, China has advocated that what global governance system is better
cannot be decided upon by any single country, as the destiny of the world should
be in the hands of the people of all countries. In principle, all the parties should
stick to the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction and co-sharing,
resolve disputes through dialog and differences through consultation. Regarding the critical areas,
opening to the outer world does not mean building one’s own backyard, but building the spring garden for co-sharing; the “Belt and Road” initiative is not China’s solo, but a chorus

China has also proposed international public security

participated in by all countries concerned.

views on nuclear security, maritime cooperation and cyber space order,

calling for efforts to make the global village into a “grand stage for seeking
common development” rather than a “wrestling arena”; we cannot “set up
a stage here, while pulling away a prop there”, but “complement each
other to put on a grand show”. From the orientation of reforms, efforts should be made to better safeguard and expand the legitimate
interests of the developing countries and increase the influence of the emerging economies on global governance. Over the past 5 years, China has attached importance to full court
diplomacy, gradually coming to the center stage of international politics and proactively establishing principles for global governance. By hosting such important events as IAELM,
CICA Summit, G20 Summit, the Belt and Road International Cooperation Forum and BRICS Summit, China has used theseplatforms to elaborate the Asia-Pacific Dream for the first
time to the world, expressing China’s views on Asian security and global economic governance, discussing with the countries concerned with the Belt and Road about the synergy of
their future development strategies and setting off the “BRICS plus” capacity expansion mechanism, in which China not only contributes its solution and shows its style, but also
participates in the shaping of international principles through practice. On promoting the resolution of hot international issues, China abides by the norms governing international
relations based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, and insists on justice, playing a constructive role as a responsible major power in actively promoting the political
accommodation in Afghanistan, mediating the Djibouti-Eritrea dispute, promoting peace talks in the Middle East, devoting itself to the peaceful resolution of the South China Sea
dispute through negotiations. In addition, China’s responsibility and quick response to international crises have gained widespread praises, as seen in such cases as assisting Africa in
its fight against the Ebola epidemic, sending emergency fresh water to the capital of Maldives and buying rice from Cambodia to help relieve its financial squeeze, which has shown
the simple feelings of the Chinese people to share the same breath and fate with the people of other countries. D. To Support the Increase of the Developing Countries’ Voice. The
developing countries, especially the emerging powers, are not only the important participants of the globalization process, but also the important direction to which the international
power system is transferring. With the accelerating shift of global economic center to emerging markets and developing economies, the will and ability of the developing countries to

As the biggest developing country and fast

participate in global governance have been correspondingly strengthened.

growing major power, China has the same appeal and proposal for governance as
other developing countries and already began policy coordination with them, as
China should comply with historical tide and continue to support the increase of
the developing countries’ voice in the global governance system. To this end, China
has pursued the policy of “dialog but not confrontation, partnership but not
alliance”, attaching importance to the construction of new type of major power
relationship and global partnership network, while making a series proposals in
the practice of global governance that could represent the legitimate interests of
the developing countries and be conducive to safeguarding global justice,
including supporting an open, inclusive, universal, balanced and win-win economic
globalization; promoting the reforms on share and voting mechanism of IMF to
increase the voting rights and representation of the emerging market economies;
financing the infrastructure construction and industrial upgrading of other
developing countries through various bilateral or regional funds; and helping other
developing countries to respond to such challenges as famine, refugees, climate
change and public hygiene by debt forgiveness and assistance.
Effective global governance prevents unregulated emergent tech---prevents
extinction.
Robert Bailey 18, Vision of Earth contributor and computer science masters, 9-5-
2018, "Why do we need global governance?," Vision of Earth,
https://www.visionofearth.org/social-change/global-governance/
Global governance is necessary because humanity increasingly faces both
problems and opportunities that are global in scale. Today, transnational problems
such as violence and pandemics routinely reach across borders, affecting us all. At the same time,
the increasingly integrated global system has also laid the necessary foundations
for peace and spectacular prosperity. Effective global governance will allow us to
end armed conflict, deal with new and emerging problems such as technological
risks and automation, and to achieve levels of prosperity and progress never before
seen.1 The most important challenge for humanity to overcome is that of
existential risks. One way to look at the danger of an existential risk is to quantify
the level of global coordination needed to deal with it. While best-shot risks, at one end of the spectrum
only require that a single nation, organization or even individual (i.e., superhero) has the means and the will to save everyone, weakest-link risks, at the
other end of the spectrum, are dangers that might require literally every country to take appropriate action to prevent catastrophe, with no room for
failure.2 3 We’ve always been at risk of natural disaster, but with advances in our level of technology the risk we pose to ourselves as a species becomes
The progress of technological
ever greater. Nuclear weapons are a well-known risk that we still live with to this day.

research exposes us to new dangers such as bioengineered superbugs,

nanotechnological menaces, and the risk of an out-of-control artificial
intelligence with ill-intent. Increased levels of global coordination are needed to
combat many of these risks, as described in our article on the cooperation possibilities frontier. There are other
problems that don’t necessarily threaten the species or even civilization as we
know it, but which are holding back the development of prosperity and progress.
Armed conflict, around since the dawn of history, still haunts us today. Even though wars between great powers appear to
be a thing of the past, regional conflicts still account for tremendous human suffering and

loss of life in parts of the world without stable governance.4 Other problems have emerged precisely
because of our successes in the past. The unprecedented advancement of human wellbeing and

prosperity over the past century has been based in large part on the use of fossil
fuels, thus exposing us to climate change. Widespread automation, already a
stressor on society, will put increased pressure on the social and economic fabric
of our societies over the next few decades. Global governance can help alleviate these issues in various ways – we refer
the interested reader to the very detailed work in Ruling Ourselves. Finally, global governance will increasingly be judged not only by the extent to
which it prevents harm, but also by its demonstrated ability to improve human wellbeing.5 Progress has let us set our sights higher as a species, both
for what we consider to be the right trajectory for humanity and for our own conduct.6 Major advances in human wellbeing can be accomplished with
Effective global governance is global
existing technology and modest improvements in global coordination.

governance that tackles these issues better than the regional governments of the
world can independently. Global governance is key to solving global problems.
Without it, we may not be able to avoid weakest-link existential risks or
regulate new and dangerous technologies. With it, we may be able to prosper
as we never have before. The next step is to determine how effective global
governance can be achieved.

AI Impact---2NC
Chinese leadership stops proliferation and instability---nuclear war.
Dong ’23 [Jean; 2023; Research Fellow at the Centre for Contemporary Chinese
Studies at the University of Melbourne; Chinese Statecraft in a Changing World :
Demystifying Enduring Traditions and Dynamic Constraints, “A World at Stake:
Competition, Destruction, or Cooperation?” Ch. 10] jchen
The catastrophic risks associated with weapons of mass destruction have long been a
subject of concern. However, with the emergence of AI technology, their potential for severe intensity
and destructiveness has been heightened, making them particularly pertinent in today’s global
landscape. In this section, I will delve into the topic of weapons of mass destruction, examining it from both
traditional viewpoints and through the lens of AI technology.
The resurgence of great-power rivalry, following decades of uncontested U.S.
supremacy, has ushered in new challenges and risks, fostering a conflict-ridden
geopolitical environment and arms races, including nuclear proliferation. Nevertheless, as
Washington’s leadership on this issue may be constrained by financial stress and domestic division, the
necessity for collective strategic methods to maintain global stability intensifies,
especially in relation to nuclear concerns.
As explored in Chap. 6,China’s geography-derived interest in maintaining stability could
position it as a key player in this task. In particular, with its economic sway over countries
like North Korea and Iran, China could serve as both mediator and guarantor,
leveraging a shared aspiration for global stability.33 A notable example is the decade-long Iranian
nuclear issue, where Beijing played an important role during the final leg of nuclear negotiations in
2013–2015, exerting effective leverage to bring Tehran back to compliance on the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action.34 China’s economic might is integral for enforcing nuclear
non-proliferation. Its economic scale means it cannot be excluded from international
sanctions, especially those targeting energy exports, and its non-participation could significantly weaken
international efforts to sanction or isolate Tehran.35
China’s economy solves AI best---extinction.
Xiang ’18 [Feng; May 3; professor of law at Tsinghua University; Washington
Post, “AI will spell the end of capitalism,”
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/05/03/end-of-
capitalism/?arc404=true] jchen
But China’s socialist market economy could provide a solution to this. If AI rationally
allocates resources through big data analysis, and if robust feedback loops can supplant the imperfections of “the
invisible hand” while fairly sharing the vast wealth it creates, a planned economy that actually works could at last
be achievable.
The more AI advances into a general-purpose technology that permeates every corner of life, the
less sense it makes to allow it to remain in private hands that serve the interests of
the few instead of the many. More than anything else, the inevitability of mass unemployment and
the demand for universal welfare will drive the idea of socializing or nationalizing AI.
Marx’s dictum, “From each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs,” needs an update for the
21st century: “From the inability of an AI economy to provide jobs and a living wage for all, to each according to
their needs.”
idea that digital capitalism will somehow make social welfare a
Even at this early stage, the
priority has already proven to be a fairytale. The billionaires of Google and Apple, who have been
depositing company profits in offshore havens to avoid taxation, are hardly paragons of social responsibility.
The ongoing scandal around Facebook’s business model, which puts profitability above responsible citizenship, is
yet another example of how in digital capitalism, private companies only look after their own
interests at the expense of the rest of society.
One can readily see where this is all headed once technological unemployment accelerates. “Our responsibility is
to our shareholders,” the robot owners will say. “We are not an employment agency or a charity.”
These companies have been able to get away with their social irresponsibility because the
legal system and its loopholes in the West are geared to protect private property above
all else. Of course, in China, we have big privately owned Internet companies like Alibaba and Tencent. But
unlike in the West, they are monitored by the state and do not regard themselves as above or beyond
social control.
It is the very pervasiveness of AI that will spell the end of market dominance. The market may reasonably if
unequally function if industry creates employment opportunities for most people. But when industry only produces
As AI
joblessness, as robots take over more and more, there is no good alternative but for the state to step in.
invades economic and social life, all private law-related issues will soon become public
ones. More and more, regulation of private companies will become a necessity to maintain some semblance of
stability in societies roiled by constant innovation.
 Laissez-faire capitalism as
I consider this historical process a step closer to a planned market economy.
we have known it canlead nowhere but to a dictatorship of AI oligarchs who gather rents
because the intellectual property they own rules over the means of production. On a global
scale, it is easy to envision this unleashed digital capitalism leading to a battle between robots for market share
end as disastrously as the imperialist wars did in an earlier era.
that will surely
For the sake of social well-being and security, individuals and private companies should not be
allowed to possess any exclusive cutting-edge technology or core AI platforms. Like
nuclear and biochemical weapons, as long as they exist, nothing other than a strong and stable
state can ensure society’s safety. If we don’t nationalize AI, we could sink into a dystopia
reminiscent of the early misery of industrialization, with its satanic mills and street urchins scrounging for a crust
of bread.
The dream of communism is the elimination of wage labor. If AI is bound to serve society instead of private
capitalists, it promises to do so by freeing an overwhelming majority from such drudgery while creating wealth to
sustain all.
If the state controls the market, instead of digital capitalism controlling the state, true communist aspirations will
be achievable. And because AI increasingly enables the management of complex systems by processing massive
amounts of information through intensive feedback loops, it presents, for the first time, a real alternative to the
market signals that have long justified laissez-faire ideology — and all the ills that go with it.
Going forward, China’s socialist market economy, which aims to harness the fruits of
production for the whole population and not just a sliver of elites operating in their own self-
centered interests, can lead the way toward this new stage of human development.
If properly regulated in this way, we should celebrate, not fear, the advent of AI. If it is brought
under social control, it will finally free workers from peddling their time and sweat only to enrich those at the top.
The communism of the future ought to adopt a new slogan: “Robots of the world, unite!
China’s AI is regulated.
Karch et al. 18, JD from Stanford law, “Covington Artificial Intelligence Update:
China’s Vision for The Next Generation of AI”,
https://www.insideprivacy.com/artificial-intelligence/chinas-vision-for-the-next-
generation-of-ai/ //AP
Artificial intelligence promises to be a paradigm shift for many applications from manufacturing
to finance, and from defense to education. Given the vast potential, focus on AI has sharpened around
the world, including in China. Decision makers in Beijing and around the country are paying
attention and have begun shaping a legal and policy regime that favors the
development of AI. Research and investment in AI on both sides of the Pacific has led to cross-border collaboration
– both in terms of talent and capital. Last December, Google announced that it will open an AI research center in
Beijing, in part to leverage AI talent there. A month earlier, San Diego-based Qualcomm announced a strategic
investment in SenseTime, a Chinese company specializing in facial-recognition software. China’s technology
giants, including Tencent and Baidu, already have AI research labs in the US. And Didi Chuxing, China’s leader in
ride-hailing technology and which has a lab in Silicon Valley, on January 26 officially launched its “AI Labs”
research initiative, boasting a team of over 200 AI scientists and engineers. But how does the Chinese
legal and regulatory environment affect the development of these
technologies? Last summer, the State Council released “A Next Generation
Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” (“Plan”), which sets the goal of
having China become the world leader in AI by 2030. The Plan divides China’s AI goals
into three “Strategic Objectives” to be met by 2020, 2025, and 2030, respectively. By 2020, the Plan aims
to bring China’s AI up to global standards, with important achievements in AI applications
and theory, as well as a “core AI industry” of at least 150 billion RMB. By 2025, it aims to begin the
establishment of AI laws and regulations, as well as a core AI industry of at least 400 billion RMB,
including sectors such as intelligent manufacturing, medicine, agriculture, and urban planning. Finally, by 2030,
the Plan aims for China to become the world’s leading AI developer, with AI deeply embedded in daily life and a
core industry exceeding one trillion yuan. To accomplish these quantitative goals, the Plan outlines a number of
The
“focus tasks” that touch on the application of AI to social, economic, and national security challenges.
Plan also lays out several “guarantee measures” intended to support and guide the
development and application of AI, such as necessary laws and regulations,
ethical frameworks, and resource allocation principles . While the Plan is scant on
concrete details, its ambitious agenda and discrete policy tasks point toward significant industry, legal, and
regulatory developments in the near future. Building on the State Council’s Plan, on December 13, 2017 the
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (“MIIT”) released the “Three-Year Action Plan to Promote the
Development of a New Generation of the Artificial Intelligence Industry (2018-2020)” (“Action Plan”). The Action
Plan encourages efforts in key areas, including autonomous vehicles, intelligent service robots, intelligent
unmanned aerial vehicles, medical image diagnosis assistance systems, video and imaging identification systems,
intelligent voice interactive systems, intelligent translation systems, and smart home products. It also calls for
making breakthroughs in “core foundational” technologies, including intelligent sensors, neural network chips,
and open source platforms. Finally, the Action Plan calls on the government and the financial industry to support
AI initiatives. Even at this early stage, there are signs that these initiatives are moving forward.
Bloomberg reported last October that Megvii Inc., a Chinese facial recognition company, had set a new record for
the largest single-round investment in an AI company, raising $460 million from investors, including one of
China’s largest state-backed venture funds. In early January, the city of Beijing announced plans to build a $2.12
billion (13.8 billion RMB) AI development park and also released plans for a dedicated zone to test autonomous
vehicles. And the Nieman Foundation reported that China’s state news agency, Xinhua, will be rebuilding its
newsroom to integrate AI into the newsmaking process.