Unclassified NEA/CSNI/R(2010)15

Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 13-Apr-2011
___________________________________________________________________________________________
English text only
NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY
COMMITTEE ON THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS
Unclassified
NEA/CSNI/R(2010)15

TECHNICAL BASIS FOR COMMENDABLE PRACTICES ON AGEING MANAGEMENT

SCC and Cable Ageing Project (SCAP)

Final Report

The complete version is only available in PDF format.

English text only

JT03300214

Document complet disponible sur OLIS dans son format d'origine

Complete document available on OLIS in its original format
NEA/CSNI/R(2010)15

ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT

The OECD is a unique forum where the governments of 33 democracies work together to address the
economic, social and environmental challenges of globalisation. The OECD is also at the forefront of efforts to
understand and to help governments respond to new developments and concerns, such as corporate
governance, the information economy and the challenges of an ageing population. The Organisation provides
a setting where governments can compare policy experiences, seek answers to common problems, identify
good practice and work to co-ordinate domestic and international policies.
The OECD member countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea,
Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The European
Commission takes part in the work of the OECD.
OECD Publishing disseminates widely the results of the Organisation’s statistics gathering and research
on economic, social and environmental issues, as well as the conventions, guidelines and standards agreed
by its members.

This work is published on the responsibility of the Secretary-General of the OECD.

The opinions expressed and arguments employed herein do not necessarily reflect the official
views of the Organisation or of the governments of its member countries.

NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY

The OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) was established on 1st February 1958 under the name of the
OEEC European Nuclear Energy Agency. It received its present designation on 20th April 1972, when Japan
became its first non-European full member. NEA membership today consists of 28 OECD member countries:
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the
Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States. The
European Commission also takes part in the work of the Agency.
The mission of the NEA is:
– to assist its member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international co-
operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for a safe, environmentally friendly
and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as well as
– to provide authoritative assessments and to forge common understandings on key issues, as input
to government decisions on nuclear energy policy and to broader OECD policy analyses in areas
such as energy and sustainable development.
Specific areas of competence of the NEA include safety and regulation of nuclear activities, radioactive
waste management, radiological protection, nuclear science, economic and technical analyses of the nuclear
fuel cycle, nuclear law and liability, and public information.
The NEA Data Bank provides nuclear data and computer program services for participating countries. In
these and related tasks, the NEA works in close collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency in
Vienna, with which it has a Co-operation Agreement, as well as with other international organisations in the
nuclear field.

Corrigenda to OECD publications may be found online at: www.oecd.org/publishing/corrigenda.

© OECD 2010
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2 SCC AND CABLE AGEING PROJECT (SCAP) – © OECD/NEA 2010

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COMMITTEE ON THE SAFETY OF NUCLEAR INSTALLATIONS

Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations

The NEA Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations (CSNI) is an international committee made
up of senior scientists and engineers, with broad responsibilities for safety technology and research
programmes, and representatives from regulatory authorities. It was set up in 1973 to develop and
co-ordinate the activities of the NEA concerning the technical aspects of the design, construction and
operation of nuclear installations insofar as they affect the safety of such installations.
The committee’s purpose is to foster international co-operation in nuclear safety amongst the
OECD member countries. The CSNI’s main tasks are to exchange technical information and to
promote collaboration between research, development, engineering and regulatory organisations; to
review operating experience and the state of knowledge on selected topics of nuclear safety
technology and safety assessment; to initiate and conduct programmes to overcome discrepancies,
develop improvements and research consensus on technical issues; to promote the co-ordination of
work that serves to maintain competence in the nuclear safety matters, including the establishment
of joint undertakings.
The committee shall focus primarily on existing power reactors and other nuclear installations;
it shall also consider the safety implications of scientific and technical developments of new reactor
designs.
In implementing its programme, the CSNI establishes co-operative mechanisms with the NEA’s
Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities (CNRA) responsible for the programme of the NEA
concerning the regulation, licensing and inspection of nuclear installations with regard to safety.
It also co-operates with the following NEA committees on matters of common interest: Committee on
Radiation Protection and Public Health (CRPPH), Radioactive Waste Management Committee (RWMC)
and the Nuclear Science Committee (NSC).

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of contents

Committee on the Safety of Nuclear Installations..................................................................................... 3

Executive summary........................................................................................................................................ 11
1 Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 13
1.1 Background ....................................................................................................................................... 13
1.2 Objective ............................................................................................................................................ 13
1.3 Project organisation ......................................................................................................................... 14
1.4 Scope .................................................................................................................................................. 15
1.5 Ageing management ........................................................................................................................ 15
1.6 Definitions ......................................................................................................................................... 18
2 SCC Working Group ................................................................................................................................. 21
2.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 21
2.2 SCC event database .......................................................................................................................... 24
2.2.1 Scope .................................................................................................................................... 24
2.2.2 Structure .............................................................................................................................. 24
2.2.3 Search capability ................................................................................................................ 27
2.2.4 Limitations of the event database.................................................................................... 27
2.2.5 Contents of the database .................................................................................................. 27
2.3 SCC knowledge base ........................................................................................................................ 29
2.3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 29
2.3.2 Search capability ................................................................................................................ 31
2.3.3 SCC phenomena ................................................................................................................. 31
2.3.4 Analysis of the event database......................................................................................... 33
2.3.4.1 IGSCC of stainless steel ....................................................................................... 34
2.3.4.2 IGSCC of Ni-based alloy including PWSCC (PWR) ............................................ 36
2.3.4.3 IASCC ..................................................................................................................... 40
2.3.4.4 Transgranular stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC) ........................................... 42
2.3.4.5 External chloride stress corrosion cracking (ECSCC) ....................................... 42
2.3.4.6 Stress-induced corrosion cracking (SICC) ......................................................... 43
2.3.4.7 Corrosion fatigue/environmentally assisted fatigue ....................................... 44
2.3.5 Analysis of general information ....................................................................................... 45
2.3.5.1 Regulations/codes and standards ...................................................................... 45
2.3.5.2 Inspection/monitoring/qualification ................................................................. 45
2.3.5.3 Preventative maintenance/mitigation and repair/replacement .................... 46
2.3.5.4 Safety assessment ................................................................................................ 47
2.3.5.5 Research and development................................................................................. 49

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

3 Cable Working Group .............................................................................................................................. 51

3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 51
3.2 Cable database .................................................................................................................................. 52
3.2.1 Scope .................................................................................................................................... 52
3.2.2 Development of structure ................................................................................................. 52
3.2.3 Search capability ................................................................................................................ 54
3.3 Cable knowledge base...................................................................................................................... 55
3.3.1 Technical data of cable ...................................................................................................... 56
3.3.2 Cable maintenance data/condition monitoring ............................................................. 61
3.3.2.1 Background for condition monitoring ............................................................... 61
3.3.2.2 Cable inspection/condition monitoring method in-service ........................... 62
3.3.2.3 Cable sampling/cable deposits ........................................................................... 63
3.3.2.4 Cable repairing...................................................................................................... 68
3.3.3 Data for the cable failure events ...................................................................................... 68
3.3.4 Cable environmental qualification code data ................................................................ 72
3.3.5 Plant and cable environmental condition....................................................................... 77
3.3.6 Mitigation of cable-installed environment ..................................................................... 85
3.3.7 Cable replacement ............................................................................................................. 85
3.3.8 Regulatory information for cables ................................................................................... 86
3.3.9 Description of condition monitoring technique ............................................................ 90
3.3.10 Future advancement for the report ................................................................................. 96
4 Commendable practice ........................................................................................................................... 97
4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 97
4.1.1 Benefits in the area of SCC ................................................................................................ 97
4.1.2 Benefits in the area of cable ageing ................................................................................. 97
4.2 SCC ..................................................................................................................................................... 98
4.2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 98
4.2.2 Inspection/monitoring/qualification ............................................................................... 99
4.2.3 Preventative maintenance/mitigation............................................................................. 100
4.2.4 Repair/replacement............................................................................................................ 102
4.2.5 Safety assessment .............................................................................................................. 103
4.2.6 Research and development............................................................................................... 104
4.2.7 New plants .......................................................................................................................... 104
4.3 Cable ................................................................................................................................................... 104
4.3.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 104
4.3.2 Specification........................................................................................................................ 105
4.3.3 Inspection ............................................................................................................................ 105
4.3.4 Maintenance ....................................................................................................................... 106
4.3.5 Environmental qualification (focusing on EQ cables).................................................... 109
4.3.6 Recent discovery from cable ageing evaluation test ..................................................... 112
4.3.7 Cable deposits ..................................................................................................................... 113
4.3.8 New plants .......................................................................................................................... 113
5 Recommended future activities ............................................................................................................. 115
5.1 Lessons learned from the SCAP process and potential follow-up activities ............................ 115
5.2 SCC Working Group and Cable Working Group ........................................................................... 115
5.2.1 SCC Working Group ........................................................................................................... 115
5.2.2 Cable Working Group......................................................................................................... 116

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References ....................................................................................................................................................... 117

Appendix 1: Example of ageing management programmes for stress corrosion cracking.................. 119
Appendix 2: SCAP Management Board, SCC Working Group and Cable Working Group .................... 129

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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

List of figures

1.3-1 SCAP organisation structure ........................................................................................................ 14

1.5-1 Systematic approach to managing ageing of a structure or component ............................... 17
1.5-2 Definition and determining process of commendable practices ............................................ 18
2.1-1 Schematic ageing management programme for stress corrosion cracking .......................... 21
2.1-2 Relationship between the SCC event database, general information, knowledge
base and commendable practices ............................................................................................... 23
2.2.1-1 SCAP SCC event database opening screen ................................................................................. 25
2.2.2-1 SCAP SCC event database relationships ..................................................................................... 25
2.2.2-2 SCAP SCC event database – example of input format .............................................................. 26
2.2.5-1 Distribution of the data populated in the SCC database .......................................................... 28
2.3.1-1 SCC knowledge base web interface structure............................................................................ 30
2.3.2-1 An example of search result (search with the keyword “IGSCC”) ........................................... 31
2.3.2-2 Advanced search function............................................................................................................ 31
2.3.4.1-1 Historical summary of IGSCC for stainless steel components in BWR .................................. 34
2.3.4.1-2 Number of reported cracking incidents in SCC database for BWR, PWR and
CANDU as a function of calendar year ....................................................................................... 35
2.3.4.2-1 Historical summary of PWSCC in components of wrought Inconel 600 based
material and welds (Alloys 132, 182 and 82) .............................................................................. 36
2.3.4.2-2 Operating times to observation of defects attributed to PWSCC in Alloy 132/182
welds with no correction for operating temperature ............................................................... 38
2.3.4.2-3 Operating times to observation of defects attributed to PWSCC in Alloy 132/182
welds by weld type with no correction for operating temperature ........................................ 38
2.3.4.3-1 One of the field experiences of IASCC ........................................................................................ 41
2.3.4.4-1 Historical summary of TGSCC in German plants ...................................................................... 43
2.3.4.6-1 Historical summary of SICC in ferritic steel piping of German plants ................................... 44
3.1-1 Example of cable layout in NPP (PWR) ........................................................................................ 51
3.1-2 Typical cable construction ........................................................................................................... 51
3.2.2-1 Cable ageing database structure.................................................................................................. 53
3.2.3-1 Entry point for the database search tool, showing panels for selecting the main
search criteria, i.e. parts, countries and search strings ............................................................ 54
3.2.3-2 Detailed search and display criteria panel for a given database part, allowing
detailed field-specific selections ................................................................................................. 54
3.2.3-3 Search results (example) .............................................................................................................. 55
3.3.1-1 Material of cable insulation.......................................................................................................... 57
3.3.1-2 Material of cable jacket ................................................................................................................. 57
3.3.1-3 Design temperature of cable ........................................................................................................ 58
3.3.1-4 Design dose rate of cable .............................................................................................................. 58
3.3.1-5 EQ cable or non-EQ cable .............................................................................................................. 59
3.3.1-6 Qualification period of EQ cable .................................................................................................. 59
3.3.1-7 Qualified post-accident mission time......................................................................................... 60
3.3.2.3-1 The stand for deposit of reference specimen in the reactor containment at a
Ukraine NPP.................................................................................................................................... 66
3.3.3-1 Cables that failed while in service .............................................................................................. 69
3.3.3-2 Cables that failed to meet testing and inspection acceptance criteria .................................. 69
3.3.3-3 Number of failures per ten-year service intervals .................................................................... 70
3.3.3-4 Failures per insulation type ......................................................................................................... 70

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LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

3.3.3-5 Causes and causal factors for all cable failures......................................................................... 70

3.3.4-1 Typical LOCA/HELB temperature and pressure illustrating additional peak transient
to account for margin ................................................................................................................... 74
3.3.4-2 DBE temperature profile of inside containment for a plant in Korea .................................... 74
3.3.5-1 Measured points for a PWR 440 ................................................................................................... 78
3.3.7-1 Fire protection layer for cables .................................................................................................... 85
3.3.9-1 Mechanical damage on a low voltage cable ............................................................................... 95
3.3.9-2 Identification of a mechanical damage spot (LIRA, EPRI experiment, 2007) ......................... 95
3.3.9-3 Identification of a thermal hot spot in a low voltage cable
(LIRA, EPRI experiment, 2007) ...................................................................................................... 95
4.2.3-1 Example of a maintenance plan for ageing due to stress corrosion cracking ....................... 101
4.3.4-1 Correlations between indenter modulus and elongation at break ......................................... 107
4.3.4-2 Baseline analysis with reference signatures (LIRA) .................................................................. 108
4.3.5-1 Comparison of the methods for Cable Environmental Qualification Test ............................ 111

List of tables

2.1-1 Comparison of the generic attributes of an effective ageing management programme

in IAEA Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.12 and the items of SCAP SCC knowledge base ............... 22
2.2.5-1 Contents for BWR RPV internals in SCC event database .......................................................... 28
2.2.5-2 Contents of SCC event database on PWR non-piping passive components .......................... 29
2.3.4-1 Matrix of SCC mechanisms and major components ................................................................ 34
2.3.4.2-1 Distribution of RPV Ni-based components and welds with known indications
attributed to PWSCC...................................................................................................................... 37
2.3.4.2-2 Distribution of steam generator Ni-based components with known indications
attributed to PWSCC...................................................................................................................... 37
2.3.4.2-3 Summary of repair, replacement and preventative techniques for PWSCC
recorded in the SCAP SCC event database ................................................................................. 41
2.3.4.3-1 IASCC experiences example in France, USA and Korea ........................................................... 42
2.3.5.3-1 Preventive maintenance, mitigation and repair techniques ................................................... 48
3.3-1 Comparison of different classification systems ........................................................................ 56
3.3.2.2-1 Cable inspection/condition monitoring methods applied in service ..................................... 63
3.3.2.2-2 Acceptance criteria for inspection in Japan NPP ....................................................................... 64
3.3.3-1 Root causes of cable failures ........................................................................................................ 71
3.3.4-1 Pressure profiles in Germany ....................................................................................................... 75
3.3.4-2 Temperature profiles in Germany ............................................................................................... 75
3.3.5-1 Summary of plant environmental condition for Czech NPP ................................................... 77
3.3.5-2 Summary of plant environmental condition for Japanese NPP .............................................. 79
3.3.9-1 Condition monitoring techniques ............................................................................................... 91
3.3.9-2 Correlations of the diagnostic data ............................................................................................. 92
4.3.6-1 Acceptance criteria for endurance in LOCA environment ....................................................... 112
4.3.6-2 The pre-ageing conditions and the results of the LOCA tests ................................................. 112

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive summary

The number of ageing nuclear power plants is increasing in OECD/NEA member countries.
Accordingly, maintenance programmes, in-service inspection and testing of structures, systems and
components important to safety have been implemented to ensure that levels of reliability and
effectiveness remain in accordance with the design assumptions. This is often being done using an
integrated ageing management strategy based on state-of-the-art technologies.
Ageing effects, especially material degradation, have progressively been experienced world wide
and since the start of nuclear power plant operation. Material degradation is expected to continue as
plants age and operating licenses are extended.
Two subjects – stress corrosion cracking (SCC) and degradation of cable insulation – were selected
as the focus of the SCC and Cable Ageing Project (SCAP) due to their relevance for plant ageing
assessments and their implications on nuclear safety. In order to achieve that goal, 14 NEA member
countries joined the project in 2006 to pool their knowledge, and 3 additional countries joined during the
course of the project. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Commission
participated as observers.
When establishing the project it was recognised that in the limited time available ageing
management could not be addressed in detail over a large range of topics. SCC has been and
continues to be a serious problem and in recent years cable ageing has been identified as an area
requiring more attention from both regulators and industry. Incidents in these areas often occur and
draw attention. These two topics were therefore chosen for specific study in the project as examples
of areas in which ageing management has been applied for many years and in which ageing
management still needs to be developed through an internationally co-ordinated study which could
yield greater insights into the management of these topics.
The objective of this internationally co-ordinated project is to share the corporate knowledge and
operating experience to understand the failure mechanisms and identify effective techniques and
technologies to effectively manage and mitigate active degradation in nuclear power plants.
The specific objectives of the project are to: i) establish a complete database with regard to major
ageing phenomena for SCC and degradation of cable insulation through collective efforts by NEA
members; ii) establish a knowledge base in these areas by compiling and evaluating the collected data
and information systematically; iii) perform an assessment of the data and identify the basis for
commendable practices which will help regulators and operators to enhance ageing management.
The scope of this project involves the development of a knowledge base and commendable
practices that address common elements in the management of ageing and mitigation of failures for
components and cables: study of ageing effects, investigation of failure mechanisms, mitigation of
influencing factors, prediction of conditions for replacement, safety assessment of components,
qualification testing (environmental qualification for cables) and condition monitoring.
According to IAEA Safety Guide NS-G-2.12 “Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants”,
effective ageing management throughout the service life of SSC requires the use of a systematic
approach to managing ageing that provides a framework for co-ordinating all programmes and
activities relating to the understanding, controlling, monitoring and mitigation of ageing effects of the
plant component or structure.
The SCAP SCC knowledge base was established by analysing and evaluating the data from the
viewpoint of the implementation of appropriate ageing management beneficial both to the regulators
and licensees. The practices of particular importance (e.g. key to the maintenance of SCC) were
identified as commendable practices for the purpose of appropriate ageing management of SCC, the

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

establishing or improvement of ageing management programmes under the technical information

basis by analysing and evaluating the data from the viewpoint of the implementation of appropriate
ageing management beneficial both to the regulators and operators.
The SCAP SCC event database, knowledge base as well as commendable practices will be of great
help for less experienced staff to access past and present experiences and knowledge for the
evaluation of new events. It will support a balanced assessment of the new events in the context of all
applicable historic knowledge, aiding all stakeholders in terms of informed decision making. Four
years is an extremely short time to establish such a complex event database and knowledge base in
the field of stress corrosion cracking. Without the input from the OECD Piping Failure Data Exchange
Project (OPDE), the event database could not have been developed in the time frame available.
Members of the SCC Working Group have expressed a firm commitment to continue to populate and
develop the event database and the knowledge base. It is envisaged that co-operation with the OPDE
project will provide a suitable platform for this continuation.
For cable ageing, the crucial point is the knowledge about the qualification procedure for harsh
environment and the predictive capability to estimate the remaining qualified life. The cable
condition-monitoring techniques shared by the participants have become an up-to-date encyclopaedic
source to monitor and predict the performance of every unique application of cables. The experience
from events is rather limited and failures are in part strongly related to past manufacturing and
installation practices. The insights collected in this project have offered greater levels of knowledge in
ageing mechanisms and technically sound bases to address life extension and continued qualification
of cables. In addition to the technical data and operating experience, the SCAP cable database and
knowledge base provides up-to-date information on environmental qualification of cables that are to
remain functional during and following a design basis event. The database has incorporated the
publications on recent research results on ageing mechanisms and continued efforts in enhancing
condition monitoring capability.
The Cable Working Group has created an encyclopaedia on cables useful for both novice and
experienced NPP regulators and operators. This will be a living reference book on the web and its
value will be inestimable if it is kept up-to-date.
The two working groups have brought together representatives of regulators, licensees, vendors
and academics working in the field, and this combination has been found to be invaluable for the
successful execution of the project. It is expected that the expert network will facilitate the sharing of
knowledge as well as increase co-operation among experts outside the project.
The products of each working group are a database, a knowledge base and a report describing
these and the commendable practices that the groups consider should be used in the ageing
management of cable and stress corrosion cracking.
The commendable practices identified in this report are intended to strengthen technical
approaches to optimise ageing management in the areas of SCC and cable ageing. The SCAP SCC and
Cable data- and knowledge bases provide extensive information to benefit all stakeholders in
designing, constructing, operating and regulating nuclear power plants and also provide commendable
practices applicable to new reactors.
The working process of SCAP has also provided an important example to demonstrate how such
a challenging task can be effectively addressed and therefore could be used as a basis for other topics
in ageing management. Vital elements of the working process have been the identification of priority
items of common interest, the assignment of a dedicated project co-ordinator, chairperson and
clearing house with expert knowledge and lead organisations providing input to start the discussion
and provide orientation.
This report summarises the product of SCAP work resulting from four years of technical
interactions and shared knowledge from all participants from June 2006 to June 2010. The project was
financed through a Japanese voluntary contribution to the NEA.

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INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background

The number of ageing nuclear power plants is increasing in OECD/NEA member countries.
Accordingly, maintenance programmes, in-service inspection and testing of structures, systems and
components important to safety have been implemented to ensure that levels of reliability and
effectiveness remain in accordance with the design assumptions. This is often being done using an
integrated ageing management strategy based on state-of-the-art technology.
Ageing effects, especially material degradation, have progressively been experienced world wide
and since the start of nuclear power plant operation. Material degradation is expected to continue as
plants age and operating licenses are extended. It is clear that unanticipated and unmanaged structural
degradation could result in significant loss of safety margins, undermining public confidence and
straining the resources of both regulatory authorities and the operators.
For regulatory authorities, it is also important to verify the adequacy of the ageing management
methods applied by the licensees, based on reliable technical evidence. Two subjects – stress
corrosion cracking (SCC) and degradation of cable insulation – were selected as the focus of the SCC
and Cable Ageing Project (SCAP) due to their implications for nuclear safety and their relevance for
plant ageing assessment.
In order to achieve that goal, 14 NEA member countries initially joined the project in 2006 to pool
their knowledge. A further 3 countries joined while the project was being conducted, for a total of
17 participating countries. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European
Commission also participate as observers. The project was financed through a Japanese voluntary
contribution to the NEA. Japanese technical institutions are also actively co-operating in the project
under the co-ordination of the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) of Japan.
When establishing the SCAP project it was realised that in the limited time available ageing
management could not be addressed in detail over a large range of topics. Stress corrosion cracking
has and continues to be a serious problem and in recent years cable ageing has been identified as an
area requiring more attention from both regulators and industry. Incidents in both areas continue to
provide periodic surprises. These two topics were therefore chosen for specific study in the SCAP
project, being examples of areas in which ageing management has been applied for many years (SCC)
and one in which ageing management still needs to be developed (cable ageing), in an internationally
co-ordinated study which was anticipated could yield greater insights into the management of these
failures.
This report summarises the project results of SCAP after four years of operation, from June 2006
to June 2010.

1.2 Objective

The objective of this internationally co-ordinated project is to share the corporate knowledge and
operating experience so as to better understand the failure mechanisms and identify effective
techniques and technologies to manage and mitigate active degradation in nuclear power plants.

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INTRODUCTION

The specific objectives of the project are to:

• establish a complete database with regard to major ageing phenomena for SCC and degradation
of cable insulation through collective efforts by OECD/NEA members;
• establish a knowledge base in these areas by compiling and evaluating the collected data and
information systematically;
• perform an assessment of the data and identify the basis for commendable practices which
will help regulators and operators to enhance ageing management.

1.3 Project organisation

The project participants are experts in the fields of SCC and cable ageing and come from regulators,
industry, research institutions and academia. They provide the relevant information and perform the
assessments needed for the proper execution of the programme.
The Project Management Board (MB) runs the project with assistance from the NEA Project
Secretariat (Figure 1.3-1). The MB responsibilities include, but are not limited to: approving the
programme of work to be carried out by the working groups on SCC and cable; monitoring the project’s
progress in terms of results and time lines; and supervising reporting within and outside the project.

Figure 1.3-1: SCAP organisation structure

There are two working groups, one dealing with SCC and the other with cable insulation
degradation. The working groups are responsible for carrying out the programme of work and
ensuring the quality and timeliness of the reporting within and outside the project. Each working
group is supported by a clearing house. The clearing houses work to ensure the consistency of the
data contributed by the participating countries. They verify whether the information provided
complies with the SCAP Coding Guidelines. They also verify the completeness and accuracy of the
data, and maintain and distribute copies of the databases.
Seventeen (17) member countries are participating in one or both of the SCAP working groups:
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Norway,
the Republic of Korea, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine and the United States.

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Participation in the project is open to the government of any country, whether or not they are a
member of the OECD, or to any national agency, public or private organisation designated by such
government provided the government agrees with the Terms of Reference which were specified during
the first Management Board meeting. Each member country nominates a national representative for
both the SCC Working Group and/or Cable Working Group respectively who is responsible for the
administration of the project within his/her respective country.
Each participating country has submitted data through its national representative. The data has
been entered according to a coding format which was specifically developed for the databases and
which is explained in the Coding Guidelines and the Quality Assurance Programme for the two
working groups. Each participant has been exclusively responsible for its use of information generated
under the project. Both the SCC and the cable databases are password protected, and the contents and
data analysis results are distributed only among active working group members under the project
Terms of Reference.

1.4 Scope

Based on differences in the fundamental knowledge concerning the SCC and cable insulation
degradation mechanisms, as well as the operating experience associated with SCC and cable insulation
degradation events, it was expected that the scope and focus of the databases for these two topics
would differ from each other. The SCC event database is based on event occurrences, including piping
and component failures. On the other hand, since cable failure or event occurrences are rare under
normal operating conditions and because of the highly magnified cable stresses in an accident
mitigation environment, the cable database is focused on cable material qualifications and condition
monitoring methodology and its validation.
The scope of this project involves the development of a knowledge base and commendable
practices that address common elements in the management of ageing and mitigation of failures for
components and cables: study of ageing effects, investigation of failure mechanisms, mitigation of
influencing factors, prediction of conditions for replacement, safety assessment of components,
qualification testing (environmental qualification for cables) and condition monitoring.

1.5 Ageing management

The NEA has initiated various activities in the last decade to collect information and share experience
regarding ageing mechanisms, developing databases, technical reports, position and guidance
documents in support of assessment and management of long-term operation (the more recent NEA
reports are Refs. [1-5]).
The IAEA has worked on ageing problems and their relevance for the safety of nuclear power
plants since the mid 1980s. The first documentation was published in 1990 as an overall description of
the problem [6]. Shortly after, in 1991 and 1992, IAEA published two documents describing methods to
approach ageing management [7,8]. At the end of 1990 a document was published concerning the
introduction and supervision of ageing management programmes [9]. Since 1992 a number of specific
advisory documents have been published concerning different components [10,11], including their
relevance for safety and why they should be included in an ageing management programme, which
degradation mechanisms can be expected to occur and how to detect and manage them. In 2009 the
collective experience of these documents was summarised with the publication of an IAEA Safety
Guide [12-14].
Ageing problems are best tackled through a systematic programme in which existing relevant
activities for ageing management are co-ordinated. Therefore ageing management includes the
documentation of relevant programmes and activities and a description of how these different
programmes are co-ordinated in a systematic manner that guarantees continuous improvement by
incorporating operational experience and relevant research results. The documentation should also
address which maintenance, control, inspection and monitoring should be covered is necessary as
well as the frequency and the scope of these activities. To maintain degradation to an acceptable level,
it is necessary to understand possible degradation mechanisms; suitable operational conditions that
are designed to minimise degradation; control, inspection and monitoring techniques that need to be

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used to detect degradation in time; evaluation criteria to determine if sufficient safety margins remain
if degradation is detected, and methods to manage, repair or replace components. In order to work
in a systematic manner, it is necessary to understand the underlying design principles, including
relevant regulations, codes and standards, operational and maintenance histories, results from
inspection programmes, safety evaluation criteria and procedures, generic operational experience and
research results.
According to the IAEA Safety Guide, effective ageing management throughout the service life of
structures, systems and components (SSC) requires the use of a systematic approach to managing
ageing that provides a framework for co-ordinating and harmonising all the programmes and
activities related to the understanding, controlling, monitoring and mitigation of ageing effects of the
plant component or structure. This approach is illustrated in Figure 1.5-1, which is an adaptation of
Deming’s “PLAN – DO – CHECK – ACT” cycle to the ageing management of SSC based on understanding
the ageing of a structure/component; the closed loop of Figure 1.5-1 indicates the continuous
improvement of the ageing management programme for a particular structure or component, on the
basis of feedback of relevant operating experience and results from research and development, and
results of self-assessment and peer reviews, to help ensure that emerging ageing issues will be
addressed adequately. Every ageing management programme should have nine generic attributes
described in the IAEA Safety Guide:
• scope of the ageing management programme;
• preventative actions to minimise control and ageing degradation;
• detection of ageing effects;
• monitoring and trending of ageing effects;
• mitigation of ageing effects;
• acceptance criteria;
• corrective actions;
• operating experience feedback and feedback of research and development;
• quality management.
For the safe long-term operation of nuclear power plants it is necessary to develop and implement
effective ageing management programmes. It is generally recognised that a proactive approach is
preferred since this allows the nine attributes of a successful programme in accordance with the IAEA
Safety Guide to be implemented in a timely manner.
However, effective ageing management can be jeopardised by several factors that might lead
either to unexpected or premature ageing (i.e. ageing degradation that occurs earlier than expected).
These factors or weaknesses need to be identified and addressed if the proactive approach to ageing
management for safe long-term operation is to be successful. The most frequently encountered
weaknesses of ageing management are:
• insufficient understanding or predictability of ageing;
• lack of data for ageing management;
• inadequate communication and co-ordination;
• inadequate safety culture;
• error-induced ageing;
• inappropriate use of reactive ageing management;
• insufficient capability for dealing with unforeseen ageing phenomena.
Throughout the plant operating period, it is important to implement a comprehensive ageing
management programme starting early in the plant life to ensure safe long-term operation. In many
countries comprehensive ageing management activities are now included from the early stages
of plant operation and are reviewed regularly both through routine supervision and as part of the

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Figure 1.5-1: Systematic approach to managing ageing of a structure or component

Periodic Safety Review (normally every ten years). Some countries perform a first extensive review in
connection with the Periodic Safety Review associated with 30 years’ operation and others as part of
the license renewal process.
Therefore, knowledge should be extracted from the database (operational experiences and recent
findings) by analysing and evaluating the data from the viewpoint of the implementation of
appropriate ageing management and maintenance activities beneficial both to regulatory authorities
and operators. The knowledge which can contribute to the smooth “PLAN – DO – CHECK – ACT” cycle
for ageing management of SSC based on understanding the ageing of structures/components, and the
closed loop of Figure 1.5-1.
Under the “PLAN – DO – CHECK – ACT” cycle, knowledge has been extracted from the database of
each member country (i.e. analysis and evaluation of database) and transferred to the knowledge base
through discussion with experts. Ageing management and maintenance activities are to a large extent
based on international events and technical knowledge. As the regulator, it is very important to
review the adequacy of ageing management conducted by utilities/operators, based on a reliable
technical information basis (TIB). The TIB should be updated regularly to ensure timely, adequate
ageing management and maintenance activities to improve ageing management.
The commendable practices are extracted from the knowledge base collected from project
members, for the appropriate management of ageing phenomena (e.g. those common to member
countries or key to the maintenance of individual ageing phenomena) and the improvement of ageing

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management programmes as described in the IAEA Safety Guide. It should be noted that commendable
practices are included in the knowledge base. The definition and process for determining commendable
practices is illustrated in Figure 1.5-2.
The database, knowledge base and commendable practices form a living technical information
base and are updated continuously to reflect the latest findings.

Figure 1.5-2: Definition and determining process of commendable practices

CP

Knowledge base
(including CP)

Analysis &
evaluation

Database
(operational experience
and recent findings)

1.6 Definitions

In this report, the definitions of ageing management and maintenance activities from the IAEA Safety
Glossary [15] are used as follows:

Ageing management
Engineering, operations and maintenance actions to control within acceptable limits the ageing
mechanism of structures, systems and components.
• Examples of engineering actions include design, qualification and failure analysis. Examples
of operations actions include surveillance, carrying out operating procedures within specified
limits and performing environmental measurements.
• Life management (or lifetime management) is the integration of ageing management with
economic planning: i) to optimise the operation, maintenance and service life of structures,
systems and components; ii) to maintain an acceptable level of performance and safety; iii) to
maximise the return on investment over the service life of the facility.

Maintenance
The organised activity, both administrative and technical, of keeping structures, systems and
components in good operating condition, including both preventive and corrective (or repair) aspects.

Corrective maintenance
Actions that restore, by repair, overhaul or replacement, the capability of a failed structure, system or
component to function within acceptance criteria.
• Contrasted with preventive maintenance.

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Periodic maintenance
Form of preventive maintenance consisting of servicing, parts replacement, surveillance or testing at
pre-determined intervals of calendar time, operating time or number of cycles. Also termed “time-based
maintenance”.

Planned maintenance
Form of preventive maintenance consisting of refurbishment or replacement that is scheduled and
performed prior to unacceptable degradation of a structure, system or component.

Predictive maintenance
Form of preventive maintenance performed continuously or at intervals governed by observed
condition to monitor, diagnose or trend a structure, system or component’s condition indicators;
results indicate present and future functional ability or the nature of and schedule for planned
maintenance. Also termed “condition-based maintenance”.

Preventive maintenance
Actions that detect, preclude or mitigate degradation of a functional structure, system or component
to sustain or extend its useful life by controlling degradation and failures to an acceptable level.
• Preventive maintenance may be periodic maintenance, planned maintenance or predictive
maintenance.
• Contrasted with corrective maintenance.

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Chapter 2: SCC Working Group

2.1 Introduction

Stress corrosion cracking (SCC) is an ageing mechanism for which many events have occurred in
different structures, systems and components (SSC) of nuclear power plants since the 1970s, continuing
through to the present time. The causes of these events have been identified as sensitisation of material,
local high residual stress, surface finishing and hardness associated with certain environments such
as high-temperature water. For these reasons, it is necessary to carry out maintenance activities,
inspections with the appropriate interval, monitoring, preventive maintenance/mitigation repair/
replacement and safety assessments to minimise the occurrence of future events.
The counter measures for SCC should be included in the ageing management programme (AMP).
To achieve the targets of an ageing management policy for safe long-term operation, it is necessary to
select the systems and components, identify the specific SCC degradation mechanisms/phenomena, and
determine the criteria to ensure that the intended function of the system or component is maintained.
It is necessary to assume an operating period and include the evaluation result in a preventive
maintenance plan (or AMP covering inspection, repair, replacement, monitoring or surveillance).
To achieve this, a well-grounded Technical Information Basis (TIB) is required. To maintain the
TIB, it is necessary to take into account the feedback from the results of research and development,
codes and standards, trends of the specific degradation mechanism, and consolidation of appropriate
maintenance programme.
The establishment of an AMP for SCC is illustrated schematically in Figure 2.1-1.

Figure 2.1-1: Schematic ageing management programme for stress corrosion cracking

Ageing Management Program

Examples
Make Target of Ageing Management
and policy

HAZ of primary coolant piping, core

Select System and Components internals, reactor vessels and nozzle, …
Plan
Develop maintenance plan, e.g. Clarify degradation/damage mode IGSCC, PWSCC, IASCC, ECSCC…
- Inspection plan
- Repair/replacement
/modification & its Establish criterion to maintain Integrity evaluation of flawed component
monitoring plan component’s function - Growth of hypothesized initial
flaw/crack or detected flaw/crack
Do - Fracture analysis of the
Execute inspection/maintenance component with the grown
flaw/crack
Check/Act Crack growth rate
Evaluate the result of Residual stress distribution
inspection/maintenance & Evaluate allowable flaw size
and inspection interval Fracture toughness
Effectiveness of maintenance Corrosive environment
program

Code & standard

Preparation/revision of guidelines, rules & standards
Technical data bases Safety research & development
Development of Knowledge Base/ Data Base R&D by Power Industries, Academe, Regulatory bodies, …
- Plant operating/failure experience - Advance Inspection technology
- Inspection data - Preventive maintenance/mitigation technology
- R&D data - SCC growth prediction technology & CGR data
- Regulatory information - Flaw evaluation technology
Commendable practice - Remote repair technology
- Degradation mechanism/root cause
International information exchange

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The relationship between the nine generic attributes of the IAEA Safety Guide [12] and the
activities of the SCC Working Group are shown in Table 2.1-1.

Table 2.1-1: Comparison of the generic attributes of an effective ageing management

programme in IAEA Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.12 and the items of SCAP SCC knowledge base

IAEA Safety Guide No. NS-G-2.12 Items of SCAP SCC

Attribute Description knowledge base
• Structures (including structural elements) and components subject
1. Scope of the
to ageing management.
ageing management
programme based • Understanding of ageing phenomena (significant ageing Introduction
mechanisms, susceptible sites): structure/component materials, of this report
on understanding
ageing service conditions, stressors, degradation sites, ageing
mechanisms and effects.
• Identification of preventive actions.
2. Preventive actions to • Identification of parameters to be monitored or inspected.
(3) Preventive
minimise and control • Service conditions (i.e. environmental conditions and operating maintenance
ageing mechanism conditions) to be maintained and operating practices aimed at
slowing down potential degradation of the structure or component.
• Effective technology (inspection, testing and monitoring methods) (2) Inspection/
3. Detection of ageing
for detecting ageing effects before failure of the structure or monitoring/
effects
component. qualification
• Condition indicators and parameters monitored.
4. Monitoring and (2) Inspection/
• Data to be collected to facilitate assessment of structure or
trending of monitoring/
component ageing.
ageing effects qualification
• Assessment methods (including data analysis and trending).
• Operations, maintenance, repair and replacement actions to (3) Preventive
5. Mitigating
mitigate detected ageing effects and/or degradation of the maintenance/
ageing effects
structure or component. mitigation
(5) Safety
• Acceptance criteria against which the need for corrective action is assessment
6. Acceptance criteria
evaluated. (including flaw
evaluation)
• Corrective actions if a component fails to meet the acceptance (4) Repair/
7. Corrective actions
criteria. replacement
8. Operating experience
• Mechanism that ensures timely feedback of operating experience (0) Event data
feedback and
and research and development results (if applicable), and provides
feedback of research (6) Research and
objective evidence that they are taken into account in the ageing
and development development
management programme.
results
• Administrative controls that document the implementation of the
ageing management programme and actions taken. Out of the
9. Quality management
• Indicators to facilitate evaluation and improvement of the ageing scope of SCAP
management programme.
Items of (1) Regulation/code and standards and (6) Research and development of SCAP SCC knowledge base are related to
all attributes of IAEA.

The general aim of the knowledge base and commendable practices is to reflect basic
international technical information (event data, R&D, etc.) for AMP and to provide a state-of-the-art
description of the SCC phenomena treated and the main factors influencing their occurrence, the
locations affected, as well as the strategies available for mitigation and repair. This information is
useful for both regulators and utilities to establish and review AMP.
The working group was to identify commendable practices for ageing management of the
different SCC degradation mechanisms for safe long-term operation. In order to achieve this, the
working group agreed to establish an event database using similar principles to those already
established within the OPDE project. The event database also covers experience such as field data
from light water reactor events and field experience from inspections. In addition it was recognised
that a knowledge base must also be established in order to identify commendable practices. The two
together have been evaluated and provide the basis for the SCC portions of this report.

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The scope of the event database, knowledge base and commendable practices covers Class 1 and 2
pressure boundary components, reactor pressure vessel internals and other components with
significant operational impact, excluding steam generator tubing.
The ageing mechanisms included in the event database and materials affected (base metal, weld
metal and cladding) are:
• intergranular SCC (IGSCC) of stainless steel;
• IGSCC of Ni-based alloy including primary water SCC (PWSCC);
• irradiation-assisted SCC (IASCC);
• trans-granular SCC (TGSCC);
• external chloride SCC (ECSCC);
• strain-induced corrosion cracking (SICC);
• corrosion fatigue/environmental fatigue.
The entire SCC database consists of an event database and general information. The general
information consists of regulations/codes and standards, inspection/monitoring/qualification,
preventive maintenance/mitigation, repair/replacement, safety assessment and R&D. Together these
comprise the knowledge base.
The knowledge base is the identified knowledge, as an outcome of analysis and evaluation of the
entire SCC database (event, operating experience and recent findings) for appropriate ageing
management and maintenance activities. The knowledge base has also been identified from the key
data and information contained in the database to establish an AMP for a specific ageing mechanism
from the database of member countries, as well as discussion among the experts. The knowledge base
can be used for establishing an AMP and the technical information basis (TIB).
The database, knowledge base and commendable practices are the living technical information
base and are updated continuously to reflect the latest findings as illustrated in Figure 2.1-2.

Figure 2.1-2: Relationship between the SCC event database,

general information, knowledge base and commendable practices

SCC Database SCC Knowledge base Commendable

●Operating experiences
practices
Event database ▪ Event history
▪ Trend analysis
●Event narrative
▪ Causes & contributing factors
●In-service inspection history
▪ Corrective actions, etc.
●Root cause information
●Flaw size information
●SCC mechanisms Practices of particular
importance among
▪ IGSCC of stainless steel
✚ ▪ IGSCC of Ni-based alloy including
the latest knowledge

PWSCC
General Information
▪ IASCC ➜contribute to the
database appropriate ageing
▪ TGSCC
management and
▪ ECSCC, etc.
●Regulation / continuous
Code & standards improvement of
●Regulation / Code & standards ageing management
●Inspection / Monitoring /
●Inspection / Monitoring / programme
Qualification
Qualification
●Preventive maintenance /
●Preventive maintenance / Mitigation
Mitigation
●Repair & replacement
●Repair & replacement
●Safety assessment
●Safety assessment
●Research & development
●Research & development

Living technical information base

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The SCC Working Group has been supported by the project consultant, a clearing house and two
expert consultants, one for BWR and one for PWR aspects. The working group has held ten formal
meetings as well as a number of informal meetings with the Japanese SCC Working Group, the
consultants and the working group chairperson. Thirteen countries (Canada, the Czech Republic,
Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Republic of Korea, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland and the United States) have actively participated in the activities of the group, contributing
to the event database and the knowledge base. The clearing house has together with the NEA IT-group
established the event database which is a web-based relational database using Microsoft® Access. The
project consultant has together with the NEA IT-group established the knowledge base which is
available on the project website to all members. The two SCC experts have written comprehensive
reports of SCC in BWR and PWR based both on their own knowledge and experience correlated with
an evaluation of the information in the event database.
Most members of the working group are also members of the OECD/NEA Pipe Failure Data
Exchange (OPDE) project. This database contains a considerable number of piping events caused by
stress corrosion cracking. It was agreed at a very early stage that the SCAP-SCC event database would
be based on the OPDE database following a review of the fields and identification of additional fields.
Events could then be extracted from OPDE and comprise a major part of the SCAP-SCC event database.
More information on the contents of the event database is given in Section 2.2.
Based on previous experience from populating the OPDE database a decision was taken to
concentrate on so-called “representative events”. A representative event is typical for several identical
or very similar events and is intended to contain all the relevant information and references for such
events. This simplifies the data input since similar events can be entered in a simplified format with
only the basic information and a note that they are coupled to the reference event.
National reporting requirements and practices vary considerably in the member countries. This
means that for some of the member countries confidential information has been entered to make the
entries comprehensive and to improve utilisation and interpretation of the database contents. This
has led to the need to restrict access to the database to those countries that have contributed to the
database. This is also consistent with the terms of the OPDE database, which is only available to
members supplying data to the project. The event database can only be accessed with individual user
names and passwords.

2.2 SCC event database

2.2.1 Scope
The SCAP SCC event database addresses passive components degradation or failure attributed to SCC
occurring at nuclear power plants in participating countries. The opening screen is shown in
Figure 2.2.1-1. The scope of the event database includes Class 1 and 2 pressure boundary components 1,
reactor pressure vessel internals and other components with significant operational impact, excluding
steam generator tubing.
The following mechanisms are considered in the event database: intergranular SCC in austenitic
stainless steel and nickel-based material, irradiated-assisted SCC, primary water SCC, external
chloride SCC and trans-granular SCC.

2.2.2 Structure
The SCAP SCC event database is a web-based relational database (Figure 2.2.2-1). The data entry is
managed via input forms, tables, roll-down menus and database relationships. Database searches and
applications are performed through user-defined queries that utilise the tables and built-in data
relationships. The data entry forms are organised to capture essential passive component failure
information together with supporting information. The four data entry forms are described below,
and an example is shown in Figure 2.2.2-2.

1. Class 1 and 2 pressure boundary components are defined by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) as follows: Class 1 includes all reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) components; Class 2 generally
includes systems or portions of systems important to safety that is designed for post-accident containment and
removal of heat and fission products.

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Figure 2.2.1-1: SCAP SCC event database opening screen

Figure 2.2.2-1: SCAP SCC event database relationships

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Figure 2.2.2-2: SCAP SCC event database – example of input format

Failure data input

This form defines the minimum data requirements. All data entry starts from here. It contains 35 fields,
including the plant’s name and operational state at the time of discovery of the event.
This allows differentiation between events with an operational impact, e.g. forced shutdown, and
those events discovered through scheduled or augmented inspections. It also contains information
regarding the event type, with a roll-down menu offering options such as a through-wall crack without
active leakage, a partial through-wall crack and different types of leaks.
Information regarding collateral damage related to operational events involving active through-wall
leakage is included. A menu defines the different corrective actions taken at the plant. A detailed
description of plant conditions prior to the event and plant response during the event, the method of
detection, and the corrective action plan are included in the event narrative field.
All the relevant information that characterises the degraded component is also included such as
code class, dimensions, base metal and weld metal material designation, mechanical properties, for
example yield strength and hardness, and the type of process medium at the time of detection.

Flaw characterisation
This form contains 11 fields with information that characterises the flaw (description, information
about size and further details according to the type of flaw).

ISI history
This form consists of four fields. While primarily intended for recording in-service inspection (ISI)
programme weaknesses, the free-format field may be used to document any information pertaining
to the ISI of the affected component, or ISI history such as the time of most recent inspection.

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Root-cause information
This form consists of 52 fields and includes information regarding the estimated age of the component,
i.e. the in-service life at the time of failure. If the affected component has a known repair or replacement
history this is to be taken into consideration.
A free-format field is provided to describe the location of failure, i.e. line or weld number or using a
piping and instrumentation (P&I) reference. Roll-down menus present different options for choosing
the method of detection, the apparent cause and contributing factors. Finally, a free-format field is
included to provide information relevant to the root-cause analysis and cause-consequence relationship.

2.2.3 Search capability

The SCAP SCC event database is a Structured Query Language (SQL) database designed for managing
relational information on stress corrosion cracking events. All fields in the database are searchable.
In its present form, the database structure supports two types of searches. First, the web-based
database allows searches for specific types of event reports based on plant type, plant name, event
date and event characteristics (e.g. flaw characteristics, SCC mechanism, component type, material).
Second, the SCAP SCC event database can be exported to a database platform such as Microsoft®
Access. Within the Access database platform queries may be defined to support amongst other things
statistical evaluations of the database content.

2.2.4 Limitations of the event database

It is a complicated task to establish a forum for the exchange of international event data.
Complications arise because of the different regulatory regimes and the proprietary nature of much of
the information relating to engineering activities that involve structural evaluation of flawed parts,
root-cause evaluation and ISI technology. Another basic problem is that reporting levels vary from
country to country and even over time in a given country. Experience has shown that this has resulted
in considerable difficulties to provide detailed or complete information about very early events.
There is now an awareness of the value of compiling such information and thus for more recent
events extensive information can often be collected. These difficulties are of course reflected in the
quality of the data and can reflect the usefulness of the event database for some applications in which
specific information is required but not available to the extent necessary.

2.2.5 Contents of the database

Event data
The general aim of SCC databases is to provide qualified data to form the basis for recommendations
concerning commendable practices that will help to establish optimised and improved ageing
management for light water reactors systems. Therefore priority should be directed to data on SSC in
which degradation, defects or failure could affect safe long-term operation or could lead to a
considerable burden regarding maintenance strategy, outage time or personnel exposure.
In order to develop the database and knowledge base for stress corrosion cracking, the event data
were collected and populated as follows:
• SCC data from OECD/NEA Piping Failure Data Exchange Project (OPDE) were extracted and
merged.
• Representative events were identified considering the importance of SSC such as reactor
vessel and vessel internals, Class 1 including the reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB)
components; Class 2 including systems or portions of systems important for safety designed
for post-accident containment and removal of heat and fission products.
• Entries for the events were completed, in particular representative events.
The SCAP event database contains more than 1 600 data records (see Figure 2.2.5-1). The event
database contains a number of representative events for which more extensive information has been
made available. There are approximately 20 representative BWR records of a total of 1 156 and

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Figure 2.2.5-1: Distribution of the data populated in the SCC database

15 representative PWR records of a total of 507. It should be noted that the contents of the OPDE and
SCAP SCC event databases are not the same since the fields differ to some extent. The contents for
BWR RPV internals in the SCC event database are shown in Table 2.2.5-1. The contents of the SCC
event database on PWR non-piping passive components are shown in Table 2.2.5-2. The differences in
the numbers in the text, tables and figures are due to the use of representative events. As described
above, these have been chosen as events for which a relatively complete set of information is
available, rather than for the most part the events for which much of the SCC specific information has
not yet been entered, or is not available.
A representative event is typical for several identical or very similar events and is intended to
contain all the relevant information and references for such events with information in the majority
of the fields. This allows similar events to be entered in a simplified format with only the basic
information and a note that they are coupled to the reference event.

Table 2.2.5-1: Contents for BWR RPV internals in SCC event database

Passive Component Category Passive Component Type No. of

(P-C-C) (P-C-T) records
Bolting 01
Control rod 03
Core shroud support 02
Core shroud tie rod (X-750) 01
Core shroud weld 51
BWR RPV internals In-core monitor housing 04
Core shroud head
01
Hold-down bolt
Core shroud access
01
Hole cover
Jet pump hold-down beam (X-750) 04
RPV internals – pipe weld 07
Total 75

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Table 2.2.5-2: Contents of SCC event database on PWR non-piping passive components

Passive Component Category Passive Component Type No. of

(P-C-C) (P-C-T) records
Bolting 007
Control rod guide tube support pin 007
CRDM housing/tube 013
PWR non-piping passive component In-core instrumentation tube 003
Pressuriser heater sleeve 063
RPV bottom head – BMI nozzle 002
RPV head penetration – VHP 126
Total 221

General information
General information includes both data and information on the following items for ageing management:
• regulation/codes and standards;
• inspection/monitoring/qualification;
• preventive maintenance/mitigation;
• repair/replacement;
• safety assessment;
• R&D (initiation/crack growth/fracture).
In addition, documents and reports published by regulators and technical support organisations
(TSO) and by operators in member countries have been collected and compiled. Two consultant
reports on IGSCC and PWSCC prepared by the expert consultants are included. One report covers
stress corrosion cracking of stainless steels in BWR. The report includes a historical review of SCC,
empirical correlations based on plant and laboratory experience, a quantitative understanding of the
mechanism of cracking, parametric dependencies of SCC under irradiated and un-irradiated conditions,
and a rationale for various mitigation actions. The other consultant report covers primary water stress
corrosion cracking of nickel-based alloys. The report includes a brief history of PWSCC in PWR, a
review of laboratory investigations on PWSCC of Alloys 600, 132, 182 and 82, an analysis of general
information on PWSCC and mitigation techniques for PWSCC.
Country reports on knowledge are another source of information prepared by members of the
SCC Working Group. Some country reports cover the general information on each SCC mechanism
and others cover information on each item of regulation/codes and standards, inspection/monitoring/
qualification, preventive maintenance mitigation, repair/replacement.

2.3 SCC knowledge base

2.3.1 Introduction
The structure of the knowledge base is illustrated in Figure 2.3.1-1. The knowledge base consists of the
event database, general information data and information on SCC mechanisms.
Country reports contain data and information on SCC operating experience and general
information. Some country reports cover the general information on each SCC mechanism, while
others cover information on individual SCC mechanism, regulatory framework and approaches, and
operators’ ageing management activities. The knowledge base also contains basic information on safety
assessment approaches, regulations/codes and standards, inspection, monitoring and qualification
practices, preventative maintenance, mitigation, repair and replacement, as well as R&D.
The future user of the SCC knowledge base can access the information regarding their home
country immediately, whilst having access to all the other information.

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Figure 2.3.1-1: SCC knowledge base web interface structure

SCC knowledge base General information Regulation/code and standard

Inspection/monitoring/qualification

Preventive maintenance/mitigation

Repair/replacement

Safety assessment

Research and development

IGSCC in austenite SS Regulation/code and standard

Inspection/monitoring/qualification

Preventive maintenance/mitigation

Safety assessment

Repair/replacement

Research and development

IGSCC in Ni-based alloys

PWSCC

IASCC

SICC

TGSCC

ECSCC

Corrosion fatigue

Consultant reports

Country reports
: Same basic structure

The general aim of the knowledge base is to provide a state-of-the-art description of the SCC
mechanisms treated and the main influencing factors, the affected locations of SSC, as well as the
strategies available for mitigation and repair. This information provides the basis to identify the
commendable practices useful for establishing AMP.
The knowledge base comprises information identified from the databases (events, operational
experience and recent findings), which is analysed and evaluated from the viewpoint of the
implementation of appropriate ageing management and maintenance activities.

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2.3.2 Search capability

An example of a knowledge base search result is shown in the Figure 2.3.2-1. The user can further
filter the search result by entering more specific search criteria using the advanced search option by
the document title (specify words to be found in the title), description (specify words to be found in
the document’s description), full text, status and document type (see Figure 2.3.2-2).

Figure 2.3.2-1: An example of a search result (search with the keyword “IGSCC”)

Figure 2.3.2-2: Advanced search function

2.3.3 SCC phenomena

SCC is an ageing mechanism that occurs at locations where there is a corrosive environment, where
material is susceptible and where there is sufficient tensile. This section gives a short description of
the different SCC phenomena that have occurred in LWR components.

Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of stainless steel

Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) is the dominant type of SCC in LWR. It first occurred in
the 1970s and continues to occur up to the present time.

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The IGSCC morphology was associated with the temperature/time fabrication conditions that
gave rise to thermal sensitisation and the formation of chromium carbide precipitation (e.g. M23C6)
and chromium depletion at the grain boundary. The reduction in chromium concentration adjacent to
the grain boundary gives rise to a reduction in passivity and makes the material susceptible to
intergranular stress corrosion cracking.
Since the late 1970s, the importance of water purity control became increasingly apparent,
especially with regard to creviced components (where the geometry and oxidising conditions in the
bulk environment could give rise to increased anionic activity in the creviced region), even though the
bulk water purity was acceptable at that time. This water purity aspect was of importance for
environmentally-assisted cracking of stainless steel and low alloy pressure vessel steels and
nickel-based alloys.
Subsequent to the introduction of low carbon and stabilised grades of stainless steel IGSCC has
occurred in these materials that were clearly not in a sensitised condition. It has been shown that
their susceptibility to IGSCC is due to cold work induced during fabrication. In many cases the initial
cracking was found to be initially transgranular then changing to an intergranular cracking mode. The
initial transgranular cracking is often associated with a surface layer of cold work induced by grinding.
Failures have also occurred where the occurrence of IGSCC was attributed to the presence of either
severe bulk cold-worked material (cold bent piping). The mechanism by which cold work renders
austenitic alloys susceptible to IGSCC in BWR environments is not fully understood and is still being
investigated. It is possible that there is an unfavourable interaction between deformation-induced
martensite, high residual stresses and strains, and localised deformation.
SCC seldom occurs in austenitic stainless steels under the PWR primary coolant water condition,
as the dissolved oxygen content of the PWR primary coolant system is normally controlled at an
extremely low level.

IGSCC of Ni-based alloy including PWSCC

In contrast to the IGSCC problems experienced in stainless steels in BWR systems, the same materials
used in PWR systems have experienced few problems.
However, nickel-based alloys, particularly Alloy 600, and weld metals 82,132 and 182, have proven
to be generically susceptible to IGSCC in normal specification PWR primary water systems. This is
commonly known as PWSCC. Recent operational experience shows that the fabrication-induced
residual stresses have a large influence on PWSCC in Alloy 600 weld metal. Examples of components
affected include pressuriser, hot leg, cold leg, steam generator drain, and reactor coolant pump
nozzle-to-safe end dissimilar metal welds, penetrations welded to the reactor vessel and reactor
vessel head and steam generator.
PWSCC in the weld metal grows along the grain boundaries of columnar crystal dendrite packets.
Initiation in the weld metal is often thought to be the result of typical and non-typical fabrication
processes leading to locally high residual stresses, or surface stresses from, for example, grinding.
To date, it has been found that the susceptibility to SCC of nickel-based alloy weld metal is higher
than that of the base metal.
IGSCC of Ni-based alloys in BWR is believed to be attributed to Cr depletion at grain boundaries,
similar to IGSCC in thermally sensitised stainless steels.
Corrosion-resistant Ni-based alloy has been used in the RV dissimilar metal weld because of the
thermal expansion rate compatibility. A limited number of events has occurred after relatively long
operational times (25 years or more) in BWR plants.

Irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC)

As with SCC, irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) requires stress, environment and a
susceptible material. In the case of IASCC, however, a normally non-susceptible material can be
rendered susceptible above a fluence threshold due to the accumulation of neutron irradiation. There
are increasing concerns that it might occur at high fluences if no mitigation measures are taken.
IASCC is an ageing mechanism that affects reactor vessel internals in both BWR and PWR plants.
Neutron irradiation effects are primarily thermal but, in the case of gamma heating of thick section,

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the higher temperatures generated can have a significant effect on void swelling. In addition, neutron
capture induces transmutation reactions and hence changes in chemical composition of the material.
Irradiation hardening and radiation-induced segregation (RIS), resulting in chromium depletion and
silicon enrichment at grain boundaries, are considered to be the most probable factors leading to
IASCC susceptibility.

Transgranular stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC)

As with other types of SCC, transgranular stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC) requires stress, an
aggressive environment and a susceptible material. It is often caused by chloride contamination or
other halide anions such as fluorides, and it can occur in materials in the solution heat-treated
condition. TGSCC occurs in all types of reactors.
It generally initiates on the outside surfaces of components mainly due to lack of attention to
adequate cleanliness (also known as external chloride stress corrosion cracking).
TGSCC has also occurred from inner surfaces, mainly in pipe sections containing stagnant
two-phase coolant, where evaporation and concentration of chlorides can occur. Wetting due to
condensation or nearby water leaks allows an aqueous environment to form that leads to TGSCC,
usually accompanied by pitting or crevice corrosion. The stress required for chloride-induced TGSCC
is relatively modest, the threshold being close to the proportional yield strength of solution annealed
austenitic stainless steels. Implementation of the known adequate procedures to ensure appropriate
surface cleanliness is a continuing necessity that requires careful management attention at all stages
of construction and operation of nuclear power plants.

External chloride stress corrosion cracking (ECSCC)

External chloride stress corrosion cracking (ECSCC) is normally a transgranular type of stress
corrosion cracking initiated on the outside surface of components due to contamination from saline
environments, high polymer products, etc., and even by human sweat.

Strain-induced corrosion cracking (SICC)

Strain-induced corrosion cracking (SICC) is used to refer to those corrosion situations in which the
presence of localised dynamic straining is essential for crack formation to occur, but in which cyclic
loading is either absent or restricted to a very low number of infrequent events. SICC have been
observed in particular in pressurised components in German NPP made of higher-strength ferritic
carbon steel.

Corrosion fatigue/environmentally-assisted fatigue

Corrosion fatigue or environmentally-assisted fatigue is the behaviour of materials under cyclic
loading conditions and is commonly considered as consisting of two broad categories of material
properties. One category relates to the cycling life for the formation of a fatigue crack in a smooth test
specimen, the so-called S-N fatigue properties. The second relates to the growth of a pre-existing
crack. Laboratory tests have shown that LWR coolant water can have a detrimental effect on both S-N
fatigue properties and fatigue crack growth.

2.3.4 Analysis of the event database

The contents of the event database are summarised in Table 2.3.4-1 for the different stress corrosion
cracking mechanisms in the different reactor types. The event database contains a number of
representative events for which more extensive information has been made available. There are
approximately 20 representative BWR records of a total of 1 156 and 15 representative PWR records of
a total of 507.
The SCC event database contains in principle data connected to reportable events supplemented
by additional technical information. To assist in the understanding of the flow of information the flow
charts for reportable events have been contributed to the knowledge base by the participating countries.
Three factors are critical in SCC and it can be avoided by eliminating at least one of these three
factors since there are some uncertainties in the specific mechanism; elimination of only one of the

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Table 2.3.4-1: Matrix of SCC mechanisms and major components

Plant type
SCC mechanism PHWR VVER
BWR PWR
(CANDU) (PWR)
IGSCC (SS, BWR) 1 027* – – –
IGSCC (SS, PWR) – 085 – 2
IGSCC (Ni-based alloy, incl. PWR) 0 017* 323 – –
ECSCC 0 027* 063 –
TGSCC (SS, ferritic steel) 0 050* 033 15 3
SICC 0 026* 001 01
IASCC 0 008* 002 1
Corrosion fatigue –
Total 1 155* 507 16 6

* All event records are for control rods.

three factors may not be sufficient. Therefore it is recommended if possible to eliminate at least two
SCC factors in order to improve the effectiveness of the mitigation method. This can also be achieved
by applying a combination of mitigation methods.
The commendable practices which can be identified from an analysis of the event database and the
general information comprising the knowledge base are discussed in Chapter 4 and not in Chapter 2,
so as to avoid repetition.

2.3.4.1 IGSCC of stainless steel

BWR plants have experienced a large number of IGSCC events in stainless steels. Figure 2.3.4.1-1
shows the historical summary of IGSCC in stainless steel components in BWR. Various kinds of
mitigation measures have been developed and applied. Figure 2.3.4.1-2 shows the number of reported
cracking incidents in the SCC database for BWR, PWR and CANDU as a function of the calendar year.

Figure 2.3.4.1-1: Historical summary of IGSCC for stainless steel components in BWR

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Figure 2.3.4.1-2: Number of reported cracking incidents in SCC database

for BWR, PWR and CANDU as a function of calendar year
200

Initial input from SCAP data base

180

160 BWR - 973 Records

CANDU - 17 Records
140

PWR - 435 Records

120

Mandated Inspections
100
No. of Data Records

(Would incident rate in earlier

80
years been greater if pipes
were inspected ? )
60

40

20

IGSCC is a cracking phenomenon occurring initially in 304 SS and other materials, which develops
along the grain boundaries. It occurs under synergistic effects of three factors in austenitic stainless
steel such as 304 SS with carbon content exceeding 0.03 wt.%. The three factors are: the material
sensitisation by heat input during welding, surface hardening heat treatment such as nitrising, etc.;
the residual stress caused by welding; and the water chemistry environment such as high dissolved
oxygen content, etc. However, in recent years, IGSCC has also been observed in non-sensitised
austenitic stainless steel, such as 316NG SS, 316L SS, etc., in nuclear components having improved
IGSCC resistance compared with 304 SS, owing to material surface hardening by machining and cold
work or surface residual stress resulting from cutting, grinding, etc.
Low-carbon stainless steel was developed and adopted considering the analysis results of IGSCC
initiation in 304 SS due to sensitisation and the corrective measures taken. In those days, it was
considered that the improvement of material only is sufficient to prevent SCC. However, many IGSCC
incidents occurred in low-carbon stainless steel. Accordingly, a combination of several technologies
was adopted instead of a single corrective measure to address potential SCC in a more effective
manner. For example, regarding SCC in low-carbon stainless steel, it was determined to reduce
residual stresses as well as to remove the surface hardened layer. By taking the measures to address
two of three factors causing SCC, the SCC initiation was successfully controlled.
Regarding inspection, in sizing SCC which has developed into stainless steel welds, the
requirements according to the Potential Drop (PD) system were imposed and thus a certain level of
accuracy can be maintained. In addition, utilities’ operating experience has shown that SCC may
arrest or the SCC propagation rate may significantly decline in the middle of the depth depending on
the residual stress and the configuration of the flaw.
It is desirable that SCC incidents at operating nuclear power plants and knowledge about SCC in
other countries be widely shared among the regulatory authorities, academia and industry so that
such experience and knowledge can be immediately incorporated into corrective actions, and that the
regulatory authorities, academia and industry will work closely to verify the validity of an evaluation
as soon as possible.

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Regarding IGSCC, many events have been observed and much research undertaken to understand
its mechanism on low carbon stainless steels. Based on the above background, preventive maintenance
measures (recommended practical actions) considering the possibility of IGSCC initiation and crack
growth are described below.

2.3.4.2 IGSCC of Ni-based alloy including PWSCC (PWR)

Historically, PWSCC first affected wrought Alloy 600 components and then spread to the compatible
weld metals Alloys 132/182, and, to a limited extent, to Alloy 82. Cracking in thick section wrought
Alloy 600 nozzles was first detected in pressuriser nozzles in the 1980s, spread to CRDM nozzles in the
1990s and then finally after 2000 to the compatible weld metals Alloys 132/182/82 (see Figure 2.3.4.2-1).
The SCC database contains over 200 records pertaining to PWSCC incidents in PWR primary circuits
since the mid 1980s. PWSCC has mostly affected components fabricated from wrought Alloy 600 and
its high strength analogue Alloy X750. However, increasingly the weld filler metals Alloys 132 and 182
are being affected by PWSCC together with a much small number of welds fabricated from Alloy 82.
A further general comment that can be made on the basis of the representative PWSCC events in the
database is that several different remedial techniques have been adopted that to some extent reflect
the regulations in force in different countries.

Figure 2.3.4.2-1: Historical summary of PWSCC in components of

wrought Inconel 600 based material and welds (Alloys 132, 182 and 82)

The PWSCC records in the database can be analysed to reveal the most vulnerable locations and
occurrence rates in the PWR primary circuit. Tables 2.3.4.2-1 and 2.3.4.2-2 summarise the wrought
Alloy 600 and Alloy 132/182/82 welds affected by PWSCC for, respectively, RPV, steam generators,
pressurisers and primary circuit penetrations. The last group listed in Table 2.3.4.2-1 essentially only
concerns B&W and combustion engineering design PWR. It is not immediately apparent from these
tables how important a role surface finish has played in the incidence of PWSCC and this can only be
deduced by reading the narrative accounts in the event database and associated publications.
Consequently, mitigation methods for components that are not too severely cracked as to warrant
repair or replacement concentrate on improving surface finish and residual stress state.
It can be seen immediately in Tables 2.3.4.2-1 and 2.3.4.2-2 with some reservations relating to
CRDM nozzles in RPV upper heads, that there is a very strong influence of operating temperature on
the incidence rate of PWSCC. Nevertheless, Alloy 600 and Alloys 182/132 have cracked at cold leg
temperatures, albeit at a significantly lower incidence rate.

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Table 2.3.4.2-1: Distribution of RPV Ni-based components

and welds with known indications attributed to PWSCC

Material affected Number

Component Temp °C
Wrought Weld cracked
CRDM nozzles Alloy 600 – 288-318 044
CRDM nozzles and J-groove welds Alloy 600 Alloy 182 289-318 191
CRDM J-groove welds Alloy 182 307-317 008
Thermocouple nozzles and head vents Alloy 600 311-317 019
BMI nozzles Alloy 600 288 001
BMI nozzles and J-groove welds Alloy 600 Alloy 182 294 002
Hot leg nozzle butt welds Alloy 182/82 319-325 007
Cold leg nozzle butt welds Alloy 132 290 007
Split pins Alloy X-750 320 Multiple

Table 2.3.4.2-2: Distribution of steam generator Ni-based

components with known indications attributed to PWSCC
Material affected Number
Component Temp °C
Wrought Weld cracked
Tube sheet cladding Alloy 82 321-323 001
Tube sheet cladding Alloy 600 – 326 008
Channel head and manway drain in
– Alloy 182/82 290-325 008
J-groove welds
Partition (divider) plate (stub) Alloy 600 – 321-323 005
SG inlet nozzle butt welds – Alloy 132 319-325 016
Tube to tube sheet welds – Alloy 82? 325 196

The reasons why the effect of temperature appears to be much less apparent in the case of CRDM
nozzles and J-welds could be related in part to the uncertainty in the actual temperature of operation
in so-called “cold” upper heads. The primary water that circulates into the upper head may,
depending on the particular plant design, originate from the hot leg or the cold leg. In the former case,
there is no uncertainty as to the temperature of the CRDM nozzles and J-welds on the underside of the
upper head, but in the latter case, an experience has certainly indicated that there is significant
uncertainty, which may be due to convection effects from the mass of hot leg water below the upper
core internals support plate. Another location where there could be similar uncertainty in the actual
temperature of the component is the steam generator channel head drain nozzle, which, depending
on design, is often located beneath a small hole in the divider plate at the bottom of the channel head.
In any event, the apparent lack of a strong effect of temperature in the operating experience of
Alloy 600 CRDM nozzle cracking was also significantly affected by other highly distributed parameters,
such as intrinsic material susceptibility and residual fabrication stress.
Another observation that can be made on the data shown in Tables 2.3.4.2-1 and 2.3.4.2-2 is that,
in Alloy 182/82 welds, cracking is usually believed to have initiated in the Alloy 182 part of a weld and
then propagated, seemingly without difficulty, into the Alloy 82 part of the weld. However, as mentioned
earlier, there are a very small number of PWSCC events that have without doubt initiated in Alloy 82.
These cases appear to be characterised by design features or weld repairs that severely exacerbated
residual fabrication stresses.
The evolution of PWSCC in Alloy 600 components with operating time and its dependence on
stress, surface finish, material susceptibility and temperature have already been addressed. Similar
predictive tools have not yet been developed for Alloys 132/182/82 although crack growth equations
are available for conservatively evaluating the future growth of any defects found by non-destructive
examination.
The event database can be used to examine the evolution of detectable cracking with operating
time in Alloy 132/182/82 welds. However, some reliance has to be placed on judgments from the
original failure analyses as to whether PWSCC initiated first in Alloy 600 or in Alloy 132/182/82 where

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both were present and cracked in the same affected component. This approach updates an analysis
where 148 cases of PWSCC initiation in Alloys 132/182/82 welds were plotted as the cumulative
number of cracking incidents as a function of effective full power hours. Interestingly, the continuous
evolution of cracking revealed then and by the updated plots based on 161 cases shown in
Figures 2.3.4.2-2 and 2.3.4.2-3 were uncorrected for operating temperature differences.

Figure 2.3.4.2-2: Operating times to observation of defects attributed to

PWSCC in Alloy 132/182 welds with no correction for operating temperature

120
RPV CRDM welds (290°C-318°C)
RPV BMI welds (290°C)
RPV nozzles welds (290-326°C)
100 PRZ nozzles welds (340-345°C)
RCS + DHR nozzles welds (290°C-325°C)
Cumulative number of cracked welds

SG Cladding (325°C)
SG drains welds (290-325°C)
80 SG nozzles welds (320-325°C)

60

40

20

0
10000 100000 1000000

Operating time (EFPH)

Figure 2.3.4.2-3: Operating times to observation of defects attributed to PWSCC

in Alloy 132/182 welds by weld type with no correction for operating temperature
120
Butt welds
110 J-Welds
Cladding
100

90
Cumulative number of cracked welds

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
10000 100000 1000000

Operating time (EFPH)

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If temperature compensation is attempted, the development of cracking is then no longer a

continuo function of operating time. This is probably due both to uncertainties in certain operating
temperatures, as already discussed, and secondly to a dominating influence of the distribution of
residual fabrication stresses that can mask the effect of temperature. Nevertheless, the conclusion
from Figures 2.3.4.2-2 and 2.3.4.2-3 is that PWSCC of Alloy 132/182/82 weld metals is a slowly
developing generic materials ageing problem.
Replacement of upper heads with Alloy 690 CRDM nozzles welded with Alloys 152/52 has been
the almost universal response to PWSCC of the original upper heads with Alloy 600 CRDM nozzles
welded with Alloy 182/132. Temporary internal overlay coatings have also been applied using
Alloys 152/52 while new replacement upper heads are procured.
Small Alloy 600 nozzles attached by Alloy 182/132 J-welds in pressurisers and steam generators
have generally been replaced where necessary using Alloy 690 or stainless steel nozzles and matching
weld metals, a temper bead welding method being necessary for attachments to the low alloy steel.
On the other hand, so-called half-nozzle repairs, again using Alloy 690 and Alloy 152, have been
adopted to add a supplementary pressure boundary on the exterior surface of RPV for the small
number of cases on BMI nozzle cracking that have been encountered so far.
External full structural weld overlays have been widely deployed as a preventative measure for
nickel-based butt welds, particularly in the United States, where the overlay adds PWSCC-resistant
material (Alloy 52/52M) as well as produces compressive residual stresses on the internal diameter.
MSIP is another technique that produces compression on the inner surface of the component through
a squeezing operation. To date operational experience in both BWR and PWR is that there have been
no crack growths in welds containing flaws and repaired by weld overlay or MSIP. Spool piece inserts
welded with Alloy 152/52 have been used to replace major RPV and steam generator nickel-based butt
welds affected by PWSCC. Inlays using Alloys 152/52 are another method available to isolate original
Alloy 132/182/82 butt welds from the PWR primary water environment.
Measures such as shot peening, water jet peening, and laser stress improvement to improve the
surface stress condition of the original Alloy 132/182/82 welds when a flaw is detected but is not of a
size that welding repair is necessary, can be used as mitigation techniques.
Finally, the widespread occurrence of PWSCC of CRDM guide tube split pins fabricated from the
high-strength Alloy X750 have been replaced either with pins manufactured from the same material
with an improved heat treatment plus design changes to reduce stress concentrations and improve
surface finish, or with strain-hardened Type 316 stainless steel. The latter solution necessitates a
design change to compensate for the lower strength of strain-hardened Type 316 stainless steel as
compared to Alloy X750.
The terminology PWSCC has in some instances been used erroneously to describe cracking of a
few stainless steel components where there was no direct evidence of chemical contamination of the
PWR primary water environment. (Most cracking in stainless steel components in PWR has been
attributed to the presence of anionic contaminants such as chloride and sulphate together with
trapped air bubbles in dead legs after refuelling.) In fact, previous diagnoses of these incidents
involving stainless steel, especially in pressurisers, were attributed to a combination of the presence
of sensitised or cold-worked stainless steels with operational practices that involved injecting
inadequately de-aerated boric acid and/or activity reduction practices involving oxygenation using
hydrogen peroxide of the primary circuit during cool-down. It can be noted that around half the PWR
fleets in the USA and France no longer de-aerate boric acid and demineralised water storage tanks as
the original vendors intended. It is not clear that initiation of stress corrosion cracking can occur in
PWR primary water, but it is clear that stress corrosion cracks can propagate in that environment.
Work to further investigate this is in progress. Cleanliness and limiting surface abrasion are very
important factors in addition to operational practices.
Recent operational experiences in Japan and overseas show that the residual stress from
mechanical work and welding has big influence on PWSCC in Alloy 600 series weld metal.
Based on this standpoint, this report addresses commendable practices against PWSCC in 600
series nickel-based alloy weld metal of nozzles and penetrations which are welded to the reactor
vessel (RV), reactor vessel head (VH), steam generator (SG) and pressuriser (Prz) of PWR.

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The United States NRC defined the effective degradation year (EDY) as a function of effective full
power years (EFPY) and RV head top operating temperature to estimate the timing of PWSCC
occurrence. The NRC assumes that the susceptibility to PWSCC initiation increases as EDY becomes
larger. In Japan, temperature-accelerated constant load tests of base metal were conducted and the
test result was used to develop an equation to estimate the timing of PWSCC as a function of applied
stress and RPV head top operating temperature. However, PWSCC in the weld metal grows along the
grain boundaries of columnar crystal. PWSCC initiation in the weld metal is suspected to have been
caused by defective welding application and high residual stress on the surface due to grinding.
Therefore, the frequency of PWSCC initiation may increase depending on the operating years, service
temperature and stress. It is expected that the susceptibility to SCC of nickel-based alloy weld metal is
higher than that of base metal.
Considering that the possibility of PWSCC initiation in nickel-based alloy increases as a plant
ages and that PWSCC susceptibility of weld metal is higher than that of base metal, it is desirable that
inspection should be conducted in an assured manner and Alloy 600 components should be replaced
with corrosion-resistant Alloy 690 components as necessary. At the same time, it is necessary to
improve the inspection accuracy so that PWSCC can be detected at an early stage. For example, the
detection ability of ultrasonic testing and eddy current examination techniques needs to be improved
and technologies applicable to narrow gaps need to be developed. In addition, research on the
estimation of the timing of PWSCC initiation both in base metal and weld metal should be promoted
while collecting new knowledge about PWSCC world wide. At the same time, it is necessary to work
on the establishment of evaluation techniques, including the improvement of detection ability and
accuracy in estimating the propagation rate. In addition, repair and replacement methods, including
peening and stress improvement, should be developed.
For feedback to another structure system and component, it is recommended to make analysis
and evaluation based on the event database and knowledge base of OECD/NEA SCAP, to review
inspection, evaluation, repair, replacement and preventive maintenance.
The SCAP SCC event database also allows the practical repair, replacement and maintenance
strategies adopted in various countries to combat PWSCC in nickel-based components to be catalogued
and compared. A summary is shown in Table 2.3.4.2-3. Two zones where repairs have either not been
necessary to date or are not known to have been implemented at the time of writing are, respectively,
core radial supports (no cracks reported) and steam generator divider plates, even if cracking has been
observed in divider plates.

2.3.4.3 IASCC
Irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) is a mode of the ageing mechanism in which
cracking occurs in BWR and PWR core internals when the component is irradiated to high fluence.

PWR
As shown in Figure 2.3.4.3-1 and Table 2.3.4.3-1 only a few events attributed to IASCC have been
reported in the event database. In the 1980s, inspections of older French PWR revealed cracking in
baffle-former bolts. The bolts were made of type 316 cold-worked (CW) stainless steels. They were
damaged by intergranular cracking. Normally, AISI 316 steel is not prone to IGSCC in the PWR primary
coolant environment and all the bolts cracked were predominantly located in the second and third
rows from the bottom, where the highest neutron fluence is expected. This demonstrated that the
neutron irradiation played a significant role in this cracking, even though the detailed mechanism is
as yet unknown. Until now, baffle-former bolt cracking was mainly observed in the “down-flow”
design of reactor vessel internals (RVI) either before or after the conversion to “up-flow”.
As a proactive countermeasure against baffle-former bolt damage, two different measures were
applied to PWR plants. The first measure was to replace baffle-former bolts by bolts with a better
mechanical design. All the baffle-former bolts made of AISI 347 stainless steel have been replaced in
Japan by new ones made of 316 CW stainless steel. The second approach was to replace all the reactor
vessel internals. Lower internals including baffle-former bolts and upper internals were replaced in
four PWR plants in Japan.

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Table 2.3.4.2-3: Summary of repair, replacement and preventative

techniques for PWSCC recorded in the SCAP SCC event database
Component Core
Reactor pressure vessel Pressuriser Steam generator
internals

Complete steam
Radial supports

head nozzles
Lower head

generators

Inlet/outlet

Channel
Nozzles
nozzles

nozzles

sleeves

nozzles

Divider
Heater
Upper
head

plate
Split
RPV

pins
Technique
Replacement FJSU FJKSU F FU FGJKSU KSU
Spool piece U J J
replacement
Cutting, drilling, JSU U J
grinding
Temper bead JU JU FJ SU
welding
MSIP U
Overlay clad U U U
(external, full
structural)
Overlay clad U U
(internal)
Inlay clad (internal) JS J
Half nozzle repair U
Seal welding JU
Shot peening J U
Water jet peening J J
Laser stress J
improvement
Key: Technique applied in F = France, G = Germany, J = Japan, K = Korea, S = Sweden, U = USA.

Figure 2.3.4.3-1: One of the field experiences of IASCC

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Table 2.3.4.3-1: IASCC experiences example in France, USA and Korea

BWR
As shown in Table 2.3.4.3-1, in BWR, several events involving IASCC in control rods have been
reported in the event database but no events of IASCC in core shrouds have been reported. It is well
known that several plants in the US and in Japan have experienced cracking in their core shrouds, and
it is to be expected that some of these will be added to the event database in the future.

2.3.4.4 Transgranular stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC)

Chloride-induced TGSCC can also initiate on the inner surface, generally in regions of stagnant fluid,
such as dead legs, due to concentration of chloride and oxygen ions. An area that has been damaged
rather frequently in PWR is the CRDM seal, known as the canopy seal. It seals the pressure boundary
of threaded joint of the control rod drive housings located above the reactor pressure vessel upper
head. Trapped air bubbles, when the reactor pressure vessel is open during refuelling, are unable to
be removed by inadequate de-oxygenation processes since the pathway to the reactor vessel is
complicated. Plant start-up procedures to eliminate these air pockets may vary among operators, but
completing the final fill of the primary loop after connection of a vacuum pump to the upper head
penetration has been acknowledged to be the most reliable method. Small bore piping is another
component that has been subjected to TGSCC (see Figure 2.3.4.4-1).

2.3.4.5 External chloride stress corrosion cracking (ECSCC)

External chloride stress corrosion cracking initiates on the outer surface of austenitic stainless steel
components mainly due to lack of attention to adequate cleanliness. It is called external chloride SCC
(ECSCC). Wetting due to condensation or nearby water leakage allows developing an aqueous
environment that leads to TGSCC which is usually accompanied by pitting or crevice corrosion. The
stress level required for initiation of chloride-induced TGSCC is relatively modest; the threshold being
close to the elastic limit of solution annealed austenitic stainless steels. The only known measure to
maintain sufficient surface cleanliness is continuous attention by management at all stages of
construction and during operation of the nuclear power plant.

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Figure 2.3.4.4-1: Historical summary of TGSCC in German plants

ECSCC is transgranular type stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC) initiated for the reason that chlorine
in the sea salt grains, high polymer products, etc., attach to the material surfaces. It has been initiated
for the reason that the outside surfaces of components are not kept properly clean, then further
contaminated with chlorides. These chlorides are then dissolved by dewing, deliquesce with the
humidity in the air, etc., and the environment which contains chloride ions on the material surfaces
is produced.
With this in mind, and as mentioned above, preventive maintenance measures (recommended
practical actions) with respect to ECSCC initiation and crack growth are as follows.
Materials used for storage or curing during construction or maintenance and repair work have
also been reported to cause TGSCC. Therefore the amount of halides should be controlled within the
allowable level. In particular poly vinyl chloride (PVC) tape should not be used in contact with
stainless steels. If PVC tape is used, special care should be taken to clean the surface after it has been
removed. The selection of lubricants for bolt tightening should be made taking into account the
possibility of SCC initiation. Other factors of importance are the presence of halides and the
prevention of dew condensation inside the containment.

2.3.4.6 Stress-induced corrosion cracking (SICC)

In contrast to practice in other countries, relatively high-strength steels were widely used for the
construction of steam and feedwater piping in the 1970s. From the mid-1970s cracks were found in
several BWR plants, which were categorised as SICC (see Figure 2.3.4.6-1). This led to the introduction
of the basic safety concept in Germany, i.e. the use of steels with high fracture toughness and
moderate strength is required among others.
An extensive replacement action was performed in five operating German BWR for the piping
inside the pressure-retaining boundary. Between 1980 and 1985 all high-strength steels were replaced
there by steels of high fracture toughness with restricted chemical composition. Up to now the new
piping has been behaving as expected, i.e. no further cracking has occurred.
In contrast, piping systems in the turbine hall made by high-strength ferritic steels were not
replaced at that time. In the 1980s a programme was performed to investigate the critical boundary
conditions for SICC. Based on the results of this programme, pipe sections in the turbine building
sensitive to SICC were identified. These pipe sections are the object of supplementary examinations.
Several operational and systems engineering provisions were implemented to avoid the critical

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Figure 2.3.4.6-1: Historical summary of SICC in ferritic steel piping of German plants

boundary conditions, such as reduction of the oxygen content in the water phase during start-up and
avoidance of corrosion during the shutdown period. In most cases, partial replacement or local repair
was performed.
However, some incidents of minor safety significance occurred due to SICC outside the
containment even in the 1990s, which indicates that the issue has not yet been completely solved.

2.3.4.7 Corrosion fatigue/environmentally-assisted fatigue

Results from laboratory tests generally reveal a detrimental effect of BWR and PWR water environments
on the fatigue lives of specimens made from carbon steels, low-alloy steels, austenitic stainless steels
and nickel (Ni)-based alloys. The parameters predominantly affecting the fatigue life of laboratory
specimens are strain rate, temperature, dissolved oxygen concentration in the water and sulphur
content of the material, the latter of which is only applicable for carbon steels and low alloy steels.
The detrimental effects of reactor environments on fatigue lives have been known for more than
30 years. Reactor coolant pressure boundary components exposed to the reactor water environment
have exhibited degradation due to environmentally enhanced fatigue in service. In all these cases,
unacceptable component fabrication, material selection, or plant operation (and combinations of these)
were identified as root causes leading to the degradation. Significant large-scale, generic degradation
due to environmental fatigue has not been observed in service even though environmental effects due
to the impact of light water reactor (LWR) coolant were not explicitly considered in current design
rules. NRC investigation of the risk associated with corrosion fatigue in the Fatigue Action Plan
concluded that there was no inherent risk to core damage frequency for operating nuclear reactors,
although increased probability of leakage indicates this issue requires management for extended
plant operation [16-18].
Limited observations of cracking due to corrosion fatigue stand in contrast to significant
occurrences of stress corrosion cracking in stainless steels and Ni-based alloys, which have been
observed more systematically in reactor coolant pressure boundary welds and reactor internals from
LWR plant operational experience world wide.
The lack of significant observed degradation in plant components with regard to corrosion
fatigue is attributed, at least in part, to the generally conservative design requirements adopted within
the ASME Code and applicable regulations (e.g. the NRC’s requirement to keep the cumulative usage
factor less than 0.1 for break exclusion locations). Margins in the design requirements appear to
compensate for the detrimental environmental effects.

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Another consideration when comparing the environmental effects between laboratory and service
components is the applied loading associated with pressure and thermal transients. Laboratory
testing typically relies on simple mechanically-controlled loading transients (e.g. artificially shaped
waves), and may arguably include some amount of compensation for the effects of more complex
thermal transient loading. Additionally, plant components are often subjected to thermal transients
with long-lasting hold times at almost constant load or temperature corresponding to steady-state
operating conditions which may lead to some strain recovery within the component. These differences
should be taken into consideration because they can significantly affect fatigue lives.
Currently, different regulatory approaches are being pursued or initiated to explicitly address
environmental effects as part of component fatigue design in countries with operating nuclear power
plants (NPP), especially as longer-term operation of NPP is considered. These approaches are based on
use of existing environmental factors derived from previous laboratory test programmes, reduced
environmental factors based on tests that attempt to more accurately simulate plant loading and
environmental conditions, or predicted “attention factors” of cumulative usage factor (CUF). Once a
component exceeds the attention factor, additional measures are applied.

2.3.5 Analysis of general information

2.3.5.1 Regulations/codes and standards
In most countries information regarding regulations, codes and standards is fairly general with respect
to requirements to prevent corrosive influences. Detailed information is partly contained in regulatory
documents which have often been generated over the course of event evaluations, such as information
notices, generic letters, bulletins, decisions, etc. These documents are of prime importance, because
they contain actual regulatory positions and are updated if new information becomes available, for
example in the course of root cause analysis or further events.
The national systems to incorporate lessons learned from experience in revised codes and
standards are different, and it sometimes takes more than one revision period to incorporate the new
information. This reflects the situation that codes and standards are based on consolidated knowledge
and broad acceptance within the technical community.
The analysis of the information supplied by the participants and complementary sources like
NEA and IAEA reports can be summarised as follows.
Prevention and mitigation of component degradation caused by SCC mechanisms has been dealt
with in general terms during the construction and licensing phase of NPP. Today’s regulatory
documents and safety standards as listed in the knowledge base country reports reflect the operating
experience and component degradation observed. Most countries have national regulatory documents
requiring or giving guidance for ageing management and/or safe long-term operation.
Event reporting systems are in place in all countries. Flow charts describing the information
flow within a country and interactions between the parties involved as well as the international
organisations are stored in the KB. Regarding the reporting criteria it is well known that there are
different practices in the different countries with changes over the time to adapt to experience and
regulatory developments. SCC events in Class 1 components will be reported in all countries.

2.3.5.2 Inspection/monitoring/qualification
Inspection and monitoring techniques applied in the past have undergone many developments.
Today most countries use ultrasonic and eddy current testing techniques and have established
qualification procedures to ensure reliable detection of cracks. Some countries require test pieces with
“natural” crack morphology in the qualification process, reflecting the experience that artificial cracks
or notches may not be adequate to achieve the detection capability desired.
The applicable codes and standards and regulatory documents for the inspection of pressure
boundary components and internal structures for SCC mechanisms are identified in the knowledge base
in the country reports. The information regarding the qualification of non-destructive examination
(NDE) systems are summarised as a separate table in the knowledge base web interface.

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The operators shall perform inspection of vessels, pipes and other components specified by the
codes and standards of academic societies in order to comply with the requirements in the laws and
regulations. Besides those inspections, and in the event SCC is detected, the regulatory authority may
require the operators to implement special inspection by specifying the concerned sections made of
material susceptible to SCC, timing of inspection and inspection methods considering previous
actions taken by domestic and overseas NPP to address detected SCC.
The determination of special inspection depends on incidents of SCC in material for which SCC
has been hardly observed, validation of the applicability of new flaw detection and evaluation methods,
and safety significance of a flaw which is different from previous cases. However, the regulatory
authority may take flexible actions by specifying the timing and start of inspection period according to
the extent of measures to be taken to address SCC in the concerned section. In order to ensure such
flexibility in special inspection for SCC, both the regulatory authority and operators should work
on collecting data from operating experiences which show the countermeasures against SCC and
their validity.
Regarding regulatory requirements, operators conduct inspections of vessels and piping based on
the code and standards. In some cases, extended inspections are required based on the regulatory
practices that instruct location, timing, scope and methods of inspection as the feedback of operating
experiences of observation of SCC domestically and overseas.
In these cases, materials and characterisation for which SCC has not yet been observed,
application and validity of detection and evaluation methods on SCC and so on are considered.
However, there are some exemptions that flexible actions for location, timing, scope and methods of
inspection are applied by the extent of SCC countermeasure. In these cases, it is of importance to
populate the operating experience data to confirm the SCC countermeasures and their validity and
effectiveness.
It is necessary to make the AMP appropriate to the ageing mechanism (e.g. those common to
member countries or key to the maintenance of individual ageing mechanism) and the improvement
of AMP (e.g. six attributes of an effective ageing management programme).
It is one of key points that more sophisticated ageing management is to undertake timely and
adequate maintenance activities in compliance with the age specific to each plant. Another one is
harmonisation of maintenance and ageing management activities from plant construction. The
following ageing management is conducted:
• ageing management from the early stage of NPP operation;
• ageing management every 10 years within the framework of PSR;
• ageing management before the operation for 30 years and following every 10 years.
The inspection methods for each SCC mechanism are described in the paragraph of inspection/
monitoring/ qualification in Section 2.3.3 (SCC mechanism).
For the development of an adequate inspection and ageing management programme the extent
of information available from surveillance and monitoring systems as well as the population of
systems, structures and components involved is to be considered. Specifically for a small population
of systems, structures and components being operated under similar conditions the international
exchange of operating and inspection experience as it is achieved by SCAP is of importance to
broaden the knowledge of the issue.
Regarding methods for inspection, signal processing, evaluation and interpretation of results,
further improvements are to be expected in the coming decades as was the case in the past driven by
technological developments in the NDE area. The inspection of areas where previous inspections have
been performed with different techniques may deliver results which are difficult to evaluate without
knowing the details of different inspection techniques. Therefore the documentation of the inspection
method applied and qualification procedures used is important and need to be maintained.

2.3.5.3 Preventative maintenance/mitigation and repair/replacement

It has been requested to conduct ageing management based on combination of check/ inspection and
preventive maintenance in a planned manner and to prepare the plan based on data of past inspection

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and the results of research and development. Evaluation items such as the philosophy of check/
inspection and preventive maintenance, methods, plan and its performance are addressed in the
ageing management related manual. Therefore, current knowledge on these items was analysed and
summarised.
For preventive maintenance, mitigation, repair and replacement, it is effective that one of three
SCC factors at least is excluded. However, it is not sufficient to exclude only one of the three SCC
factors because the mechanisms of some SCC are uncertain.
When selecting the combination of preventive maintenance, mitigation, repair and replacement
measures, it is desired to consider the extent of understanding of related SCC, technology level
applicable to plants, operating experiences and regulatory framework. In many countries, however,
ageing management is conducted taking these factors into account.
Table-2.3.5.3-1 shows an example of the preventive maintenance, mitigation and repair techniques.
As described in the section on inspection/monitoring/qualification, there are practices based on the
latest knowledge such that flexible practices on inspection timing and scope are conducted by the
extent of preventive maintenance, replacement and repair applied.

2.3.5.4 Safety assessment

Regarding ageing management on SCC, it is necessary to conduct periodic evaluations taking into
account the characteristics of ageing mechanisms; inspection from the early stage of plant operation,
about a ten-year evaluation within the framework of periodic safety reviews and in some countries an
evaluation before the end of 30 years’ operation and then every 10 years.
As for inspection from the early stage of operation, flaw evaluating or integrity evaluation is
carried out when the SCC is detected in the inspection. For ageing technical evaluation, especially
IASCC, ageing mechanism trend evaluations are conducted to assess the occurrence of prediction and
the postulated flaw on the location where the cumulative neutron fluence is predicted to exceed the
threshold at 30 years operation. In this case, maintenance performance over the past ten years,
maintenance at 30 years and current maintenance at 40 years are compared.
There are some cases, based on the prediction of possibility of occurrence, the location and
frequency of inspection were prepared and other cases crack growth evaluation for the crack detected
were conducted. In these safety evaluations, it is important to predict and identify the location where
the possibility of SCC occurrence may be, and of importance to collect and analysis of data and to
develop the prediction and evaluation methods on SCC.
In operating nuclear power plants active degradation mechanisms exist, although they were not
anticipated when the plants were designed. Regulations in the different countries define the principles
and provide guidance concerning the steps to be taken to assure the integrity of components. The
principles vary considerably from detailed clarification of the root cause of any defects detected,
expanded inspection programmes to identify defects in comparable components, or to confirm that
no are present, assess and implement repair methods, flaw evaluation using standardised analysis
methods.
When defects are found the first step is the identification of possible root causes. In some cases,
use of different inspection methods can help in this process by better defining the flaw. Final
clarification is often only achieved by taking boat samples or a micro-printing method called SUMP
and carrying out metallography. Previous inspection records and operating experience are often
reviewed as part of this process. It is then necessary to determine whether the component can remain
in operation for a limited period of time or whether it must be repaired or replaced immediately.
In most countries, defect assessment methods are addressed in regulatory documents (codes,
standards, guides, etc.) as partly referenced in the knowledge base. The documents provide guidance
regarding evaluation of acting stresses, including residual stresses, the estimation of flaw geometry
based on the inspection results, crack growth laws and duration of the operating time the assessment
should cover. Physically based models are still at the stage of scientific development. Due to the
number of variables involved as well as dependencies and correlations, further R&D efforts are
ongoing as shown in Section 2.3.5.5. Common to all such evaluation methods is the need for propagation
rates in the specific material/environment combination. It is generally accepted that propagation rates
should be based on quality assured data whenever possible.

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Table 2.3.5.3-1: Preventive maintenance, mitigation and repair techniques

Technique BWR PWR

• SG: from 600/CS to 690
• Instrument tubes
• From 321 to 347 NG
• Pressuriser nozzles for instrumentation
• From 304 to 316 L/NG
Alloy 600 to 316
• Improved heat treatment of X-750
• Pzr heater sleeves 600 to 690
• Alloy 600: Modified Alloy 600
Material change • RV nozzle (VC summer)
(Nb added)
• X-750 AH to improved version X-750
• XM19
(support pin of CI)
• Austenitic stainless steel with low-carbon
• X-750 to CW316 SS
grades
• Minimum ferrite of 7.5% in weld metal and
CASS
• Sleeving 690 SG (SG tube)
• Plating (Ni)
Isolation technique • Corrosion-resistant cladding • Coating (cold spray)
• Cladding
• Weld inlay
• From Nb containing 182 to high Cr and Nb
Weld material containing 82 • From 82/182 to 52/152
change • High ferrite content weld metal • Inlays
(more than 5%)
• Design changes of core internals
• Down-flow to up-flow conversion
• Bolting design changes, e.g. head-shank
Reducing number of welds by using induction
Design change radii, thread details
bend pipes or forged materials
• Water pass holes in baffle formers
• Shape of the head-shank curve of baffle
bolts
• Induction heat stress improvement (IHSI)
• Peening [laser peening (LP), water jet
peening (WJP), shot peening (SP), ultra • MSIP
sonic peening (USP)] • Peening (WJP, SP, USP)
• Mechanical stress improvement process • Laser
Stress improvement (MSIP) • Cavitations/water jet
• Polishing (N stripping) • L-SIP
• Post-weld heat treatment (PWHT) • In situ heat treatment
• Solution heat treatment (SHT) • Surface buffing
• Improved weld preparation (including
narrow gap welding, heat sink welding)
• Hydrogen water chemistry (HWC) • Inhibitor application (secondary system)
Environment • Noble metal chemical addition (NMCA) • Zinc addition
improvement • Noble metal cladding (NMCL) • Optimised hydrogen xx
• TiO2 injection • Temperature reduction
• Tie rod
• Clamp
• Half nozzle repair (BMI nozzle)
• Bracket
• Tie rod repair
Mechanical • Roll repair (tube expansion)
• Repair weld
Repair

repair • Crack removal [electric discharge

• Drilling (BMI nozzle)
machining (EDM), drilling, grinding]
• Capping (BMI nozzle)
• Shape memory alloy (SMA) coupling
• Crack removal (EDM)
• Supplement wedge
• Weld over lay (WOL)
• Weld over lay (WOL)
Weld
• Repair weld

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For stainless steels and nickel-based alloys the flaw acceptance criteria are generally based on
limit load analysis reflecting the ductile characteristics of the materials involved. Following the
concept applied in the design to demonstrate the integrity of components of operational and design
basis accident loads.
Regarding IASCC, it is considered that possibility of occurrence is less if the fluence does not
exceed the threshold value, it is requested to conduct maintenance taking cumulative fluence into
account. For PWR, it is anticipated that some location (e.g. baffle former bolts) with the high potential
of IASCC might occur in the extent of no affect to the intended function of components when the
neutron fluence exceeds the threshold. Therefore, as with the ageing management, it is requested to
conduct evaluations and predictions of the cumulative fluence at locations with a high potential of
occurrence and to perform appropriate measurement near the threshold value.

2.3.5.5 Research and development

Research and development efforts are ongoing in most countries with the goal to improve
understanding of the initiation and propagation processes associated with the different types of stress
corrosion cracking and also for preventive maintenance/mitigation and repair/replacement. Research
and development is carried out by industry, regulators and academia. Extensive efforts are also under
way to develop inspection and monitoring techniques, repair and replacement methods, mitigation
and preventative maintenance programmes, component integrity assessment technologies, and
the necessary data to enable the performance of safety analyses. The outcomes of research and
development should be the seeds for the knowledge base and further commendable practices may be
identified from the knowledge base. The results of such research and development will be reflected in
the commendable practices and also be further reflected in revisions of regulations and codes and
standards in the different countries.
To ensure that research and development is relevant and cost effective it is important that
experience feedback is incorporated into the planning. One of the main sources of such relevant
information can be obtained from a thorough root cause analysis. This is particularly true when stress
corrosion cracking is found in an unexpected location or material/environment combination. With the
establishment of the SCC event and knowledge databases new sources of experience feedback are
available for participants to analysis and review.
For the preventive maintenance of SCC, research of crack initiation prevention, cracking growth
suppression, proper inspection, clarification of crack initiation and crack growth mechanisms, and
root cause investigation, etc., are important. In addition, it is important to identify the subjects such
as verification for long-term service, and to perform safety-related R&D and feed the results back into
the ageing mechanism management of components. The long-term operation of plants is also an
important area of research with regard to stress corrosion cracking. Experience has shown that
initiation times can be very long, up to decades, and thus it is to be expected that new problems will
arise in the future.
Because the degradation due to IASCC proceeds with neutron irradiation with long-term
operation, it is important to conduct a comprehensive evaluation taking into account the high fluence
comparable to the operating period, irradiation hardening (decrease in plasticity), segregation,
accumulation of helium, stress relaxation/creep, and swelling. Therefore, it is of importance to reflect
on maintenance practices of the results of understanding of mechanism, modelling and its
verification due to research for irradiated materials from ex-plants, and to develop the degradation
prediction for the components in service.
Regarding these approaches, it is necessary to promote research co-operation and ties within the
international framework. Below are some examples of ongoing safety-related research regarding
stress corrosion cracking being performed by industry, regulators and academia in the areas of
inspection, monitoring, qualification, preventative maintenance, mitigation and repair/replacement.

Mechanisms
• Mechanism studies for PWSCC and IASCC initiation to improve the prediction of initiation.
• Development of disposition curves for safety assessment using quality-assured crack
propagation data.

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• Methods for in-service measurement of residual stress.

• Development of disposition curves for safety assessment using quality-assured crack
propagation data.

Materials
• Studies of the long-term resistance to stress corrosion cracking of replacement materials such
as Alloy 690.

Inspection of SCC
Regarding inspection on SCC, there are technical issues of detectability and sizing of SCC of Ni-based
alloys and PWSCC from experiences of inspections at the fields. It is necessary to study to reduce the
area inaccessible for inspection and to study inspection at location conducted repair welding such as
weld overlay methods because of remaining inspectability issues. From the viewpoints of reasonable
inspection, it is necessary to develop inspection technology applied during operation. It is necessary
to develop and verify the non-destructive inspection combined of UT and ECT technology in the
future when it is expected that inspection may be conducted with good efficiency and high accuracy.
The themes of research and development are listed as follows:
• to verify the UT inspection accuracy;
• to develop inspection equipments and its technology to improve the inspection accessible
area and to improve UT inspection accuracy;
• to prepare codes and standards reflecting the results of research and development in a
continuous manner.

Technology of in-service monitoring

It is necessary to improve the accuracy of current monitoring technology from the viewpoints of
promotion of application to operating plants. The following themes are desirable:
• to develop advanced inspection methods, some for specific applications or complicated
component geometries and robots for application under water;
• to develop on-line monitoring techniques for crack initiation and propagation;
• to promote the further development of fundamental technology on in-service monitoring
technology and environment evaluation technology;
• to develop and verify the in-service monitoring technology.

Preventive maintenance technology

For BWR, it is necessary to prepare codes and standards on plant ageing maintenance based on review
of currently applied technologies and on verification of applicability and effectiveness for preventive
maintenance methods. For PWR, it is necessary to develop and verify mitigation technology on
PWSCC. The following themes are desirable:
• to promote the preparation of codes and standards on environmental isolation methods and
related welding methods to prevent SCC propagation;
• to verify the effectiveness of long-term integrity after repair welding;
• to study effectiveness of new chemistries such as the effect of zinc, titanium oxide, changes
in hydrogen concentrations (PWR).

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Chapter 3: Cable Working Group

3.1 Introduction

Electrical cables are installed approximately 1 000 to 2 000 km for each nuclear power plant (NPP).
They transmit instrument and control signals, supply power to electric components such as motors,
actuators for power-operated valves. Certain cables for safety-related systems are required to remain
operational until the last stage of an in-service period, during and following a design basis event such
as a loss of coolant accident (LOCA).
Typical construction of the cable consists of conductor, insulator, filler, tape and jacket and is
shown in Figure 3.1-2. The filler and tape are used for fitting them into the cable, and the jacket is for
the protection of the insulator from external force that might be applied during cable installation. The
insulator has the function of assuring electric independence between the conductor and ground or
between the conductors and is made of polymer material such as XLPE, EPR and SIR.

Figure 3.1-1: Example of cable layout in NPP (PWR)

RCV

Control Electric penetration Instrumentation cable

Central rack Power cable
control panel Terminal box Control cable
Conduit Conduit

Cable tray
Conduit
Cable tray
Power supply Thermometer
Motor operated valve

Figure 3.1-2: Typical cable construction

Conductor
Insulator
Filler
Tape
Jacket

The insulator degrades during normal operation due to various environmental factors, such as
temperature, radiation, moisture, etc., and their combined effects. In general, degradation of polymer
is said to be attributed to oxidation. It causes chain scission or cross-linking among chains and the

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oxidative products such as carbonyl and hydro-peroxide accumulate in polymer matrix. The electrical
property and mechanical property degrade with the degree of oxidation and such phenomenon is
generally referred to as insulation degradation and it progresses with time.
In addition to the degradation which occurs during normal operation, rapid degradation of cable
insulator progress can occur under the severe environments such as the design basis event (DBE) and
it will cause failure. Therefore appropriate ageing management for cables, especially for safety-related
cables, is important for prevention of potential failures and for safe long-term operation of NPP.
For maintenance, inspection and condition monitoring for cables is performed to detect
degradation of the insulation. When degradations are detected, cables are repaired or replaced.
However, it is difficult to evaluate the integrity of safety-related cables in a LOCA environment based
on the results of the inspection or condition monitoring techniques currently used. The type of test
that simulates degradation of the cable during normal operation and the LOCA environment is
performed as an environmental qualification (EQ) test. In addition, environmental condition monitoring
during normal operation is performed to confirm that the environmental conditions of the place
where the cables are installed are within the design basis assumptions and the result of the
monitoring is also used to requalify the service life of the cables. If the environment condition is very
severe, mitigation of the cable’s installed condition may be applied.
A few countries have introduced a requirement to perform a flame propagation test on aged
cables. This requirement is to ensure that the flame retardant capabilities have not degraded due to
operational ageing. A representative sample of cables has to be tested for their fire properties to
confirm its continued suitability for nuclear plant application. Generally, XLPE, EPR, EVA based cables
show no changes after the ageing. PVC cables improve their fire retardant properties due to the loss of
flammable plasticisers during the ageing.

3.2 Cable database

3.2.1 Scope
The cable database covers safety-related cables that support emergency core cooling, safety cables
(required to prevent and mitigate a design basis event) and cables important to plant operation (cables
whose failure could cause a plant trip or reduction in plant power). The scope of the database includes
cables with voltage levels up to 15 kV AC and 500 V DC, including instrumentation and control (I&C)
cables.

3.2.2 Development of structure

The electrical cable systems are a vital part of the plant because of the communication they provide
for the operation of every system, monitoring, controlling and shutdown. The cables primarily fall
into two categories: cables with operational significance, and those with nuclear safety significance.
The failure of cables with operational significance could trip a plant, cause a transient, reduce output
power, or cause other conditions that affect power production. Therefore, the cables that have
operational significance receive prompt attention for corrective and preventive care because of the
direct impact on plant availability. Most of the cable failures in this category are remedied through a
simple replacement of the cable; an improved design is sought only when there are repeated failures.
The steady advancement in cable chemistry has further contributed to better performance of cables
that were manufactured in the 1990s and later.
The cables with nuclear safety significance are needed to mitigate the effects of an accident,
monitor critical parameters to ensure safety, monitor the effectiveness of emergency core cooling, and
monitor and prevent the potential for containment breach and the consequent off-site releases. Most
of the cables in this category are in standby mode and never subjected to an accident environment.
A significant per cent of the cables in this category are required to be operational during and following
an accident to preserve nuclear safety. The required confidence in the performance of these cables
during an accident environment is achieved through the testing of cables in simulated accident
environments. While the simulation of accident environment has improved over the years, it has not
offered a continuing affirmation on the qualification process that prevailed in the 1980s. Therefore,
the working group added the qualification of the safety-related cable into the scope of the database.

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The operating experience shared by the participating countries indicated that there were other
environmental factors such as moisture intrusion, chemical and adverse environment that could
degrade the cable during its normal service (non-accident) conditions. Therefore, it is important to
monitor the operational readiness of the cable periodically or in response to unanticipated service
conditions. The cable condition monitoring techniques have been evolving and the industry has not
yet developed a single test that could evaluate the condition of all the variety of cable designs.
In order to share the evolving techniques applicable to the variety of cables, the working group
decided to include the cable condition monitoring techniques and the related research, study and
publications to the database.
The database is organised in 10 parts to document all the details of the cable including design,
qualification, maintenance, condition monitoring and continuing research. Data entry in the SCAP
cable database is managed via tables and roll-down menus. Database searches and applications can
be performed through user-defined field entries. The data entry tables are organised to capture
essential cable insulation failure events along with information regarding environmental qualification
and condition monitoring. The 10 data entry sheets are as shown in Figure 3.2.2-1.

Figure 3.2.2-1: Cable ageing database structure

Part 1: TECHNICAL DATA OF CABLE:

Details on structure and materials of the
cable COUNTRY

Part 2.2: CABLE SAMPLING Part 2.1: CABLE INSPECTION

(INCLUDING CABLE DEPOSIT): Details METHODS / CONDITION MONITORING
on the samples that are placed at critical IN-SERVICE: Details on the condition
locations in the plant for assessing cable aging monitoring techniques that are in service now

Part 4: CABLE ENVIRONMENTAL

Part 2.3: CABLE REPAIRING: QUALIFICATION CODE DATA: Détails
Details on the acceptable methods utilized on applicable codes for qualifying cables
for repairing cables of different design and
located in different environments
Part 5: PLANT AND CABLE
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITION:
Part 3: DATA FOR CABLE FAILURE Details of the temperature and radiation
EVENTS: A record of cables failures, root environment at critical plant locations
causes and corrective actions

Part 8: REGULATORY INFORMATION

Part 6: MITIGATION OF CABLE- FOR CABLE / CONTINUED
INSTALLED ENVIRONMENT: CONFIRMATORY AND EXPLORATORY
Approaches to moderate the effects of the RESEARCH: Applicable regulatory
environment for the cable requirements in each country

Part 9: DESCRIPTION OF CONDITION

Part 7: CABLE REPLACEMENT: MONITORING TECHINICQUES:
Provides details of cable replacement and its Operational procedures, descriptions of
reasons techniques

Part 10: TECHNICAL REFERENCES:

Related publications and research work on
cable aging

Cable-related data Country-related data

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3.2.3 Search capability

The cable database search tool allows fast access to desired information in any part of the database.
The search tool opens up for multi-section/multi-country searches, with possibilities for tailor-made
search and display criteria. Figure 3.2.3-1 shows the entry point of the search tool, with panels for
selecting main search criteria as parts, countries and search strings.

Figure 3.2.3-1: Entry point for the database search tool, showing panels
for selecting the main search criteria, i.e. parts, countries and search strings

To narrow the search down to one or more fields within one part, each part has a dedicated
search/display criteria panel allowing the user to specify in detail the actual field(s) to be considered
in the search. In the same way the user can choose which field(s) of that particular part shall be
displayed in the search result list. See Figure 3.2.3-2 for an example from “Part 8: Regulatory
information for cable/Continued confirmatory and exploratory research”.

Figure 3.2.3-2: Detailed search and display criteria panel for a

given database part, allowing detailed field-specific selections

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An example of a database search and its outcome is shown in Figure 3.2.3-3. Here, searching for
the word “Regulatory” within “Part 8: Regulatory information for cable/Continued confirmatory and
exploratory research”, given any country and a list of applicable cable regulations, organisation, a
contact name for the regulator, etc., are displayed in the figure. Viewing or editing detailed record
information based on the search results list can be done by choosing “[Show/Update] selected search
result”.

Figure 3.2.3-3: Search results (example)

3.3 Cable knowledge base

The knowledge base was built from the data that was collected from the member participants. The
data included all the subject areas discussed in Section 3.2.2. The working group evaluated the
information in the database and identified subject areas that were of great significance that would be
of great use to current nuclear operators and regulators and classified them as the knowledge base.
Because of the wide variety in the classification of importance the assessment began with safety
classification and proceeded to identify the essential elements of the knowledge base.
The Cable Working Group has examined and reviewed the data collected in the database and
extracted information, leading to a certain number of conclusions. There is a wide variation of cable
classification among the different countries. These classifications form the basis for the required level
of qualification to meet its specific performance requirements. Table 3.3-1 provides a relative
comparison.

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Table 3.3-1: Comparison of different classification systems

National or
international Classification of the importance to safety
standard
Systems important to safety Systems not
IAEA
Safety Safety related important to safety
Systems important to safety
IEC 61226 Unclassified
Category A Category B Category C
France N4 1E 2E IFC/NC
European utility F1B (automatic
F1A (automatic) F2 Unclassified
requirements and manual)
Japan PS1/MS1** PS2/MS2** PS3/MS3** Non-nuclear safety
1E, safety related, or Non-safety related
USA
safety Important to safety Balance of plant (BOP)
Important to safety Not important to safety
CANADA
Not safety, not safety
(CSA Std Safety, safety related
related
N209.14)
Category 1 Category 2 Category 3 Category 4
* DBE: design basis event. (There is also Class 1 in Russian regulations, but it is not relevant to I&C systems and does not
correspond to IAEA Safety, IEC Category A and IEEE Class 1 categories.)
** PS: prevention system, MS: mitigation system. There is no cable classified as PS1.

The Ukraine systems on nuclear power plants are categorized into four classes based on the
influence on plant safety:
• Class 1: Fuel elements and systems of NPP for which failures led to fuel element damage
exceeding the limits specified for the design basis event (DBE).
• Class 2: Systems for which failures led to fuel element damage within the limits of DBE.
Elements of safety systems for which failures led to failures in operation of such systems.
• Class 3: Elements of safety systems not belonging to 1 and 2 safety classes. Systems for
protection of plant personnel and residential population from radiation.
• Class 4: System for normal operation of NPP which are not relevant for safety. Other systems
not belonging to1, 2 and 3 safety classes.

3.3.1 Technical data of cable

General information
This section addresses the variety of cables that are currently in use at various nuclear stations. The
most common type of insulation materials are cross-linked polyethylene, ethylene propylene rubber
(EPR), and ethylene propylene diene monomer (EPDM) as shown in Figure 3.3.1-1. The most common
type of jacket material is chloro-sulphanated polyethylene (CSPE) as shown in Figure 3.3.1-2. However,
there are some unique applications with unique materials with distinct properties essential for
certain plant applications.

Polyvinyl chloride insulation

The general use of polyvinyl chlorides (PVC) has been discontinued at nuclear stations because of its
undesirable nature with regard to fire propagation.
In the Czech Republic, new NPP installations are significantly restricted with regard to the use of
certain chemical elements. European Utility Requirements (“European Utility Requirements for LWR
Nuclear Power Plants”, Revision C, Vol. 2, Chapter 2.6: Material-related Requirements, April 2001) quotes
general rules and requirements concerning new NPP projects, e.g. the amount of halogens should not
be higher than 200 ppm. There are also requirements concerning other elements like sulphur, zinc,
lead, mercury, asbestos, etc. These requirements disqualify PVC cables for future installations.

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Figure 3.3.1-1: Material of cable insulation

EPR
EPDM
EVA
Power
PE
Control
Insulation material

PEEK Inst.
PVC Coaxial
SHPVC
SiR
XLPE
XLPO
Other
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
Number of record in the database

Figure 3.3.1-2: Material of cable jacket

Asbestos braid
CR
CSPE
ETFE
Glass braid
Jacket material

PEEK Power
PVC Control
SHPVC Inst.
Coaxial
SiR
XLPE
XLPO
Other
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300
Number of record in the database

The design temperature and dose rate of the cable recorded in the database are shown in
Figures 3.3.1-3 and 3.3.1-4.
In Spain, PVC insulated cables are not commonly used in NPP. Only two plants have used them in
safety-related applications.
In a BWR plant, 1E, PVC insulated, instrumentation and control cables have been used, but these
cables were located in mild environmental conditions and, as a consequence, were not required to be
qualified for DBE conditions. The cables have recently been visually inspected and tested, according to
the “Cable Ageing Management Program” developed in support of the plant “Life Extension
Application”. No significant degradation has been found in these cables after 40 years of operation.

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Figure 3.3.1-3: Design temperature of cable

60°C < T
13 cables T ≤ 40°C
20 cables

50 C < T ≤ 60°C
o

14 cables

40°C < T ≤ 50°C

29 cables

Figure 3.3.1-4: Design dose rate of cable

D ≤ 0.001 Gy/h
0.1 Gy/h < D 18 cables
25 cables

0.001Gy/h < D ≤ 0.01 Gy/h

1 cable
0.01 Gy/h < D ≤ 0.1 Gy/h
5 cables

Another PWR plant has installed 1E instrumentation and control cables with PVC insulation and
a polyethylene jacket. These cables are located outside reactor containment (containment annulus)
and they are required to function under a harsh environment (HELB conditions). These cables “Pirelli
Radiflam” (see database cable ID 511) have been qualified according to IEEE-383-74. Pirelli specified a
maximum continuous duty temperature of 70°C for these cables. During the qualification process the
cables were aged at 110°C for 8 days. Maximum DBE qualified temperature was 112°C. After 23 years
of operation, no ageing degradation has been reported by the plant for these cables.
In Japan, special heat-resistant PVC (SHPVC), an improved type of PVC using heat-resistant
plasticisers (which withstand up to 80°C) and polyvinyl chloride resins with a high degree of
polymerisation, is used mainly for the cables installed in high-temperature area. The maximum
temperature of continuous duty for the cables with SHPVC, specified in Japanese standards for electric
power utilities, is 80°C. Some cables installed outside the containment vessel of BWR are required to
perform their function under DBE environment, and thus they are qualified by EQ test.
The Argentinean programme to qualify in-containment cables for the CAREM advanced reactor
project concluded against the use of PVC insulated cables. In this context, and based on international
experience, the life cycle of cable ageing management was developed with a special focus on
environmental qualification. The first efforts concerned the evaluation of material characterisation
and thermal endurance properties. The first set of materials to be studied was PVC cable insulation.
Plastiser characterisation and content evaluation were done and the activation energy evaluation was
done based on IEEE standards.

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This last set of tests was carried out with elongation at break curves vs. time curves at three
different temperatures. Once this step was completed, the value of the intersection between 50%
elongation at break (relative to the un-aged material) and time was stored for each curve. Finally from
the slope of the linear regression of the graphics log time vs. reciprocal temperature, activation energy
was derived.
The results indicated that, even though it was possible to evaluate activation energy in this
manner, such property has a strong dependence on the value chosen for elongation at break. It was
concluded that commercial PVC formulation does not follow Arrhenius behaviour and therefore, it is
undesirable to use this model to predict future ageing characteristics and cable performance.

Environmental qualification of cable

Environmental qualification (EQ) was required of almost all the cables recorded into the database as
shown in Figure 3.3.1-5. As for these cables, EQ test was carried out based on the IEEE Std. 323 and 383
or a standard similar to IEEE standard.
The qualification period (qualified life) of the EQ cable recorded in the database is shown in
Figure 3.3.1-6. The qualification period of more than the half of the cables is 60 years.

Figure 3.3.1-5: EQ cable or non-EQ cable

Unknown
Non-EQ cable
8 cables
25 cables

EQ cable
535 cables

Figure 3.3.1-6: Qualification period of EQ cable

60 yrs < Q period

None

Q period ≤ 40 yrs.
15 cables
50 yrs. < Q period ≤ 60 yrs.
20 cables

40 yrs. < Q period ≤ 50 yrs.

1 cable

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Cables with 60 years life

Wyle performed a cable qualification programme on cables that were naturally aged in a nuclear
power plant for 29 years. Samples were removed and a test programme performed on all of the
required ageing to simulate another 31 years prior to DBE radiation and accident simulation. These
cables are now qualified for 60 years. The subject cables were Kerite FR and Kerite FR3 unjacketed
power and control cables. This qualification would apply only to plant-specific conditions because the
cable was naturally aged at a specific nuclear station.

Qualified post-accident mission time

The qualification post-LOCA period for the EQ cables, as recorded in the database, is shown in
Figure 3.3.1-7. The qualification of about half of the cable post-LOCA period is 30 to 100 days.

Figure 3.3.1-7: Qualified post-accident mission time

365 days < Post-LOCA period

1 cable

Post-LOCA period ≤ 30 days

19 cables
100 days < Post-LOCA period ≤ 365 days
35 cables

30 days < Post-LOCA period ≤ 100 days

52 cables

The post-accident mission time in the United States varies widely, ranging from two weeks to
180 days and in certain cases the duration is more. The approach to post-accident mission and the
corresponding qualification period evolved from the early 70s and marked differences were noted
following the Three Mile Island Accident in the US.
The post-accident temperature profile of the core, containment environment, radiation, etc., forms
the basis for mission time for each of the accident mitigation systems. While specific mission time
may offer some relief on the duration and level of environmental qualification of certain components,
the general practice had been to qualify the common cables for the worst-case environment. Certain
operators have opted to specify component specific mission time based on its specific mission and the
associated cable would need only the same mission time. Certain specialty cables may be qualified for
a limited mission time because of specific chemical property limitations.
In Japan, the “Assessment of Electrical Equipment Ageing for Nuclear Power Plants (AEA)” project
started in 2008. One of its purposes is the re-evaluation of the mission time required for cables to
maintain their functions during the post-LOCA period. The period for BWR is 100 days and for PWR
one year.
In Spain there are six operating NPP, four PWR and two BWR, but all of them present specific
differences in their designs. Therefore, the required qualification profiles (temperature/time and
pressure/time) are different and plant-specific. Selected examples are given below:
• CN Vandellos II PWR. Combined LOCA + MSLB qualification profile. Post-LOCA period of
120 days with temperature decaying from 300°F to 140°F.
• CN Santa Maria de Garoña BWR. LOCA qualification profile. Post-LOCA period of 400 days with
temperature decaying from 185°F to 101°F.

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Conclusion
While it may not be possible to identify a fixed period for post-accident mission time for all reactor
designs, certain basic principles can be observed in arriving at that period. The primary basis for
environmental qualification is that the equipment has to perform its safety function in a harsh
environment where it is practically impossible to perform any equipment replacement or corrective
maintenance. Therefore, the minimum duration for qualification is the time that is needed for
accessing the area when the risk is relatively low and the environment is suitable for people to enter
and perform services with reasonable precautions. For most containments, this period is considered
to be a minimum of 180 days. Based on the worst-case design basis event, a plant-specific evaluation
is necessary to arrive at a post-accident mission time in each case. The containment size, reactor core
size, containment spray systems, clean-up systems and its effectiveness will determine the final
value for this duration.

Assessment of paper-oil insulated cables for life extension using double kink number
In Ukraine, cables with paper-oil insulation (BMI) have a specified service life term of 25 years. Further
life extension is accepted based on conditions of cable insulation and protective shields. Measurement
of mechanical characteristics of cable paper is one of the methods of cable condition assessment. It is
known that during the ageing process the degree of paper polymerisation decreases, the elongation at
break indicator and the number of double kink fall down. To define the degree of polymerisation it is
necessary to prepare a cellulose solution and to measure its viscosity.
The advantage of this method is that it requires only a small amount of paper sample. On the
other hand, high labour for the solution preparation and toxicity of solvents are the disadvantages.
Additionally, it is difficult to measure elongation at break because even at the initial condition the
ratio for a paper is only 2% in relation to polyethylene, at 300 to 500%.
The number of double kinks is a more convenient indicator for the technical condition monitoring
of the cables with paper-oil insulation. From one section of a cable with a length of about 0.2 m it is
possible to prepare 20 to 70 strips of a paper with the size 140 × 15 mm2. This number of samples is
enough for the reliable definition of the specified parameter. The samples of cables for laboratory
researches are selected during repair.
Characteristics of cable paper in initial condition are specified in the standard documentation.
The breaking effort of strips of the specified size should make at least 7-13.5 kg (depending on a
thickness of paper type К080-К120), relative elongation at break – 2%, number of double kinks – at
least 2 000, irrespective of a paper thickness.

3.3.2 Cable maintenance data/condition monitoring

Generally, cable was considered a maintenance-free item and its failures were considered to be
random events and therefore the failed cable was replaced without much of a post-mortem analysis.
The United States nuclear industry noticed a number of failures and questioned the randomness of
the failure. These failures appear to be linked to ageing and monitoring the condition of insulation
was recognised to be a rising need to mitigate in-service failures.

3.3.2.1 Background for condition monitoring

The interest of safety aspects of cable ageing is increasing world wide because of their impact on
several industrial fields, like power generation, transportation and defence. Although the environmental
conditions and degradation mechanisms of installed cables can be different in each application, the
negative consequences of cable failures, both from a safety and performance standpoint, are so
important that almost all the countries in the industrialised world have some research project in
progress for this area. In the nuclear field, where cables are normally qualified before installation for
an expected life of 40 years, there are a number of issues that are not adequately solved today. These
issues include:

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• The effect of the particular adverse environment conditions (high radiation, humidity and
temperature), especially during and after a design basis event (DBE).
• Extending the plant life after 40 years involves the requirement to assess and qualify the cable
conditions for a longer time.
• Many cable condition monitoring techniques do exist today, but none of them are considered
accurate and reliable enough for all the cable materials and types in use at their installed
applications. In addition to that, only few of them are non-destructive techniques and are
applicable in situ.
• Accelerated ageing techniques, for qualification purposes under DBE conditions, are often not
conservative and should be complemented with reliable condition monitoring methods.
The United States White House National Science and Technology Council Committee on
Technology issued a report in 2000 [19] in which safety issues on wire systems were addressed. The
conclusions of this report are important to understand the weak points of the current status and
which topics should be addressed in future research. The recommendations of the Committee can be
summarised as follows:
• increase co-operation between industry and research institutes, also internationally;
• improve design and functionality of wire systems;
• develop advanced wire system techniques including condition monitoring.
Research efforts from the IAEA [20] and the OECD NEA [21] led to similar conclusions.
In the United States, the NRC published in May 2003 a Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) [22],
wherein it reported the conclusions of qualification tests on I&C cables. Here a particular concern was
posed on cables status assessment needs when extending the plant life and the need to have reliable
qualification methods for LOCA and post-LOCA conditions. Basically, the NRC concluded that current
I&C wire system qualification methods provide a high level of confidence that the installed cables will
perform adequately during a design basis event, as required by 10 CFR 50.49. However, some LOCA
test failures indicate that under certain conditions, the accepted conservatisms in the qualification
tests is less than expected. Moreover, no single monitoring technique was found to be adequate to
reliably detect I&C cable failures. Two recommendations are significant, among others:
• Environment conditions should be monitored during plant operation, to ensure that they do
not exceed those applied for the qualification tests.
• A combination of condition monitoring techniques is suggested, to overcome the limits
existing in each single method.

3.3.2.2 Cable inspection/condition monitoring method in-service

In January 2010 the US NRC published a report entitled “Essential Elements of an Electric Cable
Condition Monitoring Programme” (NUREG/CR-7000). This publication is based upon the results of the
NRC’s electric cable and equipment research programmes, industry guidance and standards, and the
experience and observations of other electric cable condition monitoring and qualification testing.
The programme methodology presented in this report provides guidance on the selection of cables to
be included in the programme, characterisation and monitoring of cable operating environments and
stressors, selection of the most effective and practical condition monitoring techniques, documentation
and review of cable condition monitoring testing and inspection results, and the periodic review and
assessment of cable condition and operating environments.
The cable inspection/condition monitoring methods applied in-service recorded into the database
are shown in Table 3.3.2.2-1. This table shows that there are few countries which are conducting
condition-monitoring of the cable under normal operation.
In the Czech Republic, the basic condition monitoring technique is visual and tactile inspection.
The inspection is performed mainly in the hot spots. Nevertheless, all safety-related cables are
successively inspected within the whole length of their installations. For cables where the calculated
service life time is very short and for some cables located in hot spots, other condition monitoring
techniques are applied. The method commonly used in the Czech Republic is the OIT/OITP method.

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Table 3.3.2.2-1: Cable inspection/condition monitoring methods applied in-service

Applied Applied cable type

Method number of Fibre
country Power Control Inst. Coaxial Hybrid
optic
Combined AS high potential
and partial discharge 1 √
extinction level tests
Current leak rate testing 1 √
Elongation at break. 2 √ √
Indenter 2 √ √ √ √
Insulation resistance 2 √ √ √ √
Line resonance analysis
2 √ √ √ √
(LIRA)
Oxidation induction
1 √ √ √ √ √
temperature (OITP)
Oxidation induction time
1 √ √
(OIT)
Potential decay 1 √
System of electrical
characterisation and 1 √ √ √
diagnosis
Tangent delta 1 √
Thermogravimetry 1 √ √
Visual/tactile inspection 5 √ √ √ √ √ √

In Japan, all cables installed in NPP are inspected periodically and the acceptance criteria for
respective techniques are shown in Table 3.3.2.2-2. However, these acceptance criteria cannot be used
for the evaluation of integrity in the DBE environment.

3.3.2.3 Cable sampling/cable deposits

In order to carefully monitor insulation degradation, it is recommended to have cable samples
exposed to actual nuclear plant service environment. A novel idea, practiced by several plants, is to
deposit additional pieces of cable at service locations and expose them to actual harsh service
environment. Portions of these cables can in turn be conveniently made available ongoing
qualification, destructive examination, and other requalification efforts based on the evolving needs.

Cable deposits in Czech NPP

In the Czech Republic, NPP have the following cable deposits:
• On the primary loop line with the temperature and radiation higher than other locations
within NPP. Safety related 1E LOCA cables.
• Inside the NPP containment, different locations where the cables age under the same
conditions as the cables in service. Safety related 1E LOCA and non-LOCA cables.
• Outside the containment. This is a good source of cables for future testing.
The cable deposits on the primary loop line is most important where the cables age under higher
temperature and dose rate than in other NPP locations. Six such deposits have been installed in Czech
Republic; four in Temelín NPP (8 years in operation) and two in Dukovany NPP (23 years in operation).
The deposited cables are representatives of the cable types used in containment. The number of
samples and its total length must be adequate for scheduled and unscheduled removal of samples
over a period of up to 40 or 60 years. There are three 8 meters long samples for each cable type. These
samples are prepared for:

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Table 3.3.2.2-2: Acceptance criteria for inspection in Japan NPP

Cable
Insulation Visual Current leak
inspection Potential decay Tangent delta
resistance inspection rate testing
method
Cable type All cable types All cable types Power Power Power
except for fibre except for fibre
optic. optic.
Rated voltage No limitation No limitation 6 600 or 7 000 V 6 600 or 7 000 V 6 600 or 7 000 V
Operating voltage No limitation No limitation 6 600 or 6 900 V 6 600 or 6 900 V 6 600 or 6 900 V
Insulation No limitation No limitation No limitation No limitation No limitation
material
Assumed ageing Insulation Physical damage, Water tree Water tree Water tree
mechanisms resistance thermal ageing, degradation degradation degradation
degradation etc.
caused by thermal
and radiation
ageing
Industry standard JIS C 3005*1 No standard Technical No standard JIS C 3005*1
document 116C,
Maintenance
Guideline for CV
Cable for Medium
Voltage,
Dec. 2007,
Japan Electric
Wire & Cable
Makers'
Association
Details of test 1) Disconnected Colour change of With a DC-voltage The discharge AC 3.8 kV is
from power an insulator/jacket generator, DC time after DC applied between
source. is checked voltage is applied charging is each conductor
2) Keep connected visually between each measured by and shield layer,
with load or conductor and special devise and the tangent
disconnected shield layer, and delta is measured
with load. the temporal by the Schering
3) Voltage for response of bridge method
megger testing: leakage current is
1 000 V megger measured
for power cable
(6 600 or
7 000 V)
500 V megger
for power cable
(600 V)
Management Case by case, None e.g. 6.6 kV cable: e.g. 6 kV cable: e.g. 6.6 kV cable:
criteria e.g. power circuit > < 1 × 10–7 A applied voltage < 0.1% (at 3.8 kV)
5 M ohms, control (at 5 kV, 10 min.) 5.0 kV,
circuit > 2 M ohms judged voltage:
4.0 kV,
decay time:
> 230 sec.
Additional Carried out once Quantitative Carried out to Carried out to Carried out to
information during a 1 to ageing examine the water examine the examine the
6 time periodical assessment tree for power water tree for water tree for the
inspections cannot be cables installed power cables power cable
performed outdoors once installed installed outdoors
every 4 to 6 times outdoors once once every 4 to 6
periodical every 4 to 6 times periodical
inspections times periodical inspections
inspections

*1 JIS: Japanese industrial standards.

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• mechanical testing (elongation at break, strength at break), determination of physico-chemical

properties (oxidative-induction time or temperature, density);
• testing of electrical properties (insulation resistance, loss factor tangent delta and capacity at
different frequencies);
• verification of the LOCA and post-LOCA survival.
Temelín NPP is a new nuclear power plant of PWR 1000 type, in operation since 2001 and the
deposits were installed before the plant start-up. The cable deposits were installed at the cold leg of
the primary loop line between reactor pressure vessel and the main recirculation pump. Each
construction skeleton is assembled around the loop line. The structure has a width of 120 cm and the
distance from the thermal insulation of the loop line is 10 cm. The selected cables are wound around
this structure.
Nine types of cables performing safety functions of Temelín NPP have been chosen for the deposit.
The different types of cables include low voltage control, instrumentation, power cables and one
medium voltage power cable.
The cables are not powered. The joule heating due to current flow in power cables may heat up
the insulation by about 30°C. Important safety-related power cables are operated in Temelín NPP at a
relative low temperature of 30°C (the data comes from our long-term temperature measurements).
On the deposit, the temperature is about 56°C. The cable deposits are protected from the environment
and from undesirable manipulation with a fireproof blanket and sheet steel. This protection does not
restrict the air flow and supply of oxygen from the environment.
At the Dukovany NPP, the situation was more complicated. The deposits were realised after
20 years of NPP operation. Therefore, old safety-related cables had been taken at first from the store
and subjected to an accelerated ageing to bring them to the same condition as naturally aged cables in
the containment. To perform the simulation as realistically and reliably as possible, the accelerated
ageing conditions were very mild. The cables were aged simultaneously at elevated temperature (70°C)
and radiation (2.5 Gy/h).

Cable deposits in Canada NPP

In Canada, since 1995, Ontario Power Generation (OPG) has been using the cable deposits at OPG
Darlington Nuclear Generating Station. Various cable insulations are deposited for a period of 40 years
on specific areas so that they can be exposed to the actual environment inside the NPP. Every 10 years,
these cables are removed for testing to verify whether their insulation materials are deteriorating. The
last test verification has shown that there was no degradation of the insulation materials. This cable
deposit approach is considered part of Darlington Station’s cable condition monitoring programme.
Factors to be considered for cable deposits:
• anticipated plant life including potential life extension;
• critical locations where the cables are likely to be subjected to extreme environmental effects;
• samples to represent all the cables that have potential age-sensitive locations;
• hot spot locations for radiation and temperature;
• adequate length of cable with due consideration for plant life, continuing qualification and
research that could involve destructive examination;
• documentation that supports traceability to production, historic test records, stock no.
(sample labels, etc.);
• appropriate protection of cable ends;
• impeccable sample;
• convenience for retrieving the required samples;
• self-heating that raises the temperature should be considered while evaluating the cable
insulation degradation (since deposited cables are not energised with an electrical load).

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Cable deposits in Ukraine NPP

Sampling and preparation of reference specimens for deposit
• Reference specimens are sampled from the cables which are available at the plant storage or
from set of spare parts
• Reference specimens are sampled from the operable cables the storage conditions of which
meet the requirements of specifications.
• The length of reference specimens shall be 2.00 ± 0.05 m.
• Reference specimens should have no deformation or mechanical damages on the jacket.
• The ends of reference specimens shall be properly sealed preventing the paper oil insulated
cables from ingress of moisture and leakage of dipping compound or hydrophobic compound.
• Ends of cables with a rubber, PVC or PE cover shall be sealed with the caps, wrapped with the
tapes of similar to the cable jacket material, or sealed using the “hot” method.
• “Hot” sealing of the cable ends could be performed using melted polyethylene providing
hermetic sealing of the cable.
• Ends of cables in a metal jacket should be sealed with a “hot” method (soldered) or using
metal caps.
• Each reference-specimen shall be labelled.
• Labels shall be made of flame-retardant material standing operation conditions of the
equipment, specified by regulations for reference specimen locations.
• Metal labels shall be corrosion-proof.

Figure 3.3.2.3-1: The stand for deposit of reference

specimen in the reactor containment at a Ukraine NPP

Deposit of reference specimens in the plant

Reference specimens are to be deposited in “hot spots” identified in the list of deposited reference
specimens of the plant. The method of reference specimen deposit in cable installations and the
premises of the plant meets the requirements of cable normative documents and can be similar to the
method of allocation of operational cables. The minimum bending radius of cable reference specimens
shall be provided according to the cable’s technical specifications.
In a case of reference specimens, deposit in the containment is expected to place them on a
separate tray or stand.
• During reference specimen deposit it is necessary to consider:
– periodic sampling of specimens;
– identical distribution of influence of the damaging effects on the surface of the specimens.

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• The data of the reference specimen deposit shall be recorded in the register of cable reference
specimens of the plant.
• The reference specimens were deposited in the 1000 WWER plant in the containment, turbine
room and reactor containment in accordance with this programme.

Cable deposits in Spain NPP

Vandellos II NPP (PWR) is performing an ongoing qualification programme covering the safety-related
cables installed in the plant. The cables have been qualified according to IEEE-383-74 requirements.
The programme activities started in 1988 and include the following groups of 1E plant cables:
• medium voltage power cables (6 600 V);
• low voltage power and control cables (600/1 000 V);
• instrumentation, coaxial and triaxial cables (300/1 500 V);
• instrumentation cables (300 V);
• thermocouple cables (300 V);
• mineral insulation cables were excluded from the programme;
• cables from different manufacturers are included in each group.

Programme activities
The programme is based on the comparison of mechanical and electrical test results, applied on two
sets of identical cable samples: i) naturally aged cables located in selected plant areas (cable deposit)
and aged during plant operation; ii) new cables existing in plant stores and later artificially aged in
laboratory. Both sets of cable samples are aged to the same time intervals: 5, 10, 15, 20…40 years. The
programme includes the following basic activities:
• Cable sample selection. Thirteen different cable types (existing in plant stores) were selected, as
a representative sample of the cable population in the plant. For each sample, two pieces
34 meters long were selected and insulation-resistance base line tests values were obtained.
• Cable deposit area selection. The following plant areas were selected to install cable samples for
naturally ageing:
– Area 1. Reactor containment, near AFW turbine-pump, with the following design normal
operation conditions (dose values corresponding to 40 years): 49°C, 10 Mrad, 95% humidity.
– Area 2. Reactor containment, near containment liner: 49°C, 0.3 Mrad, 95% humidity.
– Area 3. Reactor containment, near a steam generator: 49°C, 10 Mrad, 95% humidity.
– Area 4. Auxiliary building: 40°C, 0.1 Mrad, 80% humidity.
• Environmental monitoring of deposited cable samples. Cable samples in each area were installed
(de-energised) in cable trays, together with the existing operational cables.
– Temperature monitoring in each area is performed using specific thermocouples, (one per
tray) located near cable trays. Measured values are sent outside reactor containment and
registered weekly.
– Radiation monitoring is performed using specific “high-temperature designed TLDs” (one
per area). Dose accumulated values are measured and registered yearly.
– Humidity is measured continuously inside containment, using the existing design plant
devices. Values inside the auxiliary building were taken weekly using portable devices.
– Sequentially, groups of all the naturally aged cable samples are extracted every five-year
period.

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• Simulated cable-ageing process. Cable samples selected for artificial ageing simulation (previously
stored under controlled environment), were subjected to radiation and thermal ageing test,
simulating expected degradation in the programme time intervals (5, 10, 15,…, 40 years).
• Post-ageing tests. The following tests are applied to the different groups of artificially and
naturally aged cable samples (5, 10, 15,…, 40 years):
– Electrical tests: insulation resistance and polarisation index.
– Mechanical tests: elongation at break and tensile strength.
– High potential tests: each cable sample was subjected to the post-LOCA test required by
IEEE Std. 383-74.
• Programme results evaluation. For each cable sample, the results of the above tests are
registered and plotted in graphics, to be compared for the two groups of cables (naturally and
artificially aged). Evaluation of the programme results is performed every five years by the
plant staff. Presently (2010) the programme is still ongoing but already there are some
evaluation data (plant property), referring to the 5, 10, 15 and 20 years of cable-ageing groups.
As a preliminary conclusion, the plant has informed CSN that after 20 years, most of the
naturally aged cables seem to be less degraded than the corresponding artificially aged cables.

3.3.2.4 Cable repairing

Cable repairing is not a common maintenance practice in the Spanish NPP; when damaged cables are
found the usual practice is to replace them as soon as possible. Before replacement, the damaged
cables could be temporarily repaired, using insulating tapes or Raychem heat-shrink sleeves.
In the 90s, a BWR NPP, following cable manufacturer recommendations, has used special BOPIR
(auto-vulcanised butyl rubber) and NABIB adhesive tapes, for repairing its Pirelli EPR Radiflam cables.
Plant repairing procedures recommend applying two layers of BOPIR tape over cable conductor,
followed by two layers of NABIB tape with 50% overlap. NABIB and BOPIR tapes are certified up to
100°C thermal endurance but are not qualified for accident conditions.
Generally these repairs are done to cable jackets. Raychem, a manufacturer of cable termination
and splicing products provides detailed instructions on conducting a cable repair: www.tycothermal.com/
assets/NorthAmerica/English/Documents/Installation_Operation_and_Maintenance_Manuals/Products/287/H57
286.pdf. These are special materials that shrink on to cable surface and form a protective jacket.
Certain models of this heat shrunk materials are qualified for safety application and in certain cases
for harsh environments. On multi-conductor cables, the repair is recommended only when the
individual conductors indicate 20 M ohms when tested with a 2 500 V DC megger.

3.3.3 Data for the cable failure events

Most of the cable failures recorded in the database are from the United States experience. The US
experience was further analysed to gather insights from the reported events. On 7 February 2007, the
NRC issued Generic Letter (GL) 2007-01, “Inaccessible or Underground Power Cable Failures that
Disable Accident Mitigation Systems or Cause Plant Transients”. Specifically, the NRC issued this GL to
obtain from its operators information in two areas:
1) A history of inaccessible or underground power cable failures for all cables within the scope of
Title 10, Section 50.65, “Requirements for Monitoring the Effectiveness of Maintenance at
Nuclear Power Plants” (the Maintenance Rule), of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR 50.65)
and for all voltage levels with the following characteristics indicated for each cable failure:
type, manufacturer, date of failure, type of service, voltage class, years of service, and the root
causes for the failure.
2) A description of the inspection, testing and monitoring programmes to detect the degradation
of inaccessible or underground power cables that support emergency diesel generators, off-site
power, emergency service water, service water, component cooling water and other systems
that are within the scope of 10 CFR 50.65.

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The operators provided information for 269 cable failures, of which 125 occurred while the cable
was in service. Operators reported 114 instances of cables failing to meet testing and inspection
acceptance criteria (referred to as “testing failures” in this report). These include cables that did not
fail while in service and cables that failed visual inspections. Operators reported 30 cable failures that
the NRC could not conclusively infer from the responses as being in-service or testing failures.
Of the 269 cable failures reported by the operators, 209 cables were normally energised, and
15 cables were normally de-energised. The operators did not supply this information for 45 cables.
Of the failures, 93% (209 of 224) occurred on normally energised cables. Of the 15 normally de-energised
cable failures, 3 failures were identified while the cables were in service and 10 were identified during
testing; operators did not indicate this information for 2 of the normally de-energised cable failures.
Of the 15 normally de-energised cable failures, the root causes included water/moisture, manufacturing
defects, installation error and digs. The operators listed water or moisture as a contributing or root
cause for 4 of the 15 normally de-energised cables, and 3 of these 4 failures were of 480 V (service)/
600 V (rated) cables.
It was noted that the majority of failures occurred on normally energised cables. Testing identified
66.7% of the normally de-energised cable failures, and water/moisture was a contributing factor to the
failures of some de-energised cables.
In Japan, four cable failure events have occurred since 1970, three of which were caused by initial
flaws or defects given in cable installation processes.

Figure 3.3.3-1: Cables that failed while in service

16

14

12
Number of failures

10

0
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Year of failure

Figure 3.3.3-2: Cables that failed to meet testing and inspection acceptance criteria
14

12
Number of failures

10

0
1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Year of failure

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Figure 3.3.3-3: Number of failures per ten-year service intervals

90
80
70
Number of failures

60
50
40
30
20
10
0
0-10 11-20 21-30 31-40
Year in service

Figure 3.3.3-4: Failures per insulation type

120
105
100
Number of failures

80

60 59

40

20 17
1 2
0
BTYL EPR Kapton PVC XLPE
Insulation type

Figure 3.3.3-5: Causes and causal factors for all cable failures

70
60
Occurrences in GL responses

Possible causes Probable causes Definitive causes

50

40

30

20

10

0 Water/moisture Manufacturing Contamination or Human error

Defect chemical attack
Physical/mechanical General or age-related Electrical issues Lightning
damage degradation (design, faults)

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In Ukraine, the analysis of cables defects was performed using the data received for the period
1984-2008. For the AASHv cables three types of failures were identified:
• The failure occurred as the result of contact of the cut part of the cable and the sharp corner
of metalware. Failure is caused by an error in the cable laying connecting cells KRU-6kV.
• The failure was the result of the power cable damage during earth excavations.
• The failure was the result of short circuit of the cable conductor and the jacket of the power
cable at a bending point of the cable. Two failures of PvSG cable were registered.
The failure occurred as the result of the cable mechanical damage (breaks, dents, cuts) during the
construction. For cable KVVG three failures were registered:
• The failure was the consequence of rubbing against control cable laid between control panels.
• The failure was the result of mechanical damage of a cable during repair of fire-resistant
partitions.
• The failure was the result of short circuit which occurred because of rubbing against an
operating valve.
The reasons of failures:
• errors in cables installation;
• errors at cable routes and channels installation;
• degradation of cable insulation caused by the wrong cable application;
• mechanical damage of a cable during work not relevant to cable operation;
• change of cables’ electric characteristics (decrease in insulation resistance) caused by
insulation ageing.
A few other countries reported cable failures that had root causes as listed in Table 3.3.3-1..

Table 3.3.3-1: Root causes of cable failures

Cable Number of
Root cause
type events
Mechanical ageing. The cables were connected to a running motor. Due to vibrations
Power 20
coming from the motor, the cables wore out on edges.
Poor quality cable. The manufacturer did not use the same material as was used in the
1 batch
Power qualification programme. Moreover, not all technological conditions were maintained
(some km)
during the manufacturing. After one year at 60°C the cable sheath cracked.
Poor quality of the whole batch. Some cables from this batch were installed. No failure,
1 batch
Signal but extremely low insulation resistance measured soon after installation. All cables
(some km)
were immediately changed.
During the cable installation, the workers pulled a cable with very high force. The cable
Power crossed another power cable. At the crossing, the cable insulation wore out. Two years 1
later, this position had a short circuit.
Very low insulation resistance was measured. It was a cable in the middle of a cable
Power bundle and under a fire protective layer. After cutting out, it appeared that the cable 5
was extremely brittle.
During the visual inspection some cables with cracked sheath were found. Conditions:
Power,
20 years in operation, 60°C, 0.001 Gy/h, PVC cable. Cracking due to loss of plasticiser. 10
signal
No loss of functionality, but such cables were replaced as needed following LOCA.

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Other topics

Removal of heat insulation

In various locations of the plant, a variety of heat insulation materials (reflective metallic insulation,
asbestos fibre, wool wrap, etc.) are used either to shield the plant environment from high temperature
or to preserve the heat within the pipes and components for thermal efficiency. These insulation
materials are often removed for maintenance activities. Since most of the heat insulation activities
are performed by non-electrical staff, the vulnerabilities of cable insulation to high heat is often not
considered. As a result, the removal of heat insulation leads to overheating of cables in the immediate
proximity.
Based on the level of excess heat exposure received the cable may have a delayed failure or a
prompt failure when a service is required. The problems are often identified following a cable failure.
Therefore, it is important to evaluate the impact of heat insulation removal on electrical components
located in the proximity.

Cables wrapped within heat insulation

The piping systems associated with steam systems and other hot process systems have motor-operated
valves and other electrical components connected to the piping systems. During construction or
maintenance, the heat insulation wrap work is the last step of the work completion. Therefore, the
insulation workers mistakenly wrapped the hot pipe with the cable inside. This type of wrapping
results in exposing the cable to an unacceptable level of heat produced by the piping system. The
cable undergoes accelerated ageing, leading to premature failure. These problems are often identified
only with system failures and could lead to system unavailability or plant trip. Therefore, it is prudent
to have oversight on heat insulation work to prevent deleterious effects on electrical cables.

3.3.4 Cable environmental qualification code data

Cable ageing programmes in all countries require managing the effects of ageing so that the cables
and connections can perform their intended function during the period of operation. Qualification
tests include the verification that wire systems can maintain electrical and mechanical properties also
during and after a design basis event (DBE), which is normally a large break LOCA accident.
These requirements have evolved as operating experience accumulated and the ageing process
was better understood. Initially, qualification was based on the “high industrial quality” of electrical
components. For plants constructed after 1971, a more formal approach was adopted: qualification
was judged on the basis of Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 323-1971,
“IEEE Trial-Use Standard: General Guide for Qualifying Class 1E Electrical Equipment for Nuclear
Power Generating Stations” [23].
Although IEEE Std. 323-1971 did not address ageing or service life determination issues, the
standard did call for a systematic programme of analysis, testing and quality assurance. It specified
that qualification might be achieved through type testing, analysis, operating experience or a
combination of these methods. In the United States, for plants with NRC construction permits dated
1 July 1974 or later, the NRC endorsed the 1974 version of IEEE Std. 323, IEEE Std. 323-1974, “IEEE Standard
for Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations” [23], and IEEE 383-1974,
which specifically addressed cable qualification [24].
In 1983, the NRC established federal regulations with specific environmental qualification (EQ)
requirements in 10 CFR 50.49 [25] for nuclear stations. In addition to the general design requirements,
10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A, Criterion 4, 10 CFR 50.49 specifically requires that an EQ programme be
established to demonstrate that electrical safety components located in harsh plant environments
[that is, areas of the plant that could be subject to the harsh environmental effects as a consequence
to a loss of coolant accident (LOCA), high-energy line breaks (HELB) or post-LOCA radiation] are
qualified to perform their safety function in those harsh environments during and following the event
while the component is in service. 10 CFR 50.49 requires that consideration must be given to all
significant type of degradation which can have an effect on the functional capability of the equipment
and this includes ageing mechanisms to be addressed as part of environmental qualification.

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In Europe, the international standards normally used, in addition to IEEE-323 is IEC-780 [26] and
IEC-60780 [27]. For the effects of radiation on insulation materials, common guidelines are IEC-544 [28]
and IEC-1244. France and Germany have developed their own national standards, i.e. RCC-E and RCC-M
(France) and KTA 3706 (Germany) [29]. In Sweden, the Swedish utilities have developed their own
guidelines, KBE EP-154 [30]. These standards include procedures using accelerated ageing to assess cable
capability to survive the environmental conditions existing in a power plant during and after a DBE.
In most areas within a nuclear power plant, the actual ambient temperature, pressure and
humidity is lower than that used for the cable qualification, providing a high degree of confidence
during the expected 40 years of plant life. In many countries it is then assumed that the qualification
process (especially for I&C cables) provides a reasonable assurance that the cables will perform the
intended safety-related function during the qualified life. In consequence, ageing assessment
requirements can be summarised as follows:
• Accuracy and limitations of accelerated ageing mechanisms utilised for the qualification. The
issue is to evaluate to what extent the ageing mechanisms can be simulated by models and
tests. It is normally assumed that thermal ageing in polymer materials can be modelled using
the Arrhenius equation (explained in the next paragraph) and that the thermal effect due to
long exposure to working environment conditions can be achieved in a much shorter time
frame for testing (accelerated ageing).
• Life extension. It is normally assumed that the difference between the real operating
environment and the original qualification environment (worse) can justify the requalification
for the extended period, usually 20 years, by reanalysis [22]. However, some LOCA tests
performed at Wyle Labs [31] showed that most cables aged 60 years (accelerated ageing) during
LOCA tests exhibited high leakage currents and failures. These results suggest that monitoring
of environmental conditions and methods to assess cable conditions are needed to improve
confidence during the extended plant life. Moreover, the new generation of plants and the
digital upgrades to the existing designs are increasingly less tolerant of leakage currents.
The considerations above suggest that some requalification process or update might be needed
under specific circumstances. However, plant license renewal is only one of the reasons that could
require actions in this direction. Recently [32], a list of cases where an installed component needs to
be updated regarding its qualification for long-term effects of ageing conditions was presented. This
list can be summarised as follows:
• The environment conditions deviate from those used in the qualification. As specified above,
this requires environment condition monitoring procedures during the whole qualified life.
An important aspect of this case is the consideration of “hot spots”, defined as points where
temperature and/or dose rate are higher than what was assumed in the early qualifications
tests.
• Reconsideration of the previously assessed qualified life, due to the use of non-conservative
factors such as very high acceleration factors for ageing, depletion of oxygen in the LOCA test
chambers in the early hours of the test or lack of adequate consideration of dose rate effects.
• New knowledge in the field in consideration of the long qualification period (40 or 60 years).
• The end of the qualified period is approaching.
• Installed life is longer than previously expected. Reanalysis of an ageing evaluation to extend
the qualification life of a component is performed routinely in the context of an EQ programme.
In the US, the licensing basis for environmental qualification is 10 CFR 50.49, “Environmental
Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants”. A Regulatory
Guide (RG) 1.89 “Environmental Qualification of Certain Electric Equipment Important to Safety for
Nuclear Power Plants” provides practical approaches to complying with the code requirement. The RG
endorses IEEE Std. 323, “Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations” [23]
with certain exceptions. Further guidance is provided in the “Guidelines for Evaluating Environmental
Qualification of Class 1E Electrical Equipment in Operating Reactors” or NUREG 588 “Interim Staff
Position on Environmental Qualification of Safety-related Electrical Equipment” for the plants that
were operating when this guidance was issued. All the new plants are required to fully comply with
10 CFR 50.49.

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The IEEE standard provides a recommended procedure for conducting the qualification test.
A further caution is given to confirm that the selected procedure is conservative for the particular
materials that are under test. Figure 3.3.4-1 is taken from IEEE 323 to indicate the development of a test
profile with adequate consideration for margin and extended period for post-accident service period.
The 2003 version of IEEE 323 does not have the pressure and temperature curve given below. The
standard directs the use of plant-specific profiles with suggested margins for qualification tests.
Figure 3.3.4-2 shows the predicted accident profile for a plant in Korea. The qualification test
profile has to envelope the worst case environment with recommended margins.
Tables 3.3.4-1 and 3.3.4-2 show the test profile of accident pressure and temperature for a plant
in Germany.

Figure 3.3.4-1: Typical LOCA/HELB temperature and pressure

illustrating additional peak transient to account for margin
Note: A later revision to CFR and endorsement of IEEE 323 of 2003 is anticipated in 2010-12

Figure 3.3.4-2: DBE temperature profile of inside containment for a plant in Korea

400

350

300 o
( 286 F)
Temper at ur e ( F)
o

250
o
( 250 F)

200

o
( 30 days, 166 F)
150

o
( 0 sec, 120 F)
100
1. E- 01 1. E+00 1. E+01 1. E+02 1. E+03 1. E+04 1. E+05 1. E+06 1. E+07 1. E+08
Ti me ( seconds)

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Table 3.3.4-1: Pressure profiles in Germany

Peak
Test profile location Peak Peak duration
increase time
Test profile of devices in the valve compartment of a
1 750-2 000 mbar ~1 s ~4 s
1 300 MW (electric) type PWR light water reactor
Test profile of devices in the annulus (within the region of the
break compartment) of a 1 300 MW (electric) type PWR light 100-120 mbar ~100 s ~200 s
water reactor
Test profile of devices in the annulus (outside the region of the
break compartment) of a 1 300 MW (electric) type PWR light 100-120 mbar ~100 s ~100 s
water reactor

Table 3.3.4-2: Temperature profiles in Germany

Peak Short-term Long-term
Peak Short-term Long-term
Test profile location Peak increase decrease decrease
duration decrease decrease
time duration duration
Test profile of devices in
the containment vessel of Up to Up to
155-165°C ~10 s ~1 h ~1.3 h ~21.7 h
a 1 300 MW (electric) type 95-105°C 50-60°C
PWR light water reactor
Test profile of devices in
the valve compartment of a Up to
150-160°C ~40 s ~1 h ~1.8 h Stable ~2.2 h
1 300 MW (electric) type 95-100°C
PWR light water reactor
Test profile of devices in
the annulus (within the
region of the break Up to
95-100°C ~50 s ~1 h – – ~3 h
compartment) of a 25-35°C
1 300 MW (electric) type
PWR light water reactor
Test profile of devices in
the annulus (outside the
region of the break Up to
50-60°C ~100 s ~1 h – – ~3 h
compartment) of a 25-35°C
1 300 MW (electric) type
PWR light water reactor

Input from several countries has introduced several experiences that challenge the early
approaches to qualifying electrical cables using accelerated ageing. The areas of new insight include:
the influence of oxygen content in LOCA chamber, variation in activation energy, the influence of
dose rate in ageing and the procedure for accelerated ageing.
New insights are reported from Japan on activation energy and the procedure for accelerated
ageing in the environmental qualification tests.

Activation energy used for accelerated ageing

When the activation energy of each insulation material is calculated from thermal ageing test data
acquired at this time, most of the data is of the order of 100 kJ/mol (20 or more kcal/mol), and some is
also 40 or more kJ/mol (a little more than 10 kcal/mol). In addition, a large portion of thermal ageing
test data used for calculation of activation energy is data ranges from 100 to 120°C [33].
When the sampling data in actual operating plants and the data acquired in this project are
compared, the activation energy in actual operating plants’ temperature region (from 50 to 60°C)
follows a lower trend other than the value calculated from the thermal ageing test data acquired in
this project.
Also, although it differs from elongation at break, some literature states that around 60 kJ/mol
(approximately 15 kcal/mol) it can be assumed to be appropriate for the activation energy in a region
of uniform oxidisation acquired with chemo-luminescence analysis.

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Based on the above, the principles of calculation and application for the activation energy used
for future assessment as shown below were determined to be appropriate.
• Applicable region of activation energy calculated by thermal ageing tests is limited up to the
minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests. However, when the calculated activation
energy is less than 62.8 kJ/mol (15 kcal/mol) the value can be applied up to the operating
temperature region of actual operating plants.
• Activation energy in the region between the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests
and the temperature of actual operating plants are evaluated from the investigation results of
ageing in actual operating plants (sampling inspection) and thermal ageing characteristics at
the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests.
• When activation energy cannot be evaluated from the investigation results of ageing in actual
operating plants, 62.8 kJ/mol (15 kcal/mol) is used as a tentative value for the activation
energy in the region between the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests and the
temperature of actual operating plants.

Recommended procedure for accelerated ageing

Accelerated ageing equivalent to ageing during normal operation is defined as simultaneous ageing
based on the results of the “Assessment of Cable Ageing for Nuclear Power Plant (ACA)” project [33].
The temperature and dose rate that enable confirmation of degradation progress uniformly into the
full thickness of the insulation material should be selected for simultaneous ageing.
In the ACA project, progress of degradation into the inside of the insulator was confirmed with a
dose rate of 100 Gy/h and a temperature of 120°C (175°C for silicone rubber) for cross-linked polyethylene,
flame-retardant cross-linked polyethylene, ethylene-propylene rubber, flame-retardant ethylene-
propylene rubber, silicone rubber and special heat-resistant polyvinyl chloride.
Qualification procedures in Ukraine for the harsh environment of the control cables in the
containment of the WWER 1000 plant are performed according to The “Procedure of the Control
Cables Qualification for Harsh Environment in Containment of the VVER 1000 Plant”. The scope and
the sequence of cable qualification procedures include the following steps:
1) sampling of cables;
2) testing in the cable initial condition;
3) accelerated thermal ageing;
4) radiation ageing;
5) testing after the accelerated thermal and radiating ageing;
6) testing in simulated LOCA and post-LOCA conditions;
7) qualification testing;
8) technical report on the qualification of the control cables for harsh environment in
containment of the VVER 1000 plant.
Steps 3) and 4) should be evaluated to confirm that sequential ageing is conservative and
acceleration factors utilised are in fact suitable for homogeneous changes.
In the above sequence, Step 5) conducted following the ageing can be a reference point for
periodically monitoring the component to verify if the degradation has gone beyond the condition
that was adequate to endure a LOCA environment. If several tests can be conducted to identify the
degradation threshold at which the component can endure the LOCA environment, this condition can
be monitored in the plant as the maximum allowable degradation. If the operating environment
remained milder than the test assumptions, or if the accelerated ageing was more demanding, the
component service life can be extended by condition monitoring until the degradation threshold to
withstand a LOCA environment is reached.

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3.3.5 Plant and cable environmental condition

Another finding from the international database is that the variations in plant environment have
influenced the life of the cables. An increasing temperature decreases the service life and a decrease
in temperature could be of benefit to increasing the life of the cable in relation to the assumptions in
the qualification phase of the cable.
There is yet another benefit to be gained by conducting periodic inspections in plant areas.
A visual inspection of the cable in accessible areas could reveal surface discoloration, flaking,
browning, etc., that would be indicative of localised overheating that degrades insulation. A periodic
inspection at potential hot spot locations could avoid several in-service failures.

Environmental monitoring in the Czech Republic

Environmental monitoring
It is a predominant consideration to have environmental monitoring in the NPP containment to obtain
a detailed knowledge of temperature, dose rate, humidity, etc. Inside and outside the NPP containment,
more than 200 locations have been monitored. The temperature, humidity and dose rate have been
monitored for many years at the same locations.

Temperature and humidity monitoring

A proven approach for local monitoring is the use of self-powered temperature, temperature/humidity
data loggers (black boxes). The recorders are equipped with internal or external (up to 15 m long)
sensors. The recording interval is usually set on 2, 4 and/or 6 hours, respectively. During the reactor
shutdown, the results from the data loggers can be evaluated.

Radiation monitoring
The dose rate distribution is measured with the aid of Alanine dosimeters. The selected location has
been fitted with hermetically sealed dosimeters from Bruker Company, Germany, all in the form of
small cylinders with a diameter and height of 5 mm. The dosimeters are evaluated in the laboratory
using electron spin resonance (ESR) spectroscopy. Since the irradiation temperature influences the
ESR response of Alanine dosimeters, the true absorbed dose is calculated from the measured dose by
using the temperature coefficient. The dose rate is calculated from the known irradiation time.

Fluency of neutrons
The fluency of thermal and fast neutrons is measured using cobalt and nickel foils, respectively. The
evaluation of these dosimeters consists in measuring their induced activity after neutron irradiation.
At some locations the temperature exceeded the projected calculations. The dose rates at all
locations were markedly lower than what was projected.

Table 3.3.5-1: Summary of plant environmental condition for Czech NPP

Czech Temperature Dose rate

plant Tool No. of points Temperature Tool No. of points Dose rate
75°C at one
0.4 Gy/h, but in
position with
PWR 440 Data logger 180 per unit Alanine 200 per unit most cases
cables, otherwise
under 0.1 Gy/h
60°C and less
0.17 Gy/h,
PWR 1000 Data logger 200 per unit 51 °C Alanine 230 per unit
usually less

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Figure 3.3.5-1: Measured points for a PWR 440

Plant environmental condition in Japan

The electric power utilities are required to investigate the environmental conditions for cables
installed inside reactor containment vessels in all operating commercial nuclear power plants, based
on an administrative document issued by the Japan Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) in
October 2007.
In the investigation programme, the temperature and radiation dose in cable-installed areas
must be measured once during periodic inspection or during refuelling outage. Devices for the
temperature measurement must include a data logger and an Alanine dosimeter for the radiation
measurement.
Investigations of 35 nuclear power plants have been completed as of January 2010 and their
results are shown in Table 3.3.5-2. On the whole, temperature and radiation dose rate investigated
showed lower values than the design value except in some nuclear power plants. Especially, the
values of radiation dose rate were considerably low. Based on the results, the qualified life of cables is
being revaluated and cable replacement is planned in some nuclear power plants where the
environment was more severe.

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Table 3.3.5-2: Summary of plant environmental condition for Japanese NPP

Temperature Dose rate
Investigated Number of Measuring Number of
Measuring tool Maximum Maximum
plant measurement tool of measurement
of temperature temperature dose rate
points dose rate points
9 (data loggers) 59.5°C (data logger)
BWR, ABWR 110 (labels) 110 0.147 Gy/h
65°C (label)
Data loggers
9 (data loggers) 70.8°C (data logger) Alanine
BWR, BWR-4 and labels for 56 0.179 Gy/h
59 (labels) 75°C (label) dosimeters
thermometry
96 (data loggers)
BWR, BWR-5 59.8°C (data logger) 112 0.234 Gy/h
117 (labels)
BWR, BWR-3 74 65.7°C 75 0.093 Gy/h
BWR, BWR-4 58 74.8°C Alanine 73 0.581 Gy/h
Data loggers
BWR, BWR-4 74 67.0°C dosimeters 82 0.301 Gy/h
BWR, BWR-4 65 75.7°C 73 1.016 Gy/h
34 (data loggers)
BWR, BWR-5 64.5°C (data logger) 38 0.546 Gy/h
38 (labels)
84 (data loggers)
BWR, BWR-5 74.2°C (data logger) 95 0.265 Gy/h
56 (labels)
80 (data loggers)
BWR, BWR-5 76.2°C (data logger) 83 0.305 Gy/h
86 (labels)
Data loggers 89 (data loggers)
BWR, BWR-5 Alanine 93 0.139 Gy/h
and labels for 84.8°C (data logger)
94 (labels) dosimeters
thermometry
72 (data loggers)
BWR, BWR-5 66.8°C (data logger) 87 0.192 Gy/h
88 (labels)
135 (data loggers)
BWR, BWR-5 60.4°C (data logger) 142 0.156 Gy/h
148 (labels)
11 (data loggers) 54.0°C (data logger)
BWR, BWR-3 78 (labels) 68 0.563 Gy/h
70°C (label)
BWR, BWR-5 Labels for 90 70°C Alanine 88 0.152 Gy/h
BWR, BWR-2 thermometry 100 80°C dosimeters 95 0.484 Gy/h
22 (data loggers)
PWR, WE-2 60.8°C (data logger) 30 0.288 Gy/h
16 (labels)
28 (data loggers)
PWR, WE-2 73.2°C (data logger) 30 0.288 Gy/h
15 (labels)
25 (data loggers)
PWR, WE-2 74.6°C (data logger) 21 0.190 Gy/h
21 (labels)
17 (data loggers)
PWR, WE-3 50.0°C (data logger) 15 0.085 Gy/h
21 (labels)
35 (data loggers)
PWR, 3-loop 51.8°C (data logger) 18 0.146 Gy/h
40 (labels)
33 (data loggers)
PWR, 3-loop 61.4°C (data logger) 23 0.099 Gy/h
34 (labels)
34 (data loggers)
PWR, 3-loop 44.5°C (data logger) 25 0.385 Gy/h
34 (labels)
38 (data loggers)
PWR, 3-loop 47.5°C (data logger) 15 0.090 Gy/h
39 (labels)
34 (data loggers)
PWR, WE-4 66.1°C (data logger) 15 0.144 Gy/h
10 (labels)
Data loggers
29 (data loggers) Alanine
PWR, WE-4 and labels for 64.0°C (data logger) 20 0.129 Gy/h
9 (labels) dosimeters
thermometry
35 (data loggers)
PWR, WE-4 39.4°C (data logger) 30 0.078 Gy/h
8 (labels)
37 (data loggers)
PWR, WE-2 79.8°C (data logger) 25 0.307 Gy/h
25 (labels)
37 (data loggers)
PWR, WE-2 75.8°C (data logger) 25 0.337 Gy/h
36 (labels)
25 (data loggers)
PWR, 2-loop 53.3°C (data logger) 26 0.240 Gy/h
39 (labels)
20 (data loggers)
PWR, 2-loop 67.8°C (data logger) 29 0.286 Gy/h
37 (labels)
21 (data loggers)
PWR, 4-loop 45.8°C (data logger) 30 0.241 Gy/h
29 (labels)
27 (data loggers)
PWR, 4-loop 43.6°C (data logger) 33 0.240 Gy/h
33 (labels)
20 (data loggers)
PWR, 3-loop 43.5°C (data logger) 29 0.354 Gy/h
36 (labels)
17 (data loggers)
PWR, 3-loop 47.0°C (data logger) 22 0.310 Gy/h
27 (labels)

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Plant and cable environmental monitoring in Spain

According to 10 CFR.49 the Spanish NNP are required to develop a plant-specific “Equipment
Environmental Qualification Programme” on the “electrical equipment important to safety”.
Environmental monitoring programmes are not specifically required by the applicable qualification
rules and standards, but most of the plants, according to CSN recommendations, have decided to
implement these programmes, to complement their equipment qualification programmes.
Each monitoring programme is plant-specific but, as a general rule, the plants have historically
monitored the operating temperature and radiation values in selected areas where qualified equipment
are located. Measuring periods and devices vary from plant to plant. Usually, instrumentation of
temperature and radiation plant control systems have been used, but some plants have also installed
additional temperature sensors (thermocouples, RTD, thermometers) and radiation monitors (TLD), or
“Westinghouse Time Life Monitors” in selected areas.
The “Time Life Monitors” supplied by Westinghouse, are self-integrated devices, qualified
according to IEEE-323-83 and IEEE-344-87 that, as customers choose, can make different environmental
measurements:
• high range gamma dose;
• low range gamma dose;
• beta particle dose;
• neutron flux exposure;
• peak temperature on a period;
• integrated temperature in a period (based on Arrhenius methodology).
In order to make the above measurements, the monitors are supplied with different environmental
“block sensing materials”. At the end of the measuring period, the blocks are removed from the
monitor and sent for analysis to Westinghouse facilities.
The following summarises the main aspects of the “Environmental Monitoring Programme on 1E
Equipment” developed by some Spanish plants:

PWR Westinghouse design (2 units)

The temperature monitoring programme is based on 60 Westinghouse Time Life Monitors (33 installed
in Unit 1, 23 in Unit 2 and 4 monitors in common plant areas). The monitors are located outside
reactor containment in the “safeguards building” (including the steam tunnel), auxiliary building,
electric building and fuel building. Inside the electric building, five specific cable rooms are monitored.
The installed monitors only include peak and integrated temperature sensors. The measures have
been made during three operation cycles (18 months/cycle). Results of the programme show some
peak temperatures higher than design values (10°C in steam tunnel) but the integrated temperature
values always remained below design values.

BWR (Mark 1 containment)

The operating temperature inside the drywell has historically been measured using the “drywell
temperature control system”. This system includes 14 thermocouples that send continuous temperature
values to data loggers located in the control room. Thermocouples are located in different drywell
elevations:
• Elevation 514: 4 thermocouples.
• Elevation 520: 2 thermocouples.
• Elevation 525: 4 thermocouples.
• Elevation 536: 4 thermocouples.

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In 2007, according to the recent “Life Extension Application” of this plant, CSN required an
analysis of the existent temperature data in the different drywell elevations corresponding to a
20-year period (1986-2007). For each elevation, the following medium-temperature values during the
period were estimated, considering conservative margins:
• Elevation 514: 42°C.
• Elevation 520: 57°C.
• Elevation 525: 65°C.
• Elevation 536: 66°C.
The maximum cable operating temperature was established at 65°C. According to the above
temperature values, a “Time Limited Ageing Analysis” was performed for all qualified equipment and
cables existing inside the drywell.

BWR-6 (Mark 3 containment)

The programme is based on temperature and radiation values, measured in selected areas inside the
reactor building, auxiliary building (including steam tunnel), turbine building and diesel generator
building over a 13-year period (from 1991 to 2003).
• Temperature monitoring. The programme is based on the following types of measures:
– Local temperature monitoring on selected 1E equipments. Accessible and non-accessible
equipment, located inside the reactor building, steam tunnel and auxiliary building.
 Temperature sensors located on the equipment or as close as possible.
 Maximum, minimum and average temperature values were measured and registered
yearly for each piece of equipment. Maximum temperature deviations from the design
temperature were also calculated.
– Temperature monitoring on relays located on cabinets and panels located in different
buildings.
 Measures were taken avoiding heat dissipation coming from relays. Maximum, minimum
and average temperature values were registered yearly for each cabinet/panel.
 Deviations from design temperature in each cabinet and area were calculated.
– Area temperature monitoring.
 Ambient temperature monitoring on selected areas inside the reactor building, steam
tunnel, auxiliary building, turbine building and diesel generator building.
 Different temperature sensors (RTD and thermocouples) were used in each area
(22 sensors inside the reactor building and 9 sensors inside the steam tunnel).
 Maximum/minimum/average temperature values for each sensor were registered yearly.
For each equipment, cabinet and area, the measured yearly values over the 13-year period were
plotted on graphs.
• Radiation monitoring.
– Operating gamma doses were measured yearly on equipments in several locations:
 1 measurement point inside the reactor building (internal MSIV);
 2 measurement points inside the steam tunnel (external MSIV);
 2 measurement points inside the turbine building) (1 limit switch, 1 switch).
– Accumulated doses over 8 years were calculated for each location. These values were
extrapolated to a 40-year value and later compared with design values in each location.
– Final results show that design estimated doses in each location were greater than the
expected 40-year actual doses.

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• Significant temperature monitoring results. Measured local temperatures on some accessible

equipment inside the reactor building show some years where peak values are over the design
temperature (57°C), but the average values remain below the design temperature during the
entire measured period.
Measured local temperatures on SRV and MSIV inside and outside reactor containment show
several maximum values over design temperature. Some temperature peak values reached
100°C (full range of the sensor).
Maximum measured temperatures on relays (cabinets and panels) remained below design
temperature during the 13-year period. The average temperatures, for all locations, remained
at least 10°C below the design temperature.
Area temperature monitoring showed the following results:
– Maximum values inside the reactor building always remained over the design temperature
(57°C) reaching peak values of 72°C, but the average temperature remained below the
design temperature.
– Maximum temperature values inside the steam tunnel always remained over the design
temperature (49°C). The peak values near the main steam lines reached 90°C some years.
The average temperature in areas near the main steam lines always remained about 10°C
over the design temperature. The average temperature in other areas inside the steam
tunnel remained below the design temperature.
– Inside the auxiliary building and turbine building the maximum temperature values in
some areas remained over the design temperature (40°C and 49°C respectively), but the
average temperature remains below the design temperature.
• Conclusions. After evaluation of the monitoring programme results, the plant reached the
following conclusions.
– The high local temperature peak values (about 100°C) measured on MSIV and SRV located
inside the reactor building and steam tunnel were not considered representative of actual
average temperature in the area. Plant analysis concluded that these peak values could
have been a consequence of “steam leaks” coming from valves located near the equipment
temperature sensors, and also of “thermal radiation beams” coming from defects in
thermal insulation of “high-energy lines” and equipments.
– The area surrounding the main steam lines were considered as a “hot spot” with an
average temperature of 60°C (more than 10°C over design temperature).
– The plant considered that postulated design temperature values were acceptable inside
the reactor building and the rest of the steam tunnel.
• Plant corrective actions. As a consequence of the above conclusions, the plant implemented
(in 2005) the following corrective actions.
– Performance of walkdowns in the steam tunnel, using thermography to detect hot spots.
– Replacement or repair of damaged thermal insulation on high-energy lines and equipments
inside the steam tunnel and reactor building.
– Isolation of thermal hot spots detected by thermography.
– Performance of visual inspection on cables and equipments affected by steam leaks inside
the reactor building and steam tunnel.
– Reactor building and steam tunnel HVAC systems units reviewed and improved.
– Replacement of local temperature sensors on MSIV and SRV with new devices (temperature
range up to 250°C).
– Performance of an analysis of qualified life on cables and equipment located inside the
steam tunnel.

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Cable hot spot identification

In accordance with regulatory requirements, in 2003 Spanish plants began to develop ageing
management programmes (AMP) on structures, systems and components important to safety,
including electrical cables (see database, Part 8). General criteria for cable critical environmental and
service conditions identification are described in Technical Procedure ES13/IT-03-0903, developed in
the UNESA/CSN Research Co-ordinated Project PCI-13 (see database field 8007).
Based on the above document, preliminary basic recommended activities for cable hot spots and
critical service conditions identification are the following:
• meetings with plant technical staff, for obtaining actual plant environmental and service
information;
• review of historical equipment and cable maintenance reports;
• review of plant equipment location drawings.
As a result of the above activities, it is possible to identify areas inside the plant with potential
hot spot indicators like the following:
• presence of liquids or fluids on floors or on plant structural elements, particularly chemical
solutions;
• degraded or “burned” paintings on walls and structures;
• high-temperature water leaks;
• presence of condensation;
• high-temperature areas;
• high vibrations on equipments and structures;
• presence of oil or fuel steams;
• signals of chemical spray or steam impingement on cables or equipments;
• equipment subjected to frequent maintenance activities;
• cable trays and conduits presenting sharp surfaces or loosened supports;
• degraded fire barriers;
• degraded high-temperature equipment or piping isolation;
• areas where previous cable failures have been detected.
Based on the above indicators specific potential hot spot plant areas can be selected for walk
downs and visual cable inspection.
According to CSN recommendations, some Spanish plants have performed specific plant
inspections and walk downs based on the ES13/IT-03-0903 Technical Procedure criteria for identifying
cable hot spots.
• BWR Mark 1 containment
– 2003: Visual inspection on qualified cables located in drywell (10 cables).
– 2005: Visual and tactile inspection on qualified cables located in drywell and steam tunnel.
– 2007-2009: Cable ageing management activities related to the plant “Extended Operation
Permit Application”:
 Plant walk downs for cable hot spot identification.
 Inspection on qualified and non-qualified representative cable sample (233 cables),
located on drywell, steam tunnel, reactor building, turbine building and other specific
hot spot areas, previously identified.

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• PWR Westinghouse design, 2 units

The plant began to implement its cable ageing management programme activities in 2006.
Walk downs on cable routings, using thermography, were performed in selected areas inside
safeguards building (steam tunnel), electric building and outside areas (building terraces).
Some temperature values, higher than those measured by the existing area temperature
sensors, were detected. During walk downs visual and tactile inspection, and indenter
modulus technique, were also applied to accessible cables.
• PWR KWU design
The plant began its cable ageing management activities in 2007. A walk down using visual
inspection and thermography was performed for cable hot spot identification on the following
plant areas:
– valve chamber (steam tunnel);
– electric building (cable rooms);
– galleries ZX, ZA;
– turbine building;
– containment annulus.
Walk down results did not identify any cable hot spot. Complementing the walk down, a detailed
inspection on a representative sample of cables in the above areas was performed, using visual and
tactile inspection, and the indenter modulus technique.

Service life time assessment based on environmental monitoring in the Czech Republic
Accelerated testing methods used during the qualification may not be enough to simulate operational
cable ageing. Moreover, the cables in containment age at different rates based on their location. For
example, the temperature and the dose rate may vary within the containment from 25 to 70°C and/or
from 0 to 0.5 Gy/h, respectively. As the cables age in different locations at different rates, the service
life can vary. Hence, it is necessary to know the temperature and the dose (dose rate) to ensure the
qualification of polymeric materials. Representative cable samples are aged at different temperatures,
at different dose rates and/or are simultaneously irradiated at elevated temperature. Functional
properties were measured.
The results are transformed into the mathematical equations that convert the rate of degradation
at different conditions (temperature, dose rate) with ageing time. The equations exist for all 1E cable
types, sheath as well as insulation and this approach helps to extend cable life based on actual
temperature and radiation doses.
The rate of degradation in individual locations in a NPP depends on the surrounding temperature
and on the dose rate. To assess the service life time in individual locations more easily, a special
software system has been developed. The input parameters are the following:
• equations describing the rate of degradation at specific conditions;
• information on the temperature and dose rate in individual locations in NPP;
• information on cables: type, trace (room, location, etc.), qualification.
The output is:
• the cable service life time in individual locations;
• much more additional information like temperature distribution and dose rate along the cable
trace, connected device, etc.

Canadian experience on service life

It was observed that some specific insulation materials failed after radiation doses much lower than
predicted. Research work confirmed that there are a few insulation materials which are very sensitive
to low dose rate. IAEA-TECDOC-1188 states (Vol. I, pg. 28) that very low dose rates (20-30 Gy/h) have

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been found necessary for testing certain materials particularly sensitive to the dose rate [20]. It is
important to note that the use of such insulation materials in radiation environments where the
effects of dose rate at high dose rate exposure may not be an indication of ageing experience in a low
dose environment for material irradiated to a common dose. Therefore, materials “qualified” for a
40-year service life may fail sooner than expected [34].

3.3.6 Mitigation of cable-installed environment

Another approach to ageing management, endorsed by three or four countries, is to manage the
environment that cables are subjected to in their service. The normal operating environment for the
cable could be provided with additional shielding from heat, radiation and other chemical effects to
reduce the impact of operational ageing and extend cable life.

3.3.7 Cable replacement

In 1991, one US licensee experienced a cable failure at 4 160 V level. The root cause was identified to
be “treeing” from a damp environment. This cable failure resulted in the shutdown of both units. The
license replaced all the 4 160 V and 13 kV underground cables of the same vintage to prevent any
future problems in this area.
In order to fulfil the objective of preventing/mitigating operational failures, it is essential to know
the conditions that would prompt a cable replacement. An early knowledge of potential cable failure
scenario could help to stage the replacement cable and schedule a convenient plant outage time for
replacement. This assessment is more challenging for cables that are required to endure an accident
environment and remain functional.
These conditions are identified by condition monitoring against the previously known threshold
on cable degradations or using new information gained from operating experience.
In the Czech NPP, old safety-related cables required to function following a LOCA were re-qualified
after 25 years of operation. The real operating conditions were used for qualification. Some cables that
did not pass the LOCA test were replaced.
In order to extent the NPP life for another 30 years, the potential of an increasing number of cable
failures also has to considered for non-safety-related cables. The cables are protected by fire protection
foam as shown in Figure 3.3.7-1. Therefore, it is impossible to change a single cable that failed.
Therefore, new cables are added to the current cable trays and the old ones are not removed. In many
cases there is no room left for further addition of cables. Therefore, it has been decided to change the
majority of the NPP cables. A massive cable replacement is supposed to be performed within about
10 years (2020).

Figure 3.3.7-1: Fire protection layer for cables

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In one Spanish BWR plant, built in the 60s (operation permit in 1971), many originally installed
cables supplied by General Electric were not qualified for functioning under accident conditions.
In 1983, the plant was required by CSN to develop a Safety Evaluation Plan (SEP). According to the SEP,
an Equipment Environmental Qualification Programme, following NRC IE-Bulletin 79-01-B (DOR
Guidelines), was required for cables and equipments. As a consequence of the SEP, in 1985 the plant
replaced power and control cables in safety-related equipment located inside the drywell (RV, SRV, MSIV,
MOV, thermocouples, etc.). About 140 cables, with lengths varying from 10 to 150 meters, were replaced.
New cables from Spanish manufacturers Pirelli (EPDM, EPR and Afumex insulation) and Saenger
(EPR insulation) were qualified according to IEEE-383-74 and installed inside the drywell. Afterwards, a
CSN inspection (2002) on the plant EQ programme, found that many power and control cables located
inside the steam tunnel and reactor building were not properly qualified (lack of documentation)
according to 10 CFR 50.49 requirements. Following a specific assessment of the issue, 34 cables inside
the steam tunnel and 122 cables inside the reactor and turbine building were replaced in 2003 and
2005, respectively. New Pirelli (EPR and Afumex insulation) and Saenger (EPR insulation) cables,
qualified according to IEEE-383-74 were installed.
In another Spanish BWR plant, original cables installed in the plant were qualified according to
IEEE-383-74 requirements. As result of maintenance activities on MOV, in 1994 and 1995 plant
personnel found degradation (burned and cracked jackets) in some Pirelli EPR/CSPE, control and power
cables feeding MOV (Limitorque actuators). Subsequent cable failures occurred in 1996, 2000 and 2002
resulted in three safety-related MOV failures.
A further plant evaluation in 2005 determined that temperature hot spots inside the reactor
building and steam tunnel could have been the cause of the cable degradation. As a consequence, the
plant decided to replace all Pirelli EPR cables in 39 MOV located in high-temperature areas. A plant
design modification was applied to a total of 176 actuators (1E, non-1E) including those located in
high-temperature areas. Intermediate connection boxes were installed in cable routings, and control
and power cable portions, from box to actuator, were replaced with new Nucletef (ETFE insulation)
power and control cables. Quick connectors were also installed in some actuators. Cable replacement
began during a 1997 outage and will be probably be finished in 2012 outage.
In Canada, the PVC cables were replaced inside containment at Ontario Power Generation (OPG)
nuclear power plants for several reasons: The qualification of PVC for use in high-radiation fields was
a concern because OPG’s original qualification tests for PVC did not perform well for the bounding
environmental profiles, and a concern with regard to dose rate effects related to PVC cables.
In addition, some original manufacturers were out of business or had no detailed information needed
to demonstrate the environmental qualification of their cables. In light of these issues, a decision was
made to remove PVC insulated cables from qualified applications inside containment. At that time,
OPG owned most of the nuclear power plants in Canada.
Currently, Gentilly-2 (owned by Hydro-Québec), another Canadian nuclear power plant, is also
planning to replace PVC cables inside containment based on similar reasons to those encountered by
OPG. For instance, even though a few of the PVC cables successfully passed one of the simulated
design basis events (DBE), such as main stream line break (MSLB), they did not pass the loss of coolant
accident (LOCA). Thus, these cables will not perform their safety-related functions when exposed to
harsh environments resulting from a LOCA.
As this nuclear power plant is scheduled for refurbishment, a decision was made to replace the
PVC insulated cables inside containment by the end of refurbishment in 2012.

3.3.8 Regulatory information for cables

Advanced EQ test guide
In Japan, an “Assessment of Cable Ageing for Nuclear Power Plants (ACA)” was performed from FY2002
to FY2008 and the advanced guide for cable EQ test “Guide for Cable Environmental Qualification Test
for Nuclear Power Plants” was formulated based on the results of the project. The guide is a part of the
final report JNES-SS-0903 [33]. In the guide, simultaneous thermal and radiation ageing is adopted as a
pre-ageing method instead of the conventional method of sequential ageing. In addition, activation
energy used to set the accelerated ageing condition is determined considering the condition in operating
plants. The several techniques for setting accelerated condition are also provided in the guide.

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The outline of the advanced guide is as follows:

• A cable specimen with 3 m length is used. The cable with the thinnest insulation is selected
as cable specimen for the cables with the identical specifications in insulation.
Even if the insulation specification is identical, a separate test is carried out for the cables
supplied by different manufacturers.
• Accelerated ageing equivalent to ageing during normal operation is conducted as simultaneous
ageing. The temperature and dose rate that enable confirmation of degradation progress into
the full depth of the inside of the insulation are selected for simultaneous ageing.
In the ACA project, degradation progress on inside of the insulator was confirmed with dose
rate 100 Gy/h and temperature 120°C (175°C for silicone rubber) for cross-linked polyethylene,
flame-retardant cross-linked polyethylene, ethylene-propylene rubber, flame-retardant
ethylene-propylene rubber, silicone rubber and special heat-resistant polyvinyl chloride.
• Activation energy used for accelerated ageing is as follows:
– Applicable region of activation energy calculated by thermal ageing tests is limited up to the
minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests. However, when the calculated activation
energy is less than 62.8 kJ/mol (15 kcal/mol) the value can be applied up to the operating
temperature region of actual operating plants.
– Activation energy in the region between the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests
and the temperature of actual operating plants are evaluated from the investigation results of
ageing in actual operating plants (sampling inspection) and thermal ageing characteristics
at the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests.
– When activation energy cannot be evaluated from the investigation results of ageing in
actual operating plants, 62.8 kJ/mol (15 kcal/mol) is used as a tentative value for the
activation energy in the region between the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests
and the temperature of actual operating plants.
• The condition of accelerated simultaneous ageing equivalent to ageing during normal operation
is established by the techniques of “superposition of time dependent data” and “superposition
of dose to equivalent damage data” or the technique of “same acceleration factor” (which has
been verified to be equivalent to the former) based on the condition of actual operating plants.
However, it is recommended not to use the technique of “superposition of time dependent
data” to establish the condition for silicone rubber insulation cable.
Further, if the cable has an insulation made of cross-linked polyethylene, flame-retardant
cross-linked polyethylene, ethylene-propylene rubber, flame-retardant ethylene-propylene
rubber, silicone rubber and special heat-resistant polyvinyl chloride, the condition of accelerated
simultaneous ageing may be established by a simplified method, that of using the technique
of “superposition of dose to equivalent damage data”.
• The withstand-voltage test in Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS) is used as a method for
determination of integrity after LOCA test.

Future trend of cable environmental qualification test in Japan

NISA issued the regulatory instruction on 30 October 2007 based on the ACA project interim report
(issued in December 2006). To meet this instruction, electric utilities are conducting environmental
conditions and performance evaluations of safety-related cables installed in the reactor containment.
The performance evaluations are conducted with LOCA tests, using cable samples from actual plant
applications. Tensile tests are also conducted using actual cables from the plant.
The results of these investigation and evaluations will be used to confirm the appropriateness of
applying the advanced guide for cable environmental qualification tests. Therefore, the advanced
guide is planned to be used in order to evaluate the validity of ageing management in the near future.

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Requalification plan for stored cables

In Argentina, Atucha II NPP is delayed in construction. Like Atucha I, it is a pressure vessel pressurised
heavy water reactor (PV-PHWR), but was planned to have a higher power. Its construction started in 1980
under a contract with Siemens AG, but it was never finished and it remained around 80% completed.
Non-safety related cables were purchased during ‘90. Some of them were installed and the rest
were stored in good condition. Cable ageing management programme (CAMP) for stored cables, and
EQ maintenance programme (EQMP) are planned for the end of 2009. The plan includes the following
phases:
• Screening of cables involved in systems and components relevant for the long-term operation. The
scope involves the non-safety-related cables but still relevant for the power generation of the
NPP and the long-term operation.
• Condition assessment of stored cable based on original standards. Several studies are being carried
out. The studies include material characterisation, mechanical properties, thermal stability,
etc. The methodology and acceptance criteria are based on the original standards of
qualification for cables (DIN-VDE).
• Determination of ageing related mechanism and its effect on current conditions. This phase includes:
environmental condition assessment, determination of ageing mechanism based on material
and environmental condition (based on design parameters). Finally, the determination of the
acceptance criteria of each cable will be developed and the chosen property to be evaluated is
the elongation at break.
• Data collection of baseline for ageing management programme (including activation energy).
Development of master curves of elongation at break at different temperature and correlation
of elongation at break with non-destructive assessment of properties.
• Condition monitoring and in-service inspection procedures development and their implementation.
• EQ maintenance programme:
– Qualified life determination and initial qualification assessment. The proposed qualified life is
30 years. Based on design data establish the environmental condition in order to carry out
accelerated ageing and testing.
– Sampling location determination. The location selected should be representative of the cable
environment condition and accessible to carry out the periodic qualification maintenance
test. The set of qualification reference location and measurements for maintenance are
still under discussion and the frequency is now proposed to be 10 years.
– Sample testing procedures elaboration and implementation. The scope of the quality maintenance
test is still under discussion.

Canadian environmental qualification programme

The regulatory information below is related to the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) license
conditions concerning the environmental qualification programme. This also includes components
such as cables.

License condition
“The licensee shall have an environmental qualification programme in accordance with the
requirements of CSA Standard N290.13: Environmental Qualification of Equipment for CANDU Nuclear
Power Plants.”

Preamble
The purpose of this license condition is to ensure that all required systems, equipment, components,
protective barriers, and structures in a nuclear facility are qualified to perform their safety functions if
exposed to harsh environmental conditions resulting from credited design basis events (DBE) and that
this capability is preserved for the life of the plant.

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Compliance verification criteria

As part of the CNSC regulatory compliance activities, CNSC staff shall verify compliance of the
environmental qualification (EQ) programme with the requirements of CSA Standard N290.13 and the
following acceptance criteria:
• The licensee shall have a documented environmental qualification programme in place. The
environmental qualification programme shall:
– identify managerial roles and responsibilities;
– be consistent with the safety report, design basis documentation and abnormal accident
procedures;
– list processes and procedures in place to identify equipment that require environmental
qualification;
– identify methods used to establish environmental qualification of equipment;
– list procedural controls in place to preserve environmental qualification of equipment for
the life of the plant.
• The licensee shall provide evidence that the processes and procedures related to the
environmental qualification programme meet the requirements of recognised industrial
standards.
• The licensee shall have available, at the plant, all documentation related to environmental
qualification.
This documentation includes (but it is not limited to) policies, procedures, environmental
qualification list, environmental qualification assessments, type test reports, maintenance,
procurement and storage of replacement parts for inspection by CNSC staff.
• The licensee shall have in place a monitoring programme to measure degradation and failures
of qualified equipment.
The monitoring programme shall contain elements of condition monitoring and environmental
monitoring. Condition monitoring shall measure variables that indicate the physical state of
the equipment, including cables, and assess its ability to perform its intended function following
the period of observation. Environmental monitoring shall measure environmental stressors,
such as temperature, radiation and operational cycling during normal operating conditions.
This monitoring programme will allow periodical re-evaluations of equipments’ qualified life.
• The licensee shall provide evidence that all EQ work, including processes for establishing and
preserving EQ, meet the requirements of the licensee’s quality assurance programme.
• The licensee shall provide evidence that the personnel in the EQ work have received training
on EQ principles and related procedures. This shall include both in-house and contract
personnel.

Programme of nuclear power plant cable ageing management in Ukraine – PM-Т.0.08.121-07

The “Programme of NPP (Nuclear Power Plant) Cable Ageing Management” specifies the requirements
for the development, implementation and context of methodical, organisational and technical activity
related to NPP cable ageing management. This programme is developed taking into account the
recommendations of IAEA experts.
The purpose of ageing management is to assure cable operational safety, reliability and
cost-effectiveness under normal operating conditions over the specified cable lifetime and under
design accident conditions.
The main purposes of this document are:
• to specify the requirements for NPP cable ageing management;
• to specify the main principles of cable ageing management, the order of works and
requirements for the procedures of ageing management.

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The programme is applied to control cables (instrumentation, signal, block cables) with plastic
and rubber insulation, low- and medium-voltage cables with plastic and paper-oil insulation operating
in NPP. The programme requirements are obligatory for the ageing management of safety-related
cables, which are classified as 2nd and 3rd safety classes according to the “General Provisions for NPP
Safety” NP 306.2.141-2008.
The programme requirements can be used for the ageing management of the cables for systems
of normal operation (4th safety class). The programme specifies:
• procedures of ageing management activity;
• programme requirements for NPP ageing management for specific plants;
• programme requirements for cable technical condition inspection;
• requirements and principles of cable lists compiled for the inspection of cable technical
condition in order to define the possibility of lifetime extension;
• procedures of cable environment condition monitoring and identification of hot spots;
• methods of cable technical condition assessment;
• requirements to cable technical condition inspection for the purpose of the cable lifetime
extension;
• the requirements to cable database and content of cable data for the integration into general
cable database;
• registration of cable ageing management works;
• content of scientific and technical support activity and maintenance;
• quality assurance.
The requirements of the programme are obligatory for the implementation by the NPP staff and
management and the management of the national nuclear energy-generating company Energoatom
and specialised organisations involved in cable ageing management activity. The work on cable
ageing management is performed by the NPP personnel involved in the specialised organisation when
needed.

3.3.9 Description of condition monitoring technique

There are 18 cable condition monitoring techniques recorded in the database and their classifications
of application are shown in Table 3.3.9-1. It has varying levels of capabilities and weaknesses. Each
technique has its own specialties that are better suited for certain kinds of cables.

US records
In January 2010 USNRC published NUREG/CR-7000 “Essential Elements of an Electric Cable Condition
Monitoring Programme”. Table 3.3.9-1 of this publication provides an exhaustive listing of all cable
monitoring techniques, applicable cable categories and materials, applicable stressors, ageing
mechanisms detected, advantages and limitations.

Applicability tests of non-destructive degradation diagnostic technologies for cables

In Japan, several condition monitoring methods for cables installed in nuclear power plants was
tested their applicability. The outlines of the methods tested are as follows [33].
• Indenter. The indenter is to measure the indenter modulus as the non-destructive degradation
diagnostic parameter. The Indenter modulus is calculated as the slope of load versus
penetration curve and its unit is Newton per millimetres (N/mm). Load at the start of
measurement and load at the end of measurement are specified for each material. An
improved type of indenter modulus device, which was originally manufactured by AEA
Technology Inc. in (UK) and improved jointly by Institute of Nuclear Safety System, Inc. (INSS,
Japan) and AEA Technology Inc., was used to measure indenter modulus.

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Table 3.3.9-1: Condition monitoring techniques

Destructive/ In service/ On site/ Condition monitoring

Position
non-destructive disconnect laboratory techniques
Elongation at break
Destructive Disconnect Laboratory
Thermo-gravimetry
On site Indenter
Oxidation induction time
In service
Laboratory Oxidation induction temp.
Local Density analysis on polymer samples
Non-destructive Indenter
Optical diagnosis
Disconnect On site Surface hardness measurement
Ultrasonic diagnosis
Microwave diagnosis
In service On site Time domain reflector
Current leak rate testing
Insulation resistance
Full length Non-destructive Loss factor
Disconnect On site
Potential decay
Tan delta
Broadband impedance spectroscopy

• Ultrasonic degradation diagnostic method. The ultrasonic diagnostic method is the technology
developed by Mitsubishi Cable Industries, Ltd. as the degradation diagnostic technology for
insulation or jackets of the cables and to measure ultrasonic propagation velocity for axial
direction of materials as the non-destructive degradation diagnostic parameter. The diagnostic
equipment for low-voltage cables in NPP has been jointly developed by Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Ltd. and Mitsubishi Cable Industries, Ltd. The ultrasonic probes of this equipment
moves automatically by the sequential control to measure accuracy in a short time and to
decrease exposure dose of the operators.
• Optical diagnostic method. The optical diagnostic method has been developed by Hitachi, Ltd. as
a degradation diagnostic method for polymer materials used for the cables. The basic concept
of this method is the colour-change of polymer materials due to ageing are exposed to two
optical beams with different wavelengths and their absorption is quantitatively evaluated.
In the test, the difference of absorption for 405 nm and 1 310 nm were measured as a diagnosing
parameter.
• Surface hardness measuring method. The surface hardness measuring method is to press a
cylindrical needle against the surface of the object with a spring, and its compressed depth is
measured as a surface hardness in relative value. In the test, the device with a simplified
micro-hardness meter developed by Mitsubishi Cable Industries, Ltd. for rubber materials of
cable insulation was used.

Results of investigation
Correlation between the diagnostic data of the non-destructive methods listed above and elongation at
break were obtained by round robin tests. A summary of the results is shown in Table 3.3.9-2. Based on
the result, the applicability of the methods to cables installed in operating NPP was evaluated as follows:
• The indenter is applicable to the EPR family, SIR, SHPVC and certain kinds of XLPE.
• Though the ultrasonic degradation diagnostic technology is applicable to the EPR family, an
improvement is needed as the result showed a somewhat large dispersion.
• Though the optical diagnostic method is applicable to white colour insulation of the XLPE and
EPR families, an improvement is needed as the result showed a somewhat large dispersion.
• Though the surface hardness measuring method is applicable to the EPR family and SIR, an
improvement is needed as the result showed a somewhat large dispersion.

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Table 3.3.9-2: Correlations of the diagnostic data

Ultrasonic Optical Surface hardness

The indenter
diagnostic method diagnostic method measuring method
XLPE #1 R = 0.94*1 No definite correlation No definite correlation –
XLPE #2 R = 0.85 No definite correlation No definite correlation –
FR-XLPE #1 No definite correlation No definite correlation R = 0.90 –
FR-XLPE #2 R2 = 0.94*2 R = 0.71 No definite correlation –
EPR R2 = 0.93 R = 0.75 No definite correlation R = 0.72
FR-EPR #1 R2 = 0.75 R = 0.73 R = 0.63 R = 0.76
FR-EPR #2 R2 = 0.75 R = 0.61 R = 0.70 R = 0.58
FR-EPR #3 R2 = 0.96 R = 0.62 R = 0.80 R = 0.73
SIR #1 R2 = 0.99 – – R = 0.72
SIR #2 R2 = 0.97 – – R = 0.59
SIR #3 R2 = 0.98 – – R = 0.86
SHPVC #1 R2 = 0.87 – – –
SHPVC #2 R2 = 0.91 – – –

*1 R: Coefficient of correlation for linear regression.

*2 R2: Coefficient of determination for nonlinear regression.

Line impedance resonance analysis (LIRA)

The current techniques to evaluate ageing properties of electric cables include electric properties
tests [21,22]. While known to be difficult, advancements in detection systems and computerised data
analysis techniques may allow ultimate use of electrical testing to predict future behaviour and
residual life of cables.
Line impedance resonance analysis (LIRA) was developed by the Institute for Energy Technology
(IFE), Halden, Norway and a new company, Wirescan AS, was founded in 2005 to further develop and
market the product. In 2005, IFE contacted EPRI concerning the use of LIRA. By mutual agreement,
EPRI and IFE chose to explore the use of LIRA for nuclear cable applications. EPRI developed specimens
with localised thermal damage that caused hardening of the cable materials but did not cause
cracking of the insulation and IFE brought their equipment to EPRI and tested the samples to determine
if LIRA could identify and locate the thermal damages to the otherwise undamaged cables. LIRA
successfully identified and located the damaged segments of the cables both when cables were tested
individually and when connected in series. Given the success of this proof of principles effort, EPRI
chose to fund a larger, more formal effort addressing the capabilities of LIRA to identify cuts, gouges
and thermal ageing. This article highlights the results of the larger programme that began in 2006 and
was completed in April 2007.
Two basic types of thermal and radiation ageing of cables are of concern at nuclear power plants:
Bulk ageing where an entire room or space within a plant has elevated temperature or radiation
conditions, and local ageing where a localised heat or radiation source such as a pipe is close to a
cable tray or conduit. Identification of bulk area conditions is generally easy in that the temperature
or radiation levels in an entire room are known with a reasonable level of precision. Localised ageing
is somewhat more of a problem in that identifying all possible localised adverse conditions is time
consuming and somewhat difficult. In addition, determining whether the localised condition has
significantly affected a cable may be difficult if the cable is located inside a conduit or located in a tray
that requires scaffolding or other access means to allow the condition to be assessed. Accordingly, a
means of assessing the condition of a cable from its terminations by electrical means is desirable.
Until recently, the changes in the electrical characteristics of low-voltage insulations caused by
thermal and radiation damage have been too subtle to be detected electrically from the terminations
until the damage is so severe that cracking or powdering has taken place. Even at that point, good
insulation resistance readings may occur as long as the insulation remains dry and the circuit is not
physically disturbed. Accordingly, ageing characterisation methods have concentrated on mechanical
and chemical properties. Tests such as the indenter measure modulus (a form of hardness) and many
chemical tests are available for laboratory assessment. Depending on the type of insulator and jacket
polymers, thermal and radiation ageing causes chemical changes in the material that can be easily

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measured and compared to trending data from accelerated laboratory ageing. These tests are useful
when the surface of the cable is accessible or the insulator can be evaluated at the terminations. They
cannot be used for cable contained in a conduit unless the cable is pulled out.
The advent of LIRA has provided a means to detect thermal and radiation damage to cables
because it can detect small changes in electrical properties of insulator materials on the order of 1 pf.
This detection level allows localised and bulk thermal ageing to be identified well before the material
has aged to the point of cracking or powdering. The tests described here indicate that LIRA can
identify damage below the point where a cable can no longer pass a LOCA test. The results also
indicate that trending of the severity of damage is possible if LIRA tests are performed periodically.
The results indicate that LIRA may be used to assess the condition of cable circuits that traverse
multiple rooms with different environmental conditions and circuits with intermediate termination
points such as splices and terminal blocks. LIRA will also be a useful troubleshooting tool if there is a
concern that significant installation damage has occurred. The tests proved that LIRA can identify
cuts and gouges in the insulation system as well as identify thermal or radiation damage. While this
research used 30.5 m (100 ft) cables, other assessments performed by IFE have evaluated much longer
cables and in one case a 128 km (~78 mile) undersea cable.
LIRA presents a significant addition to the tools available to evaluate cable condition and ageing.
Because the system allows the location of the adverse condition to be identified, the position of the
hot spot along the length of a cable circuit can be reviewed to determine if a heat or radiation source
is present or if another damage type is present in the cable. Conversely, if a heat source is identified
adjacent to a conduit system, LIRA may be used to determine if significant damage has occurred
adjacent to the heat or radiation source.

Conclusion
The tests at EPRI in November 2006 showed that LIRA could identify localised thermal damage to
insulator that had not progressed to the point where the insulation had totally failed. LIRA could
locate the damage even though the insulation could still function adequately under normal and
accident conditions. These tests indicated that LIRA could identify ageing before the end of the
qualified life. The results indicate that LIRA will be useful in assessing the condition of cables located
in conduits that are suspected of having been subjected to localised thermal/radiation ageing.
Similarly, LIRA could be used to assess cables in trays that are difficult to access. The May 2006
EPRI tests indicate that LIRA can identify cuts and gouges to one or more conductors of multi-conductor
cables. In-plant tests or simulation thereof may be necessary to determine if cuts and gouges to a
single conductor can be identified under plant conditions.
An important issue is the assessment of the condition of installed cables that have been exposed
for a long time (more than 30 years) to relative high temperature and gamma radiation (the condition
of cables inside the reactor containment). Several techniques have been proposed to monitor and
identify cables that are close to the end of their qualified life. The purpose of this work was to evaluate
three well known techniques and finding the correlation among them. These techniques are the
elongation-at-break (EAB), the indenter and the line resonance analysis (LIRA). The first one is the
reference technique, for which a limit of 50% absolute was set by several international standards. The
indenter is a local technique that has produced good results, mainly with EPR insulated cables. LIRA is
an emerging technique based on the evaluation of electrical properties and their trends with the
ageing conditions.
The cables tested are low-voltage, EPDM insulated cables produced by the Swedish Lipalon. The
reason for this choice is that this type of cable is widely in use in all the Swedish nuclear power plants.
Samples 5 m long of three Lipalon cable types were globally aged artificially for different times and
their condition was analysed using the three methods mentioned above. This report describes the
findings and results if this analysis.
In this report, three techniques for cable global ageing assessment were tested and evaluated.
The EAB technique is a destructive, local technique that is often used as a reference for other methods.
The indenter is a local, in situ mechanical technique that is currently quite often used in NPP. LIRA can
be an electrical method, full line, in situ. LIRA correlated quite well with EAB and both tend to flatten
when the ageing time reaches 40 years. The only cable type that was difficult to assess for all three
methods was the medium type in an air environment.

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These tests considered only thermal ageing up to 50 years and should be completed by also
considering gamma irradiation ageing. This work was performed with the financial support of Nordic
Nuclear Safety Research (NKS), Ringhals AB and Forsmark AB. The cable samples used in these tests
were supplied by Ringhals AB.

Hot spot identification

The general term “hot spot” normally references any local damage caused on a cable by temperature,
radiation or mechanical stress. The local degradation extends from a few cm to several meters and
most often are difficult to spot because they develop in inaccessible areas of the primary containment
or in underground medium-voltage cables. The main causes of hot spots can be:
• Local adverse environment conditions (temperature and/or radiation). This is usually due to
the presence of hot pipes or components nearby. In such conditions, the local part of the cable
degrades at a considerably faster rate than the rest of the cable and eventually fails.
• Installation or maintenance errors. This usually results in mechanical damages due to friction
or mishandling. Aged and brittle cables are particularly exposed to this kind of damage.
• Manufacturing errors.
The main problem with hot spots is that, although the average cable condition is still good with a
residual life expectation of several years, the cable would eventually fail at the hot spot position much
earlier than expected, if the hot spot is not properly identified and the cause corrected or the cable
replaced/repaired.
Thermal hot spot identification in non-accessible areas can be performed with the following
methods:
• Environment monitoring, to identify containment areas where the temperature/radiation is
higher than the average (higher than that used in the cable qualification process). In this case,
actions to remove the cause of possible hot spots can be implemented.
• Cable deposits. Deposits of sacrificial cable samples can be installed in areas where the
environment temperature/radiation is higher than average and periodically tested with local
condition monitoring techniques (EAB, indenter, OIT and so on).
• Full length, on-line, electrical condition monitoring. Methods such as LIRA can be used to
periodically test cables in situ to identify the presence of hot spots along the cable.
Mechanical damages in non-accessible positions (underground or inside containment, in
conduits) can only be identified using electrical tests.
Figure 3.3.9-1 shows an example of mechanical damage and its identification and localisation
(Figure 3.3.9-2) using the condition monitoring tool LIRA. Figure 3.3.9-3 shows an example of a thermal
hot spot and its identification in LIRA. Here, the black trace represents the cable signature before the
development of the hot spot degradation, while the red trace shows the effect on the signature of the
developing damage (high temperature).

Leakage current technique utilised in Ukraine

The control of leakage current is carried out for DC voltage power cables. Absolute value of leakage
current is not an index of defect. For cables with paper-oil insulation at 10 kV the leakage current
should be no more than 300 microampere at the maximum test pressure, and asymmetry factor on
phases no more than 2.5. The indicator of insulation defect is the slow decrease of leakage current or
even its increase, especially at full test voltage.

Partial discharge measurement in Ukraine

Partial discharge is a breakdown in air cavities of insulation or oil films in paper-oil insulated cables.
It is accompanied by a spasmodic voltage change in insulation from 0.1 mV to 1 mV, that it is difficult
to notice against high operating voltage. At AC voltage partial discharge could be observed each half
cycle. Then their frequency will make over 100 Hz. Long-term influence of partial discharges causes
insulation damage.

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Figure 3.3.9-1: Mechanical damage on a low voltage cable

Figure 3.3.9-2: Identification of a mechanical damage spot (LIRA, EPRI experiment, 2007)

F igure 3.3.9-3: Identific ation of a thermal hot s pot in a low voltage c able (L IR A, E P R I experiment, 2007)

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Partial discharge influence leads to occurrence of short current impulses in an external electric
chain (lasting less than 1 microsecond) and to charge (q) transfer. This charge is called “seeming” and
could be measured. Admissible level of seeming charge at the testing of new paper-oil insulated
cables makes q ≤ (10 – 20) • 10-12 coulomb = from 10 picocoulomb to 20 picocoulomb and is defined by
comparison of an actual cable resource to the initial level of partial discharges measured in a new
product. For cables with PE insulation this level is essentially lower – from 2 to 5 picocoulomb, since
polymeric insulation is less resistant to the influence of partial discharges than paper-oil insulation.

3.3.10 Future advancement for the report

OECD/NEA carried out the research on the wire system ageing and published the report Research
Efforts Related to Wire System Ageing in NEA Member Countries [NEA/CSNI/R(2004)12], in which three
collaborative researches related to the SCAP Cable Working Group activity were recommended as the
high-priority near-term needs to be pursued. The Cable Working Group priority evaluation for the
recommended collaborative research is as follows:
• “Collaborative research is recommended for the development of an electrical diagnostics and condition
monitoring method that can scan the entire length of an installed wire system and determine its current
condition. In this regard, advanced electrical, optical, ultrasonic and aerospace technologies should be
evaluated and developed for nuclear plant applications.”
– The LIRA system being developed by Wirescan in Norway is one of the potential methods
of condition monitoring for cables installed in nuclear power plants. This technique may
need further refinement to enhance its applicability to actual plant needs.
• “Collaborative research is recommended to establish the correlation between wire system condition
indicators and the functional performance of the wire system during design basis events.”
– The result of the ACA project of Japan showed the correlation between elongation at break
(EAB) of cable insulator and the results of the test for design basis event (DBE). In addition,
the management value of condition indicator for ageing cable was suggested based on the
results (see Section 4.3.6).
• “Collaborative research is recommended to provide a technical basis for developing and/or updating
qualification methods and standards to reflect past operating experience and realistic plant operating
conditions. Further focus and emphasis is needed on condition-based qualification. It needs demonstration
and ongoing support of the international community.”
– Advanced environmental qualification method was suggested in the guide entitled “Guide
for Cable Environmental Qualification Test for Nuclear Power Plants”, which was made
based on the result of ACA project of Japan. In the guide, simultaneous thermal and
radiation ageing is recognised as the most suitable accelerated ageing method (see the
item concerning advanced EQ testing in Section 4.3.5).
– The impact of continued oxygen supply in the LOCA chamber, dose rate effects and
appropriate use of Arrhenius equation require further collaborative evaluation and
standardisation.

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Chapter 4: Commendable practice

4.1 Introduction

The objective of this internationally co-ordinated project is to share the corporate knowledge and
operating experience to understand the failure mechanisms and identify effective techniques and
technologies to effectively manage and mitigate active degradation in nuclear power plants.
The specific objectives of the project are to: i) establish a complete database with regard to major
ageing phenomena for SCC and degradation of cable insulation through collective efforts by NEA
members; ii) establish a knowledge base in these areas by compiling and evaluating the collected data
and information systematically; iii) perform an assessment of the data and identify the basis for
commendable practices which will help regulators and operators to enhance ageing management.
Commendable practices are derived from collected knowledge and experience as shown in
Figure 1.5-2. The SCAP database and knowledge bases provide the extensive information underlying
the commendable practices outlined in Sections 4.2 and 4.3. These, in turn, provide the technical and
organisational elements which can inform ageing management programmes in the areas of SCC and
cable ageing for safe long term operation. To use accumulated knowledge and a co-operative approach
is to help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of ageing management and safety of long-term
operation, so that it will be benefit for all stakeholders including designers, operators, regulators and
ultimately the public.

4.1.1 Benefits in the area of SCC

Operating experience shows that the frequency of SCC events is generally decreasing. This clearly
indicates that the mitigation measures developed and applied in the past decades to control SCC,
incorporated into ageing management programmes for safe long-term operation, have been successful.
While it is possible that new mechanisms may surface and that there could be an increase in SCC type
failures involving some components or materials (e.g. IASCC), the overall trend is positive.
It is now understood that effective ageing management of SSC can be hindered by several factors
which include an insufficient understanding or predictability of ageing, lack of data for ageing
management and inappropriate use of reactive ageing management. The latter can lead to either
unexpected or premature ageing (i.e. ageing mechanism that occurs earlier than expected). These
factors or weaknesses need to be considered and the work of the SCAP project will help in this regard.
The broad knowledge base which now exists in the area of SCC resulted from experience gained
from past challenges. Currently there are many experts in this field, but this may not be the case in
the future due to demographic, practical (less opportunity to gain experience) and educational trends.
So, efforts will have to be made to change these trends and the SCAP-SCC event data and knowledge
bases, as well as commendable practices, will be a good source of information for those entering the
field of SCC or needing to assess new SCC events.

4.1.2 Benefits in the area of cable ageing

The project has yielded crucial knowledge in the area of cable ageing related to qualification
procedure for harsh environments, as well as the predictive capability to estimate the remaining
qualified life. As part of the work, an up-to-date encyclopaedic source of data on unique cables and
condition-monitoring techniques has been gathered and this can now be applied to help monitor and
predict cable performance. While the project did not yield a great deal of data on cable failures, this,
in and of itself was a finding. It was noted that cable failure events were strongly related to past

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manufacturing and installation practices. When corrected or when the cable was replaced, the
problems were resolved. This information also forms part of the database and can be used to inform
future practices.
The insights collected in this project offer a greater level of knowledge of ageing mechanisms,
cable types and technical basis for addressing life extension and continued qualification of cables.
Besides the technical data and operating experience, the SCAP cable ageing data- and knowledge base
provide up-to-date information on environmental qualification of cables that need to remain functional
during and following a design basis event. The database incorporates information on recent research
results on ageing mechanisms and on continued efforts in enhancing condition-monitoring capability.
Countries regulate the long-term operation of their NPP in accordance with their legal and
regulatory frameworks. Information supporting AMP is of vital importance given that ageing
management is an essential and important aspect to be taken into consideration in connection with
safe long-term operation. The activities of both working groups, the databases generated and the
knowledge gained for SCC and degradation of cable insulation will be very valuable in this regard. The
commendable practices being outlined in this report demonstrate practices that enhance safety or
performance, and provide information on how to mitigate or avoid problems now known.

4.2 SCC
4.2.1 Introduction
Many stress corrosion cracking events have occurred in different structures, systems and components
of nuclear power plants as early as the 1970s and have continued to the present time. The causes of
these events were sensitisation of material by high heat input, local high residual stress, surface
finishing and hardness associated with certain environments (such as high-temperature water). For
these reasons, it is necessary to carry out maintenance activities, inspections, monitoring, preventive
maintenance/mitigation, repair/replacement and safety assessment to minimise the occurrence of
future events.
Therefore, knowledge should be extracted from the database (operational experience and recent
findings) by analysing and evaluating the data from the viewpoint of the implementation of appropriate
ageing management and maintenance activities beneficial to both regulators and operators.
To achieve this, a well grounded technical information basis (TIB) is needed for both the operator
and the regulator. The ageing management and maintenance activities for SCC are to be performed
taking into account ageing management from the early stage of nuclear power plant operation for the
safe long-term operation of the plant.
In many countries comprehensive ageing management activities are now included from the early
stages of plant operation and are reviewed regularly both through routine supervision and as part of
the Periodic Safety Review (normally every ten years). Some countries perform a first extensive review
in connection with the Periodic Safety Review associated with 30 years operation and others as part of
the license renewal process.
As shown in Figure 2.1-1, it is first necessary to define an ageing management programme (AMP)
for the counter measure regarding SCC by selecting the structures, systems and components (SSC),
determining the safety important specific SCC mechanisms, and determining the criteria for evaluating
that the intended safety function of the SSC are maintained. It is necessary to perform evaluation
consistent with the long-term operation (e.g. 40 or 60 years), and to include the evaluation results in a
preventive maintenance plan.
In order to perform optimal preventive maintenance for SCC, utilities should establish a long-term
maintenance management plan. For safe long-term operation a well-grounded TIB is needed for each
of the SCC mechanisms. To construct the TIB, comprehensive activities, including research and
development, establishment of codes and standards, and consolidation of maintenance activities
(PDCA), need to be continuously reviewed.
There are several factors which may hinder effective ageing management and may lead to either
unexpected or premature ageing. These factors or weaknesses need to be identified and addressed in
a proactive approach involving experts.

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As shown in Figure 1.5-1 and Table 2.1-1, effective ageing management for SCC throughout the
service life requires the use of a systematic approach to manage ageing. It is helpful to use the basic
idea of a framework for co-ordinating all ageing management programmes and activities based on the
understanding of preventive maintenance, mitigation, repair and replacement, inspection/monitoring/
qualification, safety assessment, and research and development on the ageing mechanisms and/or
ageing effects of the SSC.
As described in Section 1.5, the IAEA Safety Standard Series No. NS-G-2.12 “Ageing Management
for Nuclear Power Plants” explains how to extract and identify commendable practices appropriate for
ageing management programmes (AMP) for SCC.
The guide describes nine generic attributes of an effective ageing management programme:
scope of the ageing management programme, preventative actions to minimise control and ageing
mechanisms, detection of ageing effects, monitoring and trending of ageing effects, mitigation of
ageing effects, acceptance criteria, corrective actions, operating experience feedback and feedback of
research and development, and quality management.
It is also important to establish the TIB to identify commendable practices from the knowledge
base data which should contain international harmonisation of at least the following five items,
excluding quality management which is not within the scope of SCAP:
• inspection/monitoring/qualification;
• preventive maintenance/mitigation;
• repair/replacement;
• safety assessment (flaw evaluation/fracture);
• R&D (initiation/crack growth/fracture).
As an example the Japanese approach to the ageing management of stress corrosion cracking for
safe long-term operation is presented in Appendix 1.

4.2.2 Inspection/monitoring/qualification
Inspection and qualification
The locations and components to be inspected should be chosen on the basis of their susceptibility to
the various types of stress corrosion cracking. This should be based upon a systematic analysis of the
plant SSC. The choice of components and methods in the inspection programme can be affected by
exposure to irradiation of the inspection personnel, for example visual techniques such as underwater
cameras should be used for reactor vessel internals, and other mechanised methods developed for
other components. When setting up an inspection programme, the initiation times should be taken
into account. For example PWSCC under normal chemistry conditions and IASCC have been found to
have much longer initiation times than IGSCC and ECSCC.
The inspection interval and technique used depends upon the type of stress corrosion cracking to
be detected. The inspection interval should be related to the propagation rate of the cracking to be
detected and the probability of detection using the inspection performance qualification. The inspection
interval should be revised periodically, in particular if a defect is found and left in place during
continued operation, or if suitable methods are available to monitor the crack propagation.
Inspection techniques should be qualified for the purpose in accordance with the applicable
regulations, codes and standards. The applied process should be qualified (procedure, equipment and
personnel) using real SCC or, if this is not possible, artificial defects (ex. EDM notch).
Different inspection methods can be qualified for detection and/or sizing the defect. In some cases,
one method is used to detect a crack and a second method to size a defect. For some SCC degradation
mechanisms a surface examination is sufficient, and for others volumetric methods must be used.
It should also be noted that the crack morphology is mechanism-dependent. For example, PWSCC
cracks are much tighter than the more oxide filled IGSCC in BWR, and this should be considered in the
qualification procedure. In order to provide reliable input data for safety assessments of cracked
components, both the probability of detection and the accuracy of the sizing method must be known.

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As plants become older, it will be necessary to revise and expand the inspection programmes.
There needs to be continuous development of new monitoring and inspection techniques. Improved
understanding of some of the degradation mechanisms not fully understood today will aid in the
identification of new mitigation possibilities.

Monitoring
Several chemical parameters that can affect the initiation or propagation of stress corrosion cracking
such as harmful impurities should be monitored on a regular basis and should be included in plants’
chemistry programmes. Many of these measurements are now performed on-line so that monitoring
is carried out on a continuous basis. Some specific monitors have been developed, such as electrodes
to measure the electrochemical corrosion potential (ECP) in situ in BWR to determine if sufficient
hydrogen is being dosed to the system. The cleanliness of stainless steel surfaces should be monitored
regularly to ensure that the prescribed levels are maintained and eliminate the initiation of ECSCC.
Since there is susceptibility fluence for IASCC which depends on the stress level of the component
the fluence levels of vessel internal components should be monitored, and/or calculated, so that
inspection and maintenance can be carried out in a timely manner. The cumulative damage in
materials and changes in stress, including radiation creep and swelling in PWR, should also be taken
into consideration.
Once a crack has been detected and is left in place during continued operation some countries
permit that it be monitored directly or indirectly. Direct in situ monitoring techniques are not yet being
used other than in an experimental or verification manner. Some advanced inspection/monitoring
techniques could become available, but need further development. There are a number of established
methods for leak detection. In many countries leak detection is not an approved method of detection,
but can be considered to be part of the defence in depth.

4.2.3 Preventative maintenance/mitigation

The maintenance process should consider maintenance systematisation in order to prevent SCC
initiation, mitigate crack propagation and perform proper inspection, flaw evaluation, preventive
maintenance, repair and replacement. In the operation stage, preventive maintenance consists of
period surveillance (ISI time/cycles) and predictive maintenance (based on the residual life assessment).
For the selection of appropriate inspections, the safety functions of the components, the anticipated
degradation based on the pertaining environment, and the field experience should be considered.
If the possibility of stress corrosion cracking cannot be ruled out, preventative maintenance or
predictive maintenance is applicable. An example of a maintenance plan for ageing due to stress
corrosion cracking is shown in Figure 4.2.3-1. Based on past operating experience and the latest
research results, mitigation against crack growth, partial or complete replacement, can be carried out
as preventative maintenance.
Three factors (susceptible material, aggressive environment and stress) are essential for SCC, and
it can be avoided by eliminating at least one of these three factors. Therefore mitigation of several SCC
factors is recommended to improve the effectiveness of mitigation methods. Early application of
mitigation methods is recommended since mitigation is often more effective when applied prior to
SCC initiation or when the degradation is limited.
For the safe long-term operation of nuclear power plants, it is important to maintain a proactive
ageing management programme. This should be based on the lessons learned from past experience.
It is important that past experience be regularly incorporated into new regulations, codes and standards,
and shared and harmonised internationally.

Material
It should be noted that it is important to eliminate at least one of the factors to prevent SCC. In terms
of prevention, the choice of material is important and is one of the key factors. Since the first plants
were built, new materials have been designed in an attempt to eliminate some of the causes of
cracking based on the experience of stress corrosion cracking events.

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Figure 4.2.3-1: Example of a maintenance plan for ageing due to stress corrosion cracking

To prevent stress corrosion cracking in BWR components, low carbon grades of austenitic
stainless steel containing up to 0.03% carbon are selected as material while for PWR components,
even though carbon level control is not needed for weld metal and casting with duplex structures
according to Regulatory Guide 1.44, material with a carbon content ranging between 0.03% and 0.05%,
and weld metal with a maximum carbon content of 0.035%, and often a specified minimum ferrite
content weld metal and cast stainless steel (CASS) have demonstrated good operational experience
and are recommended.
The Alloy 600 series has successively been replaced by the less susceptible Alloy 690 series
because of its higher chromium content, in particular in PWR components. Care however is needed
when using its weld materials (Alloys 52 and 152) since they are prone to hot cracking. In the case of
IASCC, 316L stainless steel can be used in BWR since the susceptibility fluence has been found to be
higher than that of 304/304L stainless steels.
If reactor vessel internals are to be replaced as preventative maintenance it is worthy to note that
experience has shown that the susceptibility fluence for IASCC in BWR is higher for 316 than for
304 austenitic stainless steels. It is also advisable to avoid welds in the highest flux regions of the
components.

Stress
Stresses introduced during manufacture should be minimised to reduce the risk of SCC initiation. For
this purpose new welding procedures such as narrow gap and heat sink welding have been developed.
In the BWR reactor water environment, there have been many incidents in which cracks initiated
in the transgranular mode in the hardened layer due to the heavy machining, and have then grown in
the intergranular mode. It is therefore important that the surfaces of components do not contain high
tensile stresses and a number of methods (for example peening and polishing) have been developed to
ensure that the surface finish is acceptable in this respect free from cold work. Some of these methods
can also be applied to existing components to reduce residual stresses or introduce compressive
stresses, for example induction heating stress improvement and laser stress improvement processes.
When applying any of these techniques, it is recommended that a qualification process is followed,
and if appropriate, that the work be supervised by an independent third party. It is also important that
the component can be inspected as part of the ordinary inspection programme. Weld overlays and
MSIP are accepted as mitigation techniques in some countries.

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In PWR, it is recommended that a parabolic-shaped radius be introduced for the head-shank curve
of baffle former bolts, in order to reduce the stress concentration factor compared to the circular curve.
Elongation of head-shank length is also effective to reduce the stress of the head-shank.
With regard to IASCC the threshold stress decreases as the dose increases. Stress improvement
surface finishing techniques can be applied during preventative maintenance. However it is necessary
to take into account irradiation-induced stress relaxation, creep and void swelling, when applying
stress improvement techniques to highly irradiated components.

Environment
Research on the root cause of IGSCC in BWR led to improved water chemistry and chemistry control
programmes with low levels of impurities measured indirectly by the conductivity of the water.
Lowering the electrochemical corrosion potential by the addition of hydrogen [hydrogen water
chemistry (HWC)] is a widely applied mitigation technique. Noble metal chemical addition (NMCA)
has also been applied in cases where cracks have been found in reactor vessel internals, such as core
shrouds, to increase the effectiveness of HWC in the more oxidising core environment.
Chloride contamination levels must be controlled to avoid ECSCC. It is also advisable to control
the cation contamination, and it can be noted that sodium is more benign than magnesium, zinc and
copper. The choice of non-chloride-containing marking pens and tapes is important and it should also
be noted that personnel are a major source of chloride contamination. Lubricants and gaskets should
not contain substances known to cause TGSCC. It is also important to pay attention to such things as
coversheets used for temporary storage on site, and also to dew condensation in the containment
during construction or maintenance and repair work, etc. (installation of an air dryer can alleviate this
problem).
In general reactor vessel internals are intended to be used for the entire plant lifetime and,
in consequence, will in particular in PWR be exposed to very high radiation doses, typically up to
100 displacements per atom (dpa), assuming 60 years operation. With such high radiation doses, the
material microstructure and mechanical properties can change considerably, which could have a
significant impact on the stress corrosion cracking susceptibility. Radiolysis is suppressed in PWR
by the addition of hydrogen. There are moves to reduce the amounts of hydrogen dosed and it is
recommended that this be considered with care with regard to the potential effect on IASCC and
PWSCC. Fuel management can affect the final dose of the material and may offer a method of
mitigating IASCC.
All the environmental conditions of SSC must be reviewed periodically with respect to normal,
local (crevice, two-phase) or accidental environment (polluted) conditions.

Other approaches to preventative maintenance and mitigation

When replacing piping and similar components weld configuration and welding procedures can be
optimised.
When replacing baffle bolts, changes in design can be made to reduce the temperature due to
gamma heating and thus to reduce stress by swelling in the high fluence range. Other changes have
been made to improve the shape of the head-shank curvature and remove some of the regions of
stress concentration in the original design. The bolt heads should be evaluated during the design and
construction phase.

4.2.4 Repair/replacement
Many of the considerations for preventative maintenance and mitigation are applicable for repair and
replacement. The difference between these two concepts is that the latter is carried out after a crack
is detected and the former, as the name implies, is carried before a crack is found in order to prevent
stress corrosion cracking. When a component is to be replaced the concepts presented in Section 4.2.3
are applicable. This section will therefore concentrate on repair methods rather than replacement.
If the flaw detected does not meet the acceptance criteria in the safety assessment, the component
should be repaired or replaced in accordance with the regulations, codes and standards. When a repair/
replacement method that is not in accordance with the regulation standard is to be applied, the basis
for the validity of the structural integrity must be approved and verified.

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Repair normally implies that the crack is removed. Care should in such cases be taken to ensure
that the crack tip does not remain in the component but is fully removed. If the crack is removed by
grinding, the surface finish should not result in unnecessary cold work or residual stresses which
could lead to initiation. Thus surface polishing can be applicable. If the crack is removed by electrode
discharge machining the choice of electrode and process parameters should prevent hot cracking of
the component surface. The surface condition should permit further inspection of the component.
Welding is another possible repair method. This can be applied after the crack has been removed
to restore the original dimensions and structural integrity to the component. In this case an inlay of
compatible material is introduced. A method acceptable in some countries is the weld overlay. In this
case additional weld material is applied to the outside of the component (nozzle or pipe) and the crack
may be left in place. Welding is also a central component in the half-nozzle repair technique which
has been applied in some cases of reactor vessel penetrations in which cracking has been detected.
Repair methods should normally be chosen so that the possibility of recurrence is minimised.
This can mean that the component is not repaired immediately after the crack has been evaluated,
but that the repair is performed after extensive planning and verification procedures and associated
safety assessments is carried out. It can therefore be cost-effective to develop repair techniques for
specific essential components in advance. It is recommended that repair techniques be qualified for
the specific application.
Regarding replacement, it is advisable to make a judgement taking into account the following
factors: comparison of merits and demerits of repair and replacement, feasibility study of replacement
in accordance with the original design or reflecting latest design, needs for technology development,
applied experience, the need for additional licensing procedures, access limitation during field work,
working environmental conditions (e.g. underwater), location, requirements of installation accuracy,
working period, personnel radiation dose, costs, requirements of inspection after replacement and so on.
Opportunities for modernisation should be taken to replace systems and components using
materials less susceptible to stress corrosion cracking with optimised weld configuration and welding
processes. When replacing systems and components, quality control is essential not least because of
the shortage of experienced workers, such as welders, in the nuclear field. The detail of on-site storage
of new components is important to ensure that they are not degraded prematurely, e.g. by ECSCC.

4.2.5 Safety assessment

When defects are detected during in-service inspection the extent of the inspection programme
should be expanded to include other components which could also be affected. It is important that a
root cause analysis be performed so that appropriate repair and replacement procedures can be
applied to limit the risk for repercussion. If the defect is to remain during continued operation then
this should be justified by a safety evaluation. This is illustrated in Figure 4.2.3-1.
When defects are detected during in-service inspection, a safety assessment must be performed
to determine if the flaw size will be within the acceptance criteria at the end of the evaluation period
and if continued operation can be permitted for the evaluation period. The component integrity
assessment can be made using either a deterministic or a probabilistic approach, or a combination of
the two in accordance with the regulations in the country.
The evaluation methods used in different countries for the safety assessment of the acceptability
of limited defects are mostly based on empirical data. As described in the consultant reports
physically based models are still at the stage of scientific development. Due to the number of
variables involved, as well as dependencies and correlations, further R&D efforts are ongoing as
shown in Section 4.2.6. Common to all such evaluation methods is the need for propagation rates in
the specific material/environment combination. It is generally accepted that propagation rates should
be based on quality assured data whenever possible. It should be noted that propagation rates in
irradiated materials are normally several orders of magnitude higher than for un-irradiated materials.
Operating experience has shown that stress corrosion cracking may arrest, or the propagation
rate may decease significantly in the centre of the component depending on the residual stresses and
the configuration of the flaw.
In the safety assessment, consequences of leak and break on plant safety must be assessed for
normal and accidental conditions.

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4.2.6 Research and development

Research and development (R&D) efforts are ongoing in most countries with the goal to improve
understanding of the initiation and propagation processes associated with the different types of stress
corrosion cracking. Extensive efforts are also under way to develop inspection and monitoring
techniques, repair and replacement methods and the necessary data to enable the performance of
safety analyses. The results of such research and development should be reflected in revisions of
regulations and codes and standards in the different countries.
Although it is not an R&D activity in itself, one very important source of such efforts lies in
experience feedback not least in the root cause analysis of events, in particular stress corrosion
cracking events which are found for the first time in a specific material or material environment
combination. Such findings should lead to research to ensure that there is full understanding of the
specific conditions and that a suitable strategy can be developed regarding mitigation.
Another important aspect of R&D is international co-operation that has been developed within
the SCAP SCC Working Group where regulators, operators, vendors and academia have collaborated in
an open and productive manner.

4.2.7 New plants

For new plants ageing management of amongst other things stress corrosion cracking should be part
of the maintenance programme from the first operation of the plant. The principles discussed in this
report are as applicable to new plants as they are to the current fleet.
When designing and building new plants all of the comments concerning long-term operation
are relevant; there are however greater possibilities to minimise the risk for many of the degradation
mechanisms discussed here. This can be done through choice of materials (including insulation),
optimising coolant chemistry and weld configuration and procedures. It is also possible to avoid
positioning welds in regions which have been demonstrated to be sensitive, such as the core region
for reactor vessel internals.
It is also important that inspection needs and monitoring be considered during the design process
both with respect to accessibility but also to ensure that doses to personnel can be as low as reasonably
possible. With regard to maintenance possibilities of on-line maintenance, condition-based monitoring
and maintenance-free design should be considered. A surveillance programme for internals as well as
the reactor pressure vessel can be introduced.

4.3 Cable

4.3.1 Introduction
Cables installed in nuclear power plants have the functions of transmitting instrument and control
signals and supplying power to electric components. Some of the cables are required to perform their
function under the condition of the design basis event and they are classified as Environmentally
Qualified (EQ) cables.
In general, the cables have been regarded as a maintenance-free component. However, cable
insulation performance will gradually decrease due to the surrounding environment such as heat,
radiation, moisture, etc. Therefore appropriate ageing management needs to be carried out from the
early stage of plant operation to prevent potential failure events.
The commendable practices for cable ageing management identified through the activity of the
SCAP Cable Working Group are presented in following sub-sections. In addition, the items to be
considered especially for new plants are described in Section 4.3.8, entitled “New plants”. It is
desirable that all the items of the commendable practices in this section be applied to EQ cables. For
non-EQ cables, the items related to environmental qualification are excluded; however certain
elements of the programme may be adopted based on specific needs.

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4.3.2 Specification
Power cables with shield
The United States experience indicates that the condition monitoring of power cables has become a
necessity in order to ensure the operational readiness of the cable. The medium-voltage cables that
power most of the emergency core cooling pumps and feeds to 1E power supplies serve a significant
function for nuclear safety. Some of these cables are normally energised and some are in standby
conditions during the power operation of the plant. As the plants continue to age, several factors
could contribute to insulation degradation.
Such degradation has to be monitored and corrective actions have to be implemented to prevent
operational failures that could trip the plant or limit core cooling capability. The cables that have a
continuous shield as part of the cable jacket provide much wider and better options in condition
monitoring. Therefore, power cables for new plants or replacement cables for the operating plants
should consider using only cables with a metallic shield.

Undesirability of PVC cable insulation

New NPP installations in the Czech Republic are significantly restricted as regards the use of certain
chemical elements. European Utility Requirements (European Utility Requirements for LWR Nuclear
Power Plants, Revision C, Vol. 2, Chapter 2.6: Material-related Requirements, April 2001) quote general
rules and requirements concerning new NPP projects [35], e.g. the amount of halogens should not be
higher than 200 ppm. There are also requirements concerning other elements like sulphur, zinc, lead,
mercury, asbestos, etc. These requirements disqualify PVC cables for future nuclear installations.

Preservation of cable technical data

Cable specifications, normally required and acquired during cable procurement are very important for
preserving the qualification of the cable. During plant life (40 years), design modifications and
maintenance activities could change the original plant cable population or its routing. Additionally,
cable manufacturers could disappear or change, causing problems to collect cable information for any
future assessments.
In Spain there are examples where additional detailed designs of cable information were needed
by the plants:
• Plant life extension applications: One plant was required by CSN, for collecting additional cable
design details (identification, routings, material characteristics) to supplement its cable ageing
effects analysis.
• Cable qualification: After manufacturer disappearance, one type of cable was qualified by the
plant using the “analysis method”. The cable design and its materials (chemicals) were
compared with a similar qualified cable and found to be identical.
• Field cable identification: One plant had problems for identifying many installed cables that were
found without visible marks in the jacket.
In the above examples the corrective actions applied by the plants to solve the lack of cable
information were expensive and time consuming and could have been avoided if the proper cable
design and qualification information was available.
For these and many other reasons, preserving cable design details from the beginning of plant
operation could be a valuable practice.

4.3.3 Inspection
Condition monitoring inspections and tests can provide the means for evaluating the level of ageing
degradation of electric cables. The cables are exposed to a variety of environmental and operational
stressors throughout their service life. Environmental stressors can include elevated temperatures,
high radiation, high humidity, moisture intrusion, accumulation of dirt and dust and exposure to
chemicals or other reactive contaminants. Operational stressors can include external interference,
installation and maintenance damage, high voltage stress, materials defects, water treeing and electrical
transients. Over time, the ageing and degradation mechanisms caused by these stressors can eventually

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lead to early failure of the cable. It is therefore important to have periodic condition-monitoring
inspection and testing of electric cables in the assessment of cable ageing and degradation. Severely
damaged or degraded cable insulation can then be identified and repaired or replaced to prevent
unexpected early failures while in service.
In addition, the benefits of periodic cable condition-monitoring inspections and testing can be
further complemented by monitoring cable operating environments. Environmental stressors, especially
temperature, moisture/flooding and radiation, can contribute to significant ageing and degradation of
electric cable insulation and jacket materials. Monitoring and management of the environmental
conditions in which cables are operated can help operators to identify adverse stressors so that
measures can be taken to control or reduce ageing and degradation.

4.3.4 Maintenance
Maintenance activities interact in various ways with the specified function of components and
environmental conditions within the area where the activities are performed. Procedures are
established to assure that conditions at the end of maintenance activities are within specified limits.
Regarding cable ageing, past experience has demonstrated the importance of the following areas.

Acceptance criteria for condition monitoring inspection

In general, cables installed in nuclear power plants have been regarded as a maintenance-free
component. However, for long-term operation, maintenance activities for cables important to safety
should be done appropriately to ensure their capability for the required function. In Japan, all cables
installed in NPP are inspected periodically and the acceptance criteria are shown in Table 3.3.2.2-2.
These acceptance criteria cannot be used for the evaluation of integrity in a DBE environment.

Applicability of indenter
For maintenance, the level of degradation of cable insulation needs to be measured appropriately.
Elongation at break (EAB) is considered to be a good condition indicator for degradation of polymer
and a lot of EAB data have been accumulated.
In the ACA project, the applicability of the indenter modulus method for cables was tested by
checking its correlation with EAB. In the test, reliability of the diagnostic was confirmed by round
robin test with an improved type of indenter modulus device with bearing of the probe actuator made
in Japan and higher supply voltage, developed by Institute of Nuclear Safety System, Inc. (INSS, Japan)
and AEA Technology Inc. (UK). As a result, it was found that there is a good correlation between
indenter modulus and EAB (shown in Figure 4.3.4-1) and therefore the method is proven to be
applicable to the condition-based EQ.

Environmental condition monitoring

In order to ensure the qualification life or to predict the life of EQ cable, monitoring of a cable’s installed
environment is very important.
In Japan, electric power utilities are required to investigate the environmental conditions for cables
installed inside reactor containment in all operating commercial nuclear power plants, based on an
administrative document issued by the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA) in October 2007.
In the investigation programme, the temperature and radiation dose in cable’s installed areas must be
measured once during periodical inspection period or during refuelling outage period. Devices for the
temperature measurement must include a data logger and an Alanine dosimeter for the radiation
measurement.
Investigations of 35 nuclear power plants have been completed as of January 2010 and their
results are shown in Table 3.3.5-2. On the whole, temperature and radiation dose rate investigated
showed lower values than the design value except for some nuclear power plants. In particular, the
values of radiation dose rate were considerably low.
For power uprate of NPP, the possible change of the environment condition where cables are
installed should be evaluated and further environmental monitoring should be carried out after the
power uprate.

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Figure 4.3.4-1: Correlations between indenter modulus and elongation at break

(1) The EPR insulator (R2 = 0.93) (2) The FR-EPR #3 insulator (R2 = 0.96)

40 30

Indenter modulus (N/mm)

black core
Indenter modulus (N/mm)

black core
30 white core 25 white core
red core red core

20 20

10 15

0 10
600 500 400 300 200 100 0 500 400 300 200 100 0
Elongation at break (%) Elongation at break (%)

(3) The SIR #1 insulator (R2 = 0.99) (4) The SHPVC #2 insulator (R2 = 0.91)
35 250

30
Indenter modulus (N/mm)

Indenter modulus (N/mm)

black core
black core 200 white core
25 white core red core
red core
20 150

15
100
10

5 50
400 300 200 100 0 300 200 100 0
Elongation at break (%) Elongation at break (%)

Hot spot identification

The main problem with hot spots is that although the average cable condition is still good with a
residual life expectation of several years, the cable would eventually fail at the hot spot location much
earlier than expected, if the hot spot is not properly identified and the cause corrected or the cable
replaced/repaired.
Thermal hot spot identification, in inaccessible areas, can be performed with the following
methods:
• Environment monitoring, to identify containment areas where the temperature/radiation is
higher than the average (higher than that used in the cable qualification process) and remove
the cause of possible hot spots or replace the cable with greater capability to withstand the
environment.
• Use of cable deposits. Deposits of sacrificial cable samples can be installed in areas where the
environment temperature/radiation is higher than average and periodically tested with local
condition monitoring techniques (EAB, indenter, OIT…) to schedule corrective actions.
• Full length, on-line, electrical condition monitoring. Methods such as LIRA can be used to
periodically test cables in situ to identify the presence of a hot spot along the cable.
Figure 4.3.4-2 (upper graph) shows a LIRA signature taken on a good cable (red trace) and another
measurement taken a year later on the same cable (dark trace). The two traces are almost identical

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Figure 4.3.4-2: Baseline analysis with reference signatures (LIRA)

Dark trace
Red trace

and no action would be taken by the analysis of only the current, most recent measurement. However,
a comparative analysis of the two signatures would discover a developing change that should be
addressed, see the lower graph on Figure 4.3.4-2.
This approach is called Baseline Analysis of Installed Cables and is particularly suited for new or
good cables, when a reference signature can be taken before any damage or degradation has occurred.

Removal of heat insulation

In various locations of the plant, a variety of heat insulation materials (reflective metallic insulation,
asbestos fibre, etc.) are used either to shield the plant environment from high temperature or to
preserve the heat within the pipes and components for thermal efficiency. These insulation materials
are often removed for maintenance activities. Since most of the heat insulation activities are performed
by non-electrical staff, the vulnerabilities of cable insulation to high heat is often not considered. As a
result, the removal of heat insulation leads to overheating of cables in the immediate proximity.
Based on the level of heat exposure received the cable may have a delayed failure or a prompt
failure during its service. The problems are often identified following a cable failure. Therefore, it is
important to evaluate the impact of heat insulation removal on electrical components located in the
proximity.

Cables wrapped within heat insulation

The piping systems associated with steam systems and other hot process systems have motor-operated
valves and other electrical components connected to the piping. During construction or maintenance,
the heat insulation work is the last part of the work. Therefore, the insulation work has mistakenly
wrapped the hot pipe with cable inside. This type of wrapping results in exposing the cable to an
unacceptable level of heat produced by the piping system. The cable undergoes accelerated ageing,
leading to premature failure. These problems are often identified only with system failures and it
could lead to system unavailability or plant trip. Therefore, it is prudent to have oversight on heat
insulation work to prevent deleterious effects on electrical cables.

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4.3.5 Environmental qualification (focusing on EQ cables)

New insight from Japan
Activation energy used for accelerated ageing
When the activation energy of each insulation material is calculated from thermal ageing test data
acquired at this time, most of the data is of the order of 100 kJ/mol (20 or more kcal/mol), and some
are also 40 or more kJ/mol (a little more than 10 kcal/mol). In addition, a large portion of thermal
ageing test data used for calculation of activation energy is data ranging from 100 to 120°C [33].
When the sampling data in actual operating plants and the data acquired in this project are
compared, it is found that the activation energy in actual operating plants’ temperature region (from
50 to 60°C) is smaller other than the value calculated from the thermal ageing test data acquired in
this project.
Although it differs from elongation at break, some literature states that around 60 kJ/mol
(approximately 15 kcal/mol) can be assumed to be appropriate for the activation energy in a region of
uniform oxidisation acquired with chemo-luminescence analysis.
Based on the above, the principles of calculation and application for the activation energy used
for future assessment as shown below were determined to be appropriate.
• Applicable region of activation energy calculated by thermal ageing tests is limited up to the
minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests. However, when the calculated activation energy
is less than 62.8 kJ/mol (15 kcal/mol) the value can be applied up to the operating temperature
region of actual operating plants.
• Activation energy in the region between the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests
and the temperature of actual operating plants are evaluated from the investigation results of
ageing in actual operating plants (sampling inspection) and thermal ageing characteristics at
the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests.
• When activation energy cannot be evaluated from the investigation results of ageing in actual
operating plants, 62.8 kJ/mol (15 kcal/mol) is used as a tentative value for the activation energy
in the region between the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests and the temperature
of actual operating plants.

Recommended procedure for accelerated ageing

Accelerated ageing equivalent to ageing during normal operation is most accurate when conducted as
simultaneous thermal and radiation ageing based on the results of ACA project [33]. The temperature
and dose rate that enable confirmation of degradation progress uniformly into the full thickness the
insulation material should be selected for simultaneous ageing.
In the ACA project, progress of degradation into the inside of the insulator was confirmed with
a dose rate of 100 Gy/h and a temperature of 120°C (175°C for silicone rubber) for cross-linked
polyethylene, flame-retardant cross-linked polyethylene, ethylene-propylene rubber, flame-retardant
ethylene-propylene rubber, silicone rubber and special heat-resistant polyvinyl chloride.

Advanced EQ testing [differences from IEEE document (IEEE383-2003)]

It is important that the EQ test be performed with a method which can appropriately simulate ageing
under normal operation.
In Japan, the “Assessment of Cable Ageing for Nuclear Power Plants (ACA)” was carried out from
FY2002 to FY2008 and the advanced guide for cable EQ test “Guide for Cable Environmental
Qualification Test for Nuclear Power Plants” was formulated based on the result of the project [33].
In the guide, simultaneous thermal and radiation ageing is adopted as an accelerated ageing method
to simulate ageing under normal operation instead of the conventional method of sequential ageing.
In addition, activation energy used to set the accelerated ageing condition is determined considering
the conditions in operating plants. Several techniques for setting accelerated conditions are also
provided in the guide.

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The outline of the advanced guide is as follows:

• A cable specimen 3 m long is used. The cable with the thinnest insulation thickness is
selected as the specimen for the cables with identical insulation specifications.
Even if the insulation specification is identical, a separate test is carried out for the cables
produced by different manufacturers.
• Accelerated ageing equivalent to ageing during normal operation is conducted as concurrent
temperature and radiation ageing to reflect actual plant conditions. The temperature and dose
rate are chosen such that a homogeneous change that penetrates the full depth of the
insulation is selected for simultaneous ageing.
In the ACA project, degradation progress into the inside of the insulation was confirmed with
a dose rate of 100 Gy/h and a temperature of 120°C (175°C for silicone rubber) for cross-linked
polyethylene, flame-retardant cross-linked polyethylene, ethylene-propylene rubber, flame-
retardant ethylene-propylene rubber, silicone rubber and special heat-resistant polyvinyl
chloride.
• Activation energy used for accelerated ageing is as follows:
– Applicable region of activation energy calculated by thermal ageing tests is limited up to
the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests. However, when the calculated
activation energy is less than 62.8 kJ/mol (15 kcal/mol) the value can be applied up to the
operating temperature region of actual operating plants.
– Activation energy in the region between the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests
and the temperature of actual operating plants are evaluated from the investigation results
of ageing in actual operating plants (sampling inspection) and thermal ageing
characteristics at the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests.
– When activation energy cannot be evaluated from the investigation results of ageing in
actual operating plants, 62.8 kJ/mol (15 kcal/mol) is used as a tentative value for the
activation energy in the region between the minimum temperature in thermal ageing tests
and the temperature of actual operating plants.
• The condition of accelerated simultaneous ageing equivalent to ageing during normal operation
is established by the techniques of “superposition of time dependent data” and “superposition
of dose to equivalent damage data” or the technique of “same acceleration factor” (which has
been verified to be equivalent to the former) based on the condition of actual operating plants.
However, it is recommended not to use the technique of “superposition of time dependent
data” to establish the condition for silicone rubber insulation cable.
Further, if the cable has an insulation of cross-linked polyethylene, flame-retardant cross-linked
polyethylene, ethylene-propylene rubber, flame-retardant ethylene-propylene rubber, silicone
rubber and special heat-resistant polyvinyl chloride, the condition of accelerated simultaneous
ageing may be established by a simplified method, that of using the technique of “superposition
of dose to equivalent damage data”.
• The withstand-voltage test in Japanese Industrial Standards (JIS) is used to determine integrity
of insulation after LOCA test.
The differences between IEEE document IEEE383-2003 and the advanced guide are shown in
Figure 4.3.5-1.

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Figure 4.3.5-1: Comparison of the methods for Cable Environmental Qualification Test

Present evaluation method The Guide for Cable Environmental Qualification Test
(IEEE Std. 323-2003 and 383-2003) for Nuclear Power Plants

Length of specimen cable should be

3 m, and a cable selected with the
smallest insulator thickness about
the cable with same specification
except insulator thickness.
Cable specimens Cable specimens Moreover, even if an insulator
specification is the same, when
manufacturer differ, it shall examine
an individual cable.

Establishment of
thermal ageing Based on operating conditions of
1. Equivalent thermal ageing conditions by the actual operating plant,
during normal operation Arrhenius low. simultaneous ageing conditions
Example: are established by the
superposition of time dependent
66°C - 60 years to
1. Equivalent simultaneous data and superposition of dose to
121°C - 24 days*1 equivalent damage data etc.*2
ageing during normal
operation Activation energy is determined by
taking into account the
temperature values in the actual
operating plant temperature
2. Equivalent radiation Example: region*3.
exposure during normal 40 years: 500 kGy Temperature and a dose rate
operation (10 kGy/h or less) should be the values with which
progress of degradation was
checked to an inner part of an
insulator. (Example:
66°C – 60 years to
Example: 100°C – 100 Gy/h – 480 days) *4
3. Equivalent radiation BWR: 260 kGy 2. Equivalent radiation
exposure during accident PWR: 1 500 kGy exposure during accident Integrating dose is set based on the
(10 kGy/h or less) analysis result of the actual operating
plant. The dose rate is 10 kGy/h or
less.
4. Equivalent steam 3. Equivalent steam
Number of transient cycle is 1.
exposure during accident exposure during accident

5. Acceptance test 4. Acceptance test

(Bending and submerging (JIS withstand voltage
withstand voltage test) test)

*1: Extrapolation of activation energy evaluated from degradation characteristics in a high temperature region up to the actual
operating plant temperature is permitted.
In the above example, 33 kcal/mol is used for activation energy.
*2: There is the technique of same acceleration factor, such as making equal the accelerating factor of temperature and
radiation other than such technique.
*3: When the activation energy in the actual operating plant temperature region cannot be estimated, 41.8 kJ/mol (10 kcal/mol)
for silicon rubber and 62.8 kJ/mol (15 kcal/mol) for materials other than silicone rubber may be used.
*4: It set up with the superposition of time dependent data by making activation energy into 62.8 kJ/mol (15 kcal/mol).

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4.3.6 Recent discovery from cable ageing evaluation test

In the “Assessment of Cable Ageing for Nuclear Power Plants (ACA)” project, EQ tests for various types
of cables was carried out with the advanced environmental qualification test method based on the
new insight obtained in the project. Based on the result, the acceptance criteria for elongation at
break (EAB) of cable ageing indicator was suggested as shown in Table 4.3.6-1.
In the EQ test, pre-ageing tests with several accelerated conditions were carried out for each type
of cable to find the maximum degree of degradation that pass the LOCA test. The pre-ageing
conditions and the results of the LOCA tests for XLPE #1 insulated cables are shown in Table 4.3.6-2.
The management values of elongation at break were determined by adding an approximate 10%
safety margin to the original value measured. They are considerably higher than conventional ones.
This is attributed to the fact that homogeneous degradation in samples is given by low accelerated
ageing while ageing with high accelerated rate causes non-homogeneous degradation, which leads to
the small value of EAB.

Table 4.3.6-1: Acceptance criteria for endurance in LOCA environment

Initial value Management

Insulator of cable Remarks
(EAB) value (EAB)
Confirmed to endure
XLPE #1 insulated cable 557% 310%
LOCA to follow at 276%
Confirmed to endure
XLPE #2 insulated cable 488% 90%
LOCA to follow at 76%
Confirmed to endure
XLPE #3 insulated triaxial cable 307% 70%
LOCA to follow at 58%
Confirmed to endure
FR-XLPE #1 insulated cable 396% 250%
LOCA to follow at 226%
Confirmed to endure
FR-XLPE #2 insulated cable 562% 240%
LOCA to follow at 215%
Confirmed to endure
EPR insulated cable 571% 110%
LOCA to follow at 92%
Confirmed to endure
FR-EPR #1 insulated cable 405% 70%
LOCA to follow at 60%
Confirmed to endure
FR-EPR #2 insulated cable 515% 230%
LOCA to follow at 204%
Confirmed to endure
FR-EPR #3 insulated cable 479% 210%
LOCA to follow at 184%
Confirmed to endure
SIR #1 insulated cable 357% 30%
LOCA to follow at 24%
Confirmed to endure
SIR #2 insulated cable 517% 40%
LOCA to follow at 30%
Confirmed to endure
SIR #3 insulated cable 420% 40%
LOCA to follow at 29%
Confirmed to endure
SHPVC #1 insulated cable 248% 110%
LOCA to follow at 99%
220%* Confirmed to endure
SHPVC #2 insulated cable 245%
LOCA to follow at 219%

* Determined by adding safety margin of small per cent because the value of EAB with 10% margin is nearly
equal to the initial value of EAB.

Table 4.3.6-2: The pre-ageing conditions and the results of the LOCA tests

Pre-ageing condition LOCA test result

Case 1 100°C – 89.4 Gy/h – 591 hrs Passed
Case 2 100°C – 89.4 Gy/h – 734 hrs Passed
Case 3 100°C – 89.3 Gy/h – 805 hrs Passed
Case 4 100°C – 99.3 Gy/h – 852 hrs Failed
Case 5 100°C – 99.6 Gy/h – 988 hrs Failed

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The acceptance criteria can be used for condition-based EQ, in which cables are periodically tested
after they are installed by comparing the EAB value with the management values. For condition-based
EQ, management values should be determined based on the result of the LOCA test of cable samples
that are pre-aged by low accelerated simultaneous thermal and radiation ageing test. If management
values are set using high accelerated pre-ageing test, it will be non-conservative value.
However, the condition indicator of EAB is obtained using a destructive test. Condition indicators
that can be obtained non-destructively are desirable for condition-based EQ. Other non-destructive
condition indicators such as indenter modulus can be used as an alternative condition indicator if
their correlation with the condition indicator of EAB is confirmed. The correlation between the indenter
modulus of improved type and indicator of EAB has already been confirmed in the ACA project and its
outline is described in Section 4.3.4.

4.3.7 Cable deposits

In order to carefully monitor insulation degradation, it is recommended to have cable samples exposed
to actual nuclear plant service environment. A novel idea, practiced by several plants, is to deposit
additional pieces of cable at service locations and expose them to the actual service environment.
Even for operating plants that have not made cable deposits should consider keeping good sections of
old cables in plant locations when cable replacements are done.
Portions of these cables can in turn be conveniently made available for ongoing qualification,
destructive examination and other requalification efforts based on the evolving needs. Factors to be
considered for cable deposits:
• anticipated plant life including potential life extension;
• critical locations were the cables are likely to be subjected to extreme environmental effects;
• samples to represent all the cables that have potential age-sensitive locations;
• hot spot locations for radiation and temperature;
• adequate length of cable with due consideration for plant life, continuing qualification and
research that could involve destructive examination;
• documentation that supports traceability to production, historic test records, stock no.
(sample labels, etc.);
• appropriate protection of cable ends;
• impeccable sample;
• convenience for retrieving the required samples;
• self-heating that raises the temperature should be considered while evaluating the cable
insulation degradation (since deposited cables are not in service).

4.3.8 New plants

The following topics are specially selected because of their applicability to new plants. Considerations
of these aspects in the plant design phase would lead to significant benefits.
• Cable deposits. It is recommended to have cable samples exposed to actual nuclear plant service
environment.
• Area monitoring for environmental conditions. In order to ensure the qualification life or to predict
the life of EQ cable, monitoring of a cable environment is essential.
• Cable condition monitoring (base line and periodic). Baseline analysis of installed cables is
particularly suited for new or good cables to better assess degradation or damage.
• Shielded jackets for cables. Power cables for new plants should consider using cables with a
continuous metallic shield.
• Environmental qualification method. It is important that the EQ test be performed with a method
which can appropriately simulate ageing in the normal operation.

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Chapter 5: Recommended future activities

5.1 Lessons learned from the SCAP process and potential follow-up activities

The working groups have brought together representatives of regulators, operators, vendors and
academics working in the field, and this combination has been found to be invaluable for the
successful execution of the project.
The products of each working group are a database, a knowledge base and commendable practices
which will support both regulators and operators. The use of the products will strengthen technical
approaches to optimise ageing management in the areas of SCC and cable ageing. The products are
useful tools and documents for technical experts including the younger generations of engineers, and
they are of even greater use when they are continuously enhanced and updated.
The working process of SCAP has also provided an important example to demonstrate how such
a challenging task can be effectively addressed and therefore could be used as a basis for other topics
in ageing management. Vital elements of the working process have been the identification of priority
items of common interest, the assignment of a dedicated project co-ordinator, chairperson and
clearing house with expert knowledge and lead organisations providing input to start the discussion
and giving orientation.
The international knowledge that was collected in this project should help industry organisations
to revise existing standards or develop new standards. IEEE and IEC have just started such activities
and this foundation should help the regulators to implement requirements and programmes to
support safe long-term operation of nuclear power plants.
The US is launching new research in light of the lessons learned from this project. The impact of
concurrent ageing, dose rate effects, manufacturing tolerance and oxygen-starved chambers for LOCA
tests became areas of interest that require further research.
Research efforts are also ongoing in other countries. An important aspect of the research will be
international co-operation such as has been developed within this project, during which regulators,
operators, vendors and academics have collaborated in an open and productive manner.

5.2 SCC Working Group and Cable Working Group

5.2.1 SCC Working Group

The SCAP SCC Working Group has demonstrated that an international project to develop a common
source and understanding of information on stress corrosion cracking is an invaluable method to
share important experience in a timely manner. The products of the working group are an event
database, a knowledge base and a report describing the commendable practices that the group
recommends in the ageing management and safe long-term operation of stress corrosion cracking.
The working group has brought together representatives of regulators, operators, vendors and
academics working in the field and this combination has been found to be invaluable for the successful
execution of the project. Members of the working group have agreed that the efforts expended should
continue for a number of reasons.
It is important that the knowledge base be maintained, as this is a central source of information
concerning both general information of the different approaches that member countries have for
ageing management and specific information about stress corrosion cracking. This is a unique
collection of data that will provide an invaluable source of readily accessible information and its
transfer, and the training of the next generation of engineers. Several of the stress corrosion cracking

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mechanisms are the subject of ongoing research, as are the inspection and mitigation techniques.
This ongoing work should be added to the knowledge base as it becomes available.
The SCAP SCC event database is a development of the OPDE database. It covers more types of
components and the information about stress corrosion cracking is much more extensive and detailed.
The database is not complete and new events will occur and need to be added. The approach taken by
which the working group concentrated upon ensuring that the representative events were as complete
as possible means that for many purposes it is necessary to expand the information for many of the
other events, including those transferred from OPDE. It is important that this collection of operational
experience continue.
After an investigative meeting together with the OPDE Programme Review Group it was agreed
that the two groups should work together to establish a new project under the CSNI. This new project
should combine the best of the two projects with respect to content, scope and working methods.
Since OPDE has an agreement which expires at the end of May 2011, the interim period after the
completion of the SCAP project will be used to define the new project in more detail whilst
maintaining the important network of contacts established within the SCAP SCC Working Group.

5.2.2 Cable Working Group

The current report along with the web-based database and commendable practices has created an
encyclopaedia on cable based on the historic work of participating countries. Continued research and
developments should take place with interested participation to further increase the safe long-term
operational availability and reliability of cable systems.
The next phase of work should involve the collection of more data, advancement of the
knowledge base and the extraction of further commendable practices.
It is recommended to carry out benchmarking procedures for cable life extension with
international co-operation to refine the qualification process and other areas of interest. A round
robin testing should be considered to build further consistency and refinement of the process.
Expanding the scope with a similar database to other electrical equipments which are commonly used
in the NPP across the globe could be another valuable addition to the project.
The Cable Working Group should take into consideration the recommendations described in
Section 3.3.10 (“Future advancement for the report”) to define the scope in the first meeting to proceed
with the second phase.

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REFERENCES

References

[1] Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA), “Regulatory Aspects of Ageing Reactors”, 1998 Committee on Nuclear
Regulatory Activities (CNRA) Special Issue Meeting, OECD/NEA, Paris, NEA/CNRA/R(99)1, March 1999.
[2] NEA, Technical Aspects of Ageing for Long-term Operation, OECD/NEA, Paris, NEA/CSNI/R(2002)26.
[3] NEA, Research Efforts Related to Wire System Ageing in NEA Member Countries, OECD/NEA, Paris,
NEA/CSNI/R(2004)12.
[4] NEA, Status Report on Developments and Co-operation on RI-ISI and NDT Qualification in OECD/NEA
Member Countries, OECD/NEA, Paris, NEA/CSNI/R(2005)9.
[5] NEA, “Better Nuclear Plant Maintenance: Improving Human and Organisational Performance”,
CSNI Technical Opinion Papers, No. 11, OECD/NEA, Paris, NEA/CSNI/R(2006)8.
[6] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Safety Aspects of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing, IAEA-
TECDOC-540, IAEA, Vienna (1990).
[7] IAEA, “Data Collection and Record Keeping for the Management of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing”,
IAEA Safety Series, No. 50-P-3, IAEA, Vienna (1991).
[8] IAEA, “Methodology for Ageing Management of Nuclear Power Plant Components Important to
Safety”, IAEA Technical Report Series, No. 338, IAEA, Vienna (1992).
[9] IAEA, “Implementation and Review of Nuclear Power Plant Ageing Management Programme”,
IAEA Safety Report Series, No. 15, IAEA, Vienna (1999).
[10] IAEA, Assessment and Management of Ageing of Major Nuclear Power Plant Components Important to
Safety: Steam Generators, IAEA-TECDOC-981, IAEA, Vienna (1997).
[11] IAEA, Assessment and Management of Ageing of Major Nuclear Power Plant Components Important to
Safety: PWR Vessel Internals, IAEA-TECDOC-1119, IAEA, Vienna (1999).
[12] IAEA, “Ageing Management for Nuclear Power Plants”, IAEA Safety Guide, NS-G-2.12 (2009).
[13] IAEA, “Proactive Management of Ageing Management of Ageing for Nuclear Power Plants”, IAEA
Safety Report Series, No. 62, IAEA, Vienna (2009).
[14] IAEA, “Safe Long-term Operation of Nuclear Power Plants”, IAEA Safety Report Series, No. 57,
IAEA, Vienna (2008).
[15] IAEA, IAEA Safety Glossary Terminology Used in Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection, 2007 ed.,
IAEA, Vienna (2007).
[16] Taylor, James M., Completion of the Fatigue Action Plan, SECY-95-245, United States Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (US NRC), Washington, DC, 25 September 1995.
[17] United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (US NRC), Fatigue Analysis of Components for
60-year Plant Life, NUREG/CR-6674 (PNNL-13227), June 2000.
[18] Thadani, Ashok C., “Fatigue Evaluation of Metal Components for 60 Year Plant Life”,
Memorandum from Ashok C. Thadani, Director, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, to
William D. Travers, Executive Director for Operations, Closeout of Generic Safety Issue 190,
US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, 26 December 1999.
[19] National Science and Technology Council Committee on Technology, Review of Federal Program
for Wire System Safety, United States White House, November 2000.

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[20] IAEA, Assessment and Management of Ageing of Major NPP Components Important to Safety, IAEA-
TECDOC-1188, IAEA, Vienna (2000).
[21] NEA, Research Efforts Related to Wire System Ageing in Member States, OECD/NEA, Paris (2002).
[22] US NRC, Environmental Qualification of Low-voltage Instrumentation and Control Cables, RIS 2003-09
(2003).
[23] Institute of Electrical & Electronic Engineers (IEEE), Qualifying Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power
Generating Stations, IEEE-323, IEEE, New York (1974, 1983).
[24] IEEE, “Type Test of Class 1E Electric Cables, Filed Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power
Generating Stations”, IEEE-383, IEEE, New York (1974).
[25] US NRC, “Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear
Power Plants”, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Title 10, Part 50.49.
[26] International Electrothecnical Commission (IEC), Qualification of Electrical Equipment of the Safety
System for Nuclear Power Plants, IEC 780, IEC, Geneva (1984).
[27] IEC, “Qualification of Electrical Equipment of the Safety System for Nuclear Power Plants”,
IEC 60780, IEC, Geneva (1997).
[28] IEC, Guide for Determining the Effects of Ionizing Radiation on Insulation Materials, IEC 544, IEC,
Geneva (1977, 1985, 1991).
[29] Kerntechnischer Ausschuss (KTA, German Nuclear Safety Standards Commission), Ensuring the
Loss-of-coolant-accident Resistance of Electrotechnical Components and of Components in the
Instrumentation and Controls of Operating Nuclear Power Plants, KTA 3706, KTA, Germany (2000)
(in German).
[30] Svenska karnkraftverken, Environmental Qualification for Accident Conditions, KBE EP-154, Sweden
(1996).
[31] US NRC, Assessment of Environment Qualification Practices and Condition Monitoring Techniques for
Low Voltage Electric Cables, NUREG/CR-6704 (2001).
[32] SCK•CEN (Belgian Nuclear Research Centre), Topical Day on Cable Ageing in Nuclear Environments,
SCK/CEN-BLG-969, Mol, Belgium (2003).
[33] Yamamoto, T., T. Minakawa, The Final Report of the Project of Assessment of Cable Ageing for Nuclear
Power Plants, JNES-SS-0903, Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES), Tokyo, Japan (2009).
[34] Sindelar, Robert L., “Nuclear Radiation”, presentation paper of short course of Introduction to
Nuclear Fuel Cycle Chemistry of Vanderbilt University School of Engineering, Nashville, TN,
USA, 4-6 August 2009.
www.cresp.org/NuclearFuelCycleCourseII/Presentations/05_SINDELAR_CRESP_%20Sindelar_Bob_August_
2009.pdf
[35] European Utility Requirements (EUR), European Utility Requirements for LWR Nuclear Power
Plants (website), Revision C, Vol. 2, Chapter 2.6: Material-related Requirements,
www.europeanutilityrequirements.org.

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Appendix 1: Example of ageing management

programmes for stress corrosion cracking

This appendix describes the Japanese approach to the ageing management of stress corrosion
cracking. The tables describe, for each stress corrosion cracking mode, appropriate methods for
preventative maintenance, the inspection, mitigation, repair and replacement, safety assessment and
research based on the information in the knowledge base.

Introduction

Many stress corrosion cracking (SCC) events occurred in different structures, systems and components
(SSC) of nuclear power plant as early as the 1970s and have continued to the present time. The causes
of these events were sensitisation of material to high heat input, local high residual stress, surface
finishing and hardness, associated with certain environments (such as high-temperature water). For
these reasons, it is necessary to carry out maintenance activities, inspections with the appropriate
intervals, monitoring and collection of relevant data, preventive maintenance/mitigation, repair/
replacement and safety assessment to minimise the occurrence of future events.
Therefore, knowledge should be extracted from the database (operational experience and recent
findings) by analysing and evaluating the data from the viewpoint of the implementation of
appropriate ageing management and maintenance activities beneficial to both regulatory authorities
and operators.
To achieve the goal for both operator and regulators, a well-grounded technical information basis
(TIB) is needed. The ageing management and maintenance activities for SCC are to be performed
under the following three stage considerations:
1) Ageing management from the early stage of nuclear power plant operation. Effective ageing
management can be achieved if performed regularly from the early stage of operation.
2) Ageing management every 10 years within the framework of PSR. The subject of investigation
should include those ageing mechanisms for which mid-term trend monitoring is effective.
3) Ageing management before the operation for 30 years and following every 10 years. The ageing
mechanisms which require the ageing management technical assessment (AMTA) shall be
identified and specified. SCC should be managed in accordance with trend monitoring which
can be performed through inspections, and thus the ageing management programme (AMP)
should be established based on such results.
As shown in Figure 2.1-1 it is first necessary to define an ageing management programme (AMP)
for the countermeasure of SCC by selecting the structures, systems and components (SSC), determining
the safety-important specific SCC mechanisms, and determining the criteria for evaluating if the
intended safety function of SSC are maintained. It is necessary to perform evaluations consistent with
long-term operation (e.g. 40 or 60 years), and to include the evaluation results in a preventive
maintenance plan (or AMP contained inspection, repair/replacement, monitoring/surveillance).
In order to perform optimal preventive maintenance for SCC, utilities should establish a long-term
maintenance management plan (LMP). For safe long-term operation a well-grounded TIB is needed for
each of the SCC mechanisms. To construct it, comprehensive activities, including the results of
research and development, establishment of codes and standards, and consolidation of maintenance
activities (PDCA), need to be continuously reviewed.

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There are several factors which may hinder effective ageing management and may lead to either
unexpected or premature ageing (i.e. IGSCC, PWSCC). These factors or weaknesses need to be
identified and addressed in a proactive approach by experts.
As shown in Figure 1.5-1 and Table 2.1-1, effective ageing management for SCC throughout the
service life requires the use of a systematic approach to manage ageing. It is helpful to use the basic
idea of a framework for co-ordinating all ageing management programmes and activities based on the
understanding of preventive maintenance, mitigation, repair and replacement, inspection/monitoring/
qualification, safety assessment, and research and development on the ageing mechanism and/or
ageing effects of the SSC.
As described in Section 1.5, the IAEA Safety Standard Series No. NS-G-2.12 “Ageing Management
for Nuclear Power Plants” explains how to extract and make commendable practices equal to
appropriate ageing management programmes (AMP) for SCC.
The guide outlines nine generic attributes of an effective ageing management programme: scope of
the ageing management programme, preventative actions to minimise control and ageing mechanism,
detection of ageing effects, monitoring and trending of ageing effects, mitigation of ageing effects,
acceptance criteria, corrective actions, operating experience feedback and feedback of research and
development, and quality management.
It is also important to establish the TIB to establish commendable practices from knowledge base
data which should include at least the following five items, excluding the international harmonisation
of quality management not within the scope of SCAP.
• inspection/monitoring/qualification;
• preventive maintenance/mitigation;
• repair/replacement;
• safety assessment (flaw evaluation/fracture);
• R&D (initiation/crack growth/fracture).

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Table A-1: Commendable practices for IGSCC of stainless steel in Japan

Items Commendable practices

IGSCC is a degradation mechanism of which a number of events were observed tens of years in
the pasts. Also, this IGSCC mechanism is not sufficiently understood yet at present. Therefore, it is
required to perform systematic ageing management combining inspection and preventive
maintenance from the early stage operation of nuclear power plant. The ageing management
programmes (AMP) should be developed based on the updated and evaluated previous inspection
data and research results. It is recommended to select the appropriate preventive activities
Ageing described in this table, taking into account related regulation, the evaluated structural integrity on
management the maintenance of SSC functions, and assumption of the safe long-term operation.
In the core internals, it is necessary to consider the influence of the irradiation in addition to the
material, the stress, the environment.
Because IASCC susceptibility appears over a threshold of the cumulative neutron irradiation
fluence, it is recommended to refer the tables of commendable practices for irradiation-assisted
corrosion cracking (IASCC) on preparing or revising of specified ageing management programme
(AMP).
It is commendable to improve more than two factors among three factors as shown in material,
stress and the environment on performing repair weld, mitigation and replacement. Special
attention should be paid to the reason why IGSCC is observed at location with high hardness due
to surface finishing of stainless steels, by grinding, machining and welding shrinkage of the inside
diameter near the HAZ.
Material:
• For BWR components, low-carbon grades austenitic stainless steel containing up to 0.03%
carbon is selected as material.
• For PWR components, material with a carbon content ranging between 0.03% and 0.05%, and
weld metal with a maximum carbon content of 0.035 wt.%.
• For BWR and PWR, certain amount of delta ferrite should be included in weld metal and cast
austenitic stainless steel (CASS) (e.g. in minimum ferrite of 7.5% in weld metal for PWR, 5.0%
Preventive
for BWR).
maintenance/
mitigation Residual stress:
• Induction heating stress improvement (IHSI).
• Peening (shot peening, US peening, water jet peening, laser peening).
• Polishing.
• HSW (heat sink welding).
Water chemistry:
• Hydrogen water chemistry (HWC), noble metal chemical addition (NMCA) (It is recommended to
pay an attention to demonstrate the effectiveness of HWC and NMCA to high dose material
experiments).
Because IASCC susceptibility appears over a threshold of the cumulative neutron irradiation
fluence, it is recommended to refer to the tables of commendable practices for irradiation-assisted
corrosion cracking (IASCC) for preparing or revising of specified preventive maintenance activities.
It is recommended to select appropriate inspection to maintain the safety function of the SSC:
• Specified inspection. VT, UT or ECT is recommended for inspection as required by the range,
method, commencing time and frequency under the considering of the assumed IGSCC initiation
and propagation in service operation.
Inspection, • General inspection. VT is recommended for inspection as checking method to supplement the
monitoring, individual above-specified inspection just in case from the viewpoint of depth protection or
qualification double checking.
The methods to detect the SCC include visual inspection capable of discriminate 0.0254 mm wires,
liquid penetrant inspection, phased array ultrasonic inspection (detection and sizing).
Because IGSCC propagates along heat affected zone (HAZ) or the weld line, it needs to consider
the attenuation of UT signal when the sizing of the cracks by UT inspection.

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Table A-1: Commendable practices for IGSCC of stainless steel in Japan (cont.)

Items Commendable practices

For example, when IGSCC is detected in the core internals, it is recommended to conduct flaw
evaluation (crack growth evaluation and fracture evaluation) in accordance with the applicable
regulatory guidelines and to confirm that the components satisfy the required safety functions
throughout the pre-determined evaluation period.
Safety
• Crack growth evaluation. Based on the crack growth rate of the relevant material/environment
assessment
combination, the crack size at the end of the pre-determined evaluation period should be
(flaw evaluation/
estimated. IGSCC of BWR occurs at the grain boundaries of the HAZ, so that it needs to take
fracture)
into consideration the high propagation rate for hardening HAZ on performing the crack growth
evaluation.
• Fracture evaluation. Determine whether or not the estimated cracking size at the end of the
evaluation period could reach the allowable limit which might cause fracture of the component.
Same as preventive maintenance/mitigation.
Many of the considerations for preventative maintenance and mitigation are applicable for repair
and replacement. The difference between these two concepts is that the latter is carried out after a
crack has been detected and the former as the name implies is carried out before a crack is found
in order to try and prevent stress corrosion cracking.
Repair and It is recommended that the validity and reliability of the methods in terms of the long-term operation
replacement be verified by a third-party organisation:
• To select proper methods based on investigating the structures, workability, etc.
• It is recommended to apply one or more mitigation procedures to the heat affected zone with
high tensile strength by repair weld.
• To pay a special attention to helium content in stainless steel induced due to neutron irradiation
for a long-term operation.
It is recommended to sophisticate and understand the SCC phenomena at SSC in the operation
plants in precision manner and to study and prepare inspection method and the reasonable
frequency. The research and development themes are as follows:
• To obtain the SCC initiation data for materials machined out or used at operating plants and their
R&D database under the water chemistry at operating plants.
• To preparation and development of codes and standards on evaluation methods of SCC initiation
and growth.
• To research the evaluation of effectiveness of optimised PWR and BWR water chemistry.

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Table A-2: Commendable practices for IGSCC of Ni-based alloy including PWSCC (PWR) in Japan
Items Commendable practices
IGSCC is a degradation mechanism that a number of events tackled tens of years in the past.
Also, the IGSCC mechanism is insufficiently clear. Therefore, systematic ageing management
combined with inspection and preventive maintenance are required to be performed from the early
stage of nuclear power plant operation.
Ageing
management The ageing management programmes (AMP) should be developed based on the update and
evaluated previous inspection data and research results. It is recommended to select the
appropriate preventive activities from the following items in this table based on the applicable
regulation, the structural integrity evaluation on the maintenance of SSC functions, and assumption
of the safe long-term operation.
It is recommended to improve more than two factors among three factors as shown in material,
stress and the environment to do repair weld, mitigation, and replacement, as the IGSCC
mechanism of Ni-based alloy including PWSCC is not sufficiently clear.
Material:
• Alloy 690 base metal and Alloy 52 and 152 weld metal are resistant for PWSCC. These materials
should be employed for replacing materials or repair weld or cladding materials to isolate the
existing Alloy 600.
Preventive Residual stress:
maintenance/ • Peening (shot peening, US Peening, water jet peening, laser peening).
mitigation • Outer surface irradiated laser stress improvement process (L-SIP).
• Polishing.
Water chemistry:
• Optimisation of dissolved hydrogen concentration.
Peening, outer surface irradiated laser stress improvement process (L-SIP), surface residual stress
improvement by polishing are recommended to reduce residual stress caused by welding or to
improve tensile stress on material surface caused by severe plastic deformation during fabrication
into compressive stress.
It is recommended to select appropriate inspection to maintain the safety function of the SSC:
• To identify the cause of cracking, it is desired to observe crack morphologies by visual inspection,
ECT, printed replicas and SUMP observation and to compare them with those observed in past
events.
Inspection, • To detect cracking, bare metal inspection within a required period is recommended in addition to a
monitoring, leak test conducted during every refuelling outage. The methods to detect the SCC include visual
qualification inspection capable of discriminate 0.0254 mm wires, liquid penetrant inspection, phased array
ultrasonic inspection (detection and sizing).
Because PWSCC propagates along columnar (dendrite) microstructure in the weld metal, when the
sizing of the cracks by UT inspection, the attenuation and scattering of UT signal due to grain of
weld metal need to be considered.
When PWSCC is detected, flaw evaluation (crack growth evaluation and fracture evaluation) should
be conducted in accordance with the applicable regulatory guidelines and to confirm that the
Safety components satisfy the required safety functions throughout the pre-determined evaluation period.
assessment • Crack growth evaluation. Based on the crack growth rate of the relevant material/environment
(flaw evaluation/ combination, the crack size at the end of the pre-determined evaluation period should be
fracture) estimated.
• Fracture evaluation. Determine whether or not the estimated cracking size at the end of the
evaluation period could reach the allowable limit which might cause fracture of the component.
Same as preventive maintenance/mitigation.
Many of the considerations for preventative maintenance and mitigation are applicable for repair
and replacement. The difference between these two concepts is that the latter is carried out after a
crack has been detected and the former, as the name implies, is carried out before a crack is found
Repair and in order to try to prevent stress corrosion cracking.
replacement It is recommended that the validity and reliability of the methods in terms of the long-term operation
are verified by a third-party organisation.
Especially, if applying Alloy 690 and its weld metals, Alloys 152/52 as a countermeasure, special
consideration should be paid to the susceptibility to micro-cracking due to local residual stresses
along the grain boundaries in the repair weld.

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Table A-2: Commendable practices for IGSCC of

Ni-based alloy including PWSCC (PWR) in Japan (cont.)

Items Commendable practices

From now on, it is necessary to promote further development of evaluation methods taking
conditions in the operating plants into account. It is also necessary to verify the data of effects of
water chemistry on PWSCC, in order to apply the SCC countermeasures from environmental
aspects to the operating plants. It is necessary to verify the long-term integrity for Alloy 690 applied
as countermeasures to PWSCC. The themes for the research and development are as follows:
R&D
• To promote further reliability of SCC growth data and SCC growth evaluation methods.
• To study evaluation of effectiveness of optimised PWR water chemistry.
• To verify the long-term integrity for Alloy 690 and its weld metals.
• To study the SCC mechanism for development new materials in future applications.

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Table A-3: Commendable practices for IGSCC of Ni-based alloy including NiSCC (BWR) in Japan
Items Commendable practices
IGSCC is a degradation mechanism that a number of events tackled tens of years in the past. The
IGSCC mechanism is insufficiently clear. Therefore, systematically ageing management combined
inspection and preventive maintenance are required to be performed from the early stage of nuclear
power plant operation.
Ageing
management The ageing management programmes (AMP) should be developed based on the updated and
evaluated previous inspection database and research results. It is recommended to select the
appropriate preventive activities from the following items in this table based on the applicable
regulation, the structural integrity evaluation on the maintenance of SSC functions, and assumption
of the safe long-term operation.
It is commendable practice to eliminate more than two factors among three factors as shown in
material, stress and the environment to do repair weld, mitigation and replacement, as the IGSCC
mechanism of Ni-based alloy including NiSCC is not sufficiently made clear.
Material
• To use SCC resistant Ni-based alloys, such as Alloy 82, modified Alloy 600 and modified Alloy 182.
Preventive Alloy 82 contains higher Cr than conventional Alloy 182 and has shown excellent field performance.
maintenance/ Modified Alloy 600 and 182 contain niobium (Nb) to stabilise carbon by suppressing chromium
mitigation carbide precipitation especially.
Stress/environment
• Same as the IGSCC of stainless steels.
• The recommended methods to reduce residual stress caused by welding or to improve tensile
stress on material surface caused by severe plastic deformation during fabrication into
compressive stress are peening, surface residual stress improvement by polishing.
It is recommended to select appropriate inspection to maintain the safety function of the SSC:
• To identify the cause of cracking, it is desired to observe crack morphologies by visual inspection,
ECT, printed replicas and SUMP observation and to compare them with those observed for past
Inspection, events.
monitoring,
qualification • To detect cracking, visual inspection in addition to leak test conducted during every refuelling
outage.
Because NiSCC propagates along columnar (dendrite) microstructure in the weld metal, when the
sizing of the cracks by UT inspection, the attenuation of UT signal should be considered.
It should conduct flaw evaluation (crack growth evaluation and fracture evaluation) in accordance
with the applicable regulatory guidelines and confirm that the components satisfy the required
Safety safety functions during the pre-determined evaluation period.
assessment • Crack growth evaluation. Based on the crack growth rate of the relevant material/environment
(flaw evaluation/ combination, the crack size at the end of the pre-determined evaluation period should be
fracture) estimated.
• Fracture evaluation. Determine whether or not the estimated cracking size at the end of the
evaluation period could reach the allowable limit which might cause fracture of the component.
Same as preventive maintenance/mitigation.
Many of the considerations for preventative maintenance and mitigation are applicable for repair
and replacement. The difference between these two concepts is that the latter is carried out after a
Repair and crack has been detected and the former, as the name implies, is carried out before a crack is found
replacement in order to try to prevent stress corrosion cracking.
• It is recommended that the validity and reliability of the methods in terms of the long-term
operation be verified by a third-party organisation.
• To select proper methods upon investigating the structures, workability, etc.
• It is necessary to promote further development of reliable methods on SCC initiation, growth
evaluation and integrity evaluation. It is necessary to understand and manage the SCC
phenomena in operating plants in a precise manner and to prepare and study rationalised
R&D inspection frequency. The following themes are desirable:
• To develop modelling and UT simulation technology on SCC initiation and its propagation.
• To study an evaluation of SCC propagation behaviour of weld fusion line of dissimilar weld joint
between ferrite steel and Ni-based alloys.

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Table A-4: Commendable practices for irradiation-assisted corrosion cracking (IASCC) in Japan

Items Commendable practices

Irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC) has less experience for structural materials of
components in nuclear power plants. IASCC is characterised by the threshold of irradiation level
related to susceptibility.
There are increasing concerns that IASCC might occur in the high fluence if no countermeasures
could conducted. Susceptibility of IASCC is induced by the accumulation of neutron irradiation to
austenite stainless steels with normally non-susceptible and IASCC has high time dependency
compared to other SCC mechanisms.
Since these changes in the material and stress due to neutron irradiation are all cumulative, IASCC
should be under the management as an irradiation level dependent, that is, a time-dependent
Ageing degradation phenomenon. IASCC also requires structural evaluation since material and stress
management continuously and complicatedly changed with time and also the allowable level changed due to the
irradiation.
The inspection programme and interval should take all these factors into account. Therefore,
systematically ageing management combined inspection and preventive maintenance are required
to be performed from the early stage of nuclear power plant operation. The ageing management
programmes (AMP) should be developed based on the updated and evaluated previous inspection
database and research results.
It is recommended to select the appropriate preventive activities from the following items in this
table based on the applicable regulation, the structural integrity evaluation on the maintenance of
SCC functions, and assumption of the safe long-term operation.
Preventive maintenance
PWR
Preventive maintenance measure/mitigation with respect to material, stress and environment
aspect, It is important to take into account that the degradation is cumulative nature,
i.e. time-dependent nature.
The possibility that any specific locations would reach the threshold value for IASCC susceptibility
during the lifetime should be evaluated.
• Approximately 1 × 1025 n/m2 or more (E > 0.1 MeV).
• The threshold stress for IASCC initiation decreases as dose increases, and Type 316 cold-worked
stainless steel over approximately 30 dpa showed IASCC initiation threshold, even at the
relatively low stress condition approximately to 0.6 σy.
As examples of preventive maintenance, all baffle former bolts were replaced, as was the whole
reactor vessel internal (RVI).
BWR
Preventive
maintenance/ Preventive maintenance measure/mitigation with respect to material, stress and environment
mitigation aspect. It is important to take into account that the degradation is cumulative nature,
i.e. time-dependent nature.
To plan maintenance relevant location before cumulative neutron exposure reaches 1.51 × 1025 n/m2
(E > 1 MeV)(at H4 weld for 60 years) to take into account the threshold IASCC susceptibilities are
as follows:
• Type 304 SS: approximately 5 × 1024 n/m2 or more (E > 1 MeV).
• Type SUS316 SS: approximately 1 × 1025 n/m2 or more (E > 1 MeV).
Preventive technologies to IGSCC are believed to be effective for IASCC. However, it is necessary
to demonstrate the effectiveness experimentally such as the improved water chemistry and stress
improvement technologies to the relevant components.
It is recommended to take into account irradiation-induced stress relaxation phenomenon in the
application of the stress improvement technologies to the relevant components.
As concerns the application of hydrogen water chemistry (HWC), the effectiveness of HWC and
NMCA to high dose material should be demonstrated by experiments.
It is recommended to select proper methods by investigating the structures, working conditions, etc.

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Table A-4: Commendable practices for irradiation-assisted

corrosion cracking (IASCC) in Japan (cont.)

Items Commendable practices

Mitigation
PWR
It is important to take into account that the degradation is cumulative nature, i.e. time-dependent
nature, and to perform countermeasures.
Preventive Examples of changes in design are as follows:
maintenance/ • Upflow conversion.
mitigation
• Improving the shape of the head-shank curve of baffle bolts.
(cont.)
• Low leakage fuel loading.
BWR
As with the preventive maintenance to IGSCC are recognised to be effective for IASCC, but it is
necessary to demonstrated the effectiveness experimentally.
PWR
The inspection method and interval should take the IASCC’s nature into account.
• Visual inspection and/or UT inspection to inspect baffle-former bolts.
• Dissolved oxygen concentration, dissolved hydrogen concentration and pH are for main water
chemistry.
BWR
It is recommended that IASCC should be detected in order to maintain structural integrity and
Inspection, required function of components. So that, it is necessary to prepare the method and range of
monitoring, surface inspection involving visual inspection and volumetric inspection.
qualification It is recommended to select inspection methods and time interval based on the results of structural
integrity with assumed crack considering the irradiation effect on the crack growth rate and fracture
toughness of the respected location.
As detection methods for IASCC, the following are recommended.
• Visual inspection (underwater camera): The visual inspection capable of discriminating 0.0254 mm
wires can be recommended.
• Liquid penetrant inspection, ultrasonic inspection, etc.
As with ultrasonic inspection for the purpose of flaw sizing, phased array method is recommende
PWR
It is recommended for baffle former bolts to manage the allowable number of damaged bolts
considering plant’s operational condition such as operation years, temperature, neutron fluence and
applied stress considering swelling/creep effect due to irradiation.
Safety BWR
assessment
For safety assessment, it is necessary to take into account the irradiation effect both for material,
(flaw evaluation/
stress, and environmental aspect.
fracture)
In case of flaw evaluation, it is recommended to take into account the following items:
• Crack growth evaluation: Neutron fluence dependency.
• Residual stress distribution: Neutron fluence dependency.
• Fracture toughness evaluation: Neutron fluence dependency.
Same as preventive maintenance/mitigation.
Many of the considerations for preventative maintenance and mitigation are applicable for repair
Repair and and replacement.
replacement The difference between these two concepts is that the latter is carried out after a crack has been
detected and the former, as the name implies, is carried out before a crack is found in order to try to
prevent stress corrosion cracking.
Fundamental study on IASCC mechanism at the high irradiation fluence region, in order to reflect
the outcomes to long-term operation and construction of LWR in next generation:
• To develop the database on IASCC initiation and propagation and to prepare the simulation
technology based on the results of mechanism understanding researches.
R&D
• To further develop the database including data from components from ex-plants and swelling data
from the components.
• To develop the simulation technology for evaluation on IASCC initiation and growth based on the
results of research and development mentioned above.

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Table A-5: Commendable practices for external chloride corrosion cracking (ECSCC) in Japan

Items Commendable practices

ECSCC is a degradation mechanism of which there were a number of events except for the
nuclear energy power plants. The outside material surface of components for the reason that
chlorine in the sea salt grains, high polymer products, human sweat, etc., is attached.
Systematic plans are required with respect to the quantity of adhered salt particles such as sea salt
particles.
Ageing As this mechanism depends on halogen ion, especially chlorine ion. So, it is needed to perform
management periodical cleaning to avoid the chlorine concentration.
It is necessary to manage a hygroscopic-moisture of not bringing the equipment to deal with
halogen ion by the good practice to this mechanism, and manage needs to control chlorine
concentration quantity regularly below the tolerance.
In case ECSCC is detected, there is a way of evaluating the breakage depth by assuming the
depth to be half of the crack length.
It is necessary to keep free of halide such as the sea salt particles and keep cleanliness of
Preventive
component surface during manufacturing and installation stage. As for the outdoor components,
maintenance/
which are painted or worked out waterproof measures, it is necessary to confirm the integrities of
mitigation
painting protections or waterproof measures.
Inspection manuals, inspection equipments and personnel should be defined based on codes and
standards.
The methods to detect ECSCC include visual inspection capable of discriminate 0.0254 mm wires,
Inspection, liquid penetrant inspection, phased array ultrasonic inspection (detection and sizing).
monitoring, As to the monitoring/trending of salt adsorption to the surfaces of piping, etc., it is necessary to
qualification periodically measure the surface salt concentration and prescribe a proper control criteria (for
example, 70 mg Cl/m2).
If the measured concentration exceeds the control criteria, surface clean-up (washing) and
examination of SCC occurrence (e.g. VT, PT, ECT, UT) should be implemented.
Safety
assessment It is recommended that the crack depth be assumed to be half of the maximum crack length and
(flaw evaluation/ the integrity of the component is evaluated using this assumption.
fracture)
Repair and If the crack length and depth do not meet the safety requirements in the codes and standards,
replacement repair/replacement is necessary.
R&D Not necessary

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Appendix 2: SCAP Management Board,

SCC Working Group and Cable Working Group

SCAP Management Board

Member
Organisation Experts
states
Belgium SCK•CEN (Belgian Nuclear Research Centre) Andrei Goussarov
Canada CNSC (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission) Robert Lojk
Czech
NRI (Nuclear Research Institute) Jiri Zdarek
Republic
Finland STUK (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority) Martti Vilpas
EDF-SEPTEN Claude Faidy
France IRSN/DSR/SAMS/BAMM
Marc Le Calvar
(Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire)
ASN (Nuclear Safety Authority) Rachel Vaucher
Germany GRS mbH Frank Michel
Korea KINS, Materials Engineering Department Koo-Kab Chung
Naoto Sekimura
University of Tokyo
(Chair)
Japan METI/NISA Hiroki Ishigaki
(Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry,
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency) Kentaro Morita
National Commission on Nuclear Safety and Safeguards
Mexico Pablo Ruiz Lopez
(Mexican Nuclear Regulatory Body)
OECD Halden Reactor Project,
Norway Paolo Fantoni
Computerised Operation Support Systems Division
Slovak
VUJE Inc. Martin Brezina
Republic
Figueras Clavijo, Jose Maria
Spain CSN (Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear)
Jose M. Fernandez Cernuda
Sweden Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM) Karen Gott
Aladar Csontos
United States US Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Thomas Koshy

EC
Joint Research Centre – IE (Institute for Energy) Luigi Debarberis
(Observer)
IAEA Engineering Safety Section,
Ervin Liszka
(Observer) Division of Nuclear Installation Safety

SCAP Consultant Helmut Schulz

Mr. Akihiro Yamamoto
OECD Nuclear Energy Agency
(SCAP secretariat)

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SCC Working Group

Member
Organisation Experts
states
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission,
Canada Jovica Riznic
Operational Engineering Assessment Division
Czech NRI Rez plc (Nuclear Research Institute),
Marek Postler
Republic Structural Properties and Corrosion Department
Finland VTT (Valtion Teknillinen Tutkimuskeskus) Pertti Aaltonen
IRSN/DSR/SAMS/BAMM
Marc Le Calvar
France (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire)
ASN Directorate for Nuclear Pressure Vessels (DEP) Liliane Gogoluszko
AREVA, NTM-G Renate Kilian
Germany AREVA, NTM-G Armin Roth
GRS mbH Frank Michel
Sung-Sik Kang
KINS, Regulatory Research Division
Korea Koo-Kab Chung
Seoul National University, Nuclear Engineering Department Il Soon Hwang
Tohoku University Tetsuo Shoji
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI),
Yutaka Sosa
Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA)
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Kunio Onizawa
Japan
Masaaki Kikuchi
Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES)
Masakuni Koyama
Nuclear Engineering, Ltd. (NEL) Takeshi Sakai
Toshiba Corporation Ryoichi Saeki
Mexican Nuclear Regulatory Body,
Mexico Pablo Ruiz Lopez
National Commission on Nuclear Safety and Safeguards
Slovak
VUJE Inc. Martin Brezina
Republic
CSN (Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear) Jose Maria Figueras Clavijo
Spain
TECNATOM S.A. Xavier Jardí Cuerda
Karen Gott
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority (SSM)
Sweden (Chair)
Vattenfall Pål Efsing
Switzerland ENSI (Swiss Federal Nuclear Safety Inspectorate) Klaus Germerdonk
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
United
Component Integrity Branch Office of Aladar Csontos
States
Nuclear Regulatory Research

EC
Joint Research Centre – IE (Institute for Energy) Ralf Ahlstrand
(Observer)
IAEA Engineering Safety Section,
Ervin Liszka
(Observer) Division of Nuclear Installation Safety
(Clearing
SIGMA, USA Bengt Lydell
House)

Peter Ford
SCAP SCC Consultant
Peter Scott

* : Management Board member.

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Cable Working Group

Member
Organisation Experts
states
Argentine
National Atomic Energy Commission Jorge Zorrilla
Republic
SCK•CEN (Belgian Nuclear Research Centre) Andrei Goussarov
Belgium
LABORELEC Jean Tusset
CNSC (Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission),
Canada Desire Ndomba
Systems Engineering Division
NRI Rez plc (Nuclear Research Institute)
Czech
Radiation Chemistry and Vit Placek
Republic
Environmental Qualification Department
Finland STUK (Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority) Kim Wahlström
France IRSN (Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire) Juliette Colombani
AREVA, NTR-G Peter Waber
Germany Volker Wild
GRS mbH
André Lochthofen
KINS (Korea Institute of Nuclear Safety),
Korea Cheol-Soo, Goo
Nuclear Regulation Division
Waseda University Yoshimichi Ohki
Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) Tadao Seguchi
Toshio Yamamoto
Japan Japan Nuclear Energy Safety Organization (JNES)
Takefumi Minakawa
Kazunari Bunno
Nuclear Engineering, Ltd. (NEL)
Hideo Hirao
OECD Halden Reactor Project,
Norway Paolo Fantoni
Computerised Operation Support Systems Division
Slovak
VUJE Inc. Miroslav Lukac
Republic
Jose M. Fernandez-Cernuda
CSN (Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear)
Spain Migoya
Tecnatom Jorge Gonzalez Nieto
Swedish Radiation Safety Authority Tage Eriksson
Sweden
Ringhals AB Anders Nygårds
Thomas Koshy
United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Chair)
United States
Nitin Patel
Wyle Labs Tom Brewington
Certification Centre of I&C systems Raisa Naryzhna
Ukraine
of State Centre of Supplies and Cervices Quality of Ukraine Tetyana Chetverikova

IAEA Nuclear Power Engineering Section,

Oszvald Glöckler
(Observer) Division of Nuclear Power Safety
Clearing Institute for Energy Technology Jan Erik Farbrot
House OECD Halden Reactor Project Kjell Tore Hansen

* : Management Board member.

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