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The New Political Economy of Private Security

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The New Political Economy of Private Security

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Jehrehmiah Muyah
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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Article

Theoretical Criminology
16(1) 85–101
The new political economy © The Author(s) 2011
Reprints and permission:
of private security sagepub.co.uk/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1362480611410903
tcr.sagepub.com

Adam White
University of York, UK

Abstract
This article maps out a new research agenda for interpreting the trajectory and
dynamics of domestic private security provision in advanced democratic countries:
the ‘new political economy of private security’. It proceeds on the basis that the key
challenge in this field is to construct an agenda which takes account of how both
the economic context (shifts in supply and demand) and the political context (state-
centric conceptions of legitimacy) of domestic security simultaneously serve to shape
the conduct of contemporary private security providers. In attempting to meet this
challenge, the article not only builds upon the important theoretical research already
undertaken in the form of the nodal governance and anchored pluralism models, but
also sheds new light on the nature of domestic private security today.

Keywords
agency, culture, economics, legitimacy, market, politics, private security, state, structure
policing

Introduction
Domestic security provision is undergoing a significant transformation. In advanced
democratic countries across the world, monopolistic and state-centred systems of secu-
rity provision are increasingly giving way to more pluralistic systems in which public
police forces and private security companies work alongside one another in fragmented
security networks. This transformation affects the delivery of many core human goods—
including peace, democracy and human rights—on a daily basis. Given the importance
of these issues, the expansion of domestic private security has attracted considerable

Corresponding author:
Adam White, Department of Politics, Derwent College, University of York,York Y10 5DD, UK.
Email: [email protected]
86 Theoretical Criminology 16(1)

academic attention in recent decades, giving rise to a series of different empirical and
theoretical lines of enquiry (key contributions include: Johnston, 1992; Johnston
and Shearing, 2003; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Loader and Walker, 2007; Shearing and
Stenning, 1981, 1983; Wood and Shearing, 2007; Zedner, 2009). While these lines of
enquiry have served to deepen our understanding of this trend, there is a lack of joined-
up thinking in this research area. Scholars pursuing different research questions have a
tendency to talk past one another, leaving underexplored a number of important issues
such as private security growth patterns, the dynamics of legitimation, the logics of secu-
rity regulation and the relationship between security and the public good. One reason for
this fragmentation is that there have been few attempts to link together these different
lines of enquiry within a broadly pitched research agenda. The purpose of this article is
to develop such an agenda: the ‘new political economy of private security’.
The construction of this agenda is guided by a normative commitment to the ‘new
political economy’ framework developed by Gamble et al. (1996).1 In this framework,
the traditional dichotomies between politics/economics, states/markets and structure/
agency are consciously broken down and reframed within an integrated approach
designed to give expression to the multiple bounded rationalities which drive social phe-
nomena (Gamble et al., 1996: 5–6). This is a particularly useful approach with which to
(re)order current empirical and theoretical research on domestic private security because
this research is often characterized by such dichotomies. Some of the most pressing
issues in this field are situated in the space where politics/economics, states/markets
and structure/agency collide with and mutually constitute each other. Furthermore, this
approach generates valuable insights by introducing a contemporary political science
perspective into an area of research presently dominated by criminological enquiry,
thereby leading to a more multidisciplinary understanding of these issues. As such, the
prefix ‘new’ in the title not only reflects a normative affiliation with a specific analytical
framework, but also emphasizes the fact that the article maps out important new empiri-
cal and theoretical terrain.
Against this backdrop, the article proceeds in three stages. First, it is argued that the
majority of empirical research on domestic private security has (implicitly) been con-
ducted within either an economic context which focuses upon the laws of supply and
demand or a political context which emphasizes the deeply embedded cultural belief
that security is an inherently governmental function. Consequently, it is reasoned that
one of the main challenges in this field is to put together an agenda which encourages
researchers to investigate how both of these contexts serve simultaneously to shape the
everyday conduct of domestic private security actors. Second, it is contended that while
the two main theoretical frameworks in this area—the nodal governance model (see
Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wood and Shearing, 2007) and the anchored pluralism
model (see Loader and Walker, 2006, 2007)—both make useful contributions to the
challenge of guiding researchers towards the political economy of private security, nei-
ther provides a balanced and integrated framework. Third, it is thus argued that a new
series of research questions, methodological techniques and analytical propositions are
required in order to steer future research more effectively in the direction of the political
economy of private security.
White 87

Political and economic context


Over the past two decades or so, researchers from a range of disciplines have contributed
important insights into the dynamics of domestic private security in advanced demo-
cratic countries. On the surface, this multidisciplinary body of literature appears to bring
into frame a wide array of trends which defy simple categorization. From a new political
economy perspective, however, it is possible to identify two meta-trends: the first relates
to the economic context of domestic private security and the second relates to the political
context.

Economic context
Economic context refers to the shifting laws of supply and demand in the domestic secu-
rity sector. Research conducted in relation to this context tends to produce an economic
narrative in which private security providers are conceptualized as economic actors
whose primary motivation is to take advantage of market fluctuations so as to expand
their commercial operations. This narrative begins with an examination of some well-
known shifts in supply and demand in the immediate post-war era, before moving onto
more contemporary economic developments.
During the middle decades of the 20th century, domestic security sectors in many
advanced democratic countries were dominated by well-resourced public police forces.
In accordance with post-war Keynesian economic policy, rising demand for domestic
security was, at this time, usually met with an increase in the supply of public policing
resources (Ayling et al., 2009; Braithwaite, 2000). As such, there was little demand for
private security. However, cracks in this monopolistic system began to emerge in the
1970s and 1980s with the onset of fiscal crisis in many advanced democratic (Keynesian)
states. As investment in public services declined in line with resource constraints and an
emergent neoliberal governing mentality, public police forces were no longer sufficiently
well resourced to satisfy demands for domestic security, in turn creating a security vac-
uum which was duly exploited by business-savvy private security providers (see Jones
and Newburn, 1998: 98–104).
Although this often cited scenario has a great deal of analytical purchase, it does not
provide the full picture. While state investment in public services did decline during the
1970s and 1980s, in many countries state investment in public policing actually contin-
ued to rise. Braithwaite (2000: 49), for instance, observes that between 1970 and 1990
the number of public police officers in Britain and the United States increased by 35 and
64 per cent respectively. On the surface, this observation appears to invalidate the above
scenario. Yet on closer inspection this is not necessarily the case. This is because the rise
in spending on the public police did not in fact manage to keep up with demand for
domestic security, which from the 1970s onwards accelerated at an increasingly rapid
pace. As a consequence, there was still a supply side deficit which private security pro-
viders were able to exploit, but the deficit was caused by escalating demand for domestic
security rather than by declining state investment in public policing. Why was demand
accelerating at such a pace?
88 Theoretical Criminology 16(1)

To begin with, crime rates in many advanced democratic countries were rising steadily
during this era, stimulating demand for domestic security provision (Gurr, 1977; Maguire,
2007). Furthermore, as Reiner (1992) points out, patterns of crime in many of these
countries were also becoming more complex in line with the gradual pluralization of
class, gender, identity and religious social relations, making it difficult for monolithic
public institutions such as the police to combat criminal activity. This explains not only
why demand for security was increasing in general, but also why a sizeable proportion of
this demand was being satisfied by private security providers, for the services delivered
by these flexible market-based organizations could (in theory at least) be more effec-
tively tailored towards the localized and particularistic security needs which were result-
ing from these trends (Wood and Shearing, 2007).
A further source of demand has come from the emergence of security fetishism. In
many advanced democratic countries there has been an increasing desire to ameliorate
subjective feelings of insecurity—which are spreading as a consequence of shifting pat-
terns of crime and the rise of an increasingly individualistic neoliberal world view—
through the accumulation of ever more security products and services (Jones and
Newburn, 2006; Neocleous, 2008; Zedner, 2003). Importantly, this fetishism is self-per-
petuating. The more public or private security officers there are patrolling publicly
accessibly spaces, the more citizens are reminded of their insecurity, thereby further
stimulating their desire for security products and services (Zedner, 2003: 163). Whether
or not the fuelling of such insecurity is a conscious business strategy used by private
security providers to maintain a healthy demand for their services is a matter of debate.
Some argue that it can be seen as a kind of conspiracy (Neocleous, 2008: 145–160). It is
likely, however, that such insecurity is equally as much one of the many unintended con-
sequences of private security provision.
Lastly, shifting property relations have also stimulated demand for domestic private
security by enhancing the capacity of citizens to choose between different modes of secu-
rity provision. The key trend here is the emergence of what Shearing and Stenning (1981,
1983) have famously termed ‘mass private property’—that is, expansive tracts of private
property which are used predominantly as public spaces, such as shopping centres, indus-
trial complexes, gated communities and so on (see also Kempa et al., 2004). On this
property, Shearing and Stenning (1983) observe, landlords have the legal right to employ
private security providers in order to control access to and behaviour within their borders.
This in turn creates a latent demand for private security, which can easily be actualized if
landlords are dissatisfied with—or simply want to supplement—public policing.
These economic fluctuations in supply and demand have a profound impact upon the
conduct of private security providers. Importantly, though, this is by no means the whole
story. As further research has demonstrated, the activities of private security providers
are also shaped by the political context of the domestic security sector.

Political context
Political context refers to the deep-rooted political norms which are centred around the
idea that domestic security ought to be exclusively provided by the state, entirely free
from the interference of commercial interests. Research conducted in relation to this
White 89

context tends to produce a political narrative in which private security providers figure
as political actors seeking to navigate their way through this complex political terrain in
an effort to legitimate (and thereby enhance the appeal of) their commercial operations.
This narrative begins with an exploration of the historical relationship between the pub-
lic and private sectors in relation to domestic security, before moving on to the conse-
quences of this relationship for contemporary private security providers.
While no state has ever actually exercised a true Weberian-style monopoly over secu-
rity provision, a number of advanced democratic states came close enough to this ideal-
type institutional arrangement during the mid-20th century to give the broad impression
of one. Furthermore, the discourse of political leaders in these countries frequently drew
upon the idea of a state monopoly in order to justify the state’s activities, in turn serving
to further reinforce this broad impression (Shearing, 1992). As such, populations across
the globe have gradually come to expect that the state ought to monopolize domestic
security provision and, by extension, to regard any institution which appears to under-
mine this monopoly as immoral and unjust (see Brodeur, 2007: 119–120; Garland, 1996:
448–449; Rawlings, 2003: 61). In many advanced democratic countries, these expecta-
tions have transformed into inter-subjective norms which mark out the socio-political
contours of domestic security provision today. One significant consequence of these
norms is that as private security providers expand their operations they tend to encounter
resistance because their presence grates against popular expectations about how security
ought to be delivered (Loader, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c; Loader and Walker, 2001, 2007).
They have accordingly developed a number of political strategies designed to circum-
vent this resistance.
For example, many providers have openly sought to recruit into their ranks moon-
lighting and retired public police and military officers in order to incorporate (former)
representatives of the state monopoly into their commercial operations. In some coun-
tries, such as the United States, moonlighting is especially common. Sklansky (1999:
1176) remarks, for instance, that in some US metropolitan police departments more than
half of the police officers are employed by private security providers in some capacity.
Furthermore, according to Stewart (1985: 761) ‘some cities permit such officers to wear
their uniforms, badges and guns on the theory that increasing police presence in an area
is a public as well as private benefit’ (see also Ayling et al., 2009: 133–156). This policy
serves to blur the boundary between public and private policing in a manner which plays
to the advantage of private security providers, since it confers upon their operations a
degree of the symbolic state-like legitimacy which is widely expected of domestic secu-
rity actors. In other countries, such as Australia, Japan and the United Kingdom, a paral-
lel dynamic takes place with regard to retired public police and military officers, who are
integrated into the ranks of private security companies in what seems to be a similarly
conscious effort to create the general impression of ‘stateness’ (Ayling and Shearing,
2008; White, 2010; Yoshida, 1999).
A further (and related) strategy utilized by private security providers has been to issue
uniforms to their officers which mimic the uniforms of the public police. Despite the fact
that this practice is banned or severely restricted in many countries (see Bunyan, 1977;
White, 2010; Yoshida, 1999), it goes on unabated across the world. This is an important
trend because, as Thumala et al. (2011: 294) remark, ‘the use of uniforms, badges and
90 Theoretical Criminology 16(1)

vehicles that resemble those of the police (and are designed to do so) are all indicative of
an attempt to secure legitimacy by association’. This visual sleight of hand once again
appears to be designed to give private security providers an air of ‘stateness’ in anticipa-
tion that it will appeal to the deep-seated state-centric political norms which permeate the
domestic security sector.
In addition to these largely symbolic strategies, private security providers have also
made great efforts to develop legally grounded relations with state institutions through
statutory regulation. In Britain, for example, a powerful alliance of private security pro-
viders lobbied in favour of regulation for almost 40 years before this institutional arrange-
ment was finally codified in the form of the Private Security Industry Act 2001 (White,
2010). Similar scenarios have occurred in other such geographically diverse locations as
France and Australia (see Ocqueteau, 1993; Prenzler and Sarre, 1998, 2006). In many
respects, regulation represents the legitimation strategy par excellence, for although it
entails the implementation of restrictive bureaucratic red tape upon commercial security
operations, it also gives these operations a concrete semblance of ‘stateness’. This in turn
allows private security providers to market themselves not as commercial organizations
working in line with private goods and profit margins, but rather as state-deputized insti-
tutions functioning in accordance with the state-guaranteed public good (White, 2010).
The political context of domestic security shapes the activities of private security
providers to a significant degree. From a new political economy standpoint, however, it
is critical to recognize that in reality this political context runs alongside and overlaps
with the economic context examined above. It seems clear that the laws of supply and
demand in the domestic security sector are mediated by a set of deeply embedded politi-
cal norms about how security ought to be delivered. However, this is an under-appreci-
ated dynamic. Researchers in this field rarely make explicit and systematic connections
between these political and economic contexts, tending instead either to focus on these
problems in isolation or to make only rudimentary linkages between them. Consequently,
one of the key challenges in this field is to develop an agenda which encourages research-
ers to investigate how both the economic context and the political context of domestic
security have the effect of jointly shaping the conduct of contemporary private security
providers. The remainder of the article represents an attempt to meet this challenge from
a new political economy perspective. It does so in two stages: first, it explores the degree
to which the two main theoretical frameworks in this research area can be used to con-
tribute towards this agenda, thereby taking advantage of the conceptual work already
done in this field; second, it expands upon these frameworks in order to construct the
new political economy of private security.

Nodal governance and anchored pluralism


Over the past couple of decades, two theoretical frameworks have come to dominate the
study of domestic security: the nodal governance model and anchored pluralism model.2
Both set out to conceptualize today’s security landscape in a broad sense—focusing on
the activities of state and non-state actors in both advanced and emerging democracies—
and therefore provide numerous insights which fall beyond the scope of this article. For
present purposes, however, these two models are important because—in the abridged
White 91

formulations set out below—they stand at the forefront of conceptual research into
domestic private security in advanced democratic countries. As a consequence, they
serve to mark out the terrain of what has so far been accomplished in meeting the chal-
lenge of developing a research agenda which explicates how both the political and eco-
nomic context of domestic security simultaneously serve to shape the conduct of private
security actors.

Nodal governance
The nodal governance model came to prominence in the mid-1990s (though its intellec-
tual roots can be traced back to the early 1980s) as the first explicit attempt to conceptu-
alize the increasingly pluralized domestic security sector.3 The key nodal governance
theorists are Shearing, Johnston and Wood (see Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Shearing,
1996, 2006; Shearing and Wood, 2003; Wood and Shearing, 2007)—though many others
have contributed towards the development of the model, taking it in a number of interest-
ing directions (for example Dupont, 2004; Kempa and Singh, 2008; Kempa et al., 2004;
Marks and Wood, 2010). Together these scholars have made a significant contribution
towards the task of understanding contemporary security provision in its various forms.
Importantly, though, when viewed from a new political economy perspective, it can be
argued that these scholars have a tendency to focus more upon the economic context of
domestic private security than the political context.
The model emerged as a way of interrogating and generalizing Shearing and Stenning’s
(1981, 1983) empirical findings from the early 1980s about the relationship between
mass private property and the emergence of domestic private security. As a result of this
focus, its proponents have primarily been concerned with first ‘mapping’ the pluralized
security arrangements which exist in localized geographical spaces—or ‘nodes’—and
then working out how these nodes relate to one another in broad security networks. In
order to construct such nodal maps, they have drawn upon the key concepts of gover-
nance theory, such as institutions, practices, mentalities, knowledge and resources (on
governance theory in general see Pierre and Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997; Smith, 1993,
1999; on nodal mapping see Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wood, 2006; Wood and
Shearing, 2007). The key stipulation they make when constructing these maps is that no
a priori emphasis ought to be placed on public security arrangements at the expense of
private ones. To do so would, in their view, essentially mean falling back into the monop-
olistic system which is in the process of being transcended. Instead, they argue, the con-
stitution of each node must be approached as an ‘empirically open question’ with no
preconceived disposition towards either the public or private sphere (Shearing and Wood,
2003: 404).
Using this theoretical framework, the nodal governance theorists have set about the
task of mapping out the contemporary security landscape. The breadth of this mapping is
impressive and stretches beyond the focus of this article, covering parts of Latin America
(Wood and Cardia, 2006) and Africa (Kempa and Singh, 2008; Marks and Wood, 2010;
Shearing and Berg, 2006) as well as global terror networks (Shearing and Johnston,
2010) and global security institutions (Wood and Shearing, 2007). With regard to domes-
tic security in advanced democratic countries, they have illustrated how in recent decades
92 Theoretical Criminology 16(1)

many—if not most—of today’s nodes are populated not only by public sector institutions
such as the police, but also private sector institutions such as private security providers.
So as citizens move between different nodes during the course of their daily lives—from
shopping malls, industrial complexes and gated communities to airports, city centres and
national border points—they encounter a variety of security regimes which are charac-
terized by both public and private institutions, practices, mentalities, knowledge and
resources (see, for example, Button, 2007, 2008; Kempa et al., 2004; Shearing and
Stenning, 1987; Van Steden, 2007).
Within this broad framework there does appear to be space to accommodate both the
economic and political context identified in the previous section. However, when analys-
ing the dynamics of domestic private security, researchers using this model have a nota-
ble tendency to focus more upon the economic context of domestic security than the
political context. In particular, they repeatedly explain the growth patterns of domestic
private security by citing the emergence of mass private property set against the back-
drop of changing patterns of crime and rising insecurity. To be sure, they do also discuss
important political trends such as the shift in governing mentalities from ‘welfare liberal-
ism’ to ‘lean-state, market-orientated models of neo-liberalism and neo-conservativism’
(Kempa et al., 2004: 575; see also Ayling et al., 2009; Shearing and Wood, 2003). But
such discussions—with their focus upon the deepening logic of the market and the
shrinking of the political sphere—if anything have the effect of consolidating the central-
ity of economic context in their writings rather than balancing it against the equally
important political context. As such, references to the political context of domestic pri-
vate security are rare. To date there has been no systematic attempt by researchers work-
ing within this framework to investigate either the legitimation activities in which most
private security providers are presently engaged or the political rationalities which lay
behind them. Instead, these providers are generally regarded as being unconstrained by
the state-centric political norms which structure the contemporary domestic security sec-
tor in many advanced democratic countries.
This is not to say, though, that the nodal governance model precludes analysis of this
political context. Given the model’s ‘empirically open’ standpoint, there is no reason
why such legitimation activities—together with the causes which lay behind them—cannot
be mapped onto security nodes where they occur. However, there is a plausible reason
why this context has not featured prominently in nodal governance analysis. It is because
the model has frequently been framed—especially by Shearing, Johnston and Wood—as
an explicit critique of those state-centred ‘Westphalian’ analyses of domestic security
provision which came to prominence during the monopoly era and continue to influence
much social science research today (see in particular Shearing, 2006: 29–30; Shearing
and Johnston, 2010: 496–498; Shearing and Wood, 2003: 418–419). According to these
theorists, the problem with such state-centric analyses is that ‘they attempt to grasp
what is happening from the vantage point of what is being superseded’ (Shearing and
Wood, 2003: 418)—they seek to interpret the present and future through the prism of the
past. With this in mind, Shearing, Johnston and Wood have explicitly designed the nodal
governance model to conceptualize the post-monopoly era of security provision. This of
course explains why the model is so effective at capturing many of the more radical
trends in the contemporary security sector. The counter-critique of this futuristic
White 93

orientation, however, is that domestic security provision today—particularly in advanced


democratic countries—is still shaped by the legacy of the monopoly era, as evidenced by
the ongoing influence of those political norms whose origins can be traced to the discur-
sive and institutional formation of the state monopoly over security provision. So while
the model does not preclude analysis of the political context, the way in which it is
framed may go some way towards explaining why no systematic analysis of this context
has yet been advanced within the nodal governance literature.

Anchored pluralism
The anchored pluralism model is closely associated with the writings of Loader and
Walker (2001, 2006, 2007) and has emerged as the main alternative to the nodal gover-
nance model as a lens through which to interpret the changing nature of the contempo-
rary security landscape.4 This model too has made a significant contribution towards the
project of deconstructing the dynamics of private security provision today. When viewed
from a new political economy perspective, however, it can be seen that this model has a
tendency to focus more upon the political context of private security than the economic
context.
Like the nodal governance theorists, Loader and Walker regularly employ the lan-
guage of governance theory and make reference to shifting economic forces in order
to understand the trajectory of contemporary private security provision. The key point
of departure between the two models concerns the role of the state in both normative
and empirical terms. Whereas the nodal governance theorists adopt no consistent nor-
mative position with regard to the ideal role of the state, arguing that such questions
ought to be addressed on a node by node basis, Loader and Walker do assume an
explicit normative position in this regard. While appreciating the potentially hazard-
ous nature of state security provision, they reason that a reformed and reconstituted
state represents the most effective, morally just and socially responsible means of
delivering security today. In their view, the state should ‘anchor’ the plurality of secu-
rity actors in the contemporary security sector firmly in the public interest (Loader
and Walker, 2006, 2007). This normative position runs alongside a strong empirical
focus on state security provision, especially its influence on contemporary social rela-
tions. As such, Loader and Walker view the monopoly era and the state-centred
‘Westphalian’ models of security provision as having a continuing relevance for
today’s domestic security sector.
The full reach of Loader and Walker’s writings goes beyond the scope of this article,
since they extend from the domestic into the global sphere (see Loader and Walker,
2007). It is thus necessary to focus on that part of their work which seeks to develop
further and generalize Loader’s empirical findings from the mid-1990s about the role of
symbolism and cultural power in the relationship between domestic public and private
security (Loader, 1997a, 1997b, 1997c). In order to understand this relationship, Loader
and Walker have developed a series of innovative connections between contemporary
domestic security provision and the deeply embedded political norms which have perme-
ated this sector throughout the course of modern history. They focus in particular on
those norms rooted in Enlightenment political thought—especially the social contract
94 Theoretical Criminology 16(1)

philosophy of Hobbes (1996, Books 1 & 2) and Locke (1988, Book 2)—where the idea
of a war-ridden state of nature in which each individual looks after his or her own inter-
ests (including security) is contrasted with a peaceful and prosperous civil society
ordered by a benevolent state. Loader and Walker (2001: 20) develop this connection as
follows:

[a]s an institution intimately concerned with the protection of the state and the security of its
citizens, one that is deeply entangled with some profound hopes, fears, fantasies and anxieties
about matters such as life/death, order/chaos and protection/vulnerability, the police remain
closely tied to people’s sense of ontological security and collective identity, and capable of
generating high, emotionally charged levels of identification among citizens.

In this conceptualization, the public police are cast as representatives of the Enlightenment
project to vanquish ‘death, chaos and vulnerability’ (i.e. the state of nature) and to maxi-
mize ‘life, order and protection’ (i.e. a peaceful and prosperous civil society). For Loader
and Walker, the association between the public police and civility has for many people
become naturalized: ‘the most basic grid of meaning through which we see the world’
(Loader and Walker, 2007: 44). It is because of this connection, they go on to reason, that
today’s police forces in many advanced democratic countries enjoy such high levels of
symbolic power, cultural support and legitimacy, even in the face of repeated controver-
sies (see also Loader, 1997b). Importantly, however, for Loader and Walker this ‘basic
grid of meaning’ has the opposite effect on private security provision, for ‘the logic of
market allocation offends against the social meanings that have come to be attached to
security in liberal democracies’ (Loader, 1997c: 381). Because private security provision
grates against people’s cultural attachment to public policing—and by extension the
Enlightenment project to build a peaceful and prosperous society—it is widely regarded
as being immoral and unjust, enjoying very little symbolic power, cultural support or
legitimacy.
Loader and Walker thus mark out important conceptual ground in relation to the polit-
ical context of domestic security. They illustrate, for instance, why private security pro-
viders invest so much time and effort into legitimation activities, such as incorporating
(former) representatives of the state monopoly into their ranks, appropriating the sym-
bolism of the state and, in some extreme cases, lobbying for a system of statutory regula-
tion. It is because they are consciously seeking to disassociate their operations from the
commercial logic which so ‘offends’ against popular sensibilities about domestic secu-
rity and to instead align their operations with the Enlightenment project to vanquish
‘death, chaos and vulnerability’ and maximize ‘life, order and protection’. However, the
economic context of domestic private security features less prominently in their writings.
While they appreciate that domestic private security has expanded in line with shifts in
supply and demand, they provide limited guidance on how to investigate this economic
context. This is problematic because in leaving these supply and demand factors in the
background they have a tendency to downplay the agency of private security providers.
In their writings, these providers are engaged in a struggle to reconcile their activities
with the political norms which permeate the domestic security sector, but it is not clear
whether or not they ever make any progress. Indeed, it often appears as though they are
White 95

forever destined to lose out to the culturally superior and symbolically more powerful
public police forces. Yet this is far from being the case, for these providers have capital-
ized upon fluctuations in supply and demand to the extent that they are now engaged in
frontline security operations in advanced democratic countries across the globe. Despite
the constraining influence of the deeply embedded political norms which structure the
domestic security sector, they do have the power to change the constitution of this sector
over time.
There is no inherent reason why such economic factors cannot be more fully inte-
grated into the anchored pluralism model. Loader and Walker could certainly retain their
insights about the way in which private security providers are constrained by inter-subjective
political norms while at the same time placing more emphasis on the way in which these
providers are empowered by the shifting laws of supply and demand. There is, however,
a likely explanation for this omission. Building the logic of the market more comprehen-
sively into their analysis does have the knock on effect of moving their empirical narra-
tive ever further away from their normative ideal of a state-anchored security system and
thus generates an increasing degree of tension between the empirical and normative
dimensions of their model. Of course, this tension is by no means irreconcilable, but it
does require a new balance to be struck. So while the anchored pluralism model does not
preclude analysis of this economic context, the way in which the model is normatively
framed may go some way towards explaining why no systematic analysis of supply and
demand has yet been advanced within this literature.

The new political economy of private security


It is clear that one of the key challenges in this field is to construct an agenda which
encourages researchers to investigate how both the economic context and the political
context of domestic security have the effect of jointly shaping the conduct of contempo-
rary private security providers. The purpose of this section is to map out such an agenda
in the form of the new political economy of private security. This will be done by setting
down a series of research questions, methodological techniques and analytical proposi-
tions which can be used to study the political economy of private security in a systematic,
balanced and integrated manner. It is important to emphasize, however, that the rationale
behind this agenda is not to reject the contributions of the nodal governance and anchored
pluralism models, but rather to reformulate a number of the key insights articulated in
these models within a new political economy framework.
When investigating the dynamics of domestic private security in advanced demo-
cratic countries, researchers should pose two sets of questions and then draw upon two
interlinked methodological techniques in order to develop answers to these questions.
The first set of questions should relate to the economic context of domestic security and
to the corresponding economic rationality which emerges out of this context. What fluc-
tuations in supply and demand are responsible for facilitating the expansion of private
security providers? What business strategies are these providers using in order to capital-
ize upon these fluctuations? And how are these strategies impacting upon the delivery
of domestic security? The methodological technique of nodal mapping—as developed
by the nodal governance theorists—should then be used to develop answers to these
96 Theoretical Criminology 16(1)

questions. In this way, it should be possible to explore how crime patterns, citizen inse-
curity and property relations vary between different nodes and to investigate how private
security institutions, practices, mentalities, knowledge and resources have taken shape in
response to these trends.
The second set of questions should then relate to the political context of domestic
security and to the corresponding political rationality which emerges out of this context.
What inter-subjective political norms are serving to constrain the activities of private
security providers? What political strategies are these providers deploying in order to
negotiate their way through these norms? And how are these strategies impacting upon
the provision of domestic security? Next, the methodological technique of historically
grounded cultural investigation—as developed by the anchored pluralism theorists—
should be used to develop answers to these questions. In this way, it should be possible
to understand both how and why private security providers are using a variety of legiti-
mation strategies—including state-orientated recruitment policies, the appropriation of
state symbolism and the pursuit of statutory regulation—in order to enhance the appeal
of their operations to an often sceptical population which expects domestic security pro-
vision to be monopolized by the state.
Once these questions have been posed and corresponding answers have been devel-
oped using the appropriate methodological techniques, researchers should then seek to
integrate these economic and political dimensions into a single narrative. This process of
integration should proceed in line with two key analytical propositions. First, it is impor-
tant to recognize that the conduct of private security providers in advanced democratic
countries is not generally constituted in relation to a singular rationality, but is rather
pushed and pulled in accordance with (at least) two different rationalities: one economic
and the other political. Second, it is crucial to recognize that the differential conduct
which results from these two rationalities is in many instances mutually constitutive. For
instance, private security providers can often only successfully capitalize upon market
fluctuations by simultaneously engaging in legitimation strategies. Conversely, they can
often only successfully realize these legitimation strategies by using the resources and
influence they have accrued from taking advantage of market fluctuations. As such,
researchers should regard private security providers as political economic actors moving
back and forth within a political economic dialectic.
Using these research questions, methodological techniques and analytical proposi-
tions, it is possible to shed new light on a number of key issues which are situated in the
space where politics/economics, states/markets and structure/agency impact upon and
mutually constitute one another. These issues include (but are not limited to): private
security growth patterns and trajectories; the dynamics of legitimation; the relationships
between private security providers and state institutions; the competing logics of regula-
tion; and the connections between security and the public good. In order to provide a
more concrete demonstration of how these issues can be interpreted through a new politi-
cal economy lens, it is useful to explore briefly some of the core questions facing
researchers in this field.
How have private security providers become so prominent? In economic terms, they
have expanded their operations by responding to a series of fluctuations in the laws of
supply and demand. In doing so, they have acted as successful businessmen operating in
White 97

line with an economic rationality which prioritizes the logic of the market. The progress
of this economic expansion should be charted using the analytical technique of nodal
mapping, which serves to delineate how security provision in localized spaces is increas-
ingly being defined by the practices, mentalities, knowledge bases and resources of com-
mercial actors. However, this expansion has not been guided by economic rationality
alone. In political terms, they have engaged in a series of activities designed to reconcile
their commercial operations with the state-centric political norms which structure the
domestic security sector. In doing so, they have acted as skilled political strategists func-
tioning in line with a political rationality which prioritizes the logic of legitimacy. This
process should be interpreted through a historically grounded cultural lens designed to
situate these providers within the broader socio-political trajectory of domestic security
provision.
What is their relationship with the state? Private security providers often have a com-
plex relationship with the state. In economic terms, the state is a competitor, contractor
and partner. The balance between these roles is fluid and should therefore be mapped out
node by node. In political terms, however, the state represents the primary source of the
legitimacy needed by these providers to gain a firm foothold in the domestic security
sector. In order to appropriate this legitimacy, they can either borrow from the symbolism
of the state at a distance or they can steer their commercial activities into a position
where they are directly controlled by state institutions through statutory regulation. This
process usually takes place throughout the entire security network, rather than being
isolated in particular nodes, and should be examined through a historically grounded
cultural lens which cuts across the range of nodes under examination.
What is their relationship with the public good? Their relationship with the public
good is similarly complex. In economic terms, this relationship varies contract by con-
tract. This is because while public sector contracts usually direct private security opera-
tions towards some conception of the public good, private sector contracts often point
them in a very different direction. According to this economic logic, then, the relation-
ship between private security providers and the public good is determined externally by
the preferences of their clients, and these preferences should once again be mapped out
node by node. In political terms, however, these providers are simultaneously engaged in
an ongoing effort to reconcile their operations with the state-centric political norms
which permeate the domestic security sector, and it is important to note that these norms
are intimately associated with the idea of security as a public good. As such, this process
of reconciliation causes private security providers to internalize the logic of public good
to a certain degree—that is, they essentially become the bearers of the public good when
they attempt to appeal to the expectation that security ought to be delivered exclusively
by the state. This political process generally takes place across the entire security net-
work, not simply in isolated nodes, and as a consequence it should once more be inter-
preted through a broadly pitched and historically grounded cultural lens.
What lies ahead for security provision? It often seems as though the rise of private
security signifies the emergence of a new (postmodern) era of pluralized domestic secu-
rity provision in which nodal networks are fast eclipsing the monopolistic arrangements
of the modern era. In one sense this is certainly true. It is also the case, however, that for
decades private security providers have been actively reconciling their operations with
98 Theoretical Criminology 16(1)

the state-centric political norms which are synonymous with the modern era. So while the
reality of domestic security provision may have moved steadily away from these monop-
olistic arrangements, the popular idea of security provision has not. Many people in
advanced democratic countries remain extremely attached to the idea of a state monopoly
over security provision. This enduring attachment has compelled private security providers
to advertise themselves not simply as commercial organizations delivering private goods,
but also as state-deputized organizations acting in accordance with the public good. In
decades to come, then, domestic security provision will no longer be dominated by the
modern state as it once was, but neither will it rapidly progress into a postmodern system
in which the idea of a state monopoly is long forgotten. The 21st century will see domes-
tic security in a period of notable flux in which a nodal network of pluralized security
provision overlaps with traditional, state-centred political norms whose origins can be
traced back to the Enlightenment.
The common thread running through these answers is the dynamic interplay between
politics/economics, states/markets and structure/agency—interplay which lies at the
heart of new political economy analysis. It is important to note, however, that the nature
of this interplay is likely to vary according to geographical location. This is because
certain countries have experienced more pronounced shifts in supply and demand than
others. For example, while private security officers significantly outnumber police offi-
cers in Canada, South Africa and the United States, this relationship is inverted in a
number of European countries (Brodeur, 2010: 268–275), indicating different rates of
expansion. Likewise, some countries (for example, the United Kingdom, Canada and
France) appear to have more deeply embedded state-centric political norms than others
(for example, the United States) (White, 2010).5 As such, researchers should be prepared
to strike different balances between the influence of political and economic contexts and
rationalities as they move between different countries. Nevertheless, elements of this
new political economy narrative can be found in most advanced democratic countries. It
is for this reason that there is great utility in drawing upon this research agenda.

Conclusion
The rise of domestic private security over recent decades has been driven by multiple and
competing contexts and rationalities. In all this complexity it is easy to miss the bigger
picture. This is why it is necessary to construct broadly pitched and ambitious agendas
which guide researchers towards new and important lines of enquiry. The new political
economy of private security constitutes one such agenda. By setting out a series of
research questions, methodological techniques and analytical propositions for studying
the space where politics/economics, states/markets and structure/agency clash with and
mutually constitute one another, it has marked out significant new academic territory. Of
course, no agenda or theoretical framework can capture all the processes at work—the
social world is too infinitely complex for that. But in providing the tools which allow
researchers to address core issues relating to domestic private security in new ways, the
new political economy of private security should be utilized alongside other agendas and
theoretical frameworks in this field so as to generate as many insights about this social
phenomenon as possible.
White 99

Notes
I would like to thank Mary Bosworth, Ian Loader, Martin Smith and three anonymous reviewers
for their extremely helpful and insightful comments. All errors remain my own. I would also like
to acknowledge gratefully the financial support I have received from the ESRC (grant number
RES-000-22-3062) during the course of this research.

1. The ‘new political economy’ framework is comprehensively set out in the eponymously titled
journal New Political Economy.
2. It is important to note that in reference to nodal governance and anchored pluralism the term
‘model’ does not relate to the formal, predictive modelling which is found in positivist—or
behavioural—social science. Rather, it relates to the less formal, exploratory modelling which
is found in post-positivist—or interpretivist—social science. This type of modelling is driven
by the more modest ambition of developing a coherent set of conceptual propositions with
which to help the social science researcher make sense of and interpret social phenomena.
3. It could be argued that there are Marxist analyses of the trajectory and dynamics of contem-
porary private security provision which predate the nodal governance model (see Spitzer,
1987, 1993; Spitzer and Scull, 1977). However, these writings were never galvanized into an
explicit model as such, but rather stood more as isolated—though important—contributions
towards this field of research.
4. It should be acknowledged from the outset that Loader and Walker often use the anchored
pluralism model as a normative lens as opposed to an explanatory one. Following Crawford
(2006), however, it is argued here that this model can be regarded as both an explanatory
and normative lens.
5. It is important to acknowledge that the new political economy of private security is, for the
most part, only relevant to advanced democratic countries precisely because in many other
countries the existence of inter-subjective state-centric political norms is patchy and uneven
at best—usually because domestic security provision in these countries has at some point in
recent history been dominated by authoritarian states whose repressive actions have served to
counteract rather than reinforce the presence of such political norms.

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Adam White is Lecturer in Public Policy at the University of York, UK. His research focuses on
the governance of security, public policy and the changing nature of the state. These interests are
multi-disciplinary, lying at the intersection of politics, international relations, criminology and
socio-legal studies. He has recently published The Politics of Private Security: Regulation, Reform
and Re-legitimation (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010).

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