O X F O R D STUDIES I N

EARLY M O D E R N
PHILOSOPHY
VOLUME I I

E D I T E D B Y

DANIEL GARBER
flPrinceton University)

A N D

STEVEN NADLER
(University of Wisconsin, Madison)

/
f
•r-.
C L A R E N D O N PRESS · O X F O R D
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 Contents

Notefrom the Editors vi

D A N I E L G A R B E R A N D S T E V E N N A D L E R

Abbreviations viii

ι. SkepticismandToleration:TheCaseofMontaigne i
E. M . C U R L E Y

2. R e a s o n , I m a g i n a t i o n , a n d M e c h a n i s m i n Descartes's
Theory ofPerception 35
T H O M A S V I N C I

3. TheActivityofMatterinGassendi'sPhysics 75
A N T O N I A L O L O R D O

4. Spinoza o n F i n a l CausaHty 105

J O H N C A R R I E R O

5. S p i n o z a ' s A x i o l o g y 149
J O N M I L L E R

6. C a u s e a n d R e a s o n : I s T h e r e a n O c c a s i o n a H s t S t r u c t u r e
to MaIebranche's Philosophy? 173
J E A N - C H R I S T O P H E B A R D O U T

7. T h e C a r t e s i a n i s m o f D e s g a b e t s a n d A r n a u I d a n d t h e
Problem ofthe EternaITruths 193
E M M A N U E L F A Y E

8. H u m e a n d H u t c h e s o n : T h e Q u e s t i o n o f I n f l u e n c e 211
D A V I D F A T E N O R T O N

Index ofNames 257

Notes to Contributors 261

 Notefrom the Editors

Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy covers t h e p e r i o d t h a t begins,

very roughly, w i t h Descartes a n d h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s a n d ends w i t h
K a n t . I t also p u b h s h e s p a p e r s o n t h i n k e r s o r m o v e m e n t s o u t s i d e t h a t
framework ( a n d i n c l u d i n g K a n t ) , a s l o n g as t h e y are i m p o r t a n t f o r i E u -
m i n a t i n g e a r l y m o d e r n t h o u g h t . T h e c o r e o f t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r is, o f
course, p h i l o s o p h y a n d its history. B u t t h e v o l u m e ' s papers reflect t h e
fact t h a t p h i l o s o p h y i n this p e r i o d was m u c h b r o a d e r i n its scope t h a n i t
is n o w t a k e n t o b e , a n d i n c l u d e d a g r e a t d e a l o f w h a t c u r r e n t l y b e l o n g s
t o t h e n a t u r a l sciences. F u r t h e r m o r e , p h i l o s o p h y i n t h e p e r i o d w a s
c l o s e l y c o n n e c t e d w i t h o t h e r d i s c i p h n e s , s u c h as t h e o l o g y , a n d w i t h
larger questions o f social, p o h t i c a I , a n d rehgious history. W h i l e m a i n ­
t a i n i n g a focus o n p h i l o s o p h y , t h e v o l u m e i n c l u d e s articles t h a t e x a m i n e
t h e larger inteHectuaI, social, a n d poUtical c o n t e x t o f e a r l y m o d e r n p h i -
l o s o p h y . W h i l e t h e a r t i c l e s i n t h e v o l u m e are o f i m p o r t a n c e t o specialists
i n t h e v a r i o u s s u b f i e l d s o f t h e d i s c i p H n e , o u r a i m is t o p u b h s h essays t h a t
a p p e a l n o t o n l y t o s c h o l a r s o f o n e p a r t i c u l a r figure o r a n o t h e r , b u t t o t h e
larger audience o f p h i l o s o p h e r s , inteUectual historians, a n d others w h o
are i n t e r e s t e d i n t h e p e r i o d .
Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy appears o n c e a y e a r i n a s i n g l e
volume available i n b o t h h a r d b a c k a n d p a p e r b a c k and containing
roughly 250-350 pages.While everything w i U be pubHshed i n Enghsh,
essays m a y also b e s u b m i t t e d i n F r e n c h , G e r m a n , o r I t a H a n .
T h e e d i t o r s o f Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy are D a n i e l
Garber ^>rinceton University) and Steven N a d l e r (University o f
W i s c o n s i n , M a d i s o n ) . T h e m e m b e r s o f t h e e d i t o r i a l b o a r d are:

E d w i n Curley (University o f M i c h i g a n ,U S A )
K n u d H a a k o n s s e n @3oston U n i v e r s i t y , U S A )
Sarah H u t t o n ( M i d d l e s e x U n i v e r s i t y , U K )
SusanJames @Jirkbeck C o E e g e , U n i v e r s i t y o f L o n d o n , U K )
J e a n - L u c M a r i o n ^ J n i v e r s i t e d e Paris W ( S o r b o n n e ) , France)
E m a n u e k S c r i b a n o ^ J n i v e r s i t a d i Siena, Italy)
R o b e r t Sleigh,Jr. ( U n i v e r s i t y ofMassachusetts,Amherst, U S A )
 Daniel Garber and Steven Nadkr vii

T h e o V e r b e e k ^ajksuniversiteit te U t r e c h t , the Netherlands)

C a t h e r i n e W i l s o n (University o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , Canada)

T h e e d i t o r s w o u l d also l i k e t o t h a n k M r N i c h o l a s S t a n g f o r his assis­

tance i n p r e p a r i n g the final m a n u s c r i p t f o r p u b l i c a t i o n .

T h e e d i t o r i a l o f f i c e is:

Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy

Department ofPhilosophy
Princeton University
1879 H a U
Princeton,NJ 08544-1006
USA

Email: [email protected]; [email protected]

FAX: 609-258-1502
 Abbreviations

D E S C A R T E S

AT Charles Adam and Paul Tannery (eds.),

CEuvres de Descartes, 11 v o l s . (Paris: CNRS/
V r i n , 1964-74)

CSM John Cottingham, Robert StoothofF, and

D u g a l d M u r d o c h , The PhilosophicalWritings of
Descartes, 2 vok. (Cambridge: Cambridge
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984)

CSMK J o h n C o t t i n g h a m , R o b e r t StoothofF, D u g a l d
Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, The
Philosophical Writings of Descartes, iii: The
Correspondence (Cambridge: Cambridge
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1991)

Meditations Meditations on First Philosophy

First Objections First Set of Objections

Third Replies Replies to Third Set of Objections

Principles ofPhilosophy Principles of Philosophy [ T h e part i n Roman

n u m e r a l , t h e article i n A r a b i c numeral.]

G A S S E N D I

Opera Opera Omnia, 6 vok. ^yon, 1658; repr.

S t u t t g a r t — B a d C a n n s t a t t : F r o m m a n n , 1964)

H O B B E S

EW Sir W i U i a m M o l e s w o r t h ( e d . ) , The English

Works ofThomas Hobbes qfMalmesbury, 11 voL·.
( L o n d o n , 1839-45)

LW Sir W i U i a m M o l e s w o r t h ( e d . ) , Opera philo-

sophica quae Latine scripsit omnia, 5 vols.
( L o n d o n , 1839-45)
 Abbreviations ix

H U M E

EHU T. L. Beauchamp ( e d . ) , An Enquiry concerning Human

Understanding ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press, 2 0 0 0 )

EPM T . L . B e a u c h a m p ( e d . ) , Enquiry concerning the Principles of

MoraL· ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press, 1998)

LDH J . Y . T . G r e i g ( e d . ) , The Letters of David Hume, 2 vols.

( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press, 1932)

Letter A Letterfrom a Gentleman to his Friend at Edinburgh

NLDH Pv. K h b a n s k y a n d E . C . M o s s n e r (eds.), New Letters qfDavid

Hume ( O x f o r d : C b r e n d o n Press, r 9 5 4 )

ΤΗΝ D . E N o r t o n a n d M . J . N o r t o n (eds.), A Treatise ofHuman

Nature ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2 0 0 0 )

H U T C H E S O N

Inquiry An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue,
4th edn. ^ondon, 1738; fac. Westmead: Gregg
I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b H s h e r s , 1969)

Essay An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and

Affections. With Ulustrations on the Moral Sense (London,
1728;fac. H i I d e s h e i m : G e o r g O h n s , 1971)

Short Intro A Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy ( G l a s g o w , 1747;fac.

H i l d e s h e i m : O k n s , 1969)

System A System ofMoral Philosophy, ed. E H u t c h e s o n theYounger,

2 vols. (Glasgow, 1 7 s 5 ; f a c . B r i s t o l : T h o e m m e s , 2 0 0 0 )

L E I B N I Z

DM Discours de mitaphysique

GP C . I . G e r h a r d t ( e d . ) , Diephilosophischen Schriften (BerUn,

1875^0)

GM C . I . G e r h a r d t ( e d . ) , Mathematische Schrifien ^ e r i i n and

HaUe, 1 8 4 9 ^ 3 )
χ Abbreviations

A D e u t s c h e A k a d e m i e der Wissenschaften (ed.), Gottfried

Wilhelm Leibniz: Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe @3eriin:
AkademieVerlag, 1923-)

L O C K E

E J o h n L o c k e , Essay concerning Human Understanding

M A L E B R A N C H E

Recherche Recherche de h verite

OC A n d r e R o b i n e t ( e d . ) , Malebranche: CEuvres completes (Paris:

V r i n , 1958-84)

M O N T A I G N E

V-S PierreVfflay ( e d . ) , V - L . S a u m i e r ( r e v . ) , Essais @?aris: P U F ,

1992)

S M . A . S c r e e c h ( t r . ) , Complete Essays (NewYork: Penguin,

1991)

F D a v i d F r a m e ( t r . ) , Complete Works of Montaigne (Stanford:

S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1943)

S M I T H

TMS D . D . R a p h a e l a n d A . L . M a c f i e (eds.), The Theory of Moral

Sentiments ( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n Press, 1976)

S P I N O Z A

ЕПР 13S Ethics. [ T h e part i n R o m a n n u m e r a l , f o U o w e d b y P (for

proposition), D (for demonstration), S (for scholium),
p r e f . ( f o r p r e f a c e ) , app. ( f o r appendix),etc]

G C a r l G e b h a r d t ( e d . ) , Spinoza Opera, 4 v o l s . ( H e i d e l b e r g : C .
W i n t e r , 1925)

C Edwin Curley (tr.), Collected Writings of Spinoza, i

( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1984)
 I

Skepticism andToleration: The Case

ofMontaigne

E. M . CURLEY

A N I N I T I A L P A R A D O X

I n The Essays of Montaigne, R i c h a r d Sayce w r i t e s t h a t M o n t a i g n e presents

i n an acute f o r m , the d i c h o t o m y o f post-Renaissance Europe, b e t w e e n

ChristianreHgionandclassicaIculture . . . I n h i m c l a s s i c a l h u m a m s m , r e l a t i v i s m ,
scepticism, indifference, c o m b i n e t o produce his most positive c o n t r i b u t i o n t o
reHgious t h o u g h t , the toleration w h i c h released western m a n from at least o n e
source ofsavagery and fanaticism. 1

Elsewhere h e adds t h a t a l t h o u g h M o n t a i g n e was n o t t h e first t o

advocate religious t o l e r a t i o n , ' h e m a y w e U have b e e n t h e m o s t i n f l u e n t i a l
u p t o t h a t d a t e ' . 1 t h i n k t h i s m a y b e t r u e , a n d t h a t i f t r u e , it's a s u r p r i s i n g
2

t r u t h , a n o d d i t y , at least, i f y o u t h i n k o f M o n t a i g n e i n t h e w a y m u c h o f
t h e h t e r a t u r e o n h i m e n c o u r a g e s us t o .
S o m e o n e m a y say: ' L o o k , M o n t a i g n e is a s k e p t i c , a p y r r h o n i a n skeptic,
who t h i n k s t h a t e v e r y t h i n g is radicaUy u n c e r t a i n , t h a t i n a n y d i s p u t e
b o t h sides are equaUy Hkely, t h a t n o p r o p o s i t i o n is m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a n its
d e n i a l , a n d t h a t t h e p a t h t o c o n t e n t m e n t is t o s u s p e n d j u d g m e n t a b o u t

T h i s essay is a r e v i s i o n o f a p a p e r first p r e s e n t e d t o t h e T o l e r a t i o n S e m i n a r at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f
M i c h i g a n , i n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 9 7 , s u b s e q u e n t l y at t h e C e n t r a l D i v i s i o n m e e t i n g s o f t h e A P A , i n
C h i c a g o , i n A p r i l 1998, a n d m o s t recently at the M o n t a i g n e C o n f e r e n c e at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f
C h i c a g o i n M a y 2000. I ' m indebted to the audiences o n those occasions for their c o m m e n t s ,
a n d especiaUy to P h i B p p e D e s a n , J e a n - L u c M a r i o n , a n d D a v i d Q u i n t . Special thanks go to
G e o r g e H o f l m a n , f o r h i s e n c o u r a g e m e n t a n d his d e h g h t f u l a n d p r o f i t a b l e s e m i n a r o n M o n t a i g n e
i n the w i n t e r semester o f 2 0 0 4 at the U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n . I n q u o t i n g M o n t a i g n e , I give the
reference t o V - S , f o U o w e d b y references to F a n d S; unless o t h e r w i s e indicated, the translation
is from F. W h e r e I a d o p t a t r a n s l a t i o n from S , I g i v e t h e p a g e r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s e d i t i o n first.
W h e r e I m a k e m y o w n t r a n s l a t i o n I n o t e t h a t fact.

1
S a y c e , The Essays of Montaigne [Essays] (London:Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972),232.
2
Ibid.226.
2 Е. M. Curley

e v e r y t h i n g . So of course h e beHeves i n t o l e r a t i o n ' . W e U , n o d o u b t t h e r e is

3

some tendency o f skepticism t o lead t o toleration. W e m i g h t cite here

M o n t a i g n e ' s o b s e r v a t i o n a b o u t t h e p u n i s h m e n t o f w i t c h e s : ' I t is p u t t i n g
a v e r y h i g h v a l u e o n one's c o n j ectures, t o h a v e a m a n roasted ahve because
o f t h e m ' ( I I I , x i , ' O f cripples'; V-S 1032; F 7 9 0 ; S 1169). O r : ' T o kffl
p e o p l e , t h e r e m u s t b e sharp a n d brüHant d a r i t y ' ^ f - S 1031; F 7 8 9 ; S 1167).
I f i t is necessary t o h a v e c e r t a i n t y a b o u t y o u r v i e w s , b e f o r e you
b u r n someone for n o t sharing t h e m , t h e n skepticism may justify a
h m i t e d toleration: abstention f r o m a particularly brutal k i n d ofkühng.
I n Montaigne's century that w o u l d have b e e n a n o t a b l e advance.
Nowadays w e require m o r e o f toleration t h a n that. M o r e o v e r , i t m a y
s e e m t o us t h a t even ifyou are c e r t a i n o f y o u r v i e w s , y o u ' r e n o t e n t i t l e d
t o b u m s o m e o n e f o r disagreeing w i t h t h e m — o r f o r that m a t t e r , t o кШ
t h e m i n other,less c r u e l ways.
Perhaps M o n t a i g n e ' s apparent concession that certainty would
j u s t i f y k i U i n g h e r e t i c s is i r o n i c . B u t b e f o r e w e c a n k n o w w h a t t o m a k e
o f remarks l i k e t h e ones q u o t e d above, w e n e e d t o t h i n k a b o u t how
M o n t a i g n e m i g h t deal w i t h a c e r t a i n k i n d o f r a t i o n a l e f o r p e r s e c u t i o n . 4

T h e p e r s e c u t o r m i g h t r e s p o n d t o M o n t a i g n e t h a t h i s f a i t h is f a r f r o m a
m e r e c o n j e c t u r e , i t is a n a b s o l u t e c o n f l d e n c e , b a s e d o n d i v i n e r e v e l a t i o n ,
i n w h i c h G o d ' s S o n h i m s e r f h a s t o l d us t h a t :

G o d so loved the w o r l d that he gave his o n l y Son, so that everyone w h o beHeves i n

h i m m a y n o t perish, b u t may have eternal Hfe . . . Those w h o beheve i n h i m are
n o t condemned; b u t those w h o do n o t beKeve are c o n d e m n e d akeady, because
they have notbeHeved i n the name o f t h e o n l y Son o f G o d . (John 3:16,18)

H e r e Jesus m a k e s b e h e f i n h i m as t h e M e s s i a h , as t h e S o n o f God
a n d o u r R e d e e m e r , b o t h necessary a n d sufficient f o r salvation. B u t
(pace L o c k e ) 5
w e d o n o t p u n i s h heretics t o achieve t h e salvation o f t h e

3
C f . ' M o n t a i g n e , h k e a U t r u e s k e p t i c s , is t o l e r a n t . . .' i n H u g o F r i e d r i c h ( P h f f l i p e D e s a n
( e d . ) , D a w n E n g ( t r . ) ) , Montaigne ( U n i v e r s i t y o f C a h f o r n i a Press, 1991), 109. A l a n L e v i n e ' s
r e c e n t Sensual Philosophy, Toleration, Skepticism and Montaigne's Politics of the S e ^ " ^ a n h a m , M d . :
L e x i n g t o n B o o k s , 2001), provides a m u c h m o r e c o m p l e x account o f t h e rehtion b e t w e e n
M o n t a i g n e ' s s k e p t i c i s m a n d h i s t o l e r a t i o n , b u t n o t o n e I find s a t i s f a c t o r y i n t h e e n d .
4
M y p e r s e c u t o r ' s r a t i o n a l e is a b l e n d o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a d d u c e d b y A q u i n a s (Summa
theologiae I I - I I , q u . i o - i i ) , C a l v i n (Declaratio orthodoxae fidei, i n Opera quae supersunt omnia,
5 9 v o k . @ J r a u n s c h w e i g , 1 8 6 3 — 1 9 0 0 ) , v o l . v i i i , to w h o m I o w e t h e m e t a p h o r o f t h e w o l v e s a n d
the lambs), a n d Pascal (in the w a g e r argument).
5
F o r a c r i t i q u e o f L o c k e ' s case f o r t o l e r a t i o n , s e e E d w i n C u r l e y , ' F r o m L o c k e ' s Letter to
M o n t e s q u i e u ' s Lettres', Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 26 (2002), 2 8 0 - 3 0 6 .
 Skepticism andToleration 3

heretics, f o r w e k n o w fuU w e n that a saving f a i t h m u s t be voluntary.

W e p u n i s h t h e m t o preserve the faith o f those believers w h o m i g h t be
l e d astray i f t h e h e r e t i c s w e r e a U o w e d t o s p r e a d t h e i r p o i s o n . W h a t w e d o
m a y s e e m c r u e l , t h e o p p o s i t e o f C h r i s t i a n l o v e ; b u t t h e p e o p l e w h o are
reaUy c r u e l are t h e o n e s w h o w o u l d p e r m i t h e r e s y : i n t h e i r s q u e a m i s h
desire t o spare t h e w o l v e s , t h e y p u t t h e h t t l e l a m b s at r i s k o f e t e r n a l
t o r m e n t . F o r c i b l y repressing h e r e s y is a necessary e v i l , a m p l y c o m p e n s a t e d
b y t h e g o o d i t d o e s o v e r a U . C h r i s t i a n l o v e r e q u i r e s us t o l o o k t o t h e g o o d
o f t h o s e w h o m i g h t b e c o m e heretics i f w e d i d n o t p r o t e c t t h e m .
M o r e o v e r , e v e n i f w e w e r e t o g r a n t — w h a t w e c a n n o t reaUy b e h e v e
w i t h o u t i m p i e t y — t h a t t h e r e is s o m e u n c e r t a i n t y i n o u r f a i t h , n e v e r t h e ­
less w h a t w e b e h e v e m u s t b e at least h i g h l y p r o b a b l e . I f w e t a k e i n t o
a c c o u n t b o t h t h a t p r o b a b i h t y a n d t h e i n f i n i t e g a i n s a n d losses w h i c h are
at stake, p e r s e c u t i o n is a p e r f e c d y r a t i o n a l c o u r s e o f a c t i o n . T h e intense
s u f f e r i n g o f t h e h e r e t i c as h e is b e i n g b u r n e d aHve m a y b e h o r r i b l e t o
w a t c h , b u t that's p r e c i s e l y w h y i t is a n e f f e c t i v e d e t e r r e n t t o o t h e r s w h o
m i g h t b e t e m p t e d t o spread d o u b t i f w e w e r e m o r e l e n i e n t . M o r e o v e r ,
t h a t f i n i t e s u f f e r i n g is t r i v i a l b y c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e i n f i n i t e s u f f e r i n g
G o d hirnseffwLUjustb/ inflict o n the heretic i n heU. CaU this h n e of
t h o u g h t : ' t h e persecutor's w a g e r ' . 6

O b j e c t i o n : t h e p e r s e c u t o r ' s w a g e r , as h e r e f o r m u l a t e d , c o n c e d e s o n l y
s o m e m o d e s t d e g r e e o f d o u b t a b o u t t h e f a i t h ( a n d t h a t o n l y f o r t h e sake
o f t h e a r g u m e n t ) ; s i n c e M o n t a i g n e is a p y r r h o n i a n , h i s s k e p t i c i s m is
m u c h m o r e r a d i c a l t h a n t h a t . N o t o n l y is n o t h i n g c e r t a i n , n o t h i n g is
e v e n m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a n n o t . T h e p y r r h o n i a n ' s m o t t o s are:'since equal
reasons are f o u n d o n b o t h sides o f t h e s a m e s u b j e c t , w e s h o u l d s u s p e n d
j u d g m e n t o n e a c h side . . . i t is n o m o r e t h i s w a y t h a n t h a t . . . b o t h
sides s e e m e q u a U y h k e l y ' ( I I , x i i , ' A p o l o g y for R a y m o n d Sebond';
V - S 504—5; F 373—4; S 5 0 2 - 3 ) . W i U t h e p e r s e c u t o r ' s r e s p o n s e w o r k , i f t h e
s k e p t i c i s m is that radical?
R e p l y : P e r h a p s n o t . B u t is i t necessary t o g o so f a r i n t o d o u b t t o a v o i d
the persecutor's wager? I f w e n e e d t o b e c o m e p y r r h o n i a n s t o j u s t i f y
t o l e r a t i o n , w e are i n t r o u b l e . M o s t p e o p l e find f u U - s t r e n g t h p y r r h o n i s m
i m p o s s i b l e t o a c c e p t . Is i t , f o r e x a m p l e , reaUy n o m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a n n o t

6
I o w e t h e l a b e l ' p e r s e c u t o r ' s w a g e r ' t o C r a i g D u n c a n , a f o r m e r g r a d u a t e s t u d e n t at t h e
U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n , w h o has b e e n w o r k i n g i n d e p e n d e n t l y o n a m o r e formal treatment
o f this i s s u e , w h i c h I h o p e h e w i U s o o n p u b h s h . I ' m a l s o i n d e b t e d t o C r a i g f o r t h e C a l v i n
reference i n the preceding note.
4 Е. M. Curley

t h a t M o n t a i g n e h v e d i n t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y a n d w r o t e t h e essays
w e a t t r i b u t e t o h i m ? Y o u c a n say, o f c o u r s e , t h a t t h e d e n i a l o f t h e s e
p r o p o s i t i o n s is e q u a U y p r o b a b l e o n t h e e v i d e n c e . B u t c a n y o u believe
t h a t ? I f y o u are h o n e s t w i t h y o u r s e l f , I t h i n k y o u ' U c o n c e d e t h a t y o u
t h i n k the propositions a m r m i n g Montaigne's existence a n d authorship
are at least s o m e w h a t m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a n t h e i r d e n i a l s .
M o r e o v e r , i t is n o t clear w h a t t h e i m p h c a t i o n s o f p y r r h o n i s m w o u l d b e ,
e v e n i f w e c o u l d a c c e p t i t . I n M o n t a i g n e i t seems t o b e c o m b i n e d w i t h
views w h i c h l o o k hostile t o toleration. I n the ' A p o l o g y f o r Sebond' ( I I , xii)
pyrrhonismleads to a f o r m offideism:

I n a t h i n g so d i v i n e a n d so lofty, a n d so far surpassing h u m a n inteUigence, as

is this t r u t h w i t h w h i c h i t has pleased the goodness o f G o d t o e n l i g h t e n us,
i t is v e r y necessary that he stffl l e n d us his help, b y e x t r a o r d i n a r y a n d p r i v i l e g e d
favor, so that w e m a y conceive i t a n d l o d g e i t i n us. I d o n o t beheve that p u r e l y
h u m a n means are at aU capable o f t h i s ; i f t h e y were, so m a n y rare a n d exceUent
souls, so abundandy f u r n i s h e d w i t h natural powers i n ancient times, w o u l d
n o t have failed t o arrive at this k n o w l e d g e t h r o u g h t h e i r reason. It is faith
alone that embraces vividly and surely the high mysteries of our religion. fV-S 440—1,
m y emphasis; P 321;S 4 9 2 ) 7

W i t h t h i s fideism c o m e s c o n s e r v a t i s m i n r e h g i o n :

I d o n o t change easily, f o r fear o f l o s i n g i n the c h a n g e . A n d since I a m n o t cap­

able o f c h o o s i n g , I accept o t h e r people's c h o i c e and stay i n the p o s i t i o n w h e r e
G o d p u t m e . O t h e r w i s e I c o u l d n o t keep m y s e l f f r o m roUing a b o u t incessantly.
T h u s I have, b y the grace o f G o d , kept myseff intact, w i t h o u t agitation o r
disturbance o f conscience, i n the ancient behefs o f o u r r e l i g i o n , i n the m i d s t
o f s o m a n y sects a n d divisions that o u r c e n t u r y has p r o d u c e d . Q J - S 569; F 428;
S 642)

M o n t a i g n e ' s a v e r s i o n t o c h a n g e i n r e h g i o n e x t e n d s also i n t o p o h t i c s :

I t is v e r y d o u b t f u l w h e t h e r there can be such evident p r o f i t i n c h a n g i n g an

accepted law, o f w h a t e v e r sort i t be, as there is h a r m i n d i s t u r b i n g i t . . . a g o v ­
e r n m e n t is h k e a structure o f different parts j o i n e d together i n such a r e k t i o n
that i t is impossible t o b u d g e o n e w i t h o u t the w h o l e b o d y feeling i t . . . I a m
disgusted w i t h i n n o v a t i o n , i n whatever guise, and w i t h reason, f o r I have seen
very h a r m f u l effects o f i t . ( I , x x i i i , ' O f c u s t o m ' ; V-S 119; F 86; S 134)

7
T h e F r e n c h f o r t h e i t a l i c i z e d s e n t e n c e i s : ' C ' e s t l a foy s e u l e q u i e m b r a s s e v i v e m e n t et
c e r t a i n e m e n t l e s h a u t s m y s t e r e s d e n o t r e R e h g i o n . ' S o h e r e , at l e a s t , M o n t a i g n e w o u l d s e e m t o
c o n c e d e that faith m a y b e certain.
 Skeptidsm andToleration 5

H e t h e n ofFers t h e P r o t e s t a n t R e f o r m a t i o n as a n e x a m p l e o f a disastrous
n o v e l t y . F o r m o s t o f M o n t a i g n e ' s a d u l t h f e h i s c o u n t r y was t o r n a p a r t b y
a bitter civil war between a Cathohc faction,which wanted n o toleration
o f t h e Protestant heretics, a n d a Protestant f a c t i o n , w h i c h w o u l d have
been no more tolerant o f Cathohc idolatry had it gained power.
T h r o u g h o u t most ofthis p e r i o d the monarchy tried t o mediate between
t h e factions, o f f e r i n g t h e Protestants h m i t e d t o l e r a t i o n , w i t h i n a France
stül o f f i c i a U y C a t h o h c . M o n t a i g n e refers r e p e a t e d l y t o t h e harmful
consequences o f t h i s war.
Sometimes Montaigne's conservatism seems t o be a matter of
t e m p e r a m e n t , a t o t h e r t i m e s a n a p p h c a t i o n t o r e h g i o n o f t h e classic
p y r r h o n i a n solution to the p r o b l e m o f h o w one should live under
c o n d i t i o n s o f radical u n c e r t a i n t y : ' T h e m o s t plausible advice that o u r
r e a s o n g i v e s us is g e n e r a Q y f o r e a c h m a n t o o b e y t h e l a w s o f h i s c o u n t r y '
( ' A p o l o g y ' ; V - S 5 7 8 ; F 4 3 6 ; S 6 5 2 ) . I n O f c u s t o m ' t h i s is c a U e d ' t h e r u l e
o f rules, t h e universal l a w o f l a w s . . . that each m a n s h o u l d observe
t h o s e o f t h e p l a c e h e is i n ' . ( I , x x i i i ; V - S 118; F 8 6 ; S 133). S o m e t i m e s
M o n t a i g n e appears t o b e a n extreme conservative:

W h a t seems t o m e t o b r i n g as m u c h disorder i n t o o u r consciences as a n y t h i n g ,

i n these reHgious troubles that w e are i n , is this partial surrender o f t h e i r behefs
b y CathoHcs. I t seems t o t h e m that t h e y are b e i n g v e r y moderate and u n d e r ­
standing w h e n t h e y y i e l d t o t h e i r opponents some o f t h e articles i n dispute. B u t
besides t h e fact that t h e y d o n o t see w h a t an advantage i t is t o a m a n c h a r g i n g
y o u f o r y o u t o b e g i n t o give g r o u n d and w i t h d r a w , and h o w m u c h that e n c o u r ­
ages h i m t o pursue his p o i n t , those articles t h e y select as t h e m o s t t r i v i a l are
sometimes v e r y i m p o r t a n t . W e must either s u b m i t c o m p l e t e l y t o t h e a u t h o r i t y
o f o u r ecclesiastical g o v e r n m e n t , o r d o w i t h o u t i t completely. I t is n o t f o r us t o
decide w h a t p o r t i o n o f o b e d i e n c e w e o w e i t . x x v i i , ' I t is foUy t o measure
the t r u e a n d false b y o u r o w n capacity'; V - S 181—2; F 134; S 204)

I f w e assume t h a t d o i n g w i t h o u t ecclesiastical a u t h o r i t y a l t o g e t h e r is n o t
r e a h y a h v e o p t i o n , t h i s leaves o n l y t o t a l s u b m i s s i o n . T h e r e are s i m i I a r
statements i n t h e ' A p o l o g y ' , w h e r e t h e o p t i o n o f releasing ourselves
f r o m a u t h o r i t y is n o t m e n t i o n e d . 8

8
e . g . ' P e o p l e w h o j u d g e a n d c h e c k t h e i r j u d g e s n e v e r s u b m i t t o t h e m as t h e y o u g h t . H o w
m u c h m o r e d o c i l e a n d easily l e d , b o t h b y t h e l a w s o f r e H g i o n a n d b y p o h t i c a l l a w s , are t h e s i m p l e
a n d i n c u r i o u s m i n d s , t h a n those m i n d s that s u r v e y d i v i n e a n d h u m a n causes Hke p e d a g o g u e s ! '
<yS 5 0 6 ; F 3 7 5 ; S 5 6 4 ) . Simüarly: ' R e a s o n d o e s n o t h i n g b u t g o astray i n e v e r y t h i n g , a n d
e s p e c i a U y w h e n i t m e d d l e s w i t h d i v i n e t h i n g s . W h o feels t h i s m o r e e v i d e n t l y t h a n w e ? F o r e v e n
t h o u g h w e h a v e g i v e n i t c e r t a i n a n d i n f a U i b l e p r i n c i p l e s , e v e n t h o u g h w e U g h t its steps w i t h
6 Е. M. Curley

N o w i f M o n t a i g n e ' s s k e p t i c i s m caUs f o r h i m t o o b e y t h e l a w s o f h i s
c o u n t r y , a n d t o s u b m i t t o t a l l y t o t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e C h u r c h estabhshed
t h e r e , a n d i f t h a t C h u r c h h o l d s t h a t heresy, a n d u n b e h e f g e n e r a u y , are n o t
to be tolerated, t h e n toleration w i U n o t be a consequence ofskepticism.
S i n c e b o t h t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s s e e m t o b e s a t i s f i e d — i . e . his s k e p t i c i s m
does s e e m t o r e q u i r e h i m t o o b e y the k w s o f h i s c o u n t r y , a n d t o s u b m i t
t o t h e a u t h o r i t y o f a n i n t o l e r a n t c h u r c h — i t is s u r p r i s i n g t h a t h e s h o u l d
have acquired a r e p u t a t i o n f o r tolerance,and indeed,perhaps be a m a j o r
figure i n the development o f arguments i n favor o f t o l e r a t i o n .

M O N T A I G N E A S A R E V O L U T I O N A R Y :

W I T C H C R A F T A N D M I R A C L E S

I n s p i t e o f t h e c o n s e r v a t i s m I h a v e so f a r h i g h l i g h t e d , M o n t a i g n e c a n stül
be quite critical o f h i s coreligionists:

I have i n m y t i m e seen w o n d e r s i n the u n d i s c e r n i n g and p r o d i g i o u s ease w i t h

w h i c h peoples let t h e i r behefs and t h e i r hopes be l e d a n d m a n i p u l a t e d i n w h a t ­
ever w a y has pleased a n d served t h e i r leaders, passing over a h u n d r e d mistakes
one o n t o p o f the o t h e r . . . I a m n o l o n g e r amazed at those w h o are h o o d ­
w i n k e d b y the m o n k e y tricks o f A p o U o n i u s and M o h a m m e d . . . I h a d
observed this t o a supreme degree i n the first o f o u r feverish factions; this other,
w h i c h has b e e n b o r n since, i n i m i t a t i n g i t , surpasses i t . (III,x,'Ofhusbanding
y o u r w u T ; V - S 1013;F775;S 1146)

T h e first o f t h e s e f a c t i o n s is t h e H u g u e n o t s ; t h e s e c o n d , t h e C a t h o h c
League, w h i c h arose i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e Huguenots. Montaigne
expresses s i m i l a r s e n t i m e n t s i n t h e e s s a y ' O f F r e e d o m o f C o n s c i e n c e ' ( I I ,
x i x ; V - S 6 6 8 ; F 506; S 759).
- T h e M o n t a i g n e w h o appears i n s u c h passages is c l e a r l y n o t so c o n ­
servative a n d c o n f o r m i s t as t h e M o n t a i g n e w e m e t earher. I n d e e d , Sayce
entides his c h a p t e r o n M o n t a i g n e ' s p o H t i c a l p h i l o s o p h y ' T h e Conservative
and the R e v o l u t i o n a r y ' . W h a t c o u l d possiblyjustify caUing M o n t a i g n e

t h e h o l y l a m p o f t h e t r u t h w h i c h i t h a s p l e a s e d G o d to c o m m u n i c a t e t o u s , n e v e r t h e l e s s w e
s e e d a i l y h o w , w h e n i t strays h o w e v e r h t d e f r o m t h e b e a t e n p a t h a n d d e v i a t e s o r w a n d e r s f r o m
t h e w a y t r a c e d a n d t r o d d e n b y t h e C h u r c h , i m m e d i a t e l y i t is l o s t , i t g r o w s e m b a r r a s s e d a n d
e n t a n g l e d , w h i r l i n g r o u n d a n d floating i n t h a t vast, t r o u b l e d a n d u n d u l a t i n g sea o f h u m a n
opinions, u n b r i d l e d a n d aimless' 520, F 386^7, S 581). O n this issue s e e J e a n Starobinski,
Montaigne in Moft'o«,trans.Arthur G o l d h a m m e r ( C h i c a g o : C h i c a g o U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s 1 9 8 5 ) , 2 8 2 ,
a n d D a v i d L e w i s S c h a e f e r , The Political Philosophy of Montaigne [PoliPhil] (CorneU: СогпеП
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 9 0 ) , 15 n .
 Skepticüm andToleration 7

a r e v o l u t i o n a r y ? Q u i t e a f e w t h i n g s , as i t t u r n s o u t . F i r s t , n o t o n l y does h e
d i s a p p r o v e o f k i U i n g w i t c h e s , h e appears n o t t o t h i n k t h a t t h e y s h o u l d b e
p u n i s h e d at aU, b e c a u s e i t is b e y o n d o u r p o w e r t o t e n w h o is t r u l y a w i t c h :

T h e witches o f m y n e i g h b o r h o o d are i n m o r t a l danger every time some n e w

a u t h o r comes a l o n g and attests t o the reaHty o f t h e i r visions.To apply the e x a m ­
ples that the H o l y W r i t offers us o f s u c h things, v e r y certain and irrefragable
examples, and b r i n g t h e m t o bear o n o u r m o d e r n events, requires greater i n g e ­
n u i t y t h a n ours, since w e see n e i t h e r t h e i r causes n o r t h e i r means . . . G o d m u s t
be beHeved i n these things, that is t r u l y m o s t reasonable; b u t n o t , b y the same
t o k e n , one o f u s , w h o is astonished at his o w n narrative (and he is necessarily
astonished unless h e is o u t o f h i s senses),whether he teUs i t about someone eke
or against himself. ( I I I , x i , ' O f c r i p p l e s ' ; V - S 1031; F 7 8 8 ^ ; S n 6 6 )

So e v e n w h e r e t h e r e is a v o l u n t a r y c o n f e s s i o n o f w i t c h c r a f t , i t is m o r e
r e a s o n a b l e t o s u p p o s e t h a t t h e w i t c h is c r a z y t h a n t h a t she reaUy has
s u p e r n a t u r a l p o w e r s f V - S 1032; F 7 9 0 ; S 1 1 6 8 ^ ) . T h i s m a y n o t s e e m a
t e r r i b l y r e v o l u t i o n a r y i d e a . N o w a d a y s sane, e d u c a t e d p e o p l e , i n o u r p a r t
o f the w o r l d , d o n o t believe i n witchcraft, h o w e v e r m u c h bibhcal
e v i d e n c e t h e r e m a y b e f o r its reaHty. B u t i n t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y e v e n
s o m e o n e as g e n e r a U y s k e p t i c a l asJean B o d i n t o o k i t q u i t e s e r i o u s l y . 9

W i t c h c r a f t is c o n n e c t e d w i t h o t h e r m a t t e r s n o t so e a s ü y d i s m i s s e d as
relics o f a n c i e n t s u p e r s t i t i o n . W h a t w o u l d m a k e s o m e o n e a real w i t c h ,
i f t h e r e w e r e any real w i t c h e s , w o u l d b e t h e possession o f s u p e r n a t u r a l
powers, combined with t h e d i s p o s i t i o n t o use t h e m f o r e v i l ends.
M o n t a i g n e does n o t d o u b t t h a t t h e r e are p e o p l e w h o have e v i l d i s p o s i ­
tions; w h a t h e d o u b t s is t h e e v i d e n c e t h a t a n y o n e has s u p e r n a t u r a l p o w e r s :

M y ears are battered b y a thousand stories Hke this: ' T h r e e people saw h i m o n
such-and-such a day i n t h e east; three saw h i m t h e n e x t day i n the west, at such
and such a t i m e , dressed thus'.Truly, I w o u l d n o t beheve m y o w n selfabout this.
H o w m u c h m o r e natural and Hkely i t seems t o m e that t w o m e n are l y i n g t h a n
that one m a n s h o u l d pass w i t h the w i n d s i n t w e l v e hours f r o m the east t o the
west! H o w m u c h m o r e natural that o u r understanding s h o u l d be c a r r i e d away
f r o m its base b y the v o l a t i h t y o f o u r u n t r a c k e d m i n d t h a n that o n e o f u s , i n flesh
and bone, s h o u l d be w a f t e d u p a c h i m n e y o n a b r o o m s t i c k b y a strange spirit!
( ' O f c r i p p l e s ' ; V - S 1031-32;F 789;S 1168)

9
I n h i s De la demonomanie des sorders (1580), w h i c h a r g u e d for t h e repression o f w i t c h e s ,
a n d g a v e tests f o r d e t e c t i n g t h e m . S e e M a r i o n L e a t h e r s D a n i e l s K u n t z , i n t r o d u c t i o n t o h e r
t r a n s l a t i o n o f B o d i n ' s Colloquium of the Seven about Seaets of the Sublime (Princeton: Princeton
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1975),pp. x x x i v — x x x v i i .
8 Е. M. Curley

T h i s a r g u m e n t c o m e s v e r y close t o , a n d m a y w e U h a v e s u g g e s t e d , H u m e ' s
f a m o u s c r i t i q u e o f t e s t i m o n i a l e v i d e n c e f o r m i r a c l e s . H u m e w i U ask:
' W h i c h is m o r e p r o b a b l e , t h a t t h e w i t n e s s e s s h o u l d b e l y i n g o r m i s t a k e n ,
o r t h a t t h e event t h e y testify t o s h o u l d have o c c u r r e d ? ' 1 0
H i s initial
a n s w e r is t h a t w h e n t h e e v e n t is a v i o l a t i o n o f t h e l a w s o f n a t u r e (as a
m i r a c l e is, b y d e f m i t i o n ) , a n d h e n c e , c o n t r a r y t o w h a t e x p e r i e n c e has
u n i f o r m l y t a u g h t us, i t must always b e m o r e p r o b a b l e t h a t t h e w i t n e s s e s
are m i s t a k e n o r l y i n g t h a n t h a t t h e e v e n t t h e y r e p o r t o c c u r r e d , n o m a t t e r
h o w s t r o n g t h e t e s t i m o n i a l evidence i s . T h i s sounds t o o d o g m a t i c f o r
Montaigne; 1 1
b u t i t is h a r d t o see h o w M o n t a i g n e c o u l d f a i l , i f h e w e r e at
aU c o n s i s t e n t , t o b e as s k e p t i c a l a b o u t m i r a c l e s as h e is a b o u t w i t c h c r a f t .
N o w M o n t a i g n e is n o t n o t e d f o r h i s c o n s i s t e n c y . B u t i n t h i s i n s t a n c e
h e d o e s a p p l y a v e r y H u m e a n k i n d o f r e a s o n i n g t o m i r a c l e s t o r i e s also:

I have seen the b i r t h o f m a n y miracles i n m y t i m e . E v e n w h e n t h e y are s m o t h ­

ered at b i r t h , w e d o n o t f a i l t o foresee the course they w o u l d have taken i f t h e y
had Hved o u t t h e i r m i l age . . . the first persons w h o are c o n v i n c e d o f a strange
i n i t i a l fact, as t h e y spread t h e i r story, feel f r o m the o p p o s i t i o n t h e y m e e t w h e r e
the d i f f i c u l t y ofpersuasion lies,and go a n d caUt that place w i t h some false patch.
Besides ' b y t h e innate desire i n m e n t o foster r u m o r s d ü i g e n d y ' 12
w e naturaJJy
scruple t o r e t u r n w h a t has b e e n l e n t t o us w i t h o u t some interest and a d d i t i o n
f r o m o u r o w n stock . . . this w h o l e structure goes o n b u i l d i n g itself u p and
shaping itseH"from h a n d t o h a n d , so that the remotest witness is better i n s t r u c t e d
about i t t h a n the nearest, a n d t h e last i n f o r m e d m o r e c o n v i n c e d o f i t t h a n the
first. I t is a natural progression. F o r w h o e v e r beheves a n y t h i n g esteems i t a w o r k
o f c h a r i t y t o persuade a n o t h e r o f i t , a n d . . . does n o t fear t o add, o u t o f h i s o w n
i n v e n t i o n , as m u c h as he sees t o be necessary . . . t o take care o f the resist­
ance . . . ( ' O f c r i p p l e s ' ; V - S 1027-8; F 786; S 1162)

T h i s is r e m i n i s c e n t o f t h a t p a r t o f H u m e ' s essay i n w h i c h h e a r g u e s t h a t
t h e t e s t i m o n y w e actuaUy get f o r miracles never meets t h e highest
standards. M o n t a i g n e ' s q u e s t i o n n o w i s : ' W h a t are t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f
h u m a n n a t u r e w h i c h lead m e n t o fabricate a n d accept m a r v e l o u s stories
o n slender e v i d e n c e ? ' 1 3
L i k e H u m e , h e suggests t h a t o u r n a t u r a l l o v e o f

1 0
S e e S e c t i o n X o f t h e Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, Part I .
1 1
ü i t h e e n d i t is a l s o t o o d o g m a t i c f o r H u m e . N e a r t h e e n d o f S e c t i o n X h e c o n c e d e s t h a t
i f t h e m i r a c l e is n o t a U e g e d t o p r o v i d e t h e f o u n d a t i o n f o r a r e U g i o n , v e r y s t r o n g t e s t i m o n i a l
e v i d e n c e c o u l d m a k e it likely that a m i r a c l e h a d o c c u r r e d . C f . t h e S e l b y - B i g g e e d i t i o n o f t h e
P . H . N i d d i t c h tdn.,Enquiry concerning Human Understanding ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press,
l979),i27^J. 1 2
Montaigne'squoteisfromLivy,XXVIII,xxiv.
1 3
T h e p a s s a g e c o n t i n u e s i n a s i m i l a r v e i n : ' I t is a m a r v e l from w h a t e m p t y b e g i n n i n g s a n d
frivolous causes s u c h f a m o u s impressions o r d i n a r i l y s p r i n g . T h a t i n itsetfhampers investigation.
 Skepticism and Toleration
9
w o n d e r , a n d desire f o r t h e a d r m r a t i o n w h i c h c a n r e s u l t f r o m b e i n g a b l e
t o p e r s u a d e o t h e r s o f t h e events w e t e s t i f y t o , g i v e s us a s t a n d i n g m o t i v e
to be credulous a n d t o exaggerate.
Q u e s t i o n i n g t h e o c c u r r e n c e o f m i r a c l e s is a m o r e s e r i o u s m a t t e r
t h a n q u e s t i o n i n g t h e reahty o f w i t c h c r a f t . Perhaps n o t m a n y educated
b e h e v e r s t o d a y w o u l d i n s i s t o n o u r a c c e p t i n g at f a c e v a l u e t h e b i b h c a l
texts w h i c h i m p l y a b e l i e f i n w i t c h e s . B u t b e l i e f i n t h e m i r a c l e o f t h e
r e s u r r e c t i o n o f Jesus is stffl c e n t r a l t o t h e f a i t h o f most Christian
denominations e v e n n o w , a n d w a s m u c h m o r e so i n t h e sixteenth
century.What w o u l d become ofsuch behefifwejudged i t b y t h e same
c r i t e r i a w e a p p l y t o o t h e r h i s t o r i c a l claimsPThis was n o t a q u e s t i o n y o u
c o u l d safely raise i n t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y . B u t i t is a c r u c i a l q u e s t i o n
for C h r i s t i a n s today, a n d o f t e n answered i n a w a y w h i c h w o u l d have
gratified H u m e . 1 4

So i t m a y c o m e as a s u r p r i s e t h a t M o n t a i g n e d i d n o t g e t i n m o r e
trouble w i t h the authorities than he did. W h e n the question of
M o n t a i g n e ' s r e h g i o u s o r t h o d o x y is r a i s e d , i t is o f t e n p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e
Essays w e r e 'passed w i t h m i n o r o b j e c t i o n s b y t h e p a p a l c e n s o r i n R o m e
i n 1 5 8 1 ' (Sayce, Essays, 2 0 6 ) . F r o m M o n t a i g n e ' s Journal we k n o w what
some o f t h e objections were:

h a v i n g used the w o r d ' f o r t u n e , ' h a v i n g n a m e d heretical p o e t s , h a v i n g excused 15

Juhan [the 'apostate' e m p e r o r ] . . . the idea that anyone w h o prays o u g h t t o be

free o f evil i m p u k e s at the t i m e ; item, esteeming as c r u e l t y whatever goes

F o r w h i l e w e are l o o k i n g for p o w e r f u l a n d w e i g h t y causes a n d ends, w o r t h y o f s u c h great

r e n o w n , w e lose t h e t r u e o n e s . . . I n s u c h researches a v e r y p r u d e n t , attentive a n d subtle
i n q u i r e r is n e e d e d , i m p a r t i a l a n d u n p r e j u d i c e d . T o t h i s m o m e n t aU t h e s e m i r a c l e s a n d strange
events h i d e t h e m s e l v e s f r o m m e ' ^J-S 1 0 2 9 ; F 7 8 7 ; S 11Ö4; F r a m e ' s t r a n s l a t i o n s H g h t l y m o d i f i e d ) .

1 4
S e e , e.g. G e r d L ü d e m a n n : ' A c o n s i s t e n t m o d e r n v i e w m u s t s a y f a r e w e U to t h e r e s u r r e c ­
t i o n o f J e s u s as a h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t ' (What ReaUy Happened toJesus ^ouisviUe, KY:Westminster
J o h n K n o x Press, 1995), 130). L ü d e m a n n is a r a d i c a l Protestant t h e o l o g i a n , n o t i n g o o d s t a n d ­
i n g i n h i s o w n c o m m u n i o n . B u t J o h n M e i e r ' s A Marginal Jew, 3 vok. ( N e w Y o r k : Doubleday,
I99 ). p u b h s h e d w i t h the i m p r i m a t u r o f the C a t h o U c C h u r c h , reaches a similar, i f m o r e
1

d e k c a t e l y s t a t e d , c o n c l u s i o n . I n M e i e r ' s a c c o u n t , t h e ' h i s t o r i c a l J e s u s ' is ' t h e J e s u s w h o m w e c a n

recover, recapture o r reconstruct b y u s i n g the scientific t o o k o f m o d e r n historical research'
(1.1). H e o m i t s t r e a t m e n t o f t h e r e s u r r e c t i o n , ' n o t b e c a u s e i t is d e n i e d , b u t s i m p l y b e c a u s e t h e
r e s t r i c t i v e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e h i s t o r i c a l J e s u s I w i U b e u s i n g d o e s n o t a U o w u s to p r o c e e d i n t o
matters that c a n b e a f f i r m e d o n l y b y faith'(I.13,197).
1 5
I n t h e essay ' O n p r e s u m p t i o n ' 66l, F 5 0 2 , S 751) M o n t a i g n e had mentioned
T h e o d o r e B e z a ( C a l v i n ' s s u c c e s s o r a t G e n e v a ) o n a Ust o f g o o d c o n t e m p o r a r y p o e t s . I n s u b ­
sequent editions h e retained t h e reference, b u t a d d e d a n aUusion to B e z a i n w h i c h h e d e s c r i b e d
h i m ( w i t h o u t e x p H c i t l y n a m i n g h i m ) as t h e a u t h o r b o t h o f ' v e r s e s e x c e U i n g i n b e a u t y a n d i n
u c e n n o u s n e s s ' a n d o f ' t h e m o s t c o n t e n t i o u s w o r k o n theological r e f o r m that t h e w o r l d has
feasted o n f o r a l o n g t i m e ' f V - S 9 8 9 ; F 7 5 6 ; S 1119).
10 Е. M. Cwky

b e y o n d p l a i n death; item that a c h i l d s h o u l d be b r o u g h t u p t o d o a n y t h i n g , and

othersuchthings . . . (Fo55H5) 1 6

T h i s l i s t d o e s n o t profess t o b e c o m p l e t e . S t i U , w e m i g h t w o n d e r why
M o n t a i g n e ' s t r e a t m e n t o f m i r a c l e s is n o t o n i t .
T h e r e is a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h i s o m i s s i o n : t h e m i r a c l e
a n d w i t c h c r a f t passages I ' v e b e e n q u o t i n g aU c o m e e i t h e r f r o m l a t e r
editions, and w e r e n o t part o f t h e text the censor e x a m i n e d i n 1581.
T h e passages w h i c h discuss m i r a c l e s i n t h e 1580 e d i t i o n are n o t n e a r l y as
s k e p t i c a l as t h o s e I ' v e q u o t e d from t h e l a t e r e d i t i o n s . I n g e n e r a l t h e f i r s t
e d i t i o n passages are c u r s o r y a n d at m o s t m i l d l y s k e p t i c a l . 1 7
I f t h i s is
r i g h t , t h e n a f t e r his e n c o u n t e r w i t h t h e c e n s o r s M o n t a i g n e said m o r e
t h a t m i g h t h a v e o f f e n d e d t h a n h e h a d s a i d b e f o r e — o n t h i s t o p i c , at least.

M O N T A I G N E , T H E S P A N I S H A N D T H E P O R T U G U E S E

F o r aU his c o n f o r m i s m , M o n t a i g n e is a c r i t i c o f h i s s o c i e t y i n m a n y
respects. H e d e p l o r e s t h e w a y t h e c o n q u i s t a d o r s t r e a t e d t h e n a t i v e p o p u ­
l a t i o n s o f t h e w e s t e r n h e m i s p h e r e w h e n t h e y first e x p l o r e d t h o s e r e g i o n s :

W h a t an i m p r o v e m e n t that w o u l d have b e e n , and w h a t an a m e l i o r a t i o n f o r the

entire globe, i f t h e first examples o f o u r c o n d u c t offered over there had set u p
b e t w e e n t h e m and us a b r o t h e r l y friendship a n d u n d e r s t a n d i n g . H o w easy i t
w o u l d have b e e n t o m a k e g o o d use o f souls so fresh, so famished t o learn, and
h a v i n g , f o r the m o s t part, such fine natural b e g i n n i n g ! O n the contrary, w e t o o k
advantage o f t h e i r ignorance and i n e x p e r i e n c e t o i n d i n e t h e m the m o r e easüy
t o w a r d treachery, lewdness, avarice, and every sort o f i n h u m a n i t y and cruelty, after
theexampleandpatternofourways. (III,vi,'Ofcoaches';V-S910;F695;S 1031)

1 6
I n t h e P l e i a d e e d i t i o n , p . 1 2 2 9 . F r a m e i d e n t i f i e s t h e p a s s a g e s c r i t i c i z e d . S e e also M a l c o h n
S m i t h , Montaigne and the Roman Censors [Censors] ( G e n e v a : L i b r a i r i e D r o z , 1 9 8 1 ) , 16.
1 7
A n i n t e r e s t i n g A - e d i t i o n passage favorable to the o c c u r r e n c e o f m i r a c l e s c a n b e f o u n d i n
I , x x v i i , ' I t is f o U y t o m e a s u r e t h e t r u e a n d t h e false b y o u r o w n c a p a c i t y ' , w h e r e Montaigne
says t h a t r e j e c t i n g m i r a c l e s as i m p o s s i b l e p r e s u m e s m o r e k n o w l e d g e o f t h e p o w e r s o f G o d t h a n
w e a r e e n t i t l e d t o p r e s u m e . f V - S 1 8 0 ; F 133; S 2 0 2 ; V f f l e y n o t e s t h a t w h e r e t h e A & B editions
refer to t h e p o w e r s o f G o d , the C e d i t i o n refers to t h e p o w e r o f nature.) B u t a C additdon
a r g u e s t h a t w e s h o u l d n e i t h e r b e h e v e r a s h l y n o r r e j e c t easily. I n t h e c a t e g o r y ' m i l d l y s k e p t i c a l
a t m o s t ' I w o u l d p u t I , x x i f V - S 9 9 ; F 7 0 ; S 111-12) a n d I , x x x i v f V - S 2 2 1 ; F 1 6 3 ; S 2 4 8 ) . I n o t e
h e r e the f o U o w i n g interesting C additions, s o m e o f w h i c h are m o r e S p i n o z i s t i c t h a n H u m e a n :
I , x x i i i , ' M i r a c l e s a r i s e f r o m o u r i g n o r a n c e o f N a t u r e ' f V - S 112; F 8 o ; S 1 2 6 ) ; I I , x i i , ' N a t u r e
is O n e a n d c o n s t a n t i n h e r c o u r s e ' f V - S 4 6 7 ; S 5 2 1 ; F 3 4 3 ) ; I I I , v , ' I b e h e v e i n m i r a c l e s o n l y i n
m a t t e r s o f f a i t h ' . f V - S 855; F 6 5 0 ; S 9 6 4 - 5 ) . F o r a C a d d i t i o n a p p a r e n d y a c c e p t i n g o f m i r a c l e s
s e e I , x x i i i f V - S 1 2 1 ; F 8 8 ; S 137).
 Skepticism and Tokration I I

M o n t a i g n e makes i t clear t h a t , w h a t e v e r t h e professed m o t i v a t i o n f o r

this c o n q u e s t m a y have b e e n , its real m o t i v a t i o n was g r e e d : ' W h o e v e r
set t h e u t i l i t y o f c o m m e r c e a n d t r a d i n g at s u c h a p r i c e ? So m a n y c i t i e s
r a z e d , so m a n y n a t i o n s e x t e r m i n a t e d , so m a n y m i h i o n s o f p e o p l e p u t
to the s w o r d , a n d the richest and m o s t b e a u t i f u l part o f the w o r l d
t u r n e d u p s i d e d o w n , f o r t h e traffic i n pearls a n d p e p p e r ! ' ( I I I , v i , ' O f
c o a c h e s ' ; V - S 910; F 695; S 1 0 3 1 ) . T h e C h u r c h t o w h i c h M o n t a i g n e
professes t o t a l s u b m i s s i o n b e a r s s o m e r e s p o n s i b i h t y f o r t h e s e c r i m e s .
T h e Spanish based t h e i r c l a i m t o t r i b u t e o n t h e fact that the Pope,
t h e V i c a r o f G o d o n earth, h a d g r a n t e d t h e i r k i n g d o m i n i o n over ah
t h e I n d i e s , so t h a t t h e c o n q u i s t a d o r s m i g h t c a r r y C h r i s t i a n i t y t o t h e
NewWorld.
T h e k i n d o f r e k t i v i s m M o n t a i g n e o f t e n endorses i n e v i t a b l y e n c o u n ­
ters p r o b l e m s when one culture meets another. I n ' O f cannibals'
M o n t a i g n e h a d c l a i m e d t h a t : ' w e h a v e n o o t h e r test o f t r u t h a n d r e a s o n
than the example and p a t t e r n o f t h e opinions and customs o f t h e c o u n ­
t r y w e h v e i n . There is a l w a y s t h e p e r f e c t r e h g i o n , t h e p e r f e c t g o v e r n ­
m e n t , t h e p e r f e c t a n d a c c o m p h s h e d m a n n e r s i n aU t h i n g s ' ( I , x x x i ; V - S
2 0 5 ; F 1 5 2 ; S 2 3 1 ) . B u t b y t h e e n d o f t h a t essay h e uses t h e c a n n i b a l s ' p o i n t
o f v i e w t o m a k e criticisms o f F r e n c h society w i t h w h i c h h e himseH"
c l e a r l y s y m p a t h i z e s . T h e issues M o n t a i g n e e x p h c i d y m e n t i o n s are t h e
F r e n c h c u s t o m o f passing t h e m o n a r c h y t o a y o u n g b o y w h e n his
p r e d e c e s s o r has l e f t n o a d u l t c h i l d r e n a n d t h e gross d i s p a r i t y b e t w e e n
r i c h a n d p o o r i n F r e n c h s o c i e t y . W h y , t h e c a n n i b a l s ask, d o 'so m a n y
1 8

g r o w n m e n , bearded, strong and a r m e d . . . submit to obey a child?'

W h y d o t h e p o o r , ' e m a c i a t e d w i t h h u n g e r ' , e n d u r e t h e affluence ofthe
r i c h , ' g o r g e d w i t h aU sorts o f g o o d t h i n g s ' ? 1 9

1 8
I , x x x i ; V - S 213—14; F 1 5 9 ; S 2 4 0 - 1 . B u t M o n t a i g n e says t h a t t h e c a n n i b a b m a d e t h r e e
points, the third o f w h i c h h e has forgotten. I n ' A n a t o m y o f t h e Mass: M o n t a i g n e ' s " C a n n i b a b " '
(PMLA, 117 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , 2 0 7 — 2 1 ) G e o r g e H o f f i n a n n a r g u e s t h a t t h e t h i r d t h i n g w h i c h a m a z e d t h e
cannibals ( w h i c h M o n t a i g n e h a d n o t forgotten,but c h o s e to leave impHcit) w a s t h a t ' E u r o p e a n s
s h o u l d c o n d e m n t h e m f o r eating their prisoners o f w a r , w h e n E u r o p e a n s w e r e wiffing to go to
w a r i n t h e first p l a c e o v e r t h e r i g h t t o eat t h e i r g o d ' . H o f h n a n n o b s e r v e s t h a t t h e a c c u s a t i o n o f
theophagy was p r o m i n e n t i n sixteenth-century Protestant criticism o f C a t h o H c i s m , a n d points
t o a n u m b e r o f i n t e r n a l s i g n s t h a t t h i s essay w a s i n t e n d e d t o s u g g e s t s k e p t i c i s m a b o u t t h e
C a t h o h c interpretation o f t h e Eucharist.
1 9
T h e s e questions are r e m i n i s c e n t o f t h e general questions raised a b o u t poHtical a u t h o r i t y
b y M o n t a i g n e ' s f r i e n d , E t i e n n e d e h B o e t i e , i n h i s Discours de la servitude volontaire, ed. S i m o n e
G o y a r d - F a b r e (Paris: E h m m a r i o n , 1983). A c r i t i c o f t h e c u s t o m s o f o n e c u l t u r e n e e d n o t c o m e
f r o m a n o t h e r culture, a n d M o n t a i g n e k n e w this.
 12 Е. M. Curley

S i m i l a r l y , i n t h e essay ' O n coaches' ( I I I , v i ) , M o n t a i g n e uses t h e

c o n f r o n t a t i o n b e t w e e n t h e S p a n i s h a n d t h e n a t i v e s as a w a y o f c r i t i c i z i n g
t h e E u r o p e a n s o c i e t y o f h i s day. H e p o r t r a y s t h e n a t i v e s as m e n ofgood
j u d g m e n t a n d c h a r a c t e r , n o t c h i l d r e n o r m e r e savages: t h e y d o n o t f i n d
t h e Spanish t o be the m e n o f p e a c e t h e y c l a i m t o be; t h e i r k i n g m u s t be
very needy, i f h e m u s t beg for t r i b u t e ; t h e i r Pope m u s t be a m a n who
l o v e s d i s s e n s i o n , i f h e takes from o n e , t o g i v e t o a n o t h e r , p r o p e r t y w h i c h
is n o t h i s t o g i v e ; t h e y h a v e h t t l e g o l d , a n d d o n o t v a l u e i t , p r e f e r r i n g
happiness a n d c o n t e n t m e n t . 'As f o r o n e single G o d , t h e a c c o u n t h a d
pleased t h e m , b u t t h e y d i d n o t w a n t t o change t h e i r r e l i g i o n , h a v i n g
f o U o w e d i t so a d v a n t a g e o u s l y f o r so l o n g ' f V - S 9 1 1 , F 6 9 5 , S 1 0 3 2 ) . 2 0
In
s a y i n g t h i s , o f c o u r s e , t h e y are o n l y f o U o w i n g ' t h e L a w ofLaws'.They
w i U n o t c h a n g e t h e i r w a y s , e v e n i n t h e face o f t h r e a t s .
Montaigne then d e s c r i b e s at l e n g t h the treatment the Spanish
accorded the kings o f P e r u and M e x i c o , w h o d i d have g o l d . T h r o u g h o u t
t h e n a t i v e s are p o r t r a y e d as h o n e s t , c o u r a g e o u s , a n d n o b l e ; t h e S p a n i s h
as c r u e l , g r e e d y , a n d c o w a r d l y . M o n t a i g n e p u t s n o s t o c k i n t h e c l a i m t h a t
t h e y w e r e a c t i n g from r e l i g i o u s zeal:

These accounts w e have f r o m the Spaniards themselves.They d o n o t merely c o n ­

fess t o t h e m , they boast o f t h e m and p r o c l a i m t h e m . C o u l d i t be i n order t o witness
t o theirjustice o r to their reHgious zeal? Lftheir i n t e n t i o n had simply been to spread
the faith, they w o u l d have t h o u g h t u p o n the fact that i t grows n o t b y t a k i n g pos­
session o f k n d s , b u t o f m e n , and that they w o u l d have had kinings e n o u g h t h r o u g h
the necessities ofwar, w i t h o u t i n t r o d u c i n g indiscriminate shughter, as total as their
swords and pyres c o i d d make i t , as t h o u g h they were b u t c h e r i n g w i l d arnmaU,
merely preserving the Hves ofas many as they i n t e n d e d to make p i t i f u l skves, to
workandservicetheirmines. ( I I I , v i , ' O f C o a c h e s ' ; V - S 9 1 3 ; F 6 9 7 ; S 1034)

W e s h o u l d a c k n o w l e d g e that the Spanish conquest o f t h e N e w W o r l d

was c o n t r o v e r s i a l w i t h i n t h e C h u r c h . S o m e SpanishThomists—notably
F r a n c i s c o V i t o r i a a n d B a r t o l o m e d e las C a s a s — c o n d e m n e d i t , a r g u i n g ,
2 1

2 0
I a m p u z z l e d , h o w e v e r , b y the c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n this passage a n d o n e i n t h e ' A p o l o g y ' i n
w h i c h M o n t a i g n e attributes the spiritual t r a n q u i h t y o f t h e B r a z i K a n s to the fact that t h e y
'spent their hfe i n admirable s i m p h c i t y a n d i g n o r a n c e , w i t h o u t letters, w i t h o u t law, w i t h o u t
k i n g , without religion of any kina" f V - S 4 0 1 , m y e m p h a s i s , F 3 6 2 , S 5 4 7 ) .
2 1
S e e F r a n c i s c o d e V i t o r i a , Political Writings, ed. A n t h o n y Pagden a n d J e r e m y L a w r a n c e
( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1991), a n d P a u l C o r n i s h , ' S p a n i s h T h o m i s m a n d the
A m e r i c a n Indians:Vitoria a n d L a s Casas o n the Toleration o f C u l t u r a l Difference', i n C a r y
N e d e r m a n a n d J o h n C h r i s t i a n L a u r s e n ( e d s . ) , Difference and DHssent: Theories ofTolerance in
Medieval and Earfy Modem Europe ^ a n h a m , M D : R o w m a n & Littlefield, 1996), 99-117.
 Skepticism andToleration i3

a m o n g o t h e r t h i n g s , t h a t t h e Pope, w h o s e a u t h o r i t y was p u r e l y s p i r i t u a l ,
had n o r i g h t t o grant t h e N e w W o r l d t o anyone, a n d that the conquistadors
h a d n o r i g h t u n d e r natural k w t o treat t h e Indians the w a y they d i d .
B u t t h i s T h o m i s t c r i t i q u e o f t h e C h u r c h is d r y , l e g a h s t i c , a n d h m i t e d .
V i t o r i a , f o r example, w ü l aUow that i f the barbarians obstruct the
Spaniards i n t h e i r p r o p a g a t i o n o f t h e Gospel,

the Spaniards, after first reasoning w i t h t h e m t o remove any cause o f p r o v o c a -

tion, may preach and work for the conversion of thatpeople even against their will, and
may ifnecessary take u p arms and d e c k r e w a r o n t h e m , insofar as this provides
the safety and o p p o r t u n i t y needed t o preach the Gospel. A n d the same holds
true i f t h e y p e r m i t the Spaniards t o preach, b u t d o n o t aUow conversions . . . 2 2

F o r V i t o r i a t h e m o s t i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n is t h a t t h e m e t h o d o f
e v a n g e l i z a t i o n u s e d s h o u l d n o t b e d e s t r u c t i v e o f t h e e n d i t is s u p p o s e d
t o a c h i e v e , t h e p r o p a g a t i o n o f t h e G o s p e l . I f i t is, t h e evangehsts m u s t use
s o m e o t h e r m e t h o d . ' M y f e a r ' , h e w r i t e s , 'is t h a t t h e afFair m a y h a v e
gone b e y o n d the permissible bounds ofjustice and r e l i g i o n ' . 2 3

Montaigne's c r i t i q u e o f t h e conquistadors occurs i n B o o k I I I , a m o n g

t h e essays a d d e d t o t h e 1588 e d i t i o n . I t w a s n o t p a r t o f t h e e d i t i o n 'passed
w i t h m i n o r o b j e c t i o n s b y t h e papal censor . . . i n 1581'. I n t h e e d i t i o n
M o n t a i g n e was p r e p a r i n g w h e n h e d i e d , h e m a d e f u r t h e r a d d i t i o n s r e l ­
e v a n t t o t h e issue o f f o r c i b l e c o n v e r s i o n i n a n essay w h i c h h a d b e e n p a r t
o f t h e first e d i t i o n . T h e p r o p o s i t i o n h e r e is t h a t ' a n y o p i n i o n is p o w e r f u l
e n o u g h f o r s o m e b o d y t o e s p o u s e i t at t h e c o s t o f h i s h f e ' ( I , x i v , ' T h a t t h e
taste o f g o o d a n d e v i l d e p e n d s i n l a r g e p a r t o n t h e o p i n i o n w e h a v e o f
t h e m ' ; V - S 53; F 35; S 5 5 ) . A u r e h g i o n s are c a p a b l e o f t h i s . M o n t a i g n e ' s
e x a m p l e is t h e J e w s . W h e n F e r d i n a n d a n d IsabeUa b a n i s h e d t h e m f r o m
their lands,

K i n g J o h n o f P o r t u g a l sold t h e m sanctuary i n his t e r r i t o r i e s at eight crowns a

head, o n c o n d i t i o n that t h e y w o u l d have t o leave b y a particular day, w h e n he
w o u l d p r o v i d e vessels t o transport t h e m t o A f r i c a . T h e day d u l y a r r i v e d after
w h i c h t h e y were t o r e m a i n as slaves i f t h e y h a d n o t obeyed; b u t t o o f e w ships
were p r o v i d e d ; those w h o d i d get aboard were treated harshly and viUainously
b y the sailors,who, apart f r o m m a n y o t h e r indignities, delayed t h e m at sea, sail­
i n g this w a y and that u n t i l t h e y h a d used u p aU t h e i r provisions a n d were f o r c e d
t o b u y others from t h e m at so h i g h a p r i c e and over so l o n g a p e r i o d that they
were set ashore w i t h the shirts t h e y stood u p i n . W h e n the news o f t h i s i n h u m a n

d e V i t o r i a , Political Writings, 285. Ibid.286.

Η Е. M. Curley

treatment reached those w h o h a d r e m a i n e d b e h i n d , m o s t resolved t o accept

slavery; a f e w p r e t e n d e d t o change r e h g i o n . (V-S 5 3 ; F 35;S 55)

J o h n d i e d i n 1495 a n d as M o n t a i g n e p r o c e e d s t o r e p o r t , h i s successor,
E m m a n u e l I , i n i t i a U y set t h e J e w s free w h e n h e c a m e t o t h e t h r o n e . T h e n
h e c h a n g e d h i s m i n d , g a v e t h e m a t i m e w i t h i n w h i c h t h e y h a d t o leave
t h e k i n g d o m , a n d a s s i g n e d t h r e e p o r t s f o r t h e m t o leave b y :

he h o p e d . . . that t h e y w o u l d be b r o u g h t t o [conversion] b y t h e hardship o f

h a v i n g t o expose themselves as t h e i r comrades h a d d o n e t o t h i e v i s h seamen and
o f h a v i n g t o abandon a l a n d t o w h i c h they h a d g r o w n accustomed a n d w h e r e
they h a d acquired great w e a l t h , i n order t o cast themselves i n t o k n d s f o r e i g n
and u n k n o w n . B u t f i n d i n g his hopes deceived and theJews d e t e r m i n e d t o make
the crossing, he w i t h d r e w t w o o f t h e ports he h a d p r o m i s e d , i n order that the
l e n g t h and d i f f i c u l t y o f t h e voyage w o u l d make some o f t h e m t h i n k a g a i n — o r
perhaps i t was t o p i l e t h e m aU together i n o n e place, so as the m o r e easily t o
carry o u t his design, w h i c h was t o tear aU the c h i l d r e n u n d e r f o u r t e e n f r o m
t h e i r parents and t o transport t h e m o u t o f sight and o u t o f c o n t a c t , w h e r e t h e y
c o u l d be taught o u r r e l i g i o n . CV-S 53-4; F 36; S 55^5)

T h e r e s u l t o f t h i s p o h c y , M o n t a i g n e o b s e r v e s , was

a dreadful spectacle . . . the natural love ofparents and c h i l d r e n , together w i t h

t h e i r zeal f o r t h e i r ancient f a i t h , rebeUed against this harsh decree: i t was c o m m o n
t o see fathers and m o t h e r s k i U i n g themselves o r — a n even harsher e x a m p l e —
t h r o w i n g t h e i r babes d o w n weUs o u t o f l o v e a n d compassion, i n order t o evade
thelaw. fV-S54;F3o;S56)

W h e n t h e i r t i m e r a n o u t , s o m e r e t u r n e d t o slavery, a n d s o m e ' b e c a m e
C h r i s t i a n s ' . B u t M o n t a i g n e is n a t u r a U y s u s p i c i o u s o f t h e s i n c e r i t y o f t h e
conversions p r o d u c e d b y these m e t h o d s . ' E v e n t o d a y , a c e n t u r y l a t e r , f e w
P o r t u g u e s e t r u s t i n t h e i r s i n c e r i t y o r i n t h a t o f t h e i r descendants, even
t h o u g h t h e c o n s t r a i n t s o f c u s t o m a n d o f l o n g d u r a t i o n are as p o w e r f u l
c o u n s e l o r s as a n y o t h e r ' f V - S 54; F 36; S 5 6 ) .
Forcible conversion was part o f Montaigne's f a m i l y history. H i s
m o t h e r c a m e from a n o r i g i n a U y J e w i s h f a m i l y i n S p a i n , w h o s e m e m b e r s
h a d b e e n f o r c i b l y c o n v e r t e d t o C h r i s t i a n i t y . A U o u r e v i d e n c e suggests
t h a t she was a s i n c e r e C h r i s t i a n . C u s t o m is a p o w e r f u l c o u n s e l o r . B u t
m a n y o f t h e ' N e w Christians' d i d return toJudaism w h e n circumstances
p e r m i t t e d . F r a m e suggests t h a t M o n t a i g n e ' s m a t e r n a l a n c e s t r y m a y h a v e
b e e n r e s p o n s i b l e , ' i n s o m e m e a s u r e . . . [ f o r ] h i s d e e p t o l e r a n c e i n a n age
w h e n t h a t w a s n o t i n f a s h i o n . . . [and]aratherdetachedattitude,typical
 Skepticism andToleration 15

o f t h e marranos and natural i n t h e m , t o w a r d the r e l i g i o n he consistentiy

and very conscientiously practiced'. 2 4
Montaigne may have been
detached t o w a r d t h e r e h g i o n h e practiced. H e was n o t detached t o w a r d
t h e s u f f e r i n g h i s c o - r e h g i o n i s t s h a d i n f l i c t e d o n t h e J e w s a c e n t u r y earher.

M O N T A I G N E A N D T H E R O M A N C E N S O R S

W e h a v e l o o k e d n o w at s o m e p o t e n t i a U y c o n t e n t i o u s passages M o n t a i g n e
a d d e d t o h i s Essays after h i s e n c o u n t e r w i t h t h e censors, passages t h e y
w o u l d n o t h a v e h a d t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o m p l a i n a b o u t . Let's t u r n t o t w o
m a t t e r s t h e y d i d c o m p h i n a b o u t . M o n t a i g n e ' s e n c o u n t e r o c c u r r e d o n his
visit t o R o m e , w h e n the customs a u t h o r i t i e s confiscated his book.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , t h e y s e e m t o have t r e a t e d h i m g e n d y , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e
a c c o u n t h e gives i n h i s Journal, a w o r k n o t intended for puhtication:

T h e Master o f t h e Sacred Palace h a d been able t o j u d g e t h e m o n l y b y the r e p o r t

o f s o m e F r e n c h friar, since he d i d n o t understand o u r language at aU; and he was
so c o n t e n t w i t h the excuses I offered o n each o b j e c t i o n that this F r e n c h m a n
had left h i m , that h e referred i t t o m y conscience t o redress w h a t I should see
was i n bad taste . . . (F955) 25

A f t e r his e n u m e r a t i o n o f t h e contested p o i n t s c i t e d e a r h e r , M o n t a i g n e
reports that

the said Master, w h o is an able m a n , was fuU ofexcuses f o r me, and w a n t e d m e

t o k n o w that he was n o t v e r y sympathetic t o these revisions, and he pleaded
v e r y i n g e n i o u s l y f o r m e i n m y presence, against another m a n , abo an ItaHan,
w h o was o p p o s i n g m e . . .

N e a r l y a m o n t h later M o n t a i g n e h a d a second m e e t i n g w i t h t h e Master

a n d h i s c o n e a g u e , after w h i c h h e r e p o r t e d t h a t t h e y

u r g e d m e n o t t o make use o f t h e censorship o f m y b o o k , i n w h i c h censorship

some o t h e r F r e n c h m e n h a d i n f o r m e d t h e m there were m a n y s t u p i d things;
saying that t h e y h o n o r e d b o t h m y i n t e n t i o n a n d affection f o r the C h u r c h , and
m y abüity, a n d t h o u g h t so w e U o f m y frankness a n d conscience that t h e y left i t t o
myseUfto c u t o u t o f m y b o o k , w h e n I w a n t e d t o repubHsh i t , whatever I f o u n d
too Ucentious. 26

2 4
OonddFmme,Montaigne:A Biography ( N e w Y o r k : H a r c o u r t , B r a c e & W o r l d , 1965),28.
2 5
S e e S m i t h , Censors, 16; P l e i a d e , 1 2 2 8 ^ j .
2 6
F 0 6 5 . S e e S m i t h , Censors, 1 9 - 2 0 , P l e i a d e , 1240.
 l6 Е. M. Curley

M o n t a i g n e d i d r e s p e c t t h e i r w i s h e s , at least i n s o f a r as h e m a d e n o
a t t e m p t t o ' u s c ' t h e c e n s u r e o f his b o o k . H e d i d n o t m e n t i o n i t i n
s u b s e q u e n t e d i t i o n s o f t h e Essays, except briefly and obliquely. 2 7

P e r h a p s h i s t r e a t m e n t o f t h e c o n t e s t e d passages is also c o n s i s t e n t w i t h
t h e i r w i s h e s , t h o u g h t h i s seems less clear. O n e o f t h e i r c o m p l a i n t s , r e c a h ,
was a b o u t M o n t a i g n e ' s v i e w t h a t ' a n y t h i n g w h i c h g o e s b e y o n d e x e c u ­
t i o n p u r e a n d s i m p l e is c r u e l ' . I n t w o essays i n t h e 1580 e d i t i o n — I I , x i ,
' O f cruelty' and I I , x x v i i , ' O f cowardice, the m o t h e r o f cruelty'—
M o n t a i g n e h a d r a i s e d t w o m a i n issues a b o u t t h e use o f t o r t u r e : w h e t h e r
i t w a s l e g i t i m a t e t o t o r t u r e c o n d e m n e d p e o p l e i n t h e process o f e x e c u t -
i n g t h e m , a n d w h e t h e r i t w a s l e g i t i m a t e t o use t o r t u r e as a m e t h o d o f
i n v e s t i g a t i o n . R e g a r d i n g t h e f h r s t , M o n t a i g n e h a d said:

Savages d o n o t shock m e as m u c h b y roasting and eating the bodies o f t h e dead

as d o those w h o t o r m e n t a n d persecute t h e m H v i n g . . . аП that goes b e y o n d
p l a i n death seems t o m e pure cruelty, a n d especiauy i n us w h o o u g h t t o have
some c o n c e r n a b o u t sending souls away i n a g o o d state, w h i c h cannot happen
w h e n w e have agitated t h e m a n d made t h e m desperate b y unbearable tortures.
(II,xi,'Ofcruelty';V-S 430-1;F314;S482) 2 8

I t w a s , o f c o u r s e , at least t h e o c c a s i o n a l p r a c t i c e 2 9
o f the Roman
I n q u i s i t i o n t o a d d t o r t u r e t o t h e process o f e x e c u t i o n . I n t h e first e d i t i o n
M o n t a i g n e does n o t e x p l i c i t l y m e n t i o n t h e I n q u i s i t i o n , b u t he does
w r i t e t h a t h e lives i n a t i m e w h i c h a b o u n d s i n ' u n b e l i e v a b l e examples'
ofcruelty:

w e see i n the ancient histories n o t h i n g m o r e extreme t h a n w h a t w e experience

o f t h i s every day [ i n o u r c i v i l w a r s ] . B u t that has n o t r e c o n c i l e d m e t o i t at аП.
I c o u l d hardly be convinced, u n t i l I saw i t , that there w e r e souls so monstrous that
they w o u l d c o m m i t m u r d e r f o r the mere pleasure o f i t ; hack and c u t o f f o t h e r
men's Hmbs; sharpen their w i t s t o i n v e n t unaccustomed t o r m e n t s and n e w forms
o f d e a t h , w i t h o u t enmity, w i t h o u t p r o f i t , and f o r the sole purpose o f e n j o y i n g the

2 7
Cf.ni,x,'Ofbrabana4ngyourwin'fy-S 1013,Sii45,p775),wherehewrites,indefenseof
h i s p r a c t i c e o f s o m e t i m e s finding g o o d q u a h t i e s i n p e o p l e w h o s e v i e w s h e o p p o s e d , t h a t ' I d i d
n o t c o n c e d e to the magistrate h i m s e l f t h a t h e w a s right to c o n d e m n a b o o k for h a v i n g n a m e d
a heretic a m o n g the best poets o f t h e age'. H e does n o t , h o w e v e r , n a m e t h e magistrate; i f w e d i d
n o t h a v e h i s Journal w e w o u l d n o t k n o w that h e w a s referring to the papal censor.
2 8
See I I , x x v i i , V - S 7 0 0 - 1 , F 7 2 0 - 3 0 , S 7 9 4 - 5 .
2 9
C f . S m i t h , Censors: ' T h e R o m a n Inquisition h a d a p a r t i c u k r reason to be c o n c e r n e d
a b o u t M o n t a i g n e ' s attack o n c r u e l executions: for it w a s t h e p o h c y o f t h e R o m a n I n q u i s i t i o n ,
n o t o r J y t o e x e c u t e c e r t a i n o f f e n d e r s , b u t , in admittedly very exceptional cases, t o b u r n t h e m
w i t h o u t s t r a n g h n g t h e m first' fe. 7 5 ) .
 Skepticism and Toleration 17

pleasing spectacle o f t h e p i t i f u l gestures a n d movements, the k m e n t a b l e groans

and cries, o f a m a n d y i n g i n anguish . . . fV-S 432; F 315-16; S 4 8 4 ) 30

M o n t a i g n e sees savagery a n d s a d i s m i n w h a t t h e I n q u i s i t i o n d o e s . A n d
h e d o e s n o t b a c k d o w n . I n k t e r e d i t i o n s h e r e t a i n e d these passages, a n d
strengthened t h e m b y adding f u r t h e r examples.
R e g a r d i n g t h e use o f t o r t u r e as a m e a n s o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n , t h e s i t u a t i o n
is m o r e c o m p h c a t e d . I n t h e f i r s t e d i t i o n M o n t a i g n e l i m i t e d h i m s e r f t o
a r g u i n g t h a t i t is a n u n r e h a b l e m e t h o d :

W h y s h o u l d p a i n make m e confess w h a t is t r u e rather t h a n force m e t o say w h a t

is n o t true? . . . i f a m a n w h o has n o t d o n e w h a t he is accused o f i s able t o sup­
p o r t such t o r m e n t , w h y s h o u l d a m a n w h o has d o n e i t be unable t o support i t ,
w h e n so b e a u t i f u l a r e w a r d as hfe itseH"is offered h i m ? . . . I t is a m e t h o d ftdI o f
danger and uncertainty. ( I I , v , ' O f c o n s c i e n c e ' ; V - S 368—9, S 414, F 266)

A g a i n , i t w a s at least t h e o c c a s i o n a l p r a c t i c e o f t h e I n q u i s i t i o n t o use
t o r t u r e as a m e t h o d o f i n q u i r y . 3 1
M o n t a i g n e r e t a i n s t h i s passage i n s u b ­
sequent editions, b u t strengthens i t i n t w o ways.
F i r s t , h e c o m p l a i n s , n o t o n l y a b o u t t h e ineffectiveness o f t o r t u r e as
a m e t h o d o f i n q u i r y , b u t a b o a b o u t t h e i n j u s t i c e o f i t : ' T h i s results i n a m a n
w h o m t h e j u d g e has p u t t o t h e t o r t u r e , lest h e d i e i n n o c e n t , b e i n g
c o n d e m n e d t o d i e b o t h i n n o c e n t a n d t o r t u r e d ' ( I I , v, ' O f c o n s c i e n c e ' ;
V - S 369, S 414, F 2 6 6 ) . 3 2
S e c o n d , as t h e e d i t i o n s s u c c e e d o n e another,
M o n t a i g n e b e c o m e s p r o g r e s s i v e l y less i n c h n e d t o e x c u s e t h e p r a c t i c e .
I n t h e 1580 v e r s i o n o f t h e essay ' O f c o n s c i e n c e ' , after several sentences
o n t h e ineffectiveness o f t o r t u r e , c u m r m a t i n g i n t h e q u e s t i o n 'What
w o v d d y o u not say, w h a t w o u l d y o u not d o , t o a v o i d s u c h g r i e v o u s p a i n ? '
Montaigne concluded t h e essay w i t h t h e a b r u p t c o n c e s s i o n : ' B u t i t
is at a n y rate t h e best [ m e t h o d ] t h a t h u m a n w e a k n e s s has b e e n able t o
devise'. I n 1588 t h i s b e c o m e s : ' B u t i t is at a n y rate the least evil t h a t h u m a n
w e a k n e s s has b e e n able t o d e v i s e ' . A n d i n 1595, M o n t a i g n e distances
h i m s e r f e v e n f r o m t h i s j u d g m e n t : ' B u t i t is at a n y rate, they say, t h e least e v i l
t h a t h u m a n w e a k n e s s has b e e n a b l e t o d e v i s e ' . T h e n h e adds a n e x t e n d e d
passage e l a b o r a t i n g o n t h e b a r b a r i t y o f u s i n g t o r t u r e t o d i s c o v e r t h e t r u t h .

3 0
F o r a p a r a f l e l p a s s a g e . a l s o f r o m t h e first e d i t d o n , s e e I , x x x i , O n c a n n i b a k ' f V - S 2 0 9 , F 155,
S235^>).
3 1
C f . S m i t h , Censors: ' I t is c o n c e i v a b l e . . . t h a t h e h a s i n m i n d t h e p r a c t i c e o f t h e R o m a n
I n q u i s i t i o n i n h i s o w n day, w h i c h d i d i n d e e d t o r t u r e f o r t h i s p u r p o s e , a l t h o u g h , a p p a r e n t l y , in
very rigidly-defined circumstances and, in practice, in a very small minority of cases' ψ . 8 1 , m y e m p h a s i s ) .
3 2
S c r e e c h p o i n t s o u t t h a t M o n t a i g n e is h e r e i n d e b t e d t o S t A u g u s t i n e (City of God, XIX,
v i ) a n d t o V i v e s ( i n h i s c o m m e n t a r y o n t h e City qfGod).
 i8 Е. M. Curley

So regarding torture, Montaigne's r e s p o n s e t o t h e c e n s o r s is t o

s t r e n g t h e n t h e passages a b o u t w h i c h t h e y h a d c o m p k i n e d . T h i s is
t r u e e v e n i f w e c o n s i d e r o n l y t h e w a y t h e passages f r o m t h e essay ' O f
c o n s c i e n c e ' , p r e s e n t i n t h e 1580 e d i t i o n , w e r e c h a n g e d i n s u b s e q u e n t
e d i t i o n s . I t is e v e n m o r e t r u e i f w e a d d t h e passages d e a h n g w i t h t h e
Spanish t r e a t m e n t o f the A m e r i c a n Indians a n d the Portuguese treat­
m e n t o f t h e J e w s , w h e r e M o n t a i g n e uses t h e l a t e r e d i t i o n s t o a m p h f y h i s
c o n d e m n a t i o n o f t h e use o f c r u e l t y t o a d v a n c e t h e cause o f r e l i g i o n .
T h i s d o e s n o t s o u n d h k e a m a n w h o is p r a c t i c i n g t h e t o t a l s u b m i s s i o n
t o t h e C h u r c h w h i c h h e elsewhere preaches. Perhaps t h e c o n c l u s i o n
w e s h o u l d d r a w is t h a t h i s e n c o u n t e r w i t h t h e c e n s o r s h a d t a u g h t h i m
j u s t w h a t t h e h m i t s o f t h e C h u r c h ' s t o l e r a t i o n w e r e i n his case.At any
r a t e , w e h a v e s e e n m u c h a k e a d y t o j u s t i f y Sayce's c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f
M o n t a i g n e as b e i n g ( i n s o m e m o o d s at least) a r e v o l u t i o n a r y .

M O N T A I G N E A N D J U L I A N T H E A P O S T A T E J J

I c o n c l u d e m y c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f M o n t a i g n e ' s response t o t h e censors b y

e x a m i n i n g his t r e a t m e n t o f J u h a n , t h e R o m a n emperor k n o w n to
C h r i s t i a n h i s t o r i a n s as ' t h e A p o s t a t e ' . J u U a n r e i g n e d i n t h e m i d d l e o f
3 4

t h e f o u r t h c e n t u r y , after C o n s t a n t i n e h a d m a d e C h r i s t i a n i t y t h e o f f i c i a l
r e l i g i o n o f t h e E m p i r e . A n e p h e w o f C o n s t a n t i n e , h e was r a i s e d as a
C h r i s t i a n b y C o n s t a n t i n e ' s s o n , C o n s t a n t i u s I I , w h o was also J u h a n ' s
i m m e d i a t e p r e d e c e s s o r as e m p e r o r . A t s o m e stage J u h a n seems t o h a v e
developed a preference for paganism. W h e n he became emperor, he
declared himseh"a pagan a n d — w h a t makes h i m particularly i m p o r t a n t
f o r o u r s t o r y — p r o c l a i m e d a p o h c y t o l e r a t i n g аП r e h g i o n s , i n c l u d i n g
n o t o n l y p a g a n r e h g i o n s , b u t also t h e v a r i o u s f o r m s o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , b o t h
o r t h o d o x a n d h e r e t i c a l . T h e accusation against M o n t a i g n e was t h a t h e
3 5

had 'excused'Juhan.

3 3
I r e c o t n m e n d t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i s essay i n D a v i d L e w i s S c h a e f e r , PoliPhil, 145^7.1 a m
substantiaUy i n a g r e e m e n t w i t h S c h a e f e r , b u t have a f e w points o f m y o w n to add.
3 4
M o n t a i g n e d o u b t s t h e p r o p r i e t y o f this e p i t h e t , s i n c e h e t h i n k s that J u h a n w a s n e v e r
r e a U y a C h r i s t i a n at h e a r t , t h a t h e m e r e l y p r e t e n d e d t o b e , i n o b e d i e n c e t o t h e U w s ( I I , x i x , O f
freedomofconscience',V-S 6 7 0 , S 761—2, F 508).
3 5
A t this stage it w a s stiU n o t c l e a r w h i c h f o r m o f C h r i s t i a n i t y w a s o r t h o d o x . C o n s t a n t i n e
( i f h e h a d a n y real v i e w s a b o u t the d o c t r i n e o f t h e T r i n i t y ) h a d presumably b e e n a n A t h a n a s i a n .
B u t C o n s t a n t i u s I I was a n A r i a n . H a d h e h v e d longer, that heresy m i g h t have b e c o m e orthodoxy.
 Skepticism andToleration 19

T h e p r i m a r y t e x t h e r e is a s h o r t e s s a y , ' O f f r e e d o m ofconscience'
( I I , x i x ) . I n t h e o p e n i n g p a r a g r a p h , M o n t a i g n e observes that g o o d
i n t e n t i o n s , p u r s u e d i m m o d e r a t e l y , can lead t o vicious actions. H i s
i n i t i a l e x a m p l e is t h e C a t h o h c League, w h o s e members sometimes
acted w i t h the g o o d i n t e n t i o n o f preserving the religious u n i t y of
the k i n g d o m , b u t often behaved brutaUy i n their pursuit o f that goal
( a n d o f t e n h a d less w o r t h y a g e n d a s ) . N e x t h e cites t h o s e C h r i s t i a n
l e a d e r s w h o , o n c e b a c k e d b y t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e state, a t t e m p t e d
t o destroy m a n y o f t h e w o r k s o f p a g a n authors, a m o n g t h e m those o f
Tacitus, w h o s e w o r k s have n o t s u r v i v e d i n t a c t because o f 'five or
six i d l e sentences c o n t r a r y t o o u r b e h e f ' . 3 6
M o n t a i g n e deplores this
'excess . . . [ w h i c h ] d i d m o r e h a r m t o l e t t e r s t h a n aLI t h e b o n f i r e s o f t h e
Barbarians' ^ - S 668; F506; S 759).
M o n t a i g n e offers a t h i r d e x a m p l e o f i n o r d i n a t e zeal: t h o s e C h r i s t i a n
h i s t o r i a n s w h o c o m p l e t e l y c o n d e m n e d аП t h e a c t i o n s o f t h e R o m a n
emperors w h o were ' o u r adversaries'.Juhan e n t e r s as h i s e x a m p l e of
an e m p e r o r h o s t ü e t o C h r i s t i a n i t y w h o m these h i s t o r i a n s w r o n g l y
m a h g n e d . M o s t o f t h e r e m a i n d e r o f t h e essay consists i n a n e n u m e r a t i o n
ofJulian's m a n y v i r t u e s a n d a discussion o f w h a t M o n t a i g n e concedes t o
b e his great vice, his r e h g i o u s v i e w s .
W h a t d i d t h e c e n s o r s o b j e c t t o i n this? D i d t h e y , h k e t h e e a r l y
C h r i s t i a n historians w h o m M o n t a i g n e criticizes, object t o seeing any
v i r t u e at aU i n a n e n e m y o f t h e C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n ? T h a t is w h a t M a l c o h n
S m i t h suggests:'The p r i n c i p l e i n v o l v e d i n M o n t a i g n e ' s praise ofJuhan's
s t a t e s m a n s h i p is t h e s a m e as t h a t i n h i s p r a i s e o f B e z a : a c c e p t a n c e o f t h e
R o m a n C a t h o h c f a i t h d o e s n o t entaÜ d i s m i s s a l o f t h e p e r s o n a l m e r i t s
o f those w h o reject i t ' . 3 7
B u t sensing t h a t this m a y seem insufficient,
S m i t h also p r o p o s e s t h a t t h e c e n s o r s m a y h a v e b e e n r e a c t i n g as w e U
t o M o n t a i g n e ' s c r i t i c i s m o f t h e e a r l y h i s t o r i a n s w h o t r i e d t o suppress
T a c i t u s , a n d m o r e generaUy, t o h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e i d e a o f b u r n i n g
b o o k s b e c a u s e o f t h e i r c o n t e n t . T h a t is: t h e y w e r e o b j e c t i n g t o h i s
o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e i r profession ofcensorship. 3 8

3 6
V-S669,my trans.Cf.S76o,F507.Fortherecord,whatTacitussMdwasthatChristianity
w a s a ' p e r n i c i o u s superstition', a n d that N e r o h a d f o u n d the C h r i s t i a n s g o o d candidates to
b l a m e f o r t h e fire b e c a u s e p e o p l e l o a t h e d t h e m f o r t h e i r v i c e s , p r i n c i p a U y t h e i r h a t r e d o f t h e
humanracefXV,xhv). 3 7
Smith,CensoK,40^o.
3 8
S m i t h n o t e s t h a t T a c i t u s w a s stUl c o n t r o v e r s i a l i n t h e s i x t e e n t h c e n t u r y : ' S h o r t l y b e f o r e
M o n t a i g n e ' s visit to R o m e , t h e F r e n c h s c h o l a r M a r c A n t o i n e M u r e t h a d b e e n f o r b i d d e n b y
t w o m e m b e r s o f the C o n g r e g a t i o n o f t h e I n d e x . . . to give lectures o n Tacitus because
20 Е. M. Curley

B o t h these suggestions s e e m q u i t e p k u s i b l e . B u t I d o n ' t t h i n k t h e y teU

t h e w h o l e s t o r y ; t h e r e is m o r e f o r t h e c e n s o r s t o o b j e c t t o i n t h i s essay
t h a n t h a t . F i r s t , i t u n d e r s t a t e s w h a t M o n t a i g n e d i d i n t h i s essay t o say
m e r e l y t h a t h e g a v e J u h a n c r e d i t f o r his m e r i t s , w h i l e a c k n o w l e d g i n g his
e r r o r i n t h e m a t t e r o f r e h g i o n . H e is i n f a c t extremely k u d a t o r y o f J u h a n ,
w h o , h e says,was

a v e r y great a n d rare m a n . . . w h o s e soul was deeply d i e d w i t h the arguments

o f p h i l o s o p h y , b y w h i c h he professed t o regulate aU his actions . . . there is n o
sort o f v i r t u e o f w h i c h he d i d n o t leave v e r y notable examples . . . [chastity] o f
manyverybeautifulcaptivewomenhewouhinotevenlookatone . . . [justice]
a l t h o u g h o u t o f c u r i o s i t y he i n f o r m e d h i m s e l f o f the reUgion o f those w h o
appeared before h i m , nevertheless the e n m i t y he bore t o ours c a r r i e d n o w e i g h t
inthescales;hemademanygoodlaws . . . [patience,inhisreactiontotheabuse
he received f r o m a C h r i s t i a n bishop] . . . [temperance] i n fuU peacetime he ate
Hke a m a n w h o was p r e p a r i n g . . . h i m s e i f f o r the austerity o f w a r . . . [excel­
lence i n every k i n d o f l i t e r a t u r e ] . . . a great c o m m a n d e r . . . [courage] w e have
hardly any m e m o r y o f a m a n w h o faced m o r e risks o r w h o m o r e o f t e n p u t his
person t o t h e t e s t . . . H e o w e d t o p h i l o s o p h y the s i n g u k r c o n t e m p t i n w h i c h
he h e l d his o w n life a n d aU h u m a n things . . . as he was d y i n g he said, a m o n g
o t h e r things, that he was grateful t o the gods . . . because t h e y h a d n o t w i U e d t o
кШ h i m b y surprise, h a v i n g l o n g before i n f o r m e d h i m o f t h e place and time o f
his e n d . . . he t h a n k e d t h e m f o r [ g r a n t i n g h i m a swift death and f o r ] h a v i n g
f o u n d h i m w o r t h y t o die i n this n o b l e fashion, i n the course o f h i s victories and
t h e flower o f h i s glory. (V-S 669^71; F 5 07—9; S 7 6 0 - 2 )

M o n t a i g n e does a c k n o w l e d g e t h a t this p a r a g o n h a d s o m e f a u l t s . T h e r e
was o n e c o m p l a i n t w h i c h c o m d be m a d e a b o u t his j u s t i c e : h e dealt
severely at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f h i s r e i g n w i t h those w h o h a d s u p p o r t e d his
predecessor. 39
B u t his p r i n c i p a l — n e a r l y his o n l y — f a u l t lay ' i n matters
o f r e h g i o n [ w h e r e ] h e was a l t o g e t h e r v i c i o u s ' fV-S 6 7 0 ; F 508;S 7 6 1 ) . I n
h i s o w n p a g a n r e h g i o n h e was e x t r e m e l y s u p e r s t i t i o u s a n d c a p t i v a t e d b y
the art o f d i v i n a t i o n . A n d he hated Christianity.
N e v e r t h e l e s s , M o n t a i g n e does a g o o d deal t o u n d e r m i n e this c r i t i c i s m
o f J u h a n . H e a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t J u h a n was a n e n e m y o f C h r i s t i a n i t y , a n d
a h a r s h e n e m y . B u t u r d i k e t h e C h r i s t i a n s o f M o n t a i g n e ' s o w n d a y , h e was

h c speaks Ш o f Christians a n d Jews, a n d because they w e r e t h i n k i n g o f prohibiting h i m '

(Censors, 52).

3 9
Constantius,who hadno children,hadmadeJuhanhis second-in-command,butJuhan's
a c c e s s i o n to t h e t h r o n e t h r e a t e n e d to b e b l o o d y . H e h a d b e g u n a c i v i l w a r against C o n s t a n t i u s
w h e n his c o u s i n died.
 Skeptiasm and Toleration 21

' n o t c r u e l . . . h e was a n e n e m y o f C h r i s t i a n i t y b u t w i t h o u t s h e d d i n g
b l o o d ' fV-S 6 6 0 ^ 7 0 ; F 507—8; S 760—1). H e accepts as g o o d t h e t e s t i ­
mony of only two ancient historians, A m m i a n u s MarceUinus and
Eutropius. 4 0
B o t h t h e s e m e n w e r e , as h e says, e y e w i t n e s s e s o f J u h a n ' s
a c t i o n s , a n d b o t h w e r e , as h e d o e s n o t say, p a g a n s . H e is a w a r e t h a t s o m e
o f t h e a n c i e n t C h r i s t i a n h i s t o r i a n s a s c r i b e d c r u e l t y t o J u l i a n i n his d e a l ­
i n g s w i t h t h e C h r i s t i a n s , b u t h e rejects t h e i r t e s t i m o n y as i n c o n s i s t e n t
w i t h t h a t o f his m o r e c r e d i b l e p a g a n h i s t o r i a n s . T h e worst action
A r n m i a n u s r e p o r t s J u h a n as h a v i n g t a k e n against t h e C h r i s t i a n s was to
bar C h r i s t i a n rhetoricians and g r a m m a r i a n s f r o m t e a c h i n g i n the i n s t i ­
tutes o f l e a r n i n g : 4 1
' I t is p r o b a b l e t h a t i f J u l i a n h a d d o n e a n y t h i n g h a r s h e r
against us M a r c e U i n u s w o u l d n o t h a v e o v e r l o o k e d i t , s i n c e h e was weU
disposed t o o u r side'.
M o n t a i g n e also f o U o w s A r m n i a n u s , i n p r e f e r e n c e t o C h r i s t i a n h i s t o r i ­
ans, i n r e j e c t i n g t h e s t o r y t h a t w h e n J u h a n was d y i n g , h e s a i d : ' T h o u hast
c o n q u e r e d , N a z a r e a n ! ' ( a s T h e o d o r e t has i t ) o r ' B e satisfied, N a z a r e a n ! '
(as Z o n a r a s has i t ) . ' I f m y a u t h o r i t i e s h a d b e H e v e d t h a t , ' h e o b s e r v e s , ' t h e y
w o u l d n o t h a v e o v e r l o o k e d [these w o r d s ] : t h e y w e r e p r e s e n t i n h i s a r m y
a n d n o t e d t h e s h g h t e s t o f h i s final w o r d s a n d g e s t u r e s ' . T h i s passage has 4 2

a special interest, since the o n l y change M o n t a i g n e m a d e i n the 1580

e d i t i o n v e r s i o n o f t h e essay was to o m i t i t f r o m the 1588 edition.
P e r h a p s , as F r a m e , f o r e x a m p l e , p r o p o s e s , t h e o m i s s i o n i n 1588 was a
r e a c t i o n t o t h e c e n s o r s ' c r i t i c i s m . B u t i f , i n 1588, h e was r e s p o n d i n g t o

4 0
M a i n t y A r n m i a n u s , s i n c e E u t r o p i u s ' a c c o u n t o f J u l i a n is t o o b r i e f t o b e o f m u c h u s e . I n
the d i s c u s s i o n i n C h i c a g o it w a s suggested that M o n t a i g n e m i g h t also b e d e p e n d i n g o n J e a n
B o d i n ' s d i s c u s s i o n o f J u h a n i n h i s Methodjor the Easy Comprehension of History, tr. f ß e a t r i c e
R e y n o l d s ( N e w Y o r k : C o l u m b i a U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1945), c h . 4 ) . T h e r e c e r t a i n l y are significant
s i m i k r i t i e s b e t w e e n B o d i n a n d M o n t a i g n e i n their treatment o f J u H a n a n d I feel sure that
M o n t a i g n e k n e w t h i s d i s c u s s i o n . B o d i n is c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e c h o i c e o f h i s t o r i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s ,
a n d c o m p l a i n s t h a t ' a h n o s t aU e c c l e s i a s t i c a l w r i t e r s a r e a n i m a t e d w i t h s u c h h a t r e d w h e n t h e y
w r i t e a b o u t t h e adversaries o f o u r r e h g i o n that n o t o n l y do t h e y t r y to t o n e d o w n t h e i r virtues,
b u t t h e y e v e n r e n d t h e m w i t h s c o r n ' . H e c i t e s J u U a n as a n e x a m p l e a n d c o m m e n d s A m m i a n u s
for his objectivity i n n o t i n g bothJuHan's virtues a n d his v i c e s ' w i t h the u t m o s t fidehty'. A U this
is v e r y m u c h i n M o n t a i g n e ' s s p i r i t . N e v e r t h e l e s s , M o n t a i g n e ' s a c c o u n t c o n t a i n s m u c h d e t a i l
about J u h a n w h i c h he c o u l d n o t have obtained i r o m B o d i n a n d w o u l d have f o u n d i n
Ammianus.
4 1
T h e r h e t o r i c i a n s a n d g r a m m a r i a n s w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t e a c h i n g s t u d e n t s t h e classics o f
p a g a n l i t e r a t u r e . W i s h i n g to reinstate p a g a n i s m , J u h a n w a n t e d these c k s s i c s to b e taught b y
p e o p l e w h o b e l i e v e d i n the r e h g i o n t h e y a s s u m e d ( t h o u g h J u h a n i n t e r p r e t e d that r e h g i o n
through the perspective ofNeopktonism).
4 2
T h i s argument from silence m a y have s o m e weight i n t h e case o f A m m i a n u s ; but
E u t r o p i u s ' a c c o u n t o f J u h a n is so b r i e f t h a t i t s e e m s v e r y d u b i o u s i n t h a t c a s e .
22 Е. M. Curley

t h e censors b y o m i t t i n g i t , h e c h a n g e d his m i n d w h e n h e p r e p a r e d t h e
1595 edition. In that edition this passage is restored. Smith
c o m m e n t s : ' t h e r e a p p e a r a n c e o f t h i s s u b j e c t i n t h e 1595 e d i t i o n suggests
that, o n r e f l e c t i o n , M o n t a i g n e felt n o n e e d t o sacrifice h i s t o r i c a l o b j e c ­
tivity to pious legend'. 4 3

A m m i a n u s does take pains t o b e a n objective h i s t o r i a n , carefuhy

r e c o r d i n g t h e v i r t u e s a n d t h e v i c e s b o t h o f t h e p e o p l e h e a d m i r e s (as h e
d o e s J u h a n ) a n d t h e p e o p l e h e despises (as h e d o e s C o n s t a n t i u s ) . B u t i t
is puzzhng that Montaigne should caU h i m 'weU disposed to'
C h r i s t i a n i t y . M o s t o f A m m i a n u s ' references t o t h e C h r i s t i a n s s e e m fairly
n e u t r a l . T h e r e are passages w h e r e h e s h o w s s o m e r e s p e c t f o r t h e m o r a l
teachings o f Christianity, o r f o r the c o n d u c t o f some Christians. B u t
e v e n t h o s e passages are m i x e d i n t h e i r o v e r a h v e r d i c t . T h e f o U o w i n g p a s ­
sage, w h i c h o c c u r s i n a s u m m i n g u p o f C o n s t a n t i u s ' g o o d a n d b a d
p o i n t s , seems r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h o s e i n w h i c h A m m i a n u s speaks f a v o r ­
ably about Christianity:

T h e p l a i n and simple r e l i g i o n o f the Christians he obscured b y a dotard's

superstition; and b y subde a n d i n v o l v e d discussions about dogma, rather t h a n b y
seriously t r y i n g t o m a k e t h e m agree, h e aroused m a n y controversies; as these
spread m o r e and m o r e , he fed t h e m w i t h c o n t e n t i o u s w o r d s . ( X X I , x v i , 18) 44

O t h e r passages are n e g a t i v e e n o u g h t o o c c a s i o n s u r p r i s e t h a t t h e y s u r ­
v i v e d C h r i s t i a n a t t e m p t s t o suppress p a g a n c r i t i c i s m . H e is h i g h l y c r i t i ­
cal o f t h e w o r l d l y a m b i t i o n s o f t h e C h r i s t i a n clergy, d e s c r i b i n g i n s o m e
detail t h e v i o l e n t c o n f l i c t b e t w e e n t w o candidates f o r t h e b i s h o p r i c o f
R o m e , w h i c h l e d t o t h e b l o o d y deaths o f m a n y o f t h e i r s u p p o r t e r s . T h i s
leads h i m t o r e f l e c t i o n s r e m i n i s c e n t o f R e n a i s s a n c e a n d R e f o r m a t i o n
criticisms o f l a t e r bishops ofRome:

B e a r i n g i n m i n d the ostentation i n c i t y Kfe, I d o n o t deny t h a t those w h o are

desirous o f s u c h a t h i n g o u g h t t o struggle w i t h the exercise o f a U t h e i r strength
t o g a i n w h a t they seek; f o r w h e n t h e y attain i t , t h e y w ü l b e so free from care that
t h e y are e n r i c h e d from the offerings o f m a t r o n s , r i d e seated i n carriages, wear­
i n g c l o t h i n g chosen w i t h care, a n d serve banquets so lavish that t h e i r e n t e r t a i n ­
ments o u t d o the tables o f k i n g s . T h e s e m e n m i g h t be t r u l y h a p p y , i f t h e y w o u l d
disregard the greatness o f t h e c i t y b e h i n d w h i c h t h e y h i d e t h e i r favdts, and Kve

4 3
S m i t h Censors, j i .
4 4
T r a n s U t i o n s a r e t a k e n f r o m Ammianus MarceUinus, ed. a n d t r a n s . J o h n C . R o t f e , 3 vols.
(Loeb Gassical Library) (London and Cambridge, M A : W. Heinernann and Harvard
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1950H5).
 Skepticism andToleration 23

after the manner o f s o m e provincial bishops,whose m o d e r a t i o n i n f o o d and d r i n k ,

p k i n apparel ako, and gaze fixed u p o n the earth, c o m m e n d t h e m t o the Eternal
D e i t y and t o his true servants as pure and reverent m e n . f X X V I I , i i i , 14—15)

It's c l e a r m a t A r n r n i a n u s finds s o m e o f t h e C h r i s t i a n c l e r g y a d m i r a b l e .
B u t i t seems a n e x a g g e r a t i o n t o d e s c r i b e h i m as ' w e U - d i s p o s e d t o o u r
s i d e ' . I f y o u t h i n k , as M o n t a i g n e seems t o i n t h e ' A p o l o g y f o r S e b o n d '
f V - S 4 4 2 ^ ; F 322—6; S 4 9 3 ^ 5 ) , t h a t t h e t r u e r e h g i o n o u g h t t o b e d i s t i n ­
guished b y the s u p e r i o r m o r a l b e h a v i o r o f i t s adherents, t h e n this c r i t i ­
c i s m o f t h e C h r i s t i a n clergy w o u l d be a c r i t i c i s m o f t h e r e h g i o n itself.
A l s o p u z z h n g , p r i m a f a c i e , is t h a t M o n t a i g n e s h o u l d d e s c r i b e J u h a n as
t h o r o u g h l y vicious i n matters o f r e U g i o n , w h e n one o f h i s most i m p o r ­
t a n t p o h c i e s was a g e n e r a l t o l e r a t i o n o f a U r e l i g i o n s . Y o u w o u l d n o t t h i n k
t h a t M o n t a i g n e w o u l d r e g a r d that as v i c i o u s . B u t M o n t a i g n e knows
f r o m reading A m m i a n u s that Julian had devious motives for adopting
t h i s p o h c y . J u h a n h a d l o n g b e e n a p a g a n at h e a r t , b u t d i d n o t dare d i s ­
c l o s e t h i s f a c t . T h a t is w h y M o n t a i g n e hesitates t o caU h i m a n apostate.
H e n e v e r reaUy w a s a C h r i s t i a n . S m i t h says t h a t M o n t a i g n e d e p l o r e d t h i s
dissimmation, 4 5
but I cannot detect his disapproval. As Montaigne
p o i n t s o u t , J u h a n w a s s i m p l y o b e y i n g t h e l a w u n t i l , as r u l e r , h e h a d t h e
p o w e r t o c h a n g e i t . H i s u l t i m a t e g o a l was t o r e s t o r e p a g a n i s m . T o l e r a t i o n
o f aU r e h g i o n s w a s a m e a n s t o t h a t e n d : ' H a v i n g f o u n d t h e p e o p l e i n
Constantinople at odds a n d t h e prelates o f the Christian Church
d i v i d e d , h e h a d t h e m c o m e t o h i m at t h e p a l a c e a n d e a r n e s d y a d m o n ­
i s h e d t h e m t o l u U t h e s e c i v i c dissensions a n d u r g e d t h a t e a c h m a n
s h o u l d s e r v e h i s o w n r e h g i o n w i t h o u t h i n d r a n c e a n d w i t h o u t fear'
f V - S 6 7 1 ; F 5 0 9 ; S 7 6 2 ) . H o w d i d t h i s serve t h e r e s t o r a t i o n o f p a g a n i s m ?
M o n t a i g n e suggests t h a t J u h a n h o p e d

that this c o m p l e t e fteedom w o u l d augment the schisms and factions that

d i v i d e d t h e m a n d w o u l d keep the people f r o m u n i t i n g and consequendy
strengthening themselves against h i m b y t h e i r c o n c o r d and u n a n i m o u s u n d e r ­
standing; f o r he h a d learned b y experience, from the c r u e l t y o f s o m e Christians,
that there is n o beast i n the w o r l d so m u c h t o be feared b y m a n as m a n . T h o s e
are v e r y nearly his w o r d s , (ibid.)

T h i s last s e n t e n c e is i n t r i g u i n g . M o n t a i g n e has b e e n f o U o w i n g so c l o s e l y
t h e passage i n A m m i a n u s o n w h i c h t h i s a c c o u n t is b a s e d t h a t i t is h a r d t o
b e h e v e h e d o e s n o t h a v e a c o p y o f t h e b o o k o p e n i n front o f h i m . B u t

4 5
Censors,4S>-
24 Б. M. Curley

w h a t A m m i a n u s a c t u a U y said, i n t h e s e n t e n c e M o n t a i g n e p u r p o r t s t o
paraphrase so closely, is i n f a c t r a t h e r d i f f e r e n t : ' h e k n e w f r o m e x p e r i e n c e
t h a t n o w i l d beasts are s u c h e n e m i e s t o m a n k i n d as are m o s t o f t h e
C h r i s t i a n s i n t h e i r d e a d l y h a t r e d o f o n e a n o t h e r ' ( X X I I , v, 4 ) . T h i s is t h e
p a g a n a u t h o r w h o m h e d e s c r i b e d as ' w e U - d i s p o s e d t o o u r s i d e ' .
T h e essay c o n c l u d e s b y d r a w i n g a n a p p a r e n t c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e
pohcies o f J u l i a n a n d those o f ' o u r kings':

T h i s is w o r t h y o f c o n s i d e r a t i o n , that E m p e r o r J u l i a n uses, t o k i n d l e the t r o u b l e

o f c i v i l dissension, that same recipe o f f r e e d o m o f conscience that o u r kings
havejust b e e n e m p l o y i n g t o e x t i n g u i s h i t . I t m a y be said, o n the o n e h a n d , that
t o give factions a loose r e i n t o e n t e r t a i n t h e i r o w n o p i n i o n s is t o scatter and sow
d i v i s i o n ; i t is almost l e n d i n g a h a n d t o a u g m e n t i t , there b e i n g n o b a r r i e r o r
c o e r c i o n o f t h e laws t o c h e c k o r h i n d e r its course . . . (V-S 671;F 509; S763)

T h i s sounds h k e a c r i t i c i s m o f C a t h e r i n e de M e d i c i a n d h e r sons.They
had adopted a pohcy o f t o l e r a t i o n — w i t h the apparent i n t e n t i o n o f
reducing civil d i s c o r d — a n d their p o h c y accentuated the discord. H a d
they k n o w n what Juhan had learned f r o m experience about human
n a t u r e ( o r at least, a b o u t C h r i s t i a n s ) , t h e y w o u l d h a v e a n t i c i p a t e d t h e
p r o b a b l e consequences o f t h e i r actions. I f y o u assume that t h e y w e r e n o t
fools,but shrewd pohticians,you m i g h t infer that they d i d anticipate the
consequences o f t h e i r actions, a n d h a d i n t e n t i o n s o t h e r t h a n those they
p r o f e s s e d (e.g. k e e p i n g t h e i r p o l i t i c a l e n e m i e s d i v i d e d b y r e h g i o u s d i f ­
f e r e n c e s w h i c h d i d n o t m a t t e r t o t h e r o y a l f a m i l y ) . B u t t h e r e is, o f
c o u r s e , a n o t h e r h a n d t o c o m e : ' O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , o n e c o u l d also say
t h a t t o g i v e f a c t i o n s a l o o s e r e i n t o e n t e r t a i n t h e i r o w n o p i n i o n s is t o
s o f t e n a n d r e l a x t h e m t h r o u g h f a c i l i t y a n d ease, a n d t o d u U t h e p o i n t ,
w h i c h is s h a r p e n e d b y r a r i t y , n o v e l t y , a n d d i f E c u l t y ' . W h y w o u l d o n e say
this? P e r h a p s M o n t a i g n e a n t i c i p a t e d t h a t in the long run t h e p o h c y o f t o l -
e r a t i o n w o u l d cause r e h g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s n o t t o m a t t e r so m u c h . T h e
assumption m i g h t be that m a n y people embrace opinions w h i c h divide
t h e m f r o m o t h e r s p r e c i s e l y b e c a u s e t h e y e n j o y t h e sense o f h o l d i n g
m i n o r i t y views w h i c h the majority strongly oppose.Tolerating m i n o r ­
i t y o p i n i o n s robs t h e m o f t h e i r p r i n c i p a l a t t r a c t i o n . As a m a t t e r of
psychology, I t h i n k there m a y be s o m e t h i n g i n this.
I n a n y case, t h i s h a n d d o e s n o t h a v e t h e last w o r d . M o n t a i g n e con­
c l u d e s h i s essay w i t h t h e f o U o w i n g e p i g r a m : ' A n d y e t I p r e f e r t o t h i n k ,
for the reputation o f o u r kings'piety, that having been unable to do w h a t
 Skepticism andToleration 25

t h e y w o u l d , t h e y h a v e p r e t e n d e d t o w i U w h a t t h e y c o u l d ' . T h i s seems t o
say: C a t h e r i n e a n d h e r sons m a y h a v e a p p e a r e d indifFerent t o the
q u e s t i o n o f w h i c h r e h g i o n t h e i r subjects a d h e r e d t o , b u t i n f a c t t h e y
w e r e g o o d Cathohcs, w h o w e r e f o r c e d b y p o h t i c a l circumstances to
t o l e r a t e r e h g i o u s d i f f e r e n c e s t h e y a b h o r r e d . I assume t h a t M o n t a i g n e
k n e w t h e players i n t h i s g a m e w e U e n o u g h t o k n o w t h a t i t w a s n ' t t r u e .
So I t a k e t h e last s e n t e n c e t o b e i r o n i c .
P e r h a p s M o n t a i g n e ' s f i n a l w o r d o n t o l e r a t i o n ( i n t h i s essay) is t h i s :
t o l e r a t i o n can, and often does, l e a d t o a w f u l c i v i l s t r i f e ; w e are u n f o r t u n a t e
i f w e are i n a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h i t seems t o b e necessary; b u t w e c a n h o p e
t h a t , o v e r t i m e , as p e o p l e b e c o m e a c c u s t o m e d t o l i v i n g w i t h t h o s e w i t h
w h o m t h e y disagree, t h e y m a y l o s e i n t e r e s t i n t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s .

T H E A P O L O G Y F O R R A Y M O N D S E B O N D

I b e g a n t h i s essay b y c a U i n g a t t e n t i o n t o a p a r a d o x : t h a t M o n t a i g n e has a
r e p u t a t i o n f o r b e i n g a n a u t h o r w h o advocates t o l e r a t i o n , a n d w h o m a y
h a v e s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n f l u e n c e d t h e g r a d u a l a c c e p t a n c e o f t o l e r a t i o n as a
p o l i t i c a l i d e a l , b u t t h a t h e is also i d e n t i f i e d w i t h a p y r r h o n i s t p h i l o s o p h y
w h i c h seems t o l e a d t o a d o c t r i n e o f c o n f o r m i s t s u b m i s s i o n t o a n
authoritarian, intolerant church.
W e ' v e n o w seen m a n y w a y s i n w h i c h M o n t a i g n e is a p p a r e n d y a t o d d s
w i t h t h a t c h u r c h , a n d h o w o f t e n h e does n o t p r a c t i c e t h e t o t a l s u b m i s s i o n
h e s o m e t i m e s preaches. H e expresses s t r o n g d i s a p p r o v a l o f t h e p u n i s h m e n t
o f w i t c h e s , a n d s k e p t i c i s m a b o u t t h e i r possession o f s u p e r n a t u r a l p o w e r s ;
h e a n t i c i p a t e s m u c h o f H u m e ' s c r i t i q u e o f b e h e f i n m i r a c l e s ; h e is a pas­
sionate c r i t i c o f t h e c o l o n i z a t i o n o f t h e N e w W o r l d a n d t h e f o r c e d c o n ­
v e r s i o n o f t h e n a t i v e p e o p l e s ; h e is h i g h l y c r i t i c a l o f t h e f o r c e d c o n v e r s i o n
o f t h e J e w s i n E u r o p e ; h e argues p o w e r f u U y against t h e use o f t o r t u r e , b o t h
as a m e a n s o f p u n i s h m e n t a n d as a m e a n s o f i n v e s t i g a t i o n ; a n d h e has t h e
h i g h e s t praise f o r a p a g a n R o m a n e m p e r o r , h a t e d b y t h e C h u r c h f o r h i s
a t t e m p t t o restore p a g a n i s m . T h e censors n o t i c e d s o m e o f t h e s e p o i n t s o f
c o n f l i c t w h e n t h e y e x a m i n e d t h e f i r s t e d i t i o n o f t h e Essays.We c a n see, b y
e x a m i n i n g the later editions, h o w M o n t a i g n e responded t o their pohte
r e q u e s t t o r e c o n s i d e r : h e s h a r p e n e d h i s c r i t i c i s m a g a i n a n d again.
N o w i t m a y b e said t h a t c r i t i c i s m o f , a n d d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h , the
C h u r c h d o e s n o t i m p l y r e j e c t i o n o f t h e r e h g i o n i t represents. B o t h
26 Е. M. Curley

E r a s m u s a n d L u t h e r w e r e h i g h l y c r i t i c a l o f t h e C h u r c h o f t h e i r day;
t h o u g h L u t h e r left the C h u r c h , b o t h r e m a i n e d strongly committed
Christians. M o r e o v e r , M o n t a i g n e ' s personal c o n d u c t , his regular w o r ­
s h i p at h i s p r i v a t e c h a p e l , his v i s i t s t o r e h g i o u s s h r i n e s , h i s e n c o u r a g e ­
m e n t t o his Protestant niece t o convert t o C a t h o h c i s m , a n d m a n y o t h e r
p e r s o n a l d e t a i l s , aU t e s t i f y t o his b e i n g a f a i t h f u l s o n o f t h e Church.This
is t r u e . B u t i n m a t t e r s o f t h i s k i n d , c e r t a i n t y is n o t t o b e h a d , a n d c o n t e x t
is e v e r y t h i n g . W e m u s t seek t o f o r m o u r o v e r a U j u d g m e n t o f a n a u t h o r ' s
c h a r a c t e r a n d i n t e n t i o n s b y as b r o a d a k n o w l e d g e as w e c a n m u s t e r o f
t h e w h o l e o f h i s w o r k , o f t h e predecessors b y w h o m h e was i n f l u e n c e d ,
o f t h e successors w h o m h e i n t u r n i n f l u e n c e d , a n d o f t h e v a r i o u s p r e s ­
sures w h i c h m i g h t h a v e i n h i b i t e d f r e e expression.
S o f a r I h a v e s a i d h t t l e a b o u t t h e m o s t f a m o u s essay o f a U , t h e ' A p o l o g y
f o r R a y m o n d S e b o n d ' , t r e a t i n g i t m a i n l y as a w o r k w h i c h m i g h t p r o ­
v i d e a r a t i o n a l e f o r r e l i g i o u s i n t o l e r a n c e . T h a t is n o t m y f i n a l v i e w o f t h e
' A p o l o g y ' . I t h i n k , i n fact, t h a t i n the e n d i t m a y be the m o s t i m p o r t a n t
o f M o n t a i g n e ' s p r o - t o l e r a t i o n essays. B u t h e r e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n is m o r e
t h a n usuaUy d i f f i c u l t a n d controversial. I c a n n o t h o p e t o deal fuUy w i t h
t h i s w o r k i n t h e f m a l s e c t i o n o f a n essay w h i c h is a k e a d y l o n g e n o u g h .
B u t I d o h a v e s o m e s u g g e s t i o n s t o m a k e a b o u t its i n t e r p r e t a t i o n .
D o n a l d F r a m e poses t h e f u n d a m e n t a l q u e s t i o n a b o u t t h e ' A p o l o g y '
forcefuUy w h e n he asks:'Did M o n t a i g n e betray Sebond?' 4 6
H i s answer
w a s ' n o ' , b u t h e a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t t h e r e w e r e reasons w h y y o u m i g h t
t h i n k o t h e r w i s e . S e b o n d h a d a t t e m p t e d t o establish, b y n a t u r a l reason,
the fundamental truths o f the Christian r e h g i o n : n o t merely the exis­
t e n c e o f G o d , b u t e v e r y t r u t h essential t o m a n ' s s a l v a t i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o
M o n t a i g n e , S e b o n d ' s c r i t i c s h a d m a d e t w o m a i n o b j e c t i o n s against h i m :
( i ) that'Christians d o themselves w r o n g b y t r y i n g t o support t h e i r b e l i e f
w i t h h u m a n reasons; [ t h e i r b e h e f ] is c o n c e i v e d o n l y b y f a i t h a n d b y a
p a r t i c u h t r i n s p i r a t i o n o f d i v i n e grace' fV-S 4 4 0 ( m y t r a n s . ) ; F 3 2 1 ; S 4 9 1 ) ;
a n d (2) t h a t ' h i s a r g u m e n t s are w e a k a n d u n s u i t e d t o w h a t h e w a n t s t o
d e m o n s t r a t e ' f V - S 4 4 8 ; F 3 2 7 ; S 5 0 0 ) . M o n t a i g n e ' s ' d e f e n s e ' consists i n
c o n c e d i n g b o t h o b j e c t i o n s a n d a r g u i n g at l e n g t h t h a t S e b o n d ' s a r g u ­
m e n t s are n o w o r s e t h a n a n y o n e else's. It's a m i s t a k e t o s u p p o s e t h a t
4 6
Romanic Review, 38 ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 2 9 7 — 3 2 9 . F r a m e p o s e s t h e i s s u e f o r c e f u U y , b u t p r e j u d i c i a U y ,
i n s o f a r as h i s q u e s t i o n i m p h e s t h a t i t w o u l d b e a n a c t o f d i s l o y a l t y i f M o n t a i g n e w e r e c o v e r d y
u n d e r m i n i n g Sebond's arguments. M o n t a i g n e has n o o b h g a t i o n to defend S e b o n d i f h e doesn't
a g r e e w i t h h i m . A n d g i v e n t h e p e n a l t i e s f o r d i s s e n t i n h i s day, i t is u n f a i r to e x p e c t h i m t o
oppose S e b o n d too openly.
 Skeptiäsm and Toleration 27

h u m a n r e a s o n c a n estabhsh a n y t h i n g , o r e v e n m a k e t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s o f
the faith m o r e probable than their denial. T h e fideism Montaigne
e m b r a c e s i n c o n c e d i n g t h e first o b j e c t i o n is a p p r o p r i a t e g i v e n t h e g e n ­
e r a l i n a b i h t y o f h u m a n r e a s o n t o p r o v i d e a r a t i o n a l basis f o r a n y b e h e f .
P y r r h o n i s m c o m e s t o t h e rescue o f r a t i o n a l theology.
M a n y r e a d e r s ' first i m p r e s s i o n o f t h i s essay is t h a t that's a s t r a n g e w a y
t o d e f e n d r a t i o n a l t h e o l o g y . I n t h i s case, I t h i n k , first i m p r e s s i o n s are
r i g h t : t h e ' A p o l o g y ' is, f u n d a m e n t a U y , a r e l i g i o u s l y s u b v e r s i v e work,
w h i c h m i g h t w e U w e a k e n t h e b e h e f s o f i t s readers, a n d w h i c h m a y h a v e
b e e n i n t e n d e d t o d o so. H e r e ' s o n e r e a s o n f o r t h i n k i n g t h i s . T o w a r d t h e
e n d o f t h i s l o n g essay M o n t a i g n e i n t e r r u p t s h i s a r g u m e n t t o address a
w a r n i n g t o his 'Patroness',probably M a r g a r e t o f V a I o i s :

Y o u , f b r w h o m I have taken the pains t o e x t e n d so l o n g a w o r k , c o n t r a r y t o m y

c u s t o m , w ü l n o t s h r i n k from u p h o l d i n g y o u r Sebond b y the o r d i n a r y f o r m o f
a r g u m e n t i n w h i c h y o u are i n s t r u c t e d every day, and i n that y o u w i U exercise
y o u r m i n d a n d y o u r l e a r n i n g . F o r this f m a l fencer's t r i c k m u s t n o t be e m p l o y e d
except as an extreme remedy. I t is a desperate stroke, i n w h i c h y o u must aban­
d o n y o u r o w n weapons t o make y o u r adversary lose his, a n d a secret t r i c k that
m u s t be used rarely and reservedly. I t is great rashness t o r u i n y o u r s e t f i n order
t o r u i n another. fV-S 557-8; F 418-19; S 628)

M o n t a i g n e e m p h a s i z e s h e r e t h a t i t is e x t r e m e l y d a n g e r o u s t o t r y t o use
p y r r h o n i s m t o defend C h r i s t i a n i t y . T o appreciate t h e danger,juxtapose
t h i s passage w i t h a n o t h e r , e a r l y i n t h e w o r k , w h e r e M o n t a i g n e e x p l a i n s
w h y S e b o n d ' s b o o k is u s e f u l e n o u g h t o t r a n s l a t e a n d d e f e n d at l e n g t h .
Pierre B u n e l h a d given Montaigne's father a copy ofSebond's Natural
Theology, r e c o m m e n d i n g i t as a b o o k v e r y u s e f u l f o r t h e t i m e s i n w h i c h
h e gave i t t o h i m :

T h i s was w h e n the novelties o f L u t h e r were b e g i n n i n g t o gain favor, and t o

shake o u r o l d b e l i e f i n m a n y places. I n this B u n e l was v e r y w e U advised, r i g h d y
foreseeing b y rational inference that this i n c i p i e n t disease w o u l d easily degen­
erate i n t o a loathsome atheism. F o r o r d i n a r y p e o p l e , 47
w h o lack the faculty o f
j u d g i n g things as t h e y are, let themselves be carried away b y chance a n d b y
appearances. O n c e y o u have p u t i n t o t h e i r hands the f00U1ardiness o f d e s p i s i n g
a n d j u d g i n g the o p i n i o n s t h e y used t o h o l d i n extreme reverence (such as those
w h i c h c o n c e r n t h e i r salvation), and once y o u have t h r o w n i n t o d o u b t and p u t
i n t h e b a k n c e any articles o f t h e i r reHgion, t h e y soon cast aU the rest o f t h e i r

4 7
Viüey notes that editions w h i c h appeared i n M o n t a i g n e ' s Hfetime added here: ' ( a n d
e v e r y o n e i s , as i t w e r e , o f t h a t k i n d ) ' .
28 E.M.Curley

behefs i n t o similar u n c e r t a i n t y . T h e y have n o m o r e a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e m , n o m o r e

f o u n d a t i o n , t h a n those y o u havejust u n d e r m i n e d ; and so, as t h o u g h i t w e r e the
y o k e o f a tyrant, t h e y shake offaU those o t h e r ideas they received b y the a u t h o r ­
i t y o f t h e k w s o r t h e reverence f o r ancient usage. fV-S 4 3 9 ) 4 8

So t h e c l a i m is t h a t w e n e e d S e b o n d ' s b r a n d o f r a t i o n a l t h e o l o g y t o save
us f r o m t h e P r o t e s t a n t h e r e s y ; w e n e e d t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h e f u n d a m e n t a l
propositions o f C a t h o H c Christianity,because the Protestant c r i t i q u e o f
the C h u r c h w i U lead t o atheism b y i n d u c i n g skepticism about the
a u t h o r i t y o f t h e C h u r c h a n d o f t r a d i t i o n , a n d h e n c e , a b o u t t h e articles o f
r e h g i o n , w h o s e o n l y basis is t h e a u t h o r i t y o f t h e C h u r c h a n d t r a d i t i o n .
B u t i f P r o t e s t a n t i s m is d a n g e r o u s b e c a u s e i t leads t o s k e p t i c i s m , a n d s k e p ­
t i c i s m leads t o a t h e i s m , i t is b i z a r r e t o d e f e n d C a t h o h c C h r i s t i a n i t y b y
m e a n s o f s k e p t i c i s m . T h a t is as i f , f e a r i n g t h a t y o u m i g h t h a v e e a t e n s o m e
b a d m e a t , y o u t o o k as a n a n t i d o t e t h e m o s t d e a d l y p o i s o n y o u c o u l d f m d .
Is i t M o n t a i g n e ' s i n t e n t i o n t o e n c o u r a g e a t h e i s m , o r at a n y rate, a r e j e c ­
tion o f C h r i s t i a n i t y ? M a n y o f his readers h a v e t h o u g h t so. O t h e r s h a v e
a r g u e d s t r e n u o u s l y t h a t M o n t a i g n e is a s i n c e r e C a t h o h c , a n d c o u l d n o t
h a r b o r a n y s u c h i n t e n t . F o r t u n a t e l y i t is n o t necessary t o resolve t h i s d i s ­
pute, 4 9
i f o u r p r o b l e m is t o e x p b i n h o w M o n t a i g n e ' s w o r k c o n t r i b u t e d t o
t h e g r a d u a l a c c e p t a n c e o f t o l e r a t i o n as a p o h t i c a l i d e a l . I t w i U b e s u f f i c i e n t
f o r t h a t p u r p o s e i f M o n t a i g n e was w i d e l y r e a d as s o m e o n e w h o p r o f e s s e d
a n o r t h o d o x y h e d i d n o t a c c e p t i n his h e a r t , a n d w i d e l y t a k e n t o h a v e p r o ­
v i d e d g o o d reasons f o r q u e s t i o n i n g o r t h o d o x b e h e f . T h a t m u c h seems t o
b e t r u e : h e w a s so r e a d . 5 0
A n d some later thinkers w h o read h i m that w a y
f o u n d i n h i m a r i c h storehouse o f a r g u m e n t s against C h r i s t i a n b e h e f . 5 1

4 8
I take responsibihty for the translation, w h i c h blends suggestions f r o m b o t h S c r e e c h
φ. 49o) a n d F r a m e φ. 320).
4 9
I say ' f o r t u n a t e l y ' b e c a u s e I t h i n k I agree w i t h A n d r e T o u r n o n when he writes:
' d ' a p p r e c i e r l a f o i d e M o n t a i g n e , c ' e s t l'afFaire d e D i e u . . . i l n ' e s t p a s q u e s t i o n i c i d e c e q u i
p o u v a i t se p a s s e r d a n s l e s e c r e t d e l a c o n s c i e n c e o u d e l ' i n c o n s c i e n t d e M o n t a i g n e , m a i s
s e u l e m e n t d e c e q u i est l i s i b l e d a n s s o n h v r e ' ( ' Q u e c ' e s t q u e c r o i r e ' , i n La question de Dieu,
e d . F r a n c o i s e C h a r p e n t i e r , s p e c i a l i s s u e o f t h e Bulletin de la Sodete desAmis de Montaigne (1993),
1 6 3 , 1 7 7 . 1 t a k e t h i s to m e a n t h a t o n l y G o d c a n a n s w e r t h i s q u e s t i o n .
5 0
T h i s c a n b e v e r i f i e d b y c o n s u l t i n g thejugements sur Montaigne compiled i n A p p e n d i x II,
vol. iii, oftheViüey-Saumier edition. See particularly the j u d g m e n t s o f P o r t R o y a l , Bossuet,
P a s c a l , a n d M a l e b r a n c h e . I c o u n t t h e s e r e a d i n g s as f a v o r a b l e t o m y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , n o t b e c a u s e
t h e y s e e M o n t a i g n e as a n a t h e i s t (a c k i m I w o u l d n o t i n s i s t o n ) , b u t b e c a u s e t h e y s e e h i m as a n
a u t h o r f u n d a m e n t a U y s u b v e r s i v e o f t h e r e h g i o u s status q u o .
5 1
A n a u t h o r w h o I t h i n k r e s p o n d e d f a v o r a b l y t o M o n t a i g n e ' s c r i t i q u e o f r e h g i o n is
M o n t e s q u i e u , w h o s e Persian Letters I d i s c u s s i n ' F r o m L o c k e ' s Letter to Montesquieu's Lettres'
(citedabove,n. 58).
 Skepticism andToleration 29

T h a t is n o d o u b t o n e r e a s o n w h y M o n t a i g n e ' s Essays were p u t o n the

I n d e x less t h a n a c e n t u r y after t h e c e n s o r i n i t i a U y gave t h e m his a p p r o v a l .
I t h i n k t h e h t e r j u d g m e n t shows t h e result o f m o r e careful reflection.
H e r e are a f e w m o r e reasons w h y l a t e r readers m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y h a v e
s u s p e c t e d s u b v e r s i v e i n t e n t . F i r s t n o t e t h a t p y r r h o n i s m , as M o n t a i g n e
p r e s e n t s i t , is a p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h r e q u i r e s t h e suspense o f a U j u d g m e n t .
W h e n i t caUs f o r c o n f o r m i t y w i t h t h e r e h g i o n p r e s c r i b e d i n one's c o u n ­
t r y , i t caUs f o r e x t e r n a l c o n f o r m i t y o n l y , 5 2
i . e . i t caUs f o r t h e k i n d o f c o n -
f o r m i t y w h i c h M o n t a i g n e t h i n k s J u h a n gave t o C h r i s t i a n i t y b e f o r e h e
b e c a m e e m p e r o r . I n t e r n a l assent is a m a t t e r w h i c h M o n t a i g n e ' s ' f i d e i s m '
says m u s t b e s u p p h e d b y a s p e c i a l act o f d i v i n e g r a c e , n o t r e a c h e d b y a n y
act o f t h e h u m a n w i U . 5 3

A g a i n , i n his t r e a t m e n t o f t h e afterHfe M o n t a i g n e departs f r o m t h e

p y r r h o n i s t idea that f r o m a p u r e l y rational p o i n t o f v i e w the arguments
p r o a n d c o n are n e a d y b a l a n c e d . H e m a k e s P h t o his t a r g e t , n o t a n y
C h r i s t i a n p b d l o s o p h e r , b u t t h e d o c t r i n e h e treats as u n a c c e p t a b l e t o r e a s o n
is c o m m o n t o P l a t o a n d C h r i s t i a n i t y : t h a t w e shaU r e c e i v e e i t h e r i n f i n i t e
happiness o r i n f i n i t e suffering i n t h e hfe t o c o m e . 5 4
So P l a t o is a s u r r o g a t e
for Christianity. 5 5
C o n s t i t u t e d as w e are, w e are i n c a p a b l e o f i n f i n i t e pleas­
ures a n d p a i n s . I f o u r n a t u r e s w e r e d i f f e r e n t , m a d e capable o f t h e s e r e w a r d s
a n d p u n i s h m e n t s , w e w o u l d n o l o n g e r b e t h e same p e r s o n s . M o r e o v e r , i t
w o u l d n o t bejust to give either an infinite reward or an infinite punish­
m e n t t o h u m a n s i n t h e afterhfe: t h e g o d s t h e m s e l v e s are r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
b o t h o u r v i r t u e s a n d o u r v i c e s f V - S 5 2 0 ; F 386; S 5 8 f > - 1 ) , a n d t h e r e is n o
p r o p o r t i o n a h t y b e t w e e n o u r f i n i t e hves a n d t h e i n f i n i t e r e w a r d s a n d p u n ­
i s h m e n t s w h i c h are s u p p o s e d t o h e i n s t o r e f o r us f V - S 549; F 411;
S 617—18) . W e are ' b e h o l d e n t o G o d a l o n e ' f b r o u r b e h e f i n i m m o r t a h t y . I t is
n o t ' t h e lesson o f n a t u r e a n d o f o u r reason' fV-S 554; F 415;S 6 2 3 ) . A n d this

5 2
' D e s t r o i s a c t i o n s d e l ' a m e , r i m a g i n a t i v e , l ' a p p e t i t i v e , et l a c o n s e n t a n t e , U s e n r e c o i v e n t l e s
d e u x p r e m i e r e s ; l a d e r n i e r e , i l s l a s o u s t i e n n e n t e t l a m a i n t i e n n e n t a m b i g u e , sans i n c H n a t i o n n y
a p p r o b a t i o n d ' u n e p a r t o u d ' a u t r e , t a n t s o i t - e U e l e g e r e . . . fls k i s s e n t g u i d e r c e s c h o s e s [ i n c H -
n a t i o n s n a t u r e U e s , l ' i m p u l s i o n d e s p a s s i o n s , l e s c o n s t i t u t i o n s d e s l o i x et d e s c o u t u m e s , l a t r a d i ­
t i o n d e s arts] s a n s a u c u n e o p i n a t i o n o u j u g e m e n t ' f V - S 5 0 2 - 3 , 5 0 5 ; F 3 7 2 , 3 7 4 ; S 5 6 0 , 5 6 3 ) .
5 3
S e e e.g.V-S 4 4 0 - 1 , F 3 2 1 , S 4 9 2 , cited above, reinforced b y V - S 5 6 3 - 4 , F 4 2 3 - 4 , S 635.
N o t e t h a t t h e C a t h o h c C h u r c h c o n d e m n e d fideism ( u n d e r s t o o d as t h e v i e w t h a t r e a s o n is o f
n o v a l u e a t aU i n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f C h r i s t i a n t r u t h ) i n t h e F i r s t V a t i c a n C o u n c U . S e e
R i c h a r d P. M c B r i e n , Catholicism f N e w Y o r k : H a r p e r C o U i n s , 1 9 9 4 ) , 37.
5 4
V - S 518, F 3 8 4 — 5 , 5 5 7 8 ^ j . T h i s is n o t t o say t h a t M o n t a i g n e d o e s n o t s u b s e q u e n t l y r e p ­
r e s e n t P l a t o as p u U i n g b a c k f r o m t h i s v i e w b e c a u s e o f i t s d i f f i c u l t y . C f . V - S 5 4 9 , F 411, S 6 1 8 .
5 5
H e r e I a g r e e w i t h S c h a e f e r , PoliPhil, 108.
ЗО Е. M. Curley

seems t o b e , n o t because r e a s o n reaches n o c o n c l u s i o n i n t h i s area,

b u t because t h e c o n c l u s i o n i t s u p p o r t s is t h a t o u r s o u k are so t i g h t l y
connected w i t h o u r bodies that they cannot survive t h e m . 5 6

M o n t a i g n e departs f r o m p y r r h o n i s m i n a n o t h e r way. A l t h o u g h he
does frequendy e n d o r s e t h e p y r r h o n i s t i d e a t h a t w h e n w e are f o r c e d t o
act u n d e r c o n d i t i o n s o f r a d i c a l u n c e r t a i n t y , w e s h o v d d f o U o w l a w s , c u s ­
t o m s , a n d t r a d i t i o n ( e . g . V - S 5 0 5 ; F 374; S 5 6 3 ) , s o m e t i m e s h e rebels
against t h i s c o n f o r m i s m . L a t e i n t h e ' A p o l o g y ' , s h o r d y after h e has w r i t ­
t e n t h a t ' t h e m o s t p k u s i b l e a d v i c e o u r r e a s o n g i v e s u s . . . is g e n e r a U y
f o r each m a n t o o b e y t h e k w s o f h i s c o u n t r y ' fV-S 578; F 436; S 652),
M o n t a i g n e adds:

H o w c o u l d that ancient G o d [АроПо] m o r e clearly accuse h u m a n k n o w l e d g e

o f ignorance o f t h e d i v i n e being, a n d teach m e n that r e h g i o n was o n l y a crea­
t u r e o f t h e i r o w n i n v e n t i o n , suitable t o b i n d society together, t h a n b y declaring,
as he d i d . . . t h a t t h e t r u e c u l t f b r each m a n was that w h i c h he found observed
a c c o r d i n g t o the practice o f t h e p k c e he was in? fV-S 579; F 436; S 653)

I f t h e r e w e r e a t r u e r e l i g i o n , i t w o u l d have t o b e universal. Conversely, i f

w e should foUow the religion o f our country, n o matter what country
w e h v e i n , t h e n r e h g i o n is a h u m a n i n v e n t i o n . S o w h e n p h i l o s o p h y teUs
us t o f o U o w t h e l a w s o f o u r c o u n t r y , M o n t a i g n e p r o t e s t s : ' T h a t is t o say,
t h e u n d u k t i n g sea o f t h e o p i n i o n s o f a p e o p l e o r a p r i n c e , w h i c h w i U
p a i n t m e j u s t i c e i n as m a n y c o l o r s , a n d r e f a s h i o n i t i n t o as m a n y faces, as
t h e r e are c h a n g e s o f p a s s i o n i n t h o s e m e n . I c a n n o t h a v e m y j u d g m e n t
so f l e x i b l e ' f V - S 579; F 4 3 7 ; S 6 5 3 ) . F o U o w i n g t h e l a w s o f y o u r t i m e a n d
pkce can, f o r example, lead t o e m b r a c i n g h u m a n sacrifice, which
M o n t a i g n e clearlyregardsasvicious fy~S 5 2 1 ; F 3 8 7 ; S 5 8 2 ) . M o n t a i g n e
d o e s n o t d o u b t t h a t m o s t p e o p l e ' s o p i n i o n s are p o w e r f u U y influenced
b y o p i n i o n s h e l d a r o u n d t h e m . B u t h e suggests t h a t t h i s is t h e r e a s o n ' t h e
w o r l d is f i U e d a n d s o a k e d w i t h t w a d d l e a n d Hes' f V - S 539; F 4 0 3 ; S 6 0 5 ) .
M y reading o f M o n t a i g n e imphes that m u c h o f w h a t he w r o t e he d i d
n o t beUeve, a n d d i d n o t i n t e n d his readers t o a c c e p t at f a c e v a l u e , a n d t h a t
h e n e e d s t o b e r e a d v e r y c a u t i o u s l y i f t h e r a d i c a l n a t u r e o f h i s message is

5 6
N o t e t h a t w h e n M o n t a i g n e offers u s t h e t w o r e a s o n s w h i c h raade t h e o p i n i o n t h a t t h e
s o u l is i m m o r t a l p k u s i b l e t o t h e a n c i e n t p h i l o s o p h e r s ( w h o l a c k e d d i v i n e r e v e l a t i o n ) n e i t h e r
is a n y e v i d e n c e o f t h e t r u t h o f t h e b e h e f , o n l y o f i t s u n H t y : ' W i t h o u t t h e i m m o r t a l i t y o f t h e s o u l
t h e r e w o u l d b e n o m o r e basis f o r t h e v a i n h o p e s o f g l o r y , w h i c h is a c o n s i d e r a t i o n w i t h m a r ­
v e l o u s c r e d i t i n t h e w o r l d ; [ a n d ] as P l a t o says, i t is a v e r y u s e f u l i m p r e s s i o n t h a t v i c e s , e v e n i f
t h e y escape t h e d i m a n d u n c e r t a i n sight o f h u m a n j u s t i c e , w u l always r e m a i n a target f o r d i v i n e
j u s t i c e , w h i c h w i U p u r s u e t h e m e v e n afterthe death o f t h e guilty' f V - S 5 5 2 - 3 , F 4 i 4 , S 622).
 Skeptkism andToleration 31

t o b e c o m e a p p a r e n t . T h i s is t o say t h a t m y r e a d i n g o f M o n t a i g n e is
Straussian. I k n o w t h a t m a n y M o n t a i g n e scholars w i U f i n d s u c h a r e a d ­
i n g r e p u g n a n t . T o r e a d o u r essayist i n a Straussian w a y is t o d e n y h i m o n e
o f h i s g r e a t e s t v i r t u e s : h i s s i n c e r i t y . C'est icy un livre de bonnefoy, lecteur.
T h o s e are M o n t a i g n e ' s first w o r d s t o us. H o w c a n w e n o t b e H e v e a m a n
w h o g o e s t o s u c h l e n g t h s t o assure us o f h i s s i n c e r i t y , c o n f e s s i n g those
m a n y e m b a r r a s s i n g defects o t h e r a u t h o r s w o u l d p r e f e r t o c o n c e a l ?
Easily. I t is n o a c t o f c o w a r d i c e t o exercise c a u t i o n w h e n t h e p e n a l t y
f o r b e h a v i n g o t h e r w i s e is t h e s t a k e . W h a t b e t t e r w a y t o secure o u r c o n f i ­
d e n c e t h a n t o confess t o faults? M o n t a i g n e does, I t h i n k , p r o v i d e us w i t h
several h i n t s t h a t r a d i c a l p h i l o s o p h e r s n e e d t o b e discreet. H e r e ' s o n e :

A n ancient w h o was reproached f o r professing philosophy, o f w h i c h neverthe­

less i n his o w n m i n d he t o o k n o great account, rephed that this was b e i n g a t r u e
philosopher. T h e y w a n t e d t o consider everything, t o w e i g h everything, and
t h e y f o u n d that o c c u p a t i o n suited t o the natural c u r i o s i t y that is i n us. Some
things t h e y w r o t e f o r the needs o f society, Hke t h e i r reHgions. A n d o n that
account i t was reasonable that they d i d n o t w a n t t o bare p o p u l a r o p i n i o n s t o the
skin, so as n o t t o breed disorder i n people's obedience t o the k w s and customs
o f t h e i r country. fV-S, 511-12; F 379; S 5 7 1 ) 57

I t m a y b e o b j e c t e d t h a t I r e a d M o n t a i g n e as a r e h g i o u s subversive o n l y
because I myseH a m a n atheist, a n d a m therefore p r o n e t o r e a d i n g m y
-

unbelief into authors w h o Hved i n times w h e n such views were

u n t h i n k a b l e . T h e r e m a y b e s o m e t h i n g i n t h i s , t h o u g h I suggest t h e r e is
less t h a n y o u m i g h t i m a g i n e .
F i r s t , I a m n o t m y s e l f , w i t h o u t s o m e r e s e r v a t i o n s , a n atheist. I k n o w
of conceptions of God I m i g h t accept (e.g. S p i n o z a ' s ) . It's o n l y
C h r i s t i a n i t y a n d r e h g i o n s l i k e i t w h i c h I find i n c r e d i b l e . It's c e r t a i n l y
r i g h t t h a t w h e n I find M o n t a i g n e b e i n g i n c o n s i s t e n t , I t e n d t o r e s o l v e
t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n a w a y w h i c h makes his w r i t i n g c o m e o u t t r u e ,
a c c o r d i n g t o m y h g h t s . T h i s is a n i n s t a n c e o f w h a t s o m e p e o p l e caU t h e
p r i n c i p l e o f c h a r i t y . I prefer t o speak o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f r e s p e c t f o r t h e
inteUigence o f t h e great, dead p h i l o s o p h e r s . W i t h that e m e n d a t i o n , I
t h i n k t h i s is a sensible w a y t o a p p r o a c h a n y t e x t . B u t it's a defeasible p r i n ­
ciple, w h i c h w o r k s f o r some authors and n o t others. I t h i n k Hobbes's
Leviathan is p r o b a b l y b e s t u n d e r s t o o d as t h e w o r k o f s o m e o n e w h o , i f
n o t a n a t h e i s t , w a s at least d e e p l y s u b v e r s i v e o f t h e r e l i g i o n o f h i s day.

5 7
SeeV-S 535,F 399,S600.
32 Е. M. Curky

I t r u n k t h e same o f M a c h i a v e U i a n d Spinoza. 5 8
So I reject the idea,
p o p r d a r i z e d b y F e b v r e , t h a t a t h e i s m was u n t h i n k a b l e i n t h e sixteenth
(and sevententh) c e n t u r i e s . 5 9
B u t I t h i n k t h e i d e a t h a t D e s c a r t e s was an
a t h e i s t is q u i t e u n t e n a b l e . 6 0

It's a c u r i o u s f a c t , w o r t h o u r reflection, that M o n t a i g n e himself

suggests t h i s o b j e c t i o n w h e n h e w r i t e s t h a t : ' P e o p l e are p r o n e t o a p p l y
the m e a n i n g o f o t h e r men's w r i t i n g s t o suit o p i n i o n s that t h e y have
p r e v i o u s l y d e t e r m i n e d i n t h e i r m i n d s ; a n d an atheist flatters h i m s e I f b y
r e d u c i n g aU a u t h o r s t o a t h e i s m , i n f e c t i n g i n n o c e n t m a t t e r w i t h his own
v e n o m ' fV-S 4 4 8 ; F 327; S 5 0 0 ) . T h i s is t h e t o n e M o n t a i g n e n o r m a U y
takes w h e n he discusses a t h e i s m , a n d may suggest t h a t h e regards
a t h e i s m as b e y o n d t h e paIe. S o m e w o u l d i n f e r t h a t h e c o u l d n o t h i m s e l f
be an atheist. Nevertheless, i t does i n d i c a t e t h a t M o n t a i g n e thought
atheists w e r e o p p o n e n t s w h o m C h r i s t i a n s h a d t o r e c k o n w i t h . So he
t h o u g h t t h e v i e w was t h i n k a b l e . 6 1
Moreover, we should not overlook

5 8
A t this p o i n t I've w r i t t e n several articles a r g u i n g for a Straussian reacUng o f H o b b e s :
' " I D u r s t N o t W r i t e S o B o l d l y , " o r H o w t o R e a d H o b b e s ' Theological-Political Treatise (in
D a n i e l a B o s t r e n g h i ( e d . ) , t r a n s . E m i h a G i a n c o t t i Hobbes e Spinoza Q^Japles: B i b h o p o h s , 1 9 9 2 )
4 9 7 - 5 9 3 ) ; ' C a l v i n a n d H o b b e s , o r H o b b e s as a n O r t h o d o x C h r i s t i a n ' , J o M r n a ! of the History of
Philosophy, 3 4 ( 1 9 9 6 ) , 257—71; ' R e l i g i o n a n d M o r a h t y i n Hobbes', i n Jules C o l e m a n and
C h r i s t o p h e r M o r r i s ( e d s . ) , Rational Commitment and Social Justice: Essaysfor Gregory Kavka
( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1998, 9 0 - 1 2 1 ) ; a n d ' T h e C o v e n a n t w i t h G o d i n
Hobbes' Leviathan', in Tom SoreU and Luc Foisneau ( e d s . ) , Leviathan after 350 Years
( O x f o r d : C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 2 0 0 4 ) , 199—216.1 d i s c u s s S p i n o z a i n t h e first o f t h e s e a r t i c l e s a n d i n
'Homo Audax: Leibniz, Oldenburg and the Theological-Political Treatise', Studia Leibnitiana
Suppplementa: Leibniz 'Auseinandersetzung mit Vorgängen und Zeitgenossen, ed. I n g r i d M a r c h e w i t z
a n d A l b e r t H e i n e k a m p (Stuttgart: F r a n z S t e i n e r V e r i a g , 1990), 277—312.1 discuss M a c h i a v e U i
briefly i n the third article.
5 9
I t h i n k Febvre's w o r k has h a d t o o m u c h i n f l u e n c e o n r e c e n t s c h o l a r s h i p . S e e L u c i e n
F e b v r e The Problem ofUnbeliefin the Sixteenth Century:The Religion qfRabelais, trans. B e a t r i c e
G o t d i e b ( C a m b r i d g e , M A : H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1982). F o r a salutary r e - e v a l u a t i o n , see
the foUowing works o f D a v i d W o o t t o n , ' L u c i e n Febvre and the P r o b l e m o f U n b e H e f i n the
Early Modern P e r i o d ' , J o u m a i of Modern History 6 0 (1988), 695—730; ' N e w Histories of
Atheism', in M . Hunter and David Wootton ( e d s . ) , Atheism from the Reformation to the
Enlightenment (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992); Paolo Sarpi (Cambridge: Cambridge
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1983).
6 0
I've rejected a Straussian interpretation o f Descartes i n ' T h e P r o b l e m o f Professor
C a t o n ' s S i n c e r i t y ' , Independent Journal of Philosophy 5/6 (1989), 10-15, a n d a Straussian i n t e r ­
pretation o f L e i b n i z i n ' T h e R o o t of Contingency', i n H a r r y Frankfurt (ed.), Leibniz:A
Collection of Critical Essays ( N e w Y o r k : A n c h o r , 1972), 6 9 ^ j 7 . S o I a m o n l y selectively (and I
h o p e , s e n s i b l y ) Straussian i n m y a p p r o a c h to a u t h o r s w r i t i n g i n t i m e s ofpersecution.
6 1
It's a n i c e q u e s t i o n , w h i c h I w i U n o t a t t e m p t t o r e s o l v e , w h a t M o n t a i g n e m e a n s b y ' a t h e -
ism'.No doubtthetermwasoften usedverybroadly,notjust to r e f e r t o t h e d e n i a l o f t h e e x i s ­
t e n c e o f a n y g o d , b u t to stigmatize v i r t u a U y a n y reHgious v i e w the speaker m i g h t disagree
w i t h . B u t I d o n ' t see a n y e v i d e n c e that M o n t a i g n e uses t h e t e r m this broadly. M y p r e s u m p t i o n
is t h a t h e w o u l d h a v e c o u n t e d E p i c u r e a n i s m , w i t h its a d m i s s i o n o f g o d s , b u t d e n i a l t h a t t h e y
 Skepticism andToleration 33

t h e t e n d e n c y o f t h i s passage t o i n o c u l a t e M o n t a i g n e against a c c u s a t i o n s
o f a t h e i s m . I f atheists are p r o n e t o i n t e r p r e t i n n o c e n t w r i t i n g s as
a t h e i s t i c , t h e n t h e c r i t i c o f M o n t a i g n e w h o accuses h i m o f a t h e i s m
m a y e x p o s e h i m s e l f t o a n ad hominem reply:'you wouldn't interpret m y
w r i t i n g as a t h e i s t i c i f y o u w e r e n ' t a n a t h e i s t y o u r s e l f ' . S o m e interpreters
m i g h t find t h a t r e s p o n s e m o r e t h r e a t e n i n g t h a n I d o .
B u t e v e n i f M o n t a i g n e d i d n o t i n t e n d t o e n c o u r a g e t h e secvdar v i e w
o f t h e w o r l d w h i c h his w o r k d i d , i n f a c t , e n c o u r a g e , i t d o e s s e e m t o m e
t h a t his espousal o f p y r r h o n i s m m a y have p r o m o t e d r e h g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n
i n a n o t h e r w a y . I d o n o t t h i n k a m o d e r a t e s k e p t i c i s m , w h i c h says m e r e l y
t h a t t h e f u n d a m e n t a l d o c t r i n e s o f r e h g i o n are n o t c o m p l e t e l y c e r t a i n ,
n e e d have m u c h effect o n a b e h e v e r d e h b e r a t i n g a b o u t w h e t h e r he
s h o u l d suppress d i s s e n t . A s I s u g g e s t e d at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h i s essay, h e
m a y w e U reason, a l o n g t h e hnes ofPascal's wager, t h a t w i t h t h e e t e r n a l
h a p p i n e s s o f t h e f a i t h f u l as a p r o s p e c t i v e r e w a r d , a n d t h e e t e r n a l t o r m e n t
o f t h e u n f a i t h f u l as a p r o s p e c t i v e p u n i s h m e n t , h e s h o u l d n o t l e t m i n o r
d o u b t s a b o u t t h e t r u t h o f his behefs deter h i m f r o m u s i n g force to
defend t h e m . 5 2
I also s u g g e s t e d t h a t a s k e p t i c i s m as r a d i c a l as t h e o n e
M o n t a i g n e seems t o espouse, a f u U y g e n e r a l p y r r h o n i s m , is u n a p p e a h n g .
B u t i f M o n t a i g n e ' s reader comes t o accept a h m i t e d p y r r h o n i a n skep­
t i c i s m , w h i c h a p p h e s i n t h e area o f r e h g i o n , w h e r e i t is m o s t c r e d i b l e ,
a n d t o t h i n k o f t h e n o n - b e h e v e r as s o m e o n e w h o h o l d s b e h e f s n o less
rational t h a n his o w n , t h e n i t m a y be m o r e difFicult t o defend a p o h c y o f
repression.And ofcourse,ifhe comes t o regard the b e h e f i n i m m o r t a l ­
i t y as c o n t r a r y t o r e a s o n , a n d s u p p o r t e d o n l y b y o u r desires a n d its p o s ­
s i b l e u t i h t y , t h e n h e w i U n o t find t h e p e r s e c u t o r ' s w a g e r persuasive at aU.
I n t h e e n d these m a y b e M o n t a i g n e ' s m o s t i m p o r t a n t c o n t r i b u t i o n s t o
the development o f a n argument for religious toleration. 6 3

University of Michigan

h a d a n y c o n c e r n for m a n k i n d , as a f o r m o f a t h e i s m . A n d i n a C h r i s t i a n c u l t u r e , g i v e n t h e
i m p o r t a n c e o f p r o v i d e n c e i n C h r i s t i a n t h e o l o g y , this s e e m s a r e a s o n a b l e s t i p u l a t i o n .

6 2
I d e v e l o p this p o i n t m o r e fuUy i n ' S e b a s t i a n CasteUio's E r a s m i a n L i b e r a H s m ' , f o r t h c o m -
ingin PhilosophicalTopics.
6 3
T h e r e is a f u r t h e r h n e o f t h o u g h t w h i c h n e e d s t o b e d e v e l o p e d . T h e p r o s p e c t i v e p e r s e ­
c u t o r m a y b e c o n c e r n e d , n o t o n l y w i t h t h e e t e r n a l s a l v a t i o n o f t h e f a i t h f u l , b u t also w i t h t h e
m o r a l character o f s o c i e t y i n this hfe, t h i n k i n g that a c c e p t a n c e o f t r a d i t i o n a l C h r i s t i a n behefs
is e s s e n t i a l t o p e o p l e ' s b e h a v i n g m o r a U y . I n t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y S p i n o z a a n d B a y l e w e r e t o
argue that there w a s n o discernible difference b e t w e e n t h e c o n d u c t o f C h r i s t i a n s a n d that o f
J e w s , M u s l i m s , a n d p a g a n s . M o n t a i g n e anticipates this a r g u m e n t i n t h e ' A p o l o g y ' f V - S +42—5;
F 322-5;S493^).
 2

Reason, Imagination, and Mechanism in Descartes's

Theory ofPerception

THOMAS V I N C I

. . . there is the painfuUy obvious question o f h o w the h u m a n

abüity t o h o m e i n o n a distant object relates, o n the one h a n d , t o
distance p e r c e p t i o n as Descartes interprets i t , and, o n the other, t o
the abihty o f animah t o d o the same t h i n g . W i t h o u t m a k i n g an
issue about consciousness, it's hard t o deny that i n some sense m y
d o g k n o w s w h e r e the baU feU as weU as I d o : after аП, he runs
d i r e c d y t o i t , j u s t as I do. N o w according t o Descartes s u b h u m a n
animals have n o reasoning abiHty at aU. I t w o u l d seem to foUow
that, o n Cartesian theory, either I do n o t rely f o r such physical acts
o n distance and p o s i t i o n perceptions as Descartes explains t h e m ,
o r that the e x p l a n a t i o n o f m y dog's abiHty is totally disanaIogous t o
the e x p l a n a t i o n o f m i n e . B o t h positions are, i t seems t o me,
extremely implausible. 1

I . I N T R O D U C T I O N

T h e essence o f W i l s o n ' s d i l e m m a f o r D e s c a r t e s c a n b e r e d u c e d t o t h e
f a U o w i n g : As Descartes explains them, human perceptions depend on reason­
ing, animalperceptions do not, so humanperception and animalperception must
be totally disanalogous. This is implausible. T w o t h i n g s s t r i k e us a b o u t t h e
a r g u m e n t . T h e first is t h a t t h e c o m p l a i n t o f i m p k u s i b i h t y is a c o m p l a i n t
that comes f r o m outside, an external c r i t i c i s m based o n pre-theoretical
hunches about the relation b e t w e e n animal and h u m a n psychology that
m a y n o t b e w o r t h v e r y m u c h . T h e s e c o n d is t h a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n d o e s
n o t f o h o w f r o m t h e p r e m i s e s . E v e n i f D e s c a r t e s is r i g h t t h a t h u m a n

1
MargaretWuson,'Descartes o n the Perception o f P r i m a r y Qualities',in MargaretWilson,
Ideas and Mechanism: Essays on Early Modem Philosophy ( P r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press,
1999), 2 6 - 4 0 , a t 35^5.
 Thomas Vind

p e r c e p t i o n depends heavily, e v e n exclusively, o n reasoning, a n d t h a t a n i ­

m a l p e r c e p t i o n does n o t , i t m a y b e that t h e m e c h a n i s m s t h a t u n d e r H e
a n i m a l p e r c e p t i o n a n d h u m a n r e a s o n i n g share s o m e t h i n g s i n c o m m o n .
F o r example, they m a y b o t h instantiate c o m p u t a t i o n a l algorithms. I n
t h a t case h u m a n a n d a n i m a l p e r c e p t i o n w o u l d n o t o n l y n o t b e t o t a U y
d i s a n a l o g o u s , t h e y w o u l d b e s i m i I a r i f n o t i s o m o r p h i c . I n f a c t Descartes's
a c c o u n t o f p e r c e p t i o n b o t h i n h u m a n s a n d i n a n i m a l s has i m p o r t a n t
affinities with modern computational accounts o f p e r c e p t i o n hke
M a r r ' s . So w e m a y h a v e a n easy r e s o l u t i o n t o W i l s o n ' s D i l e m m a . B u t i t
2

w o u l d b e easy b e c a u s e W i l s o n ' s D i l e m m a , t a k e n at f a c e v a l u e , d o e s n o t
g e t at t h e f u n d a m e n t a l t h r e a t t o Descartes's t h e o r y ofperception.The
t h r e a t is n o t t h a t i t is i m p l a u s i b l e t o say t h a t a n i m a l a n d h u m a n p e r c e p ­
t i o n is d i s a n a l o g o u s b u t r a t h e r t h a t Descartes's t h e o r y o f h u m a n p e r c e p ­
tion, combining both mental and mechanical systems, m a y be
i n c o h e r e n t j u s t b y itseh".The threat can be represented b y a q u a r t e t o f
p r o p o s i t i o n s e a c h o f w h i c h D e s c a r t e s seems t o e n d o r s e b u t w h i c h are
coUectively inconsistent:

ι. A n i m a l s have a p u r e l y c o r p o r e a l m e c h a n i s m ( n o t i n v o l v i n g rea­
s o n i n g ) f o r d e t e r m i n i n g a n d r e p r e s e n t i n g t h e size, shape, d i s t a n c e ,
a n d l o c a t i o n o f objects i n the i m m e d i a t e e n v i r o n m e n t sufficient
t o e x p l a i n aU t h e i r e n v i r o n m e n t a U y i n d u c e d b e h a v i o r s .
2. A U e n v i r o n m e n t a U y i n d u c e d h u m a n b o d i l y b e h a v i o r s , save a r t i c -
u b t e s p e e c h , are t o b e a c c o u n t e d f o r b y t h e s a m e a u t o m a t i c processes
p r o c e s s types) p o s t u k t e d f o r s i m i l a r m o v e m e n t s ofanimals.
3. S o m e e n v i r o n m e n t a U y i n d u c e d h u m a n b o d i l y b e h a v i o r s are t o b e
a c c o u n t e d f o r b y causal processes i n w h i c h t h e sense p e r c e p t i o n o f
t h e size, s h a p e , a n d d i s t a n c e o f o b j e c t s i n t h e i m m e d i a t e e n v i r o n m e n t
plays s o m e r o l e .
4 . A U cases o f t h e sense p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e size, shape, a n d d i s t a n c e o f
o b j e c t s i n t h e i m m e d i a t e e n v i r o n m e n t essentiaUy i n v o l v e r e a s o n i n g .
( B y ' r e a s o n i n g ' I m e a n a c t i v e m e n t a h t y . A c t i v e m e n t a l i t y i n t h i s sense
i n c l u d e s acts o f i n f e r e n c e , acts o f i n t u i t i o n (clear a n d d i s t i n c t ideas)
d i r e c t e d at i n t e U e c t u a l o b j e c t s , acts o f j u d g m e n t , a n d acts o f t h e i m a g ­
i n a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g acts o f t h e ' s p e c i a l c o g n i t i o n ' d i r e c t e d at i m a g e s i n

2
D. Marr Vision ( S a n F r a n c i s c o : F r e e m a n , 1 9 S 2 ) , esp. i 5 i H i · A l s o s e e G . K i r k e b 0 e n ,
'Descartes's P s y c h o l o g y o f V i s i o n and Cognitive Science: T h e Optics (1637) i n L i g h t of
M a r r ' s ( 1 9 8 2 ) Vision',PhilosophicalPsychology,11 (1998),161-82.
 Descartes's Theory qfPerception 37

t h e b r a i n . A c t i v e m e n t a h t y d o e s n o t i n c l u d e sensations a n d o t h e r
m e n t a l states w h e n t h e y are o c c a s i o n e d b y n a t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . )

P r o p o s i t i o n ( i ) is t h e b u r d e n o f D e s c a r t e s ' s Treatise on Man? Evidence

f o r (2) is d i s c u s s e d j u s t b e l o w . I t a k e (3) t o b e e m p i r i c a U y obvious.
D e s c a r t e s asserts (4) i n t h e Sixth Replies ( A T vii. 4 3 7 - 8 ; C S M ii.295). In
t h e p r e s e n c e o f t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e r e are e n v i r o n m e n t a U y i n d u c e d
h u m a n b o d U y m o v e m e n t s , these f o u r p r o p o s i t i o n s e n t a ü an i n c o n s i s ­
tency: ' A U environmentaUy i n d u c e d h u m a n b o d ü y behaviors (save
a r t i c u k t e s p e e c h ) are c a u s e d b y processes n o t i n v o l v i n g r e a s o n i n g ' a n d
' S o m e e n v i r o n m e n t a U y i n d u c e d h u m a n b o d i l y b e h a v i o r s are c a u s e d b y
processes i n v o l v i n g r e a s o n i n g . '
I t is o f c o u r s e n o t i m p o s s i b l e t h a t D e s c a r t e s s i m p l y is i n c o n s i s t e n t o n
t h i s p o i n t , b u t b e f o r e a c c e p t i n g t h i s w e n e e d t o l o o k at a l t e r n a t i v e i n t e r ­
p r e t a t i o n s i n w h i c h a case is m a d e t h a t o n e o r m o r e o f t h e m e m b e r s o f
t h e q u a r t e t , appearances n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , d o n o t i n fact represent
Descartes's v i e w .
A m o n g r e c e n t m a j o r i n t e r p r e t e r s o f D e s c a r t e s , H a t f i e l d has c o m e t h e
closest t o m a m t a i n i n g t h a t D e s c a r t e s is n o t c o m m i t t e d t o ( 4 ) , b u t e v e n
h e a c k n o w l e d g e s t h a t t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f o b j e c t i v e size is n o t a c c o m -
p H s h e d b y t h e v i s u a l s y s t e m s i m p l y w i t h t h e m e c h a n i c a l resources des­
c r i b e d i n t h e Treatise on Man. 4
T h i s m e a n s t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n (4) m u s t stay.
T h i s leaves s t a t e m e n t (2) as t h e m o s t h k e l y c a n d i d a t e f o r r e j e c t i o n . I t
is t r u e t h a t D e s c a r t e s says t h i n g s i n several places t h a t suggest t h a t h e is
c o m m i t t e d t o ( 2 ) , e . g . t h e f o U o w i n g passage f r o m t h e l e t t e r t o N e w c a s t l e
o f 23 N o v e m b e r 1646; ' I n f a c t n o n e o f o u r e x t e r n a l a c t i o n s c a n s h o w
a n y o n e w h o e x a m i n e s t h e m t h a t o u r b o d y is n o t j u s t a s e i f - m o v i n g
m a c h i n e b u t contains a soul w i t h t h o u g h t s , w i t h the exception ofspo-
ken words' ( C S M K iii. 3 0 3 ) . B u t i n a c o r r e s p o n d i n g passage i n t h e
Discourse w h e r e , w e c a n p r e s u m e , D e s c a r t e s is b e i n g m o r e c a r e f u l , h e
f o r m u l a t e s two g r o u n d s b y m e a n s o f w h i c h w e c a n d i s t i n g u i s h h u m a n
b e h a v i o r f r o m t h a t o f a n i m a l s . T h e f i r s t is as a b o v e . T h e s e c o n d is t h i s :

. . . even t h o u g h such r m c h i n e s [ w h i c h correspond t o animab] m i g h t do some

things as weU as w e d o t h e m , o r perhaps even better, they w o u l d inevitably fail

3
R e n e D e s c a r t e s , The Treatise on Man [ T O M ] , i n S . G a u k r o g e r ( e d . a n d t r a n s . ) , The World
and Other Writings ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1998), 99—169.
4
G . H a t f i e l d , ' D e s c a r t e s ' s P h y s i o l o g y a n d its R e b t i o n t o h i s P s y c h o l o g y ' , i n J . C o t t i n g h a m
( e d . ) , The Cambridge Companion to Descartes ( C a m b r i d g e : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1992),
335^70,at357,n.52.
38 Thomas Vina

i n others w h i c h w o u l d reveal that t h e y were acting n o t t h r o u g h u n d e r s t a n d i n g

b u t o n l y f r o m a disposition o f t h e i r organs. F o r reason is a universal i n s t r u m e n t
w h i c h can be used i n aLl kinds o f s i t u a t i o n s , these organs n e e d some p a r t i c u l a r
disposition f o r each p a r t i c u l a r a c t i o n . H e n c e i t is f o r aU practical purposes
impossible f o r a m a c h i n e t o have e n o u g h different organs t o make i t act i n aU
the contingencies o f l i f e i n the w a y i n w h i c h reason makes us act. ( A T v i . 57;
C S M i . 140; m y i n t e r p o l a t i o n )

I t a k e Descartes's p o s i t i o n t o b e t h a t a n y i n d i v i d u a l class o f h u m a n
(non-speech) behaviors can be simulated b y suitably designed m a c h i n ­
e r y i f w e f i x i n a d v a n c e t h e c o n t e x t i n w h i c h t h e b e h a v i o r is t o o c c u r .
B u t because h u m a n s can act effectively i n a suitably w i d e v a r i e t y o f
n o v e l c o n t e x t s , w e m u s t a p p e a l t o a ' u n i v e r s a l i n s t r u m e n t ' l i k e r e a s o n as
p a r t o f t h e e x p l a n a t o r y a c c o u n t . A d m i t t e d l y t h e r e is t h e p r o b l e m o f
s p e c i f y i n g w h a t t h e p r e d i c a t e s ' s u i t a b l y w i d e ' a n d ' n o v e l ' m e a n so t h a t
t h e y satisfy t h e c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h r e a s o n - i n d u c e d b e h a v i o r o c c u r s a n d
d o n o t satisfy t h e c o n t e x t s i n w h i c h a n i m a l p e r c e p t i o n - i n d u c e d b e h a v ­
i o r occurs, b u t this p r o b l e m m a y n o t be intractable.
I n a n y case, D e s c a r t e s d o e s h e r e set f o r h i m s e I f a c o n d i t i o n t h a t is t o
b e m e t w h e n a r a t i o n a l cause is t o b e p o s t u I a t e d . W h e n w e c a n n o t see
h o w a mechanical explanation c o u l d account for the behavior i n ques­
t i o n , a n d w h e n t h e d e f i c i e n c y i n t h e m e c h a n i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n arises
b e c a u s e t h e o b s e r v e d b e h a v i o r s e m b o d y p e r f o r m a n c e s w h i c h are better
t h a n t h e y w o u l d be o n t h e best m e c h a n i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n conceivable,
D e s c a r t e s appeals t o t h e ' u n i v e r s a l i n s t r u m e n t ' , r e a s o n , as p a r t o f t h e
causal e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e b e h a v i o r . T h u s , e v e n i f w e c o u l d somehow
e x p l a i n s o m e t h i n g t h a t w a s r e c o g n i z a b l e as b e l o n g i n g t o t h e t y p e human
purposive behavior b y a v e r y c o m p l e x set o f m e c h a n i c a l ' o r g a n s ' b u t a t a
l e v e l o f p e r f o r m a n c e less t h a n o n e a c t u a U y o b s e r v e s , w e are r e q u i r e d t o
p o s t u l a t e r e a s o n i n g as p a r t o f t h e e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e b e h a v i o r w e do
o b s e r v e . I p r o p o s e t o s h o w t h a t a n a n a l o g o u s s i t u a t i o n h o l d s i n t h e case
o f c e r t a i n k i n d s o f p e r c e p t u a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , n o t a b l y size constancy
s c a l i n g : D e s c a r t e s c a n n o t see h o w i t c a n b e a c c o u n t e d f o r m e c h a n i s t i -
caUy a n d , m o r e o v e r , e v e n i f i t w e r e s o m e h o w t o b e a c c o u n t e d f o r m e c h -
anisticaUy, t h e effectiveness o f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n w o u l d b e less t h a n w e
actuaUy observe. I p r e s u m e t h a t t h e observations i n c l u d e n o t o r d y t h i r d -
p a r t y o b s e r v a t i o n o f b e h a v i o r b u t also f i r s t - p e r s o n o b s e r v a t i o n ( i n t r o ­
spection) o f t h e quahtative characteristics o f p r i m a r y q u a h t y experience.
T h a t is t h e m a i n c o n c l u s i o n I seek t o establish i n s e c t i o n 5.
 Descartes's Theory ofPerception 39

T h i s makes f o r an interpretation ofCartesian perception t h e o r y that

assigns t o r e a s o n i n g t h e r o l e o f b o t h cause a n d effect o f t h e w a y e x t e r n a l
o b j e c t s a p p e a r t o us. I f I a m r i g h t i n aU o f t h i s , t h e n t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e
inconsistency p r o b l e m is t h a t p r o p o s i t i o n (2) m u s t b e d r o p p e d and
replaced b y a version w i t h a broader exception ckuse:

( 2 ' ) A U o f e n v i r o n m e n t a U y i n d u c e d h u m a n b o d i l y b e h a v i o r s , save
articulate speech a n d o t h e r behaviors dependent on reasoning,
specificaUy t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f size, shape, a n d d i s t a n c e , are t o be
a c c o u n t e d f o r b y t h e s a m e a u t o m a t i c processes p r o c e s s types) p o s t u ­
l a t e d f o r sirrnlar m o v e m e n t s ofanimak. 5

Since animals lack articulate speech b u t n o t p e r c e p t i o n Descartes

faces a p r o b l e m i n h i s a c c o u n t o f t h e r o l e o f r e a s o n i n p e r c e p t i o n t h a t is
n o t present i n his a c c o u n t o f t h e r o l e o f reason i n articulate speech:
h o w t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e j o m i operations o f t w o p e r c e p t u a l s y s t e m s — t h e
animal/mechanical system present exclusively i n o u r brains and the
i n f e r e n t i a l s y s t e m p r e s e n t at least i n p a r t i n o u r m i n d s . T h e r e s e e m t o
be t w o m a i n options.
T h e f i r s t ( o p t i o n 1) is t o s u p p o s e t h a t b o t h t h e m e n t a l a n d p h y s i o l o g ­
i c a l systems e x i s t side b y side, c o n t r i b u t i n g d i f F e r e n t effects. O n t h i s
r e a d i n g D e s c a r t e s w o u l d see t w o c a t e g o r i e s o f b e h a v i o r a l r e s p o n s e t o
p e r c e p t u a l stimulae, o n e g o v e r n e d b y t h e rationaUy c o n t r o U e d system,
t h e o t h e r g o v e r n e d b y t h e physiologicaUy c o n t r o U e d system. I f h e h a d
t a k e n t h i s c o u r s e t h e r e are aspects o f t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e p h y s i o ­
l o g i c a l system a n d the rationaUy c o n t r o U e d system t h a t w o u l d have
a n t i c i p a t e d t h e d i s t i n c t i o n d r a w n i n recent c o g n i t i v e research b e t w e e n
w h a t is c a U e d t h e ' f i r s t ' a n d t h e ' s e c o n d ' v i s u a l s y s t e m s . T h e s e c o n d sys­
t e m is a s y s t e m w i t h o u t c o n s c i o u s p h e n o m e n o l o g y that guides o u r
b e h a v i o r i n b h n d - s i g h t s i t u a t i o n s , is n o t v e r y r e h a b l e i n d e t e r m i n i n g
p r e c i s e f e a t u r e s o f o u r s p a t i a l e n v i r o n m e n t , is e f f e c t i v e o n l y o v e r s h o r t
distances a n d i n areas i m m e d i a t e l y p r o x i m a t e t o o u r o w n b o d i e s , a n d
d o e s n o t p r e s e n t us w i t h a u n i f i e d r e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f o u r e n v i r o n m e n t .
The f i r s t s y s t e m is t h e n o r m a l s y s t e m t h a t is r e s p o n s i b l e for visual

5
A l t h o u g h i n t h e p a s s a g e s f r o m t h e LHscourse m e n t i o n e d above Descartes does not, unfor­
t u n a t e l y , ofFer p e r c e p t i o n s p e c i f i c a U y as a n o t h e r e x a m p l e r e q u i r i n g t h e p o s t u l a t i o n o f r e a s o n -
i n g i n its r o l e as u n i v e r s a l i n s t r u m e n t — t h a t is w h y t h e r e is a p r i m a f a c i e i n c o n s i s t e n c y i n
D e s c a r t e s ' s o v e r a U w r i t i n g s o n t h e e m p i r i c a l t h e o r y o f p e r c e p t i o n — h e m a k e s room f o r d o i n g
so u n d e r the general h e a d i n g o f t h e s e c o n d o f t h e t w o w a y s i n w h i c h w e c a n distinguish m e n
f r o m b e a s t s . ГДЪе first is t h e c a p a c i t y f o r a r t i c u l a t e s p e e c h . ) ( A T x . 3 6 8 ; C S M i . 14.)
40 Thomas Vinci

c o n s c i o u s n e s s , o p e r a t e s at g r e a t e r d i s t a n c e s , a n d i s a b l e t o p r e s e n t a u n i ­
fied a n d q u i t e r e l i a b l e p i c t u r e o f o u r s p a t i a l e n v i r o n m e n t . W e shaU see
t h a t i n t h e s e respects Descartes's c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e p h y s i o l o g i c a l
s y s t e m is h k e t h e s e c o n d v i s u a l s y s t e m a n d h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e
r a t i o n a U y g u i d e d v i s u a l s y s t e m is h k e t h e f i r s t . 6

T h e s e c o n d o p t i o n ( o p t i o n 2) is t o s u p p o s e t h a t t h e t w o s u b s y s t e m s
i n t e r a c t so t h a t t h e y j o i n d y c o m p r i s e a s i n g l e p e r c e p t u a l s y s t e m t h a t
accounts for the fuU range o f h u m a n p e r c e p t u a l responses. O v e r a U
o p t i o n 2 fits t h e t e x t s b e t t e r — D e s c a r t e s g e n e r a U y speaks as i f t h e r e is a
m o r e o r less u n i f i e d p e r c e p t u a l s y s t e m p r o d u c i n g a s i n g l e set o f n o n -
c o m p e t i n g p e r c e p t u a l responses. B u t i f t h e m e c h a n i c a l a n d t h e r a t i o n a l
e l e m e n t s w o r k t o g e t h e r t o p r o d u c e h u m a n p e r c e p t u a l r e s p o n s e , how d o
t h e y w o r k t o g e t h e r ? SpecificaUy, h o w d o e s r e a s o n i n g cause o b j e c t s i n
o u r e n v i r o n m e n t t o appear t h e w a y t h e y do?
T h e r e are a n u m b e r o f i s s u e s t h a t w i U n e e d t o b e t r e a t e d h e r e . F i r s t ,
t h e r e is t h e m i n d — b o d y p r o b l e m as i t relates t o p e r c e p t i o n . Descartes's
v i e w o f h o w t h e m i n d perceives heat, h g h t , a n d o t h e r such quahties
( ' s e c o n d a r y q u a l i t i e s ' as w e shaU caU t h e m ) is t h a t t h e m i n d is a w a r e
o f sensations o f heat, l i g h t , a n d o t h e r s u c h qualities d i r e c t l y a n d t h a t
t h e s e s e n s a t i o n s are occasioned 7
by a 'natural institution' existing
b e t w e e n sensations a n d b r a i n states. H e a k o c o u n t e n a n c e s a role f o r
n a t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f m e n t a l states representing
p r i m a r y q u a l i t i e s . B u t D e s c a r t e s also seems t o c o u n t e n a n c e another
m i n d — b r a i n r e l a t i o n , o n e i n w h i c h t h e m i n d is said t o ' l o o k at' i m a g e s i n
the b r a i n . W h a t Descartes m i g h t m e a n b y this a n d w h e t h e r w e s h o u l d
t a k e h i m s e r i o u s l y are m a t t e r s o f c o n s i d e r a b l e c o n t r o v e r s y t h a t I address
b e l o w . M y c o n c l u s i o n is c o n t r o v e r s i a l : t h a t D e s c a r t e s s h o u l d i n d e e d b e
t a k e n s e r i o u s l y h e r e a n d w h a t h e m e a n s is t h a t w e intuit, i n h i s t e c h n i c a l
sense, t h e shape, size, a n d o t h e r s p a t i a l q u a h t i e s o f s t r u c t u r e s i n o u r
8

b r a i n . I f u r t h e r argue t h a t these i n t u i t i o n s c o n t r i b u t e t h e p h e n o m e n o -
l o g i c a l d i m e n s i o n o f o u r sense p e r c e p t i o n o f p r i m a r y q u a h t i e s .
S e c o n d , i f m y r e a d i n g is r i g h t — t h a t t h e h u m a n p e r c e p t u a l s y s t e m u l t i ­
mately turns o u t t o be a functional w h o l e o f r a t i o n a l and mechanistic

6
T h a n k s t o J o h n B a r r e s i f o r this s u g g e s t i o n .
7
I u s e O c c a s i o n ' a d v i s e d l y h e r e s o as t o stay n e u t r a l o n t h e q u e s t i o n w h e t h e r n a t u r a l i n s t i ­
t u t i o n is a g e n u i n e c a u s a l r e k t i o n i n t h e C a r t e s i a n s y s t e m o r s o m e t h i n g s h o r t o f t h a t . F o r a d i s ­
cussion see M . R o z e m o n d , 'Descartes o n M i n d - B o d y Interaction: W h a t ' s t h e P r o b l e m ? '
[ ' M i n d - B o d y ' ] , J o H f K a i of the History ofPhilosophy 37 ( 1 9 9 9 ) , 4 3 5 - 6 7 .
8
S e e Ruksfor the Direction ofthe Mind, esp. R u l e 3 ( A T x . 3 6 6 ^ 7 0 ; C S M i . 1 3 - 1 5 ) .
 Descartes's Theory ofPerception 41

e l e m e n t s — w h y s h o u l d Descartes i m p l y t h a t his mechanistic a c c o u n t i n

t h e Treatise of Шап is s u f f i c i e n t b y i t s e l f t o p r o d u c e t h e f u U r a n g e o f
h u m a n environmentaUy i n d u c e d behavior?
T h i r d , D e s c a r t e s sees h u m a n s as a n i m a l s t o w h i c h G o d has a d d e d i n
i n f a n c y t h e a d d i t i o n a l p o w e r s o f a soul. B u t h o w d o these a d d i t i o n a l
p o w e r s — m e n t a l p o w e r s — w h e n they f i n d themselves e m b o d i e d , cope
w i t h aU t h a t p r e - e x i s t i n g m a c h i n e r y ? D o t h e y , i n p a r t i c u l a r , i g n o r e o r
replace t h e capacities o f t h e b r a i n exclusively w i t h i n t e U e c t u a l c a p a c i ­
ties? I m a i n t a i n t h a t f o r D e s c a r t e s m e n t a h t y n e i t h e r i g n o r e s t h e n a t u r a l
capacity o f t h e m a c h i n e (the machine's brain) n o r repkces i t b u t , rather,
t h r o u g h a d e v e l o p m e n t a l process b e g i n n i n g i n i n f a n c y , i m p r o v e s t h e p e r ­
f o r m a n c e o f t h a t s y s t e m b y m a k i n g i t a c c u r a t e l y r e f l e c t t h e o b j e c t i v e spa­
tial properties o f i t s distal objects t o a m u c h h i g h e r degree t h a n w o u l d
h a v e b e e n t h e case w i t h o u t its i n t e r v e n t i o n . T h i s i m p r o v e d p e r f o r m a n c e
is t h e m a r k o f t h e i n v o l v e m e n t o f m e n t a h t y . N o w f o r t h e d e t a ü s .

2 . D E S C A R T E S ' S M O D E L O F P E R C E P T U A L P R O C E S S I N G I N

T H E O P T I C S I N V O L V E S A C T I V E M E N T A L I T Y

I i n t e n d t o s h o w t h a t D e s c a r t e s r e c o g n i z e s m e n t a l p o w e r s as causal
influences o n the w a y i n w h i c h p r i m a r y quahties appear.To s h o w this i t
suffices t o s h o w t h a t h e r e c o g n i z e s t h e e x i s t e n c e o f p r i m a r y q u a h t y
appearances w h o s e quahtative c o n t e n t 9
c a n n o t b e causaUy e x p l a i n e d
w i t h o u t postulating the intervention o f mentahty. If, according to
D e s c a r t e s , t h e a p p e a r a n c e s o f shape a n d size w e r e s i m p l y a n a t u r a U y
i n s t i t u t e d m e n t a l r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e s h a p e a n d size o f a r e t i n a l i m a g e t h e n
h e w o u l d n o t see a role f o r a c t i v e m e n t a h t y i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e s e
a p p e a r a n c e s . H o w e v e r , t h e a n t e c e d e n t is false: D e s c a r t e s d o e s n o t t h i n k
t h a t a p p e a r a n c e s are s i m p l y r e f l e c t i o n s o f t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e r e t i n a l
i m a g e . T h i s c a n b e c l e a r l y s e e n i n his t r e a t m e n t o f t h e m o o n i U u s i o n ,
w e U k n o w n i n c o n t e m p o r a r y treatments o f p e r c e p t i o n : 1 0

. . . w e can n o t i c e [the distance o f t h e m o o n o n the h o r i z o n ] m o r e easily [ t h a n

the distance o f t h e m o o n i n the sky] because there are various objects b e t w e e n

9
I t is n o t c o n t r o v e r s i a l t h a t D e s c a r t e s u s e s t h e l a n g u a g e o f a p p e a r a n c e t o d e s c r i b e p e r c e p -
t u a U y i n d u c e d i d e a s o f p r i m a r y q u a h t i e s ; i t is c o n t r o v e r s i a l h o w t h i s l a n g u a g e is t o b e i n t e r ­
preted. I take p r i m a r y - q u a h t y appearances for D e s c a r t e s to h a v e quaHtative p h e n o m e n a l )
c o n t e n t . I a r g u e for t h i s i n S e c t i o n 6, b e l o w .
1 0
S e e e.g. I . R o c k , The Logic of Perception [Perception] ( C a m b r i d g e , M A : M I T Press, 1983).
42 Thomas Vinci

t h e m a n d o u r eyes. A n d , b y m e a s u r i n g t h e m w i t h t h e i r instruments, the

astronomers prove clearly that [the m o o n o n the h o r i z o n ] appears larger at one
t i m e than at another n o t because [it is] seen t o subtend a greater angle,but because
[it is] j u d g e d t o be farther way. I t foUows that the a x i o m o f t h e ancient o p t i c s —
w h i c h says that the apparent size ofobjects is p r o p o r t i o n a l t o the size o f t h e angle
o f v i s i o n — i s n o t always true. ( A T v i . 145; C S M i . 174; m y i n t e r p o k t i o n )

A c r u c i a l p a r t o f D e s c a r t e s ' s e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e m o o n i U u s i o n is t h a t
w e n o t i c e t h e d i s t a n c e m o r e w h e n t h e m o o n is o n t h e h o r i z o n ( a n d
l o o k s b i g g e r ) t h a n w e d o w h e n t h e m o o n is h i g h i n t h e s k y ( a n d l o o k s
smaUer) . T h i s n o t i c i n g is i t s e r f d u e t o o u r n o t i c i n g o b j e c t s l y i n g b e t w e e n
us a n d t h e m o o n w h i c h w e k n o w t o b e v e r y l a r g e (trees, taU b u i l d i n g s ,
etc.) a n d w h i c h y e t l o o k v e r y smaJi i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e m o o n . T h e s e
facts l e a d us t o i n f e r t h a t t h e m o o n m u s t b e v e r y f a r a w a y i n d e e d w h e n
o b s e r v e d u n d e r these c o n d i t i o n s , a n inference which we are not
i n c h n e d t o m a k e w h e n t h e m o o n is v i e w e d u n d e r n o r m a l c o n d i t i o n s . 1 1

T h i s e x p l a n a t i o n is r e p l e t e w i t h t h e l a n g u a g e of'mentalese':'notic-
i n g ' , ' k n o w i n g ' , a n d ' i n f e r r i n g ' . B u t , as H a t f i e l d a v e r s , 12
i t is p o s s i b l e
t h a t t h i s is a m e t a p h o r i c a l use o f t h e s e t e r m s . G i v e n t h e pervasiveness
o f D e s c a r t e s ' s use o f m e n t a l k n g u a g e n o t o n l y i n Optics F f b u t also i n
t h e Treatise of Man, I t h i n k t h a t i t is u n h k e l y t h a t t h i s is so, b u t t h e d e c i s i v e
c o n s i d e r a t i o n is w h e t h e r t h e o p e r a t i o n s t h e s e t e r m s are i n t e n d e d t o
d e s i g n a t e are o p e r a t i o n s t h a t o u t s t r i p t h e c a p a b i h t i e s o f c o m p u t a t i o n -
s i m u l a t i o n c a r r i e d o u t i n the p h y s i o l o g i c a l m a c h i n e r y alone.As a result
o f r e c e n t w o r k o n Descartes's a c c o u n t o f c o r p o r e a l m e m o r y a n d its
s t r o n g associative c h a r a c t e r , 1 3
i t appears t h a t t h e p o w e r ofphysiological
c o m p u t a t i o n - s i m u k t i o n i n Descartes's p e r c e p t u a l m a c h i n e is c o n s i d e r ­
a b l y g r e a t e r t h a n w o u l d b e t h e case i f t h a t m a c h i n e r y c o n s i s t e d o n l y o f
w h a t is e m b o d i e d i n t h e sense o r g a n s a n d p i n e a l g l a n d p r o p e r .
T h e c o r p o r e a l m e m o r y is l o c a t e d i n t h e m a i n p a r t o f t h e b r a i n w i t h
t w o - w a y connections t o the pineal gland; and the system consisting o f
the corporeal m e m o r y , the pineal gland, a n d the optical system c o m ­
prises a m u c h m o r e p o w e r f u l p h y s i o l o g i c a l r e s o u r c e t h a n t h e l a t t e r t w o
c o m p o n e n t s b y themselves.But even w i t h a p o w e r f u l system ofassocia-
t i v e m e m o r y available t o D e s c a r t e s t o e x p l a i n t h e m o o n i U u s i o n , t h e r e

1 1
R o c k ' s e x p l a n a t i o n i s s t r i k i n g l y c l o s e t o D e s c a r t e s ' s . S e e Rock,Perceprio«, 1 8 2 .
1 2
Hatfield,'Physiology',356.
1 3
S e e e . g . J . S u t t o n , Philosophy and Memory Traces [Memory Traces] (Cambridge: Cambridge
U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1998).
 Descartes 's Theory of Perception 43

stiU h a v e t o b e t h e a p p r o p r i a t e associative cues available i n t h e p e r c e p ­

t u a l i n f o r m a t i o n . I f w e l o o k at Descartes's a c c o u n t o f d i s t a n c e r e c o g n i ­
t i o n i n t h e Optics w e find f o u r s o u r c e s c l e a r l y c a t a l o g u e d ( A T v i . 140—1;
C S M i . 172): 1 4

ι. a c c o m m o d a t i o n o f t h e l e n s ( t h e shape o f t h e b o d y o f t h e eye)
2. c o n v e r g e n c e o f t h e eyes o n a n o b j e c t i n f o c u s
3. d i s t i n c t n e s s o f t h e shape seen, a n d s t r e n g t h o f h g h t
4 . t h e o c c l u s i o n o f o n e o b j e c t b y a n o t h e r , e.g. t h e base o f a m o u n t a i n b y
a forest.

D e s c a r t e s says t h a t t h e s e cues m a y b e u s e d t o h e l p us i m a g i n e distance:

'FinaUy, w e m a y a b e a d y h a v e f r o m a n o t h e r s o u r c e a n i m a g e o f a n o b j ect's
size, o r its p o s i t i o n , o r t h e d i s t i n c t n e s s o f i t s shape a n d c o l o u r s , o r m e r e l y
t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e h g h t c o m i n g from i t a n d t h i s m a y e n a b l e us t o i m a g i n e
its d i s t a n c e i f n o t a c t u a U y t o see i t ' ( A T v i . 1 3 8 ; C S M i . 172).
D e s c a r t e s d e s c r i b e s t h e r e s u l t e n a b l e d b y t h i s process as ' i m a g i n e d '
r a t h e r t h a n ' s e e n ' a n d t h e r e are s o m e t e x t u a l reasons f o r t h i n k i n g t h a t
this indicates t h e w o r k ofassociative c o r p o r e a l m e m o r y . F o r one, i n the
Rulesfor the Direction of the Mind D e s c a r t e s e x p h c i d y says t h a t m e m o r y is
n o d i f F e r e n t from i m a g i n a t i o n — a t least t h e m e m o r y w h i c h is c o r p o r e a l
a n d s i r m l a r t o o n e s a n i m a b possess ( A T x . 416; C S M i . 4 3 ) ; f o r a n o t h e r , i n
t h e Treatise on Man i t is b y m e a n s o f a n i m a l s p i r i t s m o v i n g w i t h i n t h e
associations e m b o d i e d i n t h e c o r p o r e a l m e m o r y t h a t D e s c a r t e s a c c o u n t s
f o r t h e t e n d e n c y o f c e r t a i n p r o p e r t i e s t o b e associated w i t h o n e a n o t h e r :
' t h e r e c o U e c t i o n o f o n e t h i n g c a n b e e x c i t e d b y t h a t o f a n o t h e r w h i c h has
b e e n i m p r i n t e d i n t h e m e m o r y at t h e same t i m e . F o r e x a m p l e , i f I see t w o
eyes w i t h a n o s e , I i m m e d i a t e l y i m a g i n e a f o r e h e a d a n d a m o u t h ' ( A T x i .
179;TOM, i5i). 1 5
W e c a n c e r t a i n l y s u p p o s e t h a t associations b e t w e e n
m e m o r i e s o f i n d i s t i n c d y s e e n o b j e c t s a n d m e m o r i e s o f o b j e c t s seen at a
great distance c o u l d b e r e c o r d e d i n t h e c o r p o r e a l m e m o r y .

1 4
T h e r e m a y a k o b e a fifth: 'as w e a d j u s t t h e s h a p e o f t h e e y e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d i s t a n c e o f
o b j e c t s , w e c h a n g e a c e r t a i n p a r t o f t h e b r a i n i n a m a n n e r t h a t is o r d a i n e d b y n a t u r e t o m a k e
t h e s o u l p e r c e i v e this distance.' H a t f i e l d has s u g g e s t e d i n c o n v e r s a t i o n that this m a y refer t o t h e
'lean f u n c t i o n ' o f t h e p i n e a l g l a n d . T h e text that m o s t directly bears o n this f u n c t i o n i n t h e
Treatise on Man ( Ä T x i . 1 8 6 ^ 7 ; T O M , 158^>) d o e s i n d e e d a s s o c i a t e t h e c h a n g e i n t h e s h a p e o f
the eye w i t h the l e a n i n g o f t h e pineal gland t h r o u g h the m e d i a t i o n o f t h e c o n v e r g e n c e o f t h e
eyes, a l t h o u g h the c o n v e r g e n c e o f t h e eyes a n d t h e c h a n g e i n t h e shape o f t h e lens are d i s t i n ­
g u i s h e d b o t h i n t h e Optics a n d i n t h e Treatise on Man.
1 5
I o w e t h i s p o i n t t o S u t t o n , Memory Traces, 61—2.
44 Thomas Vina

I n t h e case o f t h e m o o n i U u s i o n n o n e o f t h e f i r s t t h r e e d e p t h cues are

o p e r a t i v e , b u t t h e p h e n o m e n o n o f o c c l u s i o n b y large objects o f a smaU
p o r t i o n o f a n o t h e r o b j e c t ' s a p p e a r a n c e is p r e s e n t . T h e r e w o u l d t h e n b e
a n association estabhshed e x p e r i e n t i a U y b e t w e e n this p h e n o m e n o n a n d
a physical m e m o r y trace o f t h e s e c o n d object's b e i n g v e r y l a r g e . T h i s
association c o u l d t h e n be supposed t o have a feedback i n f l u e n c e o n t h e
size o f t h e p i n e a l r e g i s t r a t i o n o f t h e size o f t h e m o o n s u c h t h a t t h i s r e g ­
i s t r a t i o n (a p a t t e r n o f f l o w o f a n i m a l s p i r i t s o n t h e surface o f t h e g l a n d )
c h a n g e s , p e r h a p s b y b e c o m i n g l a r g e r t h a n i t n o r m a l l y is, t h a t is, as i t is i n
t h e a b s e n c e o f these associations. T h i s l a r g e r p a t t e r n w o v d d t h e n b e
' o r d a i n e d b y n a t u r e ' t o y i e l d an appearance o f t h e m o o n o n t h e h o r i z o n
b i g g e r t h a n its a p p e a r a n c e h i g h i n t h e sky.
T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , a n o t h e r p h e n o m e n o n e x p k i n e d b y D e s c a r t e s
i n terms o f the language o f reasoning and inference for w h i c h a
mechanistic-associationist e x p l a n a t i o n (even o n e i n v o l v i n g c o r p o r e a l
m e m o r y ) is n o t always a v a i l a b l e — t h e p h e n o m e n o n k n o w n t o us as'size
c o n s t a n c y s c a l i n g ' . S i z e c o n s t a n c y s c a h n g is a f e a t u r e o f t h e w a y t h i n g s
a p p e a r t o us, specificaUy, a f e a t u r e o f t h e w a y i n w h i c h a p p a r e n t size
v a r i e s w i t h t h e p a r a m e t e r s o f d i s t a n c e a n d size o f t h e r e t i n a l i m a g e s , n o t
j u s t w i t h t h e size o f t h e r e t i n a l i m a g e itseh". A c o n t e m p o r a r y s o u r c e
describes t h e p h e n o m e n o n this w a y :

As t h e object increases i n distance its image i n t h e eye w i U c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y

s h r i n k — j u s t as f o r a camera. B u t (and this is easUy checked f o r oneseH) as t h e
v i e w e d object recedes i t does n o t appear t o s h r i n k a n y t h i n g h k e as m u c h as t h e
o p t i c a l h a l v i n g o f t h e retinal image w i t h each d o u b h n g o f i t s distance. I t n o r -
maUy looks ahnost t h e same size over a w i d e range ofdistances.This is due t o a
perceptual c o m p e n s a t i o n caUed'size constancy s c a h n g ' . 16

T h a t t h e r e is s u c h a p h e n o m e n o n , says D e s c a r t e s ,

. . . is sufFiciendy obvious f r o m t h e fact that t h e images i m p r i n t e d b y objects

v e r y close t o us are one h u n d r e d times bigger t h a n those i m p r i n t e d b y objects
t e n times farther away, a n d yet t h e y d o n o t make us see t h e objects a h u n d r e d
times larger; instead they make t h e object l o o k ahnost the same size, at least i f
t h e i r distance does n o t deceive us. ( A T v i . 140; C S M i . 172)

Descartes explains that this p h e n o m e n o n shows t h a t w e j u d g e t h e

size b y t h e k n o w l e d g e o r o p i n i o n w e h a v e o f t h e d i s t a n c e c o m p a r e d w i t h
t h e size o f t h e i m a g e s t h e o b j e c t s i m p r i n t o n t h e b a c k o f t h e eye—not

1 6
R . G r e g o r y ( e d . ) , The Oxford Companion to the Mind ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press,
1991),218.
 Descartes's Theory ofPerception 45

m e r e l y b y t h e size o f t h e s e i m a g e s ( C S M i . 1 7 2 ) . S 0 d i s t a n c e d e t e r m i n a ­
t i o n is a c r u c i a l f a c t o r h e r e . N o t i c e , h o w e v e r , t h a t f o r r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t d i s ­
tances n o n e o f t h e d i s t a n c e cues i n c a t e g o r i e s (3) a n d ( 4 ) , r e q u i s i t e f o r
t h e associative s y s t e m , are h k e l y t o b e i n p l a c e . I n d i s t i n c t n e s s ofimage
a n d w e a k n e s s o f h g h t are d e t e c t a b l e o n l y at a c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s t a n c e a n d
o c c l u s i o n is a c o n t i n g e n t p h e n o m e n o n t h a t w i U o f t e n n o t b e o p e r a t i n g
w i t h a field o f o b j e c t s s e e n i n t h e m i d - d i s t a n c e . Y e t size c o n s t a n c y is a
p o w e r f u l p h e n o m e n o n i n v a r i a b l y present w i t h objects v i e w e d i n the
m i d - d i s t a n c e e v e n w h e n t h e s e cues are a b s e n t . F o r e x a m p l e , i f I v i e w
o n e b a U at a r a n g e o f o n e f o o t a n d a n o t h e r at a r a n g e o f t e n feet, t h e sec­
o n d d o e s n o t p r e s e n t a n a p p e a r a n c e 1 / 1 0 0 t h t h e size o f t h e first—hence
size c o n s t a n c y s c a h n g is r o b u s t l y at w o r k — y e t the objects m a y be
equaUy distinct, equaUy w e U saturated i n color, n o t o c c l u d e d b y o t h e r
o b j e c t s , etc. So i f w e w o u l d h a v e D e s c a r t e s a c c o u n t f o r t h i s p h e n o m e ­
n o n by physiological rather than mental c o m p u t a t i o n , i t must be the
w o r k o f t h e basic p i n e a l g l a n d / e y e s y s t e m w i t h o u t its c o r p o r e a l m e m ­
o r y adjunct.
Descartes countenances physiological representations of objective
d i s t a n c e . O n e is t h e ' l e a n f u n c t i o n ' o f t h e p i n e a l g l a n d d e s c r i b e d i n t h e
Treatise on Man (AT xi. 185^7;TOM, 157—9) a s ш е
progressive m o v e ­
m e n t o f t h e p i n e a l g l a n d a w a y f f o m its s t a n d i n g o r i e n t a t i o n ( v e r t i c a l )
t h a t results f r o m k e e p i n g f o c u s o n a n a p p r o a c h i n g o b j e c t . C o u l d n o t t h e
p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e c o r p o r e a l i m a g e s r e p r e s e n t i n g size c o n s t a n c y , as i n o u r
s p e c u l a t i v e C a r t e s i a n p h y s i o l o g i c a l a c c o u n t o f t h e m o o n i U u s i o n , also
b e d u e t o a p h y s i o l o g i c a l process i n v o l v i n g , i n t h i s case, o n l y t h e basic
system? F o r e x a m p l e , c o u l d D e s c a r t e s n o t h a v e p o s i t e d t h a t t h e p r o g r e s ­
sive m o v e m e n t o f the pineal gland t o w a r d the vertical, interacting
mechanicaUy w i t h the p r o j e c t i o n o f t h e retinal images o n the pineal
g l a n d , p r o d u c e s a series o f i m a g e s i n t h e c o r p o r e a l i m a g i n a t i o n t h a t d o
n o t d i m i n i s h i n size as fast as t h e s u b s e q u e n t series o f i m a g e s o n t h e r e t i n a
itseh? I f s o , t h e series o f i m a g e s i n t h e c o r p o r e a l i m a g i n a t i o n m i g h t t h e n
p r o v i d e t h e p h y s i c a l basis f o r s o m e d e g r e e o f s i z e c o n s t a n c y s c a h n g . 1 7

T h i s is n o t , h o w e v e r , t h e s o l u t i o n a d o p t e d b y Descartes i n the
Optics} 9
Descartes's s o l u t i o n i n t h e Optics is a m e n t a h s t o n e : ' w e j u d g e

1 7
D i s c u s s i o n o f s i z e c o n s t a n c y scahng invites discussion o f d e p t h perception. I have o m i t ­
t e d this f r o m t h e p r e s e n t a r g u m e n t b u t b e l i e v e that D e s c a r t e s r e c o g n i z e d t h e p h e n o m e n o n
a n d that h i s treatment o f i t c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d b y a n e x t e n s i o n o f t h e present interpretation.
1 8
I n t h e Treatise on Man D e s c a r t e s does n o t discuss size c o n s t a n c y scahng,perhaps b e c a u s e
it m a k e s i t s e t f k n o w n to us t h r o u g h i n t r o s p e c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n o b s e r v a t i o n o f b e h a v i o r .
46 Thomas Vina

t h e i r size b y t h e k n o w l e d g e o r o p i n i o n t h a t w e h a v e o f t h e i r d i s t a n c e
c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e size o f t h e i m a g e s t h e y i m p r i n t o n t h e b a c k ofthe
e y e ' ( A T v i . 144; C S M i . 173). I n d e e d , h e g o e s so f a r as t o say t h a t t h e w a y
w e see t h e size a n d s h a p e o f o b j e c t s is ' w h o h y i n c l u d e d i n t h e w a y we
see t h e d i s t a n c e a n d p o s i t i o n o f t h e i r p a r t s ' . T h e i d e a p r e s u m a b l y is t h a t
i f w e c a n l o c a t e t h e p o i n t s o n t h e surface o f a n o b j e c t i n t h r e e d i m e n ­
sions i n r e l a t i o n t o us, a task r e q u i r i n g o n l y d i r e c t i o n a n d d i s t a n c e d e t e r ­
m i n a t i o n , t h e n w e h a v e d e t e r m i n e d t h e size a n d shape o f t h e o b j e c t . So
aU roads l e a d t o Descartes's a c c o u n t o f d i s t a n c e d e t e r m i n a t i o n . S i n c e ,
I h a v e a r g u e d , t h e ( p h y s i c a l ) m e c h a n i s m o f a s s o c i a t i o n is n o t g e n e r a U y
o p e r a t i v e i n size c o n s t a n c y s c a l i n g , t h e n a t u r a l a l t e r n a t i v e w o u l d s e e m t o
be the physical registration ofdistance i n the lean f u n c t i o n o f t h e pineal
g l a n d . B u t t h i s m e c h a n i s m , i f i t is t h e o n e m e n t i o n e d b y D e s c a r t e s i n h i s
first e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e w a y t h e s o u l c o m e s t o d e t e r m i n e d i s t a n c e ( A T v i .
137—8; C S M i . 1 7 0 ) , 1 9
is n o t g i v e n m u c h p r o m i n e n c e , t h o u g h i t d o e s s e e m
t o o p e r a t e a l o n g s i d e t h e o t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n s . W h a t is g i v e n p r o m i n e n c e is
a s e c o n d , m e n t a H s t e x p l a n a t i o n c o n s i s t i n g o f ' a m e n t a l act w h i c h , t h o u g h
o r d y a v e r y simple act o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , involves a k i n d o f reasoning
q u i t e s i m i l a r t o t h a t u s e d b y s u r v e y o r s w h e n t h e y m e a s u r e inaccessible
places b y m e a n s o f t w o d i f f e r e n t v a n t a g e p o i n t s ' ( A T v i . 138; C S M i . 170).
T h a t D e s c a r t e s i n t e n d s t h a t t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n is f u n d a m e n t a U y d i f f e r ­
ent f r o m the one i n v o l v i n g the lean f u n c t i o n o f the pineal gknd
e m e r g e s n o t o n l y f r o m Descartes's r e f e r e n c e t o m e n t a h t y a n d r e a s o n i n g
b u t a b o f r o m h i s c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e act as a n a c t o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n .
In the Treatise on Man Descartes contrasts imaging and sensing.
R e f e r r i n g to the figures t r a c e d i n t h e p i n e a l g l a n d h e says t h a t t h e y
s h o u l d b e c a U e d ideas o n l y w h e n t h e m i n d ' i m a g i n e s s o m e o b j e c t o r
senses i t ' . H e c o n t i n u e s :

A n d n o t e t h a t I say ' i m a g i n e ' o r 'sense'. F o r I w i s h t o apply the t e r m 'idea' g e n -

eraUy t o аП the impressions w h i c h t h e spirits are able t o receive as t h e y issue
from [the p i n e a l g l a n d ] . A n d w h e n these d e p e n d o n t h e presence o f o b j e c t s
they aU can be attributed t o c o m m o n sense; b u t they may also proceed from
other causes. . . and t h e n should t h e n be attributed t o the i m a g i n a t i o n . (AT vi.
177;TOM, 149-50)

T h e l e a n f u n c t i o n o f t h e p i n e a l g l a n d is i n d u c e d b y t h e p r e s e n c e o f
a n o b j e c t m o v i n g c l o s e r t o t h e eyes, a n d w o u l d , t h e r e f o r e , c o u n t as a n

1 9
Seen.13.
 Descartes's Theory ofPerception 47

o p e r a t i o n o f s e n s e r a t h e r t h a n i m a g i n a t i o n . So D e s c a r t e s has something
q u i t e d i f f e r e n t i n m i n d i n t h e n a t u r a l g e o m e t r y passage. 20

T h i s passage has b e e n m u c h d i s c u s s e d i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e a n d various

commentators have offered different o p i n i o n s about w h a t i t means.
Focusing o n the m e n t i o n ofsurveyors'reasomng,MauU 2 1
maintains that
D e s c a r t e s is h e r e o f f e r i n g a t h e o r y o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f a n i n n a t e g e o m ­
e t r y c o m p u t i n g d i s t a n c e v a l u e s from d a t a a b o u t t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n
t h e eyes a n d t h e angles o f c o n v e r g e n c e o f t h e eyes w h e n f o c u s i n g o n a n
object.Atherton 2 2
goes t o t h e o t h e r e x t r e m e , d e n y i n g t h a t any m e n t a l
use o f g e o m e t r y is causaUy i n v o l v e d i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f d i s t a n c e i n t h e
Opiiff.Wolf-Devine 2 3
thinks that some mental activity guided by innate
m i n d — b o d y correlations is i n t e n d e d b y D e s c a r t e s , b u t n o t fuU-dress
geometrical inference. H a t f i e l d , 2 4
focusing o n the m e n t i o n o f a 'simple
act o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ' , reads t h e r e f e r e n c e t o i m a g i n a t i o n as a r e f e r e n c e
t o t h e corporeal i m a g i n a t i o n , a n d sees t h e ' r e a s o n i n g ' as p u r e l y p h y s i o l o g ­
i c a l . FinaUy, G a r b e r , t a k i n g h i s c u e from t h e b l i n d - m a n a n a l o g y a U u d e d
t o j u s t b e f o r e t h e passage q u o t e d , has s u g g e s t e d 25
that there m a y be some
k i n d o f g e o m e t r i c a l reasoning g o i n g o n , b u t o f t h e r o u g h a n d ready sort
t h a t o r d i n a r y p e o p l e m i g h t i n d u c t i v e l y base o n e x p e r i e n c e .
A U o f t h e s e p o s i t i o n s face d i f f i c u l t i e s . I n a d d i t i o n t o i m p l a u s i b i h t y , t h e
suggestion from M a u U that f u U - b l o w n t r i g o n o m e t r i c calcvdation is
u n c o n s c i o u s l y c a r r i e d o u t b y t h e m i n d faces t h e p r o b l e m ofexplaining
w h y D e s c a r t e s w o u l d n o t h a v e c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h i s a c t i v i t y as a c o m p l e x
a c t i v i t y o f r e a s o n r a t h e r t h a n a s i m p l e act o f i m a g i n a t i o n .
A t h e r t o n m a k e s t w o c e n t r a l p o i n t s , ( i ) S h e sees t h e a c c o u n t o f s p a t i a I
p e r c e p t i o n i n t h e Optics as d e s i g n e d t o e x p l a i n h o w o b j e c t s i n t h e spa­
t i a l e n v i r o n m e n t l o o k t o us, r a t h e r t h a n h o w w e c o m e t o m a k e a c c u r a t e
j u d g m e n t s a b o u t h o w objects i n t h e spatial e n v i r o n m e n t actuaUy a r e . 2 6

2 0
A v e r y s i m i l a r p a s s a g e also o c c u r s i n t h e Treatise on Man ( A T x i . 1 6 0 ; T O M , 133—4).
T h i s m a y s u g g e s t t h a t D e s c a r t e s sees t h i s k i n d o f r e a s o n i n g as n o n - m e n t a l i s t i c s i n c e t h e
Treatise on Man w a s i n t e n d e d to treat w h a t goes o n i n a h y p o t h e s i z e d m a n - m a c h i n e rather t h a n
a true h u m a n w i t h b o t h a m i n d a n d a b o d y . B u t i n a n u m b e r ofpassages D e s c a r t e s specificaBy
i n t r o d u c e s t h e s o u l , as h e d o e s i n t h i s p a s s a g e , l o o k i n g f o r w a r d p r e s u m a b l y t o t h e final p a r t
o f t h e treatise ( w h i c h h e n e v e r w r o t e ) w h e r e the c o m p o s i t e w a s to h a v e b e e n treated.
2 1
N . MauU, 'Cartesian Optics a n d the Geometrization o f Nature'['Geometrization'],
Review ofMetaphysics 32 (1978),254^72.
2 2
M . A t h e r t o n , Berkeley's Revolution in Vision [Berkeley] (Ithaca: СогпеП, 1990).
2 3
C . W o t f - D e v i n e , Descartes on Seeing [Seeing] (Journal of the History of Philosophy
M o n o g r a p h S c r i e s ; C a r b o n d a l e a n d Edwardsvüle: S o u t h e r n IUinois U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1993).
2 4
Hatfield,'Physiology'. 2 5
Inconversation. 2 6
Atherton,Berfec/ey,27
4 8 Thomas Vinci

(2) S h e takes t h e a p p e a r a n c e s t o b e m e n t a l states p r o d u c e d b y n a t u r a l

i n s t i t u t i o n s c o r r e l a t i n g v a r i o u s states i n t h e b r a i n - a n d - e y e system—
angles o f c o n v e r g e n c e , a c c o m m o d a t i o n s , s a t u r a t i o n o f c o l o r , e t c . — w i t h
t h e a p p r o p r i a t e appearances r a t h e r t h a n p r o d u c e d b y s o m e k i n d o f r e a -
s o n i n g . T h e g e n e r a l d i f f i c u l t y w i t h t h i s a c c o u n t is t h a t i t r e q u i r e s us t o
2 7

discount too many t h i n g s i n Descartes's t e x t s : w e must discount

t h e c l a i m i n t h e Sixth Replies t h a t r e a s o n i n g plays a r o l e i n t h e Optics
( ' I d e m o n s t r a t e d i n t h e Optics h o w size, d i s t a n c e a n d s h a p e c a n be
perceived b y reasoning alone': A T v i i . 438; C S M i i . 295); w e must
d i s c o u n t t h e m e n t a l e s e i n t h e Optics i t s e l f , i n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e c l a i m i n t h e
passages w e are n o w c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t a k i n d o f i m p l i c i t surveyor's
r e a s o n i n g is at w o r k ; a n d , f i n a h y , w e m u s t leave i t c o m p l e t e l y m y s t e r i o u s
w h y D e s c a r t e s s h o u l d c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e m e n t a l a c t i n q u e s t i o n as a s i m p l e
act o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n . I f w e t a k e t h e p u r p o s e o f t h e Optics to be to
explain spatial appearances—here I agree with Atherton—these
d i f f i c u l t i e s m a y b e w o r t h a c c e p t i n g i f , b u t o n l y i f , t h e c h o i c e is b e t w e e n
t a k i n g t h e r o l e o f r e a s o n i n g a n d j u d g m e n t i n t h e Optics t o b e e x c l u s i v e l y
i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f b e h e f v e r s u s t a k i n g t h e r e t o b e n o role f o r r e a s o n i n g
a n d j u d g m e n t i n t h e Optics at a U . T h e r e is, h o w e v e r , a t h i r d p o s s i b i l i t y :
t h a t t h e r o l e o f r e a s o n i n g a n d j u d g m e n t i n t h e Optics is t o e x p l a i n t h e
a p p e a r a n c e s . T h a t is t h e p o s s i b i h t y t h a t I a m e x p l o r i n g i n t h e p r e s e n t
section. I n h g h t o f t h e existence o f this alternative I take t h e p r i c e o f
a d m i s s i o n t o A t h e r t o n ' s a c c o u n t t o b e t o o great.
Hatfield 2 8
argues t h a t t h e p e r c e p t u a l d e t e r r m n a t i o n o f d i s t a n c e i n t h e
t e x t o f t h e Optics, w h i c h l o o k s as i f i t r e q u i r e s i n f e r e n c e , c a n b e a d e ­
q u a t e l y i n t e r p r e t e d as p o s i t i n g a p u r e l y p s y c h o - p h y s i o l o g i c a l mecha­
n i s m , s i n c e D e s c a r t e s refers t o t h e process as a ' s i m p l e act o f t h e
i m a g i n a t i o n ' . T o say t h a t i t is p s y c h o - p h y s i c a l m e a n s f o r H a t f i e l d t h a t t h e
d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f d i s t a n c e p e r c e p t i o n is n o t m e d i a t e d b y r e a s o n i n g b u t is
a p h y s i o l o g i c a l representation o f distance c o n n e c t e d t o t h e m i n d b y a
natural institution hke that h o l d i n g for the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f location.
T h e p r i m a r y p h y s i o l o g i c a l f u n c t i o n f o r d i s t a n c e d e t e r m i n a t i o n is t h e
l e a n f u n c t i o n o f t h e p i n e a l g l a n d d e s c r i b e d i n t h e Treatise, b u t , as a h e a d y
n o t e d , D e s c a r t e s does n o t e m p h a s i z e t h i s f u n c t i o n . M o r e o v e r , a n d m o s t
s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h e r e is t h e p r o b l e m o f w h y t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h i s f u n c t i o n , i f
i t w e r e b e i n g r e h e d u p o n b y D e s c a r t e s , w o u l d b e c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a n a c t
o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n , e v e n i f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n is u n d e r s t o o d as t h e corporeal
2 7
Atherton,Berfeeky,24-5. 2 8
Hatfield,'Physiology',356^7.
 Descartes's Theory qfPerception 49

imagination, for the lean f u n c t i o n o f the pineal gland and the corporeal
i m a g i n a t i o n appear t o have n o direct c o n n e c t i o n w i t h o n e another.
I n h e r c a r e f u l a n d s u b t l e d i s c u s s i o n o f Descartes's k e y t e x t s i n t h e
Optics o n the perception ofsize,Woh"-Devine argues 29
that Descartes
maintains, t h o u g h n o t entirely consistendy, that natural institutions
trigonometricaUy correlate an appropriate o u t p u t i n idea w i t h the
appropriate inputs i n physiological information without temporaUy
e x t e n d e d reasoning (by the m i n d ) o r m e c h a n i c a l processing b y the
b r a i n . T h i s is a n i n t e r e s t i n g s u g g e s t i o n t h a t m a k e s a g o o d f i t w i t h t h e
p h r a s e 'as i f b y a n a t u r a l g e o m e t r y ' ( A T v i . 137f; C S M i . 170) as a q u a h f i -
c a t i o n o f t h e k i n d o f r e a s o n i n g i n v o l v e d i n distance d e t e r m i n a t i o n — b u t
i t c a n n o t b e t h e w h o l e s t o r y . F o r , (1) i t is d o e s n o t a c c o u n t f o r Descartes's
c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f t h e r e a s o n i n g as a n act o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n a n d (2) i n
t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h i r d - g r a d e s e n s o r y responses i n t h e Sixth Replies
D e s c a r t e s m a k e s s p e c i f i c m e n t i o n o f a c t u a l r e a s o n i n g processes t h a t
once occurred (AT v i i . 437-8; C S M i i . 295).Woff-Devine handles the
l a t t e r p r o b l e m b y d a i m i n g t h a t t h e r e is a s u b s t a n t i v e d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n
t h e t h e o r i e s p r o p o s e d i n t h e t w o t e x t s . H o w e v e r , t h i s c l a i m is u n h k e l y t o
b e t r u e s i n c e i n t h e Sixth Replies D e s c a r t e s refers us f o r c l a r i f i c a t i o n a n d
d e t a i k t o t h e Optics—without any quahf1cati0n o r e m e n d a t i o n t o the
t h e o r y as i t exists t h e r e .
FinaUy, Garber's v i e w , w h i c h seems t o m e t o b e q u i t e plausible as far as i t
goes, does n o t e x p l a i n a n y b e t t e r t h a n a n y o f t h e o t h e r v i e w s w h y Descartes
s h o u I d c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e a c t i v i t y as a s i m p l e act o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n .
I n s h o r t , t h e c e n t r a l p r o b l e m t h a t aU t h e s e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s share is t h a t
n o n e t a k e s e r i o u s l y t h e i d e a t h a t D e s c a r t e s m e a n s t h a t i t is hteraUy i m a g i ­
n a t i v e c o g n i t i o n t h a t is t h e s o u r c e o f t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f d i s t a n c e b y t h e
v i s u a l system.Yet t h i s , I shaU a r g u e , is a n a c c o u n t t h a t has p l a u s i b i h t y i n its
o w n r i g h t a n d fits w h a t h e says h e r e a n d e l s e w h e r e i n O p i i ' c s W a b o u t the
role o f i m a g i n a t i o n i n t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f distance. I n t h e n e x t s e c t i o n I
sketch an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ofDescartes's t h e o r y o f i m a g i n a t i v e cognition.

3. D E S C A R T E S ' S T H E O R Y O F I M A G I N A T I O N

I n MeditationVl D e s c a r t e s c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e i m a g i n a t i o n as p r o b a b l y
d e p e n d i n g i n a special w a y o n t h e c o r p o r e a l i m a g i n a t i o n .

2 9
W o l f - D e v i n e , Seeing, 72—4.
50 Thomas Vinci

I can easily understand that, i f t h e r e does exist some b o d y t o w h i c h the rründ is

s o j o i n e d that i t can apply i t s e l f t o c o n t e m p l a t e i t , as i t were, w h e n e v e r i t pleases,
t h e n i t m a y possibly be this v e r y b o d y that enables m e t o i m a g i n e c o r p o r e a l
things. So the difference b e t w e e n this m o d e o f t h i n k i n g and p u r e u n d e r s t a n d ­
i n g m a y s i m p l y be this: w h e n the m i n d understands, i t i n some w a y t u r n s
towards i t s e l f and inspects o n e o f the ideas w h i c h are w i t h i n i t ; b u t w h e n i t
imagines, i t t u r n s t o w a r d the b o d y a n d l o o k s at s o m e t h i n g i n t h e b o d y w h i c h
c o n f o r m s t o an idea u n d e r s t o o d b y t h e m i n d o r perceived b y the senses.
(ATvii. 73;CSMii.51)

A l t h o u g h D e s c a r t e s offers a n o t e o f c a u t i o n h e r e , s a y i n g t h a t t h i s is
o n l y a ' p r o b a b l e c o n j e c t u r e ' , i t d o e s r e p r e s e n t h i s b e s t c o n j e c t u r e as t o
w h a t t h e i m a g i n a t i o n is a n d h o w i t o p e r a t e s . I t o p e r a t e s b y i n t u i t i o n
d i r e c t e d t o a s t r u c t u r e i n t h e b o d y . T h i s f a c t is o b s c u r e d by the
C o t t i n g h a m t r a n s l a t i o n , r e n d e r i n g t h e L a t i n (intueator) by the n o n ­
t e c h n i c a l s o u n d i n g ' l o o k s a t ' . (Intueo a n d its v a r i a n t s o c c u r t h r e e t i m e s i n
c o n n e c t i o n w i t h i m a g i n a t i v e c o g n i t i o n i n t h e first three paragraphs o f
MeditationVl; o n n o n e o f t h e s e occasions does C o t t i n g h a m translate i t
b y the t e r m ' i n t u i t ' . ) B u t ' i n t u e o ' i s a technical t e r m i n Cartesian philos­
o p h y , h a v i n g a t h e o r e t i c a l role e s t a b l i s h e d i n s o m e d e t a i l i n t h e Rulesfor
the Direction of the Mind ( R u l e 3):

B y ' i n t u i t i o n ' I d o n o t mean the fluctuating testimony o f t h e senses or the decep-

t i v e j u d g m e n t o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n as i t botches things together, b u t the c o n c e p t i o n
o f a clear and attentive m i n d , w h i c h is so easy and distinct that there can be n o
room for d o u b t about w h a t w e are understanding . . . . I n case anyone should be
t r o u b l e d b y m y novel use o f t h e t e r m ' i n t u i t i o n ' and o f o t h e r terms t o w h i c h I shaU
be forced t o give a different m e a n i n g f r o m t h e i r o r d i n a r y one, I w i s h t o p o i n t o u t
here that I a m paying n o a t t e n t i o n t o the w a y these terms have lately been used i n
the schook. F o r i t w o u l d be v e r y difficult f o r m e t o e m p l o y the same t e r m i n o l ­
ogy, w h e n m y o w n views are p r o f o u n d l y different. ( A T x . 368; C S M i . 14)

N e x t I t u r n t o Descartes's a c c o u n t o f c l e a r ideas i n a l a t e r w o r k ( 1 6 4 4 ) ,
Principles of Philosophy I . 4 6 : ' I caU a p e r c e p t i o n " c l e a r " w h e n i t is p r e s e n t
a n d accessible t o t h e a t t e n t i v e m i n d — j u s t as w e say t h a t w e see s o m e ­
t h i n g c l e a r l y w h e n i t is p r e s e n t t o t h e eye's gaze a n d s t i m u l a t e s i t w i t h a
s u f f i c i e n t d e g r e e o f s t r e n g t h a n d accessibUity' ( A T v i i i A . 2 2 ; C S M i . 2 0 7 ) .
F i n a U y , t h e r e is t h i s passage f r o m Principles ofPhilosophy 1.66: ' T h e r e
r e m a i n s sensations, e m o t i o n s a n d appetites. T h e s e m a y b e c l e a r l y p e r c e i v e d
p r o v i d e d w e t a k e g r e a t care i n o u r j u d g m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e m t o
i n c l u d e n o m o r e t h a n w h a t is s t r i c d y c o n t a i n e d i n o u r c o n c e p t i o n — n o
 Descartes's Theory ofPerception 51

m o r e t h a n t h a t o f w h i c h w e h a v e i n n e r awareness' ( A T v i i i A . 32; CSM

i.216).
I t is t h i s t e r m ' i n n e r a w a r e n e s s ' 30
t h a t r e p r e s e n t s Descartes's clearest
c o n c e p t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ; I b e h e v e t h a t i t is t h i s s a m e c o n c e p t i o n
t h a t Descartes m e a n s t o designate i n R u l e 3 b y his ' n o v e l ' t e r m ' i n t u ­
i t i o n ' . S o , i n t u i t i o n f o r D e s c a r t e s is a g e n e r i c f o r m o f i m m e d i a t e a w a r e ­
ness p r e s e n t i n a v a r i e y o f m o d a h t i e s (sensory, i m a g i n a t i v e , i n t e h e c t u a l )
a n d d i r e c t e d t o a v a r i e t y o f o b j e c t s , i n c l u d i n g i m m u t a b l e essences, s e n ­
sations ( a n d c o r p o r e a l i m a g e s p e r h a p s ) , t h e a c t u a h t y o f o n e s e l f a n d one's
o w n t h o u g h t s . I n t h e Rules, i n t u i t i o n is t h e ' i n n a t e h g h t ' d i r e c t e d at both
c o r p o r e a l natures a n d inteUectual natures. ( R u l e 1 2 , A T x . 419; C S M i.
44—5.) T h e ' i n n a t e h g h t ' is o f c o u r s e , also o p e r a t i v e i n t h e Meditations,
t h o u g h n o t typicaUy u n d e r the technical rubric ofintueo. 31

B u t i n MeditationVl t h e t e c h n i c a l r u b r i c is u s e d (several times) and

the parity o f t r e a t m e n t ofinteUectual and imaginative c o g n i t i o n i n the
passage q u o t e d a b o v e i n d i c a t e s t h a t s o m e t h i n g v e r y close t o t h e o r i g i ­
n a l d o c t r i n e i n t h e Rulesfor the Direction of the Mind is o p e r a t i n g i n
Descartes's m a t u r e w o r k as w e U . T h i s is h o w D e s c a r t e s o f f i c i a l l y states
3 2

i t i n the earher w o r k :

. . . the p o w e r t h r o u g h w h i c h w e k n o w things i n the strict sense is p u r e l y spir­

i t u a l . . . . I t is one and the same p o w e r : w h e n a p p l y i n g itseU" a l o n g w i t h the
i m a g i n a t i o n t o the ' c o m m o n sense' i t is said t o see, t o u c h , e t c . ; w h e n addressing

3 0
T h e L a t i n is intime consdi; t h e F r e n c h is connaissance interieur.
3 1
T h e d o c t r i n e s a n d t h e t e r m i n o l o g y are n o t p r e c i s e l y t h e s a m e i n t h e t w o w o r k s . I n t h e
p a s s a g e q u o t e d a b o v e from t h e Rules D e s c a r t e s uses the t e r m i n o l o g y o f c l a r i t y a n d distinctness
as h e d o e s i n t h e k t e r w o r k s , b u t t h e r e are s o m e d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e s u p p o r t i n g t h e o r y . I c a n n o t
u n d e r t a k e h e r e a fuU e x p l o r a t i o n o f h o w the n o t i o n o f i n t u i t i o n relates to the t e r m i n o l o g y of
c l e a r a n d d i s t i n c t i d e a s i n t h e l a t e r w r i t i n g s , b u t , b r i e f l y , I t a k e t h e s i t u a t i o n t o b e as f o U o w s .
W h e n w e h a v e a n i n t u i t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g t h e s o m e t h i n g is p r e s e n t t o u s , t h u s is c l e a r t o u s : a n
i n t u i t i o n is a c l e a r i d e a . B u t i t m a y b e t h a t w e a r e u n c l e a r a b o u t v a r i o u s p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e c l e a r
i d e a , e.g. t h a t i t r e a U y is a f o r m o f i n t u i t i o n r a t h e r t h a n s o m e t h i n g e l s e , h k e a j u d g m e n t . Doubts
o f t h i s k i n d s e e m t o m e t o b e p r e s e n t i n Meditation I I I w h e n D e s c a r t e s says t h a t h e m i s t a k e n l y
t h o u g h t h e ' p e r c e i v e d clearly' that things outside o f h i m s e t f w e r e t h e s o u r c e o f h i s i d e a s , etc.
( A T v i i . 35; C S M i i . 2 5 ) . H e r e D e s c a r t e s m i s t a k e s a j u d g m e n t f o r a n i n t u i t i o n . T h e p o s s i b i U t y
that there m a y b e doubts o f this k i n d affecting i n t u i t i o n s does n o t s e e m to have bothered
D e s c a r t e s w h e n h e w r o t e , i n thepassage q u o t e d f r o m R u l e 12 a b o v e , t h a t ' t h e r e i s n o roomfor
d o u b t a b o u t w h a t w e are u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ' W h e n w e n o t o n l y h a v e a n i n t u i t i o n , b u t k n o w t h a t
w e d o , t h e n o u r i d e a is d i s t i n c t . S o a c l e a r a n d d i s t i n c t i d e a i n t h e Meditations is a n i n t u i t i o n
w h i c h w e reflectively k n o w to b e a n intuition. I have treated these matters m o r e extensively
i n T . V i n c i , CartesianTruth f N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 9 8 ) : c h . i , s e c t i o n s 1.3,1.8.

3 2
D . F l a g e a n d C.Bormen,Descartes andMethod ^ondon andNewYork:Methuen, 1999),
27, n . 1 8 , s e e m n o t to have n o t i c e d this.
 52 Thomas Vinci

i t s d f t o the i m a g i n a t i o n alone, insofar as the latter is invested w i t h various

figures,it is said t o r e m e m b e r ; w h e n a p p l y i n g i t s e t f t o the i m a g i n a t i o n i n o r d e r
t o f o r m n e w figures, i t is said t o i m a g i n e o r conceive; a n d , k s d v , w h e n i t acts o n
its o w n , i t is said t o understand. f R u l e 12, A T x . 415-16; C S M i . 42)

I n a d d i t i o n t o t h e p o w e r t o i n t u i t t h i n g s , t o f o r m figures i n t h e b r a i n
a n d o t h e r k i n d s o f a p p l i c a t i o n , t h e r e is a separate f a c u l t y ofjudgment
( R u l e 1 2 , A T χ. 420; C S M i . 45), i d e n t i f i e d w i t h the w i U i n later w o r k s
(Meditation I V , A T v i i . 56; C S M i i . 3 9 ) . W h e n t h e m e n t a l p o w e r ' a c t s on
its o w n ' i t d i r e c t s i t s e r f t o s i m p l e n a t u r e s , abstract e n t i t i e s f r o m w h i c h i t
extracts logical imphcations by i n t u i t i o n ( A T x . 425; C S M i . 48).
Descartes's a c c o u n t o f t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n the power to intuit
t h i n g s a n d t h e p o w e r t o m a k e j u d g m e n t s is s u b d e a n d I c a n n o t g o i n t o
i t here i n any detail, 3 3
b u t , briefly, I take i n t u i t i o n t o have t h e p o w e r to
e x t r a c t p r o p o s i t i o n s f r o m t h e objects o f i n t u i t i o n s a n d f o r these p r o p o ­
s i t i o n s t h e n t o s e r v e as t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r t o w h i c h j u d g m e n t is d i r e c t e d .
I caU j u d g m e n t s d i r e c t e d at p r o p o s i t i o n s ' p r o p e r j u d g m e n t s ' t o d i s t i n ­
g u i s h t h e m f r o m a s p e c i a l class o f j u d g m e n t s d i r e c t e d at t h i n g s , 'de re
j u d g m e n t s ' as I shaU caU t h e m . T h i s class o f j u d g m e n t s involves the
p o w e r o f j u d g m e n t d i r e c t e d t o i m a g e s a n d sensations a n d t h e y h a v e a
special r o l e t o play i n t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f o u r
e x p e r i e n c e . T h e c l a i m t h a t t h e r e exists t h i s s p e c i a l class ofjudgments
does n o t f o r m p a r t o f t h e standard r e a d i n g ofDescartes's t h e o r y o f m i n d
and I devote part ofsection 6 t o e x p o u n d i n g and defending the claim.
T h e r e is stiU t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e c o r p o r e a l
i m a g i n a t i o n a n d t h e c o m m o n sense a n d p r e c i s e l y w h i c h s t r u c t u r e i n t h e
b r a i n t h e i m a g i n a t i o n i n t u i t s . O v e r a U , i t seems t o f a v o r t h e c o r p o r e a l
i m a g i n a t i o n r a t h e r t h a n t h e c o m m o n s e n s e . T h e c o m m o n sense is t h a t
p a r t o f t h e p i n e a l g l a n d w h i c h is t h e d i r e c t r e c i p i e n t o f first-grade
( m e c h a n i s t i c ) s e n s o r y effects w h o s e i m m e d i a t e effects are naturaUy
i n s t i t u t e d i d e a s . T h e s p e c i f i c s t r u c t u r e s i n t h e c o r p o r e a l i m a g i n a t i o n are
t y p i c a U y caUed ' c o r p o r e a l i m a g e s ' . T h a t is t h e t e r m w e shaU use f o r t h e
objects o f imaginative intuition. T h e t e x t u a l e v i d e n c e is somewhat
a m b i g u o u s o n t h i s i s s u e . D e s c a r t e s seems t o a f f i r m i n t h e Treatise on Man
t h a t t h e c o r p o r e a l i m a g i n a t i o n ( t h e ' p h a n t a s i a ' ) is a separate s t r u c t u r e :

N o w a m o n g these figures, i t is n o t those i m p r i n t e d o n the organs o f external

sense, or o n the i n t e r n a l surface o f t h e b r a i n , b u t o n l y those w h i c h are traced i n

I d o so i n V i n c i , CartesianTmth,ch. i,esp.section 1.1.

 Descartes's Theory ofPerception 53

the spirits o n the surface o f g l a n d H w h e r e the seat o f the i m a g i n a t i o n and

' c o m m o n ' sense is located w h i c h s h o u l d be taken t o be ideas. ( A T x. 176—7;
T O M , 149; m y emphasis)

T h i s r e a d i n g is s u p p o r t e d b y a t e x t i n R u l e 12 i n t h e Rulesfor the
Direction of the Mind i n w h i c h D e s c a r t e s asserts t h e e x i s t e n c e o f a d i r e c t
information pathway between t w o distinct structures, the common
sense a n d t h e c o r p o r e a l i m a g i n a t i o n :

. . . the ' c o m m o n ' sense functions Hke a seal, fashioning i n the phantasy o r
i m a g i n a t i o n , as i f i n w a x , the same figures o r ideas w h i c h c o m e , p u r e and w i t h ­
out body, f r o m the external senses.The phantasy is a genuine part o f t h e body,
and is large e n o u g h t o aUow different parts o f i t t o take o n m a n y different f i g ­
ures a n d , generaUy, t o retain t h e m f o r some t i m e ; i n w h i c h case i t is t o be i d e n ­
t i f i e d w i t h w h a t w e caU ' m e m o r y ' . ( A T x. 414; C S M i . 41-2)

However, Caton 3 4
argues t h a t a l t h o u g h t h e c o r p o r e a l i m a g i n a t i o n
a n d t h e c o m m o n sense w e r e t a k e n b y D e s c a r t e s as separate s t r u c t u r e s i n
t h e Rulesfor the Direction of the Mind t h e y w e r e t a k e n as a s i n g l e s t r u c t u r e
i n l a t e r w o r k s . T h i s is t h e v i e w t h a t I shaU a d o p t .
Before leaving this account ofDescartes's t h e o r y o f t h e i m a g i n a t i o n ,
I n e e d b r i e f l y t o say s o m e t h i n g a b o u t Descartes's t h e o r y oicontent and
t h e n t o c o n s i d e r , at l e n g t h , s o m e o b j e c t i o n s t o t h e a c c o u n t .

The Theory of Content

W h e n w e can discern introspectively a qualitative difference between

t w o c o g n i t i o n s , w h a t e v e r e x p l a i n s t h a t d i f f e r e n c e is, b y d e f i n i t i o n , con­
tent i n m y sense. O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , w h a t c o g n i t i o n s are d i r e c t e d t o is,
b y d e f i n i t i o n , t h e intentional object o f t h e c o g n i t i o n . T h e s e c o n c e p t s are
n o t l o g i c a U y e q u i v a l e n t . I t is b y d e f i n i t i o n a d i f f e r e n c e i n c o n t e n t t h a t
explains t h e quahtative difference b e t w e e n an i m a g i n a t i v e i n t u i t i o n o f a
pentagon and an inteUectual i n t u i t i o n o f a pentagon. However, depend­
i n g o n one's t h e o r y o f t h e s e t h i n g s t h e d i f f e r e n c e m a y b e d u e t o d i f f e r ­
ent object-types f o r these c o g n i t i o n s , o r i t m a y b e d u e t o d i f f e r e n t
h i g h e r - o r d e r properties o f t h e c o g n i t i o n s themselves, o r some c o m b i ­
n a t i o n o f t h e t w o . I n d e e d , t h e r e m a y b e c o g n i t i o n s w i t h c o n t e n t t h a t are
n o t d i r e c t e d t o o b j e c t s at aU.

H i r a m C a t o n , The Origin of Subjectivity flSTew H a v e n : Y a l e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 7 3 ) , 165 n .

54 Thomas Vinci

Descartes's d o c t r i n e i n t h e passage q u o t e d from R u l e 12 ( A T x . 414;

C S M i . 4 2 ) is t h a t i t is ' o n e a n d t h e s a m e ' s p i r i t u a l a c t t h a t is r e s p o n s i b l e
for ( i n t e U e c t u a l ) u n d e r s t a n d i n g ( ' w h e n i t acts o n its o w n ' ) a n d for i m a g ­
i n a t i v e c o g n i t i o n w h e n d i r e c t e d at c o r p o r e a l i m a g e s . W h e n t h e s p i r i t u a l
p o w e r ' a c t s o n its o w n ' i t is d i r e c t e d t o s i m p l e n a t u r e s , i n t e U e c t u a l o b j e c t -
types d i f f e r i n g from the material object-types ( c o r p o r e a l images) at
w h i c h t h e p o w e r is d i r e c t e d i m a g i n a t i v e l y . S i n c e d i f f e r e n c e i n c o n t e n t
m u s t b e traceable t o s o m e t h i n g — e i t h e r a difference i n t h e p o w e r of
c o g n i t i o n o r a d i f f e r e n c e i n its o b j e c t s — a n d s i n c e t h e p o w e r is said t o b e
t h e same, t h e d i f f e r e n c e i n c o n t e n t m u s t t h e n b e d u e t o t h e d i f f e r e n c e
b e t w e e n c o r p o r e a l i m a g e s a n d i n t e ü e c t u a l n a t u r e s . I s h a h caU t h i s p r i n ­
c i p l e Descartes's General Content Principle.By similar reasoning a distinc­
t i o n i n c o n t e n t w i t h i n t h e i m a g i n a t i o n m u s t also b e d u e t o differences
b e t w e e n t h e objects o f i m a g i n a t i v e c o g n i t i o n . Since these objects are
actual c o r p o r e a l images, differences i n t h e contents b e t w e e n difference
acts o f i m a g i n a t i v e c o g n i t i o n w i U b e d u e t o d i f f e r e n t p r o p e r t i e s o f c o r -
p o r e a l i m a g e s , t h a t is, d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e size, shape, a n d d i s t a n c e ofthese
e n t i t i e s . So, f o r e x a m p l e , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n i n c o n t e n t b e t w e e n i m a g i n i n g a
t h r e e - s i d e d f i g u r e a n d i m a g i n i n g a f o u r - s i d e d f i g u r e lies e x c l u s i v e l y i n
t h e difference b e t w e e n t h e actual spatial p r o p e r t i e s o f s a i d images,pre-
s u m a b l y t h r e e - s i d e d n e s s a n d f o u r - s i d e d n e s s r e s p e c t i v e l y . I shaU caU t h i s
Descartes's Content Principlefor the Imagination.

Objections

T h e r e is a t e x t i n Optics VI i n w h i c h D e s c a r t e s seems t o c o n s i d e r t h e
p o s s i b U i t y t h a t t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e sense e x p e r i e n c e o f p r i m a r y q u a h t i e s
d e p e n d s o n t h e c o n t e m p l a t i o n o f b r a i n i m a g e s , a n d d e c i s i v e l y rejects i t .
S i n c e t h i s t e x t is m u c h d i s c u s s e d i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h p r e s e n t themes 3 5

a n d seems t o c o n t r a d i c t a p o s i t i o n I h a v e j u s t b e e n a t t r i b u t i n g to
D e s c a r t e s , I n e e d t o s h o w h o w i t c a n b e i n t e r p r e t e d i n w a y t h a t is c o n ­
s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s p o s i t i o n . T h i s is t h e t e x t :

N o w w h e n this p i c t u r e [the r e t i n a l image] thus passes t o the inside o f o u r head,

i t stiU bears some resemblance t o t h e objects f r o m w h i c h i t proceeds.As I have
a m p l y s h o w n akeady, however, w e must n o t t h i n k that i t is b y means o f this
resemblance that t h e p i c t u r e causes o u r sensory p e r c e p t i o n ofthese objects—as

R e c e n d y by R o z e m o n d , ' M i n d - B o d y ' .
 Descartes's Theory ofPerception 55

ifthere were yet other eyes within our brain with which we could perceive it.
Instead we must hold that it is the movements composing this picture which,
acting directly upon our soul insofar as it is united to our body, are ordained by
nature to make it have such sensations. (AT vi. 130; C S M i. 167)

T h e first and primary point made here is that even though there is a
certain resemblance between image in the corporeal imagination and distal
object, that fact is not causaUy efficacious i n producing the sensation: that
depends solely on a proximate cause consisting of a certain pattern of
movement i n the brain. This point, however, is compatible with my
interpretation that w h e n the mind intuits images in the brain the c o n ­
tent ofthe cognition comprising this contemplation is due to the image.
Second, in the middle of the passage quoted Descartes makes a
remark that seems decisively to disparage the idea that the contempla­
tion ofbrain images plays a role i n sense perception.The remark is this:
'as ifthere were yet other eyes within our brain with which we could
perceive it'. Several commentators, for example R o z e m o n d , have cited
this as key evidence that Descartes denies that the soul contemplates the
brain. 36
However,it seems that Descartes is not expressing this denial in
these words since it is the possibility that the brain, not the soul, has
another set of eyes that is being disparaged. Indeed, i n Optics IV
Descartes uses language that seems to endorse the idea that the mind
contemplates the brain:'it is not, properly speaking,because ofits pres­
ence i n the parts ofthe body w h i c h function as organs ofthe external
senses that the soul has sensory perceptions,but because ofits presence
in the brain, where it exercises the faculty caUed the " c o m m o n sense" '
(AT vi. 109; C S M i. 164).The fact that the soul is present in (dans) the
brain here supports the 'contemplation' interpretation.
What, then, is Descartes's point about yet other eyes within the brain?
O n e possibihty is that he is trying to block an explanatory regress that
would result ifone were trying to explain how a person sees an object
with his eyes by introducing a theory i n w h i c h rephcas i n the brain of
the eyes see rephcas i n the brain ofthe object. I f I have Descartes right
here, the main import of this remark is yet another jibe taken at the
defective explanatory model ofhis scholastic opponents, not a rejection
ofsome role for the contemplation ofbrain images in Cartesian cogni­
tive science.

ibid.463.
56 Thomas Vinci

FinaUy, and perhaps most potentiaUy damaging for my interpretation,

is the last sentence of the passage: 'it is the movements composing this
picture w h i c h , acting direcdy upon our soul insofar as it is united to our
body, are ordained by nature to make it have such sensations'.This pas­
sage seems to leave no room for image contemplation as a means o f c o n -
nection between the mind and the body—only the arbitrary correlations
instituted by nature between physical movements and ideas are permit-
ted.This doctrine, also expressed i n the language of'natural institution'
or what the body 'occasions' i n the mind, is weh represented i n
Descartes's writings, for example i n Comments on a Certain Broadsheet
( A T viiiB. 358^>; C S M i. 304). However, in the latter text, the main point
seems to be not to deny a role to the contemplation ofbrain images i n
cognition but to deny a role to scholastic species 'transmitted' from dis­
tal objects direcdy into the mind. It is something hke this same scholas­
tic bogeyman that is the target of the first part of the passage quoted
above from Optics VI.
Notice that in this passage Descartes says that the ordination ofnature
explains why the soul has 'sensations'.This is a very striking fact, since, i f
Descartes means to include the sense experience ofprimary qualities
under this term, it is, as far as I know, the only place where he does so. 37

GeneraUy Descartes is scrupulous in reserving the term 'sensations' for

the sense experience ofcolor,hght ('the proper objects ofsight'),flavors,
etc. Indeed, i n the very same paragraph from w h i c h the passage quoted
is drawn, Descartes's only examples of sense experience ordained by
nature to arise from movements in the brain are of the 'sensations' o f
hght, color, fkvors, sounds, and pains. Nowhere i n this hst are primary
qualities to be found. EventuaUy, ofcourse, Descartes does move on to
consider how our ideas ofprimary quahties arise (AT vi. 1 3 4 - 7 ; C S M i.
169^70) .There are several to consider. Position ('the orientation ofeach
part ofan object i n relation to our body'):'Our knowledge ofit does not
depend on any image' but rather it is 'ordained by nature' that an idea of
orientation arises whenever the nerves i n the brain connected to the
hmbs are pointing i n a certain direction. Distance: ' T h e seeing of dis­
tance depends no more than does the seeing ofposition on any images
transmitted from objects' (my emphasis). Descartes does not say that the

3 7
ш a n i m p o r t a n t t e x t i n t h e Sixth RepUes (discussed b e l o w ) D e s c a r t e s seems to suggest that
the shape ('extension') o f a color c a n be associated w i t h s e c o n d - g r a d e sensory response.
A l t h o u g h D e s c a r t e s caUs t h e c o l o r a s e n s a t i o n , h e d o e s n o t c a U t h e s h a p e o f t h e c o l o r a s e n s a t i o n .
 Descartes 's Theory of Perception 57

seeing ofdistance fails to depend on cognition ofimages i n any way:

indeed, in characterizing one ofthe procedures realizing the seeing of
distance as a 'simple act ofthe imagination' he is making it clear in gen­
eral, ifnot i n detail, that the seeing ofdistance does depend on images.
I now return to the question ofwhat Descartes has in mind when he
speaks i n Optics V I o f a 'simple act ofthe imagination' as the means by
w h i c h the mind determines the distance ofobjects we perceive i n our
environment.

4. A S I M P L E A C T O F T H E I M A G I N A T I O N

T h e reference to a simple act of the imagination occurs i n the passage

where Descartes is explaining the bHnd-man analogy for the visual
determination ofdistance by o c u k r convergence.Descartes says that we
can use both eyes orjust one:

Thus, ifwe keep it (the one eye) turned towards X and place it first at point
A and immediately afterwards at point B, this wiU be enough to make our
imagination contain the magnitude ofofthe HneAC together with that ofthe
two angles X A B and X B A , and thus enable us to perceive the distance from
point X . A n d this is done by a mental act which, although only a very simple
act ofthe imagination, involves a kind ofreasoning quite simUar to that used by
surveyors when they measure inaccessible places by means oftwo different
vantage points. (AT vi. 138; C S M i. 170; the diagram in which the various
lines and angles are present is Fig. 9)

W h a t could Descartes mean w h e n he says that the imagination ' c o n ­

tains' a certain magnitude of hnes and angles? T h e ordy container—
indeed, the only object—associated with the imagination is the
corporeal imagination and that, I shaU take it, is where the magnitudes
ofhne and angle are contained. B u t how do they get there, why are they
there and how does that help with the task ofdistance determination?
To answer these questions let us revert to the blind man analogy (Fig. 8,
A T vi. 135; C S M i. 1 6 9 ) . T h e bhnd man has two sticks, one i n each
hand, w h i c h he uses to triangulate the location ofan object located at a
point E . I f we imagine that we are looking down upon this man, the
configuration of sticks and arms forms a triangle w i t h the base a line
running from one elbow (A) to the other (C) and the apex at the object,
point E . T h i s man is said to know 'as ifby a naturaI geometry' how far
58 Thomas Vinci

E is away from his body. I f the midpoint between A and C is F, and

the angIes E C A and E A C and the distanceAC is known, then a trigono­
metric calculation can determine the distance E F , w h i c h represents
the distance ofthe object from the man. It is, however, unhkely that
said blind man knows trigonometry, and unhkeher stiU that he carries
out a formal trigonometric proof to determine the value of E F .
Whatever he does, Descartes would characterize it as a 'simple act ofthe
imagination' i n w h i c h the various magnitudes are apparently contained
in the brain as corporeal images. Although Descartes does not say
precisely what he has i n mind here, the only thing to fit this description
would be (mental) operation on a triangular corporeal image congruent
with, but on a smaUer scale than, the triangular configuration ofsticks
and arms, A E C . That is, the blind man is imagining himseh" seen from
above, an act w h i c h involves a corporeal intuition of a triangular
configuration i n the corporeal i m a g e , A ' E ' C ' , c o n g r u e n t w i t h A E C .
Although this brain-triangle is smaUer in scale than the actual
configuration, the relevant ratios remain the same. Thus, i f the base of
the brain triangle, A ' C ' , is % the length ofthe triangle (the distance from
themidpointF' o f A ' C ' tomeapexE'),thenthedistancefromthemid-
point ofhis body, F, to the point at w h i c h the object is located, E , is also
three times the distance between his elbows,AC.The bHnd man knows
the properties of the brain triangle by corporeal intuiting, knows the
distance between his elbows by experience, and can multiply by three.
I n this way he comes to know the distance from his body to the object.
It is, ofcourse, a crucial presupposition ofhis coming to know this
that the brain triangle is similar to (differs only i n scale from) the physi­
cal configuration oflimbs and sticks.There is stiU the question o f h o w
such a brain triangle comes to be accurately produced,There does not
seem to be any physiological mechanism among those countenanced i n
the Treatise on Man that would explain how a triangle similar to a c o n ­
figuration ofsticks and limbs could come to be in the brain.The only
device available (at least to Descartes in 1637) is that of the 'spiritual
power'freely constructing images i n the corporeal imagination.This c o n ­
struction would be guided by information concerning the angles, E A C ,
E C A and distance betweenA and C , aU avaikble to the bHnd man's cog-
nition.The active intervention ofreason is an essential part ofthe story.
If, as Descartes asserts, the visual system determines distance in an ana­
logous way, the procedure wiU be this. First the mind constructs the brain
 Descartes's Theory of Perception 59

triangle representative ofwhat we shaU caU the 'visual triangle' ^ase:hne

joining the eyes; apex: the location ofthe focal object) based on informa­
tion avaüable to it regarding the angle ofconvergence ofthe eyes.This
information determines the construction ofthe two sides which intersect
at a point to create the closed figure ofa triangle.The base is ofarbitrary
length, constrained only by the physiological hmitations ofthe corporeal
imagination itseh , and constructed to represent the base ofthe visual tri­
0

angle. CDescartes is not entirely clear about how this information is made
avaUable to the rnind, but in the main it appears to be by means ofthe
mind-body correlations he caUs 'institutions ofnature'.) This is a mental
act, it is involved i n the free construction ofimages in the corporeal ima­
gination, and it is simple.And so we have it: a simple act ofthe imagination.
This act also includes the basic acts of arithmetical reasoning and de re
judgment that involve computing or estimating the actual distance ofthe
focal object from the eyes by taking the ratio ofthe base to the length of
the representative brain triangle times the known actual dimensions of
the base (the distance between the eyes).And so we have our conclusion:
mentahty is actively involved i n an essential way in the determination of
distance by the Cartesian visual system. I shaU caU this model ofvisual
cognition the Concrete-Imagination Model of Perceptual Processing.
Attributing this model to Descartes also aUows us to explain what
would otherwise be a very puzzhng passage that occurs a few pages kter:

. . . ifone is looking at an object at aU far away, there is . . . hardly any variation

in the angles between the hnes joining the two eyes (or two positions of the
same eye) and the hnes from the eyes to the object.As a consequence, even our
'common sense' seems incapable of receiving in itself the idea of a distance
greater than approximately two hundred feet.This can be verified in the case of
the moon and the sun.Although they are among the most distant bodies that we
can see, and their diameters are to their distances roughly as one to a hundred,
they normaUy appear to us as at most only one or two feet in diameter—
although we know by reason that they are extremely krge and extremely far
away.This does not happen because we cannot conceive them any larger, seeing
that we can easUy conceive towers and mountains which are much larger. It
happens, rather, because we cannot conceive them as more than one or two
hundred feet away, and consequendy their diameters cannot appear to us to be
more than one or two feet. (AT vi. 144; C S M i. 173)

First there is the puzzle ofwhat Descartes could mean when he says
that the common sense can 'receive' an idea o f a distance ofany kind,
6o Thomas Vinci

even one less than 2 0 0 feet. O n e thing that he cannot mean is that the
common sense can receive a 'species' of distance transmitted from the
environment.Another thing that he cannot mean is that on the basis o f
a stimvjlus from the corporeal common sense the mind can form an idea
having distance as an objective reality, since there is no impossibility i n
having an idea whose objective reahty contains a magnitude 0 f 2 0 0 feet,
yet Descartes says that it is impossible for the common sense to receive
such an idea.What he might mean is that the brain cannot receivefrom the
activities of imaginative cognition a brain-triangle representative ofa visual
triangle with length greater than 2 0 0 feet. 38
That is, Descartes might
mean that the impossibihty is a physiological impossibihty. Supporting
evidence that this is what he means comes from the last sentence ofthe
passage where he says that we cannot conceive ofobjects as more than
2 0 0 feet away.Descartes often uses 'conceive' as a synonym for'imagine'.
For example,inRule 12 he says ofthe mind,'when applying itselfto the
imagination i n order to form new figures, it is said to imagine or c o n ­
ceive' (AT χ. 416; C S M i. 4 2 ) . I f he is doing so here, then, on the
Concrete Imagination Model, this sentence is asserting that we cannot
construct a brain-triangle that represents a visual triangle with length
greater than 2 0 0 feet.
W h y not? Descartes's text mentions the lack of 'variation i n the
angles between the hnesjoining the two eyes (or two positions ofthe
same eye) and the hnes from the eyes to the object'.In the two-eye case
it is not clear why the lack of variation is relevant, unless Descartes
means that for a series ofobjects progressively further away than 2 0 0
feet, there is hardly any variation i n angles ofconvergence. I n this case
his reasoning would seem to be that beyond that distance no difference
in the angles ofconverge are detectable by the mind, so the input para­
meters (angles of convergence and distance between the eyes) remain
the same for the construction of ah brain-triangles representing visual
triangles oflength greater than 2 0 0 feet. So the mind would not construct
brain triangles representative ofvisual triangles oflength greater than
2 0 0 feet. But Descartes says 'incapable ofreceiving' znd'cannot conceive',
so we should look for a stronger reason i n the text.We can find it i f w e

3 8
D e s c a r t e s caHs t h e r e g i o n r e c e i v i n g t h e i d e a t h e ' c o m m o n s e n s e ' r a t h e r t h a n t h e ' c o r p o ­
r e a l i m a g i n a t i o n ' , b u t , if, as w e a r e a c c e p t i n g , t h e c o m m o n s e n s e a n d t h e c o r p o r e a l i m a g i n a ­
t i o n are t h e s a m e p h y s i c a l s t r u c t u r e i n the later w r i t i n g s , t h e n this does n o t p r o v i d e a m a j o r
p r o b l e m for the present interpretation.
 Descartes's Theory qfPerception 6i

focus on the singIe-eye case and treat the lack ofvariation i n the angles
as a k c k ofvariation in the angles from the eye to the object w h e n the
position ofthe eye is moved.This lack ofvariation means that the lines
from the two positions ofthe eye to the object are paraUel, or nearly so:
hence there either is no visual triangle at аП, or its length/base ratio is
enormous. I n the first case it is geometricaUy impossible and i n the sec­
ond physicaUy impossible for a congruent representative brain triangle
to be constructed in the finite physical dimensions of the corporeal
imagination.This is so because the base has to be ofa certain nfinimum
size, say, i m m , requiring a length too great to be accommodated within
the physical dimensions ofthe corporeal imagination.This would show
why, as Descartes asserts, the idea ofsuch a distance cannot be represented
by the imagination.
I conclude this section with some objections and rephes.

Objection i

Descartes does not specificaUy and direcdy say that any aspects of the
phenomenology of primary-quality sense experience, including size
constancy scahng, are produced by an intervention ofreasoning i n the
corporeal imagination. H e does not,in fact, give any detaUed account of
how InteUect, Sense, and Imagination interacting with human neuro­
physiology might produce human primary-quahty experience. T h e
only explanation for this omission is that some part of the foregoing
interpretation is wrong.
Reply:Thtr& is another explanation. Descartes's data in the Treatise of
Man are human behavior (or what would simulate it i n his human
machines) not the data of human introspection. T h e ktter gives evi­
dence ofthe existence ofperceptual phenomena hke size constancy and
the moon iUusion that is not direcdy avaUable from human or animal
non-verbal behavior. It is, however, only i n the Treatise of Man that
Descartes gives an account ofthe nuts-and-bolts details ofthe physio­
logical mechanisms ofthe human machine,but because ofthe relatively
impoverished explananda (there are no data from introspection), the
mechanisms are relatively less sophisticated than would be required to
account for aU the relevant data about what actual humans with minds
experience. fDescartes is not, however, entirely consistent i n keeping to
this austere program in the Treatise,lctung us know that the perception
62 Thomas Vina

of objective size i n humans is a factor requiring a more comphcated

mechanism employing the fuU range ofactivities ofthe union o f m i n d
and body.) I n the Optics and later works, on the other hand, where the
explananda do include the richer data ofintrospection, and the explanans
includes the deployment of reasoning and the doctrine of natural
institution, nitty-gritty physiological detail is largely omitted. It is only
i n the second part ofthe Treatise, the one that was to combine physio­
logical detail and introspective evidence, that we would expect to find
the fuU story, the one I think Descartes meant to teU. B u t that is the part
ofthe Treatise he never wrote.

Objection 2

Ifwe apply to the example ofsize constancy scahng our interpretation of

how, for Descartes, the three faculties (InteUect, Imagination, and Sense)
determine the content ofthe sense perception ofprimary quahties,we
might get something along the foUowing hnes. Starting with the retinal
image, a causal process yields a reproduction ofthat image i n the common
sense.A second process yields a reproduction ofthat image i n the corpo­
real imagination.The mind becomes cognizant ofthe second image, takes
directional information avaUable to it by natural institution, takes distance
information derived i n the way described in the Concrete Imagination
Model, carries out further trigonometric-hke calcukitions, and then,
finaUy, records the results by somehow altering the initial image i n the
corporeal imagination, scahng it up so that its actual properties match the
requirements ofthe scaled up appearances we are introspectively aware of.
(This last step is required by the Content Principle for Imagination.)
Unfortunately, the objection continues, as an interpretation of
Descartes's account ofperception, there are at least two major implausi-
bihties i n this account, both deriving from the presumed Cartesian doc­
trine that any mental activity is automaticaUy noticed.The first is that we
do not notice the calculating.The second is that we would expect first
to notice the object to appear very smaU and only then w o u l d w e notice
it increase i n apparent size after size constancy scahng has occurred—of
course we do not notice any ofthis either. So the storyjust told must be
mistaken i n certain key elements.
Reply: There is a difference for Descartes between what we 'notice'
and what we are 'conscious' of. Descartes does not say that we notice aU
 Descartes's Theory ofPerception 63

the operations ofthe mind (see Six Replies: A T vii. 422—3; C S M ii. 185),
only that we are conscious of aU the operations of the mind (Second
Replies:AT vii. 1 6 0 - 1 ; C S M ii. 113).S0 the fact that we faU to notice the
operationsjust described is not contrary to the Cartesian doctrine ofthe
transparency ofthe mind's operations to itself. (This doctrine is exph-
cidy stated in the Second Replies:XT vii. 2 2 9 ; C S M ii. 160—1.) Setting
aside the question o f h o w one can be conscious ofsomething one fails
to notice, there is the question o f h o w we can (a) fail to notice the initial
appearance of the retinal image and φ) fail to notice the calctdations.
For both ofthese, Descartes has something hke a direct answer. For the
first, he says in R u l e 12 of the Rulesfor the Direction of the Mind that the
mind is too 'preoccupied' to 'receive' (I read this as 'notice') the ' c o m ­
m o n ' sense's images (AT x. 4 1 5 ; C S M i. 4 2 ) . For the second,we have the
foUowing passage from the Sixth Replies:

I have demonstrated in the Optics how size, distance and shape can be perceived
by reasoning alone, which works out any one feature from the other features.
The only difference is that when we now make a judgment for the first time
because ofsome new observation, then we attribute it to the inteUect; but when
from our earHest years we have made judgments, or even rational inferences,
about the things which affect our senses, then, even though these judgments
were made in exacdy the same way as those we make now, we refer them to the
senses.The reason for this is that we make thejudgment and calculation at great
speed because of habit, or rather we remember the judgments we have long
made about similar objects; and so we do not distinguish these operations from
simple sense-perception. (AT vii. 438; C S M ii. 295)

There are two points ofinterest for us.The first is that Descartes says
that reasoning was at work i n us exphcidy w h e n we were children; the
second is that this reasoning is somehow automated rather than expli-
cidy carried out.What does Descartes have in mind here?
Building on a suggestion from Wolf-Devine, 39
we can consistendy
account for both the doctrine ofautomatic perceptual responses in the
Sixth Replies and the doctrine of rational perceptual processes in the
Optics by taking the derivation ofthe ideasofsize, shape, and distance
(the three quahties mentioned as derived by reasoning in the Sixth
Replies) to be a temporal sequence of actual reasoning that either
occurred i n our childhood or, with novel situations, occurs currently.

W c J f - D e v i n e , Seeing, 72—4.
6 4
Thomas Vinci

T h i s reasoning then estabhshes a rough and ready trigonometric 'tables

ofvalues' as an acquired institution correlating physiological data with
mental data. FinaUy, this institution guides automated perceptual
processes w h e n we are adults and w h e n we are in famihar perceptual
contexts, resulting i n changes i n the corporeal imagination analogous to
those achieved initiaUy by the explicit intervention ofreasoning. Ifthis
suggestion is right then Descartes sees reasoning as a truly universal
instrument operating even at early stages in the development ofthe
perceptual system.

5. M E N T A L I T Y A N D T H E I N S U F F I C I E N C Y O F M E C H A N I S M

I have now concluded my argument that a correct interpretation of

Descartes's account of distance perception requires a role for active
mentahty. It comes i n two forms: (r) active mentaHty as imagination,
(2) active mentahty as inteUect. Mentahty as imagination constructs and
alters figures i n the corporeal imagination; it makes de re judgments
about them. Mentahty as inteUect engages in inference; it makesjudg-
ments. InteUectual operations are needed w h e n the mind 'works out'
some spatial quahties from others, as he says in the Sixth Replies (AT vii.
4 3 7 ; C S M ii. 2 9 5 ) , the results o f w h i c h are needed to guide the mind's
imaginative operations. For example, the mind i n its imaginative oper­
ations creates a brain triangle w h i c h it uses to judge that an object is
about 10 feet away. It then uses that information inteUectuaUy to judge
how m u c h the corporeal representation ofthe retinal image needs to be
scaled up, then uses its imaginative power to scale up the corporeal rep­
resentation appropriately. (Notice that this is not a trigonometrically com­
puted 'scahng up', since the appearance o f a 1 ' diameter object at a
distance of 1 0 ' is somewhat smaUer than the appearance ofthe same
object at a distance of 1'—so there is a compensation effect but it is only
partial.)Whether we hke it or not, there is thinking going on behind the
scenes for Descartes, but not formal trigonometry. We are, aU of us,
rational beings; we are not, aU ofus, mathematicians.
There is stiU a question pending: given that Descartes has avaikble i n
the Treatise on Man a mechanical account of the determination of
distance—the lean function of the pineal gland—why did he feel it
necessary to de-emphasize that account, emphasizing one involving
 Descartes'sTheoryofPerception 65

mentaHty and the imagination? There is no direct answer to this ques­

tion in Descartes's writing.There is, however, an indirect answer, or at
least an indication ofwhere to look for an answer,in the methodologi­
cal doctrine o f t h e Discourse 40
that reason (active mentahty) is to be
invoked as an explanatory element i n human psychology when and
only w h e n some human cognitive capacity is observed to operate at a
more advanced level than could be accounted for by mechanistic expla­
nation alone. I f my argument has been persuasive we now know that
there is indeed actual reasoning i n the perceptual determination ofdis­
tance, size, and shape; we infer from the methodological doctrine that
there must be some advanced cognitive/perceptual capacity that m e c h ­
anism alone cannot account for; what we do not yet know is what defi­
ciency Descartes might have seen i n the lean function of the pineal
gland as a mechanical distance-determinator.
I n the Treatise on Man the mechanism causing the pineal gland to
move inward (away from the center) is a mechanical puhing action that,
in the first instance, is created by the movement ofthe eyes as they c o n ­
verge to achieve focus on a nearby object, and then is transmitted to the
pineal gland through the optic tubules (AT xi. 1 8 5 - 1 8 7 ; T O M , i$7~9'<
Figure 6 7 ) . N o w it is pretty clear that since the angle ofconvergence and
the distance between the eyes wffl both influence the degree ofpuUing
action on the pineal gbnd, the mechanical and geometrical structure of
this system would yield at least the orientation ofthe pineal gland as a
monotonicfiinction ofthe distance ofthe focal object away from the m i d ­
point between the two eyes. (A monotonic function is a correlation, i n
this case, a correktion between measures ofthe objective distance ofan
object from the midpoint ofthe eyes and measures ofthe nearness of
orientation ofthe pineal gland to the midpoint ofthe brain.) What is
needed, ofcourse, for accuracy is a trigonometricßmction, but I cannot see
how the physiological machinery Descartes actuaUy envisaged, or any
natural extension ofit, could have instantiated a computer oftrigono-
metric relationships. This is where the intervention ofthe mind as a
41

4 0
D i s c u s s e d i n m o r e detail i n the I n t r o d u c t i o n .
4 1
I t h a s b e e n s u g g e s t e d t o m e t h a t D e s c a r t e s might well have thought that the p h y s i o l o g i c a l
m e c h a n i s m i n v o l v i n g t h e basic p i n e a l - e y e s y s t e m i n fact instantiated a t r i g o n o m e t r i c f u n c -
t i o n . A l t h o u g h o n e c a n n o t r u l e t h i s p o s s i b i h t y o u t e n t i r e l y , a g a i n s t i t I n o t e t h e r e is a n e m p i r ­
i c a l side to Descartes's investigations o f the brain that constrained what physiological
m e c h a n i s m s h e c o u l d r e a s o n a b l y p o s t u k t e . M a t h e m a t i c a U y , as a n o b j e c t a p p r o a c h e s 2 0 0 fcet
(at w h i c h p o i n t t h e e y e s w o u l d b e at m a x i m u m d i v e r g e n c e a c c o r d i n g t o D e s c a r t e s ) s m a U e r a n d
66 Thomas Vinci

constructor ofrepresentative brain triangles, together with its capacity

to carry out attendant arithmetical calculations, fdls the gap. B u t w i t h ­
out at least a rough and ready trigonometric capabihty, or something
that simuktes one as is the case here, it would be simply impossible to
account for either the degree of accuracy with w h i c h humans judge
middle distance or the rehabihty of the other perceptual phenomena
w h i c h depend on accurate distance determinations, e.g. the phenome­
non ofsize constancy scahng. I n these circumstances, as i n the c i r c u m ­
stances with human speech capabilities, Descartes appeals to the
'universal instrument', reason (in this case applying trigonometry-
simulating inference),for the explanation.

6. I M A G I N A T I O N , DE RE J U D G M E N T A N D T H E

P H E N O M E N O L O G Y O F E X P E R I E N C E I N D E S C A R T E S

It is obvious to us and, no doubt, to Descartes as weU that apples and

cherries appear difFerendy even iftheir colors are indistinguishable.The
question is what this difference consists in. O n e possibihty is that
Descartes sees the distinction as purely cognitive, a distinction in what
we believe (or are inchned to beheve) about the shape ofthe cherry vs.
the shape of the apple. I n one part of a weU-known text i n the Sixth
Replies (Response o,AT vii. 4 3 8 ; C S M ii. 2 9 5 ) Descartes says,'I demon­
strated i n the Optics how size, distance and shape can be perceived by
reasoning alone, w h i c h works out any one feature ffom the other fea-
tures.'What is 'worked out' here are judgments about these properties,
judgments w h i c h comprise the 'third grade ofsensory response'.Yet
even i n this text there is a suggestion that i n cases oführaons perceptual
judgments are based on primary-quahty appearances:'when people say
that a stick in water"appears bent because ofreffaction" this is the same
as saying that it appears to us i n a way that would lead a child to judge
that it was bent' (AT vii. 4 3 8 ; C S M ii. 2 9 6 ) . T h e first occurrence o f a n
appears-locution, 'a stick appears bent', is paraphrased by Descartes in

s m a U e r c h a n g e s i n t h e a n g l e o f d i v e r g e n c e o f t h e eyes d e t e r m i n e k r g e r a n d l a r g e r c h a n g e s i n
distance. P h y s i o l o g i c a U y this w o u l d translate i n t o c o r r e s p o n d i n g l y k r g e r c h a n g e s i n t h e l e a n
o f t h e p i n e a l g l a n d t o t h e c e n t e r w i t h s m a U e r a n d s m a U e r e y e m o v e m e n t s . I t is n o t e v i d e n t f r o m
any o f the diagrams o r descriptions that the physiological m o d e l Descartes provides w o u l d
a u t o m a t i c a U y h a v e t h i s effect; a n d h e n o w h e r e says t h a t i t w o u l d . I f h e t h o u g h t t h a t h e h a d
a c h i e v e d t h i s ( r e m a r k a b l e ) effect, w o u l d h e n o t h a v e a n n o u n c e d i t ?
 Descartes's Theory ofPerception 67

terms that mention bothjudgment and a way ofappearing, suggesting

that Descartes does not think that aU mention of primary-quality
appearances can be contextuaUy defined in terms ofjudgments.
This position, ifindeed it is Descartes's position, abo seems operative
in the passage from Optics VI (quoted above) i n w h i c h the phenomenon
ofsize constancy scaling is revealed. Here it is again:

the images imprinted by objects very close to us are one hundred times bigger
than those imprinted by objects ten times farther away, and yet they do not
make us see the objects a hundred times larger; instead they make the object
look almost the same size, at least iftheir distance does not deceive us. (AT vi.
140; C S M i. 172)

T h e phenomenon of size constancy scahng, thus described, seems

best regarded as a property ofthe quahtative aspect ofthe way the object
looks rather than a property of our behefs about the object since,
although a famihar object hke one's hand is described as looking pro­
gressively smaUer as it is moved away from our eye (though not in pro­
portion to the shrinking ofthe size ofthe retinal image), we do not
beheve that our hand is getting smaUer as it is moved away from our eye.
And, i f w e do have a tendency to think that the hand is getting smaUer,
then that tendency, hke the tendency to judge that a stick immersed in
water is bent,depends on the way the hand (or the stick) appears.This lat­
ter use of 'appears' would, on the present reading, be regarded by
Descartes as irreducible and primary.This is the reading that I shaU adopt.
O n e of the chaUenges for an interpretation w h i c h assigns to
Descartes an irreducible notion of primary-quahty appearances is
where among the three faculties involved i n the production ofsensory
response (the InteUect, the Imagination, and the Senses proper) to find
the source ofthese appearances.A text quoted eariier from The Rules for
the Direction of the Mind suggests that it is the imagination. Here it is again:

It [the spiritual power] is one and the same power: when applying itselfalong
with imagination to the 'common sense' it is said to see, touch, etc.; when
addressing itselfto the imagination alone, insofar as the latter is invested with
various figures, it is said to remember;when applying itseH4o the imagination
in order to form new figures, it is said to imagine or conceive . . . (AT x. 415;
C S M i. 42)

Some evidence from a later text that the source ofthe phenomenol­
ogy of primary-quahty experience involves the imagination can be
68 Thomas Vinci

found i n Meditation II (AT vii. 3 2 ; C S M ii. 21).This is a passage i n w h i c h

Descartes speaks of the 'outward forms' of objects, spatial properties
presented as appearances. Although Descartes does not say that the
perception ofoutward form is due to the imagination, we may infer that
it is from two facts about the context: (1) that in this passage Descartes is
contrasting the power ofthe inteUect to know the essences ofthings with
the power of the imagination and (2) that it is not the inteUect w h i c h
presents the mind with outward forms.The passage runs as foUows:

So let us proceed, and consider on which occasion my perception ofthe wax

was more perfect and evident.Was it when I first looked at it, and believed I
knew it by my external senses, or at least by what they caU the 'common
sense'—that is, the power of the imagination. Or is my knowledge more perfect
now . . . (AT vii. 32; C S M ii. 21—2; my emphasis)

Finding that the imagination has a decisive role to pby for Descartes
in producing the phenomenology ofprimary-quahty sense experience
stiU leaves us with the task of elucidating the mechanisms by means of
w h i c h he sees this happening.This is a task that I cannot undertake i n
detail here. 42
A t least we can say this: the mind's cognition ofimages

4 2
I h a v e d o n e s o e b e w h e r e . S e e Cartesian Truth, c h . r V , s e c t i o n s 4.1—4.3 ·
H o w e v e r , t w o q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d b y a n a n o n y m o u s r e f e r e e n e e d s o m e d i s c u s s i o n h e r e : Are there
second-grade sensory responses ofprimary qualities? a n d What role do theyphy in thegeneration of the
phenomenology of visual experience7K c r u c i a l t e x t o c c u r s i n t h e Sixth Replies, w h e r e Descartes
says t h a t ' o n t h e basis o f t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e c o l o u r a n d its b o u n d a r i e s t o g e t h e r w i t h its r e k ¬
t i o n to the parts o f t h e b r a i n , I m a k e a rational c a l c u l a t i o n a b o u t the size, shape a n d distance o f
t h e s t i c k ' ( A T v i i . 4 3 7 ; C S M i i . 2 9 5 ) . T h e t e x t is a d i f H c u l t o n e t o i n t e r p r e t , b u t I t a k e i t t o m e a n
t h a t t h e r e is a s p e c i a l c o g n i t i o n o f t h e r e g i o n o f t h e b r a i n e x h i b i t i n g a first-grade (neurologi­
cal) response to c o l o r s t i m u l u s . T h i s s p e c i a l c o g n i t i o n p r o d u c e s a s e c o n d - g r a d e c o n s c i o u s n e s s
o f a t w o - d i m e n s i o n a l c o l o r - p a t c h a p p e a r a n c e w h i c h s e r v e s as t h e b a s i s f o r a de re i n f e r e n c e
f r o m t h e a p p e a r a n c e t o t h e efFect t h a t t h e r e is a s t i c k r e s e m b h n g t h e p a t c h i n c o l o r , t h o u g h n o t
( o r n o t e x a c t l y ) i n o t h e r r e s p e c t s . f F o r m o r e o n de re c o g n i t i o n s i n D e s c a r t e s s e e S e c t i o n 6,
below.) Epstein a n d Hatfield f W U h a m Epstein a n d G a r y Hatfield, ' T h e Sensory C o r e a n d
M e d i e v a l F o u n d a t i o n s o f E a r l y M o d e r n P e r c e p t i o n T h e o r y ' , J i i s 7 0 (1979), 363—84) also t h i n k
t h a t t h i s p a s s a g e i n t r o d u c e s a n i n s t a n c e o f w h a t t h e y саЛ t h e ' s e n s o r y c o r e ' , b u t ( i n c o n v e r s a ­
t i o n ) H a t f i e l d e m p h a s i z e s t h a t t h i s is n o t s o m e t h i n g o f w h i c h w e are a w a r e , t h u s n o t s o m e t h i n g
c o m p r i s i n g a s e c o n d - g r a d e r e s p o n s e as s u c h . W h a t w e a r e a w a r e of, p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , is a
t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l stick p e r c e p t p r o d u c e d b y r e a s o n i n g a n d j u d g m e n t . H o w e v e r , i n o r d e r to
respect the suggestion i n the text that the color-patch appearance is a second-grade
r e s p o n s e — t h u s is c o n s c i o u s f o r u s — w h U e respecting the point, rightly emphasized by
H a t f i e l d , t h a t i t is a t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l o b j e c t t h a t w e e x p e r i e n c e , I p r o p o s e a c o m p r o m i s e : w e
are indeed conscious of a two-dimensional color-patch appearance before imagination
e m p l o y i n g de re i n f e r e n c e t r a n s f o r m s t h e c o r p o r e a l i m a g i n a t i o n i n s o m e w a y w h i c h y i e l d s a
t h r e e - d i m e n s i o n a l p e r c e p t , b u t , b e c a u s e t h e a p p e a r a n c e exists o n l y m o m e n t a r i l y , w e d o n o t
n o t i c e it.
 Descartes's Theory of Perception 69

constructed i n the corporeal imagination has a role to play in sense per­

ception as it does i n imagination proper. Previously, I have argued (1) for
the Content Principle for Imagination (that the content ofcorporeaI
intuitions depends on the properties of their objects) and (2) that the
objects o f corporal intuitions are corporeal images. Since I am now
arguing (3) that perceptual ideas ofprimary quahties derive their c o n ­
tent from the content ofideas ofthe imagination, it foUows (4) that the
content o f t h e sense experience ofprimary quahties depends on the
mind intuiting spatial properties ofactual structures i n the brain.
But there is more to our visual experience ofthe physical world than
simply a set ofdisconnected perceptions o f shape, size, distance, orienta­
tion, color, and hght. (These are the six 'principal' quahties perceived
by vision that Descartes enumerates i n Optics VI—AT vi. 130; C S M i.
167.) O u r experience is that these properties are connected—color is
presented as having shape, a point Descartes notes i n R u l e 12 of the
Rulesfor the Direction of the Mmi:'whatever you may take color to be, you
wiU not deny that it is extended and consequendy has shape' ( A T x. 413;
C S M i. 40—1). E v e n ifthis observation is taken to be directed to poten­
tial scholastic or common-sense interlocutors and not to represent the
true metaphysics of color as Descartes conceived it phenomenologi-
caUy, this is how colors appear. How, then, does Descartes account for
the phenomenological unification o f color and extension? I n a simUar
vein we experience pains as somehow spatiaUy locahzed within our
bodies. Emotions, on the other hand, though experienced, are not expe­
rienced as spatiaUy locahzed anywhere. H o w is this to be accounted for
by Descartes?
There is one, and only one, place where Descartes has anything hke
an exphcit explanation for the spatial-locahzation properties ofour per-
ceptions,sections 22—5 ofthe Passions of the Soul, I . Perceptions like c o l ­
ors, pains, and emotions differ from one another 'in so far as we refer
some to external objects w h i c h strike our senses, others to our bodies or
to certain ofits parts, and stiU others to our soul' (AT xi. 345; C S M i.
3 3 6 - 7 ) . T h e difFerences i n question are in the phenomenology ofspatial
locahzation, and the key mechanism is referral. I have offered a detailed
treatment of this @itde discussed) aspect o f Descartes's thought else­
where, 43
but a briefaccount here wiU be useful.

S e e V i n c i , CartesianTruth, ch.4,secti0ns 4.4 a n d 4 . 5 ; c h . 5 : e s p . s e c t i o n s 5.2,5.3.

70 Thomas Vinci

I take the Operation ofreferring to be a mental act that somehow

projects sensations hke color and p a i n — i n themselves simply modes of
mind—onto the (representations of) objects that serve as the causal
stimulus i n the external world for the occasion ofthese sensations. I also
take this operation to faU within the general category ofjudgment,
specificaUy a kind ofde re version ofjudging that creates out ofsensa-
tions—entities that considered i n themselves cannot be true or false—
entities that can i n principle be true or false. De re judgments are
directed to concrete objects, such as sensations (and perhaps corporeal
images), and should be contrasted with inteUectualjudgments directed
to clear and distinct ideas. T h e latter are never false, 44
the former are
usuaUy false:

And the chiefand most common mistake which is to be found here consists in
my judging that the ideas which are in me resemble, or conform to, things
located outside me. Ofcourse,ifI consideredjust the ideas themselves simply as
modes of my thought, without referring them to anything else, they could
scarcely give me any material for error. (Meditation III, A T vii. 37; C S M ii. 26;
my emphasis)

So the notion ofreferral does double duty for Descartes both as an

account ofthe phenomenology ofspatial localization and as an account
ofthe material for error that sense experience creates.
Although not aU aspects ofthe mechanism ofreferred sensations are
direcdy relevant to my main purpose, one aspect is important: the u n i ­
fication ofthe manifold ofperception. So far we have mentioned only the
unification of color and extension as results of referral. MetaphysicaUy
and epistemologicaUy speaking, this unification is regarded by Descartes
as deluding us. B u t practicaUy speaking this unification is ofgreat bene­
fit to us. Because the meat appears green, I do not eat it; because the
hand hurts, I know w h i c h part ofthe body needs my attention. If, rather
than just experiencing them together, I somehow had to consciously
correlate the meat-shaped quahty and the green sensation inductively I
would be very m u c h less rehable and efficient as a being who needs to
eat healthy food and avoid damage to the body. Similarly, the unification
ofsize and shape that we experience i n objects, and the unification of
objects and their spatial relations to one another and to our bodies i n a
single visual field, also have clear practical advantages over having to

4 4
S e e MeditationVI,AT v i i . 56; C S M i i . 39.
 Descartes's Theory of Perception 71

carry out complex, attention- and memory-comuming correlations

and inferences with respect to these properties, as we would have to i f
they were separately registered i n our experience.
T h e cognitive operations ofthe faculty ofimagination by means of
which, I have argued, we judge distances, take concrete images i n the
corporeal imagination as objects oftheir operations and to the extent to
w h i c h they yieldjudgments, they are de rejudgments, e.g. that the ratio
ofbase to height ofthis brain triangle is 1 : 3 . I speculate that the func­
tion of de re judging by the imagination is involved i n аД of the phe-
nomenological unifications mentioned—the spatial localization of
primary and secondary quahties, the unification ofprimary quahties in
objects, and the unification ofobjects in a unitary visual field. O n e is
forced to speculate about the latter two unifications because the m e c h ­
anisms by w h i c h they might be achieved are not discussed by Descartes,
but the mechanism of referral for sensations is discussed by Descartes
and does serve a function ofphenomenological unification—so there is
at least a model that one might extend.
AnimaL·, on the other hand, do not have any mechanism whereby
their sensory responses can be unified.This can be seen from the fact
that there is no hint in Descartes's detailed account ofthe brain (in the
Treatise on Man) ofany neural mechanism that would unify the separate
responses for color, hght, shape, size, distance, and orientation. Even i f
animals were somehow to have sensations (second-grade sensory
responses), they would experience a fragmented world where color and
shapes were experienced separately since, as beings who lack the power
ofjudgment (they lackjudgment because they lack inteuect),they lack
the only means Descartes postulates for the unification ofthe manifold
of experience. Animals must make their way i n the world relying on a
rich set of dispositions keyed to specific environments, inductively
learned though association and encoded in physical memory. This is
good enough for them to chase down baUs as efficiently (or more effi­
ciently) than we do, but does not give them the practical advantages that
beings with inteUects gain from the various unifications ofour sensory
responses that inteUects make possible.
O n e final point. Descartes says i n Principles of Philosophy I.71 that
when we are infants, sensations (second-grade sensory responses) and
perceptions ofexternal objects and their modes are experienced sepa­
rately. I take him to hold that our experience evolves i n stages and it is
72 Thomas Vinci

only at the stage wherein we 'refer' sensations to external obj ects that the
phenomenological unification begins to occur. I take this to point to the
existence of a developmental psychology i n Descartes's thought, and
venture the conjecture that the other kinds of unification also occur
developmentaUy, as products of an active mind seeking through the
operations of de re judging to advance the interests of the body, thus
producing a final unification—that of the m i n d and the body i n the
whole human being.

7- C O N C L U D I N G R E M A R K S

I take one virtue ofthe interpretation advanced here to be that it gives

a natural explanation ofwhat Descartes might mean by describing the
perceptual determination ofdistance in Optics VI as a 'simple act ofthe
imagination'.In this respect the present interpretation has an advantage
over other accounts that I am famihar with.This account also shows that
some kinds ofactual reasoning occur i n conjunction with acts ofimagi-
nation w h e n people engage i n ordinary, spontaneous acts ofperceptual
cognition—as Descartes maintains—but without committing Descartes
to the view that whenever we do so we are employing somehow the
skül and knowledge ofprofessional surveyors or mathematicians.This is
a second virtue ofthe account.
Regarding the set of puzzles raised i n the Introduction fWikon's
D i l e m m a and the inconsistent quartet),the present interpretation gives
a formal resolution to the puzzles by uncovering from the Discourse a
high-level methodological m a x i m — A t t r i b u t e reason (active mental causa­
tion) where observed behavior exceeds a standard of performance that could be
exphined mechanistically—showing that Descartes leaves room for it to be
apphed not only i n the case ofarticulate speech but also i n the case of
perception. I take this to be a third main virtue ofthe interpretation.
B u t ifthis principle is i n force and applies i n the case ofreasoning, it
follows that Descartes must think that human perceptual processing
meets performance standards that purely mechanistic systems fhke those
in animak) fail to meet. It may seem that this just cannot be right—as
Wilson puts it, 'my dog knows where the baü feU as weU as I d o ' — a n d
that Descartes could not possibly have thought that it was right. But,
and this is a fourth virtue ofthe interpretation, it shows that, given the
 Descartes's Theory qfPerception 73

physiological details ofDescartes's account ofthe mechanistic registra­

tion ofdistance (the lean function ofthe pineal gland), that function fails
to display the trigonometric precision ofeven the rough and ready form
ofin^gination-cum-arithmetical reasoning that comprises forDescartes
the human method for perceptuaUy determining distance. Although
this increased precision may not show up i n an advantage that humans
have over dogs i n chasing down bans, 45
it does show up elsewhere, first,
in the phenomenologicauy unified, conscious representation of the
physical environment that only beings with minds can possess and, sec­
ond, i n providing the kind of mathematical accuracy and quantitative
expressibility needed for common-sense observational data about phys­
ical objects to serve as the foundations ofempirical science.

Dalhousie University

4 5
T h i s d o e s n o t c o n t r a d i c t m y d a i m t h a t in some respects the reason-assisted h u m a n p e r ­
c e p t u a l s y s t e m m a y b e less e f f i c i e n t t h a n t h e r e a s o n - u n a s s i s t e d a n i m a l s y s t e m , f o r i t is p o s s i b l e
for t h e k t t e r t o g e t p e r f o r m a n c e s i m i t a r t o o r b e t t e r t h a n t h e f o r m e r at c e r t a i n tasks ( s u c h as
c h a s i n g d o w n baUs) b y m o r e r e l i a n c e o n c o m p e n s a t i n g m e c h a n i c a l s y s t e m s s u c h as t h e a s s o c i -
ational apparatus i n c o r p o r e a l m e m o r y
 3
TheActivity ofMatter i n Gassendi's Physics

ANTONIA LOLORDO

Pierre Gassendi, the early seventeenth-century reviver of Epicurean

atomism w h o m Boyle treated as one ofthe paradigmatic 'mechanical
philosophers', embraced Epicurus's claim that atoms have an intrinsic
motive power and that matter is thus intrinsicahy active. H e held that 1

this claim could be acceptable to Christians so long as it is made clear

that G o d is the original source of the activity o f matter. Indeed, he
argued that auowing the activity ofmatter is the only way to preserve the
genuine secondary causation that is necessary for rehgion and moraHty.
I n making the claim that matter is intrinsicaüy active, Gassendi inter­
venes i n a debate involving parties with widely divergent theoretical
orientations. T h e debate includes various Aristotehans, Renaissance
Platonists and other novatores such as Patrizi, Campaneha, and Telesio, as
weh as Descartes.We are used to tmnking ofseventeenth-century debates
about causation as, primarily, debates about occasionahsm. However,
looking at Gassendi's argument for the activity of matter helps us see

1
I r e f e r h e r e t o t h e a c c o u n t p r e s e n t e d i n G a s s e n d i ' s p o s t h u m o u s Syntagma Philosophicum,
V o l s , ι a n d 2 o f G a s s e n d i ' s Opera omnia [ h e r e a f t e r Opera] ( L y o n , 1658) c o n t a i n t h e Syntagma.
T h e s e c t i o n s m o s t d i s c u s s e d i n t h i s esszy,Physics 1 . 3 - 4 , r e c e i v e d t h e i r f i n a l f o r m b e t w e e n 1649
a n d 1 6 5 5 . H o w e v e r , t h e y r e p e a t a g r e a t d e a l o f m a t e r i a l f r o m t h e 1 6 3 6 - 7 m a n u s c r i p t De vita et
doctrina Epicuri. S e e O l i v i e r R e n e B l o c h , La Philosophie de Gassendi fParis: M a r t i n u s N i j h o f f ,
1 9 7 0 ) ; C a r l a R i t a P a h n e r i n o , ' P i e r r e G a s s e n d i ' s De Philosophia Epicuri Universi Rediscovered',
Nuntius 14 ( 1 9 9 9 ) , 2 6 3 ^ 5 ; a n d t h e C e n t r e I n t e r n a t i o n a l e d ' E t u d e s G a s s e n d i e n n e s ' Catalogue
Pierre Gassendi ( D i g n e : L e C e n t r e , 1 9 9 2 ) . T h e r e l e v a n t p o r t i o n o f t h e Syntagma contains a brief,
a n d n o t p a r t i c u k r l y w e U - i n t e g r a t e d , t r e a t m e n t o f D e s c a r t e s , w h i c h suggests a f a i r l y q u i c k r e v i ­
s i o n o f a m a n u s c r i p t w r i t t e n i n t h e 1 6 3 0 s . T h u s i t a l s o suggests t h a t G a s s e n d i c o m p o s e d t h i s
a r g u m e n t after h a v i n g first m e t H o b b e s , b u t b e f o r e t h e i r l o n g p e r i o d o f i n t e r a c t i o n i n t h e
1640s. I f o c u s o n t h e Syntagma as m y m a i n t e x t r a t h e r t h a n t h e o t h e r n a t u r a l c h o i c e , t h e 1 6 4 9
Animadversiones, f o r t w o r e a s o n s . F i r s t , t h e Syntagma tends t o m a k e m u c h c l e a r e r w h a t is
E p i c u r u s ' v i e w a n d w h a t is G a s s e n d i ' s o w n v i e w , w h i l e t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f t h e commentary
f o r m a n d p r o g r a m m a t i c i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e Animadversiones makes t h e difference difEcult to d i s ­
c e r n . S e c o n d , t h e Syntagma account considers a broader range o f views a n d h e n c e makes
clearer w h a t alternatives G a s s e n d i takes h i m s e M 4 o b e i n debate w i t h .
7 6 Antonia LoLordo

that an entirely different set of theoretical concerns is also at issue,

concerns over where to locate activity within the created world rather
than concerns over whether created activity is compatible with God's c o n ­
servation ofand concurrence with the created world.Within this debate,
the project is not to defend created activity against occasionahsm—
both Gassendi and the writers he engages with more or less assume that
creaturely activity and divine conservation and concurrence are c o m ­
patible—but to understand what in creation is genuinely active.
I begin with Gassendi's account ofatomic motion. I then move on to
Gassendi's chief motivating argument, that the accounts of causation
offered by scholasticAristotehans, advocates oftheWorld Soul,'second-
ary quality' theorists ofbodily activity, and Descartes are inadequate to
preserve secondary causation i n an inteUigible and theologicaUy accept­
able manner. I close with some briefremarks on the relevance (or lack
thereof) of doctrines of conservation and concurrence to the debate
Gassendi sees himselfas involved in.

I. T H E VIS MOTRIX O F A T O M S A N D

T H E M O T I O N O F B O D I E S

Gassendi's overarching project was the revival ofEpicurean philosophy,

revised so as to make it acceptable within a Christian context. His revi­
sion of Epicureanism was intended to provide the basis of a compre­
hensive system ofphysics, as weU as a system oflogic or 'canonic' that he
held to be a necessary propaedeutic to physics. After presenting this
logic and physics, Gassendi's Syntagma closes with a book of ethics—
again pardy inspired by Epicurean doctrines but making significant
changes to t h e m — w h i c h Gassendi, like many early modern philo­
sophers, understood as the culmination and ultimate goal ofhis philo­
sophy. Some ofthis ethical concern is manifest i n his arguments about
the activity of matter, since Gassendi thinks this doctrine preserves
morality by preserving secondary causation. M y concern is chiefly with
the portion of physics that concerns the motion of atoms and the
motion ofthe bodies they compose, but it is important to see what in
morahty and rehgion Gassendi thinks requires secondary causation.
For one thing, secondary causation is required so that human beings,
rather than God, are the cause of vicious and virtuous actions (Opera
 TheActivity ofMatterin Gassendi's Physics 77

2.817a).The mtimate cause ofmoraUy relevant actions is the incorporeal

human soul; however, I take it, Gassendi thinks this requires corporeal
activity as weU, because the soul's dispositions or intentions cannot
become actions without the intervention ofthe human body, so that the
human body must be capable of genuine causahty as weU. However,
human freedom as a secondary cause is a special case, and Gassendi has
more general reasons for thinking secondary causation is necessary as
weU. H e thinks that we experience the causality of created things in
sense perception, endorsingAquinas's claim that we know by sense that a
body such as fire heats another (Summa Contra Gentiles 3 . 6 9 ) . Gassendi 2

ako suggests that we should read the words ofScripture 'as they sound',
and that a literal reading ofthe first chapter ofGenesis—where 'God
commanded the Earth andWater to germinate and produce Plants and
Animals'—shows that G o d has endowed creation with activity (Opera
1.493a; cf. 1 . 4 8 7 a ) . 3
FinaUy, Gassendi holds that it would detract from
God's power and greatness i f he did not confer some active power on
created things—a claim that again foUowsAquinas (Opera 1.239a; SCG
3 . 6 9 ) . N o n e ofthese ckims are elaborated or defended i n any detaU;
Gassendi is simply mentioning, at various appropriate points,what seem
to be standard arguments for secondary causation.
Gassendi begins his account of the principle of efficient causahty
within nature by writing approvingly that Leucippus, Democritus, and
Epicurus

wished the Efficient Principle to be distinguished from the material principle

only in virtue ofa different way ofconsidering them [diverso respedu], not in fact
and by substance. For this is known from what was said earJier, namely, that the
Atoms, which they said are the Material ofthings, are not considered to be inert
and immobue, but rather most active and mobile . . . (Opera 1.334a)
2
T h o m a s A q u i n a s , S u m m a contragentiks ( P a r i s : L e t h i e f f i e u x , 1 9 2 5 ) . H e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d t o as
'SCG.
3
G a s s e n d i ' s a d v o c a c y o f b i b H c a l h t e r a h s m is n o t e n t i r e l y c o n s i s t e n t . W h e n w r i t i n g a b o u t
C o p e r n i c a n i s m i n D e motu impressopar motore translato ( i n Opera 3 ) , h e n o t e s t h a t i t is n e c e s s a r y
to i n t e r p r e t t h e w o r d s o f t h e B i b l e 'as t h e y s o u n d ' o n l y i n ' m a t t e r s o f f a i t h a n d m o r a l s ' , a n d says
t h a t as f a r a s h e k n o w s g e o c e n t r i s m i s n o i a m a t t e r o f f a i t h a n d m o r a l s (Opera 3.519b).He notes
e l s e w h e r e that s o m e , e v e n a m o n g t h e C h u r c h Fathers, ofFered a n aUegorical r e a d i n g o f the
c l a i m that G o d t o o k s i x days to create the w o r l d . A n d t h o u g h G a s s e n d i goes o n to a c c e p t a s i x -
d a y c r e a t i o n , h e d o e s so o n l y o n t h e g r o u n d s t h a t ' w e c a n n o t e r r ' b y a h t e r a l r e a d i n g , a n d n o t
o n t h e s t r o n g e r g r o u n d s t h a t f a i t h r u l e s o u t o t h e r r e a d i n g s (Opera 1.485a). H i s g e n e r a l p o h c y
seems to b e to t r y to distance h i m s e t f f r o m the G a l i l e a n p r o g r a m m e o f s c r i p t u r a l i n t e r p r e t a ­
t i o n w h i l e at t h e s a m e t i m e r e s t r i c t i n g w h a t c o u n t s as a m a t t e r o f f a i t h as m u c h as h e c a n
(cf. Opera 2.440-2.446b).
78 Antonia LoLordo

H e endorses a version of this view that has been amended i n three

important ways, as foUows.
(1) Epicurus held that aJJ atoms move with a natural direction of
motion downwards—a view that, notoriously, seems to require the pos¬
tulation ofan uncaused atomic swerve i n order to make coUision possi­
ble (as weU as to preserve human freedom). Gassendi objects both to the
indeterminism ofthe swerve and to the assumption that space is direc­
tional i n such a way that there is any one privileged direction ofmotion
(Opera 2.837a).Thus,although Gassendi continues to use the traditional
term 'gravitas' for the weight or motive power ofatoms, it is no longer
apt. O n Gassendi's view, gravity is a product ofcorpuscularian emissions
from the earth w h i c h hook onto and puU back certain composite b o d ­
ies, and motion i n aU directions is equaUy natural (Opera 3 . 4 8 7 b ff.).
(2) Epicurus held that aU atoms move with the same speed, a doctrine
w h i c h Gassendi holds cannot bejustified given that we have no direct
evidence as to atomic speed and that G o d could have created atoms with
whatever speed he likes (Opera 1.335b). O n e complication arises here.
T h e Epicureans held both that aU atoms move with the same speed and
that each individual atom maintains the same speed at aU times, never
gaining or losing velocity as a result of coUision but merely changing
direction.
Gassendi certainly holds that the total quantity of atomic motion is
conserved over time. His definition ofatomic weight makes that clear:

[weight is] an innate vigor or internal energy . . . because ofwhich [the atoms]
are moved through the vacuum . . . such that, since the vacuum is infinite and
lacks any center, they wiU never cease from this motion oftheirs, which is nat­
ural to them, but in every age wiU persist in this motion, unless either other
atoms or composite bodies Ue in the way and they are deflected from it in
another direction. (Opera 1.276b)

At times, Gassendi makes the further suggestion that the intrinsic

activity of atoms is such that each atom conserves the same speed at
aU times (Opera 1.273b, 1.276b, 1.385a, 3 . 1 9 b ) . Although this claim
is Epicurean, it is somewhat puzzhng for Gassendi to make it. For
Gassendi develops a roughly Gahlean account of 'uniform and perpetual
motion' and acceleration under free faU. 4
It is difficult to see how

4
T h i s is t h e t o p i c o f G a s s e n d i ' s De motu as w e U as h i s 1 6 4 9 Deproportione quagravia dedden-
tia accelerantur, also i n Opera 3.
 TheActivityofMatter in Gassendi's Physics 79

the Galilean account o f composite motion and the Epicurean

account o f atomic motion could be fitted together, although the fact
that Gassendi never articulates precise coUision rales is notable.
Unfortunately, I cannot address this issue i n any detail here, and it is
enough for the current argument that the total quantity of atomic
motion is conserved.
T h e conservation of atomic motion, whether individuaUy or taken
aU together, is consistent with the existence of differences i n activity
between different atoms. O n this point Gassendi's divergence from
Epicurus is unmistakable:

nothing hinders us from supposing that some Atoms are inert and that not aU
Atoms are equaUy mobile . . . since aU mobUity in them was impknted in them
by God as author, some might have been created by God with outstanding
mobihty,somewithmoderate,somewithUtde,somewithnone . . . pbutonthe
other hand,] nothing hinders our supposing that. . . aU Atoms are implanted
equaUy with the highest mobility . . . One thing must equaUy be supposed
everywhere, namely, that however much mobUity is innate in the Atoms, that
much constandy continues. (Opera 1.335b)

There is some asymmetry between the relation atoms bear to their vis
motrix or intrinsic motive power and the relation they bear to their other
two intrinsic properties, size and shape. Extension and impenetrabUity
are part of the concept of an atom, but vis motrix is not. However,
Gassendi is not i n general inclined to put much epistemic weight on our
ways ofconceiving the world, and it would be unhelpful to ask whether
vis motrix is essential to a particular atom or not. Indeed, given Gassendi's
tendency to identify the essence ofbodies with their atomic structure,
it is not clear that he would even grant that there are meaningful ques­
tions to be asked about the essences ofatoms.
(3) T h e final and, from our perspective, most important amendment
of the Epicurean account o f atomic activity concerns the source of
atomic activity. I n place of the Epicurean claim that atoms are eternal
and self-existent, Gassendi insists that atoms are created by G o d and are
active because G o d created them as active, that is, instiUed in them a vis
motrix (or pondus or gravitas) at their creation: 'it should be granted that
Atoms are mobUe and active because of a force of moving and acting,
which G o d gave to them in his creation ofthem' (Opera 1.280a; cf. 1.335b).
It is important both to my argument and to the physical conse­
quences that Gassendi draws from his account of efficiency that
8o Antonia LoLordo

Gassendi does not simply intend the claim that matter was in fact put i n
motion by God,but rather the stronger claim that atoms contain within
themselves a source ofmotion. However, the c b i m that the vis motrix of
atoms is due to God's creation has been read as a denial ofthe genuine
activity ofmatter. Osler argues that: 5

Gassendi beheved that atoms are mobile and active because of the power of
moving and acting that God instiUed in them at their creation. Iftheir mobUity
and activity were indeed innate, the dangers ofmateriaHsm would be very real.
Rather, he claimed, their mobiHty and activity function with divine assent,'for
he compels [cogo] aU thingsjust as he conserves aU things.' (Divine Will, 191)

O n her interpretation, Gassendi holds instead that 'motion is imposed

on atoms by G o d ' (192),so that atoms are neither innately nor intrinsi-
caUy moving. Osler tends to think ofGassendi as one ofa homogeneous
group of'mechanical philosophers' w h o worried that 'active matter,
insofar as it is self-moving, seemed capable of explaining the world
without needing to appeal to G o d or the supernatural'—a danger that
could be avoided 'ifmatter were considered naturaUy inert and able to
produce its efFects ordy be mechanical impact', so that G o d was neces­
sary as the source o f m o t i o n ( 1 7 8 ) . Now, it is entirely correct that by
insisting on God's role as the cause ofatomic vis motrix, Gassendi is try­
ing to mitigate worries about the atheism associated with Epicurean
theories.But Gassendi simply does not infer from this that we must dis-
auow the activity ofmatter i n order to avoid atheism. Rather, as we have
seen, he argues that active matter is required i n order to preserve sec­
ondary causation and thus to preserve religion.There is clear conceptual
space for holding both that matteris genuinely active and that G o d must
create and concur with material activity. 6

5
Margaret O s l e r , Divine WiU and the Mechanical Philosophy [Divine WiU] QSTew Y o r k :
C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1994). Sirnflar a r g u m e n t s are p r o v i d e d i n h e r ' H o w M e c h a n i c a l
w a s the M e c h a n i c a l P h i l o s o p h y ? N o n - E p i c u r e a n aspects o f G a s s e n d i ' s P h i l o s o p h y o f N a t u r e '
['Mechanical'],in C h r i s t o p h L u t h y J o h n M u r d o c h , a n d W f l h a m N e w m a n (eds.),Late Medieval
and Earh/ Modern Corpuscular MatterTheories f L e i d e n : ВгШ, 2 0 0 i ) , 4 2 3 - 3 9 . B o t h Divine WiU and
' M e c h a n i c a l ' a r g u e a g a i n s t B l o c h ' s v i e w o f m a t t e r as a c t i v e . B l o c h is c o n c e r n e d t o refute
A l e x a n d r e K o y r e ' s c h a r g e t h a t a t o m i c a c t i v i t y c a n n o t b e r e c o n c i l e d w i t h w h a t h e caUs t h e
p r i n c i p l e o f i n e r t i a . B l o c h is c o r r e c t t o p o i n t o u t t h e r e is n o t h i n g s t r i c t l y i n c o n s i s t e n t i n h o l d ­
i n g that atoms m o v e b e c a u s e o f t h e i r activity w h i l e c o m p o s i t e b o d i e s have u n i f o r m a n d p e r ­
p e t u a l m o t i o n . H o w e v e r , t h e c o n s e r v a t i o n p r i n c i p l e h e i n v o k e s t o r e c o n c ü e t h e t w o ( 2 2 2 ff.)
l a c k s t e x t u a l s u p p o r t a n d fits b a d l y w i t h G a s s e n d i ' s s u g g e s t i o n s t h a t a t o m i c a c t i v i t y underlies the
uniform and perpetual motion ofbodies.
6
I b r a c k e t o u t t h e i s s u e o f o c c a s i o n a h s m — w h i c h is n o t O s i e r ' s c o n c e r n — u n t i l t h e e n d o f
t h e essay.
 TheActivity ofMatterin Gassendi's Physics 81

OsIer s argument reHes on texts that say G o d is the ukimate source of

atomic propensity to motion and must conserve the moving thing and
'cooperate' with its 'power ofmoving or acting' (Opera 1.280a).Taking
these texts to imply a denial ofthe activity ofmatter runs together what
should be treated as two distinct questions: first,the question ofwhether
there is activity in the created world; and second, the question ofwhether
this activity derives from and rehes on G o d or is altogether independent.
Consider the soul: it is not commonly taken as a barrier to the soul's
activity that G o d created active souls and must concur with their activity.
Nor was it generaUy taken to undermine hylomorphism that G o d is
the uitimate source and preserver ofthe activity offorms. Claims that 7

G o d conserved the created world and concurred with its activity were
entirely standard i n the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. 8

Ifthere are worries later i n the century that aUowing activity to creation
wiU lead to atheism, they have not yet emerged i n the 1640s; at least, nei­
ther Gassendi nor those writers he is arguing against evidence those
worries.

2. S O M E C O M P E T I N G V I E W S O N

T H E E F F I C I E N T P R I N C I P L E W I T H I N N A T U R E

Early on i n the Syntagma s Physics, Gassendi develops an account ofthe

material and efficient principles of nature w h i c h he intends, among
other things, to replace a common scholastic model ofform, privation,
and matter as the three principles of natural bodies. 9
T h e account
revolves around two questions: 'what is matter h k e ? ' A n d 'what is the
principle of activity within nature?' or, more simply, 'what kinds of
things are secondary causes?' This second question amounts for
Gassendi to the question 'what kinds of created things are efficient
causes?' For Gassendi holds that efficient causation is the only kind of
secondary causation, although we can, ofcourse, usefuUy think ofGod's

7
I r e t u r n t o t h e s e d a i m s i n s e c t i o n 2.1 below.
8
See AUred J . Freddoso, 'God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: W h y
C o n s e r v a t i o n is N o t E n o u g h ' [ ' N o t E n o u g h ' ] , Philosophical Perspectives 5 ( 1 9 9 1 ) , 5 5 3 - 8 5 ; a n d his
'God's General Concurrence with Secondary C a u s e s : PitfaHs a n d P r o s p e c t s ' [ ' P i t f a u s ' ] ,
American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 6 7 (1994), 131-56. F r e d d o s o identifies the o c c a s i o n a l -
ist p o s i t i o n w h i c h s i x t e e n t h - c e n t u r y s c h o l a s t i c s h k e S u a r e z a n d M o h n a r e a c t a g a i n s t as t h e
m u c h e a r h e r p o s i t i o n o f G a b r i e l B i e l a n d Peter d'AiUy.
9
S e e e . g . F r a n c o Bmgesdiji,ldeaphilosophiae naturalis ( O x f o r d , 1637),6.
82 Antonia LoLordo

intentions for the created world as final causes. 10

I n this context
Gassendi treats the equation of efficient causation w i t h causation i n
general as a 'presupposition', stating that 'It seems evident that the effi­
cient cause, and the cause as such, are one and the same thing' (Opera
1.283a). H e offered some argument for this i n the much earher
Exerdtationes, i n the form of an argument against the other three
scholastic genres ofcause—although this argument often succeeds only
by aiming at a highly simphfied, textbook account rather than a
worked-out view. However, Gassendi's assumption is legitimized i n this
context by the fact that his chiefconcern is causal relations between dis-
tinctbodies,which were traditionaUy thought to be efficient causal rela­
tions anyway.
Gassendi's account ofthe efficient principle is developed in a manner
typical ofthe Syntagma. H e begins by describing the views ofphiloso-
phers from the Presocratics to the present on the question at hand in
some detail.He offers arguments against each ofthese views save one,and
concludes that we should accept that one—typicaUy as the most probable,
but sometimes as certain.The view accepted is more often than not a
roughly Epicurean view with certain important modifications, often
those required to make atheistic Epicureanism acceptable. I n this case, the
paramount modification is that the activity ofmatter is itserfdependent
on God. Gassendi describes and attempts to refute five previous views on
the nature ofthe efficient or active principle within nature: 11

1. F o r m s — a view ascribed to 'certain Interpreters ofAristode' and

w h i c h , as we shaU see, is commonly found i n roughb/ contemporary
physics textbooks as weU as more sophisticated sources.
2 . T h e anima mundi, ahgned more or less direcdy with God. R o b e r t
Fludd and Marsiho Ficino, among others, hold such a view.
3. T h e elemental quahties or some subset thereof (in different versions,
this is the view ofHippocrates,Thales,etc.) (Opera 1.241b).Gassendi
does not say anything to suggest that there were contemporary
adherents of this view, and I have not found any evidence of their
existence. Gassendi's conception o f a philosophical debate, here as

1 0
I n t h i s s e c t i o n o f t h e Syntagma G a s s e n d i states t h i s as a g e n e r a l r u l e , b u t i n f a c t o n h i s
a c c o u n t w e n e e d to b r a c k e t o u t a n y t h i n g p r o d u c e d b y g e n e r a t i o n .
1 1
G a s s e n d i a l s o c o n s i d e r s a n d r e j e c t s , as a s p e c i a l c a s e o f t h e g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n , t h e v i e w t h a t
I n t e U i g e n c e s o r a n g e l s are t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f a c t i v i t y w i t h i n c e l e s t i a l b o d i e s .
 TheActivity qfMatterin Gassendi's Physics 83

ebewhere, is very broad. I n this he is like his more humanist inter­

locutors such as F i c i n o . 12

4 . T h e 'secondary quaUties' 13
of'the chymists'. Here Gassendi has in
14

mind both the triaprima ofParacelsus and the Dane Petrus Severinus
and his preferred version, the five-element view of J . B . van
Helmont,which adds earth and water to the three principles salt, sul­
phur, and mercury. (Opera 1.241b, 2 4 4 b )
5. T h e 'secondary quahties' ofthe various moderns or 'Recentiores'. I n
particular, Gassendi discussesTelesio and CampaneUa's active princi­
ples heat and cold; Patrizi's heat and hght; and Digby's rarity, density,
and levity. (Opera 1.245b) 1 5

Formulating aU these options as views on the efficient principle of

nature may seem odd, as many ofthem are put forward as views on the
quahties of matter. However, throughout this discussion, it is clear that
Gassendi thinks ofqualities as powers, and I assume there is no difficulty
in understanding why powers should be spoken ofas causes and thus as
efficient principles. Indeed, Gassendi's equation ofqualities with p r i n ­
ciples is important for understanding the tight connection he sees
between the material and efficient principles. For ifwhatever quahties
exist i n matter are powers and hence efficient principles, then there is a
clean division between views that hold that matter is without quahties
and is thus entirely passive, and views on w h i c h matter does have some
quahties, i.e. views w h i c h build the efficient principle(s) into the
material principle itseh". (I return to this issue i n discussing the various

1 2
S e e the discussion o f t h e w o r l d soul i n section 2.2 below.
1 3
G a s s e n d i ' s u s a g e o f t h e t e r m s ' p r i m a r y q u a h t y ' a n d ' s e c o n d a r y q u a H t y ' is t y p i c a U y s c h o k s -
tic, s o t h a t t h e p r i m a r y q u a h t i e s a r e h o t , c o l d , w e t , a n d d r y — i n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e e l e m e n t a l
q u a U t i e s . S e e R o d o l p h u s G o c l e n i u s , Lexicon Philosophicum ( F r a n k f u r t , 1613), 9 1 2 ff. f o r a s t a n d ­
ard account.
1 4
G a s s e n d i uses cognates o f t h e t e r m s ' a l c h e m y ' , ' a l c h y m y ' , ' c h e m i s t r y ' , a n d ' c h y m i s t r y '
interchangeably. I u s e ' c h y m i s t r y ' as t h e b l a n k e t t e r m , f o U o w i n g Lawrence Principe, The
AspiringAdept ^ r i n c e t o n : P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1998), 8 ^ ) .
1 5
G a s s e n d i c o r r e s p o n d e d w i t h C a m p a n e U a , a n d they m a y have m e t w h e n CampaneUa
stayed w i t h Gassendi's p a t r o n Peiresc o n h i s release f r o m p r i s o n i n 1628. S e e Gassendi's Vita
Peireskii, i n its s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y a n o n y m o u s t r a n s k t i o n as The Mirrour of True Nobility and
Gentility ( L o n d o n : H u m p h r e y M o s e l e y , 1657), 5.111—12,6.170. G a s s e n d i knewTelesio—who
d i e d f o u r y e a r s b e f o r e h i s b i r t h — a n d P a t r i z i — w h o d i e d five y e a r s a f t e r — o n l y t h r o u g h t h e i r
reputations a n d w o r k s . I o m i t D i g b y f r o m n o w o n , since Gassendi's objecdons to D i g b y s e e m
to m e to r e l y o n a m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h i s a c c o u n t o f a c t i v i t y o r , at least, t o f a U t o c a p t u r e t h e
role h e assigns to m o t i o n .
84 Antonia LoLordo

'secondary-quahty' views below.) T h u s the overarching distinction is

between views (i) and ( 2 ) , w h i c h locate the efficient principle outside
matter and thus construe matter as inert, and views (з)—(5), w h i c h
understand efficiency as a quality or power of matter itseUf and thus
understand matter as active. 16

This brings us to Gassendi's own view. Gassendi argues that the mater­
ial and efficient principles are distinct only in thought. I n particular, he
argues, the efficient principle is simply the vis motrix that underhes and
explains the motion ofatoms:

6. Atoms themselves are the efficient principle as weU as the material

principle, since they have an intrinsic vis motrix or motive power.

It is important to distinguish this from a more famihar version of the

'matter and motion' view, according to w h i c h matter is inert and
motion is superadded to it:

7. T h e efficient principle of matter is motion, w h i c h belongs to

matter but does not foUow from its essence, so that matter is not
intrinsicaUy active. (This is the view ofDescartes and Hobbes.)

Gassendi does not expHcidy argue against (7) in the way he argues
against ( 1 ) - ( 5 ) . A s we shaU see w h e n we turn to Descartes, Gassendi
understands Descartes' account ofmotion as ultimately requiring some
immaterial efficient principle hke the anima mundi i n the created world.
Before we turn to Gassendi's arguments against views ( i ) - ( 5 ) , l e t me
remind the reader of a ground rule i n effect throughout: Whatever
account of the efficientprinciple isprovided mustpreserve genuine secondary cau­
sation (Opera 1.333a). Gassendi assumes that i f h e can show that an
account ofthe efficient principle is incompatible with genuine second­
ary causation, he has thereby shown that the account is absurd. I n one
sense, Gassendi's refusal to accept or even exphcidy consider the occa-
sionalist option is unsurprising. Although there had been medieval
occasionalists and would soon thereafter be Cartesian occasionahsts,
there was no contemporary champion ofthe view. (Here I bracket sug­
gestions ofoccasionahsm i n Descartes' Principles; I take this up i n c o n ­
nection with Gassendi's reaction to the Cartesian account ofcausahty

1 6
T h e s i t u a t i o n is n o t a c t u a U y q u i t e t h i s n e a t , f o r w o r l d s o u l a n d s e c o n d a r y q u a H t y v i e w s
c a n b l e n d i n t o e a c h o t h e r (as w e s h a U s e e i n t h e c a s e o f P a t r i z i ) . H o w e v e r , t h e t a x o n o m y is
nonetheless helpful.
 TheActivityofMatterin Gassendi's Physics 85

below. ) It is relevant here that Gassendi's attempts towards a complete

17

account ofhistorical positions ahnost ahvays bracket out disagreement

and diversity of views between various AristoteHans. Gassendi's presen­
tations of'theAristotehans' are generaUy presentations ofa highly s i m -
pHfied, textbook view and hence tend to leave minority positions out.
In another sense, however, one might be surprised that occasionahsm
never arises, since the rise ofoccasionahst worries later in the century is
often thought to be very closely tied to Thomistic theses about the
nature of divine conservation and concurrence w h i c h Gassendi could
not help but be aware ofand had to accommodate i n some way. I defer
discussion ofthis issue until section 3.

2.1. The rejection qfforms as effkient principles

Let us begin with the view that forms are the active or efficient p r i n ­
ciple within nature. Gassendi is careful to ascribe the view that he is
about to criticize to 'certain Interpreters of Aristode' rather than
Aristotle himseh,who c 0 u 1 d have held no such view. 18
Gassendi names
no interpreters in particular, but roughly contemporary statements of
the view that forms are active principles are easy to find. Sennert's
Epitome states that form'is the active principle' (Epitome, 58). 1 9
I n the
Summa Philosophia Quadripartita, Eustachius explains that form can be
caUed 'activity' in virtue ofbeing the 'actus' ofa substance (Summa, 26),
and Burgersdijk (Idea, 9) concurs that form is act. 20
In Disputationes
Metaphysica X V , Suarez holds that forms 'actuate matter' and that 'the
principle ofcausing is nothing other than the entity and nature ofthe
formitseh ' (Formal 0
Cause, 8 o ) . A n d Descartes,who ofcourse disputes
21

1 7
R e a d i n g s o f D e s c a r t e s as a n o c c a s i o n a l i s t o r as s u g g e s t i n g t h e s e s c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o o c c a ­
s i o n a h s m are f o u n d i n , for e x a m p l e , D a n i e l G a r b e r , ' D e s c a r t e s a n d O c c a s i o n a h s m ' ; i n S t e v e n
Nadler ( e d . ) , Causation in Early Modern Philosophy fUniversity Park: Pennsylvania State
U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 9 3 ) , 9 — 2 6 ; a n d G a r y H a t f i e l d , ' F o r c e ( G o d ) i n D e s c a r t e s ' P h y s i c s ' , Studies in
the History and Philosophy of Science, PartA 10 (1979),281-310.
1 8
G a s s e n d i a s s u m e s t h a t A r i s t o Ü e h i m s e t f c o u l d n e v e r h a v e h e l d s u c h a b a d v i e w , o r at l e a s t
that s u c h a v i e w c o u l d n o t h a v e b e e n p r o v i d e d i n A r i s t o t l e ' s t r a g i c a U y l o s t e s o t e r i c p h i l o s o p h y .
T h u s i t m u s t h a v e a r i s e n as a r e s u l t o f r n i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , w h i c h m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n G a s s e n d i
d i a g n o s e s as f o H o w s : t h e s e i n t e r p r e t e r s t o o k f r o m A r i s t o t l e t h e d a i m s t h a t f o r m s are i n d i v i s i b l e
a n d t h a t i n d i v i s i b i h t y d i s t i n g u i s h e s f o r m f r o m m a t t e r , a n d i n t e r p r e t e d t h o s e c k i m s as i m p l y i n g
t h a t f o r m s are i m m a t e r i a l e n t i t i e s d i s t i n c t f r o m m a t t e r (Opera 1.333b).
1 9
D a n i e l S e n n e r t , Epitome naturalis scientiae ( O x f o i d , 1653).
2 0
E u s t a c h i u s a S a n c t o P a o l o , Summaphilosophia quadripartita (Lyons, 1626).
2 1
J o h n K r o n i n and Jeremiah R e e d y ( t r a n s . ) , Suarez on the Formal Cause of Substance
(Metaphysical Disputations 1 5 ; M i l w a u k e e : M a r q u e t t e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2000).
86 Antonia LoLordo

the view that forms are active principles, writes that 'substantial forms . ..
were introduced by philosophers solely to account for the proper actions of
natural things, ofwhich they were supposed to be the principles and bases'
(AT in. 506; C S M iii. 208;letter to Regius ofJanuary 1642).
T h u s it is clear that in attacking an account offorms as active p r i n ­
ciples, Gassendi is attacking a mainstream position. O n e might suspect
that the view that forms are efficient principles within nature is less c o m ­
mon. For instance, one might worry that forms are thought ofas formal
principles rather than efficient principles, and that Gassendi is conflat­
ing formal with efficient principles because he holds that there is no
such thing as formal causation. However,it turns out that the same w r i t ­
ers who make clear that forms are active principles also make clear that
forms are formal causes i n respect ofthe things they inform, but efficient
causes in respect of the effects produced by the body they inform
produces in oifoerbodies.Thus the form or—what is often held to be the
same thing or at least something very closely related—the nature offire
is the efficient cause ofthe heating ofa pot ofwater placed above it.After
equating nature with informing form, Sennert writes that 'a nature
is . . . the transeunt cause ofactions', providing as his example 'when
fire heats some other thing' (Epitome, 5 4 - 5 ) . Eustachius also equates
form with nature (Summa, 58),and, after defining natures as the p r i n c i ­
ples ofmotion and rest, says that principles ofmotion and rest are effi­
cient causes (Summa, 5 9 ) . Lying behind this is the claim that formal
causes are immanent causes, while transeunt causes must be efficient
(Summa, 59).Thus the efficient cause ofa change i n a body b is body a,
considered i n respect ofits form or nature, i.e. its principle ofactivity. D u
M o u l i n writes that the efficient cause—one of the two external
causes—is 'that w h i c h produces an effect by its active virtue',as the sun
is the efficient cause ofday (Laphilosophie, 6). 2 2
Indeed,he is wihing to
relax the externality requirement somewhat, and say that forms are also
efficient causes ofthe motion and rest ofthe body possessing them, as
'the form o f a c o l t . . . is . . . the efficient cause ofthe movements and
neighing ofthat colt' (Laphilosophie, 7 ) . Gassendi is not doing anything
unusual or unwarranted by taking 'the Interpreters ofAristode' to hold
that forms are efficient causes.

2 2
P i e r r e D u M o u h n , La philosophie, mise enfrancois, et divisee en trois parties, scavoir, elements de
la logique, la physique ou science naturelle, l'ethyque ou science morale paris: T h o m a s Blaise and
O h v i e r d e V a r e n n e , 1644).
 TheActivityofMatter in Gassendi's Physics 87

T h e chfficuky Gassendi sees with the view that forms are efficient
principles is the weU-known problem of explaining where forms or
active principles can come from. 23
A traditional answer is that^orm is
educedfiom thepotentialityqfmatter. 24
Gassendi objects that this answer

is mere words. For ifthey mean that it is educed in such a way that it is only a
mode ofmatter iike the shape ofa statue into which bronze or wood is formed,
then they are indeed saying something, but form wiU be merely passive, hke the
matter whose mode it is, and not at aU an active Principle. However, if they
mean that it is some super-added entity, then they cannot say at aU whence this
entity exists, since the potential ofmatter has been put aside, nor what source its
power ofacting comes from, since the potential ofmatter is merely passive and
in no way active. (Opera 1.335b)

Gassendi understands it as a basic assumption ofthe view under consid­

eration that matter is entirely passive: this, after aU, is w h y we need a dis­
tinct active principle. Now, the claim is that the active principle is
educed from the potentiality ofmatter. However, Gassendi objects that
you cannot derive a genuinely active principle from the potential of a
purely passive thing,'and therefore the situation always returns where aU
active potential is derived from merely passive potential' (Opera 1.335b).
Thus 'one cannot hold that matter supphes the power ofform' (Opera
!-335b)- Hence one must either give up the claim that matter is purely
passive or give up the d a i m that form is educed from matter.
T h e first option is a non-starter.To give up the claim that matter is
passive is to give up hylomorphism, and an active principle distinct from
matter is no longer needed.The second option ako faik, on Gassendi's
account. For it simply brings us back to the original question, where does
2 3
S e n n e r t w r i t e s t h a t ' t h e r e is a g r e a t c o n t r o v e r s y a m o n g p h i l o s o p h e r s c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e a l
o r i g i n o f f o r m s ' a n d c o n s i d e r s t h e r e p l y t h a t f o r m is e d u c e d f r o m t h e p o t e n t i a l o f m a t t e r ( 1 4 ) .
D u p l e i x w r i t e s t h a t ' t h e P h y s i c i s t s ' s a y ' t h a t f o r m i s e h c i t e d f r o m t h e p o t e n t i a l o f m a t t e r ' (127).
S c i p i o n D u p l e i x , La Physique QParis: F a y a r d , 1 9 9 2 ) . L e i b n i z taUcs a b o u t ' t h e v e x a t i o u s p r o b l e m
o f t h e o r i g i n o f f o r m s ' a n d m e n t i o n s t h e v i e w that t h e y arise f r o m t h e p o w e r o f matter i n h i s
1 6 6 9 ' L e t t e r t o T h o m a s i u s ' ( G P 1 1 8 ) . W i H i a m P e m b l e ' s De origineformarum ( C a m b r i d g e , 1650)
takes i t as its c e n t r a l p r o b l e m . Suärez s i m i l a r l y e n d o r s e s t h e d a i m t h a t f o r m s a r e e d u c e d f r o m
t h e p o t e n t i a l o f m a t t e r , a l t h o u g h h e is c a r e f u l t o n o t e that, a s T h o m a s a r g u e d , i t is n o t p r o p e r l y
speaking f o r m b u t the form—matter composite w h i c h s h o u l d be held to have a n o r i g i n .
S u a r e z ' s d i s c u s s i o n m a k e s c l e a r t h a t t h e r e a r e s e r i o u s d e b a t e s o v e r h o w t h e c l a i m t h a t f o r m is
e h c i t e d from t h e p o w e r o f m a t t e r c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d b u t n o t o v e r w h e t h e r t h e c k i m , p r o p e r l y
u n d e r s t o o d , i s t r u e (55 ff.).
2 4
G a s s e n d i a n d t h e w r i t e r s m e n t d o n e d i n n . 18 a r e a U c a r e f u l to say t h a t t h e s u b s t a n t i a l f o r m
o f t h e h u m a n b e i n g is a s p e c i a l c a s e , b e i n g d i r e c d y i n f u s e d b y G o d r a t h e r t h a n e h c i t e d i n t h e
w a y o t h e r f o r m s are.
88 Antonia LoLordo

the activity ofform comeßom? Gassendi suggests that someone, abandoning

the notion that form is educed from the potential ofmatter, might argue
that form is educed from some other created thing. However, Gassendi
argues against this suggestion on the grounds that 'there is nothing
characteristic ofform except this innerpower ofacting' (Opera 1.335b).
I f w e say that forms merely transmit activity without being an original
source of activity, then forms so described are doing no work, and the
question ofwhat the real efficient principle or locus ofactivity is has not
been answered. Indeed, Gassendi's suggestion is that whatever is the
original source ofactivity within creation is what should be caUed 'form'.
Activity is the prime,ifnot the only, conceptual ingredient ofform.
O n e might not find this argument terribly satisfying.Why do forms
need to get their activity from anything (except, ofcourse, from God)?
W h y can't forms just have—or just be—active powers? Two different
sorts ofanswers can be given here. First, the force ofGassendi's argument
rehes on the fact that he is not posing a new problem in asking where
forms get their activity from. Rather, he is refusing a traditional answer
to a traditional question.That is, i n thinking that we need an explana­
tion ofwhere forms get their activity from, Gassendi is not demanding
anything that was not traditionally demanded.
Second, Gassendi may be relying on worries about reifying abstrac­
tions put forth i n his Exerdtationes.To say that formsjust have—or, per­
haps, just are—active powers by themselves, without any help from
matter or other causes save God, is to make forms into complete things
or substances i n their own right. Indeed, Gassendi writes that these
interpreters ofAristode must always end up saying that forms 'are some
true entity distinct from matter' (Opera 1.335a), at w h i c h point the c o n ­
nection between form and matter has been lost. Dupleix, for instance,
explains the relation between form and matter by saying that form is 'an
incomplete, imperfect substance' or a 'demi-substance' w h i c h w h e n
joined to matter makes a whole substance (Laphysique, 133).The view of
substantial form as an incomplete substance is endorsed by many o t h ­
ers—Suarez, for instance (Formal Cause, 1 5 . 5 . 2 , 7 8 ) . 25
Such an explana­
tion could not be given once one had been forced into saying that forms
are genuine, i.e. complete, substances i n their own right. 26

2 5
D e n i s D e s C h e n e , Physiologia (Ithaca: С о г п е П U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1996), 54, argues that t h e
p o i n t t h a t s u b s t a n t i a l f o r m s are i n c o m p l e t e is m a d e s o c l e a r l y t h a t d e k c a t e a r g u m e n t s t h a t t h e
h u m a n s o u l is a n e x c e p t i o n a n d c a n e x i s t i n s e p a r a t i o n f r o m m a t t e r b e c a m e n e c e s s a r y .
2 6
A g a i n , t h e s e c l a i m s a r e n o t s u p p o s e d t o a p p l y to t h e s u b s t a n t i a l f o r m o f h u m a n b e i n g s .
 TheAdivityofMatterin Gassendi's Physics 89

Moreover, forms cannot just have (or just be) active powers unless
their activity (or their existence) is connected i n some way to the mat­
ter they are associated with. For Gassendi, as for most ofhis contempor­
aries, isokted powers—i.e. powers that are not the powers of some
thing—do not make sense. While I can conceive o f a power without a
substance it belongs to, only misguided reification o f o u r way o f c o n -
ceiving the world could infer from this that there could be such powers.
Thus, Gassendi holds, there is no way to make sense ofthe claim that
forms are efficient principles, and a created locus ofefficiency must be
found elsewhere.

2.2. The refection of the World Soul as the efficientprinciple

Although I have spent a fair amount oftime on Gassendi's critique of

forms as principles ofactivity, this is by no means the view that Gassendi
devotes most ofhis attention to. His chieftarget here—as in many ofthe
more programmatic sections ofthe Syntagma's Physics—is the doctrine
ofthe Anima Mundi orWorld Soul.
W h o is Gassendi attacking i n attacking the doctrine ofaWorld Soul?
T h e main contemporary target is Robert Fludd. Fludd was a successful
Enghsh anti-Galenist physician, relying on iatrochemistry andjudiciary
astrology; he invented a new process for refining tin for w h i c h he
received a patent from James I; his philosophy had sources in
Neoplatonism, the Cabbala, Paracekus, the Chaldean oracles, and the
Corpus hermeticum. 21
I n his De macrocosmi historia (Oppenheim, 1617)
Fludd gave a reading of Genesis that Mersenne attacked as heretical in
Quaestiones in Genesim (Paris, 1623). Fludd defended himseifin Sophiae
cum moria certamen (Frankfurt, 1629),'The Batde o f W i s d o m and Idiocy'.
Mersenne asked Gassendi to reply for him, and Gassendi did so i n the
1630 Epistolica exercitatio, in quaprincipiaphilosophiae Roberti Fluddi media
reteguntur fJ'aris, 1630), many ofthe more general arguments o f w h i c h
are repeated i n the Syntagma.Theie Gassendi writes that Fludd's views
are—no doubt unintentionahy, he is careful to add—dangerously het­
erodox.
T h e chiefaUeged heterodoxy is the doctrine that there is an Anima
Mundi immanent in the world, w h i c h is variously identified with light
2 7
S e e A U a n D e b u s , Robert Fludd and his Philosophicall Key ( N e w York: Science History
P u b U c a t i o n s , 1 9 7 9 ) a n d W i U i a m H u f f m a n , Robert Fludd and the End of the Renaissance (London:
Routledge,1988).
90 Antonia LoLordo

and with G o d in the person of C h r i s t . 28

Fludd argues that the World
Soul or Christ is the sole source of causal activity i n the world: 'Jesus
C h r i s t . . . sustaineth aU, and is aU in aU, and fiUeth aU, and acteth or
operateth aU i n aU'. 29
H e opposes this to 'the E t h n i c k doctrine . . .
that. . . maketh an infinity of essential Agents in this world, as
Daemons, Stars, Elements, Meteors, Fire,Water, C o l d , Heat, Man, Beast,
P k n t , MineraU, and such H k e ' — a doctrine w h i c h , Fludd argues, has
infected 'our Christian phUosophers' w h o say 'that there are an infinity
ofsecundary causes,which act and operate ofthemselves' (M0saicall,29).
However, we should accept the view of 'our true PhUosopher Paul'
(whose view Fludd takes himseU" to be propagating) 'that by his
Philosophy . . . he can discern no other Agent but one primary [viz.
God], o f w h o m are aU things; and the other secundary [viz. the world
soul],by w h o m are aU things, both w h i c h he acknowledgeth to be but
one i n essence; for the one being an emanation out ofthe other, doth
onely, and of himself operate aU in aU' (Mosaicall, 3 0 ) . Against this,
Gassendi points out that Fludd's view has the efFect of making G o d
immanent i n the created world and hence making h i m subject to rare­
faction, contraction, and the like. T h e sort of worries Gassendi
advances here look remarkably like the worries later advanced
concerning Spinozism.
However, i n attacking the world soul, Gassendi is not simply attack­
ing Fludd, but has bigger targets i n mind as weU. Indeed, Gassendi
ascribes such an account to 'Pythagoras, according to Stobaeus, and
Plutarch . . . and also Plato, and i n a word whoever, asserting that there
is an Anima Mundi,judges that aU special forms ofthings are little parts
ofthe world soul, from w h i c h parts aU efficacy i n things comes' (Opera
i . 3 3 3 a - b ) . O n e influential contemporary formulation of the Anima
Mundi view is found in Marsiho Ficino's 1474 PlatonicTheology. 30
Ficino
explains that one of his goals is to show that 'besides this inert tyigram]
mass ofbodies w h i c h the Democriteans, Cyrenaics and Epicureans limit
2 8
S e e , f o r i n s t a n c e , R o b e r t F l u d d , Utriusque cosmi . . . historia [Historia] (Oppenheim,
1 6 1 7 ) . T h i s w o r k c o m p r i s e s De macrocosmi historia a n d De microcosmi historia.
2 9
R o b e r t F l u d d , The Mosaicall Philosophy [MosaicaU] r L o n d o n : H u m p h r e y Moseley, 1659),29.
3 0
M i c h a e l J . B . A U e n w i t h J o h n W a r d e n ( t r a n s . ) , Platonic Theology [PT] (Cambridge:
H a r v a r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 2 0 0 i - 2 ) . A l t h o u g h I a m n o t aware o f a n y p r o o f t h a t G a s s e n d i read
this w o r k , h e w a s certainly famiHar w i t h F i c i n o , a n d o w n e d s o m e o f his translations o f
Plato w h e n he died. See M a r i e - A n t o i n e t t e F l e u r y a n d Georges B a U h a c h e , ' D o c u m e n t s inedits
s u r G a s s e n d i ' , i n B e r n a r d R o c h o t ( e d . ) , Pierre Gassendi 1592-1b"55: Sa vie et son ceuvre ^aris:
E d i o o n s A l b i n M i c h e l , 1955), 3 7 - 5 2 .
 TheActivity qfMatter in Gassendi's Physics 91

their consideration to, there exists some efficacious quahty or power'

(PT 1.1, 15).Thus, i n responding to a view hke Ficino's, Gassendi is
intervening i n a pre-existing debate between Neoplatonists and
Epicureans. I n the chapter'Body does not act ofits own nature', Ficino
explains that body—by w h i c h he understands matter and its extension,
quantity—cannot act because 'it is characteristic of matter only to be
extended and to be affected, and extension and affection are passions'
(PT 1.2,19) .Thus 'aU power ofacting must be attributed to an incorpor­
eal nature' (PT 1 . 2 , 2 1 ) , and 'ifbodies appear to act i n any way, they do
not do so by virtue oftheir own mass, as the Democriteans, Cyrenaics
and Epicureans supposed, but through some force and quality
implanted i n them' (PT 1.2,23) .Therefore, Ficino argues,'there must be
a certain incorporeal substance [or form] present i n and rahng over aU
objects' ( P T 1 . 3 , 3 7 ) , a n d ' t h e powers and activities ofquahties are based
on the power and activity ofsuch an incorporeal form' ( P T 1.3,41) .This
incorporeal form in the end 'is nothing other than soul', as 'soul is both
movable ofitseffand bestows on bodies the imprint ofits movement'
( P T 4 . 1 , 2 8 1 ) . F i c i n o assigns souls to individual humans and animals and
the twelve heavenly spheres, but at the highest level these are subsumed
in'the single world soul',which is thus the ultimate source ofaU appar-
entactivity in bodies ( P T 4 . 1 , 2 9 5 ) .
Thus Gassendi captures Ficino's view as weU as Fludd's when he
describes the Anima Mundi as something w h i c h is 'as it were scattered
and divided into particles w h i c h result (euado) i n particular Souls or
forms, not only o f m e n but also ofbeasts and even ofPlants, Metals,
stones and everything in general' (Opera 1.334a).The claim that the
world soul exercises its causahty through its division into particles,
Gassendi says,'is not only an impious thing to say but ako a most absurd
one: as i f indeed an incorporeal, immense, and nowhere-not-existing
Entity could be separated, carried along and caught up by a body!'
(Opera 1.334a). Gassendi invokes the aUeged divisibihty into parts again
as foUows, i n a passage suggesting a view ofthe world soul as distinct
from God:'Indeed, it is sufficient that G o d is incorporeal and pervades
and fosters (foveo) the universal Machine of the World; and therefore
there is not such an Anima Mundi or form as its substance, as it were scat­
tered and cut into little parts, w h i c h become particular Souls or forms'
(Opera 1.334a).The taUc of'division' o f t h e world soul into parts is
Gassendi's own gloss. It is not clear that advocates ofa world soul would
92 Antonia LoLordo

have countenanced division as the explanation for how the world soul
gives rise to individual souls; Ficino, at least,would have said that emana­
tion is not division. Gassendi seems to assume that the ordy way we can
get many from one is through a hteral division, thus rejecting the emana­
tion modek w h i c h world soul theories often rely on. However, Gassendi
proposes several distinct problems with the claim that the world soul is
divided into parts that become the souls or forms ofparticular things, and
only the first ofthese problems depends on conceiving ofthe way i n d i ­
vidual souk result from the world soul as hteral division into parts:

(a) it requires the division ofan incorporeal thing,which Gassendi can­

not accept since he holds that real division occurs only by cutting
and separating, and thus requires resistance or impenetxabihty; 31

φ) it imphes that aU souk, whether ofmen or oflead, have the same sta­
tus vis-a-vis eternity, w h i c h is unacceptable;
(c) it requires the world soul to have parts that move around with dif­
ferent bodies,which is incompatible w i t h its reaUy being one entity
and thus shows that there is a contradiction i n the theory;
(d) iftheworldsoulisincorporealthen'itcannotbegraspedhow . . . it
can be apphed to bodies so that it impresses impulses on them, since
it cannot contact them,bcking that tangibUity [tactu] or bulk [mole]
bywhichitcouldtouch.' (Opera 1 . 3 3 4 b ; c f . 3 . 3 0 4 b , 3 . 2 8 4 b )

N o w the reader may at first think that objection (d) simply begs the
question. For, she might reason, surely no one who beheves that an
Anima Mundi is the locus ofactivity i n nature would accept the principle
that aU action is the impression ofimpulse by contact. Indeed, Gassendi's
main argument for that principle is simply the overarching argument we
are now considering, viz. the argument that there is no other acceptable
way to make sense ofsecondary causation.
However, one need not read objection (d) as relying on the assump­
tion that all action proceeds through the impression of impulse. AU
Gassendi needs is the much weaker claim that there is some physical
causation w h i c h is the impression ofimpulse through contact, and I take
it that this weaker claim is uncontroversial.The objection then is this.
3 1
G a s s e n d i denies the reality o f m a t h e m a t i c a l a n d c o n c e p t u a l d i v i s i o n ; rather, o n his v i e w ,
аП d i v i s i o n is a m a t t e r o f s p a t i a l d i v i s i o n , i . e . i n t r o d u c i n g a r e l a t i v e l y l a r g e s p a c e b e t w e e n what
are n o w t h e d i s t i n c t p a r t s o f t h e t h i n g (Opera 1.297b).This a U o w s h i m t o saythatalthoughGod
is e x t e n d e d , i n t h e s e n s e t h a t h e c a n b e t h o u g h t o f as d i f f u s e d t h r o u g h s p a c e ( w h i c h is h i s
i m m e n s i t y ) , h e is n e v e r t h e l e s s i n d i v i s i b l e (Opera 1 . 1 9 1 a fE).
 TheActivity ofMatterin Gassendi's Physics 93

A world souI which is incorporeal could not impress impuke on

anything. This is incompatible with the world soul's being the ordy
principle ofactivity within nature. But it is essential to the doctrine ofthe
world soul that all creaturely activity is reaUy the activity ofthe world soul.
Objection (d) might bring up a second worry as weU, namely, a worry
that Gassendi cannot put forward the c k i m that the incorporeal cannot
affect the corporeal without in effect committing himseh either to the 0

entirely unacceptable view that God is corporeal, or to the equaUy unac­

ceptable view that G o d cannot affect the created world. However, Gassendi
is careful to note that his c k i m that the incorporeal is unable to affect the
corporeal is hrnited to created things, and does not apply to God,for three
reasons. First, God, unKke created things, has unhmited power or virtus, i.e.
power not hmited by natural necessity. Second, God, unhke other incor­
poreal things,ispresent everywhere. FinaUy,unhke the action ofcorporeal
things, God's action is nutu, by command, rather than motu, by motion. 32

Gassendi is careful here to restrict his fourfold hne ofobjection to a

conception ofthe world soul as an incorporeal being. H e is not here
concerned to argue against those who, by holding that the world soul is
something hke vital heat, an affection ofbodies, hold that it is corporeal.
For such a person agrees with Gassendi that the efficient principle i n the
created world is material. A t this point i n the argument, Gassendi can
agree with anyone who would accept the existence ofa corporeal world
soul, since both parties would reject the view ofmatter as itselfinert.

2.3. Qualities and the activity of matter

T h e issue now is to figure out exactly what the activity of matter

consists in, i.e. what the fundamental quahties ofmatter are. Gassendi's

3 2
I t is, h o w e v e r , w o r t h n o t i n g t h a t m this s e c t i o n o f t h e Syntagma G a s s e n d i d o e s t a k e this d o c ­
t r i n e t o a p p l y t o t h e i n c o r p o r e a l h u m a n s o u l , w h i c h eHcits o n l y ' i n t e H e c t u a l o r m e n t a l a n d i n c o r ­
p o r e a l ' a c t s , r a t h e r t h a n h a v i n g c a u s a l i n f l u e n c e o n t h e b o d y . N o w , this is a s t a n d a r d s c h o l a s t i c v i e w ,
b u t n o t o n e w h i c h G a s s e n d i c a n s u c c e s s n d l y assimUate. T h e s c h o h s t i c s u g g e s t i o n is that t h e
r a t i o n a l s o u l c a n n o t affect t h e b o d y d i r e c d y b u t can affect i t i n d i r e c d y , v i a t h e m e d i a t i o n o f t h e s e n ­
sitive s o u l . A t p o i n t s G a s s e n d i suggests that t h e c o r p o r e a l s o u l , w h i c h w e h u m a n s share w i t h
plants a n d a n i m a k , s e r v e s as a nexus b e t w e e n b o d y a n d i n c o r p o r e a l s o u l . H o w e v e r , this s u g g e s t i o n
is n o r e a l h e l p , s i n c e t h e c o r p o r e a l s o u l is itsetf e n t i r e l y c o m p o s e d o f p a r t i c v u a r l y fine a n d ' s p i r i t u a l '
c o r p u s c l e s — a n d h e n c e t h e p r o b l e m a b o u t t h e i n c o r p o r e a l b e i n g able to affect t h e c o r p o r e a l
p e r s i s t s . T h i s v i e w o f t h e i n c o r p o r e a l s o u l as p o w e r l e s s o v e r t h e b o d y is o n e w h i c h G a s s e n d i a b a n ­
d o n s i n b t e r s e c t i o n s o f t h e Syntagma a d d r e s s i n g t h e s o u l specificaUy, a l t h o u g h h e n e v e r d e v e l o p s
a satisfactory a c c o u n t o f i n t e r a c t i o n . F o r c h a n g e s i n G a s s e n d i ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e s o u l , see m y
' G a s s e n d i o n H u m a n K n o w l e d g e o f t h e M i n d ' , Archivfüt Geschichte der Phibsophie (forthcoming).
94 Antonia LoLordo

argument against different versions ofthe view that the elemental and
'secondary' qualities ofmatter are the efficient principle can be treated
relatively quickly. The view that the qualities ofmatter are the efficient
33

principle is reaUy the view that matter, as quahfied, is the efficient p r i n ­

ciple, and hence Gassendi's arguments here can also be read as directed
against minima naturalia theories on w h i c h there are ultimate 'atoms' o f
a hmited number ofdifferent kinds. For he makes essentiaUy the same
point against aU versions ofthe view ofmatter as active i n virtue ofbeing
quahfied in specified ways,whether the quaHties are heat, cold,wetness,
or dryness; salt, sulphur and mercury; or primeval heat and hght. I n the
end, Gassendi thinks, it is fine to talk about any ofthese things as being
active principles—so long as we aUow that,first,they are whoUy corpor­
eal and, second, that they are exphcable i n terms ofcorpuscles or mole-
cules,i.e. smaU composites ofatoms. This has the advantage ofaUowing 34

Gassendi to insert into his own phüosophy whatever explanations

deriving from these other theories ofefficiency he finds useful.
Consider an example coming from one of Gassendi's discussions of
chymistry. Gassendi writes that the five-element view is made plausible
by the principle that'every thing consists i n those things into w h i c h it is
resolvable', together with the fact that chymists have shown that some
things are indeed resolvable into the five elements (Opera 1.245a).
However, he thinks that these five elements could themselves be further
resolved, ultimately into atoms: 'I remain sUent here about what could
be added concerning the resolution ofthose five Principles into their
seeds, and finaUy into Atoms: for the matter shouId be understood from
the things w h i c h wiU be said later.' (Opera 1.245b). Setting aside the issue
ofwhether we could resolve the five elements into atoms, Gassendi's
d a i m is that the chemical elements are resolvable in theory because they
are constituted by atoms. This pattern of explanation is quite general.

3 3
I n G a s s e n d i ' s u s a g e , a n y q u a H t y w h i c h is n o t o n e o f t h e f o u r e l e m e n t a l q u a U t i e s ofheat,
c o l d , w e t n e s s , a n d d r y n e s s is c a U e d a s e c o n d a r y q u a h t y , r e g a r d l e s s o f w h e t h e r t h e a d h e r e n t o f
t h a t q u a h t y aJso a c c e p t s t h e e l e m e n t a l q u a l i t i e s o r t h e four e l e m e n t s w i t h w h i c h t h e y are
closely associated.
3 4
H e a t , a l t h o u g h n o t t h e o t h e r three e l e m e n t a l quahties, is a special case for G a s s e n d i . F o r
G a s s e n d i is w U h n g t o taUc a b o u t h e a t a t o m s , a l t h o u g h h e m a k e s t h e i m p o r t a n t quaUf1cati0n
t h a t w h e n h e taUcs a b o u t h e a t , ' d o n o t u n d e r s t a n d a c e r t a i n n u d e a n d s o h t a r y q u a h t y , b u t
u n d e r s t a n d c e r t a i n A t o m s to t h e e x t e n t that t h e y are f u r n i s h e d w i t h s u c h a size, s u c h a shape,
s u c h a m o t i o n ' ( O p e r a 1 . 3 9 4 b ) . T h u s ' t h e y are n o t h o t , b u t c a n nevertheless b e j u d g e d a n d caUed
A t o m s o f h e a t , o r c a l o r i f i c A t o m s , i n s o f a r as t h e y c r e a t e h e a t , t h a t i s , h a v e t h i s efFect' (Opera
i-394b).
 TheAdwity of Matter in Gassendi's Physics 95

Gassendi explains salt and gravity, for instance, as being particular types
ofcorpuscles or molecules, i.e. insensibly smaU collections ofatoms.And
ifthis is what the 'elements' are, then there is htde reason to minimize
the number of elements or minima naturalia aUowed. Indeed, i n the
course ofthe Syntagma Gassendi makes use ofa great number ofdifFer-
ent types ofcorpuscles—corpuscles ofhght, ofgravity, ofmagnetism, of
niter, and so on.This use is intended to be consistent, and is consistent,
with an account ofindividuaI atoms as differing only i n terms ofsize,
shape,and vis motrix. The 35
same sort ofargument applies against minima
naturalia theories, whose explanatory successes Gassendi wiU attempt to
integrate into his own theory while providing an account ofthe minima
as themselves corpuscles constituted ofEpicurean atoms.
Gassendi's treatment of the 'secondary quahties' of the Recentiores
Telesio, Patrizi, and CampaneUa requires a bit more attention. For
Telesio,'there are three principles ofaU things: two incorporeal active
natures and . . . one corporeal'. Within this system, 'the agents heat
36

and cold are the principles of aU things' (RN 14), while 'matter is pro­
vided with . . . no faculty ofgenerating and acting on itself (RN 2 2 ) .
This apphes straightforwardly to individual bodies, so that, for instance
'the sun is given its dispositions and its faculties and species ofacting and
operating by heat' (RN 7 ) . CampaneUa also provides a version ofthe
claim that heat and cold are the universal agents.
For Patrizi, there are four principles w h i c h constitute aU bodies:
space, heat, hght, and fluidity or flux (fluor) (UP 85c) . 37
Space, for Patrizi
as for Gassendi, is inert—and fluidity'constitutes the matter ofthe world
(mundum hylaeum)' (UP 7 8 c ) , so that matter is also passive. It is light and
heat w h i c h are the active principles: 'by hght ßsodies] ako have heat, by
heat essence and powers and actions' (UP 78c).As this makes clear, heat
and light are not entirely distinct (UP cf. 7 6 b - c ) . Heat can be considered
'as the material cause' or, i n the sense we are interested in,'as the found­
ing (conditrix) cause of the universe', i.e. the 'efFectorem' (UP 76a). Patrizi
at points ahgns heat with the 'anima mundi' or'spiritus mundi',where for
Patrizi souI—both the world soul and the individual souk ofindividual
3 5
I d o n o t m e a n t o s u g g e s t t h a t G a s s e n d i e i t h e r e x p b i n s o r a t t e m p t s t o e x p b i n h o w t h e vis
motrix o f a t o m s , c o m b i n e d i n t o a c e r t a i n t e x t u r e , actuaUy gives rise to t h e p o w e r s o f t h e five
chemical elements.
3 6
B e r n a r d i n o T e l e s i o , De rerum natura iuxtapropriaprincipia [RN] ( M o d e n a : A . F. F o r m i g g i n i ,
1910).
3 7
F r a n c i s c o P a t r i z i , Nova de universisphilosophia [UP] ( F e r r a r a , 1591).
9 6 Antonia LoLordo

things—is 'a certain union ofthe incorporealwith the corporeal',i.e. an

incorporeal thing having certain corporeal elements (UP 57a-b).The
soul is that whose presence 'effects three things: animating, making hve,
and moving', and without soul there would be no action, since 'body
alone'—again including the body ofthe world—is 'inert and indeed a
cadaver' (UP 57b).Thus Gassendi argues against Patrizi both i n arguing
against a world soul and i n arguing against a view ofmatter as provided
w i t h various secondary quahties.
Gassendi's argument against Patrizi is the most interesting of his
responses to the 'novatores' .As Gassendi notes, for Patrizi the active p r i n ­
ciple is 'an incorporeal corporeal' (Opera i . 2 4 5 a - b ) — b u t this category
has no place within Gassendi's ontology.Thus Gassendi alternately c o n ­
siders Patrizi's heat and hght as corporeal and as incorporeal. Ifthey are
incorporeal, then the view simply is a version ofthe world soul view, or
is at least subject to the same difficulties as the world soul view (such as
providing no expknation of how matter can be affected so as to be
moved by impuke). B u t ifthey are corporeal—if, that is, the view is
something hke the view of Plutarch and the Stoics w h o think of the
efficient principle as corporeal spirit distinct from ordinary bodies (Opera
! - 3 3 3 b ) — t h e n they are, at best, partial explanations and can be anah/zed
in the same way as other secondary quahties. T h e argument against
Telesio (and, by extension, CampaneUa) is the simpler claim that the
usefuhiess of positing heat and Hght as active principles can be fuUy
captured within a version ofEpicurean atomism. For on Gassendi's view,
heat and hght simply are what corpuscles with a certain size, shape, and
motion produce. Thus Epicurean atomism is to be preferred to the
various secondary quahtyviews since Epicurean atomism can reinterpret
and integrate their theoretical successes, while they, having nothing
helpful to say about motion, cannot do the same for Epicurean atomism.

2.4. Descartes

FinaUy, let us consider Gassendi's objections to the view ofDescartes

and others that the efficient principle ofmatter is motion itself, rather
than motive power, so that matter is inert but moved. N o w Gassendi
does not consider Descartes'view, as I havejust described it, exphcidy. H e
tends to think ofthe claims that the principle ofaction i n created things
is corporeal, and that matter is active rather than inert, as equivalent
 TheActivity of Matter in Gassendi's Physics 97

(Opera 1.335b). For, he explains, an action requires an agent, and ifthe

action is a corporeal action, viz. an action on a body, then the agent must
itserfbe a body (Opera 1.336b).Thus Gassendi understands the activity
ofmatter as the natural consequence ofany view on w h i c h nature c o m ­
prises nothing but matter.
O n e might weh wonder how Gassendi can fail to engage with a
Cartesian view ofthe principle ofchange i n the material world, given
that he rephed to Descartes' Meditations at length in his Objections and
Counter-objections (printed together as the Disquisitio Metaphysica).ln the
Disquisitio, Gassendi argues that i f w e accept a Cartesian account ofthe
essence of body as extension alone, we would have to reintroduce an
incorporeal source ofthe activity ofbodies:

Concerning body, I note only this, that ifaU its nature consists in its being an
extended thing, then aU action and aU faculty ofacting wÜl be outside ofcor-
poreal nature, since extension is merely passive and he who says that a thing is
merely extended says among other things that it is not active. Hence there wiU
be no action, no faculty ofacting in bodies: and from where does [the action or
faculty ofacting] come from? From an incorporeal principle? But that which is
incorporeal is only thinking, and cannot eHcit corporeal actions. Or from a cor­
poreal principle? But that which is corporeal is only extended and not reaUy
something that acts . . . And you wiU have to go back to forms or differentia or
whatever eke you want. . . (Disquisitio, Opera 3.305b; cf. 3.284b)

Gassendi's claim is that i f the corporeal is equated with the merely

extended then nothing corporeal can have activity.And since he always
operates on the assumption that there is genuine activity i n the created
world,it foUows that Descartes wiU need an incorporeal source ofactiv­
ity within physics. Gassendi here invokes Descartes' account of the
incorporeal—that is, the mind—as essentiaUy thinking, and writes that
a merely thinking thing could not ehcit action i n a body. Gassendi's
worries about how the mind could afFect the body it isjoined to are
obviously lurking i n the background here. However, even i f w e accept
that Descartes has an acceptable account of interaction, invoking the
mind wiU not solve the problem unless we are wiUing to revert to the
panpsychism rejected earlier in discussions ofthe world soul.
A t this point i n the dialectic, Gassendi has argued against the six c o m ­
peting accounts ofcreated activity w h i c h he has found i n the tradition,
and thereby estabhshed his own account of creaturely activity, namely
that atoms possess an intrinsic motive power w h i c h is ahvays realized.
98 Antonia LoLordo

Gassendi's argument is complete at this point. H e takes himselfto have

shown that preserving secondary causation requires guaranteeing
the activity ofmatter by positing intrinsicaüy active atoms; no available
account of the locus of activity within the created world is workable.
However, since historians of seventeenth-century philosophy are
accustomed to thinking ofconcurrence, conservation, and occasional­
ism as central issues i n seventeenth-century arguments about causation,
it is worth looking briefly at how Gassendi deak with the relationship
between divine and created activity.

3. C O N S E R V A T I O N A N D C O N C U R R E N C E

T h e passagejust quoted makes clear that,whatever one might make o f

the suggestions ofoccasionahsm or related views i n Descartes' Principles,
Gassendi himselfdoes not understand Descartes as i n any way intending
to deny the activity of the created world. His charge is rather that
Descartes faib to make sense ofthe creaturely activity w h i c h aU parties
to the debate accept as necessary. However, we are getting very close
here to the emergence of occasionahsm i n the later Cartesians, and to
themes at least suggestive of occasionahsm in Descartes himseU . 7

Scholars describe three more or less distinct pathways to occasionahsm

in the seventeenth century. The furst pathway starts by emphasizing the
38

notion, fairly common amongst seventeenth-century 'new philo­

sophers', that matter is inert, devoid ofaU special powers and capable of
moving from place to place but not ofspontaneously producing move-
ment.Thus, whenever a given body is moving, the initial cause ofits
motion cannot be that body itself (for it was assumed to be inert), and
cannot be a different body (for i f m o t i o n ifunderstood as a mode of
bodies, it cannot inteUigibly be held to be transferred from one body to

3 8
F o r i n s t a n c e , S t e v e n N a d l e r , Causation in Early Modern Philosophy ^Jniversity Park:
P e n n s y l v a n i a S t a t e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 9 3 ) e m p h a s i z e s t h e first p a t h w a y , n a m e l y t h e i n e r t n e s s
ofmatter. Steven N a d l e r , ' D o c t r i n e s o f E x p l a n a t i o n i n L a t e S c h o b s t i c i s m a n d the M e c h a n i c a l
P h i l o s o p h y ' , i n D a n i e l G a r b e r a n d M i c h a e l A y e r s ( e d s . ) , The Cambridge History of Seventeenth
Century Philosophy ( N e w Y o r k : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 9 8 ) , 513—52, d e s c r i b e s b o t h t h e
first a n d second pathways. K e n n e t h Qatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Early Modern
Philosophy @4ewYork: Roudedge, 1 9 9 9 ) , d i s c u s s e s aU t h r e e . F r e d d o s o , i n ' N o t E n o u g h ' a n d
' P i t f a U s ' , i d e n t i f i e s t h e p a t h t h r o u g h d i v i n e c o n c u r r e n c e as t h e r o u t e t o t h e m e d i e v a l o c c a ­
s i o n a h s m o f G a b r i e l B i e l a n d P e t e r D ' A i U y a n d s u g g e s t s t h a t i t is i m p o r t a n t f o r s e v e n t e e n t h -
c e n t u r y o c c a s i o n a h s m as w e U .
 TheAdivity ofMatter in Gassendi's Physics 99

another), and hence by process of ehmination the initial cause ofevery

motion of a body must be God. Hence there is no genuine secondary
causation: the coUision ofone piece of matter with another may be the
occasion for G o d to put the second i n motion, but it is not a real cause.
T h e key element of this first pathway is the inertness of matter, so
Gassendi easily avoids this Cartesian or Malebranchian path to occa­
sionalism.
T h e second and third suggested pathways to occasionalism depend
on the doctrines ofdivine conservation and divine concurrence respec­
tively. Some philosophers have thought that continual creation leads
direcdy to occasionahsm i n virtue of being incompatible with crea-
turely activity. It should be noted, ofcourse,that continual creation goes
back at least to Aquinas and was an extremely popular view, one w h i c h
the majority ofscholastics did not take to lead to the denial ofcreaturely
activity and hence to occasionalism.Thus one ought not simply assume
that Gassendi would have seriously considered the possibility that c o n ­
tinuous creation has occasionalistic imphcations. Indeed, as far as I
know, the debate he is intervening i n prescinds entirely from questions
about conservation.This should be expected, since the question at issue
is the locus ofsecondary causation rather than the existence ofsecond-
ary causation.
Conservation and its gloss as continual recreation are at issue in the
debate between Descartes and Gassendi, most notably in the discussion
of Descartes' second argument i n Meditation I I I that it is evident by the
natural light that conservation differs only by reasonfrom creation. Gassendi
chaUenges this claim, asking 'how is this evident except perhaps in the
case ofhght and simikr effects?' (Opera 3 . 3 4 4 b ) . 39
Descartes replies, with
some irritation, by paraphrasingAqvrinas' claim that in denying 'that we
need the continual influx ofthe first cause in order to be conserved',
Gassendi is denying 'something w h i c h aU Metaphysicians affirm as
evident'. 40
Gassendi, w h o would surely have recognized the claim as
Thomistic, rephes in equaUy irritated fashion that he is not denying that
there is a continual influx of the first cause, i.e. G o d , into the created
world (Opera 3.346a).Everyone agrees that the world'has nothingfrom
3 9
T h e r e l e v a n t c o n t r a s t is b e t w e e n effects h k e h g h t a n d effects h k e h e a t . S u n h g h t p e r s i s t s
o n l y so l o n g as t h e s u n s h i n e s , b u t a b o i l e d k e t d e r e m a i n s h o t e v e n after i t is t a k e n o f f t h e fire.
4 0
T h o m a s A q u i n a s , Summa theologica (NewYork:fHackfriars, 1964—), 1q104a1.Gassendi's
o r i g i n a l o b j e c t i o n a n d D e s c a r t e s ' r e p l y a r e d i s c u s s e d i n D a n i e l G a r b e r , Descartes Embodied
^ I e w Y o r k : C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 2 0 0 1 ) , 195 ff,
100 Antonia LoLordo

itselfby w h i c h it subsists per se' (Opera 1 . 3 2 3 b ) . Rather, Gassendi is

denying that this continual influx is the same thing as creation. N o r is he
denying something w h i c h everyone accepts as evident, since the nature
of conservation is disputed among the doctors of the schools (Opera
3-346a). 41

However, this passage, hke many from the Disquisitio, needs to be read
with care; one cannot be sure that Gassendi is advancing a positive view
ofhis own, rather than suggesting that Descartes has not ruled out a pos­
sible alternative. Indeed, at one point i n the Syntagma Gassendi remarks
in passing that 'it is granted that conservation is nothing other than c o n ­
tinual production (continentemproductionem)' (Opera 1.485b).It is hard to
know how to weigh this claim against what is said i n the dispute with
Descartes. I n general, texts from the Syntagma carry more weight than
texts from the Disquisitio, since it is clearer that the Syntagma puts forth
a positive philosophy. O n the other hand, the Disquisitio contains a series
ofarticles on this issue,while the Syntagma claim is merely a note in pass­
ing—and one made i n the context of an insistence on the genuine
activity of matter i n the form of atomic motion at that. W h i l e the
Syntagma makes reference to conservation in a number of places, it
never develops any nuanced account ofwhat conservation consists in.
For Gassendi's claims about conservation there are intended to serve the
project ofChristianizing Epicureanism, and thus take as their main task
a rebuttal ofthe views ofEpicurus rather than the construction ofa pos­
itive theology.
At this point, we can draw two conclusions. First, Gassendi himself
saw no reason to think that adopting a view ofconservation as contin­
ual creation would lead to denying the activity of matter. W h a t he
objects to i n Descartes' apphcation of the doctrine is not any aheged
imphcations ofoccasionahsm he sees in it, but rather its use i n a proofof
the existence o f G o d . Second,we have at least some reason to think that
Gassendi is not particularly concerned with the proper theological
understanding of conservation. Thus, given that he thinks there are

4 1
G a s s e n d i does n o t identify the dissent. H o w e v e r , S u a r e z , w h o h i m s e k argues that c o n ­ 0

s e r v a t i o n 'differs f r o m c r e a t i o n o n l y b y r e a s o n o f a c e r t a i n c o n n o t a t i o n o r i m p U e d n e g a t i o n —
t h a t i s , i t is o n l y c o n c e p t u a H y d i s t i n c t from c r e a t i o n ' ( 2 1 . 2 . 2 ; 1 2 0 ) , c i t e s t h e t h i r t e e n t h - a n d
f o u r t e e n t h - c e n t u r y d o c t o r s H e n r y o f G h e n t , G r e g o r y o f R i m i n i , a n d P e t e r A u r e o l i as r e j e c t ­
i n g the m e r e l y conceptual distinction b e t w e e n c o n s e r v a t i o n a n d c r e a t i o n . On Creation,
Conservation and Concurrence, trans. A . J . F r e d d o s o ( M e t a p h y s i c a l D i s p u t a t i o n s 20—22; S o u t h
B e n d : S t . A u g u s t i n e ' s P r e s s , 2 0 0 2 ) . I t is c l e a r t h a t Suärez takes t h i s t o b e a m i n o r i t y v i e w .
 TheActivity qfMatter in Gassendi's Physics ιοί

acceptable theological authorities on w h i c h to base a refusal to identify

conservation with creation,ifhe had been forced to deal with an aUeged
route from continual creation to occasionahsm he might weU have
responded by denying continual creation rather than embracing occa-
sionalism.But this is pure speculation; I see no reason to think Gassendi
entertained the possibihty ofsuch a hnk.
T h e third suggested route to occasionahsm starts from the notion that
G o d must concur or cooperate with the actions of creatures as weU as
conserving the existence ofcreated things—a notion w h i c h some w r i t ­
ers before Gassendi, namely the medieval occasionalists Gabriel Biel and
Peter d'AiUy, had found ultimately incompatible with genuine crea-
turely action. Again in the matter of divine concurrence, Gassendi
42

assumes a rather under-described position. H e discusses concurrence

only, so far as I know, in the course ofrebutting the Epicurean view of
the gods as unconcerned with human affairs,but the characterization of
divine general providence he gives makes clear that he holds that both
G o d and created causes have genuine causahty i n the case ofany bodily
action:

even though authority and dominion are granted to God, the causes which he
wishes to exist and to aUow to act in their turn are therefore not denied. For it
is his general providence that estabHshed the course ofnature and permits it to
be conserved (servo) continuously . . . God is in fact supposed as the general
causeof. . . aUthings.Butmoreover,particularcausesarerequired . . . [which]
are comprehended within a series ofnatural causes, which God permits to act
in their turn . . . (Opera 1.326a)

As the Hght analogy suggests, Gassendi argues that G o d is the general

cause o(actions as weU as creatures:'God cooperates with aU secondary
causes' (Opera 1.337b) and permits them to act.This is exacdy the ter­
minology Gassendi used i n describing how G o d cooperates with atoms'
power ofmoving and acting (Opera 1.280a).Here Gassendi faUs squarely
within the concurrentist tradition, holding that both G o d and bodies
are fuU causes of bodily efFects—a tradition sometimes thought to
derive fromAquinas and his Sumnta contragentiles claim that 'It is not the
case that the same effect is attributed to a natural cause and to the divine
power so that it is effected partly by G o d and partly by the secondary
cause. Rather, the whole is effected by both ofthem i n different ways'

See Freddoso,'PitfaUs'.
102 Antonia LoLordo

( S C G 3.70). 4 3
O n this view, both G o d and creatures are genuine,
immediate and fuU causes of their effects. But what is it, on Gassendi's
view, for there to be both a fuU, immediate general cause ofa particukr
action and a fuU, immediate particular cause ofthe same action?
H e gives us, so far as I can teU, nothing particularly helpful to go on
here. Indeed, one can identify at least four reasons why Gassendi might
have felt that it was not his task to explicate divine concurrence. First,
Gassendi holds that we have Utde positive knowledge of the divine
nature or its operations. We can only conceive of God, and hence of
divine action, on a model with human action. 44
Such a conception
of G o d is enough to ground knowledge and worship of God, but
without the benefit of relevant revelation it cannot enable us to
explicate the divine nature. Second, to the extent that he is aware ofthe
debate between concurrentists and occasionahsts, he takes the issue to
be resolved in favor ofconcurrentism, for compeUing, ifnot particularly
weU-expHcated, reasons.Thus Gassendi would not have taken himseffto
have any more need to explain the details ofdivine concurrence than
any of the other natural philosophers, since aU accepted that creation
was active i n one way or another. Concurrence is a topic that should faU
within the boundaries ofmetaphysics, not physics, and Gassendi wrote
no book ofmetaphysics.Third, Gassendi has good rhetorical reasons to
avoid giving any particular account of concurrence, for he does not
want his project ofreviving Epicureanism too closely tied to controver­
sial theological theses. Instead, he wants it to be acceptable to as many of
the orthodox as possible.The goal is to render Epicureanism compatible
with whatever we know must be true i n rehgion and theology, and it
does not help serve that goal to make any theologicaUy or metaphysi-
caUy controversial claims unless absolutely necessary.
However, the most important ofGassendi's reasons for not providing
a detailed account ofconcurrence is that worries about how conserva­
tion and concurrence can be compatible with creaturely activity are
simply not part ofthe debate Gassendi is intervening in. Ofcourse,wor-
ries about the compatibihty of divine and creaturely activity become
central topics within a few decades, as Cartesianism evolved.The reader

4 3
S e e F r e d d o s o ' s ' N o t E n o u g h ' a n d 'PitfaUs' for a n a c c o u n t o f c o n c u r r e n t i s m .
4 4
H e r e i t is r e l e v a n t t h a t a l t h o u g h G a s s e n d i at p o i n t s u s e s t h e t r a d i t i o n a l e x a m p l e o f t h e s u n
c o n s e r v i n g as w e U as c r e a t i n g U g h t , h e h o l d s t h a t i t is n o t a c t u a U y apt, g i v e n h i s c o r p u s a d a r i a n
a c c o u n t o f h o w Ught emanates f r o m the s u n .
 TheActivity of Matter in Gassendi's Physics 103

may weU wonder what happened i n those decades to account for such
a dramatic change—whether,for instance, the spur is something within
Cartesianism itseLf (other than the common equation of conservation
with continuous creation) or some set of changes in the theological
miheu ofFrance. However, diagnosing the reasons for this shift is a topic
for another essay. M y aim here has been to explain the reasons behind
Gassendi's adoption of the doctrine o f the activity of matter and, in
so doing, to show some of the richness and diversity of seventeenth-
century debates about causation.

C O N C L U S I O N

Gassendi's view ofmatter as intrinsicaUy active (although not innately

active) is motivated primarily by a felt need to preserve genuine sec­
ondary causation. Gassendi argues that religion and morahty require the
existence ofsecondary causation, and that secondary causation can only
be preserved ifmatteris intrinsicaUy active. I n so arguing Gassendi inter­
venes i n a debate involving phüosophers ofwidely divergent theoretical
orientations: variousAristotehans, Renaissance Platonists, the Novatores
Patrizi,Telesio and CampaneUa, and Descartes. Gassendi and the various
writers he engages with more or less assume that occasionahsm is not a
live option, and hence that creaturely activity is compatible with divine
conservation and concurrence. Thus, examining the debate Gassendi
concerns himselfwith and the arguments he presents helps us to see
the great variety o f early modern philosophical projects concerning
causation. 45

University ofVirginia

4 5
I w o u l d h k e to t h a n k D a v i d G h d d e n , S t e v e n N a d l e r , a n d e s p e c i a U y D a n i e l G a r b e r f o r
c o m m e n t s o n p r e v i o u s v e r s i o n s o f t h i s essay. I w o u l d a k o H k e to t h a n k t h e H u n t i n g t o n L i b r a r y
QPasadena, C A ) for t h e i r g e n e r o u s s u p p o r t .
 4
Spinoza on Final CausaHty

JOHN CARRIERO

W h e n historians of philosophy discuss the attitudes o f early modern

philosophers toward final causahty, they often write as ifwhat is at issue
is the legitimacy ofa certain style ofexplanation—let's caU it teleologi-
cal explanation, and construe it broadly enough to take i n both expla­
nations involving conscious decisions (he went to the refrigerator in
order to get a beer) and so-cahed functional explanations (the purpose of
the heart is to help bring about the exchange ofoxygen and carbon diox-
ide).A complaint by an early modern phUosopher about final causes is
taken to be a complaint about functional or purposive explanations.
In this way, the central issue quickly becomes—too quickly, I feel—
how various early modern philosophers understand the relationship
between mechanistic explanation and teleological (or functional or pur­
posive) explanation: To what extent did early modern philosophers
exclude teleological explanation from certain domains of inquiry? To
what extent was their practice o f using functional idioms consistent
with their rejection offinal causes? (Is, for example, Descartes's claim to
have excluded final causes from physics consistent with his employment
offunctional idioms i n his physiological writings?) D i d some thinkers
reject teleological explanations completely or only in certain contexts?
D i d Spinoza, for example, reject ah teleological explanations, or only
those teleological explanations that involve attributing purposes to G o d
or nature, making room for teleological explanations that involve
human beings? A n d ifSpinoza did reject aU teleological explanations, is
this consistent with what he had to say about human behavior? 1

1
F o r D e s c a r t e s , s e e e.g. A h s o n S i m m o n s , ' S e n s i b l e E n d s : L a t e n t T e l e o l o g y i n D e s c a r t e s '
A c c o u n t o f S e n s a t i o n ' J o H m a / ofHistory ofPhilosophy 39 ( 2 0 0 i ) , 4 o ^ 7 5 , w h i c h explores the rela­
t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n ' t e l e o l o g i c a l e x p k m a t i o n ' a n d ' c a u s a l e x p l a n a t i o n ' <p. 7 4 ) . F o r S p i n o z a , s e e
e . g . J o n a t h a n B e n n e t t , A Study of Spinoza's E t h i c s @ n d i a n a p o H s : H a c k e t t , 1 9 8 4 ) , c h . 9 , esp. § 5 1 ,
a n d the subsequent hterature it inspired, E d w i n C u r l e y , ' O n Bennett's S p i n o z a : T h e Issue o f
 io6 John Carriero

I f we think of teleology as a style of explanation and mechanism as

another style of expknation, it is not obvious why early modern
philosophers should have seen a conflict between mechanistic explana­
tion and teleological explanation.Why couldn't it be the case that the
heart is a pump and that it serves the purpose of facihtating the
exchange ofoxygen and carbon dioxide? O r why couldn't one employ
mechanistic explanations at, say, the level of molecular biology, and
functional explanations at the level ofphysiology?
We can achieve a much firmer grip on early modern thought c o n ­
cerning final causahty, I c k i m , i f we take pains to recover a scholastic
Aristotehan conception ofa final cause or end.The scholasticAristotehan
conception of a final cause wiU provide us with a sharper analytical
tool than the rather blunt instrument of contemporary and somewhat
free-floating notions of a teleological or functional explanation for
understanding exacdy what it was that Descartes tried to ehminate from
the corporeal world, that Spinoza (I shaU argue) tried to ehminate from
the universe, and that Leibniz went to extraordinary lengths to readmit
into the world. 2

Perhaps the most important thing that wiU emerge is that, in

Aristotehan theory, the final cause holds a preeminent place: it is the cause
of the causahty of the other causes. fWhat this means wiU be taken up
below.)The final cause is,in particukr,fundamental to howAristotehans
understand an effkient cause or an agent: part ofwhat it is to be an agent,
for them, is to intend an end. So when early modern phUosophers advo­
cated that we concern ourselves only with efficient causes and ignore final
causes, they were in effect advocating a different conception ofan efficient
cause, one according to w h i c h efficient causes are 'bHnd' (exacdy what
'bhnd' comes to in this context wiU also be taken up below).
I n what foUows, I take Thomas's writings to be representative of
Aristotelian scholastic thinking about causation. While, obviously, his
writings were not the most immediate scholastic Aristotehan influence

Teleology' andJonathan Bermett,'Spinoza andTeleology:A R e p l y to C u r l e y ' , b o t h i n E d w i n

C u r l e y a n d P i e r r e - F r a n f o i s M o r e a u ( e d s . ) , Spinoza: bsues and Directions (Leiden: B r i U , 1990),
37—48 a n d 4 9 - 5 2 , r e s p e c t i v e l y ; a n d D o n G a r r e t t , ' T e l e o l o g y i n Spinoza and Early Modern
Rationahsm', in R o c c o J. Gennaro and Charles H u e n e m a n n ( e d s . ) , New Essays on the
Rationalists ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1999), 310-55.

2
I n c i d e n t a U y , i t is u n c l e a r t o m e t o w h a t e x t e n t o u r c o n t e m p o r a r y n o t i o n ( s ) ofteleologi-
cal p u r p o s i v e o r functional) explanations w o u l d have been recognized by early modern
thinkers.
 Spinoza on Final Causality 107

on the period, the main lines of his thought exercised considerable

influence i n the seventeenth century.What is more important, his work
has the virtue ofbeing systematic and comprehensive enough to pro­
vide us with a philosophical feel for how Aristotelians thought about
this topic. I then turn to early modern thinking about final causahty,
focusing on Spinoza (and to a lesser extent Descartes).I am particularly
interested i n what I take to be Spinoza's very ambitious attempt to pre­
sent an interpretation of the universe that is free of traditional final
causes. I n the concluding section, I consider briefly the way i n which
Leibniz sought to make room for fmal causahty, notwithstanding the
fact that efficient causes within his physics are bhnd.

A Q U I N A S A N D S C H O L A S T I C N A T U R A L P H I L O S O P H Y

Aristotehan thinking about causation, perhaps not so surprisingly, has a

lot to do with how Aristotehan natural philosophers thought about
change. So let's start there.

Change, Motion, Matter, and Form

T h e Aristotelian account of change, kinesis—in Latin translations,

motus—is the actuahzation of a being i n potency insofar as it is in
potency. Although some early modern thinkers ridiculed this character­
ization ofchange as gibberish, their contempt was more polemical than
3

substantive. According to scholastic Aristotelians, a change takes place

3
D e s c a r t e s w r i t e s i n The World o f t h e b a s i c A r i s t o t e H a n c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f m o t i o n : t h e y [the
p h i l o s o p h e r s , i . e . s c h o l a s t i c A r i s t o t e h a n s ] a d m i t t h e m s e l v e s t h a t t h e n a t u r e o f t h e i r m o t i o n is
v e r y h t d e u n d e r s t o o d . T o r e n d e r i t i n s o m e w a y i n t e n i g i b l e t h e y h a v e n o t y e t b e e n able t o
e x p l a i n i t m o r e c l e a r l y t h a n i n t h e s e t e r m s : Motus estactus entis inpotentia,prout inpotentia est. F o r
m e t h e s e w o r d s are s o o b s c u r e that I a m c o m p e U e d t o l e a v e t h e m i n L a t i n b e c a u s e I c a n n o t
i n t e r p r e t t h e m . ( A n d i n f a c t t h e s e n t e n c e ' M o t i o n is t h e a c t u a H t y o f a p o t e n t i a l b e i n g i n s o f a r as
i t is p o t e n t i a l ' is n o c l e a r e r f o r b e i n g t r a n s k t e d . ) ( A T x i . 9 4 ; C S M i . 9 4 ) . D e s c a r t e s also c o m p b i n s
a b o u t t h i s f o r m v d a i n R u l e T w e l v e o f t h e Rulesfor the Direction of theMind,KX x. 426, C S M i.
4 8 ^ . L o c k e is n o m o r e s y m p a t h e t i c to t h e A r i s t o t e h a n c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n o f m o t i o n i n h i s Essay
Concerning Human Understanding: ' W h a t m o r e e x q u i s i t e Jargon c o u l d the W i t o f M a n invent,
t h a n t h i s D e f i n i t i o n , The Act of a being in Power, asfarforth as it is in Power, w h i c h w o u l d puzzle
a n y r a t i o n a l M a n , t o w h o m i t w a s n o t a l r e a d y k n o w n b y its f a m o u s a b s u r d i t y , t o g u e s s w h a t
W o r d i t c o u l d e v e r b e s u p p o s e d t o b e t h e e x p U c a t i o n of. I f Tully, asking a D u t c h m a n w h a t
Beweeginge w a s , s h o u l d h a v e r e c e i v e d this E x p H c a t i o n i n his o w n L a n g u a g e , that it w a s Actus
entis in potentia quatenus in potentia; I ask w h e t h e r a n y o n e c a n i m a g i n e h e c o u l d thereby have
u n d e r s t o o d w h a t t h e W o r d Beweeginge s i g n i f i e d o r h a v e g u e s s e d w h a t Idea a Dutchman ordi-
n a r i l y h a d i n h i s M i n d , a n d w o u l d signify to a n o t h e r , w h e n h e u s e d t h a t s o u n d ' ( H I I . i v . 8 ) .
 io8 John Carriero

w h e n something that has a perfection or reahty only potentiaUy comes

to possess that perfection actuaUy. W h e n Socrates learns Greek, he
moves from being a potential speaker of Greek to being an actual
speaker o f G r e e k . T h e change covers the ground between the onset of
the actuahzation and its completion: before the actuahzation, the
change has yet to begin, and by the time Socrates is an actual speaker
(and so is no longer a speaker 'in potency'), the change is over. Sirmlarly,
w h e n an ohve tree germinates, something that is potentiaUy an ohve
tree—say, some mixture ofseed and earth—becomes actuaUy an ohve
tree.Hence the characterization ofchange as the actuahzation ofabeing
i n potency whUe it stiU remains to some extent i n potency.
To simphfy matters, let's continue to focus on generation, a change
that involves the coming to be (as opposed,for example,to a corruption,
that is, a ceasing to be) o f a fbrm or perfection.There are two kinds of
generation, qualitied and unquahfied. Quahfied generation occurs
w h e n an aheady existing being comes to exist i n a new way, so as to
possess a new perfection, as w h e n Socrates learns Greek. Unquahfied
generation occurs w h e n a new being comes to exist simpliciter, as w h e n
an ohve tree is generated.
Two ofthe fourAristotelian causes faU out ofthis picture ofchange.
T h e subject that undergoes the change—that moves from potentiality
to actuahty i n some respect—serves as the matter ofthe change, and so
is the change's material cause. I n the case ofa quahfied generation, the
4

material cause is the subject in w h i c h the change takes place (i.e. the
being that aheady exists simpliciter but comes to exist with a new per­
fection), usuaUy a substance. I n the case o f a n unquahfied change, the
matter is what becomes the new being—e.g. whatever it was that used
to be the earth and seed and is now the ohve tree (according to some
medieval theorists, prime matter). InAristotelian metaphysics,/orm is
the principle ofactualization or perfection (one might think ofform as
what the ohve tree has that the mixture ofearth and seed lacks). I n the
case ofa quahfied change an accidental form serves as the formal cause
4
I n m o v i n g t h u s f r o m t h e f o r m a n d m a t t e r as t e r m i n i o f c h a n g e s , t o t h e i r b e i n g con­
s t i t u e n t s o f a b e i n g , I a m f o U o w i n g A q u i n a s ' s De Prindpiis Naturae i n S t T h o m a s A q u i n a s (Sancti
T h o m a e A q u i n a t i s ) , Opera omnia:adfidemoptimarumeditionumaccuraterecognita,2$ voh. @"arma:
P. F i a c c a d o r i e , 1 8 5 2 ^ 7 3 ) , x v i . 3 4 0 . E n g h s h t r a n s l a t i o n i n St. Thomas Aquinas: Selected Writings,
t r a n s . R o b e r t P. G o o d w i n ( I n d i a n a p o h s : B o b b s - М е г г Ш , 1 9 6 5 ) , 16. I t w o u l d b e i n t e r e s t i n g t o
c o n s i d e r m o r e f u U y h o w t h e s e t w o roles o f f o r m a n d m a t t e r are r e l a t e d .
 Spinoza on Final Causality 109

of the change, and i n the case of unquaUfied generation a substantial

form does: as marking the difference between something's potentiaUy
being simpliciter and its actuaUy being simpliciter, the substantial form
is responsible for the ohve tree's being, and not merely its being i n a
certain way.
According to an Aristotelian analysis, a generation has endpoints or
termini. A generation is a movement from nonbeing (simpliciter or in
some respect) to being (simpliciter or i n some respect), that is, from
potentiality to actuahty. Other types ofAristotelian changes also have
termini.An alteration is a movement from being to being (e.g. from
being actuaUy white to being actuaUy black), and a corruption is a
movement from being to nonbeing, that is, from actuahty to nonactual-
ity.The boundaries are set by the matter and the form or perfection that
is acquired, exchanged, or lost.When Socrates has acquired the form of
Greek grammaticahty—that is, when he has become fluent i n G r e e k —
he has made a transition from potentiahty to actuahty and the learning
is over;when the substantial form ofan olive tree comes to inform the
mixture's matter—so that now an ohve tree exists—the generation of
the tree is over.This point is worth highlighting because an important
difference between a new science worldview and an Aristotehan c o n ­
ception ofnature is that, according to the former, the fundamental motive
principle—inertial motion—is unbounded: inertial motion goes on
forever unless something gets in its way.

Hylomorphic Ontology within the Natural World

For an Aristotehan, any being that comes into existence through a

process of (unquahfied) generation is composed ofwhat undergoes the
change and a principle perfecting what we began with, that is, the mat­
ter and a substantial form.The substantial form confers upon the ohve
tree a characteristic set of powers and abihties to bring about and
undergo changes; the form fixes the individual to a determinate genus
and species.The powers are organized around ends, such as the mainte­
nance ofthe individual form (nutrition) and ofthe species form (repro­
duction). I n the case of a human being, its powers and abihties are
organized around its highest end, which, according to scholastic phUo-
sophy, is to reach the visio dei.
 110 John Carriero

Although possession of a substantial form and membership in a

species is an aU-or-nothing affair, not every individual exemplifies its 5

species equaUy weU. For example, whüe dogs are ofsuch a nature that
they ought to see, some do not. Blindness i n a dog is a privation, the
absence of a perfection or reahty that it ought to have, where what it
ought to have is set i n this case by its substantial form. I n other words,
the internal constitution o f a natural being—its matter and substantial
form—brings with it certain standards by w h i c h it is measured.An i n d i ­
vidual's essence or nature internaUy orders the individual with respect to
exceUence and defect.

The Efficient Cause and the Final Cause

Aquinas, foUowing Aristotle, remarks that 'what is potency cannot

reduce itserfto act' (Opera omnia X V I , 339; Goodwin, i 4 ) . W h a t has a 6

perfection only potentiaUy—the matters—cannot give itselfthat perfec­

tion i n actuahty. Moreover, the form does not exist during the change
but only w h e n the change is complete, and so it cannot, as it were,'draw
itselfout ofpotency to act' . I n order for generation to take place, there
7

must be an efficient or moving cause, from w h i c h the change begins and

w h i c h operates until the change has been completed.
Aquinas, taking himserf to foUow Aristode, holds moreover that
nothing acts unless intending an end (omne quod agit, non agit nisi inten-
dendo aliquid). 8
I n the Summa contragentiles (SCG) 3.2,Aquinas argues
at length for what I take to be the same thesis, that aU agents act for an
end (quod omne agens agitpropterfinem), 9
and we wiU examine some ofthe
arguments he gives below. B u t let's notice i n a general w a y — a n d this I
beheve wiU prove crucial for understanding the principal difference
between schoksticAristotehan thinkers and early modern thinkers over

5
T h e r e a r e r e a s o n s t o w o n d e r w h e t h e r A r i s t o d e h i m s e r f h e l d this v i e w . S e e Generation of
^«ima/s,769 7—i3,andDavidBamie,'AristoUe'sBiologyvv^snotEssennahst\inAUanGottheh '
b <

a n d J a m e s G . L e n n o x ( e d s . ) , Philosophical Issues inAristotle's Biology (Cambridge: Cambridge

U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1987),291-312.
6
H e r e ' s a p l a c e w h e r e it matters that w e are c o n c e r n e d w i t h generations, w h i c h s e e m to
d o m i n a t e T h o m a s ' s ( a n d A r i s t o d e ' s ) t h i n k i n g a b o u t c a u s a t i o n , as o p p o s e d t o , say, c o r r u p t i o n .
T h e e x e g e t i c a l issues h e r e are c o m p l e x , b u t o n e gathers that a c o r r u p t i o n m a y h a p p e n w i t h ­
o u t a n e f f i c i e n t c a u s e a i m i n g at it. F o r e x a m p l e , as a n a n i m a l a g e s , t h e v a r i o u s e l e m e n t s o f i t s
b o d y — e a r t h , w a t e r , a i r , a n d f i r e — b y p u r s u i n g t h e i r e n d s l e a d t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f its b o d y
w i t h o u t a n y t h i n g i n t e n d i n g this result. 7
Opera omnia x v i . 3 3 9 ; G o o d w i n , p. 14.
8
Operaomm'axvi.339. 9
Operaomniav.i6o.
 Spinoza on Final Causality 111

che nature ofefficient causation—that this commitment makes obvious

sense given what Aquinas thinks an efficient cause is supposed to do,
namely, bring something from potency to act. I f one's lead thought in
positing an efficient cause is that things don'tjust, oftheir own accord,
get themselves from a condition ofpotentiaUy possessing a perfection
into a condition ofactuaUy possessing that perfection, 10
then it makes
sense to think that whatever puUs offthe trick has to be especiaUy suited
for the task. Such a cause wiU somehow have to be speciaUy equipped
for actualizing the perfection (as we shaU see, this turns out to mean,
according to Aquinas, that the perfection or some likeness thereofexists
in the agent).
Consider an analogy. If, for example, one thinks that bricks,naUs, and
lumber are not hkely to get themselves into the form ofa house, one is
not going to think that a hurricane is a much better candidate for get­
ting them into that shape. Perhaps this sort ofthing could happen, but
only extremely rarely and not 'for the most part'.Rather, one wiU hold
that we need an efficient cause that is somehow geared toward the actu­
ahzation o f a house, perhaps because that cause itseifcontains i n some
manner the perfection that it is trying to bring about (say, either in the
buüder's art or i n the architect's plans).A 'blind' efficient cause won't
help here.
Let's turn to Aquinas's development, i n SCG 3.2, ofthe thesis that
every agent acts for an end. H e begins by emphasizing the idea that
agents tend toward something definite and rest when this definite thing
is achieved (see e.g. Щ 2 and 3 ) . O n e might agree that the activity o f a
given agent is in some sense determined to some definite result, w i t h ­
out seeing why it is appropriate to think in terms ofacting for an end.
(Don't blind efficient causes—say,two coUidingpieces ofmatter—have
a set result, and so, in this sense, tend toward 'something definite'?) O n e
important idea that is lying i n the background here, 11
I think, is the
1 0
M o r e p r e c i s e l y , A r i s t o t e H a n s h o l d t h a t , w i t h o u t a c a u s e a i m i n g at t h i s r e s u l t , t h i n g s c o u l d
m o v e f r o m a c o n d i t i o n o f p o t e n t i a l t o a c t u a l p e r f e c t i o n o n l y r a r e l y a n d n o t for t h e m o s t p a r t .
1 1
T h e r e m a y b e o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s at w o r k h e r e c o n n e c t e d w i t h a n A r i s t o t e h a n c o n ­
c e p t i o n o f c h a n g e : f o r e x a m p l e , w e m a y w i s h t o d i s t i n g u i s h s h a r p l y b e t w e e n (a) a s e r i e s o f r a n -
d o m o c c u r r e n c e s , after w h i c h a h o u s e - h k e e n t i t y a p p e a r s o n t h e s c e n e a n d φ ) t h e p r o c e s s o f a
house's b e i n g built, o r the activity o f b u i l d i n g a h o u s e . I f w e do, w e m a y w a n t to d e n y that the
h u r r i c a n e b u i l t a h o u s e , a n d e v e n t h a t t h e t h i n g left i n t h e w a k e o f t h e h u r r i c a n e , as fit f o r h a b i ­
t a t i o n as i t i s , is r e a U y a h o u s e . Tt is p o s s i b l e t o s e e A q u i n a s ' s e m p h a s i s o n a n a g e n t ' s t e n d i n g
t o w a r d ' s o m e t h i n g d e f i n i t e ' as c o n n e c t e d w i t h s u c h i d e a s — a n d , i n p a r t i c u l a r , w i t h t h e v i e w
t h a t p a r t o f w h a t i t is t o b e as a m o t i o n o r a c t i v i t y (as o p p o s e d t o b e i n g a r a n d o m c o U e c t i o n o f
ii2 JohnCamero

point wejust noted, that this something definite is a form or perfection,

and that the agent has to be structured i n such a way as to be able to
bring about this form or perfection.This idea exphcidy surfaces i n an
argument thatThomas gives i n 6:

\ 6: Furthermore, for every agent the principle ofits action is either its nature
or its inteUect. Now, there is no question that inteUectual agents act for the sake
of an end, because they think ahead of time in their inteUects of the things
which they achieve through action; and their action stems from such precon-
ception.This is what it means for the inteUect to be the principle ofaction.Just
as the entire Ukeness ofthe result achieved by the actions ofan inteUigent agent
exists in the inteUect that preconceives it, so, too, does the Ukeness ofa natural
resultant pre-exist in the natural agent; and as a consequence ofthis, the action
is determined to a definite result. For fire gives rise to fire, and an ohve to an
ohve.Therefore, the agent that acts with nature as its principle isjust as much
directed to a definite end, in its action,as is the agent that acts through the intel­
lect as its principle.Therefore, every agent acts for an end. (Opera omnia v. i 6 i ;
Bourke,iii,pt. 1 , 3 6 - 3 7 ) 12

Aquinas thinks ofthe result ofthe agent's activity as achieved by some

'hkeness',so that the hkeness ofthe effect in the fire or the olive tree is
doing the same sort ofwork as the likeness ofthe effect i n the mind of
the cognitive agent.That the agent's exercise ofits agency is directed by
the hkeness is why it is appropriate to characterize the agent as acting for
an end or intending an end. I shaU refer to such agents—that is, agents
the exercise ofwhose agency is directed by some end—as end-directed
t e m p o r a r i l y c o n s e c u t i v e g o i n g s o n ) is t o b e e n d - d i r e c t e d . ( S e a n K e k e y i n s t r u c t i v e l y d e v e l o p s
these considerations i n ' T h e A r g u m e n t o f E 3 ' (unpubUshed) i n the c o n t e x t ofAristode's p h i ­
l o s o p h y . ) I a m f o c u s i n g o n a d i f f e r e n t a s p e c t o f t h e A r i s t o t e H a n a c c o u n t o f a motus, t h e i d e a t h a t
a motus is a n a c t u a h z a t i o n , a b r i n g i n g o f p e r f e c t i o n i n t o t h e w o r l d . I t is t h i s a s p e c t o f a motus
t h a t t r i g g e r s t h e n e e d f o r a n e f f i c i e n t c a u s e ; w i t h o u t t h i s a s p e c t , t h e r e is n o r e a s o n w h y a p r o c e s s
c o u l d n o t t a k e p l a c e o f i t s o w n a c c o r d , i . e . w i t h o u t a n e f f i c i e n t c a u s e a i m i n g at t h e s i t u a t i o n
t h a t i t ' t e r m i n a t e s ' , as is p e r h a p s t h e c a s e w i t h c o r r u p t i o n s . I t h i n k t h e r e is a n e s p e c i a U y s h a r p
a n d iUurninating contrast here b e t w e e n A r i s t o t e h a n t h o u g h t a n d early m o d e r n t h o u g h t about
c a u s a l t r a n s a c t i o n s w i t h i n res extensa: i n early m o d e r n t h o u g h t , e x t e r n a l efficient causes are
b r o u g h t i n t o p l a y t o e x p h i n d e v i a t i o n f r o m i n e r t i a l m o t i o n , t h a t i s , t o e x p l a i n a t h i n g ' s faüure
to r e m a i n i n t h e s a m e state. B y c o n t r a s t , i n A r i s t o t e h a n t h o u g h t , t h e e f f i c i e n t c a u s e m u s t n o t
o n l y d i s l o d g e t h e t h i n g f r o m its c u r r e n t state, b u t also b r i n g i t (aU t h e w a y ) t o its ' n e x t ' state, a
state o f a c t u a l i t y o r p e r f e c t i o n . I t s e e m s t o m e t h a t S p i n o z a ' s a c c o u n t o f t h e s e n s e i n w h i c h
h u m a n b e i n g s h a v e ' e n d s ' (see b e l o w ) m a k e s i t u n U k e l y t h a t h e w o u l d s e e a d e e p m e t a p h y s i c a l
d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n (a) a n d Q>), a n d t h a t , o n t h i s p o i n t , h e w o u l d b e , t o u s e S t r a w s o n ' s t e r m i ­
nology, a revisionist metaphysician.

1 2
I h a v e u s e d V e r n o n J . B o u r k e ' s t r a n s l a t i o n o f t h e Summa contra gentiles, iii (Notre D a m e :

U n i v e r s i t y o f N o t r e D a m e , 1975).
 Spinoza on Final Causality "3

or end-governed; I shaU refer to agents whose agency is not so directed

as bhnd.
This helps us to understand an important commitment inAristotehan
thinking about causation. T h e final cause holds a preeminent place
within the order ofcausahty.Aquinas explains that 'the end is the cause
of causes, inasmuch as it is the cause of the causahty of aU the causes'
(Opera omnia xvi. 3 4 0 ; Goodwin, 19). B y this he means that, absent the
direction ofthe end, the agent's actions would be undetermined (and so
could not make potential perfection actual), matter would not receive
form, and form would not perfect matter:

Hence, the end is the cause ofthe causaHty ofthe efficient cause, for it makes the
efficient cause be an efficient cause. Sirnilarly, it makes the matter be matter, and
form be form, since matter receives a form for some end, and form perfects mat­
ter for an end.Wherefore the end is said to be the cause ofthe causaHty ofaJl the
causes. (Opera omnia, xvi. 340; Goodwin, 19)

In his Metaphysics Commentary, Aquinas exphcates the relation

between the final cause and efficient cause i n this way:

The final cause is the cause ofthe efficient cause, not in the sense that it makes
it be, but inasmuch as it is the reason for the causality ofthe efficient cause. For
an efficient cause is a cause inasmuch as it acts, and it acts only because ofthe
final cause. Hence the efficient cause derives its causality from the final cause,
(n. 775; Opera omnia xx. 584;Rowan, 3 0 8 ) 1 3

Ifagents intend ends, then one might think that they are subject to
various forms ofevaluation depending on how weU they achieve their
ends.Aquinas takes it to be obvious that they are subject to such evalu­
ation. Moreover, since he holds the converse thesis—i.e. that they would
not be subject to such evaluation unless they intended ends—he even
argues from agents' being subject to evaluation to their intending ends:

7:Again, there is no fault (peccatum) to be found, except in the case oftbings that
are for the sake ofan end.A fault is never attributed to an agent, ifthe failure is
related to something that is not the agent's end.Thus, the fault offaiHng to heal
is imputed to the physician, but not to the builder or the grammarian.We do
find fault with things done according to art, for instance, when the grammarian
does not speak correcdy, and also in things done according to nature, as is evi­
dent in the case ofthe birth ofmonsters.Therefore, it isjust as true ofthe agent
1 3
E n g h s h t r a n s k t i o n , St. ThomasAquinas: Commentary on the Metaphysics qfAristotle, trans.
J o h n P. R o w a n ( C h i c a g o : H e n r y R e g n e r y C o . , 1 9 6 1 ) .
ii4 John Carriero

that acts in accord with nature as ofthe agent who acts in accord with art and as
a result ofprevious pkrming that action is for the sake ofan end. (Opera omnia
v. i6i;Bourke,iii,pt. 1,37)

We shaU canvass below Spinoza's reaction to this way ofthinking about

natural agents.
O n e might object that the idea ofbeing governed by an end makes
sense only in the case ofa cognitive agent, an agent w h o knows where
she is headed, so to speak.This is an important issue that we'U want to
consider more fuUy at the end ofthis section, but we should note for
now that, as the argument i n f 6 indicates,Aquinas sees the conscious
planning i n view of an end as just one example of a certain general
structure, where the agency of an efficient cause is directed by some
hkeness that an agent possesses of a perfection to be achieved. I n De
Principiis Naturae, he argues for the coherence ofthe thesis that noncog-
nitive beings intend ends thus:

And although every agent, be it natural or voluntary, intends an end, we should

reahze nevertheless that it does not foUow that every agent knows or deliber­
ates about the end. Knowing the end is necessary for those whose actions are
not determined, but for whom opposed goals are possible (sed se habent ad
opposita), as is the case for voluntary agents.These, therefore, must know the
end, through which knowledge they determine their actions. However, the
actions ofnatural agents are determined; hence, there is no necessity for their
choosing the means to their end. Avicenna offers the example of the cithara
player,who need not dehberate as to which notes form a chord by striking each
individuaUy, since they are predetermined. If the player did deliberate, there
would be a delay between the notes, producing an arpeggio. Furthermore,
dehberation is especiaUy apparent in the voluntary agent, as opposed to the
natural agent. So an even stronger argument can be made ifone sees that ifa
voluntary agent (whose deHberation is especiaUy evident) does not always
deUberate, then, certainly, neither does the natural agent.Therefore, it is possi­
ble for a natural agent to intend an end without dehberating about it.To intend
in this way is nothing more than to have a natural inclination toward some­
thing (habere naturalem indinationem ad aiiquid). (Opera omnia xvi. 339—40;
Goodwin, 15—16)

Ifone reflects on nondehberative aspects ofhuman agency, one wiU see,

Thomas thinks, that cognition is not essential to something's mtending
an end.What is essential for h i m seems to be what we noticed above (in
S C G 2.6),that the end shape or determine the agent's activity.
 Spinoza on Final Causality " 5

Appetite, Natural Inclination, and the Good

There is in Thomas's thought a basic connection between the ideas of

the end and the good that r u n s through the idea ofappetite or natural
inchnation. Thomas takes his basic characterization o f good f r o m the
Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristode says that good is what aU desire
(i094 i). a 1 4
T h e Latin used for this was bonum est quod omni appetunt.
Appeto, a cognate of appetite, was used to render the Greek ephiemi.
Because there is no verb i n Enghsh that matches appetere and we'U want
to preserve its connection to appetite (as weU as reserve 'desire' for cog­
nitive beings), I wiU translate appetere somewhat awkwardly as 'to have an
appetite for', flagging exceptions.Aquinas himselfexplains the meaning
of the word appetere in this way: 'to have an appetite for (appetere) is
nothing other than to seek after something (aliquid petere), stretching
(tendere), as it were, toward something ordered to o n e s e i f . ' Thus good is 15

what aU things have an appetite for (appetunt).

Goodness is a transcendental property, according to Aquinas, c o e x ­
tensive w i t h being. G o o d and being differ only i n account, in logos or
rafio.What goodness brings into view that being does not, is a relation to
appetency (appetibilis): to consider something as good is to consider it as
the object ofsome appetite.
What then is an appetite forAquinas? (The concept ofappetite wiU pmve
important, because Spinoza, as we shaU see, connects conatas and appetite.)
Taken in the most general way, an appetite is simply a natural inchnation.
Aqumasmakesthisclearin Summa theologiae (ST) I,Q. 8o,A. i :

^ff]e must observe that some inchnation foUows every f o r m : for example, fire,
by its f o r m , is incHned to rise, and to generate its hke. Now, the f o r m is found to
have a m o r e perfect existence in those things which participate [in] knowledge
(quae cognitionem participant) than in those which lack knowledge. For in those
which lack knowledge, the f o r m is found to determine each thing only to its
being—that is, to its nature.Therefore this natural f o r m is foUowed by a natural
inclination, which is caUed natural appetite. (Opera omnia i. 3 1 8 ) 16

1 4
A r i s t o d e s e e m s to h a v e i n t e n d e d t h i s f o r m u l a t i o n i n a m o r e c i r c u m s c r i b e d w a y , r e s t r i c t -
i n g it to art, i n q u i r y , a c t i o n , a n d d e c i s i o n , t h a n it w a s u n d e r s t o o d b y A q u i n a s .
1 5
Deveritate,Q.22,A. 1,Operaomniaix.315;MMS,pp.36-7.TransktionsofDeveritatebsve
b e e n t a k e n f r o m R o b e r t W . M u U i g a n , S.J. J a m e s V . M c G l y n n , S . J . , a n d R o b e r t W . S c h m i d t , S . J . ,
t r a n s . , Truth ( C h i c a g o : H e n r y R e g n e r y C o . , 1952—4), h e n c e f o r t h M M S .
1 6
T r a n s k t i o n s f r o m A q u i n a s ' s Summa theologiae are t a k e n f r o m F a t h e r s o f the English
D o m i n i c a n P r o v i n c e , t r a n s . , Summa theologica, 4 pts. i n 5 vols, fwestminster, M D : C h r i s t i a n
C l a s s i c s , 1 9 8 r ; f i r s t p u b H s h e d 1911).
Il6 John Carrie.ro

W e might think o f these natural inchnations or appetites as constitut­

ing an agent's tendency to move or act: the fire's tendency to rise, the
ohve tree's tendency to generate an olive tree. Moreover, we saw above
that natural inchnations or appetites are end-directed: Aquinas writes,
in Deprinapiis naturae, concerning the end-directedness ofnoncognitive
beings: 'To intend i n this way is nothing more than to have a natural
inclination toward something (habere naturalem inclinationem ad aliquid).'
FinaUy, the defining characteristic ofgood is that w h i c h aU things have
appetite for (appetunt). Putting these ideas together i n SCG 3.3 ,Aquinas
moves from the thesis that every agent acts for an end to the thesis that
every agent acts for a good (omne agens agitpropter bonum).

T| 3: Again, the end is that in which the appetitive incHnation of an agent or

mover, and ofthe thing moved, finds its rest. Now, it is of the nature ofthe good
(ratione boni) that it provides a terminus for appetite, since 'the good is that for
which aU have an appetite (appetunt).' Therefore, every action and motion are for
thesakeofagood (propterbonum). (Gtyeraomm'av.i6i;*Bourke,iii,pt. 1 , 3 8 ) 17

Cognitivity and End Seeking: Internal (natural)

Motion versus External (violent) Motion

M u c h ofThomas's thinking about final causahty is built around the the­

sis that w h e n an agent exercises its power what the agent is doing is actu-
ahzing perfection, and this cannot happen bhndly. Something i n the
agent must guide the exercise ofits power, ifthe agent is to be able to
move something from being merely potentiaUy perfect i n some respect
to being actuaUy perfect i n that respect. I f w e develop final causahty i n
this way, it seems plausible enough to think o f noncognitive agents as
exercising their agency through final causes, that is, to think ofthem as
seeking (as having appetites for) ends.
Yet, the vocabulary ofseeking, ofhaving an appetite for (appetere), and
intending (intendere) has cognitive overtones, and w h e n defending his
view that aU natural agents intend ends and have appetites,Thomas c o n ­
siders repeatedly the objection that only cognitive (or dehberative
beings) do so. I n some contexts, as we have seen, he simply argues that
there is no conceptual obstacle to an end's being intended without
reflection or consciousness—this was what the example o f the cithara

I n t h e cases w h e r e a n E n g k s h s o u r c e has a n '*', I have m o d i f i e d t h e t r a n s k t i o n .

 Spinoza on Final Causality 117

p l a y e r was s u p p o s e d to help s h o w — b u t sometimes h e adds a n o t h e r

layer o f t h e o r y , w h i c h I w a n t t o c o n s i d e r n o w . ( I n d e s c r i b i n g t h i s as
a n o t h e r layer o f t h e o r y , I d o n o t m e a n t o suggest t h a t A q u i n a s himseH"
t h o u g h t t h a t t h e s e t w o sets o f i d e a s s h o u l d b e s e p a r a t e d , b u t o n l y t h a t t h e
f u h e r s t o r y w e are a b o u t t o c o n s i d e r c a n b e u s e f u U y d i s t i n g u i s h e d f o r
o u r p u r p o s e s f r o m t h e c o n s t e l l a t i o n o f i d e a s w e h a v e e x a m i n e d t h u s far.)
A c c o r d i n g t o T h o m a s , n o n c o g n i t i v e beings i n t e n d t h e i r ends t h r o u g h
t h e i r r e h r t i o n t o a c o g n i t i v e b e i n g w h o has set t h e e n d f o r t h e m ( f o r n a t ­
u r a l b e i n g s , t h e r e l e v a n t e n d - s e t t i n g c o g n i t i v e b e i n g is G o d ) . So, f o r
example, i n his Physics commentary, here's h o w T h o m a s explains
A r i s t o d e ' s thesis t h a t m a t t e r seeks [appetit] form: 1 8

For w e m u s t n o t e that e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h seeks (appetit) s o m e t h i n g either k n o w s

that w h i c h i t seeks and orders i t s e i f t o i t , o r else i t tends t o w a r d i t b y t h e o r d i n a ­
t i o n a n d d i r e c t i o n o f s o m e o n e w h o k n o w s , as t h e a r r o w tends t o w a r d a deter­
m i n a t e m a r k b y t h e d i r e c t i o n a n d o r d i n a t i o n o f t h e archer.Therefore, natural
appetite is n o t h i n g b u t t h e o r d i n a t i o n o f t h i n g s t o t h e i r e n d i n accordance w i t h
t h e i r p r o p e r natures. H o w e v e r a b e i n g i n act is n o t o n l y ordered t o its e n d b y an
active power, b u t also b y its m a t t e r insofar as i t is potency. F o r f o r m is the e n d o f
the matter.Therefore f o r m a t t e r t o seek f o r m is n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n m a t t e r b e i n g
ordered t o f o r m as p o t e n c y t o a c t . 19
( n . 138; Opera omnia x v i i i . 2 3 9 ; B S T 65)

T h i s passage is a b o u t n a t u r a l i n c h n a t i o n o r n a t u r a l a p p e t i t e i n g e n ­
e r a l , a n d so i t c o v e r s b o t h t h e n a t u r a l p o w e r s w i t h w h i c h w e h a v e b e e n
c o n c e r n e d a n d the i n c h n a t i o n o f m a t t e r t o receive f o r m . F o r A q u i n a s , i t
is a s o r t o f b a c k g r o u n d c o n d i t i o n o f n a t u r a l t h i n g s s e e k i n g (appetere)
s o m e t h i n g t h a t t h e y h a v e b e e n o r d e r e d so as t o d o b y a n i n t e i h g e n t
b e i n g . W h i l e t h i s c o n d i t i o n is p a r t o f T h o m a s ' s thinking about final
causahty, as I i n d i c a t e d a b o v e , I b e l i e v e t h a t t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t n a t u r a l
beings act f o r a n e n d c o u l d b e c o h e r e n t i y d e v e l o p e d i n d e p e n d e n d y of
t h i s c o n d i t i o n . M y o w n sense is t h a t A r i s t o d e h i r n s e h , f o r e x a m p l e , m a y
7

have h e l d t h a t ( n o n c o g n i t i v e ) n a t u r a l beings i n t e n d e n d s , w i t h o u t m a i n ­
t a i n i n g t h a t t h e i r d o i n g so d e p e n d s o n t h o s e b e i n g s h a v i n g t h e i r ends set
for t h e m b y some inteUigent b e i n g . ( O n e o f t h e things that m a y u l t i m a t e l y

18
T h e Greek for 'seeks' in the text thatThomas is commenting upon (Physics 192"18) comes
from ephiemi and oregd; the latter has both the sense ofbeing incUned toward and having an
appetite for.
1 9
Enghsh translation taken from R i c h a r d J . BlackweU, R i c h a r d J. Spath, and W. E d m u n d
Thirkel, St. ThomasAquinas: Commentary ofAristotk's Physics ßMew Haven: Yale University Press,
1963); abbreviatedas'BST'.
n 8 John Carriero

b e a t issue h e r e , I t h i n k , is h o w f a r o n e p u s h e s b a c k t h e r e q u e s t f o r a n
a c c o u n t o f h o w p e r f e c t i o n gets i n t o t h e u n i v e r s e : Is o n e c o n t e n t t o s t o p
at t h e f a c t t h a t t h e p e r f e c t i o n a l r e a d y exists i n t h e a g e n t i n s o m e f o r m o r
o t h e r , o r d o e s o n e f e e l t h e n e e d t o ask n o w , h o w d i d p e r f e c t i o n , p e r h a p s
i n t h e f o r m o f s o m e h k e n e s s , g e t i n t o t h e agent?)
B e t h a t as i t m a y , t h e r e is a w a y i n w h i c h , i f w e are n o t c a r e f u l ,
Aquinas's r e m a r k s a b o u t c o g n i t i v e b e i n g s s e t t i n g ends f o r n o n c o g n i t i v e
b e i n g s m a y m a k e i t t o o easy f o r a n o n c o g n i t i v e b e i n g t o a c q u i r e a n e n d ,
m a y a U o w a n o n c o g n i t i v e b e i n g t o a c q u i r e a n e n d o n t h e c h e a p , as i t
w e r e . F o r e x a m p l e , w h i l e o n e m i g h t a g r e e t h a t t h e r e is a sense i n w h i c h
a n a r r o w has t h e e n d o f h i t t i n g t h e t a r g e t , o r t h e c h a i r seeks t o h o l d m e
u p ( o r has a n a p p e t i t e f o r h o l d i n g m e u p ) — a f t e r aU, that's w h a t I , o r t h e
p e o p l e at I K E A , d e s i g n e d i t t o d o — t h i s d o e s n o t s e e m t o b e t h e s o r t o f
t h i n g t h a t w e w e r e taUcing a b o u t w h e n w e taUced a b o u t t h e r o c k ' s s e e k ­
i n g its n a t u r a l p l a c e o r t h e o l i v e tree's a p p e t i t e t o p r o d u c e a n o t h e r o l i v e
t r e e . T h e a r r o w is n o t e x e r c i s i n g its c a u s a h t y i n o r d e r t o s t r i k e t h e t a r g e t ;
t h e v a r i o u s p i e c e s o f t h e c h a i r are n o t e x e r c i s i n g their c a u s a l i t y i n o r d e r
t o h o l d m e u p : r a t h e r , t h i n g s h a v e b e e n a r r a n g e d b y c o g n i t i v e b e i n g s so
t h a t i f t h e a r r o w exercises its c a u s a h t y (stays i n t a c t , faUs t o w a r d t h e
g r o u n d ) , t h e t a r g e t w i U b e s t r u c k , o r so t h a t i f t h e v a r i o u s p i e c e s o f t h e
c h a i r d o w h a t e v e r i t is t h e y d o (e.g. resist d i s s o l u t i o n ) , I w i U b e h e l d u p .
H o w s h o u l d w e understand, t h e n , t h e difference b e t w e e n an arrow's
h a v i n g t h e e n d o f h i t t i n g t h e t a r g e t , a n d a h e a v y t h i n g ' s s e e k i n g its n a t ­
u r a l place? A q u i n a s d r a w s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i n t e r m s o f w h a t a c t i v i t i e s o f a
t h i n g f o U o w f r o m its n a t u r e a n d w h a t a c t i v i t i e s are e x t e r n a l o r c o n ­
s t r a i n e d , t h a t is, i n A r i s t o t e h a n t e r m i n o l o g y , ' v i o l e n t ' :

T h e n a t u r a l necessity i n h e r e n t i n those beings w h i c h are d e t e r m i n e d t o a par­

ticular t h i n g , is a k i n d o f i m p r e s s i o n f r o m G o d , d i r e c t i n g t h e m t o t h e i r e n d ; as
the necessity w h e r e b y an a r r o w is m o v e d so as t o f l y towards a certain p o i n t is
an impression from the archer, a n d n o t from the arrow. B u t there is a difference,
i n a s m u c h as that w h i c h creatures receive f r o m G o d is t h e i r nature, w h i l e t h a t
w h i c h n a t u r a l things receive f r o m m a n i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e i r nature relates t o v i o -
lence.Wherefore, as t h e v i o l e n t necessity i n the m o v e m e n t o f t h e a r r o w shows
the a c t i o n o f t h e archer, so the n a t u r a l necessity o f t h i n g s shows the g o v e r n m e n t
o f D i v i n e Providence. (*ST I , Q . 103 , A . 1, ad 3; Opera omnia i . 595)

So w h e r e a s t h e m o t i o n o f t h e h e a v y t h i n g is n a t u r a l , t h e i n s t r u m e n t a l
m o t i o n o f a n a r t i f a c t is v i o l e n t .
 Spinoza on Final Causality 119

A q u i n a s e l a b o r a t e s t h i s c o n t r a s t i n De veritate Q. 2 2 , A . 1, ' D o A U
T h i n g s T e n d t o G o o d ? ' H e b e g i n s his d e f e n s e o f a n a f f i r m a t i v e a n s w e r
b y a d d u c i n g c o n s i d e r a t i o n s s i m i l a r t o t h o s e w e h a v e a h e a d y seen. I n p a r ­
ticular, he appeab to Aristotie's criticism o f a n c i e n t phUosophers, w h o
' t a u g h t t h a t w e U - s u i t e d effects i n n a t u r e c o m e a b o u t f r o m n e c e s s i t y o f
t h e i r p r i o r causes (necessitatepraecedentium causarum),thou$i the natural
causes t h e m s e l v e s h a v e n o t b e e n d i s p o s e d i n t h a t p a r t i c u k r w a y w i t h a
v i e w t o t h e s u i t a b i h t y o f effects.' A c c o r d i n g t o A r i s t o d e , 'unless s u c h
s u i t a b i h t i e s a n d aptnesses w e r e i n s o m e sense i n t e n d e d , t h e y would
c o m e a b o u t b y c h a n c e a n d so w o u l d n o t h a p p e n m o s t o f t h e t i m e b u t
o n l y rarely, H k e o t h e r t h i n g s w h i c h w e say h a p p e n b y c h a n c e . ' T h o m a s
proceeds f r o m there t o n o t e that a t h i n g ' m a y be o r d a i n e d o r directed t o
s o m e t h i n g else as a n e n d ' i n t w o w a y s , first, ' b y itself, as a m a n directs
h i m s e H f t o t h e p l a c e w h e r e h e is g o i n g ' a n d , s e c o n d , ' b y s o m e t h i n g else, as
a n a r r o w is a i m e d at a d e f i n i t e s p o t b y t h e archer.' T h e seif-direction
r e q u i r e s k n o w l e d g e ; b e i n g d i r e c t e d b y a n o t h e r d o e s n o t . W i t h i n t h e dass
o f t h o s e b e i n g s t h a t are d i r e c t e d b y a n o t h e r , h e d r a w s a f u r t h e r d i s t i n c t i o n :

(1) Sometimes w h a t is directed t o an e n d is m e r e l y d r i v e n o r m o v e d b y the one

d i r e c t i n g i t w i t h o u t a c q u i r i n g from the director any f o r m b y w h i c h such a
d i r e c t i o n o r i n c l i n a t i o n belongs t o i t . Such an i n c h n a t i o n , Hke that b y w h i c h the
a r r o w is a i m e d b y the archer at a definite target, is v i o l e n t . (2) Sometimes w h a t
is directed o r incHned to an e n d acquires from the d i r e c t o r o r m o v e r some form
by w h i c h such an i n c H n a t i o n belongs t o i t . I n that case the i n c H n a t i o n w i U be
natural, h a v i n g a natural p r i n c i p l e . T h u s H e w h o gave heaviness t o the stone
incHned i t t o be b o r n e d o w n w a r d naturaUy. I n this w a y the one w h o begets
t h e m is the m o v e r i n regard t o heavy and Hght things, according t o the
Philosopher.
I t is after this fashion that aU natural things are incHned t o w h a t is suitable f o r
t h e m , h a v i n g w i t h i n themselves some p r i n c i p l e o f t h e i r i n c H n a t i o n i n v i r t u e o f
w h i c h that i n c H n a t i o n is natural, so that i n a way t h e y go themselves and are n o t
merely l e d t o t h e i r due ends.Things m o v e d b y v i o l e n c e are o n l y led, because
they c o n t r i b u t e n o t h i n g t o the mover. B u t natural things go t o t h e i r ends inas­
m u c h as they cooperate w i t h the one i n c H n i n g a n d d i r e c t i n g t h e m t h r o u g h a
principle implanted i n them. (De veritate, Q . 22,A. 1; Opera omnia i x . 315; M M S
3:36)

S o m e o f t h e t h i n g s t h a t acquire t h e i r ends f r o m a n o t h e r — t h e ones

w h o s e m o t i o n is v i o l e n t — a r e ' o n l y l e d ' . T h e y h a v e n o i n t e r n a l f o r m o r
natural impression directing their activity toward the inherited end.
120 John Carriero

O t h e r beings, natural things exercising their activity t h r o u g h their o w n

p r i n c i p l e s , ' g o t h e m s e l v e s ' t h r o u g h a ' f o r m ' (as w e s a w a b o v e , A q u i n a s
says i n ST I , Q . 8 o , A . i , t h a t ' s o m e i n c h n a t i o n f o h o w s e v e r y f o r m ' ) o r a
natural ' i m p r e s s i o n ' . W e m i g h t t e r m end-chrection o f t h e second sort
internal o r natural e n d - d i r e c t i o n , s i n c e t h e e n d is v i e w e d as p a r t o f t h e
agent's n a t u r a l m a k e - u p , i n t e r n a l t o i t ; a n d w e m i g h t caU t h e o t h e r s o r t
ofend-direction external o r violent e n d - d i r e c t i o n , s i n c e t h e e n d is e x t e r ­
n a l t o t h e agent's n a t u r e a n d , as s u c h , g u i d e s i t v i o l e n d y .
L e t ' s n o t e , finaUy, t h a t w h a t m i g h t c o u n t as a f a U u r e f r o m t h e i n t e r n a l
p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e a g e n t m i g h t c o u n t as a success f r o m t h e p o i n t o f
v i e w o f a n e x t e r n a l a g e n t , u s i n g i t as a n i n s t r u m e n t . F o r e x a m p l e , i n De
veritate, Q . 5 , A . 4 , A q u i n a s n o t e s t h a t t h e r e is n o p o w e r o r d a i n e d t o t h e
production o f 'natural monstrosities' even i f the generation o f such
m o n s t r o s i t i e s is ' d i r e c t e d b y G o d t o s o m e u s e f u l p u r p o s e ' ; r a t h e r , t h e
m o n s t r o s i t i e s r e s u l t from t h e f a i l u r e o f a n a t u r a l a g e n t t o r e a c h i t s e n d
(see also SCG 3.2.70). Similarly, A q u i n a s endorses t h e a c c o u n t o f c h a n c e
a n d f o r t u n e p r e s e n t e d b y A r i s t o d e i n B o o k I I o f t h e Physics, according
t o w h i c h a n o u t c o m e t h a t o c c u r s o u t s i d e t h e i n t e n t i o n o f a n a g e n t is
o w e d t o c h a n c e ( i n t h e case o f a n a t u r a l a g e n t ) o r f o r t u n e ( i n t h e case o f
a voluntary agent). 2 0

SPINOZA

Although s o m e early m o d e r n thinkers d o h a v e t h i n g s t o say a b o u t

external e n d - d i r e c t i o n — S p i n o z a complains i n t h e A p p e n d i x t o Part 1
o f t h e Ethics, f o r example, a b o u t o u r t e n d e n c y t o read d i v i n e p u r p o s e
i n t o n a t u r a l c a l a m i t i e s — I d o n o t t h i n k t h a t t h e issues r a i s e d b y t h i s t o p i c

2 0
T h a t fact thatAquinas traces both the internal end-directedness ofnatural beings and
external end-directedness offailed natural causation to G o d , as both the author ofthe heavy
thing's nature and the author ofthe p k n for the universe, means that, for h i m , there are two
very different species of'divine teleology'.This makes it hard to determine w h e n early m o d ­
ern figures c o m p b i n about divine teleology—e.g. w h e n Descartes says that we cannot know
God's ends and 'for this reason alone I consider the customary search for final causes to be
totaUyuseless i n p h y s i c s ' , o r w h e n S p i n o z a s u g g e s t s i n t h e A p p e n d i x t o Part 1 ofthe Ethicsthat
we should not attribute ends to G o d at aU—whether they had i n view end-directedness ofnat­
ural beings or speculation concerning God's plans or both, ( m these cases, Descartes's qualifi­
cation ' i n physics' suggests to me that he primarily has natural beings i n mind, and the range o f
examples that Spinoza presents, encompassing natural disasters as weU as the organization o f
Hving things,would seem to indicate he has both in view.)
 Spinoza on Final Causality 121

r u n as d e e p as q u e s t i o n s r a i s e d b y i n t e r n a l e n d - d i r e c t i o n . Consider
t h e thesis t h a t e v e r y a g e n t acts f o r a n e n d . I t c o n c e r n s i n t e r n a l e n d -
d i r e c t i o n . E v e r y a g e n t , a c c o r d i n g t o T h o m a s , i s s t r u c t u r e d so as t o r e a h z e
s o m e p e r f e c t i o n t h a t i t seeks/has a n a p p e t i t e f o r , regardless o f w h a t
o t h e r a g e n t s are s e e k i n g t o d o w i t h i t . T h e thesis faUs o u t o f a c e r t a i n
c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t a n e f f i c i e n t cause is, a n d c o n n e c t s u p w i t h a c o n -
s t e h a t i o n o f i d e a s , a b o u t w h a t a c h a n g e (motus) is, a b o u t w h y w e need
e f f i c i e n t causes ( t o a c t u a h z e p e r f e c t i o n ) , a n d a b o u t h o w t h e y m u s t b e
s t r u c t u r e d ( g u i d e d b y ends) i f t h e y are t o p l a y t h e r o l e assigned t o t h e m .
T o g e t h e r , t h e s e ideas h e l p t o d e f i n e t h e basic causal a r c h i t e c t u r e o f t h e
universe.
E a c h o f t h e s e p o i n t s c o m e s u n d e r pressure f r o m t h e n e w s c i e n c e .
Early m o d e r n philosophers reject t h e A r i s t o t e h a n characterization o f a
c h a n g e (motus) as t h e a c t u a h z a t i o n o f s o m e t h i n g i n p o t e n c y i n s o f a r as i t
is i n p o t e n c y . C a u s a l t r a n s a c t i o n s i n t h e c o r p o r e a l w o r l d , as t h e y u n d e r ­
s t a n d i t , d o n o t h a v e n a t u r a l t e r m i n i . I n e r t i a l m o t i o n goes o n f o r e v e r ;
m o t i v e a c t i v i t y i n t h e u n i v e r s e is c o n s e r v e d r a t h e r t h a n e n d i n g as t h e
r e l e v a n t a g e n t s 'rest' u p o n t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e i r w o r k . H e n c e , e a r l y
m o d e r n t h i n k i n g a b o u t w h y w e n e e d c o r p o r e a l e f f i c i e n t causes ( w i t h i n
t h e c o r p o r e a l w o r l d ) a n d w h a t t h e y are s u p p o s e d t o d o differs f r o m
A r i s t o t e h a n t h i n k i n g . T h e y are n o w u n d e r s t o o d t o b e b h n d , as o p p o s e d
t o e n d - g u i d e d . T h e v e r y c o n c e p t i o n o f w h a t a c o r p o r e a l e f f i c i e n t is has
b e e n a l t e r e d at its r o o t .
O n e o f t h e m o r e i m p r e s s i v e — t h o u g h , i t seems t o m e , p e r h a p s n o t y e t
s u f f i c i e n t l y a p p r e c i a t e d — a s p e c t s o f S p i n o z a ' s p h i l o s o p h y is h i s a t t e m p t
t o r e t h i n k systematicaUy t h e n a t u r e o f a g e n c y a n d a c t i v i t y i n general i n
v i e w o f the n e w c o n c e p t i o n o f activity a n d causation that one finds
w i t h i n t h e c o r p o r e a l w o r l d . H e presents a t h e o r y a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h
t h e s o r t o f c a u s a h t y t h e n e w scientists find i n t h e c o r p o r e a l o r d e r is
f o u n d t h r o u g h o u t aU o f n a t u r e . T h i s , I b e l i e v e , is t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e ofhis
s t r i k i n g a n n o u n c e m e n t i n t h e Preface o f Part 3 that whereas others
' s e e m t o c o n c e i v e m a n i n n a t u r e as a d o m i n i o n w i t h i n a d o m i n i o n ' a n d
'believe that m a n disturbs rather t h a n foUows, t h e o r d e r o f n a t u r e , that
h e has a b s o l u t e p o w e r o v e r h i s a c t i o n s , a n d t h a t h e is d e t e r m i n e d o n l y
b y h i m s e r f ' , h e , S p i n o z a , is g o i n g t o ' t r e a t m e n ' s v i c e s a n d a b s u r d i t i e s i n
G e o m e t r i c a I style'because:

N o t h i n g happens i n nature w h i c h can be a t t r i b u t e d t o any defect i n i t , f o r

nature is ahvays the same, and its v i r t u e and p o w e r o f a c t i n g are everywhere one
122 John Carriero

and the same, i.e. the laws a n d rules o f nature, according t o w h i c h aU things
happen, and change from one f o r m t o another, are always and everywhere the
same. (EIIIpref.;Gii.138;Ci.492)

Plainly, w h a t S p i n o z a is s a y i n g h e r e g o e s b e y o n d the thought that

h u m a n b e i n g s c a n n o t b e free i n a d e t e r m i n i s t i c u n i v e r s e ; h e is c l a i m i n g
that activity o r agency ('the v i r t u e and p o w e r o f a c t i n g ' ) are'everywhere
o n e a n d the same'.
I t is n o t o b v i o u s , o f c o u r s e , w h a t i t means t o c l a i m t h a t a c t i v i t y o r
a g e n c y is e v e r y w h e r e o n e a n d t h e same. I f i n d i t h e l p f u l t o a p p r o a c h t h i s
q u e s t i o n i n t w o steps. F i r s t , w e n e e d a w o r k i n g u n d e r s t a n d i n g ofhow
S p i n o z a u n d e r s t o o d t h e basic s t r u c t u r e o f c o r p o r e a l systems. S e c o n d ,
w e w ü l w a n t to understand h o w Spinoza understands m o t i v a t i o n and
activity i n general and h u m a n activity i n particular.

From a Hylomorphic Ontology to Pattern-like Beings

A s w e s a w a b o v e , t h e s c h o l a s t i c v i e w o f c h a n g e as t h e a c t u a h z a t i o n of
p o t e n t i a l p e r f e c t i o n leads t o a n o n t o l o g y w h e r e g e n e r a t e d b e i n g s are a
composite o f a principle ofactuahzation (form) and potentiahty (mat­
t e r ) . H o w are c o r p o r e a l i n d i v i d u a l s ftjodies) structured, according to
S p i n o z a ? H i s g e n e r a l p i c t u r e o f t h e p h y s i c a l o r d e r is d e e p l y i n d e b t e d t o
Descartes, 21
so let's b e g i n there. W h e n , i n the Sixth Meditation,
D e s c a r t e s d e s c r i b e s t h e c l o c k as s o m e t h i n g ' c o n s t r u c t e d w i t h w h e e l s
a n d w e i g h t s ' ( A T V I I , 84; C S M I , 58), h e is a s k i n g us t o c o n s i d e r t h e
c l o c k s i m p l y as a c o r p o r e a l s t r u c t u r e , as a c o U e c t i o n o f v a r i o u s p i e c e s o f
m a t t e r o f d i f f e r e n t sizes a n d s h a p e s , j u x t a p o s e d i n c e r t a i n w a y s ( i n p a r ­
t i c u l a r , h e is a s k i n g us t o abstract f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t t h i s s y s t e m o f m a t t e r
h a p p e n e d t o o r i g i n a t e i n a c e r t a i n w a y , so t h a t i t is a n a r t i f a c t ) . D e s c a r t e s
m a i n t a i n s f u r t h e r t h a t t h e e x t e n d e d w o r l d is a p l e n u m o f a u n i f o r m
e x t e n s i o n i n m o t i o n , so t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e s a m o n g t h e v a r i o u s m a t e r i ­
als f o u n d i n t h e c l o c k d e p e n d o n t h e i n t e r n a l p a t t e r n s o f m o t i o n associ­
a t e d w i t h i r o n , t i n , a n d so f o r t h . So, f o r D e s c a r t e s , a c l o c k is a v e r y
c o m p l e x pattern o f m o t i o n r u n n i n g t h r o u g h extension.

2 1
A U o w me to put to the side what differences between S p i n 0 2 a and Descartes result from
the fact that Spinoza regards bodies as modes ofre$ «eimse.WhUe not irrelevant to the present
discussion, to get into this controversial topic would take us very far afield. F o r the present dis­
cussion, TU use the term 'body' in a way that is neutral between whether a body is a mode or a
substance (or a part o f a substance). I discuss the difference between Spinoza's and Descartes's
positions o n this question in ' M o n i s m i n Spinoza', in OUi Koistinen a n d J o h n Biro (eds.),
Spinoza:MetaphysicaIThemes (Oxford: Oxford University P r e s s , 2 0 0 2 ) , 3 8 - 5 9 , e s p . p p . 4 9 - 5 4 .
 Spinoza on Final Causality 123

S p i n o z a w o r k s w i t h a sirniIar c o n c e p t i o n o f a c o r p o r e a l i n d i v i d u a l . I n
t h e v e r y s c h e m a t i c a c c o u n t o f b o d y t h a t h e p r o v i d e s after E I I P 1 3 , h e
w r i t e s , ' I f t h e parts c o m p o s i n g an I n d i v i d u a l b e c o m e greater o r less,but
i n s u c h a p r o p o r t i o n t h a t t h e y a h k e e p t h e s a m e r a t i o o f m o t i o n a n d rest
t o e a c h o t h e r as b e f o r e , t h e n t h e I n d i v i d u a l w i U h k e w i s e r e t a i n its n a t u r e , as
b e f o r e , w i t h o u t a n y c h a n g e o f f o r m ' p L e m m a 5; G i i . 1 0 0 - 1 ; C i . 4 6 1 ] , a n d
adds, ' F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e I n d i v i d u a l so composed r e t a i n s its n a t u r e ,
w h e t h e r i t , as a w h o l e , m o v e s o r is at rest, o r w h e t h e r i t m o v e s i n t h i s o r
t h a t d i r e c t i o n , so l o n g as e a c h p a r t r e t a i n s its m o t i o n , a n d c o m m u n i c a t e s
i t , as b e f o r e t o t h e o t h e r s ' P ^ e m m a 7; G i i . 1 0 1 ; C i . 4 6 1 ] . I n t h i s m a t e r i a l
f o U o w i n g Е П Р 1 3 , S p i n o z a is p r o v i d i n g a n e x t r e m e l y s c h e m a t i c p i c t u r e
o f a n e n d u r i n g p h y s i c a l s y s t e m , i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e flux ofres extensa,
w h a t w e m i g h t t h i n k ofas a very r o u g h first-cut account o f w h a t a cor­
p o r e a l s y s t e m t h a t persists o v e r t i m e is.
C o r p o r e a l b e i n g s , f o r D e s c a r t e s a n d S p i n o z a , t h e n , are r e l a t i v e l y stable,
m o r e o r less c o m p l e x , c u r r e n t s a n d e d d i e s w i t h i n a sea o f fluidlike
e x t e n s i o n . S o m e have w o n d e r e d w h e t h e r w e can get any f o o t h o l d i n
such a chaotic w o r l d o f f l u x , a n d s o m e have t a k e n L e i b n i z t o b e a r g u ­
i n g t h a t i t is i m p o s s i b l e t o d o w i t h o u t r e i n t r o d u c i n g s c h o l a s t i c n o t i o n s ,
s u c h as t h e i d e a o f a s u b s t a n t i a l f o r m . I d o n o t see a n y p r o b l e m h e r e i n
p r i n c i p l e : o n e m i g h t l i v e i n a w o r l d t h a t is t o o c h a o t i c t o g e t a n y p u r ­
chase o n i t , a n d o n e m i g h t n o t . W e are i n d i s p u t a b l y able, at least o n
occasion, to track and c o m p r e h e n d patterns i n fluxes—consider, for
example, rainbows, hurricanes a n d tornadoes, the j e t stream and the
G u l f S t r e a m , a n d , o n e m i g h t a d d , e v e n galaxies, w h i c h f r o m o u r p o i n t
o f v i e w m i g h t as w e U b e n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n s u c h p a t t e r n s . W e s h o u l d
t h i n k o f w a t c h e s , f e r n s , snails, a n d e v e n t h e h u m a n b o d y , i n D e s c a r t e s
a n d S p i n o z a ' s m e t a p h y s i c s , a l o n g t h e Hnes o f especiaUy c o m p l e x a n d
stable t o r n a d o e s . W h a t n a t u r e s t h e s e b e i n g s h a v e are g i v e n t h r o u g h
m o r e o r less stable p a t t e r n s o f m o t i o n ; I shaU c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e s e b e i n g s
as ' p a t t e r n - h k e ' . 2 2

2 2
There is an issue here about h o w to think about patterns that typicaUy evolve over time:
hurricanes usuaUy gather intensity and weaken, and plants and animab have considerably more
comphcated courses ofdevelopment. M y sense is that this additional complexity, while i m p o r ­
tant and not reaUy addressed by Spinoza's rather sketchy treatment ofthis topic, can probably
be accommodated within the framework ofpattern-like beings. I should mention that the
issues concerning final causaHty that we are concerned w i t h do not seem to hang o n whether
one adopts a plenum version ofthe new science or a corpuscular version, according to w h i c h
corporeal beings are composed oftiny corpuscles moving about i n various ways.
124 John Carriero

Internal Final Causality and Pattern-like Corporeal Systems

W h e r e d o these p a t t e r n - h k e c o r p o r e a l systems faü v i s - a - v i s A q u i n a s ' s

d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s o m e t h i n g w h o s e a c t i v i t y is i n t e r n a U y o r naftrraUy
d i r e c t e d b y s o m e e n d , a n d s o m e t h i n g t h a t is e x t e r n a U y o r v i o l e n d y d i r e c t e d
b y a n a g e n t t o a n end? T h a t is, d o e s a s y s t e m o f m a t t e r i n m o t i o n t h a t
w e caU a c l o c k ' g o i t s e l f ' so as t o k e e p t h e c o r r e c t t i m e , o r is i t ' l e d ' t o d o
so b y t h e c l o c k m a k e r ? D o e s t h e s y s t e m o f m a t t e r i n m o t i o n w e caU a
p l a n t ' g o i t s e l f ' t o seek n o u r i s h m e n t , o r is i t ' l e d ' t o d o so b y G o d ? D o e s i t
m a t t e r t h a t i n t h e o n e case t h e s y s t e m is a r t i f i c i a l i n t h a t i t has b e e n
a r r a n g e d b y a h u m a n b e i n g , w h e r e a s i n t h e o t h e r case t h e s y s t e m is n a t u ­
r a l a n d ( t o s u p p o s e s o m e t h i n g t h a t S p i n o z a w o u l d d e n y ) t h a t i t results
from t h e w a y i n w h i c h has G o d has p k n n e d t h i n g s ?
I f w e focus o n anAristotehan-style d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n natural a n d v i o ­
l e n t m o t i o n — t o the extent that one can locate such a d i s t i n c t i o n w i t h i n a
mechanistic f r a m e w o r k — o n e m i g h t be t e m p t e d t o conclude that a p k n t
s y s t e m n a t u r a U y p u r s u e s t h e ends o f n u t r i t i o n a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n . A f t e r aU,
n o t h i n g is f o r c i n g t h e m a t t e r i n m o t i o n from its n a t u r a l c o u r s e , w h i c h i n
t h i s c o n t e x t w o u l d m e a n t h e c o u r s e set b y t h e l a w s o f m o t i o n . G r o w t h a n d
r e p r o d u c t i o n d o n o t o c c u r v i o l e n d y b u t r a t h e r naturaUy.
H o w e v e r , e v e n i f g r o w t h a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n are t h e n a t u r a l o u t c o m e o f
t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e p l a n t s y s t e m , t h o s e a c t i v i t i e s , as u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e n e w
s c i e n c e , are n o t d i r e c t e d b y e n d s . A U o f t h e p a t t e r n system's a c t i v i t i e s are
(aheady?) set b y t h e m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s o f its p a r t s ( t h e i n t e r a c t i o n o f
those parts w i t h t h e e n v i r o n m e n t ) . T h e r e is n o p l a c e i n a p a t t e r n - h k e
b e i n g f o r a ' f o r m ' o r ' i m p r e s s i o n ' o f t h e ends o f g r o w t h a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n
t o shape t h e exercise o f its a g e n c y . M o r e o v e r , t h i s is t r u e h o w e v e r t h e sys­
t e m came i n t o being, w h e t h e r artificiaUy via a c l o c k m a k e r o r naturaUy
t h r o u g h G o d . T h e h u m a n o r d i v i n e a r t i f i c e r has set t h i n g s u p so t h a t c e r ­
t a i n t h i n g s w i U h k e l y r e s u l t i n t h e c l o c k o r t h e p l a n t , so t h a t t h e c l o c k ' s
h a n d s w i U m o v e at a c o n s t a n t a n g u l a r v e l o c i t y o r t h a t o v e r t i m e t h e p l a n t
w i U , ceteris paribus, g r o w . B u t after t h i n g s h a v e b e e n set u p , t h e s e results
eventuate i n d e p e n d e n d y o f t h e ends, t h r o u g h m o t i v e tendencies b l i n d l y
f o U o w i n g t h e i r c o u r s e . A n d so, e v e n i f i t is t r u e t h a t t h e p k n t ' s m o v e m e n t s
a n d t h e c l o c k ' s m o v e m e n t s are n a t u r a l , n o t v i o l e n t , t h e i r s i t u a t i o n is m o r e
h k e that o f t h e arrow's b e i n g l e d t o d o t h e archers b i d d i n g a n d n o t a
h e a v y b o d y ' s h a v i n g i m p l a n t e d w i t h i n i t a f o r m t h a t directs its m o t i o n . I n
o t h e r w o r d s , t h e r e is n o i n t e r n a l final c a u s a h t y h e r e .
 Spinoza on Final Causality 125

Descartes b r i e f l y explores this p o i n t i n the S i x t h M e d i t a t i o n when

h e e x p l a i n s t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l basis o f t h e i d e a o f s o m e t h i n g ' s d e v i a t i n g
f r o m i t s n a t u r e . ( T h e i d e a o f s o m e t h i n g ' s d e v i a t i n g f r o m i t s n a t u r e is
approximately related to the idea o f b e i n g internaUy end-directed as
f o U o w s : w h e n a n i n t e r n a U y e n d - d i r e c t e d b e i n g fails t o a c h i e v e s o m e
e n d , i t d e v i a t e s f r o m its n a t u r e . S o i f a n e n d is n o t i n t e r n a l t o a t h i n g ' s
nature, t h e faUure t o achieve i t doesn't c o u n t as a d e v i a t i o n from
its n a t u r e . ) I n t h i s d i s c u s s i o n , D e s c a r t e s d o e s a U o w t h a t t h e r e is a sense
o f n a t u r e a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h w e c a n say t h a t a c l o c k t h a t d o e s n o t k e e p
c o r r e c t t i m e o r a h u m a n b o d y t h a t is i n i U h e a l t h ' d e v i a t e s f r o m its
n a t u r e ' , b u t insists t h a t t h i s sense o f n a t u r e is ' e x t r i n s i c ' t o t h e c l o c k o r
b o d y ( A T v i i . 84—4; C S M i i . 5 8 - o ) . T h i s is b e c a u s e t h e sense o f n a t u r e
depends o n comparisons o f t h e c l o c k o r b o d y w i t h o t h e r things (viz.
the i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e c l o c k m a k e r , o r t o other, healthy, h u m a n beings).
f W e ' U see b e l o w h o w S p i n o z a w o r k s t h e s e ideas o u t . ) I f w e f o c u s o n l y
o n the i n d i v i d u a l physical system itself-—the 'wheels and the weights',
i n t h e case o f t h e c l o c k , a n d 'a k i n d o f m a c h i n e e q u i p p e d a n d m a d e u p
o f b o n e s , n e r v e s , m u s c l e s , v e i n s , b l i n d a n d s k i n ' , i n t h e case o f t h e
b o d y — w e w i U see t h a t a b a d l y m a d e c l o c k ' o b s e r v e s aU t h e l a w s o f i t s
n a t u r e j u s t as c l o s e l y as' o n e t h a t teUs t h e c o r r e c t t i m e a n d t h a t i t is ' j u s t
as n a t u r a l ' f o r t h e diseased b o d y t o d o w h a t i t d o e s as f o r a h e a l t h y one
to do w h a t i t does. 2 3

A l t h o u g h t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f a p a t t e r n - h k e b e i n g , say, a p l a n t , are n o t v i o ­
l e n t o r c o n s t r a i n e d , t h e y are n o t i n t e r n a U y g o v e r n e d b y e n d s . P l a n t s d o

2 3
I n 'Descartes, Mechanics,and the Mechanical Philosophy', Midwest Studies in Philosophy
2 6 ( 2 0 0 2 ) , 185—204, at i 9 7 - 8 , D a n i e l Garber offers a reading ofthis passage according to w h i c h
its point is to remove teleology from the science ofmechanics. I n particular, it is supposed to
support the foHowing conclusion: 'For traditional mechanics, a machine is an artifact, some­
thing made for a particular purpose. For Descartes, Isuggest, a machine has hecome simply a collec­
tion of parts whose states are determined by the size, shape, and motion of those parts, as well as the
collisions among them.The focus ofCartesian mechanics, a Cartesian mechanical philosophy, is
not o n the things that we can do w i t h machines and the purposes for w h i c h we might c o n ­
struct them, but on the means at our disposal for constructing them, on the different configu­
rations ofsize, shape, and motion that produce those effects' p . 198). I read the passage
differendy, as simply making the point that the clock and, o n Descartes's teUing, the human
body, are more likeAquinas's arrow than his heavy thing (which is supposed to have an impres­
sion w i t h i n it directing it to earth):whatever finaHty is involved in their activities is not inter­
nal, but external.As far as I a m aware, that is h o w everyone thought ofartifacts like machines.
This makes it difficult for me to see that what Descartes is saying about the clock (as opposed
to the human body) should come as news to anyone, and so hard to see w h y it should reorient
the science ofmechanics i n some new,'nonteleological' direction.
126 John Carriero

r e g u l a r l y a n d naturaUy assimilate n o u r i s h m e n t a n d r e p r o d u c e , b u t n o t

b e c a u s e t h e y are i n t e r n a U y g u i d e d t o d o so. I t is w o r t h r e c a U i n g t h a t

A q u i n a s , o f c o u r s e , d o e s n o t t h i n k s u c h a t h i n g is n a t u r a U y p o s s i b l e .

F r o m his p o i n t o f v i e w , assirmlation o f n o u r i s h m e n t a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n

involve the actuahzation o f potential perfection, and he, foUowing

Aristotle, t o o k i t to be impossible that regions o f m a t t e r b h n d l y f o U o w ­

i n g s o m e laws o f m o t i o n c o u l d i n general b r i n g about such a t h i n g : that

perfection should be actuahzed by the b y - p r o d u c t ofregions ofmatter

b h n d I y c o U i d i n g c o u l d h a p p e n o n l y rarely, b y c h a n c e . ( T o b e sure, i t lies

w i t h i n God's p o w e r t o b r i n g about such occurrences frequendy;but we

are n o t i n t e r e s t e d i n w h a t m i g h t h a p p e n v i a s o m e m i r a c u l o u s a c t i v i t y o f

G o d ' s p a r t , b u t r a t h e r w h a t h a p p e n s i n t h e o r d i n a r y c o u r s e o f events.)

T h i s b e i n g s o , T h o m a s takes t h e f a c t t h a t a p l a n t r e g u l a r l y secures c e r t a i n

p e r f e c t i o n s as e v i d e n c e o f t h e p l a n t ' s b e i n g i n t e r n a U y d i r e c t e d b y e n d s . 2 4

Pattern-like Natures and 'Fault'

O n e ofAquinas's a r g u m e n t s f o r t h e c l a i m t h a t n a t u r a l b e i n g seeks e n d s

is t h a t w e f i n d ' f a u l t (peccatum)'with t h i n g s ' d o n e a c c o r d i n g t o n a t u r e , as

2 4
In'Sensible Ends',Simmons suggests that Descartes would have no objection to 'directed
powers', w h e n taken as 'placeholders for latent or insensible processes that underhe regular and
observable changes'; he w o u l d object only w h e n 'they are put forward as simpbz and basic effi­
cient causes that therefore admit o f n o further analysis': 'Descartes' charge, I submit, is that the
Aristotehan natural philosophers effectively aUow ends to masquerade as ultimate efficient
causes, thereby putting a premature halt to their inquiry. W h e n Descartes repkces directed
powers with micro-mechanisms, he is not so much denying that natural processes have ends as
he is denying that theAristotehans have the right story about the mechanisms by w h i c h those
ends are achieved' p . 7 1 ) . It is not clear to m e to what extent Descartes does make such a
charge, but, in any case, the charge's inteUigibihry rests o n a conception o f efficient causahty
ahen to an Aristotehan outlook. It wasn't some sort ofmethodological stubbornness o n the
part o f the Aristotehans that prevented them from aUowing for the 'repbcement' o f their
directed powers by p h n d ) micro-mechanisms.The Aristotehans thought that (in general: for
the most part) the generation ofperfections cannot take place i n the ordinary course ofevents
as the result of a series ofaccidental occurrences, but instead requires beings whose agency is
directed by an end i n order to bring this about. F r o m their point ofview, Descartes is not s i m ­
ply replacing 'directed powers' by underlying mechanisms; he's saying that something can get
from potency to act bhndly—that is, we can get from potency to act through a series ofcauses
that are not governed by the relevant end—something that they did not think could happen
naturaUy. Conversely, it not obvious that, from Descartes's point o f view, changes within res
extensa involve the movement from potency to act, or that the generation ofa tree involves the
introduction ofa n e w p e r f e c t i o n i n t h e w o r l d (see his comments about'pbnts,flies,etc.',atAT
vii. 134). H o w one stands on very basic questions about the nature o f change and w h e n and
w h y efficient causes are caUed for affects whether it even makes sense to think that a 'directed
power' might be 'replaced by' an underlying mechanistic process.
 Spinoza on Final Causality 127

is e v i d e n t i n t h e case o f t h e b i r t h o f m o n s t e r s ' a n d ' n o f a u l t tyeccatum) to

b e f o u n d , e x c e p t i n t h e case o f t h i n g s t h a t a r e f o r t h e sake o f a n e n d ' . T h e

i d e a t h a t e x e r c i s e o f t h e n a t u r a l agent's p o w e r m i g h t i n v o l v e f a u l t rests i n

p a r t o n t h e i d e a t h a t m o n s t e r s a r e n o t as t h e y s h o u l d b e , t h a t a m o n s t e r

is a d e f e c t i v e b e i n g . I n 4Pref, S p i n o z a o f f e r s a n e x t e n d e d d i s c u s s i o n o f

fault i n nature, w h i c h can b e i n s t r u c t i v e l y read i n t h e c o n t e x t of

Aquinas's a r g u m e n t .

W e saw above t h a t Descartes h o l d s that a j u d g m e n t that a c o r p o r e a l

p a t t e r n - h k e b e i n g d e v i a t e s from i t s n a t u r e rests o n a n ' e x t r i n s i c d e n o m -

i n a t i o n ' , a c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l w i t h o t h e r t h i n g s . T h i s is t o p r o ­

v i d e a basis f o r s u c h j u d g m e n t s — t h e y a r e n o t w h o U y c a p r i c i o u s o r

a r b i t r a r y — w i t h o u t l o c a t i n g t h a t basis i n t h e v e r y m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n s t i ­

t u t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l b e i n g assessed. 25

C o n s i d e r first artifacts. If, f o r example, w e t h i n k o f a c l o c k i n t e r m s o f

the i n t e n t i o n s o f t h e c l o c k m a k e r , w e c a n say t h e c l o c k is o p e r a t i n g i n a

f a u l t y w a y (what's w r o n g w i t h this watch?). B u t this involves a n ' e x t r i n ­

sic d e n o m i n a t i o n ' , t h i n k i n g o f t h e c l o c k i n r e l a t i o n t o s o m e t h i n g e k e

(the c l o c k m a k e r ' s i n t e n t i o n s ) . I f w e c o n s i d e r t h e c l o c k i n itserf, t h a t is,

s i m p l y as a p h y s i c a l t h i n g , a p a r t i c u l a r p a t t e r n o f m o t i o n i n m a t t e r , t h e r e

2 5
It is easy to think that Descartes brings up the 'extrinsic' sense ofnature only to dismiss
it, as w h e n he writes: 'For this one [sc. acceptation ofnature] is nothing but a denomination
(denominatio) that depends o n my thought (cojHitioHf),comparing a sick man and a poorly made
clock with the idea o f a healthy man and correcdy made clock, and is extrinsic to the things
that it is said of(haec enim nihil aliud est quam denominatio a cogitatione mea hominem aegrotum &
horologium malefabricatum cume idea hominis sani & horologii rectefacti comparante dependens). By the
other use I understand something that is i n fact (vero) found in things, and for that reason pos­
sesses some truth (veritatis)' ( A T vii. 85). B u t I think Descartes has a constructive role for his
extrinsic sense o f nature; it provides the basis for certain teleological idioms, teUing us what we
mean w h e n we say that a body is sick or defective. I n brief, Descartes's idea is that such idioms
depend on comparisons between the defective thing and either the intentions o f a n artificer
or other systems that strike us as similar, to w h i c h we compare the original system i n terms o f
stabihty, complexity o f activity, and so forth. I think Descartes thinks we can do this pretty
m u c h across the board, e.g. we evaluate weather systems, hchen, coral reefs, slugs, cats, and dogs
along these Hncs.These assessments, while not grounded i n the metaphysical constitution o f
the individual being evaluated, do ten us something about the individual and have their point
and use. W h a t Spinoza is doing i n 4 P r e f seems to be very similar in spirit. For a different
account ofDescartes's views o n these matters, according to w h i c h teleological idioms, w h e n
used in connection with the human body, depend on its union with the mind, and w h e n used
in connection with animals are 'based o n an (admittedly compeffing) analogy with the organs
ofthe human body' p . 62, n. 17), see Simmons,'Sensible Ends'. H e r view may be encouraged
by her translation o f the relevant part ofthe above extract, so as to read that the extrinsic sense
ofnature rests on an 'arbitrary denomination extrinsic to the things o f w h i c h it is predicated
anddependent onlyonmythought'('Sensible Ends', 58).However,Idon'tseeanythinginthe
Latin (or French) that hcenses the 'arbitrary' here.
 128 John Caniero

is n o basis f o r a n a t t r i b u t i o n o f d e f e c t : t h e p a t t e r n - h k e b e i n g is d o i n g
exacdy w h a t i t ' s h o u l d ' do, w h a t any such p a t t e r n - l i k e b e i n g w o v d d do
i n s i m i l a r c i r c u m s t a n c e s . A s D e s c a r t e s r e m a r k s , a c l o c k O b s e r v e s aU t h e
l a w s o f n a t u r e j u s t as c l o s e l y w h e n i t is b a d l y m a d e a n d teUs t h e w r o n g
time as w h e n i t c o m p l e t e l y f u m U s t h e w i s h e s o f t h e c l o c k m a k e r ' ( A T v i i .
84;CSMii.58).
W e d o n o t f i n d f a u l t j u s t w i t h artifacts, h o w e v e r . W e also f l n d f a u l t
w i t h n a t u r a l e n t i t i e s , s u c h as t h r e e - l e g g e d d o g s o r m o n s t e r s . H o w d o w e
come to attribute defect to n o n a r t i f i c i a l , p a t t e r n - l i k e beings? In
E I V p r e f . , S p i n o z a presents a n e x t e n d e d t r e a t m e n t o f t h i s t o p i c , e x p l a i n ­
i n g a l o n g t h e w a y h o w h e w o u l d h a v e us u n d e r s t a n d s o m e k e y v o c a b u ­
l a r y p e r f e c t a n d i m p e r f e c t , g o o d a n d evil) t h a t h e e m p l o y s i n his o w n
ethicaI t h e o r i z i n g . A c c o r d i n g to Spinoza, the d i c h o t o m y b e t w e e n per­
fect a n d i m p e r f e c t was o r i g i n a U y d r a w n i n t e r m s o f h o w w e U a n a u t h o r
o f a w o r k reahzes his i n t e n t i o n s i n t h a t w o r k . 2 6
N e x t , people came to
h a v e s t a n d i n g ideas a b o u t a l a r g e class o f a r t i f a c t s a n d ' t o f o r m u n i v e r s a l
ideas, a n d d e v i s e m o d e l s o f h o u s e s , b u U d i n g s , t o w e r s , e t c ' a n d make
j u d g m e n t s o f i m p e r f e c t i o n a n d p e r f e c t i o n i n t e r m s o f these models
r a t h e r t h a n f a b r i c a t o r s ' i n t e n t i o n s . FinaUy, t h i s p r a c t i c e w a s t r a n s f e r r e d
t o t h e n a t u r a l o r d e r , ' S o w h e n h3e0ple] see s o m e t h i n g h a p p e n i n n a t u r e
w h i c h does n o t agree w i t h t h e m o d e l t h e y have c o n c e i v e d o f t h i s k i n d
o f t h i n g , t h e y beheve that N a t u r e itserfhas failed o r sinned, a n d left the
t h i n g i m p e r f e c t ' ( H l V p r e f . ; G i i . 2 0 6 ; C i . 5 4 4 ) . So ' p e r f e c t i o n a n d i m p e r ­
f e c t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , are o n l y m o d e s o f t h i n k i n g , i . e . n o t i o n s w e are a c c u s ­
t o m e d t o f e i g n b e c a u s e w e c o m p a r e i n d i v i d u a I s o f t h e s a m e species t o
o n e another' ( E I V p r e f . ; G i i . 207; C i . 545).
H e r e is w h a t I t h i n k S p i n o z a has i n m i n d . I f w e t a k e a g i v e n s y s t e m o f
matter and compare i t t o o t h e r , s i r r n l a r systems o f m a t t e r , w e may
d e v e l o p v i e w s a b o u t h o w t h i n g s u s u a U y g o w i t h s u c h systems. D o i n g so
is n o t w i t h o u t p r a g m a t i c v a l u e : i t c a n h e l p us, f o r e x a m p l e , d e c i d e w h a t
t o d o i f a p a t t e r n - h k e cat is h o t ( w e m i g h t say f e v e r i s h ) , i f w e k n o w w h a t
has h a p p e n e d w i t h o t h e r systems t h a t s t r i k e us as r e a s o n a b l y s i m i l a r . B u t
t h e c o m p a r i s o n o f t h e cat w i t h o t h e r , s i m i I a r p a t t e r n - l i k e b e i n g s , e v e n i f
u s e f u l a n d i n f o r m a t i v e , i n v o l v e s r e l a t i n g t h e cat t o s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l
( t o o u r i d e a s , a n d p e r h a p s , t h r o u g h t h e ideas, t o o t h e r f e h n i s h s y s t e m s ) .

2 6
Spinoza's remarks about the 'the purpose o f the Author o f a work and the author's
carrying the work 'through to the end w h i c h its Author has decided to give i t ' should be
understood i n the context ofhis claim that a final cause is nothing but an appetite (see below).
 Spinoza on Final Causality 129

W h a t e v e r p r a g m a t i c o r e p i s t e m i c use t h e s e c o m p a r i s o n s m a y h a v e , t h e y
are n o t g r o u n d e d i n t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s y s t e m : aU it is is
a pattern ofmatter i n m o t i o n .
O f p a r t i c u k r i m p o r t a n c e h e r e is h o w a p a t t e r n - h k e b e i n g ' s r e k t i o n t o
a s p e c i e s — w h a t Spinoza terms a'universal idea [one] f o r m s o f t h i s k i n d o f
t h i n g ' ( E T V p r e f . ; G i i . 2 0 6 ; C i . 544) differs f r o m a n A r i s t o t e h a n n a t u r a l
being's r e k t i o n t o its s p e c i e s . A n A r i s t o t e h a n n a t u r a l b e i n g is a c o m p o s i t e
e n t i t y , c o m p o s e d o f a (substantial) f o r m a n d m a t t e r , w h i c h f o r m a n d m a t ­
t e r serve t o p l a c e t h e i n d i v i d u a l i n a d e t e r m i n a t e g e n u s a n d s p e c i e s . 27

T h u s , i t f o U o w s from its m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n s t i t u t i o n t h a t i t b e l o n g s t o t h e
g e n u s a n d species i t does. So i f w e w e r e t o m a k e j u d g m e n t s o f d e f e c t c o n ­
c e r n i n g a scholastic n a t u r a l b e i n g b y a d v e r t i n g t o its g e n u s a n d species, w e
w o t d d n o t b e r e l a t i n g i t t o s o m e t h i n g e x t e r n a l . T h e d e f e c t (say, h a v i n g
o n l y t h r e e legs) w o u l d b e b a s e d o n w h a t i t is ( s o m e t h i n g w i t h t h e s u b ­
s t a n t i a l f o r m c a n i n e ) , w h i c h teUs us s o m e t h i n g a b o u t h o w i t s h o u l d b e
(four-legged). B y w a y o f contrast, i f n a t u r a l beings have p a t t e r n - h k e
n a t u r e s , w h a t G o d d i d was t o create t h e m a t t e r a n d t h e m o t i o n , a n d a n y
c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i n t o a g e n u s o r species is s u b s e q u e n t t o w h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l
is, b a s e d o n t h e c o m p a r i s o n s w i t h o t h e r i n d i v i d u a k . I n itserf, a p a t t e r n - h k e
b e i n g s i m p l y has w h a t e v e r r e a h t y o r p e r f e c t i o n i t h a p p e n s t o have: t h e r e
is n o l e v e l o f r e a h t y t h a t i t o u g h t b y n a t u r e t o have. I t is w h a t i t is.
S p i n o z a g o e s o n t o e x p l a i n , i n t h i s s e t t i n g , h i s p r e f e r r e d use f o r t h e
t e r m s 'perfect' a n d ' i m p e r f e c t ' . H e proposes t h a t w e d r o p the reference
t o g e n e r a a n d species a n d s i m p l y c o n s i d e r t h i n g s as b e i n g s . I f w e u n d e r ­
s t a n d p e r f e c t i o n i n t h i s w a y , w h e n w e say s o m e t h i n g is i m p e r f e c t , w e
w i U m e a n o n l y t h a t i t is H m i t e d i n s o m e way, i . e . t h a t t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g
else t h a t has m o r e p e r f e c t i o n t h a n i t i n s o m e r e s p e c t ; w e w o n ' t m e a n t h a t
i t lacks s o m e t h i n g that i t b y nature o u g h t t o have:

So insofar as w e refer aU i n d i v i d u a k i n N a t u r e t o this genus ^>eing], compare

t h e m t o o n e another, and f i n d that some have m o r e b e i n g , o r reahty, t h a n o t h ­
ers, w e say that some are m o r e perfect t h a n o t h e r s . A n d insofar as w e attribute
s o m e t h i n g t o t h e m that involves negation, Hke a H m i t , an end, a lack o f p o w e r ,
etc., w e caU t h e m imperfect, because t h e y do n o t affect o u r M i n d as m u c h as
those w e caU perfect, and n o t because s o m e t h i n g is l a c k i n g (deficiat) t o t h e m
w h i c h is theirs, o r because N a t u r e has sinned fpeccaverit). ( S V p r e f . ; G i i .
2 0 7 - 8 ; C i . 545)

2 7
I n De ente et essentia (Opera omnia X V I , 3 3 1 - 2 ; G o o d w i n , 4 1 - 2 ) , A q u i n a s claims that the
genus is taken from the matter and the difference from the form.
i30 John Camero

( S o m e m i g h t find i t s u r p r i s i n g t h a t p a t t e r n - И к е systems s h o u l d a d m i t o f
c o m p a r i s o n i n t e r m s o f r e a h t y o r p e r f e c t i o n . B u t Spinoza holds that pktnts
are m o r e i m p r e s s i v e t h a n rocks, a n i m a l s m o r e i m p r e s s i v e t h a n p l a n t s , p e o -
p l e m o r e i m p r e s s i v e t h a n a n i m a l s . T h i s is c o n n e c t e d w i t h , I b e h e v e , w h a t
S p i n o z a caUs t h e i r ' p o w e r o f a c t i n g ' , w h i c h f u n c t i o n s as a s o r t ofplace
h o l d e r f o r t h e w a y t h e s y s t e m behaves. C a n i n e a n a t o m y is i n m a n y w a y s
m o r e r e m a r k a b l e t h a n s l u g a n a t o m y : a d o g is able t o r e a c t i n m o r e c o m ­
p l e x a n d v a r i e d w a y s t o its e n v i r o n m e n t , c a n n e g o t i a t e m o r e obstacles i n
its c o u r s e , is m o r e r e s i h e n t , a n d so o n . ) I n t h i s passage, S p i n o z a g r o u n d s
2 8

the vocabulary o f perfection and i m p e r f e c t i o n w i t h o u t supposing that

b e i n g s faU i n t o k i n d s t h a t c a r r y w i t h t h e m c a n o n i c a l standards ofexcel-
l e n c e a n d d e f i c i e n c y f o r t h e i r m e m b e r s , H i s p r o p o s e d usage effaces t h e
s c h o k s t i c d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n a p r i v a t i o n ( t h e absence o f p e r f e c t i o n a b e i n g
o u g h t t o h a v e b y its n a t u r e , s u c h as b h n d n e s s i n a d o g ) a n d a n e g a t i o n ( t h e
s i m p l e absence o f a b e i n g , s u c h as b h n d n e s s i n t h e rock).Since t h e r e is n o
l e v e l o f p e r f e c t i o n o r r e a h t y t h a t a t h i n g o u g h t t o have, i t d o e s n ' t m a k e
sense t o m a i n t a i n , as A q u i n a s d i d , t h a t n a t u r a l causes s i n : t h e y b r i n g a b o u t
as m u c h r e a h t y o r p e r f e c t i o n as t h e y d o ; t h e r e is n o specific a m o u n t o f
r e a h t y o r p e r f e c t i o n t h a t t h e y are s u p p o s e d t o b r i n g a b o u t .
I n f a c t , S p i n o z a h n k s h i s c l a i m t h a t t h e r e are n o p r i v a t i o n s i n n a t u r e
a n d t h a t n a t u r e d o e s n o t s i n t o t h e c h a r a c t e r o f e f f i c i e n t causahty. T h e
passage c i t e d a b o v e c o n t i n u e s : ' F o r n o t h i n g b e l o n g s t o t h e n a t u r e o f
a n y t h i n g e x c e p t w h a t foUows f r o m t h e necessity o f the nature o f t h e
e f f i c i e n t c a u s e . A n d w h a t e v e r f o U o w s from t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h e n a t u r e o f
t h e e f f i c i e n t cause h a p p e n s n e c e s s a r i l y ' ( E I V p r e f . ; G i i . 2 0 8 ; C i . 5 4 5 ) . B y
' t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e e f f i c i e n t cause' I t a k e S p i n o z a t o m e a n
w h a t I h a v e r e f e r r e d t o as a b h n d e f f i c i e n t cause. C o n s i d e r Aquinas's
e x a m p l e o f m o n s t r o u s b i r t h . I n o r d e r t o find f a u l t — t o t h i n k t h a t n a t u r e
has s i n n e d (peccauit)—here,we w o u l d h a v e t o t h i n k o f c a u s e s as a i m i n g
at s o m e t h i n g a n d f a i h n g . B u t t h e r e l e v a n t p a t t e r n - h k e b e i n g s , say, t h e
s p e r m a n d e g g , b h n d l y fix t h e s t r u c t u r e o f t h e i r ' i s s u e ' ; t h e p r i o r m o t i v e
tendencies f o u n d w i t h i n t h e m absolutely determine the outcome.
T h e r e ' s n o t h i n g h e r e t h a t is n o t g o i n g as i t s h o u l d , n o t h i n g t r y i n g t o d o
something and faihng.

2 8
I n theAristotehan tradition, differences i n the character ofactivities were understood in
terms ofdifferences in the objects or ends ofthose activities; I take Spinoza's idea o f a general­
ized 'power o f acting' to be an attempt to measure individuak and their activities without
making the objects or ends ofthose activities primary.
 Spinoza on Final Causality 131

W h i l e Spinoza's h a n d h n g o f g o o d a n d e v i l , a n d h u m a n p e r f e c t i o n
a n d i m p e r f e c t i o n , is s i m i l a r i n s p i r i t , i t is s o m e w h a t more complex
b e c a u s e o f t h e use h e w i s h e s t o m a k e o f t h e s e d i c h o t o m i e s i n his m o r a l
t h e o r y . L i k e p e r f e c t i o n a n d i m p e r f e c t i o n , g o o d a n d e v i l are merely
comparative o r relational a n d d o n o t indicate a n y t h i n g real i n t h e w o r l d :
' A s f a r as g o o d a n d e v i l are c o n c e r n e d , t h e y also i n d i c a t e n o t h i n g p o s i ­
tive i n t h i n g s , c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e m s e l v e s , n o r are t h e y a n y t h i n g o t h e r t h a n
m o d e s o f t h i n k i n g , o r n o t i o n s w e f o r m because w e c o m p a r e o n e t h i n g
t o a n o t h e r ' (jETVpref.; G i i . 2 0 8 ; C i . 5 4 5 ) . F o r his p u r p o s e s , g o o d a n d e v i l
are u n d e r s t o o d i n t e r m s o f o n e o f t h e species ideas c o n s t r u c t e d b y us,
' t h e i d e a o f m a n ' . L i k e aU s u c h ideas, i t is b a s e d o n c o m p a r i s o n s t h a t are
external t o the beings b e i n g compared: I a m n o m o r e constituted b y
n a t u r e a h u m a n b e i n g t h a n F i d o is c o n s t i t u t e d a d o g . G o o d a n d e v i l are
defined b y reference t o this m o d e l : 2 9

B u t t h o u g h this is so, stiU w e m u s t retain these words. F o r because w e desire

to f o r m an idea o f m a n , as a m o d e l o f h u m a n nature w h i c h w e may l o o k t o , i t
w i U be useful t o us t o retain these same w o r d s w i t h the m e a n i n g I have i n d i ­
cated. I n w h a t foUows, therefore, I shaU understand b y g o o d w h a t w e k n o w cer­
t a i n l y is a means b y w h i c h w e m a y approach nearer and nearer to the m o d e l o f
h u m a n nature w e set before ourselves. B y evU, w h a t w e certainly k n o w prevents
us f r o m b e c o m i n g l i k e that m o d e l . N e x t , w e shaU say that m e n are m o r e perfect
o r i m p e r f e c t , insofar as they approach m o r e o r less near t o this m o d e l .
C B V p r e f . ; G i i . 208; C i . 545)

I n this way, S p i n o z a provides a m e a n i n g f o r the t e r m s ' g o o d ' a n d ' e v i l ' ,

h u m a n ' p e r f e c t i o n ' a n d ' i m p e r f e c t i o n ' , t h a t is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h h i s p o s i ­
t i o n t h a t w e are n o t c o n s t i t u t e d b y s o m e k i n d w e b e l o n g t o , a n d t h a t
w e d o n o t c o m e e q u i p p e d w i t h ends t h a t shape t h e exercise o f o u r
a c t i v i t y . I t is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e g u i d i n g i d e a t h a t o u r a p p e t i t e s or
m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s are n o t s t r u c t u r e d f f o m t h e t o p d o w n , t h a t is, n o t v i a
s o m e e n d s t h a t w e are ' o r d a i n e d ' b y o u r n a t u r e t o s e e k , b u t r a t h e r
f r o m the b o t t o m up, that i s , f r o m t h e m o t i v e tendencies o f t h e simplest
bodies, to the m o t i v e tendencies o f the bodies that they f o r m , u p
t h r o u g h t o t h e v e r y c o m p l e x s y s t e m o f m a t t e r i n m o t i o n t h a t c o u n t s as
the h u m a n body.

2 9
Consider also Spinoza's comment in the ShortTreatise,'l say, then, that I must conceive a
perfect m a n , i f I want to say anythingregardingman's good or evil' ( i i . 4 ; C i . 103).
132 John Carriero

Motivation and Human Psychology

L e t ' s t u r n t o S p i n o z a ' s h a n d U i n g o f m o t i v a t i o n , w h i c h is o n e o f t h e m o s t
i n t e r e s t i n g a n d i m p o r t a n t aspects o f t h e Ethics.The m a i n presentation o f
h i s t h e o r y o f m o t i v a t i o n c o m e s at t h e b e g i n n i n g o f P a r t 3. T h e r e
S p i n o z a teUs u s t h a t t h e basic m o t i v e p r i n c i p l e (at least f o r finite beings)
is t h e s o - c a U e d c o n a t u s p r i n c i p l e : ' E a c h t h i n g , as f a r as i t c a n b y its o w n
p o w e r , strives t o p e r s e v e r e i n its b e i n g ' ( Е Ш Р 6 ; G i i . 146; C i . 4 9 8 ) . I t is
n o t i m m e d i a t e l y obvious h o w t o understand t h e conatus d o c t r i n e . T h e
l a n g u a g e o f ' s t r i v i n g ' a n d t h e clause 'as f a r as i t c a n b y its o w n p o w e r '
h a v e b e e n t a k e n b y m a n y t o suggest s o m e t h i n g t h a t i s , b r o a d l y s p e a k i n g ,
t e l e o l o g i c a l . H o w e v e r , i f w e step b a c k a n d c o n s i d e r t h e r o l e t h a t t h e
d o c t r i n e plays w i t h i n S p i n o z a ' s o v e r a l l t h e o r y , I t h i n k a r a t h e r d i f F e r e n t
p i c t u r e emerges.
W e m i g h t t h i n k o f t h e c o n a t u s d o c t r i n e as t h e s p e c i f i c a t i o n o f a
p r i n c i p l e o f s u f f i c i e n t reason w i t h respect t o transactions a m o n g finite
b e i n g s . I t teUs us w h a t a t h i n g w i l l d o w h e n l e f t t o i t s o w n d e v i c e s ;
i m p l i c i t l y , i t a k o teUs u s w h e n w e n e e d a n e x t e r n a l cause, n a m e l y ,
w h e n a t h i n g has n o t d o n e w h a t i t w o u l d h a v e d o n e , l e f t t o i t s o w n
d e v i c e s . T h i s w a y o f t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h e c o n a t u s p r i n c i p l e is e n c o u r ­
a g e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t , as has o f t e n b e e n o b s e r v e d , 3 0
Spinoza's statement
o f t h e p r i n c i p l e recaUs s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y statements o f t h e conser­
v a t i o n o f m o t i o n . T h e r e is a n o b v i o u s s i m i l a r i t y , f o r e x a m p l e , b e t w e e n
S p i n o z a ' s f o r m u l a t i o n o f E I I I P 6 , unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, in suo
esse perserverare conatur ( e a c h t h i n g , as f a r as i t c a n b y its o w n power,
s t r i v e s t o p e r s e v e r e i n its b e i n g ) , a n d ( t h e first p a r t o f ) D e s c a r t e s ' s first
l a w o f m o t i o n i n Principles, I I . 3 7 , unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, sem­
per in eodem statu perseveret ( e a c h t h i n g , as f a r as i t c a n b y i t s o w n p o w e r ,
a l w a y s p e r s e v e r e s i n t h e s a m e s t a t e ) . M o r e o v e r , i n Cogitata metaphysica,
w h i c h is a s o r t o f a p p e n d i x t o S p i n o z a ' s e x p o s i t i o n o f t h e first two
p a r t s o f D e s c a r t e s ' s Principles of Philosophy, Spinoza, e c h o i n g a line o f
t h o u g h t t h a t is f o u n d i n D e s c a r t e s h i m s e l f , a r g u e s t h a t m o t i o n has a
tendency t o persevere i n its present state. 31
H e writes i n a section

3 0
See e.g. D a v i d Bidney, The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza ( N e w Haven:Yale University
Press, 1 9 4 0 ) , 9 3 ^ j ; E d w i n Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method Princeton, N J : Princeton
University Press, 1988); Alan Donagan, Spinoza (Chicago: University ofChicago Press, 1988), 152.
3 1
Although the Cogitata metaphysica was written in close connection with an exposition of
Descartes's Principles ofPhilosophy, I see no reason to doubt that the argument here reflects Spinoza's
own thinking, or that he changed his views on this topic by the time he wrote the Ethics.
 Spinoza on Final Causality 133

h e a d e d ' H o w t h e t h i n g a n d t h e s t r i v i n g i t has t o p e r s e v e r e i n i t s state

are d i s t i n g u i s h e d ' :

To make this clear, l e t us take an example o f a very simple t h i n g . M o t i o n has a

force o f p e r s e v e r i n g i n its state; this force is reaUy n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n the m o t i o n
i t s e K — t h a t is, the nature o f m o t i o n as such. For i f I say that i n this b o d y , A , there
is n o t h i n g b u t a certain q u a n t i t y o f m o t i o n , i t foUows clearly f r o m this that, so
l o n g as I attend t o A , I m u s t afways say that i t is m o v i n g . F o r i f I were t o say that
i t was l o s i n g , ofitseUT, its force o f m o v i n g , I s h o u l d necessarUy have t o a t t r i b u t e
t o i t s o m e t h i n g else, besides w h a t w e have supposed i n the hypothesis, t h r o u g h
w h i c h i t was l o s i n g its nature. (1.6; G i . 248; C i . 314)

O n t h e o n e h a n d , i f a t h i n g is l e f t t o i t s e l f , i t s c u r r e n t m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s
w i U a c c o u n t f o r its c o n t i n u i n g t o d o w h a t i t is d o i n g ; o n t h e o t h e r , i f
s o m e t h i n g ceases t o d o w h a t i t is d o i n g , t h i s w i U r e q u i r e a n e x t e r n a l
cause (i.e.'somethingeke').
So t h i n g s w i U c o n t i n u e t o d o w h a t t h e y are d o i n g unless t h e y g e t i n
o n e a n o t h e r ' s w a y ( o f c o u r s e , i n a p l e n u m , t h i n g s are c o n t i n u a U y g e t t i n g
i n o n e a n o t h e r ' s w a y ) . T h i s w a y o f t h i n k i n g a b o u t a c t i v i t y is f u n d a m e n -
taUy o p p o s e d t o t h e A r i s t o t e l i a n o n e w e s u r v e y e d earlier.Arguably,this
is o n e o f t h e d e e p e s t p l a c e s o f o p p o s i t i o n b e t w e e n m e c h a n i s t i c n a t u r a l
p h i I o s o p h y a n d A r i s t o t e h a n n a t u r a l p h i l o s o p h y . S p i n o z a rejects t h e i d e a
t h a t m o t i o n is s o m e s p e c i a l state b r i d g i n g p o t e n t i a h t y a n d a c t u a l i t y .
T h i n g s are n a t u r a U y i n m o t i o n . I f w e t h i n k i n t e r m s o f p a t t e r n - h k e
b e i n g s , t h e r e is a sense i n w h i c h a t h i n g s i m p l y is t h e t o t a h t y o f i t s m o t i v e
tendencies. T h i s m a y be the t h o u g h t b e h i n d the a d m i t t e d l y obscure
Е Ш Р 7 , ' T h e s t r i v i n g b y w h i c h e a c h t h i n g strives t o p e r s e v e r e i n its
b e i n g is n o t h i n g b u t t h e a c t u a l essence o f t h e t h i n g ' ( G i i . 146; C i . 4 9 9 ) .
I n a n y case, Ε Π Ι Ρ 7 seems t o c h a r a c t e r i z e b e t t e r a p a t t e r n - h k e b e i n g t h a n
anAristotelian h y l o m o r p h i c being,becauseAristotehan b e i n g s are s u p ­
p o s e d t o faU i n t o k i n d s t h a t s e r v e as a p r i o r g r o u n d f o r its m o t i v e t e n ­
d e n c i e s , i . e . its a p p e t i t e s and i n c h n a t i o n s . FinaUy, l e f t t o itself, a
p a t t e r n - h k e b e i n g w i U s i m p l y g o o n as i t has b e e n f o r e v e r (cf. Ε Π Ι Ρ 8 ,
' T h e s t r i v i n g b y w h i c h e a c h t h i n g strives t o p e r s e v e r e i n its b e i n g
i n v o l v e s n o f i n i t e t i m e , b u t a n i n d e f i n i t e time' ( G i i . 147; C i . 4 9 9 ) ) .
As I emphasized above, A r i s t o t e h a n t h i n k i n g a b o u t t h e nature of
m o t i o n is c o n n e c t e d t o A r i s t o t e h a n t h o u g h t a b o u t w h y w e n e e d e f f i ­
c i e n t causes a n d h o w e f f i c i e n t causes are s t r u c t u r e d : e f f i c i e n t causes are
necessary t o b r i n g s o m e t h i n g f r o m p o t e n c y t o act, a n d h a v e t o be
e n d - g o v e r n e d t o a c c o m p h s h t h i s . I n a s m u c h as S p i n o z a has a d i f f e r e n t
 i34 John Caniero

conception o f motion, we w o u l d expect h i m t o have a different

conception o f causation. T h e conatus principle imphcidy divides
f i n i t e causal a c t i v i t y i n t o t w o sorts: ( i ) T h e r e ' s w h a t h a p p e n s t h r o u g h A ' s
s t r i v i n g t o p e r s e v e r e i n its b e i n g a n d (2) there's w h a t h a p p e n s w h e n A i s
a c t e d o n b y a n e x t e r n a l cause ( I s p e c u l a t e t h a t A is, i n t h e f o r m e r case,
w h a t S p i n o z a t e r m s a n ' a d e q u a t e cause', a n d i n t h e l a t t e r case,'a p a r t i a l
o r i n a d e q u a t e cause' ( E H I D i ) o f w h a t is g o i n g o n ) .
L e t m e b e g i n w i t h e x t e r n a l c a u s e s . T h e c o n a t u s p r i n c i p l e teUs us t h a t ,
l e f t t o t h e i r o w n d e v i c e s , t h i n g s w i U c o n t i n u e as t h e y are. So t h e p r i n c i ­
p l e also teUs us t h a t w h e n s o m e t h i n g v e e r s f r o m its c u r r e n t c o u r s e w e
n e e d a n e x t e r n a l cause, a n d t h a t cause w i U b e , at least i n t h e case o f
e x t e n s i o n , s o m e o t h e r e x t e n d e d s y s t e m t h a t has g o t i n i t s w a y . W h a t t r i g ­
gers t h e r e q u i r e m e n t f o r a n e x t e r n a l cause is n o t t h a t a p o t e n t i a l p e r f e c ­
t i o n has b e c o m e a c t u a h z e d , b u t r a t h e r t h a t s o m e t h i n g has c h a n g e d f r o m
its p r e v i o u s s t a t e . T h e r e is n o r e a s o n , m o r e o v e r , t o t h i n k o f t h e i n t e r f e r ­
i n g a g e n c y as d i r e c t e d t o w a r d c h a n g i n g t h e state o f t h e f i r s t b e i n g : i t
s i m p l y gets i n t h e w a y o f t h e first b e i n g . I n f a c t , t h e t r a n s a c t i o n is t h e
o u t c o m e o f t h e c o n a t u s o f b o t h systems, t h e m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s o f b o t h ,
as f a r as t h e y c a n , t o r e m a i n i n t h e i r p r e s e n t state ( w h i c h is w h y , I t h i n k ,
e a c h is a ' p a r t i a l c a u s e ' o f t h e o u t c o m e ) .
N e x t , let's c o n s i d e r w h a t A does t h r o u g h its o w n s t r i v i n g t o r e m a i n i n
its c u r r e n t s t a t e . E v e n i f e x t e r n a l causes d o n o t act f o r ends, c o u l d n ' t i t b e
t h e case t h a t t h e c o n a t u s p r i n c i p l e i t s e i f i n v o l v e s a n e n d - g o v e r n e d agency?
A f t e r aU, o n e o f t h e w a y s i n w h i c h t h e c o n a t u s p r i n c i p l e b e c o m e s m a n ­
ifest i n h u m a n b e i n g s is t h r o u g h o u r d e s i r e f o r s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n . A n y
a c t i v i t y t h a t w e u n d e r t a k e i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , o n its
face, seems e n d - d i r e c t e d .
I b e h e v e t h e a n s w e r t o t h i s q u e s t i o n is n o . L e t m e s u m m a r i z e t h e v i e w
t h a t I ' U d e f e n d . T h e m a i n i d e a b e h i n d Spinoza's a c c o u n t o f a g e n c y is t o
t a k e t h e p i c t u r e o f a g e n c y t h a t h e finds i n s i m p l e s i t u a t i o n s i n t h e n e w
s c i e n c e a n d t o a p p l y i t systematicaUy. S i m p l e b o d i e s , w h e n n o t i n t e r f e r e d
w i t h b y o t h e r b o d i e s , j u s t c o n t i n u e t o d o w h a t t h e y are a h e a d y d o i n g
t h r o u g h a m e t a p h y s i c a l i n e r t i a . T h e i r m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s are n o t s t r u c t u r e d
a b o u t e n d s . T h e m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s o f m o r e c o m p l e x b o d i e s are set b y t h e
m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s o f t h e i r c o m p o n e n t s ; t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s are n o m o r e e n d -
g o v e r n e d t h a n are t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e i r c o m p o n e n t s . A n d because o f h i s
basic c o m m i t m e n t t o t h e v i e w t h a t w h a t goes o n i n t h e m e n t a l r e a h n is
paraUel t o w h a t goes o n i n t h e c o r p o r e a l r e a h n , a d d i n g m e n t a h t y o r
 Spinoza on Final Causality 135

consciousness t o t h e p i c t u r e does n o t alter t h e f u n d a m e n t a l s t r u c t u r e o f a

m o t i v e t e n d e n c y o r a p p e t i t e . I n t h i s , t h e r e is b o t h d e e p agreementand
d i s a g r e e m e n t b e t w e e n S p i n o z a a n d A q u i n a s . T h e y agree t h a t ah m o t i v e
t e n d e n c i e s , n a t u r a l i n c h n a t i o n s , o r appetites are u n i f o r r r d y s t r u c t u r e d :
t h e r e is n o t , f o r e x a m p l e , o n e s t r u c t u r e f o r n o n c o g n i t i v e b e i n g s a n d
a n o t h e r f o r c o g n i t i v e b e i n g s . W h e r e t h e y disagree, o f c o u r s e , is o n w h a t
t h a t s t r u c t u r e is. F o r A q u i n a s aU i n c h n a t i o n s o r appetites are e n d - g o v e r n e d
a n d f o r S p i n o z a n o m o t i v e t e n d e n c y o r a p p e t i t e is.
W e c a n g e t s o m e t h i n g o f t h e flavor o f S p i n o z a ' s a p p r o a c h from a w e U -
k n o w n discussion o f f r e e d o m . A f t e r discussing God's freedom, Spinoza
writes:

L e t us, however, descend t o created things, w h i c h are aU d e t e r m i n e d b y exter­

nal causes t o exist, and t o act i n a definite and d e t e r m i n e d manner. I n order that
this m a y be clearly u n d e r s t o o d , l e t us t h i n k o f a v e r y simple t h i n g . For instance,
a stone receives from an e x t e r n a l cause, w h i c h impels i t , a certain q u a n t i t y o f
m o t i o n , w i t h w h i c h i t w i U afterwards necessarUy c o n t i n u e t o m o v e w h e n the
i m p a c t o f the e x t e r n a l cause has ceased. T h i s c o n t i n u a n c e o f t h e stone i n its
m o t i o n is compeUed, n o t because i t is necessary, b u t because i t must be d e f i n e d
by t h e i m p a c t o f a n external cause. 32
( G iv. 2 6 6 ; T h e Letters, 2 9 5 )

A f t e r m a k i n g this p o i n t a b o u t the stone, Spinoza n e x t notes that t h e

s a m e h o l d s g o o d o f m o r e c o m p l e x systems:

W h a t is here said o f a stone m u s t be u n d e r s t o o d o f e a c h i n d i v i d u a l t h i n g , h o w ­

ever composite and h o w e v e r adapted t o various ends i t may be t h o u g h t t o be
(quantumvis illa composita, & adplurima apta esse condpiatur): that is, each t h i n g is
necessarily d e t e r m i n e d b y an external cause t o exist and act i n a definite a n d
d e t e r m i n a t e manner. ( G iv. 2 6 6 ; Correspondence, 2 9 5 )

T h e n , finaUy, h e c o n s i d e r s t h e d i f f e r e n c e t h a t c o g n i t i o n m a k e s t o t h i s :

N e x t , conceive, i f y o u please, that t h e stone w h U e i t continues i n m o t i o n t h i n k s ,

and k n o w s that i t is s t r i v i n g as m u c h as possible t o c o n t i n u e i n m o t i o n . Surely
this stone, i n a s m u c h as i t is conscious o n l y o f i t s o w n effort, and is far from i n d i f ­
ferent, w i U beUeve that i t is c o m p l e t e l y free, and t h a t i t continues i n m o t i o n f o r
n o o t h e r reason t h a n because i t wants t o . A n d such is t h e h u m a n freedom w h i c h
aU m e n boast that t h e y possess, a n d w h i c h consists solely i n this, that m e n are
conscious o f t h e i r appetite (appetitus),3nA i g n o r a n t o f t h e causes b y w h i c h t h e y
are d e t e r m i n e d . ( G iv. 2 6 6 ; Conespondence, 2 9 5 * )

3 2
T h e translation is taken f r o m A . W o l f , The Correspondence of Spinoza [Correspondence]
(London: G e o r g e A U e n & U n w i n , 1 9 2 8 ) .
 ι 6
3 John Carriero

S p i n o z a is s u g g e s t i n g h e r e t h a t (a) t h e r e is n o s i g n i f i c a n t difference
b e t w e e n t h e r o c k ' s a c q u i s i t i o n o f a m o t i v e t e n d e n c y a n d a c o m p l e x sys­
t e m ' s a c q u i s i t i o n o f a m o t i v e t e n d e n c y (aU are set b y e x t e r n a l causes a n d
r e m a i n u n t i l a n e x t e r n a l n e w cause c o m e s a l o n g ) , a n d (b) h u m a n m o t i v e
t e n d e n c i e s ^ i e r e , ' a p p e t i t e (appetitus)') w o r k i n the same way.Tojudge
f r o m t h i s passage, t h e o n l y d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n us a n d t h e c o g n i t i v e s t o n e
is t h a t t h e m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s o f w h i c h w e are a w a r e are m o r e complex
( n a m e l y , t h o s e a s s o c i a t e d w i t h a s y s t e m o f m a t t e r t h a t c o u n t s as t h e
h u m a n b o d y ) , n o t a difference i n h o w w e acquire m o t i v e tendencies o r
i n t h e i r i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e ( v i z . , i n w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e y are i n t e r n a U y
end-directed).
T h e passage w e h a v e j u s t c o n s i d e r e d is a b o u t f r e e d o m , a n d i t is c o n ­
c e i v a b l e t h a t S p i n o z a d o e s t h i n k t h a t h u m a n m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s are
s o m e h o w a c q u i r e d d i f f e r e n d y o r s o m e h o w s t r u c t u r e d difFerendy, b u t
t h a t t h i s is i r r e l e v a n t t o t h e p o i n t h e w i s h e d t o m a k e t h e r e . T o g e t a f u U e r
p i c t u r e o f h i s t h o u g h t , let's l o o k at his c o m m e n t s a b o u t a p p e t i t e , d e s i r e ,
e n d s , final causes, a n d t h e p e r c e i v e d g o o d i n t h e Ethics.
I n E H I P o S , after i n t r o d u c i n g his c o n a t u s d o c t r i n e , S p i n o z a offers a
series 0 f d e f 1 n i t i 0 n s b a s e d o n t h e i d e a o f c o n a t u s . A l t h o u g h I t h i n k t h a t
Spinoza holds that the defined t e r m i n o l o g y can be apphed v e r y gener-
aUy, I t h i n k h e also h o l d s t h a t t h e t e r m i n o l o g y is especiaUy a s s o c i a t e d
w i t h h u m a n activity:

S c h o l . : W h e n this s t r i v i n g is related o n l y t o the M i n d , i t is c a U e d W i U ; 33

but
w h e n i t is related t o the M i n d a n d B o d y together, i t is caUed A p p e t i t e . T h i s
A p p e t i t e , therefore, is n o t h i n g b u t the v e r y essence o f m a n , f r o m w h o s e nature
there necessarUy f o U o w those things that p r o m o t e his p r e s e r v a t i o n . A n d so m a n
is d e t e r m i n e d t o do those things.
B e t w e e n appetite and desire there is n o difference, except that desire is g e n -
eraUy related t o m e n insofar as they are conscious o f t h e i r appetites (quatenus sui
appetitus sunt constity.So desire can be defined as appetite togetherwith consaousness
(conscientia) of the appetite. ( G i i . 147-8; C i . 500)

N o t i c e , t o b e g i n w i t h , t h a t t h e r e is a s i n g l e m o t i v e t e n d e n c y , ' t h i s s t r i v ­
i n g ' , t h a t is f o u n d i n b o t h t h e h u m a n b o d y a n d t h e h u m a n m i n d . T h i s

3 3
O n Spinoza's account o f 'wUl' the wiU is not characterized through its object, the good,
as it was for the Aristotehans. I n fact, o n Spinoza's teUing, there is not reaUy a faculty ofwffl at
aU—there isjust thejoint product ofthe striving ofaU the constituent ideas ofthe nrind.This
breaking ofthe 'wiU' into pieces was adumbrated first in E I I P 4 8 .
 Spinoza on Final Causality 137

was a p o i n t t h a t S p i n o z a h a d e m p h a s i z e d e a r h e r i n P a r t 3 , 1 n E I I I P 2 S :

АД these t h i n g s , i n d e e d , show clearly that b o t h the decision o f t h e M i n d and the

appetite a n d the d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f t h e B o d y b y nature exist t o g e t h e r — o r rather
are o n e a n d the same t h i n g , w h i c h w e caU a decision w h e n i t is considered
under, and explained t h r o u g h , the a t t r i b u t e o f T h o u g h t , a n d w h i c h w e caU a
d e t e r m i n a t i o n w h e n i t is considered u n d e r the a t t r i b u t e o f E x t e n s i o n a n d
deduced f r o m the laws o f m o t i o n a n d rest. ( G i i . 144; C i . 497)

T h e m o s t o b v i o u s w a y t o t a k e t h e s e r e m a r k s is t h a t t h e r e is a s i n g l e basic
structure that can be related t o body, m i n d , o r b o t h together. I n p a r t i c ­
u l a r , i f t h e m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s c o n n e c t e d w i t h t h e h u m a n b o d y are b h n d ,
t h a t is, i f t h e y are n o t e n d - g o v e r n e d , t h e n i t is d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d
h o w t h e same t h i n g w h e n ' c o n s i d e r e d u n d e r , a n d e x p l a i n e d t h r o u g h ,
the attribute o f T h o u g h t ' c o u l d be end-governed.
T h e r e a s o n t h a t m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s h n e u p i n t h i s w a y is r o o t e d i n
Spinoza's s o - c a U e d p a r a U e l i s m , h i s basic m e t a p h y s i c a l thesis t h a t ' t h e
o r d e r a n d c o n n e c t i o n o f i d e a s is t h e same as t h e o r d e r andconnection
o f t h i n g s ' ( Е П Р 7 ; G ü. 8 9 ; C i . 4 5 1 ) . A c c o r d i n g t o Spinoza, this means that
t h e h u m a n m i n d is a c o m p l e x e n t i t y ( M I P 1 5 ) , c o m p o s e d o f m a n y ideas
i n t h e s a m e w a y t h a t t h e h u m a n b o d y is c o m p o s e d o f m a n y bodies.
S p i n o z a ' s p a r a h e h s m is o b v i o u s l y a d i f f i c u l t d o c t r i n e , a n d a c a r e f u l e x p l i ­
c a t i o n a n d e x p l o r a t i o n o f i t w o u l d t a k e us t o o f a r a f i e l d . B u t , h o w e v e r
t h e d o c t r i n e is m t i m a t e l y u n d e r s t o o d , I t a k e S p i n o z a t o b e i n d i c a t i n g
h e r e t h a t m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s are a m o n g t h e ' o r d e r a n d c o n n e c t i o n ' t h a t
is c o m m o n t o t h i n g s a n d t h o u g h t , so t h a t f o r e v e r y m o t i v e tendency
t h a t is f o u n d u n d e r t h e a t t r i b u t e o f e x t e n s i o n t h e r e is a s t r u c t u r a U y s i m ­
i l a r m o t i v e t e n d e n c y ( i n d e e d , i n s o m e sense, t h e s a m e m o t i v e t e n d e n c y )
f o u n d under the attribute o f t h o u g h t . Further, I believe that Spinoza
h o l d s t h a t i n t h e s a m e w a y t h a t t h e h u m a n b o d y is t h e t o t a h t y o f its
m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s , t h e h u m a n m i n d is t h e t o t a h t y o f i t s c o r r e s p o n d i n g
m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s , a n d t h e h u m a n b e i n g is t h e t o t a l i t y o f t h o s e motive
t e n d e n c i e s related b o t h t o m i n d a n d b o d y . T h i s w o u l d e x p l a i n Spinoza's
c o m m e n t i n E I I I P 9 S t h a t ' A p p e t i t e ' — t h a t is, c o n a t u s o r m o t i v e t e n ­
d e n c y as i t is r e l a t e d t o b o t h m i n d a n d b o d y t o g e t h e r — ' i s n o t h i n g b u t
t h e v e r y essence o f m a n ' . 3 4

3 4
T h e idea that the human being and human mind, hke the human body, are fundamen-
tauy composite entities,made up oftheirsubparts,while clearlypresentin the Ethics (BIIP15),
is not as m u c h emphasized as might be. I think it comes from the way physical systems are
thought o f i n the n e w science. Leibniz wffl try to find room for the idea that physical systems
 i38 John Carriero

T h e s e passages l e n d c r e d e n c e t o t h e i d e a t h a t S p i n o z a is t a k i n g t h e
p i c t u r e o f m o t i o n a n d a c t i v i t y h e f i n d s i n t h e n e w science's c o r p o r e a l
w o r l d a n d s y s t e m a t i c a U y i n t e r p r e t i n g ah f o r m s o f activity o f finite
b e i n g s i n t e r m s o f i t . B u t w h e r e d o e s t h i s leave w h a t w e m i g h t caU p h e ­
n o m e n a l a g e n c y , o u r sense o f o u r s e l v e s as b e i n g s w h o act t h r o u g h ends?
H o w d o e s S p i n o z a ' s a c c o u n t o f t h e d e e p s t r u c t u r e o f a c t i v i t y as i n e r t i a l
i n character h o o k u p w i t h o u r everyday c o n c e p t i o n o f o u r o w n agency?
L e t m e p u U o u t f o r e x a m i n a t i o n t w o basic aspects o f o u r e v e r y d a y c o n ­
c e p t i o n o f a g e n c y . ( A ) W e d o , a f t e r аД, t e n d t o t h i n k o f o u r s e l v e s as b e i n g s
w h o s e a g e n c y is g o v e r n e d b y o r d i r e c t e d b y e n d s . ( B ) A n d w e t e n d t o
t h i n k o f o u r s e l v e s as p u r s u i n g e n d s b e c a u s e o f s o m e t h i n g w e f i n d v a l u ­
a b l e i n t h e m , so t h a t o u r a c t i v i t y t r a c k s o u r j u d g m e n t s a b o u t g o o d . O n e
w a y t o c a p t u r e t h i s s e c o n d t h o u g h t , p e r h a p s , is i n t h e t r a d i t i o n a l m o t t o
t h a t n o t h i n g is w i U e d e x c e p t u n d e r t h e aspect o f s o m e g o o d .
L e t ' s t u r n t o φ). I n a n i n t e r e s t i n g c o m m e n t at t h e e n d 0 f E I I I P 9 S ,
S p i n o z a discusses t h e r e l a t i o n o f a p p e t i t e a n d t h e g o o d : ' F r o m aU t h i s , t h e n ,
i t is clear t h a t w e n e i t h e r s t r i v e f o r , n o r w i U , n e i t h e r w a n t (appetere), nor
desire a n y t h i n g because w e j u d g e i t t o be g o o d ; o n t h e contrary, w e
j u d g e s o m e t h i n g t o b e g o o d because w e strive f o r i t , w i U i t , w a n t i t
(appetimus),and d e s i r e i t ' ( G i i . 148; C i . 5 0 0 ) . ' F r o m aU t h i s ' s e e m s t o r e f e r
t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n s o f w i U , a p p e t i t e , a n d d e s i r e t h a t w e c o n s i d e r e d earher,
a n d t h r o u g h these d e f i n i t i o n s t o t h e g e n e r a l c o n c e p t i o n of motive
t e n d e n c y as c o n a t u s . I t a k e t h e f i r s t h a l f o f S p i n o z a ' s c l a i m t o foUow
i m m e d i a t e l y f r o m t h e i d e a t h a t m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s are s i m p l y given—
e x t e r n a U y c a u s e d — a n d n o t e n d - r e s p o n s i v e at aU, a n d so, i n p a r t i c u l a r ,
n o t r e s p o n s i v e t o o u r j u d g m e n t s o f w h a t is a n d w h a t is n o t g o o d .
The basis f o r t h e s e c o n d hah° o f S p i n o z a ' s c l a i m — t h a t w e judge
s o m e t h i n g g o o d b e c a u s e w e h a v e a n a p p e t i t e f o r i t , t h a t is t o say, b e c a u s e
w e h a v e a m o t i v e t e n d e n c y t o w a r d i t — i s p e r h a p s less clear. I t is, I t h i n k ,
p a r t o f t h e i n e r t i a l c h a r a c t e r o f a m o t i v e t e n d e n c y t h a t i n t h o s e cases
w h e r e t h e m o t i v e t e n d e n c y is a c c o m p a n i e d b y awareness, w e t e n d t o
a f f i r m i t ( i n a pro tanto w a y ) , w h i c h a f f i r m a t i o n is e x p r e s s e d i n t h e ( a g a i n ,
pro tanto) b e l i e f t h a t w h e r e t h e t e n d e n c y is t a k i n g us is g o o d . ( S p i n o z a ' s
assumption t h a t i f a s t o n e w e r e c o n s c i o u s o f its m o t i v e t e n d e n c y i t

are the product of their parts (and the parts, the product oftheir parts) and that this complex­
ity is reflected i n the mental w o r l d — t h e complexity o f the perceptual state o f the monad
(which expresses its body completely) mirrors the internal complexity o f b o d y — w i t h o u t
endorsing the conclusion that the monad itseh"is composite.
 Spinoza on Final Causality 139

w o u l d t h i n k t h a t i t c o n t i n u e s i n m o t i o n b e c a u s e i t w a n t s t o , seems t o b e
a s p e c i a l case o f h i s v i e w t h a t b e i n g s f e e l t h e i r m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s i n t h i s
manner.) Conversely, a m o t i v e tendency that, w h e n accompanied b y
c o n s c i o u s n e s s , was i n its o w n r i g h t ( a n d n o t t h r o u g h o t h e r m o t i v e t e n ­
dencies i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h i t ) e x p e r i e n c e d negatively w o u l d seem t o
c o n t a i n t h e seeds o f i t s o w n d e s t r u c t i o n i n v i o k t i o n o f t h e basic c o n a ­
tus i d e a ( Ε Π Ι Ρ 4 ) .
H o w e v e r w e i n t e r p r e t t h e basis f o r t h i s s e c o n d haJ_fofSpinoza's c l a i m ,
h e is c l e a r l y a f f i r m i n g a n a h g n m e n t b e t w e e n w h a t w e d e c i d e t o d o a n d
w h a t w e j u d g e t o b e g o o d . H i s p o i n t is t h a t , c o n t r a r y t o w h a t o n e m i g h t
t h i n k , t h e conatus, m o t i v e tendencies, appetites, o r w h a t he t e r m s i n
E l I I P 2 S ' t h e d e c i s i o n s o f t h e M i n d ' are p r i o r t o o u r e v a l u a t i o n o f s o m e -
t h i n g as g o o d . O u r a p p e t i t e s d o n ' t t r a c k o u r e v a l u a t i o n s ; o u r e v a l u a t i o n s
t r a c k o u r a p p e t i t e s . S p i n o z a e x p l a i n s h i s p o s i t i o n f u r t h e r l a t e r i n P a r t 3,
at E l I I P 3 9 S . A f t e r r e c a U i n g t h e c l a i m a b o u t a p p e t i t e a n d g o o d h e set
o u t i n E I I I P 9 S ( r e p o r t e d h e r e as ' t h a t w e d e s i r e n o t h i n g b e c a u s e w e
j u d g e i t t o b e g o o d , b u t o n t h e c o n t r a r y w e caU i t g o o d b e c a u s e w e
desire i t ' ) , h e w r i t e s :

So each one, f r o m his o w n affect,judges, o r evaluates, w h a t is g o o d and w h a t is

bad, w h a t is better and w h a t is worse, a n d finaUy, w h a t is best a n d w h a t is worst.
So t h e Greedy m a n j u d g e s an abundance o f m o n e y best, and p o v e r t y w o r s t . T h e
A m b i t i o u s m a n desires n o t h i n g so m u c h as Esteem and dreads n o t h i n g so m u c h
as Shame.To t h e E n v i o u s n o t h i n g is m o r e agreeable t h a n another's unhappiness,
and n o t h i n g m o r e burdensome t h a n another's happiness.And so, each one, from
his o w n afFect,judges a t h i n g g o o d o r bad, useful o r useless. ( G i i . 170; C i . 516)

A p p a r e n d y , t h e g e n e r a l r u n o f o n e ' s a p p e t i t e s , m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s , estab­
lishes ( o r c a n i n c e r t a i n cases estabhsh) a s t a n d i n g affect, so t h a t , f o r
e x a m p l e , t h e g r e e d y m a n is p u t t o g e t h e r so t h a t h e g r a v i t a t e s t o w a r d
m o n e y a n d a w a y f r o m p o v e r t y . T h i s s t a n d i n g affect d e t e r m i n e s h i s v a l u -
a t i o n s . T h i s is a n a p p h c a t i o n o f S p i n o z a ' s p o i n t t h a t o u r a p p e t i t e s , o u r
m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s , are p r i o r t o o u r j u d g m e n t s o r e v a l u a t i o n s o f g o o d .
Spinoza's c o m m e n t s a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n m y appetites a n d
t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e g o o d c a n m a k e i t s e e m as i f m y h f e as a n a g e n t
o u g h t t o b e a m u c h h a p p i e r affair t h a n i t i s — t h a t I f i n d m y s e i f h e a d e d
i n a certain d i r e c t i o n , a n d h k e t h e cognitive stone o r the greedy m a n ,
I f i n d myserfpleased w i t h w h e r e I a m heading and p r o n o u n c e i t g o o d .
I n E H I P 2 S , S p i n o z a , a n t i c i p a t i n g h i s d o c t r i n e t h a t o u r afFect is p r i m a r y
i40 John Carriero

a n d t h a t o u r ' d e c i s i o n s ' , r a t h e r t h a n t r a c k i n g a n y t h i n g , are reaUy j u s t

a p p e t i t e s , fiüs t h e s t o r y o u t a b i t :

So experience itself, n o less clearly t h a n reason, teaches that m e n beHeve t h e m ­

selves free because they are conscious o f t h e i r o w n actions, a n d i g n o r a n t o f t h e
causes b y w h i c h they are d e t e r m i n e d , that the decisions o f t h e M i n d are n o t h ­
i n g b u t t h e appetites t h e m s e l v e s , w h i c h therefore vary as t h e disposition o f t h e
B o d y varies. For each o n e governs e v e r y t h i n g from his affect; those w h o are
t o r n b y c o n t r a r y affects do n o t k n o w w h a t they w a n t , and those w h o are n o t
m o v e d b y any affect are v e r y easily d r i v e n here and there. ( G i i . 143; C i . 49CH7)

A r e a s o n , t h e n , w h y o u r affective h f e d o e s n o t always r u n s m o o t h l y is
t h a t , c o m p l e x systems o f m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s t h a t w e are, w e c a n f i n d o u r ­
selves ' t o r n b y c o n t r a r y affects' o r w i t h o u t a n y s t r o n g m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s
o f o u r o w n , i n w h i c h case w e 'are v e r y easily d r i v e n h e r e a n d t h e r e ' .
Let's t u r n t o ( A ) , o u r sense o f o u r s e l v e s as b e i n g s w h o s e a c t i v i t i e s are
d i r e c t e d b y ends. S p i n o z a does n o t deny, o f c o u r s e , t h a t w e t h i n k o f o u r ­
selves i n t h i s w a y . H e h o l d s t h a t t h i s w a y o f t h i n k i n g , h o w e v e r , i n v o l v e s
a certain a m o u n t ofconfusion. Let m e explain.
A f t e r c l a i m i n g t h a t ' a s [ G o d ] has n o p r i n c i p l e o r e n d o f e x i s t i n g , so h e
has n o n e o f a c t i n g ' , S p i n o z a goes o n t o r e m a r k , ' W h a t is caUed a final
cause is n o t h i n g b u t a h u m a n a p p e t i t e i n s o f a r as i t is c o n s i d e r e d as a
p r i n c i p l e , o r p r i m a r y cause, o f s o m e t h i n g ' ( E l V p r e f . ; G i i . 206—7; C i .
544), w h i c h is r e i n f o r c e d b y M V D 7 : ' B y t h e e n d f o r t h e sake o f w h i c h
w e d o s o m e t h i n g I u n d e r s t a n d a p p e t i t e ' ( G I I , 210; C I , 5 4 7 ) . T h e s e are
s t r i k i n g , i f d i f f i c u l t , r e m a r k s . A s w e have s e e n , i n t h e A r i s t o t e h a n t r a d i ­
tion t h e final cause is t h e cause o f c a u s a h t y o f t h e o t h e r causes, d i r e c t i n g
i n p a r t i c u l a r a t h i n g ' s exercise o f i t s agency, a n d a n a p p e t i t e w a s a n a t u ­
r a l i n c l i n a t i o n t h a t is i n s o m e w a y g u i d e d b y a n e n d . So w h a t d o e s
S p i n o z a m e a n w h e n h e says t h a t final cause is t h e a p p e t i t e , c o n s i d e r e d i n
a c e r t a i n w a y ? H e offers t h i s i U u s t r a t i o n :

F o r example, w h e n w e say that h a b i t u a t i o n was the final cause o f t h i s o r that

house, surely w e understand n o t h i n g b u t that a m a n from the fact that h e i m a g ­
i n e d the conveniences o f d o m e s t i c hfe, h a d an appetite t o b u i l d a house (ex eo,
quod vitae domesticae commoda imaginatus est, appetitutn habuit aedificandi domum).
So h a b i t u a t i o n , insofar as i t is considered as a final cause, is n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n
this singular appetite. I t is reaUy an efficient cause, w h i c h is considered as a first
cause, because m e n are c o m m o n l y i g n o r a n t o f the causes o f t h e i r appetites.
( H V p r e f ; G i i . 207; C i . 544—5)
 Spinoza on Final Causality 141

N o t i c e , t o b e g i n w i t h , t h a t m y t h i n k i n g o f m y s e h " as h a v i n g a f i n a l
cause i n v o l v e s a m i s t a k e : I t h i n k o f a m o t i v e t e n d e n c y , a n e f f i c i e n t cause,
as a f i r s t cause, w h e n i t is n o t a f i r s t cause b u t s i m p l y a n e l e m e n t i n a n
i n f i n i t e c h a i n o f m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s . I t a k e i t t h a t S p i n o z a is i m p l y i n g t h a t
i f w e w e r e n o t i g n o r a n t o f t h e causes o f o u r a p p e t i t e s ( o r p e r h a p s e v e n
i f w e w e r e n o t i g n o r a n t o f t h e f a c t t h a t o u r a p p e t i t e s are t h e sorts o f
t h i n g s t h e y are, w i t h t h e sorts o f c a u s e s t h a t t h e y h a v e ) , w e w o u l d d r o p
t a l k 0 f f 1 n a l causes a n d s t i c k w i t h a p p e t i t e s o r e f f i c i e n t causes. So w h i l e
i t is t r u e t h a t S p i n o z a says f i n a l causes are a p p e t i t e s , I t h i n k w e n e e d t o
b e alive t o t h e h i n t o f a n e r r o r t h e o r y h e r e . 3 5

W h a t S p i n o z a is d o i n g h e r e is s i m p l y h o o k i n g u p his conception
o f t h e u n d e r l y i n g causal a r c h i t e c t u r e o f a c t i v i t y t o t h e s u r f a c e p h e n o m ­
e n o l o g y o f h u m a n a g e n c y . W e s a w a b o v e t h a t o u r awareness o f o u r
m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s is a c c o m p a n i e d , f o r S p i n o z a , b y s o m e s o r t o f p r o -
a t t i t u d e t o w a r d w h e r e t h e t e n d e n c i e s are c a r r y i n g us ( t h i s p r o - a t t i t u d e
c a n b e e x p r e s s e d i n a j u d g m e n t t h a t w h a t w e desire, t h a t is, w h e r e our
m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s are t a k i n g us, is g o o d ) . So i m a g i n e t h a t I , s o m e w h a t
the w a y w e m i g h t i m a g i n e a bee o r wasp, 3 6
f i n d myseH"headed t o w a r d
nest c o n s t r u c t i o n o r h o u s e b u i l d i n g . T h e w a y i n w h i c h I e x p e r i e n c e
t h i s m o t i v e t e n d e n c y is t h a t I f i n d m y s e r f b e i n g v i s i t e d b y i m a g e s o f
d o m e s t i c bhss a n d so f o r t h — t h a t ' s w h a t ' i m a g i n [ i n g ] t h e c o n v e n i e n c e s
o f d o m e s t i c h f e ' i s , f o r S p i n o z a — a s I g o a b o u t s t a c k i n g b r i c k s a n d so o n .
S i n c e I d o n o t k n o w w h e r e t h e s e i m a g e s c o m e f r o m , I t h i n k o f t h e m as
t h e f i r s t i t e m s i n a causal c h a i n a n d c o m e t o see t h e s u b s e q u e n t i t e m s
i n t h e c h a i n as d o n e f o r t h e i r sake.

3 5
Others have taken this iUustration and related doctrine as more straightforward than it is,
not giving enough weight to the fact that our attribution ofends is based on ignorance. F o r
example, E d w i n C u r l e y and D o n Garrett take this passage to provide a prima facie example o f
Spinoza's locating 'the cause o f human action in the present representation o f a future effect'
(Garrett,'Teleology in Spinoza';see also C u r l e y , ' O n Bennett's Spinoza'). I n my view,they do
not provide a pbusible account ofthe 'nothing but' w h e n Spinoza claims 'a final cause is n o t h ­
ing but human appetite' or the penumbra ofconfusion he claims surrounds our thinking about
final causes. A s I understand them, the point o f Spinoza's identification o f final cause w i t h
appetite is to avoid some form o f causation whereby the future (final cause) exercises some
mysterious influence over the present. Such a motivation is, i n my view, idle.According to the
traditional doctrine 0 f f 1 n a l causality, the final cause, the end, is registered i n the 'current' struc­
ture ofthe agent ^ience the role ofthe likeness in the case o f a n oHve tree's causing an olive
tree, or 'the impression' o n the heavy thing i n the case ofheaviness). F o r this reason, I do not
find it credible that the force ofSpinoza's identification ofthe final cause w i t h appetite is to get
a coherent temporal ordering ofcause and efFect.
3 6
Spinoza compares us w i t h the lower animab i n S I D ? 2 S (see below).
142 John Carriero

O f c o u r s e , a m u c h b e t t e r w a y f o r m e t o v i e w these matters, Spinoza

t h i n k s , w o u l d b e f o r m e t o r e a l i z e t h a t t h e i m a g e s t h e m s e l v e s are b u t
h n k s i n a n e n o r m o u s l y c o m p l e x causal c h a i n t h a t r u n s p a r a U e l t o a s i m ­
i l a r l y c o m p l e x c h a i n o f c o r p o r e a l causes i n v o l v i n g m y b o d y . I f I t h i n k o f
myseffas g o i n g a b o u t the h o u s e - b u i l d i n g i n a p u r e l y m e c h a n i c a l way, i n
t h e w a y w e m i g h t t h i n k o f a w a s p o r b e e b u i l d i n g i t s nest, a n d t h i n k o f
t h e m e n t a l side o f t h i s a c t i v i t y as r u n n i n g p a r a U e l t o t h e c o r p o r e a l side,
I w ü l c o m e t o r e a h z e t h a t t h e h o u s e - b u i l d i n g a p p e t i t e is i n f a c t a n e n o r ­
m o u s l y c o m p l i c a t e d t e n d e n c y t h a t i n v o l v e s a vast n u m b e r o f m o r e s u b -
Üe t e n d e n c i e s o r urges. A s these v a r i o u s tendencies w o r k their way
t h r o u g h m y s y s t e m ( o r b e t t e r : t h r o u g h t h e s y s t e m t h a t is m e ) , a h o u s e
results. T h e k e y t h i n g h e r e is t h a t ah o f t h i s h a p p e n s b h n d l y , w i t h o u t
the subsequent m o t i v e tendencies b e i n g directed b y o r ordained t o
some end.
I w o u l d n o t w a n t t o stake m y s e l f t o e v e r y d e t a i l h e r e , b u t I t h i n k t h e
p r e c e d i n g affords a p r e t t y g o o d p i c t u r e o f h o w S p i n o z a t h i n k s a b o u t
f i n a l causes a n d t h e w a y i n w h i c h w e c o m e t o h a v e m i s g u i d e d v i e w s
a b o u t t h e m . I n a n y e v e n t , h i s c l a i m t h a t f i n a l causes are reaUy e f f i c i e n t
c a u s e s a m o u n t s t o t h e coUapse o f t h e e n d - s t r u c t u r e d a g e n t o f s c h o l a s t i c
A r i s t o t e h a n i s m i n t o t h e b l i n d m e c h a n i c a l e f f i c i e n t cause o f t h e n e w s c i ­
ence. O n e m i g h t w o n d e r , i n a n A r i s t o t e l i a n frame o f m i n d , w h e t h e r w e
d o n ' t n e e d t o m a k e r o o m f o r t h e i d e a t h a t at least o u r h i g h e r - l e v e l a c t i v ­
i t i e s are c o n t r o U e d b y e n d s . D o n ' t I n e e d a n e n d t o c o n t r o l m y a c t i v i t y i f
I a m t o d o a n y t h i n g so r e m a r k a b l e as t o b u i l d a h o u s e ? H o u s e s c a n n o t ,
i t m i g h t be suggested, s i m p l y result f r o m b h n d m o t i v e tendencies hash­
i n g t h i n g s o u t , o r at least t h e y c a n n o t d o so ' f o r t h e m o s t p a r t ' .
D o e s S p i n o z a s h o w a n y s y m p a t h y f o r t h e i d e a t h a t , p u t t i n g aside w h a t
is g o i n g o n e l s e w h e r e i n t h e u n i v e r s e , at least i n t h e case o f h u m a n
a c h i e v e m e n t s w e n e e d final causes t o d i r e c t o u r a c t i v i t y ? A l t h o u g h h e
d o e s n o t d i r e c d y address t h i s q u e s t i o n i n t h e c o n t e x t o f f i n a l causahty,
I t h i n k i t is e v i d e n t , from w h a t h e says i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h h i s d e f e n s e o f
h i s v i e w t h a t t h e m i n d d o e s n o t c o n t r o l t h e b o d y , t h a t t h e a n s w e r is n o .
I n j5niP2S,he c o n s i d e r s t h i s o b j e c t i o n :

T h e y w ü l say, o f c o u r s e , that i t cannot happen that the causes o f b u i l d i n g s , o f

paintings, and o f t h i n g s o f t h i s k i n d , w h i c h are made o r J y b y h u m a n skiU, s h o u l d
be able t o be deduced from the laws o f n a t u r e alone, insofar as i t is considered
t o be o n l y corporeal; n o r w o u l d t h e h u m a n B o d y be able t o b u i l d a t e m p l e , i f i t
were n o t d e t e r m i n e d a n d g u i d e d b y the M i n d . ( E I I I P 2 S ; G i i . 142-3; C i . 496)
 Spinoza on Final Causality 143

His reply:

B u t I have already s h o w n that t h e y d o n o t k n o w w h a t the B o d y can do, o r w h a t

can be deduced f r o m the consideration o f i t s nature alone, a n d that they k n o w
f r o m experience that a great m a n y things happen f r o m the laws o f n a t u r e alone
w h i c h t h e y never w o u l d have beheved c o u l d h a p p e n w i t h o u t the d i r e c t i o n o f
the M i n d — s u c h as the things sleepwalkers do i n t h e i r sleep, w h i c h they w o n ­
der at w h i l e t h e y are awake. ( E n i P 2 S ; G i i . 143; C i . 496)

T h e ' B u t I h a v e a h e a d y s h o w n ' refers b a c k t o a n e a r h e r passage i n t h e

Scholium:

A n d ofcourse, n o one has yet d e t e r m i n e d w h a t the B o d y can do, i . e. experience

has n o t yet taught anyone w h a t the B o d y can d o f r o m the laws o f n a t u r e alone,
insofar as nature is o n l y considered t o be corporeal, and w h a t the b o d y can do
o n l y i f i t is d e t e r m i n e d b y the M i n d . F o r n o o n e has yet c o m e t o k n o w the
structure o f t h e B o d y so accurately that he c o u l d explain aU its f u n c t i o n s — n o t
to m e n t i o n that m a n y things are observed i n t h e l o w e r A r u m a b that far surpass
h u m a n ingenuity, a n d that sleepwaUters d o a great m a n y things i n t h e i r sleep
that t h e y w o u l d n o t dare t o awake.This shows weU e n o u g h that the B o d y itself,
s i m p l y from the laws o f i t s o w n nature, can d o m a n y things w h i c h its M i n d
w o n d e r s at. ( E I I I P 2 S ; G i i . 142; C i . 495)

S p i n o z a is s u g g e s t i n g h e r e t h a t o u r m o r e i m p r e s s i v e achievements—
' b u i l d i n g s , p a i n t i n g s , a n d so f o r t h ' — h a p p e n i n m o r e o r less t h e s a m e
w a y as t h e i m p r e s s i v e a c h i e v e m e n t s o f t h e l o w e r a n i m a l s , i . e . t h r o u g h t h e
laws o f c o r p o r e a l nature alone, w h i c h d o n o t i n v o l v e end-directed
a c t i v i t y . T h e p o i n t a b o u t s l e e p w a l k e r s is especiaUy sahent. H e is i m p l y ­
3 7

i n g t h a t t h e y are able t o p u U o f F w h a t e v e r i t is t h e y p u U o f f w i t h o u t t h e
g u i d a n c e o f m e n t a l i m a g e s o r w h a t n o t — w h a t t h e y d o is s u p p o s e d t o
f o U o w f r o m t h e l a w s o f b o d y a l o n e . T h i s m a k e s i t h a r d t o see h o w i n
t h o s e cases w h e r e w e are c o n s c i o u s , w h e r e w e are v i s i t e d b y i m a g e s o f

3 7
It is worth noting here that one o f the aspects o f Descartes's philosophy that Spinoza
seems least happy with in his exposition Descartes's 'Principles of Philosophy' are the causal
principles that Descartes employs in his argument for the existence o f G o d , namdy,'What can
bring about the greater, or more difficult, can also bring about the lesser' and 'It is greater to
create, or . . . preserve, a substance than the attributes, or properties o f a substance'. Spinoza
comments: 'But what he means by this I do not know.What does he caU easy, and what dif­
ficult? N o t h i n g is said to be easy or difficult absolutely, but only i n rektion to a cause. So one
and the same thing can at the same time be caUed both easy and difficult i n relation to differ­
ent causes' ( G i. i 6 i ; C i. 2 4 8 ) . Spinoza gives as an example 'the spider w h i c h easily weaves a web
that men could weave only w i t h the greatest difficulty'. (For h o w Descartes might respond, see
Curley's helpful comment i n note 'd'; see also, A T vii. 134.)
144 John Carriero

d o m e s t i c bHss o r w h a t e v e r , t h o s e i m a g e s s e r v e t o g u i d e o r c o n t r o l o u r
activity.
S o w h e n S p i n o z a says i n ErVD7,'By t h e e n d f o r t h e sake o f w h i c h w e
d o s o m e t h i n g I u n d e r s t a n d appetite', I take h i m t o be d e n y i n g that w e
h a v e e n d s i n t h e A r i s t o t e h a n sense o f s o m e t h i n g t h a t is t h e cause o f t h e
causaHty o f t h e o t h e r causes, s o m e t h i n g t h a t , i n p a r t i c u l a r , d i r e c t s a n
agent's exercise o f i t s a c t i v i t y , so t h a t t h e a g e n t m i g h t b r i n g a b o u t a t r a n ­
s i t i o n f r o m p o t e n c y t o act, o r , less m e t a p h y s i c a U y a n d m o r e i n f o r m a U y ,
so t h a t a n a g e n t m a y b r i n g a b o u t s o m e i m p r e s s i v e a c h i e v e m e n t , s u c h as
a b u i l d i n g o r , f o r t h a t m a t t e r , t h e w r i t i n g o f t h e Ethics. Rather, an
e n d , a c c o r d i n g t o h i m , is reaUy m y i m p e r f e c t c o g n i t i o n o f a m o t i v e
t e n d e n c y — t h a t is, a n a p p e t i t e — t h a t is e m b e d d e d i n a c o m p l e x o f o t h e r
m o t i v e tendencies, o t h e r appetites.
I n t h e cases o f b o t h ( A ) a n d @ 3 ) , S p i n o z a m a k e s c e r t a i n c o n c e s s i o n s t o
w h a t m i g h t b e caUed t h e p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f agency. I t is t h e case t h a t
m y a p p e t i t e s a n d t h e p e r c e i v e d g o o d ( o r m y e v a l u a t i o n s o f g o o d ) are
aligned. I misunderstand w h a t brings this a l i g n m e n t about, however,
w h e n I take m y appetites t o f o U o w m y p e r f e c t i o n o f t h e g o o d . Similarly,
w h e n I d o t h i n k o f a t least s o m e o f m y a c t i v i t i e s , say, h o u s e - b u i l d i n g , as
h a v i n g f i n a l c a u s e s , t h i s results f f o m m y e r r o n e o u s l y t h i n k i n g t h a t s o m e
o f m y appetites i n i t i a t e (and, I t h i n k , c o n t r o l ) m y subsequent activities.

FINAL CAUSALITY AND TELEOLOGY

I h a v e b e e n u s i n g t h e t r a d i t i o n a l i d e a o f a f i n a l cause t o f o c u s S p i n o z a ' s
t h i n k i n g a b o u t c o n a t u s , a p p e t i t e , f i n a l causes, a n d e n d s . I n t h i s w a y , i t is
p o s s i b l e , I t h i n k , t o a c h i e v e a f a i r l y clear a n d c o n s i s t e n t p i c t u r e o f his
t h o u g h t o n these t o p i c s . A c t i v i t y a n d c h a n g e i n h i s u n i v e r s e r e s u l t f r o m
( m o r e o r less c o m p l e x ) b e i n g s , w i t h ( m o r e o r less c o m p l e x ) i n e r t i a l t e n ­
d e n c i e s , t h a t is, t e n d e n c i e s t o p e r s e v e r e i n t h e i r b e i n g , t h a t b o t h s t r i v e t o
k e e p g o i n g as t h e y are a n d c o n t i n u a U y g e t i n e a c h o t h e r ' s way. T h i s is
w h a t w e w o u l d e x p e c t h i m t o h o l d i f h e t h i n k s o f c o r p o r e a l b e i n g s as
t h e p a t t e r n - h k e entities d e p i c t e d above, a n d i f the m e n t a l w o r l d runs
paraUel t o t h e c o r p o r e a l w o r l d . M o r e o v e r , w h e n carefuUy examined,
t h e r e m a r k s t h a t S p i n o z a m a k e s a b o u t h u m a n b e i n g s a n d ends d o n o t ,
i n m y view, encourage the t h o u g h t that he sought to reintroduce the
 Spinoza on Final Causality 145

e n d - g o v e r n e d appetites i n t h e m e n t a l w o r l d that he banished f r o m t h e

c o r p o r e a l order. R a t h e r , t h e y s e e m t o reflect a strategy o f t a k i n g m o t i v e
tendencies i n b o t h orders t o be similarly structured and i n t e r p r e t i n g
the p h e n o m e n o l o g y o f h u m a n agency a r o u n d this fact. I n this way,
r e f l e c t i n g o n t h e basic n a t u r e o f m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s as f o u n d w i t h i n t h e
c o r p o r e a l o r d e r e n v i s i o n e d b y t h e n e w s c i e n c e , S p i n o z a is u l t i m a t e l y l e d
t o p r e s e n t a n a c c o u n t o f t h e u n i v e r s e t h a t is free from a n y t h i n g t h a t a n
A r i s t o t e h a n w o u l d h a v e r e c o g n i z e d as final causahty.
T h e p i c t u r e o f o u r s e l v e s as agents t h a t S p i n o z a leaves us w i t h can
s e e m r a t h e r s t a r k . I t is h a r d t o t h i n k o f o u r s e l v e s as (at least o n o u r b e t ­
t e r days) n o t m u c h m o r e t h a n a r e l a t i v e l y c o m p l e x b u n d l e o f m o t i v e
t e n d e n c i e s o r a p p e t i t e s . I t is h a r d t o g i v e u p t h e i d e a t h a t w e genuinely
p u r s u e e n d s , w h e r e t h o s e e n d s are p r i o r t o o u r a c t i v i t y a n d g u i d e o u r
e x e r c i s e o f o u r causaHty. I t is also h a r d t o g i v e u p t h e i d e a t h a t o u r d e c i ­
sions, at least s o m e o f t h e m , are r e s p o n s i v e t o v a l u e , o r at least t o o u r
perception ofva|ue.
W h a t is c a u s i n g t h e d i f f i c u l t y h e r e , I t h i n k , is t h a t i t is e x t r e m e l y d i f ­
ficult t o find a w a y t o i n t e g r a t e t h e s e b e h e f s a b o u t o u r s e l v e s as agents
w i t h t h e causal a r c h i t e c t u r e o f t h e c o r p o r e a l w o r l d , as u n d e r s t o o d i n t h e
n e w s c i e n c e , a n a r c h i t e c t u r e t h a t is p r i m a f a c i e a h e n t o o u r a g e n c y . M o s t
t h i n k e r s t o o k i t as o b v i o u s t h a t t h e m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s o f n e w s c i e n c e
m a t t e r are n o t ( i n t e r n a U y ) e n d - d i r e c t e d . B u t , t h e n , h o w c a n w e fit
t o g e t h e r i n a satisfying w a y this c o n c e p t i o n o f m a t t e r a n d t h e h u m a n
b o d y w i t h o u r o r d i n a r y sense o f o u r s e l v e s as agents? W e m a y g a u g e
s o m e t h i n g o f t h e e n o r m i t y o f t h e task i f w e l o o k at w h a t L e i b n i z h a d t o
d o , i n o r d e r t o r e t u r n t o us o u r agency. O n h i s t h e o r y , w e d o g e n u i n e l y
p u r s u e e n d s a n d o u r a p p e t i t e s are r e s p o n s i v e t o p e r c e i v e d g o o d . B u t i n
o r d e r t o secure this h e h a d t o replace p a r a U e h s m — i n particular, t h e v i e w
that the order and c o n n e c t i o n o f t h i n g s w i t h i n the attribute o f t h o u g h t
is t h e s a m e as t h e o r d e r a n d c o n n e c t i o n o f t h i n g s w i t h i n t h e a t t r i b u t e o f
e x t e n s i o n — w i t h pre-established h a r m o n y , w h i c h , as I u n d e r s t a n d i t ,
whUe a U o w i n g t h a t t h e r e is a s y s t e m a t i c relationship between the
m o n a d i c o r d e r a n d t h e c o r p o r e a l o r d e r , sees t h e t w o o r d e r s n o t as p a r ­
aUel, b u t as f u n d a m e n t a U y d i f f e r e n t : ' S o v d s act a c c o r d i n g t o t h e k w s o f
final causes t h r o u g h t h e i r a p p e t i t i o n s , e n d s , a n d m e a n s . B o d i e s act
a c c o r d i n g t o t h e l a w s o f e f f i c i e n t causes o r t h e l a w s o f m o t i o n . A n d t h e
t w o k i n g d o m s , t h a t o f e f f i c i e n t causes a n d t h a t o f final causes, are i n
146 John Carriero

h a r m o n y w i t h each other' ( ' M o n a d o l o g y ' , §79, G P v i . 6 2 0 ) . 3 8

Notice
h o w u n - A r i s t o t e l i a n Leibniz's segregation o f f i n a I causahty f r o m effi­
cient causahty is.We d o g e n u i n e l y p u r s u e ends, w e d o g e n u i n e l y t r a c k
the perceived good, but w e had to posit monads t o get this result.
M o r e o v e r , t h i s a c t i v i t y is n o w v i e w e d as m e t a p h y s i c a h y p r i o r t o — a n d
i n a c e r t a i n sense, separate f r o m — t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d , w h i c h is n o w ( i n
l a r g e p a r t f o r t h i s v e r y r e a s o n , I t h i n k ) r e g a r d e d as m e r e l y
3 9
phenome­
n a l . S p i n o z a a n d L e i b n i z are b o t h h a v i n g t r o u b l e g e t t i n g t h e b H n d e f f i ­
c i e n t causality o f the n e w science a n d the e n d - g o v e r n e d efficient
c a u s a l i t y o f h u m a n a c t i v i t y i n t o t h e s a m e f r a m e , so t o speak. S p i n o z a ' s
s o l u t i o n is t o t a k e t h e p h y s i c a l o r d e r as f u n d a m e n t a l a n d r e i n t e r p r e t
h u m a n a g e n c y i n t e r m s o f i t , a r g u i n g t h a t t h e r e is less t o o u r p u r s u i t o f
e n d s a n d g o o d t h a n m e e t s t h e eye. L e i b n i z goes i n t h e o t h e r d i r e c t i o n ,
t a k i n g o u r a g e n c y at f a c e v a l u e , a r g u i n g t h a t t h e r e is less r e a h t y t o t h e
p h y s i c a l o r d e r t h a n m e e t s t h e eye. S u r e l y t h e l e n g t h s t o w h i c h e a c h
p h i l o s o p h e r w e n t is a t e s t a m e n t t o t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f t h e p r o b l e m w i t h
w h i c h t h e y saw t h e m s e l v e s f a c e d , i n a c c o m m o d a t i n g us t o a c o r p o r e a l
o r d e r i n w h i c h e f f i c i e n t c a u s a t i o n is b h n d .
I n r e c e n t years, t h e r e has b e e n a f a i r a m o u n t o f d i s c u s s i o n o f S p i n o z a ' s
a t t i t u d e t o w a r d ' t e l e o l o g y ' , w h e r e t h i s has b e e n t a k e n t o m e a n h i s a t t i ­
t u d e t o w a r d a c e r t a i n style o f e x p k n a t i o n . 4 0
W h i l e i t m a y be an interest­
ing e x e r c i s e t o l o o k t o h i s t e x t s f o r a n a n s w e r t o t h i s q u e s t i o n , i t is
i m p o r t a n t t o r e c o g n i z e t h a t w h e n he's d i s c u s s i n g f i n a l causahty, w h a t
he's d i s c u s s i n g is n o t w h e t h e r a c e r t a i n f o r m o f e x p l a n a t i o n is l e g i t i m a t e ,
i U u m i n a t i n g , o r u s e f u l , b u t r a t h e r h o w m o t i v e t e n d e n c i e s a n d a g e n t s are
structured, and, i n p a r t i c u h r , w h e t h e r those m o t i v e tendencies and
a g e n t s are e n d - g o v e r n e d o r d i r e c t e d as o p p o s e d t o b h n d . O n e m a y s p e c -
u k t e that w h a t objections Spinoza had to teleological explanations
w o u l d r u n t h r o u g h t h e sorts o f u n d e r l y i n g agents t h a t these e x p l a n a t i o n s

3 8
T h e translation is from GottfriedWUhekn Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and Letters, ed. and
trans. L e r o y E . L o e m k e r @ 3 o r d r e c h t : R e i d e l , 1976), 651.
3 9
I argue for this in 'Substance andTeleology i n Leibniz' (unpubhshed).
4 0
Although I have come to think it is not a good idea to use the notion o f teleological
explanation to frame an interpretation ofSpinoza o n fmal causahty, I want to record my debt
to Bennett's w o r k , w h i c h sparked my interest in this topic. I am particukrly sympathetic to his
insistence that Spinoza's rejection offinal causahty is quite general and o fhi gh importance—
as Bennett puts it,'Miss that and you miss most o f w h a t is interesting in Part 3 ' ofthe Bthics
i A StudyofSpinoza'sEUncs,2is).For t h e v i e w thatSpinoza's rejection offinal causahtyapphes
onlyto the attribution ofdivine purpose withinnature,see Curley,'OnBennett's Spinoza';for
the v i e w that Spinoza is a thoroughgoing teleologist, see Garrett,'Teleology i n Spinoza'.
 Spinoza on Final Causality 147

presupposed. I f a given form o f teleological explanation does not

r e q u i r e f i n a l c a u s a l i t y , t h a t i s , d o e s n o t r e q u i r e e n d - d i r e c t e d a g e n t s , i t is

not clear t o m e t h a t Spinoza w o u l d o b j e c t t o i t . B y w a y o f c o n t r a s t , i f a

given form of teleological explanation does require end-directed

a g e n t s , i t is h a r d t o see h o w i t m i g h t b e h e l p f u l f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n y o f

the g o i n g s o n w i t h i n Spinoza's u n i v e r s e . 4 1

University of California at LosAngeles

4 1
I thank the editors, Stephen Nadler and Daniel Garber, for their helpful advice. I ako
acknowledge, with gratitude, the written comments of Hannah Ginsborg, Paul Hoffman,Jon
МШег, and StephenVoss on an earHer version ofthis essay. O v e r the years, the writings ofand
conversation with Gavin Lawrence and Sean Kekey have helped improve my understanding of
Aristode andAristotehan philosophy; I am especiaUy grateful to Kekey for a set ofdetailed c o m ­
ments o n a late drafi o f the essay. I would ako hke to thank Barbara H e r m a n and Calvin
Normore, w h o have influenced the current version ofthe essay more than they perhaps realize.
 5

Spinoza's Axiology

JON MILLER

A f t e r experience had t a u g h t m e that аП the things w h i c h regularly occur

i n o r d i n a r y hfe are e m p t y and f u t i l e , a n d I saw that aU the things w h i c h were
the cause o r object o f m y fear h a d n o t h i n g o f g o o d o r b a d i n themselves,
except insofar as [ m y ] m i n d was m o v e d b y t h e m , I resolved at last t o t r y t o
f i n d o u t w h e t h e r there was a n y t h i n g w h i c h w o u l d be the t r u e g o o d , capable
of communicating itsetf, and w h i c h alone w o u l d affect the m i n d , aU
others s o m e t h i n g w h i c h , once f o u n d
a n d a c q u i r e d , w o u l d c o n t i n u o u s l y give m e the greatestjoy, to eternity. (TIE
1,Gii.5;Ci.7)

I n t h e s e o p e n i n g l i n e s o f t h e Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect—

a m o n g t h e m o s t s t i r r i n g i n aU h i s c o r p u s — S p i n o z a raises a q u e s t i o n t h a t
has l o n g v e x e d p h i l o s o p h e r s : w h a t , i f a n y t h i n g , is t r u l y v a l u a b l e ? S p i n o z a
was t o r e t u r n t o t h i s q u e s t i o n i n m a n y o f h i s w o r k s , f r o m t h e e a r l y TIE
a n d Short Treatise t o his m a t u r e m a s t e r p i e c e , t h e Ethics. B e c a u s e i t was so
i m p o r t a n t t o h i m , i t shovdd n o t b e s u r p r i s i n g t h a t his answers have b e e n
the subject o f a n u m b e r o f s t u d i e s . 1
F o r аД t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s , h o w e v e r ,

1
These include: H . A . WoHson, The Philosophy of Spinoza, i [Spinoza] (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1 9 3 4 ) , esp. 4 3 7 f.;David Bidney, The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza
[Psychology] (New Haven, C T : Yale University Press, 1 9 4 0 ) , esp. ch. 1 5 ; E . M . Curley,'Spinoza's
Moral Philosophy', i n Marjorie Grene (ed.), Spinoza:A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden
City, N Y : A n c h o r Books, 1 9 7 3 ) , 3 5 4 - 7 6 ; W i u i a m K . Frankena, 'Spinoza's " N e w Morahry" '
['New Morahty'], in Maurice Mandelbaum and E u g e n e Freeman (eds.), Spinoza: Essays in
Interpretation fLaSaue, Ш O p e n C o u r t Publishing, 1975), 85—100; R u t h Mattern, 'Spinoza and
Ethical Subjectivism' ['Ethical Subjectivism'], i n Charles E . J a r r e t t , J o h n King-Farlow, and
E J . PeHetier (eds.), New Essays on Rationalism and Empiricism (Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy,
supplementary vol. 4 ( 1 9 7 8 ) ) , 5 9 - 8 2 ; J o n a t h a n Bennett, A Study of Spinoza's Ethics [Study]
(Indianapohs: Hackett PubHshing, 1 9 8 4 ) , ch. 12; D o n Garrett, 'Spinoza's Ethical T h e o r y '
[ ' E t h i c a l T h e o r y ' ] , i n D o n Garrett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1 9 9 6 ) , 2 6 7 - 3 1 4 ; CharlesJarrett,'Spinoza on the R e k t i v i t y o f
G o o d and E v i l ' ['Good and E v i l ' ] , i n O U i Koistinen andJohn Biro (eds.), Spinoza: Metaphysical
Themes (Oxford: O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 2 0 0 2 ) , 159—81.
 i50 Jon Miller

t h e r e is a c o m m o n t h e m e t o t h e s e s t u d i e s : t h a t S p i n o z a w a s a r e l a t i v i s t
a b o u t v a l u e . I n o n e o f t h e earhest s t u d i e s , W o h % o n a r g u e s t h a t S p i n o z a
u s e d l a n g u a g e stressing t h e d e p e n d e n c e o f v a l u e o n h u m a n c o g n i t i o n
a n d i m a g i n a t i o n i n o r d e r t o express h i s ' c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i v i t y o f
g o o d a n d e v i l ' i n t h e Short Treatise a n d t h e Ethics. 2
M o s t recendyJarrett
o p e n s h i s p a p e r b y s t a t i n g t h a t ' S p i n o z a appears t o m a i n t a i n t h a t g o o d
a n d e v i l are r e l a t i v e i n at least t h r e e w a y s . ' D i s p u t e s a b o u t h o w , p r e c i s e l y ,
3

his r e l a t i v i s m o u g h t t o b e u n d e r s t o o d have k e p t t h e i n k f l o w i n g b u t
t h e r e has b e e n essential a g r e e m e n t among most commentators that
v a l u e o b t a i n s s o l e l y i n r e l a t i o n t o us.
A s n o t e d b e l o w , t h e r e are t e x t s i n s u p p o r t o f a r e l a t i v i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a -
t i o n . Y e t t h e r e are o t h e r s w h i c h suggest t h a t S p i n o z a w a s n ' t a n u n q u a h ­
f i e d r e l a t i v i s t . S h o r d y after t h e a b o v e e x c e r p t , h e speaks i n t h e TIE of
t h e successful c o m p l e t i o n o f h i s q u e s t f o r a ' t r a e g o o d ' ( a n d , i n a d d i t i o n ,
a ' h i g h e s t g o o d ' ) ( § 1 3 ) . I n t h e Ethics h e says t h a t s o m e t h i n g s are ' c e r ­
t a i n l y g o o d o r b a d ' (ErVP27) a n d s o m e t h i n g is ' n e c e s s a r i l y g o o d ' w h i c h
'agrees w i t h o u r n a t u r e ' ( E I V P 3 1 ) . T e x t s h k e these ( a n d o t h e r s t o b e
c i t e d b e l o w ) are h a r d t o f i t i n t o a n u n q u a h f i e d r e l a t i v i s t i c f r a m e w o r k ,
w h e r e v a l u e is n o t o b v i o u s l y t h o u g h t o f a s ' t r u e ' o r ' c e r t a i n ' o r ' n e c e s ­
sary'. I n d e e d , texts h k e these have l e d s o m e o f t h e best S p i n o z a com­
mentators to conclude t h a t his t h o u g h t s o n value are incoherent.
B i d n e y states t h e a c c u s a t i o n w e U w h e n h e vnites,'Spinoza's Stoic ration­
alism with its acknowledgment of absolute moral standards is incompatible with
his biological naturalism which teaches the complete relativity of allgood and evil,
virtue and vice, to the requirements ofself-preservationl*
T h i s essay offers a fresh p e r s p e c t i v e o n S p i n o z a ' s a x i o l o g y , d i f f e r i n g
f r o m o t h e r s b y e m p h a s i z i n g t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l g r o u n d s o n w h i c h i t is
secured. B y c o n n e c t i n g Spinoza's a x i o l o g y t o his metaphysics, a n e w a n d
crucial distinction w i U be made possible—the distinction between n o n -
circumstantiaUy relatively valuable goods a n d circumstantiaUy relatively
v a l u a b l e o n e s . T h i s d i s t i n c t i o n w i U p r e s e r v e t h e essential t r u t h o f t h e r e l -
a t i v i s t r e a d i n g — t h a t g o o d s are o n l y r e l a t i v e l y v a l u a b l e — w h i l e also
a c c o m m o d a t i n g t h e n o t i o n that s o m e goods have value w h i c h doesn't
change w i t h the circumstances. I n a d d i t i o n , n e w h g h t w i U be shed o n
o t h e r key properties w h i c h Spinoza accords t o value.

2
Woffson,SpiHi>ze,438. 3
Jarrett,'GoodandEvil',i59.
4
Bidney, Psychology, 317 (his itahcs).
 Spinoza'sAxiology

I t w ü l b e u s e f u l t o b e g i n w i t h s o m e basics. S p i n o z a w r i t e s i n M V P 3 1 D e m ,
' I n s o f a r as a t h i n g agrees (convenit) w i t h o u r nature, i t cannot be bad
ftry P 3 0 ) . S 0 i t m u s t e i t h e r b e g o o d o r i n d i f f e r e n t . ' L i k e m a n y i n t h e h i s ­
5

tory o f W e s t e r n philosophy, 6
Spinoza t h o u g h t that goods do n o t admit o f
a b i v a l e n t d i v i s i o n . I n s t e a d , t h e r e are t h r e e categories o f v a l u e — b a d
(malus), g o o d (bonus), a n d i n d i f f e r e n t (indifferens).Wbile t h e r e is a p p a r e n d y
n o t h i n g special a b o u t his a c c e p t a n c e o f a t r i p a r t i t e d i v i s i o n o f v a l u e , t h e
basis t h a t S p i n o z a p r o v i d e s f o r t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f v a I u e is m o r e d i s t i n c t ­
ive. I n t h e t e x t j u s t q u o t e d , h e aUudes t o t h i s basis: i t c o n c e r n s t h e t h i n g ' s
' a g r e e m e n t ' w i t h o u r n a t u r e . H e elaborates i n t h e C o r o U a r y t o S V P 3 1 :

insofar as [a t h i n g ] does n o t agree w i t h o u r nature, i t w i U necessarily be difFer¬

ent from i t o r c o n t r a r y to i t . I f i t is different from i t , t h e n ф у P29) i t can be n e i ­
ther g o o d n o r b a d . A n d i f i t is contrary, t h e n i t w U l also be c o n t r a r y t o that w h i c h
agrees w i t h o u r nature, i.e. ф у P31), c o n t r a r y t o the g o o d , o r (seu) bad. N o t h i n g ,
therefore, can b e g o o d except insofar as i t agrees w i t h o u r nature.

I f s o m e t h i n g 'agrees' w i t h o u r n a t u r e , i t is g o o d ; b a d i f i t disagrees; a n d
n e i t h e r g o o d n o r b a d — t h a t is, i n d i f f e r e n t — i f i t n e i t h e r agrees n o r disagrees.
O n e m i g h t w o n d e r w h y s o m e t h i n g s h o u l d be g o o d j u s t because i t
agrees w i t h o u r n a t u r e . T o t h i s , S p i n o z a m i g h t ask us t o consider
t h e o p p o s i t e c a s e — t h e case w h e r e s o m e t h i n g is d e e m e d b a d b e c a u s e i t
5
C u d e y renders 'malus' as 'evil' here and ebewhere. I n his 'Glossary-Index',he says that he
struggledoverthe correct transbtion,debatingbetween'evU'and'bad'before settling on'evil'
with the understanding that it was to be taken as deflationary ( C i. 6 3 6 ) . Because 'evil' has a
morahstic connotation that is lacking i n Spinoza's Latin, it wiU be replaced throughout
with 'bad'.This preserves the contrast (intended by Spinoza) between malus and its opposite,
bonus, and reorients the interpretation from the moral to the axiological. Cf. G . H . R . Parkinson
(ed. and trans.), Spinoza: Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 0 ) , 338 n. 51.
6
T h i s is true o f Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, to take but three obvious and influential
examples. For Plato, see, e.g. Laws 6 9 7 a - b and Diogenes Laertius 03.L.) Lives of the Philosophers
I I I . 8 1 , where he is said to have thought that 'there are three kinds ofgoods: goods o f t h e
mind, goods ofthe body and external goods' (trans, by R . D. H i c k s (Cambridge, M A : Harvard
University Press, 1972)).ForAristotle, see, e.g. Nicomachean Ethics 1.8 and the pseudo-Aristode
text DivisionesAristotekae 1.1:'Ofgoods, some are i n the soul, some in the body, and some
external. For example, justice and practical wisdom and courage and setf-control and such
things are in the soul;beauty and good condition and health and strength are i n the body; and
friends, the eudaimonia o f one's fatheriand and wealth are among externak. So there are
three kinds (eide) ofgoods: those in the soul, those i n the body, and those external' (my transhi-
tion).For the Stoics,see, e . g . D . L . V I I . i o i : ' f T h e Stoics] say thatsome existingthings are good,
others are bad, and others are neither o f these' (trans, by A . A . L o n g and D. N . Sedley in
The HellenisticPhilosophers,i (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1 9 8 7 ) , 4 5 3 ) .
152 Jon Miller

disagrees w i t h o u r n a t u r e . F o r e x a m p l e , s u p p o s e s o m e o n e eats s o m e
s p o i l e d f o o d a n d is s t r i c k e n b y f o o d p o i s o n i n g . T h a t f o o d d i s t u r b s
h e r n a t u r a l p h y s i c a l processes a n d states; as a r e s u l t , w e w o u l d say t h a t i t
is b a d for h e r . O u r r e a s o n f o r s a y i n g so, S p i n o z a w o r n d a r g u e , is e x a c d y
t h e o n e h e c i t e s — i t disagrees w i t h h e r n a t u r e . O r , t o t a k e a n o t h e r e x a m ­
p l e , s u p p o s e a s u i t o r ' s desire f o r a r o m a n t i c r e l a t i o n s h i p is t h w a r t e d b y h i s
rej e c t i o n b y h i s w o u l d - b e l o v e r . S i n c e h i s desires are a p a r t o f h i s n a t u r e —
t h e y are a p a r t o f h i s m i n d — h e r r e j e c t i o n disagrees w i t h h i s n a t u r e a n d
is t h e r e f o r e b a d . I n b o t h these e x a m p l e s , t h e g o o d s i n q u e s t i o n r e c e i v e
t h e i r v a l u a t i o n f r o m t h e i r c o n s i s t e n c y w i t h t h e agent's n a t u r e ( w h e t h e r
p h y s i c a l o r m e n t a l ) . B e c a u s e t h e y are i n c o n s i s t e n t — o r , t o use S p i n o z a ' s
w o r d , c o n t r a r y — w i t h t h e agent's n a t u r e , t h e y are b a d .
T o b e sure, i t is possible f o r s o m e t h i n g t o b e agreeable ( o r disagreeable)
b y b e i n g i n e r t a n d inefficacious. As t h e examples i n t h e previous para­
g r a p h suggest, h o w e v e r , t h i s is n o t t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f a g r e e m e n t or
d i s a g r e e m e n t t h a t S p i n o z a has i n m i n d . W h e n h e speaks o f a g o o d as
a g r e e i n g o r d i s a g r e e i n g w i t h us, h e m e a n s t h a t i t has a n effect o n o u r
n a t u r e s : i t i n t e r f e r e s w i t h o u r n a t u r e s w h e n i t disagrees a n d c o n t r i b u t e s t o
t h e m w h e n i t agrees. I t is h e r e , i n t h e effect t h a t t h e t h i n g has o n us, t h a t
t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n h o w s o m e t h i n g agrees w i t h o u r n a t u r e s a n d its
v a l u e hes: i f i t increases o u r a b i h t y t o act, t h e n i t is g o o d ; o t h e r w i s e , i t is b a d
o r i n d i f f e r e n t . T h e r e are o t h e r standards b y w h i c h v a l u e m a y b e d e t e r ­
7

m i n e d , b u t f o r S p i n o z a i t e m e r g e s o u t o f a g o o d ' s a b i h t y t o affect u s . T h e
n o t i o n t h a t t h e u s e f u b e s s o f a g o o d d e t e r m i n e s its v a l u e is so f u n d a m e n t a l
t o Spinoza's t h o u g h t t h a t h e m a k e s t h e m h i s o f f i c i a l D e f i n i t i o n s o f g o o d
a n d b a d : f H V D i , ' B y g o o d I shah u n d e r s t a n d w h a t w e c e r t a i n l y k n o w t o
b e u s e f u l t o us'; a n d £ l V D 2 , ' B y b a d , h o w e v e r , I shaU u n d e r s t a n d w h a t w e
c e r t a i n l y k n o w p r e v e n t s us from b e i n g masters o f s o m e g o o d . '
F r o m t h e f o r e g o i n g , a q u e s t i o n arises. I t is e v i d e n t t h a t S p i n o z a d e t e r ­
m i n e s v a l u e i n t e r m s o f u s e . H o w e v e r , a t h e o r y o f v a l u e w h i c h defines
v a l u e i n t e r m s o f u s e c a n b e s a t i s f a c t o r y o n l y i f a n a c c o u n t is p r o v i d e d o f
t h e a g e n t u s i n g t h e g o o d i n q u e s t i o n . T h e r e a s o n is s i m p l e : i t is i m p o s ­
sible t o say w h e t h e r a t h i n g is u s e f u l a n d t h e r e f o r e v a l u a b l e f o r a n a g e n t
unless i t is k n o w n w h a t s o r t o f b e i n g t h a t a g e n t is. T o understand
Spinoza's v i e w s o n t h i s m a t t e r — t h a t i s , t o u n d e r s t a n d h i s v i e w s o n n a t u r e s
o r essences—we n e e d t o e x p l o r e his d o c t r i n e o f serf-preservation or
awaiMS, f o r h e d e f i n e s essences i n t e r m s ofconatus.

7
T h e connection between one's nature and one's abihty to act wiU be made plain shordy.
 Spinoza 's Axiology 153

Conatus f i r s t appears i n t h e Ethia at t h e b e g i r m i n g o f P a r t I I I : ' E a c h

t h i n g , as far as i t is i n itself(quantum in se est), strives t o persevere i n its b e i n g '
(ЕШР6). I t is a fact a b o u t u s — a n d ah o t h e r b e i n g s — t h a t w e s t r i v e t o
8

c o n t i n u e t o exist; t h i s fact a n i m a t e s aU o f o u r a c t i o n s ( M I I P 8 ) . T h e i n d i ­
v i d u a l a n d coUective actions that each o f u s undertakes t o r e m a i n i n exis­
t e n c e are, b y Spinoza's h g h t s , f u n d a m e n t a l t o w h o w e are. H e w r i t e s i n
flniP7:'The s t r i v i n g (conatus) b y w h i c h e a c h t h i n g strives t o persevere i n
its b e i n g is n o t h i n g b u t t h e a c t u a l essence o f t h e t h i n g . ' I t is n o t t h e case
t h a t w e have s o m e ' c o r e ' essence apart from t h e a c t i o n s w e take t o r e m a i n
i n e x i s t e n c e ; t h e r e is n o m o r e basic e n t i t y w h i c h is t h e s o u r c e o f these
a c t i o n s t h a t m i g h t i t s e t f b e i d e n t i f i e d as o u r essence. R a t h e r , S p i n o z a
argues, o u r essencejust is o u r conatus—that is, o u r essence is o u r i n d i v i d u a l
a n d c o U e c t i v e s t r i v i n g s t o p r e s e r v e o u r b e i n g . H e offers d i f f e r e n t a r g u ­
m e n t s f o r t h i s c k i m . I n t h e Cogitata Metaphysica, f o r e x a m p l e , h e says t h a t
t h e r e is at m o s t a ' d i s t i n c t i o n o f r e a s o n ' a n d n o t a 'real d i s t i n c t i o n ' b e t w e e n
o u r essence a n d o u r s t x i v i n g s . W h ü e o n e c a n speak o f o u r essence apart
from o u r s t r i v i n g s — t h i s is a h a U m a r k o f a d i s t i n c t i o n o f r e a s o n — o n e c a n ­
n o t t r u l y c o n c e i v e t h e f o r m e r w i t h o u t t h e k t t e r . T r y as o n e m i g h t , o n e
w i U always f m d o n e s e i f t h i n k i n g o f i n d i v i d u a l s t r i v i n g s w h e n o n e t h i n k s
o f a n essence, p r o o f t h a t t h e r e is n o t a real d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o . 9

T h e i n t r o d u c t i o n oiconatus and the emphasis o n the p o w e r o f a c t i n g

necessitates t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f a n o t h e r f a c t o r i n t o t h e d i s c u s s i o n . I t
m a y b e t h a t s o m e t h i n g is u s e f u l i f i t f u r t h e r s ( o r at least does n o t i n h i b i t )
o u r a b i h t y t o act so as t o p r e s e r v e o u r b e i n g . S p i n o z a t h o u g h t , h o w e v e r ,
t h a t w e h a v e two r a d i c a U y d i f f e r e n t p o w e r s o f a c t i o n a n d as a r e s u l t ,
he t h o u g h t there w e r e t w o radicaUy different orders o f v a l u e . T o explain
t h i s — t h a t is, t o e x p l a i n w h y h e t h o u g h t t h a t w e h a v e t w o d i f f e r e n t p o w ­
ers o f a c t i o n a n d , c o n s e q u e n d y , t h a t t h e r e are t w o d i f f e r e n t o r d e r s o f
v a t a e — a d i g r e s s i o n i n t o his m e t a p h y s i c s is necessary.
I n P a r t I o f t h e Ethics, w e are t a u g h t t h a t t h e r e is o n e a n d o n l y o n e
substance ( £ 3 P i 4 ) . T h i s 1 0
s u b s t a n c e — m o r e precisely, t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f

8
T h e account o f conatus given i n this paragraph is necessarily condensed and makes no
claims to originality.Among the many exceUent commentaries w h i c h the reader may consult
for more is the coUection ofarticles i n Section O n e o f Y i r m i y a h u Y o v e l (ed.), Desire and
Affect: Spinoza as Psychologist (NewYork: LitUe R o o m Press, 1 9 9 9 ) .
9
See Cogitata Metaphysica, I . V I , I I . V and I I . V I ( C i. 3 1 4 , 3 2 3 ^ 5 ) .
1 0
T h e foUowing overview draws o n many sources, including Bennett, Study, chs. 3 , 4 , and 6,
andMichaelDeUaRocca,'Spinoza'sSubstanceMonism',inKoistinenandBiro (tds.),Spinoza:
MetaphysicalThemes, 11-37.
i54 Jon Miller

this substance—is capable o f b e i n g 'perceived' b y t h e 'inteUect' i n

m o r e t h a n o n e w a y (ElD4 a n d P10). Perhaps o t h e r intehects w o u l d p e r ­
ceive t h e substance chfferendy t h a n t h e h u m a n i n t e h e c t ; however, we
p e r c e i v e s u b s t a n c e as e x t e n d e d a n d as t h i n k i n g ( £ I I P i — 2 ) . E v e n t h o u g h
w e p e r c e i v e s u b s t a n c e i n t w o r a d i c a U y d i f f e r e n t t e r m s , its essential u n i t y
is n o t s a c r i f i c e d . A s S p i n o z a s a y s , ' T h e o r d e r a n d c o n n e c t i o n o f i d e a s is
t h e same as t h e o r d e r a n d c o n n e c t i o n o f t h i n g s ' ( Н П Р 7 ) . B e c a u s e h e
t h o u g h t t h a t s u b s t a n c e is c a p a b l e o f b e i n g p e r c e i v e d i n t w o d i f f e r e n t
w a y s , h i s t h e o r y is s o m e t i m e s c a U e d a ' d u a l a s p e c t ' t h e o r y . T h e r e is o n l y
n

o n e s u b s t a n c e b u t i t has t w o aspects w h i c h are r e l a t e d t o e a c h o t h e r i n

such a way that, i f an attempt were made to provide an account o f sub­
stance i n t e r m s o f o n e a t t r i b u t e , a correlate t o t h a t a c c o u n t w o u l d b e
f o u n d i n t h e o t h e r a t t r i b u t e . I f o n e w e r e t o d e s c r i b e a state o f s u b s t a n c e
u s i n g p h y s i c a h s t i c t e r m i n o l o g y , o n e w o u l d also b e a b l e t o d e s c r i b e t h a t
state u s i n g m e n t a h s t i c t e r m s . A s S p i n o z a p u t s i t i n E I I P 7 S , ' t h e t h i n k i n g
s u b s t a n c e a n d t h e e x t e n d e d s u b s t a n c e are o n e a n d t h e s a m e s u b s t a n c e ,
w h i c h is n o w c o m p r e h e n d e d u n d e r t h i s a t t r i b u t e , n o w u n d e r t h a t . '
Two o t h e r p o i n t s . F i r s t , t h e d u a l aspect t h e o r y j u s t m e n t i o n e d ,
according to which substance is p e r c e i v a b l e as thinking and as
e x t e n d e d , is o f t e n r e f e r r e d t o as p a r a U e l i s m . A s t h e m e t a p h o r o f p a r a l -
l e l i s m suggests, t h e t w o o r d e r s — t h e m e n t a l a n d t h e p h y s i c a l — r u n
paraUel to o n e a n o t h e r w i t h o u t ever intersecting. A t h o u g h t can lead
t o a n o t h e r t h o u g h t b u t i t c a n n e v e r p r o d u c e o r o t h e r w i s e affect a b o d y ,
a n d v i c e v e r s a . I t is t r u e t h a t s u b s t a n c e is c h a n g i n g ( o r : a p p e a r s t o o u r
i n t e U e c t s as t h o u g h i t w e r e c h a n g i n g ) ; a n d s i n c e w e p e r c e i v e s u b s t a n c e
under the attribute o f thought and the attribute o f extension, the
c h a n g e s h a p p e n s i m u l t a n e o u s l y . B u t t h e r e is a n i n s u r m o u n t a b l e c o n ­
ceptual barrier between the thinking and the extended realms,
s u c h t h a t i n t e r a c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e m is i m p o s s i b l e . A s S p i n o z a says i n
E H I P 2 , ' T h e B o d y cannot determine the M i n d to thinking, and the
M i n d c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e t h e B o d y t o m o t i o n , t o rest o r t o a n y t h i n g else
( i f t h e r e is a n y t h i n g else).'
T h e s e c o n d p o i n t is t h a t t h e paraUehsm e x i s t i n g b e t w e e n t h e a t t r i b u t e s
o f substance a k o exists, mutatis mutandL·, i n i n d i v i d u a l m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f
11
For example,Thomas Nagel writes, 'Searle identifies me as a defender ofproperty
dualism. I prefer the term "dual aspect theory," to express the v i e w deriving from Spinoza that
mental phenomena are the subjective aspects o f states that can also be described physicaUy'
('Searle:Why we are not Computers',reprinted i n T h o m a s Nagel, OtherMinds: CriticalEssays
1g60-1004 (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress, i Q Q 5 ) , o 6 - i i o , a t 105 n. 6.
 Spinoza 's Axiology 155

substance s u c h as y o u a n d m e . 1 2
As modifications ofsubstance, the para­
m e t e r s o f o u r natures are closely c i r c u m s c r i b e d b y its n a t u r e . S i n c e s u b ­
stance is p e r c e i v e d as b o t h t h i n k i n g a n d e x t e n d e d , w e t o o m u s t b e b o t h
t h i n k i n g a n d e x t e n d e d b e i n g s ( H I A 2 a n d A 4 ) . I n s o f a r as w e are t h i n k i n g
b e i n g s , o n l y t h o u g h t s are relevant t o o u r m e n t a l actions a n d passions; qua
e x t e n d e d beings, o n l y b o d i e s m a t t e r t o t h e states o f o u r b o d i e s . A s S p i n o z a
says i n £ I L P 6 , ' T h e m o d e s o f e a c h a t t r i b u t e h a v e G o d f o r t h e i r cause o n l y
i n s o f a r as h e is c o n s i d e r e d u n d e r t h e a t t r i b u t e o f w h i c h t h e y are m o d e s , a n d
n o t i n s o f a r as h e is c o n s i d e r e d u n d e r a n y o t h e r a t t r i b u t e . ' Because p a r a l -
l e h s m apphes t o us, w e have t w o radicaUy d i f f e r e n t p o w e r s o f a c t i o n : m e n ­
tal p o w e r s a n d p h y s i c a l p o w e r s . T h e s e p o w e r s c a n n o t b e a s s i m i k t e d o r
reduced, o n e t o the other: the physical involves the n o t i o n o f f o r c e studied
b y physics w h e r e a s t h e m e n t a l i n v o l v e s t h e n o t i o n o f i n f e r e n c e o r s o m e
s i m i k r conceptual counterpart studied b y logic (taking'logic'very broadry).
That said, w e can now r e t u r n t o axiology. T h i s digression was
l a u n c h e d at t h e m o m e n t w h e n t h e significance ofco«ai«5 f o r Spinoza's
a x i o l o g y e m e r g e d . I t w a s o b s e r v e d t h a t f o r S p i n o z a , s o m e t h i n g is u s e f u l
a n d h e n c e v a l u a b l e i f i t increases o u r p o w e r o f a c t i o n . T h i s p o w e r o f
a c t i o n is a t h i n g ' s conatus a n d e r g o its essence. N o w , b e c a u s e w e h a v e
b o t h physical a n d m e n t a l aspects w h i c h , a l t h o u g h u n i f i e d i n one
essence, d o n o t i n t e r a c t a n d are n o t r e d u c i b l e o n e t o t h e o t h e r , w e h a v e
effectively t w o radicaUy different powers o f a c t i o n : w e have m e n t a l
p o w e r s a n d w e h a v e p h y s i c a l p o w e r s . B e c a u s e w e h a v e t w o radicaUy d i f ­
ferent powers o f a c t i o n , there m u s t b e t w o different kinds o f g o o d s c o n ­
tributing to the maintenance a n d increase o f these p o w e r s . Since
w h a t e v e r is u s e f u l t o us is v a l u a b l e , w e h a v e t o c o n c l u d e t h a t t w o d i f f e r e n t
k i n d s o f t h i n g s are v a l u a b l e , because t w o d i f f e r e n t k i n d s o f t h i n g s are u s e ­
f u l . C l e a r e v i d e n c e o f t h i s d u a h s m o f v a l u e is d i s c e r n i b l e i n Spinoza's texts.
T a k e first t h e issue o f v a l u e f o r t h e b o d y . W h e t h e r s o m e t h i n g w i U b e
useful f o r o u r bodies is d e t e r m i n e d b y i t s effect on our bodies'
essences. 13
O u r b o d i e s ' essences are d e f i n e d i n t e r m s o f t h e p r o p o r t i o n
o f m o t i o n a n d rest a m o n g t h e i r p a r t s . 1 4
So, t h i n g s are u s e f u l a n d h e n c e

1 2
F o r more o n this, see M i c h a e l DeUa R o c c a , Representation and the Mind-Body ProbUm in
Spinoza [Representation] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, ioa6),esp. ch. 2 .
1 3
HereandthroughoutmetaUcisofourboa^es''essences'andourrninds' 'essences'.Thisshould
not be taken to imply that we have two different essences, one for our bodies and a second for our
minds. O u r essences are unified even ifthey are ako describable in (at least) two sets ofterms.
1 4
C f . E l I P i 3 S , H V P 3 9 S . F o r discussion, see Alan Gabbey, 'Spinoza's Natural Science and
Methodology',inGarrett (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, 142^1,at 1 6 7 ^ .
i56 Jon Miller

v a h m b l e t o t h e b o d y i f t h e y a i d t h e b o d y ' s essential p r o p o r t i o n of
m o t i o n and rest. 1 5
A s S p i n o z a says i n E I V P 3 9 : ' T h o s e t h i n g s are g o o d
w h i c h b r i n g about the preservation o f the p r o p o r t i o n o f m o t i o n and
rest t h e h u m a n B o d y ' s p a r t s h a v e t o o n e a n o t h e r ; o n t h e o t h e r hand,
t h o s e t h i n g s are b a d w h i c h b r i n g i t a b o u t t h a t t h e p a r t s o f t h e human
b o d y h a v e a d i f f e r e n t p r o p o r t i o n o f m o t i o n a n d rest t o o n e another.'
T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f p h y s i c a l g o o d s is e x p a n d e d o n a f e w pages l a t e r :

T o use things, therefore, and take pleasure i n t h e m as far as p o s s i b l e — n o t , o f

course, t o the p o i n t w h e r e w e are disgusted w i t h t h e m , f o r there is n o pleasure
i n t h a t — t h i s is the part o f a wise m a n .
I t is the p a r t o f a w i s e m a n , I say,to refresh and restore himseh"in m o d e r a t i o n
w i t h pleasant f o o d and d r i n k , w i t h scents, w i t h the beauty o f g r e e n plants, w i t h
d e c o r a t i o n , music, sports, the theater, a n d o t h e r things o f t h i s k i n d , w h i c h any­
one can use w i t h o u t i n j u r y t o another. F o r the h u m a n B o d y is c o m p o s e d o f
a great m a n y parts o f d i f f e r e n t natures, w h i c h constandy require n e w a n d v a r i e d
n o u r i s h m e n t , so that the w h o l e B o d y may be equaUy capable o f aU the things
w h i c h can f o U o w f r o m its nature, a n d hence, so that the M i n d ako may be
equaUy capable o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g m a n y things. (xjIVP45Cor2S)

H e r e , one f o r m s the i m a g e o f a p e r s o n w h o partakes fuUy ofphysical

g o o d s . S u c h a p e r s o n d o e s so, h o w e v e r , n o t b e c a u s e h e a c c e p t s a h e d o ­
n i s t i c m o r a l o u d o o k , n o t b e c a u s e h e t h i n k s o f p l e a s u r e as t h e h i g h e s t
good. 1 6
R a t h e r , h e is m o t i v a t e d b y t h e b e n e f i t t h e y b r i n g t o h i s b o d y —
t h a t is t o say, b y t h e d i f f e r e n t sorts o f n o u r i s h m e n t t h e y p r o v i d e which

1 5
A few words are in order about the relationship between this conception ofessence—the
conception o f essence as consisting i n the propordon o f motion and rest among the body's
parts—and the earher conception o f essence—the conception o f essence as conatus. That
Spinoza thinks his general conception ofessence is to be cashed out i n terms ofthis ratio w h e n
it comes to the body is clear from the digression i n physics after fTHPi3 and other p k c e s . T h e
idea seems to be that the body's identity consists in this ratio w i t h the result that the destruc­
tion o f this ratio ako leads to the destruction o f the body. A n y individual, insofar as it is
a physical being, must seek to preserve the ratio o f m o t i o n and rest among its parts i f i t is to
remain i n existence.These efforts at seff-preservation constitute the essence ofthe individual
as a physical being.
1 6
Acceptance ofpleasure as the highest good is, o f course, the haUmark ofEpicureanism.
Some commentators have taken Spinoza to be an Epicurean: see, e.g. the coUection ofarticles
in Archives de Philosophie 57 ( 1 9 9 4 ) , and E d w i n Curley, Behind the Geometrical Method [Metkod\
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 8 8 ) , 114—15. Curley argues that the pleasure w h i c h
may attend an increase ofour power ofaction constitutes part ofthejoy that is the highest good
(115).Yet, merely showing that pleasure attends the highest good does not suffice to estabHsh
Spinoza as an Epicurean. I n addition, it must be shown that one seeks the highest good because
it is pleasurable. Spinoza does not think that this is the case; rather, he thinks one pursues the
good because ofthe benefit it brings to oneseff.
 Spinoza 's Axiology

t h e b o d y r e q u i r e s f o r o p t i m a l f u n c t i o n i n g . I n s o f a r as p h y s i c a l t h i n g s —
f o o d , d r i n k , theater, g r e e n p l a n t s — a r e useful t o t h e b o d y , they are
v a l u a b l e a n d h e n c e g o o d (cf. E T V A p p X X X ) .
On t h e g e n e r a l issue o f g o o d s o f t h e b o d y , p a r t i a l d e v e l o p m e n t i n
S p i n o z a ' s v i e w s f r o m t h e TIE is d i s c e r n i b l e . T h e r e , h e h e w s a m u c h
m o r e i n t e U e c t u a h s t i c h n e . T h e ' h i g h e s t g o o d ' , h e a r g u e s , is ' t h e k n o w ­
l e d g e o f t h e u n i o n t h a t t h e m i n d has w i t h t h e w h o l e o f N a t u r e ' ( § 1 3 ) .
D i s t i n g u i s h e d from t h i s is t h e ' t r u e g o o d ' , w h i c h is d e f i n e d as ' W h a t e v e r
c a n b e a m e a n s t o [one's] a t t a i n i n g ' t h e h i g h e s t g o o d ( § i 3 ) . B e c a u s e t h e
h i g h e s t g o o d is c o n f m e d t o t h e a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h e m i n d , t h e class o f
t r u e g o o d s is s i m i l a r l y r e s t r i c t e d . S p i n o z a does n o t g o so f a r as t o d e n y
any value whatsoever t o goods that he w ü l later c o u n t a m o n g t h e t r u e
g o o d s o f t h e b o d y . B u t h e insists t h a t t h e s e g o o d s are o f secondary
w o r t h . T h e y can c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e body's m a i n t e n a n c e , b u t since t h e
b o d y ' s m a i n t e n a n c e is itseUTess i m p o r t a n t t h a n t h e m i n d ' s , t h e y t o o are
a c c o r d e d l o w e r status a n d n o t v a l u e d as t r u e g o o d s ( § 1 1 ) . S p i n o z a m a y
h o l d t h e v i e w s t h a t h e d o e s i n t h e ΊΊΕ a b o u t t h e b o d y a n d g o o d s o f t h e
b o d y b e c a u s e , at t h e t i m e o f i t s w r i t i n g , h e h a d n o t y e t f u U y f o r m u l a t e d
t h e d o c t r i n e o f s u b s t a n c e m o n i s m a n d its a t t e n d a n t p a r a U e h s m f o u n d i n
t h e Ethics. B e c a u s e h e d i d n o t y e t c o n c e i v e o f t h i n g s as h a v i n g o n e
essence p e r c e i v a b l e i n t w o d i f f e r e n t w a y s , h e d i d n o t y e t h a v e a w a y o f
v a l u i n g t h e b o d y a n d t h i n g s w h i c h c o n t r i b u t e t o its w e U - b e i n g w i t h o u t
concurrendy i n t r o d u c i n g an entirely n e w order ofgoods.
T u r n i n g n o w to goods o f the m i n d , Spinoza t o o k the m i n d t o be
made up ofideas. 1 7
I n E I I P 7 D e m a n d e b e w h e r e i n the early p a r t o f
P a r t I I , w h e n d i s c u s s i n g t h e n a t u r e o f t h e h u m a n m i n d , S p i n o z a treats
' i d e a ' as s y n o n y m o u s f o r ' k n o w l e d g e ' . 1 8
Given the synonymy between
t h e t w o c o n c e p t s , s i n c e t h e m i n d is a n a g g r e g a t e o f r e l a t e d ideas, i t m u s t
also b e a n a g g r e g a t e o f r e l a t e d k n o w l e d g e . T o p u t i t i n c o U o q u i a l t e r m s ,
i n s o f a r as w e are o u r m i n d s , w e are w h a t w e k n o w (cf. E I V P 3 7 D e m ,

1 7
F o r an exceUent discussion o f h o w the m i n d is made up ofideas, see Paul Eisenberg,'How
to understand De InteUectus Emendatione', The Journal of the History of Philosophy 9 (1971),
171^1.
1 8
Because it features i n Spinoza's solution to so many philosophical conundrums,it should
come as no surprise that he does not always use 'idea' in such a way as to make it synonymous
for 'knowledge'. For some texts equating idea w i t h knowledge, see M I P 1 9 D e m ('For the
human m i n d is the idea itseh , or knowledge (sive cognitio)
7
ofthe human body'), f I I P z o D e m
('this idea, or k n o w l e d g e ' ) , S I P 2 3 D e m ('The idea, or knowledge'), etc. F o r discussion, see Paul
Kashap, 'Spinoza's U s e o f " I d e a " ', i n R o b e r t Shahan and John B i r o (eds.), Spinoza: New
Perspectives (Norman: University o f O k l a h o m a Press, 1 9 7 8 ) , 57—70.
i58 Jon Miller

E V P 3 6 S ) . B e c a u s e a n d i n s o f a r as t h e m i n d is k n o w l e d g e , k n o w i n g is its
p e c u h a r p o w e r . A s S p i n o z a s a y s , ' t h e p o w e r o f t h e M i n d is d e f i n e d o r d y
b y u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' ( f 3 V P r e f ) . N o w , b e c a u s e t h e r n i n d is a n a g g r e g a t e o f
r e l a t e d k n o w l e d g e a n d its p e c u h a r p o w e r is k n o w i n g o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g ,
w h a t is u s e f u l t o t h e m i n d w i U b e k n o w l e d g e or understanding. As
S p i n o z a says, ' W h a t w e s t r i v e f o r f r o m r e a s o n is n o t h i n g b u t u n d e r ­
s t a n d i n g ; n o r d o e s t h e M i n d , i n s o f a r as i t uses r e a s o n , j u d g e anything
else u s e f u l t o i t s e l f e x c e p t w h a t leads t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' (ElVP26).
B e c a u s e w h a t is u s e f u l t o t h e m i n d is ' w h a t leads t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g ' a n d
b e c a u s e u s e f u l t h i n g s are g o o d , t h i n g s are g o o d ( o r b a d ) f o r t h e m i n d
o n l y i n s o f a r as t h e y f u r t h e r i t s c a p a c i t y f o r k n o w l e d g e . S p i n o z a says i n
fnVP27, ' W e k n o w n o t h i n g t o b e c e r t a i n l y g o o d o r b a d , e x c e p t w h a t
reaUy leads t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r w h a t c a n p r e v e n t us f r o m u n d e r s t a n d i n g . '
O f c o u r s e , t h e r e are m a n y p o s s i b l e o b j e c t s o f k n o w l e d g e or under­
s t a n d i n g : w e c o u l d s p e n d o u r t i m e l e a r n i n g basebaU t r i v i a o r a b o u t t h e
p r i c e o f t e a i n C h i n a . H o w e v e r , t h e basic m e t a p h y s i c a l a n d e t h i c a l j u s t i -
fication f o r the acquisition o f k n o w l e d g e o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g m u s t be, f o r
Spinoza, t h a t i t w i U increase o u r p o w e r o f a c t i o n . W e m i g h t increase o u r
p o w e r o f a c t i o n i n c e r t a i n respects o r c o n t e x t s b y k n o w i n g m o r e a b o u t
basebaU, b u t t h e effects o f s u c h k n o w l e d g e are b o u n d t o b e h m i t e d .
F o r k n o w l e d g e t o b e m o r e versatUe, u s e f u l i n a w i d e r r a n g e o f c i r c u m -
stances, i t m u s t b e a b o u t a n o b j e c t t h a t i t s e l f h a s a r i c h e r n a t u r e . I n g e n ­
eral, the r u l e f o r d e t e r m i n i n g the u t i h t y o f a n i t e m o f k n o w l e d g e w o t d d
b e : t h e g r e a t e r t h e p r o p o s i t i o n a l o r c o n c e p t u a l c o n t e n t o f t h e essence o f
t h e t h i n g b e i n g k n o w n — a s S p i n o z a m i g h t say, t h e m o r e 'ideas' i t h a s —
t h e m o r e useful k n o w l e d g e o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f such a t h i n g w i U be.
S i n c e n o t h i n g has a r i c h e r essence t h a n G o d , 'a B e i n g absolutely
i n f i n i t e ' (as S p i n o z a p u t s i t i n E I D 6 ) , ' t h e greatest t h i n g t h e M i n d c a n
u n d e r s t a n d is G o d ' ( E l V P 2 8 D e m ) . T h a t i s , ' K n o w l e d g e o f G o d is t h e
M i n d ' s g r e a t e s t g o o d ; its g r e a t e s t v i r t u e is t o k n o w G o d ' (ErVP28). 19

I t w a s s a i d a b o v e t h a t p a r t i a l d e v e l o p m e n t is d i s c e r n i b l e i n S p i n o z a ' s
a x i o l o g y f r o m t h e e a r l y TIE t o his m a t u r e w o r k s . Emphasis m u s t be
p l a c e d o n 'partiaI', f o r w h ü e Spinoza d i d a d m i t i n his later w o r k s w h a t

1 5
A point ofclarification: the reason that knowledge o f G o d is more useful than knowledge
ofother things is not that G o d is a global or universal being.The generaUty or universahty o f
the object k n o w n is not important for it is possible that general or universal beings could have
relatively impoverished conceptual or propositional content. Instead, the utihty ofan object o f
knowledge is solely determined by the richness ofthe object's content, the number ofideas (to
employ a w o r d that Spinoza might use) it contains.
 Spinoza 's Axiology 159

h e r e f u s e d i n h i s e a r l y o n e s — n a m e l y , t h a t g o o d s f o r t h e b o d y are o r c a n
b e t r u l y v a l u a b l e — h e c o n t i n u e d t o t h i n k o f t h e m i n d ' s g o o d s as m o r e
valuable t h a n the body's. F o r e x a m p l e , h e w r i t e s i n C h a p t e r F o u r o f t h e
Theological-PoliticalTreatise ( T T P ) , ' S i n c e o u r inteUect f o r m s the better
p a r t o f u s , i t is e v i d e n t t h a t , i f w e w i s h t o seek w h a t is d e f i n i t e l y t o o u r
a d v a n t a g e , w e shaU e n d e a v o u r a b o v e aU t o p e r f e c t i t as f a r as w e c a n , f o r
i n its p e r f e c t i o n m u s t consist o u r s u p r e m e g o o d ' ( G i i i . 5 9 ) . T h e super­
2 0

i o r i t y o f t h e g o o d o f t h e m i n d t o t h a t o f t h e b o d y is e c h o e d i n t h e Ethics
(cf., e.g. rilVP27). I t also raises i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e p r e c i s e
status o f t h e m i n d ' s g o o d . T h e m o s t p r e s s i n g o f t h e s e q u e s t i o n s , at least
f o r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s , c a n b e cast b y r e f e r e n c e t o s o m e o f S p i n o z a ' s
closest p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r e d e c e s s o r s .
I n the Platonic Socrates,we f i n d arguments p u r p o r t i n g to prove that
k n o w l e d g e a l o n e is i n t r i n s i c a U y a n d u n c o n d i t i o n a U y g o o d , b e c a u s e
k n o w l e d g e a l o n e n e c e s s a r i l y b e n e f i t s us b y c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e basis f o r
t h e r i g h t use o f a U g o o d s . T h e S t o i c s f o U o w e d S o c r a t e s i n s o f a r as t h e y
2 1

t h o u g h t there w e r e goods o f t r u e intrinsic value, t h o u g h t h e y supple­

m e n t e d t h e a r g u m e n t a t i v e basis f o r t h i s c l a i m b y s h o w i n g h o w t h o s e
goods m u s t be valuable, g i v e n the nature o f those w h o possessed
them. 2 2
T h u s v i r t u e is g o o d f o r S t o i c s b e c a u s e b y i t h u m a n s are able t o
achieve h a r m o n y b e t w e e n themselves a n d the w o r l d a r o u n d t h e m .
B o t h S o c r a t e s a n d t h e S t o i c s a r g u e d t h a t t h e g o o d a t t a i n s its v a l u e f r o m
its usefulness, a n d b o t h t h o u g h t t h a t b e c a u s e t h e s p e c i f i c g o o d s t h e y
i d e n t i f i e d as g o o d are n e c e s s a r i l y u s e f u l , t h e y are t r u e g o o d s . B e c a u s e
o t h e r g o o d s are s o m e t i m e s u s e f u l a n d s o m e t i m e s n o t , t h e i r p r e f e r r e d
g o o d s t r a n s c e n d o t h e r g o o d s i n t e r m s o f v a l u e . O n aU t h e s e p o i n t s
S p i n o z a ' s p r e d e c e s s o r s a g r e e . T h e q u e s t i o n w e c a n ask S p i n o z a is—
d o a n y o f h i s g o o d s t r a n s c e n d aU o t h e r g o o d s i n t e r m s o f v a l u e ?
M o r e specificaUy, is t h e h i g h e s t g o o d o f t h e m i n d — k n o w l e d g e o r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f G o d — o n t h e s a m e o r d e r o f v a l u e as o t h e r g o o d s ,
j u s t h i g h e r u p t h a n t h e rest, o r is t h a t g o o d q u a h t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m
o t h e r goods?

2 0
T h i s and aU transIarions ofthe TTP are by Samuel Shirley i n Michael L . Morgan (ed.),
Spinoza: Complete Works (Indianapohs: Hackett Pubhshing, 2 0 0 2 ) .
2 1
See especiaUy Euthydemus 2 7 9 a - 2 8 2 a and Meno 8 7 c - 8 o a . F o r a very different version o f
Socrates'views,where he is depicted as arguing that knowledge can sometimes be harmful, see
Xenophon's Memorabilia rVii.32—3.
2 2
See e.g. D . L . V H . 9 4 , 9 7 , and Cicero, TuscuUn Disputations 4.29,34-5.
i6o Jon Miller

M o s t S p i n o z a c o m m e n t a t o r s t h i n k t h a t h e h e l d t h e r e is a c o n t i n u u m
o f v a l u e , so t h a t a l t h o u g h k n o w l e d g e o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f G o d o c c u p i e s
o n e e x t r e m e o f t h e c o n t i n u u m , n o n e t h e l e s s i t is n o t essentiaUy d i f f e r e n t
f f o m o t h e r g o o d s . S i n c e a h o t h e r g o o d s are o n l y r e l a t i v e l y v a l u a b l e , i t
f o U o w s as a c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t h a t k n o w l e d g e ofGod
is o n l y r e l a t i v e l y v a l u a b l e , t o o . T h i s c o n s e q u e n c e f o h o w s b e c a u s e i t is
a s s u m e d t h a t t h e g o o d f o r m e d b y k n o w l e d g e o f G o d shares its n a t u r e
w i t h t h e g o o d f o r m e d b y o t h e r types o f k n o w l e d g e . A n i n t e r p r e t a t i o n
o f t h i s s o r t has r e c e n d y b e e n a d v a n c e d b y J a r r e t t . A c c o r d i n g t o J a r r e t t ,
' S p i n o z a ' s theses c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e l a t i v i t y o f g o o d a n d e v i l a p p e a r t o b e
s u c c i n c d y expressible w i t h t h e h e l p o f a f i v e - t e r m r e l a t i o n a l predicate:
χ is b e t t e r t h a n y f o r a g e n t z at t i m e t f o r a t t a i n i n g g o a l g . ' 2 3
U s i n g this
f i v e - t e r m p r e d i c a t e , J a r r e t t e x p l a i n s t h a t ' " x is g o o d " ' is s h o r t h a n d f o r
' " x is b e t t e r t h a n a n y o t h e r a v a i l a b l e a l t e r n a t i v e f o r z at t r e g a r d i n g
g " . . .'. 24
O n Jarrett's a c c o u n t , a l t h o u g h k n o w l e d g e of God would
a l w a y s b e v a l u a b l e b e c a u s e i t w o u l d always b e b e t t e r t h a n a n y o t h e r
available alternative, i t c a n n o t b e said t h a t k n o w l e d g e of God has
a n y a b s o l u t e v a l u e ; i t is o n h / v a l u a b l e f o r h u m a n s a n d i t is o n l y m o r e
valuable t h a n the o t h e r goods that humans m i g h t acquire.
T o assess t h e m e r i t s o f t h e r e l a t i v i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e f o r m u k t i o n
o f relativism must be tightened. T a k e n broadly, relativism m a y be
d e f i n e d as t h e v i e w t h a t a g o o d x is v a l u a b l e i f f x is v a l u a b l e t o o r f o r
s o m e s u b j e c t S. W i t h i n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , w e m a y d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n
n o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a l versus c i r c u m s t a n t i a l r e l a t i v i s m s .

1 . N o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a l r e l a t i v i s m : t h e v i e w t h a t a g o o d x is v a l u a b l e i f f
χ is v a l u a b l e f o r s o m e s u b j e c t S, i r r e s p e c t i v e o f S ' s a c t u a l o r p o s s i b l e
circumstances.
2. C i r c u m s t a n t i a l r e l a t i v i s m : t h e v i e w t h a t x is v a l u a b l e i f F x is v a l u a b l e
f o r S, g i v e n S's a c t u a l o r p o s s i b l e c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

T h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n ( i ) a n d (2) hes i n t h e r e l ­
e v a n c e o f S ' s c i r c u m s t a n c e s t o t h e v a l u e t h a t x has f o r S . A c c o r d i n g t o ( 1 ) ,
S's c i r c u m s t a n c e s are i r r e l e v a n t t o x's v a l u e , w i t h t h e r e s u l t t h a t x w f f l
always h a v e v a l u e f o r S, w h e r e a s (2) s t i p u l a t e s t h e r e l e v a n c e o f S's c i r ­
c u m s t a n c e s t o x's v a l u e : x m a y o r m a y n o t h a v e v a l u e f o r S, d e p e n d i n g
o n h e r o r his circumstances. E v e n t h o u g h t h e y differ i n this respect,

jarrett,'GoodandEvil',174. 2 4
ibid.175.
 Spinoza 's Axiology 161

( i ) a n d (2) are stiU r e l a t i v i s t i c t h e o r i e s o f v a l u e , s i n c e b o t h o f t h e m m a k e

value relative t o t h e subject S. 25

M o s t r e l a t i v i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s o f S p i n o z a are circumstantialbecause
t h e y h n k d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f v a l u e t o t h e agent's c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h i s
is t r u e o f J a r r e t t , w h o argues t h a t v a l u e is d e r i v e d from o r d e t e r m i n e d b y
t h e a c t i o n s o f a p a r t i c u l a r a g e n t p u r s u i n g a p a r t i c u l a r g o a l at a p a r t i c u l a r
t i m e . O n Jarrett's a c c o u n t , i f y o u c h a n g e a n y o f t h e c i r c u m s t a n t i a l
f a c t o r s — t h e agent o r t h e goal o r t h e t i m e — y o u m i g h t get a different
v a l u e - d e t e r m i n a t i o n . T a k e t h e f o U o w i n g e x a m p l e , discussed b y J a r r e t t ,
from MVPref:

As far as g o o d a n d bad are c o n c e r n e d , t h e y also indicate n o t h i n g o t h e r t h a n

modes o f t h i n k i n g , o r n o t i o n s w e f o r m because w e compare things t o one
another. F o r one and t h e same t h i n g can, at t h e same t i m e , b e g o o d , and bad, a n d
also indifferent. F o r e x a m p l e , M u s i c is g o o d f o r one w h o is M e l a n c h o l y , b a d f o r
one w h o is m o u r n i n g , and n e i t h e r g o o d n o r b a d t o one w h o is deaf.

I n some circumstances music w i U be g o o d whereas i n others i t w i U n o t :

i t m a y h e l p d i s t r a c t o n e p e r s o n from h e r h e a d a c h e a n d so b e g o o d f o r h e r
w h U e c a u s i n g a h e a d a c h e i n a n o t h e r p e r s o n a n d so b e b a d f o r h i m . W h a t
m a k e s m u s i c v a l u a b l e , S p i n o z a says h e r e , is n o t s o m e t h i n g i n t r i n s i c t o
m u s i c itseLf; r a t h e r , its v a l u e is e n t i r e l y d e p e n d e n t o n t h e c o n d i t i o n s a n d
natures o f t h o s e w h o hear it.Texts w h e r e Spinoza m a d e value dependent
o n c i r c u m s t a n c e s c a n b e m u l t i p h e d t o s u c h a n e x t e n t t h a t i t is i m p o s s i b l e
t o d e n y t h a t h e t o o k m a n y g o o d s t o h a v e t h e i r values c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y
d e t e r m i n e d . T h e o n l y r e a l q u e s t i o n is w h e t h e r t h i s is t r u e f o r all g o o d s .
2 6

A n i m p o r t a n t passage o f E I V P 1 8 S f o r c e s t h i s q u e s t i o n o n us. I n t h e
passage i n q u e s t i o n , S p i n o z a w r i t e s t h a t reason demands everyone
s h o u l d seek ' w h a t is t r a l y u s e f u l t o h i m ' (quod reverd utile est; G i i . 2 2 2 ) .
B e c a u s e r e a s o n d o e s n o t issue d e m a n d s w h i c h cannot be achieved
( i b i d . ) , t h e r e m u s t b e t h i n g s w h i c h are ' t r u l y u s e f u l ' t o u s . T h e q u e s t i o n
that w e w o u l d l i k e answered i s — w h a t does Spinoza m e a n b y ' t r u l y ' ?
T w o i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s suggest t h e m s e l v e s . F i r s t , a g o o d x c a n b e truly

2 5
T h o u g h there are certain affinities between them, non-circumstantial rebtivism must be
distinguished from an absolutist or non-rektivistic theory ofvalue. Like the former, the n o n -
reUtivistic theory does not tie value to circumstances. I n addition, however, non-relativism
takes the significant extra step ofsevering all ties between value and the subject.While n o n -
circumstantial relativism holds that goods can only have value for the subjects w h o possess
them, non-relativism contends that there are goods w h i c h have value, simplititer. See ako the
next section, where the rehted concept ofunconditional value is discussed.
2 6
See,e.g.HIIP39S,fimT50S (atGii.189),ErVP65Dem,EIVP68.
 IÖ2 Jon Miller

u s e f u l t o s o m e o n e i f i t h e l p s h i m o b t a i n h i s goals, g i v e n t h e e x i g e n c i e s
o f h i s circumstances. F o r example,water m a y be t r u l y useful t o a thirsty
person, o r a n e w f r i e n d m a y be t r u l y useful t o a l o n e l y person, j u s t
b e c a u s e o f t h e t h i r s t o r l o n e h n e s s . T o s o m e o n e w h o is n o t t h i r s t y o r
l o n e l y , i t is p o s s i b l e t h a t n e i t h e r w a t e r n o r n e w f r i e n d s h i p w o u l d b e t r u h /
u s e f u l . T h e s e c o n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n takes t h e ' t r u h / ' t o m e a n t h a t t h e g o o d
χ is n o t p o s s i b l y n o t u s e f u l . I f x is n o t p o s s i b l y n o t u s e f u l , i t is necessarily
u s e f u l . T o say t h a t s o m e t h i n g is necessarily u s e f u l is t o say t h a t i t is u s e f u l
w i t h o u t c o n d i t i o n o r regardless o f c i r c u m s t a n c e . T o say t h i s is t o say t h a t
it is n o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y valuable. Now, when t h i s passage from
E l V P i 8 S is t a k e n o u t o f c o n t e x t , i t m u s t b e a d m i t t e d t h a t b o t h i n t e r p r e ­
t a t i o n s c a n b e g i v e n o f i t : t h e r e is n o t h i n g i n t h e w o r d i n g o r ideas w h i c h
f a v o r s o n e r e a d i n g o v e r t h e o t h e r . P l a c e d i n c o n t e x t , h o w e v e r , i t seems t o
m e t h a t t h e s e c o n d is m o r e n a t u r a l . F o r i n t h i s p a r t o f t h e Schohum
S p i n o z a is e m p h a s i z i n g t h e u n c o n d i t i o n a h t y o r (as h e caUs i t ) ' a b s o l u t e ­
ness' o f t h e d e m a n d s t h a t r e a s o n places o n r a t i o n a l agents. G i v e n t h a t
reason's d e m a n d s are u n e q u i v o c a l — t h e y a p p l y across c i r c u m s t a n c e s — i t
seems n a t u r a l t o s u p p o s e t h a t at least s o m e o f t h e g o o d s w h i c h m i g h t
h e l p us t o m e e t t h o s e d e m a n d s w i U also b e v a l u a b l e i n aU c i r c u m s t a n c e s .
T h o u g h B l V P i 8 S seems t o i m p l y t h a t t h e r e are n o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y
r e l a t i v e l y v a l u a b l e g o o d s , t h e i m p h c a t i o n is n o t i n c o n t e s t a b l e . Other
t e x t s are less a m b i g u o u s . F o r e x a m p l e , S p i n o z a w r i t e s i n f n V P 2 7 , ' W e
k n o w n o t h i n g t o b e c e r t a i n l y g o o d o r b a d , e x c e p t w h a t reaUy leads t o
u n d e r s t a n d i n g o r w h a t c a n p r e v e n t us f r o m u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ' T h e key
w o r d h e r e is c e r t a i n l y (certo): t h a t w h i c h leads t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g is
certainly good. S o m e things—say, water o r f r i e n d s h i p — m a y n o t be cer­
t a i n l y g o o d ; t h e y m a y be o n l y u n c e r t a i n l y g o o d , because t h e y m a y be
u s e f u l o n l y at s p e c i f i c t i m e s . B u t a n y t h i n g w h i c h d o e s c e r t a i n l y a i d o u r
q u e s t f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g is c e r t a i n l y g o o d . T h e r e is n o n e e d t o c o n s i d e r
w h a t ' s g o i n g o n i n o u r hves: i f s o m e t h i n g increases o u r b o d y ofknow­
l e d g e , i t is sure t o b e u s e f u l a n d h e n c e v a l u a b l e ; i f i t i m p e d e s knowledge
a c q u i s i t i o n , i t is d e f i n i t e l y h a r m f u l . T h e i r r e l e v a n c e o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s to
t h e u t i h t y a n d v a l u e o f e p i s t e m i c a U y b e n e f i c i a l g o o d s places t h e m i n a
different axiological category f r o m non-epistemic goods.
O t h e r p r o b l e m a t i c texts f o r t h e circumstantiaUy relative i n t e r p r e t a ­
tion c o u l d be c i t e d , 2 7
b u t i t w i U be m o r e instructive to b u i l d a positive

2 7
F o r a subtle attempt to read the passage o f M V P r e f q u o t e d above i n terms favorable to
the non-circumstantial rektivist, see Curley, Method, 122—4. C u r l e y mmselfis not arguing for
 Spinoza 's Axiology

case f o r a n o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y r e l a t i v e r e a d i n g . EssentiaUy, t h e p o s i t i v e
case sees S p i n o z a as b e h e v i n g i n s o m e n o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y r e l a t i v e l y
valuable g o o d s because o f his v i e w s o n h u m a n n a t u r e . T h e argument
is t h i s :

1. H u m a n n a t u r e c a n b e p r o p e r l y c o n c e i v e d i n t e r m s o f t h e n a t u r e o f
the h u m a n m i n d .
2. Thehumanmindisbynatureknowledge.
3. K n o w l e d g e is b e n e f i t e d b y k n o w l e d g e .
4 . B e c a u s e t h a t w h i c h b e n e f i t s is v a l u a b l e , k n o w l e d g e is v a l u a b l e .
5 . B e c a u s e o f h o w o u r conatus is c o n s t r u c t e d , t h e r e is s o m e k n o w l e d g e
w h i c h is always u s e f u l .
6. So t h i s k n o w l e d g e is n o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y v a l u a b l e .

Since this f o r m s the core o f t h e n o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y relative reading,

let's g o t h r o u g h i t systematicaUy, e x a m i n i n g e a c h step a n d its c o n n e c t i o n
to the others.
T h e f i r s t p r e m i s s rehes o n p a r a U e h s m , w h i c h s a n c t i o n s t h e p e r c e p t i o n
o f i n d i v i d u a l m o d e s u n d e r any o f t h e a t t r i b u t e s o f substance: o n e a n d
t h e s a m e m o d e c a n b e p e r c e i v e d as a t h i n k i n g b e i n g o r as a n e x t e n d e d
b e i n g . R e g a r d l e s s o f w h i c h w a y t h e m o d e is p e r c e i v e d , a n a c c o u n t c a n
b e g i v e n o f i t s n a t u r e i n t h e t e r m s p r o v i d e d b y t h a t p e r c e p t i o n . So, w h e n
a m o d e w h i c h is a h u m a n b e i n g is p e r c e i v e d as t h i n k i n g , a n a c c o u n t c a n
b e g i v e n o f t h i s m o d e w h i c h c o n s t r u e s its n a t u r e i n t h i n k i n g o r m e n t a l -
i s t i c t e r m s . W h e n s u c h a n a c c o u n t is g i v e n , t h e n a t u r e o f t h e h u m a n
b e i n g t u r n s o u t t o b e its m i n d .
N o w , t h e q u e s t i o n arises as t o t h e n a t u r e o f t h e m i n d . T h e r e are t w o
p o i n t s t o b e m a d e h e r e , t h e f i r s t o f w h i c h c a n b e o b t a i n e d f r o m ЕИР11 Cor:

[ T ] h e h u m a n m i n d is a part o f t h e i n f i n i t e inteUect o f G o d . T h e r e f o r e , w h e n w e
say that the h u m a n M i n d perceives this o r that, w e are saying n o t h i n g b u t that
G o d , n o t insofar as he is i n f i n i t e , b u t insofar as he is explained t h r o u g h the
nature o f t h e h u m a n M i n d , or insofar as he constitutes the essence o f the h u m a n
M i n d , has this o r that idea . . .

a non-circumstantial relativistic reading; he shows no sign ofbeing aware ofthe distinction

between circumstantial versus non-circumstantial relativism, and in any case his purpose is to
defend the claim that the notion o f a human exempbr pkxys an important role in Spinoza's
ethics. Nonetheless, although this was not his intention,it would be a substantial blow to the
circumstantial relativists i f Curley succeeds in explaining h o w E l V P r e f can be read i n a way
that is compatible with non-circumstantial rekmvism, because that text is a key piece o f e v i d -
ence i n the circumstantial relativists' case.
i64 Jon Miller

H e r e t h e d e p e n d e n c y o f t h e h u m a n m i n d o n G o d is f o r c e f u U y s t a t e d .
A l s o f o r c e f u U y s t a t e d is t h e i d e a t h a t t h e h u m a n m i n d is c o m p r i s e d o u t
o f o n e t y p e o f t h i n g : at b o t t o m , t h e m i n d is m a d e u p o f G o d ' s infinite
i n t e U e c t . T h a t ' s t h e first p o i n t : i n S p i n o z a ' s m e t a p h y s i c a l psychology,
o n l y one k i n d o f m a t e r i a l forms the contents o f t h e n ü n d . T h e second
p o i n t c o n c e r n s t h e n a t u r e o f t h o s e c o n t e n t s . O n t h i s issue w e are t o l d
d i f f e r e n t t h i n g s : f o r e x a m p l e , S p i n o z a w r i t e s i n £lVP36S t h a t ' t h e v e r y
essenceofman . . . isdefinedbyreason'whereasinEVP36S,hesaysthat
' t h e essence o f o u r M i n d consists o n h / i n k n o w l e d g e ' . T h e r e is n o c o n ­
flict b e t w e e n these s t a t e m e n t s , h o w e v e r , s i n c e r e a s o n a n d k n o w l e d g e are
b o t h c o g n i t i v e , a c t i v e , i n t e n t i o n a l states a n d , as s u c h , t h e y c a n b e r e a d as
s y n o n y m o u s . B e c a u s e t h e m i n d is m o n i s t i c a n d b e c a u s e its s i n g l e c o m ­
p o n e n t is k n o w l e d g e o r r e a s o n , i t f o U o w s t h a t i t is b y n a t u r e k n o w l e d g e
(or reason).
T h e t h i r d a n d f o u r t h p r e m i s s e s — c o n c e r n i n g w h a t benefits k n o w ­
l e d g e — d r a w u p o n t h e thesis t h a t o n l y h k e b e n e f i t s H k e . F o r a g o o d x t o
b e o f u s e a n d h e n c e o f v a l u e t o a s u b j e c t S, x a n d S m u s t share s o m e t h i n g
i n c o m m o n . A s a p o s s i b l e e x a m p l e , w e possess t h e e n z y m e s t o digest
c o r n k e r n e l s b u t l a c k t h e o n e s n e e d e d t o d i g e s t cornstaUts. B e c a u s e w e
have t h e e n z y m e s t o digest t h e f o r m e r b u t n o t t h e latter, w e have s o m e ­
t h i n g i n c o m m o n w i t h the one b u t n o t the other. Because w e have
s o m e t h i n g i n c o m m o n w i t h c o r n b u t n o t cornstaUts, c o r n is u s e f u l t o us
as a n u t r i e n t w h i l e c o r n s t a l k s are n o t . I n g e n e r a l , S p i n o z a t h i n k s t h a t t h e
m o r e a g o o d x has i n c o m m o n w i t h S, t h e m o r e v a l u a b l e i t is t o S
(iiTVP31Cor). 2 8
S i n c e a n d i n s o f a r as k n o w l e d g e shares i t s n a t u r e w i t h
o t h e r k n o w l e d g e , k n o w l e d g e is t h e m o s t u s e f u l a n d so m o s t v a l u a b l e
good for knowledge.
The fifth premiss is t h e o n e most h k e l y t o i n c i t e controversy.
U n d e r s t o o d p r o p e r l y , h o w e v e r , i t s h o u l d n ' t . T h e c o r e i d e a is t h i s : qua
t h i n k i n g b e i n g s , o u r n a t u r e is k n o w l e d g e . B e c a u s e o u r n a t u r e is k n o w ­
l e d g e a n d because o f t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t h k e b e n e f i t s h k e , o u r n a t u r e w i U b e
benefited b y knowledge. M u c h knowledge w i U be chcumstantiaUy-
relatively beneficial: i t w i U be useful i n some circumstances a n d f o r some

2 8
F o r further discussion o f J E I V P 3 1 C o r , see D o n Garrett,' " T h e Free M a n Always Acts
Honesdy, N o t Deceptively": Freedom and the G o o d in Spinoza's E t k i c s ' , in E d w i n Curley and
Pierre-Francois Moreau (eds.), Spinoza: Jssues and Directions (Leiden: E . J . BriU, 1 9 9 0 ) , 221—38,
at 2 2 3 f.
 Spinoza 's Axiology 165

p e o p l e b u t n o t o t h e r s . S u c h k n o w l e d g e is t h e r e f o r e c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y -
r e l a t i v e l y v a l u a b l e . O t h e r k n o w l e d g e , h o w e v e r , w i U always b e n e f i t us: n o
m a t t e r w h o w e are o r w h a t o u r c i r c u m s t a n c e s , i t is u s e f u l f o r us t o k n o w
c e r t a i n t r u t h s o r p r o p o s i t i o n s . T h e r e a s o n t h a t s u c h k n o w l e d g e is always
b e n e f i c i a l has t o d o w i t h o u r n a t u r e s o r conatus: s u c h k n o w l e d g e w i U
ahvays serve t o p r e s e r v e a n d i n c r e a s e o u r p o w e r o f a c t i n g . I f o u r conatus
o r natures w e r e different, perhaps such k n o w l e d g e w o u l d n ' t be b e n e f i ­
c i a l t o us. B u t i t is i m p o s s i b l e f o r o u r conatus t o b e d i f f e r e n t f r o m w h a t
t h e y are, a n d g i v e n t h e i r a c t u a l c o n t e n t , s u c h k n o w l e d g e is b e n e f i c i a l .
A n d i t w o u l d b e b e n e f i c i a l t o a n y b e i n g w i t h a conatus h k e o u r s . A s a
r e s u l t , b e c a u s e o f h o w o u r conatus are, t h e r e is s o m e k n o w l e d g e w h i c h is
valuable irrespective o f o u r circumstances.
T o p u t t h e m a t t e r i n a different way, f o r s o m e k n o w l e d g e , there w i U
b e c i r c u m s t a n c e s i n w h i c h i t is u s e f u l a n d o t h e r s i n w h i c h i t i s n ' t ;
b e c a u s e use d e t e r m i n e s v a l u e , s u c h k n o w l e d g e w i U s o m e t i m e s b e v a l u ­
able a n d o t h e r t i m e s , n o t . F o r e x a m p l e , i t w i U s o m e t i m e s b e u s e f u l f o r us
t o k n o w t h e w e a t h e r forecast; at o t h e r t i m e s , i t w o n ' t . A s a r e s u l t , k n o w ­
ledge o f the weather w i U sometimes be valuable and sometimes n o t .
M o s t o f t h e k n o w l e d g e t h a t w e c a n possess w i U b e r e l a t i v e l y v a l u a b l e i n
t h i s w a y . H o w e v e r , t h e r e is s o m e k n o w l e d g e w h i c h i t is always u s e f u l f o r
us t o k n o w : v i z . r a t i o n a l k n o w l e d g e a n d especiaUy k n o w l e d g e ofGod's
n a t u r e . T h i s k n o w l e d g e is ahvays u s e f u l b e c a u s e o f o u r n a t u r e s as essen-
tiaUy r a t i o n a l o r k n o w l e d g e a b l e b e i n g s . I f o u r n a t u r e s w e r e d i f f e r e n t ,
perhaps this k n o w l e d g e w o u l d n ' t b e u n w a v e r i n g l y useful; b u t o u r
n a t u r e s n e c e s s a r i l y b e i n g w h a t t h e y are, i t i s . A s a r e s u l t , s u c h k n o w l e d g e
is always v a l u a b l e . I t is stiU r e l a t i v e l y v a l u a b l e , b e c a u s e i t is v a l u a b l e f o r us,
b u t i t is n o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y r e l a t i v e l y v a l u a b l e .
F r o m the fifth premiss, the sixth foUows immediately. G i v e n that
s o m e k n o w l e d g e is always u s e f u l , t h a t s a m e k n o w l e d g e m u s t b e always
v a l u a b l e . T h i s is b e c a u s e o f t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n use a n d v a l u e : t h a t
w h i c h is u s e f u l is v a l u a b l e a n d so t h a t w h i c h is u s e f u l always is v a l u a b l e
ahvays.
S u c h is t h e a r g u m e n t w h i c h p r o v e s t h a t s o m e g o o d s — m o r e p r e c i s e l y ,
one good, knowledge of God—are non-circumstantiaUy relatively
v a l u a b l e . W h i l e t h e r e a s o n i n g w h i c h leads t o i t m a y b e somewhat
o p a q u e , t h e t r u t h o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n c a n b e seen b y s t e p p i n g b a c k a n d
v i e w i n g Spinoza's n o r m a t i v e p r o j e c t f r o m a f a r . W h e t h e r i n t h e TIE,
l66 Jon Miller

t h e Short Treatise, o r t h e Ethics, Spinoza's o v e r a r c h i n g c o n c e r n is t o

e x p l a i n w h a t h a p p i n e s s is a n d h o w w e c a n b e c o m e h a p p y . T h i s goal
w o u l d b e i n c o h e r e n t i f t h e v a l u e o f t h e g o o d s w h i c h are essential t o
h a p p i n e s s w e r e t o t a U y d e p e n d e n t o n c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I n s u c h a case, n o
general o r universal statements c o u l d be m a d e regarding happiness;
rather, they w o t u d have t o be tailored t o particular circumstances. I t
w o u l d m a k e n o sense t o t a l k g e n e r a U y a b o u t ' t h e g r e a t e s t s a t i s f a c t i o n o f
M i n d ' ( E V P 2 7 ) , f o r there w o u l d be n o t r u l y general satisfaction h o l d i n g
across o r f o r aU m i n d s . Pvather, t h e r e w o v ü d b e a n i n d e f i n i t e d i s j u n c t i o n
o f g r e a t e s t s a t i s f a c t i o n s , j u s t as t h e r e is a n i n d e f i n i t e d i s j u n c t i o n o f g r e a t -
est satisfactions o f t h e b o d y . 2 9
I f t h e g o o d o f t h e m i n d w e r e relative t o
the subjective conditions o f i n d i v i d u a l m i n d s i n the w a y that the g o o d
o f t h e b o d y is d e p e n d e n t o n t h e p h y s i c a l states o f i n d i v i d u a l b o d i e s ,
t h e r e w o t d d b e n o s i n g l e state o f h a p p i n e s s h o l d i n g f o r aU m i n d s .
T h a t t h e r e is s u c h a state i m p h e s t h a t there m u s t be a single, non-
circumstantiaUy relative g o o d .

II

C l a r i f y i n g t h e n a t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i v i s m o f S p i n o z a ' s a x i o l o g y is t h e m a i n
p o i n t o f t h i s essay. B u t i n a d d i t i o n , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c i r c u m s t a n -
tiaUy v e r s u s n o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y r e l a t i v e v a l u e c a n b e u s e d t o reassess

2 9
T h i s is assuming that there is in fact no single non-circumstantiaUy rebtive good for the
body. T h e argument w o u l d not be affected ifthere were such a good. I n that case, the analogy
drawn i n this paragraph w o u l d fail, but since the analogy is only meant to clarify the notion o f
the mind's greatest good, its failure wouldn't harm the essential point being made.The diffi­
culty ofthe question whether there is a single non-circumstantiaUy rekitive valuable good for
the body might be noted. O n the one hand, there doesn't seem to be any a priori reason to sup­
pose that the body can't have a g o o d — a perfect nutritional supplement, say—analogous i n its
singularity to the greatestgood ofthe mind.Furthermore,there are theoreticalpressures,stem-
m i n g from paraUelism, for Spinoza to say that there is such a good. G i v e n paraUehsm, then
given that the m i n d is such that it has a single non-circumstantiaUy relatively valuable good,
there ought to be such a good for the body, too. O n the other hand, whereas Spinoza often
speaks about the mind's greatest good (which is non-circumstantiaUy rehtively valuable), he
never speaks about the body's greatest good.This is inductive evidence that he either didn't
recognize or didn't acknowledge the pressure that paraUehsm pkiced o n h i m to posit a n o n -
circumstantiaUy relatively valuable good for the body. I n addition, there are open questions
about whether paraUehsm breaks down at precisely thatjuncture ofthe argument: viz. where
the notion ofthe mind's greatest good is introduced i n the htter part ofthe Ethics.This seems
to be the view ofBidney, Psychology, 3 4 3 - 4 , 4 0 7 , etc., and Bennett, Study, 3 7 2 . F o r a recent
attempt to acquit Spinoza ofthe charge ofinconsistency,see Steven Nadler, Spinoza's Heresy
[Heresy] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2 0 0 2 ) , ch. 5.
 Spinoza's Axiology 167

other i m p o r t a n t properties that m i g h t be a t t r i b u t e d t o any given g o o d

b y his a x i o l o g y . 3 0

F o r starters, w e c a n use t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n c i r c u m s t a n t i a l l y v e r ­
sus n o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y relative value t o r e i n t e r p r e t t h e p r o p e r t y of
u n c o n d i t i o n a l v a l u e . W h i l e a g o o d x m i g h t b e caUed u n c o n d i t i o n a U y
v a l u a b l e j u s t i n case its v a l u e is n o t s u b j e c t t o a n y c o n d i t i o n s , t h e d i s ­
tinction b e t w e e n circumstantiaUy versus n o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y relative
value i m p h e s a d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o types o f u n c o n d i t i o n a l value.

ι. S t r o n g u n c o n d i t i o n a l v a l u e : a g o o d x is s t r o n g l y unconditionaUy
v a l u a b l e i f f i t s v a l u e is n o t c o n t i n g e n t o n a n y c o n d i t i o n s w h a t s o e v e r .
2. W e a k u n c o n d i t i o n a l v a l u e : x is w e a k l y u n c o n d i t i o n a U y v a l u a b l e i f f
its v a l u e is c o n t i n g e n t o n o n l y a n o n - c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y v a r i a b l e set o f
conditions.

W i t h t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n , i t appears t h a t f o r S p i n o z a , n o g o o d s at aU are
strongly u n c o n d i t i o n a U y valuable, n o t even k n o w l e d g e o f G o d . One
c o n d i t i o n o n l y makes k n o w l e d g e o f G o d useful a n d hence beneficial t o
us: o u r n a t u r e s as r a t i o n a l , c o g n i z i n g b e i n g s . B u t t h a t o n e c o n d i t i o n is
e n o u g h t o d i s q u a l i f y k n o w l e d g e o f G o d as s t r o n g l y unconditionaUy
valuable.At the same time,because o u r natures d o n o t v a r y according t o
c i r c u m s t a n c e s , k n o w l e d g e o f G o d w i U always b e u s e f u l a n d so i t c o u n t s as
w e a k l y u n c o n d i t i o n a U y v a l u a b l e . T h e r e is n o c i r c u m s t a n c e t h a t w e may
f i n d ourselves i n w h e r e k n o w l e d g e o f G o d w o n ' t b e v a l u a b l e ; f o r t h i s r e a ­
s o n , i t m a k e s sense t o caU t h a t g o o d w e a k l y u n c o n d i t i o n a U y v a l u a b l e .
O n a r e l a t e d p o i n t , i t is r e a s o n a b l e t o say t h a t k n o w l e d g e o f G o d is
u n i q u e l y v a l u a b l e . W h e r e a s t h e v a l u e o f o t h e r g o o d s is s u b j e c t t o m u l t i ­
p l e c o n d i t i o n s , k n o w l e d g e o f G o d is n o t a n d t h i s a l o n e suffices t o m a k e
k n o w l e d g e o f G o d a u n i q u e g o o d . I n a d d i t i o n , such k n o w l e d g e provides

3 0
It would take us too far afield to address this issue fuUy, but it can be noted i n passing that
the distinction between the two types ofrelativity wül help to solve what Steven Nadler caUs
'a notorious problem i n interpreting Spinoza's ethical theory' ('Spinoza in the Garden o f G o o d
and E v i l ' , in E h n a r K r e m e r and Michael Latzer (eds.), The Problem of E v i l in E a r l y Modem
Philosophy (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 2 0 0 1 ) , 6 6 — 8 0 , at 6 9 ) . O n the one hand,
Nadler says, Spinoza speaks of'good' and'evU' as 'only rektive to our conceptions ofthings,
and they do not denote anything real about things in themselves', while o n the other hand, he
talks about'the"true knowledge ofgood and evU" ',therebysuggesting that there is something
real about things w h i c h can make normative statements about them truth-susceptible (ibid.).
As Nadler argues,it would be wrong to conceive of'the true knowledge ofgood and evU' as
' "merely relative" to our conceptions' (ibid.).The argument ofthe previous section shows that
Nadler is right: the true knowledge ofgood and evU does not rest at aU o n our individual c o n ­
ceptions; instead, it rests on our natures as knowing beings.
 i68 Jon Miller

t h e m o s t p o w e r f u l r e i n f o r c e m e n t t o o u r conatus. I n c o n s e q u e n c e , i t is t h e
m o s t u s e f u l g o o d w e m i g h t possess a n d b e c a u s e use d e t e r m i n e s v a l u e , i t
is also t h e m o s t v a l u a b l e g o o d w e m i g h t p o s s e s s . W i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e
q u e s t i o n ( r a i s e d a b o v e ) o f w h e t h e r t h e r e is a c o n t i n u u m o f v a l u e i n c l u d ­
i n g b o t h k n o w l e d g e o f G o d as w e U as o t h e r g o o d s , t w o a n s w e r s c a n b e
g i v e n . S t r i c d y s p e a k i n g , k n o w l e d g e o f G o d is o n a p a r w i t h aU o t h e r
g o o d s : h k e aU o t h e r g o o d s , i t is r e l a t i v e l y v a l u a b l e a n d p r o v i d e s essen-
tiaUy t h e s a m e k i n d o f b e n e f i t t o us as o t h e r g o o d s . I f w e speak s h g h d y
l o o s e l y , h o w e v e r , w e c a n say t h a t i t is q u a h t a t i v e l y d i f f e r e n t f r o m o t h e r
g o o d s , f o r i t a l o n e is n o t c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y r e l a t i v e l y v a l u a b l e , a n d t h e
b e n e f i t i t p r o v i d e s us is f a r g r e a t e r t h a n t h a t o f o t h e r g o o d s .
A l t h o u g h t h e r e are n o s t r o n g l y u n c o n d i t i o n a U y v a l u a b l e g o o d s , i t
d o e s n ' t n e c e s s a r i l y f o U o w ( f o r S p i n o z a o r a n y o n e e k e ) t h a t t h e r e are n o
i n t r i n s i c a U y v a l u a b l e g o o d s . T h e r e a s o n f o r t h i s has t o d o w i t h t h e n a t u r e
o f i n t r i n s i c v a l u e . A g o o d x m a y b e caUed i n t r i n s i c a U y v a l u a b l e i f f i t s v a l u e
is n o t d e r i v e d f r o m its c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a n o t h e r g o o d y w h i c h is o f v a l u e :
t h a t is, χ is i n t r i n s i c a U y v a l u a b l e i f f t h e s o u r c e o f i t s v a l u e is i n t e r n a l t o
itseh . 7 31
So s t a t e d , t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n i n t r i n s i c versus u n c o n d i t i o n a l
v a l u e is t h e c o n t r a s t b e t w e e n t h e v a l u e w h i c h o b t a i n s w h e n a g o o d has
v a l u e ' i n i t s e l f ' ( i n t r i n s i c ) versus t h e v a l u e w h i c h i s n ' t s u b j e c t t o a n y c o n ­
ditions ( u n c o n d i t i o n a l ) . S o m e t h i n g m a y b e intrinsicaUy valuable b u t n o t
u n c o n d i t i o n a U y so; v i c e versa, a g o o d m a y b e u n c o n d i t i o n a U y b u t n o t
i n t r i n s i c a U y v a l u a b l e . S p i n o z a seems aware t h a t u n c o n d i t i o n a l versus
i n t r i n s i c v a l u e are d i f f e r e n t , f o r h e d e n i e s t h a t t h e r e are a n y s t r o n g l y
u n c o n d i t i o n a U y v a l u a b l e g o o d s w h i l e a f f i r m i n g t h a t t h e r e are i n t r i n s i c ­
aUy v a l u a b l e g o o d s . H e w r i t e s i n ErVP41, 'Joy is n o t d i r e c d y b a d , b u t
g o o d (Laetitia direcU mala non est, sed bona);Sadness (tristitia),on the other
h a n d , is d i r e c d y b a d . ' T h e p r o o f f o r t h e i n t r i n s i c g o o d n e s s o f j o y , g i v e n i n
t h e D e m o n s t r a t i o n f o r t h i s P r o p o s i t i o n , is s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d : j o y is t h e
'affect b y w h i c h t h e b o d y ' s p o w e r o f a c t i n g is i n c r e a s e d o r a i d e d ' . S i n c e
s o m e t h i n g is g o o d j u s t i n case i t increases o u r p o w e r o f a c t i n g , j o y is
g o o d . T h a t i s , j o y is its o w n s o u r c e o f g o o d n e s s : i n s o f a r as s o m e t h i n g k
j o y f u l , t o t h a t e x t e n t i t is g o o d . A t t h e s a m e time,joy c a n n o t b e caUed
u n c o n d i t i o n a U y v a l u a b l e , b e c a u s e its v a l u e is c o n t i n g e n t o n o u r conatus.
A s a f i n a l p o i n t , c o n s i d e r w h e t h e r S p i n o z a was a s u b j e c t i v i s t w i t h
respect t o v a l u e . S o m e c o m m e n t a t o r s have a r g u e d t h a t h e is: f o r e x a m p l e ,

3 1
T h i s conception o f intrinsic value is taken from Christine M . Korsgaard, 'Two
Distinctions i n Goodness', Philosophical Review 9 2 ( 1 9 8 3 ) , 1 6 9 ^ 5 , at 170.
 Spinoza 's Axiology

B e n n e t t i r n p h e s S p i n o z a is a s u b j e c t i v i s t b e c a u s e h e d e n i e s t h a t ' g o o d ­
ness a n d badness are o b j e c t i v e l y o u t t h e r e i n t h e w o r l d ' . 3 2
T o evaluate
this c l a i m , a d e f i n i t i o n o f s u b j e c t i v i s m a n d o b j e c t i v i s m w i t h respect t o
v a l u e is n e e d e d .

ι . S u b j e c t i v e v a l u e : a g o o d x is s u b j e c t i v e l y v a l u a b l e i f f a s u b j e c t S h o l d s
χ t o be valuable.
2. O b j e c t i v e v a l u e : x is o b j e c t i v e l y v a l u a b l e i f F i t s v a l u e is i n d e p e n d e n t
o f w h a t S holds.

T h e a m b i g u o u s v e r b ' h o l d s ' is u s e d h e r e b e c a u s e t h e r e are a n y n u m b e r

o f w a y s i n w h i c h v a l u e m i g h t b e d e p e n d e n t o n S's a t t i t u d e t o w a r d x: x
m i g h t b e v a l u a b l e b e c a u s e S believes i t is v a l u a b l e , o r b e c a u s e S feels i t is
v a l u a b l e , e t c . W h i l e r e l a t i v i s m a n d o b j e c t i v i s m w i t h r e s p e c t t o v a l u e are
u s u a U y t a k e n t o b e o p p o s e d , t h i s i s n ' t n e c e s s a r i l y t h e case. O b v i o u s l y ,
r e k t i v i s m m a k e s t h e v a l u e o(x d e p e n d e n t i n s o m e w a y o n S. I t d o e s n o t ,
h o w e v e r , specify t h e n a t u r e o f t h i s d e p e n d e n c e ; f u r t h e r a r g u m e n t o r i n f o r ­
m a t i o n is n e e d e d f o r t h i s s p e c i f i c a t i o n t o b e estabhshed. F o r e x a m p l e ,
i t m a y b e t h a t x is v a l u a b l e o n l y i n r e l a t i o n t o S's b e h e f s o r f e e h n g s :
i f S believes o r feek t h a t x is v a l u a b l e , t h e n x is v a l u a b l e f o r S.
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , x m a y b e v a l u a b l e f o r S i n d e p e n d e n d y o f S ' s behefs o r f e e l ­
i n g s : f o r e x a m p l e , x m a y b e v a l u a b l e f o r S ifx is n e e d e d f o r S's s u r v i v a l .
I n t h i s case, x m a y b e s a i d t o b e v a l u a b l e regardless o f w h a t S b e h e v e s o r
f e e k . A s t h e l a t t e r e x a m p l e s h o w s , r e l a t i v i s m is c o m p a t i b l e w i t h o b j e c t ­
i v i s m , f o r regardless o f w h a t S h o l d s , x m a y b e v a l u a b l e f o r S, e v e n i f x is
n o t i n t r i n s i c a h y o r u n c o n d i t i o n a U y v a l u a b l e . T h i s m a y b e b e c a u s e S's
n a t u r e is s u c h t h a t S n e e d s x f o r h e r o r h i s s u r v i v a l o r w e U - b e i n g o r s o m e
o t h e r e n d capable o f m a k i n g x valuable.Because x w o u l d be valuable t o
S i n d e p e n d e n t o f w h a t S h o l d s , x w o u l d b e o b j e c t i v e l y v a l u a b l e f o r S;
b u t b e c a u s e x is v a l u a b l e o n l y i n s o f a r as S n e e d s x, t h e v a l u e ofx is r e l ­
a t i v e t o S ( i n p a r t i c u k r , r e h t i v e t o S's n e e d s ) .
N o w , i t is q u i t e p o s s i b l e t h a t S p i n o z a t o o k s o m e v a l u e j u d g m e n t s t o
b e d e p e n d e n t o n w h a t t h e a g e n t h o l d s : i t is p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e agent's
attitudes m a y f o r m part o f t h e circumstances w h i c h d e t e r m i n e t h e value
o f a g o o d t h a t is c i r c u m s t a n t i a U y r e l a t i v e l y v a l u a b l e . A t least, i t is n o t
p a r t o f t h e a r g u m e n t o f t h i s essay t h a t S p i n o z a t o t a U y s e v e r e d aU c o n ­
n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n v a l u e j u d g m e n t s a n d t h e agent's p r e f e r e n c e s . A t t h e
same t i m e i t L· p a r t o f t h e a r g u m e n t o f t h i s essay t h a t S p i n o z a s e v e r e d t h e
3 2
Bennett, Study, io. See ako Frankena,'New MoraHty',94.
 Jon Miller

c o n n e c t i o n s b e t w e e n s o m e d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f v a l u e a n d t h e agent's
subjective preferences. I n p a r t i c u l a r , t h e agent's s u b j e c t i v e states are
irrelevant to the value o f r a t i o n a l and intuitive knowledge. Such k n o w ­
l e d g e is r e l a t i v e l y v a l u a b l e — i t s v a l u e is r e l a t i v e t o o u r essences as
r a t i o n a l , k n o w i n g b e i n g s — b u t i t is also o b j e c t i v e l y v a l u a b l e — n o m a t t e r
w h a t w e t h i n k o r f e e l , i t is g o o d f o r u s . S i n c e at least s o m e v a l u e is o b j e c ­
tive, i t is w r o n g t o say w i t h o u t q u a h f l c a t i o n t h a t S p i n o z a p r o m u l g a t e d a
subjectivist account o f v a l u e . 3 3

III

T o s u m m a r i z e : S p i n o z a u p h e l d t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t t h e r e is a j u s t i f i c a t i o n
for s o m e values, above a n d b e y o n d t h e preferences o f i n d i v i d u a l s . T o t h e
e x t e n t t h a t v a l u e s are g r o u n d e d o n a s t a n d a r d i n d e p e n d e n t o f t h e a t t i ­
t u d e s o f t h o s e w h o s u b s c r i b e t o t h e m , t h e y m a y b e caUed ' o b j e c t i v e ' . H e
f u r t h e r a r g u e d t h a t d e t e r m i n a t i o n s o f v a l u e are g r o u n d e d o n t h e u t i h t y
o f t h e g o o d i n q u e s t i o n f o r t h e a g e n t possessing t h a t g o o d . Given
t h a t w e are b o t h p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l b e i n g s , b o t h p h y s i c a l a n d m e n t a l
g o o d s h a v e v a l u e f o r u s . A t t h e s a m e time, s i n c e o u r i n t e U e c t s f o r m t h e
b e t t e r p a r t o f o u r s e l v e s , g o o d s f o r t h e i n t e U e c t are m o r e v a l u a b l e t h a n
o t h e r g o o d s . C e r t a i n c o g n i t i v e states ( s u c h as k n o w l e d g e o r reason)
are w o r t h p u r s u i n g i n a n u n q u a h f i e d sense, t h o u g h o t h e r g o o d s m a y b e
w o r t h p u r s u i n g d e p e n d i n g o n one's c i r c u m s t a n c e s . T h o s e t h i n g s s h o u l d
b e p u r s u e d b e c a u s e t h e y b e n e f i t us, a n d t h e y b e n e f i t us b e c a u s e o f w h o
w e are. FinaUy, t h e g o o d h f e consists i n t h e p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e t r u e g o o d ,
regardless o f w h e t h e r o r n o t o n e e n j o y s a n y lesser g o o d s .
W h i l e s o m e questions a b o u t Spinoza's a x i o l o g y have (hopefuUy)
b e e n answered, m a n y r e m a i n . 3 4
B y w a y o f c o n c l u s i o n , o n e o f these
q u e s t i o n s w i U b e a d d r e s s e d . T h e analysis g i v e n h e r e o f S p i n o z a ' s views
o n v a l u e has b e e n a h n o s t e n t i r e l y s e c o n d - o r d e r : m u c h has b e e n said

3 3
F o r discussion o f other possible restrictions o n Spinoza's ethical subjectivism, see
Mattern,'Ethical Subjectivism'.
3 4
F o r instance, there are the questions whether Spinoza consistendy apphes his theory to
goods ofthe body, as he ought to given paranelism, or what the interest ofhis theory may be
to contemporary philosophers. For some indication ofan important potential source o f i n c o -
herency, see n. 2 9 above and, for discussion,Jarrett, ' G o o d and E v i l ' , and Bidney, Psychology,
4 0 8 ^ > . O n the question o f contemporary interest,see Garrett,'EthicalTheory,' 3 0 8 .
 Spinoza'sAxiology 171

a b o u t t h e f o r m o f h i s t h e o r y b u t h t t l e a b o u t its c o n t e n t s . F o r e x a m p l e ,
w e n o w k n o w t h a t t h e h i g h e s t g o o d is k n o w l e d g e o f G o d , a n d i n w h a t
sense t h i s k n o w l e d g e is g o o d , b u t w e k n o w h a r d l y a n y t h i n g a b o u t w h a t
k n o w l e d g e o f G o d a c t u a U y consists i n . T h i s is t o o b i g a n issue t o c o v e r
c o m p l e t e l y i n t h e space available, b u t t o p r o v i d e m o r e o f t h e flavor o f
Spinoza's a x i o l o g y , a f e w c o m m e n t s s h o u l d b e m a d e c o n c e r n i n g t h e
t h i n g s h e t h o u g h t v a l u a b l e . B e c a u s e i t is t h e m o s t v a l u a b l e g o o d t h a t
h u m a n s c a n possess,let us t a k e k n o w l e d g e o f G o d i n p a r t i c u l a r .
S i n c e t h e r e is n o r o o m f o r analysis, a U o w m e t o use a n e v o c a t i v e q u o ­
tation instead. 3 5
I n TTP F o u r Spinoza writes,

[S]ince aU o u r k n o w l e d g e , and t h e certainty w h i c h banishes every possible

d o u b t , d e p e n d solely o n t h e k n o w l e d g e o f God—because, f i r s t l y , w i t h o u t G o d
n o t h i n g can be o r be conceived, and secondly, e v e r y t h i n g can be caUed i n t o
d o u b t as l o n g as w e have n o clear and distinct idea o f G o d — i t foUows that o u r
supreme g o o d and p e r f e c t i o n depends solely o n t h e k n o w l e d g e o f G o d . A g a i n ,
since n o t h i n g can be o r be conceived w i t h o u t G o d , i t is clear that e v e r y t h i n g i n
N a t u r e involves and expresses t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f G o d i n p r o p o r t i o n t o its
essence a n d p e r f e c t i o n ; and therefore w e acquire a greater and m o r e perfect
k n o w l e d g e o f G o d as w e gain m o r e k n o w l e d g e o f n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a . T o p u t
i t another way, since t h e k n o w l e d g e o f an effect t h r o u g h its cause is n o t h i n g
o t h e r t h a n t h e k n o w l e d g e o f a p r o p e r t y o f t h a t cause, the greater o u r k n o w ­
ledge o f natural p h e n o m e n a , t h e m o r e perfect is o u r k n o w l e d g e o f God's
essence,which is the cause o f a U things. So t h e w h o l e o f o u r k n o w l e d g e , t h a t is,
o u r supreme g o o d , n o t m e r e l y depends o n the k n o w l e d g e o f G o d b u t consists
entirely t h e r e i n . ( G i i i . 59^>0)

K n o w l e d g e o f G o d is k n o w l e d g e o f n a t u r e . N o t a n y k i n d o f k n o w l e d g e
o f n a t u r e , b u t k n o w l e d g e o f t h e laws a n d rules b y w h i c h n a t u r e operates
a n d t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e b e h a v i o r o f aU n a t u r a l p h e n o m e n a are g o v ­
e r n e d . I n i t i a U y , w e s t r i v e t o k n o w n a t u r e r a t i o n a U y — t h a t is, w e s t r i v e t o
k n o w m u t a b l e a n d t e m p o r a l p h e n o m e n a i n r e l a t i o n t o n a t u r a l laws.
A s o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g d e e p e n s , h o w e v e r , w e pass t o i n t u i t i v e k n o w l e d g e
o f n a t u r e . W h e n t h i s h a p p e n s , w e k n o w d i r e c d y t h e essences o f n a t u r a l
events a n d o b j e c t s ( E H P 4 0 S 2 ) . S u c h k n o w l e d g e is p o s s i b l e b e c a u s e t h e
h u m a n m i n d has ' a d e q u a t e k n o w l e d g e ' o f G o d ' s essence ( Е П Р 4 7 ) .

3 5
A m o n g others, these commentaries o n knowledge o f G o d are especiaUy helpful: Nadler,
Heresy, at 116 f.; Margaret D.Wilson,'Spinoza'sTheory ofKnowledge', i n Garrett (ed.), The
Cambridge Companion to Spinoza, 89—141, at 1 2 6 - 3 1 ; Y i r m i y a h u Y o v e l , Spinoza and Other
Heretics, i: The Manano qf Reason p>rinceton: Princeton University Press, 1 9 8 9 ) , at 156 f.
172 Jon Miller

W h e n we attain intuitive k n o w l e d g e o f G o d , w e have attained our

g r e a t e s t g o o d . T h e ' g r e a t e s t s t r i v i n g (conatus) o f t h e M i n d , a n d its g r e a t ­
est v i r t u e ' ( i 3 V P 2 5 ) is s u c h k n o w l e d g e , a n d t h r o u g h i t arises t h e m i n d ' s
'greatest possible satisfaction' ( E V P 2 7 ) . 3 6

Queen's University, Ontario

3 6
Special thanks are due to Steven Nadler for extensive and extremely helpful comments
on several early versions ofthis essay. I n addition, I gratefuUy acknowledge the comments (ver­
bal or written) ofJohn Carriero, C a l v i n Normore, the students w h o took my Spinoza seminar
at Queen's University i n the spring o f 2 0 0 3 , and an anonymous referee ofthisjournal.
 6

Cause and Reason: IsThere an Occasionalist

Structure to Mabbranche's Philosophy?

JEAN-CHRISTOPHE BARDOUT

C o n t r a r y t o Descartes o r Spinoza, M a l e b r a n c h e , m u c h h k e L e i b n i z ,
d o e s n o t b e g i n f r o m a u n i q u e s t a r t i n g p o i n t , s u c h as t h e cogito o r Natura
Naturans. R a t h e r , t h e r e seems t o b e a v a r i e t y o f l e g i t i m a t e m e a n s o f
e n t r y i n t o h i s s y s t e m , as t h e c o m p o s i t i o n a n d t h e i n t e r n a l s t r u c t u r e
o f h i s w o r k s attest. T h u s , De la recherche de h verite starts w i t h a n analysis
o f t h e facvdties o f t h e m i n d i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e w i t h r e s p e c t t o e a c h o f
t h e m w h a t are t h e causes o f e r r o r , w h i l e t h e Traitk de la nature et de la
grace b e g i n s b y e x a m i n i n g t h e m o d a U t i e s o f d i v i n e a c t i o n i n t h e n a t u r a l
w o r l d , i n o r d e r s u b s e q u e n d y t o s t u d y t h e w o r l d o f g r a c e a n d its l a w s . I f
t h e Conversations chutiennes estabhsh,first, t h e i m p o t e n c e o f t h e h u m a n
b e i n g w i t h o u t G o d , t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e Maditations chntiennes and
t h e Entretiens sur la metaphysique are o r g a n i z e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d e f i n i ­
tion a n d t h e p r i m a c y o f a m e t a p h y s i c s u n d e r s t o o d as a ' g e n e r a l s c i e n c e '
o r d o c t r i n e o f t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f k n o w l e d g e , f o r t h e sake o f c o n s i d e r i n g ,
finaUy, t h e ' p a r t i c u k r sciences' t h a t are s u b o r d i n a t e t o this general
science.
T h i s i n d e t e r m i n a c y o f t h e M a l e b r a n c h i a n starting p o i n t o f p h i l o s o p h y
is r e f l e c t e d i n t h e d i f f e r e n t t e m p k t e s a d o p t e d b y his m a j o r c o m m e n t a t o r s .
I f H e n r i G o u h i e r finds i n Malebranche's bipartite vocation—Cartesian
a n d r e l i g i o u s — t h e source o f h i s philosophy, a n d i n t h e g l o r i f i c a t i o n o f
God his most opportune point of departure, 1
the magisterial
Malebranche b y M a r t i a l G u e r o u l t takes fbJl m e a s u r e o f t h e e x t r a o r d i n a r y
a f f i r m a t i o n o f a v i s i o n i n G o d o f i d e a s , w h i l e F e r d i n a n d A l q u i e uses as
the g u i d i n g thread ofhis reading the o n g o i n g dialogue—composed of
renewals, displacements, and ruptures—between Malebranche and

1
See, respectively, L a vocation de Malebranche (Paris: J . V r i n , 1926) and L a philosophie de
Malebranche etson expirience religieuse ^"aris:J.Vrin, 1 9 2 6 ) .
i74 Jean-Christophe Bardout

Cartesianism. 2
M e a n w h i l e , j u s t as t h e s t u d y o f a c o n s t a n d y evolving
philosophy is t h e s u b j e c t o f A n d r e R o b i n e t ' s w o r k , so o t h e r , more
r e c e n t scholars take o t h e r tacks: S t e v e n N a d l e r , t h e s t u d y o f ' i d e a ' ; T a d
Schmaltz, the soul; D e n i s M o r e a u , the reconstitution o f the debate
b e t w e e n M a l e b r a n c h e a n d A r n a u l d . I m y s e l f have suggested that the
d e f i n i t i o n and f u n c t i o n o f metaphysics constitutes one o f the more
p r i v i l e g e d routes ofaccess t o a g e n e r a l c o m p r e h e n s i o n o f M a l e b r a n c h e ' s
philosophy. 3
I n its s h e e r d i v e r s i t y , t h i s a b u n d a n c e o f v i e w p o i n t s itserf
raises a c r u c i a l p r o b l e m . D e s p i t e t h e n u m b e r o f p r o p o s e d a p p r o a c h e s t o
h i s t h o u g h t , t h e r e is stiU o n e q u e s t i o n t h a t , a l t h o u g h p e r f e c d y i d e n t i f i ­
a b l e , seems n o t t o h a v e d r a w n a n y a t t e n t i o n : a l t h o u g h M a l e b r a n c h e is
n o t t h e i n v e n t o r o f t h e t e r m ' o c c a s i o n a l i s m ' , h e is at least t h e m o s t w e U -
4

k n o w n defender o f the d o c t r i n e t o w h i c h historians have g i v e n that

l a b e l . H e is also t h e o n e w h o elevates a p a r t i c u l a r thesis r e g a r d i n g the
essence o f c a u s a h t y t o t h e l e v e l o f a u n i v e r s a U y v a l i d p r i n c i p l e . I n d e e d , i t
is i n M a I e b r a n c h e ' s ceuvre t h a t t h i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f c a u s a t i o n receives
its fuUest d e v e l o p m e n t , f o r t h e ' s y s t e m o f o c c a s i o n a l causes' a n d the
m o d e l o f c a u s a t i o n o n w h i c h i t rehes is e x t e n d e d , b e y o n d aU l i m i t s , t o
t h e t o t a h t y o f n a t u r a l a n d s u p e r n a t u r a I causal r e l a t i o n s . T h u s , i f o c c a ­
5

s i o n a h s m has b e e n t h e o b j e c t o f a n u m b e r o f r e m a r k a b l e studies, 6
and

2
See Guerouk, Malebranche, 3 vok. @*aris: Aubier, 1 9 5 5 ^ ) ; Alquie, Le cartfsianisme de
Malebranche @'aris:J.Vrin, 1 9 7 4 ) . StiU others, such as Ginette Dreyfus, make the study ofthe
wiU, under its human and divine guises, the occasion for a general study o f the system;
see Dreyfus, La volonÜ sehn Malebranche fl>aris:J.Vrin, 1958).
3
R o b i n e t , Systime et existence dans l'aeuvre de Malebranche f P a r i s : J . V r i n , 1 9 6 5 ) ; Nadler,
Malebranche and Ideas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 9 9 2 ) ; Schmaltz, MaIebranche's Theory
of the Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 9 9 6 ) ; Moreau, Deux Cartesiens ^aris:J.Vrin,
1999);S3rdoat,Malebranche et la mttaphysique ^aris:PressesUniversitaires de France, 1 9 9 9 ) .
4
H e never employs this word, nor any rekted term, and is content to speak o f Occasional
causes'.
5
I have recendy suggested that the history o f m o d e r n occasionahsm is, for aU intents and
purposes, the history o f Malebranchism, and finds its extension in Berkeley's doctrine o f
causahty; see ' L e modele occasionnahste. Emergence et developpement au tournant des X V I I e
e t X V I I I e siecles', Quaestio ( 2 0 0 2 ) , 4 6 1 ^ 2 ; a n d ' L e malebranchisme de Fenelon,occasionnal-
isme et vision en Oieu',Revuephilosophique ( 2 0 0 3 ) , 151^72.
6
See especiaUy Gueroult, Malebranche, volume 2 , whose subtide is 'Order and
Occasionahsm', although the examination o f the latter in fact occupies only fifty pages
( 2 0 8 — 5 8 ) ; and R o b i n e t , SysUme et existence, 2 7 - 4 o ; A l q u i e , Le cartisienisme de Malebranche,
2 4 3 — 8 5 ; R i c h a r d A.Watson, 'Malebranche, Models and Causation', in Steven Nadler (ed.),
Causation in Early Modern Philosophy (University Park, PA: Penn State Press, 1 9 9 3 ) , 7 5 ^ 1 ;
Steven Nadler, 'Connaissance et causahte chez Malebranche et Geulincx', X V I I e siecle 51
(i999)> 335—461 and 'Malebranche o n Causation', i n Steven Nadler (ed.), The Cambridge
Companion to Malebranche (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 0 0 0 ) , 112—38; Kenneth
 Cause and Reason in Malebranche 175

e n j o y s t o d a y a r e n e w e d i n t e r e s t , especiaUy i n t h e b o d y o f w o r k devoted
t o the reception ofpost-Cartesian phUosophy i n the seventeenth century,
i t n o n e t h e l e s s appears t h a t t h i s d o c t r i n e , w i t h its c e n t r a l a n d m u l t i p l e
r a r n i f i c a t i o n s , h a s n e v e r s e r v e d as t h e p o i n t o f e m b a r k a t i o n f o r systematic
s t u d y o f M a l e b r a n c h e ' s p h i l o s o p h y , s u c h as has b e e n d o n e w i t h t h e v i s i o n
i n G o d o r t h e o t h e r m a j o r M a l e b r a n c h i a n theses m e n t i o n e d a b o v e . T h i s
f a c t is aU t h e m o r e s u r p r i s i n g w h e n o n e c o n s i d e r s t h a t , s i n c e t h e i n f l u e n ­
tial w o r k o f G o u h i e r , t h e m o s t s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e o f M a l e b r a n c h e ' s phUo­
s o p h y is t h e n o t i o n o f o u r r a d i c a l i m p o t e n c e i n t h e face o f G o d a n d o u r
a b s o l u t e d e p e n d e n c e u p o n H i m — i t is e x a c d y t h i s i d e a t h a t o c c a s i o n a l ­
i s m transktes phUosophicaUy b y reserving causahty f o r G o d alone.
O c c a s i o n a h s m c a n n o t be reduced s i m p l y t o some reflections o n the
nature ofcausahty o r o n the extent o f t h e vahdity o f t h e principle ofsuf-
f i c i e n t reason. I w o u l d h k e t o argue t h a t t h e p i c t u r e o f c a u s a h t y t h a t i t
ofFers,just b e c a u s e i t d r a w s s u c h a s i n g u l a r d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e f f i c a c y
a n d r a t i o n a l i t y , a U o w s us t o m a k e sense o f a c e r t a i n n u m b e r o f t h e o r e t -
ical duahties that characterize MaIebranche's phUosophy. T o p u t i t
a n o t h e r w a y , t h e d i s j u n c t i o n b e t w e e n e f f i c i e n t cause a n d o c c a s i o n a l
cause, w h i c h is c o n s t i t u t i v e o f o c c a s i o n a h s m , s t r u c t u r e s i n a d e e p w a y
t h e a r c h i t e c t o n i c o f his t h o u g h t a n d directs t h e p r i n c i p l e that governs
the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n varieties o f k n o w i n g .
B e f o r e d e v e l o p i n g t h i s thesis, h o w e v e r , i t is w o r t h w h U e t o r e v i e w t h e
essentials o f M a l e b r a n c h e ' s analysis o f c a u s a h t y .

I. OCCASIONALISM: CAUSE OR REASON

I t w o u l d b e a m i s t a k e t o r e d u c e o c c a s i o n a h s m , as is so o f t e n d o n e , t o t h e
thesis o f t h e u n i q u e n e s s o f d i v i n e causahty, o r t h e a f E r m a t i o n t h a t G o d is
t h e sole e f f i c i e n t cause i n n a t u r e . r f i t is t r u e t h a t G o d a l o n e t r u l y acts, t h e r e
7

are n o n e t h e l e s s t w o o t h e r p r i n c i p a l theses essential t o o c c a s i o n a h s m :

ι. T h e consideration ofrelations b e t w e e n finite beings (whether i t

be a m a t t e r o f t h e relationship b e t w e e n m i n d a n d b o d y o r the relations

Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosopky (New York: Roudedge, 1 9 9 9 ) ,

97—127. See alsoVincent Carraud, Causa sive ratio QParis:Presses Universitaires de F r a n c e , 2 0 0 2 ) ,
ch. 5; as weU as two o f my o w n works:Jean-Christophe B a r d o u t , ' Y a-t-U une theorie o c c a -
sionakste des passions?', XVTle sieck 51 ( 1 9 9 9 ) , 3 4 7 — 6 6 , and 'OccasionaUsm: L a Forge,
Cordemoy, GeuUncx', in Steven Nadler (ed.), A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy JBoston:
BlackweU, 2 0 0 2 ) , 1 4 0 - 5 1 .

7
O n this theological exclusivity ofefficacy, see Recherche de la veriti VI.2.iii.
 Jean-Christophe Bardout

b e t w e e n h o m o g e n e o u s substances) d o e s n o t s u p p o r t t h e conclusion
t h a t t h e r e are r e a l ( t h a t is, e f f i c i e n t ) causal r e l a t i o n s a m o n g t h e m , b u t
o n l y constandy observable correlations b e t w e e n p h e n o m e n a . Efficacy
proper, w h i c h belongs o n l y to the divine power, remains i n itselfinvis-
i b l e , t h a t is, i n c o n c e i v a b l e . 8

2. E f f i c i e n t c a u s a h t y d o e s n o t o p e r a t e i n a n a r b i t r a r y m a n n e r . W i t h
t h e e x c e p t i o n o f t h e f i r s t m o m e n t o f c r e a t i o n , G o d acts o n l y w h e n he
is d e t e r m i n e d b y a n o c c a s i o n a l cause, t h a t is, a c c o r d i n g t o l a w s t h a t
guarantee the m t e m g i b i h t y o f h i s operations and g r o u n d the possibihty
o f a science o f n a t u r e , a t h e o r y ofpsychoOO-physical u n i o n , a d o c t r i n e
o f k n o w l e d g e , and an understanding o f t h e supernatural w o r l d . 9

T h i s d o c t r i n e o f cause is t h u s ahvays c h a r a c t e r i z e d b y t h e b i f u r c a t i o n
o f e f f i c i e n t cause a n d o c c a s i o n a l cause, a d u a h t y w h o s e p r o p e r f u n c t i o n
consists i n p r o v i d i n g a n e x p l a n a t i o n f o r t h e e f f i c a c y exercised b y t h e cause:

A n e x p l a n a t i o n o f a particular efFect is n o t p r o v i d e d m e r e l y b y n o t i n g the g e n ­

eral cause a n d r e p l y i n g s i m p l y that G o d w a n t e d i t so. F o r this is common
k n o w l e d g e . F o r example, i f o n e asks w h y a w a r m fire causes pleasure, i t is hardly
an adequate response t o say that G o d w i s h e d i t , f o r this is never i n d o u b t .
R a t h e r , one must say w h y G o d wants i t , o r refer t o the natural cause that, i n c o n ­
sequence o f g e n e r a l laws, makes G o d p r o v i d e the feeHng o f w a r m t h t o the soul;
that is, one must, ifpossible, e x p k i n the efFect b y the occasional cause. (Traite de
la nature et de lagräce, I I . 2 , O C v. 6 6 - 7 ) 1 0

R e c a U t h a t o c c a s i o n a h s m takes v e r y s e r i o u s l y t w o d i f f i c u l t i e s exph-
c i d y i n v o l v e d i n Cartesian metaphysics. First, Descartes, i n establishing
the primacy ofefficient causahty, 11
finds h i m s e l f o b l i g e d to articulate
efficacy a n d i n t e U i g i b i h t y b y means o f a u n i q u e a n d exclusive d e p i c t i o n
o f c a u s a t i o n . I n o t h e r w o r d s , i t i s j u s t b e c a u s e a cause is a n e f f i c i e n t cause

8
See Miditations chretiennes ( M C ) , L X . 2 , O C x. 9 6 .
9
T h e kind ofrationahty that occasional causes introduce reigns i n a univocal manner over
the totahty o f causal retations. T h a t is, in aU domains, from the material world to angek to
Christ the distributor o f grace, one 6nds the same requirement ofan occasional cause to bring
about the action ofthe true cause, even ifthese occasional causes are, i n their various contexts,
o f very different natures. See the Entretiens sur la mitaphysique et sur h religion flienceforth,
Entretiens) X I I I . 9 , O C x i i . 319-20.Malebranche's distinctionbetween five groups ofoccasional
causes or 'abimes de la providence' provide Gueroult w i t h his material for volumes two and
three ofhis study.
10
T h e occasional cause is the determining principle ofthe efficient cause.
11
АД causahty for Descartes is efficient causality, and the formal cause is itseffconceived only
o n analogy w i t h the efficient cause.
 Cause and Reason in Malebranche 177

t h a t i t c a n e x p l a i n w h a t is a n d w h a t i t effects. S e c o n d , t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f
t h e h u m a n b e i n g as a s o u l u n i t e d t o a b o d y , a n d t h u s as c o m p o s e d o f t w o
h e t e r o g e n e o u s substances, m a k e s i t d i f f i c u l t t o u n d e r s t a n d h o w t h e s o u l
acts o n t h e b o d y , a n d r e c i p r o c a U y h o w t h e b o d y acts o n t h e s o u l . T h u s ,
as w e k n o w , t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e r e a h t y o f t h e u n i o n is a c c o m p h s h e d b y
t h e r e c i p r o c a l e f f i c i e n t c a u s a h t y o f t h e t w o substances is e x a c d y t h a t
w i t h w h i c h o c c a s i o n a h s m takes issue: s i n c e n o c r e a t e d substance c a n
reaUy act o n a n o t h e r , w e c a n n o l o n g e r r e l y o n l y o n e f f i c i e n t causahty,
n o w e x p e h e d f r o m created nature, t o p r o v i d e f o r t h e inteh4gibuity of
theirrelations.
Recognizing t h e d i f f i c u l t y t h a t arises w h e n cause a n d r e a s o n are
i d e n t i f i e d , b u t refusing t o g r a n t a u t h e n t i c (and, thus, efficient) causahty
t o finite t h i n g s , o c c a s i o n a h s m separates w h a t D e s c a r t e s h a d u n i t e d a n d
b i f u r c a t e s causality, o r , m o r e e x a c d y , t h e t w o f u n c t i o n s t h a t a n y t r u e
cause m u s t f u r f i U — n a m e l y , t o b r i n g a b o u t existence a n d produce
effects, a n d t o m a k e t h i s p r o d u c t i o n i n t e U i g i b l e a c c o r d i n g t o set l a w s .
B u t t h e exercise o f e f f i c i e n t causahty does n o t b e c o m e i n t e U i g i b l e
e x c e p t b y t h e m e d i a t i o n o f o c c a s i o n a l causahty. O c c a s i o n a h s m t h u s
takes its p l a c e i n t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f s u f -
ficient r e a s o n , e v e n i f t h e d i s j u n c t i o n t h a t i t i n t r o d u c e s serves p r e c i s e l y
t o d i v o r c e t h e o c c a s i o n a l cause ( w h i c h e x p l a i n s ) a n d t h e e f f i c i e n t cause.
I t is t h u s n o w a m a t t e r 0 f f 1 n d i n g a w a y t o c o m p r e h e n d t h i s r e a l d i s t i n c ­
tion b e t w e e n e f f i c i e n t c a u s a h t y a n d o c c a s i o n a l causahty, a b i f u r c a t i o n
t h a t n o n e t h e l e s s m a k e s sense o n l y t h r o u g h t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f t h e s e t w o
concepts ofcausahty i n a system that demands that they be u n i f i e d w i t h ­
o u t thereby b e i n g conflated.
I have e k e w h e r e t r i e d t o s h o w h o w MaIebranche's conception of
m e t a p h y s i c s aUows f o r a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h e r e l a t i o n s
b e t w e e n t h e v a r i o u s sciences t h a t are s u b o r d i n a t e t o i t . 1 2
I t also seems t o
m e entirely w o r t h w h u e t o t h i n k a b o u t t h e tensions that r u n t h r o u g h
each science i n t h e h g h t o f t h i s specific d i v i s i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o f u n c ­
t i o n s o f c a u s a h t y , s u c h as t h e y are p r o p o u n d e d b y o c c a s i o n a h s m . T o b e
m o r e p r e c i s e , i t is n o t a q u e s t i o n o f m a k i n g o c c a s i o n a h s m i n t o s o m e s o r t
offrrst i n t u i t i o n o r a p r i m i t i v e concept f r o m w h i c h one tries t o deduce
the w h o l e o f t h e system. R a t h e r , I propose t o sketch a b r i e f r e a d i n g o f
s o m e M a l e b r a n c h i a n theses r e g a r d i n g t h e t e n s i o n t h a t o c c a s i o n a h s m
i n t r o d u c e s b e t w e e n cause a n d r e a s o n , i n v i s i b l e p o w e r a n d r e a s o n w i t h o u t

1 2
See Bardout, Malebranche et la mkaphysique, ch. 1.
178 Jean-Christophe Bardout

p o w e r . O c c a s i o n a h s m r e p r e s e n t s n o t so m u c h a f o u n d a t i o n a l o r first s c i ­
e n c e as a c e r t a i n w a y o f s e t t i n g u p p r o b l e m s . 1 3
F r o m this perspective,
o c c a s i o n a l i s m s h o u l d b e s e e n n o t o n l y as a thesis o n t h e essence o f
causality, b u t a b o v e aU as a s t r u c t u r a l c o n s t a n t t h a t p r o j e c t s its r e f r a c t e d
h g h t o v e r several i m p o r t a n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l topics. 1 4

I w i U test t h i s h y p o t h e t i c a l r e a d i n g o n t h r e e p r i n c i p a l t o p i c s : m e t a ­
physics a n d r a t i o n a l theology, physics, a n d ethics. I f w e can l o o k b e y o n d
t h e t h e m a t i c diversity o f the examples that w i U be used, the operative
p e r m a n e n c e o f t h e c o n c e p t o f cause w i U a U o w us t o m e a s u r e t h e u n i f y ­
i n g p o w e r o f t h e occasionahst m o d e l . M a l e b r a n c h e ' s t r e a t m e n t o f t h e s e
d i f f e r e n t t o p i c s w i U , i n efFect, r e v e a l t h e c o n c e p t u a l b i f u r c a t i o n s t h a t are
o r g a n i z e d , each i n its o w n way, a c c o r d i n g t o t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
e f f i c i e n t c a u s a h t y a n d o c c a s i o n a l causahty.

2. METAPHYSICS: ESSENCE AND E X I S T E N C E

MaIebranche's metaphysical reflections reveal t w o p r i n c i p a l meanings

of'being'.This d o u b l e s i g n i f i c a t i o n o f b e i n g is i t s e I f g r o u n d e d o n t h e
r e a l s e p a r a t i o n o f e s s e n c e a n d e x i s t e n c e . T h u s , i f t h e thesis o f s u c h a r e a l
d i s t i n c t i o n is n o t c o m p l e t e l y n e w , 1 5
i t is stiU t h e case t h a t M a l e b r a n c h e
g i v e s i t a n e w status b y i n s c r i b i n g i t w i t h i n his o w n p r o b l e m a t i c . T h e dis­
t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n essence a n d e x i s t e n c e is t h e r e b y r e l a t e d t o t h e d i f f e r ­
e n c e b e t w e e n t h a t w h i c h is w i t h o u t cause a n d t h a t w h i c h depends
essentiaUy o n a n e f f i c i e n t cause as its m o s t p r o p e r efFect.

1 3
Ifreflection o n causahty is not to be taken as a point ofdeparture for excursions through
MaIebranche's philosophy, nonetheless its central status is readily apparent as soon as one
attends to the fact that most ofhis major philosophical theses presuppose, either exphcidy or
imphcidy, the occasionahst understanding o f the rebtions between cause and reason.Thus, the
theory ofsensory and inteUectual knowledge, the doctrine ofthe invisibihty ofexisting beings,
the conception ofpsycho-physical union, his view ofthe krws ofnature, his account ofhuman
voUtion and divine grace, etc.
1 4
T h i s dichotomy ofcause and reason, the latter understood as both universal R e a s o n and
the reason behind the cause (that is, the principle according to w h i c h and by w h i c h the effi­
cacy ofthe cause is determined) captures, i n a sense, the hst oftruths comprehended under
metaphysics:'What does the ordinary man think, for example, w h e n most metaphysical truths
a r e p r o v e d t o h i m , w h e n w e d e m o n s t r a t e f o r h i m t h e e x i s t e n c e o f G o d . . . thatthereisbutone
G o d or one true cause that does everything i n aU things, that there is but one sovereign R e a s o n
inwhichaUinteUigencesparticipate?'(SixthElucidation, O C i i i . 5 3 ; L O 5 6 8 ) .
1 5
T h e distinction is famously sustained by St Thomas, especiaUy chapter 4 o f De ente et
essentia.
 Cause and Reason in Malebranche 179

ι. T r a d i t i o n a U y , t o e x i s t , for f i n i t e b e i n g s , is t o d e p e n d i m m e d i a t e l y
o n a n e f f i c i e n t c a u s e : ' O n l y G o d p r o p e r l y has b e i n g , a n d n e c e s s a r i l y
exists, s i n c e e v e r y t h i n g d e p e n d e n t exists o n l y t h r o u g h t h e w i U o f H i m
u p o n w h o m t h e y d e p e n d ' (Recherche de la verite IV.5.i1, OC i i . 47; L O
288). N0 b e i n g , t h u s , c a n subsist i f i t is n o t c o n s e r v e d i n e x i s t e n c e b y
God, through the identification of creation and conservation. 1 6

E x i s t e n c e is t h u s d e f i n e d o n l y i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e cause t h a t effects i t a n d
f r e e l y sustains i t r i g h t t h r o u g h t o its least m o d a l i t i e s . 1 7
I n denying to
f i n i t e b e i n g s aU efficacy, o c c a s i o n a l i s m b r i n g s i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e f i r s t
cause n o t o n l y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s u b s t a n c e s , b u t also t h e i r m o d i f i c a t i o n s
o r ways o f b e i n g . 1 8
When i n t e r p r e t e d as t h e effect o f d i v i n e causahty,
e x i s t e n c e leads us t o t h e e f f i c a c i o u s p o w e r o f G o d u n d e r s t o o d as g e n e r a l
or universal cause, 19
or as t h e power that confers and maintains
b e i n g : ' N o , L o r d , the p o w e r that provides b e i n g and m o t i o n to bodies
a n d s p i r i t s is f o u n d o n l y i n y o u . I d o n o t r e c o g n i z e a n y t r u e cause o t h e r
t h a n t h e efficacy o f y o u r v o h t i o n s ' (Maditations chretiennesV\.22, OC
χ . 6 8 ) . B u t t h i s g r o u n d i n g o f e x i s t e n c e i n d i v i n e e f f i c a c y m u s t , i n effect,
inevitably render existence inconceivable o r invisible. 2 0
The deep-
seated i r r a t i o n a h t y o f e f f i c a c y , c o n s i d e r e d i n i t s e l f a n d i n d e p e n d e n t l y of
t h e reasons t h a t g r o u n d its exercise, is r e f l e c t e d i n t h e u n k n o w a b i h t y of
its effects. S i n g u l a r e x i s t e n t s b e c o m e u n i n t e U i g i b l e f o r u s . 2 1
The occa­
s i o n a h s t d e n i a l o f aU f o r m s o f c a u s a l i t y i n n a t u r e p r e v e n t s sensations
f r o m b e i n g t h e effects o f f i n i t e c o r p o r e a l causes; i n so f a r as t h e y e x i s t ,
finite b e i n g s d o n o t affect us. T h e sensations o r f e e h n g s w i t h w h i c h G o d
affects us are s u p p o s e d t o r e v e a l t o us t h a t w h i c h is, i n i t s e l f , i n v i s i b l e . 2 2

1 6
O n the identification ofcreation and conservation, see EntreHensVll.j and 10.
1 7
Existence is thus the efFect o f a pure divine freedom; Traite de l'amour de Dieu, O C x i v . 8.
1 8
See,for example, Miditations chritiennes L X . 6 , O C x . 9 8 . T h e modifications ofthe soul,hke
those ofthe body, can never be produced by the substance they modify.The wiU, for example,
does not provide evidence for any activity o n the part ofthe soul, but is defined as a motion
generated by God; see Recherche IV. 1, and the First Elucidation.
1 9
See TraitSdelanatureetdelagracel.36,OCv.4s;l.43,OCv.49.
2 0
' T h u s , w h e n we perceive bodies, let us judge only that we perceive them and that these
perceptible or inteUigible bodies actuaUy exist;but w h y should wejudge positively that there
is an external material world Uke the inteUigible world w e perceive?' (Sixth Elucidation, O C
iii. 6 0 ; see ako Entretiens4l.$ and 6 ) .
2 1
See Jean-Christophe Bardout, 'Toute-puissance et singularite selon Malebranche', in
B. Pinchard (ed.), Malebranche et la ttgheU de l'itre @>aris:J.Vrin, 1 9 9 8 ) ; and P. Desoche,
'Malebranche ou l'inconcevable existence', XVIIe siMe 51 ( 1 9 9 9 ) , 317—35.
2 2
Recherche I I I . 2 . v i , ОС 1 , 4 4 5 . Note that an existing body never attains the complete suf­
ficiency o f a reason, in so far as it is impossible for us, after original sin, to determine whether
i8o Jean-Chnstophe Bardout

T h e r e thus emerge t w o c o m p l e m e n t a r y theses a b o u t e x i s t e n c e . I n

t h e f i r s t p l a c e , M a l e b r a n c h e v a h d a t e s t h e classic d e f i n i t i o n , w h i c h has
b e e n i n p l a c e s i n c e t h e M i d d l e A g e s : t o e x i s t , at least f o r a f i n i t e t h i n g , is
t o b e c a u s e d , t o o c c u r o u t s i d e one's cause. B u t , s e c o n d , t o t h e d e g r e e t o
w h i c h causal e f f i c a c y d o e s n o t , b y itserf, g u a r a n t e e t h e i n t e U i g i b U i t y o f
w h a t i t nevertheless p r o d u c e s , existence b e c o m e s radicaUy u n i n t e U i g i -
b l e , o r , m o r e p r o p e r l y , i n v i s i b l e . T h i s s e q u e s t e r i n g o f e x i s t e n c e is a t t e n u ­
a t e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t w h a t exists d o e s n o t i t s e i f e x e r c i s e a n y f o r m o f
causahty u p o n a k n o w i n g b e i n g , t o the extent that the rektionship
b e t w e e n t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d e x i s t i n g b e i n g s is s t r e t c h e d t o t h e m a x ­
i m u m degree. 2 3

T h e inteUigibility o f t h e w o r l d must therefore he outside the w o r l d ,

i n o r d e r t o b e fixed i n t h e c l e a r a n d d i s t i n c t v i s i o n i n G o d o f e s s e n c e s .
Essences, t h e o r d y t h i n g s e f f e c t i v e l y k n o w n , are t h u s d i s t i n g u i s h e d f r o m
this u n k n o w n existence.
A s f o r t h e d e f i n i t i o n ofessence, i t presents t w o d i s t i n c t b u t comple­
mentary characteristics:

ι. I f M a l e b r a n c h e , t o aU a p p e a r a n c e s , p r o v i d e s f o r i t a t r a d i t i o n a l d e f ­
inition, 2 4
he q u i c k l y modifies its m e a n i n g t o signify that w h i c h is
k n o w n , a n d identifies i t w i t h a divine idea, the i m m e d i a t e object o f t h e
h u m a n m i n d . A g a i n s t A r n a u l d , M a l e b r a n c h e always m a i n t a i n s t h e dis­
tinction b e t w e e n t h e p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e m i n d a n d i d e a , t h e essential
archetype o f the t h i n g . 2 5
T h e essence o f a finite b e i n g t h u s finds i t s e i f
r e i n s c r i b e d i n t h e d i v i n e essence. P u t a n o t h e r w a y , t h e essence o f a t h i n g
is n o l o n g e r a f o r m a l c o n s t i t u e n t o f i t , b u t t h e d i v i n e p e r f e c t i o n t h a t r e p r e ­
sents i t a n d c o n s e q u e n t l y r e n d e r s i t i n t e U i g i b l e . ^ A n e x a m p l e o f t h i s is t h e
d e f i n i t i o n o f i n t e U i g i b l e e x t e n s i o n , s i m u k a n e o u s l y u n d e r s t o o d as essence
o f t h e material universe and d i v i n e perfection, archetype o f e x t e n s i o n .

the occasional cause that spurs the production o f a sensation i n the mind is reaUy an external
body or simply a brain trace. O n this point, see EntretiensVl.j, OC 12,140.
2 3
T h i s caUs into question any kind ofrational proofofthe existence o f the external world,
especiaUy the Cartesian version found i n the Sixth Meditation. See Sixth Elucidation, O C iii. 6 0 .
2 4
'Phüosophers agree that w e ought to regard as the essence o f a thing what we recognize
as primary i n that thing, what is inseparable from it, and what aU the properties belonging to it
depend o n ' (Recherche I I I . 2 . v i i i . 2 , O C i . 4 5 9 ; L O 2 4 3 . S e e also I I I . i . i , O C i . 381).
2 5
O n l y essences,identified w i t h divine ideas, and their rekitions have for us a true objective
consistency. See Bardout,Mafef>rancAe et h mitaphysique, 112 ff.
2 6
T h e strong rejection o f any 'creation' o f eternal truths carries o n the Malebranchian
restatement o f the traditional definition o f essence as the necessary and eternal connection
between terms.
 Cause and Reason in Malebranche 181

2. An essence is t h u s r e a U y d i s t i n c t f r o m t h a t w h o s e e x i s t e n c e i t

grounds.The d o c t r i n e o f i n t e U i g i b l e e x t e n s i o n is, o n t h i s p o i n t , t o t a U y

c l e a r . T h r o u g h i t w e k n o w t h e essence o r n a t u r e o f t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d ,

w i t h o u t ever b e i n g able t o d e d u c e f r o m i t t h e actual existence o f this

w o r l d . T h e world, Malebranche is f o n d o f r e p e a t i n g , is n o t a n e c e s s a r y

emanation ofthe Divinity. 2 7

T o k n o w clearly and d i s t i n c d y is,first ofaU,

t o see t h e a r c h e t y p e s o f t h i n g s i n G o d , t h a t is, t o see essences t h a t m a k e

n o c l a i m s a b o u t e x i s t e n c e . ' O n e c a n see a c i r c l e , a h o u s e , a s u n , w i t h o u t

any o f t h e m e x i s t i n g . . . S u c h a b e i n g , a l t h o u g h k n o w n , m i g h t n o t exist

at aU. O n e c a n see i t s essence w i t h o u t i t s e x i s t e n c e , i t s i d e a w i t h o u t

the t h i n g itself' (Entretiens II.5, O C x h . 53). 2 8

I t t h u s appears t h a t t h e

d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n e x i s t e n c e a n d essence f o U o w s q u i t e c l o s e l y t h e d i s ­

tinction b e t w e e n t h a t w h i c h d e p e n d s u p o n a n e f f i c i e n t cause a n d t h a t

w h i c h does n o t .

I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , t h e essence o f a c r e a t e d b e i n g has n o cause, s i n c e i t

is c o n s t i t u t e d b y t h e d i v i n e essence i t s e l f , i n s o f a r as i t is p a r t i c i p a b l e b y

c r e a t u r e s . T h e essence p r o v i d e s t h e r e a s o n f o r t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f a t h i n g ,

b u t itseH"makes n o c l a i m w h a t s o e v e r a b o u t e x i s t e n c e . 2 9

2 7
Maditations chnHiennes DC.2, O C x . 96; Traitt de la nature et de lagr&ce I.4, O C v . 18 and II.51,
O C v . 110.'Thus theWord precisely as theWord, as the universal Reason ofrninds, does not
contain their existence; one cannot, in contemplating it, learn what G o d has created' (TraiU de
morale I.i.v, O C x i . 18).The distinction between essence and existence constitutes one ofthe
points ofdispute between Malebranche and Dortous de Mairan,whom we know to have been
tempted by Spinozism.The real distinction between the two constitutes for Malebranche the
best defense against the Spinozist conflation o f G o d and the world.
2 8
See akoTenthElucidation, O C i i i . 1 4 2 : ' I t i s b y t h e H g h t a n d b y a c l e a r i d e a thatthe mind
sees the essences ofthings, numbers and extension'; and Recherche rV11.3, O C ii. 96; L O 318:
' O n e must remember that w h e n we see a creature, we see it neither in itselfnor ofitself, for we
see i t . . . only through the perception ofcertain perfections in G o d that represent it.Thus w e
can seethe essence ofthis creature withoutseeingits existence,i.e.we can seeits ideawithout
seeing it; we can see i n G o d that w h i c h represents it without its existing. It is uniquely because
ofthis that necessary existence is not included i n the idea that represents it, since it is not n e c ­
essary for it actuaUy to exist in order for us to see it, unless we ckum that created objects are
immediately visible, inteUigible i n themselves, and capable ofiUuminating, affecting and m o d ­
ifying inteUigences.' See also Meditations chritiennes I X . 12, O C x. 100.
2 5
Contrary to the Leibnizian definition, the Malebranchian possible, a pure object o f
divine (and human) thought, intrinsicaUy contains no striving for existence, and moreover
seems not to be understood through the necessary existent that grounds it. Far from being c o n ­
ceived through its eventual actuahzation, it only secondarUy constitutes what is offered to the
creative efficacy o f God. For Leibniz, see, for example, Theodicy, § 7 and Monadology, §54.
Nothing could be further from MaIebranche's position than the definition ofthe possible as
a future existent. Thus, whUe a number o f Leibnizian texts conceive o f possibUity through
the necessary existent that grounds it by thinking it (Mondadology, §44; Theodicy, §189),
Malebranche highUghts the distance between the possible (defined more as what is inteUigible
l82 Jean-Christophe Bardout

I n t h e s e c o n d p l a c e , essences, r a n k e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e p r i n c i p l e o f
t h e i r m o r e o r less g r a n d p e r f e c t i o n , c o n s t i t u t e t h e o r d e r a c c o r d i n g to
w h i c h G o d creates t h e w o r l d a n d t h e k w s t h a t m a k e i t i n t e U i g i b l e . T h e 3 0

creative w i U thus submits itself t o an i n t a n g i b l e rationahty, p o w e r t o a

g r e a t e r w i s d o m t h a t r e n d e r s i t 'so t o s p e a k i m p o t e n t ' (Traito de la nature
et de / a ^ r a c e I . i , a d d i t i o n , O C v . 1 2 ; I . 3 8 , a d d i t i o n , O C v . 4 6 ) .
T o g e t h e r , t h e s e theses a m o u n t t o a p i t i l e s s c r i t i q u e o f a n y a t t e m p t t o
g r o u n d truths i n the divine w i U : 3 1

I reply that G o d can d o n o t h i n g and can r u l e n o t h i n g w i t h o u t k n o w l e d g e , and

that therefore his voUtions suppose s o m e t h i n g ; b u t w h a t t h e y suppose is n o t
s o m e t h i n g created. O r d e r , t r u t h , eternal w i s d o m is the exemplar o f aU God's
w o r k s , and this w i s d o m is n o t created. G o d w h o creates aU things d i d n o t create
i t , a l t h o u g h he is always b e g e t t i n g i t t h r o u g h the necessity o f h i s b e i n g . A U that
G o d wiUs is i n order f o r the sole reason that G o d wiUs i t , this I a d m i t . B u t this is
because G o d cannot act against himself, against his o w n w i s d o m and Hght. H e
is i n d e e d n o t able t o p r o d u c e a n y t h i n g external t o h i m s e l f , b u t i f h e wiUs t o act,
he can do so o n l y according t o the i m m u t a b l e order o f w i s d o m that he neces-
sarUy loves. (Eighth Elucidation, O C i ü . 8 5 ; L O 5 8 6 ^ 7 )

I n c o n t r a s t w i t h c o m p l e t e d e p e n d e n c e o n a cause, t h e u n i v e r s a l r e a s o n ,
c o n s t i t u t e d b y t h e t o t a h t y o f essences, is g r o u n d e d o n l y i n i t s e l f , so m u c h
so t h a t i t is ' i n a sense m o r e i n d e p e n d e n t than G o d himself' (Tenth
E l u c i d a t i o n , O C i i i . 1 3 1 ; L O 614).
T h e metaphysical d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n essence a n d e x i s t e n c e , t h u s ,
finds its i m m e d i a t e extension, i n rational theology, i n God's double
d e t e r m i n a t i o n as u n i v e r s a l R e a s o n a n d o m n i p o t e n c e . W h i l e W i s d o m
c o n t e m p l a t e s t h e i d e a - a r c h e t y p e s , a l t h o u g h d i v i n e t h o u g h t does n o t
p r o v i d e t h e g r o u n d f o r t h e i r reahty, t h e w i U , w h i c h is n o t h i n g b u t p o w e r ,
e x c l u s i v e l y exercises t h e causal f u n c t i o n . M a l e b r a n c h e a c c e n t u a t e s t h e

than as what can be created) and the existing.This can be expkined by the profound diver­
gence between the two thinkers regarding the metaphysical origin o f singubrity: while
Leibniz seems i n a number oftexts to think ofindividuation at the level ofthe possibles t h e m ­
selves, Malebranche reserves it for existents alone, and thus finds its locus i n the divine wiU.

3 0
' R e k t i o n s ofperfection are truths and, at the same time, immutable and necessary laws:
these are the inviolable rules ofaU motions and minds.Thus, these truths are the order that G o d
himseU"consults i n aU his operations. F o r always loving aU things i n proportion to their w o r ­
thiness ofbeing loved, the different degrees ofperfection govern the different degrees ofhis
love, and the subordination that he estabhshes between creatures' (Meditations chretiennes IV.8,
OCx.39).
3 1
See J e a n - L u c M a r i o n , Questions cartesiennes, i i ^"aris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1996), 1 9 7 - 2 0 5 .
 Cause and Reason in Malebranche 18 3

d i s j u n c t i o n b e t w e e n cause a n d r e a s o n t o t h e p o i n t o f a s s i g n i n g t o t h e
w i U a k i n d o f c o g n i t i v e p o w e r : i t is i n k n o w i n g i t s e r f t h a t t h e w i U accedes
1

t o t h e e x i s t e n c e o f w h a t i t p r o d u c e s . ' G o d d e r i v e s his H g h t o n h / f r o m h i m ­
self; h e sees t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d o n l y i n t h e i n t e U i g i b l e w o r l d h e c o n t a i n s
a n d i n t h e k n o w l e d g e h e has o f h i s v o h t i o n s , w h i c h actuaUy g i v e e x i s t e n c e
a n d m o t i o n t o aU t h i n g s ' ( S i x t h E l u c i d a t i o n , O C i i i . 6 1 ; L O 573). 32

T h e m e t a p h y s i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o senses o f b e i n g t h u s
p e r m i t s t h e d i s j u n c t i o n , a c q u i r e d b y occasionahsm, b e t w e e n a reason
w i t h o u t cause ( t h e d o m a i n o f i n t e U i g i b l e essences) a n d a cause w i t h o u t
reason (the source o f existents). O r g a n i z e d a c c o r d i n g t o this d o u b l e
d e t e r m i n a t i o n , o n t o l o g y a n d t h e c o n c e p t o f c a u s e find t h e m s e l v e s p r o ­
f o u n d l y d e p e n d e n t o n each other.
B u t i f i t is o t h e r w i s e c l e a r t h a t b e i n g is first accessible t o us b e c a u s e
w e h a v e k n o w l e d g e o f i t , p e r h a p s t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t w o senses o f
b e i n g regulates t h e t h e o r y o f k n o w l e d g e elaborated i n metaphysics. F o r
the latter certainly acknowledges t w o ways o f k n o w i n g : o n the one
h a n d , t h e v i s i o n i n t h e e t e r n a l w i s d o m o f ideas o r essences a n d t h e i r
necessary r e l a t i o n s , a n d o n t h e o t h e r h a n d t h e n a t u r a l r e v e l a t i o n b y s e n ­
sation o f c o n t i n g e n t e x i s t e n t s . W h a t is c o n t a i n e d e t e r n a U y b y wisdom
a n d w h a t is p r o d u c e d i n time b y t h e i n f i n i t e e f f i c a c y o f p o w e r t h u s
require t w o irreducible epistemic modahties,

for there is always a pure idea a n d a confused sensation i n the k n o w l e d g e w e have

o f the existence o f beings, the k n o w l e d g e o f G o d and o f o u r soul excepted.
I exclude the existence o f G o d , w h i c h w e k n o w t h r o u g h a pure idea and w i t h o u t
sensation, because his existence depends o n n o cause and is contained i n the idea
o f a n i n f i n i t e and necessary being. (Tenth E l u c i d a t i o n , O C i i i . 143; L O 6 2 1 - 2 ) 3 3

W e shaU find a simUar t e n s i o n i n t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f t h e t w o fundamental

e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l concepts that structure MaIebranche's physics.

3 2
Compare this with Leibniz (Causa Dei, § 16): ' T h e science ofactual things or ofthe world
brought into existence . . . is caUed the science ofvision; it is distinguished from the science of
pure inteUigence ofthis same world considered insofar as it is possible only because it adds to
it the reflexive knowledge by w h i c h G o d knows his decree to bring this world into existence.'
3 3
Contrary to divine existence, w h i c h is seen through a pure idea because it is stricdy
uncaused (Malebranche clearly rejects the Cartesian concept o f G o d as cause ofhimsetf), finite
existence,just because it depends o n its cause, cannot be conceived through pure idea but
needs to be revealed through sensation. ' F r o m this we can judge that it is i n G o d or i n an
immutable nature that we see aU that we k n o w by means ofiUumination or clear idea—not
only because through Шигтпагюп we see only numbers, extension, and the essences ofthings,
w h i c h do not depend o n a free act o f G o d , as I have aheady pointed out' fTenth Elucidation,
O C i i i . 142).
 i84 Jean-Christophe Bardout

3. PHYSICS: REASON AND EXPERIENCE

I f p h i l o s o p h y is, first o f a U , t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f i d e a s o r essences seen i n

G o d , h o w o u g h t w e to understand the nature o f t h e connections between
m e t a p h y s i c s (a s c i e n c e f o u n d e d o n essences o r clear a n d d i s t i n c t ideas) a n d
p h y s i c s ( t h e s c i e n c e o f a n a t u r e t h a t exists b u t is i n v i s i b l e w i t h respect t o
ideas), especiaUy c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t several o f M a l e b r a n c h e ' s texts p k c e
physics w i t h i n t h e o r b i t ofmetaphysics? 34
T h i s q u e s t i o n takes o n t h e f o r m
o f a famous M a l e b r a n c h i a n paradox, t o the extent that the O r a t o r i a n
m a m t a i n s t h a t i t is, w i t h aU r i g o r , possible t o c o n s t r u c t a physics e v e n
t h o u g h o n e remains rationaUy u n c e r t a i n o f t h e existence o f b o d i e s :

B u t t o preserve the order i n o u r reasoning, w e n e e d n o t reexamine w h e t h e r w e

have a b o d y a n d w h e t h e r there are others a r o u n d us, o r w h e t h e r w e o n l y have
the sensations o f t h e m even t h o u g h these bodies do n o t exist. T h i s question
contains t o o m a n y great difficulties, and i t is perhaps n o t as necessary as m i g h t
be i m a g i n e d t o resolve i t i n order t o perfect o u r k n o w l e d g e , n o r even t o have
an exact k n o w l e d g e ofphysics, m o r a h t y , and some o t h e r sciences. (Recherche
V I . 2 . v 1 , O C i i . 3 7 3 ; L O 482)

I t is u s e f u l h e r e t o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n t w o g r o u p s o f t h e s e s , w h o s e
a r t i c u l a t i o n defines t h e e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l s t r u c t u r e ofphysics:

1. I t u n d o u b t e d l y p e r t a i n s t o m e t a p h y s i c s t o p r o v i d e p h y s i c s w i t h its
g e n e r a l p r i n c i p l e s , t h a t is, t h e f u n d a m e n t a l c o n c e p t s p e r t i n e n t t o e v e r y
s c i e n c e o f n a t u r e . P h y s i c s is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as t h e s c i e n c e ofbodies;
a n d t h e essence o f b o d i e s c a n b e u n d e r s t o o d o n l y t h r o u g h a n d i n i n t e l -
Ugible extension, the archetype o f corporeal nature. 3 5

2. B u t k n o w i n g t h e essence o f m a t t e r d o e s n o t l e a d t o k n o w i n g
e x i s t i n g bodies. I n t e U i g i b l e e x t e n s i o n represents o n l y t h e archetype of
an i n f i n i t u d e ofpossible universes. The metaphysical consideration o f
3 6

t h e i d e a o f G o d as m ' i r i m i t e l y p e r f e c t b e i n g ' aUows us t o a f f i r m , m o r e o v e r ,

3
* O n the relationship between metaphysics and physics, see Bardout,Ma!ei>raniAe et le mita-
pkysique, 50—3.
3 5
T h e consideration ofinteUigible extension grounds the real distinction between matter
and mind,just as m u c h as the clear idea of the causal impotence ofbodies eventuaUy brought
into existence.
3 6
' B u t G o d does not reveal to us through the idea ofextension only the world that he has
created; it represents even an infinitude ofworlds that he has not made. F o r inteuigible exten­
sion is the archetype ofan infrnite number ofpossible worlds' (Entretiens sur la mort I I , О С Х Ш .
409;seeako Ttaitidelanatureetdelagrdcel.s5,OCv.57).
 Cause and Reason in Malebranche 185

t h a t w h i c h has c o m e t o b e k n o w n as t h e ' p r i n c i p l e o f t h e s i m p l i c i t y o f
m e a n s ' . B e g i n n i n g i n t h e Traite de la nature et de lagr<ke, a n d e v e n m o r e
c l e a r l y i n t h e n i n t h o f t h e Entretiens sur la mitaphysique, the consideration
o f t h e idea o f G o d imposes the p r i n c i p l e o f o p t i m a l p r o p o r t i o n b e t w e e n
means and p r o d u c t . 3 7
B u t t h i s s i m p l i c i t y i n t h e m a n n e r o f a c t i n g aUows
us t o i n f e r a p r i o r i t h e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e l a w s t h a t w i n b e o b s e r v e d i n a n y
w o r l d w h a t s o e v e r : t h e l a w s w ü l n e c e s s a r ü y b e t h e m o s t s i m p l e , t h a t is,
t h e m o s t g e n e r a l . T h e s i m p h c i t y o f a c t i o n t h u s reflects t h e s i m p h c i t y o f
t h e a g e n t i t s e l f . B y g i v i n g us a n a p r i o r i k n o w l e d g e o f t h e n o r m a t i v e
and regulative p r i n c i p l e o f d i v i n e action, metaphysics procures for
p h y s i c s a g e n e r a l f r a m e w o r k f o r its o w n p r o j e c t . B u t w h i l e m e d i t a t i n g
o n t h e d i v i n e a t t r i b u t e s reveals t h e essence o r t h e u n i v e r s a l f o r m o f t h e
l a w s , i t c a n n o t , f o r aU t h a t , teU us w h a t are t h e l a w s o f n a t u r e t h a t are
actuaUy o b s e r v e d i n this created w o r l d . T h a t w o u l d r e q u i r e e x p e r i e n c e ,
a m o d e o f k n o w i n g suited f o r fiUing this lacuna. ' W h e n w e d o n o t
k n o w w h a t t h e l a w s o f n a t u r e are, w e t r y t o d i s c o v e r t h e m b y v a r i o u s
e x p e r i m e n t s . B u t w h e n w e c o m e t o k n o w t h e m , w e r e g a r d these l a w s as
inviolable.' 3 8
T h i s recourse to supplementary i n f o r m a t i o n provided by
e x p e r i e n c e is g r o u n d e d , i n t h e f i n a l analysis, i n t h e status o f t h e created
w o r l d r e l a t i v e t o its e f H c i e n t cause. I n o r d e r t o d e s c r i b e t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p
o f t h e w o r l d t o G o d , M a l e b r a n c h e uses a r e c u r r i n g f o r m u l a , a v e r i t a b l e
l e i t m o t i v o f h i s p h ü o s o p h y : ' T h e w o r l d is n o t a necessary e m a n a t i o n
o f t h e d i v i n i t y . ' T h i s f o r m u l a appears m o s t n o t a b l y w h e n h e deals w i t h
3 9

t h e k n o w l e d g e o f e x i s t i n g b o d i e s , w h o s e b e i n g is c l e a r l y n o n - d e d u c i b l e
f r o m ideas k n o w n i n t h e W o r d :

T h e n o t i o n o f t h e i n f i n i t e l y perfect B e i n g never includes a necessary c o n n e c ­

t i o n t o any creatures. G o d is c o m p l e t e l y serf-sufficient. M a t t e r is thus n o t a nec­
essary e m a n a t i o n o f t h e d i v i n i t y . O r at least, and this is sufficient f o r m y present
purposes, i t is n o t evident that i t is a necessary emanation o f i t . For one can p r o ­
v i d e an exact d e m o n s t r a t i o n f o r a t r u t h o n l y w h e n one estabhshes a necessary
c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n i t a n d its p r i n c i p l e , o n l y w h e n one estabHshes that there is
a necessary c o n n e c t i o n contained i n the ideas that one c o m p a r e s . A n d i t is n o t
possible t o demonstrate, rigorously, that there are bodies. I n efFect, the existence
o f bodies is arbitrary. I f there are any, i t is because G o d has chosen t o create

3 7
' W h e n we presume to speak about G o d , we must not model h i m upon ourselves and
have h i m acting as we do; we must consult the idea ofan infinitely perfect Being, and have G o d
a c t i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h thisidea' (Τταίίέ de la nature el de la^rfcII.17,addition).
3 8
Conversations chretiennes I X , O C iv. 198.
3 9
See n. 2 7 . Besides the texts already cited, see Meditations chretiennesV.7, OC x. 4 9 .
i86 Jean-Christophe Bardout

t h e m . . . T h e v o H t i o n t o create bodies is n o t necessarily c o n t a i n e d i n t h e

n o t i o n o f an i n f i n i t e l y p e r f e c t B e i n g , o f a b e i n g t h a t is c o m p l e t e l y seLf-

sufficient. Far from i t — t h i s n o t i o n seems t o e x c l u d e from G o d any such

v o h t i o n . T h e r e is thus n o o t h e r w a y t o assure ourselves t h a t G o d has i n d e e d

createdbodies t h a n r e v e k t i o n . (Entretiens surla metaphysique4l.$, O C x i i . 137)

T h u s , i f t h e l a w s o f n a t u r e c a n n o t , p r o p e r l y s p e a k i n g , b e c o n s i d e r e d as

contingent, 4 0
t h e y are, n o n e t h e l e s s , c o n t e m p o r a n e o u s w i t h t h e p r o d u c ­

tion o f the bodies whose constant relations they determine. T h e

'arbitrary' character o f t h e existence o f t h e w o r l d extends equahy t o the

l a w s t h a t g o v e r n n a t u r a l b e i n g s . ' T h u s G o d has t w o s o r t s o f l a w s that

r e g u l a t e h i s c o n d u c t . O n e set is e t e r n a l a n d n e c e s s a r y ; t h i s is O r d e r . T h e

o t h e r s a r e a r b i t r a r y , a n d t h e s e are t h e g e n e r a l l a w s o f n a t u r e a n d g r a c e '

(MeditationschretiennesVll.18, O C x . 76). 41
H e n c e , i t is e x p e r i e n c e a l o n e

that permits the inferring o f l a w s , b y h n k i n g the constancy o f p h e n o -

m e n a l c o r r e k t i o n s t o t h e i m m u t a b i h l t y o f t h e cause t h a t i n s t i t u t e s t h e m . 4 2

T h i s d u a h s m b e t w e e n reason a n d e x p e r i e n c e 4 3
leads us b a c k t o t h e

d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e essence o r n a t u r e o f b o d y , e t e r n a h y t r u e a n d

seen i n G o d i n d e p e n d e n d y o f a U c r e a t i o n , a n d t h a t w h i c h exists, b o d i e s

whose r e l a t i o n s are r e g u l a t e d b y t h e l a w s o f n a t u r e t h a t t h e i n t e h e c t

4 0
This complex question cannot be dealt with here. I wiU onh/ remark that, to the degree to
w h i c h the k w s instituted by G o d constitute the transktion o f divine simphcity into the created
universe, it seems that the laws that govern our actual world are the only truly possible ones, that
is, the only ones compatible with divine perfection.Whüe they do notshare i n the unconditioned
necessity ofthe divine essence (since they are not co-eternal with it), they seem for aU that to be
no less conditionaUy or hypotheticaUy necessary.To put it in non-Malebranchian terms, their
contingency is ofa logical order—since different laws had been absolutely possible—but not real.
This would expkin why Malebranche counts physics among the sciences constituted principaUy
ofnecessary truths (Recherche I.3.ii, O C i. 6 3 ) without this necessity making the k w s ofnature
epistemologicaUy homogeneous with the truths seen i n G o d .
4 1
T h e arbitrariness ofexistence and the arbitrariness ofits law are closely connected in the
arbitrariness ofthe divine wiU; see Miditations chritiennesV.14, OC x. 53.Malebranche often
speaks ofthe efficacy oflaws; see Meditations chratiennesVü.g, OC x. 7 2 .
4 2
I have to raise my arm to learn that my wiU is the occasional cause o f m y arm's motion
through divine efficacy. Experience constitutes the privUeged field ofexperimentation for the
laws:'Experience teaches me that I sense pain, for example, w h e n a thorn pricks me.This is cer­
tain. B u t we cannot go further than this. For experience never teaches that the thorn acts on
my mind,northat ithas any power' (E«(reft'e«sVII.2, O C x i i . 151).
4 3
W h i l e Malebranche oftenjoins the two, to the point of forging a recurring phrase ('rea­
son and experience'), he never conflates them.Thus a doctor must refer simultaneously, but not
indifferendy, to his r e a s o n — w h i c h proves for example the distinction between body and soul,
or w h i c h keeps h i m from faUing prey too quickly to prejudice—and to his experience,
patiendy acquired over time. See, for example, among other texts,Thirteenth Elucidation, O C
iii. 187.
 Cause and Reason in Malebranche 187

c a n n o t d e d u c e as o n e d r a w s a c o n c l u s i o n f r o m a p r i n c i p l e . A l t h o u g h
M a l e b r a n c h e grants t o experience an u n d e n i a b l e epistemic value, this
v a l u e n o n e t h e l e s s is s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e u n c e r t a i n t i e s t h a t i n p r i n c i p l e
a c c o m p a n y k n o w l e d g e o f t h e c r e a t e d as s u c h : ' P h y s i c i s t s k n o w t h e p a r ­
ticular laws o f nature i n o n l y an i m p e r f e c t m a n n e r , f o r experience,
w h i c h is t h e m o s t r e h a b l e w a y o f d i s c o v e r i n g t h e m , is v e r y deceptive'
(Conversations chretiennes IX, OCiv. 198^). 4 4

I n s u m , M a I e b r a n c h e ' s p h y s i c s seems t o o p e r a t e b y t w o a n t a g o n i s t i c ,
i f n o t c o n t r a d i c t o r y , d e m a n d s . A t t h e same t i m e t h a t i t provides a m e t a ­
physical f o u n d a t i o n f o r physics b y l e a d i n g t h e physicist t o t h e c o n s i d e r ­
a t i o n o f essences s e e n i n G o d , i t p a r a d o x i c a U y leads t o a p h y s i c s t h a t is
i n d i f f e r e n t t o t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d t h a t i t is i n v e s t i g a t i n g . P h y s i c a l
b e i n g , c o n s i d e r e d as a p u r e essence, m u s t e x p l a i n t h e i n t r i n s i c p r o p e r t i e s
o f m a t t e r , j u s t as t h e i d e a t h a t G o d has o f t h e w o r l d i n f o r m s us a b o u t t h e
w o r l d i t s e l f . B u t b e c a u s e t h e w o r l d is a b i t m o r e t h a n its i d e a , t h i s m e t a ­
physical r e p e t i t i o n ofphysics finds an i n v i o l a b l e h m i t i n the arbitrariness
o f c r e a t i o n , o r t h e f r e e e f f i c a c y o f t h e cause. I f G o d c a n c r e a t e o n b / w h a t
h e has c r e a t e d , stül, n o t h i n g o b h g e s h i m t o c r e a t e a w o r l d . 4 5
I f t h e phys­
i c a l l a w s o f t h e u n i v e r s e are r a t i o n a l , stiU, o n e m u s t p e r h a p s g r a n t t h a t , i n
aU r i g o r , its b e i n g is n o t , o r at least t h a t t h i s r a t i o n a h t y is a b s o l u t e l y i n a c ­
cessible t o u s . T h i s o b s c u r i n g b o t h o f e x i s t e n c e , u n a t t a i n a b l e t h r o u g h t h e
W o r d , a n d o f t h e cause t h a t d e t e r m i n e s i t w i U l e a d t h e p h y s i c i s t s i m p l y
t o i n v e s t i g a t e effects a n d t h e i r c o r r e l a t i o n s a c c o r d i n g t o l a w s , a n d t h u s
t o e x p e r i e n c e , as t h e m o d e o f a p p r e h e n s i o n o f t h e a r b i t r a r y c o n n e c t i o n
between the d i v i n e w i U a n d its effects. W h a t m i g h t be caUed a
Malebranchian 'conversion' to experience 4 6
d o e s n o t express a d i s t r u s t
o f m e t a p h y s i c a l a b s t r a c t i o n s . F a r f r o m i t — r a t h e r , i t f i n d s its d e e p e s t

4 4
Note that the purpose ofexperience is to make inteUigible not a rational truth but a c o n ­
fused truth. Contrary to certain aspects ofLeibniz's conception ofsensation, for Malebranche
the sensible is not the confused inteUigible.The Hnk between occasional cause and efficient
cause is not o f an analytic nature. T h e connection between the impact o f a body and the
motion that foUows remains synthetic, and cannot be compared to the relations between ideas
in theWord.
4 5
We k n o w that Malebranche maintains the radical freedom ofthe creative act by distin­
guishing between the decision to create a world and the world effectively brought into being.
T h u s , i f t h e principle ofthe simpUcity ofways seems to make the actual world the only reaUy
possible world, it remains the case that nothing can constrain G o d to create a world. Some o f
MaIebranche's opponents nonetheless seek to radicakze for Malebranche the necessity ofthe
existing world by showing that the second moment ofthe divine decision (to create this world)
is identical to the first (to create at aU).
4 6
See the remarks b y P i e r r e Costabel i n O C x v i i . 1 , 4 6 and 5 5 .
i88 Jean-Christophe Bardout

m o t i v a t i o n s i n the k i n d ofcausal agnosticism characteristic ofoccasion-

ahsm. 4 7
I n its o w n w a y , t h e O r a t o r i a n ' s p h y s i c s seems t o b e g o v e r n e d b y
tensions generated b y the occasionahst m o d e l ofcausahty.
A g l a n c e at M a I e b r a n c h e ' s m o r a l t h i n k i n g reveaIs t h e seed o f a sirnüar
d i f f i c u l t y , i d e n t i f i a b l e t h i s t i m e as h e t r i e s t o a r t i c u l a t e t h e s p e c u l a t i v e
a n d p r a c t i c a l aspects o f h u m a n a c t i o n ;

4. ETHICS: T H E IDEA OF T H E GOOD AND

THE DESIRE FOR HAPPINESS

I h a v e e l s e w h e r e t r i e d t o s h o w h o w M a I e b r a n c h e ' s e t h i c s is g o v e r n e d b y
a double perplexity, itself grounded i n the distinction between two
complementary aspects o f t h e m o r a l i m p e r a t i v e . W h e n 4 8
Malebranche
seeks t o g r o u n d e t h i c s — t h a t is, t o p r o v i d e i t w i t h t h e c h a r a c t e r o f a n
a u t h e n t i c science o f v i r t u o u s a c t i o n — h e a g a i n has r e c o u r s e t o m e t a ­
physics. 4 9
T h e g o o d is t h u s u n i v o c a U y k n o w n b y t h e c o n c e p t o f o r d e r
s e e n i n G o d , a n d e t h i c s is u n d e r s t o o d as a s c i e n c e d i r e c d y g r o u n d e d i n
a n d t h r o u g h the v i s i o n ofessential relations ofperfection.

I n c o n t e m p l a t i n g this d i v i n e substance, I can see a p a r t o f w h a t G o d t h i n k s , f o r

G o d sees aU truths and I can see some o f t h e m . I can also discover s o m e t h i n g
about w h a t G o d desires, f o r G o d can desire o n l y according t o O r d e r , a n d O r d e r
is n o t entirely u n k n o w n t o m e . C e r t a i n l y G o d loves things i n p r o p o r t i o n t o
t h e i r worthiness o f b e i n g l o v e d , a n d I can discover that there are some things
that are m o r e perfect, m o r e estimable, m o r e w o r t h b e i n g l o v e d t h a n others.
(Traite de morale I . i . i v , O C x i . 18)

P u t a n o t h e r w a y , t h e m o r a l l a w a n d t h e v a l u e s t h a t are f r x e d b y t h e r e l a ­
tions ofperfection 5 0
w o u l d be t h e same e v e n i f t h e w o r l d h a d n o t b e e n
created. 5 1

4 7
O n this point, see Bardout, Malebranche et h> mitaphysique, 301^7.
4 8
SeeJean-Christophe B a r d o u t , L a w f M de laphilosophie:Essaissure lamoraledeMalebranche
[ L a Vertu] (Hildesheim and N e w Y o r k : OhnsVerlag, 2 0 0 0 ) .
4 9
' T h e majority o f men seem incapable ofconcluding anything from the first principle o f
morality . . . T h i s principle is abstract, metaphysical, purely inteUigible; it is not sensed or
imagined' (Recherche IV.2.iii, O C ii. 2 0 ; L O 2 7 1 ) .
5 0
W h i l e relations ofmagnitude are for the stricdy specuktive sciences, such as mathematics,
rebtions ofperfection between essences govern moral actions. O n these two types ofrebitions, see
Tenth Elucidation, O C i i i . 138; Mkditations chrttiennes TV.S, O C x , 39; Traiti de morale I.i.vi, O C x i . 19.
5 1
'Just as there are necessary and eternal truths because there are rebtions o f magnitude
among inteUigible beings, there must also be a necessary and immutable order because ofthe
 Cause and Reason in Malebranche 189

H o w e v e r , w h i l e p e r f e c t i n p r i n c i p l e ф е с а ш е i t is g r o u n d e d i n t h e
v i s i o n o f e s s e n c e s ) , t h i s e t h i c s reveaU i t s e l f t o b e c o n c r e t e l y i m p r a c t i c a l
w h e n i t comes to the w i U . 5 z
T w o shortcomings plague such a concep­
tion o f e t h i c s . I n the first place, t h e universahty o f t h e relations o f p e r ­
f e c t i o n m a k e s , i t d i f f i c u l t t o d e t e r m i n e , from t h e m a l o n e , a n y p a r t i c u k r
acts. 53
B e s i d e s , i t seems i m p o s s i b l e t o desire a n d t h u s t o l o v e t h e g o o d as
l o n g as m o t i v e s o f a sensible n a t u r e are t h e r e t o c o u n t e r b a l a n c e the
a t t r a c t i o n o f t h e p u r e l y i n t e U i g i b l e g o o d . I n a w o r d , i t is n o t e n o u g h t o
t h i n k w e i l i n o r d e r t o act w e U . T h e u n h k e h h o o d o f b e i n g a b l e t o r e s o l v e
t h i s d i f f i c u l t y l e d M a l e b r a n c h e , a r o u n d 1 6 9 0 , t o i n t r o d u c e t h e 'desire t o
b e h a p p y ' . P l e a s u r e , ahvays e x p e r i e n c e d as a n a f f e c t i o n o f t h e s o u l c a u s e d
b y an external cause,becomes the fundamental m o t i v e o f t h e v o l u n t a r y
act. T h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h a t w h i c h is g o o d is r e v i s e d i n t h e h g h t o f t h i s
n e w d e m a n d c r e a t e d b y p l e a s u r e : ' N o t h i n g is g o o d i n o u r v i e w i f i t is
n o t capable o f m a k i n g us h a p p i e r a n d m o r e p e r f e c t . . . o n e c a n l o v e n o t h ­
i n g e x c e p t t h r o u g h its r e l a t i o n t o o n e s e i f o r t h r o u g h s e l f - l o v e , f o r I a m
not s p e a k i n g h e r e at aLl o f a species o f g o o d n e s s t h a t consists i n t h e
p e r f e c t i o n o f e a c h t h i n g ' ( T h i r d L e t t e r t o R . P. L a m y , O C x i v . 85). 54

T h i s t e x t requires t w o b r i e f c o m m e n t s .

ι. G o o d n e s s is n e v e r d e f i n e d s i m p l y as a p e r f e c t i o n , o r as c o n f o r m i t y
to t h e essential p e r f e c t i o n o f an archetype. I t becomes actual and
o c c u r s r e l a t i v e t o o u r desire f o r h a p p i n e s s , a n d m a n i f e s t s i t s e l f as t h a t
w h i c h c a n satisfy i t . T h e g o o d is n e v e r m e a s u r e d b y t h e q u a n t i t y o f s o m e
essential r e a h t y , b u t is e x p e r i e n c e d i n t h e a c t u a l a f f e c t i o n o f t h e s o u l b y
t h e e f f i c a c y o f t h e cause t h a t m o d i f i e s i t . I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e g o o d m u s t
be felt o r experienced i n the m a n n e r o f a n existent, a n d n o t s i m p l y
t h o u g h t i n t h e m a n n e r o f a n essence.

rektions ofperfection among these same beings.An immutable order has it, then, that minds
are more noble than bodies, as it is a necessary truth that twice two is four, or that twice two is
notfive' (TenthElucidation, O C i i i . 1 3 8 ; L O 6 1 8 ) . T h e moral orderandthektw that grounds it
are thus absolutely independent ofany divine decree. Far from deriving from the divine wiU,
the moral k w guides that wiU, as it does our own.

5 2
Malebranche seems to have recognized this difficulty early on: 'So far, order seems to be
more ofa specuktive truth than a necessary k w . F o r ifwe consider order as we havejust done, we
clearly see, for example, that it is a truth that minds are more noble than bodies,but we do not see
that this truth is at the same time an order that has the force oflaw and that we are obhged to pre­
fer minds to bodies' ^Tenth Elucidation, O C iii. 138; L O 618—19). See Bardout, La vertu, 91 f.
5 3
T h e dechne o f the virtue o f prudence, understood as the articulation o f a universal
imperative, to what is always a singukr case is, from this point ofview, significant.
3 4
See ako Conversations chretiennesVlll, OC iv. 170.
i90 Jean-ChristopheBardout

2. T h e w i U t e n d s t o w a r d t h e g o o d o n l y i f i t is m o v e d efficaciously
t o w a r d i t . G o d is s i m u l t a n e o u s l y t h e m o v e r o f t h e w i U a n d t h e e f f i c i e n t
cause o f d e l i g h t f u l m o d i f i c a t i o n s . 5 5
I t is h e n c e f o r t h p h U o s o p h y ' s task t o
d i s s o l v e t h e i U u s i o n o f s e c o n d a r y causes a n d t o p r e v e n t t h e perversion
o f d e s i r e f o r false g o o d s .

T h e supreme g o o d never shows itseh"only u n d e r the guise o f r a t i o n a l

o r d e r o r u n i v e r s a l r e a s o n , b u t p r i m a r i l y as t h e i n f i n i t e l y e f f i c a c i o u s cause
o f o u r h a p p i n e s s . G o d is t h e r e f o r e n o t o n h / u n i v e r s a l R e a s o n , b u t a k o
universal efficient cause. 56

T h e o c c a s i o n a h s t h n k i n g o f i n f i n i t e cause a n d u n i v e r s a l r e a s o n p u t s a
fecund and never completely r e s o l v e d stress u p o n m o r a l reflection.
A r i g o r o u s l y 'inteUectualist' ethics, u n d e r s t o o d as t h e c o n f o r m i t y of
t h e w i U t o order, gives w a y t o a h e d o n i s t i c ethics, g r o u n d e d o n the
a t t r a c t i o n o f p l e a s u r e as t h e u n i q u e m o v e r o f t h e w i U a n d , u l t i m a t e l y , o n
the occasionahst r e c o g n i t i o n o f d i v i n e unicausahty. 5 7

The Malebranchian conception o f the relations b e t w e e n faith a n d

r e a s o n , as t h e y are a r t i c u l a t e d i n t h e t w o aspects o f t h e W o r d (uncreated
a n d c r e a t e d ) , p r o v i d e s us w i t h t h e o c c a s i o n f o r a d o u b l e c o n f i r m a t i o n o f
o u r h y p o t h e s i s , b u t i t w i U also r e v e a l its h m i t s .
T h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e c o g n i t i v e f a c u l t i e s f u r n i s h e s , as w e k n o w , t h e
d o m a i n f o r reflection o n t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n f a i t h a n d reason.
W h i l e t h e l a t t e r is t o b e u n d e r s t o o d as p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e d i v i n e l i g h t ,
i t is t h e r o l e o f ' s e n s a t i o n ' t o r e v e a l t o us t h e w o r l d a n d its i n t r i n s i c a U y
i n v i s i b l e e x i s t e n c e . B e y o n d aU o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n i n an idea, existence
becomes the object ofnatural behef. Thus the history ofsalvation, and 5 8

5 5
' F o r one cannot love G o d w i t h a love ofunion, nor even w i t h a love ofcomplaisance, i f
his substance does not touch us, or one cannot hope that that substance wiU agreeably touch
us ifit does not effectively please us' (Traiti de l'amour de Dieu, OC xiv. 2 3 ) .
5 6
T h e drvine unicausahty demands that we think o f G o d as the absolutely immediate cause
ofthe most minute pleasure:'It is only he w h o confers being w h o can confer ways ofbeing,
since ways ofbeing are only the beings themselves existing i n such and such a manner' (Traita
dem0ralell.2M, O C x i . 1 6 0 ) . T h e development ofthe secondpartofthe Traittde moraleis,&om
this point ofview, significant: treating as he does the duties owed to G o d , Malebranche inverts
the order that seemed to prevail i n the first part, and gives priority (chapter 3) to the duties
owed to power, as ifthis, in a sense, took precedence over wisdom.
5 7
T h i s preference for the primacy ofthe cause makes sensed order an efFect o f a n effica­
cious idea.
5 8
'Godjoins the sensation to the idea w h e n objects are present so that we may believe them
to be present and that we may have afl the feehngs and passions that we should have in relation
to them' (Recherche I I I . 2 . v i , O C i. 4 4 5 ) .
 Cause and Reason in Malebranche 191

especiaUy c e r t a i n aspects o f M a l e b r a n c h e ' s christology, reproduce the

e v o l u t i o n that marks m o r a l philosophy, a n d m o r e generaUy the gap
b e t w e e n i d e a a n d s e n s a t i o n . W h U e o u r f i r s t f a t h e r ( A d a m ) was able,
b e f o r e t h e faU, t o l i v e a c c o r d i n g t o o r d e r a n d t o e n j o y a r a t i o n a l k n o w ­
l e d g e o f G o d (EntretiensVl.7),the faU b r u t a U y a c c e n t u a t e s t h e w e i g h t o f
t h e b o d y , so f a r as t o r e n d e r r e a s o n e f f e c t i v e l y i m p o t e n t . 5 9

It is from this perspective that the O r a t o r i a n reflects on the

I n c a r n a t i o n . T o its t r a d i t i o n a U y r e d e m p t i v e f u n c t i o n h e adds a n o t h e r :
t h e s a n c t i f i c a t i o n o f c r e a t e d n a t u r e , as w e U as t h e r o l e o f s e r v i n g as a n
i U u s t r a t i o n o f t h e t r u t h . G o d has s e n t h i s S o n t o h u m a n b e i n g s w h o h a v e
b e c o m e o v e r l y c a r n a l , t o m a k e sensible f o r t h e m t r u t h s t h a t r e a s o n c a n ­
n o t a p p r e h e n d . I t is a t r u e i n c a r n a t i o n , d e s c e n t a n d c o n t r a c t i o n o f t h e
i n t e U i g i b l e i n t o sensible flesh.'For o n e w h o renounces universal reason
r e n o u n c e s t h e a u t h o r o f f a i t h , w h o is r e a s o n i t s e l f r e n d e r e d sensible a n d
p r o p o r t i o n a t e t o the weakness o f h u m a n beings, w h o f o U o w o n l y then-
senses' (Traiti de morak I I . 3 . v i i i ) . T h e t r u e i m a g e o f G o d b e i n g i n v i s i b l e
6 0

t o r e a s o n , t h e i n c a r n a t e d C h r i s t i n s c r i b e s r e v e l a t i o n i n t h e sensible
order. T h e existence o f C h r i s t , a n d m o r e generaUy t h e phUosophicaI
t r e a t m e n t o f t h e I n c a r n a t i o n , seems t h u s t o r e p e a t the distinction
b e t w e e n a n i n t e U i g i b l e w o r l d set i n t h e W o r d a n d i n d i f f e r e n t t o its o w n
c r e a t i o n a n d a sensible w o r l d . B u t f a r from d e b a s i n g a r e a s o n t h a t is n o w
c o r r u p t e d , r e v e l a t i o n is c o m m i t t e d t o its e x t e n s i o n , b y b r i n g i n g a b o u t
t h e t r a n s l a t i o n o f w h a t is h e n c e f o r t h r a t i o n a U y i n a c c e s s i b l e t o us. B y
p u t t i n g h i m s e I f o n v i e w u n d e r t h e aspect o f h i s o t h e r , C h r i s t , R e a s o n
incarnate, unites i n h i m s e l f the contraries about w h i c h philosophy
strives t o t h i n k . I n t h i s sense, p h i l o s o p h y , from its o w n n e e d s , c o m e s t o
t h i n k o f C h r i s t as t h e a u t h e n t i c c e n t e r o f R e v e l a t i o n .
To conclude: MaIebranche's t r e a t m e n t o f t h e p r i n c i p a l objects o f
p h U o s o p h y r e v e a k a series o f c o n c e p t u a l d u a h s m s . I o b v i o u s l y cannot
c l a i m t h a t t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n essence a n d e x i s t e n c e , w i s d o m a n d
o m n i p o t e n c e , reason a n d e x p e r i e n c e , a n d t h e c o n c e p t o f g o o d and
p l e a s u r e c o n s t i t u t e , e a c h i n its o w n w a y , t h e o r e t i c a l a p p u r t e n a n c e s that
belong to Nicolas Malebranche a l o n e . R a t h e r , t h e radicalness and
o r i g i n a h t y o f M a l e b a n c h e ' s s t a n d p o i n t is b e s t seen i n t h e m a n n e r i n
w h i c h h i s p h i l o s o p h y a r t i c u l a t e s these d i s t i n c t i o n s . B y choosing to
distinguish that w h i c h others h a d u n i t e d , and, even b e t t e r , b y separating

5 9
Original sin introduces not so m u c h a lesion in our intenectual capacity as an increase i n
oursensorydisturbances. 6 0
SeealsoRecAeri:fteVI.1.ui,OCii.260.
 192 Jean-Christophe Bardout

w h a t o t h e r s h a d always c o n f l a t e d , M a l e b r a n c h e d e h b e r a t e l y takes u p t h e
p r o b l e m t h a t t h e c b s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h o u g h t a n d act, o r ( i n m o d e r n
p h i l o s o p h y ) b e t w e e n r e a s o n a n d cause, w h e n t a k e n t o its e x t r e m e , g i v e s
r i s e . F a r f r o m b e i n g a m e r e l y l o c a h z e d issue, t h i s q u e s t i o n , a n d a b o v e
aU t h e r e s p o n s e t o i t ofFered b y t h e o c c a s i o n a h s t u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f t h e
relations b e t w e e n the inteUigible a n d t h e existent, determines i n a deep
w a y the nature a n d the organization o f phUosophy. Occasionahsm,
w i t h o u t being reduced to the solution to a particular p r o b l e m i n
physics, a n t h r o p o l o g y , o r t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f C a r t e s i a n i s m , can b e seen
as t h e g r i d o n w h i c h , f o r M a l e b r a n c h e , m a j o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o b l e m s
are o r g a n i z e d . One m i g h t therefore e v e n speak o f a n aetiological
c o n s t i t u t i o n o r s t r u c t u r e o f M a l e b r a n c h e ' s p h i l o s o p h y . M o r e generaUy,
the occasionalist configuration o f the p r o b l e m o f causahty serves
t o e x t e n d t h e b i f u r c a t i o n o f t h e t w o f o u n d a t i o n s t h a t are t h o u g h t a n d
e f f i c i e n t cause, t h e a r t i c u l a t i o n o f w h i c h , i n d i v e r s e w a y s , has n e v e r
ceased t o o c c u p y p h U o s o p h y .

Universite de Rennes
[Translated b y Steven N a d l e r ]
 7
The Cartesianism ofDesgabets andArnauld and
the Problem ofthe EternalTruths

E M M A N U E L FAYE

I t is a w e U - k n o w n f a c t t h a t t h o s e w h o m w e t o d a y c o n s i d e r t h e ' m a j o r '
post-Cartesians—Spinoza, Malebranche, and Leibniz—aU resolutely
r e j e c t e d t h e C a r t e s i a n thesis o f t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e e t e r n a l t r u t h s . F r o m
t h i s o n e c a n d r a w a g e n e r a l a r g u m e n t t o t h e efFect t h a t Descartes's p o s i ­
tion was a s o h t a r y a n d c o m p l e t e l y a p o r e t i c one, w h i l e c o n c e d i n g i n a
f o o t n o t e t h a t o n l y s o m e ' m i n o r ' C a r t e s i a n s — s u c h as CaUy, D e s g a b e t s ,
Regis, or Poiret—'foUowed' t h e i r mentor's thesis. 1
I t seems t h a t t h i s
a c c o u n t , h o w e v e r , needs t o be questioned, and i n t w o ways: first,
t h r o u g h a reconsideration o f t h e p o s i t i o n o f a f i g u r e as i m p o r t a n t as
A r n a u l d , w h o occupies an e x c e p t i o n a l p o s i t i o n i n the century, since he
w a s , i n t u r n , o n e o f Descartes's o b j e c t o r s , t h e p r i n c i p a l o p p o n e n t of
M a l e b r a n c h e , a n d t h e i n t e r l o c u t o r s o u g h t b y L e i b n i z w h e n h e was com­
p o s i n g t h e Discourse on Metaphysics; s e c o n d , t h r o u g h a closer e x a m i n a t i o n
o f w h y a n d h o w the a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d 'Cartesians' a d o p t e d the o r t h o ­
d o x C a r t e s i a n thesis.
A m o n g t h e ' C a r t e s i a n s ' , I w o u l d h k e t o address f i r s t t h e p o s i t i o n o f
Desgabets, b e f o r e t u r n i n g t o t h e m u c h - d i s c u s s e d case o f A r n a u l d . T h e c o n ­
trast b e t w e e n these t w o t h i n k e r s , as w e U as t h e p r o b l e m a t i c c h a r a c t e r — f o r

1
See, for example,Jean-Luc Marion,'Creation des verites eterneUes. Principle de raison
Spinoza, Malebranche, Leibniz', Questions cartesiennes 2 ( 1 9 9 6 ) , 2 1 8 ; a n d V i n c e n t Carraud,
'Arnauld theologien cartesien? Toute-puissance, hberte d'indiflerence et creation des verites
eterneUes', XVUe sikle 4 8 ( 1 9 9 6 ) , 2 5 9 - 7 6 ( 2 6 1 n. 7 ) . Moreover, the exceUent study by
Genevieve Rodis—Lewis, 'Pol6miques sur la creation des possibles et sur l'impossible dans
l'ecole cartesienne',in R o d i s - L e w i s , f $ e s et verith itemeUes chez Descartes etses successeurs (Paris:
J . V r i n , 198s) addresses the chronology oftexts pubhshed in the seventeenth century for and
against Descartes's thesis, but does not devote m u c h discussion to Desgabets. Nearly aU o f
Desgabet's philosophical writings remained unpubUshed during his hfetime, w i t h the excep­
tion ofthe Critique de la Critique de la Recherche de h vni'i^,which appeared anonymously in
1675 and i n w h i c h Desgabets adopts the Cartesian thesis on the creation ofthe eternal truths.
i94 Emmanuel Faye

d i f F e r e n t r e a s o n s — o f t h e i r ' C a r t e s i a n i s m ' o u g h t t o h e l p us a v o i d any

d e f i n i t i v e s c h e m a t i z a t i o n s , m a k e p o s s i b l e h e n c e f o r t h a m o r e c a r e f u l use
o f t h e t e r m ' C a r t e s i a n i s m ' , a n d m a k e i t clear that m u c h m o r e research
needs t o be d o n e o n p o s t - C a r t e s i a n metaphysics i n France. 2

I. DESGABETS' A D O P T I O N AND TRANSFORMATION OF

T H E CARTESIAN THESIS OF l630

B o r n i n 1610, D e s g a b e t s is, c h r o n o l o g i c a U y , t h e o l d e s t a m o n g t h o s e
w h o m w e t o d a y caU t h e F r e n c h ' C a r t e s i a n s ' ( C l e r s e h e r was b o r n i n
1614, R o h a u l t i n 1617, a n d C o r d e m o y i n 1 6 2 6 ) . H e r e c e i v e d h i s p h i l o ­
s o p h i c a l t r a i n i n g a n d b e g a n t e a c h i n g i n 1636, i n T o u l , b e f o r e b e c o m i n g
a c q u a i n t e d w i t h Descartes. Desgabets was thus o r i g i n a U y n o t a partisan
o f D e s c a r t e s . H e b e c a m e f a m i h a r w i t h his w o r k s m i d - c a r e e r a n d p r o ­
gressively assimilated his p h i l o s o p h y , always i n a v i g ü a n t a n d c r i t i c a l
manner, i n the h g h t ofhis o w n intuitions.After having taught for nearly
s e v e n t e e n years a m o n g t h e B e n e d i c t i n e s o f T o u l a n d M e t z , h e b e g a n , i n
1653, t h e t w e n t y - y e a r p r o j e c t o f c o m p o s i n g his g r a n d metaphysical
treatises, p r i m a r i l y t h e Traite de l'indefectibilite des creatures, also c a U e d t h e
Traiti de l'indefectibilite des substances? a n d t h e Supplement ä la philosophie
de Monsieur Descartes, while continuing t o fbJfiU h i s p r i o r y duties.
A c t i v e l y engaged i n the controversies a r o u n d the Cartesian expUcation
o f t r a n s u b s t a n t i a t i o n , D e s g a b e t s h a d t h e m i s f o r t u n e t o c o m p l e t e his
p h ü o s o p h i c a l w o r k ( t h e Supplement was finished i n 1675) j u s t at t h e
m o m e n t w h e n t h e r o y a l p r o h i b i t i o n s m a d e its p u b h c a t i o n impossible.

2
A l o n g w i t h the monographs by Steven Nadlet,Amauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) and Malebranche and Ideas (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1 9 9 2 ) , and by A . - R . Ndiaye, L a philosophie d'AntoineArnauld QParis:J.Vrin,
1991), two works i n particular have contributed to a renovation in our perception ofpost-
Cartesian philosophy i n France: Denis Moreau, Deux Cartesiens. L a polemique Arnauld-
Malebranche P a r i s : J . V r i n , 1 9 9 9 ) , andTad Schmaltz, Radical Cartesianism:The French Reception of
Descartes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 0 0 2 ) .
3
T h e tide Traiti de l'indefectibilite des criatures is found only i n the Epinal manuscript, while
the tide Traiti de l'indefectibiliti des substances is o n the other extant manuscripts.The first tide
is the one retained by the editors ofthe CEuvres philosophiques inidites. Note, meanwhile, that it
is the thesis ofthe indefectibüity ofsimple substances that Desgabets maintains, rather than aU
creatures, whose modal existence is not indefectible. I am i n the process o f preparing n e w
annotated editions ofthe Critique de la Critique de la Recherche de la verite and the Traiti de l'in­
defectibiliti des criatures, i n the coUection 'Cartesiens', edited by Denis Moreau forJ.Vrin.
 The Cartesianism qfDesgabets andArnauld i9S

H i s w o r k was n o t p u b l i s h e d u n t i l three centuries later. M e a n w h i l e , his 4

t h o u g h t strongly i n f l u e n c e d t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l m i h e u o f his t i m e , w h i c h
w e l c o m e d Cartesian innovations. N o t o n l y d i d n u m e r o u s manuscript ver­
sions o f h i s w r i t i n g s circvdate, p r i m a r i l y a m o n g t h e B e n e d i c t i n e s , b u t his
interpretation o f Cartesian p h i l osop hy markedly influenced Regis, w i t h
w h o m h e c o r r e s p o n d e d . M o r e o v e r , t h e a n o n y m o u s p u b h c a t i o n i n 1675 o f
his Critique de la Critique de la Recherche de la νέήίέ, 5
w h i c h was a response t o
t h e a t t a c k o n M a l e b r a n c h e p u b h s h e d t h a t same year b y S i m o n F o u c h e r , as
w e U as h i s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h M a l e b r a n c h e a n d t h e i r P a r i s i a n d i a l o g u e
( o f w h i c h w e have t h e t r a n s c r i p t ) , m a d e Desgabets a m a j o r p l a y e r i n t h e
discussions t h a t a c c o m p a n i e d M a I e b r a n c h e ' s first p u b h c a t i o n s .
R e a d i n g D e s g a b e t s ' m a j o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l treatises p u t s us i n t h e presence
o f s o m e original and striking metaphysical thought, a philosophy whose
c o n s i s t e n c y a n d c o h e r e n c e bears c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h a t o f M a l e b r a n c h e ,
e v e n i f t h e B e n e d i c t i n e ' s q u a h t i e s as a w r i t e r a n d as a n a n a l y t i c t h i n k e r
d o n o t m a t c h u p t o t h e O r a t o r i a n ' s . I n effect, f a r f r o m b e i n g c o n t e n t
s i m p l y t o f o U o w Descartes's l e a d o n aU p o i n t s , D e s g a b e t s seems t o b e as
free as M a l e b r a n c h e was i n c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f h i s p h U o s o p h y .
N e v e r t h e l e s s , a n d t h i s r e p r e s e n t s n o t t h e least i n t e r e s t i n g aspect o f h i s
t h o u g h t , Desgabets o f t e n moves closer t o Descartes o n p o i n t s w h e r e
M a l e b r a n c h e distances h i m s e l f , a n d v i c e versa. I n p a r t i c u l a r , D e s g a b e t s
n o t o n l y a d o p t s t h e C a r t e s i a n thesis o f t h e f r e e c r e a t i o n o f t h e e t e r n a l
t r u t h s t h a t M a l e b r a n c h e h a d r e j e c t e d , b u t h e g e n e r a h z e s its a p p l i c a t i o n
and reinterprets i t t o the p o i n t o f g i v i n g i t a significance that i t d i d n o t
have w i t h Descartes.
Each ofDesgabets' m a j o r w o r k s contains a l o n g restatement o f t h e
C a r t e s i a n thesis o f t h e free e s t a b h s h m e n t b y G o d o f t r u t h s , a n d s o m e ­
t i m e s several, as is t h e case i n t h e SuppUment a la philosophie de Monsieur
Descartes. I n 1675, D e s g a b e t s ( f o U o w i n g F o u c h e r , a n d o n t h e basis o f a
h i g h h / e U i p t i c a l passage w h e r e M a l e b r a n c h e d e f i n e s necessary t r u t h s as
' t h o s e t h a t are i m m u t a b l e b y t h e i r n a t u r e , a n d b e c a u s e t h e y h a v e b e e n
fixed by t h e w i U o f G o d , w h i c h is i n n o w a y s u b j e c t t o change' ) 6

4
D o m R o b e r t Desgabets, CEuvres philosophiques inedites, edited by J . Beaude, introduction
by Genevieve R o d i s - L e w i s (Amsterdam: Quadratures, 1983—5) ^ u b k s h e d i n seven fascicules
as Analecta Cartesiana 2 ) , h e n c e f 0 r t h cited as OPI.
5
D o m R o b e r t Desgabets, Critique de la Critique de la Recherche de la verite ou Von decouvre le
chemin qui conduit aux connaissances solides @>aris:J. du Puis, 1675),henceforth cited as CCRV.
6
Malebranche,Recherche,I.3.ii.Desgabets, CCRV,72; CCRF,71-5.
196 Emmanuel Faye

b e h e v e d t h a t M a l e b r a n c h e s u b s c r i b e d t o Descartes's t h e s i s . T h i s is w h y
h e p u b h s h e d i n t h e Critique de la Critique, a n d u n d e r t h e tide ' S e c o n d e
supposition des V e r i t e s necessaires', a n i m p o r t a n t defense of the
C a r t e s i a n d o c t r i n e against F o u c h e r ' s c r i t i q u e . 7

D e s g a b e t s s i m i l a r l y m a k e s t h e C a r t e s i a n thesis his o w n i n t h e Traite de

l'indefectibiliti des creatures, a n d d e v o t e s t o i t аД o f c h a p t e r 5, tided
' E x p h c a t i o n d ' u n autre p r i n c i p e de la p h i l o s o p h i e de Descartes q u i
p r o u v e l ' i n d e f e c t i b i h t e des c r e a t u r e s ' (OPI, 3 2 - 5 ) . T h i s t i d e indicates the
use t o w h i c h D e s g a b e t s p u t s Descartes's thesis. F a r f r o m b e i n g c o n t e n t
s i m p l y t o accept the d o c t r i n e w i t h o u t a d d i n g a n y t h i n g t o i t , Desgabets
sees i n i t a n a r g u m e n t t h a t w i U s u p p o r t his m o s t o r i g i n a l thesis, t h a t o f
t h e i n d e f e c t i b U i t y o f s u b s t a n c e s . T h i s is w h a t h e w r i t e s :

U p u n t i l n o w , I have o n l y spoken about M . Descartes w i t h o u t i n d i c a t i n g w h a t

use I i n t e n d t o make o f h i s d o c t r i n e . I t remains f o r m e n o w t o apply i t and t o say
that whatever m a y be the difference b e t w e e n physical beings a n d m o r a l beings,
b e t w e e n existing substances a n d inteUigible t r u t h s , i t d i d n o t prevent this
phUosopher f r o m persuading the m o s t learned that t h e y aU d e p e n d equaUy
u p o n G o d , a n d thus this difference m u s t n o t keep us f r o m similarly p h i l o ­
sophizing i n a p r o p o r t i o n a t e w a y about these sorts o f t h i n g s and from saying that
they are equaUy i m m u t a b l e and i n d e f e c t i b l e , w i t h a borrowed'parftopee'and c o n ­
sequent immutabüity and i n d e f e c t i b i K t y , w h i c h s h o u l d always be u n d e r s t o o d t o
apply o n l y t o substantial and p e r m a n e n t substances and n o t m o d a l and succes­
sive beings, w h i c h d o n o t carry this necessity o f e x i s t i n g . (OPI, 34)

Desgabets applies a p r i n c i p l e o f r e c i p r o c i t y : because Descartes was n o t

a f r a i d t o e x t e n d G o d ' s causal a c t i o n f r o m p h y s i c a l b e i n g s a n d e x i s t e n t s
t o m o r a l b e i n g s a n d essences, i t is l e g i t i m a t e t o philosopher de mSme a n d
t o say t h a t t h e i m m u t a b i h t y a n d i n d e f e c t i b i h t y t h a t w e accord to
essences a p p h e s e q u a U y t o e x i s t e n t s , a l t h o u g h t h i s a p p h e s o n l y t o s u b ­
stances a n d n o t t o t h e i r c h a n g i n g m o d e s .
Desgabets's r e a s o n i n g is n o t w i t h o u t its f o r c e . I f b o t h essences a n d
existents d e p e n d o n t h e same u n i q u e e f f i c i e n t causality o f G o d , w h y
t h e n s h o u l d t h e i m m u t a b U i t y t h a t w e g r a n t t o n e c e s s a r y t r u t h s i n s o f a r as
t h e y h a v e b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d b y G o d n o t a p p l y e q u a U y t o substances? F o r
D e s g a b e t s , 'substances c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e m s e l v e s . . . are n o less i n d e ­
f e c t i b l e ' t h a n ' t h e e t e r n a l t r u t h s ' (OPI, 35).
W h a t general i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ofDesgabets'rebtionship t o Descartes a n d
o f the authenticity o f h i s 'Cartesianism' can w e d r a w f r o m this argument?

7
CCR^,71-85.
 The Cartesianism qfDesgabets andArnauld 197

O u g h t w e t o say t h a t t h e B e n e d i c t i n e is p e r f e c t i y f a i t h f u l t o D e s c a r t e s ,
t h a t h e takes t h e k t t e r ' s d o c t r i n e as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t a n d r e p r o d u c e s i t
exacdy, b e f o r e m a k i n g a n o r i g i n a l a p p h c a t i o n o f i t ? I n s h o r t , does n o t
D e s g a b e t s — a n d h e o f t e n seeks t o g i v e t h i s i m p r e s s i o n — o n l y correct
D e s c a r t e s by Descartes t h r o u g h f a i t h f u U y a d o p t i n g h i s p r i n c i p l e s i n o r d e r
to give t h e m , i n the end, a m u c h k r g e r extension than anything granted
b y the author o f t h e Meditations?
T h i s p i c t u r e o f D e s g a b e t s as s t a r t i n g f r o m D e s c a r t e s i n o r d e r t o t a k e
t h i n g s f u r t h e r seems t o b e c o r r o b o r a t e d b y texts (such as c h a p t e r 5 o f t h e
Traiti) w h e r e t h e B e n e d i c t i n e f r o m L o r r a i n e f a i t h f u U y presents Descartes's
t h o u g h t a n d d e f e n d s i t against several S c h o l a s t i c o b j e c t i o n s before
i n d i c a t i n g t h a t h e intends t o m a k e his o w n additions t o i t . N o n e t h e l e s s ,
this v i e w m a y be nhsleading a n d m a y conceal the f u n d a m e n t a l o r i g i -
nahty f r o m w h i c h Desgabets' metaphysical t h o u g h t t r u l y proceeds.
T u r n i n g t o t h e t e x t o f t h e Critique de la Critique,we c a n estabhsh t w o
i m p o r t a n t things. First, w i t h respect t o t h e n a t u r e ofnecessary t r u t h s , far
f r o m presenting h i m s e l f a s a disciple o f D e s c a r t e s , Desgabets begins b y
l a y i n g o u t t h e o r i g i n a h t y o f h i s o w n t h i n k i n g , n o t o n l y w i t h respect t o
S i m o n F o u c h e r a n d M a l e b r a n c h e , b u t also w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e a u t h o r o f
t h e Meditations. H e w r i t e s t o F o u c h e r : ' Y o u say m u c h m o r e i m p o r t a n t
t h i n g s r e g a r d i n g t h e n a t u r e ofnecessary t r u t h s , w h i l e I nevertheless feel
o b h g e d t o d i s t a n c e m y s e h " f r o m y o u r v i e w as m u c h as f r o m t h a t o f t h e
a u t h o r o f t h e Recherche [Malebranche],and even f r o m that o f M o n s i e u r
Descartes, w h o presents h i m s e l f a s t h e i n v e n t o r o f t h e f a m o u s o p i n i o n
t h a t is h e r e i n q u e s t i o n ' (CCRV, 71—2). I n effect, a n d t h i s is t h e s e c o n d
p o i n t , D e s g a b e t s d e t a c h e s h i m s e h f r o m t h e C a r t e s i a n thesis w h e n
0
he
refuses t o g r o v m d t h e n e c e s s i t y o f t r u t h s a n d t h e i m m u t a b i l i t y o f
essences i n t h e i m m u t a b ü i t y o f t h e d i v i n e w i U , as D e s c a r t e s suggests i n
his l e t t e r t o M e r s e n n e o f 15 A p r U 1 6 3 0 . 8
Desgabets w r i t e s , i n an
absolutely categorical text:

B u t above aU, let us each recognize that according t o this d o c t r i n e , there are
things that G o d has v e r y freely created w h i c h are nevertheless i m m u t a b l e b y
t h e i r nature, because he has w i U e d that they be such, and that because t h e y

8
I n the dialogue included in this letter, there is the foHowing reply: ' B u t I understand them
[the truths estabhshed by God] to be eternal and immutable.—And Ijudge the same to be true
o f G o d ' ( A T i . 1 4 6 ) . I n addition, immediately after this dialogue Descartes refers to his physics,
and i n chapter seven ofthe Traite de la lumiire, where w e find the only reference in the entire
work to 'eternal truths' ( A T xi. 47),he exphcidy affirms that'God is immutable' and that he acts
'always i n the same manner' (ibid. 4 3 ) .
198 Emmanuel Faye

possess t h e i r existence indivisibly, there is n o t h i n g t o take i t away from t h e m .

T h i s makes i t clear that, precisely speaking, t h e i m m u t a b i l i t y ofessences a n d t h e
necessity o f t r u t h s does n o t c o m e from the i m m u t a b i h t y o f t h e d i v i n e decree,
b u t rather t h a t t h e i m m u t a b i h t y o f a U these things comes from t h e i n d i v i s i b U i t y
o f t h e i r existence, w h i c h has n o extension. (CCRV, 83-84e)

T h u s , t h e p r i n c i p l e o f t h e i n d e f e c t i b i h t y o f s i m p l e substances d o e s n o t
derive from t h e i m m u t a b i h t y o f t h e d i v i n e w i U , b u t from t h e i n d i v i s ­
i b U i t y o f t h e i r e x i s t e n c e . T h i s p o i n t seems n o t t o h a v e b e e n s e e n b y
B e a u d e , w h o , w i t h o u t e v e r c i t i n g t h e a r g u m e n t s o f t h e Critique de la
Criii^MC,presents Desgabets' d e r i v a t i o n o f t h e i m m u t a b i h t y ofcreatures
in a completely Cartesian manner from the i m m u t a b i h t y o f God's
decree. T h e 9
p r i n c i p l e b e h i n d aU o f D e s g a b e t s ' p h U o s o p h y is n o t a
s i m p l e a d o p t i o n o f t h e C a r t e s i a n thesis o f t h e i m m u t a b i l i t y o f t h e d i v i n e
w i U , b u t , o n t h e c o n t r a r y , a p r e c i s e c o n c e p t i o n o f s i m p l e substances, o n e
w h i c h is n o t C a r t e s i a n . 1 0
D e s g a b e t s , i n efFect, dissociates s u b s t a n c e a n d
d u r a t i o n a n d insists t h a t s i m p l e substances, c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e m s e l v e s , are
n o t i n t i m e a n d t h u s are i n d e f e c t i b l e b e c a u s e t h e y are w i t h o u t d u r a t i o n .
H e is t h u s r a d i c a U y o p p o s e d t o t h e C a r t e s i a n c o n c e p t i o n o f c o n t i n u o u s
c r e a t i o n . F o r D e s g a b e t s , t h e r e is d u r a t i o n o n l y w h e r e t h e r e is m o v e m e n t
a n d a succession o f c h a n g i n g m o d e s . T h e great o r i g i n a l i t y o f h i s m e t a ­
p h y s i c s t h u s d e r i v e s f r o m h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f d u r a t i o n , w h i c h is f o r h i m a
m o d a l a n d n o t a s u b s t a n t i a l n o t i o n . B e c a u s e d i v i s i b i h t y is a f u n c t i o n o f
m o t i o n , s u c c e s s i o n a n d d u r a t i o n (aU o f w h i c h are h e r e c o n f l a t e d ) , i t c a n
be predicated o n l y o f c h a n g i n g modes and n o t o f t h e simphcity o f b e i n g
t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e s aU substances.

D e s c a r t e s h i m s e r f , i n t h e Principles of Philosophy, begins b y presenting

d u r a t i o n as a m o d e o f e a c h t h i n g i n s o f a r as i t p e r s e v e r e s i n b e i n g , 1 1
but

9
Joseph Beaude, 'Cartesianisme et anticartesianisme de Desgabets', Studia Cartesiana I
(Amsterdam: Quadratures, 1979), 10 and 14. O n other points, Beaude shows i n a very
convincing manner what there is i n Desgabets' way o f thinking that is fundamentaUy
non-Cartesian.
1 0
T h i s primary reason for the indefectibihty ofsubstances is weU noted b y T a d Schmaltz,
w h o highhghts what is not Cartesian i n the Benedictine's thesis. B u t is it right to continue to
speak ofDesgabets"radical Cartesianism' ifthe one thesis ofhis that seems the most Cartesian
foUows, i n fact, from a non-Cartesian conception ofsubstance and duration? Schmaltz, to be
sure, expkins in detaU what he means by'radical Cartesianism';see Radical Cartesianism, 88—102
on the indefectibihty ofsubstances, and 17—19 for mejustification ofhis tide.
11
'We shaU have a very distinct understanding ofduration, order and number provided we
do not mistakenly tack o n to them any concept o f substance. Instead, we should regard the
duration ofa thing simply as a mode under w h i c h w e conceive the thing insofar as it continues
to exist' (Principia PAi7ojopfeiaeI.55,ATviii-i.26;CSMi.2ii).
 The Cartesianism qf Desgabets andArnauld 199

i n t h e succeeding article he corrects h i m s e r f b y specifying that d u r a t i o n ,

as m u c h as e x i s t e n c e , s h o u l d d e f i n i t i v e l y b e c a U e d a n a t t r i b u t e o f t h e
t h i n g t h a t exists a n d e n d u r e s , r a t h e r t h a n a m o d e o r a q u a h t y . W i t h o u t 1 2

u n d e r t a k i n g a deeper investigation i n t o the Cartesian c o n c e p t i o n of

d u r a t i o n s u c h as i t is f o u n d i n o t h e r s t e x t s , especiaUy t h o s e d e a l i n g w i t h
continuous creation or the temporahty o f t h o u g h t , 1 3
i t is s u f F i c i e n d y
a p p a r e n t t h a t i t is m o r e t h a n a m o d a l n o t i o n , d u r a t i o n b e i n g , as m u c h as
e x i s t e n c e , a n a t t r i b u t e t h a t is i n s e p a r a b l e f r o m t h e t h i n g i t s e l f .
A definitive evaluation o f the nature o f Desgabets' r e l a t i o n t o
D e s c a r t e s w o u l d r e q u i r e a n e x a m i n a t i o n o f his e n t i r e metaphysical
t h o u g h t , w h i c h is o b v i o u s l y i m p o s s i b l e i n a s t u d y h m i t e d t o c o n s i d e r i n g
o n l y h i s r e l a t i o n t o Descartes's thesis o n t h e f f e e c r e a t i o n o f n e c e s s a r y
t r u t h s . S t i U , t h i s e x a m p l e is v e r y m u r m n a t i n g , f o r w i t h i t w e h a v e t h e
m o s t e m b a t t l e d C a r t e s i a n thesis o f t h e s e v e n t e e n t h c e n t u r y . A n d t h e f a c t
t h a t D e s g a b e t s s u b s c r i b e s t o t h i s d o c t r i n e , a n d d o e s so i n t h e s a m e t e r m s
u s e d b y D e s c a r t e s , has c a u s e d m o d e r n c o m m e n t a t o r s o n h i s CEuvres
inidites t o b e h e v e t h a t h e is a C a r t e s i a n i n t h i s m a t t e r , e v e n t h o u g h
D e s g a b e t s n e v e r p r e s e n t s h i m s e r f a s s u c h t o h i s c o n t e m p o r a r y readers i n
t h e o n l y p h d o s o p h i c a l w o r k t h a t h e p u b h s h e d , t h e Critique de la Critique
de la recherche de la verit6. I f t h e r e is, n o n e t h e l e s s , a ' C a r t e s i a n i s m ' i n
Desgabets, i t can be o n l y an i n s t r u m e n t a l Cartesianism, w h e r e Descartes
is n o t so m u c h h i s i n s p i r a t i o n as a p r i v i l e g e d a u t h o r i t y — a n d n o t t h e
o n l y o n e — w h o m h e uses t o m a k e h i s p r i n c i p l e s a c c e p t a b l e .
I t s h o u l d b e n o t e d t h a t Desgabets does n o t hesitate t o e m p l o y a u t h o r ­
i t i e s o t h e r t h a n D e s c a r t e s . T h u s , e a c h t i m e h e i n v o k e s t h e thesis o f t h e
free c r e a t i o n o f t h e e t e r n a l t r u t h s , h e uses t h e f o U o w i n g p h r a s e a n d p r e ­
sents i t as a c i t a t i o n from St A u g u s t i n e : Uniuscuiusque rei natura voluntas
Dei e s i , ' T h e n a t u r e o f e a c h t h i n g is t h e w i U o f G o d ' , a l t h o u g h i t seems
i n f a c t t o b e o n l y a c o n d e n s e d r e f o r m u l a t i o n o f a passage f r o m t h e City
qf God (21.8), a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e n a t u r e o f e v e r y t h i n g is r e l a t e d t o
t h e w i U o f t h e C r e a t o r ('voluntas tanti utique conditoris conditae rei cujusque
natura sit') . T h i s passage is a l r e a d y c i t e d i n 1667 b y t h e a n o n y m o u s a u t h o r
o f t h e Art de vivre heureux, w h e r e t h e w o r d ' n a t u r e ' refers n o t t o t h e
e t e r n a l t r u t h s o r essences, b u t , as R o d i s - L e w i s has s h o w n , t o c o r p o r e a l

1 2
' A n d even i n the case o f created things, that w h i c h always remains unmodified—for
example, existence and duration i n a thing that exists and endures—should be caUed not a
quahty or a mode but an attribute' (Principia Philosophiae I.56,AT v i i i - 1 . 2 6 ; C S M i.211—12).
13
O n Desgabets' opposition to the Cartesian conception o f the duration o f thought as
such, see the suggestive analyses by Schmaltz, Radical Cartesianüm, 186—206.
200 Emmanuel Faye

t h i n g s i n s o f a r as t h e y h a v e b e e n c r e a t e d i n t i m e . 1 4
I n o t h e r places, i t is
Saint T h o m a s o r H e n r y o f G h e n t o r D u n s Scotus o r Peter A u r i o l e
w h o m D e s g a b e t s uses t o t h e s a m e e n d , t h a t is, t o m a k e his thesis o f t h e
i n d e f e c t i b i h t y ofsubstances m o r e palatable.
T h e 'Cartesianism' ofDesgabets,wbile weU g r o u n d e d w h e n i t comes
to his p h y s i c s , is t h u s very problematic i n matters metaphysical.
M o r e o v e r , i t seems t h a t i n his o w n time h e w a s n e v e r p e r c e i v e d t o b e a
Cartesian—on t h e c o n t r a r y . A n d w e have s o m e r e m a r k a b l e testimony
t o t h i s efFect, t o w i t , t h e c o U e c t i o n o f Conferences de Commercy between
t h e C a r d i n a l d e R e t z , D o m D e s g a b e t s , a n d several d i s c i p l e s o f D e s c a r t e s ,
a m o n g t h e m C o r b i n e U i . H a v i n g r e t i r e d t o t h e lands o f Commercy,
C a r d i n a l d e R e t z h k e d t o discuss p h i l o s o p h y w i t h h i s Benedictine
neighbors i n t h e m o n a s t e r y o f B r e u i l , w h e r e Desgabets was a s u b p r i o r .
T h e k s t y e a r o f D e s g a b e t s ' l i f e , from t h e b e g i n n i n g o f 1677 t o t h e b e g i n ­
n i n g o f 1678 f h e d i e d i n B r e u U o n 13 M a r c h ) , w a s m u c h o c c u p i e d by
intense discussions, exchanges o f dissertations, a n d rephes b e a r i n g o n
t h e principles o f h i s p h n o s o p h y a n d the relevance o f h i s criticisms o f
Descartes. 1 5
D e s g a b e t s m a y w e U say t h a t h e d o e s n o t i n t e n d t o a t t a c k
D e s c a r t e s b u t t o c o r r e c t h i m t h r o u g h his o w n p r i n c i p l e s , b u t i n t h e eyes
o f D e s c a r t e s ' s d i s c i p l e s h e a p p e a r e d as n o t h i n g less t h a n T a d v e r s a i r e j u r e
de M . Descartes'. 1 6

O n t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e i n d e f e c t i b i h t y o f creatures a n d o f t h e c o n ­
f o r m i t y o f t h i s thesis w i t h Descartes's m e t a p h y s i c a l p r i n c i p l e s , C a r d i n a l
de R e t z formulates some h i g h l y perspicacious objections. H e certainh/
p e r c e i v e s t h a t t h e r e are t w o w a y s o f u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h e i n d e f e c t i b i h t y o f
substances: e i t h e r e x c l u s i v e l y t h r o u g h t h e i m m u t a b i h t y o f G o d ' s w U l
(and, i n t h i s case, D e s g a b e t s w o u l d b e s a y i n g n o t h i n g n e w r e l a t i v e t o
w h a t D e s c a r t e s s a i d ) , o r t h r o u g h 'a r e q u i r e m e n t o f i n d i v i s i b l e b e i n g ' ,
w h i c h is i n d e e d w h a t D e s g a b e t s o f f e r s . I n t h i s case, t h o u g h , o n e r u n s u p
a g a i n s t a series o f o b j e c t i o n s , t h e first o f w h i c h is t h a t t h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f
i n d e f e c t i b i h t y seems i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h G o d ' s f r e e d o m . I n efFect, i f
i n d e f e c t i b U i t y b e l o n g s t o substances c o n s i d e r e d i n themselves, one

1 4
Genevieve R o d i s - L e w i s , ' L e s essences eterneUes et leur creation: le detournement d'un
texteaugustinien',XWTesiicfe 135 ( 1 9 8 2 ) , 2 n - 1 5 .
1 5
T h e most complete edition ofthe Conßrences de Commercy, and the one to w h i c h I refer
below, is found i n the CEuvres ofJean—Francois—Paul de Gondi, Cardinal de R e t z , in Lesgrands
ecrivains de la France, ix, ed. R . de Chantekuze (Paris, 1887). This edition, however, is not
without its faults; see Genevieve Rodis—Lewis, Studia Cartesiana 2 (Amsterdam: Quadratures,
1981), 1 5 5 - 6 4 . 1 6
Conferences de Commercy, 270.
 The Cartesianism qfDesgahets andArnauld 201

m i g h t r e a s o n a b l y w o n d e r w h e t h e r G o d has b e e n ' c o n s t r a i n e d t o c r e a t e
t h e m as i n d e f e c t i b l e ' (Conferences de Commercy, 325),which would con­
t r a d i c t t h e v e r y thesis o f D e s c a r t e s ' s t h a t D e s g a b e t s c l a i m s as his o w n .
I t w o t d d b e w o n d e r f u l t o k n o w h o w Desgabets r e s p o n d e d t o these
o b j e c t i o n s from t h e C a r d i n a l . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h e e x t a n t e d i t i o n s o f t h e
Conferences de Commercy, the very incomplete one b y V i c t o r Cousin, and
t h e m o r e c o m p l e t e o n e b y C h a n t e l a u z e , d o n o t p r o v i d e his r e p h e s . T h e
k t t e r writes that 'nous t e r m i n o n s i c i l ' e x t r a i t de cette polemique'
(Confkrences de Commercy, 334), w i t h o u t any i n d i c a t i o n w h e t h e r o r n o t
t h e m a n u s c r i p t i n c l u d e s Desgabets' r e p l y t o these e x t r e m e o b j e c t i o n s b y
t h e C a r d i n a l . A search at E p i n a l is r e q u i r e d t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r t h i s
r e p l y exists a n d , i f s o , w h a t i t is.
I f w e d o n o t h a v e at o u r disposal, at least f o r n o w , D e s g a b e t s ' o w n
response, t h e l o g i c o f h i s d o c t r i n e clearly p o i n t s t o t h e absolute i m p o s s ­
i b i h t y o f c r e a t i n g d e f e c t i b l e s u b s t a n c e s . I n effect, i t is essential t o substance,
a c c o r d i n g t o D e s g a b e t s , t o b e o n t o l o g i c a U y i n d i v i s i b l e a n d t o h a v e aU o f
its e x i s t e n c e g a t h e r e d i n a p o i n t , t h a t is, n o t t o h a v e d u r a t i o n , i n t h e sense
i n w h i c h D e s g a b e t s u n d e r s t a n d s t h e t e r m . I f G o d is p e r f e c d y free n o t t o
create substances, n e v e r t h e l e s s these are, o n c e c r e a t e d a n d i n v i r t u e o f t h e
s i m p h c i t y o f t h e i r b e i n g , i n themselves indivisible a n d indefectible.
T h i s d o c t r i n e is n o t C a r t e s i a n , 1 7
n o m o r e t h a n is (as S c r i b a n o has
s h o w n ) Desgabets' r e d u c t i o n o f t h e possible t o the existent, such that
1 8

t h e r e are n o possibles o t h e r t h a n w h a t G o d has c a u s e d t o e x i s t b y h i s free

d e c r e e . T h u s , d e s p i t e t h e h t e r a l fideHty o f t h e e x p o s i t i o n o f t h e C a r t e s i a n
d o c t r i n e o f t h e free c r e a t i o n o f t h e e t e r n a l t r u t h s t h a t w e f i n d i n c h a p t e r 5
o f t h e Traite de l'indefectibilite des creatures, t h e sense i n w h i c h D e s g a b e t s
u n d e r s t a n d s t h i s d o c t r i n e is, i n reahty, t o o f a r f r o m D e s c a r t e s f o r us t o b e
able t o say, w i t h o u t q u a h f i c a t i o n , t h a t D e s g a b e t s f u n d a m e n t a U y adopts
a n d f o U o w s t h e 1630 thesis.

1 7
IfDescartes admits, in the Synopsis ofthe Meditations, that 'generaUy aU substances, that is
things that cannot exist without being created by G o d , are by their nature incorrupdble, and
can never cease to exist', he nonetheless immediately adds: 'as long as they are not reduced to
nothing by this same G o d withdrawing from them his ordinary concourse' ( A T i x - i . 10). I n
short, substances are not i n themselves corruptible, b u t — a n d here is the difference from
Desgabets' doctrine—they are never said to be indefectible with regard to the power o f
God, w h o created them and w h o continues to conserve them in existence by his ordinary
concourse.
1 8
E m a n u e k Scribano,'Le "spinozisme" d ' A r n a u l d ' , i n W v a n Bunge andW. K k v e r (eds.),
Disguised and Overt Spinozism around 1700 (Leiden: BriU, 1 9 9 5 ) , 2 9 1 — 3 0 4 .
202 Emmanuel Faye

I n consuIting the stiU-unpubhshed writings ofDesgabets and t r y i n g

t o p r o v i d e a m o r e c o m p l e t e s t u d y o f h i s m e t a p h y s i c s , I h a v e n o t so f a r
b e e n able t o m a k e a n y d e f i n i t i v e c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t t h e d e g r e e t o w h i c h
h i s m e t a p h y s i c s is ' C a r t e s i a n ' . A t t h i s stage i n m y r e s e a r c h , I t e n d t o
r e g a r d D e s g a b e t s j u s t as h e w a s r e g a r d e d i n h i s o w n time a n d e v e n i n t o
t h e n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r y , a n d n o t as h e is r e g a r d e d t o d a y , t h a t is t o say,
I p r e f e r t o see h i m less as a C a r t e s i a n t h a n as a n o r i g i n a l m e t a p h y s i c i a n ,
s o m e o n e i n c o n s t a n t e n g a g e m e n t w i t h Descartes's p h i l o s o p h y , w h i c h
fascinates h i m b u t t h e essentials o f w h o s e m e t a p h y s i c s h e c o m b a t s .
I w i U a d d , t o c o n c l u d e t h i s analysis o f D e s g a b e t s , a g e n e r a l r e m a r k a n d
a h y p o t h e s i s f o r f u t u r e research. T h e m o s t g e n e r a l d i f H c u l t y i n i n t e r ­
p r e t i n g D e s g a b e t s stems f r o m t h e f a c t t h a t w e , a c q u a i n t e d as w e are w i t h
D e s c a r t e s , u s u a U y p r o c e e d f f o m w h a t is b e t t e r k n o w n t o w h a t is less
k n o w n a n d t h u s t e n d t o e v a l u a t e D e s g a b e t s ' p h U o s o p h y as a f u n c t i o n o f
t h a t o f D e s c a r t e s , s o m e t h i n g w e are especiaUy e n c o u r a g e d t o d o b y t h e
fact that Desgabets h i m s e l f i s constandy c o n f r o n t i n g t h e a u t h o r o f t h e
Meditations. M e a n w h i l e , as t h e c h r o n o l o g y s h o w s , D e s g a b e t s was p h i l o ­
s o p h i z i n g before b e c o m i n g acquainted w i t h Descartes, a n d i t w o u l d be
i n d i s p e n s a b l e f o r u n d e r s t a n d i n g h i s t h o u g h t t o k n o w its o r i g i n s . H e
t e n d s t o a d v a n c e h i s ideas against t h e C a r t e s i a n s t r e a m , t o w a r d a smaU
n u m b e r o f p r i n c i p l e s t h a t h e r e g a r d s as e v e n m o r e s i m p l e a n d m o r e g e n ­
e r a l t h a n Descartes's f i r s t p r i n c i p l e s . T h e q u e s t i o n , t h e n , is t o know
w h e t h e r these represent generahzations o f Cartesian principles, or a
r e t u r n t o s o m e f o u n d a t i o n a l ideas t h a t p r e d a t e h i s a c q u a i n t a n c e with
Descartes's p h U o s o p h y a n d are d i s t i n c t f r o m i t . I f D e s g a b e t s w a s able t o
d r a w t h e thesis o f t h e f r e e c r e a t i o n o f e t e r n a l t r u t h s d i r e c d y f r o m h i s
r e a d i n g o f D e s c a r t e s ' s l e t t e r s t o M e r s e n n e p u b h s h e d b y C l e r s e h e r , stiU,
t h i s is n o t t h e o n l y thesis o n w h i c h h i s m e t a p h y s i c a l t h o u g h t r e s t s . T h e r e
is also t h a t w h i c h h e caUs ' t h e m o s t s i m p l e , t h e b e s t k n o w n a n d t h e m o s t
n e c e s s a r y o f a l l p r i n c i p l e s ' , t h a t i s , ' e v e r y s i m p l e c o n c e p t i o n a l w a y s has,
o u t s i d e o f t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g , a r e a l a n d e x i s t i n g o b j e c t t h a t is i n i t s e l f a s
i t is r e p r e s e n t e d b y t h o u g h t ' (SuppUment a la philosophie de Monsieur
Descartes, OPI, 223).
I f o n e seeks a n h i s t o r i c a l o r i g i n f o r t h i s p r i n c i p l e , a d i f f i c u l t y e m e r g e s .
T h i s p r i n c i p l e is c o n n e c t e d , i n p a r t , w i t h t h e ' r u l e o f t r u t h ' a n n o u n c e d
at t h e e n d o f t h e T h i r d M e d i t a t i o n a n d a g a i n i n a r t i c l e 30 o f P a r t O n e o f
t h e Principles, w h e r e Descartes c k i m s that t h e natural h g h t 'can never
e n c o m p a s s a n y o b j e c t t h a t is n o t t r u e i n s o f a r as i t is i n d e e d e n c o m p a s s e d
 The Cartesianism ofDesgabets andArnauld 203

b y t h i s f a c u l t y ' ( C S M 1,203 ; A T V I I I , 16). M e a n w h i l e , t h e C a r t e s i a n r u l e

is t r u i y c o n f i r m e d o n l y at t h e e n d o f a l o n g c h a i n o f r e a s o n i n g , a n d
t h u s d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e a ' p r i n c i p l e ' i n t h e sense i n w h i c h D e s c a r t e s
d e f i n e s t h a t t e r m i n his l e t t e r t o C l e r s e h e r o f J u n e o r J v d y 1 6 4 6 . B e s i d e s ,
Desgabets' p r i n c i p l e , closer t o the reahsm ofmedievalAristotehanism,
is i n s o m e sense t u r n e d against t h e Meditations, s i n c e i t has t h e e f f e c t o f
u n d e r m i n i n g t h e s p e c i f i c i t y o f t h e cogito, t h e p r i m a c y a c c o r d e d t o t h e
i d e a o f G o d , t h e h y p o t h e s i s o f t h e d i v i n e deceiver, t h e necessity of
hyperbolic d o u b t and o f t h e p r o o f o f t h e existence o f b o d i e s — i n short,
a l m o s t aU o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c s o f t h e Meditations.
I t is t h u s n o t a b s u r d t o assume, at least as a p r o v i s i o n a l h y p o t h e s i s f o r
r e s e a r c h , t h a t D e s g a b e t s ' p r i n c i p l e a n d t h e use h e m a k e s o f i t p r o c e e d
from some source other t h a n Descartes's m e t a p h y s i c s , e v e n i f t h e
Benedictine's terminology owes an e n o r m o u s d e b t t o Descartes. I n
D e s g a b e t s ' p r i n c i p l e , w h i c h leads h i m t o c l a i m t h a t ' n e i t h e r a n a n g e l n o r
t h e m o s t perfect m a n can f o r m an idea o f a n y t h i n g that w o u l d n o t exist'
(Supplement, OPI, 2 5 5 ) , o n e c a n find a n e c h o o f a thesis a d o p t e d b y l a t e
m e d i e v a l a u t h o r s w h o r e j e c t t h e possibUity, f o u n d i n t h e S c o t i s t t h e o r y
o f k n o w l e d g e , o f a n i n t u i t i o n o f w h a t is non-existent. 1 9

Sirnüarly, D e s g a b e t s ' thesis o f t h e i n d e f e c t i b i h t y o f c r e a t u r e s o r s i m p l e

substances, w h i c h leads h i m t o assert t h e i m m u t a b i h t y n o t o n l y o f e t e r n a l
t r u t h s , h k e D e s c a r t e s , b u t also ' o f a n g e l s , t h e s o u l a n d m a t t e r ' (Supplement,
OPI, 2 0 9 ) , d o e s n o t assume aU o f i t s h i s t o r i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e unless o n e
recognizes w i t h i n i t the echo, i f n o t the repetition, o f c e r t a i n disputed
q u e s t i o n s f r o m t h e l a t e M i d d l e A g e s o n t h e p r o b l e m o f annihilatio: can
G o d a n n i h U a t e a c r e a t u r e P T h i s p r o b l e m i t s e r f d e r i v e s from t h e d i f f i c u l t y
that medieval theologians encountered w h e n they t r i e d to reconcUe
t w o passages from S c r i p t u r e : t h e g r a d u a l c r e a t i o n i n G e n e s i s a n d t h e
c r e a t i o n simul et semel o f E c c l e s i a s t i c u s 1 8 . 1 . 2 0
T h e s o l u t i o n suggested b y

1 9
It recaus,for example, an author such as Francois de Meyronnes. O n e can equaUy weU invoke
the principle adopted three centuries earHer by another phUosopher from Lorraine, that is, the the­
ses ofNicolas ofAutrecourt on the apparentiapkna, introduced i n chapter six ofthe E x i g i t orio and
directed against the possibUity, found in the Scotist theory ofknowledge, ofthe intuition ofthe
non-existent; o n the apparentiu plena, see the First Letter to Bernard d'Arezzo, in Nicolas
Autrecourt, Correspondance.Articles c0ndamnes,i3tm text estabUshed by L. M . de R i j k QParis:J.Vrin,
2001). It would, however, be overly bold to conclude from this that elements ofthe thought of
Nicohs, whose manuscript works were preserved and hidden in Lorraine by a Benedictine (a cer-
ainWittier) ,were transmitted,bystages stiU indeterminate,in the Benedictine tradition in Lorraine.
2 0
O n A u g u s t i n e o n the two creations, see section 3 ofthe article by Z . K a l u z a , ' L a notion
de matiere et son evolution dans Ъ doctrine wydifienne', i n M . T. FumagaH, Beonio
204 Emmanuel Faye

A u g u s t i n e i n De Genesi ad litteram a n d t a k e n u p i n p a r t a t t h e e n d o f t h e
Confessions—that o f a c r e a t i o n ex nihilo o f aU t h i n g s at t h e s a m e time
( s u c h as i n f o r m e d m a t t e r ) , f o U o w e d (at least causaUy) b y a n administratio
or gradual c r e a t i o n a k m g t h e lines o f G e n e s i s — s e e m s t o b e t h e o r i g i n
o f d o c t r i n e s t h a t , as i n D e s g a b e t s , d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n p e r m a n e n t t h i n g s
a n d c h a n g e a b l e t h i n g s , o r , t o use m o r e A r i s t o t e h a n t e r m s , i n d e f e c t i b l e
substance a n d perishable m o d e s . M o r e d e t a i l e d w o r k o n t h e m e d i e v a l
sources o f D e s g a b e t s , w h i c h e x c e e d s t h e s c o p e o f t h i s essay, r e m a i n s t o
b e d o n e . S u c h w o r k w i U a U o w us t o test t h e h y p o t h e s i s t h a t I p r o p o s e ,
n a m e l y , t h a t , w i t h respect t o t h e sources o f his t h o u g h t , Desgabets
s h o u l d b e s e e n less as a ' r a d i c a l C a r t e s i a n ' , w h o s e d o c t r i n e has b e e n
c o n s t i t u t e d o u t o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e a u t h o r o f t h e Meditations and
t h e Principles, t h a n as a t h i n k e r m o l d e d b y t h e q u e s t i o n s a n d d i s p u t a ­
tions o f l a t e Scholasticism w h o e n c o u n t e r e d o n his w a y t h e w o r k s o f
D e s c a r t e s w h e n h i s ideas w e r e a h e a d y p a r t i a U y f o r m e d , a n d w h o — a t least
w i t h r e s p e c t t o m e t a p h y s i c s ( f o r t h e case o f p h y s i c s is, w i t h o u t q u e s t i o n ,
d i f f e r e n t ) — w a n t e d t o assimUate s e l e c t i v e l y t h o s e e l e m e n t s o f D e s c a r t e s ' s
p h i l o s o p h y t h a t s e e m e d t o h i m able t o f u r t h e r h i s o w n p r i n c i p l e s .

2. A R N A U L D A N D T R U T H I N T H E DISSERTATIO BIPARTITA

G a u g i n g t h e e x t e n t o f A r n a u l d ' s ' C a r t e s i a n i s m ' is a d e h c a t e m a t t e r . C e r t a i n

r e c e n t i n t e r p r e t e r s , i n o t h e r w i s e e x c e U e n t studies, h a v e p r e s e n t e d A r n a t U d
as a c o m p l e t e C a r t e s i a n , a n d t h e y h a v e a r g u e d , f u r t h e r , t h a t o n e c a n f i n d
i n h i m t h e 'Cartesian t h e o l o g y ' that Descartes h i r n s e l f n e v e r w r o t e .
W i t h r e g a r d t o t h e f i r s t p o i n t , w h i c h is t h e o n e I w a n t t o f o c u s o n i n
t h i s essay, 21
o n c e r t a i n essential q u e s t i o n s , s u c h as t h e n a t u r e o f ideas,
A r n a u l d does i n d e e d t e n d , i n his c o n t r o v e r s y w i t h M a l e b r a n c h e , t o w a r d
an e x p h c i t f i d e l i t y t o w a r d D e s c a r t e s . T h u s , i n t h e first chapters ofDes
vraies et desfausses idaes, h e rehes o n t h e C a r t e s i a n d e m o n s t r a t i o n s o f t h e

Brocchieri, and S. Simonetta (eds.),John Wiclif. Logica, PoUtica, Teologia (Florence: E d i z i o n i del
GaUuzzo, 2 0 0 3 ) , 1 1 3 - 5 1 .
2 1
I have shown elsewhere, as a fouow-up to my edition ofthe Examen d'un traite de l'essence
dueorps. . . (Paris:Fayard,i999),thatthereisno'Cartesiantheology'inArnauld;see'Arnauld
defenseur de Descartes dans VExamen du traiti de l'essence du mrps, i n E . Faye (ed.), CartSsiens et
augustiniens au X V I I e siecle, Corpus: Revue de philosophie 3 7 ( 2 0 0 0 ) , 131—59. See also m y discus­
sion w i t h G. R o d i s - L e w i s , w h o adopts the same interpretation, in 'Descartes et les philosophes
francais de la Renaissance. Discussion', L'Enseignementphihsophique 49 (1999),48.
 The Cartesianism ofDesgabets andArnauld 205

F i r s t a n d S e c o n d R e p l i e s , w h i c h h e cites literaUy, t o p r o v e t h a t , c o n t r a r y
t o M a l e b r a n c h e , o u r ideas are n o t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e b e i n g s d i s t i n c t f r o m
o u r p e r c e p t i o n s a n d t h o u g h t s . M e a n w h i l e , i n t h i s s a m e w o r k , w h i c h is
w i t h o u t a d o u b t t h e m o s t C a r t e s i a n o f his w r i t i n g s , A r n a u l d d o e s n o t
shy f f o m i n n o v a t i o n i n h i s d e f e n s e o f C a r t e s i a n p o s i t i o n s . I h a v e s h o w n
elsewhere h o w A r n a u l d was able t o h e l p h i m s e l f t o a Cartesian a r g u ­
m e n t (i.e. t h e o n e f o r t h e e x i s t e n c e o f b o d y t h a t appears at t h e b e g i n ­
n i n g o f t h e S i x t h M e d i t a t i o n a n d is c r i t i c i z e d b y M a l e b r a n c h e i n t h e
' S i x t h E l u c i d a t i o n ' ) b u t use i t i n a c o m p l e t e l y o r i g i n a l w a y (although
probably inspired b y the arguments o f C o r d e m o y and Francois de
L a n n i o n ) i n his m e d i t a t i o n o n s p e e c h a n d l a n g u a g e . 2 2
This example
s h o w s w e h A r n a u l d ' s s p e c u l a t i v e i n v e n t i v e n e s s ; h e was n o t c o n t e n t s i m p l y
a n d p a s s i v e l y t o t a k e u p p r e f a b r i c a t e d C a r t e s i a n theses.
I n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e e x t e n t o f A r n a u l d ' s C a r t e s i a n i s m , i t is n e c ­
essary t o g o f u r t h e r a n d t r y t o e s t a b h s h w h a t h i s p o s i t i o n is w i t h r e s p e c t
t o s o m e f u n d a m e n t a l theses o f C a r t e s i a n m e t a p h y s i c s . F o r a n u m b e r o f
years, c o m m e n t a t o r s h a v e b e e n t r y i n g t o d i s c o v e r h i s v i e w o n t h e free
creation o f the eternal truths. A d o p t i n g H e n r i Gouhier's idea o f a
'Cartesianism w i t h o u t the creation o f the eternal truths' and taking
advantage o f A r n a u k T s silence o n this m a t t e r i n his c o r r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h
L e i b n i z ( i n t h e l e t t e r o f 28 S e p t e m b e r 1 6 8 6 ) , m a n y i n t e r p r e t e r s h a v e
concluded that he refused t o take a stand o n this question. A n d yet,
A r n a u M c e r t a i n l y d i d n o t o b s e r v e t h i s p r u d e n t s i l e n c e i n his l a t e r w o r k s ,
s u c h as t h e Dissertatio bipartita; D e n i s M o r e a u , w h o has b r o u g h t o u t a n
e x c e l l e n t e d i t i o n o f t h i s w o r k , has s h o w n t h i s w e U . 2 3
M o r e a u goes so far
as t o say t h a t A r n a u l d c e r t a i n l y w o u l d h a v e m a n i f e s t e d his f e a l t y to
Descartes's thesis, t h u s a g r e e i n g w i t h a thesis p r o p o s e d b y J e a n L a p o r t e . 2 4

2 2
E m m a n u e l Faye, 'Arnauld et l'essence des corps: la controverse avec Malebranche
et l'argument du langage', Rivista di storia dellafilosofia 3 (2000), 417—33.
2 3
See Antoine Arnauld, Textes philosophiques, ed. D. Moreau ^ a r i s : Presses Universitaires de
France, 2 0 0 1 ) . OnArnavud's position in the Dissertatio bipartita, see Moreau, Deux Cartesiens, ch. 6.
T h i s chapter appeared separately as 'Arnauld, les idees et les verites eterneUes', Les Etudes
philosophiques 1—2 ( 1 9 9 6 ) , i 3 i - 5 6 . T h i s article represents the most innovative work o n post-
Cartesian metaphysics in France to appear in the last several years. E v e n though my c o n c l u ­
sions differ ffom those ofMoreau, I must acknowledge my debt to a study that has contributed
50 m u c h to awaken my interest inArnauld's philosophy.
2 4
Laporte says that 'en reahte son opinion sur ce sujet n'est pas differente de ceUe de
Descartes bien comprise';see La doctrine de Port-Royel,vol.2,part i,Les verites de lagrdce @>aris:
Presses Universitaires de France, 1 9 2 3 ) , 335; the phrase is partiafly cited by Moreau, Deux
Cartisiens, 177 n. i . It aU depends o n what one means by 'properly understanding' Descartes's
opinion.While a profound reader ofDescartes, Laporte, in my view, draws h i m too close to
20б Emmanuel Faye

W i t h aU d u e r e s p e c t t o t h o s e w o r k s t h a t h a v e g r e a d y advanced
r e s e a r c h b y m a k i n g f o r g o t t e n t e x t s accessible a n d b y i U u m i n a t i n g t h e
value o f c e r t a i n c r u c i a l p o i n t s i n these texts f o r t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e rela­
tionship between the t h o u g h t o f A r n a u l d a n d the metaphysics of
D e s c a r t e s , i t seems t o m e t h a t i t has n o t y e t b e e n p r o v e n t h a t A r n a u l d
t r u l y a d o p t e d t h e C a r t e s i a n thesis o n t h e e t e r n a l t r u t h s . 2 5
I n essence,
b o t h t h e l e t t e r a n d t h e s p i r i t o f t h e p r o p o s i t i o n s o f t h e Dissertatio bipar­
tita o n e t e r n a l t r u t h a n d c r e a t e d t r u t h are n o t C a r t e s i a n b u t T h o m i s t .
Gummare H u y g e n s , i n h i s Theses theologiae o f i686, and foUowing
Malebranche, h a d subscribed t o the doctrine o f the vision i n G o d of
t r u t h s . A r n a u l d o p p o s e d h i m i n 1692, w h e n h e w r o t e t h e EHssertatio
bipartita ( w h i c h d i d n o t a p p e a r u n t i l 1715) a n d e m p l o y e d SaintThomas
t o c o u n t e r t h e ' P l a t o n i s m ' o f A u g u s t i n e . I n a r t i c l e 2, c o r o U a r y s i x o f t h e
EHssertatio bipartita, Arnauld's doctrinal position and argumentation,
g r o u n d e d e x p h c i d y i n question sixteen o f t h e First Part o f t h e Summa
Theologiae ( a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y a r t i c l e 7: Utrum veritas creata sit aeterna), is
noticeably different f r o m the Cartesian view. T h i s article f r o m the
Summa theologiae is p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t , f o r i n i t o n e sees T h o m a s
o p p o s e A u g u s t i n e ' s v i e w i n t h e t r e a t i s e On Free Will o n t h e status o f a n
' e t e r n a l ' t r u t h , s u c h as t h e d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e c i r c l e , o r t h a t t w o p l u s t h r e e
e q u a k f 1 v e . T h 0 m a s ' s thesis, a d o p t e d a n d d e v e l o p e d i n a n a c u t e m a n n e r
b y A r n a u l d , is t h a t ' e a c h t h i n g is t r u e , a b s o l u t e l y s p e a k i n g , i n s o f a r as i t is
r e l a t e d t o t h e i n t e U e c t o n w h i c h i t d e p e n d s ' . T h u s , a t r u t h is ' e t e r n a l '
w h e n i t is i n t h e d i v i n e i n t e U e c t , a n d i t is ' c r e a t e d ' w h e n i t is i n a c r e a t e d
i n t e U e c t . I t f o U o w s — a n d A r n a u l d w i U use t h i s p o i n t against Huygens—
that f o r one t o k n o w the d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e circle o r that t w o plus three
e q u a l five is n o t t o see a n e t e r n a l t r u t h i n G o d , b u t t o h a v e a c r e a t e d t r u t h
i n one's o w n i n t e U e c t .
M e a n w h i l e , i f t h e t r u t h f o u n d i n o u r o w n i n t e U e c t s is s a i d by
T h o m a s a n d , after h i m , b y A r n a u l d t o b e a 'created t r u t h ' , t h i s expres­
s i o n a b s o l u t e l y does n o t have t h e same m e a n i n g t h a t Descartes gives i t
i n 1630. I n e f f e c t , w h e n T h o m a s a n d A r n a u l d s p e a k a b o u t a m a t h e m a t ­
i c a l t r u t h s u c h as ' t w o p l u s t h r e e e q u a l s five' as a c r e a t e d t r u t h , t h e y

StThomas, w h i c h aUows h i m to minimize the differences betweenArnauld's metaphysics and

that ofDescartes.
2 5
See the long argument by Moreau, for w h o m Ъ metaphysique qui sous-tend ici les posi­
tions arnaldiennes' is that ofDescartes himseH"(Dcxx carttsiens, 176), and the conclusion that he
draws from it, according to which'Arnauld etait profondement et completement cartesien' (177).
 The Cartesianism ofDesgabets andArnauld 207

i n t e n d o n l y t o c l a i m t h a t t h i s t r u t h is k n o w n b y t h e h u m a n i n t e U e c t ,
w h i c h is a c r e a t e d i n t e U e c t . B y c o n t r a s t , w h e n D e s c a r t e s speaks a b o u t
t h e c r e a t i o n o f t r u t h s , h e m e a n s t h a t G o d is t h e a u t h o r a n d e f f i c i e n t
cause o f t h e s e t r u t h s , s o m e t h i n g t h a t n e i t h e r T h o m a s n o r A r n a v d d is
w i U i n g t o g r a n t . A r n a u l d is n o t s a y i n g t h a t t h e ' e t e r n a l t r u t h s ' t h a t w e
f i n d i n o u r inteUects d e p e n d o n a ffee decree o f G o d . R a t h e r , h e wants
t o d i s t i n g u i s h u n c r e a t e d e t e r n a l t r u t h t h a t is f o u n d i n t h e d i v i n e i n t e l ­
l e c t f r o m t h e c r e a t e d t r u t h t h a t is i n o u r i n t e U e c t a n d t h a t c a n n o t b e s a i d
t o b e e t e r n a l . F a r f r o m a d o p t i n g t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l thesis o f D e s c a r t e s
( w h i c h says n o t h i n g a b o u t t h e status o f t r u t h i n t h e i n t e U e c t o f G o d ,
since this q u e s t i o n does n o t faU,for h i m , w i t h i n the d o m a i n ofphüos-
o p h y ) , A r n a u l d is o n l y taking over f r o m T h o m a s the distinction
b e t w e e n t r u t h as i t is in mente divina ( t h a t is, e t e r n a l a n d u n c r e a t e d ) and
t r u t h as i t is in intellectu nostro ( t h a t is, n o n - e t e r n a l a n d c r e a t e d ) . T h i s d i s ­
t i n c t i o n is n o t C a r t e s i a n , a n d t h e m e a n i n g o f t h e w o r d ' t r u t h ' is n o t t h e
same f o r T h o m a s a n d Descartes. F o r D e s c a r t e s , ' e t e r n a l t r u t h s ' denotes
c r e a t e d essences, w h i l e f o r T h o m a s , w h o e m p l o y s t h e e x p r e s s i o n i n
o n l y the singular, 'created t r u t h ' denotes n o t a created e s s e n c e — G o d
does n o t create the d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e c i r c l e — b u t o n l y a created i n t e l ­
lect's k n o w l e d g e o f t h e t r u t h . F o r T h o m a s , t h e c o n t e n t o f t h a t k n o w l ­
e d g e is n o t c r e a t e d b y G o d .
The Dissertatio o f 1692 is t h u s w h o U y c o m p a t i b l e w i t h t h e non-
Cartesian o b j e c t i o n that A r n a u l d makes t o Descartes i n the F o u r t h
Objections of1641,that

w e l o o k f o r the efficient cause o f s o m e t h i n g o n l y i n respect o f i t s existence, n o t

i n respect o f i t s essence. For example, i f I see a triangle, I may l o o k f o r the effi­
cient cause that is responsible f o r the existence o f this triangle; b u t I cannot
w i t h o u t absurdity i n q u i r e i n t o the efficient cause o f t h i s triangle's h a v i n g three
angles equal t o t w o r i g h t angles. I f a n y o n e makes such an i n q u i r y , the correct
response w o u l d be n o t t o give an efficient cause, b u t t o explain that this is the
nature o f a triangle. ( A T v i i . 212; C S M i i . 1 4 9 ) 26

I n short, f o r A r n a u l d , God's efficient causality operates o n l y o n exist­

e n c e , n o t o n t r u t h o r essence. C o n t r a r y t o t h e C a r t e s i a n d o c t r i n e , f o r
A r n a u l d G o d c a n n o t b e t h e e f f i c i e n t cause o f t h e n a t u r e a n d i n t r i n s i c
properties o f t h e triangle.

26
SeeA.-R.Ndiaye,'Le status desverites eterneues danslaphilosophie d'AntoineArnauld:
cartesianisme ou augustinisme?', Antoine Amauld (1612-1694): phihsophe, ecrivain, thiologien,
Chroniques de Port-Royal 44 (1995), 283^j6.
208 Emmanuel Faye

T o r e t u r n t o t h e DHssertatio o f 1 6 9 2 , A r n a u l d ' s T h o m i s m is c l e a r l y
c o n f i r m e d b y t h e final a r t i c l e , 2 7
w h e r e he adopts exacdy the T h o m i s t
interpretation ofAugustine's Quaestio de ideis, i n w h i c h p u r e a n d h o l y
s o u l s , w h i c h are c a p a b l e o f k n o w i n g i n G o d ideas o r e t e r n a l reasons, are
i d e n t i f i e d as s i n g u l a r l y blessed.
T h u s , i t appears t h a t A r n a u l d ' s d o c t r i n a l p o s i t i o n i n 1692 is n o t
C a r t e s i a n b u t T h o m i s t , e v e n i f i t is, i n actuahty, a n u a n c e d T h o m i s m , one
t h a t gets r e m o d e l e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f s e v e n t e e n t h - c e n t u r y controver-
s i e s . W i t h respect t o t h e Cartesian d o c t r i n e o f t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e eternal
t r u t h s , o n e s h o u l d t h e r e f o r e speak, relative t o t h e t e x t o f 1692, n o t o f
Arnauld's 'silence',nor ofhis unquahfied adherence,but o f a doctrinaUy
d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n , o n e t h a t is d i r e c t l y i n s p i r e d b y T h o m a s a n d t h a t o n h /
p a r t i a h y c o i n c i d e s w i t h Descartes: b o t h A r n a u l d a n d Descartes reject
t h e u n i v o c i t y o f h u m a n a n d d i v i n e k n o w l e d g e , a n d A r n a u l d is r e s o l u t e l y
o p p o s e d t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e v i s i o n i n G o d o f e t e r n a l t r u t h s t h a t is h e l d
b y c e r t a i n adversaries o f C a r t e s i a n m e t a p h y s i c s , s u c h as Malebranche,
H u y g e n s , and Francois Lamy.

I c o n c l u d e t h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f A r n a u l d ' s Dissertatio bipartita w i t h a g e n ­

e r a l r e m a r k . I f A r n a u l d ' s T h o m i s m seems t o m e , i n t h i s t e x t , t o b e i n d i s ­
p u t a b l e a n d u n q u a h f i e d , I n e v e r t h e l e s s see h o w D e n i s M o r e a u c a n c k i m
t h a t A r n a u l d ' s T h o m i s m is occasionnel. 28
I n e s s e n c e , A r n a u l d is f a r from
foUowingThomas o n ah p o i n t s i n s p e c u l a t i v e q u e s t i o n s t h a t l i e o n t h e
border b e t w e e n metaphysics and theology. I f w e t u r n to Arnauld's cor­
r e s p o n d e n c e w i t h L e i b n i z , w e find h i m c r i t i c i z i n g t h e n o t i o n o f a p o s ­
s i b l e s u b s t a n c e . H e r e A r n a u l d i s , as E m a n u e l a Scribano has shown, 2 9

w o r k i n g w i t h a n o t i o n o f t h e p o s s i b l e t h a t is n o t p r o p e r l y C a r t e s i a n b u t
rather corresponds to an otherwise d o m i n a n t understanding o f the
t e r m , o n e t h a t is v e r y s i r n i l a r t o t h a t a d o p t e d b y D e s g a b e t s . I t c a n n o t b e

2 7
Arnauld, Textesphilosophiques,94..
2 8
'Justement parce qu'il est instrumental, ce thomisme n'est qu'occasionnel' (Deux
cartesiens, i66).Ifthisis the nature ofArnauld'sThomism,canonemeanwhileargue,asMoreau
does ekewhere, for'la possibikte d'une conünuite fortre entreThomas d'Aquin et Descartes'?
(See Arnauld, Textes philosophiques, xi.) The question remains open, and Moreau is righdy cau­
tious inhis assertion,speaking omy ofa'possibility'.Inmyview,Iwouldreplyinthe negative,
not only because theThomism ofthe Dissertatio seems to be far from Cartesian positions,but
also because, in Arnauld's most Cartesian work, Des vraies et des fausses idies, the Thomism of
chapter 13 is no longer exphcable in terms ofDescartes's metaphysics, as we can see by the fact
that the term 'idea' is taken in the non-Cartesian sense ofideas in mente divina.As he says,'ifwe
remove the word "we" ', Arnauld has expHcidy left the metaphysical domain of the mens
humana. He is now speaking ofanother domain, no longer philosophy but theology.
2 9
Scribano,'Le"spinozisme" d'Arnauld'.
 The Cartesianism ofDesgabets andArnauld 209

said t h a t i n t h i s c o r r e s p o n d e n c e A r n a u l d is w o r k i n g from Thomist

p o s i t i o n s i n his stance against L e i b n i z , as h e w i U u l t i m a t e l y d o i n his c o n ­
frontation w i t h H u y g e n s . I t is w o r t h n o t i n g , h o w e v e r , t h a t i t is H u y g e n s
w h o w r a p s r n m s e H m t h e a u t h o r i t y o f T h o m a s , a n d thus A r n a u l d ' s appeal
t o T h o m a s i n 1692 is d e m a n d e d b y t h e t e r m s o f t h e d e b a t e .
T h e m o s t d i f f i c u l t p r o b l e m stiU r e m a i n s , n a m e l y , d e t e r m i n i n g , o n t h e
basis o f A r n a u l d ' s e n t i r e ozuvre, w h e t h e r t h e r e is a g e n e r a l metaphysical
p o s i t i o n t h a t c a n b e i d e n t i f i e d , b e i t a stable o r e v o l v i n g o n e . B e t h a t as
i t m a y , i t seems t o m e h e r e a n d n o w t h a t , o n t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e c r e a t i o n
o f t h e e t e r n a l t r u t h s — a n d o n t h e basis o f t h e t e x t s t h a t h a v e b e e n e x a ­
m i n e d b y d i f f e r e n t i n t e r p r e t e r s — A r n a u k i ' s p o s i t i o n ( o r successive p o s i ­
tions) is n e v e r s t r i c d y a C a r t e s i a n o n e .
To conclude this e x a m i n a t i o n o f the positions o f Desgabets a n d
A r n a u l d w i t h r e s p e c t t o t h e C a r t e s i a n d o c t r i n e o f t h e free c r e a t i o n o f
t h e e t e r n a l t r u t h s , I w i U say t h a t A r n a u l d ' s ' C a r t e s i a n i s m ' is o n l y p a r t i a l ,
c a u t i o u s , a n d h i g h l y s e l e c t i v e . D e s c a r t e s is, f o r A r n a u l d , a p h i l o s o p h i c a l
aUy i n h i s c o n t r o v e r s i e s o v e r t h e v i s i o n i n G o d o f e t e r n a I t r u t h s , a n d t h e y
share a n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e u n i v o c i t y o f h u m a n a n d
d i v i n e k n o w l e d g e . B u t e v e n i f A r n a u l d abstains from a t t a c k i n g o r e v e n
c r i t i c i z i n g D e s c a r t e s , this does n o t m a k e h i m his disciple, a n d i n t h e texts
so f a r e x a m i n e d , h e w i U h a v e n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h e thesis o f 1630.
B y c o n t r a s t , D e s g a b e t s t h o r o u g h l y m a k e s Descartes's d o c t r i n e his o w n ,
a n d d o e s so i n a m o s t e x p h c i t a n d f a i t h f u l m a n n e r — e s p e c i a U y i n chapter 5
o f t h e Traite de l'indefectibilitS des creatures.And y e t , j u s t because o n e a d o p t s
t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e e t e r n a l t r u t h s , t h i s does n o t m a k e
one's m e t a p h y s i c s ' C a r t e s i a n ' . T h i s d o c t r i n e is n o t , f o r t h e L o r r a i n e
B e n e d i c t i n e ' s m e t a p h y s i c s , a f u n d a m e n t a l p r i n c i p l e , since h e uses i t o n l y
f o r i n t e g r a t i n g his arguments f o r the indefectibihty ofcreatures.Thus, this
i n d e f e c t i b i h t y , w h i c h c o n s t i t u t e s o n e o f t h e t w o o r t h r e e basic p r i n c i p l e s
o f D e s g a b e t s ' m e t a p h y s i c s , is t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f a c e r t a i n c o n c e p t i o n of
c r e a t i o n , o f s u b s t a n c e , a n d o f d u r a t i o n , aU v e r y d i f f e r e n t f r o m Descartes's.
M o r e o v e r , w h ü e h e e x p h c i d y a d o p t s t h e 1630 thesis, D e s g a b e t s , i n his
SuppUment a laphilosophie de MonsieurDescartes, takes e x c e p t i o n t o a h n o s t
aU o f t h e m e t a p h y s i c s o f t h e Meditations i n t h e n a m e o f p r i n c i p l e s t h a t are
n o t at aU C a r t e s i a n . I n t h i s way, t h e ' C a r t e s i a n i s m ' o f D e s g a b e t s appears
mtimately to be even m o r e problematic than that o f A r n a u l d .

Universite de Paris X-Nanterre

[Translated by Steven N a d l e r ]
 8
Hume and Hutcheson: The Question ofInfluence

DAVID БАТЕ NORTON

I. INTRODUCTION

O n e i m p o r t a n t aspect o f t h e c o n t i n u i n g a t t e m p t s t o d e l i n e a t e D a v i d
H u m e ' s p h i l o s o p h i c a l c h a r a c t e r has b e e n t h e e f f o r t t o c l a r i f y t h e r e l a ­
t i o n s h i p o f H u m e ' s v i e w s t o those o f h i s o l d e r c o n t e m p o r a r y Francis
H u t c h e s o n . T h r o u g h o u t t h e s e c o n d h a h " o f t h e past c e n t u r y c o m m e n t a ­
t o r s r o u t i n e l y c o n c l u d e d t h a t , at least e a r l y o n , H u m e was i n f l u e n c e d o r
s t i m u l a t e d b y t h e m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y o f H u t c h e s o n . T h e r e is g o o d e v i ­
d e n c e t h a t p r i o r t o t h e p u b h c a t i o n o f h i s f i r s t woik,ATreatise qfHuman
Nature (1739—40), H u m e was r e a s o n a b l y famihar w i t h Hutcheson's
Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue (1725), a n d p e r ­
h a p s also w i t h h i s Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and
Affections ( 1 7 2 8 ) . T h e r e h a v e also a p p e a r e d t o b e several s i g n i f i c a n t s i m i ­
l a r i t i e s b e t w e e n H u t c h e s o n ' s v i e w s a n d t h o s e o f H u m e . T h e s e facts l e d
N o r m a n K e m p S m i t h t o c o n c l u d e t h a t ' i t was u n d e r t h e d i r e c t i n f l u ­
e n c e o f F r a n c i s H u t c h e s o n t h a t [ H u m e ] was l e d t o r e c o g n i s e t h a t j u d g -
ments o f m o r a l approval a n d disapproval, a n d i n d e e d j u d g m e n t s ofvalue
o f w h a t e v e r t y p e , are b a s e d n o t o n r a t i o n a l i n s i g h t o r o n e v i d e n c e , b u t
s o l e l y o n f e e h n g ' . A n d , K e m p S m i t h , w e n t o n , w h a t o p e n e d u p 'a n e w
S c e n e o f T h o u g h t ' f o r H u m e was ' t h e d i s c o v e r y t h a t t h i s [ H u t c h e s o n i a n ]
p o i n t o f v i e w c o u l d be carried over i n t o the theoretical d o m a i n ' w h e r e
h e used i t t o solve p r o b l e m s raised b y L o c k e a n d Berkeley. K e m p S m i t h
m o d i f i e d h i s thesis, h o w e v e r , b y o b s e r v i n g t h a t H u m e d r e w c o n s e ­
quences from Hutcheson's philosophy that H u t c h e s o n h i m s e l f ' h a d
refused t o d r a w ' . 1

K e m p S m i t h ' s g e n e r a l p o i n t o f v i e w was e n d o r s e d b y D . D . R a p h a e l ,
w h o supposed t h a t ' H u t c h e s o n ' s t h e o r y a n d his attack o n ethical r a t i o n -
a h s m p r o v i d e d H u m e w i t h h i s i n i t i a l s t i m u l u s t o p h i l o s o p h y ' , so t h a t h i s

1
ThePhilosophy ofDavidHume ^ondon:MacnuUan, 1964), 1 2 - 1 3 , 2 0 .
212 David Fate Norton

p o s i t i o n i n e t h i c s is a ' d e v e l o p m e n t ' o f H u t c h e s o n ' s , w h i l e his t h e o r y o f

k n o w l e d g e makes ' w i d e r apphcation o f t h e moves H u t c h e s o n had made
i n ethics'. 2
Others, although supposing t h a t H u m e was i n d e b t e d to
H u t c h e s o n , h a v e d o u b t e d t h a t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p w a s as f a r - r e a c h i n g as
K e m p S m i t h supposed. I a g r e e d t h a t H u m e was d e e p l y i n f l u e n c e d b y
H u t c h e s o n , so t h a t , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e i r m o r a l e p i s t e m o l o g i e s are s i m i l a r
^ > o t h s u p p o s e t h a t m o r a l d i s t i n c t i o n s are k n o w n t h r o u g h d i s t i n c t i v e
m o r a l sentiments), b u t argued that H u m e d i d n o t uncritically apply
H u t c h e s o n ' s s e n t i m e n t a h s t m o r a l e p i s t e m o l o g y t o m e t a p h y s i c a l issues.
I also p o i n t e d o u t t h a t w h i l e p r o v i d e n t i a l d e s i g n a n d f i n a l causes p l a y a
s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n H u t c h e s o n ' s m o r a l t h e o r y , t h e s e e l e m e n t s are e n t i r e l y
a b s e n t f r o m H u m e ' s t h e o r y , a n d c o n c l u d e d , m o r e generaUy, t h a t w h U e
' H u m e is h k e H u t c h e s o n i n s o m e respects, [ h e is] n o t j u s t U k e h i m i n a n y
respect'. Stephen D a r w a U , w h U e supposing i t 'weU k n o w n that H u m e
3

t o o k s o m e o f t h e m a i n hnes o f his sentimentahst meta-ethic from

H u t c h e s o n ' s t h e o r y o f t h e m o r a l sense', u n d e r t o o k ' t o s h o w t h a t e l e ­
ments o f H u m e ' s m o r a l philosophy constitute a radical departure from
Hutcheson'. 4
M i c h a e l G i U has t a k e n a s i m U a r v i e w , s a y i n g t h a t ' t h e r e c a n
b e n o d o u b t t h a t H u m e d o e s t a k e o n b o a r d several c r u c i a l H u t c h e s o n i a n
elements', b u t then adding that 'Hutcheson's m o r a l theory, hke that o f
m o s t o f h i s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s , is g r o u n d e d i n a t h e o l o g i c a l c o n c e p t i o n of
h u m a n n a t u r e t o w h i c h H u m e is a d a m a n d y o p p o s e d ' . J e n n i f e r 5
Herdt
a r g u e s t h a t w h i l e ' H u m e a n d H u t c h e s o n are a U i e d i n t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n t o

2
'Hume'sCritiqueofEthicalRationahsm',inWB.Todd(ed.),HumeandtheEnligktenment
^ d i n b u r g h : Edinburgh University Press, 1 9 7 4 ) , 15.A. N . Prior had gone further, saying that
' T h e r e is htde or nothing i n Hume's moral philosophy that cannot be traced to Hutcheson,
but in H u m e it is аП more clear and pointed', (Logic and the Basis qf Ethics (Oxford: Q a r e n d o n
Press, 194g),31).
3
David Hume: Common-Sense Moralist, Sceptical Metaphysician [David Hume] QMnceton:
Princeton University Press, 1 9 8 2 ) , 9 3 , 5 3 — 4 , 5 9 , 9 5 , 1 3 2 , esp. 1 4 7 — 5 0 , 2 0 5 . See also my ' H u m e ,
Atheism, and the Autonomy o f Morals', i n M . Hester (ed.), Hume's Philosophy of Religion
fwmston-Salem:Wake Forest University Press, i 9 8 6 ) , 9 7 - i 4 4 . J a m e s Harris has recendy elabo­
rated o n this difference between Hutcheson (and such other Scottish moraUsts as H e n r y
H o m e (Lord Kames),Adam Smith, a n d T h o m a s R e i d ) and H u m e ; see his 'Answering Bayle's
Question: Religious B e l i e f in the Moral Philosophy o f the Scottish Enhghtenment'
[AnsweringBayle's Question], Oxford Studies in EaAy ModemPhilosophy 1(2003),229-53.
4
' H u m e and the Invendon ofUtUitarianism',inM.A. Stewart andJ.W. W r i g h t (eds.),HMmi
and Hume's Connexions (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1 9 9 4 ) , 58—82; at 5 9 - 6 0 ; see
ako, by the same author, The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought', 1640-1740 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 2 8 4 - 9 1 .
5
'FantastJckAssociations andAddictfve General R u l e s : A Fundamental Difference between
Hutcheson a n d H u m e ' ['FantastickAssociations'], HumeStudies22 (i996),23-48;at 23.
 Hume and Hutcheson 213

self-interested and rationaHst accounts o f morals, H u t c h e s o n ' s enter­

p r i s e i n d e f e n c e o f P r o v i d e n c e c o u l d scarcely have b e e n m o r e d i a m e t -
ricaUy o p p o s e d t o H u m e ' s a t t e m p t t o naturahze o r secularize m o r a h t y ' . 6

J a m e s M o o r e , i n a p r o v o c a t i v e a n d i n f l u e n t i a l p a p e r , has chaUenged
this consensus a n d c o n c l u d e d t h a t H u m e was n e i t h e r i n s p i r e d n o r i n f l u ­
e n c e d b y H u t c h e s o n . H a v i n g b e g u n h i s essay ' H u m e a n d H u t c h e s o n ' b y
suggesting some 'grounds for scepticism' regarding the claim that
' H u t c h e s o n exercised a f o r m a t i v e and lasting influence u p o n H u m e ' s
t h i n k i n g a n d w r i t i n g ' , M o o r e goes o n t o c o n c l u d e 'that H u m e ' s m o r a l
p h i l o s o p h y w a s n o t at aU H u t c h e s o n i a n i n o r i g i n o r i n s p i r a t i o n ' . 7
He
reaches this conclusion after, a m o n g other things: (1) suggesting
that Hume's contemporaries (four are mentioned) and unnamed
n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y s c h o l a r s , p r e s u m a b l y u n c o n c e r n e d w i t h s u c h issues
as n a t u r a h s m a n d m o r a l r e a h s m , saw t h a t H u m e ' s m o r a l p h U o s o p h y w a s
'basicaUy d i f f e r e n t ' f r o m H u t c h e s o n ' s ; (2) o f f e r i n g d e s c r i p t i o n s o f two
d i a m e t r i c a U y o p p o s e d p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , o n e o f w h i c h is said t o
h a v e h a d a d i s t i n c t i v e i n f l u e n c e o n H u t c h e s o n , t h e o t h e r o f w h i c h is s a i d
t o have had a distinctively different influence o n H u m e , w i t h the c o n ­
sequence that the t w o phUosophers differ o n the f u n d a m e n t a l m o r a l

6
Religion and Faction in Hume's Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
i997),58-
7
'Hume and Hutcheson', in Hume and Hume's Connexions, 23-57, 4 5.35—8,53.Those
a t 3 _

giving credence to Moore's account include John Robertson, who says that the prevaihng
view, that Hutcheson had a significant influence on Hume, is 'now very much in question'.'In
a particularly original contribution to recent scholarship on the Scottish EnHghtenment', he
writes, 'James Moore has argued that the rektion [of Hutcheson to Hume] was not one of
influence,but offundamental opposition'.Robertson goes on to summarize Moore's position
and the 'circumstantial and philosophical' evidence for it, and then to conclude from this 'rad­
ical reassessment of Hume's гекШоп to Hutcheson' that there are likely to be otherflawsin
standard accounts ofScottish moral philosophy. SeeJ. Robertson,'The Scottish Contribution
to the Erdightenment' ['Scottish Contribution'], in PaulWood (ed.), The Scottish Enlightenment:
Essays in Reinterpretation Rochester, NY: Rochester University Press, 2000), 3 7 ^ 2 , at 47. GÜ1
describes Moore's paper as 'an exceUent account ofthe relationship between Hutcheson and
Hume' ('FantastickAssociations', 39).Although he nicely shows that Hutcheson apparendy
did influence the style ofHume's later philosophical works (those in which Hume attempted
to combine the anatomistmetaphysicianwith the morahstpainter),MartinBeUispreparedto
grant that Moore has shown that Hutcheson did not,'nel modo che Kemp Smith e gU altri cre-
dettero' (did not 'as Kemp Smith and others beHeved'), have an influence on Hume's earUer
work. See Beu's 'Hume, Hutcheson e le due specie difilosofia',inA. Santucci (ed.), Filosqfia e
cultura nel Settecento britannko, 2 vols. fBologna: Societa editrice il Muhno, 2000), 11.167-79, at
179. See ako Harris,'Answering Bayle's Question', 230.As wül be seen, considerably more than
the question ofa historical rektionship is at issue here. Central to Moore's argument are a num­
ber ofwhat appear to be seriously mistaken claims about Hume's moral phüosophy.
214 David Fate Norton

p o s i t i o n s d e v e l o p e d b y H u m e i n B o o k 3 o f t h e Treatise; a n d ( 3 ) , o u t h n -
i n g w h a t are a U e g e d t o b e t h e d i a m e t r i c a U y d i f f e r e n t v i e w s o f t h e t w o
p h i l o s o p h e r s o n s u c h k e y m o r a l issues as t h e state o f n a t u r e , n a t u r a l
i n s t i n c t s , m o r a l m o t i v a t i o n , t h e m o r a l sense, a n d s y m p a t h y ( ' H u m e a n d
Hutcheson', 2 5 , 2 7 ^ , 3 3-5).
M o o r e ' s c o n c l u s i o n , t h a t H u m e ' s m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y w a s ' n o t at aU
H u t c h e s o n i a n i n o r i g i n o r inspiration', and thus that H u t c h e s o n c o u l d
n o t h a v e e x e r c i s e d 'a f o r m a t i v e a n d l a s t i n g i n f l u e n c e u p o n Hume's
t h i n k i n g a n d w r i t i n g ' , l o o k s t o b e m i s t a k e n o n t w o counts. I t clearly
o u t p a c e s t h e available e v i d e n c e , a n d i t a p p e a r s t o rest o n t h e m i s t a k e n
supposition that any phUosopher B i n f l u e n c e d b y another p h i l o s o p h e r
A m u s t b e h k e A i n aU s i g n i f i c a n t respects. O n e c a n g r a n t t h a t t h e r e are
i m p o r t a n t differences between the m o r a l theories o f H u t c h e s o n and
H u m e w i t h o u t being led to the conclusion that H u m e t o o k neither
i n s p i r a t i o n n o r ideas f r o m H u t c h e s o n , a n d t h a t o n e v e r y p o i n t o f c o n -
s e q u e n c e t h e i r m o r a l v i e w s are d i a m e t r i c a U y o p p o s e d . I n t h i s essay I
u n d e r t a k e t o s h o w t h a t t h e r e are s o u n d reasons f o r c o n c l u d i n g t h a t
H u m e ' s m o r a l t h e o r y w a s i n f l u e n c e d , i n a robust sense o f ' i n f l u e n c e ' , b y
that o f H u t c h e s o n . T o this e n d I reply, i n section 2 below, t o t h e a r g u ­
m e n t ( t h e exclusive-traditions argument, as i t m a y b e a p d y caUed) t h a t t h e
m o r a l theories o f H u t c h e s o n and H u m e derive f r o m t w o distinctively
different and diametricaUy opposed philosophical traditions, w i t h the
c o n s e q u e n c e t h a t these t w o p h i l o s o p h e r s m u s t necessarily have e n t i r e l y
d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n s o n aU ' t h e p r i n c i p a l t o p i c s a n d t h e m e s ' d e v e l o p e d b y
H u m e as p a r t o f t h e m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y o f t h e Treatise.This s e c t i o n I take
t o s h o w t h a t H u m e c o u l d h a v e b e e n i n f l u e n c e d b y H u t c h e s o n . I n sec­
t i o n 3 I r e v i e w w h a t H u m e h i m s e l f h a s t o say o n t h e m a t t e r o f h i s p h i l o ­
sophical debts t o H u t c h e s o n . T h i s section shows that H u m e was
i n f l u e n c e d b y H u t c h e s o n , b u t leaves o p e n m o s t q u e s t i o n s a b o u t t h e
nature o f that influence. I n section 4 I respond to Moore's claim that
H u m e ' s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s a n d n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y scholars t o o k H u m e ' s
m o r a l p h U o s o p h y t o b e f u n d a m e n t a U y d i f f e r e n t from H u t c h e s o n ' s . I d o
so b y p r o v i d i n g a s u r v e y , b r o a d e r a n d m o r e d e t a U e d t h a n M o o r e ' s , o f
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century o p i n i o n regarding the relationship
o f H u m e t o H u t c h e s o n . I n s e c t i o n 5 I discuss b r i e f l y t h e p o s i t i o n s t a k e n
b y H u t c h e s o n a n d H u m e o n s o m e o f t h e k e y m o r a l issues m e n t i o n e d
a b o v e ( t h e state o f n a t u r e , n a t u r a l i n s t i n c t s a n d m o r a l m o t i v a t i o n , a n d
sympathy, f o r example), p o i n t i n g o u t some o f t h e m a n y ways i n w h i c h
 Hume and Hutcheson 215

t h e i r p o s i t i o n s are s i m i l a r . I n t h e f i n a l p a r a g r a p h I r e f l e c t b r i e f l y o n t h e
significance o f t h e s e finchngs.
First, t h o u g h , a b r i e f w o r d about the concept ofinteUectual influence.
T h i s n o t i o n is d o u b t l e s s e l u s i v e , b u t a g e r m a n e a n d r o b u s t sense o f i t c a n
b e set o u t . W e c a n say t h a t H u m e w a s i n f l u e n c e d b y H u t c h e s o n , I s u b ­
m i t , i f t h e s e t w o c o n d i t i o n s are m e t :

(1) T h e r e is i n d i s p u t a b l e e v i d e n c e s h o w i n g t h a t H u m e k n e w the
w o r k o f H u t c h e s o n , a n d treated this w o r k w i t h respect. R e l e v a n t e v i ­
d e n c e o f t h i s s o r t m a y t a k e several f o r m s ( a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t , com­
mentary, or correspondence, for example),but must be distinct f r o m
the philosophical similarities m e n t i o n e d i n the f o l l o w i n g c o n d i t i o n .
(2) T h e r e are g o o d g r o u n d s f o r c o n c l u d i n g t h a t t h e r e are s i g n i f i c a n t
philosophical similarities b e t w e e n H u t c h e s o n a n d H u m e , i n c i r c u m ­
stances w h e r e i n o t h e r easily r e c o g n i z e d a l t e r n a t i v e v i e w s w e r e r e a d i l y
available t o H u m e at t h e same time a n d i n t h e same g e n e r a l p h i l o s o p h ­
ical cuIture. I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e r e m u s t b e g o o d g r o u n d s f o r saying t h a t
H u m e is m o r e h k e H u t c h e s o n t h a n h k e , say, t h o s e p h i l o s o p h e r s w h o
chaUenged Hutcheson's central doctrines o r w h o w e r e i n t u r n chal­
lenged b y H u t c h e s o n (Gübert B u r n e t o r J o h n Balguy, for example). 8

I n a d d i t i o n , t h e case f o r s a y i n g t h a t H u m e w a s i n f l u e n c e d b y H u t c h e s o n
w i U b e e n h a n c e d i f t h i s t h i r d c o n d i t i o n is m e t :

(3) T h e r e is i n d i s p u t a b l e e v i d e n c e that f u n d a m e n t a l sirmlarities

b e t w e e n H u t c h e s o n a n d H u m e w e r e observed b y a substantial n u m ­
ber ofthose contemporaries a n d near contemporaries w h o k n e w a n d
c o m m e n t e d o n the w o r k o f b o t h .

However, before presenting positive evidence showing that these

c o n d i t i o n s are m e t , l e t m e clear t h e g r o u n d b y s h o w i n g t h a t t h e e x c l u s i v e -
t r a d i t i o n s a r g u m e n t faUs, a n d t h u s t h a t H u m e c o u l d h a v e b e e n i n f l u e n c e d
by Hutcheson.

8
See Letters Between the Late Mr. Gilbert Burnet and Mr. Hutchinson fhrtcheson], concerning
the True Foundation of Virtue or Moral Goodness [Letters concerning the Foundation of Virtue]
fxmdon, 1735); andJohn Balguy, The Foundation of M o r a l Goodness, 2 voh. (London, 1728^p).
Saying that Humeftdfilsthis second condition is not, however, the equivalent ofsaying (a) that
there are no important philosophical differences between Hutcheson and Hume; φ) that
Hume was not also influenced by such other philosophers as John Locke orJoseph Buder;
(c), that both Hutcheson and Hume were not influenced by such philosophers as Cicero or
Shaftesbury; or (d), that Hume's philosophy is merely the product ofthe several and varied
influences on it.
2l6 David Fate Norton

2. T H E EXCLUSIVE-TRADITIONS A R G U M E N T

T h e e x c l u s i v e - t r a d i t i o n s a r g u m e n t p u t f o r w a r d ftjut n o t so n a m e d ) b y
M o o r e c a n b e q u i c k l y sketched. T h e a r g u m e n t b e g i n s w i t h t h e cLaim
t h a t t h e s u b s t a n t i v e features o f t h e m o r a l t h e o r i e s o f H u t c h e s o n a n d
H u m e derive f f o m t w o distinctively different a n d diametrically opposed
p h i l o s o p h i c a l t r a d i t i o n s , t h e Stoic a n d t h e E p i c u r e a n . I n practice, these
d i s t i n c t i v e d e r i v a t i o n s are t a k e n t o b e so c o m p l e t e a n d c o m p r e h e n s i v e
t h a t n o o t h e r sources o f t h e v i e w s o f t h e s e t w o p h i l o s o p h e r s need
be sought. Consequendy, the argument concludes, H u t c h e s o n and
H u m e m u s t necessarily have e n t i r e l y chfferent m o r a l t h e o r i e s — t h e y
m u s t n e c e s s a r i l y h a v e o p p o s i n g v i e w s o n aU t h e f u n d a m e n t a l features o f
m o r a l t h e o r y t o u c h e d o n i n t h e Treatise. A s M o o r e p u t s h i s case, t h e
' p r i n c i p a l t o p i c s a n d t h e m e s d e v e l o p e d b y H u m e i n Parts I I a n d I I I o f
B o o k I I I o f t h e Treatise d e r i v e f r o m [ t h e E p i c u r e a n ] t r a d i t i o n ' . I n c o n ­
trast, H u t c h e s o n is s a i d t o h a v e m o d e U e d h i s m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y o n t h a t
of t h e a n c i e n t S t o i c s , t o h a v e ahvays b e e n severely c r i t i c a l o f t h e
E p i c u r e a n s , a n d t o h a v e as a r e s u l t ' d i f f e r e d f f o m H u m e o n aU t h o s e m a t ­
ters w h i c h H u m e t o o k o v e r f f o m w r i t e r s i n t h e E p i c u r e a n t r a d i t i o n ' . 9

T h e success o f t h i s a r g u m e n t o b v i o u s l y d e p e n d s o n p r o v i d i n g c o m -
peUing accounts o f t h e t w o traditions involved, o f H u t c h e s o n ' s r e l a t i o n ­
ship t o t h e m o r a l p h U o s o p h y o f t h e Stoics, a n d o f H u m e ' s t o t h a t o f t h e
E p i c u r e a n s . T h e a c c o u n t i n q u e s t i o n faUs t o p r o v i d e t h e s e necessities.

A. Hutcheson, Cicero, and Stoicism

T h e e x c l u s i v e - t r a d i t i o n s a r g u m e n t m a y b e said t o b e g i n w i t h t h e c l a i m
that Hutcheson's m o r a l phUosophy was deeply i n d e b t e d t o t h e Stoicism
o f C i c e r o . H u t c h e s o n , M o o r e says,'took C i c e r o t o have b e e n a Stoic,
and p r e f e r r e d those w o r k s o f C i c e r o ' s i n w h i c h t h e Stoics h a d t h e b e t ­
ter o f the argument'. 1 0
We are n o t t o l d w h i c h works of Cicero
H u t c h e s o n preferred. I n m y o w n review o f Hutcheson's published
w o r k I have n o t f o u n d a n expression o f s u c h preferences. O n t h e c o n ­
t r a r y , H u t c h e s o n is o p e n I y a n d s h a r p l y c r i t i c a l o f S t o i c m o r a l t h e o r y .
I n t h e p r e f a c e t o h i s Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, Hutcheson
o b s e r v e s t h a t t h e ' d e s i g n o f C i c e r o ' s b o o k s de officiis . . . has b e e n m i s ­
t a k e n i n c o n s i d e r a t e l y b y s o m e v e r y i n g e n i o u s m e n , w h o speak o f t h e s e

' ' H u m e and Hutcheson', 2 7 , 3 4 . 1 0

ibid. 2 6 .
 Hume and Hutcheson 217

b o o k s as i n t e n d e d f o r a c o m p l e a t s y s t e m o f m o r a k o r e t h i c k s ' , a n d t h i s
d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t C i c e r o ' e x p r e s l y declares, t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e con­
c e r n i n g virtue, a n d t h e supreme good, w h i c h is t h e p r i n c i p a l p a r t of
e t h i c k s , is t o b e f o u n d e l s e w h e r e ' — i n , precisely, t w o o f h i s o w n w o r k s ,
Definibus a n d Tusculan Disputations.Kccorain% to Hutcheson, Cicero
also tehs us t h a t i n De officiis h e ' f o U o w s t h e Stoicks, a n d uses t h e i r w a y o f
t r e a t i n g ' t h e s u b j e c t o f t h i s w o r k (offices o r duties),but w i t h a significantiy
restricted a i m i n view:

N o w 'tis weU k n o w n that the Stoicks made such difference b e t w e e n virtue,

w h i c h they c o u n t e d t h e sole g o o d , a n d the officia, o r external duties ofUfe, that
they c o u n t e d these duties a m o n g the things indifferent, neither moraUy g o o d n o r
evil. T h e design t h e n o f these b o o k s de officiis is this; t o shew h o w persons i n
h i g h e r stations, aheady weU i n s t r u c t e d i n the fundamentals o f m o r a l phUosophy,
s h o u l d so c o n d u c t themselves i n life, that i n perfect consistence w i t h v i r t u e t h e y
may o b t a i n great interest, power, popularity, h i g h offices and glory. (Short
/nfro,pp.ii-iii) 1 1

I n t h e m e a n t i m e , H u t c h e s o n i n a f o o t n o t e has said:

'tis manifest to any w h o read the books definibus and the Tusculan questions, that the
fundamental doctrine ofmorals is copiously deHvered i n t h e m , and presupposed i n
the books oide officiis, and passed over i n a section or t w o . (Short Intro, p. ii)

The relevance o f H u t c h e s o n ' s references t o De finibus and the

Tusculan Disputations w i U n o t be lost o n those f a m i l i a r w i t h Cicero's
assessments o f S t o i c i s m i n these t w o w o r k s . I n t h e l a t t e r , S t o i c analyses
o r c o n c l u s i o n s are o c c a s i o n a U y a c c e p t e d , b u t s o m e are also r e j e c t e d as
foohsh and irrelevant, whUe t h e debts t h e Stoics o w e to Plato and
A r i s t o d e f o r m o s t o f w h a t is v a l u a b l e i n t h e i r t h e o r y are e m p h a s i z e d . 1 2

11
T h i s volume is a posthumously pubhshed translation ofHutchesou's Philosophiae Moralis
Institutio Compendiaria, 2nd edn. (Glasgow, [1745]).As Moore has pointed out i n another paper,
Hutcheson's remarks about De officiis were added to this second edition; see ' T h e T w o Systems
ofFrancis Hutcheson' ['Two Systems'], in M . A . Stewart (ed.), Studies in the Philosophy of the
Scottish Enlightenment, Oxford Studies in the History of Philosophy [OSHP], 1 ( 1 9 9 0 ) , 37—59, at 5 6 .
T h e remarks in question may have been a part ofHutcheson's response to the moral philoso­
phy ofthe Treatise, for H u m e informed Hutcheson that his 'Catalogue ofVirtues' came from
Cicero's De officiis; see L D H i . 34.
1 2
J. G . F. Poweu says that while C i c e r o 'can on occasion sound Hke a dogmatic Stoic', two
observations need to be made. First, sometimes Cicero is 'dekberately arguing fbr a Stoic view as
a rhetorical exercise, as most notably i n the Paradoxa [Sfom>rwm];this should not be taken i n any
sense to represent Cicero's o w n v i e w ' . Second,'there are many constituents ofactual Stoicism
w h i c h C i c e r o argues against at various points i n his philosophical works, as most notably i n
Fin. 4 [Definibus 4 ] ; the fact that he found some Stoic ideas congenial does not imply that he
2l8 David Fate Norton

Clearly, t h e Stoics d o n o t have the 'better o f t h e a r g u m e n t ' i n this w o r k .

T h e s a m e c o n c l u s i o n h o l d s f o r Definibus.The Stoic position, presented
i n B o o k 3 o f t h i s w o r k b y a s y m p a t h e t i c i n t e r l o c u t o r , M . C a t o , is i n
B o o k 4 s u b j e c t e d t o severe c r i t i c i s m . T h e r e , s p e a k i n g t h r o u g h a p e r s o n a
b e a r i n g h i s o w n n a m e , C i c e r o r e p e a t e d l y difFers w i t h t h e S t o i c s o n s u b ­
s t a n t i v e issues. H e c h a U e n g e s , f o r e x a m p l e , t h e S t o i c c l a i m t h a t t h e o r d y
g o o d is m o r a l w o r t h a n d t h a t t h i s c h i e f g o o d is d i s t i n c t f f o m n a t u r a l
motives o f a c t i o n . 1 3
Cicero's arguments i n support ofthese chaUenges
are p o i n t e d . B e g i n n i n g w i t h t h e c l a i m t h a t t h e v a l u a b l e aspects o f
S t o i c i s m d e r i v e f f o m P l a t o , A r i s t o d e , a n d t h e i r f o U o w e r s (Defin. 4.3—44),
h e goes o n t o n o t e t h e i n t o l e r a b l e a n d u n p r o d u c t i v e n o v e l t y o f Z e n o ' s
m o r a l v o c a b u l a r y (Defin. 4.20, 22, 74), and t h e n t o characterize Stoic
a r g u m e n t s as s t u p i d , r i d i c u l o u s , a n d i n c o n s i s t e n t , s a y i n g t h a t t h e y r e a c h
c o n c l u s i o n s 'so false t h e p r e m i s e s f r o m w h i c h t h e y s p r a n g c a n n o t b e t r u e '
a n d t h a t v i o l a t e c o m m o n sense (Defin. 4.50,54,64,72).More generaUy,
t h e m o r a l p h U o s o p h y o f t h e S t o i c s is t o o r e m o t e f f o m l i f e as i t is U v e d .
I n c o n t r a s t , f o r e x a m p l e , t o t h e P e r i p a t e t i c s w h o h a d p r o d u c e d a vast h t -
e r a t u r e o n p o h t i c s a n d j u r i s p r u d e n c e , t h e Stoics s h o w ( t o use H u t c h e s o n ' s
l a n g u a g e ) a b c k o f w a r m t h i n t h e cause o f v i r t u e . T h e y h a v e n o t q u i t e
1 4

i g n o r e d these t o p i c s . T h e y d i d m a k e t h e p o h t i c a l c l a i m t h a t t h e universe
is e v e r y o n e ' s t o w n . B u t t o m a k e t h i s p o i n t e f f e c t i v e l y , C i c e r o says, t h e
Stoic ' m u s t rouse his audience t o enthusiasm. W h a t ? a Stoic rouse
e n t h u s i a s m ? H e is m u c h m o r e h k e l y t o e x t i n g u i s h ' i t (Defin. 4.7).And
again:

F o r m y o w n p a r t , as regards aU these Stoic syUogisms, I s h o u l d have t h o u g h t that

t o be w o r t h y o f p h U o s o p h y a n d ofourselves, p a r t i c u l a r l y w h e n the subject o f
o u r i n q u i r y is the Supreme G o o d , the a r g u m e n t o u g h t t o a m e n d o u r hves, p u r ­
poses a n d wiUs, n o t j u s t c o r r e c t o u r terrrrinology. C o u l d those concise and
p o i n t e d arguments w h i c h y o u say y o u deUght i n possibly make any m a n alter

accepted the system wholesale' ('Introduction: Cicero's Philosophical Works and their
B a c k g r o u n d ' , i n J . G . F. PoweU (ed.), Cicero the Philosopher (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 9 9 5 ) ,
1—35, at 2 2 ) . See also J . Annas, ' C i c e r o o n Stoics and Private Property', i n M . G r i f E n and
J . Barnes (eds.), Philosophia Togata: Essays on Philosophy and Roman Society (Oxford: Q a r e n d o n
Press, 1 9 8 9 ) , 151^73,at 172.

1 3
T h e Stoics forget, C i c e r o says, that the 'instinct ofappetition' is wide-ranging, an instinct
that draws us to a wide range ofthings: from external goods or health right o n to 'ultimate
Ends'; see Definibus bonorum et malorum [Defin.], trans. H . R a c k h a m (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1 9 8 3 ) , 4 . 4 2 ; cf. 4 . 2 5 ^ 7 , 3 7 , 4 3 , 4 6 , 7 1 .
1 4
Hutcheson observed that the draft o f B o o k 3 o f Hume's Treatise wanted 'a certain
Warmth in the Cause ofVirtue';see L D H i . 3 2 .
 Hume and Hutcheson 219

his opinions? H e r e are people aU agog t o learn w h y p a i n is n o evil; and the Stoics
teU t h e m that t h o u g h p a i n is irksome, a n n o y i n g , hateful, u n n a t u r a l a n d h a r d t o
bear, i t is n o t an e v i l , because i t involves n o dishonesty, wickedness or malice, n o
m o r a l blame o r baseness. H e w h o hears this may o r may n o t w a n t t o laugh, b u t
he w ü l n o t go away any stronger t o endure p a i n t h a n he came. (Defin. 4.52)

C i c e r o does n o t , i n s h o r t , g i v e t h e S t o i c t h e b e t t e r o f t h e a r g u m e n t i n
any o f h i s three w o r k s that focus o n m o r a l theory.
M o r e o v e r , H u t c h e s o n himseh% H k e C i c e r o , f o u n d S t o i c m o r a l t h e o r y
i m p l a u s i b l e a n d r e j e c t e d at least t h e f o U o w i n g f u n d a m e n t a l S t o i c t e n e t s :

ι. Thefirst and mostJundamental human motivation is setf-love.As is t y p i ­

cal o f h i s s c h o o l , t h e S t o i c o(Definibus 3 argues t h a t ' l o v e o f s e l f . . . s u p -
phes the p r i m a r y i m p u l s e t o a c t i o n ' , a n d that t h e first'appropriate act'is
t o p r e s e r v e o n e s e l f . I n t h e f o U o w i n g b o o k , C i c e r o says t h a t t h e S t o i c s
t o o k s e F - p r e s e r v a t i o n t o b e t h e first a i m o f ' e v e r y n a t u r a l o r g a n i s m ' ,
h u m a n o r g a n i s m s i n c l u d e d (De fin. 3 . 1 t > - 1 7 , 2 0 ; 4 . 1 6 ) . 1 5
Hutcheson in
contrast claims that h u m a n s have a n instinctive t e n d e n c y t o b e n e v o ­
l e n c e , a n d t h a t t h e g r e a t e s t m o m e n t o r q u a n t i t y o f g o o d is p r o d u c e d b y
a n a c t i o n t h a t is m o t i v a t e d , i n t h e f a c e o f t h e m a x i m u m adversity, b y n o
l o v e o f o r c o n c e r n f o r t h e seh". 16

2. The passions are unnatural and are to be suppressed.The Stoics, w h o

m a i n t a i n e d that one s h o u l d live according t o nature, recognized f o u r
k i n d s o f p a s s i o n , s o r r o w , fear, l u s t , a n d p l e a s u r e o r e l a t i o n o f t h e m i n d ,
n o n e o f w h i c h is ' e x c i t e d b y a n y i n f l u e n c e o f n a t u r e ; t h e y are aU o f t h e m
m e r e fancies a n d frivolous o p i n i o n s ' (Defin. 3.35).This attitude t o w a r d
t h e passions l e d s o m e Stoics t o a d o p t , H u t c h e s o n says, 'a v e r y f a n t a s t i c k
S c h e m e o f V i r t u e , w h i c h represents i t as zprivate sublimely selfish Discipline'.
A n d , h e c o n t i n u e s , t h e w i s e a n d v i r t u o u s , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e S t o i c s , are
r i g h d y said t o b e ' w h o U y unconcerned' n o t only about their own

15
F o r more o n the Stoic view that self-love is the primary instinct' ofaU creatures, humans
included, see M . R . W r i g h t , 'Cicero o n Seff-Love and Love o f H u m a n i t y i n De Finibus 3'
['Cicero on Self-Love'],in Cicero the Philosopher, 171^>s;and Cicero on Stoic GoodandEvil:Oe
Finibus B o n o r u m et M a l o r u m Liber I i i and Paradoxa Stoicorum, ed. and trans. M . R . W r i g h t
^Varminster:Aris & PhUhps, 1991).Also helpful on these issues is A . A . Long,'Stoicism i n the
PhilosophicalTradition: Spinoza,Lipsius,Buder' ['Stoicism'],inJ. МШег and B . Inwood (eds.),
Hellenistic and Early Modern Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2 0 0 3 ) , 7 - 2 9 ,
at21.
1 6
/И4ШГУ2.3.11—12 (i.e.Treadse 2,ch.3,sects. ii-i2).TheIneMirywasfirstpublishedin 1725,
and Hutcheson's moral calculus is most obvious in that and the second (1726) editions o f
the work, but there are more than vestigial remains in the fourth and final edition o f 1738, the
edition cited here.
220 David Fate Norton

h e a l t h , h b e r t y , o r w e a l t h , b u t also a b o u t t h e w e U - b e i n g o f t h e i r d e a r e s t

friends or country. I n m a r k e d contrast, H u t c h e s o n supposes t h a t our

passions o r affections are n a t u r a l , a c o m p o n e n t of our providentiaUy

designed nature, and f u r t h e r m o r e , that some o f t h e m , notably b e n e v o ­

lence, pity, o r compassion,for e x a m p l e , are v i r t u o u s . 1 7

'TrueVirtue', he

says, is a n 'affectionate Temper', n o t t h e 'undisturbed Selfishness', ofthose

' b o a s t i n g Refiners u p o n V i r t u e ' , t h e Stoics. 1 8

3. Virtue isfound in only one complete orperfectform.Accordhig to the

S t o i c s , v i r t u e is a b s o l u t e . I f o b t a i n e d , i t is c o m p l e t e and unvarying;

' G o o d n e s s is a b s o l u t e , a n d is n o t a q u e s t i o n o f d e g r e e ' (Defin. 3.34;

see also 4 . 2 1 , 6 6 ^ 7 , 7 1 , 7 5 ) . H u t c h e s o n i n contrast beHeved v i r t u e t o

c o m e i n degrees a n d e v e n d e v e l o p e d a sophisticated m o r a l calculus f o r

' c o m p a r i n g t h e moral Qualitys o f A c t i o n s ' t o d e t e r r n i n e t h e 'Moment' of

a n agent's g o o d o r v i r t u e . T h i s c a l c u l u s s h o w s t h a t h e s u p p o s e d t h a t t h e

m o m e n t o f v i r t u e f o r any g i v e n agent w i U v a r y f r o m time to time, and

t h a t t h e r e w i U a b o b e v a r i a t i o n s b e t w e e n agents. I n a d d i t i o n , w h U e the

S t o i c s d e n i e d t h a t d u r a t i o n is a r e l e v a n t f e a t u r e o f v i r t u e , H u t c h e s o n s a i d

t h a t ' Virtue is i n p r o p o r t i o n t o t h e Number o f Persons t o w h o m the

H a p p i n e s s shaU e x t e n d ' o v e r , p r e s u m a b l y , t i m e a n d p l a c e (Inquiry 2.3.8).

1 7
M . A . Stewart, discussing Stoic elements i n early eighteenth-century Scottish moralists,
observed ofHutcheson: 'Not even his particular psychology ofthe passions is Stoic . . . T h e
passions, in Hutcheson, are as integral to happiness and right action as to unhappiness and
wrong action; and his cardinal concept ofbenevolence, whatever limited role one might find
for it i n MarcusAurelius, hardly looms k r g e i n the classical literature' ('The Stoic Legacy i n the
Early Scottish EnHghtenment',in M . J . Osler (ed.),Pneuma,Atoms, andTranquillity (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1 9 9 1 ) , 2 7 3 ^ 6 , at 2 9 0 ) . I n an analogous discussion ofJoseph
Buder,A.A. L o n g points out that whfle B u d e r was influenced by the ancient Stoics, his moral
theory is distinct from Stoicism because he 'takes the Stoic ideal ofcomplete freedom from
passion to be inappropriate'.As Buder put it i n the fifth o f t h e Sermons preached at R o U s
Chapel:'Reason alone,whatever a n y o n e m a y w i s h , i s notinreahtysufficientmotive ofvirtue
i n such a creature as man.' L o n g also notes that Butler differs from the Stoics insofar as he 'does
not identify virtue w i t h happiness';the same may also be said ofHutcheson ('Stoicism',23).
1 8
Essay 1.4.5 (i.e.Treatise i , c h . 4 , sect. 5 ) . Hutcheson took such'Mistakes' to characterize
'the lower rate ofPhilosophers o f t h e Stoick Sed', or more precisely, the Stoic interlocutors
found i n Cicero's writings (Essay 1.4.5; cf. Short Intro 1 . 6 . 3 ) , and apparendy thought more
highly o f a later Stoic,MarcusAureHus.Atleast he cooperatedwith a coHeague,James Moor,
i n a translation, The Meditations qf Emperor Marcus AureIius Antoninus (Glasgow, 1 7 4 2 ) . F o r his
part, H u m e found even the 'philosophy' ofsuch later Stoics as Epictetus 'onry a more refined
system o f serfishness' ( E H U 5.1; see also EPM, App. 4 . 1 4 ) . A d a m Smith, w h o had been
Hutcheson's student at the University ofGfosgow, also complained that the 'soft, the amiable,
the gende virtues', are 'by the Stoics i n particular. . . often regarded as mere weaknesses
w h i c h it behoved a wise man not to harbour i n his breast' (The Theory qf Moral Sentiments,
ed.D.D.RaphaelandA.L.Macfie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 9 7 6 ) , 7 . 2 . 4 . 2 ) .
 Hume and Hutcheson 221

4. Moral distinctions or qualities are known by reason. C i c e r o r e p r e s e n t s

t h e S t o i c s as r n a i n t a i n i n g t h a t m a n , ' b y e x e r c i s e o f i n t e U i g e n c e a n d r e a ­
son infers' the correct conclusion regarding'the C h i e f G o o d o f m a n , the
t h i n g t h a t is p r a i s e w o r t h y a n d d e s i r a b l e f o r its o w n sake', a n d t h a t t h i s
' e x e r c i s e ' is a ' s u b s e q u e n t d e v e l o p m e n t ' , a s k i U o r a b i l i t y t h a t o n l y a n
e h t e f e w are a b l e t o d e v e l o p (De fin. 3.21). H u t c h e s o n argues t h a t
P r o v i d e n c e has f o r e s e e n t h a t r e a s o n is t o o s l o w a n d u n c e r t a i n t o g i v e us
m o r a l d i r e c t i o n o r d i s c e r n m e n t , a n d t h a t t h e m o r a l sense, t h e f a c u l t y
t h a t d o e s g i v e us s u c h d i r e c t i o n , is as w i d e l y d i s t r i b u t e d as t h e e x t e r n a l
senses: ' N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e m i g h t y Reason w e boast o f above o t h e r
A n i m a l s , its Processes are t o o s l o w , t o o f u U o f D o u b t a n d H e s i t a t i o n , t o
s e r v e us i n e v e r y E x i g e n c y , e i t h e r f o r o u r o w n P r e s e r v a t i o n , w i t h o u t t h e
external Senses, o r t o i n f l u e n c e o u r A c t i o n s f o r t h e Good o f the Whole,
w i t h o u t t h i s moral Sense' (Inquiry 2.7.3).
5. Suicide is morally acceptable.The Stoics m a i n t a i n e d that suicide m a y
b e t h e ' a p p r o p r i a t e ' o r m o r a U y c o r r e c t a c t i o n : ' W h e n a man's c i r c u m ­
stances c o n t a i n a p r e p o n d e r a n c e o f t h i n g s i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h n a t u r e , i t
is a p p r o p r i a t e f o r h i m t o r e m a i n a h v e ; w h e n h e possesses o r sees i n
p r o s p e c t a m a j o r i t y o f c o n t r a r y t h i n g s , i t is a p p r o p r i a t e f o r h i m t o d e p a r t
f f o m Hfe'.This means that suicide m a y even be the appropriate action
f o r t h e t r u l y h a p p y a n d v i r t u o u s W i s e M a n (Defin. 3.60). H u t c h e s o n , a
Ucensed Presbyterian minister, d i d n o t b r i n g h i m s e l f t o m a k e exphcit
r e f e r e n c e t o s u i c i d e . H e d i d , h o w e v e r , say t h a t r e m e m b e r i n g ' t h e s h o r t ­
ness o f h f e , w i U e q u a U y e n a b l e t h e s o u l t o b e a r o r despise a d v e r s i t y ' , a n d
t h a t w h e n ' a n y g o o d m a n is t h r e a t n e d w i t h g r e a t d a n g e r s ' i t is 'his b u s i ­
ness t o rouse u p aU t h e f o r c e s o f f o r t i t u d e a n d p a t i e n c e a n d r e s i g n a t i o n ,
t o recoUect t h e sacred laws o f t h e s e v i r t u e s , w h i c h p r o h i b i t effeminate
weakness, p r o h i b i t o u r s i n k i n g o r l o s i n g spirit, o r c r o u c h i n g u n d e r this
l o a d ' (Short Intro 1.6.2, r . 7 . 2 ; cf. System 2.4.5). 19

T h i s b r i e f r e v i e w is n o t i n t e n d e d t o estabhsh t h a t H u t c h e s o n was i n
n o w a y i n f l u e n c e d b y the Stoic v i e w s he f o u n d represented i n Cicero's
w o r k s . H u t c h e s o n r e a d these w o r k s a n d m a y h a v e f o u n d i n t h e m S t o i c
elements w h i c h c o u l d be assimÜated t o his o w n m o r a l t h e o r y . B u t
H u t c h e s o n ' s m o r a l t h e o r y , v i e w e d as a n efFect,is n o t t h e o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l

1 9
L o n g acknowledges that'early Christianity appropriated a great deal ofStoic ethics w i t h ­
out acknowledgement', so that 'Stoicism is a part. . . ofthe Christian tradition', but he then
emphasizes that some Stoic doctrines,'such as the identification o f G o d with fire and the denial
ofthe soul's immortahty,were anathema to the early Fathers ofthe church';see'Stoicism', 8.
222 David Fate Norton

r e s u l t o f a s i n g l e c a u s e , w h i l e h i s d e b t s t o S t o i c i s m a p p e a r t o b e less t h a n
his coUective debts t o others. H u t c h e s o n d r e w substantiaUy on the
moral philosophy ofAristode, the m o r a l psychology o f Malebranche,
a n d the eclectic views ofShaftesbury. 2 0
H i s m o r a l t h e o r y is b y n o m e a n s
a s i m p l e n e o - S t o i c t h e o r y w h i c h is n e c e s s a r U y a n d i n aU respects h o s t i l e
to every fundamental element o f t h e m o r a l phUosophy o f H u m e , and
especiaUy as i t c a n a k o b e s h o w n t h a t H u m e as m o r a h s t is b y n o m e a n s
a simple neo-Epicurean.

B. Hume and the Epicurean moral tradition

I n saying that ' H u m e d r e w u p o n o r a p p r o p r i a t e d o r t o o k over t h e

insights o f a particular t r a d i t i o n o f m o r a l phUosophy . . . the t r a d i t i o n o f
t h e E p i c u r e a n s ' , M o o r e is c a r e f u l t o disassociate H u m e f f o m t h a t c o m ­
m o n p l a c e c a r i c a t u r e o f t h e E p i c u r e a n as n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a l o v e r o f
s e n s u a l p l e a s u r e . H e associates H u m e w i t h , r a t h e r , a g r o u p o f d i s t i n ­
guished w r i t e r s : E p i c u r u s , Lucretius, H o r a c e , H o b b e s , Gassendi, Bayle,
a n d Saint E v r e m o n d . 2 1
T h e p r i n c i p a l characteristics o f this t r a d i t i o n
f o u n d i n B o o k 3 o f t h e Treatise a r e , M o o r e says,

(a) the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n j u s t i c e and the natural virtues; φ ) the state o f n a t u r e ;

(c) [the v i e w that society began w i t h ] the c o n v e n t i o n t o abstain from the pos­
sessions o f o t h e r s ; (d) the a r g u m e n t that virtues are approved because o f t h e i r
usefulness and agreeableness; (e) the idea that sympathy reinforces o u r approval
o f q u a l i t i e s w h i c h are useful and agreeable. ( ' H u m e and H u t c h e s o n ' , 27)

I shaU f o r t h e sake o f t h e p r e s e n t d i s c u s s i o n g r a n t t h a t t h e s e are f i v e

features o f a n a u t h e n t i c t r a d i t i o n o f E p i c u r e a n m o r a l t h e o r y . B u t i t is
essential t o ask t w o q u e s t i o n s . Is i t o n l y E p i c u r e a n m o r a l t h e o r i e s t h a t

2 0
O f classical philosophers, Plato aud Aristotle, and Cicero in non-Stoic modes, are the
most frequendy cited i n Hutcheson's Inquiry and Essay.The most often cited classical author,
by a wide margin, is Horace, 'one o f the great Epicurean moraHsts o f antiquity', as M o o r e
describes h i m ('Hume and Hutcheson', 27). Shaftesbury, whose views are defended i n the
Inquiry, isfrequendy citedthere. I n t h e Essay (see 1.3),Hutcheson uses MaIebranche's account
ofthe passions in preference to that ofthe Stoics.
2 1
Saint E v r e m o n d , w h o said'that ofaU Opinions ofPhilosophers concerning the sovereign
G o o d , none appears to me so rational' as that o f Epicurus, counted Pierre Gassendi and
Franfois Bernier among the Christian Epicureans; see The Letters of Saint Evremond,
ed.J. Hayward pLondon: Roudedge, 1930), 274—5. F o r the views ofGassendi and Bernier,
see Three EHscourses, OfHappiness, Virtue, and Liberty (London, 1699),a trans, ofvol. 7 ofBernier,
Abrege de la philosophie de Gassendi; and J . B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 264^71.
 Hume and Hutcheson 223

incorporate t h e s e features? A n d has M o o r e a c c u r a t e l y d e s c r i b e d t h e

v i e w s f o u n d i n t h e Treatise?The a n s w e r s t o t h e s e q u e s t i o n s are n e g a t i v e ,
a n d t h u s t h e s e c o n d p a r t o f t h e e x c l u s i v e - t r a d i t i o n s a r g u m e n t also fails.
Consider: 2 2

(a) The distinction betu>eenjustice and the natural virtues. H u m e ' s d i s t i n c ­

tion b e t w e e n t h e n a t u r a l a n d t h e a r t i f i c i a l v i r t u e s is c o m p l e x , d e s e r v i n g
a f u U e r t r e a t m e n t t h a n c a n b e g i v e n h e r e . B u t i t is clear t h a t i n m a k i n g
the d i s t i n c t i o n he highhghts the difference b e t w e e n w h a t m i g h t n o w be
c a U e d first- a n d s e c o n d - o r d e r f o r m s o f b e h a v i o u r . T h e r e l e v a n t first-
order forms o f behaviour are b o t h i n s t i n c t i v e ( t h e y d e r i v e , w i t h o u t
m e d i a t i o n , f r o m c e r t a i n i n h e r e n t d i s p o s i t i o n s ) , a n d also necessary i n
e v e n t h e smaUest i m a g i n a b l e , c o h e s i v e h u m a n g r o u p , a f a m i l y c o n s i s t i n g
o f t w o p a r e n t s a n d t h e i r c h i l d r e n . P a r e n t a l a f f e c t i o n is a n o b v i o u s e x a m ­
p l e o f s u c h i n s t i n c t i v e b e h a v i o u r . Parents s p o n t a n e o u s l y a n d disinteres­
tedly love their chüdren, a n d because t h e y typicaUy do this, such
' a f f e c t i o n ' o r its m a m f e s t a t i o n s is ' n a t u r a l ' , a n d , b e c a u s e t h i s a f f e c t i o n is
u n i v e r s a h y a p p r o v e d b y t h e m o r a l sense, i t is also a ' n a t u r a l v i r t u e ' . T h e
relevant s e c o n d - o r d e r f o r m s o f b e h a v i o u r p i g g y - b a c k o n these first-
o r d e r f o r m s . T h e y d e v e l o p o n l y after t h e first-order f o r m s have b r o u g h t
a b o u t essential p r e - c o n d i t i o n s . T h e rules o f j u s t i c e ( t h e rales r e g a r d i n g
private property) are one such developed f o r m o f behaviour, and
b e c a u s e t h e y are H u m e s p o k e o f j u s t i c e as a n ' a r t i f i c i a l v i r t u e ' . B u t as h e
e x p l a i n e d i n t h e Treatise p e r h a p s i n r e s p o n s e t o a n o b j e c t i o n r a i s e d b y
H u t c h e s o n ) , h e d i d n o t b y t h i s t e r m i n o l o g y i n t e n d t o suggest t h a t t h e
r u l e s o f p r o p e r t y are n o t i n a n i m p o r t a n t sense n a t u r a l :

T o avoid g i v i n g offence, I must here observe, that w h e n I d e n y j u s t i c e t o be a

natural v i r t u e , 1 make use o f t h e w o r d , natural, o n l y as opposed t o artificial. I n
another sense o f t h e w o r d ; as n o p r i n c i p l e o f t h e h u m a n m i n d is m o r e natural
t h a n a sense o f v i r t u e ; so n o v i r t u e is m o r e natural thanjustice. M a n k i n d is an
inventive species; a n d w h e r e an i n v e n t i o n is obvious and absolutely necessary, i t
may as p r o p e r l y be said t o be natural as any t h i n g that proceeds i m m e d i a t e l y
from o r i g i n a l principles, w i t h o u t the i n t e r v e n t i o n o f t h o u g h t or reflection.

2 2
I n the interests ofbrevity, I here expHcitly discuss only (a) and φ), but I discuss (e), the role
of sympathy, in Sect. 5 below. Also, because i n making the claim that H u m e is an Epicurean
Moore discusses only the Treatise, I shaH only note i n passing that i n his Enquiry concerning the
Principles ofMorals H u m e is sharply and exphcidy critical o f the Epicureans @3picurus,Atticus,
Horace) and Hobbists (Hobbes and Locke); see E P M , app. 2.Because it is possible, however
unhkely, that the moral theory ofthe Uter Enquiry is o n this matter fundamentaUy unhke that
ofthe Treatise, I wül not use the k t e r work as evidence ofthe position taken i n the earher one.
224 David Fate Norton

T h o ' t h e rules ofjustice be artifirial,they are n o t arbitrary. (THN3.2.1.19;see

also 3.2.1.1,3.3.6.4-5)

I n s h o r t , H u m e i n t h e Treatise s a w t h e v i r t u e s as c o m i n g i n t o b e i n g i n
t w o stages. H e gave p r i d e o f p k c e t o v i r t u e s o f t h e first o r d e r b y c a U i n g
t h e m ' n a t u r a l v i r t u e s ' . H e t h e n , n o d o u b t i n v i t i n g m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g , gave
t h e n a m e ' a r t i f i c i a l v i r t u e s ' t o w h a t h e t o o k t o b e t h e e q u a U y necessary
second-order virtues.
This account ofvirtue—specificaUy Hume's account ofjustice—is
said t o m i m i c E p i c u r e a n v i e w s . B u t even i f w e g r a n t t h a t t h e E p i c u r e a n s
d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n j u s t i c e a n d t h e n a t u r a l v i r t u e s , t h i s c l a i m is o n l y
partiaUy correct. O n M o o r e ' s account o f t h e Epicureans i t foUows that
t h e y are u n h k e H u m e b e c a u s e t h e y s u p p o s e t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s h a v e n o
o r i g i n a l , self-interested m o t i v a t i o n t o j u s t i c e . T h e y s u p p o s e that 'some
v i r t u e s ( w i s d o m , t e m p e r a n c e , f o r t i t u d e ) are always a s o u r c e o f p l e a s u r e ' ,
b u t t h a t o n l y p u n i s h m e n t o r a s e l f - s e r v i n g desire o f e s t e e m c a n m o t i v a t e
a p e r s o n t o u p h o l d t h e distasteful v i r t u e o f j u s t i c e . A b o u t j u s t i c e Hume
supposes p r e c i s e l y t h e c o n t r a r y . H e a r g u e s t h a t , o n c e ' m e n , f r o m t h e i r
early e d u c a t i o n i n society' ( f r o m t h e i r experience o f t h e proto-society
o f t h e f a m i l y , perhaps) b e c o m e aware ' o f t h e i n f i n i t e advantages t h a t
r e s u l t f r o m i t H u s t i c e ] , a n d h a v e besides a c q u i r ' d a n e w a f f e c t i o n t o c o m ­
pany and conversation', they t h e n w i U i n g l y go o n to enter i n t o conven­
tions t h a t ' b e s t o w stability o n t h e possession o f t h o s e e x t e r n a l g o o d s ' ,
c o n v e n t i o n s t h a t so r e s t r a i n a n ' i r r e g u l a r a n d i n c o m m o d i o u s ' tendency
t o a v i d i t y t h a t e v e r y o n e is l e f t ' i n t h e p e a c e a b l e e n j o y m e n t o f w h a t h e
m a y a c q u i r e b y h i s f o r t u n e a n d i n d u s t r y ' . F u r t h e r m o r e , H u m e insists
t h a t t h i s s e l f - i m p o s e d r e s t r a i n t is n o t c o n t r a r y t o o u r basic passions. I f i t
w e r e , h e argues,

i t c o u ' d never be enter'd i n t o , n o r m a i n t a i n ' d . . . i t is o n l y c o n t r a r y t o t h e i r

heedless and i m p e t u o u s m o v e m e n t . Instead o f d e p a r t i n g f r o m o u r o w n interest,
o r f r o m t h a t o f o u r n e a r e s t f r i e n d s , b y a b s t a i n i n g f r o m t h e possessions o f o t h e r s ,
w e cannot better consult b o t h these interests, t h a n by such a c o n v e n t i o n ;
because i t is b y that means w e m a i n t a i n society, w h i c h is so necessary t o t h e i r
w e U - b e i n g a n d subsistence, as weU as t o o u r o w n . (THJV3.2.2.9) 23

2 3
Moore, i n spite ofthis exphcit claim to the contrary, argues that H u m e supposed there is
'no natural instinct w h i c h w o u l d prompt us to be sociable, i n the manner required . . . [to]
prompt us to agree to leave others in possession ofthe things they have occupied'. H i s mistake
may be traced to his supposition that, for H u m e , our interested motivation to justice 'derives
from the artificial arrangements, or conventions, or rules w h i c h regukte the passions' ('Hume
 Hume and Hutcheson 225
H u m e concludes, i n short, that b o t h the original and c o n t i n u i n g m o t i ­

v a t i o n s t o u p h o l d t h e a r t i f i c i a l v i r t u e o f j u s t i c e are i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h

o u r n a t u r e , a n d , i n c o n s e q u e n c e , t h a t acts o f j u s t i c e w e r e n o t o r i g i n a U y ,

a n d are n o t n o w t y p i c a U y , e n t e r e d i n t o o n l y t o a v o i d p u n i s h m e n t o r t o

g a i n esteem.'I have n e v e r caU'dJustice u n n a t u r a l , b u t o n l y a r t i f i c i a l ' , h e

told Hutcheson (LDH i . 33). I n o t h e r w o r d s , h u m a n s developed the

c o n v e n t i o n s o f j u s t i c e because t h e y f o u n d these t o b e i n t h e i r interest,

a n d t h e y c o n t i n u e t o m a i n t a i n these c o n v e n t i o n s , despite occasional

s h o r t - t e r m p a i n , f o r t h e same r e a s o n . 2 4

T w o f u r t h e r points. First, o n the matter o f t h e o r i g i n o f t h e virtues, i t

is n o t o n l y t h e E p i c u r e a n s w h o d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n ( t o use H u m e ' s l a n ­

guage) n a t u r a l a n d artificial v i r t u e s . 2 5
C i c e r o r e p r e s e n t s t h e S t o i c s as

o f f e r i n g a s i r m l a r , d e v e l o p m e n t a l a c c o u n t . A c c o r d i n g t o De finihus, the

S t o i c s s u p p o s e d t h a t ' l o v e o f seh°. . . supphes t h e p r i m a r y i m p u l s e to

action', and that the first ' a p p r o p r i a t e a c t . . . is t o p r e s e r v e oneselfin

one's n a t u r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n ' . 2 5
T h e Stoics a k o supposed that those things

and Hutcheson', 49,51) .This is to reverse Hume's position: for Hume, as this passage shows, the
conventions ofjustice derive fromjust such interested motivations. For his part, Hutcheson, i n
his Inaugural Lecture o f 1729, granted that even the Epicureans 'maintain that social life is
natural to m a n ' . See Francis Hutcheson on Human Nature [Hutcheson on Human Nature],
ed.T.Mautner (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 134.

2 4
H u m e grants that the connection between interest and the rules ofjustice is 'somewhat
singukr', so that single acts ofjustice may be contrary to both the pubhc and private interest.
W h e n a benevolent person repays a debt to a miser or bigot, the act 'may, in itself, be very pre­
judicial to society'.An individual may be impoverished by an act ofintegrity, and thus 'have
reason to wish, that with regard to that single act, the b w s ofjustice were for a moment
suspended in the universe'. B u t H u m e insists that the system ofjustice, taken as a whole, is
conducive, and necessary, 'both to the support o f society, and the weU-being o f every
i n d i v i d u a l . . . every individual person must find himselfa gainer, on baUancing the account'.
H e also undertakes to show that, subsequent to our 'natural obhgation to justice, viz. interest',
we develop also a 'moral obhgation' to it, a sense that beingjust is the moraUy right thing to be
(THN3.2.2.22-3;cf.3.3.6.5). 2 5
'HumeandHutcheson',27-8.
2 6
It is ako relevant to note that,in explicit contrast with the Epicureans, the Stoics routinely
argued that seff-love is a more fundamental motivation than pleasure, w h i c h is at best a c o n ­
comitant ofthe successful achievement ofthat to w h i c h self-love directs.The new-born m a m ­
mal seeks the fbod necessary to preserve itself, not any putative pleasure arising from the
satisfaction ofthk impulse. O n thisimportantpoint,seeWright,'Cicero on Self-Love', 171—2,
andJ.Brunschwig,'The CradleArgument in Epicureanism and Stoicism', in M . Sch0f1eld and
G . Striker (eds.), The Norms of Nature: Studies in Hellenistic Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1986). Hutcheson attributed to the Epicureans the view 'that setf-love alone,
or everyone's search for his own pleasure or advantage, is the spring ofaU actions, and . . . aU
affections o f the mind, including even the seemingly most benevolent ones' (Hutcheson on
Human Nature, 134).In doing so he conflated the distinction between motivations ofseff-love
and desires for pleasure on w h i c h the ancient Stoics insisted.
226 David Fate Norton

t h a t are ' i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h n a t u r e ' are f i r s t c h o s e n i n s t i n c t i v e l y . O n c e

discovered, however, they are t h e n c h o s e n d e l i b e r a t e l y . N e x t , 'such
choice becomes a fixed habit', and finaUy, the choice becomes 'fuUy
r a t i o n a h z e d a n d i n h a r m o n y w i t h n a t u r e ' . I t is o n l y 'at t h i s final stage
t h a t t h e G o o d p r o p e r l y so c a U e d first e m e r g e s a n d c o m e s t o b e under­
s t o o d i n its t r u e n a t u r e ' . I t is o n l y b y t h i s ' s u b s e q u e n t d e v e l o p m e n t ' t h a t
m a n ' b y e x e r c i s e o f i n t e U i g e n c e a n d r e a s o n i n f e r s . . . w h e r e i n hes the
C h i e f G o o d o f m a n , t h e t h i n g t h a t is p r a i s e w o r t h y a n d d e s i r a b l e f o r its
o w n sake' (Defin.$. 1 6 , 2 0 - i ) . I n B o o k 4 o f t h e same w o r k C i c e r o argues
that Z e n o merely took over f r o m m o r e ancient phUosophers (the
P e r i p a t e t i c s ) t h e v i e w t h a t t h e u n i o n o f m e n a n d w o m e n is t h e ' r o o t ' o f
p a r e n t a l affection, a n d t h a t f r o m these ' g e r m s ' o r 'first p r i n c i p l e s ' t h e
Stoics 'traced o u t the o r i g i n a n d g r o w t h o f a U the virtues',includingjus-
t i c e . T h i s l a t t e r v i r t u e is s a i d t o d e v e l o p o u t o f a sense o f m o d e s t y a n d
s h a m e ' c o u p l e d w i t h m a n ' s ' d e s i r e f o r i n t e r c o u r s e a n d s o c i e t y w i t h his
f e U o w s , a n d w i t h a s c r u p u l o u s care i n aU h i s w o r d s a n d a c t i o n s t o a v o i d
a n y c o n d u c t t h a t is n o t h o n o u r a b l e ' . A f e w p a r a g r a p h s l a t e r C i c e r o says
t h a t i t is o u t o f w h a t ' o u r earhest n a t u r a l i n s t i n c t d e m a n d s ' t h a t ' w e m u s t
c o n s t r u c t o u r E n d , o u r C h i e f a n d U l t i m a t e G o o d ' (Defin. 4.17-19,25;
see also 4 i ) . 2 7
T h e p e r s p e c t i v e h e r e is n o t e x a c d y t h a t o f H u m e , a n d e v e n
i n t r a n s l a t i o n t h e l a n g u a g e is d i f f e r e n t , b u t H u m e ' s d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n
t h e ' n a t u r a l ' a n d t h e ' a r t i f i c i a l ' is n o t u n h k e t h a t w h i c h C i c e r o says t h a t
t h e Stoics d r a w b e t w e e n the ' n a t u r a l ' a n d ' c o n s t r u c t e d ' , w h U e t h e c l a i m
that the virtue o f j u s t i c e is c o n s e q u e n t u p o n sexual necessity and
p a r e n t a l a f f e c t i o n is c o m m o n t o b o t h a c c o u n t s .
S e c o n d , H u t c h e s o n , u s i n g stiU a n o t h e r t e r m i n o l o g y , also r e c o g n i z e d
a d i s t i n c t i o n t h a t is f o r p r e s e n t p u r p o s e s r e l e v a n d y s i m U a r t o t h a t w h i c h
H u m e d r e w b e t w e e n t h e n a t u r a l a n d a r t i f i c i a l v i r t u e s . I n h i s System qf
Moral Philosophy, f o U o w i n g d i s c u s s i o n s o f t h e 'state o f h b e r t y ' i n w h i c h
there w e r e n o c i v i l laws, a n d t h e n o f t h e n e e d for society t o r e m e d y the
defects o f t h i s state, H u t c h e s o n says t h a t t h e ' P r i v a t e r i g h t s o f i n d i v i d u -
als' m a y b e d i v i d e d a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r o r i g i n s i n t o t w o k i n d s , t h e 'natu­
ral' a n d t h e 'adventitious' (System 2.4-5). 2 8
Natural rights correspond to

2 7
W r i g h t describes a multi-stage process by w h i c h , according to the Stoics, humanity is
said to move from self-love through family affection, friendship, and civic justice to, finaUy, a
love ofhumanity in accord w i t h the ideas ofnatural law and enHghtened world government;
see ' C i c e r o on Seii-iove',passim.
2 8
Although H u m e could have seen the manuscript o f this work (it circulated i n the k t e
1730s),it is n o t m y contention t h a t h e w a s i n f l u e n c e d b y i t . I h e r e intend o n l y t o show thatthe
 Hume and Hutcheson 227

H u m e ' s f i r s t - o r d e r v i r t u e s . T h e y are t h e r i g h t s , as H u t c h e s o n p u t s i t ,
' e a c h o n e has f r o m t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f n a t u r e i t s e l f w i t h o u t t h e i n t e r ­
v e n t i o n o f a n y h u m a n c o n t r i v a n c e , i n s t i t u t i o n , c o m p a c t , o r deed'. Seven
s u c h r i g h t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e r i g h t s t o h f e a n d safety, t o h b e r t y , t o f r e e d o m
o f j u d g e m e n t , a n d t o t h e s o c i e t y o f o t h e r s , are d i s c u s s e d . T h e c o n t r a s t ­
i n g adventitious rights correspond to Hume's second-order virtues.
H u t c h e s o n says t h a t these s e c o n d - o r d e r r i g h t s 'arise f r o m s o m e h u m a n
institution, compact, or action'. H e counts the r i g h t to private property
as o n e s u c h r i g h t . T h e ' n a t u r a l a p p e t i t e s a n d desires o f m e n ' w i U l e a d a n
i n d i v i d u a l t o o c c u p y f o r h i m s e l f t h i n g s that 'lye i n c o m m o n , w i t h fuU
p e r s u a s i o n o f h i s r i g h t , ifhe has attained to moral notions (emphasis a d d e d ) .
I n o t h e r w o r d s , individuals w h o have developed m o r a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g
w i U see t h a t t h e y h a v e a r i g h t t o w h a t e v e r has n o t b e e n c l a i m e d b y
a n y o n e else. H u t c h e s o n also sees t h a t , w e r e o t h e r s a U o w e d t o d e p r i v e
a p e r s o n o f w h a t h e o r she has t h u s o c c u p i e d , n o t j u s t i n d i v i d u a l w e U -
b e i n g , b u t also t h e g e n e r a l g o o d w o u l d b e a d v e r s e l y affected: 'such
practice obtaining among m e n m u s t subject t h e m to the greatest
m i s e r y ' b y g i v i n g ' p e r p e t u a l o c c a s i o n f o r t h e m o s t d e s t r u c t i v e passions
a n d c o n t e n t i o n s ' . H e t h e n g o e s o n t o say, as H u m e says i n t h e Treatise
(3.2.2.16—17), t h a t t h e r u l e s o f p r o p e r t y are c o n t i n g e n t u p o n t h e c i r ­
cumstances i n w h i c h h u m a n s f i n d themselves: 'Before m a n k i n d w e r e
m u c h i n c r e a s e d , i f t h e r e g i o n s t h e y possessed w e r e so v e r y f r u i t f u l a n d
m U d t h a t there was p l e n t y o f a U c o n v e n i e n c i e s w i t h o u t uneasy l a b o u r ,
t h e r e was Htde occasion f o r any f u r t h e r rules o f p r o p e r t y ' . As things n o w
stand,however,such r u l e s are necessary (System 2.4.1,2.5.1,2.6.5).Thus
i n t w o o f h i s w o r k s , at least o n e o f w h i c h was w r i t t e n b e f o r e h e c o r r e -
s p o n d e d w i t h H u m e a b o u t t h e 7 r e a i w e , H u t c h e s o n a b o takes t h e r u l e s o f
p r o p e r t y a n d t h e v i r t u e associated w i t h t h e m t o b e d e v e l o p e d , s e c o n d -
order moral entities. 2 9

moral views ofHutcheson and H u m e are not, in the matters discussed, entirely and diametri-
саПу different.
2 9
There is i n the background here an important difference between Hutcheson and
H u m e , but that difference is not, as Moore puts it, that Hutcheson 'saw no need for conven­
tions, rules or artificial restraints to ensure that [men] would bejust i n their dealings with one
another' because he supposed 'rights. . . were ahvays natural or instinctive, never artificial or
conventional', while H u m e took the contrary position ('Hume and Hutcheson', 3 4 ) . It is,
rather, that Hutcheson supposed that adventitious rights, although dependent on the conven­
tions imphcit i n 'human institution, compact, or action',rest o n a naturaUy moral foundation,
one ofthe two forms ^ u b h c , private) ofbenevolence, while H u m e i n contrast traces the arti­
ficial virtues to a beginning, seM"-interest, that both he and Hutcheson suppose to be morauy
228 David Fate Norton

ib) The state of nature. M o o r e also supposes H u m e t o b e a n E p i c u r e a n

b e c a u s e h i s ' a c c o u n t o f t h e state o f n a t u r e , as a c o n d i t i o n i n w h i c h
h u m a n n a t u r e is s e v e r e l y d i s a d v a n t a g e d i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e easier,
m o r e felicitous c o n d i t i o n o f a n i m a k ' , derives ' f r o m the E p i c u r e a n t r a d i ­
tion' ('Hume and Hutcheson',28,30).This point ofview,however,was
b y n o m e a n s exclusively a n E p i c u r e a n one. Seneca, w h o s e Stoic c r e d e n ­
tials are b e y o n d q u e s t i o n , said t h a t , t a k e n s i n g l y , h u m a n s are t h e ' p r e y o f
aU c r e a t u r e s ' , a n d t h a t

w h i l e other creatures possess a strength that is adequate for their seH>protection,

and those that are b o r n t o be wanderers and t o lead an isolated Hfe have been given
weapons, the c o v e r i n g o f m a n is a frail skin; n o m i g h t o f c i a w s or o f t e e t h makes
h i m a t e r r o r to others; naked and w e a k as he is, his safety Hes i n feHowship. 30

Lactantius, the early Christian apologist who was no friend of

E p i c u r e a n s , also saw t h e o r i g i n o f s o c i e t y i n h u m a n w e a k n e s s :

I f e a c h M a n alone h a d sufficient Strength t o w a r d o f f aU Dangers, and stood i n

n e e d o f n o Assistant: w h a t Society w o u l d there be i n t h e W o r l d ? W h a t mutual
R e v e r e n c e or Respect? W h a t O r d e r ? W h a t Reason? W h a t H u m a n i t y ? W h a t
w o u l d be m o r e v i l e t h a n M a n ? W h a t m o r e extravagant?What m o r e fierce a n d
cruel? B u t n o w w h U e each single Person is p o o r a n d i n d i g e n t , and c a n n o t sub­
sist w i t h o u t the H e l p o f his FeUows, aU desire Society f o r O r n a m e n t and
Defence o f c o m m o n L i f e . 3 1

FinaUy, H u t c h e s o n h i m s e l f draws a t t e n t i o n t o the weakness o f i n d i ­

v i d u a l h u m a n s . ' A n O f f s p r i n g o f s u c h C r e a t u r e s as M e n are', h e says,
' c o u l d n o t be preserved w i t h o u t perpetual L a b o u r and Care', w i t h o u t a

neutral. For H u m e , it is only after the relevant conventions are developed or in pbce that they
come to have a moral dimension—it is only then that, as he ssys,'we annex the idea ofvirtue to
jMsrice'andthus find ourselves witha'mora/obhgation'to bejust ( T H N 3 . 2 . 2 . 2 3 ) . I t w a s onthis
difference that H u m e focused w h e n inJanuary 1743 he wrote to Hutcheson about the account
ofthe origin ofproperty andjustice offered i n the latter's Short Introduction:'You sometimes,in
my O p i n i o n , ascribe the O r i g i n a l ofProperty &Justice to pubhc Benevolence, & sometimes
to private Benevolence towards the Possessors ofthe Goods, neither o f w h i c h seem to me sat-
isfactory.You k n o w my O p i n i o n o n this head. It mortifies m e m u c h to see a Person,who pos­
sesses more C a n d o u r & Penetration than any ahnost I know, condemn Reasonings, o f w h i c h
I imagine I see so strongly the E v i d e n c e ' ( L D H i . 4 7 ; for relevant 'Reasonings', see e.g. THN
3 . 2 . 1 . 9 - 1 7 ) . For further discussion o f this issue, see K n u d Haakonssen, ' T h e Structure o f
Hume's Pohtical T h e o r y ' , i n D. E N o r t o n (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hume
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 9 3 ) , 1 8 2 - 2 2 1 , a t 1 9 9 - 2 0 1 .
3 0
' O n Benefits' 4 . 1 8 . 2 , in Moral Essays, trans.J.W. Basore, 3 vols. (London: Heinemann,
1958); see ako Seneca's Moral Epistles 90.19.
3 1
De opificio Dei 4 , as cited in Pufendorf, Law of Nature and Nations, trans. B . Kennett et al.
(London, 1 7 2 9 ) , 7.1.6 n.
 Hume and Hutcheson 229

l e v e l o f a t t e n t i o n t h a t p r e s u p p o s e s a n i n s t i n c t i v e m o t i v a t i o n ^parental

affection) stronger than that provided b y 'the m o r e general Ties of

Benevolence' (Essay 1.2.6). 32

This truncated comparison o f H u m e w i t h the moral theory o f the

E p i c u r e a n t r a d i t i o n is s u f f i c i e n t t o s h o w b o t h t h a t H u m e ' s m o r a l p h i ­

l o s o p h y is i n s o m e f u n d a m e n t a l r e s p e c t s d i f f e r e n t from t h a t t r a d i t i o n as

t h i s is d e s c r i b e d b y M o o r e , a n d t h a t s o m e o f t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w s

M o o r e s u p p o s e s t o c h a r a c t e r i z e t h e E p i c u r e a n t r a d i t i o n are f o u n d as

w e U i n s o m e Stoics a n d a k o i n H u t c h e s o n . W e can grant that the m o r a l

p h U o s o p h i e s o f t h e E p i c u r e a n s a n d H u m e share s o m e f e a t u r e s , b u t t h i s

d o e s n o t j u s t i f y a r e d u c t i v i s t , o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l r e a d i n g o f H u m e as, i n

substantive matters, n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a disciple o f H o b b e s , Bayle, a n d

S a i n t E v r e m o n d . H u m e , as d i d H u t c h e s o n , r e a d w i d e l y a m o n g both

ancient and m o d e r n m o r a l philosophers, and learned f r o m , whUe yet

modifying,more than one tradition.

3. HUME ON HUTCHESON'S PHILOSOPHY

If Hutcheson and H u m e are n o t t h e one-dimensional products of

distincdy different phUosophical traditions, t h e n i t is p o s s i b l e that

3 2
T h e claim that humans existed first in a 'state ofnature' is often associated with Hobbes's
description ofthe state ofnature as a state ofwar ofaU against aU, and his further suggestion that
'in old time, there was a manner o f living . . . living by rapine' that corresponds with this
description; see e.g. De Cive, Preface, i . i o , 5.2. Hutcheson dismissed this characterization o f
the state ofnature as faUacious,but he did not hesitate to suppose there had been such a state.
H e said e.g. that 'the universal U s e o f F o r c e in a State qfNature, i n pursuance oiperfect Rights,
seems exceedingly advantageous to the Whole, by making every one dread anyAttempts against
the perfect Rights ofothers' (Inquiry 2.7.6).Later he argued that the 'first state' ofhumankind, the
'state ofhberty',wasfarfrombeingastate o f ' w a r a n d enmity',butnonethelessgrantedthatin
such a state, 'where there are no civil laws w i t h a visible power to execute their sanctions, m e n
wUl often do injurious actions contrary to the laws oftheir nature; and the resentments ofthe
sufferers wffl produce wars and violence'. I n other words, Hobbes was wrong about human
nature—humans are naturaUy disposed to 'beneficence toward aU'—but at least partiaUy right
in his suggestions about the hkely features of, as he put it, the manner ofliving ' i n old time'
(System 2.4. ι; cf. Short Intro 2.4.1). For his part, H u m e exphcidy chaUenged aU talk ofthe state
ofnature, saying phUosophers may use such language only ifthey grant that this 'suppos'd state
qf nature' is 'a mere phUosophical fiction, w h i c h never had, and never cou'd have any reality'.
E v e n parents, in order to keep the peace among their chUdren, must set out some rules ofpos-
session orjustice, and then 'these first rudiments ofjustice must every day be improv'd, as the
society enlarges: IfaU this appear evident, as it certainly must, we may conclude, that'tis utterly
impossible for m e n to remain any considerable time i n that savage condition, w h i c h precedes
society;but thathis veryfirst state and situationmayjusdybe esteem'd social' (THN3.2.2.14).
230 David Fate Norton

Hutcheson, w h o by the time H u m e began w o r k i n g o n w h a t became

t h e Treatise (c.1730) w a s a m o n g t h e b e s t - k n o w n m o r a l p h i l o s o p h e r s of
his t i m e , chd have s o m e i n f l u e n c e o n t h e v i e w s o f t h e y o u n g e r p h i l o s o ­
p h e r . H u m e h i m s e l f h a s i m p o r t a n t t h i n g s t o say o n t h i s t o p i c .
First, though, some circumstantial evidence that Hume read
H u t c h e s o n ' s Inquiry sometime before 1730. W e know that Hume
a c q u i r e d a c o p y o f S h a f t e s b u r y ' s Characteristics i n 1726. T h i s w e know
because a c o p y o f that w o r k , signed a n d dated b y h i m ( ' D a v i d Home
1 7 2 6 ' ) is e x t a n t . T h i s f a c t is r e l e v a n t f o r t w o reasons. I t dates H u m e ' s
3 3

i n t e r e s t i n m o d e r n m o r a l t h e o r y t o n o l a t e r t h a n 1726, t h e y e a r i n w h i c h
t h e s e c o n d e d i t i o n o f H u t c h e s o n ' s Inquiry was p u b h s h e d . A n d w e now
also k n o w t h a t t h e H u m e l i b r a r y i n c l u d e d a c o p y o f t h a t e d i t i o n o f t h e
Inquiry. 34
I t is r e a s o n a b l e t o s u p p o s e , t h e n , t h a t H u m e h a d a c o p y o f t h e
Inquiry early on ft3ef0re c.1729, w h e n a third edition o f t h e work
a p p e a r e d ) , c e r t a i n l y b y t h e time t h a t h e w a s b e g i n n i n g t o t h i n k s e r i o u s l y
a b o u t , p e r h a p s e v e n w r i t e , t h e w o r k p u b h s h e d i n 1739—40 as A Treatise of
Human Nature. The o b v i o u s q u e s t i o n is: d o v o l u m e s 1 a n d 2 o f t h i s
w o r k s h o w Hutcheson's influence? 3 5
T h e e q u a U y o b v i o u s a n s w e r is t h a t
they do.
H u m e was p r o b a b l y i n t r o d u c e d t o t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l m e t h o d b y R o b e r t
Steuart's n a t u r a l p h U o s o p h y c o u r s e at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f E d i n b u r g h , a
course that centred o n the w r i t i n g s o f R o b e r t B o y l e . 3 6
B u t H u m e does
n o t i n t h e Treatise p o i n t t o B o y l e as t h e i n s p i r a t i o n o f t h e a t t e m p t m a d e
there to introduce the experimental method into moral subjects.
R a t h e r , after i n d i r e c d y c r e d i t i n g F r a n c i s B a c o n w i t h i n t r o d u c i n g t h e
experimental m e t h o d into Britain, H u m e , i n a w e U - k n o w n note, m e n ­
t i o n s five B r i t i s h p h U o s o p h e r s ' w h o h a v e b e g u n t o p u t t h e s c i e n c e o f
m a n o n a n e w f o o t i n g , a n d have engag'd the a t t e n t i o n , a n d excited the
c u r i o s i t y o f t h e p u b l i c ' (THN, n . 1) . T h e five are, i n t h e o r d e r m e n t i o n e d ,

3 3
CharacteristicsqfMen,Manners, OpiniotJi,T!mes,3vob.(London,1723).Thesevolumeswere
purchased by the University ofNebraska Library i n 1 9 2 7 . F o r further details see D. F. N o r t o n
and M . J . N o r t o n , The David Hume Library (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Bibhographical Society,
i996),i6,44-5,anditemii64. 3 4
TheDavidHumeLihrary,ia$,ittm67j.
3 5
F o r the present, I Umit consideration to vols. 1 and 2 because M o o r e suggests that H u m e
revised vol. 3 i n an effort to address Hutcheson's criticisms, and that these revisions 'have c o n ­
veyed the misleading impression that p i u m e ] was a Hutchesonian in his moral philosophy'
( ' H u m e and Hutcheson', 5 4 ) .
3 6
See Michael Barfoot, ' H u m e and the Culture o f Science in the Early Eighteenth
Century', OSHPi: 1 5 1 ^ 0 . M o o r e ( ' H u m e andHutcheson',32—3) draws attentionto Steuart's
course and the associated Physiological Library, o f w h i c h H u m e was a member.
 Hume and Hutcheson 231

L o c k e , Shaftesbury, M a n d e v i U e , Hutcheson, and Buder. 3 7

In other
w o r d s , i n t h e I n t r o d u c t i o n t o h i s f i r s t p h i I o s o p h i c a I w o r k H u m e gives t o
H u t c h e s o n partial credit for i n s p i r i n g the w o r k that foUows.
H e d i d so f o r g o o d r e a s o n . H u t c h e s o n h a d f o c u s e d o n p r e c i s e l y t h e
t o p i c , the science o f h u m a n nature, a n d h a d r e c o m m e n d e d the means,
t h e o b s e r v a t i o n a l m e t h o d , t h a t H u m e t o o k t o b e a d e f i n i n g characteristic
o f t h e Treatise.The openingwords o f t h e Preface o f H u t c h e s o n ' s Inquiry
are: ' T h e r e is n o P a r t o f Philosophy o f more Importance than a just
Knowledge o f Human Nature, a n d its v a r i o u s P o w e r s a n d Dispositions'
(Inquiry, p. i x ) . 3 8
H e goes o n i n t h i s w o r k t o r e c o r d t h o s e o b s e r v a t i o n s t h a t
l e d h i m t o c o n c l u d e t h a t h u m a n n a t u r e m u s t i n c l u d e a m o r a l sense. 39

T h e n , i n t h e P r e f a c e t o his Essay H u t c h e s o n d i f f i d e n d y h o p e s t h a t t h e
'imperfect' effort that foUows w i U d o t m t i l someone eke undertakes
'a m o r e s t r i c t P h U o s o p h i c a l I n q u i r y i n t o t h e v a r i o u s natural Principles or
natural Dispositions o f M a n k i n d ; from w h i c h p e r h a p s a m o r e e x a c t T h e o r y
o f M o r a l s m a y b e f o r m ' d , t h a n a n y w h i c h has y e t a p p e a r e d ' (Essay, p . x i i ) .
A s s u m i n g t h a t H u m e also r e a d H u t c h e s o n ' s Essay,we can a k o reasonably
suppose that this r e m a r k w o u l d be a m o n g those that inspired h i m t o the
p u r s u i t o f a 'just Knowledge otHuman Nature, a n d its v a r i o u s P o w e r s a n d
Dispositions' (to ' t h e science o f h u m a n nature' i n H u m e ' s language) that
c h a r a c t e r i z e s t h e Treatise, w h i l e y e t l e a v i n g h i m a d e q u a t e p h i l o s o p h i c a l
space i n w h i c h t o d e v e l o p v i e w s w i t h w h i c h H u t c h e s o n m i g h t disagree.
H u t c h e s o n is n o t a g a i n m e n t i o n e d b y n a m e i n t h e Treatise.Theie is,
h o w e v e r , o n e c l e a r a U u s i o n t o h i s t h e o r y i n B o o k 2. I n h i s d i s c u s s i o n o f
v i r t u e a n d v i c e as causes o f t h e i n d i r e c t passions o f p r i d e a n d h u m i l i t y ,
H u m e m e n t i o n s a ' c o n t r o v e r s y , w h i c h o f l a t e years has so m u c h e x c i t e d t h e
c u r i o s i t y o f t h e p u b h c ' , t h e c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r t h e quesaon,'Whether . . .
3 7
T h e H u m e hbrary ako indudedJohn Locke, Two Treatises on Government p,ondon, 1690),
item 776; Joseph Buder, The Analogy of Religion ^ o n d o n , 1736), item 222; and Bernard
Mandevüle, The Fable of the Bees (London, 1723),item 824.
3 8
I note that Hutcheson was not the first ofHume's predecessors to emphasize the impor­
tance ofthe study ofhuman nature. See e.g. Malebranche, Search afterTruth, trans.T. Lennon and
P. O k c a m p (Columbus: O h i o State University Press, 1980), pp. xxv, 291; Pufendorf, Law of
Nature and Nations 2.3.14; Shaftesbury, Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 3 vok.
^ o n d o n , 1714;fac.Westmead: Gregg International Pubhshers, 1968),iii: 192.
3 9
See e.g. Inquiry 2.1. Hutcheson and H u m e ako hmited their inquiries i n the same way.
B o t h refused to be drawn into any discussion o f the physical or physiological aspects o f the
phenomena to be expkined. Hutcheson said:'Let Physicians andAnatomists explain the sev­
eral Motions i n the Fluids or Solids o f the Body, w h i c h accompany any Passion; or the
Temperaments ofBody',for discussion ofthese bodily accompaniments is not the business ofthe
moralphilosopher (Essay 1.2.7).ForHume's sirnUarremarks,see THiV1.1.2.1,2.1.1.2.
232 David Fate Norton

moral distinctions befounded on natural and original principles, or arisefrom

interest and education'.Ahhough h e reserves h i s e x a r n i n a t i o n ofthese
a l t e r n a t i v e s t o t h e t h e n u n p u b l i s h e d t h i r d b o o k o f t h e Treatise, Hume
does a U o w h i m s e l f t o c o r n m e n t o n t h e relative m e r i t s o f t h e alternative
p o s i t i o n s h e m e n t i o n s . I n d o i n g so h e e n d o r s e s H u t c h e s o n ' s theory:
' T h e m o s t p r o b a b l e h y p o t h e s i s , w h i c h has b e e n a d v a n c ' d t o e x p l a i n t h e
distinction b e t w i x t vice and virtue, and the o r i g i n o f m o r a l rights and
o b l i g a t i o n s , is, t h a t from a p r i m a r y c o n s t i t u t i o n o f n a t u r e c e r t a i n c h a r ­
acters a n d p a s s i o n s , b y t h e v e r y v i e w a n d c o n t e m p l a t i o n , p r o d u c e a p a i n ,
a n d o t h e r s i n l i k e m a n n e r e x c i t e a p l e a s u r e ' . T h u s i t is t h a t : ' T o a p p r o v e
o f a c h a r a c t e r is t o f e e l a n o r i g i n a l d e h g h t u p o n its a p p e a r a n c e . T o d i s a p ­
p r o v e o f i t is t o b e sensible o f a n uneasiness' ( T H N 2 . 1 . 7 . 2 , 5 ) . H u m e ' s
o w n a c c o u n t o f t h e m o r a l sense i n s o m e w a y s d i f f e r s f r o m H u t c h e s o n ' s ,
b u t i n l a t e 173 8, w h e n t h e first t w o v o l u m e s o f t h e Treatise w e n t t o press,
H u m e was p o s i t i v e l y d i s p o s e d t o w a r d t h e m o r a l t h e o r y m o s t c l e a r l y set
o u t i n H u t c h e s o n ' s Inquiry and Essay.
H u m e n e x t discusses H u t c h e s o n ' s v i e w s i n t h r e e l e t t e r s w r i t t e n t o
h i m w h i l e t h e t h i r d b o o k o f t h e Treatise w a s b e i n g r e v i s e d . I t is o f t e n
n o t e d t h a t t h e first o f t h e s e l e t t e r s ( t h a t o f S e p t e m b e r 1739) discusses
Hutcheson's (no longer extant) c o m m e n t s a b o u t an earher draft o f
B o o k 3 o f t h e Treatise, c o m m e n t s t h a t m u s t h a v e c o n s t i t u t e d o b j e c t i o n s
to the tone, approach, and t e r m i n o l o g y o f t h a t draft.Abstracting for the
p r e s e n t f r o m t h e s e o b j e c t i o n s , w e c a n ask w h y H u m e h a d s u b m i t t e d h i s
m a n u s c r i p t t o H u t c h e s o n . T h e answer m a y lie i n earlier correspondence
b e t w e e n H u m e a n d H e n r y H o m e ( L o r d K a m e s after 1 7 5 2 ) . T h e l a t t e r
h a d suggested that H u m e send h i m , i n S c o d a n d , m a n y copies o f the
Treatise w h i c h K a m e s w o u l d t h e n seU. S o m e t i m e L i t e r H u m e rephed,
s a y i n g t h a t t h e fate o f h i s b o o k d i d n o t d e p e n d o n s a l e s , b u t o n r e p u t a ­
tion. I t n e e d e d to be read a n d r e c o m m e n d e d b y p r o p e r j u d g e s , b y those
w i t h philosophical authority. 4 0
I n due course, K a m e s t o o k this h i n t a n d
s e n t a c o p y o f Treatise 1 a n d 2 t o H u t c h e s o n .

4 0
H u m e wrote to Kames: ' I n looking over your Letters I find one o f a twelve-month's
Date, wherein you desire me to send down a great many Copys to Scodand.You propos'd no
doubtto take the Pains ofrecommendingthem,&pushingthe Sale.Butto teU theTruth there
is so htde to be gain'd that way i n suchWorks as these, that I wou'd not have you take the
Trouble. I f y o u k n o w any body that is aJudge, you wou'd do me a sensible Pleasure i n engag­
ing h i m to a serious Perusal ofthe B o o k . T i s so rare to meet with one, that wül take Pains o n a
Book, that does not come recommended by some great N a m e orAuthority, that, I must c o n -
fess,Iam as fond o f m e e r i n g w i t h s u c h a one,as i f I w e r e sure ofhisApprobation' ( N L D H 4 ) .
 Hume and Hutcheson 233

N o w , a f t h o u g h i t was K a m e s w h o s e n t t h e f i r s t t w o v o l u m e s o f t h e
Treatise t o H u t c h e s o n , a n d r e c e i v e d f r o m t h e l a t t e r a p l e a s a n t l e t t e r s u g ­
g e s t i n g h e w o u l d b e w i l h n g t o discuss t h e a u t h o r ' s w o r k w i t h h i m , 4 1
it
was H u m e w h o f o U o w e d u p b y s e n d i n g h i s m a n u s c r i p t t o t h i s s a m e
' A u t h o r i t y ' , t h u s s e c u r i n g from h i m t h e ' R e f l e c t i o n s ' t o w h i c h Hume
r e p h e d i n S e p t e m b e r 1739 (LDHi. 3 2 - 5 ) . M o r e o v e r , i t was H u m e w h o on
4 M a r c h 1740 a s k e d H u t c h e s o n t o r e c o m m e n d a p u b h s h e r o f t h e t h i r d
v o l u m e because, h e said, ' I k n o w y o u r A u t h o r i t y w i U g o a great W a y
t o m a k e t h e M a t t e r [ o f f i n d i n g a p u b l i s h e r ] easy f o r m e ' (LDHi. 37). 4 2

Less t h a n t w o w e e k s l a t e r h e p r e s u m e d o n H u t c h e s o n ' s ' G o o d - N a t u r e

& f r i e n d l y D i s p o s i t i o n ' t o ask f o r a d v i c e a b o u t ' C o p y - M o n e y ' a n d a
publisher. H u m e r e c o g n i z e d t h e s e c o n d p o i n t was a dehcate one.
H u t c h e s o n m i g h t n o t care t o r e c o m m e n d a b o o k t h a t m a y b e 'offen­
sive t o r e h g i o u s P e o p l e ' . H u t c h e s o n ' s r e p l y is l o s t , b u t w e c a n s u r m i s e
from H u m e ' s letter 0 f 1 6 M a r c h that H u t c h e s o n agreed to w r i t e a sup­
portive l e t t e r t o ' L o n g m a n t h e B o o k s e U e r ' , his o w n pubhsher, for
T h o m a s L o n g m a n d i d s o o n after a g r e e t o p u b h s h v o l u m e 3 o f the
Treatise. 43
H u t c h e s o n ' s b e h a v i o u r was n o t , I s u b m i t , t h a t o f a ' d e e p l y
disapproving' phUosophical antagonist ( ' H u m e and Hutcheson',24—5),
n o r was H u m e ' s b e h a v i o u r t h a t o f a n i n d i v i d u a l u n i n s p i r e d a n d u n i n ­
fluenced b y the older p h i l o s o p h e r to w h o m he t u r n e d f o r advice and
assistance.
T h e f i r s t e d i t i o n o f H u t c h e s o n ' s Philosophiae moraiis institutio compen-
diaria was p u b h s h e d i n 1742, a n d its a u t h o r s e n t a c o p y t o H u m e . In
J a n u a r y o f t h e f o U o w i n g year H u m e w r o t e t o H u t c h e s o n t h a n k i n g h i m
f o r t h e ' v e r y agreeable Present', a n d t h e n added, n o t entirely out of
p o l i t e n e s s , I suggest: ' I t h i n k i t needless t o express t o y o u m y E s t e e m o f
t h e P e r f o r m a n c e , because b o t h t h e S o l i d i t y o f y o u r J u d g e m e n t , & the

41
See Ian. S. Ross, 'Hutcheson on Hume's Treatise: A n Unnoticed Letter',J<wrna/ qf the
History qfPhilosophy 4 (1966), 69-72.
4 2
I n this same letter H u m e divulges his admiration for the 'Candour I have observd in
M r Locke,Yoursetf, & a very few more', and abo reveak that he was famUiar not only with
Hutcheson's moral philosophy, but also with the attacks made against it: 'I wish from my
Heart', he wrote,'I coud avoid concluding, that since Morahty, according to your O p i n i o n as
weU as mine, is determin'd merely by Sentiment, it regards only human Nature & human Life.
T h i s has been often urg'd against you, & the Consequences are very momentous. I f you make
anyAIterations on your Performances, I can assure you, there are many w h o desire you w o u d
more fuUy consider this Point;ifyou think that theTruth lyes on the popular Side' ( L D H i . 4 0 ) .
4 3
O n this occasion H u m e wrote: 'I must trouble you to write that Letter you was so kind
as to offer to Longman the BookseUer' ( L D H i . 3 8 ) .
234 David Fate Norton

g e n e r a l A p p r o b a t i o n y o u r W r i t i n g s meet w i t h , instruct y o u sufficiently

what O p i n i o n y o u ought to f o r m ofthem.' 4 4

I n 1744—5 H u m e w a s b e i n g c o n s i d e r e d f o r t h e c h a i r o f m o r a l p h i l o ­
s o p h y at t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f E d i n b u r g h . W i U i a m W i s h a r t , w h o opposed
t h i s a p p o i n t m e n t , c o m p o s e d a h s t o f charges s h o w i n g that Hume,
because o f his p h i l o s o p h i c a l v i e w s , was unsuited for the position.
T h e last o f t h e s e c h a r g e s w a s t h e c l a i m t h a t H u m e w a s g u i l t y o f ' s a p p i n g
the Foundations o f Morality, by denying the natural and essential
Difference betwixt Right and W r o n g , G o o d a n d E v i l , Justice and
I n j u s t i c e ; m a k i n g t h e D i f f e r e n c e o n l y a r t i f i c i a l , a n d t o arise from h u m a n
C o n v e n t i o n s a n d C o m p a c t s ' (Letter 18). 45

H u m e t o o k t h i s c h a r g e as t h e m o s t severe o f t h e s i x W i s h a r t h a d l e v e l ­
l e d against h i m , a n d r e s p o n d e d b y c k r i f y i n g his p o s i t i o n . H e granted
t h a t h e h a d d e s c r i b e d j u s t i c e as a n a r t i f i c i a l v i r t u e , b u t p o i n t e d o u t t h a t
h e h a d also d r a w n a t t e n t i o n t o t h e n a t u r a l a n d i n s t i n c t i v e v i r t u e s of
c o m p a s s i o n a n d g e n e r o s i t y , a n d said t h a t e v e n j u s t i c e is n a t u r a l i n a n o t h e r
sense. H e a b o g r a n t e d t h a t h e h a d ' d e n i e d t h e e t e r n a l D i f f e r e n c e of
R i g h t a n d W r o n g ' i n t h e sense i n w h i c h t h e m o r a l r a t i o n a h s t s h a d m a i n ­
tained t h e m , namely; 'That the Propositions o f M o r a l i t y were o f the
same N a t u r e w i t h t h e T r u t h s o f M a t h e m a t i c k s a n d t h e abstract Sciences,
t h e O b j e c t s merely o f R e a s o n , n o t t h e Feelings o f o u r i n t e r n a l Tastes a n d
Sentiments.' I n t h i s r e g a r d , h e w e n t o n , h e h a d c o n c u r r e d ' w i t h aU t h e
a n t i e n t M o r a l i s t s , as w e U as w i t h M r . Hutchison Professor o f M o r a l
P h i l o s o p h y i n t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f Glasgow, w h o , w i t h o t h e r s , has r e v i v e d
the antient Philosophy i n t h i s P a r t i c u l a r ' (Letter 36). H u m e ' s defence
a g a i n s t W i s h a r t ' s s i x t h c h a r g e , i n o t h e r w o r d s , is t h a t t h e m o r a l t h e o r y o f
t h e Treatise r e l e v a n d y r e s e m b l e s t h a t ofHutcheson.
T h e f i r s t a n d s e c o n d e d i t i o n s o f H u m e ' s Enquiry concerning Human
Understanding (then entided Philosophical Essays concerning Human
Understanding) w e r e p u b h s h e d i n 1748 a n d 1 7 5 0 . T h e s e e d i t i o n s i n c l u d e d
a note which exphcidy credited Hutcheson w i t h recognizing that

4 4
LDH ι: 45^>; for more ofthis letter, see n. 27.
4 5
Hutcheson, w h o was offered the position at Edinburgh and consulted about hkely can­
didates w h e n he refused it, was o n good authority said to have actively opposed the appoint­
ment o f H u m e . T h a t this opposition came as a disappointing surprise to H u m e (see LDHi. 58)
may be further evidence that he saw fundamental similarities between his moral theory and
that o f Hutcheson. F o r the fuUer story o f Hume's candidature for the Edinburgh chair, see
M . A . Stewart, The Kirk and the Infidel (Inaugural Lecture, University ofLancaster, 1994), and
'PrincipalWishart (1692-1753) and the Controversies ofhis Day', Records qf the Scottish Church
History Society 30 (2000),60-102; also R . B . Sher,'Professors ofVirtue', OSHP1 (1990), 87-126.
 Hume and Hutcheson 235

m o r a l difFerences are d i s c e r n e d b y t h e m o r a l sense:

T h a t Faculty, b y w h i c h w e d i s c e r n T r u t h a n d FaLshood, and that b y w h i c h w e

p e r c e i v e V i c e a n d V i r t u e h a d l o n g b e e n c o n f o u n d e d w i t h each other, a n d all
M o r a h t y was suppos'd t o be b u i l t o n eternal and i m m u t a b l e Relations, w h i c h
t o every inteUigent M i n d were equaUy invariable as any P r o p o s i t i o n c o n c e r n ­
i n g Q u a n t i t y o r N u m b e r . B u t a k t e Philosopher [ ' M r . Hutcheson', a f o o t a o t e
says] has taught us,by the m o s t c o n v i n c i n g A r g u m e n t s , that M o r a h t y is n o t h i n g
i n the abstract N a t u r e o f T h i n g s , b u t is entirely relative t o the S e n t i m e n t o r
mentalTaste o f e a c h p a r t i c u l a r B e i n g ; i n the same M a n n e r as the D i s t i n c t i o n s o f
sweet and b i t t e r , h o t and c o l d , arise f r o m the particular FeeUng o f e a c h Sense o r
O r g a n . M o r a l Perceptions therefore, o u g h t n o t t o be cks'd w i t h the Operations
o f t h e U n d e r s t a n d i n g , b u t w i t h the Tastes o r Sentiments. (EHU 1.14 note)

M o o r e has a r g u e d t h a t t h e r e v i s i o n s H u m e m a d e t o B o o k 3 o f t h e
Treatise w e r e i n t e n d e d t o ' p e r s u a d e [ H u t c h e s o n ] t o revise h i s t h i n k i n g
o n t h e s u b j e c t o f v i r t u e a n d v i c e ' , a n d t h a t s u b s e q u e n t readers h a v e b e e n
m i s l e d b y these r e v i s i o n s . 4 6
B u t , given that Hutcheson died i n m i d -
1746, i t c a n n o t b e s u p p o s e d t h a t as l a t e as 1750, w h e n t h e s e c o n d e d i t i o n
o f t h e Philosophical Essays a p p e a r e d , H u m e w a s stiU t r y i n g t o b r i n g
H u t c h e s o n a r o u n d t o his w a y o f t h i n k i n g , n o r d o there appear t o be
g r o u n d s f o r s u p p o s i n g t h e c i t e d n o t e gives a m i s l e a d i n g i m p r e s s i o n o f
H u m e ' s e a r l y v i e w s a b o u t m o r a l t h e o r y . I n 1739—40 H u m e t u r n e d t o
H u t c h e s o n forphüosophical advice a n d , w i t h o u t g i v i n g g r o u n d o n cer­
t a i n f u n d a m e n t a l issues, f o U o w e d m u c h o f t h e a d v i c e t h a t H u t c h e s o n
g a v e . T h i s n o t e h e l p s us see w h y h e was w i U i n g t o ask f o r t h a t a d v i c e .
T o s u m u p these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s : H u m e a h n o s t c e r t a i n l y r e a d H u t c h e s o n
b e f o r e w r i t i n g t h e Treatise, and then, over the course o f m o r e t h a n a
decade, m a d e b o t h e x p h c i t a n d i m p h c i t references t o Hutcheson's
m o r a l philosophy, a n d consistendy spoke o f t h a t phUosophy favourably.
I n a v a r i e t y o f w a y s h e p r e s e n t e d H u t c h e s o n as a m o d e l a n d as a n
a u t h o r i t y t o b e f o U o w e d . H e also c o n s i s t e n d y h i g h H g h t e d ways i n
w h i c h h i s o w n v i e w s r e s e m b l e d i m p o r t a n t aspects o f t h a t p h i l o s o p h y .
W e saw e a r l i e r t h a t t h e m o r a l p h U o s o p h i e s o f H u t c h e s o n a n d H u m e are
n o t the products o f d i a m e t r i c a U y opposed traditions, thus leaving o p e n
t h e possibihty that H u m e c o u l d have b e e n i n f l u e n c e d b y H u t c h e s o n .
H u m e ' s o w n r e m a r k s a b o u t a n d assessments o f H u t c h e s o n ' s phUosophy
s h o w t h a t h e was i n d e e d , a n d i n i m p o r t a n t w a y s , i n s p i r e d a n d i n f l u e n c e d
b y that phUosophy.

' H u m e and Hutcheson', 54.

236 David Fate Norton

4. C O N T E M P O R A R Y V I E W S OF H U M E AND H U T C H E S O N

M o o r e teils us t h a t H u m e ' s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s and nineteenth-century

scholars t o o k his m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y t o b e 'basicaUy chrFerent' f r o m
Hutcheson's. 4 7
F o u r such contemporaries,James Balfour,Adam Smith,
T h o m a s R e i d , a n d A d a m F e r g u s o n , are m e n t i o n e d , b u t n o f u r t h e r r e f ­
e r e n c e s are p r o v i d e d . E a r l y v i e w s a b o u t t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f H u m e t o
H u t c h e s o n are p r o b a b l y r e l e v a n t t o a n a p p r e c i a t i o n o f t h e n a t u r e o f t h a t
r e l a t i o n s h i p , b u t w e n e e d t o l o o k m o r e c l o s e l y at t h o s e v i e w s . 4 8
Without
s u p p o s i n g t h a t m y a c c o u n t is c o m p l e t e , I h e r e o f f e r a b r o a d e r a n d m o r e
detailed survey o f e i g h t e e n t h - and n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u r y o p i n i o n s about
the relationship o f H u m e t o Hutcheson.

1. An anonymous reviewer in the N o u v e H e BibUotheque/or

October 1j3g

The first t w o volumes o f Hume's Treatise w e r e p u b l i s h e d i n J a n u a r y

1739. L a t e r t h a t y e a r t h e Nouvelle Bibliotheque printed a notice ofthe n e w
work. This one-sentence notice began b y observing the similarity
b e t w e e n the views o f t h i s n e w author and those o f H u t c h e s o n :

A l t h o u g h the ideas o f t h e a u t h o r are i n several respects v e r y s i m i k r t o those o f

D r . H u t c h e s o n o n the m o r a l sentiments a n d the passions, there are certainly
m a n y o r i g i n a l things i n this n e w treatise, w h i c h is o n l y the b e g i n n i n g o f a m o r e
extensive a n d c o m p l e t e w o r k . 4 9

2. An anonymous reviewer in the G ö t t i n g i s c h e Zeitungen^ör

December 1739

T h e Göttingische Zeitungen also p u b h s h e d a s h o r t n o t i c e o f t h e Treatise

a n d c o m m e n t e d o n its s i m ü a r i t y t o H u t c h e s o n ' s w o r k :

A n u n k n o w n a u t h o r has prepared A treatise ofhuman nature o r A b h a n d l u n g v o n

der M e n s c h l i c h e n N a t u r , w h e r e i n he has sought, m o r e t h a n any o t h e r previous

4 7
' H u m e and Hutcheson', 2 5 .
4 8
F o r a brief discussion o f the potential interpretative value deriving from studies o f a
philosopher's reception, see Q u e n t i n Skinner,'Meaning and Understanding i n the History o f
Ideas',inJ.Tuuy (ed.),Meaning and Context (Princeton:Princeton UniversityPress, i o 8 8 ) , 5 o 4 i .
4 9
Nouvelle bibliotheque, ou histoire litteraire desprinapaux 6crits qui sepublient, 3 (October 1 7 3 9 ) ,
303.This transLation is my own.
 Hume and Hutcheson 237

a t t e m p t , t o i n t r o d u c e i n t o m o r a k t h e m e t h o d o f d r a w i n g inferences f r o m sen­

sations a n d experiences. I n this w o r k h e has dealt w i t h t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g a n d

t h e passions. I t is o n l y t h e b e g i n n i n g o f a larger w o r k . T h e a u t h o r has i n d e e d

m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h M r . H u t c h i n s o n , t h o u g h [he has] also n o t a f e w new

thoughts ofhis o w n . 5 0

3. An anonymous reviewer in the B i b H o t h e q u e raisonnee

forspring, 1741

V o l u m e 3 o f t h e Treatise was p u b h s h e d i n N o v e m b e r 1740.The foUow­

i n g s p r i n g , t h e Bibliotheque raisonnie p u b h s h e d a substantial r e v i e w o f t h i s

volume. 5 1
This reviewer begins b y granting that the anonymous author

o f t h i s w o r k ( H u m e is n e v e r m e n t i o n e d b y n a m e , a n d is s u p p o s e d t o b e

an Enghshman) is i n t h i s v o l u m e c l e a r e r t h a n h e h a d b e e n i n h i s t w o

5 0
Göttingische Zeitungen vongelehrten Sachen, 1 fDecember 1 7 3 9 ) , 9 0 4 . T h e transktion is by
Dario Perinetti. See ако M . K u e h n , @iume in the GöttingischeAnzeigen: 1739-1800', Hume
Studies 13 ( 1 9 8 7 ) , 4 9 .
5 1
Bibliotheque raisonnie des ouvrages des savans de L'Europe [ВЩ, 26 (Aprü—June, 1741),
4 i i - 2 7 . T h e transkstion that foUows is by D a r i o Perinetti and David Norton.The reader should
k n o w that Moore has attributed this review to Hutcheson, and that at least one schokr has
taken this attribution to be correct.The attribution is i n Moore's unpubhshed but widely c i r ­
culated paper,'WiUiam Smith and the R e v i e w s ofHume's Treatise in the Bibliotheque Raisonnee'
['WiUiam Smith and Hume's Treatise'], presented to the Conference o n Cross-Cvdtural
Perspectivesin theErJightenment,Universityof Victoria, 1 9 9 3 . R o b e r t s o n (see n . 7 ) , r e f e r r 1 n g
to this paper, says: 'It seems that Hutcheson was ahnost certainly the author ofthe successive
critical reviews o f B o o k s I and I I I o f the Treatise of Human Nature . . . [in] the Bibliotheque
Raisonnee . . . reviews w h i c h made a point ofexposing the differences between Hume's work
and Hutcheson's' ('Scottish Contribution', 4 7 ) . E k e w h e r e Moore hypothesizes 'that w h e n
WiUiam Smith undertook to review volume 3 ofthe 2feaftie,'OfMorak', he again consulted
Hutcheson',and that the 'critical perspective ofthe reviewer' ofvolume 3 'was particularly and
peculiarly Hutcheson's' ( J . Moore and M . A . Stewart, ' A Scots-Irish BookseUer i n HoUand:
W i U i a m Smith ofAmsterdam ( 1 6 9 8 — 1 7 4 1 ) ' , Eighteenth-Century Scotland:The Newsletter of the
Eighteenth-Century Scottish Studies Society 7 ( 1 9 9 3 ) , 8—11, at 1 0 ) . T h e discussion that foUows
addresses the hypothesis that the review i n question was written or shaped by Hutcheson, and
shows it to be unhkely. I n the meantime, I note thatJ.W.Yolton has suggested that Pierre Des
Maizeaux may be the author o f the B R review o f volumes 1—2 ('Hume's Abstract i n the
Bibliotheque Raisonnie',Joumal of the History qfIdeas 4 0 ( 1 9 7 9 ) , i 5 7 - 8 ) . M o r e recendy, however,
evidence contrary to that hypothesis has been brought to hght.This evidence is a letter, from
W m . Smith to D e s Maizeaux, that hsts work puhUshed in the relevant volume (vol. 24) o f B R and
for w h i c h Des Maizeaux is to be paid.The first review ofthe Treatise is not included in this hst,
thus suggesting that Des Maizeaux was not the author ofit. Later, this same evidence is ako taken
to show that Des Maizeaux was not the author ofthe review ofvolume 3 pubhshed in BR 26,
but this further conclusion goes beyond the evidence presented. See See B . Lagarrigue, Un tem-
pk de la culture europienne (1728-1753): l'histoire exteme de h Bibhotheque raisonnee des ouvrages
des savants de l'Europe 0STijmegen: pCathoheke Unfversiteit Nijmegen?], 1993), 7 4 , 3 1 7 .
238 David Fate Norton

e a r l i e r v o l u m e s , b u t is n o n e t h e l e s s stül r e g r e t t a b l y o b s c u r e . M o r e t o t h e
present p o i n t , however, the reviewer shows h i m s e i f h i g h l y suspicious o f
any attempt to provide a philosophical foundation for morals. The
'metaphysician w h o undertakes to demonstrate the principles ofnatural
r i g h t ' , h e says,'wastes his time a n d h i s e f f o r t b y m a k i n g t h e m a b s t r a c t ' . I t
is n o t j u s t t h a t , b e c a u s e t h e y are u n d e r s t o o d b y so f e w , s u c h a b s t r a c t
approaches can be o f h m i t e d benefit:

I d o n o t even k n o w that this m e t h o d is n o t reaUy h a r m f u l t o r e h g i o n , i n spite o f

the i n t e n t i o n o f t h e phUosophers w h o use i t . W e k n o w that o u r hearts are c o n -
standy seeking pretexts for a v o i d i n g obedience. Is there any m o r e plausible p r e ­
t e x t t h a n that d r a w n f r o m the o b s c u r i t y o f b o o k s i n t e n d e d t o teach the
elements o f v i r t u e ? Is i t t o m a k e these agreeable that they are made so difficult?
Is this n o t , o n t h e contrary, the means f o r m a k i n g t h e m always disagreeable?
(BR413) 5 2

As the reviewprogresses,however,this general suspicion ofphilosoph-

icaUy b a s e d m o r a l s is r e p l a c e d b y a m o r e n a r r o w l y f o c u s e d d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n
w i t h the moral sense t h e o r y f o u n d m o s t famously i n the w o r k of
H u t c h e s o n , a n d n o w i n this n e w w o r k . N o t i n g that this n e w volume
b e g i n s b y r a i s i n g t h e issue o f t h e f o u n d a t i o n o r sotrrce o f m o r a I distinc­
tions, a n d t h a t t h e v i e w s o f b o t h S a m u e l C l a r k e a n d W o U a s t o n are r e j e c t e d
as u n s o u n d , t h e reviewer complains that the author o f the Treatise
' a p p r o v e s n o n e o f w h a t is m o s t a p p r o v e d o n t h i s s u b j e c t ' (BR 416). 5 3

5 2
I f this review is by Hutcheson, then we have here the first saIvo ofsome remarkable self-
criticism. Hutcheson i n his Inquiry undertook to provide for morals a philosophical founda­
tion ofexacdy the k i n d that is criticized (see e.g. the opening paragraphs ofthe Preface and
1.2, and the tides given to Sections 2.1,2.3,and 2.4). I n the Preface to his Essay on the Nature
and Conduct ofthe Passions andAffections Hutcheson attempted to forestaUjust such criticism
as this reviewer makes, saying: ' I f any should look upon some Things i n this Inquiry into the
Passions, as too subtile for c o m m o n Apprehension, and consequently not necessary for the
Instruction o f M e n i n Morah, w h i c h are the c o m m o n business o f M a n k i n d , let them bear i n
m i n d that some have claimed that we have no 'kind,generousAffedions' and that these mislead­
ing moralists need to be rebutted' ( E s s a y , p. v). I n addition, Hutcheson's important corre­
spondence w i t h Gilbert B u r n e t was apdy pubhshed under the tide Letters between the Late
Mr. Gilbert Burnet and Mr. Hutchinson, concerning the True Foundation qfVirtue or Moral Goodness
(see n. 8).
5 3
As M o o r e points out ('Hume and Hutcheson', 40), Hutcheson had ako criticized the
views ofClarke andWoUaston (in, respectively, the second and third sections ofhis Blustrations
on the Moral Sense). G i v e n the reviewer's imphcit endorsement ofthose views, we have further
grounds for thinking it unlikely that Hutcheson is the author of this review. W h y would
Hutcheson criticize H u m e for criticizing the same rational moralists he had himseU earlier 7

criticized?
 Hume and Hutcheson 239

T h o s e w h o w o n d e r h o w t h i s n e w a u t h o r e x p l a i n s v i r t u e a n d v i c e are
t o l d t h a t h e supposes t h a t

t h e m i n d , as m u c h as the body, has a taste, and that this taste helps i t t o d i s t i n ­

guish that w h i c h is r i g h t fix>m that w h i c h is w r o n g , i n the same m a n n e r as w e at
first glance distinguish that w h i c h is b e a u t i f u l from that w h i c h is ugly. I t is a m a t ­
ter o f s e n t i m e n t : reasoning has n o p k c e i n i t . . . W h a t is r i g h t gives pleasure
and is approved; w h a t is w r o n g produces p a i n and is b k m e d . T h e r e is the key t o
the w h o l e mystery! (BR 4 2 1 - 2 )

T h e n , f o U o w i n g a fuUer s u m m a r y o f t h e p o s i t i v e m o r a l t h e o r y o f B o o k 3,
H u m e is s h a r p l y c r i t i c i z e d f o r g i v i n g us n o t h i n g m o r e t h a n a n essen­
tially u n i m p r o v e d v e r s i o n o f t h e useless, d e m o n s t r a b l y d e f e c t i v e m o r a l
sense t h e o r y o f H u t c h e s o n :

I n ordinary knguage, w h a t w e havejust read amounts, i f l a m n o t mistaken, t o

this. I n order t o express w i t h precision the difference between r i g h t and w r o n g , i t is
necessary t o state the question i n these t e r m s . W h y is i t that o u r m i n d , o n a simple
v i e w o f c e r t a i n actions, is t o u c h e d by a sentiment ofpleasure that makes i t approve
t h e m , whereas o n the v i e w o f o t h e r actions i t is touched b y a contrary sentiment?
M a n y people w o u l d be satisfied t o reply that i t is because w e are so made, b u t for
the h k i n g o f o u r author, this is n o t philosophical enough. I t is necessary to say that
things happen i n this way because o u r rrrind, besides its other faculties, has a mental
taste that to h i m is pardy natural, b u t ako pardy artfficiat—that is to say, w h i c h i n
part foUows from the constitution o f o u r nature, and i n part is the product o f e d u -
cation, example, conventions and o f h u m a n laws (des constitutions humaines).Wiih
the help o f t h i s taste o u r m i n d first knows, b y the pleasure or pain i t experiences,
that w h i c h is moraUy g o o d and moraUy bad, and thus, spared f r o m reasoning, this
sentiment suffices f o r i t t o choose,without doubt, to embrace v i r t u e and avoid vice.

T h a t is the w h o l e system o f o u r a u t h o r . W h e n M r H u t c h e s o n proposed i t i n

his Recherches sur l'origine des Idees que nous avons de la Vertu & du Bien moral, 54
able
people f o u n d i n i t three great flaws. 55
Firsdy, t h e y d i d n o t approve o f t h i s sup­
p o s i t i o n o f a n e w m e n t a l faculty, i n t e n d e d o n l y t o enable o u r m i n d t o discern
r i g h t from w r o n g . T h e y saw this as absolutely useless, and c k i m e d that the m i n d ,
g i v e n its indisputable capacity t o reflect and sense, is adequately f u r n i s h e d w i t h
aU that w h i c h is necessary f o r i t t o distinguish g o o d from eviL Secondly, they
observed that i n this system the p e r c e p t i o n o f o b j e c t s is c o n f o u n d e d w i t h the

5 4
Reviewer's note: 'An Inquiry concerning the Original of our Ideas ofVirtue and Moral Good.
8 v o ' . T h e correct short title 'is:An Inquiry into the Original ofourIdeas ofBeauty andVirtue.
5 5
'Voüä tout le Systeme de notre Auteur. Q u a n d Mr. Hutcheson le proposa dans ses
Recherches sur l'origine des Idies que nous avons de la Vertu &Bien moral, d'habiles gens y trouverent
trois grand defauts' ( B R 423).
 240 David Fate Norton

sentiments t h a t result f r o m i t . O n t h i s , M r . B u r n e t raised objections that u p u n t i l

n o w have r e m a i n e d u n a n s w e r e d . 56
T h i r d l y , and k s t , t h e y d i d n o t conceal that
this m e n t a l taste (Gout spirituel), o r this moral sentiment, whatever one wishes t o
caU i t , is clearly h n k e d t o fanaticism, and can at least v e r y easily o p e n the d o o r
to the excesses o f enthusiasm. D r . Berkeley sharply exposed this d i f f i c u l t y i n his
Alciphron, 57
and made i t clear that n o t h i n g w o u l d be m o r e arbitrary t h a n the
ideas o f r i g h t and w r o n g i f these depended o n such an i n n e r taste. I d o n o t
understand h o w i t is that o u r a u t h o r d i d n o t find i t appropriate t o examine the
objections o f t h e s e scholars.They w o u l d have o p e n e d a b e a u t i f u l field f o r his
speculations, and f o r his p r o f o u n d metaphysics. Perhaps i t is modesty, perhaps
even prudence. H o w can one add a n y t h i n g t o the ingenious efforts that
M r . H u t c h e s o n has opposed t o M r . Burnet's reflections o n this t o p i c ? 58

How, w e c a n r e a s o n a b l y ask, are t h e s e severe c r i t i c i s m s o f H u t c h e s o n ' s

m o r a l sense t h e o r y t o b e m a d e c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e thesis t h a t H u t c h e s o n
himseLfis the a u t h o r o f t h i s review, o r even w i t h the suggestion that the
' c r i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e r e v i e w e r ' o f v o l u m e 3 'was p a r t i c u l a r l y a n d
p e c u h a r l y H u t c h e s o n ' s ' ? M o o r e c o n j e c t u r e s t h a t H u t c h e s o n r a i s e d these
o b j e c t i o n s t o his o w n t h e o r y because h e was d i s a p p o i n t e d t h a t H u m e
w a s n o t a s u f f i c i e n d y f a i t h f u l d i s c i p l e : ' I f H u m e was i n d e e d a f a i t h f u l f o l ­
l o w e r o f H u t c h e s o n ' s , as h e s e e m e d t o b e p r e t e n d i n g , w h y h a d h e n o t
d e f e n d e d his m e n t o r f r o m his c r i t i c s ? T h e i m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e reviewer's
[ i . e . H u t c h e s o n ' s ] r h e t o r i c a l q u e s t i o n s w a s clear. H u m e m e r e l y a p p e a r e d
to b e a f o U o w e r o f H u t c h e s o n ' s . I n fact h e was n o t h i n g o f t h e k i n d ' . 5 9

A g a i n s t t h i s thesis I c o n c l u d e t h a t t h e r e v i e w e r ' s g e n e r a l h o s t i h t y t o
m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y , a n d especiaUy t o t h e m o r a l sense t h e o r y , c o m b i n e d
w i t h t h e fact t h a t h e makes mistakes that H u t c h e s o n w o u l d p r o b a b l y
not h a v e m a d e ( n o t k n o w i n g t h e tides, c o n t e n t , o r s c o p e o f h i s o w n
w o r k ; supposing H u m e t o be an Enghshman), lead t o the c o n c l u s i o n
t h a t M o o r e ' s h y p o t h e s e s a b o u t t h e o r i g i n s o f t h i s r e v i e w are u n h k e l y t o
b e t r u e . A n d t h a t c o n c l u s i o n leads t h e n t o a n o t h e r r e l e v a n t t o t h e p o i n t
at issue: a t h i r d a n o n y m o u s r e v i e w e r , t h e a u t h o r o f t h i s r e v i e w , saw sig¬
n i f i c a n t simUarities b e t w e e n t h e phUosophies o f H u t c h e s o n and H u m e .

5 6
Reviewer's note: 'Letters between the bxte M r . Gilbert Bumet and Mr. Hutcheson, concerning the
foundation ofVirtue &c. 8. Lond. 1735. N 0 philosophical controversy has ever been conducted, by
both parties, with so m u c h spirit, candour, and pokteness, as i n these letters ofMessrs.Burnet and
Hutcheson. O n e can without reservation ofFer them as a perfect model for this kind ofdispute'.
5 7
Reviewer's note:'Alciphron;or,TheMinutePhilosopher,Oisl.ΙΙΓ.
5 8
A s M o o r e points out, this reviewer also goes o n to criticize H u m e for offering an account
ofjustice that is, i n effect,'Hobbes's system clothed i n a new fashion' ( B R 426^7).
5 9
'WiUiam Smith and Hume's TreatUe', 25.
 Hume and Hutcheson 241

4. Henry Home, Lard Kames

A p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n f i d a n t o f H u m e d u r i n g t h e latter's f o r m a t i v e years,
K a m e s r e s p o n d e d i n p r i n t t o t h e Treatise. I n a b r i e f d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e
m o r a l sense K a m e s c o m p l a i n s t h a t its p r i n c i p a l p r o p o n e n t s , S h a f t e s b u r y ,
H u t c h e s o n , a n d ' t h e a u t h o r o f t h e treatise u p o n h u m a n n a t u r e ' f a i l t o
p r o v i d e a n adequate f o u n d a t i o n o f m o r a h t y because t h e y fail t o a c c o u n t
f o r d u t y a n d o b h g a t i o n . H u m e d i f f e r s from t h e s e p r e d e c e s s o r s i n so f a r
as h e ' e n d e a v o u r s t o r e s o l v e t h e m o r a l sense i n t o p u r e s y m p a t h y ' , b u t t h i s
p r i n c i p l e is also ' f a r t o o f a i n t t o c o n t r o l o u r i r r e g u l a r a p p e t i t e s a n d p a s -
s i o n s ' . K a m e s closes h i s r e m a r k s o n H u m e b y n o t i n g t h a t ' i t is i m p o r t a n t
t o o b s e r v e , t h a t u p o n t h i s a u t h o r ' s s y s t e m , as w e U as Hutchison's, the noted
t e r m s ofduty, obligation, a n d should &c. are p e r f e c d y u n i n t e U i g i b l e ' . 6 0

5. James Balfour

I n his Delineation of the Nature and Obligation ofMorality 0f1753, and then
a g a i n n e a r l y t h i r t y years l a t e r i n h i s Philosophical Dissertati0ns,]3mes
B a l f o u r discussed H u m e ' s m o r a l theory. I n the earher w o r k Balfour
made n o explicit comparisons b e t w e e n H u m e and Hutcheson, b u t he
b e g a n b y insisting 'that private happiness . . . m u s t be t h e c h i e f e n d and
object o f e v e r y man's p u r s u i t ' , a n d t h e n w e n t o n t o criticize the m o r a l
sense p h i l o s o p h e r s . T o 6 1
s u p p o s e as t h e y d o t h a t a p e r s o n is so m a d e as t o
t a k e m o r e p l e a s u r e i n t h e h a p p i n e s s o f a n o t h e r t h a n i n his o w n is i n
efFect t o say t h a t t h i s ' v e r y p l e a s u r e is reaUy h i s o w n p r o p e r h a p p i n e s s ' ,
a n d t h a t 'seU>love w o u l d , i n t h i s case, p r o m p t h i m c h i e f l y t o p u r s u e t h e
happiness o f t h a t o t h e r b e i n g ' . E v e n Shaftesbury a n d Hutcheson,'who
h a v e taUced b i g g e s t o f t h e d i s i n t e r e s t e d n e s s o f v i r t u e , h a v e e v e r b e e n
o b H g e d t o s u p p o r t t h e i r scheme, b y t h e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f these p u r e r
j o y s , a n d s u p e r i o r d e h g h t s , w h i c h arise from t h e i m m e d i a t e g r a t i f i c a t i o n
o f t h e k i n d a n d v i r t u o u s a f f e c t i o n s ' (Delineation, 4 - 6 ) . I t is o n l y i n his
later w o r k t h a t B a l f o u r e x p h c i d y c o n n e c t s H u m e t o H u t c h e s o n , saying,
'Mr Hume has e x t e n d e d t h e i n f l u e n c e o f sentiment i n morals far

6 0
H e n r y H o m e , Essays on the Prindples ofMorality and Natural Religion (Edinburgh, 1751),

57-8.
6 1
A Delineation qf the Nature and Obligation ofMorality, with Reflexions upon Mr. Hume's Book,
intitkd,An. Inquiry concerning the Principles o f M o r a k [Delineation] flidinburgh, 1753),pub-
lished anonymously. H u m e attempted to estabhsh a friendly correspondence w i t h the author,
but received no reply to a letter left (it is said) w i t h the work's pubhsher. See LDHi 172—4.
242 David Fate Norton

b e y o n d D r H u t c h e s o n ' , l a r g e l y b e c a u s e his ' c a t a l o g u e o f t h e virtues'

i n c l u d e s aU t h e o b j e c t s o f a p p r o b a t i o n , o r b o t h m e n t a l a n d p h y s i c a l
quahties that i n Balfour's v i e w have n o m o r a l character. 6 2

B a l f o u r also insists, a g a i n s t aU t h e m o r a l sense t h e o r i s t s , t h a t m o r a l i t y ,

w h i c h is i n v a r i a b l e , c a n n o t b e f o u n d e d o n the notoriously variable
responses o f t h e m o r a l sense ( t h e e x i s t e n c e o f w h i c h h e is p r e p a r e d to
g r a n t ) . F o r B a l f o u r , m o r a h t y rests u l t i m a t e l y o n r e a s o n a n d , b e y o n d t h a t ,
the authority o f t h e D e i t y and the prospect o f r e w a r d or punishment i n
a f u t u r e e x i s t e n c e . H e classifies m o r a l t h e o r i e s as t h e i s t i c ( t h o s e t h a t
r e c o g n i z e t h e essential r o l e o f t h e D e i t y ) a n d a t h e i s t i c o r Epicurean
(those w h i c h a t t e m p t t o a c c o u n t f o r m o r a k w i t h o u t reference t o t h e
D e i t y ) . H u m e ' s is classed a m o n g t h e b t t e r b e c a u s e his m o r a l t h e o r y is
f o u n d to be 'no other than the ancient scheme w h i c h excluded rehgion,
w h i c h E p i c u r u s first r e d u c e d t o some f o r m , a n d c l o t h e d w i t h a tolerably
d e c e n t dress; h e r e f e r r e d aU t o seH" l o v e a n d i m m e d i a t e enjoyment'
(Delineation, 123). I n his l a t e r w o r k B a h o u r a g a i n associates H u m e w i t h
t h e E p i c u r e a n s , b u t h e t h e r e d o e s so b e c a u s e H u m e a t t e m p t s t o a c c o u n t
f o r v i r t u e (as d o aU t h e m o r a l sense p h U o s o p h e r s , B a i f o u r suggests) o n
the 'Epicurean p r i n c i p l e s ' o f sensory pleasure a n d p a i n (Dissertations,
173). I n b r i e f , B a h o u r finds, between Hutcheson and H u m e , more
simQarities t h a n differences, b u t does d r a w a p p r o p r i a t e a t t e n t i o n t o t h e
secular character o f H u m e ' s t h e o r y .

6. RichardPrice

P r i c e ' s Review qf the Principal Questions and Difficulties in MoraL· w a s first

published i n 1758. 63
Although c a U e d a 'Review' of moral questions,
Price's w o r k is, i n s o f a r as i t discusses t h e moral philosophies of
H u t c h e s o n and H u m e , an extended critique o f Hutcheson's theory of
the moral sense w i t h a few references t o Hume's related views.
Hutcheson, P r i c e says, ' d e d u c e s o u r m o r a l ideas f r o m a moral sense'
w h i c h t h r o u g h t h e m e d i u m o f i d e a s leads us t o a p p r o v e o f s o m e m o r a l
o b j ects a n d t o d i s a p p r o v e o f o t h e r s , w i t h t h e resvdt t h a t m o r a l ' t i g h t a n d

6 2
PhilosophicalDissertations[Dissertations] @5dinburgh,i782),i57,i63.
6 3
T h e fuU title o f the first (1758) and second editions (1769) was A Review ofthe Principal
Questions and Difficulties in Morals. Particularly those relating to the Original of our Ideas qjVirtue, its
Nature, Foundation, Reference to the Deity, Subject-Matter, and Sanctions. I quote here from the text
ofthe third edition (London, 1787), ed. D. D. Raphael, A Review of the Prindpal Questions in
Morals [Review] fx>ndon: Oxford University Press, 1948).
 Hume and Hutcheson 243

w r o n g ' n o m o r e refer t o o b j e c t i v e qualities t h a n d o t h e t e r m s 'sweet a n d

b i t t e r ' . M o r a l p e r c e p t i o n s are e m o t i o n s w h i c h , h a d o u r n a t u r e s b e e n
d i f f e r e n d y c o n s t i t u t e d , w o u l d p i c k o u t as r i g h t a n d w r o n g a c o m p l e t e l y
d i f f e r e n t set o f o b j e c t s (Review, 13-15). I n his subsequent c o m m e n t s o n
t h i s t h e o r y , w h i c h h e supposes s e r i o u s l y m i s t a k e n , P r i c e also a t t r i b u t e s
i t t o H u m e . R e p e a t i n g his c r i t i c i s m o f H u t c h e s o n ' s association o f m o r a l
g o o d a n d e v i l w i t h t h e effects t h a t a c c o m p a n y c e r t a i n p e r c e p t i o n s ,
P r i c e p o i n t s o u t t h a t H u m e has said t h e s a m e t h i n g : ' T h e v i r t u e o f a n
a c t i o n , M r H w m e says,is itspleasingus after aparticular manner'.This same
p a t t e r n is r e p e a t e d l a t e r i n t h e w o r k (Review 6 3 , 2 1 1 - 1 2 ) . P r i c e also i n
passing criticizes H u m e ' s a c c o u n t o f causation, his scepticism a b o u t
r e a s o n , a n d his a c c o u n t o f p e r s o n a l i d e n t i t y , b u t h e r o u t i n e l y takes
H u m e ' s moral t h e o r y t o b e e s s e n t i a h y t h e s a m e as H u t c h e s o n ' s (Review
25,56,96).

7. Adam Smith

I n t h e final p a r t o f h i s Theory qf Moral Sentiments,Adam S m i t h reviews

'the m o s t celebrated and remarkable o f the different theories w h i c h
have b e e n g i v e n c o n c e r n i n g t h e nature a n d o r i g i n o f o u r m o r a l senti­
m e n t s ' . S m i t h structures this r e v i e w a r o u n d t h e answers m o r a l p h i l o ­
s o p h e r s g i v e t o t w o q u e s t i o n s : (1) ' w h e r e i n does v i r t u e consist?' a n d
(2) ' b y w h a t p o w e r o r f a c u l t y i n t h e m i n d is i t ' t h a t v i r t u e is r e c o m m e n d e d
t o us? H i s l e n g t h y a n d c o m p l e x d i s c u s s i o n p r o d u c e s several i m p o r t a n t , b u t
i m p h c i t , c o m p a r i s o n s o f H u t c h e s o n a n d H u m e (TMS 7.1.1—2).
S m i t h reports f o u r different k i n d s o f answers t o his first question.
V i r t u e has b e e n said t o c o n s i s t i n propriety, i n prudence, and benevolence
(TMS 7.2. I n t r o . ) . 6 4
I n i t i a U y , S m i t h says t h a t i t is t h e P l a t o n i s t s , the
Peripatetics, t h e Stoics, a n d t h e m o d e r n rationahsts w h o have traced
v i r t u e t o p r o p r i e t y , t h a t i t is t h e E p i c u r e a n s w h o h a v e t r a c e d i t t o p r u ­
d e n c e , a n d t h a t o f t h o s e t r a c i n g i t t o b e n e v o l e n c e t h e m o s t n o t a b l e is

6 4
According to Smith, the three systems corresponding to these answers are ahke in one
fundamental: each supposes 'that there is a real and essential distinction between vice and
virtue,whateverthese quahties may consist i n ' . I n contrast,the proponents ofa fourththeory,
the 'hcentious system' (MandeviUe is the principal representative), attempted 'to prove that
there was no real virtue', and that what 'pretended to be [virtue], was a mere cheat and i m p o ­
sition upon mankind' ( T M S 7 . 2 . 4 . 1 , 1 2 ) . C o n c e r n w i t h moral realism obviously did not begin,
as M o o r e suggests ('Hume and Hutcheson', 2 5 ) , i n the twentieth century. (See also below, on
Dugald Stewart's account ofHutcheson's theory.)
244 David Fate Norton

Hutcheson. 6 5
A t t h e c l o s e o f a l e n g t h y survey, S m i t h , w r i t i n g with
H u m e i n m i n d , adds t h e ' s y s t e m w h i c h places v i r t u e i n u t i h t y ' t o t h e h s t
o f systems t h a t s u p p o s e v i r t u e consists i n p r o p r i e t y , o r i n ' t h e p r o p e r
d e g r e e o f a U t h e a f f e c t i o n s ' ( T M S 7 . 2 . 3 . 2 1 ) . O n t h i s issue H u t c h e s o n a n d
H u m e are s u p p o s e d t o b e d i f F e r e n t , b u t n o t o n l y is H u m e n o t t a k e n t o
b e a n E p i c u r e a n , i t is h e , a n d n o t H u t c h e s o n , w h o is t h o u g h t t o r e s e m ­
ble t h e Stoics.
S m i t h shows t h a t H u t c h e s o n a n d H u m e give s i m i l a r answers t o his
s e c o n d q u e s t i o n : B y w h a t p o w e r o r f a c u l t y o f m i n d is i t t h a t v i r t u e is
r e c o m m e n d e d t o us? B o t h s u p p o s e t h e a n s w e r t o b e n e i t h e r s e l f - l o v e
( t h e a n s w e r o f t h e egoists) n o r r e a s o n ( t h e a n s w e r o f t h e r a t i o n a h s t s ) , b u t
s e n t i m e n t . I n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e egoists, H u t c h e s o n u n d e r t o o k ' t o p r o v e
t h a t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f a p p r o b a t i o n [is] n o t f o u n d e d o n s e r f - l o v e ' , b u t o n ,
rather,'a sentiment o f a pecuhar n a t u r e , u p o n a particular p o w e r o f p e r -
c e p t i o n e x e r t e d b y t h e m i n d at t h e v i e w o f c e r t a i n a c t i o n s o r a f f e c t i o n s ' ,
h i o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e rationahsts, H u t c h e s o n ' d e m o n s t r a t e d ' that o u r
m o r a l assessments ' c o u l d n o t arise f f o m a n y o p e r a t i o n o f r e a s o n ' , a n d
t h u s t h a t t h e y m u s t d e p e n d o n s e n t i m e n t s . S m i t h is, h o w e v e r , dissatisfied
w i t h H u t c h e s o n ' s f u r t h e r c l a i m t h a t these s e n t i m e n t s r e s u l t f f o m t h e
o p e r a t i o n o f a d i s t i n c t i v e m o r a l f a c u l t y , t h e m o r a l sense, a n d h e is e q u a U y
dissatisfied w i t h H u m e ' s v i e w t h a t , a l t h o u g h t h e r e is n o d i s t i n c t i v e
m o r a l f a c u l t y , m o r a l a p p r o b a t i o n o r d i s a p p r o b a t i o n are n o n e t h e l e s s d i s ­
tinct ' f e e h n g s o r e m o t i o n s w h i c h arise i n t h e m i n d u p o n t h e v i e w o f c h f -
f e r e n t c h a r a c t e r s a n d a c t i o n s ' , b u t h e c l e a r l y supposes t h a t o n t h i s issue
t h e v i e w s o f H u t c h e s o n a n d H u m e are s i r n i l a r (TMS 7.3.3.2, 4 , 11).66
M o r e generaUy, S m i t h supposes t h a t t h e r e are s u b s t a n t i a l s i m U a r i t i e s
between the m o r a l theories o f H u t c h e s o n and H u m e . T h e t w o p h i l o ­
s o p h e r s d i f f e r o n t h e m a t t e r o f w h a t c o n s t i t u t e s v i r t u e , b u t t h e y are a l i k e
i n s u p p o s i n g t h a t t h e r e is a r e a l d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n v i r t u e a n d v i c e , a n d
t h a t i t is s e n t i m e n t t h a t i n f o r m s us o f t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n . B r i e f l y t h e n ,
S m i t h finds Hutcheson's v i e w s decidedly u n h k e those o f t h e Stoics,and
H u m e ' s H k e t h o s e o f t h e S t o i c s a n d f u n d a m e n t a U y d i f f e r e n t from t h o s e
o f the Epicureans.

6 5
O f 'аИ the patrons of this system, ancient or modern', Smith writes, 'the late
D r . Hutcheson was undoubtedly, beyond aU comparison, the most acute, the most distinct, the
mostphilosophical. . . t h e s o b e r e s t a n d m o s t j u d i c i o u s ' ( T M S 7 . 2 . 3 . 3 ) .
6 6
SndmappearstobeparaphrasingTHiv'3.1.2.3.
 Hume and Hutcheson 245

8. Thomas Reid

Reid's one expHcit comparison o f H u t c h e s o n a n d H u m e focuses o n

t h e i r d e s c r i p t i v e p s y c h o l o g y , n o t i n g t h a t H u m e 'gives t h e n2mepassi0n
t o e v e r y p r i n c i p l e o f a c t i o n i n t h e h u m a n m i n d ' , w h i l e H u t c h e s o n gives
that name only to 'turbulent and vehement' principles of mind.
H u t c h e s o n ' s usage is t h a t p r e f e r r e d a n d a d o p t e d b y R e i d . 6 7
I n m o r e nar­
r o w l y m o r a l matters, R e i d attributes to H u m e a version o f the m o r a l
sense t h e o r y o f H u t c h e s o n , n a m e l y , t h e v i e w t h a t ' t h e p r o p e r o b j e c t o f
M o r a l A p p r o b a t i o n ' is ' n a t u r a l a f f e c t i o n s o r passions', w h i l e moral
a p p r o b a t i o n i t s e l f is n o t a n act o f j u d g e m e n t , but a 'certain Feeling,
w h i c h , f r o m t h e c o n s t i t u t i o n o f h u m a n n a t u r e , arises u p o n c o n t e m p l a t ­
i n g c e r t a i n characters, o r quahties o f m i n d , cooUy and impartiaUy'.
S u p p o s i n g t h i s t o b e t r u e , R e i d asks w h i c h are t h e q u a h t i e s t h a t ' p r o d u c e ,
i n the disinterested observer, the feehng o f a p p r o b a t i o n , o r the c o n t r a r y
f e e h n g ? ' H u m e ' s a n s w e r is s a i d t o b e t h o s e ' q u a h t i e s o f m i n d w h i c h are
agreeable o r useful t o t h e p e r s o n w h o possesses t h e m , o r t o others'.Reid
is severe i n h i s c r i t i c i s m o f t h i s v i e w , s a y i n g f i r s t t h a t i t r e d u c e s m o r a l
m e r i t t o t h e dulce a n d t h e utile, a n d leaves ' n o r o o m ' f o r t h e 'honestum' of
w h i c h C i c e r o speaks: ' B y Honestum, t h e n , w e u n d e r s t a n d t h a t w h i c h is
o f s u c h a nature that, t h o u g h devoid o f a U utihty, i t c a n j u s d y be com­
m e n d e d i n a n d f o r itseh , a p a r t f r o m a n y p r o f i t o r r e w a r d ' .
0 6 8
R e i d then
g o e s o n t o say:

A m o n g the ancient moralists, the Epicureans w e r e the o n l y sect w h o d e n i e d

that there is any such t h i n g as honestum, or m o r a l w o r t h , distinct from pleasure.
I n t h i s , M r . H u m e ' s system agrees w i t h theirs. For the a d d i t i o n o f u t i l i t y t o pleas­
ure, as a f o u n d a t i o n o f m o r a k , makes o n l y a verbal, b u t n o real differ­
ence . . . W h a t a m a n does, m e r e l y because i t is agreeable, o r useful t o procure
w h a t is agreeable, is n o t v i r t u e . T h e r e f o r e the E p i c u r e a n system was j u s d y
t h o u g h t , b y Cicero, and the best moralists a m o n g the ancients, to subvert moraHty.
(ActivePowers 5.5)

T h i s is n o t , h o w e v e r , R e i d ' s last w o r d o n H u m e a n d E p i c u r u s . H e
i m m e d i a t e l y goes o n t o e m p h a s i z e a c r u c i a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e m ,

6 7
Essays on the Active Powers of Man [Active Powers], i n The Works qf Thomas Reid,
ed.W. H a m i l t 0 n , 7 t h e d n . , 2 v 0 k . @idinburgh, 1S72),Essay 3,Part 2 , c h . 6 .
6 8
R e i d cites Cicero, Defin. 2 . 1 4 . 4 5 , i n t h e original L a n n . T h e L o e b translation used here
renders honestum as 'MoralWorth'.
246 David Fate Norton

i n effect d e f e n d i n g H u m e f r o m t h e charge o f b e i n g a n E p i c u r e a n :

I n one t h i n g , however, [ H u m e s system] differs remarkably f r o m that o f

E p i c u r u s . I t ailows that there are disinterested affections i n h u m a n nature; that
the love o f c h i l d r e n and relations, friendship, gratitude, compassion, and
h u m a n i t y , are n o t , as E p i c u r u s m a i n t a i n e d , different m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f s e i f l o v e ,
b u t simple and o r i g i n a l parts o f t h e h u m a n c o n s t i t u t i o n ; that w h e n interest, o r
envy, o r revenge, pervert n o t o u r disposition, w e are incHned, f r o m natural p h i ­
lanthropy, t o desire, and to be pleased w i t h the happiness o f t h e h u m a n k i n d .

H v r m e m a i n t a i n s t h i s O p p o s i t i o n t o t h e E p i c u r e a n s y s t e m ' , R e i d adds,
' w i t h great strength o f r e a s o n a n d eloquence', a n d whereas a c c o r d i n g t o
E p i c u r u s , ' v i r t u e is w h a t e v e r is a g r e e a b l e t o o u r s e l v e s ' , a c c o r d i n g t o
H u m e , v i r t u e is ' e v e r y q u a h t y o f r n i n d t h a t is a g r e e a b l e o r u s e f u l t o o u r ­
selves o r t o o t h e r s ' (Active Powers 5 . 5 ) . F o r R e i d , t h e n , H u m e has a s i g ­
n i f i c a n t E p i c u r e a n t e n d e n c y , b u t h e is n o t a c o m p l e t e E p i c u r e a n . O n t h e
issue o f h u m a n m o t i v a t i o n , h e is said t o h o l d t h e v i e w , c e n t r a l to
H u t c h e s o n ' s m o r a l t h e o r y , t h a t h u m a n s h a v e , as a p a r t o f t h e i r nature,
b o t h disinterested a n d b e n e v o l e n t m o t i v a t i o n s . 6 9

9. AdamFerguson

I have n o t found i n Ferguson's w o r k an expHcit comparison of

H u t c h e s o n a n d H u m e , a n d n o association o f H u m e ' s m o r a l t h e o r y w i t h
t h a t o f t h e E p i c u r e a n s , a l t h o u g h F e r g u s o n d o e s , i n h i s Prindples qf Moral
and Political Sdence, offer a brief, comprehensive r e v i e w o f t h e o r i e s p r o ­
posed to account for m o r a l approbation. Rationahst theories, he begins,
' h a v e b e e n r e j e c t e d , as u n f i t t o e x p l a i n ' t h i s p h e n o m e n o n . 7 0
The alter­
n a t i v e t h e o r i e s are t h o s e t h a t a p p e a l t o u t i h t y , t o s y m p a t h y , a n d t o a
m o r a l sense. H e says t h a t t h e ' a u t h o r o f [ t h e ] s y s t e m ' p l a c i n g v i r t u e i n
u t i h t y maintains t h a t ' m o r a l a p p r o b a t i o n does n o t e x t e n d t o matters of
m e r e p h y s i c a l u t i h t y ; ß m t ] is l i m i t e d t o m i n d , a n d its a c t i v e exertions'.

6 9
I n a more recent paper M o o r e says that, i n his Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals,
' H u m e was clearly determined to estabhsh i n human nature an indisputable, irreducible p k c e
for benevolencc'. H e also says that R e i d recognized that H u m e 'had not reduced the passions
and affections, as Epicurus did, to self-love' ('Utihty and Humanity: T h e Quest for the
Honestum in Cicero, Hutcheson, and H u m e ' , Utilitas 14 (November 2 0 0 2 ) , 3 6 5 - 8 6 ; 3 8 1 , 3 8 4 ) .
B u t this later paper records no change ofopinion about Hume's position i n the Treatise.
7 0
Prindples of Moral and Political Sdence, 2 vok. @3chnburgh, 1 7 9 2 ; fac. N e w Y o r k : Garland
Press, 1 9 7 8 ) , 2 . 2 . 3 ; aH citations ofFerguson are from this section. Hume's moral philosophy is
not discussed in either o f Ferguson's earher works, An Essay on the History of Civil Sodety
^ d i n b u r g h , 1767),and InstitutesofMoralPhilosophy Edinburgh, 1769).
 Hume and Hutcheson 247

A l t h o u g h p r e c i s e l y t h e l a n g u a g e c i t e d is n o t f o u n d i n H u m e , F e r g u s o n
m a y h a v e h i m i n m i n d . I n b o t h t h e Treatise a n d h i s s e c o n d Enquiry
H u m e d i d c o n c l u d e t h a t i t is o n l y q u a h t i e s o f m i n d o r c h a r a c t e r w h i c h
are t h e o b j e c t o f m o r a l a p p r o b a t i o n , w h i l e F e r g u s o n does g o o n t o
say t h a t H u m e has ' i n c o l o u r s o f g l o w i n g a n d s u p e r i o r eloquence'
s h o w n t h a t v i r t u e is ' s u p r e m e l y u s e f u l ' . F e r g u s o n n e x t c o n s i d e r s a n d
rejects t h e t h e o r y t h a t s y m p a t h y is ' t h e p r i n c i p l e o f m o r a l a p p r o b a t i o n ' .
H u m e d i d o f c o u r s e s u p p o s e t h a t s y m p a t h y plays a r o l e i n m o r a l s , b u t
F e r g u s o n appears t o b e d i r e c t i n g his o b j e c t i o n s t o w a r d s s y m p a t h y as i t is
e x p l a i n e d i n A d a m S m i t h ' s Theory of Moral Sentiments. Lasdy, F e r g u s o n
considers the suggestion that h u m a n s have a distinctive p o w e r , a m o r a l
sense, t h a t enables us t o d i s t i n g u i s h r i g h t f r o m w r o n g . T h e use o f t h i s
t e r m has l e d s o m e t o s u p p o s e t h a t w e have b e e n p r o v i d e d w i t h a
distinctive 'judicative' p o w e r t h a t enables us t o assess c h a r a c t e r and
d i s p o s i t i o n s . B u t F e r g u s o n , i n t e n d i n g t o b e a g o o d N e w t o n i a n , aUows
for only a figurative use o f ' m o r a l sense'. T h i s t e r m , H k e ' g r a v i t y ' o r
' m a g n e t i s m ' , has n o e x p l a n a t o r y w e i g h t , a n d its use s h o u l d c o n c e a l n o
'hypothesis t o account for the p h e n o m e n o n o f m o r a l approbation'. I t
m e r e l y expresses t h e f a c t , i n ' n o w a y s u s c e p t i b l e o f explanation or
p r o o f , that w e d o discern the difference b e t w e e n r i g h t a n d w r o n g .
S h a f t e s b u r y is t h e o n l y p h i l o s o p h e r c r e d i t e d w i t h u s i n g t h e t e r m i n t h i s
properly restricted manner.

10. Dugald Stewart

After studying w i t h b o t h A d a m Ferguson and T h o m a s R e i d , D u g a l d

S t e w a r t i n 1785 s u c c e e d e d F e r g u s o n as p r o f e s s o r o f m o r a l p h i l o s o p h y at
E d i n b u r g h . Stewart was clearly c o n v i n c e d t h a t H u m e h a d c o m e u n d e r
the influence o f H u t c h e s o n , a n d that the m o r a l theories o f the t w o
w e r e , d e s p i t e a p p a r e n t d i f f e r e n c e s , f u n d a m e n t a U y a h k e . S t e w a r t ' s earhest
b o o k , Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind (1792),sets t h e d i r e c ­
t i o n h e was t o f o U o w i n aU h i s w o r k :

M r . H u m e entered i n t o his Inquiries concerning Morah at a p e r i o d w h e n

D r . Hutcheson's l i t e r a r y name was unrivaUed i n S c o d a n d . T h e abstract p r i n c i ­
ples o n w h i c h his doctrines are f o u n d e d , differ w i d e l y f r o m those o f h i s prede­
cessor, a n d are u n f o l d e d w i t h far greater ingenuity, precision, and elegance. I n
various instances, however, he treads very closely i n D r . Hutcheson's footsteps;
and i n the final result o f his reasonings, he coincides w i t h h i m exacdy.
248 David Fate Norton

A c c o r d i n g t o b o t h w r i t e r s , a regard t o general expediency [ u t i l i t y ] afFords the

o n l y universal c a n o n for the r e g u l a t i o n o f o u r c o n d u c t . 7 1

T w o years l a t e r , i n h i s Account of the Life and Writings of Adam Smith,

S t e w a r t says t h a t H u t c h e s o n (who had been A d a m Smith's teacher)
i n t e n d e d t o ' s h o w t h a t t h e w o r d s R i g h t a n d W r o n g express c e r t a i n
agreeable a n d disagreeable qualities i n a c t i o n ' , a n d cahed this p e r c e p t u a l
p o w e r the moral sense. H u t c h e s o n ' s 'reasonings u p o n this subject',
S t e w a r t goes o n t o say,

are i n the m a i n acquiesced i n , b o t h b y M r . H u m e a n d M r . S m i t h ; b u t they d i f ­

fer f r o m h i m i n one i m p o r t a n t p a r t i c u l a r , — D r . H u t c h e s o n plairdy supposing,
that the M o r a l Sense is a simple p r i n c i p l e o f o u r c o n s t i t u t i o n , o f w h i c h n o
account can be given; whereas the o t h e r t w o philosophers have b o t h a t t e m p t e d
t o a n d y z e i t i n t o o t h e r principles m o r e generaL (Works x . 17)

I n a l e n g t h y essay p u b h s h e d i n 1810, S t e w a r t q u o t e s H u t c h e s o n ' s c k i m s

t h a t ' c a U i n g t h e Ideas o f V i r t u e a n d V i c e P e r c e p t i o n s o f a Sense' i n n o
w a y d i m i n i s h e s t h e i r ' R e a h t y ' , a n d t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t t h e m o r a l sense m a y
b e c o r r e c t e d b y r e a s o n i n n o w a y e n t a i l s t h a t w e h a v e t h e ideas o f v i r t u e
a n d v i c e p r i o r t o t h e o p e r a t i o n o f t h e m o r a l sense. H u m e , S t e w a r t c o n ­
t i n u e s , w a s n o t satisfied w i t h H u t c h e s o n ' s r e p l y , a n d 'has, a c c o r d i n g l y ,
w i t h h i s u s u a l acuteness, p u s h e d t h i s s c h e m e o f m o r a l s ( w h i c h he evi-
dendy adopted f r o m Hutcheson a n d S h a f t e s b u r y ) t o its u l t i m a t e a n d
l e g i t i m a t e c o n c l u s i o n ' (Works v . 8 2 ) . I n his m a g n u m o p u s , The Philosophy
of theActive and Moral Powers ofMan (1828),Stewart argued that H u m e ' s
theory o f u t i h t y derives f r o m , a n d presupposes, H u t c h e s o n ' s theory.
A f t e r c r i t i c a l r e m a r k s a b o u t ' t h e m o d e r n d o c t r i n e o f U t i l i t y ' as f o u n d i n
Paley a n d G o d w i n , Stewart t u r n e d again t o ' D r . Hutcheson's scheme o f
B e n e v o l e n c e ' , o r t o t h e t h e o r y b y w h i c h t h a t o f ' M r . H u m e was p l a i n l y
s u g g e s t e d , a n d t o w h i c h аП t h e m o r e m o d e r n m o d i f i c a t i o n s o f t h e s a m e
p r i n c i p l e [ u t i h t y ] m a y be traced. I n d e e d , t h e t h e o r y o f U t i h t y m u s t tac-
i d y take f o r granted t h e scheme o f B e n e v o l e n c e , i n o r d e r t o b e c o m p l e t e
a n d c o n s i s t e n t ' (Works vii. 239). 7 2

7 1
C i t e d from The Collected Works of Dugald Stewart [Works], ed.W. Hamilton, 10 vok.
(Edinburgh, 1754),iii. 4 0 1 .
7 2
Moore ako suggests, without giving names, that nineteenth-century scholars supposed that
there are fundamental differences between Hutcheson and H u m e ('Hume and Hutcheson',25).
I have not found this to be correctJames M c C o s h thought that Hutcheson 'prepared the way for
the system ofAdam Smith, and even for that o f H u m e ' , and that H u m e at times 'seems to adhere
to the theory ofShaftesbury and Hutcheson, as to the existence ofa moral sense', but in fact his
 Hume and Hutcheson 249

5. SOME O V E R L O O K E D LIKENESSES

W h y , i t is h e r e g e r m a n e t o ask, m i g h t t h e a u t h o r s o f t h e b r i e f n o t i c e s o f
1739 (see 4.1—2 a b o v e ) h a v e s e e n H u t c h e s o n as a p h i l o s o p h i c a l f o r c e
b e h i n d v o l u m e s 1 a n d 2 o f t h e Treatise? I f w e s u p p o s e f o r a start t h a t t h e y
h a d c o m p a r e d t h e account o f h u m a n nature (the p h i l o s o p h i c a l p s y c h o ­
logy, i f y o u w i U ) o f t h i s n e w w o r k w i t h t h e t h e n viable alternatives, t h e y
w o u l d h a v e f o u n d i t at m a n y p o i n t s c o n g r u e n t w i t h H u t c h e s o n ' s views.
F o r a start these e a r l y readers c o u l d h a v e s e e n t h a t :

(a) T h r o u g h o u t t h e t w o v o l u m e s b e f o r e t h e m r e a s o n was o f t e n s u b ­
o r d i n a t e d t o s e n t i m e n t a n d t h e passions. B e h e f , t h e y w o u l d h a v e r e a d , is
a f e e h n g a n d ('moreproperly an act qf the sensitive, than qf the cogitativepart qf
our natures' (ΊΉΝ 1 . 4 . 1 . 8 ) , w h i I e m u c h o f w h a t w e t a k e t o b e r e a s o n is
s a i d t o b e a c a h n p a s s i o n c a p a b l e , as r e a s o n is n o t , o f d e t e r m i n i n g t h e w i U
(THN 2.3.3.8^). O f the b e t t e r - k n o w n eighteenth-century phUo-
s o p h e r s o n l y H u t c h e s o n h a d s u g g e s t e d t h a t r e a s o n has o n l y s e c o n d a r y
status, p r o n o u n c i n g i t , as w e saw i n s e c t i o n 2 a b o v e , ' t o o slow, t o o f u U o f
D o u b t and Hesitation' to provide moral direction or motivation. 7 3

φ) O n e s e c t i o n o f t h e t w o v o l u m e s e x p h c i d y o n e t h i c a l issues, a sec­
t i o n e n t i d e d , Of vice and virtue (THN 2.1.7), provides a n approving
s k e t c h o f w h a t is u n m i s t a k e a b l y H u t c h e s o n ' s m o r a l sense t h e o r y , e x p h c -
i t l y f a v o u r i n g i t o v e r e g o i s m , w h U e n o t so m u c h as r e c o g n i z i n g t h e e x i s ­
t e n c e o f t h e o t h e r m o r a l t h e o r i e s o n o f f e r c. 1739.
(c) T h e l e n g t h y a c c o u n t o f t h e passions c o m p r i s i n g t h e s e c o n d v o l ­
u m e takes these, as H u t c h e s o n h a d , t o b e p o s i t i v e aspects o f h u m a n
nature, and includes a m o n g t h e m ' c e r t a i n instincts originaUy i m p l a n t e d
i n o u r n a t u r e s , s u c h as b e n e v o l e n c e a n d r e s e n t m e n t , t h e l o v e o f h f e , a n d
kindness t o chUdren; o r the general appetite t o g o o d , and aversion to
e v U , c o n s i d e r ' d m e r e l y as s u c h ' ( T H N 2 . 3 . 3 . 8 ) .

'theory goes a step farther than that ofHutcheson in the same direction'.McCosh ako says that
H u m e k careful not to suggest that virtue k identical with utihty; see The Scottish Philosophy,
Biographical, Expository, Critical, From Hutcheson to Hamilton (NewYork, 1875), 8 5 , 1 5 0 - 1 . Henry
Sidgwick ako saw simüarities between Hutcheson and H u m e , supposing both were proto-utih-
tarians;seeMeiftoibofEihics^x>ndon,i874) i.4.2,i.6.3.Seeako,W.R.Scott,FrancisHwfcftesoM.His
Life,Teaching and Position in the History ofPhilosophy (Cambridge, 1 9 0 0 ) , 125.

7 3
I continue to think that Hutcheson said nothing so 'extraordinary' (to use Hume's
descriptor) as that ' R e a s o n is, and ought only to be the shve ofthe passions, and can never pre­
tend to any other office than to serve and obey them' ( T H N 2 . 3 . 3 4 ) ; see M o o r e , ' H u m e and
Hutcheson', 4 0 ; Norton, David Hume, 100 n. 5.
250 David Fate Norton

T h o s e w h o l o o k e d at t h e Treatise after t h e p u b h c a t i o n o f t h e t h i r d
v o l u m e w o u l d h a v e h a d a d d i t i o n a l reasons f o r t h i n k i n g its a u t h o r i n f l u ­
e n c e d b y H u t c h e s o n . M o s t o b v i o u s w o u l d b e t h e message o f t h e f i r s t
t w o s e c t i o n s o f B o o k 3, Moral distinrtions not deriv'dfrom reason, a n d Moral
distinctions deriv'd from a moral sense ( T H N 3 . 1 . 1 - 2 ) . T h e l a t t e r e x p h c i d y
d e f e n d s a v a r i a t i o n o n H u t c h e s o n ' s m o r a l sense t h e o r y , w h i l e t h e f o r ­
m e r u n d e r t a k e s t o d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t aU f o r m s o f r a t i o n a h s t m o r a l t h e o r y
are u n t e n a b l e . Less o b v i o u s , p e r h a p s , are at least t h r e e f u r t h e r s i m i l a r i t i e s
o f g r e a t i m p o r t a n c e i n the present context.
A s w e k n o w f r o m H u m e ' s 1739 l e t t e r t o H u t c h e s o n , t h e l a t t e r m a d e
s u b s t a n t i a l c o m m e n t s o n a l a t e d r a f t o f B o o k 3 o f t h e Treatise. These
c o m m e n t s i n c l u d e d expressions o f concern about the work's lack o f
' W a r m t h i n the Cause o f V i r t u e ' ; a b o u t H u m e ' s n o t i o n o f t h e natural,
w h i c h f a U e d t o address t h e e n d f o r w h i c h h u m a n s w e r e c r e a t e d ; a n d
about the lack o f prudence, f r o m a rehgious p o i n t o f view, s h o w n b y
some o f Hume's comments (LDH i . 32—5). O n t h e f i r s t t w o issues,
H u m e w a s n o t t o b e m o v e d . H e p o i n t e d o u t t h a t h i s is a w o r k o n t h e
metaphysics o f morals, and thus that i t w o u l d be inappropriate to
i n c l u d e i n i t e f f o r t s at m o r a l s u a s i o n . A n d h e o p e n l y d i s a g r e e d with
H u t c h e s o n ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e natural, saying he d i d n o t suppose i t p o s ­
sible t o answer t h e q u e s t i o n , ' F o r w h a t e n d w e r e h u m a n s createdP',and
i n a n y case t h e e f f o r t t o d o so w a s o u t s i d e t h e s c o p e o f p h U o s o p h y as h e
u n d e r s t o o d this. O n the o t h e r h a n d , h e accepted Hutcheson's advice
a b o u t passages ' r e m a r k t as d e f e c t i v e i n P o i n t o f P r u d e n c e ' , a n d u n d e r ­
t o o k t o r e m o v e these.
T h i s l e t t e r also suggests t h a t H u t c h e s o n h a d r a i s e d several a d d i t i o n a l
issues. L e t us f o c u s b r i e f l y o n t h r e e o f t h e s e :

(d) T h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n v i r t u e s a n d n a t u r a l a b i h t i e s ;
(e) t h e l o c u s a n d s o u r c e o f v i r t u e a n d v i c e ; a n d
(f) the role o f s y m p a t h y i n morals.

M o o r e claims that H u t c h e s o n a n d H u m e t o o k i n c o m p a t i b l e positions

o n t h e s e t h r e e issues, a n d t h a t t h e s e o p p o s i n g p o s i t i o n s e f f e c t i v e l y d e f i n e
t h e r a d i c a l d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n t h e i r m o r a l t h e o r i e s . T h e r e are g o o d r e a ­
sons, h e r e o n l y s k e t c h e d , t o say t h a t o n t h e s e issues t h e v i e w s of
H u t c h e s o n a n d H u m e significandy overlap.
 Hume and Hutcheson 251

(d) The distinction between virtues and natural abilities. H u t c h e s o n seems

t o h a v e u p b r a i d e d H u m e f o r t r e a t i n g n a t u r a l a b i h t i e s as v i r t u e s , f o r
H u m e r e s p o n d s t o h i r n t h u s : ' W h e t h e r n a t u r a l A b i h t y s b e V i r t u e s is a
Dispute ofWords. I t h i n k I foUow the c o m m o n Use ofLanguage' (LDH
i . 3 3 ) . T h i s l o o k s s i m p l e e n o u g h , b u t s e t t h n g o n t h e precise f o r m o f
w h a t e v e r c o m p l a i n t H u t c h e s o n m a d e is c o m p l i c a t e d b y t h e f a c t t h a t
o n l y t h r e e years l a t e r H u t c h e s o n c a n b e f o u n d g i v i n g ' t h e h o n o u r a b l e
t i d e s o f virtues' t o c e r t a i n ' m o d e r a t e passions' w h i c h ' s o m e h a v e r a s h l y
i m a g i n e d . . . are w h o U y a n d a b s o l u t e l y e v U ' . T h e passions h e has i n
m i n d i n c l u d e m o d e r a t e v e r s i o n s o f s e r f - p r e s e r v a t i o n , sensual p l e a s u r e ,
f r u g a h t y , h b e r a h t y , d e s i r e o f p o w e r , d e s i r e o f f a m e , a n d anger.To these h e
adds w h a t h e caUs ' t h e v i r t u e s o f s o c i a l c o n v e r s a t i o n ' , n a m e l y , v e r a c i t y ,
c o u r t e s y , g o o d m a n n e r s , c o m p l a i s a n c e , sweetness, p l e a s a n t r y , a n d w i t
(Short Intro 1.6.3). O n t h e o t h e r h a n d , H u m e h a v i n g said t h a t t h e d i s ­
tinction ' b e t w i x t natural abilities a n d moral virtues' is ' m e r e l y a d i s p u t e o f
w o r d s , a n d t h a t t h o ' t h e s e q u a h t i e s are n o t a l t o g e t h e r o f t h e s a m e k i n d ,
y e t t h e y agree i n t h e m o s t m a t e r i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s ' , goes o n t o suggest
that industry, perseverance, patience, activity, vigUance, apphcation, c o n ­
stancy, t e m p e r a n c e , f r u g a h t y , e c o n o m y , r e s o l u t i o n , w i t , e l o q u e n c e , a n d
g o o d h u m o u r are natural abilities, n o t v i r t u e s (THN 3 . 3 . 4 . 1 , 7—8). I n
s h o r t , i n 1742 H u t c h e s o n a d o p t s a v i e w h e is s u p p o s e d t o h a v e c r i t i c i z e d
w h e n h e f o u n d i t i n H u m e ' s m a n u s c r i p t , w h i l e H u m e has t a k e n o n
b o a r d t h e d i s t i n c t i o n H u t c h e s o n appears t o h a v e r e c o m m e n d e d .
(e) The locus and source qf virtue and vice. I n a p o s t s c r i p t t o h i s l e t t e r
responding to Hutcheson's criticisms, H u m e makes i m p o r t a n t c o m ­
m e n t s a b o u t t h e l o c u s a n d s o u r c e o f v i r t u e a n d v i c e . H e b e g i n s b y say­
i n g t h a t ' A c t i o n s are n o t v i r t u o u s n o r v i c i o u s ; b u t o n l y so f a r as t h e y are
proofs o f c e r t a i n Qualitys or durable Principles i n the M i n d ' , and t h e n
criticizes h i m s e i f f o r n o t m a k i n g this p o i n t m o r e explicidy. I n a sub­
s e q u e n t p a r a g r a p h h e says t h a t i t is o n ' t h e G o o d n e s s o r B a d n e s s o f t h e
M o t i v e s t h a t t h e V i r t u e o f t h e A c t i o n d e p e n d s ' , a f a c t h e takes t o p r o v e
'that t o every v i r t u o u s A c t i o n there must be a M o t i v e o r i m p e U i n g
P a s s i o n d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e V i r t u e , & t h a t V i r t u e c a n n e v e r b e t h e sole
M o t i v e t o a n y A c t i o n ' . H u t c h e s o n d i d n o t 'assent t o t h i s ' , a n d H u m e
blames his e x p o s i t i o n : ' m y Proofs w e r e n o t d i s t i n c t e n o u g h , & m u s t b e
a l t e r d ' (LDH 35). H u m e ' s ' t h i s ' refers t o s o m e p e r c e i v e d d i f f e r e n c e , o n
t h e m a t t e r o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f m o t i v e t o v i r t u o u s a c t i o n , b e t w e e n his views
252 David Fate Norton

a n d t h o s e o f H u t c h e s o n , b u t w h a t is t h i s d i f f e r e n c e ? C i r c u m s t a n c e s m a y
p r e v e n t us from f i n d i n g t h e d e f i n i t i v e a n s w e r t o t h i s q u e s t i o n , b u t , b y
n o t i n g s o m e f u n d a m e n t a l c o m m i t m e n t s t h e t w o p h ü o s o p h e r s share, w e
can clear u p s o m e c o n f u s i o n .
F i r s t , i t is t r u e t h a t H u t c h e s o n was c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e r e 'are k i n d
affections a n d b e n e v o l e n c e i n h u m a n nature' ( ' H u m e a n d Hutcheson',
3 6 ) . T h i s is b e y o n d d i s p u t e . B u t H u m e , t o o , w a s so c o n v i n c e d . W e U 7 4

b e f o r e h e c o r r e s p o n d e d w i t h H u t c h e s o n , as w e h a v e seen, H u m e had
said t h a t t h e r e are ' c e r t a i n i n s t i n c t s o r i g i n a U y i m p l a n t e d i n o u r n a t u r e s ,
s u c h as b e n e v o l e n c e a n d r e s e n t m e n t , t h e l o v e o f h f e , a n d k i n d n e s s t o
c h i l d r e n ' (THN 2.3.3.8). I n B o o k 3 as p u b h s h e d h e said o f a m a n , t h a t
does m a n y b e n e v o l e n t a c t i o n s ; reheves t h e distress'd, comforts the
a f f l i c t e d , a n d e x t e n d s his b o u n t y e v e n t o t h e greatest s t r a n g e r s ' t h a t : ' N o
character can be m o r e amiable a n d v i r t u o u s ' ( T H N 3 . 2 . 1 . 6 ) . H u m e d i d
g r a n t (as d i d H u t c h e s o n ; s e e Inquiry 2.2.3) t h a t seffishness is o n e c h a r a c ­
t e r i s t i c o f h u m a n n a t u r e , b u t h e r e j e c t e d t h e egoists' a c c o u n t o f t h a t
n a t u r e . T h e i r a c c o u n t is, h e said,'as w i d e o f n a t u r e as a n y a c c o u n t s o f
m o n s t e r s , w h i c h w e m e e t w i t h i n fables a n d r o m a n c e s ' . T h e f a c t is t h a t
w e r a r e l y e n c o u n t e r i n d i v i d u a l s ' i n w h o m aU t h e k i n d a f f e c t i o n s , taken
t o g e t h e r , d o n o t o v e r - b a U a n c e aU t h e s e h i s h ' ( T H N 3 . 2 . 2 . 5 ) . S h o u l d w e
be r e m i n d e d that H u m e supposed o u r benevolence or generosity h m i -
ted, w e n e e d f o r present purposes o n l y p o i n t o u t that H u t c h e s o n had
r e a c h e d t h e s a m e c o n c l u s i o n . I n t h e f i r s t t w o e d i t i o n s o f his Inquiry
H u t c h e s o n said t h a t o u r ' s t r o n g I n s t i n c t s are b y N a t u r e h r n i t e d t o smaU
N u m b e r s o f M a n k i n d , s u c h as o u r W i v e s o r C h U d r e n ' (Inquiry 2.3.10).
L a t e r h e said t h a t t h e i n s t i t u t i o n o f p r o p e r t y , w h i c h g i v e s i n d i v i d u a k
' h o p e s o f f u t u r e w e a l t h , ease, a n d p l e a s u r e t o t h e m s e l v e s , t h e i r o f f s p r i n g ,
a n d aU w h o are d e a r t o t h e m ' , has p r o v i d e d a n e e d e d m o t i v e . W i t h o u t
this i n s t i t u t i o n , w h i c h secures ' t o e v e r y o n e t h e f r u i t s o f his own
l a b o u r s . . . one has no other motive to labour than thegeneral affection to his
kind, which is commonly much weaker than the narrower affections to ourßiends

' 4
Moore, having on three occasions only suggested that Hutcheson and H u m e differ
because Hutcheson supposed humans to have a natural disposition to benevolence, while
H u m e supposed that we always act out ofseh"-interest, then does make his position exphcit.
' H u m e ' , he says, 'assumed that m e n would always be motivated by interest i n any case', and
refers the reader to T H N 3.2.7.1 ('Hume and Hutcheson', 4 0 - 3 ) . However, the text o f t h e
Treatise cited by M o o r e says only that ' m e n are, i n a great measure, govern'd by interest', then
adds that the extent oftheir other-regard is Umited, points ofview found also i n Hutcheson as
I show below. See also, at sect. 4.8 above, Reid's comment on this same issue.
 Hume and Hutcheson 253

and relations, n o t t o m e n t i o n t h e o p p o s i t i o n w h i c h i n t h i s case w o u l d b e

g i v e n b y m o s t o f t h e selfish [ a f f e c t i o n s ] ' (System 2.6.5; i t a h c s a d d e d ) . 7 5

S e c o n d , H u t c h e s o n also d e f e n d e d , i n s h g h d y d i f f e r e n t b n g u a g e , t h e
v i e w t h a t , as H u m e p u t i t i n his l e t t e r , a c t i o n s per se 'are n o t v i r t u o u s n o r
v i c i o u s ' , a n d a k o t h e coroUary, t h a t i t is o n ' t h e G o o d n e s s o r Badness o f t h e
M o t i v e s that t h e V i r t u e o f t h e A c t i o n depends'.According to Hutcheson,
' E v e r y A c t i o n , w h i c h w e a p p r e h e n d as e i t h e r morallygood o r ew7,is always
s u p p o s ' d t o f l o w f r o m s o m e Affection t o w a r d sensitive N a t u r e s ; a n d w h a t ­
ever w e call Virtue o r Vice, is e i t h e r s o m e s u c h Affection, or some Action
consequent u p o n i t ' (Inquiry 2 . 2 . 1 ; cf. 2.3.1, 12, 14; Essay 1.2.3.12).
M o r e o v e r , t h e f u r t h e r c o r o U a r y t h a t H u m e articulates i n t h e Treatise,
n a m e l y , t h a t because a c t i o n s t h e m s e l v e s are m o r a U y n e u t r a l t h e m o t i v e t o
p e r f o r m t h e m cannot be a motive to p e r f o r m a virtuous action,looks not
t o be contrary to, b u t a variation o n , Hutcheson's position. O n 'theWhole
i t m a y appear' H u t c h e s o n w r o t e , ' t h a t t h e r e is i n h u m a n N a t u r e a düinter-
ested ultimate Desire o f t h e H a p p i n e s s o f o t h e r s ; a n d t h a t o u r Moral Sense
d e t e r m i n e s us t o a p p r o v e o n l y s u c h A c t i o n s as v i r t u o u s , w h i c h are a p p r e ­
h e n d e d t o p r o c e e d p a r d y at least f r o m s u c h D e s i r e ' (Inquiry 2.2.6; itahcs
i n t e x t ) . F o r his p a r t , H u m e f i r s t says:' ' T i s e v i d e n t , t h a t w h e n w e praise
any actions, w e regard o n l y t h e motives that p r o d u c ' d t h e m , a n d consider
t h e a c t i o n s as signs o r i n d i c a t i o n s o f c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s i n t h e m i n d a n d
t e m p e r ' , a n d t h e n , after a f e w sentences o f e x p h c a t i o n , c o n c l u d e s :

I t appears, therefore, that ah v i r t u o u s actions derive their m e r i t o n l y f r o m v i r ­

tuous motives, and are consider'd merely as signs o f those motives. F r o m this
p r i n c i p l e I conclude, that the first v i r t u o u s m o t i v e , w h i c h bestows a m e r i t o n
any action, can never be a regard t o the v i r t u e o f t h a t action, b u t must be some
other natural m o t i v e o r p r i n c i p l e . 76

B y way ofiUustration, t w o natural, and virtuous, motives or principles

are m e n t i o n e d : t h e ' n a t u r a l a f f e c t i o n ' o f p a r e n t s f o r c h i l d r e n , a n d t h e
' h u m a n i t y ' o f t h e 'amiable and v i r t u o u s ' m a n m e n t i o n e d i n the previous
paragraph (THN3.2.1.2H5).These t w o virtuous motives are,asithappens,

7 5
Hutcheson's remark rcvcals that M o o r e has ako overstated the case w h e n he claims that,
for Hutcheson, the kind affections 'prompt us to act without the assistance ofother motives
and passions' ('Hume and Hutcheson', 36). Hutcheson may take the instincts ot kind affections
he mentions to be themselves strong enough to motivate us to some ends,but as these remarks
show, he did not suppose them strong enough to motivate us to universal benevolence.
7 6
Adumbrationsofthisviewarefoundin THN2.2.3.3,whereHumearguesthatlearning
the character, design, or intent o f an agent may change what was perceived as vicious (an
injury) into something perceived as virtuous (ajust punishment).
254 David Fate Norton

two f o r m s o f t h a t b e n e v o l e n c e o r 'disinterested ultimate Desire o f the

Happiness o f o t h e r s ' that, according t o H u t c h e s o n , constitute virtue.

(f) The role qf sympathy in m o r a / s . W i t h o u t q u e s t i o n , H u t c h e s o n and

H u m e h a d difFerent v i e w s o f t h e role o f s y m p a t h y i n m o r a l s . H v r m e t o o k

sympathy to be c e n t r a U y i m p h c a t e d i n a t least m o s t f o r m s o f m o r a l

a p p r o b a t i o n a n d disapprobation, a v i e w n o t shared b y H u t c h e s o n . 7 7
But

i t is a m i s t a k e t o s u g g e s t t h a t s y m p a t h y w a s a p r i n c i p l e a d o p t e d o n l y b y

Epicureans ( ' H u m e a n d H u t c h e s o n ' , 29).As o t h e r scholars have p o i n t e d

out, s y m p a t h y t o o k diverse f o r m s i n t h e early m o d e r n p e r i o d . 7 8

To be

sure, s o m e m o r a h s t s a d o p t e d a s i m p h s t i c f o r m o f s y m p a t h y fEpicurean,

i f y o u wffl),supposing o u r 'feUow-feehngs' to a m o u n t to n o t h i n g m o r e

t h a n pleasure i n response t o another's pleasure o r p a i n i n response t o

another's p a i n . 7 9
B u t stiU o t h e r s , i n c l u d i n g a n u m b e r o f t h o s e s e v e n ­

teenth-century writers w h o undertook t o refute Hobbes, supposed

sympathy t o be an extension o f t h e natural benevolence they f o u n d t o

characterize h u m a n n a t u r e . 8 0

I t is also a m i s t a k e t o say t h a t ' H u t c h e s o n f o u n d n o p l a c e f o r s y m p a ­

thy i n h i s s y s t e m ' ( ' H u m e a n d H u t c h e s o n ' , 35). I n a t least t h r e e ofhis

7 7
H u m e in the postscriptjust mentioned ako asked Hutcheson 'to consider, i f there be any
Quahty, that is virtuous, without having aTendency either to the pubhc G o o d or to the G o o d
ofthe Person, w h o possesses it. Ifthere be none without theseTendencys, we may conclude,
that their M e r i t is derivd from Sympathy.'As w e saw above, the proto-utihtarian character o f
Hutcheson, as wefl as that o f H u m e , was noticed by Stewart, M c C o s h , and Sidgwick.
7 8
See,for example,LuigiTurco,'Sympathy a n d M o r a l Sense: 1 7 2 5 - 1 7 4 0 ' , Β π ί ύ Λ J o u r n a l f o r
the History ofPhilosophy 7 ( 1 9 9 9 ) , 7 9 - 1 0 1 . T u r c o distinguishes three eighteenth-century forms
ofsympathy, 'first, sympathy as a mechanical communication offeehngs and passions; second,
sympathy as a process ofimagination, or ofreason, by w h i c h w e substitute ourselves for o t h ­
ers; third, sympathy as dehght i n the happiness and sorrow in the misery ofother people', and
then suggests that sympathy is 'more a " f a m i l y " concept than a univocal one' ( 7 9 ) .
7 9
Hutcheson exphcidy describes this form ofsympathy: there are some, he says, w h o claim
'that we desire the good ofothers, or o f societies. . . as the means ofsome subder pleasures o f
our o w n by sympathy w i t h others i n their happiness' (System 1.3.1; cf. 1.4.1).Hutcheson ako,
asTurco points out, attributed to Hobbes sympathy ofthe second type described i n the previ­
ous note, namely, the v i e w that w e feel e.g. pity for another 'when by Imagination w e place
ourselves i n the Case ofthe Sufferers' and then feel their pain. Hutcheson then goes on to raise
objections to thk view and variations o n it. See 'Additions and Corrections', /«^«iry;Turco,
'Hutcheson, H u m e e la simpatia:le obiezioni e le riposte', [Hutcheson, H u m e e la simpatia],
Filosqfia e cultura nel Settecento hritannico, i i 181—203; at 1 8 8 ^ .
8 0
See Pv. S. Crane,'Suggestions toward a Genealogy o f t h e " M a n o f F e e h n g " ', English
LiteraryHistory 1 ( 1 9 3 4 ) , 2 0 5 - 3 0 ; a n d N o r m a n S.Fiering,'Irresistible Compassion:AnAspect o f
Eighteenth-Century Sympathy and Humanitarianism',JoMr>Mi qf the History qfIdeas 37 (1976),
195—218. For a study that focuses on H u m e and provides many valuable suggestions about his
philosophical relations to his early modern predecessors and about the H u m e - H u t c h e s o n
cormection,see Heidt,ReligionandFaction,cbs. i - 2 . H e r d t argues t h a t i n B o o k 3 ofthe Treatise
 Hume and Hutcheson 255

w o r k s , H u t c h e s o n has p o s i t i v e t h i n g s t o say a b o u t s y m p a t h y . 81
For
e x a m p l e , h e argues against t h e selfish t h e o r i s t s t h a t t h e O b s e r v a t i o n o f
t h e H a p p i n e s s o f o t h e r s is m a d e t h e necessary O c c a s i o n o f P l e a s u r e , a n d
t h e i r M i s e r y t h e O c c a s i o n o f P a i n ' , a n d t h e n adds t h a t s u c h ' Sympathy' is
a n 'EfFect o f t h e C o n s t i t u t i o n o f o u r N a t u r e ' (Essay 1.1.3).Later, s p e a k ­
i n g o f n a t u r a l d i s p o s i t i o n s , h e says t h a t

sympathy seems to e x t e n d t o ail o u r affections and passions.They afl seem nat-

uraOy contagious.We n o t o n l y s o r r o w w i t h t h e distressed, and rejoice w i t h the
prosperous; b u t a d f m r a t i o n , o r surprise, discovered i n one, raises a correspon­
d e n t c o m m o t i o n o f m i n d i n ail w h o b e h o l d h i m . . . O n e easily sees h o w
directly subservient this sympathy is t o that g r a n d d e t e r r m n a t i o n o f the soul
towarduniversalhappiness. (System 1.2.3)

A n d h e i n c l u d e s a m o n g o u r ' m o r e n o b l e senses a n d m o r e u s e f u l . . . t h a t
sympathy o r f e U o w - f e e h n g , b y w h i c h t h e state a n d f o r t u n e s o f o t h e r s
affect us e x c e e d i n g l y , s o t h a t b y t h e v e r y p o w e r o f n a t u r e , p r e v i o u s t o a n y
reasoning o r m e d i t a t i o n , w e rejoice i n t h e p r o s p e r i t y o f o t h e r s , a n d sor­
r o w w i t h t h e m i n t h e i r m i s f o r t u n e s ' (Short Intro 1.1.9; cf. 2.2.1).There
m a y w e U b e i m p o r t a n t differences between s y m p a t h y as f o u n d i n
H u t c h e s o n ' s m o r a l t h e o r y a n d as f o u n d i n H u m e ' s , b u t t h e r e a k o a p p e a r
t o b e s o m e equaUy i m p o r t a n t similarities. I n any event, the m e r e fact
t h a t H u m e ' s t h e o r y m a k e s use o f s y m p a t h y is n o t e v i d e n c e t h a t h i s t h e ­
o r y is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h H u t c h e s o n ' s .

***
I h a v e s h o w n t h a t H u t c h e s o n was n o t t h e o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l p r o d u c t o f
S t o i c i n f l u e n c e s , a n d t h a t H u m e was n o t t h e o n e - d i m e n s i o n a l p r o d u c t
o f E p i c u r e a n forebears. I have s h o w n that H u m e h i m s e H " a c k n o w l e d g e d
H u t c h e s o n ' s i n f l u e n c e a n d a p p r o a c h e d h i m as a n ' A u t h o r i t y ' f o r p h U o ­
sophical a n d practical advice, some o f w h i c h advice he t o o k ; that
H u t c h e s o n w a s n o t always ' d e e p l y d i s a p p r o v i n g ' o f H u m e ' s p h i l o s o p h i ­
cal e f f o r t s ; a n d t h a t t h e i r c o n t e m p o r a r i e s a n d successors f o u n d m o r e
f u n d a m e n t a l simUarities t h a n differences b e t w e e n t h e i r m o r a l theories.
M o o r e ' s historical claims, that H u t c h e s o n h a d n o ' f o r m a t i v e and lasting
i n f l u e n c e ' o n H u m e ' s t h o u g h t a n d t h a t H u m e ' s c o n t e m p o r a r i e s saw h i m

H u m e develops a form ofsympathy that is immune to the charge ofbeing nothing more than
a mechanism for producing pleasure i n observers.
8 1
Turco says that Hutcheson, although suspicious ofsome explanations of the principle o f
sympathy,'nevertheless felt compeUed to adopt'it ('Sympathy and Moral Sense', i o i ) .
256 David Fate Norton

a n d H u t c h e s o n as o n l y a n t a g o n i s t s , are c l e a r l y m i s t a k e n . So, t o o , are s o m e

o f his m o s t i m p o r t a n t claims a b o u t t h e p h i l o s o p h i c a l c o n t e n t o f t h e
m o r a l t h e o r i e s o f these t w o p h i l o s o p h i c a l p r o t a g o n i s t s . T h e v i e w s o f
H u t c h e s o n a n d H u m e are i n i m p o r t a n t w a y s s i m i l a r , j u s t as t h e y are a k o
i m p o r t a n d y oUssimilar. M o r e o v e r , i f h a v i n g e s t a b h s h e d t h a t H u m e w a s i n
a s i g n i f i c a n t sense i n f l u e n c e d b y H u t c h e s o n , w e n o w g o o n t o c o n s i d e r
t h e w a y s i n w h i c h H u m e m a y h a v e r e v i s e d B o o k 3 o f t h e Treatise i n
response t o H u t c h e s o n ' s comments o n a n earher m a n u s c r i p t o f this
w o r k , w e are h k e l y t o f i n d m a n y a d d i t i o n a l reasons f o r c o n c l u d i n g t h a t
H u m e o w e d i m p o r t a n t p h i l o s o p h i c a l debts t o H u t c h e s o n . I n response t o
Hutcheson's c o m m e n t s o n his manuscripts H u m e e x p h c i d y adjusted o r
c l a r i f i e d t h e p o s i t i o n s t a k e n i n B o o k 3 o f t h e ^eafise.'Since I s a w y o u , ' h e
w r o t e t o H u t c h e s o n , ' I have b e e n v e r y busy i n c o r r e c t i n g & f m i s M n g that
D i s c o u r s e c o n c e r n i n g M o r a l s , w h i c h y o u p e r u s ' d ; & I flatter m y s e l f , t h a t
t h e A l t e r a t i o n s I have m a d e have i m p r o v ' d i t v e r y m u c h b o t h i n p o i n t o f
Prudence & Philosophy.' 8 2
C i c e r o said o f Z e n o t h a t t h e f a c t t h a t h e was
' n o t prepared t o f o U o w t h e Peripatetics i n every detaU d i d n o t alter t h e
f a c t t h a t h e h a d s p r u n g f r o m t h e m ' (Defin. 4.12-13), n o r
d i d t h e fact that
C i c e r o saw similarities b e t w e e n Z e n o a n d t h e Peripatetics prevent h i m
f r o m g i v i n g us a p h i l o s o p h i c a U y i n t e r e s t i n g a c c o u n t o f t h e i r d i f f e r e n c e s .
A s several r e c e n t studies h a v e s h o w n , 8 3
a t t e n t i o n t o t h e details c h a r a c t e r ­
i z i n g t h e c o m p l e x set o f s i m U a r i t i e s a n d d i f f e r e n c e s t h a t m a r k t h e p h U o ­
s o p h i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n H u m e a n d H u t c h e s o n c a n also p r o v i d e us
w i t h historical a n d phUosophical insights o f i n t e r e s t a n d i m p o r t a n c e . 8 4

McGill University, University ofVidoria

8 2
Letter 0 f 4 M a r c h 1 7 4 0 . A few days later H u m e wrote: Ί shaU consider more carefuUy aU
the Particukrs y o u mention to me; tho' w i t h regard to abstract Ideas, tis w i t h Difficulty I can
entertain a D o u b t on that head, notwithstanding your Authority. O u r Conversation together
has furnish'd me a hint, w i t h w h i c h I shaU augment the 2 d Edition.Tis this.TheWord, simple
Idea,is an abstractTerm comprehending different Individuak that are simüar.Yet the point o f
their SimUarity from the very Nature o f such Ideas is not distinct nor separable from the rest.
Is not this a Proof, among many others, that there may be a simUarity without any possible
Separation even i n thought?' ( L D H i . 3 6 , 3 9 ) . F o r suggestions about h o w H u m e may have
revised B o o k 3 to meet Hutcheson's objections, see Turco, 'Hutcheson, H u m e e la simpatia',
i 9 8 - 2 0 i , a n d m y ' H i s t o r i c a l A c c o u n t o{ATreatise ofHuman Nature',inihe CbrendonEdition
of^4 Treatise qf Human Nature, forthcoming.
8 3
See e.g. the work ofGiU,DarwaU, Herdt, Schneewind, andTurco cited in earher notes, and
KennethWinkler,'Hume and Hutcheson on the C o l o r ofVirtue',HwMe Studies 22 ( i 9 9 6 ) , 3 - 2 2 .
8 4
I am indebted to M i c h a e l GiU, K n u d Haakonssen, Mary J . N o r t o n , D a r i o Perinetti, and
an anonymous referee for comments that have helped me cbrify my discussion ofthe issues
raised in this essay.
 Index qf Names

Akmie,Ferdinand 173 Chantekuze,R.de 200,201

Annas,J. 2 1 8 Cicero, M . T. 2 1 5 , 2 1 6 - 2 2 , 2 2 5 4 > , 2 4 5 , 2 5 6

ApoUonius 6 Clarke,Samuel 2 3 8
Arezzo,Bemardd' 2 0 3 Clerseher,Qaude 194,203
Aristode 107-20,151,217,222 Constantine 18
Arnauld,Antoine 174,180,193,204^0 Constantius I I 18
Atherton,M. 47,48 Constantius 2 0 , 2 2
Atticus 2 2 3 Corbineffi,J. 2 0 0
Augustine, St. 1 9 9 , 2 0 3 - 4 , 2 0 6 Cordemoy, G . de 194,205
Auriole,Peter 2 0 0 Cottingham,J. 5 0
Cousin,Victor 2 0 1
Bacon,Francis 2 3 0 Crane,R.S. 254
Battour,James 236,241-2 Curley,E.M. 105,141,143,146,149,151,
Balguy,John 215 156,162-3
Babne,David 110
Barfoot,Michael 230 DarwaLl,Stephen 212,256
Barresi,J. 4 0 DeMairan,Dortuous 181
Bayle,Pierre 222,229 DeUaRocca,Michael 153,155
Beaude,J. 195,198 Des Maizeaux, Pierre 2 3 7
BeU,Martin 213 Descartes,Rene 75,84,96^9,105,122-3,
Bennett,Jonathan 105,146,149, 132,173,176-7,193-209 passim

153,166,169 Desgabets,DomRobert 193-204,

Berkeley,George 240 208,209

Bernier,Francois 2 2 2 Digby,Kenehn 83
Beza,Theodore 9 Dupleix,Scipion 88
Bidney,David 1 3 2 , 1 4 9 , 1 5 0 1 6 6 , 1 7 0
Bodin,Jean 7 Eisenberg,PauI 157
B o e t i e , E t i e n n e d e l a 11 Enmianuel I, K i n g ofPortugal 14
B o n n e n , C . 51 Epicurus 7 5 , 7 7 ^ ?
Boyle,Robert 75,230 Epstein,W. 6 8
Brocchieri,Beonio 203—4 Eutropius 2 1
Brunschwig,J. 2 2 5
Bunge,W.van 2 0 1 Faye,E. 2 0 4 , 2 0 5
Burnet,Gilbert 215,238,240 Febvre,Lucien 3 2
Buder,Joseph 215,220,231 Ferdinand (and IsabeUa) 13
Ficino,Marsiho 82,90—2
CaUy,Pierre 193 Hage,D. 51
Calvin,Jean 2 Fludd,Robert 82,89^»
CampaneUa,Tommaso 75,95 Fontiahs,Jacobus 2 1 0
Carraud,Vincent 193 Foucher,Simon 195,196,197
Carriero,John 1 2 2 , 1 4 6 , 1 7 2 Frame, Donald 14,15,26
Casas,Bartolome 1 2 Frankena,WiUiam 149,169
Catherine de Medici 24,25 Friedrich,Hugo 2
C a t o n , H . 53 Fumagali,M.T. 203—4
258 Index qfNames

Gabbey,Akn 155 Mersenne,Marin 8 9

Garber,Daniel 47,4g,125 Meyronnes, Francois de 2 0 3
Garrett,Don 106,141,146,149,164 Mohammed 6
Gassendi,Pierre 75-103 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat,
Gondi,Jean-Francois-Paul de, Cardinal baron de L a Brede et de 2 8
deRetz 200 Moreau, Denis 174,194,205,208
Gouhier,Henri 173,205
Gregory,R. 4 4 Nadler, Steven 1 6 6 , 1 6 7 , 1 7 1 , 1 7 2 ,
Gueroult,Martial 173 174-194
Nagel,Thomas 154
Hatfield,Gary 37,42,43,47,47,48,48 Ndiaye,A.-R. 194,207
HenryofGhent 2 0 0 Newcasde, Marquess o f
Hobbes,Thomas 3 1 , 8 4 fWm.Cavendish) 3 7
HofEnann,George 11 Nicholas ofAutrecourt 2 0 3
Hume,David 8^),2s,211-s6passim N o r m o r e , C a l v i n 172
Huygens,Gummare 206,209
Osler,Margaret 8 0 - 1
Jarrett, Charles 1 4 9 , 1 5 0 , 1 6 0 , 1 6 1 , 1 7 0
Jesus 2 , 9 Paracelsus ^hihppusAureolus
J o h n Duns Scotus 2 0 0 Theophrastus Bombastus
John, K i n g ofPortugal 1 3 , 1 4 VonHohenheim) 83,89
Juhan ('theApostate') 9 , 1 8 - 2 4 , 9 2
Pascal,Blaise 2 , 3 3
Patrizi,Francesco 75,95^
Kaluza,Z. 2 0 3 Pbto 151,159
Kashap,Paul 157
Kelsey,Sean 112 Regis,Pierre-Sylvain 195
K i r k e b e e n , G . 36 Rijk,L.M.de 203
Klever,W. 2 0 1 Robinet,Andre 174
Kuntz, M a r i o n Leathers Danieb 7 Rock,I. 41,42
Rodis-Lewis 193,195,199,200,204
Lannion, Francois de 2 0 5 Rohault,Jacques 1 9 4
Laporte,Jean 2 0 5 Rozemond, Μ. 4 0 , 5 4
Leibniz,GottfriedWiUiehnvon 137-8,
145-7.173,181,183,187, Sayce, R i c h a r d 1 , 9 , 1 8
193,205,208^) Schaefer, D a v i d Lewis 6,18,29
Livy 8 Schmaltz,Tad 1 9 4 , 1 9 8 , 1 9 9
Locke,John 2 Scribano,Emanuela 201,208
Liidemann,Gerd 9 Sebond,Raymond 26,27,28
Luther,Martin 26,27 Sennert,Daniel 8 5 ^
Severinus,Petrus 83
MachiaveHi 3 2 Simmons,Ahson 105,126,127
Malebranche,Nicolas 99,173-192,193,195, Simonetta,S. 2 0 3 — 4
197,204—5,206 Smith,Malcohn 1 0 , 1 5 , 1 6 , 1 7 , 1 9 ,
Marceffinus,Ammianus 21—4 22,23

Marion,Jean-Luc 193 Spinoza,Benedict de 3 1 , 3 2 , 1 0 5 ^ 7 , 1 4 9 — 7 2

Marr,D. 3 6 , 3 6 passim, 173,181,193
Mattern, R u t h 149,170 Starobinski,Jean 6
MauU,N. 4 7 , 4 7 Stoics 151,159
Meier,John 9 Strauss,Leo 31—2
 IndexofNames 259

Suarez,Francisco 8 5 , 8 8 Vinci,T. 51,52,69

Sutton,J. 4 2 . 4 3 Vitoria,Franciscode 12,13

Tacitus 19 W i k o n , Margaret 35,35,36,171

Telesio,Bernardino 75.95 Worf-Devine,C. 4 7 , 4 7 , 4 9 , 4 9 , 6 3 , 6 3
Thomas Aquinas, St. 2,77,99,101,107-20, WoMson, H . A. 149,150
178,200,206^7 Wootton,David 32

VanHehnont,JeanBaptiste 83 Yovel,Yirmiyahu 153,171

 Notes to Contributors

ι . Articles m a y be s u b m i t t e d at any t i m e o f y e a r . I t is strongly preferred

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articles s h o u l d be s u b m i t t e d i n M S W o r d (either M a c i n t o s h or P C version) or
i n R T F f o r m a t . Diagrams a n d iUustrations can be s u b m i t t e d either as c o m p u t e r
fdes o r i n h a r d copy. T h e editors s h o u l d be alerted i f there are any special
requirements w i t h respect t o characters o r fonts. I f i t is n o t possible to submit
an article b y e m a i l attachment, please send t w o copies t o one o f the editors,
double spaced clearly p r i n t e d o n one side o f t h e page w i t h reasonable margins.
N o t e s s h o u l d be g i v e n at the end, t h o u g h i n the published version, they w ü l
be p r i n t e d at the b o t t o m o f t h e p a g e . T h e notes s h o u l d abo be double spaced
w i t h reasonable m a r g i n s . W h e r e v e r possible, references s h o u l d be b u i l t i n t o
the text.

2. T h e first t i m e a b o o k is referred t o i n the notes, give at least the first name

o r i n i t i a l o f the author, the place and date o f p u b h c a t i o n , and, f o r books
pubhshed after 1900, the pubhsher; w h e r e y o u are abbreviating the tide i n
subsequent citations, give the abbreviation i n square brackets.Thus f o r an i n i t i a l
citation:

R.ohertM.Adirns,Leibniz:Determinist,Theist,Idealist [Leibniz]
( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1994), 138.

For a k t e r c i t a t i o n :

Adams, Leibniz, 28—9.

D o not use the author-and-date style ofreference:

Adams 1994:28^.

3. F o r articles i n j o u r n a U , give the ftJl c i t a t i o n i n the first o c c u r r e n c e . T h e fuU

extents ofarticles s h o u l d be g i v e n , and w h e r e the reference is t o a specific page
o r pages, that s h o u l d be indicated. I n subsequent citations, use o n l y an a u t h o r
and a b r i e f t i d e , as i n d i c a t e d i n square brackets i n the o r i g i n a l c i t a t i o n . T h u s f o r
an i n i t i a l c i t a t i o n :

M i c h a e l R A y e r s , ' M e c h a n i s m , Superaddition, and the

Proofs o f G o d ' s Existence i n Locke's Essay' [ ' M e c h a n i s m ' ] ,
Philosophical Review 90 (1981), 210-51,at 2 2 1 - 2 .

F o r a later c i t a t i o n :

A y e r s , ' M e c h a n i s m ' , 225.

202 Notes to Contributors

4. For articles i n coUected volumes, f o U o w a similar f o r m a t . T h u s f o r an i n i t i a l

citation:

Christia Mercer, 'The Vitality and Importance of Early Modern

A r i s t o t e k a n i s m ' [ ' V i t a l i t y and I m p o r t a n c e ' ] , i n T o m SoreU (ed.), The Rise of
Modern Philosophy ( O x f o r d : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1997), 33-67, at 52.

For a k t e r c i t a t i o n :

M e r c e r , ' V i t a U t y and I m p o r t a n c e ' , 38.

5. V o l u m e s o f Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy c o n t a i n Hsts o f c o n v e n -

t i o n a I abbreviations f o r standard w o r k s a n d editions, as weH as c i t a t i o n
conventions, f o r each w o r k . Please consult these w h e n p r e p a r i n g y o u r text.

EDITORS

D a n i e l Garber
Department ofPhilosophy
1879 НаП
Princeton University
P r i n c e t o n , N e w J e r s e y 08544—1006
[email protected]

Steven N a d l e r
Department ofPhilosophy
5185 H e l e n C . W h i t e H a U
600 N o r t h Park St.
University ofWisconsin-Madison
M a d i s o n , W i s c o n s i n 53706
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