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36,9/10 Research through DESIGN
through research
A cybernetic model of designing design
1362 foundations
Wolfgang Jonas
School of Arts and Design, University of Kassel, Kassel, Germany

Abstract
Purpose – The paper seeks to make a substantial contribution to the still controversial question of
design foundations.
Design/methodology/approach – A generic hypercyclic design process model is derived from
basic notions of evolution and learning in different domains of knowing (and turns out to be not very
different from existing ones). The second-order cybernetics and evolutionary thinking provide
theoretical support.
Findings – The paper presents a model of designerly knowledge production, which has the potential
to serve as a genuine design research paradigm. It does not abandon the scientific or the hermeneutic
or the arts & crafts paradigm but concludes that they have to be embedded into a design paradigm.
“Design paradigm” means that “objects” are not essential, but are created in communication and
language.
Research limitations/implications – Foundations cannot be found in the axiomatic statements of
the formal sciences, nor in the empirical approaches of the natural sciences, nor in the hermeneutic
techniques of the humanities. Designing explores and creates the new; it deals with the fit of artefacts
and their human, social and natural contexts. Therefore foundations for design (if they exist at all)
have to be based on the generative character of designing, which can be seen as the very activity which
made and still makes primates into humans.
Practical implications – The hypercyclic model provides a cybernetic foundation (or rather
substantiation) for design, which – at the same time – serves as a framework for design and design
research practice. As long as the dynamic model is in action, i.e. stabilized in communication, it
provides foundations; once it stops, they dissolve. The fluid circular phenomena of discourse and
communication provide the only “eternal” essence of design.
Originality/value – “Design objects” as well as “theory objects” are transient materializations or
eigenvalues in these circular processes. Designing objects and designing theories are equivalent.
“Problems” and “solutions” as well as “foundations” are objects of this kind. This contributes to a
conceptual integration of the acting and reflecting disciplines.
Keywords Design, Cybernetics, Evolution, Learning, Research, Knowledge management
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction: problem statement and motivation

The paper is motivated by the still controversial issue of (lacking) design foundations.
They can neither be found in the axiomatic statements of the formal sciences (logic,
mathematics, etc.), or the empirical approaches of the natural sciences (physics,
Kybernetes biology, etc.), nor in the hermeneutic techniques of the humanities (language, literature,
Vol. 36 No. 9/10, 2007
pp. 1362-1380 history, etc.). Available theories about the foundations of designing evoke the
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited impression of Babylonian confusion (Jonas and Meyer-Veden, 2004). Reasons for this
0368-492X
DOI 10.1108/03684920710827355 mess may be found in the “non-fit” of theories and their subjects (Glanville, 2005).
There seems to be a comparable interface problem in theory-building as in designing Research
itself. Designing explores and creates the new; it deals with the functional and
symbolic fit of artefacts and their human, social and natural contexts of use. Therefore,
through DESIGN
foundations for design should be based on the processual and generative character of through research
designing itself, which can be regarded as the human activity that made and still
makes primates to humans.
Design has become a profession, mainly rooted in arts and crafts traditions, and – 1363
later in its development – an academic discipline. More recently design has been
discovered as a central driver of social and economic innovation, which now has to
clarify its position in the university context. If disciplinary autonomy, inter-disciplinary
acceptance and social effectiveness is to be achieved, then this cannot be done with
reference to the sciences (as mentioned above), or to the equally inappropriate arts and
crafts tradition. Findeli and Bousbaki (2005) proposed three historical stages in design
research: aesthetics, referring to object-centeredness, logic, referring to rational process
models, and ethics, referring to user experience in their engagement with the designed
environment. In this most recent perspective, the aesthetic or functional object cannot be
in the focus any more, but rather the processes of generation and use.
Regardless of these changes, the improvement of “quality of life” may still be
considered as design’s ultimate purpose. Modernist design claimed to meet people’s
needs by means of nineteenth century scientific approaches. Solutions were conceived
by simple mechanistic answers to seemingly “real” needs, which had been determined
by means of statistical methods. Ideological bias guided the determination of these
needs; enthusiastic misinterpretations of the potential of the sciences lead to
expectations of boundless progress. A striking example is the use of simplified and
misinterpreted concepts of purpose-oriented evolution, leading to ideological positions
as the notorious “form follows function” which has been impressively analyzed by
Michl (2002). This modernist “belief in science” applied to major parts of the design
methods movement (DMM) of the 1960s. And it still applies to parts of the current
“Design research movement” (DRM, my own term, W.J.), which started in the 1980s.
The paper outlines an alternative foundation/substantiation (maybe a constructivist
position has to content itself with “substantiation” of a theory instead of “foundation”
of a discipline).

2. Guiding ideas in design research: for users and/or for design itself?
Because of the hybrid nature of design research (looking for knowledge þ aiming at
real world improvements) the DRM addresses two related issues:
(1) internally, regarding the disciplinary status: how can design become a
respected academic field of knowledge production? and
(2) externally, regarding design’s benefit for society: how can design contribute to
human-centred innovation?

The adoption of scientific standards immediately contributes to design’s academic

respectability. Nonetheless, this strategy has a price, since it fails to substantially
contribute to tackling practical issues of social and economic innovation and human
well-being. Two reasons are:
(1) The failure of de-contextualized scientific approaches to handle the systemic
complexity of real world situations. For an early programmatic statement see
K Weaver’s (1948) concept of organized complexity, for an account of the
36,9/10 inherent problems in analysing/controlling/designing social systems
(see Luhmann 1984, 1997).
(2) The failure to deal with future states of real-world systems. Design is involved
in proposing the new, which, by definition, is not predictable. Early futures
studies were still aimed at prediction, today there are projective and
1364 evolutionary approaches, which explore multiple futures and take the methods
rather as learning devices than as forecasting tools.

This demands us to reconfigure and conjoin the two questions into one and ask:
How can design establish its own genuine research paradigm (independent from the sciences,
the humanities and the arts) that is appropriate for dealing with purposeful change in
ill-defined (therefore called “complex”) real-world situations?
The discussion is embedded in ongoing debates about shifting modes of knowledge
production in the sciences and in society at large. Nowotny et al. (2001) claim that science
enters the “agora” and explicate “Mode-2” knowledge production, which is contextualized
and which must be “socially robust” rather than “true”. Science is increasingly involved in
projects of socio-cultural and technological change, and this can be interpreted as “science
approaching designerly ways of knowledge production” (Jonas and Meyer-Veden, 2004).
Knowing how becomes equally important as knowing that (Polanyi, 1966). Therefore, I will
step away from essentialist “theories of what” and have a closer look at process models or
“theories of how” to design. Doing this from a systemic and evolutionary perspective leads to
a cybernetic process model, which appears to be constitutive of any attempt at
theory-building in design. Concepts such as “research through design” (Frayling, 1993,
going back to Archer), or “project grounded research” (Findeli, 1997), or, although
semantics-focussed, “science for design” (Krippendorff, 2005) offer promising starting
points. But little has been done since to operationalize these concepts in a coherent model.

3. An anthropological assumption: designing as the essence of being human

The ability to design and to be conscious about this (i.e. to be retrospective and
projective regarding one’s own position in the surrounding world) seems to be the
essential human characteristic, distinguishing us from the rest of the living world.
The construction of models of the human position and ability of acting in relation to
nature is one of the essential and unresolved challenges of modernity.
According to Latour (1998) and Jonas (2000) Boyle’s Invention of the Laboratory and
the scientific community as factory for the production of facts concerning nature adds
to the transcendence of naturalised nature the immanence (feasibility) of socialised
nature. Hobbes’s Invention of Leviathan as representative of the unpredictable mass of
citizens, seduced by their passions, adds to the immanence (mundane chaos) of the
social the transcendence of a scientifically substantiated eternal order. It is thus, that
the three paradoxical constitutional guarantees of modernity (Latour, 1998) arise:
(1) even when we construct nature, it is as if we did not;
(2) even when we do not construct society, it is as if we did; and
(3) nature and society must remain absolutely separate; the work of purification
must therefore remain separate from the mediation work.
Design cannot take part in the scientific endeavour of purification since it has to ignore Research
the modern separation of nature and society. The conception and realization of projects through DESIGN
necessarily includes natural and social components. Even Simon (1996, pp. 139-67), one
of the protagonists of rational cognitive process models of designing argues that through research
design, seen as a socio-cultural phenomenon, follows evolutionary patterns and has no
final goals. The intentional transfer of system states into preferred ones (or:
state 1 ! state 2) opens up the hybrid field of the “Sciences of the artificial”. 1365
Management philosophy (Hayek, 1967) has argued that the separation of natural and
artificial is insufficient. There are systems (Table I), which are the outcomes of human
activities, but not the results of human purpose. And of all things it is these delicate
hybrid systems, which are the actual subjects of management and design
interventions; appropriate tools for these “semi-artificial” systems are still missing.
According to Rittel (1972), these “wicked problems” can only be overcome by
opening up the closed algorithmic problem solving process (1st generation methods)
and initiating a process of argumentation and negotiation among the stakeholders
instead (2nd generation methods). In other words: he suggests a change from 1st order
observation to 2nd order observation: not systems are observed, but systems observing
systems (von Foerster, 1981). Under conditions of 2nd order observation, we have to
account for the fact that the problem itself is not “given” but will be designed by the
stakeholders. In consequence, problems are changing their character in the course of
the solution process. No information is available, if there is no idea of a solution,
because the questions arising depend on the kind of solution, which one has in mind.
One cannot fully understand and formulate the problem, before it is solved. Thus, in
the end, the solution is the problem. Therefore, Rittel argues for the further
development and refinement of the argumentative model of the design process and the
study of the logic of the designers’ reasoning, where logic means the rules of asking
questions, generating information, and arriving at judgements. Given this situation
Rittel (Cross, 1984, p. 326) states slightly ironically:
All of which implies a certain modesty; while of course, on the other side there is a
characteristic of the second generation which is not so modest, that of lack of respect for
existing situations and an assumption that nothing has to continue to be the way that it is.
That might be expressed in the principle of systematic doubt or something like it.

Systems emerging without Systems as results of human

human activity activities

Systems which are – Artificial (mainly

results technological þ simple social)
of human systems ! “constructivist”
design/planning
Systems which are Natural systems (solar system, Complex social systems (family,
not results crystals, organisms) economy, ethics, culture, . . .)
of human ! “evolutionary” Table I.
design/planning The generation of
systems by human
Source: Hayek (1967) and Malik (2000, p. 158) design/activities
K The second-generation designer also is a moderate optimist, in that he refuses to believe that
planning is impossible, although his knowledge of the dilemmas of rationality and the
36,9/10 dilemmas of planning for others should tell him otherwise, perhaps. But he refuses to believe
that planning is impossible, otherwise he would go home. He must also be an activist.
Jones (1992) puts it more general and metaphoric, when emphasizing the necessity of
designing the design process itself. A considerable part of the design capacities has to
1366 be re-directed from the problem to the process. The designer as “black box” (the artist)
as well as the designer as “glass box” (the follower of 1st generation methods) have to
change their attitude towards a self-conception of designer as “self-organizing system”
who is observing the evolving artefact plus her/himself observing the evolving artefact.

4. Inherent patterns: circularity and autopoiesis

Circularity as a characteristic of problem-solving and purposive design processes is
showing up. We know DO-loops as instructions for iterative processes in formal
languages in software-programming. We know the Test – Operate – Test –
Exit-scheme (TOTE-scheme) from cognitive psychology (Miller et al., 1960) as the
prototypical pattern for dealing with iterative heuristics and feedback in design
methods. Most of these design methods consist of linear sequences of steps of specific
subtasks plus TOTE cycles for the necessary feedback. Opaque systems, called
“black-boxes” are rendered “white” and manageable by means of circular
feedback-models. Human agents act as detached operators of these “machines”.
Systems have been typically treated mechanistically as open (for matter, energy and
information), and in interaction with their context, transforming inputs into outputs as
a means of creating the conditions necessary for survival. Changes in the environment
are seen as input stimuli, to which the system must respond in defined manners.
The concept of autopoietic closure in living and meaning-based systems is essential
for the further argument concerning design processes. Autopoiesis characterizes the
self-referential logic of self-(re)producing systems. Maturana (1985) argues, that living
systems are organizationally closed, i.e. without any input or output of control
information. Operations only refer to themselves and the system’s internal states. The
impression, that living systems are open to an environment, results from attempts of
outside observers to make sense of their observations. If at all, “black boxes” can only
temporarily be “whitened” by means of an interaction of observer and observed
(Glanville, 1982). The aim of autopoietic systems is ultimately to maintain their own
identity and organization. A system cannot enter into interactions that are not specified
in the pattern of relations that define its organization. In this sense, the system’s
environment is really a part of itself. The theory of autopoiesis thus admits that
systems can be recognized as having “environments” but insists that relations with
any environment are internally determined; systems can evolve only along with
self-generated paths.
The theory of autopoiesis encourages us to understand the transformation of living
systems as the result of internally generated change. Rather than suggesting that the
system merely adapts to an environment or that the environment selects the system
configuration that survives, autopoiesis places principal emphasis on the way the total
system of interactions shapes its future and evolves. Autopoiesis presents a
modification of Darwinian Theory: while recognizing the importance of system
variation and the retention of “selected” features in the process of evolution, the theory
offers different explanations as to how this occurs. Changes are eventually induced, but Research
not directed by means of perturbations from outside. The emphasis is shifting from through DESIGN
adaptation of a system to its environment towards co-evolution of autonomous systems.
Morgan (1986, p. 245) was one of the first to apply the biological concept of autopoiesis through research
to a design-related field, namely organization theory:
When we recognize that the environment is not an independent domain, and that we do not
necessarily have to compete or struggle against the environment, a completely new 1367
relationship becomes possible. For example, an organization can explore possible identities
and the conditions under which they can be realized. Organizations committed to this kind of
self-discovery are able to develop a kind of systemic wisdom. They become more aware of
their role and significance within the whole, and of their ability to facilitate patterns of change
and development that will allow their identity to evolve along with that of the wider system.
This is probably a step forward with respect to the problems of organizations. But it
still neglects the fact that the environments of autopoietic systems consist of various
other, equally stubborn autopoietic systems. Luhmann (1984) has formulated this
radical generalization of biological autopoiesis, applying it to mental and social
systems as well. His theory provides more delicate instruments for a composed
deconstruction of unfounded expectations in design theory. Organizations, as
described by Morgan, are one of several sub-categories of communicative/social
systems, all of which are operationally closed, autopoietic systems: Living systems act
in the medium of life, mental systems in consciousness, and social systems in
communication. Both mental and social systems operate with language and meaning.
Communication cannot happen without presupposing consciousness and vice versa,
nevertheless both are closed, without any transfer of information. Language, which
Luhmann calls a “variation mechanism of socio-cultural evolution” is the ultimate
instrument for coupling mental and social systems. This strange, fuzzy, non-causal
coupling, called interpenetration, seems to be a powerful driver of human evolution
and, eventually, learning.

5. Evolutionary thinking as the basis: recognition and explanation

A Darwinian view of natural and cultural processes and design is deliberately adopted
here, since there is not the least evidence that socio-cultural processes as a whole
follows a kind of plan or design. Not even complexification seems to be a general
characteristic of evolution. The concept of evolution appears to be promising for the
sake of theoretical support and methodological progress. Evolution theory relieves us
from assuming an Intelligent Artificer at some mysterious point of origin. Utter
undesignedness, pure chaos was the starting point, no more conditions, no foundations
are required:
A designed thing, then, is either a living thing or a part of a living thing, or the artifact of a
living thing, organized in any case in aid of this battle against disorder (Dennett, 1995, p. 69).
A good design theory, as a designed artefact, should be able to explain its own
emergence. And so far, Darwinian thinking, in close combination with operational
epistemology (von Foerster, 1981), provides the only descriptive model, which satisfies
this self-referential requirement. Any other explanation would be either a vicious circle
or an infinite regress.
K The epistemic characteristic of design can be assumed as a learning process. This
36,9/10 process can be considered as biologically grounded in the need of organisms to survive
in an environment. The aim cannot be final “true” representation of some external
reality, but rather a process of (re-) construction for the purpose of appropriate (re-)
action. The history of biological evolution suggests similarities of the way the material
world is structured and the way we think of it. Yet Aristotle suspected that the
1368 recognizability of the world must rely on the fact, that there is a kind of similarity
between the “particles” of the world and those in our senses. Evolutionary
epistemologists (Campbell, 1960) argue that the Kantian transcendental apriori has to
be replaced by the assumption of an evolutionary fit between the objects and the
subject of recognition.
The evolutionary model of knowledge production provides a scheme with structural
identity from the molecular up to the cognitive and cultural level (Riedl, 2000). The
basic structure reveals a circle of trial (based upon expectation) and experience (leading
to success or failure, confirmation or refutation), or of action and reflection. Starting
with passed cases, the circle consists of an inductive/heuristic semi-circle with
purposeful learning from experience, leading to hypotheses and theories and
prognoses about how the world works, and a deductive/logical semi-circle, leading to
actions and interventions, which result in the confirmation or refutation of theories due
to new experiences, etc. Internal or external perturbations (called ideas, creativity, or
accidents, environmental changes, etc.) influence the circle, leading to stabilizations
(negative feedback) or amplifications and evolutionary developments
(positive feedback).
Only very recently in the cultural evolution this general scheme was split into the
“ratiomorphous” (the term was coined by Konrad Lorenz) systems of recognition and
the rational systems of explanation/understanding, with its most extreme form: the
logical positivist dualism of “context of discovery” (acting) vs “context of justification”
(thinking). While the ratiomorphous process of recognition has a high potential in
dealing with complex, evolving phenomena, it is not always useful for causal
explanations, and vice versa. But this “dilemma” is not inherent in the nature of
knowledge production, but rather a consequence of the dualistic concept, which we
have imposed on the process. Toulmin (2001) traces it back to the mid-seventeenth
century and distinguishes rationality from reasonableness, the latter loosing authority
in the sciences. The path from recognition to explanation is continuous and circular,
sometimes with dead ends. Language is too much locked in the “black&white”
tradition for the beautiful transitory shades of “grey” between the poles (Table II).
The argument of naturalized epistemology appears in various forms. Dewey (1986)
argues that processes of circular action, driven by intention, are the essential core of
knowledge generation. The separation of thinking as pure contemplation and acting as
bodily intervention into the world becomes obsolete; quite the reverse: Thinking
depends on real world situations that have to be met. Thinking activity is initiated by
the necessity to choose appropriate means with regard to expected consequences. The
active improvement of an unsatisfactory, problematic situation is the primary
motivation for thinking, designing, and, finally – in a more refined, purified,
quantitative manner – for scientific knowledge production. According to Dewey,
knowing is a manner of acting and “truth” is better called “warranted assertibility”. To
come back to design: Schön’s (1983) epistemology of “reflective practice” can be
 Research
Recognition (Erkennen) Explanation (Erklären/Verstehen)
through DESIGN
Networks, many causes Linear cause – effect relations through research
Simultaneous (simul hoc) Sequential (propter hoc)
Four Aristotelian causes considered Only causa efficiens considered
Only local validity, context is crucial Global validity claimed, context excluded
Allows no experiments, mostly irreversible Relies on experiments, mostly reversible 1369
Prognosis is projection Prognosis is forecasting
Correspondence of organism/artefact in a milieu Coherence of elements inside a system
Reaches into high complexity Reduces complexity
Fitness, “truth” means strong design “Truth” means correct causal relations
Is labelled “pre-scientific” Is labelled “scientific” Table II.
Recognition vs
Source: Riedl (2000, pp. 53-5) explanation

regarded as the design-related description of these concepts. It is this special unspecific

(generic) pattern, which Cross (2001, p. 54) characterizes as “designerly ways of
knowing”:
The underlying axiom of this discipline is that there are forms of knowledge special to the
awareness and ability of a designer, independent of the different professional domains of
design practice.
Evolutionary epistemology uses the most basic generative mechanism to explain
learning in the living world, thus explaining the ongoing production and re-production
of both artefacts and knowledge, finally of design and science as dynamic forms. This
is the “essence” and there is no need for any specific nature of knowing in design. The
theory of socio-cultural evolution seems to be a useful framework to denote the
unpredictability of design developments and project outcomes, thus the limits of causal
explanations, in a scientific manner. This is not to deny that designers/planners/people
are able to intentionally design and manufacture a new teapot, a new aircraft, or a new
constitution. But these designs are temporal interventions into evolutionary
processes. Design interventions are episodes in the process of evolution. Most of the
results disappear, a few are integrated into the further process. Failures as well as
successes become part of the socio-cultural archive of mankind. Variation – selection –
re-stabilization form the basic pattern of development (Luhmann, 1997; Jonas, 2005).

6. Variation – selection – re-stabilization: the basic pattern of

socio-cultural evolution and design
Autopoietic systems show a high independence from internal and external
perturbations (negative feedback compensates for the irritations). Furthermore, it is
one of the insights of chaos theory, that circularity in simple mathematical models can
cause so-called deterministic chaos. Minimal differences in initial conditions of the
system parameters can cause completely different outcomes; so that predictability of
final states is lost (positive feedback amplifies perturbations and triggers evolutionary
change) (Figure 1).
Natural evolutionary patterns of development, with their sequence of stable phases
and sudden variations seem to be based on an interplay of negative and positive
feedback mechanisms. The evolution of artefacts shows similar patterns (Figure 2).
K 1.0
36,9/10
0.8

0.6
1370 x
0.4

0.2

0
2.4 2.6 2.83.2 3.43.0 3.6 3.8 4.0
r
Figure 1. Notes: Simple feedback processes, as e.g. in the logistic equation xn+1 = r xn (1-xn)
Simple feedback processes show the tendency to produce bifurcation cascades and deterministic chaos
logistic equation (2007)

Telegraphy
Telex
Broadband data
Packet-switched data
Telegraphy Circuit-switched data
Telemetry
Telex Teletex
Packet-switched data Text facsimile
Telegraphy
Facsimile
Telex Colour facsimile
High-speed data
Telegraphy Electronic mail
Telegraphy Telenewspaper
Telex Medium-speed data
Circuit-switched data Videotex
Telegraphy Low-speed data
Telex Data Telemetry Speech facsimile
Telegraphy Photo Facsimile Telephony
Telegraphy Photo Photo
Facsimile Teletex Hi-fi telephony
Telephony Telephony Facsimile Facsimile Facsimile
Facsimile Telephone-conference
Telephony Telephony Facsimile
Sound Videotex Videoconference
Sound Stereo hi-fi sound Telephony
Telephony Videotelephony
Stereo hi-fi sound Videoconference Stereo hi-fi sound
Colour television
Quadrophony
Mobile telephony Colour television Colour television
Stereo hi-fi sound
Stereo television
Colour television
Mobile telephony High-definition television
Stereo television
Paging Mobile videotelephony
Mobile telephony
Mobile telephony
Paging
Mobile text
Mobile facsimile
Mobile data
Mobile videotex
Paging

Figure 2.
1847 1877 1920 1930 1960 1975 1984 2000
Bifurcation patterns in the
evolution of artefacts
Source: Graham and Marvin (1996, p.16)

Hybs and Gero (1992) describe artefacts as entities struggling for the survival of the
fittest in the hostile environment of the market; but the approach is still sub-complex.
We seem to know where we come from, but we do not know, where we are going. At
least we know the ancestors of our current artefacts, which means some interpretation
capacity for design history. Nevertheless, we normally do not know the influences that
acted upon the bifurcation situations and resulted in exactly this and no other
development. Representations of design processes reveal these patterns too, which
may indicate some kind of similarity of ontogenetic and phylogenetic processes in Research
designing (Figure 3). The nicely cut branches after the bifurcation points suggest that through DESIGN
there is a rational means to overcome the indeterminacy, to take a decision, which
provides more than a random chance, that the decision is viable in the future. Rittel through research
(1972, pp. 48, 54, translation W.J.) comments this laconic:
Constrictions are not “natural conditions” but deliberate restrictions of the variety of
solutions, mostly implicit signs of resignation . . .
1371
In reality there is no opposition/sharp conflict between an . . . intuitive approach to solve a
problem and . . . a controlled, reasonable and rational approach. The more control one wants
to exert, the more well-founded one wants to judge, the more intuitive one has to be.

Tasks
Planning

Selected task
Overall function
Sub-functions (function structure
to meet the overall function)
Solution principles and/or building
blocks for thd sub-functions
Conceptual design

Selected solution principles

and/or building blocks
Combinations of principles to
fulfil the overall function
Selected combination of principles
Concept variants (rough dimensioned
sketches or layouts)
Solution concept
Embodiment design

Dimensional layout
Improved layout
Selected assemblies

Form design variants of assemblies

Optimum assemblies

Final layout
Detail design

Detail design of components

Production documents
(drawings, parts lists, instructions) Figure 3.
Bifurcation cascades in the
design process
Source: Roozenburg and Eekels (1991, p.110)
K The endpoints in the more and more ramifying tree of causal explanations are always
spontaneous judgements.
36,9/10
These evident analogies in the processual patterns of natural and artefact evolution
confirm the application of evolutionary concepts to the design of artefacts. No
one-to-one analogies are sought; of course, variation in a meaning-based context is
different from variation in organisms. It is not necessary to stick too closely to the
1372 biological concepts or to “translate” every feature of biological evolution to the
socio-cultural field. Thus, if we are aiming at new descriptions and tools for the design
process, we have to identify the elements and processes of natural evolution, which can
be transferred to the evolution of artefacts.
Luhmann’s (1997) social theories are closely related to evolutionary epistemology.
In his main oeuvre he started to work out the concept of social evolution. Evolution
theory is based upon the system/environment distinction; it is this difference, which
enables evolution. Evolution theory does not distinguish historical epochs, but the
circular sequence of variation, selection, and re-stabilization. It serves for the unfolding
of the paradox of “the probability of the improbable”. Evolution theory thus explains
the emergence of essential forms and substances from the accidental, relieving us of
attributing the order of things to any form-giving telos or origin. It simply turns the
terminological framework of world-description upside-down. Evolution theory is not a
theory of progress, and it does not deliver projections or interpretations of the future.
Autopoiesis, as outlined above, enforces a revision of the concept of “adaptation”.
Adaptation is a condition, not the goal or outcome of evolution: on the basis of being
adapted it is possible to produce more and more risky ways of non-adaptation – as
long as the continuation of autopoiesis is guaranteed (Figure 4).
The three separated processual components of evolution can be related to the
constituent components of society, conceived as a communicative system
(Luhmann, 1997):
(1) Variation. Varies the elements of the systems, i.e. communications. Variation
means deviating, unexpected, surprising communication. It may simply be
questioning or rejecting expectations of meaning. Variation produces raw
material and provides further communicative connections with wider varieties
of meaning than before. In design this means new artefacts, conceived as
materialized communication.
(2) Selection. Relates to the structures of the system. Structures determine the
creation and use of expectations that determine communication processes.
Positive selection means the choice of meaningful relations that promise a value
for building or stabilizing structures. Selections serve as filters to control the
diffusion of variations. Religion has been such a filter. Truth, money, power, as
symbolically generalized media serve as filters in modern societies. In design
this may be phenomena such as fashion, taste, etc.

var. sel. re-stab.

1 2

Figure 4. Note: This figure represents variation - selection - re-stabilization as the basic pattern
of socio-cultural evolution, transferring a system from state 1 state 2
 (3) Re-stabilization. Refers to the state of the evolving system after a Research
positive/negative selection. It has to take care of the system-compatibility of through DESIGN
the selection. Even negative selections have to be re-stabilized, because they
remain in the system’s memory or archive. In design this is the long-term through research
viability of an artifact, in a functional as well as in a semantic sense.
There is the relation to Langrish’s (2004) memetic concept of recipemes, selectemes, 1373
explanemes. And, more pragmatically, to Sanders (2006), who refers to the concept of
usable/desirable/useful. She argues that we are quite good in designing usability, make
progress in designing desirability, and are still weak in designing usefulness. I agree
with her diagnosis, but – before the evolutionary background – I am highly sceptical
as to substantial progress regarding desirability or even usefulness (Table III).
7. A generic design process model: designing as a learning process within
the overall evolutionary pattern
An important step forward towards an integration and more precise differentiation of
the concepts of design and evolution consists of the argument, that human designing
comprises just the variation phase of socio-cultural evolution as introduced above.
Designing, as a sometimes highly rational endeavour (bringing a man to the moon may
include certain trial and error components, but cannot be considered as trial and error
overall) is embedded in an overall trial and error process (Figure 5).
Although design activities desperately try to consider selection- and re-stabilization,
they are necessarily de-coupled from these phases. There is no causal relation between
variation – selection – re-stabilization. Bringing a man to the moon may turn out as
the first step into the universe, or as a singular historical event of the second half of the
twentieth century. So state 2 (the “preferred one”) should better be labelled state 20
leaving 2 for the actual future state, which cannot be determined. Design is about what
is not (yet). This statement expresses the main epistemological problem/paradox the

Luhmann Langrish Sanders

(1997) (2004) (2006)
(process steps) (information units) (success criteria)

Variety generation Variation Recipemes Usable Table III.

Selective filtering Selection Selectemes Desirable Evolutionary concepts
Systemic re-stabil. Re-stabilization Explanemes Useful with different authors

variation selection re-stabil.

evolution
design Figure 5.
1 2
process The conscious design
process as part of the
design evolutionary trial and
1 A P S 2' error process
"true" "ideal" "real"
K discipline has to face in order to construct an own paradigm. Although designing
36,9/10 happens now, it tries – by means of various methodological approaches – to include
future developments. This issue has been addressed more philosophically by Nelson
and Stolterman (2003), who argue that design is an inquiry into three domains of
knowing: the true, the ideal and the real, with incompatible ways of reasoning. I have
proposed the process model of ANALYSIS – PROJECTION – SYNTHESIS, which can
1374 be considered as a more pragmatic and operationalized version of the true/the ideal/the
real (Jonas, 1996) (Figure 6).
The well-known circular design process models, as for example the one of the
Institute of Design in Chicago (research – analysis – synthesis – realization), relate to
a different origin. They seem to be adoptions of Kolb’s (1984) “learning cycles”. The
latter, in turn, seems to be an adoption of the very basic cybernetic OODA (2007) model
of the USAF (Figure 7).
If we combine the macro model of ANALYSIS ! PROJECTION ! SYNTHESIS
(domains of knowing) and the micro model of research ! analysis ! synthesis !
realization (the learning phases) we obtain a hypercyclic generic design process model
(Hugentobler et al., 2004) (Figure 8).
Hypercycles (Eigen and Schuster, 1979) are models of the basic process patterns at
the transitory stage between chemical and biological evolution, in other words:
explanations of the “origin of life” out of non-living material. The design argument
becomes highly methaphoric here: hypercyclic processes produce autopoietic closure.
Simple circular feedback cycles describe prototypical learning processes of autopoietic
systems. They produce patterns of deterministic chaos and evolutionary development,
macro
2'
A
1
Figure 6. S
ANALYSIS – A
PROJECTION – P
SYNTHESIS: the macro
S
cycle of the design process
P

micro

realization

A research
P
S
Figure 7. analysis
Research – analysis – synthesis
synthesis – realization:
the micro cycle of the
design process
which supports the suggested link between cybernetic and evolutionary patterns. Research
Natural and artificial evolution follows comparable processes. All this supports the through DESIGN
concept of conscious design as necessarily embedded in evolutionary processes. Only
the variation phase of artificial evolution is fully conscious and controllable. This is through research
what we call design. That means most of the time the “watchmaker” is actually blind
(Dawkins, 1986). He experiences some rare enlightened moments in an eternity of
blindness (Table IV). 1375
If we switch the mode from the metaphoric concept to operation, then we can interpret
the hypercyclic scheme of the design process as a toolbox of three rows and four colums.
Each of the 12 compartments that represent the complete process contains methods and
tools for the respective process steps: for example, the ANALYSIS/SYNTHESIS
compartment provides methods about “How to understand the situation as a
whole? ! worldviews” which can be, for example, systemic modelling techniques. If we
assume ten methods per compartment and 12 process steps, then we arrive at 1012
different paths/processes. Each path is a legitimate roadmap of the design process,
transferring state 1 ! state 20 . The scheme is open for various “flavours” of design
research: technological, cultural, user-centred, semantic, systemic, etc. It is just one
possible model of a process, the validity of which has to be debated elsewhere.
The model allows individualized sequences/design processes. The distinction of
design and research becomes fuzzy. The more one limits the inquiry to single domains
of knowing or even to single process steps, the more it becomes possible and important
to match the standards of scientific research. On the other hand, processes covering
several boxes or even the whole process necessarily have to creatively deal with
knowledge gaps (Jonas and Meyer-Veden, 2004).

8. Research through design through research: re-contextualizing the

scientific paradigm
Success of designing depends on the variation phase of the evolutionary process. The
following phases (selection, re-stabilization) are causally de-coupled. I.e. the quality of
the design process is essential. Scientific contributions may improve the probabilty of
successful design, to a certain degree. The field of HCI, as an increasingly
design-related activity, is facing similar problems. Fallman (2005) tries to clarify the
role of design in HCI research and argues that “it makes more sense to regard HCI as a
design discipline rather than as a more traditional academic research discipline.” This
is remarkable, and even a bit bizarre, since the design discipline on the other hand, is on

macro/micro
2'
1 res. anal. synth. real.
1 Figure 8.
A The combination of
A
S macro- and micro cycle
P provides a generic,
hypercyclic model of the
S design process, which can
be linearized into a tabular
2'
scheme
P
 and outcomes
methods/tools, questions
categories of design
form of a toolbox:
The design process in the
Table IV.

1376

36,9/10
K
Steps of the iterative micro process of learning/designing
Research Analysis Synthesis Realization

Domains of design ANALYSIS “the How to get data on the How to make sense of How to present the
How to understand the
inquiry, true” how it is today situation as it IS? ! data this data? ! knowledge situation as asituation as
steps/components of the PROJECTION “the on what IS on what IS IS? ! consent on the
whole? ! worldviews
iterative macro process ideal” how it could How to get data on future How to interpret these situation
How to get consistent
of designing be changes? ! future-related data? ! information How to present the
images of possible
data about futures future
futures? ! scenarios
scenarios? ! consent
on problems/goals
SYNTHESIS “the How to get data on the How to evaluate these How to design solutions How to present the
real” how it is situation as it SHALL data? ! problem, list of of the solutions? ! decisions
tomorrow BE ! problem data requirements problem? ! design about “go/no go”
solutions
COMMUNICATION How to establish the process and move it forward? How to enable positive team dynamics? How to find
“the driver” balance between action/reflection? How to build hot teams? How to enable equal
participation? ! focused and efficient teamwork
the same road, but heading into the opposite direction, towards scientific research. Research
Fallman distinguishes design and research in HCI as two poles of a continuum and through DESIGN
coins the terms of “research-oriented design” and “design-oriented research” which can
immediately be related to the present concepts of “research through design” and
through research
“design through research” (Table V).
Research within the “DRM-mindset” assumes that the “swampy lowlands” of
uncertainty (Schön, 1983) will be subsequently replaced by well-grounded knowledge. 1377
But exclusively scientific research is unable to fully recognize the implications of acting
in a space of imagination and projection, where design criteria only become apparent
after the outcome has been designed. Therefore, the “knowledge base position” needs to
be complemented by the “unknowledge base position” (Jonas et al., 2005) or by the
competencies to deal with not-knowing (Willke, 2002). It is not science as a method, but
science as a guiding paradigm for design, which is being called into question. Examining
design as processes in the course of socio-techno-cultural evolution will reveal more
clearly what is impossible and will enable us to identify the stable islands of reliable
knowledge. This view adopts the circular and reflective “trial & error” models of
generative world appropriation, as put forward by Dewey (1986), von Foerster (1981),
Glanville (1982), Schön (1983) and Swann (2002) and many others. Furthermore, the
hierarchical separation of basic/applied/clinical research does not make sense in this
conception of design. Basic research for real needs has to be closely related to real-world
situations. I.e. basic research, in order to be basic, has to be embedded/applied in clinical
situations.
The idea of research through design is based upon a generic structure of
learning/designing, which has been derived from practice. Design process logic,
according to the argument in this text, is a cybernetic logic of creating the objects of the
world. Relevant design knowledge is not knowledge of the objects, but knowledge for the
creation of the objects (Glanville, 2006). Every design process (more or less) follows this
generic structure, making use of the various (scientific) methods provided for each of the
steps. The inherent fuzziness of the process model is able to bridge the causality gaps
occurring between the different, often incompatible, scientific contributions.

Design ˆ ! Research

Fallman (for Research-oriented design Design-oriented Research

HCI)
Design is driven by research within a Research is driven by design within a
larger design process, aiming at the real, larger research process, aiming at the
by means of judgment and intuition, true, by means of Analysis and logic,
judged by the client judged by academic peers.
Jonas (for Research through design Design through research
design) Table V.
Covering the whole situation/process, Focussing on isolated questions, Design and research in
building design as an institution for producing knowledge for/about (?) design. HCI and design,
human-centred innovation and according to Fallman
supporting design as a discipline. (2005) and Jonas
K The proposed paradigm of design research means that it is the generic design process
36,9/10 and not the scientific process that guides design research. Other than Fallman, who
just distinguishes the two approaches, I suggest a clear design-orientation:
The scientific paradigm has to be embedded into the design paradigm:
† research is guided through design process logic; and
† design is supported/driven by phases of scientific research and inquiry.
1378
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About the author

Wolfgang Jonas was born in 1953, he studied naval architecture during 1971-1976 at the
Technical University of Berlin, research on the computer-aided optimisation of streamlined
shapes, PhD in 1983. During 1984-1987 consulting engineer for companies of the automobile
industry and the German Standardisation Institute. Since 1988 teaching (CAD, industrial design)
and research (system theory and design theory) at the University of Arts Berlin and at the
University of Wuppertal. In 1994 lecturing qualification (Habilitation) in design theory. During
1994-2001 Professor for “process design” at the University of Art and Design Halle/Burg
Giebichenstein. During 2001-2005 Professor for “design theory” at the University of the Arts
Bremen. Since, 2005 Professor for “system design” at the School of Art and Design, University of
Kassel. Focus of interest: design theory as meta theory, design methods in a systemic
perspective, scenario planning. Numerous publications on theoretical and practical aspects of
designing, for example “Design – System – Theorie: Überlegungen zu einem
systemtheoretischen Modell von Designtheorie” (1994) and “Mind the gap! – on knowing and
not-knowing in Design” (2004), also publications on the history of naval architecture in
Nordfriesland (1990) and on the aesthetics of modern ships (1991). Wolfgang Jonas can be
contacted at: [email protected]

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