Research Article

Psychology of Women Quarterly

2024, Vol. 48(1) 8–37
The Misandry Myth: An Inaccurate © The Author(s) 2023

Stereotype About Feminists’ Attitudes Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions
Toward Men DOI: 10.1177/03616843231202708
journals.sagepub.com/home/pwq

Aífe Hopkins-Doyle1,*, Aino L. Petterson2,*, Stefan Leach3, Hannah Zibell3,

Phatthanakit Chobthamkit4, Sharmaine Binti Abdul Rahim3, Jemima Blake3,
Cristina Bosco3, Kimberley Cherrie-Rees3, Ami Beadle3, Victoria Cock3,
Hazel Greer3, Antonina Jankowska3, Kaitlin Macdonald3,
Alexander Scott English5, Victoria Wai Lan YEUNG6, Ryosuke Asano7,
Peter Beattie8, Allan B. I. Bernardo9, Chinun Boonroungrut10,
Anindita Chaudhuri11, Chin-Lung Chien12, Hoon-Seok Choi13, Lixian Cui14,
Hongfei Du15, Kei Fuji16, Hidefumi Hitokoto17, Junko Iida16, Keiko Ishii18,
Ding-Yu Jiang19, Yashpal Jogdand20, Hyejoo J. Lee21, Nobuhiro Mifune22,
Chanki Moon23, Aya Murayama24, Jinkyung Na25, Kim One26, Joonha Park27,
Kosuke Sato7,28, Suryodaya Sharma20, Eunkook M. Suh29, Arun Tipandjan30,
and Robbie M. Sutton3,*
Abstract
In six studies, we examined the accuracy and underpinnings of the damaging stereotype that feminists harbor negative atti-
tudes toward men. In Study 1 (n = 1,664), feminist and nonfeminist women displayed similarly positive attitudes toward men.
Study 2 (n = 3,892) replicated these results in non-WEIRD countries and among male participants. Study 3 (n = 198) extended
them to implicit attitudes. Investigating the mechanisms underlying feminists’ actual and perceived attitudes, Studies 4 (n =
2,092) and 5 (nationally representative UK sample, n = 1,953) showed that feminists (vs. nonfeminists) perceived men as
more threatening, but also more similar, to women. Participants also underestimated feminists’ warmth toward men, an
error associated with hostile sexism and a misperception that feminists see men and women as dissimilar. Random-effects
meta-analyses of all data (Study 6, n = 9,799) showed that feminists’ attitudes toward men were positive in absolute terms
and did not differ significantly from nonfeminists’. An important comparative benchmark was established in Study 6, which
showed that feminist women’s attitudes toward men were no more negative than men’s attitudes toward men. We term

1 22
University of Surrey, Guildford, UK Kochi University of Technology, Kochi, Japan
2 23
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway Leeds Beckett University, Leeds, UK
3 24
University of Kent, Canterbury, UK Kindai University, Osaka, Japan
4 25
Thammasat University, Pathumthani, Thailand Sogang University, Seoul, South Korea
5 26
Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China China University of Geosciences, Wuhan, China
6 27
Lingnan University, Hong Kong Nagoya University of Commerce and Business, Nagoya, Japan
7 28
Kurume University, Kurume, Japan Kochi University, Kochi, Japan
8 29
The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong Yonsei University, Seoul, South Korea
9 30
De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines International Centre for Psychological Counseling and Social Research,
10
Silpakorn University, Nakhon Pathom, Thailand Puducherry, India
11
University of Calcutta, Kolkata, India
12
Soochow University, Taipei, Taiwan *
Joint first authors.
13
Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, South Korea
14
NYU Shanghai, Shanghai, China Corresponding Author:
15
Beijing Normal University at Zhuhai, Zhuhai, China Aífe Hopkins-Doyle, School of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford
16
University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Japan GU2 7XH, UK.
17
Fukuoka University, Fukuoka, Japan Email: [email protected]
18
Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan
19
National Chung-Cheng University, Chiayi, Taiwan Correction (November 2023): Article updated to correct affiliation of
20
Indian Institute of Technology Delhi, New Delhi, India author Kosuke Sato from “Kochi University of Technology” to “Kochi
21
Handong Global University, Pohang, South Korea University” since its original publication.
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 9

the focal stereotype the misandry myth in light of the evidence that it is false and widespread, and discuss its implications for
the movement.

Keywords
feminism, stereotypes, threat, metaperceptions, collective action

Feminism has achieved many impressive advances for women including those with diverse samples (i.e., ethnicity and sexuality)
and girls as well as men and boys (Gamble, 2004; Javaid, show that this stereotype deters women from identifying as fem-
2016). At the same time, it has been dogged, since at least the inist (Liss et al., 2001; Moore & Stathi, 2020; Roy et al., 2007).
19th century, by the perception that it is motivated by antimale The stereotype has also been used to delegitimize feminism and
sentiment, or misandry (Oxford English Dictionary, 2019). This to call into question the extent to which its grievances are
trope has been used to delegitimize and discredit the movement, genuine and its goals truly egalitarian (Cataldi, 1995; Marwick
has deterred women from joining it, and motivated men to oppose & Caplan, 2018).
it, sometimes with violence (Anderson, 2015; Ging, 2017; Roy
et al., 2007). Despite its longevity and impact, the misandry ste-
reotype has not received much research attention. In this article, Feminists’ Attitudes Toward Men: Theory and
we subject the stereotype to direct and sustained empirical scru-
tiny. We examine whether the stereotype is accurate. We ask
Research
why feminists may harbor negative (or positive) attitudes Though the stereotype that feminists are man-haters is clearly
toward men. We consider the implications of our results for the- used as a political weapon against the movement, there are well-
ories of stereotyping and the social and cognitive mechanisms established theoretical grounds to suppose that feminists may in
underpinning the dynamics of collective action. fact, harbor negative attitudes toward men. First, despite the polit-
ical uses of the misandry stereotype, it may nonetheless capture an
important reality. The stereotype accuracy hypothesis suggests
The Meaning and Demeaning of Feminism that stereotypes, like other social perceptions, are sustained by
Historically, women of color and other marginalized groups were inductive learning of objective regularities in the environ-
excluded, and their concerns ignored, by the feminist movement ment (Dawtry et al., 2015; Kelley & Michela, 1980), and
(hooks, 1981, 1984; Kruks, 2005). These important concerns not- therefore often contain kernels of truth (Campbell, 1967;
withstanding, the feminist movement1 is widely credited with Jussim et al., 2015). There is little doubt, of course, that some
bringing many benefits to women including voting, property, feminists are misandrists, just as some nonfeminists are also
and marital rights, reproductive autonomy, and the criminaliza- likely to harbor negative attitudes toward men. Further, some
tion of rape within marriage (Gamble, 2004; LeGates, 2001). feminists have claimed that misandry is a legitimate, even nec-
Despite these gains, only a minority of US women have identified essary aspect of the movement. Their argument is that bad feel-
as feminists (Huddy et al., 2000; Schnittker et al., 2003). ings toward men are rational responses to men’s hatred and
Polling data do suggest increases in feminist identity mistreatment of women and that more positive or dispassionate
among US women pre #MeToo (up 9% between 1995 and responses would only undermine women’s motivation to bring
2015; Hamel et al., 2016) and post #MeToo (up 4% about social change (Harmange, 2020; Morgan, 2014).
between 2016 and 2018; Ballard, 2018). In recent surveys, Second, consistent with this line of thought, social psycholog-
a majority of 18- to 24-year-old UK women identified as ical theories of collective action suggest that positive attitudes and
feminist (Young Women’s Trust, 2019), and a majority of emotions to perpetrator groups may dampen the motivation to
US women agreed that the term “feminist” applied to them strive for just and equitable intergroup relations (Cakal et al.,
very well, or somewhat well (Barroso, 2020). Despite this 2011; Saguy et al., 2009; Sobol-Sarag et al., 2022). The aversive
surge in feminist identity, US polls show feminism is still emotional experience of injustice, manifested as anger on behalf
seen by 45% of women and 46% of men as polarizing of the ingroup toward perpetrator groups or unjust systems (Judge
(Barroso, 2020) and as unfairly blaming men for women’s et al., 2022; Leonard et al., 2011; van Zomeren et al., 2008) has
challenges (Hamel et al., 2016). been found to be a major predictor (and also an outcome:
A key factor in the continued derision of feminism is the Becker et al., 2011) of politicized identity and collective action
widely endorsed stereotype that feminists are man-haters. (for a meta-analysis, see Agostini & van Zomeren, 2021).
Qualitative investigations show that feminists are seen as unfem- However, though specific intergroup emotions such as anger
inine, man-haters, and lesbians (Scharff, 2010; Swirsky & have been studied extensively, relatively few studies have exam-
Angelone, 2014). Likewise, quantitative evidence suggests fem- ined the role of broad affective attitudes such as prejudice toward
inists are negatively stereotyped as disliking men or “antimale” society’s powerful and perpetrator groups (cf. Crandall et al.,
(Robnett et al., 2012; Twenge & Zucker, 1999). Many studies 2002). According to intergroup emotions theory, collective
10 Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)

emotions like anger rather than prejudice toward other groups midpoint (i.e., 50, on a scale ranging from 0 = very cold to 100
motivate collective action (Mackie et al., 2000). Thus, it = very warm). In their study, feminists’ mean response was
appears that social movements may be characterized by nega- strongly positive (71.4) and the reported beta weight in regression
tively valenced emotions and attitudes toward majority groups implies that participants’ feminist identification would have
and that further research is needed to clarify whether these are needed to be many standard deviations above the mean for their
only specific (e.g., anger) or also more general (e.g., prejudice) attitudes toward men to fall below the midpoint. Since there are
in nature (see also Urbiola et al., 2022). important functional differences between positively and nega-
A third reason that feminists may hold negative attitudes tively valenced attitudes (Alves et al., 2017; Fazio et al., 2004),
toward men is that they may be inclined to perceive men as a such findings matter, and are in need of replication and extension.
threat to women. A common theme of feminist thinking is aware- Going further, feminists’ beliefs about gender similarity
ness that women collectively are oppressed and disrespected by (vs. difference) also give reason to believe that their attitudes
men (Gamble, 2004). According to integrated threat theory toward men may even be more positive than nonfeminist
(Stephan et al., 2016), prejudice toward an outgroup is heightened women’s. In general, feminists have resisted, challenged,
when it is seen as presenting realistic threats to the material and rejected traditional notions of gender difference, seeing
welfare of the ingroup and symbolic threats to its values, standing, them as mythical justifications of gender inequality. Feminist
and dignity. Realistic and symbolic threat perceptions have been scholars have dismantled popular, religious, and scientific
shown empirically to relate to negative intergroup attitudes to claims of gender differences in reasoning abilities, neuroanat-
majority groups (Riek et al., 2006), including women’s attitudes omy, and personality (Fine, 2012; Hyde, 2005). Their critiques
toward men (Alt et al., 2019; Stephan et al., 2000). In gender rela- are consistent with the popular liberal-feminist perspective that
tions, specific perceptions of realistic threats include sexual mis- emphasizes gender similarity as a basis for equality of the sexes
conduct, violence, and discrimination (Alt et al., 2019; Tjaden & (Mill, 1869/1980; Wollstonecraft, 1792). Because perceived
Thoennes, 2000), and perceptions of symbolic threats include the similarity to the ingroup is a powerful determinant of positive
objectification of women and devaluation of their domestic labor outgroup attitudes (Brown & Abrams, 1986; Hornsey & Hogg,
(Sears, 1988; Stephan et al., 2000). An implication of integrated 2000), we propose that it should lead women feminists (com-
threat theory is therefore that feminists’ attitudes toward men pared to nonfeminist women) to have more positive attitudes
may be more negative than nonfeminists’ to the extent that they toward men.
are more aware of such symbolic and realistic threats. Thus far, we have reviewed theoretical perspectives that point
On the other hand, there are reasons to think that feminists may to opposing possibilities: That regardless of its political uses and
harbor positive attitudes toward men. Many feminists disown mis- motivations, the stereotype that feminists harbor relatively nega-
andry and even advocate for men and boys. hooks (2000) rejects tive attitudes toward men is accurate, and also that it is inaccurate.
the idea that feminism is antimale. hooks defines feminism as “a There are also grounds to think that feminists’ attitudes toward
movement to end sexism, sexist exploitation, and oppression” men may depend on moderating factors. For example, theoretical
(p. 1) and acknowledges men’s suffering under patriarchy— analyses of feminist consciousness offer a nuanced account of
especially men of color and men from other marginalized feminists’ attitudes toward men. Downing and Roush’s (1985)
groups. Feminists have driven forward significant changes in stage theory of the development of feminist consciousness pro-
men’s favor (Courtenay, 2000) including the repeal of sexist posed that personalized negative feelings toward men may
drinking laws (Plank, 2019) and laws that define rape in terms develop in the early stages of feminist consciousness (i.e., revela-
that exclude assaults in which men are victims (Cohen, 2014; tion stage). They argued that this negativity is transformed into a
Javaid, 2016). Feminists have also advocated for reforms that system-blaming, rather than a person-blaming, orientation as
mean the burden of front-line combat duties and dangerous women progress to a deeper, more integrated feminist conscious-
occupations are now open to women and therefore no longer ness (i.e., synthesis and collective action stages). Models devel-
borne alone by men (Soules, 2020). These phenomena weigh oped for women of color, likewise, suggest stages of
against the conclusion that in general, feminists are motivated consciousness raising and rejection of patriarchy followed by
by negative attitudes toward men. awareness of individual men’s separation from the system
This strain of positivity toward men is not surprising when (Ossana et al., 1992).
considered in light of another fundamental feature of social atti- However, both models have been subject to criticism, and
tudes—despite meaningful variations, they tend to be positive. there is mixed evidence that women actually experience these
Thus, most summary evaluations of people and groups tend phases distinctly (Moradi, Subich et al., 2002; Moradi, Yoder
toward the positive end of response scales (Brewer & Silver, et al., 2004). Alternatively, women may develop distinct
1978; Sears, 1983). This suggests that though feminists are types of feminist consciousness that vary in underlying ideo-
widely caricatured as “man-haters” (Ging, 2017), their attitudes logical beliefs (e.g., radical, liberal, and cultural). Distinct
are likely to be positive in absolute terms, even if they turn out types of feminism define the locus of oppression differently.
to be less positive than nonfeminists. Some evidence for this For some, it lays with men as a group; for others, it lays with
comes from Henderson-King and Stewart (1997) who used a political systems and patriarchal institutions (Henley et al.,
feeling thermometer measure, which crucially includes a neutral 1998). Therefore, feminists, depending on the type or stage
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 11

of their consciousness, may view men’s role in gender apart from their valence. Therefore, lower scores on hostility
inequality differently. to men and benevolence to men indicate rejection of sexist
Indeed, some varieties of feminist thinking—notably cul- stereotypes and ideological statements more clearly than
tural feminism—have, over the decades, emphasized gender they indicate the overall valence of attitudes to men.
differences in order to construct a positive, distinct identity In sum, previous studies paint an unclear picture of femi-
for women (Branscombe et al., 1999; Donovan, 2012). In nists’ attitudes toward men. Samples are often small, opera-
contrast, the most popular forms of feminist thinking (i.e., tionalizations of feminism have varied from study to study,
liberal feminism) tend to deny gender differences and can and measures of attitudes toward men have often confounded
be expected to promote the belief that men are essentially the valence of perceptions of men with specific stereotypical
similar to women. These opposing implications for the per- and ideological content. Further, studies have been concen-
ceived similarity of men and women could, in turn, affect trated in just one national setting (the US). Global variations
how different feminists feel about men in overall evaluative in evaluations of men (Glick et al., 2004; Krys et al., 2018)
terms. and in the cultural currency and meaning of feminism itself
In sum, despite the social, political, and theoretical impor- (Kruks, 2005), mean that it is important to extend the
tance of the stereotype that feminists dislike men, there is no research with larger, more geographically diverse samples
singular theory to guide research on the veracity and sources as well as more robust operationalizations of attitudes
of this stereotype. Relatively few studies have attempted to toward men and of feminism itself. It is also important to
investigate this stereotype, and the studies that exist have determine the accuracy of perceptions of feminists’ atti-
mixed findings. Some studies on feminists’ attitudes toward tudes by testing them against feminists’ actual attitudes—
men are at least partly consistent with the view that the mis- something that no study thus far has attempted.
andry stereotype may be accurate. For example, one study
by Iazzo (1983) compared 28 members of the National
Organization of Women (NOW)—defined as feminists—
Metaperceptions of Feminists’ Attitudes Toward Men
to a control group of 104 local Californian women. NOW In studying the accuracy of people’s beliefs about feminists’
members reported less favorable attitudes toward men attitudes, it is important to consider why they may depart
than controls. A clear limitation of this study is that from reality. Stereotypes, like other social perceptions,
women who did not belong to NOW may well have been diverge from reality under the influence of ideologically
feminists. Another study, this time with 234 US undergraduate motivated reasoning. Negative views of feminists are associ-
women, using a self-report measure of feminist identification, ated with ideological attachment to social hierarchy and
returned similar results: feminist identification was negatively authority (Haddock & Zanna, 1994) and with hostile
associated with warmth toward men (Henderson-King & sexism, which portrays women as trying to usurp men by
Stewart, 1997). However, taking a different methodologi- weaponizing feminine sexuality and feminist ideology
cal approach again, a later study of 62 US women’s studies (Glick & Fiske, 2001). This suggests that the misandry ste-
students showed that completing the course did not affect reotype is an example of stereotyping functioning as a moti-
graduates’ feelings toward men, though it did increase fem- vated distortion of reality (Fiske, 1993), which forms part of
inist identification and consciousness (Henderson-King & the backlash that perennially confronts feminism (Faludi,
Stewart, 1999). 2006; Jordan, 2016).
Another study also returned mixed results. Anderson et al. Even in the absence of ideological motivations, stereo-
(2009) administered the Ambivalence to Men Inventory types may distort reality as a result of faulty and heuristic
(Glick & Fiske, 1999) to a sample of US undergraduates thinking (Bodenhausen, 1993; Hopkins-Doyle et al., 2019).
that included 41 feminists and 167 nonfeminists. The In general, people struggle to understand that criticism of
Ambivalence to Men Inventory includes a negatively social groups (e.g., of men) from the outside (e.g., by femi-
valenced subscale, Hostility to Men (e.g., “Men act like nist women) may be intended constructively and does not
babies when they are sick”), and a positively valenced sub- necessarily stem from prejudice (Adelman & Verkuyten,
scale, Benevolence to Men (e.g., “Every woman needs a 2020; Sutton et al. 2006). Similarly, people may struggle to
male partner who will cherish her”). Results showed femi- understand that when members of social movements (e.g.,
nists scored lower than nonfeminists on both the hostility feminists) point to important differences in the experiences
to men and benevolence to men subscales. Since the and interests of their group (e.g., women) from a majority
Ambivalence to Men Inventory is by definition a scale of group (e.g., men), they may not be repudiating the important
ambivalence toward men, low scores on both subscales are traits and interests that the groups have in common. This kind
not suggestive of an overall positivity toward men, but of heuristic thinking leaves feminism, like other forms of
reduced ambivalence. Further, like the Attitudes to Men so-called “identity politics,” vulnerable to being perceived
Scale used in earlier work (Iazzo, 1983), the Ambivalence as divisive (Bernstein, 2005). Feminism’s supposed empha-
to Men Inventory includes specific stereotypes and ideolog- sis on gender differences is evident in media representations
ical statements that may be accepted or rejected for reasons of feminism (i.e., Digby, 1998). There is work showing that
12 Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)

even feminists see “typical” feminists as endorsing ideolog- (e.g., that feminists’ attitudes to men are more positive than
ical perspectives that emphasize difference between men nonfeminists).
and women (Liss et al., 2000; see also Home et al., 2001). Turning to the bases of feminists’ attitudes toward men,
Thus, people may think that feminists, compared to nonfem- we also predicted that that feminists’ attitudes toward men
inists, perceive men and women as more different, and there- would differ from nonfeminists’ attitudes through indirect
fore that they dislike men, insofar as people intuitively pathways representing two opposing processes: feminists at
understand the link between liking and perceived similarity. once tend to see men as more threatening and more similar
In sum, a combination of ideologically motivated and heuris- to women. Regarding the factors that inform metaperceptions
tic thinking may lead to systematic distortions in people’s of feminists’ attitudes toward men, we predicted that partic-
beliefs about feminists’ attitudes. ipants would accurately perceive that feminists see men as a
threat, but underestimate the extent to which feminists see
men and women as similar. We propose that this inaccurate
The Present Research metaperception, in addition to ideological motivations such
In the present studies, we tested the accuracy of the misandry as hostile sexism, may be associated with endorsement of
stereotype across five studies and 9,799 participants in nine the misandry stereotype.
nations, including two nationally representative samples. In Study 1, we asked women in five cross-national
Across these studies, we operationalized feminism as strength samples to report their feminist identity and explicit attitudes
of identification, ideology, and collective action. These diverse toward men. In Study 2, women and men in five non-WEIRD
measures captured the multifaceted nature of feminism out- (i.e., Western, educated, industrialized, rich, democratic;
lined in the literature (Siegel & Calogero, 2021; Zucker, Henrich et al., 2010) countries completed the same measures.
2004) and enabled our studies to directly inform ongoing the- Study 3 introduced an implicit measure of attitudes toward
oretical debates about the role of positive and negative atti- men. Study 4 included metaperceptions of feminists’ atti-
tudes in suppressing, or motivating, collective action. We tudes toward men, and we examined mechanisms (i.e.,
operationalized attitudes toward men with a variety of explicit threat and gender similarity) that may underlie feminists’ atti-
and implicit measures, most featuring a meaningful neutral or tudes toward men. We also tested participants’ metapercep-
midpoint value, which allows the absolute as well as relative tions to check their understanding of these mechanisms. In
valence of these attitudes to be examined. We also measured Study 5, we replicated these findings in a nationally represen-
metaperceptions of feminists’ attitudes toward men. tative sample of UK adults. Finally, to provide the most reli-
Establishing the truth or falsity of the misandry stereotype able and generalizable findings we estimated the overall
is very important for public debate and to inform major the- trends, both within and across studies, by conducting
oretical perspectives in social, feminist, and political psy- random-effects meta-analyses (Study 6). In some studies,
chology. Because there are several theoretical perspectives we also measured attitudes to women, and present aggregate
with a stake in this issue, and because different predictions analyses in Study 6 (see Supplement A, Table S1 for details).
may be derived from them, we did not attempt a critical
test of any one theory. Rather, our main aim was to
provide a critical test of the misandry stereotype itself. We Study 1: Feminists’ Explicit Attitudes
therefore predicted that feminists would have less positive
Toward Men in WEIRD Countries
attitudes toward men, compared to nonfeminists. Though
the misandry myth is often asserted in absolute terms (e.g., In Study 1, we conducted an initial examination of feminists’
describing feminists as “man-haters”), we took into account attitudes toward men across five convenience samples of
theory and evidence suggesting that social attitudes gener- women in Italy, Poland, the US, and the UK. Country
ally, and feminists’ attitudes toward men specifically, are choice was based on practical concerns (i.e., authors’
positive in absolute terms. We therefore predicted that femi- ability to collect data). However, these countries also repre-
nists’ attitudes toward men would be positive in absolute sented different cultural contexts with varying degrees of
terms, when compared to meaningful neutral or midpoint gender equality on factors such as labor force participation,
values. We also hypothesized that metaperceptions of femi- reproductive rights, and political empowerment (World
nists’ attitudes to men would be negative in (a) absolute Economic Forum, 2022), and are therefore interesting sites
terms and (b) relative to feminists’ actual attitudes. We also of investigation. Further, some of these countries, such as
tested an alternative hypothesis derived from intergroup Poland, feature both visible and well-organized feminist
emotions theory (Mackie et al., 2009), which is that femi- movements, and mainstream critiques of feminism in politics
nists’ attitudes toward men would be characterized by and popular media are commonplace (Gwiazda, 2020; Hall,
higher levels of the specific emotion of collective anger. 2019). Participants completed measures of feminism includ-
All of our statistical procedures employed two-tailed signifi- ing identification, ideology, and actions, as well as attitudes
cance testing, which means that we were able, while testing toward men on explicit measures including warmth toward
the critical hypotheses, to also test opposing hypotheses men, liking and trust, emotional reactions, ambivalence
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 13

toward men, and collective anger. We expected that in abso- size, given the typical effect sizes reported in social psychol-
lute terms, feminists’ (and nonfeminists’) attitudes toward ogy (Lovakov & Agadullina, 2021).
men would be positive (H1), but that feminists’ attitudes
would be less positive than nonfeminists’(H2). We also Materials and Procedure. Detailed information including
expected that feminist identity (continuous measure), ideol- number of items, response scales, reliability, and example
ogy, and action would be negatively associated with attitudes items about all feminism (feminist identity, ideology, and
toward men (H3). Finally, we conducted exploratory tests for collective action) measures and outcome measures are pre-
possible nonlinear relations between feminist identity (con- sented in Tables 2 and 3, respectively. Although internal reli-
tinuous) and attitudes toward men. We did not make any ability was acceptable for most of the scales, it fell below the
explicit predictions about the nature of this association, but conventional .70 threshold in a few instances (e.g., emotional
one possibility is that misandry would only emerge among reactions in samples 1.1 and 1.2).
the most highly identified feminists. Feminist Identity. In all samples, participants indicated
feminist identity on a dichotomous and continuous measure.
Previous research indicates these two methods produce
Method similar but not identical results (Bay-Cheng & Zucker,
Participants, Data Collection, and Power Analysis. All relevant 2007; Liss et al., 2000).
information on participants, data sources, and recruitment Feminist Ideology. Some samples indicated their agree-
are included in Table 1. The data for Study 1 came from ment with core tenets of feminism. In sample 1.2, participants
five different samples (labeled samples 1.1–1.5) of women completed the three-item cardinal feminist beliefs scale only
from Italy (sample 1.1), Poland (sample 1.2), the UK (Zucker, 2004). In sample 1.5, participants also completed
(samples 1.3 and 1.5), and the US (sample 1.4). Sample eight items from the liberal feminism subscale of the
1.5 was first chronologically. We then sought to replicate Feminist Perspectives Scale (Henley et al., 1998).
these investigations in different samples and national con- Feminist Collective Action. Measures of posting and
texts. Data were collected separately by different members support for #MeToo were operationalized as separate mea-
of the research team but given the similarities in design sures of feminist collective action. To assess posting to
and methods across samples we decided to combine them MeToo, participants (samples 1.3–1.4) indicated whether
to increase power and statistical inference. Country choice they had participated in MeToo by answering two binary
was driven by practical decisions about the research team’s questions. A scale total was calculated such that if a partici-
ability to recruit participants via convenience sampling, pant answered yes to either item they were coded as having
rather than a priori expectations. posted MeToo. To assess support for MeToo, participants
Participants were entered into a raffle or were paid for par- (samples 1.3–1.4) indicated their attitudinal and behavioral
ticipation. Materials were presented to participants in Italian engagement with MeToo. A scale total was calculated.
(sample 1.1), Polish (sample 1.2), or English (samples 1.3– Explicit Attitudes Toward Men. Participants indicated
1.5). Materials were translated to Italian and Polish by two their attitudes toward men on measures of warmth toward
of the authors who are native speakers and were back trans- men, liking and trust of men, and emotional reactions to
lated by separate academic colleagues, who were also native men. All individual measures were positively correlated
speakers. The majority of participants identified as feminist. (r = .230–.716, all p < .001). See Table 3 for details. These
Hypotheses and methods were pre-registered for sample 1.5, indices were centered around their scale midpoints, standard-
which was chronologically our first investigation of the mis- ized, and averaged to derive a composite score. For a given
andry stereotype2: https://osf.io/7pzaj. Samples 1.3 and 1.4 measure, let xi be an observed score, m the scale midpoint,
were part of a larger survey which included questions regard- and s the standard deviation. Then the midpoint centered
ing the #MeToo movement. and standardized score is given: Zm = (xi−m)/s. Hereafter,
A sensitivity power analysis conducted via the pwr we will refer to these midpoint standardized scores as Zm
package for R (Version 1.3-0; Champely, 2020) suggested whenever they are used.
that each of the samples afforded greater than 80% power Ambivalence Toward Men. Sample 1.5 included the
(a = .05, two-tailed) to detect a difference in attitudes Ambivalence to Men Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1999),
between feminists and nonfeminists of the following magni- which included subscales for hostility to men and benevo-
tudes: d = 0.25–0.39. Assuming moderate variance across lence to men.3
samples (I = 50%), a sensitivity power analysis for a random- Collective Anger. Participants indicated their group-based
effects meta-analysis via the metapower package for R anger in the context of MeToo in samples 1.3 and 1.4.
(Version 0.2.2; Griffin, 2021) suggested that the combined
sample (nstudy1 = 1,664) afforded greater than 80% power
(a = .05, two-tailed) to detect a difference in attitudes Results
between feminist and nonfeminist of the following magni- Feminist Identification and Attitudes Toward Men. See Table 4
tude: d = 0.21. This is considered a small-to-medium effect for all means, standard deviations, and test coefficients.
Table 1. Participant Demographics by Study and Separately by Individual Sample.
14

Study Sample Territory Data source Total N Age M (SD) Age range (years) Gender/sex (n) Feminist n (%) Nonfeminist n (%) Not disclosed n (%)

1 - 1,664 29.82 (12.08) 18–98a W only 968 (58.2) 696 (41.8) 0 (0)
1.1 Italy Social media 507 30.92 (13.22) 18–98b W only 295 (58.2) 212 (41.8) 0 (0)
1.2 Poland Social media 212 28.93 (11.25) 18–67 W only 113 (53.3) 99 (46.7) 0 (0)
1.3 UK Prolific 311 28.36 (8.33) 18–58 W only 177 (56.9) 134 (43.1) 0 (0)
1.4 US Prolific 312 38.29 (12.72) 19–75 W only 171 (54.8) 141 (45.2) 0 (0)
1.5 UK Students/prolific 322 21.86 (5.98) 18–49c W only 212 (65.8) 110 (34.2) 0 (0)
2 - 3,892 21.11 (3.82) 18–63d W (2162) 1,448 (37.2) 1,931 (49.6) 513 (13.2)
M (1724)e
2.1 China Students 462 21.74 (5.46) 18–63f W (259) 124 (26.8) 235 (50.9) 103 (22.3)
M (202)g
2.2 Hong Kong Students 223 19.36 (2.84) 18–55 W (142) 88 (39.5) 135 (60.5) 0 (0)
M (81)
2.3 India Students 518 23.2 (5.39) 18–60h W (261) 385 (74.3) 119 (23) 14 (2.7)
M (254)i
2.4 Japan Students 1,184 19.8 (1.41) 18–27 W (607) 233 (19.7) 765 (64.6) 186 (15.7)
M (576)j
2.5 Macau Students 313 19.67 (1.41) 18–30 W (182) 115 (36.7) 193 (61.7) 5 (1.6)
M (131)
2.6 South Korea Students 488 22.95 (2.79) 18–39 W (265) 230 (47.1) 195 (40) 63 (12.9)
M (222)k
2.7 Taiwan Students 704 21.29 (4.16) 18–52 W (446) 273 (38.8) 289 (41.1) 142 (20.2)
M (258)
3 - UK Students/prolific 198 24.77l (7.98) 18–56 W only 136 (68.7) 62 (31.3) 0 (0)
4 - 2,092 37.46 (16.20) 18–78 W (1232) 677 (32.4) 946 (45.2) 469 (22.4)
M (860)
4.1 US Prolific 364 38.9 (12.86) 19–78 200 (54.9) 164 (45.1) 0 (0)
4.2 Poland Representative 962 45.18 (15.74) 18–75 W (493) 78 (8.1) 415 (43.1) 469 (48.8)
M (469)
4.3 UK Students 375 19.21 (2.22) 18–44 W only 270 (72) 105 (28) 0 (0)
4.4 US Prolific 391 34.63 (12.69) 18–76 M only 129 (33) 262 (67) 0 (0)
5 - UK Representative 1,953 48.92 (16.96) 18–91 W (1075) 706 (36.1) 1,247 (63.9) 0 (0)
M (878)

Note. M = men; W = women. Frequency and percentage of feminists, nonfeminists, and undisclosed are based on the feminist dichotomous measure only.
a
Age data missing for nine participants.
b
Age data missing for seven participants.
c
Age data missing for two participants.
d
Age data missing from three participants.
e
Gender/sex for Study 2: Other = 4; Not disclosed = 2.
f
Age data missing for two participants.
g
Gender/sex for sample 2.1: 1 = Other.
h
Age data missing for one participant.
i
Gender/sex for sample 2.3: NA = 2; Other = 1.
j
Gender/sex for sample 2.4: Other = 1.
k
Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)

Gender/sex for sample 2.6: Other = 1.

l
Age data missing for four participants.
Table 2. Measures of Feminism Across All Studies.
Hopkins-Doyle et al.

Number of
Measure Study Sample items Response scale Alpha Example item

Feminist identity D 1-5 All 1 −1 = no, 1 = yes - Are you a feminist?

Feminist identity C 1, 3, 4, 1.1–1.5, 3, 1 1.1-1.2, 4.2, 5: (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) - How feminist do you consider yourself to be?
5 4.1–4.4, 5 1.3-1.5, 3, 4.1, 4.3-4.4: (1 = not at all,
6 = very much)
Liberal feminism 1, 4 1.2, 1.5, 4.3 1.2 = 3 All: (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 1.2 = .70 1.2: “Girls and women have not been treated as well
1.5/4.3 = 11 1.5 = .82 as boys and men in our society.”
4.3 = .80 1.5/4.3: “The availability of adequate childcare is
central to a woman’s right to work outside the
home.”
Radical feminism 4 4.3 10 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree 4.3 = .83 “The workplace is organized around men’s physical,
economic, and sexual oppression of women.”
Cultural feminism 4 4.3 10 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree 4.3 = .80 “Rape is best stopped by replacing the current
male-oriented culture of violence with an
alternative culture based on more gentle, womanly
qualities.”
Women of color feminism 4 4.3 6 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree 4.3 = .86 “Women of color have less legal and social service
protection from being battered than White women
have.”
Feminist collective action 1 1.3, 1.4 2 1.3/1.4: (0 = did not post MeToo, 1 = did post - “Did you participate in the #MeToo social media
(Posting MeToo) MeToo) movement by using the hashtag/but without using
the #MeToo hashtag?”
Feminist collective action 1, 5 1.3, 1.4 1.3/1.4, 5: (1 = not at all/strongly disagree, 1.3 = .85 1.3-1.4: “How much did you use likes, favorites,
(Support MeToo) 7 = very much/strongly agree) 1.4 = .85 comments, shares etc. to support others who
posted their #MeToo experiences?”
1.3-1.4, 5: “To what extent do you support or
oppose the #MeToo movement?”
Feminist collective action 3 - 5 1 = extremely unlikely, 7 = extremely likely 3 = .92 “Take part in a rally or demonstration in support of
intentions women’s rights”

Note. D = dichotomous; C = continuous.

15
16 Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)

Here we report analyses using the composite measure of Study 2: Feminists’ Explicit Attitudes
explicit attitudes toward men. See Supplement B for analyses Toward Men in Non-WEIRD Countries
with each individual measure. As predicted (H1), both fem-
inists and nonfeminists (using the dichotomous measure) Our initial investigation with women in WEIRD (Western,
held positive (above midpoint) explicit attitudes toward educated, industrialized, rich, and democratic; Henrich
men. Inconsistent with predictions and shown in Table 4 et al., 2010) countries yielded little support for the misandry
(H2), feminists’ and nonfeminists’ explicit attitudes toward stereotype. However, given the importance of the feminist
men were not significantly different. There was likewise no movement globally, and criticism of its narrow focus on
significant difference between feminists (M = 3.40, SD = the interests of Western women (Kruks, 2005), in Study 2
1.26) and nonfeminists (M = 3.53, SD = 1.14) on hostility we extended our investigation to feminists in five
toward men t(320) = −0.93, p = .352, d = −0.11, 95% CI non-WEIRD countries in Asia: China (Mainland China,
[−0.34, 0.12], but feminists (M = 2.43, SD = 1.16) were Hong Kong, and Macau4), India, Japan, South Korea, and
less benevolent toward men than nonfeminists (M = 3.23, Taiwan. All countries (except India) are also Confucian cul-
SD = 1.13) t(320) = −5.86, p < .001, d = −0.69, 95% CI tures which are explicitly patriarchal and represent an impor-
[−0.92, −0.45]. tant context in which to study feminism (Rosenlee, 2012).
Correlational analyses of the continuous measure of fem- Recently, there have been some psychological investigations
inist identification produced largely the same patterns. into feminist identity development and activism in Asian
Inconsistent with prediction (H3), this measure was unrelated countries. For example, researchers in China examined
to participants’ explicit attitudes toward men, rMeta = −0.04, how feminist identity (using Feminist Identity Composite;
95% CI [−0.14, 0.05], Z = −0.88, p = .377, and hostility to Fischer et al., 2000) is positively related to activism and
men, rMeta = −0.05, 95% CI [−0.16, 0.06], Z = −0.86, p = sexual harassment awareness (Liu & Zheng, 2019; Shi &
.390; but it was predictive of lower benevolence to men, Zheng, 2021). Elsewhere, qualitative interviews of feminist
rMeta = −0.39, 95% CI [−0.47, −0.29], Z = −7.26, p < .001. activists in India and China identified social relationships
Adding the quadratic term (feminist identification squared) and experiences of gender inequality and violence as key
to a mixed-effects model predicting variations at the factors in feminist identity development (Frederick &
meta-level did not improve the fit compared to the simpler Stewart, 2018). Notwithstanding these findings, there
model, χ2s < 0.54, Δdf = 1, p > .462, producing no evidence remains a dearth of research examining levels of feminist
of a nonlinear relation between feminist identity and attitudes identification in Asian countries and how feminists feel
toward men. This result tends to disconfirm any notion that toward men.
misandrist attitudes may emerge distinctively among the We expected that consistent with our theorizing, femi-
most highly identifying feminists. nists’ attitudes toward men would be positive in absolute
terms (H1), but less positive relative to nonfeminists’ (H2).
Feminist Ideology and Attitudes Toward Men. Inconsistent with For the first time, we also recruited male participants. We
expectation (H3), correlational analyses of feminist ideology expected the same pattern to emerge for female and male par-
showed that it was not significantly related to explicit atti- ticipants, since previous research has shown that predictors
tudes toward men, rMeta = 0.03, 95% CI [−0.23, 0.29], of feminist attitudes are largely similar between men and
Z = 0.20, p = .840, nor hostility to men, r(319) = .00, 95% women (Bolzendahl & Myers, 2004). Relatedly, men are
CI [−0.11, 0.11], p = .990. Feminist ideology was negatively not precluded from the feminist movement and also suffer
associated with benevolence to men, r(319) = −.36, 95% CI under sexist systems (hooks, 2000), and other studies on fem-
[−0.45, −0.26], p < .001. inist attitudes have included both men and women (e.g.,
Henley et al., 1998). We did not make any specific predic-
Feminist Collective Action and Attitudes Toward Men. To further tions by country, but we do report country-level analyses
test the misandry myth, we ran correlational analyses with in Supplement C.
feminist collective action (i.e., participation in, and support
for, #MeToo), explicit attitudes toward men, and collective
anger (regarding women’s experiences of sexual miscon- Method
duct). Contrary to predictions (H3), participation in and Participants, Data Collection, and Power Analysis. See Table 1
support for MeToo were unrelated to explicit attitudes for information on participants and recruitment overall and
toward men (rsMeta < ± .08, ps > .047). However, they were split by sample. The data for Study 2 came from seven differ-
positively associated with collective anger (MeToo participa- ent samples (labeled samples 2.1–2.7) of women and men
tion: rMeta = .15, 95% CI [0.08, 0.13], Z = 3.86, p < .001; from Mainland China (sample 2.1), Hong Kong (sample
MeToo support: rMeta = .38, 95% CI [0.31, 0.44], Z = 9.86, 2.2), India (sample 2.3), Japan (sample 2.4), Macau
p < .001). See Table S3 (Supplement B) for additional corre- (sample 2.5), South Korea (sample 2.6), and Taiwan
lations between feminist identity and these variables. (sample 2.7). Four participants were removed as their
Table 3. Outcome Measures Across All Studies.

Measure Study Sample Number of items Response scale Alpha Example item

Warmth toward men 1, 3, 4, 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 1 1.1, 1.2, 1.5, 4.1-4.3 (0 = extremely cool/ - “How warm/favorable or cold/
5 3, 4.1–4.3, 5 unfavorable, 5 = neutral, 10 = extremely unfavorable do you feel towards men in
warm/favorable general.”
5) (0 = extremely cool/unfavorable,
Hopkins-Doyle et al.

50 = neutral, 100 = extremely warm/

favorable)
Liking and trust of men 1, 2, 3, 1.3–1.5 1.3/1.5, 2.1–2.7 = 3 1.3–1.5, 3 (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 1.3 = .73; 1.4 = .81 “like men,” “dislike men,” “trust men,”
4 2.1–2.7, 3, 1.4, 3 = 4, 4.1/4.3 = 2 4.1/4.3 (1 = dislike/distrust, 7 = like/trust) 1.5 = .76; 2 = .50; “distrust men”
4.1, 4.3 3 = .83; 4.1 = .78
4.3 = .71
Emotional reactions men 1, 3, 4 1.1–1.2, 1.5, 1 = 12 1.1/1.2/1.5 (1 = not at all, 6 = very much) 1.1 = .51; 1.2 = .50 “disdain,” “fondness,” “acceptance,”
3, 4.1 3=4 3, 4.1 (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) 1.5 = .87; 3 = .76; “hostility”
4.1 = 12 4.1 = .91
Hostility to men 1 1.5 6 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree .77 “Men act like babies when they are sick.”
Benevolence to men 1 1.5 6 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree .83 “Men are more willing to take risks than
women.”
Collective anger 1, 5 1.3–1.4, 5 1.3, 5 = 2 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree 1.3 = .85; 1.4 = .91; “I am furious with the sexual harassment
1.4 = 3, 5 = .86 of women.”
Gender similarity 4, 5 4.1, 4.3, 5 1 1 = low similarity, 7 = high similarity - “Select the picture that best describes
the similarity or difference between men
and women.”
Threat 4, 5 4.1, 4.3, 5 4.1/4.3 = 9 each RT 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree 4.1 RT = .93 RT (“Many women live in fear of men’s
ST; 5 = 1 4.3 RT = .89 aggression.”)
4.3 ST = .71 ST (“Men do not value childrearing as
much as they should.”)
5 (“Generally speaking, men harm,
threaten, or diminish women in too many
ways.”)
Hostile sexism 4 4.1, 4.3–4.4 4.1/4.3 = 6 4.1/4.3 (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) 4.1 = .93 “Women seek to gain power by getting
4.4 = 5 4.4 (1 = strongly disagree, 6 = strongly agree) 4.3 = .87 control over men.”
4.4 = .92
Feminists’/nonfeminists’ WTM 4, 5 4.1–4.4, 5 1 0 = extremely cool/unfavorable, 5 = neutral, - “How warm or cool do you think women
10 = extremely warm/favorable who answered ‘yes’ [and ‘no’] to the
question ‘Do you consider yourself a
feminist” feel toward men?”
Feminists’/nonfeminists’ 4, 5 4.1/4.4, 5 1 1 = low similarity, 7 = high similarity - “Select the picture that best describes
gender similarity the similarity or difference between men
and women.”
Feminists’/nonfeminists’ 4, 5 4.1/4.4, 5 4.1 = 9 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree 4.1 = .90/.94 4.1 = “Many women live in fear of men’s
threat 4.4 = 1 aggression.”
5=1 4.4/5 = “Generally speaking, men harm,
threaten, or diminish women in too many
way.”

Note. RT = realistic threat; ST = symbolic threat; WTM = warmth toward men. Where response scales differed on the same measure across samples, scores were standardized within sample
17

before being aggregated.

 18

Table 4. One-Sample and Between-Sample Tests of Explicit Attitudes to Men (Composite Measure), Perceived Threat, and Perceived Similarity, for Each Individual Study.

One-sample test One-sample test Between-samples test

Feminists Feminists (vs. scale midpoint) Nonfeminists Nonfeminists (vs. scale midpoint) Feminists versus nonfeminists
Study/
measure M SD Z p dMeta 95% CI M SD Z p dMeta 95% CI Z p dMeta 95% CI

Study 1
Explicit 0.63 0.95 3.88 <.001 0.69 0.34, 1.03 0.72 0.95 3.74 <.001 0.78 0.37, 1.18 −1.03 .302 −0.10 −0.28, 0.09
Study 2
Explicit 0.57 1.08 6.29 <.001 0.63 0.43, 0.83 0.63 0.98 6.25 <.001 0.63 0.43, 0.82 0.02 .980 0.00 −0.13, 0.14
Study 4
Explicit 0.81 0.96 14.51 <.001 0.81 0.70, 0.92 1.18 0.93 7.88 <.001 1.08 0.81, 1.35 −2.26 .024 −0.26 −0.48, −0.03
Threat 5.14 0.92 4.03 1.17 2.73 .006 1.06 0.30, 1.83
Similarity 4.38 1.29 4.02 1.50 3.20 .001 0.25 0.10, 0.40

M SD t(df) p d 95% CI M SD t(df) p d 95% CI t(df) p d 95% CI

Study 3
Explicit 1.20 0.89 15.76 <.001 1.35 1.12, 1.58 1.34 0.87 12.07 <.001 1.53 1.16, 1.90 −1.03 .305 −0.16 −0.46, 0.14
(135) (61) (196)
Study 5
Explicit 71.13 20.81 26.51 <.001 1.02 0.92, 1.11 67.44 22.73 26.03 <.001 0.77 0.70, 0.83 3.47 <.001 0.17 0.07, 0.26
(680) (1150) (1830)
Threat 4.63 1.43 3.62 1.39 15.13 <.001 0.72 0.62, 0.81
(1921)
Similarity 3.92 1.64 3.67 1.72 3.00 .003 0.15 0.05, 0.24
(1826)

Note. CI = confidence interval. Where the study contained multiple samples meta-estimates are reported (i.e., Z, dMeta). Where a study contained a single sample, sample estimates (i.e., t, d)
are reported. Means and standard deviations for explicit attitudes toward men are Zm scores in multisample studies and raw elsewhere.
Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 19

responses indicated inattentiveness. Participants reported between the two largest gender/sex subgroups (female vs.
identifying as feminist (nWomen = 1,000; nMen = 444, nOther = male participants) when comparing feminists’ and nonfemi-
3, nDid not disclose = 1), nonfeminist (nWomen = 906; nMen = nists’ liking and trust of men. There was no strong evidence
1,023, nOther = 1, nDid not disclose = 1), or did not disclose to suggest that gender/sex moderated the differences between
their feminist identity (nWomen = 256, nMen = 257). Only par- feminists and nonfeminists on liking and trust of men, Q(1) =
ticipants who had lived in each respective country since birth 3.42, p = .064. As shown in Table 4, and consistent with our
were recruited to take part.5 Participants were undergraduate predictions (H1), both feminists’ and nonfeminists’ liking
students recruited in class or through research participation and trust were positive in absolute terms. However, inconsis-
programs. Participation was voluntary but those who took tent with predictions (H2), feminists reported no less liking
part via research participation programs received course and trust of men than nonfeminists. The same pattern was
credit. observed for each individual item (see Supplement C for
A sensitivity power analysis conducted (pwr for R v1.3-0; details).
Champely, 2020) suggested the samples afforded greater
than 80% power (a = .05, two-tailed) to detect a difference
in attitudes between feminists and nonfeminists of the fol-
Study 3: Feminists’ Implicit Attitudes
lowing magnitudes: d = 0.17 to 0.38. Assuming similar var-
iance across samples as we observed in Study 1 (I = 90%), Toward Men
a sensitivity power analysis for a random-effects meta- In Study 3, we extended our investigation of feminists’ atti-
analysis (metapower for R v0.2.2; Griffin, 2021) suggested tudes toward men to include implicit attitudes. Participants
that the combined sample (nstudy2 = 3,892) afforded greater took part in a single-category implicit association test
than 80% power (a = .05, two-tailed) to detect a difference (SC-IAT; Karpinski & Steinman 2006), which asks partici-
in attitudes between feminists and nonfeminists of magnitude pants to categorize “male” words to either a good or bad cat-
d = 0.20. The magnitude of this effect could be considered egory depending on which rule is active. Response latencies
small-to-medium (Lovakov & Agadullina, 2021). for categorizing male words with good or bad are calculated.
A positive (negative) d-score indicates a positive (negative)
Materials, Measures, and Procedure. Data were collected implicit association with the category male. We expected
through a large-scale collaboration of 28 researchers from that participants would demonstrate a positive association
24 universities across countries. Participants were presented with the category male in absolute terms (H1). Our key pre-
with the materials in their native language, except in Hong diction, based on the theoretical reasons to suppose that the
Kong and India where materials were in English. Materials misandry stereotype contains a grain of truth, was that femi-
were translated and back translated by co-authors and their nists would demonstrate a less positive association with the
teams in each country, except in Japan where all Japanese category male than nonfeminists (H2). We also expected
co-authors worked together on translation and validation. that feminist collective action would be negatively related
Our items were included as part of a larger cross-cultural to explicit and implicit attitudes (H3). Hypotheses and
questionnaire examining social justice beliefs in South and methods were pre-registered: https://osf.io/fwqgk
East Asia. Countries were included based on availability of
collaborators. Given the methodological similarity across
countries the samples were combined to increase power.
Feminist Identity. Participants indicated their feminist Methods
identity using the dichotomous measure (see Table 2). A con- Participants, Data Collection, and Power Analysis. See Table 1
tinuous measure of feminist identity was dropped due to for participant details. Participants were undergraduate
inconsistencies in how it was measured across countries. women from a UK university, who took part for course
Liking and Trust of Men. See Table 3 for details. credits. Initial data collection in the lab was slow (n = 97)
Negatively worded items were reverse scored so that owing to mid-semester breaks during testing; therefore, we
higher scores reflected greater positivity. Internal reliability also collected data online (n = 101) to maximize recruitment.
fell below the conventional .70 threshold for this scale. Results did not differ between lab and online participants.7
Therefore, we replicated all analyses with each item individ- Most participants in the sample identified as feminists.
ually. The pattern was the same (see Supplement C for Details of data processing and exclusions are available on
details). the OSF project page (see author note for link). A sensitivity
power analysis conducted (pwr for R v1.3-0; Champely,
2020) suggested that the sample (n = 198) afforded greater
Results than 80% power (a = .05, two-tailed) to detect a difference
Unlike in Study 1, the present study contained male partici- in attitudes between feminists and nonfeminists of the fol-
pants (and a small number of gender/sex6 variant identified lowing magnitude: d = 0.40 (i.e., average effect size reported
people). For this reason, we first tested for differences in social psychology, Lovakov & Agadullina, 2021).
20 Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)

Materials and Procedure. Feminism. Participants completed Feminist Collective Action and Attitudes Toward Men.
measures of feminist identity (dichotomous and continuous) Inconsistent with prediction (H3), feminist collective action
and feminist collective action intentions (multi-item measure; was unrelated to all measures of implicit and explicit attitudes
Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995). See Table 2 for detailed toward men (all rs < .12, all ps > .071), except for a negative
information. relation with emotional reactions toward men, r(196) = −.15,
Implicit Attitudes Toward Men. Participants completed the 95% CI [−.29, −.01], p = .031. Feminist collective action did
SC-IAT (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006), which measures correlate positively with feminist identity, r(196) = .65,
evaluative associations with a single category or attitude 95% CI [.56, .72], p < .001, but in regression analyses pre-
object. We presented seven target words associated with dicted neither implicit or explicit attitudes toward men (all
the object category Male (e.g., He, Mister, Kevin), and 21 ps > .14). In concert, these findings indicate that even when
target words for the evaluative dimension, labeled Good operationalized as action, feminism is largely unrelated to
(e.g., wonderful and celebrating) and Bad (e.g., terrible, hor- attitudes toward men.
rible; adapted from Rudman et al., 2001). A d-score was cal-
culated from responses such that a positive score (i.e., > 0)
indicated positive associations between Male and Good. Study 4: Mechanisms and Metaperceptions
This number was calculated by subtracting mean reaction of (Non-)Feminists’ Attitudes Toward Men
times in Block 2 (where Male and Good were paired) from
Thus far our studies show little support for the accuracy of
those in Block 4 (where Male and Bad were paired). Zero
the misandry stereotype: across national contexts and using
is the neutral midpoint at which associations change from
a variety of measures, feminists are largely positive in their
negative to positive. In line with previous SC-IAT studies,
attitudes toward men and no different from nonfeminists.
responses were winsored above 1500 ms and counted as
However, these findings do not tell us anything about the pro-
missing values if less than 350 ms. Incorrect responses
cesses shaping feminists’ attitudes toward men, nor can they
were replaced by the block mean of correct trials plus
shed light on why previous investigations of the misandry
400 ms (for details see Karpinski & Steinman, 2006).
stereotype have been inconsistent in their conclusions. To
Explicit Attitudes Toward Men. A composite (Zm score)
address this, in Study 4 we tested, for the first time, our
was created as in Study 1 (see Table 3 for details of individual
full path model of feminists’ attitudes toward men via
measures). All individual measures which comprise the com-
posite were positively correlated (r = .613–.747, all p < .001).
Figure 1. Implicit Attitudes Toward Men Among Feminists and
Non Feminists (Study 3).
Results
Feminists’ Implicit and Explicit Attitudes Toward Men. As in
Studies 1 and 2, we first examined feminists’ absolute
(using one-sample t-tests against midpoint = 0) and then rel-
ative (compared to nonfeminists’) attitudes toward men.
As predicted (H1) and shown in Figure 1, both feminists
(M = 0.23, SD = 0.33) and nonfeminists (M = 0.19, SD = 0.32)
showed positive implicit attitudes toward men in absolute
terms (feminists: d = 0.71, 95% CI [0.52, 0.90], t(135) = 8.28,
p < .001; nonfeminists: d = 0.59, 95% CI [0.31, 0.85],
t(61) = 4.61, p < .001). Inconsistent with predictions (H2),
the between-participants comparison showed no differences
between feminists’ and nonfeminists’ implicit attitudes
toward men, d = −0.13, 95% CI [−0.40, 0.16], t(196) =
−0.86, p = .391. Similarly, analyses using the continuous
measure of feminist identity showed it was unrelated to
implicit attitudes toward men r(197) = .02, 95% CI [−.12,
.16], p = .752. As shown in Table 4, explicit attitudes
toward men were similar to Study 1, indicating positivity
in absolute terms, and no difference between feminists’ and
nonfeminists’ attitudes toward men in relative terms.
Likewise, correlational analyses using the continuous Note. Scale midpoints are indicated by dashed horizontal lines. Scores above
the dashed horizontal line represent greater positivity. Scores below the
measure showed no relation with implicit or explicit attitudes dashed line represent greater negativity. The figure depicts box plots repre-
toward men (rs < .09, ps > .198). See Supplement D for tests senting interquartile ranges (boxes), outliers (points), and means with 95%
with individual measures of attitudes toward men. confidence intervals (white circles and whiskers).
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 21

gender similarity and threat (i.e., realistic and symbolic). We Method

also tested directly comparable stereotypes (metapercep-
Participants, Data Collection, and Power Analysis. See Table 1
tions) of feminists’ attitudes toward men, gender similarity,
for overall participant details, and broken down by sample.
and threat. This means for the first time we were able to
Participants from the US (samples 4.1 and 4.4), Poland
compare feminists’ attitudes toward men, gender similarity,
(sample 4.2), and the UK (sample 4.3) took part. Data were
and threat to metaperceptions of those attitudes, thus
collected separately by different members of the research
testing stereotype accuracy in a novel way (Judd & Park,
team, and in one case (sample 4.2) a contracted research
1993).
company, but were later merged to increase statistical
Our investigations so far have also been constrained to
power and inference. Samples were merged in this way
measuring only mainstream feminists’ thinking (i.e., liberal
because all included measures of metaperceptions of femi-
feminism). Therefore, in Study 4 we extended our investiga-
nists’ and nonfeminists’ attitudes. Sample 4.2 (Poland) was
tion to include different types of feminist ideology. Feminism
a nationally representative sample of adults (by age,
is a heterogenous movement with many varieties of thinking
gender/sex, and education) recruited via a Polish research
that conceptualize oppression and its sources in distinct ways
company. Our items were part of a larger omnibus survey
(Donovan, 2012). We chose to focus on ideologies (liberal,
conducted using a Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing
radical, cultural, women of color) that represented a
(CAPI) technique (i.e., respondents were interviewed in their
breadth of beliefs but which could be measured using a val-
homes by an interviewer with a laptop). Materials were trans-
idated tool (i.e., Henley et al., 1998). Liberal feminism
lated and back translated by separate native Polish speakers.
emphasizes the notion that women and men are essentially
They were also reviewed by the Polish research company
the same, and thus should have equal rights and opportuni-
for clarity and accuracy.
ties. Cultural feminism distinguishes women from men by
Hypotheses and methods8 were pre-registered for sample
advocating for positive so-called feminine values concerning
4.2 (see https://osf.io/u584r). Participants completed the
gentleness and peace. Radical feminism views men as a
study in person (sample 4.2) or online (samples 4.1, 4.3,
group that oppresses women. Women of color feminism crit-
and 4.4). Participants identified as feminists (nWomen = 548,
icize the exclusion of women of color from the feminist
nMen = 129; note that only n = 391 men completed the dichot-
movement and emphasize intersectional issues of racism
omous measure of feminist identification9) or nonfeminist
and poverty.
(nWomen = 684; nMen = 262).
As in Studies 1 to 3, we predicted that feminists’ attitudes
A sensitivity power analysis (pwr for R v1.3-0;
to men would be positive in absolute terms though less pos-
Champely, 2020) suggested the samples afforded greater
itive than nonfeminists’ (H1 and H2), and predicted negative
than 80% power (a = .05, two-tailed) to detect a difference
associations between feminist ideology (liberal, radical, cul-
in attitudes between feminists and nonfeminists of the fol-
tural, and women of color) and attitudes toward men (H3).
lowing magnitudes: d = 0.18 to 0.29. Given the variance
Guided by our theoretical model of feminists’ attitudes
across samples in our prior studies (I ≈ 90%), a sensitivity
toward men, we predicted that feminists (relative to nonfem-
power analysis for a random-effects meta-analysis (meta-
inists) would report greater threat from men (H4a), but also
power for R v0.2.2; Griffin, 2021) suggested the combined
greater similarity between men and women (H5a). We
sample (nstudy4 = 2,092) afforded greater than 80% power
expected these factors to have opposing evaluative indirect
(a = 0.05, two-tailed) to detect a difference in attitudes
effects on attitudes toward men: negative via threat (H4b)
between feminists and nonfeminists of: d = 0.35 (i.e., close
and positive via similarity (H5b).
to the average size reported in social psychology; Lovakov
Turning to people’s understanding of those mechanisms,
& Agadullina, 2021).
we expected that feminists’ metaperceived attitudes toward
men would be inaccurately stereotyped as negative in abso-
lute terms (H6a), and underestimated relative to feminists’ Materials and Procedure. Detailed information about mea-
actual mean (H6b). We predicted that this stereotype would sures of feminist identity and ideology are presented in
be associated with a faulty understanding of the factors Table 2. Detailed information about all other measures are
underlying feminists’ attitudes. Specifically, we expected presented in Table 3.
that feminists (relative to nonfeminists) would be perceived Feminist Identity. Participants completed both a dichoto-
as believing men to be a stronger threat (H7), and also mous and a continuous measure. In sample 4.2, male partic-
would be stereotyped as perceiving men and women as less ipants completed the continuous measure only, due to
similar (H8). We expected these metaperceived differences financial constraints.
to mediate the relation between (non-)feminists and their Feminist Ideology. Sample 4.3 included the same measure
metaperceived attitudes toward men (H9–H10). Finally, we of liberal feminism as in Study 1 and three subscales (i.e.,
expected that ideological motivations (i.e., hostile sexism) cultural, radical,10 and women of color) from the Feminist
would be associated with participants’ tendency to endorse Perspectives Scale (Henley et al., 1998). We chose not to
the misandry stereotype (H11). include the conservative and socialist feminist subscales
22 Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)

because the former does not measure feminist ideology, and (p = .217), were negatively related to explicit attitudes
we felt the latter was dated and was likely to yield little var- toward men (all rs between −.31 and −.11; all ps < .041).
iance in responses. A multiple regression showed that radical (β = −.24, p < .001)
Explicit Attitudes Toward Men. A composite was created and cultural (β = −.18, p = .003) feminism, but not liberal
as in Studies 1 and 3. All individual measures which make up (β = .06, p = .330) or women of color (β = .01, p = .910) fem-
this composite were positively correlated (r = .639–.720, all inism, were uniquely associated with less positive explicit
p < .001). attitudes toward men, overall model: R2 = .12, F(4, 370) =
Gender Similarity. Participants (samples 4.1 and 4.3) 12.89, p < .001. These findings indicate that nonmainstream
completed a scale of similarity using the adapted Inclusion feminist ideologies may be associated with less positive atti-
of Others in Self (IOS) Scale (Aron et al., 1992). tudes toward men.
Threat. Participants completed a measure of realistic
threat (samples 4.1 and 4.3; Stephan et al., 2000) and sym- The Role of Gender Similarity and Threat in Feminists’ Attitudes
bolic threat (sample 4.3; Stephan et al., 2000). In sample Toward Men. Next, we tested our focal hypotheses about
4.3, symbolic and realistic threat were aggregated. mechanisms shaping feminists’ and nonfeminists’ relative
Hostile Sexism. Participants (sample 4.1, 4.3, and 4.4) positivity toward men. As predicted (H4a) and shown in
completed the hostile sexism subscale from the Ambivalent Table 4, women feminists (vs. nonfeminists) perceived
Sexism Inventory (Glick & Fiske, 1996). Hostile sexism is men as a greater threat,11 but also more similar to women
conceptualized as mistrust of women who are seen as (H5a). Next, we ran indirect effects analyses using Hayes
trying to usurp male authority through feminism. In this (2017) SPSS Process macro v.4.1, Model 4, with 5,000
way it is explicitly antifeminist and likely to be associated resamples and standardized scores (see Figure 2, Panel A).
with distrust and disliking of feminists. As predicted (H4b and H5b), dichotomous feminist identifi-
Metaperceptions of (Non-)Feminists’ Attitudes. cation was negatively related to warmth toward men via
Participants completed the measures of attitudes toward threat, but positively related via gender similarity. The
men as they believed other participants (i.e., feminists and direct effect was nonsignificant. Note that male participants
nonfeminists) in the study would have. We asked participants in Study 4 did not complete all of the measures needed in
to specifically consider women feminists (and nonfeminists), order to conduct this mediation analysis. In any case, the
since the misandry stereotype is largely, if not exclusively, roles of gender similarity and threat to women may only be
concerned with women feminists. Since samples 4.1, 4.3, relevant to female feminists, for whom women are the
and 4.4 were nonrepresentative, care was taken to word gender ingroup. See Supplement E for additional analyses
these questions such that metaperceptions were directly com- with explicit attitudes toward men as the outcome variable
parable to feminists’ and nonfeminists’ reported attitudes and the continuous feminist identity as the predictor.
(e.g., “We are asking women Prolific workers based in the
US to answer similar questions”). In counterbalanced Metaperceptions of Feminists’ Attitudes Toward Men. Means
order, participants indicated how warm they thought femi- and inferential statistics are shown in Table 5. As expected
nist and nonfeminist women felt toward men. In addition, (H6), feminists’ attitudes were perceived as below midpoint:
samples 4.1 and 4.4 completed measures of metapercep- that is, negative in absolute terms, dMeta = −0.15, 95% CI
tions of gender similarity and threat (see Table 3 for [−0.22, −0.07], Z = −3.91, p < .001. Further, relative to fem-
details). Note reliability was not calculated for metaper- inists’ actual warmth toward men participants as whole sub-
ceived warmth and gender similarity because these were stantially underestimated women feminists’ warmth toward
single item measures. In some samples (5.1 and 5.4) partic- men. This error was committed by feminists and nonfemi-
ipants also completed metaperception measures of warmth nists alike. We then examined, for the first time, participants’
toward women, but these are only analyzed in our meta- understanding of the mechanisms underlying women femi-
analysis (see Study 6). nists’ attitudes toward men. As predicted (H7 and H8), and
shown in Table 5, participants overestimated women femi-
nists’ perceptions of threat and underestimated their percep-
Results tions of gender similarity. This pattern was evident even
Feminists’ Attitudes Toward Men. For brevity we only report among feminist participants for threat. See Supplement E
results of the composite here. For full results (i.e., tests for analyses of the accuracy of nonfeminists’ attitudes
of individual measures, and continuous feminist identity toward men, and for female and male participants separately.
measure) please see Supplement E. As predicted (H1), To examine the accuracy of participants’ understanding of
and shown in Table 4, both feminists’ and nonfeminists’ mechanisms connecting feminism and warmth toward men,
explicit attitudes toward men were positive in absolute we analyzed repeated-measures mediation using Memore
terms, and feminists were slightly less positive toward for SPSS v2.1 (Model 1 with 5,000 resamples, 95% boot-
men relative to nonfeminists (H2). As expected (H3), all strapped confidence intervals; Montoya & Hayes, 2017).
types of feminist ideology, except liberal feminism Zm scores12 were used for this analysis.13 Results are
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 23

presented in Figure 2 (Panel B). As predicted (H9), partici- own feminist identification and feminist collective action)
pants were accurate regarding the role of threat perceptions: would be associated with participants’ endorsement of
feminists were rated as higher in perceived threat, and subse- the misandry stereotype (H11).15
quently lower in warmth toward men. In contrast, participants
were, as expected (H10), inaccurate regarding the role of
gender similarity perceptions, which they erroneously per- Method
ceived to be lower among feminists. The direct effect was sig- Participants, Data Collection, and Power Analysis. Participant
nificant. See Supplement E for additional indirect effects details are displayed in Table 1. Participants were UK adults
investigated separately among female and male participants, recruited via YouGov and were nationally representative by
and feminist and nonfeminist participants. age, gender/sex, social grade and voting behavior. Our mea-
Finally, indicating the importance of faulty mental models sures were included as part of a larger omnibus survey and
over and above ideological factors multiple regression anal- administered online. More participants identified as not femi-
yses showed that, as predicted (H11), metaperceptions of nist (nWomen = 610; nMen = 637) than feminist (nWomen = 465;
feminists’ warmth toward men (criterion variable) were asso- nMen = 241). A sensitivity power analysis (pwr for R v1.3-0;
ciated with metaperceptions of similarity (β = .16) and threat Champely, 2020) suggested the sample (n = 1,953) afforded
(β = −.25) after adjusting for participants’ own feminist iden- greater than 80% power (a = .05, two-tailed) to detect a differ-
tification (continuous, β = .26) and hostile sexism (β = −.15, ence in attitudes between feminist and nonfeminist participants
ps < .001; samples 4.1 and 4.4). The beta-weights for similar- of d = 0.12. This magnitude could be considered small—that is,
ity and threat were not moderated by gender/sex (ps = .855 >75% of effect sizes typically reported in social psychology
and .417, respectively14). See Supplement E Tables S12 for (Lovakov & Agadullina, 2021).
full model statistics.
Measures. Feminism. Participants completed measures of
feminist identity (dichotomous and continuous) and feminist
Study 5: Nationally Representative collective action (i.e., support for MeToo). Detailed informa-
Investigation of (Non-)Feminists’ tion is presented in Table 2. See Table 3 for details of all
other measures.
Attitudes Toward Men
Warmth Toward Men. Participants indicated the warmth
Thus far, our previous samples, while diverse, have been largely of their feeling toward men using the same feeling thermom-
student or convenience samples or where they were representa- eter as in previous studies.
tive (sample 4.2), were conducted in a non-English speaking Gender Similarity. Participants rated their perceived sim-
national context. To generalize and extend previous findings, ilarity between men and women as in Study 4 (i.e., IOS
in Study 5 we sought to replicate key effects in a nationally rep- Scale; Aron et al., 1992).
resentative sample of UK adults. Participants completed the Threat. Participants completed a single item that
same measures as in Study 4 and two additional measures of expressed both symbolic and realistic threat.
feminist collective action (i.e., support for MeToo) and collec- Metaperceptions of (Non-)Feminists’ Attitudes. In a coun-
tive anger (specifically about sexual misconduct). As in previ- terbalanced order, participants completed the same measures
ous studies, we expected that in absolute terms, feminists’ of warmth toward men, gender similarity, and threat as they
attitudes toward men would be positive (H1), but less positive thought feminist and nonfeminist UK women would.
than nonfeminists’ (H2). Likewise, we expected feminist collec- Collective Anger. Participants reported their anger at the
tive action and anger would be negatively related to attitudes sexual harassment of women.
toward men (H3). We expected that feminists (compared to
nonfeminists) would report greater threat from men (H4a), but
greater gender similarity (H5a), and these beliefs would indi- Results
rectly predict attitudes toward men—negative (H4b) and Analyses were conducted in line with Study 4, using stan-
positive (H5b), respectively. Regarding metaperceptions, dardized Zm scores for comparisons with midpoint. For all
we expected feminists to be perceived as having negative other analyses regular standardized scores were used (i.e.,
attitudes toward men in absolute terms (H6a) and relative M = 0, SD = 1). Here we report analyses using unweighted
to the feminists’ actual mean (H6b). We predicted that fem- estimates. We chose to do this because we wanted to main-
inists would be perceived as believing men to be a greater tain consistency in our analytic approach across studies,
threat (H7), but also to be inaccurately stereotyped as per- and because some outputs (i.e., the reporting of effect sizes
ceiving men and women as dissimilar (H8). We predicted and related confidence intervals in R) and analytic
that these metaperceived differences in threat and gender approaches (i.e., using the Process and Memore macros to
similarity would mediate the metaperceived relation test indirect effects analyses in SPSS) are not possible
between feminism and attitudes toward men (H9 and using weighted estimates. We also considered this approach
H10). Finally, we expected that ideological factors (i.e., appropriate because the differences between analyses using
24 Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)

weighted and unweighted estimates were negligible. For rep- The Role of Gender Similarity and Threat in Feminists’ Attitudes
licated analyses using the weighted estimates see the project Toward Men. Next, we tested our proposed model of feminists’
page on OSF (see author note for link). Note that YouGov and nonfeminists’ attitudes toward men. Independent t-tests
data collection policy allowed participants to select a showed that as predicted (H4a and H5a), and shown in
“don’t know” option in the omnibus survey that our ques- Table 4, feminists (vs. nonfeminists) perceived men as a
tions were part of. This means a small number of participants greater threat, but also more similar to women. As predicted
responded outside of the scale on some questions.16 However, (H4b and H5b), analysis of indirect effects using Process
to avoid problems with interpreting or imputing don’t know macro v4.1 for SPSS (using Z scores, Model 4 with 5,000
responses (Manisera & Zuccolotto, 2014), we have employed resamples; Hayes, 2017) for female participants revealed that
listwise deletion.17 For this reason, reported sample size and dichotomous feminist identification was negatively related to
degrees of freedom vary across measures and analyses. warmth toward men via threat, but was positively associated
via similarity. The direct effect of feminist identity was nonsig-
nificant. See Figure 3 Panel A for coefficients. Here, we report
Feminists’ Attitudes Toward Men. Analyses of feminists’ atti- the results only for female participants for consistency with
tudes toward men were largely consistent with expectations Study 4 and with the metaperception questions that asked spe-
and findings from Studies 1 to 4. As shown in Table 4 cifically about the attitudes of women; theoretically, also, threat
(H1), feminists’ and nonfeminists’ warmth toward men was and similarity to women can be expected to be more relevant to
positive in absolute terms, but unexpectedly feminists female than male participants. In Supplement F, moderated
reported slightly warmer attitudes than nonfeminists (H2). mediation results are presented which show that the indirect
Further exploration of a gender/sex interaction F(1, 1828) effects hold for both female and male participants, and that
= 13.58, p < .001, η2p = .01 showed differences between fem- the indirect effect for threat (but not similarity) was signifi-
inists and nonfeminists were only significant for male partic- cantly stronger for female participants.
ipants (see Supplement F for details). Contrary to
expectation, (H3), feminist collective action and collective
anger were unrelated to warmth toward men (all rs = −.01, Metaperceptions of Feminists’ Attitudes Toward Men. Consistent
all ps > .685). In contrast, consistent with intergroup emo- with expectations (H6a), one-sample t-tests showed female
tions theory, collective anger was related to feminist identity, feminists’ attitudes were inaccurately perceived as below
r(1830) = .28, 95% CI [0.24, 0.32], p < .001, and feminist midpoint (i.e., 50): that is, negative in absolute terms,
collective action, r(1598) = .42, 95% CI [0.38, 0.46], d = −0.53, 95% CI [−0.58, −0.47], t(1746) = −21.95, p < .001.
p < .001. See Supplement F for the results in full, including Also consistent with expectations (H6b), and shown in
investigation of gender/sex effects. Table 5, one-sample t-tests against the mean of female

Figure 2. Indirect Paths Between Feminist Identification and Warmth Toward Men via Threat and Gender Similarity, in Reality (Panel A)
and Metaperceptions (Panel B; Study 4).

Note. Panel A (female participants’ beliefs, n = 739) and panel B (female and male participants’ metaperceptions, n = 755). Coefficients are standardized esti-
mates with standard error in parentheses and these estimates are bootstrapped in panel A only. All confidence intervals in panel A are bootstrapped. Only
confidence intervals for the indirect effect are bootstrapped in panel B. **p < .002 and ***p < .001.
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 25

feminists’ attitudes showed that participants as a whole (Cohen’s d ) and are weighted via an inverse-variance
strongly underestimated their warmth toward men. This error method (Schwarzer et al., 2015). A sensitivity power analysis
was committed by feminist and nonfeminist participants for a random-effects meta-analysis (metapower for R v0.2.2;
alike. See Supplement F for analyses of feminists’ and nonfem- Griffin, 2021) suggested that the combined sample (ntotal =
inists’ metaperceived attitudes split by participant gender/sex. 9,799, nfeminists = 3,935, nnonfeminists = 4,88218) afforded
Next, we examined participants’ understanding of the greater than 80% power (a = .05, two-tailed; I = 90%) to
mechanisms underlying feminists’ attitudes toward men detect a difference in attitudes between feminist and nonfem-
using one-sample t-tests against the mean of female feminists’ inist of the following magnitude: d = 0.18 (i.e., considered
threat and similarity. As predicted (H7) and shown in Table 5, small-to-medium in size; Lovakov & Agadullina, 2021).
participants overestimated feminists’ perceptions of threat and
(H8) underestimated feminists’ perceptions of gender similar- Method
ity. This pattern was evident even among feminists for threat
and gender similarity, and also among nonfeminists. Measures
Likewise, these patterns were the same for female and male To provide a broad and parsimonious overview of how femi-
participants (see Supplement F, Table S16 for details). nists and nonfeminists perceive men and women, we present
As in Study 4, we conducted repeated-measures media- the results using the feminist identity (dichotomous and contin-
tion (using Memore v2.1 for SPSS; Model 1 with 5,000 uous) measures only and two composite outcome measures,
resamples) to examine our focal hypothesis about partici- capturing explicit attitudes toward men and explicit attitudes
pants’ understanding of mechanisms connecting feminism toward women. The former is an aggregated index of
and warmth toward men. Zm scores were used for these attitudes toward men composed of warmth toward men
analyses to make comparison with mediation models of (n = 4,295; Studies 1 and 3–5), liking and trust of men (n =
feminists’ own attitudes easier, but the pattern was the 5,215; Studies 1–4), and emotional reactions toward men (n =
same using raw scores (see Supplement F). As expected 1,602; Studies 1, 3, and 4). The latter is an aggregated index
(H9), and shown in Figure 3 (Panel B), participants were of attitudes toward women composed of warmth toward women
accurate regarding the role of threat perceptions: feminists (n = 3,667; Studies 1 and 4–5) and liking and trust of women
were rated as higher in threat, and subsequently lower in (n = 4,707; Studies 1–2 and 4). As in previous studies, these
warmth toward men. In contrast (H10), participants were measures were centered around their scale midpoints, standard-
inaccurate regarding the role of gender similarity percep- ized, and averaged to derive each index using the formula:
tions, which they erroneously perceived to be lower Zm = (xi−m)/s. In addition, we also present results from two
among feminists. Further analyses confirmed the indirect measures of metaperceptions of feminists’ attitudes: metaper-
effects were equivalent when investigated separately ceptions of feminists’ warmth toward men (n = 3,839; Studies
amongst female and male participants, and feminists and 4 and 5) and metaperceptions of feminists’ warmth toward
nonfeminists (see Supplement F for details). women (n = 755; Study 4 only). Important inferences that can
Finally, consistent with predictions (H11) hierarchal mul- be drawn from our data in their entirety are outlined below.
tiple regressions showed that metaperceptions of feminists’ Note that findings pertain to mixed gender/sex samples unless
warmth toward men (criterion variable) were associated otherwise stated.
with metaperceptions of similarity (β = .14) and threat (β =
−.26) after controlling for participants’ own feminist identi-
fication (β = .38), collective action (β = .16), and gender/sex, Results
β = .09, ps < .001; step 2: R2 = .39, F(3, 1353) = 170.74,
p < .001. The beta-weights for metaperceived similarity and Feminists’ Attitudes Toward Men and Women
feminist collective action were moderated by gender/sex In line with our key prediction, feminists and nonfeminists
(p < .001, i.e., effect stronger for women; p = .01, effect stron- were, in largely equal measure, positive toward men. Both
ger for men, respectively). See Supplement F Table S18 for feminists and nonfeminists reported attitudes toward men
full models for women and men separately. These results that were consistently above the scale midpoint (feminists:
also held after controlling for relevant demographic variables dMeta = 0.73, 95% CI [0.58, 0.89], Z = 9.44, p < .001; non-
(see Supplement F Table S19 for details). feminists: dMeta = 0.80, 95% CI [0.64, 0.96], Z = 9.89,
p < .001). There was no strong evidence to suggest that fem-
inists’ attitudes toward men were any less positive than non-
Study 6: Meta-Analyses of Key Effects
feminists’, dMeta = −0.07, 95% CI [−0.17, 0.04], Z = −1.27,
To provide the most reliable and generalizable estimates of p = .204. To provide some useful context to this finding,
our key effects we conducted a final set of analyses to we note that women feminists were no more negative
examine the overall trends across all samples by conducting toward men than men in general were, dMeta = 0.19, 95%
random-effects meta-analyses (Cumming, 2014). Effect sizes CI [−0.10, 0.49], Z = 1.30, p = .194. In this sense, feminists
are presented in terms of standardized mean differences are no more guilty of the charge of misandry than men are
 26

Table 5. Tests Comparing Metaperceptions Against the Actual Mean of Feminists’ Warmth Toward Men, Threat, and Similarity for the Whole Sample, Feminists, and Nonfeminists in
Studies 4 and 5.

Study 4 Study 5

Female feminists’ warmth Female feminists’ warmth

(MActual = 6.56) (MActual = 74.65)

Participant identity MPerceived Z p dMeta 95% CI MPerceived t df p d 95% CI

Whole sample 4.65 −34.55 <.001 −0.81 −0.86, −0.76 37.60 −65.57 1746 <.001 −1.57 −1.64, −1.50
Feminists 5.57 −6.50 <.001 −0.44 −0.57, −0.31 52.18 −26.66 654 <.001 −1.04 −1.14, −0.95
Nonfeminists 3.92 −8.34 <.001 −1.22 −1.51, −0.93 28.85 −74.77 1091 <.001 −2.26 −2.37, −2.15
Female feminists’ threat Female feminists’ threat
(MActual = 5.19) (MActual = 4.62)

Whole sample 6.11 4.00 <.001 1.05 0.53, 1.56 5.54 28.61 1795 <.001 0.68 0.62, 0.73
Feminists 6.09 5.16 <.001 1.11 0.69, 1.53 5.49 17.54 662 <.001 0.68 0.60, 0.77
Nonfeminists 6.12 3.75 <.001 1.02 0.49, 1.56 5.57 22.67 1132 <.001 0.67 0.61, 0.74
Female feminists’ similarity Female feminists’ similarity
(MActual = 4.38) (MActual = 3.70)

Whole sample 3.47 −10.18 <.001 −0.45 −0.54, −0.36 2.55 −24.36 1719 <.001 −0.59 −0.64, −0.54
Feminists 4.16 −1.56 .120 −0.12 −0.27, 0.03 3.04 −8.84 640 <.001 −0.35 −0.43, −0.27
Nonfeminists 2.95 −14.75 <.001 −0.71 −0.81, −0.62 2.26 −24.42 1078 <.001 −0.74 −0.81, −0.68

Note. MActual = the mean of (female) feminist participants on an outcome variable. MPerceived = metaperceived score attributed to female feminists on an outcome variable. In both studies tests compared
MPerceived against the actual mean of female feminists’ warmth toward men, threat, and similarity. Tests were Z-test in Study 4 and t-test in Study 5. Raw scores were used in these analyses to make
meaningful comparisons on the same measurement scale.
Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 27

Figure 3. Indirect Paths Between Feminist Identification and Warmth Toward Men via Threat and Gender Similarity, in Reality (Panel A)
and Metaperceptions (Panel B; Study 5).

Note. Panel A (female participants’ beliefs, n = 1,013) and panel B (female and male participants’ metaperceptions, n = 1,489). Coefficients are standardized
estimates with standard error in parentheses and these estimates are bootstrapped in panel A only. All confidence intervals in panel A are bootstrapped. Only
confidence intervals for the indirect effect are bootstrapped in panel B. *p < .01, **p < .003, and ***p < .001.

themselves. The continuous measure of feminist identifica- Z = −2.16, p = .031. Participants also underestimated femi-
tion was also largely unrelated to explicit attitudes toward nists’ warmth toward men relative to feminists’ actual
men, rMeta = −0.04, 95% CI [−0.11, 0.02], Z = −1.28, p = .199. score, dMeta = −0.95, 95% CI [−1.35, −0.55], Z = −4.65,
There was also no evidence that this relation was nonlinear. p < .001. Exploratory analyses showed that metaperceptions
Adding the quadratic term (feminist identification squared) of feminists’ warmth toward women and men were not
to a mixed-effects model predicting variations at the significantly correlated, rMeta = −.00, 95% CI [−.21, .20],
meta-level did not improve the fit compared to the simpler Z = −0.03, p = .978. This result suggests that while partici-
model, χ2 = 1.29, Δdf = 1, p = .255. pants did not erroneously infer that feminists’ ingroup love
Thus far we have focused on attitudes toward men. for women translates to outgroup hate toward men, they
However, feminism is conceived primarily as a movement for were unaware of the positive correlation between feminists’
women and can be expected to be characterized by ingroup attitudes to men and women—an awareness that might
love in the form of positive attitudes toward women (hooks, help dispel the misandry myth.
1986). Examination of attitudes toward women showed that
while both groups displayed attitudes toward women
that were positive in absolute terms (feminists: dMeta = General Discussion
1.11, 95% CI [0.93, 1.29], Z = 12.27, p < .001; nonfemi-
The present studies comprise the most systematic examina-
nists: dMeta = 0.88, 95% CI [0.75, 1.01], Z = 13.28, p <
tion yet of feminists’ actual and perceived attitudes toward
.001), feminists’ attitudes toward women were more positive
men. They yielded key findings that inform public debate
than nonfeminists’, dMeta = 0.25, 95% CI [0.15, 0.34], Z =
as well as social psychological theories of stereotyping,
5.17, p < .001. Importantly, feminists’ positivity toward
metastereotyping, and intergroup processes. First, across
women and men were positively correlated: the warmer
several measures and nine national contexts, feminists dis-
they felt toward women, the warmer they also felt toward
played strongly positive attitudes toward men when com-
men, rMeta = .46, 95% CI [.40, .52], Z = 12.62, p < .001,
pared to meaningful neutral benchmarks, and there was
contradicting any notion that feminists’ ingroup love for
little-to-no evidence that these attitudes differed from non-
women translates to outgroup hate for men (Brewer, 1999).
feminists’ (Studies 1–3) or even men’s own attitudes
toward men (Study 6). Second, participants—including fem-
Metaperceptions of Feminists’ Attitudes Toward inist participants—incorrectly perceived feminists to hold
negative attitudes toward men (Studies 4–6). Third, media-
Men and Women tional analyses suggested that the closeness between femi-
Feminists’ attitudes toward men were perceived as negative nists’ and nonfeminists’ attitudes toward men might be
in absolute terms, dMeta = −0.22, 95% CI [−0.42, −0.02], explained by two opposing forces: feminists at once
28 Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)

perceived men as a greater threat to women (associated with misandry myth itself, which is seldom couched in these con-
less favorable evaluations), and also more similar to women ditional terms. Thus, these findings do not undermine the fal-
(associated with more favorable evaluations; Studies 4–5). sification of the misandry myth provided by the present
Fourth, turning to the mechanisms that cause myth and studies.
reality to diverge, the widespread misunderstanding of femi- In the meta-analysis (Study 6) we were also able to con-
nists’ attitudes toward men was associated not only with textualize our findings on feminists’ attitudes toward men
ideological antipathy to feminism but also a false belief by comparing them directly with men’s attitudes to their
that feminists see men and women as especially dissimilar ingroup. We found that feminist women’s attitudes toward
(Studies 4 and 5). We discuss the implications of each of men were no more negative than men’s. Thus, the label
these findings in turn. “man-hater” is at least as accurate if attached to men them-
selves. This finding may reflect intragroup competition
among men (e.g., Buunk & Massar, 2012; Hojjat et al.,
Feminists’ Positive Attitudes Toward Men 2022). Further research should examine this possibility to
Feminists’ overall warmth toward men implies that a general assess to what extent these variables might account for the
antipathy is not necessary for this politicized identification— less positive attitudes toward men among men.
and is not even substantially associated with it. Neither were
overall evaluative attitudes toward men associated reliably
with feminist collective action intentions. These results Misperceptions of Feminists’ Attitudes Toward Men
suggest that positive intergroup attitudes do not necessarily The present findings indicate that people are grossly inaccu-
stifle disadvantaged groups’ motivation to agitate collec- rate in their understanding of feminists’ attitudes toward
tively for social change (cf. Cakal et al., 2011; Saguy et al., men. Across measures and studies, participants consistently
2009; for relevant recent findings see Sobol-Sarag et al., perceived feminists’ attitudes to be negative in absolute
2022). In contrast, the more specific intergroup emotion of terms and less positive relative to feminists’ actual attitudes
anger was reliably associated with feminist identification toward men. Even feminists themselves failed to accurately
and action intentions. Together, these findings are consistent recognize the overall positivity of their peers’ attitudes.
with the view that antipathy to structural inequalities (e.g., The size of these effects—averaging d = −0.95 in our meta-
injustice, violence, and discrimination) rather than majority analysis—suggest stereotype inaccuracy. The present find-
or perpetrator groups (e.g., men) mobilizes disadvantaged ings thus contribute to the literature on stereotype accuracy
groups to fight for social change (Cohen-Chen et al., 2014; by providing a clear exception to this phenomenon
van Zomeren et al., 2008). The so-called “irony of (Campbell, 1967; Jussim et al., 2015). Specifically, it
harmony” and “sedative” effects of positive intergroup emo- appears the misandrist stereotype does not originate from
tions may therefore be associated with more specific inter- unbiased learning from observations of feminists’ actual atti-
group perceptions, such as expectations of favorable tudes (Dawtry et al., 2015; Kelley & Michela, 1980). We turn
treatment by the majority group, rather than any overall pos- now to other factors that might account for the development
itive affective evaluation (Cakal et al., 2011; Saguy et al., and maintenance of this mistaken stereotype.
2009). Further research is required however to determine
whether this pattern generalizes to other intergroup contexts.
These conclusions are given some nuance by subtly dif- Opposing Mechanisms Through Perceived Intergroup
ferent patterns for different varieties of feminist ideology.
Radical and cultural feminism were associated with Threat and Similarity
reduced positivity toward men. There is pronounced ideolog- The present studies provide the first evidence of social-
ical and demographic heterogeneity within the feminist cognitive processes that shape feminists’ attitudes toward
movement. Further research is needed to determine which men. In support of theories of intergroup attitudes that
of the many varieties that can be identified are associated emphasize the importance of intergroup threat (Stephan
with different overall evaluations of men, and with what con- et al., 2016), the perception that men pose threats to
sequences for our model of feminists’ attitudes. For example, women featured in a pathway connecting feminism to less
it is possible that cultural and radical feminism differentially favorable attitudes toward men. This finding is consistent
predict the similarity and threat pathways in our model. We with experimental research showing that manipulations of
note, however, that the magnitude of the cultural and threat—either realistic or symbolic—can lead to more nega-
radical feminism effects (from β = −.18 to β = −.24; Study tive outgroup attitudes (see Rios et al., 2018). Also, in the
4) suggests that women would need to be three to four stan- present studies, feminism overlapped with more favorable
dard deviations over the mean of radical or cultural feminism attitudes toward men through the perception that they are
to overcome the overall, absolute positivity toward men that similar to women (at least among participants who were
participants displayed. We also note that the nuance sug- themselves female). This finding supports theories of inter-
gested by these findings is decidedly absent from the group attitudes that emphasize perceived intergroup
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 29

similarity (Brown & Abrams, 1986; Hornsey & Hogg, 2000). positivity toward women (Study 6). It is worth pausing to
The balance of these opposing forces (perceived threat and reflect on this finding, which indicates that feminism is dis-
similarity) meant that feminists’ attitudes toward men, tinctive in its ingroup love for women, rather than its out-
though strongly positive, were not reliably different from group hate for men (Brewer, 1999; hooks, 1986). Another
nonfeminists’ attitudes. That said, these factors may be important exploratory finding is feminists’ attitudes toward
related to each other in ways not addressed in the current men and women were positively correlated: the warmer
investigation. For example, recent research shows greater they were to women, the warmer they also were to men. In
perceived similarity is associated with lower threat percep- contrast, metaperceptions of feminists’ attitudes to men and
tions in other intergroup contexts (Yitmen et al., 2022). women were uncorrelated. This indicates that though partic-
Future research should establish the causal directions of our ipants did not assume that ingroup love and outgroup hate
model of feminists’ attitudes toward men. False polarization— go hand in hand (cf. Brewer, 1999), they did not appreciate
the tendency to overestimate the extent to which an outgroup that ingroup and outgroup love are actually positively
member endorses a certain ideology—may also factor into the related. If people were to appreciate this, they might be
perception of what feminists believe (Blatz & Mercier, 2018; less inclined to endorse the misandry myth. Further research
Moore-Berg et al., 2020). Further research should investigate is needed to uncover the perceived relation between ingroup
this possibility. love and outgroup hate, which may underpin understand-
ings of feminism and other social movements (Waytz
et al., 2014).
Mechanisms Underlying Misperception
As well as the mechanisms underlying feminists’ attitudes
toward men, the present studies cast some first light on Limitations and Future Directions
why perceivers are wrong about these attitudes. As we A limitation of the present work is that it relies, for the most
expected, one source of error was ideological: Participants part, on self-reported attitudes. This leaves open the possibil-
who were higher in hostile sexism, or who disidentified ity that feminists denied their prejudice toward men for stra-
with feminism, were more likely to believe that feminists tegic reasons. However, their positivity toward men was also
dislike men. Over and above these associations, endorsement evident using an implicit measure of attitudes toward men. In
of the misandry myth was associated with a social-cognitive Study 3, we found no evidence that feminist women hold
error. On one hand, participants tacitly and accurately appre- negative implicit beliefs about men. Also, explicit attitudes
ciated that feminists, compared to nonfeminists, tend to per- were the same regardless of whether participants had
ceive men as a threat to women, and that this is associated earlier disclosed their feminist identity or not (see
with less positive attitudes toward men. However, they Supplement G, Table S20). Nonfeminist women may also
erred in assuming that feminists see men as highly dissimilar deny prejudice or exaggerate their positivity toward men,
to women. This error was committed even by those who for example to discredit feminists by implication, or to
identified as feminists, consistent with earlier findings that justify their disidentification with the movement
feminists view their peers as more like cultural feminists (Christiansen & Høyer, 2015). Further research is needed
who emphasize gender differences, compared to liberal fem- to examine whether, how, and when these performative
inists who deemphasize them (Liss et al., 2000). Further dynamics play out in the laboratory and in everyday life.
research could explore metaperceptions of feminists’ ideo- Across studies, we measured feminism and attitudes
logical beliefs (e.g., cultural, radical, and liberal feminism) toward men in a variety of ways. While the consistency in
and how these affect metaperceptions of their attitudes our findings across such heterogenous measures is a strength,
toward men. our findings are also limited by this variance. In Studies 1 and
One reason for this heuristic misunderstanding may rest in 4, we chose to aggregate a number of smaller samples to
a misinterpretation of feminist discourses. Since feminists maximize the power of our investigations. That meant that
must invoke women’s distinct identity to mobilize and scale points were not always consistent across measures in
raise consciousness, observers may infer that they see men a study. We addressed this by standardizing measures
and women as essentially different. This perception may con- within samples before aggregating. Our measurement of fem-
tribute to the tendency for people to view feminism, like inism included self-reported identity, endorsement of differ-
other forms of so-called identity politics, as “divisive” ent feminist ideologies, and feminist collective action. Many
(Bernstein, 2005), and to interpret their criticism of men as of our decisions regarding measure choice were made prior to
hostility rather than a genuine effort to improve intergroup the publication of reviews on the measurement of feminism
relations (Hornsey et al., 2002; Sutton et al., 2006; and therefore could not be informed by these insights (see
Thürmer & McCrea 2021). Siegel & Calogero, 2021). For example, the different femi-
One clear finding obtained also sheds some preliminary nist ideology subscales used in Studies 1 and 4 have been
light on the possibility of a further mechanism: feminists, criticized for poor psychometric properties by Siegel and
to a greater degree than nonfeminists, showed strong Calogero (albeit reliability was good in our studies).
30 Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)

Further, there is some recent evidence suggesting that people (Maddux et al., 2008; Moss et al., 2019). Further still,
used the MeToo hashtag to show solidarity without having to future research should focus on how to experimentally
detail traumatic experiences (e.g., Clark-Parsons, 2021) sug- manipulate the paths in our model of metaperceptions of fem-
gesting that this index of collective action, used in Study 1 inists’ beliefs as a means of correcting the faulty beliefs that
could be problematic (though this was complemented by a underpin the misandry myth.
more general index of collective action intention in Study Finally, our findings may be limited to the experiences of
3). Nevertheless, we believe it is worthwhile for future only some women. Except in Study 5, we did not collect infor-
research to investigate nuanced relations between different mation from all participants about demographic characteristics
forms of feminism, attitudes to men, and collective action. such as ethnicity, educational or socioeconomic status (SES)
In particular, our operationalization of feminist collective background that could influence our findings. In Study 5, eth-
action is limited by the use of only one, quite dated, behav- nicity was not associated with feminism (see Supplement F),
ioral intentions measure (Study 3) and a support for feminist but we did find some evidence that those lower in formal edu-
collective actions (i.e., MeToo; Studies 1 and 5). Despite cation or SES were less likely to identify as feminist. There are
these limitations patterns of findings were similar across also other factors such as sexual orientation that may be impor-
studies, except a negative relation with emotional reactions tant to consider. For example, heterosexual and bisexual
to men in Study 3, but not in Study 1. This inconsistency women might report less negative attitudes toward men than
is likely explained by differences in how feminist collective lesbians owing to greater investment in forming intimate rela-
action was operationalized. It is possible that the type of tions with men (e.g., Kántás & Kovacs, 2022; Kruk &
action (online vs. offline) and the context (broad vs. specific Matsick, 2022). On the other hand, lesbian women might be
goals) are differentially associated with attitudes toward men. more motivated than heterosexual and bisexual women to
Further research is needed to examine the link between fem- deny negative feelings toward men and avoid confirming
inist action and attitudes toward men. widespread tropes (Scharff, 2010). Future research should
A strength of the present investigation is that it operational- investigate whether our findings extend to different groups
ized feminism in various ways—as feminist identification, ide- of women, and if some feminists have more or less negative
ology, and action, and obtained similar results for each attitudes toward men and why this might be.
operationalization. However, it should also be noted that in its
approach to feminist identification, the present investigation
relied primarily on the measurement of just one facet of this Concluding Remarks
multidimensional construct. Specifically, the use of a more The present findings reveal that feminists’ attitudes toward men
straightforward dichotomous feminist self-identification are broadly positive and broadly similar to other people’s atti-
measure and a continuous measure of strength of feminist iden- tudes toward men. They also reveal that people generally per-
tification allowed us to measure self-categorization with empha- ceive the opposite to be true. In so doing, the present findings
sis on self-labeling and perceived certainty of self-identification disconfirm a trope that deters women from feminism, and
(Ashmore et al., 2004). Future research should include measures which is widely used to delegitimize it. This trope, which we
that capture other aspects of feminist collective identity such as have called the misandry myth, is deserving of the name
the attachment, importance, and meaning of the identity to insofar as a myth is defined as a false but widespread belief
address this ambiguity (Ashmore et al., 2004). (Oxford English Dictionary, 2019). A disconcerting implication
By extension, future research should investigate the relation of the present findings is therefore that gender relations are
between different feminist beliefs and attitudes toward men. being conducted in the shadow of a falsehood. Since feminists
The current findings indicate that there might be some differ- may be under no obligation to hold positive attitudes toward
ences in terms of the association of different kinds of feminist men (Cataldi, 1995), we do not claim that feminists’ liking of
beliefs such as liberal, cultural, and radical with attitudes men gives the movement any normative legitimacy. However,
toward men. This is particularly important in light of by showing that people are wrong to think that feminists
ongoing discussions about feminist identity and postfeminism, dislike men, the present findings indicate that people are
where feminist self-dentification in some circumstances may wrong to dismiss feminism on these grounds. We hope (cf.
go together with the endorsement of neoliberal attitudes and Pennycook et al., 2019) that by shedding light on false
rejection of key feminist beliefs for instance relating to repro- notions about feminists’ attitudes toward men and the specific
ductive justice (Gill, 2019; Siegel & Calogero, 2021). mechanisms that may produce them, the present results contrib-
The present findings are also limited by the correlational ute to theory, research, and public debates that put gender rela-
nature of the designs. Future research should seek to causally tions on a more rational and informed setting.
test the paths in our model of feminists’ attitudes toward men.
For example, by exposing feminists and nonfeminists to real-
istic and symbolic threats and measuring their attitudes Author Note
toward men. Research has shown that exposure to both real- Chanki Moon is currently affiliated with Royal Holloway,
istic and symbolic threats can increase outgroup prejudice University of London, UK. Aífe Hopkins-Doyle, Aino Petterson,
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 31

and Robbie M Sutton contributed equally, and are joint first authors. 2. Initially we pre-registered two sets of competing hypotheses
We would like to thank the reviewers for taking the time and effort predicting relative differences between feminists and nonfem-
to review this manuscript. Their comments were valuable and inists. The grain of truth hypothesis predicted feminists’
greatly improved this manuscript. We would like to thank reduced positivity relative to nonfeminists. In contrast, the mis-
members of the Political Psychology Lab at University of Kent taken stereotype hypothesis predicted feminists’ greater posi-
and Dr. Chris Jones for their thoughtful feedback on earlier drafts. tivity relative to nonfeminists. In the manuscript we have
We thank Frank Gasking for invaluable help with programming. presented hypotheses consistent with the grain of truth perspec-
tive. In later studies (see Study 3, chronologically the second
Author Contributions study) we pre-registered absolute and relative comparison.
3. We chose not to aggregate the benevolence to men and hos-
A.H-D, A.P., R.M.S. contributed equally. Conceptualization:
tility to men subscales into the composite measure of explicit
R.M.S., A.H-D, A.P; Data Curation: A.H-D, S.L, R.M.S; Formal
attitudes to men. Conceptually benevolence to men and hostility
Analysis: A.H-D, S.L, A.P, R.M.S.; Funding Acquisition: R.M.S;
to men are not indices of positivity–negativity, but rather they
Investigation: all authors conducted research; Methodology/
measure stereotyped attitudes to men. Consistent with this, we
Resources: A.H-D, A.P., R.M.S.; Project Administration: A.H-D.;
found no association between our composite indices of explicit
Supervision: R.M.S.; Validation: A.H-D, A.P., S.L., H.Z.;
attitudes to men and benevolence to men, r(320) = .09, p = .093.
Visualizations: S.L., A.H-D.; Writing - original draft: R.M.S.,
However, hostility to men was negatively associated with
A.H-D, A.P; Writing - review and editing: R.M.S., A.H-D., A.P.,
explicit attitudes to men, r(320) = −.37, p < .001.
S.L., H.Z, P.C., all authors.
4. Given the political, economic, and social differences across
territories in China we decided to treat Mainland China,
Transparency and Openness Hong Kong, and Macau as separate samples.
In each study we report all measures, data transformations and 5. Despite our recruitment strategy n = 20 indicated that they
exclusions (if any), and sensitivity analyses of our sample size. had not resided in the country since birth. We decided to
We have no conflicts of interest to disclose. For some studies, mate- keep these participants as residence since birth was not of
rials and hypotheses were pre-registered. Links to view these pre- interest to the current investigation.
registrations are provided in the method section for each study. 6. In line with Hyde et al. (2019) we have decided to use the ter-
The anonymized summary data file, individual study files, and anal- minology “gender/sex” throughout this article. This is in rec-
ysis code are available on the project page of the OSF: https://osf.io/ ognition of the often intertwined and inseparable nature of
7ub2e/. Data were analyzed using R (version 4.0.2) for the main sociocultural and biological components of gender/sex.
analyses, and SPSS (version 27-28) for regression-based analyses Likewise, the term gender/sex more accurately describes the
including between-subjects and within-subjects mediation analyses types of the questions participants were asked, which some-
and some supplementary analyses (i.e., some reported in the times used response category labels typically considered as
Supplemental materials). Ethical approval and data collection gender categories (i.e., woman, man, and non-binary) or as
dates for each sample are available on the OSF project page. sex categories (i.e., female and male).
7. Moderation analyses to check the influence of data collection
format (−1 = lab, 1 = online) on the relationship between femi-
Declaration of Conflicting Interests nist identity (dichotomous and continuous) and feminist collec-
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect tive action with implicit and explicit attitudes toward men were
to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article. conducted using Process macro for SPSS (v4.1, model 1). There
were no interaction effects between feminist identity or feminist
Funding collective action and data collection format for implicit or
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for explicit attitudes toward men (all p > .391).
8. Note that hypotheses were listed separately for female and
the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: Study 5
male participants. This is because the data were originally
was funded by a University of Kent Research Enhancement
intended to comprise two separate manuscripts with different
award to R.M. Sutton.
theoretical focuses and research questions. However, to maxi-
mize power and increase the generalizability of our theoretical
Supplemental Material model of feminists’ attitudes toward men we decided to use the
Supplemental material for this article is available online. whole sample of participants in the present investigation.
9. Due to financial constraints, men in sample 4.2 (n = 469) only
Notes completed the continuous measure of feminist identity.
1. Note that although the feminist movement can be defined in a Frequency analysis of the continuous measure of feminist
myriad of ways, in the present investigation we generally identity for these participants showed that n = 37 or 7.9% of
refer to the mainstream, liberal movements mainly situated men selected a scale point above the midpoint, indicating
in the Western world (Henley et al., 1998). some degree of identification with feminism.
32 Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)

10. It should be noted that radical feminism, as measured by this Anderson, K. J., Kanner, M., & Elsayegh, N. (2009). Are feminists
scale, is distinct from the media use of the term “radical man haters? Feminists’ and non-feminists’ attitudes toward
feminism.” men. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 33(2), 216–224.
11. The same pattern of results occurred when we investigated https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2009.01491.x
symbolic threat, d = 0.34, 95% CI [0.10, 0.51], t(373) = Aron, A., Aron, E. N., & Smollan, D. (1992). Inclusion of other in
2.98, p = .003, and realistic threat separately in sample 4.3, the self-scale and the structure of interpersonal closeness.
dMeta = 1.13, 95% CI [0.51, 1.76], Z = 3.54, p < .001. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63(4), 596–
12. These measures were centered around their scale midpoints, 612. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.4.596
standardized, and averaged to derive each index. For a given Ashmore, R. D., Deaux, K., & McLaughlin-Volpe, T. (2004). An
measure, let xi be an observed score, m the scale midpoint, organizing framework for collective identity: Articulation
and s the standard deviation. Its midpoint centered and stan- and significance of multidimensionality. Psychological
dardized score is given: Zm = (xi−m)/SD. Bulletin, 130(1), 80–114. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.
13. The same pattern of results is found using the raw scores (see 130.1.80
SI E). We chose to report Zm analyses in the main text to Ballard, J. (2018, August 9). American women are more likely to
allow for comparison between-subjects mediation in which identify as feminist now than in 2016. YouGov. https://today.
we use standardized scores.
yougov.com/topics/lifestyle/articles-reports/2018/08/09/feminism-
14. Note, we have used raw scores for this analysis for ease of
american-women-2018
interpretation. The pattern is the same using standardized
Barroso, A. (2020, July 7). 61% of U.S. women say ‘feminist’
score.
describes them well; many see feminism as empowering, polar-
15. Note, that for H1–H3 we expected the same pattern for female
izing. Pew Research Center. https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
and male participants. However, for our model of feminists’
tank/2020/07/07/61-of-u-s-women-say-feminist-describes-them-
attitudes toward men (H4–H5) predictions were made in
well-many-see-feminism-as-empowering-polarizing/
respect of female feminists only, since the misandry stereo-
Bay-Cheng, L. Y., & Zucker, A. N. (2007). Feminism between the
type is about women exclusively. For people’s understanding
sheets: Sexual attitudes among feminists, nonfeminists, and
of that model (H6–H10), we tested the effect of gender/sex on
our models but made no specific prediction about its effect. egalitarians. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 31(2), 157–163.
16. Don’t know responses ranged from 2.4% (n = 47 for Threat) https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2007.00349.x
to 20.5% (n = 399 for Support MeToo) of responses across Becker, J. C., Tausch, N., & Wagner, U. (2011). Emotional conse-
measures. quences of collective action participation: Differentiating self-
17. Except for correlation analyses where pairwise deletion was directed and outgroup-directed emotions. Personality and
used to maximize power. Patterns are the same using listwise Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(12), 1587–1598. https://doi.
deletion. org/10.1177/0146167211414145
18. Note n = 983 did not report dichotomous feminist identity. Bernstein, M. (2005). Identity politics. Annual Review of Sociology, 31,
47–74. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.29.010202.100054
References Blatz, C. W., & Mercier, B. (2018). False polarization and false
Adelman, L., & Verkuyten, M. (2020). Rules of engagement: moderation: Political opponents overestimate the extremity
Reactions to internal and external criticism in public debate. of each other’s ideologies but underestimate each other’s cer-
British Journal of Social Psychology, 59(2), 405–424. https:// tainty. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 9(5),
doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12351 521–529. https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550617712034
Agostini, M., & van Zomeren, M. (2021). Toward a comprehensive Bodenhausen, G. V. (1993). Emotion, arousal, and stereotypic judg-
and potentially cross-cultural model of why people engage in col- ment: A heuristic model of affect and stereotyping. In
lective action: A quantitative research synthesis of four motiva- D. Mackie & D. Hamilton (Eds.), Affect, cognition and stereo-
tions and structural constraints. Psychological Bulletin, 147(7), typing: Interactive processes in intergroup perception (pp. 13–37).
667–700. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000256.supp Academic Press.
Alt, N. P., Goodale, B., Lick, D. J., & Johnson, K. L. (2019). Threat Bolzendahl, C. I., & Myers, D. J. (2004). Feminist attitudes and
in the company of men: Ensemble perception and threat eval- support for gender equality: Opinion change in women and
uations of groups varying in sex ratio. Social Psychological men, 1974–1998. Social Forces, 83(2), 759–789. https://doi.
and Personality Science, 10(2), 152–159. https://doi.org/10. org/10.1353/sof.2005.0005
1177/1948550617731498 Branscombe, N. R., Ellemers, N., Spears, R., & Doosje, B. (1999).
Alves, H., Koch, A., & Unkelbach, C. (2017). Why good is more The context and content of social identity threat. In
alike than bad: Processing implications. Trends in Cognitive N. Ellemers, R. Spears, & B. Doosje (Eds.), Social identity:
Sciences, 21(2), 69–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2016.12. Context, commitment, content (pp. 35–59). Blackwell.
006 Brewer, M. B. (1999). The psychology of prejudice: Ingroup love
Anderson, K. J. (2015). Modern misogyny: Anti-feminism in a post- and outgroup hate? Journal of Social Issues, 55(3), 429–444.
feminist era. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-4537.00126
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 33

Brewer, M. B., & Silver, M. (1978). Ingroup bias as a function of Psychological Science, 26(9), 1389–1400. https://doi.org/10.
task characteristics. European Journal of Social Psychology, 1177/0956797615586560
8(3), 393–400. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420080312 Digby, T. (1998). Do feminists hate men?: Feminism, antifeminism,
Brown, R., & Abrams, D. (1986). The effects of intergroup similar- and gender oppositionality. Journal of Social Philosophy, 29(2),
ity and goal interdependence on intergroup attitudes and task 15–31. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9833.1998.tb00105.x
performance. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Donovan, J. (2012). Feminist theory: The intellectual traditions (4th
22(1), 78–92. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-1031(86)90041-7 ed.). Continuum.
Buunk, A. P., & Massar, K. (2012). Intrasexual competition among Downing, N. E., & Roush, K. L. (1985). From passive acceptance to
males: Competitive towards men, prosocial towards women. active commitment: A model of feminist identity development
Personality and Individual Differences, 52(7), 818–821. for women. The Counseling Psychologist, 13(4), 695–709.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.01.010 https://doi.org/10.1177/0011000085134013
Cakal, H., Hewstone, M., Schwär, G., & Heath, A. (2011). An Faludi, S. (2006). Backlash: The undeclared war against American
investigation of the social identity model of collective action women. Broadway Books.
and the ‘sedative’ effect of intergroup contact among black Fazio, R. H., Eiser, J. R., & Shook, N. J. (2004). Attitude formation
and white students in South Africa. British Journal of Social through exploration: Valence asymmetries. Journal of
Psychology, 50(4), 606–627. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044- Personality and Social Psychology, 87(3), 293–311. https://
8309.2011.02075.x doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.87.3.293
Campbell, D. T. (1967). Stereotypes and the perception of group Fine, C. (2012). Explaining, or sustaining, the status quo? The
differences. American Psychologist, 22(10), 817–829. https:// potentially self-fulfilling effects of ‘hardwired’ accounts of
doi.org/10.1037/h0025079 sex differences. Neuroethics, 5(3), 285–294. https://doi.org/
Cataldi, S. L. (1995). Reflections on “male bashing”. NWSA 10.1007/s12152-011-9118-4
Journal, 7(2), 76–85. https://www.jstor.org/stable/25164285 Fischer, A. R., Tokar, D. M., Mergl, M. M., Good, G. E., Hill, M. S.,
Champely, S. (2020). Package ‘pwr’. [R Software]. Open Source.
& Blum, S. A. (2000). Assessing women's feminist identity
https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/pwr/index.html
development studies of convergent, discriminant, and struc-
Christiansen, A. P. L., & Høyer, O. L. (2015). Women against fem-
tural validity. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 24(1), 15–
inism: Exploring discursive measures and implications of anti-
29. https://10.1111/j.1471-6402.2000.tb01018.x
feminist discourse. Globe: A Journal of Language, Culture
Fiske, S. T. (1993). Social cognition and social perception. Annual
and Communication, 2, 70–90. https://doi.org/10.5278/ojs.
Review of Psychology, 44(1), 155–194. https://doi.org/10.
globe.v2i0.1049
1146/annurev.ps.44.020193.001103
Clark-Parsons, R. (2021). “I see you, I believe you, I stand with
Frederick, J. K., & Stewart, A. J. (2018). “I became a lioness”
you”: #MeToo and the performance of networked feminist vis-
Pathways to feminist identity among women’s movement
ibility. Feminist Media Studies, 21(3), 362–380. https://doi.
activists. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 42(3), 263–278.
org/10.1080/14680777.2019.1628797
https://doi.org/10.1177/03616843187713
Cohen, C. (2014). Male rape is a feminist issue: Feminism, govern-
Gamble, S. (Ed.). (2004). The Routledge companion to feminism
mentality, and male rape. Palgrave Macmillan.
Cohen-Chen, S., Halperin, E., Saguy, T., & van Zomeren, M. and postfeminism. Routledge.
(2014). Beliefs about the malleability of immoral groups facil- Gill, R. (2019). Post-postfeminism?: New feminist visibilities in
itate collective action. Social Psychological and Personality postfeminist times. In J. Keller, J. Littler, & A. Winch.
Science, 5(2), 203–210. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2018. (Eds.), An intergenerational feminist media studies (pp. 54–74).
03.016 Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315121734
Courtenay, W. H. (2000). Constructions of masculinity and their Ging, D. (2017). Alphas, betas, and incels: Theorizing the masculin-
influence on men’s well-being: A theory of gender and ities of the manosphere. Men and Masculinities, 22(4), 638–657.
health. Social Science & Medicine, 50(10), 1385–1401. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X17706401
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0277-9536(99)00390-1 Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1996). The ambivalent sexism inventory:
Crandall, C. S., Eshleman, A., & O’Brien, L. (2002). Social norms Differentiating hostile and benevolent sexism. Journal of
and the expression and suppression of prejudice: The struggle Personality and Social Psychology, 70(3), 491–512. https://
for internalization. Journal of Personality and Social doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.70.3.491
Psychology, 82(3), 359–378. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022- Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (1999). The ambivalence toward men
3514.82.3.359 inventory: Differentiating hostile and benevolent beliefs
Cumming, G. (2014). The new statistics: Why and how. about men. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 23(3), 519–536.
Psychological Science, 25(1), 7–29. https://doi.org/10.1177/ https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1999.tb00379.x
0956797613504966 Glick, P., & Fiske, S. T. (2001). An ambivalent alliance: Hostile and
Dawtry, R. J., Sutton, R. M., & Sibley, C. G. (2015). Why wealth- benevolent sexism as complementary justifications for gender
ier people think people are wealthier, and why it matters: inequality. American Psychologist, 56(2), 109–118. https://
From social sampling to attitudes to redistribution. doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.56.2.109
34 Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)

Glick, P., Lameiras, M., Fiske, S. T., Eckes, T., Masser, B., Volpato, experienced feminists. Women & Therapy, 23(2), 5–18.
C., Manganelli, A. M., Pek, J. C. X., Huang, L.-l., Sakalli- https://doi.org/10.1300/J015v23n02_02
Uğ urlu, N., Castro, Y. R., D’Avila Pereira, M. L., hooks, B. (1981). Ain’t I a woman: Black women and feminism.
Willemsen, T. M., Brunner, A., Six-Materna, I., & Wells, R. Taylor & Francis Group. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://
(2004). Bad but Bold: Ambivalent Attitudes Toward Men ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/surrey/detail.action?docID=
Predict Gender Inequality in 16 Nations. Journal of 1899877
Personality and Social Psychology, 86(5), 713–728. https:// hooks, B. (1984). Feminist theory: From margin to center. Taylor &
doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.86.5.713 Francis Group. ProQuest Ebook Central, https://ebookcentral.
Griffin, J. W. (2021). Calculating statistical power for meta-analysis proquest.com/lib/surrey/detail.action?docID=1811030
using metapower. The Quantitative Methods for Psychology, hooks, b. (1986). Sisterhood: Political solidarity between women.
17(1), 24–39. https://doi.org/10.20982/tqmp.17.1.p024 Feminist Review, 23(1), 125–138. https://doi.org/10.1057/fr.
Gwiazda, A. (2020). Right-wing populism and feminist politics: 1986.25
The case of law and justice in Poland. International Political hooks, B. (2000). Feminism is for everybody: Passionate politics.
Science Review, 42(5), 580–595. https://doi.org/10.1177/ Pluto Press.
0192512120948917 Hopkins-Doyle, A., Sutton, R. M., Douglas, K. M., & Calogero, R. M.
Haddock, G., & Zanna, M. P. (1994). Preferring “housewives” to (2019). Flattering to deceive: Why people misunderstand benev-
“feminists”: Categorization and the favorability of attitudes olent sexism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
toward women. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 18(1), 25–52. 116(2), 167–192. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000135
Hornsey, M. J., & Hogg, M. A. (2000). Intergroup similarity and
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1994.tb00295.x
Hall, B. (2019). Gendering resistance to right-wing populism: Black subgroup relations: Some implications for assimilation.
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(8), 948–958.
protest and a new wave of feminist activism in Poland?
https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672002610005
American Behavioral Scientist, 63(10), 1497–1515. https://
Hornsey, M. J., Oppes, T., & Svensson, A. (2002). “It’s OK if we
doi.org/10.1177/0002764219831731
say it, but you can’t”: Responses to intergroup and intragroup
Hamel, L., Firth, J., Clement, S., & Brodie, M. (2016, January 28).
criticism. European Journal of Social Psychology, 32(3), 293–
Washington Post/Kaiser Family Foundation Feminism Survey.
307. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.90
Kaiser Family Foundation. https://www.kff.org/other/poll-
Huddy, L., Neely, F. K., & Lafay, M. R. (2000). Trends: Support for
finding/washington-post-kaiser-family-foundation-feminism-
the women’s movement. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 64(3),
survey/
309–350. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3078722
Harmange, P. (2020). I hate men. Harper Collins.
Hyde, J. S. (2005). The gender similarities hypothesis. American
Hayes, A. (2017). Introduction to mediation, moderation, and condi-
Psychologist, 60(6), 581–592. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-
tional process analysis: A regression-based approach. Guilford.
066X.60.6.581
Henderson-King, D., & Stewart, A. (1999). Educational experiences
Hyde, J. S., Bigler, R. S., Joel, D., Tate, C. C., & van Anders, S. M.
and shifts in group consciousness: Studying women.
(2019). The future of sex and gender in psychology: Five chal-
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(3), 390–399. lenges to the gender binary. American Psychologist, 74(2),
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167299025003010 171–193. https://doi.org/10.1037/amp0000307
Henderson-King, D., & Stewart, A. J. (1997). Feminist conscious- Iazzo, A. N. (1983). The construction and validation of Attitudes
ness: Perspectives on women’s experience. Personality and Toward Men Scale. The Psychological Record, 33(3), 371–
Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(4), 415–426. https://doi.org/ 378. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1999.tb00379.x
10.1177/0146167297234007 Javaid, A. (2016). Feminism, masculinity, and male rape: Bringing
Henley, N. M., Meng, K., O’Brien, D., McCarthy, W. J., & male rape ‘out of the closet’. Journal of Gender Studies, 25(3),
Sockloskie, R. J. (1998). Developing a scale to measure 283–293. https://doi.org/10.1080/09589236.2014.959479
the diversity of feminist attitudes. Psychology of Women Jordan, A. (2016). Conceptualizing backlash: (UK) Men’s rights
Quarterly, 22(3), 317–48. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471- groups, anti-feminism, and postfeminism. Canadian Journal
6402.1998.tb00158.x of Women and the Law, 28(1), 18–44. https://doi.org/10.
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010). Most people are 3138/cjwl.28.1.18
not WEIRD. Nature, 466(7302), 29. https://doi.org/10.1038/ Judd, C. M., & Park, B. (1993). Definition and assessment of
466029a accuracy in social stereotypes. Psychological Review, 100(1),
Hojjat, M., Ayotte, B., Page, M., Beauparlant, E., & Mehta, C. 109–128. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-295X.100.1.109
(2022). Women do not shy away from competition: Judge, M., Fernando, J. W., & Begeny, C. T. (2022). Dietary behav-
Competition in same-gender and cross-gender friendship iour as a form of collective action: A social identity model of
dyads. The Journal of Social Psychology, 162(4), 393–406. vegan activism. Appetite, 168, 105730. https://doi.org/10.
https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2021.1906202 1016/j.appet.2021.105730
Home, S., San Mathews, S., Detrie, P., Burke, M., & Cook, B. Jussim, L., Crawford, J. T., & Rubinstein, R. S. (2015). Stereotype
(2001). Look it up under “F”: Dialogues of emerging and (in)accuracy in perceptions of groups and individuals. Current
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 35

Directions in Psychological Science, 24(6), 490–497. https:// context. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79,
doi.org/10.1177/0963721415605257 602–616. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.79.4.602
Karpinski, A., & Steinman, R. B. (2006). The single category Mackie, D. M., Maitner, A. T., & Smith, E. R. (2009). Intergroup
implicit association test as a measure of implicit social cogni- emotions theory. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of preju-
tion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 91(1), dice, stereotyping, and discrimination. Psychology Press.
16–32. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.91.1.16 https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203361993
Kántás, ÉM, & Kovacs, M. (2022). The role of sexual orientation Maddux, W. W., Galinsky, A. D., Cuddy, A. J., & Polifroni, M.
and the perceived threat posed by men in the acceptance of (2008). When being a model minority is good… and bad:
sexism. Acta Psychologica, 230, 103749. https://doi.org/10. Realistic threat explains negativity toward Asian Americans.
1016/j.actpsy.2022.103749 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 34(1), 74–89.
Kelley, H. H., & Michela, J. L. (1980). Attribution theory and https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167207309195
research. Annual Review of Psychology, 31(1), 457–501. Manisera, M., & Zuccolotto, P. (2014). Modeling “don’t know”
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.31.020180.002325 responses in rating scales. Pattern Recognition Letters, 45,
Kelly, C., & Breinlinger, S. (1995). Identity and injustice: 226–234. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.patrec.2014.04.012
Exploring women’s participation in collective action. Journal Marwick, A. E., & Caplan, R. (2018). Drinking male tears:
of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 5(1), 41–57. Language, the manosphere, and networked harassment.
https://doi.org/10.1002/casp.2450050104 Feminist Media Studies, 18(4), 543–559. https://doi.org/10.
Kruk, M., & Matsick, J. L. (2022). How do women’s attitudes towards 1080/14680777.2018.1450568
heterosexual men differ by their sexual orientation? A test of com- Mill, J. S. (1869/1980). The subjection of women. AHM Publishing
peting hypotheses. Psychology & Sexuality, 13(3), 774–784. Corp.
https://doi.org/10.1080/19419899.2021.1929423 Montoya, A. K., & Hayes, A. (2017). Two condition within-
Kruks, S. (2005). Simone de Beauvoir and the politics of privilege.
participant statistical mediation analysis: A path-analytic
Hypatia, 20(1), 178–205. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.
framework. Psychological Methods, 22(1), 6–27. https://doi.
2005.tb00378.x
org/10.1037/met0000086
Krys, K., Capaldi, C. A., van Tilburg, W., Lipp, O. V., Bond, M. H.,
Moore, A., & Stathi, S. (2020). The impact of feminist stereotypes
Vauclair, C. M., Manickam, L. S. S., Domínguez-Espinosa, A.,
and sexual identity on feminist self-identification and collective
Torres, C., Lun, V. M., Teyssier, J., Miles, L. K., Hansen, K.,
action. The Journal of Social Psychology, 160(3), 267–281.
Park, J., Wagner, W., Yu, A. A., Xing, C., Wise, R., Sun, C. R.,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2019.1644280
Siddiqui, R. S., … Ahmed, R. A. (2018). Catching up with
Moore-Berg, S. L., Ankori-Karlinsky, L. O., Hameiri, B., &
wonderful women: The women-are-wonderful effect is
Bruneau, E. (2020). Exaggerated meta-perceptions predict
smaller in more gender egalitarian societies. International
intergroup hostility between American political partisans.
Journal of Psychology, 53, 21–26. https://10.1002/ijop.12420
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 117(26),
LeGates, M. (2001). In their time: A history of feminism in western
14864–14872. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2001263117
society. Routledge.
Moradi, B., Subich, L. M., & Phillips, J. C. (2002). Revisiting fem-
Leonard, D. J., Moons, W. G., Mackie, D. M., & Smith, E. R.
(2011). “We’re mad as hell and we’re not going to take it inist identity development theory, research, and practice. The
anymore”: Anger self-stereotyping and collective action. Counseling Psychologist, 30(1), 6–43. https://doi.org/10.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 14(1), 99–111. 1177/0011000002301002
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430210373779 Moradi, B., Yoder, J. D., & Berendsen, L. L. (2004). An evaluation
Liss, M., Hoffner, C., & Crawford, M. (2000). What do feminists of the psychometric properties of the Womanist Identity
believe? Psychology of Women Quarterly, 24(4), 279–284. Attitudes Scale. Sex Roles, 50, 253–266. https://doi.org/10.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.2000.tb00210.x 1023/B:SERS.0000015556.26966.30
Liss, M., O’Connor, C., Morosky, E., & Crawford, M. (2001). What Morgan, R. (2014). Going too far: The personal chronicle of a fem-
makes a feminist? Predictors and correlates of feminist social inist. Open Road Media.
identity in college women. Psychology of Women Quarterly, Moss, A. J., Blodorn, A., Van Camp, A. R., & O’Brien, L. T.
25(2), 124–133. https://doi.org/10.1111/1471-6402.00014 (2019). Gender equality, value violations, and prejudice
Liu, Y., & Zheng, Y. (2019). Reliability and validity of feminist iden- toward Muslims. Group Processes & Intergroup Relations,
tity composite in Chinese women. Frontiers in Psychology, 10, 22(2), 288–301. https://doi.org/10.1177/136843021771675
2842. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02842 Ossana, S. M., Helms, J. E., & Leonard, M. M. (1992). Do “wom-
Lovakov, A., & Agadullina, E. R. (2021). Empirically derived anist” identity attitudes influence college women’s self-esteem
guidelines for effect size interpretation in social psychology. and perceptions of environmental bias? Journal of Counseling
European Journal of Social Psychology, 51(3), 485–504. & Development, 70(3), 402–408. https://doi.org/10.1002/j.
https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2752 1556-6676.1992.tb01624.x
Mackie, D. M., Devos, T., & Smith, E. R. (2000). Intergroup emo- Oxford English Dictionary. (2019). Oxford English dictionary (term
tions: Explaining offensive action tendencies in an intergroup used was “misandry” & “myth”). https://www.oed.com/
36 Psychology of Women Quarterly 48(1)

Pennycook, G., Cheyne, J. A., Koehler, D., & Fugelsang, J. A. Shi, X., & Zheng, Y. (2021). Feminist active commitment and
(2019). On the belief that beliefs should change according to sexual harassment perception among Chinese women: The
evidence: Implications for conspiratorial, moral, paranormal, moderating roles of targets’ gender stereotypicality and type
political, religious, and science beliefs. Judgment and of harassment. Sex Roles, 84(7-8), 477–490. https://doi.org/
Decision Making, 15(4), 476–498. https://doi.org/10.31234/ 10.1007/s11199-020-01180-8
osf.io/a7k96 Siegel, J. A., & Calogero, R. M. (2021). Measurement of feminist
Plank, L. (2019, September 13). Why the patriarchy is killing men. identity and attitudes over the past half century: A critical
The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/ review and call for further research. Sex Roles, 85(5), 248–270.
why-the-patriarchy-is-killing-men/2019/09/12/2490fa7e-d3ea- https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-020-01219-w
11e9-86ac-0f250cc91758_story.html Sobol-Sarag, D., Schori-Eyal, N., Fernández, S., & Saguy, T.
Riek, B. M., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2006). Intergroup (2022). The irony of (romantic) harmony: Heterosexual
threat and outgroup attitudes: A meta-analytic review. romantic relationships can drive women’s justification of
Personality and Social Psychology Review, 10(4), 336–353. the gender hierarchy. Group Processes & Intergroup
https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr1004_4 Relations, 26(5), 1099–1118. https://doi.org/10.1177/
Rios, K., Sosa, N., & Osborn, H. (2018). An experimental approach 13684302221100403
to intergroup threat theory: Manipulations, moderators, and Soules, M. J. (2020). Women in uniform: The opening of
consequences of realistic vs. symbolic threat. European combat roles in state militaries. International
Review of Social Psychology, 29(1), 212–255. https://doi.org/ Interactions, 46(6), 847–871. https://doi.org/10.1080/
03050629.2020.1814766
10.1080/10463283.2018.1537049
Robnett, R. D., Anderson, K. J., & Hunter, L. E. (2012). Predicting Stephan, C. W., Stephan, W. C., Demitrakis, K. M., Yamada, A. M.,
& Clason, D. L. (2000). Women’s attitudes to men: An inte-
feminist identity: Associations between gender-traditional atti-
grated threat theory approach. Psychology of Women
tudes, feminist stereotyping, and ethnicity. Sex Roles, 67(3–4),
Quarterly, 24(1), 63–73. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.
143–157. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11199-012-0170-2
2000.tb01022.x
Rosenlee, L. H. L. (2012). Confucianism and women: A philosoph-
Stephan, W. G., Ybarra, O., & Rios, K. (2016). Intergroup threat
ical interpretation. SUNY Press.
theory. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, ste-
Roy, R. E., Weibust, K. S., & Miller, C. T. (2007). Effects of stereo-
reotyping, and discrimination (pp. 255–278). Psychology
types about feminists on feminist self-identification. Psychology
Press.
of Women Quarterly, 31(2), 146–156. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
Sutton, R. M., Elder, T. J., & Douglas, K. M. (2006). Reactions to
1471-6402.2007.00348.x
internal and external criticism of outgroups: Social convention
Rudman, L. A., Greenwald, A. G., & McGhee, D. E. (2001).
in the intergroup sensitivity effect. Personality and Social
Implicit self-concept and evaluative implicit gender stereo-
Psychology Bulletin, 32(5), 563–575. https://doi.org/10.1177/
types: Self and ingroup share desirable traits. Personality and
0146167205282992
Social Psychology Bulletin, 27(9), 1164–1178. https://doi. Swirsky, J. M., & Angelone, D.-J. (2014). Femi-nazis and bra
org/10.1177/0146167201279009 burning crazies: A qualitative evaluation of contemporary
Saguy, T., Tausch, N., Dovidio, J. F., & Pratto, F. (2009). The irony beliefs about feminism. Current Psychology, 33(3), 229–245.
of harmony: Intergroup contact can produce false expectations https://doi.org/10.1007/s12144-014-9208-7
for equality. Psychological Science, 20(1), 114–121. https:// Thürmer, J. L., & McCrea, S. M. (2021). Disentangling the inter-
doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02261.x group sensitivity effect: Defending the in group or enforcing
Scharff, C. (2010). Young women’s negotiations of heterosexual general norms? European Journal of Social Psychology,
conventions: Theorizing sexuality in constructions of ‘the fem- 51(7), 1061–1072. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2748
inist’. Sociology, 44(5), 827–842. https://doi.org/10.1177/ Tjaden, P., & Thoennes, N. (2000). Prevalence and consequences of
0038038510375736 male-to-female and female-to-male intimate partner violence
Schnittker, J., Freese, J., & Powell, B. (2003). Who are feminists as measured by the National Violence Against Women
and what do they believe? The role of generations. American Survey. Violence Against Women, 6(2), 142–161. https://doi.
Sociological Review, 68(4), 607–622. https://doi.org/10.2307/ org/10.1177/10778010022181769
1519741 Twenge, J. M., & Zucker, A.-N. (1999). What is a feminist?
Schwarzer, G., Carpenter, J. R., & Rücker, G. (2015). Meta-analysis Evaluations and stereotypes in closed- and open-ended
with R (Vol. 4784). Springer, Cham. responses. Psychology of Women Quarterly, 23(3), 591–605.
Sears, D. O. (1983). The person-positivity bias. Journal of https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1471-6402.1999.tb00383.x
Personality and Social Psychology, 44(2), 233–250. https:// Urbiola, A., McGarty, C., & Costa-Lopes, R. (2022). The AMIGAS
doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.44.2.233 model: Reconciling prejudice reduction and collective action
Sears, D. O. (1988). Symbolic racism. In P. A. Katz & D. A. Taylor approaches through a multicultural commitment in intergroup
(Eds.), Eliminating racism. Perspectives in social psychology. relations. Review of General Psychology, 26(1), 68–85.
Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-0818-6_4 https://doi.org/10.1177/10892680211056321
Hopkins-Doyle et al. 37

van Zomeren, M., Postmes, T., & Spears, R. (2008). Toward an inte- Yitmen, Ş , Verkuyten, M., Martinovic, B., & Erdoğ an, M. (2022).
grative social identity model of collective action: A quantitative Acceptance of Syrian refugees in Turkey: The roles of
research synthesis of three socio-psychological perspectives. perceived threat, intergroup contact, perceived similarity and
Psychological Bulletin, 134(4), 504–535. https://doi.org/10. temporary settlement. In H. Çakal & S. Husnu (Eds.),
1037/0033-2909.134.4.504 Examining complex intergroup relations (pp. 150–174).
Waytz, A., Young, L. L., & Ginges, J. (2014). Motive attribution Routledge.
asymmetry for love vs. hate drives intractable conflict. Young Women’s Trust. (2019). Young women’s feminism and activ-
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 111(44), ism. https://www.youngwomenstrust.org/our-research/young-
15687–15692. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1414146111 womens-feminism-and-activism-2019/
Wollstonecraft, M. (1792). A vindication of the rights of women. Zucker, A. N. (2004). Disavowing social identities: What it means
https://digital.library.lse.ac.uk/objects/lse:dur688faq when women say, “I’m not a feminist, but…”. Psychology of
World Economic Forum. (2022). The Global Gender Gap Report Women Quarterly, 28(4), 423–435. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.
2022. https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2022.pdf 1471-6402.2004.00159