Douglas L. Cairns - Damien Nelis - Emotions in The Classical World - Methods, Approaches, and Directions-Franz Steiner Verlag (2017)
Douglas L. Cairns - Damien Nelis - Emotions in The Classical World - Methods, Approaches, and Directions-Franz Steiner Verlag (2017)
Emotions in
Heidelberger Althistorische Beitrage und Epigraphische Studien the Classical World
Gegriindet von Geza Alfoldy
Herausgegeben von Angelos Chaniotis und Christian Witschel Methods, Approaches, and Directions
Beirat: Fram;:oisBerard, Anthony R. Birley, Kostas Buraselis, Lucas de Blois,
Segolene Demougin, Elio Lo Cascio, Mischa Meier, Elizabeth Meyer, Edited by Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis
Silvio Panciera, Michael Peachin, Henk Versnel und Martin Zimmermann
Band 59
@ FranzSteinerVerlag
Cover illustration: The grave stele of Demokleides from Athens (ea. 350 BCE),
National Archaeological Museum, Athens (inv. no. 752)
Photo: Eleutherios A. Galanopoulos
© YITOYPfEIOITOAITU:MOY& A®AHTILMOY/TAMEIOAPXAIOAOrIKON ITOPON TABLE OF CONTENTS
© Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Sports/ Archaeological Receipts Fund
1
The emotion of disgust, provoked and expressed in earlier Greek literature ......... 31
DONALDLATEINER(Ohio Wesleyan)
The poetics of emotional expression: some problems of ancient theory ............. 105
STEPHENHALLIWELL(St Andrews)
The papers in this volume all derive from the conference, 'Emotions in the Classi-
cal World: Methods, Approaches, and Directions', held at the F ondation Hardt,
Vandoeuvres, 2--4 May, 2013. The inclusion of Geneva's Latinists in the Centre
Interfacultaire en Sciences Affectives (part of the Swiss National Center of Com-
petence in Research, Affective Sciences) and CISA's generous funding for the
conference and related research activities were the immediate catalysts; 1 but the
deeper reasons for planning the conference and this resulting volume lay in our
sense that what had until fairly recently been sporadic and isolated contributions
to the study of ancient emotions had begun to coalesce into a substantial and thriv-
ing sub-discipline in the fields of Classics and Ancient History, one in which
Classicists and Ancient Historians now had significant contributions to make to
the wider upsurge in interest in the emotions that has taken place across a range of
disciplines in recent years. Given all that had been achieved in our fields, and how
much remained to be done, we felt that it was time to take stock, consolidate, and
look to the future.
Emotion research is now an enormous field, too vast to survey.2 Major centres
have been established for interdisciplinary research in emotion and affective sci-
ence.3 The upsurge of interest in emotion in Humanities disciplines is one aspect
of these developments, and central to that phenomenon has been the impetus giv-
en to the historical study of emotions by scholars such as William Reddy and Bar-
bara Rosenwein. 4 In this area, too, major research projects and centres for emotion
history have been established, in Australia, France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom,5 and the field continues to expand. 6 In that connection, the landmark
See http://www.affective-sciences.org.
2 The journal Emotion Review publishes regular 'views from a discipline' and is an excellent
repository of current approaches. For recent, stimulating, and accessible contributions (albeit
with a philosophical bias), see e.g. Goldie 2010, Deonna and Teroni 2012, and Colombetti
2014. For an encyclopaedic and interdisciplinary overview of research in emotion and affec-
tive science, see Sander and Scherer 2009.
3 See n. 1 above, and cf. Languages of Emotion at the Free University of Berlin (http://www.
loe .fu-berlin.de/en/).
4 See Reddy 2001; Rosenwein 2006; among earlier works, note especially Stearns and Steams
1986; Stearns 1989, 1994.
5 See the websites for the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of
Emotion (http://www.historyofemotions.org.au), Les emotions au Moyen Age (EMMA,
8 Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis Introduction 9
development in Classics has been Angelos Chaniotis' University of Oxford pro- honour and shame offered by Classical thinkers such as the Sophists, Plato, and
ject, funded by the European Research Council, entitled 'The Social and Cultural Aristotle with the representation of aidos and similar affective phenomena in im-
Construction of Emotions: The Greek Paradigm'. This has so far yielded two sub- aginative literature, especially epic and tragedy. 10 The cognitive-evaluative ac-
stantial volumes of essays (with more forthcoming) and has considerably broad- count of emotion was central also to the spate of monographs and edited collec-
ened the evidence base and the focus of emotion research in Classics. 7 tions on emotion and particular emotions that appeared in the 2000s, 11 works
A truth established by emotion research across the disciplines in which it is whose central strength was their focus on the ancient emotional lexicon and the
practised is the ubiquity, pervasiveness, and centrality of emotion in everything construction, conceptualisation, and valorisation of emotion in ancient authors,
that human beings do and everything that they have ever done. This is one reason genres, philosophical schools, and societies. 12
why it cannot by any means be said that Classics research had, before the recent A central figure in galvanizing, supporting, and generating much of this
upsurge in interest, ignored emotion. Inevitably, this was a topic that featured scholarship has been David Konstan, who (in several accounts of particular emo-
prominently wherever it was regarded as particularly important for our under- tions and affective phenomena and in his major study of The Emotions of the An-
standing of the works, contexts, and genres in which it occurred - in ancient phi- cient Greeks) has contributed in particular to our understanding of ancient theories
losophy, for example, where the views of ancient thinkers and schools on the role of emotion (particularly those of Aristotle and the Stoics, which offer particularly
of emotion in the good life have always been central subjects of scholarship; in fruitful opportunities for dialogue with modem cognitive-evaluative approach-
13
the study of ancient poetics, aesthetics, and rhetoric; in scholarship on epic and es), to the semantics and history of ancient emotional concepts, 14 and to the
tragedy; and so on. sharpening of our appreciation of salient differences between ancient emotional
At the same time, however, the development of a dialogue in which research lexica and our own. It is salutary to remember that not even the concept of emo-
in Classics and Ancient History slowly began to take account of contemporruy tion itself is a transcultural historical constant, 15 even if it is true that few or no
research in other fields can be traced to the later years of the twentieth century. A cultures have ever been able entirely to dispense with a category of a similar
16
pioneering work here is William Fortenbaugh's 1975 book on Aristotle, which is sort. One of the central emphases ofKonstan's work {and of many of the other
fully informed by the cognitive-evaluative approach to emotion which achieved studies on ancient emotion produced since the l 990s) has been the interaction
prominence in the 1950s and 1960s. 8 A measure of the advance that this work between emotion and moral and social norms. This is an interaction that needs to
represented over traditional approaches may be taken by means of a comparison be viewed from both angles, not only in terms of the embeddedness of ancient
with W. B. Stanford's Greek Tragedy and the Emotions, published eight years emotions, emotion concepts, and theories of emotion in social interaction and cul-
later. 9 Useful enough in many of its individual observations, Stanford's work tural normativity, but also in terms of the fundamentally affective character of
nonetheless falls short in its reliance on traditional philological connoisseurship
and the absence of theoretical underpinning. 10 D. L Cairns 1993.
The approach outlined in Fortenbaugh's book was a crucial stimulus to 11 Monographs: e.g. Harris 2001; Konstan 2001; Graver 2002; Zaborowski 2002; Kaster 2005;
Caims's 1993 volume on aidos, which sought to synthesize the perspectives on Sternberg 2006; Konstan 2006; Graver 2007; Konstan 2010; Munteanu 2012. Edited collec-
tions: e.g. Braund and Gill 1997; Braund and Most 2003; Konstan and Rutter 2003; Sternberg
2005; Fitzgerald 2008; Munteanu 2011; Sanders et alii 2013. See also the monographs by the
http://emma.hypotheses.org), the Queen Mary University of London Centre for the History of philosophers Bernard Williams (1993) and Martha Nussbaum (1994, 2001).
Emotions (http://projects.history.qmuLac.uk/emotions), and The History of Emotions project 12 For recent and valuable studies in the same vein, see e.g. Caston 2012; Fulkerson 2013;
of the Max Planck Institnte for Human Development, Berlin (https://www.mpib-berlin.mpg. Sanders 2014.
de/en/research/history-of-emotions). 13 See Konstan 2006 on Aristotle and 2015 on Seneca; cf. pp. 231-242 in this volume. On the
6 For overviews of trends in the historical study of emotion, see Frevert 2009, 2011; Plamper Stoics, see also (in primis) Graver 2007; on the Epicureans, see Annas 1989; Fowler 1997;
2010; Hitzer 2011; Matt 2011; Rosenwein 2011; Matt and Stearns 2014; Plamper 2015; Procope 1998; Armstrong 2008. On emotion in Hellenistic ethics and psychology, see also
Schnell 2015. Cf. Stearns and Steams 1985; Konstan 2009; Corbin 2016. Annas 1992, Nussbaum 1994; Sihvola and Engberg-Pedersen 1998; Gill 2010. Cf. Fitzgerald
7 See http://emotions.classics.ox.ac.uk, with Chaniotis 2012d; Chaniotis and Ducrey 2013. 2008. For contemporary cognitivist approaches, see e.g. Nussbaum 2001; Solomon 2003,
8 Fortenbaugh 1975; a second edition appeared in 2002. Landmarks in the development of the 2006.
cognitiye-evaluative approach include (as well as the philosophical contributions cited by 14 See esp. Konstan 2001 on pity and 2010 on forgiveness.
Fortenbaugh himself) the appraisal theories of Magda Arnold (Arnold 1960) and Richard 15 Salient differences between English 'emotion' and Greek pathos emerge particularly in
Lazarus (summed up in e.g. Lazarus 1991) and the experiments of Schachter and Singer Fortenbaugh's discussion in this volume.
(Schachter and Singer 1962) which purported to demonstrate that it is was not arousal of the 16 On the historical contingency of the English-language concept of emotion, see Dixon 2003,
autonomic nervous system but situational appraisal that specified an episode as emotional and 2012. Against the assumption that the English-language category of emotion (and its constit-
differentiated one emotion from another. uent taxonomies) are universal, but also in favour of the existence of at least broadly analo-
9 Stanford 1983. gous categories in all languages, see Wierzbicka 1999.
10 Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis Introduction 11
ancient moral, social, and legal values. These are features that are emphasized in succeed in fostering that engagement. Not only do works of literature embed and
some of the most important contributions within Classical Studies,17 but they also embody the emotion scripts of their society and culture, they also constitute emo-
constitute major topics in other disciplines. 18 tion scripts in themselves, feeding back into, recalibrating, and extending the emo-
Literature has loomed large in these discussions, especially because literary tional repertoires and capacities of their audiences.23 The emotion-eliciting power
24
sources provide tich evidence for the complex dynamics of emotional episodes in of texts is not just a matter of the depiction of emotion in the text. The mecha-
multifaceted depictions of more or less realistic forms of social interaction. Gen- nisms by which texts exert this power, however, as well as the nature of the re-
res such as epic and drama provide various perspectives on characters' motivation sponses that these mechanisms elicit, are matters of controversy; this is an area
and substantial information on the eliciting conditions of their emotions, all of where the centuries' worth of implicit and explicit testimony that classical litera-
which can guide our interpretation both of explicit ascriptions of emotion and of ture and classical literary theory have to ofter on the emotional power of texts and
implicit representations of emotional behaviour. A wide range of other genres performances can still make a contribution to contemporary debate, not only in
(from elegiac poetry and historiography to forensic oratory and biography) rely applying modem theory to ancient sources or in bringing our literary-theoretical
similarly on narrative constmctions of characteristic affective scenatios as con- approaches into contact with the cognitive and affective sciences, 25 but also in
26
texts for their representations of and appeals to emotion. In a very real sense, then, using the richness of ancient theory to interrogate modem assumptions.
the manifold forms of dramatic enactment and narrative representation of emotion If literary texts draw on the paradigmatic emotion scenarios of the culture in
in literature reflect the paradigmatic scenarios of emotion in the wider culture or which they are created, they also help create, disseminate, and extend those para-
in particular 'emotional communities' within that culture. 19 If literary representa- digms, not only in individual readers and audience members, for whom the emo-
tions of agency are successful, then we have good evidence of affectivity in action tional scripts embedded in a literary work may be exemplary or who may find
in the cultures we study - in the agents represented in literary artefacts, in their their emotional repertoires stretched by engagement with literature, but also in the
interaction with other agents and with internal audiences, and in the appeal to the work of other artists and in whole genres. Other works of literature constitute a
emotions of external audiences. This is one reason why Classicists have been tight significant aspect of the contextual background against which the emotions por-
to make such extensive use of literary evidence in their contributions to the histor- trayed in and elicited by particular texts must be read, as Battistella and Nelis re-
ical study of emotion,2° and why literary sources still provide much of the evi- mind us in this volume.27
dence and subject matter in this volume.21 Historiography perhaps constitutes a special case in this general connection.
The emotional texture and affective character of literary works also figure On the one hand, th~ role of emotion in the genre became a subject of debate al-
prominently in contemporary emotion research. 22 But a further feature of this ready in antiquity: historiography is penneated by the. theories of emotion that
strand of research is its focus on the emotional responses of readers and audienc- prevailed in ancient aesthetics, ethics, and rhetoric, just as it is thoroughly influ-
es, the subject of Caims's and Halliwell's chapters in this volume and a topic in enced by the practices of other literary genres (especially tragedy), yet the purpose
several of the others. Here, the concerns of modem emotional research and those and use of emotion-eliciting scenarios in the genre could be the subject of polemic
of ancient poetics, aesthetics, and rhetoric coalesce in seeing emotion as a salient and controversy. 28 At the same time, historiography needs to confront emotion as
element in readers' and audiences' -",...,~,,-,,~-,,.with texts, performances, and nar- a factor in historical causation. And, as Damon notes, ancient historians did pre-
ratives and in the techniques by which those texts, performances, and narratives cisely that: as she points out 'Thucydides' "trnest cause" for the Peloponnesian
17 See e.g. (on emotion, moral and social norms, and the emotional of ordinary social 23 See D. L. Cairns 2014, esp. 103-109; cf. Cairns, this volume (pp. 53-78), with references in
interaction) Harris 2001; Kaster 2005; Sanders 2014. On the affective character of ancient n. 69; Munteanu, this volume (pp. 79-103).
Greek moral, social, and legal norms see also D. L. Cairns 1993, 2003a, 2003b, 2015. In this 24 See Halliwell, this volume (pp. 105-123), and cf. Damon, pp. 183f. on Thucydides 7 .29-30.
volume, see esp. Graver on the norms, scripts, and display rules that conditioned Cicero's 25 As indeed is happening, within Classics, in the work of scholars such as Felix Budelmann
grief over the death of his daughter. (see e.g. Budelmann and Easterling 2010; Budelmann and LeVen 2014; Budelroann,
18 On the intimate relationship between emotions and social norms, see esp. Elster 1999. On the Maguire, and Teasdale 2016), Jonas Grethlein (e.g. Grethlein 2015a, 2015b), Elizabeth
emotional character of moral norms, see e.g. Prinz 2007; De Sousa 2008; Bagnoli 2011. On Minchin (e.g. Minchin 2001), Ruth Scodel (e.g. Scodel 2014), and Ineke Sluiter (e.g. Duijn,
emotions, values, and legal norms, see Deigh 2008 and the January 2016 issue of Emotion Sluiter, and Verhagen 2015), with much more in the pipeline. So far, however, few have con-
Review (vol. 8.1,pp. 3-61). centrated specifically on emotion.
19 To use the term introduced by Rosenwein 2006; see also Chaniotis 2011. 26 See the chapters by Cairns and Halliwell in this volume, with further references (pp. 53-78
20 Sec nn. 11-12 above. and 105-123).
21 See esp. the chapters by Battistella and Nelis, Cairns, Damon, Fulkerson, Halliwell, Lateiner, 27 See also Nelis 2015; and cf. (e.g.) F. Cairns 2005.
and Munteanu. 28 See Damon. this volume (pp. 178-194), with references to ancient sources and modem dis-
22 See esp. Oatley 2011, 2012. cussion.
12 Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis Introduction 13
war Sparta's fear, rp6~ot;, of Athens' growing power (1.23.6) - is the tip of a appraisal theory, as represented in the work of figures such as Magda Arnold,
29 34
very large iceberg. ' The Greeks and Romans recognized the importance of emo- Richard Lazarus and Nico Frijda. In the case of the 'component process model'
tions in history, if not of emotion history, in ways that are only now coming back developed by the Geneva school under Klaus Scherer this is a multidimensional
into focus. At the same time, this is an enterprise that is fraught with difficulty. and multifactorial approach that encompasses a range of cognitive and physiolog-
That we live in an infinite affective continuum is a point made not only by the ical processes. 35 Models of this type can be adapted in the attempt to take account
30
likes of William James, but also (as emerges from a passage quoted in this vol- of cross-cultural and historical variation, 36 but in general they are not much .con-
ume by Stephen Halliwell) by the ancient author of On the Sublime (22.1): 'there cerned with labels, categories, and the variqus things that language can do to emo-
is an indefinite multiplicity of emotions (pathe) and no one can even say how tion. 37 Many rival and complementary approaches pay even less attention to such
31
many they are'. Every motive that every living human being has ever enter- things: for Paul Griffiths, only 'basic emotions' or 'affect programme responses',
tained has been affectively charged: affectivity is fundamental to consciousness, i.e. short-term, spontaneous, and physical experiences, can be studied scientifical-
to cognition, and to the ways that we make sense of the natural and social envi- ly; conceptual analysis can elucidate a society's beliefs about emotion, but cannot
ronments.32 The experiences we pick out and label as emotions or emotional epi- get us any closer to what emotions really are. 38 Jesse Prinz's 'embodied appraisal'
sodes are just the peaks and troughs in this continuous emotional landscape. But if model recognizes that emotion episodes are multi-componential events, yet seeks
this is true, the history of emotions will be a difficult thing to write. Certain emo- to isolate the one single component that is the emotion, 39 finding it (like William
tions, in certain individuals, sectors of society, and communities, are inevitably James and Kurt Lange before him) in the perception of bodily change. For a large
privileged in terms of the causal force they are felt to have exerted. This tendency number of other researchers, the primary focus of investigation is the physical
towards schematization can extend even to the point at which it becomes an as- experience of the individual, whether in terms of facial expressions or neurophys-
pect of periodization the 'age of anxiety', and so on. iological changes. 40 But the fundamental problem with thi:'i is that, as features of
It is, however, undeniable that emotions are powerful historical forces. It is language, thought, and culture, the phenomena that we categorize as emotions and
also undeniable that there is a history not only of such forces but also of their cat- that other cultures have categorized in other, at least partly comparable terms,
41
egorization and conceptualization. We can historicize emotions in tenns of their encompass much more than these approaches attempt to address.
importance as causes of particular historical events, the norms and values that The general approach to emotion that has become established in Classics,
regulate their expression in different places at different times, their role in the his- then, based on language and literary or philosophical texts, still has much to offer.
tory of ideas and belief systems, and the ways in which the language, labelling, But that approach has been and can be further transformed by the broadening of
and valorization of emotion shifts over time and varies from culture to culture. 33 the field, its focus, and its source base. This is the pa;rticular merit of Angelos
In attempting to pursue this project, Classics has to date - for the good reasons Chaniotis' Oxford ERC-funded project, mentioned above. Its inaugural publica-
outlined above - concentrated extensively on language and texts. This marks a tion, Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methodv for the Study of Emotions in the
substantial difference of emphasis behveen Classics (and certain other historically Greek World, both outlines and fulfils a programme of expanding the source ma-
focused Humanities disciplines) and much mainstream emotion research in other terial for the study of ancient Greek emotion, from the traditional and virtually
disciplines. Although there is no single agreed definition of emotion or accepted exclusive focus on literary and philosophical sources towards a wider range of
account of what counts as emotion across the range of disciplines that deal with non-literary and sub-literary documents and a much greater concentration on ma-
42
the issues and phenomena in question, it would be fair to say that the most fa- terial culture.
voured approach in many branches of the behavioural sciences is some form of In one respect, this represents a move away from elite and culturally authori-
tative literary texts to other forms of textual evidence e.g. ktters, wills, and peti-
29 Damon, this volume, pp. 178 and 181. See also the studies of Thucydidean historiography
cited in her n. 19. 34 See Amold 1960; Frijda 1986; Lazarus 1991.
30 James 1890, ii.485. 35 See the interview with Scherer in Lombardo and Mulligan 2008.
31 rcoU&yap Kat &vapi0µrrm rc&0n1ml ouo' &v E1.7CEtV n<:;6rc6aa0VVO:l"to(quoted by Halli- 36 See Parrott 2010, 2012; Frijda and Parrott 2011.
well, below, p. 114). 37 For a good account of which see Colombetti 2009.
32 See now Colombetti 2014. 38 Griffiths 1997.
33 Again, there is much to be learned here from the work of David Konstan, whether it concerns 39 See Prinz 2004, 3.
the shifts in meaning of Greek phthonos and nemesis (Konstan 2003), the changing valoriza- 40 Facial expressions: see (most recently) Elanan and Cordaro 2011; brain studies: see Damasio
tion of pity, clemency, etc. (Konstan 200 I), or the emergence of a modem concept of forgi- 1994; LeDoux 1996; Rolls 1999, 2005; Fox 2008.
veness in contradistinction to the scenarios envisaged by ancient Greek syngnome or Roman 41 Cf. Cairns and Fulkerson 2015b, 1-6.
ignoscere (Konstan 2010). 42 See Chaniotis 2012b, 24-27, with 2012d, 37-150, 177-355, 389-430.
14 Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis Introduction 15
tions; 43 inscriptions set up by private individuals; 44 and inscriptions, both religious Angelos Chaniotis' chapter in this volume indicates another fruitful approach
and secular, commissioned by communities of various kinds. 45 But the broadening in this connection, in so far as it represents a growing tendency to consider the
of the source base also encompasses a shift of focus on to non-textual forms of products of the visual arts not just in their own right, as evidence for the depiction
evidence - to visual and material culture. Visual culture, in particular, is an area in of emotion, but (as far as possible) in their wider original context, as functional
which great opportunities exist, but also considerable obstacles. In principle, objects in specific physical and cultural settings: statues not only represent emo-
sources such as vase-painting and sculpture might be thought to afford direct ac- tional experience, but also express emotional commitment and elicit emotional
cess to the physical expression of emotion in gesture and body language. But, as responses. Chaniotis' study, in this volume, of the multiple ways in which the
Glenys Davies points out, 'although some aspects of body language are universal dedication of a statue provides evidence for aspects of ancient affectivity com-
and found across cultures many behaviours are culture-specific, and it should not plements earlier studies on the emotional dimensions of sanctuaries and other lo-
be assumed that an interpretation that seems natural or obvious to us would have cations for ritual performance. 52 Epigraphic texts, dedications, religious architec-
been so for the Roman [or Greek] viewer' .46 Contemporary scientific accounts can ture, and the configuration of the site more generally all contribute to the creation
help, especially if they can offer strong grounds, with robust cross-cultural evi- of a shared space for emotional experience and emotional performance, a locus for
dence, that a given expression or gesture genuinely is found in a range of cultures; the enactment of the emotions - awe, fear, wonder, respect, hope, gratitude, and
but even so it would be unsafe merely to assimilate representations of emotion in so on - on which religious experience depends. 53 Such an orientation reflects the
the visual arts of the ancient Greeks and Romans to our own understanding (even tum towards materiality in archaeology and ancient history more broadly, a con-
if scientifically informed) of what appears to be depicted. To link the depiction of cern that is also manifest in studies that focus more generally on the affective im-
non-verbal behaviour in ancient art to ancient concepts of emotion we typically plications of human beings' interaction with objects and artefacts. 54
require warrant from linguistic (and especially narrative) sources, 47 together with This is not an approach, however, that needs to restrict itself to material evi-
as much contextual information (e.g. about the identity and status of the individu- dence alone. The literary texts that have dominated the study of ancient emotions
als depicted, the relation between their depiction and ancient norms of self- to date also have a great deal to offer those who wish to investigate the concrete
presentation, proxemics, and emotional display, etc.) as can reasonably be ob- physicality of ancient emotions as aspects of the ways in which embodied human
tained, as well as a thorough understanding of the iconography of the wider cor- beings interact with the world and the objects that it contains. This is partly a con-
pus to which the depiction belongs. Though progress is being made,48 works sequence of the fact that literary sources are rich in representations of the objects,
which in the past attempted to survey this field systematically are now outdated artefacts, spaces, symptoms, movements, postures, and gestures through which
and inadequate, 49 and coverage remains in many respects sporadic. 50 A systematic emotions can be expressed, symbolized, constructed, and elicited. 55 But it is also
and comprehensive study remains very much a desideratum. 51 significant that there is a very real sense in which there is no absolute gulf be-
tween the material and the textual, the physical and the mental, in the study of
emotion. To quote Caims's chapter in this volume:
43 Kotsifou 2012a, 2012b, 2012c.
44 Chaniotis 2012a; Salvo 2012. The importance of emotional symptoms in the construction of emotional concepts underlines
45 Chaniotis 2012a, 2012c; Martzavou 2012a, 2012b; Chaniotis 2015. the fundamental importance of physical embodiment in the. concept of emotion itself. In the
46 Davies, this volume, p. 159. case ofphrike, the symptom is one that has its roots in basic somatic mechanisms of tempera-
47 See Chaniotis 2012b, 18, 27; Masseglia 2012a, 137-139, 2012c. ture regulation, that is manifested in a range of non-emotional contexts, and that is shared
48 See especially the recent contributions ofMasseglia 2012c, 2013; Bobou 2013. with other animals. From these materials, universal in humans and extending beyond the hu-
49 Sitt! 1890; Neumann 1965. On body language in general (chiefly in literary sources), see man species, is constructed an emotional concept in which physical symptoms are intimately
Maier-Eichhorn 1989; Bremmer and Roodenburg 1991; Lateiner 1995; Aldrete 1999; Boege- related to cognitive appraisals and evaluations. The mechanism by which this occurs is the
hold 1999; Lobe 1999; Ricottili 2000; Fagen 2001; Llewellyn-Jones 2003; Corbeill 2004; D. universal one of metonymy, by which the name of the symptom comes to function as a name
L. Cairns 2005. Among works on emotion expression in particular, one might single out Hal- of the emotion. The concept of phrike is typical in locating the language and thought of emo-
liwell 2008 (on Greek laughter), Beard 2014 (on Roman); on tears, see the chapters in Fagen
2009. customs more generally (e.g. Vermeule 1979; Garland 1985; Loraux 1990/1998; Seaford
50 As well as the works cited in n. 48, note also e.g. Davies 1985, 1994, 1997, 2002, 2005; 1994; Engels 1998; Derderian 2001).
McNiven 2000 (and his unpublished 1982 dissertation). For Roman art, Brilliant 1963 re- 52 See Chaniotis 2011, 2012a.
mains valuable. See also Kenner 1960 on laughter and tears in Greek art. 53 Cf. e.g. Masseglia 2012b.
51 There is a partial exception in the well-studied phenomenon of grief and mourning in ancient 54 See e.g. Masseglia 2012a, 2012b; Bourbou 2013. For theoretical perspectives on materiality
visual culture: see e.g. (on Greek art) Shapiro 1991; Huber 2001; Oakley 2004. This belongs and cognition, see e.g. Appadurai 1986; Brown 2004; Bennett 2010; Malafouris 2013, Bos-
with a long-standing tradition of studies of (especially Greek) lamentation (see Alexiou cagli 2014.
1974/2002; Holst-Warhaft 1992; Schauer 2002; Due 2002, 2006; Suter 2008) and funerary 55 Cf. the works cited inn. 49 above on body language, and cf. (on objects) Mueller 2016.
16 Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis Introduction 17
tion in embodied physical experience. There is nothing in any way surprising or unfamiliar language, and especially in the use of metaphor. Ahnost always, these metaphors
about this •· the point is precisely that ancient Greek emotional concepts are, to large extent, will be conventional, or at least not unique to individuals; very often, they will
built up out of the same materials as our own, materials that draw on our experience as physi-
reflect not subjective experience as such, but shared models of the fonns that sub-
cally embodied beings interacting with our physical and social environments. What needs to
be emphasized, however, is that this experiential, embodied nature of emotion is not just an jective experience was expected to take. In this way, however, metaphor us
aspect of a shared biological substratum; it is a feature also of language and of thought. It is from what cannot be studied historically - the totality of living human beings'
not that embodiment is relevant only in terms of emotions' physical ehanges, symptoms, and actual subjective experience of affective events and states (that 'indefinite multi-
expressions and is left behind when emotional concepts take root in language, thought, and plicity of pathe' mentioned in On the Sublime 22.1) to what cah, the representa-
culture. There is no disjunction, but rather a fundamental continuity between emotions as tion of subjective experience in language.
physical experiences and emotional concepts as linguistic and cultural categories. In terms of
There are complex issues to be explored here, in emotion research in general,
the development of emotional concepts, there is no wedge to be driven between the body, on
the one hand, and language and culture on the other. about the links between physical experience, observing and thinking about physi-
cal experience, responding emotionally to others' embodied experience, and the
Mechanisms of thought, such as metonymy and metaphor, regularly bring the creation and reception of verbal and visual narratives of physical experience, es-
body and its interactions with the material and social environments into the lan- pecially in terms of possible connections between the represehtation of the subjec-
guage and thought of emotion. A growing number of studies are beginning to ex- tive phenomenology of emotion in language, thought, and narrative and the emo-
plore what metaphor can tell us about the conceptualization of emotion in ancient tional responses of the recipients and audiences of such language, mental repre-
Greek and Roman societies. 56 To say 'I shudder' rather than merely 'I am afraid' sentations, and narratives. 59 We have touched on these issues already above, with
is to give a more vivid and immediate sense of the emotion as a holistic, embodied regard to the emotional responses of audiences and readers. 'Longinus' is one of
experience; to present the onset of grief as the feeling of being suddenly envel- many ancient authors who exhibits a pronounced interest .in how the representa-
oped in a cloud or a garment presents an individual's emotion in terms of a shared tion of embodied experience in literature appeals to the emotions of readers and
cultural model of what that emotion feels like to a subject (and links it to the visi- audiences: Halliwell's discussion in this volume brings out the author's sense of a
ble expression of the emotion in body language and dress). 57 When Achilles wish- symmetry between vivid representation of physical experience in texts and the
es that anger (cholos) would disappear from the world, that anger that is sweeter physicality of an audience's emotional response (and similarly highlights the role
than liquid honey and expands like smoke in a man's chest (Iliad 18.107-110), he of metaphor in mediating that symmetry). 60 One of the sub-issues in this domain,
is, to be sure, telling us what anger has felt like to him, but he does so in a way concerning the relation between physical and mental or 'social' pain, 61 and thus
that draws on his culture's metaphorical models of emotional experience (e.g. as between the emotional pain that an observer feels at the physical pain of another, 62
the movement of gases and fluids in a container), so that his description is mean- is raised in the pseudo-Aristotelian Problemata and discussed in Fortenbaugh's
ingful also in terms of the conceptual schemas that the poem's audiences use to chapter in this volume. 63 The author of the Peripatetic treatise is puzzled by a
articulate their own subjective experiences. The similarity between these schemas question that remains an issue of contemporary scientific discussion.
and those that are currently in use in modem societies will at least partly reflect But these issues ultimately raise a more fundamental question concerning the
the constraints that actual physiology, symptomatology, and other features of hu- utilitv of the antithesis between mind and body when it comes to thinking about
man embodiment place on metaphors and metonymies that depend on embodi- emotion as one of the ways in which human beings (and other organisms) make
ment. sense of their environments. The phrike that registers a difference in temperature
As Angelos Chaniotis has pointed out, 'the ancient historian cannot study between an organism and its surroundings is a primary way in which that organ-
what people really felt'; 58 but the ancient experience of emotion is not completely ism makes sense of the world; the same embodied sense-making capacities remain
inaccessible to us, at least in so far as we can study shared cultural models of implicated when phrike responds (e.g.) to presumed signs of divine presence or to
emotion phenomenology via their representation in the intersubjective medium of the convincing representation of human suffering in the theatre, though the latter
56 See D. L. Cairns 2013a, 2013b, 2014, 2016a, 2016b, forthcoming. See also Canovas 2011 on 59 See e.g. Oatley 2011, 111-114; Wojciehowski and Gallese 2011 (with bibliography on the
the arrows of love and cf. Hom forthcoming on Homeric metaphors for death (which have wider issues in terms of mirror neurons, embodied simulation, etc.). On the issue of whether
some affinities with metaphors for grief and other emotions: D. L. Cairns 2016a). Latinists metaphors which draw on embodied experience involve embodied simulation of that experi-
have focused less closely on emotion, but for the general approach, see Short 2012, 2013, ence in the brain, see the studies cited in D. L. Cairns 2014, 1111.5-8.
2014. 60 See Halliwell, p. 116 and n. 22 on On the Sublime 15.2, 20.3, and 29.2.
57 See D. L. Cairns 2013a and in this volume on shudders (phrike) and 2016a on clouds and 61 See (for different views) Eisenberger 2012; Woo et alii 2014.
garments. 62 See Singer et alii 2004.
58 Chaniotis 2012, 94. 63 See Fortenbaugh, this volume, pp. 125-142.
18 Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis Introduction 19
clearly involve much more in the way of affective and cognitive processing. At This volume cannot survey or represent the totality of what is becoming a
both ends of the scale, in non-human animals and in human beings, phrike is an substantial volume of work on ancient emotions. Nor can it anticipate all the di-
experience of a body that is simultaneously an experience of the world. The rections that future research in the field might take. We are conscious of what we
body's sense-making capacities are involved at all levels; they remain involved have omitted, not least because several colleagues who made valuable contribu-
when symptoms of this type, the primary sense-making capacities that they re- tions to the 2013 Geneva conference were sadly unable, for various reasons, to
flect, and other embodied forms of experience are used to construct the metonyms contribute. At the conference, the focus of Chaniotis and Davies on visual and
and metaphors that structure emotion concepts. At all levels, these phenomena material culture was supplemented by papers by Ioannis Mylonbpoulos and Em-
reflect the fact that cognition is embodied and that cognition and affectivity are ma Stafford. The absence of a chapter on ancient medicine, a subject treated at the
inextricably linked as aspects of the single complex system that is the living or- conference in William Harris's paper on Greek emotions and mental illness, will
ganism. 64If we as Classicists can insist on the extent to which our discipline, too, shortly (though sadly not here) be made good by contributions by George Ka-
focuses on embodied, embedded, and enactive aspects of emotion, then we can zantzidis.68 Cristobal Pagan Canovas' paper on emotion metaphor complemented
engage in meaningful dialogue with emotion researchers in a variety of other dis- nicely the paper by Cairns, but rested substantially on published work. 69 David
ciplines, while also seeking to pursue a dialogue within our own discipline in syn- Armstrong's work on Philodemus' On Anger is being published in fuller form in
thesizing the material, visual, and textual data that the ancient evidence has to his edition of that work (in collaboration with M. McOsker); we particularly feel
offer. the lack of the Epicurean perspective. We shall naturally be less conscious of what
In studying the emotions of the ancient Greeks and Romans we already en- we have overlooked; but we hope that what we have managed to include gives a
gage in cross-cultural comparison: none of us is an ancient Greek or an ancient reasonably accurate impression of an exciting and developing field.
Roman. In bringing this comparative and historicizing impetus to bear Classicists In his paper Donald Lateiner investigates what he describes as an unjustly ne-
are already in a position to supply perspectives that are too often overlooked in glected emotion, disgust. He does so by looking at three literary genres: epic,
other branches of emotion research. We do this well when we interrogate to the tragedy and comedy. Following an analysis of disgust as an emotion, concluding
best of our abilities the linguistic, social, and cultural habits that inform our own that is not an innate instinct but a response and signal system that depends on de-
and our own societies' views about emotion. But we can also do more. It is a vir- veloped capacities and socialization, he goes on to look at Homeric narrative,
tue of the current volume that so many of our contributors ( especially Battistella concluding that for all the references to and brutal descriptions of fighting,
and Nelis, Halliwell, and Munteanu) treat both Greek and Roman evidence - an wounding, and killing Homer rarely provides detailed descriptions of disgust-
obvious cultural interface which is too often overlooked and which should much arousing encounters. Turning to tragedy, Lateiner refers to the gruesome features
more regularly form the focus of our investigations. 65 Other comparators readily . of such monstrous creates as the Aeschylean Furies and such horrible events as
suggest themselves: conferences and workshops have begun to examine similari- the blinding of Oedipus in order to show just how grim this genre can be, remark-
ties and differences between Greek and Arabic, Greek and Chinese classical tradi- ing in conclusion that disgust can sometimes make room for the typically tragic
tions;66 and a new international research network has been set up to examine the emotion of pity. After a section about smell as it features in a range of Greek
interface between ancient Greek and Byzantine affectivity, taking into account texts, he concludes by looking at comic drama and the staging and description of a
also the influence of Christianity and Islam and Byzantium's relations with the remarkable array of disgusting acts, odours, and substances, before some conclud-
Mediaeval West. 67 ing remarks about the aesthetics of disgust, in which he notes that one important
aspect of the appearance of disgust in a literary text of any kind is that from a safe
distance an audience can enjoy disgusting acts and the e4 posure to of others to
them.
64 See Damasio 1994, 1999, 2003, 2010, and now Colombetti 2014, with its background in the
Douglas Cairns takes as his starting point the reappearance on stage of the
enactivist approach of(e.g.) Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, Thompson 2007.
65 See now the essays collected in Cairns and Fulkerson 2015a. For recent studies that also en- Sophoclean Oedipus, after he has blinded himself. He does so in order to focus on
gineer an explicit confrontation between the affective worlds of Greek and Roman societies, one specific aspect of the Chorus' emotional response at Oedipus Tyrannus 1297-
cf. Konstan 2010 and Fulkerson 2013. 1306, the phrike that they experience on first setting eyes on the blinded king and
66 For the former project, see hhtp://nyuad.nyu.edu/en/news-events/abu-dhabi-events/2015/02/ in confronting his tragedy. Emphasizing the fact that it is both an emotion and a
emotions-across-cultures.html, with working papers at https://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/ fundamentally physical experience common to a range of emotional and non-
33966. For ancient Greek and Chinese emotions in an intellectual-historical context, involv-
ing also discussions of Mediaeval, Early-Modern, and Modern Europe, see hhtps://emma.
hypotheses.org/histoire-intellectuelle-des-emotions, now published as Boquet and Nagy 2016. 68 See Kazantzidis forthcoming, a, b, and c.
67 See http://emotions.shca.ed.ac.uk/. 69 Canovas 2011.
20 Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis Introduction 21
emotional events, the experience of a body that shivers and shudders, Cairns goes are frequently inaccurate and that modem scholars often work with over-
on to study phrike in relation to the tragic emotions and also to Greek ideas about confident generalisations about the approaches of ancient critics.
literature and enargeia and phantasia. The phrike of an internal audience in trage- William Fortenbaugh devotes his paper to the little-studied pseudo-
dy or in narrative offers a perspective on the text's emotion-eliciting power. Look- Aristotelian work, the Physical Problems. He points out that throughout the Prob-
ing at a wide range of sources beyond tragedy, from Homer and Gorgias to Jose- lems there are numerous references to emotional response, and that three of the
phus and Galen, Cairns demonstrates that though it is typically a symptom of fear, thirty-three books that make up the work carry in their headings explicit reference
horror, or revulsion, phrike can also be an expression of the link between these to an emotion or to dispositions closely tied to emotional responses. Fortenbaugh
emotions and the shared sense of vulnerability that gives rise to pity. As such, it is attracted especially to Book 7, devoted to 'Problems arising from Sympathy'. It
can be dissociated neither from pity and fear as the typical tragic emotions nor deals with such topics as shared pain, which is presented as a cognitive response
from broader questions about emotional empathy and sympathy in the analysis of to another person's suffering; painful sounds and sights, some of which but not all
literary texts. involve thought; infectious yawning and urinating, which might be considered
Dana Munteanu sets out to explore the relationship between stories depicting automatic reactions, but in the Problems are presented as responses involving
extraordinary suffering and the fact that they may be recounted with a clear prac- thought. Overall, he sees pleasure and pain as constituting one unifying feature
tical purpose, namely to help a grieving person by restoring him or her to normal that renders intelligible the grouping together of the phenomena discussed in
social interactions and activities. She is in addition interested in the frequent de- Book 7, but not the most important one. Rather, taking his cue from its title, he
bates of Greco-Roman philosophers about the degree of usefulness of such cases. sees the presence of the word sympatheia as capturing the essence of this book,
Following a discussion of the fundamental role of narrative in arousing emotion, which brings together and discusses shared affections, a better translation of the
using modem research into the ways in which narrative clues guide readers to one Greek pathos than the more usual term emotion.
emotional state or another, clues that can be detected in all popular and long- In his contribution, Angelos Chaniotis studies the emotive power of Greek
lasting genres, she goes on to focus on the ways in which tragic stories, both in statues. Starting from their ubiquity in Greek culture, their variety in terms of
epic and drama, can function as means of consolation. By the fifth century BCE, form and function and the immediate materiality of their physical presence, he
she proposes, tragedy may have been seen as a geme offering consolation to the surveys the various ways in which they display and arouse emotions. He notes
spectators, by turning their attention from personal misfortunes to the unparalleled that the very existence of a statue may arise from an emotional response, offering
suffering of others and thus giving them pleasure and relief. But subsequently as one example among several the fact that the Nike of Paionios was motivated by
Plato opposes this notion, arguing instead that the relief and pleasure felt when the pride of the Messenians and Naupaktians for their victory over Sparta in 425
people watch tragedies, instead of providing solace, stir the soul. Since lamenta- BCE. Once they have been set up, the perception of statues as agents of divine
tion for fictional others fosters lack of restraint in expressing grief when one is power and epiphany explains in part why they can be associated with all the emo-
faced with personal loss, Plato proposes an alternative model of endurance tions that are connected with religious worship: fear, hope, gratitude, and affec-
through philosophy. Hellenistic philosophers continued to debate the utility of tion. In tum, statues of human beings are seen as hosts of memory, which prompts
tragic examples, while advancing their own paradigms of consolation. the idea that one aspect of commemoration is the transmission of communal val-
Stephen Halliwell devotes his paper to looking at ancient theorizing about the ues. A series of examples next illustrates what Chaniotis describes as 'the illusion
poetics of emotional expression. He begins by asking three crucial, closely related of agency': cases where a statue was believed to kill, heal, or punish or when stat-
questions about the triangular relationship involving author, text, and audience: ues seemed to present the physical symptoms of life, by moving, sweating, and
when emotional expression is predicated of a literary text, is that emotion to be shedding tears. When statues appear to be filled with life, the emotional responses
ascribed directly to the author? If so, must a distinction be made between the 'bi- to and the emotional interaction with them is largely determined by the same fac-
ographical' author and the 'virtual' author (i.e. the author created from the reading tors that also govern emotions in interpersonal human relations. Consistently
of the text) to make sense of such expression? Alternatively, is emotional expres- aware of the methodological difficulties inherent in the kinds of reconstructions
siveness an effect that inheres in the linguistically constituted worlds of literary he is attempting, Chaniotis concludes that we must study the emotions if we want
works themselves? Or is the essential test of what is at stake in emotional expres- to understand ancient statues.
sion best approached by concentrating on the production of emotion in the reader Glenys Davies studies some examples of Roman art in the light of modern re-
or audience of a literary text? Halliwell goes on to offer close analyses of some search into nonverbal communication, or body language. She has a special interest
ancient texts (for example, Aristotle's Poetics, Horace's Ars poetica, Longinus, in what she describes as proxemics (how close people stand to one another and the
On the Sublime) that have important things to say about such questions and have extent to which they can be thought tb invade another person's space) and haptics
as a result been much cited and studied by those modern scholars who have inves- (touch), taking as a basic premise that Roman artists observed the body language
tigated these matters, arriving at the conclusion that standard readings of key texts in use in Roman society and used their observations as a communicative device in
22 Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis Introduction 23
their work in a culturally specific way. She treats first the central group on the Laurel Fulkerson devotes her paper to studying hope in Vergil's Aeneid and
Palazzo della Cancelleria relief B (her 1), one of two reliefs found in Rome in Ovid's Metamorphoses. Her starting point is that hope is indeed an emotion, but
1939 and now on display in the Vatican Museo Gregoriano Profano. Davies fol- that the ancient view of hope is not exactly the same as that prevalent today. She
lows those who argue that the figure on the left is Domitian, that on the right Ves- sees hope in the Greco-Roman world as a more double-edged phenomenon. Turn-
pasian, and that the occasion depicted is Vespasian's arrival in Italy as emperor in ing to her two chosen texts, she emphasizes the strong relationship between hope
70 CE, and she goes on to analyse in detail the various interpretations of the close and narrative in epic. As far as the Aeneid is concerned, the ways in which Vergil
physical contact between the two men. This debate raises the wider matter of constructs Roman history as a future that the poem's characters can only dimly
whether ancient Rome was a 'contact' or a 'non-contact' culture, with Davies fa- foresee gives hope an important role throughout. The Aeneid's misleading proph-
vouring the latter. ecies and signs get at the very nature of the function of hope, as so many of Aene-
Past emotions are often the raw material of historians, but as Cynthia Damon as' hopes, as well as those of others in the poem, are either shown to be inappro-
points out the passions are also inextricable from one of the genre's most celebrat- priate or are fulfilled only in unexpected ways. Hope that becomes.reality is a use-
ed effects, its emotional impact on readers. She then goes on to look at the impli- ful and encouraging thing, but deluded hopes can make a bad situation worse, and
cations of Tacitus' famous remark that the historian must write sine ira et studio, encourage the reader to imagine outcomes that will not come to pass. Fulkerson
'without anger or favour'. Overall, her aim is to illustrate what a dilemma emo- takes the _Metamorphoses to be a fundamentally different kind of poem. In Ovid,
tions were for the historians of antiquity. One of the merits of the historical genre she argues, hopes are mentioned mostly when they are about to be dashed. Hope
is that it depicts great emotions, such as the terrible sufferings of the Peloponne- thus fulfils no plot-advancing function; instead, it usually adds a layer of irony,
sian War. Polybius goes on from this fact to make explicit the idea that the only revealing that events did not tum out in the way some of the characters expected,
method of learning how to bear bravely the vicissitudes of fortune is to recall the frequently with spes being immediately identified as fruitless. In the Metamor-
calamities of others, thus emphasizing the utility of the historian's efforts. But phoses, then, Ovid uses the emotion of hope to close down narrative possibilities.
Damon is more interested in the audience and the arousal of readers' emotions, David Konstan sets out to explore Seneca's thinking about the relationship be-
discussing a series of examples that show the complexities involved in the strong tween reason and emotion. That emotions and reason cohabit in the mind is the
connections that exist between emotion and historical memory: while historians orthodox Stoic view. Emotions are, after all, judgements. But, Konstan asks, how
obviously seek to move their readers, Tacitus, for example, shows how the in- can we account for their stubborn resistance to correction by reason, to the extent
flammatory books of Cremutius Cordus got him killed and the books themselves that when they are in full swing they can ouly be driven out by another emotion?
burned, suggesting that the emotions aroused by historiography can be dangerous- What is the origin of the special impetus that emotions have that makes them
ly efficacious. In giving the past its emotions the historians, working in a geme analogous to running at top speed and being unable to stop in an instant? He goes
that is by its nature inherently suspicious of authorial emotion, could sometimes on to argue that we cannot distinguish emotions from other judgements without
be 'playing with fire'. studying carefully what Seneca has to say about pre~emotions or propatheiai.
Margaret Graver takes as her starting point Julius Caesar's reaction to the Konstan, after a reading of a selection of passages scattered across the corpus,
death of his daughter Julia in 54 BCE. On campaign in Britain, Caesar receives advances the idea that for Seneca each of the individual emotions has a corre-
the news with composure and allows himself only a brief mourning period before sponding initial motion or impulse. Failure to understand the nature of these in-
returning to action two days later. Such self-control illustrates a Roman cultural stinctive responses and taking them to represent a fully emotional reaction to an
norm in the realm of emotional behaviour: in times of personal suffering, elite external stimulus makes it more likely that we will resist altering our judgements
males were able to gain in stature by restricting their expression of grief in favour and hold firmly to our false beliefs.
of concern for the interests of their community. Graver then goes on to focus on Expressions of anger dominate throughout Seneca's Medea. In their paper,
cases in which Cicero deliberately reverses the expectations created by Caesar's Chiara Battistella and Damien Nelis concentrate on the end of the play, with a
exemplary behaviour, cases such as his reaction to the death of Tullia, in which a special focus on the connections between literary representation of the emotions
public figure projects an image of himself as one who is strongly moved by emo- and intertextuality. Their main aim is to illustrate the extent of the direct influence
tion, and in particular by feelings of grief and distress. She thus shows how first- on Seneca of the final scene ofVergil's Aeneid. They argue that Medea's climac-
century Roman culture also offered options for advancing one's influence through tic murder of her children is directly modelled on Aeneas' killing ofTumus at the
the performance of grief, with the prevailing cultural tendency to emphasize self- close of the Aeneid. They conclude that in addition to the relevance of philosophi-
control making a move in the opposite direction rhetorically powerful. She argues cal, and particularly Stoic, analyses of passionate anger and his overall adherence
that Cicero was fully aware of that rhetorical potential and that he used it for his to the Euripidean model, it was in the final scene of Aeneid 12 that Seneca en-
own political and philosophical ends. countered a powerful and climactic meditation on anger that profoundly influ-
enced the ways in which he went about bringing his own play to a close.
24 Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis Introduction 25
In conclusion, as editors, it is our hope for this volume that our readers will Budelmann, F. and P. E. Easterling (2010) Reading Minds in Greek Tragedy, Greece & Rome 57,
find in it both a representative survey of the state of current research in the field 289-303,
and indications of some of the new directions classicists working on the affective Budelmann, F. and P. Le Ven (2014) Timotheus' Poetics of Blending: A Cognitive Approach to
the Language of the New Music, Classical Philology 109, 191-210.
sciences will be taking in the years to come. And as we send it off: we should like
Budelmann, F., L. Maguire, and B. Teasdale (2016) Ambiguity and Audience Response, Arion 23,
to close by offering our most sincere thanks to a number of people, without whose 89-114.
help it would not have been possible to complete our task. At the Fondation Hardt, Cairns, D. L. (1993) Aidi5s: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek
all the staff made sure that the conference went smoothly and enjoyably for all Literature, Oxford. 1
involved. At the Centre Interfacultaire en Sciences Affectives, Marion Gumy, (2003a) Ethics, Ethology, Terminology: Iliadic Anger and the Cross-Cultural Study of Emo-
David Sander, Daniela Sauge, Klaus Scherer, and Cristina Soriano provided es- tion, in S. M. Bra1md and G. W. Most (eds,), 11-49.
(2003b) The Politics of Envy: Envy and Equality in Ancient Greece, in D. Konstan and K.
sential guidance. At the University of Geneva, the Faculty of Arts and the Admin-
Rutter (eds.), 235-252.
istrative Commission provided crucial financial support. In addition, for help and - ed. (2005) Body Language in the Greek and Roman Worlds, Swansea.
advice of various kinds we sould like to thank Chiara Battistella, Lavinia Galli (2013a) A Short History of Shudders, in A. Chaniotis and P. Ducrey (eds.), 85-107,
Milic, and Aglae Pizzone. And finally, we should like to express our most sincere (2013b) The Imagery of Eros in Plato's Phaedrus, in E. Sanders, C. Thumiger, C. Carey, and
gratitude to Angelos Chaniotis and Yannick Zanetti, without whom we would N. J. Lowe (eds.), 233-250.
never have got this far. - (2014) Psyche, Thymos, and Metaphor in Homer and Plato, Les Etudes Platoniciennes 11, 1~
37.
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THE EMOTION OF DISGUST, PROVOKED AND EXPRESSED
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cographique a la psychologie homerique des sentiments, Paris.
The ancient Greeks and contemporaries in the West, at least, positively privilege
love and admiration, joy and devotion, emotions evoking pride. Disgust,1 shame,
and jealousy identify emotions then and now usually suppressed because social
standards deem them unworthy of such pride. The negative or 'rivalrous'
emotions originate from fears for our bodies and status.2 Since disgust obtains
little respect, men tiy to suppress it and its visible and audible symptoms often
but not always. This paper directs attention to an inappropriately neglected
emotion by detailing its important role in three ancient Greek literary genres.3
Instincts that display fear and its cousin terror reveal insecurities to others, a
source of embarrassment and target of social policing. Justified fears, lizard-level
brain impulses about impending death, lead creatures to visible 'fight or flight'
behaviors. Disgust behaviors prominently among middling rejectionist
impulses displays less than punches, more than escape. Hellenes recognized that
envy can lead to healthy and socially beneficial competition,4 but the Greek term
English has richer resources than Greek (or Latin) for this 'semantic field' of words denoting
hostile emotions, perhaps due to a millennium's socio-cultural developments; cf. Elias 1939/
1978. Loathing, contempt, scorn, disdain, sneering, and derision belong here. Some expressi-
ve attitudes, like contempt, are social and hierarchical (perceived ,social dominance) or gen-
der-sensitive in permissible displays (think Akhilleus) rather than constituting distinct emo-
tions.
2 Konstan and Rutter 2003 passim. The Classicist philosopher Nussbaum 2004 considers these
'shameful' emotions, observing them from a distinctly contemporary, American point of
view; so too Kekes 1992.
3 Disgust plays a minor role in Classical visual arts, a few pots sho,,ing defecation and ugly
individuals in sexual pursuits. Hellenistic and dependent Roman visual arts develop a kinky
interest in bestial perversions and the pygmies at work and play with grotesque genitals enga-
in grotesque activities (cf. Sutton 2000; Clarke 2007). The tradition, literary and
visual, portrays real or imagined disgust for and of the lower classes.
4 As Hesiod and Herodotos suggest about some forms of eris. The volume on 'rivalrous emo-
tions' edited by Konstan and Rutter (2003) would benefit from a chapter on Aristophanes'
envious and spiteful characters. Konstan 2006, 39 (following Aristotle, Rhetoric 1379a) ex-
cludes from his list of eleven emotions (pathe). He argues that the absence of other
subjectivities involved in this and.other 'modem' emotions renders certain contemporary ex-
32 Donald Lateiner The Emotion of Disgust, Provoked and Expressed in Earlier Greek Literature 33
sophrosyne signifies a nexus of dispositions and strenuous efforts to control our intermittent fascination. Disgust, however, resists abstraction and analysis.
negative instincts and socially destructive emotions. That is, the Greeks channeled One can exhume the rhetoric of manipulating disgust but not much discourse
competitive and bluntly rejectionist impulses, such as Akhilleus' intent to kill analyzing it. Raw expletives express non-budging negativity, irreducible fetid
Agamemnon, into socially acceptable expressions, such as his verbal, animalizing materiality. The dialects of emotion in other cultures remain difficult to decode.
insults and non-verbal disgust-displays responding to the commander's strategic Scholars of les sciences humaines only now are attempting to manage relevant
and personal faults.5 phobias and disgust.
Disgust and its neighbor, loathing, a more enduring disposition are human Few psycho-biologists, evolutionary anthropologists, literary scholars, and
'NO' responses. They derive from instinctual fear, especially fear of deadly philosophers, before and after Darwin, 10 still presume that instincts and human
substances or creatures that may contaminate or destroy our vulnerable human emotions and their modes of expression remain universal or are largely
bodies. Psychologists (e.g., Herz 2012, 103) thus speculate that disgust's objective constant. More of them argue that the passions (pathe) or at least their verbal and
is bad food detection and rejection: 'to keep the outside away from our inside' .6 nonverbal expressions are social constrncts that vary by cultural groups, by
Disgust, an emotion responding to cognitive capacities of perception and ethnicity, and/or by gender, race, age, class, etc.11
evaluation, actively and self-protectively responds to perceived threats. Re- Disgust, then, is not an innate instinct but an evolved or developed response
searchers must recognize, however, the allure of disgust, its aesthetic pleasures in and signal system (c£ Kelly 2011, 43-59: the 'entanglement thesis'). Parents train
limited circumstances. Smelly cheeses, one's own excrement, and many ancient their youngsters as soon as they possibly can (ea. three years old) to find feces
literary monuments 7 prove disgust's queasy attractions attested for many mil- disgusting to see, touch, smell, and taste, even to hear the evacuation of the
lennia.8 bowels. Small children, many have observed, consider excreta fascinating and
To paraphrase Aristotle on laughter, only humans show disgust. 9 Greek and pleasurable objects to play with. This negative socialization towards one's own
Roman artists and thinkers, in genres with very different disgust protocols, exploit excreta then extends to other substances and creatures such as wonns and dead
kittens, and to snot, pus, and other secretions. Disgust is the emotion that children
acquire last, around five to seven years of age, later than hard-wired automatic
periences irrelevant to Greek thought. Aristotle's social interaction assumptions for the emo- instincts and less complex emotions such as joy and hate (Herz 2012, 46, 80). The
tions do not illuminate Hellenic disgust.
lower face, the site of incorporation for air, liquids, and solid foods through its
5 North 1966, Konstan 2006, cf. Ngai 2002, 162. Robert Plutchik's 1980 wheel of primary and
secondary emotions provides a good contemporary list of emotions, but any list (or count!) of many breachable orifices, employs its most expressive organs, the mouth and
primary emotions remains contentious. nose, to express disgust. These entrances allow outside contaminants to enter the
6 Rozin and Fallon 1987, 24. The body's borderlands (mouth, nose, genitals, and rectum) are body's fortress. Disgust develops the original instinct to avoid ingesting un-
the sites most liable to contamination. Herz's 2012 study is the latest introduction to the so- pleasant rotted and toxic substances. 12
cio-psychological study of disgust known to me. Hindu and Hebrew food regulations develo-
ped elaborate food taboos, further limiting the in-group's food choice and sources of nouri-
shment. Nourishment denials become moral decisions. The Hindu caste system regulates in- gued as anger, sadness, happiness, fear, and surprise). Only disgust makes blood pressure
terpersonal contacts (and disgust) tln·ough an ideology of human contagion: touching (caste) drop (Herz 2012, 29).
'inferior' individuals contaminates and pollutes (Rozin et alii 2008, 643). Many ideologies 10 Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872; consulted in Ek.man's
rd
sniff at purported inferiors, insisting that they smell bad and should not be touched. annotated 3 edition of 1998) devotes chapter xi, part 1, to 'Disdain-Contempt-Disgust-Guilt-
7 E.g., Homer's man-eating Kyklops, Aisk.hylos' Erinyes, Sophokles' Philoktetes, and Aristo- Pride, etc. Kelly 2011, 1-9 summarizes the history of explanations of core disgusts and 'do-
phanes' dung beetle, and the Latin misadventures ofHorace's smelly hag in the Epodes, Pe- wnstream effects'.
tronius' catamites, and Martial's pustuled acquaintances. 11 Some expressions of emotions are universal (smiles of pleasure, squinched faces of disgust,
8 Kaster 2001 summarizes some psychologists' emotional 'scripts' approach that breaks down for instance), while others are limited by particular groups' parameters of condoned self-
the 'emotion' that leads to displays, visible and audible expressions. Korsmeyer 2011 extends expression (Sicilian arm gestures, American tongue-extrusions, Japanese or Palestinian pro-
Menninghaus' 2003 philosophical investigation of the aesthetics of disgust, how revulsion xemics ). Therefore, quei,sy-making sights and stenches are culturally malleable, as connois-
can bring pleasure in certain circumstances. Humanities scholars and social scientists (follow- seurs of cheeses like Limburger, Roquefort, or the outlawed Sardinian casu marzu (with or
ing Aristotle) have examined disgust less than, e.g., anger, surprise, or fear. The chief cause without the live maggots) ··· will realize. People suffering from severe OCD cases cannot re-
of inattention seems clear: reluctance to discuss publicly elicitors of and responses to disgu- cognize disgust expressed by others. (OCD here identifies 'Obsessive Compulsive Di,sorder',
sting materials. Ever since Herodotos, however, anthropologists have described and explained not the Oxford Classical Dictionary.) OCD sufferers are themselves hypersensitive, while
other cultures' corpse-abuse, cannibalism, incest violations, maggot-eaters, gendered excreto- psychopaths can rarely perceive disgust in themselves or in others (Herz 2012, 66--76).
ry habits, etc. Greenblatt J 982 offers many examples. 12 Humans, arguably, should feel disgust more frequently to protect healthy bodies against mi-
9 Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium 3.10, 673a on laughter. Herz 2012, 151-155 notes that crobial and other infection. They should. !earn sooner to feel disgust towards, e.g., dirt and
disgust is the most complex and least understood of the six basic emotions (the others catalo- their focal matter. Despite frequent hectoring in public washrooms, adults still do not wash
Donald Lateiner The Emotion of Disgust, Provoked and Expressed in Earlier Greek Literature 35
34
Emotion psychologists divide elicitors of disgust (Greek: ~8i::t-..'ll)'µma) into present feelings, for reasons of self-promotion and status-competition. Fraud and
six groups: 13 foods, hygiene, sexual acts, death and decay, damage to the body hypocrisy, intentional deceptions, frequently infest facial expression and posture
envelope (amputations, disfigurements, gore, open wounds,), and slimy, squirmy, in life and literature. Feelings may not 'lie', but our expressions of them to others
and swarming animal life (e.g., maggots, snakes, cockroaches). Surviving ancient can and do. 17
texts exhibit every variety. In order to distinguish verbal and nonverbal manifestations of disgust, we
To divide 14 an emotional event, one must identify its stimulus (1), the categorize them by channel of expression. One distinguishes explicit verbal
consequent perception (2), the individual's appraisal of it (3), and thereafter his or comments (including mocking, joshing, and spoken insults) frorti other vocalic,
her 'emotional' response (4). The inner process seems harder than the present paralinguistic indicators (such as 'ugh' or 'phew'). Nonverbal responses constitute
task: to describe the last step for disgust, the repelling external expressions (5). a second category, both relatively passive responses such as disattendance (gaze-
Other papers in this volume examine the internal processes (stimulus and psycho- avoidance) and body orientation (turning away) and active gestures such as nose-
biological mental responses), but this contribution explores that last step - the holding and sticking out one's tongue, or symbolic arm and hand extension
external responses, non verbal, verbal or vocalic, and instrumental (bodies' (motions 'as if to reject). Thirdly, instrumental acts (pushing away, kicking aside)
increased proximity, fight, or more usual flight). Responses to disgust start from differ from vocalic and nonverbal maneuvers of repulsion, when reacting to
the mouth: the jaw drops, the tongue extrudes, the nose wrinkles, and the upper lip feelings of disgust. Other acts of contact aggression (haptics) - such as whipping
is raised.
15 or striking with a stick, and throwing objects (ballistics) - extend this category to
This five-step micro-event breakdown 16 helps to describe 'the power of reject with things (object-adaptors).
negative thinking'. Visible, audible, tangible, smellable, and tasteable nonverbal Paralinguistic tones of voice (sarcasm, contempt), vocalic ejaculations (such
behaviors exhibit disgust. These sensible, hard to miss expressions differ from the as shrieks of disgusted horror ('euwgh'), nasal snorts, derisory laughter), and
invisible, psychological steps that cause them. One necessarily reconstructs and gagging noises constitute vocal, nonverbal displays. They often accompany
interprets squeamish feelings from individuals' self-presentation,. or interacta~ts' gestures of the body, negatively responsive postures, and especially 'yuck' facial
words or artists' and narrators' omniscient, or deficient, percept10n of acquamt- expressions. Many facial expressions of disgust subsist only briefly. 'Affect
ance/ nonverbal expressions of emotions. Observers, even spouses, often misper- displays' of disgust remain easily comprehensible to all cultures. Other emotions
ceive others' feelings from insufficient understanding. Interactants may misre- and their manifestations such as anger, remorse, 18 and joy - have changed due to
social and organized religious pressures. Judaism, Pauline Christianity, 19 and
other traditions, religious and secular, have altered Greek and Roman social
their hands (and foods) enough. Ashenburg 2007 provides 'an unsanitized history' of sanitary
views, practices, and devices. Unfortunately, disgusts developed from imperfect categories codes. They have encouraged, 'naturalized', admired, 20 or enforced different ex-
lead to maladaptive rejection of nutritive edibles, like grasshoppers (Rozin and Fallon 1987, pressions for many other emotions. Core disgust remains less amenable, more
29). primal, but groups have often channeled its secondary, moral energies for social
13 Rozin et alii 1999 recognize three more categories: body products, contamination by unsavo- and political harm.
ry people, and a few moral offenses. The latter two are 'opportunistic accretions' (645, 'en- Affect responses to loathsome creatures and slimy substances activate
tanglements' [Kelly]) to the oral-rejection hypothesis. Contamination and concepts of infec-
muscles near the mouth. The face is averted from the item generating disgust, the
tion can result from ingestion, contact, and even proximity.
14 Herz 2012, 41 reports that disgust reactions decline in intensity and variety as human beings nose becomes wrinkled or is held shut, the eyes blink, the lips purse, and in
age.
15 Smiling involves the entire face, not least the eyes, and frowning wrinkles the forehead. Other
parts of the body involved in disgust displays have not received as much attention (Rozin et 17 Ekman 1992, 123-161 examines (contemporary) 'display rules' for facial expression and
alii 2000, 639) - such as audibles including laughter, or shrinking back from a loathsome per- deception management. Goffman 1967 brilliantly explores when and where (by frames) Ame-
son, as Aiskhylos' Kassandra does (Agamemnon 1307, cf. stugos 1308-1309, cf. 547, 558). ricans are embarrassed.
The cannibalism of Thyestes' celebratory feast ended when the disgusted diner-father vomi- 18 Harris 2001, 339-399; Fulkerson 2013, esp. 12-44, 213-219.
ted up his stewed children, 'disgorged the butchery' (1590-1599: an;o crcpay~vl:p&v). 19 The two divisions of the Greek Bible are full of disgust (bdelu-) vocabulary, especially in
16 Kaster (in Konstan and Rutter 2003 and in Kaster 200 I, 2005) develops this step-by-step situations describing heathen and backsliding practices of those otherwise faithful. Shake-
'script' approach in his essays on invidia, Roman 'jealousy', andfastidium, Roman 'disgust', speare, interestingly, does not use the word 'disgust', but disgust pullulates in the witches'
and in his book on Roman emotions. He usefully distinguishes verbal, somatic, affective, and brew (Macbeth), or Iago's sex-talk (Othello), or the Duke Vincentio posing as a puritanical
pragmatic responses to abhorrent stimuli (200 I, 148). Roman concepts require separate monk (Measure for Measure).
treatment, he notes, because one culture's emotions and vocabulary do not map precisely on 20 Christian exercises in increasing sanctity, such as Saint Catherine's of Siena (ea. 1370), prac-
another's. See my treatment of disgust (2017) in Petronius, Satyrica and Apuleius, Meta- ticed innovative forms of humility. She, for instance, deeply inhaled and even drank the
morphoses. stench-producing, pus-filled wounds of a cancer victim's rotting skin (Miller 1997, 157-161 ).
Donald Lateiner The Emotion of Disgust, Provoked and Expressed in Earlier Greek Literature 37
36
extremis the digestive apparatus vomits up the gorge's contents. Indeed, wrinkled, sick, dying, and dead. Everyone distances him/herself now from these unpleasant
apotropaic Greek female Gorgon faces may illustrate vomiting in disgust. Their chores, when salaried soldiers, sometimes following protocols for captured and
active and aversive gaze locks onto victims to petrify them, while their tongue- dead enemies, immigrants underpaid by corporate meat processors, hospital order-
. . b 21 lies, and professional morticians take on these jobs.
mouth actions indicate nausea and repe I mvas1ve su stances or co-presences.
Paul Rozin, 'the father of disgust [studies] in psychology' (Herz 2012, ix), found Epic poetry describes entrails (including intestines and the squishy liver)
vomiting for self-preservation from toxins to be the Ur-expression, the physiolo- spilling out, while eyeballs drop from skulls. Oinomaos and Hippothoos' blood
gical origin, of 'good' disgust. Oral incorporation of presumably edible matter and guts ooze out their bellies, Polydoros grabs at his own, speared from the rear
followed by an intin1ation of its danger produces appropriately aversive and (13.506-508, 17.314, 14.517, 20.418--420: ev.epa, not animal crrcAarxva).
expulsive mouth-muscle expressions, predicting future reactions that will reject Oileus'
24
and Damasos' brains splatter out, evoking dreadful sights (11 . 97 '. 12• 185'
22 etc.). Spears penetrate Phereklos' and Harpalion's buttocks, bladder, and pubic
similar matter on sight. Thus, the lower face's disgust behaviors 'gate-keep' the
oral apparatus, originally after but subsequently prior to victims' reaction to arch, wounds that produce writhing death agonies. Ballistic weapons disable and
wound every part of the permeable body and its delicate orifices (eyes, nose, ears,
noxious toxins.
mouth). Worse, enraged warriors ponder the decapitation of their down and
defeated even dead - enemies. Some audiences find this trophy-taking pointless
2 EPIC and dangerously distracting for combatants, and most disturbing when ascribed to
Hektor. That icon of gentle family values and civilization plans to decapitate
Akhilleus' superheated emotion, anger (menis), kick-starts European literature. Patroklos, a measure of the degradation that this endless, bitter war has produced
'Homer', still in the proem, arouses disgust, when he proleptically sings that feral (17.125, 18.175; cf. 13.202-204, 17.38--40).
dogs and carrion-birds mauled and feasted on thousands of warriors' corpses. Mutilation of corpses arouses moral or secondary disgust, e.g., Agamemnon
Battle situations forced many comrades to leave to rot soldiers' decaying flesh - beheads and then brutally 'dis-arms' his now mute victim Hippolokhos ( 11.145-
exposed on the field, neither cremated nor buried (Iliad l .4f.). Characters evoke 147). As a last measure of degradation, this berserker insults the helpless corpse,
this very fear and disgust in others and feel it for themselves. They pray to avoid rolling him 'like a log' .25 Recent, frank accounts of modern battlefield behaviors,
this unhallowed fate, one much worse than death. Homer's gmesome battlefield describing both unintentional forms of horrific body damage and intentional
woundings and gore suit his action: total war fought to total victory with mutilations, keep contemporary audiences from 'holier than they' condescension.
infanticide and genocide explicitly intended for the defeated Trojans (6.57-60). Acts imprecisely and insultingly called 'savage' or 'bestial', however, 26 berserker
The social construction of disgust from different substances and actions that destmction of order, and mle-free rampaging increase brain arousal in readers as
23
elicit it and thresholds of its expression vary in different ages, but core elements
of decay and death remain constant. Although one empathizes with pain and 24 Friedrieh 2003 (orig. 1956), 41-51 discusses gross-ish examples of battleground killings.
physical suffering, feelings of disgust well up at gross wounds to the body. Following the Scholiasts, he finds some gruesome examples indecent or undignified, beeause
Historicists cannot confidently distinguish situations where the oral Homerids they mention lower parts of the body: Ilioneus 14.487-505, Peisandros 13.605-619, Kebrio-
meant to evoke warrior audiences' disgust from those where only recent readers nes 16.732-743, Polydoros 20.407-418, Phereklos 5.59-68, Harpalion 13.650-652. Seholiast
experience disgust. Disgust thresholds in polite company have fallen over the last A on 5.67 alleges the shame of this carpentering shipwright: aicrxpov 1:0 1:pauµa wu -ti\:;
two millennia, indeed, the last two centuries. Greek soldiers di.semboweled ene- nopvdrn; vmmayou.
25 Segal 1971 discusses Homeric examples, e.g. eh. 2: 'mutilation and Homeric values'. He
mies in battle face-to-face, men killed and butchered animals on home chopping states (17) that 'Homer does not glory in elaborate descriptions of grisly details of mutilation
blocks for their meat, and usually women cleaned and tended in-house the smelly for their own sake'. Iris (as messenger for Here) reports to Akhilleus that Hektor intends to
decapitate Patroklos and stick his head on a stake (18.175-177, 18.344-347; cf. 14.496-500).
Her authority is dubious, but Homer attributes that intent to Hektor himself ( 17.126-127)!
21 The very name Gorgo (and perhaps the similarly sound-duplicated terrorizer Mormo) is ety-
mologically related to English gorge, gnrgle, gargle, gargoyle, Latin gurgulio and gurges, de- 26 Shay 1995, 57, 116-117 discusses warriors' development of sub-human beastliness, turning
the enemy into vennin rather than honoring and respecting the enemy. Comparing men to
voro, Greek p1ppo)crKco (*gi-gwro-sko ). The English word disgust and French degout, origi-
nally 'bad taste', are derived from the neutral Latin degustare, 'to taste of, from the PIE root wild animals is one of Homer's favorite tropes. Michael Herr Dispatches ( 1971) also reports
atrocity stories of scalping, severed penises stuffed in enemies' mouths by Americans, Japa-
*geus. nese, Germans, and others, eorpses dug out of graves. The abbreviated descriptions of one sy-
22 Indeed, psychologist Susan Miller's disappointing 2004 book is entitled Disgust: The Gate-
stematic method of maiming eorpses mentioned in Greek tragedy, maschalismos, have maii-
Keeper Emotion, Hillsdale. cal, apotropaic justifications as well as sadistic pleasures. The original audiences better knew
23 Elias 1939/1978 recounts the evolution of Western European table manners, spitting, sexual
the process and reasons for it.
relations, etc.
Donald Lateiner The Emotion of Disgust, Provoked and Expressed in Earlier Greek Literature 39
38
well as participants. That is, disgust generates pleasure in audiences (as does way of indicating 'up the anus' and through the viscera. 33 These ghastly punish-
Akhilleus' anger, because Homer keeps it safely distant). Besides intentional ments, designed to discourage rebellions against divine rule and the community or
mutilation of the living and the dead, 27 Homer refers to the havoc and disassembly to enforce primitive prohibitions, activate any audience's disgust perceptors. They
of scores of minor warriors' bodies, the necessarily messy consequence of sharp threaten horrifically painful damage to easily damaged organs: the squishy visual,
28
and blunt weapons wielded forcibly on and in vulnerable flesh. More rhetorical, alimentary, and reproductive systems. Onstage, characters such as Orestes and
but intentionally disgust-arousing nevertheless, are fervent wishes to eat raw an Apollo run away, remove themselves from proximity, or otherwise maintain
distance.
1
and age-debilitated Oidipous at Kolonos. 36 Disgust evolved from survival Furies (117-141). He has violated primitive taboos provoking 'normal' disgust,
mechanisms and remains soldered to animal desire for survival and awareness of nomoi both sacred and secular, against killing one's father and marrying and
fragility. Disgust motivates avoidance; Sophoklean protagonists (save Antigone) repeatedly impregnating one's own mother four times. The facts, regardless of
present contaminated and contaminating bodies, visibly repellent features that are intent, disgust 'right-thinking' people. Again he offends by visiting forbidden
analogous to their gnarly, contaminated souls. These elicitors of disgust percepti- grounds, and again he faces community expulsion (167: ap&1:rov ano~ac.;). The
ble to audiences vivify presentations of incurably flawed persons. They are not old men grunt or moan exclamations in disgust: ico, ID ro... ID ro,before they
morally inferior but spiritually stronger, to compensate for their grievous, unan- pronounce expulsion (224, 226): e~ro n:6p~ro ~a{ve1:Excopac_;.Cultural develop-
ticipated suffering. ments have extended instinctual aversions to immediate dangers to socially, and
The onstage messenger in Oedipus Tyrannus describes Oidipous' off-stage possibly evolutionary, advantageous disgust felt for parricide and incest. 39 Core or
drastic reaction to his realization that he is a parricide guilty of incest with his primary disgust recognizes the vulnerability of mortals to death. Cultural disgust,
mother. His self-blinding was too disgusting for the audience to witness (1260- however, goes further and acknowledges that the purity of any community
37
1280), although the result is ilourished on his mask (1287, 1410f.). After his exhibits vulnerability to an individual's social and religious defilements. 40 The
wife/mother hangs herself, reacting to the news of their incestuous coupling, he expression of disgust, verbal and nonverbal, conveys trapped insiders and wary
breaks into her bedroom. He seizes her brooches with dagger-like pins and outsiders' strong aversion from two levels of disgust. Tragic disgust, nevertheless,
immediately gouges his eyeballs from their sockets (1265-1281): q:iotvtm 8'6µou/ unlike comic disgust, eventually may make room for pity. We probe unforgivable
yAftvm yevEt' lfrqyov, oM' &vfocrav/ q:i6vou µ.u8cocrac.;cr1:ay6vac.;,&1c1c' oµou smells in these two prestigious, publicly financed, stage genres before turning to
µli'Aasf oµ~poc_;xa1v&~11c.; aiµmouc.; £1:ErfET.O,K.1:.'A.The messenger recalls blood comedy's immersion in other pleasurable but unforgivable elicitors of disgust.
and gore splashing down the hero's face. Remnants of eyeballs and optical nerves
and clots of eye-socket blood foul his beard. Sophokles has the devastated chorus
and audience react. 'I can't bear to look, but ... I shudder at the sight (1302-1306: 4 SMELL
- cprn
q,eu, - ... I fXA/1,
, 11 , ouu
, 1:, , 1: ~
Ecrtunv 1:,
uuvaµat ,
cre, / ... 1:01av
, ,
<pplK11V ,
rcapEXEtc_; ) 3s
µ01 .
Fascination with disgusting scenes - faces covered with boils or mangled bodies Smell (odme) washes the atmosphere with non-avoidable sense experiences,
at auto accidents - constitutes one disturbing hallmark of this emotion (Kors- unlike sight, touch, or taste since we need to breathe. Smell ranks as the most
meyer 2011, 113-135). rapid and powerful sense for eliciting emotions, thus its separate attention for a
41
Sophokles' chorus of Attic elders in the Oedipus at Colonus (401 BCE) fears study of disgust. 'Homer' comments more often on sweet (118u nvdo,mo.) and
42
that contagion (miasma) will affect innocents. Their problem arose from the pol- perfumed smells than on unpleasant odors, such as the overpowering smell of
luted outcast Oidipous' contact with their sacred shrine's soil. His eyeless Zeus's thunderbolt and Proteus' stench. One sulphurous Olympian prodigy strikes
appearance (still gory or not) and awful prior actions parricide and incest and damages an oak, tree of Zeus, in a simile describing valiant Hektor' s crum-
render him doubly repulsive, unfit for Attic asylum. The old men of the deme hunt pling from Aias' hit in battle (Iliad 14.415: ◊ELY~ ••• ooµiJ). Menelaos mentions
him down for violation of their sanctuary one that belongs to the still potent the sour stink of seals that the younger Atreid hero endured in order to question
the slippery, malleable Old Man of the Sea ( Odyssey 4.406, 442). On the whole,
36 Elektra's filthy hair and foul rags elicit audience disgust at such treatment of a princess (Euri- however, Homer's usual sensorium eschews descriptions of the plentiful foul
pides, Electra 184-185). Aias' crazed and humiliating mental agonies on stage produced odors of the pre-sanitized world, for instance, Iliadic reek of corpses' decomposi-
shuddering revulsion in himself and others' desire to keep away from the mad man (Ajax
430-480, 577-582, 720-732, 1059-1091). Herakles' physieal disintegration and agony (Tra-
chiniae 1007-1017, 1059-1090) portray the hero's disgusting excamation and evoke audien- 39 Freudian interpretations, based on the human race's sexual instincts and the individual's psy-
ce pity. Menninghaus 2003, 78-91 explores disgust-reactions in and to Sophokles' Philocte- chosexual development, seem more speculative. Miller 1997 is more sympathetic to Freud's
tes, Ovid's Marsyas, and Horace's hag in Epode 8. emphasis on stages of psycho-genital development.
37 Perhaps Aristotle did not discuss disgust one prominent element in many tragedies - becau- 40 Miller 1997, 9 makes this important point.
se it did not fit his concept of tragic excitation of emotions. Tragedy's arousal of disgust 41 Herz 2012, 215; cf. her earlier study, Scent of Desire (2007). Mark Bradley's recent (2015)
through mythical proxies would fit his medical/plumbing/ritual metaphor of katharsis. Ari- colleetion of thirteen essays on smelts in antiquity - medical, philosophical, literary, and ar-
stotle writes nearly nothing about this emotion elsewhere (no bdelu- terms), although it over- ehaeological focuses attention on the neglected scents of antiquity.
laps with the closely attended emotions of fear and hate (Herz 2012, 202). 42 E.g., in the Odyssey, Helen's (4.121) fragrant bedchamber, Eidothea's ambrosia (4.446),
38 See Cairns, this volume. Sokrates' friend Leontios was angry at Iris own eyeballs. On them he Kirke's sweet wine (10.468: presumably smell and taste), Kalypso's cedar kindling and clo-
displaced his hungry desire for the 'beautiful sight' of the executioner's corpses (Plato, Res- thes (5.59, 264), Maron's mixed wine (9.210), Penelope's closet of clothes (21.62). Note the
publica 439e-440a). The anecdote remains foundational for the seductions of the repulsive. feminine associations of most attraetive smells.
42 Donald Lateiner The Emotion of Disgust, Provoked and Expressed in Earlier Greek Literature 43
tion on battlefields (cf. the exceptional Patroklos, Iliad 19.33), Priam's rolling in Thus, the odorously 'graphic' ('osmic') tragic poets re-present their principal
excrement in his grief, and the Odyssey's foul odors rising from the palace's figures' stink, rousing fellow characters' and audience disgust. Aiskhylos richly 1
manure-pile. 43 describes and stages the female Erinyes' putrid smells, as noted above. The Furies
Odysseus encounters his aged hunt-dog Argos still gatekeeping his courtyard have a foul breath of blood (137: aiµa1:ripov rcvi::uµ.a).They vomit and froth
-- but the noble beast is now lying atop the dung heap, covered with insect ticks blood from their mouths (183f.: eµoucra), and their diseased bodies reek of human
(Odyssey 17_299f.). His limp posture, bug-covered body, and buzzing, liminal blood (253).45 Disgusting bodies personify their past deeds and disgusting
location communicate the guard animal's family fidelity but now ineffective intentions.
service, the suitors' indifference to animal husbandry, and the rotten, smelly state Sophokles' characters on Lemnos (409 BCE) repeatedly invoke Philoktetes'
of Ithaka's command structure. The beggar-hero's rare, pitying tears focalize and stinking leg and foot, the open wound and pus-oozing lesion. The stench and
color his dog's death. disabling pain represent some divine punishment. 46 The phenomenon most foul
The sight suggests, 'to the mind's nose', the smell, without Homer's that militates against anyone ever again, even briefly, befriending the abandoned
specifying offensive, affronting odors. After the suitors' slaughter, in order to hero is his leg wound's piercingly unpleasant odor and its putrescent, untouchable
remove the sight and scent of their quickly putrefying corpses, stacked like gunk, along with the sight of his bloody, ulcerous foot (7, 473, 825, 890f., 1032:
(smelly) fish in his hot Hellenic courtyard, Odysseus summons the maids to oucrroo11i;).All characters stress the abandoned man's disgusting stench, more
cleanse the tables and chairs with water and sponges (22.435--494). To purge his offensive than his incoherent, inhuman shrieks (8-11, 481--483, 520, 693-695,
entire house of the hvo levels of defilement and disgust, sensory and moral 872-876, 889-891, 1031-1034). Neoptolemos' critical handclasp with Philo-
miasma, he calls for pungent, nose-wrinkling sulfur, Biblical brimstone and fire. ktetes, the first man to touch the ulcerated cripple, makes him a friend. The haptic
The double purification removes both primary sources of disgust, olfactory aware- expression of comradeship restores the stinking sufferer's fragile trust in any other
ness of corpses decomposing in the sun, and the secondary, moral pollution of the person (813-820). Sophokles has deployed nearly every sense (except taste) to
suitors' adulterous intent and uninvited parasitism. This purification erases addi- portray Philoktetes' repulsive presence, smell as much as sight and sound.
tional stains from the gang-hanged, fornicating maids and the grotesquely muti-
44
lated, multiply amputated, disloyal servant Melanthios.
Turning from nanative epic to on-stage smells, tragedy and comedy 5 COMEDY
performed live, Athenians encountered worse and uglier disgust. The stinking
monster Erinyes advance like animals (or dung beetles; v. infra), on their hands The aesthetics of disgust,47 the attractions of aversion from perversion and foul
and feet rather than erect. Spectators both engaged in, and remained removed bodies behaving badly, shaped audience expectations watching and hearing Old
from, the mythical present of every staged, theatrical performance. This vivifica- Comedy. Beyond the Dionysiac fantasies of bawdiness, unlimited sexual
tion and presentness of dramatic actions and sensations supercharge disgust not stimulus,48 gluttony, and drunkenness, Aristophanes fascinates audiences by
only the Aristotle-certified emotions of fear and pity. staging and describing disgusting acts, odors, and substances. 49 Laughter fre-
quently provides the easiest response to non-threatening disgust situations, an
43 Odysseus' unseemly pile of valuable manure at the manor gate (Odyssey 17.297-299) finds adjustment that allows our ambivalent reaction both to r~ject and 'enjoy' such
an analogue in Trojan basileus Priam rolling in palace dung to mourn his son's killing. Smea-
ring excrement on his body expresses his downfall in surviving Hektor, the bulwark of Troy, 45 Captive Kassandra is disgusted by the reek (Agamemnon 1309-1311: a,µ6<;) emanating from
and his house and city's upcoming miseries (Iliad 22.414, cf. 24.640; 24.163-165). Diflerent the Atreid palace 'as from a tomb', that is, from decaying corpses.
cultures develop, discuss, and privilege different senso1y perceptions, because their sensory 46 Aiskhylos and Euripides also devoted tragediesto this wounded man's damaged body and its
ecologies differ. Eighteenth-century Londoners, Parisians, and Philadelphians drank water pain. These dramas' relative and absolute dates remain contested.
polluted by cesspits and industrial establishments (cf. Ashenburg 2007 and Corbin 1986, 11- 47 Ngai 2002, Menninghaus 2003, and Korsmeyer 2011, philosophically reflect on this para-
85). They frequently left human, horse, and pet excrement in the street (whether or not origi- doxical subject.
nally collected in chamber pots). Current Western urban societies try to prevent encounters 48 The stage always presented the penis as the erect Dionysiac phallos, a sacral obscenity not
with excrement, passing laws requiring removal of pets' 'dog-do'. disgusting to Attic audiences. Aristophanes somewhat muddies this phallic message when the
44 First, the agents of heroic retributive justice cut off his nose and ears, then they chopped off wasps' stingersemerge from their anuses (225, cf. 739-740).
his medea [= aidoia] for a rare aud raw doggy-treat, and finally they lopped off his hands and 49 In Acharnenses l l 68-1173, the chorus reports that Aristophanes' rival poet Antimakhos
feet (23.474-476; cf. threats to Iros, 18.86-87). After this torture, he presumably expired looked for a rock in the street at night, picked up some freshly shat ordure (1:ftXetpt 1tEAE0ov
from loss of blood and the ghost of the disabled amputee could not return to haunt them. This &.p1:{ro.;
Kexeo-µEvov)to defend himself against a drunk, but when he hurled it, he hit another
humiliating set of punishments resembles maschalismos, the corpse-delimbing procedure that Aristophanic rival, Kratinos. This older contemporary meets specific abuse in four extant Ari-
Aiskhylos and Sophokles mention. stophanic comedies (see Rusten 201 I, 173-220, especially Testimonia 9-14).
44 Donald Lateiner The Emotion of Disgust, Provoked and Expressed in Earlier Greek Literature 45
situations. Disgust disesteems its targets, rendering the poet's opponents despica- its food. The creature is a vile (miaros) gift of Zeus, described as 'Lord of Shit-
ble as well as derisory. Thus, Aristophanes' public allegations deliver devastating Dancing' or 'Thunder Crap'. 54
insults of incest, sex with old hags, and handling smelly effluvia. Offensive Trygaios' economical travel plan is to supply his own human food that will,
allegations mix the disgust-elicitors of sex, excremental decay, and death with when excreted, become the dung beetle's rations. Once they lift off from Athens
fragile body envelopes. 50 Bad sex, perverts, and mismatched partners offer play- on their quixotic flight, the man's rations will feed both. Trygaios' rations
wrights and audiences the pleasures of reproach ai:i.drepudiation. Athenians safe becomes excrement, and, when recycled, becomes food for his shit-eating steed
in Dionysos' precinct and Spartans at their syssitia 01 communally observe, smirk, and, again excreted, lightens the team's airborne load (138£). 55 !
and wrinkle noses at old, foreign, sexually questionable, and vile servile bodies Trygaios takes off for Olympos on hi~ outsized dung beetle, a new Pegasos
either misbehaving and/or repeatedly humiliated. Whether those events be satiated with Athenian excrement. The hard-working beetle, naturally, is sweating
voluntary or involuntary, smell and filth stamp victims as amusingly disgusting. and breathing out foul odors. Trygaios anxiously fears that hmnans farting and
Thus, the voluntary expulsion of bodily substances, polluting and contagious defecating along his flight-path will distract his steed from his skyward course.
filthy smells and substances, provides frequent fantasies that express and evoke Indeed, breaking frame, he orders the present Athenian audience not to fart or crap
primary or core disgust. Comic lack of si5phro.'l~vnecan prominently transgress for three days (152: ~L~ ~bEt'!£ ~LT]0£ xJsi::0'~µep&v 'tptrov) while he heads off
polis standards in Attic Old Comedy's freedom to describe and present repulsive heavenwards. Should the alleyway smell reach his steed's nostrils, it might seduce
acts on stage. 52 Involuntary 53 loss of sphincter or other muscle control signals lack the high-flying dung beetle to tum back to earth (158). He directs the beetle's
of spiritual self-control, wealmess usually signaling fear. For example, pompous nose upward, then he complains about a man shitting among the houses of. the
56
politicians, poneros protagonists, and even gods exhibit involuntary, grotesque Peiraieus' harbor whores. As his aery vehicle wobbles, in fear he worries that he
violations of 'ordinary decency'. They 'shit in their pants' (minus the pants, of will lose control of his own bowels (162--176). The fantastical and charming
course) or nearly vomit (Aristophanes, Ranae 1-11 ). travel scene, powered by excrement, produces the pleasures of both on-stage,
The opening episode of Pax provides a paradigm of scatological disgust vicarious peril and of the sight of a filthy, smelly .insect a notably repulsive
sources and reactions (vv. 1-175, dated 421 BCE). Trygaios' slaves are kneading creatures. 57
cakes of putrid ass-dung for Mr. Comedy's Aetnaean dung-beetle. The greedy and Aristophanes' characters indulge in intentional and unintentional public
filthy kantharos' bilge and filth fills a tub. As a result, Trygaios' slave wants a defecation and urination. Many of these corporeal products have associated putrid
nose without openings to fend off the disgusting stench (38, 132: kakosmon). odors. But others are relatively odorless, at least for a time, like urine. Old man
Whereas pigs and dogs will eat their shit, the grand dung beetle haughtily picks at Philokleon refers to rich men brought before the law-court who shit in fear
(Vespae 626), and to the bogey-woman Lamia who reportedly once farted
repeatedly to repel or suffocate her male pursuers (I 177). Young Bdelukleon
50 Herz 2012, l 77 gets this point right, although she wrongly claims that Greek husbands typi- 54 Pax 42: LKmm~aTrJi;. another Aristophanic slave calls Zeus crKaToq>ayo;(Ptutus 706).
cally had sex with their newly deceased wives, a generalization begat by one item of anti- 55 Dung Beetles fly and move shit-balls fifty times their weight. 'Googling' Dung Beetle brings
tyrannical propaganda (Herodotos 5.92.2-3). up handsome creatures who even 'dance': https://www.ted.com/talks/markus_byme_the_
51 The helots regularly provided butts for humiliation and laughter at Spartan homoioi' s syssitia. dance_of_the_dung_beetle. Entomologists now argue that these earthy creatures employ star
Their degradation was part of the equals' education (Plutarch, Lycurgus 28.8, David 1989, 1-- navigation (Dacke et al. 2013). Steiner 2008 and Tordoff 2011 examine repulsive ereatures
25 with further refs.). A comparison of humiliation 'on stage' in Sparta and Athens could be and smells in Aristophanes, especially in Pax.
instructive. 56 To taste audiences' increased tolerance for disgust at a distance, ldok up 'Fear Factor' on the
52 Tears do not insult but signal sadness or grief. Although liquid exits another's body in weep- WWW, and watch people eating live leeches and other vermin, bathing among slithering rep-
ing, tears are the only such substance not regarded as dangerous or polluting (Douglas 1966). tiles, licking foul substances and head lice.
Spurting blood, on the other hand, is certainly believed to be magical and polluting, but its 57 Meanwhile, the comic's bete noire Kleon still eats shit, recently dead but still active after
unnatural elimination or loss likewise signals the bleeder's weakness (wounding, insecure arrival in Hades (Pax 47-48; cf. Ranae 145). Post-Christian scholars still struggle to distin-
body envelope) and not strength. guish Attic obscenities from universally disgust-producing speech and acts. 'Dirty as a ca-
53 The defecator is shown as more embarrassed than disgusted when others are present. The mel's ass' (Vespae 1035) seems both, but puns on xotpt8iov, both piglet and a maiden's va-
incontinent one does not dwell on his unpreventable accident, but it causes disgust to rise gina, seem to invoke obscene but not disgusting thoughts (573; cf. 1364). Philokleon, the
among involuntary bystanders onstage and a benignly masochistic shudder of disgust in the newly refined but tipsy Dad, claims that the courtesan Dardanis' vagina is actually a split pie-
safely distant theater audience. Defecation in public animalizes a human exhibiting shame- ce of wood, thus a torch, and that her pubic hair is only tar (1371-1378). The verbal fantasy,
less, dog-like behavior. To animalize, infantilize, feminize, and barbarize are key forms of ridiculous and far-fetched rather than obscene and disgusting, provides stage business with
Hellenic insult, to which we here add: association with disgusting substances. suitably visual obscene actions.
Donald Lateiner The Emotion of Disgust, Provoked and Expressed in Earlier Greek Literature 47
46
presents his Dad with a private court piss-pot (807), a waste utensil for use during References to toilet slops emptied from chamber pots into the street may reflect
the solemn and public legal processes of the Athenian democracy. The old man's ordinary unspoken practice, but, in the god Dionysos' precinct, they break another
prancing and farting are described as socially offensive, 'most outrageous boundary, violate another taboo and religious protocols, and thus trigger the
8
behavior' (1305: hybristotatos). Farts (nop8ai)5 on stage - not the smell but the innocent audience's subversive, therefore pleasurable, disgust. 64
perceptible sound -provide an easily mimicked disgusting act, one that a rare Aristophanes mentions all the disgusting oral emissions: vomit, hot belches,
individual can control, 59 to express contempt or to evoke others' disgust. and spit. Vomit (eµEtv, AU')'~),the signature event (Rozin 1999, 430) of extreme
60
The Wasps' chorus vilifies the demagogue Kleon's disgusting person: dirty disgust, is often preceded by the ugly sounds ofretching and/or gagging. Homer's
61
buttocks, acrid odor, and unwashed balls, unless he has none at all. Kleon was Cyclops vomits (Odyssey 9.374), exemplifying his uncouth manners and his
vilified as acrid when alive throughout Wasps - stinking like a seal and sporting a ignorance of the power of sweet Thracian wine. Involuntary spasms of the throat
camel's anus. He is termed a shit-eater, both when recently dead in Peace of 421 and stomach muscles are painful to experience and disgusting for even close ac-
BCE (48), and deader still in Frogs of 405 (145). More than fifteen years post quaintances. Dionysos himself threatens to throw up, if his slave Xanthias makes
mortem in that drama, he continues to devour Hell's ever-flowing dung. the usual poor jokes about wanting to shit or cut farts (Ranae 8-11). 65 K.leon
Aristophanes repeatedly refers to passive homosexuals' artificially wide anal vomited up some of his ill-gotten gains. Dikaiopolis wants a feather to help him
orifices, an alleged result of habitual anal penetration. Thus, he contrasts his vomit when he sees the disgusting display of general Lamakhos' crest (Acharni-
public enemies' stretched anuses, the awkward wallcing euryproktoi, 'assholes' ans 6, 586f.). 66 Belches (epun&vro, epuyri) can express the banqueteer's pleasure,
suffering from such penetration, to his heroic chorus, the waspish Maratho ~ but the comic poets stage their sounds to express and evoke bystanders' disgust. 67
6
fighters whose buttocks (and anal orifices) are presumably tight and firm. Philokleon objects to the rank belches of a nearby dog and a stinking cloak. Spit
Ariphrades, possibly a competitor comic poet, allegedly favors cunnilingus and (n'tUEtv,and compounds), whether employed to expel an unwelcome substance in
habitually exercises his tongue licking brothel whores' genitals (1280-1283: the oral cavity or mere saliva summoned to disparage recollection of another
63
yAro't't01totEtVde; 'ta nopvEta), an act that certainly aroused viewers' disgust. person, expresses contempt and puts distance between the expectorator and his
interactant, or an absent, apostrophized third-party. 68 Philokleon expresses spit's
original purpose (Vespae 787-792), to clear the mouth of something unhealthy
58 Six compound verb forms of perdomai express comic flatulence; Pax 1077 relates the 'fart and therefore nauseating. Lysistratos, an acquaintance, had treated him in a most
most foul' oracle. disgusting manner (aiskhista). He had given the protagonist rotten mullet scales
59 Joseph Pujol, the world's renowned petomane, had unique sphincter-control, 'an elastic anus',
as he claimed. The achievements of the early twentieth-century theatrical farter from Marseil-
le appeared in books and film.
60 Kleon has filthy testicles, but he ranks as an abnormal animal, not an Athenian man, much
less a hoplite (1035). Obscenity without disgust characterizes dirty old Philokleon's fantasy
of gazing on the ripe genitals of eighteen-year-old boys enrolled at their dokimasia (578), or 64 Acharnenses (425 BCE) 616, Vespae (early 422) 259-261, 806, 858, 935-940.
when he asks young, little 'Pussy-Piggy' Dardanis to rub his decayed 'rope' and to fellate 65 Blepuros' constipation (Ecclesiazusae 311-372) introduces an extended scene of scatological
him (Vespae 1342-1350). The age discrepancy possibly produces disgust (in younger humor. He strains to 'do his business' outside in the 'dark', .crouching near the front edge of
viewers, anyway). the 'stage'.
61 Vespae 1035. Father-loving Bdelukleon comments on his own father's filthy ass (Vespae 66 Involuntary excretions such as suffering severe hiccoughs, the expulsion of phlegm or snot in
604), and describes him in a heavy coat thus: you look like a foot-boil dressed in a garlic ban- sneezing, suppurating diseases, or any nearby presence of pus or blood cause disgust in on-
dage (Vespae 1172). Whether the child-eating ogress Lamia has testicles was already a que- lookers but are not nonverbal expressions ('leakage') of it. Parker 1983, 100-103, and n. 113,
stion for the scholiasts; MacDowell thinks s/he may have been a Hermaphrodite. discusses rituals designed to avert blood pollution, especially contamination from women gi-
62 1070: euruproktoi is a favored element among disgrace- and disgust-evoking insults (cf. 687); ving birth and during menstruation, an aversion found also in Orthodox Jewish rituals.
compare the rare descriptor 'feather-romped'(?), 1:0uppo1tuyiov(1076; Nubes 158, 162). 67 Examples of nearby putrid eructation: Aristophanes, Pax 528, Vespae 913, 1151: hot and
63 The loose parameters of Attic comedy avoided staging certain taboo bodily fluids: menstrual foul; Kratinos 58; Eupolis 198/204; Euripides, Cyclops 523. The sole example in tragedy, if
discharges, semen and sperm ejaculation, smegma removed from penile foreskin. Vaginal di- correctly restored by Hermann in Agamemnon 1388-1389, has victorious Klytaimestra coar-
scharges appear, according to Sommerstein (Index 2002 s.v.). He cites Equites 1285 (Ariph- sely describe Agamemnon's dying as belching forth his life, spurting out blood, striking his
rades who licks 'the abominable dew' [drosos] 'will never share a cup with us'), Pax 716 spousal killer with a dark shower of gory dew. The disgusted chorus responds with <p£U,the
(punning on meat soup, zomos), Lysistrata 197, 1061-1064 (see also Sommerstein's notes ad exclamation of loathing (Stanford 1983, 157). In revulsion, they compare her to a creeping
locc.), and Ecclesiazusae 845 (punning on young girls' 'pea-soup'). Mining with the pinky- insect, the spider.
finger for earwax (cerumen) may be absent for reasons connected to masks. Tears uniquely 68 Examples, in tragedy: Antigone 1232, Hippolytus 614, Hecuba 1276, Helena 664, Hercules
(among bodily products) escape disgust reactions. See Henderson 1975/1991 for discussion furens 560 (collected by Stanford 1983, 34). Haimon spits in his father's face, an atrocious
of these obscene substances, disgusting and not. violation of father-respect.
48 Donald Lateiner The Emotion of Disgust, Provoked and Expressed in Earlier Greek Literature
49
rather than several obols that he owed him. Philokleon smelled them, was washed balls, and has a camel's asshole.72 The sight and smells elicit several core
69
nauseated, and spat them out (B/51:luxOci<;, 1H;£1t'tucra).
6cnpp6µ1:vo<;, or primary disgust markers. Wannabe aristocrats like Bdelukleon attempt to
develop their recalcitrant students' secondary, moral disgusts from grosser fof)11s 1
72 Kleon recently died (near Thracian Amphipolis, summer 422; Thucydides 5.10) while disa-
69 Aristophanes' Euripides (Ranae 1179) expresses the metaphoric contemptuous use of katap- strously commanding an Athenian am1y, but his cowardly demise still demands Aristopha-
tuson, telling his competitor character Aiskhylos, to 'spit on me', if Euripides does not emer- nes' violent 'moral' disgust, publicly expressed in spring 421. De mortuis etiam malum,
ge victorious. 73 ~Ierz 2012, 153 explains 'excitation transfer', by which psychological adjustment already
70 Kaster 2005 discusses Roman fastidium denoting our primary versus secondary disgust di- tunny events become even funnier since the arousal energy of disgust multiplies it. Situations
stinction as 'per se disgust' as opposed to 'deliberative, ranked disgust'. building on human hunger and sex instincts further intensify amusement.
71 Moral disgust is more divergent in varieties, causes, displays, and its effects on others 74 M. Luther, Table Talk 5537; Greenblatt 1982, 11--12cites this passage and praises the 'quan-
than nearly instinctual physical 'core' disgust. tity, intensity, and inventiveness' ofLuther's sixteenth-century scatological imagery.
50 Donald Lateiner The Emotion of Disgust, Provoked and Expressed in Earlier Greek Literature 51
comedy. The world since pre-Christian antiquity has become more disgusted and Miller, W. L (1997) The Anatomy of Disgust, Cambridge MA.
disgusting. Further, our culture has become more disgust-focused, disgusted by Ngai, S. (2002) Raw Matter: A Poetics of Disgust, in M. Wallace and S. Marks (eds.), Telling ft
Slant, Tuscaloosa and London, 161-190.
our own bodies and disgust-sensitive to reminders ofmortality. 75
North, H. (1966) Sophro~yne. Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, Ithaea NY.
Nussbaum, M, (2004) Hiding from Humanity. Disgust, Shame, and the Law, Princeton.
Parker, R. (1983) Miasma, Oxford.
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New York, Ch. 40, 637-653. I
Ashenburg, K. (2007) The Dirt on Clean, New York. Rozin, P. and A. Fallon (1987) A Perspective on Disgust, Psychological Revie~: 94, 23--41.
Bradley, M., ed. (2015) Smell and the Ancient Senses, New York. Rozin, P., J. Haidt, and C. McCauley (1999) Disgust: The Body and Soul Emotion, in T. Dalgleish
Clarke, J. R. (2007) Looking at Laughter, Berkeley/Los Angeles. and M. Power (eds.), Handbook of Cognition and Emotion, Chichester/New York, 429-445.
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M. L. Kochan et alii, Cambridge MA. Segal, C. (1971) The Theme of the lvfutilation of the C01pse in the 'Iliad', Leiden.
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Milky Way for Orientation', Current Biology 23.4. 298-300. Sommerstein, A. (2002) Index: The Comedies of Aristophanes, Vol. 12, Warminster.
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David, E. (1989) Laughter in Spartan Society, in A. Powell (ed.), Classical Sparta, London, 1-25. and R. Rosen (eds.), Kakos, Leiden/Boston, 83-118.
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Ekman, P. (1992) Telling Lies, New York. Leiden/Boston, 186-202. '
Elias, N. (1978) The History of Manners: The Civilizing Process. Vol. 1, 1939. Trans, E. Jephcott, Tordoff, R. (2011) Excrement, Sacrifice, Commensality: The Ophresiology of Aristophanes'
New York. Peace, Arethusa 44, 167--198.
Friedrich, W. H. (2003) Wounding and Death in the lliad. Trans. G. Wright and P. Jones, London.
Fulkerson, L. (2013) No Regrets: Remorse in Classical Antiquity, New York.
Goffman, E. (1956/1967) Embarrassment and Social Organization, in Interaction Ritual, New
York 1967, 97-113.
Greenblatt, S. (1982) Filthy Rites, Daedalus 111.3, 1-16.
Harris, W. V. (2001) Restraining Rage: The Ideology of Anger Control in Classical Antiquity.
Cambridge MA.
Henderson, J. (1975, rev. 1991) 11ie lvfaculate Muse: Obscene Language in Attic Comedy, New
Haven.
Herz, R. (2012) That's Disgusting: T.Jnravelingthe A·fysteries of Repulsion, New York.
Kaster, R. (2001) The Dynamics of fastidium and the Ideology of Disgust, Transactions of the
American Philological Association 113, 143-189.
(2005) Emotion, Restraint, and Community in Ancient Rome, Oxford.
K.ekes, J. (1992) Disgust and Moral Taboos, Philosophy 67, 431-446.
Kelly, D. (2011) Yuck. The Nature and lvforal Significance of Disgust, Cambridge.
Kirk, G. S. (1985), The Iliad: A Commenta,y I, Cambridge.
Konstan, D. and N. K. Rutter, eds. (2003) Envy, Spite and Jealousy. The Rivalrous Emotions in
Ancient Greece, Edinburgh.
-·- (2006) The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks, Toronto.
Korsmeyer, C. (201 l) The Aesthetics of Disgust, Oxford.
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H. Eiland and J. Gelb, Albany.
Douglas Cairns
In Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus, once the true horror of what Oedipus has (un-
wittingly) done has become known, the Chorus sing a song (the fourth stasimon)
in which they reflect on their ldng's status as a paradigm of the instability of hu-
man happiness if even someone like Oedipus, the saviour of his city, can rise so
high only to fall so low, which of us is not vulnerable (1186-1222)?1 Oedipus'
own reaction to this horror is to blind himself, and his reappearance on stage, once
he has done so, occasions this further reaction from the Chorus ( Oedipus Tyran-
nus 1297-1306):
i◊E'i:v na0o<;o:v0proitol<;,
Ji OE'.tvOV
6Jףtv01:U1:0V lt!XVWJV ocr'
npocrfrupcr' 1\8ri.1:ii;cr', Ji 1:lf\µov,
npoa€f3riµavia; ol'tT]OT)cra<;
µd~ovo: foiµmv ,fuv µT]Ktcr'tWV
npo.:;qi oucroo:iµov1µo{p<;i:;
G)€U G)£U bucr1:Tjv''&n' ouo' fot◊EtV
ouvo:µo:{cr', i:0EAO}V l'tOAA'avspfo0m,
l'tOA/,fi1t1J0fo0m,l'tOAAfi o' a0pficrm·
1:0fo:vcppt!CT]Vl'tO:pEXcli;
µot.
What suffering, terrible for humans to see, most terrible of all that l have ever encountered!
What madness came upon you, wretched one? What divine being was it that leapt further
than the longest leap on top of your unhappy fate? Alas, poor man: 1 cannot even look at you,
though there is much I want to ask, much to hear, and much to look at; such is the shiver
(phrike) you cause in me.
I should like to thank the Leverhulme Trust, the Alexander van Humboldt-Stiftung, the Euro-
pean Research Council (via the University of Oxford project, The Social and Cultural Con-
struction of Emotions: The Greek Paradigm, directed by Professor A. Chaniotis), and the Arts
and Humanities Research Council (via the University of Edinburgh project, A History of Di-
stributed Cognition) for their support for the research from which this chapter developed, as
well as Jan Bremmer, Elizabeth Craik, David Levenson, Oliver Overwien, and Richard Smith
for advice and assistance with fhat research. r am also very grateful to audienees in Geneva,
Nottingham, London, Freiburg, Cara9a (Brazil), and Edinburgh for c;11~;"1".'111s with various
oral versions, and to Pierre Destree and Stephen Halliwell for their helpful comments on a
written draft. A shorter, preliminary version of this chapter appeared in Pyschoanalytical ln-
quily 35 (2015) 75-94.
54 Douglas Cairns Horror, Pity, and the Visual in Ancient Greek Aesthetics 55
The Chorus are still, as in their previous song, horrified by what Oedipus' suffer- experience. Eyes, mind, and body are all implicated: the Chorus look, reflect, and
ing represents, and they remain, fundamentally, sympathetic to him. Yet Oedipus' shudder. Simply calling their response phrike goes a very long way towards speci-
physical appearance makes a difference: the sight of the horrible mutilation that fying and recreating its phenomenological character, what it feels like to be
he has inflicted upon himself (represented in the new mask which the actor will moved as they are moved by Oedipus. Whether we ourselves see the play in the
have put on before re-emerging from the stage-building) elicits a new and more theatre or merely in our mind's eye as we read, the response of this internal audi-
physical response, one that they call phrike, shivering or shuddering. 2 This re- ence is, at least in this instance, a guide to our own.
sponse springs from a fascination with the spectacle that Oedipus now represents Phrike can be the name of an emotion (see below), but its !primary signifi-
and yet also entails an instinctive revulsion towards that spectacle. Oedipus is, in a cance lies in its reference to a physical symptom that is common to a rnnge of
way, an object; but also an object of pity, a human being like the Chorus members emotional and non-emotional events. It belongs, in its primary sense, to the basic
themselves. The sight of Oedipus is important, but it is not merely this that excites somatic level of emotion. Sources such as the Hippocratic corpus, other medical
the Chorus' revulsion. They cannot bear to look at him (1303f.), but equally his writings, and the collections of Problemata attributed to Aristotle and Alexander
entire pathos not just the self-blinding, but the general catastrophe of which the of Aphrodisias all give ample evidence of its basic somatic aspect. 4 In medical
self-blinding is the latest, most physical, and most visible expression ~ is 'terrible writers, phrike is especially associated with fever and cold sweats. 5 These sources
for humans to see' (1297). are well-nigh unanimous in relatingphrike and its cognates to bodily temperature:
This scene is the point at which all the dense imagery of sight and blindness, 6
we shudder when we are cold, and when we shudder or shiver in other circum-
light and darkness, insight and ignorance reaches its concrete, visual, and emo- stances (e.g. when we are afraid, when we are suffering from various physical
tional climax, as the Oedipus who chose darkness over light as a way of avoiding ailments, when we sneeze, when we urinate, after eating, etc.) variations in bodily
sights too painful to contemplate (1371-1390) nonetheless insists on making him- temperature are normally also implicated. 7 For Galen, phrik? affects only the skin,
self an object of the citizens' visual attention (1287-1289; see Cairns 1993, whereas rhigos, 'chill', affects the whole body,8 illustrating a link between shud-
217f.), and the Chorus express their fascination with the horror of a spectacle they dering or shivering and piloerection (a vestigial phenomenon in humans) that is
cannot bring themselves to look upon, a fate they seek to understand but can bare- frequently noted elsewhere,9 and which can in turn provide a cue for comment on
ly begin to contemplate. Oedipus' self-blinding encompasses a wish to be unseen
as well as unseeing, yet he also insists on making his suffering visible; in a similar
4 Cf. Burkert 20 I 0, 48f. The Hippocratic corpus has 60 occu1rences of the noun, phrike, 36 of
way, the Chorus are drawn to the spectacle that Oedipus presents, but find it so
horrific that they cannot bear to look. 3 the verb, phrissein (cf. one instance of phrikazein), and 53 of the derivative adjective,
phrikodes (plus one of the synonym,phrika!eos). In Galen, the figures are 110, 49, and 86 re-
My focus is on the specific nature of the Chorus' emotional response, the spectively. In the pseudo-Aristotelian Problernata, see esp. Book 8 (887bl0-889b9) on chill
phrike that they experience on first setting eyes on the blinded king and in con- (rhigos) and shivering (phrike 9 occurrences of the root; there are a further 25 occurrences
fronting his tragedy, the phrike that also makes them reluctant to look. This, as we elsewhere in the work). et: e.g. Hesiod, Works and Days 539f.; Plutarch, De prirno frigido
saw, is a response with a strong perceptual element; it is above all the sight of 947C for the fundamental association with bodily temperature.
5 E.g. Hippocrates, Aphorisms 7.4, On Diseases 1.23-25; cf. Zink 1962, 19 n. 49; Berrettoni
Oedipus in his present condition that triggers it. It is a spontaneous and instinctive
1970, 262; Op de Hipt 1972, 21 Of.
reaction; but it is not merely a simple reflex, because its ideational content in- 6 It is, however, rhigos and not phrike that is etymologically related to Latin ji-igeo, frigus
cludes the Chorus' attempt to encompass the sheer magnitude of Oedipus' suffer- (Chantraine 1968-1980, 1249).
ing, together with whatever superhuman or supernatural forces may have caused 7 Cf. Berrettoni 1970, 263. Galen, however, insists on the existence of other causes, e.g. the
it. These sensory and cognitive aspects, however, essential though they may be for application of bitter drugs (De trernore vii.627 .11-629 .5 Killin). He also distinguishes be-
the specification of the emotion in these particular circumstances, do not suffice to tween phrike and rhigos as symptoms of fear and as signs of physical cold (ibid., 628.2-4);
make phrike what it is for phrike is fundamentally a physical experience, the contrast [Aristotle], Problemata 889a15-25, on the role of bodily temperature in the emotions
of fear and anger.
experience of a body that shivers and shudders. In this passage, then, phrike is (a) 8 Galen, De trernore vii.612.9-12 Kuhn; for Hippocrates, On Diseases 1.24 the distinction is
a spontaneous response to a shocking visual stimulus; (b) an interpretation of a simply one of degree, phrike being the milder reaction. Galen, however, also notes that all
particular state of affairs in terms of specific evaluative norms; and (c) a corporeal other medical writers use the terms interchangeably (De trernore vii.611.18-612.4). Two late
sources (Palladius, Synopsis de febribus 24 in Jdeler 1841, 117f.; Theophilus and. Stephanus
of Athens, De febriurn dijferentia in Sicurus 1862, 30-32) confirm Galen's view of his fellow
2 As background to this discussion, see the more comprehensive and synthetic overview of the professionals; while ancient grammarians (Apollonius Sophista, Lexicon Hornericurn 138.32;
concept ofphrike in Cairns 2013. Hesychius p299-301) regularly use the two groups oftenns interchangeably.
3 For contrasting (psychoanalytical versus anti-psychoanalytical) readings of this theme in the 9 E.g. [Aristotle], Physiognomonica 812b30, Problernata 888a38, 889a26, [Alexander of Aph-
play, see Devereux 1973 and Buxton 1980. rodisias], Problernata 2.26; cf. [Theocritus] ldyllia 25.244£, Plutarch fr. 73 Sandbach. Cf. the
56 Douglas Cairns Horror, Pity, and the Visual in Ancient Greek Aesthetics 57
the occurrence of phrike also in non-human animals, in both emotional and non- That the verb phrissein in such locutions stands for a verb of fearing (vet sim.) is
emotional scenarios. 10 Phrike, therefore, is an involuntary bodily movement, one particularly clear irI Euripides' Hippolytus (415-418), where Phaedra expresses
that is part of human beings' pre-human inheritance and rooted in basic systems her incredulity that an adulteress should be able to conceal her guilty conscience
of bodily regulation that respond to changes in the temperature of the organism from her husband:
and of the environment. As a symptom of emotion, and especially of fear-like a.t1tior;1t01:',ID6foJCOtVCX
1t0VttcxKunpt,
emotions, it is a member of a set of related symptoms that are also recognized in €<;1tp0<i(l)1t(X
{31,£7C01JO'tv 1:(()V~1JVE1JVE1:ffiV
our own folk models ('I shudder to think', 'it gives me the shivers', 'he was in a O\lOE.CiKO-tOVqipicrcroucrt,ov ~uvepycrn1v
cold sweat', 'she's got cold feet', 'it was a chilling/hair-raising experience'), and 1:epcxµva,' OtKffiV µfi1to,Ecp0oyy1]V acpfi;
confirmed by empirical investigation. 11 How, oh Cyprian, mistress of the can they look their husbands in the face and not shud-
der at the darkness, their partner in crime, or at the timbers of the house, lest they at some
In Greek as in English, however, such terms are not restricted to the labelling
stage speak?
of physical symptoms. In the language of emotion, it is typical for the physical
symptom to be used as a metonym for the emotion with which it is associated. A The fact that phrissein is here followed not only by a direct object, but also by a
large number of passages illustrate this with reference to phrike in Greek, but the noun clause of the sort that regularly specifies the propositional content of a verb
phenomenon is at its clearest when the verb phrissein, 'to shudder', governs a of fearirig indicates that 'shudder' here is a simple metonymy for 'fear'; 14 shud-
12
direct object in the same way as would a verb meaning 'to fear' . Thus, in a fa- ders as such need not imply propositional content in the thoughts of those who
mous passage, Helen contrasts the kindness of Hector with the horror that she experience them.
13
occasions in the other Trojans (lliad24.774f.): The importance of emotional symptoms in the construction of emotional con-
cepts underlines the fundamental importance of physical embodiment in the con-
O\lyap 1:t<;µot e-,;'
&Uo; evl Tpo{118'JPEll1
navn:<; 6eµ£ m,cpph:cxcrtv.
f\inoi;;ouoe cp{Aoi;;, cept of emotion itself. In the case of phrike, the symptom is one that has its roots
For I no longer have anyone else in broad Troy who is gentle or kind- all the others shudder in basic somatic mechanisms of temperature regulation, that is manifested in a
atme. range of non-emotional contexts, and that is shared with other animals. From
these materials, universal in humans and extending beyond the human species, is
constructed an emotional concept in which physical symptoms are intimately re-
lated to cognitive appraisals and evaluations. The mechanism by which this occurs
frequency of the association between goosebumps (UK English goosepimples) and physical
cold (as also with fever and other biological functions such as sneezing) in the studies of is the universal one of metonymy, by which the name of the symptom comes to
Schurtz et alii 2012. function as a name of the emotion. The concept of phrike is typical in locating the
10 S. fr. 875 Radt, [Aristotle], Physiognomonica 812b30 (again), Nicander Theriaca 721, 727, language and thought of emotion in embodied physical experience. There is noth-
PlutarchAristides 18.2 (developing the Homeric image by which weapons and the like bristle ing in any way surprising or unfamiliar about this - the point is precisely that an-
like the fur of an angry animal), Dio Chrysostom Oration 58.4, Achilles Tatius 1.12.3, x 14 in cient Greek emotional concepts are, to large extent, built up out of the san1e mate-
Aclian, On the Nature of Animals, [Alexander of Aphrodisias], Problemata 4.159.
rials as our own, materials that draw on our experience as physically embodied
11 Specifically on symptoms of fear, see Darwin 1889, 70f., 346f. (trembling), lO0f., 104f.,
29lf., 295-298 (piloerection), 291, 346f. (temperature changes), with Ekman's comments (in beings iriteracting with our physical and social environments. What needs to be
the 1998 edition) and further reading where relevant; cf. Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1989, 371 (on piloe- emphasized, however, is that this experiential, embodied nature of emotion is not
rection), 479 (on changes in skin temperature); Balcombe 2010, 48 (on changes in body and just an aspect of a shared biological substratum; it is a feature also of language
skin temperature as symptoms of fear and other emotions in humans and animals); cf. also and of thought. It is not that embodiment is relevant only in terms of emotions'
Burkert 2010, 46. For low body temperature as a metonym for fear in various cultures, see physical changes, symptoms, and expressions and is left behind when emotional
Kiivecses 2000, 5, 23f.; for a survey of psychological applications of words meaning warm
concepts take root in language, thought, and culture. There is no disjunction, but
and cold in Greek, see Zink 1962, esp. 15-30 on "'Kalte" als Ausdruck einer unangenehmen
Gefiihlslage wie Schreck, Angst, Furcht, Entsetzen, Grauen'; cf. also Bouvier 201 l. On the rather a fundamental continuity between emotions as physical experiences and
relation between actual physical temperature and the metaphorical concepts of emotional emotional concepts as linguistic and cultural categories. In terms of the develop-
warmth and coldness, see Williams and Bargh 2008, Zhong and Leonardelli 2008, Wilkowski
et a[ii, 2009.
12 For this phenomenon, cf. Apollonius Dyscolns, De constructione 413SA15.2. 14 Cf. Odyssey 23.216, where the verb in question is rhigein. The response that Phaedra attribu-
13 Cf. (among a large number of parallels) Aeschylus, Septem contra Thebas 720f., Euripides, tes to the hypothetical adulteress also involves a failure to experience the guilty fear of expo-
Cyclops 320, Hippolytus 855, Sophocles, Antigone 997, Aristophanes, Nubes 1132[. Tbe sure that Phaedra herself would feel in such a situation; thus, though still a fom1 of fear,
same phenomenon is observable when the noun, phrike, governs an objective as at phrike is here implicated in a scenario that also encompasses prospective and retrospective
Euripides, Ion 898, Plutarch, Timoleon 22.6. shame. On this aspect of the wider context, see Cairns 1993, 321-340.
58 Douglas Cairns Horror, Pity, and the Visual in Ancient Greek Aesthetics 59
ment of emotional concepts, there is no wedge to be driven between the body, on which we began, the Chorus' sudden shock at being confronted by the sight of
the one hand, and language and culture on the other. Attention to these wider as- their once-revered king, now horribly mutilated, is fully in keeping with these
pects of emotion language (beyond the semantics of emotion-words themselves) connotations of phrike.
not only accords due recognition to the role of embodied experience but can also Phrike's associations with unexpected and unsettling visual stimuli, however,
provide better evidence of a culture's phenomenology of emotion, getting us as also make it an especially appropriate response to epiphany, quasi-epiphany, or
close as we can get to a culture's attempt to encapsulate subjective emotional ex- other presumed signs of divine presence - another relevant aspect of our tragic
.
penence . language. "·
m passage, in which the Chorus' questions focus specifically on the daimonic origins
A fundamental aspect of that phenomenology in the case of phrike is its regu- of Oedipus' sufferings. A heavenly light, for example, occasions phrike before the
lar association with immediate, automatic, and instinctive responses to direct and divine in Xenophon's Cyropaedia (4.2.15), 19 andphrike is the reaction of the au-
often sudden visual or aural stimuli. The Aristotelian Problemata discuss phrike dience to the illusion of divine presence or possession created by the Sicilian
as a spontaneous reaction to various unpleasant sounds (886b9-l l, 964b34-37), a statesman, Nicias, in Plutarch's Life of Marcellus 20.8. 20 In the recently published
reflex that is then explicitly explained in terms of fear, on the basis that such 'Getty Hexameters' (fifth-century BCE incantations against witchcraft found on a
sounds are instinctively regarded as signs of impending trouble (887a 1-3). 16 This lead tablet from Selinus in Sicily), phrike's association with unpleasant and unset-
particular association between phrike and immediate visual or aural stimuli is tling auditory stimuli takes on an ominous, chthonic dimension in a reference to
widely confirmed, and is reflected in the way that the adjective phrikodes very the 'barbarian shriek' that the underworld goddess, Hecate, emits 'with phrikodes
21
often qualifies sights and sounds: though many of these passages include a refer- voice' (<pptKOJOEt cpwvn). The relevant tem1s are also used of reactions to the
ence to the ominous connotations or negative import of the sights or sounds in supematural communications believed to occur in dreams, 22 or to a variety of mir-
23
question, it is clear that in many cases the adjective also highlights the capacity of acles, portents, and omens. In such contexts, phrike often connotes awe and clef-
the stimulus to elicit an instinctive and automatic emotional response. Plutarch,
for example, uses phrikodes of the deep and horrific roar, the low and terrible sounds (snch as works of art or pieces of music) as such; contrast the subjects investigated by
tone, a mixture of bestial roaring and the clap of thunder, produced by the Parthi- Schurtz et alii 2012, and cf. Keltner and Haidt 2003, 300f., 303f., 306f.
ans' percussion instruments as they face the Romans in battle, commenting that 19 Cf. the shudders that respond to epiphany at Hesiod fr. 165.4f. M-W and to the divine sign
the Parthians have clearly understood the impact of such sounds on the emotions from Zeus that marks Oedipus' heroization at Oedipus Coloneus 1606f., though in both these
and morale of their opponents (Crassus 23.Sf.). 18 In the Oedipus passage with places the verb employed is rhigein. For the 'holy shudder', cf. esp. Burkert 201O, 50-54; al-
so Keltner and Haidt 2003, 298f., 308-310 on awe and religion. Only a very small number of
respondents in the survey of Schurtz et alii 2012 refer their goosepimples to religious expe-
15 Cf. Burkert 2010, 54. riences (p. 209); but (as the authors note, p. 2 W)this may simply reflect the limited scope for
16 The relation of the startle reflex to the emotion of fear is similarly in question at 964b22-29, profound religious experiences in the lives of typical US college students over the four-week
where the phrike caused by being touched by another person is explained in terms of the fear period of the survey.
aroused by what is sudden and unexpected. 20 For phrike in the context of quasi-or assumed epiphany (i.e. when the appearance or beha-
17 The link with vision is esp. frequent in Plutarch's Lives: see Alexander 74.6, Aratus 32.3, viour of a mortal suggests or is assimilated to epiphany), see Josephus, Antiquitates Judaicae
Cicero 49. 2, 1Vlarius44.9, Numa 10.6; cf. phrissein and cognates + participle of a verb of 19.344f. (the quasi-epiphany of Agrippa in the theatre), Pluta,ch, De Alexandri magni fortuna
seeing, e.g. Aeschylus, Supplices 346, Prometheus Vinctus 695. For phrike as a reaction to aut virtute 343E {the appearance of Alexander as quasi-epiphany), Aratus 32.lf. (a captive
loud, sudden, uncanny, or unexpected noises, cf. Cassius Dio, Hi.sioria Romana 48.37.2 Bois- girl in a warrior's helmet taken for an apparition of a goddess).
sevain (cf. 36.49.2); Philostratus, Heroicus 748.14-17. 21 Lines 13f.: see Kotansky and Jordan 2011, 57, Faraone and Obbink 2013, 10-13; cf. Janko
18 Again, parallels are very numerous. See for example Euripides, Hippolytus 1201f. (sounds of 2013, 40f. See also the comments of Bremmer 2013, 28, Janko 2013, 50, 59f.
supernatural origin), 1215f. (ditto), Andromache l 147f. (ditto), Aristophanes, Ranae 1335f. 22 See Josephus, Bellum Iudaicum 3.353, Plutarch, De superstitione I65F, Philostratus, Heroi-
(ditto), (Aristotle], Mirabilium auscultationes 843al5f. (the mere sight of waves in the Straits cus 666.6--8, Achilles Tatius 5.25.4.
of Messina), Apollonius Rhodius 4.1339-1342 (sound as sign of danger), Plutarch, Marius 23 Again, the basic phenomenon goes back to Homer (Iliad 12.208f., a physical shudder at the
19.1-20.3 (the groans and lamentations of their defeated opponents echo through the hills at sight of an omen, though the verb there is rhigein), but Plutarch proves especially rich in in-
night and tenify the Romans), Sulla 14.3 (the sound of trumpets and horns; cf. Pollux 4.85: stances: see Aemilius 17.8 (eclipse), Agesilaus 24.5 (daylight as quasi-divine sign, associated
phrikodes a good epithet for the sound of the trumpet), Josephus, Jewish Wars 4.286f. (thun- with Eleusis), Sulla 11.1 (an omen that takes place in the theatre), Timoleon 12.9 (the phrike
der), 6.2 (the sight of piles of corpses), 6.83f. (the sight of one centurion's prodigious massa- and wonder, thauma, of the people of Adranum when, at the beginning of Timoleon's battle
cre of the enemy), Plutarch, Comparatio Lysandri et Sullae 2.4 (the sight of slaughter), Lu- against Hicetas of Leontini, the gates of their temple spontaneously flew open to reveal the
cian, Philopseudes 22 (the Gorgon-like aspect of a female monster), Achilles Tatius 3.17.7 cult-statue's spear-tip trembling, sweat running down the god's face). For 'wonder' as a stock
(the sight of Leucippe emerging, mutilated but alive, from her coffin). In these phrike-eausing feature ofepiphanies, often coupled with 'fear', see e.g. Homer, Iliad 3.398, Odyssey l.322f.,
sights and sounds the element of fear, or at least of the unnerving or uncanny, is prominent; 3.372f., l6.178f., 19.36-40, Homeric Hymn to Apollo 134f., Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite 81-
Greek writers seem not to present phrike as a response to stining or awe-inspiring sights or 90; cf. Richardson 1974, 208f.; Faulkner 2008, 164.
60 Douglas Cairns Horror, Pity, and the Visual in Ancient GreekAcstlletics 61
erence as much as fear, 24 and it is in this sense that sacred places, such as temples am's shudder (with the verb rhigein) in response to the request that he perform
and shrines, are said to attract it.25 In connection with the divine, then, phrike has oath-sacrifice atlliad3.259. 29 To be sure, the oath entails frightening consequenc-
as much to do with sebas, a type of awe or respect that responds to legitimate sta- es in the event of its breach, 30 but is also an institution in which status and prestige
tus and authority, 26 as it does with simple fear of unpleasant consequences. It is in (Greek time) are deeply implicated the time of the god is invested in the solem-
this respect that phrike is associated with the institution of the oath, a ritual that nity of the ritual itself and that of the human participants is committed to its
publicly puts at stake the honour both of the human actors and its divine guaran- maintenance.
tors in an often elaborate and solemn ceremony involving prescribed roles and Emotional phrike, then, is not always f~ar or a symptom of fear; occasionally
fonnulas. To be sure, in this context phrike remains, at bottom, an instinctive and it can be associated with apparently quite different emotions, 31 but even when it
involuntary emotional response, but its association with the oath reminds us that does belong with fear-like emotions its connotations can be more specific. Though
such responses are regularly embedded in highly structured and specific cultural it can be associated with institutions, rituals, and scenarios that are deeply embed-
practices. 27 A large number of passages from the Imperial Period and later make ded in specifically Greek cultural norms, it retains its basic rootedness in the body
this link, 28 but the association between the oath and the physical reaction that and its sensations, specifying an immediate, instinctive, and occurrent form of
phrike represents is as old as Greek literature itself, as we see in the case of Pri- emotional experience. It is, one presumes, precisely in order to retain such conno-
tations, to conjure up something of the experience of emotion rather than merely
labelling it, that language makes use of metonyms of this sort in the first place.
24 Cf. Cornutus, De natura deorum l l.3-18; Julian, Contra Heracleiurn 8.14-17, Epistulae When Sophocles' Chorus refer to the phrike that Oedipus occasions in them,
89b.169--175. therefore, they are referring to an involuntary, physical response. This is a re-
25 See Demosthenes 23.74 (of the Delphinion, the court with jurisdiction over justifiable homi-
cide, qua holy place); Josephus, Bellum Judaicurn 4.181f., 6.123; Plutarch, Tiberius and
sponse such as one would feel if one were very cold, one that is allied to feelings
Gaius Gracchus 21.5; NB esp. Pollux 1.23, where phrikodes appears after 'august', 'god- of fear and revulsion occasioned, on the one hand, by the sudden and shocking
filled', and 'numinous' in a list of appropriate epithets for temples. This basic, instinctive re- sight of Oedipus' physical mutilation, but also by their reflections upon actions
sponse to the awesomeness of the numinous as such is attested (albeit with the verb rhigein) which are at once the most heinous of transgressions and the most shocking indi-
as early as the shudder with which Ajax looks upon the works of the gods at Iliad 16.l l 9f. cation of human vulnerability to suffering. That suffering is now compounded in a
26 See Cairns 1993, 137f., 157, 206-214. On occasion,phrike can also express awe or deference horrific act of self-mutilation which (the Chorus assume) must be divinely in-
towards human superiors (e.g. Euripides, Troades 1025-1028, Plutarch Demosthenes 20.3,
De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute 33 IF). On English awe as a social emotion, and espe-
spired, as were the parricide and incest that preceded it. Precisely because their
cially on its positive aspects, see Keltner and Haidt 2003, Schurtz et alii 2012, 210-216. For description of their reaction conveys such a pronounced sense of its phenomenol-
Keltner and Haidt 2003, 306f. awe towards social superiors is the emotion's 'primordial' ogy, audiences ancient and modern attain a more vivid and immediate understand-
form, the application to elicitors in the natural world, art, or music a secondary development. ing of what it might be like to be in their shoes. This understanding may itself
Schurtz et alii's investigation oftlle physical symptom of'goosebumps' likewise concentrates reinforce an analogous reaction on the audience's part.
on social factors (for which their respondents did indeed provide much evidence). But the Some of the issues raised by this passage are addressed in Aristotle's Poetics.
rootedness of such symptoms in evolutionarily old capacities that humans share with other
In a characteristic passage of the important Chapter 14 (on the best type of tragic
species might suggest a different evolutionary hypothesis, less specifically focused on human
social hierarchies. plot), Aristotle reflects on the importance of plot construction vis-a-vis visual
27 Cf. the deliberate arousal of the initiand's phrike in mystic initiation, esp. at Plutarch fr. 178 spectacle (Poetics 14, 1453bl-7): ·
Sandbach (from On the Sou[), a scenario that lies behind Plato's account of the lover's vision
fonv ,u./,;votiv io <po~EpovKO'.t D,ravov eK y(yvrn0m, fonv 61:rnt I:~O'.tnfjc;
01jfecoc; ifi;
of Beauty Itself at Phaedrus 25 la. As a response to the sanctity, solenmity, and power of the
(HJ<JTU<JECO<;tfuv 1tp0'.yµ&1:mv, rcpcm:pov i<cd.JtOlTjTOU aµeivovoc;. ◊ii yap KO'.L UVEU
Oltep E<J1;l
ritual, the link between phrike and the mysteries is attested throughout antiquity and beyond:
cf. Demetrius, De elacutiane 101, Josephus, Bellum Iudaicurn 2.133, Lucian, Juppiter tra-
wu op&v ou1:coouvemcivm 1:ov µi:l0ov &crie 1:ov aKouovm irx itp&y,u.ma yw6µev0'. Kai
<ppti:1:ElVKcdeAEEtv eK1:iovouµ~mv6v1:mv· arcEp o:v n&0ot ,tc; aKouwv ,ov 1:oi:lOi6inou
goedus 30, Aristides, Hieroi logoi 2, 297.20f. Jebb (cf. 256.24, 320.5). Phriki5des and the like
µu0ov.
are frequently used in Christian writers' representations of Christian dogma and practice, esp.
Pity and fear can derive from the visual (opsis), but also from the arrangement of the inci-
the sacrament, as mysteries. For a speculative account of the links between mystic phrike,
dents itself: which is preferable and the mark of a better poet. For the plot ought to be so
Platonic philosophy, and tragedy (in which phrike becomes central to tragedy's effect on its
audiences), see Gould 1990, 44---47,57-62, 121-133, 135f., 202.
28 See e.g. Philo Judaeus, De decalogo 141. 3, Josephus, Vita 275, Bellum Iudaicum 2.139, 29 Cf. rhigiste of the oath sworn by the Styx at Apollonius Rhodius 2.291£.; more remotely,
[Clement of Rome], Homiliae 5.5.2, Plutarch, Alexander 30.11, Arrian fr. 94.2f. Jacoby (with rhigistos of Zeus Hikesios, Apollonius Rhodius 2.215.
stress on sanctions for perjury), Pollux 1.39, Cassius Dio, Historia Romana 8.36.29 Boisse- 30 Cf. curses at Plutarch, Crassus 16.7, Timoleon 5.3, Philostratus, Vitae Sophistarum 2, p.
vain, Porphyry, De abstinentia 4.13, and so on into the writings of the Church Fathers and 599.9-11; magic spells: Lucian, Philopseudes 31.
beyond (e.g. x 7 in John Chrysostom, x 4 in Palladius). 31 E.g. intense, quasi-erotic joy, at Sophocles, Ajax 693.
62 Douglas Cairns Horror, Pity, and the Visual in Ancient Greek Aesthetics 63
composed that, even without seeing a performance, one who merely hears what happens will power of opsis (Helen 15-19) as well as that of logos. Both, it emerges, persuade
shudder and feel pity as a result of the events as indeed one would on hearing the plot of the in similar ways: as the speech of astronomers persuades by making 'what is in-
Oedipus.
credible and obscure apparent to the eyes of opinion' (Helen 13), so opsis 'en-
This passage contains the only instance of phrike in the Poetics. The evidence graves images of the objects of vision on the mind' (Helen 17).34 But this differ-
considered above would suggest that Aristotle choses the verb phrissein over, say, ence of emphasis takes us back to Aristotle's point: both seeing and hearing in-
phobeisthai (as one would expect given his repeated use of phobos and phoberos volve the formation of mental -images, and thus poetic speech alone, without op-
elsewhere in Poetics) precisely because the topic is the relative power of specta- sis, is capable of aro~sing in the hearer the kind of emotion that opsis might
cle: that spectacle can produce phrike is, given the term's connotations, uncontro- arouse in the spectator.· 5
versial, but Aristotle wants to insist that even this quintessentially instinctive re- Both Gorgias and Aristotle, in fact, draw on the implicit poetics of earlier,
sponse to immediate and unexpected visual stimuli is better produced by means of pre-dramatic Greek poetry. In the Homeric poems, song is presented as something
the plot, for which performance is unnecessary. Aristotle's example is the Oedi- that derives from (Iliad 2.484-487) or at least resembles (Odyssey 8.491) eye-
pus Tyrannus, in which spectacle does play an important role in the phrike ex- witness knowledge: Homer's Demodocus was not present at Troy, and neither
pressed by the Chorus in the scene discussed above. 32 As a practitioner, Sophocles witnessed the events he narrates nor heard about them from someone who did; but
might have wanted to insist on the interaction of plot and spectacle to a greater someone who was present, Odysseus, is able to offer a unique guarantee of the
extent than Aristotle does. But the Chorus' (and by extension the audience's) re- bard's powers of representation. 36 That both audienc.es and authors revelled in
sponse in the Oedipus Tyrannus is clearly not simply a product of visual effects; it such capabilities is demonstrated by the pervasive tradition of ekphrasis, the viv-
depends on a reflective evaluation of a structured series of actions that does in- id, quasi-pictorial representation of a scene, person, animal, or object (not just a
deed, in many respects, correspond to the pattern commended in this chapter of work of art) that appears already as a deliberate tour de force in the Shield of
the Poetics. Achilles in Iliad 18. The capacity that allows a reader or hearer to form mental
Aristotle was not the first to give phrike a role in poetics. At some point in the images from a verbal narrative the Greeks called phantasia and we call imagina-
fifty years or so before Aristotle's birth (in 484 BCE), the Sicilian philosopher and tion; its counterpart in the text, and in the repertoire of skills which create the text,
rhetorician, Gorgias, expressed what are, in some respects, similar ideas, in his is enargeia (sometimes also emphasis or sapheneia ), 'vividness'. 37 Enargeia re-
Encomium of Helen. Part of this case involves the argument that persuasive mained an aspiration of wordsmiths and a core term of the literary and rhetorical
speech is irresistible (Helen 8-14), and the prime example of such persuasive critic's art throughout antiquity, but for Greeks of all periods its unsurpassed mas-
speech is poetry (Helen 9): 33 ter was Homer. An ancient scholar's note on the famoµs passage of Iliad 6 in
which Hector reaches out towards his baby son, only for the child to shrink back
t~V JtOlTjO'W anuoav 1ml voµil;;roKUl ovoµ&t;;wAO'{OV i£xov1:aµe-rpov· '!OU<;CtKO'l)OV1:U<;
dof\A.0£ Kut rppiKTJm:pirpo~o<;Kat 1£),m; 1t0Auoa.Kpu,;Kal n60o,; rptAorr£v0fii;,tn' in fear at his helmet, is a typical example: 38
aAA01:pirov1:Errpuyµa-rrovKO.toroµa1:rovEU't:'l)Xtat<; Kut ouorrpayicw; \'.St6vn n:a0riµa /:ha
i:rovAoyrovi£n:u0evri \jfUX'll•
All poetry I regard and describe as speech with metre. Into those who listen to it comes a
fearful shuddering [phrike] and a tearful pity and a longing that loves to lament, and at the 34 Cf. Halliwell 20l l, 280f.; Munteanu 2012, 45-47.
success and failure of others' affairs and persons the soul undergoes, through words, a certain 35 See Munteanu 2012, 47 on this passage and 95-100 on the importa11ceof phantasia (imagina-
experience of its own. tion) in Aristotle's approach to emotion, in everyday scenarios as well as in response to dra-
ma and poetry; in that regard, cf. once more Poetics 1462al4-18 (n. 32 above) on the enar-
Like Aristotle, Gorgias is concerned with an audience's emotional engagement geia (vividness) of tragedy both in performance and as a text for reading. On the truth of Ar-
with the changing fortunes of others; his core emotional responses are Aristotle's istotle's insight, that emotional responses to imagined scenarios are as fundamental in life as
in literature, cf. Currie and Ravenscroft 2002, 197.
pity and fear; and he emphasizes the power of these emotions with reference to
36 See De Jong 2001, 214f.; Serra 2007, 34; Halliwell 2011, 85f.
physical symptoms and expressions (tears and phrike). But Gorgias differs from 37 On ekphrasis, enargeia, andphantasia, see Webb 2009. On enargeia, see Zanker 1981; on
Aristotle in the degree of emphasis that he places on the compulsive emotional phantasia, Rosenmeyer 1986; Watson 1988; Manieri 1998; Halliwell 2002, 308-312; Serra
2007; Sheppard 2014.
38 E bT on Iliad 6.467. Cf. Richardson 1980, 277-280, with further examples; Snipes. 1988 on
32 Cf. Gould 1990, 50f. Aristotle returns to the point l 462al °"" 18, where it is clear that reading similes; Bakker 2005; Slatkin 2007; Graziosi and Haubold 2010. 23f. Here. Greek aesthetic
is sufficient for tragedy's effects to be realized, but that these are enhanced by music and per- and rhetorical theory seems to have been on to something: 'brai~-imaging ~tudies show that
formance. when we imagine a visual scene, we activate the same visual regions of our brain normally
33 On this passage, see Segal 1962, esp. 105-107, 12lf., 124f., 127f., 13lf.; Halliwell 2011, active when we actually perceive the same visual scene', Wojciehowski and Gallese 2011,
274f., 280f.; cf. Heath 1987, 7; Munteanu 2012, 40-42. 17, with references.
64 Douglas Cairns Horror, Pity, and the Visual in Aneient Greek Aesthetics 65
ties his recitation involves an element of identification with the poem's characters o"mcn<;DP£t Kat 1tapa 'tTJVov1v E1t£1tTJY£<mv, Bellum Judaicum 6.210),50 but as
in their reactions to the events narrated. ln a very real sense, his physical presence the news spreads through the city, all those who hear it visualize and shudder at
as performer helps to suggest the phenomenology and physicality of the charac- the event as if they had committed it themselves (Kat 1tpo oµµai;rov eKaO''tO<;
ters' emotions.
47 'tO1ta80<;A,a,µ~avrovIDCT1t€p a{ncp 't0/\,µ118£v£<ppt't't€,6.213). The internal audi-
Clearlv characters within a narrative can and do feel pity for others and fear tors recreate the act in their mind's eye; their powers of phantasia lend the event a
for thems;l~es: but these (especially pity) are also, already in Plato's day, the vividness that elicits the same kind of spontaneous, involuntary, and physical re-
characteristic ~motional responses of audiences, as the passage from Gorgias' sponse as was experienced by those who actually did witness it.· The reaction of
Helen quoted above indicates. 48 Accordingly, Ion's emotional reaction is also that the eye-witnesses is one of horror and revulsion; but the secondary audience, in
of the audience (535d-e): some sense, imagines something of what it would be like to perpetrate such a
thing. There is still revulsion, but the suggestion of putting oneself in the place of
rn. ofo0a oiiv onKal -r&v0em:&v 'tOU<;noAAou:; rni11:a 'taU-ta uµe'i:<;i\,py&~rn0£; Mary, the perpetrator, facilitates another response, of sympathy. Accordingly,
mN. Kat µ&Aa K<XA©<; au-cou:; &vw0ev &nfi'tOU[:)riµm:o,;
otoa· ,m0op& yap EKCW't'.01'.£
KAcxovr&c;
1;e 1m1.oewov tµ[:)linovrnc; Kat cruv0aµ[}ouv-i:ac;to'i:; leyoµEvotc;.
when the news reaches the Romans, though some are incredulous and many filled
SOC. So do you realize that you rhapsodes produce these same effects on most of the specta- with even greater loathing for the Jews than they had hitherto felt, others feel pity
tors too? (6.214). Josephus' wider narrative of the episode concentrates on the extremes of
ION. yes, I am very well aware of that: every time it happens I look down on them from the suffering to which human beings can be reduced (6.201-205, 213) and presents
platform above and see them weeping, with fear in their eyes, sharing my amazement at
Mary herself a victim of others' greed and cruelty (6.202), her cannibal feast a
what's said. desperate protest against their inhumanity (6.207, 211). Thus the imaginative
The passage is thus subject to several tensions: Ion is a narr~tor o~ the actions of identification with Mary that is attributed to those who first hear the report of her
others, but also (especially, one might think, when performmg_drrect character- deed and the pity that is the response of at least some of the Romans act as cues
speech) something like an actor, e?gaging in di~ect representation o~ the ,story's for the responses that Josephus' vivid and artfully constructed narrative is intend-
characters. At the same time, Ion himself embodies aspects of an audience s reac- ed to arouse in its readers. The emotions of the latter, then, are guided first of all
tion to the doings and sufferings of the characters. The audie~ce's ~eacti~n mirrors by the vividness of the narrative itself, then by the responses of internal eye-
his but it is not clear whether the response of either Ion or his audience is (to bo~- witnesses, and then by two distinct sets of internal auditors. In this case, though
rm~ terms from Keith Oatley) an empathetic one (feeling with), in which the audi- (at 6.213) the internal audience's picturing of themselves in the agent's shoes has
ence identifies emotionally with the characters and recreates, at least to some ex- a strong emotional component, this does not entail feeling what the agent felt, but
tent, their first-person perspective, or a sympathetic, th_ird-per~onrespon_s~(feel- rather recreating the agent's point of view as part of a third-person response to the
ing for) in which the audien~e experiences distinc\~moti~ns of its ~wn, ~hcit~d by act all the emotional responses adumbrated in the text (whether horror, revul-
but not identical to the emot10ns of the characters. The tSsues which might mter- sion, hatred, or pity) are third-person, onlookers' responses, and so is the hypo-
est us in this regard remain largely unexplored, because the di~log_ue's~xpli~it thetical sympathy of the reading audience. 51
emphasis is elsewhere: on the status of poetry as a third-hand denvatlve of real~ty It is common (and correct) to emphasize the influence of the theatre, and spe-
(535a); on its negative effects on audiences (535d); _onits status as a form ~f m- cifically of tragedy, on such passages (see Chapman 200n but as we have seen
spiration rather than a skill (536a-d); and on_the mis1;11a:ch be:ween the skills of the vivid presentation of action and emotion as if before the eyes of a listening or
the rhapsode and those that inform the poetic narrative s sub3ect-matter (536e~ reading public is a staple of Greek poetics and rhetoric from their very beginnings.
542a). . . . . The centrality of pity to an audience's responses to serious poetry, too, is implicit
A striking incident in Josephus' narrative of Rome's Jewish wars raises simi- in the poetics of the Iliad and explicit in the earliest formulations of Greek philo-
lar issues. During the of Jerusalem, a starving woman cooks and eats her sophical poetics. The ability to feel this pity, according to Aristotle in the Rheto-
own son in a desperate attempt to avenge herself upon the Jewish guards whose ric, depends on a sense of the vulnerability that we share with those who are suf-
depredations have reduced her to this leve~;the gu,ards,w~o ,see wh,at she ~as d~ne fering (Rhetoric 2.8, l385bl3-33, 1386a25-29). Similarly self-referential is the
are transfixed with horror, phrike, at the sight ('tous; 8 £U0£ro<;<pptK11
Kut 1tap£K- fear that in both Poetics and Rhetoric is said to derive from the sense that such
47 Cf. Halliwell 2002, 80. 50 napt1<cr1:acr1~(found in one MS and printed by Niese) occurs only here; all other MSS (and
48 Cf. Heath 1987, 11--16; Halliwell 2002 passim, esp. 100, 208-213, 218f.; Munteanu 2012. . testimonia) have <ppEvrovi,xr,nrn,1r
49 For the terms, see Oatley 2011, 115-120; on empathy versus sympathy cf. various authors m 51 On pity as characteristic of an observer's perspective, see Halliwell 2002, 215f.; cf. also Kon-
Coplan and Goldie 2011. stan 2001 (with Cairns 2004) on classical pity and emotional distance.
Horror, Pity, and the Visual in Ancient Greek Aesthetics 69
Douglas Cairns
68
a prerequisite for the recognition that his suffering differs in degree but not in kind
things might also happen to us (Poetics 13, 1453a4-6; cf. Rhetoric 1386b27-29,
from that which might befall any of us. The use of phrike of a response that is
where the things we pity in others are said to be the kind of things that we fear
both sympathetic and fearful is apparent in other passages. In Sophocles' Trachin-
may happen to ourselves).52 Shared vulnerability to vicissitude is a condi:ion for
iae, for example, the leader of the female Chorus deploys the tem1 in her response
pity both in traditional Greek ethics and in the implicit aesthetics of poetic texts.
to Heracles' sufferings in the poisoned shirt ofNessus (1044f.):
The locus classicus is the encounter between Achilles and Priam in Iliad 24.485-
551, in which Priam appeals to Achilles to release his son's body for burial. Priam 11:1cuoucr'
E<ppt~a1:&croecruµcpop&,;,q,{1cm,
first seeks to elicit Achilles' sympathy by comparing himself with Achilles' own avaKtoS, ofo.t,; otoc; o.\vSAauve-i;m.
I shudder when I hear our king suffering like this, friends; what terrible afflictions for a man
father, but Achilles realizes that the parallel is in fact closer than Priam suggests.
like him.
As a result, he goes on to deliver an elaborate speech of consolation in which he
presents suffering as the lot of all mankind, using both Priam and his own father So too do the female Chorus in expressing their sympathy for the persecuted cow-
53
as examples of great felicity undercut by extreme suffering in old age. Among maiden, lo, at Prometheus Vinctus 687-695:
several salient and authoritative statements of the same principle in (especially ea fo., UltEXE,q,efr
Sophoclean) tragedy, 54 Odysseus' reflections on the madness and degradation of ouno0' <(i)o'> OUltO't'11uxouv ~evou,;
his enemy, Ajax, are perhaps the most memorable. The goddess Athena, who has µoA.c'i:cr0mAO'YOU<; sc; <XKOUV i;µav,
deflected on to the army's flocks Ajax's murderous attack on the Greek leaders, ouo' 6)0€oucr0em:a K!Xl0\)C!Otcna
toys with her humiliated victim and invites his rival, Odysseus, to gloat. But tnfiµm:a Auµa,;a odµm'
56
aµ<pT]KEllKfV'tP(!)1JfUXetV wuxuv i:µavt.
Odysseus takes an entirely different view (Ajax 121-126): iro µo'ipa µoi:pa,
SltOlK'tlpOl08 VlV Jt8<ppt11:'
Eimooucra 'Ious.
oucr1:11vov eµnas, K(J,lltepOV'ta oucrµevf\, Ah, keep ~way, oh! I never, ever thought that words so strange would come to my hearing, or
60oUVeK'lhn (!U'YK<X1£Se'\JK'tat Kaiq\, that suffermgs, outrages, terrors so hard to look at and to bear would chill my soul with dou-
,;o
O'UOEV 'CQU'COU µiiAA.OV T\1:ouµov crKoit&v. ble-pronged goad. Ah, fate, fate, I shudder as I behold Jo's plight.
op& 'YUPriµ&s OUOfVov1:m;(1,/cA.O 1tAT1V
The movements and gestures that accompanied Io's opening words at 561-588
e'iow1c'ocrotnep sioµev T\KOU<p11V crKtUV.
[What you say is true,] but nonetheless I pity him in his misfortune, e.ven though he is my ~n- will have made her physical torment visible to both the internal and external audi-
emy, because he is yoked to dire ruin. In this I look out for my own s1tuat1onno less than his, ences. In the ensuing scene, and especially in the narrative of her persecution at
for I see that all ofus who are alive are nothing more than apparitions or :fleeting shadow. 640-686, she emphasizes her sufferings and presents herself as an appropriate
Similarly, in the Oedipus Tyrannus, the pity that the Chorus and others feel, de- recipient of pity; indeed, pity is a response that she herself expects (684f.). The
spite their revulsion, for Oedipus, complements the Chorus's authoritative presen- leader of the Chorus of Oceanids has specifically requested the 'pleasure' of a full
tation (in the fourth stasimon) of his career as a paradigm of the shared human report of Jo's sufferings (631-634), and the Chorus's pity is cued when Prome-
vulnerability on whieh pity rests, and is thus crucial in guiding and conditioning theus then encourages her to comply, on the grounds that 'to weep away and la-
the response of an external audience.55 The same seems to me to be true of their ment away one's misfortunes is worth the effort, when one is likely to win a tear
phrike in the passage with which we began their horror at Oedipus' suffering is from listeners' (638f.). The audience is thus primed to see the Chorus's response
as sympathetic, and they are not deceived - the Chorus do recognize the extremity
of Jo's situation.57 But the sympathy that is implicit in that recognition is also
52 On the role of fear for oneself in Aristotle's conception of pity see Konstan 2001, 130-136
with Cairns 2004, 66f.; on the relation of pity to fear in Aristotle's conception of tragic emo-
mixed with personal distress. Like the Chorus of Sophocles' Oedipus, with whom
tion, see Halliwell 1986, 168-202; 2002, 216-218.
we began, the sufferings of another person both compel their attention and over-
53 On the importance of this passage and its ethos in the Greek narrative tradition, see Cairns whelm them, so that they can hardly bear to contemplate the other's pain.58 In this
2014. passage, understanding of another's emotional distress produces self-focused anx-
54 Cf. Philoctetes 501-506, Oedipus Coloneus 566-568; Euripides, Hecuba 282-287. Beyond
tragedy see Bacchy!ides 5.155-162 (esp. 160-162 and cf. 89-92); Herodotus I.86.6, 7.46.2;
cf. Pelling 2005, 289,291 f. on Plutarch. 56 The transmitted text is unsatisfactory for metrical and syntactic reasons, but the sense is not
55 Pity: 1194, 1211, 1216-1221, 1286, 1296, 1299, 1303, 1347; revulsion: esp. the Chorus at
seriously in doubt.
1217f., 1297-1299, 1303-1306, 1348, all, significantly, associated in context with their pity;
57 Cf. Griffith 1983, 211: the lyrics voice to the horror and sympathy which the audience
cf. Creon at 1424-1431. On the 'hermeneutic' function of the choral voice in the fourth sta-
must by now feel'.
simon, see e.g. Calame 1999, 139; for the same general phenomenon (internal audience re-
58 For this reaction, cf. Decety and Meltzoff201 l, 76; Hoffman 2011, 250f.
sponse guiding external) in Plutarch, see Pelling 2005, 282f.
70 Douglas Cairns Horror, Pity, and the Visual in Ancient Greek Aesthetics 71
59
iety more obviously than other-concern - there is pity, but also fear. The Cho- nerability that is demonstrated by military defeat is similarly the focus of phrike at
rus's move from anticipated pleasure in a report of another's troubles to phrike at Aemilius 29.5: booty from the sack of the cities ofEpirus produces no more than
sufferings that now, both in Io's presence on stage and in the vividness of her nar- eleven drachmas per solider., so that 'everyone shuddered at the outcome of the
rative seem to be visible before their eyes (dm8oucm., the same verb as was used war, that the division of an entire nation's wealth should yield so little profit and
in th; Oedipus Tyrannus passage with which we began, 1303) serve to prime, gain for each individual' (cppt~m 0£ :rcav'ta<;av0pro:rcouc;'to wu :rcoAiµ.ou-reAoc:;,
steer, and comment on the anticipated reactions of the theatrical audience, and de; µtKpov O'U't{O 'to Ka0' EKCJ:O"COV11.f\,uµaKat K£p6ot; e0vouc; OIi.OU KaWXEp-
thus bear upon the tragic paradox of finding pleasure in painful reactions to oth- µancr0evwc;). .
ers' pain (Gorgias' :rc60oc:; cptll.o:rczv0fic:;). In each of these four cases, the dramatic and the narrative, phrike responds to
Both Heracles and lo are onstage; the Choruses in question respond to suffer- the misfortunes of others, uniting both the fearful sense that we ourselves are as
ings presented before their eyes and compounded by the lamentatio~s ~f their pa- vulnerable as they are and a sympathy that is born of that very recognition. This
tients. But similar responses can also be attributed to characters w1thm a verbal union of fear for oneself and sympathy for others, together with the central focus
narrative, as in the case of two passages in Plutarch's Life of Aemilius Paullus. of these emotions on the mutability of fortune, echoes some of the central tenets
The Homeric theme of the mutability of fortune is central both to this Life and to of Aristotle's theory in the Poetics, demonstrating how widespread these assump-
60
the pair that it forms with the Life of Timoleon; the specific debt to Homer in the tions are in Greek literary culture. In each of these cases, too, an internal audience
Life of Aemilius in particular is adve1tised at the emotional climax of the work experiences an emotional reaction with all the phenomenological connotations of
(34.8), where Plutarch narrates the reversal that struck Aemilius at the very pinna- phrike that we have explored above, a reaction that is clearly meant to stand in
cle of his success. Aemilius is the conqueror of Perseus, the last of Alexander's some relation to the potential responses of the external audience. Internal and ex-
successors as king of Macedonia, but the triumph in which this crucial stage in ternal audiences in some sense feel the same emotion. But it would be too simple
Rome's rise to dominance is celebrated is undercut by the death of two of the to suggest that the phrike of the external audience is caused by that of the internal
general's sons, aged 14 and 12, one five days before the triumph and the other one. The conditions that evoke the phrike of the internal audience are clearly suf-
three days after it. For the narrator, this is the work of that daemonic force, what- ficient to evoke the same feeling in the external audience, and the emotional re-
ever it may be, whose business it is to ensure 'that no one's life should be sponse of the internal audience is in no way the focus on which the emotion of the
unsullied or without admixture of trouble, but that, as Homer says, those may be external audience rests. The external audience is not feeling with the internal, im-
regarded as best off whose fortunes shift in the balance, now this ~ay, now_t~at'., aginatively simulating or reconstructing their first-person response; nor is it simp-
For the Roman people, however, the vulnerability of all human bemgs to v1c1ss1- ly 'catching' that response in the purely unconscious manner that is supposedly
tude is occasion for phrike: they typical of emotional contagion. These are third-person, onlookers' responses in
each case; the external audience replicates the response of the internal, but each
all shudder at the cruelty of Fortune, that she did not scruple to introduce so much sorrow into
a household so admired, so full of joy and sacrifices, or to mix laments and tears together remains the response of an audience to the emotional plight of a third party. In so
with victory paeans and triumphs ((J)ptl;mTI]Vroµfrcrp;a T!lr:;'t'llXT\r:;
anav'tar:;, OUKnofomo far as the emotions of internal and external audiences are the same, this is a matter
nev0or:; 'tOO"O'U'tOVdr:; OtKlaV ~{it,OUKat xcxp&r:;K(Xt0um&v yeµ01)(mV dcr&.youcra, K(Xt of their converging on the same object, though it is ~nt·,~alu possible that the emo-
,
1m'taµetyv-6oucra 0p11vour:; Km' uaKpua
s ' -
rmtmnv ' '
e:rrw1K101r:;
Kat
' 0 , P. ) .61
pmµ.,olr:; tion of the internal audience may serve to prime, focus, or ;reinforce the response
This vulnerability is explicitly a phenomenon that unites the victors and the van- of the external audience. 62 In this respect, the reaction of a character or a Chorus
quished: Aemilius' defeated opponent, Perseus, is as much a paradigm of the mu- in tragedy or the point of view of a character in a narrative operate, in a sense, like
tability of fortune as is Aemilius himself (26.4-12, 27.4f., 33.6-8, 37.2). The vul- the point-of-view or reaction shot in cinema the eliciting conditions for the rele-
vant emotional response are contextually and situationally established, but the
facial expressions of onlookers prime and steer the audience's reactions to those
59 Griffith 1983, 212, and Podlecki 2005, 182, both note that the rhythms of the choral lyric in
687~695 are similar to those of lo's entrance-song at 566--608 a formalized representation
elicitors. 63 The phrike of an internal audience in tragedy or in narrative constitutes
of emotional mirroring?
60 See Swain 1989; Tatum 2010; Cairns 2014. 62 On the general issues here, see N, Carroll 2011.
61 On this passage, see. Pelling 2005, 209, and cf. 280-283 on quasi-tragic narrative patterns in 63 On the cinematic technique and its implications, see Plantinga 1999; Coplan 2006; Smith
Plutarch's Lives. Among pre-Christian (non-medical) authors Plutarch is by far the most pro- 2011; N. Carroll 2011, 179. On point of view more generally as a form of priming or framing,
lific user ofphrike-words (143 instances of the noun; 43 uses of cognate terms). The qualities see Currie 2010, 87-107, 123-166. A substantial differenee between classical tragedy and
as I have outlined them above, chime very well with his predilection for vivid nar- modern cinema in this respect is that the laner, given large screen projection and pervasive
rative, dramatic ehanges of fortune, and moralizing on the ways in which his subjects' lives use of close-ups of facial expressions, offers much more scope for such priming. Tragedy is
exemplify recurrent human types and patterns. masked, gesture was probably stylized, and the size of the theatre also makes a substantial
72 Douglas Cairns Horror, Pity, and the Visual in Ancient Greek Aesthetics 73
a reflection, in the text itself, of the relation of the text and its performance to an way that Mary herself did not. As Halliwell puts it (2002, 216): 'When we feel
audience; it offers a perspective on the text's emotion-eliciting power. pity, we do not share the sufferer's subjectivity: however much we may draw
Empathy is a slippery and multivalent term. 64 But i±: as some claim, 65 it re- emotionally near to it, or move vicariously with its psychological expression, we
quires the adoption of another person's first-person perspective and/or experienc- remain, qua feelers of pity, outside the immediate, "first-person" reality of the
ing, from that first-person perspective, the emotions that another person feels, then pain, whether physical or mental.' This is a significant fact about ancient Greek
the external audiences of the ancient Greek dramas and narratives that we are con- aesthetic and poetic theory. Though contemporary approaches also have much to
sidering do not empathize with these internal figures whose point of view helps to say about sympathetic responses of this sort, it is also typical for' them to empha-
steer their responses: the internal viewer feels phrike, and the external audience size the potential for identificatory or empathetic responses of various sorts, to a
may feel phrike, but the latter's phrike is not a matter of their identifying with or much greater extent than do ancient Greek texts, which make no grand claims
being affected by the emotional reaction ·of an :internal focalizer. Nor is the ideal about feeling what other people feel.67
response of an external audience typically represented as empathy with the focal Phrike is by no means ubiquitous as a tragic emotion, but nonetheless, when it
characters whose suffering elicits the phrike of both internal and external audienc- occurs in that connection, it is informative about the nature of tragic emotions.
es. Though there is regularly, as we have seen, an element of generalization that Though typically a symptom of fear, horror, or revulsion, it can be an expression
extrapolates from the suffering of the character to the kind of thing that might of that link between these emotions and the shared sense of vulnerability that
happen to anyone, and though one might adopt a view of the sufferer as a human gives rise to pity. Its nature as an involuntary, instinctive response especially to
being like oneself, still the characters' experience is not that of their audiences, immediate visual and aural stimuli, together with its fundamentally somatic char-
internal or external. They are suffering; Choruses, focalizing characters, and ex- acter, help us to put some phenomenological flesh upon the bare bones of 'pity
ternal audiences do not feel what they are feeling, but feel, as Gorgias so aptly put and fear' as the typical tragic emotions. Its immediacy, in tum, and especially its
it, 'a certain experience of their own', not (for example) anguish, grief, remorse, association with the visual, can serve to illustrate the premium placed on vivid-
or shame, but (for example) fear, pity, or phrike. 66 To be sure, characters in a ness and visuality by authors, consumers, and theorists of ancient Greek narra-
drama or a narrative can be afraid, shiver, or shudder, and an audience may do so tives, and thus also illustrates the continuity between narrative and dramatic gen-
along with them - this is perhaps an element in the passage from Plato's Ion con- res as objects of ancient litera1y theory. Though actors as well as observers can
sidered above. But this is not the type of response that is considered characteristic experience phrike as a response to the terrifying or horrific, what we might call
of poetic audiences: when phrike appears as an aesthetic emotion, it is typically an 'tragic' phrike tracks the tragic emotions of pity and fear as characteristically
observer's response, not a vicarious first-person one. It is not, in Sophocles, Oedi- third-person, observers' responses to suffering, and thus corroborates the general
pus' phrike that elicits that of the Chorus or the audience, and even those who, in emphasis of ancient Greek aesthetics on sympathy over empathy, on feeling for
Josephus' narrative, imaginatively recreate Mary's cannibal feast before their rather than feeling with. But although in this way (and in many others) the con-
eyes, as if they themselves were its perpetrators, nonetheless react to the event in a cept of phrike is deeply enmeshed in the cultural specifics of ancient Greek socie-
ties, it nonetheless possesses a core that ..cannot be relativized, a rootedness in the
difference. But as we saw above (n. 43) the assumption that 'emotional contagion' (uncon- physicality of human emotion and an origin in our pre-human biological inher-
scious mimicry and feedback) requires 'direct sensory input' (Coplan 2006, 35) is open to itance; when the Chorus express their phrike at Oedipus' self-blinding, we know
question: similar phenomena can be observed in readers, and if this is so, they can be as- what they mean. This is the difference that phrike' s phenomenological richness
sumed in audiences of masked performance too. But if something like emotional contagion makes: even if(and this is debatable) such a full-blooded, somatic response is less
does play a role in the reactions of cinematic and tragic audiences, or in those of readers of frequent in our own emotional repertoire as readers, theatrical audience-members,
narrative fiction, it does not do so in isolation from those audiences' experience of the emo-
tions consciously elicited by narrative or performance. In the case in question, if the phrike of
or cinema-goers (or if our cultures have taught us to find o~ frissons in somewhat
an internal audience or focalizing character primes or prompts that of an external audience- different aspects of the relevant art-forms), still we all know what it is like to
member or reader, the latter is not simply a case of unconscious mimicry, but rather a shared, shudder or shiver; and thus we can approach, at least to some degree, something
in-awareness response to the representation of the experiences of a third party. of the characteristic emotional tone at which ancient authors were aiming.
64 A complaint of several contributors to Coplan and Goldie 2011 (see pp. xxxi, 4, 3lf., 103,
162f., 211,319); cf. Stueber 2012, 55.
65 Hoffman 2011, 231; Engelen and Rottger-Ri:\ssler 2012, 4; Walter 2012, 10; Preston and 67 For scepticism about 'empathy', in so far as it is said to involve emotional matchin<i feeling
Hofelich 2012, 26; Bischof-Kohler 2012, 40f. Cf. Giovanelli 2008 and 2009 on empathetic the emotions of others, simulating others' mental states, and so on, cf. N. Carroll 20J'i; Gold-
identification as an element in sympathy, with criticism by N. Carroll 2011, 180-184. ie 2011, 302f. and passim; Mcfee 2011, 193,197,201; Morton 2011, 319,325. For a recent
66 On the echo ofGorgias' formulation (\'.lit6vn na01')µa, Helen 9) in Plato's Republic (606b), review, starting from the premise that 'The inconsistent definition of empathy has had a nega-
see Halliwell 2002, 77; 201 I, 267 n. 9. tive impact on both research and practice', see Cuff et alii 2016.
74 Douglas Cairns Horror, Pity, and the Visual in Ancient Greek Aesthetics 75
Whatever he meant by the enigmatic term catharsis, 68 Aristotle clearly Cairns, D. L. (1993) Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek
thought that the experience of such intense emotion in the audiences of Attic trag- Literature, Oxford.
edy or Homeric epic was both pleasurable and somehow beneficial for the indi- (2004) Pity in the Classical World, Hermathena 176, 59-74.
- (2013) A Short History of Shudders, in A. Chaniotis and P. Ducrey (eds.), Unveiling Emotions
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GRIEF: THE POWER AND SHORTCOMINGS OF GREEK
TRAGIC CONSOLATION
Could tragic exempla and then, by extension, tragedy as genre, originally have
been used to bring solace to mourners? Characters within Greek tragedies often
refuse consolatory tropes, 1 but, in more specific situations, consolatory narratives
can be successful. In this essay I intend to explore how tragic stories depicting the
extraordinary suffering of others are offered in epic and tragedy with a clear
practical purpose, namely to help a bereaved person in the initial stage of grief by
restoring him or her to normal activities and social interactions. Yet, the degree of
the usefulness of such exempla remains a subject of.constant interest and debate
for Greco-Roman philosophers.
With surprising consistency and despite various nuances and disagreements,
Greek philosophers describe pity and some form of ancillary fear as the main
emotions felt by the audiences of the Homeric epic and tragedy.2 Thanks to their
power to arouse emotions, these genres were also generally thought to bring
pleasure and alleviate the personal sorrows of the spectators. Why is this so? A
simple assumption is that the emphasis on tragic pity represents a cultural
peculiarity of classical Greece, perhaps prompted by the developments of various
dramatic genres at the end of the sixth century BCE. However, can the association
belong to a more universal realm? Fascinating recent s.tudies in the philosophy of
emotions have shown deep connections between narratives and specific emotions.
Those connections are twofold in nature. First, the formation of emotions them-
selves requires narrative structures 3 and, second, (literary) narratives are paradig-
matically structured to arouse emotions.4
Chong-Gossard 2009 and 2013, for example, has convincingly argued this point.
2 For a convenient introduction to this topic, with a list of major ancient testimonies, see, for
example, Konstan 2014, 976f.
3 Snaevarr 2010, 321-331.
4 Hogan 2003 and Snaevarr 2010, 332-335 offer details on how various narratives surround the
formation of specific emotions.
80 Dana LaCourse Munteanu Grief: the Power and Shortcomings in Greek Tragic Consolation 81
1.1 Narratives in the formation of emotions popular and long-lasting genres. 10 If we accept this type of analysis, then we could
see tragedy in general as a genre that arouses sorrow for fictional others, because
The idea that emotions are linked to narrative structures was initially proposed by it weaves themes of loss. Indeed, Greek tragedians present carefully chosen
Goldie 2000 and later developed by Snaevarr 2010. Synthesizing narratives unify paradigmatic stories, which could be interpreted as clearly directed at arousing
5
our feelings, beliefs, and actions into a coherent emotional trait. For example, the sadness, in light of these modem narrative-emotional theories. More specifically,
formation of anger presupposes several steps that cannot do without internal ancient Greek thinkers say that tragedy should elicit the spectators' pity because
narrative ingredients: the essential element in the cause of anger starts from a of depicting suffering as undeserved or beyond expectation.ll Co!uldthis focus on
simple narrative paradigm: 'someone has willingly offended me', followed by the suffering of others diminish the spectators' personal sorrow? Some ancient
understanding facial expressions (of another, mine), recognizing motives, and sources suggest exactly this, but the extent to which it is so remains debatable.
acting as a result of the emotion. In all these phases, narratives structures are used First I examine how tragic stories depicting the extraordinary suffering of others
to justify and understand sensations, to recognize the causes for emotion, and to are offered in epic and tragedy with the precise aim of rescuing a mourner from
define the emotion as such.
6 self-imposed isolation, silence, or interminable fasting. Next I consider how
Greco-Roman philosophers question and reassess the usefulness of tragic exempla
in consolation.
1.2 Emotions in literary narratives
Hogan 2003 has drawn attention to the fact that narratives contain paradigm 1.3 The biology of consolation
7
scenarios that are prototypical in nature and able to elicit emotions accordingly.
Micro-narratives govern our emotive terms. Some emotions are stirred by so- From a biological perspective, research indicates that the need to provide .comfort
called thin temporal events (quick, intense conditions) in Hogan's theory: fear, to others in pain may precede language. Until recently, scientists have believed
anger, disgust. Others are caused by thick temporal events: sorrow or happiness. that empathy was exclusively to be found in humans. New evidence suggests,
Prototypical narratives tend to mimic the thick temporal events. Thus, narratives however, that primates may express concern for the wellbeing of other group
describing romantic unions and achievements of social power form prototypes for members. One of the most striking experiments observes the behavior of a group
literary happiness, while narratives dealing with deaths of the beloved and loss of of chimpanzees, 12 who appear much more likely to try to comfort by grooming an
8 'innocent bystander' than a member who has caused his own suffering. In these
social power (imprisonment, exile) lead to sorrow. Furthermore, these are not
isolated literary preferences, but we can observe a cross-cultural existence of such instances of proto-consolation there is no prospect of reward for behavior, so
prototypes. For instance, in romantic and heroic tragic-comedy, we can find chimpanzees seem to understand complex motivations related to the idea of
recognizable narrative patterns: first, the union of the lovers; second, the deserved versus undeserved suffering. It is important to underscore that de Waal
separation; third, the reunion of the couple. The middle complications of the plot has proposed a 'bottom-up view' of empathy, different from the common defini-
9 tion of the dictionaries, which usually place a strong cognitive demand on
are designed to anticipate the final joy.
Overall, Goldie, Hogan, and Snaevarr do not propose that complex literary empathy (seen as the ability to share and mentally understand someone's feelings
works should be reduced to thematic models, but argue that narrative clues guide and situations). Instead, he notes that the beginnings of empathy are much simpler
the readers to one emotional state or another, and those clues can be detected in all and that, overall, the notion can be understood more broadly as an immediate
5 For a broader analysis of the link between emotions and various arts, not only literature, see
also Sousa 2011, 153-218. 10 In the introduction of his book Herman 2013, l-19 conveniently summarizes the main direc-
6 Goldie 2011, 8-22 expands his ideas about nanative thinking, proposing that we all have tions in which sciences of the mind have most recently explored stories and story telling, not
'fictionalizing tendencies' that become manifest in several areas, such as perceiving our lives only with respect to emotions but also with respect to other eognitive aspects.
as a plot, ascribing agency to a world where there is no agency, looking for narrative threads 11 For eulturally specifie conditions of arousing pity in Greek culture, see especially .Konstan
and closure (where there is none). 2001.
7 The earlier study of Wierzbieka 1994 has also examined some linguistic and cultural patterns 12 De Waal 2009, 33-34: in a first stage, a young male chimpanzee provokes the alpha male of
of emotions, the group to a fight; tl1e alpha male beats and defeats the challenger; in a second stage of the
8 Hogan 2003, 94. experiment, the alpha male is in a bad mood and starts beating a younger male without pro-
9 Hogan 2003, 98; Snaevarr 2010, 335. vocation.
82 Dana LaCourse Munteanu Grief: the Power and Shortcomings in Greek Tragic Consolation 83
shared feeling with another in distress. 13 Animals partake in basic forms of persons return to life, a group (or a single individual) would approach with a
empathy, such as intensifying their own response to pain when they perceive consolatory narrative, showing that others have suffered more acutely before, and
members of their species in pain (mice). But primates appear to display a more yet survived the terrible situation. I will first look at several scenes from Greek
advanced type of cognitive empathy. 14 Attempts to alleviate the suffering of epic and tragedy in which characters offer someone in deep mourning, unrespon-
others who have endured unjustly may thus have basic biological roots. Surely, sive, or fasting, tragic paradigmatic narratives in order to bring the sufferer back
linguistic sophistication and cultural variations give human types of consolation to life.
both complexity and uniqueness, but a basic inclination toward helping another In the Iliad, after agreeing to return, the corpse of Hect@r to his father,
can point to a universal biological base. Achilles wants Priam to postpone leaving his camp immediately and asks him to
eat together first. In several unsuccessful attempts, Ach.illes suggests that Priam
should stop lamenting and take a seat (24.521-526), using consolatory examples:
2 GRIEF AND PARADIGMS OF SUFFERING IN HOMER AND TRAGEDY Zeus gives to all both good and bad fortune (24.527-533); his o,vn father, Peleus,
is growing old at home, without help (24.534-541), matching the reference to his
A link between Greek epic, tragedy, and an old form of Indo-European own father that Priam himself brought up earlier in his appeal to pity (24.504);
consolation might account for similarities in scenes in which characters offer finally saying that weeping will not bring Hector back (24.549-551). 17 To all
solace to others who endure horrific fates. 15 In the Old Norse epic poem Gudru- these, Priam responds that he cannot stop mourning until he sees the corpse of his
narkvida. Gudrun was consoled when she refused to move away from the body of son and the deal is sealed (24.552-558), to which Achilles responds with increas-
slain Sigrud, by other women who have endured various misfortunes. The ing irritation (24.560·-564). A cynical psychological reading may credit Priam's
scenario is as follows. When people were stricken by unbearable calamity, usually final obedience to Achilles' earlier irritated outburst rather than to his plea, and
by the death of a beloved, they became unable or unwilling to function in society, there is, perhaps, some truth in that. However, Achilles does not lose his patience
and may have refused to eat, move, or speak. In modern medical studies of be- with the - not entirely at any rate and does not force him to eat, but spends
reavement four major stages have been observed: numbness, yearning, searching, time developing a long story of Niobe to console him. This narrative will
and anger. 16 Descriptions of characters abstaining from food or shut in silence can eventually work better than his prior consolatory attempts.
be linked to the first phase of numb withdrawal. Then, in order to help such In order to persuade the distraught king of Troy, Achilles reminds him of the
fate ofNiobe (24.600-613):
13 De Waal 2012, 135-138 takes consolation in a very broad way: reassurance of a distressed µev OT]'tOl /.£J,U'ta.t')'Epovro,;€KE/.EU£<;,
individual, which is common in apes but absent in monkeys. He discusses the 'Russian doll KEtto:t6' ev 1.zxie,m'· 6' TJOt<pmvoµivrwnv
model of empathy': having at the bottom motor mimicry and emotional contagion, at a se- ovi::m auto,; &:1rov·vuv oe µvricrcoµt:0aS6p1tou.
cond level coordination, shared goals - sympathetic concern, and, at a third, the highest level: Ka1 rap,' rii.l11:oµo,;N16Prieµv{icrmocrhou,
true imitation perspective the most cognitively developed empathic responses occur ,ft 11:Ep6rooi::1mm:nOESEVlµer&potcrtVot,ov,o
when there is an increased distinction between the self and the other. Singer and Hein 2012, ESo' ulfa:,;riPo>OV,E<;.
sl; µev 0U')'<X't€pE<;,
after reviewing previous scholarship in developmental psychology and neuroscience, analyze WU<;µev 'An6t.t.rov ltE(!)VEV an'ap1upfot0 Pt0t0
more nuances of human empathy: it is an affective state coming from the apprehension of xro6µ£VO(; Nt6Pu, 6' 'Ap,Eµt<;toxempa,
another's condition, and it can turn to sympathy or personal distress or both; it should be di- OVVEK' &pa Arito'i icracrKtWKaAt.tmxprilqr
stinguished from sympathy, empathic concern, and compassion. Empathy translates into sha- <pf\ootro 'tcKEEtv,fi 6' au-i:ri')'etvaro 1toA1coui;·
ring the other person's feeling, while the other forms do not have to have this sharing but can Till6' &pa Kal oou.oJtep eovt' (XJt() 1t&v1:a,;
OAEmmv.
mean only mental understanding of another's condition. One can mentally understand another 01µev /;,,p'evvfjµap 11:sm'ev cp6wp,OUOE n<; ~EV
person's state, but be unable to share the feeling (some types of psychopaths appear to be ve- Km0&wm, J>aaou,;0£ lt0ou,; ltOlT]C,£ Kpov{cov·
ry good at the first without having empathy, as Singer and Heim 2012, 168 show). Someone S' &pa tfi Se11:c«n06:vav 0wt Oupav{rover;.
'tO'\J<;
else's pain can produce two immediate reactions (best studied in children): empathic concern, fi 6' &pa crhou µv{icrm', £Jttt 11:6:µz oo:Kpuxfoucra.
which tends to lead to a desire to help the other, or personal distress, which is not conducive 'Your son is back to you, aged sir, as you asked it.
to helping another. He lies on a bier. When dawn shows you yourself shall see him
14 De Waal 2012, 127 has concluded this, noting that the scientific community has not yet
agreed whether other species besides apes, such as canines and corvids, are capable of conso-
lation; he lists at 129-135 other forms of empathy among animals, including reciprocal al- 17 Home.tic characters do not seem to have difficulties weeping as soon as lose someone.
truism. As Follinger 2009, 24-26 notes, shedding tears frequently marks a reaction to personal loss
15 I have briefly discussed this topic in Munteanu 2012, 132f. (other occasions for crying being anger, despair, fear, and joyful events). Homeric heroes, ne-
16 Bowlby 1980 and 1988; Small 2001 examines additional theories of grief. vertheless, appear to abstain from food when they find themselves in extreme sorrow.
84 Dana LaCourse Munteanu Grief: the Power and Shortcomings in Greek Tragic Consolation 85
as you take him away. Now you and I must remember our supper. guarantees the success of the new paradigm? Two features differ from Achilles'
For even Niobe, she of the lovely tresses, remembered previous attempts: the story of Niobe matches much closer Priam' s situation and
To eat, whose twelve children were destroyed in her palace, state of mind (already lost children, did not want to eat, but had to) than the prior
Six daughters, and six sons in the pride of their youth, whom Apollo
examples and, second, it is much more developed than the previous suggestions,
killed with arrows from his silver bow, being angered
with Niobe, and shaft-showering Artemis killed the daughters;
turning into a mini-drama sui generis.
because Niobe likened herself to Leto of the fair colouring Even though the story of Niobe succeeds in its immediate purpose, I would
and said Leto had borne onlv two, she herself had borne many; like to point out certain strange details in th.euse of it, and, more generally, in the
but the two, though they we~e only two, destroyed all those others. use of comforting speeches destined to alleviate mourning in the Homeric epic.
Nine days long they lay in their blood, nor was there anyone There is something odd in the example offered by Achilles. An essential function
To bury them, for the son of Cronus made stones out of
of the tragic stories used in consolation is to bring the mourner back to life: to
the people; but on the tenth day the Uranian gods buried them.
But she remembered to eat when she was worn out with weeping.' snatch the person from self-destruction, marked by starvation, isolation, and
perhaps a desire to join the dead. So seems to be the case in the Indo-European
After eating, she turned to stone and continued to mourn her children (24.617- example of women rescuing Gudrun with their storytelling, However, the myth of
620): Niobe remains for us, and probably already for the Homeric audiences, an exam-
i:v0a :ueo.:;
1tepEO"U(m
0erov f,K KT]Ocalte<J(JE'.l. ple of inconsolable mourner, who vanishes into stone, unable to rejoin the world
&JJ; &ye ◊t] Kal vrot µe8coµc0a ◊lE )'£pme of the living.21Achilles' use of her myth does not aim to save Priam permanently
ahou· fitztt6. Kevain:E ipiAovitai:80: KA◊:ioia0ri from his deep mourning, but only to give him enough strength to return to his
"IAtOV ';J(Y,J{Y'Jf,W" ltO!.UOaKpU1:0<;
0€ 1:0t fo-i:m. lamentation, if he so wishes, as the final lines of the speech (24.617-620) indicate.
'There, stone still, she broods on the sorrows that the gave her.
Indirectly, then, the tragic example may strengthen the ability to mourn rather
Come then, we also, magnificent sir, must remember
to eat, and afterwards you may take your beloved son back than diminish it in the long run.
18
to Ilion. and mourn for him; and he will be much Jarnented.' Elsewhere in the Iliad, Achilles, himself a mourner, also fasts, marking thus
his deep grieving. On hearing about the death of Patroclus, he chooses not to eat,
Without any specific invocation of emotions, the story ofNiobe serves a practical and even tries to impose abstaining from food to his fellow-warriors, until his be-
purpose here, in a manner similar to the consolation moment from the Norse loved companion is fully avenged in Book 19.22 Twice Odysseus intervenes
poem: it should help Priam to temporarily leave aside mourning and to return to (19.156-169) and (19.216-234) insisting that the Achaeans ought to eat before
life-sustaining activities. The consolation comes from a simple narrative formula: going to battle, with which Achilles agrees in the end (19.275). But he alone does
others have endured even worse calamities and managed to gather strength: even not yield to any exhortation, continuing to subject himself to starvation. Individual
9
Niobe (who had twelve unburied children, not one)1 temporarily stopped her (Briseis) and group lamentations (other captive women), accompanied by exhorta-
lamenting to feed herself (if only to be able to cry more later). Like a veritable tions (of Greek men) follow.23 Many important studies have rightly pointed out
dramatist, Achilles imagines and describes the moments after the death of the the significance of Briseis' lament over the loss of Patroclus, showing how it
Niobids, giving a series of details that may be innovations, or free improvisations connects various narrative threads in the poem, as it anticipates the suffering of
on the skeletal structure of the myth. 20 It is noteworthy that this speech using
Niobe as a paradigm does work as consolation (24.624): Priam indeed eats and
requests a place to sleep, so he abandons his unbreakable mourning state (24.635- 21 Gantz 1993, 537 also remarks on the strangeness of this version of the story ofNiobe and on
642), even though Achilles' earlier words of solace failed (24.517-564). What additional surprises of the Homeric version of the story: so, forexample, the unburied corpses
of the children, which must intensify the pain of the mother. In my view, this narrative detail
18 Translations from the Iliad are Lattirnorc's (1951) or slightly adapted. has to be understood in opposition to Priam's advantage (ability to bury his son immediately).
19 As Keuls 1978, 58, footnote 57, writes, however, Priam has also lost many children, not only 22 Ochs 1993, 39 comments on the oddity of this behavior, wondering 'whether or not fasting
Hector in the Iliad (24.601f.). It seems remarkable to me that Achilles not only dramatizes the was an expected behavior in the bereavement ritual for Homeric Greeks or whether the self-
story of Niobe in a manner convenient to his purpose, but also chooses to ignore certain de- imposed "penance" can better be read as a plot mechanism to highlight tl1e of the he-
tails that could close the gap between the mythological sufferer and Priam. roes eagerness for revenge'. Clearly, to everyone else Achilles' idea of fasting seems extre-
20 Willcock 1964, 141-143 interestingly underscores the idea that certain details in the Homeric me.
version of the myth, including Niobe's eating, seem to be a 'made-up' addition to the basic 23 Pucci 1998, 97-112 in the chapter entitled 'Antiphonal Lament Between Achilles and Bri-
petrification of the devastated mother. These inventions stretching the myth to fit the purpose seis' continues to develop the earlier observations of Lohmann (1993) to examine the paralle-
(to convince Priam) are nowhere else attested unless Homer is cited. On this, see also Alden lism between Briseis' lament and Achilles' (19.282-339). As Briseis' lament is followed by
2000, 27-29, who sees in the story ofNiobe a 'positive' paradigm. other women's laments, so Achilles' is followed by other men's.
86 Dana Lacourse Munteanu Grief: the Power and Shortcomings in Greek Tragic Consolation 87
Andromache and commemorates war loss.24 But could we interpret Briseis' inter- perhaps, he in fact responds to the earlier lament of Briseis, which she may have
vention as an attempt to alleviate Achilles' pain? Though never addressing intended as consolatory. She has lost her male protectors (including her father,
Achilles directly, Briseis (19.282-300) offers a moving variation of the theme ofa husband, and brothers), but his loss has surpassed hers, because losing Patroclus is
woman's suffering even more than the mourner: she lost her husband and three worse than losing his father. In this instance, the female song does not bring
brothers all in one day (19.291-294). We can easily link her personal story to solace but is amplified by the lament of the grieving male instead. 29 And, instead
those laments sung by the women of the Gudrunarkvida who try to console the of Achilles' return to a normal way of living, we witness an extraordinary pro-
widow. 25 Most of the women in the Norse poem were captives who have lost their longation of the mourning process in Book ) 9 of the Iliad, in which both the dead
male relatives, just like Briseis, who in a way is twice taken prisoner, once by and the living are allowed not to separate through magic intervention. As, at the
Achilles and secondly by Agamemnon. But here is the twist: she has lost even her beginning of the book, the gods permit Patroclus' body not to decompose, through
consoler, Patroclus, so she wilJ weep endlessly for him (19.300). The implication feeding it ambrosia and nectar post-mortem (19.36-39), so they keep the fasting
may well be that she feels even more unfortunate than Achilles, but she does not Achilles alive and strong through feeding him artificially with ambrosia and
dare say so.26 Other women join in lamentation (19.301-303), each for herself, 30
nectar (19.351-356). Thus, one's longing for the deceased hero has an extraordi-
though openly grieving for Patroclus. Then Greek men approach Achilles with a nary extension through artificial nourishment in the Iliad until the funeral proces-
clear message - that he should nourish his body, 'begging him to eat' (Atcrcr6- sion,31 although consolation through tragic myth can provide temporary solace.
µi.::votoEucvficrm, 19.304). This could have resembled the scene of the Norse Contemplating the misfortune of another in an exemplary story can snatch a
poem, in which the mourner is slowly brought back to senses by tragic stories of sufferer from the paralysis of deep grief. A curious example, similar to the Niobe
others. But it does not. All is in vain, for consolation (if that was the intention of parable in the Iliad, occurs when Clytemnestra first addresses Cassandra in
Briseis and the other women) fails, and so does also the men's exhortation. Aeschylus' Agamemnon (1035-1041):
Achilles persists in his self-mortification, justifying his refusal to eat: his longing
el<JW1rnµl;ou Kat cro, Kacrcr&vopavf,B"(W,
for Patroclus exceeds his desire for food and drink (19.319-321), but most of all £1tetcr' e811Ke aµ11vhw<;o6µoli;
because he could not imagine suffering 'anything worse', KaKo:n:EpovaXAo Kowwvovdvm XEpv{Pwv, rcoAArov µtm
(19.321), not even if his father had died. Afterwards he imagines how losing oouA(ovcr,ath:icrav ic,ricrfouPwµou 1t1SMX<;'
Peleus would have been a less terrible scenario (19.321-336). 27 What rescues EKPmv' 0:1tr]V'll';
1:f\croi:,µ110'U1tep(jlp6vn.
Gudrun in the Norse poem is thinking of the other women suffering even more ical.1tatoa "(ap to{ (jlO:<JtvAAKµr]V11<;no,/,
than she does; what prevents Achilles from letting his grief loosen is his failure to 1tpa8ev1:a1:Af\vmOOUAta<; µ&~11<;
'1:UXElV.
Cassandra you may go within the house as well,
see that anyone could suffer more than he does. He remains disconnected from Since Zeus in no unkindness has ordained that you
Briseis' lamenting interlude and unable to relate to other men's pleas. 28 But, Must share our lustral water, stand with the great throng
Of slaves that flock to the altar of our household god.
Step from this chariot, then, and do not be so proud.
24 Due 2002, 6-9, with earlier bibliography, connects Briseis especially to the plight of Andro- And think - they say that long ago Alcmena's son
mache and, more generally, to the suffering of all Trojan women; further on the theme, see Was sold in bondage and endured the bread of slaves.32
also Due 2006. 54f. and Perkell 2008, 98--104.
25 Most of the w~men in the Norse poem were captives who have lost their male relatives, just Leaving aside the queen's ultimate intentions, it is worth taking a brieflook at her
like Briseis, who in a way is twice taken prisoner, once by Achilles and secondly by Aga- words, which make use of the consolatory tragic exemplum. Perhaps few corn-
memnon. As Karanika 2014, 24 notes, the very first image of a mortal woman in the Iliad is
that of the silenced Briseis (l.347f.) walking reluctantly away from the tent of Achilles, after
Patroclus hands her to the men who will bring her to the new master. 29 Crotty 1994, 49 well points out the gendered parallels in lamentation: the women hearing
26 As Due 2002, 67t'. suggests, we could imagine Briseis as a widow three times in the Iliad: Briseis mourn not only for Patroclus, but also for themselves (19.301f.); similarly, the old
first, she is bereaved of the Trojan husband, secondly, she weeps for Patroclus, a substitute men join Achilles, grieving also for their own losses (I 9.338f.).
for her new husband, and, thirdly, she anticipates the death of Achilles who implicitly views 30 To Achilles' worries that Patroclus' body will rot, Thetis assures him that the corpse will
her as wife-like (9.340-343). remain intact even for a year; then she drops ambrosia and nectar through the dead man's no-
27 On the complicated relationship between hero-sons and their fathers in Homer, see, for strils (Iliad 19.21-39). In response to Zeus' wony that Achilles' body will grow weaker ifit
example, Holway 2011, 79-104. is not fed, Athena pours nectar and ambrosia inside Achilles' chest (Iliad 19.340-356).
28 Murnaghan 1999 notices that, in general, laments bring the female perspective into the male 31 Roberts 1993, 574f. observes that while the burial enhances the possibility of closure in both
oriented narratives of the Greek epic; despite gender differences, however, at 207, she points Greek epic and tragedy, the exclusion of relatives from the burial often occurs as a theme in
out that laments stem from regretful fantasies, from imagined scenarios that can no longer ta- these gerues, increasing the anxiety around the dead.
ke place: Briseis' and Achilles' laments for Patroclus resemble each other in this respect. 32 The translation is Lattimore's ( 1967).
88 Dana LaCourse Munteanu Grief: the Power and Shortcomings in Greek Tragic Consolation 89
mentators would take the allusion to Heracles being a slave to be a prototypical Paradigmatic tragic stories serve to remind the sufferer of vital routines. Certain
consolation, but I think it is.33 It is certainly surprising to attempt to console one's features of the tragic story are worth underlining here. (1) There is no specific
34
future victim, but the scene on the whole is surprising. It does not seem appeal to the emotions (e.g. pity) in the address. Nor is there any implication that
implausible that Clytemnestra wants to be able to convince the Cassandra to the sufferer could take action and help someone. The exemplum invites only to
move, even though she has no concern for her overall good. At any rate, abstract thinking, even when it is not mythological: others have survived similar
Clytemnestra briefly describes the misfortune of someone of higher status than the but more horrible situations. However, the speaker clearly presents the paradig~
Trojan captive; someone who has steadfastly endured a similar calamity, namely matic narrative as a way of diverting the 1;1ttentionof the grieving person from
slavery. She does so in order to convince Cassandra to abandon her motionless feeling sorrow for the self to thinking of another's pain and as a way of sympa-
state and step down from her chariot. As in the case of Priarn in the Iliad, thizing with another. (2) An implied comparison is drawn: the sufferer in the
Cassandra here is in extreme pain after seeing her city destroyed and herself taken mythical example has endured even more terrible things (Niobe) or belongs to a
captive, and that most likely causes her silence, 35 though her unresponsiveness higher ranl<:than does the person currently in pain (Heracles). (3) The misfortune
36
may also be a sign of defiance. of the paradigmatic mini-tragedy resembles that of the sufferer (e.g. the loss of
Concentration on personal misfortune causes a kind of indifference to the children in the Iliad, or slavery in the example from the Agamemnon). 37 (4)
world, a senseless and motionless state, in which the sufferer forsakes the funda- Finally, the mythical example hides a message of optimism (even though some-
mental activities of life: eating, moving, and speaking to other fellow-humans. times we can detect only a very slight optimistic nuance such as in the case of
Niobe who overcame her mourning state only· to gather strength to continue to
lament); the overall (implied) moral of the mythical story lies in the fact that
33 Not many pay attention to Clyternnestra's use of the example ofHeracles. Raeburn and Tho-
others have managed to survive in most unfortunate circumstances.
mas 2011, 180, for instance, simply summarize (lines 1035-1071): 'First, Clytemnestra re-
enters from the house and attempts to lure Cassandra inside'. Earlier, Denniston and Page How extensive is the practice of offering consolation through tragic exempla
1957, 159, ad loc. correctly note 'There is something ironical, almost contemptuous, in the within tragedies themselves? And how successful. is it? Overall, as Chong-
futile consolation of 1040f., "Don't think too good for your position: cheer yourself Gossard has shown, characters in Greek tragedy often refuse to be consoled by an
up with the example of Heracles in bondage to Omphale."'- they point out that Cassandra invocation of persons who have endured similar misfortunes.38 He notes that con-
will not live long enough to need strength. This is certainly true but, in my opinion, Clytem- solatory examples fail to work within tragedies, even though philosophers
nestra still intends her words to function as a consolation with a practical purpose, namely to
sometimes cite them later as standard texts for consolation. 39 The parodos of
help Cassandra temporarily to overcome her petrified state, albeit she intends to murder her
later. As Mossman 2005, 354f. notes, Cassandra is the only character who resists Clytemne- Sophocles' Electra offers a memorable example (137-157): 40 when the chorus of
stra's persuasive speech in the play. Argive women attempt to soothe the heroine's grief with numerous common
34 Rehm 2002, 79 observes that at this point the audience expects Agamemnon to be killed tropes (invariability of mortality, sorrow has not befallen her alone, etc ), she
offstage, a moment anticipated by the song of the chorus (975-1034), but, instead, Clytemne- refuses to accept those. Furthermore, she responds with her own counter-exam-
stra appears unexpectedly and tries to lure the silent character inside. Cassandra's entrance ples, including tragic stories, including a reforence to Niobe who cries endlessly in
constitutes then a surprising climax. Surprising is also another detail in this scene, as Scodel
her rocky grave (147-152). Interestingly, the story ofNiobe gives here justifica-
2010, 99f. observes: when Cassandra did not respond to Clytemnestra, ancient spectators
would have assumed that she was played not by an actor but by an extra, so they would have tion for relentless weeping - a quite different spin from the passage in the Iliad
been shocked when she started singing at 1072. examined above. Surely Electra' s situation differs considerably from those of the
35 Stanford 1983, 61 associates silence with various emotional attitudes in Greek tragedy: 'the other mourners in that she continues to hold her deep grief for the death of her
pathetic silence of Cassandra in Agamemnon (783-1071 ), the "tense" silence of Prometheus
in the Prometheus Bound for the first eighty lines, the silence of Phaedra linked to shame in
the Hippolytus (297), and the silence linked to desolation and Euripides' Heracles, af-
ter the hero realizes that he has killed his children (1178-1230). On silent veiling, as a sign of
see, for""'""',""'' Cairns 2009, 46f. 37 Note that Achilles' consolatory attempts prior to the story ofNiobe did not satisfy this cpndi-
36 Clytemnestra first seems to interpret Cassandra's silence as a sign of grief, hence her brief tion (agreement between the type of suffering in the myth and of the sufferer).
attempt to console her and, no doubt, Cassandra starts lamenting as soon as she lets sounds 38 Chong-Gossard 2013 and, for an earlier, narrower essay, dealing with failure of consolation
come out of her. But interpreters most commonly underscore the fact that Clytemnestra belie- in a situation of erotic disappointment, see Chong-Gossard 2009. His excellent analyses have
ves that the Trojan captive does not know Greek (1050-1052) - so for example Montiglio a different scope than mine, looking more generally at broad consolatory themes and not at
2000, 214, who analyzes with subtlety the effects of this silence on the confident queen. This the examples I have discussed, which regard profound grief, felt immediately after a calamity,
latter assumption, it seems to me, comes from the queen's reconsidering the reason of the si- when consolation could bring someone back from numbness.
lence after her consolatory example failed: so if Cassandra cannot be consoled, it may be be- 39 Examples come from Alcestis and Hypsipyle.
cause she does not understand the words. 40 Chong-Gossard 2013, 46-49 offers a detailed discussion of this failed consolation.
90 Dana LaCourse Munteanu Grief: the Power and Shortcomings in Greek Tragic Consolation 91
father in order to punish her mother,4 1 but normally that stage of lamentation function well in one respect, namely to restore the mourner to behavior that is
should have passed. In conclusion, however, protagonists often reject consolation conducive to living, by ending the unresponsive state, or social isolation? Later on
through common tropes and mythical exempla in Greek tragedy. In a way, in the fourth-century, Aristotle notes that people who are utterly destroyed do not
nevertheless, by declaring themselves inconsolable, these characters could feel pity for others, having no greater evil to fear in their own life. 45 In the scenes
become in themselves useful paradigms for the external Athenian audience, who explored above, the bereft persons may think that the worst has already happened
could not possibly have had to endure such incredible sorrows. 42 to them, but they often still hope to accomplish something, so it is worth overcom-
My analysis has concentrated on more specific situations, narrower in scope ing their grief on that account. 46 In the Iliad, certainly Achilles persuades Priam to
than those analyzed by Chong-Gossard, namely on instances when consolation is eat with him after using the example of Niobe. Briseis is not successful in consol-
delivered immediately after a calamity (usually bereavement) occurs. The purpose ing Achilles, but she never dares to use her personal misfortune directly as a
of the consolatory speech in this particular context can be rather precisely defined: means of persuasion. It may be due to gender and status that she cannot offer
to restore the sufferer to normality, and thus end his or her silence, fasting, and herself as a consolatory model openly, and Achilles does not connect with her but
isolation. Practical results can thus measure the success of the consolatory speech. laments separately and is followed antiphonally by a group of men. He is,
In the epic instances examined here and the Aeschylean scene, the narrated however, restored to nourishment through magic, as he also has to avenge the
example of another's misfortune occurs in precise circumstances, immediately death of his friend. In Aeschylus' Agamemnon, Cassandra does not respond to
after a calamity. A story used may be exemplary, myth-based (Niobe, Heracles), Clytemnestra's strange encouragement immediately. However, she does regain
but it might be personal as well, if we consider Briseis' lament to be in this her voice later on. In the lost Aeschylean tragedies, Niobe and Achilles do not
consolatory category. The speaker brings it up to convince Priam to eat, as earlier speak for a long time, but again they do eventually after being consoled by the
47
in the Iliad Achilles ought to eat, and in the Agamemnon Cassandra has to speak. choruses. In the examples discussed above there was a clear correspondence: the
We know of more scenes of similar sort in the lost tragedies of Aeschylus, in more similar the mourner perceives his or her plight to be to the narrated tragic
which the protagonists remained silent on stage for a long time, especially his example, the more successful the consolation and viee versa, the more dissimilar,
Niobe in the homonymous play and Achilles, probably in the Phrygians, while the less likely successful the consolation. 48 ·
others tried to convince them to return to the normal activities. 43 Although we do From a broader perspective, Niobe as a mythical paradigm can strangely offer
not have all the details, those scenes were memorable enough to be mocked by solace, even though she herself appears to have been inconsolable,· and may be
Aristophanes in the Frogs (911-913). The scenes in which consolation is offered used to excuse eternal mourning (e.g. Sophocles' Electra). Her story is not only
in an exemplary narrative display metatheatrical features: self-referential when used in an inventive way in the Iliad already, as we have. seen, but also continues
they occur in tragedies, and inviting the mourner to be a spectator to the misfor- to remain a model for consolation, as fourth-century Apulian vase iconography
49
tunes of others. 44 But does consolation by tragic exempla - mythical or personal-- indicates. In the Italiote funerary art, the image of the Niobe in deep mourning
41 The first stage of grief produced by bereavement is usually more acute and potentially
paralyzing than the following phases. For example, in a standard book, Kubler-Ross 1969, 45 Rhetoric 3.8, 1385b20-22: these people cannot relate to another's suffering because they
lists denial and isolation as first manifestations of bereavement; those, in their turn, may come have already endured everything.
with silence and refusal to cat, followed by anger, negotiation, sadness, and finally acceptan- 46 Priam still hopes to bury Hector and Achilles still wants. to avenge his beloved companion.
ce. Cassandra may be the exception, but she still seems to think that her prophetic skills may
42 As Chong-Gossard 2013, 39 observes, invocations of tragic exempla within tragedies are in warn the chorus about the murder about to happen, and keeps some vague hope until she en-
themselves meta-theatrical, and these scenes where consolation occurs can be used as para- ters the palace to meet her death in the Agamemnon (1330).
digms in future drama. 47 According to the testimony of Aristophanes in the Frogs (924f.), Niobe spoke in the end
43 Sommerstein 2010, 242 reviews the evidence for Aeschylus' tetralogy based on the Iliad: it twelve ox-like monstrous words.
contained The l'vfyrmidons, The Nereids, The Phrygians, and a satyr play. Aristophanes mocks 48 The mourner has to accept the similarity and concede to an extent that the nanated suffering
the silent Aeschylean characters, such as :Niobe and Achilles, but the commentators are unsu- was worse than his. Thus Priam accepts the parallel: parents honibly losing children who are
re whether it is the angry silent Achilles in the Myrmidons (coinciding with the known begin- unburied in the Iliad. Achilles does not take in Briseis' lament (that she has suffered similarly
ning of the Iliad) or the mourning Achilles in the Phrygians, after losing Patroclus. Most in- but worse: not only their gender but also their losses are weighed differently). Later he.clearly
cline toward the latter, but, as Sommerstein 2010, 242f. rightly points out, Aeschylus could states that his loss is worse than that of a male protector. Cassandra does not respond to
have represented Achilles twice stubbornly silent, in both tragedies. Clytemnestra's comparison, so we do not !mow what she believes, but she may well think
44 As I have suggested earlier, there is no request, and most often no possibility, for the sufferer that she is going to suffer more than Heracles.
to act on account of his pity for another in these instances, so he or she only contemplates 49 Schmidt 1976, 41-43 connects the figure ofNiobe on the Apulian funerary vases with Achil-
another's misfortune in the same way in which a spectator would. les' use of the myth in the Iliad as a consolatory example for Priam. For skepticism regarding
92 Dana LaCourse Munteanu Grief: the Power and Shortcomings in Greek Tragic Consolation 93
by the grave of her children was probably seen as consolatory in connection with place the audience's troubles into the right perspective. And several cases follow
the Aeschylus' lost play: as her death through petrification symbolizes both a as illustrations from tragedies, 54 among which I am going to select the example of
relief from unbearable pain and perhaps a promise to be reunited with her lost Niobe because, on the one hand, it relates to our earlier discussion, and on the
children. 50 So, in Greek epic and tragedy, consolation through a narrative of other, it moves us to the next stage, the philosophical views. Someone's child has
another's suffering functions well, at times, in a limited sense, that of briefly died, Niobe has eased (K£KOU<ptK£V, 14) his/her pain. As we have already seen, in
restoring the bereaved to normality, although, more broadly, tragic characters may the Iliad already Achilles reminded Priam of Niobe in order to divert him from
refuse to forget their pain or to accept collllllon tropes. Disturbing in most of the mourning and help him return to resume eating. Furthermo:te, in different
cases I have explored, however, is the sense that the consolation through exem- philosophical contexts, the same idea resurfaces: contemplating the enormous
plary story can only function as a sort of palliative: good enough for ending the misfortunes of others (and responding emotionally to them) can ease personal
ongoing crisis, so the mourner does not die from grief, but not sufficient to concerns, and can thus produce pleasure. 55
alleviate the sorrow long-term.
3.2 Plato
3 FROM TRAGIC EXEMPLA TO CONSOL TORY GENRE AND PLEASURE
Within epic and tragedy, consolation through tragic exempla appears to be
3.1 Timocles successful only in a limited sense, namely to alleviate grief in its first acute phase,
so that the mourner can return to routine activities. But tragedy as genre may have
From using tragic exempla for practical reasons, tragedies might offer spectators been seen as offering solace to spectators, with its parade .of utterly devastated
who are less traumatized by recent calamities a more abstract type of relief. A characters, who, though inconsolable themselves become paradigms of suffering,
fragment .from Middle Comedy, Timocles' Dionysiazusae (Kassel-Austin, fr. 6. as Timocles' fragment from Dionysiazusae parodically suggests. However, this
Vol 7=Athenaeus 6.223b-d) gives a humorous account of the benefits of tragedy notion probably already circulated in Greek culture, and not only in dramatic
that fits the earlier idea of consolation. 51 The mind (voui;, 5) of the listener, contexts, but also among philosophers and rhetoricians. 56 A fragment of Demo-
leaving aside personal sorrows (1:&vioimv ATJ811v Aa~cov, 5) is mesmerized by critus (B 191 DK) already recommends that by contemplating (8cmpE£tv)the lives
another's experience (c:xAA01:piq:i1:£ \Jfuxaywy118di;n&8n, 6).52 This process of those who are more unfortunate than they, people can realize that they live
comes with both pleasure (µc8' ii8ovfti;, 7) and instruction (7), 53 for tragic stories better than others. 57 A sharp and formidable opponent of this idea of tragic
this view, see Keuls 1978, 60, with footnote 65, who suggests that Aeschylus' tragedy could more broadly seen it as a response to various philosophical views about tragedy and a parody
have served as a model for the artists instead. of philosophical diction, including that of Aristotle.
50 Keuls 1978 convincingly reconstructs the symbolism of the figure of Niobe on the Apulian 54 Rosen 2012, 185, footnote 15, observes that Timocles' list of tragic examples in this fragment
vases in relationship with literary evidence (particularly the Aeschylean tragedy). She starts comes close to the one which Dicaeopolis gives in Aristophanes' Acharnians (410---434),
with a surprising observation: while the preferred themes on funerary vases belong to the asking Euripides for his most piteous creations: Oeneus (419), Phoenix (421), Philoctetes
'happy ending' Euripidean tragedies, Niobe appears to be an exception; even on the Apulian (424), Bellerophon (427), and Telephus (429). This may imply a long interaction of comedy
vases she is depicted mourning by the grave, sometimes guarded by consolatory figures (e.g. with a series of (particularly) Euripidean characters who may have been seen as prototypes of
a woman, or Zethus and Amphion) often with parallel scenes depicting Andromeda, and endurance.
Keuls suggests several plausible explanations for the optimistic take on the myth of the 55 The description of musical catharsis from Aristotle's Politics 8 (1342a4-15) contains the idea
mourning mother. For a recent reexamination of the Aeschylean fragments, see Pennesi 2008, that people who feel pity and fear (though not necessarily in a theatrical context here, these
who carefully reviews previous scholarship. are the quintessential emotions of tragedy in the Poetics) experience catharsis, which is pla-
51 Generally, on Greek comedy writers' preoccupation with tragedy, see Wright 2012, 162-164, ced on the same level as relief and pleasure. The same verb, to ease (Kou<pii;Etv)was used in
listing the following: Alcaeus' Comitragedy, Callias' Tragedy of Letters, Phrynichus' Trage- the fragment from Timocles, in connection with the tragic Niobe easing the pain of a person
dians; comedies that presented themselves as tragedies: Strattis' Orestes the Man and Phoe- who loses a child. I am not including a full discussion of Aristotle here because he does not
nician Women (based on Euripides), Cratinus' Eumenides, etc. deal with the subject directly and because of the problems surrounding catharsis. For more on
52 McCoy 2013, 200 interestingly notes that while the audience's engagement with the suffering the possible links between his oikeia hedone and consolation, see my suggestions 2012, 117-
of another certainly refers in this fragment from Timocles to the tragic character, it may also 131.
be expanded to the real misfortunes of others beyond the examples, of people in the commu- 56 On this see Kassel 1958, Sf.
nity. 57 It seems interesting to me that the dominating terms in the fragment relate to contemplation
53 Rosen 2012, 183 plausibly suggests that the speaker ofTimocles' fragment targets especially and thinking (about others) and not to feeling, although, of course, the two should not be seen
contemporary theories proclaiming the didactic usefulness of tragedy. I (2012, 133-136) have in contrast.
94 Dana Lacourse Munteanu Grief: the Power and Shortcomings in Greek Tragic Consolation 95
consolation is Plato. His critique of tragic pleasure in the tenth book of the however, the famous discussion of tragic pleasure in last book of the Republic is
Republic comes precisely as an argument against finding solace for grief in epic deeply connected with a rejection of the notion of tragic consolation. Although
and dramatic perforn1ances. Here Socrates sets his theoretical point on a particular originally story-telling appears to have brought solace to a mourner isolated
narrative frame, a hypothetical case: imagine that a worthy man has lost his son socially because of his grief, Plato envisions a later stage, and is concerned with
(1O.6O3e).While he wiH feel a certain amount of grief in a moderate measure, for the mourner's proper social behavior. In this context, a man ought to bear his
experiencing no emotion would be impossible, this bereft man would refrain bereavement with dignity and moderation, but tragic performances rather stir the
expressing this grief in public, because of a sense of shame, though he would be personal pain than alleviate it. As an alternative to the tragedian's work, the
less composed in privacy (1O.6O4a). As the interlocutor readily agrees with this philosopher proposes his own complex myth with consolatory power, that of Er,
premise, Socrates continues to show that tragic pleasure slackens the soul's the Pamphylian soldier who died but came back to life later. 61 Plato's successors
capacity for restraint (I0.6O6a3-b8). 58 Some cultural commonalities can be easily seemed to have continued to develop ways tp promote philosophy as consolation,
observed in this account. Thus, the spectator of epic and tragic performances perhaps in contrast with tragedy. A disciple, Crantor, wrote a treatise entitled On
relaxes the guard of his lamentation and feels pleasure (11oovfi),both relief arid Grief (Ilcpt rcev0ouc.,),probably expanding Platonic ideas: it apparently argued
enjoyment being features also present in the Timoclean fragment. The main that emotions, and excessive grief in particular, were natural but had to be
concern here also matches the theme of consolation through tragic exempla. Thus moderated by reason. 62
Plato examines the effect of feeling pain for a fictional other (of another man,
&'J.J..oc.,avrw), by observing the suffering of others (aA.t1hcpmna0ri) when one
tries to bear his own misfortunes. What Plato brilliantly reverses is the starting 3.3 Later Philosophers on Tragic Consolation
point in the tradition. As we have seen in the early examples from tragedy and
epic, the silence and isolation of the mourners were symptoms of the first, acute The debate over accepting or rejecting tragedy as a form of consolation in
stage of grief, a phase of bereavement well documented by modem medicine philosophy did not end with Plato, but resurfaced in .later philosophical debates.
· and biology. Those succumbing to such grief were unable to interact with others For example, it preoccupies the Stoics and Skeptics, who meditate on the
in a normal manner, so the tragic stories of others helped them rejoin the world. relationship between feeling sorrow for fictional others and for the self. I would
Plato presents a different situation: the mourner keeps the grief to himself not like to devote the last section to a brief review of these later philosophical
because he is unable but because he is unwilling to lament publicly, held back by approaches, as presented in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations.
a sense of shame. From this viewpoint the ease and pleasme at letting the sorrow The analysis of consolatory techniques in Cicero's third book of Tusculan
for fictional others flow does not come with a benefit (even if it is commonly Disputations6 3 reviews the opinions of various philosophical schools about
thought so), but with a loss, an inability to control the expression of sorrow. This distress caused by bereavement Again without going into intricate detail, 64 I will
conclusion, therefore, opposes the view of tragedy as solace, in which the select for discussion a section that seems to have direct relevance to my topic: the
spectator gains control over his o\vn pain by contemplating the suffering of others relationship between the observation of the fictional other in tragic exempla and
on the tragic stage. the alleviation of personal pain (3.24.59-60):
Certainly historical cultural changes can account for some differences in the Quodcirca Carneades, ut video nostrum scribere Antiochum, r:eprehendere Ch,ysippum
attitudes toward mourning between the archaic and classical Greece, and literary solebat laudantem Euripideum carmen illud:
representations of lament do not simply corresponded to social realities. 59 The
idea that one should feel ashamed for lamenting publicly in Plato's Republic does
not appear in the Homeric examples. 60 Most importantly for our purpose here,
durance has to replace otherwise endless weeping, which appears womanish. For a recent
reappraisal of the fragment, with a review of scholarship, see Steiner 2012.
58 I do not intend to offer any close analysis of this passage, which I have discussed elsewhere 61 Halliwell 2007 offers a nuanced examination of this myth and its function within the Repu-
(2009) 119--122 and (2012) 62-{i5, but I shall only highlight relevant points for the present blic.
discussion. 62 A brief description of Crantor's work is given by Cicero, Academica Priora 2.135; for a good
59 On this topic see especially Foley 2001, 21-55 and Due 2006, 46-50 with a careful review or scholarly discussion of Peri Penthous, its central idea, metriopatheia, and its influence, see
earlier scholarship. Dillon 2003, 224-228.
60 When Achilles offers the example ofNiobe, he suggests that there would be nothing shame- 63 General topics in Cicero's Tusculan Disputations regard the shock of misfortune and duration
ful in Priarn's interrupting his lamenting, not that Priam should altogether stop weeping for of mourning. Is grief natural or not? Responses of various philosophical schools are listed and
his son. However, the idea that unbridled mourning ought to be confined only to certain ap- discussed.
propriate social contexts has been seen as early as a fragment of Archilochus (13 West): en- 64 For a detailed commentary, see Graver 2002, 78-112.
96 Dana Lacourse Munteanu Grief: the Power and Shortcomings in Greek Tragic Consolation 97
Mortalis nemo est quem non attingat dolor In conclusion, Cicero defends the power of tragic consolation, assuming that
Morbusque; muftis sunt humandi liberi, awareness of universal necessity aids us in enduring hardships (Tusculan
Rursum creandi, morsque estflnita omnibus Disputations 3.24.60):
Quae generi humano angorem nequiquam adferunt ...
Negabat genus hoe orationis quidquam omnino ad levandam aegritudinem pertinere; id enim 111ihivero longe videtur secus nam et necessitas ferendae condicionis humanae quasi cum
ipsum dolendum esse dicebat, quad in tam crudelem necessitatem incidissemus; nam illam deo pugnare prohibet admonetque esse hominem, quae cogitatio magno opere luctum levat,
quidem orationem ex commemoratione aliernorum malorum ad malevolos consolandos esse et enumeratio exemplorum, non ut an/mum malevorum oblectet, adfertur, sed ut ille qui
accomodatam. maeret, ferendum sibi id censeat, quad videat mµltos moderate et tranquill'e tulisse.
Therefore, Carneades, as I see our Antiochus writes, used to reproach Chrysippus who was It seems to me that the matter is quite different, for the necessity of bearing the human
65
praising that famous Euripidean passage: condition prevents us from fighting as if with a god, and reminds us that we are human, and
There is no mortal whom pain does not touch this thought alleviates our sorrow with great power, and the counting of examples are not for
And ilh1ess; many have to bury their children, delighting the mind of the spiteful, but rather for the person who grieves, so that he might
And to conceive again, death is definite for all think that it (his own sorrow) can be endured, because he sees that many have endured it
Things bring distress to the human race in vaiu ... [from Euripides' Hypsipyle, fr. 757 patiently and quietly.
Kannicht]
He would deny that this type of speech pertains at all to the alleviation of sorrow; that very Cicero's reasoning surely sounds convincing: people do not naively enjoy
thing has to be painful, he would say. For, we have fallen into such cruel necessity; for, watching the suffering of others, even when presented in mimetic form, but may
surely, that famous [Euripidean] speech about the commemoration of other peoples' find solace in finding models of people who have endured the most extraordinary
misfortunes must be fit to bring solace to the ill-disposed people. hardships and prevailed. However, several objections can be raised to this
It remains unspecified here why exactly Chrysippus, the Stoic philosopher (279- argument, and some have been. (1) In the tragedies themselves, heroes often
206 BCE), praised this passage from Euripides' Hypsipyle. Possibly he saw in it a declare themselves inconsolable. Therefore, they could not be taken as models
confirmation that all people suffer and die, so that it would be futile to grieve this strength, as Plato points out. If the spectator watching these most unfortunate
inescapable human fate. This would support the Stoic viewpoint that we should cases becomes rather content with his own life, which, by comparison, seems to
eliminate grief.66 Certainly, however, Chrysippus interpreted the Euripidean lines be fortunate, then such a spectator may seem a little selfish if not spiteful, as
along the lines of the traditional consolation, as we can guess from the response of Cameades words it. An escape from this label would be to note that staged
the opponent. Conversely, Carneades, the Skeptic philosopher (214-129 BCE), calamities are only mimetically represented, not real. But the question still
raises a fascinating question. Why should such tragic examples bring any relief at remains hypothetically: why find those enjoyable? No final answer has yet been
all? Why would the idea that others have suffered, and that ultimately we all do, given. 67 (2) Although some tragic exempla seem absolutely inappropriate for
should be useful for easing pain (ad levandam aegritudinem)? On the contrary, consolation, they ,v-ere used nevertheless in this manner. In Cicero's Tusculan
the thought of universal suffering and inescapable doom ought to depress us, not Disputations, Niobe and Hecuba figure as prototypes of persons who have failed
to sooth our soul. The verb levare, 'to ease', reiterates the idea of relief of some to bear their bereavement and took it to two extremes: utter grief (represented by
sort that appears in all the Greek texts we have examined, and was often Niobe as stone), and, respectively, utter fierceness, (represented by Hecuba as a
connected in some way to pleasure. If Plato speaks against tragic pleasure because bitch).68 Yet, even those extreme cases could be given for solace to others,
it fosters our own desire to lament personal sorrows, Carneades seems to consider through crafty manipulation of the narrative details, as in Homer, or thanks to
finding solace in tragic examples as a kind of Schadenfreude. eschatological symbolism, as on Apulian vases. Interpretation of tragic mythical
stories remains thus relative not absolute. (3) Understanding theoretically that
everyone suffers, and some (tragic exenipla) more than the average person, does
65 It is perhaps not random that Cicero, following Hellenistic philosophers, cites Euripides in
this context. As Lloyd 2013 has observed (with a review and reinterpretation of earlier scho-
larship on the topic), Euripides more than any other Greek tragedian (as far as our evidence 67 For an attempt to explain why tragedy gives us pleasure, from Plato to Shakespeare, see, for
permits to say) deals with the topic of the mutability of fortune, but at the same time, he, mo- example, Nuttall 2001; more specifically on Aristotle's proper pleasure of tragedy, and its
re than any other, invests his characters with incredible resilience when faced with vicissitu- possible connection with the pleasure of mourning, see Munteanu 2012, 103-131 and Destree
des. However, within these tragedies themselves, sometimes such speeches of consolation 2014.
were unsuccessful, as Chong-Gossard 2009 and 2013 has pointed out. 68 Tusculan Disputations 3.63.26: in both examples the women do not let their pain go; so the
66 Gill 2008, 155 plausibly suggests this interpretation, comparing Ciccro's translation of the listed causes are propter aeternum ... in luctu silentium, 'because of endless silence in her
Euripidean fragment into Latin to the Greek. Cicero changes certain details in his translation mourning' and propter acerbitatem quoandam et rabiem, 'because of a certain fierceness and
that may emphasize the Stoic view; for example, he adds nequiquam, 'in vain' and mors est insane anger'. According to modern psychological diagnosis each heroine appears to be stuck
finita omnibus, 'death is ordained for all'. in a different phase of mourning: withdrawal and, respectively, anger.
98 Dana Lacourse Munteanu Grief: the Power and Shortcomings in Greek Tragic Consolation 99
not guarantee that one will use this knowledge practically at the time of need. An real or mythological, appear to have been used to provide temporary solace at a
interesting dramatic example is adduced by Cicero (Tusculan Disputations very critical moment: in the first stage of grief, when the mourner isolates himself
69
3.29.71). In Sophocles' lost tragedy, the Teucer, Oileus found words to console or herself from the rest of the community and from the normal daily activities. We
Telamon for the death of Ajax, but he could not apply the same to himself, and can observe traces of this type of consolatory narrative within Greek epic and
collapsed into sorrow (literally 'was broken', fractus est) when he heard that his tragedy. 72 However, tragic exempla do not offer universal solace: often characters
own son died. within Greek tragedies metatheatrically reject consolatory attempts of this sort. By
But should we ascribe these problems to the tragic exempla used in the fifth century BCE, nevertheless, some may have regarded tdgedy as a genre
consolation or to the genre of consolation in general, including philosophical offering consolation to the spectators, in a kind of abstract manner, by turning
percepts? Most philosophical schools that developed their own methods of their attention from personal misfortunes to the unparalleled suffering of others
consolation appear to have included examples from tragedies for illustrating and giving them pleasure and relief (thus in Timocles' playful fragment from
various arguments (e.g. the Stoics), or, at least, needed to explicitly reject them Dionysiazusae). Plato opposes this notion in the tenth book of the Republic,
(Cameades ), and Cicero incorporates analyses of tragic exempla, along with re~l- noting that the relief, accompanied by pleasure when people watch tragedies,
life illustrations from Roman history in his Tusculan 3. But difficulties persist seems innocent, but instead of providing solace, it stirs the soul. Lamentation for
beyond the use of tragedy, and philosophers do not posses the key to eliminating fictional others fosters lack of restraint in expressing grief when one is faced with
grief. After losing his daughter, Tullia, in 45 BCE shortly after she gave birth to personal loss. Plato proposes an alternative model of endurance through
her second son, Cicero attempted to find solace in all the previous writings, but philosophy and, more practically, through the figure of Socrates facing death in
found out that 'pain overcomes all consolation', omnem consolationem vincit the Phaedo. Hellenistic philosophers appear to have continued to debate whether
do/or, in a letter to his friend Atticus (12.14.3). By the time of the late Roman or not tragic examples should be useful in consolation, while advancing their ovin
Republic, Cicero had at his disposal philosophical and rhetorical writings on paradigms of consolation. Cicero's Tusculan Disputations and Self Consolation
consolation that go beyond tragic exempla. Different Hellenistic schools seem to provide us with a review of some of these philosophical approaches and revive
have been preoccupied with healing the mental anguish caused by the death of a questions regarding the power consolation altogether, regardless of its sources
loved one, and especially by the loss of a child. For example, the Cyrenaics literary or philosophical.
proposed pre-rehearsal of sorrow, whereas the Epicureans advocated con9entra- Most intriguingly, the same consolatory relief that tragedy may provide to the
tion on past blessings, and Cicero inclines toward the former approach. ,o And spectator has been linked to pleasure. Ancient writers do not agree on the causes
there was more at his disposal. Most likely all major philosophical currents after of this connection, suggesting forgetfulness of personal sorrows (Timocles ), false
Plato proposed consolatory techniques. In his unique Consolatio ad se, Cicero belief in such forgetfulness which leads to arousal of personal sorrow (Plato),
acknowledges trying to follow Crantor and his notion of metriopatheia (later encouragement by observing the fortitude of others (Cicero), or Schadenfreude
embraced by Peripatetics), even though he admits ignoring the advice of the Stoic (Carneades ). And neither do modem philosophers. 73 Perhaps \.Ve want to
Chrysippus to let the first wave of grief pass before dealing with bereavement. He remember and understand traumatic experiences in life, not only ours but also
describes himself resembling a doctor who knows exactly what treatments he those of other people, sometimes only in a hypothetical manner - the kind that
71
ought to administer to his patient, but is unable to do so efficiently. Cicero's could happen to us all. Perhaps, we simply want to acknowledge such experiences
position here does not seem to be much different from Oileus in Sophocles' play: with sadness when we are reminded of them in arts, and so we find value in tragic
theoretical knowledge about how one should act in response to personal loss does narratives that describe suffering. Simply documenting one's experiences may be
not translate into practical solutions. a source of comfort, as memorialization offers us the solace (illusory as it may be)
In conclusion, initially, perhaps, originating in an Indo-European tradition, that suffering has not been endured in vain. As Rilke wonderfully puts it in
narratives describing the extraordinary sufferings of others, whether those were Titelblatt, a poem in which a number of tragic characters, vaguely reminiscent of
the Timoclean Dionysiazusae fragment, parade:
69 Most scholars agree that these lines should be attributed to Teucer, although Stobaeus
(4.49.7) places them at the beginning of Sophocles' Oedipus, which was later emended to Oi-
leus: for further discussion on this see Gill 2008, 156, with footnote 10. 72 Note that initially consolation through tragic narrative seems intended for the first stage of
70 Graver 200 I offers a nuanced analysis of this topic, emphasizing that two philosophical grief. Even the Stoics believe that this first wave of the emotion should pass before one can
schools, whose opinions Cicero documents very carefully, are particularly interested in as- deal with sadness rationally.
suaging the pain of losing children. See also her essay in this volume on the political implica- 73 Ring 2011 argues that 'sad' songs especially have no narrative to go with them (so no cogni-
tions of Cicero's display of grief. tive pleasure) - 'anticathartic' and are sought out for their ability to make us sad, which we
71 Baltussen 2013, 71-75. value for some reason; on this, see also Smuts 2007.
Dana LaCourse Munteanu Grief: the Power and Shortcomings in Greek Tragic Consolation 101
100
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THE POETICS OF EMOTIONAL EXPRESSION:
SOME PROBLEMS OF ANCIENT THEORY
Stephen Halliwell
For some thoughts on the relationship between ancient categories of discourse and the mo-
dem concept of 'literature', see Halliwell 2016.
Stephen Halliwell The Poetics of Emotional Expression: Some Problems of Ancient Theory 107
106
I shall be relying on reference to this trio of basic possibilities throughout my It is not sufficient that poems be beautiful; they should charm us
And should move the hearer's mind wherever they wish.
argmnent. But it will prove necessary, as the argument develops, to think of them Ju~t_ashuman fac_esrespond to smiles with smiles, so weeping
not only as separate possibilities in their own right but also as the points of a sort Elicits sy~pathetic tears. If you wish me to weep, you must grieve
of triangular configuration of relationships: relationships between author and Yourself m the first place; then I too will be hurt by your misfortunes,
work (in what sense can an author 'put' emotions 'into' a work? a seemingly Telephus or Peleus; but if you speak inappropriate words
clumsy formulation but relevant to some ancient texts), between work and audi- I'll either fall asleep or laugh. Sad words befit
A sorrowful face, threatening words an angry f(\ce,
ence (should we think of the former triggering emotions in the latter and/or of the
Frivolous words a playful one, serious words a harsh one.
latter as projecting them onto the former?), and between author and audience (do The reason: nature shapes us inwardly in advance
authors manipulate their audience's emotions or transmit their own emotions to For every state of fortune it gladdens or angers us
them?). Or makes us collapse and anguishes us with sorrow -
Two further, overlapping sets of questions are worth adding to these brief pro- Then expresses the mind's emotions in the medium oflanguage. 4
legomena; they will be touched on again at various stages of the enquiry. The first According to the usu~l exegesis, Horace (or the didactic voice of his poem, at
is this: does emotional expression in literature necessarilyialways entail actual or
lea~t) urges a~d requ:res P?ets t?induce in themselves the emotions they wish
'first-order' emotion, i.e. some sort of consciously affective state (in which case,
theu w~rks to 111d~ce111t~elf audience. On this account, we are dealing in the first
whose?), or is it sometimes/always rather a matter of depicted, symbolised, or (on place with a~thonal emotion which is then quasi-rhetorically conveyed to the au-
the reader's part) 'make-believe' ernotion? 2 The second is this: does literary emo-
d1enc~:.tha~ is th~ view, for instance, of Charles Brink, who thinks the origin of
tion, however predicated or located, belong to the same continuum as normal or the cnt1cal ideas m question lies within the traditions of rhetoric as such.5 But the
real-life emotions, or does it deserve to be categorised as in some special sense ~ra~nof thought in this passage is less simple than that. I suggest that we can find
'aesthetic'? 3 Might there even be literary emotions that cannot exist outside litera- 111it a sequence of five main thoughts - a sequence in which there is a sense of
ture? paitially elliptical connections and some slippage between different frames of
I start, appropriately enough, in medias res, with a passage from Horace's Ars reference.
Poetica which is valuable for my purposes because it contends that poetry is in- (I_)Poems (poemata, 99), i.e. the works themselves, should 'move the minds'
complete without some kind of emotional expressiveness. But how exactly does it ofthe1r hearers (animum auditoris agunto, 100, obviously equivalent to the Greek
conceive of emotion in this context? The passage is very well known though more ,ituxayroyet~)- It is the poems rather than their authors which are made the gram-
intricate in its implications than standard readings admit. i~at1cal subjects of a~ts o~ ':"illi~g' or intent~onality (quocumque volent, 100).
non satis est pulchra esse poemata; dulcia sunto ~ote also th~t Horace·s pr111ciple1s coupled with the need for poems to be affec-
et quocumque uolent animum auditoris agunto. tively_ch~mg ~dulcia): the assumption is apparently of a distinctively aesthetic
ut ridentibus adrident, ita jlentibus adjlent ~xpe~ienc~ 111which the arousal of emotion is made to serve a special kind of grat-
humani uultus. si uis meflere, dolendum est ification, 111contrast to some of the real-life contexts of grief) envisaged in
primum ipsi tibi; tum tua me infortunia laedent,
uel Peleu; male si mandata loqueris
the generalisations of lines l 08-110. 6
aut donnitabo aut ridebo. tristia maestum . (2) Human beings' faces show how they are capable of responding instinc-
uultwn uerba decent, iratum plena minarwn, tively to each _other's expressions of emotion. This is something like a general
ludentem lasciua, seuerum seria dictu. theory of emot10nal sympathy as outwardly manifested in facial signals: the point
format enim natura prius nos intus ad omnem
fortunarum habitum; iuuat aut ad iram
aut ad humum maerore graui deducit et angit; 4 All translations in this paper are my own unless otherwise indicated.
post ejfert animi motus inte171retelingua. (Horace, AP 99-111) 5 Brink 1971, 174, 182-190 (with much helpfi.Jl detail). In his references to Aristotle Brink
privileges rhetorie over poetics, though he recognises the overlap between them; thi's leads
him_ to foreground an author-audience model over the more complex author-eharacter-
audienc~ nex:-is;note esp. _185for his conviction that what is at issue is 'H[orace]'s belief in
2 One influential but widely debated modern view of aesthetic emotion in as make- poetic smcenty . For the idea of emotional expression in the rhetorical tradition in its own
believe or quasi-emotion is that of Walton 1990, esp. 240-259. For one critique of Walton, right, et: n. 39 below.
6 Compare Aristotle's conception of pity and fear as modified by aesthetie pleasure at Poetics
see Carroll 1991.
3 Munteanu 2009 explores the relationship between 'aesthetic' and 'ordinary' emotion in a 14.1453bl2, 'the pleasure from pity and fear through mimesis' 'tTJV &:r,oe,\,fou ico:t
tpO~O"\J bta µtµY)<J€.(0<;
... 'l]bov11v,with Halliwell 2002, 178--187. , . .
number of ancient texts.
The Poetics of Emotional Expression: Some Problems of Ancient Theory 109
Stephen Halliwell
108
property of the workings of poetic language itself, as lines 104-107 suggest. Yet
applies in the first instance to literally 'face-to-face' encounters. Yet it is (also) a
Horace's ostensibly sequential reasoning, with the connective enim at 108 leaves
premise in an argument about poetry, where the audience is confronted with imag-
the impression that poetry is being tested by the standards precisely of 'life'. But
inary characters, whether physically represented in staged performances of drama,
how can that be?
vocally represented in recitation, or only fictively present in a text consumed by
A provisi~na~ a~swer is that Horace imagines literary language as operating
individual readers. on the same s1gmfiymg and expressive principles as in life but with a kind of re-
(3) If 'you' wish 'me' to respond instinctively to your emotions, you must re-
versed causal flow. In the paradigm of linguistic expression - wlJ.erethe 'tongue'
ally feel those emotions (102f.). But who is the 'you' in this injunction? Contrary
7 (lingua) functions as interpres (expounder, interpreter, translator, all rolled into
to a common misconception, nothing tells us that it is the poet; the continuation
one) -. the ~ovem~nt is from the 'interior' experience of speakers to the public
ofHorace's sentence explicitly invokes those imaginary characters, such as Tele-
realm m which their speech is received. But in the case of literature, words invite
phus and Peleus, who inhabit the world of the poem. So there are immediate com-
the audience to project a kind of 'interior', a mental-cum-emotional life, behind
plications. What might have sounded, in the light of the preceding point, like a
those words, even though the psychology of that life is a pure fiction, not an actu-
principle of authorial sincerity turns out to be something rather different. But how
al agency of expression.
can characters in poems 'really' feel emotions? Horace (or, again, his didactic
This famo~s section_of the Ars Poetica, then, discloses far more complexity
voice, itself a kind of 'imaginary character') underlines the paradox by addressing
than standard mterpretat10ns of it as enunciating a single principle of 'rhetorical'
examples of poetic characters as though he were in face-to-face dialogue with
expressiveness (the transmission of emotion from author to audience) would lead
them: the voice of a figure in one poem momentarily merges his world with that
us to believe. 8 Its train of thought moves subtly backwards and forwards between
of figures in other poems. Nor can the paradox be resolved simply by saying that
the linguistic conditi?ns of life and literature, nature and art. In doing so it posits
Horace means the poet's emotions but employs a trope to add vividness to his
processes of expression which blur the distinctions between the text/poem itself
point: we would still be left with the problem of how the audience is supposed to
th~ speaking characters of the poem, and the poet (the agent of mandare, 104; cf.
gain access to the poet's own emotions via the words of fictive characters in his
pomt (4) above). Horace - himself, to reiterate, a 'virtual' author inside the text-
works. is insistent on the importance of emotion for poetry but leaves it uncertain just
(4) The tacit transition from 'ordinary' to poetic emotional expression which
how and why emotion is generated in the workings of literature.
takes place between the second and third points above is now reinforced by the
Against the background of those various points, consider now the following
idea that poetic characters need to speak words that are appropriate for them (lit-
(condensed) extracts from the discussion of periodic sentences in Demetrius De
erally 'assigned' to them, mandata, 104). The formulation clearly entails a princi-
elocutione. '
ple of literary-stylistic fit, not general psychological sincerity: after all, in life
words are not normally 'assigned' to us, and in any case it is possible to feel, and oun: yap ◊Etvii\; Aeyovn Ertt'TT]◊Eta [sc. 'l:OtaU'l:UKOlAa] · ... Tlyap 6µ016n1<;Tl7tEpl1:a KOlAa
even exhibit, genuine emotion without finding appropriate words for it at all. (We Kat av1:i8E<Jt<;EKA'llEt1:T)V8av61:rim 8ta 1:T)VKUKO'l:£XVtav.0uµo<; yap 'l:EXYT\<; 01) ◊Et'l:at
CXAAa◊Et 1:p61tovnva auwcpu&, dvm ... KUl U7lAO'. 1:a AEyoµEva. OU'l:£8f\m EV ◊EtVO'l:T\'l:~
shall meet an example later in which 'disordered' language is itself taken to be
XPTJ<Jtµa1:a 1:ornu1:a... OU'l:£EV mi0E<Jt Kal ~0E<Jtv· anAOUV yap dvat ~O'llAE'l:at KUt
emotionally powerful.) The list of examples in lines 105-107 emphasises the no- 9
anoiriwv 1:0n&0o,;... (Demetrius, De Elocutione 27-28)
tion of stylistic-cum-expressive 'decorum' (cf. the verb decent, 106) with refer- [Such clauses] are not appropriate for a forceful speaker. .. , since the balance and contrast be-
ence to different positions on the spectrum of emotional (and, by implication, gen- tween the clauses dissipate forcefulness by their contrived artificiality. Anger needs no arti-
re-relative) possibilities, even though it borrows from the principle stated in lines fice; what is said should be, in a way, spontaneous ... and simple ... Such clauses, then, are of
101-102 the idea of the face as the prime locus of bodily expressiveness. no use for forcefulness ... nor for the expression of emotion and character. Emotion is typical-
ly simple and uncontrived ...
(5) Human beings have a natural propensity to react emotionally 'inside' or
inwardly (intus, 108) and then to externalise their feelings in language. The train The nub of Demetrius' argument is seemingly unequivocal: strong emotion is
of thought here moves back to the terms of a psychological and anthropological simple, uncontrived, natural, and therefore incompatible with stylistic artifice. But
universalism - so much so, indeed, as to reactivate the paradox noted under point
(3) above. The imaginary characters of poetry do not have an 'interior' and their 8 Cf. Abrams 1953, 71f. for brief but telling remarks on how the Horatian passage, and espe-
expressiveness consequently cannot be a matter of an inside/outside or feel- cially the 'si vis mejlere' tag, lent itself to a shift of emphasis from 'artfulness' to 'spontanei-
ings/language fit but must be something different in kind: it must, in fact, be a ty' in the historical shift of sensibility from Neoclassicism to Romanticism.
9 In the_~ourse of this passage Demetrius cites a scathing sexual description of the companions
of Ph1hp of Macedon from the historian Theopompus (FGrHist 115 F225(c)). For present
7 Rudd 1989, 167f. thinks Horace's injunctions apply equally to actor and playwright; each
purposes I leave aside the details of the quotation and Demetrius' judgement on it.
'induces in himself the emotions of the character.
110 Stephen Halliwell The Poetics of Emotional Expression: Some Problems of Ancient Theory 111
as so often in ancient critical texts, the nature-art dichotomy is not only an indis- elevation. Furthermore, Demetrius clearly conceives of the emotional quality of
pensable reference-point but also a kind offaultline running beneath the surface of the lines he quotes from Odyssey 5.203f. as something specifically verbal and
critical standards. Unlike Horace, who in the passage already quoted tries to poetic, not psychological in a straightforwardly naturalistic sense: 'if you remove
smoothe out the nature-art contrast into a harmonious relationship (nature herself the particle, you will remove the emotion with it' is intelligible as a comment on a
produces both the experience of emotion and the tongue's articulation of that ex- text, but it would make no sense of a 'real' Calypso (or of anyone else in a compa-
perience), Demetrius sees an inherent tension between nature and art. While, rable situation) to suppose that removing a particle from her words would remove
therefore, like Horace, he recognises a necessary principle of expressive 'match' her emotion at the prospect of Odysseus's departure. Demetriu~' rather clipped
between emotion and language, Demetrius puts himself in a quandary. It is not comments make it hard to be sure just what nuance of feeling he attributes to the
hard to see why he takes conspicuously formal balance/contrast between clauses particle in Homer's line, 11 though he goes on to reveal that he is following the
to be unsuitable for expression of anger, but this draws him into formulating a intriguing view of the early Peripatetic Praxiphanes that particles like 011 were
strangely sweeping opposition between emotion and literary art. He is, after all, literary equivalents to, or surrogates for, groans, sighs and the like. There is no
analysing resources of linguistic style which are for him by definition a matter of doubt, however, that Demetrius locates the emotion in question (which he does
poetic and literary artfulness. If anger 'needs no artifice' for its expression, it falls not identify by name) firmly in the words and imagined attitude of the character;
outside the ambit of critical stylistics altogether. Yet Demetrius is precisely con- he offers no hypothesis about the poet's own creative state of mind. It is clear, in
cerned with how the emotion can be stylistically conveyed. How, then, could short, that within the terms of his larger stylistic theory he treats emotional ex-
0Etv0'rT\i;,forcefulness, ever be (supposedly) like emotion itself entirely pression as a powerful effect but a literary effect nonetheless: a controlled use of
an:o{nwi;, translated above as 'uncontrived' (one could equally say 'unformed', language that will elicit an appreciative response of recognition from the sensitive
'uncrafted') and implying a complete absence of anything other than raw nature? reader/hearer. There is no reason to conclude that this same model does not also
A necessary part of the answer to that question is that in the above quotation underlie his remarks (above) at 27-28. He is preoccupied there with the need to
Demetrius is schematically simplifying his stylistic principles. The simplification avoid misapplied artifice, but his qualification, 'in a way spontaneous', betrays his
is hinted at in the statement that the literary expression of anger should be 'in a awareness that in literary language the 'natural' is always filtered through the op-
way' spontaneous ('rp01tOV nva au'tocpua): 10 we sense that what is desired here is erations of compositional construction.
not after all raw, uncrafted nature, but the creation of artful impressions of the I propose now, in what will be the central section of my argument, to explore
natural (an idea which we shall meet again shortly). Although the point is not de- further some of the issues and problems so far raised by looking at a selection of
veloped in this context itself, we can find elsewhere in the treatise a convenient passages from Longinus, On the Sublime. (I retain Longinus as the author's name
confirmation of how Demetrius makes room for the discreetly artful expression of for mere convenience.) As with Horace's Ars Poetica, we are dealing here with a
emotion. In his discussion of the 'grand' (µ£yaA01tprn11i;)style, he writes as fol- highly familiar, not to say 'canonical', text that can nonetheless yield new insights
lows. when scmtinised afresh and without idees rer;ues. The first extract I want to exam-
t,aµpav£1:m Be KUVim0T)tlKOt,; 1tot,A.aK1,;0 cruv6£crµo,; o'()toc;, ffi(J1t£P€1tl Tij,; Kat,'\l\jfOllS
ine is from Longinus' famous reading of Sappho fr. 31 PLF. He chooses the song
npo,; tOV'06ucrcrfo as an example of how a writer can achieve sublimity by carefully selecting the
tnoyi:ves Am:pn&Bri 1tOAVµT)xav''Ooucrcre:D, component factors of certain experiences and by configuring them into an organi-
ov-cco Bri otK6v8£ qii;.,riv ESnmpioa ya'i'av ... cally integrated whole.
d youv ,ov cruv6wµov £/;EA,ot,;,cruvel;mp{ian,; Kat to ita0os. (Demetrius, De Elocutione
olov TJIaitqim -i;a cruµBa{vovm tmi; epconKat,; µavim,; na0fiµam EK t&v no:percoµevcov
57)
This particle [ofi: 'indeed'] is also frequently used at moments of emotion, as in the case of KCl.lfK .apEtTjVaitO◊ElKVUtm; on 1,(1.
O'.AT)0eta,;aut'ij; E:KacrwtE ;.,aµB&vn. nou 81: 'CTjV
Calypso's address to Odysseus, lh:pa o:u1:&vKai UitEptEtaµfva oewh Kai ml ELSaA,A,TjAa<.rnvo'ijcrm.[quotation of
'Zeus-born son ofLaertes, Odysseus of many wiles, Sappho fr. 31 follows] OU0auµ&sn; roi; U1t0 C(U't:0'tT)V\j/'UXTjV, 1:0 cr&µa, m; C(KO!XS,-rhv
[ls it indeed your wish] to go borne to your own dear land'?' yl&crcrav, ta; O\Jfcl<;,,riv xp6av, nave· m; aAA.o,pta Ot0txoµEva emsTJtel, ... \'.va µri ev n
If you remove the particle, you will remove the emotion with it. 1t£pl na0os qio:tVT)'tat,ita0&v OEcruvooo;; itav,a µev totai}m ytVE.'tal 1t£pt wu;
ep&v-ra;, T\;.,f\ljfl<;6' ms £<pT)V1&v CXKpOJV Kat 11d; tau,o cruva{p£cr1; am:tpyacro:to 'tTjV
Several things are striking about this passage. In the first place, since it belongs to e~oxfiv. (On the Sublime 10.1-3)
Demetrius' analysis of the grand style, there can be no question here of emotion
as entirely simple, raw or unformed: it must carry with it an element of imposing 11 Demetrius is presumably committed to finding an equivalent emotional inflection when the
same Homeric line as 5.204 occurs in a different context at Iliad 2.158, 174, or when
ov,w ofi introduces other questions atlliad 14.88, 15.553.
10 The words are omitted from the translation of Grube 1961, 68. 12 Praxiphanes fr. 24 Matelli, fr. 13 Wehrli.
112 Stephen Halliwell The Poetics of Emotional Expression: Some Problems of Ancient Theory 113
Sappho, for instance, always chooses the emotional elements that go with episodes of erotic consciousness (even 'ecstasy', £Kcr'mcrtc;,1.3). It is true that more generally Lon-
madness from the things that actually accompany it and from the truth itself. Where does she
ginus employs a conception of sublime writing which entails a transmission of
display this excellence? In her ability to select and bind together extreme and intense symp-
toms. [quotation of Sappho fr. 31 follows] Do you not marvel at how she fuses together soul, experience (both thought and emotion) from the mind of the writer to the mind of
body, hearing, tongue, vision, skin - tracking them all as if they were alienated and splitting the reader a sort of 'echo' of the fom1er in the latter (via the echo of the writer's
15
apart, ... so that she seems to be the subject not of some one emotion but of a whole cluster of mind in the text itself). But in the present case that does not mean that either
them? All such things actually happen to people in love, but it is, as l said, the choice and author or reader has an experience that matches real-life erotic passion: to reiter-
weaving together of the extremes which renders her work outstanding. ate, L?nginus is at pains to distinguish th~ two things. The emotion of Sappho's
Despite his reference to psychological 'truth', we need to be clear that Longinus song 1s perceived by the critic as an imagined state of mind on the part of the
does not take Sappho to be transcribing or recording her own emotions in the speaking subject and thereby in tum as giving rise to a sense of sublimity on the
moment of their experience. His whole case depends on the idea of artistic selec- part of the reader. The reader's experience resonates with the poem but is none-
tion and composition; the last sentence of the extract draws attention directly to theless separate from the emotion depicted in the poem. It is an important exten-
the difference between the phenomenological immediacy of erotic passion (which sion of that point that what Longinus takes the poem to offer is something availa-
anyone can be in the grip of) and the special capacity of great writers to create a ble only through 'art', not life. 16
powerful impression of the kind of experience in question. But Longinus does It is worth adding a final observation on this passage. Longinus believes that
something more with this distinction. He conve11s it into an acute paradox. The part of the effect of Sappho's poem is to create an impression (cf the verb
experience of passion is taken to be portrayed by Sapp ho as psychologically cen- <paivw0m, 10.3) not of any one emotion but of a cluster or convergence of sever-
trifugal, a sort of fragmentation of consciousness: the symptoms seem aA.A.o'tpm al (na0&v <Juvooo~). This is all the more significant given that he is not in any
('alienated' or somehow not properly part of the experiencing subject) and 'split- doubt that the essential state of mind represented in the song is that of 'erotic
ting apart' (owix6µ£va) from the person. Yet the poem which conveys such expe- madness'. What this means, therefore, is that the notion of pathos, 'emotion', here
rience is, for Longinus, precisely a specimen of artistically crafted unity: it illus- e~pands from that of a set of discretely identifiable affective states (fear, anger,
trates what he has called, just before the quotation above, the way in which poetic pity, love, etc.) to encompass a more fluid realm of psychosomatic feelings. In the
composition can combine the various facets of an experience into, as it were, 'a case of S~ppho's poem, these feelings are linked to the array of bodily symptoms
single body' (Kcx0&m:cp ev n cr&µcx1tot£tv, 10.1). The idea of a poetic or artistic she descnbes and must be the same as 'the emotional elements' (pathemata, 10.1:
work as a quasi-organic 'body' is, of course, a critical commonplace as old as see above) w_hich, while not strictly defining erotic passion, may accompany it
Plato, Phaedrus 264c. Longinus revivifies it by making it central to the paradox of and charactense the texture of its phenomenology. This is corroborated later in the
his account of Sappho's poem: the unified 'body' of the poem reconstitutes, even treatise, at 22.1, when Longinus starts a list of conventionally recognised and la-
recomposes, the fragmented body-consciousness of the lover. 13 At the same time belled emotions (anger, fear, indignation, jealousy) before adding, 'or some other
he shows that the emotion which interests him is not 'beyond' the poem but em- feeling, for there is an indefinite multiplicity of emotions (pathe) and no one can
bodied in its very features. even say how many they are' (see below for the Greek). If emotions, or at any rate
But where exactly does this leave the idea of emotional expression in Longi- pathe, cannot be counted, then they cannot all have names. And if they cannot all
nus' reading? I have stressed that he does not purport to make a claim about the be named, that makes it even more remarkable that great writers can nonetheless
autobiographical experience of Sappho the woman, though his remarks are com- cap~re (or create) a sense of what it might be like to experience them in particular
patible, even so, with something like a model of the creative act as 'emotion recol- settmgs. Whatever else emotional expression amounts to in Longinus, it must em-
lected in tranquillity'. Equally, he does not claim that the reader of the poem in brace what he regards as the capacity of sublime writers to do artistically with
any sense experiences erotic madness: we do not have here the application of a words what nature itself cannot do for us. 17
principle equivalent to Horace's 'si vis me flere ...'. Instead, Longinus supposes
the reader of Sappho to experience 'sublimity', which is not an emotion or n&0oc;
in itself (even if expression of certain strong emotions is highly conducive to it) 14 15 For sublimity as an 'echo' of the author's greatness of mind, see On the Sublime 9.2, with
but a quality of writing which transports the reader into an intensely heightened Halliwell 2011, 327-367 for various reflections on this idea.
16 That is not to deny that some forms of sublimity are, for Longinus, provided directly by
aspects of external nature: see the implications of the reference to rivers and celestial bodies
13 Compare Prins 1996, 49-51 (though it is, I think, a little misleading to say that Longinus at On the Sublime 35.4. But nature itself cannot provide an experience of the sublimely inten-
'conflate[s] poem and poet', 49), Hertz 1983, 582-585 (also cited by Prins). se depiction of erotic passion; only something like a poem can do that.
14 See On the Sublime 8 for Longinus' careful attempt to position sublimity in relation to emo- 17 In a fuller analysis, one qualification that would be needed here is that for Longi:nus the wor-
tion. For one discussion of this aspect of the treatise, see Bompaire 1973. kings of the sublime in the human mind are themselves part of 'nature' in the largest and
114 Stephen Halliwell The Poetics of Emotional Expression: Some Problems of Ancient Theory 115
That formulation might, however, suggest a more clear-cut contrast between after all to suppose that we are dealing with radically different conceptions of cre-
'art' (techne) and nature than Longinus consistently maintains. We have already ative expression in chapters 10 and 22: in both cases, emotion is not a raw product
seen that his praise of Sappho includes the perception that she selects emotionally of nature but a powerful and special artistic impression.
expressive details 'from the things that actually accompany erotic madness and The intricacies of this aspect of Longin us' poetics of emotional expression
from the truth itself'. Artistic creation, then, works with the stuff of nature, yet it can be pursued further in relation to the following passage, which is part of an
is also thought of as different from it. Like both Horace and Demetrius, Longinus illustration, taken from Demosthenes' speech Against Meidias (21 ), of how a con-
needs a critical conception of the nature-art axis but inevitably faces some diffi- centration or cluster of figures of speech eaµ add special qualities ~o a work.
culty in keeping it entirely stable. In this connection it is profitable to focus more d0' 't'.vaµT]ent 1:&va{n&v o Myo<; imv cnn (ev CT'tCXCTEt yap 'tO T]pEµouv,EV&1:as{~ 0£ 'tO
closely on 22.1 (quoted in part in the previous paragraph). n&So,;, end cpopa IJIUXT\<;Kal CT'\lYKlVT]CTl<;
ECT'ttv),Eu0u,; en' &Ua µE8f\1cmo CXCTUVOE'ta Kat
enavacpop&,;·'1:ipcrxf\µmt, 1:ip~AEµµan, 'tT]cpruvn,1hav CD<; u~p{i:;ruv,omv CD<; ex0p6,;, 01:UV
CD<;yap 01 1:ipovn 6pyti:;6µEVOt17cpo~ouµEVOt17ayavaK'tOUV'tE<; 17uno i:;171co1:unfo<;17uno
(XA,A,O'\l'ttvO<;(no1c1ca yap Kat &vapi8µ17m n&817Kal ou8' av dnEtV n,; 6n6cm 8uvmw)
KOVOUAOt<;, 01:UVEnt Kopp17,;.'ou81:vUAAOOta 1:01)1:(0V O pf\1:rup17onEp O't1J1t't(OV
epyal;;E1:m·
'tT]V8,&voiav 1:&vOtKacr1:&v n1cf\1:1:acpop~.( On the Sublime 20.2)
1:nena1c1cfi1ccp
EKCXCHO'tE napant1t'tOV'tE<;&1c1ca npo0EµEVOtnoAACXKt<; en' &1c1ca µE1:an178&cn,... 'tTJOE
Then, in order to save the sentence from monotony and a static effect - for this goes with in-
KCXKEl<JE ayxtcnp6cpru<;&vncmmµEVOl1:a,; AESEl<;,1:a,; VOT\CTEt<; 'tT]VEK 'tOU Ka'ta cpucrtv
ertia, whereas disorder goes with emotion, which is a disturbance and agitation of the mind -
dpµou nav1:01ru,;npo<; µup{a,; 1:pona<;evaAACX't'tO'\lCTl 1:&stv, OU'tffi<;napa Wt<; aptCT'tOt<;
he leaps immediately to fresh instances of asyndeton and epanaphora: 'With gesture, with
cruyypacpEUCTt Ota 1:&vUnEp~m&v TJµ{µ17cn<; ent 'ta 1:r\<;<pUCTEW<;ifpya <pEpE'tat.'tO'tEyap TJ
look, with voice, when he insults, when he acts as an enemy, when he slaps the fellow, when
'tEXVT] 'tEAEtO<; T]VtK'av cpucrt<;dvm OOKT],ri 8' a'G <pUCTt<; £1tl't'\lXT]<;
1hav 1cav8&voucrav
he slaps him on the ears ...' The orator is doing here exactly what the bully does hitting the
nEptEX11 'tT]V'tEXVT]V.
( On the Sublime 22.1)
jurors' minds with blow after blow. 19
Just as those who are actually in the grip of anger, fear, indignation, jealousy, or some other
feeling (for there is an indefinite multiplicity of emotions and no one can even say how many At first sight, Longinus seems to be tracing in Demosthenes' words the 'disorder'
they are) keep switching and jumping between points, ... and by constantly wrenching words
(ataxia) which, just like the dislocation involved in hyperbaton, he believes to be
and thoughts in different directions they twist into innumerable variations the order to be ex-
pected from natural sequence, so likewise in the case of the best writers the use ofhyperbaton a natural hallmark of emotion. But once again we have to see beyond that prima
is a means by which mimetic representation can approximate to the workings of nature. For facie level: how could actual disorder be compatible with the overwhelming sub-
art is perfect when it seems to be nature, while nature in tum is successful when it contains art limity that Longinus consistently finds in Demosthenes, or with the rhetorical self-
concealed within it. awareness predicated of the orator by that clause 'in order to save the sentence
Longin us' concern at this juncture is specifically with hyperbaton, dislocated ...'? As we read on, we get confirmation of Longinus' own self-consciousness
word-order. He takes this to be the chief means by which a sublime writer can about the delicacy of his critical stance. After giving a further quotation from De-
mimetically represent or simulate the excited discontinuities and distortions of mosthenes' speech to illustrate how it exploits constant variations of figural repe-
speech caused by intense emotion. 18 The emphasis here is ostensibly different tition to maintain a (seeming) 'naturalness' (physis), he concludes with a pointed
from the perspective adopted on Sappho's poem in chapter 10, where the poet was paradox: 'in this way his order becomes disordered and in turn his disorderliness
said to create something which did not simply mirror the real-life phenomenon, takes on a certain order' .20 Longinus is wrestling with the slippery entanglement
indeed transfigured that phenomenon in certain respects (converting psychological of art and nature within his terms of reference. The consequences affect not least
fragmentation into poetic unity). If we ponder Longinus' position a little further, his interpretation of emotional expression: a visible tension remains between the
however, the gap between the two passages narrows. The clue is in the fact that sense of emotion in general as messily disruptive and, on the other hand, the great
Longin us takes it as a mark of the best writers to be able to harness hyperbaton to writer's transformation of such upheaval into an expressively compelling effect of
this end. But why should that be so if what is involved is only the replication of a language. But unlike Demetrius, who, as we saw, thinks of emotion as 'simple'
kind of dislocated speech that many people produce in the real world when under and unaffected, and therefore incompatible with any kind of conspicuous artifice,
the pressure of strong emotion? Why can't anyone make sublime use of hyperba- Longin us' notion of emotion as intrinsically turbulent and agitated allows him to
ton? The answer must surely be of a similar kind to the reason we can all experi- find points of contact between real-life psychology and the exceptional resources
ence erotic passion but cannot all create poems like Sappho's. There is no reason of sublime writing.
That last consideration is reinforced by the fact that Longinus employs some
most significant sense. But on another level it is perfectly possible to work with an art-nature
of the same metaphorical vocabulary for the dynamic aspects of both the psychol-
contrast, as Longinus himself does at e.g. 8.1.
18 For Longin us' idea of mimesis as representation or simulation of emotion, cf. On the Sublime 19 Trans. Russell 1972, 483 (adapted).
18.2: a rhetorical question-and-answer technique 'provides mimesis of spontaneous emotion' 20 OU'tffi<;
au1:ip Kat T]'tCXSl<;
U'tUK'tOV Kat ifµnaAtV T\&1:as{a notav nEptAaµ~&va 1:&stv ( On
(µtµEi:1:m1:oun&Sou,; 1:0entKatpov). the Sublime 20.3).
Stephen Halliwell The Poetics of Emotional Expression: Some Problems of Ancient Theory 117
116
ogy of emotion and its expression in language. He calls emotion in general a 'dis- incidents described. Moreover, it requires only a little reflection to grasp that the
turbance and agitation of the mind/soul' (<popa \Jfuxf\i; Kat cruyKtVTJCTti;, 20.2), sheer fact that Longinus attributes sublimity to a description of (allegedly) trau-
using two Greek nouns which in their literal sense both imply types of movement. matic humiliation, the very opposite of the sublime, shows that he sees a process
(Compare Horace's animi motus, AP 111, quoted earlier, with the corresponding of emotional transformation at work here. Sublimity engenders an emotional ex-
Latin etymology of 'emotion'.) He repeats the first of those nouns shortly after- pressiveness which is not identical to the speaker's (or author's) implied affective
wards, at 20.3, when describing the impact of Demosthenes' own oratory on the state but exists on a further plane of experience opened up by language itself.
minds of the jurors: 'The orator is doing here exactly what the bully does - hitting To underline the complexity of what counts for Longinus as emotional ex-
the jurors' minds with blow after blow' (a doubly ironic formulation, given De- pressiveness, I adduce one final passage from On the Sublime. This comes from a
mosthenes' own insistence at 21.72-73 that it is not the blows as such but the re- later section on hyperbole or overstatement, where Longinus cautions against ex-
sulting psychological trauma which is the worst thing for the victim of violent cessive use of the device and suggests that the best instances may be those 'which
hubris). The noun phora, 'disturbance' of mind at 20.2, is here applied to t~~ disguise the very fact that they are hyperbole'. He then proceeds to cite a support-
force of physical blows, but blows as a metaphor for the force of language. ing example from Thucydides' unforgettable description of the calamitous con-
Elsewhere in the treatise Longinus also uses cognates of sunkinesis ('agitation' clusion in 413 BCE of the Athenian expedition to Sicily. The passage runs as fol-
above) in connection with the animated power of emotional writing: words them- lows.
selves can be emotionally excited or energised, creating a symmetry between psy- µ{inot' ofiv &ptcrtat t&v UitEp~oA&v,OJ<; Kat Eitl t&v <JXT]µtxtCOV
npodnoµEv, ai auto toilto
22
chological impulses and their linguistic expression. Where emotion, though not OtaAav0&voucrm on dcrtv um:p~oAat. y{vnm 0£ to tOlOVOEEitEtOav uno EKna0dai;
emotion alone, is concerned, language is treated by Longinus as quasi-vitalistic - µcye0Et ttVl O"'\lVEK<pCOVWVtat itEptcrtCXO"ECO<;,
OitEp 6 0oUK'\l0tOT]<;Eitl t&v EV LtKEAtC.,:
capable, that is, of embodying (in a strong sense of that term) something of the qi0apoµevcov 1t01Et. 'o't tE yap LupaKOUO"tot' <pf\O"tV 'EitlKata~&vtE<; toU<; .EVtip notaµip
dynamic qualities oflived experience. µaAtcrta foqiasov. KCXlto \58cop Eu0u,; OtE<p0apto, aAA' ouoev ~O"O"OV EittVEtOoµoil tip
1tf\A(fluµmcoµevov KCXl tot<; noAAOt<;Etl ~v itEptµaxTJtOV.' alµa Kal 1tf\AOVmv6µEva oµcoi;
We need once again, however, to remind ourselves that, just as in his discus-
dvm nEptµaxTJta ifn norn'i ntcrtov ~ toil n&0ou<;unEpoxTJKat nEptcrtacrt<;. (On the Sublime
sion of Sappho, Longinus is claiming for Demosthenes something more than the 38.3).
25
simple aim of transmitting his own emotions directly to the audience. Admittedly, Perhaps, therefore, the best instances of hyperbole, as we said also in the case of figures, are
it is a general conviction of Longinus' that the sublime can potently communicate those which disguise the very fact that they are hyperbole. This happens when, under the
emotion from author to audience, so that the latter 'participates' in the experience pressure of strong emotion, they are formulated in a way which resonates with the magnitude
of the former. 23 Furthermore, we can assume that Longinus takes Demosthenes in of a crisis, as Thucydides does in the case of those who perished in Sicily. 'The Syracusans',
he says, 'came down and slaughtered especially those who were in the river; and the water
the present passage to be striving to elicit a sort of sympathetic indignation on the
was immediately contaminated, but they drank it nonetheless, despite all the mud and blood
part of the jury by giving them a vicarious sense of what it felt like to be the vic- mixed together in it, and the majority were still prepared to fight over it'. The high pitch of
tim ofMeidias' insulting aggression. But Longinus' interest in the emotional qual- emotion and the nature of the crisis make credible even the idea of drinking and fighting over
ities of the text reaches beyond the jurors' need to judge the cogency of the liti- a mixture of blood and mud.
gant's account: in one of the treatise's defining tenets, sublimity is more than
If we leave aside the puzzle of Longinus' judgement of 'hyperbole' in Thucydi-
'persuasion' (1.4). That interest is such as to be able to discern 'beauty' in the
des' description ( a puzzle rendered all the more curious by the fact that the power
orator's words, 24 which can scarcely be part of a purely vicarious response to the
of the historian's writing supposedly makes the description 'credible'), the most
important point about this passage for my purpqses is that it finds intense emotion
21 Cf. also On the Sublime 21.2, where the free flow of emotion is compared to the movement in a piece of writing where there can be no question of any straightforward corre-
(phora again) of a runner's legs. lation between author, text, and readers. The noun I have translated as 'strong
22 See On the Sublime 15.2 (in vivid use of imagination poets and orators seek 'what is emotio- emotion' (EKita0na) is unique in the whole of surviving Greek but there is no
nal and animated', t6 tE <na0rinK6v> ... Kat to cruyKEKtvf\µevov),29.2 (figures make lan- doubt about its sense. Whose emotion, however, is Longinus identifying here or in
guage 'more emotional and dynamically animated', na0T]nKcotepou<;Kat cruyKEKtvf\µevou,;).
the later phrase, 'the high pitch of emotion'? 26 Thucydides himself - the authorial
23 See esp. On the Sublime 39.3, where the noun metousia ('participation') stresses the effect of
sublime composition which 'carries the speaker's emotion into the souls of the audience and
voice in the text - is clinically non-emotional throughout his account of the scene.
at every point induces the hearers' participation( ... to napwtro<; tqi Aeyovn n&0o<;d,; ta<;
\Jf'\lXa<;t&v neAa<; napEtcrayoucrav Kat d<; µEto'\l<Jtav auwu tOU<; IXK01l0Vta<;ad 25 Longinus quotes from Thucydides 7 .84.5 (making a small slip, easy enough in context, by
rn0un&crav ...). Cf. Halliwell 2011, 339, 363f. writing 'Syracusans' for 'Peloponnesians').
24 On the Sublime 20.1 cites the passage as an example of how accumulated figures can contri- 26 In this last phrase, ~ toil n&0ou<; unEpox{i, it is arguable that pathos means 'catastrophic
bute 'strength, persuasion, beauty' (tTJVicrxuv, tT]Vna0ro, to KCXAAo<;). event' rather than 'emotion'.
118 Stephen Halliwell The Poetics of Emotional Expression: Some Problems of Ancient Theory 119
This does not, of course, preclude emotion on the part of readers. But if readers do The passage in question comes from chapter 17 of the Poetics and relates to
respond with emotions of their own, they do so without any explicit authorial di- the psychology of poetic composition.
rection. Thucydides' fastidiously 'objective' manner depicts men who are them-
selves in hopeless panic, though seemingly more desperate to drink than to defend
◊Et OE,ou; µu0ouc; cruvun&vm Kat 1:ft on
P.8/;El<rovarcEpy&t;ecr0m µ&Aw,:a npo 6µ,u&,rov
n0fµEVOV' ou,ro~ yap UV evapyi:cnma op&v ro<:mEp reap' au,o'i:r yt''{VOµEvo~'tOlC
themselves or escape (which may underlie Longinus' diagnosis of 'hyperbole'). 27 f I , ':)
But precisely how individual readers might respond to the narrative of the Atheni- ouv_a1:ovK(Xtw'i:c;crxfiµacrtv crvva1tEpyal;:6µr,vov·m0av6:rcmm yap arco tf\<; avriis(J)UO"E{J)<;
ans' plight (and the ruthlessness of their enemy) depends on a number of varia- oi tv rt&0rn{v Eicnv, Kat xeiµaivn 6 XElµa1;6µEvo<;1ml xaArnaivEt 6 6pyt1;6µEvoi;
bles, not least their degree of sympathetic predisposition towards the Athenians, a fonv µaAAOV ft ~LUVlKOU"
at.1']0w6:m::('m,010 Ell(jl'Oouc;Tl 1tOlT}'tt1Cl] 'tOU,COV
yap oi µEv
£U1tA-am:01 oi 81:ew1:m1Ko{ dcriv. (Aristotle, Poetics 17. l 455a22-34 ). 30
factor which could not be taken for granted on the part of all Thucydides' original
The poet should construct his plots and complete their composition in language while placing
readers. A more universalising response of tragic pity or the like might be an op- things as much as possible before the mind's eye: in this way, by visualising as vividlv as
tion for some; it certainly has great appeal for many modem readers. But such a possi~le, like someone present at the events themselves, he is likely to discover what is, ap-
response is neither cued by Thucydides nor clearly identified by Longin us' own propriate and not to overlook things which clash with that ... As far as possible, the play-
reading (which we might in any case not expect to be wholly hospitable to 'the wright should complement the process of composition with physical gestures; for it is in vir-
tragic'). 28 tue of the same natural means that those in an emotional state are most convincing - the most
real display of distress or anger is conveyed by those who are actually feeling these things,
I suggest that for Longinus the extreme 'emotion' (e1erca0t:w.,rca0os;) of this
Hence poetry is the work of a naturally gifted person rather than someone manic: the former
moment in Thucydides is not specifically that of the author, the human actors in are those with supple imaginations, whereas the latter get carried away.
the scene, or the reader. It is, rather, a complex property of the writing itself, one
that mediates expressively between the imagined event and the receptive mind of It has often been observed that this passage shares with the lines of Horace's Ars
an implied reader, conjuring up the event in a manner which is highly charged Poetica from which I started an interest in how emotional expression can be con-
without spelling out just what the reader's reaction should be. The complexity of vincingly embedded in the characters of dramatic poetry. But just as in Horace's
such expressiveness is what Longinus strains to capture by his characteristically case, so too in Aristotle's we need to tease out the sense from a rather compressed
inventive wording, 'when, under the pressure of strong emotion, [hyperboles] are formulation; and in both cases my own reading diverges in some crucial respects
fonnulated in a way which resonates with the magnitude of a crisis', where 'reso- from long-established orthodoxy. On the surface, Aristotle's injunctions look
nates' attempts to translate a rare verb (cruvE1eqicow:fo0m) meaning literally 'to be clear enough. First, vividness (enargeia) of visualisation will ensure that the
uttered/voiced at the same time as' (i.e. of simultaneous and/or harmonious playwright 'plots' the situations of his drama in an appropriate and coherent man-
sounds). Sublime language itself resonates with the full significance of what it ner (avoiding inconsistencies that would show up in theatrical staging, as spelt out
expresses: as Longinus eloquently puts it elsewhere, 'thought and diction are for at 1455a26-29, omitted above). Secondly, the composing poet should stimulate
the most part intertwined with one another' .29 Equally, what becomes sublime his imagination with a degree of physical enactment for the roles being created (as
expression in such an instance - an instance, after all, which graphically describes though he were somewhat like an actor in rehearsal), since this will help him in-
the slaughter of human beings in the most degrading of circumstances - does so duce in himself the emotions he wishes his characters to display. 31 That, at any
only through the transformative power oflanguage. rate, is the standard interpretation of the passage; I have followed it myself in the
I have tried to show, then, that we cannot make complete sense of emotional past. But there are acute problems with it.
expression in On the Sublime by appeal to what is often treated as the standard Fundamental is the difficulty of seeing how Aristotle could suggest that by
ancient model of such expression, namely the direct transmission of specifiable gesturally 'inhabiting' the roles he is creating the dramatist can induce full-blown
emotions from author to audience. As an epilogue to my argument, I would like ~motions in himself. It is hard to square this with Aristotle's psychology of emo-
now to move back in time and consider a passage of Aristotle which is often be- tion, all the more so when one bears in mind that the principle would need to em-
lieved to contain evidence for this idea of expression but which turns out on closer
inspection not to be so simple. 30 In printing µaAA.ov ·TIµavtKoi3 rather than TIµavt1rni3 at 1455a33, I accept the case made by
Taran and Gutas 2012, 274f., 399-401 that this was the reading of the Greek manuscript from
which the Syriac translation (subsequently retranslated into the fragmentarily surviving Ara-
27 Thucydides 7.84.2 couples the desire for escape and for water in the retreating Athenians' bic version) was made. The textual question is far too briskly dismissed by Schmitt 2008,
state of mind; 7 .85 .I and 4 indicate that a few did manage to escape, at least temporarily. 552,
28 For the less than full compatibility between Longinian sublimity and tragedy, see Halliwell 31 Gill 1984, 152f. distorts the passage by playing down the poet's imagining of the characters'
2011, 353 with n. 55. emotions (as expressed by actors) and instead making the poet imagine 'standing before the
29 TlWU Ahyou VOT]CJV; fj 1:Eq,pamc; Ta rct.dro 61' bcm:epou OlETC'tVK'tat
(On the Sublime 30.1 ). audience himself' like an orator.
120 Stephen Halliwell The Poetics of Emotional Expression; Some Problems of Ancient Theory 121
brace emotional extremes (of grief, anger, fear, etc.) of the kind called for by (cUIJ)UTJ<;)does not suggest a capacity actually to work up an emotional state in
many scenes in tragedy: how could a playwright induce extreme grief or anger in oneself but rather a psychological adeptness at finding the right form of expres-
himself by making physical gestures/movements appropriate to a role? 32 If that sion for the states of mind of various characters. 35 But that is only what, on more
objection holds, then Aristotle's explanatory mention of 'those in an emotional general grounds, one would expect, since the art of poetry is for Aristotle nothing
state' must refer not to the experience of composing playwrights themselves, but if not a form of mimesis.
to the phenomena of the social world in general. That inference is strengthened by The reading outlined above can be fully aligned with a passage in Aristotle's
the fact that 'those in an emotional state' are said to be 'most convincing' in their Rhetoric with which, as frequently noticed, it has some features in common.
displays of emotion. But that would make little sense if applied to composing
playwrights, since their task is not to display emotion themselves but to find em:l 8' eyyu<;<pmvoµcVa 'ta nu0ri EAEEtVUE<:m,... avurK'll 'tOUSCTUVCl7t£pyal;oµtvou,;
crxfiµam K<Xt<pWV<Xt<; 1ml i\a0fin KCltOAOJ<; EY'\l7t0KpicrnEAeewo1:epovi:;EiVCll'enus yap
words which actors will convert into fully embodied theatrical performances. 33
What needs to be 'convincing' in the dramatist's case is not his state of mind per
to
7t0l~~crt <pa{vecr0m KClKOV itpo 6µµ&.1:wv1to10uv1:es... (Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.8, 1386a28-
34).
se but the material expression he creates for his characters' emotions. Since sufferings whieh seem near at hand are conducive to pity, ... it follows that those speak-
But what, then, is the best alternative to the standard reading of this passage? ers who complement what they say with gestures, inflections of voiee, clothing, and in gen-
It is to take Aristotle to be talking not about real emotions on the part of the com- eral with dramatic delivery will have a more pitiful effect (since they make the suffering seem
near at hand by placing it before the mind's eye ...)
posing playwright but something more like emotional authenticity of effect (and
expression) in the roles he envisages and creates for his characters. The poet is These remarks specifically concern oratory. But since the passage belongs to Aris-
being urged not to work himself into a quasi-hallucinatory state of feeling but to totle's analysis of pity, one of the defining tragic emotions, and since he evidently
use his imagination in a strong yet controlled manner, and to do so in part by re- thinks of orators here as physical and vocal performers (using the term hupokrisis,
hearsing a plausible physical enactment for how characters in a genuine emotional 'dramatic delivery', which encompasses the performative techniques of both ac-
state would behave according to 'the same natural means', i.e. in their expressive tors and orators), there is a clear point of contact with .the advice in Poetics 17 for
bodily deportment. 34 the poet to compose with the aid of some of the actor's corporeal methods. What
Here the parallel with the first of Aristotle's two injunctions in the passage is matters most for my interpretation of the latter are two things about this passage
helpful: just as the poet's vivid visualisations are to help him plot situations ap- from the Rhetoric. First, Aristotle does not assert anything about the speaker's
propriately, imagining them as if they were real but not thereby making them real, actual emotional state (which might vary according to the precise rhetorical occa-
so his emotional imagination, with additional stimulation from physical move- sion);37 instead, he stresses how certain details of visual and vocal demeanour can
ments of the kind an actor would employ, will enable him to give his characters add emotive force to the speaker's arguments. Secondly, Aristotle shows us here
theatrically convincing expressions of emotion but will not entail first-hand emo- the other side, as it were, of the imaginative process hypothesised in the Poetics:
tions on the poet's own part. This alternative interpretation fits well with Aristo- there, the poet himself is enjoined to place things as much as possible 'before the
tle's further statement that poetry is the work of a naturally gifted person or of mind's eye'; here, the effect of good oratorical presentation is to bring things viv-
'those with supple imaginations' (£unAa.<Yt:0t),since being 'naturally gifted' idly before the mind's eye of the audience. This confirms what we can anyway
infer from the train of thought in the context of the Poetics itselt: namely that the
32 Aristotle himself certainly allows that emotions can sometimes be indueed by imagination or poet's reason for 'rehearsing' and partly 'acting out' the roles he creates is to an-
thought alone (cf. De motu animal/um 7, 70lb19-22), though this will normally involve be-
lief-based imagination, most obviously in the case of fear (Rhetoric 2.5, 1382a21-25). De
anima 1.1, 403a21-24 states that a condition of the body alone can sometimes induce emo-
tion even in the absence of any external justification for it, but this special case hardly covers 35 This is an independent argument in favour of reading µ&1lov 11~wv1Kouat 1455a33; seen.
the circumstances of the composing poet: for one reading of this passage of De anima, see 30 above. Among editors wbo retain the reading 11µavurnu, Rostagni 1945, 99 allows for
Fortenbaugh 2002, 113. simulation of emotion by .the EU<p1lEt~ yet still takes Aristotle to say that the most persuasive
33 Meijering I 987, 15 shows the tangles into which the standard interpretation gets itself: she poets are those who aetually feel the emotions expressed, i.e. the µav1x:oi.
ends up making the composing poet 'the person in distress' and 'a person in a temper'! This 36 I prefer the reading of ms. F, fo0ij1:1(there is no need to emend to the plural fotn,cn), to that
may be psychologically picturesque but cannot be Aristotle's meaning. of A, akr0~cret, whieh is retained by Kassel 1976, 97; Meijering 1987, 16 prints the seeond
34 My translation of aico tfis a1Yti\<;<pu<H:coi;
(lit. 'from the same nature') as 'in virtue of the reading but translates the first. For some further observations on the passage, see Rapp 2002,
same natural means' is certainly open to debate, but so are all other interpretations of what is II 656f
(in this context) a highly problematic phrase. I cannot here pursue all the ramifications of this 37 Cf. the supposedly Peripatetic view at Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 4.43, according to
point; for the history of translations of the phrase cf. Sanborn 1938, 325-332 (though note which the orator should if neeessary feign (simulare) emotion in order to arouse genuine
that this article contains many errors and confusions). emotion in the audienee; on this passage see Graver 2002, 163-165, Brink 1971, 186.
122 Stephen Halliwell The Poetics of Emotional Expression: Some Problems of Ancient Theory 123
ticipate how his play might be performed in the theatre and how it could there of intuition with which individual critics attempted to do justice to what they saw
have an appropriate impact on the imagination and emotions of the audience. as one of the most important aspects ofliterature and its value.
A significant asymmetry, however, now needs to be highlighted. I have ar-
gued that, contrary to the communis opinio, Aristotle does not claim in Poetics 17
that the poet will actually experience (as opposed to imagining and 'rehearsing' BIBLIOGRAPHY
with vivid intensity) the emotions he depicts on the part of his characters. But
there is no question that the Poetics as a whole takes the (properly aroused) emo- Abrams, M. H. (1953) The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theo1y and the Critical Tradition,
Oxford. ·
tions of theatrical spectators, just like those of the engaged audiences of oratory,
Bompaire, J. (1973) Le pathos dans le Traite du Sublime, Revue des Etudes Grecques 86, 323-
to be real emotions. It is true, in fact, not only of Aristotle but of the entire ancient 343.
critical tradition that emotions felt towards literary characters are assumed to be at Brink, C. 0. (1971) Horace on Poetry: the 'Ars Poetica', Cambridge.
their core the same emotions (with the same causes and psychosomatic dynamics) Carroll, N. (1991) On Kendall Walton's Mimesis as Make-Believe, Philosophy and Phenomeno-
as those felt in life, though with the necessary rider that in the framework of liter- logical Research 51, 383--387.
ary experience they can become attached to fictional objects and associated with Fortenbaugh, W. W. (2002) Aristotle on Emotion, edn., London.·
special kinds of aesthetic pleasure even where the same emotions would in life Gill, C. (1984) The Ethos/Pathos Distinction in Rhetorical and Literary Criticism, Classical Quar-
38 terly 34, 149-166.
have a painful dimension. This means, on my reading, that for Aristotle (and
Graver, M. R. (2002) Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4, Chicago.
Horace) dramatic poets need not feel genuine, full-blown emotions themselves, Grube, G. M.A. (1961) A Greek Critic: Demetrius on Style, Toronto.
even though they may strive to induce real emotions in their hearers or readers. If Halliwell, S. (2002) The Aesthetics of Mimesis: Ancient Texts and Modern Problems, Princeton.
that is a paradox, it is one that admits of psychologically unproblematic resolu- ~ {2011) Between Ecstasy and Truth: Interpretations of Greek Poetics from Homer to Longinus,
tion. Poet and hearer/reader stand in quite different positions: the poet (qua maker, Oxford.
perhaps 'creator') is preoccupied - as all the passages considered in this paper (2015) Fiction, in P. Destree and P. Murray (eds.), A Companion to Ancient Aesthetics,
Malden Ma., 341-353.
illustrate - with achieving expressive adequacy in the linguistic fabric of their
(2016) Ancient Beginnings, in N. Carroll and J. Gibson (eds.), The Routledge Encyclopedia of
works, whereas the hearer/reader responds (with however much scope for inter- the Philosophy of Literature, New York, 3-12.
pretation and judgement) to the resulting aesthetic object, a text/performance that Hertz, D. (1983) A Reading ofLonginus, Critical Inquiry 9, 579-596.
already incorporates marks of expression in its constitutive structure. Kassel, R. (1976) Aristotelis Ars Rhetorica, Berlin.
That asymmetry between author and audience is one of several reasons which Matelli, E. (2012) Praxiphanes of Mytilene (called 'of Rhodes'): The Sources, Text and Transla-
I hope have emerged in this paper for drawing back from positing a standard an- tion, in A. Martano, E. Matelli, and D. Mirhady ( eds.), Praxiphanes of Mytilene and Chamae-
leon ofHeraclea, New Brunswick, 1-156.
cient critical model of emotional expression in literature. My close-focus concen-
Meijcring, R. (1987) Literary and Rhetorical Theories in Greek Scholia, Groningen.
tration on a series of specific passages has deliberately been the reverse of sys- Munteanu, D. L. (2009) Qua/is tandem misericordia in rebus fictis? Aesthetic and Ordinary Emo-
tematic; it has been intended to expose some of the complexity inherent in the tion, Helios 36, 117-147.
subject and to counteract over-confident generalisations about how ancient critics Prins, Y. (1996) Sappho's Afterlife in Translation, in E. Greene (ed.), Re-Reading Sappho: Recep-
construed the various relationships at play in the 'triangle' of author, work and tion and Transmission, Berkeley, 36-67,
audience. In particular, I have tried to provide some evidence against the conven- Rapp, C. (2002)Aristoteles Rhetorik, 2 vols, Berlin.
Rostagni, A. ( 1945) Aristotele Poetica, 2 nd edn., Turin.
tional conviction that ancient criticism broadly relied on a 'rhetorical' model
Rudd, N. (1989) Horace hpistles Book II and Epistle to the Pisones ('Ars Poetica '), Cambridge.
(though the model needs qualifying even for rhetoric itself) 39 in which the essen- Russell, D. A. (1972), Longinus, On Sublimity, in D. A. Russell and M. Winterbottom (eds.), An-
tial component in emotional expression is a state of mind transmitted from author cient Literary Criticism, Oxford,460-503.
to audience. Generalisations need replacing by refreshed attention to the subtleties Sanborn, H. (l 938) A Side-Light on the Katharsis, The Classical Journal 33, 322-335.
Schmitt, A. (2008) Aristoteles Poetik, Berlin.
Taran, L., and D. Gutas (2012) Aristotle Poetics: editio maior, Leiden.
Walton, Kendall L. (1990) .Mimesis as Make-Believe, Cambridge rvtA.
Wehrli, F. ( 1969) Die Schule des Aristoteles: Phainias, Chamaileon, Praxiphanes, 2nd edn., Basle.
38 Cf. n. 6 above. On the justifiability of identifying various conceptions of 'fiction' in ancient
criticism, see Halliwell 2015.
39 The 'rhetorical model' is itself afflicted by tensions, even confusions, which I lack space to
investigate here; as a token example, note how Quintilian, Institutio oratoria 6.2.26-28 oscil-
lates unstably between the idea of the orator as actually feeling emotion (ut moveamur ipsi, ut
... adficiamur) and, by contrast, as producing a realistic impression of emotion (veri similia).
THE PSEUDO-ARISTOTELIAN PROBLEAfS ON SYMPATHY
William Fortenbaugh
Well over forty years ago, work being done by modem philosophers on emotional
response caught my attention. I think especially of articles by Errol Bedford, who
argued for the essential involvement of thought in emotional response, and by
George Pitcher, who viewed thought as characteristic of emotion but not essen-
tial.1 Those articles and others like them led me to reconsider Aristotle's analysis
of emotion as set forth in his Rhetoric and to argue that Aristotle had come to un-
derstand thought as the efficient cause of emotional response. From there the path
led to the Nicomachean Ethics, in which moral virtue is tied to emotional response
qua cognitive behavior involving not only factual judgemei;it but also moral as-
sessment. Subsequently Aristotle's successor Theophrastus came 1mder the mi-
croscope as did his contemporaries within the Peripatos. 3 Other scholars have con-
tributed mightily and taken the investigation into other schools and other periods.
Hence, when I received a letter from Douglas Cairns and Damien Nelis inviting
me to a conference on the future of research on emotions in Classical Antiquity, I
hesitated and might have declined, saying that I had nothing new to contribute
concerning the Peripatos and was too old to learn a new field. Happily, however, I
had recently been given a copy of the new Loeb Library edition of pseudo-
Aristotle's Rhetoric to Alexander. To that edition is joined another pseudo-
Aristotelian work, the Physical Problems, 4 which has been largely ignored by
scholars, and for good reason. The work is a collection of questions and answers
awkwardly put together from various sources, which are often difficult if not im-
possible to identify. Heavy-handed abridgment makes understanding difficult, and
the physiology that underlies much of the work is woefully antiquated. Neverthe-
less, it occurred to me that the Problems has much to say on emotional response
and is largely untapped by persons interested in the topic. Hopefully this paper
will encourage other scholars to tap in.
Throughout the Problems, there are numerous references to emotional re-
sponse, and three of the thirty-eight books that make up the Problems carry in
their headings explicit reference to an emotion or to dispositions closely tied to 1 SHARED PAIN
emotional response: 'Problems arising from Sympathy' (Book 7), 'Problems con-
nected with Fear and Courage' (Bk. 27), 5 and 'Problems Connected with Modera- All chapters in the Problems begin with a question, and the answer or answers
tion and Licentiousness' (Bk. 28). I was attracted by the first of the three titles, that follow take the form of a question, which is to be understood as a tentative
because it contains the word cruµrca8aa, which does not occur elsewhere in the assertion. 8 Chapter 7 of Book 7 is no exception. The question and the first of two
corpus Aristotelicum. 6 I had expected to find a discussion of an emotion like pity, answers run as follows:
I
but to my surprise I found much more. There is, indeed, a discussion of shared Iha 'tl, E1lEt◊<XV 'tEµvoµEvov 'ttVO:'C8coµEv~ Ko:toµEvov~ CJ'tpE~AouµEVOV ~ aAAO n 'tffiV
pain which might be referred to as pity (Ch. 7), but painful sounds and sights (Ch. ◊Etv&v 11acrxovm, cruvo:AyouµEv 'tll 8to:voi~; ~ O'tt T\ cpucrt~ T]µtv KOtV~ armcrtv;
5), contagious diseases (Ch. 4, 8), infectious yawning and urination (Ch. 1, 2, 3, 6) CJUVY\AYT]CJEV tb'[1,'t(f)11acrxovn 8ta 't~V OtKElO'tT]'tO:.
oDv, E1lEt8av'tl 'tOlOU'tOV
and cures for bleeding gums (Ch. 9) also receive treatment, albeit of varying Why when we see someone being cut or burned or tortured or suffering something else that is
length. In what follows, I shall ignore the last mentioned topic as a largely irrele- terrible, do we share his pain in our thought? Is it that all of us have a common nature? So
when one sees something of this sort, one shares the pain of the person who is suffering on
vant addition to Book 7. It comes at the end and most likely was added by a late
account of kinship (887a15-18).
editor/compiler, who wanted to include a stray piece of text within the Problems
and could do no better than attach it to the end of the book. 7 The other topics will The verb rcacrxav occurs twice: once in the opening question and again in the first
all be discussed, beginning in Section 1 with shared pain, which is presented as a answer (887al6, 18). Both times it is used of someone suffering bodily affliction.
cognitive response to another person's suffering. Section 2 focuses on painful We can imagine his mental anguish and think of it as an emotion, but in the text
sounds and sights, some of which but not all involve thought. In Section 3, the under consideration rcacrxav refers to bodily suffering. I emphasize that, because
subject is contagious disease, which has no essential tie to cognition. In Section 4, the noun rca8oi;, which is cognate with rcacrxEtV,is the word that Aristotle uses in
attention turns to infectious yawning and urinating, which might be considered the Rhetoric and elsewhere for emotional response. 9 As often, context determines
automatic reactions, but in the Problems are presented as responses involving how a word is being used. 10
thought. Section 5 takes up urination prompted by running water, while Section 6 The description of the man who shares someone else's pain is different. His
concludes the discussion, suggesting inter alia that the phenomena discussed in pain is explicitly attributed to thought, 81avo1a (887al 7), which Aristotle treats as
Book 7 make it difficult to mark off a clearly defined class of emotional res- the efficient cause of emotion. If we ask what thought is in play, our text provides
ponses, unless one does so within a particular context such as ethical and rhetori- an answer: it is the thought of kinship, otKEto-rT]i;(887al 7), which in the case of
cal theory. And even then arbitrary decisions may creep in. human beings is a natural relationship based on body and soul. 11 The person who
sees another person suffering, sees that person as akin and feels pain. That is an
intelligent response. It involves understanding that the person suffering is closely
related in an important way. Much as a person is moved when he sees a parent,
spouse or child in affliction, so he is moved when he sees another human being
suffering, for he understands that they share the bond of humanity. To be sure, the
degree to which he is moved will be different. A person is more deeply moved
when he sees a family member suffering, but being moved in lesser degree is still
5 On Book 27, see Fortenbaugh 2014. being moved and this movement may be both mental and physical. We might say
6 The Stoics, perhaps beginning with Chrysippus, use cruµ11&0rnxin regard to the uni- both that he is deeply troubled in mind and seriously concerned, and that his men-
ty/coherence of the cosmos (see Meijer 2007, 85-88, citing Sextus Empiricus, Against the
Physicists 1.78-85 and Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods 2.19). Epicurus, in the Letter to
Herodotus, uses the word of the interconnection and mutual sensibility of body and soul in
sense-perception (ap. Diogenes Laertius, Lives 10.64).
7 Chapter 9 is concerned with curing an unpleasant condition of the gums and not with a sym-
pathetic response to another person's suffering. I have written 'largely irrelevant,' because 8 On the question and answer format, see Flashar 1962, 341-346.
7.9 does relate to 7.5 in that both chapters take note of the condition often referred to as 'teeth 9 Rhetoric 2.1 1378a19; cf. Nicomachean Ethics 2.5 1105621-23.
set on edge' (see below, n. 16). In 7.9 the noun cdµco8io: occurs in the opening line (887al), 10 It is well known that both 11&80~and 11acrxEtvare used widely for a variety of phenomena,
and in 7.5 the cognate verb o:lµco8tav is found (886612). That may have caught the eye of an bodily and mental alike See Bonitz, Index Aristotelicum s. v. and Fortenbaugh 2011, 146, n.
editor/compiler, but it is not a good reason for tacking on Chapter 9 at the end of the Book 7. 71. For Aristotle's use of the noun and verb in reference to a mental image, cpavmcrµo:,see
Moreover, if the editor were alert and interested in economy, he might have omitted 7.9 as a below, Section 2.
near duplicate of 1.38. 11 Cf. Theophrastus, fr. 531.21 FHS&G. For discussion see. Fortenbaugh 2011, 557-561.
128 William Fortenbaugh The Pseudo-Aristotelian Problems on Sympathy
129
tal state affects his body, so that he feels bodily pain, perhaps diffuse discomfort Aristotle does not explain smell, hearing and sight in terms of emanations. Rather,
or an unpleasant feeling located in a particular part of the body. 12 he posits a medium that differs in respect to each of the three senses. In regard to
What has just been said goes beyond what our text says, but it is in line with sight, Aristotle posits a transparent medium that is actualized by fire. or the like
what Aristotle says in the Rhetoric concerning pity, eAwc;.He defines the emotion and is continuous between a colored object and the eye. In regard to sound, he
as a certain pain based upon/caused by the appearance of some evil, destructive or speaks of a single mass of air that is continuous from a body that is struck to the
painful, which is afflicting someone who does not deserve it, and which a person ear. And in regard to smell, he refers not only to air but also to water as the me-
might expect to suffer himself or one of his own, and soon (2.8, 1385bl3-16). dium through which smelling takes place, for water animals are al;>leto smell ( On
Here pity is said to be grounded or based upon the appearance of an evil, fat Soul 2.7, 418a26-2.9 422a7). My guess is that Flashar is correct in suggesting a
cpmv~µEV(fl K<XK(fl ~l~85b13). T? at is to be ~nderstood in ten_ns of cogniti~n; the post-Aristotelian source and that the answer has suffered extreme abbreviation
1
emotion has a basis m thought. · The same is true of expectmg, n:pocr◊OKTtCictEv and/or been assigned its place by an unthinking editor.
(1385b 14). Expecting is holding a belief, M~a, concerning the future. This in-
volvement of cognition together with the initial reference to pain, fo1:coOrJEAEoc;
Mi:rcrinc; (1385bl3), invites speaking of pity as sharing someone else's pain, 2 PAINFUL SOUNDS AND SIGHTS
cruva.Ayetv.Only the pain need not be identical in kind: when we see a person
being burned, we may feel pain, both mental and bodily, without experiencing the Chapter 5 is related to Chapter 7, in that it is concerned with shared pain. The
pain of burning flesh. If there is any detail that causes pause, it is the idea that opening question runs as follows:
feeling pity is self-reflexive: the same might happen to oneself (1385b 14-15). But
the worrv is unfounded for an adult human being with life experience unders- Ota 'tl t&v µ/:v Iha Tll£aKofj.:;A.1J1tf)prov
EVtaqipfr1:eiv /Jµfo; ltOtEl, ofov npirov <XKOV(O~LEVO<;
·rnµvoµi:vri KatAi0o,; aA.oUµEVO<;,
K!XlKl<i1'Jpt<; --eaOEoux1:fj<;0\jfEro<;crriµEia t&v na0rov
tands full well that kin;hip among humans extends to misfortune. And that un- (X1)'t(X~µ1v ta 1ta811 eµnotei:; <Xiµrootfoµi:vtE yap !OU<;6~,'i opfovn:; fo-0fovm;; Kat --cou,;
derstanding underlies shared pain qua human emotion. 14 anayxoµevou,; EVlOloprovrn; eK\jf'llXOU<J\V.
The second answer to the question with which Chapter 7 begins is: Why do some things that are painful to hear make us shudder, like a saw being sharpened and
pumice being cut and stone being ground, but the visual signs of these effects (on others)
i\ on rocrm:p (X1 ptvc<; K!Xl ext &1wal. Aaµl3avoucri 'tlVU<;anoppoia; Kma 1:a<; OtKl'tm;
produce those very effects in us? For our teeth are set on edge when we see people eating
ouv&µrn;, o\hro 1m1~ O\jft<;'m'U"CO K!Xlano 1:&v1j0£COVK!XlAun:11p&v. something bitter and some faint when they see people strangled (886b9-14).
Or is it that just as noses and ears receive certain emanations according to their peculiar capa-
cities, so also sight (does) the same both from what is pleasant and what is painful (887al9- In the answer that follows, we are told that hearing is duller than sight and that it
21). involves breath, which enters the body and produces movement. When the breath
The answer seems quite unrelated to the first answer. There is no reference to is large in quantity and smooth, it causes pleasure, but when it is large in quantity
thought, and smell and hearing are mentioned as well as seeing. In addition, an and rough, it causes the hair to stand on end and the body to shudder (886b 14-
emanation theory of sense perception is introduced. That suggests to Flashar that 34). Concerning sight we are told that effects actually occurring in others are re-
the source of the second answer is a later Peripatetic. 15 And with good reason, for produced in those who are observing them: 1:a1ha µev 1:a 6:n:o 1:11,;o:Ari0dac;
na0ri cruµ~ai'.va yivEcrOm&:re'aui-11c;(sc. O'J!Eroc;)
(886b35-37). The idea expres-
sed here is the same as that found in the opening question (886bll-l2). The vi-
12 A well-known case of shared pain is that of Phaedra's nurse in Euripides Hippolytus. Biolo- sual signs of other people suffering cause others to suffer in kind. Picking up the
gically the nurse is not a member of Phaedra's family, but being her nurse she is, as it were, examples that accompany the initial question, we can say that the sight of people
within the family and closely involved with Phaedra. Hence, the nurse is deeply affected by
eating something bitter causes the observer to experience the sensation of teeth set
Phaedra's distress (253-260), which is initially characterized as illness (176, 205, 293) and 16
only later as a shameful, painful fom1 of eros (331, 347f). on edge. And seeing a person being strangled causes the observer to faint. He
13 The preposition i':ni with the dative is used frequently in reference to the underlying belief experiences the painful effects of being choked, but slighter than in reality,
that is at the heart of emotional response, i.e., is the efficient eause. In addition to Rhetoric
2.8 1385bl3, see 2.9 1386b9, 1387a9, 2.10 l387b23, 2.11 1388a32. On the use of qiaivecr0m
in reference to what is thought to be the case, i.e., a belief that can be correct or false, see For-
tenbaugh 2002, 97-100. 16 The phrase 'teeth set on edge' is used to describe the sensation caused by acidic tastes like
14 I have added 'qua human emotion,' because I do not want to deny that certain animals exhibit that of rhubarb. lt is, therefore, an apt translation of the verb aiµwoi&.v at 886b 12, where the
shared pain, even though they lack cognition and therefore cannot understand kinship in the verb is used to describe the sympathetic responses experienced by people who observe others
way that human beings do. At least, that is what an Aristotelian would say. eating something bitter. Understood literally, the Greek verb refers to bleeding gums. Cf. the
15 Flashar 1962, 491. cognate noun at 1.38 863bl 1 and 7.9 887bl.
130 William Fortenbaugh
The Pseudo-Aristotelian Problems on Sympathy 131
oe
D.acpp61:i;pa 1:~i:;aA110dai:; (886b37-887al). Death does not follow, but we
3 CONTAGIOUS DISEASE
can say that the response is in kind.
The final sentence of Chapter 5 is not to be ignored:
Ve~ different is the treatment of infectious disease in Chapters 4 and 8. In the
µi':v OU,1:'flV8' cm'0:,1)1:{0V
&.noOE,:fie;(h:ofic;0:,\)1:C( 1tpocr8oidav c;,pino~l£V'<XAYEWOU yap earher chapter, the topic is treated briefly and without reference to specific di-
KaKou 1tpocr8oida foi:{v. seases. The text runs as follows:
It is not on account of hearing that there occur these (effects that are actually being felt by
another person); rather, we shudder at the expectation that comes from them, for it is an ex-
$:: \
uta
I ' \
n a1to vocrrovEVtOJV
I l f ,-... t " r
ano
vocrovow Ol 1tAT]crtai;ov1:e,;;; Beuyidar; ou:8dr; frytod'E'l:at' ;;
pectation of painful evil (887al-3) 01:t
U t
T\ ,UEV
\
VOCTO<:;
; / { r
~• , ,... t 1 •: ":) ' 'I
T\ ue Vyteta flpeµta; 1] µEVOUVKlVEt,T] 8' ou0r;v. ~ 0\01:l tO µEV
KtvT]crt<;,
1
a.Kov;t, ,o 8' tx6vn yivei:m; Kat &pa 1:aihoucna ,&v i:Koucr{rovical ,&v EKnpovoiar;
If I understand correctly, we have here an acknowledgment that thought (expecta- 8taq>Epet.
tion, npoaSoKia) plays a role in fright brought on by sound. Throughout most of Why do certain diseases cause those who come close to become sick, but health causes no
Chapter 5, sound and its effect are discussed in material terms. Sound is said to be one to become healthy? Is it that disease is motion and health is rest? Therefore the one
breath, which can vary in quantity and quality. If nothing more were said, we moves and the other docs not. Or is it because the one occurs involuntarily and the other vo-
luntanly. And so what is involuntary is different from what is voluntarv and what is due to
might say that Chapter 5 presents hearing as a bodily reaction to physical stimuli. forethought (886b3-8). •
In certain contexts, there is nothing wrong with such a description: there are
sounds that are pleasant and others that are unpleasant in themselves, e.g., the The question makes reference to persons getting close, nA'T]ata~ovn:i:;(886b4).
sound of a saw being sharpened (886b 10). But now reference is made to an expec- That suggests that a physical explanation will be offered, and that is what the first
tation of evil, which takes us to the level of emotional response. In particular, the answer. provides. Sic~ess being a form of motion infects the person who gets
reference takes us to the level of fright, which Aristotle connects with expectation: close either through direct contact or mediated through, e.g., breath. The second
µimx npoaooKfot; nvoi:; WU ndcrea0ai n (p0ap'tlKOVnci0oi:; (Rhetoric 2.5, answer shifts the focus from the nature of disease and its physical cause to unin-
1382b29). 17 We may think of the sound of the salpinx, the war-trumpet, which an !ended co~sequences. In general, people do not want to become sick; they do so
ordinary citizen would understand as a threat to his wellbeing. If he has not been mvoluntanly when they get close to someone who has a contagious disease. In
trained in proper values, he might flee straightway, but if he has received a sound co~trast, pe~ple who keep their distance from those who are contagious act volun-
education, he will respond like Aristotle's more courageous individual, who res- ~nly and with forethought, np6vow. (886b8). Their evasive action involves cogni-
ponds correctly to sudden alarms (Nicomachean Ethics 3, l l l 7al 7-22). 18 t10n, but only as it plays a role in staying healthy. The cause of disease remains
Since sight is contrasted with hearing in Chapter 5, we might conclude that physical.
cognition plays a role in cases of hearing and not in cases of seeing. But the idea . Chapt~r 8 is longer and shifts the attention from disease in general to specific
is to be resisted. It is nowhere stated in either Chapter 5 or 7, and what we do read kmds of disease: consumption, eye-disease and scurvy, each of which is treated as
in Chapter 7 indicates that thought is in play when a man beholds undeserved cut- a physical condition, whose transmission occurs in a particular way_ In the case of
ting or burning and shares the victim's pain: auvaAyouµev 1:fi6mvoiq; (887a16-- scurvy, transmission is by contact with a sticky discharge that remains on the sur-
l7). In regard to Chapter 5, we can say that the man, who sees another person fa~e .of an infected individual (887a33-37). In the case of consumption, the trans-
being strangled, understands that the victim is in great pain and that he too could m1ss10n ~ccurs by corrupted breath, which is inhaled by another person who
experience such pain. He might faint (886b13-14), but that does not mean that his becomes 111(887a27-33). And in the case of eye-disease transmission depends
response is mindless. Far from it; his response is intelligent and similar to emo- upon the ease with which an eye is moved by and assimilates itself to whatever it
tions like pity and fear. sees. Hence, when a person sees another person whose eyes are disturbed his own
eyes readily become disturbed (887a24-27). 19 We might want to speak of a shared
na~oi:;, an~ if the ~isturbed condition is painful we might want to speak of shared
pam, a pam ~hat 1~ the same in kind. But if we choose to speak in that way, we
should keep m mmd that Chapter 8 is like Chapter 4 in that diseases and their
transmission are described in physical terms. Cognition plays no role, which is not
17 The move from a painful sound (a saw being sharpened) to an expectation of grievous ill
comes awkwardly at the end of the chapter and gives the impression of being an afterthought.
That is hardly unique in the Problems. We might guess that something has been omitted by
19 Whereas Chapter 7 introduces an emanation theory of sight, it is not clear that such a theory
an editor or fallen out in transmission.
1s to be understood in Chapter 8. What is said there seems compatible with Aristotle's notion
18 On the more courageous man and the speed with which the human mind can make connec-
of a transparent medium (see above, Section 1), but with so little text (just over three Jines), it
tions, see Fortenbaugh 2002, 71 and 100-103.
seems prudent to leave matter undecided.
132 William Fortenbaugh The Pseudo-Aristotelian Problems on Sympathy 133
the case in pity and shared pain as presented in Chapter 7. Apparently we have it is ri~e for yawning. When that is not the case, then infectious yawning does not
two distinct classes of naeri: those whose efficient cause is cognitive and those in occur.~ 2
which it is not. Regarding the main verb of the if-clause, avaµvr1cr0&aiv (866a25), we can
say that yawning in response to another person's yawn is not presented as an
automatic reflex, a simple physical/bodily reaction and nothing more. On the con-
4 INFECTIOUS YAWNING AND URINATING trary, it also involves remembering, which in the case before us is to be under-
stood in terms of thinking. That is made clear at the end of our text, where we are
20
Three different chapters take up the subject of responding to a yawn by yawning. told that yawning as a response occurs, r:,a;v µovov voftan, 'if only (the person
The first is Chapter 1, which rnns as follows: responding) thinks,' (866a28). We have here a second factor that explains excep-
Ota 1:t 1:0t<;xacrµOl~L£VOlS avnxacrµ&vw,t rlis !:ltt 'tO 7tOA.u;~ 6dm eav avaµv11cr0&criv ti~ns to sympathetic yawning. The first is physiological: the failure to be urgently
opy&v1:es,fVEpyoucriv,µa11,1cr1:a 0£ 1:a euidv711:a,ofov oupoumv; ii 0£ xacrµri ltVeUµa l(C(,l disposed. The second is psychological: one fails to think, vo£tv, of yawning. I
uypou KtVT]<Jt<; EfftlV, itpOXEtpovo'bv, eav µ6vov VOT]CTff fon yap ltA,T]O"toV, return to remembering qua thinking below.
Why do people usually yawn in response to (other) people who yawn? Is it because, if people A reference to urinating completes the first sentence of the answer. After
are reminded (of something) when their condition is urgent, then they act, especially in regard being told that the person whose condition is urgent acts in regard to what is easi-
to what is easily moved, e.g., they urinate? Yawning is breath and a movement of moisture, It
is therefore ready at hand, if only one thinks (ofit), For it is nearby. (886a24-28)
ly moved, £UK1vriw: (886a26), urination is mentioned as an example, ofov
(866a26). The sentence that follows returns the focus to yawning, which is said to
The occurrence of yawning in response to someone else's yawn is accepted with- be breath and a movement of moisture. We understand that breath, like urine, can
out argument. Apparently the phenomenon is regarded as familiar, which indeed it accumulate to the point where it needs to be released. A person in this condition is
is. Nevertheless, we may wonder whether the phenomenon is so common, that it predisposed to yawn breath is ready at hand, JtPOXEtpov(886a27) and he is
can be said to occur 'usually' or 'for the most part,' o:i<;btt 'IO n:01-u.A better likely to yawn, should he see someone else yawn. Ifthat is correct, then we can
choice might be evto'tE, 'sometimes,' since it is vague enough to cover a pheno- say that the comparison with urination is apt. Only we may wonder whether the
menon that is common but falls short of 'for the most part.' Be that as it may, the phenomenon under discussion should be called yawning, for in my experience and
23
insertion of a qualifier like 'usually' is not surprising, for infectious yawning be- according to medical handbooks, yawning is deep inspiration, i.e., breathing in,
longs to human physiology, which is an empirical science. It deals with regulari- frequently on account of drowsiness or fatigue. To be sure, when a person inhales
ties that admit exceptions, which in principle are open to explanation. deeply, he subsequently exhales, but in regard to yawning that seems to be a sec-
The answer that follows on the question begins with the phrase erxv ondary phenomenon. Perhaps I have misunderstood Problems 7.1, but my reading
avaµvr1a0&cnv opy&vw; (866a25). To take the participle first, the verb opyiiv is is consistent not only with 7.2 and 7.6 but also with 11.29, where diminished hear-
familiar to readers of Aristotle's History of Animals, where a man is said to feel ing due to yawning is explained as a consequence of exhalation: tou £St6vw;
the urge for intercourse, opyq; n:po<;tllV6µ,A.iav, more in winter and a women nvcuµaw; (902b9-10). 24
more in summer (5.8, 542a32-bl).2 1 Hence, in Mayhew's recent translation of the Chapter 2 is the second chapter to discuss infectious yawning. It runs:
Problems, we find the participle translated with 'when they feel an urge.' For our
~ 'tOVitOOO'.
Ota,:{, eav µtv nva lOOlµevtTjVxei:pa £K1:ctVOV'tfJ, l] &X),on r&v 1:0l01J1:ffiV,
OUK
purposes, the important point is that when a person yawns in response to someone CtV1:L7tOlODµ€V eav 0£ xacrµwµevov antxacrµwµ£0a; ~ ou8/:,'tOU'tOad. &XA' Eav
to O'.'U'tO,
else's yawn, he does so in part because his body is predisposed. We might say that 6p~&v ruxn !O cr&µa Kat 01.J't(l) ◊mKdµc:vov rocrtE1:0uypov ava0epµaf.vccr0m; ,6,e yap ii
µy71µ71cTJVKlVTJCTlVitotet, (J}<Jitcp 1tpo:;aqipooima Kat E◊WOT]V' 'tO yap ltOl~<JC(,V
KCXl µv{iµriv
e{vm 1:0£XOV opµTjVltpo<;,o qiav1:acr0evita0o:;.
22 For 6pyiiv used of a body predisposed to emotion, cf. Aristotle, On Soul I.I 403a21-22,
20 Repetitive chapters are frequent in the Problems and almost certainly reflect the fact that the where we are told that a person may be moved to anger by trivial experiences, when the body
Problems is a collection of texts that were assembled over a period time from various sources is in an aroused state: ch:av 6pyf'f,o cr&µa. •
without final editing by a single person who aimed at coherence and economy. 23 E.g., Taber ·s Encyclopedic Medical Dictionary 1989, 2031.
21 Cf. History of Animals 8.8, 613b28-29 where 6pyiiv is nsed of the female partridge, which is 24 See also Problems 11.44, 904al6-22 and 32.13, 96la38-bl; in addition, ps. Aristotle,
eager or excited to lay eggs, In Theophrastus' Plant Explanations 3,2,6, the verb is used of Supplementary Problems 2.17, p, 128 K&S and Aristotle, On the Generation of Animals 5.2,
the earth, which is said to be ready for seed much as in animals the womb may be desirous of 781a30-31, where ya,vning and exhaling, xacrµc&µevot1<a1.EK1tvfov1:e<;, are marked off from
sperm. inhaling, dmrvfovre<;.
134 William Fortenbaugh
The Pseudo-Aristotelian Problems on Sympathy
135
Why if we see someone extending his hand or his foot or any other such thing, do we not re-
spond in the same way, but if (we see) a person yawning, we yawn in response? Or not al- minded of t~e relief that comes with yawning, his imagination is in plav What he
remembers IS a mavi:acr0iv '0
ways (do we do) this, but only if the body happens to be urgently disposed and in such a con- • • . 't' na os;, towar d w h'1ch an Impulse
· · .J.
is directed Unless
dition that its moisture is heated? For then memory produces movement, just as it does in re- an 1mpediment mtervenes, exhalation occurs. · '
gard to sex and food, for that which causes a memory to exist is that which possesses an im-
pulse toward the imagined condition (886a29-35).
It m.ay be _helpful to take a cue from the mention of sex, which is introduced
along with eatmg as comparable to yawning (886a34) •I arn thinki' · ll f
l · · · ng especia y o
The opening question differs from that of Chapter 1, but the answer focuses on nocturna, e~mss1~n,which is discussed on several occasions in the Problems. Its
yawning and is in close agreement with Chapter 1. Exceptions are acknowledged: o~currence , Is attributed, not, only to heat, moisture , and breath but' also to 1mag1n-
28 · ·
ouSe tofrro ad (886a3 l ), after which we are told that a person responds in kind, atlon .. ,ui::ta <pavtacriac: 'Ytv£tat (JO 16 892b18) Wh · I · ·
. - • , . en a person IS as eep, heat
if his body happens to be in an urgent condition, tav opyrov tuxn to crroµa ~:scends to th~ region ar?und.the.groin, resulting in a quantity of warm moisture.
(886a32), and so disposed that the moisture within is hot. 25 In what follows, me- . ould dreammg o~cur, 1.magmat1onis in play and the body is primed for emis-
mory is said to produce motion, after which sex and eating are mentioned by way s10n. In the c~se .of m~ect10us yawning, moisture, heat, and breath are also impor-
of comparison (886a33-34). They replace urination in Chapter 1. Much as an urge tant along w~rh_imagm~tion. _To be sure, there are obvious differences between
to urinate may be intensified and lead to actual urination when one sees another noc.turnal.em1ss1onand mfect10us yawning. Whereas the former involves heat and
relieving himself: so too in regard to sex and food, a present/latent urge may be m01stur~ m th~ lower torso and the emission is of seed, the latter involves heating
activated when one sees another satisfying his need.26 ~nd 1:10 1sture I~the upper body and the release of breath. Moreover, the ima ina-
The last sentence of Chapter 2: TOyap rcoif\c,av µv'T]µnvEtvat to rxov 6pµnv tI,on u~volv~d 1?the former differs in content from that of the latter. but in toth
rcpos; to <pavwcr0ev n&0os; (886a34-35), has been described as hardly intelli- ?ases. 1m~gm~t10n plays a role in triggering a physiological respon~e. And this
gible,27 but it can be understood if one keeps in mind the preceding reference to imagmati?n 1s to be ~derstood as calculative or deliberative imagination
the body in an urgent condition, opycov ... to crroµa (886a32). When a person's ~oywnKll 0 : PouAE~ttKll <pav;mcria, which is peculiar to human beings (animal~
body is full of breath that has become increasingly hot and moist, should that per- ave only au::r011n1<11 q>avtacrw, sensory imagination 29) and which plays I
son see someone else yawning, his body not only jogs his memory, prompting wheneve~ humans engage in cognitive activity. I do not want to deny that d:e:::
him to remember the relief that yawning effects, but also provides the impulse to ~ay be VlSl~al,b~t they are not limited to sensory images. A dreamer may imagine
yawn, i.e., the latent impulse, now activated, to exhale. Hence, Mayhew's transla- himself dehberatmg, e.g., how best to seduce a woman. He may proceed methodi-
tion: 'that which causes a memory to exist is that which provides an impulse to- ~all,y through steps that have an _intelligible cause-and-effect relationship, and ul-
ward the imagined condition.' timately. he may reach ~n explosive conclusion. Upon awaking he may be able to
On first reading, the concluding words, to <pavtacr0ev 1ta0o,;, 'the imagined re~ort his dream or port10ns thereof, including the steps through which his delibe-
condition,' (886a35), are puzzling, but they are intelligible in terms of Aristotelian r~tion proce:ded. ~or an Aristotelian such dreams and such reports involve reaso-
psychology. I cite the work On A1emory and Remembering, in which Aristotle mng and dehberat1ve imagination.
repeatedly refers to memory as a 1r&0os;(e.g., I, 449b5, 25, 450b18), while focu- So~ething similar is. tme of the person whose body needs relief from an ac-
sing on the faculty of imagination, <pavrao-1-a..He makes clear that memory and cumulation of warm 1:101stbreath. Upon seeing a pernon yawn, his memory is
thinking in general do not occur without an image, <pavmcrµa, which is a rca0o,; moved so that he th1nlcs of lus own condition and the .beneficial effects of
of the common sense (449b30.-450a14, 451a14-l 7). Applied to Chapter 2, we can
say that when a man is urgently disposed, sees another person yawn and is re-
28 P1'.oblems3.33, 876a5-10, 4:5, 877a5-9, 5.31, 884a6'-15, 33.15, 963a!O-l2.
25 A reference to heat is missing in Chapter 1, but that does not mean that the explanations of
2
9 his "'.ell known that the Ar'.stotelian scala natura places animals below human beings. Their
yawning in Chapters 1 and 2 are fundamentally different. Rather, the explanation offered in psychic capacities nse no higher than sensation and sensory imagination ( see e g A. · t ,
1
Chapter 2 is more complete: it includes a factor omitted in Chapter 1. On Soul 3. ~O,433b29-30). Unless that is kept in mind, mistranslation is all t;o ~a~; r;sc~: ~
26 My words are chosen in order to suggest a response in kind. The opening question speaks of :::me~t of Clearcht~s, a pupil of Aristotle and colleague of Theophrastus, who is re;orted to
f. e tat~ that male sparrows, partridges, roosters and quail ejaculate not only when they see
responding in the same way, avnnotouµeV 1:0 au1:6, and of yawning in response to yawning,
uvnxucrµcoµd:!a. Hence, it seems natural to understand the reference to sex and food in terms ema ;s ut als~o.whenthey ~ea;: their ,:iall. A~d the cause of this reaction is the image ofma-
,n
tmg t at occurs m the soul: fJ 'J'DXUy1voµEV11 qmviacr{a (fr. 36 W = Athenaeus, So hists
of response in kind. But in fact a person whose body is properly disposed may be moved to
engage in sex without observing an actual sex act, and similarly a hungry person may be mo- a! Dm~er 9, 389F). Guh?k 1930, 262 overtranslates with 'imaginative thought' (my e! ha-
ved to eat when he sees a plate of food. For further remarks on responses that are in kind, see sis). It 1s, of ~ourse, possible that Gearchus departed from the teaching of Aristotle and Ittti-
below, Sections 5 and 6. buted some kmd of thought to the birds m question but no text tells us that he di'd p
bly th · · · h . ' · . resuma-
27 Flashar 1962, 489. tion. e imagmatton t at moved the b1rds to ejaculate is to be understood as sensory imagina-
136 William Fortenbaugh The Pseudo-Aristotelian Problems on Sympathy 137
yawning. Here the thought process does not involve complex deliberations; as a Smell is introduced and used to explain how it is that yoke animals sniff out and
result, it proceeds rapidly. If I understand what Aristotle says in On Memory, we urinate in the same place (887a8-14). There is a striking imbalance here. Yoke
have here a case of recollection without seeking: avaµiµvncrKEa0m without animals are discussed at greater length and the focus is entirely on urination. My
(45lb22~23). Recollection is a kind of inference, a o--uAAoytcrµ6<;
1;;11i-E'iv guess is that a compiler or editor has intervened, perhaps combining material from
(453a10), which begins with thought (45lbl8) and proceeds by seeking out con- two separate accounts of sympathetic response. 31
nections, which may be numerous. But when they are few and when the process is Yoke animals are said to lack reason, avrn Myou (887all). Although not
quick and effortless, Aristotle describes the process as recollecting without see- emphasized, the implied contrast is with human beings, who have 'A6yo<;.They are
king. That applies to the case of the distressed individual who sees someone else able to recollect and to respond straightway. That takes us back to Chapter 1, in
yawn. The relationship between yawning and relief is so familiar that he im- which we read, 'It is therefore ready at hand, if only one thinks, Mxvµ6vov voncrn.
30
mediately makes the connection and exhales. For it is nearby' (886a24-28). The words 'ready at hand' and 'nearby' refer to an
Chapter 6 is the third chapter to discuss infectious yawning. It runs as follows: accumulation of warm moist breath (7.1, 886a26-27, 7.2 886a33). In the person
foa:-.;{'tOt<;xacrµricraµevot<; avnxacrµ&v,m, 1ml omv oupouv,a \'.orocrtv,oi'Jpoi3m, KU1 whose condition is urgent, the material and motive force are at hand, so that the
µ&,,tcr,a -eai'inol;uyux; 118ux TI)Vµvriµ11v;o,av yap µvTtcr0f\,KlV£t-cmwiho -co
µep0<;. person who sees someone else yawning is prompted to think of yawning and the
µtv Ol)Vav0proitot<;, 010: 1:0 Eumcr0111:01:epo1i:;dvm, iooumv Eu0ui:; cruµ~a{vn Kal Kt- relief it provides. Usually he relieves himself straightway by yawning.
vefo0m Kal avaµ1µ~cr1<rn0m· 1:01,;81:unol;uyfot<; OUKau1:apK£t; '1:0loEtV, &)),,a 1tpoobE- The occurrence of the verb avaµtµvncrKecr0m, 'to recollect,' is important, for
aicr0ricrero,;· Oto 1ml 6crcppav0evw, 01:l£UK1VT]1:01:Epa
ov1:m Kal &11,1,11,; athrt TJa'fo011mi; it is used in connection with men (887a7-8). In On Memory, Aristotle tells us that
Wt<; UV£1)),6you. Kal foawiho di; 'tOVa-61:ov't01tOVcmavm oi'Jpci', Qi) &v &v 't(l 1tp&-rnv
human beings alone have the faculty of recollection. And as noted above, 32 recol-
oup1101J.'tO'tEyap µahcn:a KlVOUVmt,01:av 6crcppav0&cr1v·ocrcppaivonm o' omv 1tA.T\<JtU-
orocrtv. lection is said to be a kind of inference, cruAAoytcrµ6r;,and to belong only to those
Wby in response to yawning do they yawn, and when they see urinating they urinate, and es- who have the capacity to deliberate, PouAEuecr0m (2, 453a4-14). In regard to
pecially yoke animals? Is it on account of memory, for when one remembers, the relevant Chapter 6 of the Problems, we can say that avaµtµvricrKm0m is used as it is in
part is moved. Therefore in the case of human beings, on account of having better senses, it On Memory. We understand that the individual, who is predisposed to yawn and
happens that when they see something they are straightway moved and recollect. But in the responds in kind to the yawn of another person, is thinking. He makes a connec-
case of yoke animals, their sight is not sufficient, but they need in addition another sense.
tion between that person and himself. He sees the other person's yawn as a way to
This is why (they respond) having smelled, because this sense is more easily moved in (ani-
mals) lacking reason. And on account of this they all urinate in the same place, where the first relieve his own condition and yawns straightway. The fact that he responds
one urinated. For they are especially moved at that time when they smell (urine); and they straightway, Eu0ur; (887a7), does not rule out inference. In On Memory, Aristotle
smell (it) when they are nearby (887a4-14). makes clear that recollection can occur quickly, i-axu (2, 452al4, 28); the author
of Chapter 6 agrees.
The question with which the chapter begins is the same as that with which Chap-
ter I begins: 'Why do people yawn in response to people who yawn?' (887a4)
There are, of course, certain differences. Omitted is a reference to frequency; in
Chapter 1 'for the most part' occurs (886a24-25). Included is a mention of urina-
tion and yoke animals (887a5); in Chapter 1 only urination is mentioned, and
there it is part of the answer (886a26). The answer given in Chapter 6 is longer
than the answer given in Chapterl as well as that given in Chapter 2.
The answer begins by attributing the responses to memory and then adds by 31 The phenomenon of animals sniffing out a place to urinate is familiar to modem man from
way of explanation that remembering moves the relevant part. The statement is fhe behavior of dogs. It will not have been otherwise with the ancient Greeks; they had ample
quite general and can be applied to both yawning and urination (887a4-6). In opportunity to observe dogs sniffing their way to a eommon urinarium. In addition, they will
what follows, human beings are singled out. They are characterized as having have had opportunity to observe animals yawning, but yawning on the part of animals is
ignored not only in Chapter 6 but also throughout Book 7. (I am assuming that the opening
better sight: when they see, straightway they are moved and recollect (887a6-8).
Next come yolk animals, which have poor sight and are in need of another sense.
words of Chapter 6, ota,{ Wt<; xacrµncra.µ12vo1<;
&vnxaoµ&vim [887a4], refer to human
beings. Cf. the translation of Flashar, 'Warum glihnt man, wenn jemand geglihnt hat.') Per-
haps the ancient Greeks did observe dogs and horses and other animals ymvning but never
made a eonnection with contagious yawning, which is the subject of Chapter 6. Or should we
30 Cf. On Memory 2, 452a28-30: o:1tOA.A.<XKt<; ewoouµev, 1:axu avaµtµV1)0KOµc0a. ... 'tO OE recognize that the Problems is selective and suffers from abridgment? Indeed, there is no
noA.A.aKt<; cpucrtv note'i:, 'What we think of frequently, we quickly recollect ... frequency commitment to exhaustive treatment.
creates nature.' 32 This section, p. 136.
William Fmienbaugh The Pseudo-Aristotelian Problems on Sympathy 139
138
5 URINATING AND RUNNING WATER voice), and like Hett he seems to understand 'all water' as the subject. A difficulty
is that the immediately preceding reference to moisture in the body involves the
In Chapters 1 and 6, urination is mentioned along side yawning. In Chapter 2 it is word uyp61:ri~(886bl), which is feminine. In what follows, ,o
rcpocn6v occurs,
not mentioned. I now want to focus on Chapter 3 in which urination is discussed which is neuter. The change in gender is real, but the difficulty may be more ap-
apart from yawning. The chapter rnns as follows: parent than real. Either the preceding mention of uocop has influenced the change
Ota ti EJttl◊ClV to Jtt>p crcfoµev, oup11n&µev, Kal £UV itpor; u6rop, olov £UV itpo<;
in gender, or we can understand uyp6v with ,o
rcpocn6v. The shift would be a
simple variation, which might be viewed as.an improvement. The abstract/general
on
Jtotaµ6v, oupoucnv; 11 to it&v \S6rop u1t6µv11mv ()lOO)<JlV tf\s 8V moµan fryp61:111:os:
noun fryp61:ri<;is replaced by a neuter participial phrase that is appropriate to a
K(XL£KKaAettm to 1tpocr16v;au,:o OEto itt>p lhaxal~ 't:O1trn110or;EV,:qi m:oµan, OlCi7CEp
()
+\Aw<;rriv x16va.
particular stuff, i.e., to the bodily fluid that is increasing and pressing to be relea-
Why when we stand near fire, do we feel the need to urinate, and if near water, e.g. near a sed.
river, do they ( does one) urinate? Is it because all water provides a reminder of the moisture A different way to read the text should not be overlooked. Instead of taking -to
in the body and calls forth the (moisture) that is advancing? And the fire itself dissolves what rcpom6v as the object of EKKatcii:,m, it might be construed as the subject of the
is solidified in the body,just as the sun (melts) the snow (886a37-b2).
verb. I.e., instead of taking eKKaA.,e11:m as the middle voice, we might take it as
The question with which the chapter begins is bipartite. First it is asked, 'Why passive and understand ,o npocn.6v as the subject: the fluid within, which is ad-
when standing near a fire, do we desire/feel the need to urinate?' Second comes, vancing and creating pressure, is called forth. I see no grammatical impediment to
'And if near water, e.g., if near a river, do they urinate?' The shift from first per- this way of reading the text and leave it to others to decide whether EKK<XA.,£1'tat is
son plural to third person plural is awkward and may be a sign of corruption or middle or passive. 33 What I do want to insist upon is that we take seriously the
careless abbreviation. Also odd is the reversal of the order in which the questions reference to a river, rco1:aµ6~,which occurs in the second half of the question with
are answered. For the first question seems to concern a time prior to the second, which the chapter begins (886a37). The reference seems important, because it is
and answering it might facilitate answering the second. Nevertheless, the answer foolish to claim that all water not only provides a reminder of the moisture within
to the first question is postponed to the end of the chapter, where we are told that the body but also excites actual urination. For the latter to be plausible, water
fire melts what is solidified within the body. We understand that melting creates needs to be qualified in some way, and that way is suggested by the reference to a
fluids and the desire to urinate (886b2-3). stream. Except during prolonged drought, a stream is running water, and running
The answer to the second question precedes and divides in two. First, we are water may be thought to excite the flow of urine. At least modem men who are
told that all water provides a reminder of the fluid within the body (886a37-b 1). having trouble urinating are known to turn on/open the water-faucet, in order that
Second, we read Kat eKKaAii1:m1:0rcpom6v (886bl-2). The meaning is not im- running water may encourage the flow of urine. Perhaps a reference to running
mediately clear, and translators have rendered the words in different ways. Hett water once stood before the verb eKKaAct,m (middle voice). It could have been
translates 'and calls out what is near to it.' He takes 1:0 1tpom6v as the object of lost through abbreviation. Or is a reference to running water conveyed by the par-
EKK<XA8t'Cm (middle voice) and understands.the preceding reference to 'all water' ticiple rcpom6v. After all, a river does flow toward something down stream, so
as the subject. Louis agrees; he translates 'et attire ce qui est proche' and unders- that one might be tempted to understand u◊cop with -to
rrpocrt6v and regard the
tands the subject to be 'toute eau.' Forster translates 'and the neighborhood of resulting phrase as the subject of EKKaAet,m (middle voice). That would give us a
water incites our internal moisture to come out.' And Mayhew offers 'and nearby qualified reference to water and allow the reader to understand moisture within
(water) calls out for it.' Both Forster and Mayhew take 1:01tpom6v as the subject the body as the object of eKKaA.,£1,m.I leave the issue undecided; a brighter mind
of eKKatce11:m(middle voice). If I understand correctly, all four translators con- can pick the winner.
fuse rcpom6v (the participle of rcpocnevm) with rcpoa6v (the participle of rcp~a- Finally, I call attention to the fact that Chapter 3 speaks of reminding: we are
81vm). In combination with the definite article, the former refers to somethmg told that water provides a reminder, im6µvricnv oi8comv, of the moisture within
going toward or advancing, the latter refers to something that is nearby. The the body. That invites comparison with Chapter 1 in which people who respond to
transmitted text has the former. To be sure, a careless scribe might have misread yawning by yawning are said to be reminded, cxvaµvri00&mv (886a25), and
rcp6crovand inserted an iota. Were that the case, emending the text to read n:po06v Chapter 2 where we read that motion is caused by memory, µviJµri (886a3). In
would be in order, but there is no good reason to think that a scribe has erred. these earlier chapters we have response in kind, so that one is tempted to interpret
Indeed, the text as transmitted is intelligible. I cite Flashar, who translates: 'und
(weil jedes Wasser) die schon andrangende (Feuchtigkeit) herauslockt', or in En- 33 While there may be no grammatical impediment to understanding to npocn6v as the subject
glish, 'and (because all water) entices out the (fluid within the body) :"hich is al- of frnile'i:1:m, word order may be thought to favor taking -co npocrt6v as the object of the
ready creating pressure.' Flashar is clear that rcpom6v refers to mot10n and not verb. At least that is the judgement of Stefan Schorn, with whom I agree.
place nearby. He takes the phrase 1:0npom6v as the object of £KKaAe11:m(middle
140 William Fortenbaugh The Pseudo-Aristotelian Problems on Sympathy 141
the response as mindless, i.e, an infectious response rather like catching a disease Pleasure and pain might be better candidates for unifying the various pheno-
from someone who is already infected. 34 The temptation is to be resisted. Chapter mena discussed in Book 7. They are mentioned together in the discussion of sha-
1 makes explicit mention of thinking, 'if only one thinks,' vofiau (886a27), and red pain (Ch. 7). In the discussion of sound and sight, there is explicit mention of
Chapter 2 uses the phrase 1:0 qmv1:aa0ev mx80<;,'the imagined condition,' which pleasure, while references to shuddering and teeth set on edge clearly suggest fee-
can be interpreted plausibly in terms of deliberative imagination. Now in Chapter lings of pain (Ch. 5). Although the account of diseases lacks an explicit reference
3 we have memory introduced to explain a response that is not in kind. Proximity to either pleasure or pain, the account suggests afflictions that are readily asso-
to running water prompts one to think of urinating as a way to relieve an urgent ciated with both bodily discomfort and mental anguish (Ch. 4, 8). 'Similarly in the
condition. Animals may do something similar, but the picture presented in Chap- case of yawning and urination, there is no explicit mention of either pleasure or
ter 3 makes clear that they are exercising their sense of smell. Their behavior pain, but mention of urgency suggests physical discomfort and the relief that
gives new meaning to the injunction 'follow your nose.' In contrast, the person comes with yawning and urinating is known to be not only welcome but also
who responds to a stream is making connections between two quite different pleasant, at least to some degree (Ch. 1-3, 6). Perhaps, then, we should say that
things. And in doing so he uses his mind. To be sure, he may respond to his cir- pleasure and pain taken together constitute the unifying feature that renders intel-
cumstances straightway (cf. 6, 887a7): he might wet his pants. But responding ligible grouping together the phenomena discussed in Book 7.
straightway need not exclude thinking, and wetting one's pants is exceptional. For my part, I would prefer to say that pleasure and pain constitute a unifying
Normally a person can restrain himself and take evasive action. feature, but not the most impo11ant one. Rather, we should take our cue from the
heading to Book 7. To be sure, the heading involves the word m.iµn6:0i::ta,which is
not Aristotelian and not attested for any Peripatetic of the Hellenistic period, but
6 A FINAL WORD we need not conclude that the heading is inappropriate. On the contrary, it cap-
tures succinctly the essence of Book 7, which brings together and discusses shared
In the preceding sections, I have discussed Book 7 of the Problems, whose hea- affections. I have written 'affections' because the Greek word n6:0o-; is more in-
ding contains the word auµn6:0i::ta, 'sympathy'. We have seen that the book is clusive than the English word 'emotion' and is so used by Aristotle. I cite the
quite diverse: shared pain, painful sounds and sights, contagious diseases, infec- opening chapter of Aristotle's On Soul, in which pathos is used not only of emo-
tious yawning, and urination are all discussed. 35 Such a potpourri may be faulted tion but also inclusively of affections peculiar to the soul (1.1 403al 6 and 402a9,
36
by the pedantic scholar, who is accustomed to arrange his material in a tight, respectively). Moreover, in the Categories, Aristotle contrasts not6nrrnt; with
cohesive manner, but for persons interested in emotional response, Book 7 can be mi0ri. The fonner are well-established dispositions, whic:h may be quite resistant
instructive. Its diversity challenges the reader to ask whether the several pheno- to change. The latter are typically conditions of limited duration (9b33-1Oa10),
mena discussed within the book are sufficiently similar to be grouped together as which fits not only an emotional response like pity but also an illness that runs its
emotional responses. If we follow Errol Bedford in holding that thought is essen- course, shuddering in response to certain noises or sights and an episode of
tial to emotional response and if we follow Aristotle and say that the efficient yawning or urination.
cause of emotion is thought, then a negative answer would be correct. For Book 7 The adjective 'shared' renders the prefix auµ- and in itself could be mislea-
includes two discussions of contagious disease, which is said to be involuntary ding. It might suggest that Book 7 is restricted to responses/reactions that mirror
and contracted through motion: either by direct contact with an infected person or each other in kind. But in faet Book 7 is concerned with responses that are both in
over a distance through breath (Ch. 4, 8). Persons suffering from contagious di- kind and not in kind: e.g., responsive yawning is in kind and sharing the pain felt
seases may have thoughts of various kinds (Where did I contract this condition? by someone who is being burned or tortured is not in kind. And on occasion we
How can I be cured?), but none are essential to the condition (one may simply may want to recognize a response that admits both descriptions. I am thinking of
accept one's condition and its consequences). Much the same can be said of pain- the man who is standing by a stream. We are told that all water provides a remin-
ful sounds caused by sharpening a saw or cutting pumice stone. The person who der of the fluid/urine in his body and being beside a stream calls forth the urine. If
hears these noises shudders. His response is a physical reaction that is not to be we focus on the difference between water and urine, we have a response that is
confused with hearing the sound of a salpinx. The latter arouses fear based on an not in kind. But if we focus on the stream, which is flowing, then we may want to
expectation of grievous ill (Ch. 5).
36 That pathos is used repeatedly by Aristotle for emotional response is well known; see, e.g.,
34 Cf. Chapters 4 and 8, discussed above in Section 1. Nicomachean Ethics 2.5, l 105b2l-23 and Rhetoric 2.1, l378al9-22. For pathos used of
35 As stated at the outset, I am ignoring the final chapter on curing bleeding gums. memory and mental images, see above, Section 4, p. 133 on Problems 7.2.
142 William Fortenbaugh
say that the response is in kind in that flowing water has prompted the flow of
urine.
I stop here and take a deep breath, reminding myself that the English word
'yawning' is used primarily of inhalation and therefore is an odd translation of the
Greek word xaoµ11and its cognates as found in the Problems. THE LIFE OF STATUES: EMOTION AND AGENCY
Angelos Chqniotis
BIBLIOGRAPHY
For Tonio Holscher
Bedford, E. (1956-1957) Emotions, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57, 281-304.
Flashar, H. (1962) Aristoteles, Problemata Physica, Berlin.
Fortenbaugh, W. (1968) Aristotle and the Questionable Mean-Dispositions, Transactions of the 1 INTRODUCTION 1
American Philological Association 99, 203-231.
- (1969) Aristotle: Emotion and Moral Virtue, Arethusa 2, 163-185.
~ (1970) Aristotle's Rhetoric on Emotions, Archiv fiir die Geschichte der Philosophie 52, 40-
George Seferis is an iconic figure in modern Greek literature, as the first Greek
Nobel laureate, because of his opposition to the junta in 1967, and because his
70.
- (1985) Theophrastus on Emotion, in Theophrastus On His Life and Work, ed. W. poems became the lyrics of some of Mikis Theodorakis' best known songs. One
Fortenbaugh, P. Huby and A. Long= RUSCH II, New Brunswick NJ, 209-229. of the poems in his collection Mythistorema (1935) begins with these verses (in
_ (2002) Aristotle on Emotion, London/New York. Reprinted with epilogue. First edition 1975. the translation of Edmund Keeley and Philip Sherrard):
(2011) he(mhira,,tusofEresus, Commentmy Volume 6.1. Leiden.
(2014) Problems Connected with Fear and Courage, in R. Mayhew (ed.), The Aristotelian I woke with this marble head in my hands;
Problemata Physica, Leiden, 311-320. it exhausts my elbow and I don't know where
Gulick, Ch. ( 1930) Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, London. to put it down.
Hett, W. (1936) Aristotle, Problems, Cambridge MA, rev.1953.
Seferis alludes to the almost unbearable weight of ancient tradition on modem
Louis, P. (l991-1994)Aristote: Problemes, 3 vols, Paris.
Mayhew, R. (2011) Aristotle, Problems, Cambridge MA. Hellenism, representing this tradition with a marble head. Years later, in his Es-
Meijer, P. (2007) Stoic Theology, Delft. says (Dokimes), Seferis returned to the seductive power of ancient statues in mod-
Pitcher, G. (1965) Emotion, ]\,find74, 326-346. em Greek culture, quoting from the memoirs ofMakriyannis, one of the leaders of
the Greek revolution of 1821 against the Ottoman Empire:
I had two marvellous statues, a woman and a prince, intact - you could see their veins, so per-
fect they were. When they destroyed Poros, some soldiers took them and were planning to
sell them to some Europeans in Argos; they were asking for one thousand taters. It happened
that I was also passing by. I took the soldiers aside; I talked to them. 'Even if they give you
ten thousand talers, don't accept that these statues go out of our fatherland. It is for them that
we fought' ...
Thanks to Seferis, Makriyannis has also become an iconic figure of Greek litera-
ture. And it is the fate of iconic figures to be more often quoted than read. But this
isolated passage had a successful career; it is part of the selections to be read in
secondary schools; in 1987 it was the subject of the essay exam for entry to Greek
universities; and as a Google search can convince you, it is one of the most quoted
passages ofMakriyannis on the web, with more than 14,000 hits.
The symbolic function of statues differs from culture to culture and from time
to time; it is a cultural construct. In Makriyannis' times the symbolic function of
ancient statues was resurrected after centuries of oblivion together with a resur- mous statue of the Drunken Old Woman (late second/early first century BCE). 4
rected nation. Makriyannis' didactic phrase 'it is for them that we fought' reveals We may argue today about what emotions the statue of the Drunken Old Woman
the effort to give a material expression and a face to the abstract, vague, and he~- in Munich represented or was intended to arouse. But the jug from Skyros leaves
erogeneous motives of the Greek revolutionaries. The emotive power of statues_1s no room for speculation, because an inscription presents an unambiguous explana-
intrinsically connected with their materiality, with their physical presence, with tion: 'This old woman sits here full of joy holding her wine.' It is also clear that
the clarity of their subject a woman and a young prince (µta yuvatKa Kt lfva the Nike of Paionios was motivated by the pride of the Messenians and Naupa-
~acriMn:ouA.o) , with aesthetic aspects (Makriyannis' statues were n:Epicp11µcr; ktians for their victory over Sparta in 425 BCE (even if fear of the Spartans pre-
they had ev1:iAna). One of the memorable scenes in Theo Angelopoulos' film vented the dedicators from inscribing the name of the enemy). 5 The Naxian Apol-
Ulysses' Gaze is that of a fragmented statue of Lenin being loaded onto a barge lo on Delos forever commemorates the pride of its maker through an inscription:
and transported downriver; the broken materiality of this statue alludes to a break 'I am of one and the same stone, both the statue and the pedestal. ' 6
with the past, to a fragmented empire, to shattered identities and ideologies. There can be no doubt that the Greeks were fully aware of the emotive func-
Some cultures are more iconolatric than others, and that of the ancient Greeks tion and power of statues. The very word for statue, agalma, 'the object that offers
certainly is dominated by the physical presence of statues of diverse sizes and pleasure', can be understood as an emotional term. Inscriptions sometimes ex-
materials, set up in different locations, performing various functions, and repre- plained the emotions that had triggered the erection of a statue. For instance, the
senting all kinds of subjects. Statesmen, benefactors, and kings were honoured expressions kat' euchen or charisterion made clear that a statue was dedicated as
with statues; funerary statues commemorated the dead; statues of gods received an expression of gratitude towards the gods. A worshipper of Dionysos at Ni-
acts of worship; statues decorated spaces dedicated to the activities of the living komedeia in the Imperial period had a statue of the god erected next to his grave;
and the dead, spaces both public and private, sacred and profane. To say that stat- the statue visualized his affection towards the god in life and in death. 7
ues and their functions occupy a central position in the study of Greek religion, I, Dion, am a concern to you, Dionysos, while alive, both when I dance with the children and
politics, art, society, culture, rituals, and literature is to bring owls to Athens - or at the symposia, when I hold in my hand the nectar of Bromios. And now I have set you up
even by my tomb, at my side, for all to see, so that even when lying among the dead I may
statues to a Greek city, for that matter.
see you.
Statues were made to be seen, to be observed, and to be discussed. They were
part of the discourse of the philosophers and the literary ekphraseis of poets and A decree of an association of athletes explicitly states what the erection of certain
orators, but also points of reference and orientation in the everyday life of the honorary statues for a fellow athlete, who had died young, aimed at: these images
common people.2 Statues had lives after they left their worksh?ps and before they should offer consolation. 8
fell off their bases, pushed by men or toppled by earthquakes:' There were many
We shall request from the city of Aphrodisias suitable locations in order to dedicate images of
ways to treat statues in Greek antiquity but one could hardly ignore them. Studies the great winner in sacred contests and in order to erect a portrait statue, exactly as in Ephe-
concerning the display and arousal of emotions in Greek culture cannot ignore
them either. 4 Athens National Archaeological Museum, inv. no, 2069. See Masseglia 2012, 421-424.
5 Pausanias 5,24.l. On the circumstances of the dedication of the Nike of Paionios, see
Holscher 1974.
2 STATUES AND EMOTIONS 6 I.Delos 4 (ea. 600 BCE). Recent discussion of the inscription, w,ith earlier bibliography: di
Cesare 2004,
7 Merkelbach and Stauber 200 l, no. 09/06/19 (Imperial period): fo{, At6vucrE, Airov srooc; µEta
There is no such thing as a statue or a relief that does not have an emotional back-
nmcrt xopEvwv cruvnocrfo1crtµeAro vi\1cmp fxwv Bpoµimr vuv oi\ crEKat napo: crfjµ' foop&v
ground: either because it represents an emotion (e.g. grief or fear), or because its 'fopucra nap& µE o<ppa K(Xt&v <p0(µEvo[c:;]KEtcr6µ2v6c;crE /3Aenro. Cf. a funerary epigram
display is motivated by an emotion (e.g. true or theatrical gratitude towards a _god from Perinthos that mentions that a man was buried near the statue of Apollo: SEG L VII 635
or a benefactor, pride for a victory), or because it is expected to arouse emot10ns (ea. 170 CE); recent discussion: Jones 2011.
among future viewers (e.g. apotropaic statues stirring fear). An example of the 8 1Aph2007 12.719 ( ea. 117~ 138 CE): ai't1]cracr0m tT)v A-qipo6e1cr1erovn6Atv 'tonouc; tm-
representation of emotion is a clay jug from Skyros imitating a version of the fa- 1:rioeiouc;onroc;noiricrc:hµe0a tOU µeyaA.011lEpOVetKOU etKOVWV ava0foetc:; Kat avopEHivwc:;
&v6.cr1:acrtvKa0a Kell b 1:ft µri-cponoAEtTr\<;A_crf.ac:;
'E(J)fo<pi':xoucrfuvt&v ·mµ&v i':mypa(j)ar;
rcpOO'TjKOUcrai; KaAAtKpatEt, 'iva Ota 1:0UtOU'tOU \jfrj(j)tcrµm:rn;"COf3apu0uµov npoc:;
ciµapµevriv amxpaftT]'tOV ai 'tOOV 1:e1µ.&vxa.pl"CE<;
€'\J1tO:pTjyOpTj'tOV
fiµe'tv 'tOVcruva0A.T]tT)V
Katacrt11crrocrw. The text's syntax is not clear; cf. Robert 1965, XIII, 146: 'afin que, par ce
2 JG IV 2 .l.123 no, XLVI; cf. Stramaglia 1992.
3 The concept of the 'lives of statues' is used e.g. by Smith 2007, Mylonopoulos 2010b, 12-18, decret, pour ce qui est de !'irritation contre un destin inevitable, les faveurs et les egards
temoignes par ces honneurs nous fassent (nous rendent) notre camarade athlete bien console'.
Petrovic 2010, and Chaniotis 2014. Cf. Holscher 2015: 'life of images'.
Angelos Chaniotis The Life of Statues: Emotion and Agency 147
146
sos, the metropolis of Asia; the honorific images shall have inscriptions appropriate to Kal- and divinity. 12 The image psychologically prepared the worshippers to communi-
likrates, so that through this decree, in our heaviness of heart at an inexorable destiny, the cate with the divinity. 13 In the case of mortals, statues were regarded as their sub-
gracious gift of the honorific statues will provide consolation for our fellow athlete. stitutes. They created the illusion of the mortal's presence, with all the emotional
Admittedly, the emotional contexts of statues the representation, expression, or 'baggage' that goes with it. 14
arousal of emotions - are often hard or even impossible to reconstruct, and they A few examples may illustrate this. When the Ephesians sent an embassy to
may change in the course of time. But this should not discourage historians and Emperor Caracalla, 'Artemis, the ancestral goddess, was leading the embassy', as
archaeologists from trying to approach them. a decree states. 15 As the statue of Artemis was carried by the envoys, Artemis was
The emotional impact of statues in Greek culture certainly is connected with thought to be present through her statue. During the devastating pestilence of the
their materiality and physical presence. Unlike painted images and reliefs, statues mid-second century CE, a city in Asia Minor, probably Sardis, received an oracle
are three-dimensional objects; often they are life-size representations, or close from Apollo Klarios advising its inhabitants to bring a statue of Artemis from
thereof; when they are over life-size, they dominate the surrounding space. Their Ephesos: 16
display is subject to careful consideration. Placed on a base and raised above the Bring in her form from Ephesos, brilliant with gold. Put her up in a te~ple, full of joy; she
spectator, they are at the same time separated from him and close to him. will provide deliverance from your affliction and will dissolve the poison of pestilence, which
My aim in this study is not to present a collection of sources pertaining to the destroys men, and will melt down with her flame-bearing torches in nightly fire the kneaded
'emotive' lives of statues or to provide lists of the emotions expressed, aroused, or works of wax, the signs of the evil art of a sorcerer. But when you have performed for the
goddess my decrees, worship with hymns the shooter of arrows, the irresistible, straight
expected to be aroused by statues. Such a list would be very long and would only
shooting one, and with sacrifices, her, the renowned and vigilant virgin; and during dancing
prove the obvious: statues were closely linked to emotions. Instead, I would like and feasting, you girls together with the boys, above the salty lands of Maionic Hennos,
to argue that, under certain conditions, emotional elements in the interaction be- praising her in every respect wear crowns of large myrtle, having'called from the Ephesian
tween statues and viewers may make a statue appear to have agency and to be land the pure Artemis, in order that she might always be to you an unfailing helper.
filled with life.
The physical presence of Artemis' statue, in combination with rituals, resulted in
the goddess' epiphany and the presence of her protective powers.
As a privileged locus of epiphany, the divine image had to be periodically
3 MORE THAN IMAGES
prepared to receive the divinity. This was the aim of the statue's ritual treatment,
the removal of stain, and its adornment. 17 In an inscription from Olbia (ea. 200-
Whether Greek statues represented or, in a sense, were understood as 'being' the
210 CE), the washing of the statue of Zeus Olbios is directly connected with the
mortals or the immortals whom they depicted is a complex question that defies
manifestation of divine power. The decree praises the local statesman and bene-
brief answers. 9 In Greece, divine images were not invested with powers - unlike
10 factor Kallikrates: 18
divine images in the ancient Near East or images used in magic and theurgy.
Although in many cases the words theos and thea are indiscriminately used to
designate both a god or goddess and their statue, 11 the textual evidence suggests
that the image of a deity was strictly distinguished from the deity; it was a medi- 12 Dio, Oratio 12.59: av0prorcwov cr&µa ros &yyii:ovq:,poVr)O'£(J)S Kal. AO)'O'\.l
0ccp1tpoa&m:ov,Es.
um through which the deity manifested its powers, communicated with mortals, On this passage see Steiner 2001, l24f.; Betz 2004; Chaniotis 2014, 263f. On the significance
and responded to their prayers. To use an idea expressed by Dio of Prusa in a pas- of statues for prayer and epiphany, see Scheer 2000, 66-70; Steiner 2001, 105f.; Guggisberg
sage often quoted in this context, statues were 'vessels' (o:yyiota)that accommo- 2013, 72-82; Chaniotis 2014, 264-270.
13 Cf. Minucius Felix, Octavius 22.5, who asks when god comes into being (quando igitur hie
dated divine epiphanies and facilitated the communication between worshipper nascitur): 'now he is being decorated, consecrated, and addressed with prayers; now, finally,
he is a god, in accordance with human desire and dedication' (ecce ornatur, consecratur, ora-
tur: tune postremo deus est, cum homo illum voluit et dedicavit).
9 See e.g. Gladigow 1985/86; Jones 1998; Scheer 2000, 44-130; Steiner 2001, 79-134; Francis 14 E.g. Steiner 2001, 145-151.
2003; Holscher 2010, 117f.; Bremmer 2013, 9; Guggisberg 2013; Chaniotis 2014, 259-277. 15 SEG XXXI 955; l.Ephesos 2026 (ea. 200-205 CE): 1tpoE1tpfol3,mevri n&1:ptoc;riµfuv 0coc;
1O On rituals of consecration of Greek statues, see Pirenne-Delforge 2008. On the special case of 'Ap1:eµts.
statues invested with powers in the context of magic and theurgy, see Dodds 1951, 291-295; 16 Graf 1992.
Faraone 1992; Steiner 2001, 114-120. 17 On the washing of statues see Kahil 1994; Scheer 2000, 57-60.
11 E.g. /G II2 1277 lines 8f.: €1i:EKOCTµt)crav oe 1m[t] 1:[11]v!k6v (Athens, 278 BCE); SEG 18 JOSPE I22: tEpcU<;08 YEVOµEvos[w)~ 7tpOEO"'tW1:0<; -i:f\s'ltOAeros~µ&v 0e0u lltos '0Al3101J
XLVIII 1104: rco,l ,&.v ,iov 0efuv emK6crµ11crw(Kos, ea. 200 BC); JG V.2.265 (Mantineia, i:-[ma.A]oucra<;'tOV0EOV&yv&s, 1:f\s1:&vueprov EUKpacr[ia<;os6µsvo;] £JtS1:UXeV EUETIJpi.m;.
64-61 BCE): [r&v 0£ K]6[p]av eµ rcavi:l.Kmp&t 0cpa7t£U01J(l"(X KO'.t(j1JVf:UK[o]crµ[ou]cm]. I have restored the verb ~[am'.A..)oucrac;(or ~[at A]ou·aw;;). The only verbs that produce a
148 Angelos Chaniotis The Life of Statues: Emotion and Agency 149
When he became priest of Zeus Olbios, the god who presides over our city, he washed the After this building has been adorned with her statue, let the present kosmophylax and the fu-
god in a pure manner, and praying for a good combination of winds, he achieved prosperity. ture kosmophylakes (the guardians of order) use this building as their office. It will be the du-
ty of those who register the celebration of weddings in the presence of the kosmophylax to
The god's image was an agent of divine power, and as such it was thought to re- crown the statue of Apollonis, which is consecrated in the office.
spond to prayers and to have healing powers; dedications were directly given to
statues. 19 The perception of statues as agents of divine power and epiphany ex- An ordinary and unoccupied building in the agora of Kyzikos changed its status
plains why they could be associated with all the emotions that are connected with because of the consecration (kathierosis) of a statue of Apollonis. The statue of
religious worship: fear, hope, gratitude, and affection. Apollonis became an eternal reminder of female virtues; through the ceremonial
As for the statues of mortals, nonnally they were not believed to be identical crowning of her statue, future couples asserted the values described in the honor-
with tlle people that tlley represented. They did not host the soul of a deceased ary decree of Apollonis. Thus her statue became part of the cultural memory of a
individual, but rather preserved the memory of one's life and qualities. The statues civic community, at least as long as the community read the inscription tllat ex-
20
of mortals were hosts of memory, mnemeia and hypomnemata. As a decree from plained why tllis particular woman had been honoured.
Olbia (third century BCE) puts it, the statue of a war hero was set up 'in order that This perception of statues explains their tremendous emotive impact. Statues
his deeds are commemorated' .21 The statues triggered memories and through them were consciously manipulated as powerful visual media of emotional arousal, but
emotions, thus creating the illusion of a deceased or absent person's presence. 22 as we shall now see, they could also arouse emotion simply by their presence.
The epigram on the base of the honorific statue of a certain Apollodotos in
Rhodes (ea. 200 BCE) invites tlle viewer to look at the image, which is filled witlJ
life (eµnvouv), and remember the man's justice. 23 When statues were incorporated 4 EMOTIONALITY AND THE ILLUSION OF AGENCY
into rituals, such as their periodic crowning during festivals, the power to trigger
affective memory was enhanced. Narratives about statues, both in the literary and in tlle documentary sources,
Through acts of commemoration, statues became a powerful instrument for make clear that under certain circumstances statues appeared to have agency. This
the transmission of values. An instructive example is offered by a first-century-CE agency took different forms. We see its most direct manifestation when statues
decree of consolation from Kyzikos. It was issued after the death of Apollonis, a were believed to kill, heal, or punish. Secondly, agency was also manifested when
woman of a prominent family, who was admired for her virtue, prudence, and statues seemed to present the physical symptoms of life, such as moving, sweat-
behaviour as a wife. Her statue was dedicated in one of the buildings of the mar- ing, and shedding tears. 25 Thirdly, the emotional arousal triggered by a statue
ketplace.24 could be so strong as to create the illusion that a direct communication witlJ the
statue was possible. Finally, in a less straightforward way, statues revealed agency
when they influenced the actions of humans and triggered responses that were not
participle ending in -ovm:x; are aKovro, Kpovro, Aovro, and their composita; only Aovro can be the ones intended by their makers.
restored here. An examination of a small selection of relevant sources shows that the agency
19 Prayers in front of statues: e.g. van Straten 1974; Scheer 2000, 66-70; Steiner 2001, 105 and
of statues, both direct and indirect, occurred in contexts of strong emotionality.
115; response of statues to prayers: see note 31. Dedications directly presented to statues: e.g.
Iliad 6.311; JG 112 1514 lines 41-43; 1523 ll 27f.; 1524 II 202-207; Guggisberg 2013, 69; see When statues appear to be filled with life, the emotional responses to and the
also Magele 2005 (anatomical votives placed on the base of statues of Asklepios and Koronis, emotional interaction with statues are largely determined by the same factors that
Sagalassos, second century CE). The expression 'I placed the property title in the arms of the govern emotions in interpersonal relations.
goddess' (1:rivc'ovrivKa1:E8eµ11v 1:a; avKaAa; TI\<; 0wu et sim.), used in inscriptions that
record the dedication of slaves to Meter Theon Autochthon (I.Leukopetra 3, 63, 93), suggests 4.1 Statues as instruments of revenge and punishment
that the dedicators plaeed the documents in the arms of the (seated?) image of the goddess. A
relief from Lydia (Saittai, 165 CE) shows a thief bringing stolen garments to the statue of
Mes: Petz! 1994, 3-5 no. 3. Healing statues: e.g. l.Oropos 380: a statue is called ncmcrircovov. It is said that when tlle athlete and statesman Theagenes ofThasos died in the ear-
For healing statues of athletes: Zanker 2003, 48f. ly fifth century BCE, one of his political enemies came every night to his statue
20 E.g. Isocrates, Euagoras 73; JG Ir2 1326, 8396; JOSPE r2171 lines 12-13; JG XII.7.240 lines and flogged the bronze image as though he were ill-treating Theagenes himself
28-31. " amq:>
(mE ' ~ 0~ w:yEvn
' ~I\.UµmvoµEVo::;
' ) .26 Th
. e statue put an end to the outrage by
21 JOSPE r2325: [cr-i:a0rjvm](X'\J"COU ElKOV<X,011:ro;
&v a\'. 'tE 11:pasEt[;a{nou µ ]v11µovevrov1:m.
22 Steiner 2001, 145-151.
23 Maiuri 1925, 19: ch0p~cra<;, Ji se'ive, 'tOV eµ11:vouvxahov I µv&.crm 'tfo; 6cr{a,;; 'tOU◊e 25 Bremmer 2013 studies the agency of statues only in this sense.
OtKmocruva;. 26 Pausanias 6.11; cf. Dio of Prusa, Oratio 31.95-99; Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica 5.34.
24 Seve 1979. For evidence on killer-statues see Jones 1998, 139f.
Angelos Chaniotis The Life of Statues: Emotion and Agency 151
150
falling on him and killing him. Recognized as an agent of homicide, the statue ed with emotions: fear and excitement during a battle, indignation for a sacrile-
was thrown into the sea. When the Thasians were punished with disease, an oracle gious deed. This also applies to divine images, in literary sources, that indicate
advised them to return the exiles. The calamity only stopped when the last 'exile', through movement that they accept or reject the requests of praying mortals. 31
Theagenes' statue, was coincidentally caught in the nets of fishermen and brought Analogous miracles in other cultures are not a rarity. As recently as July
back to Thasos. Another killer statue likewise represented an athlete, this one by 1998, dozens of people in thirty different locations in Ireland claimed to have seen
the name of Mitys. In a discussion of stories suitable for a tragic plot, Aristotle statues of Mary and other saints move. More than 100,000 people visited one of
refers to accidental events ( cmo 1:ux,11<;)
that arouse amazement (0auµacrnirtma these locations, Ballinspittle. A research tec+mof psychologists explained this as
6oKEt) because they seem to have OCCU1Ted with a purpose (rocrrcep erchri6e<; an illusion caused by staring at the statues in .the evening twilight. 32
qia{vemi yeyovtvm). As an example, he reports an incident that had allegedly
unfolded in Argos. While the man responsible for the death of Mitys was looking 4.3 Emotional interaction with statues
7
at the latter's statue, it fell on him and killed him.2
Although in these narratives the images appear to act on their own, one may A nice example of how the excitement triggered by a statue could create the illu-
argue that they were only the instruments of avenging spirits or punishing gods. sion that it was filled with life and invite a viewer to communicate with it is pro-
We encounter the same ambiguity in a poem transmitted among Theocritus' id- vided by an anecdote in Plutarch's Life qf Alexander. 33
ylls.28 When a beautiful youth remained indifferent towards the suicide of the When he [Alexander] saw a large statue of Xerxes carelessly lying on the ground, having
desperate man who had unsuccessfully pursued him, a statue of Eros fell upon the been thrown down by the multitude of those who were pushing their way into the palace, he
heartless boy and killed him. Whose agency was at work here? The statue's or the stood above it and addressed it, as if it were filled with a living soul (11:a8&1tcpEWl'uxov).
god's? The text is ambiguous. But in these narratives, what makes statues appear 'What am I to do?', he asked. 'Should I pass by, leaving you on the ground for the campaign
against the Greeks, or should I set you up again for the magnanimityand vhtue that you oth-
as agents in a very real sense is the strong emotional context.
erwise showed?' Finally, after long silent contemplation, he passed by.
4.2 Emotions make statues alive By reminding Alexander of Xerxes' deeds and properties, the statue made him
feel the Great King's presence and created the illusion that the conqueror could
Strong emotionality is also the context of narratives about statues that suddenly somehow communicate with him through his statue.
reveal physical symptoms of life. An example is provided by a narrative concern- At first sight, Alexander's behaviour in this anecdote differs neither from that
ing Tirnoleon of Syracuse and the liberation of cities in Sicily in 343/342 BCE. ofTheagenes' enemy, who flogged the dead man's statue in order to ill-treat him,
When he attacked the city ofHadranos, the inhabitants saw the gates of the temple nor from that of his contemporaries who crowned statues in order to honour the
of the homonymous local god open by themselves; inside, the god's statue was people that they represented. 34 In all these cases, someone seems to communicate
seen with sweat all over its face, shaking its lance. TI1is caused shuddering among with an individual through his statue, cultivating the illusion that the treatment of
the viewers. 29 the statue allows him to honour or to humiliate the individual that the statue repre-
A similar story is told by Herodotus, who makes sure to state his own doubts sents. There are, however, important differences between these stories.
on its historicity. When the Athenians attempted to remove the old statues of First, there is a difference in the intensity of emotional excitement. The ene-
Damia and Auxesia from Aigina (late sixth century BCE), the images were seen my of Theagenes was dominated by hatred; those who honoured statues did this
falling on their knees to prevent this. 30 In these two narratives, the context is load- out of affection, pride, or gratitude, but they acted in a ritual manner; Alexander
contemplated for a long time before he decided that revenge for Xerxes' cam-
paigns ~ more closely connected with a sense of justice than with a feeling of ha-
27 Aristotle, Poetics 9.11--12, 1452al-JO. tred weighed more than a recognition of the king's achievements.
28 Ps.-Theocritus 23.
29 Plutarch, Timoleon 12.9: ~lE'tUcppix11c; KUt 8auµo:-toc; a1tayye.UovtES, die;£VtcnaµeV11<; ,f\:;
µ&;01:;ol µev le.pot 7:0UV£ffi1tUt,&vEc; au1:6µmot chavoix8EtEV, 6cp8dri 6/oWD 8eoi3 1:0 µev
66pu an6µevov ex 1:f\~alxµf\<; &11:prn;, 1:0 61; 1tp6cromovlop&n 1t0Uip pe6µEvov. On shud-
dering in this narrative: Cairns 2013, 97 and p. 58 n. 17 above. 31 Iliad 6.311; Aeschylus, Agamemnon 519-520; Euripides, Iphigeneia in Tauris 1167; Lucian,
30 Herodotus 5.86.3: OU 6uvaµivouc; 6/, avacrn:&crm £1( 1:&v ~a8pcov auta 01)1:(06n Lexiphanes 12. See also Steiner 2001, 134, 175f. and 182; Bremmer 2013, 8f.
n:ept~a11,oµevous;crxotvia f/cKEtV,lo,;oZifAKOµeva 1:U&y&lµma aµcp6,Epa t<lim:o1tOtf\crm, 32 Ryan and Kirakowski 1985.
eµol µ/,,vOU1tlO''tUAEYOV'tE<;, e,;
al,1,cpbe -ceip· youvaw y&p creptafrta 1tecre'i:v'1ml 't:OV(X1(() 33 Plutarch, Alexander 37.3.
-rouwu xp6vov Btm:eleav oui:co exovw;. For similar stories see Steiner 2001, 182; Bremmer 34 Examples of the periodical crowning of statues: SEG VIII 529 line 17; SEG XXVIII 953 lines
2013, 1O. For a discussion of the historical context of this tradition, see Figueira I 985. 63-71; SEG XLI 1003 II lines 50-56; JG Xll.4.348 lines 19--23.
Angelos Chaniotis The Life of Statues: Emotion and Agency 153
152
Second, a distinction should be made between the treatment of the statue in Euarestos felt the anxiety of a proud man eager to preserve his kleos. He had a
front of an audience or cryptically. Theagenes' enemy acted in the secrecy of the future audience in mind.
night; he was under the illusion of ill-treating the man he hated (a-rn au1qi An audience was also important for Nero's attack against the statue of a fa-
0mylvn /Vl)µmv6µ1.wo<;). In the cases in which the honourable or contemptuous mous musician. It is reported that during his grand tour in Greece, the emperor
treatme~t of a statue took place in front of an audience (see below), ultimately its forced the elderly kitharode Pammenes to compete with him, in order to be able to
target was not the represented individual but his reputation and memory. The claim that he had defeated the greatest performer of his time and to have the op-
honourable treatment of a statue mainly triggered by affection and gratitude - portunity to ridicule Pammenes' honorific statues.39 Incidents suchlas this explain
was commemoration· its destruction motivated by hatred, envy, or indignation Herodes Atticus' fear that his statues and those of relatives and friends might be-
was damnatio memo:iae in a very clear manner.
35
come the victims of envy and enmity.40
Reputation and memory also explain rituals directed towards the image of a In the above examples in which people interact with statues, the intensity of
mortal. When Kritolaos of Amorgos established a foundation in honour of his son emotions varies according to the circumstances, which range from a spontaneous
Aleximachos, a pankratiast who had died prematurely, Aleximachos' statue was reaction to a rihialized display of honour or a carefully planned attack Although ·
the focal point of the ceremony.36 A sacrifice took place near the statue, which the interaction is with a statue, what ultimately determines the reaction is not the
was also presented with an offering of food. The dead Aleximachos was regarded statue but the individual it represents. We reach yet another level of agency ema-
as present through his statue. In the contests that took place during this celebra- nating from statues when we turn to stories in which emotions are directed to-
tion, no competition in pankration was held, but instead the dead youth was an- wards the statue as a physical object
nounced as the winner.
Furthermore, reputation and memory underlay attacks against statues - open 4.4 Uncontrolled emotions: erotic desire for statues
attacks, dissimilar to the abuse of Theagenes' statue. The statue of the Carian
dynast Hekatomnos was set up in Mylasa as an expression of the city's loyalty In all of the above cases, the emotional impact of a statue, whether intended and
and gratitude, but it was e~ity and resentment that caused an attack by a group desirable or not, derived from the god or the mortal that it depicted or the values
of men around 360 BCE.3 ' That statues could provoke insulting responses was for which an individual stood. Agency did not directly stem from the statue itself.
well known to Euarestos of Oinoanda, a teacher and sponsor of athletic contests, Things are quite different in the case of statues that provoked erotic desire di-
who had proudly set up five statues of himself. In an epigram written on the base rected towards the material object The best known case of 'agalmatophilia' 41 is
38
of the latest statue (ea. 238 CE) he describes what he felt looking at his statues: that of Pygmalion, the mythical king of Cyprus, who fell in love with an ivory
statue. His story had a happy ending, but most similar anecdotes did not.
Many have estahlished beautiful contests in their cities after their death, but no one has done
it during his lifetime. I am the only one who has ventured this, and my heart rejoices with
The story of how the statue of Praxiteles' Knidian Aphrodite aroused such a
pleasure at the bronze statues.
strong sexual desire in a young man that he attempted to have sex with it is narrat-
ed by the author of the Affairs of the Heart. 42 He describes how an Athenian en-
Euarestos knew, however, what we should expect from his fellow countrymen: ters the temple of Aphrodite, sees the statue, and expresses his admiration. When
not gratitude but envy, not delight but mocking. So, he uses one feeling against he notices a mark on one thigh, which he takes to be a defect ofthe marble, he is
another, emulation against envy. told of the heartache of a young man who once fell in love ,vith the statue. All dav
Now give up your carping criticism, all you who are in thrall to dread envy, and gaze at my long he would sit facing the goddess with his eyes fixed upon her and whispering
statue with eyes of imitation. words of love, until one night he slipped unnoticed into the temple and attempted
to have sex with the statue in the pederastic manner, as the author explains to
curious readers. 'These marks of his amorous embraces were seen after day came
35 On damnatio memoriae in Hellenistic Greece and in Rome see Varner 2004; Savalli-Lestrade
2009.
36 JG Xll.7.515 (ea. 100 BCE).
37 I.Mylasa 2: 1tapavoµ11cravm; e; 'TTJV
dK6va 1:riv 'EKm6µvro. Cf. the traditions concerning 39 Cassius Dio 62.8.4-5: Kat 'COVITaiLµBVT]V£KclVOV£7,t 10U rafou aKµacrav,;a KCXU\V<XYKUO"E,
the destruction of hundreds of statues of Demetrios of Phaleron in Athens in 307 BCE: Strabo KO:t'tOtyepovm ova, ayvrovfoacr0m. \'va auwG 'CO'll£avopt<XV10:~Kpcn11crac;atKl(TI\'tCXL
9.1.20 (C 398); Plutarch, Praecepta gerendae reipublicae 27.13; Dio, Oratio 37.41. 40 On the curse inscriptions set up by Herodes in order to protect his statues, see Tobin 1997,
38 SEG XLIV 1182 B: n:Aetcnm µ~'Vyap 80TJKO:V ae0Ata KO:Ati1t0/,E<J<cr>tI n:0ve6·m;, t;,coo;
o' 113-160.
1:6oe, Kat p' eµov ~to[p J I yT]0Et 1:Epn:6-
o{htc; £<pT]µEpirov·I µouvoc; o' au1:o; i:yrov E'C/1.T)V 41 On this motif in art and literamre see Corso 1999, 102-104; Steiner 2001, 186-207; Hersey
<µe>vov xaAKEA<X'totS~o&vou;· I 'totyap µ&µov av~v-m; ocrot q,06vov alvov EXOUO[tV} I 2009.
µetµ.T)AOtSocrcrotc;dcrioe,;' dK6v' eµ11v.On this epigram see Dickie 2003. 42 Pseudo-Lucian, Amores 13-16. Recent discussion by Mylonopoulos 2010b, 1-3.
154 Angelos Chaniotis The Life of Statues: Emotion and Agency 155
and the goddess had that blemish to prove what she had suffered.' Out of his ing of both literary texts and inscriptions and ranging from incredible anecdotes to
mind, the young man then committed suicide. prescriptions for the ritual treatment of statues, illustrates that ancient statues were
A statue of Aphrodite is expected to arouse delight, awe, and hope - and in- part of a dynamic interaction between images and viewers. Statues were washed
deed, those who saw the young man staring at the statue interpreted this as reli- and perfumed, anointed, carried in processions, greeted, offered food, touched,
gious awe (◊Ewtoaiµcov ayw-rEia). When a community sets up a statue, intended kissed, flagellated, raped, and castrated; women dressed.them, men insulted them,
emotions may include gratitude towards the deity, hope for future protection, ad- birds left their dung on them, enemies captured them; they were attacked, carried
miration for the sculpture, and civic pride for the splendour of a work of art. An away, destroyed, burned, repaired, or buried, 46 Statues had life precisely through
ancient statue may also cause the indignation of the citizenry for the expenses or this continual interaction with humans. This life was not free of dramatic changes,
the envy of a neighbouring community; in these cases, the emotions do not turn and under certain conditions one could have the impression that statues were not
against the statue but against those who commissioned it. But when a statue caus- passive objects in this interaction but actors themselves. They killed and healed,
es a man not to kneel in front of it but to rape it, this is a different matter. This performed some biological functions such as movement, and influenced the ac-
paradox explains the appeal of the narrative; it explains why such anecdotes were tions of their viewers in a manner that clearly exceeded the intended emotional
preserved in the literary tradition. It would not be shocking if a man, turned on by effect. In the cases examined in these study, the impression that statues were filled
the statue's beauty, went home to have sex with his wife or to a brothel for possi- with life and the illusion that they had agency of their own were created or en-
bly better options. This was done by Makareus of Perinthos, another man alleged- hanced by the strong emotional impact generated by their physical presence.
ly struck by erotic desire for the Knidian Aphrodite; the goddess advised him to The most interesting manifestations of agency can be observed when the emo-
have sex with Ischas, a famous courtesan of that time. 43 The shocking element in tive impact of statues was unintended and undesirable when they aroused hatred
this story is that a man fell in love not with Aphrodite - this is known to have and envy instead of gratitude, erotic desire instead of religious awe, contempt
happened in myth and is alluded to in the earliest Greek metrical inscription 44 - instead of respect. In some of these cases, emotion was closely connected with
but with her statue. It is a story of losing control, of being driven to irrationality cultural memory and private memories. Two incidents, one possibly an anecdote,
through love; the agency does not originate in the maker of the statue, Praxiteles, the other attested in a documentary source, illustrate the interplay of memory and
or those who commissioned it, but in the statue itself. Ultimately, this is a story unintended emotional arousal. When Kassandros saw a statue of Alexander the
about emotions as much as it is a story about statues. Significantly, it is not nar- Great, it was not admiration for the conqueror that he felt, not grief for his death
rated in a treatise about statues but in one about affairs of the heart. or friendship; instead, it is said that he had all the physical symptoms of panic: he
47
A similar story was told about the statue of Agathe Tyche in Athens, again a physically shuddered and trembled; he was dizzy. The statue of Philites in Ery-
work of Praxiteles. 45 thrai ( early third century BCE) had been erected as a symbol of freedom; its im-
pact on the supporters of an oligarchical regime was the opposite: fear. Afraid of
A young man in Athens, descendant of a noble family, fell strongly in love with the statue of
the statue's emotive agency the statue encouraged the people to fight for democ-
Agathe Tyche, which stood in front of the prytaneion. First, he used to embrace the statue and
kiss it. Then, mad with love and driven by desire, he appeared in front of the council, begging racy - they literally disarmed the statue by removing the sword, 'believing that his
them to sell the statue, which he was eager to buy for a lot of money. As he failed to persuade posture/attitude was directed against them'. After the collapse of this regime, the
the council, he bound many ribbons aronnd the statue, crowned it, offered a sacrifice, deco- statue was restored to its earlier form. 48
rated it with valuable ornaments and, after shedding many tears, he committed suicide in front
ofit.
46 For the ritual treatment of statues see Scheer 2000, 54-66; Bettinetti 200 I; Steiner 2001, 105-
120; Broder 2008; Monte! 2014. For attacks against statues see notes 26 and 37. Attacks
5 CONCLUSIONS:NOWAYTOTREAT A STATUE! against statues, and also against divine images, are well attested long before the destruction of
statues by Christian mobs: e.g. an inscription from Kollyda reports that during the celebration
of a festival in 197 CE, people came together and marched against a sanctuary. Armed with
Statues were made to be seen, exactly as inscriptions were made to be read. In a
swords, sticks and stones, they attacked the sacred slaves and smashed the statues of the gods.
time in which the keen interest in novelty sometimes defeats common sense, it SEG LVII 1185. Statues captured in war or stolen: e.g. Pausanias 1.8.5; Arrian, Anabasis
may not be uncalled-for to stress such trivial things. The textual evidence, consist- 3.16.7; 7.129.2; SEG XLII 273 bis; I.Laodikeia 72; Reynolds 1982, no. 12; Bernard 1990;
Knoepfler 1997; Scheer 2000, 201-229. Repaired statues: I.Ephesos 519; IAph2007 4.308,
43 Ptolemaios Chennos, Kaine historia, fr. inc. sed. I ed. Chatzis. 12.402, 13.116; SEG XLIV 938; IG X.2.2.336. Buried statues: Caseau 2011. For a discussion
44 Recent edition: Dubois 1995, 22-28 no. 2: 'whoever drinks from this cup, here, will be mo- of these phenomena, see Chaniotis 2014.
mentarily seized by desire for Aphrodite, the one with the beautiful garland'. 47 Plutarch, Alexander 74.6. See Cairns 2013, 89.
45 Aelian, Varia historia 9.39. 48 I.Erythrai 503. Recent discussion of the statue's manipulation by Teegarden 2013, 142-172.
156 Angelos Chaniotis
The Life of Statues: Emotion and Agency 157
Perhaps the most revealing cases of agency through emotion are the narratives Dodds, E. R. (I 951) The Greeks and the Irrational, Berkeley/Los Angeles.
concerning the Knidian Aphrodite and the murderous statue of Theagenes. These Dubois, L. ( 1995) Inscriptions grecques dialectales de Grande Grece. f. Colonies eubeennes.
narratives have several things in common: the affective responses to these statues Colonies ioniennes. Emporia, Geneva.
love in the first case, hatred in the second - differed from the intended emotion- Faraone, C. (1992) Talismans and Trojan Horses: Guardian Statues in Ancient Greek Jvfyth and
Riiual, Oxford.
al arousal. The Thasians had erected the statue of Theagenes as an expression of
Figueira, T. J. (1985) Herodotus on the Early Hostilities between Aigina and Athens, American
gratitude, honour, and pride, not to see it flogged. Both incidents took place in the Journal of Philology 106, 49-74.
night: the darkness and secrecy of the night stressed the element of transgression. Francis, J. A. (2003) Living Icons: Tracing a Motif in Verbal and Visual Representation from the
The third common element is the physical contact with the statue as a result of Second to the Fourth Centuries C.E., American Journal of Philology 124, 575-600.
strong emotion. The inappropriate treatment of a statue was perceived as an ex- Gladigow, B. (1985/86) Prasenz der Bilder Priisenz der Gotter. Kultbilder und Bilder der Gotter
pression of emotion that was so intense and out of control that it caused irrational in der griechischen Religion, Visible Religion 4/5, 114--133.
actions: the raping of marble and the flogging of bronze. In both narratives, the Graf, F. (1992) An Oracle Against Pestilence from a Western Anatolian Town, Zeitschr/R fur
Papyrologie und Epigraphik 92, 267-279.
culprit was punished with death - in the case of Theagenes, through the statue's Guggisberg, M. (2013) Lebendige Gotter. Zurn Verhiiltnis von Gottheit und Gottesbild im antiken
direct agency. Griechenland, in M. M. Luiselli, J. Mohn, and S. Gripentrog (eds.), Kutt und Bild. Die bild-
Affective responses to statues were part of the life of statues; statues were liche Dimension des Kultes im alten Orient, in der Antike und in der Neuzeit Wurzburg 67-
manipulated as visual stimuli of emotions, but the circumstances sometimes made 89. ' '
them emotive agents that triggered unexpected or unintended emotions. Hersey, G. L. (2009) Falling in Love with Statues: Artificial Humans.from Pygmalion to the Pre-
sent, Chicago.
What do we learn about emotions from all this? Not much, but this is not sur-
Holscher, F. (2010) Gods and Statues. An Approach to Archaistic Images in the Fifth Century
prising. What I have realized after five years of engagement in a project concern- BCE, in J. Mylonopoulos (ed.) 2010a, 105-120. ,
ing emotions is that in ancient studies, we should not study texts and images iu Holscher, T. (1974) Die Nike der Messenier und Naupaktier in Olympia. Kunst und Geschiehte irn
order to understand emotions, but that we should study emotions in order to un- spiiten 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr., Jahrbuch des Deutschen Archaologischen Instituts 89, 70-111.
derstand texts and images in their contexts. These conclusions are encapsulated in (2015) La vie des images grecques, Societes de statues, roles des artistes et notions es-
the heading: 'no way to treat a statue!' Ignoring the emotional context of its life is thetiques dans !'art grec w1cien, Paris.
certainly no way to treat a statue. Jones, C. P. (2011) An Apamean at Philippopolis, Zeitschriftfi:ir Papyrologie und Epigraphik 176.
96--98. .
Jones, S. C. (1998) Statues that Kill and the Gods Who Love Tnem, in K. J. Hartswick and M. c.
Surgeon (eds.), I:·dxpavor;.Studies in Honor of Bruni/de Sismondo Ridgway, Philadelphia
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and Image in Ancient Greece. Essays in Honour of William J. Slater, Oxford, 232-246. Terminologies, in J. Mylonopoulos (ed.) 2010a, 1-19.
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Petrovic, I. (2010) The Life Story of a Cult Statue as an Allegory. Kallimachos' Hermes Per-
pheraios, in J. Mylonopoulos (ed.) 2010a, 205-224. .
Petz!, G. (1994) Die Beichtinschriften Westkleinasiens (Epigraphica Anatolzca, 22), Bonn.
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une statue, in S. Estienne et alii (ed.), Image et religion dans l'Antiquite greco-romaine, Na- TOUCHING BEHAVIOUR: PROXEMICS IN ROMAN ART
ples, 103-110.
Reynolds, J. (1982) Aphrodisias and Rome, London. . .. Glenys Davies
Robert, L. (1965) Hellenica. Recueil d'epigraphie, de numismatique et d'antzqu1tes grecques.
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Ryan, T. and J. Kirakowski (1985) Ballinspittle: Moving Sta_tuesand Faith, Cork/Dublm:
Savalli-Lestrade, I. (2009) Usages civiques et usages dynastJques de la damnatzo memonae dans le Although the face is the main site for the expression of emotion we also use the
monde hellenistique (323-30 av. J.-C.), in S. Benoist, A. Daguet-Gagey, C. Hoe~-van Cau- body as a whole to express what we are feeling, whether voluntarily and con-
wenberghe, and S. Lefebvre (eds.), Memoires partagees, memoires disputes. Ecriture et sciously or not. One aspect of this 'body language' involves proxemics (how close
reecriture de l'histoire, Metz, 127-158. people stand to one another and the extent to which they invade another's space)
Scheer, T. (2000) Die Gottheit und ihr Bild. Untersuchungen zur Funktion griechischer Kultbilder
in Religion und Politik, Munich. . .
and haptics (touch). 1 This paper looks at some examples of Roman art in the light
Seve, M. (1979) Un decret de consolation a Cyzique, Bulletin de Correspondance Hellemque 103, of modern research into Nonverbal Communication (as body language is more
1979,327-359. , properly called), taking as its premise that Roman artists observed the body lan-
Smith, R. R. R. (2007) Statue Life in the Hadrianic Baths at Aphrodisias, CE 100-600: Local guage in use in Roman society and used their observations as a communicative
Context and Historical Meaning, in F. A. Bauer and C. Witschel (eds.), Statuen in der Spat- device in their art. But although some aspects of body language are universal and
antike, Wiesbaden, 203-235. found across cultures many behaviours are culture-specific, and it should not be
Steiner, D. T. (2001) Images in the Mind. Statues in Archaic Greek Literature and Thought,
assumed that an interpretation that seems natural or obvious to us would have
Princeton.
Stramaglia, A. (1992) II leone, ii tesoro e l'indovinello, Zeitschriftfiir Papyrologie und Epigraphik been so for the Roman viewer. There are several interrelated questions here: does
91, 53-59. Roman art reflect how people actually behaved? Does the body language depicted
Teegarden, D. A. (2013) Death to Tyrants! Ancient Greek Democracy and the Struggle Against give us an insight into the expression of emotion among the Romans, or is art
Tyranny, Princeton/Oxford. more concerned with the expression of status and identity?
Tobin, J. (1997) Herodes Attikos and the City of Athens. Patronage and Conflict under the Anto-
My starting point for this paper is the central group on the Palazzo della Can-
nines, Amsterdam.
van Straten, F. T. (1974) Did the Greeks Kneel Before their Gods?, Bulletin Antieke Beschaving celleria relief B (fig. 1), one of two reliefs found in Rome in 1939 and now on
49, 159-189. display in the Vatican Museo Gregoriano Profano. 2 Although other suggestions
Varner, E. R. (2004) Mutilation and Transformation: Darnnatio Memoriae and Roman Imperial have been made since, I see no reason to doubt the original identification of the
Portraiture, Leiden. two main figures as Domitian on the left and Vespasian on the right, and the occa-
Zanker, P. (2003) Der Boxer, in L. Giuliani (ed.), Meisterwerke der antiken Kunst, Munich, 28- sion depicted as Vespasian's arrival in Italy as emperor in 70 CE. 3 The poses of
49.
For a good general introduction to the study of this aspect ofnonverbal behaviour see Argyle
1988, especially chapters 11 (Spatial behaviour) and 14 (Touch and bodily contact).
2 The earliest substantial publication was Magi 1945. For a good summary and bibliography of
subsequent publications see Kleiner 1992, 191f. and 203f. Many of the subsequent articles
were primarily interested in the question of style, date, and the recut (or not) portrait heads.
3 McCann 1972 argues that the relief was carved early in the reign of Hadrian and represented
Trajan's adoption of Hadrian, but when Hadrian later backpedalled on this justification for his
assumption of power the head of Trajan was recut to represent Vespasian, so that the relief
now represented Vespasian's approval of a young Nerva. The arguments are based entirely on
the portraits and the style of the relief: the postures and gestures of the main protagonists are
barely mentioned. McCann's interpretation of the relief has not received general acceptance.
Other interpretations involve the suggestion that 'Vespasian' originally represented Domitian,
who is shown with some other less important figure but the head was recut after Domitian's
damnatio memoriae (see most recently Petruccioli 2014): for the view the heads in relief B
were not recut see Varner 2004, 119f., and n. 62.
Glanys Davies Touching Behaviour: Proxemics in Roman Art 161
160
the two figures and the gesture being made by V espasian in particular look as to 'friendly approbation ... even congratulation'. 7 Toynbee also speaks of a 'ges-
though they ought to be communicating something about their relationship, yet ture of approval'. 8 Whatever the 'meaning' of the gesture, Vespasian is making all
the body language used by the two figures is difficult to read, enigmatic even. the moves, whereas Domitian stands aloof and unresponsive; the gestures appear
This is not a hackneyed, stereotypical scene: rather it gives the impression that the stiff and unnatural, not the outpourings of the kind of emotion one would expect
sculptor created a new motif in an attempt to say something very specific about at the meeting of father and son after a long separation during which the father has
the relationship between father and son - but what? been elevated to the position of the ruler of the Roman world. 9 Domitian and Ves-
pasian stand immobile amid other figures Vl;'hichinclude lictors, personifications
of the Senate and the Roman people, and Victory hovering behind Vespasian,
putting a wreath on his head. At the far left is a group of Vestal Virgins, with Ro-
ma appearing in the top left corner implying that the scene takes place at Rome. 10
The meeting is mentioned by Dio Cassius, who says that although Vespasian _
met Mucianus and other VIPs at Brundisium he met Domitian at Beneventum (not
Rome). 11 Dio, Tacitus and Suetonius all criticise Domitian's conduct in Rome up
to this point, and imply that the meeting would not have been a cordial one. 12 Tac-
itus tells us that before coming back to Italy from Egypt Vespasian had heard un-
favourable reports of Domitian's behaviour in Rome, but Titus urged him to be
impartial and forgiving of his son~13 Vespasian judged the situation to be critical,
as there were only 10 days' worth of grain left in Rome. 14 Qio tells us that while
Vespasian was in Egypt Mucianus and Domitian ruled in Rome 'like absolute
rulers'; 15 Domitian was afraid of his father 'because of what he had done and far
more because of what he intended to do': 16Domitian was consequently ill at ease.
(It is at this point that Dio introduces the famous anecdote that Domitian's favour-
ite pastime was impaling flies on his stylus, which he sees as a significant indica-
tor of his character defects). He then goes on to say that Vespasian proceeded to
humble his son's pride, while greeting all the rest not as an emperor but as a pri-
Fig. l. Detail ofreliefB from the Palazzo della Cancelleria, Rome, Museo Gregoriano Profano
(Vatican Museums): Vespasian and Domitian.
'Domitian', a young man with down on his cheeks,4 stands on the left, immobile
but in a relaxed pose wearing an immaculately draped toga, his body virtually 7 Last 1948, l Of.
frontal, with only his head turned towards his father; 'Vespasian' stands next to 8 Toynbee 1957, 5.
him in a similar pose, but there is a significant gap between the two which is 9 Varner's suggestion that 'Domitian welcomes his father' does not sei::mto me to be supported
bridged by V espasian' s raised right hand: he appears to be in the act of patting his by the visual evidence (Varner 2004, 120).
son on the shoulder. His head is turned into side view as he looks at his son. Bril- 10 As several commentators have pointed out, the presence of axes in the fasces carried by the
lictors shows that the setting is outside the pomerium, although presumably near the city be-
liant describes this as 'Vespasian's warm gesture of greeting',5 but the distance
cause of Roma and the Vestals. '
the two stand from each other does not in fact suggest great warmth of feeling; 11 Dio Cassius, Roman History 65.9.3.
Kleiner also interprets this as a gesture of greeting, though she says Vespasian 12 Dio 65.2; 65.9.3; Suetonius, Domitian 1.3; Tacitus, Histories 4.2.1 (no care for his duties;
actually puts his hand on Domitian's shoulder (in fact it does not quite make con- debauchery and adultery); 4.39.2; 4.51.2 (Vespasian hears unfavourable reports ofDomitian's
tact).6 Last starts out by identifying the gesture as greeting, but later corrects this transgressions, and that is the reason for his return to Rome).
13 Tacitus Histories 4.52, Tacitus says that Vespasian is impressed by this show of brotherly
affection (pietas), rather than being persuaded that Domitian was not as black as he was/pain-
ted. -
4 The meeting is estimated to have taken place early in the autumn, just before Domitian' s 19th 14 Tacitus, Histories 4.52; Dio (65.9.2) also says Vespasian sent corn ships from Egypt to Rome,
birthday, before he shaved off his youthful beard. but does not mention actual shortages.
5 Brilliant 1963, 102. 15 Dio 65.9.2.
6 Kleiner 1992, 191. Varner 2004, 120 also speaks of a '.gesture of greeting'. 16 Dio 65.9.3.
162 Glanys Davies Touching Behaviour: Proxemics in Roman Art 163
vate citizen. 17 Throughout their accounts all three authors imply that relations be- recognition that each man's impression of a work like this must be his own alone and that it
23
tween Domitian and his father (and indeed his brother) were not good. So perhaps cannot be imposed on others.
an affectionate hug is not what we would expect to see here. Using more recent studies ofnonverbal behaviour helps to explain why a modem
The explanation elaborated by Hugh Last and questioned by Jocelyn Toynbee viewer reads the scene in this way: it may also help to elucidate what the artist
in her study of the reliefs, is that this was a propaganda work erected in the reign intended to convey and what a Roman viewer might have seen in it.
of Domitian, much later than the events depicted, in an attempt to re-write histo- The scene on the relief is not, of course, a straightforward realistic representa-
ry: 18 instead of the dressing-down Domitian received for his mismanagement of tion of events in 70 CE (not a 'photographic record'): 24 Domitian 1and Vespasian
affairs in Rome while Vespasian was away we see him being treated with approv- are accompanied by deities and allegorical figures (Victory, personifications of
al. Vespasian is giving Domitian an approving pat on the shoulder. Toynbee de- the Roman people and the Senate) as well as the lictors and Vestal Virgins, and
scribes Domitian as 'the pivot of the whole scene, composed, confident, and the other historical characters present at the actual meeting are not represented.
somewhat aloof, accepting as though it were his natural right the gesture of ap- The two-figure group of Domitian and Vespasian embodies a concept (such as
19
proval with which the Emperor greets him'. She adds that 'Vespasian's approval and recommendation of Domitian') rather than or as well
The unpleasant encounter of father and son at Beneventum, when the former rebuked the lat- as representing an event. Two- figure groups ( sometimes with a third figure in the
ter sharply for his outrageous conduct, is over and forgotten; and it would seem that Domitian background between them) were used in this way on imperial coins, but the 'pat-
was publicizing here his own version - not so much a wholly false as a 'rose-coloured' ver- ting on the shoulder' gesture adopted by Vespasian on the Cancelleria relief was
sion - of his situation as Caesar in Rome at the time of his father's accession, as the recipient not used elsewhere in Roman art.
of congratulations on the 'vice- regency' exercised by him in the capital while Vespasian was
20 On the coinage the most common gesture linking two figures is the right
still absent in the East.
handclasp: a handclasp between the emperor and a praetorian was famously used
She notes that 'the emphasis does not seem to be laid on mutual friendliness, for on coinage early in the reign of Claudius to acknowledge the debt owed to the
Domitian in no way reciprocates his father's friendly gesture'; she comments on praetorian guard for his elevation to imperial power. 25 Two soldiers linked by the
'the contrast between the youthful Caesar's cool self-possession and Vespasian's handclasp were represented on the coinage ofVespasian with the legend 'consen-
almost deprecating air' .21 Last is even more critical of Domitian's appearance, sus exercitus', again suggesting Vespasian had the support of the army; 26 Domi-
22
describing him as 'smug and self-satisfied' and 'surprisingly unresponsive'. Last tian also appears on coins taking the hand of a soldier in the presence of other
and Toynbee here give a plausible explanation of the scene based on their reading soldiers. 27 During Vespasian's reign coins depict his two sons together, but with-
of the body language displayed (though in 1948 and 1957 they would not have out any physical contact between them: 28 it is not until the reign of Titus that two
called it that), and their knowledge of the historical situation based on the writings members of the imperial family are shown linking right hands (fig. 2). 29
of the ancient historians. Last acknowledges the subjectivity of his interpretation:
When first I saw this relief, it seemed to me to speak clearly enough to be at least vaguely in-
telligible - and to say something rather different from what it appears to have said to others.
Nevertheless its meaning to me may well not be what the artist intended and I must repeat my
23 Last 1948, 10. He also begins his article with the statement that 'the interpretation of monu-
ments such as these is largely subjective'.
24 Last 1948, 12: he rejects the idea that the scene simply represents the meeting of father and
son in 70 CE because of the lack of emotion displayed; 'no sign of the emotions to be expec-
17 Dio 65.10 See also Dio 65.3.4 (Domitian was afraid of his father because of what he had ted at the reunion of father and son after long absence through the perils of four fateful years'
done) and Tacitus, Histories 4.86.1 (Domitian felt he was treated contemptuously by his fa- (Last 1948, 10).
ther and brother). 25 Brilliant 1963, 78, fig. 2.7; also BMC I Claudius no. 228, pl. 34.4. Aureus 41-42 CE. Brilliant
18 Toynbee 1957, 6 insists that the message of the relief had a positive purpose (enhancing Do- interprets this as an image of 'their joint amity', but also points out that the Praetorian occu-
mitian's prestige), whereas Last's view (Domitian was attempting damage limitation in re- pies what he identifies as 'the principal right-hand position', and refers to Claudius' 'passive
sponse to rumours alleging bad relations with his father) is too negative. These seem to me to receptivity to the prerogatives of power'.
be two sides of the same coin. 26 BMC JJVespasian no. 369 pl. 12,6 and 7 and nos. 414-416 pl. 14, 11, 12, and 13.
19 Toynbee 1957, 5. 27 BMC JJDomitian nos. 301-303 pl. 71,4 and no. 368 pl. 74,3 (86 CE).
20 Toynbee 1957, Sf. 28 BMC IJVespasian no. 6, pl. 1 and 2; no. 430 pl. 15, 9; no. 443 pl. 15.20; no. 456 pl. 16, 8 (all
21 Toynbee 1957, 6. togate); no. 528 pl.20, 1 in military dress (also Brilliant 1963, 92 fig. 2.97).
22 Last 1948, 10. 29 BMC II Titus no. 177 pl. 49 2 Brilliant 1963, 92 fig. 2.96. Sestertius of 80-81 CE.
Glanys Davies Touching Behaviour: Proxemics in Roman Art 165
164
dux, again alluding to his safe return to Rome). 36 Roma is also represented hand-
ing a globe to Hadrian on a relief panel from an unknown monument in the Capi-
toline Museums (Conservatori). 37 .
Fig. 2. Sestertius of Titus, 80-81 CE: Titus and Domitian link right hands
with the legend 'pietas' (British Museum).
Titus and Domitian are both togate, they stand facing one another clasping right
hands and holding sceptres in their left, and there is a third, female, figure stand-
ing between them in the background. She is identified by Mattingly as possibly
representing Concordia, although the legend on the coin refers to Pietas: she looks
towards the right hand figure (Titus). 30 Also used on the coinage of Titus' reign is
the image of V espasian and Titus standing opposite one another with their right
hands extended and a globe held between them: the legend refers to the 'providen-
tia' (foresight) of the emperor in providing a son and heir to take over ruling the
Fig. 3. Aureus of Hadrian, 117 CE: Trajan and Hadrian clasp right hands with
Roman world. 31 Providentia, this time of the Senate, is also represented by the the legend 'adoptio' (British M_useurn).
same motif on coins issued early in the reign ofTrajan; 32 coins minted early in the
reign of Hadrian use the same formula (right hands extended with globe) to link The various messages represented by the images on these coins would all be rele-
Trajan and Hadrian, but with the legend 'adoptio' or 'Concordia'. 33 'Adoptio' vant to Domitian as emperor recalling the events of 70 CE: a handclasp with his
(referring to Hadrian's supposed adoption by Trajan shortly before he died) is also father could imply the concord between them, the handclasp with globe Vespasi-
used as the legend for coins with a right handclasp between Trajan and Hadrian an's 'providentia' in providing a second son to succeed him as heir to the imperial
(fig. 3), 34 and another design with the same legend shows Trajan extending both power; the handshake might also be associated with return to Rome, implying
hands to Hadrian who holds out his right hand. 35 Hadrian is also shown on his Domitian, like Roma, welcomed his father's return to the city. Such images con-
coinage clasping hands with the Senate (or a representative senator) with Roma in tinued to be used after Domitian' s time not only on coins but also in official relief
the background, with Roma (with the legend 'adventus' - his return to Rome from sculpture (see fig. 4), the 'Concordia' scene from the arch ofSeptimius Severns in
abroad), with Felicitas, and with Fortuna (with a legend referring to Fortuna Re- Leptis Magna). 38 The hand cla~p (dextrarum iunctio) was already in use in private
contexts in Roman funerary art, as we shall see, albeit as a gesture that usually
linked a male and female figure. The designer of the Cancelleria relief however
chose not to use any of these motifs and presumably therefore wished to convey
30 Brilliant 1963, 92 fig. 2.96 identifies the third figure as Pietas rather than Concordia, em- something different and original. Since, unlike the coins, the reliefs do not have
phasises that 'Although the expectations of Domitian were soon to be realised, he was still
subordinate to his brother' and sees the dextrarum iunctio (with Titus on the right) as reinfor-
36 BMC III Hadrian nos. 506f., pl. 56, 17 and 18 (Hadrian and Senate); nos. 581-588, pl. 58,
cing the dynastic bond.
16-18 (Hadrian and Roma; 'adventus'); nos. 613-617, pl. 59, 6; nos. 634 and 653-655, pl.59,
31 BMC II Titus nos. 178-181 pl. 49; Brilliant 1963, 92, fig. 2.94.
32 BMC III p. 38 (no number): exceptional issue: 5 denarius piece, 98-99 CE. 12 and 59, 17 (Hadrian with Felicitas or Fortuna).
33 Brilliant 1963, 134 fig. 3.71. BMC III Hadrian nos. 1-4, pl.46, 1 and 2. Aurei and denarii, 117 37 McCann 1972, 270, pl. 114,2. To confuse matters the figure of the emperor has been Wrongly
restored with the head of Marcus Aurelius.
CE.
34 BMC III Hadrian nos. 5-8 pl. 46, 3 and 4. The motif was used again when Hadrian adopted 38 Kleiner 1992, 340-343, fig. 310. Septimius Severns (on the right) clasps the hand of his elder
son Caracalla, while the younger son Geta stands behind and between them, in the position
Aelius: Brilliant 1963, 134 fig. 3.72.
35 BMC III Hadrian p. 243, figs. 47, 1-2 (No number; irregular issues of 117 CE). previously taken by Concordia/Pietas.
166 Glanys Davies Touching Behaviour: Proxemics in Roman Art 167
legends which point the viewer in the right direction, it is proposed here that we superior power (both as father and emperor) what are we to make of Domitian's
should look at the body language of the scene, and see what emerges if it is ana- failure to respond, to acknowledge that power?
lysed and read as if it were a record of actual behaviour. The rest of this paper explores various aspects of touching behaviour as rec-
orded in Roman art, and asks the question of whether ancient Rome was a 'con-
tact' or a 'non-contact' culture. Argyle says that 'people from contact cultures
stand closer, face more directly, touch and look more, and speak louder' - he lists
as typical 'contact cultures' Arabs, Latin Americans, and Southerrt Europeans (he
specifies Greeks and Turks); in the non-contact group he puts Asians, Indians and
Pakistanis, and Northern Europeans. But he also points out that there are different
rules governing spatial behaviour for different groups within any culture. 42 Should
ancient Rome be classed as a 'contact culture' or not - or to put it another way,
how touchy-feely were the Romans?
Argyle also discusses the expression of dominance through spatial behaviour:
the more important a person is, the greater the distance between him and other
people. The higher status person can choose the degrees of proximity of others to
himself - he can allow or not allow others to come close. The subordinate person
has little choice, even though invasion of their territory will cause discomfort or
annoyance. Feminist writers on body language have pointed out that where rela-
tions between men and women are concerned touching implies power and being
the recipient of touch is associated with lower status. Men interpret touch initiated
Fig. 4. Detail of one of the Attic reliefs from the arch of Septimius Severus
at Leptis Magna: Concordia Augustorum.
by men of equal status to themselves as a put down. This may explain the modem
tendency to interpret Domitian' s response as an attempt to negate his subordinate
The use of proxemics and touch in this scene raises questions about how Romans position. But Argyle also says: 'touch is theoretically rather puzzling: it involves
actually did behave. Would it be normal for a father and son greeting each other an invasion of personal space, but it is sometimes very well received' .43 He adds
after a long separation to behave in this way? (Last interpreted it as odd behaviour that there appear to be social rules which permit certain.kinds of touch between
in the circumstances, but would it have seemed odd to its Roman audience?) Is the certain people, on certain occasions only, and the dominance rule does not neces-
distance between the figures meant to be significant? What does the gesture made sarily apply in all circumstances.
by Vespasian suggest? Is it to be read as greeting- or approval? Is patting-on-the- The issue of touch, and more specifically embracing, represented in Roman
shoulder a gesture which had the same connotations for the Romans as it does for art is explored in one chapter of Natalie Kampen's Family Fictions. 44 Her starting
us? 39 How different, in short, was Roman body language from our own? 40 Ac- point is the embrace shared by pairs of the Tetrarchs in the statue groups in Ven-
cording to Michael Argyle, one of the experts on this aspect of body language in ice and the Vatican Library. She asks what contemporary c:>bserverswould have
the modem world, made of these images, and what visual precedents they could have drawn on to
Touch has two main dimensions of meaning: warmth and dominance ... The person who interpret them. There is only one other clear example of Roman men embracing -
touches is seen as having enhanced status, assertiveness and warmth; the person who is and that is so unusual that it slaps you in the face when you.see it: this occurs on
touched as having less.41 scene 44 from the spiral relief on Trajan's column (fig. 5). 45
So how should we interpret this d~piction of the relationship between Vespasian
and Domitian? If Vespasian' s attempt to touch Domitian is an expression of his
39 Argyle 1988, 227 in a table called 'a vocabulary of touch' identifies a 'pat on the hand, arm 42 Argyle 1988, 60. He also cites a study made in 1966 of the frequency with which couples
or back' in modern Western societies as 'friendship, reassurance, support'. were observed to touch each other at cafes - in Puerto Rico the tally was 180 times per hour,
40 On cultural difference in body language in the modem world see Argyle 1988, 49-70 (chapter in Paris 110, and in London 0.
4), with discussion of spatial behaviour and touch. 43 Argyle 1988, 224.
41 Argyle 1988, 226. See in general Argyle 1988 chapters 11: spatial behaviour; 12: gestures 44 Kampen 2009, 104-122 (chapter 5: Tetrarchs and Fictive Kinship).
and other bodily movements; 13: posture; and 14: touch and bodily contact. 45 Kampen 2009, 115, fig. 40: the group with the soldiers embracing is discussed on p. 118f.
Glanys Davies Touching Behaviour: Proxemics in Roman Art 169
168
46 Rossi 1971, 154-156, fig. 40. 48 Brilliant 1963, 3lf., fig. 1.46 (sarcophagus from Vulci in Boston). The lids of both sarcophagi
47 Davies 2007, 140-145, no. 104, pl. 104-106. are illustrated in Brendel 1978, 389 figs. 299 and 300.
170 Glanys Davies Touching Behaviour: Proxemics in Roman Art 171
should not surprise us. Kampen, however, also suggests it was a matter of status. The scene on Trajan's column containing the two embracing soldiers (fig. 5)
'Physical contact between emperor and other mortals except in the form of a also has another very unusual scene involving the use of touch, this time between
handclasp is a significant absence, rooted, I think, in fundamental attitudes to- the emperor and one of the soldiers who are being rewarded by him for bravery;
wards class and gender. ' 49 She suggests that touching is the mark of women and the auxiliary bows before the emperor and holds him by the wrist, as if about to
low-class men: elite men in general (and emperors in particular) are not touched kiss his hand. Trajan does not otherwise get as close as this to touching, or being
by and do not touch others. Thus on the Cancelleria relief B she points out that touched by, anyone on the column. Rather, it is noticeable on Trajan's column
Vespasian 'raises his right hand towards Domitian's shoulder' - but she is not that although Trajan is omnipresent on campaign, he is generally kept separate
convinced that Vespasian actually touches him: 'Vespasian's hand seems to mark from the mass of the soldiery: he is usually accompanied by a· couple of high-
a visible join that is at the same time a halt' .50 Or to put it another way, Vespasi- ranking officers, but he does not touch them, and they do not touch him (see fig.
an's hand hovers near Domitian's shoulder, and it is not clear whether contact has 7).53 Instead they act as a kind of frame for him and help to make. his figure stand
actually been made. Kampen also points out that on the other Cancelleria relief out visually. This adlocutio scene illustrates the general principles at work: there
(A) Domitian is touched, but by a goddess or personification (Roma or Virtus) is a large gap between the imperial group (elevated on a tribunal) and the crowd of·
who takes him by the elbow to urge him on to war: Domitian can allow such a soldiers, and the amount of space surrounding the er;nperor and senior officers
touch from an immortal, but seems reluctant to do so from his own father. Is this indicates their superior status. The isolation of the emperor of course is an artistic
because by accepting his father's touch he is acknowledging Vespasian's domi- device to make him stand out visually - although Trajan is in the thick of the ac-
nance over him, and by failing to respond to it he is asserting his own superiority tion he has a decided clear space around him, and does not touch, and is not
over his father? touched by, those around him. The direction of everyone else's gaze also serves to
Suetonius in his Life of Domitian says two possibly significant things about draw the viewer's attention to him: even the two officers with Trajan look at him,
him, one immediately after the other: he says that from his youth Domitian was but they do not touch him, and he does not seem to acknowledge their presence by
far from affable - when his father's mistress Caenis returned from Histria and looking at them. He is also represented as slightly taller than they are: Trajan's
offered to kiss him as usual, he held out his hand to her instead (Suetonius, Domi- height is also commented on favourably by Pliny in the Panegyricus as something
tian 12.3).51 He goes on to say (13) that when Domitian became emperor he did which gives Trajan natural superiority.
not hesitate to boast in the Senate that he had conferred their power on both his
father and his brother. Suetonius seems to link Domitian's disdain for affectionate
touching with his desire to show himself superior to his father. The failure to use
the handclasp, associated with concord and the transfer of power from one emper-
or to another, on the Cancelleria relief may have been a deliberate and conscious
decision. Trajan, on the other hand, is praised by Pliny in the Panegyricus (23, 1-
2) for not being so stand-offish: 'There was general delight when you embraced
the members of the Senate, as they had embraced you when you went away' and
Pliny goes on to suggest that Trajan even allowed himself to be jostled by the
people. And as mentioned above, Dio says that Vespasian on his return to Italy
greeted those who came to meet him (with the exception of Domitian) 'not as an
emperor, but as a private citizen' - because he remembered where he came
from. 52 It seems that Domitian's lack of touchy-feely behaviour may have con-
tributed to the Senate's negative assessment of him - but it may also have been
deliberately used by Domitian as an assertion of status.
Trajan is behaving extremely affably in allowing an auxiliary soldier to touch him extra demonstrative gesture: the man allows it, but does not react to it or recipro-
in the award scene, but it is noticeable how far Trajan extends his arm away from cate.
his body. He does not so much initiate touch as permit it. This is not an invitation
to closer contact. (Even Domitian, according to Suetonius, allowed Caenis to
touch his hand). The soldiers embracing and the emperor allowing a soldier to
touch his hand are not the only instances of unusual forms of touching on this
section of the column: the next scene along is one of the most infamous - it is the
scene where Dacian women torture naked men (who they are is debated): 54 here
too the emphasis is on touch, but in this case the natural order is inverted: women
inflict pain on bound men who are powerless to deny them the right to touch
them. 55 Domitian's unresponsiveness, then, would appear to be in character; it is
also not surprising in a teenager who is intent on asserting himself as an adult, but
it was also the sort of behaviour one might expect of an emperor, indeed from any
elite Roman male.
It could perhaps in fact be Vespasian's hand-on-shoulder gesture on the Can-
celleria relief that is anomalous, rather than Domitian's unresponsiveness. The
dextrarum iunctio gesture used on Roman imperial funerary monuments involved
a certain degree of touch, but it was usually only the right hands of husband and Fig. 8. Portrait busts of Gratidia Chrite and M. Gratidius Lihanus linked
wife that made contact; 56 the figures did not stand particularly close together, and by dextrarum iunctio (Vatican Museums).
the extent to which their bodies were oriented towards one another, and the degree
This can be seen particularly clearly in a later (Antonine) funerary relief from
of mutual gaze, varied. The couple were often placed side by side, both looking
Ostia (fig. 9): 59 she leans in towards him, resting her left wrist rather than hand on
out of the relief at the viewer, rather than at each other: the high relief busts of
his shoulder, and gazes at him intensely. He does not react, but stares out of the
Gratidia Chrite and Gratidius Libanus (fig. 8)57 are typical in that although they
scene at the viewer. 60 The same applies to statue groups of a husband and wife as
are placed side by side with their heads turned inwards they still do not look at
Mars and Venus (his portrait head is added to a heroic nude statue type, the Ares
one another. Here, though, there is an additional element of touch, as the wife's
Borghese, hers to a type which originally represented Venus writing on a shield,
left hand rests on the man's shoulder: the gesture is not flamboyant, but does
the Venus of Capua) (fig. 10). 61 When put together she appears to be embracing
serve to intensify the bond indicated by the linking of right hands. 58 This added
him. But he does not seem to respond: she looks at him, but he does not look at
element can be found in other dextrarum iunctio scenes, and it is usually (but not
her. It does not seem that initiating touch in these cases is the privilege of the
always) performed by the woman. It is the woman who is expected to make this
dominant figure. It might seem that in attempting to touch Domitian V espasian is
playing the woman's part, and that Domitian in failing to react is behaving in a
manly fashion.
54 Scene 45: Rossi 1971, 156; also illustrated in Kampen 2009, 51 fig. 16.
55 The idea that Roman men should be 'impenetrable penetrators' is discussed in Walters 1997:
although he is mostly concerned with sexual penetration it would seem that the principle also
applied to the penetration of personal space by touching any part of the body. He argues that 59 Ostia, Museo Ostiense, 140-150 CB. Kleiner 1981, 513-519, cat. I; pl. XVII fig. 1 and XIX
males with a low place in the social hierarchy lacked the manly characteristic of 'corporeal fig. 2. .
inviolability'. 60 Kleiner 1981, 522-529 also discusses two other reliefs with couples; but without the hand-
56 Davies 1985. clasp: one in the Palazzo Valentino (cat. 3, pl. XXI and XXII figs 4 and 5) and the other in the
57 Also popularly known as 'Cato and Porcia'. In the Vatican Museum, Sala dei Busti, inv. 592. Villa Albani (cat. 4, pl. XXIII, fig. 6). In both cases the woman puts her left hand on the
Kleiner 1977, 215, no. 34; Kockel 1993, 188-190, no. L19: Kockel suggests that although he man's shoulder. The couple turn their heads to gaze at one another in the Villa Albani relief,
appears to be freeborn, Gratidius was probably the son of a freedman; Gratidia Chrite was his and the woman puts her right hand on the man's chest.
freedwoman and wife. Augustan. 61 Statue group found in the Isola Sacra cemetery (Ostia) in the Capitoline Museum (invAi52) c.
58 For another example of portrait busts linked by the handclasp and with the wife's hand on the 145-150 CB. Kleiner 1981, 537f., pl. XXV fig. 8. Kleiner 1981 discusses three other statue
husband's shoulder see Kleiner 1981, 519-522, cat. 2, pl. XX fig. 3, in the Vatican Museums, groups which combine the Mars and Venus figures in the same way, two of them (in the Lou-
Museo Chiaramonti inv. 1477. In this case, however, the wife's hand rests on his left shoul- vre and Museo Nazionale Romano) with portrait heads. See Kampen 2009 pl. XXII for the
der, so her arm extends across his back. statue in the Louvre (MA 1009).
174 Glanys Davies Touching Behaviour: Proxemics in Roman Art 175
concede his father's superiority. This would seem to fit with the suggestion in the
. historical sources that Domitian saw his father and brother as rivals for power, felt
· belittled and ignored by them, and thought he was in fact superior to them.
It seems likely that imperial Rome was not a contact culture, at least as far as
the dominant group, elite Roman men, was concerned. Touching is used sparingly
in Roman art, and where it is used it is usually initiated by women, and seen on
monuments erected by the non-elite classes (Barbarians and imperfectly Roman-
ised provincials I suspect are also represented as more liable to touch one another,
but that is a subject for another paper). It is not surprising that Domitian and Ves-
pasian are not shown in a friendly embrace, but the gesture that may be meant as a
pat on the shoulder still needs some explanation. Vespasian's gestQ.re is not quite
the same as the hand-on-shoulder gesture seen on the funerary reliefs, but it may
be significant that he is the one initiating the touching gesture: far from being the
prerogative of the dominant figure this would appear to be associated in Roman
art with women. In male-female groups the man, like Domitian, does not respond
to touch. It may be that Domitian' s aloofness is meant to be an assertion of supe-
rior status, and Vespasian's attempt to touch him is meant to underline his (Ves-
pasian's) lack of elite manly reserve. Domitian's immacula~e toga, elegant hair-
style and youthful features also contrast with Vespasian's more rugged appear-
Fig. 9 (left). Funerary relief with figures of a couple joined by dextrarum iunctio. ance: his bluff manners are those of an earlier genera{ion and the country squire.
From the Isola Sacra (Ostia Museum). Domitian may well have felt that the behaviour recorded in stone on the Cancel-
Fig. 10 (right). Portrait statue group of a couple as Mars and Venus. leria relief expressed his cultural superiority to his father and right to rule: in fact
From Ostia (Capitoline Museum).
it may rather have served to confirm his total lack of affability and popular charm.
One possibly significant difference between the Cancelleria relief and the funerary
images with husband and wife couples, however, is the direction of the gaze of the
two figures. Domitian and Vespasian both stand with their bodies in near frontal BIBLIOGRAPHY
view (Domitian turns slightly towards his father, but this is not the strong orienta-
tion of the woman seen in figs. 9 and 10), and both turn their head sharply into Argyle, M. (1988) Bodily Communication, 2nd edition, London 1988 (1 st ed. 1975).
side view so they are looking directly at one another. While husband and wife BMC= Mattingly, H. Coins of the Roman Empire in the British Museum vol. I Augustus to Vitelli-
us, London 1923; vol. II Vespasian to Domitian, London 1930; vol. III Nerva to Hadrian,
may on occasion be shown with a mutual gaze, this is usually combined with a
London 1966.
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ly posed togate bodies of Domitian and Vespasian stress their width and mascu- Arts and Sciences vol. XIV), New Haven.
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that this mutual gaze is one of affection but rather it suggests hostility and aggres- Journal of Archaeology 89.2, 627-640. '
- (2007) The Ince Blundell Collection of Classical Sculpture, volume 2: The Ash Chests and
sion. 62 Vespasian may be attempting to lessen the tension by his friendly gesture,
other Funerary Reliefs, Mainz am Rhein.
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Kleiner, D. E. E. (1977) Roman Group Portraiture. The Funerary Reliefs of the Late Republic and
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62 Argyle 1988 chapter 10 on Gaze: 'Mutual gaze gives a feeling of intimacy, mutual attraction, - (1981) Second-Century Mythological Portraiture: Mars and Venus, Latomus 40, 512-544.
and openness' (p. 160); 'People look more at those they like' and 'Married couples who re- - (1992) Roman Sculpture, New Haven/London.
port marital discord look at each other less' (p. 162), but 'Gaze is widely used by animals, as Kockel, V. (1993) Portriitreliefs stadtr6mischer Grabbauten. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und zum
a threat signal', 'Gaze is used by primates as a threat signal, and it evokes aggression or sub- Verstiindnis de spiitrepublikanisch-fruhkaiserzeitlichen Privatportriits, Mainz am Rhein.
mission; cut-off or gaze aversion signals appeasement', 'Gaze aversion is an appeasement si- Last, H. ( 1948) On the Flavian Reliefs from the Palazzo dell a Cancelleria, Journal of Roman Stud-
gnal, while gaze is a threat signal' (p. 157). ies 38, 9-14.
Magi, F. ( 1945) I rilievi flavi de/ Palazzo de/la Cancelleria, Rome.
176 Glanys Davies
McCann, A. M. (1972) A Re-dating of the Reliefs from the Palazzo della Cancelleria, Romische
lvlitteilungen 79, 249-276.
Petruccioli, G. (2014) The Cancelleria Reliefs, Vespasian the Younger, and Domitian's Dynastic
Program,BABesch 89, 109-127.
Rossi, L. (1971) Trajan 's Column and the Dacian Wars, London.
Toynbee, J. M, C. (1957) The Flavian Reliefs from the Palazzo de/la Cancelleria in Rome, Lon- EMOTIONS AS A HISTORIOGRAPHICAL DILEMMA
don.
Varner, E. (2004) lvlutilation and Transformation. Damnatio Memoriae and Roman Imperial Por- Cynthia Damon
traiture, Leiden/Boston.
Walters, J. (1997) Invading the Roman Body: Manliness and Impenetrability in Roman Thought,
in J.P. Hallett and M. B. Skinner (eds.), Roman Sexuality, Princeton.
It is well known that historiography is undertheorized in our ancient sources. An-
cient critics had a regrettable tendency to address this genre indirectly, by likening
it to other genres: historiography is, in Cicero's words, an 'eminently rhetorical
PICTURE CREDITS
project' (opus ... oratorium maxime, De legibus 1.5). Or, in Quintilian's, 'very
Figure l: Detail of relief B from the Palazzo della Cancelleria, Rome, Museo Gregoriano close to the poets' (historia ... proxima poetis, 10.1.31). With respect to the topic
Profano (Vatican Museums): Vespasian and Domitian. (photo: DAIR 2007.0009). of the present paper, the emotions in historiography, such analogies provide lim-
Figure 2: Sestertius of Titus, 80-81 CE: Titus and Domitian link right hands with the legend ited insight into the ancient historians' very rich engagement with emotions. And
'pietas'. British Museum 1872,0709.490 (photo: ©Trustees of the British Museum). they do no good at all when it comes to historiography's defining feature, its truth
Figure 3: Aureus of Hadrian, 117 CE: Trajan and Hadrian clasp right hands with the legend claim. 1
'adoptio'. British Museum 1938,0207.6 (photo: ©Trustees of the British Museum).
In order to reduce this vast topic to manageable dimensions I will be looking
4: Detail of one of the Attic reliefs from the arch of Septimius Severns at Leptis
Magna: Concordia Augustorum (photo: Koppennann DAIR 61.1701 ).
at historiographical emotions in just three venues, so to speak:.2First, in the story.
5: Cast of scene 44 from Trajan's Column (photo: Faraglia DAIR 31.311 ). This involves considering the emotions of the past as the historian's raw material.
Figure 6: 6a and b Sides of the grave altar of Passienia Gemella. Ince Blundell collection, Obviously, history-worthy events often involve actors in the grip of strong emo-
Liverpool Museum (photo: ©National Museums, Liverpool, Antiquities Collec- tions: one remembers Xerxes' anger at the Hellespont after the thwarted crossing,
tions). or Lucretia's shame at being violated by Tarquin, or Scipio's sorrow upon seeing
Figure 7: Cast of scene 77 on Trajan's column: adlocutio (photo: author's own).
the destruction of Carthage, or Agrippina' s horror when Nero eliminates Britanni-
Figure 8: Portrait busts of Gratidia Chrite and M. Gratidius Libanus linked by dextrarum
iunctio. Vatican Museums (photo: Anger DAIR 96VAT 2126). cus. Or, on a broader canvas, the despair of Athens' plague victims or the conflict-
9: Funerary relief with figures of a couple joined by dextrarum iunctio. From the Isola ing emotions present in the Roman army victorious over their compatriots fighting
Sacra, in Ostia Museum (photo: Singer DAIR 67.1071). for Catiline: delight and sorrow, grief and joy. More abstract, but still under the
Figure 10: Portrait statue group of a couple as Mars and Venus. From Ostia, in the Capitoline heading of raw material, are emotions as historical explanations. Thucydides'
Museum (photo: Koppermann DAIR 64.1832).
I build upon some important recent discussions of the emotions in ancient historiography,
esp. Levene 1997, Marincola 2003, Lateiner 2009, Chaniotis 2013. Translations are mine un-
less otherwise attributed.
2 I omit one impo1tant venue, that of the performer, so memorably represented in Plato's Ion as
the middle ring in the chain of emotional response to the magnet-Muse (for the performer's
emotion see esp. 535c-d). For historiographical texts we have very little information about
live performances beyond the fact of their occurrence (e.g., on Herodotus Plutarch, Moralia
862A, Lucian, Herodotus 1-2, and, on recitations of histories in the Roman world, Suetonius,
Claudius 41, Pliny, Epistulae 1.13.3, 8.12, 9.27 .1, Lucian, Quomodo historia conscrib,mda sit
7, Herodotus 8; for the Hellenistic period see Chaniotis 2013, 8lf.). Plutarch assigns the in-
termediate role to the historian himself: 'But all the other historians [besides Xenophon] ...
have been for the exploits of others what actors are for plays, exhibiting the deeds of the ge-
nerals and kings, and themselves with their characters as tradition records them'
(Moralia 345E, Babbitt translation).
178 Cynthia Damon Emotions as a Historiographical Dilemma 179
'truest cause' for the Peloponnesian war Sparta's fear, q>6~o<;, of Athens' grow- caused in Greece (1.23.1 ). 8 And Thucydides is praised by Dionysius (and others)
ing power (1.23.6) is the tip of a very large iceberg. 3 for his representations of these sufferings: 'Having often been compelled to write
But emotions are not just the matter of historiography; they are also one of the of the capture, overthrow, and enslavement of cities and other similar disasters, he
genre's most celebrated effects. Dionysius of Halicamassus pays Thucydides a sometimes makes the sufferings (mi0n) appear so cruel, so terrible, so piteous, as
great compliment in suggesting that Demosthenes Dionysius' favourite orator to leave no room for historians or poets to surpass him' ..9
learned from the historian how to give his speeches their emotional impact. 4 So Another merit is utility. Polybius cites as a familiar prefatory move by histori-
the second venue for emotions that I'll be looking at is the audience. The un- ans a claim about the therapeutic value of their works:
known author of the treatise On the sublime is particularly informative on how All historians, one may say without exception, and in no half-hearted manner ... have im-
historians produce an emotional response in their readers. 5 pressed on us that the surest and indeed the only method of learning how to bear bravely the
Emotion-provoking historiography, however, can backfire badly, particularly vicissitudes of fortune is to recall the calamities (1tspt1tE1:E1rov)of others. 10
if the historian himself is seen or suspected to be at the mercy of emotion. Hor-
ace's advice to would-be dramatists 'if you want me to weep, you yourself must This merit is shared with other emotion-filled literary genres such as tragedy,
suffer first' does not apply in any simple fashion to historians, who are much glancingly alluded to with the term 1t£p11tet£m1.11
A third merit is entertainment value. Cicero offers the historian Lucceius a
more likely to assert loudly, like Tacitus, that they write sine ira et studio, 'with-
out anger or favour' .6 So this is my third emotional venue, the author. 7 After look- long list of reasons why a narrative of the emotion-filled peripeties of his career
ing at emotions in all three venues we will be in a position to appreciate what a from glorious consulship to ignominious exile to triumphant return would enthrall
and delight prospective readers:
dilemma emotions were for the historian.
My experiences will give plenty of variety to your narrative, full of a certain kind of delecta-
tion to enthral] the minds of those who read, when you are the writer ... [I]n the doubtful and
1 IN THE STORY various fortunes of an outstanding individual we often find surprise and suspense, joy and dis-
tress, hope and fear. 12
In all of our ancient historical narratives, even Caesar's commentarii, one can find In fact, according to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, the representation of emotions
people under the sway of powerful emotions. And this is not just a matter of 're- (1ta0&v µiµrtcrt<;)was a generic imperative, the fifth of ten stylistic virtues par-
porting what Alcibiades did and (especially) what he suffered' (ti £1ta0sv, Aristo-
tle, Poetics 9, 1451b8-11); it is intimately connected with historians' claims about
the merits of their genre. My term 'merits' is necessarily vague, since different
historians associate emotions with different merits. 8 Here and elsewhere I quote Hammond's translation of Thucydides. On the rhetoric of this
One merit, obviously, is significance. In defending the proposition that the passage see Woodman 1987, 29-32, who argues that 'it demonstrates that [Thucydides] is
Peloponnesian War was 'a greater war than any in previous history' (1.21.2), for writing a "disaster narrative" of the most vivid and dramatic type' (30).
9 Dionysius of Halicamassus, De Thucydide 15, 347.15-20. Dionysius subsequently faults
example, Thucydides points to the vast quantity of sufferings (1ta017µam) it
Thucydides' scantier narratives for failing to give readers even 'an inkling of [their] terrors'
(a\'.cr0ricnvoeiv&v, De Thucydide 15, 347.21). In his note on this passage Pritchett quotes a
3 On <poJ)o,;and other forms of fear in Thucydides see de Romilly 1956. comment by Walbank that stresses the sensory richness of Thucydidean narratives over their
4 Dionysius of Halicamassus, De Thucydide 53, 412.18-26: 'He added to his own political emotional impact: 'The examples [Dionysius] quotes are Plataea, Mytilcne, and Mclos; in all
speeches merits received from Thucydides which were possessed by neither Antiphon, nor three the modem critic would be inclined to regard Thucydides' treatment as vivid but emo-
Lysias, nor Isocrates ... The qualities ... are swiftness, concentration, intensity, pungency, tionally restrained' (my italics). The Melians' fate (Thucydides 5. f16.4), for example, is re-
firmness and vehemence that arouses emotion'. Here and elsewhere 1 quote Pritchett's trans- ported but not depicted. But see below for Thucydides' emotion-filled accounts of the landing
lation. on Sphacteria and the sack of Mycalessus, and, on Scione (Thucydides 5.32.1 ), Rood 1998,
5 Chaniotis 2013, 60 and passim calls this the historian's 'stagecraft', but he is also attentive 76f. (with n. 77): 'the result is ... pathos.'
throughout to the overlapping techniques of orator and historian. For the historian as drama- I O Polybius 1.1.2; cf. also Lucian, Quomodo historia conscribenda sit 42. Here and elsewhere I
turge see also Lucian, Quomodo historia conscribenda sit 26 (quoted below). quote Paton's translation of Polybius, as recently updated by Walbank and Habicht.
6 Horace, Ars poetica l 02f. si vis me flere, dolendum est I primum ipsi tibi; Tacitus, Annales 11 See recently Marincola 2013, 83-85 on this passage and, more generally, McGing2010, 71-
1.1.4. 75.
7 Both Levene 1997 and Marincola 2003 divide the topic into two parts equivalent to my first 12 Cicero, Ad familiares 5.12.4-5 (Shackleton Bailey translation) Multam etiam casus nostri
two venues. Levene labels them 'analytical emotion' and 'audience-based emotion', respecti- varietatem tibi in scribendo suppeditabunt plenam cuiusdam voluptatis, quae vehementer
vely, and looks at the tension between the two. Marincola focuses on the second (2003, animos hominum in legendo tuo scripto retinere possii ... at viri saepe excellentis ancipites
293f.). variique casus habent admirationem exspectationem, laetitiam molestiam, spem timorem.
180 Cynthia Damon Emotions as a Historiographical Dilemma 181
ticular to historiography. 13 Furthermore, we find the author of On the sublime 'Crying over the memory of the cakes' is an apt shorthand for the fault of mis-
asserting that the depiction of emotion licenses stylistic innovation and audacity in judged emotion in the story. 17
historiography as well as in Homer, Greek lyric, and tragedy ([Longinus] 38.5). Turning from the merits and demerits of emotion-producing events to other
For example, speaking about Thucydides' hyperbolic account of the desperately forms of emotion in the story, we can briefly consider emotions as historical forc-
thirsty Athenians' arrival at the Assinarius river after their defeat at Syracuse, the es. Thucydides on the truest cause of the Peloponnesian War (1.23.6 q>o~ov), or
critic maintains that 'it is the intense emotion of the moment which makes it cred- on the Corinthians' hatred of Corcyra (1.25.3 µicrni), which indirectly precipitated
14
ible that dirt and blood should ... be fought for as drink' . The same is true of it, or on the Athenian's renewed desire (6.1.1 E~OUAOV'to aMvt) for invading
Herodotus' hyperbolic version of the last stand at Thermopylae, where the Spar- Sicily, which was the beginning of its end, are three prominent examples of the
tans defend themselves with knives, and then even with hands and teeth, as they type, and they can be supplemented by Sallust's numerous references to the inva-
were buried in a hail of missiles: hyperboles, says our author, are effective 'when sive passions responsible for Rome's decline: lubido, superbia, avaritia, metus,
they are connected with some impressive circumstance and with moments of high maeror, lascivia, etc., and by many other discussions of causae. 18 However, this is
emotion'. 15 one of the least satisfactory features of ancient historiography - my students al-
A necessary corollary is of course that an inappropriate or untimely depiction ways find it baffling so I am not inclined to dwell on it. 19 When historians give
of emotion makes an author look silly. Poor Callisthenes, an Alexander-historian words to an emotional character so as to show causae instead of stating them in
of whom the works are lost but about whom the following verdict survives: 'he abstract terms the results are somewhat more appealing, at least. But I'm not in-
has not so much risen to heights as been carried off his feet', says our critic clined to dwell on this aspect of my topic, either, since the manifold contributions
([Longinus] 3.2). Historians, like other authors, can 'carried away ... into emo- of emotional speeches in historiographical texts are on the whole well understood
tions unconnected with the subject, which are simply their own pedantic inven- and I wa11tto move on to the next emotional venue, the audience.2°
tion' ([Longinus] 3.5). 16 Lucian, in his satirical How to write history, gives an
unforgettable example from an unnamed (and probably unreal) author's Parthian
War: 2 IN THE AUDIENCE
[H]e has a centurion, one Afranius Silo, climb up onto the tomb as a rival to Pericles. This
man declaimed over [Severianus, a Roman governor and gourmand] in such a strange and When Herodotus says that he is going to expound the 'amazing' (1. praef.
over-blown (µi::ya1co1tprn&s;)way that, by the Graces, I couldn't stop crying with laughter, 0mµam:a) achievements of the Greeks and barbarians he presumably expects to
especially when Afranius the orator at the end of his speech burst into tears, and with pas- arouse amazement in his readers. Vitruvius, for his part, emphasizes the emotion
sionate groans (olµroyf\ 1t£pmaOz'i) reminded us of all those lavish dinners and toasts. Then of suspense in historical narrative. As the author of a boring technical treatise he
he capped it all by acting like Ajax: he drew his sword, and with the absolute nobility befit-
comments rather enviously on the inherent attractiveness of history, saying that
ting an Afranius he killed himself on the tomb in front of everyone - and by the god of war he
deserved to die long before for making a speech like that. The writer went on to say that all
'histories automatically grip their readers', tenent lectores, 'for they offer ever-
the onlookers were astonished and praised Afranius to the skies. As for me, I condemned him
overall for all but telling us about the soups and the shell-fish, and crying over the memory of
the cakes (e1t1◊a1Cpuov,oc;; 1:ft-c&vrcAaKouv,wv µV11µn); but most of all I blamed him for
ing before he had first slaughtered the historian who had stage-managed the show
17 Lucian, Quomodo historia conscribenda sit 26 (Costa translation). Lucian discusses the histo-
(616acr1CaAov1:0\J&p&µmO(;).
rian's need for a tight hand on the reins with stylistic boldness later in the same work ( 45). On
historical frigidity see von Mollendorff 200 I
18 On Corinth's hatred see recently Rusten 2010. For emotional causation in Sallust see, e.g.,
Bellum Catilinae 2.5; cf. Bellum lugurthinum 3.3, I 1.1, 12.2, 39.1, 41.3.
13 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Epistula ad Pompeium 3, 239.14--16. This is one of only three 19 The topic is particularly salient in the study ofThucydides. See recently Wohl (forthcoming),
criteria on which Thucydides surpasses Herodotus in Dionysius' rather pedantic comparison Tamiolaki 2010 (esp. 70 'for [Thucydides] feelings ... are facts' [emphasis original]), Rood
of the two authors; the others are concision and intensity. Among the key features of Thucy- 1998 (passim: see Index under 'fear', 'hope', 'morale', 'pathos', 'reason/passion antithesis',
dides' style, according to Dionysius, are 'a tendency to inspire awe and fear (deinon kai 'Sicilian expedition ... emotional').
phoberon) and above all these the power the emotions (pathetikon)' (De Thucydide 20 The bibliography on speeches in historiography is vast. For a recent overview see Pausch
24, 363.14-15). 2010. On the of emotional speeches to prompt both emotion and analysis in the rea-
14 [Longinus] 38.3 on Thucydides 7.84. Here and elsewhere I quote Russell's translation. der see, e.g., Macleod 1983, 227-246 on the speeches about the fate of Plataea (Thucydides
15 [Longinus] 38.3-4 on Herodotus 7.225. 3.9-12, 37-48): '[P]ity is doubled for the reader when ... he sees how no pity can be raised
16 On historians fabricating emotions see, e.g., Polybius 2.59 on Phylarchus' ,epa1:e1o;, with for a sufferer. And that emotional response is also to recognize what it is that reduces human
Marincola 2013, 83-85. morality and fellow to nothing' (246).
182 Cynthia Damon Emotions as a Historiographical Dilemma 183
changing expectations of surprising developments'. 21 Furthermore, Cicero' s Rhetorical teaching about enargeia, vividness, stresses a Plutarchean equiva-
above-mentioned characterization of historiography as an opus ... oratorium max- lence of emotion between participant and reader. The object. was to make the
ime (De legibus 1.5) speaks to a more general presumption that the historian, like reader feel present at the events narrated. Livy has what is practically a formula
the orator, intends to move his audience, a presumption that underlies Cicero's for this: he writes an internal audience into an event so as to give readers a model
22 26
reference to Thucydides as an author who 'sounds the war-horn' . for engagement. Cicero in his infamous letter to Lucceius reminds us, however,
A major question for us is what these readerly emotions are and what their re- that the effect on the reader of a character's experiences (including emotions) can
sult is. The simplest position, expressed by Plutarch among others, is that the be quite distinct from the effect of those experiences on the character: 'although
emotions of participant and reader are, at least ideally, the same.23 In his view, these vicissitudes were not what I would have wished in the event', he says, 'in
when Thucydides, for example, recounts the perverse situation at Pylos whereby the reading they will give pleasure' (erunt iucundae). 27 The difference is that the
the Spartans were fighting a land battle from on board ship and the Athenians a reader is in no danger and no pain; this is a secura recordatio, in which the read-
naval battle from the shore (4.14.3), he desired to produce in the minds of his er's vicarious participation in the character's wonder, suspense, delight, pain,
readers 'the emotions of amazement and consternation (EKTCAl]K'tlK<X Kat tapaK'tl- hope and fear results in real delectatio. 28 This kind of asymmetrical emotional
24
Ka rca8ri) ... experienced by those who beheld [the combatants]'. And the emo- response is familiar from other literary genres, including, to mention only the
tions in this particular scene are so powerful that they propel the onlookers into most obvious example, tragedy, where the pity and fear in the audience are
action: aroused by the anguish of the characters on stage.29
'Anguished by the sight of this disaster (a 6p&v1:1o,;... Kat 1t1opmAyouv1:1o<;)
the Spartans came
But emotionally powerful vividness need not involve emotion in the story it-
running in support ... There was huge confusion (06pupo,; µeym;) and an inversion of their self. An example will be helpful. In Thucydides' narrative of the raid on Mycales-
usual roles ... [W]ith the energy induced by the shock (uno npo0uµia,; Kat EKitATJ~em<;) the sus (7.29-30) no participant emotions are mentioned. 30 The facts are bad enough:
Spartans were virtually fighting a sea-battle from land, etc.' (Thucydides 4.14.2-3.) an unprotected city is attacked unawares, and the barbarian attackers spare neither
the old nor the young, nor women and children; indeed they kill anything that
At the other extreme is Seneca, no fan of historiography, who argues that what
breathes. Furthermore, circumstantial detail situates the atrocity in a particular
readers experience when reading about historical topics (inter lectiones rerum
time and place: the children had just come in for their lessons. And its impact is
vetustarum) - Clodius driving Cicero into exile, say, or Hannibal prowling outside
magnified by diction and hyperbole: 'they butchered (7.29.5 KcxtEKO'JfCXV) the en-
of Rome - are not emotions such as anger or fear but something much less conse-
tire school', 'spared neither ... nor ... automatically killed even ... destruction in
quential: in essence, they are rehearsals for emotion rather than emotions them-
every form ... the greatest disaster. ..'. The thematic relevance of the episode is
selves (principia proludentia adfectibus).2 5 Both positions can be nuanced in vari-
guaranteed by the fact that the violence, although perpetrated by Thracians, was
ous ways. And by looking more closely at what the readers' emotions are we will
unleashed by Athenians: their instructions to the commander escorting the barbar-
get a clearer sense of why historians aim to arouse them.
ians back to Thrace are 'to make what use of them he could to do harm (7.29.1
21 Vitruvius 5. praef. 1 historiae per se tenent lectores; habent enim novarum rerum varias
expectationes. For a discussion of suspense in Livy in particular see Pausch 2011, 191-250.
22 Cicero, Orator 39 de rebus bellicis canit etiam quodam modo bellicum. On the capacity of
the war-horn to arouse see, e.g., Seneca, Dialogi 4.2.6: Sic enim militaris viri in media pace
iam togati aures tuba suscitat equosque castrenses erigit crepitus armorum. Seneca insists 26 On how Livy developed a practice used to notable effect by Homer, Herodotus, Thucydides
that this is a motus of the soul but not an emotion, in that it doesn't involve intellectual assent, and other writers see Feldherr 1998. For 'onlookers' in other authors see, e.g., Dewald 1999
but Cicero is speaking in layman's terms. John Marincola argued in a recent talk (at the an- on Herodotus and Thucydides, Greenwood 2006 (eh. 2) on Thucydides, Davidson 1991 on
nual meeting of the APA in 2013, 'Historiographical advocacy: Cicero's opus oratorium ma- Polybius. Walker 1993 provides a synthesis.
xime revisited') that Cicero is thinking particularly of the forensic advocate here. Heidmann 27 Cicero, Adfamiliares 5.12.4 quae (sc. vicissitudines) etsi nobis optabiles in experiendo non
2011, 105-120 argues for a deliberative model, instead, whereby (Roman) historiography is a fuerunt, in legendo tamen erunt iucundae; cf. delectationem lectoris, and 5.12.5 iucundissima
form of 'Politik mit anderen Mitteln'. See further below for the connection between emotion lectionis voluptate.
and judgement. 28 Cicero, Ad familiares 5.12.4-5 habet enim praeteriti doloris secura recordatio delectatio-
23 Plutarch is deliberately simplifying here, in the context of an argument that belittles writers nem; ceteris vero nu/la perfunctis propria molestia, casus autem alienos sine ullo dolore in-
and painters by comparison with the men whose deeds these artists depict. For a more sophi- tuentibus, etiam ipsa misericordia est iucunda.
sticated analysis see Levene 1997. 29 For the asymmetry between character and readerly emotion in historiography see, e.g., Leve-
24 Plutarch, Moralia 347A (Babbitt translation). ne 1997, 13lf. (with the bibliography there cited).
25 Seneca, Dialogi 4.2.2-6. On Seneca's view of historiography see Damon 2010 and Marincola 30 Hammond supplies one in his translation, the 'total panic' of the townspeople. But this ren-
2003, 290 n. 13. On the Stoic principia, or npona0nm, see Konstan in this volume. ders Thucydides' more cli~ical 1:apax~ OUK 0Atyr1(7.29.5).
184 Cynthia Damon Emotions as a Historiographical Dilemma 185
31
~A!l\lfat) to the enemy as he sailed along the coast'. 'Harm' is starkly reified at Another consequence of audience emotion particularly relevant to historio-
Mycalessus - 'a whole swath of the population was wiped out' - and Thucydides graphy - although perhaps even more so to or~tory is that emotions underpin
pronounces the episode 'a calamity (7.30.3 mi0£t ...) which, relative to the size of judgements, at least if you're not a philosopher." 7 We just saw Tacitus refusing to
the city, was more pitiable( ... oA.ocpupacr0m a~{cp) than any other in this war', arm his readers with reasons to despise the well-born actors, lest they blame the
scripting the pity that his narrative evokes without any help from lamenting My- victims rather than the man responsible for their degradation, whom Tacitus him-
calessians. He may also expect gratification when his readers learn of the punish- self blames: 'the offence is his'. There are any number of programmatic state-
ment inflicted on the barbarians by the Thebans, which was swift and deadly, and ments that frame the historian's task as enabling readers to judge hi&torical agents
was complemented by Athenian betrayal (7 .30). But none of the concomitant and actions, to condemn (and avoid) the base, to admire (and emulate) the virtu-
emotional responses is mentioned. ous.38Readerly emotions aroused in aid of a verdict are clearly distinct from those
As for the historian's purpose in arousing readerly emotions, this needs to be of the agents. That where the agents feel anger, anguish, ambition etc., the
considered under several headings. reader is prompted to feel, say, indignation or compassion or admiration.
First, Cicero's longing for a history of his consular career that would produce An example discussed by David Levene is Tacitus' account of the last mo-
the aforementioned voluptas and delectatio in readers arises, as he tells Lucceius ments of the short-lived emperor Vitellius. 39 Vitellius, the third of the four emper-
with a blush, from his desire for the perpetuation of his memory. 32 The author of ors of 69 CE, is dragged from the palace where he hid, abandoned by his house-
On the sublime makes the causal connection between emotion and memory ex- hold, after the Flavians seized control of Rome then frog-marched through the
plicit in his introductory discussion of the emotions aroused by sublimity: 'real streets of Rome, mocked, abused, and hacked to death. While Vitellius feels fear,
sublimity', he says, 'is difficult or rather impossible to resist, and makes a strong shame and perhaps some defiance, the internal audience hasn't got a tear for him
and ineffaceable impression on the memory'. 33 This is a consequence ofpatticular because, Tacitus tells us, 'the unseemliness of [Vitellius'] death had banished
relevance for historiography, obviously. It is a great shame that the process of pity' (misericordiam abstulerat). 40 The reader's aversion from and condemnation
textual transmission (or authorial decision) has deprived us of the fuller discussion of Vitellius are meant to align with those of the internal audience, which sees Vi-
41
of the emotions that On the sublime promises but doesn't deliver in its present tellius' end as afoedum spectaculum, a 'disgraceful spectacle'.
state. This is especially true for my topic, since the author of that work is uniquely
generous with illustrative passages drawn from historiography.
and passed over'. Here, however, he does name nan1es. The passage is famously obscure and
That scenes arousing an emotional response in readers tend to be remembered often emended, but it is clear that his failure to keep silence will be associated with hatred,
is no surprise. But here too the historian must exercise caution: not everything either as a sign of his hatred of those whose disgrace he reports, or his readers' hatred of the
warrants an emotional response and the memories it produces. For example, after disgraced (reading ne oderim or the emendation ne oderint respectively), and that he tries to
Nero humiliated some contemporary descendants of noble families by forcing keep the hatred at bay. Failure to keep silence is one of the categories Plutarch uses to argue
them to go on stage, Tacitus has to decide whether or not to name names. That for malignity in a historian (Moralia 855C-D). Similarly, Dionysius of Halicarnassus uses
Thucydides' failure to keep silence about a war in which Athens was defeated in charging
Tacitus knows the names is suggested by the fact that Dio knows them, and in fact
him with spite against Athens (Epistula ad Pompeium 3, 233.8-11: 'Thucydides ... writes of a
uses them to produce a scene full of scorn comparing these degraded specimens single war which ... should have been consigned to silence'; Lucian, Quomodo historia con-
with their illustrious forebears. 34 But here is Tacitus' verdict: 'These men, now scribenda sit 38 disagrees).
dead, I will not name, in due deference to their ancestors. For the offence is his 37 There is a large modern bibliography on the role of emotions in judgement. See Marincola
who gave money for wrongdoing'. 35 Tacitus' decision to keep silent in this in- 2003, n. 12 and Lateiner 2009, 127f. for a start. Of the ancient sources Polybius is particularly
stance must have been adopted at many other times by historians conscious of the interesting, since he insists that the historiali should, by explaining causes and motives, help
his reader 'feel pity on reasonable grounds' and 'become appropriately angry' (2.56.13). On
power of narrative to confer a lasting memory, for better or worse. 36
this passage see further below.
38 E.g., Polybius 2.56.13, 2.61.6-11, Livy,praefatio 10, Tacitus, Annales 3.65.2, etc. Cf. Diony-
31 See, e.g., Kallet 1999. Hornblower notes ad loc. that the Athenian expedition leader 'was not sius of Halicarnassus, Epistula ad Pompeium 6, 246.16-247.4 (Usher translation): 'Indeed, I
apparently in disgrace after the episode' and that this brutal incident is followed by one very feel in some way that the fabled examination before the judges of the other world, which is
like it in Sicily (7.32). He also asks, 'Could [7.2730] have been a recitation piece?' conducted in Hades .upon the souls that have been released from the body, is of the same
32 Adfamiliares 5.12.l, etc. searching kind as that which is carried out through the writings ofTheopompus'.
33 [Longinus] 7.3. 39 See Levene 1997.
34 Dia Cassius 61.17.2-5. 40 Tacitus, Historiae 3.84-85. Fear: terret soliiudo ... inhorrescit vacuis; shame: pudenda late-
35 Tacitus, Annales 14.14.3. Here and elsewhere I cite my Penguin translation. bra, contumeliis; defiance: una vox non degeneris animi.
36 Tacitus evokes the decorum of silence at Annales 16.16.2, where he lists 'disasters to 41 At least at first. Levene 1997, 136-149 shows how Tacitus 'works' the readers' emotions and
our armies or the capture of cities' as examples of events that are 'to be simply announced judgement in the larger context ofVitellius' fall from power (Historiae 3.36-86), concluding
186 Cynthia Damon Emotions as a Historiographical Dilemma 187
There is plenty of emotion to go around in this gruesome scene, but a histori- tive-poor annales libri on the grounds that they 'can do nothing to make people
an doesn't in fact need character emotion to elicit an emotion-based judgement. more quick to defend the state or more hesitant to do wrong'. 49 Or that Sallust
An example from Caesar, who otherwise might not make it into this paper: when wants when he imagines his reader being inspired, literally 'set afire', for excel-
his legate Cotta is killed in an ambush by the Eburones in Book 5 of the Bel/um lence by narratives of exemplary figures from the past (Bellum lugurthinum 4.5:
Gallicum, Caesar just gives the facts: 'There Lucius Cotta was killed as he fought, ad virtutem adcendi).
as was the majority of his men'. 42 The events of the surrounding narrative Cot- Inspiring patriotic and valiant actions and instilling reluctance to do wrong
ta's unsuccessful argument against leaving camp, his co-commander's culpable might seem to be unobjectionable aims in a historian. However, the capacity for
credulity, the treacherous ambush, the brave last-ditch defense, the proud refusal historical narrative to move readers to practical action can get a historian into
to capitulate all prompt the reader to feel the pity and anger that motivate Cae- trouble. This is precisely the situation in which Tacitus shows his histori-
sar's pursuit ofrevenge throughout Book 6. 43 If Caesar hadn't succeeded in arous- an/character Cremutius Cordus. Brought before a senatorial court, with Tiberius
ing pity and anger, his ruthless punishment of the Eburones, who were hounded looking on, Cordus offers a defense against what Tacitus calls a 'novel charge,
and starved into extinction, might have been judged•- ruthless. 44 heard then for the first time': 'In published annals, after praising Brutus, he called
Here again, however, the historian's power can provoke censure. Polybius Cassius "last of the Romans"'. 50 The novelty lies in the fact that verba, notfacta,
holds up Phylarchus as a particularly egregious offender, for his deliberate arous- constitute the crime. 51 Thus Cordus' defense culminates in a question aboutfacta:
ing of pity for a people that, in Polybius' view, deserved worse treatment than num ... incendo? 'I'm not firing the people for civil war, am I?' Cordus' question,
they in fact suffered. 'Against such men, one asks oneself, can any indignation with its introductory particle num, presses for the answer 'No, you are not current~
(6pYT1) be too strong?' (2.58.8). 45 That is part of Polybius' response to Phylarchus' ly inciting the populace.' 52 He is, as he says,factorum innocens (4.34.2), and if his
pity-rousing depiction of conquered Mantinea, which featured 'women with their verba produce an emotional response in his readers, he implies, it is simply an
hair disheveled and their breasts bare ... and crowds lamenting as they are led index of literary excellence. 53 However, it is not at all clear that Tacitus himself
46
away to slavery' (2.56.6). Prompting (a negative) judgement of the conquering wants Cordus' defense to be seen as the whole truth of the matter. As Martin and
Achaeans was precisely, Polybius claims, Phylarchus' aim, 'evidently deeming it Woodman put it at the end of their note on this passage, 'It would not have been
a historian's duty to lay stress on criminal acts' (2.61.1 -cac;napav6µouc; -c&v difficult to interpret Cordus' narrative as criticism of the principate and a call to
npa~iorov), but Polybius puts the historian himself in the dock. Similarly Lucian arms.' Indeed this is surely how Cordus' accusers presented it in the treason trial.
with Theopompus, whom he faults for making his narrative more like a prosecu- His inflammatory books, whatever the precise nuance of the metaphor in incendo,
tion speech than like a history, 47 a criticism that echoes succinctly Polybius' more got Cordus killed and the books themselves burned. This famous passage suggests
long-winded, not to say caustic, critique of the historian of Philip II (8.9-11 ). On a that the emotions aroused by historiography can be dangerously efficacious.
more sober note Polybius recommends that the historian keep the need for judge- And that brings us to the end of our consideration of emotion in the histori-
ment in view, so that a reader can feel 'legitimate pity' (EAcetv iouMyroc;)and an's audience, a category not without its perils, as we have seen, but on the whole,
48
'proper anger' (6pyH;wem 1m811K6v1:roc;). and within generically and ethically appropriate limits, an openly desiderated ef-
The last outcome of audience emotion to consider here is action, the sort of fect. 54
action, say, that Sempronius Asellio seems to want when he criticizes the narra-
( 149): '[Tacitus] arouses our sympathies in ways that are not primarily related to a reasoned
morality at all, by the use of the internal audience and enargeia. Thus, Vitelli us' standing is
improved in our eyes precisely because of the sympathy that has been generated for him'.
42 Caesar, Bellum Gallicum 5.37.4 ibi Lucius Cotta pugnans interficitur cum maxima parte 49 Sempronius Asellio F2 FRHist, Nam neque alacriores ... ad rempublicam defendundam ne-
militum. que segniores ad rem perperamfaciundam annales libri commovere quicquam possunt.
43 See Caesar, Bellum Gallicum 6.34.8 for his intent to avenge. For the combination of pity and 50 Tacitus, Annales 4.34.1 novo ac tune primum audito crimine, quod editis annalibus laudato-
anger see Marincola 2003, 295-302. que lvf. Bruto C. Cassium Romanorum ultimum dz);isset.
44 Caesar, Bel/um Gallicum 6.43.1-3, cf. 6.34.5, 8, 6.42.3. 51 Or part of the novelty. The trial also expanded the purview of maiestas to cover victims ou-
45 On this passage see Marincola 2013. tside the imperial family and to punish praise as well as libel.
46 On Phylarchus' emotional effects and Polybius' counterattack see recently Thornton 2013. 52 Tacitus, Annales 4.35.2 num ... belli civilis causa populum ... incendo?
47 Lucian, Quomodo historia conscribenda sit 59. 53 As is noted by Martin and Woodman ad loc.
48 Polybius 2.56.13. On this key passage see recently Marincola 2003, 301--302, 2010, Levene 54 Cf. Levene's conclusion 1997, 149: 'We can now see that the "audience-based" approach to
1997, 133-136,Schepens2005, 158-164. the passions is far from being inimical to historical analysis; it can lie at its very heart'.
188 Cynthia Damon Emotions as a Historiographical Dilemma 189
3 IN THE AUTHOR tus observed in the preface to the Histories, it is easy enough to understand and
compensate for the self-interested bias inherent in a work like that of Velleius, a
Emotions in the author are quite a different matter. Anger and favour, in particu- history written under Tiberius with Tiberius as its narrative telos. But something
lar, are censured. 55 Hence prefatorial protestations about the author's freedom like Herodotus' malignity, KaK0178Eta,or Tacitus' own fervour- 'er ... gltiht', said
from bias; I've quoted Tacitus' famous sine ira et studio from the Annals al- Norden (1909, 1.326) these are harder to explain. And yet emotional authors are
ready.56 In the preface to his earlier Histories Tacitus is explicit about what is at not the exception but almost the rule. One of the things that was forcefully borne
stake: in the works of prior historians, he says, in on me while I was working on this paper is how exceptional Caesar is in his
truth was crippled in many ways, first by ignorance of public affairs ..., eventually - here
avoidance of authorial emotion. Plenty of emotion-worthy events are recorded in
come the emotions - by the passion for flattery q;bidine adsentandi) or on the other hand by the commentarii, but in the face of crushing defeats, decisive victories, painful
5 betrayals, and disappointments and successes of all kinds Caesar, as both actor
hatred of the rulers (odio adversus dominantes).
and author, maintains an imperturbable surface. Other authors don't keep them-
He draws the obvious conclusion that selves on so tight a leash. 61It is worth asking why.
historians who have promised undiminished honesty (incorruptam fidem) must speak of no
58
A small point to begin with. As Horace points out in the Ars poetica (102f.,
person with favour (amore) and of each person without hatred (sine odio)' . quoted above), the easiest way to arouse emotions in your audience is to feel them
Comparably lofty standards are asserted by many a historian, and even where they yourself. He is speaking about poetry, but Aristotle had made much the same
are not made explicit one assumes that they are generically programmed. Accord- point about orators: 'the hearer always feels sympathy with the person who ex-
ing to Josephus, for example, in lamenting the fate of his country as he does in the presses emotions'. 62 Given the overlap between historiography and both poetry
Jewish War he is giving scope to an emotion, a n&0o<;, 'contrary to the law of and oratory one would expect to find historians using this technique. Josephus'
history' .59 And yet one finds in ancient and modem scholarship titles such as 'On lamentations are presumably one instance of this, and if we had more of Theo-
the Malignity of Herodotus' and 'Mendacity in Velleius', not to mention the occa- pompus' Philippic History we might have others, since .he is praised by Dionysius
60 for the pungency (mKp61:ri<;)of passages where he yields to his emotions (21tl'tp£-
sional mud-slinging on similar grounds at a whole array of historians. As Taci-
\Jf1lwt<; n&8rn1) in rebuking the injustices perpetrated by Philip and others (Epis-
tula ad Pompeium 6, 247.9-11). 63
55 For an overview of how historians address the issue of authorial bias and a discussion of
More broadly, I'll observe that authorial bias and authorial emotion are not
authorial 'friendliness' and its opposite see Marincola 1997, 158-174 and 2003, 306-308 re-
spectively. On the topic of authorial bias Luce 1989 remains fundamental, but for a useful at- co-extensive categories. Nobody has anything good to say about bias, which both
tempt to re-center the debate, at least for Roman historiography, around subjectivity see detracts from an author's credibility and reflects poorly on his character. Howev-
Heidmann 2011. Dionysius of Halicamassus suggests that Thucydidean bias against Athens er, historians often claim to share their readers' emotions. Livy's preface, for ex-
after his exile is responsible for the reprehensible arguments he assigns to the Athenian side ample, engages in a complicated negotiation on this topic. After initially pointing
in the Melian dialogue, which, Dionysius says, would cause Athens 'to be hated by all men' to a divergence between author and reader - the story of Rome's earliest days
(De Thucydide 41, 397.5). In this discussion I focus on authorial emotion visible in the narra-
relieves the author's anxiety but makes readers impatient- he evokes both parties'
tive or in reactions to it. For a discussion of emotions, especially indignatio, deployed in po-
lemical passages about fellow historians see Marincola 1997, 218-236. a
common experience of suffering in the corrupt present, period in which 'we can
56 Cf. Cicero's approving precis of a Lucceian preface (Ad familiares 5.12.3): de qua (sc. gra-
tia) suavissime quodam in prohoemio scripsisti, a qua te flecti non magis potuisse demonstras
quam Herculem Xenophontium illum a Voluptate.
57 Tacitus, Historiae 1.1.1 simul veritas pluribus modis infracta, primum inscitia reipublicae ut lybius 12.14 mKpia, and passim), Theopompus (Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Epistula ad
alienae, mox libidine adsentandi aut rursus odio adversus dominantis. The connection Pompeium 6, 246.20 ~cxaKavos), (2) resentment: Thucydides (Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
between authorial emotion (specifically, eagerness to please or hatred) and falsification is ex- Epistula ad Pompeium 3,238.19 µvnmimKoucra), (3) partiality: Philistus (Dionysius ofHali-
pressed even more directly by Josephus (Bellum Judaicum 1.2, cf. 1.6-8); see also Polybius carnassus, Epistula ad Pompeium 5, 243.3 KOJcaKtK6v);Lucian, Quomodo historia conscri-
16.14.7-8, Sallust, Bellum Catilinae 1.3.2 plerique quae delicta reprehenderis malevolent/a benda sit 7-20 is an extended rant on the flattering historiography produced by hopeful histo-
et invidia dicta putant. rians.
58 Tacitus, Historiae 1.1.3 sed incorruptam fidem profess is neque amore quisquam et sine odio 61 With some honourable exceptions, such as Thucydides. See, e.g., Hornblower 1987, l 15f. on
dicendus est. Thucydides' understated conclusion to the Sicilian expedition, 'Few out of all those many re-
59 Bellum Judaicum 1.9-12, esp. 11, rcapa 1:ov,f\s icnoptas v6µov; similarly 5.19-20. turned home' (7.87.6). Hornblower shows that tragic structure (i.e., a reversal) is per se mo-
60 'On the malignity of Herodotus' is an essay by Plutarch (Moralia 854E-874C), 'Mendacity in ving, without adornment (1987, 148). See also n. 9 above.
Velleius' a paper by Ronald Syme (AJP 99 (1978) 45-63). Mud-slinging: (1) malice: Thucy- 62 Aristotle, Rhetoric 3.7, 1408a23-25 (Hubbard translation). See further Gill 1984, esp. 155.
dides (Dionysius of Halicamassus, Epistula ad Pompeium 3, 235.3 cp0ovEpios),Timaeus (Po- 63 Polybius, as we saw earlier, thought otherwise (8.9-1 I). For discussion see Bearzot 2005.
190 Cynthia Damon Emotions as a Historiographical Dilemma 191
endure neither our vices nor the remedies for them'. 64 He posits a shared reaction But there is more to it than that: authorial emotion seems to be in some sense
to history again in Book 10, after yet another Sabine war. 'Who', says Livy, an index of an author's worth. Thucydides, who is routinely credited with an out-
'would begrudge the length of time spent on writing and reading of wars that did standing ability to depict and arouse emotion, is also credited with 'greatness of
not exhaust the men fighting them?' 65 And when at the beginning of Book 31 thought' ([Longinus] 14.1). I suspect that the two qualities are related, perhaps
Livy reports that he is happy me quoque iuvat, he says to have reached the end owing to the aforementioned link between emotion and judgement. 71 We have
of the second Punic war, one suspects that he imagines his readers to have been already considered this as a factor motivating authors to arouse their readers'
66
happy as well. The emotions that Tacitus shares with his readers are rather dark- emotions, but authors also pronounce or convey judgements of their own. Herodo-
er: tus has figured rather little in this paper because, as the ancient ctitics observe
repeatedly, emotions are not his forte. 72 He is not a particularly judgemental histo-
Were I recording with such similarity of event foreign wars and deaths on state service, sur-
feit would have mastered even me, and I would expect impatience in others, too, spurning fel- rian, either. Which makes the moment when he pronounces judgement on the man
low citizens' ends, however honourable, as dismal and unending. As it is i.e., given that he who betrayed the Greeks at Thermopylae all the more striking: 'It was Ephialtes
is providing individualized death scenes for Nero's victims - slavishJjassivity and the volume who showed the Persians the way around the mountain along the path, and I here-
of blood squandered at home weary the spirit, hobble it with sorrow. by record his guilt'. 73 This depa.iiure from Herodotus' authorial norm gives voice
The history of Nero's reign, in Tacitus' view, is likely to afflict both writer and to the emotion-based judgement that his narrative is designed to arouse, and he
reader with surfeit, impatience, tedium and sorrow: too much, too sad. 68 Such ex- takes care to show that the judgement is not just his but that of the Greek world
pressions of authorial emotion are a stylistic device, one among many, used by more generally, as represented by the Amphictyons, who condemned Ephialtes in
historians to establish a rapport with their readers, to create a commonality of ex- absentia, and by the Spartans, who rewarded his murderer (7.213). Thucydides,
pectation and experience, or at least to create a plausible and attractive authorial who is extremely judgemental, tends to let his verdict emerge from the narrative
persona. 69 At a minimum, one might say, they are meant to keep the reader read- rather than pronouncing it, but for Nicias he does register a summation: 'Of all the
ing as long as the writer kept on writing. 70 Greeks in my time he was the least deserving of this depth of misfmtune, since he
conducted his whole life as a man ofprinciple'. 74 The regret Thucydides feels for
the sorry story ofNicias' role in the Sicilian expedition is palpable, and again, it is
a shared verdict, as can be seen in Plutarch's much longer meditation on the same
64 Livy, praefatio 4-5 legentium plerisque haud dubito quin primae origines proximaque origi-
point. 75 In the Jugurthine War Sallust says he doesn't wish to pronounce a verdict
nibus minus praebitura voluptatis sint .:. ego contra hoe quoque laboris praemium petam, ut
me a conspectu malorum ... avertam and 9 haec tempora nee vitia nostra nee remedia on Sulla (whose story lies in the narrative future), but he nevertheless lets us see
pati possumus, well elucidated in Moles 1994, esp. 146-148. Livy is even willing to admit to his emotional reaction to the material (Bellum Jugurthinum 95.4): 'as for what
emotions affecting the author alone: in the preface we hear of his pleasure in telling Rome's Sulla did later, I don't know whether the tale causes more shame (pudeat) or more
story he speaks of 'love of the task I have set myself (amor negotii suscepti, praefatio 11, pain (pigeat)'.
cf. praefatio 3 iuvabit) ~ and his imagined disappointment if the work doesn't repay his ef- But historians are also conscious of the dangers inherent in this rhetorically
forts (consoler, pr. 3). And later of something close to dismay at the thought that, after wri-
effective mode of wtiting. T acitus, for example, tries to immunize readers against
ting 30 books, he still has so much Roman history left to cover: it's like walking into the
ocean --the water just gets deeper and deeper (31. I .5). the persuasive force of expressions of authorial hostility; which, he says, are 're-
65 Livy I0.31.15 quinam sit ille quem pigeat longinquitatis bellorum scribendo legendoque
quae gerentes nonfatigaverunt? cles, Pericles, Demosthenes the general, Nicias and Alcibiades (De Thucydide 8, 334.16-
66 Livy 31.1.1 me quoque iuvat, velut ipse in parte laboris ac periculi fuerim, ad finem belli 335.7). An author envious of his characters would presumably be unattractive.
Amici venisse. 70 Cf. Pausch 2011, 249: 'Halt man sich vor Augen, daB das Gesamtwerk ursprlinglich 142
67 Tacitus, Annales 16.16.1 Etiam si bella externa et obitas pro re publica mortis tanta casuum Bande umfaBte, wird deutlich, daB es sich hier sicherlich um einen kritischen Punkt bei der
similitudine memorarem, meque ipsum satias cepissel aliorumque taedium expectarem, Frage der Aufrechterhaltung der Kommunikation zwischen Autor und Leser gehandelt haben
quamvis honestos civium exitus, tristis tamen et continuos aspernantium: at nunc patient/a di.irfte'.
servilis tantumque sanguinis domi perditumfatigant animum et maestitia restringunt. 71 See, e.g., Aristotle, Rhetoric 2.1, 1378al9-22.
68 He had made much the same point earlier, about Tiberius' principate, at Annales 6.7.5, but 72 But see Lateiner 2009, 110--114, 126 for discussion of some weepy scenes.
whereas in that passage he justified himself by saying that the event he reports (others had 73 Herodotus 7.214 (Waterfield translation).
bypassed it) is 'worth knowing', here he seems to give his readers the upper hand: 'My de- 74 Thucydides 7.86.5. Hornblower ad loc. comments, before proceeding to discussion of the
fence - the only one I would ask from those who come to know these words - is that I must verdict's undeniable complexities, 'And therefore was, according to Aristotelian criteria, de-
not hate men ner·ishinP' so slackly' (reading oderim ); see also n. 36 on this difficult passage. serving of pity'.
69 Dionysius praises Thucydides for 'abstaining from envy and flattery kind, particular- 75 Plutarch, Nie/as 26.4-6. Plutarch is more critical ofNicias' death at the end of the compari-
ly in his appreciation of men of merit', in view of the fact that he gave their due to Themisto- son between Crassus and Nicias (5.2).
192 Cynthia Damon Emotions as a Historiographical Dilemma 193
ceived into eager ears'. 76 Polybius, too, specifically on the subject of manifesta- Feldherr, A. (l 998) Spectacle and Society in Livy's Hist01y, Berkeley.
tions of authorial emotion in historiographical polemic, feels that the historian Gill, C. (1984) The ethos/pathos Distinction in Rhetorical and Literary Criticism, Classical Quar-
loses more than he gains through vehemence. His whipping boy Timaeus was terly 34, 149-166.
Hammond, M., trans. (2009) 1nucydides: The Peloponnesian War, Oxford.
famously harsh towards fellow historians. According to Polybius, the rctKpta of
Greenwood, E. (2005) Thucydides and the Shaping of History, London.
Timaeus' refutations convinces some readers of his superior accuracy and judge- Heidmann, K. (2011) Sine ira et studio: Das Subjektivitiitsprinzip der romischen Geschichtsschrei-
ment (12.25c, 26d.3--4). But other readers, including of course Polybius himself, bung und das Selbstverstiindnis aniiker Historiker, Munich.
are inclined to dismiss everything Timaeus says once they realize, from closer Hornblower, S. (1987) Thucydides, Baltimore.
study, that he is guilty of inaccuracies of his own (12.26d.4-5). The only benefit - ( 1991-2008) A Commentary on Thucydides, 3 vols., Oxford.
such readers get from Timaeus' emotional protests about professional malfea- Hubbard, M. E., trans. (1972) Aristotle, in D. A. Russell and M. Winterbottom (eds.), Ancient
Literary Criticism: The Principal Texts in New Translations, Oxford, 85-170.
sance, says Polybius, is practice in debunking Timaeus (12.26d.5).
Ka!lct, L. (1999) The Diseased Body Politic, Athenian Public Finance, and the Massaere at
It is clear that emotions are involved in the whole historiographical enterprise. Mykalessos, American Journal of Philology 120, 223f.
Vividness in the depiction of emotionally charged events produces an impact on Lateincr, D. A. (2009) Tears and Crying in Hellenic Histoiiography: Dacryology from Herodotus
emotionally engaged readers, activating memory, judgement and emulation or to Polybius, in T. Fagen (ed.), Tears in the Greco-Roman World, Berlin, 105-134.
rejection - and perhaps even action. The historian's dilemma is that in every one Levene, D.S. (1997) Pity, Fear, and the Historical Audience: Tacitus on the Fall ofVitellius, in S.
of the venues discussed in this paper emotion is dangerous. In the story, if it leads M. Braund and C. Gill (eds.), The Passions in Roman 1nought and Literature, Cambridge,
128-149.
to stylistic oddities or silly inventions like 'crying over the memory of the cakes',
Luce, T. J. (1989) Ancient Views on the Causes of Bias in Historical Writing, Classical Philology
in the audience if it incurs charges of sensationalism or perpetuates the memory of 84, 16-31.
undeserving people or actions, in the author if it leads to suspicions of falsifica- Macleod, C. W. (1983) Collected Essays, Oxford.
tion. The risks are considerably higher for the historian than for other authors. Marincola, J. (1997) Authority and Tradition in Ancient Historiography, Cambridge.
After all, if a tragedian misjudges his emotional content he's just liable to be (2003) Beyond Pity and Fear: The Emotions of History, Ancient Society 33, 285-315.
called turgid ([Longinus] 3.1). But if a historian does so, he may forfeit his claim (2010) Aristotle's Poetics and 'Tragic History', in S. Tsitsiridis (ed.), llapazopryyT]µ.a:
to be a historian. Returning to Cremutius' Cordus num ... incendo one last time, I MeA8TTJ,U(X1:(X yia r:o apxafo 0iarpo 1Cp0~nµ.ryv WV m0T]y,/r:f/ I'pT]yOpT]M. LTJ<p<XKr/,
Hera-
klion, 445-460.
might say that in giving the past its emotions the historians were indeed playing --- (2013) Polybius, Phylarchus and 'Tragic History': A Reconsideration, in B. Gibson and T.
with fire. Harrison (eds.), Polybius and his World: Essays in Memory of F. W. Walbank, Oxford, 73-
90.
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Bearzot, C. (2005) Polibio e Teopompo: Osservazioni di metodo e giudizio morale, in G. Schepens
Norden, E. (1909) Die antike Kunstprosa vom VI. Jahrhundert v. Chr. bis in die Zeit der Renais-
and J. Bollansee (eds.), The Shadow of Polybius: lntertextuality as a Research Tool in Greek
sance, 2"d ed., 2 vols., Leipzig.
Historiography, Leuven, 55-71.
Paton, W.R., trans. (2010) Polybius, The Histories: Books 1-2, revised by F. W. Walbank and C.
Chaniotis, A. (2013) Empathy, Emotional Display, Theatricality, and Illusion in Hellenistic Histo-
Habicht, Cambridge MA.
riography, in A. Chaniotis and P. Ducrey (eds.), Unveiling Emotions II, Stuttgart, 53--84.
Pausch, D., ed. (2010) Stimmen der Geschichte: Funktionen von Reden in der antiken Histori-
Cornell, T. J. (ed.) (2013) The Fragments of the Roman Historians, 3 vols, Oxford.
ographie, Berlin.
Costa, D. (2005) Lucian: Selected Dialogues, Oxford.
- (2011) Livius und der Leser: Narrative Strukturen in Ab urbe condita, Munich.
Damon, C. (2010) Too Close? Historian and Poet in the Apocolocyntosis, in J. F. Miller and A. J.
Pritchett, W. K. (1975) Dionysius of Halicarnassus: On Thucydides, Berkeley.
Woodman (eds.), Latin Historiography and Poetry in the Early Empire: Generic Interactions,
de Romilly, J. (1956) La craintc dans !'oeuvre de Thucydide, Classica & Mediaevalia 17, 119-
Leiden, 49- 70.
127.
Damon, C., trans. (2012) Tacitus, Annals, London.
Rood, T. (1998) Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation, Oxford.
Davidson, J. (1991) The Gaze in Polybius' Histories, Journal of Roman Studies 81, 10-24. .
Russell, D. A. (1972) 'Longinus', On Sublimity, in D. A. Russell and M. Winterbottom (eds.),
Dewald, C. (1999) The Figured Stage: Focalizing the Initial Narratives of Herodotus and Thucyd1-
Ancient Literary Criticism: The Principal Texts in New Translations, Oxford, 460-503.
des, in T. M. Falkner et alii (eds.), Contextualizing Classics: Ideology, Performance, Dia-
Rusten, J. S. (2010) Four Ways to Hate Corcyra: Thucydides I 24-55 against the Background of
logue, Oxford, 221-252.
Odyssey 13, Herodotus III 48-53, and VII 168, in G. Rechenauer and V. Pothou (eds.), Thu-
cydides: A Violent Teacher? Gottingen, 99-114.
76 Tacitus, Historiae 1.1.2 obtrectatio et livor pronis auribus accipiuntur.
194 Cynthia Damon
Cicero, Ad Quintum fratrem 3.6.3, De virtute et gravitate Caesaris, quam in summo dolore
adhibuisset, magnam ex epistula tua accepi voluptatem.
2 Seneca, Consolatio ad Marciam 14.3 intra tertium diem imperatoria obit munia et tarn cito
dolorem vicit quam omnia solebat; Tacitus, Annales 3.6.2; for the circumstances Gelzer 1968,
146-148; for a well-articulated conception of exemplarity, Roller 2004.
3 Cicero, Tusculanae disputationes 3.70; Ad familiares, 4.6.1 (both concerning Cicero's self-
consolation); Seneca, Consolatio ad Marciam 13.3f.
196 Margaret Graver The Performance of Grief: Cicero, Stoicism, and the Public Eye 197
Cicero's technique, we find that the refusal to show emotion was only one possi- the best connections to my more specific concern with Cicero's reception of Stoi-
bility: first-century Roman culture also offered options for advancing one's influ- cism. The essential step is to consider each instance of emotional display within
ence through the performance of grief. Indeed, the prevailing tendency to valorize the tightest possible chronological frame and with the greatest possible sensitivity
self-mastery in political leaders made an occasional move in the opposite direc- to its immediate frame of reference.
tion rhetorically powerful. I argue here that Cicero was fully aware of that rhetori-
cal potential and used it for his own political and philosophical ends.
So as not to prejudge what we find in the texts, it is important to remember 1 PITY OUT OF ORDER: THE CHASTISEMENT OF CATO
that what we are studying is precisely the expression of feeling, regardless of
whether we think the feeling is sincere. I take it as axiomatic that the inner life of My first example is one among many in which Cicero claims to experience a
somebody who is dead is just not available for study. All we can look at is expres- strong emotion while delivering a speech, with obvious relevance to the case in
sion, and what a person expresses to others is not determined by inner experience: hand. This was one situation in which some display of emotion was accepted and
a highly effective expression of feeling might or might not be sincere, and deeply even expected in public life, for the effort to stir the emotions of a jury in favor of
felt emotions may or may not be expressed. Naturally this is all the more true of one's client is a standard device of the rhetorical handbooks, and a tried and true
written forms of expression, where the presumed feelings have not only been ar- means of arousing emotion in others is to express the same emotion oneself. In
ticulated but phrased as formal prose, written out or dictated to a slave, and for the this ease, the emotion is of pity, a standard type of emotional appeal that is espe-
published works also delivered to a scriptorium for copying and circulation. We cially useful when one's client happens to be guilty. This particular example holds
are dealing then with deliberate acts of self-representation, with gestures that Cic- special interest, however, because of the way it interacts with philosophical mate-
ero chooses to make toward his own emotional nature. rial in the same speech. I have in mind a passage from the Pro lvf.urena, a speech
It is my hope that in learning to read that kind of gesture we might free our- delivered during Cicero's consulship in 63. Murena, a successful candidate for the
selves from some unhelpful assumptions that have affected interpretations of Cic- next year's consulship, had been indicted on charges of electoral malpractice; his
ero' s philosophical works. Psychological readings have been accorded especially guilt seems to have been an entirely open secret. Cicero, of course, was speaking
to the Tusculan Disputations, no doubt because that work seems especially to in- for the defense. 5
4
vite them. In the Tusculans, Cicero speaks explicitly of the power grief has had The interesting moment comes just as the orator is preparing to respond to the
over him, and in that work too he makes his strongest claims for the power of phi- one really significant charge made by the prosecution, that of buying and barter-
losophy, especially Stoic philosophy, to alleviate sufferings like his. It is hardly ing votes. He means to refute this charge but first,. he has to express some per-
surprising, then, that interpreters of the treatise have been preoccupied with Cice- sonal feelings about the situation in which poor Murena now finds himself.
ro' s inner experience of grief to such an extent that the work often comes out as a
But first let me briefly voice the distress that has suddenly welled up within me at Lucius
kind of self-therapy, Cicero's way of working through his feelings about his Murena's misfortune. The distress of others, gentlemen, no less than my own daily anxieties
daughter's death earlier in the year. But understandable as these readings may be, and labors, has often in the past made me envy the peace and tranquility of those free from
they seem to me quite mistaken as to the nature of Roman literary utterance. They the pressures of ambition. Today, however, I have been so deeply moved by the extent and
pick up on the narrative Cicero creates about himself but fail to realize that it is suddenness of Lucius Murena's peril that I cannot deplore strongly enough either the situation
just that: a narrative created within a particular social, political, and philosophical in which we all find ourselves or the unhappy course that his life has taken. 6
nexus and for specific and identifiable reasons. To us, reading the written version and far removed from the situation, the device
For my purposes here it will be sufficient to concentrate on quite a small seems quite stagey, even forced. It's impossible to say, though, what Cicero's
number of examples, primarily three from among many instances of emotional actual feelings were or what he might have been able to summon up in the heat of
display in Cicero's works. These are selected not only to illustrate the range of the moment. What we do know is that it was part of his job to deliver the lines
rhetorical ends that can be served, but also because these particular examples offer
5 For the rhetoric of the speech esp. Leeman 1982 and 1986.
4 MacKendrick 1989 (164: 'In this book he tried manfully to assuage his grief for Tullia'); 6 Pro Murena 55: Sed pauca quae meum animum repente moverunt prius de L. Murenae fortu-
VVhite1995 (226: 'the entire work is in effect a sustained consolatio composed in the after- na conquerar. Nam cum saepe antea, iudices, et ex aliorum miseriis et ex meis curis ldbori-
math of grave personal loss'); Erskine I 997 (39f: 'the account of the passions in the Tuscul- busque cotidianis fortunatos eos homines iudicarem qui remoti a studiis ambitionis otium ac
ans is so coloured by Cicero's own experience that the two are virtually inseparable'); more tranquillitatem vitae secuti sunt, tum vero in his L. l'vfurenae tantis tamque improvisis pericu-
recently Lefevre 2009, 193-212; presumed textual support in Tusculanae disputationes 1.111, lis ita sum animo adfectus ut non queam satis neque communem omnium nostrum condicio-
5.121. Resistance in Graver 2002, xi-xv; cf. Gildenhard 2007, 69 n. 228, Baraz 2012, 86-95. nem neque huius eventumfortunamque miserari. Translation by Macdonald 1977.
198 Margaret Graver The Performance of Grief: Cicero, Stoicism, and the Public Eye 199
effectively. And of course he knew very well how to do that; in fact, he claims in precept 'Don't be moved by pity', they respond, 'Not so as to remit a penalty;
the Orator to have been especially proficient in the use of this very device, which nonetheless, it is praiseworthy to show some compassion' .12 Coming right after
he designates by the term of art commiseratio, the expression and evocation of Cicero's own effusion of pity, the excursus legitimates an emotion-driven vote on
• 7
pity. the part of the jury. In tum, the real or imagined feelings of pity add force to the
That much is standard enough, but in this particular work the display of dis- philosophical posturing (one can hardly call it argumentation) that Cicero uses to
tress has a further significance that becomes evident when we consider its position degrade the authority of Cato, both at the time of the speech and later on when he
within the speech. The usual place for an appeal to pity was near the end of the circulates the written version.
oration; Cicero, perhaps following Aristotle, sometimes places it earlier. 8 Here, There can be no doubt that Cicero means to create a productive tension be-
however, the move is made unusually early, before any details of the case have tween his own use of the pity defense and the Stoic ethics favored by Cato as his
even been presented, with the result that pity for Murena becomes an important opponent in the court and sometimes later within the Senate. If the rhetoric of the
theme of the defense. The emotion expressed by Cicero as defender is thus made Pro 1vfurena were not clear enough, we have also several passages from the De
to contrast with the pitiless character attributed to the principal prosecutor, Marcus Oratore, several years later, that make the same connection. The presentation of
Porcius Cato the Younger, on grounds of his interest in Stoic ethics. The connec- Stoicism in De Oratore has a number of similarities to that of the Pro 1vfurena;
tion is especially evident in the written version of the speech, where the omission the Stoic orator Rutilius Rufus appears there as a kind of surrogate Cato. The pity
of some of what Cicero actually delivered sets things up so that the philosophical defense continues to be a concern: the Stoic orators decline to use it, while Anto-
polemic follows almost immediately. nius regards it as useful and indeed necessary for success. 13 Antonius insists,
Cato is first represented as a true descendant of Cato the Elder, who had ob- moreover, that when such tactics are used, the orator should not only express the
jected without success to a famous appeal for pity by Servius Sulpicius Galba in requisite emotion, but should even feel it at a visceral level. We do not have to
149.9 Then, in an elaborate philosophical excursus, Cicero represents his opponent regard this as Cicero's authorial position; after all, Aritonius' speech is meant to
as committed to a ridiculously inflexible system that refuses to allow any role to be that of an advocatus diaboli, and we know that some years later, in Tusculan
the emotions in decision-making. A tendentious list of the precepts Cato is sup- Disputation 4, Cicero's principal speaker insists that authenticity of emotion is not
posed to have inherited from the Stoic Zeno of Citium gives special prominence needed in this situation, that feigned emotions work just as well. 14 There seem to
to the denial of pity: be multiple levels of irony here. Still, Antonius' assertions do make it clear that
The wise person is never influenced by favor, never forgives anyone's wrongdoing. Only the when Cicero makes a show of strong emotion in a speech like the Pro Murena, he
foolish and lightweight person experiences pity. It is not manly to yield to entreaty or to be is fully aware of the effect he is creating and equally aware of the philosophical
appeased. and ethical implications of doing so.
Some poor disaster-stricken people come for aid. 'You will be scandalously wicked
if you do anything for them out ofpity'. 10
By contrast, the philosophers Cicero himself admires do have room for pity in 2 GRIEF OUT OF BOUNDS: THE PASSING OF TULLIA
their scheme of ethics: they are 'moderate and well-tempered people' who 'take
after Plato and Aristotle', and they say that a good man does feel pity. 11 To Zeno's Let's leave that for the moment and turn to something that seems very different, a
very different moment in Cicero's life and a very different sort of text. The text is
an intimate personal letter, which I quote here in its entirety. On March 7 of 45,
7 Orator 128-132. about ten days after his daughter's death, Cicero writes this to Atticus:
8 Solmsen 1938 and Wisse 1989 argue for direct dependence on Aristotle in this regard. For-
tenbaugh 2005, 45 cautions that while Cicero might conceivably have read Aristotle's Rheto-
ric in a cursory manner, he can hardly have studied it carefully. A safer hypothesis is that he 12 Pro Murena 65 'A1isericordia commotus ne sis'. Etiam, in dissolvenda severitate; sed tamen
was influenced indirectly by the work through his contact with the Peripatetic tradition of rhe- est laus aliqua humanitatis.
torical training. 13 De oratore 2.189-196. Observe also the tension between Servius Sulpicius Galba and Cato
9 Pro Murena 59. the Elder in De oratore 1.227, where Sulpicius' commiseratio is criticized by Rutilius Rufus.
10 Pro Afurena 6lf: Sapientem gratia numquam moveri, numquam cuiusquam delicto ignoscere; The implied derogation of Rutilius' perspective is in keeping with the reference to Servius
neminem misericordem esse nisi stultum et levem; viri non esse neque exorari neque placari. Sulpicius Galba already in Pro l'vfurena59.
... Supplices aliqui veniunt miseri et calamitosi; sceleratus et nefarius fi,eris, si quicquam mi- 14 Tusculanae Di,mutntinnP< 4.55. Wisse 1989, 257-268 derives this entire Ciceronian dichoto-
sericordia adductus feceris. my from the philosophical rather than the rhetorical tradition, referring specifically to the
11 Pro Ii1urena 63; nostri, inquam, illi a Platone et Aristotele, moderati homines et temperati, controversy between Stoics and Peripatetics as to whether the emotions have a useful function
aiunt apud sapientem valere aliquando gratiam; viri boni esse misereri. in human life.
Margaret Graver The Performance of Grief: Cicero, Stoicism, and the Public Eye 201
200
Please see that my excuses are made to Appuleius from day to day, since a once for all excuse described Brutus' letter as ungentle, obiurgatoria: it can only have chastised Cice-
does not seem advisable. In this lonely place I do not talk to a soul. Early in the day I hide ro for unmanly conduct, mere days after his bereavement. 19 Atticus' own several
myself in a thick, thorny wood, and don't emerge till evening. Next to yourself solitude is my lett~rs n?t only ~rged a show of fortitude b~J reminded Cicero pointedly of the
best friend. When I am alone all my conversation is with books, but it is interrupted by fits of
notice his behav10r was attracting in the city. One should remember that howev-
weeping, against which I struggle as best I can. But so far it is an unequal fight. I shall answer
Brutus as you recommend. You shall have the letter tomorrow. Forward it when you have the er ~lose the friend~hip was between Atticus and Cicero, Atticus was also frequent-
opportunity.
15 ly_m c?mpany with supporters of Caesar: when Cicero writes to him of 'your
friends , he means Balbus and Oppius. 21 1
The page bleeds. The emotion certainly appears to be genuine and I have no doubt It was in this context that Cicero took the unprecedented step of composing a
16
it is genuine; Tullia had always been important to her father. Nonetheless, I consolatory letter to himself on the occasion of his own bereavement. The rhetoric
mean to argue that in this letter and in several others that are along these lines, the of this document must have been extraordinary. We don't have the text, but the
gesture toward the writer's personal feelings has a clearly identifiable rhetorical fragments and reports make it clear that this was a formal work of some erudition
purpose. The display of emotion may not be devious or artificial, but it is deliber- intended for circulation and in fact circulated, probably before the end ofMarch. 22
ate, and it is meant to influence others in accordance with Cicero's interests. In it, Cicero presented himself to his readers in two roles simultaneously, as the
Consider the situation. The customary nine-day period of mourning was over; be~eaved suf~erer and as the eloquent friend who supplies all the arguments of
Cicero was expected to resume his usual round of visits at Rome, among which philosophy, h~story, and common sense that might have efficacy against that grief.
17
was attendance at a state event for the Appuleius mentioned in the letter. Cicero He thus provided Romans with an interestingly layered self-portrait: on the one
had already asked Atticus to sign a deposition on his behalf stating that the ab- hand, h~ ~dvertised the fact of his emotional debility, answering the questions
sence was for reasons of health: for that particular obligation, emotional turmoil about his mopportune absence from public business; on the pther, he dramatized
was not a suitable excuse. Then there was the larger picture. It was March of 45. his conquest of grief, answering to the cultural imperative in favor of strength and
Caesar was in Spain, preparing for his final showdown against the republican ar- self-mastery. More obliquely, he provided evidence that grief had in fact been
mies; Rome was full of his supporters, and any move by a prominent member of mastered in the disciplined elegance of his language and in the sheer rapidity with
the Senate would immediately be noticed. In this setting the usual expectation that which he produced the work.
a man and a political leader should rise above his personal concerns had a real Yet even as he gave this demonstration to the reading public, Cicero still had
urgency to it. Atticus had already written words to this effect, as had Brutus in the need to convince his closest associates that in fact his grief had not been mastered.
letter mentioned here. Brutus' letter, and to some extent those of Atticus be- As that mo_me~tous s~ring advanced, Cicero's continued absence from the city
longed to the genre of the consolatio or consolatory epistle, the elaborate R~man was becommg mcreasmgly awkward. A long letter from Servius Sulpicius Rufus
notion of a note of condolence. We might expect such notes to be exempt from leans heavily _on ~ic~ro's commitment to public service. More specifically, it
political pressures, but that was not the case at Rome. A recent study by Amanda spells out the imphcat10ns that some would be likely to draw from Cicero's hav-
Wilcox highlights the eristic rhetoric such letters could employ as writers and re- ing exceeded the conventional period of mourning:
18
cipients negotiated their relative status in the hierarchy of virtus. Cicero later
And then, since in the pass to which we have come we must not disregard even this aspect, do
n?t let anyone sup~ose that it is not so much a daughter you are mqurning as the public pre-
15 Ad Atticum 12.15: apud Appuleium, quoniam in perpetuum non placet, in dies ut excuser dicament and the victory of others. I am ashamed to write at greater length to you on this mat-
23
videbis. in hac solitudine careo omnium conloquio, cumque mane me in silvam abstrusi den- ter, lest I seem to doubt your good sense.
sam et asperam, non exeo inde ante vesperum. secundum te nihil est mihi amicius solitudine.
in ea mihi omnis sermo est cum litteris. eum tamen interpellat jletus; cui repugno quoad pos-
sum, sed adhuc pares non sumus. Bruto ut suades, rescribam. eas litteras eras habebis. cum
erit cui des, dabis. Translation by Shackleton Bailey 1966. Circumstances in Griffin 1997, 8- 19 AdAtticum 13.6.3; cf.AdBrutum 1.9.1.
14, Mitchell 1991, 282-288. 20 AtticusinAdAtticum 12.20.1, 12.38a.l.
16 Evidence on this point is collected in Treggiari 1998. 21 'Your friends' is Shackleton Bailey's rendering for isti in Ad Atticum 13.1.3; 13.27.1 (both
17 AdAtticum 12.13.2, 12.15. May 45); compare 12.4.2 tui convivae (May 46).
18 Examples include Ad familiares 5.16, Ad Brutum 17, Ad familiares 4.5 from Sulpicius, 5.14 22 Ad Atticum 12.14.3-4 (copies being made on March 6), 12.18.2, 12.20.2 (fact-checking); the
from Lucceius (but cf. the alternative view of Shackleton Bailey ad. lac.); others are often work 1s quoted and/or mentioned as a circulated work in Tusculanae disputationes 1.66, 3.70,
mentioned, notably Ad Atticum 12.13.1 from Brutus. Frequently also for political disappoint- 3.75-76, 4.63; De divinatione 2.3.
ments, e.g. Ad familiares 4.3 to Sulpicius, 4.13 to Nigidius Figulus, 6.1 to Torquatus. See 23 Ad familiares 4.5.6 (SB 248): Denique, quoniam in earnfortunam devenimus, ut etiam huic
Wilcox 2012, 40-63; Wilcox 2005; Hutchinson 1998, 59-77; for the philosophical tradition rei nobis serviendum sit, noli committere, ut quisquam te putet non tamfiliam quam rei publi-
Graver 2002, 187-194. cae tempora et aliorum victoriam lugere. Plura me ad te de hac re scribere pudet, ne videar
202 Margaret Graver The Performance of Grief: Cicero, Stoicism, and the Public Eye 203
What exactly Sulpicius means depends in part on the date assigned to the letter. swelling while it was still fresh. I brought the force of nature to bear upon it, so that my great
25
Bailey puts it in mid-March, but only as a terminus post quem to allow for news pain would give way to the greatness of the medicine.
of Tullia's death to reach Sulpicius in Greece. If Sulpicius knows already about The reference to his earlier work puts Cicero as author in an interesting relation to
Caesar's victory at Munda, or even if he anticipates that victory, his words are his present argument. One of Chrysippus' recommendations for the therapy of
extremely pointed. He means that if Cicero fails to appear in Rome for the cele- grief had been that one should refrain from talking to the sufferer until some time
bration, he risks giving the dangerous impression that his withdrawal from public has passed. This is troped both in Cicero' s Latin and in our principal Greek
life is a gesture of disaffection. By the time the letter reached Cicero's villa at sources as 'allowing the swelling to subside' .26 The Consolatio S~i, circulated so
Astura, the implication was there to be drawn in any case. Atticus will have made soon after Tullia's death, declined to follow this recommendation, and yet was
the same point in his letters, and Cicero's old friend Lucius Lucceius says some- effective: 'so that my great pain would give way to the greatness of the medicine'.
thing similar, when he writes not long afterward of how Cicero's absence is actu- Cicero's earlier venture in self-consolation thus presents a contradiction to the
ally doubling his problems. With these pressures acting upon him, it was quite Stoic material he is expounding.
prudent of Cicero to insist to Atticus and to all of these friends that in fact his Now, for those who want to read the Tusculan Disputations as a kind of self-
grief for Tullia was still extreme and inconsolable. 24 If he could convince these directed therapy, Cicero working through his feelings for Tullia and for his loss of
close associates that his delay was owing to personal rather than political griefs, political power, this reference to the Consolatio Sui is an important exhibit. But
they would convince others, and Cicero would have the time he wanted for griev- should we in fact read the passage in that way? To my mind, the point is quite
ing, or for writing, or for planning his next move. different. Cicero does not project any present emotional turmoil in the way he did
in the previous two examples. He speaks of his grief now as a thing of the past, as
a great enemy but one he has conquered. He offers the world an image of his pre-
3 CAESAR OUT OF BOUNDS: THE SORROWS OF TUSCULUM sent self as a man healed through his own devices, in control of every argument
philosophy can supply and able to purvey that powerful medicine to others. In
Let's now move forward another five months, to late summer of 45 and the com- fact, he is better at this task than the Greek philosophers he has read: he can cri-
position of the five Tusculan Disputations. This time, Cicero's gesture toward his tique their methods, and he can succeed at a task the supreme Stoic philosopher
own emotional weakness has substantial philosophical context. Books 3 and 4 of thought impossible.
the treatise offer a lengthy and rather technical analysis of the causation of occur- With that said, this is still a kind of emotional display. Cicero does make a
rent emotions, treating first grief and then all types of emotion including grief. For point of reminding his readers of his personal emotional experience, and he does
the most part, the argumentation is modeled on that of the Stoic Chrysippus of speak of that experience as having been extremely painful. Why mention those
Soli, insisting that emotions of the kind with which we are familiar are inherently feelings at all? One answer might be that having circulated the Consolatio Sui,
wrong, because they are causally dependent on false beliefs about the value of Cicero felt he needed to acknowledge its existence, so that it would not seem to
externals. Within the lecture format of this work, quite different from that of the undermine his present point about the available methods of consolation. But the
Academica and the De Finibus, Cicero allows his authorial figure to advocate reference also makes a positive contribution to the argument of the Tusculan Dis-
quite forcefully for this position, with only brief reminders of his usual Academic putations. It will be remembered that in the Pro Murena, Cicero appears to have
stance. At two points, however, he intervenes in his essentially Stoic discussion set up a display of his own pity in opposition to the rigid and unrealistic Stoicism
with references to his personal experience of grief as addressed in the Consolatio
Sui: at Book 3, sections 75-76 and again at Book 4 section 63, both in the context
of strategies for consolation. As the rhetoric is essentially the same in both in- 25 Tusculanae disputationes 4.63: Etsi aegritudinis sedatio et hesterna disputatione explicata est
et in Consolationis libro, quern in media - non enim sapientes eramus - maerore et do/ore
stances, I treat here only the Book 4 passage. Cicero writes,
conscripsimus; quodque vetat Chrysippus, ad recentis quasi tumores animi remedium adhibe-
But the means of calming distress have been explained already, both in yesterday's discussion re, id nos fecimus naturaeque vim attulimus, ut magnitudini medicinae doloris magnitudo
and in my Consolation, which I composed in the midst of sorrow and pain, not being a wise concederet. Translation in Graver 2002. Compare Tusculanae disputationes 3.75-76: Sunt
person myself. I did what Chrysippus says one should not do: applied a remedy to the mind's etiam qui haec omnia genera consolando colligant - alius enim alio modo movetur - ut Jere
nos in Consolatione omnia in consolationem unam coniecimus; erat enim in tumore animus,
et omnis in eo temptabatur curatio.
prudentiae tuae diffidere. Translation in Shackleton Bailey 1977, vol. 2; the discussion of its 26 Cicero's tumor in this context corresponds to what Chrysippus in his treatise On Emotions
date is in Shackleton Bailey 1977, vol. 2,415. calls phlegmone or 'inflammation' (apud Galen, PHP 4.7.26-27 SVF 3.467; Origen,
24 Adfamiliares 4.6 to Sulpicius (mid-April), Ad Atticum 12.38a, 12.40, 12.41 (early May); 5.15 Against Celsus 8.51 = SVF 3.474). The metaphor is also a commonplace of the consolatory
to Lucceius (early May). tradition: ps-Plutarch, Consolatio ad Apollonium 102a-b. See Graver 2002, 123, 189f, 205.
204 Margaret Graver The Performance of Grief: Cicero, Stoicism, and the Public Eye 205
of his opponent Cato. Here we have a similar interaction between emotional dis- munication took place in August, again about the Cato pamphlets. This was out-
play and philosophical argument, but working in the opposite direction. The de- wardly cordial, with the two authors complimenting one another's style but of
tailed account of the Stoic position has sought to show that the Stoics have good course the compliments did nothing to mask the realities of the situation. 32
reasons for seeking to eliminate the emotions, that their view is well argued, can Let us try then to read the grief of the Tusculans within the context of these
handle all the usual objections, and is psychologically realistic. Within this project mutually uncompromising negotiations, considering first the passage from Book 4
it is quite useful to Cicero to be able to refer to a real-life emotional crisis and to and then the more generally consolatory or self-consolatory nature of the work.
claim from a first-personal perspective, as it were, that the consolations of philos- As to the Book 4 passage, surely we ought to read it against Caesar's letter of
ophy are efficacious. Moreover the somewhat heroic self-positioning that puts consolation and of a piece with the dedication to Brutus rather than to Caesar.
Cicero's own consolation above and beyond the recommendation of Chrysippus Brutus had already received the dedications of four Ciceronian treatises; he didn't
tends a fortiori to make the Stoic approach appealing to the ordinary person. If the need another. But even if Cicero was unwilling to honor Caesar with a work of
fortitude of Cicero himself seems unattainable, one can still follow the advice of this nature, he could still have balanced that refusal with some kind of reference to
Chrysippus, which seems quite reasonable by comparison. Caesar's effort at consolation, here at the point in his work where it would have
We thus have a way to read Cicero's display of grief in relation to the philo- been appropriate. He could have observed, conventionally and in accordance with
sophical argument conveyed in his work. We are not finished, however. Remem- Chrysippus' views, that it is advantageous for the consolatio to arrive after a lapse
bering the political tensions of the period following Tullia's death, it is reasonable of time (like five months). He could have remarked on how wonderful it is to have
also to consider whether this backward glance at Cicero's period of mourning words of comfort spoken by great leaders who pardon the vanquished and rein-
might not convey a message to the current political regime. We know that the vent the calendar. But he does not say any of those things. Instead, he refers back
Caesarians were deeply interested in Cicero's literary activities in this period and to his own work of consolation, speaking of it as premature and yet effective.
were in contact with him about them. Caesar' s lieutenants Hirtius and Pansa had There is nothing openly defiant in this, but when the full story is known, the note
practiced disputation with Cicero at his villa the previous summer; as Ingo of obstinacy is evident.
Gildenhard points out, the setting and format of the Tusculan Disputations seem That same note of obstinacy can also be heard in the Tusculan Disputations as
to refer to that rather uncomfortable teacher-student relationship. 27 Then during a whole, when we consider how Cicero's choice of themes projects a larger narra-
the summer of 45, Cicero had been engaged in a series of tight-lipped negotiations tive of grief and consolation with himself as the protagonist. The point of that
with the Caesarians about his writings. His eulogy for Cato had certainly attracted narrative comes clear finally in a scalding passage in Book 5.
their attention; first Hirtius and then Caesar himself had circulated pamphlets What benefit it might bring to others I cannot very well say; but for my own very bitter sor-
meant to refute it.28 Then in early summer, with urging from Atticus and Brutus, rows, son;3ws of many kinds assailing me from every side, there was no other consolation to
0
Cicero had drafted a short work addressed to Caesar in the format of the Hellenis- be found.
tic 'letters to princes'. The draft had been shown to Oppius and Balbus and revi-
Coming from the author of the Consolatio Sui, it is inevitable that these words
sions suggested, but these were revisions Cicero was unwilling to make, and the
will be referred to the author's personal bereavement and recovery process. But
matter was dropped. 29 Later in the summer, however, Cicero received one more
the frame has now been broadened. The words 'sorrows of many kinds assailing
letter of consolation, this time from Caesar's own pen. 30 It seems that Caesar still
me from every side' cannot refer merely to a singular and private misfortune.
wanted Cicero to write something in his honor, for just one week later, Brutus
Spoken thus and within the formal and public venue of utterance, they transform
appeared at Cicero's villa with exactly that suggestion. This was just as Cicero
was beginning to plan the Tusculans, so that it would have been convenient for the story of Cicero' s grief as a father into that of his grief as a public figure. It is
him to address that work to the dictator; but again, this was a gesture he did not as if he had erected a statue of himself in grieving posture right in the middle of
the Forum. The message, then, is that Cicero the statesman has experienced ills
wish to make, and the work was given instead to Brutus himself. 31 Further corn-
for which Caesar has not provided any consolation, which can only be consoled
by philosophy and that would now be Stoic philosophy and that would be Ca-
27 Adfamiliares 9.16.7, 7.33.1; Gildenhard 2007.
to 's philosophy.
28 Cicero's anxiety about the Cato is evident already in summer and fall of 46 (Ad Atticum
12.4.2, 12.5.2, Orator 35). The matter is still very much a concern in May of 45 (Ad Atticum
12.40.1, 12.41.4, 12.44. l ).
29 The work was referred to in Greek as the Sumbouleutikon: Ad Atticum 12.40.2, 13.26.2, 32 AdAtticum 13.46.2, 13.50.J, 13.51.1.
13.1.3, 13.27.1, 13.28.2-3, 13.31.3 (all in May of 45). 33 Tusculanae disputationes 5.121: Quantum ceteris profuturi sumus non facile dixerim, nostris
30 AdAtticum 13.20.l. quidem acerbissimis doloribus variisque et undique circumfusis molest/is alia nu/la potuit in-
31 Ad Atticum 13.44.1. veniri levatio.
206 Margaret Graver
BIBLIOGRAPHY
I offer here many thanks to the editors of this volume for the invitation to speak at the confe-
rence at which it originated, to my hosts in Geneva for their generous hospitality, and to the
audience and speakers for stimulating questions and discussion.
2 This is, of course, not the place to discuss the role of the goddess Spes in Augustan thought
and iconography; for entry into the bibliography, see Fears 1981, Clark 1983, andLIMC s.v.
spes.
208 Laurel Fulkerson The Vagaries ofHope in Vergil and Ovid 209
First, to outline the semantic range of hope (or rather, the Latin words spero same time, there are narrative voices in the History that also emphasize hope's
and spes): like any good Latinist, I start with Greek. Elpis and elpizo, the Greek potential to save the day, when it is buttressed by careful planning (and a good
equivalents of spes and spero, carry a pretty broad semantic range: they can mean amount of luck); while hopeful individuals and city-states sometimes make terri-
hope, but also things more like expect, or even think; they can also be used for ble mistakes of judgement, those without hope never prevail.
things one believes might happen but does not want to happen (i.e., they can be Spes is, it seems, similarly double-edged, as is suggested by the fascinating
roughly equivalent to the English 'fear'), or even for things one feels fairly secure sixty-six line elegiac poem De Spe, which comes to us as part of the Senecan cor-
about (i.e, they can mean 'confidence'). That said, the notion seems to be pro- pus and details the myriad ways in which hope deceives people into continuing on
foundly ambiguous from the start: the noun first appears, of course, in Hesiod, in in situations they ought to find intolerable. But here again, that is only one side of
conjunction with Pandora's jar, Opera et dies 96 where it is seemingly classed the picture. As with many emotions described in narrative contexts, elpis and spes
with the evils - but that passage itself is by no means easy to interpret. 3 Essential- often serve as an index of the story as a whole. You can tell a lot about characters
ly, the question there centers around why, when Pandora opens the pithos and all in a story (and perhaps also in real life) by what they hope, and whether their
of the evils fly out of it into the world to punish humanity, elpis remains inside. hopes are fulfilled. Perhaps not surprisingly, it is often the case that those who are
Many have argued that its presence inside the pithos mirrors its presence in us, but favored by the narrator tend to hope for things they deserve, and so they get them.
it is unclear whether this is a boon or a further punishment (i.e. does human elpis And villains regularly have their hopes dashed.
mitigate the other evils, or make them even worse?). My first point, which may or may not be controversial, is that in narrative
Perhaps the most important part of the problem is its ambiguity; we seem to contexts, hope functions as a kind of road-marker, helping us to figure out where
have one noun with two aspects (this may be something like Hesiod's good and we are going. Hope sometimes foreshadows things that will happen, or alterna-
bad eris). Sometimes, hope is all people have and it helps them to soldier on tively, it points away from the story, raising expectations in .the reader soon to be
through difficulties. But at other times, it simply prolongs human agony; recog- dashed. 6 The emotion of hope is, of course, more complicated, and certainly more
nizing that things are not going to get better on their own may be the first neces- interesting, than this, especially in Ovid, but for the purposes of this study, we will
sary step to ameliorating them yourself. Note that elpis has already become rather focus primarily on its narrative role.
complicated, including, especially, the fact that its status depends on the reality of Before discussing Vergil and Ovid, I also want to address, briefly, the ques-
the situation. And any Greek could tell you that human beings are not nearly as tion of whether hope and its ancient equivalents are in fact emotions. There are
competent as they think they are at judging reality. certainly cases that make the question a legitimate one, especially when hope in-
I take one other quick Hellenic sounding: in Thucydides elpis tends to be a volves an accurate assessment ofreality. So, for instance, we might say that I have
marker of how bad things really are. Take, for instance, the pithy statement at good hopes of being able to conquer my enemies because my forces and position
4.108.4: are vastly superior - and here, we might simply be saying that it seems i.e., it
dco86'm; Ol &v8pro1tototi µi-:v em8uµoumv €AJtt()l arcrptcrKerc,;qitho6vm, o 61: µ11
would also seem to any reasonable observer fairly likely that I will conquer
rcpocrirvmt Jcoyl<l'µip
a.v1:0Kp1hopt6tro8tcfo8m. them. At the same time, and crucially, my own assessment of reality is in part
Men are wont to entrnst what they desire to unreflecting hope, and to push aside with sover- colored by emotion: I 'have good hopes' not only because I think that I am likely
4
eign reason what they do not want. to conquer, but because I want to do so. I might, however, also have good hopes
although my forces and position are not vastly superior, because I really want to
Earlier in the narrative, the Corinthians had characterized the Athenians as
conquer, and I know that the troops want to do so, or because I know that if we
euelpides (l.70.3): this might have seemed like a good thing, as it made them re-
lose our city will be destroyed, or even because I have misjudged or been misin-
silient, but as the war, and the narrative, continue, and especially in the Mytilene-
formed about the situation and believe I cannot lose. And, of course, the other side
an debate and the Sicilian expedition, we begin to see that hope regularly leads
may also have hopes, which may derive from good reasons, e.g. that they have set
people to behave rashly because it impedes their perceptions of reality. 5 At the
an ambush, or expect reinforcements at any moment, or they may not. And one's
perception of reality in turn colours one's emotions: if I think 1 have no real
3 The bibliography on this controversial passage is vast; see West 1978 and Verdenius 1985 ad chance of winning, it is difficult to be hopeful. In part because of its inherent un-
loc. The discussion continues at Adams 1932, Kerschensteiner 1944, Greene 1945, Schrijen predictability and innumerable complicating factors, war is a situation in which all
1965, 16-41, Neitzel 1976, Noica 1984, and Komomicka 1990.
4 Translations throughout are my own.
5 Interestingly, Thucydides' statement fits in well with the modem notion of the confirmation
bias, wherein people tend to find more plausible evidence that supports already-held theories, 6 On techniques used by epic poets for foreshadowing, see Duckworth 1933, 6-27 (20-22 on
and to discount as implausible that which does not. hope and fear), and on false foreshadowing, l 13f.
210 Laurel Fulkerson The Vagaries of Hope in Vergil and Ovid 211
parties involved, however implausibly, might feel hope, and this is reflected by its with the potential of future evil and good. 9 One of the particular difficulties of
frequency in ancient sources in battle contexts. hope namely, that of deciding whether and when it is 'reasonable' or 'justifia-
Conversely, hope may seem more like an emotion and less like a thought the ble', is also applicable to fear, though there seems to be somewhat less attention to
more improbable its object of fulfillment (I'm hoping to win the race next week, baseless fears than to baseless hopes in ancient literature as a whole. Furthermore,
although I haven't really trained for it), and this slippage is important, as it helps it is tempting to base our judgements about whether hope and fear are appropriate
to explain the negative aspects of the ancient assessment of it. Where modern a on the result (irrational fears are those which do not come about; well-founded
thinker sees hope as useful in inculcating perseverance in difficult circumstances, hopes are those which come true) but this is to prejudice the inquiry. In any
ancient Greeks and Romans seem more likely to see hope as deriving from false case, hope is similar enough to an emotion, if it is not actually one, that the theo-
belief, and so as impeding an accurate understanding of the world. But hope can- retical models developed for the study of the emotions in antiquity can usefully be
not automatically be deemed unrealistic simply because it is unfulfilled, or vice- deployed in examining it.
versa: as every human being knows, the most plausible and successful-seeming
plans can be thwarted by circumstance, and the pleasing narrative in which an
underdog beats the odds does actually occur in real life. The disjunction between 1 VERGIL'S AENETD
expectation and reality, in fact, is what creates much of the drama of human exist-
ence, and the emotional aspects of that gap are well worth further attention. The Aeneid is, among other things, a poem about the fmmding of Rome, but it
Aristotle's brief but illustrative discussions of elpis suggest that it is, at least casts that past event into the future, and so hope plays a significant role in the ep-
some of the time, close enough to an emotion to be considered one. 7 The extreme- ic: throughout the narrative, spes is a primary marker of Rome's future glory, fo-
ly frequent occurrence ofspes and metus together, as alternative choices, through- calized in a number of different ways and with a number of different effects. The
out Latin literature, suggests that Romans too would not have found it preposter- first appearance of spes in the poem comes early, and is characteristic of one of its
ous to think of spes as an emotion. 8 It is even possible to come up with an Aristo- primary roles: 10 Aeneas is putting a good show on for his men, pretending that he
telian-type schema for hope (although no such thing appears in Aristotle): if pain believes they are better off than he really thinks they are (1.208-209):
and pleasure are the emotions associated with present evil and good, and fear and Talia uoce refert curisque ingentibus aeger
joy are associated with future evil and good, then worry and hope are associated spem vultu simulat
he said these words, sick with massive distress but feigning hope on his face.
In this context, spes seems to be a good thing, even though (perhaps because) it is
7 Aristotle discusses elpis in a variety of contexts: in addition to the 'Duteh courage' variety
false; it encourages the men to go on. And it makes up, at least in part, for Aene-
brought by alcohol (Ethica Eudemia 1229al8-20, Nicomachean Ethics Ill 7al5, Problems
955al-5), he points out that the truly brave man remains eourageous even without hope in a as' outburst during the storm (1.94-102), which, at least implicitly, suggested
shipwreck, whereas sailors are hopeful merely because of experience (Nicomachean Ethics despair. The picture offered is one of a good leader, who motivates his followers
l l 15b3; see further discussion through 1117), notes that good men have good hopes for the toward their shared goal. But, as O'Hara 1990 points out, this is a disturbing mo-
future, and wieked have the expectation of further bad deeds (Nicomachean Ethics l l 66a-b; ment precisely because Aeneas does not really believe that they have a chance; he
elpis is regularly connected by Aristotle to tharros ), points out that pleasures such as smell, is deliberately misleading his men. Readers know it will all work out, so raising
memory and hope have no corresponding pain (Nicomachean Ethics ll 73bl9), observes that
false hope may be justified here by the result - indeed, perhaps it even helps to
the female of every speeies is less courageous and more inclined to despair (duselpi) than the
male (History of Animals 608b12) and that cold climates tend to produce hopeful individuals bring about the result. At the same time, the fact that the first use of hope is de-
(Problems 910a31), while youth makes people more hopeful (Rhetoric 1389a-1390a), speeu- ceptive raises troubling questions about the role spes will play in the poem.
lates that a science of expectation (elpistike) could exist (De memoria 449bll-12), and defi- Aeneas receives a series of prophecies about the Trojan future in Italy which,
nes arete as concerned with bodily pains and pleasures, either in the present, or in the past, or as O'Hara has noted, regularly leave out important information. Not all of his 'de-
in expectation (elpis, Physics 247a9-l3; et:further discussion of past and future pleasures at ceptive prophecies' center on spes, but a good number do. O'Hara's work is much
Rhetoric 1370a-b ). He also notes that things people want tend to seem more plausible to them
(Rhetoric 1378a3), the point made above by Thucydides, and identifies a category of reaso-
nable or justifiable hope (elpidi epieikei, Rhetoric 1380b5). So Aristotle, while never defining
hope as an emotion, is clearly willing to grant it a related status, and to treat it as if it is one. 9 As Bill Fortenhaugh points out to me, Aristotle may not treat elpis as an emotion precisely
See too Leighton 1988, 96f. on the subject of hope in Aristotle. because he does not see it as intrinsieally tied to action (and this may also help to provide an
8 The issue is less clear in Latin, because it does not contain as much diseussion of emotions as explanation for why aneient authors are suspicious ofit).
emotions. But fear is usually considered to be one of the very most basic emotions, present in 10 The noun spes is more frequent than the verb spero, 46:22. It is perhaps noteworthy that the
all humans; so its co-presence with hope suggests that we may think of the two as analogous. verbs cluster around Dido and Aeneas.
212 Laurel Fulkerson The Vagaries of Hope in Vergil and Ovid 213
11
more detailed than I can be here, and has a different emphasis. But one of his He hid the deed for a long time, and wicked man, pretending much, cheated the lovesick
most important points for our purposes is that the net result of prophetic omissions woman by an empty hope.
and misdirections is to manipulate Aeneas' emotions in order to keep him focused Here there is no positive future: Dido has been deceived by the hope encouraged
on his mission in spite of himself: he is hopeful where he should be wary, and by her brother. So too, when she welcomes Aeneas into Carthage (1.451f.):
despairing just where things are, in fact, not so bad. This is well beyond the delu-
primum Aeneas sperare salute
sive capacity of human beings to hope for what they want, for Aeneas is regularly ausus et adjlictis melius conjidere rebus
misled, and becomes almost a plaything of the gods. 1
Aeneas first dared to hope for safety, and to trust in better things despite his damaged for-
The second appearance of spes in the poem occurs at 1.217-221: tunes.
amissos longo socios sermone requirunt, This hope is at first manifested, but only in the short term, and it brings terrible
spemque metumque inter dubii, seu uiuere credant consequences for Dido and for Roman history. Ilioneus offers the suggestion that
siue extrema pati nee iam exaudire uocatos
[Aeneas' men] yearn for their comrades in long conversation, hesitating between hope and
the gods care about human life, delivering the menacing warning (1.543f.):
fear, whether they should believe them alive or suffering the end and no longer hearing their si genus humanum et mortalia temnitis arma,
names called. at sperate deos memores fandi atque nefandi
If you think light of offending against the race of men and mortal arms, still, expect the gods
It will tum out that they are nearly all alive; we might believe that the hope is
to be mindful ofright and wrong.
therefore justified (or at least, more justified than their fear), but in fact, both
make sense within the narrative context of the poem, which will bear witness to Here again, this is a pleasing enough sentiment, but we will be provided with am-
vast quantities of suffering and death. This use of spes is particularly vague, but ple evidence that the gods of this poem have only limited interest in right and
also resonates with real life, since the future will bring, for pretty much everybody wrong (see below, pp. 216f.).
in the poem (let alone out ofit), both things to hope for and things to fear, in some In Book 2, Sinon lyingly assures the Trojans (2.137, 2.162f.):
admixture - and the important details of how much of each, and when, are nor- nee mihi iam patriam antiquam spes ulla uidendi [. ..}
mally unknown. As with the prophecies that focus only on the positive, omitting omnis spes Danaum et coeptifiducia belli
the negative, hope misleadingly provides only a part of the full story (and, inci- Palladis auxiliis semper stetit.
dentally, heightens the narrative tension, resolved when we discover that the men I have no hope now of seeing my old homeland. [ ... ] All the hope of the Greeks, and their
are alive). On the other hand, in Book 7, a chance remark by Iulus reminds Aene- trust in the war they began, lay in help from Pallas.
as of a prophecy delivered by his father (7 .124-126): Pallas, he falsely claims, has turned against them. Finally, he says (2.169f.):
cum te, nate, fames ignota ad litora uectum ex ilia flu ere ac retro sublapsa referri
accisis coget dapibus consumere mensas, spesDanaum
tum sperare domos defessus. From that time, the hope of the Greeks, ebbing, receded.
Son, when hunger forces you, carried to an unknown shore, to eat your tables because of a
shortage of food then, worn out, hope for a home. This deceptive use of spes is particularly sophisticated irt its implicit irony: Sinon
assures the Trojans that the Greeks have hoped for divine assistance in vain (thus
When it happens, this is not nearly as bad as it seemed; the incident is instantiated
providing an example, perhaps, of why it would be safer for the Trojans not to
in the first historically recorded open-faced sandwich.
rely on hope - although this is not the lesson they gain from it). But his utterance,
Sometimes hope is even more ominous, as when Dido's brother killed her
paradoxically, is also designed to encourage the Trojans to hope (again, in vain,
husband Sychaeus (1.35lf.): although of course they do not know this). Here we see another troubling aspect
factumque diu celauit et aegram of hope, in that one can deceptively inculcate it in another, to further one's own
mu/ta malus simulans uana spe lusit amantem ends.
Tumus provides one of the poem's main exemplars of deluded hope. First, in
Book 9, the ships of the Trojans are turned back into nymphs. This might seem
11 See especially his remarks about Aeneid l.208f. on p. Sf., on 1.261-290 at p. 135, on 1.450- like a positive omen for them, but Tumus interprets it as follows (9.130f.):
452 at p. 36f., on 3.254-257 at p. 25f., on 4.477 at p. 136f., on 9.131 at p. 75, and on 11.49-
52 at p. 48. For Aeneas, the poem is a series of 'cycles of hope followed by disappointment, ergo maria inuia Teucris,
followed by divine or other encouragement that leads to renewed hope' (1990, 61). For tho- nee spes ulla fugae
rough discussion of the prophecies of the Aeneid, see Moore 1921, 133-142. And so, the seas are pathless for the Trojans, and they have no hope of flight.
214 Laurel Fulkerson The Vagaries of Hope in Vergil and Ovid 215
He concludes his speech, after noting that the Trojans have already been defeated aut qua spe inimica in gente moratur
(9.157f.): nee prolem Ausoniam et Lauinia respicit arua?
With what hope does Aeneas tarry among a hostile people, and pay no attention to the race of
laeti bene gestis corpora rebus Ausonia and Lavinian fields?
procurate, uiri, et pugnam sperate parari
Be happy, men; refresh yourself after your deeds well done, and expeet to prepare for war. This is rephrased by Mercury in his speech to Aeneas (4.271):
Later, Turnus misinterprets developments on the battlefield (10.647f.): aut qua spe Libycis teris otia terris?
With what hope do you waste your time in Libyan l.ands?
tum uero Aenean auersum ut cedere Turnus
credidit atque animo spem turbidus hausit inanem. This almost sarcastic use of spes contributes to our understanding of Aeneas, who
Turnus thought Aeneas had yielded, and drank in this empty hope. in faet clearly did hope that he was beginning a new life in Carthage, and did not
conceive of himself as wasting time. He is told, once again, that he is wrong, and
His misplaced hope in turn causes further misjudgements. In a speech to the Lat-
must therefore re-form his hopes.
ins, he asserts (ll.436f.):
This interchange, of course, causes Aeneas to make plans to leave Carthage
non adeo has exosa manus Victoriafugit (4.29lf.):
ut tanta quicquam pro spe temptare recusem
Victory has not so wholly fled from me that I refuse to dare anything for my hopes. optima Dido
nesciar et tantos rumpi non speret amores
It is not long before (12.324f.): Generous Dido does not know, nor expects the rupture, ofso strong a love.
Turnus ut Aenean cedentem ex agmine uidit, She discovers his plans and confronts him (4.305f.):
turbatosque duces, subita ardet
Turnus, when he saw Aeneas withdrawing, burned with a sudden hope. dissimulare etiam sperasti, perfide, tantum
posse tacitusque mea decedere terra?
This of course, the final, and fatal, delusion practiced upon Turnus. Here it is Wretch, did you really hope to hide such a foul erime, and to succeed in on the sly
important not merely that Turnus has hopes that will be unfulfilled; their disap- from my land?
pointment is central to the development of the narrative, creating and relieving Aeneas responds (4.337f.):
tension in a number of ways (and this is true whether we ultimately sympathize
with Turnus' cause or not). neque ego hanc abscondere fi,rto
speraui (ne finge) fugam
Narratively speaking, the Aeneid's misleading prophecies and signs at the
I did not expect - and do not think it - to hide my departure.
very nature and function of hope, which turns out to be an interpretive frame that
we place around our guesses about the future. This is made all the clearer by the Dido, in tum, curses him (4.382-384):
fact that so many of Aeneas' hopes, as well as those of others in the poem, are spero equidem mediis, si numina possunt,
either shown to be inappropriate or are fulfilled in unexpected ways. Some of this supplicia hausurum scopulis et nomine Dido
derives from the fact that Aeneas is misled by the gods, but some of it inheres in saepe uocaturum
the nature of hope itself. Because hope focuses on future events, it cannot, by def- I hope that, if the gods have any power, you will drink your punishment on the middle of the
inition, have a seeure basis. We can only try to eompare present circumstances to rocks, often calling Dido by name.
other similar situations in the past, and engage in imaginative reconstruction. This, of course, precedes her more formal curse later. Dido then deceptively tells
In a way less immediately obvious, but more pregnant for Roman history, Di- her sister (4 .4 l 9f.):
do's amatory hopes are also dangerous. First, her sister Anna (4.54f.):
hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem,
His dictis impenso animum flammauit amore et perferre, soror, potero.
spemque dedit dubiae menti If I have been able to expeet such a pain, sister, so too can I endure it.
She fanned the queen's soul into lavish flame with her words, and put hope in her wavering
mind. With these words, and in the rest of her speech, we are told (4.477):
Dubia mens, I think, gives us an important clue: Dido really does know better, at maestam dictis adgressa sororem
consilium uultu legit ac spemfronte serenat
least partly. Interestingly, however, she does not hope alone: the queen's hopes
She speaks to her mourning sister with an expression that hides her plan and wears serene
and expectations are interwoven with those attributed to Aeneas. When Jupiter hope on her face.
sends Mercury to Aeneas to remind him that it is time to go, he says (4.235f.):
216 Laurel Fulkerson The Vagaries of Hope in Vergil and Ovid 217
Here, in fact, her behavior mirrors that of Aeneas in Book 1. The disappointed seek his ancient mother, which will enable the 'house of Aeneas' to rule over all
hopes of both parties to this ill-fated romance end, on the one side in loneliness lands. Aeneas and his men are uncertain what to make of this, but his father An-
and frustration, and on the other in suicide and a curse that brings the Punic wars. chises interprets the prophecy (3.103):
Dido's immediate hope, however, that Aeneas will drown with her name on his
audite, o proceres, ait et spes discite uestras
lips, must go unfulfilled. Hear, princes, and learn your hopes.
As we will also see with Ovid, being mortal does not uniquely qualify one to
have one's hopes frustrated. Juno is the god in the poem most associated with The men are to sail to Crete, which is gentis cunabula nostrae, the cradle of our
hope, and her hopes are fated to be disappointed. Jupiter speaks to her thrice using race (I 05). This is all well and good, and it certainly cheers the men up, but An-
the vocabulary of hope. On the first occasion, he explains (10.107f): chises is incorrect in his interpretation (as a dream soon informs Aeneas). The
men eventually (and unexpectedly, insperata, 3.278) arrive at Buthrotum, where
quae cuique estfortuna hodie, quam quisque secat spem,
Tros Rutulusne fuat, nullo discrimine habebo
Helenus and Andromache rule. They then make landfall in Italy, and see four
Whatever is the fortune for each today, whatever hope each man follows, I will make no dis- white horses. Anchises interprets this omen too: the horses will bring war (since
tinction. horses are battle-animals), but there is perhaps hope of peace too, spes et pacis,
(since horses are also used in farming, 3.543). For Anchises, the war seems cer-
Later in the same book, he tells her (10.625-627): tain, the peace less so. The interpretation of this omen is not precisely misleading
sin altior istis in O'Hara's sense, but it is somewhat lame as a prediction, since all wars eventu-
sub precibus uenia ulla latet totumque moueri ally end in peace. And it is not at all clear how it is useful for Aeneas to know
mutariue putas helium, spes pascis inanis. about this impending war so far in advance.
If you think by your prayers to alter the war, you feed an empty hope.
There is a third significant kind of hope in the poem, introduced first in Book
She does, of course, hope for this, and in fact continues to interfere. Near the end 1, that of the hope which future generations bring. 12 This is a somewhat more neu-
of the poem, Jupiter obtains Juno's final, semi-willing consent to the combination tral hope than many, insofar as it is not always explicitly assumed that offspring
of Trojans and Latins to make the Roman people. Early in the speech, he asks her will improve upon their parents. In the poem, this sort of hope is for the most part
(12.796): focalized in two young characters, Aeneas' son Ascanius/Iulus and Evander's son
aut qua spe gelidis in nubibus haeres?
Pallas. Its first appearance, also in the mouth of lloneius, proclaims that Iulus is
What hope do you cling to? not the only potential future for the Trojans (1.556):
[sin] nee spes lam restat Juli
The goddess' hope seems quite a lot like Aeneas' in Carthage, fondly held but
If our hopes no longer live in Iulus ...
ultimately impossible. Venus, by contrast, seems to offer a more positive face of
divine hope: while she claims to give up on her hopes for the future glory of the But generally speaking, Iulus and Pallas are treated as the best, or only, recourse
Romans, they are ultimately fulfilled (10.42f.): for their respective peoples. 13 Mercury motivates Aeneas to leave Dido and Car-
nil super imperio moueor. sperauimus ista,
thage by mentioning Ascanius (4.274f.):
dumfortunafait Ascanium surgentem et spes heredis Juli
I care nothing for empire. We hoped for that while fortune was. respice
Have regard for growing Ascanius, and the hopes of your heir Iulus.
As Juno discovers to her detriment, certain things are simply meant to be, and
even her hopes of making what must come to be difficult are thwarted. This hap-
pens also on the human plane, as when Palinurus is warned by the Sibyl (6.376):
desine fata deum fleet/ sperare precando 12 This kind of hope, the hope of continuance (also used in agricultural contexts) is probably
Stop hoping that the fates of the gods can be turned aside by prayer. most recognizable in Latin poetry from Vergil, Eclogues 1.15, where the goat gives birth on a
rock and so destroys the spem gregis.
He will not, cannot be buried - although she does promise him some recompense 13 Sometimes too, that hope is already destroyed, as when Aeneas addresses the dead Hector as
in the form of an empty tomb, cult offerings, and an eponymous promontory. o lux Dardaniae, spes o fidissima Teucrum (Light of the Dardanians, most faithful hope of the
But the gods, at least in this poem, are more often deceivers than deceived, Trojans, 2.281). Here, of course, the Trojans are conceived of as beyond hope - as they will
and there are a number of additional deceptive messages from the gods that pro- need to be in order to allow Aeneas to leave Troy. Thus the palace of Priam is described,
along with quinquaginta illi thalami, spes tanta nepotum (The famous fifty chambers, the ho-
voke hope. Aeneas makes a landing on Delos and visits the temple of Apollo. He pe of descendants, 2.503).
asks for a divine sign, and immediately receives one: a voice commands him to
218 Laurel Fulkerson The Vagaries of Hope in Vergil and Ovid 219
And Palinurus, dead and unburied, begs Aeneas to bury him by mention of his son And Marcellus provides a contemporary example of the frustration of the hopes
(6,364): we place in youth (6.875f.):
per genitorem oro, per spes surgentis Juli nee puer Iliaca quisquam de gente Latinos
By your father, by the hopes of growing Iulus I beg you, save this life. in tantum spe toilet auos
No Trojan youth will ever raise his Latin ancestry so high in hope.
After the death of Pallas, however, Aeneas is no longer a believer in the hopes
which future generations bring: his response to the plea (l0.524f.): The problem of assuring the future by means of one's offspring of course, a
main concern of Augustus during the period in which the Aeneid was written. And
per patrios manis et spes surgentis Juli we ought not to overlook the ways Turnus' youth and promise are also ultimately
te precor, hanc animam serues gnatoque patrique
By your father's shades and by the hopes of growing Iulus, I beg you,
frustrated. This appears in terms of spes only where Amata, not ready to give up,
beseeches Tumus with these words (12.56-58):
is to slaughter the suppliant Magus. Finally, Ascanius is reaffinned as magnae
Turne, per has ego te lacrimas, per si quis Amatae
spes altera Romae, (second hope of mighty Rome, 12.168). tangit honos animum: spes tu nunc una, senectae
Pallas, on the other hand, embodies the poem's worries about the problematic tu requies miserae, decus imperiumque Latini
nature of placing hope in the young, the dark side of spes gregis. Evander entrusts Turnus, by these tears, by any honor that touches you for the soul of Amata, I beg you: you
his son to Aeneas with these words (8.514f.): are now my sole hope, you my reprieve in wretched old age, you the glory and rule of Lati-
nus.
hunc tibi praeterea, spes et solacia nostri,
Pallanta adiungam As with other kinds of hope, the hope that one's descendants \\--illprosper, or even
I will give you too Pallas, our hope and comfort. continue the family name, sometimes becomes reality and sometimes does not.
As he bids his son farewell for what will be the last time, Evander exclaims On the one hand, the Aeneid is a poem very concerned with the human cost of
(8.579f.): war, so it is not surprising that many young men die. On the other hand, it is also a
poem concerned with the destiny of Rome, which cannot happen if all of the
o liceat crude/em abrumpere vitam, young men die. So Pallas dies, but Ascanius does not. It may be tempting to see
dum curae ambiguae, dum spes
May I break the bonds of cruel life, while fears are unconfirmed, while hope does not know
the death of Pallas as a kind of displacement of the death of Ascanius, or even
the future. Aeneas; recent scholarship has had much to contribute to our understanding of the
complex ways death in this poem functions. 14
On the one hand, Evander's fears seem unreasonable, or perhaps simply exces- Finally, war brings its own kind of hope. So Tumus, catching up to the
sively cautious. But on the other, of course, Pallas will not return to his father, Lycus, exclaims (9.560f.):
will not take over the kingdom of Arcadia. This betrayed hope is also put into
Pallas' mouth: urging the faltering Arcadians on, Pallas invokes his own hopes nostrasne euadere, demens,
sperasti te posse manus?
(10.370f.): Fool, did you hope to evade my hands?
per ducis Euandri nomen deuictaque bella
spemque meam
Whether he did or not, Lycus is soon despatched. Hisbo, for his part, hoping to
By the name of Evander, your victorious wars, my hopes just arising. surprise Pallas from above, does not succeed (10.384f.):
And then, shortly after Pallas' death, Aeneas phrases Evander's tragic situation as quern non super occupat Hisbo,
ille hoe operans; nam Pallas ante ruentem,
follows (1 l .49f.): Whom Hisbo, hoping, did not take from above, for Pallas, before the one attacking ...
et nunc ille spe mu/tum captus inani
fors et uota facit cumulatque altaria don is,
But often the fortunes of war are conceived of more generally in terms of hope, as
Evander, much taken in by empty hope, is perhaps offering incense at altars. when Aeneas' army has no hope of escape from its palisades (10.120f.):
The poem gives similar attention to Euryalus, who asks his comrades (9.290f.): at legio Aeneadum uallis obsessa tenetur
nee spes ullafugae
at tu, oro, solare inopem et succurre relictae.
hanc sine me spem ferre tui
14 See Dyson 2001, Fullcerson 2008, and the ongoing debate about whether to understand Tur-
I beg you, comfort my destitute mother and aid her when she is bereft; allow me to have this
nus as perf01ming devotio.
hope of you.
220 Laurel Fulkerson The Vagaries of Hope in Vergil and Ovid 221
But the legion of the sons of Aeneas, besieged, were held within the ramparts, nor had they 2 OVID'S METAMORPHOSES
hope of escape.
or when, conversely, their hopes are renewed (10.262f., 12.241-243): I move now to spes in the A1etamorphoses. In that poem, and in Roman elegy, a
genre to which it is closely related, the noun is significantly more common than
clamorem ad sidera tollunt
Dardanidae e muris, spes add/ta suscitat iras, [. ..] the verb (a ratio of 40:15 in the Metamorphoses), but with uneven distribution
qui sibi iam requiem pugnae rebusque salute throughout the books. As with the Aeneid, I focus primarily on the instructive
sperabant, nunc arma uoluntfoedusque precantur examples, beginning with the point that the characters in the poem may well have
infectum et Turni sortem miserantur iniquam. many unexpressed hopes (so, for instance, in Book 1, presumably Jupiter hopes to
The Dardanians from the walls raised a cry to the heavens, and hope, renewed, kindled their be able to rape lo just as Apollo does Daphne, even though we hear nothing of the
anger[ ... ] Those who had been hoping for rest from battle and security for themselves, now
former). This is perhaps not as irrelevant as it seems, given that hopes are men-
wished for their arms, and prayed that the treaty be unmade, and pitied the wretched fate of
Tumus.
tioned in the Metamorphoses mostly when they are just about to be dashed. That
is, spes fulfills no plot-advancing function in the Metammphoses; what it usually
After killing Mezentius, Aeneas rallies his men as follows (11.18): does is add a layer of irony, telling us that events did not turn out in the way one
arma parate, animis et spe praesumite bellum of the parties wanted. In some cases, there is a tension created as we wait to see
Prepare your arms, tal,e up the war with spirit and hope. what will happen, but in others, spes is invoked and then immediately identified
as fruitless. In the Metamorphoses, then, Ovid rarely uses hope to build suspense;
Latinus urges the Latins to give up hoping for an alliance with the Aetolians
instead, it closes down narrative possibilities.
(l l.308f.):
It will be no surprise to readers of the Metamorphoses, chock-full of rape
spem si quam ascitis Aetolum habuistis in armis, scenes and tales of illicit love, that hope often occurs in these contexts. I discuss
ponite. spes sibi quisque below the amatory hopes of gods and humans, but I first want briefly to outline
If you put any hope in Aetolian arms, give it up. Each man is his own hope.
some of the other kinds of narrative situations in the Metamorphoses where spes
But surprisingly, he means by this statement to encourage them to make a treaty happens, to give a sense of the range of the concept in this poem, and especially
and not, as the sentiment usually does, to fight to the death; the line continues sed where it does and does not overlap with Vergilian spes. First, the hope placed in
haec quam angusta uidetis (but you see how narrow this is). As a matter of fact, future generations, similar to but subtly different from its Vergilian manifesta-
Latinus' hopes turn out to be correctly founded, but he is ignored. Tumus replies tions: at Metamorphoses 9.341, the water lotus has blossoms, spem bacarum, and
in the same terms (11.411): this scene is especially poignant because a mother picks these blossoms with her
son, but the water lotus was herself once human, and became a plant in order to
si nu/lam nostris ultra spem ponis in armis
Father, if you put no further hope in our arms, let us pray for peace.
escape being raped by Priapus. This mother, Dryope, is just about to become a
tree because of her innocent violation of Lotis. Pythagoras' speech in Book 15
This, of course, is not his ultimate advice. Quite the contrary (11.491 ): contains the other three examples of this sort in the Metamorphoses, as befits the
exsultatque animis et spe iam praecipit hostem philosopher's cosmogonic role: at 15.113 a sow digs up roots, spem anni, the hope
In his hopes, he is already falling upon the enemy. of the year, and so becomes the first sacrificial animal in recompense for her evil
deed; in 15.217 we are reminded that in our mothers' wombs we were spem
Latinus has the final word (12.34f.):
hominum, the hope of men and, in a variation of the formula at 15.367, the bu-
bis magna uicti pugna uix urbe tuemur gonia-produced bees in spemque laborant, work toward their hope. \\'hat the bees
spes Italas; recalent nostro Thybrinafluenta hope for is not quite clear; presumably honey. This kind of spes is just as regularly
Twice beaten, we can barely keep within our walls the of the Italians.
fulfilled as unfulfilled (see above on human life in the Aeneid), and the Ovidian
Not that it does him any good; Tumus goes out, fights Aeneas, and is killed. uses are also evenly divided; two of them describe the destruction of new life, and
There are, of course, other instances of hope in the Aeneid. But the above sur- two of them seemingly hold out a genuine promise for the future. Related to this, I
vey has outlined the major categories, delineating hope as a double-edged sword think, is the situation in Metamorphoses 8.498, where Althaea decides to kill her
(at best): perhaps the safest conclusion to be drawn at this point is that hope that son Meleager, and with him spem patris, the hope of his father. This kind of spes
becomes reality is a useful and encouraging thing, and deluded hopes can make a serves to add poignancy to a tale, particularly when it is unfulfilled. And, if Ver-
bad situation worse, and narratively speaking can lead the reader to imagine future gilian usage in battle contexts points to his concern with the human costs of war,
outcomes which will not come to pass. Ovid's invocation of the topos in natural contexts makes clear just how delicate a
thing spes is: even something as seemingly regular as blossoms ripening into fruit
Laurel Fulkerson The Vagaries of Hope in Vergil and Ovid 223
222
can be thwarted by unforeseen circumstances (and this is perhaps even more dis- and the Metamorphoses is chock-full of powerful individuals becoming abusive,
tressing given that in the Metamorphoses the dividing line between human and and of gods who are exceedingly jealous of their privileges. 15
non-human is constantly blurred). I offer one final example of hubristic spes, which further destabilizes this cat-
The Metamorphoses also features a kind of spes not seen in the Aeneid, the egory's appearance in Ovid. Having been raped by Tereus, her brother-in-law,
spes of hubris, which occurs primarily in contexts of overreaching and punish- Philomela swears to tell the world. But Tereus, emaged, draws his sword
ment. The raven of Book 2 has turned informer (2.631): (6.553f.):
sperantemque sibi nonfalsae praemia iugulum Philomela parabat
Hoping for a reward based on the truth of its statements spemque suae mortis viso conceperat ense
Philomela prepared her throat and conceived a hope of her own death, once she had seen the
It is instead turned from a white bird into a black one for being a tattletale. So too, sword.
in a Roman imperial context, informants might well expect to be rewarded, but
But instead of the killing she might find merciful, Philomela is instead silenced;
presumably this does not always occur. And in Book 6, Minerva tells Arachne Tereus cuts her tongue off and, finding her still appealing, rapes her again. Tereus
(6.84): is, of course, not a god; he is explicitly marked in the text as a barbarian (and in-
quad pretium speret pro tam furialibus ausis deed, this is the first rape of the poem perpetuated by a human man). But within
what reward she can hope for in exchange for such mad daring, the context of this story, at least for now, he is all-powerful, and it is up to him to
She does this shortly before she beats her into arachnid form. Here, we might fulfill or deny the hopes of those around him.
characterize the spes as wildly inappropriate, and so, in a sense, as calling forth its The next category of spes is 'ironic', hopes which are fulfilled but detrimen-
own punishment (so too, the situation of Typhoeus at 5.348, who hopes for the tally (this is in some ways quite similar to the deceptive, prophetic hopes of the
heavenly realms, and Ixion's hope of raping Juno at 12.506). This situation is an Aeneid, although usually without the divine context). So, Procris hears that her
extension of the much more regular unfulfilled hope, different here, I think, be- husband has been unfaithful to her. The couple has a troubled marital history, but
cause the hope is not simply in vain but prevents the person who feels it from she tries not to believe (Metamorphoses 7.832):
judging the situation accurately. The hope of these offenders exceeds their grasp saepe tamen dubitat speratque miserrimafalli
so much that it, and they, simply must be squashed. Arachne, however phenome- Often, still, she hesitates and, poor thing, hopes she is being deceived.
nal a weaver she was, should never have imagined that she could defeat Minerva.
In actual fact, Cephalus has been cheating on her only with the breeze, Aura. But
But here is where this kind of hope becomes interesting, for the narrative is at
unable to stop herself, Procris seeks the truth, only to be killed by her husband,
great pains to suggest that Arachne's tapestry was not inferior to Minerva's
and who believes that the noises she makes in the bushes while she is spying on
(6.129f.): him indicate a wild animal and so throws his always-accurate spear. So Procris'
non illud Pallas, non ilhid carpere Livor hope is in fact fulfilled: she hopes she has been misinformed, and she has, but she
possit opus doluit succesu jlava virago dies anyway: she is both miserrima andfalli. (And in a typically Ovidian linguis-
Pallas was not able, nor was Envy, to pick at the work, and the blonde virago grieved at its
tic turn, she herself is not only deceived, bL1ta deceiver, since she is mistaken for
success.
an animal.) Here again we see the baleful influence of the divine, for there is more
In the Metamorphoses it is not merely that humans cannot reasonably expect to to Procris' story. Cephalus had earlier cheated on his wife with a goddess named
have divine privileges, or to be rewarded when they (think they are) helping gods; Aurora (note the similarity of names, Aurora and Aura), and that the spear's ulti-
rather, the deck is always stacked against them, such that their performances can- mate origin is divine, at least in· this version of the tale (Procris claims to have
not even be judged fairly; from this kind of hope in Ovid we might be tempted to gotten it from Diana; normally it is her payment for sleeping with Minos). So the
conclude that human hope will always be fruitless at best, and at worst, will be deck has been somewhat unfairly stacked against the human protagonists.
met with unfair punishment. So too, in Book 11, Midas has newly discovered that his touch turns things to
In defense of the raven of Book 2, for instance, we might note that the differ- gold (l 1.l 18f.):
ence between being a delator and a loyal subject is not as clear-cut as the seam-
less narration encourages us to believe. So too, it is surely not a coincidence that
15 Megan Drinkwater points out to me that this situation is not essentially different from the
two of these examples center on those who hope to defeat or better the gods: hopes of Tumus in the Aeneid; where that poem may have suggested that he was over-
whether your hope is hubristic or justified may depend on who your audience is reaching and perhaps even impious, this poem allows for a rather different reading, in which
he, like so many others, simply got in the way of what was to be.
Laurel Fulkerson The Vagaries of Hope in Vergil and Ovid 225
224
vix spes ipse suas animo capit aureafingens had hoped to win them in marriage. 17 I focus in some detail in what follows on
omnia three of these examples of aggressive amatory hope, chosen because they are
He could barely capture all his hopes in his mind, and imagined all things golden. places where spes and spero cluster, and also because they give a good sense of
In a way that he thinks lucky but which soon turns disastrous, his hope is fulfilled: the terrain overall. The first of them is the tale of Apollo and Daphne, primus
absolutely everything he touches turns to gold, so he cannot eat. By comparison to amor, Apollo's first love, but also the first rape story of the poem. A bare outline
Procris, Midas gets off easy, for he prays to Bacchus to take away the gift he had of the story follows:
given, and is saved - at least temporarily. Phoebus amat visaeque cupit conubia Daphnes,
My penultimate category in the Metamorphoses is cases in which spes is ful- quodque cupit, sperat, suaque illum oraculafallunt (1.490f.)
filled in a way that is unambiguously beneficial. So far as I can tell, this use does sic deus in jlammas abiit, sic pectore toto
not appear in the Aeneid. The Metamorphoses contains only two examples of this, uritur et sterilem sperando nutrit amorem (1.495f.)
the first in Book 7, when Aeacus, having just lost all of the Aeginetans to plague,
ut canis in vacua leporem cum Gallicus arvo
sees a colony of ants and prays that he will have as many subjects. An oak-tree vidit, et hie praedam pedibus petit, ille salutem;
rustles in response, which Aeacus is not sure is an omen (7 .632f.): alter inhaesuro similis iam iamque tenere
nee me sperare fate bar; sperat et extento stringit vestigia rostro (1.533-536)
sperabam tamen atque animo mea votafovebam
Nor did I confess that I was hoping, but still, I was hoping and I cherished my wishes within sic deus et virgo est hie spe celer, illa timore (1.539).
my mind. Phoebus loves and desires a marriage with Daphne the instant she is seen, and what he de-
He dreams that the ants tum into men, and wakes up to discover that the ants have sires, he hopes for, and his own oracles cheat him ... Thus the god went up in flames, thus he
burned in his whole heart, and fed a fruitless love by hoping ... [chase scene follows] Just as
in fact turned into men. So he thanks Jupiter and rules over the Myrmidons. In our
when a Gallic hound sees a hare in an open plain, and he seeks her as booty with his feet,
second example, Iphis, the girl who has been raised as a boy, and who is in love while she seeks safety; the one seeming as if he is about to cling to her any moment, he hopes
with her betrothed, Ianthe, despairingly claims that Pasiphae had more hope of he's got her and grazes her footsteps with his muzzle extended long ... Thus the god and the
having her love fulfilled than she herself does (9.739): virgin; one swift from hope, the other from terror.
ilia secuta est
It is well known that this bit of the poem combines epic with elegiac themes in a
spem veneris quintessentially Ovidian manner, and I've recently argued that there are pastoral
She followed some hope of Venus. overtones as well (Fulkerson 2012 with bibliography). You will remember that
this story begins when Apollo, fresh from his Pythic victory, runs into little Cupid,
But, interestingly, she's wrong, as she is just about to be turned into a boy, once
who is playing with his bow. Apollo makes fun of Cupid for his pretensions at
she and her mother pray to Isis on the morning of her wedding.
archery, and Cupid shoots an arrow at him that kindles love, while also shooting
We come to our final topic, and the main situation in which spes appears in
an arrow at the nymph Daphne which kills it. Apollo sees the virgin, and immedi-
the poem, and that is in scenes of sexual violence. In these narrative situations, it
ately both cupit and sperit (490f.). But the two verbs are not simply synonyms, for
is often the aggressors who hope. 16 In the majority of these examples, the sexual
before line 491 is over, we are informed that suaque ilium oracula fallunt, his
aggressor's hope is fulfilled, to the detriment of the other party, who was presum-
oracles deceive him, i.e., the god will not achieve his hope. This first rape of the
ably though this is not mentioned - hoping for a different outcome. This is,
poem, then, is a tale of failure, and the failure tells us something important about
however, not always the case, and it is a well-documented but still curious fact of
Apollo, about love, and about the poem as well. Indeed, the introduction to the
the Metamorphoses that being an aggressor, or even a god, does not automatically
tale had already foreshadowed the point that you cannot beat Cupid. So too, at
give you what you want. But, of course, it takes two to tango, and another related
496, the word sperando is immediately preceded by sterilem, to let us know that
use of spes in the Metamorphoses is in the opposite situation, when virgins either
Apollo is deluding himself. Hope next appears in a simile at 536, when, like Apol-
hope to remain virgins, or when they are raped despite the fact that many suitors
lo, a hound hopes, so close to a terrified hare that neither of them is certain wheth-
er he has actually bitten her, sperat et extento stringit vestigia rostro. He is very
16 Sexual aggressors: Apollo (1.491, 1.496, 1.536 - a simile, 1.539), Mercury (2.719 - a simile), nearly there, but, as the exit from the simile shows, he never actually makes it.
Jupiter (2.862), Narcissus (3.417, 3.457), Echo (3.389), Salmacis (4.368), Scylla (8.55,
8.112), Byblis (9.468, 9.534, 9.597, 9.639), lphis (the female 9.739), Myrrha (10.336) Apollo
(11.306), Ixion (12.506 also hubristic), Circe (14.31), Apollo (14.134), Iphis (the male 17 Virgins: Medusa (4.795), Persephone (5.377), Deianira (9.10): multorumfuit spes invidiosa
14.704, 14.715). procorum; cf. Caenis (12.192): multorumfrustra votis optata procorum.
226 Laurel Fulkerson The Vagaries of Hope in Vergil and Ovid 227
Finally, at 1.539, Apollo runs swiftly because of his hope, and Daphne because of Echo has become. Ovid has a good time with this story, focusing on the frustra-
her fear. tion caused by the simultaneous absence and presence of the love object in a way
The episode offers a lesson on hope: even if you are a god, you never know. that becomes fruitful for a number of later thinkers: this culminates in the witty
(We might, in fact, given the traditional Greco- Roman views about hope as often 3.432f.:
delusive, wonder why the gods need to hope in the first place, but Ovid's gods, credule. quidfrustra simulacraji1gacia captas?
like Homer's, are like us only bigger, so they make the same kinds of mistakes we quod petis, est nusquam; quod amas, avertere, perdes !
do.) 18 And there is perhaps a second lesson as well: Jupiter's hope of raping Euro- Poor fool, why do you seek to capture in vain a fleeting image? What you s~ek is nowhere,
pa at 2.862 is expressed casually and just as casually fulfilled, which might rein- turn away and what you love, you destroy!
force the Thucydidean point that hoping too vehemently (but not acting) can also Later in the book, as he stares mesmerized at himself, he delivers a soliloquy in
get you into trouble. which he characterizes his shadow as proffering hope (3.457):
There are a few further instances of divine amatory hope in the poem, but the
majority of the rest of it is human I would suggest that this is because nothing in spem mihi nescio quam vultu promittis amico
You me some sort of hope with your friendly appearance.
the poem means very much to the gods. Our second example occurs in Book
three, in the tale of Echo and Narcissus. This too is a well-lmown story, so I'll His tears mar the surface of the water, and he mourns the subsequent disappear-
summarize only briefly. Narcissus is a beautiful baby, and is told by Teiresias that ance of his reflection. So he too, like Echo, is overcome by his beauty and he too
he will live a long life si se non noverit (ifhe does not know himself, 3.346-348). melts away, this time into the narcissus, a river-loving flower. Here we see again
This line is of course a calque on the Delphic maxim gnothi seauton, but in the that hope is deceptive; Echo thinks that Narcissus is genuinely engaged in a mutu-
context of this story it will tum out to be much more as well. The story then cuts al exchange with her, and the discovery that she is mistaken dissolves her identity.
to Echo, and we hear that she has lost her voice as a punishment from Juno, be- So too, the hope-giving reflection of Narcissus is always a lie, and one which de-
cause she used to distract Juno while Jupiter was frolicking with nymphs on the stroys him. This story, as all know, has been repeatedly, and fruitfully, mined for
mountainside. This is a part of the story that never gets much attention, but in fact psychological insights. But it has not, so far as I know, received any attention as a
it is quite interesting, as it offers us a new paradigm for erotic behavior in the po- case study of what can happen when hopes are disappointed: one's very identity
em one we do not hear much about, in which both men and women are engaged can disappear. The doubling of the hope is significant: Ovid provides us with a
in ~onsensual activity. And this is no accident, for Echo is just about to become tale of two people, both desperately wanting something they cannot have, and
the first female desiring subject of the poem. Perhaps it is also no coincidence that both ultimately destroyed by the frustration of their desires.
her new nature makes it difficult for her to initiate speech, for her attitude may Our final example is the case of Byblis, one of the several examples of aber-
well be seen as aberrant, even dangerous. rantly desiring women in this part of the poem. Byblis is a nice girl, daughter of
She sees the stunning Narcissus, and falls immediately in love (no arrows Miletus, the king of Miletus. She has a twin brother, Caunis. It takes her some
needed). She lucks out in that he loses his companions and so calls out to them, so time to realize that there is a problematic aspect to her desire to kiss her brother
that she can respond. And eventually, they agree to meet (although his consent is and throw her arms around him; she manages to convince herself that she is simp-
given unwittingly). Echo comes out of the woods in order to throw her arms ly showing sisterly affection. When she is awake, she will not admit her spes ob-
around the hoped-for neck (sperato, 3.389). She is, of course, repulsed by Narcis- scenas (468); only in her dreams do her real wishes become clear to her. She de-
sus and eventually melts away into nothing, which is how we come to have ech- livers a long speech in which she tries but fails to overcome her incestuous de-
oes, voices with no body. But Narcissus' problems are just beginning: he, as you sires, and eventually resolves to write a letter to spare her shame. It seems better
will probably remember, is just about to fall in love with himself. One of the not to begin her letter with a direct address to her brother as brother, since that is
many spurned youths has prayed that Narcissus too will know what it is to feel precisely the point at issue, and she notes that she would prefer to remain incogni-
rejection. And in the economy of this tale, he is the only desirable object, so his to (9.534):
eye is caught by himself, when he sees his reflection in a clear spring and is capti-
nee cognita Byblis ante forem, quam spes votorum certa fttisset.
vated by his own beauty. I would not be known as Byblis, before the hopes ofmy vows have become more certain.
In fact the two stories of Echo and Narcissus are connected, for Narcissus
loves a ho~e without body (spem sine corpore amat, 3 .417), which is just what This is, of course, not how love works, even when you are not courting your
brother it is precisely the specificity of the person that makes or breaks the deal.
And Byblis suffers from just the same problem as Narcissus, since love requires
18 There is much bibliography on the gods in this poem; see Fulkerson 2006 on Apollo's fre-
quent falling-short of fully divine status.
closeness, but also a certain degree of distance: twin brothers, it turns out, are not
quite far enough from one's self. But let's return to her letter. She fills up the
228 Laurel Fulkerson TI1e Vagaries of Hope in Vergil and Ovid 229
whole tablet, even the margins, seals it, drops it while handing it to a servant to from which to be a man'). So too, including discussion about the divine has not
give to her brother, and waits anxiously. Caunis, in the meantime, reads the letter seemed inappropriate, since that is the poem's other main example of differential
only halfway through and then throws the servant out in a rage. The scenario is, of equations of power, and the kinds ofrelationships which are and are not possible.
course, tragic, reminiscent of Phaedra's relationship with Hippolytus among other
things, but perhaps that of the Aeolidae, Canace and Macareus, too. Byblis faints,
and when she recovers, she realizes that her mistake was to write her love rather 3 CONCLUSION
than speak it. She now sees in the falling tablet an omen of her own hopes (9.595-
597): In lieu of a formal conclusion, I draw attention to a few of the major differences
Quid quad et ominibus certis prohibebar amori between Vergilian and Ovidian epic hope. In Vergil, hope is narratively interest-
indulgere meo, tum cum mihiferre iubenti ing because it creates tension, offering hints at several roads not traveled. The
excidit etfecit spes nostras cera caducas? hope of future generations, as it must be in a poem such as this, is more or less
What of the fact that I was prohibited from indulging my love by secure omens, then, when fulfilled. There are, of course, losers in this game, and Vergil is not unsympathetic
the tablet fell from my hands as I was giving them to a servant, and made my hopes also lia- to them, but the trajectory of the poem as a whole is such that Trojan hopes are
ble to fall?
fated to be realized, even when that comes at the cost of the hopes of individual
She seems, however, only to find fault with their written expression and so she Trojans. Readers of Books 4 and 6, for instance, are often left with the sense that
determines to face him directly, deciding that if she does not he will think her Aeneas really would have preferred to remain in Carthage. Beyond this, however,
fickle, or worse, will believe that she was falsely t1ying to entrap him. So she con- and in keeping with the critical tradition that sees Vergil as a poet of loss, a num-
tinues to pursue him until he eventually leaves town and founds a new city, ber of major characters in the poem suffer from unfulfilled hopes; while Aeneas
whereupon she follows him (9.638-640): may be comforted by the fact that his personal happiness has been sacrificed to a
bright future for his son, there is little comfort for Tumus, and even less for Dido,
iamque pa/am est demens, inconcessaeque fatetur
spem veneris, siquidem patriam invisosque penates neither of whom had hopes that were unreasonable.
deserit, et profugi sequitur vestigia fratris. Ovid, characteristically, pays more attention to those narrative byways, the
Then she was openly mad, making public to all her hopes of illicit love, and left her homeland unfulfilled hopes tliat are cast aside as stories march to their conclusions. Some of
and hated family gods, and tracked the footsteps of her exiled brother. this may derive from his lifelong experience with elegy, a genre which is predi-
Eventually, she falls, exhausted, and weeps so much that she becomes a fountain. cated upon the implausible, perhaps even pathetic hopes of the amator that never
She too, that is, loses her identity and her humanity because of disappointed materialize, or never permanently. So too, given Ovid's greater interest in expos-
hopes. ing power relations, it is not surprising that those who hope are sometimes vi-
These three examples, the places in the Metammphoses where amatory hope ciously punished, and sometimes rewarded beyond expectation, but rarely in ways
clusters, have a number of things in common. The first is that hopes are regularly that seem equitable to observers. These two discrete senses of hope may reflect
disappointed, even, sometimes, for the divine (though, as many have noted, Apol- the two poets' experiences of the world as it changed in the Augustan period. Be-
lo is something of a special case in the poem; his divinity is regularly under- yond this, however, they offer tv,o rather different takes on this ambiguous and
mined). So too, the mortal among these hopes we might characterize as unreason- problematic notion.
able to begin with: by as early as Book 3 of the poem, rape narratives have be-
come increasingly tedious, but when the first one occurs, or rather, does not occur,
it may seem aberrant. The other two defy the laws of physics and incest respec- BIBLIOGRAPHY
tively; hoping for preposterous things will you what you deserve - in this case,
Adams, S. M. (1932) Hesiod's Pandora, Classical Review 46, 193-196.
oblivion. And Apollo, the god who cannot even manage to rape a mortal woman?
Clark, M. E. (1983) Spes in the Early Imperial Cult: 'The Hope of Augustus', Numen 30, 80-105.
He seems simply to be unlucky in love. Duckwoiih, G. E. (1933) Foreshadowing and Suspense in the Epics of Homer, Apollonius, and
I've focused on the hope oflovers and would-be lovers in part because that is Vergil, Princeton, NJ.
the major scenario in which hope occurs in the poem, but also because I have Dyson, J. T. (2001) King of the Wood: The Sacrificial Victor in Virgil's Aeneid, Norman OK.
come to believe that gender relations in the lvfetammphoses are nearly always a Fears, J. R. (1981) The Cult of Virtues and Roman Imperial Ideology, ANRW Il.17.2, Berlin, 827-
948.
kind of Ovidian shorthand for power relations (this is a similar argument to that
Fulkerson, L. (2006) Apollo, Paenitentia, and Ovid's lvfetamorphoses, Mnemosyne 59.3, 388-402.
made by some scholars of Roman elegy, who see the stance taken by the elegists
(2008) Patterns of Death in the Aeneid. Scripta Classica Lgraelica 27, 17-33.
as their way of claiming that in the words of Paul Allen Miller, 'there is no place
230 Laurel Fulkerson
~ (2012) Pastoral Appropriation and Assimilation in Ovid's Apollo and Daplme Episode in E.
Karakasis (ed). Post-Vergilian Roman Pastoral, De Gruyter Trends in Classics series, Berlin,
29-47.
Greene, W. C. (1945) Fate, Good, and Evil, in Early Greek Poetry, Harvard Studies in Classical
Philology 46, I -36. REASON VS. EMOTION IN SENECA
Kerschensteiner, J. (1944) Zu Aufbau und Gedankenflihrung von Hesiods Erga, Hermes 3-4, 149-
191.
Komomicka, A. M. (1990) L'elpis hesiodique dans lajarre de Pandore, Eos 78, 63-77. David Ko7Jstan
Leighton, S. R. (1988) Aristotle's Courageous Passions, Phronesis 33, 76-99.
Miller, P.A. (2004) Subjecting Verses: Latin Love Elegy and the Emergence of the Real, Princeton.
Moore, C. H. (1921) Prophecy in the Ancient Epic, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 32,
In a famous lapsus that has been variously explained or emended, Trimalchio, in
99-175.
Neitzel, H. (1976) Pandora und das Fass: Zur Interpretation von Hesiod, Erga 42-105, Hermes
Petronius' Satyrica, affirms: 'lest you think that I have disdained study, I have
104, 387-419.
three libraries: one Greek, the other Latin'. 1 There is what may appear to be an
Noica, S. (1984) La boite de Pandore et l'ambiguJte de l'elpis, Platon 36, 100-124. analogous incongruity in Seneca's definition of emotion in his treatise on anger:
O'Hara, J. J. (1990) Death and the Optimistic Prophecy in Vergil's Aeneid Princeton.
so that you may !mow how emotions begin or grow or run wild, the first motion is not volun-
Schrijen, J. J. A. (1965) Elpis: de Voorstelling van de Hoop in de Griekse Literatur tot Aristoteles,
tary, but is like a readiness for emotion and a kind of alarm; another motion is accompanied
Diss. Amsterdam. by volition, but one that is not defiant, for example that I ought to take revenge because I
Verdenius, W. J. (1985) A Commentary On HesiodWorks and Days vv. 1-382, Leiden.
have been injured, or this one ought to pay a penalty since he committed a crime; the third
West, M. L. (1978) Hesiod Works and Days, Oxford.
motion is by now out of control: it wishes to take revenge not if one ought to, but on any ac-
2
count, and it has wholly conquered reason.
Seneca continues to explain: 'We cannot avoid that first blow to the mind by
means of reason', just as we cannot help blinking when someone's finger is sud-
denly flashed before our eyes;3 'reason cannot conquer such things, though per-
haps habit and constant attention can attenuate them. That other motion, which
arises by virtue of a judgement, is eliminated by a judgement' .4 At this point, Sen-
eca seems to embark on a wholly different topic:
And now we must inquire whether those who rage habitually and delight in human blood are
angry, since they kill those from whom they have received no harm nor do they themselves
5
think they have received any.
et ne me putes studio fastiditum, tres bybliothecas habeo, unam Graecam, alteram Latinam,
48.4; cf. Adamik 2005 for discussion.
2 et ut scias quemadmodum incipiant adfectus aut crescant aut efferantur, est primus motus
non uoluntarius, quasi praeparatio adfectus et quaedam comminatio; alter cum uoluntate non
contumaci, tamquam oporteat me uindicari cum laesus sim, aut oporteat hunc poenas dare
cum scelus fecerit; tertius motus est iam inpotens, qui non si oportet ulcisci uult sed utique,
qui rationem euicit, 2.4.1.
3 primum ilium animi ictum effugere ratione non possumus, sicut ne ilia quidem quae diximus
accidere corporibus, ne nos oscitatio aliena sollicitet, ne oculi ad intentationem subitam digi-
torum comprimantur, 2.4.2.
4 ista non potest ratio uincere, consuetudo fortasse et adsidua obseruatio extenuat. alter ille
motus, qui iudicio nascitur, iudicio tollitur, 2.4.2.
5 illud etiamnunc quaerendum est, ii qui uulgo saeuiunt et sanguine humano gaudent, an iras-
cantur cum eos occidunt a quibus nee acceperunt iniuriam nee accepisse ipsos existimant,
2.5.1.
232 David Konstan Reason vs. Emotion in Seneca 233
Such people cannot be examples of a final stage of emotion, since Seneca de- reason cannot free itself from the mixture when the worse element prevails. 14 If
clares: 'this is not anger, it is savagery' ,6precisely because it does not respond to emotions, once triggered, can be brought under control at all, it is only when they
any cause'. What happened to the third motion? have faded on their own and lost their initial potency (1.8.6). Those who, in the
The solution to the puzzle, if puzzle it is that Seneca is not describing three full flush of anger, abstain from harming someone who has offended them do so
stages in an emotion, but three distinct kinds ofbehavior. 7 The first corresponds to not because they submit to reason, but only when another emotion, such as fear or
what the Stoics sometimes called pre-emotions (propatheiai); the second is emo- greed, has dislodged the first; 15 but this is scarcely a trustworthy method for curb-
tion proper; and the third is a habitual state of cruelty, which has its source in an- ing anger. One problem with the emotions, indeed, is that they are fickle, and jus-
ger but has, by the continual exercise of vengeful behavior, been transformed into tifiable indignation may well yield inappropriately to pity. 16
something else.8 It is only the second movement that may be called an emotion Seneca's account of the conflict between reason and emotion might sound as
the one that 'arises by virtue of a judgement and is eliminated by a judgement'. though he has conceded something to the Platonic view that the soul is divided
Since, for the Stoics, an emotion just is an assent to a certain kind of proposition into ·a rational and irrational part, a view that Posidonius had adopted in some
resulting from an impression, or more technically, t\vo acts of assenting, it is no form or other, at least according to Galen. 17 But Seneca's point is rather that emo-
surprise to read that judgement is the key both to arousing and assuaging emo- tions and reason cohabit in the mind, that the ruling part of the psyche or
tions. We may, of course, assent to a false proposition, and for the Stoics this is hegemonikon, which is the orthodox Stoic view: since emotions are judgements,
the case for all pathe or ac{fectus; but in this respect the opinion that constitutes an this is just where we should expect them to reside. 18 What then accounts for their
emotion is no different from any other false belief. stubborn resistance to correction by reason, to the extent that they can only be
And yet, there was something about emotions in particular that made such driven out, when in full swing, by another emotion which is, after all, a judge-
judgements especially difficult to alter or dislodge. As Seneca puts it, 'it is easier ment in its own right? Whence the special impetus that emotions have that makes
to shut out destructive things than to control them' .9 In fact, reason itself is only them analogous to running at top speed?
powerful so long as it is separated from the emotions; once mixed with them, it is Wnen he comes to defining anger more precisely in Book 2 of De ira, Seneca
helpless. 10 Seneca appeals to the familiar analogy with headlong running, when states that it is roused by the presentation or appearance of an offense. 19 But he
one cannot immediately come to a stop, as opposed to walking (l.7.4), but this is immediately adds that the emotion does not follow automatically upon the presen-
an image rather than an explanation. He then reaffirms that reason is absent when tation itself, but only when the mind assents, 20 a view that he takes to be orthodox
once emotion is admitted and authority is voluntarily handed over to it;ll for the Stoicism (cf. nobis). Seneca notes that, for anger to arise, one must receive the
mind does not occupy a separate place, but is itself changed into the emotion. 12 impression of having endured an offense and desire to avenge it, and what is more
Reason and emotion are alterations of the mind, for better or for worse; 13 hence, join two judgements together, namely that one ought not to have been harmed and
that one ought to seek revenge, and this is not in the nature of the kind of impulse
that is stimulated independently of our will. 21 For the impulse or impetus by itself,
6 haec non est ira, feritas est, 2.5.2.
7 Note that in one sense there is a logical sequence in the three forms of behavior, in that the 14 quemadrnodum e.x confusione se liberabit in qua peiorum rnb;turapraeualuit?, 1.8.3.
stage of inveterate cruelty arises only as a perverted form of actual emotions; thus, animals do 15 cum adfectus repercussit adfectum et au/ metus aut cupiditas aliquid inpetrauit, 1.8. 7.
not experience this third stage (my thanks to Michael Champion for this observation). Just 16 irarn saepe misericordia retro egit; habet enim non solidum robur sed uanum tumorern uio-
how the third stage arises is unelear in Seneca; it would seem to be a consequence of the fre- lentisque principiis utitur, 3.17.4.
quent experience of a given emotion such as anger, and to take the form of a rationalization of 17 Krewet 2013, 137 argues that Seneca departs from Posidonius' 'middle Stoa' position. Ga-
a disposition to seek revenge, for example, even in the absence of a legitimate presentation len's testimony concerning Posidonius' ostensibly Platonic account of emotion has been que-
(thanks to Megan Beasley for raising the question). stioned by various scholars; see e.g. Gill 1998; Cooper 1999, 449-484; Tieleman 2003, 198--
8 origo huius mali ab ira est, quae ubi frequenti exercitatione et satietate in obliuionem cle- 287; contra Sorabji 2000, 93-108.
mentiae uenit et omne foedus humanum eiecit animo, nouissime in crudelitatem transit, 2.5.3. 18 Cf. Krewet 2013, 135: ':Fur ilm [sc. Seneca] also ist ein wahres Zomgefiihl ohne einen kogni-
9 facilius est excludere perniciosa quam regere, 1.7.2. tiven Akt nicht Denkbar'.
IO ratio ipsa ... tarn diu potens est quam diu diducta est ab adfectibus; si miscuit se illis et inqui- 19 iram quin species oblata iniuriae moueat non est dubium, 2.1.3; species here renders the
nauit, non potest continere quos summouere potuisset, I. 7.3. Greek phantasia.
11 nihil rationis est ubi semel adfectus inductus est iusque illi aliquod uoluntate nostra datum 20 nobis placet nihil illam [sc. iram] per se audere sed animo adprobante, 2.1.4.
est, 1.8.1. 21 non est eius impetus qui sine uoluntate nostra concitatur; nam speciem capere acceptae iniu-
12 neque enim sepositus est animus et extrinsecus speculatur aqfectus ..., sed in adfectum ipse riae et ultionem eius concupiscere et utrumque coniungere, nee laedi se debuisse et uindicari
mutatur, 1.8.2. debere, non est eius impetus qui sine uoluntate nostra concitatur, 2.1.4; I take utrumque to
13 adfectus et ratio in melius peiusque mutatio animi est, 1.8.3. look forward to the two judgements that follow, each introduced by debere.
234 David Konstan Reason vs. Emotion in Seneca 235
Seneca affirms, is a simple thing, whereas a true emotion is compound and con- what you are experiencing is not fear, and your response is not in principle differ-
tains several elements: one has recognized something, become indignant, judged it ent from trembling because of a chill. In this same context, Seneca states that 'the
to be an offense, and now seeks revenge, and all this cannot occur unless the mind ears of a soldier prick up at the sound of a trumpet, even when peace reigns and he
has given its assent to what has struck it.22 At this point Seneca imagines his read- is wearing the toga, and the noise of arms rouses army horses' (2.2.6); thus, ani-
er inquiring: 'what is all this leading up to?', 23 and he replies that it is essential to mals too have a share in at least some of these involuntary responses (they too
knowing what anger is, since if it arises in us despite our will, it will never submit shiver with cold, after all), though of course they do not react anxiously to bad
to reason. 24 And just here Seneca launches on his discussion of what, he tells us, news, since they do not possess language.29 . 1
are not emotions in the strict sense but rather the initial preliminaries to emotion25 Indeed, in Book 1 of De ira, Seneca states:
- that is, that first blow to the mind (primum illum animi ictum ), which was the We must affirm that wild animals, and all creatures apart from human beings, are without an-
first of the three kinds of reaction that Seneca listed in the passage I quoted at the ger; for since anger is contrary to reason, it does not arise except where reason has a place.
beginning (that passage follows immediately upon the discussion of the principia Animals have violence, rabidity, ferocity, aggression, but do not have anger any more than
proludentia adfectibus), and which we cannot avoid by means ofreason. But how they have licentiousness ... Dumb animals lack human emotions, but they do have certain im-
do these preliminaries enter into Seneca's conception of emotion? My answer will pulses that are similar to emotions.
be that they are crucial to understanding just how emotions differ from other kinds Seneca goes on to remark that animals can utter sounds, but they do not have lan-
of judgements. 26 guage; their perceptions, moreover, are muddy and confused: 'thus, their attacks
Let us recall Seneca's account of these preliminary feelings, which pretty and outbreaks are violent, but they do not have fears and worries, sadness and
clearly correspond to what at least some Greek Stoics labeled propatheiai. 27 Sene- anger, but rather things that are similar to these' (1.3.4-8; in the Consolation to
ca's detailed list of such reactions includes shivering with cold, squeamishness at Marcia 5 .1, Seneca affirms that animals do not experience sadness and fear any
certain kinds of touch, hair standing on end in response to bad news, blushing, more than stones do). 30
dizziness caused by heights, and the sentiments we experience when seeing plays, Are the reactions that Seneca attributes to animals identical or similar to the
reading books, hearing music or seeing horrible paintings, or watching people principia proludentia adfectibus that he describes in the following book? To be
being severely punished even if they deserve it.28 What all these reactions have in sure, he does not label them as such, but it is not hard to see why: for animals
common is precisely that they are involuntary and do not depend on judgement or there is no further stage, no moment when they judge rationally whether, for ex-
assent. When you are watching a tragedy, you may shudder instinctively at the ample, there is in fact a danger, which is what fear is, or whether they ought not to
action on stage but you know perfectly well that there is no real danger, and hence have been harmed and ought to take revenge, which are the judgements that are
constitutive of anger; hence, animal responses are not preliminary to anything
else. Soldiers, like war horses, are habituated to responding to the blast of a mili-
22 ille simplex est, hie compositus et plura continens: intellexit aliquid, indignatus est, damnauit,
tary trumpet, but only they can take the next step and experience a true emotion.
ulciscitur: haec non possunt fieri, nisi animus eis quibus tangebatur adsensus est, 2.1.4.
23 'quorsus' inquis 'haec quaestio pertinet? ', 2.2.1. Of course animals are not susceptible to some of the pre-emotions that affect
24 ut sciamus quid sit ira; nam si inuitis nobis nascitur, numquam rationi succumbet, 2.2.1. human beings, for example those that are aroused by verbal reports of events; the-
25 omnia ista motus sunt animorum moueri nolentium, nee adfectus sed principia proludentia se require a degree of reason, but nevertheless do not involve assent, which is
adfectibus, 2.2.5. what discriminates the first motus from the second. But human beings can, it
26 D'Jeranian 2014, 230 sees Zeno as the inspiration for Seneca's view, whereas Chrysippus' would seem, experience all or most of the quasi-emotions or instinctive reactions
more strictly intellectual analysis lies behind a fragment from the lost fifth book of Epictetus'
to which animals are liable: they too, one assumes, are capable of feeling 'vio-
Discourses (fr. 9 Schenkel), quoted by Aulus Gellius Attic Nights 19.17: 'Seneque suivrait
Zenon dans la mesure ou ii conclut, d'une part, que la passion est un elan irrationnel et non lence, rabidity, ferocity, aggression', or the kind of instinctive hostile reaction that
simplement un jugement, et, d'autre part, que !'affection preliminaire n'est pas un mouve-
ment psychologique mais un trouble de l'ame a caractere non pathologique, une "morsure"
naturelle, inevitable, remanente et irreductible a la sagesse, quoique sans consequence prati- 29 Cf. Krewet 2013, 135: 'Seneca jedenfalls stellt dem Zorn verschiedene sich physiologisch-
que. Contrairement a !'affection preliminaire, qui touche meme l'ame du sage, la passion est kiirperlich und nahezu mechanistisch abspielende Phiinomene gegeniiber'.
une action, un mouvement intentionnel resultant d'unjugement errone auquel l'insense aurait 30 For discussion of this passage, see Tutrone 2012, 228-234; Tutrone discusses in detail and
donne son assentiment. Epictete incamerait quant a lui la ligne intellectualiste dure initiee par with rich bibliography every passage in both philosophers in which animals figure impor-
Chrysippe'. I do not take here a position on the sources of Seneca's view. tantly. Cf. Krewet 2013, 138: 'Auch den Tieren gesteht Seneca ... keine Gefiihle zu' (p. 138),
27 Cf. Graver 1999. because they do not have the necessary cognitive apparatus; contrast Nussbaum's 'neo-Stoic'
28 Krewet 2013, 138 rightly notes that music does not produce genuine emotions but rather pre- revision, according to which animals can indeed experience emotions in the strict sense of the
emotions; contra Nussbaum 2001, 239, 249-295. term (Nussbaum 2001, 89-137).
236 David Konstan Reason vs. Emotion in Seneca 237
these several postures have in common, and which are natural responses to certain means of reason. The particular instance of such a response that he considers here
kinds of stimulus. Indeed, the first blow or ictus that strikes us upon receiving is blushing. Seneca says that he was favorably impressed by a young friend of
certain kinds of impressions or appearances (species) will produce just such an Lucilius', who, having uttered an opinion impromptu, could not shake off his ex-
impetus or impulse (in Greek horme). If, in the case of an impression of the sort pression of shame (verecundia) even as he tried to gather his wits, since his face
that can lead to anger, we judge that we have been wronged and that revenge is was suffused with a deep blush something Seneca considers a good sign in a
appropriate, then the emotion of anger supervenes. But what happens to this initial youth. 34 Seneca suspects, however, that this tendency to blush will remain with
response, that preliminary movement that we share with non-rational creatures? the lad even when he is grown and has become wise, since no aniount of wisdom
The answer, I believe, is that it abides, forming part of that compound that, Seneca can eliminate natural weaknesses of the body or the mind. 35 Seneca provides ex-
says, is in the nature of emotions as opposed to mere instinctive reactions. What is amples of other such responses, such as sweating when one is tired or hot, a trem-
more, its locus is, I think, the hegemonikon, which, if I understand the Stoic theo- bling in the knees when one is about to speak in public, and the like. Not that eve-
ry properly, is something that irrational animals too possess, not just human be- ryone is subject to such reactions; but in those who are, they are ineradicable. Cor-
ings. As Julia Annas writes: respondingly, even actors, who imitate a variety of emotions (adfectus), such as
Animals as we11as humans are selves; an animal's hegemonikon, however, will unify its psy-
fear and sadness, may indeed lower their voices and look down at the ground, but
chological events in a merely automatic and instinctual way. Because humans are rational, they cannot summon up a blush at will when they try to represent verecundia
31 (11. 7). Now, blushing at obscene language is one of the reactions that Seneca in-
everything in a human hegemonikon will be organized and interpreted in a rational way.
cludes among the principia proludentia adfectibus, and it is not umeasonable to
So too A. A. Long affirms: 'All mortal animals have the same eight psychic parts',
suppose that in the present context as well it is to be understood as falling under
that is, the hegemonikon, the five senses, what the Stoics call 'voice', and repro-
this description.
duction.32 To put it differently, in the case of other animals, the hegemonikon does
With characteristic abruptness, Seneca announces that his letter now demands
not develop to the point of acquiring reason, as it does with human beings. 33 I
a conclusion, 36 and proceeds to advise Lucilius that. we ought always to keep a
expect that it is the presence of this primitive motion in the hegemonikon, together
man whom we love and respect before our eyes, so that we may act always as
with the movements that correspond to false judgements, that led Seneca to con-
though he were observing us - a precept that Seneca attributes to Epicurus. When
clude that 'reason cannot free itself from the mixture when the worse element
our mind has in view a person it reveres (quern vereatur; cf. qui sic vereri potest,
prevails': reason has to contend not just with a wrong judgement but with the
11.9), we behave better even in private; and whoever can feel such respect for
combination of that judgement and the initial impetus that gave rise to it, all of
another will in turn soon be the object of similar regard on the part of others. 37
which takes place in the hegemonikon. And this is why it is so difficult to dislodge
The feeling in question is verecundia, and I take it that it is, in contrast to the mere
an active emotion: the judgement involved is supported by the initial, and abiding,
reflex of blushing, a full-fledged emotion. To be sure, in certain contexts verecun-
impulse, which in human beings tends to demand justification and is thereby con-
dia may be more like a disposition, analogous to irascibility (iracundia) rather
verted into an emotion proper. Reason may well be helpless to undo the effects of
than to ira; but in the case of a blush, or the reaction that ensues upon imagining
that amalgam.
that someone is observing our behavior, it is clearly more Hke an occurrent emo-
But it is not just that what Seneca calls the first motion, that is, the reaction to
tion. Verecundia can also su~:gest a sense of shame, something like the Greek
the impression that takes the form of a blow, enters into the construction, as it
aidos, and in this respect might be more like a virtue (it was deemed a eupatheia
were, of emotion once assent has been given. For I should like to add the further
in some of the Stoic classifications); but since Seneca associates it with adfectus
point that is likely to be still more controversial, namely, that each of the emotions
such as metus and tristitia, he is evidently thinking of it as ap. emotion here. As an
has, corresponding to or paired with it, a specific initial motion or impulse. The
emotion, verecundia should involve, for the Stoics, a double assent; I do not know
evidence, such as it is, for this latter claim is scattered among Seneca's writings,
of an explicit Stoic account of the judgements that constitute shame, but we may
and I shall now collect a few of the relevant passages.
suppose that it comprises something like assenting to the view that the other's
I begin with the eleventh letter in the Epistulae ad Lucilium, in which Seneca
treats the topic of certain reflexes that are not amenable to change or correction by
31 Annas 1992, 64; Annas cites Arius Didymus, Epitome Physicon 39D Diels SVF 2.821 to 34 verec1111diam,bonum in adulescente signum, vix potuit excutere; adeo illi ex
the effect that every soul has a hegemonikon, which is the seat oflife, perception, and impul- rubor, 1 I.I.
se. 35 nulla enim sapientia natura/ia corporis aut animi vitia ponuntur, 11.1.
32 Long 1996, 242. 36 iam clausulam epistula poscit, 11.8.
33 Cf Newmyer 2006, 46 37 qui sic aliquem vereri potest cito erit verendus, 11.9.
David Konstan Reason vs. Emotion in Seneca 239
238
disapproval of us is bad, and that we ought not to behave in such a way as to elicit experience loss (desideria) intensely, but nevertheless for only a brief span of
it. time, and he concludes:
What then is the connection between blushing and shame? As we have not- no animal has a lengthy sorrow for its offspring except man, who adheres to his grief and is
44
ed, not e;eryo~e blushes, but only those who have a physical constitution that is stirred not to the extent that he feels it but to the extent that he has decided to be.
conducive to it.38 Does the kind of embarrassment or reaction to novel circum-
In the 99th epistle to Lucilius, Seneca makes the same point about the brevity of a
stances that causes some people to blush have no effect at all on others, or is
sense of loss in animals, but uses it to opposite effect:
blushing simply the visible sign of a reaction to which all are susceptible, even if
it is not always manifested by blood rushing to the face? Seneca is careful to point when the first news of a bitter death strikes us, when we hold the body that is about to pass
out that not every instance of blushing is necessarily a positive indication of char- from our embrace into the fire, a natural necessity forces out our tears. 45
acter. Some people are to be especially feared when they turn red, 'as though they But these tears fall irrespective of our wilL 46 The case is different with the tears
had poured forth all their shame', and Sulla was at his most violent when the that we shed at the memory of those we have lost. Seneca affirms that to forget
39
blood rushed to his face, whereas in others it is a becoming sign ofmodesty. The loved ones and bury memory of them along with their bodies is inhuman; this is
phrase, 'as though they had poured forth all their shame' (quasi omnem verecun- what birds and wild animals do, which love their young with a fierce passion, but
diam ejfuderint), is not entirely perspicuous. Most commentators and translators, this is extinguished when they have died. 47 Seneca concludes that a sensible man,
as far as I can judge, take it to mean that such people have cast aside all shame. on the contrary, will persist in remembering- but he will cease to mourn (lugere).
Thus Richard Gummere in the Loeb edition, gives: 'as if they were letting all Seneca again equates the pre-emotional sting that even a sage experiences up-
their ' sense of shame escape',
' .
which I cannot understand. 40 The Pengum · ·
version on the loss of a dear one with that of animals, but here he seems to disapprove of
41
by Robin Campbell has: 'as ifin so doing they let loose all their inhibitions', but the transient, if intense, affection that animals bear toward their own in compari-
why on earth would this cause someone to redden? People so disposed as to be son with the enduring memory of the deceased that human beings retain. But Sen-
frightening do not of course feel shame in the proper sense, that is, they do not eca's real point comes in the final phrase, in which he insists that though one may
assent to the idea that their behavior is wrong; that is why it is 'as though' they rightly recall the dead, one ought not to mourn them. The pain that human beings
were expressing shame. But they must experience something like shame - the pre- feel upon such a loss ought not to be repressed - tears are entirely natural and ex-
emotion that corresponds to it - and hence they blush involuntarily, just as a sage pected - but it should not last more than a brief time; if our capacity to remember
might, who of course has no reason to feel shame. So too, people who, for physio- turns loss into grief or mourning, then it is a pathology and must be cured. Like
logical reasons, do not blush but do experience shame, will presumably have re- the instinctive reaction that lies behind blushing and which enters into our sense
sponded initially to the external impression in the way that those who blush do, of shame, the natural sense of loss is a part of mourning, which by the addition of
that is, even without the particular physical symptom will have been subject to the belief becomes an emotion and hence something to be got rid of. 48
pre-emotion. And this is the correlation that I am arguing for. Toward the beginning of his book On Benefits, in the course of arguing that
In his consolation to Marcia, Seneca challenges the idea that grief for the loss that one ought to persist in providing help even to those who fail to show grati-
ofloved ones is natural. That missing them (desiderium suorum) is, Seneca happi- tude, since the second benefaction or the third may aw.aken their memory, Seneca
ly allows: 'quis negat?', he asks, provided that it is moderate. He points out that states that 'even wild beasts recognize services, and no animal is so savage that
even the strongest minds will feel a certain sting at the departure of those who are attention cannot render it gentle and make it affectionate'. Trainers, for example,
dear, never mind their death. 42 The problem, however, is that opinion adds more put their hands in the mouths of lions, and food makes even elephants docile. The
than nature demands. 43 Here he gives the example of dumb animals, which also analogy between animals and human beings here might seem to suggest that even
38 naturali in hoe facilitate corporis pronos, nam ut quidam boni sanguinis sunt, ita quidam
incitati et mobilis et cito in as prodeuntis, 11.5. 44 nee ulli animali longum fetus sui desiderium est nisi homini, qui adest dolori suo nee tantum
39 quidam numquam magis quamcum erubuerint timendi sunt, quasi omnem verecundiam effi1- quantum sentit sed quantum constituit adficitur, 7.2.
derint; Sulla tune erat violentissimus cum faciem eius sanguis invaserat ... Fabianum, cum in 45 cum primus nos nuntius acerbi funeris perculit, cum tenemus corpus e complexu nostro in
senatum testis esset inductus, erubuisse memini, et hie ilium mire pudor decuit, 11.4. ignem transiturum, lacrimas naturalis necessitas exprimit, 99.18.
40 Gummere 1917, 61. 46 hae lacrimae per elisionem cadunt nolentibus nobis, 99.19.
41 Campbell 1969, 55. 47 oblivisci quidem suorum ac memoriam cum corporibus efferre et effusissimejlere, meminisse
42 nam discessu, non solum amissione carissimorum necessarius morsus est et firmissimorum parcissime, inhumani animi est. sic aves, sic ferae suos diligunt, quarum concitatus est amor
quoque animorum contractio, 7 .1. et paene rabidus, sed cum amissis lotus extinguitur, 99.24.
43 sed plus est quad opinio adicit quam quad natura imperauit, 7 .1. 48 See Konstan 2013a for an analogous treatment of grief in Epicurean texts.
240 David Konstan Reason vs. Emotion in Seneca 241
though animals cannot be said to provide a benefaction, since they will not do it cape, is crushed along with it (57.7), a notion that he proceeds to refute by observ-
intentionally and in a spirit of generosity, they can nevertheless recognize and feel ing that the soul is constituted of such fine particles that it can, even more than
gratitude for kindnesses received. But this is to mistake Seneca's point. The pas- fire, find an exit through the densest mass (57.8). He concludes the letter by af-
sage continues: 'to such an extent does persistence in unwavering service over- finning that the real question, accordingly, is whether the soul is immortal; if it
come even those creatures that are without intelligence and appreciation of a ben- does survive the body, then it cannot in any way be destroyed, since nothing eter-
efaction' .49 Repeated benefactions bestowed on a thankless human being will nal is vulnerable to harm. 54 As stated, Seneca's position here is odd, since the Sto-
stimulate an instinctive tameness or compliance, similar to that of animals that ics, and Seneca himself in the conclusion to the Consolation f<g Marcia, main-
have been treated kindly. This is not yet gratitude in the full sense of the term, but tained that the souls of the wise did survive the death of the body, but not everlast-
is a precondition for it; although an animal can never advance beyond this un- ingly, since they would be consumed, along with everything else, in the universal
thinking disposition, human beings can reflect on their behavior, once they are conflagration; perhaps Seneca means by 'eternal' here simply enduring till the
suitably trained, as it were, and make it a matter of conscious choice and values. ekpurosis. Leaving that matter aside, Seneca's principal point is that someone like
I have already remarked on the way in which Seneca contrasts animal ferocity himself, with reasonable beliefs about the soul, will perceive no distinction be-
and aggressiveness with anger proper in De ira, and so will not elaborate further tween being squashed in a tunnel or by a falling tree, and since his good cheer
on that emotion here. I would like to conclude with a look at the emotion fear, returned as soon as he exited the tunnel, what he experienced inside it cannot be
which Seneca discusses in the fifty-seventh epistle to Lucilius. Jn this letter, Sene- described as fear in the proper sense of the term but _rathersome more primitive
ca begins by reflecting on his sense of unease while he was passing through a dark and ineradicable reaction (the imagery of a journey through subterranean obscuri-
tunnel en route from Baiae to Naples. As he puts it, 'I felt a kind of blow to my ty and the emergence into light may be a symbolic parallel to the movement from
mind which the novelty of an unfamiliar situation together with the griminess fear of bodily extinction to the immortality of the soul).
produced'. 50 He insists that this type of response cannot be eliminated by philoso- Seneca's object, here as in the letter on blushing, is to distinguish the elemen-
phy or wisdom, even that of the accomplished sage, since there are some things tary response of shock or the like from emotion, which depends on judgement and
that no amount of virtue can escape. 51 Seneca offers as a parallel the vertigo we assent. If some people do not fear being crushed under a nearby tower, it is be-
experience upon looking down from a great height, one of the examples that he cause they do not believe that their souls are at risk from such a collapse. But
cites also in his list of pre-emotions in the De ira, and he goes on to explain that what of those who do fear towers as much as tunnels, or fear some other impend-
52
'this is not fear, but rather a natural affect that cannot be eliminated by reason' . ing danger? They give their assent, wrongly from the Stoic point of view, to the
Once again, as in the case of blushing, Seneca notes that this reaction varies proposition that death is an evil and is to be avoided; but is their fear purely a mat-
among people: some men cannot endure the sight of another's blood but are pre- ter of judgement, or do they also experience that cringing anxiety at the imminent
pared to shed their own blood willingly; some faint at a fresh wound, others at one destruction of their lives? Seneca has demonstrated that one can feel the 'natural
that has festered. Seneca then repeats that what he experienced was not an emo- affect' even if one is not afraid; but can one be afraid without sensing the natural
tion but rather an alteration,53 and he begins to reflect on how foolish it is to fear 'blow to the mind'? Seneca does not say so explicitly. But I take his tendency to
some things more than others, since all end in death. After all, what difl:erence associate particular kinds of instinctive response with given emotions as an indi-
does it make whether you are killed by the collapse of a mountain, as in the tun- cation that such organic reactions accompany proper emotions generally, and lend
nel, or of a tower; both are equally lethal. Yet some do fear the former more. them that extra ictus that renders them so difficult to eliminate, once they have
Seneca then moves, with a transition that on the surface seems characteristi- arisen, by argument and persuasion.
cally abrupt, to a critique of the idea, ascribed here (if the text is sound) to certain It is interesting to observe that a similar correlation between certain instinctive
Stoics, that when the body is buried under a huge mass the soul, finding no es- responses that human beings share with animals and fully realized human emo-
tions has been proposed in the context of modem experimental psychology. Thus,
49 etiam ferae sentiunt, nee ullum tam inmansuetum animal est, non eura mitiget et Gerrod Parrott suggests that we may 'use the term ur-emotion to refer to the
in amorem sui vertat. leonum ora a magistris inpune tractantur, elephantorum feritatem commonalities shared by otherwise different emotions of various species'. 55 Par-
usque in servile obsequium demeretur cibus; adeo etiam, quae extra intellectum atque aesti- rott goes on to observe that
mationem benefieii posita sunt, adsiduitas tamen meriti pertinaeis evineit, 1.2.5.
50 sensi quendam ietum animi et sine metu mutationem quam insolitae rei novitas simul ae foe-
ditasfeeerat, 57.3. 54 nee quicquam noxium aeterno est, 57.8.
51 quaedam enim, mi Lueili, nu/la virtus potest, 57.4. 55 Parrott 2012, 247f. See also Parrott 2010, and Frijda and Parrott 2011, where ur-emotions are
52 non est hoe timor, sed naturalis adfeetio inexpugnabilis rationi, 57.4. defined as 'intentional states' accompanied a 'mode of action readiness' (the list of such
53 sensi ergo, ut dieebam, quandam non quidem perturbationem, sed mutationem, 57.6. modes eighteen in all includes acceptance, attending, avoid, reject, desire, exuberance,
242 David Konstan Reason vs. Emotion in Seneca 243
there are many differences between the emotions marah (in Indonesian), ikari (in Japanese),
BIBLIOGRAPHY
song (in Ifaluk), and anger (in English), but in all of them the ur-emotion of antagonism is
evident all four are aimed at an object that is appraised as interfering in some way with
one's concerns, and all four give rise to a motivation to stop that interference in different, cul- Adamik, B. (2005) Tres bybliothecas habeo, unam Graecam, alteram Latinam: Textkritische,
turally specific ways ... The recognition of these components across cultures leads to the intu- philologische und soziolinguistisehe Interpretation von Petrons Satyricon 48.4, Acta Antiqua
45, 133-142.
ition that there is something universal about emotions, but it is a mistake to suppose that there
exist universal 'basic emotions' marah, ikari, song, and anger are not the same emotion! Annas, J.E. (1992) Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, Berkeley.
Rather, it is the presence of the ur-emotion of antagonism that provides the intuition of uni- Campbell, R., trans. (1969) Seneca: Letters from a Stoic, Harmondsworth.
1
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ThemJ', Princeton.
In the conclusion to epistle 90, in which he treats the emergence of civilization D'Jeranian, 0. (2014) Deux theories stoi'ciennes des affections preliminaires, Revue de Philoso-
and takes issue with Posidonius' ascription of all technical advances to the work phie Ancienne 32, 225-257.
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415.
semble virtues but are not true virtues, which are only acquired through education. Gill, C. (1998) Did Galen Understand Platonic and Stoic Thinking on Emotions, in J. Sihvola and
In that early time, human beings lacked justice, wisdom, moderation, and courage, T. Engberg-Petersen (eds.), The Emotions in Hellenistic Philosophy, Dordrecht, 113--148.
the four primary virtues, according to Plato; what they possessed was rather the Graver, M. R. (1999) Philo of Alexandria and the Origins of the Stoic Opona0nm, Phronesis 44,
basic material of virtue, not virtue itself. 57 Aristotle too had distinguished between 300-325.
certain innate characteristics, which he called phusikai, that are common to chil- Gummere, R. (1917) Senecae epistulae morales, vol. I, London.
dren and animals and are similar to virtues but not virtues in the strict or proper Konstan, D. (2013a) Lucretius and the Epicurean Attitude toward Grief, in D. Lehoux, A. Morri-
son, and A. Sharrock ( eds.), Lucretius: Poehy, Philosophy, and Science, Oxford, 193-209.
sense (kurios). 58 I suggest that the relation between proto-virtues, as we may call (2013b) Emotions and Morality: The View from Classical Antiquity, in Moral Emotions,
them, and the several virtues in the proper sense of the word is analogous to that special issue of Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy 32, DOI 10.1007/s11245--013-
between the pre-emotions, as Seneca describes them, and emotions proper. Just as 9229--0.
the primitive disposition is not cancelled when we acquire true virtue but is deep- Krewet, M. (2013) Die stoische Theorie der Gefahle: Ihre Aporien, ihre Wirkmacht, Heidelberg.
ened insofar as our behavior is now ratified by understanding, so too the pre- Long, A. A. (1996) Stoic Studies, Berkeley.
emotional tendencies common to all people subtend the emotions that emerge Newmyer, S. T. (2006) Animals, Rights, and Reason in Plutarch and kiodern Ethics, New Yark.
Nussbaum, M. (2001) Upheavals of Thought: the Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge.
when people reach the age of reason. They are part of the compound sentiment of Parrott, W. G. (2010) Ur-Emotions and Your Emotions: Reconceptualizing Basic Emotion, Emo-
which Seneca speaks. If we fail to understand the nature of these instinctive re- tion Review 2, 14-21.
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tion may be, we are likely to resist altering our judgements and, instead, to justify Emotions, Emotion Review 4, 247f.
the sentiments by holding firmly to our false beliefs. And this is what makes emo- Sorabji, R. (2000) Emotion and Peace of Mind: From Stoic Agitation to Christian Temptation,
Oxford.
tions so hard to change once they have us in their grip.
Tieleman, T. (2003) Chrysippus on Affections: Reconstruction and Interpretation, Leiden.
Tutrone, F. (2012) Filosofi e animali in Roma antica: Modelli di animalita e umanita in Lucrezio e
domination, submission, tenseness, and inhibition). However, when Frijda and Parrott affirm Seneca, Pavia.
that 'Ur-emotions are elicited by events as appraised' (p. 410), they would seem to part com-
pany with the classical analyses, or else to be using the term 'appraise' in a very latitudinarian
sense in which non-human animals too can be said to appraise situations.
56 Parrott 2012, 248.
57 deerat illis iustitia, deerat prudentia, deerat temperantia ac fortitudo. omnibus his virtutibus
habebat similia quaedam rudis vita: virtus non contingit animo nisi instituto et edocto et ad
summum adsidua exercitatione perducto. ad hoe quidem, sed sine hoe nascimur, et in optimis
quoque, antequam erudias, virtutis mater/a, non virtus est, 90.46.
58 icai yap T] ClpETTl1mpa1tAT10"t(Oc; £Xelroe;Tj (j)pOVTjO"tc;
npo; -i:nv OEtvo-i:11-i:a
- OU TaUTOµev,
oµotov oe ou,:co Kai +i(j)UO"tlCTJ
ap€TTJ1tpoc;-i:nv KUptav. 1tficrt yap OOKEleicam:a -r&v110&v
U1tO:PXEtv(j)UO"Et nroc;· Kat yap OlKCX\OtKat <YCO(j)pOVlKOl Kat avopElOl Kat Tlit.la exoµev
Ev0uc; eic "{EVETT\;' all' oµroc; ~rii:ouµev E'tEpOVn 't() 1rupiroc;ayo:0ov KO:l1:a 1:0to:UTa&t,lov
1:p61tov{m&p;o,:tv.KO:lyap 1tmcrt KO:l01wfotc; ai (j)UO"lKO:l {m&pxoucrtv €~€Le;, al).: &vrn vou
f3Aaf3Epai (J)tdvov1:m oticrm, EN 1144bl-9. For Aristotle's view of natural (phusei) emotions
in relation to Seneca's, see Konstan 2013b.
SOME THOUGHTS ON THE ANGER OF SENECA'S MEDEA
Anger pervades Seneca's Medea. In this paper we will examine some of its mani-
festations at the end of the play. In doing so, we will look back to Euripides' Me-
dea, clearly a key model text, while also keeping in mind some relevant features
of Stoic ideas about the emotions. But mainly we will attempt to illustrate the ex-
tent of the direct influence on Seneca of the final scene of Vergil' s Aeneid. 1
Even in comparison with the already highly emotional Euripidean Medea,
Seneca's play notoriously offers an escalation of passion, violence and horror.
Right from the beginning, its driving force comes consistently from the main pro-
tagonist's heightened emotional state. In Euripides' version, the Nurse has the
play's opening speech, in which she expresses her fear for the children's future ('I
am afraid that she will hatch some sinister plan', 37). Seneca transfers the opening
words to Medea herself, and the tone is immediately set (49-52):
grauior exsurgat do/or:
maiora iam me scelera post partus decent.
accingere ira, teque in exitium para
fi1rore toto
my bitterness must grow more weighty: greater crimes become me now, after giving birth.
Arm yourself in anger, prepare to wreak destruction with full rage.
After hearing these appalling words, one can get a clear sense of why the Euripi-
dean Nurse was so scared. It is almost as if Seneca's prologue provides the 'ex-
planation' for the fear of Euripides' Nurse. By playing .with the fictional chronol-
ogy of literature, it is possible to imagine that the utterances of the Senecan Me-
dea were spoken before the worried speech of the Euripidean Nurse.
Established from the outset as central to the play, the vocabulary of extreme
passion will recur throughout.2 That the anger of Seneca's Medea reaches greater
We are not the first to see connections between the end of the Medea and the end of the Ae-
neid. See especially Putnam 1995, 263-265. See also Schiesaro 2003, 92-96 on Thyestes and
the closing scene of the Aeneid as a model for sacrificial death scenes in later texts. On Sene-
ca and Augustan poetry generally see now Trinacty 2014; at 136f. he links the anger at end of
the Aeneid to the Hercules Furens; see also Littlewood 2004, 152f. On Senecan emotions see
the summary of Konstan 2015. The following translations have been used: for Seneca's Me-
dea Fitch 2002; for Euripides' Medea Kovacs 1994; for Seneca's De ira Basore 1928; for
Vergil's Aeneid Ahl 2008.
2 On the metadramatic nature ofMedea's passions in the tragedy see Schiesaro 2003, 16-18.
246 Chiara Battistella and Damien Nelis Some Thoughts on the Anger of Seneca's Medea 247
heights than that of her Greek counterpart is shown in an exemplary way at lines Capite supplicium lues,
382-396: clarum priusquam Phoebus attollat diem
nisi cedis Isthmo.
Alumna, celerem quo rapis tectis pedem? You will be punished by death if you do not leave the Isthmus before Phoebus raises the
resiste et iras comprime ac refine impetum. bright day. 3
Jncerta qualis entheos gressus tulit
cum iam recepto maenas insanit deo This similarity clearly aligns the action of the two plays at this central moment in
Pindi niualis uertice aut Nysae iugis, the plot. And as in Euripides, Seneca follows on with the Chorusj but with varia-
talis recursat hue et hue motu effero, tions on the model that are all the more visible because of the connection between
furoris ore signa lymphati gerens. the lines we have just been discussing. In Euripides' version Creon exits and the
jlammatafacies, spiritum ex alto citat, scene continues with an exchange between. the Chorus and Medea. In Seneca's
proclamat, oculos uberijletu rigat,
renidet: omnis specimen affectus capit.
imitation, both Creon and Medea exit together, and instead of the very short
haeret: minatur aestuat queritur gemit. speech of the Chorus at Euripides 357-363 we get a full-scale choral ode running
quo pondus animi uerget? ubi ponet minas? from verse 301 to 3 79. Then, instead of the long Euripidean speech of Medea at
ubi se istejluctusfranget? exundatfuror. 364-409, we get the much shorter speech of the Nurse quoted in full above, and
non facile secum uersat aut medium scelus; only then a longer reply by Medea (397-425), who has evidently just reappeared
se uincet: irae nouimus ueteris notas. on stage with the Nurse. The Euripidean order of speeches involving Cre-
magnum aliquid instat, efferum immane impium:
uultum Furoris cerno. difallant metum!
on+Medea-Chorus-Medea becomes in Seneca Creon+Medea-Chorus-Nurse-
Like an ecstatic maenad taking erratic steps, crazed and possessed by the god, on snowy Pin- Medea. Seneca thus draws attention to his originality in including a speech by the
dus' peak or Nysa's ridges, so she keeps running here and there with wild movements, with Nurse at this point. It is all the more noteworthy, therefore, that the Nurse's words
signs of frenzied rage in her expression. Her face is blazing, she draws deep breaths, she offer a remarkably concentrated and powerful depiction ofa Medea subsumed by
shouts out, weeps floods of tears, beams with joy; she shows evidence of each and every passionate wrath, as the vocabulary of anger piles up: iras, furoris, juror, irae,
emotion. She hesitates, threatens, fumes, laments, groans. Which way will the weight of her
Furoris. In addition, we get such related vocabulary as impetum, insan it, lymphati,
mind come down? Where will she implement her threats? Where will that wave break? Her
rage is cresting. It is no simple or moderate crime she is contemplating: she will outdo her- flammata, fletu, minas. Indeed, we almost seem to find in these few lines as the
self. I !mow the hallmarks of her old anger. Something great is looming, savage, monstrous, Nurse herself states, 'evidence of each and every emotion' (omnis specime~ a.ffec-
unnatural. I see the face of Rage. May the gods prove my fears wrong! tus, 389). 4
Although Euripides' Nurse too brings out in two of her speeches Medea's
These lines, spoken by the Nurse, have no counterpart in Euripides' play. In fact,
savage nature and her propensity to show violent emotions (cf. 103f. and 187-
if one compares the two texts in close detail, Seneca's quite striking variation on
189), the Nurse's description of Medea in Seneca rather resembles quite closely
the model becomes obvious. In the corresponding section of the Euripidean play
the portrait of the angry man at De ira 1.1.3-5. They appear to share almost the
the pivotal encounter between Medea and Creon comes to an end at verse 356. In
same symptoms. The colour of her face, the frantic movement, the tears in her
his closing words Creon gives Medea permission to stay in Corinth for just one
eyes, the groaning, to mention only a few obvious features, help to present Medea
more day (351-354):
as a character stereotypically prone to this hideous vice (uitium deforme):
rcpouvvfom OEcrot
Vt scias autem non esse sanos quos ira possedit, ipsum illorum habitum intuere; nam ut
Et cr' ~ 'moucra Aaµrcai; O\jfE1at8rnu
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K<Xtrcai:oai; £V10<;
1f\crOE1Epµ6vcovx8ov6c;,
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8avn· AEAEK1atµu8oi; <X\jfEUOTJ<; 00£
signa sunt: flagrant ac micant oculi, multus ore toto rubor exaestuante ab imis praecordiis
But I warn you, if tomorrow's sun sees you and your children within the borders of this land,
you will be put to death. I mean what I have said.
Next comes a short speech by the Chorus (357-363), followed by a long speech of 3 We may have Ennius' version of this crucial moment in the play: si te secundo lumine hie
offendero I moriere (Vahlen fr. 6). Jocelyn 1967, 349 is cautious, but see Boyle 2014, on
Medea (364-409). In Seneca's version of the same events, the corresponding en-
296-299. This point reminds us of just how much our appreciation of the full complexity of
counter between Medea and Creon comes to an end at verse 300. In his closing Seneca's intertextual strategies is hindered by the absence of this key model. On Seneca and
words, Creon orders Medea to leave Corinth before dawn on the following day Ovid's Medea see most recently Battistella 2015; there is much of interest also in Curley 2013.
(297-299): 4 Traina's claim that the uertere of the Romans stresses the pathos of the original both at the
level of the signifier and the signified may be also applied to Seneca's rewriting of his Eurip-
idean model (1987 4 , 37).
Chiara Battistella and Damien Nelis Some Thoughts on the Anger of Seneca's Medea 249
248
sanguine, labra quatiuntur, dentes comprimuntur, horrent ac surriguntur capilli, spiritus co- T~e en~ing of Seneca's play, where the infanticide takes place, engages with
actus ac stridens, articulorum se ipsos torquentium sonus, gemitus mugitusque et parum ex- the climactic effects of such emotionality. Of course, the death of the children at
planatis uocibus sermo praeruptus et conplosae saepius manus et pulsata humus pedibus et the play's end comes as no surprise. Nonetheless, the fact that in Seneca's version
totum concitum corpus magnasque irae minas agens,foeda uisu et horrendafacies deprauan- it is articulated in two distinct phases represents an element of novelty when com-
tium se atque intumescentium - nescias utrum magis detestabile uitium sit an deforme. pared with Euripides' version. The way in which Seneca has reworked the Euripi-
You have only to behold the aspect of those possessed by anger to know that they are insane.
For as the marks of a madman are unmistakable - a bold and threatening mien, a gloomy
dean scene may offer some food for thought, especially if one considers another
brow, a fierce expression, a hurried step, restless hands, an altered colour, a quick and more literary text in which ira and the motifs of mercy, murder, punishment and sacri-
violent breathing- so likewise are the marks of the angry man; his eyes blaze and sparkle, his fice are put on display: the final scene of Aeneid 12. And in addition, as if the in-
whole face is crimson with the blood that surges from the lowest depths of the heart, his lips tertextual mix were not already complex enough, it is always important to keep an
quiver, his teeth are clenched, his hair bristles and stands on end, his breathing is forced and eye open for the presence of possible allusion to specifically Stoic thinking about
harsh, his joints crack from writhing, he groans and bellows, bursts out into speech with
the emotions, given that it has now been recognised that Seneca tragicus cannot
scarcely intelligible words, strikes his hands together continually, and stamps the ground with
his feet; his whole body is excited and performs great angry threats: it is an ugly and horrible be fully understood without taking into account philosophical components. 7
picture of distorted and swollen frenzy - you cannot tell whether this vice is more execrable . ~ccordin~ to De ira 2.4. l, anger, like ther pass~o~s, develops gradually and
or more hideous. is articulated m three movements (motus): the first is mvoluntary, a preparation
for passion; the second is an act of volition, which assumes that revenge is neces-
Medea's character is thus presented by Seneca in relation to an established, ca-
sary because of an injury, but which still may be controlled. The third movement
nonical register of extreme emotionality. 5 Reference to the literary tradition and
is quite beyond control: est iam impotens, qui non si oportet ulcisci uult sed
comparisons with philosophical investigations underpin both her inner disposition
utique, qui rationem euicit (in that it wishes to take venge,ince, not if it is right to
to get angry and the forms in which it can be expressed. Horace's Ars poetica 123
do so, but whether or not, and has utterly vanquished reason). At the play's close,
comes inevitably to mind, where he states that Medea must be fierce and implaca-
Medea's ira has clearly already entered this third stage. From the De ira we also
ble: sit Medea ferox inuictaque.6 When the Senecan Nurse says at verse 394, 'I
learn that anger is bent on punishment (auida poenae, 1.5.3), which perfectly fits
know the hallmarks of her old anger' (irae nouimus ueteris notas), she makes the
our tragic narrative, the ultimate goal of whfoh is murderous revenge. However,
same point that the Nurse makes right at the start of Euripides' play, based on her
Seneca warns, pudor and morae can serve as checks (De ira 3.1.2): alias pudor
previous experience (37-39): coepto deiecit, alias mora, lentum praecipitis mali remedium 9 ( others are turned
OEOOtKao' U"ll't~VµT]n ~O'llAEU<J'[l
vfov· from the_irc~urse by shame, others by procrastination - a slow remedy, this last,
~apEta yap <ppT]V,ouo' aVESE'tmKUKW<; for a swift disorder). Now, Medea has been attentively depicted as both refusing
n&crxoucr' (eyifioa [ ...J
1:11voE) pudor (~O? _abeatexpulsus pudor let any sense of shame be expelled) and raising
I am afraid that she will hatch some sinister plan. Her temper is violent, and she will not put
the possibility of delay, mora (988 quid nunc moraris, anime? quid dubitas? why
up with bad treatment (I know her)[ ... ]
delay now, my spirit? why hesitate?) only to refuse it too. Horribly, the only thing
Within the terrible logic of the Senecan play itself, it is only by committing the th~t is slow in this case is the pleasure she takes in the accomplishment of her
horrible crime of infanticide that Medea can fulfil the role demanded of her by c~i~e: perfruer~ lento scelere (relish your crime in leisure, 1016). With the possi-
literary precedent and thus tragically become truly herself. This point is suggested bility of any kmd of delay or change of mind eradicated, the play's specta-
by the terrible irony of the first half of verse 171. There the Nurse starts to say tors/readersio can only wait for the final acts in order to find out precisely how
something, beginning with the name Medea, only to be immediately interrupted Seneca will decide to present the infanticide. It is at this pqint that the presence of
by Medea herself, who famously interjects the single wordfiam ('I will become a possible Vergilian intertext merits discussion.
her'). The point is that she will indeed only become fully Medea through the In the last scene of the Aeneid Turnus is wounded by Aeneas. Turnus makes a
completion of her murderous vengeance. In this way, Seneca inscribes his play into suppliant's plea. His words seem to take effect, and Aeneas stops his hand, until
a long literary tradition, declaring his status as a latecomer but using this declaration
as a marker of his success in taking his Medea to new depths of crime and suffer-
ing, which will also result in the creation of a different and more poignant finale. 7 The problems are numerous and the bibliography vast, but for holistic views of Seneca's
writings see, for example, Tarrant 2006 and Ker 2006.
5 In narratological terms, emotionality may be defined as the competence preceding action (cf. 8 On this cf. Graver 2014, 271ff. and passim.
9 Cf. also 3.12.4 maximum remedium irae dilatio est, ut primus eius feruor relanguescat et
Bartezzaghi 1988, 58; cf. also Greimas 1983, 245).
6 Medea's traditional depiction in tragedy seems to contravene Aristotle's warning against caligo, quae premit mentem, aut residat aut minus densa sit.
manly representations of female characters, cf. Poetics 1454a20. 10 On this cf. Kohn 2013 and 2015.
250 Chiara Battistella and Damien Nelis Some Thoughts on the Anger of Seneca's Medea 251
his eyes light on Pallas' baldric. 11 He then strikes and kills Turn us in a fit of pas- ing with two climactic scenes of killing. Nevertheless, we will try to set out as
sionate anger. In order to facilitate comparison with the close of Seneca's Medea, clearly as possible the parallels between the two texts, taking Seneca as our start-
we will quote the closing lines in full (930-952): ing point, in order to try to assess whether he is indeed alluding to Aeneid 12 in
ille humilis supplex oculos dextramque precantem any meaningful sense.
protendens 'equidem merui nee deprecor' inquit; At 970, Medea strikes to kill the first child: uictima manes tuos I placamus
'utere sorte tua. miseri te si qua parentis ista (with this sacrifice I placate your shade); it is these words that mark the actual
tangere cura potest, oro (fuit et tibi talis death stroke. She presents the murder of her child as a sacrifice that will placate
Anchises genitor) Dauni miserere senectae her brother Apsyrtus, whom she had murdered during the journey from Colchis
et me, seu corpus spoliatum lumine mauis,
back to Greece. References to his death are frequent in the play. 12 After express-
redde meis. uicisti et uictum tendere palmas
Ausonii uidere; tua est Lauinia coniunx, ing doubts and hesitations right up to the last minute (especially lines 926-932),
ulterius ne tende odiis '. stetit acer in armis but in fact right up to line 952 (inuitam manum), the struggle in her soul contin-
Aeneas uoluens oculos dextramque repressit; ues, before the climactic declaration ira, qua ducis, sequor at 953 (anger, where
et iam iamque magis cunctantemjlectere sermo you lead, I follow). Then, as she prepares to kill her son, her brother Apsyrtus
coeperat, infelix umero cum apparuit alto comes to mind. In lines 958-966 she seems to imagine his shade approaching,
balteus et notis fulserunt cingula bullis
alongside the Furies, 13 who desire vengeance for his death. She then declares that
Pallantis pueri, uictum quern uulnere Turnus
strauerat atque umeris inimicum insigne gerebat. her breast is 'open' to the Furies (pectus en Furiis patet) and invites her brother to
ille, oculis postquam saeui monimenta doloris tell them to withdraw (967f.). She goes on to ask Apsyrtus to act, apparently im-
exuuiasque hausit, furiis accensus et ira agining that he is the one who is going to strike the blow with the sword she has
terribilis: 'tune hinc spoliis indute meorum drawn: utere hac, frater, manu I quae strinxit ensem (969f.). Eventually she kills,
eripiare mihi? Pallas te hoe uulnere, Pallas while the second half of line 971, quid repens affert sonus? (what is the meaning
immolat et poenam scelerato ex sanguine sumit'.
of this sudden noise?) marks the beginning of the nexfitage of the action.
hoe dicens ferrum aduerso sub pectore condit
feruidus ira; ast illi soluuntur frigore membra If we now compare this first killing with the end of the Aeneid, a number of
uitaque cum gemitufugit indignata sub umbras. similarities come easily to mind. There too the essential movement of the climac-
Low on the ground and on bended lmee, he appeals with extended hand, with an earnest look tic scene is one that proceeds from hesitation (et iam iamque magis cunctantem
in his eyes, and declares: 'I've deserved this, now am I begging for life. Opportunity's yours; flectere sermo/coeperat, 12.940f.) to mention of the Furies (furiis/Furiis accensus,
and so use it. But, if the love ofa parent can touch you at all (for you once had just such a fa- 12.946), 14 to the actual strike of the sword. At that moment, enraged by the sight
ther, Anchises), I beg you to pity the aged Daunus, and give me, or if you prefer, my lightless
of Pallas' baldric, Aeneas speaks thus (12.948f.):
cadaver, back to my kin. You've won; the Ausonians have witnessed the vanquished reaching
his hands out to make his appeal. Now Lavinia's your wife. Don't press your hate any fur- 'Pallas te hoe uulnere, Pallas
ther'. Aeneas, relentless in combat, stops; and though rolling his eyes, he holds back his hand immolat et poenam scelerato sub pectore sum it'
from the death-stroke. Slowly but surely, the words take effect, but when a harness catches 'Pallas gives you this death-stroke, yes Pallas makes you the sacrifice, spills your criminal
his gaze, high on Turnus's shoulder, gleaming with amulet studs, those pleas have no chance blood in atonement!' ·
of fulfilment: Pallas' s oh so familiar belt, which Turnus has shouldered after defeating and
killing the boy. It's the mark of a hated personal foe. As his eyes drink in these mementoes of With these words he presents Pallas as the killer of Tumus. In addition, he pre-
savage pain, these so bitter spoils, Aeneas. grows fearsome in anger, burning with fire of the sents the killing as a sacrificial act (immolat). This strikingly unexpected dou-
Furies. 'You, dressed in the spoils of my dearest, think that you could escape me? Pallas bling, which has Aeneas plunge the sword into Turnus precisely as he presents
gives you this death-stroke, yes Pallas makes you the sacrifice, spills your criminal blood in Pallas as the killer, is repeated by Seneca. At 969f. Medea tells Apsyrtus to 'use
atonement!' And, as he speaks, he buries the steel in the heart that confronts him, boiling with
this hand that has drawn the sword', and then goes on to use the first-person plural
rage. Cold shivers send Turn us' limbs into spasm. Life flutters off on a groan, under protest,
down among shadows. form placamus. This can of course be taken simply as plural for singular, but there
is added point if Medea is in fact imagining herself and Apsyrtus together killing
Close comparison between this scene and Seneca's account of the death of Me-
dea's children will reveal a number of similarities. One must always allow, of
12 Cf. 278; 452; 473; 487; 911; 936.
course, for the possibility of accidental verbal confluences, given that we are deal- 13 On this cf. Aygon 2004-2005.
14 On the inherent ambiguity created by the fact that it is hard to decide whether one should read
11 The bibliography on this closing scene is of course vast; for ways in to the debates see the either furiis or Furiis see, for example, Polleichtner-Nelis 2009, 109; Konstan 2010, 14f.
recent expert contributions by Putnam 2011; Tarrant 2012, 16-30. More generally see Feeney 1991, 83.
252 Chiara Battistella and Damien Nelis Some Thoughts on the Anger of Seneca's Medea 253
15
the child, thus producing a climactic doubling up, exactly as in Vergil. Seneca's (oro ... Dauni miserere senectae, I beg you to take pity the aged Daunus, 12.933f.;
phrase utere hac, frater, manu (969) is highly evocative in this respect. It is as if cf. 12.932 miseri ... parentis). When Aeneas finally thrusts his sword (ferrum,
both Pallas and Apsyrtus enact their own vengeance. The sight of Pallas' baldric 12.950) into Turnus, he presents the act, as we have already noted, both as one of
may also have a counterpart in Medea's vision of her brother (963f.): punishment and as a sacrifice.
The presence of the motif of the internal audience, hesitation, the request for
cuius umbra dispersis uenit
incerta membris? Frater est, poenas petit
pity, the iron sword, the lethal blow seen as both a punishment and a sacrificial act
whose shade approaches ill-defined with limbs dispersed? It is my brother, he seeks amends. are all features common to both texts. In thyse passages also the wider context is
one in which a perceived wrong now leads to revenge/ with the underlying idea
Seneca's phrase poenas petit strikingly activates a point of textual contact with that arrogance must be punished. Just as Medea describes Jason as superbus at
Aeneid 12.949 poenam ... sumit: in both cases, retribution is successfully exacted. verse 1007, Turnus is consistently presented as super bus across the Aeneid, in
As Medea moves on to the final stage of her actions and the killing of the se- which the adjective usually refers to overbearing arrogance. 16 The reader's
cond child, we once again pass first through a moment of doubt and hesitation: memory can easily go back at least to Aeneid 10.514 17 ... te, Turne, super bum I
quid nunc moraris, anime? quid dubitas? (Why delay now, my spirit? Why hesi- caede noua quaerens (he seeks you out, Tumus, proud of your latest slaughter).
tate? 988). She then rejoices in the presence of Jason as a spectator of the final At 12.326 he is described as superbus for the final time. 18 Turnus' and Jason's
moments of the play: derat hoe unum mihi, spectator ipse (this was the one thing I arrogance paves the way to the ultimate act of revenge, in which a bloody price in
lacked, this spectator, 992f.). Jason then first asks her to spare the second son: iam the form of human sacrifice is exacted (macto; litarem; immolat) to assuage the
parce nato (spare our son now, 1004), before going on to ask Medea to kill him, protagonists' ira and furor. 19 The function of monimentum doloris assigned to
presenting this action as sacrificial: noxium macta caput (sacrifice my gui~ty life, Pallas' baldric worn by Turnus is transferred, as it were, to. Medea's children in
1005). Medea replies that she will drive the sword (ferrum, l 006) where 1t hurts that they embody the living memory of her recent past. 20 Moreover, it may be
most and uses the adjective superbus of Jason: i nunc, superbe, uirginum thala- added that Turnus' plea to Aeneas not to extend his hatred further at 938 (ulterius
mos pete (go on now, arrogant man, seek out virgins' bedrooms, 1007). Jason ne tende odiis) looks conceptually close to Jason's request to Medea to spare the
replies that the death of one son is enough punishment: unus est poenae satis (one second child (unus est poenae satis, 1008).
boy is enough to punish me, 1008). Finally, at verse 1018, Medea kills the second If the arguments set out here succeed in convincing anyone that Seneca's in-
son, saying misereri iubes (you bid me have pity, 1018). tertextual strategy at the end of his Medea includes allusion to the final scene of
Once again, there are parallels with the V ergilian text. There, as we have Aeneid 12, the connection between the two texts may be thought to raise the ques-
seen, hesitation precedes final action. There too, strong attention is drawn to the tion of the legitimacy of Medea's anger in light of debates about the morality of
presence of an internal audience: in lines 928f., when Turnus is first wounded by Aeneas' actions. Looking at the commonalities on which we have been insisting,
Aeneas, Vergil takes care to devote two whole verses to the reaction of the Ru- key differences stand out. Medea revels in a double murder; she even experiences
tulians as they watch the scene unfold:
Consurgunt gemitu Rutuli totusque remugit 16 On the adjective in the Aeneid see Lloyd 1972.
mons circum et uocem late nemora alta remittunt.
17 Cf. Lloyd 1972, 131f.
Up leaped Rutulians moaning in notes re-intoned in the whole hill's rippled response, as their
18 Anchises' advice to Aeneas at Aeneid 6.853 parcere subiectis et debellare superbos (to spare
voices are echoed around by the high woods the humble and to tame the proud in war) must resonate at the poem's end, ensuring that Tur-
In Turnus' final speech, he refers to the presence of the Italian onlookers: uicisti et nus can be thought of as superbus right up to the very end and, at the very least, complicating
the possibility of seeing him as simply subiectus.
uictum tendere palmas I Ausonii uidere (you've won; the Ausonians have wit-
19 Cf. also Seneca, Medea 38f. postque sacrificas preces I caedam dicatis uictimas altaribus
nessed the vanquished reaching his hands out to make his appeal, 12.936f.), thus (with reference to the first murder in the tragedy, that of the new bride and her father). For the
strengthening the idea of the presence of an internal audience in the minds of upsetting choice of staging a human sacrifice in the Aeneid cf. Putnam 1995, 254; cf. also
readers. At this point, also Tumus asks to be spared: et me ... redde meis (and give Polleichtner-Nelis 2009, 105f.; Tarrant 2012, 21 on revenge and sacrifice as an old motif of
me ... back to my kin, 12.934f.). He specifically asks Aeneas to pity his father tragedy. Considerations of space here preclude detailed discussion of the ways in which Sen-
eca may have read the closing scene of the Aeneid as a text constructed out of tragic models
and motifs. On ancient anger and retaliation cf. e.g. Vogt 2006, 58.
15 Putnam 1995, 265 notices that Medea 970f. uictima manes tuos I placamus ista recalls Ver- 20 Or because they remind her of Jason? On the children's resemblance to their father as area-
gil's immolat in Aeneid 12.949. In comparing Medea's with Aeneas' anger, gender is not an son for Medea's vengeance, which is perhaps adumbrated in Seneca, Medea 23-26, cf. Bes-
obstacle, since women are often represented as masculine when they are affected by anger sone 1997, 258f. On Dido acting as Medea see, for example, Vergil, Aeneid 4.84; 328f.; 600f.
and punish in tragedy. Cf. Seneca, Medea 42; 268 and Harris 2003, 137 and passim. and in general Nelis 2001, chap. 4.
254 Chiara Battistella and Damien Nelis Some Thoughts on the Anger of Seneca's Medea 255
pleasure through it (uoluptas, 991). Moreover, she makes a shocking claim by 0 unhappy woman, why does wrath falls so heavy upon your mind and one rash murder suc-
professing herself ready to probe her vitals with the sword, should another child ceed another?
lie hidden in her womb (1011-1013). 21 Manifesting pleasure in exacting revenge As we have seen, unlike that of Euripides, Seneca's finale counts on an accumula-
was firmly condemned by the Stoics (Seneca, De ira l.6.5). As for the Epicure- tion of the vocabulary of furious anger. Medea's monologue (893-977) preceding
ans,22 Philodemus in his On Anger (44) rejects the idea that the wise man may the infanticide is packed with ira (7x) and juror (3x), to which the appearance of
find any pleasure in revenge: revenge is necessary, but there is no pleasure in it the Furies Medea envisions is to be added (4x). Ira, as we have already pointed
(he is not 'impelled to his revenge as to something enjoyable - because it has out, leads the way (ira, qua ducis, sequor, 957), but Medea's action, to be suc-
nothing pleasurable to offer him - but approaches it as something most necessary cessful, needs, as it were, the final validation of an external the Furies, her
and most unpleasurable, as he would the drinking of apsinthion or surgery' [trans. brother's avenging divinities, so that they may injectfiwor into her and ira may
courtesy of D. Armstrong]). 23 In this light, the contacts between Seneca and Ver- turn into something even more violent and irrational. 25 And incidentally, from
gil rather than bringing them closer, make Medea's cruelty stand out even more Seneca's treatise On Anger we learn that ira has a retenue of comites adfectus,
terribly and invite us to turn back to the final scene of the Greek play. 24 amongst which rabies, saeuitia, crudelitas andfi1ror are listed (2.12.6). The con-
The infanticide section at the close of Euripides' Medea is almost devoid of course of ira and juror, or rather the progression frorn the one to the other, is ef-
the vocabulary of anger that is so predominant in the rest of the play. The mono- fectively described in 2.36.5: Aiacem in mortem egit Juror, in furorem ira (it was
logue Medea delivers shortly before her murder does not give prominence to any frenzy that drove Ajax to his death and anger drove him into frenzy). It is our be-
sign of anger or similar emotion, as if she had already evacuated her passions lief that, in addition to the relevance of philosophical analysis of passionate anger
(.Medea 1242-1250): and his overall adherence to Euripides as a key model text, it w.as in the final sce-
aU' et' 6rr:W;ou,1mpofrx:Tl µEAAOµev ne of Aeneid 12 that Seneca encountered a powerful and climactic meditation on
't:(XOElV<X
KO'.VO:yKata
µT]1tpacrcre1v
KO:Ka; anger and murderous revenge, one that profoundly influenced the ways in which
&y', w1:&11,mva xdp eµfi, 11,a!3i:l;i<poc;, he went about bringing his own play to a close.
A&!3', rrpoc;!30:A.!3100:
AU1t1']pav !3iou,
Kal µl] KO:KtcrOftc;
µrio' &.vaµv1']cr0nc; TEKVCOV,
roe;q,{l1:aO',chi;EnK'tEt;"Ct/\.1.Ci
'tT]VOqe
,,a0ou !3paxe'i:aviiµepav rra{ocovcreOev, BIBLIOGRAPHY
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23 Cf. Konstan 2010, l 7f.
24 Ovid too in 1vfetamorphoses 7.396f. does not seem to approve ofMedea's act: sanguine nato-
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I.Ephesos 519: 155 n. 46 BMC III
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SEG XLI 1003 II: 151 n. 34 975-1034: 88
SEG XLIV 1182 B: 152 n. 38 1035-1041: 87
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SEG XLIV 938: 155 n. 46 1050-1052: 88 11. 36
SEGXLVIII 1104: 146n. 11 1072: 88
SEG LVII 635: 145 n. 7 1040f: 88 n. 33
SEGLVII ll85: 155n.46 1178-1230: 88 n. 35
1233: 38 n. 32
1307: 34 n. 15
Coins
1309--1311: 43 n. 45
BMC I Claudius 228: l 63 n. 25 1330: 91 n 46
BMC II Vespasian 369: 163 n. 26 l388f: 47 n. 67
BMC ll Vespasian 414-416: 163 n. 26 1590-1599: 34n. 15
BMC IT Domitian 301-303-416: 163 n. 27
Choephori
BMC II Domitian 368: 163 n. 27
249: 38 n. 32
BMC II Vespasian 6: 163 n. 28
928 39 n. 35
BMC II Vespasian 430: 163 n. 28
994: 38 n. 32, 39
258 Index locorum Index locorum 259
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