G.R. No. 207105. November 10, 2015.

ARSENIO A. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and SALVADOR S. PILLOS, respondents.

Administrative Proceedings; Due Process; It is worthy to state

that the observance of due process in administrative proceedings
does not always require or involve a trial-type proceeding, for the
demand of due process is also met whenever a person, being
notified, is afforded the opportunity to explain or defend himself.—
We note that the petitioner’s citizenship came to the fore because
he himself asserted his Philippine citizenship in his answer to
Pillos’ petition to cancel his CoC in order to bolster his allegation
of compliance with the one-year residency requirement. As such,
he could not credibly complain about being denied due process,
especially considering that he had been able to file an opposition
to Pillos’ motion for reconsideration. It is worthy to state that the
observance of due process in administrative proceedings does not
always require or involve a trial-type proceeding, for the demand
of due process is also met whenever a person, being notified, is
afforded the opportunity to explain or defend himself. Also, due
process is satisfied by giving the opportunity to seek the
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The rule is
the same in election cases.
Election Law; There are two (2) remedies available under
existing laws to prevent a candidate from running in an electoral
race. One is by petition for disqualification, and the other by
petition to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy.—A valid CoC arises upon the timely filing of a
person’s declaration of his intention to run for public office and his
affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position he
seeks to assume. The valid CoC renders the person making the
declaration a valid or official candidate. There are two remedies
available under existing laws to prevent a candidate from running
in an electoral race. One is by petition for disqualification, and the
other by petition to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate
of candidacy.

_______________

* EN BANC.
 354

354 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

Same; The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the

Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) under Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC) involves a finding not only that a person
lacked a qualification for the office he is vying for but also that
such he made a material representation in the CoC that was false.
—The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code involves a finding not
only that a person lacked a qualification for the office he is vying
for but also that such he made a material representation in the
CoC that was false. The Court has stressed in Mitra v.
Commission on Elections, 622 SCRA 744 (2010), that in addition
to materiality there must be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render the
candidate ineligible.
Same; Citizenship; By his Oath of Allegiance and his
renunciation of his United States of America (USA) citizenship, he
reverted to the status of an exclusively Filipino citizen.—The
petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on March 9, 2012 and
executed his Affidavit of Renunciation on October 2, 2012. By his
Oath of Allegiance and his renunciation of his USA citizenship, he
reverted to the status of an exclusively Filipino citizen. On
October 5, 2012, the date he filed his CoC he was, therefore,
exclusively a Filipino citizen, rendering him eligible to run for
public office. His CoC was valid for all intents and purposes of the
election laws because he did not make therein any material
misrepresentation of his eligibility to run as Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
Same; Same; Dual Citizenship; The petitioner’s continued
exercise of his rights as a citizen of the United States of America
(USA) through using his USA passport after the renunciation of
his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual
citizen. Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to
public office in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code (LGC).—We uphold the declaration by the
COMELEC En Banc that the petitioner was ineligible to run and
be voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
It is not disputed that on October 6, 2012, after having
renounced his USA citizenship and having already filed his CoC,
he travelled abroad using his USA passport, thereby representing
himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued using his USA
passport in his subsequent travels abroad despite having been
already issued his Philippine passport on Au-

355

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 355

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

gust 23, 2012. He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of

renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA
passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012.
Consequently, he could be considered an exclusively Filipino
citizen only for the four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6,
2012. The petitioner’s continued exercise of his rights as a citizen
of the USA through using his USA passport after the renunciation
of his USA citizenship reverted him to his earlier status as a dual
citizen. Such reversion disqualified him from being elected to
public office in the Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the
Local Government Code.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Judd L. Anastacio for petitioner.
Ferdinand P. Ignacio for respondents.

BERSAMIN, J.:

A person of dual citizenship is disqualified from running

for a public office in the Philippines.

The Case

The petitioner seeks to annul and set aside the adverse

resolution issued on April 23, 2013 in SPA No. 13-023 (DC),
1
whereby the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En
Banc disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion

for Reconsideration of Petitioner Stewart D. De La
Cruz in SPA No. 13-024 (DC) is denied for lack of
merit. On the other hand, the Motion for
Reconsideration of Petitioner Salvador S. Pillos in
 SPA No. 13-023 (DC) is granted; consequently, the
Certificate of Candidacy of

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 195-201.

356

356 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

Respondent Arsenio A. Agustin is hereby

CANCELLED and DENIED DUE COURSE.
SO ORDERED.2

Antecedents

In 1997, the petitioner was naturalized as a citizen of

the United States of America (USA).3 On October 5, 2012,4
he filed his certificate of candidacy (CoC) for the position of
Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte to be
contested in the May 13, 2013 local elections.5 As the
official candidate of the Nacionalista Party,6 he declared in
his CoC that he was eligible for the office he was seeking to
be elected to; that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen;
and that he had been a resident of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte for 25 years.7
On October 10, 2012, respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a
rival mayoralty candidate, filed in the COMELEC a
Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin, docketed as
SPA No. 13-023 (DC),8 alleging that the petitioner had
made a material misrepresentation in his CoC by stating
that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos
for 25 years despite having registered as a voter therein
only on May 31, 2012. The petition stated the sole ground
thuswise:

THE DECLARATION UNDER OATH MADE BY

THE RESPONDENT THAT HE IS ELIGIBLE FOR
THE OFFICE OR SEEK TO BE ELECTED TO (sic)
CONSTITUTES MATERIAL
MISREPRESENTATION FOR THE
_______________

2 Id., at p. 200.
3 Id., at p. 65.
4 Id., at p. 44.
5 Id., at p. 34.
6 Id., at p. 45.
7 Id., at p. 44.
8 Id., at pp. 32-36.

357

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 357

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

TRUTH OF THE MATTER (sic) HE HAS NOT

RESIDED AS REQUIRED BY LAW FOR A PERIOD
OF ONE YEAR IN THE LOCALITY HE SEEKS TO
BE ELECTED.9

and prayed, viz.:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed before

this Honorable Commission, to issue an order to
immediately deny due course and or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy of respondent Arsenio A.
Agustin.
Other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed
of (sic).10

In his answer, the petitioner countered that the one-year

requirement referred to residency, not to voter registration;
that residency was not dependent on citizenship, such that
his travel to Hawaii for business purposes did not violate
the residency requirement pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence; and that as regards citizenship, he attached
a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation of U.S./American
Citizenship executed on October 2, 2012.11
On January 28, 2013, the COMELEC Second Division
issued its omnibus resolution,12 pertinently holding:

As can be clearly gathered from the Velasco case,

a candidate’s status as a registered voter is a material
fact which falls under the same classification as one’s
citizenship or residence. While they are under the
 same classification as referring to a candidate’s
qualification for elective office, the requirements are
different. The requirement that a candidate must be a
registered voter does not carry with it the
requirement that he must be so one

_______________

9 Id., at p. 34.
10 Id., at p. 36.
11 Id., at pp. 52-54, 65.
12 Id., at pp. 162-166.

358

358 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

year before the elections because this refers to the

residency qualification.
On this score, it could not be said that respondents
falsely represented the length of their residence in the
municipality simply because they became registered
voters thereof only fairly recently. As far as
registration as a voter is concerned, it should suffice
that they are duly registered upon the filing of their
COCs or within the period prescribed by law for such
registration.
Anent petitioners[’] allegations that respondents
were unable to vote because they are residents of
other countries, the records are bereft of any evidence
that would substantiate this. It is a fundamental rule
that he who alleges, not he who denies, must prove.
Here, petitioners have not adduced a single shred of
competent evidence that respondents were actually
residents or citizens of other countries that is why
they were unable to vote.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.13

On February 12, 2013, Pillos moved for the

reconsideration of the January 28, 2013 resolution with the
COMELEC En Banc.14 He underscored in his motion that
the certification issued by the Bureau of Immigration
reflected that the petitioner had voluntarily declared in his
travel documents that he was a citizen of the USA; that
when he travelled to Hawaii, USA on October 6, 2012, he
still used his USA passport despite his renunciation of his
USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 and after filing his CoC
on October 5, 2012, in which he declared that he was a
resident of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte; and
that the petitioner’s declaration of his eligibility in his CoC
constituted material misrepresentation be-

_______________

13 Id., at pp. 165-166.

14 Id., at pp. 167-184.

359

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 359

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

cause of his failure to meet the citizenship and residency

requirements.
The petitioner opposed the motion for reconsideration.15
On April 23, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued its
assailed resolution cancelling and denying due course to
the petitioner’s CoC, observing as follows:

Having admitted his dual citizenship, Agustin had

the burden of proving through his evidence that he
complied with the statutory requirements imposed
upon dual citizens provided under Republic Act 9225,
particularly Sections 3 and 5(2) thereof, to wit:
xxxx
While Agustin presented a copy of his Affidavit of
Renunciation, he failed to furnish this Commission a
copy of his Oath of Allegiance. Noteworthy is the fact,
that in Agustin’s Affidavit of Renunciation, it was
stated that his Oath of Allegiance is attached as
Annex “B”; however, said attachment has not been
made available for the perusal of this Commission.
Having failed to sufficiently show that he complied
with the provisions of RA 9225, Agustin’s COC must
be cancelled and/or denied due course. Consequently,
the Motion for Reconsideration is only granted as
against Respondent Agustin.16
 On May 3, 2013, the petitioner filed a Verified Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court.17 He
attached thereto copies of the Order of Approval dated
February 12, 201218 and his Oath of Allegiance dated
March 9, 2012,19 both issued by the Consulate General of
the Philippines in Honolulu, Hawaii. He further attached
certifications issued by Election Officers in Ilocos Norte
attesting that the documents

_______________

15 Id., at pp. 188-192.

16 Id., at pp. 199-200.
17 Id., at pp. 202-211.
18 Id., at p. 216.
19 Id., at p. 217.

360

360 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

had been received by the COMELEC and retained in its

files. He explained that the documents were not presented
during the course of the proceedings because the sole issue
raised by Pillos’ Petition to Deny Due Course and/or to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy had involved only his
(petitioner) compliance with the one-year residency
requirement.
Pillos submitted a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution and Comment on the Verified Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave of Court on May 8, 2013,20
praying that a writ of execution be issued to implement the
cancellation of the petitioner’s COC.
On election day, May 13, 2013, the name of the
petitioner remained in the ballot. He was later on
proclaimed as the duly elected Municipal Mayor of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte for obtaining 5,020 votes,21 the highest among
the contending parties.
Sensing that the 30-day period within which a petition
for certiorari should be filed in the Supreme Court was
about to expire, the petitioner filed on May 24, 2013 an
Urgent Motion to Withdraw Verified Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration with Leave of Court dated May 3, 2013.22
 On May 28, 2013, the petitioner thus instituted this
case, alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the COMELEC En
Banc based on the following grounds:

a. The assailed En Banc Resolution was

promulgated in gross violation of Petitioner’s
guaranteed Constitutional Right to Due Process and
to be informed of the facts and the law on which the
same was based; and

_______________

20 Id., at p. 249.
21 Id., at p. 225.
22 Id., at pp. 226-229.

361

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 361

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

b. The grave erroneous appreciation of the facts,

law, and the evidence of the case.23

Meanwhile, on June 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc,

pointing out that the filing of a motion for reconsideration
of an En Banc resolution was not allowed under Rule 13 of
the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure; and that,
accordingly, the April 23, 2013 resolution was deemed final
and executory pursuant to Section 8, paragraph 2 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, issued the writ of
24
execution.
On July 16, 2013, the Court required the parties to
observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the
COMELEC En Banc resolution dated April 23, 2013.25

Issues

The core issue involves the eligibility of the petitioner as

a candidate for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte.
A secondary issue concerns the propriety of Pillos’ claim
as the rightful occupant of the contested elective position.
 Ruling

The petition for certiorari lacks merit.

The Court finds and declares that the petitioner made
no material misrepresentation in his CoC; hence, there is
no legal or factual basis for the cancellation of the CoC.
Even so, he was disqualified to run as Mayor of the
Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for being a dual
citizen. With his disqualification having been determined
and pronounced by final judgment before the elections, the
votes cast in his favor

_______________

23 Id., at p. 9.
24 Id., at pp. 250-251.
25 Id., at pp. 256-257.

362

362 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

should not be counted. Accordingly, his rival, respondent

Pillos, should be proclaimed duly elected Mayor for
obtaining the highest number of votes in the elections.

1.
Administrative due process was observed

Before anything more, let us deal with the petitioner’s

insistence that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its
discretion in resolving Pillos’ motion for reconsideration
based on a ground that was neither the basis of nor raised
in the Petition To Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin; that the
non-presentation of his Oath of Allegiance should not be
fatal to his constitutional right to run for public office
especially because the sole ground for Pillos’ petition in the
COMELEC had dealt only with the residency requirement;
that Pillos could have included citizenship as a ground by
the amendment of his petition, but he did not move for that
purpose; that he duly complied with the requirements for
the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship pursuant to
Republic Act No. 9225, and the proof of the reacquisition
had been submitted to the Election Officers in Ilocos Norte;
and that the COMELEC, by not at least holding a
clarificatory hearing to ascertain and confirm such matters,
violated his right to due process by denying to him the
opportunity to prepare for his defense.
The petitioner’s insistence lacks merit.
We note that the petitioner’s citizenship came to the fore
because he himself asserted his Philippine citizenship in
his answer to Pillos’ petition to cancel his CoC in order to
bolster his allegation of compliance with the one-year
residency requirement. As such, he could not credibly
complain about being denied due process, especially
considering that he had been able to file an opposition to
Pillos’ motion for reconsideration. It is worthy to state that
the observance of due process in administrative
proceedings does not always require or

363

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 363

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

involve a trial-type proceeding, for the demand of due

process is also met whenever a person, being notified, is
afforded the opportunity to explain or defend himself. Also,
due process is satisfied by giving the opportunity to seek
the reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.26
The rule is the same in election cases.27

2.
The petitioner filed a valid CoC, but the use
of his USA passport after his renunciation
of foreign citizenship rendered him disqualified
from continuing as a mayoralty candidate

A valid CoC arises upon the timely filing of a person’s

declaration of his intention to run for public office and his
affirmation that he possesses the eligibility for the position
he seeks to assume. The valid CoC renders the person
making the declaration a valid or official candidate.28
There are two remedies available under existing laws to
prevent a candidate from running in an electoral race. One
is by petition for disqualification, and the other by petition
to deny due course to or to cancel his certificate of
candidacy. In Fermin v. Commission on Elections,29 the
Court has differentiated the two remedies thuswise:
 [A] petition for disqualification, on the one hand,
can be premised on Section 12 or 68 of the OEC, or
Section 40 of the LGC. On the other hand, a petition
to deny due course to or cancel a CoC can only be
grounded on a

_______________

26 Office of the Ombudsman v. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, October 5,

2011, 658 SCRA 626, 640.
27 Reyes v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 207264, June 25, 2013,
699 SCRA 522, 538-539.
28 Talaga v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 196804 and G.R. No.
197015, October 9, 2012, 683 SCRA 197, 231.
29 G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 182369, December 18, 2008, 574
SCRA 782.

364

364 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

statement of a material representation in the said

certificate that is false. The petitions also have
different effects. While a person who is disqualified
under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a
candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or
denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a
candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC.30

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states:

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or

cancel a certificate of candidacy.—A verified petition
seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on
the ground that any material representation
contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not
later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided,
after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen
days before the election.
 The Court has described the nature of a Section 78
petition in Fermin thusly:

[t]he denial of due course to or the cancellation of

the CoC is not based on the lack of qualifications but
on a finding that the candidate made a material
representation that is false, which may relate to the
qualifications required of the public office he/she is
running for. It is noted that the candidate states in
his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the office
he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is
to be read in relation to the constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications or
eligibility for public office. If the candidate
subsequently states a material representation
in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC,
following the law, is empowered to deny due
course to or cancel such certificate. Indeed, the
Court has

_______________

30 Id., at p. 796.

365

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 365

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a

quo warranto proceeding under Section 253 of the
OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or
qualification of a candidate, with the distinction
mainly in the fact that a “Section 78” petition is filed
before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto
is filed after proclamation of the winning candidate.31

The denial of due course to or the cancellation of the

CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
involves a finding not only that a person lacked a
qualification for the office he is vying for but also that such
he made a material representation in the CoC that was
false. The Court has stressed in Mitra v. Commission on
Elections32 that in addition to materiality there must be a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
that would otherwise render the candidate ineligible, viz.:

The false representation under Section 78 must

likewise be a “deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render
a candidate ineligible.” Given the purpose of the
requirement, it must be made with the intention to
deceive the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s
qualifications for public office. Thus, the
misrepresentation that Section 78 addresses cannot
be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot
exist in a situation where the intent to deceive is
patently absent, or where no deception on the
electorate results. The deliberate character of the
misrepresentation necessarily follows from a
consideration of the consequences of any material
falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact
cannot run; if he runs and is elected,

_______________

31 Id., at pp. 792-794.

32 G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744, 769.

366

366 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be

prosecuted for violation of the election laws.33

A petition for the denial of due course to or cancellation

of COC that falls short of the foregoing requirements
should not be granted.
The petition of Pillos in SPA No. 13-023 (DC) was in the
nature of the Section 78 petition to deny due course to or to
cancel the CoC of the petitioner because it contained
allegations pertaining to a Section 78 petition, namely: (a)
the petitioner as a candidate made a representation in his
CoC; (b) the representation referred to a material matter
that would affect his substantive right as candidate (that
is, the right to run for the position for which he filed his
CoC); and (c) he made the false representation with the
intention to deceive the electorate as to his qualification for
public office, or he deliberately attempted to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render him
ineligible. Pillos further challenged the petitioner’s
eligibility for public office based on his failure to comply
with the one-year residency requirement stated in the
Local Government Code, and ultimately specifically prayed
that the COMELEC “issue an order to immediately deny
due course and or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of
respondent Arsenio A. Agustin.”34
Yet, the COMELEC En Banc canceled the petitioner’s
CoC not because of his failure to meet the residency
requirement but because of his failure “to sufficiently show
that he complied with the provisions of RA 9225.”35 In our
view, such basis for cancellation was unwarranted
considering that he became eligible to run for public office
when he expressly renounced his USA citizenship, by
which he fully complied

_______________

33 See also Fermin v. Commission on Elections, supra note 29 at p.

792; Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135886, August 16,
1999, 312 SCRA 447, 455.
34 Rollo, p. 36.
35 Id., at p. 200.

367

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 367

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

with the requirements stated in Section 5(2) of Republic

Act No. 9225, to wit:

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and

Liabilities.—Those who retain or reacquire Philippine
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:
xxxx
(2) Those seeking elective public in the
Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding
such public office as required by the Constitution and
 existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the
certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
xxxx

More particularly, the petitioner took his Oath of

Allegiance on March 9, 2012 and executed his Affidavit of
Renunciation on October 2, 2012. By his Oath of
Allegiance and his renunciation of his USA citizenship, he
reverted to the status of an exclusively Filipino citizen. On
October 5, 2012, the date he filed his CoC he was,
therefore, exclusively a Filipino citizen, rendering him
eligible to run for public office. His CoC was valid for all
intents and purposes of the election laws because he did
not make therein any material misrepresentation of his
eligibility to run as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte.
Nonetheless, we uphold the declaration by the
COMELEC En Banc that the petitioner was ineligible to
run and be voted for as Mayor of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte. It is not disputed that on October 6,
2012,36 after having renounced his USA citizenship and
having already filed his

_______________

36 Id., at p. 126.

368

368 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

CoC, he travelled abroad using his USA passport,

thereby representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He
continued using his USA passport in his subsequent travels
abroad37 despite having been already issued his Philippine
passport on August 23, 2012.38 He thereby effectively
repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the
first time he used his USA passport after renouncing his
USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could
be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the
four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012.
 The petitioner’s continued exercise of his rights as a
citizen of the USA through using his USA passport after
the renunciation of his USA citizenship reverted him to his
earlier status as a dual citizen.39 Such reversion
disqualified him from being elected to public office in the
Philippines pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, viz.:

Section 40. Disqualifications.—The following

persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
xxxx
(d) Those with dual citizenship.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

A candidate is ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected

to office, and he is disqualified if he lacks any of the
qualifications for elective office.40 Even if it made no
finding that the petitioner had deliberately attempted to
mislead or to misinform as to warrant the cancellation of
his CoC, the COME-

_______________

37 Id., at pp. 126, 324-325.

38 Id., at p. 238.
39 Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, April 16,
2013, 696 SCRA 420.
40 Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, supra note 33 at p. 457.

369

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 369

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

LEC could still declare him disqualified for not meeting

the requisite eligibility under the Local Government Code.

3.
The petitioner was declared disqualified by
final judgment before election day; hence, the
votes cast for him should not be counted

Considering that the Section 78 petition to deny due

course to or to cancel the CoC requires a finding that he
made a material representation in the CoC that was false,
the COMELEC En Banc, in granting Pillos’ motion for
reconsideration, expressly held the petitioner ineligible to
participate in the elections or disqualified from the
mayoralty race, which was the basis for the cancellation of
his CoC. Such reason cancelling the petitioner’s CoC
despite the absence of the material misrepresentation at
the time he filed his CoC might not be in order, but the
undisputed fact is that the COMELEC En Banc expressly
decreed his disqualification in the April 23, 2013
resolution.
The effect of the petitioner’s disqualification under the
April 23, 2013 resolution depended on when the
disqualification attained finality. The distinction exists
because of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (The
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987), which states:

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—Any

candidate who has been declared by final judgment to
be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial
and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

370

370 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

In Cayat v. Commission on Elections,41 the Court has

expounded on the effect of Section 6 of Republic Act No.
6646 thusly:

The law expressly declares that a candidate

disqualified by final judgment before an election
cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not
be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law.
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, The Electoral
Reforms Law of 1987, states:
 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.—
Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not
be voted for, and the votes cast for him
shall not be counted. If for any reason a
candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election,
the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest and, upon motion of the complainant or
any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong. (Emphasis added)
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987
covers two situations. The first is when the
disqualification becomes final before the elections,
which is the situation covered in the first sentence of
Section 6. The second is when the disqualification
becomes final after the elections, which is the
situation covered in the second sentence of Section 6.
The present case falls under the first situation.
Section 6 of the Electoral Reforms Law governing the
first situation is categorical: a candidate
disqualified

_______________

41 G.R. No. 163776 and G.R. No. 165736, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23.

371

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 371

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

by final judgment before an election cannot

be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be
counted. The Resolution disqualifying Cayat became
final on 17 April 2004, way before the 10 May 2004
elections. Therefore, all the 8,164 votes cast in Cayat’s
favor are stray. Cayat was never a candidate in
the 10 May 2004 elections. Palileng’s proclamation
 is proper because he was the sole and only candidate,
second to none.42

Even if his disqualification did not subvert the validity

of his CoC, the petitioner would be reduced to a
noncandidate under the terms of Section 6, supra, should it
be shown that the disqualification attained finality prior to
the 2013 elections. The effect was to render the votes cast
in his favor stray, resulting in Pillos being proclaimed the
winning candidate.
It is crucial, therefore, to determine with certainty the
time when the judgment declaring the petitioner
disqualified from running for the local elective position
attained finality.
Pillos submits that the April 23, 2013 resolution was
already deemed final and executory as of May 4, 2013;
hence, the writ of execution was issued on June 18, 2013;
and that the petitioner’s disqualification thus attained
finality prior to the May 13, 2013 elections.
Pillos’ submission is correct.
Although the petitioner filed his Verified Urgent Motion
for Reconsideration with Leave of Court on May 3, 201343
upon receiving the April 23, 2013 resolution granting
Pillos’ motion for reconsideration,44 such filing did not
impede the April 23, 2013 resolution from being deemed
final and executory because Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the
1993 COMELEC Rules of

_______________

42 Id., at p. 45.
43 Rollo, pp. 202-212.
44 Id., at p. 200.

372

372 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

Procedure expressly disallowed the filing of the motion

for reconsideration.45 Within the context of Section 13, Rule
18,46 and Section 3, Rule 37,47 both of the 1993 COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the April 23, 2013 resolution became
final and executory as of May 4, 2013 upon the lapse of five
days from its promulgation without a restraining order
being issued by the Supreme Court.
Under the circumstances, the finality of the petitioner’s
disqualification pursuant to the April 23, 2013 resolution
prior to the May 13, 2013 elections rendered him a
noncandidate, and the votes cast for him should not have
been counted.48 Pillos, being the qualified candidate
obtaining the highest number of votes, should be
proclaimed duly elected as Mayor of the Municipality of
Marcos, Ilocos Norte in the 2013 elections.
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for
certiorari; AFFIRMS the resolution dated April 23, 2013

_______________

45 Section 1. What Pleadings are not Allowed.—The following

pleadings are not allowed:
xxxx
(d) motion for reconsideration of an En Banc ruling, resolution, order
or decision except in election offense cases. x x x
xxxx
46 Section 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.—x x x
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolutions of
the Commission En Banc shall become final and executory after five (5)
days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court. x x x
xxxx
47 Section 3. Decisions Final After Five Days.—Decisions in pre-
proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel
certificates of candidacy, to declare a candidate as nuisance candidate or
to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or suspend elections shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days from their
promulgation, unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
48 Cayat v. Commission on Elections, supra note 41 at p. 45.

373

VOL. 774, NOVEMBER 10, 2015 373

Agustin vs. Commission on Elections

insofar as it disqualified petitioner Arsenio A. Agustin

from running for any local elective position in the May 13,
2013 elections; DECLARES respondent Salvador S. Pillos
the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos
Norte in the May 13, 2013 elections; ORDERS the
Commission on Elections to cause the proclamation of
 respondent Salvador S. Pillos as the duly elected Mayor of
the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte in the May 13,
2013 elections; and REQUIRES the petitioner to pay the
costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

Sereno (CJ.), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro,

Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe
and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., On Leave.
Peralta, J., No part.
Mendoza, J., On Leave.
Jardeleza, J., No part.

Petition dismissed, resolution disqualifying petitioner

Arsenio A. Agustin affirmed. Respondent Salvador S. Pillos
declared duly elected Mayor of Municipality of Marcos,
Ilocos Norte.

The twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of

Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship in R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to a natural-born
Filipino who did not subsequently become a naturalized
citizen of another country. (Id.)

——o0o——

© Copyright 2024 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.