BEAR

BEAR
STEARNS
STEARNS ABS Research
April 12,
December 2001
8, 2005

Bear,
Bear, Stearns
Stearns & Co.
& Co. Inc.Inc.
245 Park Avenue
383 Madison Avenue
NewNew
York,York, New York 10167
NY 10179
Introduction to Asset-Backed CDS
(212) 272-2000
(212) 272-2000
www.bearstearns.com
www.bearstearns.com

Gyan Sinha
Gyan(212) 272-9858
Sinha
(212)[email protected]
272-9858
[email protected]
V.S. Srinivasan
Karan
(212)P.S. Chabba
272-8054
(212)[email protected]
272-1978
[email protected]

The research analysts who pre-

pared this research report
hereby certify that the views
expressed in this research
report accurately reflect the
analysts' personal views about
the subject companies and their
securities. The research ana-
lysts also certify that the ana-
lysts have not been, are not,
and will not be receiving direct
or indirect compensation for
expressing the specific recom-
mendation(s) or view(s) in this
report.
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 Table of Contents

Table of Contents

Page
Section I: Introduction
Introduction ....................................................................... 6

Historical Background ....................................................................... 6

Section II: Review

Corporate CDS ....................................................................... 10

Asset-Backed Securities ....................................................................... 11

Section III: Asset-Backed CDS Market

Growth of Asset-Backed CDS ....................................................................... 16

Asset-Backed CDS Investor Base ....................................................................... 16

Section IV: Asset-Backed CDS vs. Corporate CDS

Unique ABS Bond Characteristics ....................................................................... 20

Section IV: Asset-Backed CDS Contract

I. Pay-As-You-Go (PAUG) Asset-Backed CDS ....................................................................... 24

Interest Shortfall Variants ....................................................................... 26

II. Cash-Settle Asset-Backed CDS ....................................................................... 29

III. Physical Settle Option under PAUG or ....................................................................... 35

Cash-Settle Asset-Backed CDS

Section V: Asset-Backed CDS Valuation

Asset-Backed CDS Pricing ....................................................................... 40
Risk-Neutral Pricing ....................................................................... 42
Static Replication Pricing ....................................................................... 43

Unwind Valuation of Asset-Backed CDS ....................................................................... 49

Section VI: A Look Ahead

A Look Ahead ....................................................................... 52

Appendix I: Example of CDS Cash Flows ....................................................................... 53

Appendix II: Static Replication for a Discount ....................................................................... 55

Bond

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Page 4
SECTION I: INTRODUCTION

Page 5
Introduction

Introduction1
A Credit Default Swap (CDS) is a bilateral contract between a protection buyer and a protection seller ref-
erencing an underlying reference obligation for a fixed maturity. The contract stipulates that in exchange
for a fixed premium that is paid a pre-set number of times a year on an agreed upon notional amount, the
protection seller will make whole any credit losses incurred on the underlying obligation. As in any swap,
no money changes hands at inception. As a result, CDS are viewed as instruments to “synthetically” trans-
fer the credit risk of an asset in contrast to the more conventional route of selling the asset outright and
receiving cash in exchange. Indeed, one could even argue that they resemble insurance contracts more so
than swaps since most periodic payments go one way, from protection buyer to seller. It is only when a
credit event is declared that the seller of protection is obligated to make any payments if the terms of the
contract so dictate.

While CDS contracts are no longer a novelty in the credit markets, more recently the pool of reference obli-
gations has been broadened to include asset-backed and mortgage-backed securities. The purpose of this
primer is to introduce our readers to this latest round of innovation in the credit markets. In doing so, we
recognize fully that CDS, in their general form, may still be new to some in our audience which tradition-
ally has focused on the buying and selling of “cash” as opposed to “synthetic” instruments. In order to fill
this gap, we also provide a brief history of developments in the corporate CDS markets. This discussion
will be useful in another respect - highlighting some of the differences between the corporate and asset-
backed varieties of CDS contracts. For those of our readers already familiar with much of this background
material, we suggest skipping ahead directly to section 3 which introduces single-name Asset-Backed
CDS.

Historical Background
Over the last 10 years, the credit derivatives market has emerged as an important component of the overall
derivatives market. The evolution of this market is the culmination of a process that began to unfold with
the securitization markets. A key feature of securitization - the bundling of pools of individual assets in an
bankruptcy remote vehicle for sale in the capital markets - was that it broke the link between origination
and the funding and risk-taking involved in the creation of risky debt. Until the emergence of the securiti-
zation market, all three functions resided in one institution, the deposit-taking local bank that invested
short-term deposits in long-term assets, primarily mortgages. The Mortgage-Backed-Securities (MBS) mar-
ket changed all that, allowing financial institutions to specialize in the functions in which they had a natu-
ral competitive advantage, such as originating loans and servicing them. In return, the onus of funding
and holding the risk was shifted on to capital market participants, such as the Government-Sponsored-
Enterprises (GSE), life insurance companies, pension funds, etc. Indeed, one can argue that it is precisely
this development that allowed specialty finance companies to emerge as “pure” originators in the auto
loan, credit card, and mortgage-backed sectors since they could finance their origination programs and
transfer the credit risk using the capital markets. It took two decades for this process to come to its full
potential, and one can truly claim that the US ABS and MBS markets are one of the best functioning in the
world in their ability to fund almost $10 trillion in outstanding assets.

The synthetic market evolved as the second step in the securitization process. As financial institutions
became larger and were able to fund themselves efficiently and cheaply in the capital markets, the funding
advantage of the capital markets shrank. In addition, for certain assets such as corporate loans, the sale of
the loan was deemed as cumbersome since it broke the close link between banker and borrower. Unlike
granular assets like mortgages and credit cards, corporate lending was viewed as one where the relation-
ship between the lending institution and the borrower was viewed as a highly negotiated business. In such
a situation, since funding could be had just as cheaply on the balance sheet and the sale of the loan (and the
potential impediment to the continuation of a healthy relationship) was not considered desirable, a “syn-

1. We would like to thank Louis Nees, Todd Kushman and Dmitry Pugachevsky for many helpful discussions during the writing of
this primer.

Page 6
 Historical Background

thetic” transfer of credit risk emerged as a viable risk-management tool. The first synthetic securitizations
used pools of corporate loans and were issued by large commercial banks such as JP Morgan and National
Westminster. In a synthetic risk transfer, the lender pays a premium for protection on a pool of assets to a
third party, a protection seller. As should be clear from the description presented earlier, the structure is
called “synthetic” because it mimics a cash sale of the asset to the protection seller, but the sale is executed
using a derivative contract. Therefore, the risk is effectively transferred, albeit synthetically.

Synthetic transactions have been further utilized in the corporate bond market through the introduction of
a more specific risk transfer instrument, the single-name credit default swap or CDS. Although CDS first
emerged in 1993, they did not become widely available and used until 1997. Since then, this market has
grown remarkably, most notably in the corporate sector because the assets to be first actively and liquidly
traded synthetically were corporate bonds and loans. The market has seen not only a dramatic growth in
the total notional value of contracts written on single name corporates, but this growth has contributed to
a paradigm shift from cash to synthetic transactions. Figure 1 below shows how the growth in synthetic
Collateralized-Debt- Obligation (CDO), created from pools of single name CDS, has occurred in conjunc-
tion with the slowing growth rates in cash CDO issuance. It should also be noted that the growth of the
new “single-tranche” style of synthetic CDO, utilizing a correlation book could not have occurred without
the development of a liquid single-name default swap market in the underlying names as well as the stan-
dardized indices composed from these names.

Figure 1: CDO Issuance

200
Cash Corporate CDO Synthetic Corporate CDO

175

150

125
$Billions

100

75

50

25

0
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003

Source: Bear Stearns

In many ways, the synthetic market in corporate risk can be regarded as having come full circle. The first
transactions referenced pools of risk and were used to transfer risk from balance sheets. As the single-
name market developed, the need to move risk in pool form went away since it could be hedged on a indi-
vidual name basis. Finally, as the single-name market itself developed, a pooled market in the names
emerged which investors could use as a hedging tool as well as a source of spread income.

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Page 8
SECTION II: REVIEW

Page 9
Corporate CDS: A Review

Corporate CDS: A Review

A CDS is a contract between a party who buys default protection on some reference entity, and the coun-
terparty that sells that protection. The default of the reference entity is called a credit event, and the buyer
of the protection obtains the right to sell a particular bond issued by the reference entity (known as the ref-
erence obligation) for its par value when a credit event occurs. The cost of this protection takes the form of
fixed periodic payments to the protection seller for the duration of the contract, or until such a credit event
occurs; settlement usually requires a final accrual payment by the protection buyer.

Figure 2: Credit Default Swap Economics

At contract initiation:

Credit Protection

Protection
Protection Seller
Buyer
Premium * Notional (quarterly)

Credit Risk on Reference Entity

In the case of a Credit Event:

Physical Settle Cash Settle

Par on the Notional Value Par - Market Value

Protection Protection Protection

Protection Seller
Buyer Seller Buyer
Reference Obligation (or Pari Passu)

In corporate credit markets, the CDS is settled either by physical delivery of the reference obligation or by
a cash payment where the value of the reference obligation following the credit event is determined by an
auction / dealer poll. Under cash settlement, the poll establishes a mid-market price R of the reference
security and settlement is for (100- R)% of the notional principal, paid to the protection buyer. Under phys-
ical delivery, the protection buyer has the option to deliver any “borrowed money” obligation with the
same subordination. This gives the protection buyer the option to deliver the cheapest bond with the given
subordination.

A CDS is a form of a put option, but the ability to exercise is only triggered by a credit event. Also, instead
of purchasing the option outright in one payment, periodic payments are made in the case of CDS, and
only up until a credit event takes place. The protection buyer does not have the option of canceling the
insurance payments for the remaining contract term prior to maturity, so the analogy with some other
forms of insurance goes only so far. Instead, the protection buyer must unwind the CDS by selling it in the
open market.

When a CDS is negotiated, the current market price of protection is such that the contract has zero value at
that time. CDS spreads are typically quoted on a quarterly basis, and the most liquid market is for the 5-
year maturity. There is no payment by the buyer at the start of the contract, and the fixed periodic pay-
ments are made in arrears. Importantly, CDS have been able to separate funding from credit by allowing
trading in an unfunded swap format. The major effect of this has been that the credit markets have become
more accessible to investors with high funding costs and those looking to leverage credit risk in either
direction. In effect, these products have given an investor the flexibility of doing anything that the cash

Page 10
 Asset-Backed Securities: A Review

market does and much more. For example, there have been instances of CDS on issuers with no tradable
debt.

These features have led to an exponential growth of the CDS market over the past decade, particularly
since 1998 when the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) standardized the terminol-
ogy in credit derivatives transactions. This has been most notable in corporate CDS that were the first
assets to be actively traded. The total CDS Notional has exceeded the cash supply of debt in most corpo-
rate names. Figure 3 presents a comparison of corporate debt and CDS notional outstanding at the end of
2004.

Figure 3: Corporate Debt and CDS Outstanding

6,000 120%
CDS Notional (Left Axis)
Public and Private Corporate Debt (Left Axis)
CDS Notional / Corporate Debt (right axis)

5,000 100%

4,000 80%

3,000 60%

2,000 40%

1,000 20%

- 0%
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
$ Billions

Source: British Bankers' Association, Bloomberg, BMA

In our view, the increasing maturity and sophistication of the corporate CDS market will only aid the
development of newer forms of risk-transfer, such as CDS on ABS. Much of the groundwork for the devel-
opment of the market has been laid already, and more importantly, participants have a frame of reference
to understand the pitfalls that arise in the process of transferring risk synthetically. Before we go on any
further however, and in recognition of the fact that a synthetic market has the potential to draw in many
new investors, we provide a brief review of the ABS markets themselves.

Asset-Backed Securities: A Review

The key element of asset-backed securitization (ABS) is the establishment of a “bankruptcy remote” spe-
cial purpose vehicle (SPV) structured to hold pools of individual assets and provide cash flow to its bond-
holders. We use ABS in a generic sense to include all securitization vehicles encompassing both RMBS and
CMBS assets. A typical structure is shown below.

Page 11
Asset-Backed Securities: A Review

Figure 4: Asset-Backed Security Structure

Borrower Investor

Borrower Funding Cash Special Cash Investor

Lender /
Purpose
Servicer
Borrower Cash Flow s 1) Risk Vehicle (SPV) 1) ABS Investor
2) Cash Flow s 2) Risk
Borrower 3) Cash Flow s Investor

There are two basic variants of ABS/CMBS structures:

a) Master Trust Structures (Revolving Structures): A pool of receivables is transferred to a master trust
and the master trust then issues one or many series of notes backed by these receivables. Most master
trusts have a revolving period during which any principal payments received on loan balances are used to
purchase additional receivables instead of paying off existing notes. In many instances this is followed by
an accumulation period when principal payments are accumulated in a separate account. The final phase
is the amortization period when the accumulated and new payments are used to pay down a set of issued
notes. These amortizations have evolved such that principal is repaid over a pre-determined time period
or close to a single date - almost bullet-like. Credit cards are usually securitized through such structures.

b) Closed End Structures (Senior/Subordinate Structures): No new receivables are added to the securiti-
zation pool on an on-going basis and there is only one series of notes that are issued on the assets to be
securitized. Credit enhancement is usually done through excess spread and some combination of mort-
gage insurance, reserves, overcollateralization, subordination and monoline insurance. These are typically
structured so that mezzanine and subordinate classes may begin receiving principal after a pre-deter-
mined lock-out period, subject to certain performance triggers. Home equity deals are usually securitized
through such structures.

A wide variety of assets, such as home equity loans, auto loans, credit card receivables, student loans,
vehicle leases, and many others have been securitized in this fashion and sold to investors. A general rule
is that any asset with “reasonably” predictable cash flows can be (and probably has been) securitized as
can be seen below from a sector-wise break-up of outstanding ABS/CMBS.

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 Asset-Backed Securities: A Review

Figure 5: ABS Outstandings - Q2-2005

Other
15%

Hom e Equity
26%

Student Loans
7%

Manufactured Housing
2%

Lease
3%

CBO/CDO Credit Card

15% 20%

Auto
12%

Source: BMA

Figure 6: CMBS Outstandings - Q2-2005

U nk no w n
0 .2 5%
W ar eho us e Heal t h C ar e
0 .11% 1.0 5%
Ind us t r i al
4 .8 2 %
Sel f St o r ag e
1.4 3 % Lo d g i ng
7.19 %

M i x ed U s e
2 .3 7%

R et ai l M o b i l e Ho me
2 9 .8 0 % 1.8 3 %

M ul t i - F ami l y
2 1.50 %

Ot her
2 .9 8 %

Of f i c e
2 6 .6 6 %

Source: Trepp

Though some sources in academia have traced the roots of securitization as far back as the 1400s (!), the
real growth of the ABS market started in the 1980s. The market for publicly offered ABS issuance was $1.2
billion in 1985 (source: BMA) and since then it has grown exponentially to a new record of $671 billion in
2004 ($339 billion till May 2005. Source: BMA). This growth clearly is not showing signs of slowing in the
near future. The compound annual growth rate of ABS public issuance was 20% between 1999 and 2003
and issuance has grown over 40% in just 2004 over 2003.

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Asset-Backed Securities: A Review

Figure 7: The Growth of the ABS/CMBS Market

2005 Q2 $1,860 $510

2004 $1,828 $459

2003 $1,694 $382

2002 $1,543 $322

2001 $1,281 $278

2000 $1,072 $220

1999 $901 $173

Total ABS Outstanding Total CMBS Outstanding

1998 $732 $114

$- $500 $1,000 $1,500 $2,000 $2,500

$ Billions

Source: BMA, Trepp

Until now, the ABS market has provided investors the opportunity to only go long risk on the underlying
assets. Shorting ABS in the cash market is extremely difficult and some would argue, well nigh impossible.
As a result, there has been no easy way for investors to express a negative view on the overall ABS markets
or specific segments of it. In addition, due to the lack of shorting vehicles, investors could not hedge exist-
ing ABS positions. Originators wishing to hedge asset pipelines while ramping up an ABS structure have
also found themselves taking on execution risk between ramp-up and pricing. An important reason for
this situation is the fact that the vast proportion of the capital structure of an ABS transaction consists of
highly rated securities. Thus, the outstanding “float” in securities that could legitimately be viewed as
being “risky” is generally so small as to create the potential for a short squeeze. In addition, a significant
concern in the shorting of cash bonds is the funding disadvantage for the typical speculators (such as
hedge funds) that are the driving force behind relative value plays in the credit markets. It is not surprising
therefore that the capital markets would look to synthetic ABS as a tool to fill this gap.

Page 14
SECTION III: ASSET-BACKED CDS MARKET

Page 15
Growth of Asset-Backed CDS

Growth of Asset-Backed CDS

Synthetic risk-transfer in ABS markets in not a new phenomenon but what is new is the use of single-name
CDS to synthetically transfer risk. Until the emergence of the single-name variant, synthetic ABS technol-
ogy had been applied primarily in the securitization context. Examples of these transactions include the
Freddie Mac MODERNs deal, Toyota's Gramercy Park automobile lease transaction, the BankAmerica
RESIF deal and the HSH CMBS transaction. Importantly, the synthetic ABS sector was viewed as a creative
alternative to traditional securitization rather than an active market for the trading of credit risk in ABS.
There was very clearly the need for the development of a market in single-name Asset-Backed CDS. How-
ever, the growth of a liquid Asset-Backed CDS market was hindered in the past few years by the lack of
standard documentation for the product, the relative non-existence of an investor base to short or hedge
ABS risk and the abundance of cash CDO collateral in the market.

This has changed in the past year and the trading of the single-name Asset-Backed CDS has increased from
a negligible amount in 2003 to almost $75-$100 billion through November 2005. Most of this increased vol-
ume has been equally divided between RMBS and CMBS assets while smaller volumes have traded on
CDOs/Credit Cards/Autos. Most RMBS CDS trades have been on the triple-B rating bucket while CMBS
trades have been divided equally between triple-A and triple-B rating buckets.

This has been driven primarily by consistency in contract documentation, difficulty in sourcing collateral
by cash CDO managers and the interest of market players like hedge funds in exploiting any pricing ineffi-
ciencies in the ABS market. ISDAs release of standard confirmations for Asset-Backed CDS has made the
market more liquid by removing most of the burdens stemming from non-standard documentation. It has
led to a vibrant secondary market in Asset-Backed CDS as investors are able to easily assign existing deals
and get competitive quotes across the dealer community for unwinding or putting on new trades.

Asset-Backed CDS Investor Base

A look at the potential investor base for Asset-Backed CDS gives us an idea of the growth potential of this
market in the next few years.

Protection Sellers
The demand for selling protection arises largely from the same group of investors that currently invest in
cash ABS. Asset-Backed CDS serves as a good substitute for taking on ABS risk in sectors where cash issu-
ance tends to be constrained. This is an increasingly common phenomenon in the lower rated parts of the
capital structure as increasing demand from ABS CDOs often leads to a paucity of cash bonds for other
investors.

CDS on ABS allow investors or CDOs to gain exposure to a sector quickly and in size. While accumulating
$250 million in BBB rated cash HEL securities could take as much as three to four months, the CDS market
allows an equivalent sized exposure to be taken on in the course of a single day. In addition, a CDO can
structure its underlying asset portfolio in different forms using Asset-Backed CDS to reference diverse
issuers, sectors or vintages that may not be readily available in the cash market.

Leveraged investors such as hedge funds constitute another source of demand. They can use the unfunded
synthetic ABS market to express views on ABS credit using higher leverage than currently offered through
the cash ABS market.

Protection Buyers
At first glance, there would seem to be less demand for protection buying since structural features in ABS
are designed to avoid defaults and most ABS are investment-grade rated, giving investors little incentive
to buy protection. Also, while institutions like banks have natural credit exposures to corporates through
loans, derivatives transactions etc., the same is not usually true of credit exposures to ABS structures.

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 Asset-Backed CDS Investor Base

However, first glances can be misleading and there exist ample sources of demand for buying ABS protec-
tion.

A large source of demand is from investors looking to express a negative view on ABS credit. This has his-
torically been impossible through the cash market because of the lack of a liquid repo market in ABS
bonds. Another source of demand comes from ABS issuers hedging their deal pipeline who may be look-
ing to hedge the risk that spreads would widen while they are in the process of completing their structure.

Two-Way Interest
Hedge funds or other relative value players serve as important constituencies in both the protection buy-
ing and selling markets. In doing so, they may be looking to exploit any price inefficiencies across rating
classes or within a CDO capital structure, trading the basis between the cash bond and the CDS or
attempting to manage any correlation risk from CDO trades. Non-originator banks can access markets
without the need for a platform and can take a view on a sector spreads in either direction.

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Page 18
SECTION IV: ASSET-BACKED CDS vs. CORPORATE CDS

Page 19
Unique ABS Bond Characteristics

Unique ABS Bond Characteristics

Before we discuss the features of asset-backed CDS, it may be helpful to first understand the unique char-
acteristics of ABS. This will aid us in determining the validity of applying terms specific to the corporate
market to the ABS market.

Principal Payments - Both prepayment uncertainty and principal write-downs change the outstanding
notional of the ABS bond over its life. As a result, it would make sense to amortize the notional of the
asset-backed CDS as well. This is different from a corporate bond (and thus the notional of a corporate
CDS) that usually has a fixed bullet repayment at maturity.

• Prepayment Uncertainty - This does not occur in corporate bonds that have a fixed amortization
schedule. However, ABS bonds can get prepaid as and when the underlying assets - RMBS, CMBS,
and credit card receivables etc. - get prepaid. This creates uncertainty about the amortization schedule
in ABS cash bonds and thus a failure to pay according to a fixed amortization schedule would be diffi-
cult to justify as a legitimate credit event.

• Principal Write-downs - In contrast to corporate bonds, principal on ABS bonds may be reduced. This
can happen if losses on the underlying assets exceed available credit enhancement or if principal pay-
ments from underlying assets is used to pay any interest shortfall. Most ABS bonds have a provision
for this write-down to be reimbursed if the underlying assets start performing again. It may be inap-
propriate to classify such an event as a default event unless the write-down is relatively large or has
been outstanding for a long time without any possibility of recovery in the future.

Interest Payments / Interest Shortfalls - Again, in contrast to corporate bonds, many ABS bonds have the
flexibility to alter interest payments when cash flows from underlying assets are insufficient to repay bond
interest. This can occur in two main ways:

Payment In Kind (PIK) - In this case the bonds accrue interest by adding the shortfall amount to the out-
standing principal balance. The accrued interest in most cases also compounds until it is repaid. These
interest shortfalls can be reimbursed if performance recovers but there can be instances when this becomes
a permanent loss. Again, it may be inappropriate to classify such an event as a default until the PIK-ing is
too large or has been outstanding for a long time.

Available Funds Cap (AFC) - This is most common in US HEL ABS but is also prevalent in US RMBS and
certain European CMBS. The interest rate cap stems from the fact that ABS bonds are usually floating rate
instruments while the underlying collateral may have a large percentage of fixed rate or hybrid-ARM
products. This creates the possibility of interest inflows being smaller than interest outflows if the coupon
on the ABS tranches (floating rate index plus margin) is higher than the weighted average net coupon on
the underlying collateral. To prevent this imbalance, bond interest is capped at available funds, which is
the weighted average net coupon on the underlying collateral. This is an inherent interest shortfall risk for
the buyer of the cash bond and thus it makes sense for the Asset-Backed CDS to have a similar feature if it
is to mimic the underlying bond.

Change in Credit Profile - De-levering - This primarily holds for subordinated tranches that effectively
get a higher credit enhancement as the higher tranches pay down either with time or on account of
breaches in some structural covenants. This obviously lowers the credit risk of these tranches and does not
have any parallels in a corporate bond. Such a de-levering brings down the spread on the cash bond and
should correspondingly bring down the Asset-Backed CDS spread too.

Tenor - (Legal Final Maturity vs. Average Life or Expected Life) - ABS bonds have long legal final maturities
that reflect the tenor of the long-maturity assets like residential mortgage loans etc. in the underlying pool.
However, their expected life is not very long since they pay down much earlier because of prepayments. A
measure used by the market to gauge their expected maturity is the weighted average time of principal

Page 20
 Unique ABS Bond Characteristics

repayments or average life. While most contracts would tend to match the legal final maturity of the
underlying ABS bonds, it is possible to have contracts that have shorter maturities nearer the expected life
or average life of the ABS bond. However, shorter maturity Asset-Backed CDS can leave a protection
buyer open to “default” risk between the time the CDS matures and the final maturity date of the cash
bond.

Uniqueness of Reference Obligation (RO) - The performance of an ABS bond is very specific to a particu-
lar pool of collateral and its place in the capital structure and not highly dependent on the issuer of the
ABS. This is because credit performance of the cash bond varies depending on:

Vintage - year of origination - different years have different quality of assets based on factors like economic
conditions, underwriting standards etc. For example a 2004 RMBS pool might have more default-prone
borrowers than a 2002 pool because rising home prices may have increased the credit quality of many
subprime borrowers.

Asset mix - different bonds can have different underlying assets and thus very different credit risks.

Seniority - structurally, the subordinate bonds in an ABS transaction absorb losses before the senior bonds
and thus are more prone to default.

Therefore, unlike a corporate CDS that references any “borrowed money obligation” of a reference entity,
an Asset-Backed CDS is specific to a reference obligation and has no “cheapest-to-deliver” option (except
in the case of master trust structures like credit cards).

Management Control Over Defaults - Usually the management of any corporation exerts control over the
ability or timing of the default decision through small changes in the capital structure, operational effec-
tiveness, labor force, market strategy etc. However, an ABS is ruled by strict covenants and structural fea-
tures that the manager or the trustees have very little control over. This would imply that there is less early
jump-to-default risk and a higher probability of back-ended defaults.

These unique ABS characteristics have lead to the formulation of an Asset-Backed CDS contract distinctly
different from the Corporate CDS contract. Table 1 highlights some of these differences.

Page 21
Unique ABS Bond Characteristics

Table 1: Structural Comparison - Corporate CDS and ABS - CDS

Characteristic Corporate CDS Asset-Backed CDS

Reference Entity - Corporate Bond / Loan - Asset Backed Security

Reference Obligation - Cheapest-to-Deliver Option - Specific Reference Obligation

Notional Amount - Fixed (No Uncertainty) Varies with notional of cash bond primarily on account of
- No Prepayment risk 1. Prepayments
- No Writedown risk 2. Writedowns

De-levering Not Applicable to the bond Possible due to structural features

Control Over Default Management discretion Structural features of the bond

Interest Shortfall
1. AFC Not Applicable Applicable in CDS on certain type of ABS
2. PIK Not Applicable Applicable in CDS on certain type of ABS

Settlement Method - Physical - PAUG (Pay-As-You-Go) / Physical Settle

- Cash (Market Valuation Process) - Cash / Physical Settle

Scheduled Termination 2 / 5/ 7 / 10 years common Depends on type of CDS settlement

1. PAUG - Legal Final Maturity of ABS Bond
2. Cash Settle - 5 years at present (other maturities might
develop)

Premium (Fixed Rate) Fixed at Origination Depends on type of CDS settlement

1. PAUG - Fixed at Origination
Adjusted for shortfalls or reimbursements and step-up
2. Cash Settle - Fixed at Origination

Floating Rate Not Applicable Depends on type of CDS settlement

1. PAUG - Includes Interest Shortfalls, Principal Shortfalls,
Writedowns
2. Cash Settle - Not Applicable

Credit Events Depends on type of CDS Settlement but in general

- Failure to Pay - Failure to Pay
- Bankruptcy - Writedown
- Restructuring (For Some) - Ratings Downgrade
- Maturity Extension
- Bankruptcy (more for regulatory capital purposes)

Fixed Rate Frequency - Typically Quarterly - Frequency of ABS Bond payments usually monthly
- Standardized Payment Dates
20th - Mar, Jun, Sep, Dec

Assignment -Available (subject to counterparty approval) -Available (subject to counterparty approval)

- Cash transfer is PV of spread differential - Cash transfer is based on cash flow valuation

Page 22
SECTION V: ASSET-BACKED CDS CONTRACT

Page 23
Asset-Backed CDS Contract Terms

Asset-Backed CDS Contract Terms

The Asset-Backed CDS contract has been structured to account for these unique features of the underlying
ABS cash bond. The contract has two main variants based on the manner in which it is settled after a credit
event:

1. Pay-As-You-Go (PAUG)/Physical Settle

2. Cash / Physical Settle

Currently almost all of the US Asset-Backed CDS are traded PAUG/Physical Settle while contracts traded
in Europe are traded Physical/Cash Settle to primarily try and mirror the performance of the master trust
structures commonly used in the European securitization market. The belief probably is that upon a Fail-
ure to Pay of a master trust an investor is indifferent to holding the cash security or to market valuation.
We do not believe this is the case as master trust structures can live for a significantly longer time than the
settlement period (120-140 days) after the credit event, therefore yielding a materially different perfor-
mance and recovery rate.

I. Pay-As-You-Go (PAUG)/Physical Settle Asset-Backed CDS

The contract is structured to mirror the flows on the underlying reference obligation to its Legal Final
Maturity Date. The protection buyer pays a fixed rate to the protection seller who makes the protection
buyer whole for any Writedowns, Principal Shortfalls or Interest Shortfalls experienced by the reference
obligation. However, if the reference obligation reimburses these amounts to the cash bond holders then
the protection buyer has to pass them back to the protection seller.

In case there is a credit event, the protection buyer has the option to either physically settle and deliver the
underlying reference obligation or continue with the existing contract. This option can be exercised by the
protection buyer after the conditions for settlement are met.

Figure 8: PAUG ABS Economics

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

(Short Seller– Cash) (Long Buyer– Cash)

Credit Events that trigger the settlement option are:

I. Writedown
This is defined in three different ways depending on the terms of the reference obligation.

i) Actual Writedown
If the terms of the reference obligation provide for a Writedown, it is defined as the applied loss result-
ing in a reduction in the Outstanding Principal of the reference obligation.

ii) Principal Deficiency Ledger (PDL)

If the terms of the reference obligation provide for a PDL, it is defined as an attribution of a principal
deficiency or realized loss to the reference obligation resulting in a reduction of the interest payable by
it.

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 I. Pay-As-You-Go (PAUG)/Physical Settle Asset-Backed CDS

iii) Implied Write Down (Undercollateralization)

If the terms of the reference obligation do not provide for a writedown, it is defined as the difference
between the Implied Writedown amounts for the current calculation period and the previous one.
Implied writedown is typical for AAA CMBS/RMBS bonds that might not suffer writedowns but
could get undercollaterized.

To calculate the Implied Writedown for a period the Outstanding Principal Balance of the reference
obligation is added to that of all obligations of the reference entity secured by the same underlying
assets and ranked pari passu or senior in priority to the reference obligation. This is then reduced by
the aggregate outstanding asset pool balance to come up with the result, if it is a positive quantity.

II. Failure to Pay Principal

This gets triggered when the issuer of the reference obligation (or an insurer if applicable) misses a
Scheduled Principal Payment or pays a lesser amount at a date, most commonly the legal final matu-
rity date, when the Scheduled Principal is legally due.

The Scheduled Principal Payment is calculated as the product of the notional amount due on that date
and the Reference Price. The Reference Price is par in most cases, except where the reference obliga-
tion is at a deep discount or high premium, in which case it reflects that discount or premium.

III. Distressed Ratings Downgrade

A specific ratings change by any one or more of the rating agencies. If the reference obligation gets
downgraded to or below Caa2 (Moody's) or CCC (S&P/Fitch) or its rating is withdrawn then a credit
event is triggered.

If immediately prior to withdrawal, the reference obligation was rated at or higher than Baa3
(Moody's) or BBB- (S&P/Fitch), then, if the reference obligation is assigned a rating of at least
Caa1(Moody's) or CCC+(S&P/Fitch) within three calendar months of such a withdrawal, it does not
constitute a credit event.

IV. Maturity Extension

This is triggered if there is an extension of the legal final maturity date of the reference obligation after
the CDS contract has been entered into by the two parties. The protection buyer can exercise the trig-
gered settlement option at the original legal final maturity of the underlying reference obligation.

Treatment of Step-Up Coupon

The coupon on the outstanding obligations of certain ABS bonds steps-up in case the collateral balance
falls below 10% of the initial collateral balance. In line with such a step-up provision that exists in certain
ABS reference obligations, in the PAUG contract the protection buyer has the option of choosing between
stepping-up the fixed rate whenever there is step-up in the reference obligation or early termination of the
contract at that point in time. This is similar to the option held by the servicer of the reference obligation
and ensures that the protection buyer does not get shortchanged if the servicer decides not to call the bond
for his/her own economic benefit.

Treatment of Interest Shortfall

Interest Shortfall can occur in ABS cash bonds on account of either a credit event or because of certain
mechanisms like available funds cap. Interest shortfall is defined as the difference between the Expected
Interest and the Actual Interest. The calculation of Expected Interest is done without taking into account
any limited recourse provisions of the underlying assets that provide for capitalization of interest (an
available funds cap) or deferral of interest (payment in kind).

Page 25
Interest Shortfall Variants

Expected Interest is usually LIBOR plus the notional margin for floating rate bonds while it is the fixed
coupon for fixed rate bonds. However, if a floating rate reference obligation has a hard cap then the
Expected Interest is the lesser of the hard cap and LIBOR plus the notional margin. For WAC bonds (com-
monly CMBS and Alt-A mezzanine bonds) the Expected Interest is the pass-through rate paid to the
holder of the reference obligation i.e. Expected Interest moves lower in case the collateral WAC is lower on
account of prepays of higher coupon loans. Current ISDA templates do not directly address WAC bonds
but CDS transacted on any such bonds add the above definition in the contract.

Interest Shortfall is not defined as a credit event in ISDA’s June 21st publication, rather its occurrence
requires that the protection seller make a payment for the same to the protection buyer. If there is an inter-
est shortfall in one period that the protection seller has made the protection buyer whole for, such amount
compounds at the rate of LIBOR plus the fixed rate until repaid. However, consistent with the practice in
the underlying cash CMBS bonds, interest shortfall amounts do not get compounded when the reference
obligation is a CMBS security.

There are three variants of how the payment for Interest Shortfall can be made.

Interest Shortfall Variants

1. Fixed Cap - In this case the maximum amount that the protection seller has to pay to the protection
buyer is the Fixed Rate. Therefore, the worst case for the protection seller is receiving no Fixed Rate for
providing principal protection. On the other hand, the protection buyer takes the risk of not being pro-
tected on the full interest shortfall of the reference obligation.

This has been adopted as a market standard since it most resembles a credit trade. A “pure credit trade” would have
no reduction in the Fixed Rate when non-credit Interest Shortfalls are experienced.

In ABS transactions, it is operationally difficult for the trustee to differentiate between credit-related Inter-
est Shortfalls or those because of an available funds cap. The Fixed Cap option is the closest to a credit
trade that one can create when referencing RMBS securities exposed to AFC risk. When referencing an
RMBS security, protection sellers preferring to minimize the interest rate risk due to an AFC would prefer
to trade Fixed Cap as AFC risk is capped at the Fixed Rate for each calculation period.

For CMBS, the Fixed Cap best resembles a credit trade since all Interest Shortfalls are credit related (there
is no AFC Cap).

2. Variable Cap - In this case the protection seller has to make up any interest shortfall on the bond to the
extent of LIBOR plus the Fixed Rate. AFC risk up to LIBOR plus Fixed Rate is taken on by the protection
seller and the protection buyer receives protection for the same. Clearly, the fair spread in such a case
should be higher than that paid for the Fixed Cap variant since the protection buyer gets protected for a
higher interest shortfall amount - LIBOR plus Fixed Rate as against just the Fixed Rate.

3. Cap Not Applicable - In this case the protection seller takes on the full AFC risk up to LIBOR plus Bond
Coupon and the protection buyer receives protection on the full interest shortfall. There is no cap at either
the Fixed Rate (Fixed Cap) or at LIBOR plus Fixed Rate (Variable Cap).

In case the reference obligation is a floater trading at par, then this variant is the same as the Variable Cap
one. This is because a par floater will imply a CDS Fixed Rate that is similar to the coupon on the bond.
Thus the cap of LIBOR plus Fixed Rate (Variable Cap) will be the same as that of LIBOR plus Bond Cou-
pon in the Not Applicable case.

However, the situation becomes more interesting if the bond is not trading at par. There can be two ways
of looking at this. One, adjust the Fixed Rate (CDS premium) to compensate for any additional protection
being received by the protection buyer. In the case of a premium bond, the protection buyer pays a higher

Page 26
 Interest Shortfall Variants

Fixed Rate every period than that in the case of a Variable Cap CDS on the same bond. This is because the
protection buyer is protected for the entire shortfall amount which is higher than LIBOR plus Fixed Rate in
the case of a premium bond. For example, take the case of a bond with a coupon of LIBOR+300 bp trading
at a premium and having a protection premium of 200 bp that is lower than the bond coupon. The interest
shortfall protection for the Variable Cap CDS would be capped at LIBOR+200 bp but for the Not Applica-
ble CDS would be capped at the higher LIBOR+300 bp.

On the other hand, in the case of a discount bond the fair spread will be the same in both cases since the
maximum shortfall amount is always lower than LIBOR plus Fixed Rate. For example, take the case of a
bond with a coupon of LIBOR+300 bp trading at a discount and having a protection premium of 400 bp
that is higher than the bond coupon. The interest shortfall protection for both the Variable Cap CDS and
the Not Applicable CDS would be capped at LIBOR+300 bp since that is the maximum possible shortfall
on the bond. Even though the Variable Cap CDS has a higher cap but the difference has no value since the
shortfall can never exceed LIBOR+300.

The other way to tackle premium or discount bonds is to set an Initial Payment to “parize” the reference
obligation. This implies an upfront payment of the difference between par and the current dollar price of
the bond from either the protection buyer or protection seller (depending on whether the reference obliga-
tion bond is at a discount or at a premium, respectively). This upfront payment enables the setting of the
CDS Fixed Rate equal to the Bond Coupon and then the cap is set to LIBOR plus Coupon which in effect is
the same as LIBOR plus Fixed Rate. The market uses this convention for any trades done under the Not
Applicable variant.

Let's take a few examples to understand the issues clearly.

Figure 9: Example 1- Variants of Interest Shortfall Cap for a Par Bond

Bond Coupon L + 200
Bond Trading At L + 200
Price $100
CDS Spread 200
Interest Shortfall L + 200

Fixed Cap
200

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

200

Net Payment by Protection Seller: ZERO

Variable Cap
LIBOR + 200

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

200
Net Payment by Protection Seller : LIBOR
Not Applicable

LIBOR + 200

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

200
Net Payment by Protection Seller: LIBOR

Page 27
Interest Shortfall Variants

Figure 10: Example 2- Variants of Interest Shortfall Cap for a Premium Bond
Bond Coupon L+ 300
Bond Trading At L + 200
Price $102
CDS Spread 200
Interest Shortfall L +300

Fixed Cap
200

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

200

Net Payment by Protection Seller: ZERO

Variable Cap
LIBOR + 200

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

200
Net Payment by Protection Seller : LIBOR
Not Applicable
At Initiation
CDS Spread 300

PV of Bond Price Premium (here : 102-100)

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

At Shortfall
LIBOR + 300

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

300
Net Payment by Protection Seller : LIBOR

Figure 11: Example 3- Variants of Interest Shortfall Cap for a Discount Bond
Bond Coupon L + 100
Bond Trading At L + 200
Price $98
CDS Spread 200
Interest Shortfall L +100

Fixed Cap
200

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

200

Net Payment by Protection Seller : ZERO

Variable Cap
LIBOR + 100

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

200
Net Payment by Protection Seller : LIBOR - 100
Not Applicable
At Initiation
CDS Spread 100

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

PV of Bond Price Premium (here : 100-98)

At Shortfall
LIBOR + 100

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

100
Net Payment by Protection Seller : LIBOR

Page 28
 II. Cash-Settle/Physical Settle Asset-Backed CDS

II. Cash-Settle/Physical Settle Asset-Backed CDS

Contrary to the PAUG contract, the Cash-Settle contract does not mirror the flows on the underlying refer-
ence obligation to its Legal Final Maturity Date. The contract is structured like a corporate CDS where a
credit event leads to a market valuation process or physical delivery of the underlying reference obliga-
tion.

The Protection Buyer pays a fixed rate to the Protection Seller who makes the protection buyer whole for
the difference between par and the value of the underlying reference obligation after the credit event. In
most cases this contract has its scheduled termination at a date other than the reference obligations legal
final maturity date (at present 5 year maturities are most common).

Figure 12: Cash Settle ABS Economics

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

(Short Seller– Cash) (Long Buyer– Cash)

Protection Buyer Protection Seller

(Short Seller– Cash) (Long Buyer– Cash)

This contract is similar to an out-of-the-money put option on the underlying cash bond. However, the
maturity mismatch gives rise to the risk that the put might have already expired when the investor needs
to protect its investment the most.

Credit Events that trigger market valuation are:

I. Failure to Pay (“Payment Shortfall”)

This credit event gets triggered under the following different conditions:
i) The reference obligation fails to pay the full outstanding principal balance at the earlier of its legal final
maturity or the day on which the underlying assets securing the reference obligation have been disposed
off.

ii) The reference obligation (or an insurer if applicable) misses an Expected Payment Amount (defined
ahead) by more than $100,000 at a Scheduled Distribution Date and
a) such non-payment allows for an acceleration in payment of the reference obligation or,

b) the terms of the reference obligation do not provide for a reimbursement of the Payment Shortfall
(i.e. the shortfall is “permanent”)or,

c) the reference obligation does not provide for the Payment Shortfall to compound at a rate equal to
or more than its coupon rate until repaid. This may not be appropriate for reference obligations that
do not have a PIKing feature because such reference obligations would inherently not have this provi-
sion.

The minimum shortfall amount of $100,000 ensures that a credit event is not triggered by an immaterial
shortfall in interest or principal payment.

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II. Cash-Settle/Physical Settle Asset-Backed CDS

The Expected Payment Amount is the principal or interest due at the Scheduled Distribution Date. Its calcula-
tion is done without taking into account any limited recourse provisions of the underlying assets that pro-
vide for capitalization of interest (an available funds cap) or deferral of interest (payment in kind).

However, the Expected Payment Amount does not include any payments or withholdings because of
withholding tax. It can also get amended if the Scheduled Distribution Dates are changed for reasons other
than deterioration in creditworthiness of the issuer, the reference obligation or the underlying assets of the
reference obligation.

iii) Additional Condition - Counterparties have the flexibility to include an additional condition such that
if non-payment (of any amount) continues uninterrupted for a certain period, then this credit event is trig-
gered. This is especially important because rating agency studies show that after two years of non-pay-
ment the probability of default on such an amount is very high.

It should be noted that while the PAUG contract defines only principal shortfall as a credit event and inter-
est shortfall as a floating rate payment event, the Cash Settle contract defines both as credit events. Impor-
tantly, the credit event is triggered only if the shortfalls change the underlying bond's cash flows or are
“permanent”.

The permanence feature implies that a Failure To Pay might not be clear till the final maturity of the under-
lying reference obligation which might be much after the maturity of the CDS. However, in a PAUG con-
tract, the payments immediately mirror those on the underlying reference obligation whenever there is an
interest shortfall or interest reimbursement.

We believe this is one of the primary reasons why the PAUG contract is becoming a universal standard since it allows
traditional cash investors to source a larger stock of risk without materially changing the nature of the underlying
cash flows.

II. Loss Event

This event is triggered if there is a reduction in the principal amount of the reference obligation with-
out any corresponding payment of the same to the holders of the reference obligation and the terms of
the reference obligation do not provide for:

a) reinstatement or reimbursement of the Principal Reduction (i.e. the reduction is “permanent”), or

b) interest to be paid on the Principal Reduction at a rate equal to or more than its coupon rate until the
amount is repaid, or

c) interest to be paid on the interest that would have accrued on this Principal Reduction. Again, this
may not be appropriate for reference obligations that do not have a PIKing feature because such refer-
ence obligations would inherently not have this provision.

Clearly, in this case only an actual Principal Reduction triggers a credit event and this loss event needs to
be irreversible or not pay interest on the reduced amount for it to be classified as such. Similar to Failure
To Pay, this irreversibility implies that a Loss Event might not be clear till the final maturity of the under-
lying reference obligation which might be much after the maturity of the CDS.

This credit event is different from the Writedown event in the PAUG contract where any actual or implied
writedown not only triggers the credit event but any actual writedowns also result in a transfer of cash
flows from the protection seller to the protection buyer.

Page 30
 II. Cash-Settle/Physical Settle Asset-Backed CDS

We agree with the omission of Implied Writedowns on certain referenced assets like CDOs or possibly cer-
tain master trusts. This removes documentation mismatch in such referenced assets but omitting implied
writedowns also adds additional uncertainty about the ABS bond and this would make the price of the
CDS diverge from that of underlying reference obligation making it less transparent for investors.

This failure to consider Implied Writedowns as a credit event and importantly, the uncertainty about the timing of
the credit event is another reason for the increased use of the PAUG contract.

III. Ratings Downgrade

If the reference obligation is rated by only one rating agency and gets downgraded to or below Ca
(Moody's) or CC (S&P/Fitch) then a credit event is triggered. However, if the reference obligation is
rated by two or more of Fitch, Moody's and S&P then a credit event is triggered only if it is down-
graded to or below the above stated levels by at least two of these rating agencies.

This is different from a PAUG contract where a downgrade by any one agency is sufficient to trigger a
credit event that allows the protection buyer to physically settle. Moreover, the rating levels that trigger
default in a Cash Settle contract are one level below those in the PAUG contract (Caa2(Moody's) or CCC
(S&P/Fitch)) and trigger a market valuation.

IV. Bankruptcy
This has primarily been added because some protection buyers require the inclusion of bankruptcy to
satisfy regulatory capital requirements since there is little chance of this in an ABS, which by defini-
tion, is structured as a “bankruptcy-remote” special purpose vehicle. This credit event gets triggered if
the Reference Entity (issuer of the reference obligation) either

a) gets dissolved (other than for a merger, amalgamation or consolidation), or

b) makes a general assignment with or for its creditors, or

c) institutes or has instituted against it bankruptcy proceedings that either result in bankruptcy or are
not dismissed within thirty calendar days, or

d) has a resolution passed for its liquidation or wind-up, or

e) seeks or becomes subject to the appointment of an administrator or other similar official for all or
substantially all of its assets (This obviously excludes the appointment of an official such as a trustee
solely for the issue of securities), or

f) has all or substantially all of its assets possessed by a secured party or has a legal process like attach-
ment, distress proceedings etc. levied on them and this situation is not remedied within thirty calen-
dar days, or

g) causes or is subject to any event that has an effect analogous to the above, or

Bankruptcy also includes the event where the occurrence of any of the conditions above leads to an event
of “default” under the terms of the reference obligation.

The ISDA Cash Settle confirm does not have any explicit provisions for a step-up in the Fixed Rate with
the stepping-up of the rate on the reference obligation. However, ISDA does “advise” counterparties to
consider including this step-up feature in the Fixed Rate in line with any such feature in the reference obli-
gation.

Page 31
II. Cash-Settle/Physical Settle Asset-Backed CDS

Valuation After Credit Event

The protection seller has the right to choose any business day between 120 and 140 calendar days after the
credit event date as the Valuation Date. The valuation of the reference obligation is done by sourcing bids
from at least five Dealers (of which two each can be selected by the protection seller and the protection
buyer). The required bid amount is at least $500,000 or is the lower of the reference obligation Notional
Amount on the credit event date and the reference obligation aggregate Outstanding Principal Balance on
the day the quotation is sought. The bids exclude any accrued interest (so any PIKed interest is not
included) and the highest bid is chosen as the Final Price.

The calculation agent needs to receive quotations on either the notional amount or the outstanding princi-
pal balance (“full quotations”) from at least two dealers and will average these to determine the Final Price
of the reference obligation. If it cannot source full quotations from at least two dealers, the calculation
agent shall continue to try and source bids on every fifth business day till sixty calendar days after the Val-
uation Date. If after this period only one full quotation is available then the Final Price is this quotation.
However, if no full quotation is available then a weighted average of any available quotations is taken for
valuation purposes. If no quotations are available then the Final Price is deemed to be zero.

If the reference obligation ceases to exist because the outstanding principal balance is reduced to zero and
the underlying assets have been disposed off then the settlement method is Cash Settle and the Final Price
is taken as zero.

However, this process can become challenging because at present there is a very small investor base for
distressed ABS. This is primarily because of the continuance in negative performance of such bonds and
the lack of information and transparency in the market. Moreover, liquidity and thus information dissemi-
nation, tends to be lesser in ABS deals since they tend to be smaller than the average corporate bond issu-
ance and the number of investors exposed to a given name is smaller. Also, the increased exposure to ABS
by CDOs reduces the volume of secondary trading and available-for-sale bonds in the market because a
CDO will often purchase an entire tranche and hold it to maturity, even if prices reach levels where trad-
ing has a high economic incentive. As shown in Figure 13, ABS CDOs as a percentage of total CDOs have
grown to 41% of all newly funded CDOs.

Figure 13: CDO Issuance

250,000
ABS Funded CDO
Non-ABS Funded CDO

200,000

150,000
$ Billions

100,000

50,000

0
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 1H 2005

Page 32
 II. Cash-Settle/Physical Settle Asset-Backed CDS

On account of this it may be difficult to get realistic bids in sufficient size for the distressed ABS bond from
a sufficient number of dealers and there might be considerable dispersion of prices. This situation might
improve as the market matures and there are more takers of distressed ABS but the possibility does seem
remote at present.

Impact on Synthetic ABS-CDO Ratings

The ISDA market valuation time-frame for Cash-Settle Asset-Backed CDS also impacts synthetic ABS
CDO ratings adversely. This is because rating agencies are concerned about accurate valuations in such a
short time frame and “haircut” the cash recovery value estimates based on the liquidity of the security
and/or the time to settlement.

Table 2: Moody's Recovery Adjustments for Synthetic ABS CDOs

Time To Settlement Percentage of Recovery Assigned

Liquid Illiquid
Securities Securities
3 Months 25% 15%
6 Months 75% 50%
1 year 95% 65%
2 year 100% 90%

Table 3: S&P Recovery Adjustments for Synthetic ABS CDOs

Time To Settlement Percentage of Recovery Assigned

45 days 25%
180 days 50%
> 360 days 90%
At Maturity 100%

Many synthetic CDOs use a long cash settlement period to avoid these haircuts but that would produce a
documentation mismatch between the CDS and the CDO.

We believe that this market valuation process creates an additional risk in the Cash Settle contract and in CDOs ref-
erencing this contract and is another important factor because of which the PAUG contract (which does not have to
go through a valuation) is becoming the market standard.

Fixed Recovery CDS Contracts

One solution that the market has evolved to take care of market valuation risk is to trade the CDS contract
with a fixed recovery. This has been observed as the norm in the few CDS on CDOs that have started trad-
ing in the past few weeks. In such a contract the recovery value of the reference obligation is fixed at initi-
ation and there is no need for the market valuation process on default. However, this does create a basis
risk for the protection seller between realized recovery after default and the fixed recovery rate of the con-
tract. An increase in volumes in such a market will probably give an impetus to developing a market in
recovery swaps on Structured Finance reference obligations in the near future.

At present almost all of the US Asset-Backed CDS are traded PAUG/Physical Settle while contracts traded
in Europe are traded Physical/Cash Settle to match documentation in existing ABS CDOs. The total out-
standing notional of Cash-Settle Asset-Backed CDS is a minor fraction of the outstanding PAUG notionals.
We believe that the structural features of the PAUG contract that enable it to mirror the cash flows of the
underlying reference obligation and take away any market valuation risk are convincing counterparties to
trade Asset-Backed CDS as PAUG. Table 4 highlights some of the differences between the PAUG contract
and the Cash-Settle contract.

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II. Cash-Settle/Physical Settle Asset-Backed CDS

Table 4: PAUG vs Cash-Settle

Characteristic PAUG Asset-Backed CDS Cash Settle ABS

Scheduled Termination Legal Final Maturity of ABS Bond 5 years at present
(other maturities might develop)

Settlement Method - Physical (PB's Option) - Physical (PB's Option)

- Pay As You Go (Actual losses) - Cash (Valuation Process)

Valuation Method - Not Applicable - One Point in Time

- Actual Loss suffered -Needs Minimum Number of Quotations

Assignment -Available -Available

(subject to counterparty approval) (subject to counterparty approval)
- Cash transfer is based on cash flow valuation - Cash transfer is based on cash flow valuation

Premium (Fixed Rate) Fixed at Origination Fixed at Origination

Adjusted for shortfalls or reimbursements and step-
up

Floating Rate - Interest Shortfalls Not Applicable

- Principal Shortfalls
- Writedowns

Failure to Pay - Includes only failure to pay Principal - Includes failure to pay Principal or Interest
- Failure should be greater than $100,000

Writedown - Includes Implied Writedown - Only actual writedown or loss event

Ratings Downgrade - Caa2 (Moody's) / CCC (S&P/Fitch) - Caa (Moody's) / CC (S&P/Fitch)

- Any one rating agency can downgrade - If rated by multiple agencies two or more should
downgrade
- No credit event if rating withdrawn from a specific - Not Applicable
level and assigned again at a specific level within 3
calendar months

Maturity Extension - Can be used to trigger settlement option - Not Applicable

Bankruptcy - Not Applicable - Exists

Interest Shortfall Three Variants Not Applicable

- Fixed Cap
- Variable Cap
- Not Applicable

Market Valuation Not Applicable Required at Default

Most Commonly Traded in US Europe

Page 34
 III. Physical Settle Option under PAUG or Cash-Settle Asset-Backed CDS

III. Physical Settle Option under PAUG or Cash-Settle Asset-Backed

CDS
In a PAUG contract, in case there is a credit event, the protection buyer has the option to physically settle
and deliver the underlying reference obligation or continue with the existing contract. This option can be
exercised by the protection buyer after the conditions to settlement are met.

Figure 14: Physical Settle ABS Economics

Par on the Notional Value

Protection Protection
Buyer Seller

Reference Obligation

Similarly, in a Cash-Settle contract, the protection buyer can opt for delivering the underlying reference
obligation after a credit event. When protection buyers choose to physically settle, they have thirty days
after the credit event to deliver the reference obligation. In addition to the amount payable by the protec-
tion seller for the delivered reference obligation, the protection seller also has to pay any accrued but
unpaid interest up to and including the delivery date. However, this accrued interest is only paid on the
lower of the reference obligation amount delivered and the total reference obligation notional amount on
the delivery date. If the outstanding principal balance is lower than the notional amount then physical set-
tlement shall apply to the outstanding principal balance and cash settlement shall apply to the difference
between the notional amount and the outstanding principal balance.

In either case - PAUG or Cash Settle- we believe that counterparties in this market will probably not opt
for a physical settlement of the full notional of the contract because it is very difficult to source the under-
lying reference obligation. This is because in most cases the notional amount of the CDS written on a par-
ticular reference obligation is a large multiple of the outstanding cash security. Credit Card Master Note
Trusts might be an exception to this since any shortfall or excess spread in these is applied pro-rata to all
outstanding tranches with the same priority.

Another factor working against physical settlement is the possibility of the current holders of the reference
obligation applying a short squeeze on the market during the settlement process as demand outstrips the
supply of the reference obligation.

In fact, we recently saw an example of this in the corporate CDS space after the default of Delphi. The
indentures of most of the single-name CDS on Delphi required a physical settlement of the bond in case of
a credit event. However, over time the outstanding notional of the synthetic contracts on CDS had become
a multiple of the outstanding bond issuance of Delphi. This led to a short squeeze in the market that saw
prices on the bond rising from approximately 45 levels just after the default to approximately 70 in a cou-
ple of weeks. The effect has since been muted to some extent on account of netting of protection bought
and sold contracts between two counterparties. This has brought down the net outstanding notional of the
CDS contract leading to some sanity in the market. However, this experience is a manifestation of the dif-
ficulties inherent in physical settlement as the size of the synthetic market grows.

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III. Physical Settle Option under PAUG or Cash-Settle Asset-Backed CDS

Let us now look at a simple example to understand the cash flows under both the settlement options of an
Asset-Backed CDS. The reference obligation on which the CDS is written has the following characteristics:

Outstanding Reference Obligation Notional 10,000,000

Reference Obligation Coupon LIBOR+300 bp
Monthly Scheduled Interest Payment (on $10 Million) 60,417
Rating BBB

CDS Spread 250

CDS Notional 1,000,000
Monthly CDS Premium 2083.33

We assume the occurrence of credit events, after two parties have entered into a CDS trade, according to
the schedule given in Table 5 below and look at the obligations of both the protection seller and the protec-
tion buyer under each of these scenarios.

Table 5: PAUG Asset-Backed CDS

Action
Default
Time Credit Event Protection Seller Protection
Amount
Pays Buyer Pays

Month 1 Reference Obligation Interest Payment 30,208 PAUG Interest Shortfall Cases Illustrated in Figure 10
Therefore Reference Obligation Interest Shortfall 30,208 Physical Settle Not Applicable
Therefore CDS Interest Shortfall 3,021

Month 4 Reference Obligation Writedown 100,000 PAUG 10000 2062.50

Therefore CDS Writedown 10,000 Physical Settle Par Deliver ABS Reference Obligation

Month 8 Reference Obligation Writedown Reimbursement 25,000 PAUG Zero 4567.71

Therefore CDS Writedown Reimbursement 2,500 Physical Settle Not Applicable

Month 12 Ratings Downgrade to CCC (or below) PAUG Zero 2067.71

Physical Settle Par Deliver ABS Reference Obligation

In the first month after the CDS contract the reference obligation has an interest shortfall and in the fourth
month it has a writedown event. The writedown of $100,000 on the reference obligation outstanding
notional of $10 million implies a write-down of $10,000 for someone holding $1 million of these cash
bonds. Under the PAUG option this is the amount that is paid by the protection seller to the protection
buyer who has bought protection on a notional of $1 million. However, now the outstanding notional of
the CDS contract decreases by that amount and the 250bp are paid on a lower notional of $990,000. The cal-
culations for interest shortfall and writedown reimbursements are done the same way. After the write-
down reimbursement the notional on the CDS contract goes up again to $992,500 and the premium is
calculated on this new notional. In the twelfth month the reference obligation gets downgraded to CCC.
This event has no effect under the PAUG contract other than to trigger a settlement option. In case the pro-
tection buyer does not exercises this option the protection payments continue as before. However, if the
protection buyer does exercise this option it leads to a physical settlement of the trade.

Page 36
 III. Physical Settle Option under PAUG or Cash-Settle Asset-Backed CDS

Under Cash Settle, as mentioned earlier, the added risk is that one can not ascertain the “permanence” of
the shortfall or writedown amount within a reasonable time interval of such an event occurring. Table 6
below shows the cash flows for each credit event if the shortfall or writedown can or can not be deemed
permanent with certainty. The notional of the CDS contract is not reduced if the reference obligation writ-
edown is not deemed to be permanent. Therefore, even though the reference obligation notional effec-
tively goes down after the writedown, the CDS contract still pays 250 bp on the original notional. In
addition, since the cash settle contract terminates after the first “default” event any subsequent writedown
reimbursements do not affect cash flows.

Table 6: Cash-Settle Asset-Backed CDS

Action
Default
Time Credit Event Protection
Amount Protection Seller Pays
Buyer Pays

Month 1 Reference Obligation Interest Payment 30,208 Case 1 If shortfall deemed to be irreversible or outstanding for a long time
Therefore Reference Obligation Interest Shortfall 30,208 Cash Settle Par - Market Value Zero
Therefore CDS Interest Shortfall 3,021 Physical Settle Par Deliver ABS Reference Obligation

Case 2 If shortfall not deemed irreversible or not outstanding for a short time
Cash Settle Zero 2,083.33
Physical Settle Zero 2,083.33

Month 4 Reference Obligation Writedown 100,000 Case 1 If writedown deemed to be irreversible or outstanding for a long time
Therefore CDS Writedown 10,000 Cash Settle Par - Market Value Zero
Physical Settle Par Deliver ABS Reference Obligation
Case 2 If writedown not deemed irreversible or not outstanding for a short time
Cash Settle Zero 2,083.33
Physical Settle Zero 2,083.33

Month 8 Reference Obligation Writedown Reimbursement 25,000 Cash Settle

Therefore CDS Writedown Reimbursement 2,500 Physical Settle

Month 12 Ratings Downgrade to CCC (or below) Cash Settle Par - Market Value 2,083.33
Physical Settle Par Deliver ABS Reference Obligation

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Page 38
SECTION VI: VALUATION of ASSET-BACKED CDS

Page 39
Asset-Backed CDS Pricing

Asset-Backed CDS Pricing

Similar to corporate CDS, pricing on Asset-Backed CDS is dependent on the pricing of the underlying cash
bond. ABS cash bonds are historically valued by their DM over LIBOR and this practice has carried over
into PAUG Asset-Backed CDS which uses the cash bond DM as the first step towards pricing.

As a first cut, the CDS spread can be approximated by the price of an unfunded par floater on the cash
bond. This prices the CDS at the difference of the par cash bond DM and the funding level of the dealer
writing the CDS. Assuming a common market-wide funding cost of LIBOR, this method prices the Asset-
Backed CDS at the DM of the underlying cash instrument. The first cut on fixed rate bonds could also be
found from the DM on the bond which gives a measure of the equivalent floating spread over LIBOR on
the bond.

This pricing works cleanly for the most part for the PAUG contract since the cash-flows on the CDS and
the cash bond are the same. However, there are nuances in pricing that will come up based on, among
other things,

i) Interest Shortfall Cap

The Variable Cap / No Cap variants mirror the cash flows on the cash bond and thus could possibly
be priced using the above mentioned methodology. However, the Fixed Cap should be priced at a
spread lower than these since the Available Funds Cap risk of the Protection Seller is capped at the
Fixed Rate.

ii) Premium/Discount bonds

The Reference Price in the PAUG contract is set at par unless the bond is at a deep discount or high
premium in which case that is reflected. If the bond is not at a deep discount or high premium then the
DM is on many occasions just multiplied (thus reduced or increased) by the price of the bond to get the
effective CDS spread on the cash bond. This will give rise to some basis risk since the DM of non-par
ABS bonds is not a linear function of the par DM.

iii) Fixed Rate Bonds

The DM on fixed rate bonds is usually a measure of not just the credit risk on the bond but also of any
changes in the interest rate curve. Therefore, an asset swap on the fixed rate bond to convert it to a
floater will give different spread levels at different times based on the existing interest rate curve in the
market.

iv) Day Count Convention

The day count convention used for interest calculations in Asset-Backed CDS is Actual/360 which
may not always match the day count convention used in the underlying cash ABS bonds. For example,
fixed rate ABS cash bonds use a day count convention of 30/360. The difference in day-count conven-
tions between the underlying cash bonds and the CDS will lead to “true” CDS premium being differ-
ent from the cash bond DM.

v) Implied Writedown
All PAUG CDS contracts include implied writedowns as a credit event while this is not an obvious
credit event in cash bonds. Undercollaterization might not lead to immediate interest shortfalls or
writedowns on a bond. Moreover, it might not lead to immediate interest shortfalls on all tranches in a
securitization e.g. the higher tranches that have a lower coupon than the portfolio WAC might not
have an interest shortfall in case of undercollaterization but the lower tranches might do so. More than
anything this credit event creates a difference in time value of cash flows between the cash bond and
the CDS contract.

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 Asset-Backed CDS Pricing

The pricing of Cash-Settle Asset-Backed CDS will also differ from that of the PAUG contract on
account of a few variations in the structure of the contract in addition to the fact that a credit event
leads to market valuation.

i) Market Valuation
The market valuation of the bond after default might be very different from any estimated value
owing to the lack of liquidity and depth in the market for distressed ABS. This will cause the fair
spread on a cash-settle Asset-Backed CDS to be typically higher than that on a PAUG contract as
investors will demand a higher risk premium to offset the market valuation risk.

ii) Rating Triggers

Rating downgrade triggers are a level lower in cash-settle Asset-Backed CDS and trigger a market val-
uation of the cash bond. The timing and level of a ratings action is much more important in a cash set-
tle Asset-Backed CDS than in a PAUG contract. In a PAUG contract, for a bond that has started writing
down, having no concurrent ratings action to the trigger levels will have no material affect on cash
flows because all writedowns are exchanged between the protection seller and the protection buyer.
However, in a Cash-Settle contract, if there is no rating action down to the trigger levels the protection
buyer will not be able to effect a settlement and receive the requisite protection cash flows (assuming
no other credit event triggers have been hit). This loses the protection buyer valuable time value of
money on writedown amounts because there can be a long gap between the start of writedowns and
any rating action to reflect the writedowns. This implies that investors in a cash-settle contract will
demand a premium for taking on this additional risk over the PAUG contract.

iii) Accrued Premium

In a cash-settle contract, after a credit event, the protection buyer pays the protection seller the market
price of the reference obligation in return for par. Similar to a forced settlement on a cash bond, this
market price does not include accrued interest in case the credit event happens between two sched-
uled payment dates. However, the protection seller still gets accrued premium for that period. This sit-
uation does not arise in PAUG contracts because there is no forced market valuation, thus not giving
the protection seller any additional income over holding a cash bond. This accrued premium is addi-
tional income earned by the protection seller in Asset-Backed CDS over holding a cash bond and
should lead to a lower CDS premium than the cash bond DM or the PAUG CDS premium to compen-
sate for the same.

iv) Implied Writedown

This is taken as a credit event under standard PAUG contracts but is not considered a credit event for
cash-settle contracts. Therefore, under the PAUG contract the CDS notional would be reduced and
there will be a protection payment to the extent of the writedown. On the other hand, under the cash-
settle contract there would be no impact on cash flows if the cash bond does not suffer an interest
shortfall or actual writedown in the same period. Therefore there might a lag in protection payments
under the cash-settle contract leading to a loss of time value for the protection buyer. This will be off-
set a bit because protection buyers would start paying premium on a lower notional amount earlier in
the PAUG contract.

All the above factors call for a valuation of Asset-Backed CDS using a more robust method just as corpo-
rate CDS graduated to using a hazard rate approach to valuation. Risk-neutral pricing, as used in corpo-
rate CDS will be much more complex to implement here because of the various unique features of ABS
bonds. For example, bootstrapping a survival curve for say subprime reference obligations can prove to be
difficult. This is because such reference obligations are usually issued with the same average life so to
bootstrap across average lives we would end up comparing bonds with different seasoning profiles, mak-
ing the whole exercise futile. Also, a simple approach like using the spread duration of the bond might
make the valuation too rough on account of the prepayment and default characteristics of ABS bonds.

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Asset-Backed CDS Pricing

In general, there are two possible approaches to deriving “fair-value” spreads for credit default swap con-
tracts. We look at these two approached for valuing a PAUG Asset-Backed CDS below.

Risk-Neutral Pricing
A risk-neutral default rate is first derived from the market prices of cash bonds. These default rates are
then used to generate the cash flow stream that the protection seller is liable for. The fixed spread on the
premium leg is then iteratively solved for by equating the present value of the protection payments to the
present value of the premiums received by the protection seller.

At a zero option adjusted spread (OAS) an bond is deemed to have “risk-neutral” cash flows since zero
OAS implies zero compensation for risk which in turn implies that the bond is similar to a risk-neutral
instrument. Thus, one could find out the cash flows of the ABS reference obligation that make it a zero
OAS security and use these risk-neutral cash flows to price the credit default swap.

However, in reference obligations like ABS it can get tricky to get a set of zero OAS cash flows because of
the prepayment and default characteristics of the bond. We believe that since the CDS mirrors the cash
bond we should take the same prepayment and default assumptions as we use for valuing the cash bond.
In our case, we use our proprietary Econometric Prepayment Model (EPM) and the Econometric Default
Model (EDM).

We run the underlying reference obligation (at its current market price) through a Monte Carlo simulation
that factors in different interest rate paths and thus different prepayment and default scenarios. This simu-
lation gives us an option adjusted spread (OAS) on the bond which is a measure of the credit and prepay-
ment risk of the bond.

The OAS obtained from such a simulation is then taken to zero by changing the EDM multiple in our
model. However, this tweaking can lead to a change in the duration of the bond. To rectify this, we add
another constraint - while keeping the OAS zero, change the EPM multiple on the bond so that the dura-
tion remains the same as under base EPM and EDM.

This implied risk-neutral probability of default (EDM) and prepayment (EPM) across the Monte Carlo
paths then allows us to generate a set of risk-neutral cash flows for the reference obligation. We use this set
of cash flows to obtain the writedowns and shortfalls on the bond. These writedowns and shortfalls make
up the set of floating (payment on default) cash flows. The fixed spread that gives the same PV (discount-
ing done at the LIBOR curve since these are risk-neutral cash flows) as these floating cash flows would be
the fair CDS spread for the bond.

Using ABS bonds with different durations, a term-structure of default probabilities can be constructed for
Asset-Backed CDS on a particular reference obligation. However, this would not be very accurate because
bonds with different seasoning profiles would behave quite differently. We will look at the effect of sea-
soning in a separate publication.

This approach takes care of any pricing variations on account of the reference price of the bond since we
run the OAS analysis at the market price of the bond. It also factors in any pricing variations because of the
Interest Shortfall Cap variants used since the analysis takes place over a set of different simulated interest
rate paths and changing prepayment speeds. The CDS spread on a bond with a Fixed Cap should be lower
than the CDS spread on the same bond with a Variable Cap since in the Fixed Cap case the protection
buyer's compensation is capped at the CDS spread while in the Variable Cap case the protection buyer
receives protection for any shortfalls on account of AFC or PIKing up to LIBOR plus CDS Spread.

We have not considered a breach of rating triggers while pricing because such an event does not trigger a
market valuation but only an option to physically settle. We believe that in most cases the PAUG contract
would not be physically settled so at present we have left out any impact on pricing of a breach of rating
triggers.

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 Asset-Backed CDS Pricing

Static Replication Pricing

One can attempt to create a model-independent procedure to pricing by constructing a portfolio that repli-
cates the upfront as well as default payoffs of the CDS contract. By comparing the cost or benefit of this
replicating portfolio and invoking the principle of no-arbitrage, a range within which the CDS premiums
should lie can be established. While this approach seems appealing in practice, a number of practical diffi-
culties may arise in the construction of such a portfolio. As such, the analysis described under the static
replication approach should be viewed as guidelines rather than as true arbitrageable trades. Neverthe-
less, it still serves a very important purpose in describing how the two parties to a CDS contract may
approach the issue of hedging the risks they are taking on.

In order to simplify the analysis, we focus only on floating-rate reference obligations, leaving the compli-
cations arising from fixed-rate cash bonds to a later date. In addition, a large part of the effort made here is
to define CDS premiums in situations where the underlying reference bond is trading away from par. At
this stage, we also abstract away from real-world features such as differential treatment of available fund
cap interest shortfalls as well as step-up coupons past the 10% clean-up call date. While important to the
final calculations, they are not critical for our purpose. Unlike standard corporate CDS where the underly-
ings are non-amortizing, non-par pricing with prepayment risk creates an entirely new set of issues that
need to be addressed.

Before we describe the process by which we arrive at no-arbitrage pricing bounds however, let us define a
few terms. Accordingly,

PS: protection premium received by protection seller.

PB: protection premium paid by protection buyer.

C: coupon margin on floating rate reference obligation.

D: the market price discount/premium from par at which the reference obligation currently trades in the
market.

F: the funding spread over LIBOR at which the marginal participant in the PAUG market can borrow at
over the life of the reference bond.

R: the term repo rate earned by the purchaser of securities in a reverse-repurchase agreement. The term
repo rate is assumed to apply until the maturity date of the reference bond as in a reverse-to-maturity
transaction.

L{t}: one-month LIBOR at time t.

T*: The uncertain maturity date of the underlying reference obligation and PAUG CDS contract which is a
function of prepayment and default rates on the collateral backing the transaction.

We attempt to derive pricing bounds in a situation where the underlying reference bond trades at prices of
par, discount and premium and the reference prices on the CDS contract are respectively par, discount
and premium. We will view the exercise from the perspective of both a protection buyer and a protection
seller.

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Asset-Backed CDS Pricing

I. Par Priced Reference Obligation

1. Protection Buyer
For a par priced asset a long protection position paired off with a purchase of the cash asset creates an
essentially risk-less position. The purchase of the cash asset requires the protection buyer to fund the pur-
chase price at the protection buyer's cost of funds. Thus, the cash investment will require a periodic out-
flow of (L{t} + F). The protection payments constitute an additional outflow of funds amounting to PB.
Note that all of these amounts are calculated off a notional amount of par. In exchange, the buyer receives
a coupon of (L{t}+ C) on the cash asset. Thus, the no-arbitrage condition can be expressed as:

-PB - (L{t} + F) + (L{t} + C) = 0

This reduces to:

PB = C - F

Thus, from the perspective of the protection buyer, the protection premium paid must equal the coupon
margin on the floating rate reference bond minus his funding cost.

To see that this creates a perfectly hedged position in the case of the PAUG contract, note that every dollar
of prepayments and losses reduces the notional amount of both the protection leg and the borrowed posi-
tion in the funded asset by an equivalent amount. Every dollar of prepaid principal and every dollar of
principal writedown reimbursement received from the protection seller is passed through to the lender
who has advanced funds for purchase of the cash asset. The protection buyer has a zero outlay on day one
and is left with zero liability when the asset and the CDS notional have both amortized down to zero.
Thus, for no money down, a risk-less position is created which must, by the law of one price, generate zero
return. The sequence of trades and periodic cash flows are summarized in Table 7. The table shows peri-
odic cash flows and the cumulative flows at maturity under the two extremes of there being either only
writedowns or only prepayments on the bond. The flows under any other scenario will always fall
between these two - in this case the bounds are 0 for both cases.

Table 7: Long Protection in CDS Hedged with Cash Bond

Total
Time CDS Loan Bond
Flow
Amount Invested t=0 0 1 -1 0
Cash Flow t=1 -PB -(L+F) +(L+C) -PB + (C-F)

Bond Has Only Write Downs t=T* 1 -1 0 0

Bond Has Only Prepayments t=T* 0 -1 1 0

2. Protection Seller
A short position in protection (i.e. a long risk position) can be offset by engaging in a reverse-repurchase
transaction that has the effect of creating a short position in the underlying reference obligation. In the
reverse-repo, the protection seller lends cash equal to the market value of the bond to the bond holder and
borrows the underlying reference bond in return (we assume no haircut to simplify matters). The bond is
immediately sold it in the market at its current price. Strictly speaking, this would be akin to a reverse-to-
maturity transaction in which the reverse-repo counterparty agrees to pay a repo spread to the short-seller
and continues to receive all principal and interest payments on the collateral until the maturity date and
gives back borrowed cash on account of any prepayments or writedowns.

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 Asset-Backed CDS Pricing

Every dollar of prepayment on the reference bond is passed through to the original holder of the reference
obligation by simultaneously liquidating a dollar from the reverse-repo lending account. In addition,
every dollar of loss on the tranche, if it occurs, also leads to a dollar of liquidation from the reverse-repo
lending account which is passed through to the protection buyer. In this fashion, the balance of the reverse
repo account and the reference bond track each other perfectly. The various legs of the transaction, from a
periodic cash flow perspective, can be summarized as follows:

PS + (L{t} + R) - (L{t}+C) = 0

This can be reshuffled to arrive at

PS = C - R

In other words, from the perspective of the protection seller, the premium received has to be at least equal
to the coupon margin minus the repo rate on the underlying reference bond in the reverse-repurchase
market. The sequence of trades and cash flows is summarized in Table 8. The table shows periodic cash
flows and the cumulative flows at maturity under the two extremes of there being either only writedowns
or only prepayments on the bond. The flows under any other scenario will always fall between these two -
in this case the bounds are 0 for both cases.

Table 8: Short Protection in CDS Hedged by Shorting Cash Bond

Reverse
Time CDS Bond Total Flow
Repo
Amount Invested t=0 0 -1 1 0
Cash Flow t=1 PS L+R -(L+C) PS+(L+R)-(L+C)

Bond Has Only Write Downs t=T* -1 1 0 0

Bond Has Only Prepayments t=T* 0 1 -1 0

II. Discount Priced Reference Obligation

The discount could have resulted either from standard new issue pricing convention where bonds are
structured with a below-market coupon at the expense of discount proceeds or from a widening of credit
spreads in the market since the issue date of the bond. As stated earlier, we represent the discount from
par by the symbol D. We will alternately examine the pricing relationship from both a protection buyer
and a seller's perspective.

1. Protection Buyer
As in the par bond case, a long protection position paired off with a purchase of the cash bond creates a
“hedged” position. However, the discount dollar price of the cash asset creates an additional complication
that must be addressed so that the hedging is complete. In this case, the protection buyer borrows (1-D) to
pay for the purchase of $1 of face amount of the reference asset since it is trading at a discount of D from
par.

Every dollar of principal repayment on the bond is used to reduce the borrowed amount by a dollar. How-
ever, while every dollar of loss reduces the CDS notional and the face amount of the reference bond by $1,
default payments received by the protection buyer are capped at (1-D) since that is the reference price on
the CDS. Thus, for every dollar of principal write-down, only (1-D) dollars are available to repay the bor-
rowing.

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Asset-Backed CDS Pricing

Depending on the pattern of prepayments and write-downs, the balance of the borrowing has a maximum
value of 0 if the entire tranche is written down. If every dollar were to be prepaid, there would be redemp-
tions in excess of the amount borrowed, leaving the protection buyer with a credit equal to D dollars.
Based on this mix of prepayments and writedowns there will be a date at which the balance of the loan is
paid down to zero. After this date, the financing cost of the loan is reduced to zero obviously and any fur-
ther prepayment would lead to a credit for the protection seller.

The cash flows are summarized in Table 9. The table shows periodic cash flows and the cumulative flows
at maturity under the two extremes of there being either only writedowns or only prepayments on the
bond. The flows under any other scenario will always fall between these two - in this case the bounds are 0
(only writedowns) and D (only prepayments).

Table 9: Long protection in CDS Hedged with Discount Cash Bond

Time CDS Loan Bond Total Flow

Amount Invested t=0 0 1-D -(1-D) 0
Cash Flow t=1 -PB -(L+F)*(1-D) +(L+C) -PB+(C-F)+D*(L+F)

Bond Has Only Write Downs t=T* 1-D -(1-D) 0 0

Bond Has Only Prepayments t=T* 0 -(1-D) 1 D

Accounting for this, the no-arbitrage condition can be expressed as:

-PB - (1-D) * (L{t} + F) + (L{t}+C) + PV(D{T})/DV01= 0 0 < D{T} > D

This can be rearranged to yield

PB = (C-F) + D*(L{t}+F) + PV(D{T})/DV01

where PV(x) is the present value of x dollars in the future and DV01 is the Dollar-Value of a Basis Point for
the expected duration of the borrowing. Appendix II shows detailed cash flows for such a case.

2. Protection Seller
As indicated earlier, a protection seller can hedge his risk by engaging in a reverse-repurchase transaction
and “shorting” the cash bond. In addition, the reference price principal write-down adjustment also needs
to be accounted for as before. The mechanics of the trade in this situation are summarized in Table 10. The
table shows periodic cash flows and the cumulative flows at maturity under the two extremes of there
being either only writedowns or only prepayments on the bond. The flows under any other scenario will
always fall between these two - in this case the bounds are 0 (only writedowns) and -D (only prepay-
ments).

Table 10: Short Protection in CDS Hedged by Shorting Discount Cash Bond

Reverse
Time CDS Bond Total Flow
Repo
Amount Invested t=0 0 -(1-D) 1-D 0
Cash Flow t=1 PS (L+R)*(1-D) -(L+C) PS+(L+R)*(1-D)-(L+C)

Bond Has Only Write Downs t=T* -(1-D) 1-D 0 0

Bond Has Only Prepayments t=T* 0 1-D -1 -D

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 Asset-Backed CDS Pricing

Every dollar of loss or prepayment on the underlying implies a dollar of liquidation of the money-market
account. However, if defaults occur, since only (1-D) of the dollar has to be paid out to the protection
buyer, D dollars can be set aside for paying the loan down. This implies that the balance of the loan will
decline based on the rate of defaults being applied to the reference obligation. At the maturity date of the
reference obligation, the protection seller is still on the hook for the D dollars borrowed at the inception of
the trade minus any loan redemptions from the liquidation proceeds from the reverse-repo lending
account. At maturity, there is the possibility that some part of the loan is still outstanding and this has to
be accounted for as part of the premium that the protection seller needs to receive. The adjustment can be
roughly approximated by:

PS + (1-D) * (L{t} + R) - (L{t}+C) + PV(D{T})/DV01= 0 -D < D{T} > 0

PS = (C - R) + D*(L{t}+R) - PV(D{T})/DV01

where PV(x) is the present value of x dollars in the future and DV01 is the Dollar-Value of a Basis Point for
the expected duration of the borrowing.

III. Premium Price Reference Obligation

In this section, we consider the case of a floating rate reference obligation which is trading at a premium to
par. The premium could possibly have resulted from a narrowing of credit spreads in the market since the
issue date of the bond. As stated earlier, we represent the deviance from par by the symbol D. We will
alternately examine the pricing relationship from both a protection buyer and a seller's perspective.

1. Protection Buyer
As in the par bond case, a long protection position paired off with a purchase of the cash bond creates a
“hedged” position. However, the premium dollar price of the cash asset creates an additional complica-
tion that must be addressed to make the hedging complete. In this case, the protection buyer borrows
(1+D) to pay for the purchase of a $1 of face amount of the reference asset since it is trading at a premium
of D from par. The cash flows are summarized in Table 11. The table shows periodic cash flows and the
cumulative flows at maturity under the two extremes of there being either only writedowns or only pre-
payments on the bond. The flows under any other scenario will always fall between these two - in this case
the bounds are 0 (only writedowns) and -D (only prepayments).

Table 11: Long protection in CDS Hedged with Premium Cash Bond

Time Total Flow CDS Loan Bond

Amount Invested t=0 0 0 1+D -(1+D)
Cash Flow t=1 -PB-(L+F)*(1+D)+(L+C) -PB -(L+F)*(1+D) +(L+C)

Bond Has Only Write Downs t=T* 0 1+D -(1+D) 0

Bond Has Only Prepayments t=T* -D 0 -1 1

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Asset-Backed CDS Pricing

Every dollar of loss reduces the CDS notional and the face amount of the reference bond by a (1+D) due to
the reference price adjustment. However, for every dollar of principal prepaid, only one dollar is available
to repay borrowings. Depending on the pattern of prepayments and write-downs, the balance of borrow-
ings has a maximum value of D if the entire tranche is prepaid down. If every dollar were to be written
down however, the CDS payments would exactly cover the amount borrowed. Accounting for this, the no-
arbitrage condition can be expressed as:

-PB - (1+D) * (L{t} + F) + (L{t}+C) + PV(D{T})/DV01= 0 -D < D{T} > 0

This can be rearranged to yield

PB = (C-F) - D*(L{t}+F) + PV(D{T})/DV01

where PV(x) is the present value of x dollars in the future and DV01 is the Dollar-Value of a Basis Point for
the expected duration of the borrowing.

2. Protection Seller
As indicated earlier, a protection seller can hedge his risk by engaging in a reverse-repurchase transaction
and “shorting” the cash bond. However, the premium dollar price of the cash asset creates an additional
complication that must be addressed to make the hedging complete. As before, the reference price princi-
pal write-down adjustment also needs to be accounted for. The mechanics of the trade in this situation are
summarized in Table 12 below. The table shows periodic cash flows and the cumulative flows at maturity
under the two extremes of there being either only writedowns or only prepayments on the bond. The
flows under any other scenario will always fall between these two - in this case the bounds are 0 (only
writedowns) and D (only prepayments).

Table 12: Short Protection in CDS Hedged by Shorting Premium Cash Bond

Reverse
Time Total Flow CDS Bond
Repo
Amount Invested t=0 0 0 -(1+D) (1+D)
Cash Flow t=1 PS-(C-R)+D*(L+R) PS (L+R)*(1+D) -(L+C)

Bond Has Only Write Downs t=T* 0 -(1+D) 1+D 0

Bond Has Only Prepayments t=T* D 0 1+D -1

Every dollar of prepayment on the underlying implies a dollar of liquidation of the reverse-repo lending
account. However, if defaults occur, since (1+D) of the dollar has to be paid out to the protection buyer,
(1+D) dollars have to be set aside for paying the protection buyer. At maturity, there is the possibility that
some part of the reverse-repo account is still outstanding. This could occur for example if there were no
tranche write-downs and the tranche balance was reduced to zero through principal repayments only. The
adjustment can be roughly approximated by:

PS - (C - R) - D*(L{t}+R) + PV(D{T})/DV01 = 0 0 < D{T} > D

PS = (C-R) +D*(L{t}+R) - PV(D{T})/DV01

where PV(x) is the present value of x dollars in the future and DV01 is the Dollar-Value of a Basis Point for
the expected duration of the borrowing.

Page 48
 Unwind Valuation of Asset-Backed CDS

Our analysis of no-arbitrage pricing bounds for PAUG swaps should reveal the complexities associated
with reference bonds that are trading away from par. Arriving at the pricing bounds in the case of par obli-
gations is almost trivial since we have assumed away some of the complications arising from differential
cap treatment in the PAUG.

For non-par obligations, pricing bounds are dependent on assumptions about the rate of principal
redemptions as well as the split between prepayments and defaults. Given the uncertainty about principal
prepayments in the RMBS deals, this makes the job even harder. The no-arbitrage bounds derived here in
these cases can at best be described as very rough guides that indicate the ordinality of the relationships
between stated coupon margins and the fair spread on CDS contracts. In addition, the hedge-based pricing
approach described here can be employed to seek arbitrage opportunities if market relationships between
the various markets get so out of whack that the profit opportunity becomes painfully obvious and allows
the obvious frictions and transactions costs to be overcome.

Unwind Valuation of Asset-Backed CDS

The valuation process laid out above allows us to value any outstanding Asset-Backed CDS from first
principles. With the passage of time and as base-case prepayment and default assumptions change in the
market, the PV of the fixed rate (CDS premium) will no longer balance the PV of the writedowns and
shortfalls on the bond. The difference between the two PVs gives us a measure of the unwind value of the
CDS contract.

At present though, the market has taken a leaf out of the corporate CDS world and uses a much simpler
method to calculate the unwind value of the ABS credit default swap. The unwind value of a corporate
CDS is calculated by multiplying the change in premium by the risky DV01 of the credit default swap. In
simple terms, the risky DV01 of the corporate CDS is a product of its survival probability curve, risk-free
discount curve and the notional of the CDS.

Similarly, one can find a measure of the DV01 of Asset-Backed CDS using the modified duration of the
cash bond since the CDS mirrors the cash bond to a large extent. Under current market convention, the
dealer finds the modified duration of the cash bond at its market price and the dealer's base prepayment
and default speeds. Then it is just a simple matter of multiplying this by the outstanding notional of the
CDS and the change in spreads to get the unwind value on the Asset-Backed CDS. Table 13 below gives an
example of this unwind value for a investor who sold protection at 325 bp and unwound the trade at 250
bp.

Table 13: Calculating Unwind Value in Asset-Backed CDS

Bond Name Mod Duration Notional at Unwind Spread at Initiation Spread at Unwind Unwind Value
Deal I - Baa3 3.75 10,000,000 325 250 281,250

This works reasonably well for CDS on ABS bonds trading at or near par. However, for ABS bonds trading
at a big discount or premium, the modified duration of the cash bond could be very different from the
duration of the CDS in case the reference price of the CDS is par or is very different from the price of the
bond. It is on account of such nuances that we need to develop a more robust model to value the CDS than
using a simplified measure like the bond’s modified duration.

Page 49
 [This page is intentionally left blank.]

Page 50
SECTION VII: A LOOK AHEAD

Page 51
A Look Ahead

A Look Ahead
We expect a rapid growth of the Asset-Backed CDS market to occur in the near future, especially with the
publishing of standardization ISDA confirmation for both PAUG and Cash Settle contracts and with stan-
dard ISDA confirms for CDS on CDOs expected in the near future. Recent trading volumes in both the
RMBS and CMBS space are a testament to the fact that the market is slowly coming to terms with the syn-
thetic contract and is comfortable with its nuances. Using a back-of-the-envelope calculation, even if the
synthetic ABS market grows to a size comparable to the corporate CDS market (when calculated as a per-
centage of cash bonds outstanding) it should grow to a notional size of over $1 trillion by 2009. We expect
it to hit that point sooner if Asset-Backed CDS participants can leverage the familiarity of the investor base
with corporate CDS to accelerate the growth of the market, an advantage that the pioneers of the corporate
CDS market did not have.

Asset-Backed CDS indices should be the next frontier in the development of this market. Market opinion
has already coalesced towards forming indices segregated by asset type and rating levels rather than a
diverse ABS index that would include CMBS, RMBS, credit card receivables et al. The two indices soon to
be launched are:

1. ABX: This is expected to reference 20 subprime RMBS issuers and shall have five sub-indices broken
down by rating buckets - AAA, AA, A, BBB and BBB-. In essence ABX is going to be five different indices
based on these five rating categories. The indices are expected to be settled under the Pay-As-You-Go
(PAUG) format with Fixed Cap on Interest Shortfall and are expected to trade in price terms and not on
spread terms.

2. CMBX: This is expected to reference a pool of US CMBS with the triple-A sub-index expected to lead the
launch.

Similar to the corporate CDS market, the single-name CDS market coupled with the indices is expected to
be a fore-runner of an increasingly liquid market in more complex trades like n-to-default baskets and
other correlation trades.

Page 52
 Appendix I: Example of CDS Cash Flows

Appendix I: Example of CDS Cash Flows

We ran cash flows for an existing deal (BSABS - 05HE4 M6) at our base prepayment speed and three times
our base default rate to get a sense of the cash flows on the cash bond and the resulting cash flows on the
CDS. We ran the deal at higher defaults than base defaults just to give an illustration of writedowns on a
bond across time.

Table 14: Bond/CDS Profile: BSABS 05-HE4 M6

Rating Nominal Spread Tranche Balance CDS Notional CDS Premium
Baa3 180 bp 6,228,000.00 10,000,000.00 250 bp

The tranche suffers writedowns starting in month 42 and under the PAUG contract the protection seller
has to make the protection buyer whole for these writedowns. The protection buyer continues to pay the
CDS premium to the protection seller every month. However, the outstanding notional on which this is
paid keeps getting reduced in line with the reduction in the outstanding notional of the cash bond after the
writedowns. These payments continue till the tranche gets totally extinguished in month 184.

Under the cash-settle contract, the two counterparties would settle the deal at the first instance of a credit
event - writedown at month 42 in this case. The protection seller pays par and receives the market value of
the deal from the protection buyer.

In case the CDS contract is physically settled the protection buyer will deliver the bond - BSABS 05-HE4
M6 - to the protection seller while getting back par in return. Under a cash-settle contract this can be done
at the first instance of the credit event - month 42. However, under the PAUG contract this can be done at
any of the writedown dates for any portion of the CDS. Importantly, the entire notional of the CDS con-
tract can not be settled physically under either CDS variant since the outstanding notional of the bond is
lower than the notional of the CDS contract. The remaining portion will have to be cash settled if the two
counterparties have agreed to physically settle notionals up to the tranche notional.

Page 53
Appendix I: Example of CDS Cash Flows

Table 15: Cash Bond and CDS Cash Flows

Bond Cash Flows CDS Cash Flows

Interest Interest Interest CDS
Month Date Writedown PB Pays PS Pays
Paid Due Shortfall Notional
1.00 25-Nov-05 0 31,755.66 31,755.66 0.00 10,000,000.00 20,833.33 0.00
2.00 25-Dec-05 0 30,731.29 30,731.29 0.00 10,000,000.00 20,833.33 0.00
3.00 25-Jan-06 0 32,791.48 32,791.48 0.00 10,000,000.00 20,833.33 0.00
4.00 25-Feb-06 0 33,657.20 33,657.20 0.00 10,000,000.00 20,833.33 0.00
5.00 25-Mar-06 0 31,069.57 31,069.57 0.00 10,000,000.00 20,833.33 0.00
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
42.00 25-Apr-09 222,955.69 41,156.99 41,156.99 0.00 9,642,010.77 20,087.52 357,989.23
43.00 25-May-09 311,665.30 38,439.54 38,439.54 0.00 9,141,584.79 19,044.97 500,425.98
44.00 25-Jun-09 294,811.67 37,693.80 37,693.80 0.00 8,668,219.88 18,058.79 473,364.92
45.00 25-Jul-09 268,991.19 34,619.53 34,619.53 0.00 8,236,313.66 17,158.99 431,906.21
46.00 25-Aug-09 255,941.47 34,019.79 34,019.79 0.00 7,825,360.76 16,302.83 410,952.91
47.00 25-Sep-09 244,247.04 32,348.83 32,348.83 0.00 7,433,185.04 15,485.80 392,175.72
48.00 25-Oct-09 228,246.15 29,759.13 29,759.13 0.00 7,066,701.17 14,722.29 366,483.86
49.00 25-Nov-09 221,513.96 29,255.97 29,255.97 0.00 6,711,026.86 13,981.31 355,674.31
50.00 25-Dec-09 206,020.94 26,905.43 26,905.43 0.00 6,380,228.95 13,292.14 330,797.91
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
117.00 25-Jul-15 7,604.64 1,241.11 1,241.11 0.00 286,075.29 595.99 12,210.40
118.00 25-Aug-15 7,677.79 1,230.64 1,230.64 0.00 273,747.43 570.31 12,327.86
119.00 25-Sep-15 7,355.89 1,178.26 1,178.26 0.00 261,936.43 545.70 11,811.00
120.00 25-Oct-15 6,668.49 1,091.66 1,091.66 0.00 251,229.16 523.39 10,707.27
121.00 25-Nov-15 6,761.26 1,082.55 1,082.55 0.00 240,372.93 500.78 10,856.23
122.00 25-Dec-15 6,138.80 1,002.93 1,002.93 0.00 230,516.15 480.24 9,856.78
123.00 25-Jan-16 6,232.60 994.45 994.45 0.00 220,508.77 459.39 10,007.39
124.00 25-Feb-16 5,981.82 951.85 951.85 0.00 210,904.05 439.38 9,604.72
125.00 25-Mar-16 5,126.23 852.16 852.16 0.00 202,673.11 422.24 8,230.94
126.00 25-Apr-16 5,548.01 875.86 875.86 0.00 193,764.93 403.68 8,908.17
127.00 25-May-16 5,024.25 810.82 810.82 0.00 185,697.74 386.87 8,067.20
128.00 25-Jun-16 5,109.10 803.42 803.42 0.00 177,494.30 369.78 8,203.44
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
166.00 25-Aug-19 1,186.43 108.47 108.47 0.00 23,888.20 49.77 1,904.99
167.00 25-Sep-19 1,141.09 100.39 100.39 0.00 22,056.01 45.95 1,832.19
168.00 25-Oct-19 1,021.28 92.62 92.62 0.00 20,416.18 42.53 1,639.82
169.00 25-Nov-19 1,050.45 85.6 85.6 0.00 18,729.53 39.02 1,686.66
170.00 25-Dec-19 939.38 78.44 78.44 0.00 17,221.21 35.88 1,508.32
171.00 25-Jan-20 972.99 72.01 72.01 0.00 15,658.93 32.62 1,562.28
172.00 25-Feb-20 940.33 65.43 65.43 0.00 14,149.08 29.48 1,509.84
173.00 25-Mar-20 781.89 57.71 57.71 0.00 12,893.64 26.86 1,255.44
174.00 25-Apr-20 885.45 53.76 53.76 0.00 11,471.92 23.90 1,421.72
175.00 25-May-20 794.18 47.8 47.8 0.00 10,196.74 21.24 1,275.18
176.00 25-Jun-20 827.53 42.45 42.45 0.00 8,868.02 18.48 1,328.73
177.00 25-Jul-20 741.92 36.9 36.9 0.00 7,676.75 15.99 1,191.27
178.00 25-Aug-20 773.45 31.92 31.92 0.00 6,434.86 13.41 1,241.89
179.00 25-Sep-20 748.16 26.74 26.74 0.00 5,233.57 10.90 1,201.28
180.00 25-Oct-20 669.58 21.73 21.73 0.00 4,158.46 8.66 1,075.11
181.00 25-Nov-20 700.63 17.25 17.25 0.00 3,033.49 6.32 1,124.97
182.00 25-Dec-20 627.93 12.58 12.58 0.00 2,025.26 4.22 1,008.24
183.00 25-Jan-21 658.2 8.39 8.39 0.00 968.42 2.02 1,056.84
184.00 25-Feb-21 603.13 4.01 4.01 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) 968.42

Page 54
 Appendix II: Static Replication for a Discount Bond
Par 4,697,000.00 LIBOR L 435
Price / Loan Balance 4,227,300.00 Coupon C 300
Par - Price (D) 469,700.00 Financing Rate 25
F
CDS Reference Price 0.9 Repo Rate R 5
Discount / Premium 0.1 DV01 5

Estimated Range:
Bond Has only WriteDowns (Prepay Gain, X = 0)
PB = (C - F) +D*(L+F) + PV(X)/DV01 321

Bond Has only Prepayments (Prepay Gain, X = D)

PB = (C - F) +D*(L+F) + PV(X)/DV01 521

CDS
CDS Loan Bond Prepayment Outstanding Outstanding
Period Date LIBOR DF Net Flow Protection Prepays Writedown
Premium Interest Interest Gain/Loss Bond/CDS Loan
Payment
0 Today 11/22/2005 -PB -(1-D)*(L+F) (L+C) Positive 4,697,000.00 4,227,300.00
1 10.00 12/02/2005 3.64 0.999020941 (5,152.59) (4,505.26) 8,663.36 0.00 -994.50 - 0.00 0.00 4,697,000.00 4,227,300.00
2 33.00 01/04/2006 3.64 0.995796841 (17,003.55) (14,867.36) 28,589.07 0.00 -3,281.84 - 0.00 0.00 4,697,000.00 4,227,300.00
3 28.00 02/01/2006 3.80 0.992771456 (14,427.26) (13,133.58) 24,841.91 0.00 -2,718.93 - 0.00 0.00 4,697,000.00 4,227,300.00
4 33.00 03/06/2006 3.98 0.988941186 (17,003.55) (16,166.82) 30,052.97 0.00 -3,117.40 - 0.00 0.00 4,697,000.00 4,227,300.00
5 28.00 04/03/2006 4.15 0.985402438 (14,427.26) (14,268.59) 26,120.54 0.00 -2,575.30 - 0.00 0.00 4,697,000.00 4,227,300.00
6 29.00 05/02/2006 4.26 0.981766814 (14,942.52) (15,147.63) 27,469.62 0.00 -2,620.53 - 0.00 0.00 4,697,000.00 4,227,300.00
7 31.00 06/02/2006 4.32 0.977998414 (15,973.04) (16,407.71) 29,606.76 0.00 -2,773.99 - 0.00 0.00 4,697,000.00 4,227,300.00
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
161 28.00 04/01/2019 5.04 0.518331286 (834.56) (7.65) 1,699.05 6,883.99 7,740.83 759.15 8,010.15 843.50 262,848.82 -6,883.99
162 31.00 05/02/2019 5.05 0.515510709 (893.87) - 1,822.05 8,594.15 9,522.34 730.51 7,863.64 811.68 254,173.50 -15,478.15
163 33.00 06/04/2019 5.05 0.513219623 (920.13) - 1,875.59 7,719.26 8,674.72 702.73 7,016.53 780.81 246,376.16 -23,197.40
164 28.00 07/02/2019 5.05 0.511283659 (756.77) - 1,542.59 7,710.74 8,496.57 677.39 7,033.35 752.66 238,590.15 -30,908.15
165 30.00 08/01/2019 5.05 0.509217514 (785.20) - 1,600.54 8,104.89 8,920.24 652.47 7,452.42 724.97 230,412.76 -39,013.04
166 33.00 09/03/2019 5.05 0.506954397 (834.11) - 1,700.25 7,740.25 8,606.39 627.07 7,113.18 696.74 222,602.84 -46,753.29
167 29.00 10/02/2019 5.05 0.504973902 (708.16) - 1,443.52 7,527.01 8,262.36 602.90 6,924.11 669.89 215,008.84 -54,280.30
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
354 30.00 05/02/2035 4.89 0.245001173 (0.18) - 0.36 29.39 29.57 0.73 28.66 0.81 25.00 -267,423.07
355 30.00 06/01/2035 4.89 0.244041672 (0.08) - 0.16 19.29 19.38 0.23 19.07 0.25 5.68 -267,442.37
356 31.00 07/02/2035 4.89 0.243054135 (0.02) - 0.04 5.03 5.05 0.02 5.01 0.02 0.65 -267,447.39
357 31.00 08/02/2035 4.89 0.242070595 (0.00) - 0.00 0.65 0.65 - 0.65 0.00 0.00 -267,448.04
358 31.00 09/02/2035 4.89 0.241091034 - - - 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 -267,448.04
359 31.00 10/03/2035 4.89 0.240115438 - - - 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 -267,448.04

Page 55
Appendix II: Static Replication for a Discount Bond
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