General Exceptions
General Exceptions
For example, let’s say A is accused of murder but claims they didn’t know what they were doing
because of their mental condition. In this case, A needs to provide evidence to support their
claim. It’s important to note that while the prosecution needs to prove the charge beyond a
reasonable doubt, the accused person needs to show that it is more likely than not that their
plea is true.
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Under Section 76 of the law, a person who, in good faith, believes they are legally obligated to
do something, and acts accordingly due to a mistake of fact (not a mistake of law), is not
considered to have committed an offence.
Examples
• A soldier, following orders from a superior officer and conforming to the law, fires upon
a mob. In this case, the soldier has not committed an offence.
• An officer of a Court of Justice, following a court order to arrest Y, mistakenly arrests Z
after conducting a proper investigation. The officer has not committed an offence.
The mistake is an unintentional error, not deliberate wrongdoing. Even under English common
law, an honest and reasonable belief in circumstances that would have made an act innocent
has always been a valid defence. An honest and reasonable mistake is similar to the absence of
reasoning, infancy, or lunacy.
Mere forgetfulness is not considered a mistake. Mistake of fact refers to errors in identifying
true identities or sensory perceptions, such as temporary distortion of imagination. For instance,
in the case of Tolson, a wife was wrongly convicted of bigamy. She genuinely believed her
husband was dead when she remarried, so her conviction was incorrect.
Mistakes of fact cannot be used as a defence if the fact itself is illegal. One cannot perform an
illegal act, such as selling adulterated food, and then claim ignorance as a defence. Similarly,
taking an unmarried girl under 16 against her father’s will does not serve as a valid defence for
abduction. Intent to commit a wrongful or immoral act, rather than an innocent act, renders the
defence ineffective.
In criminal law, the respondeat superior principle (acting under a superior’s order) does not
apply. An order from a superior to an inferior employee to commit an offence is not a valid
defence. If the order is illegal, the subordinate is justified in refusing it.
In cases where responsible inquiry would have revealed the true facts, ignorance of fact cannot
be pleaded. For example, if a person marries believing in good faith that a divorce decree has
legally dissolved their previous marriage, but it hasn’t, they would be guilty of bigamy. They
should have conducted responsible inquiries to confirm the dissolution of their previous
marriage.
According to Section 79, if a person genuinely believes in good faith that their actions are
justified by law, they are not considered offences. The key difference between Section 76 and
Section 79 is that a person is assumed to be legally bound in the former, while in the latter, they
are assumed to have legal justification. This means the distinction lies between a real or
perceived legal obligation/compulsion and a real or perceived legal justification for the act.
However, both sections require a sincere intention to act in accordance with the law (without a
guilty mind).
Illustration
• Chirangi v. State (1952 CrLJ 1212): In a momentary delusion, the accused mistakenly
identified his son as a tiger and tragically killed him.
• Waryam Singh v. Emperor (AIR 1962 Lah 554): During the night, the accused
mistook a living person for a ghost and caused harm to them.
• State of Orissa v. Ram Bahadur Thapa (AIR 1961 Ori 161): In a similar incident, the
accused mistakenly believed that a person was a ghost and committed an act resulting
in harm.
These cases demonstrate situations where individuals acted in good faith, but due to a genuine
mistake, their actions led to unintended consequences.
Similarly, Section 78 states that an act carried out in accordance with the judgment or order of
a court of justice, as long as the person involved genuinely believes in good faith that the court
has jurisdiction, is not an offence. This means that the executioner who carries out the hanging
of a prisoner based on the court’s order would not be held accountable for the act.
It is important to note that under Section 78, the person executing the court’s order is protected,
even if its jurisdiction is questionable. On the other hand, under Section 77, the judge must act
within their jurisdiction to benefit from the protection. Therefore, a mistake of law can be used
as a defence under Section 78.
Illustrations
Let’s say A is working with a hatchet, and accidentally, the head of the hatchet flies off, killing a
person standing nearby. If A took proper caution and there was no negligence, their act is
excusable and not considered an offence.
An accident is something that occurs unexpectedly, outside the normal course of events. It
involves the idea of something fortuitous and unforeseen. An injury is considered to be caused
accidentally when it is neither intentional nor due to negligence.
For example, during a game of cricket, if a ball strikes a person’s head resulting in their death,
it is considered an accidental death. Similarly, if two wrestlers engage in a bout and during it,
one of them falls and breaks their skull, it is also considered an accidental occurrence.
However, certain acts may appear criminal but are performed without any criminal intent. It is
fair that such acts should not be punished since they lack mens rea, which is the mental element
of criminal responsibility.
There are seven such acts mentioned in Secs. 81-86 and 92-94:
An act done with the knowledge that it may cause harm, but performed in good faith and
without any criminal intention to cause harm, to prevent or avoid harm to a person or property,
is not considered an offence.
For example, if a person, during a great fire, pulls down houses to prevent the spread of the fire
or if sailors throw passengers overboard to lighten a boat in a dangerous situation, these acts
are not considered offences under Section 81.
The underlying principle of Section 81 is that in sudden and extreme emergencies where one
of two inevitable evils must occur, it is lawful to choose the lesser evil. Whether such
circumstances exist in a particular case is a matter of fact to be determined.
However, it is important to note that a person cannot intentionally commit a crime to avoid
greater harm. For instance, if a thief intentionally poisons the stolen toddy to catch the thief but
unknowingly causes harm to unsuspecting individuals who consume it, Section 81 cannot be
used as a defence.
Similarly, a starving person cannot justify stealing food by claiming that it was done to avoid
harm, such as their death. Intentionally committing an offence like theft cannot be justified
under the principle of self-preservation.
In the case of Dudley v. Stephens (1884) 14 Q. B. D. 173, it was held that a person who kills
another to consume their flesh to save themselves from starvation is guilty of murder. The
doctrine of self-preservation does not apply in such cases.
Sections 82-83: Act of Child
According to the Indian Penal Code, children under seven are considered incapable of
committing a crime. Section 82 states that the acts of a child under seven are not offences. It’s
important to note that this immunity extends not only to offences under the Indian Penal Code
but also to offences under any special or local law.
By legal presumption, infants are deemed doli incapax, meaning they cannot understand right
from wrong, and therefore the question of criminal intent does not arise. If individuals commit
crimes through children below seven, they will be held responsible while the child will be
exempted.
Under Section 83, acts done by children above the age of seven and below the age of twelve
will be protected if it can be shown that the child in question did not possess sufficient maturity
of understanding to comprehend the nature and consequences of their conduct on that
occasion. It’s important to note that after twelve, there is an unlimited liability for punishment.
In a specific case, if a 10-year-old girl enters into a second marriage during her husband’s
lifetime, with the marriage arranged and performed by her mother, the girl would be liable for
bigamy if she was deemed to possess sufficient maturity of understanding.
Similarly, if a 9-year-old child steals a gold necklace and sells it to someone for a meagre
amount, the child would be liable if it can be proven that they had sufficient maturity of
understanding. The maxim “malitia supplet aetatem” (malice supplies defect of years) applies
to Section 83. The circumstances of a case may reveal a level of malice that justifies the
application of this maxim.
Criminal law provides complete protection to individuals who are deemed to be lunatics.
Section 84 states that nothing is considered an offence if it is done by a person who, due to
unsoundness of mind, is incapable of understanding the nature of the act or that it is wrong or
against the law. It’s important to note that the legal insanity referred to in this section is distinct
from medical insanity.
• Insane individuals cannot be held culpable as they lack free will (Furiosi nulla voluntas
est). The term “unsoundness of mind” encompasses various types of individuals,
including:
• Idiot: Someone rendered non-compos mentis due to illness, which may be a temporary
failure.
• Lunatic or madman: A person with a mental disorder.
• Unconscious person, if proven: This can include cases of sleepwalking or
somnambulism.
• Intoxicated person.
To determine the insanity of a person, the following tests or principles are important:
It must be demonstrated that the accused was of unsound mind when the offence was
committed. If they were not insane then but later became insane, they cannot benefit from
Section 84.
Factors such as the accused’s history of previous insanity, their behaviour on the day of the
incident, and the State of mind before and after the offence are relevant considerations.
Evidence of premeditation attempts to evade or resist arrest, confession given shortly after the
incident, and other similar factors may undermine an insanity defence (Queen-Empress v.
Gedka Gowala AIR 1937 Pat. 333).
Section 84 protects against impairment of cognitive faculties of the mind, such as inherent or
organic incapacity. However, it does not protect wrong or erroneous beliefs (which may result
from distorted illusions), uncontrollable impulses, moral insanity, weak or defective intellect, or
eccentric behaviour. When cognitive faculties are not impaired, and only the will and emotions
are affected, insane impulses are not a valid defence (Queen-Empress v. K.N. Shah 1896).
Under Section 84, to claim protection, a person doesn’t need to be unaware of an act being
right or wrong, but rather, they must be incapable of knowing whether the act they have done
is right or wrong. If the capacity to distinguish between right and wrong is still present, the
individual cannot be protected under Section 84 (Lakshmi v. State AIR 1959 All 534).
A related concept to lunacy is known as insane delusion, considered a borderline case. Delusions
are false beliefs that can be complete or partial. Whether a person who commits an offence
under the influence of an insane delusion is excused depends on the nature of the delusion.
The law regarding insane delusions is well-discussed in McNaughten’s case (1843).
In the case of A. Ahmed v. King (AIR 1949 Cal 182), the accused killed his 5-year-old son by
thrusting a knife into his throat under the delusion and belief that he had received a command
to do so from someone in paradise in his dream. He was held to be protected under Section
84.
For example, if a person suffering from an insane delusion that X and Y were persecuting him
buys a knife to seek revenge and later goes to their club and stabs them to death, it shows that
he intended to kill. In this case, A would be guilty of murder.
In another case, where a father and his relatives sacrificed their 4-year-old son to propitiate a
deity, the Supreme Court held that this act alone does not prove insanity (Paras Ram v. State
of Punjab, 1981).
When acts of violence are committed by a person without any apparent motive, especially
towards their close relatives with whom they had previously been affectionate, and when there
is a history of lunacy, the benefit of the doubt may favour the accused.
Individuals who are occasionally possessed by spirits or experience visions/images during fits
of delirium can benefit from Section 84. However, in cases of delirium tremens (a type of
madness caused by habitual excessive alcohol consumption or illness), they would be criminally
liable if the patient is aware of their actions.
Drunkenness is considered a form of voluntary madness for which the individual is responsible.
If a person chooses to get drunk, it is their own voluntary act, distinct from the madness not
caused by any voluntary action.
The Latin maxim “Qui Pecat Ebrius Luat Sobrius” means “Let him who sins when drunk be
punished when sober.” However, Sections 85 and 86 protect an intoxicated person if they
became intoxicated by mistake (e.g., taking the wrong medicine) or against their will through
fraud or force.
Section 85 states that an act done by a person who, due to intoxication, is incapable of knowing
the nature of the act or that it is wrong or contrary to law is not an offence, provided that the
substance that caused the intoxication was administered without their knowledge or against
their will.
The test for drunkenness is the capacity to form an intention to commit the offence, whereas
the test for insanity is the capacity to know the nature of one’s act. However, if insanity is
produced by drunkenness, it can be considered a defence under Section 84.
Alcohol, medicines, bhang, ganja, etc., can cause intoxication. If the accused drank liquor at the
persuasion of their father to alleviate pain, it could not be considered that the liquor
administration was against their will. Therefore, they could not claim the benefit under Section
85.
In Basdev v. State of Pepsu (AIR 1956 SC 488), it was held that drunkenness is generally
neither a defence nor an excuse for a crime. By law, an intoxicated person is presumed to have
the same knowledge as a sober individual. However, the accused’s intention must be
determined from the circumstances of the case, taking into account the degree of intoxication.
If the accused’s mind was so affected by drink that they more readily gave in to violent passion,
it could not be argued that they did not intend the natural consequences of their actions. To
claim the benefit under Section 86, the accused must be so drunk that they could not form the
intent (Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard, 1920).
Test of drunkenness
In cases of drunkenness, the focus is on whether the accused was capable of forming an
intention to commit the offence. Insanity produced by drunkenness can be considered a
defence under Section 84.
The correct test is whether, due to drunkenness, the accused was incapable of forming the
intention to commit the offence. It is presumed that a person intends the natural consequences
of their acts. However, this presumption can be rebutted in the case of a drunken person by
showing that they did not know their actions were dangerous or that they were incapable of
forming the specific intent required for the crime [Director of Public Prosecutions v. Beard
(1920) AC 479]. The accused can present evidence of their drunkenness affecting their
understanding and ability to form the necessary intent (Dasa Kandha v. State of Orissa, 1976
Cr LJ 2010).
Section 86 states that a voluntarily intoxicated person will be deemed to have the same
knowledge as if they were not intoxicated. The section does not presume the same intention as
if the person had not been intoxicated; it only presumes the same knowledge. Therefore, there
is no presumption regarding intention under Section 86 (only the presumption of knowledge is
provided). The accused’s intention must be determined based on the facts and circumstances
of each case, taking into account the degree of intoxication.
Suppose the existence of a specific intention is necessary for the commission of a crime. In that
case, the fact that the offender was drunk at the time of the act, which would constitute the
crime if coupled with that intention, should be considered in determining whether they had the
necessary intention (Sir James Stephen).
Voluntary drunkenness can be an excuse only with regard to intention, so it is a complete excuse
in crimes where the presence of intention is required. However, voluntary drunkenness is not
an excuse for a crime that only requires knowledge, not intention. If a person was completely
out of their mind at the time of the crime, holding them accountable may not be possible.
In an example where a person fires at a tiger that has carried off someone, knowing that the
shot may kill the person but not intending to kill them, and doing so in good faith for their
benefit if the bullet fatally wounds the person, the individual who fired the shot would not have
committed an offence under Section 92.
This provision recognizes that in emergencies when immediate action is necessary to protect
or benefit someone, the harm caused in the process is exempted from criminal liability. It
focuses on the intention and good faith of the person performing the act to benefit another.
Under Section 93 of the Indian Penal Code, any communication made in good faith to a person
for their benefit is not considered an offence, even if it causes harm to that person. This
provision protects individuals who communicate information honestly and with good
intentions, even if the outcome is unfortunate.
For example, if a surgeon, in good faith, communicates to a patient that they cannot survive a
certain condition, and the patient subsequently dies due to the shock caused by the
information, the surgeon would not be held liable for any offence. Despite knowing that the
communication might lead to the patient’s death, the surgeon’s actions would be considered
legal because they were made in good faith for the patient’s benefit.
Section 93 recognizes that sometimes difficult information needs to be conveyed honestly for
the welfare of individuals, even if it may cause harm. The provision focuses on the intention
behind the communication and protects individuals who act in good faith to provide necessary
information for the benefit of others.
Under Section 94 of the Indian Penal Code, if a person commits an offence under compulsion
or threat, they may be excused if the threat is to cause instant death. However, there are certain
limitations to this provision. The person under threat cannot commit murder or an offence
against the State that is punishable by death, such as treason, to avail themselves of the benefit
of Section 94. Additionally, the person must not have voluntarily or reasonably placed
themselves under such constraint due to a fear of harm short of instant death.
If a person voluntarily joins a gang of dacoits on their own accord or due to the threat of being
beaten, they would not be entitled to the benefit of Section 94. However, if a person is seized
by a gang of dacoits and forced, under the threat of instant death, to commit an illegal offence,
such as breaking open a door, they would be entitled to the benefit of Section 94.
It is important to note that the threat must be to cause instant death. Merely threatening with
future death or any other injury that is not instant death would not be a valid excuse under
Section 94. For example, if someone threatens another person with a stick to harm someone
else, the person threatened cannot plead the defence under Section 94. However, if the threat
involves a loaded revolver or a dagger held at the person’s throat, causing them to believe they
would be instantly killed if they did not commit the offence, this would be a valid defence under
Section 94.
Sections 87-91 of the Indian Penal Code outline the circumstances in which an act done with
the victim’s consent will be excused or not considered an offence. Consent is a crucial factor
that distinguishes between innocence and criminal liability in various situations.
Section 90 of the Indian Penal Code specifies instances where consent is not considered valid.
These include:
Section 87 states that if an act, not intended or known to cause death or grievous hurt, causes
harm to a person above 18 years of age who has given consent to suffer it, it is not an offence.
This section applies to injuries during games, sports, or similar activities. It is based on the
principle of volenti non-fit injuria, which means that he who consents cannot complain.
However, consent cannot justify acts that are likely to cause death or grievous hurt.
Section 88 states that an act done in good faith for the benefit of the victim, with the victim’s
consent, is not an offence. This section protects surgeons performing surgical operations and
reasonable acts of teachers, such as corporal punishment, to enforce discipline. However, it
does not protect unqualified medical practitioners (quacks).
Section 89 protects acts done in good faith for the benefit of a child or an insane person or with
their guardian’s consent.
Section 92 clarifies that the term “benefit” mentioned in Sections 88 and 89 does not include
mere pecuniary benefits.
Section 91 specifies that the exceptions in Sections 87-89 do not extend to acts that are offences
independently of any harm caused to the person giving consent. For example, causing a
miscarriage (unless done in good faith to save the woman’s life) is considered an independent
offence, and the consent of the woman or her guardian does not justify the act.
According to Section 95, if a person causes harm, even intentionally or knowingly, and that
harm is so slight that a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain about it, then
it is not considered an offence.
This section applies to acts that result in negligible or trifling harm, including accidental and
deliberate acts. The harm can include actual physical injury as well. It recognizes that certain
acts, while technically falling within the scope of the penal law, are inconsequential and do not
warrant criminal prosecution.
Examples of such trivial acts mentioned in your explanation, such as picking up a wafer from
another person’s plate without permission, lighting one’s cigar with someone else’s matchbox
without consent, or a light blow given with an umbrella, illustrate the types of acts that would
fall within the purview of Section 95. These acts may technically meet the criteria for an offence,
but they are considered insignificant and not deserving of legal consequences.
Section 95 prevents the law from being overly burdensome by exempting trivial matters from
criminal liability, focusing instead on more substantial offences that warrant attention and
prosecution.
The right of private defence allows individuals to protect themselves and their property against
unlawful aggression by others.
Section 96 of the Indian Penal Code states that nothing is an offence when it is done in the
exercise of the right of private defence.
• A person facing grave danger to their life does not have to wait for state aid if it is not
readily available.
• Private defence is a preventive measure rather than a means of punishment, although
punitive consequences may occur.
• The right of private defence should not be used for self-gratification or to satisfy
malicious or sadistic urges. It should not involve deliberate retaliation.
The right of private defence can be exercised when there is a real and immediate threat and
reasonable apprehension. Future or hypothetical threats do not justify the use of this right.
The right of private defence arises when there is a reasonable apprehension of danger, even if
the offence has not yet been committed. Mistaken apprehension is valid if it is real and
reasonable.
The force used in self-defence must be proportionate to the danger faced and should not
exceed the necessary limits. However, in situations of imminent danger, a person may not be
expected to calculate the proportion of force required precisely.
The right of defence ceases when the necessity for it ends. Pursuing and attacking a fleeing
aggressor is not justified.
The law does not require a person to avoid injury by running away if they have the right to
exercise self-defence.
Every individual has the right to protect their own body or another person’s body from any
offence that harms the human body. This right extends to defending someone even if they are
a stranger, unlike the English law that requires an existing relationship like master and servant
or husband and wife.
The mental or physical capacity of the attacker, whether they have a guilty mind (mens rea) or
not, does not prevent the exercise of the right of private defence. For example, if a lunatic,
minor, intoxicated person or someone acting under a mistaken belief tries to kill someone, they
are not guilty of an offence. However, the person being attacked has the same right to defend
themselves as they would if the attacker were sane.
There is no right of private defence against an act that does not reasonably cause the fear of
death or serious injury if done by a public servant acting in good faith under the pretence of
their official duties, even if the act may not be strictly justifiable by law.
However, a person is not deprived of the right to defend themselves against an act by a public
servant unless they know or have reason to believe that the attacker is a public servant or is
acting under the direction of a public servant (explained in Section 99).
The distinction between Illegal Acts and Acts Not Strictly Justifiable by Law
There is a distinction between completely illegal acts (ultra vires) and acts that may not be
strictly justifiable by law (irregular acts). In a situation where the police illegally arrested a
person, and certain villagers, to rescue that person, launched an attack on the police only after
a constable had fired at them, it was held that the villagers acted to exercise their right of private
defence. The firing by the constable caused a reasonable fear of death or serious injury in their
minds. However, if a police officer, acting in good faith under the authority of his office, arrests
a person without proper authority, the person being arrested has no right to self-defence
against the officer.
Absence of Right of Defence When Time for Recourse to Public Authorities Exists
There is no right of defence in situations where there is sufficient time to seek the protection of
public authorities. However, this does not mean that a person must run away to seek public
authorities’ help when attacked instead of defending themselves.
The right of private defence does not extend to causing more harm than is necessary for
defence. Section 100 lists six serious acts of aggression that authorize the defender to even
cause the assailant’s death. These acts include reasonable fear of death or serious injury, assault
to commit rape or unnatural lust, kidnapping and abduction, or wrongfully confining a person.
In other cases, the defender may cause harm other than death (Section 101).
In cases where there is a reasonable fear of death if the defender is in a situation where
exercising the right of self-defence would risk harm to an innocent person, they may even
choose to take that risk (Section 106). For example, if a mob attacks a person and cannot use a
firearm without the risk of harming young children who are mixed within the mob.
Therefore, if the accused continues to assault the victim after falling and are no longer a threat,
the right of private defence would not be available. Similarly, if a group of individuals strangle
a thief and subject him to severe mistreatment when he is completely under their control, the
right of private defence would not be justified.
Every person has the right to defend their property or the property of others against
theft, robbery, mischief, criminal trespass, or any attempt to commit such acts (Section 97). This
right also applies when dealing with individuals who are mentally incapacitated, minors,
intoxicated persons, or those acting under a misconception of fact (Section 98).
However, the right of private defence of property is subject to certain limitations as specified in
Section 99.
The right of private defence of property comes into effect when there is a reasonable
apprehension of danger to the property. It continues under the following circumstances:
• In cases of theft, until the offender has escaped with the property, until the assistance of
public authorities is obtained, or until the property is recovered.
• In robbery cases, as long as the offender causes or attempts to cause death, hurt, or
wrongful restraint, or as long as there is a fear of immediate death, hurt, or personal
restraint.
• In cases of criminal trespass or mischief, as long as the offender continues to commit
such offences.
• In cases of house-breaking by night, as long as the trespassing continues. However, if a
person follows a thief and kills them in the open after the house-trespass has ended,
they cannot claim the right of private defence (Section 105).
Section 103 lists the specific cases where the right of private defence extends to causing the
wrongdoer’s death. These cases include:
• Robbery
• House-breaking by night
• Mischief by fire to a building, tent, or vessel used as a dwelling or for property custody
Theft, mischief, or house trespass under the circumstances causing a reasonable apprehension
of death or grievous hurt. In other cases, the right of private defence extends to causing harm
other than death (Section 103-104).
Conclusion
The Indian Penal Code provides several general exceptions that safeguard individuals who may
have acted under certain circumstances that mitigate or negate criminal liability. The general
exceptions in IPC include mistakes of fact, judicial acts, accidents, absence of criminal intention,
acts done by consent, trifling acts, and the right of private defence.