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title: Philosophy Without Foundations : Rethinking

Hegel SUNY Series in Philosophy
author: Maker, William.
publisher: State University of New York Press
isbn10 | asin: 0791421007
print isbn13: 9780791421000
ebook isbn13: 9780585090375
language: English
subject Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,--1770-1831,
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,--1770-1831--
Influence, Philosophy, Modern--20th century.
publication date: 1994
lcc: B2948.M257 1994eb
ddc: 193
subject: Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,--1770-1831,
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich,--1770-1831--
Influence, Philosophy, Modern--20th century.

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Philosophy Without Foundations

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SUNY Series in Hegelian Studies
William Desmond, Editor
and
SUNY Series in Philosophy
George R. Lucas, Jr., Editor

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Philosophy Without Foundations

Rethinking Hegel

William Maker

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS

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Production by Ruth Fisher Marketing by Fran Keneston
Published by State University of New York Press, Albany
© 1994 State University of New York
All rights reserved
Printed in the United States of America
No part of this book may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without written
permission except in the case of brief quotations embodied in critical articles and reviews.
For information, address the State University of New York Press, State University Plaza,
Albany, NY 12246
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Maker, William.
Philosophy without foundations: rethinking Hegel/William Maker.
p. cm. (SUNY series in Hegelian studies) (SUNY series in
philosophy)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7914-2099-X (alk. paper). ISBN 0-7914-2100-7 (pbk.:
alk. paper)
1. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 17701831. 2. Hegel, Georg
Wilhelm Friedrich, 17701831InfluencePhilosophers, Modern.
3. Philosophy, Modern20th century. I. Title. II. Series.
III. Series: SUNY series in philosophy.
B2948.M257 1994
193dc20
93-42703
CIP
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

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Contents

Preface vii
A Note on the Text ix
Introduction 1
Part One. The Relevance of Hegel
1 Reason and the Problem of Modernity 21
2 Philosophy as Systematic Science 47
3 Hegel's Phenomenology as Introduction to Systematic Science 67
4 Beginning Philosophy without 'Beginnings' 83
5 Philosophy and Dialectical Method 99
6 On the Presumed Blasphemy of Hegelian Absolutism 125
Part Two. The Transcendence of Contemporary Philosophy
7 Hegel and Hermeneutics 147
8 The Critique of Marx and Marxist Thought 159
9 The Dead End of Postmodernism 179
10 The Renewed Appeal to Transcendental Arguments 199
11 The Problematic Role of God in Modern Epistemology 217
Notes 239
Index 293

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Page vii

Preface
In a recent essay, Karl Americks noted that while "Hegel's contribution to practical philosophy
no longer requires rehabilitation. ... Hegel's theoretical philosophy, however, continues to be
highly suspect. ..." 1 The aim of this book is to confront and challenge that suspicion. Its
central concern is with the nature and status of Hegel's theoretical philosophy, with his
understanding of how we are to engage in philosophy and of what results from that
engagement. The enduring antipathy to this theoretical enterprise is contested here in this
fashion: I argue, in a variety of ways and from various perspectives, that Hegel's texts can be
read such that we can rethink those aspects of the traditional picture of Hegel which have
continued to cause contemporary philosophers to dismiss him. Finding philosophical
significance in Hegel need not force us to ignore or sidestep what has traditionally been the
cause of suspicion, his idea of a philosophical system. Indeed, I shall argue that when we have
properly rethought what Hegel means by systematic philosophy, we will see that he is not a
metaphysical idealist who attempts to foist on us a system which is as unintelligible as it is
devoid of argument.
In part, this book endeavors to demonstrate that Hegel's philosophy contains some powerful
arguments, and to indicate their cogency. Additionally, it aims to show that these arguments
are contemporary in a vital sense because they address what I take to be the central questions
about philosophy today: Do criticisms of the foundational tradition in philosophy force us to
abandon philosophy and its attempt to provide objective truth? Must philosophy be rejected in
favor of relativism, nihilism, deconstruction, or genial conversation? I try to show how a
rethought Hegel enables us to answer both of these questions in a decisively negative manner.
Thus, this book contends not only that Hegel has something worthwhile to say about a variety

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of philosophical topics, but that his conception of systematic philosophythat which still
appears most anachronistic in Hegelis not only intelligible and defensible but also of
contemporary importance. What I have worked to indicate is that Hegel's philosophy is not
consummately foundational and absolutist, but rather originates in a critique of
foundationalism. Recognizing and understanding this critique is the basis for rethinking Hegel;
indeed, when we have done so, Hegel's system emerges as a nonfoundational philosophy
which incorporates some contemporary criticisms of foundationalism without abandoning
philosophy's traditional goal of offering demonstratable, objective truth. Because the Hegel
presented here is an adamant and radical antifoundationalist, some features of this
interpretation run directly counter to the accepted understanding of Hegel. Nonetheless, I have
tried to show both that this nonfoundational reading is firmly based in Hegel's arguments, and
that it does not require us to dismiss crucial Hegelian claims about the nature of his system:
rather, what is called for is a shift of focus to enable us to rethink Hegel's idea of systematic
philosophy in a new way.

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Page ix

A Note On The Text

Portions of some of the chapters were previously published. Publication details are listed
below.

Part of "Reason and the Problem of Modernity" appeared under the same title in The
Philosophical Forum 18, no. 4 (Summer 1987): pp. 275303.

Part of "Philosophy as Systematic Science" appeared under the title "Deconstructing

Foundationalism and the Question of Philosophy as Systematic Science" in Reason Papers 16
(Fall 1991): pp. 95113.

Part of "Hegel's Phenomenology as Introduction to Systematic Science" appeared under the

title "Hegel's Phenomenology as Introduction to Science" in CLIO 10, no. 4 (1981): pp.
381397.

Part of "Beginning Philosophy Without 'Beginnings'" appeared under the title "Beginning" in
Essays on Hegel's Logic, ed. George di Giovanni (Albany: SUNY Press, 1990): pp. 2743.

Part of "Philosophy and Dialectical Method" appeared under the title "Does Hegel Have a
'Dialectical Method'?" in The Southern Journal of Philosophy 20, no. 1 (1982): pp. 7596.

Part of "On the Presumed Blasphemy of Hegelian Absolutism" appeared under the title
"Hegel's Blasphemy?" in The History of Philosophy Quarterly 9, no. 1 (January 1992): pp.
6785.

Part of "Hegel and Hermeneutics" appeared under the title "Gadamer on Hegel: 'Taking
Finitude Seriously' and the 'Unbreakable Circle of Reflection'" in The Dayton Review 17, no. 1
(Spring 1984): p. 6978.

Part of "The Critique of Marx and Marxist Thought" appeared under the title "Hegel's Critique
of Marx: The Fetishism of Dialectics" in Hegel and His Critics: Philosophy in the Aftermath
of Hegel, ed. William Desmond (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989): pp. 7292.

Part of "The Dead End of Postmodernism" appeared under the title "(Postmodern) Tales from
the Crypt: The Night of the Zombie

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Philosophers" in Metaphilosophy 23, no. 4 (October 1992): pp. 311328.

Part of "The Renewed Appeal to Transcendental Arguments" appeared under the title
"Davidson's Transcendental Arguments" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51,
no. 2 (June 1991): pp. 345360.

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Page 1

Introduction
Questions about the basic nature and the fundamental status of their discipline have always
preoccupied philosophers, and this is understandable. Given philosophy's traditional claim
concerning its special status as a disciplineits self-proclaimed role as the queen of the
scienceswe ought not to be surprised by the spectacle of continual debate over foundations
which the history of philosophy affords. There have been many pretenders to philosophy's
queenly throne, and the palace struggles have been frequent and bloody.
But at least since Nietzsche those metaconcerns which previously engendered recurring
foundational crises have taken a new twist. Philosophers have come to focus increasingly, and
with an increasingly skeptical eye, on the question of the very possibility of philosophy as
traditionally understood: as that endeavor which is distinctive, meaningful, necessary, and
superior to others because of its capacity to speak in an unconditional and authoritative fashion
about what there is, how it is to be known, and how we ought to live.
So, while the tradition of philosophy has always been exceptional owing to its ceaseless
generation of revolutionsthe procession of ever-succeeding claims to have overcome the errors
of the past and, through a redefinition of first principles, to have finally founded philosophy as
the first sciencethe latest revolution appears to be different. It claims for itself the distinction
of having rejected not only the errors of the past, but also the whole tradition of laying claim to
philosophy as science. In recent years an image of philosophy as being ''tormented by
questions which bring itself into question" has taken hold, along with attempts to effect an end
to this torment by bringing the urge which gives rise to it to an awareness of the impossibility
of its satisfaction. 1 We are told that the recurring cycle of crises in philosophy can be
overcome by a rejection of that self-understanding of philosophy which has

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inevitably engendered them. 2 What has emerged from the efforts of Heidegger, Gadamer,
Derrida, the later Wittgenstein, and the work of Richard Rorty, to mention only the most
obvious and prominent names associated with the latest revolution, is a mode of
philosophizing (or thinking) which is rooted in a felt need to direct the critical capacities of
philosophy upon the traditional conception of the philosophical enterprise itself, in order to
effect a liberation from it.3 Much of contemporary discussion and debate centers around
various attempts to analyze and critically reject philosophy's traditional guiding ideal, its aim
to be a radical, self-legitimating science, an absolute foundational discipline.4 The latest
fashion in philosophy is to be against foundations. Linked with the demise of foundationalism
is the widely proclaimed collapse of modernity. As an attempt to provide objective rational
criteria for individual judgments about knowledge and action, foundationalism is seen to be
central to providing a legitimation for modern claims about individual freedom: demonstrating
that individuals possess the capacity and the right to autonomy seemingly presupposes
establishing foundational principles for judgment within subjectivity. Thus,
antifoundationalism and postmodernism go hand in hand.
I hesitate to speak of "antifoundationalism," insofar as that suffix might suggest a coherent,
deliberately united school of philosophers emerging from a shared tradition, writing in a
common style, referring to one another's work, and consciously acknowledging both their
mutual influences and a univocal positive goal.5 If antifoundationalism as a school does not
exist, at least yet, what does legitimate the use of this collective label to bunch together
philosophers who otherwise diverge in many ways is their agreement, not on some specific
and detailed positive conception of what philosophy should be and how to realize this, but
rather on what it has been and can no longer be. Antifoundationalism is better thought of as a
movement of opposition than a coherent positive school, and what unifies it, minimally, lies,
as the name indicates, in what it is directed against. Tying together hermeneutics,
deconstruction, poststructuralism, posthumanism, postmodernism, neopragmatism,
postanalytic philosophy, and postphilosophical philosophyto mention some of the terms
currently in use6is an agreement that foundationalism with its goal of a philosophical science
needs to be rejected7insofar as it has not already rejected itselfas well as a sense that this
rejection entails certain basic minimal conditions for future philosophy.
Just what is being attacked here? What are we being asked to renounce? Antifoundationalism
defines itself minimally as a rejec-

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tion of what is sometimes called Cartesianism, understood as the modern attempt to legitimate
philosophy's claim to be the queen of the sciences through a project of self-reflection which
would result in the discovery and legitimation of indubitable truth principles. 8 As understood
from the antifoundationalist perspective, the modern project of foundational epistemology
arises from the "Cartesian anxiety"9 that both philosophy and culture generally are in need of
"foundations": before rightful truth claims can be justly made, the conditions of cognition
which can afford us knowledge must be articulated and shown to be truth-affording. Our
capacity to know must be grounded, legitimated, or justified if errors of judgment both
cognitive and practical are to be avoided. The path of discovery which is to lead to these
cognitive foundations is one of critical reflection, an internal self-investigation in which the
knowing subject liberates itself from all preconceptions and prejudices and comes to full
consciousness of the nature, limits, and legitimacy of its capacities as a knower. Through
attaining this foundational standpoint of self-transparency, philosophy will have legitimated
itself in the radical sense of establishing its authority as "first philosophy": the foundational
project will result in philosophy's emergence as the super science. For, by establishing its
privileged access to the conditions of cognition through critical self-reflection, philosophy will
be distinctive both in having grounded itselfby demonstrating its capacity to arrive at
foundational knowledgeand, through this self-grounding, in having justified its claim to
authority as that discipline which can rightly judge all other claims to know. Philosophy will
have legitimated its claim to be the metadiscipline by rending transparent what Rorty refers to
as the "permanent ahistorical matrix" in which all knowledge claimstheoretical as well as
practicalcan and must be founded.
Thus, implicit or explicit in foundationalism are the assumptions: (1) that conditions for
knowledge are unchanging and universal; (2) that they pertain to or can be located in the mind
or consciousness; (3) that this same mind can mirror to itself its own cognitive conditions and
through this, establish both their legitimacy as necessary and its specific authority as the voice
which judges adherence to and deviations from them. As I understand the antifoundational
movement, it is defined by its effort to reveal these assumptions as mere assumptions and to
demonstrate that they are illicit. "Antifoundationalism" as I shall use the term has as its
reference a congeries of philosophers who are minimally united by the conviction that future
philosophy must be predicated on the denial of (1) through (3).

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The locus of antifoundationalism's rejection of this project lies in the conviction that the
foundational standpoint of cognitive self-transparency, the "God's eye" "view from nowhere"
10 which affords foundational knowledge of how knowledge is possible, is unattainable.
Antifoundationalism's definitive critical claim is to have revealed the impossibility of arriving
at a perspective which can oversee the knowledge-affording relation between the mind and its
objects, appearances and things in themselves, beings and Being, or language and the world.11
Without access to such an Archimedean standpoint (from which we could see that and how
our representations hook up to what they purportedly represent) we cannot claim to have
revealed the foundations of knowledge, and, antifoundationalism concludes, it makes no sense
to speak of such foundations or to construe philosophy as a foundational science which can
articulate conditions of necessity, universality, rationality, objectivity, and legitimacy, either
cognitive or practical.
Inseparable from the paramount critical claim denying the possibility of such an autonomous
view of things is a rejection of the foundationalist conception of knowledge as a possible
object: as something whose 'nature' and 'conditions' can be isolated, analyzed, and subjected to
a thoroughgoing and detached critical scrutiny. In contrast, antifoundationalism is rooted in a
basic belief in the opaqueness of the knowing situation. For antifoundationalists all
knowledgeand all philosophical reasoningis finite, conditioned, located, perspectival, or
contextual: tied to conceptual schemes, embedded in horizons, governed by language games,
ruled by paradigms, inseparable from particular historical traditions, inextricable from forms
of life or sets of social practices. According to this contextualist view, knowledge and
discourse are irredeemably situated: rooted in or wedded to factors whose ineluctable
givenness precludes their ultimate transcendence, as well as any hope of rendering these
conditions of contextuality fully transparent. Thus, we cannot come to know things as they are
in themselves, independent of a point of view, and must forgo all hope of attaining the
autonomous, unmediated perspective requisite of philosophy as science.
This autonomy is doubly precluded since all possible knowledge, we are told, is situated,
located, or bounded in a twofold way: both embedded in the particular givens of the "styles of
reasoning" defined by the contingencies of our various linguistic, historical, social, and
cultural contexts and practices, and conditioned generally by the "framework of givenness"12
peculiar to our finite subjectivity, to who and what we are as knowers (or language users).

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Local rebellions and a conditional liberation from at least some of the particular givens is
possible: antifoundationalism itself claims to effect an emancipation from what it sees as the
particular and contingent givens which helped to define the foundationalist tradition; more
generally, it rejects the notion of absolutes in the sense of there being any specifiable
particulars conditioning knowledge, language, or practice which may be said to hold
necessarily, universally, and ahistorically. (Were such absolutes discoverable, their
specification would complete the foundational project.)
But while we can liberate ourselves from some particular (social, linguistic, cultural, etc.)
givens, we can never hope to escape from all such givens. That is, the general condition of our
being conditioned by contingent, given particulars (social, linguistic, etc.) is inescapable,
foraccording to antifoundationalismescaping from it would mean arriving at a transcendent
view of the context of conditioning itself, a perspective outside of all contextuality, beyond all
givenness as such. No revolution seeking emancipation from the context of contextuality, from
the framework of givenness itself, from the inescapable situatedness of all claims to know, can
possibly succeed. 13 Efforts to attain such liberation are doomed to failure because, by not
"taking finitude seriously" they comprise attempts to "step outside our skins."14 To engage in
knowing (or to use language) is always and everywhere to participate in an activity whose
foundations must remain opaqueand unjustifiedsince knowing (and language use) cannot
proceed without the assumption of some givens which, in establishing conditions for judgment
(or expression) first make knowledge (or discourse) possible.15
What remain open for possible revision or replacement are the particular givens we happen to
be operating from, but such revision or replacement can only take place in a context defined
by other givens. That we must always proceed from some givens is unavoidable. This situation
then is The Big Given which rules out foundational philosophy. (And it is this situation which
I am indicating by the expressions 'framework of givenness' and 'context of contextuality.'
These are, so to speak, the transcendental conditions of possibility, the rock upon which the
antifoundational position buildsand restsits case.) The transcendental illusion of
foundationalism was rooted in the unwarranted belief that subjectivity could somehow,
through liberating itself from the contingently given, attain to transparency concerning the
framework of givenness itself, to a position outside of the cognitive, conceptual, or linguistic
matrix from which one could survey its principles of operation: the privileged, necessary
givens which are immanent in

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its structure and which purportedly define the universal and necessary conditions for cognition
or discourse. But this could only amount to a claim to have represented the grounds of
representation itself, to having said that which, because it makes saying possible, cannot itself
be said. It would be tantamount to having pulled oneself up by one's own cognitive or
linguistic bootstraps. Thus the very attempt to transcend the framework of givennessthe iron
cage of contextualityin order to provide foundational knowledge of it, only demonstrates its
inescapability and ineluctability. 16
Hence, when antifoundationalism proclaims the myth of the given (or when it decries the very
idea of a conceptual scheme) what is being described as a myth in need of abandonment is the
foundationalist belief that certain givens can be isolated as privileged, as those determinative
factors which, in being universally and necessarily peculiar to subjectivity (or language)
ahistorically define the conditions of all possible knowledge (or provide the system of
categories with which we organize experience). What is precisely not a myth, and what
seemingly cannot be proclaimed as one if antifoundationalism is to avoid undercutting its own
critical claims, is our perspectivality or contextuality, our finitude, understood as the necessity
that our knowledge claims are founded in and relative to some givens, to features of our
conceptual or linguistic framework which cannot be rendered fully transparent or explicit.17
Thus, while renouncing all hope of a final discovery of eternal, unchanging, universal
grounding conditions, and hence of the image of philosophy as a mirror of nature and a
metascience of knowing, discourse, and conduct, antifoundationalismso far at leasthas not left
the traditional arena of philosophy altogether. In renouncing epistemology it has not
abandoned all talk of knowledge and its possibility.18 Rather, what we are being asked to do is
conceive of knowledge in a different fashion: in such a way that our urge to think of it as
analyzable into finite and specific components, and as having or needing grounds, is stifled.
Despite adamant denials that some sort of a theory of knowledgean anti-epistemological
epistemologyis being offered, antifoundationalism has been accused of self-referential
inconsistency.19 It would seem that in order for its claim denying the possibility of
transcendental, epistemological knowledge to have argumentative force, it must be made from
nothing other than a standpoint which claims privileged insight into the conditions of knowing,
the very standpoint whose possibility is being denied. Some antifoundationalists seem not to
be troubled by this charge of self-referential inconsistency, perhaps

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regarding the apparent perversity (from a traditional perspective) of their position as 'showing'
something which cannot be 'said,' in the tradition of Wittgenstein of the Tractatus. 20
Whether this Wittgensteinian gambit is a weasel is something I consider at length, especially
in Chapter 2, "Philosophy as Systematic Science" and in Chapter 9, "The Dead End of
Postmodernism." At this juncture, it is worth noting that the problemthe need to somehow
speak about the unspeakable, just in order to assert its inarticulability, or the need to make
claims to somehow know the unknowable, in order to make manifest its resistance to cognition
(for the sake of articulating the necessary finitude of our knowledge) or the need to engage in
meaningless speech, in order to provide a verifiability criterion to rule it outgoes back at least
to Kant's first Critique. As Jacobi put it: "I need the assumption of things-in-themselves to
enter the Kantian system, but with this assumption it is not possible for me to remain inside it."
Or as Ramsey put it: "but what we can't say we can't say, and we can't whistle it either."21 I
shall argue that this problem may be endemic to all talk about foundations of knowledge, both
anti- and profoundational, and that antifoundationalism is plagued by difficulties which bear
more than just a family resemblance to those it detects in foundationalism.
In any case, the denial of foundationalism and the rejection of its correlative notions of
privileged representations, the correspondence theory of truth, and the transcendental subject
would thus seem to represent at least a paradigm shift, albeit one which entails a significant
reconceptualization of the philosophical enterprise, rather than a wholesale abandonment of
philosophy altogether.
Just what "philosophy" in a positive sense is now to beeven whether it is worthwhile to hold
on to the termis somewhat unclear, and given the denial that philosophy can establish its own
paradigmatic status, we should expect a diversity of views concerning what postfoundational
philosophy should be. Nonetheless, the terms of the antifoundationalist argument against
foundationalism, and especially the contextualist understanding of knowledge which it
employs in attacking the foundationalist conception, do lead to the defining of certain minimal
or basic conditions for future, postfoundational, philosophy. If antifoundationalism's negative,
critical project provides us with no specific univocal roadmap for the future of philosophy, it
would seem to offer us at least a compass for the charting of our course, as well as a fixed
point of departure. Taking our bearings from the correlative primal notions of the finitude (or
contextuality) of cognition and the impossibility of absolute, foun-

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dational knowledge, we find that holism, historicism, pluralism, and fallibalism define the
points of the antifoundational compass for future conceptual navigation. Consideration of
these foundational points of antifoundationalism enables us to bring into focus some broad
features of the postfoundational project.
Because the rejection of foundationalism is conjoined with the claim that knowledge is
determined by the context in which the knower is located, antifoundationalism generally can
be said to endorse holism, that conception of knowledge according to which truth is defined
not in terms of correspondence to objects but as the coherence of claims within the frame of
reference defined by the tradition, style of discourse, or set of linguistic or social practices in
which the knower is located. 22 Because the context of knowledge is not reducible to some set
of isolatable mental or mind-dependent qualities attributable to a transcendental subject23 (or
to some set of fixed, isolatable logical, linguistic, or semantic features), it is usually seen by
antifoundationalists as determined intersubjectively and in terms of socially conditioned
practices. So, coupled with its holistic view of cognition, antifoundationalism generally
regards knowledge as socially constituted. Future talk about knowledge will require us to bring
into consideration institutions and activities in the life world.24
Given that the context, however it is specified, always functions in an over-determinative
manner, and because some condition of contextuality must function as a given, no tradition,
style, paradigm, language game, or set of practices can be uniquely privileged. Thus the very
idea that philosophy is distinctly defined by its authoritative access to the domain of the
eternally and universally true must be abandoned. "Philosophy has become anti-aprioristic."25
Rather than speaking of those features which condition cognition and discourse in terms of
ahistorical universality, necessity, and immutability, we must see their tentative and
historically contingent character. Hence, along with the renunciation of the claim to such
privileged access to foundational absolutes, there emerges an effort to reveal and describe the
various extra-philosophical and non-rational conditioning factors and assumptions from out of
which arose the myth of philosophy and other myths which claim transcendental, ahistorical
authority. These conditioning factors are variously described as rooted in social, linguistic,
cultural, economic, political, or other contingent givens, in practices and traditions which are
human, historical constructs rather than natural or supernatural fixities. Postfoundational
philosophy thus tends towards a sweeping historicistic overview of the human

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condition and offers us various de-mythologizing "genealogies" or "deconstructions"critiques
of attempts to postulate some givens as privilegedin the styles of Nietzsche, Marx, and
Foucault. 26
Coupled with the new humility associated with historicistic debunkings of the foundational
illusion about the privileged nature of philosophical rationality, we find the endorsement of a
leveling pluralism which purports to contrast with the authoritative, hierarchical outlook of
traditional philosophy.27 Because philosophy can no longer appeal to the privileged domain of
the eternally rational a priori as its special subject matter, philosophers are counseled to
abandon their contempt for the contingent givens which make up the subject matter of other
disciplines, and to cease disparaging or devaluing these disciplines and their methods. In
contrast, a pluralistic tolerance of styles, techniques, and truths should be adopted along with
an acceptance, if not of their incommensurability, then at least of their irreducibility to one,
unified True Picture. "There is no God's eye point of view that we can know or usefully
imagine; there are only the various points of view of actual persons reflected in various
interests and purposes that their descriptions and theories subserve."28
Also intertwined with the rejection of foundationalism and the endorsement of pluralistic
holism is an espousal of fallibilism: because all claims to know are ultimately unjustifiable and
contingent upon contexts or perspectives, they must be consciously regarded as unavoidably
conditional, subject to future reevaluation, revision, and possible rejection.29
Emerging out of the turn to holism, historicism, pluralism, and fallibilism and tied to its
depiction of our entrapment in the framework of givenness, antifoundationalism has also
brought about calls for a turn to and an appreciation of the pre-philosophically given as that
with which we should concern ourselves. If absolute and final authority and guidance cannot
be found in a mythical domain of the eternally rational, then our attention needs to be directed
to the ordinary, to the Lebenswelt, to praxis, to the given languages, styles, traditions,
communities, habits, and practices in which we find ourselves located.30
From this perspective, and in conjunction with the aforementioned, an overall goal for
postfoundational philosophy would seem to emerge. Its task is to bring us to self-knowledge in
the sense that we attain an awareness of the nature and unavoidable limitedness of our
conceptual schemes, styles, traditions and points of viewour habits, our ways of behaving. A
condition of this knowledge must be the realization that we cannot ever fully escape from

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or justify them, for no ultimate justification is possible. Thus some antifoundationalists
contend that the most philosophy can be is "edifying" and therapeutic. 31 Armed with the
special awareness of the limited character of our particular perspectives which
postfoundational philosophy provides, we can, and should, focus our attention on the world of
the living, on practices and forms of life, and away from the illusory eternal domain of Ideas.
Rather than strive for the unattainable authority which the tradition promised, we should
instead seek solidarity and community with those who share our habits and work to extend the
boundaries of the "conversation of mankind."32 It would now seem that philosophical wisdom
is to be defined as the practical, putatively tolerance-engendering consciousness that we
cannot authoritatively demonstrate that our contexts, styles, traditions, and points of view are
better than others. This outlook is almost universally defended by antifoundationalists as being
in some way or another emancipatory. It is said to lead to openness, to the liberation of the
mind, and the expansion of horizons.
Connected of course with the notion that we cannot demonstrate the superiority of our own, or
any other, style, tradition, etc. would seem to be the correlative notion that we cannot
demonstrate (or have no grounds for suspecting) the inferiority of our own, or any other, style,
tradition, etc. Thus, not the least of what is controversial about antifoundationalism is the
apparent dogmatism or relativism which it is said either to lead to or to leave us defenseless
against. Much has and will be written about this, some of it by way of denying that a rejection
of foundationalism entails relativism.33 As this topic is dealt with below (especially in Chapter
2, "Philosophy as Systematic Science," and Chapter 9, "The Dead End of Postmodernism,") I
shall touch on it only briefly at this point.
In asserting our entrapment in the framework of givenness, and by declaring the impossibility
of our ever justifying the givens which happen to shape us, antifoundationalism would seem to
lead to levelled standards and equated perspectives, and also, curiously, to at least the possible
re-emergence of the very perspective-privileging which it purports to oppose. The attempt has
been made to defuse the charge of relativism (in a manner similar to that directed against the
charge of self-referential inconsistency) by suggesting that foundationalism and relativism are
correlative terms: when the specter of foundationalism and the Cartesian "quest for certainty
and indubitability" are "exposed and overcome," we are supposed to appreciate that the
phantom companion of relativism disappears too.34

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At best, this response amounts to an attempt to ease the sting of relativism, to cure a fear of it.
It is not a demonstration that the phenomenon does not exist nor that its association with
antifoundationalism is baseless. Put differently, to hold that relativism is only conceptually
compelling insofar as foundationalism isand that with the realization of the latter's
impossibility the former is somehow defusedmay be an argument against the charge that
relativism will inevitably lead to anarchic nihilism. One can suggest that the realization of a
lack of absolute foundations for our beliefs need not lead to our abandoning them, or to chaos,
if the very idea of such foundations is unintelligible: there may be a false dichotomy between
beliefs absolutely grounded and beliefs which, because they have no ground at all, may or
ought to be abandoned at whim. This, however, is not an argument against the claim that
antifoundationalism leads to relativism. To assert that one need not worry about foundations
for standards of cognition and conduct because none are to be found does not amount to a
demonstration that, in the absence of such foundations, there are objective standards (in the
sense of standards which can compel rational assent), whose authority rests on something
more than the arational and contingent force of tradition, custom, habit, or power. But it is
with this latter situationthe issue of the nature and legitimacy of authoritythat those who
charge antifoundationalism with relativism are (or should be) concerned. This concern takes
its force from the conviction that antifoundationalismwith its glorification of the primacy of
the other-than-rational, contingently givenoffers no ground for distinguishing between
legitimate and illegitimate authority. There are good reasons to suspect that
antifoundationalism leaves us no bases for distinguishing between the authority of reason and
the authority of power. Indeed, antifoundationalists siding with Nietzsche question whether
this is a distinction that makes a difference (or différance).
If antifoundationalism is not merely to avoid the issue and dogmatically assert the correctness
of its view (that relativism is a pseudo-problem) it must do more than simply make the above-
mentioned response, for it can only appeal to the unconverted as sophistical rhetoric. Short of
conversion to the antifoundationalist position, the response, although meant to dissolve the
issue of relativism, will appear to the unconverted as simply a manifestation of the relativist
position. What antifoundationalism needs to doand seemingly cannot do without again
succumbing to inconsistencyis somehow to show how its denial of foundationalism is

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compatible with the assertion and affirmation of some critical perspective which can be
ultimately defended as more than just the standard of this or that tradition or perspective, as
resting finally on something more than an appeal to the contingent givens of our location.
Failing such a move, which would force antifoundationalism back into the foundational
gambit, its own call for a defense of pluralism and tolerance seem at best shaky (although the
antifoundationalist would hold that this is all any position can be) and at worst merely the self-
serving trumpeting of certain features of the Enlightenment tradition out of which it emerges
and whose death it has proclaimed. The purportedly liberating tendency of antifoundationalism
is ambiguous, because if no perspective or tradition is privileged, then not only is there no
reason for preferring one tradition or perspective to another, there is equally no reason for not
preferring it to another. 35
Thus antifoundationalism's charge against foundationalismthat it is authoritarian because it
privileges one tradition, style, etc., over anothercan be turned against antifoundationalism
itself. One may then wonder to what extent we are being asked to endorse a kind of self-
conscious dogmatism, and whether antifoundationalism's pronouncement of our entrapment in
the given does not amount to a curious endorsement of, and an apologetics for, contemporary
society, or whatever status quo one chooses. Philosophy as therapy would in fact seem to leave
''everything as it is."36 For the demonstration that the emperor has no clothes, that the
Enlightenment and liberal tradition of modernity is without final justification, is coupled here
with the claim that not only are no clothes to be found, neither are any needed. From the denial
that justification is possible, coupled with the loss of foundations, the implication that all
discourse is conversation or rhetoric, and the abandonment of the ideal of an autonomous
rational standpoint of objectivity, there would necessarily seem to follow a final abandonment,
not only of the ideal of philosophy as authoritative, but also of any claim to the critical force of
philosophy. The historicizing and contextualizing of the modernist conception of reason, while
arguably implicit in the self-critical project which it instituted and which antifoundationalism
claims to have completed, would seem also to sever the link between reason and emancipation
which this tradition attempted to forge and which antifoundationalists such as Habermas
continue to espouse.
Initially, it might seem curious to mention this current received view in connection with Hegel,
except perhaps by way of

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pointing out that his is a version of philosophy diametrically and thoroughly opposed to it.
While there seems to be some recognition of the fact that Hegel mounted a critique of certain
features of the foundational project, 37 it remains a fixed truism of contemporary philosophical
education that he nonetheless unabashedly propounded an absolute philosophical science
resting on a claim to having attained absolutefoundationalknowledge. According to one recent
commentator, Hegel is "[l]ike other geniuses" in "confusing himself with God. ..."38
Yet it is worth considering whether that view, which would directly and without further ado
postulate a fixed and rigid opposition between current skepticism about philosophy and
Hegel's position, does full justice both to the serious and complex issues involved, and to
Hegel. I believe that such a rigid opposition is one-sided. To hold that Hegel is in
disagreement with certain of the postfoundationalist views on the limited possibility of
philosophy is certainly correct. Hegel unquestionably believed that a standpoint of
autonomous rational objectivity was attainable, that philosophy as a rigorous science was
possible, and that the legitimacy of certain features of the tradition of modernity could be
established through a demonstration of their character as distinctively rational. In a nutshell,
Hegel subscribed to and attempted to defend what I shall refer to as "the thesis of autonomous
reason." "Henceforth, the principle of the independence of Reason, or of its absolute self-
subsistence, is made a general principle of philosophy ..."39 But to assume therefore that Hegel
was unaware of the difficulties, pitfalls, and paradoxes consequent upon the foundational
project, and to suggest that his attempt at scientific philosophy is precriticalin either the
Kantian or Rortian (or both) senses of that termis a serious misreading of what Hegel was up
to.
It can certainly be shown that Hegel was profoundly aware of the inherent difficulties involved
in grounding, founding, or legitimating the philosophical enterprise. But not only that. I shall
also contend, as curious as this must initially sound, that Hegel's own attempt to render
philosophy scientificthe project carried out in the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807, his self-
described introduction to scienceconsists as introduction in nothing other than an immanent
and thoroughgoing critique of the traditionally conceived manner of establishing philosophy as
science. In brief, I aim to show that Hegel proposed to introduce the standpoint of autonomous
reason and philosophical science through a radical and consummately destructive critique of
foundational epistemology and

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transcendental philosophy. (See especially Chapter 3, "Hegel's Phenomenology as Introduction
to Systematic Philosophy," Chapter 4, "Beginning Philosophy without 'Beginnings,'" and
Chapter 5, "Philosophy and Dialectical Method.") Bracketing issues of historical
interpretation, the position argued here is that the way to philosophy as a critical science of
autonomous reason is, in part, through a realization of the impossibility of establishing such a
science on epistemological foundations, and further, that this realization emerges in and
through a thinking through of the foundational epistemological project. In addition, I argue
that such a philosophical science fulfills philosophy's traditional aim of attaining a self-
grounding discourse which can articulate objective truth, and that such philosophical science is
not only compatible with, but is the only consistent articulation of the postmodernist notions of
an antimetaphysical, nonauthoritarian, nonsubjectivist and nontotalizing discourse. (Hegel
completes the philosophical tradition in a way which already incorporates the legitimate
features of the postmodernist critique of it, and he does this without undermining the force of
this critique and without succumbing to the problematic features of the postmodernist version
of it.) By providing for a conceptualization of autonomous reason tied to a radical critique of
foundationalism, this discourse would be nonfoundational; yet, as constructed through the self-
constitution of autonomous reason which that critique first makes possible, systematic
philosophy would provide a frameworkand a legitimationfor modernist claims about the
primacy of autonomy and reason. 40
Therefore, this book presents the unusual thesis that a thoroughgoing critique of
foundationalism is the basis for both a reconstitution of the philosophical tradition and a
successful legitimation of modernity. I argue that, rather than presupposing foundationalism,
philosophy and modernity require liberation from it. Put differently, I contend that
contemporary oppositions between philosophy and postphilosophy and modernity and
postmodernity are false dichotomies; that the philosophical revelation of the failure of
foundationalism is part of the modernist tradition of the self-critique of reason; and that
modernity, with its distinctive claims to the rightful primacy of autonomy, can only be
legitimated on the basis of a demonstration that the autonomies of thought and action are
neither in need of nor can have any foundations.
Thus, in addition to offering a new approach to ongoing debates about the future of philosophy
and the status of modernity, a further concern of this book is to address the contemporary
historical question of how the modern philosophical project should be

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interpreted. It presents a reinterpretation or reconstruction of Hegel's notion of systematic
philosophy, one which discloses a profound antifoundational argument in Hegel, an argument
which provides a basis for addressing contemporary metaphilosophical issues. In addition,
insofar as it shows how Hegel based a philosophical system and a defense of modernity on a
radical critique of foundationalism, Philosophy Without Foundations introduces a revisionist
account of the modernist philosophical project: properly construed, the failure of
foundationalism leads not to the rejection, but to the vindication of modernist notions of
objectivity and rationality.
How can Hegel be read as a source for arguments which address the current crises in
philosophy? Chapter 1, "Reason and the Problem of Modernity," presents an overview of
Hegel's philosophy as both continuous with while still unique in the modernist project by
showing how foundationalism prior to Hegel failed, and how, in responding to this failure, he
anticipated many of the critical and positive claims of postmodernism while remaining true to
central features of the philosophical tradition and the modern project. At a systematic level, it
outlines the common assumptions underlying foundationalism and antifoundationalism,
revealing how Hegel's rejection of them provides the framework for his distinctive attempt to
legitimate modernity in his systematic project. Chapter 2, "Philosophy as Systematic Science,"
takes these issues outside of this historical framework; it centers on the contemporary
foundationalist-antifoundationalist debate, and shows why this debate has reached an impasse
requiring a different approach, and how systematic philosophy provides a response to this
impasse. Chapter 3, "Hegel's Phenomenology as Introduction to Systematic Science," picks up
the twofold themes of reinterpreting Hegel and criticizing foundationalism by showing how
reading the Phenomenology as such a critique reconciles seeming contradictory claims Hegel
made about his system and lays to rest interpretive controversies about the Phenomenology.
Where "Hegel's Phenomenology" looks ahead to the logic and the system, Chapter 4,
''Beginning Philosophy without 'Beginnings,'" looks back to the Phenomenology from the
Logic, and again addresses both interpretive controversies about Hegel (pertaining to claims
about the nature of logical science and the system) as well as reconstructing and assessing
Hegel's arguments about how an immanent critique of foundationalism provides the basis for a
foundation-free systematic philosophy. "Beginning" provides a further development of key
aspects of the positive outcome of a Hegelian critique of

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foundationalism for philosophy, laying the basis for the notion that a rejection of subjectivity
as foundational need not require an abandonment of objectivity and indicating how Hegel's
radical antifoundationalism provides a basis for a nonfoundational system of autonomous
reason. Chapter 5, "Philosophy and Dialectical Method," broadens the considerations of
"Hegel's Phenomenology" and ''Beginning" to show how the beginning of a systematic
philosophy which the Phenomenology's immanent critique of foundationalism has made
possible provides a framework not only for logic, but for Hegel's system as a whole; addressed
here in a preliminary fashion are crucial questions regarding the ways in which logic and
system can be said to present an argument and how the system is not merely nonfoundational
but antimetaphysical as well. Thus the argument (in "Reason" and "Beginning") presenting
systematic philosophy as sui generis, as capturing features of both the philosophical tradition
and of postmodernism's critique of it, are further articulated. Chapter 6, "On the Presumed
Blasphemy of Hegelian Absolutism," indicates how this reconstruction of Hegel corrects the
traditional interpretive claim that his philosophy is a blasphemous absolutism, and how, unlike
contemporary antifoundationalism, the system in fact provides a coherent conceptualization of
finitude.
Picking up on further considerations of the system as nonfoundational and of its contemporary
relevance are both Chapter 7, "Hegel and Hermeneutics," and Chapter 8, "The Critique of
Marx and Marxist Thought." Chapter 7 shows the centrality for hermeneutics of its
confrontation with Hegel, and reiterates in the specific context of Gadamer's hermeneutics the
fundamental problem with contemporary nonsystematic critiques of foundationalism and the
effort to articulate finitude. Chapter 8 indicates how Marx and his followers have profoundly
misread Hegel as a metaphysical idealist. Disclosing how Hegel's conception of systematic
dialectical philosophy properly construes systematic philosophy as limited, it further shows
how this limitation makes a viable critical theory possible, and how Marx, by
misunderstanding Hegel's approach, falls prey to the idealism and absolutism he accuses Hegel
of. The problematic character of recent attempts to overcome philosophy discussed in earlier
chapters is further developed in Chapter 9, "The Dead End of Postmodernism," a critical
overview of contemporary postmodernism which focuses specifically on the failure of Rorty's
attempts to overcome foundationalism and establish something "postphilosophical." This
chapter also provides a further consideration of how nonfoundational systematic philosophy
may pro-

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vide a way of fulfilling philosophy's traditional claim to articulate unconditional objective
truth in a manner which nonetheless escapes postmodernism's charges of totalization and
absolutism. Chapters 10, "The Renewed Appeal to Transcendental Arguments," and 11, "The
Problematic Role of God in Modern Epistemology," again address the formal and the
historical issue of foundationalism and the modern project from a contemporary perspective.
Chapter 10 presents Donald Davidson's attempt to fulfill certain traditional philosophical
objectives as part of the modernist transcendental project, and discloses how it, too, fails.
Picking up on a reading of foundationalism's structure introduced in Chapter 6, "The
Problematic Role of God" illustrates how appeals to a divine mind throughout the modern
foundational epistemological-transcendental project, from Descartes through Nietzsche, both
disclose a common gambit and reveal its fundamentally problematic character.
This book challenges contemporary assumptions about philosophy's inevitable demise in the
collapse of foundationalism by showing how antifoundationalism remains committed to the
central assumptions of foundationalism; additionally, it articulates a radical critique of
foundationalism which transcends those assumptions and provides for a discourse which
articulates philosophical truth as objective while yet nonmetaphysical and nonabsolutist. By
locating the grounds for this response to the current crisis in philosophy in Hegel, it also
challenges what has been the received view in contemporary Hegel scholarship.

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Part One
The Relevance of Hegel

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Chapter 1
Reason and the Problem of Modernity
Perhaps a new form of systematic philosophy will be found which has nothing whatever to
do with epistemology but which nevertheless makes normal philosophical inquiry possible.
Richard Rorty

The sleep of reason produces monsters.

Goya

Hegel is back.
Ian Hacking

At least among those whose philosophical education includes a study of its history, it has long
been a commonplace that, in line with his immediate predecessors, Hegel sought to articulate a
distinctively modern conception of philosophical rationality or reason in order to address what
he regarded as distinctively modern theoretical and practical problems. 1 The problems
underlying Hegel's philosophical project can be described as distinctively modern because
they concerned two things: on the one hand, theoretical or epistemological issues arising
uniquely out of the emergence of modern scientific thought in its break from the prevailing
intellectual tradition and, on the other hand, practical issues arising uniquely out of the French
Revolution in its break from prevailing social and political traditions.2 As I shall suggest in
more detail, these two revolutionary events were perceived by their philosophical supporters
as standing in need of justification or legitimation. In addition, these philosophical supporters
felt that, because of the

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nature of the claims being made in and by these revolutions, this legitimation could only be
provided by philosophy.
According to this traditional view, Hegel is at one with his predecessors from Descartes
through Kant, Fichte, and Schelling in seeking to provide a standpoint of reason which could
articulate, justify, and ground the new conception of our place in the cosmos which follows
from an endorsement of modern principles of scientific thought and modern principles of
action. 3 Thus, in broadest terms, the core issue or problem of modernity, when looked at
philosophically, is that of justification or legitimation, and modern philosophy's major
historical theme is the search for an adequate rational-foundational standpoint from which the
tasks of legitimation could be accomplished.4
If at least some features of the broader context of modern philosophy and of Hegel's thought
which I have noted have long since been a philosophical commonplace, it is fast becoming a
commonplace of more recent times that both the pre- and postHegelian traditions of modern
foundational philosophy have consistently failed in their efforts to provide the sort of rational
legitimation for the norms of cognition and conduct which both supporters and critics of
modernity perceive as in need of legitimation. Put simply, and in its most contemporary
version, the central core of attacks on the modern philosophical-foundational project seems to
arise from the conviction that the philosophical standpoint of reason from out of and upon
which modern conceptions of knowledge and conduct could be justifiedas legitimate because
paradigmatically rationalis unattainable.5 It is argued that reason is unable to attain self-
transparency concerning its own conditions, and that the contexts of discourse in which
problems of knowledge and conduct are to be addressed are inherently and inescapably extra-
rational. Claiming that we are embedded in a web of givenness which resists rational
penetration in some final sense, critics hold that criteria of knowledge and conduct must
always lack an adequately rational foundation.6
In fact, the basic program of the philosophical critique of the claim that modern scientific
thought and modern society are distinctively rational is by no means a recent invention. To one
degree and in one form or another, the three central tenets of this critical view have been with
us for quite a long time. To perceive that the epistemic and practical ideals of modernity have
continued to stand in need of a philosophical accounting since their inception, to conclude that
the various attempts to provide one have failed, and to make the subsequent critical claim of
having unmasked these ideals as false idolsthese have long since ceased to be original
assertions. One might hold that the philosophical critique of

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modernity counts as a distinct tradition in its own right. From such a perspective the larger
tradition of modern thought can be witnessed as a struggle and a dialectical interplay between
those who contend that modern cognitive and social practices have a distinctively rational
core, and those who contend that they do not. In this way one may locate the beginning of the
antimodernist tradition within modernity with Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzschethe holy
trinity of the idea that modern bourgeois society is hollow, corrupt, and corrupting, and fraught
with a high degree of systematic self-deception which is mirrored in the vain efforts of
philosophers to provide this society with rational justification. Insofar as one can place the
origins of philosophical critiques of modernity with these thinkers and these notions, then it is
easy to see that variations on these antimodernist themes have been a significant feature in
philosophy since their time.
Thus one might wonder which is the dominant trend in modern philosophy as a whole, and
whether modern philosophy does not, in an important sense, come to an end with Hegel and
his perceived failures. For at least when viewed from an anti- or postmodernist position,
postHegelian efforts to provide rational, legitimating foundations for the central tenets of
modern thought and societythe efforts undertaken by the schools and traditions arising out of
phenomenology and logical positivismbegin to appear now as doomed exceptions to a growing
consensus of naysayers: in the burgeoning camp of critics of the modern rational-foundational
project we certainly find the later Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Gadamer, Foucault, Derrida,
Habermas, Feyerabend, MacIntyre, Davidson, Rortyand if Rorty is correct, Quine, Sellars,
Putnam and Kuhn. 7 Agreement on this seems to be cutting across traditional philosophical
boundaries.
One curious thing about this critical tradition is its relation to Hegel. Leaving aside the more
recent critics of modernity who ignore Hegel altogether, such as Wittgenstein, or dismiss him
outright, such as Heidegger, the views on Hegel of several otherscertainly Foucault, Derrida,
Gadamer, Habermas, MacIntyre, and Rortyare complex and often ambivalent.8 We find, for
example, an explicit appreciation and endorsement of aspects of Hegel's phenomenological
critique of foundational subject-based epistemology and transcendental philosophy in Rorty,
Gadamer, and Habermas.9 In MacIntyre, and to varying degrees in Habermas, Rorty, and
Feyerabend, we find a reiteration of aspects of Hegel's holism: assertions about the contextual
embeddedness of knowledge and morality and the irreducibly intersubjective character of
cognition and individuality. Broadly, and also in agreement with Hegel, we can

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find the increasing endorsement of an historicist perspective. For certainly in Gadamer,
MacIntyre, and Rorty, we find agreement with its first serious practitioner, Hegel, about the
centrality of the history of philosophy for philosophical understanding. And more generally
there is increasing agreement with Hegelmost recently for example in postKuhnian philosophy
of sciencethat ideas and theories are intertwined with and incapable of being adequately
understood apart from their historical, social, political, and cultural contexts. 10
On the negative side, though, the relation between Hegel and contemporary critics of
modernity is easier to delineate. They all reject in Hegel what they perceive as the character of
the philosophical-rational position or standpointthe systemfrom which he developed his
particular views on knowledge, man, and society. Like others whose rejection of Hegel is
complete and unequivocal, they will have nothing to do with Hegel's purported idealistic and
metaphysical absolutism, which they identify with his claim to have brought philosophy to the
standpoint of an autonomous rational science. What they occasionally wish to do is mine, from
the wreckage of his system, those features of it in accordance with their own outlooks.11
Given this state of affairs, a question arises which at first seems to be of interest only to
students of the history of philosophy, but which has, I believe, extrahistorical and genuinely
philosophical significance. How did a self-acknowledged defender of modernity and a
participant in the tradition which seeks to find a legitimation for it, a philosopher who
espouses the autonomy and self-sufficiency of reason, anticipate and articulate so many of
those critical points noted above? This question may take on added weight when one
appreciates that, according to critics of the modern foundational tradition, these 'postmodernist'
pointsantifoundationalism, holism, and historicismfollow from a rejection of the ideal of
autonomous reason and are incompatible with it as well as with modernity's claim to a
distinctive legitimacy and rationality.12 To put my question in a more challenging way, it is
possible to disentangle a whole Hegel from his perceived commitment to absolute idealism?
Can we somehow make sense of a Hegel whose agreement with the postmoderns on
antifoundationalism, holism, and historicism can be seen not as an aberration, but rather as a
consequence of his conception of philosophical rationality? Are antifoundationalism, holism,
and historicism, properly understood, compatible with a claim to autonomous reason and a
philosophical

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system? And if this can be worked out, will it suggestas paradoxical as this may soundthat a
philosophical legitimation of modernity, rather than being rendered impossible by antifoundationalism,
holism, and historicism, is inseparable from them? Is it possible that Hegel saw these things and worked
out these connections?
I believe that the answer to all these questions is yes. In an attempt to sketch the reasons for my belief I
shall argue three things.
Hegel's position onhis understanding and defense ofmodernity is unique. To an extent not usually
recognized, Hegel is an anomalous phenomenon when looked at from either the modernist or the
(1)antimodernist perspective.
(2)The seeming discord noted previously between many of Hegel's conclusions and his systematic
positionwith its commitment to a notion of autonomous reasonmay be resolved insofar as we
understood the manner in which Hegel undertook the project of a rational legitimation of modernity
in and through a conception of autonomous reason. This is the question of whether or not, and if so
how, we can reconcile the points where Hegel is in agreement with critics of modernity with his
commitment to the project of legitimating modernity and with his belief in the autonomy of reason.
In this regard, my aim is to put forth a revisionist scheme. I want to suggest that we need to reassess
Hegel's conception of philosophy as a system and that, while Hegel is deeply concerned with the
foundationalist project of his predecessors, he nevertheless breaks with central features of it and is not
a foundationalist in the sense attacked by, amongst others, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, and most
recently Richard Rorty, in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.
(3)If I am correct about these points, then Hegel needs to be introduced into contemporary debates about
knowledge and practice along with Rorty's Dewey and MacIntyre's Aristotle.

So the issues I plan to address are three-fold: (1) What are the problems of modernity from Hegel's
perspective and how does he attempt to deal with them? (2) How might Hegel's project as a defense of
modernity be perceived as in continuity with, while yet as distinctly different from, that of his
predecessors in the foundational tradition? (3) Which features of Hegel's treatment of the problems of
modernity are worthy of contemporary consideration and how might Hegel be seen as having provided a
legitimation of modernity?

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I.
The Problems of Modernity
The tasks of Hegel's project as a philosophy of modernity arise from two related sources: first,
from a general belief, shared to certain extents by some of his predecessors, that the decisive
breaks from past authority heralded by the scientific and French revolutions stand in need of
legitimation, and that this legitimation must consist in the discovery, articulation, and
clarification of general principles for knowledge and practice in consonance with at least some
of the specific core claims of these revolutions. As I shall indicate, for Hegel this need for
legitimation will appear not only as a need to reject what the prerevolutionary traditions had
regarded as specifically authoritative in matters of cognition and conduct; more generally and
radically, the legitimation of modern notions of cognition and conduct will require for Hegel a
demonstrative and thoroughgoing rejection of the idea that the past or tradition in their
givennessindeed, that whatever we might find givenmust and ought to be taken forthwith as
authoritative for knowledge and conduct. 13
Second, Hegel's own project is more specifically shaped by his perception of the inadequacies
of his predecessors in successfully legitimating the breaks from past authority announced by
the scientific and French revolutions. In general terms, for Hegel the core of this inadequacy
stems from what he sees as these modernists' attempts to substitute, for the old, privileged and
authoritative givens of the then prevailing intellectual and socio-political traditions, what are
new, allegedly rational privileged givens as the authoritative modern principles for cognition
and conduct. To anticipate, Hegel's disagreement with this approach to the issue of
legitimation stems from the fact that he sees the task of philosophical legitimation as resting
on a thoroughgoing demonstration of the autonomy of reason from any and all givens,
privileged or otherwise.
But first of all, how is it that these revolutions appear as decisive breaks from the past and as
in need of a legitimation which will involve a search for new principles of cognition and
conduct? How are the modern approaches to knowledge and action distinctive? And why is
modernity as the outcome of these two revolutions in need of philosophical legitimation?
As regards the scientific revolution, it constitutes a radical or revolutionary break from past
authority because the new truths concerning nature which it asserted were out of consonance
both with the teleological tradition of Aristotelian science and with

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common sense. 14 Thus, from the point of view of the philosophical supporters of the new
science, the legitimacy of its claims seemingly had to rest on the further philosophical or
metascientific claim that this approach embodied not simply a new method for arriving at the
truth about nature, but rather the true and proper method of cognition as such.15 Hence one
major concern of the modern philosophical project becomes defined as an investigation into
the foundations of knowledge, an investigation to be conducted in and by the mind, reason,
consciousness, understandingin and by the reflecting subject. For, whether the new method of
science was perceived by its inventors and legitimators as rationalist or empiricist in character
(whether ideas or sense impressions are its basic foundations), it seemed nonetheless that only
an exercise of reason could establish and legitimate this method and its truth claims against the
recognized authorities of Aristotle and common sense.16 Given the deviation of some of the
central truth claims of the new science from these traditional authorities, what had to be
established in general was that final authority in matters of cognition of nature resides within
the mind of the cognizing subject. So, to succeed in this legitimation (a legitimation which
would seek to ground the right to freedom of thought in science and the autonomy of science
from external authorities), philosophy would have to demonstrate that all minds share a
common set of cognitive principles sufficient for providing knowledge of the truth. Thus, we
have the modern project of foundational epistemology. It sought to show that the ultimate
foundations for determining truth lay, not in certain privileged texts or institutions, as the
tradition would have it, but rather within the thinking-rational subject, in its possessing access
to certain privileged, knowledge-foundational and criteriological givens, be they sense
impressions, innate ideas, or a priori forms of judgment.17
Paralleling the rejection of the authority of tradition in matters of cognition announced by the
scientific revolution, the French Revolution was witnessed as heralding a rejection of the
authority of tradition in matters of action and conduct, both individual and social, and as thus
also necessitating the attempt to establish reason, or the autonomous rational subject, as the
final authority for practical judgment. For what was perceived by its philosophical supporters
as this revolution's combined assertion of an in principle human equality and a universally
shared right to individual autonomy or liberty flew in the face both of common sense and of
long-standing social and political tradition. In the former case, these modernist assertions
conflicted with the evidence that human beings

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are by nature unequal, suited for different tasks and responsibilities. In the latter case they
conflicted with traditional notions of naturally or divinely ordained hierarchies of rights and
privileges, hierarchies seemingly appropriate to the given evidence of human inequality. 18
Thus again, since neither given tradition nor the given evidence of common sense supported
the unprecedented revolutionary claims of equality and universal autonomy now being
asserted here in the practical domain, it seemed that their only proper articulation and
justification could come from reason. Again, and again because of the unprecedented and
radical character of the claims in question, philosophy was called upon to find a new
authoritynow regarding conductlocated within the individual subject. Paralleling its task in
regard to science, the philosophical exercise of reason would have to demonstrate the
legitimacy of the ideas of equality and freedom by discovering and articulating those universal
principles or grounds for judgement on the basis of which all individual wills could constitute
a harmonious social and political world, when once freed from the constraints of tradition and
despite the seeming diversity of their particular inclinations. And thus, we have the modern
philosophical-foundational projects in the areas of morality, politics, and economics, with
philosophers seeking to show that the ultimate foundations for right conduct lie within each
and every autonomous subject, in its possessing access to certain commonly shared and
privileged behavior-legislating givens, be they desires, natural sentiments, or innate rules.19
In broad terms, then, this is how Hegel understood the efforts of his predecessors. He saw
rationalists, empiricists, and transcendental idealists all engaged in the task of seeking to
discover some given, universally shared bases for knowledge and action within the individual,
either as a rational or a natural sensing being. But what prompted him to pursue the process of
articulation and legitimation further, and in a decisively different manner than his
predecessors? What pushed Hegel on was the convictionshared by him with contemporary
critics of modernitythat the foundational project as undertaken by empiricists, rationalists, and
transcendental philosophers was bankrupt and could succeed neither in the specific task of
illuminating concrete principles for knowledge and action nor in the general task of
legitimating the ideal of individual autonomy itself.20
How so? First of all, and as was already clear to Kant, the empiricist foundational project had
failed, and necessarily so. For what had originated as a search for universal principles for
knowl-

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edge and conduct within the domain of the autonomous subject as a natural, sensing being had
culminated in Hume's thinking through the empiricist position to its ultimate consequences. 21
These consequences were devastating from a foundationalist and modernist perspective, and
not merely because Hume's specific conclusions about knowledge and conduct were
antithetical to the modernist outlook. In addition, Hume's skeptical position had been arrived at
through the very practice of critical reflection which was seemingly the only possible path to a
secure legitimation of the modernist perspective. Through rational-critical reflection Hume had
demonstrated that, on strict empiricist principles, matters of knowledge and conductof science
and moralityare and can only be fundamentally and irreducibly subjective matters of habit and
convention, without any ultimate, strictly rational foundations. Consequently he advocated
skepticism in knowledge and the hewing to tradition in matters of conduct.22 Thus, if new
foundational principles for distinctively new notions of cognition and conduct were to be
established, it became all the more clear in light of Hume that they had to be found, if they
were to be found at all, in humans as rational, in reason. In opposition to Hume, it had to be
shown that reason contains as given universal principles of judgment on the basis of which
humans as rational are capable of constructing, from the sensibly given a common intelligible
world of knowledge and experience and a common and harmonious social world. But, more
significantly given Hume's negative achievement vis-à-vis rationalist metaphysics, this project
as a reply to Hume presupposed showing that reason in fact possesses the power and authority
to make such discoveries and claims.
That is, it had to be shown before all else that what reason might claim to find within itself as
the privileged and given principles for knowledge and conduct are not in fact arbitrary posits
in the style of the rationalist metaphysics which Hume had decisively criticized. Thus Kant,
having been awoken from his dogmatic slumber by Hume, called for a critique of reason itself
as an unavoidable preliminary task for the future of modern philosophy.
For Hegel, then, it is on this issuethe demonstration of reason's autonomy and the consequent
demonstration that reason can rightfully lay claim to possessing an authority which can
challenge traditionthat the transcendental projects of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling fail. And it is
around this issuethe issue of how reason might establish its autonomy, and of what follows
from such a demonstrationthat we can see Hegel parting company with the whole
foundationalist endeavor.

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Hegel saw that the confrontation between Kant's, Fichte's, and Schelling's foundational-
transcendental rationalism and Hume's skeptical empiricism could only be a standoff, and that
the only possible way beyond it to establish the autonomy of reason and the legitimacy of its
claims to authority would be by rejecting the whole conception of mind or reason which
underlies both the skeptical and the transcendental-foundationalist positions. 23 In what sense
does Hegel see the transcendental-foundational project as a failure and as issuing in a standoff
between foundationalism and antifoundationalism, between modernism and antimodernism?
How does he attempt to go beyond this aporia? This brings me to the second of my three main
points and more specifically to my revisionist claim that Hegel rejects foundationalism as a
basis for legitimating modernity.

II.
The Hegelian Difference
In brief, the failure of Kant and the transcendental endeavor lies in the fact that this elaborate
and complex approach cannot finally meet the objections of Humean skepticism, which is
ultimately a challenge not merely to certain specific claims of reason but also and more
fundamentally a challenge to the very conception of reason as adequate to making any
legitimate and authoritative claims about matters of fact. From a Humean perspective the
Kantian transcendental gambit could show that, given Newtonian science and Lutheran
morality, we can reason back in a transcendental fashion to the ultimate principles of judgment
which are the necessary conditions for the possibility of these modes of cognition and conduct.
But that just these purportedly given modes of thinking and acting are the universally
necessary and legitimate modes of cognition and conduct überhaupt, that they have not been
arbitrarily selected or posited, is beyond the power of the transcendental method to establish.24
In the face of Hume's skepticism, which challenges reason's pretension to critical authority, the
transcendental-foundational approach can only appear as a mode of argumentation which
finally establishes nothing with the certainty which it claims. For just what is at stake here is
the exclusive legitimacy and universality of those modes of cognition and conduct taken in
transcendental thought as the original privileged givens whose foundations are articulated and
allegedly grounded in the critical project. Thus, the transcendental gambit of assuming their
legitimacytaking them not as some, but as the givensand then

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finding principles in reason which account for them gets one nowhere, 25 at least insofar as
one has pursued the more radical self-critique of reason along Hume's lines.
So, Hume's challenge could be seen as standing, a challenge echoed in contemporary critiques
of modernity and foundationalism such as Heidegger's. Hume's final challenge was to contend
that, because reason is always and inescapably conditioned by what are (presumptively)
externally given factors, any determinations it might make by way of issuing a challenge to the
authority of extra-rational givens in the name of internally given rules of reason are and must
be arbitrary. As such, these claims of reason ought to be abandoned in the face of the more
primal givens of experience as conditioned by tradition and convention, the extra-rational
background on the basis and from out of which all reasoning emerges. This claim for the
recognition of the primacy of the other-than-rational might be said to be paralleled in
Heidegger's demand that we attune ourselves to the primordial call of Being which is
ineluctably resistant to any rational penetration which would challenge its authority over us.26
How might this state of affairs be viewed along Hegelian lines as a standoff, albeit one with
which those skeptical of reason's power could be more comfortable? From Hegel's perspective,
the notion that a philosophical impasse has been reached can emerge when one begins to
consider, from a broader outlook, what can be seen as the common assumptions of the anti-
and pro-modernists, the antifoundationalists and the foundationalists.27
What are these common assumptions? For one thing, it is not only that the transcendental
philosophers and Hume both reach their conclusions through critical reflection on the givens
of experience. Both Hume and Kant begin their critical reflection with assumptions about the
given nature of human experience, seeking to discover through critical reflection in what
respects, and how much of, given experience is philosophically legitimate. At a higher level of
generality, they also share, in one respect, a common overview of the nature of reason itself.
For both agree, despite their differing views on the specifics, that reason is and always must be
conditioned by certain determining factors, certain inescapable givens.28 For Hume these are
factors external to reason: in matters of cognition they are the sensible givens which legislate
to reason; in matters of conduct they are the passions to which reason is and must be a slave.
For Kant and the transcendentalists the factors that condition, limit, and determine reason are
its internally and innately given a priori rules and principles, which must legislate to

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the sensibly given manifold in matters of cognition, and which ought to legislate to the
passions in matters of conduct. 29 And as Kant concludes the meta-critical lesson of the critical
philosophy, although these principles are found in reason they are nonetheless givens to which
reason must submit itself in any coherent and legitimate exercise of its powers. They are fixed
givens beyond which reason must not extend itself no matter how much it may be driven by its
very nature to do so.30
And thus to Hegel, the point of contention in his times between foundationalists and
antifoundationalistsparalleled perhaps in our ownappears as a standoff. It appears as an aporia
because both positions are based on conflicting and seemingly irresolvable claims concerning
what a property critical reflection on experience indicates as the necessary determining and
conditioning factors for knowledge and conduct. Both Hegel's pro- and antimodernist
predecessors agreed that the rational subject is conditioned and limited in matters of
knowledge and action by certain givens. Yet they disagreed on the source, nature, extent, and
consequences of this conditioning, and on its limitations. (Moreover, they particularly
disagreed on its practical entailments.) Beyond the points of commonality, they disagreed on
these particulars because, while they held similar views on the given character of experience,
they parted company in their critical accounts of just what is to be found in the deeper analysis
of human subjectivity which finally makes this experience possible and which thus establishes
the character and range of its legitimacy. Hence, finally, from Hegel's view, each side was
incapable of demonstrating to its opponent that what was being presented as the final and
ultimately determining and conditioning factors were in fact finally authoritative and
determining. On the issue of what provides individuals with legitimate principles and
guidelines for knowledge and action, one side holds that it is what is given to the senses by
reason, the other that it is what is given to reason by the senses which constitutes these
principles.31
So we can see Hegel coming to ask if there is any way to get beyond this impasse. (To which
the Habermas-Gadamer debate bears at least a family resemblance.)32 Do the outcomes of the
pro-and antimodernist attempts to show specifically what it is that conditions reason in fact
show that reason is and must always be conditioned by certain givens? That is, is the only final
meta-perspective here something like this: that these conflicting conclusions on just what the
determining factors are point to a general impotence on the part of reason as regards its ability
to ultimately

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discover just what always conditions and determines it? Must we reconcile ourselves, in the
manner of Nietzsche, to the idea that reason must always arbitrarily posit some determinative
foundations, foundations which are then remorselessly unmasked as illusory, and so on, ad
infinitum? Is the only position beyond foundationalism and skepticism one where the life of
the mindand life by the mindis a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, etc.? Must we
resign ourselves to the genial nihilism which regards human existence as pointless positing? 33
Orand I take this to be Hegel's viewdo the conflicting conclusions perhaps indicate instead that
it is a mistake to conclude that reason must be conditioned by any given factors? Might it be
that this general negative conclusion (disagreements about the particulars of what conditions
reason aside) follows from the fact that these efforts at critical self-examination always began
with the conditioned character of reason as an assumption (so that all that needed to be done
was to determine its specifics)? Does the fact of the conflicting conclusions arrived at by
foundationalists and skeptics perhaps point to or suggest the possibility that the conflict over
conclusions, rather than providing the necessary impotence of reason in the face of the given,
stems instead from the fact that, in both of these cases, the process of critical reflection began
with certain arbitrarily selected givens as the starting points? Might this metacritical discovery
about the ruling assumption of prior efforts point to the possibility of a further self-
examination of reason? Might not such a further self-consideration have a different outcome
just because and insofar as it does not begin, as its predecessors did, with the assumption that
reason is inescapably conditioned by certain givens (either external or internal)? Put
differently, might a self-consideration of reason arrive at different conclusions if it did not
begin with the assumption that the given features of human subjectivity defined, governed, and
limited the nature and prospects of reason? And might not this outcome differ radically from
both foundationalism and antifoundationalism, at least as regards reason's capacity for
autonomy?34
The conventional wisdom, a commonplace going back to Kant and echoed most recently in
Gadamer, is that it displays the self-deceptive arrogance of reason to assert its autonomy from
the limiting conditions of human finitude and subjectivity. Could not one rather suggest that
the deeper arrogance lies in unreflectively presupposing that the conditions of our merely
human subjectivityas they happen to be interpreted at some particular timedelimit the
capacities of our (merely human) reason?

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How might such an alternative reaction to the standoff emerge? For one thing, it is possible
that these conflicting outcomes and the apparent failure of the rational-foundational project in
general indicate that from the start it is a mistake to attempt to establish the right of reason to
legislate in knowledge and conduct by seeking givens in reason; conditions or principles which
allegedly ground ''given" experience and which need only to be uncovered and made
perspicuous. Perhaps the key to demonstrating the authority of reason over what is given to it
lies not, à la the critical philosophy, in searching within reason to discover given determinate
principles in which modern claims about rational autonomy in thought and action are
grounded, but rather in first showing that no givens, either internal or to external to reason
need necessarily condition or determine it in its operations.
Furthermore, could not one argue that an implicit indication of reason's power to transcend
what is given might be found in the very efforts of critical reflection to establish the given,
reason-determining conditions? These projects, both foundational and antifoundational, aim to
specify what they take to be the conditioning and limiting features of reason's operation. But,
as Jacobi had already suggested, if an exercise in philosophical-critical reflection can come to
specify and articulate these conditions, does not this very exercise and employment of reason
indicate that these allegedly reason-determining and limiting conditions can, in some sense, be
gone beyondthat the exercise of reason which establishes them is not and cannot itself be
thoroughly subject to them? 35
But how might such a demonstration of the potential autonomy of reason be effected? How
might it be shown that reason need not necessarily be conditioned in its operations by any
givens? Perhapsand I take this to be the argument of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spiritby
working to show systematically and immanently that any process of critical reflection which
attempts to establish that reason is governed or determined by certain givens (internal or
external) is finally aporitic. Displaying the aporia would involve revealing that the very
standpoint of critical reflection from which the conditioned character of reason could be
articulated always eo ipso shows itself as a standpoint which transcends the allegedly
unconditional reason-determining conditions it aims to establish. And this feature of reason's
persistent self-transcendence of the purportedly ultimate transcendental conditions which it
posits would be shown to emerge just because of reason's alleged capacity to demonstrate the
exclusive legitimacy and rulership of these conditions. To establish ultimate limiting
conditions, reason must tran-

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scend them; once it has transcended them it can no longer claim that they are ultimate. In this
way, one might attempt to show immanently that both foundationalism and
antifoundationalism are systematically self-defeating.
To what would such a demonstration lead? This question is vital in terms of seeing how
different Hegel's rejection of foundationalism is from contemporary antifoundationalism. It
could finally come to indicate not only that no given conditions can finally be established once
and for all as the unconditional, absolute, fundamental principles of reasona negative point on
which Hegel is in agreement with various contemporary antifoundationalists. In additionand
here is one central point of differenceby proceeding systematically in a consideration of
attempts to establish such reason-determining conditions, this consideration might finally
come to unmask as arbitrary and unfounded that fundamental meta-assumption about reason's
own nature in terms of which its operations must always be viewed as conditioned by certain
givens. This immanent critique of foundationalism and antifoundationalism might reveal the
illegitimacy of what is, for Hegel, the primal further common assumption at work both in
foundationalism and antifoundationalism, an assumption he sees as the ultimate and heretofore
hidden, unjustified, given operative in all attempts to demonstrate that reason is necessarily
and inescapably conditioned by some given or givens.
For Hegel, the hidden assumption underlying the view of reason as necessarily heteronomous
is the notion that reason's operations must always and can only be construed according to the
model of conscious awareness. This assumption holds that reason must be construed according
to that mode of thinking in terms of which whatever is thought is always in some way given
and fixed in its determinate character in virtue of being theregivenas an object (Gegenstand)
for a thinking awareness. As a systematic consideration of the legitimacy of this "natural
assumption ... in philosophy," the Phenomenology works to show that when the process of
critical reflection by philosophical consciousness comes finally to the point of defining and
grounding its own presupposed structure, the structure of consciousness, as necessarily
determinative for thought, this ultimate act of self-legitimation is and must be one in which the
fixed and minimal distinction definitive of consciousnessthe distinction between awareness
and its objectis eliminated or collapses. 36 For only when this distinction is suspended can
consciousness show that what it takes the object to beits representation of the givenis the
correct representation of the

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given as given. Only at the moment of the elimination of the distinction between thought and
its object can the "referential skyhook" requisite to complete the project of foundational
epistemology be attained. 37
This outcomeChapter VIII of the Phenomenologywould show thereby that the view which
holds that all thought is and must necessarily be conditioned by some given cannot critically
groundlegitimate überhauptthat very understanding of the nature of thought or reason (the
consciousness model) which could finally establish in a philosophically adequate fashion just
this allegedly necessary fact. Phrased in a different way, this would constitute subjectivity's
immanent, deconstructive discovery that its own constitutive structureas a structure which
seeks to posit foundationsis itself an arbitrary posit.
This metacritical discoverythis critique of critical philosophy, of the unchallengeable primacy
of subjectivity, and of the correspondence model of truthwould then reveal that to engage in
reasoning with the assumption that reason's operations are and must be conditioned by some
given is, at least at this juncture, an arbitrary assumption. And coming to an awareness of the
arbitrary character of this fundamental assumption common to foundationalists and
antifoundationalists alike would thus open the way to or point to the possibility of, an exercise
of reason which possesses at least the potential for genuine autonomy.38 For insofar as we
come to see the arbitrary character of assuming in philosophy that whatever reason conceives
must be founded in some given determinacysomething always taken for granted in that process
of critical reflection which presumably took nothing for grantedthen perhaps a self-
consideration of reason can take place which is autonomous. This self-consideration of reason
may be autonomous in the sense that neither any given determinacy, nor the very structure
according to which determinacy is construed as always to some extent given, is illicitly
appealed to in reason's constitution of its own domain.
My claim at this juncture is only that the Phenomenology, through its immanently critical
deconstruction of the standpoint which assumes the impossibility of such autonomy, reveals
the possibility for such an autonomous self-constitution of reason. The existence of such a
possibility does not, of course, amount to anything like a demonstration that Hegel, or anyone
else, has succeeded in creating a system of reason whose concepts are exclusively generated in
an autonomous fashion. Nor have I indicated how reason might go about engaging in a
procedure of autonomous

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self-constitution which, even in being autonomous, is not at the same time arbitrary in the
determinations it constitutes. These are matters which cannot be gone into here. 39 But,
assuming for the sake of argument that Hegel has at least offered a system which can make a
plausible, prima facie claim to being a system whose determinacies are those of autonomous
reason, I will now turn to my third question. What features of Hegel's treatment of the problem
of modernity are of contemporary relevance? I will address this question in two parts.
Assuming Hegel's systematic philosophy, or parts of it, is a system of autonomous reason. (1)
where does this place him in the contemporary spectrum, and (2) in what sense has he
presented a legitimation of modernity?

III.
Legitimating Modernity
(1) For one thing, and as I have suggested in my remarks about Hegel's assessment of the
inadequacies of his predecessors, his position puts him in agreement with those contemporary
philosophers such as Rorty who have argued against the foundational epistemological project
with its commitment to the primacy of reflective consciousness and the representational or
correspondence model of truth. Unlike such contemporary critics of foundationalism however,
and as I have also suggested, Hegel's rejection of the adequacy of consciousness as a paradigm
in philosophy does not lead him to skeptical, relativistic, nihilistic, pragmatic, religious, or
quasi-mystical conclusions which devalue reason and explicitly or implicitly suggest that we
must subordinate reason to some other authority. Hegel's systematic philosophy acknowledges
no such ultimate authority over reason, be this authority the passions or nature, tradition or
convention, the material and economic conditions for the reproduction of the species, the
hermeneutic consciousness, the (allegedly) necessary conditions for the possibility of
linguistic communication, the will as will to power, God, or the Being of beings. Hegel's
systematic philosophy rejects all such foundations, and his critique of foundationalism opens
the way for the creation of an alternative conception and system of reason, one whose claim to
authority rests solely on its character as having articulated concepts and principles which can
be seen to be the exclusive determinations of autonomous reason.
The following should be stressed at this point, for it is a key feature of this revisionist account
of Hegel. Any authority such a system of autonomous reason might command does not rest on
any

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claim to be an account of reality as we find it or as it is given. Hegel's systematic philosophy is
not; in fact, it is anything but a metaphysics, either idealist, materialist, realist, descriptive, or
critical. It is none of these simply because the very beginning of the systemfollowing upon the
Phenomenology's critiquelies in its severing, in and for this system, of all connections with
that model of reason (the consciousness or subjectivistic model) which underlies all possible
metaphysics. This system rejects at its start that model for philosophical thought which must
be presupposed in order to postulate either a contrast (as in realist metaphysics) or an identity
(as in idealist or materialist metaphysics) of thought and object or mind and nature. 40
Hence, and in sharp contrast with Marx, the dialectical generation of categories or concepts in
Hegel's system, and the necessity which pertains to this process and to conceptual relations is
exclusively intra-systemic. (And hence, for Hegel, even the system of pure reason is limited,
although its limitations are strictly self-constituted.) What this means is that dialectical
reasoning as a philosophical science and dialectical necessity as a feature of it are exclusively
matters of the constitution and relation of thought determinations. Thus the system contains
neither an explicit nor an implicit claim as to whether 'reality as we find it'reality construed
according to the model of consciousnesseither is or is not dialectical in re.41 In addition, this
system is not a transcendental system of categories, principles, or rules in terms of which a
thinking subject allegedly must cognize reality construed as what is in some manner given to
consciousness.42 Forand once again as in the case of metaphysicssuch a transcendental
philosophy presupposes the model of consciousness which takes as paradigmatically and
irreducibly given the distinction between subject and object, the exact presupposition which
this system rejects as primal and as exclusively and irreducibly authoritative for philosophy at
its start.43
If this system claims to be neither a descriptive account of reality as it is given nor an account
of the forms of thought according to which reality must be cognized, if it is founded neither on
a purportedfoundationalinsight into the fundamental nature of being nor on a
purportedfoundationalinsight into the conditions for the possibility of conscious cognition,
what then is this system? Hegel's philosophical system is, I would suggest, sui generis. In its
fully developed form it is simply the conceiving of reality from the standpoint of autonomous
reason, which, more specifically, is that standpoint which rejects the authority both of any

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specific given and of the framework of givenness itself as demonstrably determinative for
reason. Alternatively, it is what we might call Realphilosophie, using Hegel's term to describe
the system beyond the Phenomenology and the Science of Logic. And as suchand this is a
further feature of its self-constituted limitednessthis system does not deny the reality of
anything 'given' external to reason, or to itself as the system of reason. In strict terms,
questions of what can be actually established by modes of cognition which assume givenness
and which take account of the given in their actual employment fall outside of the system.
So this system does not deny überhaupt the factuality of the given or the possibility of modes
of cognition appropriate to it. For, as a final, metaphysical conclusion, such a denial would
require cognitive reference from within the system to the allegedly given, just in order to
establish an idealistic rejection of its ontological ultimacy, and that reference would entail a
lapse into the mode of consciousness whose suspension is a precondition for this system's
autonomy. Rather, what this system does deny is simply that the determinative primacy for
reason of any such givens can be demonstrated. 44 So this system does not 'absolutize' reason
in the sense of denying that there are any limits to it. As noted above in regard to Marx, who
from the point of view of Hegel lapses into idealism in postulating reality and history as
literally dialectical in character, this system does acknowledge its limits, and it must do so for
the sake of its own claim to autonomy. The price of the claim to reason's autonomous self-
constitution, as based on a rejection of the given as foundational in and for it, is an
appreciation of the self-closure of the system. Insofar as the autonomy of the system rests on a
rejection of the philosophical authority of the given, a rejection of the foundational standpoint
which assumes the possibility of a referential skyhook, self-closure is entailed in the sense that
the completed system of reason cannot return to the framework of descriptive reference which
was abjured as operative in and for it at its start. (This is, in part, my revisionist account of the
notorious "circularity" of Hegel's system.)
Nonetheless, those features of the system which comprise its autonomy and its self-limitedness
are at the same time just those features of it which give it a certain normative force vis-à-vis
the given. Rejecting the given as a basis for the system does not, as I shall argue, entail a
rejection of reason's claim on or against the given. But, it should be stressed once again,
systematic philosophy's normative force rests neither on the basis of any descriptive claims
concerning the nature of given reality, nor on any descriptive or

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prescriptive claims concerning what are allegedly those necessary principles according to
which reality must be known or cognized. Hegel's is a nonfoundational while still a critical
philosophy. What I am suggesting is that he avoids the current dilemma of rejecting
foundationalism only to fall into uncritical relativism.
What does this mean and how does he do this? It means, amongst other things, that this system
of reason, to the extent to which various domains of reality do come to be conceived within it,
has critical authority solely insofar as we seek to discover what can be conceived from a
standpoint which is not founded on arbitrarily selected or postulated givens. That is, it has
critical authority solely insofar as we choose to seek to determine what is rational about the
real when it is conceived from the standpoint of autonomous reason, i.e., as a category of
systematic philosophy. And this means the following, then, for us as human subjects, as
conscious awareness who live, think, and act in the domain of the given: the critical question
of the extent to which some aspect or feature of what we take to be the world as given to us
does or does not accord with the demands of reason is an extra-systemic question. 45 In a
moment I shall have more to say on this, and on how this system can play a critical role in
regard to the given, despite its severance from the given.
In addition, and more specifically as regards the location of this systematic philosophy in the
contemporary spectrum, Hegel's rejection of the primacy of subjectivity in and for this system
puts him in general agreement not only with those holists who reject the model of isolated
subjectivity as adequate for understanding cognition; additionally, in the arena of social and
political philosophy, he would agree with those critics of modern society who attack what they
see as its roots in unfounded conceptions of liberal individualism.46 Based as it is on a
standpoint of reason which rejects the exclusive primacy of givenness and of the subject.
Hegel's conception of the rational character of society and its institutions is derived from the
notion that individuality and freedom are not givens. In this manner, Hegel parts company
with traditional liberal theory. For Hegel, individual freedom and individuality itself, when
systematically conceived, are seen to originate from and be dependent upon a network of
various institutions whose definitive character is more properly thought of as intersubjectively
constituted. Thus, Hegel's social and political philosophy does not reject the ultimate worth or
legitimacy of individual freedom, as MacIntyre's does.47 What it does reject is the adequacy of
properly understanding the nature and conditions for the actualization of

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such freedom insofar as it is theoretically conceived in atomistic, egological terms, as it is
either in natural right or in contract theory. 48
So, we can say that Hegel, like the postmoderns, rejects foundationalism and absolute
subjectivity while endorsing cognitive and practical holism. But unlike the postmoderns he
does this in such a way that this rejection and endorsement are fully rational, and are not only
compatible with but also entailed by the idea of autonomous reason which the postmoderns
disparage. In addition, as we shall see, the Hegelian endorsements of holism and historicism,
unlike those of the postmoderns, are part of a legitimation of modernity and are connected to
the preservation of a critical dimension for philosophy. This is an important contrast to the
postmoderns' dismissal of or despair concerning such a legitimation and their cheerful
embracing of, or moody resignation to, relativism.
(2) In what sense has Hegel presented a legitimation of modernity? And in just what sense is
this nonfoundational system nonetheless a critical system vis-à-vis the given? How does Hegel
reject foundationalism, which seeks a basis for its critical stance in the given, and still avoid
relativism?
Insofar as the core idea of modernity is the notion of a human right to autonomy, a right to self
-determination in matters of thought and action, then, in Hegel's view, this notionas it comes to
be developed and articulated within systemic philosophy, i.e., as a rational conceptwould have
the only possible theoretical legitimation it can have or needs. It seems to me that a central
insight in Hegel's projectparalleling his methodological rejection of a foundation for
philosophy itselfis that the modern claim to such autonomy is utterly insusceptible of being
founded or legitimated theoretically by an appeal to any facts, any givens.49 Hegel would
agree with MacIntyre that, in this sense, modernity is without foundations. For Hegel as for
MacIntyre, both the idea of natural rights and the idea that given principles internal to reason
can support these claims to freedom are fictions.50 But unlike MacIntyre and other critics of
modernity, it does not follow from this for Hegel that the absence of such foundations for
principles of freedom amounts to an indication of their illegitimacy. From a Hegelian
perspective, it is fundamentally contrary to the whole modern idea of freedoman idea Hegel
sees as challenging the immediate and ultimate authority of all givensto seek its legitimacy in
some givens. To put the matter in positive terms, these claims to freedom are fictions in the
literal sense of being non-natural human

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constructs. Consequently, the legitimation of freedom and the constitution of principles of
thought and action in accordance with it can be undertaken only through an exercise of fully
autonomous reason. But if this is so, how can the system of reason which conceives freedom
in these terms have any critical force?
The prima facie claim that autonomous reason has the right and authority to legislate critically
to the given can be established only insofar as it can be shown that no allegedly privileged
givens can be demonstrated as primary and necessarily determinative and authoritative for
reasonthe task of the Phenomenology. Thus, finally, the following can be said in regard to the
critical dimension of this nonfoundational system: it can function critically only insofar as one
acknowledges that claims to authority require some rational justificationinsofar, that is, as one
steps beyond a mute appeal to coercion or force. Then, Hegel claims, if we make this move,
we must finally acknowledge only the authority of autonomous reason itself. For, in the last
analysis, it can be shownat least according to the Phenomenologythat no particular given
which might claim primacy over reason can be fully legitimated in an adequately rational
fashion as something more than an arbitrary given or postulate.
I have argued that the severance of reason from the given in the self-constitution of its
principlesthe system's self-imposed alienation from the world as it is foundis crucial as a
necessary (but not sufficient) condition for the claim that this is a rationally autonomous
system and also for the claim that the system has provenance as regards the philosophical
theory of rational autonomy. This feature of the system has important consequences in regard
to the system's understanding of how freedom, as rationally conceived, is to be actualized extra
-systematically. For one thing, the system's self-imposed self-containedness leads in its own
right to the ideawhich accords with our non-systematic intuitionthat the extra-systemic
actualization of freedom as rationally conceived is, amongst other things, contingent in part
upon the acknowledgment in the socio-political world of the rightful authority of reason. And
reason alone, as Hegel was well aware, cannot compel this acknowledgment. Hence for Hegel
the actualization of the rational freedom articulated in systematic philosophy is unquestionably
dependent upon historical circumstances and human actions which can be neither predicted
nor ordained by philosophical theory. Thus, both Hegel's historicist perspective about the
contingent and located character of modern freedom and his own philosophy of freedom, and
his cautious views concerning what philosophers can do to actual-

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ize freedom follow from his conception of systematic philosophy itself. 51 In this way we can
appreciate how a system of autonomous reason, rather than demanding a denial of the
contingent, the located, and historically embedded, leads instead to a rational appreciation of
them (where by "rational" I mean an appreciation or acceptance which does not absolutize
these features of our life world).
Only free choicethe choice, methodologically, to think rationally-philosophically; and the
subsequent choice to seek effective acknowledgment of reason as legitimately authoritative in
the world of the givencan finally bring systematic philosophy to bear as a critical force in this
world. But acknowledging that such choices cannot be rationally compelledacknowledging
that they are free and that nothing given forces us to be rationalonly involves a reasonable
appreciation of the limits of reason and not a pronouncement of its utter importance. For in
any case, the postmoderns' reason-disparaging pronouncements, which assume that philosophy
can be critical only insofar as it can be foundational and that, since it cannot be foundational it
cannot be critical, are self-sublating. As that thoughtful student of the Hegelian dialectic,
Quine, puts it: someone "cannot proclaim cultural relativism without rising above it, and he
cannot rise above it without giving it up."52
The larger point for Hegel here, given his conception of systematic philosophy and of
freedom, is this: philosophical reason as such cannot actualize freedom, nor, as a rational
system, can it provide guidelines as to how, pragmatically, one can best go about the activity
of attempting to actualize freedom. For Hegel, the task of this actualization, given his
systematic conception of what freedom is, is necessarily a task for human action. Thus, Hegel
would agree with Aristotle and others that there can be no practical science of politics. Hegel,
however, does not take this Aristotelian and postmodern position on the basis of a purported
insight into the allegedly determinative givens of human nature which supposedly establish
that human affairs must always lack the necessary regularity and universality for theoria.
Rather, Hegel rejects that idea of a practical science of politics simply because a rational,
systematic understanding of the modern principle of freedom as individual autonomy leads to
the perception that any attempt to dictate the specifics of this freedom's actualization would be
in conflict with this very idea of freedom. In other words, 'rational freedom'freedom as
conceived in systematic philosophymust be freely realized. Thus such freedom is fragile, for
its essential nature is to be a free human construct. Freedom's reality depends upon various

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circumstances and conditions which can only be guaranteed by human acts and by humanly
created institutions. The necessary minimal framework for such action and for the structure of
such institutions can be rationally perceived. Here systematic philosophy has its proper role,
one which cannot be gone into here. (I refer interested readers to the work of K. R. Dove and
Richard D. Winfield.)
The point worth stressing here is that reason alone cannot make the institutions and structures
of rational freedom real and cannot tell us how best to go about making them real. Again, this
is because such judgmentsas to whether the world as given is or is not in accord with reason,
as well as judgments about how to act in the worldboth fall outside of the purview of
systematic philosophy. They do so because its claims to autonomy and legitimacy require the
suspension in and for the system of that model of cognition in and through which such
judgments are made. And this suspension is required since that model itself requires and must
assume in its operations the validity for cognition of the given generally and of some given
specifically. To make this point in another wayand as Hegel argues systematically in the
Philosophy of Rightsuch practical judgments fall outside systematic philosophy because they
require contextuality: our location as citizens within the institutional frameworks of particular
socio-political institutions and traditions. Like Herr Krug's pen, these cannot be deduced
systematically.
So for Hegel, unlike Marx, there can be no strictly philosophical theory of praxis, in the sense
of philosophy as a dialectical science of autonomous reason. There can be no philosophical
theory of the realization of theory, and especially of a theory of freedom 53 (where
''philosophical theory" means one claiming universality, necessity and not descriptive but
prescriptive and critical force for its assertions). There is no place in systematic philosophy for
those who wish to take on the role of philosopher kings. And so in this systematic philosophy
there is missing the paradoxical notion in which rational freedom is reduced to some form of
rational necessity, a paradox found, as I see it, in Hegel's predecessors Leibniz, Spinoza, and
Kant, and in his successor, Marx.
Similarly located in historical circumstances, as Hegel himself notes, is his own system of
thought.54 Thus again, Hegel's historicism fits in part with contemporary historicism (though
his historicistic perspective emerges out of a system of autonomous reason). But, insofar as
critics of modernity are incorrect in claiming that we are now in a postmodern agean issue for
rational-

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empirical discussion and debate, but not for systematic philosophy as such to addressand
insofar as we remain committed to the basic notions of the distinctively modern tradition
which Hegel saw emerging and hoped to shapethe notions of the rightful autonomy of human
thought and actionthen his philosophy still remains important, or ought to take on a new
importance. And, if we choose for whatever reason to make a commitment to these ideals of
freedom, this philosophy retains a critical force against those aspects and features of our given
social and political worlds whichin our best extra-philosophical judgmentdo not accord with
freedom as rationally and philosophically understood. If Hegel is right on these matters, if a
nonfoundational but still critical philosophy is possible, then we ought to conclude that our
contemporary relativists are wrong. Philosophy is not mental masturbation. If Hegel is right on
these matters, if a genuinely distinctive role for philosophy is possible, then we ought to
conclude that our fashionable postmodernists are wrong. Philosophers have more to do than to
commit philosophical suicide.
<><><><><><><><><><><><>
In this chapter I have begun to make a case for the contemporary relevance of Hegel's
philosophy, arguing that some themes he shares with antifoundational postmodernists are not
aberrant features of his systematic philosophy, but are consistent with his radical notion of a
nonfoundational system. Many of the themes introduced in this chapter are developed further
in subsequent chapters. Historically, Hegel's departure from the modernist foundational project
was connected to his objective, in the Phenomenology, of developing an immanent critique of
foundationalism and the subjectivist model of cognition. The specifics concerning how the
Phenomenology can be understood in this light are laid out in Chapter 3, "Hegel's
Phenomenology as Introduction to Systematic Science." How this critique provides the
beginning point for a nonfoundational system of autonomous reason is addressed in Chapter 4,
"Beginning Philosophy Without 'Beginnings.'" I have also claimed here that Hegel's system is
antimetaphysical, that it is self-limiting, that it provides for a coherent understanding of the
finite character of knowledge and that it is nonetheless a legitimation of modernity, rationality,
and objectivity. These themes are also addressed below, in Chapters 5, 6, and 8, where the idea
that this system is a critical philosophy is also considered.
In Chapter 2, "Philosophy as a Systematic Science," I tackle in more detail one of the central
claims of Philosophy Without

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Foundations introduced in Chapter 1: the idea that today's strictly dichotomous opposition
between foundationalism and antifoundationalism is mistaken. Chapter 2 argues that
foundationalism and antifoundationalism are both deeply flawed enterprises, and shows that in
their present formulations they appear to be irreconcilably opposed. It then develops the
Hegelian insight that they share an underlying assumption about the nature of cognitionthat
knowledge can only be construed along subjectivist lines. Chapter 2 concludes by showing
that when this assumption is subjected to an immanent critique, it may lead to a conception of
philosophical knowledge which not only avoids the problems of foundationalism and
antifoundationalism but also reconciles certain of their positive notions about knowledge.

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Chapter 2
Philosophy as Systematic Science
There is nothing more terrifying than ignorance in action.
Goethe

What is perhaps most distinctive about contemporary rejections of foundational philosophy is

the self-understood radicality of these critiques. They claim not to be doing better what their
predecessors had attempted, but rather to be putting an end to the philosophical tradition in
general. What I aim to do in this chapter is threefold: (1) to consider the basic character of
some contemporary attempts to reject philosophy wholesale and to indicate certain difficulties
with these attempts; (2) to suggest a method of criticizing traditional philosophy which avoids
these difficulties; (3) to outline how such a method both coherently articulates what is valid in
contemporary criticisms of philosophy and points the way to a different understanding of what
philosophy as a rigorous or systematic science might be.

I.
The Contemporary Idea of Deconstruction
Since Nietzsche, philosophy has become increasingly preoccupied with metaquestions
concerning both its status and its possibility as a meaningful endeavor. In more recent years, in
the works of Heidegger, the later Wittgenstein, Gadamer, Habermas, Foucault, Lyotard,
Derrida and Rorty, this metaconcern has been transformed into a concerted effort to analyze
and to critically reject or

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'deconstruct' the traditional guiding ideal of philosophy: its aim to attain a standpoint of
objective and autonomous reason and thereby to transform itself into the 'queen of the
sciences,' a radical, absolute or presuppositionless foundational discipline which can speak for
the truth.
The possibility of philosophy in this grand and traditional sense has been disparaged from
several different perspectives. All might be said to share in common a belief in, and a desire to
demonstrate, the unattainability of the radical self-grounding or self-legitimation which the
traditional ideal of philosophy demands. In brief, the deconstructors hold that the philosophical
pretension to an aperspectival, presuppositionless standpoint is an unwarranted conceit.
Positively expressed, the differing attempts to deconstruct foundationalism variously strive to
demonstrate that there are inherent, necessary and non-transcendable limits to thought. I shall
call this the thesis of thought's finitude. It is further argued, with differing stresses and in
differing ways, that these limits must be taken into account if philosophy, or postphilosophical
thought, is to go about its business in a meaningful way.
The contemporary attack on philosophy's ideal of rigorous science takes the shape of a
thoroughgoing rejection or deconstruction of foundational epistemology. In aiming to speak of
the nature of truth itself and the conditions for its possibilitya precondition for philosophy's
claim to be a rigorous scienceepistemology claims to discover and ground the necessary
conditions for the possibility of true knowing or discourse. And the capacity to do this
successfully presupposes implicitly or explicitly that one has attained a metastandpoint of
unconditional knowing, a standpoint in which thought is fully transparent to itself, meaning
that the epistemological ground or foundation is itself as fully legitimated or grounded as that
which is to be founded upon it. Because the standpoint to which foundational philosophy must
lay claim is the absolute standpoint from which the determinate character and legitimacy of
philosophy as a rigorous foundational science would be articulated, and because epistemology
is that endeavor in which claims to such a standpoint are both made and argued for, the attack
on the ideal of philosophy as a rigorous science has taken shape specifically as an attack on
foundational epistemology.
Positively expressed, the antifoundationalist position asserts that the self-grounding standpoint
of absolute knowing to which foundationalism must lay claim is unattainable, in that every
standpoint of thought is necessarily one from amongst several possible perspectives, each of
which is a limited standpoint unavoidably

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conditioned by determinative factors which can neither be made fully transparent nor
transcended. Such factors might consist in the overdetermined character of the given natural
languages in which philosophical thought is articulated. Or, expressing the antifoundationalist
position in Heideggerian fashion, it is claimed that the correspondence model of truthwhich
foundational epistemology presupposes and which promises knowledge as a full revelation
and a complete mirroring of what isis illusory in that every truth-telling or disclosure is also a
concealment. Each event of presencing presupposes, as a condition of its possibility, a
correlative absencing or concealing. Truth as dis-closure (a-letheia) always retains within
itself an ineluctable reservoir of closedness or obscurity (lethe).
What does the antifoundationalist position have to do with 'systematic philosophy'? Systematic
philosophy claims to provide a mode of discourse which is unconditional and absolute in the
sense that what comes to be established in this discourse is thoroughly determined by the
discourse itself. As self-determining discourse, systematic philosophy articulates the position
of autonomous rationality. On the face of it, both the positive and negative points made by
antifoundationalism would seem to suggest that, if antifoundationalism is correct, systematic
philosophy is impossible. This would seem to be the case because, as self-determining,
systematic philosophy lays claim to a standpoint of thought which is presuppositionless and
from out of which all of the system's determinacies are generated in a fully immanent manner.
Systematicity in systematic philosophy means, first and foremost, this internal immanent or
self-generative feature, and the alleged autonomy and rigor of systematic philosophyits claim
to being scienceis a function of its immanency, an immanency the condition of the possibility
of which is the attainment of a presuppositionless starting point.
The apparently complete incompatibility between systematic philosophy and
antifoundationalism arises from the linking of such a presuppositionless starting point with the
completion of a project of foundational epistemology which has as its outcome the attainment
of a standpoint of self-grounding or self-legitimating thought or reason. This would
purportedly function as a determinate standpoint from which the systematic philosopher could
lay claim to having uncovered and grounded the conditions for the possibility of knowledge
überhaupt. The favorite historical exampleand the bête noirof the antifoundationalists is, of
course, Hegel's system. 1

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Thus, the view which sees systematic philosophy as wedded to foundationalism and as falling
along with it holds that 'presuppositionlessness' must and can only consist in a position in
which the determinate factors constitutive of knowledge are clearly defined and fully
legitimated (such that, these factors having thus been shown to be the necessary preconditions
for thought, they are 'absolutes' and not presuppositions in the negative sense of the word).
I shall argue, however, that presuppositionlessness need notindeed cannotbe construed in this
manner. Thus I shall contend that a genuine systematic philosophy which does have a
presuppositionless beginning point does not claim to have attained this by successfully
completing the project of foundational epistemology in the manner envisioned by
antifoundationalists. I shall argue, to use the closing words of Rorty's Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature, that "... a new form of systematic philosophy ... which has nothing whatever
to do with epistemology but which nevertheless makes normal philosophical enquiry possible"
2 is possible. Furthermore, I aim to show not only that such a systematic philosophy is
possible, but also that its possibility is not only compatible with, but itself presupposes, a
deconstruction of foundationalism. In making that point, I shall contend that there is an
essential difference between a systematicthat is, a thoroughly immanentdeconstruction or
critique of foundational epistemology and an ad hoc deconstruction. My contentions will be:
(1) that systematic deconstruction makes clear the extent to which a nonfoundational
systematic philosophy is possible; (2) that it makes possible a coherent, nonparadoxical
articulation of the finite character of thought; and (3) that in so doing it thereby avoids various
difficulties found in ad hoc deconstructions. In criticizing ad hoc attempts at deconstruction
and in arguing the superiority of systematic deconstruction I shall contend that a major failing
of ad hoc deconstructists consists in the paradoxical or self-referential character of their
assertions that thought is finite and not susceptible to transparent self-legitimation. I shall ague
that, as a consequence of this paradoxicality, ad hoc deconstructionists are unable to decisively
undermine the foundationalist perspective. Lastly, as it is clear that a systematic philosophy
which does not begin with epistemological foundations but rather with a systematically
deconstructive critique of foundationalism would be something different from what one would
expect of philosophy as a rigorous science, I will conclude with a few remarks concerning
what I take the nature of such a scientific system of philosophy to be.

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II.
The Problematic Character of Ad Hoc Deconstructions of Foundationalism
One way to focus on the difficulty with ad hoc rejections of foundationalism is to examine the
complex character of the issue of dogmatism as it is perceived and addressed by both
foundationalists and antifoundationalists. This is an important issue because one of the guiding
motivations for both foundationalism and antifoundationalism is a desire to avoid dogmatism,
broadly understood as the unfounded assumption that a particular point of view is
unequivocally right. For foundationalists, dogmatism can be avoided only by foundational
epistemology. For the antifoundationalist, however, it is rather foundationalism itself which
leads to dogmatism. By looking more closely at this issue we can see (1) how and why is it
that ad hoc deconstructions of foundationalism fail as decisive critiques of foundationalism
and (2) why a systematic deconstruction is called for if the claim that foundationalism ought to
be rejected is to be substantiated.
That one aim of foundationalism is to transcend dogmatism is clear from the works of
Descartes, the founding father of foundationalist epistemology and from the works of his
followers in modern philosophy who continued and transformed his project. Foundational
epistemology's original position regarding dogmatism can be expressed as follows: If the
definitive conditions for knowledge are not first established and grounded by means of a
preliminary investigation into the nature and limits of knowing, then when we go about the
business of making knowledge claims we cannot be certain that we are operating properly.
The project of foundational epistemology is needed so that the twin specters of radical
skepticism and dogmatism can be laid to rest. For our assumption that we are going about
things in the proper way may be unjustified. We may have deceived ourselves (or we may be
being deceived) into thinking that we are coming to know the truth when we in fact are not.
Mere assumptions concerning the rightness and legitimacy of how we go about the business of
knowing must be viewed as so many dogmatic assertions, as unjustified assumptions, resting
on faith, tradition, convention or whatever. They amount to untenable appeals to authority and
they are not to be accepted until they pass certification by the tribunal of reason. Foundational
epistemology achieves this end in two steps. First, it determines whether knowledge as such is
possible or impossible.

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Having determined the possibility of knowledge, it then supplies a method which allows the
systematic verification or falsification of our beliefs, enabling us to create a rationally
reconstructed, autonomous and self-grounding culture. 3
From this perspective, reason is a "natural light."4 This image is powerful, important, and
seductive. In raising the specter of radical skepticism as a possibility for which the absolute
certainty provided by foundationalism is the only antidote, the foundationalists shaped a view
of reason, mind, understanding or consciousness as a fully self-illuminative faculty. Only if
mind or reason can attain to full transparency concerning itselfknowing its own workings as
the instrument or medium of knowledgecan the knowledge conditions which constitute its
operations be fully justified and grounded, and the twin specters of radical skepticism and
blind dogmatism exorcised. This justification and exorcism entail a view of reason as an
instrument, faculty, or medium which can only perform this justificatory task insofar as it is
itself capable of full self-justification as the epistemologically critical and justifying
instrument. Self-justification is required because anything left unjustifiedmerely assumed as
truewould compromise the whole endeavor. Thus foundational epistemology requires a
moment of absolute self-transparency in which reason's own operating conditions are known
and validated in an unconditional, unquestionable, indubitable fashion. Indeed, one can view
the entire development of modern epistemology as a search for that moment of fully self-
certain, self-transparent, unconditional, absolute knowing. And one can further see this search
as rooted in the assumptionlater to be brought into question by the antifoundationaliststhat the
mind or reason knows nothing better than itself and can attain full clarity concerning the
conditions of its own possibility.
What distinguishes the foundationalist view of dogmatism from the antifoundationalist view is
the former's linking of dogmatism with the possibility of radical skepticism. For the
foundationalist, radical skepticismthe possibility that we could be wrong about everythingis a
philosophically genuine possibility which can only be met by an absolute certainty attained
through the self-investigation of reason. Given the specter of radical skepticism, from the
standpoint of the foundationalist, any and all positions which are not rooted in and justified by
a successful foundational epistemology are eo ipso unjustified, uncertain, and dogmatic,
insofar as they claim to be anything more than unjustified and uncertain.
From the point of view of the antifoundationalist, radical skepticism is itself only a by-product
of the seductive vision of absolute

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certainty and self-transparent reason to which the foundationalist is mistakenly attached. As a
corollary of the belief in an absolute certainty, the threat, if not the possibility, of radical
skepticism is held to disappear once it is made clear that absolute certainty is unattainable in
principle. The antifoundationalist assures us that if absolute certainty cannot be attained, then
absolute uncertainty makes no sense, since they are correlative terms. In addition,
foundationalism's false claims to absolute certainty amount to dogmatism in pretending to
provide an unequivocal, exclusive standpoint from which the truth can be established. With
the demonstration that absolute self-grounding certainty is an illusion, the Gang of Four which
contemporary deconstructionsts are accused of nurturing and which they dismissradical
skepticism, relativism, nihilism and dogmatismare said to be liquidated.
The difficulty of the contemporary antifoundationalists' ad hoc attempts to deconstruct
foundationalism by showing that absolute truth or absolute certainty is impossible lies, as the
label "ad hoc" suggests, in the manner in which these critiques of foundational epistemology
are carried out. The essence of the problem is the internal inconsistency of the
antifoundationalist position. The problem here concerns the status of the discourse in which,
and the status of the standpoint from which, one attacks foundationalism.
The antifoundationalist wishes to assert that the aperspectival, ahistorical metapositionthe
standpoint of absolute self-grounding knowingwhich the foundationalist aims to attain is an
impossibility in principle. Correlatively, the antifoundationalist desires to show that all human
knowing is finite and burdened by inherent limitations which, although they can be
philosophically articulated and illuminated, cannot, nevertheless, be removed or transcended.
According to antifoundationalists, we have something like a basic insight into or self-
awareness of these limits, one which can be philosophically accounted for. 5 It is only the
seductions of the powers of reflection which lead us into the illusion that they can be gone
beyond. The difficulty for the antifoundationalist concerns the character and status of these
claims and the implicit position or standpoint from which they are promulgated.
For one thing, the claim that an absolute standpoint is unattainable in principle and that efforts
to attain it are thus mistaken and doomed to failure from the start is itself an absolute claim.
For the assertion that not only has no one yet succeeded in successfully articulating an
absolute philosophy, but that it is in principle impossible to do so, is itself an apparently
ahistorical claim to an insight into the true nature and possibility of truth and knowledge.

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Undoubtedly, what the antifoundationalist says is that unconditional truth claims are not
possible, but this claim is itself an unconditionally true meta-assertion about the nature of
truth. From the standpoint of the foundationalist, the antifoundationalist has a right to be
skeptical about the possibility of attaining an absolute standpoint through a foundational
project, but she has no legitimate grounds to dismiss the project out of hand. Correlatively, the
antifoundationalist's positive assertions concerning finitude also appear as claims which are
being made from an absolute, aperspectival standpoint. One might say that the
antifoundationalist is in a difficult position both in regard to what she wishes to assert and in
regard to the position from which she makes her antifoundationalist claims.
Antifoundationalism seems to succumb necessarily to the self-referential inconsistency of
making absolute claims against absolutism and to be denying the possibility of an absolute
perspective on the truth from a perspective which itself is absolute. From the standpoint of the
foundationalist, the antifoundationalist's unequivocal claims concerning the impossibility of
attaining an absolute standpoint can only appear as question-begging and dogmatic. For in the
foundationalist's eyes, the antifoundationalist is going about making unconditional claims
about the nature of truth and the conditions and limitations of its possibilitysomething the
foundationalist claims to do alsowithout going through the effort of justifying the standpoint
from which such claims can rightly be made.
What is the antifoundationalist response to all this? Sophisticated antifoundationalists such as
Gadamer and Rorty seem to be aware of the charges of paradox and inconsistency to which
their positions open them, but not to be especially troubled by them. 6 If the foundationalist
can respond to their attacks on foundationalism by raising metaquestions and meta-issues
concerning antifoundationalism, the antifoundationalist can respond in kind, although with a
certain twist. The kind of metalevel response which the antifoundationalist can make has its
locus classicus in the earlier Wittgenstein's notion that certain things which cannot be saidor
cannot be said coherently without violating fundamental limiting principles of discoursecan
nevertheless be shown.
The antifoundationalist response might go like this: It may appear that antifoundationalist
claims are unconditional and absolute claims concerning the nature of truth and the possibility
of knowledge; the language of the foundational tradition in which they must be asserted
produces this appearance. But it is the very nature of the limited or finite character of human
knowing

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and speaking that they convey this appearance when addressing their own nature. The very
metalevel problems which are brought to bear against antifoundationalism reveal the truth of
antifoundationalism in that they show at the metalevel what cannot be articulated without this
self-referential inconsistency. This self-referential inconsistency is not a problem, but rather a
revelation of thought's inescapably limited character, a revelation which appears whenever
thought focuses on its own nature. It serves to indicate the impossibility of our ever being able
to provide a transcendental grounding for the definitive conditions of finitude, and this
disclosure is perfectly consistent with our position. For it is just the impossibility of any such
grounding which we are interested in articulating. A consistent antifoundationalism could not
do what foundationalism demands, so we are being consistent with our position in refusing to
attempt to do so. The charges of paradox raised against antifoundationalism are finally of no
importance simply because what foundationalism sees as a paradox to be removed or avoided
the antifoundationalist recognizes as evidence for the point he wishes to make: the opacity, the
non-transparency of knowledge and truth conditions and the impossibility of attaining a
standpoint from which they can be talked about in a fully adequate manner. In addition, in
charging antifoundationalism with question-begging and dogmatism it is the
foundationalistfrom the perspective of antifoundationalismwho is truly begging the question
and being dogmatic. For these charges against antifoundationalism can only be madesince they
only make sense if foundationalism is a real possibilityby someone who does not see beyond
the confines of the foundationalist paradigm. Thus it is the foundationalist who is begging the
question and being dogmatic in refusing to be open to the radical questioning of the possibility
of foundational philosophy itself. The foundationalist is willing to be a radical skeptic about
everything except the necessity of foundationalism. In demanding that the paradoxes of self-
reference be successfully dealt with by us, you are demanding that we resolve problems which
foundational epistemology cannot resolve itself, problems which our position holds cannot be
resolved as their irresolvability is itself indicative of our thesis concerning the finite, non-
groundable character of knowing. And in demanding that we ground and justify our
antifoundationalist position you are asking us to play your game and to accomplish something
which foundational epistemology has not been able to accomplish, and which we claim cannot
be accomplished with success. Thus our failure to meet your demands is

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not indicative of a problem in our position, but of the truth of what we assert about the nature
of knowing.
To which the foundationalist might respond: You are trying to modify your position without
owning up the consequences of such a modification. The counter charges of question-begging
and dogmatism will not work. Foundationalism can admit that as yet no one has succeeded in
completing the project; indeed, foundationalism is open to bringing the possibility of
foundationalism itself into question, for our demand that a standpoint of justification be sought
brings everything into question. But antifoundationalism is not content with making the
historically accurate observation that no one has yet succeeded in successfully carrying out the
foundational project. Rather, antifoundationalism wishes to dogmatically assert that
foundationalism is impossible in principle, that it is a way of understanding the nature and the
goal of philosophy which is fundamentally mistaken. Of course, antifoundationalism refuses to
engage in the foundational activity which would ground the legitimacy of its 'insights' into the
absolute character of finitude. Were the antifoundationalist to do this he would see that he is
engaged in much the same project as we are. But unless the antifoundationalist brings his own
position into question, the charge of dogmatism is correct. And if antifoundationalism admits
that its own position is and remains ungrounded, then antifoundationalism has no basis on
which to make unequivocal claims about the possibility of foundational philosophy. If
antifoundationalism will admit that the impossibility or errancy of foundationalism cannot be
demonstrated from a justified position, then it must also admit that the possibility or
impossibility, the meaningfulness, or non-meaningfulness of foundational philosophy is an
open question, which is all that foundationalism asks. The paradoxes of the antifoundationalist
position 'show' nothing else but the fundamental wrongheadedness of the antifoundationalist
position itself.
Standing back from this dialogue, we might say at this juncture that the foundationalist-
antifoundationalist debate has reached a standoff, and that these two positions on the character
and possibility of philosophy are separated by an unbridgeable gap. It seems that each
occupies a position from which neither can finally speak to the other, for each is looking at the
philosophical world in a way which is diametrically opposed to the other's, and which
precludes the possibility of finding a common ground upon which their differences can be
resolved. Both sides approach the question of what philosophy is, and what it ought to do, in
such a fashion that their respective visions are incommensurable.

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The foundationalist will not be swayed from the fundamental and definitive demand that no
truth claimsand especially truth claims about the nature and possibility of truth claimscan be
regarded as adequate unless the standpoint from which such claims are made is justified. The
foundationalist article of faith is that reason's demands for such justification are self-evident
and unavoidable. Consequently, from the foundationalist point of view, the demands of
finitude, while seemingly obvious in being grounded in basic facts about human nature, are
contestable insofar as the commonsensical standpoint which asserts them remains ungrounded,
and insofar as these demands run counter to the idea of rational accountability. Any critical
project can only touch the foundationalist position insofar as it recognizes the demands of
reason; to fail to do so is, for the foundationalist, simply to step outside the bounds of
philosophical discourse.
The antifoundationalist will not be swayed from the fundamental and definitive view that no
truth claimsand especially truth claims about the nature and possibility of truth claimscan ever
be fully justified or grounded. The antifoundationalist article of faith is that the self-evidence
of human finitude precludes the possibility of absolute self-grounding. Consequently, from the
antifoundationalist point of view, the demands of reflective reason, while seductive, are
illusory, and any attempt to attack this principle can touch the antifoundationalist position only
insofar as it recognizes the limits of finitude.
Seeing that foundationalism recognizes the demands of reason as primary and
antifoundationalism recognizes the constraints of finitude as primary might lead one to the
view that there is no possible rational resolution of the controversy, and thus one might
conclude that no final demonstration of the correctness or incorrectness of either position is
possible, because they have incommensurable criteria concerning what counts as a
demonstration. Looking at the matter in this way, one might feel that only a quasi-religious, or
quasi-psychoanalytic, conversion from one standpoint to the other is possible; a conversion
which consists just in 'coming to see things aright' however this is construed, in the spirit of
the latter Wittgenstein.
Now this metaperspective on the issue might seem most amendable to the antifoundationalist.
In fact, an antifoundationalist might hold that if the foundationalist can be brought to agree
with this metaperspective on their differences, then the issue would be resolved in the favor of
antifoundationalism. One could imagine a sophisticated antifoundationist saying: ''Of course I
cannot

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demonstrate to you that you are wrong in a manner that you find acceptable, for you can
always respond to what I say and to what I bring forth as evidence with a demand that I justify
the standpoint or the discourse in which or from which I make my claims. And you cannot
demonstrate to me that I am wrong in a manner which I find acceptable. But that's the whole
point. Just this incommensurability shows that the ideal of an absolute metaperspective of
knowing which could reconcile such differences is unattainable." To which the foundationalist
can respond, once again, that while such a standpoint has not been reached, this in no way
proves that it cannot be reached. This metaperspective on the issue will only appear to the
foundationalist who does not 'see' that he is 'bewitched' by a 'pseudoproblem' as question-
begging.
What is to be done? Can anything to be done to resolve this situation or is it truly an impasse?
From the point of view of systematic philosophy something can be done. Systematic
philosophy holds that a common ground for resolution is attainable in that
antifoundationalism's demand for the recognition of finitude and foundationalism's demand
for radical justification can be accommodated. Both a demonstration of finitude which avoids
paradox and an articulation of a self-grounding standpoint which is non-foundational are
attainable. The key to this reconcilation, the effort which literally effects both of these
seemingly antithetical goals, lies in a systematic consideration of the foundational project. I
have labeled this a systematic deconstruction of that project in anticipation of its negative
outcome for foundationalism, but in fact its results will be equally negative and positive for
both foundationalism and antifoundationalism. The systematic consideration which follows
will reveal that antifoundationalism is right in that our way of knowing is inescapably finite,
but wrong in assuming that no other way of knowing is conceivable. Correlatively, it will show
that foundationalism is right in that a presuppositionless and hence self-grounding standpoint
is attainable, but wrong in seeing this standpoint as providing foundations for cognition. This
systematic (and deconstructive) consideration of foundationalism will also be critical of
antifoundationalism in that it will show that a consistent recognition of the finitude of our
mode of knowing is incompatible with the claim that this mode of knowing is absolute in its
finitude; the antifoundationalist view that no other mode of knowing is possible cannot be
reconciled with its assertion of the finite character of our knowing. It will be critical of
foundationalism by showing that a realization of a presuppositionless standpoint is
incompatible with the establishment of foundations of cognition; the

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foundationalist view that a self-grounding science must begin with determinate conditions for
cognition cannot be reconciled with its own realization that such a science must begin without
presuppositions.
The way in which a systematic consideration of foundationalism operates is to apply the
principles and criteria of foundationalism to the foundational project itself. What I have
labeled ad hoc deconstructions fail because they assume the correctness of a position
antithetical to foundationalism, and thus apply criteria to it which beg the question at issue.
Thus foundationalists can always dismiss antifoundationalist critiques as beside the point. To
approach foundationalism systematically however, is to approach its prospects for success as,
initially, an open possibility. If foundationalism is to be shown defective this must be
demonstrated immanently: the demands laid upon foundationalism and the criteria by which it
is judged must be its own. What are foundationalism's basic principles and criteria, and how
does their application to the foundationalist project lead to its own immanent deconstruction?

III.
The Systematic Consideration of Foundationalism
Foundationalism demands that we do not presuppose our capacity to know the truth, but rather
that we first establish it by means of a preliminary investigation into the nature of cognition,
one which will demonstrate that and how knowledge is attainable. Foundationalism holds that
cognition is something which is in need of being investigated because it could go wrong. It
further holds that cognition is capable of being investigated in such a way that this tendency
toward error can be redressed by laying out the rules for cognition's proper exercise. In holding
this, foundationalism commits itself to understanding cognition in terms of a determinate
relationship between knowledge and object. Cognition must involve a relation, for if we are
going to speak of our being right and wrong, we must have a standard for correctness and
something we compare to that standard. On the one hand we must be able to specify
knowledge, and on the other that which it is purportedly knowledge ofthe object as standard of
judgmentif cognition is going to be understood in the manner of foundationalism: as capable
of having the conditions under which it both meets and fails to meet a standard specified by an
epistemological or transcendental investigation. In addition, the cognitive relation must be
understood as something which is capable of analysis in general termsall

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instances of cognition must involve certain uniform conditionsif an investigation into it is to
result in the kind of foundational knowledge which will serve as a useful prophylactic against
error.
In accord with these requirements, foundationalism understands the relation between
knowledge and object in terms of the correspondence model: an ideaor, if we make the
linguistic turn, a propositionis true when it corresponds to an objective state of affairs. Just
how knowledge and the standard are more specifically conceived makes no essential
difference to the character of the foundational project. In line with Descartes' classic
distinction between res cogitans and res extensa, we may construe knowledge and standard as
falling into two separate ontological domains, with the standard as an object understood as
existing external to an inner dimension of mental awareness in which it is represented. Or, as
has become fashionable in more recent times, we may attempt to avoid the problem of
bridging inner and outer which 'externalists' confront by going 'internal': refusing to regard
knowledge and its object as fundamentally different in character, seeing them rather as distinct
components of a larger, ontologically seamless unity (such as the pragmatists' "nature"). The
reason that the particular ontological specification of knowledge and standard/object makes no
differencethe reason that it is irrelevant for foundational purposes whether they are both
conceived as ontologically the same or as differentis simply that all versions of
foundationalism minimally require an ineliminable epistemic difference: Foundationalism
minimally demands that the standard be construed as something which is determined as what it
is independently of the knowledge which is to be measured against it, irrespective of whether
the character of the determination as independent is construed as following from an
ontological difference or not. If the standard is not so construed (as independently determined)
there can be no question of an objective test of the knowledge against the standard. (If the
domain of that which is to be tested were permitted to determine the standard against which
the test is made, objectivity would be sacrificed. A ruler cannot be an objective measure of its
own correctness.) Knowledge and standard may both be ontologically ideational, as with
Berkeley, or they may both be ontologically natural, as with the pragmatists; but only so long
as the standard is construed as determined independently of the knowledge being measured
against it (whether it is said to be so determined by God, or by nature, or whatever) does the
possibility for a test exist.

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Once this epistemic difference which is required for testing has been allowed, the
foundationalists' central difficulty of comparing knowledge and object without compromising
the validity of the standard as an independently determined measure arises. That is, if we grant
the epistemic difference needed for genuine testingthat the standard is determined as what it is
prior to and apart from the knowledge of itthe difficulty of showing that knowledge and
standard correspond arises whether or not knowledge and object are ontologically different.
The attempt to fashion an internalist foundationalism as a response to externalist difficulties
cashes out as the introduction of a distinctive without a difference. For the foundational act of
comparing knowledge and standard requires that the standard be epistemically distinct in order
to be a genuine standard, but also epistemically the same (of the status of something
knowable) in order to be something against which knowledge can be compared. But as soon as
the standard becomes epistemically knowableas soon as it comes to be known in the act of
making the comparisonits status as an objective standard against which knowledge claims are
to be tested is fatally compromised. For once the standard is known, the foundationalist no
longer has a guarantee that it is determined as what it is objectively, independent of the
foundational knowing act. As this intimates, and as I shall discuss in more detail below, the
failure of foundationalism is that it requires itself to satisfy test conditions which cannot
possibly be met without compromising the conception of knowledge which it presupposes.
Foundationalism's goals are to show that there is a specific mode of knowing which satisfies
this correspondence relation and to specify the general conditions (pertaining to knowledge,
objects, and their relation) which make this satisfaction possible. It is when we think through
what must be required for foundationalism to succeed that we discover how and why it cannot
succeed in grounding its understanding of cognition. In order to demonstrate correspondence,
foundationalism must violate or suspend the very assumption that gets the project going: that
cognition consists in a determinate relation between its purported knowledge and an object. To
put it differently, demonstrating correspondence means attaining to a state of affairs in which
what must be presupposed to carry out the demonstration can no longer be presupposed, so
that what foundationalism was going to 'found' disappears in the very act of founding it. In
short, if foundationalism's demands are to be met, the conditions for its possibility must be
violated; the

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foundational project displays an immanently generated internal incoherence that requires its
rejection, and allows us to do so without any need on our part to claim any sort of quasi-
foundational, absolute knowledge, as is the case with the ad hoc antifoundationalists. How so?
To establish that, and how, a truth-affording relation between (what is purportedly) knowledge
and object is possible, foundationalism must demonstrate correspondence between the
candidate for knowledge and the object. It must show that 'knowledge' and object are identical
in content, in order to establish that the purported knowledge is true, is genuine knowledge;
and it must, at the same time, preserve the distinction between knowledge and object.
Demonstrating that we have achieved a successful comparison means that the entities being
compared must also be distinct from one another, for without the difference, we have no
comparison. In addition, without the preservation of a difference between knowledge and its
object we have no knowledge to speak of (at least insofar as knowledge is understood in the
manner presupposed by foundationalism). Additionally (as noted above) only if the difference
between knowledge and object is preserved in the foundational act can it be shown that the
knowledge in question is objective, is knowledge of the object, and not a mere subjective
projection or fantasy. So what foundationalism must establish is a state of affairs in which
knowledge and object are at one and the same time in a relation of identity (to demonstrate
truth) and difference (to insure that a comparison has been achieved; to insure knowledge, for
knowledge is a relation and must have distinct relata; and to insure the objectivity of
knowledge). In short, this state of affairs requires identity and difference at one and the same
time, for if at one moment (or in one foundational act) identity is established, and at another
difference, we cannot be certain that the knowledge identified at the one moment and
distinguished at the next are the same.
The problem, however, is that if we have simultaneous identity-and-difference, we no longer
have anything that can be picked out and identified as 'knowledge,' on the one hand, and as the
'object' on the other. The state of identity-and-difference between knowledge and object which
must be required in order to found knowledge is one in which 'knowledge' and 'object'
disappear, for insofar as both are identical and different at once, they are neither the same nor
different. 7 Or, to put the problem another way, we no longer have a determinate relation here,
and foundationalism presupposes that knowledge involves a determinate relation as one in

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which knowledge and its object are always distinguishable from one another. The fatal
problem for foundationalism is that both the identity of knowledge and object and the
difference must, but cannot, be attained at one and the same time, if this model of knowledge
is to be grounded. They cannot be attained, because attaining them eliminates the model; they
must be attained, because if they are not the possibility of truth as correspondence remains in
question. Put in another way: foundationalism cannot show both that its knowledge is true and
that it is knowledge of an object; it can attain certainty about truth at the price of objectivity, or
objectivity at the price of certainty about its truth, but not both.

IV.
The Possibility of Systematic Philosophy
Because the very conditions required for foundationalism to succeed have led to the
suspension of the model of knowledge which foundationalism sought to ground, this
systematic thinking through of foundationalism demonstrates the failure of foundationalism
according to its own criteria. Thus it is a thoroughly immanent critique; thus, unlike ad hoc
antifoundationalism it does not beg the question by presupposing an alternative non-
foundational model of knowledge.
If a systematic consideration of the foundationalist project succeeds in effecting the
antifoundationalist critique without the problems of ad hoc antifoundationalism, how does it
also open the way to a systematic science? Put differently, how is the consideration also a
partial success for foundationalism and a partial failure for antifoundationalism? It is a partial
failure for antifoundationalism in the sense that it is a critique of antifoundationalism's
(inconsistent) pretensions to absolutism. Both foundationalism and antifoundationalism
presuppose the same model of cognition, the subjectivist model which presupposes that
knowledge is always of a determinate other given independently of cognition.
Foundationalism presupposes this model in its attempt to establish correspondence;
antifoundationalism presupposes it in its assertion that knowledge is inescapably finite because
it is grounded in conditions which cannot be rendered transparent. The immanently generated
collapse of the subjectivist model reveals that it is finite because it cannot ground itself, but it
also shows that one cannot successfully claim, as the antifoundationalists inconsistently wish
to claim, that knowing must be understood in terms of this model. If the
subjectivist/foundationalist model cannot

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show how knowledge understood in its terms is legitimate, then it cannot be claimed (as both
foundationalists and antifoundationalists wish to claim) that this is the only conceivable model
for cognition. And thus, foundationalism's self-effected failure to ground its model of
cognition is also a partial success for foundationalism because it opens the way to a conception
of cognition which is arguably self-grounding. How so?
The specific failure of the foundational-antifoundational model lay in presupposing a
determinate difference between knowledge and object. If, as we have seen, this model of
cognition collapses when the conditions for its self-grounding are fulfilled, then perhaps this
also indicates that the way to attain a self-grounding mode of cognition lies just in specifically
rejecting that model. That is, if we begin by deliberately refusing to presuppose any
determinate relationship between cognition and its object, a mode of consideration might
ensue in which both come to be determined at once. This discourse could then be arguably self
-grounding in the sense that nothing determinate from outside of the consideration is present to
externally determine what comes to be established in it. If that were the case, philosophy as a
systematic science would arguably be possible because the demand that this discourse be
unconditional or autonomousnot founded on anything externally determinedwould allow for
the possibility of a strictly immanent determination of the categories of the discourse.
While attaining foundationalism's goal of self-grounding, this systematic science would still be
compatible with a consistent antifoundationalism for two reasons. For one thing, the very
possibility of this systematic discourse would have been conditioned by the self-engendered
collapse of the assumption that all discourse must be other-determined, founded on something
given as determinate. The collapse of foundationalism is the collapse of this assumption in its
failure to ground itself. Insofar as systematic discourse is made possible by the prior
suspension of this assumption, systematic self-grounding science would not abrogate the
antifoundational insistence that all cognition is in some way conditioned or contextualmade
possible by factors external to the cognition itself. Rather, it would articulate the only coherent
sense in which this thesis can be maintained: Systematic discourse is conditioned because it
has been made possible by the self-refutation of the assumption about cognition which insists
that all cognition must begin with something determinate. (Foundationalism asserts that it is
the conditions of cognition themselves which are always given and determinative of whatever
might be thought;

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antifoundationalism asserts the same thing, with the qualification that these conditions are
opaque. Systematic philosophy asserts that it is conditionedin the sense of "having been made
possible"by the self-suspension as a foundational principle for philosophy of this
foundationalist-antifoundationalist thesis that thought must always be conditionedin the sense
of 'predetermined'by something already given.) Secondly, this systematic discourse would also
be consistent with antifoundationalism because, being based on a thoroughgoing rejection of
the unconditional validity of the subjectivist model, it cannot claim to achieve those ends
which are part of this model's definition of knowledge. The model which has been suspended
defined knowledge as always being knowledge of something given to cognition: 'knowledge'
was thus taken to be fundamentally descriptive in character, an account of something present
to cognition. As based on a rejection of this model, systematic discourse would make no
pretension to supplant descriptive discourse by offering itself as a perfected form of such
discourse. Systematic philosophy does not claim to describe the given world in any of the
manifold senses in which traditional philosophy has construed that task; hence systematic
philosophy is radically nonmetaphysical. However, it does claim to supplant descriptive
discourse insofar as it waxes metaphysical by purporting to be unconditional.
Thus, systematic discourse parts company both with foundationalism, which sought a mode of
discourse that would be unconditionally authoritative and determinative for all other modes of
discourse, and with antifoundationalism, which explicitly or implicitly postulates a relativism
in which all modes of discourse are equal.
In Chapter 2 I have tried to show that, despite their real differences, foundationalism and
antifoundationalism share an important common assumption about the nature of knowledge.
Both are committed to the subjectivist model of cognition, to the notion that knowledge can
only be construed as knowledge of some given object. But foundationalism cannot demonstrate
that such knowledge is attainable, and antifoundationalism cannot demonstrate that knowledge
generally is finite in the distinctively pejorative sense that it can only be thought of in terms of
such a flawed model. Neither foundationalism nor antifoundationalism succeeds. I have
outlined a possible way beyond this model which avoids the problems of both foundationalism
and antifoundationalism. The

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systematic, immanent critique of the model indicates the proper sense in which knowledge is
finite, and antifoundationalism is correct, for it discloses that the grounding foundationalism
seeks cannot be attained insofar as one holds to the subjectivist model that foundationalism
presupposes. But just this disclosure functions at the same time to liberate us from this
modelantifoundationalism is not correct in its insistence that knowledge must be construed
according to the finite subjectivist model.
In Chapter 3 I shall bring these issues back to the specific context of Hegel's philosophy,
arguing that the immanent critique outlined in Chapter 2 (in the context of contemporary
debates) is what Hegel has already laid out for us in his Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807.
Thus chapter 3 lays the groundwork for my larger claim that Hegel moves beyond the
foundationalist-antifoundationalist standoff and offers a new conception of systematic
philosophy. In challenging traditional understandings of Hegel, my interpretive contention will
be that this reading of the Phenomenology functions to address a variety of interpretive
problems which have plagued readers of the book who have sought to understand it as a
coherent argument that functions as Hegel's self-proclaimed "introduction" to science.

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Chapter 3
Hegel's Phenomenology As Introduction to Systematic Science
There's no success like failure, and failure's no success at all.
Bob Dylan

Contemporary developments in continental thought which have their roots in Nietzsche, which
run through the works of Heidegger and Gadamer and perhaps reach their most radical
articulation in the writings of recent French thinkers, indicate the extent to which traditional
notions concerning interpretation, text authorship, and especially the idea of the 'correct
reading' of a text have been brought more and more into question. Serious doubts have arisen
as to whether any single interpretationof a text, idea, historical period, etc.can be designated as
adequate. Central to these doubts is the question of whether historical imbeddednessthe
historicity and the immanently perspectival character of consciousnesscan be overcome. The
issues and problems connected with these questions are many and run deep, challenging at the
most basic level the idea of autonomous, objective, and radically 'scientific' reason which has,
as an ideal, guided western thought for centuries.
What do these issues have to do with Hegel, and specifically with his Phenomenology of
Spirit? In recent years, dismay over the failure of interpreters to come to agreement over the
Phenomenology has led increasingly to the belief that no genuine, comprehensive, and finally
adequate interpretation of that work is possible.

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Thus, it might be suggested that the case history of Phenomenology interpretation provides
prima facie evidence in favor of the general (and generally negative) views on text
interpretation mentioned above. But a second point of connection is much broader and
concerns our fundamental understanding of reason. For the Phenomenology, as Hegel's
declared introduction to science, is meant to indicate how consciousness can overcome its
merely perspectival and imbedded character and how, thereby, a standpoint of autonomous
objective reasonthe standpoint of sciencecan be attained.
In what follows, I shall contend that the problem of interpreting the Phenomenology is rooted
in a serious prevailing misunderstanding of how Hegel intended the Phenomenology to
function as an introduction to a standpoint of objective reason. I shall suggest that the
Phenomenology can be interpreted in a comprehensive and adequate manner and that such an
interpretation is grounded in a new understanding of how the work is meant to introduce
science.
One of the most vexing problems confronting Hegel scholars today is understanding the
Phenomenology in the role assigned to it by its author as the introduction to science, or, to use
Hegel's words, the ''deduction of the concept of science." 1 In recent years the deeper question
has arisen of whether it is even possible to understand the work in that manner. Despite the
ever-increasing number of works devoted to the Phenomenology it has been suggested by
several scholarsamongst them Wim van Dooren and most recently J. N. Findlay2that we are
still without a satisfactory commentary on Hegel's first book over 170 years since its
appearance. This state of affairs has led Otto Pöggeler (and others) to ask whether the
Phenomenology actually presents us with a coherent argument which leads consecutively from
beginning to end and is susceptible to a philosophically reconstructive commentary: Does the
book have a genuine argument at all or is it only a collection of related themes whose
sequential ordering is more or less arbitrary? Pöggeler doubts whether the Phenomenology is
even a book at all in the sense of "something fully finished and completed." He contends that
"the composition of the work can scarcely exhibit an ordering which springs unequivocally out
of the beginning point of the work and remains unproblematic in its unfolding." And in
agreement with van Dooren and Findlay he declares, "Despite this return [to the
Phenomenology] in regard to an attempt at an interpretation of the Phenomenology of Spirit we
still have not proceeded beyond the first step."3 Pöggeler contends that, if we are going to be
able to grasp the idea of the Phenomenology, what Hegel wanted must be understood: To this
day "it has not yet

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become correctly clear what Hegel wanted and what he achieved, wherein he was led as he
sought to write an introduction to his system." 4
I agree with Pöggeler and others that we are still without a satisfactory commentary on the
Phenomenology. But unlike Pöggeler I am not convinced that the absence of a genuine
commentary must be attributed to the fact that the Phenomenology as written fails to present
us with a cohesive, interconnected argument (or to the fact that Hegel supposedly changed his
mind about what he was doing during the course of writing the Phenomenology5 ) The absence
of a commentary may rather be attributed to our failure to perceive what Hegel wanted when
he sought to write an introduction to his system. The clue which will perhaps enable us to
proceed beyond the first step in interpreting the Phenomenology can be found by turning to the
Science of Logic. We must focus on Hegel's self-understanding of the Phenomenology, that is,
on his conception of the role and accomplishments of the Phenomenology, as this self-
understanding is presented in that workthe Logicwhose concept the Phenomenology is
supposed to deduce. If, as Pöggeler says, an understanding of the idea of the Phenomenology
requires that we understand what Hegel wanted to do, then it is in the Logic, I shall argue, that
Hegel informs us both of what he wanted to do and of what he felt he had done in the
introduction to his system of science. I shall first attempt to show why we are still today
without a satisfactory commentary on the Phenomenology. I shall argue that the received view
of Hegel's Phenomenology as an introduction to science is inadequate because it cannot
account for Hegel's self-understanding of the Phenomenology as presented in the opening
sections of the Logic (The "Introduction" and "With What Must the Science Begin?").
Secondly, I shall argue that in these opening sections Hegel presents a clue as to just what he
wished to accomplish in the introduction to his science: namely, to overcome the standpoint of
consciousness altogether and thereby to attain to the standpoint of science as one of objective,
autonomous reason, which Hegel offers us in the Logic.

I.
The Received View of the Phenomenology as Introduction to Science
Although there is disagreement in the received view as to whether the Phenomenology
presents anything like an argument, and

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further disagreement about just what this argument might consist in, there is a consensus that
the aim of the Phenomenology as an introduction to science is a positive one. 6 The
Phenomenology was designed, according to the received view, either to present a
demonstrative argument whose function is to establish and ground the nature and validity of
absolute knowing, or, according to those who see the argument to be more rhetorical and
persuasive than demonstrative, to elevate the reader propadeutically to the level of absolute
knowledge and to convince him thereby of its validity.7 Although there is disagreement
concerning the exact manner of the argument, there is agreement that its aim is positive: it is to
introduce science or deduce its concept, whether through a rigorous demonstration of the truth
and validity of a mode of absolute knowing or through an illustrative recapitulation of the
steps to absolute knowing.8 Although the Phenomenology's manner of proceeding is seen to be
original and unorthodox, its aim as an argument is found to be traditional and positive.
This positivity thesis concerning the aim of the Phenomenology as the deduction of the
concept of science is reinforced by the received view's interpretation of absolute knowing
itself. According to this view absolute knowing as the concept of science deduced by the
Phenomenology stands as a determinate principle or structure of true knowing as such.9
Whether or not the argument of the Phenomenology which leads to absolute knowing is a
success is a matter of some debate in the received view.10 Nonetheless, there is agreement that
absolute knowing stands in Hegel's view as absolutely true, actual and scientific knowing and
as such constitutes for him the concept of science.11
What exactly is absolute knowing, and how does the received view understand it as the
foundational principle, the beginning point, of science? Here again we can find agreement
among holders of the received view: absolutely true and unquestionably valid knowing is held
by Hegel, they argue, to consist in the pure reflective self-knowing of an absolute self-
consciousness or absolute subject. Since the Phenomenology culminates in absolute knowing
with the establishment of the identity of subject and object, this absolute knowing as absolute
self-consciousness is seen to be the aboriginal unifying structure in which the necessary
interrelation and intermediation of subject and objectof knowing and what is knownare
achieved. As such, this structure is claimed by Hegel to be paradigmatic for any and all
knowing.12 The coming to absolute knowing via the Phenomenology is thus seen to establish
what true knowing as such is, and to have thereby deduced the concept of

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science. The Logic is then seen to begin with and rest upon this structure of absolute knowing
as its foundational and methodological principle. The logical categories of the science are seen
to be generated out of this structure through the self-reflective self-knowing of absolute self-
consciousness. 13
In summation: According to the received view, absolute knowing as the deduced concept of
science (1) is seen to be an actual and true knowing; (2) is seen to consist in a determinate
relational structure whose elements or poles are subject and object (or subject/object,
object/subject); (3) the logical science is seen to rest upon this structure as its presupposition,
to have its nature or validity as science grounded in this structure; and (4) to have its logical
categories generated out of the reflective activity of this structure of absolute self-
consciousness as it engages in self-knowing. It is thus contended that the Phenomenology was
meant by Hegelat least originallyto establish the structure of absolute self-consciousness as the
principle of absolutely true knowing and thus as the concept of science.

II.
Hegel's Understanding of the Phenomenology as Introduction to Science
It is my contention that this traditional view of the relation of the Phenomenology to the Logic
is neither in agreement with nor provides a satisfactory accounting for what Hegel himself
says in the opening of the Logic concerning the Phenomenology as the deduction of the
concept of science, concerning the nature of logical science and its method, and concerning the
beginning of this science and what is required for this beginning.
I shall argue generally, in opposition to the received view, that both the Phenomenology as
introduction, and absolute knowing as the deduced concept, must be understood negatively.
Which is to say that, even as the deduction of the concept of science, the aim of the
Phenomenology is not to establish and ground absolute knowing, embodied in the structure of
consciousness, as true knowing überhaupt. (The aim is not to establish a structure of absolute
self-consciousness as the foundational principle for autonomous, objective reason.) I shall
contend that absolute knowing, as the deduced concept which does constitute the beginning
point of the science, is, according to Hegel, not a true or actual knowing and not a determinate
structure or methodological principle for the

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constitution of science. I shall further show that according to Hegel this science does not begin
in or with, nor base itself on a reflective structure of the ego or self-consciousness, and that the
Phenomenology does not serve to deduce the concept of science by in any way predetermining
or grounding the method, manner, or nature of scientific cognition. I shall ague that it is
Hegel's claim (1) that the nature, method, and validity of logical science can only be
established within this science and not prior to it, and (2) that, nonetheless, absolute knowing
is the deduced concept of science and that the Phenomenology is designed and carried out as
the introduction to this science. My aim will be to show that the received view's account of
absolute knowing cannot reconcile the following claims made by Hegel in the opening of the
Logic: that logic begins without presuppositions while the Phenomenology is nonetheless the
presupposition for the Logic, further, that the concept of science or logic cannot be in any way
predetermined and that nonetheless the Phenomenology is the deduction of the concept of
science. 14 Any adequate account of the Phenomenology as the deduction of the concept of
science must be able to explain these apparently contradictory claims of Hegel's.15 My
positive thesis is that, to make sense of these claims by Hegel, both the Phenomenology as the
deduction of the concept of science and absolute knowing as the deduced concept must be
understood as radically negative, and further that clues in the Logic concerning the
introduction to his science support this thesis.
"With What Must the Science Begin?" is where Hegel actually informs us how absolute
knowing leads to or constitutes the beginning of science. Hegel tells us here that logic begins
in or with absolute or pure knowing, that this pure knowing is the concept of science and is the
result or outcome of the Phenomenology and the truth of consciousness (Logic: pp. 6869).16
We must ask: according to Hegel, is this pure knowing an actual and true knowing which is
embodied in a determinate structure taken up in the Logic as its constitutive or methodological
principle? Does the Phenomenology deduce the concept of science by establishing what
absolutely true and hence scientific cognition consists in? Both of these key theses of the
received view are here denied by Hegel. The latter thesis is suspect insofar as Hegel informs
us that "it is the nature of cognition simply as such which is to be considered within the
science of logic. ... [T]o want the nature of cognition clarified prior to the science [vor der
Wissenschaft aber schon über das Erkennen ins reine kommen wollen] is to demand that it be
considered outside the science; outside the science this cannot be accomplished, at

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least not in a scientific manner and such a manner is alone here in place" (Logic: p. 68). Taken
by itself, however, this statement denying the possibility of clarifying the nature of cognition
prior to science and holding that it is just the task of science to do this does not itself fully
undermine the received view. It could still be argued that the Phenomenology comes to
determine the structure or principle of scientific cognition which is only subsequently to be
elucidated or unpacked in the logic proper. But what Hegel says next rules this out, too. He
tells us that we begin in the Logic with absolute or pure knowing as the deduced concept
which results from the Phenomenology. In so doing we begin in or with the "determination of
pure knowing" (Logic: p. 69). What then is this pure knowing which has resulted from the
Phenomenology as the "ultimate, absolute truth of consciousness" (Logic: p. 68)? Is it, as the
received view maintains, some determinate structure or principle of cognition which now
merely awaits clarification or unfolding? Is this pure knowing constitutive of knowing as such;
is it even a knowing? Hegel's answer to these questions is decisively negative. He proceeds to
tell us that in beginning with this pure knowing as ''what is there before us," as the outcome of
the Phenomenology, pure knowing is that which has "sublated all reference to an other and to
mediation; it is without any distinction and as thus distinctionless ceases itself to be knowing;
what is present is only simple immediacy" (Logic: p. 69). (A few pages later, Hegel speaks of
this knowing as collapsing and vanishing into an undifferentiated unity in such a way that it
"leav[es] behind no difference from the unity and hence nothing by which the latter could be
determined" [Logic: p. 73; emphasis added]) 17
According to Hegel then, science, in beginning with the deduced concept as pure knowing
begins neither in nor with a knowing or with any structure of knowing at all. Further, it cannot
be argued that this beginning point has some structure of knowing outside it, such as its
method in terms of which "simple immediacy" is to be considered. Such a reading is ruled out
because Hegel holds: (1) that method or form and content are one in his science (Logic: pp.
4344); (2) that "the exposition of what can alone be the true method of logical science falls
within the treatment of logic itself ..." (Logic: p. 53); (3) that "the account of scientific
method ... belongs to its content" and "cannot be stated beforehand" but emerges "as the final
outcome and consummation of the whole exposition" (Logic: p. 43); and (4) that the very
immanent and scientific character of this logic consists in the fact that we rid ourselves "of all
other reflections and opinions whatever" and take

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up "what is there before us" (Logic: p. 69). Hegel is unequivocal on this point: just in its
beginning with the concept of science deduced by the Phenomenology, the logic does not
begin in or with any knowing or structure of knowing, either as the object of scientific
consideration or as the methodological or guiding principle for this consideration. Science
begins rather with that absolute or pure knowing which, as the outcome and truth of the
Phenomenology "hört somit selbst auf, Wissen zu sein." In Hegel's mind, the outcome of the
Phenomenology as the deduction of the concept of science is negative. For not only does the
absolute or pure knowing in which the Phenomenology results cease in and of itself to be a
knowing; further, in this self-cessation, what that knowing was as a determinate describable
structurethe structure of consciousnessalso ceases to be, is eliminated or aufgehoben. In
beginning with or in this self-cessation of absolute or pure knowing as the deduced concept,
science does not begin with the reflective structure of the absolute ego or self-consciousness
which subsequently comes to generate logical categories via some process of immanent self-
reflection. As we saw in his account of how the deduced concept comes to constitute the
beginning of science, Hegel makes no mention of such a structure. What he does say about the
deduced beginning point rules out the possibility of its being some such determinate structure
or principle. For "simple immediacy" as the beginning point is ''completely empty
being" (Logic: p. 75), it is "pure indeterminateness" (Logic: p. 72) as that which is "without
any distinction" within itself and which has "sublated all reference" to anything other than
itself (Logic: p. 69).
According to Hegel, the deduced concept of science with which the Logic begins cannot be
any determinate principle or structure of knowing, for he tells us that what the logic begins
with "must be purely and simply an immediacy, or rather merely immediacy itself. Just as it
cannot possess any determination relatively to anything else, so too it cannot contain within
itself any determination, any content, for any such would be a distinguishing, and an
interrelation of distinct moments and consequently a mediation" (Logic: p. 70). If Hegel took
absolute knowing as deduced concept to be a structure, then he would not speak of it as
collapsing into a unity which is "undifferentiated" (Logic: p. 74), a unity which leaves "behind
no difference" by which it could be determined (Logic: p. 73). If Hegel held that the science
begins with a determinate reflective principle embodied in an absolute self-consciousness, then
he would not hold that it begins with no determinacy either within itself or in relation to
anything else. Nor could he hold that "the beginning

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cannot be made with anything concrete, anything containing a relation within itself. ...
Consequently, that which constitutes the beginning, the beginning itself, is to be taken as
something unanalysable, taken in its simply unfilled immediacy, and therefore as being, as the
completely empty being" 18 (Logic: p. 75).
Although Hegel's remarks make it clear that absolute knowing as the deduced concept is not
the self-reflecting self-knowing absolute self-consciousness that it is traditionally taken to be,
and that the Phenomenology does not introduce science by somehow grounding, establishing,
or predetermining the nature of true and hence scientific cognition, they do not indicate just
how the Phenomenology functions to deduce the concept. That is, they do not indicate how the
outcome of the Phenomenology, in its being the deduction of the concept, leads to the self-
cessation of absolute or pure knowing into indeterminateness. Nor do they tell us what the
meaning or sense of this deduction is, or how it works. These are questions which we shall
turn to below. Nonetheless, that the outcome of the Phenomenology as deduction of the
concept is taken by Hegel to be a negative one is clear. Hegel tells us further that the
beginning of his science is an "absolute beginning" which means, according to him, that "it
may not presuppose anything" and "must not be mediated by anything nor have a
ground" (Logic: p. 70). Rather, he says, this beginning "is to be itself the ground of the entire
science" (Logic: p. 70: cf. p. 43).
Now, however, we must confront our chief interpretive dilemma. For Hegel also asserts, in
three separate places in both the "Introduction" to the Logic and in "With What Must the
Science Begin?" that this science presupposes the Phenomenology: "The concept of pure
science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work in so far as the
Phenomenology of Spirit is nothing other than the deduction of it" (Logic: p. 49; cf. p. 68, p.
60, and p. 48). How then is the Phenomenology to be understood as the necessary
presupposition for science, as its mediation and as the deduction of its concept, if it is also held
that science begins immediately (Logic: p. 70), if "not only the account of scientific method,
but even the concept itself of the science as such belongs to its content ... and cannot be stated
beforehand" because it ''has its genesis in the course of the exposition and cannot therefore be
premised" (Logic: p. 43)? How can the Phenomenology be the presupposition which Hegel
claims it is if, as he also states, the science begins without presuppositions (Logic: p. 70)?
It is my contention that if any sense is to be made out of these seemingly mutual exclusive sets
of claims, this sense is not to be

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found in the received view, with its positive reading of the Phenomenology as deduction and
its positiveand as we have already shown, mistakenunderstanding of absolute knowing as the
deduced concept. Clearly, if the aim of the Phenomenology as introduction were to be the
establishment of the nature of true cognition, and if absolute knowing as the deduced concept
of science were to be a determinate structure of actual cognition (from out of which the logical
categories are to be generated via a process of self-reflection), then the Logic would begin in
or with a determinate presupposition and it would have its ground outside itself. Only if the
Phenomenology as the presupposition for the Logic is understood to have a radically negative
outcome can we reconcile and make sense out of the above mentioned claims and also
understand Hegel's description of the Phenomenology as a self-sublating mediation or
presupposition for science (Logic: p. 69). Understood in that negative manner, absolute
knowing is, as Hegel says, a self-sublating or self-eliminating knowing and, as the deduced
concept, constitutes the presuppositionless beginning point of science not in its being a
knowing but rather in its self-elimination as a presupposed structure of knowing. The
reconciliation of Hegel's apparently mutually exclusive claims thus lies in seeing that only a
presupposition which is self-sublating, that is, which has a radically negative outcome such as
that sketched above, could be a mediation or presupposition for presuppositionless science.
How then are we to understand the Phenomenology as the presupposition for
presuppositionless science, as the necessary mediation which brings us to the point of an
immediate beginning? As I understand it, it is Hegel's contention that the Phenomenology
functions as the mediation and presupposition for presuppositionless science just in so far as it
serves to indicate that absolute knowing, the knowing arrived at by consciousness as its
"ultimate, absolute truth"pure or utterly presuppositionless and self-grounding knowingis no
knowing at all. So the mediative function, the function of the Phenomenology as the
presupposition for presuppositionless science, consists in its revealing the fact that when
consciousness' presupposed structure of cognition is brought by consciousness' immanent
dialectic to its "ultimate, absolute truth," this consists in the sublation of this knowing as a
knowing and in the collapsing or vanishing of the foundational structure of this knowingthe
structure of consciousnessinto an indeterminate unity. Absolute knowing as the deduced
concept of science is the presupposition for the beginning of presuppositionless science
because it is the indication

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that absolutely presuppositionless knowing, that with which the science must begin, is no
knowing at all and has no determinate structure. The Phenomenology can then be understood
as the presupposition for presuppositionless science not because it establishes, grounds or
predetermines the nature or principles of true, valid, and scientific cognitionfor, according to
Hegel that can be done only within the logical science, and because it is done therein he claims
this science has its ground within itself and begins without a presupposition. Rather, the
Phenomenology is the presupposition for presuppositionless science because it indicates what
science must begin with if it is to begin without any presuppositions concerning knowing: not
with some knowing, but with the self-cessation of knowing understood as the knowing of
consciousness, with this knowing's coming to establish itself as absolute. (When the
presupposed structure of knowing with which the Phenomenology beginsthe structure of
consciousnessis brought to its absolute self-grounding and self-legitimation, it comes in this
absolute self-grounding to eliminate itself.) The Phenomenology is the presupposition for
presuppositionless science because it indicates the necessity of the radically indeterminate and
presuppositionless character of the absolute beginning of philosophical science.
If Hegel is seriousand I take him to be utterly seriouswhen he says that method and content are
and must be one in the science (Logic: pp. 4344, 54), when he says that the ground, the truth,
and the validity of logic cannot be established outside it, when he states that logic must begin
"without preliminary reflection" and "cannot presuppose any of these forms of reflection and
laws of thinking" "for these constitute part of its own content and have first to be established
within the science," and when he states that the concept of logic itself "has its genesis in the
course of the exposition and cannot be premised'' (Logic: p. 43), then the concept deduced by
the Phenomenology cannot consist in a determinate structure or principle of true and scientific
knowing. According to Hegel, if science is to be truly radical and self-grounding, it cannot
begin with any determinate method, definition or rule of procedure (Logic: p. 53, p. 70, p. 72,
p. 73, p. 75). And the necessity of understanding this radically negative state of affairs as
requisite for the beginning of science is demonstrated by the Phenomenology as the
presupposition for science. Thus, the Phenomenology is not a presupposition for the science
because it establishes no principle, method, or ground for the science, and yet it is a
presupposition for the science because it shows why such a science cannot have any such
external grounding.

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How then are we to understand the task, the aim of the Phenomenology as introduction to
science? As the presupposition for presuppositionless science, the function of the
Phenomenology must be to show both that science cannot begin with any determinate
structure or presupposition and why, if it is to be pure science, it cannot begin in that manner.
Now according to Hegel, what science does begin with in beginning without presuppositions is
pure, reflectionless, and unstructured immediacy or indeterminateness, which, he says, is the
"ultimate, absolute truth of consciousness" (Logic: p. 68). As I understand this, such an
outcome of the work presupposed by presuppositionless science must indicate that the role of
the Phenomenology is to show why beginning with the structure of consciousness as a
presupposition in philosophy leads to its elimination or self-cessation as a structure of
knowing when its absolute and ultimate truth is achieved That is, the task of the
Phenomenology as introduction to science is the critical task of showing that when
consciousness itself comes to demonstrate its absolute truth as a structure of knowing, when
consciousness comes to an absolute self-grounding as structure of knowing, then
consciousness, as a determinate and presupposed structure, comes to eliminate itself. (Thus,
the Phenomenology might be understood not as the perversion of the Kantian critical project,
but as its ultimate and radical completion. A completion which leads not to the affirmative
absolutization of consciousness, but rather, through the consideration of consciousness's
attempt at its own absolutization to the immanent demonstration that consciousness cannot be
taken as the foundational principle in philosophy.) The outcome of the Phenomenology
demonstrates that consciousness' attaining to its ultimate and absolute truth in absolute
knowing yields 'indeterminateness' as the mediated indeterminateness of the structure of
knowing presupposed in the Phenomenology. So understood, the Phenomenology is a
presupposition for science because it comes to indicate indeterminateness as the outcome and
truth of consciousness' project, the project defined in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology
as consciousness' search for its truth. The Phenomenology is not a presupposition in this
science in the sense that the Phenomenology's outcome predetermines something in the
science. The positive aspect of the outcome of the introduction is precisely the negative one of
indicating how the science is not to beginwith a presupposed structure or principle of
knowingif it is to be pure and presuppositionless. The Phenomenology is not a presupposition
since it is, as Hegel says, a self-sublating mediation, in that the

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truth of consciousness as a presupposition about knowing shows itself to be its own
elimination into indeterminateness or immediacy. That the positive character of the
Phenomenology as introduction lies precisely in its negative outcome, and further, that the
beginning point of science, in virtue of this outcome, is both mediated (by the
Phenomenology) and immediate (because the Phenomenology as mediation is radically self-
sublating) is also in agreement with Hegel's remarks about the nature of determinate negation
(Logic: p. 54) and about beginning points generally. Concerning the latter he tells us: "What
philosophy begins with must be either mediated or immediate, and it is easy to show that it can
be neither the one nor the other; thus either way of beginning is refuted." "[T]here is nothing,
nothing in heaven or in nature or mind or anywhere else which does not equally contain both
immediacy and mediation, so that these two determinations reveal themselves to be
unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them to be a nullity" (Logic: pp.
6768).
My contention that the Phenomenology as the introduction to science and the deduction of its
concept functions in a negative and criticalas opposed to a positive and affirmativemanner vis-
à-vis consciousness is substantiated by other remarks by Hegel in the Phenomenology and the
Logic. In the "Preface" to the Phenomenology Hegel notes the following.
The standpoint of consciousness which knows objects in their antithesis to itself, and
itself in antithesis to them, is for Science the antithesis to its own standpoint. The
situation in which consciousness knows itself to be at home is for Science one marked
by the absence of Spirit. Conversely, the element of Science is for consciousness a
remote beyond in which it no longer possesses itself. ... When natural consciousness
entrusts itself straightway to Science, it makes an attempt, induced by it knows not
what, to walk on its head too, just this once; the compulsion to assume this unwonted
posture and to go about in it is a violence it is expected to do to itself. ... It is this
coming-to-be of Science as such or knowledge that is described in the Phenomenology
of Spirit. ... This coming-to-be (considering the content and patterns it will display
therein) will not be what is commonly understood by an initiation of the unscientific
consciousness into Science; it will also be quite different from the "foundation" of
Science. ... (Phenomenology: pp. 1516)

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And in the "Introduction" to the Phenomenology, where Hegel posits consciousness as
engaged in a search for the truth by means of a self-investigation of its modes of knowing
("shapes" of consciousness) he anticipates the outcome of this project in the following
negative manner:
Natural consciousness will show itself to be only the Notion of knowledge, or in other
words, not to be real knowledge. But since it directly takes itself to be real knowledge,
this path has a negative significance for it, and what is in fact the realization of the
Notion counts for it rather as the loss of its own self; for it does lose its truth on this
path. The road can therefore be regarded as the pathway of doubt, or more precisely as
the way of despair. ... [T]his path is the conscious insight into the untruth of
phenomenal knowledge. (Phenomenology: pp. 4950)

The idea that the Phenomenology functions as introduction to science through being a
thoroughgoing and radical critique of consciousness is also substantiated by several remarks of
Hegel's in the opening sections of the Logic. He tells us: "pure science presupposes liberation
from the opposition of consciousness" (Logic: p. 49); and "the liberation from the opposition
of consciousness which the science of logic must be able to presuppose lifts the determinations
of thought above this trivial, incomplete standpoint and demands that they be considered not
with any such limitation and reference but as they are in their proper character, as logic, as
pure reason" (Logic: p. 51).
For Hegel, sciencethe attaining to an autonomous standpoint for thoughtbegins when the
subject/object distinction of consciousness is no longer taken to be paradigmatic for thought.
We have seen that this ultimate rejectionthe "liberation from the opposition of consciousness
which the science of logic must be able to presuppose"is the outcome of absolute knowing as
the deduced concept. And we have seen that it is a radical rejection, for the overcoming of the
opposition in absolute knowing does not yield some absolute consciousness or some
superpurified transcendental ego. Rather, when consciousness comes to attain its absoluteness
in absolute knowingwhen it comes to an absolute self-grounding of itself through knowing its
object as itself and itself as its objectthe determinate difference between subject and object, the
opposition of consciousness which is definitive of consciousness as a mode of knowing, is
eliminated, leaving behind only an

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unanalyzable, undifferentiated unity: pure indeterminateness. Further evidence that such an
understanding of the role and aim of the Phenomenology corresponds to or coincides with
Hegel's own self-understanding of the work is to be found in the following remarks from the
"Introduction" to the Logic.
These views on the relation of subject and object to each other express the
determinations which constitute the nature of our ordinary, phenomenal consciousness;
but when these same prejudices are carried out into the sphere of reason as if the same
relation obtained there, as if this relation were something true in its own self, then they
are errors the refutation of which throughout every part of the spiritual and natural
universe is philosophy, or rather, as they bar the entrance to philosophy, must be
discarded at its portals. (Logic: p. 45)

The task of the Phenomenology as introduction is thus to transcend the "limited standpoint" by
refuting that "prejudice"that knowing must be, in some form or another, knowing as defined by
the structure of consciousnesswhich "bar[s] the entrance to philosophy" and consequently
"must be discarded at its portals.'' It is my contention that the Phenomenology fulfills this task
in its being a consideration (by the phenomenological "we," the observers of consciousness) of
the attempt by consciousness to show that this "relation of subject and object" can be "carried
out into the sphere of reason." Consciousness in the Phenomenology attempts to show that its
structure is definitive of true knowing as such, that it is "something true in its own self," and
that it can thus be taken as the foundational principle or beginning point for philosophical
science. But, according to Hegel, when consciousness comes to the point of grounding itself as
absolute principle for philosophical science, the knowing attained and consciousness itself as
something determinate and presupposible are eliminated. Thus, the Phenomenology deduces
the concept of science negatively by showing why it is that autonomous, radically pure and
self-grounding science cannot begin with any such presupposed determinate structure or
principle. The consideration of the attempt to absolutize consciousness in the Phenomenology
shows, contrary to the traditional interpretation of that work, that consciousness is not an
absolute principle for Hegel. And it also suggestsin a manner unappreciated by those who
today argue in favor of the notion that all thought is necessarily limited owing to its
embeddedness in a perspective defined by the structure of consciousnessthat conscious-

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ness is not an absolute limit beyond which reason cannot extend. Thus, in general terms, the
Phenomenology argues both against the positive idea of consciousness as the absolute
principle for reason and against the contemporary negative idea of consciousness as an
absolute limiting condition for reason.
<><><><><><><><><><><><>
Two central difficulties confront interpreters of the Phenomenology: deciphering how it can
have an argument, and how it can possibly function as an introduction to systematic science
without presupposing science. In Chapter 3 I have suggested that both problems can be solved
if we see the function of the Phenomenology as immanently critical and its outcome as
negative. In presenting this way of reading the Phenomenology, I have turned to Hegel's
comments about that work in its role as the introduction to his system to argue against the
received view which holds that Hegel is a committed foundationalist who wrote the
Phenomenology to establish an absolute self-consciousness as the foundation for the system.
Indicating that the relevant texts fail to support this view, Chapter 3 argues that the
Phenomenology needs to be understood precisely as the deconstruction of such a foundational
point, as a demonstration that the subjectivist model cannot ground its foundational primacy.
Read in this way, we can understand in part how this negative outcome nonetheless functions
as an introductory mediation for a self-grounding, presuppositionless system through its
elimination of consciousness as a foundational structure. It shows why philosophy cannot have
any external grounding, any beginning in a given, determinate foundation.
While Chapter 3 stresses the negative, antifoundational nature of the Phenomenology, Chapter
4, "Beginning Philosophy Without 'Beginnings,'" takes up the positive side of this negative
outcome. It addresses the question of how the subjectivist model instantiated by consciousness
can be seen as definitive of foundationalism, and it further explains why the suspension of
consciousness effected by the Phenomenology makes possible the Logic's constitution of
categories as a procedure of radical self-determination. Thus an important step is taken in
disclosing how the Hegelian critique of foundationalism nonetheless makes possible a
realization of philosophy's traditional search for a presuppositionless discourse.

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Chapter 4
Beginning Philosophy without 'Beginnings'
In no science is the need to begin with the subject matter itself, without preliminary
reflections, felt more strongly than in the science of logic.
Hegel

Understanding Hegel's Logic is crucial to any systematic endeavor to understand this most
systematic of philosophers. If we are to consider seriously Hegel's claim to have established
philosophy as science we cannot avoid a confrontation with the Logic. It is in the Logic that
the scientific status and nature of the system are first established and elucidated; it is to this
work that Hegel refers us when questions about the scientific character of rest of the system
arise. 1
But if the importance of the Logic is not in question, the same cannot be said about the work
itself. Since shortly after its appearance, the Logic has been subject not only to a variety of
interpretations but also to numerous critical attacks directed against its argumentative claims
and its putatively scientific status.2 Given its central role in the system, it is not unreasonable
to contend that insofar as the Logic remains problematic, so too does the whole of Hegel's
mature systematic philosophy.
In what follows I shall suggest a way of answering what are certainly the most immediate, and
arguably the most crucial, interpretive and critical questions about the Logic, those concerning
its beginning. But first I want to explain and defend my claim that it is the issue of the
beginning of the Logic which deserves special

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attention. In so doing I shall also introduce the specific issues of Logic interpretation and critique that I
plan to tackle.
For students of the Logic, the issue of its beginning takes prioritywe most definitely need to begin at the
beginningfor at least three reasons:
According to Hegel, the salient distinguishing feature of systematic philosophy as science is its claim
to rationally autonomous self-constitution or self-determination. The hallmark of the system's
(1)scientific character is the strict immanency of its genesis and development, its freedom from external
determination in the constitution of its categories. 3 And as Hegel acknowledges, a claim to such
autonomy and immanence can be supported only insofar as the system has, in some sense, a
beginning which is itself devoid of external determination, to wit, a presuppositionless beginning.4
But as Hegel also notes, the very possibility of such a beginning is questionable:
... We can assume nothing and assert nothing dogmatically; nor can we accept the assertions
and assumptions of others. And yet we must make a beginning: and a beginning, as primary
and underived, makes an assumption, or rather is an assumption. It seems as if it were
impossible to make a beginning at all. (Encyclopedia Logic: Paragraph 1, p. 3)
Thus, Hegel's larger claims about the distinctively scientific character of the system and his own
views on the problem of making the kind of beginning the system requires focus our attention on the
beginning of that work which begins the system proper. Understanding the overall scientific character
of the system as self-constitutive requires us to confront the question of how a presuppositionless
beginning can be made when any beginning seems to involve a presupposition.
(2)If the general question of how a presuppositionless science is to make its beginning were not enough
to draw our attention to the opening of the Logic, the perplexing character of what Hegel has to say in
the Logic about is beginning should give us pause. At the start of the Logic, Hegel tells us that it
begins without presuppositions, and that it presupposes the Phenomenology of Spirit (Logic: pp. 70,
48, 60, 68). He tells us that the concept of science set forth in the Logic cannot be in any way
predetermined, and that the Phenomenology is the deduction of this concept (Logic: pp. 43, 50, 6869).
Thus, an understanding of the beginning of the Logic is additionally crucial, for unless we can find a
way to reconcile the

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seemingly contradictory character of these claims, any further interpretative conclusions about the
meaning and the status of the Logic must remain in suspension.
(3)Last, there is the problematic character of the actual opening section of the Logic itself. Some of
Hegel's earliest and most recent critics have contended that the character of the Logic's opening
development violates the strictures concerning immanency laid down by Hegel. Dieter Henrich has
specifically argued that the movement from being through nothing to becoming can only be rendered
intelligible insofar as externally reflective operations are brought to bear. 5 If this is in fact the case,
then Hegel can only be judged as having failed to meet his own specific demands and assurances
concerning the immanent character of the opening development of the Logic (Logic: p. 43). And if
these demands are not met here, then the scientific character of the Logic as a whole and of the
system is called seriously into question simply because the claim to immanent self-constitution is
inseparable from the system's claim to be science.6

I wish to suggest that we can resolve the first and the third issues by first tackling the second, by finding
a way of reconciling Hegel's seemingly conflicting claims about the Phenomenology as the
presupposition for a presuppositionless science. I shall now turn specifically to that issue.

I.
The Problem of Beginning and the Idea of Self-Sublation
If we are not to dismiss Hegel immediately on the grounds that he engages in blatant self-contradiction
when he claims that the Logic has no presuppositions and that it presupposes the Phenomenology we
need to try to reconcile these claims by finding a way of distinguishing between the sense in which the
Phenomenology is, and the sense in which it is not a presupposition for that work. I am going to argue
that these senses can be sorted out if we can first make sense of Hegel's crucial claim that the
Phenomenology is a self-sublating mediation for the logical science.7
How might the idea of a self-sublating mediation help us, and how might the Phenomenology be
understood as just such a creature? The notion of a self-sublating mediation may enable us to reconcile
the seemingly contradictory claims if we understand a self-sublating mediation as a mediationa
presuppositionwhose own elimination is just that which is 'presupposed' for the beginning of science.
Then what the science presupposes is just the

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elimination of a presupposition. (So the science is presuppositionless in that it is made possible
by the elimination of a presupposition, but begins with a presupposition in the sense that just
this elimination is presupposed).
Before I proceed any further let me mention three questions which obviously arise at this
juncture and which must be confronted. (1) What sort of a presupposition could be conceived
as self-eliminating? (2) What sort of a presupposition might it be whose elimination would be
relevant to a presuppositionless, self-determining science? (3) Even supposing that such a self-
elimination could be effected, would not the science arising out of the elimination of this
presupposition be only relatively presuppositionless? That is, would we not have to say that
such a science might be presuppositionless relative to the presupposition eliminated, but not
thoroughly presuppositionless? Clearly, the latter sense of presuppositionlessness is crucial to
Hegel's notion of a radically self-determining science. In moving now to suggest how the
Phenomenology may be understood as a self-sublating mediation, I'll be addressing these
questions and also suggesting that the answers to the first and the second provide the grounds
for dealing with the difficulty raised in the third. Following this I shall conclude with a
consideration of how the problems Henrich raises may also be met through a proper
understanding of the Phenomenology as a self-sublating mediation.

II.
Understanding the Phenomenology as Self-Sublating Mediation
We can understand the Phenomenology as a self-sublating mediation if we can appreciate how
two conditions are met. First, its outcome must be radically negative in the sense that what is
presupposed for the work's argument is negated in and by its outcome. Second, this sublation
or negation must be immanently constituted: not externally imposed but engendered by the
very subject matter introducedpresupposedat the start. Put generally, we can understand the
Phenomenology as a self-sublating mediation if it can be seen as beginning with a determinate
thesis and culminating in its self-elimination.
Now, it is my contention that these two conditions for a self-sublating mediation can be met,
and in such a way that the sublation in question is relevant for the beginning of a
presuppositionless science just insofar as the topic of the Phenomenology is a thesisa

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presuppositionabout how to begin philosophical science. For, if the subject matter of the
Phenomenology is a thesis about how to begin science, and if its outcome is a self-constituted
rejection of this way of beginning, then perhaps, through this negative procedure of
elimination the correct way of beginning science will have been made possible without being
predetermined. To anticipate further, how then might looking at the Phenomenology as the self
-elimination of a presupposition about how science is to begin enable us to resolve the
apparently contradictory notion of a presuppositionless science having a presupposition by
clarifying two different but related senses of presupposition? What is the specific
presupposition about beginning science which comes to be eliminated by the Phenomenology
and how is it relevant to the beginning of presuppositionless science? I want to answer these
questions provisionally by outlining my reading of the Phenomenology as a self-sublating
mediation. I shall then move to fill in the details.
The way of introducing I am sketching might be seen as constituting a presupposition for
science in the sense that what science is seen to presuppose is a negative ground clearing: The
Phenomenology shows that science presupposesin the first sense of 'has as a preliminary or a
prerequisite'the elimination of a significant but erroneous notion concerning how science is to
begin. At the same time though, this would not be a presupposition in the second sense of the
term, the sense Hegel aims to avoid: Where a presupposition constitutes an external or a
predetermination of the science (Logic: pp. 69, 43). More particularly, just this latter sense of
presupposingas predeterminingcould be avoided if the Phenomenology's negative function is
more specifically one of eliminating just that whichsomehowprevents science from
constituting or determining itself.
So, as regards the question previously raised about the seemingly relative character of a
science which begins through the elimination of some presupposition: To stand as a
presupposition for a presuppositionless science, the Phenomenology must not only function as
the self-elimination of a presupposition about how science is to begin, it must also be the self-
elimination of that presupposition about science which denies or precludes the possibility of a
presuppositionless (self-determining) science. That is, the self-sublating mediation constituted
by the Phenomenology can be seen as relevant to the beginning of a presuppositionless science
if the presupposition about beginning science which the Phenomenology eliminates can be
understood as that very notion about science

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which itself precludes the possibility of self-constitutive, autonomous science.
What I am suggesting is that the particular presupposition in the Phenomenology concerning
how science is to begin which turns out to be self-eliminating, and which is relevant to the
beginning of presuppositionless science, is a notion about the nature of cognition in general. In
other words, it is a notion about what science must begin with which denies the possibility of
autonomous science by holding that all cognition is ineluctably other-determined or
predetermined. More specifically, the understanding of cognition which embodies this notion
is just the view that regards the manner in which consciousness cognizes objects as definitive
of all cognition. For, according to this view (viz., the view that consciousness' mode of
cognition can be presupposed for science) all cognition is always predetermined because all
cognition is always cognition of that which is always already minimally determinate in virtue
of being a given object for an awareness. Now, if this notion as to why it is that science cannot
begin without presuppositions can be shown to be self-defeatingif it can be shown that
consciousness cannot establish itself as exclusively definitive of cognitive possibilitiesthen, I
submit, we can make sense of the idea that just this elimination is a 'presupposition' for a
presuppositionless science. For this elimination will have shown that the understanding of
cognition which purports to specify why a presuppositionless (self-determining) science is
impossible, is arbitrary. And by having carried out this minimal and negative function the
'presupposition' in questionthe Phenomenology as a wholewill have made a presuppositionless
science possible without having determined anything in it and will thus be a presupposition (in
the first sense) for a presuppositionless science (in the second sense).
So much by way of anticipation. How can these views be fleshed out and substantiated? Hegel
points us in the direction of the view I am proposingthat the suspension of consciousness as a
model for scientific cognition is what his science presupposesat various places (Logic: pp. 49,
51, 60). To quote only one, he writes in the Logic:
... These views on the relation of subject and object to each other expresses the
determinations which constitute the nature of our ordinary, phenomenal consciousness;
but when these prejudices are carried out into the sphere of reason as if the same
relation obtained there, as if this relation were something true in its own right, then
they are errors the refu-

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tation of which throughout every part of the spiritual and natural universe is
philosophy, or rather, as they bar the entrance to philosophy, must be discarded at its
portals (Logic: p. 45).

What Hegel is referring to here as that whose refutation is a prerequisite for science is what he
refers to in the Introduction to the Phenomenology as the "natural assumption ... in
philosophy" (Phenomenology: p. 46). This is the foundational assumption, or presupposition,
found in Descartes and throughout modern philosophy. It asserts that the beginning of science
can be effected in and through a self-investigation by consciousness of the conditions of its
cognition, a self-investigation which will allegedly culminate in the clarification and
legitimation by consciousness of some specific features of its cognitive structure as definitive
of scientific cognition. I have argued at length elsewhere for the interpretive claim that the
Phenomenology, as the introduction to science, is nothing other than a thinking through of this
foundational self-investigationa thinking through of the claim that science must begin with
consciousness. 8 So, I will now turn to the issue of just how the culmination of consciousness'
self-investigation comprises a mediation which sublates itself and makes science possible.

III.
Self-Sublation and Its Consequences
Hegel anticipates the negative outcome of the Phenomenology in the Preface and Introduction
to the work, and he refers to it specifically in the Logic, as the deduced concept of science,
when he points to the collapse of consciousness' own structure as resulting in the immediacy
with which the Logic begins (Phenomenology: pp. 1516, 4950; Logic: pp. 49, 51, 6869). How
can that collapse be understood as the result of the thinking through of an attempt at
vindicating the presupposition that it is in and through such a self-investigation that science
must begin? More important, how can the self-refutation of just this presupposition
specifically be connected to the possibility of a presuppositionless beginning?
The outcome of the Phenomenology as the collapse of consciousness' structure and the self-
induced suspension of what is presupposed for us to follow through the development to this
culmination can be understood, although not demonstrated, insofar as we consider what would
be required for consciousness to successfully prove that its own structure is definitive of
cognition.9

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Minimally what consciousness must do to succeed in demonstrating the legitimacy of its mode
of cognitionand the necessity of presupposing consciousness in and for scienceis to come to
the point of being able to simultaneously identify and differentiate knowledge and object. Only
at that point can correspondencethe notion of knowledge inseparable from consciousnessbe
demonstrated as attainable. 10 But as Hegel shows at length in Chapter VIII, and as he
recapitulates in the Logic, at the very moment when consciousness attains to such self-
grounding, it is at once the self-induced dissolution of the fixed opposition between subject
and object minimally constitutive of consciousness as such.11 So, in grounding itself as that
which must be presupposed for scientific cognition, consciousness suspends its determinate
character and thereby eliminates itself as a candidate for scientific cognition. For the
simultaneous identification and differentiation of knowledge and object required to
demonstrate correspondence, and thus to vindicate consciousness, is a state of affairs in which
the fixed opposition definitive of consciousness as a cognitive structure renders itself into
indeterminacy. Thus, we see that the attempt to vindicate the presupposition that science can
begin with a preliminary investigation of cognition culminating in a determinate principle for
scientific cognition culminates rather in the self-refutation of this presupposition about how
science is to begin, for consciousness cannot attain the position of grounding its own structure
without simultaneously sublating it.
How does this very culmination make a presuppositionless science possible? The self-
refutation in question is specifically relevant for the beginning of a presuppositionless science
because what has shown itself in the Phenomenology to be an illicit presupposition is not just
any presupposition about cognition; rather, it is that very assumption about cognition
according to which all cognition must begin with a predetermined (given) determination. Thus,
the relevance of the elimination of consciousnessthe importance of the Phenomenology as
presuppositionlies in the fact that consciousness instantiates that very conception of cognition
which specifically holds that all cognition must begin with a presupposition, and which
purports to be able to show why this must be the case. Understood according to or in terms of
consciousness, knowing is always, minimally and irreducibly, knowledge of an object:
something which is always already given in its determinate character, even if only in the
minimal sense of being present to awareness. According to consciousness, determinacy is
always ineluctably pre-

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determined. Thus, in asserting its own scientific character, consciousness claimed that
cognition without presuppositions is impossible, because it held that its mode of cognitionfor
which some determination always is presupposed in always being givenis definitive of
science.
So, given what consciousness instantiates, we can see that its suspension is specifically,
indeed, preeminently relevant to the beginning of presuppositionless science. Hegel's science
can make a claim to being more than just relatively presuppositionless because the suspension
of consciousness is the suspension of nothing other than the structure of presupposing itself.
To eliminate or suspend consciousness as a presupposition concerning science is to eliminate
the structure of presupposing, for this suspension reveals as a prejudice and dismisses from
scientific contention that view which holds that radical self-determination is impossible. Put
differently, this elimination thoroughly undermines the authority of that view which holds that
any determination of determinacy must involve some predetermination. In the latest jargon:
this elimination deconstructs the fashionable postmodernist claim that all discourse is
irreducibly constrained by contextuality.
In claiming to be the constitutive principle for philosophically scientific cognition,
consciousness asserted the denial of the possibility of autonomous science (it asserted the
supremacy of heteronomous contextuality) in a twofold way. First, by asserting its scientific
primacy consciousness held that it (consciousness) must be presupposed for science. Second,
given what it is as a cognitive structure, consciousness also denied the possibility of
autonomous science by insisting that anything science comes to consider will itself involve a
presuppositiona presupposed determinacybecause anything science considers must always
already have the minimally determinate character of being an object. Thus, by articulating the
self-sublation of the structure of presupposing itself, the Phenomenology renders the nature of
presupposing perspicuous while revealing that the purported necessity of presupposing is itself
non-demonstrable. For by showing how the demonstration of this necessity is at once the
suspension of the (presupposed) structure in question, the Phenomenology reveals that in the
last analysis this purported necessity cannot be anything other than an arbitrary assumption
about cognition. Simultaneously, it shows how we can suspend that perspective according to
which presupposing is necessary and unavoidable. For we come to see in a fundamental sense
what presupposing minimally involves, and we come to

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discover that, and why, this manner of conceiving cognition need no longer be taken for
granted as exclusively determinative of cognitive possibilities.
If this indicates in a general way how a presuppositionless science may be said to have a
presupposition (in that it presupposes the self-elimination of the structure of presupposing)
what can be said more concretely about this? How does the Phenomenology's negative
outcome nonetheless, and in its very negativity, function positively in regard to the beginning
of a presuppositionless science? For one thing, in seeing that this presupposition eliminates
itself, we (the observers of consciousness) come to see that a presuppositionlessradically self-
determining or autonomous sciencemay be possible. It is important to note that nothing other
than the possibility of such a science 12 can be or is provided for in the Phenomenology as a
self-sublating presupposition for a presuppositionless science. The elimination of the structure
of presupposing cannot itself constitute (in any determinate fashion) or require the beginning
of presuppositionless scienceif it did, this would be a predetermination and a heteronomous
beginning. Nor can this suspension guarantee that the attempt to ''take up what is there before
us" (Logic: p. 69)the indeterminacy resulting from the collapse of consciousnesswill proceed
in such a fashion that no external (pre)determinations will enter in. For any such guarantees for
what purports to be a radically presuppositionless science could only be predeterminations
themselves and, in any case, nothing determinate remains from what was presupposed in the
Phenomenology to provide them. At this juncture, we might "resolve" "to consider thought as
such" (Logic: p. 70), having been disabused of the preconception about cognition which seems
to preclude such an endeavor. But as Hegel notes (Logic: pp. 6970), nothing necessitates this
move; it can be regarded as "arbitrary."
In addition to pointing to the general possibility of a presuppositionless science, the collapse of
consciousness as the collapse of the structure of predetermination has indicated with what a
presuppositionless science must begin: with nothing determinate whatsoever, i.e., with sheer
indeterminacy (Logic: pp. 6870). The self-induced collapse of consciousness (the structure of
predetermination) at the moment of grounding the view that all considerations of determinacy
must begin with a predetermination yields indeterminacy as the sole beginning point for
science. Because indeterminacy results from the Phenomenology, it is part of the sense (the
first) in which the Logic has a presupposition. But the beginning with indeterminacy does not
obviate either the

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radically negative outcome of this self-sublating mediation or the crucial sense (the second) in
which the Logic may be said to begin without presuppositions. For that which was
presupposed in and for the Phenomenologyconsciousness and its projectwas something
determinate, and in its rendering itself into indeterminacy nothing has been left behind as a
referable object, that is, as something determinate which could function predeterminatively in
the science. (How then determinacy arises out of indeterminacy is another matter.) 13
Beyond these ways in which a presuppositionless science is made possible, the self-sublating
mediation also shows us what it is that cannot be presupposed if such a presuppositionless
science is to emerge from the consideration of indeterminacy. What cannot be presupposed is
the notion that all determinacy is, and must be, minimally determinate in virtue of being
regarded as an object for consciousness. This means that we know minimally how not to
proceed if we make the resolve to think the indeterminate purely, as just what it is. We know
that it cannot be done in the manner of consciousness. However, to know this is not a
presupposition, simply because this negative knowledge is not necessary for science. This
negative outcome does not constitute a predetermined method. For the negative knowledge is
only vital for those who may happen to be in the habit of regarding consciousness' mode of
condition as self-evidently definitive of all cognition, and are thus in need of being disabused
of this notion. The fact that this habit is common throughout the history of Western
philosophythat in an important sense it constitutes this historydoes not obviate my point. I will
have something more to say about this in speaking to Henrich's objections.
In this waywithout predetermining how the autonomous science will constitute itself (its
'method'), and without predetermining what it will constitute (its determinate content)the
Phenomenology functions as a presupposition for a presuppositionless science. The Logic has
a presupposition in the sense that the Phenomenology comes before and does something that,
historically, needs to be done: it eliminates from scientific purview the notion of cognition
according to which cognizing must involve presupposing. The Logic does not have a
presupposition in the sense Hegel claims it does not: its method, content, and scientific
character are not predetermined just because what has come before (the Logic's
presupposition) has made possible a consideration free of such predetermining by articulating
the self-elimination of the structure of predetermining.

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IV.
Henrich's Objections
We can also see how understanding the Phenomenology as a self-sublating mediation makes it
possible to meet the criticisms against the strict immanency of the opening of the Logic which
Dieter Henrich raises in his famous essay, "Anfang und Methode der Logik."
For Henrich, there is no question that the movement from being to nothing to becoming stands
in need of a reconstructiveexternal"proof" (p. 88). In fact, Henrich contends that we need to
differentiate "the science of logic" from the "process of its logical thought-determinacies" and
that the "science'' only unfolds in a "retrospective grounding" which amounts to a
"metalogic" (pp. 9293). In respect to the beginning of the logic in particular, Henrich's claim is
that the "logic of pure Being can only be explicated in general by a negative method [nur via
negationis]" (p. 80). More specifically, this negative method consists in the negation
[Aufhebung] of categories of reflection. When Hegel characterizes pure Being as the
indeterminate immediate this shows the exclusion of reflection: "Thus immediacy is the
negation of mediation and thus is as such mediated and determined through this concept" (p.
85). This shows that the "source" of the thought of immediacy is "transposed" [verstellt] to the
logic of reflection. The upshot: "If ... the nature of 'pure Being' can only be brought into view
via negationis then the beginning of the Logic cannot be satisfactorily understood on its own
terms." And, Henrich contends, Hegel "does not give us any other method [save via
negationis] to explicate the thought of Being" (p. 86).
In fact then, Henrich presents a twofold critique. In addition to denying that the beginning of
the logic of being can be understood without recourse to external reflectionin this instance,
without recourse to the logic of reflectionhe contends generally against Hegel that form and
content are distinct in this work, 14 that that which makes it possible to explicate or ground or
prove the argument lies outside of the development itself.
Both of these objections can be met just insofar as we have properly understood the nature of
the Phenomenology as a self-sublating mediation.15 As we saw, one dimension of that work's
conclusion is to effect a negative lesson for anyone who would attempt to do science. We have
learned that consciousness' mode of thought is precisely what is to be avoided for science.
Whatever else a pure constitution or consideration of determinacy amounts to, it cannot be
conducted in that manner.16

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How does this relate to Henrich's claims about a via negationis, a reflective method? The
connection comes into focus when one appreciates that it is just the structure of consciousness
which can be alternatively described as the structure of reflection. What we find embodied in
consciousness is a mode of conceiving determinacy in terms of a fixed relation of contrast or
opposition. With consciousness determinacy is always minimally determinate in virtue of not
being the other: the object is always minimally determinate as an object in virtue of not being
awareness. Thus, consciousness is a structure whereby determinacy emerges out of a reflexive
relation of opposition. Stripped of all other psychological and transcendental accountrements,
consciousness is the structure of mediation or of reflection. And if we focus on consciousness
as minimally determining the determinacy of its object in virtue of the object's being an
objecta Gegen-stand [that which stands over against]them what we have with pure
consciousness is the structure of constituting determinacy via reflection: through a process of
relating which establishes determinacy by means of a distinguishing in which what is, is as
'other than' while yet 'for.' With consciousness, determinacy emerges via mediation. And just
this structure collapses in pure knowing. So what Henrich sees as illicitly involved in the logic
of beingthe negation or exclusion of reflection or mediationcan be said to have come about
licitly through the Phenomenology in its role as the consummate suspension of this structure.
For the Phenomenology's outcome in the collapse of consciousness not only establishes that
whatever is to be thought purely (without presuppositions) is not to be thought in the manner
of reflection, it also showsin the way that Henrich's ad hoc via negationis cannotwhy
reflection is to be excluded. When seen from this perspective, Henrich's discovery of a need
for the exclusion of reflection from the logic of being no longer amounts to a critique.
Unbeknownst to Henrich, his analysis reinforces the preparatory role Hegel assigned to the
Phenomenology.
How, more specifically, is Henrich's attack deflated? Henrich contends that the
characterization of pure Being offered by Hegel and needed to make sense of the transition to
nothingBeing's character as indeterminate immediacymarks a negation of reflection and
mediation and thus an illicit appeal to a later stage of the Logic. But it is easy to see that this
characterization as negation of mediation or reflection is just the outcome of the collapse of
consciousness. 17 Insofar as we take into account pure Being as the outcome of absolute
knowing it immanently (legitimately) appears as the negation of the structure of
reflectionwhich is to say, no

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longer as a determinate mediating structure but as indeterminate immediacy. 18
Last, what about Henrich's larger critical claim, that the Logic is in fact only interpretable on
the basis of a metalogic, which, if correct, would mean, against Hegel, that there is a
distinction here between method and content? Such a reconstruction is only necessary as
external and as destroying immanence insofar as we fail to see that the via negationis comes
about through the self-sublating mediation. If we have followed the Phenomenology and
understood the collapse of the structure of reflection, then we would not be predisposed to
introduce the reflective approach to constituting determinacy into our thinking, and hence
would not be in need of any metalogic which, according to Henrich, must be present to inform
us what to do. An external, immanency-compromising via negationis as the method or
metalogic of the Logic is needed only if we have failed to follow just that path Hegel offers to
philosophical science.
So, if the Phenomenology is properly understood as self-sublating mediation, then we can say
that Hegel has made a reasonable claim to having founded the kind of systematic philosophical
science he sought: one which may offer us a system of autonomous reason in virtue of a
beginning devoid of predetermining presuppositions. If this is the case, we can also suggest
that further efforts to understand Hegel's system on its own terms are worthwhile, especially in
an age in which many agree with Hegel in rejecting the primacy of consciousness but in
which, unlike him, few offer anything as an alternative to the philosophy of consciousness
save for what he prophetically decried in his own time as pious edification.
<><><><><><><><><><><><>
I have argued in Chapter 4 that making sense of Hegel's system as a philosophical science
presupposes understanding the Logic, and that the most crucial interpretive problems and the
most telling criticisms of that work can be met if we adoptand continue to developthe
antifoundational approach to Hegel initiated in earlier chapters. By so doing we can begin to
vindicate the crucial Hegelian claim about the nature of systematic philosophy: its self-
grounding, self-determinative, presuppositionless or autonomous character. Insofar as the
Phenomenology has functioned to critique foundationalism by showing that the subjectivist
model of cognition cannot be legitimated, it also makes possiblemediatesa presuppositionless,
self-grounding science, since it is just the sub-

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jectivist foundational model that holds that cognition must be construed as always grounded in
a givenpresupposeddeterminacy. If the Phenomenology is right and this model cannot be
legitimated as exclusively determinative of all possible thought, we have no basis for
presupposing that a presuppositionless discourse cannot be achieved. Chapter 4 has also
indicated something of a more positive nature about systematic philosophy, showing how we
can not only appreciate, but also begin to actualize it possibility. The antifoundational outcome
of the Phenomenology discloses the argumentative force of the Logic: the transitions Hegel
lays out in the work can be seen as radically self-generated precisely if we do what the
Phenomenology requires: Suspend our predilection to think in subjectivist terms and refuse to
construe any determinacy as necessarily already given, predetermined. Just when we resist the
temptation to do this we can engage in autonomous reasoning, in a consideration of the nature
of determinacy which is radically self-determining in the sense that no external, no already
given, presupposed determinacy enters in. And as self-determined, the discourse which ensues
would also be self-grounding: what comes to be established would have its determinate
character exclusively generated in the discourse and would need no further grounding.
In this way, Chapter 4 has linked the Hegelian critique of foundationalism with the vindication
of one of philosophy's and foundationalism's goals: the establishment of a discourse which can
give a full account of itself in that it is autonomous: what is asserted in it depends in its
determinate character on nothing beyond itself. Thus, my earlier claims concerning Hegel's
development of a philosophy which does justice to features of both foundationalism and
antifoundationalism, while succumbing to the pitfalls of neither, have been further articulated.
As I shall continue to reveal in subsequent chapters, reading Hegel as an antifoundationalist
does not require us to impose a radically anachronistic interpretation which renounces Hegel's
substantive claims about his system; it merely requires that we rethink the nature of these
claims and the manner of their fulfillment. The picture of the "whole Hegel" promised in
Chapter 1 continues to take on form and color.
Chapter 5, "Philosophy and Dialectical Method," addresses in greater detail some issues and
claims raised in earlier chapters, and also further develops the positive, antifoundational
reading of Hegel's system which those chapters have laid the groundwork for. I have
contended that the Phenomenology functions as an immanent critique of the subjectivist model
of cognition and that it culminates in this model's self-suspension. Chapter 5 works to further

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substantiate this reading by considering the nature and function of the dialectic in the
Phenomenology. I have also asserted previously that Hegel's system needs to be rethought as
nonmetaphysical and nonidealist, contending that while this system fulfills some of
philosophy's traditional goals, it does so in a unique fashion which avoids some of the most
serious contemporary criticisms of traditional philosophy. Chapter 5's overview of the
argumentative character of the Logic and of the remainder of the system is designed to explain
how this rethinking of Hegel is possible. All of these themes are brought together in this
chapter's attempt to sort out the nature of Hegel's notorious dialectical method at various
places in the system. (A theme addressed again, in relation to Marx, in Chapter 8.)

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Chapter 5
Philosophy and Dialectical Method
With the truth so dull and depressing, the only alternative is wild bursts of madness and
filigree.
Hunter S. Thompson

The notion of dialectics is perhaps as old as the idea or practice of philosophy itself. It did not
originate with Hegel, but if he has contributed something both original and significant to it,
this can be seen to lie, I believe, in his conception of a systematic dialectic. I am going to try to
explicate what systematic dialectic means for him by focusing on the question: Does Hegel
have a dialectical method? I shall proceed in this manner because I feel that it is crucial to an
understanding of what Hegel means by 'dialectic' and by 'dialectical philosophy' to see both
why and how it is that he does not have a dialectical method.
I shall try to show, by examining Hegel's sense of dialectic, that he does not have a dialectical
method insofar as one uses the term 'method' in its traditional philosophical sense. That is,
taking 'method' to denote a specific and specifiable set of rules of procedure as operational or
cognitive principles for the consideration of a given subject matter. Insofar as method is that
which caneven if only in principlebe justified, formulated or learned in abstraction from the
subject matter to which it is to be applied, Hegel does not have a method. Insofar as 'method' is
taken to be a significant term only in and through a contrast with some content for which the
method is designed and to which it is applied, Hegel does not have a method. Insofar as a
method constitutes a given

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or theoretically derivable principle or set of principles in terms of which a subject matter is
thought or considered, Hegel does not have a method. Insofar as one can speak of there being,
in the sense just outlined, a phenomenological method, a scientific method, a transcendental
method, an analytical method, a speculative method and so on, Hegel does not have a method.
1

What I take to be the absence of any methoddialectical or otherwisein this traditional sense in
Hegel's philosophy does not indicate however that we cannot talk meaningfully about the issue
of method in regard to his philosophical project. In fact, I hope that looking at Hegel in terms
of the question of method will be a good method for illuminating what is significant, unusual
and perhaps unique in his philosophy.
I shall consider the absence of method and the question of Hegel's understanding of dialectic
in terms of the three major divisions of his philosophy. These divisions correspond to three of
the four books he published: the Phenomenology of Spirit of 1807, the Science of Logic, and
the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. I shall attempt to isolate and consider as
briefly as possible three different senses or understandings of dialectic to be found in each of
these works: (1) In the Phenomenology: the dialectic of consciousness, or immanently critical
dialectic; (2) in the Science of Logic: the dialectic of pure thought as such; (3) in the
Encyclopedia: the dialectic of real philosophy.
Taken in their interconnection, and as a whole, these three dialectics constitute what I call
Hegel's systematic dialectic. For each division or book, I shall attempt to explicate how each
dialectic is peculiar or immanent to the subject matter. I shall also try to indicate how each
dialectic operates, how each differs from the other and how eachtaken in sequencedevelops
from or arises out of the other. In attempting to do all of this I shall at the same time be
focusing on my contention that Hegel does not have a 'dialectical method.'

I.
The Phenomenology of 1807: The Dialectic of Consciousness or Immanently Critical Dialectic
Hegel's consideration of method in regard to the Phenomenology, the presentation of what we
might provisionally call his phenomenological method, is to be found in the Introduction to
that

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work. 2 To sum up what he says on our topic there: The dialectical-phenomenological method
of the Phenomenology is no method at all. This is the case according to him because the
standpoint or position from which the phenomenologists consider their topic, consciousness, is
one of "reine zusehen": pure looking on or pure observation.3 Looked at from the point of
view of dialectic, what Hegel contends is that the dialectic found in the Phenomenology does
not consist in a method of consideration. Rather, he holds, it is a dialectic in or of the subject
matter itself: consciousness.4 The 'method' of the Phenomenology, according to Hegel,
consists finally in the fact that the phenomenologists, the on-lookers, neither have nor are in
need of a method.5 In other words, Hegel's claim is that it is just because consciousness is a
self-determining self-constituting subject matter, that the observers of consciousness are in
need of no 'method.'
If the alleged absence of method here means "pure observation," how is this possible? What
does Hegel say to support his contention of a "pure observation?" Is it nothing more than a
bold and unsupported claim to philosophically intuitive omniscience? A claim on Hegel's part,
that is, to be in possession of a mode of 'absolute knowing' as an absolute method? Or is this
standpoint of pure observation the result of a theoretically sophisticated preliminary reflection
consisting in something like the epoches and reductions of contemporary phenomenology?6 I
think it is neither of these, although it bears far more resemblance to the latter than to the
former. What then legitimates the claim that the phenomenologists do nothing, have no
method?7
Hegel holds that the phenomenologists can sit back and observe because the dialectic of the
Phenomenology, its manner and course of development, is not something distinct from its
subject matter, consciousness. The phenomenologists need not do anything in the way of an
application of criteria, a judging of the subject matter because consciousness, he claims, in and
of itself generates a "sequence of shapes" of itself.8 In short, what Hegel is maintaining is that
we find a self-determining subject matter in the Phenomenology. We shall see that what this
means for him is the following: That consciousness, as defined or presented, contains within
itself a criterion or standard, and that consciousness' attempt to demonstrate the unconditional
validity of its standard brings consciousness through a self-determined sequence of shapes of
itself which are constituted through the critical self-application of the standard.9

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But what then does this mean, and how is this self-constitutive or self-determinative process supposed to
work? What is consciousness' standard and how does consciousness come to apply it to itself?
According to Hegel, our phenomenological object is not merely or simply consciousness, but
consciousness as a knower. 10 Furthermore, our object is that knowing consciousness which has been
posited as engaged in a particular task or project. Our object hereconsciousness as knoweris an epistemic
structure which is engaged in the attempt to arrive at, to determine and demonstrate, the unconditional
truth of its mode of knowing. To show, that is, that its manner of cognition is definitive of science.11
According to Hegel, such a subject matter, as posited, will enable us to engage in sheer observation for
two reasons:
Consciousness as consciousnessas an entity which is what it is in being an 'awareness of' something
other than itselfprovides according to Hegel both a standard (or structure) of knowledge and a
(1)criterion of true knowledge or true knowing.12 Consciousness, just in being consciousness, is
minimally and irreducibly an awareness or consciousness of something other than or distinguishable
from itself as awarenesssome object. Thus, consciousness in and of itself, Hegel holds, contains or
manifests a claim concerning what true knowledge or true knowing consists in: 'Knowledge,'
according to consciousness, is the knowledge of an object; and 'true knowing,' according to
consciousness, consists in the knowing of an object as this object is "in-itself," outside of or over
against consciousness as the knower of it. Hegel's point is that because consciousness also gives a
criterion of true knowing, the phenomenologists will not need to bring in any criteria of their own in
considering consciousness.13
(2)This fact however is clearly not enough to constitute a self-determining subject matter which we need
only observe. Even if it is given by definition or posit that consciousness qua consciousness itself
determines a structure of knowing and contains a criterion of true knowledge or true knowing,
something more is required in order for Hegel to be able to hold that consciousness itself generates a
sequence of shapes, that consciousness itself is immanently dialectical or self-determining.14 The
second aspect which is required in order for the Phenomenology to have a self-determining subject
matter is also posited by Hegel in the Introduction. (Why he posits this second feature, beyond its
being required in order that the Phenomenology can have a self-determining subject matter, I shall
consider below.15 ) Hegel tells us that the consciousness which we shall consider is not merely a

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consciousness attempting to know the truth. In addition, it is a consciousness which is further concerned
with coming to establish that its own mode or structure of knowing is true and valid as such. 16 That is
to say, this particular consciousness is a consciousness which is concerned with the epistemological-
transcendental task of demonstrating that the structure of knowledge which it defines in being
consciousness is unconditionally true and valid. In this way, the consciousness in the Phenomenology is
further posited as being engaged in the task of its own self-legitimation as structure of cognition.17
Because consciousness' task is one of self-legitimation, the grounding of the validity of its mode of
knowing must be immanent, i.e., effected by consciousness itself. Only if consciousness can bring off
the job itself, by showing that it is in fact capable of attaining to knowledge of the in-itself, can it be said
that its structure of cognition is not merely presupposed as valid by or for this consciousness but is rather
valid unconditionally. In this sense the consciousness found in the Phenomenology is posited by Hegel
as demanding its own immanent self-grounding through a self-investigation, and the phenomenologists
are, according to Hegel, liberated from the tasks of supplying and applying criteria for the consideration
of this subject matter and thus can engage in the simple observation of it.18

What then is the immanent dialectic of the Phenomenology? How will the self-constituting dialectic of
the consciousness engaged in the search for its own truth, for the truth of its structure of knowledge,
operate? What specifically is the truth criterion given by consciousness? In what manner will
consciousness apply this to itself? How will this self-application come to constitute a finite series of
"shapes of consciousness," immanently generated by consciousness, which culminates in "absolute
knowing" as what Hegel calls the ''ultimate and absolute truth" of consciousness?19
What is consciousness' truth criterion? Since consciousness as consciousness is a mode of awareness
whose type of cognition consists in knowing an object which is over against itself, 'true knowing' for
(1)consciousness will consist in the correspondence or approximation of its knowledge of the object with
the object as it is in-itself. Thus consciousness' knowledge will have to be at one with, identical to the
object, in order for the knowing to be true. But at the same time this knowledge must still be a
knowledge of the object. Even as corresponding to it, the knowledge must be distinct from that which
it is the knowledge of in order for this to be a true knowing according to consciousness' own implicit
definition of knowledge. Thus, on the basis of what consciousness is as a knower, 'true

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knowing' is defined as the correspondence or identity in difference of knowledge and object. 20

(2)How does consciousness come to apply this criterion to itself, and how does this self-application
generate the dialectic of the Phenomenology in constituting a series of shapes of consciousness
culminating in "absolute knowing?" As consciousness is posited by Hegel as being engaged in the
attempt to discover that specific mode of its relation to the object which will satisfy its truth criterion,
consciousness will be engaged in the attempt not merely of knowing the object, but furthermore of
knowing its own knowing as true. Thus, consciousness will take its purportedly true knowing of the
objectthe oneness of its knowledge with the object in-itselfas a further object of knowledge in order
to determine if identity in difference is in fact manifested.21

Given this, we find then that the 'dialectical engine' of the Phenomenology, the generation of the shapes
of consciousness by consciousness itself, arises in the following way: Until consciousness comes to the
point of positing as the object in-itself nothing but its own structure of knowing, consciousness will
continually fail in its attempt to specify a relation of knowledge to object which satisfies its own truth
criterion. Surveying the Phenomenology as a whole, this means that consciousness will constitute and
run through a series of self-transformational failures"inversions of consciousness"until it attains to what
Hegel calls absolute knowing as a pure knowing of knowing.22 Why? Why is it that consciousness will
fail to find the identity in difference which it is looking for until it takes its own structure of knowing as
its object and thus is engaged in a pure knowing of knowing?
Consciousness has an idea of the object which it takes to be true, which it believes to be in full
correspondence with the object as it is in-itself. But consciousness must test this knowledge, i.e.,
compare it with the object, in order to see if it does correspond to it. Put differently, in order to test its
knowledge, consciousness must thematize its knowing, that is, it must come to focus on the relation of its
(purportedly true) knowledge to the object in itself. What this means is that in testing, consciousness
comes to make what we might call the epistemic move: It focuses automatically on its idea of the object
in-itselfits original immediate notion concerning what this object isin its status as knowledge of the
object. In order to effect the comparison, consciousness makes this knowledge of the object into an
object of knowledge. It becomes in effect a second object which will be compared with consciousness'
original idea of what the object in-itself is.

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It is in doing this that the immanent dialectic of consciousness emerges. For in testing its
knowledge consciousness comes to discover that the object qua knownits purportedly true
knowledge of the object in-itselfis, although different from what it first took the object in-itself
to be, not at the same time identical with it. This discrepancy arises from out of the very nature
of the project consciousness is engaged in because in consciousness' making its knowledge of
the object into an object of knowledge, what consciousness has to compare with the object in-
itself is not simply knowledge, not simply this idea of the in-itself, but rather the object or its
idea of the object as known once again by consciousness. It is the epistemic move, in other
words, which necessarily gives rise to the discrepancy.
So, in making its knowledge of the object into a second object in order to test this knowledge,
consciousness comes to automatically posit this, its knowledge of the objectthat which it has
necessarily come to thematize in order to make the test and what Hegel calls the "being for
consciousness of the in-itself"as the true in-itself. 23 And consciousness thus discovers in
making the comparison that what it took the object to be in-itself is not what it truly is as
known. In objectifying its original idea of the in-itself in order to test it, consciousness comes
to take thisthe in-itself as known by consciousness, or the in-itself as for consciousnessas the
true object, the true in-itself.24
Consciousness thus systematically falsifies its original idea concerning the in-itself in its in-
itselfness through the very attempt to show this idea to be true, and simultaneously produces a
new candidate for testing (and thus a new "shape of consciousness"). This developmental
processthe dialectic of consciousness whereby new notions of the object arise through
consciousness' testing of its purportedly true knowledge of the objectwill continue until
consciousness posits the structure of its own knowing of the object as the object in-itself. Only
at that point will identity in difference appear. For, when consciousness' own structure of
knowing is posited as the in-itself, then consciousness' knowledge of thisthe being for
consciousness of this in-itselfconsists in the being for consciousness of 'being for
consciousness.' Here, in consciousness' knowing of its own mode of knowing, in what Hegel
calls "absolute knowing," the identity in difference of the object as known and the object in-
itself is at last achieved. Identity is manifested here because the object in-itself and the
knowledge of it are of the same form: the form or structure of consciousness' knowing. And
yet, because both the

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object in-itself and the knowing of it are of the form of the 'knowing of,' difference is also
manifested. 25
This dialectic is immanent because both the mode of its self-development and the
criteriological or methodological principle in terms of which it takes place are given in or with
consciousnessthe subject matterwhen its task is posited as the self-legitimation of its mode of
knowing. In addition, it is an immanently critical dialectic because the final self-grounding of
consciousness' mode of knowing in absolute knowing is at the same time the dissolution of
consciousness as a structure of knowledge.26 Given the nature of consciousness as indicated
above, we can see why this must be the case. For, when knowledge and its object are at once
both simultaneously identical to and different from one another, the fixed difference between
knowledge and object which is presupposed by and definitive of consciousness is eliminated.
That is, according to the principle or understanding of knowing being grounded in it, absolute
knowing is not a knowing, just because in absolute knowing there is nothing determinate,
distinguishable and identifiable either as knowledge or as the object of knowledge. The two
poles which defined consciousness as a structure of knowledge and a principle of cognition
come in absolute knowing to be indistinguishable from one another. For in a sheer identity in
difference, nothing remains which can be said to be either identical to or different from
anything else. Thus in absolute knowing the structure in terms of which absolute knowing
subsists and is articulable as a determinate something and as a knowing eliminates itself.
Thus, in Hegel's words, absolute knowing "thereby ceases in and of itself to be a knowing" and
collapses into an "undifferentiated unity."27 And this final critical outcome of the dialectic of
consciousness is, just as the path of development which lead up to it, immanent or self-
constituting because the definitive structure or understanding of cognition violated hereand
thereby eliminated as a candidate for the absolute principal of all cognition as suchis
consciousness' own principle and not one externally imposed upon it by the phenomenologists
who observe the attempt at the self-grounding of this principle.

II.
The Science of Logic: The Dialectic of Pure Thought As Such
What is the significance of the outcome of the Phenomenologyabsolute knowing and its
collapsefor the Science of Logic? Hegel

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holds that the concept of Science with which logic begins has been "deduced" by the
Phenomenology in absolute knowing. 28 Does the Phenomenology come in absolute knowing
to deduce and determine a methodological principle for the Logic? Does the outcome of the
Phenomenology constitute the method for the Logic by yielding an operational truth criterion,
a determinate principle or structure through which the logical determinacies are determined
and in which, as the principle of their constitution, the criterion of their validity lies? If this is
the case, what are we to make of Hegel's claims: (1) that method and content are one in this
logic; (2) that neither the nature, validity nor method of logical science can be given at its
beginning but rather arise in it; (3) that the Logic has a presuppositionless beginning?29
The answer to these questionswhich might be summed up as the question, "how can the
Phenomenology be, as Hegel claims, the presupposition for a presuppositionless science?"is to
be found in grasping how it is that the Phenomenology can lead to the beginning point of
science without predetermining either the validity or the method of this science.30 My
contention is that the Phenomenology yields a 'method' for the Logic only in a radically
negative sense, and that it is the 'presupposition' for the Logic because it indicates why this
science must begin without presuppositions. That is, because it indicates why the Logic must
begin in and with the radical indeterminateness which according to Hegel is the final outcome
of the collapse of the structure of absolute knowing and with nothing else.31
The Phenomenology serves an 'introductory' function for the Logic because it indicates the
necessity of beginning, in an attempt at a pure philosophical science, without any presupposed
or assumed methodological principle. This negative conclusion is arrived at through the
Phenomenology because that work constitutes the consideration of the attempt to ground a
determinate presupposition concerning the nature of cognitionconsciousness' structure of
knowledgeas the valid methodological principle for cognition überhaupt.32 Wethe
phenomenological observers of consciousnesssaw that when consciousness came in absolute
knowing to complete its self-legitimation, to, in effect, legitimate the presupposing of
consciousness' structure as a principle of cognition through a radical self-grounding, this had
the consequence of collapsing the structure being grounded and eliminating absolute knowing
as a knowing. Yielding, as final residue, nothing but an "unanalysable" "completely empty
being" or "pure indeterminateness," something which according to Hegel neither contains any
determinacy within

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itself nor in relation to anything else and is yet the concept of science with which logic is to
begin. 33
The Phenomenology can thus be understood to be Hegel's 'discourse on method' as a critique
of method. That is, as a critique of the notion that one can begin in philosophy by either
assuming or postulating some determinate methodological principle or principles as a guide,
rule or truth criterion for the constitution of philosophical discourse. The critical outcome of
the Phenomenology vis-à-vis method is this: There are no determinate self-grounding or self-
legitimating principles, no self-evident assumptions with which one can begin. In this way,
one is brought to a moment of decision as a choice between alternatives. One can give up the
traditional aim of philosophy to constitute itself as self-legitimating discourse, the aim to be
scientific in a radical sense. By so doing, one thereby resigns oneself to beginning in
philosophy with some presupposition which can never be anything more than that, and which
can claim no final legitimatable superiority over any other presupposition with which someone
else begins. Philosophy, if this alternative is accepted, must then give up the claim to be able
to speak critically to the question of truth, and must acknowledge that in the last analysis there
are as many 'truths' as there are particular standpoints or cognitive interests.
The other alternative is that taken up by Hegel. We shall see that despite his rejection of the
possibility of beginning in philosophy with a determinate 'principle of principles' as an
absolute foundation, that this does not lead him to embrace an uncritical relativism. The
conclusion of the Phenomenologythat philosophy cannot begin with a determinate self-
grounding truth principleleads him rather to make an attempt at a self-grounding philosophy
that does not begin with any determinacy or determinate principle whatsoever.
The first step in this process is found in the Logic which begins in the thinking of the "pure
indeterminateness" which results from the collapse of absolute knowing. The Phenomenology
then, as the deduction of the Concept of Science, does not constitute a method for the Logic in
that it establishes neither a determinate subject matter for scientific-logical consideration, nor a
structure, rule or principle in terms of which the process of logical cognition is to proceed. The
Phenomenology, owing to its radically negative outcome, does not predetermine what the
science will be, how its 'dialectic' will operate, in what its 'scientific' character, in a positive
sense, will consist, or whether such a pure science is pos-

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sible at all and what it will mean. The negative idea or idealwhich idea or ideal the
Phenomenology does giveis that a thoroughly immanent and self-determining science can have
no such predeterminations or guarantees, and the alleged character of the Phenomenology as
the "presupposition" for "presuppositionless" science is that it has shown why this must be the
case.
Having asserted that the Phenomenology plays no positive role in the Logic, I must now show,
by considering the dialectic which is involved in the move from the Phenomenology to the
Logic, how it plays a negative role. Or, dialectically speaking, how its negative role is just its
positive one. The Phenomenology does, in a sense, play a positive role in the constitution of
the beginning of the science, in three ways. The first, which I have already considered,
consists in the fact that the Phenomenology shows why such a science must begin without any
method or methodological presuppositions, without any rule or principles for its development
and constitution. The second positive function the Phenomenology plays is that it indicates
specifically what the attempt at science must begin with: indeterminateness.
The third sense in which the Phenomenology has a positive function for the Logic is the sense
in which it constitutes a negative methodology for the Logic. I shall consider this in some
detail because what it means is clearly crucial to my contention that Hegel does not have any
'method' in the traditional sense. My claim is that the Phenomenology serves to indicate a
negative methodology for the Logic in that, although it does not tell us how to proceed in the
science because it gives no determinate principles or rules for logical cognition, it does tell us
how not to proceed. The Phenomenology does this because it indicates specifically what
cannot be presupposed if the Logic is to be a pure science; if, that is, its dialectic is to be an
immanent and self-constitutive one.
In the Phenomenology, determinacy was always considered within the context of the structure
of consciousness and determined in its determinacy in relation to consciousness as the
knowing subject. But if the "ultimate and absolute truth" of consciousness, arrived at by
consciousness in its self-grounding, consists in the self-elimination of this structure into
indeterminateness, this indicates specifically that the constitution of the logic can neither have
this structure as its subject matter nor be carried out in terms of the model or paradigm defined
by consciousness' cognition of objects. Hegel tells us the "pure science presupposes liberation
from the opposition of consciousness," i.e., from the subject/object model

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of cognition, and that when "the determinations which constitute the nature of our ordinary
phenomenal consciousness ... are carried out into the sphere of reason as if the same relation
obtained there, as if this relation were something true in its own self, then they are errors the
refutation of which through every part of the spiritual universe is philosophy, or rather, as they
bar the entrance to philosophy, must be discarded at its portals." 34 Specifically, this means
that in attempting to do pure logicin attempting to think the indeterminatewe cannot
presuppose or assume that it is already determinate simply in virtue of the fact that 'it' is an
'object.' We must not assume that the indeterminate is, even as indeterminate, already
determinate in its indeterminacy just because it will now stand over against (be gegenständlich
to) a thinking subject. Put differently, the givenness of 'our' human mode of cognition, the fact
that we are finite thinking subjects, cannot be presupposed as having any constitutive primacy
in an attempt to think without presuppositions. The 'givenness' of this our mode of cognition
may be self-evident, as some philosophers claim, but the legitimacy of presupposing this mode
of cognition as absolute, as constituting the 'bottom line' in terms of which all philosophical
cognition must either be carried out or assessed in its validity has been rendered null and void
by the Phenomenology. For that work has shown that when this structure of cognition is no
longer simply presupposed, but is rather brought to its self-grounding, it transcends itself.
So, we cannot take consciousness' structure of cognitionaccording to which whatever is being
cognized is always already determinate as being other than the awareness which thinks it, is
always already determinate as an object in some sense, whether externally given or self-
givenas the methodological model in a purportedly pure logic. For to do so would be to invest
the allegedly thoroughly indeterminate indeterminateness with a determinate character by
contrasting it, as object, with a predetermined determinacy (thought or the thinking subject)
which is its other.35
The Phenomenology thus constitutes a negative methodology for the Logic simply because it
tells us how indeterminateness is not to be thought.36 To engage in logical cognition according
to the model of consciousness would be to posit or hold indeterminateness as stable, as fixed
or determinate in its indeterminateness and thus as already contrastable with the determinate
because a thinking subject has focused on it as an object, and is 'holding' it as 'present' to the
mind. As I hope to show, the negative method-

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ology indicated by the Phenomenology will function in the opening of the Logic insofar as, in
the thinking of indeterminateness, this is not done.
That this is the case, I would like to demonstrate by considering the opening of the Logic, and
the 'move' from being, to nothing, to becoming. As we have seen, the claim that the Logic
presents a pure and immanent dialectic rests in part on the claim thatas opposed to the
Phenomenologythere is no operative and presupposed structure or principle taken as the
'method,' as the determinacy in terms of which the indeterminate is determined. 37 From a
different angle, the claim is that what we find here is pure and presuppositionless
thoughtthought which is, at the starting point as yet thoroughly indeterminate and not even
contrastable with beingengaged in self-determination. In short, the claim is that
indeterminateness, insofar as it does come to be determined in logic, is determined only in and
through itself. What I shall showby reflectively examining the move from being, to nothing, to
becomingis how this self-determination of indeterminacy operates. I shall attempt to do this by
showing how the contrast in and through which pure indeterminateness comes to be
provisionally determined is an internal and immanent contrast becauseas the Phenomenology
demandsnothing is being presupposed here as already determinate.
Hegel tells us that the Logic begins with the thinking of indeterminateness at that which has
resulted from absolute knowing.38 Looked at reflectively, what we find in the opening
moments of the logic of being is this: Insofar as we rid ourselves "of all other reflections and
opinions whatsoever" and "take up what is there before us" we discover that thinking
indeterminateness in and as indeterminate demands, requires or leads us to the thinking of a
contrast.39 (Or, we discover that this thinking is the thinking of a contrast.) Indeterminateness
as first thought, in being thought as indeterminate, or in its indeterminacy, is thought as
determinate in its indeterminacy; as being. But, insofar as no determinacy is invested in
indeterminateness simply because it is being thought as indeterminate (simply because of the
subjective act of focusing on it) we can see that as thought, this determinacy of
indeterminatenessbeingis no different from utterly indeterminate indeterminateness: nothing.
Or, making the same point non-reflectively: Thinking "empty being," thinking the utterly and
thoroughly indeterminate as indeterminate in its indeterminacy, is the thinking of nothing.

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To proceed a step further, to becoming: Thinking indeterminateness as indeterminate in its
indeterminacy demands or leads to the thinking of a contrast between the determinate and the
indeterminate. To think indeterminateness as indeterminate demands or is the thinking of a
contrast between the minimally determinate (i.e., indeterminateness first thought as being of
the determinacy of indeterminateness) and the indeterminate (i.e., the utterly indeterminate
indeterminateness, nothing). But since nothing here is predetermined, since we can presuppose
no determinacy either as given or as resulting from the objectifying act of thinking, this
thinking of the contrast is the thinking of a disappearing or vanishing contrast: becoming. (The
"truth" of being and nothing is the "movement of the immediate vanishing of the one in the
other: becoming; a movement in which both are distinguished, but by a difference which has
equally immediately resolved itself." 40 )
To move ahead in the logic of being, keeping the focus on the as yet still unstable contrast: we
find that this contrast, arising out of the thinking of indeterminateness and requisite for it,
seems minimally fixable as a contrast between being, now understood as something, and an
other. What isbeingis what it is not because it is not nothing, but because as something it is not
an other. But, in order to support this contrast, the other (that which gives being its
determinacy through its contrast with it) must itself be determinate. Simplifying, and moving
on to the outcome of the logic of being and thus to the transition to the logic of essence: This
other can only be itself determinate, and thus contrastable with being, in virtue of its contrast
with an other. But, since no determinacy can be presupposed, this other can only be itself. For:
being as something was only determinate in virtue of its contrast with an other. But the other
can only be itself determinate in virtue of its contrast with an other. But the only other to
which it can be contrasted is being/something. Conclusion: Being is determinate as the other
of the other, but since the other is only a determinate other as the other of being, being is only
as the other of itself. And thus we find the thesis of the logic of essence: Being is determinate
in virtue of an internal or self-contrasting; or, being is in and through positing its other. Being
is essence which is what it is as a structure which contrasts itself with itself. The other, which,
through its contrast with being renders being determinate is only an aspect or feature of being,
a quasi-other. The logic of essence then unfolds, with the focus still on contrast, but now
understood as a self-contrasting and as a search for the determining pole or side, the ground or
essence of the contrast.

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Being no longer disappears in or becomes its other (as being became nothing and then
becoming in the logic of being). Rather, in the logic of essence, being appears or is
determined in virtue of its contrasting and contrasted other. But again, if no determinacy is
presupposed as determinatethat is, if we do not do what the Phenomenology as negative
methodology demands that we do not dowhere and what is the determinacy of the determining
side of this relation, where being is thought as self-contrasting relation? If being here is
determinate as a result of a self-contrasting, and if no determinacy is presupposed as given,
where and what is the determinacy of the 'self' which contrasts itself with itself and is
allegedly first constituted in its determinacy as a result of this contrasting? The logic of
essence, as the search for the essential, determining side of this contrasting completes itself in
the thinking of a reciprocal contrast: Insofar as no determinacy is illicitly presupposed as
determinate, it turns out that there is no essential or grounding side of the essence/appearance
relation. As no determinacy is presupposed, but can only arise in and through the contrasting,
there is no primordial or determining side. Each side of the relation is determinate as what it is
as the other of its other; each, as the other of its other is the other of itself and it just itself
therein. This yields the thesis of the logic of the concept: Being, in being nothing but the other
of itself, is itself. Put differently: When we undertake to think being in its determinacy as not
already so given (for to think being as somehow already determinate would be to begin with,
or to introduce, a presupposition) we find that self-subsistent, self-identical being is nothing
but sheer self-differentiating, sheer self-contrasting or self-negation. This is the truth of being
purely as thought. That is, it is the truth of being insofar as we do not explicitly or implicitly
presuppose that it is determinate already in virtue of being taken as an object of thought. 41
To sum up: If no determinacy is presupposed in pure logic, but is rather allowed to arise in and
of itself, then the contrast requisite for the thinking of being will be evanescent until being is
thought of in its being, in its determinacy, as self-negation, as the negation of negation. To
once again omit much and leap ahead to the conclusion of the logic of pure thought: Being, as
determined in and through pure thought alone, can only complete or fulfill itself as pure self-
determining insofar as thought takes up the idea of an othera determinacywhich can be
thought, initially, as not at all of the character of a pure self-determining thought determinacy.
That is, as a determinacy which is 'outside' of or external to thought in the sense that its
determinacy does not derive or is not constituted

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through its being thought. This 'other,' as we shall see, is the idea of nature.

III.
The Encyclopedia: The Dialectic of Real Philosophy
Hegel's philosophical project does not end with logic. But if the Phenomenology has shown
that it is illicit, in philosophy, to presuppose any given determinacy as the 'determinacy in
terms of which' we engage in philosophical consideration, and if the Logic as the domain of
pure thought determinacies is pure because no determinacies other than pure thought
determinacies have played a role in its constitution, how, on this basis, can this philosophy go
on to say anything concerning what lies outside of this domain? That is, how is a philosophy
of the real possible? One way to explain thisthe way in which Hegel's Realphilosophie is
traditionally interpretedwould be to say that this philosophy of the real is founded on the thesis
that nothing 'lies outside' of pure thought, on the thesis that being or the real is identical to
thought.
I shall first explain why this view is mistaken before going on to give an account of what
Hegel's real philosophy actually is (not a metaphysical idealism) and how its dialectic can be
understood to operate.
As we have seen, the Logic's claim to purity itself rests, in part, on the claim that the model of
consciousness' cognition of objects has been suspended and is not operative in it. 42 But this
means that logic's purity has been bought at a great price. It means that logic as the domain of
pure thought can have, as such, no extension beyond itself.43 Where Hegel to claim that the
Logic constitutes a 'method,' either in the sense that it is implicitly about the real as such (an
ontology) or in the sense that it constitutes the necessary categories in terms of which the real
is to be thought (a transcendental logic), this would be to once againand in his own terms
illicitlyreinstate or presuppose without justification just that model of cognition which has
come to self-suspension in the Phenomenology. This would be the case because both these
notionsontology and transcendental logicpresuppose, implicitly if not explicitly, the structure
of consciousness' cognition of objects as valid and paradigmatic. Ontology implicitly
presupposes a difference between thought and being (or the real) only in order to deny the
fundamentality of this difference and to claim that being qua being, the real in its truth, can be
constituted or discovered in philosophical thought. Transcendental logic explicitly presupposes

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this model in its claim to set forth the necessary categories in terms of and through which
being or the real can be cognized by the thinking subject.
If the Logic, then, is not an 'absolute method' eo ipso applicable to any subject matter, if its
foundational thesis is neither that thought and being are identical nor that they are different
but, rather, that from the standpoint of a philosophy which aims to be pure and
presuppositionless, neither their identity nor their difference can be assumed, how on the basis
of this logic can a consideration of the real come to be constituted and what role does the
Logic play in this constitution?
Just as the completion of the Phenomenology constituted the foundation of the Logic, so too
we need to grasp how the outcome of the Logic constitutes the foundation for systematic real
philosophy. That is, for the consideration in and by thought of topics in some senseas yet
unspecified'external' to pure thought. The key aspect, both in regard to the transition from
logic to real philosophy as well as in regard to the role which logic plays in real philosophy, is
something which I shall call categorial self-transformation.
We shall have to see what 'real dialectic' is, how it is constituted, and how it differs from the
dialectic of pure thought. Important in our examination will be understanding why it is
constituted neither through the articulation of an assumed identity of 'thought' and 'reality' nor
through the application of a given pre-determined method, specified in the logic, to a content
but rather by the self-transformation of the dialectic of pure thought, through categorial self-
transformation.
The notion of a real dialectic is that of a dialectic which ensues when, from the standpoint of
pure thoughtlogicone attempts to consider in thought (to think) the idea of what is other than
pure thought. (Why it is that this dialectic emerges immanently from the prior dialectic shall
be considered below.) In this way, a new dialectic emerges as the dialectic (in thought, in
systematic philosophical thinking) of the relation between pure thought as pure thought and its
new topic, the idea of what is other than itself, other than pure thought as such.
The move from logic to real philosophy (from, textually speaking, the logic of the
Encyclopedia, volume one, to the philosophy of nature, volume two) does not consist in the
application of pure thought categories as such to something conceived as lying 'outside' of
thought in the literal or ordinary sense. This is still systematic philosophystill 'pure
thinking'because the new subject matter, the topic to be considered in real philosophy, is said
to be imma-

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nently derived, and is not constituted as the topic for thought via abstraction from the real as
we might conceive it to be in re. But, if real philosophy first comes to be constituted in and
through thought's immanent consideration of 'its other,' if the 'real' as nature is initially defined
in that manner, is this not tantamount to the assertion that the real is essentially identical to
thought? Where the real would be a 'manifestation' or an 'appearance' of the underlying 'true'
reality, thought. 44 Or, alternatively expressed, does this not amount to the assertion that
reality in its truth is nothing but thought or mind in its self-externality? This appears, at first
glance, to be the meaning of such remarks as the following ''Nature has yielded itself as the
Idea in the form of otherness ..."45
As a matter of fact however, the foundation of Hegel's real philosophy is not grounded in the
postulation of an essential identity of thought (or mind) and reality. Rather, its foundation lies
in the necessary recognition by thought of its limits qua pure thought. In, that is, an
acknowledgment and affirmation of the radical non-identity of thought and reality, an
acknowledgment by philosophical thought that insofar as it is to think about reality it must
initially acknowledge the radical otherness of the real vis-à-vis itself and then think the idea of
such a radical other. (Why thinking this other must meanfor systematic philosophythe
thinking of thought as other than itself we shall see below.) According to Hegel, the greatest
danger found in the attempt to develop a philosophy of the real in, initially, a philosophy of
nature, lies in the prediliction to engage in idealism. That is, in the tendency to transform in
thought what is other than thought into either a 'thought thing' or a 'thought-like thing':
We want to know the nature that really is, not something which is not, but instead of
leaving it alone and accepting it as it is in its truth, instead of taking it as given, we
make something completely different out of it. By thinking things, we transform them
into something universal; things are singular however and the lion in general does not
exist. We make them into something subjective, produced by us, belonging to us, and
of course peculiar to us men; for the things of nature do not think and are neither
representations nor thought. ... [W]hat we have started on may well seem impossible
from the start. ... Our aim is to grasp and comprehend nature however, to make it ours
so that it is not something beyond and alien to us. This is where the difficulty comes in.
How are we as subjects to get over into the object? If we venture the leap

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over this gap, and, while failing to find our footing, think that we have found nature,
we shall turn that which is something other than what we are into something other than
what it is. 46

So, according to Hegel there is something like a necessary contradiction in the very idea of a
thinking of nature. As a pure thinking of, a pure philosophy of nature, Hegel's philosophy does
not only begin, as we can see, with an awareness of this seeming contradiction, but also can be
understood to consistin its dialecticin a thinking through of itof the seeming contradiction
which Hegel will claim is necessarily immanent in thought's thinking of what is other than
itself. There is a seeming contradiction here, for if this other is radically other, and if we are
not to lapse into idealism, how then are we to think it, to say something about it in an allegedly
pure philosophy?
It is my contention that Hegel's philosophy of reality, in its initial appearance as a philosophy
of nature, can be understood in general as a consideration by thought of the contradictionor
dialecticinvolved in thought's thinking what is other than itself. In this sense it does not consist
in the thinking of nature in the sense that we, as thinking consciousness ordinarily conceive
nature as an object, given in its determinacy, for thinking. Rather, it is a thinking only of the
idea of nature. As 'pure,' this is a philosophical consideration which cannot, and does not,
presuppose as valid the cognitive structure of thinking awarenesses which would enable it, if
presupposed, to 'look at' nature and derive its determinacy via abstraction. But nonetheless it
claims to avoid idealism insofar as for it, for pure philosophical cognition, 'nature' is conceived
neither as being nothing but thought nor as being somehow thought-like. And yet, we shall
have to see how it is the case that, if for this philosophy of nature nature is not thought, it is
nonetheless spoken of as being thought in its otherness or in its self-externality.
So what does it mean to say that nature here is "the Idea in its otherness" or is the self-
externality of thought? We have already seen that, for Hegel, this does not mean that the real
or nature as such are nothing but idea or thought. What then is being asserted is, I believe,
this: If we are to consider, to purely and simply think the real or nature, this can be done in
systematic philosophy in such a way that we do not transform our topic into a 'thought thing'in
such a way that does not lead to metaphysical idealismif we conceive or define the subject
matter to be considered as being 'other than thought.' But, since this is still presuppositionless
and systematic philosophy, and because therefore we cannot assume

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on our part as philosophers the legitimate capacity to 'know' nature as an object such that we
could derive its determinacy as 'other than thought' from nature 'itself,' then what is other than
thought here can only be conceived in and through thought's contrasting itself with itself. The
dialectic of real philosophy thus begins in and is constituted by thought's thinking itself as
other than or as external to itself. (Why 'other than' shall mean 'external to' we shall see
below.) The contrast requisite for the determination of determinacy here, the contrast
necessary for the thinking about what is other than thought cannot, if this is to be a pure
thinking of reality and nature, be said to arise outside of thought. In systematic philosophy the
determinacies of reality and nature cannot be derived from 'reality' and 'nature' as they are
'given,' for, if they were, the systematic philosopher would then have to lay claim to the
capacity to be able to 'know' the 'object' as it is 'in-itself.' In that case, the question of the
justification of such a claim would immediately arise and we would once again be back in the
scenario of the Phenomenology.
In regard to the question of method and the constitution of this new dialectic we again find, as
in the case of the relation of the dialectic of the Phenomenology to that of the Logic, that the
preceding dialectic plays a negative role in the constitution of the subsequent one. This
negative operationwhich can be seen to consist in the self-contrasting of thought with itselfis
as follows: The coming to completion of the self-constitution of the domain of pure thought
categorieslogicdemands the consideration in and by thought of what is radically other than
itself, other than pure thought. And, if we can correctly categorize pure thought determinacies
as determinacies determined in, by and through thought alone, then what stands to be
considered in and by thought in constituting its limit as pure thought is the thought or idea of a
determinacy or a range of determinacies whose determinacy is not determined by thought
alone.
So, in constituting real philosophy all one does is to think the idea of a determinacy which is
not determined by thought, i.e., which is not determined in the way pure thought determinacies
were determined. The thinking taking place can be said to consist in the self-contrasting or self
-externalizing of thought in the following way: Just as pure thought determinacies, in the logic
of being, evidenced a lack of self-sufficiency or self-stability, a decisive instability of
determinacy and a tendency even in their determinacy to collapse into one another (or of each
to become, in its being thought, the other) so the initial salient feature or

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determinacy of the idea of a range of determinacies which are radically other than pure thought
determinacies will lie in the fact that it will consist in, or 'support,' determinacies as
independent and self-sufficient in their determinacy, as external to one another. (Figuratively
speaking, this range of determinacy will be such that it can hold determinacies as standing next
to one another in it.) And these determinacies, unlike, (or as the 'other' of) pure thought
determinacies, will be thought of as determined in their determinacy independently, or
externally, of one another. Hegel's name for such a range of determinacy is space. In addition,
just as the initial mode of relation of pure thought determinacies in the logic consisted in the
transformation of one determinacy into the other, so the initial mode of the relation of real
determinaciesof determinacies which are here being thought as not being thought
determinacieswill consist in their externality one to anotheras points in space. (It should be
noted that just as in my presentation of the dialectics of the Phenomenology and the Logic, this
is a simplification which necessarily omits much.)
Thus, in making the move from logic to real philosophy, we do not find that the system of
thought determinacies or categories which makes up the logic is applied, as it stands, to some
given or found determinacy which is said to be determinate, or to be known in its determinacy,
prior to the application. Nor do we find that the determinacy of the real is constituted by an
appeal to an analogous resemblance between logic and the real, a resemblance which would in
some way allegedly legitimate the application of logical categories. Rather, what we find is a
self-transformation of those pure thought categories, a self-transformation which arises in and
through a self-contrasting. And thus nature in systematic dialectical philosophy is determined
as 'thought in its self-externality' or as 'thought in its otherness.' For, to think thought as other
to itself is: (1) to think the idea of determinacy as not determined by thought, which is to think
a range of determinacies as not determined vis-à-vis their immediate interrelation with one
another (as the determinacies were thought in the logic of being); and (2) to think these
determinacies as capable of subsisting in their determinancy as independent of one another
(which pure thought determinacies in the logic of being were not capable of).
So, you can see that the function of logic in real philosophy is not to provide a 'method' as a
model, that is as a given thought structure which comes as such to be applied as a
predetermined organizational 'framework' into which some 'contents' are plugged

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and consequently given a logical ordering or structure. 47 For the initial determinacies of
realitythe determinacies of natureare specifically thought as not being of the character of
logical determinacies, either in the Hegelian or the traditional sense. Most definitely, they are
not thought as being concrete constants which can replace the abstract variables of a logical
system while leaving the relation framework of this system untouched. For these
determinacies of nature are not at all thought as being in a 'logical' relation one to another. If
the most general feature of logical determinacies is their 'internality,' that is, their immanent
interconnection and interdevelopment relation with one another, then the most general feature
of the determinacies of the philosophy of nature, as arising through thought's contrasting itself
with itself and thereby constituting 'nature' as 'thought in its otherness,' is externality. Nature,
as conceived in this systematic real philosophy, is 'external' or 'externality' in a three-fold
sense: (1) It is thought and defined as external toother thanthought; (2) In and of itself it is in
its most basic determinacy externality, or space; (3) The determinacies 'in' or 'of' nature as
externality, as space are thought of as determined as what they are externally to or outside of
one another, and as standing external to one another, as, initially, points in space.
So, 'nature' here is thought of not only as not being identical to thought in some essential way,
it is also not thought as being 'like' thought in some manner. Here, perhaps uniquely in
philosophy it is not claimed that we can think about the real because thought and the real have
some structure, some logos, in common. Rather, according to Hegel, what is required in order
for philosophy to think the real is, first, a self-consideration by thought which does not already
presuppose the contrast of thought and reality or their identity, and second, that thought comes
to transform itself, and to thereby think what is other than itself. Thought must come to
transform itselfto consider its othersystematically speaking, in order to realize its own
limitations, and thereby to bring the process of its immanent self-consideration to a close. (In
this sense there is no external necessity for the subsequent development of real philosophy.) In
that Hegel's philosophy of reality is grounded in a genuine and thoroughgoing recognition of
the otherness of nature and reality to thought, and in that it constitutes itself as a thinking of
them by taking this otherness as its basis and thus acknowledging the limitations of pure
thought, it must be recognized that however we wish to categorizeor criticizehis system-

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atic philosophy, it is most definitely not an absolute idealistic metaphysics.
To sum up: Hegel's 'dialectical method' consists not merely in the absence of a method in the
traditional sense, but also in the disavowal and critique of the idea of a philosophical method
as an a priori set of rules for the consideration of a subject matter. For Hegel, there is no
creature which can be specified and legitimated as a 'dialectical method.' The very notion of an
a priori dialectic is contrary to Hegel's view of a proper and systematic philosophical dialectic,
since for him the necessary introduction to systematic philosophy must consist in the
immanent critique of the assumption that it is possible and legitimate to specify some
determinate principle which can define, determine and set the limiting conditions of
philosophical thought. There are as many different dialectics and 'dialectical methods' as there
are specifiable topics of thought and specifiable standpoints from which these topics can be
considered. The particular Hegelian dialectic and standpoint, both in regard to philosophical
thought as such and in regard to what can be considered in philosophical thinking, is one
which arises when one specifically makes the attempt to think without presuppositions.
<><><><><><><><><><><><>
Chapter 5 has addressed a variety of issues critical to fleshing out the interpretation of Hegel
as a nonfoundational systematic philosopher. Themes introduced in earlier chapters have been
further developed, new aspects of the character of systematic philosophy have been discussed,
and an overview of the whole system in its interconnectedness has been presented.
The unifying chord of Chapter 5 is the consideration of what Hegel insists is the distinctive
scientific feature of his system: its self-determinative character, the strict immanence of
development which he calls dialectic. I have argued here that we can make sense of the system
as autonomously self-determinative if, first of all, we properly understand its origin in the
Phenomenology as an immanent critique of the foundationalist model of cognition and notion
of philosophical science. This by now familiar theme is further developed by focusing on how
the Phenomenology can itself be understood as meeting the requirement of immanent
development. I have shown that if the consciousness considered in the Phenomenology is
understood as foundational, we can make sense of the work as immanently developmental
because no other

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assumptions are required for its argument and because the work then culminates in the self-
elimination of its founding assumption. (It is this same self-suspension of foundational
consciousness which we saw in Chapter 4 as making an immanently self-developmental Logic
possible.) In explaining the distinctive self-developmental character of the Phenomenology I
have also addressed questions remaining from Chapter 1 concerning the argument of the
Phenomenology, and how it might be scientific without presupposing science.
Chapter 5 has also further explicated the nature of the self-developmental character of the
Logic by further indicating just how the self-suspension of foundational subjectivity both
makes possible a presuppositionless beginning while at the same time providing a negative
methodology which enables us to reconstruct the argument of the Logic. On this basis I have
traced out the development of the 3 'logics' of the Logic, showing how each follows from the
previous and how the Logic culminates in a move into Realphilosophie. Crucial here has been
showing that if we do adopt the antifoundational view, we can understand the Logic both as
actually having an argument and as fulfilling the claims Hegel makes for it.
Chapter 5 also indicates further how the antifoundational interpretation introduces a Hegel
who overcomes the problems of foundationalism while still committed to a notion of
philosophical truth which avoids the inconsistencies and the relativism of antifoundationalism.
Again, the key for this interpretation is the suspension of the fondationalist model. Reading the
system in this light discloses a mode of philosophical discourse which is not metaphysically
idealistic, because it is not a descriptive account of things as they are given; not absolutist,
because it does not preclude the possibility of such descriptive accounts; and self-limiting,
because its range has been so circumscribed.
This latter trio of themes is taken up in the next chapter which considers a traditional, and
enduring, criticism of Hegel's systematic philosophy: that it erroneously, and blasphemously,
purports to offer us a mode of divine, absolute knowledge. Refuting this charge provides an
opportunity to examine further various positive features of the system as a whole and the
philosophy of religion in particular. Additionally, it brings up a consideration of an issue of
special concern for current antifoundationalism in its attack on the possibility of philosophy:
the nature of our finitude. I argue in Chapter 6 that Hegel not only acknowledgess

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our finitude, but also that this acknowledgment is a feature of self-determining systematic
philosophy (and does not require abandoning the system's claim to philosophical truth), and
that his conception of finitude is superior to current antifoundationalist accounts in various
ways.

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Chapter 6
On the Presumed Blasphemy of Hegelian Absolutism
The squirming facts are not to exceed the squamous mind.
Wallace Stevens

A common accusation brought against Hegel is that he is guilty of blasphemy as his

philosophical system involves a human claim to divine powers. 1 This issue is of more than
strictly historical significance, since contemporary antifoundational postmodernists indict not
only Hegel, but the whole philosophical tradition on the grounds that philosophy's claim to
offer objective knowledge of the truth is blasphemous in that it abrogates the inescapable
finitude of human knowing. We are told that traditional philosophy must but cannot
successfully lay claim to what Hilary Putnam perspicuously calls the "God's eye point of
view."2 The goal of this chapter is to show that the charge against Hegel cannot be
substantiated. While addressing the question of philosophical blasphemy as it pertains to
Hegel, I will comment from time to time about the larger accusation, suggesting that Hegel's
manner of developing a systematic philosophy can provide a framework for defending
philosophy as a whole from postmodernist attacks.
Before examining the evidence and mounting a defense I want to first explain the nature and
significance of this charge.

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I.
The Nature of the Charge
There are at least two senses in which Hegel can be accused of blasphemy:
The first (hereafter, B1) is epistemic and concerns his systematic philosophy as a whole.
According to B1, Hegel must claim a divine position, even if only implicitly, given what his
system alleges about how it is established and what kind of knowledge it offers.
The second sense (B2) is substantive; it concerns the specifics of what the system says about
God and focuses on the philosophy of religion in particular. According to B2, the knowledge
of God Hegel propounds is blasphemous not only in presenting God as thoroughly knowable
by human minds, but also in blurring, if not collapsing, the distinction between humanity and
God. This collapse has purportedly taken place in that Hegel has construed divine nature in
human terms while correlatively construing human nature in divine terms. In Emil
Fackenheim's opinion, Hegel's philosophy presents religion as "a divine self-activity in finite
humanity; and in order so to grasp it Hegelian thought must have done nothing less than rise
above a self-active thought confined to human finitude in order to become a self-active thought
which is infinite and divine." 3 A central objective of this essay will be to show that Hegel's
thought is "a self-active thought confined to human finitude."
At the basis of both charges is the issue of the nature of the human and the divine; more
specifically, of the nature of the finite and the infinite as these terms pertain to knowledge and
mind. This issue is, of course, a central and recurrent topic in Hegel's systematic philosophy.
According to Fackenheim, the "struggle" between the infinite and the finite "and the struggle
to resolve the struggleis in the end the sole theme ... of the whole Hegelian philosophy."4 As
we shall see, the question of the relation of the infinite and the finite concerns not only the
philosophy of religion but also the very nature and status of systematic philosophy.5 In fact,
according to Hegel it is especially important for the philosophy of religion that we first
understand properly the nature of systematic philosophy, for "... it very frequently happens
when philosophy in general and philosophizing about God in particular are criticized, that
finite thoughts, relationships of limitedness, and categories and forms of the finite are
introduced in the service of this discourse. Opposition that draws upon such finite forms is

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directed against philosophy generally and especially against the highest kind, the philosophy
of religion in particular.'' 6 This makes it essential that we consider B1going "back to the
alphabet of philosophy itself"before turning to the philosophy of religion.7

II.
The Significance of the Charges
If one must purport to possess divine powers either in order to enter the system or to establish
its claims, the consequences are obviously devastating philosophically. The truth of the system
would then rest on assertions which appear to be manifestly false insofar as we hold to the
usual meaning of the term "divine," where it denotes a greater and other than human being,
infinite in various respects, but necessarily transcendent; always irreducibly other than human
in spite of possible manifestations in a finite guise.
It is important to observe that the force of the charges is not dependent on the piety of the
accuser. One need not believe in a divinity or in a divine mind in order to conclude that neither
Hegel nor anyone else is capable of attaining or approximating to a model of it. So Hegel can
be accused of blasphemy on strictly philosophical grounds of a purely secular nature.

III.
The First Charge
The basis for B1 lies in the claims that Hegel makes concerning the kind of philosophical
knowledge or truth the system affords, absolute knowledge or truth, and the manner in which
it comes to afford it, by means of absolute knowing. According to Hegel the system is absolute
in that it is all-encompassing and fully justified; it expresses universal, necessary,
unconditional, eternal, infinite, and absolute truth.8 Additionally, he contends that it has this
status because of its beginning in an absolute knowing which is the culmination of the
Phenomenology, the acknowledged introduction to the system. Unpacking either of these
claims would appear to provide a strong basis for B1.
Consider simply the idea that the system is absolute in virtue of being all-encompassing and
fully justified.9 To possess such features the system would have to be self-grounding, since
nothing which has a basis or foundation outside of itself could be demon-

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stratively complete and fully legitimated. But the demand for self-grounding would seem to
require a kind of philosophical activity which is divine. How so?
If the system rests on nothing outside of itself, the activity which produces it must be self-
generating or self-determining in a radical sense: both form (or method) and content must have
a common source, and they must arise without predetermination. 10 But such purported
activity of creative self-generation in the absence of prior determination could seemingly be
undertaken only by a divine mind, a mind capable of constituting, from out of nothing, both
itself as cognizer and its objects of cognition in and through one and the same act. The
apparent necessity for divine cognition occurs for the following reasons. First, the act must be
one of pure knowing which is fully self-constitutive of the knower. Otherwise something
external and giventhe form or method of knowingwould stand prior to or outside of the
system, unfounded. Second, this activity must be simultaneously constitutive of the objects of
knowledge. Otherwise that which comes to be known would have an external, given
foundation, and would be to that extent derivative, conditioned, and unfounded. Our human
knowing, however, seems to be unavoidably finite, not self-constitutive because rooted in
contextual conditions which are always given prior to the knowing activity.
The bases for thinking that Hegel claims this kind of absolute knowing lie not only in the
general claims about the system which I have considered so far but also in the fact that the
Phenomenology culminates in something called "absolute knowing." And since Hegel tells us
that the Logic and the system presuppose this absolute knowing as the deduced concept of
science, the evidence for finding Hegel guilty of B1 appears incontrovertible, until we
consider the nature of his absolute knowing and the manner in which it functions in and for the
system.

IV.
The Defense Against B1
I am going to argue not only that absolute knowing is not a blasphemous claim to divine
knowing but that it is in fact a rejection of the human pretension to divine knowing. In
addition, I aim to show that just as suchas an affirmation of the finite character of our
knowingabsolute knowing functions as the beginning point for Hegel's systematic philosophy.

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When we look at the details of Hegel's account of absolute knowing as the beginning point of
science it is clear that no claim to divine knowing is being made simply because no knowing at
all is involved. Hegel is quite explicit and unequivocal about the fact that absolute knowing, in
its role as the deduced concept of science, is no knowing at all. According to him absolute
knowing ceases as a knowing in its absoluteness; this self-cessation is the collapse of the
determinate structure of consciousness and this collapse constitutes the beginning of science
by yielding a radical indeterminacy which cannot be further characterized. 11 But divine
knowing would seemingly be totally or absolutely determinate, both as regards the structure of
the relationship between knower and objects, and as regards the concreteness of detail and the
scope of what is known. So, whatever else we might say about absolute knowing, it fails to fit
what could reasonably be regarded as the conditions of divine knowing. This absolute
knowing which "ceases itself to be knowledge" and which is "distinctionless" is certainly not
recognizable as the omniscient knowing of a divine being.12
While this defense accords with Hegel's own claims both about the role of absolute knowing
as the deduced concept of science and with his view of the relation of the Phenomenology to
the system, it would seem to conflict with his notions about the overall character of the system
as noted above. If Hegel's absolute knowing is not blasphemous because it is not a form, state,
or condition of knowing at all, how can it function as the beginning of the system? Put more
specifically, if the system is not based on a claim to divine knowledge, how can it make a
claim to the radical self-grounding and consequent self-determination upon which its general
claim to absoluteness rests? To answer this question we must first appreciate how the outcome
of absolute knowing functions as a rejection of the possibility of our attaining divine
knowledge.
In the absolute knowing with which the Phenomenology culminates, consciousness finally
comes to attain what it has sought all along, a demonstration of the fact that its purported
knowledge of the object is knowledge of it in its objectivity, as it exists apart from
consciousness. In anticipation of many contemporary critics of foundationalism and the
philosophy of subjectivity, Hegel shows in absolute knowing why it is that such foundational
knowledge proves aporetic. What absolute knowing reveals, simply, is that consciousness can
come to the point of knowing that its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object as it is
in-itself, only insofar as two conditions are fulfilled. (1) The known object must be nothing but

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consciousness' own mode of knowingso that what is known and the knowing of it are identical
in content. By having its own activity of knowing as its object, the very activity whereby
consciousness constitutes its own being is at once also constitutivecreativeof its domain of
objectivity. Failing such apparently divine activity (whereby an other to mind comes into
being solely in and through this mind and without recourse to an already given material),
consciousness cannot be certain that the object as object is what it takes it to be and thus
cannot establish its capacity to know truly.
Something else is required for consciousness' success: (2) At the same time as identity is
achievedand in the manner of a divine mind which is fully certain of its objects as what they
are while remaining distinct from the world of objects createdconsciousness' knowing and its
object of knowledge must be distinct. Identity of the knowledge and object is required for the
certainty of correspondence consciousness seeks, but at the very same time distinction must be
preserved because without a distinction between its knowledge and the object, consciousness'
knowing ceases altogether. Establishing the truth of its knowledge requires the identity;
ensuring the objectivity of its knowledge requires that the distinction also be maintained
simultaneously with the identity.
So, the success of the consciousness in the Phenomenology which seeks to establish the
unconditional truth of its mode of knowing requires that consciousness strive to reach the
divine capacity of a mind which is at one and the same time certain of its knowledge of its
objects, because they are at one with the activity which knows them (in the manner of a God
who sustains objectivity in its being) while simultaneously remaining distinct as a knower
from this domain of self-constituted objectivity (in the manner of a transcendent creator God
who is also radically other than the divine creation). But what occurs, according to Hegel,
when consciousness reaches a fulfillment of these conditions, when consciousness reaches
absolute knowing? Hegel's presentation of absolute knowing is a radical critique of finite
mind's blasphemous pretension to know absolutely because it shows both that consciousness
cannot successfully attain to such a state of divine knowing and why consciousness cannot do
so. He shows that consciousness' mode of knowing is inescapably finite by allowing
consciousness to disclose that the conditions which it must attain to in order to achieve
absoluteness cannot be attained as long as consciousness remains consciousness:
Consciousness cannot remain a consciousness while

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simultaneously being in a cognitive state of identity and difference with its object, since to be
a consciousness and to speak of conscious knowing minimally require the preservation of a
fixed distinction between knowing and the object. But the required state of simultaneous
identity and difference is one in which no such distinction is maintained. So by revealing how
the very conditions for a successful demonstration of its ability to know absolutely require the
self-suspension of consciousness as a knowing entity, Hegel provides a thoroughly immanent
critique of foundationalism and subjectivity. And since the critique is immanent, and does not
require a claim to know absolutely that absolute knowing is not possible, it avoids the self-
referential inconsistency which plagues contemporary antifoundational postmodernism. Thus,
rather than being the ultimate philosophical blasphemy, Hegel's presentation of absolute
knowing is the consummate critique of it.
If this is what absolute knowing reveals, how can it possibly function as the beginning of an
absolute system? Here we need to focus our attention on the fact that the collapse of
consciousness is a "determinate negation;" 13 it has not only negative but positive results, or
more precisely, its negative results, when fully comprehended, have an equally positive
dimension. How so?
The disclosure of the inescapable finitude of consciousness makes possible a transformation of
the conception of knowing; consciousness' negative revelation about itself as knower shows
that, since cognition cannot be successfully defined in the manner of consciousness (in that
consciousness' manner of knowing turns out to be one in which certainty of the truth can never
be attained) it need not be exclusively defined in that manner either. Discovering that
consciousness' mode of knowing cannot lead to certain knowledge of the truth can liberate us,
even as conscious begins. It can do so insofar as we avoid the temptation to draw an
exclusively negative conclusion about knowing from consciousness' failure. To do so would
be to conclude, in the current postmodernist fashion, that since consciousness cannot ground
its knowing, no genuine knowledge is possible at all.14 Such a conclusion is simply the (self-
referentially inconsistent) philosophical blasphemy of absolutizing our finitude in its finitude,
because it takes an admittedly finite mode of knowing and claims to know unequivocallythat
is, absolutelythat knowing can only be understood in that manner. This position fails to
recognize the positive self-understanding which absolute knowing affords us in virtue of the
totalizing manner in which consciousness reveals its finitude.

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In absolute knowing the finitude of consciousness is disclosed as radical and ultimate because
we finally discover that, conceived epistemologically, consciousness is itself a construct or
posit which has no ultimate foundations. 15 The ultimate finitude of consciousness is that
consciousness cannot even establish the certain truth of its own nature as consciousness. But if
this is so, if the ego or subjectivity is no more primal than anything else, and if knowing
conceived according to its nature cannot be shown to afford truth, then, Hegel positively
concludes, we no longer need remain committed to understanding truth exclusively in its
terms. The positive outcome of absolute knowing as a thoroughgoing revelation of the finitude
of consciousness is the possibility of radically reconceptualizing the nature of knowing. What
we must now see is how this reconceptualization can lead to a system which can claim
absoluteness, in virtue of being self-grounding, without abrogating finitude. What I want to
show is that the very 'absoluteness' of the Hegelian system is predicated upon its thorough
recognition and respectful 'inclusion' of finitude, not, as popularly claimed, on a blasphemous
denial and transcendence of it.
If the inadequacy of finite thinking, its inability to know the truth, lay in construing truth as a
given, as that which is always minimally predetermined as an other to an awareness, and if this
mode of understanding truth and cognition is, epistemologically speaking, a groundless posit,
then we are also given an indication of how to conceptualize truth in a manner which is not
constrained by this limitation. The positive lesson of the sublation of consciousness is this: do
not regard the topic of philosophical consideration as necessarily always predetermined in
virtue of the fact that, in the parlance of consciousness, it "stands as an object" for a thinking
awareness. Put differently, the positive lesson of the Phenomenology is that we do not need to
assume that objectivity as regards knowledge (the certainty and universality of what we know)
must be construed as something which is founded in a given object. So for Hegel, philosophy
presupposes the rejection of the dogma of the given, the rejection of the assumption that our
ordinary way of knowing, wherein we seek to describe given objects, is absolute and
philosophically primal.
This recognition of what consciousness' finitude (its inability to know the truth) consists
inalways construing the truth as a given determinacymakes possible the thinking activity of
systematic philosophy. This activity is quasi-divine because it consists in a kind of limited and
conditioned creativity consistent with self-grounding: through our rejection of the inadequacy
of conscious-

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ness' model of predetermination it becomes possible for us to conceive of determinacy in a
manner free from predetermination, since we no longer assume that whatever is determinate
must be construed as given in its determinacy. 16 (As I shall indicate below, however, this by
no means indicates a total abandonment by the system of the notion or the role of the given.)
Liberated from the assumption that whatever is determinate is always determinate in virtue of
its presence to awareness, and armed with the discovery that this assumption is
whatminimallyhas always predetermined what we conceive, we may then embark on a
consideration of determinacy which is, in principle, self-grounding (and thus absolute in
Hegel's sense) because it is based on no external predeterminations (save the
'predetermination' of rejecting consciousness as a model for philosophical cognition.)17
Yet this systematic consideration of determinacy is only quasi-divine and not blasphemous.18
For one thing, it is not blasphemous because, as Hegel asserts again and again, the very
possibility of coming to engage in this self-determinative or self-constitutive thinking is
conditioned, mediated; its presupposes the "liberation" from the opposition of consciousness
which follows from the recognition of the thoroughgoing finitude of consciousness.19 It is also
not blasphemous because the nature of what self-determination is here is also conditioned,
mediated: the system is constituted via 'self-determination' in virtue of the fact that
determinacies are not constituted in the manner of consciousness. Hence this systematic self-
determination is not self-determination in the divine manner. Presumably, God's self-
determination is not mediated, and thus is not limited and conditioned as Hegel insists the self-
determination of systematic philosophy is. Certainly the self-determination of an omniscient
and omnipotent God would not be 'in virtue' of anything.
Yet in spite of being conditioned, mediated in these ways, it is clear that the system might
make a claim to being absolute in Hegel's sense: it is self-grounding becauseand insofar asno
predeterminations function constitutively in its conceptualizing, and thus its ground lies within
itself in the sense that it presupposes nothing determinate.20 But it is not absolute in the divine
sense that it presupposes nothing at all. The system is self-grounding, absolute to the extent to
which, in it, determinacy comes to be constituted out of indeterminacy in a manner such that
no external determination enters into this process.21 But this is radically different from the
thoroughly unmediated and unconditioned self-constitutive activity of God which is not mere
self-determination from

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out of (a mediated) indeterminacy but, so we are told, literally self-creation from out of
nothing. The prevalent error of seeing Hegel's enterprise as blasphemous holds only so long as
we see consciousness' mode of knowing as the only possible one. When we do that we cannot
avoid misunderstanding the basis of the system's claim to absoluteness"constituted without
prior determination"as meaning "constituted out of nothing," because we identify being
determinate with being some thing, an object for a consciousness. The root of the false charge
of blasphemy against the system is the genuinely blasphemous assumption that our merely
finite way of knowing is the only possible way.
So, for Hegel, a thoroughgoing appreciation of the (to use current postmodernist jargon)
'inescapable contextuality of subjectivity,' an appreciation of the fact that (to use Hegelian
jargon) 'consciousness is always tied to and conditioned by a given which can never be
thoroughly grasped as it is objectively, in-itself, but only subjectively, as it is for
consciousness,' need not lead to the postmodernist wholesale rejection of the possibility of
objective truth. Properly, it leads only to a rejection of the model of truth in question,
consciousness' correspondence model. For this is a model whose fundamental incoherence has
been revealed through the Phenomenology's demonstration that it defines truth in such a way
(as knowledge of a given object as it is in-itself) that truth cannot be obtained. The strong
conclusion which postmodernists wish to draw from the (by now commonplace) rejection of
the possibility of establishing correspondencethat the very concept of objective truth must be
rejectedonly follows if it can be shown that the only conceivable understanding of truth is in
terms of consciousness' model. But to make that unequivocal assertion is to absolutize
consciousness, and not to reject it, as postmodernists claim to be doing. Additionally, to make
that assertion is to tacitly lay claim to absolute, totalizing knowledge, the very kind of
knowledge which postmodernists claim to abjure.

V.
The Second Charge
B2 can be broken down into two parts: Hegel is guilty of substantive blasphemy (1) because in
the system knowledge of God is claimed; (2) because in what the system claims about God's
nature there is an approximation of the human to the divine and the divine to the human. 22

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Much that Hegel says apparently supports these charges. Hegel explicitly claims that
knowledge of God is possible; 23 he acknowledges that his account of God is formulated in
human terms;24 he speaks of "the unity of divine and human nature" and holds that "...
humanity has attained the certainty of unity with God, that the human is the immediately
present God."25 Now it might appear that in order to count these remarks as damning evidence
of B2, we must read them in the mode of consciousness, as descriptive claims concerning a
given transcendent object. And if, as argued, the system is predicated upon the rejection of the
possibility of our attaining philosophically objective knowledge26 of such objects, that would
be to misread these remarks.27
But that defense seems to lead to a much more serious charge of blasphemy. The rejection of
consciousness in absolute knowing precludes the system's describing a world of transcendent
objects, (including a transcendent God) and it precludes postulating the identity of
philosophical mind with such a transcendent God.28 But what are we to make of the
substantive claims about spirit and God? Must we not come to conclude that while Hegel has
perhaps not claimed to have knowledge of a transcendent God, and while he has not postulated
a naive identity philosophy, he has done something worse? Namely, eliminated such a
transcendent God by reducing God to his system while elevating his system to God? This
revised charge of blasphemy holds that, rather than having tried to bridge the gap between us
and God, Hegel has done away with it.
There is considerable evidence for this. The central Hegelian notion of spirit may be said to
render God human while it elevates humanity to the divine, both implicitly and explicitly.
Throughout the philosophy of religion, we find God presented and explained in human and
cognitive terms, as spirit, just as we find divine capacities attributed to humanity, insofar as it
attains to spirit.29 In addition, both the philosophy of religion and the Encyclopedia articulate
the nature of spirit in human (albeit Hegelian-philosophical) terms, for spirit involves the
concept, reason, and freedom: The essential structure of spirit is that of the concept: it is
something which posits itself as different, but in such a way that this difference is sublated, so
that spirit is with itself in otherness.30 The activity whereby spirit is what it is is the activity of
reason. Spirit as rational is self-determining, and as rational self-determination, is freedom.31
And even as understood in terms of the concept, reason, and freedom, spirit is also to be
equated

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with the divine. For, while "human beings are themselves spirit" 32 "the spirit that has entered
into itself" "the concept that has only itself as its purpose ... is God himself. ... Spirit now has
as its final purpose its concept, its concrete essence itself; it eternally realizes and objectifies
its purpose, and is free in itindeed it is freedom itself. ...''33 In a nutshell, the argument of the
philosophy of religion is that we and God are spirit,34 and it attempts to show how this correct
understanding can be found expressed inchoately in religion.

VI.
The Defense Against B2
Hegel has a twofold defense against B2. The first part of the defense again concerns the nature
of the system and the mediation between the finite and the infinite which it has effected. This
will pertain to the second feature of B2, the charge that the system is blasphemous because it
collapses God into itself in various ways. I will try to show here that the senses in which the
system and spirit can be regarded as infinite or absolute are not the divine senses of those
terms. The second part of the defense also concerns the proper understanding of the infinite
and the finite, and takes shape, again as with the defense against B1, by way of turning the
charge of blasphemy back on the accusers. The defense here addresses the first feature of B2,
the concern that the system's claimed knowledge of God is blasphemous.
According to Hegel it is a cardinal error to understand infinity as utterly beyond and separate
from the finite, but this is just what is presupposed even in the revised charge of collapsing the
finite and the infinite, for a collapse assumes an original unmediated opposition. Thus, to bring
the charge is to think undialectically, at the level of finite thought which fixes its categories
into rigidly opposed determinations.35 According to B2, the distinction between ourselves as
finite and the divine infinite has disappeared because Hegel's concept of spirit has effectively
eliminated the divine altogether as a transcendent object. But for Hegel, the whole possibility
of the system is based on the dialectical preservation of a distinction which, as the mediation
of the finite and the infinite, effects a reconciliation of them, not an identification, or a
collapse, or an elimination of either. What is the nature of this reconciliation? The key idea for
Hegel is that there cannot be an abstract opposition of the finite and the infinite, as though

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the infinite is infinite in simply not being the finite and vice versa. As applied to the system,
this means that it is truly infinite, or absolute, only in and through a mediated relation with the
finite, that is, one which does not deny the reality of the finite as finite, but recognizes it as
what it is so that this very act of recognition is part of the infinite system's self-constitution.
We have already seen how this recognition and reconciliation work in regard to the system's
beginning in and through an acknowledgement of the genuine finitude of consciousness. Let
us see more specifically how this recognition and reconciliation of the finite plays out in the
rest of the system.

VII.
The System's Recognition of Finitude
While Hegel has rejected finite consciousness, as a basis for philosophical cognition, and
while he has thus ensured that the system does not purport to describe a transcendent world of
objects (including an objective divinity), this is not at the price of denying that world of given
objectivity in its givenness via an attempt to reduce it to itself, as the revised charge assumes.
Hegel's system is misunderstood when seen as involving a claim to be infinite in the divine
sense of being a literally all-encompassing, totalizing abrogation of finitude and givenness. To
comprehend the other systematically is not to deny or to reduce the other to the system, it is
rather, as we shall see, an attempt to conceive in thought what is radically other than thought
without transforming that other into a derivative of thought. 36
On what grounds can these claims be substantiated? For one thing, such a abrogation would
require Hegel to forget his own dicta about the relation of the finite and the infinite. The
system's attaining to infinity would be in and through an utter transcendence or reduction of
the finite, one which would be fundamentally undialectical and unHegelian because it would
leave finitude behind, in a onesided manner as something false, rather than incorporating it.
But "[t]he real infinite, far from being a mere transcendence of the finite, always involves the
absorption of the finite into its own fuller nature."37 The system does not eliminate or abandon
finitude (in this instance, the given world and our conscious relation to it as something given)
because the systematic refusal to take a descriptive stance toward that world is part of an
acknowledgement of the genuine and unavoidable limitations

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inseparable from any attempt to describe the given. Thus, in the system, finitude is accepted
without being absolutized because this system is not offered as a substitute for finite,
descriptive knowledge; and as all descriptive claims are abjured, the system also limits itself.
Insofar as it offers absolute knowledge, this knowledge is not the divine variety which is
presumably unconditional descriptive knowledge of the given universe. 38
Additionally, not only does finitude fail to be eliminated in the system, it is also acknowledged
and incorporated by it becauseas we sawthe manner in which it attains infinity as self-
determination is mediated by and predicated upon the recognition of the finitude of
consciousness. By abandoning a descriptive stance and by then engaging in self-determination
on the basis of not determining determinacy in the manner of consciousness, the system both
recognizes finite mind as finite and goes beyond it, yet in such a way that this going beyond is
not a denial of that finitude but precisely a recognition of it in and as finite. Just what makes
finite mind finite has been disclosed and acknowledged as genuine in its finitude:
consciousness as knower always confronts objects as given in their determinacy and is finite
because it cannot demonstrate that what it takes them to be is what they are in-themselves.
And, in and through that disclosure and acknowledgement, a way of thinking which differs
from the finite (in not purporting to be or to compete with descriptive knowledge) has been
made possible.39
There are two other ways in which the system can be seen as not blasphemous because
thoroughly conditioned by finitude even while being infinite as self-determining. The first
pertains to the role of the finite in the system's self-constitution; the second concerns the nature
of spirit.
As we know, Hegel claims that the system is absolute as self-determining, yet he
acknowledges the important role in it of finite determinations. Seeing how the finite enters into
the system provides further evidence for the idea that the system accepts the reality of the
finite (albeit in a manner different from consciousness which accepts the finite by taking the
given as the source of its knowledge).40
How is the role of the finite to be understood and reconciled with the idea of the system as
infinite because self-grounding?
The finite enters in without compromising the self-determining character of the system
because the system in its self-constitutive self-determination engenders a process of categorial
self-transformation which involves the recognition and conceptualizing of an

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other to thought. 41 This occurs in the system in the move from the sheer self-determination of
thought, in the logic, to the conditioned self-determination of the Realphilosophie, in the
philosophies of nature and spirit. In this move something finiteradically other than pure
thoughtis conceived, and the nature of what this is is conceptualized by systematic thought in
conformity with the concept. So systematic self-constitutive thought comes on its own to
acknowledge and to think the idea of what is other than itself, thereby effecting a move in its
self-development through the self-limitation involved in incorporating the category of finitude
within itself. On the one hand, self-determination is preserved, the infinite character of the
system is not compromised, in that the content of the categories of Realphilosophie is provided
by the transformation of pure thought categories which is engendered by thinking the idea of
what is other than thought; thus the system limits itself, for the determination of the finite here
is not derived by descriptive observation in the manner of consciousness.42 On the other hand,
because the determinacy of the finite is determined as 'other than thought' this self-limitation is
nonetheless a genuine limitation to pure thought since it establishes the necessity for thought
of thinking something as having the character of not being determined by thought. (What
'determined by thought' means has been established in the logic. Just what it means more
specifically to be determined as 'other than thought' cannot be pursued here.43 )
In addition, this 'incorporation' of finitude is also not a reduction of finitude which denies its
genuinely finite character by reducing it to the system, for Hegel recognizes that we need
descriptive contents supplied by consciousness in order to help formulate the categories
generated.44 This would not be the case if philosophical mind were infinite in the manner of
God, if our given character as finite consciousness had been transcended utterly.
If we think through the process of categorial self-determination as one of self-transformation
in which finitude is recognized and incorporated, we find further evidence that the system
recognizes finitude and thereby also limits itself, that is, establishes its own finite character.
This occurs when we take into account how spirit emerges in the system and what it is.
The process of categorial self-transformation which leads us to the idea of nature continues as
one in which that category, initially thought as what is fixed in its determinacy (i.e., as not self
-determining) is gradually transformed. (As non-descriptive the transformation must not be
understood as historical-evolutionary but as formal-categorical.) In broad terms the
transformation takes

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place in that the activity of (what was in the logic) the sheer self-determination of thought
gradually reappears, but transformed in its character, as what is called spirit. The topic is no
longer the pure or sheer self-determination exhibited in logic, but an activity of determination
located in and conditioned by what is conceptualized as the domain of the given, of finitude.
The system's progression from nature through absolute spirit shows that what is finite, given,
and not self-determining is necessary in its givenness as that in and through which spirit comes
to constitute itself as self-determining.
So, conceptually speaking, finitude emerges in the system as that which arises out of the
system's larger process of categorical self-determination. Thus the system remains self-
grounding. But in what the system conceptualizes as the determinate character of the finiteits
givenness as an other to thoughtthe system also recognizes the finite as genuinely and radically
other than itself as self-determinative systematic thought. In this way the finite is not reduced
to a mere adjunct or derivative of thought: In systematic philosophy the determinate
characteristic of the finite is not established by purportedly cognizing a given object. (As
Hegel saw, and as the history of philosophy shows, that approach leads to one or another
version of idealism. Taking as paradigmatic the issue of how what is can be known by
consciousness [or described by language] requires reading attributes and characteristics of
consciousness [or language] into the domain of objectivity.)
Additionally, when we see what spirit is as self-determining we can see again that it is
conditioned by finitude and cannot be characterized as divine in a blasphemous sense. Spirit's
process of self-constitutive self-determination is not divine simply because it involves acting
transformatively on the given, finite world in order to create in it the conditions for its own
freedom. This vision of a gradual fulfillment of self-determination through action on a given
world indicates clearly that spirit is God-like, but not divine in the blasphemous sense: "This
struggling with the finite, the overcoming of limitation, constitutes the stamp of the divine in
the human spirit. ..." True religion has just this aspect central to spirit: recognizing but refusing
to accept as absolute the given, finite character of the world. 45
But does not this whole business of mediating and reconciling the finite and the infinite in an
attempt to undercut the possibility of blasphemy still lead to blasphemy by eliminating the
intelligibility of the notion of a transcendent infinite? Hegel has a defense against this move.
For one thing, the system does not attempt to do

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away utterly with such a notion. It accords religion, as that which grasps the truth in pictorial,
representative, finite form, an important role both in leading to spirit's discovery of its truth
and in the world which is transformed by spirit's attainment of freedom. 46 Still, philosophical
truth is given priority over religious truth,47 and is not the philosophical truth about the infinite
blasphemous in denying the radical transcendence of God?
Hegel's last defense is to indicate that the very conception of the infinite which postulates God
as radically transcendent is itself blasphemous, in the following way.48 Any discussion of
God, he argues, even that which holds that we can know that God is but not what he is, claims
that God is knowable. So in any talk of God we must allow that God is knowable.49 Thus, if
we wish to talk of God, the question becomes: in what way are we best to conceive of the
nature of the divine? Those who bring the charge of blasphemy hold that God must be
conceived as radically transcendent, nonfinite, and other than human. But to conceive of God
in such an apparently pious manner is to apply finite categories to God,50 since to insist that
God only be thought of in this manner is just to define God in exclusively human terms as
nothing more than what is other than the human, the finite. "If God has the finite only over
against himself, then he himself is finite and limited."51 "[I]f the divine idea is grasped in the
forms of finitude, then it is not posited as it is in and for itself. ... To cognize the truth of
something means to know and define it according to the truth, in the form of this idea in
general."52 God is rendered finite by the seemingly pious insistence that God be thought of
only as a negation of the finite.53 This limits, finitizes, God by way of making God a being
who is only an abstract opposition to the finite.54
So we have seen that Hegel is not guilty of the charges of blasphemy. His system is not based
on a claim to divine absolute knowing, but rather on a rejection of the possibility of such
knowing. The system itself is only conditionallynot divinelyabsolute or infinite: its character
as self-grounding is conditioned by the suspension of consciousness' claim to absoluteness, a
condition which limits the system's claim as knowledge by precluding descriptive truth from
its purview. Both in the philosophical process which establishes the system and in what the
system asserts, finitude is acknowledged and accepted in a variety of ways. In addition, we
have seen that the systematic recognition of the finitude of philosophy and of the human spirit
does not require the nihilistic rejection of the possibility of our knowing objective truth.
Rather, when we see that the prospects for that truth lie not in attempting to

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describe what is, but in conceiving of how things should be, we can also recognize the limits of
finitude itself and avoid the postmodern predilection for falling into incoherence through a
tendentiously pseudo-pious absolutizing of finitude.
<><><><><><><><><><><><>
Chapter 6 has further developed and explicated my assertion that rethinking Hegel's
philosophy as antifoundational nonetheless enables us to hold onto a whole Hegel, an
antifoundationalist who is still committed to a strong sense of philosophical truth. This claim
has been articulated by unpacking Hegel's notorious notion of the system as absoluteits
purported offering of self-determining, self-grounding, and in these senses, unconditional,
absolute, truthin antifoundational terms. Chapter 6 works to render intelligible the seemingly
oxymoronic notion of nonfoundational absolute truth by showing how Hegel demonstrates that
the absolute truth philosophy has sought can only be attained through a recognition and
inclusion of finitude.
Chapter 6 has considered three central juncturesand three modesin which Hegel's system
acknowledges finitude: The whole enterprise is initiated by such an acknowledgement in that
the system's beginning in the Logic is based on the disclosure of the ineluctable finitude of
consciousness (its inability to attain self-grounding). But, unlike contemporary
antifoundationalists, Hegel sees that this negative feature has a positive prospect: It opens up
the possibility of a different conception of truth, one which does not conceive truth in terms of
a given and hence is neither necessarily susceptible to the failings of the subjectivist model nor
in competition with it. And thus, Hegel's system is not absolute in the sense of
totalizingabrogating all truth claims to itself. For it does not purport to replace finite knowing
either by claiming to offer a more perfect version of its truth or by holding that such truth must
be dismissed altogether. Rather, it is antifoundationalism which is guilty of a false
absolutization in refusing to allow for the possibility of any other mode of knowing save the
subjectivist model whose limitations it has recognized.
So, the very possibility of the system's mode of articulating philosophical truth is predicated
upon recognizing the finite character of subjective knowing, and on the basis of this
recognition, considering an alternative. Additionally, Chapter 6 has argued that the system
itself recognizes finitude in the process of presenting this alternative. For self-determinative
thought to constitute itself, it must think a radical otherrecognize, in thought, the given

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precisely in its ineluctable, sheer otherness as givenand thus acknowledge its own limits as
pure thought. So, what is other than thought comes to be thoughtthe system conceptualizes the
realbut not in the descriptive mode of finite knowing which claims to grasp the real as it is in
fact given. Chapter 6 has shown why Hegel's account of the real is not a version of
metaphysical idealism, for the system does not deny a given world, or possible knowledge of
it, and it does not collapse such a world into itself. Unlike other modes of philosophical
thought which attempt to say something in thought about the given as given, systematic Real-
philosophie thinks the other in its nature as radically other to thought. Thus this account
presupposes neither that thought and the given are identical nor even that they have any
features in common. Because this account does not purport to be of the real as something
given, it further acknowledges its own limitation and the conditional legitimacy of
nonphilosophical accounts of the real. Lastly, Chapter 6 has pointed to how the system
acknowledges finitude and the given in its account of spirit: Systematic philosophy's own self-
development leads it to conceptualize conscious agents acting in the world of the given, and its
account of human agency is one which again acknowledges, without absolutizing, the finite
character of human subjectivity. Chapter 6 has shown that the traditional understanding of
Hegel as propounding an impossible, blasphemous, absolute philosophy must ignore the
system's own considered treatment of various aspects of finitude.
Part One of Philosophy Without Foundations has made a case for the contemporary relevance
of Hegel by indicating how his philosophy can be rethought in nonfoundational terms. At
various junctures in Part One, I have contended that Hegel's philosophy should be rethought
today both because its critique of foundationalism is superior and because, unlike
contemporary antifoundationalism, it offers something other than and superior to the self-
referentially suspect attempts to replace philosophy with relativistic or nihilist glorifications of
finitude which cannot coherently capture the nature of finitude itself. Part Two, "The
Transcendence of Contemporary Philosophy," works to develop and further substantiate this
latter theme by considering various contemporary alternatives to Hegelian systematic
philosophy. Chapter 7, "Hegel and Hermeneutics," takes up the theme of finitude discussed in
Chapter 6. It focuses on Hans-Georg Gadamer, arguing that despite his appreciative dialogue
with Hegel, Gadamer does not succeed in giving coherent expression to his insights about
finitude.

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Part Two
The Transcendence of Contemporary Philosophy

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Chapter 7
Hegel and Hermeneutics
We must have a new mythology, but this mythology must be in the service of the ideas, it
must be a mythology of reason.
Hegel

Three of the major schools of contemporary continental thoughtcritical theory,

poststructuralism and philosophical hermeneuticsare alike, despite the manifold differences
which distinguish them, in criticizing and rejecting the traditional aim of modern philosophy:
our Cartesian legacy as defined by the ideal of an autonomous, fully transparent, self-
legitimating standpoint of reason as a standpoint attainable by the reflective ego,
consciousness or thinking self. 1 To a degree, this common point also marks the importance,
for them, of Hegel. All can be said to be involved in a love/hate relationship with him. Both
the negative and positive impact of Hegel on critical theory is clearly acknowledged, at least
by Habermas.2 More intriguing is the self-understanding of Hegel's influence on
poststructuralism as expressed by Foucault: "... our age, whether through logic or
epistemology, whether through Marx or through Nietzsche, is attempting to flee Hegel. ... But
truly to escape Hegel involves an exact appreciation of the price we have to pay to detach
ourselves from him. It assumes that we are aware of the extent to which Hegel, insidiously
perhaps, is close to us; it implies a knowledge, in that which permits us to think against Hegel,
of that which remains Hegelian. We have to determine the extent to which our anti-
Hegelianism is possibly one of his tricks directed against us, at the end of which he stands,
motionless, waiting for us."3
I have quoted Foucault on Hegel because I think one of the points on which poststructuralism
and hermeneutics are closest

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consists in their shared self-understandings of the complexity and the ambiguous character of
their respective relations to Hegel. 4 Foucault's remarks might just as well have been expressed
by Gadamer. In fact, Gadamer tells us: ''Concisely stated, the issue here is whether or not the
comprehensive mediation of every conceivable path of thought, which Hegel undertook, might
not of necessity give the lie to every attempt to break out of the circle of reflection in which
thought thinks itself. In the end, is even the position which Heidegger tries to establish in
opposition to Hegel trapped within the sphere of the inner infinity of reflection?"5 Indeed, of
all contemporary thinkers who take Hegel seriously and are yet critical of him, Gadamer is the
most sensitive and appreciative, the most alert to Hegel's nuances and the most willing to
acknowledge both the importance of Hegel's influence and the continuing challenge which
Hegel presents to his own philosophical position. In Gadamer's words: "... it is of central
importance for the hermeneutic problem that it should come to grips with Hegel."6
In what follows, I shall (1) reflect on the complex ambiguity of the Gadamer-Hegel
relationship, indicating the points on which they are in disagreement, the points where they
come close to one another, and the points where there is an unresolved tension in their relation.
In addition, and in the course of this task, I shall indicate (2) what I think it means, and why it
is important, for hermeneutics to overcome Hegel.
Central to understanding the importance and the complexity of the Gadamer-Hegel
relationship are three interrelated issues: (1) the rejection of subjectivity, (2) the issue of
finitude and (3) the problem of the circle of reflection. My central thesis is that on all these
points of impact between Gadamer and Hegel there exists an underlying ambiguity in
Gadamer's position on Hegel.
(1) Amongst interpreters of Hegel, Gadamer has a highly sophisticated appreciation of the fact
that Hegel's completion of transcendental idealism is effected in and through a critique of
egological subjectivity and the epistemology founded on it. "For it is Hegel who explicitly
carried the dialectic mind or spirit beyond the forms of subjective spirit, beyond consciousness
and self-consciousness."7 Yet what is initially unclear in Gadamer is the degree to which
Hegel carries out such a critique and the extent to which his critique is effective, for Gadamer
also notes critically that Hegel's project proclaims itself as having "free self-consciousness."8
Did Hegel fully overcome subjectivity? Or did he only produce its ultimate or penultimate
transformation into an absolute

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subjectivity? Does an absolute consciousness which is neither consciousness per se nor self-
consciousness but is in essence still a consciousness pervade in Hegel's thought? 9 It seems to
me that this is the point that Gadamer is getting at, and that his interpretation of Hegel gives an
affirmative answer to the last two questions. The point of difference seems to be that the "free
self-consciousness" which Hegel affirms is not an individual, finite self-consciousness, but
rather the self-consciousness of spirit, and that what Gadamer is critical of is not the notion of
spirit per se but rather the idea of such a self-conscious spirit as being capable of full and
unconditioned self-transparency, i.e., as being the progenitor of an absolute knowledge.10
Reading Gadamer in this way, it is clear that for him Hegel's rejection of subjectivity is
incomplete. It is only a rejection of its primitive or egological forms, such that the basic
structure of the ego or consciousness remains dominant. "Precisely this elevation [of the
"empirical 'I' to the transcendental 'I'"] is what Hegel claims to have accomplished through the
Phenomenology. ... Hegel demonstrated that the I is spirit."11 Thus what Gadamer sees as
purification is not at all a thoroughgoing rejection; the knowing subject qua individual, finite
consciousness has its limited character recognized, but not acknowledged as final. Rather, the
urge of reflection for totality and complete transparency drove Hegel's philosophy on to
proclaim the false triumph of an infinite ego (spirit) which, rather than accepting its finitude as
defined by the limiting conditions of an other, swallows or subsumes the other into itself:
"Absolute knowing is thus the result of a purification in the sense that the truth of Fichte's
concept of the transcendental 'I' emerges, not merely as being a subject, but rather as reason
and spirit and, accordingly, as all of reality."12 So, despite the fact that "Hegel's concept of
spirit ... transcends the subjective form of self-consciousness ...'' the ultimate structure of
consciousness remains dominant, for "[T]he light in which all truth is seen is cast from
consciousness's becoming clear about itself."13
Thus, in regard to subjectivity what initially appears to be an ambiguity in Gadamer's reading
of Hegel can be resolved by paying closer attention to Gadamer's texts: He thinks that a variety
of modes of subjective consciousness are overcome by Hegel, but the basic form of
consciousness prevails and is absolutized. Nonetheless, subjectivity is important because it is
intimately related to the issues (2) of finitude and (3) of reflection. In addition, all three are
ultimately crucial because of the fact that, in their interconnection one with another, they
define the focal point of hermeneutics'

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confrontation with Hegel and because it is around them and around this confrontation that the
even more basic issue of the foundation and legitimacy of hermeneutics revolves. That is to
say: The confrontation between Hegel and hermeneutics on subjectivity, finitude, and
reflection is directly connected not only with hermeneutics' attempts to overcome Hegel, but
also with the question of the foundations of hermeneutics itself. As I shall suggest, these are
different ways of approaching the same issue. Thus the question as to whether or not
hermeneutics has succeeded in founding itself philosophically is intimately tied to the question
as to whether or not it has succeeded in overcoming Hegel.
Determining the precise nature and limits of subjectivity is crucial in this respect simply
because the keystone of hermeneutics itself, as well as its critique of Hegel, lies in its
affirmation of the primacy of finitude, as defined in part by the notion that the thinking subject
cannot attain to the full self-transparency of an absolute knowing. For hermeneutics this is a
fundamentum inconcussum, and the rejection of Hegel hinges on it: "In its uniqueness, finitude
and historicity, however, human Dasein would preferably be recognized not as an instance of
an eidos, but rather as itself the most real factor of all." 14
But, despite his rejection of what he sees as Hegel's transcendence of Dasein in its uniqueness
and finitude, it is with good reason that Gadamer speaks of Hegel's dialectic as "a continual
source of irritation."15 For the deeper complexity of the issue of subjectivity, reflected in
Gadamer's understanding of Hegel, and especially as regards the matters of finitude and
reflection, concerns the manner in which one is to go about establishing the finitude of
consciousness or subjectivity, and hence concerns the question of the foundations of
hermeneutics itself. The problem consists in doing this in a way which is philosophically
adequate, but which does not lead, just in virtue of this adequacy, to the transcendence into an
absolute consciousness. The decisive foundational question for hermeneutics, one which
prevails despite its rejection of the perceived Hegelian notion of absolute subjectivity concerns
the following: How is one to bring finitudethe self-evident awareness of the limited character
of all human subjectivityto philosophical legitimacy? This metaquestion, which delineates the
deeper level of the Hegel-Gadamer relation, is connected with the problem of reflection, for
the preeminent method of philosophical discourse is that of reflective thought. How is the pre-
philosophical experience or awareness of finitude to be articulated in such a way that, despite
reflection's demand for an accounting of

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the conditions of the possibility of the philosophical knowing of this fact, such an accounting
does not become "trapped within the sphere of the inner infinity of reflection"? 16 How does
one articulate finitude in such a way that the very possibility of such an articulation does not
testify to the infinite power and capacity of the reflecting philosophical subject and such that
reason remains "aware that human knowledge is limited and will remain limited, even if it is
conscious of its own limit?"17
It is evidence both of the depths of Gadamer's philosophical understanding and of the extent of
his openness that he is aware of this situation and the reflective-Hegelian objections which it
presents to his own position. Where does he stand in regard to reflection's demand for a full
accounting of the 'position from which' he makes his philosophical claims? And where does he
see the locus for a philosophically adequate articulation of finitude? I think we shall see that
Gadamer's position on the former question is marked by an inner tension or ambiguity which
is not ultimately resolved, but which is broken off by his decision to reject reflection by
stepping outside of its circle. An assessment of the extent to which hermeneutics overcomes
Hegel must focus on this move. Furthermore, we shall see that both his rejection of reflection
and his delineation of the nature of finitude are mediated by his complex dialogue with Hegel.
The crux of the tension within hermeneutics in regard to reflection, and the problematic
character of reflection for it, lies in the need for a balanced or self-limiting reflection. Insofar
as it articulates finitude philosophically, rather than as a dogmatic article of faith, hermeneutics
must make use of and is a version of the philosophy of reflection.18 As such, Gadamer by no
means straightforwardly denies the demand for a reflective or philosophical grounding of the
conditions of its own possibility: "It is a question of recognizing in it [hermeneutics] an
experience of truth that must not only be justified philosophically, but which is itself a mode
of philosophizing."19 Reflection cannot be fully renounced, for it is in and through
reflectionand historically in Kant's philosophythat we reach, if not the awareness of our
finitude, at least a philosophical articulation of those conditions which define it: Reflective self
-understanding is that activity in and through which we come to an awareness of our
situatedness. In addition, hermeneutics' claim to universality requires that it ground itself and
legitimate this claim: "the hermeneutic problematic ... must establish its own universality."20
Yet reflection is dangerous, for it demands 'validation everywhere' and offers itself as a
''power" to

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afford this validation which is "false." 21 Nonetheless, it cannot deny the question of its own
possibility: "Anyone who takes seriously the finitude of human existence and constructs no ...
'transcendental ego' to which everything can be traced back, will not be able to escape the
question of how his own thinking as transcendental is empirically possible."22 It would seem
then that the very rejection of the infinite capacity for reflective grounding which hermeneutics
demands forces it to pay even greater attention to the question of its own foundation. A self-
limiting philosophy of reflection must pay special attention to this issue, and in a hermeneutics
which does so Gadamer seems to see the truth of the claims of philosophy of reflection
properly realized: "Hermeneutics achieves its actual productivity only when it musters
sufficient self-reflection to reflect simultaneously about its own critical endeavors, that is,
about its own limitations and the relativity of its own position. Hermeneutical reflection that
does that seems to me to come closer to the real ideal of knowledge, because it also makes us
aware of the illusion of reflection."23
But the decisive question concerns whether or not and how this self-limitation of
reflectionwhich, if it were a self-limitation would ground hermeneutics' assertions concerning
finitude and thus substantiate its rejection of Hegel in a twofold waycan be achieved. How is
the self-limiting reflection of hermeneutics, understood as an expression of its own relativity,
to be effected in a way that is not self-defeating? In confronting the issue of hermeneutics'
rejection of reflection, Gadamer notes that reflective arguments against hermeneutics are
"formally correct" in that they "demonstrate the inner contradictions of all relativist views."
Yet they "have something about them that suggests that they are attempting to bowl one over.
However cogent they seem, they still miss the main point. In making use of them, one is
proved right, yet they do not express any superior insight of any value." They are "sophistic"
and ''in fact they tell us nothing."24 This invective, which is not directed against Hegel, marks
the point where the intimations of a reflectively adequate self-limiting philosophy of reflection
are broken off, the point where Gadamer, in a highly self-reflective way, consciously steps
outside of the circle of reflection. Thus, through his own self-reflection, Gadamer comes to
realize that reflection cannot be limited from within: "Polemics against an absolute thinker has
itself no starting point. The Archimedean point from where Hegel's philosophy could be
toppled can never be found through reflection. This is precisely the formal quality of reflective
philosophy, that there can-

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not be a position that is not drawn into the reflective movement of consciousness coming to
itself." 25
Gadamer appreciates what it is, from the standpoint of reflection, that is unacceptable in his
own thought: "To be sure it is 'obvious' that finitude is a privative determination of thought
and as such presupposes its opposite, transcendence. ... Who will deny that? I contend
however, that we have learned once and for all from Kant that such 'obvious' ways of thought
can mediate no possible knowledge to us finite beings. Dependence on possible experience
and demonstration by means of it remain the alpha and omega of all responsible thought."26
And thus: "It seems to me that it is essential for taking finitude seriously ... that ... experience
renounce all dialectical supplementation."27 We come then to the bottom line vis-à-vis
reflection: it must be broken with. But even this break deepens the ambiguous character of
hermeneutics' relation with Hegel: One the one hand, Hegel is acknowledged as articulating a
successful critique of egological subjectivism (by implication, this is also a critique of the
transcendental philosophy of his predecessors, and hence a critique of Kant); on the other
hand, hermeneutics returns to Kant's philosophy as the locus classicus for its assertion of
finitude and its denunciation of the powers of reflection. Once again though, Gadamer is to be
given credit for his appreciation of the untenability of this position as viewed from the
standpoint of reflection: "... this critique of idealism [Kant's and Heidegger's] was faced then
as now, with the comprehensive claim of the transcendental position. Inasmuch as
philosophical reflection did not want to leave unconsidered any possible area of thought ...and,
since Hegel, this was the claim of transcendental philosophyit had already included every
possible objection within the total reflection of the mind.''28 And testifying to the strength of
the reflective position in Hegel, he notes: "It is necessary to recognize the compulsive power
of reflective philosophy and admit that Hegel's critics never succeeded in breaking its magic
spell. We shall be able to detach the problem of an historical hermeneutics from the hybrid
consequences of speculative idealism if we refuse to be satisfied with the irrationalistic
reduction of it, but preserve the truth of Hegel's thought ... we are concerned to conceive a
reality which is beyond the omnipotence of reflection. This was precisely the point against
which the criticism of Hegel was directed and where the principle of reflective philosophy
proved superior to all its critics."29
Does Gadamer succeed in 'breaking the magic spell' of Hegelian reflection? Does he feel that
he has succeeded in doing this and in

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overcoming Hegel? Reflecting what I believe is Gadamer's own position, I think we have to
answer: yes and no. No in that, and as I think Gadamer himself appreciates, his rejection of
reflection is a step outside of the circle rather than a genuine breaking of it. A step outside
because, from the standpoint of reflective philosophy, he seems not to have come up with an
articulation of finitude which will satisfy the insistent demand of reflection for a reflective
accounting or grounding of the legitimacy of the position from which the primacy of finitude
is asserted. The qualified answer of yes to the question is evidenced by Gadamer's
unquestioned belief that this reflective demand is fundamentally illegitimate, at least in part
because to meet it must lead, in his eyes, to a renunciation of the primary datum of finitude.
Insofar as finitude remains the "alpha and omega" of hermeneutics, and insofar as Gadamer is
correct in holding that no reflectively adequate philosophy of reflection can succeed in
limiting itself, then it is clear for him that hermeneutics constitutes a superior philosophical
position vis-à-vis Hegel despite its inability to mount that mode of a critique of infinite
reflection which reflective philosophy would acknowledge: a reflective, that is, a thoroughly
immanent one. 30
Given his acknowledgement of the fact that Hegel proves superior to the critiques of his
position implicit in Kant and explicit in Heidegger, I think we can see in Gadamer's own
efforts to articulate the fundamental character of finitude a development mediated by his
understanding of and confrontation with Hegel.31 I will no argue this point in detail, but I
believe that Gadamer's so-called "linguistic turn"his emphasis on language rather than Dasein
as the primary datum of finitudestems from his realization that the attempt to present finitude
in terms of the subject, along the lines of the Critique of Pure Reason and Being and Time,
relocates one within the reflective and problematic format of Hegelian philosophy. Thus,
Gadamer turns to the experience and phenomenon of language because of his realization of the
inadequacy of the Kantian and Heideggerian critiques of reflective idealism, and in order to
effect his own conception of a "reality which is beyond the omnipotence of reflection."32
I will omit a consideration of whether or not language, as it is conceived by either the later
Heidegger or Gadamer, suffices to meet Hegelian objections. I want to return instead to the
theme of the complexity and ambiguity of the Gadamer-Hegel relationship by first of all
noting the points where Gadamer emphasizes his closeness to Hegel.

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I noted earlier that Gadamer's rejection, despite their "formal correctness," of reflective
arguments against hermeneutics is not directed by him against Hegel. In fact, Gadamer himself
is quite explicit about the closeness of his project with Hegel's. It seems to me that there are
two central and related points of contact here: (1) Gadamer acknowledges, as we saw, the
importance of Hegel's critique of egological subjectivity, and remarking on the necessity of
'coming to grips' with Hegel he writes: "... Hegel's whole philosophy of the mind claims to
achieve the total fusion of history with the present. It is concerned not with a reflective
formalism, but with the same thing as we are. Hegel has thought through the historical
dimension in which the problem of hermeneutics is rooted." 33 Clearly, Hegel's emphasis on
history, and especially on the necessity of historical consciousness for philosophy is a central
point where the Hegelian and hermeneutic projects meet. Again, the crucial point of difference
is the perceived Hegelian claim to absoluteness, specifically his claim to have achieved an
absolute historical consciousness: "Hegel's application to history, insofar as he saw it as part of
the absolute self-consciousness of philosophy, does not do justice to the human
consciousness."34 In Chapter 1 I have indicated how Hegel's awareness of his historical
locatedness can be reconciled with his claim to have attained the truth.35
The second point of contact concerns the earlier noted issues of the idea of a self-limiting (non
-absolute) philosophy of reflection and the proper manner in which finitude is to be
philosophically grounded. As mentioned, Gadamer's position on these matters is especially
sensitive for, (a) he is aware of the difficulties involved in establishing finitude in a
philosophical satisfactory way and (b) he is also aware that Hegel's philosophy not only
provides a critique of subjectivism but also presents, in its further development, a serious
challenge to attempts to locate finitude primarily in a notion of subjectivity or Dasein.
Gadamer's position on Hegel here is complex for, although unquestionably critical of what he
sees as Hegel's absolutism, he nonetheless sees the parallels between his notion of language
and Hegel's concept of spirit: "... despite his speculative dialectical transcendence of the
Kantian concept of finitude. ... (Hegel's) concept of spirit is still the basis of every critique of
subjective spirit. ... This concept of spirit that transcends the subjectivity of the ego has its
counterpart in the phenomenon of language. ..." But "... in contrast to the concept of spirit ...
the phenomenon of language has the merit of being appropriate to our finitude."36

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To summarize the Gadamer-Hegel relationship: For Gadamer, the positive aspects of Hegel's
thought are: (1) The definitive critique of egological subjectivity (including the notion of a
dialectics of experience.); 37 (2) The emphasis on history; (3) The development of 'spirit' as a
notion which transcends subjectivity and which points towards the phenomenon of language.
In each of these cases, however, the breaking point lies in Hegel's insistent pushing of
reflection on to completion, a drive which is seen as transforming his philosophy into
absolutism in its ultimate desire to overcome all otherness and to attain certain self-knowledge
in a reflective consciousness which transcends all experience.38 In short, from Gadamer's point
of view it is the reflective desire for radical justification'validation everywhere' and for
completion, the lust to grasp totality, which brings Hegel to reject finitude despite his
anticipations of the hermeneutic position.39
But when we recollect how systematic philosophy manages to articulate a self-limiting
philosophy of reflection which acknowledges without absolutizing finitude, we can better see
the flaws of this hermeneutic position. In the last analysis, Gadamer asks us to acknowledge a
giventhe finitude of Daseinas philosophically primal and, consequently, as foundationally
determinative for all philosophical considerations. (As we saw, hermeneutics insists on its
universality and its primacy.) So, rather than rejecting foundationalism as the search for some
absolute, determining ground for all possible thought, Gadamerian hermeneutics merely seeks
to offer a revised, non-Cartesian, account of subjectivity, as the foundational candidate. Even
if we move to language (or to a Heideggerian Being of beings) as something beyond all
subjectivity, we are still in the position of philosophically postulating a given as the absolute
determinative ground for thought: hermeneutics insists that what it discloses about finitude
must be acknowledged. Thus, the framework of the subjectivist model of truth (and
foundationalism's pretensions to absolutism) remains in force even if there is no explicit talk of
the subject, and even if talk of subjectivity is rejected for something which purportedly
transcends and grounds the subject. As we have seen Hegel show, to begin with any notion of
a determinate given is to remain within the framework of foundational subjectivity. The
difference that hermeneutics makesthe slight step beyond Cartesianismis simply that now the
determinative, foundational absolute is postulated as something ineluctable, rather than as
transparent. So, hermeneutics, as one version of contemporary antifoundationalism, fails to
significantly distinguish itself from foundationalism. Like foundationalism,

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it claims universality for its assertions, while refusing to enter into the traditional foundational
process of reflective justification. And like foundationalism, it remains wedded to the
subjectivist model of truth. One can assert again and again, as defenders of
antifoundationalism do, that the substantive content of their thought, what they assert, is a
renunciation of foundational absolutism, an affirmation of finitude. But both the manner of
their assertions and what they offer as primal truth belie these postulations of humility. As a
version of antifoundationalism, hermeneutics is Cartesianism in sheep's clothing.
<><><><><><><><><><><><>
Chapter 7 has suggested that Gadamer's effort to conceive a 'reality beyond reflection' has
gone awry. As we have seen, the traditional Hegel he engages is a straw man. Gadamer is in
good company in misconstruing Hegel's system as totalizing, in failing to see that Hegel does
not overcome all otherness, and in failing to see how Hegel combines the possibility of radical
self-legitimation with an awareness and acknowledgement of limitations of thought. Like
hermeneutics, Marxist philosophy purports to offer a radical alternative to traditional
philosophy and to do so through a confrontation with the failures of Hegelianism. Chapter 8
will disclose how Marx's efforts in these directions fail. Additionally, Chapter 8 furthers the
account of the nature of Hegelian nonfoundational systematic philosophy by addressing the
important question: if systematic philosophy must abjure presenting a descriptive account of
the given, what is it?

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Chapter 8
The Critique of Marx and Marxist Thought
Hegel has no problems to formulate. He has only dialectics.
Karl Marx

Karl Marx is one of the most famous, influential, and genuinely important critics of Hegel.
Before I move on to the substance of this chapter, to a consideration of why I believe that
Marx's critique of Hegel is fundamentally wrong, let me first comment on why I nonetheless
feel that this critique is of central philosophical importance.
One aspect of the importance of what Marx has to say about Hegel simply has to do with the
stature of Marx in the intellectual community. Marx's thought commands considerable respect,
attention, and numerous adherents, both in the larger intellectual world and in the narrower
confines of philosophy. 1 In the world of ideas, Marx is a heavyweight, and what he has to say
about Hegel is, and should be, taken seriously.
For philosophers in particular though, Marx's critique of Hegel has a special significance. This
is not only the case because Marx and Hegel offer sweeping and comprehensive, but
divergent, philosophical accounts of the human condition and of the nature and prospects for
the good life. Particular differences in their views of man and the world aside, Marx's critique
of Hegel is especially important to philosophers because it is the focal point for a major
confrontation on metaphilosophical issues of continuing relevance. For Marx's critique is at
the center of an Auseinandersetzung between what are closely related but nonetheless sharply
contrasting views on the nature and limits of philosophy itself and on the

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proper understanding both of the relation between philosophical theory and reality and of the
relation between the philosopher and the world of his age, issues which have always
concerned philosophers and which are the subject of much philosophical discussion today.
But beyond this the importance of Marx's Hegelkritik is even greater, especially for
philosophical students of Hegel and Marx who are particularly interested in questions about
the nature and legitimacy of systematic-dialectical philosophy and the possibility of critical
theory. This is the case, because unlike many other critics past and present, Marx does not
dismiss the legitimacy of systematic-dialectical philosophy as such. He does not condemn
Hegel's whole approach, Hegel's whole idea of a philosophical science, as irredeemably
perverse and hopelessly wrongheaded. 2 Refusing to regard Hegel as a "dead dog," Marx
defended Hegel against what he saw as all too prevalent unjust attacks. He forthrightly
described himself as a "pupil of that mighty thinker," consistently acknowledging his
indebtedness to Hegel.3 And not only did he speak of setting Hegel aright, Marx even went so
far as to conceive his own philosophy as a corrected continuation and development, an
Aufhebung, one might say, of Hegel's.4
So, far from being a critic who would reject, or even simply correct Hegel, Marx seems to
have understood and justified his own position in Hegelian systematic terms, as the proper,
dialectically generated refinement and furtherance of Hegel's. Given this self-understanding of
his position then, we can say that the overall status of Marx's philosophy, and specifically its
claim to being dialectically scientific, rests at least in part on the rightness of Marx's
Hegelkritik.
Thus, the deeper philosophical significance of Marx's critique of Hegel is twofold. On the one
hand, it deserves attention from anyone interested in the general topic of the proper nature and
limits of philosophical theory. This is especially the case today, when so much philosophical
effort is being exercised in attempts to demonstrate the aporetic character of the Western
philosophical tradition to which Marx and Hegel belong.5 On the other hand, this critique and
the reconceptualization of dialectical philosophy that Marx develops in conjunction with it
compels attention for some, as it is of decisive importance to students of Hegel and Marx
concerned with questions about the status, the overall character and legitimacy, of systematic-
dialectical philosophical theory. For what is finally at stake in this critique are the claims of
this theory's two major proponents to have raised philosophy to the level of a science.

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What, briefly, are the essential features of Marx's critique? How does it lead to what is
allegedly a correct reconceptualization of the nature and limits of dialectical philosophy?
Further, how does his critique lead to what Marx sees as a necessary and radical
transformation of the relation between philosophical theory and reality and thus also to a
transformation of the tasks of the philosopher, both theoretical and practical?
The leitmotif of Marx's critique of Hegel is a familiar one, and it is not original to Marx. 6 It
amounts to the charge that Hegel propounds a patently metaphysical, idealistic, and pantheistic
system: a system in which thought or the Absolute Idea is literally and erroneously postulated
as the true essence of reality and the moving subject behind history, such that empirical
actualities are regarded as the mere appearances, the products or manifestations of this Idea.7
For Marx, however, Hegel's purported lapse into the idealistic fallacy is not a genetic flaw or
an unavoidable consequence of the systematic-dialectical approach to theory which he
originated. Hegel's mistake, according to Marx, is not attributable to the very nature of
systematic philosophy, but rather to the particular and erroneous fashion in which Hegel
understood and developed dialectics. What is wrong with Hegel's philosophy is so to speak,
essentially a matter of its content as opposed to its form, although, as we shall see, correcting
the error of content does have serious implications for the nature and form of dialectical
philosophy.8
In any case, perceiving Hegel's mistake as attributable not to dialectical thought per se, but
rather to a misconstrual of the proper nature of dialectics, the substance of Marx's critique is
directed against what he construes as the "mystification" dialectic suffers in Hegel's hands:
"With him it is standing on its head. It must be inverted in order to discover the rational kernel
within the mystical shell."9 As this mystification consists in regarding empirical actuality as a
manifestation of the Absolute Idea the demystifying inversion amounts to establishing the
proper priority of the material over the ideal, of reality over thought. It finally amounts to
transforming what Marx takes to be a dialectical idealism into a dialectical materialism. Rather
than construing dialectics fundamentally as a process or activity of thinking, dialectic for Marx
must rather be seen as a process or activity in and of reality itself.10
Continuing this corrective inversion, seeing dialectics as a process which is discovered in
reality, we come to realize then that the motor of dialectic is properly understood not as
thought or the Absolute Idea, but rather as human makers and actors: as a process taking place
in and of this world and by humans, the dialectic

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consists in humanity's historical self-realization and self-creation through the continual and
continually creative development, enhancement, and transformation of those productive
capacities that define our species being. 11 Thinking through this material, dialectical,
historical process to completion, we finally come to see that it will inevitably culminate, as a
consequence of human action, in a state where these capacities are capable of full
realization.12
There are significant consequences to this effort at a critical reconceptualization of the
character of dialectics and dialectical philosophy, according to which the idea or philosophy,
now properly understood, is "nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man and
translated into forms of thought" (rather than the other way around, which was Hegel's
error).13 These consequences do not pertain only to the content and substantive features of
Hegel's and Marx's dialectical conceptualizations of reality. In addition, they concern their
metaphilosophies, their respective understandings of the nature, limits and potential of
systematic-dialectical philosophy, as well as their views on the relation between philosophical
theory and reality and their positions on the tasks of the philosopher, both worldly and
philosophical. As we shall see, what is finally at stake here in general is the question of the
nature and possibility of a critical philosophy or theory.
From the Preface to the Philosophy of Right we know the views of the mature Hegel on these
latter topics: philosophy cannot give 'instruction,' it cannot provide us with a recipe for making
the world what it ought to be, and it must remain silent as to the future course of history. The
task of the philosopher is not to direct action, but to provide comprehension and understanding
of the real to the extent to which it is rational.14
Marx's view, as encapsulated in the XI Thesis on Feuerbach, could not be in sharper contrast:
"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change
it."15 Now as Marx develops and refines this position in his philosophical project what we see
emerging is a vision of the philosopher's task as involving more than just world-transforming
action. What Marx presents is not merely a call for philosophers' engagement in and with the
world; he also calls for, and comes to offer, a radical reformation of the character and
objectives of philosophy itself and of the tasks of the philosopher as a theorist.
For as a consideration of Marx's subsequent writings and career reveals, his claim is not at all
that the work of philosophy is done and that philosophers should stop philosophizing and just
act. Rather, Marx himself continues to philosophize, and in so doing

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redefines the nature of philosophy itself in that he conceives a properly and thoroughly
demystified systematic-dialectical philosophy as constituting not merely a call for but also a
theory of world-transformative action as revolutionary praxis.
How so? Corrected and taken beyond Hegel, systematic-dialectical philosophy, now
distinctively labeled "critique," is to provide a theory of the overcoming of philosophy; it is to
present a theory of the final transformation of philosophy qua theory into actuality through
revolutionary praxis, a praxis which is itself understood specifically as action guided by
theory. 16 What this means is that the job of the philosopher is not merely to provide an
account of the manner and extent to which the real is rational. In addition, and more
importantly, his task is twofold: to make the real rational through action, and to comprehend in
philosophical, systematic-dialectical theory the character, legitimacy and necessity of this
action. Put differently, the job of the philosopher, revealed by and consequent upon the
demystification of dialectics, is to provide a dialectically scientifica necessary and
comprehensiveaccount of the empirically discoverable dialectical process by which the
opposition between all philosophical theory and reality is inevitably to be overcome in and
through human action.17
So, the special and new goal of systematic-dialectical philosophy as now understood by Marx
is to give a theory of the realization of theory, a theory of how, through dialectics, philosophy
is to become real and of how the real is to become rational or philosophical.18 Thus, Marx's
attempt to demystify dialectics reconceptualizes the very nature and limits of dialectical
philosophy. First of all, it postulates a dialectically necessary relation between theory as a
whole, including systematic-dialectical philosophy, and reality. (It conceives them as at
present in an opposition in need of overcoming.) Secondly, it calls for a new or further
systematic-dialectical theory to comprehend the past origins, the present state, the future
movement, and the ultimate resolution of this dialectical opposition.19
It is just such a theoryone that claims to comprehend in dialectical terms the necessity of its
own overcoming and realization qua theorywhich can then finally claim to stand as a
philosophical science of praxis in the strong sense that Hegel regards as beyond the limits of
philosophy: in the sense of a theory comprehending the necessity of and both predicting and
legitimating certain courses of action.20 For on the basis of its purported comprehension of the
dialectical relationship between itself as theory and reality, this transformed and expanded
systematic-dialectical philosophy can claim to speak of the future in more than a hypo-

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thetical or tentative fashion, and it can not merely suggest, but ordain, certain courses of
action. That is, for Marx, systematic-dialectical theory offers us a science of praxis in that the
nature and legitimacy of certain future actions can be philosophically demonstrated by first
establishing that they follow as a consequence of thinking through the dialectic. Dialectics,
according to Marx, is a process in and of reality, discoverable by thought; thought, having
uncovered the basic workings of dialectic, can then further disclose, through dialectical
reasoning, at least the general features of the dialectic's future unfolding in reality. Having
disclosed this movement, theory can announce that course of action seen as in accordance with
and as necessitated by the lager movement of the dialectic, thus establishing a science of
praxis. Since the developmental dynamic of dialectics pertains not merely to theory, or reality,
but also to the relation between the twoas demystified dialectics encompasses the emerging
necessary synthesis of the ideal and the real, of the conceptual and the materialdemystified
dialectical theory can claim to reveal in theory what must subsequently come to be in reality.
It is important to note that this thoroughgoing reconceptualization of the nature, limits, and
objectives of systematic-dialectical philosophy and the demystifying corrective inversion of
dialectics involved in it seem, at least in part, to be justified by Marx in dialectical, Hegelian
terms. For, according to Marx, thinking dialectically beyond Hegel entails thinking
dialectically about the relation between Hegel's completed system and the contemporary
world. 21 Thinking dialectically about Hegel reveals the dialectical character of Hegel's errors,
as well as it reveals the need and the basis for going beyond him.22 Thus, in provisional
defense of Marx as a critic of Hegel, one might present his move beyond Hegel as one that is
seemingly in agreement with Hegel's own notion of an immanent dialectical critique.23
What I shall now attempt to show is that in working to develop further and to transform
radically the nature and limits of systematic-dialectical philosophy in the ways I have
indicated, Marx has misconstrued the proper character of this philosophy and illicitly
transgressed what Hegel happened to have correctly understood as the necessary limits of
dialectical theory. Put in another way, what I aim to indicate is that in finally assessing Marx's
claim that his is the true dialectical philosophy, we need to attend not only to Marx's explicit
critique of Hegel but also equally to what I shall present as Hegel's implicit critique of Marx.
In laying out Hegel's critique of Marx, I shall work to show explicitly what

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the limits of systematic-dialectical philosophy are through a consideration of Hegel's views on
that philosophical standpoint or theoretical assumption which he sees as in need of rejection if
philosophy is to be a science. I shall then claim that Marx reverts to this pre- or extra-
philosophical standpoint in what he offers as his demystification of dialectics, arguing that
Marx's claim that dialectics must correctly be seen as something which is first found in reality
only subsequently to emerge in philosophical thinking represents not a demystification, but in
fact a mystification of dialectics. Put differently, I shall argue that Marx's purported
demystifying inversion of dialectics is a fundamental conceptual error, analogous to the error
Marx himself diagnoses as the fetishism of commodities. I shall then argue on these grounds
that Marx is also in error in attempting to develop a philosophya systematic-dialectical
scienceof praxis. Here I shall attempt to show that a proper construal of the nature and limits
of systematic-dialectical philosophy precludes the attempt to construe a dialectical relation
between theory and reality in Marx's sense of such a relation: namely, as a relation which can
lead to an action predicting and legitimating science. Put differently, I shall argue that the
limits of philosophy as sketched by Hegel in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right follow
from the character of systematic philosophy as science and are not merely attributable to the
pragmatic conservatism of a prominent Prussian philosopher and state employee. Finally, I
shall consider the implications of this critique of Marx for the question of the possibility and
nature of a critical philosophy.
In order to see how Marx comes to transgress the nature and limits of systematic-dialectical
theory we need first of all to consider those features of such a philosophical theory that can be
said to comprise its philosophically scientific character. Secondly, and of greater import, we
also need to see what minimal conditions must be met such that a theory or philosophy can
claim to possess these features and thus present itself as having attained the status of
philosophical science. The latter is especially important because my claim is that Marx
violates these conditions and thus obviates his claim that his theory is scientific in a dialectical
sense and because it is the proper continuation of dialectical philosophy.
According to Hegel, systematic-dialectical philosophy is scientific thought or philosophy par
excellence in that it expresses philosophical truth. 24 More specifically, it is philosophical
science because it articulates what is rationally universal and necessary in a manner that is
both unconditional and complete.25 Furthermore,

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this philosophy can lay claim to such unconditional universality and necessity, and to
completeness for what it articulates, only insofar as this philosophy is fully and exclusively
self-grounding. 26
What this idea of self-grounding means is that this philosophy's claim to be scientific rests
initially and minimally on the claim that nothing external to the system enters into its
constitution in a determinative manner. In addition, this feature of being self-grounding itself
rests further on, or amounts to, this philosophy's claim to being exclusively founded in pure
and autonomous reason.27 The connection between being self-grounding and being founded in
pure and autonomous reason is this: only a mode of thought founded and developed in and
through reason's radical self-constitution can lay claim to being a mode of thought which is
genuinely and exclusively self-grounding, and thus capable of unconditionally articulating
what is rationally universal and necessary. For to be self-grounding is, minimally, to be devoid
or free from anything arbitrary, assumed, or merely postulated, i.e., anything requiring further
legitimation or grounding. Thus, to be scientific, this philosophical discourse must be free
from anything determined or justified extra-systemically or extra-rationally. And such freedom
as it pertains to the nature and content of systematic philosophyfreedom from external
determinationcan only be attained insofar as reason is autonomous in its operations, insofar as
reason is not externally or other-conditioned or determined. Thus, systematic philosophy is
only fully justified or grounded and systematic philosophy can only be a science if reason is,
or can be brought to be, autonomous and if reason alone can be said to have determined the
form and content of the system. I trust that it is obvious from these brief remarks that, while
self-groundedness is not a sufficient condition for all the attributes of scientific philosophy, it
is certainly a necessary one.
Now for Hegel, what is crucial if philosophy is to become a science in this sense, a necessary
pre-condition for science, is first showing that such a standpoint of autonomous reason is
attainable. And according to him this requires a prior exercise of thought in which it is
systematically demonstrated that reason possesses the potential for radical autonomy and is
thus in the position of generating a self-grounding science because it has been shown that
reason need not necessarily be conditioned in its operations by anything external to or other
than itself. Such a prior demonstration of reason's potential for autonomy involves indicating
what such external conditioning amounts to or consists in and in further revealing how and
why it is that the factors that constitute such

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conditioningthe factors which may be said to render reason heteronomous in its operationsare
not endemic to these operations.
Put differently, coming to the standpoint of science requires first showing that what Hegel
calls the prevailing ''natural assumption ... in philosophy"according to which reason is always
construed as in some manner necessarily conditionedis itself an arbitrary assumption about the
character of reason. 28 Revealing the arbitrary character of the assumption that reason must
always be heteronomousallegedly always conditioned by some factor or factorsis a vital
condition for science because, failing such a demonstration, this philosophy's claim to
autonomy would itself be, or appear, merely arbitrary: the claim to autonomy would only be a
"bare assurance" unless it can be shown how it is that the contending position on reason is not
a sufficient condition for science.29 Showing that reason can come to an awareness of and can
reveal as unfounded that assumption about its own nature that allegedly establishes its
necessary conditionalityits heteronomyamounts only to an indication of the prima facie
possibility of an autonomous self-constitution and self-development of reason.
More specifically, what particular assumption concerning the character of reason as
necessarily conditioned must be revealed as an unfounded and how, in brief, does Hegel work
to do this? The governing "natural" assumption that can be said to define the necessarily
heteronomous character of reason, and that is deconstructed in the Phenomenology of Spirit, is
this: it is that preconception or understanding of reason which construes reason as always
unavoidably conditioned in its operations by some given. (The Phenomenology is thus an
attack on what Sellars calls the "myth of the given."30 ) In this prevailing assumption about the
character of reason, reason is always seen as heteronomous because, according to Hegel,
reason is here identified with consciousness; the conditions of all possible thought are
identified with the conditions of human subjectivity. So reason is construed as necessarily
conditionedas less than autonomous, less than genuinely self-determining or self-constitutivein
that it is assumed that the operations of reason must and can only be construed in terms of that
model or mode of thought in which whatever comes to be known or thought is always, in some
sense, a Gegenstand, something whose determinate and knowable character is always in one
way or another given to conscious awareness. And if reason can be identified with
consciousness, then reason cannot be autonomous, for whatever it might come to establish or
claim will always be ineluctably other-determined: it will be in some way

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founded in that whose determinate character is, as a 'given,' predetermined. But, as Hegel puts
it speaking of consciousness:
These views on the relation of subject and object to each other express the
determinations which constitute the nature of our ordinary, phenomenal consciousness;
but when these prejudices are carried out into the sphere of reason as if the same
relation obtained there, as if this relation were something true in its own self, then they
are errors the refutation of which throughout every part of the spiritual and natural
universe is philosophy, or rather, as they bar the entrance to philosophy, must be
discarded at its portals (Logic: p. 45).

As we have seen the Phenomenology comes to indicate that this is an arbitrary assumption
about reason. While the rejection of the standpoint and structure of consciousness allows
systematic philosophy at least a plausible claim to autonomous self-grounding, it does so only
at the price of establishing certain limits for this philosophy. These are limits of such a
character that they cannot be transgressed if systematic-dialectical philosophy is to retain its
claim to being science and which must be, and are, transgressed in Marx's attempted revision
and extension of systematic-dialectical theory.
If the rejection of the standpoint of consciousness as a necessary model for philosophical
thought helps to establish the scientific character of systematic philosophy as self-grounding
by making it possible for reason to engage in a genuinely autonomous process of self-
constitution, it does so at the price of establishing a certain kind of limitation or closure for this
system's claim to autonomy rests on the claim that the categories generated in it are
autonomously produced by reason alone, and as this claim to autonomy is itself based on the
rejection of the form of consciousness as a determinative model for the constitution of
systematic categories, this then requires that the scientific character of the system preclude an
attempt within systematic-dialectical philosophy, to construe its relation to reality, in the sense
that "reality" is conceived extra-systemically, or from the standpoint of consciousness:
namely, as something that we find given in its determinacy for thought.
What does this mean, and how does it relate to Marx? To claim that the system cannot
conceive reality from the standpoint of consciousness is not to say that systematic philosophy
cannot

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speak of reality, even as an other to thought. Nor is it to say that the system cannot speak of
consciousness, or of reality as a datum for consciousness. The system can and does do all of
these things. It is to say that insofar as systematic-dialectical philosophy conceptualizes the
real, and these and other features of it, this philosophy cannot constitute the realas a category
of systematic philosophyin the manner of consciousness, i.e., as a category given in its
determinacy. 31 Put more specifically, systematic-dialectical philosophy cannot appeal to any
aspects or features of the real apprehended as a datum for consciousness, either as
foundationally constitutive for its conception of the real or as evidence for the philosophical
truth of its conception of the real. It cannot do this simply because, were it either to derive or
to attempt to ground its categories in such a mannerby reference to what is given to conscious
awarenessit would surrender to the primacy of the given and thus to a mode of thinking whose
rejection as authoritative in and for the system is crucial to its claim to being scientific.
That the real is not to be conceptualized within the system in this manner is clear not only
from Hegel's remarks about what conditions must be met and what position must be rejected if
philosophy is to be science. It is also clear from what he has to say about the move in the
system from logic to Realphilosophie: "The logical idea does not thereby come into possession
of a content foreign to it: but by its own native action is specialized and developed to nature
and mind" (Encyclopedia Logic: Paragraph 43). "Nature has yielded itself as the idea in the
form of otherness (Philosophy of Nature: Paragraph 247).
So, to do what Hegel precisely claims he is not doing in systematic-dialectical philosophyto
look to and at the real as a given object (Gegenstand) and as a determinative and not merely
illustrative source for the categories and determinacies of systematic philosophywould be to
resort to the pre- and extra-scientific standpoint of consciousness. And because it would
necessarily involve bringing into the system merely given and not systematically and
autonomously generated determinacies, it would invalidate the system's claim to being self-
grounding and hence its claim to being philosophical science.
Thus, while systematic-dialectical thought can conceptualize the real and can even come to
conceptualize its relation to the real, as philosophical theory and its own emergence in
historyconceptual actions which are part of its working to completenessthese notions or
categories ("the real," "philosophy," "history," and so forth) must be understood as categories
of systematic philosophy.

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That is, not as categories whose determinate character and validity are established in virtue of
the claim that they agree with, are 'true' or 'correct' descriptions of the real, history, etc., as we
happen to apprehend them phenomenally, as given data for conscious thought. (Correlatively,
the activities of conceptualizing the real and of conceptualizing the relation of philosophy to
the real must be undertaken 'systematically': without constitutive reference to the real as a
datum for consciousness.) In a word, then, systematic-dialectical philosophy does not
'describe' reality. According to Hegel:
The Idea is the Truth: for Truth is the correspondence of objectivity with the notionnot
of course the correspondence of external things with my conception, for these are only
correct conceptions held by me, the individual person. In the Idea we have nothing to
do with the individual, nor with figurate conceptions, nor with external things
(Encyclopedia Logic: Paragraph 213).

This then is the fulcrum of the difference between Hegel's and Marx's views, both as to the
proper 'method' of doing systematic-dialectical philosophy as well as on the issue of how
systematic-dialectical philosophy or theory 'relates' to reality. And the difference between
them on these points has serious consequences for an assessment both of the nature and status
of their philosophies and for the notion of a systematic-dialectical science of praxis.
First, as regards an assessment of the status of a philosophy that constitutes and presents its
categories in the manner systematic philosophy must reject, in the mode of consciousness, as
descriptions: as we can see, and as Hegel claims, to construe the truth of philosophical
categories in this way, and to proceed in philosophy in this manner, is to operate in the mode
of pictorial/metaphysical thought:
We must in the first place understand clearly what we mean by Truth. In common life
truth means the agreement of an object with our conception of it. We thus presuppose
an object to which our conception must conform. In the philosophical sense of the
word, on the other hand, truth may be described, in general abstract terms, as the
agreement of a thought content with itself. This meaning is quite different from the one
given above (Encyclopedia Logic: Paragraph 24, Addition).

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And in metaphysics, he writes:
... the predicates by which the object is determined are supplied from the resources of picture
thought, and are applied in a mechanical way. Whereas, if we are to have genuine cognition, the
object must characterize its own self, and not derive its predicates from without (Encyclopedia
Logic: Paragraph 28, Addition).

What Hegel's rejection of a foundational as well as referential basis for his philosophy indicates is that it
is wrongas Marx and others doto regard Hegel's philosophy as metaphysically idealistic. 32 This is not to
deny that various things Hegel says suggest this sort of a reading. More significantly, this is not to deny
that Hegel presents his system as, in some sense, an account of what is 'true' in reality.33 As I shall argue
below, what I see as the critical force of this system involves this latter claim. But as I shall also indicate,
such critical force hinges on the system's not being, or not being read as, an idealistic metaphysics. In
any case, to contend that Marx begins to go awry in his Hegelkritik by seeing Hegel's philosophy as an
idealistic metaphysics is, for the moment, to say two things:
This system is not metaphysically idealistic (or permits of a nonmetaphysical, nonidealistic reading)
because it does not claim to be an account of the real as it is phenomenally given, because it is not
(1)meant to be a 'correction' of what we know about reality from the standpoint of consciousness. How
so? How can this claim be made for Hegel, given the tradition of Marx's misreading? As we can now
see, to hold that it is such a correction would involve making in systematic philosophy a comparison
between its account of the real and what is purportedly a phenomenal account of the real. But just
such a comparison, if offered as a test to determine which account is true in the sense of truth as
correspondencethe sense of truth I have just quoted Hegel as rejectingwould necessitate a return to
the standpoint of consciousness and the importation into the purview of systematic philosophy of
extra-systemic determinations.
(2)More generally, this system is not metaphysically idealistic, nor is it an identity philosophy, because
any metaphysical idealism or identity philosophy presupposes as a primal given the opposition
between thought and the materially or empirically given in order to deny the primacy of such given in
favor of the primacy of thought. The opposition between thought and the given must be

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taken as a given in order to be denied or corrected: the thesis of the primacy of thought or of the identity
of thought and the given cannot be maintained without the opposition. The alleged truth of any idealism
or identity philosophy thus presupposes the opposition and is unintelligible without it. But as we have
seen, for Hegel a precondition for systematic philosophy is the suspension in it of the opposition of
consciousness, of just that opposition between thinking awareness and the given which must be
presupposed and which cannot ultimately be eliminated if any metaphysical idealism or identity
philosophy is to remain coherent.

Given these features of systematic-dialectical philosophy, and given that in criticizing Hegel's
metaphysical idealism, Marx was attacking a straw man, how do things stand with Marx? Precisely
because of what he offers as the corrective, demystifying inversionthe turn to material reality as an
empirically given foundational datumwe can see that Marx's version of systematic-dialectical philosophy
invalidates any possible claim to be scientific in a systematic-dialectical sense of what this means. By
incorporating what he claims and insists are empirically given data, correct or true descriptions of reality
as we find it, Marx's version of systematic philosophy sacrifices any claim to being self-grounding, and
with it any legitimate claim for the necessity and completeness of the dialectic it postulates. 34 (Whether
Marx regarded it to be scientific in some other sense is questionable. Whether it might be scientific in
some other sense cannot concern us here.)35
Additionally, we can also see that it is in fact Marx and not Hegel who propounds a mystified idealism,
albeit an idealism that flies the flag of materialistic realism. Marx's dialectical theory is a version of
idealism because it takes what is properly understood as a feature of the relation of categories or
determinacies in systematic philosophythe necessity of the dialectical interrelatedness and progressive co
-determination of its categories, the dialectical necessity that establishes the system's claim to
completeness for what it considersand reads it into reality and history as an allegedly empirically
discoverable feature of both. In fact, this amounts surreptitiously, and under the guise of what is
purportedly an empiricistic realism, to doing just what Marx claims Hegel is doing: imposing the
rulership of ideas or philosophy over reality.
To put the point in another way Marx's empiricistic-materialistic misconstrual of dialectics is analogous,
as an error, to what Marx diagnoses as the fetishism of commodities. Speaking of the "commodity form
and its relation," Marx writes:

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It is nothing but the definite social relation between men themselves which assumes
here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between things. In order, therefore, to
find an analogy, we must take flight into the misty realm of religion. There the
products of the human brain appear as autonomous figures endowed with a life of their
own, which enter into relations both with each other and with the human race. So it is
in the world of commodities with the products of men's hands. I call this the fetishism
which attaches itself to the products of labor as soon as they are produced as
commodities, and it is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities
(Capital: 1, p. 165).

I would suggest that in order to find a further analogy we must take flight, not now into the
misty realm of religion, but into the equally misty realm of Marx's metaphysics. There a
product of human thoughtdialectics'appears as an autonomous figure endowed with a life of its
own.' An 'autonomous figure' that 'enters into relations both with itself' (dialectics according to
Marx is a cosmic process, a feature both of theory and reality and of the relation of the two)
and that also enters into relations with the human race. For dialectics according to Marx is
also, as found in reality, a feature of human historical relations and activities. 'So it is in the
world' of Marx's dialectics with this 'product of thought.' I call this the fetishism of dialectics,
which attaches itself to a product of thought as soon as it is read as a real thing. It is therefore
inseparable, as I have suggested, from the production of an empirically founded systematic-
dialectical philosophy.
What can we say then, finally, about the notion of a systematically dialectical science of
praxis? What are we to make of Marx's claim that demystifying Hegel, and thus thinking
through the dialectic between systematic-dialectical theory qua theory and reality as an
empirical datum, can enable and lead us to offer a recipe for action? Can we have a theory of
praxis that, on the basis of the theory's comprehension of the dialectic, is capable generally of
predicting and legitimating courses of human action? Put differently, what are we to make of
Marx's claim that his version of systematic-dialectical theory permits us to assume the throne
of philosopher kingship? Or, taking a critical stance, just why, as I have suggested, does the
proper understanding of the nature and limits of systematic-dialectical philosophy preclude
such a science of praxis? How can we come to see that Hegel's views on the limits of

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systematic-dialectical philosophy and the worldly role of the philosopher follow from the
nature of systematic-dialectical philosophy?
It is here that we need to consider and assess Hegel's claim about the 'truth' of the system vis-à
-vis reality, now regarding 'reality' not as a categorical determination of systematic philosophy,
but as an empirically given datum. Just as I have suggested that it is Marx's systematic-
dialectical philosophy, and not Hegel's, that is idealistically metaphysical, I believe that it is
also Hegel's systematic-dialectical philosophy that presents itselfpotentiallyas a truly
legitimate critical philosophy.
How so? I believe that the motivation for Hegel's attempt to develop a philosophy grounded in
and exclusively generated out of autonomous reason did not arise merely out of a desire to
raise philosophy to the level of a science. Beyond this strictly theoretical motivation, I believe
that Hegel saw that any possible worldly role for philosophyany role that is, for a critical
philosophy that can claim that reality as we find it given ought to conform to reality as we
rationally conceive ithinged on first establishing that reason has a right to claim authority over
the given. 36 More specifically, Hegel felt a critical, worldly role for philosophy presupposed
showing, against Hume and even against Kant, that reason need not submit, in what it
conceptualizes, to the authority of any given. That is, if Hume, Kantand Heideggerare correct,
if it is true that reason is and must always be in some way either externally or internally
determined by a given which resists final penetration by reason, then the theoretical and
pragmatic legitimacy of reason's claim to take a critical stance vis-à-vis the given is undercut.
If they are correct, anything reason might claim to establish on its own as rational is and must
always be arbitrary and finally unfounded, because necessarily other-determined. So, if they
are correct, then a consequence of reason's heteronomy is its impotence as a critical force;
reason must surrender to the authority of the given. Thus, indicating that there is a legitimate
critical role for reason in the world of human events requires something like a
Phenomenology, a systematic demonstration that reason need not necessarily be determined in
its operations and discoveries by some allegedly ineluctable given.
But such a demonstration has the consequence of ordaining a limited role for philosophy and
the philosopher in the world of the given. For, as the philosophical account of the real as
rational requires that extra-systemic, given determinancies be eliminated from the system, this
further means that if the completed account of the real as rational is to have any critical force
vis-à-

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vis the given status quo, it can only have this force extra-systemically.
Put more straightforwardly, in systematic-dialectical philosophy one cannot claim to speak in
systematic-dialectical terms (with the force of unconditional, rational universality and
necessity) as to whether reality as it is given, or as we think it might be, is or is not rational.
Hence, one cannot claim, as Marx does, to scientifically and systematically-dialectically
predict or give advice as to how the world will be made rational. Why does the critical
dimension of systematic-dialectical philosophy fall outside of systematic-dialectical
philosophy strictly so-called? The critical dimension must fall outside simply because, in
speaking as systematic philosophers, we cannot make descriptive truth claims, the sort of
claims necessary for making predictions or for legitimating certain actions. We cannot do this
because it ultimately undercuts not only the scientific status of the system, but also its claim to
be what autonomous reason conceptualizes. To do so would undercut any legitimacy the
system might have as a critical device.
So, as systematic-dialectical philosophers, we must remain silent about whether the world or
society does or does not accord with the demands of reason as articulated by this philosophy.
Or if we choose to address these questions and if we choose to claim that the world already
does or that it should accord with reason, we must be careful to offer these judgments as
opinions: as unavoidably involving empirical claims that are subject to challenge by non-
philosophers and which are subject to challenge in a different way than the claims of
systematic philosophy are. In short, if we wish systematic philosophy to have a rightful
worldly impact, we must not seek to take on the role of philosopher kings.
If I am correct on these matters, it indicates that what Marx presents as the truly 'critical'
philosophy cannot finally have any legitimate force as critical philosophy. This is simply
because: (1) By incorporating empirically given data it stands open to philosophically
irresolvable challenges concerning its correctness; and more seriously, (2) by incorporating
empirically given data as a foundation for its claims concerning the manner in which the real
should be made rational, it obviates any possible claim to be speaking for autonomous reason.
By acknowledging the authority of the given over what reason might establish on its own, it
surrenders the basis for reason's rightful claim to critical authority and thus fundamentally and
irreparably undercuts its own critical legitimacy.
The irony of this, of course, is that Marx's philosophy has given birth to so many philosopher
kings, both those who genuinely

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rule and those who are pretenders to the throne. This might reinforce for us Hegel's skepticism
about the worldly impact of philosophy, a skepticism I have tried to show as in agreement with
his systematic philosophy. For appreciating its limits can also lead to an appreciation of the
fact that, in a world that might in some ways approximate to a world of rational freedom, one
cannot and does not want to try to coerce people to be rational. In any case, appreciating the
limits I have spoken of can help us see how Hegel's philosophical caution, his somewhat
pessimistic philosophical resignation can be explained as truly philosophical in character.
<><><><><><><><><><><><>
Not all contemporary philosophy abjuring Hegel is cast in the antifoundational mold. The
various schools of Marxist thought are as adamant in their rejection of Hegel as are today's
antifoundationalists. However, their criticisms are made in the name of a mode of dialectical
theorizing which purports to succeed in articulating philosophical truth where Hegel failed,
because of their correction of Hegel's errors. Chapter 8 has presented a Hegelian response to
the central Marxist contention that Hegel's is a failed idealistic philosophy.
In describing Hegel's nonfoundational systematic philosophy in earlier chapters I asserted that
it is not, as traditionally understood, a metaphysical idealism, in that it does not purport to
describe the given, and that it is nonabsolutist (a philosophy of finitude) in being self-limiting.
But if it does not describe the world we inhabit, what is this philosophy about? In Chapter 1 I
contended that it has a critical dimension. These features of Hegel's philosophy have been
brought together in Chapter 8's consideration of the Marxist critique. I have argued here that a
consideration of the salient features of systematic self-determining philosophy indicates not
only that this philosophy is self-limiting, but also that this self-limitation must be respected if a
genuine critical philosophy is to be afforded, showing how Hegel, and not Marx, respects
these limits.
We have seen already from earlier chapters (especially Chapters 5 and 6) how nonfoundational
systematic philosophy limits itself at various places in its self-constitution, and in so doing
precludes the traditional idealistic, absolutist reading in which the system swallows up
everything by reducing all otherness to itself. Chapter 8 has now addressed these issues in
regard to the system as a whole, showing why systematic philosophy as a totality must be
strictly self-limiting. The crux of the matter is this: Hegel insists

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that the essence of the system is its autonomous, immanent, self-determination. What I have
shown here is that such self-determination requires radical self-closure. In order to be self-
determining, nothing from without can enter in a determinative fashion into the system: it
cannot base itself on anything given without sacrificing the autonomy necessary for its
scientific character. But then the system cannot be taken to describe reality as given. Insofar as
it affords unconditional, necessary, truth, it does so precisely by abandoning any
heteronomous determination by what we might find given. Thus, Marxists (and critical
theorists) who argue that a critical philosophy must be grounded in empirical science (or in
some or another descriptive account of the human condition) are fundamentally mistaken.
Such a foundation necessitates that something given is taken as determinative for reason, thus
undermining any critical force such a philosophy may wish to have in regard to the given: It is
precisely the heteronomy of the given over reason that any critical philosophy challenges,
hence any purportedly critical philosophy undercuts its own critical force by seeking a
foundation in anything given, for it thereby recognizes the legitimate authority of the given
over critical reason. Additionally, if we wish to understand the nature of autonomy, we
proceed in a self-contradictory fashion if we first accord the given heteronomy over reason in
our considerations. It is only through the radical rejection of the claims of the given (first
articulated through Phenomenology) that the possibility emerges of a revolutionary, critical
philosophy which can comprehend the true character of autonomy because it is itself
autonomous. So Hegel's rejection of the framework of givenness, of the foundational model, is
necessary not only to attain philosophically objective truth. It is also called for insofar as a
critical philosophy of freedoma philosophy of modernityis possible. And, by showing how
rationally justifiable truth and autonomy coincide, Hegel indicates the justice of modernity's
claims to the primacy of autonomy and the rightfulness of a rational determination of the
nature of autonomy. But as Chapter 8 has shown, this precludes the possibility of a theory of
praxis and the sort of philosopher kingship which Marxists claim and critical theorists long
for.
Marx claimed to have overcome philosophy (and the pretensions of modern, bourgeois,
society) through a new mode of theorizing called critique or praxis. A central theme of
antifoundational postmodernists is also the death of philosophy. While earlier chapters have
examined antifoundationalism's difficulties in providing a coherent articulation of the rejection
of foundationalism and an affirmation of finitude, Chapter 9, ''The Dead End of

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Postmodernism," considers and criticizes Rorty's version of the postmodernist claim to have
overcome philosophy. It defends an alternative view of the history of philosophy in which past
philosophers are regarded as living participants in an ongoing enterprise, and further develops
the notion of an antifoundational philosophy which is not the death, but the continuation of the
philosophical tradition.

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Chapter 9
The Dead End of Postmodernism
The point of living is getting ready to stay dead.
William Faulkner

Who is not made better and wiser by occasional intercourse with the tomb?
George Blair

Like other humans, philosophers relate to their departed ancestors in a wide variety of ways.
At one extreme is a perspective suggested by Quine's joke that there are two kinds of people
interested in philosophy: those interested in philosophy, and those interested in the history of
philosophy. On this view of the past physically nonliving philosophers are also philosophically
irrelevant for the living, dead on all counts. 1 At another extreme are those historical scholars
who live philosophically in a dead past, concerned only with getting dead right just what
Plotinus, or Spinoza, or Marx, or other dead philosophers thought. Still others of us have a
more complexor perhaps casualrelationship with the departed. Like Odysseus, Roderick
Usher, or Norman Bates, we move from the living to the (seemingly) dead and back again, not
quite ignoring the difference, but not paying too much attention to it either, at least in that we
do not operate with the foregone conclusion that physical decomposition is a sure indication of
philosophical decease. (It may be that we believe we've found a way to engage in a dialogue
with the departed even though we must keep up both sides of the conversation ourselves.)

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As everything in philosophy seems to be related to something (if not to everything) else in
philosophy, these three ways of construing a relation to thinkers who are dead and buried in
the corporeal sense reflect different understandings of the status of the philosophical
enterprise. I want to sketch out what they are and suggest that recent developments in
philosophy indicate that there is a fourth approach, that of the zombie philosophers who have
risen from the tomb like Madeline Usher to stalk the living and bring down the Fall of the
House of Philosophy.
What overviews of philosophy are reflected by the three ways of relating to dead philosophers
I've mentioned so far?
Quine's joke suggests a view which seems to be born out elsewhere in his work: that
philosophy as conceived by the great dead philosophers, as a distinctive enterprise which is
unique in attempting to assume thoroughgoing responsibility for its discourse, is dead.
Philosophy has been 'naturalized.' What once passed under its name is now something to be
thought of as more or less continuous with science. This intimates that, generally, those not on
the scene physically are irrelevant. So, what do we do with dead philosophers? We could
simply bulldoze the philosophical boneyards and erect some labs. Or, since Quine allows for
the history of philosophyalbeit as something distinct from real philosophyperhaps we should
approach the dead in the manner of the real estate developers in the movie Poltergeist:
preserve the tombstones but move them around any way we want, ignoring what's buried
under them since just what the stones mark is no longer of importance to the living.
On this last point at least the outlook of the historical scholars is antithetical to the naturalizers:
the historians' view is that the living need to be dead serious about what the stones mark. Yet
this divergence in regard to caring about the dead buries over a basic agreement between the
naturalizers and the historians. For both, the dead are dead and getting deader all the time.
Hidden in the form of respect which the historians show for the dead is a tacit judgment about
the philosophical lifelessness of those they study. For one can only be concerned centrally
with getting just right what the physically dead have saidconsumed with the importance of
determining what the historical X really meantif one believes that these figures are in fact
philosophically dead. A philosopher's overwhelming attention to an elusive historical accuracy
is only meaningful when that about which she aims to be accurate is assessed as fixed and
final, and as such, unproblematically accessible. The texts of the dead generally are fixed and

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final, as is the context of their production. So directing attention to these things exclusively, to
the corpse left behind, as what's most important indicates conviction about its terminal
condition, as well as a philosophical naiveteor unconcernabout the questionable possibility
(and the value) of determining what these texts 'really' mean. (The naivete in question stems
from the scholars' insistence that, in claiming to be able to present what X really meant, they
are somehow free from interpretive judgments shaped by contemporary philosophical
interests. As the historian M. I. Finley puts it, we ought to beware of those who claim that their
presentations of the past are free of interpretive theories, for they are merely operating with a
theory which they are unaware of.) 2
But while the historians are as willing as the naturalizers to sign death certificates, their
attitude about the remains is strikingly different. Rather than leaving the dead to rot in their
graves the scholars are committed to embalming. To mummify (or exhume), to reconstruct and
lovingly preserve the features just as they once were is their goal. And looking more closely,
we may find further agreement with the naturalizers here: to devote one's philosophical life to
embalming the thoughts of dead philosophers would seem to indicate a conviction that
whatever their overall project was, it can no longer be carried on. So where the naturalizers see
themselves as having moved on to something elsesciencethe embalmers move back to
something that once was. Both reject the possibility of the philosophical tradition as alive in
the present.
The third attitude toward the dead is based on the assumption that physical decay does not
necessarily indicate philosophical demise. It's an approach marked by ambiguity and a
seemingly irreverent casualness towards the corpses of the departed. Marked by ambiguity, for
we do not assume either that all dead philosophers might still be alive (or live again), or even
that every part of the corpus of their works is worth attending to. Like Dr. Frankenstein some
of us like to pick and choose: a heart from Hume, a liver from Leibniz, etc. Further marking
our irreverence toward the dead as dead is our refusal to take the dead bodies of their texts as
of paramount significance; we deflect the scholar's charge of anachronism'that's not what X
meant!'because, refusing to regard X the philosopher as dead, we don't care all that much what
the genuinely dead X (the person who really is rotting in the grave) might have meant. Unlike
the historians, we do not see these texts as frozen in rigor mortis, nor do we assume that our
approach to them is neutral. Thus, our sometimes casual irreverence about the remains of the
departed is just what marks our conviction about

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and respect for the departed as those who remain alive philosophically; whether we agree or
disagree with them we regard their enterpriseour enterpriseas ongoing. Our common objective
is not, finally, getting right what they said, or what we might say, but rather, just getting it
right.
Recent work in philosophy suggests another way of thinking about and dealing with those
philosophers who are no longer here to speak for themselves, what I call the approach of the
zombie philosophers. Those I have in mind generally are the postmodernists, especially the
deconstructionists; and in particular, on this occasion, one who has reflected most
systematically on the theory and practice of zombie philosophy, Richard Rorty. What does it
mean to speak of zombies, and how can a philosophical movement be characterized in zombie
terms?
As I hope we all know from a healthy diet of horror movies, and perhaps most recently from
Michael Jackson's classic video Thriller, zombies are, in philosophical terms, walking
contradictions: they are the living dead. The factual soil from which they crawl is Haitian
voodoo, where a zombie is the mindless corpse of a dead person brought back to life.
"Emptied of the soul, the carcass may be sold for food; the walking corpse, dead in features
and mechanical in action, may be hired out as a drudge." 3 As creatures of the cinematic
imagination, zombies have undergone interesting transformations. In some manifestations they
escape sheer robothood to take on a life, and powers, of their own. The locus classicus for this
zombie variation is George Romero's Night of the Living Dead, where, in a brilliant dialectical
twist, the living dead eat the flesh of the living and transform them into zombies.
So, the notion of zombies incorporates both the living reanimating the dead as soulless slaves
and the living dead consuming the life of the living in such a way that theythe livingbecome,
not dead, but alive in death or dead in life. I will suggest that the zombie philosophers are a
synthesisor melangeof both those Haitian and Romerian concepts of zombies. Our zombie
philosopher is, philosophically, a zombie, one of the living dead, and one who sustains this
state of living death only by killing off and consuming both the living and the dead. As in the
original Haitian voodoo tales, the zombie philosopher brings the (physically) dead back to a
living death to serve as soulless or mindless slaves to his wishes. And as in The Night of the
Living Dead, he works to turn the living into the living dead. In fact, both of these necrophilic
tasks are combined by the zombie philosopher, for he enlists the

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dead he has rendered into zombies in his own zombie mission of stalking new ghouls among
the still living.
What is the philosophical voodoo chant which creates zombie philosophy? Bringing zombie
philosophy to life is the currently fashionable postmodern contention that truth with a capital T
is unattainable and that, as a consequence, philosophy in the traditional sense, as a distinctive
enterprise capable of grasping the Truth, must be carted to the morgue. What is
philosophically alive about zombie philosophywhat literally gives it lifeis just its act of
effecting the philosophical death of the departed and their whole tradition. Physically dead
philosophers are resurrected to a philosophical death; this act creates and sustains zombie
philosophy. It's the basis of the larger postmodernist mission of showing just how and why it is
that philosophy past and present is and must be forever devoid of life. But it is not only their
peculiar use of dead philosophers which earns postmodernists the name of zombies. Further
examination of the postmodernist philosophical condition reveals a deeper basis for the
appellation. On the one hand, postmodernists themselves are not philosophically alive. They
announce this, for central to their mission is the claim that they are not really doing
philosophy. Philosophy is impossible; it's dead, and our age needs to notice the rotting corpse,
entomb it, and get on to something else; on the other hand, they're not quite philosophically
dead either. They present their message, they strive to effect the death of philosophy,
philosophically, and they sustain their theoretical careers in and through consuming both
living and dead philosophers who suggest otherwise. Thus, philosophically speaking, as
neither alive or dead, they are living dead, in a word, zombies. In order to flesh out these
claims, let's examine the preeminent zombie philosopher, Richard Rorty.
Rorty's crowning of himself as the voodoo high priest of the zombie philosophers is clearly
evidenced in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, but the roots of his transformation from a
living philosopher to a philosopher of the living dead go back to Philosophy And The Mirror
Of Nature. In that work Rorty called our attention to a central theme of zombie philosophy: the
discovery (which he attributes to his zombie forbearers Nietzsche and Heidegger) that the
philosophical tradition has culminated in its own self-elimination. This sweeping diagnosis of
an inevitable suicide is based on the still radical but arguably less problematic claim that the
search for Truth has itself led to the discovery that there is no permanent neutral framework,
no final ground in God, nature, or language to

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which we can refer as something which anchors our beliefs about ourselves and our world as
anything more than happenstance fabrications.
This latter claim need not lead to the former zombie conclusion; it is not self-evident that a
rejection of foundationalism must entail an abandonment of philosophy as concerned with
objective truth. (It may only require us to reconceptualize the nature of objective truth.) 4 But
for the zombie philosophers, only truth as somehow grounded or founded in a given is worthy
of the name, and the disclosure of the myth of the given demands the zombie task of
'revealing' the death of philosophy. The act of revelation involves resurrecting the physically
dead in order to pronounce and diagnose their philosophical death. Once dragged from their
crypts to live again in philosophical death, their corpses are paraded about as exemplars of the
unavoidable putrefaction of all philosophical endeavors. This display of rotting flesh is meant
to create more dead philosophers by bringing those still living philosophers to recognize their
terminal condition, thus enlisting them in the dance of death. Contingency reveals Rorty
masterfully at work on this ghoulish project. Central there is his notion of "irony"; I shall now
dissect it to reveal the tell-tale zombie heart beating beneath this innocent linguistic
floorboard.
According to Rorty, ironist theorists (and he lists Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida as
exemplars) are "the philosophers who define their achievement by their relation to their
predecessors rather than by their relation to the truth."5 So, already we find something morbid
and parasitical at the core of the view Rorty espouses. One succeeds as an ironist exclusively
in terms of a relation to one's predecessors, and this relation is minimally defined by contrast
to a relation which seeks truth. What is the relation which the ironist seeks, and what is the
goal of entering into it? We'll see that the relation is funereal and that the goal is the traditional
one behind creating zombies.
The relation the ironist takes to her predecessors is what Rorty calls "redescription" and for the
ironist, everything is redescription: Redescription is what's left to do when one realizes that
Trutha final, authoritative descriptionis a chimera. If the goal of truth as description must be
abandoned, then, according to Rorty, what is left, short of abandoning the arena of philosophy
altogether, is some treatment of the past which recognizes that it is dead.6
Inspecting Rorty's view of the goal of redescription further reveals its zombiesque soul. As the
dead philosophers threaten to

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enslave us, we must enslave them. One redescribes, he announces, in order to be free of the
dead, to "break the spell" cast by the philosophical tradition. "The ironist wants to find
philosophy's secret, true, magical namea name whose use will make philosophy one's servant
rather than one's master." 7 So rooted in the notion that the only option is to redescribe is a
fundamental conviction that all that is possible for philosophy now is a relation to a dead past.
For to hold that we can only redescribe our predecessorswhere to redescribe is to enslaverather
than enlisting them in a shared, ongoing enterprise, presupposes that no dialogue is possible,
that they have no say in what is going on, that they and their enterprise are, in short, dead.
More precisely, what's involved in redescription?
In Rorty's accountaccording to his redescriptionwhat Nietzsche did to Hegel, what Heidegger
did to Nietzsche, what Derrida has done to Heidegger (and seemingly what Rorty is doing to
all of them) is to reveal how each in turn has failed to do what he claimed, to escape from the
dead past of philosophy to something radically new. It is just by revealing that failure of the
predecessor that each in succession seeks to effect an escape for himself. Each has proclaimed
himself alive in and through his rejection of dead forbearers, a rejection which consists in
showing how and why these forbearers are still philosophers and thus dead. Yet each of these
efforts to attain life by transforming predecessors into zombiesmindless robots whose only
living purpose lies in the service they render in being revealed as dead, so that it's their death
as disclosed by the zombie master which gives him lifeeach of these efforts in turn succumbs
to the same treatment. Forat the heart of ironist/zombie theorylies the paradox of the living
dead, of those who would attain and sustain philosophical life through the death of philosophy.
The paradox, of course, is that a rejection of the enterprise needs to be philosophical if it is to
be successful. (As Rorty appreciates, no theorist/philosopher is endangered by the ironist poets
and novelists.) Yet, if the rejective redescription is philosophical, the redescriber enslaves
herself at the same time, or leaves herself open to being redescribedmade into a zombieby
someone else. According to Rorty this difficulty, "how to avoid being aufgehoben,"8 is the
central problem for irony theory. Every ironist theorist strives "to write something which will
make it impossible to be redescribed except in one's own terms."9 However, one can only
avoid redescription either by attaining a "final vocabulary" or a uniquely private one. But final
vocabularies are the stuff of philosophy, and uniquely

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private vocabularies are the creations of art, not theory. So in the ironists' view, properly
redescribed, the philosophical world is finally an unending night of the living dead. Zombies
are everywhere; they threaten one from the dead past, the living present, and the unborn
future: one needs to make zombies of one's predecessors; only thereby can one avoid
enslavement by them; but this selfsame act of attaining autonomy by making zombies of one's
predecessors opens one to redescription, to being rendered a zombie by others.
What's problematic about zombie philosophy? Perhaps the most striking thing about it is the
question of why anyone engages in it at all, since, as we've seen, if its basic premises are
accepted, there is no escaping from it, and as Odysseus discovered on his visit to Hades, being
undead affords little peace: one is trapped in a curious condition in which one is neither
philosophizing nor not philosophizing. While the inability to escapethe zombie philosophers'
entrapment in the zombie statediscloses what nonzombies see as the underlying conceptual
problem with zombie philosophy, it is also that which earns postmodernists the ultimate
zombie status of being philosophically undead. As Rorty acknowledges, irony theory
presupposes a view of philosophy which calls for but which is incapable of successful
philosophical demonstration. The ironist/postmodern attempt at total philosophical destruction
must fail because only a final vocabulary would effect it. But final vocabularies are the stuff of
philosophy. Thus, the very conditions which would have to be met to reach the zombies' goal
of killing philosophyattaining final authoritative truth about the nature and the (im)possibility
of truthwould also constitute a rebirth of it. The ultimate paradox confronting the zombies is
that the total death of philosophy would be its rebirth. Thus, for them, philosophy can neither
die nor live. All that's left is the zombie state of living death where philosophy is neither alive
nor dead. Zombie philosophy is not alive, because Truth cannot be attained. But it's not dead
either, since that very claim is and can only be a philosophical assertion.
This curious condition of zombie philosophythe manner in which the purportedly dead past of
the philosophical tradition itself crawls from attempted entombment by the zombies to stalk
themis revealed in other ways. Consider what zombie philosophy announces as its positive
goal: total liberation from the dead past, the attainment of something radically new, something
which is not philosophy. Yet zombie philosophy is fundamentally incapable of effecting such
a break. We have been promised this 'new thinking'

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which would be 'beyond philosophy' and radically other than it since Nietzsche. But zombie
philosophypostmodernism in its various formsremains incapable of moving beyond its stock in
trade of critiques of foundationalism, the logocentric subject, totalizing discourse etc.; all of
which we have now heard ad nauseam. All its talk of the radically new remains just that, talk
about something new which fails to present anything radically new. Why is this? I'd like to
offer a suggestion as to why zombie philosophy cannot escape from being haunted and
possessed by the very tradition whose death it proclaims and from which it seeks liberation.
The zombie philosophers cannot effect the sought for liberation from the past, in part, because
without it they literally have nothing to say. And this ironic enslavement arises from the fact
that, in the terminology of one dead philosopher, theirs remains an abstract negation of the
past. 10 Which is to say that the problematic nature of their critique of philosophy condemns
them to fall prey to the very errors they aim to denounce and to transcend. I want to illustrate
this in a couple of ways before considering just what is problematic about their critique.
Consider for a moment simply the idea of attaining to a mode of discourse which is radically
new, where it is presupposed that that must minimally mean 'nonphilosophical.' This very
presupposition, without which postmodernism cannot claim to be post anything, prevents it
from attaining anything new by tying it to that from which it aims to escape. Because it seeks
total liberation, it cannot effect any genuine liberation at all. How so?
Postmodernism's goal is based on the idea of a thoroughgoing rejection of the traditional
philosophical project. But any rejection of this all-encompassing form cannot avoid assuming
a stance which is itself totalizing, i.e., philosophical. Postmodernism's wholesale rejection of
the past succumbs, in a negative fashion, to the major crime which it condemns the past of
having committed in a positive fashion: promulgating a discourse which is
'totalizing'authoritarian and insensitive to difference. And postmodernism practices what it
denounces while it is in the very act of attacking authoritarian discourse and proclaiming
difference.
Postmodernism is guilty of the authoritarianism it condemns, since its wholesale
condemnation of past and present philosophy recognizes no alternatives to itself as worthy of
serious attention. Crucial to what is purportedly ''post" in postmodernism is the deconstructive
move which denies that other texts/discourses can ever succeed in saying what they mean.
Their only legitimate status is as objects for the deconstructive exercise, corpses ripe for

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zombiehood. Thus the self-styled new thinking which purports to reject philosophical
authoritarianism does so by postulating a theory which presents itself as the newsoleauthority.
Similarly, its championing of difference as that which the tradition purportedly abrogates is a
scam. It fails to conceptualize this difference except in terms of the tradition, as what is other
than the tradition, namely, as itself. But what postmodernism is as other than the tradition has
amounted to nothing more than the now commonplace attacks on the tradition. 11 As a theory,
postmodernism has yet to get beyond its deconstructive assaults on the past to conceptualize
'difference' in positive terms, as something more than what the tradition denies or suppresses.
(And if the point is that 'difference' cannot be conceptualized or grasped in theory, or is what
cannot be grasped or conceptualizedthe ineffablethis does not conflict substantively with
claims made by various traditional philosophers. It amounts to nothing more than the
traditional observation that not everything can be comprehended theoretically.) So what it is,
postmodernism is only parasitically, in virtue of what it opposes. Thus, the 'difference' it
purports to articularte is merely negative, and as merely negative fails to amount to the
genuine, radical, difference being sought: one that is not a variation on traditional themes. In
sum, postmodernism fails to attain or to make 'difference' possible. It does not allow for
difference, and is thus just another version of the authoritarianism it attacks, because it denies
the legitimacy of other, different, modes of discourse. It does not attain difference (as that
which the tradition allegedly missed or suppressed) since it construes difference as what it is,
and what it is, it is solely in terms of opposing the tradition.
Postmodernism's disclosure of itself as nothing more than a negative echo of the modernism it
abjures shows, in another way, why it earns the name of zombie philosophy: the dead
philosophers come back to enslave the living who would turn them into zombies;
postmodernism transforms itself into an inverted mirror image (a merely abstract negation) of
that which it aims to reject. And it is not a failure of effort or imagination which prevents this
new thinking from emerging; it is rather the inadequacy of its conception of the limitations of
the past which both leads and blinds postmodernism to its own repetition of the tropes it
claims to be rejecting. The root of this inadequacy may be seen if we consider another instance
of postmodernism falling victim to the totalizing view it aims to criticize. As noted above, the
origin of the zombie project and the foundation of its criticism of the tradition is the conviction
that Truth is unobtainable, a conviction based on the

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failure of the foundational project. (In a nutshell, the failure consists in our being unable to
demonstrate that how we take things to be is how they are, independently of our description of
them.) This has led to the zombie reconceptualization of obtainable truth as a personal and
subjective redescription in opposition to the tradition's unattainable truth as objective
description. But by insisting that the only alternative conception of truth lies in a redescribing
which must be idiosyncratic and hence private and non-objective, zombie philosophy again
reveals its entrapment by what it aims to reject, while at the same time disclosing the
problematic character of its critique of the philosophical tradition.
For redescribing is simply an inverted form, an abstract negation, of describing. In the
traditional descriptive model, either the subject or the object is taken to be the determinative
ground of truth. Redescription differs from that model not through an abandonment of the
notion of a privileged ground for truth, but by its relocation of the privileged determiner in the
text (or in language, or in Being beyond presence), rather than in the object or subject. This
view denies the possibility of attaining descriptive correspondence, for the text, language, or
Being are said to be incapable of being rendered transparent (or of being brought to presence
for thought). But it remains committed to the traditional conceptual framework which
construes truth in terms of an oppositional relation and which sees truth as grounded in
something given. The commitment remains, since the sweeping denial of the possibility of
obtaining objective truth can work only if we presuppose that truth must be construed in
descriptive terms, as the representation of a given other (even while we deny the possibility of
accessing that given). Correspondingly, the notion of a privileged determining ground for truth
in a given other remains, for according to postmodernists, it is the text, or language, or Being
(as entities which are prior to and always other than us) which is determinative of what we say
or think (even if we cannot determine the manner in which this determination occurs). So even
in its denial of our capacity to attain it, postmodernism still understands objective truth as
correspondence; and even in its purportedly liberating rejection of the authority of given
foundations for thought and action, it still conceives of something given as that which rules
over us.
Thus, the foundation of zombie philosophyits critique and reconceptionalization of truthfails
on two counts. For one thing, as we've seen, the reconceptualization fails to escape from the
essential structure of the notion of truth being criticized. It endorses

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about the object, as given, always falls beyond or outside of what can be grasped with
certainty in the act of knowing. 12 And postmodernism's peculiar failureits falling victim to
what it alleges is problematic about the model in the totalizing critique which aims to get
beyond objective truth entirelysuggests that a more effective escape may lie in not attempting
a total negation of the conception of truth as knowable, but in a determinate negation of this
particular model of truth. A determinate negation would be this: if the problem lies in
construing 'knowing the truth' in terms of 'representing a given determinate object,' let us
specifically begin by not construing our subject matter as already having a given determinate
content, but as indeterminate. Correlatively, let us abandon the schema of representation. Let
us not assume in our cognizing of this subject matter that it is always already minimally
determinate (not only in terms of a given content but also) simply in virtue of being an other,
an 'object for a consciousness,' and thus present for representation.
Making the specific rejections suggested would effect a determinate negation of the old model
because, rather than attempting to abandon the conception of objective, knowable truth
wholesale and in an unequivocal manner, we instead abandon as necessary foundational
presuppositions just the two features of the traditional understanding of truth which make it
problematic: the tradition's (and postmodernism's) unquestioned assumptions that cognition
always begins with a given determinate object, and that knowing consists in a determinate
relation to such an object. Put differently, we would begin by specifically and deliberately not
assuming that the structure of subjectivity or consciousnessthe ordinary manner in which we
construe knowingis unconditionally determinative for philosophical cognition. (Of course, to
refuse to begin by taking that traditional assumption for granted would not preclude a
subsequent consideration of it, after the nature of philosophical cognition is established.)
Further consideration of what gets rejected also enables us to see what remains from the
traditional notion of truth. What is not abandoned, and what now becomes realizable are
philosophy's traditional goals of attaining certain truth in an unconditional, self-legitimating
fashion. Yet we shall see that the manner in which these goals become realizable entails a
transformation of the traditional understanding of what they consist in.
Insofar as we begin our consideration in such a way that there is not already a subject matter
construed as an 'object,' standing determinate prior to and outside of cognition itself, then the
act

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of cognition would be thoroughly constitutive of the subject matter in its determinacy. And
insofar as the always hitherto presupposed determinate difference between cognition and its
object has been rejected as a model, cognition here may begin in just as indeterminate a
fashion as its subject matter. That is, the act of cognition would also be constitutive of the
character of cognition as determinate. The initial dual indeterminacy of cognition and its
subject matter follow from the determinate negation discussed above. For precisely what has
been rejected is the model which always construes cognition as necessarily involving a
minimal predetermination, i.e., the predetermination (1) that the subject matter of cognition
must always be something already given in its determinacy, and (2) the predetermination that
cognition involves a relation between such an object and a knower. The abandonment of these
predeterminations, which makes it possible that now neither cognition nor its subject matter
would possess any already given determinacy, also makes it possible to attain the two of the
tradition's goals mentioned above.
First, the certainty of truth long sought for by the tradition and denied by postmodernism
would be afforded in that what comes to be known and the knowing 'of' it are no longer
separated by an unbridgeable gulf. Since any determinate distinction between cognition and its
subject matter is missing, and since neither possesses any pregiven determinacy, the insoluble
problem of attaining certain truth by establishing correspondence between knowledge and its
object fails to arise. As lacking in determinacy, the subject matter would not bring anything
already given to the act of cognition which would be ungraspable by cognition. Correlatively,
as equally lacking in predetermination, the cognitive act would not bring anything determinate
to distort or antecedently determine what is cognized. Thus, any and all emerging determinacy
would arise from the activity itself and thus the possibility of failing to establish this
determinacy just as what it is would be absent. (How determinacy might arise out of
indeterminacy is another question. 13 )
Further reflection on the conditions which make it possible for certain truth to be attained
reveals how another of philosophy's traditional goals (also denied by postmodernism) can be
reached. Philosophy has long sought to be that mode of discourse which is distinctive from
others in assuming thoroughgoing responsibility for itself; it has aimed to attain a radical self-
legitimation by establishing its mode of discourse as thoroughly self-constitutive, and hence
unconditioned and autonomous, because lacking in any ground or foundation outside of itself.
Insofar as cognition and its subject

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matter here lack any already given determinacy, any determinacy arrived at could arise
exclusively from the activity in question in a transparent fashion, since conditioned by nothing
antecedently determined. There would then be no external grounds or foundations for what
this mode of discourse comes to establish, and as constituted without foundations, it would be
self-grounding. As dependent in its determinate character on nothing outside of itself,
responsibility for what comes to be determined in this discourse would fall exclusively to the
discourse itself, and in this sense it would be self-legitimating. 14
But while specifically rejecting the tradition's assumption about cognition and truth allows for
a self-grounding mode of discourse which affords certain truth, further consideration of how
this can come to pass through a determinate negation shows that others of the tradition's goals
are, and must be abandoned.
For one thing, the certain truth established is the truth of self-constitutive discourse, a
discourse made possible specifically by rejecting the idea that certain truth concerning the
given can be known. Thus, the truththe determinaciesestablished by this discourse cannot be
construed as descriptive of the given. So, the price of attaining the tradition's goal of certain
truth established in a self-grounding discourse is that we must abandon the tradition's belief
that such discourse can tell us anything a priori about a given world. (By abandoning the
notion that the proper subject matter of philosophy is somehow already always given in its
determinacy, it becomes possible for philosophy to be demonstrably truth-affording,
autonomous, and self-constitutive; but sacrificing the anchor in the given also means that we
cannot assume any necessary connections between this discourse and the given.) We must
abandon the tradition's guiding belief, going back to Parmenides, that the conditions of logos
are the conditions of being. With this abandonment, of course, we also abandon the conditions
for the possibility of both realist and idealist metaphysics, as well as the notion that philosophy
is foundationalin the sense of determining the necessary conditionsof other modes of discourse
which do concern themselves with cognition of the given as it is given. Thus, this mode of
discourse, even while it can claim certain truth and self-legitimacy for its own domain,
represents a radical break from the tradition. It is limited in the scope of its claims, and is
neither totalizing nor authoritarian in the manner criticized by postmodernists.
While it could claim to speak authoritatively in a limited domainin regard to the nature and
range of what is determined or

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constituted without predeterminationsthis discourse only attains this authority by recognizing
that certain truth pertains only to what is self-constitutive. Thus, any claim to authority this
philosophical discourse might make would be to speak authoritatively only over the domain of
that which can be conceived autonomously, i.e., without externally determinative
predeterminations. In more traditional jargon its claim to authority would be restricted thus:
this discourse would speak only about that which unconditioned thought or autonomous reason
can establish. In addition, as nondescriptive, the discourse could only have a normative
authority: not authority concerning what is (understood as what is given) but authority
concerning what ought to be according to reason. Thus, it would not incorporate within itself
other modes of discourse which recognize the authority of the given, nor would it supplant
them or deny their right to speak of the given, except insofar as in so doing, they claim to
articulate unconditional truth. The right of this discourse to deny the name of unconditional
truth to modes of discourse which recognize the given as their starting point follows from the
revelation that discourses which presuppose a foundation in the given cannot even establish
that certain truth concerning the nature of the given is attainable. As we have seen, they
undermine their own presumption to afford truth in the philosophical sense of the term.
So, while this discourse is genuinely pluralistic in that, unlike postmodernism, it does not deny
altogether the legitimacy of modes of discourse other than itself, it is not relativistic, for it does
not hold that all discourses are equally true (or untrue) but rather than only one mode of
discourse can attain demonstrable truth. Of course the acknowledgment of any normative
authority for this discourse would presuppose a belief in the rightful authority of truth; a belief
in the consummately modernist philosophical conviction that what is, is not justifiable simply
because it is; a belief in the subversive notion that the given world ought to accord, insofar as
is possible, with the demands of reason. So, while it would not replace them, or deny
altogether the legitimacy of modes of discourse which purport to describe the given, this
discourse would demand the acknowledgment that these modes of discourse are inescapably
limited; their limitedness being founded in the relative character of any attempt to describe the
given. And the legitimacy of the normative authority of this philosophical discourse (vis-à-vis
descriptive modes of discourse) would follow from the problematic character of
acknowledging any final normative authority for what is given over what reason can establish
on its own. Since any claim

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to know the given must be relative and conditional, the very notion that what is (construed on
the basis of a description of the given) has legitimate normativity is insupportable, simply
because we have no conclusive means for determining "what is." Since the very idea of
normativity presupposes the ability to claim a rightful distinction between (at least some)
cases, it follows that any consistent normativity must acknowledge the rightful authority of
reason over the given, on the already mentioned grounds that accounts of the given are
inescapably relative and hence incapable of establishing any but a finally arbitrary ground for
distinguishing between cases. The rightful authority of reason over the given follows, since
relativity and normativity are logically incompatible. If we have no grounds for objectively
distinguishing between cases we also have no nonarbitrary grounds for preferring one to the
other, and if we have no nonarbitrary grounds for preference we have no norms, for to speak
of a norm is, by definition, to speak of that which is not arbitrary. But we have no grounds for
objectively distinguishing between different descriptive accounts of the given. Hence no
account of the given can provide a basis for legitimate normativity.
And while the absence of constitutive predeterminations opens the possibility of a discourse
which could be complete (in the sense that all of its determinations would be internally
engendered and not dependent in and as what they are on anything 'outside,' on anything
already given as determinate), it would not be totalizing (in the sense of claiming that these
determinations are capable of grasping or accounting for that which we might indeed find
given). So rather than committing what postmodernists regard as the inevitable blasphemy of
any philosophy which lays claim to objective truthpromulgating a totalizing, authoritarian
discourse which refuses to recognize that which is different and 'other'this approach
presupposes a recognition of radical othernessof irreducible givenness as that which cannot be
grasped by philosophical thoughtjust in its beginning in and through the determinate rejection
of the model of truth and cognition which erroneously assumes that given otherness can be
truly known. And thus, rather than abrogating finitude, as postmodernism claims philosophical
pretensions to know the truth must, this mode of discourse begins in and through a recognition
of the inevitably finite character of all claims to know the given. Unlike postmodernism
however, it refuses to absolutize this mode of knowing in its finitude.
In its denial of objective truth and of the possibility of philosophy, postmodernism fetishes and
absolutizes a radical otherness or difference as an other that can never be knownexcept, of
course,

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by postmodernism, which somehow knows this other, zombie fashion, in its unknowability.
The approach I am suggesting does not require this self-referentially inconsistent claim, and
while it recognizes the given as genuinely other than itselfby its refusal to attempt to describe
it, or to supplant modes of discourse which doit does not transform otherness, the given, the
irreducibly different, into a new transhuman authority which must be bowed before. If truth
construed in terms of 'determination given in an other' cannot be attained, then truth construed
in terms of self-determinationin terms of autonomy, most broadly and fundamentally
conceivedbecomes an option worth pondering.
<><><><><><><><><><><><>
Chapter 9 has argued that the most radical of the antifoundationalist claimsto have overcome
philosophy and replaced it with something newis without substantiation, despite the continuing
appeal of postmodernist orthodoxy. I have contended that postmodernism, especially in its
Rortian version, can be helpfully thought of as a version of zombie philosophy: it is
philosophically neither alive nor dead, but undead, and has as its goal the recruiting of new
zombies from among dead as well as living philosophers. Zombie philosophers are not alive,
for their message is that philosophy is something impossible and dead; it is not what they do,
for they know that objective truth is unattainable. But they are not philosophically dead either,
they have not left philosophy behind for something else. For they make philosophical
arguments to effect the death of philosophy, and they continually rob the graveyards of
philosophy's history, resurrecting the dead to zombiehood in order to substantiate their morbid
contentions. This chapter has diagnosed the central flaw in the zombie position: disclosing that
truth cannot be construed in foundational terms and in accordance with the correspondence
model does not show that there cannot be another conception of truth, one capable of a radical
legitimation. Once again we can see that, when carefully examined, antifoundationalism
remains committed to the foundational notions it claims to transcend: Only if truth must be
conceived foundationally can we hold that no other mode of truth is possible. But
antifoundationalism cannot claim this, for it purports to show that foundationalism, which
asserts that its model of truth is universally valid, cannot succeed in such an endeavor. Thus
antifoundationalism must fail in its efforts to bring philosophy to an end by showing that the
search for objec-

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tive truth cannot possibly attain its goal. Every attempt to bring an end to philosophy recreates
it, even if only implicitly, since the very weapon used to destroy philosophy is, and must be,
philosophical argumentation itself.
However, Chapter 9 has done more than reassert the familiar charge of self-referential
inconsistency. In addition it has argued that postmodernists have not made, and cannot make,
good on their claim to offer something new, a new, nonphilosophical mode of thought. The
flaw has been seen to lie in the indiscriminate, totalizing character of their critique of
philosophical truth: even in purporting to reject it, their commitment to the foundational
modeltheir inability to think beyond itis revealed in what postmoderns offer as an alleged
substitute. Rather than escaping from the past, postmodernism is disclosed here as a feeble
echo, a ghost of the foundational past it strives so earnestly to do away with.
Beyond this, Chapter 9 has further disclosed how a systematic philosophy in the Hegelian
mold can afford a discourse which succeeds where postmodernism fails, in being
nontotalizing, nonauthoritarian, and respectful of differencewhile still avoiding relativism by
means of a new conception of objectivity found in the irreducibly modernist notion of self-
determination. The history of foundationalism and antifoundationalism shows that construing
truth as founded in a given determinacy has proved aporetic; the specific alternative is to
conceive truth in terms of self-determination. Chapter 9 has further indicated just how self-
determination may be attained insofar as neither the object nor subject of cognition are taken
as determinate givens. And it has also argued that conceiving truth as self-determination
makes possible the realization of two of philosophy's traditional goals: the attainment of truth
which is certain and self-grounding. As not grounded in any given, the truth of systematic
philosophy is critical, in that it articulates how things ought to be when conceived from the
standpoint of autonomous reason. Correlatively, as not grounded in any given, it does not
challenge accounts of the given (except insofar as they claim demonstrable universal validity)
and is consequently not totalizing. Thus, while systematic philosophy affords unconditional,
nonrelative, truth (for as radically self-determining, the truth of this discourse is not relative to
or conditioned by any givens), it does so in a manner which avoids the pitfalls of absolutism
antifoundationalists abhor. It does so in part just because it recognizes, and differentiates itself
from, the radical otherness of the given and those other modes of discourse which begin with
what is given.

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Chapter 10 considers yet another contemporary attempt to avoid the problems of
foundationalism and the epistemological gambit, that of Donald Davidson. Comparing his
work with Kant's, I argue that Davidson can be seen as part of the transcendental project which
seeks to sidestep certain foundational difficulties while still arriving at foundationalist
conclusions. Although Davidson avoids certain pitfalls that Kant succumbed to, I contend that
he is still wedded to foundationalist assumptions and does not succeed in his attempt to
legitimate knowledge.

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Chapter 10
The Renewed Appeal to Transcendental Arguments
We are in for a sequentiality of improbable possibles.
James Joyce

In recent years philosophers from both the continental and analytic traditions have subjected
what has come to be known as foundationalism to a sustained barrage of attacks. Not the least
of what is controversial about these attacks is that they seem to render suspect not only a good
part of the philosophical tradition, but also the idea or ideal of epistemic and metaphysical
objectivity associated with it. 1 Denying that there is anything like an undistorted or neutral
cognitive standpointa foundational, God's eye, view from nowhereantifoundationalists have
asserted the perspectival, embedded, or located character of all cognition.2 Their claims about
the impossibility of attaining a foundational standpointput positively, their assertion that
knowledge conditions are unavoidably opaqueand their consequent claim concerning the
embeddedness of knowledge are usually accompanied by a rejection of metaphysical and
epistemological realism. We are counseled to abandon the notion that we can meaningfully lay
claim to manifestly objective knowledge of a real world of mind independent objects.
Donald Davidson, however, is a prominent exception to the widespread tendency of coupling a
rejection of foundationalism with a dismissal of the twin realisms. While he holds that
knowledge

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cannot have foundations, while he rejects the idea of epistemic confrontation and
scheme/content dualism, he has nonetheless endorsed a view of the knowing situation which
involves the idea of correspondence. 3 In addition, he has argued for the realistic conception of
a reality which supersedes the subjective and which is objectively knowable in the
straightforward, traditional, and nonrelative sense most antifoundationalists reject.4 Yet at
least part of his argument here (toward these foundationalist ends of correspondence and
realism) hinges upon demonstrating the untenability of certain foundationalist notions (chiefly
confrontation and scheme/content dualism). So, it would seem that Davidson wants to abandon
at least part of the central conceptual apparatus of traditional foundationalism while at the
same timeor even in and through this abandonmentendorsing some of the conclusions it sought
to establish.
What makes Davidson's position especially interestingand perhaps puzzlingis the fact that he
makes use of transcendental arguments to achieve these ends.5 This may seem puzzling
because the transcendental approach in philosophy is usually associated both with
scheme/content dualism and with a full-blown, foundationalist program. Thus, locating
Davidson within the scheme defined by the traditional relationship between foundationalism,
transcendental argumentation, and the idea of a conceptual scheme seems difficult. Can the
transcendental approach be separated from scheme/content dualism and foundationalism?
More importantly, can one salvage correspondence and present a successful philosophical
defense of realism while abandoning this dualism and the idea of epistemic confrontation? I
want to explore Davidson's transcendental philosophy with theseand especially the
latterquestions in mind. In what immediately follows I will try to sort out and assess his
transcendental procedure by first considering his relation to the preeminent transcendental
philosopher. First I will take up the similarities, then the differences between Kant's and
Davidson's transcendental approaches.
Transcendental philosophy has been closely associated both with the foundationalist
conception of knowledge discussed above and with the foundationalist endeavor itself. In
much of the literature which discusses foundationalism, Kant is given pride of place with
Descartes as a paradigmatic foundationalist philosopher. While Davidson rejects both the idea
that knowledge has foundations and the understanding of knowledge based on a conceptual
scheme, the attempt to articulate the foundations of knowledge in terms of a

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conceptual scheme is central to Kant's transcendental project. 6 How then can we locate
Davidson in this tradition?
We can begin by appreciating the extent to which both Kant's and Davidson's transcendental
approaches share, in certain important respects, comparable motivations and goals. Speaking
broadly, both turn to transcendental approaches in attempts to arrive in an indirect fashion at
realist conclusions about the objectivity of knowledge and reality while avoiding the
difficulties to which a more direct route to these conclusions seems to lead. What I see as
integral to their common transcendental approach is the idea that we can establish the
legitimacy of our subjective claims to knowledge of objectivity by a process of reasoning
which avoids appealing to some conception of a directly discoverable evidentiary connection
between what are taken to be the separate domains of subjectivity and objectivity.7 In adopting
the indirect-transcendental approach to realism8 both renounce the confrontationalist vision of
a connecting bridge linking subjectivity and objectivity; both also reject the idea of a
standpoint that transcends subjectivity, yet both seek to do so without totally collapsing or
eliminating the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Although they go about it in
significantly different ways, each of their transcendental attempts to preserve objectivity and
demonstrate its accessibility without breaching subjectivity involves reconceiving the
subjective domain in such a way that objectivity comes to be seen as somehow necessarily
'present' or 'manifest' within subjectivity, so that no confrontational bridge is needed. Rather
than conceiving subjective and objective either as radically separate domains which need to be
tied together, or as finally indistinguishable, these transcendental thinkers attempt to reveal
that, and how, subjectivity and objectivity are at one and the same time distinct yet
inseparable. Before seeing how this transcendental gambit is meant to work, what, more
specifically, is the problem with confrontationalist epistemology which it is designed to avoid?
The central difficulty which the transcendental approach aims to meet can be put in various
ways. For example, one might point out that every attempt to establish a connecting bridge
between subjectivity and objectivity fails, indeed must fail, because the specification of the
linking medium as tying (or leading) into the subjective immediately erects a barrier to the
objective. Everything we can compare our subjective notions with is, in virtue of being
comparable, itself something subjective and hence no longer serviceable for establishing a real
comparison. To phrase the difficulty in

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the linguistic mode Davidson favors: Every attempt to present the facts to which language
corresponds calls for a specification of facts in language. If the question is not beggedif it is
not assumed that language fits the factsthen the purportedly evidentiary specification of facts
in language is really no evidence at all for language's accessibility to the facts. 9 The 'fit' has
not been shown. Confrontationalist epistemologies confront a major problem: Objectivity must
be brought within subjectivity in order for the confrontational comparison to take place, but
once objectivity is brought within, its evidentiary status is compromised. Thus,
conceptualizing the project of demonstrating how we have objective knowledge of a real (trans
-subjective) world in terms of a subjectivity's capacity for coming into contact with what is
conceived as lying radically beyond its domain seems to reinforce our entrapment in that
domain.10
Thus the very effort to show that how we take things to be is how they are by describing some
apparatus or procedure which ties together what are originally conceived as separate domains
not only fails to demonstrate the correspondence of subjectivity and objectivity; additionally, it
reinforces our isolatedness in subjectivity by undermining any naive confidence we might
have had about the accessibility of objectivity. Trying to show how the separate domains of
subjectivity and objectivity can be tied together results in a startling realization: The chasm
between these domains cannot be bridged. Rather than dispelling skeptical and solipsistic
doubts, confrontationalist epistemologies would seem to put them on a more secure footing.
The transcendental approach may be thought of as an attempt to turn this problem into its own
resolution. It strives to make a virtue out of the inescapability of subjectivity by trying to get
us to rethink the idea that subjectivity can properly be understood as something within which
we are trapped, forever cut off from an objectivity lying beyond. The broad program of the
transcendental approach is fittingly captured in Kant's notion of a Copernican revolution, for it
involves a radical alteration or inversion of perspective in which an attempt is made to turn the
situation which seems to call for skepticism (unbridgeable subjectivity) against skepticism
itself. I call the transcendental approach an indirect one because, rather than asserting that
there is a bridge, it involves an attempt to show that, properly understood, subjectivity and
objectivity are such that a bridge between them is unnecessary.
So at the heart of the transcendental enterprise is a process of reconceptualization.
Transcendental thinkers ask us to interiorize

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objectivity at least in the sense of seeing that objectivity thought of as a radically separate
inaccessible domain does not make sense. How does the transcendental procedure of
reconceptualization and interiorization work? With an eye to answering this question I will
now discuss the procedure more specifically, but still in general terms as one common to Kant
and Davidson. Then I will move on to a discussion of details which will bring out the
considerable differences in their approaches.
In both Kant and Davidson, the transcendental procedure involves two stages: (1) Objectivity
is subjectivized or interiorized; (2) It is argued that the distinction between objectivity as
subjectivized (how things appear, how we describe them in language) and some radically other
objectivity (some conception of objectivity which might be inaccessible from the domain of
subjectivity) is unintelligible or incoherent.
In speaking of the subjectification of objectivity, (step one) what I have in mind is a
conceptual reorientation through which talk of our access to objectivity is brought within or
recast in terms of what can be found within subjectivity, understood as that domain to which
we are held to have unproblematic access. In the transcendental enterprise generally,
''subjectivity"however otherwise definedis just that domain whose workings are held to be
privileged or to possess a kind of epistemic primacy because of our purportedly unmediated
access to it. In psychological terms the subjective domain is that of the thinking subject: mind,
ego, consciousness, the understanding. If we make the linguistic turn and concentrate on
language as our starting point we may avoid using these terms. The focus of attention remains
the same, however. For in either case there is a basic sense among those concerned that we
must look to a domain of epistemic primacy in order to clarify all else. In other words, it seems
to be generally agreedand this whether the theory employs psychological or linguistic
termsthat all philosophically respectable talk of cognition presupposes a domain of epistemic
primacy. 11 That domain is commonly and, I suspect, not infelicitously, called the subjective
domain.
Once we are brought then to understand how objectivity is in some sense a feature of
subjectivity, we can take the second step. This involves getting us to see that this conception of
objectivity (as accessible because wedded to subjectivity) is the only intelligible conception of
objectivity. To make this point both Kant and Davidson mount an attack on the
meaningfulness of the idea of an objectivity which is radically other in the sense of lying
beyond all grasp by subjectivity. So, the second step involves a movement from

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interiorized or subjectified objectivity (the conceptualization, articulated in step one, of
objectivity in terms of what takes place or is found within subjectivity) to the 'objectification'
of this whole interiorized or subjectified domain.
What I mean here in speaking of the second step as a process of objectificationthe
objectification of subjectivityneeds to be carefully stated. The second, objectifying (or
reobjectifying step) is not an attempt to move back outside of the domain of subjectivity in
question. It is not an attempt to show how objectivity as subjectively conceived really does
correspond to something else lying outside. Such a move would constitute a return to the
confrontationalist epistemology of bridge building. But on the other hand, the second step also
does not involve an attempt to thoroughly reduce objectivity to subjectivity. The
transcendental thinker as an objectivist and a realist cannot be seen as holding that there is
nothing other than subjectivity. Both Berkeleyan and absolute idealism must be avoided. What
he wants to show is that objectivity is other than subjectivity without being something so
radically other as to be thoroughly beyond and completely inaccessible from it.
How can this procedure be reconstructed more specifically (and what are its problems)?
Looking at the first stepthe subjectification of objectivity, the conceptualization of objectivity
in terms of subjectivitymore closely, it involves first the specification of what are taken to be
some unchallengeably given, obvious features of our human subjectivity. We begin with some
aspects of the domain of subjectivity whose basic nature is, or seems to be, immediately
accessible to us, with some feature or features of the life world which are unproblematically
present.
In the case of Kant the domain of subjectivity is defined as consciousness, and our attention its
drawn to the unassailable fact that conscious experience is by and large not random or chaotic
but spatially, temporally, and causally organized in such a way that it manifests overall
coherence or intelligibility. In the case of Davidson the domain of subjectivity is defined as
language, and attention is drawn to the fact that we use language as a medium of
communication, that, by and large, we understand others and they us. 12
Once such sweeping and unassailable features of our life world have been laid out we are then
asked to consider how these phenomena are to be explained or accounted for. And bothdespite
their different construals of the subjective domainpresent accessible objectivity as a necessary
explanatory condition for those given unassailable features of subjectivity whose explanation
is being sought. What is found to be given in subjectivity is held to be

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explicable only insofar as objectivity is accessible. And further, for both, addressing the
accessibility of objectivity involves thinking of objectivity either as something established
(Kant) or always already manifest (Davidson) within the domain of subjectivity. In the case of
Kant, objectivity is seen as accessible because it is to be understood as partially constituted by
subjectivity. In the case of Davidson, objectivity is seen as accessible in that our access to it is
construed in terms of an operation present within subjectivity. Kant asks us to understand
objectivity as a product of a synthesizing transcendental ego. Davidson asks us to understand
objectivity as necessarily immanent within language as understandable. In both cases
objectivity is subjectivized in the sense that a procedure said to be inseparable from
subjectivitythe constitution of the unity of consciousness, the determination of linguistic
meaningis explained as an activity which can be accounted for only on the condition of the
involvement of objectivity in it. In both cases objectivity is subjectivized in the sense of
coming to be viewed in and through its role as a necessary component of relations established
and holding within the domain of subjectivity. What we find is that the accessibility of
objectivityand by implication the very nature of objectivity as accessibleis tied to a
constitutive activity (synthesis, meaning determination) which establishes the essential nature
of subjectivity.
How do these reconceptualizations of objectivity in terms of a relation established within the
domain of subjectivity take shape? What, more specifically, is step one?
Kant's contention is that experience as we find it given must be explained by reference to the
activity of a transcendental ego which synthesizes the sensibly given manifold according to
rules. My experience and that which it is experience of are construed as correlative byproducts
of this ego's activity. The question of whether things as I know them correspond to things as
they are is resolved by conceiving both sides of the relation as resulting from the common
synthesizing action. The certainty we can have about what we know stems from the
invariability of the schemethe categories or rulesas applied to a content given in sensible
intuition. Objective certainty is not a matter of getting beyond the subjective but of the alleged
necessity of carrying out the synthesizing process according to rules, a necessity said to be
required insofar as we are to explain experience as we find it given.
For Davidson too the issue of objectivityand more specifically an account of truth as a
correspondence relation established within the domain of the subjectiveis central to his
account of the

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conditions of the possibility of the linguistic phenomenon he wants to explain. 13 Just as our
ability to know things as they are is basic to the Kantian explanation of experience, so is it
basic to Davidson's account of how it is possible for us to understand language.
Davidson's contention is that our ability to understand the utterances of a language can best be
explained by reference to a Tarski-style theory of truth. In terms of such a theory, one's ability
to understand an utterance is tied to one's knowledge of its truth conditions. Generally,
understanding a language means being able to specify truth conditions according to a rule or
formula. Thus, as with Kant, explaining a given feature of our life world is tied to presenting
objectivity as accessible. In this instance our ability to understand is tied to our ability to
determine under what conditions a statement is true or false. And also, as with Kant, this
accessibility itself is specified in terms of a relation of correspondence internal to the domain
of subjectivity. Following Tarski's formula, knowledge of truth conditions is a linguistic
matter: To know the truth conditions for an utterance S is to be able to assert S is true if and
only if p, where p is itself a statement, either in the same or another language. Access to
objectivity is described in terms of an activity internal to the domain of subjectivity:
translation.14
So both Kant and Davidson make access to objectivity a condition of subjectivity, and both
aim to avoid confrontationalist bridge building by construing access in terms of a
correspondence relation established within subjectivity. Yet despite the general parallels
between the Kantian and Davidsonian transcendental projects considered so far, there are
considerableone might even say radicaldifferences in their approaches. These differences
pertain not only to how each defines the domain of subjectivity but also to the ways in which
they go about construing objectivity from within that domain. I want to consider what I see as
the essential difference in the ways they carry out what I have called the first step of
subjectivizing objectivity. I'll suggest that Davidson's procedure can be thought of as designed
to avoid problems with the Kantian approach. After briefly considering what these problems
are and how Davidson attempts to avoid them, I'll then assess how he carries out the second
step, which I have not discussed in terms of Kant. Here, Davidson's arguments to show why an
objectivity inaccessible to subjectivity is incoherent will receive special attention.
The crux of the difference between the ways in which Kant and Davidson subjectivize lies in
the fact that Kant is concerned

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with the transcendental psychology or mechanics, with the architecture and dynamics of the
actual connective relation between subjectivity and objectivity, while Davidson is not. For
Kant, the issue of how a fit between subjectivity and objectivity is established is crucial, while
for Davidson, avoiding this issue is crucial.
Unlike Davidson, Kant attempts to give a precise explanation of the manner in which
objectivity is accessible from within subjectivity. His way of attempting to avoid the problem
of bridging separate domains is to postulate the transcendental ego as concurrently constitutive
of both domains. 15 But this approach, as Davidson sees, cannot really avoid the traditional
epistemological confrontational problems. Rather than getting around the problem of contact
and confrontation between two domains, it now emerges twice, both internally and externally.
For even if experience and its objects are the correlative products of a synthesis, the question
remains how what come together in subjectivity are predisposed to being synthesized: How is
it that scheme (the transcendental categories) and content (the sensibility given) happen to fit?
Insofar as the activity of synthesis is an operation carried out on something given to
subjectivity, the question of linking separate domains remains, even if it has been raised at a
different level. Instead of asking how knowledge and object correspond, we now need to
inquire how it is that spontaneity and receptivity are coordinated. In addition, the mechanics of
Kant's internalization of objectivity leads to the re-emergence of an unknowable objectivity
beyond: in accounting for our knowledge of things this is reduced to knowledge of things as
they appear. So knowledge is something relative to our scheme. It is knowledge of
phenomena, not of things-in-themselves from which we remain cut off.
The avoidance of these problems is essential to Davidson. That is why he eschews any
consideration of transcendental mechanics. For Davidson there can be no talk of how any
evidentiary contact or connection, any mediation between subjectivitylanguageand
objectivitythe worldis effected. "The moral is obvious. Since we can't swear intermediaries to
truthfulness, we should allow no intermediaries between our beliefs and their objects in the
world.16 While Davidson does speak of "the causal relations between our beliefs and speech
and the world,"17 he is careful to insist that such relations carry no epistemological burden. As
a self-described coherentist and antifoundationalist,18 for him the very idea that we can make
sense of evidentiary connections, or construe our knowledge of the world as something that
can be justified or guaranteed by an appeal to some notion of how knowledge and the world
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up, is anathema. "What we must guard against," he writes, "are epistemic intermediaries." 19
Davidson's refusal to address the question of the means and methods whereby we make
contact with objectivity is, as we'd expect, manifest in the contrast between his and Kant's
subjectification of objectivity. Davidson's account of our access to the objective in terms of an
intralinguistic relationship is not at all constructivist in the manner of Kant. In fact, while truth
is characterized in terms of a linguistic relation, nothing at all is said about how we come to
know the truth conditions for a statement.20 Our ability to know objectively is wedded to
linguistic capability;21 to be an objective knower is to be in a position of being able to provide
T sentences.22 (Or, one's knowledge is manifest in one's ability to translate.) But nothing is
said in an extralinguistic vein about how one comes to be in that position. There is no talk of
how language ties to things"nothing can reveal how a speaker's words have been mapped on to
objects"23and Davidson is adamant in his rejection of that approach. There can be no
justification for our holding a sentence true "outside of other sentences held true. ..."24 I think
the implication here is that coming to learn how to use a language and coming to know the
world are inseparable, and I will return to this point later.
In any case, it seems that, for Davidson, knowledge of the world as expressible in language
functions as part of the explanans in his account of language as a medium of communication.
Our general ability to know and describe what there is, isat this juncturetaken for granted.
Thus more is required for Davidson to complete his transcendental project as a defense of
realism. How can the idea of correspondence be saved if there is to be no construal of a link,
no cogent story respecting that which establishes or guarantees correspondence? How can we
be assured that the world as described in language is not just "our own picture of things"?
What assurance do we have that "what we take there to be is pretty much what there is?"25 On
what basis can Davidson claim that ''by studying the most general aspects of language we will
be studying the most general aspects of reality?"26 Davidson's refusal to address the question
of the contact between language and the worldhowever well foundedseems to leave us all the
more confined within subjectivity, in no position to answer the questions just posed.
I want to suggest that Davidson attempts to answer them and to complete the transcendental
procedure by arguing in a manner which, initially at least, seems to involve reinforcing our
understanding of the extent to which we are 'trapped' within subjectivity,

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unable to step beyond or outside of language. In his rejection of attempts to construe contacts
between subjectivity and objectivity, Davidson is, in a sense, more radically subjectivist than
Kant. But his position, I think, is that it is just a radical or thoroughgoing subjectivisma
subjectivism without limitsthat leads to a satisfactory objectivism. Or as he puts it, "coherence
yields correspondence." 27 I would summarize his argumentative position metaphorically in
this way: Understanding the dimensions of our purported entrapment within subjectivitywithin
languageis accompanied by the revelation that we are effectively cut off from nothing. For we
cannot help coming to the realization that the borders of the trap are unavoidably unspecifiable
or untouchable from within.
Davidson moves in this direction, taking the second step of the transcendental procedure by
attempting to reveal the conceptual untenability of an inaccessible objectivity, in essays such
as "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme" and "A Coherence Theory of Truth and
Knowledge." What he offers us here are transcendental arguments which have a general form.
They are designed to show that our inability to effect an epistemological escape from
languageevident from the fact that every articulation of what language refers to, every
specification of the facts is in language28does not provide evidence of our entrapment. Rather,
this manifest inability calls into question the intelligibility of the perspective from which we
can meaningfully regard language as a trap, as something from which we should like to
escape. Davidson's general point is that we can come to regard objectivity as generally
accessible because no attempt to articulate the conditions of its general in accessibility can
succeed. Failure to demonstrate inaccessibility is unavoidableskepticism and relativism
failbecause we cannot provide a meaningful formulation of the notion that we are trapped
within language. Every attempt to do so requires an effort to articulate what lies outside this
trap in order to specify and substantiate its entrapping or limiting powers. But making this
effort requires us to draw what is purportedly outside within the domain of the intelligible and
the communicable. To show the inaccessibility of objectivity from language we need to be
able to specify in language just what it is about objectivity that lies beyond us, but doing this
can only manifest its accessibility.
One way in which Davidson makes this point is by considering the notion of language as a
conceptual scheme. According to the conceptual schemer's view, language is something which
sets a limiting or distorting condition on what we can know: As a scheme, it stands as an
intermediary between us and the given. So this is

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one way of understanding language as a perspectival trap. Yet to sort out this view of
language, Davidson argues, we must do something we cannot: make sense of an alternative
conceptual scheme. The supposition that there is at least one alternative schemein Davidson's
terms, an untranslatable languageis a necessary condition of the intelligibility of the idea that
we are operating within the constraints of a conceptual scheme that does not do justice to
things as they are. Only if there is an alternative view can one claim that one's own is a view,
just a perspective. 29 But every attempt to make sense of such alternatives requires us to grasp
a view which is correcttrue relative to the schemebut not translatable into our own. And as
truth is inseparable from translatability, this cannot be done. To understand or make sense of a
different conceptual scheme is, unavoidably, to make it our own. Thus the idea of language as
a potentially distortive or alternative medium between us and the world simply cannot be
cashed out, given Davidson's understanding of the necessary conditions for interpretation.
Davidson argues to a similar conclusion in "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge."30
Again, the position under consideration is one which denies that objectivity is accessible in
language. In this case we are asked to reflect on the possibility that our (or someone else's)
subjective conception of thingsthe world as described in languageis globally mistaken.
Davidson contends that reflecting on this possibility leads us to preclude it because we finally
realize that the notion of global error is unintelligible. Only that which we can understand is
intelligible, and for Davidson the conditions for understanding are linguistic: To understand is
to be able to interpret and articulate in language. But we have no means for understanding
such error or rendering it intelligible. It cannot be coherently expressed in language, since
general agreement about things, which is impossible here in an imagined case of global error,
is a precondition for understanding (expression). Thus, coming to understand a view as
massively wrong is impossible since understanding presupposes general agreement about
truth.
So, arguments to show our entrapment in language, arguments designed to show why language
may not get things right or may fail to correspond to things as they are, are self-defeating.
From this, Davidson draws a strong positive conclusion. Although we cannot oversee any
connection between language and the world, a consideration of the conditions of
subjectivitylinguistic communicationpermits us to reason to the general correctness of such a
connection, to the notion that things as described in language are

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pretty much as they are. "My main point is that our basic methodology for interpreting the
words of others necessarily makes it the case that most of the time the simplest sentences
which speakers hold true are true." 31 Is Davidson entitled to draw such a strong conclusion, to
argue from coherence to correspondence? Do Davidson's transcendental arguments to realism
succeed?
I think not. It's one thing to contend that mutual understanding requires general agreement
about the truth (or perhaps about some basic truths). I do not want to quibble with the notion
that we must haveor think we havea basis of agreement if we are to disagree. But what, or how
much, follows from this? Davidson, of course, does not simply contend that objective truth is
what we agree on, he does not hold the view that agreement constitutes truth. That would be a
relativist version of coherence theory, one denying the objectivist notion that truth is out there,
independent of what we might think or say. "And certainly agreement, no matter how
widespread, does not guarantee truth."32 Rather than holding that our view of the world is by
and large true because we agree on it, or that "truth" means agreement, he contends that we
agree on it because it is by and large true. His view is that agreement is indicative, not
constitutive of correctness. We just could not be massively wrong and find as much agreement
as is needed for communication. But just what grounds has he given us for reasoning from the
fact of widespread agreement to confidence that the things we agree on are the case? Having
precluded any possibility of comparing the things we agree on with the facts 'out there,' he
resorts to the aforementioned arguments. How much do they establish? I want to argue that
they do not establish what he thinks they do, that Davidson does not succeed in showing that
agreement indicates correctness, or as he puts it, that coherence yields correspondence.
Where Davidson does succeed with them is in giving us one way of seeing why there cannot
be successful conclusive arguments designed to demonstrate our entrapment in language. He
has shown that there are real difficulties with certain versions of relativism and skepticism. If
relativism requires the articulation of an alternative conceptual scheme which is radically
other than our own, if skepticism must demonstrategive a true account ofmassive error, then,
as Davidson suggests, these positions are self-defeating. But I wonder about two things: (1)
Are the demands Davidson puts on the relativist and the skeptic reasonable and such that the
failure to meet them conclusively defeats these positions? In a moment I will suggest how a
relativist and a skeptic might respond in

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a somewhat Davidsonian manner to Davidson's arguments. (2) I wonder whether pointing out difficulties
with the entrapment position really establishes Davidson's strong conclusions.
In response to Davidson, a relativist might contend that the most he has done is to indicate that
relativism cannot be conclusively established by reasoned argument, but not that the conditions a
(1)relativist suggests may obtain cannot obtain. The reason that this is a difference that makes a
difference pertains to the difference between the negative positions of a weak relativism or skepticism
and Davidson's strong realistic position. The skeptic or relativist has less to do to make her point. For,
to argue that coherence, or anything else, yields correspondence and grounds realism one needs to
eliminate the very possibility of relativism or global error. (Which of course, is what Davidson tries to
do.) Realism requires the positive demonstration that the conditions for realism can be said to hold
with certainty, (where the "with certainty" proviso demands the defeat of skepticism and relativism),
whereas relativism and skepticism, at least in their weak versions, only require showing that there is a
possibility that the conditions for relativism and skepticism may hold. In short, the relativist and
skeptic only have to give us reasons to doubt realism in order to make their cases, while the realist
must prove that relativism and skepticism are impossible.

How does this pertain to Davidson? While showing why we might not be able to prove that there are
alternative conceptual schemes, Davidson has not established that there may not be alternative
conceptual schemes. Yesour relativist saysmaybe every attempt to present, to articulate, an alternative
conceptual scheme requires that we translate it into our own. But it does not follow that we can rule out
conclusively the possibility of an alternative conceptual scheme. For there may be a view which we have
translated, but massively misunderstood, that is mistranslated, without knowing it. Unbeknowst to us,
our translation may be in error. You cannot demonstrate that such mistranslation is impossible; at best
what you've shown is that we wouldn't be able to recognize the misunderstanding/mistranslation. For
even if translation requires agreement about truth conditions, it might be the case that I have unwittingly
misconstrued what you regard as truth conditions. After all, I can no more confront my beliefs about
truth conditions with yours than I can confront my beliefs with objects. The most I can do is confront my
beliefs about truth conditions with my beliefs about your beliefs about truth conditions. So it does not
follow from what you may be said to have shownour inability to recognize

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massive mistranslationthat we have correctly translated and understood and thus that some
alternative conceptual scheme cannot possibly exist. While translation may require construing
understanding as present, as having occurred, translation cannot guarantee genuine, correct
understanding.
Moreover, given the understanding of translation Davidson operates with, it is hard to see how
my being able to translate a conceptual scheme could prove it is not a radical alternative. I say
this because Davidson's view of translation just does not allow for the possibility of our going
radically wrong in translating and realizing it. But without the possibility of our recognizing
such error (mistranslation), we are not really entitled to assume that our (seeming) ability to
translate could guarantee that there are no radically alternative conceptual schemes. Unless it
is conceivable that the error can be recognized, we are not entitled to rule out its possibility in
the unequivocal Davidsonian fashion which seeks to buttress correspondence by eliminating
any possibility of our language being radically off in its account of things. Again, there is a
difference between showing why we could not discover this error and showing why it could
not possibly be the case, and the latter is not entailed by the former, barring assumptions I'll
discuss below. So while Davidson may succeed in showing why relativism cannot be
demonstrateda weak claimhe has not established the stronger claim of demonstrating
correspondence. 33 (What I am suggesting is that translation understood à la Davidsonas a
process which always necessarily carries with it a guarantee of large scale successis translation
understood in such a way as to rule out large scale failure. Maybe this is the only adequate
account of translation. But, in any case, if such failure is precluded from the realm of
possibilities from the start, then the idea of a 'largely correct translation'which idea seems
crucial to Davidson's argument against alternative conceptual schemesloses the contrast which
gives it force.)
A skeptic might respond in a similar fashion to Davidson's argument about global error. Yes, I
may not be able to understand (to interpret and express) some view as massively wrong (or I
may not be able to grasp, that is to say, to articulate, its massive erroneousness as such), since
understanding requires interpretation which presupposes agreement. But this shows not that I
cannot or may not be wrong, it only shows that I could never recognize this error. And, as a
matter of fact, this is just the possibility Descartes' evil genius points to: My (or our) error may
be so systematic and consistentso coherentthat we take it, and cannot help taking it, for

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the truth. Rather than showing that such a situation is impossible, Davidson has helped to
explain how such colossal blindness might be possible by clarifying our inability to recognize
it for what it is. Coherence not only fails to yield correspondence, it is equally compatible with
noncorrespondence.
So I do not see that Davidson has succeeded in moving from coherence to correspondence, in
arguing from a consideration of the subjective conditions of communication to the claim that
objectivity as we talk about it is necessarily pretty much as it is. "In sharing a language," he
writes, "in whatever sense this is required for communication, we share a picture of the world
that must, in its large features, be true." 34 "Must" is simply too conclusive. Showing that we
cannot conceive (express in language) an alternative conceptual scheme, or discover massive
error (correctly interpret a view as massively mistaken) does not preclude these
possibilitiesthat the world may be quite other than we describe it. Our inability to describe the
world as other than we do describe it does not show that it may not be otherunless we further
assume that the limits of objective possibility are defined by what is subjectively possible. But
insofar as this assumption is not fleshed out in, and into, a Fichtean or Schellingean idealism,
this is simply to introduce correspondence by a kind of fiat. Insofar as one holds both that we
cannot transcend language to view its connection with the world and that we can be certain
that the world is by and large as we describe it, one tends towards collapsing the distinction
between language and objectivity. In Davidson's case, this seems to amount to holding either
that the limits of language are the limits of the knowable world (which smacks of Kant and
conceptual scheming, and suggests an unknowable residue beyond) or that the limits of
language are the limits of the world as such, a position which smacks of the logico-linguistic
mysticism of the early Wittgenstein. And taking into account his adamant rejection of
conceptual scheming, it would seem that Davidson does tend in the latter direction. "But if we
do say this, then we should realize that we have abandoned not only the ordinary notion of a
language, but we have erased the boundary between knowing a language and knowing our
way around in the world generally.''35
In the end, Davidson's commitment to correspondence and to a metaphysical realism which
holds that ontological gems can be minded from a study of language36 seems puzzling, since
he has gone to such great lengths to undermine the framework of assumptions usually
associated with both these positions. What he seems to fail to see is that correspondence is an
irreducibly contrastive

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concept. By this I mean that it does not pass muster as a coherent philosophical notion (with
epistemological and metaphysical consequences) unless it is possible for us to see both how
success and how failure to correspond can be made out. Davidson argues that
traditionalconfrontationalnotions concerning the successful demonstration of correspondence
cannot work. He also argues, against relativism and skepticism, that failure to correspond also
cannot be demonstrated. Yet despite this twofold attack on it, he thinks correspondencein the
traditional sense he accepts as not demonstrable via confrontationremains to be saved.
To conclude: Davidson attempts to harvest ontological and epistemological fruit from the idea
that, unless we get things mostly right, we cannot make sense of getting things wrong. More
particularly, he wants to dismiss the possibility that, for the most part, we might be getting
things wrong. I want to insist that there is a parallel here. It does not make sense to claim that
language must, by and large, be "getting things right" unless we can make sense at least of the
possibility of it by and large "getting things wrong," which Davidson denies. The sense of
getting things right connected to correspondence and realism requires just the contrastthe
possibility of getting things wrongrejected by Davidson. In his attacks on relativism and
skepticism Davidson has gone a long way towards explaining why failure to correspond
cannot be made out. He needs to let the other shoe drop. Correspondence is a relation, and if
we can neither see that the relata correspond nor that they fail to, then it has become an empty
notion, a wheel which turns but moves nothing.
Foundationalism's traditional goals were to show how objective knowledge of a real world is
possible and to thereby defeat skepticism. As Hegeland Davidsonclearly see, attaining these
ends by demonstrating that and how our purported knowledge of such a world corresponds to
that given world is impossible. But while this realization leads Hegel to thoroughly abandon
the subjectivist, correspondence model of truth and knowledge, Davidson, like Kant, tries to
avoid bridging the unbridgeable gulf between subjectivity and objectivity by means of a mode
of transcendental argumentation. Chapter 10 has argued that these projects cannot succeed,
that, as earlier chapters have contended, the foundationalist model must be thoroughly
abandoned.
I have indicated here that definitive of the transcendental approach to foundationalism is the
contention that certain conditions

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unquestionably manifest within the subjective domain can only be rendered intelligible on the
condition that a real, and knowable, objective domain exists. Specifically, Davidson's version
of transcendental argumentation holds that the intelligibility or coherence of language is
possible only insofar as we have access to the truth, and that this truth must be construed in the
mode of correspondence. The latter is the case, he has argued, because we can make no sense
of the notion of an inaccessible domain beyond the grasp of language. In an argument
reminiscent of Hegel's criticism of Kant's thing-in-itself, Davidson holds that every attempt to
demonstrate that access to objectivity is impossible fails because it cannot avoid presupposing
successful reference to that domain. So, Davidson's position is not that we can access objects
epistemologically, but that we can finally make no sense of objects, or of talk of objects, as
inaccessible. I have shown that this position does not vindicate correspondence and
foundationalism, because the skeptic need not fall into Davidson's trap: Skepticism does not
need to demonstrate that an inaccessible domain exists. It merely needs to indicate that we
could be wrong in our beliefs about the domain of the given, not that we need to know that we
are wrong. The former state of affairs is compatible with the conditions of intelligibility and
communication on which Davidson rests his case. Davidson has moved in a quasi-Hegelian
direction by abandoning epistemology and raising questions about the nature of intelligibility
itself. But what we have seen is that, in so doing, he still presupposes the framework of
givenness and cannot avoid its problems.
Chapter 11, "The Problematic Role of God in Modern Epistemology," provides a detailed
analysis and an independent criticism (along Hegelian lines) of the foundational project and its
subjectivist model of truth. Opening with a formal consideration of the nature of the project
and its demands, I argue that foundationalism cannot succeed because it literally requires a
divine mind. Chapter 11 moves on to indicate how a variety of modern foundationalists have
attempted to incorporate such a mind in their projects, and how each has failed.

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Chapter 11
The Problematic Role of God in Modern Epistemology 1
All history is modern history.
Wallace Stevens

Since Hegel, more and more philosophers have come to conclude that, despite its basic appeal
and initial plausibility, foundational epistemology is not merely a seriously flawed project but
one whose successful completion is impossible in principle.2 Antifoundationalism transcends
many of the traditional boundaries between the continental and analytic camps, and its
implications extend beyond epistemology and concern larger issues such as the objectivity of
rational thought, the possibility of universal norms, and the future of philosophy.3
In any case, whatever overall position one takes on the question of the possibility of
epistemology as a meaningful endeavor, a survey of its modern history from Descartes through
Nietzsche indicates that fulfilling its basic aim of providing foundations for knowledge,
through an articulation of the conditions definitive of legitimate knowing, has proved to be
more difficult than most epistemologists expected. There are, of course, many different
approaches to epistemology to be found in the modern era: various versions of rationalism and
empiricism, as well as several varieties of critical or transcendental idealism. Nonetheless, one
way of focusing on a common feature, and especially on a common difficulty which modern
epistemologies share, is to take note of the explicit or implicit role

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which Godor, more accurately put, which a conception of the divine mindplays in various
epistemologies. The central thesis of this chapter is that the use of God by various modern
epistemologists is not accidental in that it arises from a fundamental difficulty endemic to
epistemological projects. In fact, I shall argue in Part I that, historical considerations aside,
implicit in the very idea of a successful epistemology is the conception of a mind which
possesses divine attributes. In addition, and in connection with what I shall contend is a
constitutive role for God in epistemology, I shall work in Part II to trace out a historical path
of development in modern epistemology in terms of the manner and extent to which various
epistemologists have made use of or reference to God in their projects, either explicitly or
implicitly. Lastly, and in regard to contemporary skepticism about epistemology one of my
aims throughout is to show that we can focus on what is fundamentally problematic about
epistemology by taking into account how an idea of God or of a divine mind does emerge
centrally in attempts to complete the epistemological project. 4

Part I.
The Objectivity Problem
What is the difficulty endemic to epistemology which can be said to require the involvement
of a divine mind for its solution? To answer this question we must examine the motivating
impulse which defines epistemology's nature and goals.
Epistemology's roots lie in a desire to attain certainty concerning knowledge, and the basis of
this desire, as noted by Descartes (in the Meditations) and Locke (in An Essay Concerning
Human Understanding) can be characterized as follows. If we are to be certain and secure
when we go about the business of knowing, we must first engage in a preliminary
investigation of the faculty or instrument of cognition (the mind or the understanding) so that,
having established its very capacity to afford knowledge, and having acquainted ourselves
with its nature and proper manner of functioninghaving learned that and how it workswe may
then make correct use of it. Basic here is the idea that we are (or believe we are) capable of
knowledge, but that error is likely unless we first establish the proper method or methods for
arriving at knowledge.
Insofar as one subscribes to this apparently reasonable view, an equally reasonable conception
of the basic structure of cognition follows. Knowledge must be regarded as something which
is distinct

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and distinguishable from an object, and the act of knowing must be seen to consist in a relation
between knowledge and its object. This overall understanding of the structure of cognition
follows from what I have described as epistemology's motivating impulse, for two reasons.
For one thing, only if knowing involves a relation such that knowledge is regarded as distinct
and distinguishable from the object of knowledge, is there a basis for speaking of a standard
against which our purported claims to know can be measured and found adequate (true) or
wanting (false). Epistemology presupposes from the first that we can be right or wrong in our
attempts to know, and that we can determine which, in at least some cases. And being able to
do so requires an understanding of cognition as a relation in which one of the relata is a
measure against which the other is measured. Furthermore, only if cognition has the
aforementioned structure is it possible to conceive of a preliminary investigation which could
establish that and how knowledge is possible in general. The ultimate goal of epistemology is
to specify the general conditions under which the faculty or instrument succeeds and fails in
providing knowledge. To do this, knowledge must be conceived as distinct and isolatable from
its object, for only then can one undertake an examination both of the overall nature of its
relation to the object and of the agency which establishes the relation. If the structure of
cognition is not understood as a determinate relation with general features, each act of
knowing would seemingly have to be regarded as an unanalysable, unique, event and it would
not be possible to specify those general conditions of knowing which epistemology seeks: no
methodological principles governing all legitimate cases could be articulated, no rules for the
direction of the mind could be promulgated, no foundations of cognition could be laid down.
So, the idea that we can sometimes ascertain when we have and have not grasped the truth,
and the idea that there are discoverable general conditions which determine when our grasping
succeeds and fails, both require the structure of cognition outlined.
Given this structure, a general understanding of truth also follows. Truth is what we attain
when our purported knowledge corresponds to, mirrors, pictures, adequates, or re-presents the
object as it is in-itself or in its objectivity. 5 Our knowledge must be identical in its
determinate character to the object as it is prior to and apart from our conception of it; the
objectivity of knowledge (or, if you will, the distinction between subjective and objective
truth) lies in the avoidance of any coloring, distortion, or admixture

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to knowledge by the cognitive act; objectivity resides in the exclusive determination of the
contents of knowledge (what it 'says' about the object as object) by that which it purports to be
the knowledge of. A paramount task for epistemology lies in demonstrating that one or more
modes of knowing can provide such knowledge of at least some of the domains of possible
objects of knowledge. If this cannot be shown, then knowing must be construed as a knowing
of things as they appear, as subjective in the pejorative sense. And if this turns out to be the
case, we again have a situation where no general criteria, methodological conditions, or
standards for cognition can be established. 6
One last feature of the epistemological agenda needs to be considered before we examine
epistemology's root difficulty. Knowing must involve a knower as the locus of knowledge. For
the project to work there must be a cognitive agent for whom the relational event of knowing
is present. Epistemologically understood, cognition is unthinkable without an awareness, an
intentional entitymind, understanding, consciousness, subjectivitywhich is distinct from and
can distinguish itself from its knowledge and the object of knowledge, while holding both
present in its field of awareness. Again, the need for a structure which provides for this
tripartite relating and distinguishing is required because the cognitive relation must itself be
present for a knower if the knower is to be capable of distinguishing between truth and falsity.
Not only a standard for judging knowledge claims, but a judge too is required. Additionally,
the possibility of an epistemological investigation also presupposes that the knower can make,
not only his knowing act, but also his own knowledge-enabling capacities or faculties an
object of knowledge: the determination of the general conditions under which objective
knowledge is possible requires that the epistemological investigator has access not merely to
knowledge and object (to determine whether they correspond) but also to the conditions which
make cognitive successful (or failure) possible. And finally, it must be the epistemologist's
own faculties which are accessible to her (the mind must be a "lumen naturale" transparent to
itself7 ; otherwise an infinite regress of investigations would ensue, rendering the project
pointless from the start.8
So, given that cognition is an event of and for a conscious subject; given that the object of
knowledge is regarded as something distinct from the knowledge of it; given that knowledge is
certifiably true insofar as it corresponds to the object in its objectivity; and given that
legitimate cognition consists in that mode (or

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modes) of relating knowledge to object in and through which truth is afforded, what is the
fundamental difficulty with epistemology?
The most direct way of focusing on this difficulty is through considering what the
epistemologist must accomplish in order to complete the project in light of the position from
which this accomplishment must be effected. In order to demonstrate that a mode of knowing
provides truth, the epistemologist must show that the knowing in question affords
correspondence between purported knowledge, something directly and unproblematically
accessible (usually taken to be an idea) and its object as it is in-itself. 9 To demonstrate that
correspondence has been attained (and to specify the conditions which make it attainable) the
epistemologist must claim to have knowledge of this correspondence: the epistemologist must
be in the position of comparing the mind's purported knowledge of the object with the object.
This correspondence-establishing comparison requires that the epistemologist can distinguish
between knowledge and objectin order that a genuine comparative test takes placewhile at the
same time establishing the identity or sameness of their contentsin order to show a successful,
correspondence-revealing comparison which demonstrates that the mode of knowing being
examined is truth-affording.
If objective knowledge is to be spoken of, the difference between the purported knowledge and
the object as standard must be maintained, for the epistemologist must be in the position of
guaranteeing that a genuine testone with a criterion given independently of that which is being
testedhas taken place. The assurance of the objectivity of the standard against which the
purported knowledge is to be measured requires a guarantee of its being determined
independently of the mode of cognition undergoing the test: A ruler cannot be an objective
measure of its own accuracy. Since the epistemologist must be able to certify that the standard
is so determined, the difference between purported knowledge and object which insures this
independent determination must be manifest to the epistemologist.
If the truth of the purported knowledge is to be spoken of, then the identity of knowledge and
object must be equally manifest to the epistemologist, for only when knowledge and object are
present as identical can their correspondence be certified. And arriving at correspondence
requires the maintenance of difference and identity at one and the same time, for otherwise a
question can arise as to whether the knowledge differentiated from the object is the same as
the purported knowledge found to be identical. So, in sum: In

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order for the test to be objective, the difference between knowledge and object must be
maintained; in order for the test to be a success, it must be eliminated.
Attaining to this state creates what I call the objectivity problem simply because the standpoint
and locus of comparisonthe instrument of the epistemological investigationmust be the same
cognitive agency whose purported knowledge is undergoing testing, for the reason outlined
above that knowledge and object must both be for the same knower if a comparison is to take
place. 10 What is problematic is then the following: How, from the subjective domain11 of this
agency, is one to demonstrate correspondence between the purported knowledge and the
objective standard, given that this standard must not only be different from the knowledge
being tested, but must also be certified as determined independently of the subjective domain
altogether?12 If the test is to be genuine, assurance must be provided that the standard is so
determined, that what the purported knowledge is being measured against is the object as it is
in objectivity, and not just another subjective account of what the object purportedly is. But if
the comparative test is to take place at all, the standard must be as accessible to the
epistemological agent as the knowledge being compared to it; it must be present in the
epistemologist's field of awareness just as the purported knowledge to be tested is. Yet once
the standard is so accessed, it seems that the assurance of objectivity is lost, for what guarantee
can there be that what is now present as standard is in fact the object as independently
determined and not as determined by the agent? The standard must become known in order to
be compared with the purported knowledge, but once it is so known it is no longer suitable as
a genuine standard. In a nutshell, the problem seems to be that all that the epistemologist can
compare to her purported knowledge of the object in a comparative test is another instance of
purported knowledge.
This is an objectivity problem because the paramount goal of epistemology is to show that
how things subjectively appear to us is not merely how things are 'for us' but also, at least in
some specifiable instances, how they truly are in themselves, or in their objectivity. We want
assurance that how we take things to be (or how we describe things in language) is 'how things
really are,' at least where that signifies 'determined independently of arbitrary whim.' It should
be noted that it makes no difference for the issues under consideration what ontological
coloring the domain of objectivity takes; it can be construed as Moore's world of ordinary

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physical things (against which philosophical concepts are to be measured) or as Plato's world
of ideas (against which the apparent world of physical things is to be measured) or as the
empiricists' domain of sense data (against which complex ideas are to be measured). We can
construe objectivity as material, as mental, as some hybrid of the two, or we can follow the
pragmatists and abstain altogether from distinguishing knowledge and objective standard in an
ontological fashion. A test still requires a meaningful distinction and the central problem
remains as long as that distinction is drawn. Furthermore, as we shall see in more detail
subsequently, it is irrelevant whether objectivity is understood in a literal sense, as a domain
conceived as distinct from and contrasted with a subject, or whether the locus of objectivity is
said to be found in subjectivity, or whether traditional distinctions pertaining to subjects and
objects are qualified or denied altogether. As long as the epistemological project is to be
undertaken the minimal distinction between purported knowledge and an objective standard,
construed as determined independently of the knowledge candidate, must be maintainedjust
how this independent determination is more specifically conceived makes no relevant
differenceand as long as it is maintained the objectivity problem arises.
What is needed for epistemology to succeed in its initial goal of demonstrating correspondence
is an act of knowing by the epistemologist which is somehow or other not merely another
subjective act. For the test to be genuine, objective, the agent must engage in a knowing which
is not 'of' the agent in the sense that it must be a knowing by the agent of how things are apart
from the field of awareness in which the purported knowledge is to be found. Yet, as we saw,
for the comparative test to take place at all the standard must also be in that same field of
awareness. In short, epistemology calls for a mind whose objects are both immanent and
transcendent at once, a divine mind.

Part II.
The Epistemologist Becomes Divine
To make this epistemological difficulty concrete, and to show how an appeal to God may be
used to attempt to get out of it, let us consider Descartes' position in the Mediations. I want to
pick up with Descartes after he has discovered his epistemological Archimedean point in the
cogito; that is, after he has withdrawn into the solitary thinking ego through a process of
methodological

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doubt which has led him to classify all the rest of his ideas as provisionally false. Where does
Descartes stand at this point? That he has ideas of many things other than of his own mind,
Descartes is certain. But he is uncertain as to whether these ideas are objectively true, namely,
that there exist real things outside of his mind and that his ideas of these things correspond to
them. Supposing that he may be dreaming or being deceived, Descartes intensifies the notion
that the presence of an idea in the subjectively privileged domain of the mind does not
guarantee the existence of its objective referent.
Descartes has come swiftly to (what he envisions as a temporary) position of skeptical
solipsism in that he has adopted a manifestly subjective criterion, the mind's inability to doubt,
as the preliminary identifying mark of an idea's truth. And he has found it possible to doubt
everything except that he is a mind, that he exists as a thinking thing. That the cogito is
Descartes' epistemological foundation point, the exemplary truth which his search for the truth
about truth has uncovered, is not at all surprising, given the requirement that the
epistemologist must have as his object an instance of purported knowing in which idea and
object correspond. For the cogito is such that the mere act of thinking this idea suffices to
manifest the existence of that object to which the idea refers. In thinking of one's existence as a
thinking thing one perhaps comes as close as is humanly possible to approximating the divine
power of bringing forth existence from out of nothing but thought. Whenever I conceive or
think the idea, ''I think," that there is something which thinks and hence that this idea is
objectively true is immediately given by the mere act of thinking. When the mind's idea is of
itself as a thinking thing it has no need to try to escape from the subjective domain to verify
that there is some objective, independently determined thing to which this idea corresponds,
for in this instance the cognitive (thinking) act itself immediately constitutes the objectivity in
question (that thinking is), even if it does not create it ex nihilo. Just to think the idea of
oneself as a thinking being is to establish or constitute the truth of that idea, since to think the
idea of oneself as a thinking being, is to be a thinking being and to be aware of oneself as a
thinking being, and hence also to be aware of the correspondence between this idea and this
object: In pure self-reflection where the subject and object of reflection are manifested
simultaneously in the act of reflection, idea, object and their correspondence are given at once.
(Which is not to say that all that which makes this reflection possible is either constituted or
made manifest by this act.)

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So the cogito is serviceable not merely because it apparently meets Descartes' specific demand
for resistance to doubt (and the evil genius). It can meet this specific requirement and has a
more basic appeal because this object seemingly affords an instance of cognition in which the
epistemological need to bridge subjectivity and objectivity can be met without reducing
objectivity to subjectivity in the pejorative sense of that term, for in the case of the cogito the
objective reality in question is simply the restricted domain of the thinking subject, as
Descartes acknowledges in his analysis of the cogito. (Since there is no bridge, neither doubt
nor the evil genius can block the path to certainty.)
Thus the cogito is paradigmatic for the special object the epistemologist seeks, but which is so
hard to find: one which can be known in its correspondence with the idea of it. It is not
accidental that postCartesian epistemological efforts take as their model the correspondence-
affording situation which arises when the mind makes its own activity its object. It is not
merely that seeking to legitimate cognition requires the epistemologist to have knowing as the
topic of investigation. Looking at it in hindsight, and in terms of the problem of epistemology,
what we find with the cogito is the first small step in a development in which, in an ever more
expansive fashion, the character of objectivity itself comes to take on the features of the self-
knowing mind. Descartes' successors gradually move to define the nature of the objectively
real in terms of that particular object which seems to meet the basic epistemological need of
being knowable in a certifiably true fashion. It is the special demands of epistemology which
shape the ontologies of modernity. The need to move in this inflationary direction becomes
apparent when we consider Descartes' confrontation with the objectivity problem.
Once having arrived at the cogito, Descartes' paramount difficulty, of course, concerns the
existence of other things about which he has ideas; Descartes the dualist and realist will not
claim that these things are given directly in and through the act of thinking these ideas. What
Descartes needs if he is going to recapture the world bracketed by his epistemological doubt is
a bridge which can be erected from the mind's resources alone and which can lead from the
mind to the domain of objects outside his mind. The solution he offers is ingenious, given his
dilemma. First of all he needs to establish that there really is a domain of such mind-external
objects (that he is not dreaming or being deceived). But he must do this from within the
subjective domain of the mind; he has no resources save the cogito. So he needs to find an idea
in his mind

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like the cogitoin that merely thinking it will suffice to guarantee its truth, in the sense of
establishing that the idea correctly refers to something realbut also different from the cogitoin
that the existence of the object to which the idea refers is objective: the reality referred to must
be mind-independent. Second, this bridge must not only connect, it must be crossable: he also
needs a way of insuring that some of his other ideas are also true in that they correspond to
objective realities. Descartes finds an answer to both of these needs in the idea of God. "... I
must enquire whether there is a God ... and if I find that there is a God, I must also inquire
whether He may be a deceiver; for without a knowledge of these two truths I do not see that I
can ever be certain of anything." 13
I am not going to go through Descartes' proofs of the existence of God nor consider objections
to them. Neither the precise nature of the proofs nor the problems with them concern the issues
at hand in an essential way. What we do need to note is that the workability of his solution
hinges ultimately on the genuine existence of a mind which can be known as capable of
attaining what Descartes' mind cannot: a mind which has not only its own existence but also
the existence of an objective world of knowable objects given in the idea of its own being. The
divine world-creative mind of Christian thought is just such a mind: one which possesses the
certainty of the correspondence between its ideas and their references because, as a mind, it is
both self-caused and creates or constitutes these objects ex nihilo. As strictly self-caused, such
a divine mind can entertain no questions about its apprehension of its own ideas or the
working of its faculties; literally nothing conditions its knowing; there remains no conceptual
space for doubt. And since it creates out of nothing but its own ideas (and by an unconditioned
act) there remains no unknowable residue which can block correspondence between the ideas
and the things.
This unconditioned character which permits of certain knowledge by God is captured in
Descartes' important notion of divine perfection. And it is only because Descartes believes that
he can and does know such a perfect God as more than an idea that he is able to reestablish the
certainty of veridical contact between his mind and the world and avoid solipsism and the
objectivity problem. He needs to know the truth of a God who, because he is the cause both of
Descartes' ideas and of things in the world, guarantees for Descartes the correspondence
between these ideas and those things.

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For to begin with, that which I have just taken as a rule, that is to say, that all the things
that we very clearly and very distinctly conceive of are true, is certain only because
God is or exists, and that He is a Perfect Being, and that all that is in us issues from
Him. ... But if we did not know that all that is in us of reality and truth proceeds from a
perfect and infinite Being, however clear and distinct were our ideas, we should not
have any reason to assure ourselves that they had the perfection of being true. 14

Only through claiming to know a mind which can do what his mind cannot can Descartes
move to meet his difficulties. "And so I very clearly recognize that the certainty and truth of all
knowledge depends alone on the knowledge of the true God, in so much that, before I knew
Him, I could not have a perfect knowledge of any other thing."15 Yet because that claim must
remain suspect (among other reasons, because it fails to reach the cognitive standard of
certainty established by the cogito), Descartes' project is bound to fail on its own terms. But, as
the rest of my story will indicate, this failure does not prompt a rejection of the cognitive
standard established by the cogito as that object which provides epistemological satisfaction.
Rather, it leads to a reconceptualization of the nature of the knower and the known in order to
meet that standard. Instead of rethinking knowledge in a nonepistemological fashion,
subsequent epistemologists reconceive all of reality in accordance with epistemological
demands.
The next epistemologist I want to consider is the Irishman Bishop Berkeley. Although
Berkeley conceptualizes the nature of the mind's relation to objects in such a way that one of
Descartes' problems is directly eliminated without an appeal to God, he too finds a need to
refer to God in attempting to give an adequate account of knowledge, one which is capable of
explicating both the truth and the objectivity of knowledge.
Descartes' rationalistic realismhis commitment to the mind-independence of worldly
objectsled him into two difficulties: without a divine mind as a connecting bridge the mind
cannot be certain either that the objects it conceives have a genuinely objective existence (are
more than the mind's subjective fancies: solipsism), or that I know them as they truly are
independently of my subjective conceptions of them (skepticism). Berkeley offers a solution to
the second difficulty. "What I here make public has, after a long and scrupulous inquiry,
seemed to me evidently true and not

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unuseful to be known; particularly to those who are tainted with Scepticism. ..." 16 He does so
through moving in the inflationary direction I mentioned above: he expands the domain of the
mind, extending the parameters of what is immediately given to conscious awareness to
include the domain of objects. If the mind, the knowing subject, is the locus of certainty, and
if, as mind, it cannot get beyond what is immediately given, then why not redefine the nature
of objectivity in terms of the immediately given and directly accessible, in terms of ideas?
Some truths there are so near and obvious to the mind that a man need only open his
eyes to see them. Such I take this important one to be, viz. that all the choir of heaven
and furniture of the earth, in a word all those bodies which compose the mighty frame
of the world, have not any substance without a mind; that their being is to be perceived
or known. ...17

If "to be is to be perceived," if the true being of things consists in nothing but their being
objects for a mind, then the mind has immediate and incorrigible certainty of the correctness of
what it conceives, for just what it thinks or perceives is immediately at one with what is. Ideas
are not copies, they are the things themselves.18
This Berkeleyan move confronts nicely the problem of skepticism, for it eliminates the
epistemologist's need to somehow get out of the mind or to appeal to a mind outside of the
epistemologist's own mind, in order to be able to show that ideas in the mind are in agreement
with objects 'out there.' However, this solution does not deal with the issue of the objective
status of what the mind knows. Insofar as the being of objects consists in their being
perceived, it would seem to follow that the very existence of objects is made dependent on my
mind, and thus that objects are annihilated or destroyed whenever I am not perceiving them.
Skepticism at one level disappears while the problem of solipsism remains. But if this is how
things stand, then although I may be immediately certain of the correctness of my perceptions,
this correctness is utterly one-sided and radically subjective, for my perceptions have no
objective, mind-independent referents to which they may be said to correspond. Thus I have
attained the certainty of the truth of what I know at the cost of the objective reality of what I
know.
If to be is to be perceived, how is the objectivity of knowledge to be guaranteed? Although
Berkeley avoids skepticism and establishes the truth of ideas by extending the domain of the
mind he

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can only avoid the other horn of the epistemological dilemma, solipsism, by introducing God:
as constantly all-perceiving, this divine mind establishes and insures the continued existence
and the objective reality of the world. And as the cause of my perceptions, God also insures
that what I perceive corresponds with that objective reality. Leibniz might be said to confront a
similar situation in a similar way in the Monadology: As an awareness, nothing falls outside of
a windowless monad's purview; the world is immanent, present in an unmediated fashion.
Thus the gap between subjects and objects is overcome. This establishes subjective certainty
and avoids skepticism. Objectivity is guaranteed (solipsism avoided) in a twofold fashion:
There is a plurality of monads and our perceptions are coordinated by a divine monad who is
the cause of the whole infinite series of monads. "The idea of things in us is nothing but the
fact that God, the author alike of things and of mind, has impressed this power of thinking
upon the mind, so that it can by its own operations produce what corresponds perfectly to the
events which follow from things." 19 Note that as with Berkeley, only more so, objectivity
itself comes to take on the character of the mind. In Berkeley's case, what is objectively real is
defined in terms of its being for a mind. With Leibniz, objective material reality is literally
constituted out of minds.
Having considered philosophers who appeal to a divine mind in their epistemological projects,
I want to deal now with the notion that in the later period of modern epistemology the
epistemological mind itself comes to be construed in such a manner that it comes closer and
closer to approximating a divine mind. Let us look at Kant, Fichte, and Schelling.
On the face of it, it might seem strange to contend that Kant's transcendental epistemology
involves a conceptualization of the knowing mind which approximates it to the divine.
Establishing the fundamentally limited character of the understanding in the face of reason's
pretensions to know in an unlimited, God-like fashion is central to Kant's project. In Book II of
the transcendental dialectic of the first Critique he argues against the possibility of any rational
proof of God's existence.20 Clearly then, as someone awakened from his dogmatic slumbers
by Hume's critique of rational metaphysics, Kant will not appeal to God to demonstrate how
objective knowledge is possible. But although he accepts Hume's criticisms of the ways in
which earlier philosophers had attempted to justify knowledge, Kant still aims to provide such
a justification. I want to suggest that it is because Kant accepts Hume's criticisms while
refusing to accept his skepticism that Kant is driven, in his

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attempt to justify knowledge, to rethink the nature of the mind in such a way that an important
step is taken in approximating the epistemological to the divine mind. 21
How is this? In arriving at skepticism, Hume had shown that while a passive-receptive mind
can be certain of the character of its immediately present impressions, it can attain to no
certain knowledge of the purportedly objective, ostensibly mind-external sources of these
sense impressions. No appeal to God is possible, although we can understand how habit
creates the subjective necessity of my belief in an objective world. Where Descartes and
Berkeley felt confident in invoking God as a bridge who guarantees correspondence between
ideas and things, thus providing for the objectivity of my knowledge, Hume will allow no such
options and is content to accept the consequences for philosophy. Kant's way out of this, his
self-styled Copernican revolution, is based in a reconception of the knowing mind which
involves the attribution of quasi-divine powers to the mind. If appealing to God in the fashion
of Descartes and Berkeley is ruled out, why not bring God within? With Kant, we find that the
objective validity of knowledge is not a matter of the mind's capacity to have true or correct
copies of thoroughly mind-transcendent objects impressed upon it. (We can have no
knowledge of things-in-themselves.)22 As we saw, earlier attempts to account for knowledge
in that manner failed because the epistemological mind, without God, could not transcend
itself to compare ideas with objects in order to certify their correspondence. But with Kant,
objectivity is accounted for because the mind, albeit in a limited or restricted sense, is creative.
With Kant, we take the first step towards transforming the epistemological mind into the
divine mind in that he offers a reconceptualization of the mind as essentially active rather than
passive, as something which does not find correspondence but which establishes or legislates
it.23
Thus the understanding is something more than a power of formulating rules through
comparison of appearances; it is itself the lawgiver of nature. Save through it, nature,
that is, synthetic unity of the manifold of appearances according to rules, would not
exist at all (for appearances, as such, cannot exist outside usthey exist only in our
sensibility). ...24

According to Kant, "we can discover it [nature] only in the radical faculty of all our
knowledge."25 Attaining knowledge is not a matter of receiving impressions as copies of
objects; it is an act of creative synthesis in which knowledge and objects are constituted

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in one and the same act by a transcendental ego. The objectivity of my knowledge is not a
matter of (unattainable) access to some domain which thoroughly transcends subjectivity; it
pertains instead to the universality and necessity of the rules of synthesis. 26 The model for
this synthesis is Descartes' cogito. But now this is not simply an ego which makes itself
present to itself through the thinking act. It is now an ego as an actor whose self-knowing act
is nothing less than the constitutive formula for the organization of all objectivity. This self-
knower is a lawgiver whose adjudicative code is its primal (self) constitutive thinking activity,
which, as a unifying activity according to rules, extends beyond itself to objectivity. "The
original and necessary consciousness of the identity of the self is thus at the same time a
consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances according to
concepts. ..." "It is only when we have ... produced synthetic unity in the manifold of intuition
that we are in a position to say that we know the object."27 Correspondence between mind
immanent ideas and mind transcendent objects does not need to be found; it is established or
constituted because the conditions for the possibility of knowledge and the conditions for the
possibility of objects of knowledge are identical.28 We can be assured of the objective validity
of our knowledge not because we know that there exists a God who created our minds and the
world and who insures their correspondence, but because we can know that our minds, as
synthetically active, function in a God-like manner to shape knowledge and the world at one
and the same time according to the necessary constitutive principles. Correspondence between
what we find in subjectivity and what is objective is assured because the act constitutive of the
unity of consciousness is also the act which unifies the sensible manifold.
Now, although Kant works to account for objectively valid knowledge in this manner, the
viability of his project is undermined, as his critics and successors immediately saw, by the
presence in it of the notion of things-in-themselves. The problem of the thing-in-itself in Kant
is the form in which the objectivity problem appears in his philosophy. Although Kant had
brought the objective world into the domain of what the mind has certain access to by
attributing object-formative powers to the mind, the success of his account as one which
establishes knowledge as objective rests on two dubious claims.
For one thing, and as Kant clearly saw, solipsism is avoided only insofar as the material
synthesized by the transcendental ego is itself given from without. Kant insists that this active
ego is only

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conditionally active. 29 "Material idealism" is avoided, according to him, by the fact that the
stuff the mind works on is not itself created by the mind.30 Our understanding is not
"intuitive": it does not give objects to itself merely by thinking them.31 So, the nature of the
Kantian divinization of the human mind is that of a demiurge, a God who imposes form on
given material. What renders this move epistemologically problematic is the issue of the
intelligibility of the theory which attempts to root the mind in objectivity by preserving a
passive dimension. In terms of the theory itself, we seem to need to think of things-in-
themselves as the sources of what is given in the manifold of sensible intuition. For if they are
not, what is? "[T]hough we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be
in a position to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the
absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears."32 Unlike
Hume, Kant cannot remain agnostic on this issue. Some provision must be made for such an
other-than-mind source, call it what you will, if, in our desire to avoid solipsism, we are not to
err in the other direction by attributing full creative powers to the mind. Yet claims about
things-in-themselves as the ground or source of appearances must remain problematic. The
validity of the synthetic categories lies in their restricted application to what is given in
sensible intuition, but that validity can seemingly only be accounted for if we cash out the
notion of such givenness, which would seem to require applying a categorycausalitybeyond
what is given to the source of givenness.
For another thing, there is a related problem which does not concern the internal coherence of
the theory but the epistemically questionable character of its status as knowledge. Earlier we
saw how Descartes, Berkeley, and Leibniz needed, as epistemologists, to claim veridical
knowledge of a transcendent God to complete projects designed to show how knowledge is
possible in the first place. Now, with Kant we see that something like such a God has been
transposed within. (Rather than Descartes' proofs we have a transcendental deduction.) But
this does not obviate the problem of the status of the epistemologist's knowledge of this quasi-
divine mind. How is knowledge of the transcendental ego possible? In some sense this ego is
not the directly accessible phenomenal self of ordinary consciousness, although according to
Kant it is a condition of the possibility of that self. But if it is a noumenal self, lying behind
appearances, we must again ask how, and in what sense, is it knowable? The transcendental
epistemologist must somehow claim to know both a noumenal transcendental ego and a
noumenal world

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of things-in-themselves. (As I shall argue below, being able to 'think' these things does not
meet the skeptic.) But how can the transcendental philosopher know these things-in-
themselves as the two roots of possible knowledge? Only if things-in-themselves are knowable
as that which provides material for synthesis, and only if the transcendental ego is knowable as
capable of synthesizing is Kant's account of knowledge intelligible as one which guarantees
objectivity and answers Hume's skepticism. For if the transcendental philosopher cannot attain
to it, there will be no assurance of the fit between what is given to the transcendental ego and
its categories, the fit between receptivity and spontaneity. 33 And establishing this fit at the
transcendental level seems as problematic as ever as long as the ultimate source of what comes
to be known is conceived as radically other than the mind, be it the phenomenal, noumenal, or
some other mind. Postulating things-in-themselves avoids the problem of the mind's having to
transcend itself at one level (of the understanding), only to reintroduce it at another, since the
account can only work if these things-in-themselves are knowable in some sense. As Jacobi so
aptly put it, without the thing-in-itself you cannot enter Kant's philosophy, with it, you cannot
remain within Kant's philosophy.
Of course, the transcendental philosopher does not want to claim that his transcendental
'knowledge' of these matters is of the same form, or order, as ordinary knowledge of objects.
Transcendental argumentation to the noumenal realm consists in claiming that, from certain
conditions immediately and indubitably manifest in subjectivity, we can infer to the
transcendental conditions of their possibility without having to claim direct access to such a
domain. (See the "Refutation of Idealism.")34 But without such access, skepticism is not
defeated, for the skeptic (see Hume) has his own account of the conditions for what is found
manifest in subjectivity (such as the subjective feeling of causal necessity). The necessity of
our subjective belief in objectivity is not at issue between the skeptic and the Kantian. What
the skeptic disputes is that this can be more than a belief, that we are entitled to infer to
anything independent of that subjectivity in order to account for it. Ifas the transcendental
philosopher contendswe cannot have access to the domain of the given which is the
(purportedly) ultimate source of the content of our knowledge, then we have nothing against
which to compare the rival skeptical and transcendental accounts, and thus no objective basis
(in the sense of something independent of what we find in subjectivity) for preferring one over
the other. (There may be, as Kant intimates, a practical basis for preference.

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As we shall see below, from Fichte on, a move to the practical to ground the cognitive comes
to the fore.) If the transcendental philosopher cannot attain toor refuses to try to attain
toknowledge of a domain which does transcend subjectivity, at least in the sense that such a
domain can be certified as not having been determined by subjectivity, the objectivity of our
known world may be nothing more than the objectivity of a dream world. Simply contending
that we must think that there is such a domain of objectivity is not enough. The need to think
that may simply be a curious feature of our subjectivity; it provides no guarantee that there is
such a domain. But an objectivity which is no more than a subjective requirement of thought is
useless, if the term is supposed to signify that I can be certain that how I take things to be has
been measured, or at least constrained by, a standard given independently of human
subjectivity.
So once again epistemology confronts the skepticism/solipsism, truth/objectivity,
immanence/transcendence dilemma: Things-in-themselves are transcendent and cannot be
spoken of at all. In this case we are back with Hume and the account of synthetic a priori
judgments is a more complex and cumbersome version of his treatment of the subjective
necessity of our mode of thought. Or, things-in-themselves are knowable and transcendental
philosophy is possible. In which case things-in-themselves cannot fall outside of the mind and
must be the products, if not of a subjective empirical mind then of an ultimate transcendental
ego or cosmic creative mind.
Unwilling to resort to Humean skepticism about philosophy, Kant's immediate successors
seize the latter alternative, realizing that as long as anything in the affair of knowing is
conceived of as having its origin outside the mind, then the epistemological project of showing
how knowledge and object correspond (or, after the transcendental move, of showing how
spontaneity and receptivity are suitably fitted for synthesis) will be short-circuited. 35 In so
doing they took another step toward fully attributing divine powers to the human mind.
In fact, with the development of postKantian epistemology in Fichte and Schelling, we find an
explicit positing and expansionnow as the fundamental and final truth about mind and reality
in generalof what Descartes had originally discovered in the cogito as that radically minimal
truth in which epistemological certainty can be attained. The postKantians sought to avoid the
objectivity problem which leaves one trapped within the subjective mind and unable to
demonstrate correspondence by expanding the borders of

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the mind to enclose the totality of reality in its knowability. 36 Fichte tells us:
So what then, in a couple of words, is the import of the Science of Knowledge? It is
this: reason is absolutely independent; it exists only for itself; but for it, too, it is all
that exists. So everything that is must be founded in itself, and explained solely from
itself, and not from anything outside it, to which it could never get out without
abrogating itself. ...37

Fichte and Schelling worked out the notion implicit in Descartes that objects can be known in
their correspondence with ideas insofar as ideas and objects alike are nothing other than the
products of a fundamentally active mind whose activity is creative and is the ultimate source
and the final unifying ground of ideas and objects. ''The concept of action, which becomes
possible only through the intellectual intuition of the self-active self, is the only concept which
unites the two worlds that exist for us, the sensible and the intelligible."38 When the domain of
objects comes to be regarded as constituted both by the mind and as the mind in its objectivity
or self-postulated otherness, the fundamental character of Descartes's cogito reaches its full
articulation and the stage is set for the completion of epistemology. For Schelling the model of
the self is Cartesian: the self "... is nothing distinct from its thinking; the thinking of the self
and the self as such are absolutely one. ..." Additionally, this self is "the highest principle of
knowledge," "is pure act, pure doing" and as such it is "a knowing that is simultaneously a
producing of its object."39 And in Fichte, an unconditioned act lies behind everything, and the
model of this act is again Cartesian self-knowing: "In this act, then, which ... for the self is that
which it constructs ... the philosopher contemplates himself, scans his act directly, knows what
he does, because hedoes it."40 From this active self, objectivity arises: "In the self I oppose a
divisible not-self to the divisible self."41 This is the penultimate stage of the approximation of
the epistemological to the divine mind in that the conception of mind worked out here is one
whose essence is pure, unrestricted, and autonomous (unconditioned) creative acting. "I ought
in my thinking to set out from the pure self, and to think of the latter as absolutely self-active;
not as determined by things, but as determining them."42
Yet, as with Kant, the mind postulated by these epistemologists to complete their projects is
not the ordinary mind, and its knowability remains problematic. For Fichte, and even more
clearly

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for Schelling, it is a mind we must postulate, but cannot ultimately know. The self I am is not
fully active-determinative, but has a passive dimension. (As with Berkeley, objectivity is felt
as a resistance to the whim of my subjective self.) But this objectivity as resistance to the self
cannot be accounted for by things-in-themselves; that notion is incoherent. Thus, just as Kant
distinguished the transcendental ego as the ultimate synthetic ground from our phenomenal
ego, so do Fichte and Schelling distinguish their absolute theoretical egos, necessary postulates
of thought, from the practical ego of experience. 43 (So, as with Descartes, Berkeley, and
Leibniz, the divine mind is other than my mind, but now the distinction between them has
been internalized as the distinction between the phenomenal and the transcendental egos.) For
us, the true unity of subject and object is only achievable through willing.44 If correspondence
between subjective ideas and an objective reality cannot be known, perhaps it can be achieved
through the will. Of course this will is limited and ultimate unity remains an ideal.45 But this is
a fateful move. The Schelling of 1809 anticipates the position of the last figure in this story,
Nietzsche, when he asserts:
In the final and highest instance there is no other being than Will. Will is primordial
Being, and all predicates apply to it alonegroundlessness, eternity, independence of
time, self-affirmation. All philosophy strives only to find this highest expression.46

To put it quite simply, only a mind as will seems capable of doing justice to the demands of
epistemology because, as pure, unconditional willing activity, this mind is at once both
continual postulation of the other and the overcoming of the difference. The being of pure will
is corresponding, without the residue of unincorporated, unbridgeable otherness which
shipwrecked earlier projects.
What is problematic in such a conception of mind as demanded by epistemology is that, as
finally articulated it provides no indication of any determinate conditions for knowledge. It
presents, as Hegel noted about Schelling, a night in which all cows are black.47 And finally in
Nietzsche's conception of knowing and being as sheer will to powerthe notion of willing in
order to will as the hidden truth about the nature of truthone can see a fragmentation, a
particularization of the cosmic divine active-willing mind of absolute idealism: There is no
God, the idea of truth as correspondence is a lie, for each of us can be a god who creates truth
and reality for ourselves through the willing act.48 Thus, epistemology leads either

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to a failure to successfully show that truth as correspondence is demonstrably attainable
(Descartes through Fichte), or to a conception of truth as totally monolithic undifferentiated
identity in Schelling, or to a vision of truth as totally pluralizing differentiation in Nietzsche
(and in his contemporary followers who fetishize différance). For only if there is either one
cosmic mind which is at one with objectivity as a whole, or a plurality of minds each of which
is at one with the reality they individually will, can correspondence seemingly be accounted
for. We saw earlier that completing epistemology successfully by demonstrating
correspondence of knowledge and object required attaining identity and difference at one and
the same time. Schelling's resignation to sheer identity and Nietzsche's to sheer difference
point to the impossibility of attaining both. In neither instance is the correspondence attained
stable and susceptible to providing foundations for knowledge.
So, epistemology fails. It does so not because it must appeal to God, nor because a divinely
active-creative mind cannot be conceived, either as a cosmic totality or a personal truth, but
simply because by forcing us to conceive of a divine mind as the only mind capable of
establishing correspondence, nothing remains behind which can enable us to speak in a
determinate fashion of either knowledge or objects of knowledge. Neither the undifferentiated
cosmic unity of Schelling's absolute nor the will to will of Neitzsche's will to power provides
any basis for judging the truth or falsity of our ideas. As an attempt to provide such a basis,
epistemology's historical failure is not accidental but indicative of the conceptual bankruptcy,
not of any possible notion of objective truth, as Nietzsche and his descendants claim, but of the
particular model of truth wedded to epistemology.

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Notes

Preface
1. "Recent Work on Hegel: The Rehabilitation of an Epistemologist," Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 52, no. 1 (March 1992): p. 177.

Introduction
1. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (New York:
Macmillan, 1953), Section 133, p. 51.

2. On this point see especially Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis:

University of Minnesota Press, 1982), Chapters 2, 3 and p. 40.

3. For a general consideration of this development see Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond

Objectivism and Relativism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); J.
Rajchman and C. West, eds., Post-Analytic Philosophy (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1985); K. Baynes, J. Bohman, and T. McCarthy, eds., After Philosophy: End or
Transformation (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987).

4. The major anglophone proponent of antifoundationalism is, of course, Richard Rorty,

whose Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) is
the first attempt at a systematic consideration of the issue on the part of an analytic
philosopher. In Reason, Truth and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981),
Hilary Putnam also adopts an antifoundational stance while being concerned with the
questions about rationality and objectivity which antifoundationalism raises and which I shall
discuss in connection with Hegel. In the Introduction (p. xi) he writes, "In short, I shall
advance a view in which the mind does not simply 'copy' a world which admits of description
by One True Theory. But my view is not a view in which the mind makes up the world, either.
... If one must use metaphorical

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language, let the metaphor be this: the mind and the world jointly make up the mind and
the world. (Or, to make the metaphor even more Hegelian, the Universe makes up the
Universewith mindscollectivelyplaying a special role in the making up.)"

5. I will not attempt to present anything like a comprehensive survey of the various specific
philosophers who may be said to make up the antifoundational movement, norespeciallywill I
assess the many differences in background, approach, focus, style, and content which
distinguish them. To speak of a group which includes thinkers as diverse as Quine, Heidegger,
Davidson, and Gadamer is obviously to cast one's inclusionary net quite widely. I will soon
address those points on which I think a common ground exists. Anyone wishing a more
detailed overview should consult Rorty's Mirror, Bernstein's Beyond Objectivism (for book-
length treatments) as well as the excellent brief overviews of the movement provided in After
Philosophy and Post-Analytic Philosophy.

6. I have deliberately omitted the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School and their followers
from this list. While they share many of the negative positions of the antifoundationalists,
critical theorists agree with the philosophical tradition in holding that philosophy, or
something like it, can still maintain a legitimate and authoritative critical position in regard to
the status quo. In Chapter 1, "Reason and the Problem of Modernity," and in Chapter 8, "The
Critique of Marx and Marxist Thought," I argue that it is Hegel, rather than Marx and his
descendants, who develops a successful critical theory.

7. For the idea that foundational philosophy has historically culminated in its own self-
destruction, see the work of Nietzsche and Heidegger. In Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), Rorty has also developed this thesis.

8. For considerations of Cartesianism see Rorty's Mirror and Bernstein's Beyond Objectivism.
The Introduction to After Philosophy provides a nice contrastive overview of the
foundationalist and antifoundationalist positions.

9. The phrase is Bernstein's: Beyond Objectivism, p. 16.

10. The phrases are Hilary Putnam's (Reason, Truth and History, p. 50) and Thomas Nagel's
(The View From Nowhere [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986]). See also Rorty,
Consequences, p. 161. Thomas Nagel writes: "The attempt is made to view the world not from
a place within it, or from the vantage point of a special type of life and awareness, but from
nowhere in particular and no form of life in particular at all. The object is to discount for the
features of our prereflective outlook that make things appear as they do, and thereby to reach
an understanding of things as they really are. We flee the subjective under pressure of an
assumption that everything must be something not to any point of view, but in itself. To grasp
this by detaching more and more from our point of view is the

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unreachable ideal at which the pursuit of objectivity aims." "Subjective and Objective," p.
41 in Post-Analytic Philosophy.

11. Having made the linguistic turn, analytic philosophy sought to complete the foundational
project by focusing on language and the conditions of its possibility. There is considerable
skepticism about whether this version of foundationalism fares any better than earlier
psychologistic approaches. In Quine and Analytic Philosophy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983),
p. 186, George D. Romanos writes "... if Quine is right about indeterminacy of translation ...
there is no single right way to construe the grammar and meaning of words in a language, even
from within a clearly defined theoretical perspective. ... The idea of a fixed conceptual scheme
mediating between us and our theories of the world is as useless and meaningless as the idea
of a fully determinate extralinguistic reality beyond all theoretical construction." In Chapter
10, "The Renewed Appeal to Transcendental Arguments," I argue that Donald Davidson's
attempt at a compromise, his efforts to save the traditional foundational goals of objectivism
and realism while rejecting conceptual schemes and foundational epistemology, fails.

12. Ian Hacking speaks of "styles of reasoning" in "Styles of Scientific Reasoning," in Post-
Analytic Philosophy. For the analytic consideration of the myth of the given, see Wilfred
Sellars "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,'' p. 127 in his Science, Perception, and
Reality (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963).

13. Romanos brings out this point nicely. See p. 187 of Quine.

14. The expressions are Gadamer's and Rorty's. See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Philosophical
Hermeneutics, ed. and trans. D. Linge (California: University of California Press, 1976), p.
172; Rorty, Consequences, p. xix. On the same page Rorty writes "One can use language to
criticize and enlarge itself, as one can exercise one's body to develop and strengthen and
enlarge it, but one cannot see language-as-a-whole in relation to something else to which it
applies or for which it is a means to an end." Also see Romanos, Quine, p. 53.

15. See Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism, pp. 129, 137, 143; Romanos, Quine, pp. 96, 97. "The
object of knowledge is always already preinterpreted, situated in a scheme, part of a text,
outside which there are only other texts. On the other hand, the subject of knowledge belongs
to the very world it wishes to interpret. ... Thus the idea of a knowing subject disengaged from
the body and the world makes no more sense than the idea of self-transparence; there is no
knowledge without a background, and that background can never be wholly objectified." After
Philosophy, Introduction, p. 5.

16. I am using the notion of a framework of givenness in a broader sense than usual, one
which does not restrict it to an association with notions of representation and the
correspondence model of truth. In the view I am

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developing, antifoundationalismwhich rejects these notionsnonetheless remains committed
to the idea of the inescapability of determinative givens, and hence to the notion of the
framework of givenness. Antifoundationalism differs from foundationalism in asserting
that they are ineluctable. The full ramifications and the pervasiveness of the assumption
that all discourse and knowledge are necessarily conditioned by givensand Hegel's attack
on this assumptionis a central theme of this book.

17. See Romanos, Quine, pp. 186187; Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism, pp. 34.

18. Just what, if anything, remains for philosophy to do subsequent to the abandonment of
foundationalism is a controversial topic. Heidegger, Derrida, and Rorty doubt whether
anything which bears much of a connection with the philosophical tradition will remain. Other
antifoundationalists, such as Quine and Davidson, seem to feel that little of the technical
analysis they favor will be affected. See Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). For a general discussion of the issue see Rorty's
Consequences, especially Chapter 9, as well as Beyond Objectivism, and the essays in After
Philosophy. Philosophy Without Foundations lays out an argument for a nonfoundational
systematic philosophy.

19. See Rorty's Introduction to Consequences, p. xix, and the other essays in that volume for a
consideration of the issue of antifoundationalism's view of knowledge and whether it is
offering a theory of knowledge. On the issue of self-referential inconsistency, see Bernstein's
Beyond Objectivism, Part One, and Putnam's Reason, especially Chapters 2 and 3.

20. See, for example, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, trans. G. Barden and J.
Cumming (New York: The Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 308309. I explicitly address this issue in
Chapter 2, "Philosophy as Systematic Science."

21. F. H. Jacobi, Werke II, eds., F. H. Jacobi and F. Koeppen (Leipzig: Fleisher, 1812), p. 304.
Ramsey is quoted in John Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Harmondsworth:
Penguin Books, 1968), p. 362.

22. See, for example, Putnam, Reason, pp. 4950, 55, 133; Romanos, Quine, pp. 180, 185;
Rorty, Consequences, p. 92. In "Belief and the Basis of Meaning," Donald Davidson writes
"Each interpretation and attribution of attitude is a move within a holistic theory, a theory
necessarily governed by concern for consistency and general coherence with the truth, and it is
this that sets these theories apart from those that describe mindless objects, or describe objects
as mindless." Inquires into Truth and Interpretation, p. 154.

23. "...[O]ur notion of rationality and of rational revisability are not fixed by some immutable
book of rules, nor are they written into our

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transcendental natures, as Kant thought, for the very good reason that the whole idea of a
transcendental nature, a nature that we have noumenally, apart from any way in which we
can conceive of ourselves historically or biologically, is nonsensical." Putnam, Reason, p.
83.

24. The notions that knowledge needs to be considered intersubjectively rather than from the
egological model, and that social context has a decisive bearing on the conditions of
knowledge have their classical articulations in the work of Hegel, and have remained central
features of the German wing of continental philosophy through Marx, the Frankfurt School,
and its contemporary representatives Habermas, Apel, and Wellmer. Wittgenstein and Dewey
are important sources for holism in the analytic tradition where the holistic and
antifoundational approach has taken hold through Quine and Davidson and, in the philosophy
of science, through Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Hacking.

25. Putnam, Reason, p. 84. He also asserts there that "most of what we regard as a priori truth
is of a contextual and relative character ..."

26. See "Questions of Method: An Interview with Michel Foucault," especially pp. 102, 104,
in After Philosophy.

27. See "Subjective and Objective," by Thomas Nagel, p. 32 in Post-Analytic Philosophy for a
characterization of the traditional hierarchical outlook.

28. Putnam, Reason, p. 50. See Rorty, Consequences, p. xxxix. On pluralism generally, see
Nelson Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978). Feyerabend is an
especially articulate defender of pluralism.

29. "Although the quest for certainty and the search for absolute constraints continues to haunt
philosophy, there is a sense in which 'absolutism,' to use William James's phrase, is no longer
a 'live' option. The dominant temper of our age is fallibilistic." Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism,
p. 12. See also Putnam, Reason, p. 83.

30. In the continental antifoundational tradition the call to abandon the philosophical belief in
a Platonic True World and to focus our attention on the here and now in its given particularity
has been commonplace since Kierkegaard and is echoed in Heidegger and Gadamer. In
analytic philosophy such a move is commonly associated with Wittgenstein. More recently
Donald Davidson has written: "In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give
up the world, but reestablish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make
out sentences and opinions true or false." "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 198,
in Inquiries. See also Part Three and Part Four of Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism; Putnam,
''After Empiricism," p. 29; and Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity," in Post-Analytic Philosophy,
p. 15.

31. Rorty, Mirror, Chapter VIII. He adopts a more Nietzschean outlook in Contingency.

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32. Rorty, Mirror, p. 389. See also Consequences, p. 166. Similar themes are prominent,
informally, in Gadamer, and in Habermas. See "What is Universal Pragmatics," in Habermas'
Communication and the Evolution of Society (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979). Among
postfoundationalists who regard such moves as an attempt to establish a new authority, see
Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff
Bennington and Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

33. See Rorty, Consequences, pp. 173174.

34. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism, p. 19. See Rorty, "Solidarity or Objectivity," in Post-
Analytic Philosophy; Chapter 9 of Consequences, "Pragmatism, Relativism, and
Irritationalism;" and Davidson, pp. xviii and xix of the Introduction to Inquiries.

35. Putnam writes: "Just as the methodological solipsist can become a real solipsist, the
cultural relativist can become a cultural imperialist. He can say, 'Well then, truththe only
notion of truth I can understandis defined by the norms of my culture.' ('After all,' he can add,
'which norms should I rely on? The norms of somebody else's culture?')" "Why Reason Can't
Be Naturalized," After Philosophy, p. 232.

36. "Philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only
describe it.

For it cannot give it any foundation either.

It leaves everything as it is."

Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Section 124, p. 49.

37. Putnam writes: "Hegel already denounced the idea of an 'Archimedean point' from which
epistemology could judge all of our scientific, legal, moral, religious, etc., beliefs (and set up
standards for all of the special subjects)." "Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized," After
Philosophy, p. 223.

38. Stanley Rosen, G. W. F. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1974), p. 130.

39. Hegel's Logic: Being Part One of the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, trans.
William Wallace (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) Paragraph 60, p. 93. Hereafter
referred to as the Encyclopedia Logic.

40. This view of a non-foundational systematic philosophy grounded in Hegel is also

articulated in the work of Richard Dein Winfield. See: The Just Economy (New York:
Routledge, 1988); Reason and Justice (Albany: SUNY Press, 1988); Overcoming Foundations
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1989); and Freedom and Modernity (Albany: SUNY
Press, 1991).

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Chapter 1, "Reason and the Problem of Modernity"

1. The major expositors of this point of view are to be found in Herbert Marcuse, Reason and
Revolution (London: Oxford University Press, 1955); Joachim Ritter, Hegel and the French
Revolution (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982); Ernst Bloch, Subjekt / Objekt (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp, 1971); Jürgen Habermas, Theorie und Praxis (Berlin: Luchterhand, 1963). Other,
more conservative readings of Hegel are legion. For a recent appraisal which attempts a
synthesis of the left and right schools of Hegel interpretation, see Michael Allen Gillespie,
Hegel, Heidegger and the Ground of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984).

2. In speaking of the French Revolution as a "world-historical event," as announcing "our

world, our age" as the age of the "will free to will itself," the age of the "rulership of
philosophy'' (pp. 535, 524, 527), Hegel writes the following in his Lectures on the History of
Philosophy: "In the thought of right there now arose a state of mind [Verfassung], and on this
foundation everything should now be based. For as long as the sun had stood in the firmament
and planets circled about it this had not been seen, that man stands on his head, that is, on
thinking, and constructs actuality according to it. Anaxagoras was the first to say that nous
rules the world, but now for the first time man came to know that thinking should rule spiritual
actuality. This was then a magnificent sunrise. All thinking beings have joined in celebration
of this epoch. A noble emotion has ruled in this time, an enthusiasm of spirit has transfigured
the world, as though a real reconciliation of the divine with the world has just occurred. (G.
W. F. Hegel, Werke, vol. 12 [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1970], p. 529.)

A third development distinctive of the modern world and also of concern to Hegelthe rise
of the modern capitalist economywill not be considered here. See my introduction to the
essays in Hegel on Economics and Freedom (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987),
and The Just Economy, by Richard Dein Winfield.

3. It should be noted that Hegel's views on the French Revolution, on modern scientific
thought, and on the capitalist economy were by no means uncritical. The locus classicus for
Hegel's critical perspective on the French revolution is to be found in Chapter VI, "Absolute
Freedom and Terror," in the Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1977). Also see Ritter's Hegel and the French Revolution.

4. The locus classicus for a consideration of the modern problem of legitimation and of
antimodernism is Hans Blumenberg, The Legitimacy of the Modern Age (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1983). See also Jürgen Habermas, Legitimation Crisis (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975),
and Leo Strauss,

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Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953). On the specific
issue of the epistemic legitimacy of modern natural science, see Michael Foster, "The
Christian Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural Science" and Francis
Oakley, "Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: the Rise of the Concept of Laws
of Nature," both in Creation: The Impact of an Idea, eds. O'Connor and Oakley (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1969).

5. The most recent and comprehensive statement of this point of view as it applies to issues of
cognition is to be found in Rorty's Mirror. As it applies to issues of conduct and action, see
Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 2nd ed. (South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1984).

6. In addition to Rorty and MacIntyre, see also Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, and
Gadamer, Truth and Method. For the particular view that modern natural science lacks, and
must lack adequate, philosophically rational foundations see especially Paul K. Feyerabend,
Against Method (London: Verso Editions, 1978).

7. It is important to note at this juncture that not all of those who have criticized the traditional
ideal of autonomous reason and the foundational project can be classified as anti- or
postmoderns (in the sense of these terms as used in this book.) As I shall show, Hegel rejects
foundationalism but not modernity. In a similar vein, Feyerabend and Habermas fall into the
Hegelian tradition discussed here. Neither of them are unequivocally critical either of modern
science or of the modern idea of freedom. And both aim for philosophy to maintain a critical
edge and explicitly see both aim for philosophy to maintain a critical edge and explicitly see
philosophy as furthering the modern tradition of freedom. See Habermas, Knowledge and
Human Interests (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), and The Theory of Communicative Action
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1984); Feyerabend, Science in a Free Society (London: Verso
Editions, 1978), and "Two Models of Epistemic Change: Mill and Hegel," in Problems of
Empiricism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). For Rorty's consideration of
recent analytic philosophy as turning away from its earlier foundational impetus, see
"Epistemological Behaviorism and the Detranscendentalization of Analytic Philosophy," in
Hermeneutics and Praxis, ed. Robert Hollinger (South Bend: University of Notre Dame Press,
1985), which focuses especially on Sellars and Quine as implicit but not fully self-conscious
antifoundationalists. Rorty's pursuit of this topic continues in Mirror and Consequences. For
Rorty on Davidson: "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," pp. 333355 in Truth and
Interpretation: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, ed. Ernest Lepore
(London: Basil Blackwell, 1986). An interesting historical account of analytic philosophy
which presents it as self-deconstructive is to be found in Romanos, Quine.

8. See the references to Hegel in the following: Foucault, "The Discourse on Language," in
The Archeology of Knowledge (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); Gadamer, Truth and
Method, Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical

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Studies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), and Reason in the Age of Science
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982); Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests and Theorie
und Praxis.

Rorty, MacIntyre, and Sellars too, are hard to pin down as regards their assessments of
what is positive in Hegel. At several places in Mirror, Rorty speaks tantalizingly of Hegel
in positive terms, but, neither in that work nor in Consequences does he develop an overall
assessment of the pluses and minuses of Hegel's philosophy. MacIntyre's treatment is also
equivocal. See After Virtue, which he identifies as a work in "philosophical history" of the
type "propounded by writers such as Hegel" (p. 3); yet he rejects what he sees as Hegel's
absolutism (p. 270).

9. See Rorty, Mirror, pp. 165 and 167. On p. 192 he speaks of the "Hegelian ... project of
deconstruction ..." and see note #59 to "Pragmatism, Davidson and Truth," in Truth and
Interpretation, p. 354. See Gadamer's essay "Hegel and Heidegger," in Hegel's Dialectic. For
Habermas's view, see Knowledge and Human Interests, Chapter 1, "Hegel's Critique of Kant:
Radicalization or Abolition of the Theory of Knowledge."

10. Feyerabend's Against Method, Rorty's Mirror, MacIntyre's A Short History of Ethics (New
York: Macmillan & Co., 1966) and After Virtue are all either explicit or implicit testimonies to
the importance of the history of philosophy, and of history itself, for contemporary
philosophy. On the contextual embeddedness of knowledge, see, in addition to the above,
Habermas's Knowledge and Human Interests; on morality, Feyerabend's Science in a Free
Society, MacIntyre's Short History and After Virtue. On the holist and historicist turn in
philosophy of science following Kuhn, see Ian Hacking, Representing and Intervening
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); Andrew Pickering, Constructing Quarks: A
Sociological History of Particle Physics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); and
Robert Ackermann, Data, Instruments and Theory: A Dialectical Approach to Understanding
Science (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985).

In the Preface of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel writes: "To comprehend what is, this is the
task of philosophy, because what is, is reason. Whatever happens, every individual is a
child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts. It is just as
absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy
that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over Rhodes." Hegel's Philosophy of
Right, trans. T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 11.

11. "The true shape in which the truth exists can only be the scientific system of such truth. To
help bring philosophy closer to the form of Science, to the goal where it can lay aside the title
'love of knowing' and be actual knowingthat is what I have set myself to do. The inner
necessity that knowing should be Science lies in its nature, and only the systematic

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exposition of philosophy itself provides it." The Phenomenology, Preface, p. 3. MacIntyre
writes: "Hence this kind of historicism, unlike Hegel's involves a form of fallibilism; it is a
kind of historicism which excludes all claims to absolute knowledge." (After Virtue,
Postscript to the 2nd edition, p. 270). Rorty, like other postmoderns, tends to see Hegel
from two sides. He likes to speak favorably of others' critiques of Hegel. See
"Epistemological Behaviorism and the Detranscendentalization of Analytic Philosophy,"
Mirror, pp. 5, 135, 362, n. 8. And he remains elusive in Consequences. See, amongst other
places, p. xlvii, pp. 16, 9495.

12. "Henceforth, the principle of the independence of Reason, or of its absolute self-
subsistence, is made a general principle of philosophy, as well as a foregone conclusion of the
time." Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 60, p. 93.

13. For a contemporary attack on the "myth of the given," see Sellars, "Empiricism and the
Philosophy of Mind," in Science, Perception and Reality. In this essay Sellars mentions
Hegel's attack on givenness (p. 127), calls his own work "Meditationis Hegeliennes" (p. 148),
but holds that Hegel is not free of the "framework of givenness" (p. 127). One of the points to
be considered subsequently, albeit briefly in this Chapter is that it is just the ''framework of
givenness" which Hegel decisively and thoroughly criticizes and rejects in the
Phenomenology. See my essay "Understanding Hegel Today," in the Journal of the History of
Philosophy 19:3 (July 1981), as well as Chapters 4 and 5.

14. The locus classicus for viewing modern science as a rejection of Aristotle and
Aristotelianism is, of course, Bacon. For a more balanced view see E. A. Burtt, The
Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1924). For
a consideration of Galileo as someone who rejects both Aristotle and common sense, see
Feyerabend, Against Method, and Stillman Drake, Galileo (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 1990).

15. The locus classicus here is, of course, Descartes' Meditations on First Philosophy and the
Discourse on Method. For his statement of the need for a philosophical foundations of the new
science, see the opening paragraphs of the Meditations and p. 86., (vol. 1) of the Discourse in
The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Haldane and Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1931). See also Kant, Preface to the first edition of the Critique of Pure
Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1929), p. 8.

16. For the view, from an historical perspective, that modern natural science still lacks an
adequate philosophical foundation, see the essays by Foster and Oakley in Creation: The
Impact of an Idea, and Feyerabend, Against Method.

17. Speaking of modern science as a rebellion against tradition which asserts the individual's
right to freedom of thought, the historian of sci-

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ence I. B. Cohen writes: "Traditionally, knowledge had been based on faith and insight, on
reason and revelation. The new science discarded all of these as ways of understanding
nature. ... The consequences were as revolutionary as the doctrine itself. For not only did
the new method found knowledge on a wholly new basis, but it implied that men and
women no longer had to believe what was said by eminent authorities. ... What counted,
therefore, in the new science of the seventeenth century was not the qualifications of
learning of any author or reporter but rather his veracity in reporting, his true
understanding of the method of science. ... Knowledge thus took on a democratic rather
than a hierarchical character and no longer depended so much on the insight of a chosen
few as on the application of a proper method, accessible to anyone with sufficient wit to
grasp the new principles. ..." I. B. Cohen, Revolution in Science (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press 1985), p. 79. For a thorough critique of the philosophical tradition which
attempts to provide foundations for knowledge, see Rorty's Mirror.

18. See the "Declaration of the Rights of Man," in Readings in European History, vol. 2, ed. J.
H. Robinson (Boston: Ginn & Co., 1906), pp. 409411.

19. For the view that a philosophical science of morality and politics can be founded in an
analysis of desire, see Hobbes' De Homine and Leviathan; in natural sentiments, see Hume's A
Treatise of Human Nature and An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals; in innate
rules, see Kant's Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason.
And for a devastating critique of the whole project of moral and political foundational
philosophy, see MacIntyre's After Virtue.

20. For a developed consideration of the claim that Hegel's philosophical project commences
with a rejection of foundationalism see Chapters 4 and 5. See also Richard D. Winfield,
"Conceiving Reality Without Foundations: Hegel's Neglected Strategy for Realphilosophie,"
The Owl of Minerva 15:2 (Spring 1984).

21. See pp. 59 of the Introduction to the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Carus
(Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1950). Hume's negative, solipsistic, and skeptical conclusions
parallel the undesired conclusions to the same effect which follow from Descartes' attempt at
foundationalism in the Mediations, assuming his proofs of the existence of God fail. See
Chapter 11.

22. For Hume's advocacy of skepticism as regards knowledge, see An Enquiry Concerning
Human Understanding in Essential Works of David Hume, ed. Ralph Cohen (New York:
Bantam Books, 1965), pp. 157f. and 162. That according to Hume, custom and habit must
prevail in matters of morality, see A Treatise of Human Nature, Book III, "Of Morals," ed.
Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1888), p. 486. That civil society and its notion of
justice derive from and are based on convention, see A Treatise, Book III, pp. 543, 550. That
Hume was no advocate of modernity

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or revolution, see A Treatise, pp. 552, 553, 556, 563. And that morality can have no final
rational grounding, see A Treatise, pp. 267, 413, 457.

23. For a more detailed consideration of Hegel's rejection of the foundational project, see
Chapters 4 and 5.

24. See Hume, An Enquiry, pp. 166167. Hegel writes: "Even Hume's skepticism does not deny
that the characteristics of universality and necessity are found in cognition. And even in Kant
this remains a presupposition after all; it may be said, to use the ordinary phraseology of the
sciences, that Kant did not more than offer another explanation of the fact." Encyclopedia
Logic, Paragraph 40, p. 65.

25. For a defense of the idea that the circularity of the critical project is not merely benign, but
in fact a demonstration of the truth of its claims, one might attempt to argue that the very need
to presuppose what must be demonstrated indicates that what are being presupposed are
inescapable fundamental principles for thought. For an argument along these lines, see
Rudiger Bubner, "Kant, Transcendental Argument and the Problem of Deduction," The
Review of Metaphysics 28:3 (March 1975).

26. See Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking, trans. J. M. Anderson and E. H. Freund (New
York: Harper and Row, 1966), and "The Turning," in The Question Concerning Technology
and Other Essays, trans. W. Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977).

27. Hegel summarizes and considers these assumptions, as well as the inadequacies of the
critical project and his intention to engage in a metacritical consideration of epistemology and
transcendental philosophy in the Introduction to the Phenomenology.

28. "In common with Empiricism the Critical Philosophy assumes that experience affords the
sole foundation for cognitions: which however it does not allow to rank as truths, but only as
knowledge of phenomena." (Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 40, p. 65) For Hegel's view that
the nature of the givenwhether an externally given object or an internally given idea or
principleis a matter of indifference as regards a critical consideration of foundational
epistemology and transcendental philosophy, see the Introduction to the Phenomenology, p.
53.

29. See Hume, An Enquiry, pp. 6364, and A Treatise, p. 415; Kant, Critique of Pure Reason,
p. 174, B 166167, and Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. Paton (New York:
Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 79, 9293.

30. See Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 298300, B 352354.

31. Of course, to include Fichte here one must add that it is what reason must posit for itself in
order to constitute itself as consciousness and as moral will.

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32. For Habermas' critique of Gadamer's hermeneutical antifoundationalist position and his
defense of reason see Philosophische Rundschau XIV, Beiheft 5 (1967): pp. 149180. Gadamer
responds in "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," in Philosophical
Hermeneutics.

33. On the possibility of Nietzschean nihilism as an alternative, assuming the failure of

foundationalism, see MacIntyre, After Virtue, Chapter 9 and Chapter 18.

34. See Hegel's Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.,
1969), pp. 45, 49, 51, 63, where he speaks of rejecting the form of consciousness as a
prerequisite for his systematic science. Hereafter referred to as the Logic.

35. For Hegel's general consideration of the problems, paradoxes, and inadequacies of the
critical philosophy, see, in addition to the Introduction to the Logic, the Introduction to the
Phenomenology, the "Second Attitude of Thought to Objectivity," in the Encyclopedia Logic,
Paragraphs 3760, pp. 6094, and the Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. 3, Recent
German Philosophy, trans. Haldane and Simpson (New York: Humanities Press, 1974), p.
409ff.

This is a paradoxical point about the nature of critical-transcendental philosophy which is

certainly well recognized by Wittgenstein in the Tractatus: "My propositions serve as
elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them
as nonsensical, when he has used themas stepsto climb up beyond them. (He must, so to
speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)" Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,
trans. D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness [London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961]; 6.54.

36. That Hegel regards the self-sublation of consciousness as the outcome of the
Phenomenology and the beginning of the system of reason, see the Logic, pp. 49, 51 and 60. A
standard interpretation of the logic and system is that they are based on and generated out of a
superpurified transcendental consciousness or ego of some kind. For why this cannot be the
case, according to Hegel, see p. 76 of the Logic, where he explicitly rejects the notion that
philosophical science can begin with the ego. Note also the remarks in the logic of the
concept, pp. 582587, where he goes to considerable length to make clear that his logical
science is neither based on nor developed out of the structure of consciousness. Of course,
these remarks only show that the standard interpretation conflicts with Hegel's self-
understanding, not that the model of consciousness is not implicitly present.

37. I am grateful to David Baird for the useful bit of terminology, "referential skyhook,"
suggesting as it does a position, itself located nowhere, which links represented and
representation.

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38. For a consideration of the idea that the Phenomenology articulates this discovery, see
Chapter 3, "Hegel's Phenomenology as Introduction to Systematic Philosophy," and Chapter 4,
"Beginning Philosophy Without 'Beginnings.'" Also see p. 45 of the Logic where Hegel speaks
of the overcoming of consciousness as something which must be undertaken prior to the
beginning of philosophical science.

39. See Chapter 5, "Philosophy and Dialectical Method," for a detailed consideration of this
issue.

40. On this point, see the three "Attitudes of Thought to Objectivity," Paragraphs 2678, pp.
47112, in the Encyclopedia Logic and pp. 50, 51, 64 in the Logic.

41. In fact, if it can be shown that the system does contain such references, used constitutively
and not merely illustratively, then this would, of course, amount to a critique of its
autonomous and scientific character. I would suggest that there are various places in the
system Hegel developed, perhaps most obviously in the Philosophy of Right, where Hegel can
be so criticized: according to his own criteria for systematic philosophy. In this regard, see the
essay, "Hegel's Challenge to the Modern Economy," by Richard D. Winfield, in Hegel On
Economics and Freedom, and "Hegel: A Non-Metaphysical View," by Klaus Hartmann, in
Hegel: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre (New York: Doubleday & Co.,
1972).

42. It is on this point of transcendental philosophy and Hegel's continuation of it that the
interpretation of Hegel's systematic philosophy being presented here parts company with that
of Hartmann's mentioned above and also that of Alan White's in Absolute Knowledge: Hegel
and the Problem of Metaphysics, (Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1983).

43. It should be noted once again, given the prevalence of readings which take the opposite
point of view, that Hegel is quite explicit as to the fact that the thought determinacies or
categories of his system are not generated from out of some form of reflection which is based
on any version of the model of consciousness or the subject. In addition to the references
given in note 40, see also the Logic, pp. 75, 583, 586.

44. Hegel is acutely aware of the problems and pitfalls which arise when one attempts,
philosophically, to conceive realityas opposed to cognizing itas what is other than thought.
(For Hegel, cognizing reality is a matter for empirical science.) See the Introduction to the
Philosophy of Nature, especially Paragraph 246; Addition, p. 196ff., in volume 1 of Hegel's
Philosophy of Nature, 3 vols., trans. M. J. Petry (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1970).

45. That this self-restriction of what systematic philosophy can do does not necessarily lead to
the conclusion that Hegelor, more significantly, systematic philosophyadvocates quietistic
resignation to the status quo for the philosopher as citizen (or for the non-philosopher), see the
Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 213, p. 274ff., especially the Addition.

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46. See the essays in Hegel On Economics and Freedom and also "Freedom As Interaction:
Hegel's Resolution to the Dilemma of Liberal Theory," by R. D. Winfield, in Hegel's
Philosophy of Action, eds. L. S. Stepelevich and Lamb (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities
Press, 1983).

47. "The freedom of the will itself, is the principle and the substantial basis of all right, it is
itself absolute, in and for itself eternal right, and is the highest right, insofar as other particular
rights stand next to it; it is thereby that by means of which man is man, thus the fundamental
principle of spirit." Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History, Werke, vol. 12: p. 524525.

48. See MacIntyre's After Virtue, especially Chapters 4, 5, and 6. "My own conclusion is very
clear. It is that ... we still, in spite of the efforts of three centuries of moral philosophy and one
of sociology, lack any coherent rationally defensible statement of a liberal individualist point
of view ..." After Virtue, p. 259.

49. See my introductory essay and that by Richard D. Winfield in Hegel On Economics and
Freedom. From the point of view of the systematic philosophy being presented here, one must
include among those givens which cannot support a rational and adequate conception of
freedom the latest to be introduced in a long line of foundational candidates for freedom: the
linguistic-communicative principles appealed to by Habermas and Apel. For a brief critique of
Apel's attempt at a "transcendental deduction" of such principles in his Transformation der
Philosophie, see my review of the same in the Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 6:2 (Fall
1977).

50. "... the truth is plain: there are no such rights, [human rights] and belief in them is one with
belief in witches and unicorns." For "... every attempt to give good reasons for believing that
there are such rights has failed." "Natural or human rights are fictions ..." MacIntyre, After
Virtue, pp. 69, 70.

51. To anticipate a possible objection to what I have said in regard to this reading of Hegel:
one can of course, within the system, reconstruct history in a rational fashion. That is, as
leading up to an historical situation whose conditions allow for freedom and even for the
emergence of a philosophy of freedom. But this rational reconstruction of history does not
commit the systematic philosopher to a metaphysical, transhistorical claim that history as a
datum displays such necessary teleological development. For a reading of Hegel's philosophy
of history in line with the view of Hegel presented in this essay, see George Dennis O'Brien,
Hegel On Reason and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), and R. D.
Winfield, "The Theory and Practice of the History of Freedom: The Right of History in
Hegel's Philosophy of Right," in History and System: Hegel's Philosophy of History, ed. R. L.
Perkins (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984).

52. "On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World," Erkenntnis 9 (1975): p. 328.

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53. For a detailed critique of Marx from the point of view of Hegel's systematic philosophy,
see Chapter 8, "The Critique of Marx and Marxist Thought," and Klaus Hartmann's Die
Marxsche Theorie (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1970).

54. See the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, p. 11ff.

Chapter 2, "Philosophy as Systematic Science"

1. For a consideration of the issues discussed here in the context of Hegel's system, see
Chapter 1.

2. Rorty, Mirror, p. 394.

3. The issue of how these latter goals may be attained without a foundational philosophy is
developed at some length in Chapter 1.

4. See Descartes' Third Meditation.

5. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 172.

6. See Rorty, "Epistemological Behaviorism and the Detranscendentalization of Analytic

Philosophy," in Hermeneutics and Praxis, and Mirror, p. 371372; Gadamer, Philosophical
Hermeneutics, p. 36; Truth and Method, p. 309.

7. To hold that they are identical in terms of content, but also simultaneously distinct as
'knowledge' on the one hand and 'object' on the other will not suffice. To preserve that
distinction, the nature of the difference must be articulated; there must be some determinate
difference, either ontological or formal. But once such a determinate difference is established,
the requisite moment of identity is lost: If knowledge and object are in some respect(s)
different, the foundationalist can no longer be sure that knowledge corresponds to the object as
it is objectively, independent of the knowing act. As long as some determinate difference is
allowed, the foundationalist cannot claim that knowledge captures the object as it truly is as
determined independently of the knowing act. He would only be entitled to claim that the
knowledge in question is knowledge of things as they appear, not as they are in themselves.
This is discussed at greater length in Chapter 11.

Chapter 3, "Hegel's Phenomenology as Introduction to Systematic Science"

1. "The Concept of pure science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present work
insofar as the Phenomenology of Spirit is nothing other than the deduction of it." The Logic, p.
49, translation revised.

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2. Wim van Dooren, Hegel-Studien 4 (1967); 7, (1972). J. N. Findlay, foreword, the
Phenomenology, p. xiii: "Despite the sensitive work of Jean Hyppolite, we are far from having
anything like a really full commentary on the Phenomenology." See also Howard Kainz,
Hegel's Phenomenology, (Alabama: Alabama University Press, 1976), who asserts that no
"true" or "refutable" commentary is possible.

3. Otto Pöggeler, "Die Komposition der Phänomenologie des Geistes," in Materialien zu

Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes, eds. H. F. Fulda and D. Henrich (Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp Verlag, 1973), pp. 382, 333334, 371372.

4. Pögeller, "Zur Deutung der Phänomenologie des Geistes" in Hegels Idee einer
Phänomenologie des Geistes (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 1973), pp. 171, 181.

5. See Pögeller, "Zur Deutung ...," pp. 188189. Also, Charles Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 233, footnote; Malcom Clark, Logic and System (The
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 143144; Emil Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in
Hegel's Thought (Boston Beacon Press, 1967), pp. 7374. Also Rudolf Haym, Hegel und seiner
Zeit (Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1962); Theodor Haering, Hegel, sein Wollen und sein Werk
(Aalen: Scientia Verlag, 1963); Werner Marx, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New York:
Harper and Row, 1975).

6. Amongst the chief expositors of what I call the received view can be found the following:
Malcom Clark, Logic and System; Werner Becker, Hegels Phänomenologie des Geistes
(Stuttgart: 1971); Ernst Bloch, Subjekt / Objekt; Rudiger Bubner, "Problemgeschichte und
systematischer Sinn der 'Phänomenologie' Hegels" in Dialektic und Wissenschaft (Frankfurt
am Main: Suhrkam Verlag, 1971); Emil Fackenheim, The Religious Dimension in Hegel's
Thought, J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976);
Hans Friedrich Fulda, Das Problem einer Einleitung in Hegels Wissenchaft der Logik
(Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1975); Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic: Five
Hermeneutical Studies, Jürgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests; Johannes
Heinrichs, Die Logik der Phänomenologie des Geistes (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1974); Jean
Hyppolite, Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1974); Alexander Kojève, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel (New York:
Basic Books, 1969); Quentin Lauer, A Reading of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (New
York: Fordham University Press, 1976); Georg Lukacs, The Young Hegel (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1976); Herbert Marcuse, Hegels Ontologie und die Theorie der Geschichtlichkeit
(Frankfurt am Main: Kostermann, 1968); Werner Marx, Hegel's Phenomenology; Wolfgang
Marx, Hegels Theorie logische Vermittlung (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1972); G. R. G.
Mure, The Philosophy of Hegel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965); Horst Henning
Ottmann, Das Scheitern einer

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Einleitung in Hegels Philosophie (Munich: Verlag Anton Pustet, 1973); Otto Pögeller,
Hegels Idee einer Phänomenologie des Geistes; Stanley Rosen, G. W. F. Hegel: An
Introduction to the Science of Wisdom; Charles Taylor, Hegel; Karin Schrader-Klebert,
Das Problem des Anfangs in Hegels Philosophie (Munich: Oldenbourg Verlag, 1969);
Manfred Wetzel, Reflexion und Bestimmtheit in Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik (Hamburg:
Fundament Verlag Dr. Sasse, 1971).

7. See Taylor, Hegel, p. 138; Werner Marx, Hegel's Phenomenology, pp. 50, 84; Bloch,
Subjekt / Objekt, pp. 5960; Kainz, Hegel's Phenomenology, p. 12ff.

8. A somewhat dissenting voice is raised by Rudiger Bubner in his article "Problemgeschichte

und systematischer Sinn der 'Phänomenologie' Hegels." To my mind, Bubner correctly
perceives that the function of the Phenomenology was meant by Hegel to be a critical one.
(See his page 39ff.) But he is nonetheless to be classified as a holder of the received view
since he holds that the outcome of the Phenomenology as critique is positive in the traditional
sense in that it establishes the truth of knowing: Consciousness discovers the essence of its
truth as pure reflection, pp. 4243. Bubner holds that the function and the method of the
Phenomenology are critical, but that its outcome is positive and determinate. As I understand
it, the outcome of the Phenomenology is also to be seen as a radically negative one. And it is
also one which functions positively in its radical negativity: the Phenomenology does not
establish the truth of knowing as reflection, it establishes the 'truth' of no mode of knowing at
all, and just this is its positive function of determining what presuppositionless science must
begin with. I discuss this at greater length in Chapter 4, "Beginning Philosophy Without
'Beginnings.'"

9. On this point see especially Taylor, Hegel, pp. 136, 214; Lauer, A Reading, pp. 19, 263ff.,
267; Werner Marx, Hegel's Phenomenology, pp. 8, 33, 43; Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, p. 11;
Kojeve, Introduction, pp. 31, 166; Rosen, G. W. F. Hegel, pp. 40, 234, 240; Marcuse, Hegels
Ontologie, pp. 349350.

10. For those who hold that the Phenomenology fails as an argument, see Ottman, Das
Scheitern, especially pp. 145, 191ff., 200; Heinrichs, Die Logik, pp. 5354; Clark, Logic and
System, pp. 31, 166; Schrader-Klebert, Das Problem, pp. 35, 36, 46, 47.

11. See, for example, Taylor, Hegel, p. 214; Werner Marx, Hegel's Phenomenology, pp. xxiii,
49, 87, 99; Heinrichs, Die Logik, p. 66; Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, pp. 10, 111; Kainz,
Hegel's Phenomenology, p. 12; Hyppolite, Genesis, p. 587; Ottmann, Das Scheitern, p. 133;
Findlay, Re-examination, p. 145.

12. Wetzel, Reflexion, pp. 24, 15, 21, 30; Werner Marx, Hegel's Phenomenology, pp. xxi, 11,
49, 99; Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, pp. 10, 111; Kojeve, Introduction, p. 167; Heinrichs, Die
Logik, pp. 58, 60, 75, 112, 487;

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Hyppolite, Genesis, pp. 589, 590, 591, 599, 601, 603; Schrader-Klebert, Das Problem, pp.
11, 35, 62, 93, 95; Rosen, G. W. F. Hegel, pp. 41, 48, 111114, 119, 196, 197, 235; Clark,
Logic and System, p. 69; Taylor, Hegel, pp. 226, 299; Lukacs, Young Hegel, pp. 471, 515,
533; marcuse, Hegels Ontologie, p. 355.

13. See the previous note and especially Wetzel, Reflexion, Wolfgang Marx, Hegels Theorie,
Schrader-Klebert, Das Problem, Werner Marx, Hegel's Phenomenology, Taylor, Hegel. Dieter
Henrich, in his article, "Anfang und Methode der Logik," in Hegel im Kontext (Frankfurt am
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971) indicates that the notion that the Logic begins in or with
reflection does not coincide with Hegel's self-understanding and claims concerning this
beginning. I discuss Henrich's critical views extensively in Chapter 4.

14. For Hegel's assertion that the Logic begins without presuppositions: "Thus the beginning
must be an absolute, or what is synonymous here, an abstract beginning; and so it may not
presuppose anything, must not be mediated by anything nor have a ground; rather it is to be
itself the ground of the entire science" (Logic, p. 70). That the Phenomenology is the
presupposition for science: "In the Introduction it was remarked that the phenomenology of
spirit is the science of consciousness, the exposition of it, and that consciousness has for result
the Concept of science, i.e., pure knowing. Logic, then, has for its presupposition the science
of manifested spirit, which contains and demonstrates the necessity, and so the truth, of the
standpoint occupied by pure knowing and of its mediation" (Logic, p. 68, translation revised).
(See also Logic pp. 60, 48, 49.) For Hegel's assertion that neither the Concept nor the method
of science can be predetermined from outside the science: "Logic, on the contrary, cannot
presuppose any of these forms of reflection and laws of thinking, for these constitute part of its
own content and have first to be established within the science. But not only the account of
scientific method, but even the Concept itself of the science as such belongs to its content, and
in fact constitutes its final result: what logic is cannot be stated beforehand, rather does this
knowledge of what it is first emerge as the final outcome and consummation of the whole
exposition. ...the Concept of logic has its genesis in the course of the exposition and cannot
therefore be premised." Logic, p. 43, translation revised. Also see Logic, p. 53.

15. Pögeller explicitly notes the difficulties for interpretation raised by these remarks. See
"Zur Deutung ...," in Hegels Idee, p. 244.

16. That Hegel regards absolute knowing and pure knowing to be one and the same, compare
Logic, p. 48 with pp. 6869. On p. 48, the concept is referred to as the truth of consciousness,
the result of the Phenomenology, and is called absolute knowing. On pp. 6869, the concept is
again referred to as the truth of consciousness and the result of the Phenomenology, but here it
is called pure knowing.

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17. This last remark, taken in conjunction with Hegel's claim that into which this knowing
vanishes is ''unanalysable" (Logic, p. 75) also rules out that line of interpretation which holds
that there is an implicit structure, functioning as a telos within the beginning point, and
discoverable via reflection. A logical science which aims to begin, as Hegel's does, without
any determinate content, subject matter, or method is certainly unusual. And whether or not
any such science could ever be brought off is certainly a topic worthy of consideration. Just
how such a science may proceed is discussed at length in Chapters 4, "Beginning Philosophy
Without 'Beginnings,'" and 5, "Philosophy and Dialectical Method"; it is also considered in
Chapter 9, "The Dead End of Postmodernism." What concerns us here is establishing the fact
that Hegel did aim to produce just such a science. "The essential point of view is that what is
involved is an altogether new concept of scientific procedure." Logic, p. 27.

18. For Hegel's specific denial that the beginning of the science can be made with the structure
of the knowing selfthe ego or self consciousness, see Logic, p. 7578, and pp. 582587,
especially the remarks at 586587.

Chapter 4, "Beginning Philosophy Without 'Beginnings'"

1. For example, Hegel observes the following in the Remark to Paragraph 2 of the Philosophy
of Right: "What constitutes scientific procedure in philosophy is expounded in philosophical
logic and is here presupposed" (p. 15). The 2nd Addition to Paragraph 24 of the Encyclopedia
Logic states: "It will now be understood that Logic is the all-animating spirit of all the
sciences, and its categories the spiritual hierarchy" (p. 40).

2. Dieter Henrich provides a summary of the critical objections in "Anfang und Methode der
Logik." For a recent critique see Michael Rosen, Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

3. "The essential point of view is that what is involved is an altogether new concept of
scientific procedure. Philosophy, if it would be science, cannot, as I have remarked elsewhere,
borrow its method from a subordinate science like mathematics, any more than it can remain
satisfied with categorical assurances of inner intuition, or employ arguments based on grounds
adduced by external reflection. On the contrary, it can be only the nature of the content itself
which spontaneously develops itself in a scientific method of knowing, since it is at the same
time the reflection of the content itself which first posits and generates its determinate
character" (Logic, p. 27). "... [T]he character of the rational ... is to be unconditioned, self-
contained, and thus to be self-determining" (Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 82, Addition, p.
120). "For reason is unconditioned only insofar as its character and quality are not due to an
extraneous and

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foreign content, only insofar as it is self-determining [sich selbst bestimmt] and thus, in
point of content, is its own master" (Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 52, Addition, p. 86;
Werke, Vol. 1, p. 137, translation revised). (Compare Paragraph 238, Addition, p. 294;
Paragraph 9, Remark, p. 13; Paragraph 232, p. 289; Paragraph 4, p. 7; Paragraph 16,
Remark, p. 22; Paragraph 17, pp. 2223; Paragraph 77, pp. 110111) "... I hold that Science
exists solely in the self-movement of the Concept." Phenomenology, p. 44, translation
revised.

4. "Thus the beginning must be an absolute, or what is synonymous here, an abstract

beginning: and so it may not presuppose anything, must not be mediated by anything nor have
a ground, rather it is to be itself the ground of the entire science." Logic, p. 70.

5. "Anfang und Methode der Logik," pp. 7394.

6. See above, note #3.

7. "Here the beginning is made with being which is represented as having come to be through
mediation, a mediation which is also a sublating of itself [durch Vermittlung ... welche
zugleich Aufheben ihrer selbst ist]; and there is presupposed pure knowing as the outcome of
finite knowing, of consciousness." Logic, pp. 6970; Werke, Vol. 5, p. 68.

8. See Chapters 1, 2 and 3.

9. Such a successful demonstration would seemingly substantiate the claim that an

investigation by consciousness is the way to begin science and it would specify the
determinate mode of consciousness' cognition definitive of scientific cognition. If successful,
it would result in a substantive, determinate beginning point for science.

10. The impossibility of demonstrating such correspondence is a foregone conclusion for

many contemporary philosophers from both the analytic and continental camps. For example,
see Donald Davidson's essays "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge," and
"Empirical Content," in Truth and Interpretation.

11. As soon as sheer identity in difference is attained, it is no longer possible to speak of

knowledge in the only terms in which it can make sense for consciousness: for consciousness
'knowledge' always is and must be determinatively distinct from its object. The outcome of
consciousness' attempt to show the unconditional legitimacy of its mode of knowing is the
revelation that such a demonstration cannot be effected except insofar as the very mode of
knowing purported to be unconditional is transcended.

12. Speaking of our beginning with the "pure knowing ... [which has] sublated all reference to
an other and to mediation ... [and which thus] ceases itself to be knowledge," Hegel notes:
"Here"that is, from the vantage point of the completion of the Phenomenology"the beginning
is made with being which is represented as having come to be through

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mediation, a mediation which is also a sublating of itself; and there is presupposed pure
knowing as the outcome of finite knowing, of consciousness." We can see this as the
mediated outcome of consciousness. But, in thinking through the self-cessation and the
sublation, we also see that what was presupposed in the Phenomenologythe notion that a
foundational self-investigation will lead to sciencehas eliminated itself, and the
determinate agency required for thinking through this investigationthe structure of
consciousnesshas rendered itself indeterminate. Our seeing this makes it possible for us to
then adopt the following stance: "But if no presupposition is to be made and the beginning
itself is taken immediately"and the aforementioned mediation (the Phenomenology) makes
this possible"then its only determination is that it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought
as such. All that is present is simply the resolve, which can also be regarded as arbitrary,
that we propose to consider thought as such." Logic, pp. 6970.

13. See Chapter 5 for a specific consideration of this issue.

14. "What we are dealing with in logic is not a thinking about something which exists
independently as a base for our thinking and apart from it, nor forms which are supposed to
provide mere signs or distinguishing marks of truth; on the contrary, the necessary forms and
self-determinations of thought are the content and the ultimate truth itself." Logic, p. 50.

15. Interestingly, Henrich mentions the Phenomenology as the "condition of the possibility of
logic as science" in a footnote (#6, p. 83) but carries on no further discussion of it.

16. What the scientific procedure consists in more specifically, what its method unfolds itself
as qua method, can only be seen in retrospect.

17. Speaking of what emerges from the Phenomenology"pure knowing"as that which is taken
up in the Logic in its role as pure science, Hegel characterizes pure knowing as the cessation
of mediation and reflection: "Pure knowing ... has sublated all reference to an other and to
mediation; it is without any distinction and as thus distinctionless ceases itself to be
knowledge; what is present is only simple immediacy." And, against Henrich, Hegel notes that
this characterization is an expression of reflection and thus can be considered as referring, not
ahead (as Henrich would have it) to the logic of reflection, but back to that from which this
beginning point has emerged: "Simple immediacy is itself an expression of reflection and
contains a reference to its distinction from what is mediated. ... Here the beginning is made
with being which is represented as having come to be through mediation, a mediation which is
also a sublating of itself ..." Logic, p. 69, last emphasis added.

18. What about Henrich's contention that the Logic requires a method of proof, the via
negationis? Henrich seems to claim that we as thinkers are involved in applying this method
of excluding reflection. I would suggest, in at least partial agreement with Henrich, that a
reconstruction of the

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opening transitions would involve reference to the exclusion of reflection, but that even
this would not require illicit appeal to a negated logic of reflection: The legitimacy of what
Henrich claims to find (illicitly) present in his reconstruction is established through the self
-sublating mediation, for, as noted, it is just the predilection to determine determinacy
through a fixedpresupposed as givenstructure of reflection which is sublated by the
Phenomenology's outcome in the collapse of consciousness in pure knowing. So, if a
reconstruction finds 'reflection present as negated,' this is perfectly in accord with Hegel's
claims about the beginning of the logic as arising out of the sublation of mediation. For the
self-sublating mediation which the Logic presupposes is the sublation of the structure of
mediation. (This outcome and this relationship between the Phenomenology and the Logic
is also in accord with Hegel's claim that "What philosophy begins with must be either
mediated or immediate, and it is easy to show that it can be neither the one nor the other;
thus either way of beginning is refuted" [Logic, p. 67].) However, for the reason why such
a reconstruction is not needed, see the next paragraph of this chapter.

Chapter 5, "Philosophy and Dialectical Method"

1. On this point, see also K. R. Dove, "Hegel's Phenomenological Method," the Review of
Metaphysics 23, 4 (June, 1970).

2. Phenomenology, p. 46ff.

3. Phenomenology, p. 54; Werke, vol. 3, p. 77

4. Phenomenology, p. 55: "this dialectical movement which consciousness exercises on

itself..."

5. "Consequently, we do not need to import criteria, or to make use of our own bright ideas
and thoughts during the course of the inquiry; it is precisely when we leave these aside that we
succeed in contemplating the matter in hand as it is in and for itself." Phenomenology, p. 52ff.,
esp. p. 54.

6. On the Hegelian and Husserlian phenomenological methods, cf. K. R. Dove, "Die Epoche
der Phänomenologie des Geistes," Hegel-Studien, Beiheft (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1974).

7. Hegel does note (on p. 55) that there is an aspect of the dialectic which constitutes
"something contributed by us." Our contribution however, as Hegel's discussion shows,
consists in observing and recording something which consciousness itself, because of its
involvement in the dialectic, cannot see.

8. "But not only is a contribution by us superfluous ... since what consciousness examines is
its own self, all that is left for us is to simply look on." Phenomenology, pp. 49, 50; 54.

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9. "Consciousness provides its own criterion from within itself, so that the investigation
becomes a comparison of consciousness with itself." Phenomenology, p. 53. See also note 10.

10. "Yet it" (the presentation of knowledge as a phenomenon which constitutes the
Phenomenology) "can be regarded as the path of the natural consciousness which presses
forward to true knowledge." Phenomenology, p. 76, translation revised.

11. That consciousness is concerned in the Phenomenology with the philosophical problem of
knowledge, i.e., with demonstrating the validity of its own mode of knowing, see p. 49, the
passage which begins "Natural consciousness will show itself..." Also see pp. 5253.

12. Phenomenology, pp. 5354.

13. "But not only is a contribution by us superfluous, since Concept and object, the criterion
and what is to be tested, are present in consciousness itself, but we are also spared the trouble
of comparing the two and really testing them, so that, since what consciousness examines is its
own self, all that is left for us to do is simply look on." Phenomenology p. 54, translation
revised.

14. "Inasmuch as the new true object issues from it, this dialectical movement which
consciousness exercises on itself, and which affects both its knowledge and its object, is
precisely what is called experience" (Phenomenology, p. 55). One of the descriptions Hegel
gave the Phenomenology is "the science of the experience of consciousness." Phenomenology,
p. 56.

15. p. 104.

16. That the object of concern in the Phenomenology is the status of the structure of
consciousness as definitive unconditionally of true knowingscienceis not stated explicitly in
the Introduction by Hegel, although it is clear from the Preface. Also see the Logic, p. 45,
where he distinguishes between "ordinary, phenomenal consciousness" and the "sphere of
reason." It is also implied in the earlier sections of the Introduction to the Phenomenology,
especially in the reflections by Hegel on the dilemma of attempting to introduce
sciencereflections which lead him to posit consciousness' search for the truth as our object.

17. In the Logic, p. 68, Hegel informs us that it is the "ultimate, absolute truth of
consciousness" which is arrived at in absolute knowing by consciousness.

18. Phenomenology, p. 54. In this way the Phenomenology, as Hegel's 'introduction to science'
has as its topic consciousness' attempt to introduce science.

19. Logic, p. 68.

20. "Thus in what consciousness affirms from within itself as the being-in-itself or the True we
have the standard which consciousness itself sets up
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by which to measure what it knows" (Phenomenology, p. 53). "Since both [knowledge and
the object] are for the same consciousness, this consciousness itself is their comparison; it
is for this same consciousness to know whether its knowledge of the object corresponds to
the object or not." Phenomenology, p. 54.

21. See Phenomenology, p. 54, the passage beginning "The object, it is true seems only to be
for consciousness in the way that consciousness knows it ..."

22. Phenomenology, p. 55, translation revised.

23. Phenomenology, p. 55, translation revised. "... das Für-das Bewusstseins des ersten
Ansich, das zweite Gegenstand selbst werden soll..." Werke, vol. 3, p. 79.

24. Phenomenology, p. 55.

25. When consciousness takes its own structure of knowledge as its object, the essential
difference definitive of this structurethe difference between consciousness as knowing
awareness and its objectis both found in the object and preserved in the knowing of it. And
thus the simultaneous identity in difference demanded by consciousness is attained to.

26. Logic, pp. 6870; see also p. 60, p. 49, pp. 4445.

27. Logic, p. 69, (translation revised), p. 74.

28. "The Concept of pure science and its deduction is therefore presupposed in the present
work in so far as the Phenomenology of Spirit is nothing other than the deduction of it." Logic,
p. 49. See also p. 48, pp. 6869, p. 60, p. 45.

29. Logic, pp. 4345, p. 68, p. 70, pp. 7475.

30. "But in the Introduction, the Concept of logic was itself stated to be the result of a
preceding science, and so here, too, it is a presupposition" (Logic, p. 60, translation revised).
"Logic, then, has for its presupposition the science of manifested spirit ..." Logic, p. 68.

31. Hegel tells us that "the phenomenology of spirit ... has for result the Concept of science,
i.e., pure knowing," that "Pure knowing ... has sublated all reference to an other and to
mediation, it is without distinction and as thus distinctionless, ceases itself to be knowledge,"
that "its only determination is that it is to be the beginning of logic, of thought as such," that it
''cannot possess any determination relatively to anything else" and "cannot contain within
itself any determination, any content," that it is "this pure indeterminateness." Logic, p. 68,
translation revised, p. 69, p. 70, p. 72.

32. Hegel was of the opinion that the uncritical assumption of such a principle of cognition
was the major failing of his predecessors. See the Logic, pp. 4445, pp. 5051, p. 63.

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33. Logic, pp. 75, 72.

34. Logic, pp. 49, 45. That consciousnessthe structure of the subject, the egois that which is to
be overcome in order to begin this science, and that an exposition of the logical science and its
categories in terms of that structure is, from Hegel's standpoint, illicit: "But the logical form of
the Concept is independent of its non-spiritual and also of its spiritual shapes. The necessary
premonition on this point has already been given in the introduction. It is a point that must not
wait to be established within logic itself but must be established before that science is begun,"
that is, as I have argued, in the Phenomenology (Logic, p. 586, translation revised, emphasis
added). This remark is from "The Notion in General," where Hegel is discussing the
inadequacies of Kantian transcendental philosophy. The hallmark of this inadequacy lies in its
unreflective assumption of the primacy and paradigmatic character of the structure of the ego
or consciousness. Something fatal, in Hegel's eyes, for a philosophy which calls itself critical.

35. It would also be illicit to read the Logic as though some difference, or some identity in
difference or some subject/object structure were preserved in indeterminateness. Hegel
explicitly rules this out: "... if pure being is to be considered as the unity into which knowing
has collapsed at the point of its union with the object, then knowing itself has vanished in that
unity, leaving behind no difference from the unity and hence nothing by which the latter could
be determined. Nor is there anything else present, any content which could be used to make
the beginning more determinate." Logic p. 73, emphasis added.

36. Logic, p. 70; see also the Preface to the Phenomenology, pp. 20, 32.

37. Hegel does note that an "arbitrary resolve" is required in order to begin the process of
logical thought. (Logic, p. 70.) This seems to me to be in consonance with his idea that the
Phenomenology is a self-sublating mediation, and with the consequent claim that nothing of a
determinate nature remains or is carried over into logic from the Phenomenology. If
indeterminateness is radically indeterminate and if there are no presuppositions guiding or
leading us on, then we must simply decide, or resolve, to think the indeterminate.

38. The beginning of the logic is made "in the element of thought that is free and for itself" in
"pure knowing" which is the "ultimate, absolute truth of consciousness" and the ''result" as
"Concept of science" of the Phenomenology, (Logic, p. 68, translation revised). One starts
from "this determination of pure knowledge" and "ridding oneself of all other reflections and
opinions whatsoever" one "consider(s)" or "take(s) up" "what is there before us" (Logic, p.
69). This is pure knowing as "concentrated" into a "unity" which has "sublated all reference to
an other and to mediation; it is without any distinction" and "ceases itself to be knowledge"
owing to the absence of distinction (Logic, p. 69). It is "simple immediacy," but as

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this it is an "expression of reflection and contains a reference to its distinction from what is
mediated"; it is, in its "true expression," "pure being"; it is "merely immediacy itself'' or
"this pure indeterminateness." Logic, pp. 69, 70, 72.

39. Logic, p. 69.

40. Logic, p. 83. Thinking indeterminateness as indeterminate, as in no way predetermined,

requires, or is, the thinking of a contrast or a difference: Indeterminateness can only be
thought as indeterminate insofar as it is contrasted with the determinate. But since no
determinacy is given and none can be presupposed, the contrast or difference which one thinks
in thinking the indeterminate is a vanishing or disappearing contrast.

41. This is the 'truth of being' where being is understood solely as a determinacy of pure
systematic logic, which is another way of saying that it is the truth of being when we do not
implicitly or explicitly presuppose that 'being' can be thought in its determinacy through being
contrasted with thought or the thinking subject (or through being identified with either thought
or the thinking subject). It is important to keep in mind that the logic is not 'about being,' it is
not an ontology which is 'about' something which exists independently, through which a
distinct subject matter is conceived or cognized. Clearly, when Hegel speaks in the Logic of
both thought and being he is using these terms in a manner radically different from their
ordinary use in philosophy. See Logic, p. 50, pp. 7273, p. 78.

42. I say "in part" here because the suspension of consciousness' model of cognition can in no
way guarantee that logic is pure and presuppositionless, that some other methodological
presupposition cannot, does not, or will not become operative.

43. The Logic's claim to being a radically self-grounding science demands radical self-
inclusiveness. That no externally determined determinacies can either come into play in it or
act as guides for its self-development has the consequence that this domain of logical
determinacies cannot, simply as given, as constituted, be held to 'refer to' or to 'pick out'
anything outside of the logic.

44. The validity of either constitutingor understandingthe relation of the logic to its 'other' in
terms of an essence/appearance or ground/grounded relation is ruled out through the immanent
critique of these relations in the Logic. See in particular p. 592.

45. Philosophy of Nature, Paragraph 247, p. 205. This is volume 2 of the Encyclopedia of the
Philosophical Sciences.

46. Philosophy of Nature, Paragraph 246, Addition, p. 198.

47. Thus Hegel avoids the epistemological dilemmas which arise from attempts to justify such
an application. He has no need to claim either

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that reality must correspond to logic/thought (as the allegedly truer reality) or that the
logical framework is legitimate because it is in some manner derived from reality.

Chapter 6, "On the Presumed Blasphemy of Hegelian Absolutism"

1. The major articulation of this charge is made by Emil Fackenheim. "Hegelian thought, then,
can achieve its ... goals only if it is not finite and human but rather infinite and
divine" (Religious Dimension, p. 162). Stanley Rosen is more blunt: Hegel is "[l]ike other
geniuses" in "confusing himself with God. ..." G. W. F. Hegel, p. 130.

2. Putnam, Reason, p. 50.

3. Fackenheim, Religious Dimension, p. 58, emphasis in original.

4. Religious Dimension, p. 73.

5. Although B2 concerns the issue of the nature and relation of the finite and infinite as
construed in the philosophy of religion, the treatment there cannot be considered in isolation
from B1, where the issue pertains to the nature of the system as a whole, any more than the
latter could successfully be considered in isolation from the former. To rest content with an
isolated consideration in a system which alleges that the truth is the whole would be fatal from
the start. For example, an assessment of the character of Hegel's claims in the philosophy of
religion concerning the knowability and the nature of the divine would be question-begging
were this to be undertaken without considering the nature of the kind of knowledge which this
system claims to afford.

6. Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, One Volume Edition, The Lectures of 1827, ed.
Peter C. Hodgson (California: University of California Press, 1988), p. 96. Hereafter referred
to as Lectures.

7. Lectures, p. 99.

8. See the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, Part One, Encyclopedia Logic, Part
Two, the Philosophy of Nature, Part Three, the Philosophy of Mind, trans. William Wallace
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). See Paragraph 213, p. 274ff.; Paragraph 9, p. 13ff.;
Paragraph 12, p. 16ff.; Paragraph 14, p. 19ff.; Paragraph 17, p. 22ff.; Paragraph 41, Addition,
p. 66f.; Paragraph 52, Addition, p. 86; Paragraph 77, p. 110ff.; Paragraph 232, p. 289;
Paragraph 238, Addition, p. 294; (The 'Additions' to the Encyclopedia were not prepared by
Hegel but by the editors, based on student lecture notes.) Also see the Logic, p. 27, and the
Phenomenology, p. 44.

9. It can also be argued that the other features mentioned require self-grounding. See Chapter
8, "The Critique of Marx and Marxist Thought."

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10. Hegel, of course, claims both of these features for his system. According to him, in "the
standpoint of philosophy" "thinking" "does not have the concrete 'over there,' but rather is
itself essentially concrete, and thus it is comprehension, meaning that the concept determines
itself in its totality and as idea. It is free reason, which has being on its own account, that
develops the content in accord with is necessity, and justifies the content of truth." Lectures, p.
487.

11. See the Logic, pp. 49, 53, 60, 6875. As this indeterminacy results from the collapse of
consciousness, we are left neither with a determinate object of knowledge nor with a
determinate mode of relating to an object, unless we choose to lapse back into the mode of
consciousness which has just sublated itself in absolute knowing. Thus, the Phenomenology
yields neither a determinate form nor a determinate content, and insofar as knowing
presupposes these determinacies, we are left with no knowing at all. See Chapters 3 and 4.

12. The Logic, p. 69.

13. See the Logic, p. 54.

14. By 'genuine knowledge' I mean objective knowledge whose truth is certain.

15. This, of course, is from the standpoint of the "we." For an extended discussion of how the
Phenomenology functions as yielding the beginning point of science see Chapters 3, 4, and 5.

16. How could merely abandoning that assumption offer the prospects for a mode of
philosophical consideration free from predetermination? The plausibility of this lies in
appreciating that the consciousness sublated is itself the structure of predetermination in
general. See Chapter 4.

17. For Hegel, attaining to this level of self-determination is the fulfillment of knowledge and
freedom. "Free mind or Spirit is, as we have seen, in conformity with its concept perfect unity
of subjectivity and objectivity, of form and content, consequently absolute totality and
therefore infinite, eternal" (Philosophy of Mind, Paragraph 441, Addition, p. 181ff., translation
revised). And this is something we can attain to even as conscious beings: "In the scientific
domain we are not dealing with what is in feeling, but exclusively with what is outside itand
indeed is set forth for thought as an object for consciousness, more explicitly for the thinking
consciousness, in such a way that it has attained the form of thought." Lectures, p. 116.

18. According to Hegel, Spirit which is "the perfect unity of subjectivity and objectivity, of
form and content" is "absolute totality and therefore infinite, eternal" and "[f]or this reason we
must declare spirit to be the likeness of God, the divinity of man." Philosophy of Mind,
Paragraph 441, Addition, pp. 181182, emphasis added, translation revised.

19. Logic, p. 49.

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20. "The witness of spirit in its highest form is that of philosophy, according to which the
concept develops the truth purely as such from itself without presuppositions." Lectures, p.
398. For an extended discussion of how this procedure might be understood see Chapter 4.

21. But if we are finite, if we always engage in thought under given conditions, must we not
assume that they determine what we come to think? I shall argue below that Hegel's
philosophy does not involve a denial, but a recognition of this possibility.

22. That God is reduced to the human: after identifying God with Spirit, Hegel writes: "In
order not to be one-sided, spirit must encompass finitude within itself, and finitude in general
means nothing more than a process of self-distinguishing. Consciousness is precisely the mode
of finitude of spirit: distinction is present here. One thing is on one side, another on the other
side ... Spirit must have consciousness, distinction, otherwise it is not spirit. ... It must have
this character of finitude within itselfthat may seem blasphemous" (Lectures, p. 405, cf. p.
406). "The transition [to the consummate religion] is the spirit that has entered into itself: it is
the concept that has only itself as its purposethis inwardly subsisting mode [of being] whose
purpose is only itself, is God himself." Lectures, p. 410. (Material in square brackets is added
by the editors.)

23. "Besides, in philosophy of religion we have as our object God himself, absolute reason.
Since we know God [who is] absolute reason, and investigate this reason, we behave
cognitively." Lectures, p. 96

24. "The divine idea is the pure concept, without any limitation. The idea includes the fact that
the concept determines itself and thereby posits itself as what is self-differentiated." Lectures,
p. 420.

25. The quotations are from pp. 469 and 468 in the Lectures. Hegel also writes "... in
philosophy of religion we have as our object God himself, absolute reason. Since we know
God [who is] absolute reason, and investigate this reason we cognize it, we behave
cognitively. Absolute spirit is knowledge, the determinate rational knowledge of its own self.
Therefore when we occupy ourselves with this object it is immediately the case that we are
dealing with and investigating rational cognition, and this cognition is itself rational
conceptual inquiry and knowledge" (Lectures, p. 96). On God's knowability see also the Logic,
p. 50. See also the Philosophy of Mind, Paragraph 441, Addition, p. 181ff.; Paragraph 442, p.
183ff.; Paragraph 564, p. 297ff.

26. By "philosophically objective knowledge" I mean knowledge whose universal and

necessary truth can be established. This is discussed in Chapter 9.

27. Absolute knowing has shown that we finite beings cannot attain to certain truth insofar as
we remain committed to the idea of finding truth in the domain of objectivity. Thus, whatever
the nature of God the system

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affords when it speaks of God, it cannot be construed as descriptive knowledge of God as a
transcendent other.

28. To know its identity with its object is just what consciousness failed to do in absolute
knowing.

29. Hegel writes "in relation to the idea of God itself ... it is the concept itself that sets up these
distinctions and attains to itself through them, becoming for the first time idea in this
way ..." (Lectures, p. 413). "The divine idea is the pure concept, without any limitation. The
idea includes the fact that the concept determines itself and thereby posits itself as what is self-
differentiated" (Lectures, p. 420). "The fact of the matter is that humanity is immortal only
through cognitive knowledge, for only in the activity of thinking is its soul pure and free rather
than mortal and animallike. Cognition and though are the root of human life, of human
immortality as a totality within itself." Lectures, p. 446.

30. "Spirit is essencebut only insofar as it has returned to itself from out of itself, only insofar
as it is that actual being which returns and is home with itself, that being which posits itself
from itself as at home with itself. This positing produces the distinctive determinations of its
activity, and these distinctive determinations are the forms through which spirit has to
move" (Lectures, p. 410). "Spirit is the process of self-differentiating, the positing of
distinctions" (Lectures, p. 453). But "... the self-positing and sublating of otherness is love or
spirit." Lectures, p. 454.

31. "This freedom, which has the impulse and determinacy to realize itself, is rationality."
Lectures, p. 482.

32. Lectures, p. 425, note #93.

33. Lectures, p. 410.

34. "According to the philosophical concept God is spirit, concrete; and if we inquire more
precisely what spirit is, it turns out that the basic concept of spirit is the one whose
development constitutes the entire doctrine of religion. If we ask our consciousness for a
provisional account of what spirit is, the answer is that spirit is a self-manifesting, a being for
spirit" (Lectures, p. 90). "God is the one who as living spirit distinguishes himself from
himself, posits an other and in this other remains identical with himself, has in this other his
identity with himself. This is the truth." Lectures, p. 453.

35. Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 45, Addition, p. 73.

36. See the Remark and Addition to Paragraph 246, p. 196ff., of the Philosophy of Nature.

37. Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 45, Addition, p. 73.

38. Hegel's remarks in the Introductions to the Encyclopedia Logic and the Philosophy of
Nature make it clear that he sees systematic philosophi-
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cal knowledge and the descriptive knowledge of the given offered by the empirical
sciences as different modes of knowing which are not in competition with one another.

39. "For the nonspeculative thinking of the understanding, distinction remains as distinction,
e.g., the antithesis of finite and infinite." Lectures, p. 422.

40. It is important to note that the systematic rejection of the model of consciousness for
philosophy also precludes understanding the system as offering transcendental categories
which are determined in light of their intended application to some external, given content.
(As though the application to the given content constituted the manner in which finitude
entered the system.) See Chapters 8 and 5. This view of Klaus Hartmann's must be rejected for
the following reasons: it returns us to the abandoned level of consciousness and to the
unreconciled opposition of finitude and infinite; it requires abandoning any claims the system
could make to completeness and self-grounding (since the given other would be requisite for
the truth of the categories); and it would be a step backwards to the framework of the Kantian
approach Hegel unequivocally rejects (see the Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 45, Addition, p.
73.)

41. For an extended discussion of this see Chapter 5.

42. See Chapter 5.

43. See Chapter 5.

44. See the Philosophy of Nature, Paragraph 246 and Remark, p. 196ff.

45. Philosophy of Mind. Paragraph 441, Addition, p. 182. See also Lectures, p. 460;
Philosophy of Mind, Paragraph 416, Addition, p. 157; Paragraph 417, Addition, pp. 157158;
Paragraph 424, Addition, p. 165; Paragraph 437, Addition, 177ff.

46. See the discussion of religion in the Philosophy of Mind, Paragraphs 564 through 570, pp.
297302. Religion is important for "... the witness of spirit can be present in manifold and
various ways; it is not required that for all of humanity the truth be brought forth in a
philosophical way" (Lectures, p. 398). And "religion is consciousness of freedom and truth"; it
has the same object as philosophy, yet it is not philosophy, rather it is "the manner or mode by
which all human beings become conscious of truth for themselves." Religion is vital because
in it truth appears in "the form of immediate sensible intuition and external existence for
humankind" (Lectures, pp. 76, 106, 455). (Cf. Lectures, p. 144.) In religion ''the consciousness
of the absolute idea that we have in philosophy in the form of thinking is to be brought forth
not for the standpoint of philosophical speculation ... but in the form of certainty. The
necessity ... is not first apprehended by means of thinking; rather it is a certainty for
humanity." Lectures, p. 454. Also see Lectures, p. 426, note #93.

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47. "The witness of spirit in its highest form is that of philosophy, according to which the
concept develops the truth purely as such from itself without presuppositions" (Lectures, p.
398). Philosophy goes beyond positivity and even revealed religion is in the form of positivity
(pp. 396, 402). "But, even though representation grasps the content in its own forms, the
content still belongs to thinking. We are considering the idea in its universality, as it is defined
in and through pure thinking. This idea is the one truth and the whole truth; therefore
everything particular that is comprehended as true must be comprehended according to the
form of this idea." Lectures, p. 428.

48. The correctphilosophicalconception of God does not deny finitude but includes it:
"Finitude must be posited in God himself, not as something insurmountable, absolute,
independent, but above all as this process of distinguishing that we have in spirit and in
consciousnessa distinguishing that, because it is a transitory moment, ... is also eternally self-
sublating." Lectures, p. 406.

49. See Lectures, p. 88ff.

50. Of course, within the bounds of religion there is no problem with this. "Religion has its
reality as consciousness," but the "elevation to God" is "a passing over from finite things, from
the things of the world or from the finitude of consciousness ... to the infinite. ...'' Lectures, pp.
202, 162.

51. Lectures, p. 406. "For the understanding holds fast to the categories of thought, persisting
with them as utterly independent of each other, remaining distinct, external to each other, and
fixed. ... But for the concept it is equally true that these distinctions are sublated. Precisely
because they are distinctions, they remain finite, and the understanding persists in finitude.
Indeed, even in the case of the infinite, it has the infinite on one side and finitude on the other.
But the truth of the matter is that neither the finite nor the infinite standing over against it has
any truth; rather both are merely transitional." Lectures, p. 423.

52. Lectures, p. 428.

53. Lectures, p. 428.

54. "God, after all, is the universal that is determined within itself in manifold ways. In the
form of representation, however, God is in this simple manner in which we have God on one
side and the world on the other." Lectures, pp. 148149.

Chapter 7, "Hegel and Hermeneutics"

1. See Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, the essay "Man and Language," pp. 6162 for his
discussion of this Cartesian legacy as providing "the background for all of modern thought."

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2. Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests.
3. Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, "The Discourse on Language," p. 235.

4. The simplest way of putting this point is to say that they allincluding Marx and Richard
Rortywish to break off reading the Phenomenology at some point or another prior to absolute
knowing.

5. Gadamer, Hegel's Dialectic, the essay "Hegel and Heidegger," pp. 101102.

6. Gadamer, Truth and Method, pp. 309310.

7. Hegel's Dialectic, "Hegel and Heidegger," p. 104.

8. Hegel's Dialectic, "Hegel and Heidegger," p. 107.

9. See Chapters 3, 4, and 5 for a refutation of this reading of Hegel.

10. "The hermeneutical consciousness does not compete with that self-transparency that Hegel
took to constitute absolute knowledge and the highest mode of being." Philosophical
Hermeneutics, "On The Problem Of Self-Understanding," p. 55.

11. Hegel's Dialectic, "The Idea of Hegel's Logic," p. 77. Cf. also p. 11, "Hegel and the
Dialectic of the Ancient Philosophers."

12. Hegel's Dialectic, p. 78.

13. Hegel's Dialectic, p. 78.

14. Philosophical Hermeneutics, "The Phenomenological Movement," p. 135. Also: "...

understanding is not suitably conceived at all as a consciousness of something, since the whole
process of understanding itself enters into an event, is brought about by it and is permeated by
it" (Philosophical Hermeneutics, "The Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century,"
p. 125). But "For Hegel, it is necessary, of course, that the movement of consciousness,
experience should lead to a self-knowledge that no longer has anything different or alien to
itself. ... [for Hegel] the dialectic of experience must end with the overcoming of all
experience, which is attained in absolute knowledge, i.e., in the complete identity of
consciousness and object." (Truth and Method, pp. 318319). And: "Real experience is that in
which man becomes aware of his finiteness.'' Truth and Method, p. 320.

15. Hegel's Dialectic, p. 3.

16. Hegel's Dialectic, "Hegel and Heidegger," p. 102.

17. Philosophical Hermeneutics, "Semantics and Hermeneutics," p. 94.

 18. Despite Gadamer's emphasis on the reflective dimension of hermeneutics and on the
continuity of hermeneutics with the reflective

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tradition, he does intimate that the only true expression of finitude is to be attained in
religious experience: "The real concept of self-understanding ... is not to be conceived in
terms of the model of perfected self-consciousness, but rather in terms of religious
experience." Philosophical Hermeneutics, "The Nature of Things and the Language of
Things," p. 80.

19. Truth and Method, p. xiii.

20. Philosophical Hermeneutics, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," p.
37. On the universality of hermeneutics: "Hermeneutic reflection, however, is universal in its
possible application" (Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 93). "The phenomenon of
understanding not only pervades all human relation to the world. It also has an independent
validity within science and resists any attempt to reduce it into a method of science" (Truth
and Method, p. xii). ''It is important to realize that this phenomenon [the hermeneutical
problematic] is not secondary in human existence, and hermeneutics is not to be viewed as a
mere subordinate discipline within the arena of Geisteswissenschaften." Philosophical
Hermeneutics, p. 19.

21. Philosophical Hermeneutics, p. 3334.

22. Philosophical Hermeneutics, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," p.
36.

23. Philosophical Hermeneutics, "Semantics and Hermeneutics," p. 93.

24. Truth and Method, p. 308309.

25. Truth and Method, p. 308.

26. Philosophical Hermeneutics, "The Phenomenological Movement," p. 172.

27. Philosophical Hermeneutics, "The Phenomenological Movement," p. 172.

28. Truth and Method, p. 225.

29. Truth and Method, p. 307. Also: "The varied critique of this philosophy of absolute reason
by Hegel's critics cannot withstand the logical consequences of total dialectical self-mediation
that Hegel has set out ..." (Truth and Method, p. 307). And "It cannot be denied that the
objections of Feuerbach and Kierkegaard are already taken care of ... by Hegel." p. 308.

30. This is the method of criticism which, according to Hegel, is the only suitable form of
philosophical criticism: "With respect to the refutation of a philosophic system, I have
elsewhere also made the general observation that one must get rid of the erroneous idea of
regarding the system as out and out false, as if the true system by contrast were only opposed
to the
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false." Certainly, Gadamer cannot be accused of doing that. But: "Further, the refutation
must not come from outside, that is, it must not proceed from assumptions lying outside
the system in question and inconsistent with it. ... The genuine refutation must penetrate
the opponent's stronghold and meet him on his own ground; no advantage is gained by
attacking him somewhere else and defeating him where he is not" (Logic, pp. 580581).
Thus, insofar as finitude as explicated by Gadamer is an 'assumption which lies beyond the
system,' his critique fails as one which reflective philosophy is compelled to recognize as
telling, and reflective philosophy and hermeneutics remain at loggerheads. That
"reflection"in the form of Hegel's systematic philosophyitself has limits and acknowledges
finitude is discussed in Chapter 6.

31. See especially the article "Hegel and Heidegger," in Hegel's Dialectic.

32. Truth and Method, p. 307. See also Philosophical Hermeneutics, pp. 50, 6162.

33. Truth and Method, p. 310.

34. Truth and Method, p. 319.

35. "The claim which Hegel's philosophy makes contains in it an equivocation which in turn is
responsible for the fact that this man assumes the historical role that he does" (Hegel's
Dialectic, p. 101). Gadamer is referring here to Hegel's claim to have completed western
metaphysics and to having achieved the consummation of philosophical thought. See Chapter
9 for a discussion of how Hegel may claim to have completed philosophy.

36. Philosophical Hermeneutics, "The Philosophical Foundations of the Twentieth Century,"

p. 128.

37. On Gadamer's appropriation and transformation of the Hegelian notion of dialectics, cf.
especially Truth and Method, 414ff., in particular 421423.

38. Hence: "Thus the question arises of the degree to which the dialectical superiority of
reflective philosophy corresponds to a factual truth and how far it merely creates a formal
appearance. For the arguments of reflective philosophy cannot ultimately conceal the fact that
there is some truth in the critique of speculative thought based on the standpoint of finite
human consciousness." Truth and Method, p. 308.

39. "Tradition is no proof and validation of something, in any case not where validation is
demanded by reflection. But the point is this: where does reflection demand it? Everywhere? I
would object to such an answer on the grounds of the finitude of human existence and the
essential particularity of reflection." Philosophical Hermeneutics, "On the Scope and Function
of Hermeneutical Reflection," p. 34.

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Chapter 8, "The Critique of Marx and Marxist Thought"

1. Klaus Hartmann's Die Marxsche Theorie offers a thoroughgoing and important examination
of Marx as a systematic philosopher. Robert Paul Wolff's Understanding Marx (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), John Elster's Making Sense of Marx (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), and Carol Gould's Marx's Social Ontology (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1978) are all recent works which testify to the increased interest in Marx on the
part of philosophers.

2. The most recent attempt at a wholesale condemnation of Hegel's system and its dialectic is
Hegel's Dialectic and Its Criticism by Michael Rosen.

3. Karl Marx, Capital, vol. 1, trans. B. Fowkes (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1976), pp.
102, 103. For Marx's approving comments on Hegel see also the "Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts," p. 101 and "The Holy Family," p. 141, in Karl Marx: Selected Writings, ed. D.
McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977).

4. Marx's conception of his project as an Aufhebung of Hegel's goes as far back as the "Notes
to the Dissertation," pp. 1315 in McLellan, Selected Writings, and is reinterated in Capital,
vol. 1, p. 103. See also "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," pp. 104, 106 in Selected
Writings.

5. Arguably, Marx himself might be said to belong to this tradition, owing to his stated
objective of overcoming philosophy through its actualization, an issue I shall discuss
subsequently. However, Marx still has at least one foot in the tradition, for he believes that
reason is capable of attaining an adequate theoretical and critical understanding of the human
condition. Thus he cannot be accurately classified with the numerous recent and contemporary
philosophers who deny this and who attack the traditional goals of philosophy. (See the
Introduction and Chapters 2 and 9.)

6. Marx acknowledges his debt to Feuerbach for originating this criticism of Hegel in the
"Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," Selected Writings, pp. 97 and 99; in a letter to
Feuerbach, Selected Writings, p. 113; and in a letter to Schweitzer, reprinted in the Poverty of
Philosophy (New York: International Publishers, 1963).

7. "My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the Hegelian, but
exactly opposite to it. For Hegel, the process of thinking, which he even transforms into an
independent subject, under the name of 'the Idea,' is the creator of the real world, and the real
world is only the external appearance of the idea. With me the reverse is true: the idea is
nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and translated into forms of
thought" (Capital, vol. 1, p. 102). See also the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, trans.
and ed. J. O'Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 7f., 14, 15, 17, 100,
116, 122;

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Poverty of Philosophy, pp. 108109; Selected Writings, "Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts," pp. 100, 109.

8. That Marx does not see the problem as lying in dialectics itself, but rather in Hegel's version
of dialectics, see the quotation from Capital in the previous note, and also the Critique of
Hegel's Philosophy of Right, pp. 23, 24, 39, 40, 92. In a letter to Engels of the 14th of January,
1858, Marx writes: "In the method of working it was of great service to me that by mere
accident ... I leafed through Hegel's Logic again. If once again time for such work is at hand, I
would have great desire to make available for common understanding on two or three sheets
what is reasonable [Rationelle] in the method Hegel discovered and at the same time
mystified."

9. Capital, vol. 1, p. 103. See also Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, pp. 39, 40.

10. See the "Preface To A Contribution To The Critique of Political Economy," in Karl Marx,
Selected Works (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1968), p. 183; also Poverty of Philosophy, pp.
180181; Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, pp. 23, 24; Marx's Grundrisse: Foundations
of the Critique of Political Economy, trans. M. Nicolaus (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books,
1973), p. 89, 102, 105, 107108; "Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right," Selected
Writings, p. 70; "The Holy Family," Selected Writings, p. 134.

11. See the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, pp. 39, 137; Poverty of Philosophy, pp.
180181, 189; "The German Ideology," Selected Writings, pp. 164, 171.

12. See "Preface to A Contribution To The Critique of Political Economy," Selected Works, p.
183; also the letter to Weydermeyer, Selected Works, p. 679; Poverty of Philosophy, pp. 174,
181, 186; "The German Ideology," Selected Writings, p. 178; "The Holy Family," Selected
Writings, p. 135.

13. Capital, vol. 1, p. 102.

14. Preface, the Philosophy of Right, especially pp. 10, 13.

15. "Theses on Feuerbach," Selected Writings, p. 158.

16. See the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, pp. 137, 141, 142; "A Correspondence of
1843," Selected Writings, p. 36.

17. See the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, pp. 137, 141, 142; "A Correspondence of
1843," Selected Writings, p. 36.

18. See the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, pp. 136, 137, 138; "The German
Ideology," Selected Writings, p. 165; "A Correspondence of 1843," Selected Writings, pp.
3638.

19. See the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, pp. 132, 136, 138, 139; "Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts," Selected Writings, pp. 77, 97.
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20. See the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, pp. 137, 141, 132, 139; "The German
Ideology," Selected Writings, pp. 175, 176, 178; "A Correspondence of 1843," Selected
Writings, p. 36.

21. See the "Notes to the Dissertation," Selected Writings, pp. 1315; "Economic and
Philosophical Manuscripts," Selected Writings, p. 76.

22. See Capital, vol. 1, p. 103; Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, pp. 33, 39, 64, 84,
10909, 135, 136, 147; "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," Selected Writings, p. 106.

23. "The genuine refutation must penetrate the opponent's stronghold and meet him on his own
ground. ... The only possible refutation ... must therefore consist, in the first place, in
recognizing its standpoint as essential and necessary and then going on to raise that standpoint
to the higher one through its own immanent dialectic." Logic, p. 581.

24. See the Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 213, p. 274ff.

25. See the Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 9, p. 13ff.; Paragraph 12, p. 16ff.; Paragraph 14, p.
19ff.; and the Addition to Paragraph 41, p. 66ff.

26. "The essential point of view is that what is involved is an altogether new concept of
scientific procedure. Philosophy, if it would be science, cannot, as I have remarked elsewhere,
borrow is method from a subordinate science like mathematics, any more than it can remain
satisfied with categorical assurances of inner intuition, or employ arguments based on grounds
adduced by external reflection. On the contrary, it can only be the nature of the content itself
which spontaneously develops itself in a scientific method of knowing, since it is at the same
time the reflection of the content itself which first posits and generates its determinate
character." Logic, p. 27.

"For reason is unconditional only insofar as its character and quality are not due to an
extraneous and foreign content, only insofar as it is self-characterizing [sich selbst
bestimmt], and thus, in point of its content, its own master." Encyclopedia Logic,
Paragraph 52, Addition, p. 86. See also Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 238, Addition, p.
294; Paragraph 9, p. 13; Paragraph 232, p. 289; Paragraph 4, p. 7; Paragraph 16, p. 20ff.;
Paragraph 17, p. 22ff.; Paragraph 77, p. 110ff.; and the Phenomenology, p. 44.

27. "It is by the free act of thought that it [philosophy] occupies a point of view, in which it is
for its own self, and thus gives itself an object of its own production" (Encyclopedia Logic,
Paragraph 17, pp. 2223). "The most perfect method of knowledge proceeds in the pure form of
thought: and here the attitude of man is one of pure freedom." Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph
24, Addition, pp. 4142.

"Henceforth the principle of the independence of Reason, or of its absolute self-

subsistence, is made a general principle of philosophy ..." (Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph
60, Remark, p. 93). "... the character of the rational ... is to be unconditional, self-
contained, and thus to be self-

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determining." Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 82, Addition, p. 120. See also Encyclopedia
Logic, Paragraph 3, p. 5ff.; Paragraph 4, p. 7; Paragraph 6, p. 8ff.; Paragraph 28, p. 48ff.;
Paragraph 60, p. 90ff.; Paragraph 238, Addition, p. 294; and the Phenomenology, pp. 32,
34, 40.

28. Phenomenology, p. 46.

29. Phenomenology, p. 49.

30. "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," Science, Perception and Reality, p. 140.

31. See the Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 232, p. 289; Paragraph 1, p. 3; Paragraph 4, p. 7;
Paragraph 74, p. 108; the Logic, pp. 824, 826, 830.

32. See Chapters 4, 5, and 9.

33. "Truth is first taken to mean that I know how something is. This is truth, however, only in
reference to consciousness; it is formal truth, bare correctness. Truth in the deeper sense
consists in the identity between objectivity and the notion. It is in this deeper sense of truth
that we speak of a true state, or of a true work of art. These objects are true, if they are as they
ought to be, i.e., if their reality corresponds to the notion" (Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph
213, Addition, p. 276). But Hegel is also clear that the determination of whether reality
corresponds to the notion is not a matter for philosophical science: "When understanding turns
this 'ought' against trivial external and transitory objects, against social regulations or
conditions, which very likely possess a great relative importance for a certain time and special
circles, it may often be right. In such a case the intelligent observer may meet much that fails
to satisfy the general requirements of right; for who is not acute enough to see a great deal in
his own surroundings which is really far from being as it ought to be? But such acuteness is
mistaken in the conceit that, when it examines these objects and pronounces what they ought
to be, it is dealing with questions of philosophic science." Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 6,
Remark, p. 10.

"Nothing can be more obvious than that anything we only think, or conceive is not on that
account actual [Wirklich]; that mental representations and even conceptual comprehension,
always falls short of being." Encyclopedia Logic, Paragraph 51, Remark, p. 84., translation
revised, emphasis added; Werke, Vol. 8, pp. 135136.

34. See the Grundrisse, pp. 102, 104, 105, 106; "The German Ideology," Selected Writings,
pp. 164, 166, 171; Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, pp. 3940, 48; "Preface To A
Contribution To The Critique of Political Economy," Selected Works, p. 182; Poverty of
Philosophy, pp. 109, 173174, 180, 183; "Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts," Selected
Writings, p. 89; "The Holy Family,'' Selected Writings, p. 135.

35. See the "letter to Lachatre," Capital, vol. 1, p. 17; Capital vol. 1, p. 102; Grundrisse, p.
106; Poverty of Philosophy, p. 202; "Preface To A Con-

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tribution To The Critique of Political Economy," Selected Works, pp. 182, 183.

36. See Hegel's letter to Schelling, November 2, 1800, in Hegel: The Letters, trans. Butler and
Seiler (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 63; and Ritter, Hegel and the French
Revolution.

Chapter 9, "The Dead End of Postmodernism"

1. The joke is related by Alasdair MacIntyre in "The Relationship Of Philosophy To Its Past,"
in Philosophy In History, ed. Richard Rorty et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984), pp. 3940. According to MacIntyre, "the counter joke is: the people interested in
philosophy now are doomed to become those whom only those interested in the history of
philosophy are going to be interested in a hundred years' time."

2. See Finley's Ancient History: Evidence and Models (New York: Viking Press, 1986). Finley
conceives of the proper nature of the historian's relation to the past in much the same way that
the third group of philosophers, discussed below, see their relation to the dead, in terms of a
dialogue. "The historians evidence (whether documents, literary texts or objects) propounds no
questions. Or, insofar as a literary text does ask questions, they are those of an individual
author, not identical with those of anyone writing an historical account, that is to say, an
analysis suitable to a later age. Therefore, the historian himself must ask the right questions ...
and provide the right conceptual context. He must do that consciously and systematically,
abandoning the stultifying fiction that it is the duty of the historian to be self-effacing, to
permit 'things' to 'speak for themselves' (in Ranke's words)." Ancient History, p. 104.

3. Encyclopedia Americana (Danbury CT: Grolier Inc., 1988), p. 792.

4. In speaking of "objective truth" I mean, minimally, truth that is demonstrable, certain, and
unconditional. I discuss a possible reconceptualization below.

5. Contingency, p. 97.

6. As I shall discuss below, this may set up a false dichotomy between an unobtainable
objective truth as description and an obtainable non-objective truth. (Redescription is non-
objective since, according to Rorty, we have no bases, save private, personal ones, for
preferring one redescription to another.) The dichotomy may be a false one, for, as Hegel
suggested in regard to Kant, we ought to be very suspicious of the adequacy of a notion of
truth according to which truth turns out to be unobtainable by us. Rather than rejecting truth,
we may need to reject the notion of truth in question.

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7. Contingency, p. 97.
8. Contingency, p. 105.
9. Contingency, p. 106.
10. The notion of an abstract negation as contrasted with a determinate negation comes from
Hegel. "All that is necessary to achieve scientific progressand it is essential to gain this quite
simple insightis the recognition of the logical principle that the negative is just as much
positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not resolve itself into a nullity, into abstract
nothingness, but essentially only into the negation of its particular content, in other words,
that such a negation is not all and every negation but the negation of a specific subject matter
which resolves itself, and consequently is a specific negation, and therefore the result
essentially contains that from which it results ..." Logic, p. 54.

11. Is the manner in which postmodernism mounts its attacksdeconstructionsomething

radically new? I would suggest that it is basically a variation on the traditional philosophical
procedure of an immanent critique. If deconstruction essentially consists in showing that the
manner in which one's claims are asserted contradicts the claims made, then, for example,
Hegel's critiques of Kant and the transcendental approach are deconstructive efforts.

12. No matter how the subject or object are more specifically construedand this holds even if
the object is construed as the knowing subject itself, as in absolute idealismthe sheer givenness
of the object insures that certain knowledge of it cannot be demonstrated. Every attempt to
compare a description of the object with the object 'itself' necessitates that we compare a
description with another description. See Hegel, Introduction to the Phenomenology, and
Davidson, "Empirical Content," in Truth and Interpretation.

13. The answer to this question is again based on the notion of a determinate negation of the
traditional conception of cognition, and can be sketched out as follows: If failure to attain
certain truth arose from the twofold presuppositions about truth mentioned above, then, in our
consideration of the indeterminate as our subject matter, the refusal to proceed in the
traditional fashionrefusing to regard the indeterminate as somehow already fixed in its
determinacy as indeterminate just because it is an 'object' for our considerationmay lead to the
discovery that the indeterminate cannot be conceived in its indeterminacy except through a
contrast with what is determinate. This contrastingthe very procedure by means of which the
indeterminate is being toughtwould then be the first determination of the indeterminate. So, as
noted in the text, cognition and its object here both come to be determinate at one and the
same time. More extensive discussion of this procedure is to be found in Chapters 4 and 5.
The idea is that by deliberately refraining from assuming that a

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subject matter is already determinate as an objectby refusing to assume that the
indeterminate is fixed in its indeterminacy because we are focusing on it as suchwe may
endeavor to engage in a consideration of this subject manner in such a way that no
predeterminationantecedently given either in the subject matter itself or in the act of
cognitionenters. We aim to insure this simply by focusing on what we have seen does lead
to predetermination, and here refusing to cognize in this way. And it's just by moving in
this fashion that the activity of the self-constitution of determinacies in this discourse is not
arbitrary and radically idiosyncratic, even though not predetermined. In other words,
focusing on the determinate negation, on what we know about how determinacy is not to
be conceived if certain truth is to be attained, provides a negative framework for the
constitution of this discourse by specifying just what must be avoided if determinacy is to
be determined without predetermination. In this way the process has a specifiable
procedure, a 'metarule for the avoidance of introducing antecedently determined rules' such
that, armed with this rule, we can also examine efforts at self-constitutive discourse and
make a determination as to whether they fulfill the demand for self-determination or not.
It's because we thus have a way of assessing claims to what constitutes self-constituted
discourse that the whole endeavor does not lapse into a radically arbitrary exercise of
subjective positing in the style of Rorty's Nietzschean 'redescribing.'

14. For a brief consideration of how external determination could be kept out of the process,
see note 13.

Chapter 10, "The Renewed Appeal to Transcendental Arguments"

1. In speaking of epistemic and metaphysical objectivity I am referring to the idea that neither
reality nor knowledge are matters of opinion: that rigorous, nonrelative knowledge is possible,
that the world exists and is determined independent of changing styles of discourse.

2. Davidson's antifoundational position is expressed most clearly in "On the Very Idea of a
Conceptual Scheme," in Inquiries, pp. 183198, and in "A Coherence Theory of Truth and
Knowledge" and "Empirical Content," both in Truth and Interpretation. The extent to which
Davidson agrees with this thumbnail sketch will be considered subsequently.

3. In both "Coherence Theory" and "Empirical Content" (pp. 312, 320), Davidson contrasts his
coherence theory with the foundational view of knowledge. On his view of correspondence
see especially "True to the Facts," in Inquiries. There (pp. 3738) he writes, "In this paper I
defend a version of the correspondence theory. I think truth can be explained by appeal to a
relation between language and the world, and that analysis of

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that relation yields insight into how, by uttering sentences, we sometimes manage to say
what is true." Yet this is to be a correspondence theory without any comparisons, there isn't
really to be any analysis of that relation: "A theory of truth can be called a correspondence
theory in the unassuming sense of Essay 3 ["True to the Facts"], but that sense does not
encourage the thought that we understand what it would be like to compare sentences with
what they are about, since the theory provides no entities with which to compare
sentences." Introduction to Inquiries, p. xviii.

4. See especially "Coherence Theory," pp. 307, 310. "Given a correct epistemology, we can be
realists in all departments. We can accept objective truth conditions as the key to meaning, a
realist view of truth, and we can insist that knowledge is of an objective world independent of
our thought or language." p. 307.

5. For discussions of Davidson's transcendental approach see Michael Root, "Davidson and
Social Science" and Carol Rovane, "The Metaphysics of Interpretation," both in Truth and
Interpretation, and Richard Rorty, "Transcendental Arguments, Self-Reference, and
Pragmatism," in Transcendental Arguments and Science, eds. Bieri, Horstmann and Kruger
(Boston: D. Reidel, 1979).

6. To get clear on just what Davidson's understanding of foundationalism is, and just what he
rejects in it, see "Coherence Theory," especially p. 312.

7. "What we have shown is that it is absurd to look for a justifying ground for the totality of
beliefs, something outside this totality which we can use to test or compare our beliefs. The
answer to our problem must then be to find a reason for supposing most of our beliefs are true
that is not a form of evidence." "Coherence Theory," p. 314.

8. See the Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 345347, A 369A 372 for Kant's specific discussion of
the reasons for adopting this approach.

9. See "True to the Facts."

10. "The approach to the problem of justification we have been tracing must be wrong. We
have been trying to see it this way: a person has all his beliefs about the worldthat is, all his
beliefs. How can he tell if they are true, or apt to be true? Only, we have been assuming, by
connecting his beliefs to the world, confronting certain of his beliefs with the deliverances of
the senses one by one, or perhaps confronting the totality of his beliefs with the tribunal of
experience. No such confrontation makes sense, for of course we can't get outside our skins to
find what is causing the internal happenings of which we are aware. Introducing intermediate
steps or entities into the causal chain, like sensations or observations, serves only to make the
epistemological problem more obvious. For if the intermediaries are merely causes, they don't
justify the beliefs they cause, while if they deliver information, they may be lying."
"Coherence Theory," p. 312.

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11. "As interpreters we have to treat self-ascriptions of belief, doubt, desire and the like as
privileged; this is an essential step in interpreting the rest of what the person says and thinks."
Davidson, "Empirical Content," Truth and Interpretation, p. 332.

12. It might be suggested that there is a radical difference between Kant and Davidson in that
what I have been calling Davidson's domain of subjectivitylanguageis construed by him as
intersubjectively constituted, so that we're dealing with a plurality of subjects. In the essay
"Rational Animals" (Dialectic 36:4 [1982]: pp. 317327), Davidson indicates how this pertains
to the issue of ourcollectiveknowledge of objectivity. But whether we are speaking of one
subject or many, whether the subject is singular or collective, the question still remainsinsofar
as one holds on to correspondenceconcerning how what is found within subjectivity can
guarantee anything about objectivity.

13. "... a theory of truth helps us understand the underlying question how communication by
language is possible ..." "Reality Without Reference," Inquiries, p. 222.

That the relation of correspondence in question is internal to subjectivity, i.e., language:

"What characterizes a theory of truth in Tarski's style is that it entails, for every sentence s
of the object language, a sentence of the form: s is true (in the object language) if and only
if p. Instances of the form (which we shall call T-sentences) are obtained by replacing 's'
by a canonical description of s, and 'p' by a translation of s. The important undefined
semantical notion in the theory is that of satisfaction which relates sentences, open or
closed, to infinite sequences of objects, which may be taken to belong to the range of
variables of the object language." "Radical Interpretation," Inquiries, p. 13031.

"An important feature of Tarski's approach is that a characterization of a truth predicate 'x
is true in L' is accepted only if it entails, for each sentence of the language L, a theorem of
the form 'x is true in L if and only if ...' with 'x' replaced by a description of the sentence
and the dots replaced by a translation of the sentence into the language of the theory. It is
evident that these theorems, which we may call T-sentences, require a predicate that holds
of just the true sentences of L. It is also plain, from the fact that the truth conditions of a
sentence translate that sentence ... that the theory shows how to characterize truth for any
given sentence without appeal to conceptual resources not available in that sentence." "The
Method of Truth in metaphysics," Inquiries, p. 204.

14. On the inseparability of truth and translation, see "Conceptual Scheme," Inquiries, pp.
194195, and "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics," pp. 204205.

15. If "the conditions of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the
possibility of the objects of experience" (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 194, A 158 B 197) then
there would seem to be no need to worry about getting beyond experience to see if what is
found within it corresponds to objectivity.

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16. "Coherence Theory," Truth and Interpretation, p. 312. Also see the essays "Empirical
Content," Truth and Interpretation, and "Reality Without Reference," Inquiries.

17. "Empirical Content," p. 332. Also see p. 331 and "Coherence Theory," p. 312.

18. "Coherence Theory," p. 312.

19. "Coherence Theory," p. 312; see "Empirical Content," p. 332.

20. "I have not said what is to count as evidence for the truth of a T-sentence. ... What is clear
is that the evidence, whatever it is, cannot be described in terms that relate it in advance to any
particular language, and this suggests that the concept of truth to which we appeal has a
generality that the theory cannot hope to explain. Not that the concept of truth that is used in T
-sentences can be explicitly defined in non-semantic terms, or reduced to more behavioristic
concepts. ... [a] general and preanalytic notion of truth is presumpposed by the theory. It is
because we have this notion that we can tell what counts as evidence for the truth of a T-
sentence." "Reality Without Reference," p. 223.

21. "Each individual knows this [that "the sentences that express the beliefs, and the beliefs
themselves are correctly understood to be about the public things and events that cause them,
and so must be mainly veridical"] since he knows the nature of speech and belief." "Empirical
Content," p. 332.

22. See "Reality Without Reference," p. 224.

23. Inquiries, Introduction, p. xix. On the same page Davidson writes: "The question what
objects a particular sentence is about, like the questions about what an object refers to, or what
objects a predicate is true of, has no answer."

24. "Coherence Theory," p. 312.

25. Inquiries, p. xix.

26. "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics," p. 201.

27. "Coherence Theory," p. 307.

28. See "True to the Facts" and "The Inscrutability of Reference."

29. "Even those thinkers who are certain there is only one conceptual scheme are in the sway
of the scheme concept; even monotheists have religion. And when someone sets out to
describe 'our conceptual scheme,' his homey tasks assume, if we take him literally, that there
might be rival systems." "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," p. 183.

30. He presents much the same argument, briefly, in "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics."
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31. "Empirical Content," p. 332.
32. "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics," p. 200.
33. To a certain extent he seems to realize thisthat his own arguments against relativism also
go against correspondence by undermining their common conceptual framework or model. See
"Very Idea," p. 198.
34. "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics," p. 199.
35. "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs," Truth and Interpretation, pp. 44546. Speaking of
Davidson's view ("True to the Facts") that "the whole web of sentences has to be true to the
one fact, the fact of everything," Ian Hacking writes, "There is only total correspondence of all
true sentences to the fact of everything; but this fact, the world, has no autonomy beyond what
we say. That is one way in which 'coherence yields correspondence.'" New York Review of
Books (December 20, 1984): p. 57. The tendency to eliminate a significant difference between
language and the worldthat is, a difference which we can make out at the epistemological
levelis also suggested by remarks like the following: ''... if reference is relative to my frame of
reference as already embedded in my own language, all that can be provided to give my words
a reference is provided simply by my speaking my own language." "The Inscrutability of
Reference," p. 233.

36. "The Method of Truth in Metaphysics."

Chapter 11, "The Problematic Role of God In Modern Epistemology"

1. As will become clear subsequently, in speaking of the "role of God" I am only concerned
with the use which some philosophers have made of the idea of a divine mind. Whether such a
mind does or does not exist as a transcendent being is irrelevant for the purposes of this
chapter.

2. By "foundational epistemology" I mean any project which purports to establish the nature,
method, limits, and validity of a mode of cognition by means of an investigation into the
conditions of its possibility. I distinguish such projects from descriptive epistemologies on the
basis of whether or not the critical question of the legitimacy of cognition is at stake.
Epistemic inquiries which do not raise that question I call descriptive, and I shall have nothing
further to say about them here. What foundational epistemology entails more specifically I
shall detail in Part I. Traditionally understood, epistemology has a positive goal of establishing
that and how knowledge is possible, by laying out the foundations of knowledge. But, as I
shall suggest in regard to Nietzsche, even those who purport to attack epistemology share
certain basic assumptions with the foundational tradition they oppose.

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3. See the Introduction.

4. The notion that an understanding of God, and more specifically, a Christian conception of
the divine, lies behind and is intimately, albeit implicitly, interwoven with the emergence and
development of modern philosophy is not new. It can be found in the work of Koyre, Burtt,
and it was explored with considerable depth and acuity by Michael Foster in "The Christian
Doctrine of Creation and the Rise of Modern Natural Science," Mind 63 (1934) (Reprinted in
Creation: The Impact of An Idea) and "Christian Theology and the Modern Science of
Nature," Mind (1935 and 1936). Foster was concerned with the nature and importance of the
Christian conception of the divine in the attempts by modern philosophers to decipher,
unpack, and justify the ontological and methodological presuppositions of modern natural
science. Foster intimates that the demand for epistemology itself, as a distinctively modern
project, arouse out of the need to account for the newly emerging and unGreek conceptions of
nature and scientific method, conceptions which he sees as having their roots and finally their
only possible justification in the Christian notions of creation ex nihilo and of revelation,
respectively. According to Foster, modern science and philosophy alike failed to appreciate
these sources for the modern world view, and the modern philosophical failure to provide
adequate justification for the new notions of nature and scientific method stems from the
inability to grasp the religious character of their origins and to rationalize or secularize them
successfully. According to Foster then, the ultimate source for the long-perceived failure of
modern philosophy to justify adequately these foundational assumptions stems from the origin
of these assumptions in irreducibly religious conceptions which resist rational appropriation.

What I have to say does not presuppose that Foster is correct. Nonetheless, what I am
doing can be seen as complementing his work, although my approach differs from his in
that my concerns will be solely with the nature and the assumptions of modern
epistemology seen as an entity in itself. Going beyond Foster and in a different direction, I
shall argue that in the more narrowly conceived domain of modern epistemology as such,
the presence of the Christian conception of the divine is not as hidden or as nearly implicit
as he finds it in modern philosophy taken as a larger whole broadly concerned with
grounding the assumptions of modern natural science. My contention will be that
irrespective of the specific ontological and epistemological principles the modern
philosophers wrestled with, the format of epistemology itself ordains the involvement of a
notion or model of mind possessing the attributes associated with the Judeo-Christian God.
My view is that what Foster scopes out as the hidden religious wellspring of the broader
efforts of modern philosophers can be found to manifest itself more obviously, although in
finally just as problematic a fashion, in the specific details of their epistemological efforts.

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5. This seems to exclude coherence theories from the purview of epistemology. However, as
Donald Davidson notes, coherence theories do not eliminate the comparison of a knowledge
claim with a standard, it's simply that both knowledge claims and standard are construed as
beliefs, rather than the standard being construed as an object which the belief must represent. I
shall argue below that this featurethe comparison of the knowledge claim with an
independently determined standardis crucial to epistemological endeavors. If this is correct,
even coherence theories are subject to the fundamental problem addressed in this chapter.

6. On the face of it, this description would appear to exclude Kant from being classified as an
epistemologist, since he allows for a "subjective" dimension. I shall discuss this in the section
on Kant.

7. "In this field [pure reason] nothing can escape us. What reason produces entirely out of
itself cannot be concealed, but is brought to light by reason itself. ... Critique of Pure Reason,
p. 14, A xx.

8. I have spoken here of a cognitive agent as a mind, understanding, consciousness etc., since,
during the historical period I shall consider, discussions of such agents, described in those
terms, were part of the epistemological endeavor. As later epistemological developments have
shown, one need not explicitly discuss epistemological matters in psychological terms nor
even bring the nature of an agent explicitly into consideration. We can consider the purported
truth-affording relation in term of language (rather than ideas or other mental entities) and
objects; or, taking another step back, in formal terms of the relation of a metalanguage to an
object language. Additionally, we can omit all discussion of the particular subjective
conditions which make the language/object or language/world relation possible e.g., as
Wittgenstein did in the Tractatus. There are very good epistemological reasons for making
these moves (see Chapter 9). The question, which I shall not pursue here, is whether making
such linguistic and formal turns really amounts to an escape from epistemological subjectivity
and the problems associated with discussing knowledge in its terms, or whether it is merely a
bracketing of subjectivity which preserves the other featuresand problemsof the
epistemological structure of cognition.

9. Two observations need to be made here. During the historical period under consideration
purported knowledge was construed in mentalistic terms, as something 'of' and 'for' the mind
which the mind (or understanding) had induitable access to. That against which this
knowledge was to be measured was usually, albeit not always, taken as something which in
most cases was nonmental, 'other' than the mind. But epistemology can, of course, be
undertaken without any psychological considerations; indeed, without explicit reference to a
mind or awareness at all. As I understand foundational epistemology, however, the difficulties
associated with it can

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be seen to arise whether there is any mind talk or not. We can construe the purported
knowledge to be tested as an idea, or as a sentence, or proposition; the standard against
which it is to be measured can be seen as an object in the straightforward, realistic sense,
or as another idea, or as another language. Or we may choose not to draw any sort of an
ontological distinction between purported knowledge and object, in an attempt to avoid the
problems associated with connecting a mental and a physical domain. What is essential is
that the distinction between purported knowledge, as the directly and unproblematically
accessible, and its standard be maintained. Something must be taken to be
unproblematically accessible; our epistemologist must hold something certain in order to
have something to test at all. Correlatively, the standard must be construed as determined
as what it is independently of the cognitive act; otherwise any possibility of its being a
genuine, objective measure is lost.

10. If the agent/mode of cognition being tested is not the same as that effecting the test, the
question immediately arises as to the certainty of any results: if the agency/mode is other than
that being tested, what certifies the reliability of its results, save for another investigation into
it, and so on ad infinitum? If it can be assumed that the testing agency is reliable, why not
make the same assumption in regard to the cognition being tested and avoid the effort
entirely? (See the Introduction to the Phenomenology.) What must not be forgotten is that the
issue in epistemology is the possible legitimacy of any and all modes of cognition:
Epistemology must hold that all modes of cognition are in need of legitimation, including the
epistemological cognition itself; otherwise the whole enterprise is bootless. Yet how can the
results be reliable if the testing agency/mode of cognition is the same as that undergoing a
test? Epistemology seems to require either an infinite regress or vicious circularity.

11. For the period in question, "subjective" indicates subjectivity: a mind, consciousness, or
understanding. Independently of that meaning it can also signify more fundamentally, as it
does in the immediate context, that domain whose access to the "objective"in the sense of the
standard or measureis at stake.

12. Here is where epistemology and common sense part company decisively. I can check my
belief about your phone number with the phone book. But epistemologically speaking, I am
comparing one belief with another belief, and I am presupposing what epistemology aims to
demonstrate: the veridical character of beliefs as such. But how can I compare a belief with
something which is not a belief?

13. Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, vol. 1, p. 159.

14. Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Mind, in Works, vol. 1, p. 105.

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15. Meditation V in Works, vol. 1, p. 185., cf. 183. See also The Principles of Philosophy,
Works, p. 224, #XIII.

16. A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge in The Works of George
Berkeley, ed. A. C. Fraser (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1901), vol. 1, p. 235.

17. A Treatise, Works, vol. 1, p. 260.

18. A Treatise, Works, vol. 1, p. 261.

19. Leibniz, quoted in Leroy E. Loemker, Struggle for Synthesis (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1972), p. 117. Leibniz, Die Philosophische Schriften, vol. 7, ed. C. I.
Gerhardt (Berlin: 18751890), p. 264.

20. Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 495531, A 583 B 617A 642 B 670.

21. "Yet even he [Hume] did not suspect such a formal science, [as the critical philosophy] but
ran his ship ashore, for safety's sake, landing on scepticism, there to let it lie and rot; whereas
my object is rather to give it a pilot, who, by means of safe principles of navigation drawn
from a knowledge of the globe, and provided with a complete chart and compass, may steer
the ship safely wither he listeth." Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, p. 10.

22. According to Kant "knowledge has to do only with appearances, and must leave the thing
in itself as indeed real per se but as not known by us." Critique of Pure Reason, p. 24, B xx.
Cf. p. 82, A 42, B 59; p. 83, A 43, B 60.

23. "Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform to objects. But all
attempts to extend our knowledge of objects by establishing something in regard to them a
priori, by means of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must therefore
make trial whether we may not have more success in the tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose
that objects must conform to our knowledge. ... We should then be proceeding precisely on the
basis of Copernicus' primary hypothesis."

"... either I must assume that the concepts ... conform to the object, or else I assume that
the objects, or what is the same thing, that the experience in which alone, as given objects,
they can be known, conform to the concepts. ... In the latter case the outlook is more
hopeful. For experience itself is a species of knowledge which involves understanding; and
understanding has rules which I must presuppose as being in me prior to objects being
given to me, and therefore as being a priori. They find expression in a priori concepts to
which all objects of experience necessarily conform, and with which they must agree."
Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 2223, B xvixviii.

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24. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 148, A 126127. Cf. p. 140, A 114.

25. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 140, A 114.

26. "Now we find that our thought of the relation of all knowledge to its object carries with it
an element of necessity; the object is viewed as that which prevents our modes of knowledge
from being haphazard or arbitrary, and which determines them a priori in some fashion. ... All
necessity, without exception, is grounded in a transcendental condition. There must, therefore,
be a transcendental ground of the unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of
our intuitions and consequently also of the concept of objects in general, and so of all objects
of experience, a ground without which it would be impossible to think any object for our
intuitions; for this object is no more than that something, the concept of which expresses such
a necessity of synthesis." Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 134136, A 104106.

27. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 136, A 108; p. 135, A 105. Kant continues at A 108, "For the
mind could never think its identity in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think
this identity a priori, if it did not have before its eyes the identity of its act, whereby it
subordinates all synthesis of apprehension (which is empirical) to a transcendental unity,
thereby rendering possible their interconnection according to a priori rules." And we must
"suppose that our representation of things, as they are given to us, does not conform to these
things as they are in themselves, but that these objects, as appearances, conform to our mode
of representation. ..." (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 24, B xx). "The pure concept of this
transcendental object ... is what can alone confer upon all our empirical concepts in general
relation to an object, that is, objective reality. This concept ... refers only to that unity which
must be met with in any manifold of knowledge which stands in relation to an object. This
relation is nothing but the necessary unity of consciousness, and therefore also of the
manifold, through a common function of the mind. ..." Critique, p. 137, A 109.

28. "At this point we must make clear to ourselves what we mean by the expression 'an object
of representations.' We have stated above that appearances are themselves nothing but sensible
representations, which, as such and in themselves, must not be taken as objects capable of
existing outside our power of representation. What, then, is to be understood when we speak
of an object corresponding to, and consequently also distinct from our knowledge? It is easily
seen that this object must be thought only as something in general = x, since outside our
knowledge we have nothing which we could set over against this knowledge as corresponding
to it. ... But is clear that, since we have to deal only with the manifold of our representations,
and since that x (the object) which corresponds to them is nothing to usbeing, as it is,
something that has to be distinct from all our representationsthe unity which the object makes
necessary can be nothing else than the formal unity of consciousness in the synthesis of the

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manifold of representations" (Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 134135, A 104105). "The a
priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the
possibility of objects of experience." Critique, p. 138, A 111.

29. See note a at p. 169, B 158, for Kant's explicit denial that I can "determine my existence as
that of a self-active being." He also asserts, "There are only two possible ways in which
synthetic representations and their objects can establish connection, obtain necessary relation
to one another, and, as it were, meet one another. Either the object alone must make the
representation possible, or the representation alone must make the object possible. In the
former case, this relation is only empirical, and the representation is never possible a priori. ...
In the latter case, representation in itself does not produce its object in so far as existence is
concerned, for we are not here speaking of its causality by means of the will" (Critique of
Pure Reason, p. 125, A 92, B 124125). "Appearances are the sole objects which can be given
to us immediately, and that in them which relates immediately to the object is called intuition.
But these appearances are not things in themselves; they are only representations, which in
turn have their object an object which cannot itself be intuited by us. ..." Critique, p. 137, A
108109.

30. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 244, B 274.

31. see Critique of Teleological Judgement, Part II of Critique of Judgment, trans. J. C.

Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), Paragraph 15, pp. 5558.

32. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 27, B xxvixxvii.

33. Of course Kant denies such knowledge even to the transcendental philosopher. "... there
are two stems of human knowledge, namely, sensibility and understanding, which perhaps
spring from a common, but to us unknown root." Critique of Pure Reason, p. 61, A 15, B 29.

34. Critique of Pure Reason, p. 244, B 247ff. Also see Chapter 10.

35. According to Fichte, the question of the Science of Knowledge is that of the objectivity of
knowledge. And "... it would be perfectly absurd to assimilate it to the question as to an
existence unrelated to consciousness." Fichte: Science of Knowledge (Wissenschaftslehre),
eds. and trans. Heath and Lachs (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970), p. 31.

36. "... whatever we may think, we are that which thinks therein, and hence ... nothing could
ever come to exist independently of us, for everything is necessarily related to our thinking."
Science of Knowledge, p. 71.

37. Science of Knowledge, p. 48.

38. Science of Knowledge, p. 41. "The basic contention of the philosopher, as such, is as
follows: Though the self may exist only for itself, there necessarily arises for it at once an
existence external to it; the ground of

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the latter lies in the former. ..." Science of Knowledge, p. 33.

39. Schelling, F. W. J., System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), trans. Peter Heath
(Virginia: University Press of Virginia, 1978), pp. 2627.

40. Science of Knowledge, p. 36.

41. Science of Knowledge, p. 110.

42. Science of Knowledge, p. 41, see also pp. 3536.

43. "But the question now arises as to how the philosopher assures himself of this original act,
[the absolute act of self consciousness through which everything is posited for the self] or
knows about it. He obviously does not do so immediately, but only by inference." Schelling,
System of Transcendental Idealism, p. 47. cf. Fichte, Science of Knowledge, pp. 8384.

44. "The diminished activity of the self must find an explanation in the self as such; the
ultimate ground of it must be posited in the self. This comes about in that the self, which in
this respect is practical, is posited as a self that ought to contain in itself the ground of
existence of the not-self, which diminishes the activity of the intellective self; an infinite idea,
which cannot itself be thought, and by which, therefore, we do not so much explain the
explicandum as show, rather, that and why it is inexplicable; the knot is not so much loosed as
projected into infinity." Science of Knowledge, pp. 147148. See also p. 164.

45. Science of Knowledge, pp. 231, 238.

46. Of Human Freedom, trans. J. Gutman (Chicago: 1936), p. 24.

47. Phenomenology, p. 9.

48. See The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1974),
Paragraph 344; The Genealogy of Morals, trans. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books,
1989), Third Essay, Paragraph 24; The Will to Power, trans. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage
Books, 1968), Paragraph 15.

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Index

A
Ackermann, Robert, 247 n10

action, philosophy of, 162, 164

Americks, Carl, vii

antifoundationalism, 1-13, 24, 47-49, 125, 156-157, 199-200, 207, 217.

See also deconstruction

consistency of, 6, 10, 11-12, 50, 53-58, 185-186, 196

and foundationalism, 15, 31-36, 51-59

antimodernism, 22-25.

See also postmodernism

Apel, Karl-Otto, 243 n24, 253 n49

Aristotle, 25, 43

authority, legitimacy of, 11.

See also philosophy, authority of

autonomy, 27, 168, 196

B
Baird, Davis, 251 n37

Bates, Norman, 179

Becker, Werner, 255 n6

Being and Time, 154

Berkeley, Bishop George, 60, 204, 227-229, 230, 232, 236

Bernstein, Richard J., 239 n3

blasphemy, philosophical, 125-128, 133-136, 140-141, 195

Blair, George, 179

Bloch, Ernst, 255 n6

Blumenberg, Hans, 245 n4

Bubner, Rudiger, 250 n25, 255 n6, 256 n8

Burtt, E. A., 248 n14, 286 n4

Bulter, Clark, 279 n36

C
Capital, 173

capitalism, 245 n2

Cartesianism, 3, 10, 147, 156, 157, 235

Clark, Malcom, 255 n5

Cohen, I. B., 249 n17

coherence theory, 8, 209-214

conduct, principles of, 26-29

contextualism, 4-5, 7

contextuality, 8

commodities, fetishism of, 172-173

consciousness, 203, 204, 220

 absolute, 148, 150, 155.

See also knowledge, absolute

finititude of, 131-134

form of, 168.

See also structure of

structure of, 71, 72, 73, 74, 76, 78, 81, 88, 89-93, 95, 102-106, 109, 110, 114, 129, 191

sublation of, 76

suspension of, 91-92, 95

truth of, 73, 76, 78-79, 109

Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 183-185

correspondence, of knowledge and object, 90, 103-106, 130, 134, 170, 171, 189, 190, 200,
202, 205-206, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 220-223, 224, 225, 226, 230, 231, 236,
237

model of truth, 36

theory, 7, 60, 61, 62, 63

critical theory, 147, 160, 162, 174-175, 177, 204 n6.

See also Frankfurt School

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critique, 163

Critique of Pure Reason, 154, 229-234

D
Dasein, 150, 155, 156

Davidson, Donald, 17, 23, 199-216, 242 n18

deconstruction, 2, 9, 47.

See also antifoundationalism ad hoc, 51, 53-58

deconstructionism, 182-190

Derrida, Jacques, 2, 23, 47, 184, 242 n18

Descartes, Rene, 22, 51, 60, 89, 200, 213, 217, 218, 223-227, 230, 231, 232, 234, 235, 237

Desmond, William, ix

Dewey, John, 25, 243 n24

dialectics, 38, 44, 160-175

in Hegel, 99-121.

See also Phenomenology of Spirit, dialectic of; Science of Logic, dialectic of;
Realphilosophie, dialectic of

dialectical materialism, 161, 172

différance, 11, 237

difference, 187-188

di Giovanni, George, ix

divine mind, 218, 223, 229, 230

dogmatism, 51-56

and antifoundationalism, 10

Dove, K. R., 44, 261 n1, n6

Drake, Stillman, 248 n14

Dylan, Bob, 67

E
Elster, John, 275 n1

emancipation, 10

Encyclopedia Logic, 169, 170, 171

Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, 135

epistemology, 6, 23, 148, 202, 204, 207, 216, 217-237, 285 n2, 287 n8, n9.

See also foundationalism

nature of 51-52

F
Fackenheim, Emil, 126

fallibalism, 9

Faulkner, William, 179

Feuerbach, Ludwig, 162

Feyerabend, Paul K., 23, 246 n7, 247 n10

Fichte, J. G., 22, 29, 149, 214, 229, 234-236, 237, 250 n31

Findlay, J. N., 68

finite, 126, 130-134, 136-140

finitude, 126, 137, 138-140, 142, 148, 149-154, 155-157, 195

human, 33

Finley, M. I., 279 n2

Foster, Michael, 286 n4

Foucault, Michel, 9, 23, 47, 147-148

foundationalism, 12, 27-30, 33, 47, 48, 156-157, 184, 187, 189, 199-207, 215, 216.

See also epistemology

and antifoundationalism, 51-59

critique of, 63, 97

and Hegel, 13, 28-37

nature of, 3-9, 51-52, 59-62

and modernity, 22

problems with, 61-65

Frankenstein, Dr., 181

Frankfurt School, 243 n24.

See also critical theory

freedom, 28, 45, 135, 140, 141, 166, 176

and Hegel, 41, 42-43

French Revolution, 21, 26, 27-28, 245 n2

Fulda, Hans Friedrich, 255 n6

G
Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 2, 16, 23, 24, 25, 32, 33, 47, 54, 67, 143, 148-157, 244 n32
 Gillespie, Michael Allen, 245 n1

given(s), 9, 11, 12, 30, 31-32, 33, 34, 35, 132-133, 138, 140, 156, 169, 171, 172, 174, 189,
190, 194, 195, 197

authority of, 4-6, 28, 39, 42

myth of, 6, 167

privileged, 26

and reason, 31

rejection of, 44

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givenness, 22, 110, 137, 195

framework of, 4-5, 10, 39, 241-242 n16

God, 9, 17, 126, 133, 134-136, 139, 141, 183, 199, 217, 218, 223, 226, 227, 229, 230, 231,
236, 286 n4

Goethe J. W., 47

Goodman, Nelson, 243 n28

Gould, Carol, 275 n1

Goya, Francesco, 21

H
Habermas, Jürgen, 12, 23, 32, 41, 147, 243 n24, 244 n32, 246 n7, 251 n32, 253 n49

Hacking, Ian, 21, 247 n10

Haering, Theodor, 255, n5

Hartmann, Klaus, 252 n41, 254 n53, 270 n40, 275 n1

Haym, Rudolf, 255 n5

Heath, Peter, 291 n35, 292 n39

Hegel On Economics and Freedom, 245 n2, 253 n46, n49

Heidegger, Martin, 2, 23, 25, 31, 47, 49, 67, 148, 153, 154, 156, 174, 183, 184, 242 n18

Heinrichs, Johannes, 255 n6

Henrich, Deiter, 85, 86, 94-96, 257 n13, 260-261 n18

hermeneutics, 2, 147, 157

history, 155, 156, 161, 169, 170

historicism, 8-9, 24

and Hegel, 24, 41, 42, 44

historicity, 150

Hodgson, Peter C., 266 n6

holism, 8

and Hegel, 23, 24

holists, 40, 41

Hume, David, 29-31, 174, 181, 229, 230, 232, 233, 234

Hyppolite, Jean, 255 n6

I
Idea, 161, 170

idealism, 140, 148, 153, 161, 171, 172, 174, 193, 204, 214, 217, 232

and Hegel, 24, 38-39, 114, 116, 121

indeterminate, 192

indeterminateness, 74, 75, 78, 79, 81, 92, 93, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 134, 280 n13

irony, 184-186

J
Jackson, Michael, 182

Jacobi, F. H., 7, 34, 233

Joyce, James, 199

K
Kant, Immanuel, 7, 22, 28-31, 33, 44, 151, 153, 154, 174, 200-208, 214, 216, 229-234, 235

Kierkegaard, Soren, 23

knowing, absolute, 52, 53, 58, 70-71, 95, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 111, 141

as concept of science, 72, 74-77, 80

knowing, pure, 72, 73, 74, 75

knowledge

absolute, 127-134, 149.

See also absolute knowing

autonomy of, 4

conditions of, 6, 8

contextuality of, 4, 6, 8

divine, 128, 129

finitude of, 4, 6, 7, 48, 53, 54-55, 56, 57, 58, 63

foundational, 3

foundations of, 4-6

as intersubjective, 8

limits of, 9.

See also finitude of

objective, 125, 132, 135, 199, 200, 201, 202, 221, 230, 267 n14

principles of, 26-29

relativity of, 6, 152.

See also relativism

standard of, 61
 subjectivist model of, 63, 65

Kojève, Alexander, 255 n6

Koyre, Alexandre, 286 n4

Kuhn T. S., 23, 24

L
Lachs, John, 291 n35

language, 154, 155, 156, 183, 189, 202, 204-206, 209-210

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Lauer, Quentin, 255 n6

Leibniz, G. W., 44, 181, 229, 232

LePore, Ernest, 246 n7

liberal theory, 40

liberty, 27

Locke, John, 218

logic, 139, 140.

See also Encyclopedia Logic and Science of Logic

logical positivism, 23

Lukacs, Georg, 255 n6

Lyotard, Jean-François, 47, 244 n32

M
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 23, 24, 25, 40, 247 n10, 279 n1

McClellan, David, 275 n3

Marcuse, Herbert, 245 n1, 255 n6

Marx, Karl, 9, 16, 23, 38, 39, 44, 159-177, 179, 243 n24

Marx, Werner, 255 n5

Marx, Wolfgang, 255 n6

Marxists, 177

metaphysics, 161, 170, 171, 193

and Hegel, 38-40

method, philosophical, 99-100, 108, 109

mind, divine, 128, 130

modernity, 12, 177

and foundationalism, 2

legitimation of, 13, 14, 21-30, 37, 41-44

problems of, 21-30

modernism, 188, 190, 194

monad, 229

Moore, G. E., 222

Mure, G. R. G., 255 n6

N
Nagel, Thomas, 240 n10

nature, 116, 118, 120, 169, 140, 183

negation, determinate, 131, 191, 280 n10, n13

neopragmatism, 2

Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1, 9, 11, 23, 25, 47, 67, 183, 184, 187, 217, 236-237, 285 n2

Night of the Living Dead, 182

nihilism, 11, 33, 53

O
Oakley, Francis, 246 n7, 248 n16

objectivity, 12, 13, 201-210, 217, 219, 220, 222, 225, 230, 231, 234, 281 n1

problem of, 218-223, 226, 231

O'Brien, George Dennis, 253 n51

Odysseus, 179, 186

O'Malley, Joseph, 275 n7

Ottmann, Horst Henning, 255 n6

P
Parmenides, 193

Passmore, John, 242 n21

Perkins, Robert L., 253 n51

Pickering, Andrew, 247 n10

phenomenology, 23

Phenomenology of Spirit, 39, 42, 45, 149, 167, 168, 174

as deduction of science, 13, 67-82, 108-109, 127-134

dialectic of, 100-106, 118, 119

and foundationalism, 34-36

Hegel's understanding of, 69, 71-82

Introduction to, 78, 80, 89, 100

Preface to, 89

as presupposition for logic, 72, 75, 76-77, 84, 85, 93, 107, 109

problem of interpretation of, 67-69, 75-78

received view of, 69-71, 73, 76

as self-sublating mediation, 76, 78, 86-87, 89-93, 94

''we" in, 81, 101, 107

 philosophy

as autonomous, 88, 91, 93.

See also reason, autonomous

authority of, 1, 8, 9, 10, 188, 194-195

as authoritarian, 12, 187-188, 193

critical nature of, 12, 40, 42, 43, 174-176

dialectical. See under dialectics

history of, 179-186

identity, 135, 171

modern, 14, 23, 217-237

and modernity, 21-28

naturalized, 180, 181

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as normative, 39

and other disciplines, 9

postanalytic, 2

postfoundational, 7-11

postphilosophical, 2

presuppositionless, 48, 50, 58-59.

See also presuppositionlessness

of religion, 126

as self-grounding. See under self-grounding

self-determination of. See under self-determination

as science, 2, 3, 4, 6, 14, 24, 48, 67-82, 83, 87, 165-168, 160.

See also systematic philosophy

traditional, 1-3, 6, 9, 183-193

traditional aims of, 2-3, 14, 47, 48, 108, 192-195

transcendental, 38, 199-215, 229-234, 270 n40.

See also epistemology, foundationalism

zombie, 182-190

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, 183

Philosophy of Nature, 116-120

Philosophy of Right, 44, 165

Plato, 223
Plotinus, 179

pluralism, 8-9

Pöggeler, Otto, 68, 69

posthumanism, 2

postmodernism, 2, 15, 16, 23-25, 125, 134, 142, 179, 182-190, 192-196

poststructuralism, 2, 147

pragmatism, 223

pragmatists, 60

praxis, 44, 163, 164, 165, 170, 173-176, 177

presuppositionlessness, 72, 76, 77, 84, 86, 90-93, 97, 107, 115, 117, 121, 133.

See also philosophy, presuppositionless

Putnam, Hilary, 23, 125, 239 n4

Q
Quine, W. V. F., 23, 43, 179, 180, 241 n11, 242 n18

R
Ramsey, Frank, 7

real, 163, 169, 170, 171

realism, 172, 199, 200, 201, 214, 227

reality, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 168-175, 200, 201, 208, 229, 278 n33

Realphilosophie, 39, 139-141, 169

dialectic of, 100, 114-121

reason
 authority of, 29, 30, 31, 37, 42, 195.

See also philosophy, authority of

as autonomous, 14, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30-37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 67, 68, 71, 80, 96, 166-
167, 174, 194, 246 n7

and emancipation, 12

redescription, 184-186, 189, 190

reflection, 3, 148, 149-154, 155, 156

relativism, 10, 11, 41-42, 53, 65, 197, 209, 211-212, 215

revolution, scientific, 21, 26-27

Ritter, Joachim, 245 n1

Romanos, George D., 241 n11

Root, Michael, 282 n5

Rorty, Richard, 2, 3, 16, 21, 23, 24, 25, 47, 50, 54, 182-190, 242 n18, 247 n8, 248 n11

Rosen, Michael, 258 n2

Rosen, Stanley, 244 n38

Rovane, Carol, 282 n5

S
Schelling, F. W. J., 22, 29, 214, 229, 234, 235-236, 237

Schrader-Klebert, Karin, 256 n6

self-constitution, philosophical, 193-194, 281 n13

self-determination, philosophical, 41, 49, 82, 84, 86, 101, 102, 113, 121, 128, 133, 135, 138,
139-140, 197, 281 n13

self-grounding, philosophical, 64, 97, 127-128, 132, 133, 166, 193

 Sellars, Wilfred, 23, 167, 248 n13

science, 180

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Science of Logic, 39, 128, 168, 169

beginning of, 72-82, 83-93, 111-112

of being, 94-95, 111-112

of concept, 113

dialectic of, 100, 106-114, 119

of essence, 112-113

method of, 72, 73, 107, 109, 111, 115, 119

skepticism, 29, 33, 51-53, 55, 176, 202, 209, 211-214, 215, 227-228, 229, 233, 234

solipsism, 226, 228, 229, 231, 234

species being, 162

Spinoza, Baruch, 44, 179

spirit, 135-136, 141, 148, 149, 155

Stepelevich, L. S., 253 n46

Stevens, Wallace, 125, 217

subjectivity, 5, 40, 41, 129, 148, 150, 155, 156, 157, 167, 191, 201-210, 220, 223

systematic philosophy, 14, 15, 37-44, 47, 63-65, 96, 126-129, 132, 142, 160-175.

See also philosophy, as science

and antifoundationalism, 58-59

as conditioned, 64

and foundationalism, 50, 58, 59-63

introduction to, 67-82

 nature of, 49

as nonmetaphysical, 65

T
Tarski, Alfred, 206

Taylor, Charles, 255 n5

thing-in-itself (things-in-them-selves), 207, 216, 231, 232, 233, 234

Thompson, Hunter S., 99

Thriller, 182

tradition, authority of, 27, 29

translation, 206, 212, 213

truth, 206-211

certainty of, 63

nature of, 219-223

objectivity of, 63

objective, 134, 141, 177, 279 n4.

See also knowledge, objective

philosophical, 127, 165-166, 169, 170, 177, 183-184, 188-194

U
Usher, Madeline, 180

Usher, Roderick, 179

V
 Van Dooren, Wim, 68

Voodoo, 182, 183

W
Wellmer, Albrecht, 243 n24

Wetzel, Manfred, 256 n6

White, Alan, 252 n42

will, 236

Winfield, R. D., 44, 244 n40, 245 n2, 249 n20, 252 n41, 253 n46, n49, n51

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 2, 7, 23, 47, 54, 57, 214, 243 n24, 251 n35

Wolff, Robert Paaul, 275 n1

Z
Zombies. See under philosophy, zombie

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