Battle of Manzikert
57 languages
Article
Talk
Tools
Coordinates: 39°08′41″N 42°32′21″E
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
"Manzikert" redirects here. For the town in Turkey where the battle was fought,
see Malazgirt.
Battle of Manzikert
Part of the Byzantine–Seljuk wars
15th-century French miniature depicting the combatants in contemporary
Western European armour
Date 26 August 1071
Location Near Manzikert, Theme of Iberia[1][2]/Byzantine
Armenia[3][4]
(present-day Malazgirt, Turkey)
39°08′41″N 42°32′21″E
Result Seljuk victory
Byzantine power in Anatolia weakened
Belligerents
Byzantine Empire Seljuk Empire
Byzantine regular (Tagmata) and Pecheneg & Uz mercenaries[note 1]
provincial (thematic) troops.
Feudal levies of frontier land
owners.
Frankish, English, Norman, Georgian,
Armenian, Bulgarian,
Turkic Pecheneg & Uz mercenaries
Commanders and leaders
Romanos IV (POW) Alp Arslan
Nikephoros Bryennios Afshin Bey
Theodore Alyates Artuk Bey
Andronikos Doukas Suleiman ibn Qutalmish
Strength
c. 40,000[5] 30,000[7]–50,000[6]
(Close to half deserted before battle.
Turkic mercenaries defected to the Seljuk
side.)
200,000 (according to Turkish and Arabic
sources)[6]
Casualties and losses
2,000[5]–8,000 killed[7] unknown
4,000 captured [5]
20,000 deserted[8]
hide
v
t
e
Byzantine–Seljuk wars
Ganja
Vaspurakan
Kapetron
1st Manzikert
Ani
Caesarea
1st Iconium
Sebastia
2nd Manzikert
Seljuk campaigns in the Aegean
Koyun Islands
1st Nicaea
Mersivan
2nd Nicaea
Philomelion
Campaigns of John II Komnenos
Laodicea
Sozopolis
2nd Iconium
Turbessel
Myriokephalon
Hyelion and Leimocheir
Claudiopolis
1st Trebizond
Antalya
Antioch on the Meander
Sinope
Sudak
Alanya
2nd Trebizond
The Battle of Manzikert or Malazgirt was fought between the Byzantine Empire and
the Seljuk Empire on 26 August 1071[9] near Manzikert, theme of
Iberia (modern Malazgirt in Muş Province, Turkey). The decisive defeat of
the Byzantine army and the capture of the Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes[10] played
an important role in undermining Byzantine authority in Anatolia and Armenia,[11] and
allowed for the gradual Turkification of Anatolia. Many Turks, travelling westward
during the 11th century, saw the victory at Manzikert as an entrance to Asia Minor.[12]
The brunt of the battle was borne by the Byzantine army's professional soldiers from
the eastern and western tagmata, as large numbers of mercenaries and
Anatolian levies fled early and survived the battle.[13] The fallout from Manzikert was
disastrous for the Byzantines, resulting in civil conflicts and an economic crisis that
severely weakened the Byzantine Empire's ability to defend its borders adequately.
[14]
This led to the mass movement of Turks into central Anatolia – by 1080, an area of
78,000 square kilometres (30,000 sq mi) had been gained by the Seljuk Turks. It
took three decades of internal strife before Alexius I (1081 to 1118) restored stability
to Byzantium. Historian Thomas Asbridge says: "In 1071, the Seljuqs crushed an
imperial army at the Battle of Manzikert (in eastern Asia Minor), and though
historians no longer consider this to have been an utterly cataclysmic reversal for the
Greeks, it still was a stinging setback."[15] It was the first, and only, time in history that
a Byzantine emperor became the prisoner of a Muslim commander, and the first time
since the emperor Valerian that a Roman emperor was captured alive by an enemy
force.
Background
Although the Byzantine Empire had remained strong and powerful in the Middle
Ages,[16] it began to decline under the reign of the militarily incompetent Constantine
IX Monomachos and again under Constantine X Doukas – a brief two-year period of
reform under Isaac I Komnenos merely delayed the decay of the Byzantine army.[17]
About 1053, Constantine IX disbanded what the 11th
century Byzantine historian John Skylitzes called the "Iberian Army", which consisted
of 50,000 men. Skylitzes' contemporaries, the former officials Michael
Attaleiates and Kekaumenos, agree that by demobilizing these soldiers, Constantine
did catastrophic harm to the empire's eastern defenses. Constantine made a truce
with the Seljuks that lasted until 1064, when a large Seljuk army under Alp
Arslan attacked the theme of Iberia and took Ani; after a siege of 25 days, they
captured the city.[18]
In 1068, Romanos IV Diogenes took power and, after some speedy military reforms,
appointed Manuel Komnenos (nephew of Isaac I Komnenos) to lead an expedition
against the Seljuks. Manuel captured Hierapolis Bambyce in Syria, next thwarted a
Turkish attack against Iconium with a counterattack,[10] but was then defeated and
captured by the Seljuks. Despite this success, Alp Arslan quickly sought a peace
treaty with the Byzantines, signed in 1069; he saw the Fatimids in Egypt as his main
enemy and had no desire to be diverted by unnecessary hostilities.[7]
In February 1071, Romanos sent envoys to Arslan to renew the 1069 treaty; keen to
secure his northern flank against attack, Arslan happily agreed.[7] Abandoning the
siege of Edessa, he immediately led his army to attack the Fatimid-held Aleppo.
However, the peace treaty had been a deliberate distraction: Romanos now led a
large army into Armenia to recover the lost fortresses before the Seljuks had time to
respond.[7]
Prelude
Accompanying Romanos was Andronikos Doukas, son of his rival John Doukas. The
army consisted of about 5,000 professional Byzantine troops from the western
provinces and probably about the same number from the eastern provinces. These
included long established regular units (Heteria, Scholai and Straelati)[19] of the
central field army (Tagmata).[20] Amongst the native Byzantine element of the army
were provincial troops from both the eastern and western military themes. Under
Doukas, the rear guard at Manzikert was largely made up of the private retinues and
peasant levies of the border lords (archontes).[21] Finally, the large and diverse host
included 500 Frankish and Norman mercenaries under Roussel de Bailleul, some
Turkic (Uz and Pecheneg) and Bulgarian mercenaries, infantry under
the Duke of Antioch, a contingent of Georgian and Armenian troops and some (but
not all) of the Varangian Guard to total around 40,000 men.[22] The quantity of the
provincial troops had declined in the years before Romanos, as the government
diverted funding to mercenaries who were judged less likely to be involved in politics
and could be disbanded after use to save money.[23]
Alp Arslan led the Seljuk Turks to victory against the
Byzantine annexation of Manzikert in 1071
The march across Asia Minor was long and difficult. Romanos brought a luxurious
baggage train, which did not endear him to his troops. The local population also
suffered plundering by his Frankish mercenaries, whom he was obliged to dismiss.
The expedition rested at Sebasteia on the river Halys, reaching Theodosiopolis in
June 1071. Some of his generals suggested continuing the march into the Seljuk
territory and catching Alp Arslan before he was ready. Others, including Nicephorus
Bryennius, suggested they wait and fortify their position. It was decided to continue
the march.[24]
Thinking that Alp Arslan was either further away or not coming at all, Romanos
marched towards Lake Van, expecting to retake Manzikert quickly and the nearby
fortress of Khliat if possible. Alp Arslan was already in the area, however, with allies
and 30,000 cavalry from Aleppo and Mosul. Alp Arslan's scouts knew exactly where
Romanos was, while Romanos was completely unaware of his opponent's
movements.[25]
Having made peace with the Byzantines, the Seljuks
intended to attack Egypt until Alp Arslan learned in Aleppo of the Byzantine advance. He
returned north and met the Byzantines north of Lake Van.
Romanos ordered his general Joseph Tarchaniotes to take some of the regular
troops and the Varangians and accompany the Pechenegs and Franks to Khliat. At
the same time, Romanos and the rest of the army marched to Manzikert. This split
the forces into halves of about 20,000 men each. It is unknown what happened to
the army sent off with Tarchaniotes – according to Islamic sources, Alp Arslan
smashed this army, yet Roman sources make no mention of any such encounter,
and Attaliates suggests that Tarchaniotes fled at the sight of the Seljuk Sultan – an
unlikely event considering the reputation of the Roman general. Either way,
Romanos' army was reduced to less than half his planned 40,000 men.[22]
Battle
Alp Arslan summoned his army and delivered a speech by appearing in a white robe
similar to an Islamic funeral shroud on the morning of the battle.[26] This was an
encouraging message that he was ready to die in battle. Romanos was unaware of
the loss of Tarchaneiotes and continued to Manzikert, which he easily captured on
23 August; the Seljuks responded with attacks by horse archers.[27] The next day,
some foraging parties under Bryennios discovered the main Seljuk force and were
forced to retreat to Manzikert. Romanos sent the Armenian general Basilakes and
some cavalry, as Romanos did not believe this was Alp Arslan's full army. The
cavalry was routed, and Basilakes was taken prisoner. Romanos then drew his
troops into formation and sent the left wing out under Bryennios, who was almost
surrounded by the rapidly approaching Turks and forced to retreat. The Seljuk forces
hid among the nearby hills for the night, making it nearly impossible for Romanos to
counterattack.[10][28]