YOL. IH.] AND PEIVY COUNCIL. 45.

[HOUSE OF LORDS.]

JAMES CUNDY AND T. BEVINGTON . . APPELLANTS ; H. L. (E.)

AND 1878
THOMAS LINDSAY AND OTHERS . . . . EESPONDENTS. Marchi-i.
Contract—Fraud.

The purchaser of a chattel takes it, as a general rule, subject to what may
turn out to be informalities in the title.
By a purchase in market overt the title obtained is good against all the
world.
If not so purchased, though purchased bond fide, the title obtained may
not be good against the real owner.
Where the original owner has parted with the chattel to A. upon a de
facto contract, though there may be circumstances which enable that owner
to set aside that contract, the bond fide purchaser from A. will obtain an
indefeasible title.
The question, therefore, in many such cases will be, was there a contract
between the original owner and the intermediate person.
L. was a manufacturer in Ireland; Alfred Blenkarn, who occupied a
room in a house looking into Wood Street, Cheapside, wrote to L., proposing
a considerable purchase of L.'s goods, and in his letter used this address—
" 37, Wood Street, Cheapside," and signed the letters (without any initial for
a christian name) with a name so written that it appeared to be " Blenhiron &
Cor There was a respectable firm of that name, " W. Blenkiron & Co,"
carrying on business at 123, Wood Street. L. sent letters, and afterwards
supplied goods, the letters, the goods, and the invoices accompanying the
goods, being all addressed to " Messrs. Blenkiron & Co., 37, Wood Street."
The goods were received by Blenkarn at that place, and disposed of to the
Defendants, who were entirely ignorant of the fraud :—
Meld, that no contract was made with Blenkarn, that even a temporary
property in the goods never passed to him, so that he never had a possessory
title which he could transfer to the Defendants, who were consequently
liable to the Plaintiffs for the value of the goods.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of Appeal, which had

reversed a previous decision of the Queen's Bench.
In 1873, one Alfred Blenkarn hired a room at a corner house in
Wood Street, Cheapside—it had two side windows opening into '
Wood Street, but though the entrance was from Little Love Lane
it was by him constantly described as 37, Wood Street, Cheapside.
His agreement for this room was signed " Alfred Blenkarn." The
460 HOUSE OF LOEDS [VOL. III.

H. L. (E.) now Kespondents, Messrs. Lindsay & Co., were linen manufacturers,
1878 carrying on business at Belfast. In the latter part of 1873, Blenham
CUNDY wrote to the Plaintiffs on the subject of a purchase from them of
... "•
.LINDSAY. agoods of their manufacture—chiefly J cambric handkerchiefs.. His
. letters were written as from " 37, Wood Street, Cheapside," where
he pretended to have a warehouse; but in fact occupied only a room
on the topfloor,and that room, though looking into Wood Street on
one side, could only be reached from the entrance in 5, Little Love
Lane. The name signed to these letters was always signed without
any initial as representing a Christian name, and was, besides, so
written as to appear " Blenhiron & Go." There was a highly
respectable firm of W. Blenkiron & Son, carrying on business in
Wood Street—but at number 123, Wood Street, and not at 37.
Messrs. Lindsay, who knew the respectability of Blenkiron & Son,
though not the number of the house where they carried on business,
answered the letters, and sent the goods addressed to " Messrs.
Blenlciron & Co., 37, Wood Street, Cheapside," where they were
taken in at once. The invoices sent with the goods were always
addressed in the same way. Blenkam sold the goods, thus
fraudulently obtained from Messrs. Lindsay, to different persons,
and among the rest he sold 250 dozen of cambric handkerchiefs
to the Messrs. Cundy, who were lond fide purchasers, and who
resold them in the ordinary way of their trade. Payment not
being made, an action was commenced in the Mayor's Court of
London by Messrs. Lindsay, the junior partner of which firm, Mr.
Thompson, made the ordinary affidavit of debt, as against Alfred
Blenham, and therein named Alfred Blenkam as the debtor.
Blenkam's fraud was soon discovered, and he was prosecuted at
the Central Criminal Court, and convicted and sentenced. Messrs.
Lindsay then brought an action against Messrs. Cundy as for un­
lawful conversion of the handkerchiefs. The cause was tried before
Mr. Justice Blackburn, who left it to the jury to consider whether
Alfred Blenkam, with a fraudulent intent to induce the Plaintiffs to
give him the credit belonging to the good character of Blenkiron &
Co., wrote the letters, and by fraud induced the Plaintiffs to send
the goods to 37, Wood Street—were they the same goods as those
bought by the Defendants—and did the Plaintiffs by the affidavit
of debt intend, as a matter of fact, to adopt Alfred Blenkam as
 VOL. III.] AND PKIVY COUNCIL. 461

their debtor. The first and second questions were answered in H. L. (E.)
the affirmative, and the third in the negative. A verdict was 1878
taken for the Defendants, with leave reserved to move to enter the OONDY
verdict for the Plaintiffs. On motion accordingly, the Court, after LlN^'SAy
argument, ordered the rule for entering judgment for the Plaintiffs
to be discharged, and directed judgment to be entered for the
Defendants (1). On appeal, this decision was reversed and judg-'
ment ordered to be entered for the Plaintiffs, Messrs. Lindsay (2).
This appeal was then brought.

The Solicitor General (Sir H. 8. Giffard) and Mr. Benjamin, Q.C.

(Mr. B. Francis Williams was with them), for the Appellants :—
The question here is, whether the property in the goods passed
from the Eespondents to Blenham. It is submitted that it
did (3). *^
A title to goods may be acquired even where they are obtained
upon false pretences. Though it will not be an indefeasible title,
and may be voidable, it will, as to third persons at least, be good
till it has been avoided. It must in some sense pass the property,
for if it did hot, it may be doubtful whether a conviction for
obtaining the goods could be sustained. Here it is clear that there
was in the first instance an intention on the part of the original
owner that the property should pass. [LORD PENZANCE:—But
was it not the intention that it should pass to Blenkiron, but not
to BlenJcam ?] As to some person in Wood Street the intention
plainly did exist that it should pass. [LORD PENZANCE:—Is there
• no distinction between the case of a man who, being deceived,
enters into a contract, and that of a man who, being also deceived,
does not enter into a contract?] The latter was the case of
Hardman v. Booth (4), so much relied on in the Court below. But
that case is distinguishable from the present, for there the facts
shewed distinctly that the intention was to contract with Thomas
Gandell & Co., and with them alone; and the firm of Edward

(1) 1 Q. B. D. 348. original owner after the conviction of

(2) 2 Q. B. D. 96. the person who had fraudulently ob-
(3) There had been, in the Courts tained it. That question was also made
below, a question as to the effect of the the subject of argument in this House, .
statute 24 & 25 Vict. c. 96, with regard but the judgment did not refer to it.
to the restitution of the property to the (4) 1 H . & C.'803.
462 HOUSE'OF LOEDS* [VOL. III.

H. L. (E.) Qandell & Todd was a different firm and carried on business at a
1878 different place, and was wholly unknown to the Plaintiffs, and
CCNDY Edward Qandell having by fraud got hold of the goods sent to the
LINDSAY warehouse of Thomas Qandell, carried them off to his own place,.
. and so disposed of them. Here the Plaintiffs themselves sent the
goods to the person who had corresponded with them, and who
did carry on business at 37, Wood Street. The goods reached that
destination, and were delivered there according to the address-
which the Plaintiffs had put upon them. The facts of the two
cases were unlike, and without in the least doubting the decision
in that case, it may well be contended not to be applicable here..
Here the original owner allowed the goods to remain in the hands
of the person to whom he had sent them, and while there they
were sold to the Defendants, who were bond fide purchasers for
value. After that the vendor could no longer follow them as his
own; his intention had been to transfer them, and the transfer-
was complete. In no way whatever could the case be compared
to one in which money or a bill of exchange was delivered to a
person for a particular purpose, and he used it for another, and so
could give no title whatever to a third person to whom he passed
it. Neither was this a delivery to B., who stated himself to be
the agent of some one else when he was not so ; it was a delivery
to B. himself. Credit was therefore given to him ; it was given to
Blenkarn & Co., of 37, Wood Street. Then again, in the first
instance Mr. Thompson, one of the partners in Messrs. Lindsay's-
house, made an affidavit of debt against Alfred Blenkarn, which
shewed that the house recognised Blenkarn as the debtor, and the
transaction as one of a sale. That, though not conclusive on the
subject, was at least strong evidence of previous intention. I t may
be admitted that where the authority to part with the property is-
limited, and the property is parted with in disregard of that limited
authority, the title to it would not pass: Beg. v. Middleton (1) ;
but that cannot affect this case; for here the goods were trans­
mitted by the .owners themselves to a person and a place described.
by themselves. The title to the goods was for the time perfect in.
law, and, being so, the transfer to the Defendants made during.
that time, being made bond fide, could not be impeached: Pease v..
(1) Law Rep. 2 C. C. E. 38.
VOL. in.] AND PRIYY COUNCIL. 463
Gloahec (1). Till the title of Blenharn was disaffirmed it was H. L. (E.)
good, and the property disposed of in the meantime could not 1878
afterwards be followed in the hands of a third person who had CUNDY
honestly purchased it. T "•
J r
LINDSAY.

Mr. Wills, Q.C., and Mr. Fullarton, for the Eespondents:—

Where the circumstances are such that no contract has ever
arisen, mere delay in declaring a disaffirmance cannot affect the
case: Kingsford v. Merry (2); Bovlton v. Jones (3); Eardman v.
Booth (4). Here there was no contract. The Plaintiffs did not know -
of the existence of two firms of names similar to each other carry­
ing on business in Wood Street; they knew only of Blenhiron & Go.,
and thought they were dealing with Blenhiron & Co., and sent their
goods to that firm. But Blenhiron & Co. knew nothing whatever
of the matter. There was, therefore, no contract with them. Nor
was there any with Blenharn, for by a fraud in using the name of
other persons he obtained possession of goods intended for those
other persons, and not for him. There was, therefore, no contract
with him. If so, no moment existed during which a title to the
goods could be given to the Defendants. Their conversion of the
goods was consequently unlawful.

The Solicitor General replied.

THE LOED CHANCELLOR (Lord Cairns):—

My Lords, you have in this case to discharge a duty which is
always a disagreeable one for any Court, namely, to determine as
between two parties, both of whom are perfectly innocent, upon
which of the two the consequences of a fraud practised upon both
of them must fall. My Lords, in discharging that duty your
Lordships can do no more than apply, rigorously, the settled and
well known rules of law. Now, with regard to the title to per­
sonal property, the settled and well known rules of law may, I
take it, be thus expressed: by the law of our country the purchaser
of a chattel takes the chattel as a general rule subject to what

(1) Law Eep. 1 P. C. 219. (3) 2 H. & N. 564, see lie Heed,
(2) 1 H . & N . 503. 3 Ch. D. 123.
(4) 1 H. & C. 803.
464 HOUSE OF LOEDS [VOL. III.

H. L. (E.) may turn out to be certain infirmities in the title. If he purchases

1878 the chattel in market overt, he obtains a title which is good
CUNDY against all the world; but if he does not purchase the chattel in
mar
LINDSAY k e t overt, and if it turns out that the chattel has been found
by the person who professed to sell it, the purchaser will,not
obtain a title good as against the real owner. If it turns out that
the chattel has been stolen by the person who has professed to sell
it, the purchaser will not obtain a title. If it turns out that the
chattel has come into the hands of the person who professed to
sell it, by a de facto contract, that is to say, a contract which has
purported to pass the property to him from the owner of the pro­
perty, there the purchaser will obtain a good title, even although
afterwards it should appear that'there were circumstances con­
nected with that contract, which would enable the original owner
of the goods to reduce it, and to set it aside, because these circum­
stances so enabling the original owner of the goods, or of the
chattel, to reduce the contract and to set it aside, will not be
allowed to interfere with a title for valuable consideration ob­
tained by some third party during the interval while the contract
remained unreduced.
My Lords, the question, therefore, in the present case, as your
Lordships will observe, really becomes the very short and simple
one which I am about to state. Was there any contract which,
with regard to the goods in question in this case, had passed the
property in the goods from the Messrs. Lindsay to Alfred Blenham ?
If there was any contract passing that property, even although, as
I have said, that contract might afterwards be open to a process
of reduction, upon the ground of fraud, still, in the meantime,
Blenham might have conveyed a good title for valuable conside­
ration to the present Appellants.
Now, my Lords, there are two observations bearing upon the
solution of that question which I desire to make. In the first
place, if the property in the goods in question passed, it could
only pass by way of contract; there is nothing else which could
have passed the property. The second observation is this, your
Lordships are not here embarrassed by any conflict of evidence, or
any evidence whatever as to conversations or as to acts done, the
whole history of the whole transaction lies upon paper. The prin-
VOL. III.] AND PRIVY COUNCIL. 465

cipal parties concerned, the Eespondents and Blenkam, never H. L. (E.)

came in contact personally—everything that was done was done 1878
by writing. What has to be judged of, and what the jury in the' CUNDY
present case had to judge of, was merely the conclusion to be LlN „ 8AY
derived from that writing, as applied to the admitted facts of the
case.
Now, my Lords, discharging that duty and answering that
inquiry, what the jurors have found is in substance this: it is not
necessary to spell out -the words, because the substance of it is
beyond all doubt. They have found that by the form of the
signatures to the letters which were written by Blenkam, by the
mode in which his letters and his applications to the Eespondents
were made out, and by the way in which he left uncorrected the
mode and form in which, in turn, he was addressed by the Ee­
spondents ; that by all those means he led, and intended to lead,
the Eespondents to believe, and they did believe, that the person
with whom they were communicating was not Blenham, the dis­
honest and irresponsible man, but was a well known and solvent
house of Blenkiron & Co., doing business in the same street. My
Lords, those things are found as matters of fact, and they are
placed beyond the range of dispute and controversy in the case.
" If that is so, what is the consequence ? It is that Blerikam—
the dishonest man, as I call him—was acting here just in the same
way as if he had forged the signature of Blenkiron & Co., the
respectable firm, to the applications for goods, and as if, when, in
return, the goods were forwarded and letters were sent, accom­
panying them, he had intercepted the goods and intercepted the
letters, and had taken possession of the goods, and of the letters
which were addressed to, and intended for, not himself but, the
firm of Blenkiron & Co. Now, my Lords, stating the matter
shortly in that way, I ask the question, how is it possible to
imagine that in that state of things any contract could have arisen
between the Eespondents and Blenkarn, the dishonest man ? Of
him they knew nothing, and of him they never thought. With
him they never intended to deal. Their minds never, even for an
instant of time rested upon him, and as between him and them
there was no consensus of mind which could lead to any agreement
or any contract whatever. As between him and them there was
466 HOUSE OF LOEDS [VOL. III.

H. L. (E.) merely the one side to a contract, where,' in order to produce a

1878 contract, two sides would be required. With the firm of Blenhiron
CIJNDY <# Go. of course there was no contract, for as to them the matter
LOTDSAY w a s e n ti r ely unknown, and therefore the pretence of a contract
was a failure.
The result, therefore, my Lords, is this, that your Lordships
have not here to deal with one of those cases in which there is de
facto a contract made which may afterwards be impeached and set
aside, on the ground of fraud; but you have to deal with a case
which ranges itself under a completely different chapter of law,
the case namely in which the contract never comes into existence.
My Lords, that being so, it is idle to talk of the property passing.
The property remained, as it originally had been, the property of
the Eespondents, and the title which was attempted to be given
' to the Appellants was a title which could not be given to them.
My Lords, I therefore move your Lordships that this appeal be
dismissed with costs, and the judgment of the Court of Appeal
affirmed.

LOED HATHERLEY : —

My Lords, I have come to the same conclusion as that which

has just been expressed by my noble and learned friend on the
woolsack. The real question we have to consider here, is this :
whether or not any contract was actually entered into between
the Eespondents and a person named Alfred Blenham, who im­
posed upon them in the manner described in the verdict of the
jury; the case that was tried being one as between the alleged
vendors and a person who had purchased from Alfred Blenham.
Now the case is simply this, as put by the learned Judge in the
Court below; it was most carefully stated, as one might expect it
would be by that learned Judge': " Is it made out to your satis­
faction that Alfred Blenham, with a fraudulent intent ,to induce
customers generally, and Mr. Thomson in particular, to give him
the credit of the good character which belonged to William Blenh-
iron & Sons, wrote those letters in the way you have heard, and
had those invoices headed as you have heard," and farther than
that, " did he actually by that fraud induce Mr. Thomson to send
the goods " " t o 37, Wood Street?"
VOL. III.] AND PEIVY COUNCIL. 467
Both these questions were answered in the affirmative by the H. L. (E.)
jury. What, then, was the result? It was, that there were 1878
letters written by a man endeavouring by contrivance and fraud, CUNDY
as appears upon the face of the letters themselves, to obtain the L^'SAY
•credit of the well-known firm of Blenhiron & Co., Wood Street.
That was done by a falsification of the signature of the Blenhirons,
■writing his own name in such a manner as that it appeared to
represent the signature of that firm. And farther, his letters and
invoices were headed " Wood Street," which was not an accurate
way of heading them; for he occupied only a room on a third
floor, looking into Little Love Lane on one side, and looking into
Wood Street on the other. He headed them in that way, in order
that by these two devices he might represent himself to the
Eespondents as Blenhiron of Wood Street. He did that purposely;
and it is found that he induced the Eespondents by that device to
send the goods to Blenhiron of Wood Street. I apprehend, there­
fore, that if there could, be said to have been any sale at all, it
failed for want of a purchaser. The sale, if made out upon such
a transaction as this, would have been a sale to the Blenhirons of
Wood Street, if they bad chosen to adopt it, and to no other person
whatever—not to this Alfred Blenham, with whom the Eespon­
dents had not, and with whom they did not wish to have, any
dealings whatever.
My Lords, it appears to me that that brings the case completely
within the authority of Hardman v. Booth (1), where it was held
that there was no real contract between the parties by whom the
goods were delivered and the concoctor of the fraud who obtained
possession of them, because they were not to him sold. Exactly
in the same way here, there was no real contract whatever with
Alfred Blenham ; no goods had been delivered to anybody except
for the purpose of transferring the property to Blenhiron (not
Blenham); therefore the case really in substance is the identical
case of Hardman v. Booth (1) over again.
My noble and learned friend who sits opposite to me (Lord
Penzance) has called my attention to a case which seems to have
been decided on exactly the same principle as Hardman v. Booth (1),
and it is worth while referring to it as an additional authority upon
(1) 1H.&C. 803.
f
468 HOUSE OP LORDS [VOL. HI. „

H. L. (E.) that principle of law. I t is the case of EiggonsIT. Burton (1).

1878 There, one Bix, who had been the agent of a responsible firm that
CTODY had had dealings with the Plaintiff in the action, was dismissed
8
LINDSAY. ^y ^ employers; he concealed that dismissal from a customer of
the firm, the Plaintiff in the action, and, having concealed that
dismissal, continued to obtain goods from him still as acting for
the firm. The goods were delivered to him, but it was held that
that delivery was not a delivery to any person whatever who had
purchased the goods. The goods, if they had been purchased at
all, would have been purchased by the firm for which this man had
acted as agent; but he had been dismissed from the agency—there
was no contract, therefore, with the firm ; there was no contract
ever intended between the vendors of the goods and the person
who had professed to purchase the goods as the agent of that
firm; and the consequence was that there was no contract at all.
There, as here, the circumstance occurred that an innocent person
purchasing the goods from the person with whom there was no
contract was obliged to submit to his loss. The point of the case
is put so very shortly by Chief Baron Pollock, that I cannot do
better than adopt his reasoning: '•' There was no sale at all, but a
mere obtaining of goods by false pretences; the property, there­
fore, did not pass out of the Plaintiffs." The other Judges, who
were Barons Martin, Bramwell, and Watson, concurred in that
judgment.
Here, I say, exactly as in those cases of Hardman v. Booth (2),
and Eiggons v. Burton (1), there was no sale at all; there was a
representation, a false representation, made by Blenkarn, by which
he got goods sent to him, upon applications from him to become a
purchaser, but upon invoices made1 out to the firm of Blenhiron &
Co. But no contract was made with Blenkarn, nor any contract
was made with Blenkiron & Co., because they knew nothing at
all about it, and therefore there could be no delivery of the goods
with the intent to pass the property.
We have been pressed very much with an ingenious mode of
putting the case on the part of the counsel who have argued with
eminent ability for the Appellants in this case, namely, suppose
this fraudulent person had gone himself to the firm from whom
(1) 26 L. J. (Ex.) 342. (2) 1 H. & C. 803.
VOL. III.3 AND PKIVY COUNCIL. 469

he wished to obtain the goods, and had represented that he was a H. L. (E.)
member of one of the largest firms in London. Suppose on his 1878
making that representation the goods had been delivered to him. CONDY
Now I am very far, at all events on the present occasion, from r v-
, . , 1 1 . 1 1 1 LINDSAY.
seeing my way to this, that the goods being sold to him as repre-
senting that firm he could be treated in any other way than as an
agent of that firm, or suppose he had said : " l a m as rich as that
firm. I have transactions as large as those of that firm. I have
a large balance at my bankers;" then the sale would have been a
sale to a fraudulent purchaser on fraudulent representations, and a
sale which would have been capable of being set aside, but still
a sale would have been made to the person who made those false
representations; and the parting with the goods in that case
might possibly—I say no more—have passed the property.
But this case is an entirely different one. The whole case, as
represented here is this; from beginning to end the Eespondents
believed they were dealing with Blenkirori & Co., they made out
their invoices to Blenhiron & Co., they supposed they sold to
fihnkiron & Co., they never sold in any way to Alfred Blenkam ;
and therefore Alfred Blenkam cannot, by so obtaining the goods,
have by possibility made a good title to a purchaser, as against
the owners of the goods, who had never in any shape or way
parted with the property nor with anything more than the posses­
sion of it.

LORD PENZANCE:—
My Lords, the findings of the jury in this case, coupled with the
evidence, warrant your Lordships in concluding that the following
are the circumstances under which the Bespondents parted with
their goods. Whether by so doing they passed the property in
them to Alfred Blenkam is I conceive the real question to be
determined.
The Eespondents had never seen or even heard of Alfred Blen-
kam, when they received a letter followed by several others signed
in a manner which was not absolutely clear, but which the writer
intended them to take, and which they did take, to be the signa­
ture of a well-known house of Blenkiron & Co., which in fact
VOL. III. 3 2 1
470 HOUSE OF LOKDS [VOL, III.

H. L. (B.) carried on Business at No. 123, Wood Street. The purport of

1878 these letters was to order the goods now in question. The house
C^DV of Blenhiron & Co. was known to the Eespondents, and it was
£ Y also known that they lived in Wood Street, though the Eespondents
did not know the number. The Eespondents answered these
letters, addressing their answers to Blenhiron & Co. in Wood
Street, but in place of- No. 123, they directed them to No. 37,
which was the number given in the letters as the address of that
firm. In the result they sent off the goods now in dispute, and
addressed them, as they> had addressed their letters, to Blenhiron &
Co., No. 37, Wood Street, London. It is not doubted or disputed
that throughout this correspondence and up to, and after, the time
that the Eespondents had dispatched their goods to London, they
intended to deal and believed they were dealing with Blenhiron &
Co., and with nobody else; nor is it capable of dispute that, when
they parted with the possession of their goods, they did so with
the intention that the goods should pass into the hands of Blenhiron
& Co., to whom they addressed these goods. The goods, however,
were not delivered to Blenhiron & Co., to whom they were ad­
dressed, .but found their., way to the hands of Alfred Blenham,
owing to the number in Wood Street being given as No. 37, in
place of No. 123-^-a mistake which had been purposely brought
about by the writer of the letters as I have before mentioned, who
was no other than Alfred Blenham, and who had an office or room
at No. 37, Wood Street.
In this state of things, it is not denied that the contract, or deal­
ing, which the.Eespondents. thought they were entering into with
Blenhiron & Co., and in fulfilment of which they parted with their
goods, and forwarded them to what they thought [was,the address
of thatfirm,was no contract at all with them, seeing that Blenhiron
& Co. knew nothing of the transaction. But, say the Appellants, it
was a contract with, and a good delivery to, Alfred Blenham so as
to pass the property in the goods to that individual, although the
goods were not addressed to him and the Eespondents did not
know of his existence. . .
I am not aware, my Lords', that there is any decided case in
which a sale and delivery intended to be made to one man, has
VOL. III.] AND PEIVY COUNCIL. 471

been held to be a sale and delivery so as to pass the property to H. L. (E.)

another, against the intent and will of the vendor. And if this 1878
cannot be, it is difficult to see how the contention of the Appel- CDNDY
lants can be maintained. It was indeed argued that as the letters L "■
and goods were addressed to No. 37 instead of No. 123, this con-
stituted a dealing with the person whose office was at No. 37.
But to justify this argument it ought at least to be shewn that
the Eespondents knew that there was such a person, and that he
had offices there—whereas the contrary is the fact, and the
Eespondents only adopted the number because it was given as the
address in letters purporting to be signed " Blenhiron & Co."
My Lords, I am unable to distinguish this case in principle
from that of Eardman v. Booth (1), to which reference has been
made. In that case Edward Gandell, who obtained possession of
the Plaintiff's goods, pretended to have authority to order goods
for Thomas Gandell & Co., which he had not, and then intercepted
the goods and made away with them; the Court held that there
was no contract with Thomas Gandell & Co. as they had given no
authority, and none with Edward Gandell, who had ordered the
goods, as the Plaintiffs never intended to deal with him.
In the present case Alfred Blenharn pretended that he was,
and acted as if he was, Blenkiron & Co. with whom alone the
vendors meant to deal. No contract was ever intended with him,
and the contract which was intended failed for want of another
party to it. In principle the two cases seem to me to be quite
alike.
Another case of a similar kind is that of Higgons v. Burton (2),
to which similar reasoning was applied.
Hypothetical cases were put to your Lordships in argument in
which a vendor was supposed to deal personally with a swindler,
believing him to be some one else of credit and stability, and
under this belief to have actually delivered goods into his hands.
My Lords, I do not think it necessary to express an opinion upon
the possible effect of some cases which I can imagine to happen of
this character, because none of such cases can I think be parallel
with that which your Lordships have now to decide. For in the
(1) 1 H. & C. 803. _ (2) 26 L. J. (Ex.) 342.
3 2 12
472 HOUSE OF LORDS [VOL. III.

H. L. (E.) present case the Kespondents were never brought personally into
1878 contact with Alfred, Blenharn; all their letters, although received
Q^DY and answered by him, were addressed to Blenkiron & Co., and
*■ intended for that firm only; and finally the goods in dispute were
— not delivered to him at all, but were sent to Blenkiron & Co.,
though at a wrong address.
This appeal ought therefore, in my opinion, to be dismissed.

LORD GORDON concurred.

Judgment appealed from affirmed; and appeal
* dismissed with costs.
Lords' Journals, 4th March, 1878.

Solicitors for the Appellants : Charles 0. Humphreys & Son.

Solicitors for the Eespondents: Ashurst, Morris, Crisp, & Co.