China’s Strategic

Foreign Initiatives
Under Xi Jinping
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An ASEAN Perspective
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

Aileen S. P. Baviera

Abstract: This article provides a summary of China’s new strategic foreign

initiatives under Xi Jinping’s leadership. These initiatives include the “One
Belt, One Road” proposal, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank, and calls for a “New Asian Security Concept” as well as
for “a new type of major power relations.” In a localized Southeast Asian
context, they are operationalized, as projects under the so-called 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road proposal, a “2 þ 7 cooperation framework for
China-Southeast Asia relations,” and the so-called “dual track” approach
to the management of the South China Sea disputes. These initiatives are
expected to provide a favorable external environment for the attainment of
the “Chinese dream” and to pave the way for China to emerge into a
position of global power and leadership. The article mainly focuses on

Aileen S. P. Baviera is Professor of China Studies and International Relations at the Asian
Center, University of the Philippines. Her address is Rm 204-A, GT-Toyota Hall Asian
Cultural Center, Magsaysay St corner of Katipunan Ave, U.P. Diliman, Quezon City
1101, Philippines. She can also be reached at [email protected].
This article is based on a presentation delivered at the 29th Asia Pacific Roundtable,
organized by the ASEAN Institutes for Strategic and International Studies, in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia on June 2, 2015.

c 2016 World Century Publishing Corporation and Shanghai Institutes for International Studies
°
China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 2, No. 1, 57–79
DOI: 10.1142/S2377740016500032

57
 58 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 2, No. 1

what these initiatives may be signaling to China’s neighbors, and the

subsequent implications for Southeast Asia and its relations with China.
There are, for instance, some doubts as to whether China can be a reliable
provider of security and stability as public goods in its own region if China
itself is a key party in the territorial contentions and power rivalries that
could be likely causes of conflict. The fact that China is still trying to
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defend primordial territorial and cultural-ideational interests, settle his-

torical scores, and find an effective model for its domestic politics and
governance that will serve its increasingly globalized economy, indicates
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

that China may not be ready yet to make the sacrifices and compromises
that will be required of regional



let alone global


leadership.

Keywords: Chinese foreign policy; regional leadership; ASEAN; regional

security; South China Sea.

Introduction

The current leadership of China has presented the international community

with a vision of its desired global and regional order through the enunci-
ation of many new strategic foreign initiatives. Some of these initiatives
relate to the broad sweep of China’s Asia-Pacific policy, while others appear
more particularly directed at Southeast Asian countries or even at specific
issues such as territorial disputes in the South China Sea. While not all can
be considered equally “strategic” in terms of possible long-term or com-
prehensive impact, they all appear to be parts of a cohesive plan designed
by China to achieve certain desired outcomes pertaining to the strategic
environment in its neighborhood.
This article provides a summary of China’s new strategic foreign
initiatives under Xi Jinping’s leadership and their apparent objectives, based
on Chinese official pronouncements and analyses by both Chinese and
foreign scholars. “New strategic initiatives” here refer to the vision, pro-
grams, and projects that China has pursued or proposes to undertake as the
means for securing its long-term diplomatic and security interests in its
neighborhood or “periphery.” While the concept of “strategy” usually
stresses the interactions of international politics, diplomacy, economics and
military power, this article looks primarily at the first three and does not
deal as much with military power, which could be the subject of separate
analyses. Moreover, it focuses primarily on Southeast Asia. The most
 China’s Strategic Foreign Initiatives Under Xi Jinping 59

prominent of these initiatives are the “One Belt, One Road” (“Belt and
Road”) proposal, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment
Bank (AIIB), and the calls for a “New Asian Security Concept” and “a new
type of major power relations.” Perhaps less profound and ambitious but
no less important are the so-called “2 þ 7 cooperation framework for China-
Southeast Asia relations for the next decade,” as well as a “dual track”
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approach and hopes of building a “community of common destiny” in

relation to the South China Sea region.
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This study locates these pronounced foreign policy thrusts within the
shift in attitude of the Chinese government since 2010 but especially since
Xi Jinping took the helm in late 2012. Xi Jinping’s articulation of the “Chi-
nese dream” of national rejuvenation, and the apparent abandonment of
Deng Xiaoping’s earlier exhortation for Chinese leaders to “hide capacities
while biding their time” mark this shift. This new stance is evidenced by
China’s particularly active demonstration of its growing economic and
military strength, much bolder assertion of sovereignty and maritime
rights, and pointed challenges to what it perceives to be attempts by other
big powers, principally the United States, to contain China’s rise.
The article then provides some argument seeking to explain the shift in
China’s foreign policy behavior. It presents analyses of what may be de-
duced as the directions and principal objectives of China behind these new
undertakings. Finally, it briefly explores the possible implications of China’s
new thinking for its relations with Southeast Asia. For instance, how might
Southeast Asians confront the shifting geopolitical environment where
China’s rise and foreign policy proactiveness might undermine both the
post-World War II security order built on U.S.-centered bilateral military
alliances and ASEAN-centered multilateralism and cooperative security
arrangements?

New Strategic Initiatives and the \Chinese Dream"

The barrage of China’s new foreign initiatives do reflect some continuities

with previous leaderships, but they also mark an important departure from
the earlier worldview and attitude of China’s ruling elite. Xi’s government
in particular appears to have abandoned Deng Xiaoping’s policy of “hiding
capacities while biding time” in foreign policy matters, though changes had
already begun prior to Xi Jinping’s accession to the top leadership in 2012.
 60 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 2, No. 1

After decades of restraint, maintaining a low profile and deliberately

staying away from exercising leadership of the developing countries or
leading any coalition in the international front, China began to not only
expect but in some ways demand that other countries begin to pay heed to
China’s interests, accommodate its preferences on matters of regional order-
building, and accord it a position of privilege in the regional hierarchy.
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In accounting for the shift in China’s for-

eign policy stance to a more assertive posture, Whatever the
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there are various possible reasons. One theory is explanation for Xi

that a political opportunity arose with the global Jinping’s new
financial crisis of 2008 bringing chaos to Western
economies and eventually contributing to their
strategic initiatives,
political dysfunction. In contrast, China had China seems
surpassed Japan as the world’s second largest determined to
economy in 2010, and euphoria from the hosting maintain a stronger
of the 2008 Olympics had raised confidence and
inspired nationalist sentiments.1 In China, pub-
foreign policy stance.
lic expectations increased that their richer,
stronger country should be a more influential
one to be treated with deference by other states. After over thirty years of
rapid growth, China had indeed moved up in the hierarchy of power and
wealth that mattered very much to its leaders, still smarting from the historical
memory of the “Hundred Years of Humiliation.” The goals of modernization
and attaining relative affluence finally seemed within reach; the “Chinese
dream” was no longer so distant. There was a window of opportunity open to
China to extend its own influence and attain greater respect and status in the
international community. Rather than bide their time, Chinese leaders decided
to seize the moment; rather than continue to hide capacities, they began to
show the world that China had become strong and powerful and ready to
claim its place among the world’s most influential players.
Another theory is that as the U.S.-led Global War on Terror was
winding down in Afghanistan and Iraq (not having attained its purposes

1A similar argument is made by Wang Yizhou of Peking University. See Wang Yizhou,
“China’s New Foreign Policy: Transformations and Challenges Reflected in Changing Dis-
course,” The ASAN Forum, March 21, 2014, http://www.theasanforum.org/chinas-new-
foreign-policy-transformations-and-challenges-reflected-in-changing-discourse/.
 China’s Strategic Foreign Initiatives Under Xi Jinping 61

and even leading to new types of problems, in the view of many), the U.S.
would inevitably turn its attention once more to China, where such atten-
tion had been prior to 9/11. This American “pivot to Asia” began to man-
ifest quietly since 2009 before being announced publicly in 2011, and
involved mainly an invigoration of U.S. alliances and developing new se-
curity partnerships particularly in China’s maritime periphery. Only later
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did the economic component of this U.S. rebalance to Asia

the Trans
Pacific Partnership (TPP)


become part of the official policy, but by then,
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many among the Chinese elite had developed a deep belief that the pivot
was directed against China and kept raising alarm bells of a new U.S.
“containment.” Therefore, the new strategic initiatives and the much more
pronounced assertiveness, including policies and programs beefing up its
maritime power, are China’s responses and counterfoils to the U.S. pivot.
Yet another theory would attribute China’s new posture to the pre-
ferences and leadership style of Xi Jinping himself, as well as the impera-
tives of power consolidation in his first years in office. The phrase “Chinese
dream” was first mentioned by Xi Jinping a few days after taking over as
the new General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC). While
the term remains loosely defined, it is definitely associated with the ele-
ments of “national rejuvenation, improvement of people’s livelihoods,
economic prosperity, construction of a better society, and military
strengthening.”2 It appears to offer continuity with past reform efforts,
including Jiang Zemin’s “Three Represents” and Hu Jintao’s “Scientific
Development” as well as “Harmonious Society” and “Harmonious World”
concepts. Xi Jinping now talks about the “Four Comprehensives” which
involve building the moderately prosperous society that Deng Xiaoping set
as a goal in 1979, deepening social reforms, implementing the rule of law,
and strengthening Party discipline. To be more specific, the “Chinese
dream” is a link to the future by setting goals in anticipation of the “two
centennials”: becoming a “moderately well-off society” by doubling its
2010 GDP and per capita income in 2021, when China celebrates the cen-
tennial of the founding of the CPC, and the goal of becoming a “modern
socialist country” by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the
People’s Republic of China.

2 Zha Daojiong, “China’s Economic Diplomacy: Focusing on the Asia Pacific Region,”
China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies, Vol. 1. No. 1 (April 2015), pp. 85–104.
 62 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 2, No. 1

Xi also spoke of an “Asia Pacific dream” when he was host of the APEC
in 2014, stressing the need to stay ahead of global developments and for the
countries of the Asia Pacific to make greater contributions to the well-being
of mankind. As he passionately announced, “Through having higher levels
of economic vibrancy, free trade and investment facilitation, better roads,
and closer people-to-people exchanges, countries and peoples of the region
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can develop a better sense of shared destiny.”3

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China’s New Strategic Foreign Initiatives

One Belt, One Road (Belt and Road Initiatives)

The establishment of the Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Mari-
time Silk Road (“One Belt, One Road” or “Belt and Road”) was proposed by
Xi Jinping during his visits to Central Asia and Southeast Asia in October
2013. He laid out a vision of connectivity involving countries of Asia,
Europe and Africa, where building and strengthening infrastructure links
(including highways, railways, and ports, among others) are expected to
promote the cross-border coordination of development strategies, opening
of new markets, and enhanced cultural and scientific exchanges, bringing
mutual benefit and win-win outcomes for over four billion people. The
notion of a “belt” that will stretch from China to Europe will involve efforts
to jointly build a Eurasian land bridge and make use of international
transport routes, core cities and economic industrial parks as “cooperation
platforms” between China and states along the route.4 The “maritime silk
road,” on the other hand, aside from enhancing infrastructure connectivity
of China with Southeast Asia and South Asia, calls for the promotion of free
trade, development cooperation, and in particular, cooperation on “marine
economy, maritime connectivity, marine environment, marine safety and
security, and cultural and people-to-people exchanges on the sea.”5

Jinping, “Seek Sustained Development and Fulfill the Asia-Pacific Dream,” APEC
3 Xi

China, November 13, 2014, http://www.apec-china.org.cn/41/2014/11/13/[email protected].

4 “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century
Maritime Silk Road,” National Development and Reform Commission website, March 28,
2015, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330 669367.html.
5 Xu Bu, “Maritime Silk Road Can Bridge China-ASEAN Cooperation,” Jakarta Post,
August 5, 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/05/maritime-silk-road-can-
bridge-china-asean-cooperation.html#sthash.d78aGkAY.dpuf
 China’s Strategic Foreign Initiatives Under Xi Jinping 63

This ambitious infrastructure connectivity initiative is also seen to be

driven by three needs of China: (1) access to energy resources, (2) security
along its border provinces, and (3) new markets for Chinese goods and
services, especially at the current time of excess capacity amidst reduced
demand from the West.6 To fund “Belt and Road” projects, China has
established a US$40 billion Silk Road fund, and a US$100 billion Asian
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Infrastructure Investment Bank, as well as pushed for a New Development

Bank (also known as the BRICS bank) led by emerging economic powers.
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)

The AIIB was first mentioned by President Xi Jinping and Premier Li
Keqiang during visits to Southeast Asia in October 2013, as a multilateral
lending institution that will prioritize the infrastructure needs of develop-
ing Asian countries and help China implement its new “Belt and Road”
initiatives. Some observers have compared the “Belt and Road” and AIIB
together to the post-war European “Marshall Plan,” while others see AIIB
as designed to compete for financial leadership with the U.S.-led World
Bank (WB) and the Japan-led Asian Development Bank (ADB). Joined by 57
founding members at the signing ceremony of its articles in June 2015, AIIB
aims to: (1) foster sustainable economic development, create wealth and
improve infrastructure connectivity in Asia by investing in infrastructure
and other productive sectors; and (2) promote regional cooperation and
partnership in addressing development challenges by working in close
collaboration with other multilateral and bilateral development institutions.
Areas of focus include energy and power, transportation and tele-
communications, rural infrastructure and agriculture development, water
supply and sanitation, environmental protection, urban development and
logistics, etc.7
AIIB is a very significant initiative in light of the projected US$8 trillion
worth of infrastructure needed in the Asian region, and for which financing by
traditional credit sources such as the WB and ADB is insufficient. There have

6 Theresa Fallon, “The New Silk Road: Xi Jinping’s Grand Strategy for Eurasia,”
American Foreign Policy Interests, Vol. 37, No. 3 (May/June 2015), pp. 140–147.
7 “What is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” AIIB website, http://www.aiib.
org/html/aboutus/AIIB/.
 64 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 2, No. 1

been concerns expressed that AIIB, together with the “Belt and Road” projects,
would be used by China to gain geostrategic influence over its neighbors at
the expense of the United States or other powers. Some sources also articulate
fear that a Chinese-led financing mechanism would be prone to poor gover-
nance practices, despite China’s assurances that ultimately, AIIB’s rules and
procedures shall be a collectively designed multilateral undertaking.
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The New Asian Security Concept (NASC) China’s many new

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At the Shanghai Summit of the Conference on

initiatives constitute
Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures a grand strategy in
in Asia (CICA) in May 2014, Xi Jinping spoke political, security,
of the need to build a new cooperative regional
economic and
security architecture for Asia based on “win-
win” formulas. Borrowing heavily from post- cultural arenas.
Cold War Track Two discourses on security,
and reiterating concepts that the Jiang Zemin
government had already professed in the mid-1990s,8 Xi Jinping outlined
the elements of the desired architecture as “common security” (i.e., uni-
versal, equal and inclusive security), “comprehensive security” (i.e., atten-
tion to both traditional and non-traditional security challenges),
“cooperative security” (i.e., security of individual countries as well as of the
region through dialogue and building strategic trust, starting with coop-
eration in less sensitive areas); and then added to this the idea of sustainable
security (linking development and security). The approach emphasizes
mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination.9
Xi also underscored Asia’s responsibility for addressing its own
region’s security challenges, and he called for the establishment of an Asia-
wide security forum where neighbors can discuss cooperation against the
“three forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism” (reflecting China’s
internal security concerns), as well as cooperation in law enforcement,
emergency response and even intra-Asian civilizational dialogue. The New

8 Joshua Eisenman, Eric Heginbotham, and Derek Mitchell, eds., China and the Deve-
loping World: Beijing’s Strategy for the Twenty-First Century (Oxford: Routledge, 2007).
Jinping, “New Asian Security Concept for New Progress in Security Cooperation,”
9 Xi

Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, May 21, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/

mfa eng/zxxx 662805/t1159951.shtml.
 China’s Strategic Foreign Initiatives Under Xi Jinping 65

Asian Security Concept pointedly excluded the United States as a non-

Asian country. Its calls for Asian solutions to Asian security issues were no
doubt intended to undermine the role of the U.S.-led system of alliances
that had heretofore provided a semblance of stability in the Asia Pacific, but
which China increasingly felt were being targeted against it.
An analyst from the China Institute for International Studies hints at
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the reason behind its government’s call for Asians to come together on
security issues:
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

. . . the U.S. attempts to build up a so-called “encirclement ring” to

contain and deter China. This kind of conduct by the U.S. is
nothing but a product of the zero-sum game of the Cold War
mentality, which can easily invite new challenges to the stability
and development of various countries in the Asia-Pacific region.10

Picking up on this theme of Asian security for and by Asians, one Western
observer commented in turn that: “This concept appears to be an effort to
redefine the idea of security on terms that cast China as a regional security
provider and the United States as an over-assertive outsider that threatens
to undermine regional security.”11

New Type of Great Power Relations (NTGPR)

NTGPR (variedly translated as “New Type of Major Power Relations” and
“New Model of Major Country Relations”) was first introduced by then
Vice President Xi Jinping during his visit to Washington in February 2012,
and fleshed out more specifically at the Sunnylands Summit with U.S.
President Obama in June 2013.12 It refers to China’s proposal that its

10 Jiang Zhida, “Asian Security Concept and Its Implications for Regional Order: From a
Normative Perspective,” China Institute of International Studies website, November 24,
2014 http://www.ciis.org.cn/english/2014-11/26/content 7398414.htm
11 David Cohen, “‘A Clash of Security Concepts’: China’s Effort to Redefine Security,”
China Brief, Vol. 14 No. 11 (June 4, 2014), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/
single/?cHash¼86683f8705325a5f31654080b698b0c5&tx ttnews%5Btt news%5D¼42465#.
Vj8WB2QrKgQ.
12 The concept was first articulated by Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo to a U.S.
audience at the Brookings Institution in late 2008.
 66 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 2, No. 1

relations with the United States be characterized as “no conflict or con-

frontation” (i.e., escaping what many believe to be the historical pattern of
rival powers resorting to hegemonic wars), “mutual respect” (i.e., accept-
ing rather than undermine each other’s social system and “core interests”),
and “win-win cooperation” (i.e., benefits for both sides as well as the rest
of the world). Strategic trust, practical cooperation and people-to-people
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contacts were seen as the key; the Asia Pacific arena was touted to be the
priority.13
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

During the October 2015 visit by Xi Jinping to Washington, this was

mentioned again but appeared to have been completely ignored by
Obama. U.S. reluctance may be explained as an unwillingness to recognize
Chinese core interests or its ambition to achieve equal status with the U.S.,
which triggered yet more nationalist Chinese pride. As one Chinese
analyst noted:

While China has been making efforts to promote this new con-
cept, the U.S. has been reluctant to embrace it for a number of
reasons. What China wants to achieve with the slogan is in-
creased status and influence, while the U.S. views a “new type of
major power relations” as finding solutions to global problems.14

More importantly, the U.S. is suspicious of China’s intentions in putting

forward this new idea. Some scholars cite three points as reasons for China’s
enthusiasm for the new concept: (1) China wants equal status with the
United States as superpower; (2) China wants the U.S. to recognize its core
interests; (3) China is catering to domestic policy needs, namely fostering
stronger nationalistic pride under the CPC leadership.
For China, the priority is to have a principled agreement with the
United States to respect China’s core interests such as sovereignty, security

13 Wang Yi, “Toward a New Model of Major Country Relations,” Brookings Institution,
September 20, 2013 http://www.brookings.edu//media/events/2013/9/20-U.S.-china-for-
eign-minister-wang-yi/wang-yi-english-prepared-remarks.pdf.
14 ChenDingding, “Defining a ‘New Type of Major Power Relations,”’ The Diplomat,
November 8, 2014 http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/defining-a-new-type-of-major-power-
relations/.
 China’s Strategic Foreign Initiatives Under Xi Jinping 67

and development, which would lay the foundation for further cooperation.
But the United States considers some of China’s core interests themselves as
controversial, and prefers that the two sides cooperate first on specific
issues, foster mutual trust in the process, and only then (if at all) define any
new foundation for big power relations.15
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2+7 Cooperation Framework for China-Southeast Asia Relations

Following Premier Li Keqiang’s and President Xi Jinping’s five-country visit
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

to Southeast Asia in October 2013, China put forward a proposal consisting

of a “two-point political consensus” and “seven proposals for cooperation”
with Southeast Asia. The so-called two-point political consensus stated that
the basis for promoting cooperation is deeper strategic trust and good
neighborliness, and that the key to deepening China-ASEAN cooperation is
by focusing on economic development and expanding mutual benefit. The
seven-point proposals include signing a treaty on good-neighborliness,
upgrading the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) to raise bilateral
trade to one trillion dollars by 2020, setting up the earlier mentioned AIIB to
finance mushrooming regional connectivity projects, building a 21st cen-
tury “Maritime Silk Road” and pursuing greater defense and security
exchanges.
In regard to the latter, China had proposed the establishment of an
“ASEAN þ China” defense dialogue, but ASEAN’s reaction was initially
not too enthusiastic. Beijing finally organized an ASEAN-China Defense
Ministers’ Informal Meeting (ACDMIM) on the sidelines of the October
2015 Xiangshan Forum (a China-led security conference), during which it
further launched a five-point proposal, including boosting defense ties
through the continued building of security mechanisms; deepening of co-
operation in functional areas ranging from humanitarian operations and
military medicine science to anti-piracy and anti-terrorism; and the man-
agement of disputes including through the holding of new joint drills.16

15 Chen Jimin, “China-U.S.: Obstacles to a ‘New Type of Major Power Relations,”’ The
Diplomat, April 9, 2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/china-U.S.-obstacles-to-a-new-type-
of-major-power-relations/.
16 PrashanthParameswaran, “China Reveals New Proposal to Boost Defense Ties with
ASEAN,” The Diplomat, October 17, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/10/china-reveals-
new-proposal-to-boost-defense-ties-with-asean/.
 68 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 2, No. 1

Nevertheless, ASEAN’s and its member states’ reactions have yet to be

made clear.

\Dual Track" approach in the South China China’s “Dual Track”

Sea approach signals its
enduring resistance
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With respect to the management of the South

China Sea disputes, China has all along em- to a multilateral
phasized that this is not a dispute between
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approach to settling
China and ASEAN, but between China and
only some ASEAN countries. In this light, South China Sea
China resisted efforts by ASEAN to play a role, disputes.
insisting instead on holding only bilateral
consultations with individual countries while
holding on to its position that it had “indisputable sovereignty” in the area.
Chinese diplomacy was also seen to be trying to prevent ASEAN member
states from coming to agreement on this issue. However, ASEAN is in-
creasingly keen to place territorial and maritime disagreements on the
agenda of its dialogues with China, including negotiations leading to the
2002 Declaration of Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), and
continuing efforts to negotiate a legally binding “code of conduct (COC).”
Several ASEAN countries’ trust deficit in China has in fact deepened in
the last three years because of China’s growing power and greater asser-
tiveness in the enforcement of its interests, culminating in its massive island
construction on seven reefs. The reef construction, alongside China’s con-
tinuing control of Scarborough Reef (seized after a standoff with the Phi-
lippines in 2012) and the declaration of an Air Defense Identification Zone
(ADIZ) over disputed areas in the East China Sea, are seen by many in the
region as “changing facts on the ground” or altering the status quo through
both military and civilian power projection. Aside from Vietnam and the
Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia became targets of Chinese unilateral
assertions of territorial sovereignty as well. To address this deficit in stra-
tegic trust, as well as to undercut the impact of the Philippines bringing the
maritime disputes to an international arbitration process against China’s
wishes and without its participation, the new “dual track approach” by
China on the South China Sea calls for “relevant disputes being addressed
by countries directly concerned through friendly consultations and nego-
tiations and in a peaceful way,” together with “peace and stability in the
 China’s Strategic Foreign Initiatives Under Xi Jinping 69

South China Sea being jointly maintained by China and ASEAN countries.”
This proposal reflects continuing resistance to multi-lateralizing the solu-
tion to the disputes, but shows cognizance that ASEAN as a whole has
a legitimate stake in how the disputes affect its immediate security
environment.
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Deconstructing China’s New Strategy

China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

This section enumerates some interpretations that the author as an outside

observer has drawn from observing Chinese statements, behavior, and
interactions with other countries in recent years, especially in relation to Xi
Jinping’s new strategic initiatives and what they signal to the region and to
the world. The author, in addition, strives to fathom implications for the
nation-states of Southeast Asia.
First: Chinese leaders appear to envision their country growing into a power with
global reach because of its global economic interests.
With its current status as the world’s biggest trading nation, the second
largest (and in the future, the largest) economy, and the most populous
country on the planet, China lies in eager anticipation of the impending
power shift when Asia reaches new prominence as the global center of
economic and political power. When that moment comes, China is not only
determined to be a regional power but a global one, and not just a conti-
nental power but a maritime one.
Its “Belt and Road” initiatives are part of this. From where China sits in
East Asia, it looks west by land and south by sea to envisage raw material
sources, markets, investment destinations, and value chains, all the way to
South and Central Asia, Europe, West Asia and Africa (but not entirely
forgetting the South Pacific) to build financial, commercial, and people-to-
people linkages. The analogy with the ancient Silk Road aptly invokes
China’s past as a major source and destination of economic and civiliza-
tional influences, which we are told was devoid of aspirations of territorial
conquest and armed conflict.
Especially under the situation of a “new normal”, with slower eco-
nomic growth and weak demand for its manufactures in the West, China’s
economic future will rely more on domestic consumption and opening up
these new linkages. Among others, China needs new markets, sources of
 70 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 2, No. 1

raw materials and energy, infrastructure construction contracts to absorb

surplus labor and equipment now running in oversupply, and logistics
hubs to seamlessly facilitate commerce. On the maritime front, it will need
capability for anti-piracy and anti-terrorist operations for protection of
navigational freedom and safety, as well as access to refueling and repair
stations. The AIIB can help pave the way for all of these.
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This economic vision may contain the justification for China’s naval
and air force expansion and defense modernization


such was the case in
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history with economic powers that came before it.

Second: China believes that to be a global power, it The ultimate driver

must have comprehensive attributes of power in-
of China’s more
cluding capability, resources, and the opportunity
and willingness to lead. assertive posture is
China’s current crop of leaders seem to
its rising economic
believe that the time has come for them to power and global
pursue new technological breakthroughs, in- economic interests.
cluding major military advances, to ensure the
country’s pride of place among the ranks of big
powers. No more biding time or hiding capacities as Deng Xiaoping cau-
tioned; no more reluctance or shying away from opportunities to lead.
They appear to think that China’s accumulated power should serve its
purpose, including announcing China’s great achievements as well as its
ambitions, and warning others not to try and get in the way. Thus, China
holds military parades to show off its most advanced weapons. It sends its
navy to the Gulf of Aden for anti-piracy operations; acquires an aircraft
carrier that it will eventually build into a battle group (and some analysts
say eventually three or four more); builds a nuclear submarine base in
Hainan; and invests its scientific energies on ways to block U.S. missile
defense systems.
Presenting a high diplomatic profile also sends the same message. The
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the BRICS formation, and the
CICA under China’s careful nurturing have all become platforms for
enunciating China’s alternative visions of the world order.
Third: China understands that it can only be a major power if other major powers
acknowledge and accept it as an equal.
 China’s Strategic Foreign Initiatives Under Xi Jinping 71

China’s proposal for a new type of major power relations may essen-
tially be a demand that other big powers treat it as an equal, respect its core
interests, and avoid going down the path of conflict that many believe to be
inevitable whenever systemic power transitions take place. Carrying the
collective memory of the “Hundred Years of Humiliation” that the Chinese
party-state keeps alive, many among the Chinese political elite seem to
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believe that the United States, supported by its allies, will never agree
to accord China an equal status, let alone hand over global leadership reins
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

to China if and when the time comes as China expects.

If China cannot be at least an equal in the global institutions already in
place (the Bretton Woods system being a case) or if institutions are seen to
deliberately exclude or target China for isolation or containment (the TPP
and U.S. alliances come to mind), then China will create its own institu-
tions. The AIIB, BRICS New Development Bank, CICA and the New Asian
Security Concept, the Xiangshan Forum, etc., can be developed into alter-
native China-led arrangements that may in turn try to exclude the U.S. and
those deemed unfriendly to China.
Fourth: To be a leader, China knows it must cultivate followers and friends,
especially in the ASEAN region.
Garnering the support of ASEAN is especially important in order for
China to step up to a new role as a responsible leader. It is with ASEAN
(and the rest of East Asia, in due time) that China can build a “community
of common destiny.” More than any other major regional actor, ASEAN has
extended to China the doubt as to what China’s strategic intentions are.
More than any other group of countries, ASEAN’s proximity, economic
dynamism, strategic location for China, and thus far its avowed neutrality
in big power politics make it a desirable partner for China. Moreover,
ASEAN collectively is not strong enough to challenge or threaten any of the
region’s big powers, including China. These are ten countries that share
some common principles and perspectives but otherwise do not have a
common China policy. China is the major bilateral trading partner and a
major source of aid and investments for some countries. However, histor-
ical animosities and territorial disputes involving some ASEAN member
states persist, leading to mistrust. In addition, historical and sociocultural
interactions between Southeast Asian peoples and those of China have
contributed to a complexity in ties that has recently become more
pronounced as China’s power and regional influence grow.
 72 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 2, No. 1

When it comes to the South China Sea territorial and maritime dis-
putes, the resistance of a few ASEAN states to China’s recent assertiveness
has pushed the whole group to take the issue more seriously. China’s “2 þ 7
cooperation framework” and “dual track approach” bifurcate economics
and security and dichotomize the resolution of territorial disputes on one
hand and cooperation in the promotion of regional peace and stability on
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the other. But the development of China-ASEAN relations has shown the
indivisibility of economic and strategic ties, as even countries that have the
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most intense trade and investment ties with China also have problems
overcoming strategic mistrust. Meanwhile, China’s island construction
efforts and various littoral states’ defense build-ups in the South China Sea
have placed the territorial disputes up front and at the center as a main
potential trigger of regional instability.
Fifth: Even among ASEAN states, China’s followers must be persuaded and en-
ticed. Respect and loyalty must be earned. Leadership means being ready to provide
followers with public goods.
Soft power matters; so does public diplomacy. In international rela-
tions, China is learning the lesson that trade, investment ties, development
assistance or economic favors alone do not guarantee long-term coopera-
tion, nor bring respect or admiration. For China’s economic relations to
translate into political goodwill and support, it requires sustained interac-
tions with ASEAN dedicated to confidence-building, providing security
assurances, as well as attention to social needs.
The ambitious Maritime Silk Road project ultimately offers not just
funds for infrastructure connectivity projects, but proposes cooperation in
scientific and technological research, and launches discussions on educa-
tion, health, poverty reduction, biodiversity
China is facing a
and so on. AIIB will be the financing compo-
nent but the project planning and implemen- dilemma between
tation will require policy coordination, reassuring its
partnerships, and making use of existing bi- neighbors and
lateral and multilateral mechanisms. Ambi-
tious as the vision is, success depends much on
asserting its rights
the readiness of other countries to embrace and interests in the
and work hard on this. Thus far, this is turning region.
out to be a great challenge.
 China’s Strategic Foreign Initiatives Under Xi Jinping 73

Sixth, and finally: If persuasion fails, coercive diplomacy is always an option.

Ultimately, being a big power is about protecting and promoting its own interests.
China’s vision is clear, and part of its realist assumptions is that, being
a big power in its part of the world, it will not encounter much resistance
from smaller states in its periphery. Even in instances where the pursuit of
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its economic, sovereignty and security goals brings it into conflict with
other states, China appears to believe that it has the means to prevail. That
China seems to have abandoned self-restraint and pushed hard in relation
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

to its territorial and maritime disputes with Japan in the East China Sea
and with the Philippines, Vietnam, and even Malaysia in the South China
Sea shows that reputational costs are no longer given as much weight as
they used to be.
Exchanges with some Chinese scholars and analysts also reveal a
hubristic belief that, even if some states have difficulty adjusting to a new
environment where China will have become the dominant power, they will
eventually get used to the inevitable reality. When push comes to shove,
countries will care most about economic welfare, these analysts argue, for
as long as cooperation with China can offer material benefits, perceptions of
threat can be mitigated.

Implications for Southeast Asia

Restating the above narrative, this article has constructed China’s new
foreign strategy under Xi Jinping as having a softer tone but a more
muscular posture. In brief, China wants to be a global power now that it
has global economic interests. It has achieved much by way of capability,
and is now demonstrating a willingness to lead and a readiness to assert
its own interests even at high reputational cost. Power status for China
means acknowledgment by other great powers as an equal, something
China wants badly, does not yet enjoy, and will insist on achieving.
China is in the meantime cultivating strategic followers and friends, es-
pecially in the ASEAN region, by instruments of persuasion and by of-
fering to provide public goods. However, if persuasion fails, more
coercive forms of diplomacy remain an option, as they have been
resorted to before.
 74 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 2, No. 1

For many ASEAN states, there are “dualities” in Chinese policy that
give pause to their full embrace of the “Chinese dream.” The first is the
duality between what China says and what it does, which highlights a
decline in China’s credibility and a growing trust deficit between China and
many of its neighbors.
The second is the duality between China’s efforts to woo and charm
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some ASEAN countries, and its demonstration of more coercive inclina-

tions towards others. The latter underscores China’s latent influence and
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

capacity to divide the ASEAN into those who tend to unconditionally

support China’s rise and those who would oppose it, a choice that few of
the member states are ready to make.
How China’s new power and affluence are translating into major de-
fense upgrades, its uncompromising stance on longstanding territorial
disputes (including inexplicable intransigence towards Japan), and muscle
flexing through expanded presence and activity in the South China Sea,
have signaled determination to achieve the strategic dimensions of the
“Chinese dream,” even as it pledges good-neighborliness, cooperation, and
peaceful intent.
In recent years, China has extended offers of massive aid and
investments particularly for Maritime Silk Road countries (through the
“Belt and Road” initiatives and AIIB), and hinted at its readiness to take
greater responsibility for Asian security (NASC) as well as cooperate with
other big powers (NTGPR). It also continues to discuss with ASEAN the
establishment of a binding COC for the South China Sea. At the same time,
however, China has been deploying its newly organized Coast Guard,
paramilitary and civilian militia17 to the frontlines and extreme reaches of
the South China Sea in order to assert its “indisputable sovereignty” and
enforce rights in an area that is not only in dispute with four ASEAN
states, but also one that is vital to global trade, energy supply, as well as
regional food and environmental security. Aside from Vietnam and the
Philippines with whom territorial tensions for many years has led to se-
rious fraying of ties, Malaysia and Indonesia in recent years have begun to

17 James Kraska, “China’s Maritime Militia Upends Rules on Naval Warfare,” The
Diplomat, August 10, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/chinas-maritime-militia-upends-
rules-on-naval-warfare/.
 China’s Strategic Foreign Initiatives Under Xi Jinping 75

feel similar pressures from Chinese military presence and law enforcement
activities at or near the James Shoal, South Luconia Shoal, and Natuna gas
fields.
Meanwhile, China continues to block
ASEAN is neither Filipino fishermen from accessing fishing
grounds in the Scarborough Shoal, and has
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ready to accept any prevented resupply and repair missions sent

major power’s by the Philippine government to the Second
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

dominance of Thomas Shoal, where a grounded ship has

been functioning as a Philippine outpost
Southeast Asia, nor
since 1999. Dialogue between the two
willing to take sides countries has effectively been suspended
in a big-power game. since the standoff between armed authorities
occurred in 2012 and after the Philippines
filed a case for international arbitration
against China in 2013, accusing it of preventing the Philippines from
enjoying its sovereign rights under UNCLOS in its maritime zones. China
refuses to participate in the arbitration process, or to recognize the arbi-
tration panel’s jurisdiction, asserting that aside from sovereignty, it had
enjoyed prior historic rights in the South China Sea before UNCLOS en-
tered into force. On a more positive note, however, China has welcomed
the Philippines to be part of its Maritime Silk Road and AIIB, and dialogue
between both foreign ministries has resumed, in part driven by coordi-
nation on APEC matters as host countries for the 2014 and 2015 Summits.
Most significant of all, China has undertaken massive reclamation
activities in its occupied features in the Spratly (Nansha) Islands, leading to
the construction of facilities, ports, and airstrips of an unprecedented scale
for the area. Despite China’s assurances of “mainly” peaceful civilian uses
of the new facilities, this has exacerbated other countries’ suspicion of its
military intentions, while also resulting in possibly irreversible damage to
the area’s fragile reef ecosystems and fisheries. Reacting to what may be a
move by China to establish strategic presence and control of the area, the
U.S. and Japan have stepped in to support other littoral states in building
up their maritime security and defense capabilities. This, we recall, follows
their own tensions with China in recent years over China’s declaration of an
ADIZ in the East China Sea, and some air and sea incidents between China
 76 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 2, No. 1

and the U.S. showing disagreement over what constitute legitimate military
activities at sea.
Does such a vision, or the “Chinese dream,” interpreted and deduced
from Xi Jinping’s new strategic initiatives, converge with Southeast Asia’s
own concepts and preferences of regional order?
The idea of China playing a leading role in a new Asian hierarchical
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order, becoming a provider of public goods, balancing the influence of

other big powers, or being at the center of seamlessly interconnected eco-
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

nomic and cultural activity as apparently envisioned by the new strategic

initiatives, may not be particularly objectionable from the perspective of
Southeast Asia, and may even be welcomed by most. With few exceptions,
Southeast Asian countries have since ancient times lived with China under
a peaceful environment and enjoyed mutually beneficial trade and people-
to-people relations. Therefore, with assurances that the future will be the
same, ASEAN may be prepared to offer deference and accommodation
towards China.
However, there are serious concerns and questions about the future of
China-Southeast Asia relations that surface as we look into the implications
of both China’s foreign policy assertiveness (i.e., insistence on rights and
entitlements) and its proactiveness (i.e., ambitious assistance and cooper-
ation proposals).
ASEAN was created in 1967 by post-colonial small- and middle-power
states who at the time were driven to unite by a need for strategic auton-
omy, i.e., the desire to retain influence over their own destinies, indepen-
dent of machinations and interference by big powers. During the Cold War,
ASEAN’s approach to autonomy was essentially to try to keep all the big
powers at bay. After the Cold War, by having all the big powers engaged
and balancing each other’s influence, ASEAN managed to attain the same
goal. The desire for autonomy has been expressed in ASEAN agreements
such as the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality, support for nonalign-
ment by key member states, and the long-held fundamental principle of
“non-interference in internal affairs” as applied to ASEAN’s relations with
non-ASEAN states. In other words, barring a major direct threat to ASEAN
from one of the big powers, ASEAN was not and is not willing to allow
dominant powers to dominate Southeast Asia, nor is it ready to choose one
power over the others. The worst that might result from ASEAN member
states being forced to choose between big powers is that divisions would
 China’s Strategic Foreign Initiatives Under Xi Jinping 77

deepen and lead to a split, thus destroying any value that ASEAN collec-
tively represents for the big powers.
Will a China-led Asian regional order
While ASEAN preserve ASEAN’s strategic autonomy?
members welcome What appeared to be an initial lukewarm
some aspects of response to China’s 21st Century Maritime
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Silk Road initiative, in contrast to the quick

China’s new embrace of AIIB, seems to indicate precisely
China Q of Int' l Strategic Stud 2016.02:57-79. Downloaded from www.worldscientific.com

initiatives, they are that while China’s support, resources and

cautious of China even leadership in some areas may be wel-
exerting too much come, there is some discomfort at giving
China free pass to intrude more robustly into
influence through their economies and territories through
“connectivity” “connectivity” projects. Countries (or com-
projects. panies) are wary that having higher reliance
on China for markets, investment, loans and
aid will make it more difficult for them to
make choices that might displease China.
Already, China has shown indications that it expects Southeast Asian
nations to value their relationships with China more than their ties with the
U.S.18 The narrative of China’s rise and U.S. decline is one that has been so
brazenly insinuated by China in ASEAN circles that later, sensing ASEAN
resistance as well as the danger of a U.S. blowback, China’s leaders had to
back off and retreat into Xi Jinping’s statement that the Asia Pacific is “big
enough” to accommodate both powers.19
The 21st Century Maritime Silk Road proposal is laudable in many
respects. But how do China and some ASEAN countries, the Philippines
and Vietnam most especially, but also Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore,
begin to build strategic trust when recent experience shows China belittling
their legitimate interests and concerns and in some cases using coercive

18 Patrick M. Cronin and Cecilia Zhou “U.S. and China’s Dueling Visions of ASEAN,”
The Diplomat August 10, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/08/U.S.-and-chinas-dueling-
visions-of-asean/.
19 Sangwon Yoon, “Xi Tells Kerry China and U.S. Can both be Pacific Powers,”
Bloomberg Business, May 5 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-17/xi-
sees-room-for-both-china-u-s-as-powers-in-pacific-region.
 78 China Quarterly of International Strategic Studies Vol. 2, No. 1

behavior to get its way? Can China be a reliable provider of security and
stability as public goods to the region if it is itself a key party in the terri-
torial contentions and power rivalries that are the likely causes of conflict?
In its recent actions, particularly island construction activities in six reefs in
the South China Sea, China seems to have made little effort to diminish
perceptions of threat and has even dragged its feet on or resisted initiatives
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by ASEAN states to better manage the problem (such as negotiations on the

COC and the arbitration suit by the Philippines).
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The broader Asian security architecture envisioned by China in CICA

and its proposed New Asian Security Concept (i.e., Asians managing Asian
security) are obviously intended to undermine the U.S. system of bilateral
alliances, now criticized by China as anachronistic remnants of a bygone
era. But beyond the rhetorical flourish, will implementing such a concept
not also diminish the relevance of ASEAN’s security role and ASEAN
centrality by undermining the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum,
and ADMM Plus


all ASEAN mechanisms in which the United States
plays an important role? More importantly, will China’s perceived attempts
to build multilateral arrangements in Asia that keep the United States out,
and similar moves by the United States to exclude China such as the TPP,
bring to an end ASEAN’s longstanding efforts to build more inclusive and
cooperative regional arrangements?
Given the current tense security situation in the seas of East Asia, will
China’s continued military buildup and expansion of its Coast Guard



even granting peaceful intent and responsible leadership by China


not
spur a full-blown regional arms race and turn a relatively peaceful and
stable region into one with high risk of armed conflict? This is in light of
both the territorial and maritime jurisdiction disputes, as well as absence of
clear agreement among states on what are acceptable military activities in
the EEZs or airspace above disputed areas.

Conclusion

This article attempts to understand China’s new strategic initiatives in

foreign relations under Xi Jinping, and their implications for ASEAN. It
argues that collectively, these initiatives describe a new regional and global
order that China aspires toward



one where it is able to promote and
protect worldwide economic interests, play a leading role in a regional
 China’s Strategic Foreign Initiatives Under Xi Jinping 79

hierarchy, enjoy the respect of other big powers and deference by smaller
ones, and maximize the benefits of power and new-found wealth to retrieve
its rightful place in the world and therefore finally put the narrative and the
burden of the “Hundred Years of Humiliation” behind it.
The greatest obstacle to this vision is not that other countries find it
difficult to accept it; it is the fact that China is also still trying to defend
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primordial territorial and cultural-ideational interests, settle historical

scores, and find effective paths for its domestic politics and governance that
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will serve its increasingly globalized economy. In this regard, its leaders
have shown little inclination to make the compromises and sacrifices that
lasting regional leadership entails. In the perceptions of some countries in
its immediate neighborhood, China offers one open hand of cooperation
and at the same time a fist ready to pound. In response, these countries offer
one arm ready to embrace and one poised to fend off unwanted advances.
This is the basic contradiction that Xi Jinping’s new strategic initiatives will
need to overcome if they are to succeed.