Introduction: Situating Metaphysics and

Epistemology in Qualitative Research

In: Epistemology and Metaphysics for Qualitative Research

By: Tomas Pernecky

Pub. Date: 2017
Access Date: September 23, 2019
Publishing Company: SAGE Publications Ltd
City: 55 City Road
Print ISBN: 9781446282397
Online ISBN: 9781473982956
DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781473982956
Print pages: 3-32
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Introduction: Situating Metaphysics and Epistemology in Qualitative

Research

Epistemology and metaphysics are the fundamental philosophical pillars of any research. While most human
beings make epistemological and metaphysical judgements on a daily basis, unless engaged in a scholarly
activity, the average person does not contemplate complex philosophical questions, such as whether invisible

subatomic particles can be said to exist or the possibility of social reality. Rather, we1 trust our senses
and take our perceptions for granted. This introductory chapter prepares the ground for our inquiry centred
on the problem of knowledge and reality within the wider qualitative landscape. The chapter begins by
signposting some of the key views and events that have contributed to the ways in which qualitative
research unfolds today. A secondary, but no less important, aim is to provide a critical assessment of the
increasingly challenging philosophical terrains students and academics must navigate. It will be argued that
most conceptual schemata are limited in their capacity to capture the complexity and richness of the diverse
streams of philosophical thought that have emerged and evolved over the past two millennia, and that those
schemata responsible for the current paradigmatic dominance are too limiting to accomplish this task. As
qualitative research becomes a more heterogeneous blend of various philosophical stances in an intricate
web of interests, principles, ideals, and values, it is no longer sufficient to speak of only one way of embracing

realism or absolutism, of only one type of objectivism, or to take a univocal approach to constructionism,2
idealism, hermeneutics, or phenomenology. There are a multitude of philosophical and methodological
horizons which require us to think in terms of flows and continua as opposed to rigid frameworks. Although
there have been a number of useful conceptual structures devised to assist scholars in blending philosophical
decisions with methodologies and methods, and although these models will continue to play an important
role in qualitative research, they come with limitations. In order to demonstrate the various ways in which
philosophical assumptions can be organized to guide research, this chapter will concentrate on Crotty’s
(1998) structure of the research process, Lincoln and Guba’s (2000) outline of alternative inquiry paradigms,
and Lally’s (1981) anatomy of metatheoretical and epistemological assumptions in social science. These
frameworks have been selected for their popularity and to demonstrate their conceptual range. This chapter
concludes with a delineation of the core concerns raised along the way, upon which subsequent chapters are
built.

Multiple histories of qualitative research

Qualitative research, as defined for the purposes of this book, is a mode of inquiry capable of accommodating
a wide array of philosophical perspectives and methods, stretching on an attitudinal continuum from means
to orientation. This notion is discussed in more detail in Chapter 8, nonetheless it is imperative to establish
upfront that it would be too simplistic to conceive of qualitative research purely in terms of choosing a set
of methods. Rather, there are a number of considerations which determine the shape and scope of one’s

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project, including the research aims; the researcher’s or one’s own philosophical assumptions, values and
moral sensitivities; the impact on local communities and co-researchers’ lives; and, for some, also the critical
engagement with issues of emancipation, empowerment and silencing – intertwined with the act of inquiry.
Therefore, there is no single correct approach to qualitative research, and this text does not seek to offer a
simple definition that would accurately capture the immense variety of qualitative works. Such a reductionist
ideal would miss the point and be counterproductive for the task before us.

To articulate the different discourses and to show that qualitative research is a vibrant area benefiting from a
multitude of voices, Brinkmann, Jacobsen and Kristiansen (2014), who refer to it as a ‘field’, have chosen to
offer not just one historical account of it but a variety of histories. Their multi-faceted approach yields as many
as six types of historical accounts of qualitative research: conceptual, qualitative, internal, marginalizing,
repressed, social, and technological. In this section we briefly explore some of their differences.

With respect to the conceptual history of qualitative research, although the term itself is a relatively recent
one, the notion of it originates in the ideas of our philosophical predecessors who put in place the early
philosophical building blocks. Brinkmann et al. (2014) take note of the Enlightenment thinkers who
distinguished between the qualities (‘qualia’) and the quantities (‘quanta’) of things. For instance, they call
attention to Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832), who argued as early as 1810 that there is a
difference in the study of colours according to Newtonian optics and how colours are experienced through
the human senses. In Goethe’s view, the latter, embodied experience was just as significant as the physics
of colour perception, and his Theory of Colours is described by Brinkmann et al. as an early qualitative
phenomenological study. Other philosophical giants, including Descartes, Locke, and Hume, saw the need to
distinguish between primary qualities, those that are independent of observers, and secondary ones, which
are observer-dependent. This early separation between ‘appearances’ and the ‘intrinsic properties’ of objects
is, in contemporary terms, formulated as the problem of objectivism versus subjectivism, and will occupy us
later in the book.

We can go beyond Brinkmann et al. and probe even deeper into our historical past. The ancient philosophers
pondered many of the fundamental philosophical questions about knowledge with which we still grapple
today. For example, the proponents of scepticism, such as the Greeks Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrho,
contested the ‘givens’ of perception and radically undermined the views of the empirically oriented
philosophers. Likewise, the philosophical ideas put forth by the proponents of relativism, including Protagoras,
and later Wittgenstein, Feyerabend, and many others, played a major role in shaping the discourse between
the doctrines of realism and anti-realism. And therefore, as commented by Laudan, ‘struggles between realist
and relativist perspectives span the entire history of epistemology’ (1997: 139). When we adopt a longitudinal
approach to qualitative research, we realize that it is in many ways a continuation of the older debates – albeit
fuelled by contemporary concerns, novel theoretical perspectives, and innovative methods.

The second, internal history of qualitative research focuses our attention on the dedicated qualitative thinkers
from inside the field. Here, Brinkmann et al. (2014: 20) outline what they call the ‘three philosophical
foundations of qualitative research’: the German tradition of Verstehen, with figures such as Friedrich
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Schleiermacher (1768–1834), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911), and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002); the
phenomenological tradition of Edmund Husserl (1859–1938); and the North American traditions of
pragmatism, Chicago sociology, Erving Goffman’s (1922–1982) dramaturgical approach, symbolic
interactionism, and ethnomethodology. These traditions, of course, come with an elaborate list of intellectuals
– each making a contribution to what have become rather heterogeneous and at times radically different
schools of thought. Later in this book we will see that there is not just one phenomenology but rather a variety
of strands of phenomenological thought, that there is not just one symbolic interactionism but rather many
approaches within this tradition (Herman and Reynolds (1994) noted that there were up to 15 varieties), and
that there is no one univocal hermeneutics, idealism, or constructionism.

The third, marginalizing history of qualitative research is a reminder that qualitative researchers have been
subjected to hostile attitudes by scientifically oriented, or what are frequently called positivistically inclined,
academics for whom qualitative research does not meet the criteria of scientific inquiry. In this regard, what
is refreshing in the work of Brinkmann et al. (2014) is their acknowledgement of positivism as being too
quickly dismissed and typecast as the enemy of qualitative inquiry. Pointing out that not all positivists are
opposed to qualitative research, the authors comment that ‘when qualitative researchers distance themselves
from positivism, they most often construct a straw man [sic] and rarely, if ever, go back and read what early
positivists such as Comte, Schlick, or Carnap in fact had to say about research and human experience’ (2014:
31). This is a key point. We will follow this critical line of thought throughout this book, with Chapter 2 focusing
in on the doctrine of positivism and other varieties of empiricism and addressing some of the misconceptions
surrounding these.

In the fourth, repressed history of qualitative research, Brinkmann et al. provide an analysis of the discipline of
psychology as a way of demonstrating that the qualitative tradition has been ‘forgotten by the official journals
and handbooks of psychology to an extent that makes it resemble repression’ (2014: 32). The authors
argue that the qualitative character of such research as Piaget’s work with children, Gestalt psychologists’
investigations into perception, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body, and Bartlett’s work on
remembering is often omitted and ‘almost always neglected and repressed’ (2014: 32). This leads them to
the realization that, in charting various disciplinary developments, qualitative research has not always been
noted as having played a significant role, or even any role at all – a wholly unjustified view.

The fifth, social history of qualitative research underscores the necessity to take into account the social,
cultural, economic, and historical contexts within which qualitative research takes place. This approach is an
invitation to consider not only cultural and social movements, which undoubtedly created new opportunities
for scholars to think and express themselves differently (particularly in the 1960s and 1970s), but also
soft forms of power. Brinkmann et al. caution against the naïve conception of qualitative inquiry simply
as ‘progressive’ or ‘emancipatory’, and explain that qualitative market research, for example, has become
a powerful tool in the manipulation of consumers’ desires and behaviour. This is a critical reminder that
qualitative research is now firmly embedded in our social life and is applied for different purposes and
agendas, including those that are economic and political.

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The last type of history of qualitative research is the technological one. It makes allowance for the kinds
of devices researchers utilize to gather, manage, and make sense of qualitative data. From digital voice
recorders to the latest software programs, many contemporary researchers rely on a wide array of
technological innovations (Brinkmann et al., 2014). It is increasingly common for scholars to work with
electronic data, blogs, mind maps, transcription programs, and computer-assisted qualitative data analysis
software (CAQDAS) such as NVivo. Moreover, technology has been widely embraced and amalgamated into
relatively novel approaches and methods, such as visual methodologies (e.g., Hughes, 2012; Rogers, 2013;
Rose, 2012). Of course, as Brinkmann et al. point out, there are a number of issues related to the use of
technology. Its critics are concerned that the use of software programs to manage and analyze qualitative
data may lead to a certain type of analysis being favoured over others. Nonetheless, the twenty-first century
qualitative researcher can be not only a bricoleur (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005) but also a techno-savvy problem
solver who understands that technology is useful and necessary in a digital era. And if we consider that we
‘think through, with, and alongside media’ (Hayles, 2012: 1), then much of the future research in humanities
and qualitative social science is likely to rely on and incorporate the use of technology. However, there are
philosophical implications researchers ought to consider when adopting numerical approaches to qualitative
data, some of which are discussed in Chapter 8.

In addition to the types of histories noted above, an account of the developments in qualitative research can
be also organized around a focus on specific geographical areas. Flick (2009), for example, explains that in
Germany, advances on the front of qualitative research were marked by methodological consolidation and
a focus on procedural questions, whereas across the Atlantic, qualitative researchers were more concerned
about the issues of representation and the politics and practice of interpretation. He remarks that particularly
towards the end of the 1970s, German qualitative researchers reduced their reliance on the translations
of American works (what he calls the ‘import of American developments’) and began to develop original
research focusing on the application and analysis of interviews. By the 1980s, Schütze’s (1977) narrative
interview and Oevermann et al.’s (1979) objective hermeneutics had become pivotal in the development of
an original approach to qualitative research in Germany. The ‘historical moments’ delineated by Denzin and
Lincon (1994) stand as rather unique and specific to the North American context.

The ‘historical moments’ of qualitative research in North America

Norman Denzin and Yvonna Lincoln (1994) worked diligently to map several ‘historical moments’ in qualitative
research. These have become a popular way of chronologically marking specific ideas and concerns over
the past decades. As noted in the previous section, the moments correspond to developments within the
qualitative communities in North America, and have been outlined as follows: ‘the traditional (1900–1950); the
modernist or golden age (1950–1970); blurred genres (1970–1986); the crisis of representation (1986–1990);
the postmodern, a period of experimental and new ethnographies (1990–1995); postexperimental inquiry
(1995–2000); the methodologically contested present (2000–2004); and the future (2005–), which is now’
(Denzin, 2010b: 13). In the view of Denzin and Lincoln, qualitative research has reached the eighth moment,

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which ‘asks that the social sciences and the humanities become sites for critical conversations about
democracy, race, gender, class, nation-states, globalization, freedom, and community’ (Denzin & Lincoln,
2011a). We shall not describe each moment here, for this has now become the habit of nearly every text
on qualitative research, but we will address some of the concerns and misconceptions surrounding these
moments.

The act of conceptually dividing qualitative research into different periods or ‘moments’, and framing these in
terms of ‘progress’, has been questioned – particularly by scholars within the field of ethnography (Atkinson
et al., 1999, 2003; Atkinson et al., 2007; Delamont et al., 2000). Atkinson et al. argue that it is misleading to
assume that the early ethnographic figures saw their work as ‘positivist’, stating that they are not convinced
that ‘the kind of intellectual history repeatedly sketched by Denzin and Lincoln is wholly adequate’ (2003: 21).
Furthermore, they posit that Denzin and Lincoln’s chronological view ‘does a disservice to earlier generations
of ethnographers’ (2003: 197), and that ‘it is far from clear that there ever were such monolithically positivist
and modernist phases’ (2003: 26). In their opinion, it would be incorrect to assume that all ethnography in
past generations ‘was conducted under the auspices of a positivistic and totalizing gaze as it is to imply
that we are all postmodern now’ (2003: 27). Atkinson et al. make an important point about the impossibility
of capturing the development of qualitative research by designing a neat chronological system according to
which all qualitative scholars progress in a linear fashion. Nonetheless, Denzin and Lincoln acknowledge
that the various historical moments overlap and operate simultaneously, and further clarify these as marking
‘discernible shifts in style, genre, epistemology, ethics, politics and aesthetics’ (2011a: 16, see note 7). It
would indeed be problematic if Denzin and Lincoln were to claim a kind of linearity.

As far as ethnographic work in sociology and anthropology is concerned, according to Atkinson et al. (2003),
qualitative research is a ‘variegated domain of activity’, and the authors contrast the diehard traditionalist,
driven by reliability, validity and clear criteria, with the Old Guard, described as the methodological pioneers
of the 1950s and 1960s, and the Avant Garde, representing the adherents of new ethnography since 1985.
We learn that the postmodern Avant Garde scholars have questioned the universal criteria for objectivity,
the authority of the researcher, and the difficulties with neutral and independent representations of the social
world. They are largely relativists, ‘inherently political’, and thoroughly sceptical about ‘the authority and
legitimacy of more conventional notions of methodology, epistemology, and research practice’ (Atkinson et
al., 2003: 12). However, and this is an important ‘however’, the issues raised by the earlier scholars – the
pioneers of the field – are still valid and pertinent today. The point to be made is that it would be erroneous
to think that each instance of qualitative research has to conform to any particular historical moment. These
moments are more fittingly grasped in terms of preferences, trends, directions, tensions, and discussions
within certain communities of qualitative practice.

The four schools of symbolic interactionism

It has been well documented in the literature that anthropology and sociology were the disciplinary

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forerunners of qualitative research, and that it was largely the early ethnographic researchers who saw the
need to study the richness and diversity of people’s experiences, unique settings, customs, and traditions.
The foundations of the theoretical perspective in sociology called symbolic interactionism were laid down
mainly by George Herbert Mead (1863–1931), for whom the most crucial aspect about human society was
that it was ‘made up of persons with selves’, whereby the Self (see Mead, 1913) denoted something that
emerged as part of social interaction and thus become a social product (Reynolds, 1993: 58). We can
distinguish between four key strands of contemporary symbolic interactionism, represented by the Chicago,
Iowa, Indiana, and Illinois schools (Pascale, 2011). Taking brief stock of some of the historical antecedents is
useful for understanding the current debates, tensions, and approaches to qualitative research.

The Chicago School and the Iowa School

During the 1920s and 1930s the ethnographic studies conducted by the Chicago School were influential in
establishing qualitative research as an important tool in other domains of inquiry as well. Herbert Blumer later
cemented the term ‘symbolic interactionism’ during his tenure at the University of Chicago and formulated
the methodological position on which this term rests (see Blumer, 1986 [1969]). Most scholars practising
symbolic interactionism agree that human beings have the capacity to develop and use symbols as a way
of communicating and interacting with others, and that they also have the ability to self-reflect and perceive
of themselves as objects (Herman, 1994). In other words, one becomes the object of one’s own actions
(Reynolds, 1993). Whilst these views are generally shared by many symbolic interactionists, the point of
divergence lies in the methods seen as preferable for the study of humans and society. The formation of two
distinct approaches began in the 1960s with the Chicago School, led by Herbert Blumer, and the Iowa School,
founded by Manford Kuhn (Meltzer & Petras, 1970).

On the level of methodology, Blumer and the Chicago School promoted the observation of social processes,
whereas Kuhn and the Iowa School viewed such methods as inadequate, labelling them ‘high-class
journalism’ because they failed to reveal the generic principles of human behaviour (Weckroth, 1989: 213).
The scientifically-driven programme at the Iowa School in the area of social and behavioural sciences was
largely empirical in character, and guided by ‘quantifiable measurements within target samples’ (Katovich
et al., 2003: 119). Katovich et al. explain that Kuhn believed that ‘the hard work of an interactionist and
pragmatic science (Mead, 1938) would prove invaluable and would replace the more esoteric expressions of
interactionist ideas’ (2003: 120). In addition, Prus notes that Kuhn was interested in developing ‘standardized
measures of human behavior and deriv[ing] causal statements concerning human conduct, with the eventual
goal of predicting and controlling human behavior’ (1996: 77).

What this means with respect to the study of people and society is that these schools mark two distinct
philosophies. Drawing on the analysis of Herman (1994), we can say that the approaches advocated by the
Iowa School are more deterministic, that they employ a causal model of social organization, and that the
Self is viewed as the result of systems and structures, which are the focus of inquiry. From this standpoint,
structures – once created by individuals – become somewhat stable phenomena. The role and utility of the

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methods employed by the Iowa School, then, is to help us understand the causes of human behaviour.
According to Kuhn, ‘people’s behaviors were seen as caused by the sets of the self-attitudes they had
internalized with respect to this or that role’ (Prus, 1996: 77). On the other hand, the Chicago School saw
social structures as emergent phenomena, which come into being through the active agency of individuals –
shaping and co-creating social realities. The Self, within the Chicago School of approaches, was understood
to be the result of mutual interpretations (Herman, 1994). It is worth noting that Herbert Mead had a profound
influence on the research and scholarly perspectives within the Chicago tradition of sociology (Blumer, 1979);
we need only consider his views on the relation of individual Selves to the social whole to appreciate the
impact of his thought:

The self is something which has a development; it is not initially there, at birth, but arises in the
process of social experience and activity, that is, develops in the given individual as a result of his
relations to that process as a whole and to other individuals within that process [p. 135] […] The
process out of which the self arises is a social process which implies interaction of individuals in the
group, implies the preexistence of the group. It implies also certain co-operative activities in which
the different members of the group are involved. It implies, further, that out of this process there may
in turn develop a more elaborate organization than that out of which the self has arisen, and that
the selves may be the organs, the essential parts at least, of this more elaborate social organization
within which these selves arise and exist. (Mead, 1934: 164)

In terms of its chronological developments, it is useful to emphasize that after the Second World War
interactionist sociology at the University of Chicago continued to flourish, developing into a number of
research styles that later became known as ‘fieldwork’ and ‘ethnography’ (Atkinson & Housley, 2003).
Besides Mead and Blumer, there were many other influential researchers, such as Howard Becker, Erving
Goffman, Anselm Strauss, W. Lloyd Warner, Everett C. Hughes, and Gary A. Fine. Indeed not all sociologists
associated with the Chicago School can be said to have belonged to the same intellectual tradition, as pointed
out by Atkinson and Housley (2003). Some followed the work of Mead and Blumer, some the empirical
sociological research programme of W.I. Thomas and Robert Park; others were influenced by both.

The Indiana School and the Illinois School

There are two other influential institutions in the field of symbolic interactionism: Indiana University and the
University of Illinois. The Indiana School, led by Sheldon Stryker, is often perceived as a revised version of
the Iowa School programme because it follows rigorous empirical methods and draws largely on quantitative
approaches and mathematical models. Herman-Kinney and Verschaeve (2003) note, however, that there has
been a shift from positivism to pragmatism, and hence more flexibility in the use of both quantitative and
qualitative methods. The Illinois School is the home of Norman Denzin, who, despite having trained at the
University of Iowa under Manford Kuhn, followed a more ethnographically oriented approach to symbolic
interactionism and produced a version that draws on postmodern and poststructural theories (Pascale, 2011).
Denzin’s (2001) interpretive interactionism continues to focus on interactive processes on the basis that

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people can be understood through their interactions. His work combines ethnography with hermeneutics, but
also includes moral and political concerns. According to Denzin, the researcher has an important and active
role to play in the acts of interpretation and knowledge production; this theme has also arisen in his later work,
such as The Qualitative Manifesto (2010b).

From this quick glance, we can appreciate the extent to which the Chicago School influenced the early stages
of qualitative inquiry and the interpretive traditions. The Chicago School became the philosophical–theoretical
basis for many of the perspectives that are popular in qualitative research today – from phenomenological
inquiries into people’s experience and hermeneutics to social constructionist and pragmatist perspectives.
Norman Denzin continues to be the leading authority on interpretive interactionism and is well regarded for his
work in qualitative research internationally. The Iowa and Indiana schools favour positivist and quantitatively
oriented methods. Prus (1996) argues that the ‘new’ Iowa School (which was led by Carl Couch until 1994)
pays little attention to the individual’s perspective, and that the Indiana School follows the path of scientific
rigour, equations, and quantitative modelling (see, for example, Schneider & Heise, 1995).

The increasingly challenging qualitative terrains

The proliferation of qualitative inquiry is reflected in the growth of original research papers, journals, and
books, and also specialist seminars, workshops, and conferences. There is now a large pool of widely
accepted works by scholars invested in qualitative ways of thinking and knowing (see, for example, Atkinson
et al., 2003; Bogdan & Biklen, 2007; Creswell, 2013; Crotty, 1998; Denzin & Lincoln, 2011b; Hesse-Biber
& Leavy, 2010; Leavy, 2014; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Maxwell, 2012, 2013; Patton, 2002; Silverman, 1997,
2013, 2015; Slife & Williams, 1995; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2010). In addition, there is body of specialist
literature catering to the needs of qualitatively oriented academics within different disciplines, subdisciplines,
and fields of study. However, with the increased popularity of qualitative methods comes greater diversity
(Patton, 2002) and complexity (Atkinson et al., 2003) among qualitative methodologists and theorists. Denzin,
for example, is known for embracing a postmodern and poststructural stance, Lincoln sees herself as
an ‘avowed constructionist’ (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000: xi), Maxwell (2012, 2013) favours qualitative inquiry
informed by philosophical realism, and many researchers using mixed methods prefer to describe themselves
as pragmatic thinkers. This suggests that qualitative research is an umbrella term capable of accommodating
a wide range of philosophical stances.

Yet there has been a growing awareness of qualitative research as being too complex, muddled, and
confusing (Atkinson et al., 2003), and that it can be paralyzing for novice researchers (Seale, 2002). Not only
is there an immense amount of information to digest, there is also a lack of consistency among scholars in
the way they deploy terminology. As Merriam (2009) observes, philosophical and methodological concerns
have been variously called ‘traditions and theoretical underpinnings’, ‘theoretical traditions and orientations’,
‘theoretical paradigms’, ‘worldviews’, ‘epistemology and theoretical perspectives’. Furthermore, the list of
typologies and approaches claimed as underpinning qualitative research can be equally overwhelming.

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Creswell’s (2013: 8–10) summary shows that qualitative inquiry has become a conglomeration of methods,
methodologies, theoretical perspectives, and epistemological assumptions, all of which have been bundled
together and given the label ‘qualitative approaches’. Moreover, whereas in Denzin and Lincoln’s (1994,
2000, 2005, 2011b) handbooks we see a neat separation of ontological, epistemological, and methodological
assumptions in terms of guiding paradigms, Patton (2002) seems to take the opposite approach, refusing
to separate paradigms from philosophies, theoretical orientations, and design strategies. He argues that the
‘distinction between paradigmatic, strategic, and theoretical dimensions within any particular approach are
both arguable and somewhat arbitrary’ (2002: 80). Under the label of ‘theoretical traditions and orientations’,
he lists positivist, realist, and analytic induction approaches, ethnography, phenomenology, ecological
psychology, hermeneutics, symbolic interaction, constructivism, grounded theory, and even chaos and
complexity theory. These examples amply demonstrate that navigating the qualitative terrains can indeed be
a challenging task. In the next section, we examine three different conceptual schemata that continue to hold
relevance today, and in the last section of this chapter, we offer another framework – one that tackles the core
metaphysical and epistemological issues.

Crotty’s research design process

The concern over mixing up philosophical, methodological, and theoretical views, and the call to distinguish
among the different elements that make up the research process, are not new. Nearly two decades have
passed since the publication of Michael Crotty’s The Foundations of Social Research, yet one still finds
that methodologies, perspectives, and approaches are ‘thrown together in grab-bag style as if they were
all comparable terms’ (Crotty, 1998: 3). The point Crotty strove to emphasize was that constructionism, for
example, is not the same as phenomenology, which is not the same as case study. They each have a place
in the hierarchy of the research process (he calls it ‘different process elements’; 1998: 4). The conceptual
categories offered in Figure 1.1 are therefore a helpful starting point for novice researchers, as they aim
to equip academics with the confidence to combine complex philosophical ideas with practical steps. The
figure shows the four interconnected elements of research as envisioned by Crotty. These are epistemology,
theoretical perspective, methodology, and methods. Epistemology is the theory of knowledge: it signals to
the researcher the available theoretical perspectives and suitable methodologies and methods. A theoretical
perspective is described as ‘the philosophical stance informing the methodology and thus providing a context
for the process and grounding its logic and criteria’ (1998: 3). Methodology is the overall strategy for
reaching the research goal(s), whereas methods are the techniques or tools that help researchers collect
and analyze data. In Figure 1.1 we can see that by following this model, one can employ constructionism as
the epistemology, symbolic interactionism as the theoretical perspective, ethnography as the methodology,
and participant observation as a method. Moreover, it is apparent that the research design process is one
that should not be taken lightly. It needs to be a carefully mediated activity that culminates in a design
that has been well thought through and is reinforced by a strong degree of correspondence between the
four elements. Consequently, when working with Crotty’s schema, a researcher who aims to provide an
objective account of a social phenomenon may be discouraged from proposing a study that combines, say,
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the epistemology of constructionism with the theoretical perspective of phenomenology. We are told that the
path that starts with the epistemology of objectivism – the view that there are objective and mind-independent
facts about how things really are – leads, in a ‘typical string’ (1998: 5), to the theoretical perspective of
positivism and to quantitative methods. This way, survey research and statistical analysis might be employed
to obtain a sufficient amount of data and confidence so that findings can be generalized to the population at
large. Similarly, Crotty argues that symbolic interactionism is ‘thoroughly constructionist in character’ (1998:
4), leading him to propose a pathway from constructionism to symbolic interactionism to ethnography to
participant observation. We already know, however, that there are different schools of symbolic interactionism
(such as the Iowa School), and therefore we must treat claims of symbolic interactionism as ‘thoroughly
constructionist’ with caution. The problem before us is that there are multiple pathways and combinations that
are not obvious, and in fact not even permitted, within Crotty’s model.

The distinction between objectivism and subjectivism has traditionally divided quantitative and qualitative
researchers, with the quantitative aligned with objectivism and the qualitative with subjectivism. This
characterization glosses over the fact that qualitative research can also be driven by objectivity, and
underpinned by realism where philosophical assumptions are concerned. Objectivism can be found in
nearly all philosophical orientations and methodological approaches, including idealism, hermeneutics,
phenomenology, and even constructionism. Thus, one can indeed abide by the principles of objectivism and
realism while engaging in hermeneutic research, as demonstrated in Chapter 4.

Another problem with Crotty’s model is that the subjective–objective divide has been gradually replaced

by the notions of intersubjectivity and intentionality.3 We will devote an entire chapter to social ontology
later in the book, but for now suffice it to say that most social scientists concur, to varying degrees, that
meaning is constituted in collaborative ways with other agents, recognizing that we do not think and interact
in isolation. This means that it is no longer sufficient to contrast objectivism with subjectivism, especially

when subjectivism is taken as the view that ‘meaning is created out of nothing’4 (Crotty, 1998: 9). To claim
that social facts, such as money, presidents, and tourists, are socially constructed does not (inherently)
warrant subjectivism: in epistemology, social constructionism can be compatible with objectivism. In other
words, a number of scholars have argued that it is possible to have objective knowledge about socially
constructed social facts (e.g., Lawson, 2015; Nola & Sankey, 2007; Searle, 2010). But since objectivism
and constructionism are juxtaposed by Crotty as competing epistemologies in Figure 1.1, we are left with a
somewhat muddled perspective.

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Figure 1.1 Crotty’s elements of the research design process

Source: Adapted from Crotty (1998: 5).

The vigilant reader will notice that missing in Crotty’s schema is ontology. Crotty states that ‘ontological
issues and epistemological issues tend to emerge together’ (1998: 10), informing the theoretical perspective.
Although Crotty takes a materialist stance, proclaiming that ‘the world is there regardless of whether human
beings are conscious of it’ (1998: 10), it might be less clear to the novice researcher what precisely ought
to ‘emerge’ philosophically with regard to ontology and in conjunction with epistemology. We will see in
the chapters to come that different ontological entities have ‘emerged’ to varying degrees among different
thinkers. One can be a realist not only about rocks and trees, but also about numbers, universal laws, social
facts, electrons, and so forth. Much confusion and ambiguity can arise if we are not careful about discerning
between what kinds of things are claimed to exist.

Overall, Crotty’s framework remains a valuable tool for organizing the different elements in a research
process; nonetheless, it fails to thoroughly capture the unavoidable complexity of philosophical thought and
the spectrum of possibilities in research design.

Qualitative research as ‘paradigms’

The word ‘paradigm’ has become an inevitable part of any researcher’s vocabulary. Despite its revival in
the twentieth century by various philosophers of science and the popularity it continues to enjoy among
scholars today, it had been used rather sporadically and with somewhat varying meanings in the preceding
historical periods. In his introduction to the fiftieth anniversary edition of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of
Scientific Revolutions, originally published in 1962, Ian Hacking (2012) traces its origins to the Greeks, who
used the word paradeigma to suggest a ‘best possible example’. The closest translation of the term is thus
‘exemplar’. Hacking notes that ‘paradigm’ was also employed by members of the Vienna Circle in the 1930s,

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and was known to appear in the writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein. But it was Kuhn who brought it to the fore
of philosophical debates and ‘single-handedly changed the currency of the word’ (Hacking, 2012 [1962]: xvii).
Kuhn himself explained paradigms as ‘accepted examples of actual scientific practice’ (2012 [1962]: 11).
He proposed that these exemplars – bound up with scientific theories, laws, instruments, and experiments
– provide the necessary basis for scientific traditions and the formation of particular scientific communities.
Paradigms, according to Kuhn, could be observed historically, and represented communities of scholars who
shared similar principles, practices, and traditions (e.g., models, exemplars, generalizations). As he put it,
‘Men [sic] whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards
for scientific practice. That commitment and the apparent consensus it produces are prerequisites for normal
science, i.e., for the genesis and continuation of a particular research tradition’ (2012 [1962]: 11). Figures
such as Copernicus, Newton, and Einstein played a role in transforming the scientific imagination ‘in ways
that we shall ultimately need to describe as transformation of the world within which scientific work was done’
(2012 [1962]: 6).

In the domain of qualitative research, the notion of paradigms has been established and cemented in on
a global scale largely through several landmark texts, of which the most influential have been Naturalistic
Inquiry (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), The Paradigm Dialog (Guba, 1990), Fourth Generation Evaluation (Guba &
Lincoln, 1989), and the numerous editions of the Handbook of Qualitative Research (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994,
2000, 2005, 2011b), as well as the paperback editions of The Landscape of Qualitative Research (see, for
example, Denzin & Lincoln, 2013). Following Kuhn, scholars committed to advancing qualitative inquiry gave
the notion of paradigm a predominantly philosophical and methodological meaning. This is most apparent
in the description of the paradigm, or ‘interpretive framework’ (Guba, 1990), as ‘a distillation of what we
think about the world (but cannot prove)’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985: 15), and as a combination of ontological,
epistemological, and methodological assumptions (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011a). By using the term ‘paradigm’
in this fashion, Lincoln and Guba were able to separate various philosophical and methodological concerns
into distinct categories. The ongoing process of reorganizing qualitative research according to paradigms has
reinforced a conceptual schema that has been in place for nearly three decades.

There is now a widely accepted order that sees qualitative inquiry as organized according to four key
paradigms: positivism, postpositivism, critical theory, and constructivism (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). These
have been gradually developed in the literature over the past two decades (e.g., Lincoln et al., 2011:
100) to accommodate new directions and concerns, as shown in Table 1.1. Denzin and Lincoln (2011a)
see qualitative researchers as situated within four key abstract interpretive paradigms: positivist and

postpositivist,5 constructivist–interpretive, critical (Marxist, emancipatory), and feminist–poststructural. In

addition, they have been expanding the paradigm territories in order to accommodate ‘specific ethnic,
feminist, endarkened, social justice, Marxist, cultural studies, disability, and non-Western-Asian paradigms’
(2011a: 13). This shows that contemporary qualitative inquiry is firmly set in the grooves of paradigms.
Hacking comments that ‘[t]oday, it is pretty hard to escape the damn word [paradigm], which is why Kuhn
wrote even in 1970 that he had lost control of it’ (Hacking, 2012 [1962]: xix). Qualitative researchers have
perhaps also lost control over the use of the word, demonstrated by phrases like ‘qualitative paradigm’ (e.g.,
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Carter, Lubinsky, & Domholdt, 2013; Hatch, 2002; Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2010; Mouton & Marais, 1988;
Tappen, 2010), suggesting that qualitative research as a whole has become a paradigm.

As with Crotty (1998), the achievements of Lincoln, Guba, and Denzin are not to be diminished, for they
have provided a system of categorization based on selected philosophical assumptions that can be combined
with certain methodologies and methods. Problems arise, however, when the paradigms (in Table 1.1) are
interpreted in a rigid fashion and compartmentalized into static schemata. Creswell, for example, comments
on the inflexibility around the ways in which paradigms have been presented in the literature, noting that they
are ‘reinforced by the discrete boxes around different paradigm stances’ (2010: 54). In other words, each
column in Table 1.1 is taken as describing the definitive, discrete options available to researchers in terms of
specific ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions.
Table 1.1 Lincoln and Guba’s basic beliefs of alternative inquiry paradigms

Guba and Lincoln (1994: 116) have claimed that the basic beliefs associated with paradigms are ‘essentially
contradictory’, and have consistently maintained that paradigm commensurability is not possible (Lincoln et
al., 2011). While we will not take up the issue of incommensurability here, it must be pointed out that this claim
is not only controversial but also immensely problematic. For paradigms to be incommensurable (see, for
example, Kuhn’s (2012 [1962]) claim that successive scientific paradigms are methodologically, conceptually,
and even rationally incomparable), it is a logical necessity that these differ substantially in their tenets. Yet the
way the paradigms are formulated in Table 1.1 does not meet this criterion because they are not necessarily
mutually exclusive. It is beyond our scope to systematically analyze all of the tables that seek to categorize
paradigms in Denzin and Lincoln’s handbook(s), but we must address at least the main drawbacks.

For example, on the level of ontological claims, the positivists, we are told, believe in ‘real’ reality, whereas
the constructivists are relativists believing in ‘local and specific co-constructed realities’ (Lincoln et al., 2011:

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100). The question then arises as to what ‘real reality’ stands for. The answer seems to be ‘nature’. If we
are speaking about objects existing externally and independent of the mind (materialism), then we can argue
that there is no difference between, say, positivism and constructionism. Guba and Lincoln state that ‘for
constructivists, either there is a “real” reality or there is not (although one might wish to resolve this problem
differently in considering the physical versus the human realms)’ (1994: 116), leaving us to wonder whether
all constructionists are Berkeleyan idealists who question external reality altogether. This, of course, would
be unfortunate, as most constructionists are metaphysical realists or materialists content to accept external
reality, as we will see in Chapter 6. To claim that social realities are constructed is not to deny the existence
of rocks and trees – a point made explicit by Searle in his book The Construction of Social Reality (1996: 10).
The acknowledgement of metaphysical realism can also be found in the writings of other constructionists,
such as Burr (1998, 2003) and Gergen (2009). Therefore, what Lincoln and Guba call ‘real’ reality, assuming
that they are referring to external objects, is available to scholars of diverse philosophical footing, including
social constructionists (who they refer to as ‘constructivists’).

Another problem is that ontology is at times explained in terms of, and conflated with, semantics. For instance,
in one of their matrices, the ontology of positivism is described as a ‘belief in a single identifiable reality’,
followed by the statement that ‘there is a single truth that can be measured and studied’ (Lincoln et al., 2011:
102). Truth, however, is a property of propositions or sentences – it is not an ontological but a semantic
feature, such as when we speak of the truth-value of scientific statements. In other words, ‘truth’ denotes
the semantic correctness of statements about reality (i.e. correspondence theory of truth). For some, truth
can also be an epistemic notion (i.e. coherence theory of truth, pragmatist approaches to truth, etc.). For the
logical positivists, truth had to do with propositions verified empirically, known as the principle of verification
(discussed in Chapter 2).

Similarly, when – in describing the ontology of postpositivism – the authors say that for the postpositivists,
‘[t]here is a single reality, but we may not be able to fully understand what it is or how to get to it’ (2011: 102), in
fact, what they are discussing is no longer solely ontology. Understanding what something is, and how to get
to it, is different from claiming that something is or exists: to understand what things are pertains to knowledge
claims; to ponder how to obtain knowledge about the world pertains to methodology and methods. Here,
we can argue again that there is always something that exists for all thinkers, except perhaps the idealists,
solipsists, and extreme subjectivists.

By considering the notion of objectivism, we can further demonstrate that paradigms, as presented by
Lincoln et al. (2011), are not fully adequate. In Table 1.1 objectivism is mostly associated with positivism
and postpositivism. However, neither positivism nor postpositivism is as strongly associated with objectivism
as is scientific realism – the strongest form of realism available to any scholar. Scientific realism claims
that scientific knowledge about both observable and unobservable (theoretical) entities ought to be treated
as a true and accurate description of reality (Sankey, 2008). Historically speaking, the positivists were not
prepared to commit to unobservable entities as knowledge (atoms, for example), and these reservations have
attracted accusations of subjectivism. As Laudan famously proclaimed, ‘[O]ne of the best-kept secrets of the

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philosophical era between the 1930s and the early 1960s was that the positivists themselves were radical
subjectivists about methodology and epistemology’ (1996: 15). Phillips and Burbules (2000) have similarly
pointed out that it would be misleading to view positivists as realists because many took an anti-realist or
non-realist stand. In addition, as Phillips explains, the logical positivists ‘did not have much time for the
notion of absolute truth, and they wanted to remain close to the raw phenomena of experience’ (2000: 166).
In fact, logical empiricism/logical positivism have traditionally stood opposed to scientific realism (Godfrey-
Smith, 2009). Therefore, it would be misleading to assign the label of objectivism equally to the realists,
logical positivists, and postpositivists (an issue explored in Chapter 2). It would also be equally limiting to
claim that constructionist and hermeneutic inquiry is subjectivist (as per Lincoln et al.’s suggestion in Table
1.1), for we have already established in our analysis of Crotty’s model that there is such a thing as objective
hermeneutics.

With regard to the methodological matrices in Table 1.1, we have to exercise additional caution in light of
the numerous ways in which philosophical traditions can be implemented in the research process. If we
take phenomenology (discussed in more depth in Chapter 4) as an example, the fact that the Encyclopedia
of Phenomenology (Embree, 1997) lists 28 phenomenological figures and 40 major phenomenological
topics suggests a rich tradition that may not so easily be compressed into one or two paradigms. There
are at least four dominant strains in phenomenological approaches: realistic phenomenology, constitutive
phenomenology, existential phenomenology, and hermeneutic phenomenology (Moran & Mooney, 2002).
Husserl’s (1965 [1910], 1970, 2001 [1900/1901]) eidetic reduction and focus on the study of essences are not
the same as Heidegger’s (1962) and Gadamer’s (1976, 2004 [1960]) hermeneutic concerns, such as their
emphasis on the structural interpretation of foreknowledge. Moreover, phenomenological and hermeneutic
inquiry may be driven by objectivity – we need only consider Paul Ricoeur and Gunter Figal’s ‘objective turn’
in hermeneutic phenomenology (see Figal & Espinet, 2014). Thus, the ways in which the paradigms in Figure
1.1 are composed presents a limited philosophical–methodological vista.

In summary, whether at the level of ontological, epistemological, or methodological considerations, any

attempt to capture the complexity and richness of philosophical thought by means of distinct paradigms
must ultimately reach its limits. Guba and Lincoln ought to be commended for taking on a task of such
mammoth proportions. However, as some of the limitations above suggest, there is scope for loosening the
paradigmatic grip on qualitative inquiry to accommodate a broad range of philosophical and methodological
amalgamations.

Lally’s anatomy of metatheoretical and epistemological assumptions in

social science

In addition to Crotty’s (1998) structure of the research process and Lincoln and Guba’s (2000) paradigmatic
matrix, there is another schematic representation worthy of mention, one which seeks to integrate
philosophical thought into social science. The application of philosophy to sociology is not an easy task even

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for the seasoned academic (often under the influence of the community of practice to which she6 belongs),
let alone for students who have a relatively short amount of time at their disposal to grasp the ideas proffered
by various philosophers. As a way of providing a pedagogical strategy, Jim Lally (1981) created a model
that enables students to engage with the process. He developed an axial schema onto which he mapped
epistemological assumptions to demonstrate how questions in the philosophy of science can be applied to,
and may feature in, sociological inquiry (see Figure 1.2). The model consists of two axes: a horizontal axis
that bisects the subject–object distinction and a vertical axis that differentiates between ‘Analysis of the “Is”’
and ‘Analysis for the “Ought To Be”’. In erecting this basic structure, Lally placed all those philosophers for
whom man [sic] was ‘the key unit of sociological analysis’ on the left (for example Kant, who contended that
man is the subject of all knowledge), and on the right those thinkers who took the existence of man as ‘shaped
by his environment’, and for whom the focus of inquiry is not the subject but social structures and social ‘facts’
(Lally, 1981: 6). In other words, on the left side reside those thinkers who took the subject or the Self to be the
central focus of inquiry, while on the right the primary focus is on the environment, structures, and systems
– taken to shape human action and behaviour. With regard to the vertical axis, the upper area represents
the study of existing social reality, labelled as the analysis of the ‘Is’; the lower region gathers thinkers whose
primary interest was to expose society’s flaws ‘as a prelude to having it changed fundamentally’ (1981: 7). As
we move towards the bottom of the vertical axis, the focus shifts to the analysis of the ‘Ought to Be’. For Lally
the vertical axis was as important as the horizontal because:

[…] it divides between those who see themselves as doing science (whether of the natural science
variety as in Positivism or of a peculiarly social science variety as in Interactionism) as that term is
generally understood and those who see these ‘sciences’ as part of the problem. Those above the
axis tend to write off those below as ideologists. Those below to tend to write off those above as
dabbling in superficialities while all around them cruelty and crises obviously abound and the human
condition grows rapidly worse. (Lally, 1981: 7)

The key ‘paradigms’ in Lally’s schema are interactionism and emancipationism on the ‘subject’ end and
positivism and structural determinism on the ‘object’ end. It is worthwhile pointing out here that the variables
used by Lally are adjusted to address sociological concerns, including the listing of major sociological
influences. Another interesting feature is that some philosophers occupy more than one quadrant: Husserl
and Dilthey, for instance, are listed under interactionism and emancipationism, Marx under emancipationism
and structural determinism, and Weber under interactionism and positivism. Based on the outline of
propositions that define each quadrant, we could further enlist other intellectuals and assign Foucault,
Habermas, and Gramsci the label of emancipationists. Omitted in Lally’s list, but important to note, are also
many female scholars, including Hannah Arendt, Ágnes Heller, Simone de Beauvoir, Regina Becker-Schmidt,
Nancy Fraser, bell hooks, Martha Nussbaum, Judith Butler and Seyla Benhabib.

Despite some initial usefulness, the predicament of Lally’s model is that, like the previous two, it fails to
provide a complete picture. For example, it is possible to describe some proponents of social constructionism
as interactionists (e.g., Kenneth Gergen) but also as structural determinists (e.g., John Searle). We will

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examine the difference between Gergen and Searle in more depth in Chapter 6. What becomes clear in all of
the models noted thus far is that any attempt to contain, say, constructionism, in a paradigmatic straitjacket
leads to a very narrow understanding. Similarly, the brief outline of the four schools of symbolic interactionism
in the previous section would suggest that symbolic interactionism is too diverse and complex to be restricted
to a single quadrant. For instance, the differences between the Chicago and Iowa schools are too great to
place both on the ‘subject’ side of the continuum. The Iowa programme is closer to the right-hand spectrum
on the subject–object axis because its concerns lie with structures (what Lally calls the ‘object’) and not the
Self. Furthermore, the Illinois School and Denzin’s interpretive interactionism would be more appropriately
situated in the paradigm of emancipationism within the ‘Ought to Be’ region because it takes a hermeneutic
turn and makes a strong claim about the role of research in facilitating change and action. There is hope
for a better and more just world (the ‘Ought to Be’), and the researcher is not a distanced observer but
instead takes an active part in this project. Denzin’s recent ‘call to arms’ is undoubtedly a powerful form of
academic activism. Consequently, symbolic interactionism can be stretched into different corners in Lally’s
model as not all interactionists sit comfortably in the upper-left region in Figure 1.2. Understood more broadly,
interactionism is a ‘broad approach to sociology’ and a ‘sociological perspective that has had multiple origins
and inspirations’ (Atkinson & Housley, 2003: 1).

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Figure 1.2 Lally’s anatomy of metatheoretical and epistemological assumptions in social science
(adapted from Lally, 1981: Figure 1 (p. 8) and Figure 2 (p. 10))

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The contrast between the schemas created by Crotty (1998), Lally (1981), and Lincoln et al. (2011) shows
that there are various ways in which theoretical and philosophical issues can be framed. It also demonstrates
the difficulty of encapsulating the concerns and ideas for which various philosophers have been known,
and which are not so easily organized under only one label, or one set of parameters, or one conceptual
framework. The danger of compartmentalizing qualitative research into distinct paradigms is that we lose sight
of the subtler varieties and close the doors to other ways of thinking and knowing. Schemata and models
are designed to organize academic practice – they structure the ways in which research proceeds as well
as what knowledge we produce and how we produce it. The comparison of the models is an exercise not
only in vigilance but also in celebrating the conceptual minds that have played a pivotal role in the shaping
of qualitative research and social science. The final section of this chapter will offer an additional conceptual
framework which may prompt the student to ponder metaphysical and epistemological concerns.

An alternative approach to metaphysical and epistemological concerns

The most fundamental philosophical questions for any inquirer to deal with are what exists, whether we
can know that it exists, and if so, how. These problems have intrigued many philosophers and have led
to the formation of various doctrines, including solipsism, scepticism, idealism, rationalism, empiricism, and
realism. We will explore these in more detail in the chapters that follow, but for our present purposes, consider
this question: Is there an external world with objects such as rocks and trees and other planets that exists
independent of our cognitive faculties? This question is an invitation to metaphysical or ontological concerns.

Metaphysics7 is the ‘the theory of reality and the ultimate nature of all things’; it extends to all kinds of entities,
including God or gods and the spiritual realm (Solomon & Higgins, 2010: 7). In this book, our focus will remain
on the types of entities, categories, and structures that have been the object of scientific interest, such as
physical matter, numbers, universals, and the laws that govern nature. The term ‘ontology’ was invented in the
seventeenth century to capture the science of being (van Inwagen, 2013). Ontology is a field of metaphysics
that is concerned with the study of being or that which is. According to Solomon and Higgins (2010), ontology
includes a hierarchy of levels of reality to determine what is believed to exist, undeniably, in the external
world. As an exercise in ontology, they suggest pondering the extent to which the following may be considered
as real: trees, numbers, atoms, geometric shapes, love, beauty, galaxies, consciousness, music, the theory
of relativity, human rights, and colours. We realize that not all of these items are real in the same sense:
some have physical properties, some are appearances, some are abstract and theoretical concepts, and
some are produced by our senses. The aim of ontology, therefore, is to answer ‘what is most real, what is
most basic, and what is to be accounted for in terms of what’ (Solomon & Higgins, 2010: 111). Having this
basic understanding will serve us well when we explore the metaphysical and ontological battles between the
rationalists and the empiricists in Chapter 2.

To put these ideas into practice, at the level of metaphysical concerns, qualitative researchers can distinguish
between two contrasting positions: materialism/metaphysical realism and immaterialism/metaphysical
idealism. Materialism is the view that material objects exist in the external world ‘independently of the minds

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of perceivers’8 (Musgrave, 1993: 122). In some literature, materialism is used synonymously with another
term, physicalism, introduced in the 1930s by Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap (both members of the Vienna
Circle). This term denotes the thesis that everything in the world conforms to the condition of being physical
(Stoljar, 2009). To accept physicalism is to assert that everything can be reduced to a set of physical
properties – that ultimately, everything is matter. In order to simplify our inquiry, we will employ the term
‘metaphysical realism’ to designate the broader view that matter exists. Metaphysical realism, in its basic
form, makes the claim that ‘there is a world that exists independent of the mental’ (Lynch, 2002: 59). This
view is compatible with the chief tenets of realism, including the claims that ‘the world contains ingredients
whose existence does not depend either logically or causally upon any form of cognition or perception’ (Stroll,
2000: 96) and that ‘reality is indeed “out there” and existing independently of us and our understanding of it’
(Gorman, 1992: 24). While throughout this book we shall not maintain a strict distinction between the words
‘ontological’ and ‘metaphysical’, we shall use the latter to capture the broader inquiry into that which is.

Metaphysical realism is the opposing view to metaphysical idealism or immaterialism. If metaphysical realism
claims that matter exists independent of the human mind, metaphysical idealism must be the notion that
‘everything is mental or an aspect of, or dependent on, the mental’ (Alston, 2002: 97). Metaphysical idealism
and immaterialism is most strongly captured in the philosophy of George Berkeley (1685–1753), who is
commonly associated with the view that matter does not exist and that we can only have certainty about our
ideas. Debate abounds among philosophers about the degree to which Berkeley is believed to have rejected
the existence of matter. Musgrave clarifies that Berkeley was denying ‘that stones or doors exist as material
objects external to minds’, while on the other hand conceding that ‘stones and doors exist, or are real things,
but they consist of particular collections of ideas in people’s minds’ (1993: 127). In the words of Rickless,
Berkeley’s argument can be formulated as follows: ‘ […] if sensible objects are nothing but collections of
ideas and the only kinds of things there are in the world are minds, ideas, and sensible objects, then the
only kinds of things there are in the world are minds and ideas’ (2013: 1). The upshot of this, is that for the
materialists there is something external to the mind (i.e. matter) causing us to have sense data, whereas
for Berkeley, whatever the cause of sensations is, this could well be the mind (or spirit). On the level of
metaphysics, Berkeley shifts our focus from the immediate perception of external objects to sense data and
ideas. Following his philosophy, therefore, what there is and what we can know, are appearances, ideas, or
collections of ideas. In this respect, an idealist thinker would hold that ‘what we call “reality” is something
which depends for its existence upon our own minds’ (Gorman, 1992: 24). Broadly speaking then, idealism
purports that sensible objects (such as rocks and trees) and their properties are mind-dependent entities;
immaterialism tells us ‘that there is no such thing as material substance, there is no senseless, unperceiving
thing in which sensible properties inhere’ (Rickless, 2013: 1). We will return to Berkeley in Chapter 3, but for
the time being, this is what the philosopher himself had to say on the issue:

We see only the appearances, and not the real qualities of things. What may be the extension, figure,
or motion of anything really and absolutely, or in itself, it is impossible for us to know, but only the
proportion or relation they bear to our senses. Things remaining the same, our ideas vary, and which
of them, or even whether any of them at all, represent the true quality really existing in the thing, it is
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out of our reach to determine. (Berkeley, 2008 [1710]: 70)

With respect to metaphysical concerns, thus far we have established that metaphysical realism or materialism
ought to be contrasted with metaphysical idealism or immaterialism (this has been suggested previously also
by Crotty, 1998; Gorman, 1992; Stroll, 2000). This is depicted visually in Figure 1.3. To return to the question
posed earlier (‘Is there an external world with objects such as rocks and trees and other planets that exists
independent of our cognitive faculties?’), we should be able to formulate two clear responses. One may either
state that there are indeed objects that exist independent of any person’s consciousness (i.e., metaphysical
realism), or one may assert that what exists are ideas and sense data (i.e., metaphysical idealism). However,
there is also a third response, and perhaps the most extreme, which not only utterly denies the existence of
matter, it also rejects the existence of other minds – namely, other thinking subjects. This philosophical stance
is called solipsism. It is the view that material objects have no existence other than in our consciousness,

and that ‘the only real existent is the self’ (Ellis, 1999: 439).9 Solipsism’s claims are so extreme that it would
be difficult to find a contemporary philosopher willing to defend its thesis. Ellis (1999) tells us that Kant,
for example, saw solipsism as a scandal to philosophy, and that Schopenhauer deemed all solipsists to be
madmen. More recently, Musgrave (1993: 104) called it the ‘lunatic version of idealism’. He also pointed
out the necessity of distinguishing solipsism from idealism because some commentators have mistakenly
accused some idealist philosophical figures, such as Hume and Berkeley, of solipsism.

Mainly for logical reasons, solipsism is less likely to be popular in the social sciences than in a natural science
such as theoretical physics. If one were to deny the existence of other human beings, then there would be little
point in any research activity at all. Put differently, solipsism undermines the academic endeavour and refutes
itself as a legitimate metaphysical stance. Vernes sums it up nicely by stating that according to the solipsistic
thesis, ‘We are the only person in existence. Correction: I am the only person in existence and I wonder why
I am trying so hard to communicate my remarkable thoughts to you’ (2000: 92). In Figure 1.3 solipsism is
therefore separated out from the two main positions of metaphysical realism and metaphysical idealism. The
question of whether or not it is possible to know anything other than our sense impressions will occupy us in
Chapters 3 and 4. For the time being, we shall reiterate that on the level of metaphysical concerns, the key
choice is between materialism/metaphysical realism and immaterialism/metaphysical idealism, as shown by
the continuum in Figure 1.3.

Figure 1.3 is organized into four tiers, each representing a layer of specific philosophical concerns. The first
tier deals with western metaphysical concerns, the second with western epistemological concerns, the third
with non-western and indigenous philosophical views, and the fourth with additional theoretical concerns. In
keeping with our present focus on metaphysical issues, the first tier simply considers what exists. In order to
make epistemic claims, we have to be clear about the what – the object – of knowledge, which, as we have
already seen, can range from numbers and colours to atoms and rocks. Therefore Tiers 1 and 2 mark the
difference between the metaphysical/ontological status of the objects of knowledge and the ways in which we
can know about the world (epistemology).

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Figure 1.3 Core philosophical considerations for qualitative research

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Epistemology, taken as a theory about knowledge, asks such questions as, ‘What kind of knowledge do we
believe will be attained by our research? What characteristics do we believe that knowledge to have? […]
How should observers of our research […] regard the outcomes we lay out before them? And why should our
readers take these outcomes seriously?’ (Crotty, 1998: 2). We can see that Tier 2 is organized according to
five core epistemological concerns: empiricism, rationalism, realism, idea-ism, and scepticism. It is necessary
to bear in mind here that not all of these are preoccupied solely with epistemic issues: some are much
broader philosophical doctrines that are also concerned with ontology, ethics, methodology, and methods (this
will become clear later on in this book, such as when we discuss realism in Chapter 5). In Figure 1.3, we
concentrate only on the epistemic dimension of these philosophical stances.

Historically, there have been two ways by which knowledge claims can be rationally justified: empiricism and
rationalism (Gorman, 1992: 21). On the one hand is the view that knowledge can only derive from experience
(empiricism), and on the other that the source of knowledge is reason (rationalism). Opposed to both of
these claims is scepticism, whose adherents at minimum refrain from making any judgement about beliefs
and knowledge (alethic scepticism), but may go so far as to claim that no knowledge is possible at all (this
dogmatic variety is called Academic scepticism). In order to defend empiricism, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume,
the well-known trio of British empiricists, played a major role in developing the theory of ‘sense data’, which
has come to be known as idealism in metaphysics or ontology and idea-ism in epistemology (Musgrave,
1993). We have already established that idealists hold ‘that we can simply make no sense of the existence of
something independently of its existence as known by us, as mediated through our minds’ (Gorman, 1992: 25;
emphasis in original). For example, if a devout realist were to demonstrate that material objects exist by lifting
up her foot and proclaiming ‘this is my foot’, as Stroll (2000) points out, the idealist would respond that the
foot is merely a collection of sensations. Furthermore, because sensations are ideas and thus mental entities,
the foot can never have a mind-independent status (Stroll, 2000). When we use the term idea-ism in making
knowledge claims, as noted in Figure 1.3, we espouse the view that ‘what we are immediately aware of in
perception are appearances, or ideas or sense-data’ (Musgrave,1993: 96). Idea-ism as an epistemological
doctrine thus states that we can only have knowledge or immediate information about ideas and sense data
– it is a thesis about the nature of perception, ‘not a metaphysical thesis about what exists’ (Ladyman, 2002:
144). This distinction is important because idealism inevitably presupposes idea-ism in epistemology, but we
shall see that not all idea-ists are necessarily idealists.

The doctrine we have yet to address in Tier 2 is realism. We have already seen that with respect to ontology
and metaphysics metaphysical realism makes claims about the existence of objects. The metaphysical or
ontological realist ‘affirms the existence (or reality) of a largely mind-, experience-, language-, concept-,
theory-, and practice-independent world’ (Pihlström, 2014: 252). Thus, rocks and trees exist regardless of our
ability to perceive them, touch them, describe them, and theorize about them. In addition to this metaphysical
claim, on the level of epistemic concerns, realism also has something to say about knowledge and methods
of arriving at truth. Scientific realists are the ones that make the strongest claims about knowledge. Scientific
realism is a doctrine fuelled by the aim of science to produce true theories about observable and theoretical
entities (Sankey, 2008). It is the strongest realist position because its proponents hold that the aim of science

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is to discover the truth about the world (Nola & Sankey, 2007), and therefore a notable characteristic of
scientific theories is that they not only correspond to reality, they also accurately or truthfully describe it. In
other words, scientific realists are committed to there being ‘a literally true story of what the world is like’
(Giere, 2005: 150). Psillos’s statement that ‘there are no better explanations of the success of science than
the realist one’ (1999: 97) underscores the high esteem in which some scientists hold scientific realism. In
addition to scientific realism, Figure 1.3 also includes direct and indirect realism, and additional varieties will
be explored in Chapter 5. Put simply, direct realism is the naïve view that the world is how we perceive it
directly via our senses; indirect realism is the view that we can only have indirect knowledge of the external
world as things are not always how they appear to us.

Tier 3 acknowledges non-western epistemological outlooks. It would take several volumes to cover all the
world’s theories of knowledge, but it is important to at least recognize that these exist by inserting an
additional layer to Figure 1.3. The numbering of the tiers does not imply that Tier 3 is less important
in the hierarchy of philosophical views. Indigenous scholars, for example, may situate their work in the
western tradition (i.e., Tiers 1 and 2) but they can also ground their inquiry in non-western philosophy
(i.e., Tier 3). In addition, those academics operating from an ethno-epistemological standpoint (for further
clarification see Maffie, 2013) may approach western epistemology as one among many epistemological
undertakings, together with African, East Asian, Native American, First Nations, Mesoamerican, Polynesian,
Indian, and other epistemologies. This book can be viewed as an overview of the developments in western
philosophical thought, and the reader invested in non-western schools of thought may wish to complement it
with other works that specifically address other theories of knowledge (e.g., Denzin et al., 2008; Devy et al.,
2014; George, 1999; Kincheloe & Steinberg, 2008; Meyer, 2003; Phillips, 2012; Sandoval, 2000; Semali &
Kincheloe, 1999; Smith, 1999).

Tier 4 attends to additional theoretical concerns. These are called ‘additional’ in order to emphasize that
they do not replace, but rather can be added to, Tiers 1, 2 and 3. In other words, all forms of inquiry are
underpinned by some type of metaphysical and epistemological claim, and these can be enriched by a range
of theoretical concerns. Depending on the nature of the research project, these theoretical concerns can (but

do not necessarily have to)10 play a pivotal role in the formulation of the philosophical assumptions. For
instance, following the writings of Habermas, Foucault, and Gadamer, a researcher can assert that the search
for knowledge ought to include a critical analysis of the ‘obvious’ because the ways in which knowledge is
produced, and what is often represented, are driven by various interests (e.g., political, ethical, economic).
Moreover, because these interests are not so easily divorced from social realities, the role of the inquiry is
to critically examine and deconstruct such influences. Hence researchers can draw, for example, on critical
hermeneutics as a way of examining the issue of power and domination. The types of concerns listed in Tier
4 extend to critical indigenous theory, race theory, gender theory, and numerous other issue-based theories
that can be located within distinct intellectual movements such as poststructuralism and postmodernism.

Finally, before we continue our inquiry into that which is, whether we can know something, and if so, how,
it is necessary to reaffirm the scope of this text. Due to its specific focus on philosophical issues and the

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limited space available, this volume only attends to the metaphysical and epistemological problems noted
in Tiers 1 and 2. Their content will be discussed in depth in the second part of the book: Chapter 2 will
examine empiricism and rationalism; Chapter 3 will look at scepticism, idealism, and idea-ism; Chapter 4 will
survey German idealism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics; and Chapter 5 will unpack the different forms
of realism and anti-realism. In the third part of the book, we will address some of the neglected domains
of qualitative research. In Chapter 6, we will explore social ontology through the work of John Searle and
articulate how it is possible for social facts, such as money, presidents, professors, and tourists, to exist.
We will also contrast between different attitudes towards social constructionism in order to debunk some of
the myths and misconceptions associated with it. In Chapter 7, we will venture into the territory of quantum
mechanics and outline nine theories about quantum reality. This exercise will allow us to ponder some of the
problems with claims of absolutism and universalism. Finally, Chapter 8 will offer a summary of this book’s
key points and propose that qualitative inquiry can be imagined on an attitudinal continuum from ‘means’ to
‘orientation’.

Notes

1.Rather than using ‘I’ and drawing the attention to the author, the term ‘we’ was chosen deliberately to
include the reader in the philosophical explorations.

2.The terms ‘constructionism’, ‘social constructionism’, and ‘constructivism’ are often used interchangeably
and inconsistently in the literature – a problem that has been addressed elsewhere (see, for example,
Pernecky, 2012). Throughout this book we will use the terms ‘constructionism’ and ‘social constructionism’
when discussing the collective generation of meaning, and when speaking about socially constructed reality
and/or knowledge (particularly in Chapters 1 and 6). We reserve the term ‘constructivism’ for the meaning-
making activity of the individual mind – in other words, for the cognitive processes of the mind (for example,
Kant’s constructivist outlook, examined in Chapter 4). However, a number of commentators in qualitative
research use the word ‘constructivism’ to express the notion of socially constructed knowledge/reality, i.e.,
constructionism, such as Guba and Lincoln (1994), Denzin and Lincoln (2011a), and Lincoln et al. (2011),
when they speak of the constructivist paradigm.

3.Regarding intentionality, there are two opposing views: one that understands mental states as ‘directness’
or ‘aboutness’ (notable in the work of Franz Bretano, Edmund Husserl, and lately, John Searle), and another
which rejects the mind–world and subject–object dualisms and the traditional representationalist account of
practice (Heidegger’s Dasein as being absorbed in the world) (Dreyfus, 1993).

4.Crotty adds that meaning is not derived entirely out of ‘nothing’; he explains that in subjectivism, meaning
can come from one’s dreams, one’s religious beliefs, ‘primordial archetypes’, ‘the conjunction and aspects of
the planets’, etc. (1998: 9). One can argue, however, that the latter are examples of intersubjectivity. Religious
beliefs, for instance, are socially constituted and accepted by individuals.

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5.This can be a confusing term as ‘postpositivism’ is sometimes used to denote a modified pro-positivist
attitude to knowledge but also an anti-positivist stance, which is how we will use the term in this book (e.g., in
Chapter 2).

6.To include all sexes, we will alternate between ‘he’ and ‘she’ throughout the book.

7.It is pertinent to note that because of the strong hold religion had over science until the Age of Enlightment
(1650s to 1780s), the terms ‘metaphysics’ and ‘metaphysical’ were strongly interconnected with the realm of
the ‘divine’. This association can still be observed today, particularly in religiously oriented literature. In this
book we will employ the term mainly in reference to reality and being with respect to scientific knowledge.

8.Musgrave explains that there is a strong and a weak view of materialism (see 1993: 122). We shall follow
the weaker view, which states that material objects exist (as opposed to the stronger view, which states that
only material objects exist).

9.According to Ellis, one can further differentiate between metaphysical and epistemological solipsism: the
first suggests that only the Self exists, while the latter ‘advances the modest claim that the Self is the source
of all knowledge of existence’ (Ellis, 1999: 439). In addition, Musgrave (1993) notes that many philosophers
have adopted the ‘methodological solipsism’ of Rudolf Carnap, which begins with metaphysical solipsism but
eventually establishes the existence of external objects and other minds.

10.Not all qualitative work is motivated by critical theory and some scholars may simply wish to use qualitative
research as a method. We will return to this issue in the concluding chapter and distinguish between
qualitative research as a method and as an orientation.

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