WPA3™ and Wi-Fi Enhanced™ Open

Deployment and Implementation Guide

Version 1.0
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WPA3™ and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open™ Deployment and Implementation Guide v1.0

Document Revision History

Version Date YYYY-MM-DD Remarks

1.0 2024-06-10 First public release.

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WPA3™ and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open™ Deployment and Implementation Guide v1.0

Table of contents

1 INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1 Reference documents ................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2 Definitions ..................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2.1 Abbreviations and acronyms ............................................................................................................ 5
2 SECURITY MODE REQUIREMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .......................................................................... 7
2.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 7
2.1.1 Overview .......................................................................................................................................... 7
2.1.2 Role of transition modes ................................................................................................................ 11
2.1.3 Interpretation of requirements and recommendations ................................................................... 11
2.2 Common security configuration for all WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open modes ...................................... 12
2.3 WPA3-Personal Transition Mode ................................................................................................................ 13
2.4 WPA3-Personal Only Mode ........................................................................................................................ 14
2.5 WPA3-Personal SAE-PK Transition Mode ................................................................................................. 15
2.6 WPA3-Personal SAE-PK Only Mode .......................................................................................................... 16
2.7 WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode ............................................................................................................. 16
2.8 WPA3-Enterprise Only Mode ...................................................................................................................... 17
2.9 WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode .................................................................................................................. 18
2.10 Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode ...................................................................................................... 19
2.11 Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Only Mode .............................................................................................................. 21
3 DEPLOYMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................... 22
3.1 Default requirements and recommendations .............................................................................................. 22
3.1.1 WPA3-Personal.............................................................................................................................. 22
3.1.2 WPA3-Enterprise ........................................................................................................................... 23
3.1.3 Wi-Fi Enhanced Open .................................................................................................................... 23
3.1.4 General .......................................................................................................................................... 24
3.2 Troubleshooting and resolving issues with legacy client connectivity to WPA3-Personal networks .......... 25
3.2.1 Dual-SSID WPA3-Personal configuration for legacy STA interoperability .................................... 25
3.3 Considerations to maximize Wi-Fi network security ................................................................................... 26
3.3.1 WPA3-Enterprise Server Certificate Validation policies ................................................................ 27
3.3.2 Transition Disable indication .......................................................................................................... 27
3.3.3 Dual-SSID alternative to WPA3-Personal transition mode for additional security protection ........ 27
3.3.4 STA isolation and filtering .............................................................................................................. 29
3.3.5 Wireless Protected Setup and Wi-Fi Easy Connect with WPA3 modes ........................................ 29
3.3.6 WPA3-Personal password selection considerations ..................................................................... 29
3.3.7 WPA3-Personal AP denial-of-service protection ........................................................................... 30
3.3.8 SAE Group downgrade protection ................................................................................................. 30
3.3.9 Protections against A-MSDU flag manipulation attacks ................................................................ 31
APPENDIX A EXAMPLE AP CONFIGURATIONS ............................................................................................... 32
A.1 Example tri-band AP configuration using WPA3-Personal Transition Mode .............................................. 32
A.2 Example tri-band AP configuration using WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode ............................................ 32
A.3 Example tri-band AP configuration using Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode .................................... 32
A.4 Example tri-band AP configuration using Dual-SSID Wi-Fi Enhanced Open ............................................. 33
A.5 Example tri-band Dual-SSID WPA3-Personal configuration for legacy STA interoperability ..................... 34

List of tables
Table 1. Definitions ..................................................................................................................................................... 5
Table 2. Abbreviations and acronyms ......................................................................................................................... 5
Table 3. Security configuration parameters ................................................................................................................ 7
Table 4. Common security configuration for all WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open modes ...................................... 12
Table 5. WPA3-Personal Transition Mode security configuration ............................................................................ 13

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WPA3™ and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open™ Deployment and Implementation Guide v1.0

Table 6. WPA3-Personal Only Mode security configuration ..................................................................................... 14

Table 7. WPA3-Personal SAE-PK Transition Mode security configuration .............................................................. 15
Table 8. WPA3-Personal SAE-PK Only Mode security configuration ....................................................................... 16
Table 9. WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode security configuration .......................................................................... 16
Table 10. WPA3-Enterprise Only Mode security configuration ................................................................................... 17
Table 11. WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode security configuration ............................................................................... 18
Table 12. Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode security configuration................................................................... 20
Table 13. Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Only Mode security configuration ........................................................................... 21
Table 14. Dual-SSID WPA3-Personal configuration for legacy STA interoperability ................................................. 26
Table 15. Dual-SSID WPA3-Personal network configuration for enhanced security ................................................. 28

List of figures
Figure 1. Example tri-band AP configuration using WPA3-Personal Transition Mode .............................................. 32
Figure 2. Example tri-band AP configuration using WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode ............................................ 32
Figure 3. Example tri-band AP configuration using Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode .................................... 33
Figure 4. Example tri-band AP configuration using Dual-SSID Wi-Fi Enhanced Open ............................................. 33
Figure 5. Example tri-band Dual-SSID WPA3-Personal configuration for legacy STA interoperability ..................... 34

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WPA3™ and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open™ Deployment and Implementation Guide v1.0

1 Introduction
This document provides guidelines and recommended best practices for deployment of Wi-Fi CERTIFIED WPA3™ and
Wi-Fi Enhanced Open™ devices. The guidelines in this document are not mandatory for equipment certification unless
specified in the WPA3 Specification [1] and Opportunistic Wireless Encryption Specification [3]; however, their use will
contribute toward realizing maximum benefit from certified equipment.

1.1 Reference documents

Knowledge of the documents listed in this section is required for understanding this document. If a reference includes a
date or a version identifier, only that specific version of the document is required. If the listing includes neither a date nor a
version identifier, then the latest version of the document is required. In the event of a conflict between this deployment
guidelines document and the following referenced specifications, the contents of the respective specification take
precedence.
[1] WPA3 Specification, https://www.wi-fi.org/file/wpa3-specification

[2] IEEE 802.11-REVme/D5.0 "Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY)
Specifications", February 2024

[3] Opportunistic Wireless Encryption Specification, https://www.wi-fi.org/file/opportunistic-wireless-encryption-

specification

[4] IEEE 802.11be/D5.0 "Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications
- Amendment 8: Enhancements for extremely high throughput (EHT)", November 2023

[5] National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication SP 800-56A, Revision 3, April 2018

1.2 Definitions
The definitions in Table 1, as well as the definitions in the WPA3 Specification [1], are applicable to this document.
Table 1. Definitions

Term Definition

Dual-SSID A configuration that uses two distinct SSIDs, each operated by a distinct BSS

1.2.1 Abbreviations and acronyms

This section defines the acronyms used throughout this document. Some acronyms are commonly used in publications
and standards defining the operation of wireless local area networks, while others have been generated by Wi-Fi
Alliance®.
Table 2. Abbreviations and acronyms

Acronyms Definition

AKM Authentication Key Management

A-MSDU Aggregate MAC Service Data Unit

BP Beacon Protection

CCMP Counter Mode CBC-MAC Protocol

EHT Extremely High Throughput (PHY/MAC defined in [4])

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WPA3™ and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open™ Deployment and Implementation Guide v1.0

Acronyms Definition

EOS End-of-Support

FT Fast BSS Transition

GCMP Galois Counter Mode Protocol

GDH Group Dependent Hash

H2E Hash-to-element (SAE PWE method)

IE Information element

MME Management MIC element

OCV Operating Channel Validation

OWE Opportunistic Wireless Encryption

PMF Protected Management Frame

PSK Preshared key

RSN Robust Security Network

RSNE RSN Element

RSNXE RSN eXtension Element

SAE Simultaneous Authentication of Equals

SAE-PK SAE Public Key

SCV Server Certificate Validation

SHA Secure Hash Algorithm

TKIP Temporary Pairwise Transient Key

WEP Wired Equivalent Privacy

WPA3™-Enterprise Wi-Fi Protected Access® 3-Enterprise

WPA3™-Personal Wi-Fi Protected Access® 3-Personal

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WPA3™ and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open™ Deployment and Implementation Guide v1.0

2 Security mode requirements and recommendations

2.1 Introduction
2.1.1 Overview
This section summarizes the security configuration requirements for APs and STAs operating in the WPA3 and Wi-Fi
Enhanced Open modes defined in the WPA3 [1] and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open [3] specifications, and also provides additional
recommendations for the security configuration in those modes.
For APs, the WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open security modes are BSS specific, and the requirements and
recommendations apply to the security parameters of the BSS Configuration when a BSS is operating in a given mode.
The BSSs within a network (using the same SSID) do not, in general, all operate in the same mode. The security
parameters of a given BSS are advertised in the RSN element (RSNE), RSN Extension element (RSNXE) and certain
other fields and elements in Beacon and Probe Response frames.
For STAs, the WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open security modes are Network Profile specific, and the requirements and
recommendations apply to the security parameters of a given Network Profile in a given mode that is configured on the
STA. When the STA associates to any AP with an SSID that matches a given Network Profile, the STA uses that Network
Profile (together with the security parameters advertised for the BSS) to select the security parameters used for
authentication and association to that AP. When an EHT STA connects to an MLD of an EHT AP, the selected security
parameters apply to all links of the association with the AP MLD.
Table 3 describes the security configuration parameters referred to in this section, and how they determine the AP and
STA's behavior. In subsequent subsections, the required and recommended values for each of these parameters in each
security mode are specified.
Table 3. Security configuration parameters

Parameter Reference AP BSS Configuration STA Network Profile

Legacy When WEP is disallowed in a BSS configuration, When WEP is disallowed in a network profile on the STA,
Security the AP does not advertise or use WEP cipher the STA does not select a WEP cipher suite (as pairwise
Parameters suites (as pairwise or group cipher suite), and does or group cipher suite), and does not perform WEP Shared
not perform WEP Shared Key authentication, in Key authentication, with APs or AP MLDs in the network.
the BSS. When TKIP is disallowed in a network profile on the STA,
When TKIP is disallowed in a BSS configuration, the STA does not select a TKIP cipher suite (as pairwise or
the AP does not advertise or use TKIP cipher group cipher suite) when associating to an AP or AP MLD
suites (as pairwise or group cipher suite) in the in the network.
BSS. When WPA v1 is disallowed in a network profile on the
When WPA v1 is disallowed in a BSS STA, the STA does not send WPA IE when associating to
configuration, the BSS does not advertise the WPA an AP or AP MLD in the network.
IE in Beacon and Probe Response frames.
Privacy [2] 9.4.1.4 Privacy (Data frame confidentiality) configuration N/A
"Capability for the BSS.
Information When Privacy is required in the BSS, the AP sets
field" the Privacy subfield to 1.
Beacon [2] Table 9- Beacon Protection configuration for the BSS. Beacon Protection configuration in a network profile on the
Protection 192 "Extended Applicable only if PMF is enabled on the BSS. STA for use in the network (SSID). Applicable only if PMF
Capabilities When "Disabled", the capability bit in Extended is enabled in the network profile.
field" and Capabilities element is not set, and Beacon When "Disabled", Beacon Protection validation is not
11.52 "Beacon Protection is disabled in the BSS. performed when connected to an AP or AP MLD in the
Protection When "Enabled", Beacon Protection is enabled in network.
Procedures" the BSS, the capability bit in Extended Capabilities When "Enabled", the STA validates the integrity of Beacon
element is set, and Beacon frames include an frames using the MME when connected to an AP in the
MME. network that enables PMF and Beacon Protection and
validates the integrity of Beacon frames on all links when

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WPA3™ and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open™ Deployment and Implementation Guide v1.0

Parameter Reference AP BSS Configuration STA Network Profile

connected to an AP MLD that enables Beacon Protection;
otherwise, it does not perform such validation.
NOTE: An AP MLD always enables PMF.
NOTE: A STA does not advertise its Beacon Protection
configuration.
Operating [2] 9.4.2.23.4 Operating Channel Validation configuration for the Operating Channel Validation configuration in a network
Channel "RSN BSS. Applicable only if PMF is enabled on the profile on the STA for use in the network (SSID).
Validation capabilities" BSS. Applicable only if PMF is enabled in the network profile.
and 12.2.9 When "Disabled", the capability bit is not set in When "Disabled", the capability bit is not set in RSNE, and
"Operating RSNE, and Operating Channel Validation is Operating Channel Validation is not performed when
Channel disabled in the BSS. connecting to an AP or AP MLD in the network.
Validation" When "Enabled", Operating Channel Validation is When "Enabled", the STA validates its operating channel
enabled in the BSS, the capability bit in RSNE is when connecting to an AP or AP MLD in the network that
set, and the AP validates its operating channel with also has PMF and Operating Channel Validation enabled;
STAs that also support Operating Channel otherwise, it does not perform such validation. The
Validation and associate to the AP. capability bit in RSNE is set when connecting to an AP or
AP MLD in the network regardless of whether validation is
actually performed.
Transition [1] 8 Transition Disable configuration for the BSS. N/A
Disable "Transition When "Disabled", Transition Disable KDE is not NOTE: If a STA supports Transition Disable feature, it is
Disable" sent in the BSS. required to process all received Transition Disable KDEs
When "Enabled", Transition Disable KDE (with per WPA3 Specification. Transition Disable is not
specific configured contents) is sent to STAs that configured on a Network Profile basis. A STA does not
associate to the AP using a WPA3 AKM. advertise its support for Transition Disable.
NOTE: An AP does not advertise its Transition
Disable configuration in Beacon and Probe
Response frames.
Group Data [2] Table 9- A single Group Data Cipher Suite enabled for use List of one or more Group Data Cipher Suites enabled in a
Cipher Suite 188 "Cipher for all protected group data communications in the network profile on the STA for use in the network (SSID).
suite BSS, advertised in RSNE. The STA does not attempt to associate with an AP in the
selectors" The AP rejects association requests for the BSS network if the BSS is using a Group Data Cipher Suite that
from STAs that specify a different Group Data is not in this list. The STA does not attempt to associate
Cipher Suite. with an AP MLD in the network if the Group Data Cipher
Suite advertised by all affiliated links of the AP MLD is not
in this list.
Pairwise [2] Table 9- List of one or more Pairwise Cipher Suites, List of one or more Pairwise Cipher Suites enabled in a
Cipher Suite 188 "Cipher enabled for use for protected pairwise network profile on the STA for use in the network (SSID).
suite communications in the BSS, advertised in RSNE. When a STA associates with an AP in the network, it
selectors" The AP rejects association requests for the BSS selects one of the Pairwise Cipher Suites in this list which
from STAs that specify a Pairwise Cipher Suite not is also enabled by the AP. When an AP associates with an
in this list. AP MLD in the network, it selects one of the Pairwise
Cipher Suites in this list which is enabled by the BSSs of
all affiliated links. The STA indicates the selected Pairwise
Cipher Suite in RSNE. If no such suite exists, the STA
does not attempt to associate with the AP or AP MLD.
Group [2] Table 9- A single Group Management Cipher Suite, List of one or more Group Management Cipher Suites
Management 188 "Cipher advertised in RSNE, and enabled for use for enabled in a network profile on the STA for use in the
Cipher Suite suite integrity protected group management frame network (SSID).
selectors" communications in the BSS. Applicable only when The STA does not attempt to associate with an AP in the
PMF is enabled on the BSS. network if the BSS advertises a Group Management
The AP rejects association requests for the BSS Cipher Suite that is not in this list and PMF is used. The
from STAs that indicate PMF "Capable" or STA does not attempt to associate with an AP MLD in the
"Required" but specify a different Group network if the Group Management Cipher Suite advertised
Management Cipher Suite. by all affiliated links of the AP MLD is not in this list.
NOTE: An AP MLD always enables PMF.

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Parameter Reference AP BSS Configuration STA Network Profile

AKM Suite [2] Table 9- List of one or more AKM Suites, enabled for use List of one or more AKM Suites enabled in a network
190 "AKM for authentication and key management in the profile on the STA for use in the network (SSID).
suite BSS, advertised in RSNE. When a STA associates with an AP in the network, it
selectors" The AP rejects association requests for the BSS selects one of the AKM Suites in this list which is also
from STAs that specify an AKM Suite not in this enabled by the AP. When a STA associates with an AP
list. MLD in the network, it selects one of the AKM Suites in
NOTE: The AP enables FT AKMs only when its this list which is also enabled by the BSSs of all affiliated
BSS is part of an FT mobility domain. The AP links. The STA indicates the selected AKM Suite in RSNE.
enables FILS AKMs only when it supports a FILS When multiple such suites exist, selection preference
authentication method for the BSS. orders are defined (see [1]). If no such suite exists, the
STA does not attempt to associate with the AP or AP MLD.
PMF [2] Table 12-5 PMF configuration for the BSS. PMF configuration in a network profile on the STA for use
"Robust When "Disabled", the capability bits in RSNE are in the network (SSID).
management not set (MFPC=0; MFPR=0), and PMF is disabled When "Disabled", the capability bits in RSNE are not set
frame in the BSS. (MFPC=0; MFPR=0) and PMF is not used when
selection in an When "Capable", PMF is enabled but not enforced associating to an AP or AP MLD in the network; the STA
infrastructure in the BSS, the corresponding capability bits in does not attempt to associate with an AP that advertises
BSS" and PMF "Required", or with an AP MLD in the network if any
RSNE are set (MFPC=1; MFPR=0), and PMF is
9.4.2.23.4 used when a STA indicates PMF "Capable" or of the affiliated links advertise PMF "Required".
"RSN "Required"; otherwise, PMF is not used with the When "Capable", PMF is used when associating to an AP
capabilities" STA. or AP MLD in the network that advertises PMF "Capable"
When "Required", PMF is enabled and enforced in or "Required"; otherwise PMF is not used. The
the BSS, the corresponding capability bits in RSNE corresponding capability bits in RSNE are set (MFPC=1;
are set (MFPC=1; MFPR=1), and PMF is used with MFPR=0) when associating to an AP or AP MLD in the
all STAs; the AP rejects association requests for network regardless of whether PMF is actually used.
the BSS from STAs that have PMF disabled. When "Required", PMF is always used when associating to
an AP or AP MLD in the network; the STA does not
attempt to associate with an AP in the network that
advertises PMF "Disabled", or with an AP MLD that
advertises PMF "Disabled" on any of its affiliated links. The
corresponding capability bits in RSNE are always set
(MFPC=1; MFPR=1) when associating to an AP or AP
MLD in the network.
SAE Groups List of one or more SAE groups, enabled for use in Ordered list of one or more SAE groups enabled in a
SAE authentication. network profile on the STA for use in the network (SSID).
The AP rejects SAE authentication attempts using When a STA attempts SAE authentication with an AP in
a group that is not on this list. the network, it selects the first SAE group in this list. If the
NOTE: An AP does not advertise its enabled SAE AP rejects an SAE authentication attempt because it does
Groups in Beacon and Probe Response frames. not support the selected SAE group, the STA re-attempts
SAE authentication using the next SAE group in the list (if
any).
SAE Hash-to- [2] Table 9- SAE Hash-to-Element configuration for the BSS. SAE Hash-to-Element configuration in a network profile on
Element 371 "Extended Applicable only if an SAE AKM suite is used. the STA for use in the network (SSID). Applicable only if
RSN When "Disabled", SAE Hash-to-Element method is an SAE AKM suite is used.
Capabilities not enabled or used, and the capability bit in When "Disabled", the capability bit in RSNXE is not set
field" and RSNXE is not set; the SAE Hunting-and-Pecking and SAE Hash-to-Element method is not used when
Table 9-131 method is used with an SAE AKM. connecting to an AP or AP MLD in the network; the SAE
"BSS When "Enabled", SAE Hash-to-Element method is Hunting-and-Pecking method is used with an SAE AKM;
membership enabled, the capability bit in RSNXE is set, and the STA does not attempt to connect to an AP using an
selector value SAE AKM if that AP advertises "Hash to Element Only" or
Hash-to-Element is used with an SAE AKM when a
encoding" STA indicates SAE Hash-to-Element "Enabled"; if the AP MLD advertises "Hash to Element Only" on any of
otherwise, the SAE Hunting-and-Pecking method its affiliated links.
is used with the STA. When "Enabled", SAE Hash-to-Element method is used
When "H2E Only", SAE Hash-to-Element method with an SAE AKM when connecting to an AP or AP MLD in
is enabled, the capability bit in RSNXE is set, the the network that advertises SAE Hash-to-Element
Hash-to-Element Only bit in Supported Rates and "Enabled" or "H2E Only"; otherwise, the SAE Hunting-and-
Pecking method is used. The capability bit in RSNXE is set

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Parameter Reference AP BSS Configuration STA Network Profile

BSS Membership Selectors element is set, and when connecting to an AP or AP MLD in the network
Hash-to-Element is always used with an SAE regardless of whether SAE Hash-to-Element method is
AKM; the SAE Hunting-and-Pecking method is not actually used.
used. When "H2E Only", SAE Hash-to-Element method is
enabled and always used when connecting to an AP or AP
MLD in the network; the STA does not attempt to associate
to an AP if that AP does not advertise SAE Hash-to-
Element "Enabled" or "H2E Only", or if the AP MLD does
not advertise SAE Hash-to-Element "Enabled" or "H2E
Only" on all of its affiliated links. The capability bit in
RSNXE is set when connecting to an AP or AP MLD in the
network.
SAE-PK [1] 6.4 SAE-PK configuration for the BSS. Applicable only SAE-PK configuration in a network profile on the STA for
"Authentication if an SAE AKM suite is used. use in the network (SSID). Applicable only if an SAE AKM
using SAE-PK" When "Disabled", SAE-PK is not used and the suite is used.
capability bit in RSNXE is not set; SAE without When "Disabled", SAE-PK is not used when connecting to
SAE-PK is used with an SAE AKM. an AP or AP MLD in the network; SAE without SAE-PK is
When "Enabled", the capability bit in RSNXE is used with an SAE AKM.
set, SAE-PK is used with an SAE AKM when a When "Enabled", SAE-PK is used with an SAE AKM when
STA indicates SAE-PK "Enabled"; otherwise, SAE connecting to an AP or AP MLD in the network that
without SAE-PK is used with the STA. advertises SAE-PK "Enabled"; otherwise, SAE without
NOTE: "Enabled" is only set when SAE-PK SAE-PK is used with an SAE AKM. The capability bit in
credentials are configured on the AP (and, RSNXE is set when connecting to an AP or AP MLD in the
therefore, the password is in the correct format for network regardless of whether SAE-PK is actually used.
SAE-PK) When "SAE-PK Only", SAE-PK is always used with an
SAE AKM when connecting to an AP or AP MLD in the
network; the STA does not attempt to associate with an AP
that advertises SAE-PK "Disabled". The capability bit in
RSNXE is set when connecting to an AP or AP MLD in the
network.
NOTE: "Enabled" and "SAE-PK Only" are only set when
the password is in the correct format for SAE-PK
Server [1] 5 "Server N/A Server Certificate Validation configuration in a network
Certificate Certificate profile on the STA or use in the network (SSID). Applicable
Validation Validation" only when authentication uses an 802.1X EAP method that
uses server certificates (e.g., WPA2-Enterprise or WPA3-
Enterprise with EAP-TLS, EAP-TTLS, EAP-PEAPv0 or
EAP-PEAPv1).
When "Disabled", Server Certificate Validation is not
performed by the STA when connecting to an AP or AP
MLD in the network.
When "Enabled", Server Certificate Validation is performed
by the STA when authenticating using an 802.1X EAP
method that uses server certificates.
NOTE: A STA does not advertise its Server Certificate
Validation configuration.
OWE [3] Table 3 OWE Transition Mode element configuration for N/A
Transition "OWE the BSS. Applicable only if an OWE AKM suite is
Mode element Transition used.
Mode element When "Disabled", OWE Transition Mode element
format" is not sent in Beacon and Probe Response frames.
When "Enabled", OWE Transition Mode element is
sent in Beacon and Probe Response frames, on
both the OWE BSS and the Open BSS. In addition,
the SSID used by the OWE BSS is hidden.

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WPA3™ and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open™ Deployment and Implementation Guide v1.0

2.1.2 Role of transition modes

Some of the WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open modes defined in [1] and [3] are transition modes, which are intended to
support interoperability between devices that only support, or are configured in, certain other legacy modes.
A transition mode configured on a BSS of an AP is a transitional solution until all STAs in the network support the higher
security mode. For example, a BSS configured in WPA3-Personal Transition Mode will support connections from STAs
that have Network Profiles configured in WPA3-Personal Only Mode, WPA3-Personal Transition Mode, or a WPA2-
Personal mode.
Similarly, a transition mode configured on a STA is a transitional solution until all BSSs in the network support the higher
security mode. For example, a STA configured with a Network Profile in WPA3-Personal Transition Mode will connect to
BSSs in the network that are operating in WPA3-Personal Only Mode, WPA3-Personal Transition Mode, or a WPA2-
Personal mode. On the other hand, a STA configured with a Network Profile in WPA3-Personal Only Mode will connect to
APs in the network that are operating in WPA3-Personal Only Mode or WPA3-Personal Transition Mode, but not to APs
operating in a WPA2-Personal mode.
NOTE: The Transition Disable feature (see [1] and Section 3.3.2) might cause a STA to modify the mode of a Network
Profile configured on that STA, e.g., from a transition mode to an "only" mode.

2.1.3 Interpretation of requirements and recommendations

In the remainder of this section, the values of security parameters for each of the defined WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced
Open modes are specified.
For a given mode, the values are specified separately for each of four device types:

• AP: EHT enabled on BSS

• AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
• STA: EHT supported
• STA: EHT not supported
NOTE: "AP: EHT not enabled on BSS" includes all BSSs operated by APs that do not support EHT, and also BSSs
operated by APs that do support EHT but where the BSS is configured with EHT and MLO disabled. "STA: EHT
supported" includes all STAs that support EHT, even if EHT or MLO is not used in a given association.
For a given mode, device type and parameter, the values are annotated as follows:

• "MAND": Setting the parameter to this value is mandatory

• "RECOM": Setting the parameter to this value is not mandatory but is recommended
• "DISALLOW": Setting the parameter to this value is disallowed
The mandatory and disallowed values are derived from the WPA3 [1] and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open [3] specifications.
If a given annotation only applies under certain conditions, those conditions are shown in square brackets. For example,
"[6 GHz or sub-1 GHz] MAND" for an AP means that the mandatory requirement to set the parameter to that value only
applies for BSSs operating in 6 GHz and sub-1 GHz bands.
In cases where no mandatory value is specified for a parameter, or where the parameter can comprise a list of values,
other unspecified values might be (additionally) configured, provided they are not annotated as disallowed.
NOTE: Some parameters, such as AKM Suite for APs and STAs, or Group Data Cipher Suite for STAs, can comprise a
list of values. Therefore, it is not necessarily the case that a given mandatory value will actually be used in a given
association. For example, a BSS in WPA3-Personal Transition Mode has both SAE and PSK AKM Suites enabled (as
mandatory values) and might also enable other recommended AKM Suites such as FT; which of those AKM Suites is
actually selected in a given association depends on the AKM Suites supported by the peer device and the AKM
preference order defined in [1].
Implementers should refer to Table 3 for a description of AP and STA behavior with respect to the requirements and
recommendations for each parameter.
Cipher Suites and AKM Suites are annotated with their Suite Type, where the OUI is 00-0F-AC. For example, "SAE (:8)"
refers to the SAE AKM Suite 00-0F-AC:8.

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Unless otherwise stated in this document or the underlying specifications (see [1], [2], [3] and [4]), no additional
constraints exist regarding allowed combinations of security parameters. For example, use of AKM Suite SAE-GDH (:24)
with Cipher Suite CCMP-128 (:4) is also permitted, as is use of AKM Suite SAE (:8) with Cipher Suite GCMP-256 (:9).
Similarly, while the use of SAE Groups with higher strength estimates (e.g., SAE groups 20 and 21) with Cipher Suite
GCMP-256 is preferable from the perspective of security strength consistency (see Section 3.3.8), use of SAE Group 19
with Cipher Suite GCMP-256 and/or AKM Suite SAE-GDH is also permitted.

2.2 Common security configuration for all WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open
modes
The security configuration that applies to all WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open modes specified in this section are defined
in Table 4.
Table 4. Common security configuration for all WPA3 and Wi-Fi Enhanced Open modes

Parameter Device Values

WEP TKIP WPA v1 (WPA IE)
Legacy AP: EHT enabled on BSS DISALLOW DISALLOW DISALLOW
Security
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS DISALLOW DISALLOW DISALLOW
Parameters
STA: EHT supported DISALLOW DISALLOW DISALLOW
STA: EHT not supported DISALLOW DISALLOW DISALLOW

Required (1) Not required (0)

Privacy AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT supported N/A N/A

STA: EHT not supported N/A N/A

Enabled Disabled
Beacon AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW
Protection [except sub-1 GHz band *] RECOM
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported [except sub-1 GHz band *] RECOM

Operating AP: EHT enabled on BSS RECOM (**)

Channel RECOM (**)
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Validation
STA: EHT supported RECOM (**)

STA: EHT not supported RECOM (**)

Transition AP: EHT enabled on BSS RECOM (when applicable ***) MAND (by default)
Disable RECOM (when applicable ***) MAND (by default)
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
STA: EHT supported N/A N/A

STA: EHT not supported N/A N/A

Group 19 Group 20 Group 21

SAE AP: EHT enabled on BSS RECOM RECOM RECOM
Groups RECOM RECOM RECOM
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
(****)
STA: EHT supported RECOM RECOM RECOM

STA: EHT not supported RECOM RECOM RECOM

(*) N/A for operation in sub-1 GHz band, since Beacon Protection is not supported.

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(**) It is currently recommended that Operating Channel Validation is disabled due to potential interoperability issues,
particularly when EHT or MLO is enabled and/or when the BSS operating bandwidth is greater than or equal to 160 MHz.
This recommendation is expected to be revised at a future date.
(***) Transition Disable must be disabled by default on APs, except where otherwise specified. It is recommended to
enable Transition Disable on APs if specific network deployment conditions apply. See Sections 6.5.1 and 8.2 of [1], and
Section 3.3.2.
(****) SAE Groups parameter applies to all WPA3-Personal modes. There is no requirement on the order of the enabled
SAE Groups in a STA's network profile (see Table 3). Note that, if the list is ordered with the SAE Groups that have
highest strength estimate (see Appendix B of [1]) first, multiple authentication attempts (and, therefore, some additional
delay) might be incurred when connecting to APs that do not enable those stronger groups. On the other hand, if the list is
ordered with the SAE Groups that have the highest strength estimate last, those stronger groups might not actually be
used except when connecting to APs that have the weaker groups disabled.

2.3 WPA3-Personal Transition Mode

Table 5 lists the security configuration for WPA3 devices in WPA3-Personal Transition Mode [1].
Table 5. WPA3-Personal Transition Mode security configuration

Parameter Device Values

Common parameters See Common security configuration in Table 4

GCMP-256 (:9) CCMP-128 (:4) WEP-40/104 (:1/:5)

TKIP (:2)
Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW
Data MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW

Pairwise AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND MAND DISALLOW

Cipher RECOM MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Suite
STA: EHT supported MAND MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW

BIP-GMAC-256 (:12) BIP-CMAC-128 (:6)

Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND
Mgmt MAND
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND MAND

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND

SAE-GDH SAE (:8) PSK (:6) PSK (:2) FT-SAE- FT-SAE FT-PSK
(:24) GDH (:25) (:9) (:4)

AKM Suite AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND MAND RECOM MAND RECOM RECOM RECOM

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS RECOM MAND RECOM MAND RECOM RECOM RECOM

STA: EHT supported MAND MAND RECOM MAND RECOM RECOM RECOM

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND RECOM MAND RECOM RECOM RECOM

Required (MFPR=1) Capable (MFPC=1; MFPR=0) Disabled (MFPC=0)

PMF AP: EHT enabled on BSS DISALLOW MAND DISALLOW

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS DISALLOW MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT supported DISALLOW MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported DISALLOW MAND DISALLOW

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Parameter Device Values

H2E Only Enabled Disabled

SAE Hash- AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW

to-Element RECOM (if supported *)
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
STA: EHT supported DISALLOW MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported DISALLOW MAND (if supported *) DISALLOW (if supported)

(*) SAE Hash-to-Element support is necessary in the following cases:

• Using SAE-GDH and FT-SAE-GDH AKM Suites

• Connecting to a BSS using any SAE AKM Suite in 6 GHz or sub-1 GHz bands
• Connecting to a BSS using any SAE AKM Suite when EHT is enabled for the association
An AP does not operate a BSS in this transition mode in the 6 GHz or sub-1 GHz bands; the mode defined in Section 2.4
can be used instead.
A STA that is configured with a hexadecimal WPA2 PSK but is not configured with a passphrase does not operate in this
mode; the hexadecimal PSK can be used in WPA2-Personal mode with PSK AKM.

2.4 WPA3-Personal Only Mode

Table 6 lists the security configuration for WPA3 devices in WPA3-Personal Only Mode.
Table 6. WPA3-Personal Only Mode security configuration

Parameter Device Values

Common parameters See Common security configuration in Table 4

GCMP-256 (:9) CCMP-128 (:4) WEP-40/104 (:1/:5)

TKIP (:2)
Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS RECOM (**) DISALLOW
Data RECOM (***) DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW

Pairwise AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND MAND (**) DISALLOW

Cipher RECOM MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Suite
STA: EHT supported MAND MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW

BIP-GMAC-256 (:12) BIP-CMAC-128 (:6)

Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS RECOM (**)
Mgmt RECOM (***)
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND MAND

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND

SAE-GDH SAE (:8) PSK (:6) FT-SAE- FT-SAE (:9) FT-PSK (:4)
(:24) GDH (:25)
PSK (:2)
AKM Suite AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND MAND (**) DISALLOW RECOM RECOM DISALLOW

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS RECOM MAND DISALLOW RECOM RECOM DISALLOW

STA: EHT supported MAND MAND (**) DISALLOW RECOM RECOM DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW RECOM RECOM DISALLOW

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Parameter Device Values

Required (MFPR=1) Capable (MFPC=1; MFPR=0) Disabled (MFPC=0)

PMF AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

H2E Only Enabled Disabled

SAE Hash- AP: EHT enabled on BSS [6 GHz or sub-1 GHz] MAND [other] MAND DISALLOW
to-Element [6 GHz or sub-1 GHz] MAND [other] RECOM (if supported [6 GHz or sub-1 GHz]
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
*) DISALLOW
STA: EHT supported DISALLOW (**) MAND (**) DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported DISALLOW MAND (if supported *) DISALLOW (if supported)

(*) SAE Hash-to-Element support is necessary to use SAE-GDH and FT-SAE-GDH AKM Suites, and to connect to a BSS
using any SAE AKM Suite in 6 GHz or sub-1 GHz bands.
(**) If this mode is used in a network where all APs and STAs are known to support EHT, GCMP-256 (00-0F-AC:9) can be
used as the only Group Data Cipher Suite, BIP-GMAC-256 (00-0F-AC:12) can be used as the only Group Management
Cipher Suite, CCMP-128 (00-0F-AC:4) does not need to be enabled as a Pairwise Cipher Suite, SAE (00-0F-AC:8) does
not need to be enabled as an AKM Suite, and H2E Only can be used.
(***) Although not strictly required, it is strongly recommended in these cases that the AP uses CCMP-128 as the Group
Data Cipher Suite, and BIP-CMAC-128 as the Group Management Cipher Suite, for compatibility with all non-EHT STAs.

2.5 WPA3-Personal SAE-PK Transition Mode

Table 7 lists the security configuration for WPA3 devices in WPA3-Personal SAE-PK Transition Mode.
Table 7. WPA3-Personal SAE-PK Transition Mode security configuration

Parameter Device Values

Common parameters See Common security configuration in Table 4

Group Data Cipher Suite Same as WPA3-Personal Transition Mode (Table 5)

Pairwise Cipher Suite Same as WPA3-Personal Transition Mode (Table 5)

Group Mgmt Cipher Suite Same as WPA3-Personal Transition Mode (Table 5)

AKM Suite Same as WPA3-Personal Transition Mode (Table 5)

PMF Same as WPA3-Personal Transition Mode (Table 5)

H2E Only Enabled Disabled

SAE Hash- AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW

to-Element MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
STA: EHT supported DISALLOW MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported DISALLOW MAND DISALLOW

SAE-PK Only Enabled Disabled

SAE-PK AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW

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An AP does not operate a BSS in this transition mode in the 6 GHz or sub-1 GHz bands; the mode defined in Section 2.6
can be used instead.
BSS selection rules based on SAE-PK support are defined for the STA; see [1].

2.6 WPA3-Personal SAE-PK Only Mode

Table 8 lists the security configuration for WPA3 devices in WPA3-Personal SAE-PK Only Mode.
Table 8. WPA3-Personal SAE-PK Only Mode security configuration

Parameter Device Values

Common parameters See Common security configuration in Table 4

Group Data Cipher Suite Same as WPA3-Personal Only Mode (Table 6)

Pairwise Cipher Suite Same as WPA3-Personal Only Mode (Table 6)

Group Mgmt Cipher Suite Same as WPA3-Personal Only Mode (Table 6)

AKM Suite Same as WPA3-Personal Only Mode (Table 6)

PMF Same as WPA3-Personal Only Mode (Table 6)

H2E Only Enabled Disabled

SAE Hash- AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

to-Element MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

SAE-PK Only Enabled Disabled

SAE-PK AP: EHT enabled on BSS N/A MAND DISALLOW

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS N/A MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

BSS selection rules based on SAE-PK support are defined for the STA; see [1].

2.7 WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode

Table 9 lists the security configuration for WPA3 devices in WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode.
Table 9. WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode security configuration

Parameter Device Values

Common parameters See Common security configuration in Table 4

GCMP-256 (:9) CCMP-128 (:4) WEP-40/104 (:1/:5)

TKIP (:2)
Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW
Data MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW

Pairwise AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND MAND DISALLOW

Cipher RECOM MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Suite
STA: EHT supported MAND MAND DISALLOW

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Parameter Device Values

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW

BIP-GMAC-256 (:12) BIP-CMAC-128 (:6)

Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND
Mgmt MAND
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND MAND

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND

802.1X SHA-256 (:5) 802.1X SHA-1 (:1) FT-802.1X SHA-256 (:3)

FILS SHA-256 (:14)
FILS-FT SHA-256 (:16)
AKM Suite AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND MAND RECOM

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS MAND MAND RECOM

STA: EHT supported MAND MAND RECOM

STA: EHT not supported MAND MAND RECOM

Required (MFPR=1) Capable (MFPC=1; MFPR=0) Disabled (MFPC=0)

PMF AP: EHT enabled on BSS DISALLOW MAND DISALLOW

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS DISALLOW MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT supported DISALLOW MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported DISALLOW MAND DISALLOW

Enabled Disabled
Server AP: EHT enabled on BSS N/A N/A
Certificate N/A N/A
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Validation
STA: EHT supported MAND (if supported) DISALLOW (if supported)

STA: EHT not supported MAND (if supported) DISALLOW (if supported)

An AP does not operate a BSS in this transition mode in the 6 GHz band; the mode defined in Section 2.8 can be used
instead.
NOTE: WPA3-Enterprise transition mode is similar to WPA2-Enterprise, except that TKIP is disallowed, PMF is enabled
("Capable"), and support for SHA-256 AKM (in addition to SHA-1 AKM) is required.

2.8 WPA3-Enterprise Only Mode

Table 10 lists the security configuration for WPA3 devices in WPA3-Enterprise Only Mode.
Table 10. WPA3-Enterprise Only Mode security configuration

Parameter Device Values

Common parameters See Common security configuration in Table 4

GCMP-256 (:9) CCMP-128 (:4) WEP-40/104 (:1/:5)

TKIP (:2)
Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS RECOM (**) DISALLOW
Data RECOM (***) DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW

AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND MAND (**) DISALLOW

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Parameter Device Values

Pairwise AP: EHT not enabled on BSS RECOM MAND DISALLOW
Cipher MAND MAND DISALLOW
STA: EHT supported
Suite
STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW

BIP-GMAC-256 (:12) BIP-CMAC-128 (:6)

Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS RECOM (**)
Mgmt RECOM (***)
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND MAND

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND

802.1X SHA-256 (:5) 802.1X SHA-1 (:1) FT-802.1X SHA-256 (:3)

FILS SHA-256 (:14)
FILS-FT SHA-256 (:16)
AKM Suite AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW RECOM

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW RECOM

STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW RECOM

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW RECOM

Required (MFPR=1) Capable (MFPC=1; MFPR=0) Disabled (MFPC=0)

PMF AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

Enabled Disabled
Server AP: EHT enabled on BSS N/A N/A
Certificate N/A N/A
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Validation
STA: EHT supported MAND (if supported) DISALLOW (if supported)

STA: EHT not supported MAND (if supported) DISALLOW (if supported)

(**) If this mode is used in a network where all APs and STAs are known to support EHT, GCMP-256 (00-0F-AC:9) can be
used as the only Group Data Cipher Suite, BIP-GMAC-256 (00-0F-AC:12) can be used as the only Group Management
Cipher Suite, and CCMP-128 (00-0F-AC:4) does not need to be enabled as a Pairwise Cipher Suite.
(***) Although not strictly required, it is strongly recommended in these cases that the AP uses CCMP-128 as the Group
Data Cipher Suite, and BIP-CMAC-128 as the Group Management Cipher Suite, for compatibility with all non-EHT STAs.
NOTE: WPA3-Enterprise Only Mode is separate and distinct from WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode. For example, although
WPA3-Enterprise Only Mode requires PMF and disallows SHA-1 based AKMs, it allows FT and FILS AKMs to be used
and does not mandate use of CNSA Suite compliant EAP methods or GCMP-256 cipher suites.

2.9 WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode

Table 11 lists the security configuration for WPA3 devices in WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode.
Table 11. WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode security configuration

Parameter Device Values

Common parameters See Common security configuration in Table 4

GCMP-256 (:9) All other cipher suites

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Parameter Device Values

Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW
Data MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW

Pairwise AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW

Cipher MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Suite
STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW

BIP-GMAC-256 (:12) All other cipher suites

Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW
Mgmt MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW

802.1X CNSA Suite compliant EAP method All other AKM Suites
SHA-256 (:12)
AKM Suite AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW

Required (MFPR=1) Capable (MFPC=1; MFPR=0) Disabled (MFPC=0)

PMF AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

Enabled Disabled
Server AP: EHT enabled on BSS N/A N/A
Certificate N/A N/A
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Validation
STA: EHT supported MAND (if supported) DISALLOW (if supported)

STA: EHT not supported MAND (if supported) DISALLOW (if supported)

In WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode, EAP-TLS is the only permitted EAP method, using one of the following EAP cipher
suites [1]:

• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 using P-384 curve for ECDHE and ECDSA

• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 using P-384 curve for ECDHE and at least 3072-bit RSA
modulus
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 using at least 3072-bit DHE and RSA modulus

2.10 Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode

Table 12 lists the security configuration for devices in Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode.

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Table 12. Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode security configuration

Parameter Device Values

Common parameters See Common security configuration in Table 4

GCMP-256 (:9) CCMP-128 (:4) WEP-40/104 (:1/:5)

TKIP (:2)
Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW
Data MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW

Pairwise AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND MAND DISALLOW

Cipher RECOM MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Suite
STA: EHT supported MAND MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW

BIP-GMAC-256 (:12) BIP-CMAC-128 (:6)

Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND
Mgmt MAND
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND MAND

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND

OWE (:18)
AKM Suite AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS MAND

STA: EHT supported MAND

STA: EHT not supported MAND

Required (MFPR=1) Capable (MFPC=1; MFPR=0) Disabled (MFPC=0)

PMF AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

Enabled Disabled
OWE AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW
Transition MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Mode
element STA: EHT supported N/A N/A

STA: EHT not supported N/A N/A

An AP in this mode operates a pair of BSSs - a legacy Open BSS and an OWE BSS. The Open BSS uses the network
SSID. The OWE BSS uses a different, hidden, SSID. Both BSSs in the pair send an OWE Transition Mode element (see
Section 2.2 of [3]).
The Network Profile of a STA in this mode matches both SSIDs. It allows connection to both OWE BSSs and Open BSSs
using the network SSID, and also allows connection to OWE BSSs in Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode using the
hidden SSID (discovered by receiving the OWE Transition Mode element).
An AP does not operate a BSS in this transition mode in the 6 GHz or sub-1 GHz bands, or if EHT or MLO is enabled on
the BSS in any band (see deployment considerations in Section 3.1.3); the mode defined in Section 2.11 can be used
instead.

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2.11 Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Only Mode

Table 13 lists the security configuration for devices in Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Only Mode.
Table 13. Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Only Mode security configuration

Parameter Device Values

Common parameters See Common security configuration in Table 4

GCMP-256 (:9) CCMP-128 (:4) WEP-40/104 (:1/:5)

TKIP (:2)
Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND (**) DISALLOW
Data MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW

Pairwise AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND MAND (**) DISALLOW

Cipher RECOM MAND DISALLOW
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Suite
STA: EHT supported MAND MAND DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND DISALLOW

BIP-GMAC-256 (:12) BIP-CMAC-128 (:6)

Group AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND (**)
Mgmt MAND
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Cipher
Suite STA: EHT supported MAND MAND

STA: EHT not supported RECOM MAND

OWE (:18)
AKM Suite AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS MAND

STA: EHT supported MAND

STA: EHT not supported MAND

Required (MFPR=1) Capable (MFPC=1; MFPR=0) Disabled (MFPC=0)

PMF AP: EHT enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

AP: EHT not enabled on BSS MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

STA: EHT supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

STA: EHT not supported MAND DISALLOW DISALLOW

Enabled Disabled
OWE AP: EHT enabled on BSS DISALLOW MAND
Transition DISALLOW MAND
AP: EHT not enabled on BSS
Mode
element STA: EHT supported N/A N/A

STA: EHT not supported N/A N/A

(**) If this mode is used in a network where all APs and STAs are known to support EHT, GCMP-256 (00-0F-AC:9) can be
used as the only Group Data Cipher Suite, BIP-GMAC-256 (00-0F-AC:12) can be used as the only Group Management
Cipher Suite, and CCMP-128 (00-0F-AC:4) does not need to be enabled as a Pairwise Cipher Suite.

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3 Deployment and implementation recommendations

3.1 Default requirements and recommendations
3.1.1 WPA3-Personal
3.1.1.1 APs

When a new network is configured on APs that use a PSK or SAE passphrase for authentication, the AP should use one
of the following modes as the default security configuration for each BSS:

• For BSSs in 2.4 and 5 GHz band:

▪ WPA3-Personal Transition Mode as defined in Section 2.3, or
▪ WPA3-Personal Only Mode as defined in Section 2.4, with provisions for the end-user to reconfigure the BSS to
WPA3-Personal Transition Mode
• For BSSs in 6 GHz and sub-1 GHz bands:
▪ WPA3-Personal Only Mode
An example of such configuration is shown in Appendix A.1.
For new networks deployed after December 31st, 2027, the recommended default security configuration will be WPA3-
Personal Only Mode for BSSs in all bands.
For SAE-PK networks, the SAE-PK versions of the above modes should be used instead.
If the network also comprises non-WPA3 APs, the BSSs on those APs should be configured in a WPA2-Personal mode.
The same password should be configured on all BSSs of the network. This allows a STA, when provisioned with a single
password for the network, to authenticate in all BSSs of that network.
If the network enables a PSK AKM on any BSS (e.g., in a WPA2-Personal mode, or WPA3-Personal Transition Mode), it
is recommended that the deployment does not use WPA3-Personal Only Mode on any 2.4 or 5 GHz BSS of that network.
This is because some STA implementations might use the discovery of WPA3-Personal Only APs in 2.4 or 5 GHz bands
as a basis for configuring their Network Profile in WPA3-Personal Only mode, or with a policy that that will not connect to
BSSs that have a PSK AKM enabled.
If the default security configuration uses a non-unique or easily guessable password, the AP should include a label or UI
indication that recommends the user reconfigures the network with a stronger password, and the UI should enforce
password complexity requirements for user configured passwords (see Section 3.3.6).

3.1.1.2 STAs

If a STA auto-generates a network profile for an SSID (e.g., when the STA displays a list of discovered SSIDs and the
user selects one of the SSIDs for the first time), and one or more discovered BSSs with the selected SSID advertise a
PSK or SAE AKM, by default it should configure the network profile in WPA3-Personal Transition Mode (Section 2.3).
NOTE: WPA3-Personal Transition Mode does not permit use of WEP or TKIP. If the STA might need to enable WEP or
TKIP in the network (e.g., if any of the BSSs in the network are configured in WPA/WPA2-Personal Mixed Mode, which
uses TKIP group cipher), the network profile might need to be modified to additionally enable WEP and/or TKIP.
If the STA supports SAE-PK and the password is in the correct form, by default the network profile should be configured in
WPA3-Personal SAE-PK Transition Mode (Section 2.5).

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3.1.2 WPA3-Enterprise
3.1.2.1 APs

When a new network is configured on APs that use IEEE 802.1X for authentication, and the network is not intended for
WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit mode security, the AP should use one of the following modes as the default security
configuration for each BSS:

• For BSSs in 2.4 and 5 GHz band:

▪ WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode as defined in Section 2.7, or
▪ WPA3-Enterprise Only Mode as defined in Section 2.8, with provisions for the end-user to reconfigure the BSS to
WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode
• For BSSs in 6 GHz and sub-1 GHz bands:
▪ WPA3-Enterprise Only Mode.
An example of such configuration is shown in Appendix A.2.
If the network also comprises non-WPA3 APs, the BSSs on those APs should be configured in a WPA2-Enterprise mode.
All BSSs in a WPA3-Enterprise network should allow authentication using the same EAP server, so that a STA can use
the same EAP credentials to authenticate in all BSSs of that network.

3.1.2.2 STAs

If a STA auto-generates a network profile for an SSID, and one or more discovered BSSs with the selected SSID
advertise an 802.1X AKM, by default it should configure the network profile in WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode (Section
2.7).
NOTE: WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode does not permit use of WEP or TKIP. If the STA might need to enable WEP or
TKIP in the network (e.g., if any of the BSSs in the network are configured in WPA/WPA2-Enterprise Mixed Mode, which
uses TKIP group cipher), the network profile might need to be modified to additionally enable WEP and/or TKIP.
NOTE: It is expected that STAs connecting to a WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode network will be explicitly configured with a
network profile for WPA3-Enterprise 192-bit Mode.

3.1.3 Wi-Fi Enhanced Open

3.1.3.1 APs

When a new network is configured on APs that does not enable authentication, the AP should use one of the following
modes as the default security configuration for each BSS:

• For BSSs in 2.4 and 5 GHz band:

▪ Non-EHT AP in a network that does not include EHT APs:
o Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode (using a pair of BSSs) as defined in Section 2.10 and [3], or
o Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Only Mode as defined in Section 2.11
▪ Other APs:
o Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Only Mode
• For BSSs in 6 GHz and sub-1 GHz bands:
▪ Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Only Mode
Examples of such configuration are shown in Appendix A.3 (transition mode for non-EHT AP) and Appendix A.4 (Dual-
SSID for EHT APs).If Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode is configured, and other BSSs (in 6 GHz or sub-1 GHz band)
are configured in the same network using Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Only mode, those other BSSs should use the network
SSID (i.e., the same SSID that is used by the Open BSSs that are in transition mode).

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If the network also comprises APs that do not support Wi-Fi Enhanced Open, the BSSs on those APs should be
configured in legacy Open mode and use the network SSID (i.e., the same SSID that is used by the Open BSSs that are
in transition mode).
If Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode is configured, it is recommended that Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Only Mode is not
configured on any other BSS in the same network, except for operation in the 6 GHz or sub-1 GHz bands. In other words,
in 2.4 and 5 GHz bands, other BSSs in the network should be configured in Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode (if
supported) or legacy Open mode. This avoids interoperability issues between legacy STAs and BSSs in Wi-Fi Enhanced
Open Only mode (which do not use hidden SSID with OWE BSS).
If the network includes EHT or MLO APs and needs to support legacy STAs (that do not support Wi-Fi Enhanced Open)
then the network should be configured with Dual SSIDs, per the example given in Appendix A.4. In this configuration, the
BSSs using the legacy Open SSID have EHT and MLO disabled and operate in 2.4 and/or 5 GHz band only. The BSSs
using the OWE SSID can operate with EHT and MLO enabled and in any band. The OWE Transition Mode element is not
sent by any of the BSSs.
NOTE: Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode is disallowed on BSSs with EHT or MLO enabled.

3.1.3.2 STAs

If a STA auto-generates a network profile for an SSID, and one or more discovered BSSs with the selected SSID
advertise legacy Open or OWE AKM, by default it should configure the network profile in Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition
Mode (Section 2.10).
When a STA "roams" between the OWE BSS of Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode (in 2.4 or 5 GHz) and a BSS in
Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Only Mode (e.g., in 6 or sub-1 GHz GHz) or a BSS in legacy Open mode (e.g., operated by a non-
OWE AP in the same network), the SSID that the STA is associated with will change. The OWE Transition Mode element
provides the indication that both SSIDs provide access to the same DS. A STA implementation should handle this change
of SSID transparently to the upper layers, so that it does not cause unexpected user impact.
In the case of a Dual-SSID Wi-Fi Enhanced Open configuration, STAs that support Wi-Fi Enhanced Open should be
configured with a network profile for the OWE SSID only, while STAs that do not support Wi-Fi Enhanced Open should be
configured with a network profile for the Open SSID only.

3.1.4 General

The following recommendations apply to all modes of operation.

3.1.4.1 APs

Where possible, it is recommended that the WPA3 AKMs (including, when appropriate, FT and FILS AKMs) supported by
a network are advertised by all BSSs of that network. This can help maximize interoperability when STAs roam between
BSSs because a consistent AKM can be used for all roams.
When FT is enabled on a network, where possible it is recommended that the same set of pairwise cipher suites is
enabled by all BSSs of a given FT mobility domain. This allows STAs to roam between all BSSs of the mobility domain
using FT protocol, which requires the pairwise cipher suite of target BSS (or target MLD APs) to be the same as that used
in the initial FT association (see 12.7.1.6.1 of [2]).
While in principle it is permitted for a given BSS, or different BSSs in the same network, to advertise a mixture of WPA3-
Personal, WPA3-Enterprise and/or OWE AKMs, it should be noted such deployments might cause unexpected
interoperability issues with STAs, e.g., related to auto-join, roaming or UI behavior.
NOTE: The RSNE and RSNXE advertised by all links of an AP MLD must be identical, except for the AKM Suite List field
and MFPR subfield of the RSN Capabilities field [4]. The (subset of) AKM Suites that is advertised on all links of an AP
MLD can be used in ML associations; AKM Suites that are not advertised on all links can only be used for non-ML
associations to the BSS that is advertising that AKM Suite.

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3.1.4.2 STAs

A STA should not auto-configure a network profile in an "only" mode, rather than a transition mode, based purely on the
absence of BSS operating with legacy security in scan results, since BSSs in the network may be operating in different
modes and not all BSSs in the network might be detected in a given scan.
NOTE: The security mode of an auto-generated network profile might subsequently change after the STA's first
connection to the network if Transition Disable indication is enabled, e.g., from WPA3-Personal Transition Mode to WPA3-
Personal Only Mode.
If a STA's UI displays a list of discovered networks, a given SSID should be displayed only once, even when the BSSs
advertising that SSID are operating in different security modes.
A STA should not reject a BSS as a candidate for selection (either on initial network join, or on roam using the
reassociation procedure) on the basis of security if the BSS configuration and the STA's security configuration (for the
corresponding network profile) have a mutually compatible set of security parameters. Roaming between BSSs with the
same SSID (and in addition, in the case of Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode, between an OWE BSS and Open
BSS) should be performed without user intervention or disconnection.
NOTE: This means that a STA configured in a transition mode might need to roam to a target BSS using a different AKM
and/or cipher suites than was used with the source BSS. Similarly, the STA might need to roam to a target BSS without
negotiating PMF even when PMF was negotiated with the source BSS (and vice versa).
NOTE: Specific rules for security-based BSS selection prioritization are defined for SAE-PK, see [1].
NOTE: Due to the AKM preference order requirements in [1], a STA that associated to a BSS using a WPA2 FT AKM
(e.g., FT-PSK) might need to perform non-FT reassociation or FT initial mobility domain reassociation (instead of FT
authentication) when roaming to a BSS that supports a WPA3 AKM (e.g., SAE or FT-SAE). Network deployments can
maximize the use of FT authentication by ensuring the same FT AKMs are enabled across all BSSs of a network.

3.2 Troubleshooting and resolving issues with legacy client connectivity to

WPA3-Personal networks
It is expected that a large majority of legacy WPA2 STAs will correctly interoperate with APs operating BSSs in WPA3-
Personal Transition Mode. However, it is possible that connection issues might be found with certain legacy STAs, e.g.,
due to incorrect parsing of RSN element sent by the AP when it indicates multiple AKM Suites or interoperability issues
with other WPA3 mechanisms. These issues might manifest to end users as unexpected UI messages (e.g., incorrect
password error, unexpected prompts for network credentials, etc.,).
Therefore, the AP vendor should include a label or UI indication that describes how the end user can reconfigure the
BSSs, if necessary, to support non-interoperable legacy STAs.
Legacy STAs are more likely to have interoperability issues with WPA3-Personal Transition Mode if they meet one or
more of the following criteria:

• The STA has been designated as EOS by the device manufacturer, and so is no longer receiving software updates, or
• The STA was manufactured prior to December 31st, 2015
In the event that such issues are found with legacy STAs, it is recommended that a workaround configuration defined in
this section is used instead:

• Dual-SSID WPA3-Personal configuration for legacy STA interoperability (section 3.2.1)

Unless the workaround configurations described in this section result in an unacceptable user experience, it is not
recommended to disable WPA3 on the network, since to do so would reduce security for WPA3 STAs. In addition, it
should be noted that EHT or MLO associations using password-based authentication require WPA3 to be enabled on the
network.

3.2.1 Dual-SSID WPA3-Personal configuration for legacy STA interoperability

The Dual-SSID configuration for legacy STA interoperability is defined in Table 14.

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An example of this configuration is shown in Appendix A.5.

The main benefits of this configuration are:

• It ensures legacy STAs with interoperability issues do not attempt to connect to any BSS in the network with WPA3
enabled (since they are not configured with a Network Profile for the Main SSID)
• All WPA3 STAs will connect to the more secure SSID using WPA3
However, this configuration comes at the expense of deployment complexity and/or usability. For example, it may result in
a poor user experience for users who have difficulty determining which SSID a given STA should be configured to use
(based on whether it is a legacy STA with WPA3 interoperability issues), or who have difficulty manually reconfiguring
legacy STAs with the Legacy SSID.
Table 14. Dual-SSID WPA3-Personal configuration for legacy STA interoperability

Configuration

AP and radio deployment Main BSS: Deployed on all radios of all APs.
Legacy BSS: Deployed on all radios of all APs other than 6 GHz and sub-1 GHz radios.
SSID Distinct SSIDs, e.g.
Main BSS: "HomeNet"
Legacy BSS: "HomeNet-legacy"
Security mode Main BSS (6 GHz and sub-1 GHz): WPA3-Personal Only Mode (Section 2.4)
Main BSS (2.4 GHz and 5 GHz on WPA3 APs): WPA3-Personal Transition Mode (Section 2.3)
Main BSS (2.4 GHz and 5 GHz on WPA2-only APs): WPA2-Personal mode
Legacy BSS: WPA2-Personal mode
EHT Main BSS: EHT and MLO enabled if supported (WPA3 is also enabled)
Legacy BSS: EHT and MLO disabled
Password The same password can be used for Main SSID and Legacy SSID for convenience (see footnote 1)

Layer-2 forwarding The BSSs are bridged

STA configuration Legacy STAs that have WPA3 interoperability issues are configured with a Network Profile for the Legacy SSID (but
not the Main SSID)
All other STAs are configured with a Network Profile for the Main SSID (but not the Legacy SSID)

In the event that interoperability issues continue to be experienced even when this workaround is configured, the following
changes to the Legacy BSS configuration might be considered:

• Try disabling PMF (MFPC=0) on the Legacy BSS, to avoid issues with legacy STAs that advertise support for PMF
but fail to properly negotiate or sustain a PMF-enabled connection (see footnote 2)
• If there is a need for legacy pre-WPA2 STAs to connect, configure the Legacy BSS in Mixed Mode with WEP/TKIP
enabled

3.3 Considerations to maximize Wi-Fi network security

The deployment and implementation recommendations in this section are intended, along with the mandatory
requirements defined in the WPA3 Specification [1], to maximize Wi-Fi network security with WPA3.
Failure to implement these recommendations correctly may expose the vendor implementation to attack and/or
compromise the network.

1When additional security protection is required, the configuration described in Section 3.3.3 is recommended.
2Unless interoperability issues are found, it is recommended that PMF is enabled on the Legacy BSS since it protects
against deauthentication attacks that can be used to facilitate offline dictionary attacks on the WPA2 passphrase.
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3.3.1 WPA3-Enterprise Server Certificate Validation policies

When a WPA3-Enterprise network uses a TLS-based EAP method (EAP-TTLS, EAP-TLS, EAP-PEAPv0 or EAP-
PEAPv1), a Trust Override Disable (TOD) policy can be included in the TLS server certificate to provide STAs that
support Server Certificate Validation (SCV) with protection against inadvertent acceptance of trust in malicious networks
(see Section 5 of [1]).
When the network deployment is such that all STAs are configured with TLS-based EAP credentials (including the trust
basis for SCV) via a secure out-of-band mechanism (e.g., using third-party device management technologies), the TOD-
STRICT policy should be included in the server certificate.
In other network deployments using TLS-based EAP credentials, the TOD-TOFU policy should be included in the server
certificate unless it is expected the server certificate will be renewed in the future and a mechanism to update the SCV
trust basis on STAs is not available.

3.3.2 Transition Disable indication

As specified in [1], Transition Disable is an indication from an AP to a STA, which causes the STA to disable transition
mode in the network profile corresponding to the AP (i.e., modify the network profile to an "only" mode) and/or change the
values of parameters permitted within a given mode. The network administrator should ensure that, when Transition
Disable is enabled on a given BSS, it is also enabled on all other BSSs that have the same SSID. The configured
Transition Disable KDE should be identical across those APs. Since some multi-site network deployments might be
independently managed at each site, the Transition Disable configuration at one site needs to take into account the
potential impact on STAs that might subsequently attempt to connect to BSSs with the same SSID at other sites if the
Transition Disable configuration is not fully synchronized across all sites. Since the SSID is not guaranteed to be a
globally unique identifier of a network, caution should be applied if enabling Transition Disable on a network that uses an
SSID that is likely to also be used by other independent networks.
In general, Transition Disable should be used to disable a given transition mode only if all BSSs in the network have
enabled the most secure algorithm defined for that mode. However, in certain cases, a network administrator might
enable a Transition Disable configuration even when only a subset of BSSs in the network enable the most secure
algorithm. In such cases, STAs would subsequently only connect to that subset of BSSs, but would be protected against
downgrade attacks. The network administrator should evaluate the impact on network coverage and performance when
considering such configuration.
When an AP enables Transition Disable indication, the Transition Disable Bitmap field should be set as follows:

• If the APs in the network have WPA3-Personal enabled, bit 0 (WPA3-Personal) should be set to 1. This causes a STA
that supports WPA3-Personal to configure the network profile in WPA3-Personal Only Mode:
▪ If the APs also have SAE-PK enabled, bit 1 (SAE-PK) should also be set to 1. This causes a STA that supports
SAE-PK to configure the network profile in WPA3-Personal SAE-PK Only Mode
• If the APs in the network have WPA3-Enterprise enabled, bit 2 (WPA3-Enterprise) should be set to 1. This causes a
STA that supports WPA3-Enterprise to configure the network profile in WPA3-Enterprise Only Mode

3.3.3 Dual-SSID alternative to WPA3-Personal transition mode for additional security

protection
When a WPA3-Personal network needs to support both WPA3-Personal and WPA2-Personal STAs, BSSs in 2.4 and 5
GHz bands are typically configured in WPA3-Personal Transition Mode as discussed in Section 3.1.1. This provides the
convenience of a single SSID and password that can be used by all WPA3 and WPA2 devices. When a WPA3 STA
connects to an AP that is configured in WPA3-Personal Transition Mode, it is protected against passive link decryption
attacks and is also protected against (unicast) management frame spoofing attacks.
However, a trade-off of this convenience is that the common password of a WPA3-Personal Transition Mode network can
be determined by attacking a WPA2-Personal device using a simple offline dictionary attack. The WPA2-Personal attack
could be performed passively on a legacy client device that only supports WPA2-Personal, or a more complex active
downgrade attack could be performed on a client that supports WPA3-Personal.

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The passive attack on legacy WPA2-Personal only client devices is the same as exists with legacy WPA2-Personal only
networks. The active attack on an WPA3-Personal client device is complex and gains the attacker little because of the
possibility to run the simpler passive attack on legacy clients. An attacker who determines the password can access the
network simply by using WPA2-Personal, irrespective of WPA3-Personal. In addition, even after this attack is successful
and the attacker determines the password, the clients that connect with WPA3-Personal will still benefit from the forward-
secrecy that SAE affords—that is, the traffic encryption keys will still remain unknown even if the password is known.
Nevertheless, in some deployments, enhanced security is required to protect against the above attack. For these
scenarios, the Dual-SSID network configuration in Table 15 is recommended.
In this Dual-SSID configuration, since the WPA3 password is not used for WPA2 authentication exchanges, offline
dictionary attacks on the WPA2 passphrase (which, in transition mode, could lead to attacks on WPA3 STAs) are not
possible. In addition, since layer-2 forwarding between WPA2 and WPA3 BSSs is disabled or minimized, the risk of
insider attacks on WPA3 STAs via the network infrastructure, by an attacker that manages to obtain the WPA2
passphrase, is mitigated.
The benefits of this Dual-SSID configuration may come at the expense of deployment complexity and/or usability. For
example, it may result in a poor user experience for users who have difficulty determining which SSID a given STA should
connect to (based on its support for WPA3), or who have difficulty manually reconfiguring the SSID and password on
STAs that previously only supported WPA2 but were subsequently updated to support WPA3.
Table 15. Dual-SSID WPA3-Personal network configuration for enhanced security

Configuration

AP and radio deployment WPA3 BSS: Deployed on all radios of all APs that support WPA3 (see footnote 4)
(see footnote 3) WPA2 BSS: Deployed on all radios of all APs other than 6 GHz and sub-1 GHz radios (see footnote 5).
SSID Distinct SSIDs, e.g., (see footnote 6)
WPA3 BSS: "HomeNet"
WPA2 BSS: "HomeNet-legacy"
Security mode WPA3 BSS: WPA3-Personal Only Mode (Section 2.4)
WPA2 BSS: WPA2-Personal mode
EHT WPA3 BSS: EHT and MLO enabled if supported
WPA2 BSS: EHT and MLO disabled
Password Distinct passwords are used for WPA3 SSID and WPA2 SSID.
It is necessary for the WPA3 password to be unguessable – either directly, or from knowledge of the WPA2
passphrase, see Section 3.3.6.
The WPA2 passphrase should be a non-dictionary, high entropy password to improve resistance to dictionary
attack, and have length between 8 and 63 characters.
Layer-2 forwarding Layer-2 forwarding between WPA2 and WPA3 BSSs is disabled or (at least) limited to minimal forwarding rules (see
footnote 7)
Transition Disable WPA3 BSS: Enabled (if network deployment conditions apply)
WPA2 BSS: Disabled
STA configuration WPA3 STAs are configured with network profile for WPA3 SSID and password
WPA2 STAs are configured with network profile for WPA2 SSID and passphrase

3 An AP that supports "virtual APs" (aka "co-hosted BSSs" or "multiple BSSID set") can typically be configured with both a
WPA2 BSS and a WPA3 BSS on the same band/radio.
4 If an AP does not support WPA3, it is not configured with the WPA3 SSID or password.
5 Configuration of a WPA2-Personal BSS in the 6 GHz or Sub 1GHz bands is not permitted. All STAs that support the 6

GHz band or sub-1 GHz band also support WPA3-Personal.

6 The SSIDs should be chosen to encourage an end user (who might not know whether a STA supports WPA3) to first try

configuring a STA with the WPA3 SSID and password.

7 See Section 3.3.4. It is not necessary to disable forwarding between STAs in the same BSS (aka intra-BSS STA isolation)

unless in a public network deployment.

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In principle, a single-SSID solution is also possible, whereby the AP is configured with a different password for SAE AKM
and PSK AKM on the same BSS. However, this requires an AP configuration that might not be supported in typical
implementations (as well as the ability to apply per-STA filtering rules based on AKM), so is not discussed further.

3.3.4 STA isolation and filtering

Some network services (for example, some network printing, content sharing and display services) rely on STAs being
able to communicate with each other across the network. However, if a network enables such communication and an
attacker is able to gain access to the network, other STAs are potentially vulnerable to insider attacks.
In network deployments where STA-to-STA communication is not required – which in general includes all public Wi-Fi
networks – forwarding of packets between STAs in the same BSS should be disabled (aka STA isolation), and forwarding
of packets between STAs associated to different BSSs in the same network (aka BSS bridging) should be disabled; only
packet forwarding rules to/from a gateway should be configured. In addition, if broadcast data communications is not
required (e.g., if Proxy ARP is enabled and the AP converts group-addressed IP packets such as DHCP and Router
Advertisement packets to individually addressed 802.11 frames), the AP should provide a random GTK to each STA or (if
supported by all STAs) set the group data cipher suite to 00-07-AC:7 (group addressed traffic not allowed).
If STA-to-STA communication is required but there is risk of unauthorized network access, it is recommended that filtering
rules are configured to minimize the scope of forwarded packets to the needed communications.

3.3.5 Wireless Protected Setup and Wi-Fi Easy Connect with WPA3 modes

An AP can enable Wireless Protected Setup (WPS) or Wi-Fi Easy Connect when operating in any WPA3-Personal mode.
However, it is recommended that WPS is not enabled on a BSS if the BSSs in that network are configured in WPA3-
Personal Only Mode.
An AP can enable Wi-Fi Easy Connect when operating in any WPA3-Enterprise mode, except for WPA3-Enterprise 192-
bit mode.
A STA can use a password for a given network, that was obtained using WPS (with Authentication Type = WPA2-
Personal) or Wi-Fi Easy Connect (using DPP Configuration), to authenticate with any AP in that network using any PSK or
SAE AKM.
A STA can use an enterprise credential (X.509 certificate) for a given network, that was obtained using Wi-Fi Easy
Connect (using DPP Configuration), to authenticate with any AP in that network using any 802.1X AKM.
NOTE: The use of DPP AKM is defined in the Wi-Fi Easy Connect specification.
NOTE: In general, the overall security of network devices depends on the security of the bootstrapping and provisioning
mechanisms supported.

3.3.6 WPA3-Personal password selection considerations

Passwords used with WPA3-Personal should be complex enough to not be easily guessable, and WPA3-Personal
implementations should limit authentication attempts when an implementation identifies an active attack.
WPA3-Personal replaces the WPA2-Personal Pre-Shared Key (PSK) authentication with SAE. Unlike PSK, SAE is
resistant to offline dictionary attacks. The only way for an attacker to learn a password is through repeated active attacks,
each of which tests whether a single guess of the password is correct or not. Repeated authentication failures may
indicate that an active attack is underway, allowing implementations to respond appropriately, including throttling
authentication attempts and/or issuing alerts such as Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) trap, log message,
or others.
The requirement for exceedingly long, random passwords with mixed-case characters and special characters is no longer
necessary with WPA3-Personal. Passwords used with WPA3-Personal should be extremely difficult to guess due to the
possibility of an active attack; however, the difficulty in guessing a password directly correlates to the security that SAE
offers.
NOTE: This does not apply to SAE-PK passwords, which are cryptographically generated.

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To illustrate the benefits that WPA3-Personal affords, consider a password selected randomly from 5,000 possible
passwords. The attacker knows this but does not know which password was randomly chosen. With WPA2-Personal an
attacker could determine the password through an off-line dictionary attack with a probability of success of 1. With WPA3-
Personal, the attacker must launch repeated active attacks, guessing a different password each time. The probability of
success of the WPA3-Personal attack would only reach 0.5 after 2,500 active attacks. It should be possible to detect such
an attack on WPA3-Personal long before the probability of success becomes high.
Implementations of WPA3-Personal should limit authentication attempts for a particular password—identified with an SAE
Password Identifier or not—when an active attack is identified. Determination of whether an attack is underway is
implementation dependent and left up to the vendor. One possible mitigation strategy may be that the AP temporarily
disable a password after a series of unsuccessful authentication attempts. Note that the source medium access control
(MAC) address used with failed authentication attempts is irrelevant and should not factor into the decision to disable or
limit authentication for a particular password because an attacker can easily change the MAC address between attempts.

3.3.7 WPA3-Personal AP denial-of-service protection

WPA3-Personal implementations should handle SAE operations on non-privileged processing queues which, even if
overwhelmed, will not result in a failure of the entire BSS through CPU resource consumption.
An AP performs a significant amount of cryptographic work upon receipt of the first message in an SAE handshake. A
denial of service attack can be initiated by flooding the AP with fraudulent messages from fake MAC addresses resulting
in the failure of the entire BSS through CPU resource consumption.
SAE defines an anti-clogging cookie response in which the AP statelessly generates a string that is bound to the sender
of the message when the AP detects it is under a denial of service attack. An AP may consider itself under a denial of
service attack when the number of nascent connections, those in which the first message has been received but not the
third message, reaches a threshold. The AP, when in a “cookie demanding” state, will not process the first SAE message
unless that message contains a valid cookie bound to the MAC address of the sender.
This technique works against rudimentary and simple packet spraying attacks because the attacker is simply sending
random packets and not processing responses. However, this technique does not work if the attacker chooses to receive
the AP cookie request and respond with the cookie from the same MAC address. Therefore, SAE does not afford
adequate protection against more sophisticated denial of service attacks. WPA3-Personal implementations should handle
SAE operations on non-privileged processing queues which, even if overwhelmed, will not result in a failure of the entire
BSS through CPU resource consumption.

3.3.8 SAE Group downgrade protection

In SAE, the initiator chooses the group to use and includes the group number in the first message. The responder accepts
the group or responds with a message containing an error code indicating group rejection if the responder does not want
to use the group. If the group is rejected, the initiator chooses another group and tries again.
When SAE is used with the Hunting-and-Pecking method, it is vulnerable to a downgrade attack where an attacker
impersonates the AP and responds with a rejection of a stronger group until the client device offers a weak group and
then lets the protocol proceed with the real AP. This can be mitigated by not allowing weak groups and only allowing
rejections to offer “upgraded” groups.
When SAE is used with the Hash-to-Element method, explicit protection against SAE Group Downgrade attacks is
provided because identifiers of the rejected groups are included in the KDF for subsequent SAE exchanges using other
groups.
Suitable Diffie-Hellman groups for use with SAE (aka suitable SAE Groups) all generate a key whose strength is
appropriate for the cipher CCMP-128. Stronger ciphers such as CCMP-256 and GCMP-256 can also be used with SAE.
When those stronger ciphers are used, it is recommended that SAE groups with higher strength estimates (e.g., SAE
group 20 or 21) are used, together with SAE AKMs that use a group-dependent hash function (e.g., SAE-GDH (00-0F-
AC:24) or FT-SAE-GDH (00-0F-AC:25)), in order that the security level is consistent.
When a STA uses SAE to connect to an AP using a given pairwise cipher suite, it is recommended that it first offers an
SAE group whose strength estimate (see Appendix B of [1]) is greater than or equal to the strength estimate of that
pairwise cipher suite. See Appendix D Table 24 and Table 25 of [5] for more information.

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3.3.9 Protections against A-MSDU flag manipulation attacks

A receiving device should discard all subframes in an A-MSDU if its first subframe exhibits any of the following behaviors:

• DA does not map to 802.11 MAC header RA in a frame exiting DS (i.e., From DS subfield is 1 and To DS subfield is 0
in MAC header, DA is neither the device’s RA address nor a group/multicast address)
• SA does not match 802.11 MAC header TA in a frame destined to DS (i.e., To DS subfield is 1 and From DS subfield
is 0 in MAC header)
• DA is AA:AA:03:00:00:00 (any DS bits including 4-addr)
NOTE: This does not apply to some cases when operating as a GLK STA or S1G STA.
By flipping the A-MSDU Present subfield in the QoS Control field of the 802.11 MAC header in a non-A-MSDU frame, one
can make a vulnerable receiving device accept it as an A-MSDU frame. The first subframe will exhibit the pattern as
shown in the recommendation above and is usually discarded given its invalid construct. However, if a vulnerable device
retains the subsequent subframes, an adversary can inject specially formulated data to solicit sensitive user information.
Thus, a device should implement the mitigation mechanism to detect an abnormal first A-MSDU subframe behavior and
then discard the subsequent subframes. Such a mechanism can be accomplished on the receiving device side.
A more comprehensive solution may be to protect the A-MSDU Present subfield in the QoS Control field of the 802.11
MAC header using a mechanism such as Signaling and Payload Protection (SPP), and to offer a transition means to
bridge the gap between legacy and enhanced devices. The purpose of SPP is to protect an A-MSDU against attacks that
manipulate the unauthenticated A-MSDU Present subfield in its plaintext QoS Control field. SPP includes this flag as part
of the AAD calculation, which can effectively detect such manipulation.

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Appendix A Example AP configurations

A.1 Example tri-band AP configuration using WPA3-Personal Transition Mode
Figure 1 shows an example configuration using WPA3-Personal Transition Mode on a 2.4+5+6 GHz tri-band AP, when
support for legacy STAs is required. The AP is configured to operate BSSs in WPA3-Personal Transition Mode in 2.4 and
5 GHz bands and operate a BSS in WPA3-Personal Only Mode in 6 GHz band. All three BSSs use the same SSID. When
the AP supports EHT, all three BSSs can be affiliated with the same MLD.

Figure 1. Example tri-band AP configuration using WPA3-Personal Transition Mode

A.2 Example tri-band AP configuration using WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode

Figure 2 shows an example configuration using WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode on a 2.4+5+6 GHz tri-band AP, when
support for legacy STAs is required. The AP is configured to operate BSSs in WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode in 2.4
and 5 GHz bands, and operate a BSS in WPA3-Enterprise Only Mode in 6 GHz band. All three BSSs use the same SSID.
When the AP supports EHT, all three BSSs can be affiliated with the same MLD.

Figure 2. Example tri-band AP configuration using WPA3-Enterprise Transition Mode

A.3 Example tri-band AP configuration using Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode
Figure 3 shows an example configuration using Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode on a 2.4+5+6 GHz tri-band AP,
when support for legacy STAs is required. The AP is configured to operate BSSs in Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition
Mode in 2.4 and 5 GHz bands, with both OWE and legacy Open BSSs on each band, and operate an OWE BSS in Wi-Fi
Enhanced Open Only Mode in 6 GHz band.
All OWE BSSs in transition mode (i.e., in 2.4 and 5 GHz) use the same hidden SSID ("MyNetOWE3257" in this example).
OWE BSSs and legacy Open BSSs advertise each other by sending an OWE Transition Mode element.
The advertised SSID ("MyNet" in this example) is used by the 6 GHz OWE BSS and also by the legacy Open BSSs in 2.4
and 5 GHz. The advertised SSID is not hidden.The 6 GHz OWE BSS does not advertise an OWE Transition Mode
element.
NOTE: This configuration cannot be used if any of the 2.4 or 5 GHz BSSs have EHT or MLO enabled.

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If the network does not need to support legacy STAs, all BSSs in the network should be configured in Enhanced Open
Only mode on all bands.

Figure 3. Example tri-band AP configuration using Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode

A.4 Example tri-band AP configuration using Dual-SSID Wi-Fi Enhanced Open

If a Wi-Fi Enhanced Open network contains one or more AP MLDs, then Wi-Fi Enhanced Open Transition Mode cannot
be used on those AP MLDs. If support for legacy STAs is required, all APs in the network should instead use the Dual-
SSID configuration shown in Figure 4.
NOTE: Even for networks that do not contain AP MLDs, this Dual-SSID configuration might be preferred over Wi-Fi
Enhanced Open Transition Mode, since STAs that support Wi-Fi Enhanced Open can roam across all BSSs in the
network without changing SSID. On the other hand, since neither SSID is hidden, both SSIDs will appear in a STA's
network picker. The end-user of a STA supporting Wi-Fi Enhanced Open should (preferably) manually select the OWE
SSID. The end-user of a STA that does not support Wi-Fi Enhanced Open should manually select the Open SSID (and
will not be able to connect if selecting the OWE SSID).

Figure 4. Example tri-band AP configuration using Dual-SSID Wi-Fi Enhanced Open

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A.5 Example tri-band Dual-SSID WPA3-Personal configuration for legacy STA interoperability
Figure 5 shows an example Dual-SSID WPA3-Personal configuration for legacy STA interoperability on a 2.4+5+6 GHz
tri-band AP. The configuration of BSSs b2, b4 and b5 is the same as shown in Figure 1. In addition, the AP operates
BSSs b1 and b3 in 2.4 and 5 GHz bands, which have a different SSID, and are configured in WPA2-Personal mode (and
therefore do not enable EHT or MLO).

Figure 5. Example tri-band Dual-SSID WPA3-Personal configuration for legacy STA interoperability

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