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Hazop Point

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7 views

Hazop Point

Uploaded by

hicham
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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Deviations , Cause , consequences , safeguards

Potential corrosion due to water presence , and dead point


Adequate Material selection for

Hight temperature , thermal expansion of blocked sections resulting in minor spill of condensate
Consider requirement of thermal relief when sections or part of pipe are blocked in

High high pressure / excessive heating resulting to potential failure leading to potential loss of containment
Potential leak through flanges , install gas detectors

Low ambient temperature , potential freezing of non - flow small bore piping resulting in loss of level control. Also potential impact on the integrity of PSVs.
operating experience confirms the necessity of heat tracing

General Contamination , insufficient well clean up or corrosion products, potential erosion damage or blockage to valves and instruments
errors in measurements , strainers on downstream control valves, operating experience to date indicates solids accumulated in the slugcatchers and have
minimal impact on downstream process

General Composition Change,


increase H2S/CO2 , increase in Hg , increase water yield as reservoir pressure declines , existing design basis covers credible variation
insufficient capacity to evaporate water in existing evaporation pond, existing upgrade assume adequate capacity of the evaporation pond

General Spillage / Leakage , flange leakage on level bridle, instruments, drains, spillage during maintenance clean out
possible condensate spill with minor environmental impact, potential for small pool fire if ignited
. environmental containment is provided around liquid header with sump to allow pump out

. Power Service Failure . failure of power to heat tracing 1. possible freezing of water in level bridle during cold conditions (see above consequences of level
failure in this node), consider provision of common trouble alarm on heat tracing circuits
loss of power supply to coriolis meter, loss of condensate flow control through affected train. FV to manual in last position is maintained.

Instrument Air Service Failure . General loss of instrument air supply, BDV fails open (see more flow causes in this node) causing loss of gas to flare
instrument air volume tanks with inlet check valve provided for BDV to allow up to 3 stroke operation, capacity of the flare system to handle failure open of
BDV
Purge / Blanket Service Failure

General Emissions, instrument maintenance requires local venting, short term flammable mixture local to vent point location
fugitive emissions thru valve packings and flanges/gaskets

corrosion inhibitor not injected at wellheads, corrosion of downstream, integrity management plan,

Procedure Start-up / Shutdown, pressurization of new slug catcher, potential low temperature downstream of 2" pressurization line leading to brittle
failure and gas release; possible local jet fire if ignited, develop detailed start up procedure

Sampling Other Events . requirement to sample produced water . confirm sampling points requirements

More flow , 15/16-LV-0707A/B/C opens due to mechanical malfunction or controller error, possible gas blowby to 01/02/03-V-211 leading to potential
overpressure of 01/02/03-V211, CV size is limited to avoid exceeding 01/02/03- PSV-2113A/B capacity for gas blowby scenario

pressurization of scrubber with normal liquid level during start up

Reverse Flow, pressure in 15/16-V-071 less than 01/02/03-V-211, reverse flow in the condensate line leading to increase level, check valve on condensate
line

Lower temperature , low ambient temperature ,


potential freezing of non-flowing pipe works (e.g. level bridles, small bore pipings) and loss of interface level protection (high and/or low)
heat tracing of selected lines
condensation in non-flowing gas lines (e.g. lines to 15/16-PSV-0715A/B) freezing in liquids pockets, no adverse consequence if pockets are avoided
only 15/16-PSV0715A/B inlet lines are heat traced, other lines are not
ensure all small bore pressurization lines and 2" 15/16-XV-0734 line piping don't have any pockets
review the pipe routing to dry gas seal 2"-GP1507016-A9X1 to minimize vertical drop

Suction scrubber , General Composition Change, basis of design covers all credible variations in composition due to operating conditions and feed
variations in the reservoir

Procedure Start-up / Shutdown . inability to evacuate liquid during pressurization,


verify scrubber has sufficient liquid capacity to accumulate liquid until required start-up pressure is achieved
More flow , one compressor trips during phase 2 operation, drop in CPF delivery pressure, possible upset in process trains operation (see low pressure)
evaluate max flow for this scenario and confirm velocities are within design limit

Less or no flow , process train shutdown (which closes 01/02/03-ESDV-1000) or 01/02/03-PV-1096 closes due to controller malfunction or operator error
increase in discharge pressure leading to compressor surge and/or overpressurisation (109% of design) of gas processing trains
anti surge controllers . master performance controller and pressure override controller
15/16-PAHH-0705 trips inlet gas compressors

Reverse Flow , one compressor trips in parallel operation (compressor discharge 15/16-ESDV0746 open)
reverse rotation of trip compressor and turbine and possible damage of dry gas seals and gears
check valve downstream of the aftercoolers, consider requirement of closing discharge 15/16-ESDV-0746 on all stop scenario of compressor
Introduction to HAZOP and LOPA, safety Process

The process flow to be treated pass through treatment equipment in order to remove contaminant, separate to product, purification products, storage, and
export

Normal control system and control logic are impeded to maintain process parameters (flow, temperature, pressure, leve , concentration . .) within the normal
operating envelope , but process parameters deviation from the normal envelope is potentially probable and could lead to incident or catastrophic (major
leak , fire, explosion …… accident) , so an assessment of the probable deviations must be done to implement the adequate safety protection for prevention
and mitigation consequences …

Continue with the book Process Plant shutdown and turnaround management

Prepare a summarize file for global refreshment, Process oil and gas plant, safety, process safety, management, commissioning, shutdown,

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