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Tekeste Negash

ITALIAN COLONIALISM IN
ERITREA, 1882—1941
Policies, Praxis and Impact

Uppsala 1987
Disfribiitor:
Almqvisi & Wiksell International
NUNINKLUKI: bIbLlU I HbkK
Stockholm

0739 4817
Docioral'dissertation at Uppsala University 1987

® Tekcste Negash 1987

ISBN 91-554-2111-3
ISSN 0081-6531

Abstract
Negash, T., 1987: Italian Colonialism in Eritrea 1882—1941: Policies. Praxis and Impact. Acta
Universitatis Upsaliensis. Studio Historica Upsaliensia 148. xi-l-217 pp. Uppsala. ISBN
91-554-2111-3.

This dissertation has two tasks. The first task is to assess the political impact of colonialism on
Eritrean society through an analysis of colonial economic, educational and native policies as well
as praxis. The second task is to sketch a partial theory of colonialism.
An analysis of colonial policies and praxis (in chapters two to four) reveals the salient features
of colonialism to be 1) the subjugation of the economy of the colony to the needs of the colonizing
power; 2) the implementation of an educational policy with the intention of perpetuating col¬
onialism, and 3) the definition of relations between the colonizer and the colonized in immutable
terms. On the basis of these features, colonialism may be described as a system of domination
established by military conquest in the interest of the colonizing power. Its objectives are the
domination and subjugation of the colony and its inhabitants.
The obvious question such a definition raises is the purpose of domination. Did the Italian rul¬
ing classes embark on colonization solely driven by the yet unexplained and perhaps inexplicable
desire for domination? If the decades after colonization can throw any light on the motives of
colonialism, itjs that colonies and peripheries were not essential for capitalist development of the
colonizing countries. Moreover, neither the duration of the colonial period nor the degree of
restructuring brought about by colonialism could explain the demise of colonialism.
Since Italian colonialism was replaced by British colonialism in 1941, the analysis of the politi¬
cal impact of colonialism on Eritrean society is based on a hypothetical argumentation where the
question is framed as follows: Had the Italians not been replaced by the British, what would their
impact have been on Eritrean national consciousness? An examination of the records of the vari¬
ous Eritrean political parties (1946—48) preserved in the Public Records Office (London) and
those related to British administration in Eritrea reveal that there was virtually no nationalist or¬
ganization that articulated a desire for Eritrean independence within the boundaries that existed
up to 1936. Fifty years of colonial rule were neither long enough nor sufficiently profound to
bring about a political transformation that could be described in terms of Eritrean nationalism.

Key concepts: interpretations of colonialism, motives of Italian colonial expansion, political

economy of colonialism, colonial educational policies and praxis, native policies and praxis,
resistance to and collaboration with colonial rule, colonial impacts, partial theory of colonialsm.
To the memory of my Mother,
Birikti Mehari,
Tekeste Negash, Department of History, Uppsala University, S:t Larsgatan 2, S-752 20 Uppsala,
Sweden. who died too early

Printed in Sweden 1987

Textgruppen i Uppsala AB
TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE . ix
List of Maps, Graphs and Tables. xi
Chapter One
INTRODUCTION . 1
The Creation of Eritrea: A Synoptic View. 1
Theoretical Points of Departure: Interpretations of Colonialism. 8
In Search for a Theory of Colonialism. 9
Scope and Methodological Considerations. 12
State of Research . 13
Studies on Italian colonialism in General. 13
Studies on Italian colonialism in Eritrea. 18
Sources and Source Material. 20
Thematic Organization of the study. 21
Chapter Two
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF COLONIALISM. 32
Introduction .— 32
Eritrea as a Colony of Settlement. 33
Eritrea as a Source of Raw Material. 37
Eritrea as a Source of Colonial Soldiers. 48
Eritrea as a Colony of Settlement, 1935—41 . 51
Strategic versus Economic Function of Eritrea. 53

Chapter Three
THE IDEOLOGY OF COLONIALISM:
EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND PRAXIS. 66
Scope, State of Research and Source Materials. 66
The Colonial Government and Native Education. 68
Objectives of Education as derived from Colonial Textbooks. 72
a) The position of Italy in relation to Eritrea. 75
b) The raison d’etre of colonialism. 77
Colonial Educational Policy and the Catholic Mission. 77
I hc Organization of the School and Enrolment. 79
Enrolment . 82
Concluding Remarks. 83

('haptcr Four
I HE IDEOLOGY OF COLONIALISM: NATIVE POLICY. 92
Introduction . 92
Hic Basis of British and French Native Policies. 92
Italian Native Policy and Practice in Eritrea. 96
Stale of Research . 96
The Martini Period, 1897—1907 . 97
 • The era of rational imperialism. 1908—32 . 99 PREFACE
Political Organization and Colonial Administration. 101
From Paternalism to Apartheid, 1932—41 . 108
Chapter Five
LIMITATIONS OF THE IDEOLOGY OF COLONIALISM:
THE THREAT OF RESISTANCE TO COLONIAL RULE. 121
Nature and Scope of Resistance .. 122
The Ethiopian Factor in the Emergence of Irredentist Sentiments. 1924—34 .. 127
Limitations of Resistance. 132 This study would not have been completed without the constant pressure,
Concluding Remarks. I35 guidance and inspiration of my supervisors Ann-Sofie Ohlander, Eva
Chapter Six Osterberg and Sven Rubenson. The legendary support and faith of Sten
COLONIAL IMPACT ON ERITREAN SOCIETY. 145 Carlsson was also of great importance. From Michigan State University,
State of Research . 145 where 1 once studied, I had the rare blessing of the sustained interest and sup¬
Objective Colonial Impact. I49 port of Harold Marcus.
Setting new demographic balance . I49
I have benefited considerably from comments given by Carl Gdran Andr*c
Political stability and growth of material well-being. 151
and Rolf Torstendahl.
Evolution of an Eritrean identity. I54
The Italian Colonial Impact on Eritrean National Consciousness. 157 It gives me great pleasure to acknowledge profound gratitude to my Depart¬
Concluding Discussion . 161 ment of History which provided me with all the assistance that a research stu¬
Chapter Seven dent in a Swedish environment could ever wish to expect. In particular I would
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION . 172 like to mention Monica Blom, Ann-Britt Nystrdm, Kenneth Ljung, Mats
Italian Interpretations of the Motives for Colonial Expansion. 172 Aberg, Gudrun Ericsson, Harald Runblom, Christer Ohman, John Rogers,
Colonial Objectives. 174
Ragnar Bjdrk, Carl Johan Gardell, Marie Clark Nelson, Gisli Gunnlaugsson,
Partial Theory of Colonialism . I77
Eric De Geer and Ingrid Aberg.
Conclusion .. Igj
I also tender warm thanks to the staff of the University Library, Carolina
APPENDIX I
Rediviva and of the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies for their ex¬
Principal Pre-occupation Industries (i.e. pre-1941). 187
cellent services as well as for their inexhaustible patience.
APPENDIX 11
I am highly indebted to SAREC (Swedish Agency for Research Cooper¬
A Note on Salaries and Prices of Basic Food Crops. 190
ation with Developing Countries) for a generous grant that made it possible
APPENDIX III
to carry out research journeys to Italy and Great Britain. Without the finan¬
Eritrean Import/Export Trade in Thousands of Lire. 192
cial support of SAREC, the completion of this undertaking would have been
APPENDIX IV greatly delayed.
Total Enrolment of Students in Government Schools 1921—22 — 1939—40 .. 193 In Rome, the librarian of the Istituto Italo-Africano, Carla Ghezzi and her
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . I94 assistants Enrica Marianella, Umberto Giorno and Sonia Monaco showed me,
BIBLIOGRAPHY .. I95 through their enthusiasm and friendship, an aspect of Italy which did not ex¬
Archival Sources . I95 actly match with the colonial sources and my interpretation of them. In Luigi
Official Published Sources. 197 Goglia, the historian of Italian Fascism in Africa and in Sandro Triulzi, I had
Literature . ^91
a constant source of inspiration and guidance. At the Swedish Institute in
Addendum . 211
Rome, Carl Nylander and Kerstin Magnoni, besides providing me with ac¬
INDEX . 212 commodation, mediated on my behalf with the Italian archival authorities. At
a more personal level, Carla Ghezzi, Giovanni and Anna Bussi, and Marco
Guadagni and his family made my several journeys to Italy a pleasant experi¬
ence. To them all, I express my deep gratitude.
More than anyone else I am aware of the inadequacies of this .study. In-

IX
itially, I had planned to concentrate more on colonial praxis than on policies. List of Maps, Graphs and Tables
1 had expected the Eritrean Archive (Archivio Eritrea) shipped to Italy in
1947, to contain sufficient material for the task. This expectation was, how¬
ever, partially frustrated. The files that 1 checked did not contain the kind of
sources I expected. Moreover, many files that might have proven useful were
inaccessible for two reasons. Firstly, the fifty-year rule was applied arbitrarily
by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs thus preventing my access to archive Maps
material from later than 1933. Secondly, since many files contained material 1. Phases of Italian Colonial Expansion, 1885—1890 . 3
stretching from the 1890’s until the late 1930’s, 1 was denied access to them. 2. Ethnic Map of Eritrea . 5
My efforts to explain the arbitrariness of the rule proved unsuccessful. 3. Administrative Map of Eritrea. 103
As this is the first study to deal in a single volume with most aspects of 4. Eritrea. 1936—1941 . 155
Italian colonialism in Eritrea, I have been compelled to let close scrutiny of
several important issues give way to a more general treatment. Its relevance, Graphs
if I may point it out at this early stage, lies in that it provides an interpretation 2.1 Aggregate Import and Export of Eritrea, 1900—34 (in Units of a
of colonialism as well as a point of departure for a series of studies on the Million Lire) . 41
Italian period of Eritrean history — a research field that has yet to be 3.1 Total Enrolment of Students in Government Schools 1921—22 -
developed. 1939—40 . 83
The Africanist Christopher Steed has edited my English; Tony Klein and
Alex Davidson assisted me with proof-reading. Conny Holmqvist drew the Tables
graphs and reconstructed the maps after sketches by Eric De Geer. Robert 2.1. Italian Participation in the Import Trade of Eritrea. 39
Sahlstrdm, my father-in-law, was of great assistance in checking the technical 2.2. Italian Participation in the Export Trade of Eritrea, 1897—1933 . 39
aspects of footnotes and bibliography. The complicated process of preparing 2.3. Ethiopian Import Trade through Massawa in Relation to Total Eritrean
the manuscript for the printers was carried out by Berit Sahlstrom. Imports in Units of a Thousand Lire, 1922—32 . 42
While acknowledging their assistance, 1 need to mention that 1 am solely re¬ 2.4. Ethiopian Export Trade through Massawa in Relation to Total Eritrean
sponsible for any remaining errors. Exports in Units of a Thousand Lire. 42
I want to thank Weini Kahsai, Claartje Aarts, Tebe Hagos, Tibebu Taye, 2.5. Tribute, Revenue and Total Expenditure, 1900—34 (in Units of a
Ingvar Svanberg, Viveca Halldin-Norberg, Yemane Misghena, Svein Ege, Thousand Lire). 42
Weldu Tsegai, Per-Ulf Nilsson, Diana Strannard, Jacob Jonsson, Olle 2.6. Percentage of the Colonial Army out of Total Male Labour Force ... 51
Johansson and Ulla SahlstrOm for their support and friendship. 2.7. Industrial and Commercial Firms in the Italian East African Empire ... 52
Finally I wish to express my indebtedness to my wife and dear friend Berit, 2.8. Breakdown of Eritrean Industrial Firms. 52
to my daughters Shishai, Hanna and Miriam who are constant sources of joy 4.1. Budget Distribution of Seraye District for 1911 — 12 and for 1925—26 . 102
and inspiration. 6.1. The Growth of the Population. 149
6.2. Population Distribution by Religion . 150
6.3. Population Growth by Ethnic Origin, 1905—39 . 150
6.4. Imports of Selected Consumption Goods, 1922 to 1930, in Thousands
of Lire . 153

X xi
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This study endeavours to assess primarily the impact of colonialism on

Eritrean society, and secondly to provide a sketch for a partial theory of col¬
onialism. The discussion on colonial impact, as well as the outline of a partial
theory are based on an analysis of the political economy of Italian colonialism
in general and its educational and ‘native’ policies in particular.
This introductory chapter outlines the pre-colonial economic, social and
political landscape as well as a chronology of colonization of the region which
from 1890 onwards came to be known as Eritrea. It is followed by a summary
of interpretations of colonialism and its motive forces for expansion.
Thereafter the scope and methodological considerations are dealt with. A
survey of the state of research on Italian colonialism in general and on Italian
colonialism in Eritrea in particular is presented. The discussion on sources and
source materials is dealt with and this chapter is concluded with a brief
delineation of the design of the dissertation.

I'he Creation of Eritrea: a Synoptic View

In 1869 Italy, through a shipping company, purchased the bay of Assab and
gained its first foothold on the African side of the Red Sea.' No doubt the
decision was influenced by the opening of the Suez Canal, which had brought
I he Horn of Africa close to the Mediterranean. Nothing, however, came out
ol this occupation largely because the Italians faced opposition from Egypt
which itself claimed sovereignty over the African coast line. Interest in Assab
WHS revived at the beginning of the 1880’s as a result of the advance made in
diplomatic relations between Italy and the province of Shoa in Southern
l ihiopia, where the importance of Assab as a port for the future import/ex¬
port trade was emphasized. When Assab was formally declared an Italian col¬
ony in July 1882, the scramble elsewhere for African colonies had already
slatted.
In 1885 Italy expanded its colonial possessions in the Red Sea from Assab

1
to Massawa and was given diplomatic and technical assistance from Britain.^
Italian occupation of Massawa was perceived by the Ethiopian state as an act
of bad faith by the British, to whom the Ethiopian Emperor Yohannes had
already expressed a desire to annex Massawa.^ Italian colonial expansion
into the Ethiopian highlands, given the international colonialist mood of the
period, was taken for granted. Moreover, as the Italians soon found out, the
occupation of Massawa isolated from its natural hinterland of the highlands,
did not make any sense.
Military encroachments into the Ethiopian highlands were however
thwarted at the beginning of 1887 at Dogali, when a reinforcement force of
500 Italian men was annihilated."* The Dogali defeat further dragged Italy
into the colonial path.
A state of war was declared against the Ethiopian state, while at the same
time Italy sought to undermine Emperor Yohannes by arming his political
rivals. With their efforts to expand into the highlands blocked, the Italians
directed their attention to the north and northwest of Massawa.
Italian expansion into the highlands were greatly facilitated by the political,
economic and demographic chaos of 1888 and 1889. These were the drought
of 1888 followed by famines and epidemics, the political vacuum created by
the death of Emperor Yohannes (March 1889) and the shift of central power
from the north to the south of Ethiopia.^
In the Italo-Ethiopian treaty of Wichale (Uccialle), May 1889, the Ethio¬
pian Emperor Minilik II agreed to the Italians expanding their colonial ter- of the ratification of the treaty of Wichale, Prime Minister Crispi declared:
rit(;>ry into the northern part of Ethiopia.** Between May and August 1889 Ethiopia extends its hands to us. ... A vast region has been opened to our indus¬
Italy expanded its colonial territory well beyond the treaty’s provisions, with¬ try and commerce without any sacrifice of blood. ...Vast zones of land for
out encountering any resistance. On January 1 1890, these disparate posses¬ settlement would in the foreseeable future be offered to the fecund Italian.**
sions in the Red Sea were consolidated into a single political entity henceforth
In developing the policy of using Eritrea as a means towards solving the land
to be called Eritrea (see map 1).
problem in southern Italy, Crispi was assisted by Leopoldo Francheiti, a pro¬
The chronology of Italian colonialism can be divided into three phases. The
minent personality known for his liberal and humanitarian concern over the
first phase began with the treaty of Wichale of 1889 which subsequently led
economic and social crisis of southern Italy.’
to the creation of Eritrea in 1890. This phase lasted until the battle of Adwa
At the beginning of 1891 a parliamentary commission was dispatched to
of 1896, an event that compelled Italy to review its foreign and colonial
Eritrea to investigate the possibility of using the colony for Italian settlement.
policies. The second phase began in 1897 and continued until 1932. The third
Encouraged by the findings of the commission, Prime Minister Crispi ap¬
and final phase began with the preparations for the invasion of Ethiopia,
pointed Leopoldo Franchetti as a special parliamentary deputy with the re¬
where Eritrea and its inhabitants played a crucial role, and lasted until the
sponsibility of turning Eritrea into a colony of settlement. Between 1893 and
demise of Italian colonialism in 1941.
1895, as discussed in some detail in the following chapter, vast areas of land
During the first phase (1889—96) Italian foreign policy in general, and
were confiscated and set aside for colonist settlement. Franchetti’s activities
African policy in particular, was dominated by the authoritarian Prime
in Eritrea led to serious conflict, firstly with the military governor. General
Minister Francesco Crispi. In his hands colonial policy was used as an instru¬
()resie Baratieri who did not share Franchetti’s ambition of settling landless
ment to consolidate his power, as well as to gain support from southern Italy
Ifalian peasants and secondly with the mass of Eritreans. The confiscation of
where the demands for substantial land reforms were being acutely felt.’ In
land gave rise to widespread resistance among the Eritrean peasantry against
his famous speech, delivered in the southern city of Palermo on the occassion
Italian colonialism towards the end of 1894. Eritrean resistance was led by De-
2 1
 • jazmach Bahta Hagos, who had since 1888 been of great assistance to the
Italians in the consolidation of colonial rule.
In an attempt to crush the Bahta uprising, Baratieri invaded the northern
province of Ethiopia and this confrontation led to the battle of Adwa with
Ethiopia in March 1896. The defeat at Adwa with the loss of 4,600 men,
finished the career of Prime Minister Crispi and his African policy.'® From
March 1896 until the appointment of Ferdinando Martini as the first civilian
governor of Eritrea at the end of 1897, the government of Di Rudini sought
to extricate Italy from the legacy of Crispi."
The arrival of Ferdinando Martini as governor (1897—1907) of Eritrea
marked a watershed in Italian colonial history. A towering figure in Italian
f parliamentary politics, Martini was given a full mandate to solve the colonial
problem. A highly astute politician. Martini evolved a new policy based on
neighbourly relations with Ethiopia and on political stability in Eritrea. Shelv¬
ing aside the policy of colonist settlement, Martini perceived the economic
role of Eritrea as being the source of raw materials for export to Italy.
By the time he resigned from his post in 1907, he not only had consolidated
colonial rule, but also enhanced the Italian position vis-a-vis Ethiopia. This
was epitomized by the so called the Tripartite Treaty of 1906 on Ethiopia,
entered between Great Britain, France and Italy and it dealt with the division Map 2. Ethnic Map of Eritrea.
of Ethiopia into separate spheres of influence.'^
From 1907 until 1932, successive governors such as Salvago-Raggi (1907—
14) and Jacopo Gasparini (1923—28) built their policies on the foundations echelons of the clergy and the ruling elite." As a predominantly peasant
laid down by Martini. A drastic reorganization of Eritrean society and society the political organization of the Ethiopian state (of which the Tigri¬
economy was deliberately avoided during this third phase because of the new nyan state formed a part) was concentrated, to a high degree, upon the
economic role assigned to Eritrea. From 1908 onwards Eritrea’s role as a sup¬ modalities for the appropriation of peasant surplus.
plier of colonial soldiers, first to consolidate colonial rule in Somalia (1908— This surplus was appropriated through an annual tribute and through vari¬
10) and later in Libya (1912—32), necessitated a colonial policy that had the ous services to the local ruling elite. The relations between the peasantry and
issue of political stability as its cornerstone. the ruling elite can be illustrated by a brief description of the manner of
The fourth phase began in 1932 with preparations for the invasion of allocation and the collection of tribute. For the purpose of surplus appropria¬
Ethiopia, when Eritrea assumed a strategic role of the utmost importance. It tion as well as for administrative purposes the Tigrinyan region was, on the
was destined to be the staging post for the invasion of Ethiopia. Even more eve of the colonial period, divided into thirty four tribute-paying spatial units
decisive, was that Eritrea was expected to produce the legendary men of arms known as medri.'* Once a medri was assessed for a fixed sum of tribute by
to assist Italy in the acquisition of an African Empire. The 1932—41 period, the Ethiopian Emperor or his representative, the political officer responsible
I as discussed in some detail in the following chapter, transformed Eritrea into lor the medri transmitted the demand to the various spatial groupings within
his territorial sphere.
a real colony of settlement where the Italians constituted up to 12 per cent of
the entire population. I he tribute burden was then shared according to the numerical strength of
Eritrea contained three distinctly discernible pre-capitalist social forma¬ the villages and according to the relative prosperity of individual peasants."
tions. These were the semi-feudal, the aristocratic and the egalitarian or I he peasants were assessed for an irregular tribute called fesses for the
democratic social formations. niiiintenance of the royal army during its sojourn in the area. In periods of
Organized in about 800 hundred villages, the Tigrinyan semi-feudal society war the peasants were in addition obliged to feed and partially equip the army,
was divided into three main social classes, namely the peasantry, the higher II task which could easily disrupt the peasantry’s subsistence economy.'* At a
village level, tribute was collected by the judge who remunerated himself by
4
5
. deducting a certain percentage. By the time the tribute collected from the central features of this system were: 1) a sharp division between aristocratic
villages had reached the Royal Treasury, it had passed through the hands of iiiid serf castes; 2) inherited status; 3) obligations and rights defined by
at least five political officers who had rights of deduction. In addition to keep¬ customary laws and, finally, 4) the existence of slavery and a slave system.*’
ing a portion of the tribute, the local ruling elite maintained its status through Out of the ten groups which inhabited Eritrea no less than six were organ¬
various demands on the villages.” ized into the aristocratic system.*^
An institution which gave rise to much confusion, and which led some The aristocrats, related to each other by clan origin, were known by various
foreign observers to describe the Ethiopian polity as feudal, was that of names among the different ethnic groups and likewise the serfs were also
gw/r/.'* Provincial governors and loyal servants were granted specific areas, known by different names. It is, however, surprising that the structural
villages or regions as gulti for their own maintenance. This meant that tribute features of the system were essentially similar among the six ethnic groups, as
collected from gulti areas was appropriated directly by the gulti office holders. they had widely different cultural and linguistic history.*’
The gulti system was, however, not so much a land-holding system as an ad¬ To illustrate the relationship between the castes we may, as an example take
ministrative mechanism whereby the ruling elite was compensated by the state flic Bogos ethnic group who were extensively studied by Werner Munzingcr
for services rendered.”
on the eve of the colonial period. Among the Bogos the ruling caste were
The Ethiopian Church was a gulti holder in its own right, and it collected known as Shumagle while the serfs were known as Tigre.** The status of the
tribute from peasants under its control in the same manner as the Ethiopian Minmagle was acquired at birth.** All the aristocrats shared the same
state.^® Not every member of the clergy benefited from such tribute. The loiccstry or belonged to the same clan. The status of a serf was on the other
Ethiopian Church was composed of a large corps of priests who shared the liiind acquired either at birth, or by choice, or by contract.** Within the
same subsistence hazards as the peasantry. The monastic orders were Ifogos territorial context, there existed three social groups. These were the
economically better off since they had direct access to tribute from their gulti III isiocrats, the serfs, and the slaves. Strangers who moved into Bogos country
areas.
were obliged to enter into a serf relationship with an aristocrat of their
Land was owned either by single kinship organizations or by villages, which choice.** Slaves, who were rather rare, were acquired from outside or were
in essence were groupings of several kingship organizations. In theory, all loiincr serfs who due to dire circumstances had changed their status.’®
land was said to belong to the king. However, in reality, this meant that the I he obligations of the aristocrat were mainly to provide protection and to
king had a right to collect tribute from all cultivated land with the exception iciMcscni his serf in all legal cases. In exchange for such protection the serf
of gulti areas. The ruling elite and the Ethiopian state hardly interfered in the WHS obliged to provide a certain amount of produce and several types of ser¬
tenure systems limiting themselves mostly to the extraction of surplus. As I vices." I he status of serf once acquired remained permanent, although the
have discussed elsewhere, the Ethiopian state, as represented by the king of sill reserved the right to change patrons. Furthermore, neither in his ac-
kings, hardly owned any land in the Tigrinyan region and the possessions of ciiimilalion of wealth nor in his movement was the serf restricted by the
the Ethiopian Church were limited to a few villages.*' III isiocrat. Soon after the consolidation of colonial rule, some of the serfs ap-
Relations between the ruling elite and the peasantry appeared to be I'ctilcd 10 the colonial state to relieve them of their onerous obligations to the
tolerable during periods of peace. On the eve of the colonial period, as Sven III Isiocrats. This is a clear indication that the aristocrat/serf relationship was
Rubenson has pointed out, relations between the peasantry and the ruling elite iiiiliigonistic.’* The system, however, continued well into the I940’s.”
had deteriorated so much that they were on the verge of being translated into I III* Saho, the Baria and the Kunama constituted the third pre-capitalist
political rebellion. This was caused mainly by the prolonged demands of the siicliil formation. Although the Saho, as pastoralists, differed greatly in their
Ethiopian army on the Tigrinyan peasantry during the 1875—88 period when rcoiiomic system from the Baria and the Kunama peasants, they are grouped
the Ethiopian state, confronted with Egyptian (1875—79) and later Italian iiigcilicr here because of the close similarities in their political organization.
armed encroachments, was compelled to maintain a huge army in the Tigri¬ I lie main characteristic among these three groups was the absence of a ruling
nyan region.**
l ine Organized around clans, political life among these groups was con-
In contrast to the system prevailing among the Tigrinyans, the societal iliiclctl by a council of elders. The clan was made up of few hundred families
structures of the ethnic groups that inhabited Eritrean lowlands were mill II icmaincd the basic political, social and economic unit. Intcrclan rela-
markedly different. Predominantly dependent on pastoralism for subsistence, iliiiis were conducted on an ad hoc basis. The Saho were Moslems while the
their political organizations has been commonly described as aristocratic. The Hill III and Kunama practiced neither Christianity nor Islam. According to the
6
7
* census of 1931 the Baria and Kunama together formed 4.2 per cent of the capital, interpreted colonialism as the highest and encompassing stage of the
population, while the Saho made up another 6.9 per cent.^^ subjugation of Africa to the world capitalist system.^^ The impact of this
Matrilineally organized, the political and social organization of the Baria subjugation is that Africa found itself plunged into a phenomenon known as
and Kunama have been repeatedly described as democratic and egalitarian.^ the development of underdevelopment. The dependence of Africa that began
Land was owned collectively and movable property was inherited by the in the 16th Century, was further heightened in the 19th and 20th Century with
mother’s male cousins. Between the early 1860’s, when the region was first u complete colonial domination. Colonialism integrated Africa to Europe in
visited, and Pollera’s report in 1913 the political organization of the Kunama i\ relationship of perpetual dependence. Although colonialism in its most bla¬
and Baria had undergone one major change. The demands of the colonial ad¬ tant form as the political rule over African peoples has gone, it has been
ministration forced the Baria and the Kunama to accept the institution of substituted in its wake by a more pernicious system, that of neo-colonialism.
chieftainship, which was an extremely useful system for the imposition and Africa is still kept dependent by a complexity of mechanisms, one of which
consolidation of colonial rule.^’ is an African elite, who by and large are a creation of the colonial process.
This is the classical position of the so-called ‘Dependista School of Political
Ix'onomy’, first developed to describe the dilemma of Latin America versus
flic developed world and soon afterwards carried into post colonial Africa.**'
Another variant of the interpretation hinges on the conclusion that the so-
Theoretical Points of Departure: Interpretations of cTillcd African dependency is largely the result of what the colonial powers
Colonialism have failed to do rather than of what they actually did.**^
I he issue as to whether European colonialism upon its demise, could con¬
So far colonialism has been interpreted through two broadly discernible tinue to plague ex-colonies with economic dependence and underdevelopment
ideological prisms. Firstly, it has been treated as a phenomenon characterized hus to remain unanswered as it is beyond the scope of this study.
by a huge infusion of European ideas, technology and capital which, albeit
in an authoritarian and arbitrary manner, laid down the basis for African
modernization.^* The motives which took Europe into Africa, might or
ifiight have not been economic. During the late 19th century, European In Search for a Theory of Colonialism
powers acted with the presumption, which they themselves initiated and In the historiography of Afro-European relations in the past one hundred
elaborated, that Africa did not really belong to Africans. It was ‘res nullius’, years, the terms colonialism and imperialism have often been used to describe
a continent without owners, ready to be shared among those who equated the same phenomenon, i.e. the political and economical domination of one
might with right. The Europeans through the colonial system did exploit country by another. This practice is also common among the adherents of
Africa but they left behind them, when they either could not longer prolong Marxism for whom imperialism has an entirely different meaning. In the
their rule or did not wish to do so, an economic, political and social in¬ writings of classical Marxism, imperialism as developed to a level of theory.
frastructure essential to the modernization of the continent. Colonialism was Is primarily a stage in the development of capitalism. As the highest stage of
not only an exploitative mechanism but also a heavy burden on its capitalism, imperialism is characterized by the existence of monopolies and
perpetrators since it equally dealt with the material and moral development finance capital, the export of capital, the formation of international firms and
of the colonized peoples.^’ (he territorial division of the world by the main capitalist powers.The
Even Karl Marx, in the Communist Manifesto of 1848 as well as in his latter Marxist theory of imperialism gives an explanation of why the less developed
writings on the colonial process, believed that colonialism by its own con¬ world was colonized. Although Lenin was not the only one to put out a theory
tradictory logic (destroyer of pre-capitalist systems and creator of new pro¬ of imperialism he has been credited with giving it the clarity it currently main-
gressive ones) would lay down the basis for the emancipation of colonial lains.
society.^ This interpretation dominated African historiography of the The apparent clarity of the concept of imperialism notwithstanding, I
1960’s. Text book writing on African history and the national history of prefer to use the simple and uncontroversial term colonialism as a point of
African states were conceived and executed in this optimistic spirit.^' departure for a number of reasons. The Marxist theory of imperialism presup¬
The second interpretation, largely based on global analyses of the flow of poses the existence of a causal connection betwceen the changes which took
8
9
 place in the structure of the capitalist economic system in Europe after 1870, 'ihiirply from classical marxist theory by his persistent argument that protcc-
and the division of the world into colonial empires. This causal connection, llonism was not compatible with a rational development of capitalism and
as the enemies of the marxist theory readily pointed out, has not been substan¬ I hilt the interests of those who supported protective tariffs did not stem from
tiated and it may never be.**^ 4 iipiliilism as such.^®
Capitalism as a system does not by necessity require colonies, hinterlands rite policy of colonialism triumphed, according to Schumpeter, due to the
or peripheries for its development.^’ The scramble for African colonies for hiilurc of capitalism to take radical action on agrarian issues, thus providing
instance, was neither initiated by the biggest capitalist countries nor did all big II good reason for the reinstitution of tariffs, and by the fact that stale
powers participate. The problem of a causal connection certainly diminishes oigiiiiizalions were not sufficiently penetrated by the spirit of capitalism. ‘The
the value of the theory of imperialism as an explanatory instrument but it does •loclal pyramid of the present age’, wrote Schumpeter, ‘has been formed not
not altogether invalidate the theory. Moreover, the causal connection between hv substance and laws of capitalism alone, but by two different social
capitalism and colonialism does not constitute the central concern of the ^iihsiances and by the laws of two different epochs’.^* Colonialism will
theory of imperialism. wiihcr and die with the development of capitalism.
The theory of imperialism also presupposes that the capitalist system, after 14)r our purpose, the importance of Schumpeter’s study lies in the fact that
having put the less developed world under its control, proceeded first to it provides a more comprehensive explanation first on the atavistic basis for
destroy the pre-capitalist structures in the colonies and then to create the 4 olonial expansion, and secondly on colonialism as a distortion of the rational
preconditions for industrial capitalism and the building of nation-states. This ilcvciopment of capitalism rather than as a necessary stage in the development
characteristic of imperialism was first stated by Karl Marx in the 1840’s and nl the capitalist system. It can be stated that the scramble for Africa did not
later repeated by Lenin. Without having to align myself with the well-trodden III any significant manner provide a necessary stage in the development of
positions of Wallerstein, Frank, Amin and the many others who wrote on the iiipitalism in Europe.^^ Furthermore, the modernizing effect of colonialism
contrary result of imperialist domination, it suffices to state that this addi¬ envisaged by classical Marxism appeared, on the contrary, to have produced
tional aspect of the theory was based on first impressions rather than on con¬ (III antithesis, namely the underdevelopment of the colonized world.^
crete appraisal of the colonial situation."*® I prefer the Schumpeterian model because it does not anticipate any pattern
A remarkable point of departure for the study of colonialism is the research III colonial rule. Schumpeter did not show any interest in how and for what
of Joseph Schumpeter. From the outset it is important to bear in mind that goals colonies were to be used, although as an economist he was fully aware
the author does not make any distinction between imperialism and col¬ that some section of the capitalist class stood to gain by the acquisition of col¬
onialism. A central theme, which Schumpeter thoroughly examined, are the onics. In contrast, the theory of imperialism upholds the view that colonialism
motives for colonial expansion in general and the 19th century European col¬ exploited and destroyed pre-colonial structures while at the same time it lays
onization of the less developed world in particular. At the general level down the foundations for an advanced mode of production.
Schumpeter defined imperialism (colonialism) as the objectless disposition on This study on Italian colonialism in Eritrea strongly suggests that while the
the part of the state to unlimited forcible expansion, a hypothesis which he lialiuns attempted with varying degree of success to exploit the human and
later developed in his treatment of late 19th century imperialism.^’ Analysing material resources, they were not in the least interested in laying down the in-
the motives for colonial expansion, Schumpeter repeatedly emphasized the liasiructure (economical and political) for the interests of the inhabitants of
following: 1) a purely capitalist world offered ‘no fertile soil to colonialist im¬ I he colony. The premise of colonialism was political and economic domina-
pulses’; 2) that in a world where free trade prevailed no class could have an lion through the medium of military power and race. It was contrary to the
interest in forcible colonial expansion ; and 3) that any economic interest in laison d’etre of Italian colonialism as 1 argue in chapter two, to pursue a de¬
colonial expansion on the part of people or class was not necessarily a product velopment policy favourable for the creation of an autonomous colonial
of capitalism.'*’ He recognized the importance of protective tariffs in the xocicly. Free from any logical and economic determinism, Schumpeter’s
growth of imperialist policies. Protectionism, argued Schumpeter, made the model, I believe, provides a wider leeway to examine colonial praxis.
conflict of interest between nations active in the open world where diplomacy On the basis of the above exposition we can conceptualize two partial
— a non/economic instrument — was given a freer hand. A point Marxist ihcories of colonialism. They are partial because they limit themselves to ex¬
historiography often stressed and Schumpeter corroborated was that protec¬ plaining the motives as well as methods of colonization exclusively from the
tionism was a motive for colonial expansion. Schumpeter, however, differed I iiropean side of the phenomenon. The central question which Schumpeter

10 11
• and the classical Marxists tried to answer was why Europe found itself in the
scramble for colonies. As we discussed earlier, the Marxist theory came up At this juncture it is appropriate to discuss the choice of the themes as well
with the presuppositions of a causal or necessary connection between as the nature and level of analysis. By 1940 Italian colonialism had reached
capitalism and colonialism, while Schumpeter argued that colonialism was a Its apogee of consolidated power over Eritrean society. The Italians were

distortion of the rational development of capitalism rather than a necessary neither kicked out of Eritrea as a result of internal resistance nor were they
stage in the development of the capitalist system. A complete theory of col¬ put in a position whereby they felt that the cost of running the colony was
onialism, in addition to dealing with motives, ought to study and explain the greater than the benefits accruing from it. Although the slow and steady
process and praxis of colonialism. penetration of the capitalist sector did result in the partial or semi-proletarian-
ization of some Eritreans, the degree and extent of change do not warrant
detailed studies on themes such as the transformation of social relations.
Hence the mam theme of this study, while not ignoring the colonial impaci.
concentrates on the nature and dynamics of colonialism. The question that is
Scope and Methodological Considerations constantly kept in mind is how did the colonial system perpetuate its exi.stencc

This study has two inter-related tasks. The first task is to explain the praxis
of colonialism with a view of providing a partial theory on the subject. Bear¬
ing in mind the generality of the concept and the vastness of the source ma¬
terial, the leading question is framed in the following manner. Irrespective of State of Research
what motivated Italy to acquire colonies, what did Italian colonialism in
Eritrea set out to achieve and how did it go about implementing its pro¬ Studies on Italian colonialism in general
gramme?
Viewed from the Leninist definition of imperialism, Italian colonial expansion
The empirical material on colonial objectives and programme is organized
around three major issues, namely political economy, educational policy and Zhv 'he historio-
native policy. Linisf P Antonio Gramsci, the founder of the Italian Com-
un st Party and an outstanding interpreter of the evolution of Italian
The second task is to assess the impact of colonial rule on Eritrean society.
There are two main methodological problems that need to be taken into con¬ X snt '"hhout any economic or financial basis.
I he still immature Italy not only had no capital to export* wrote Gramsci,
sideration. The first deals with the object to be assessed. This is less prob¬
but had to have recourse to foreign capital for its own pressing needs’.’*
lematic since the earlier chapters on colonial policies and praxis provide suffi¬
Crjspi s colonial policy according to Gramsci was closely •connected with
cient material for the purpose. The second consideration concerns the prob¬
session o unity, and in it he proved able to understand the political in-
lem of how to assess the colonial impact. The problem is compounded because
Italian colonial rule did not terminate in decolonization, but on the contrary, lUKence of the south’.” The southern peasant continued Gramsci, ‘wanted
it was substituted by British military occupation.
iisclf. who had no wish to go for “economic jacobinism’’ conjured up the
The few available studies on the question of impact do not make a distinc¬
mirage of colonial lands to be exploited’.’" The policy of colonial expansion
tion between the Italian period (1882—1941) and the British period (1941 —
52). Moreover, the emphasis is on post-colonial reality as encapsulated at the
P tical and economic nature.” In other words. Crispi wished to resolve the
end of the colonial period. 1 have endeavoured to confront this problem by
land question in southern Italy without any reform measures by keeping the
constantly keeping in mind the following counter factual question: Had the
Italian colonial rule not been substituted by that of Britain, what would the
Ptriahsm and the imperialism of the poor’ and their variants were, according
colonial impact had been on Eritrean society? Although a useful instrument,
<1 Gramsci. developed by southern intellectuals who owing to their feudal
counter-factual argumentation has its own limitations.” Thus the analysis
baaground and ideology belonged to the exploiting classes in Italy.*"
and assessment of impact has been kept a level which can be clearly evidenced
by the empirical material. In addition, the discussion is narrowed down to the liistoriarCarloTfl'h- -^'”"' <^ramscian outline, the Africanist
political impact of colonialism on Eritrean society. ns onan Carlo Zagh. interpreted Crispi’s colonial policy as a result of several
ditional factors namely, the economic and financial motives, the passionate
12
nationalism of Crispi exclusively explained in terms of colonial expansion and prove their image vis-^-vis other European nations. Politically, the war of
what Zaghi called la spinta militaresca (the military push)/‘ Zaghi is indeed Libya was a successful test-case of the maturity of the nation. Italy proved
correct about the military as a factor for colonial expansion, especially after that it was a nation by conducting a war that was supported by all groups.
its defeat at Dogali in 1887 where the military establishment at Massawa car¬ As for the demographic motive, Michels stated that the acquisition of a col¬
ried out its less publicized wars of revenge in complete disregard of directives ony has in no way changed the pattern and extent of emigration. The author
from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.^^ The autonomy of the military was was candid enough to add that the first great imperialist motive (the
however severely circumscribed by the reluctance of the treasury to supply demographic motive) could be said to have failed.^’
funds. A slightly different interpretation is that put forward by Wolfgang
Elaborating on the alignments behind Crispins policy of colonialism, Zaghi Schieder. Adhering to the theories of social imperialism developed among
stated that there was little evidence for believing that there was a strong others by Hans Ulrich Wehler,^* Schieder argued that the colonial politics of
alliance between Crispi and the protectionist and capitalist forces. Indeed he Crispi (1894—96) coincided or immediately followed a period of economic de¬
felt that the picture resembled more that of economic and financial groups ac- pression.^ The politics of imperialism (sic.) occures, according to Schieder,
Quising to Crispi’s policy of colonial expansion in exchange for a more at a transitional phase between ‘primitive unification* and the perfection of
repressive policy against the lower classes. the ‘nation-state*.’® The problems of participation in the political life of
Gennaro Mondaini, a towering figure in the history of colonial legislation groups hitherto unintegrated and those of economic distribution create a con-
and a prolific writer between 1910 and 1941 wrote that colonialism was no fiictual situation which in turn demand a political strategy for their solution.
doubt a phenomenon of a capitalist nature represented not so much by the ex¬ One such strategy, according to Schieder, is that of imperialism, a medium
pansion of capital to the new colonies but by capitalistic greed for the acquisi¬ that solves the conflictual situation through the postponement of democratic
tion of the colonial forces of production.^ Similar view was reiterated as late solutions.’* Schieder has provided two broad theories for the evolution and
as 1981 by Luigi Goglia when he wrote that colonialism was never a diver¬ implementation of colonial expansion, namely the economic depression nexus
sionary strategy but a strategy of a poor nation with little capital for export, and the conflictual situation arising from problems of political integration
directed towards territories which had even less products to exploit.^^ and economic distribution.
For Professor Alberto Acquarone, the motives for colonial expansion were In the Italian case, Schieder argued that the overriding cause for the ‘con¬
deeply rooted in the role of Italy in European life: flictual situation* was the violent population explosion between 1861 and
1911, whereby the population increased from 25 millions to just over 35
It would have been difficult for the Italians to accept willingly the role of a millions. The social consequences of what he called the ‘violent demographic
minor power in keeping with their effective strength, not only because accep¬
explosion’ was emigration which increased dramatically from 1887 on¬
tance and success in the club of the great powers was an essential element of the
quest for identity which continued to be one of the guiding, if unspoken, forces wards.’^ The phenomenon of emigration provided, Schieder maintained, in¬
of Italian national life after unification, but also because Italians were bound spiratory ideas which were later translated into motives of colonialism.’^
to be prisoners of their past. Even leaving aside the myth of Rome (which in Moreover, the political consequence of the demographic explosion brought
its more extreme forms was the monopoly of some exalted and restricted
about the progressive isolation and fragmentation of the ruling class as it was
minorities only), the inescapable facts were that Italians had played too vital a
continously pressed by the proletariat, socialist and Catholic groups who up
role in the history of Europe since Renaissance..
to this time were marginally integrated into the state system. In other words,
An interpretation very similar to that of Schumpeter is that of Roberto the political consequence was the further deepening of the ‘conflictual situa¬
Michels. In his study Michels set out to explain the nature of Italian im¬ tion*. The adoption of colonialism (la politica coloniale) according to
perialism as well as its moral basis in the aftermath of Italian invasion of Schieder was a means used by the ruling class in order to solidify ideological
Libya. Imperialism, Michels wrote, was allowed to those nations who have adherence of the bourgeoisie against the unintegrated pressure groups.’^
sufficient power to carry it out. This was in brief Michels moral basis for im¬ Schieder’s assessment might be true during the Italian invasion of Libya in
perialism, a view not very different from that cogently explained by 1911 —12. Concerning the earlier period however, the policy of colonialism in¬
Schumpeter. Having thus established the moral basis, Michels interpreted stead of solidifying ideological adherence of the bourgeoisie further deepened
Italian imperialism as psychological, political and demographic. The the fragmentation of the ruling class. The bourgeoisie of the north of Italy,
psychological factor lay in the fact that Imperialism assisted the Italians to im¬ previously indifferent to colonial expansion became more vocal against col-

14 15
 Onialism. There might have indeed been a ‘conflictual situation’, but during a security against dangerous uprisings from the masses. In Crispi’s colonial
the 1889—96 period what appeared even more pronounced was the economic policy of expansion the south also saw a possibility for an outlet to the grow¬
dis-location brought about firstly by the union of two separate economies ing political restlessness while at the same time the southern bourgeoisie used
(those of the north and south) and secondly by the protectionist wars against colonialism as a sort of political platform to enter into the political life of the
France/^ Schieder’s characterization of Italian colonialism under Crispi as state.®^
‘social imperialism’ is fully endorsed by G. Carocci in his thematic study of Gramsci, Zaghi, Candeloro, Schieder, Carocci for the pre-1900 period and
Italian history.’^ Mola, Grassi, Goglia, Rochat and Naitza for the latter period all perceive a
For the Italian Marxist historian Giorgio Candeloro, Crispi’s policy of col¬ connection between internal conditions and colonial expansion.®^ This con¬
onial expansion was not only a result of the latter’s passionate conception and nection, however, is neither fully described nor fully assessed. It is my conten¬
rhetoric of the greatness of Italy, but also and above all it was the result of tion that the connection between internal conditions and colonial expansion
the objective economic and social situation, that is to say of the industrial and was firstly very tenuous and secondly the strategy of colonialism failed to
agrarian block formed in 1887.^ To the essentially Gramscian interpretation, achieve its intended objective. If the ruling class with Crispi as its leader ex¬
Candeloro introduced a new factor namely that of the role of the shipping and pected to control the internal situation of the south by promising free land in
armaments industries on the evolution of the policy of colonialism as later ex¬ the colonies, then it must have admitted the tenuousness of the connection
pressed by Crispi. As the economic depression gave way to recovery from the during and after the Fasci uprising of 1893—94.
end of 1894 onwards, the industrial group that supported Crispi’s colonial The Fasci, organizations of agricultural workers and landless peasants in
ambitions became relatively weaker vis-a-vis the textile, chemical and elec¬ Sicily, were apparently oblivious to Crispi’s promise of vast lands in the col¬
trical sector most of which was based in the north. From 1895 onwards, onies and not only demanded concrete action on the land question but were
Candeloro argued that the northern bourgeoisie anxious for stability, lined about to take the law into their hands. Crispi had three options. The first was
itself with the radicals and the socialists against colonial adventures and ex¬ to sidetrack the ‘conflictual situation’ by undertaking a more agressive col¬
penditures. Crispi, who was keenly aware of the allignment of forces against onial expansion thus rallying the entire nation behind him. However in order
his colonial policy pushed the ill equipped Italian army to secure a victory for to do so, Crispi had to convince the parliamentarians from the north. The
himself and the monarchy.^® north, described during the period of Crispi as the state of Milan {L*sta(o di
Grispi’s passionate belief in the politics of greatness of Italy {la politica Milano) with its preference for commercial and economic penetration would
della grandezza dltalia) meant in concrete terms extensive subsidy and pro¬ certainly have refused the allocation of more funds for colonial adventure as
tection of the heavy industries i.e. shipbuilding, armaments and steel on the it did in 1895.®^
one hand, and the extension of authoritarianism on the other.^’ His protec¬ The second option was for Crispi to introduce a substantial land reform,
tionist policy, initially caused by the need for more funds to finance colonial thus democratizing the society but at the expense of the southern bourgeiosc.
wars of attrition against Ethiopia, played a decisive role in the establishment As the opposition from the southern latifundists was a matter of common
and consolidation of heavy industries. Northern industries exploited the sense, Crispi did not even try before he played his third option namely that
favourable protective umbrella and expanded their market throughout the of crushing the Fasci movement by force, killing more than ninety citizens.*’
peninsula. In the south, however, Crispi’s tariff wars brought disastrous con¬ When Crispi belatedly introduced comprehensive legislation to ameliorate the
sequences whereby more and more peasants found it virtually impossible to conditions of the south, the landed bourgeiose together with the parliamen¬
make ends meet. tarians of the north buried the bill.®^ In the newly established colony of
Crispi’s protectionist policy described by Gramsci as that of ‘manufactur¬ Eritrea, the policy of settling landless peasants soon became unrealistic and
ing the manufacturer’.®® laid down the basis for an industrial Italy which in unrealizable partly due to parliamentary control of state funds. Even more,
the opinion of at least one author saved it from being condemned to the status the policy was once and for all revoked by the colonial governor, Oreste
of a raw material producing nation.®* The south, meaning the economic and Baratieri in the second half of 1895.
political elite, went along with Crispi’s policy because it suited its interests. There was indeed a conflictual situation that demanded a political strategy
According to the insightful summation of the parlamentary historian for its solution. Since colonial expansion was however only one option avail¬
Francesco Brancato, the southern bourgeoisie found in Crispi a true represen¬ able to the ruling class, the existence of a conflictual situation alone does not
tative of their aspirations and saw in his ‘fist of iron’ policy {pugno di ferro)y by itself explain the adoption of colonialism as the viable strategy. In other

16 17
words, colonial expansion as a policy did not necessarily follow from the in¬ To the fourth category or research belong Alberto Aquarone’s studies on
ternal conditions prevailing in Italy. Therefore, neither Italian motives for Eritrea’s first civil governor Ferdinando Martini,*’ although the main em¬
colonial expansion nor the European scramble for African colonies could be phasis was put on the Italian side of the problem. The most relevant studies
sufficiently explained by the Marxist and social imperialist theories of im¬ under this category are those by Loretta Caponi and Irma Taddia. Caponi’s
perialism.*^ article on the colonial impact on land tenure in Eritrea concentrates for the
most part on general colonial policies. Caponi sidetracks her main objective
and discusses in great detail the relationship between colonialism and Italian
Studies on Italian colonialism in Eritrea capital accumulation both at home and in the colony. Based exclusively on
Most of the research can be roughly grouped into four categories: 1) those published primary sources, Caponi concluded that Eritrea became neither an
that emphasize the negative consequences of colonialism on Italian social, outlet for Italian colonists nor a colony of intensive capital penetration as en¬
political and intellectual development; 2) those that extol and defend direct or visaged by the land law of 1926, which created the legal apparatus for the es¬
indirect the Italian presence abroad and especially in Africa; 3) those of a tablishment of vast (up to I0,(X)0 hectares) concessions. In an appendix
purely descriptive nature, several of which are of considerable value as source Caponi reproduced a table of land expropriated between 1893 and 1895, with¬
material and finally, 4) the slowly and steadily emerging body of modern re¬ out, however, any note explaining the fact that these were revoked by the land
search on aspects of Italian colonialism in the colonies, and mostly in Eritrea. laws of 1909 and 1926. Caponi noted the institution of two types of land laws
Before entering into a detailed assessment of the state of research, I shall com¬ introduced in 1909, namely lands under Italian law and lands under
ment on the scope and nature of the first two categories. Works under the customary law,’® but did not discuss the impact of the coexistence of dual
third category shall be referred and commented in the main text in so far as systems of tenure on the colony. Carried out within the framework of the
they prove to be relevant, while those of the fourth category are treated Dependista school of political economy^' Caponi concluded that Italian col¬
separately below. onialism in Eritrea brought about the disruption of values and social relations
Under the first category where colonialism is criticized from its own home and the continuation of the structure of subsistence economy.’^
ground, the works of Battaglia, Naitza, Del Boca, Mola and Maione are the Of great relevance are the studies by Professor Taddia on the transforma¬
most notable. While Battaglia and Del Boca wrote that Italian colonialism ran tion of land tenure and on public (of the colonial state) and private capital
counter against the ideals of the Risorgimento and the rights of all people to in Eritrea during the colonial period^^ In the earlier study Taddia has con¬
independence, Mola, Maione and Naitza argued that Italian colonialism made sistently argued that Italian colonialism had brought about profound changes
difficult the democratization of Italian society. in the structure of property and in the cultivation of land. These views are fur¬
In the second category we find the forty volumes of the L*Italia in Africa ther reiterated in her most recent book.’^ My main contention with Taddia,
series published under the auspices of a committee for the documentation of lies, however, in the problem of assessing the intensity of colonial impact on
Italian activities in Africa.** Created by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Af¬ Eritrean society.’^ I have argued elsewhere that Taddia has drawn conclu¬
fairs, the committee planned and carried out its investigation with the ex¬ sions which can not be supported by the empirical evidence the author herself
pressed aim of defending Italian colonial presence in Africa. Being for the assembled. Notwithstanding my reservations, Taddia has provided an
most part not critically documented, these works are of limited historical and analysis of the colonial process and an interpretation of the impact of col¬
research value. onialism, both of which are contributions of great significance. Another
The above mentioned studies share a common point of departure in that useful study although outdated, is that of Professor Romain Rainero on early
they are conceived and written from the Italian view point. Colonialism is aitempts to establish a colony of settlement in Eritrea,’^ where the author
either praised or criticized for what it has achieved or failed to achieve for argued that Italy was not fully committed to the idea of state-assisted settle¬
Italy. The African side of the phenomenon is left out. This uni-dimensional ment of landless Italian peasants in Eritrea.
aspect of the state of research is also acutely felt in the studies of colonialism On the ideological domain, De Marco’s study on colonial educational
in Eritrea. Eritrea was the oldest and by far the most important colony (for policy has been an important point of departure.’* Written during the second
the greater part of the colonial period) and yet apart from few works no at¬ world war and based exclusively on published material, the study describes in
tempt has been made to study the overall impact of Italian colonialism in detail the origin and development of colonial educational policies in Libya
Eritrea. and the Horn of Africa, including Eritrea.

18
' Sources and Source Material allocation between provinces and between various sectors of the colonial
society. The problem of source material is even more pronounced on the
The colonial sources constitute the foundation for the reconstruction and ideological plane. My source material on education, by far the most complete,
study of colonialism in Eritrea. While written Eritrean source material during is paradoxically enough striking for its gaps. Schools were opened and their
or after the end of the colonial period is virtually non-existent^ the recaptur¬ programmes changed without apparently sufficient motivation. Information
ing of some aspects of the Eritrean colonial experience through oral interviews on school attendance by age and grade is very fragmentary. Some inevitable
is impossible because of the political and military crises of the region. gaps notwithstanding, the accessible archival source material as well as the ex¬
The most important sources for this study are derived from the historical tremely rich published primary material provide a sufficient base to document
archives of the former ministry of colonies, Archivio Storico dell’Africa and analyse the policy and practice of colonialism.
Italiana henceforth referred to as ASMAl, and the local archive of the
Eritrean colony. This archive was shipped from Asmara, the capital of
Eritrea, to Rome in 1947 with the permission of the British who ruled over
Eritrea from 1941 to 1952. Containing material which by its nature is of local
interest, the Eritrean local archive deposited in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Thematic Organization of the Study
Affairs under Archivio Eritrea henceforth referred to as AE, has proved to
be of great relevance. Another important archival source is that of the com¬ The policies and practice of Italian colonialism are discussed in chapters two
mittee for the documentation of Italian activities in Africa (Comitato per la and four respectively. The chapter on the political economy of colonialism
documentazione delle attivit^ italiane in Africa). Essentially made up of ma¬ endeavours to answer questions related to the economic and non-economic
terial extracted from the ASMAl and AE, the comitato archive maintains the functions of the colony and the measures adopted by the colonial administra¬
character of a carefully edited and collected source material. Since access to tions to achieve their goals. Eritrea, I argue, was at first expected to function
the comitato archive is based on individual permission, the only section which as a colony of settlement. This policy was discontinued because of Eritrean
I had the privilege to consult was that on Italian activities in the educational resistance and due to a number of Italian economic and political considera¬
field. tions. Later on, the colonial administration attempted to turn Eritrea into a
I have also consulted the historical archive of the Ministry of Foreign Af¬
source of raw materials for Italy. However, before the potentialities of the
fairs, Rome, henceforth referred to as ASMAE. This archive was however not
colony were even fully mapped out, the function of the colony, firstly as an
as useful as I had anticipated. Due to the fifty year rule imposed by the Italian outpost for transit trade and secondly, as a reservoir for recruits to the col¬
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, my possession of copies of archival source ma¬
onial army, began to assume more importance. Finally, this chapter assesses
terial ends at 1935 with three notable exceptions. My collection on educational the importance of Eritrea to Italy.
policy and praxis, as I mentioned earlier is complete since I had access to the
The study of colonial policies and practice is extended in chapter three to
comitato archive. On the political field, for the 1938—41 period, the collec¬
the field of education. In the context of colonial Africa education has been
tion at the State Central Archive (Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Roma) have the main, if not the only, instrument which enabled the colonized to perceive
not only been useful but also gave me a clearer picture of the nature of source themselves as a nation within the territorial limitations imposed by the col¬
material which still remains inaccessible. onial power and to challenge the moral basis of the colonial system. Cogni¬
My archival collection leaves a great deal to be desired concerning the
zant of the political implications of extending western style education to
quality and reliability of data. Most often the source material is too soft to I ritreans, the colonial administration imposed strict limitations on the type
be hammered into a lasting and reliable shape. This I believe is largely because and the duration of education available to the colonized. The policy and prac¬
the problems that 1 have chosen to investigate were of marginal importance tice of colonial education, I argue, was one of the main reasons for the virtual
to the colonial state. With two illustrative examples I wish to point out the absence of a nationalist movement in Eritrea during the colonial period.
weaknesses of the source material. On the economical domain, we have good In chapter four, relations between the Eritrean and the colonial administra¬
source material on internal revenues, on subsidy from Italy and the amount tion and the position of the former in the colonial system are analysed under
of tribute levied from the population. But the source material fails to come the heading colonial native policy and practice. Italian colonialism did not in
to assistance when we wish to focus our interest on the problems of budget any manner or at any period anticipate the autonomy and self-government of

20 21
. the colony. Native policy emphasized the rural nature of the colony and the Huerra dAfrica, Torino, 1958, pp. 77—88; Angelo del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa
preservation of Eritrean social organizations. From 1930 onwards, the incor¬ Orientatey vol. 1, Milano, 1976, pp. 33—49; Raffaele Ciasca, Storia coloniate
poration of a racialist ideology into native policy, meant that relations be¬ deiritaiia contemporanea da Assab aU*ImperOy Milano, 1939, pp. 67—251.
tween the colonizers and the colonized were defined as perpetual and im¬
2. Giglio, Etiopia/Mar Rossoy pp. 350—54; \dem.y L*impresa di Massaua^ pp. 41—45.
mutable.
l or a fuller account of British role see the slightly outdated but still relevant study by
The chapter that deals with the colonial impact is preceded by a discussion Agatha Ramm, ‘Great Britain and the planting of Italian Power in the Red Sea, 1868—
in the fifth chapter on the reactions of the Eritrean people to colonial rule. 1895*, English Historical Review^ 1944, pp. 211—36. See also Sven Rubenson, The
This chapter throws light on the factors which either enhanced the continued Survival of Ethiopian Independence^ London, 1976, p. 379.
presence of the colonial system as well as those that limited the implementa¬
1. Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence^ pp. 379—80; Harold Marcus.
tion of certain colonial policies. Moreover, it has a great bearing on the
the Life and Times of Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1844—1913, Oxford, 1975, p. 78.
discussion of the colonial impact.
The Eritrean peoples’ reactions to colonial rule varied and depended largely 4. Battaglia, La prima guerra, pp. 230—58; Rubenson, The Survival, p. 381.
on their perceptions of the colonial system as well as on their perceptions of
their pre-colonial history. An important factor that explains the contradictory V Sec Richard Pankhurst. ‘The Great Ethiopian Famine of 1888—1892: A New
responses to colonial rule is, 1 argue, the pre-colonial relations between the Assessment*, Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences, 21 (1966). pp.
271—96. See also his recent study, The History of Ethiopian Famine, London, 1985.
various ethnic groups of the colony. While the Tigrinyans maintained
See Harold Marcus, The Life and Times, pp. 135—36, for an assessment of the impact
throughout the colonial period a clearly discernible notion of Ethiopian na¬ nl famine, the typhus and cattle disease that subsequently followed. For the political
tionalism, the non-Tigrinyans appeared to align themselves with colonial rule 11 Isis in northern Ethiopia created largely by the shift of central power to the south,
and perceived it as a regime of domination concerned primarily with law and MH- Bairu Tafia, ‘Political Crisis in Tigrai, 1889-1899*. Africa (Rome) 34:1 (1979)
101-21.
order. Dispersed widely in the regions of the colony that were of least import¬
ance to colonial economic and political exploitation, the Non-Tigrinyans, who
I or an exhaustive discussion on the treaty see Rubenson, The Survival, pp. 384—87.
were mostly Moslems, rated the colonial system as more favourable than the
Ethiopian system. L See the discussion in ‘State of research* of this chapter.
.The colonial impact on Eritrean society is dealt with in chapter six. The
discussion is carried out at two levels. Under the objective impact of col¬ 8 I rancesco Crispi, Scritti e discorsipolitici (1849—1890), Torino. Roma, no date. p.
onialism, I argue that the colonial period, i.e. 1882—1941, brought about MH. quoted in Claudio G. Segre. Fourth Shore: The Italian Colonization of Libya,
* hlcugo, 1974. p. 12.
both a material improvememt and a political stability when compared to the
four decades that preceded it. Furthermore, the colonial system through its 0 Komain Rainero. I primi tentativi di colonizzazione agricola e di popolarnento
educational and native practice contributed to the evolution of an inchoate ileirFritrea, 1890—1895, Milano, 1960, pp. 32—35.
Eritrean identity. The discussion is further continued at a second level by
means of a counter-factual method of investigation designed to assess the im¬ 10 I Igures on Italian casualties differ widely. Conti Rossini in his study Italia ed
I ttopia dal trattato d'Uccialli alia Battaglia di Adua, Roma. 1935, pp. 448. puts 289
pact of colonialism on national consciousness. 1 argue that the colonial period
nlfleers and 4,600 soldiers killed. Roberto Battaglia, in La prima guerra d*Africa,
was too brief for its impact to be other than limited.
hifino, 1958, p. 789, footnote 28, on the various figures. Prime Minister Francesco
The final chapter, while summing up the salient features of colonialism f rUpi resigned on March 4, 1896.
endeavours to sketch a partial theory of colonialism.
11 Alberto Acquarone, ‘La politica coloniale italiana dopo Adua: Ferdinando Mar-
ilhi governatore in Eritrea’, Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, 42:3 (1975) 346—77;
4 (1975) 449—83. One of the alternatives explored by Prime Minister Di Rudini was
I hr liiiiiding over of Eritrea to the Belgian king Leopold against acceptable compensa-
FOOTNOTES ihMi Sec Rainero. L*anticolonialismo italiano da Assab ad Adua, pp. 352—54.

1. The chronology of Italian piecemeal occupation of the Red Sea coast is fully ex¬ U ( urlo Rossetti, Storia diplomatica delTEtiopia durante il regno di Menelik II,
plained by Carlo Giglio, L'ltaVia in Africa: Etiopia/Mar Rosso^ Roma, 1958; pp. Iniiin), 1910, pp. 319 25, for the text of the treaty. For a commentary on its implica-
101—24; idem., Uimpresa di Massaua, Roma, 1955; Roberto Battaglia, La prima Ihiiu see Marcus, The Life and Times, pp. 211 — 12.

22
23
• 13. I have chosen to use the term Tigrinyans to describe the Tigrinya-speakers in 26. Werner Munzinger, Dei Costumi e del diritto dei Bogos, Roma, 1891, p. 57.
Eritrea in order to distinguish them from the rest of Tigrinya speakers in Ethiopia.
Prior to the 1840’s the Tigrinya speaking region was described by the name of the lan¬ 27. Ibid., p. 58.
guage i.e. Tigrai. However since Tigrai denotes an Ethiopian province, the term Tigri¬
nyans as used in this study refers only to those Tigrinya-speakers in Eritrea. On the 28. Ibid., p. 56.
Tigrinyan social structures see Conti Rossini, I principi di diritto consuetudinario
dell*Eritrea, Roma, 1916, pp. 29—540. 29. Ibid., p. 56.

The distinctions between the three classes were however not clear at all. In his travel
30. Ibid., pp. 56—57.
book on the Abyssinians of whom the Tigrinyans constituted a part, C. Plowden
wrote, ‘It must be remembered that between the chief and the most rugged of his
31. Ibid., p. 60.
followers there is no distinction save that of wealth and good fortune...The Abyssinian
in all respects is the equal to his chief.’ Travels in Abyssinia, London, 1868, p. 60. See
Gene Ellis for similar views, ‘Feudal Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding 32. Ferdinando Martini, II diario eritreo, vol. 4. Entry for December 22 1905, where
Ethiopia’, Journal of Modern African Studies, 14:2 (1976) 275—95. the Tigre serfs asked Martini to relieve them from their shumagle (patrons) who treated
them like slaves. Martini noted that the Shumagle were the necessary intermediaries
between the government and the Tigre.
14. See my study on ‘Land Tenure and the organization of Surplus Appropriation on
the Eve of the Colonial Period’, in Notes on Nationalism and Resistance in Eritrea,
1890—1940, pp. 22—36. 33. Spencer, J. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, Oxford, 1952, pp. 167—68.

15. Ibid., pp. 30—34. 34. Carlo Conti Rossini, / principi di diritto consuetudinario delTEritrea, pp,
741-802.
16. Rubenson, The Survival, pp. 140—42, 377—78.
35. VII Censimento generate della popolazione, 21 April 1931, vol. 5, (colonic e
17. One of the common services which the local ruling elite demanded was the cultiva¬ possedimenti), Roma, 1935, p. 38.
tion of a plot equivalent to that cultivated by a single peasant. Such plots known as
the plots of chiefs were cultivated collectively by the village and the harvest handed 36. Carlo Conti Rossini, I principi di diritto consuetudinario, p. 747; Alberto Pollera,
to the chief. As S. F. Nadel pointed out in the early 1940’s, the villages could deny / Baria e i Cunama, Roma, 1913, p. 98.
their chief such privilege. ‘Land Tenure on the Eritrean Plateau’, Africa (London) 21:1
(1946) 1— 21, p. 20. 37. Alberto Pollera, I Baria e i Cunama, p. 67.

18. Tadesse Tamrat, Church and State in Ethiopia, Oxford, 1972, pp. 100, 102. 38. L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Col¬
onialism in Africa South of the Sahara, London, 1967, idem., ‘Economic
19. Ibid.. Achievements of the Colonizers: An Assessment’, in Colonialism in Africa, vol. 4,
edited by L. H. Gann and Peter Duignan, Cambridge, 1975, pp. 673—96.
20. See Dessalegn Rahmato, Agrarian Reform in Ethiopia, Uppsala, 1984, p. 19.
39. Ibid..
21. See my ‘Land Tenure and the Organization of Surplus’, pp. 31— 34.
40. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works, Volume 6, 1845—1848,
22. Rubenson, The Survival, pp. 377—78. Moscow 1976, p. 488 (Manifesto of the Communist Party); on Marx’s perception of
colonialism as an emancipatory phenomenon, see Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories
23. Carlo Conti Rossini, I principi di diritto consuetudinario delTEritrea, Roma, 1916, of Imperialism: A Critical Survey, London, 1984, pp. 51—60.
pp. 541—740.
41. Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage, A Short History of Africa, London, 1962.
24. These were the Habab, the Marya, the Mensa, The Beni Amer, the Bogos and Afar
ethnic groups. For census purposes, the Habab, the Mensa and the Marya were con¬ 42. The main exponent of the view is the late Walter Rodney’s polemical book. How
sidered as a single group on the basis of common language. l uro/ye Underdeveloped Africa, London, 1972, a work which traces African
dependence to the 16th century. Another contemporary study is also that of Samir
25. For a traditional account of the origin of the ethnic groups see Alberto Pollera, Amin, ‘Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Historical Origin’, Jour¬
Le popolazioni indigene della colonia Eritrea, Firenze, 1935. nal of Peace Research 2:1 (1972) 105—19.

24 25
• 43. The literature is indeed considerable. In addition to Andre Gunder Frank’s early 51. Ibid., p. 92.
study. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New York, 1967, the
studies by Colin Leys, Underdevelopment in Kenya, London, 1975, and Brett, E.A., 52. Ibid., p. 98. Like Marx, Schumpeter adhered to the ‘economic interpretation of
Colonialism and Underdevelopment in East Africa, London, 1973 can be consulted. history’ but differed sharply on many Marxian dimensions of the theory. One of the
See also the forcefully argued study of Jean Suret-Canale, ‘From Colonization to In¬ issues on which he differed was concerning the connection between capitalism and im¬
dependence in French Tropical Africa’, in The Transfer of Power in Africa: perialism, i. e. colonialism. Whereas Marx argued that colonialism was a stage in the
Decolonization, 1940—1960, edited by Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis, Yale capitalist development, Schumi>eter believed that colonialism has nothing to do with
University Press, 1982, pp. 445—81. capitalism. For a comparative discussion on the views of Marx and Schumpeter sec
O.H. Taylor, ‘Schumpeter and Marx: Imperialism and Social Classes in the
44. A. Adu Boahen, ‘Colonialism in Africa: Its Impact and Significance’ in the Schumpeterian System’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 45:4 (1951) 525—55.
Unesco General History of Africa, vol. 7, 1880 to 1935, edited by A. Adu Boahen, See also the review article by Klaus Knorr, ‘Theories of Imperialism’, World Politics,
California, 1985, pp. 782— 809. 4:3 (1952) 402—21. For a marxist interpretation of broad views uniting Marx and
Schumpeter, see the Introduction by Paul Sweezy to Schumpeter’s Imperialism and
45. V. 1. Lenin, Imperialism the Highest Stage of Capitalism, 1916 (Peking, 1969), pp. Social Classes.
52—104. For a Leninist interpretation of Imperialism see, Tom Kemp, ‘The Marxist
Theory of Imperialism*, in Studies on the Theory of Imperialism, London, 1972, 53. Milward A. and S.B. Saul, The Economic Development of Continental Europe,
edited by Bob Sutcliffe and Roger Owen, pp. 26—29. For a thorough reevaluation of 1850—1914, London, 1977, pp. 503—05.
Lenin’s theory see Giovanni Arrighi, The Geometry of Imperialism, London, 1978.
54. To the extent that the gap between the industrialized countries and the formerly
46. David K. Fieldhouse, The Theory of Capitalist Imperialism, London, 1967; Idem. colonized world is growing, it makes sense to speak of underdevelopment and its
Colonialism, London, 1981, pp. 41—42; For a critique of the Marxist theory from growth. See for instance Paul A. Baran, ‘On the Political Economy of Backwardness*
within the marxist camp, see M. Barrat-Brown, ‘A Critique of Marxist theory of Im¬ in Imperialism and Underdevelopment, edited by Robert 1. Rhodes, New York, 1970,
perialism’, in Studies on the theory of Imperialism, edited by Sutcliffe and Owen, pp. 285—301. See also Thomas Stzents, The Political Economy of Underdevelopment,
1972, pp. 39—40. Several case studies have pointed out the role of economic motives Budapest, 1971.
in colonial expansion without however pushing their analysis so as to demonstrate the
existence of causal connection between capitalism and colonialism. See the survey by 55. David H. Fischer, Historians* Fallacies: Toward the Logic of Historical Thought,
Barrie M. Ratcliffe, ‘The Economics of the Partition of Africa: Methods and Recent New York, 1970, pp. 15—21.
Research Trends’, Canadian Journal of African Studies, 15:1 (1981) 3—-31.
56. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Note Books, edited and translated by
47. See Anthony Brewer, Marxist theories of Imperialism: A Critical Survey, London, Quintin Hoare and G. N. Smith, London, 1978, p. 68.
1980 (1984), pp. 44—45.
57. Ibid., p. 67.
48. ‘The bourgeoisie, by the rapid improvement of all instruments of production, by
the immensely facilitated means of communication, draws all, even the most bar¬ 58. Ibid., pp. 67—68.
barian, nations into civilization’, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Collected Works,
Volume 6, Moscow, 1976, p. 488 (The Manifesto of the Communist Party). To a great 59. Ibid..
extent the theories of underdevelopment developed by Samir Amin, Unequal Develop¬
ment, New York, 1973, Immanuel Wallerstein, Historical Capitalism, London, 1983, 60. Antonio Gramsci, The Modern Prince, translated by Louis Marks, New York.
and Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, New 1957 (1975), p. 18.
York, 1967, challenge the optimistic tone of The Communist Manifesto. See also Bar-
rat Brown, M., The Economics of Imperialism, London, (1974), 1978. 61. Carlo Zaghi, I Russi in Etiopia, Napoli, 1972, p. 264.

49. Joseph Schumpeter, Imperialism: Social Classes, (1919), New York, 1955, pp. 64, 62. Roberto Battaglia, La prima guerra d*Africa, Torino, 1958, pp. 365—72.
89, 92. Richard Koebner and Helmut Schmidt use the term imperialism in the sense
understood by historians i.e. the act of acquiring and governing colonies. See their 63. Zaghi, / Russi in Etiopia, p. 264.
study. Imperialism: The Study and Significance of a Political Word, Cambridge, 1964.
See also Winfried Baumgart, Imperialism: The Idea and Reality of British and French 64. Gennaro Mondaini, Politica colon iate e social is mo, Roma, 1911, p. 8,
Colonial Expansion, 1880—1914, Oxford, 1982.
65. Luigi Goglia and Fabbio Grassi, II Colonialismo italiano da Adua aUlmpero,
50. Schumpeter, Imperialism, p. 91. Bari. 1981, pp. 225—26.

26 27
,66. Alberto Acquarone, ‘Problems of Democracy and the Quest of Identity’, in coloniali, 1882—1943, p. 95; Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa Orientale, 1976, pp.
Modern Italy: Topical History Since 1861^ edited by Edward R. Tannenbaum and 611—12.
Emiliana P. Noether, New York, 1974, pp. 396—97.
79. Candeloro, Storia d'ltalia, vol. 6, pp. 310—11.
67. Roberto Michels, II imperialismo italiano: Studi politico-demografici, Milano,
1914, p. 140. 80. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Note Books, p. 67.

68. For a succint summary of the Theory of Social Imperialism see Hans-Ulrich 81. Alfredo Capone, Storia d'ltalia, vol. 20, Roma, 1981, p. 423.
Wehler’s paper, ‘Industrial Growth and Early German Imperialism’, in Studies in the
Theory of Imperialism, edited by Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe, London, 1972, pp. 82. Francesco Brancato, Storia del parlamento italiano, vol. 10, Roma, 1973, p. 173.
71—92. As far as I am able to understand Wehler’s thesis, his theory of Social Im¬
perialism does not explain fully German motives for colonial expansion. This inade¬ 83. Aldo Mola, Uimperialismo italiano: la politica estera dalTUnita al fascismo,
quacy comes out clearly when he writes: Roma, 1980; Georgio Rochat, II colonialismo italiano, Torino, 1975; Naitza, G. B.,
There is little doubt that the open-door policy remained Bismarck’s ideal. ... If England II colonialismo nella storia d'ltalia, 1882—1949, Firenze, 1975.
and France had guaranteed free trade in Africa, unrestricted commercial expansion would
have satisfied Bismarck’s economic aims. But the crucial reasons which induced him from 84. Candeloro, p. 468. ‘Every expansion in Africa’, wrote Crispi to Baratieri in 1895,
1883—84 onwards to acquiesce in a gradual formalization of imperial control were two ‘finds opposition in north Italy’.
fold: on the one hand the internal pressures resulting from the crisis were mounting and
had to be reduced; on the other, the end of free trade era overseas appeared imminent. 85. Ibid., p. 436.
(p. 81)
Without disputing the seriousness of the German internal crisis, it appears to me that 86. Ibid., p. 438.
German colonial policy was inspired more by British and French activities in Africa
than by internal crisis. In other words, it was after Britain and France had begun the 87. Since the literature on the motives for the scramble for Africa is too extensive lo
scramble for Africa that Bismarck started to appreciate colonialism as a strategy for be fitted into a footnote, I shall only barely outline the various explanations.
consolidation of his rule. In the context of Swedish Historical Research on the Theory
of Social Imperialism see Jan Larsson, Svenska exportstrUvanden pa Kina, 1906— The most dominant theory approached the ‘scramble* as primarily an outcome of
1916, Uppsala, 1977. European diplomatic rivalry where Africa and its resources were of little concern and
relevance. See A. J. P. Taylor, Germany's Bid for Colonies, 1884—1885, London,
69: Wolfgang Schieder, ‘Fattori dell’imperialismo italiano prima del 1914—1915’, 1938; P. Gifford and Wm. R. Louis, eds., Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial
Rivista di storia contemporanea, 3:1 (1972) p. 8. Rivalry and Colonial Rule, New Haven, 1967; Idem., Britain and France in Africa:
Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, New Haven, 1971.
70. Ibid., p. 9.
An equally important interpretation but from an entirely different angle has been that
71. Ibid.. provided by R. Robinson and G. Gallagher in their major study, Africa and the Vic-
torians: The Official Mind of Imperialism, London, 1961. The authors argued that if
72. Ibid.. it were not for conditions prevailing in Africa, there would have been no scramble. Ex¬
plaining the British occupation of Egypt and hence the beginning of the scramble, the
73. Ibid., p. 10. authors maintained that Britain was compelled to act because the nationalist move¬
ment in Egypt threatened the continued operation of the Suez Canal. The Robinson-
74. Ibid., p. 16. Gallagher thesis continues to exercise considerable influence. See R. Oliver and J. D.
Fage, Short History of Africa, London, 1%2.

75. Cf. Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Note Books, p. 67.
With the publication of A. G. Hopkins, An Economic History of West Africa, Lon¬
don, 1973, the scramble began to be explained as one of the consequences of the Great
76. Carocci, G., Storia dltalia dalPUnitd ad oggi, Milano, 1981, p. 100.
Depression (1873—96). The Great Depression had, according to Hopkins, created
serious strains between European merchants and their African counterparts. European
77. Giorgio Candeloro, Storia d'Italia contemporanea: Lo sviluppo del capitalismo e
merchants called for the involvement of their states in order to abolish taxes levied by
del movimento operaio, 1871—1896, 6th ed., vol. 6, Roma, 1979, p. 339.
Africans and for the advancement of trading frontiers necessary for the creation of a
larger market for their goods. Partition began in earnest with the wave of protectionist
78. Ibid., p. 473; Franco Bandini, Gli italiani in Africa Orientale: Storia delle guerre policies of France and Germany in the early 1880’s.
28
29
Hopkins’ economic basis of colonialism was not a re-statement of marxist theories of 95. See my review, ‘Italian Colonialism and the Transformation of Social and Econ¬
imperialism. European states were not drawn to Africa because they were desperately omic Structures’, Notes on Nationalism and Resistance in Eritrea, 1890—1940, pp.
looking for places to invest their surplus but mainly to protect existing and future trade 88—90.
with Africa.
%. Ibid., p. 89.
The influence of Hopkins’ study remains considerable, though not unchallenged. J.
F. Munro’s, Africa and the International Economy, 1800—1860, London, 1976, is ex¬ 97. Romain Rainero, / primi tentaiivi di colonizzazione agricola e di popolamento
tensively based on Hopkins. H. S. Wilson, The Imperial Experience in Sub-Saharan nella colonia Eritrea, 1890—1895, Milano, 1960.
Africa, Minneapolis, 1977, also deals with the scramble along Hopkins’ line. The
motives for German imperialism as a consequence of the Great Depression are also 98. R. De Marco, The Italianization of African Natives: Italian Colonial Educational
dealt with by W. D. Smith, The German Colonial Empire, Chapel Hill, North Policy, New York, 1943.
Carolina, 1978. More recently, J.P. Cain in his Economic Foundations of British
Overseas Expansion, London, 1980, based his African section on Hopkins. Finally, 99. The papers and Memoire of Blatta Gebre Egziabeher Gila Mariam (c. 1860—
the Hopkins interpretation was fully endorsed by G. N. Uzoigwe, ‘European Partition 1914), the historical novel of Father Gebre Yesus Haile written in 1929 but published
and Conquest of Africa: An Overview’, in The UNESCO General History of Africa, in 1950 and the small booklet by Bishop Yacob Gebre Yesus on Ancient Customs of
voL 7: Africa under Colonial Domination, 1880—1935, edited by A. Adu Boahen, the Ethiopian people composed between 1932 and 1936 and published in 1968 are Che
Heinemann, London, 1985. only written sources by the colonized.

An attempt at a comprehensive general theory of partition was that of G.N. Sander¬ 100. I refer primarily to the papers of General Rodolfo Graziani, governor of Italian
son, ‘The European Partition of Africa: Coincidence or Conjecture?’, European Im¬ East African Empire, May 1936 to December 1937, and the file of the Ministry of
perialism and the Partition of Africa, edited by E.F. Penrose, London, 1975, and re¬ Italian Africa (Ministry of Colonies) which was handed over to the Central Archive
vised and expanded for The Cambridge History of Africa, voL 6, from 1870 to 1905, by the Allies soon after the end of Second World War. This file is designated as ACS-
edited by R. Oliver and G.N. Sanderson, Cambridge, 1985. Although Sanderson ap¬ MAL The sources in the Archivio Centrale di Staio (ACS) deal mainly with political
pears to have challenged the dangers of elevating conclusions derived from case studies problems related to the pacification of Ethiopia and hence contain very limited ma¬
to the status of general explanations (e. g. Hopkins), his interpretation of the partition terial on Eritrea.
in terms of the collapse of the pre-1883 European stability has more similarities to the
diplomatic rivalry version put forward in the 1920’s and 1930’s.

88. ''^A notable exception is the study by Carlo Giglio, Etiopia/Mar Rosso, Roma, 1958.

89. Alberto Acquarone, ‘Ferdinando Martini e I’amministrazione della colonia

Eritrea’, Clio, 12:4 (1977) 341—427; Idem., ‘La politica coloniale italiana dopo Adua:
Ferdinando Martini governatore in Eritrea’, Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, 42:3
(1975) 346—77, 42:4 (1977) 449—83.

90. Lorreta Caponi, ‘Questione agraria e questione nazionale in Eritrea, Etiopia e in

Somalia*, L*AItra Africa, 1:1 (1974) p. 45.

91. Ibid., p. 50.

92. Ibid..

93. Irma Taddia, ‘Le trasformazioni della propriety terreira nell’altopiano eriireo in
periodo coloniale, 1890—1940 in Africa come storia, A. M. Gentili, et. al, Milano,
1980, pp. 275—91; Idem., ‘Sulla politica della terra nella colonia Eritrea, 1890—1950,
Rivista di storia contemporanea, 14:1 (1984) 43—77; Idem., ‘Intervento pubblico e
capitale privato nella colonia Eritrea*, Rivista di storia contemporanea, 14:2 (1985)
207—42.

94. Idem., L*Eritrea — Colonia, 1890—1952, Milano, 1986.

30 31
CHAPTER TWO 1890—1914 period on the compilation by Professor Angelo Mori (1916). For
the post 1914 period I have resorted to the publications of the Bollettino Uf-
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ficiale della Colonia Eritrea (the Official Colonial Bulletin). The Statistica del
movimento del commercio della colonia Eritrea (Statistics of the Commercial
COLONIALISM Movement of the Colony of Eritrea), published annually, has been the main
source for the figures of the import/export trade from 1912 until 1934.^
The second kind of source material is either officially sponsored or
privately conducted studies. In this category, the most important are: the
report commissioned by governor F. Martini and carried out by Bartolommci-
Gioli (1903); the study of the general economic and political situation by
Introduction Renato Paoli (1908); the study commissioned by governor Salvago-Raggi and
carried out by Omodeo Peglion (1913); Alberto Pollera’s description of the
This chapter attempts to answer two principal questions. Firstly, what func¬ commercial life in Eritrea (1926); and finally, the substantial monographs on
tions were expected from Eritrea and how did the colony fulfill them? the Eritrean economy and its economic history by Angelo Piccioli (1933) and
Secondly, did the importance of the colony (to colonialism) lie in its economic by Santagata (1935).^
function or in other non-economic factors such as strategic and political con¬ The archival sources constitute the third kind of source material and have
siderations? In the context of the state of research these questions are posed been used to assess mainly Eritrea’s role as a recruitment area for the colonial
here for the first time, although some aspects of colonial economic policies army. Although collected from the Archivio Eritrea AE, ASMAI, and ACS
for the 1890—95 period have been studied, notably by Rainero and they are, on the whole fragmentary.^
Pankhurst.*
This chapter is organized around the four distinct economic and non¬
economic functions expected of Eritrea. These were: 1) the policy of using
Eritrea as a colony of settlement for poor and landless Italian peasants
(1890-r^95); 2) as a source of raw material products for Italy and as a depot Eritrea as a Colony of Settlement
for the transit trade in Ethiopian and Arabian products; 3) as a reservoir of
recruits for the colonial army in the Italian expansion to Somalia (1908— 10), Described as la coloniaprimogenita (first bom colony), it was widely believed
Libya (1912—32) and finally Ethiopia (1935—41); and 4) as a colony of that Eritrea would attract a considerable number of Italian migrants. Those
Italian industrial and commercial settlement, 1935—41. This is followed by a who supported colonial expansion, sharing the views of Prime Minister
concluding discussion on the relative importance of the colony’s economic Crispi, differed among themselves over the methods of implementation and
and strategic condsiderations. the role of the state.^ The policy of settlement, which lasted about five years,
Three kinds of source materials have been used. By far the most important was the creation of Crispi and Leopoldo Franchetti, an outstanding expert on
are the deliberations of the Italian Parliament and reports submmitted to it. Italian rural problems. Whereas Crispi foresaw colonial policy in general
These are designated as Atti Parlamentari (Parliamentary Acts). Of these, of terms, Franchetti from the beginning had an elaborate plan. For Franchetti,
considerable value are the reports by Leopoldo Franchetti, the parliamentary Crispi’s African policy primarily meant a partial solution to the Italian rural
Deputy for settlement of colonist project (1893—94), the reports of the first problem.^
civilian governor of Eritrea, Ferdinando Martini (1901—02); (1902—07) and The Royal Decree of January 1, 1890, which established the juridical ex¬
finally, the report of the Minister of Colonies in 1918. The Atti Parlamentari istence of Eritrea as a single political entity, also created an autonomous of¬
also contain annual approvals of the budget of Eritrea.^ fice for colonizzazione (colonist settlement). This office was occupied by
The Leggi e Decreti del Regno Dltalia (Laws and Decrees of the Kingdom Leopoldo Franchetti from its inception June 1890 until the first months of
of Italy) published annually have been very useful for the amount and distri¬ 1895. Franchetti argued that colonist settlement should be limited to landless
bution of tribute to be collected from the inhabitants of Eritrea. For the local peasants only and that the state should provide generous loan for their settle¬
colonial laws, which were only published in Eritrea, 1 have relied for the ment in the new colony.® His strong opposition to the granting of conces-

32 33
 sions to capitalist firms lay in a well founded fear that such concessions would the colony was thinly populated due to famines and epidemics. He warned
create a Latifundism similar to those prevailing in southern Italy. Franchetti that If the ‘indigenous’ cultivators were not effectively impeded from
stood for a government planned and subsidized settlement of landless cultivating the areas set aside for Italian colonists, it would be virtually im¬
peasants. Franchetti’s puritanical approach was opposed by Crispi, as well as possible to carry out his programme. Otherwise he continued, the Italian pres¬
by the members of the parliamentary commission of enquiry which visited ence in the colony would remain only a military occupation, at great expense
Eritrea in 1891, and by the succesive military governors of Eritrea. to the nation and the national budget.Franchetti went further and argued
For prime minister Crispi, the idea of excluding capitalists from acquiring that a failure to keep expropriated areas free from the ‘indigenous’, and a
concessions in Eritrea amounted to a noble piece of poetry which would not failure to occupy these hectares by colonist settlement, would in the near
produce any useful result.’ Others, notably the members of the Royal Com¬ future result in an awareness among the ‘indigenous’ of the presence of a
mission of Enquiry of 1891, agreed with Franchetti and other experts, about dominating race.'*
the availability of vast colonizable lands, but they strongly differed about the Both in Italy and Eritrea Franchetti’s arguments were not only
role of capitalists in the new colony.'® The Commission of Enquiry, which misunderstood, they were also deliberately ignored. It was thought in Rome
visited Eritrea in 1891, advised the adoption of a colonizzazione libera, in that Franchetti’s colonization would demand a considerable financial com¬
other words a settlement policy regulated by supply and demand." Opposi¬ mitment.'’ In Eritrea, the military governor’s main concern was the
tion from the governors of Eritrea, particularly that of Oreste Baratieri
maintenance of law and order. The persistent requests by the Office of Settle¬
(1892—96), was more concerned with the division of power between the ment for logistical support complicated the governor’s task of strengthening
autonomous office of colonist settlement and the colonial administration. the colonial state. Instead the military governors supported a policy of volun¬
Franchetti depended on the colonial state to implement his programme, for tary settlement (colonizzazione libera).'*
example to keep Eritreans off expropriated lands. However he was not re¬ By the end of 1894 the conflict between Franchetti’s Office of Settlement
sponsible to the colonial government as he derived his authority and budget and the colonial administration had become irreparable. This confusion had
from the Italian Parliament.'^
started when Baratieri instituted his own settlement programme, which en¬
These differences notwithstanding, Franchetti was sufficiently encouraged couraged only those peasants deemed to have sufficient capital.” Baraticri’s
by Crispi and the Italian Parliament to proceed with his programme. On the
main argument was tactical. He wanted to avoid hostility to Italian colonists
bases of a series of results from several agricultural experimental stations in
which he thought could be caused by indiscriminate expropriation and the
Eritrea, Franchetti instructed Governor Baratieri to extensively expropriate
resultant adverse impact on the population. As a military governor his first
land deemed suitable for colonist settlement. Between January 1893 and the
priority was maintenance of law and order. Already undermined in Eritrea
beginning of 1895 over 400,000 hectares of land were expropriated and
and isolated in Rome, the coup de grace that destroyed Franchetti and his
declared available for Italian colonists.
policy was the Bahta Hagos uprising in December 1894 and the subsequent
Colonist settlement began in earnest with the arrival of the first group of
state of war between Italy and Ethiopia.” On February 20, 1895, Franchetti
Italian peasants to southwestern Eritrea.In his annual report to Parliament
submitted his resignation and a few months later his Office of Settlement was
for 1893—94, Franchetti emphasized the need for an effective method of
abolished by Baratieri." Baratieri then stipulated that land was only avail¬
preventing the repossession of expropriated land by the ‘indigenous’, who
able to those who possessed capital between 2,500 and 3,000 lire, an amount
after the end of the great famine (1888—92) were quickly resuming intensive
estimated to cover all settlement expenses until the first harvest. Franchetti’s
cultivation. It was indispensable, Franchetti argued, that the land set aside for
experiment with proletarian settlement was put aside. In the aftermath of
Italian colonists should not be available to the indigenous population, and he
Adwa not only the policy of settlement but the fate of the colony hung in the
urged the colonial administration to ensure that the 400,(X)0 hectares were left balance.”
fallow until the Italian colonists were ready to make use of them.'^
I he economic policy of converting Eritrea into a settlement colony, for
Seen from the perspective of the office of settlement, Franchetti’s approach
Italian peasants, was revoked in 1895 and never revived. Subsequent legisla¬
though a hard policy was indeed far sighted. The problem he wanted to avoid
tion 1903, 1909 and 1926 pushed it further into the distant past.” Although
was a conflict between the colonial state and Eritrean peasants which could
colonial economic policy during the 1890—95 period has been widely com¬
be caused by an infirm and vacillating colonial policy. Franchetti quite clearly
mented upon, there have been few attempts to explain its failure. In a pioneer
perceived that it was easier to delimit and fence off expropriated areas when
sluily, Proic.s.sor Romain Rainero, after noting that personality clashes had
34
compromised the experiment, posed the question as to who was to blame for peasants were not envisaged by the colonial power. Italy was far too weak
the failure of the settlement scheme: the Franchetti system, Baratieri’s financially to subsidize colonist settlement.^' It is difficult not to concur with
policies, the Italo-Ethiopian war, or ‘the fatalistic component of colonial Gramsci’s analysis that the policy of settling landless peasants as a motive for
policies*.^ colonial expansion was a myth. This myth was cultivated by the ruling class
Rainero did not explain the failure of the policy because he believed that in order to divert the attention of the southern Italian peasant from agitating
the reasons were too numerous and complex. Doctor Richard Pankhurst on about the problems at home to the offer of free land in the colonies.
the other hand, while maintaining that the Bahta uprising was a striking
manifestation of the Eritrean peasantry’s discontent against Italian land con¬
fiscation, argued that the failure of the policy of settlement were due to the
practical difficulties of colonization.^^ These difficulties included the ineffi¬
ciency of officials as well as the lack of interest in Rome. Eritrea as a Source of Raw Material
The authors of the Vltalia in Africa series, after explaining that Fran-
chetti’s policy was inspired by a genuine desire to settle colonists, argued that
The Italo-Ethiopian treaty of May 1900 cleared away the political uncertainty
the unfortunate events of Adwa put a definitive end to the experiment.^^
of Italian colonial rule in Eritrea.By virtue of this boundary treaty, the
Most post-Second World War Italian authors have viewed the policy of col¬
Ethiopian state sanctioned the Italian occupation of Eritrea. The treaty was
onist settlement as of little significance for Italian colonial history.^’ The
an important landmark in Italian colonial history, and particularly so for the
poverty of natural resources e.g. terrain and rainfall, are frequently men¬
history of Eritrea. The 1869—99 period, in contrast to the later 1900—35 era,
tioned as the main reasons for the failure of Franchetti’s policy.
was one of disjointed experiences which are best treated as a background lo
As the policy of colonist settlement completely failed and as the colonial
the later colonial period which — to all intents and purposes begins with the
state admitted this failure through the de jure recognition of the land rights
treaty of 1900. From the Italian perspective, the treaty to some extent
of Eritrean peasants, Italian writers could quite rightly consider it as of minor
mitigated the disastrous impact of Adwa since Italy still remained in Eritrea.
importance. However the reasons for its failure were neither the adverse
More importantly, Italian colonialism in its most pragmatic form, traces its
climatic conditions nor the series of practical difficulties mentioned by Dr.
evolution to this treaty sympathetically described in the 1910’s as la politica
Pankhurst. Eritrea had, at the beginning of the century, considerable land for
deU'imperialismo sano (rational imperialism).^
Italian colonists and this is attested by agricultural experts of the time.^*
It was not a coincidence that in 1901 the newly appointed and first civilian
With the re-establishment of colonial power by virtue of the treaties of 1900
governor Ferdinando Martini commissioned Bartolommei-Gioli to undertake
and 1902, there were no decisive factors to hinder the revamping of Fran¬
a fresh look into the future of the newly re-constituted colony. Bartolommei-
chetti’s settlement policy. Eritrean resistance was a factor to be considered but
Gioli’s report. La colonizzazione deU*Eritrea was submitted in 1903 and it was
it was hardly decisive.^’
to remain the main guide for colonial economic policy. Unlike Franchetti,
It is my contention that the policy of colonist settlement failed because it
Bartolommei-Gioli showed keen awareness of the anti-colonial mood in Italy,
was never a serious driving force in Italian colonial expansion. Moreover it
the weakness of Italian capital, and the complex nature of the Eritrean land
appears that the policy of colonist settlement was based on two fallacious
tenure systems.
assumptions. Firstly, that the Italian state would not be asked to finance the
After noting that suitable areas existed for European settlement,
settlement of landless peasants or commit itself to expenditure on infrastruc¬
Bartolommei-Gioli advised that the only way to secure land from the ‘in¬
tures. Prime Minister Crispi ordered the armed forces to conduct limited
digenous’ who were fanatically attached to it, was through the development
operations, but he knew too well that he was limited by his precarious
of the market economy whereby they could be enticed away from their land
dependence on a belligerent parliament and the Treasury for colonial
by the offer of wage labour.” He rejected state subsidized colonist settle¬
funds.^
ment as too burdensome on the national and colonial budget. He also rejected
The second assumption was based on the hope that the colonized subjects
confiscation and expropriation because of its political repercussions in Eritrea
would not, through resistance and acts of insubordination, aggravate colonial as well as in Ethiopia.”
expenditure. The cost of maintaining law and order and the considerable
Relegating the policy of settlement into the distant future, Bartolommei-
financial commitment necessary to carry out the settlement of landless Italian
Gioli proceeded to elaborate the second function of the colony, namely (hat

36 yi
* of exploitation.^’ Eritrea, Bartolommei-Gioli argued, possessed many raw Table 2,1. Italian Participation in the import trade of Eritrea
material resources needed by the mother country. These resources he felt, Year Total imports in Imports from Percentage
should be developed for export by utilizing Italian capital and indigenous units of a thousand Italy Italian share
labour. lire

The report also noted Eritrea’s strategic location, and it drew the conclu¬ 1900 9,376 275 2.9
sion that Sudan and Ethiopia appeared destined to function as the hinterland 1905 12,909 3,648 28.2
of the Italian colony. Furthermore, Eritrea could be developed as a focal 1910 20,230 6,211 30.7
1915 29,469 14,117 47.9
point for the transit trade to Ethiopia and Sudan.
1920 95,185 35,764 37.5
Bartolommei-Gioli’s description of Eritrea as primarily a colony of ex¬ 1925 203,453 133,083 65.4
ploitation shares many similarities with S. Amin’s description of colonies 1930 176,814 89,731 50.7
where the prime concern of the colonial state lay in creating a dominant trade 1934 215,686 125,219 58.0
monopoly and the concomitant restructuring of the economy for export.^®
From the limited and sketchy sources on the pre-colonial import/export
trade of northern Ethiopia, we can note that trade was transacted by barter, Table 2.2. Italian Participation in the export trade of Eritrea, 1897^1933
where imports matched exports. The Austrian Maria Theresa thaler since its Year Total exports in Exports to Italy Percentage
first issue (1780) was widely used though the economy was far from units of a thousand in units of a Italian share
monetized. The thaler was used to purchase imported goods, to pay tribute lire thousand lire
to the central state, and for ornaments. In 1879, a few years before the Italian 1900 2,745 360 13.1
occupation of Massawa, goods imported to Ethiopia (including Eritrea) were 1905 6,772 843 12.4
estimated at 2 million lir€ as opposed to two and half million in exports.^’ By 1910 11,135 1,878 27.7
the end of the first year of the Italian presence in Massawa, imports spiralled 1915 19,850 10,078 50.8
1920 67,263 26,777 39.8
up to nearly 10 million lire while exports remained constant.*^ Of the total
1925 119,462 81,061 67.8
value of the 10 million lire imports, a little over half a million lire worth of 1930 76,219 42,687 56.0
goods originated in Italy. In the first few years Italian colonization created a 1934 73,092 53,190 72.7
boom for other countries, namely India, Austria and Southern Arabia, who
Source: Statistica del movimento del commercio della colonia Eritrea, 1900—1934.
were able to increase their trade with Eritrea more than fivefold.
The colonial economic policy of restructuring the new colony’s import/ex¬
port in Italy’s favour was first introduced in 1886 when an ad valorem tax The structure of the colonial economy as perceived by Bartolommei-Gioli
from 8 to 15 per cent was imposed on non-Italian imports."**. This political luid two main components. The first component was the development and ex¬
intervention exclusively designed to reserve the Eritrean economy for Italian ploitation of resources and natural produce of the colony, which consisted of
industry, achieved the desired objective of placing Italy in a dominant posi¬ livestock, various kinds of pearls, oil seeds, gum arabic, palma dum and a
tion vis-4-vis the import/export trade of the colony. Table 2.1 and 2.2 explain potential for growing cotton and coffee. With the exception of coffee and cot¬
the transition. ton, the rest were traditional export products of Eritrea. The second compo¬
From 1910 onwards, about 50 per cent of Eritrean exports went to Italy and nent was the development of Eritrea as an entrepot for transit trade and as
more than 50 per cent of Eritrean imports came from Italy. While imports II staging post for the economic and political penetration of Ethiopia, Sudan
were restructured through the ad valorem tax system, the restructuring of the iind Arabia.
export trade was achieved through the extension of Italian capital to the col¬ While the first component was purely economic, and depended upon the
ony. Easily exploitable commodities such as palma dum were contracted out mechanism of supply and demand, the second component was dependent
to concession companies who had preferential rights of export to Italy. Italian upon political and diplomatic factors in order to maintain cordial relations be-
colonist farmers, whose active possession and cultivation in the highlands tween Eritrea and northern Ethiopia The policy of using Eritrea as a stag¬
never exceeded 4,700 hectares were encouraged to stay in business by a special ing post for the Italian economic penetration of northern Ethiopia shaped the
regulation that allowed them to export duty free to Italy."*^ irliilionship between the colonial state and its Eritrean subjects. In order to

38 39
 exercise political and economic influence in Ethiopia the colonial government
was felt compelled to treat the Eritreans in a manner acceptable to the Ethio¬
pians along the border.^ Forced or corvee labour was in practice ruled out
and the confiscation/expropriation of land was discontinued, although not in
theory. The structure of the economy appeared to hang uneasily on the ex¬
ploitation of natural resources, while due care was given to the political rela¬
tionships between the colonial stale, its Eritrean subjects and the Ethiopian
state.
From the modest scale of the colony’s exports inherited by the Italians, the
growth of the import/export trade as expressed in annual statistical reports
appears rather striking. In 1900, Eritrea exported 2,8 million lire worth of
products, while by 1933 exports had climbed to 62 million lire. From a little
over nine million lire in 1900, imports jumped to the level of 177 million lire.
As graph 2.1 below illustrates, exports as well as imports were subject to
sharp fluctuations, caused by changes in the world market prices and natural
catastrophes such as drought and locusts at home.
The sharp increase in exports from 1924 onwards, when compared with the
YEAR
1915—24 period, was largely based on coffee imports from Arabia, which
were immediately exported to Italy. The increase was also due to Eritrea’s ( iraph 2.1. Aggregate Import and Export of Eritrea, 1900—34 (in Units of a Million
position as an outlet for the Ethiopian import/export trade. Coffee exports, I ire).
which never exceeded one million lire per annum until 1922, jumped to 26
million in 1924 and reached a peak of 33 million in 1928.'*^ (icriod. according to Santagaia’s estimate, up to 25 per cent of all Ethiopian
In most years between 1924 and 1933 the import/export figure contained export/import trade may have passed through Massawa.^* This meant that
an average of 50 million lire which had virtually nothing to do with the I he aggregate Eritrean import/export figure included up to 25 per cent of the
Eritrean economy. Moreover, the aggregate import export figure does not in
I Ihiopian import/export trade. Ethiopian exports to Eritrea included items
any way take into consideration the inflation of the lire."*^ lor local consumption as well as those for export, and thus it is difficult to
The aggregate import/export figures also include products destined for distinguish the value of each item. Nevertheless, Santagaia’s estimation ap¬
northern Ethiopia as well as those export products e.g. hides, coffee, butter pears to be fairly accurate since it is corroborated by other sources after the
etc. which originated there. The commercial and economic penetration of eiul of Italian colonial rule.**’
Ethiopia from the late 1910’s had become an important component on which
I hc extent of the Ethiopian transit trade and its share in the total Eritrean
the edifice of the colonial economy was builtMassawa had been the most linpori/export trade is illustrated in the table below.
important Ethiopian outlet to the sea for centuries and the Italians strived to
If it were not for the strategic location of Eritrea, firstly as an outlet for
improve and develop it as an entrepot for the commercial and economic
I thiopian trade, and secondly as a transit juncture for Arabian products
penetration of Ethiopia.
tnnmcly coffee), the productivity of the colony in terms of exports would most
For economic purposes, northern Ethiopia was considered an extension of
icriainly have remained in the range of 15 to 20 million lire per annum.
Eritrea. There were political boundaries but no economic or fiscal borders.
I his was a result of the colonial economic policy (also described as the milking
No distinction was made at the customs office in Massawa between products
rconomy)^' pursued from 1901 until the eve of the Italo-Ethiopian war. But
destined for Eritrea or Ethiopia. All imported goods from countries other
Ihc Eritrean cow did not appear to have been very productive. Eritrean ex-
than Italy were subject to the same ad valorem tax system. By this mechanism
poiis to Italy as well as its imports from the latter comprised less than 1 per
Italian products increased their competitiveness among Ethiopian consumers.
rcni of Italian trade volume with the outside world.Neither investment in
By the 1930’s, trade between Eritrea and northern Ethiopia (the import/ex-
Ifilnisiructure (e.g. railroads, telegraph and telephone network) nor the
port of Ethiopia through Massawa) had considerably expanded. By this
chdu)rutc and overmanned colonial bureaucracy could be justified or sup-
40 41
Table 2.3, Ethiopian import trade through Massawa in relation to total Eritrean im¬ ported by the revenues of the colony. This is clearly demonstrated by the table
ports in units of a thousand lire, 1922—32. below on the relationship of expenditure to revenue and the direct tax (known
Ethiopian Eritrean a.s tribute) imposed on the Eritrean population.
Year imports imports The poverty of Eritrea, expressed by the meagreness of the export trade, did
not escape the scrutiny of competent colonial economists, although it was also
1922 28,949 87,781
1924 54,252 146,129 pointed out that Eritrea was the most profitable of all the Italian colonies.”
1926 64,782 171,789 The lack of capital and the militarization of the colony are often mentioned
1928 77,547 195,627 as the reasons for the poor economic performance of the colony.^** To these,
1930 24,827 176,814
albeit important causes, we can add the inbuilt constraints of the colonial
1932 17,920 173,075
economic system.
Source: Santagata, La coionia Eritrea, p. 166. The main impeding factor for the maximization of the ‘milking economy’
was the weakness of Italian capital. The decree of February 1895, which pro¬
hibited the migration of poor colonists, did not achieve its goal of encourag¬
ing those rich Italian peasants with capital to move to Eritrea. Most of the
Italian colonists, not farmers by profession, leased their land to Eritrean
Table 2.4. Ethiopian export trade through Massawa in relation to total Eritrean ex¬
ports in units of a thousand lire. peasants in exchange for between a quarter and a third share of the pro¬
duce.” In 1902 there were 126 colonists, of whom only 36 had each
Ethiopian Eritrean
year expons exports
cultivated more than five hectares. By 1913, the number of colonists had
decreased by a half.” Between 1913 and 1932, the colonist population slowly
1922 24,390 - 31,623
increased from 61 colonists to 161.”
1924 34,942 87,901
1926 97,854
In 1938, 22,335 hectares were distributed among the 150 colonists, 6,350
37,911
1928 50,300 93,712 hectares of which were located in the highlands.” Out of these 22,395 hec¬
1930 18,423 76,219 tares 4,473 hectares were bought as private property whereas the rest were
1S|32 14,512- 59,194 concessionary lands.” Though the total land available to colonists con¬
Source: Santagata. La coionia Eritrea, p. 167. Figures for the earlier period appear to be less stituted less than one per cent of the exploitable land, Italian colonists did not
reliable. Cf. Checchi, Movimento, p. 8, for figures from 1897 to 1910. It needs to be pointed out fully use their private possessions or concessions. In the lowlands, the colonial
that some of the Ethiopian exports were for local consumption in Eritrea.
administration set aside 3,(XX) hectares for cotton cultivation out of which
only 1,600 hectares was effectively cultivated.^ Likewise on the eastern
slopes ipendici orientale) 5,000 hectares were reserved in 1931 in anticipation
of the expected coffee production. However by 1947 there were little more
Table 2.5. Tribute, revenue and total expenditure, 1900—34 fin units of a thousand than half a dozen Italian colonists with effective concessions of up to 50 hec¬
lire). tares each.*'
total total The bulk of Italian capital was invested in the import/export trade rather
year tribute revenue expenditure than in production. The risk factor was relatively negligible as Italian pro¬
ducts, protected by the ad valorem tax, were in a favourable position to com¬
1901—02 524 2,591 12,344
1905—06 599 4,215 12,477 pete with other foreign products. Far less capital was invested in the exploita¬
1910—11 811 6,123 15,630 tion of raw material resources although one of the raisons d’etre of the col¬
1915-16 923 11,080 17.430 onial economy remained the supply of raw materials to the mother country.
1920—21 1,139 36,839 119,700
The colonial state never failed to encourage and assist Italian capital. The
1925—26 1,740 30,165 113,562
1929—30 1,986 90,284
elaborate 354 km long rail network was financed by the colonial government
31,962
rather than by a consortium of investors as was the case in many British col¬
Sources: Compiled from Raccolta Ufficiale delle leggi e dei decreti^nd Atti Parlamentari. See
onies. The colonial state developed the Tessenei dam, which was capable of
Taddia, 'Intervento pubblico\ pp. 216—21 for figures covering most of the period.

42 43
irrigating up to 20,000 hectares but it was never exploited by Italian industrial established in 1913 to supply the 6,0(X) strong Eritrean and Ethiopian colonial
capital. Italian capital had another important advantage in that the colony army stationed in Libya from 1912 until 1932. According to a report compiled
was closed to outside capital other than Italian. Instead of encouraging the in¬ by the American Consulate at Aden, the meat factory was Eritrea’s most
flow of capital, this protectionist aspect of the colonial economy produced a notable and stable industry with considerable potential for growth.** The
contrary effect by making the colony less competitive.^^ Eritrean archival sources corroborate the American assertion that most of the
Italian capital, when invested, demanded concessionary rights which would cattle for slaughter was imported from Ethiopia and not as might have been
ensure a profitable return. The concessionary demands of Italian capital expected from Eritrea.*^ On the other hand, the button manufacturing plants
turned much of the colony into an ‘economy of concession companies’.*^ at Keren and at Massawa were exclusively dependent on local products and.
Through their monopoly power the concessionaries hindered the rational ex¬ besides satisfying the limited local need, exported semi-manufactured pro¬
ploitation of raw material resources, thus strengthening the inelastic nature of ducts.
the economy. On the eve of the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935—36, the invest¬ In spite of Santagata’s optimistic assertion that of 72 gold producing na¬
ment of Italian capital into the colony can be summarized under the following tions, Eritrea had moved up from bottom place to 42nd position, the gold
areas. mining industry remained the least profitable and the most frustrating aspect
There were two firms producing salt for export, the oldest of which was of the economy. A maximum production of 230 kg achieved in 1938, was
established in 1905. Investment in the fishing resources of the colony began undertaken by a parastatal body which had little regard for cost/benefit equa¬
in 1919 but closed down in 1933 due to fall of world prices. A second small tion.** At a generous rate of 15 lire per gram, 230 kg meant that the total
fishing firm was established in 1930. Sea shells have since 1928 been converted value of gold production reached a little over 3 million lire.*’ With the excep¬
into buttons by a small factory at Massawa. tion of potash, which was mined in Ethiopia by Italian capital from Eritrea,
The second area of investment was related to the soil. By early I930’s, there salt was virtually the only mining industry carried out by colonial capital.’®
was one azienda engaged since 1907 in the cultivation and production of sisal Unfortunately the colonial censuses do not provide data on Eritrean
fiber. In addition, there were three other concession companies engaged employment patterns. However deducing from the composition of the
mainly in the collection of palma dum (a kind of nut used for manufacturing population and the rural nature of Italian capital, the number of wage earning
of buttons), essences and gum arabic. Two firms were engaged in the mining Eritreans (in the productive sector of the economy) must have ranged between
industry. The potash company although based in Eritrea carried out its ac¬ 4,(X)0 and 5,000 Up to twice this number, as we shall presently discuss
tivities in Ethiopia. Gold mining was after 1910 carried out by small en¬ below, were employed in the colonial army.
trepreneurs. The second constraint on the exploitation of the colony’s resources were
Other areas of investment were meat canning (one factory), manufacturing political factors. This had several dimensions. In Italy, the interest in African
of cigarettes using imported tobacco (five firms), tanning (one firm) and sev¬ colonies for much of the colonial period had been limited to the cost of
eral mills.*^ pacification and administration. After the defeat at Adwa, Italy remained in
Although it is virtually impossible to arrive at a reliable figure for the vol¬ Eritrea on the condition that the colonial administration kept to a specified
ume of capital invested in Eritrea, the list of the principal industries cited minimum budget.’^ This meant that the main task of colonial governors was
above provides some indication of capital distribution. As can be seen from to maintain an acceptable status quo. The limited budget and lack of support
the above description most of the capital was invested in the mining and can¬ at home were both factors that stopped the colonial administration from in¬
ning industries. Two of the three firms engaged in the production and export troducing expensive measures designed to assist Italian capital. Italy did not
of salt survived the crisis of 1929—32 and continued to export to India and forget that the price of radical colonial policies had caused the Bahta upris¬
Japan. The 1,0(X) km long Red Sea Coastline attracted only one fishing com¬ ing.’^ The 1903 report on colonial economic policy had concerned itself with
pany until 1930, when a private industrialist established a small firm at the long term plans and had called for a minimum restructuring of Eritrean pre¬
southern end of the Red Sea coast.*^ capitalist economic structures. The fear that a major economic restructuring
If we exclude the firms producing cigarettes, which used imported tobacco, would precipitate not only Eritrean but also Ethiopian resistance greatly cir¬
there were only three other processing factories in Eritrea until the 1935 Italo- cumscribed the policy options of the colonial state.’^
Ethiopian war. These were the meat canning plant in Asmara and the button The colonial power, apart from the annual fixed subsidy, left the colony to
manufacturing plants at Keren and Massawa. The meat canning plant was its own fate. The colonial government did its best to encourage primitive ac-

44 45
 cfumulation, i.e. the transfer of capital from the pre-capitalist to the capitalist formation, private ownership of the means of production equally explain their
sector.’^ This process was implemented within an economic system which receptiveness to the capitalist mode.*®
tried to maintain the social and economic organization of the peasantry and The capitalist mode was superimposed on Eritrean societies for the purpose
nomads. The colonial state facilitated, within the constraints imposed on it, of primitive accumulation. It is this process of development and the stage of
the export of Eritrean products to the mother country. It encouraged Italian primitive accumulation that distinguishes the colonial economic system from
industrial capital through various tax and duty exemptions. the capitalist system, indigenously developed in Europe. This can best be ex¬
More decisive however, were the extensive rail and road networks that the plained through an examination of the relations of production that had
colony financed and managed. Begun in 1887, the Massawa-Asmara railroad evolved and matured during the first three decades of this century.
was completed in 1911 at a cost of 19 million lire. The Asmara-Keren network Without restructuring the basis of the indigenous system, colonial capital
(104 km), started in 1910 and completed in 1922, at a cost up to 25 million attempted to integrate the indigenous economic system to that of Italy and
lire. The Keren-Agordat railway (84 km) was constructed at a cost of another then to the world capitalist system.®’ In order to increase primitive ac¬
21 million lire.’^ Between 1900 and 1930, the colonial state had invested up cumulation Eritrean workers were offered precarious jobs and invariably low
to 1(X) million lire in the development and maintenance of communication in¬ wages, thus compelling them to rely for survival on the pre-capitalist econ¬
frastructures. Nonetheless, the colonial state and its critics were aware that the omic system. Capital was organized and distributed in such a manner that
resources of the colony, e.g. livestock and land for colonists, were not still Eritreans were excluded from making full use of it. Resources, be it agricul¬
fully exploited. With a modest exercise of the coercive apparatus (e.g. forced tural or mineral, were given through concessions to Italian citizens. Other
labour, forced sale of livestock, excessive money taxation), the colonial state means of production, such as land for construction were expropriated or con¬
might have aided the process of capital accumulation. It, however, refrained fiscated and then alloted or sold to the citizens of the imperial power. The
from taking such measures for two main reasons. Firstly, for fear of the pol¬ economic role of Eritreans was to perpetually supply labour for Italian
itical repercussions that might ensue and secondly, as we shall argue below, capital.*^ As far as the Eritreans were concerned, the colonial economy was
because of the function of Eritrea as a reservoir of manpower for the colonial a closed circuit where they could never aspire beyond the stage of selling their
army. labour for wages, which were in turn so low that full proletarianization was
The imposition of the capitalist system over Eritrean pre-capitalist social virtually impossible.*^
formations was facilitated by the colonial state. The dominant mode of pro¬ From the structural analysis of colonialism, we can draw the conclusion
duction in Eritrea, without distinguishing the various social formations ap¬ that the function of the economy was primarily concerned with the expansion
pears to have been a variant of what Coquery-Vidrovitch has described as the of primitive accumulation. At the local level and throughout the period as I
African mode.^’ This system is defined as a combination of a patriarchal discuss in chapter V below, there was a positive reaction to the colonial
communal economy with exclusive control by one group of tribute and long economy. The integration of Eritreans into the colonial economy brought ma¬
distance trade. terial advantages which mitigated the adverse effects of colonial rule.*^
The various state systems (the Tigrinyan and the aristocratic) were indeed Wages were low and in most cases were never sufficient, but wages were never
despotic; however their despotism was solely aimed at the collection and ex¬ the only source of income. Most of the available jobs were seasonal and the
ploitation of the surplus. Provided the villages paid their tribute, there was Eritrean, hardly subjected to forced labour, had considerable choice. The pro¬
little interference in how they ran their collective life.’* The long distance cess of proletarianization would have been greater if wages for regularly
trade in the Eritrean highlands carried out by a distinct trading community
employed Eritreans had been higher. As the colonial state kept labour costs
called the Jeberti, was under the exclusive control of the ruling elite. Among to a level that would not discourage the inflow of capital, most of the
pastoral aristocratic communities, the ruling elite controlled long distance Eritreans employed in the modern sector considered wages as supplementary
trade by their economic power and the tribute/service mechanism. It has to to their main source of income. The material well-being, measured by the con¬
be emphasized however, that long distance trade hardly constituted the domi¬ sumption of imported clothing, food, sugar and liquor increased in propor¬
nant feature of the Eritrean social formations.’’ In these social formations tion to that of exports.*^ By providing salaried employment to between 10
with the exception of land ownership, the means of production were owned and 15 per cent of the population, colonialism increased considerably the
privately. Hence, while the egalitarian land holding system and the virtual autonomy and independence of the colony against natural catastrophes, such
absence of commodity exchange explain the pre-capitalist aspect of the social

46
47
 as drought and famine. Salaries as I discuss in Chapter six were during periods 2,875 in Libya, 3,751 in Eritrea and 880 in Somalia.”
of food shortage spent on food imports rather than in conspicous consump¬ The Italian suppression of Libyan resistance finally in 1932 meant ihal
tion.^ Eritrean soldiers could be dispensed with. However, a new recruitment plan
for the invasion of Ethiopia was being formulated. Although the precise mo¬
ment of the decision to invade Ethiopia still remains controversial, by 1932,
a series of studies were made for an eventual war against Ethiopia.*®® In one
of these studies, Eritrea was expected to provide an army of 52,600 men.*®'
Eritrea as a Source of Colonial Soldiers It was further envisaged that the number could be increased to a maximum
figure of between 60,000 and 80,000 men.*®^ This later figure compiled by
Before the first contingent of Eritrean soldiers was dispatched to Somalia the military headquarters in Eritrea was based on the assumption that a
(1907), the colonial army had only 5,132 men.*^ Between 1907 and 1910 two population of 600,000 could provide an army of between 60,000 and 80,(KK)
Eritrean battalions each of 600 men, were stationed in Somalia.®* men.
The first Eritrean battalion of 1,112 men was sent to Libya in the early In line with these work plans recruitment began in earnest in early 1934. By
months of 1912.®’ By July of the same year, 3,728 Eritrean soldiers were sta¬ mid 1935, according to a reconnaisance study by General Visconti Prasca,
tioned in Libya. During this time the entire colonial army was made up of only 22,400 Eritreans had been properly trained and were ready for battle ac¬
5,990 men.’® Recruitment considerably increased and reaching its climax in tion.'®^ The General deplored the fact that only a third of the potential man¬
October 1915, when the colonial army was organized into 15 battalions, of power had been fully trained. He observed that another 12,000 men had only
which nine were now in Libya. In October 1915 the army still in Eritrea was received one month’s training and an equal number, although organized, were
composed of 6,106 men which, with an irregular force of 1,244 men under without any training at all.*®^ Between May and the end of October of 1934,
local chiefs meant a total of 7,350 men.” In Libya, there were also 4,000 recruitment increased by 11,800, thus bringing the Eritrean colonial army to
Eritreans and an additional 4,000 men from Ethiopia and the Sudan who had a total of 60,200 men.*®^ The army was divided into two divisions each com¬
been recruited and trained in Eritrea.’^ posed of 14 battalions. On the eve of the Italo-Ethiopian war (October
By the middle of 1914 it was clear to the Ministry of Colonies (established 1935—May 1936) Italy had a colonial army of 100,000 men,*®* 20,000 of
in 1912), that Eritrea with its colonial army of slightly over 10,000 men was whom were from Somalia, 20,000 from Libya and 60,000 from Eritrea.
all that it could provide, if the economy was to function normally.’^ How¬ Sources on the exact numbers of Eritrean soldiers and their deployment in
ever, since Italy’s need for colonial soldiers appeared inexhaustible, the the newly created East African empire are not easily accessible as the relevant
Ministry of Colonies under the leadership of F. Martini, a former governor files in the Ministry of War are still closed. Even with the detailed papers of
of Eritrea, suggested the recruitment of northern Ethiopians for the war in General Rodolfo Graziani (governor of the empire May 1936—December
Libya. 1937), a reconstruction of the size and deployment of Eritrean soldiers is im¬
In so far as Eritreans were concerned, the colonial army had its own hier¬ possible as no distinction was made between Eritrean battalions and the other
archy, with promotion rewarded by higher salaries, privileges and a possible colonial forces from Somalia and Ethiopia. We know however, that the over
future post in the local colonial bureaucracy.’^ Differences in salaries were 60,000 Eritrean soldiers were from 1935 to 1941 stationed in Ethiopia engaged
based on rank and years of service.’^ Recruitment into the colonial army re¬ in the consolidation of the new empire.*®^ Reports such as the economic/an-
mained voluntary until the beginning of the 1930’s, but once recruited the thropological study on Eritrea carried out in 1938 confirm the recruitment of
Eritrean soldier was obliged, if required, to go overseas.’* Soldiers sent to up to 70,000 men to the colonial army.*®®
Libya were paid at double the rate of their normal pay in Eritrea.’^ The Eritrean colonial army remained the exemplary model on which other
Although accessible sources contain a gap for the 1916—24 period, there colonial regiments were organized. Colonial troops were used firstly to relieve
is no reason to doubt that the prevailing pattern of the 1912—16 period was the Italian army in Ethiopia, and secondly, to strengthen the defence
different. In 1925 (a year when we are able to document the distribution of capability of the newly expanded Italian African empire in view of the threat
Eritrean soldiers), we note that they were distributed in the following manner: of war in Europe.*®’
there were 4,175 men in Eritrea and 4,377 in Libya, making a total of 9,082 The impact of a considerably expanded colonial army on the economy of
men.’® Three years later the distribution had slightly changed. There were Eritrea was first noted in a study commissioned by the colonial state and

48 49
 published in 1913. ‘For the Italians’, wrote one of the authors, ‘Eritrea has Table 2.6, Percentage of the colonial army out of total male labour force.
become the colony of ascaries’ (colonial soldiers).”® This was a result, the
total actively
author added, of the implementation of a policy which by respecting the pro¬ year size of army population productive men percentage
prietary and land rights of the natives had facilitated the recruitment of
1912 5,990 330,000 82,000 7.3
Eritrean soldiers to Somalia and Libya.*” Although highly appreciative of
1915 7,350 360,000 90,000 8.1
the policy of the then incumbent governor Salvago-Raggi. the author noted 1925 9,080 480,000 120,000 7.5
that recruitment to the army had taken away a couple of thousand of workers 1928 7,500 500,000 135,000 5.5
from the labour market, ‘a sufficient cause of a certain really felt shortage of 1935 60,200 600,000 150,000 40.3
labour in the colony’.*'^ At the time of writing, the author was convinced Sources: For the size of the colonial army sources as cited above. The figures for the populalioii
that recruitment of Eritreans to Libya was of a temporary nature. However data are approximations of the censuses of 1911, 1917, 1921, and 1931. The figures for ihc ac¬
since the Libyan demand for Eritrean soldiers was constant up to 1935, the tively productive men are based on two assumptions: 1) women constitute about 50 per ceiil of
the population; 2) of the remaining male population children under the age of 16 and old men
shortage of labour and its adverse impact on the economy was felt throughout constitute up to 50 per cent thus leaving a quarter of the entire population in the category of ac¬
the period. tively productive men.
Until the end of 1907, a standing colonial army of 5,0(X) men was justified
Libya. In spite of incomplete documentation concerning the size of the col¬
for the purpose of defending Eritrea from an Ethiopian invasion. There were
onial army, in relation to the available male population, the table below gives
indeed sufficient indications that the Ethiopian state might revoke the bound¬
a sufficient indication of the situation affecting the colony.
ary treaties and launch an attack with the aim of repossessing the Eritrean
Up to 1935, the adverse impact of recruitment was to some extent resolved
highlands up to Massawa.**^ Although the colonial government and Italy
by the use of immigrant labour from northern Ethiopia, who cultivated the
were concerned, they judged the Ethiopian threat as unrealistic, and thus they
land of those recruited to the army.*** During the 1935—41 period, however,
knowingly weakened the defence of the colony by dispatching Eritrean
from the few studies available on the economy of the peasantry, recruitment
soldiers to Somalia.
to the colonial army appeared to have caused the virtual collapse of the sub¬
The damaging impact of recruitment was however clearly expressed by the
sistence economy. In a study of one of the most fertile provinces conducted
governor of the colony. In August 1914, the Minister of Colonies instructed
in 1939, production of food crops decreased by two thirds due to recruit¬
the gQvernor of Eritrea to send three more battalions to Libya altogether
ment.**^ According to the same source, 25,(XX) men out of a total population
around 2,000 men.”"* By then the Eritrean colonial army had 9,000 men.
of c. 150,000 of the province had been recruited to the army.*^
Replying to the Italian request. Governor Salvago-Raggi pointed out how the
That the recruitment of Eritreans to the colonial army ran counter to the
colony was first drawn into the Libyan war. He wrote:
economic interests of the colony can be illustrated by pointing out the British
The colony agreed willingly to contribute one battalion, but when it was asked attitude to the problem during the Second World War. In Ghana during the
to increase its contribution to four battalions and when its soldiers were made colonial period, the British worked under the assumption that they could not,
to stay longer than six months at a time, 1 have to point out how damaging the
without damaging the economy of the colony, recruit more than 2 per cent
consequences were going to be for the colony and that it was inopportune to
destroy a colony in order to conquer another.”^ of the total population or equivalent to about 9 per cent of the active male
labour force.*^* In the Eritrean case, the Italians had during the 1935—41
Continuing the impact of the dispatch of Eritreans to Libya, the governor ex¬ period a colonial army made up of about 40 per cent of the active labour
plained that Eritrea found itself in a serious economic crisis arising from the force.
shortage of labour. ‘Labour’, he wrote, ‘was earlier recruited from the
peasantry but these people are nowhere to be foundAs a result of the
shortage of labour, wages for manual labour had gone up by between 60 and
90% and even then it was difficult to satisfy the demand.**’ Cataloguing the
immediate consequences, the governor notified his superiors that many firms Eritrea as a Colony of Settlement, 1935—41
had either asked for damages, revoked their contracts, or gone bankrupt
In 1931, there were 4,188 Italians.*“ The European population constituted
mainly due to the problems created by the shortage of labour.
less than one per cent of the population in Eritrea. This ratio was completely
Between 1912 and 1932 Eritrean soldiers were permanently deployed in
changed from the early months of 1935 onwards. In a matter of a few months,
50
Eritrea was transformed into a staging post and supply depot for the invading it clear (Table 2.7 and 2.8) that apart from the pre-1935 industries, the rest
Italian army. Between April 1935 and May 1936 more than 300,000 soldiers were service firms. (See appendix 1 for an inventory of actual industries com¬
landed in Eritrea on their way to Ethiopia. 50,000 labourers arrived from Italy piled by the British soon after their occupation of Eritrea in 1941.)
to tackle the enormous problems of transportation and accommodation. With only half the population of Somalia, Eritrea had nearly four times as
Eritrea became the nerve centre of the new empire the Italians were about to many industrial firms. Thirty times more capital was invested in Eritrea than
construct, and during the 1935—37 period the colonial economy gave way to in Somalia. Compared to the rest of the provinces of the new empire, Eritrea
had more firms and more capital invested than all the five provinces put to¬
a war economy.
During the years up to 1941, at which time Eritrea provided colonial gether. In the ‘historic’ Eritrea (in contrast to the ‘New’ Eritrea created in
soldiers, the Italians turned the colony into a commercial and industrial centre 1936 with the incorporation of Tigrai) the Italian population increased from
for the new empire. According to the economic census of 1939, there were 4,600 in 1934 to nearly 75,000 in 1939.*^ Eritrea had accomodated Italians,
2,198 industrial firms. These firms were a result of the huge inflow of Italian approximately 15 per cent of the entire Eritrean population, which according
manpower and capital. A breakdown of these so called industrial firms makes to the unpublished census of 1939 was said to be 614,353.'^
In Asmara, the capital city of Eritrea, the population was divided in 1939
into 53,0(X) Italians and 45,(X)0 Eritreans. Thus the Italian colonization of
Table 2.7. Industrial and Commercial firms in the Italian East African empire.
Ethiopia turned Eritrea into a colony of settlement, composed of colonists
Governoratc Industrial Commercial whose income was derived from industrial and commercial capital rather than
number capital in number capital in from small-scale agriculture. Accounting for nearly 15 per cent of the entire
of firms units of a of firms units of a population, the Italians in Eritrea were in a far stronger position than settlers
million lire million lire
in other colonies such as Kenya, and Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe).
Eritrea 2,198 - 2,198 2,690 486 During the brief life of the Italian East African Empire, Eritrea functioned,
Somalia 584 75 659 22
both as an industrial and commercial depot of the new empire, and as a reser¬
Shoa 561 305 634 498
60 166 37 voir of cheap, efficient and easily disposable manpower for the colonial army.
Harar 223
Amara 163 21 510 38
Gall^-Sidana 278 71 126 33

Table 2.8. Breakdown of Eritrean Industrial Firms.

Strategic versus Economic Function of Eritrea
Category Number of Capital invested in
firms units of a million lire
We can periodize the colonial period into four phases. During the first phase,
Construction 383 500
846 1,500 1882—96, Eritrea was perceived as a potential area for settlement. Many
Transport
Repair workshops 227 15 aspects of colonialism were either not confronted or were deliberately ig¬
Beer and tea 25 6 nored. By presenting Eritrea as the key to the problem of emigration the rul¬
Chemicals 18 4
ing elite in Rome attempted to avoid a confrontation between the landed gen¬
Mills and pasta 269 30
241 53 try and the landless peasantry. The Bahta uprising of December 1894, and the
(Brick production)
Furniture 96 3 Italo-Ethiopian military confrontation of 1895—96 put an end to this ex¬
Cinematography 51 40 perimental phase.
Graphics 13 8
The following phase, 1897—1906, was both a period of uncertainty
Leather tanning 7 1
Textiles 3 3 (1897—1900) and of consolidation for the colonial power. During the early
Electricity 19 16 years, i.e. 1897—1900, Eritrea was perceived as a losing proposition. Colonics
Others — were expensive in terms of costs and manpower, and the ability of the state
TOTAL 2,198 to change this situation proved to be extremely limited. Emigration had its
Source: Gli Annali dell'Africa Italiana 3:2 (1940), pp. 116—17.
own logic which the state could do little to change. The military crisis of

53
52
, 1895—96 lent further support to those groups which had persistently argued trial and commercial economy. The Eritrean import/export trade
against colonialism. dramatically increased in the period 1921—32 due to Eritrea’s role in the tran¬
During the 1897—1900 period, Italy was on the verge of removing col¬ sit of goods to Ethiopia and the Arabian coast. Throughout this third phase,
onialism from its foreign policy. That Italy remained in Eritrea, as mentioned Italian policy was concerned with adding Ethiopia to Italy’s sphere of inllu-
in the introduction, was to a large measure related to African conditions ence. In other words, the Italians wanted Ethiopia as a hinterland for Eritrea.
rather than to other strategic or economic considerations. Paradoxically In contrast to the second phase, the third phase was characterized by liberal
enough, the second halt ot the period 1900—06 witnessed the consolidation attitudes to relations between the colonizers and the colonized. The main dif¬
of colonial rule. Italy was able to consolidate its colonial rule firstly because ference affected the so-called ‘native policy’. Martini, 1897—19()7 had been
of the weakness of Ethiopia, secondly because of the deepening crisis in Tigrai against the extension of education to Eritreans, because of its potential
province, and thirdly as a result of the farsighted and pragmatic leadership of dangers to cheap and peaceful colonial rule. In contrast, later colonial gover
Governor Martini, who administered Eritrea during the period 1897—1907. nors, in particular Salvago-Raggi, 1907—14 and J. Gasparini, 1923—28, pur¬
These were important factors in themselves. An additional factor, perhaps of sued and implemented a more liberal attitude toward schools and education.
even greater importance, was Eritrea’s new economic role, namely as a depot These policies are treated in some detail in chapter three below.
for transit trade and as supplier of raw material resources for export. The fourth phase, 1932—41, was essentially characterized by the invasion
Governor Martini is quite rightly regarded as the statesman who single- and pacification of Ethiopia. Eritrea’s value was both as a staging post for
handedly kept Eritrea for Italy. Martini’s privileged background was based the invading army and also as a reservoir of men for the colonial army. Be¬
upon his contact with Italian Royalty, his reputation as a liberal and on his tween 1935 and 1941, the colony provided over 60,000 men many of whom
knowledge of the workings of Italian government. To this invaluable were used as cannon fodder against the Ethiopian army. The census of 1939
background. Martini’s task was made easier because he perceived Eritrea not estimated the total population to be 617,000, and from these figures it has
as a colony for settlement, but as a raw material source for Italy and as an been deduced that as much as 40 per cent of Eritrea’s active men joined the
entrepot for the economic and commercial penetration of Ethiopia. colonial army. Already undermined during the 1920’s local production was
In the third phase, 1907—32, strategic considerations were more important now virtually set aside. At the same lime as Eritrea produced its legendary
than economic ones. Partly because of fears of resistance, the reorganization men of arms for the colonial army, Italy turned the colony into one of settle¬
oHhe colonial economy was extremely slow. Unable to attract capital, the col¬ ment, in which the Italian population grew from less than 1 per cent in 1931
onial state had to pursue a policy of little interference with the Eritrean pre¬ to 2 per cent of the entire Eritrean population by 1939. By the mid I930’s
capitalist systems. Four hundred thousand hectares which had been con¬ Eritrea had become a colony of settlement which, however, bore no
fiscated between 1893—95 were returned to their original owners. resemblance to what had been envisaged during the 1890—95 period.
By 1909 the Eritrean highlands were virtually closed to Italian colonists, That the Italians were frustrated in their grand plan was largely due to ex¬
long before they were expressly excluded by the law of 1926. From 1908 on¬ ternal factors, but they succeeded admirably in making Eritrea fulfill their
wards, and especially after 1912, the main function of Eritrea was to supply demands i.e. the Eritrean colonial army was, by and large, loyal and efficient.
soldiers for the expansion and consolidation of Italian colonialism in Somalia During the 1936—41 period, none of the 60,000 Eritrean colonial soldiers
and Libya. During the 1912—32 period Eritrea’s importance was undoubtedly were stationed in the colony itself.
of a strategic nature. The Eritrean soldiers in Libya (half of them were Ethio¬ Within half a century of colonialism, the colonial power attempted to use
pians who had been recruited and trained in Eritrea) were easily replaceable, Eritrea according to its needs and its capability. This study of the economic
extremely cheap and more efficient than Italian soldiers. Eritrean casualties and non-economic roles to which Eritrea was subjected explains in an oblique
in Libya were of little concern to Italy. The invasion of Libya, one of the most way the societal and economic changes which took place in Italy rather than
popular manifestations of a united and strong Italy maintained its appeal I those which occurred in Eritrea. As we shall attempt to show in the succeeding
believe, because of the low rate of casualties among the Italian soldiers. two chapters on educational and native policies, the prime concern of Italy
During the 1920’s Eritrea became important as a destination for Italian pro¬ was the control of social and economic changes in Eritrea in such a manner
ducts and also for the Italian transit trade to Ethiopia and the Arabian coast. that conflict between the interests of Italy and those of the Eritreans did not
This development was not at odds with the Eritrean commitment to the become unmanageable.
Libyan war, as it was. instead, a manifestation of the expanding Italian indus¬

54 55
 FOOTNOTES 8. AP: Appendice alia relazione annuale sulla colonia Eritrea dell’Onorevole Barone
L. Franchetti, 28,4.1894. pp. 3. 14, 15.
I am greatly indebted to the economic historian Yemane Misghena, University of
Lund, who read several drafts of this chapter and made accessible his source material. 9. Rainero, 1 primi tentativi, p. 58.

1. Romain Rainero, I primi tentativi di colonizzazione agricola e di popolamento 10. AP (discussioni) 14.5.1890, quoted in Rainero, / primi tentativi, p. 58.
deirEritrea, 1890—95, Milano. 1960; Richard Pankhurst. ‘Italian Settlement Policy in
Eritrea and its Repercussions, 1889—1896’ Boston University Papers on African .
11 Relazione generale della Regio Commissione sulla colonia Eritrea, 1891, p. 178,
History, vol. 1., 1964, Bennet, N., ed., pp. 121—56. The section on settlement policy on the existence of extensive lands which could be accessible to Italian colonists. Sec
is greatly based on the works of both authors but especially on that of Rainero since also pp. 182—87 on the forms of uninhibited settlement to those who possess funds.
it was based on sources not available to this author. While both authors conclude their On pages 190—91 the Commisson of Enquiry noted that it would lake some time
studies in 1895 and 1896 respectively, this study carries on to explain the reasons of before sending to Eritrea a considerable flow of emigrants {una larga corrente
why the metropole did not revive the policy after 1900 when it was in a position to do d'emigrazione), because colonial rule has yet to be established throughout the colony
so. and Italy ought not, at this period, aggravate further its budget.

2. Leopoldo Franchetti, Atti Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, Appendice alia rela- 12. Ibid., p. 186.
zione annuale sulla Colonia Eritrea, 28 Aprile, 1894, Roma, 1894; Ferdinando Mar¬
tini, Relazione sulla colonia Eritrea per gli esercizi, 1901—1902, Roma 1902; Idem., 13. The list of colonists (61 individuals grouped into 9 families) transported and settled
Relazione sulla colonia Eritrea per gli esercizi, 1905—1907, 4 vols., Roma, 1913. at the expense of the state is included in Franchetti’s report to Parliament dated
28.4.1894, cited above.
3. Mori, A., Manuale di legislazione della colonia Eritrea, 1890—1914,1 vols. Roma,
1916. The Statistica del Commercio della colonia Eritrea published with few exceptions 14. Ibid., p. 17.
in Eritrea constituted the main source for colonial reviews such as Rassegna
Economica delle Colonie issued in Rome by the Ministry of Colonies. 15. Ibid..

4. Bartolommei-Gioli, G., *La colonizzazione dell’Eritrea’, Bollettino delVEmigra- 16. Ibid., p. 18.
zione, 1906, pp. 221—57; Paoli, R., Nella colonia Eritrea, Roma, 1908; Peglion, O.,
et. al.. La colonia Eritrea: condizioni e problemi, Roma. 1913; Pollera, A., La vita 17. Rainero, / primi tentativi, p. 59.
comrnerciale etiopica e la circolazione monetaria eritrea, Tivoli, 1926; Piccioli, A., La
nuova italia d*oltremare, 2 vols., Roma. 1933; Santagata, F., La colonia Eritrea nel 18. ASMAI pos. 31/2 file 2. Governor Baratieri to Franchetti, 31.1.1893, where he
Mar Rosso davanti alPAbissinia, Napoli, 1935. pointed out that the confiscation of vast areas would alarm the indigenous people and
thus create sentiments of opposition, a phenomenon he wished to avoid. The security
5. The sources deposited in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, i.e. the Archivio of the colony Baratieri argued ought to be a result of good relations with the local
Eritrea and those of the former Ministry of Colonies (ASMAI) are subject to fifty population. He concluded by stating that Italian colonists need not be settled in empty
years rule. In actual fact, the researcher is denied access to pre 1935 material on the areas but among the indigenous population and without making adversaries of them.
grounds that the material requested happens to be located in a file containing post- This letter is included in Rainero’s 1 primi tentativi, pp. 197—202.
1935 material. The problem of access to sources is compounded by the substantial
withdrawal of files from AE and ASMAI into a working archive known as the Ar¬ 19. BUCE 15.5.1895, Bando di O. Baratieri sulle concessioni.
chivio del Comitato, created by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to facilitate
the publication under its auspicies a series of studies on Italian activities in Africa
20. Baratieri was fully aware that the main cause for the Bahia uprising was Italian
under the covering title L'ltalia in Africa.
confiscation of land. See his report to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in ASMAI, po.s.
3/7 file 50, dated 22.12.1894.
6. Relazione generale della Commissione dlnchiesta sulla colonia Eritrea, Roma.
1891, pp. 182—93; Rainero, / Primi tentativi di colonizzazione, pp. 56—58. 21. BUCE, Decreio Governatoriale, 30.6.1895, sulla colonizzazione, abrogating the
office of Franchetti.
7. Two rather contradictory approaches were in the forefront. Prime Minister Crispi
and the Royal Commission of Enquiry of 1891 recommended what they called coloniz- 22. Prime Minister Crispi resigned on March 5 1896 and was succeeded by Di Rudini
zazione libera where the pattern of settlement would be left to the laws of the market. who renounced his predecessor’s expansionist policies. Between March 1896 and Oc¬
The other view was that of L. Franchetti who argued that proprietary rights be given tober 1897 Italy debated whether to remain in Eritrea with peaceful relations with
only to small cultivators under state subsidy. Rainero, / primi tentativi, p. 57. I thiopia or to withdraw altogether from the colony. Extensive discussions were held
56
57
 as late as May 1897 (see AP (Discussioni 14.5 to 21.5) pp. 653—945) on the fate of 34. First used by Ostini, G., in ‘La nostra espansione coloniale e I’Eritrea*, Nuova An-
the colony. The matter was put to vote and the position of Di Rudini won with a wide tologia. May 1913, p. 1, it meant that colonialism ought to combine the needs for econ¬
margin. Di Rudini had argued that Italian colonial presence in Eritrea ought to be omic benefits with due respect for the rights, traditions and interests of the colonized.
based on peaceful relations with Ethiopia. While Di Rudini campaigned for his policy The term imperialismo sano is also used by Grassi, F., L*Imperialismo coloniale
in parliament, he sounded secretly the Belgian king Leopold if he would be interested italiano da Adua ad Impero, Bari, 1981, p. 183, although the author provides no ex¬
to take over Eritrea. The Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs were behind the planation either for its origin or for its scope.
secret negotiations. See C. Seton-Watson, Italy From Liberalism to Fascism, 1870—
1925, p. 184. See also Rainero, L *anticolonialismo italiano da Assab ad Adua, Milano,
35. Bartolommei-Gioli, G., ‘La colonizzazione*, 1906, p. 240.
1971. pp. 352—54.

23. The Land Act of 1909 (R.D. 31.1.1909, no. 378) declared in its second article that .16. Ibid., p. 266.
‘the rights of the population over lands which they currently possess in accordance
vrith ancient local customs shall be respected*. The Land Act of 1926 went even further
37. Ibid., pp. 257—63.
and stated that henceforth land for the purpose of cultivation may not be conceded
to Italian colonists (R.D. 7.2.1926, no. 269, article 9).
38. Amin, S., ‘Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa: Historical
24. Rainero, I primi tentativi, p. 143. Origin*, Journal of Peace Research, 2:1 (1972), p. 115.

25. Pankhurst, ‘Italian Settlement Policy*, pp. 151—52. 39. Istituto agricolo coloniale italiano. L"Economia Eritrea, 1882—1932, p. 48. The
source is derived from Beccari, O., In Mar Rosso, Roma, 1879, without precise cita¬
26. Bologna, L. M., ‘L*avvaloramento in Eritrea*, L "Italia in Africa: Serie economia- tion.
agraria, vol. 1, tome 2, Roma, 1970, p. 65.
40. Checchi, M., Movimento commerciale della colonia Eritrea, 1897—1910, Roma,
27. Cf. Rochat, G., II colonialismo italiano, Roma, 1975. 1912, p. 8.

28. Bartolommei-Gioli, G., and Checchi, M., ‘La colonizzazione dell’Eritrea*,

41. Ibid., p. 12.
L"Eritrea economica, ed., F. Martini Novara, 1913, p. 285; Peglion, O., et. al.. La
colohia Eritrea: condizioni e problemi, Roma, 1913, p. 54; Matteoda, Carlo, ‘II pen-
siero dei pionieri sulla valorizzazione economico-agraria della colonia Eritrea*, Attidel 42. Ibid.; From 1897 until 1932 colonial policy rested on a policy of good neighbour¬
primo congresso di studi coloniali, vol. 6, Firenze, 1931, p. 341. hood with Ethiopia. The key element in this policy were the Tigrinyans and their at¬
tachment to the Ethiopian state. In the early 1910*s, the colonial state, for instance,
29. For the scope and extent of resistance see chapter five below. chose to enter into conflict over land with Italian colonists rather than give in to their
demands on the grounds that confiscation of land would create hostile climate both
In I'rilrea and in Ethiopia. See ASMAI pos. 11/8, file 73. As late as 1930, the setting
30. For the relations between Crispi who wanted to pursue total war and with the
aside of c. 5000 hectares for Italian and Eritrean coffee cultivators caused serious pro-
necessary funds and the ‘bourgeoise of the North of Italy’ which denied him funds,
icsis from the Italian delegation in Ethiopia as a policy adversely affecting relations
see Battaglia, R., La prima guerra d"Africa, Torino, 1958, p. 714.
l»ctwcen Italy and Ethiopia. For further discussion see Chapter Five below.

31. This was the position put forward by the Royal Commission of Enquiry on Eritrea
of 1891, p. 191; Bartolommei-Gioli, G., ‘La colonizzazione’ (1906), p. 261. 43. In 1918, the Minister of Colonies Colosimo informed his parliamentary colleagues
that Eritrea was primarily a colony of transit trade. The redefinition of the role of
32. Gramsci, A., Prison Notebooks, pp. 67—68. I'ritrca, according to my understanding constrained the colonial state from pursuing
pedicies that might create political unrest among the Tigrinyans who maintained, albeif
iinarliculated, sentiments of Ethiopianism. Although there were other reasons such as
33. The treaty of July 10, 1900, was more favourable than the treaty of Wichale of
I he role of Eritrean soldiers in Libya, an important consideration for the Land Act of
1889, in that few more villages from Eritrean highlands were ceded to Italy. The treaty
1926 was to create a conducive climate for the implementation of the role of Eritrea
is reproduced in Carlo Rossetti, Storia diplomatica delFEtiopia durante il regno di
an outlet of Ethiopian import/export trade.
Menelik, Torino, 1910, pp. 247—50, and widely commented by Ruffilo Perini (alias
Gabre-Negus), ‘L’Eritrea e i suoi nuovi confini*, Rivista Moderna Politica e Leteraria,
6:1 (1902) 100— 17. '14 Santagata, F., La colonia Eritrea, 1935, pp. 131—34.

58 59
 .45. Coffee imports and exports, 1927—32 in a unit of a thousand lire:
Both Piccioli (1933) and Santagata (1935) simply noted that Eritrea had hardly any in¬
year imports exports dustries.
1927 30,658 23.876
1928 37.550 32,870 55. Renzo Sertolis Salis, in his study on the Eritrean Land Act, L ‘Ordinamento fon-
1929 33.231 24.634
1930
diario erilreo, Padova, 1932, p. 91, pointed out that virtually none of the Italian col¬
35.583 25.350
1931 44.049
onists cultivated the land by themselves instead they leased it on the basis of sharecrop¬
31,756
1932 22,003
ping to the Eritreans.
31.756

Source: Santagata. La coionia Eritrea, p. 141 for imports and p. 147 for exports. For Eritrean 56. Peglion, et. al.. La coionia Eritrea, p. 60.
attempts at coffee production, sec Angelo Piccioli, La nouva Italia d*Oltremare, Milano 1933
vol. 1. p. 671. * *
57. Piccioli, La nuova Italia d’Oltremare, Milano, 1933, vol. 1, p. 652.

46. Santagata, La coionia Eritrea, pp. 141, 147. Concerning inflation of the lire, see
58. Bologna, L. M., ‘L’avvaloramento’, p. 74.
Clough, S., The Economic History of Modern Italy, Columbia, 1964, pp. 197_98.

59. Piccioli, La nuova Italia, vol. 1, p. 652.

47. Ibid., pp. 131—34.

60. Istituto agricolo coloniale. Z,’£'corto/n/fl£'r/7refl. 1882—1932, Firenze, 1932, p. II.

48. Ibid., p. 164.

61. Irma Taddia, L'Eritrea — Coionia. 1890—1952, Milano, 1986, p. 244.

49. F0371/69370, Four Power Commission Report on Eritrea, Chapter Five: Trade
and Industry, p. 52.
62. See appendix 1 for the concession companies.

50. Hence the aggregate Eritrean import/export figures reproduced by Italian econ¬ 63. In this regard the farming out of over 10,000 hectares to a single company for the
omic historians do not reflect the productivity of the colony. Cf. Irma Taddia, ‘In- collection and export of palma dum (a product used for the manufacturing of buttons)
tervento pubblico e capitale privato nella coionia Eritrea’, Rivista di storia contem- could be cited. Santagata, La coionia Eritrea, p. 122.
poranea, 15:2 (1985) p. 240.
64. Ibid., pp. 100—28.
51.JCoquery-Vidrovitch, C., ‘The Colonial Economy of the former French, Belgian
and Portuguese zones, 1914-1935’, in Africa Under Colonial Domination, 1880- 65. Ibid., pp. 115—16.
1935, ed.. Boahen, A., Heinemann, 1985, p. 353.
W. Southard, A. E., Eritrea: Special Consular Reports no. 82, Washington, 1920, p.
52. See Mazzei, J., ‘La politica doganale coloniale e i problem! che ne derivano’, Atti
del primo congresso di studi coloniali, Firenze, 1931, vol.2, pp. 72—92. In 1927 for
instance, Eritrean exports to Italy were in the range of 0.1 billion lire. Total Italian 67. AE, Pacco 531 contains figures for cattle export from northern Ethiopia for the
imports for the same year were over 15 billion lire, p. 78. meat canning factory at Asmara.

53. Exports of Italian African Colonies, 1922—1930 in thousands of lire. 68. Santagata, La coionia Eritrea, (1935) p. 106; for the post 1935 gold production.
Africa Italiana, 2:7—8 (1939), pp. 41— 42.
1922 1924 1926 1928 1930
Eritrea 31,623 87.901 97,852 93.712 76.279
Somalia 10,988
69. Africa Italiana, 2:7—8 (1939), p. 42.
16,780 29.033 42,330 47,955
Cyrcnnaica 9,773 20,467 25,930 45.246 28,393
Tripolitania 13,654 25,204 45,246
70. Ibid..
28.393 36,136
Source: Extracted from Rassegna Economica delle Colonie, 20:12 (1933) pp. 1131—44.
71. This estimation is based on the intensity of commercial and industrial activity of
the colony as presented by Piccioli (1933) and Santagata (1935).
54. Cf. Tomasso Tittoni, Italy’s Foreign and Colonial Policy, London, 1914, pp.
273-75; Paoli, Nella coionia Eritrea, (1908) p. 112. For the post 1920 period, the
72. The contribution of the Italian state to the Eritrean budget varied from year to
question of the performance of the colony appeared to be no longer an important issue
year. See Taddia, ‘Intervcnto pubblico’. pp. 216-18 for a yearly subsidy to the col¬
in itself, most probably in view of the new role of the colony as a depot of transit trade. onial budget.
60
61
 73. Cf. Piccioli, La nuova Italia d*Oltremare, vol. 1, p. 629. 86. See Leuthy, France against Herself, New York, 1957, p. 259.

74) See Lefevre, R., Terra nostra d*Africa, 1932—35, Milano, 1942, pp. 184—86 87. AE 947. Governor Salvago-Raggi to MAE, 25.3.1908; Robert Hess, Italian CoT
where the author argues that the land law of 1926 made the development of commer¬ onialism in Somalia, Chicago, 1966, p. 110.
cial agriculture in the highlands difficult. The author also emphasized that the land law
was motivated by political reasons. 88. ASMAI pos. 115/2, file 2, Salvago-Raggi to MAE, 20.2.1912.

75. See Anthony Brewer, Marxist Theories of Imperialism, London, 1984, pp. 42—43. 89. Ibid..

76. Istituto agricolo coloniale, L*Economia Eritrea, pp. 76—80. 90. AE 373.

77. Coquery-Vidrovitch, C., The African Mode of Production’, Relations of Produc¬ 91. Ibid..
tion, ed., D. Seddon, London, 1978, pp. 209—57.
92. ASMAI pos. 115/2, file 15, MC to Salvago-Raggi, Rome, 17.7.1914.
78. See my ‘Land Tenure and the Organization of Surplus Appropriation on the eve
of the colonial period’. Notes on Nationalism and Resistance in Eritrea, 1890—1940, 93. Ibid,.
pp. 22—36.
94. A newly recruited soldier could expect to be promoted four times. AE is replete
79. Cf. Pankhurst, An Introduction to the Economic History of Ethiopia, London, with letters from ex-soldiers seeking chieftainship on the merit of their military service.
1960, especially pp. 389—400.
95. See appendix 2: Note on salaries and prices of basic food-crops.
80. One of the reasons why Europe managed to impose its colonial rule was because
of the compatibility of primarily economic interests between the European (capitalist) 96. Conscription started only on the eve of the Italo-Ethiopian war in 1934 and con¬
system and the pre-capitalist systems of the colonized world. See Ronald Robinson, tinued until the end of the period.
‘Indigenous Basis of Imperialism: A sketch for the theory of collaboration’. Bob
Sutcliffe and Roger Owen eds.. Studies in the theory of Imperialism, London, 1972, 97. ASMAI pos. 115/1, file 6, Ordini permanent!, anno 1912: Corpo Eritreo da in-
pp. 118—42. See also my ‘Resistance and Collaboration, 1890—1914’, Notes on Na- viarsi in Libia, 20.2.1912.
tionalistn and Resistance in Eritrea, pp. 36—48.
98. ACS-MAI B. 1, file 1. MC Ufficio Militare: Reipilogo della forza presente nclle
81. That colonialism brought very little restructuring of the indigenous system is fully colonie alia data 1.4.1925.
discussed in Wallerstein, 1., Historical Capitalism, London, 1983. More specifically,
the predominance of precapitalist system in Africa is treated in GOran Hyd6n, No 99. Ibid., 30.4.1928.
Short Cuts to Progress, London, 1983, pp. 191—213.
100. Cf. Giorgio Rochat, Militari e politici nella preparazione della campagna
82. For the role of the Eritreans in the colonial system see chapters three and four d*Etiopia: Studi e Documenti, 1932—1936, Milano, 1971, pp. 33—40, who dates July
below. For the role of the African during the colonial period in general see Michael 1933 as the decisive moment. Del Boca in Gli Italian! in Africa Orientate: La conquista
Crowder, West Africa Under Colonial Rule, London, 1967, pp. 345—48. deirimpero, Bari, 1979, p. 169, argues that the decisive moment was 1932.

83. Proletarianization presupposes that the proletariat survives solely on wages 101. Ministero della Guerra, La campagna 1935—36 in Africa Orientale, vol. 1, p.
earned, a necessary precondition for a break with precapitalist system. 108.

84. See my ‘Resistance and Collaboration’, pp. 45—48. 102. Ibid., p. 123.

85. By the 1920’s the vaccination campaign against cattle diseases was virtually com¬ 103. ACS Carte Badoglio, B.4, file 6, doc. no. 52, dated 25.5.1934.
plete thus laying down the basis for a considerable increase in the livestock patrimony.
The consequences of the serious drought of 1926—29, for instance was greatly 104. Ibid..
minimized by the importation of cereals from abroad, as can be clearly seen from the
Statistica del commercio della colonia Eritrea for 1926—29. For further discussion, see 105. Ibid., doc. no. 109, dated 14.11.1934. Ibid., doc. no. 131, dated 19.1.1935 where
Chapter Six below. it was stated that 61,700 Eritreans were recruited.

62 63
 J06. Governo Generale dell’Africa Orientale, Staio Maggiore, II Pritno anno deirim-
125. The pacification of Libya that began in 1912 ended officially in 1932. Due to ter¬
pero, Addis Ababa, 1938, vol. 1, p. 44.
rain and nature of Libyan resistance, soldiers from colonies such as Eritrea were better
suited than Italians. Moreover, Eritrean casualties were not only of little concern to
107. ACS Fondo Graziani, Governor Graziani to Minister of Colonies, Lessona,
It^y but were cheaply compensated. Close relatives to Eritreans killed in Libya were
dispatch 51183, dated 4.11.1937.
paid a compensation equivalent to two months salary of the deceased. For such a list
of payment see ASMAI pos. 115/2, file 10, dated 25.9.1912: Sussidi agli eredi degli
108. Giovanni Simonini, ‘La regione del Serae*, Gii Annali deil'Africa Italiana, 3:3 ascari morti in Libia.
(1940), p. 122, where 25,000 men were recruited to the colonial army from only one
of the five administrative districts.
In 1925, the total forces in Libya was made up of 11,320 Italians and 21,715 colonial
soldiers, i.e. from Eritrea, Somalia, Ethiopia and including Libya. The preponderance
109. ACS Fondo Graziani, Minister of Colonies, Lessona, 8.11.1937, instructing Gra¬ of colonial soldiers in the pacification of Libya indicates strongly that Italian casualties
ziani to reduce metropolitan forces for reasons of budget.
could be reasonably controlled. For distribution of forces, see ACS-MAI, busta I file
2. Ministero delle Colonie, Riepilogo della forza presente nelle varie colonie alia data
110. Peglion, La colonia Eritrea, 1913, p. 44. I aprile 1925.

111. Ibid..

112. Ibid., p. 65.

113. ASMAI pos. 3/21, file 180, Intelligence report to MC, 6—13 May and 14—21
August 1914.

114. ASMAI pos. 115/2, file 15, MC to governor of Eritrea, 17.7,1914.

115. Ibid., Salvago-Raggi to MC, 11.9.1914.

116. Ibid..

117/lbid..

118. This was noted in the brief anonymous commentary on the census of 1931,
published in the BoUettino della Societd Geografica Italiana, 72 (1935) p. 319.

119. Simonini. ‘La regione del Serae*, Gli Annali delEAfrica Italiana, 3:3 (1940), p.
122.

120. Ibid..

121. David Killingway, ‘Military and Labour Recruitment in the Gold Coast during
the Second World War*, Journal of African History, 23:1 (1982), p, 86.

122. VII Censimento generale della popolazione, 21.4.1931, Rome, 1935, p. 34.

123. Vittorio Castellano, ‘La popolazione italiana delLEritrea dal 1924 al 1940*,
Rivista Italiana di demografia e statistica, 1:4 (1948), p. 539. Idem., ‘II censimento del
1939 della popolazione indigena della Eritrea e lo sviluppo della popolazione indigena
della Eritrea storica, in un cinquantennio di amministrazione italiana*, Rivista Italiana
di demografia e statistica, 1:2 (1948), p. 272.

124. Ibid..

64
65
 CHAPTER THREE
De Marco’s study was based on policy statements and on published litera¬
ture. Apart from a couple of colonial text books developed for Libyan
THE IDEOLOGY OF COLONIALISM: students, the author had no access to those that were available in Eritrea.
EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND On the basis of literature concerned with Italian aspirations for colonial
education, De Marco stated that ‘Italy had succeeded to a considerable degree
PRAXIS in Italianizing those peoples who attended government schools and who were
enrolled in the native organizations’.^ He concluded that ‘on the whole, the
Italian public school for natives tended to carry out a policy of gradual cul¬
tural assimilation of the natives’.*^
In the Eritrean context, the conclusions of De Marco are of limited
relevance. Firstly, his assertion of Italy’s success in Italianizing those who at¬
tended government schools cannot be substantiated. Native education was
Scope, State of Research and Source Materials
limited to the equivalent of grade three in Italy. Even if we agree with the au¬
thor as to the purposes of colonial education, the length of schooling was far
The purpose of this chapter is to explain colonial relations by focussing on
too short for De Marco to conclude that Italy had succeeded in its policy of
colonial educational policies and the extent to which they were put into prac¬
‘Italianization’ and ‘gradual cultural assimilation’. As late as 1931, those
tice. The colonial state was solely responsible for educational policies, but it
Eritreans who knew rudimentary Italian constituted only 1.1 per cent of the
shared responsibility for their implementation with the Catholic mission.*
entire population. Although knowledge of Italian implied neither ‘Italiani/a-
The questions which this chapter aims to answer are: 1) what role did colonial
tion’ nor ‘cultural assimilation’, the census figure indicates the result of very
education play in the maintenance of colonial rule? 2) how did the colonial
limited colonial education.^
state perceive the spread of education and what measures did it take to
Secondly, the author’s conclusions are both confusing and contradictory
regulate and streamline it?
when he fails to consider colonial education as part of the context of col¬
An important point of departure, albeit slightly outdated is the study con¬
onialism and colonial rule. Apart from instruction in rudimentary Italian and
ducted by R. De Marco in 1943: The Italianization of Africans: Italian Col¬
some notions about the greatness of Italy,® the Italians made it clear,
onial Educational Policy. The task of the study was to document the objec¬
through their native policy, that they were opposed to any form of ‘Italianiza¬
tives of colonial education in all Italian territories. The author was convinced
tion or cultural assimilation’.’ If De Marco had looked into Italian native
that the purpose of colonial education was ‘assimilation* and ‘Italianization
policy, he would have confronted the difficulties of reconciling colonial
of the natives’, terms used as mutually exclusive. ‘Assimilation’ wrote De
education with the policies of native administration.
Marco,
The main problem for a study of colonial native education policy is the
was used by the Italians to bring about a change in the native mental outlook; paucity of published contemporary source material and the fragmentary
it implied a desire to impress the native with the greatness of Italian civilization; nature of archival sources. Contemporary sources can be divided into two
it sought to gain his respect for Italy’s colonizing ability; and it attempted to types: those concerned with an empirical description of school organization,
convince him of the singular privilege of being under the domination of modern
and those explaining the motives that gave rise to this particular educational
Rome. In carrying out this policy of Italianizing the native, the government col¬
onial school for indigenous people played a very important role.^ system. Both types of source leave much to be desired, and the few policy-
oriented studies that exist are also highly eulogistic of fascist reforms.*®
De Marco’s understanding of the terms ‘assimilation’ and ‘Italianization’ A far more serious shortcoming is the fragmentary nature of the archival
is diffuse when compared to for example, the French Colonial System. Ac¬ source material. This results from the fact that schools were not obliged to
cording to the French Colonial policy of Assimilation, the ultimate goal was provide reports to the colonial administration until 1932. The establishment
to bring the colonized to the level of the colonizer, through among other in 1932 of the Post of School Superintendent in Eritrea assisted in document¬
things, the introduction and spread of western educational system.^ As 1 ing the school system although it was unfortunate that the post was occupied
shall discuss below, the objectives of Italian colonial educational policy had by a zealous politician and propagandist whose interest in documentation was
very little to do with either assimilation or Italianization. politically motivated." Nevertheless, the archival source material from Al\
66
67
a(nd the Comitato archive have been invaluable for information on the organ¬ tion towards politically harmless objectives as his successors were later to
ization and functioning of the school system. The archival source material, al¬ prove.
though incomplete and fragmented, has made it possible to show the wide gap The primary concern of Martini was to consolidate colonial rule and his
between policy and practice. negative views on native education were generally accepted by others at a time
The second type of sources is the colonial text-books which were used in when colonial rule was not yet firmly established. From another angle. Mar¬
Eritrean native schools. These textbooks were published in Eritrea and pro¬ tini’s views were based more on ideological beliefs which in fact had very little
vide insights into the praxis of colonial education. These textbooks, eight in to do with the consolidation of colonial rule. For Martini the colonial dictum
number, were not accessible to De Marco and hence have not been examined appeared to run as follows: the business of colonialism was absolute domina¬
before. tion over the colonized in the interests of the colonizer.
The policy of no schooling for Eritreans was drastically changed by Gover¬
nor Salvago-Raggi, who succeeded Martini at the beginning of 1907. A career
diplomat with long service in Cairo and Peking, the new Governor intervened
in matters of native education by establishing state schools. In 1911 the first
The Colonial Government and Native Education government school w^ established in Keren for the children of Muslim chiefs
and other notables.'^ The school was modelled on the British colonial
Although the colonial government was not alone in furthering native educa¬ schools anCessaa"in the Sudan and Alexandria in Egypt.The school at
tion it was, however, responsible for defining its extent and orientation. As Keren, and others which were subsequently established,'^ were expected to
the ultimate source of authority on native education, the colonial government produce educated workers for the postal and telegraphic services, a develop¬
evolved and implemented three distinct policies at various phases of colonial ment which ten years earlier had been strongly rejected by Governor Martini.
rule. The schools followed a curriculum which had been developed on an ad hoc
During the first decade of colonial rule, i.e. 1897—1907, the colonial admi¬ basis, and which was different from that pursued in Italy.'’
nistration perceived native education as a process of elevating the native to in¬ Although the initiative for the new school had been taken by the Governor
tellectual parity with Italian citizens. This process, it was thought, could give and was within the budget for the colony, Rome remained the ultimate source
Eritreans the basis to challenge colonial rule. Justifying his refusal to open of authority. The ideological framework for native education was outlined by
schools for the native population, the Eritrean governor Ferdinando Martini the then Foreign Minister in reply to Governor Salvago-Raggi*s request for
wrote: funds to open other schools. The Foreign Minister, Di San Giuliano, wrote
that the Governor could indeed proceed with his plans within the limits of his
First point, no, and again no mixed schools for whiles and blacks. The native
child, more agile and alert, has the intelligence of the white child; therefore budget. At the same time he warned the governor to be careful not to create
avoid confrontation. ... Schools for blacks? Is it worth their establishment? ... mental and moral imbalance among the natives who, he stressed, had an in¬
We can not use the native in postal and telegraph services. And happy the day fantile mentality!.'®
when we do not even require the services of the natives as interpreters. ... As In 1916, the colonial state issued a policy document on native education.”
for aping some Italian, they can learn it by themselves.'^
Distributed to all commissioners and mission leaders, the document dealt with
Martini saw a threat to colonialism from educated Eritreans, and the under¬ the motives and commitment of the colonial state to native education. It was
mining effect of education on colonialism. His negative policy towards native explained that although education was an obligation of the colonial power as
schools was based on the belief that an educated population could challenge part of its civilizing mission, political reasons necessitated clear guidelines.
the basis of colonialism and thus make colonial rule unduly expensive, if not The document pointed out the potential of the school to transform the spirit
impossible to maintain. Colonies, Martini argued, were created by arms and and intellect of the native.^®
were maintained by the aura of prestige that surrounded the European col¬ Without further explaining the potential impact of school on the native, the
onizer.'^ In other words, colonies could be kept only by a strict separation of document proceeded to recommend that district commissioners and mission
races, by the cultivation of European prestige vis-^i-vis the colonized and by school leaders pay more attention to and encourage traditional schools run by
denying the native population access to western education. Martini was un¬ monasteries and mosques. Private school organizers were advised to develop
willing to accept that the colonial state had the power to direct native educa¬ a programme which was distinct from Italian education, and to limit native

68 69
 schooling to the equivalent of the first three years of elementary education in The author challenged these views by arguing that the colonial power could
Italy.^' prevent this by adequately controling native education and thus preventing
The document did not explain the political reasons for formulating clear school from being transmuted into a force for the subversion and dissolution
guidelines nor was it clear in its policy prescriptions. However two main con- of colonial domination.
elusions can be drawn from it. Firstly, the desire of the colonial state to limit From 1934 native education in Eritrea was primarily justified for its
native education to lower elementary education, and secondly, the awareness usefulness in consolidating colonial rule. The Superintendent of Schools, An¬
•’-yof the school’s transformative potential for the mental and psychological drea Festa was closely associated with colonial policy on native education.
outlook of the Eritrean. Policy assumed a clarity missing during the earlier phase. Defining the scope
In 1927 the Minister of Colonies Luigi Federezoni set out new policy of education, Festa explained:
guidelines when he wrote that, the natives twenty years thereafter would be
The child ought to know something of our civilization in order to make him a
what the Italian educational institutions had made them.^^ The clear associa¬
conscious propagandist among the families who live far away inland. And
tion which Martini perceived 20 years before was now firmly established by through our educational policy, the native should know of Italy, her glories and
the Minister’s acceptance of the role of education in the colony. The minister her ancient history in order to become a conscious militant behind the shadow
did not go into the details of what kind of an Eritrean Italy wanted to create of our flag.^’
through education. This was presumably left to experts on the subject. One
In reforming the school system, Festa instructed that courses in hygiene and
of these experts was Rodolfo Micacchi, the Director of Education in the
geography be expanded while the teaching of contentious historical issues
Ministry of Colonies, who was also instrumental in implementing school
such as the Risorgimento and other such issues were to be entirely omitted.^*
reforms in the Italian colony of Libya.^^
With this kind of reformed curriculum, he thought that school could not but
Another expert who developed the connection between education and col¬
benefit the natives, ‘our future soldiers of Italy’.The reformed system
onial rule was Professor Mininni Caracciolo. The Professor wrote:
treed the government from concern that Eritreans would be exposed to an
We have to recognize from the outset that the leaching of natives along the same educational programme available to Italian nationals.
lines as in Europe has produced most sad and dangerous results for the natives W hile Festa, Caracciolo and De Leone argued their case for limiting native
as well as for the colonizers. It is therefore necessary that native education be
eilucation to lower elementary school on political grounds, other additional
.adapted as much as possible to the conditions and needs of the native and to
' the character and specific exigencies of colonialism.^^ reasons were developed in the 1930’s. The view that Africans were
pathologically inferior, already argued by a renowned Italian anthropologist
He further argued that native education, although the most ponderous since 1932, assumed more relevance after the establishment of the Italian
obligation of the colonizer, could be a useful instrument for the peaceful Aliican empire in 1936.^®
penetration and moral conquest of the native. Moreover the duty to educate In an international conference organized by the Italian Academy the delcga-
the native ought to go hand in hand with the political, economic, ad¬ iion from Rome used a two-pronged argument in explaining their views on
ministrative and military interests of the colonizer. mlonial relations in general and native education in particular. At the general
On the basis of his wide reading. Professor Caracciolo pointed out that col¬ level of colonial relations the Italian position, as expressed by the an-
onial schools tended to alienate their pupils from their natural environment. ihfopologist. Professor Lidio Cipriani, argued that the destiny of Africa was
This danger, advised the author, could be easily avoided by giving the native lo he ruled by Europe because of their retarded mental capability Africans
an education based on his own particular social and economic milieu and by were unable to rule Africa to Europe’s satisfaction.^* He stressed the point
making education a purely practical affair.^^ In this way school would con¬ that the purpose of colonialism was to rule, rather than prepare Africans for
tribute to ameliorating the life of the native by allowing him the benefits of iuiionomy. Cipriani challenged France and Britain to admit this truth rather
improvement (introduced by Italians in pursuance of their civilizing mission) I turn to continue to pursue a false policy of preparing Africans for
without deviating the native from his environment. Finally the author attemp¬ autonomy.
ted to provide a solution to two criticisms. The first was the assertion that the Supporting Profe.s.sor Cipriani on the alleged pathological and incurable in-
educated native was much more difficult to govern than his non-educated lenoriiy ot the blacks, the cx-governor of Italian Somaliland wrote that the
brother, and the second was the allegation by the enemies of colonial educa¬ mniinued presence of colonialism depended, in addition to the u.sc of force,
tion that it invariably prepared the ground for the demise of European power. on the separation of races at all levels and in particular schools. ‘I jidowed
70
71
 with good memory which is less distracted by observation and reflection’, appendices. Chapter one dealt with the history and progress of human civili¬
argued the former governor, ‘the native child excels his white counterpart in zation using as a point of departure the simple and effective principle of
the first years of schooling’. So the author advised that in order to maintain necessity as the mother of invention. The following chapter on geography
‘our superiority over the native we have to educate him separately began with the relationship between the sun and the planets, the various
I Outlining the programme of colonial education, the Minister of Colonies aspects of planet earth and its inhabitants distinguished by race. Europe is de¬
Giuseppe Bottai wrote that the indigenous, for evident reasons of prestige, scribed as a continent neither rich in resources nor endowed with beautiful
ought not to be educated but only instructed. Elaborating the distinction be¬ and luxuriant scenery; this ancient continent has however been transformed
tween education and instruction, the Minister stressed that the objectives of by the courage and intelligent labour of its inhabitants.
native education are not to produce masters of skills like ours but expert The chapter on hygiene concentrated on the growth of the human body and
» manual labourers within their limited capability. of how to keep it healthy. The fourth chapter opened with a picture of a trac¬
Whereas separate education remained the norm throughout the colonial tor and explained farming in Italy. This was followed by the various pests and
period, the limiting of native education to a lower elementary level became diseases which affect plants and animals. Neither the farming technique nor
more emphasized during the 1932—41 period. the series of diseases were relevant in Eritrea during the period of publication.
The final chapter was reserved for the moral duties to God, to others and to
Italy.
As a first publication, the manual was bulky and of limited usefulness for
the student who aspired to learn Italian through the use of the Tigrinya
Objectives of Education as derived from Colonial Text¬ translation text. Firstly it would have required an extraordinary skill to exactly
books locate the page in the Italian text that matched its Tigrinya translation and
secondly, the Tigrinya text would have been of little use since it went beyond
In the period up to 1932 there were three kinds of schools for Eritreans. There literal translation.
were schools run by the colonial administration, others run by the Catholic The following volume was a quite substantial primer (lettere scelte) selected
mission, and lastly, those owned and managed by the Swedish mission.” In by the Catholic mission on l)stories, anecdotes, 2) notions of geography and
the government schools teachers followed the Italian curriculum with a few such places as Italy, Eritrea etc; 3) rights and duties; 4) hygiene; 5) fables,
necessary modifications. From 1923 onwards the government schools were 6) the art of writing letters with examples and finally, 7) poetry.'*^ The ma¬
handed over to the Catholic mission, whose contribution in Italian colonies terial was written in simple language and the Tigrinya version was a direct
was described as highly patriotic.” Thus from 1923 until 1941, Eritrean translation of the Italian. In school, the ambitious student could without any
education was in the hands of the Catholic mission.” However, the colonial assistance find out for himself the Italian expression of what he read in
government maintained a supervisory role through a central office for Tigrinya on the opposite page.
primary education” and remained responsible for the military training of The reading material was composed entirely from Italian literature. This
students.” was a reading textbook which could easily have accomodated some Eritrean
The textbooks here under examination are those published by the Catholic stories, fables, anecdotes and poetry. The text book can be described as the
mission from 1912 onwards. They were the only textbooks printed in Asmara classic colonial teaching aid produced by either secular or religious bodies
(most of them in Italian and Tigrinya) and were widely accessible to the urban with little knowledge of the cultural heritage of the inhabitants of the colony
population. Government textbooks for Libyan students and those written and unwilling to concede that the culture of the colonized could be taught in
after 1936 for the newly created Italian East African Empire could hardly the modern school. The cost of the book (5 lire) was equivalent to half a
have been used in Eritrea by the Catholic mission because of the entrenched week’s pay for an ordinary worker; this amount, however, could be easily af¬
position of the Church as the only institution responsible for colonial educa¬ forded by the salaried traditional elite and by the officers of the native col¬
tion.'*® onial army.
Between 1912 and 1930 a total of eight textbooks were produced by the Volume 4 in the series entitled La colonia Eritrea (the colony of Eritrea) is
Catholic mission. The first manual of 1912 was divided in two parts: the first essentially a history book.^^ The book opens with a chapter on the
in Italian and the second in Tigrinya.^' It contained eight chapters and five geographical aspects of Eritrea and neighbouring countries and ends with a

72 71
 fecapitulation of the census of 1911, followed by a chapter on the political or¬ depicts in a symbolic language the relations between the Eritrean, the Catholic
ganization of the colony. A brief biography of the current governor is mission and the Italian colonialists, where the Eritrean appears to come out
followed by a list with dates of all those who had ruled Eritrea. The chapter the beneficiary. As stated in the preface, the message of the story was to im¬
concludes with a description of the important offices of the colonial state. The part to the students that social and economic progress was the result of per¬
commerce of the colony, the industrial establishment and the agricultural sistent hard work.
situation are each assigned a chapter. In chapter six the banking system is de¬ Between 1923 and 1930 the Catholic mission produced two new series of
scribed and an attempt is made to explain the need for its existence. colonial manuals. Written only in Italian these texts appeared to have been
Education in the colony is the subject of chapter eight, where most of the planned as teachers’ manuals. Designed for grades two to four, the 1923 vol¬
space is devoted to the educational system for Italians rather than for ume consists of grammar, arithmetic and selected reading material/" The
Eritreans. This chapter is written in such a biased way that it gives the impres¬ grammar and arithmetic contents were based on Italian curricula but had been
sion that only the Catholic mission was involved in education. The book con¬ modified to meet the objectives set by the colonial state. Most of the examples
cludes with a discussion of the religions professed in the colony. The volume arc derived from Eritrean reality and to that extent the manual was a local
contains a substantial amount of factual material and its scope is exclusively product for the local school. The reading material was arranged in order to
Eritrean. Catholic prejudice against non-Catholics is apparent and it is very inculcate obedience and respect for Italian rule in Eritrea.
easy to imagine the controversy it would have aroused when read by an Ethio¬ The final volume was published in Italian in 1930 with Tigrinya words and
pian Orthodox, who is described as a Copt — an appelation which is entirely proverbs spread throughout. It was a reader as well as a book of grammar and
foreign to the ear of the Eritrean."^ arithmetic.**’ Every heading was followed by a story or an anecdote taken
The fifth volume was also a reader on Illustrious men of science and Irom the Eritrean situation as perceived by the authors of the Catholic mis¬
charity.Written in the same style as the earlier volumes, the book is sion.
divided into twelve chapters on the following: 1) engineers and architects; 2) The purpose of colonial textbooks went beyond teaching reading, writing
scientists, 3) painters, sculptors and musicians, 4) industrialists and men of and arithmetic. Through the use of textbooks, the Catholic mission attempted
business; 5) men of letters and poets; 6) magistrates and jurists; 7) navigators to inculcate certain values, attitudes and perceptions. From an analysis of col¬
and explorers; 8) sovereigns and popes; 9) generals; 10) politicians; 11) philan¬ onial textbooks, two distinct objectives emerge. These were: a) the position
thropists; and 12) missionaries. Without exception the people discussed, (alto¬ of Italy vis-a-vis Eritrea, and, b) the raison d’etre of colonialism.
gether over 60 persons) are Italians, giving the impression to the Eritrean that
the world of knowledge was dominated by Italians. a) The position of Italy in relation to Eritrea
The last volume in the collection, also a reader, is the story of Embae, a Italy was portrayed as the fatherland of the Eritreans and the most powerful
young Eritrean, and his experience with his Italian employer.**^ The book country in the world. In the textbook of 1912, in the section on duty towards
was published in 1920 and owing to its contents deserves some detailed de¬ the fatherland, the authors attempted to explain the existence of double
scription.
patriotisms.^® A fatherland was defined as a country or place of birth in¬
Of a poor peasant family, Embae had the opportunity of going to the habited by a community of people who share a great deal in common. It was
Catholic mission school. After two years of schooling he moved to the capital also mentioned that the fatherland was worth dying for. Under the same
and through the assistance of the Catholic mission found a job in an Italian heading Eritrean participation in Italian colonial wars in Somalia and Libya
commercial store. Soon after, his employer asked Embae to go with him to was described as an act of patriotism to the Italian fatherland.
Italy on the understanding that the former would eventually assist him to start
Our valiant soldiers ... who at Benadir and Tripoli had heroically sacrificed their
his own business. As the employer’s adopted son Embae moved steadily up¬
lives in honour of the fatherland, are notable examples of strong and sincere af¬
wards from being a manager to becoming a shareholder, and finally inherited fection which ought to be rendered to Italy, a country which has granted to these
the property of his employer. In Italy Embae met several leading men of people of Eritrea well-being, liberty, security and peace in civil and religious do¬
science and he dreamed of writing a book which could guide his countrymen mains.^'
to progress.**’
In exchange for efficient colonial government, the authors thought they
As a putatively true story, the book stretches the imagination of the student would succeed in inculcating among Eritreans a devotion to Italy as
into the exotic world of Europe. Told by a successful Eritrean, the story tiKherland.
74 75
 ^ The problem of the Italian relationship to Eritrea was treated more
The beauty and greatness of Italy were repeated in superlative terms which
systematically in the text of 1923. The reading section on Italy was preceded
emphasized the goodness, industriousness and bravery of the Italian people.
by a section on ‘My Country* which employed an imaginary argument be¬
tween two Eritrean students where they accused each other of originating
from a more backward part of the colony.” The teacher resolves the conflict b) The raison d’etre of colonialism
by pointing out that every country is worthy of respect if inhabited by people
The opening sentence of the first colonial textbook characterized Italian col¬
who, among other things, respect the integrity of the individual. He then
onialism as a burden carried out for the sake of civilization. To quote:
challenged his students saying, ‘By the way, you ought all to be satisfied of
being subjects of a great country*.” In possessing the Abyssinian province which currently carries the name of
Then the teacher painted a lyrical description of Italy, the most beautiful Eritrea, Italy has no other purpose than to introduce among these people a
country in the world: moral, civil and economic regeneration which are the fruits of modern civiliza¬
tion.”

There was a period when Italy ruled the world. It was Italy which brought Condemned for centuries to stagnation, Eritrea had in a brief period of time
education, the good and saintly manners of life to all other parts of the world. become, due to the intervention of Italy, profitable and civilized.” The
...Italy has sent to this colony some of her sons to make it fertile, to educate
humanitarian or altruistic motives of colonialism were repeated in the text of
the children of the colonized, to defend the colony from raids and to make it
more developed and appreciated.^'^ 1917, in the reading primers of 1916 and the comprehensive texts of 1923 and
1930. The task of improving agricultural and animal husbandry, and conse¬
quently the conditions of life, is repeatedly pointed out in the 1917 volume as
The awesome stature of Italy and its heritage was highlighted by the juxtaposi¬
the main reason for Italian presence in Eritrea.
tion of the Eritrean students* perception of their ‘country* and a description
of Italy in the most glowing terms. Whereas Italy was presented with an an¬ The altruistic ease with which the Catholic mission explained Italian col¬
cient and glorious history, Eritrea and the Eritreans emerged into history for onial presence appeared to limit itself to the changes that were taking place
the first time with the Italian occupation. in the Eritrean economy. There was however another reason, namely, the
In contrast to the text of 1912, the text of 1923 paid attention to relations Church*s own conception of colonialism. The Catholic Church accepted the
between Italy and Eritrea. From the reading section delineated above, two im¬ legitimate right of Italy to acquire colonies,^ but it perceived colonial rela¬
ages emerge: on the one hand a backward Eritrea whose destiny lay in the tions in a different perspective from that of the colonial administration. In the
hands of Italy; on the other hand, Italy as the great but selfless power engaged context of elementary education, the Catholic Church*s perception of col¬
in the civilization of the colony. The contrast between the greatness of Italy onialism and colonial relations was probably most clearly expressed by the
and the colony that was condemned to ‘centuries of stagnation until the ar¬ 1920 publication which symbolized the relationship between an Eritrean and
an Italian. '
rival of the Italians* was clear in both the 1912 and 1923 texts.”
In the final volume published in 1930, the section on Italy began with a de¬
scription of how Eritrea had become, since the Italian occupation, a land of
labour and richness, free from enemy invasions and secure within its boun¬
daries. Elaborating this theme further, the authors defined a colony as a coun¬ Colonial Educational Policy and the Catholic Mission
try occupied by a civilized nation with the aim of civilizing and educating its
inhabitants, and then they proceeded to explain the goals of Italian col¬ The Italian state and the colonial government firmly believed firstly in the
onialism. The authors wrote that the Italians were doing what the Romans did transformative impact of education on the Eritrean and, secondly, in the
in ancient times, e.g. spreading education and improving the conditions of the possibility of imparting education in a manner that would meet the re¬
inhabitants.” The advantages which Italy brought to Eritrea such as an in¬ quirements of the colonial power. The document of 1916 pointed out to
crease in population, an expansion of commerce and trade, a developed in¬ district commissioners and mission leaders the impact of education on the
frastructure and the extension of medical care, were pointed out to illustrate native and also conceptualized the attitudes of the colonial state towards
further the altruistic motives of colonialism. This was then followed by an ex¬ education. The close association between education and colonial rule as out¬
hortation: ‘Learn to salute Italy as a loving and beneficial mother country*.”
lined by the Minister of Colonies vividly emphasized education as an instru-
76
77
 mfent for creating a compliant native population. As most of the teaching was to the Church for having carried out its patriotic obligations to the satisfac¬
undertaken by the Catholic mission, an insight into the relationship between tion of both the colonial government and the Italian state.^
the state and the Church is of considerable relevance for an assessment of The Catholic mission and the Italian state shared the same goals and objec¬
educational policy. tives for native education. However, the Catholic mission diverged from the
The colonial administration saw the Catholic mission as an institution guidelines of the state on the issue of the training of priests. In the seminary
which pursued its educational activities in an acceptable and appreciated man¬ at Keren, the Catholic mission attempted to train Eritrean novices with the
ner.^' The separation between the Church and the State, which plagued pol¬ same curriculum as in Italy, although the Keren seminary only had the com¬
itical life in Italy,was virtually non-existent in the colony. As early as the petence to provide a twelve-year academic and religious training.*^ Between
1890’s, the colonial government was aware that Italian missionaries were 1894 and 1930, the Keren seminary produced 84 priests, an average of slightly
useful in facilitating the spread of Italian culture and the consolidation of col¬ over two graduates per year.^ From 1919 those Eritrean novices who had
onial rule.^^ completed their studies at Keren could pursue their theological studies at the
The Catholic mission was already using its teaching manuals in Eritrea long recently re-established Ethiopian College in the Vatican.
before colonial experts began theorizing on native education. The aims of the The universalistic approach of the Church towards the recruitment and
Catholic mission were strikingly similar to those of the colonial experts on the training of clerics, and the autonomy with which the Catholic mission pursued
subject. This unity between the colonial administration and the Catholic mis¬ its spiritual activities, contravened the policy pursued by the colonial adminis¬
sion can be illustrated by first outlining the main points of the educational tration and the Italian state based on the alleged pathological inferiority of the
programme of the colonial government and then comparing these points with native. For the Catholic mission, the Eritrean was equipped with the same
those put down in the teaching manuals of the Catholic mission. potential as any other person of any other race. For the Italian state and the
According to Andrea Festa’s writings, which are representative for the lat¬ colonial administration, however, the Eritrean found himself in an ‘irreduc¬
ter period, the policy of the colonial state with respect to native education em¬ ible pathological inferiority’ with respect to the European. While the colonial
phasized the following: 1) the greatness of Italy and its civilization; and 2) state implemented a policy of distinct separation of races with all power con¬
obedience and gratitude to Italy on the part of the natives. Long before centrated in the hands of the colonialists, the Catholic mission, through at
Festa’s proclamation of Fascist native educational policy, the Catholic mis¬ least one of its textbooks, preached the policy of assimilation. This was the
sion had already eulogized the greatness of Italy and its glorious civilization. reader (published 1920) containing the story of the Eritrean youth Embae,
The reading primer on Illustrious Men (1917), to which many references can who was eventually adopted by his Italian mentor. There was indeed a poten-
be found in the comprehensive manual of 1930, dealt only with famous men lial ground for conflict between the racialist attitudes of the colonial adminis¬
of Italy. Italy was depicted not only as great but as the greatest. The theme tration and the universalistic tendencies of the Catholic Church. However this
of Italian greatness also permeated the leading volume on arts and crafts conflict did not become manifest during the colonial period.
which drew many examples from the ingenuity of Italy.
Concerning the obedience and gratitude which the Eritrean owed Italy, the
manuals used sophisticated argumentation. On the one hand, the Catholic
mission through its manuals attempted to portray Italy as the motherland of
the natives which deserved all obedience and devotion. On the other hand it
attempted to rationalize colonial rule on the grounds that conditions had im¬
The Organization of the School and Enrolment
proved because of colonialism and thus the native owed Italy gratitude, devo¬
Although the education of Eritreans was continued by the Catholic and
tion and obedience.
Swedish missions, under a close surveillance by the colonial administration,
Festa’s educational programme could hardly have been implemented better
it is the schools established and financed by the colonial state that demand our
than by the Catholic mission’s own manuals. If the Superintendent of Schools
attention, as these all clearly demonstrate the interaction between policy and
was not actually paraphrasing the Catholic mission’s manuals, his writings on
practice.
native education were virtually identical to those of the Church.^^ It was
In 1911 the colonial government established the first school of arts and
hardly coincidental that the colonial administration handed over the running
crafts for the sons of Muslim chiefs and notables. The school was divided into
of government schools to the Catholic mission. This can be seen as a reward
groups of boarding and day students, each of which followed a different pro-
78 79
 gramme. While the boarders followed an elementary education in addition to the establishment of a school in Asmara, which contained both elementary
practical crafts such as carpentry and tanning, the external students were and a two year complementary programme.”
trained only in crafts.*^ Five years later, the colonial state established a simi¬ The decree of 1921 also limited the duration of elementary education to
lar school for Eritrean Catholics at Segeneiti and a school of agriculture for three years; but the new school established in 1926 invalidated the decree by
members of the Ethiopian Church.^’ extending the elementary programme to comprise four years, and thus in¬
Apart from setting the limit of education to the first three years of lower troduced a number of ambiguities into the educational system. The ‘superior
education, the design of the curriculum was left to the few lay teachers and school’ was not established, although a similar programme was incorporated
missionaries who had been entrusted with running the school for Catholics. into the school of 1926. Furthermore the problem of prejudice against train¬
The formation of these schools was on the initiative of the colonial governor, ing in crafts was left unresolved by the decree of 1921. In order to remedy this
and there was hardly any active participation by the Ministry of Colonies. The ambiguous situation, the colonial state decreed in 1931 that all schools should
aim of the Muslim and Catholic schools was to produce clerks, interpreters provide an elementary education of four years duration in addition to an arts
and skilled workers in crafts and to impart knowledge of modern agricultural and crafts programme.’* According to the decree of 1931 there were to be
practices.^® The school for the members of the Ethiopian Church was, on the schools of arts and crafts as well as purely academic elementary schools.’^
other hand, much narrower in outlook and was only meant to impart a better The questions of the duration of schooling and the extension of elementary
training in agricultural husbandry.^* education to all types of students were resolved by the decree of 1931. In addi¬
By 1930 three of the four schools had closed their handicraft section be¬ tion, the decree of 1931 once again allowed for the creation of a middle school
cause students were only interested in learning how to read and write. As the providing a two year education, for those who had undergone a purely
schools catered for the children of the nobility and of senior colonial soldiers, academic elementary schooling.*®
the aspirations of such students were geared to clerical jobs rather than to As with the superior school whose creation was envisaged in 1921 but never
those in the workshop. Furthermore, the students did not want to pursue such materialized, neither was the middle school, envisaged by the decree of 1931,
crafts as leatherwork and smithery because of ‘the radical social prejudice’ at¬ ever founded. Its establishment was objected to by the Superintendent of
tached to such crafts by Abyssinian society. These crafts are reserved for the Schools on the grounds that the foundation of such a school created false
lower and discriminated classes.^^ pride among Eritreans, who had now begun to demand the establishment of
With the reorganization of the educational system by the decree of 1921, a similar institution.*' Thus in spite of the decrees allowing more elementary
four schools were now financed by the state with a total number of 260 education, no measures were taken to implement them.
students, the equivalent of 90 students per school, with an admission rate of The new administrative reorganization of 1932 recognized the need for fur¬
30 students per annum.’^ In explaining the need for educational reorganiza¬ ther complementary schooling, but it did not wish to designate this pro¬
tion, the decree pointed out the necessity of providing a greater flexibility in gramme as ‘middle school’ education in order to avoid ambitious expecta¬
native education, in recognition of the exigencies of commerce, industry and tions, as the range of the ‘middle school’ education for Eritreans was much
the colonial administration.^^ Placing the decree in its historical context, with narrower than its counterpart for Italians.*^ Hence from the beginning of
the Martini era as the point of departure (1897—1907), it could be said that 1933 onwards only a few selected students continued with a two-year pro¬
the colonial state was responding to the consequences of the educational in¬ gramme of completing what they had learned in elementary school.
itiatives which it took in the early 1910’s when the first schools were opened. With the creation of the Italian East African Empire in 1936 *\ the educa¬
The schools were divided by the 1921 decree into the following categories: tional system was once again reorganized. The main characteristics of this new
1) schools of arts and crafts, 2) elementary schools, and, 3) a superior decree were that native education was to be limited to three years and that in
school.Although the colonial state justified the reorganization by the needs addition to Italian, local languages were also to be media of instruction.*^ As
of commerce, industry and administration, the pressure exerted by Eritreans the first direct legislation from Rome, the decree of 1936 set out the
for purely elementary education had been considerable. The superior school parameters of native education. During the earlier period the involvement of
envisaged by the decree was to provide a two-year programme of consolida¬ Rome was limited to defining the broad scope and objectives of colonial
tion and completion of what had earlier been learned, in addition to new education. Up to 1936 Italy did not think it necessary to resort to legislation
training in calligraphy, typewriting and topography.’^ However, the superior as general policy statements had proved sufficient. The content as well as the
school was not established, and in 1926 its supposed role was superseded by duration of native education had been left to the colonial government. How-

80 81
ever, when the Italian state intervened, nearly thirty years after the establish¬
ment of the first public school, it confirmed the old practice of a three year
schooling for natives.
From 1936 onwards the creation of ‘Great Eritrea’ posed additional prob¬
lems for the local bureaucracy, namely the opening of new schools in the
newly incorporated areas.Although the complementary school systems
continued to exist, it appeared that the student intake was extremely small.
According to an early post-colonial report, the complementary school had a
total number of ten students in 1939.*^

Enrolment

The enrolment figures prior to the establishment of government schools are

rough estimates. The first accurate enrolment census was compiled in 1910
when there were twelve Swedish mission schools with 810 students and seven
Catholic mission schools with 350 students.*^ Archival material on enrolment
figures is extremely fragmented and when figures are given there is no division
between grades and ages.
In the 1916—17 academic year the four government schools had altogether
YEAR
87 boarding and 71 day students.** The model school at Keren had 52
students in its four year programme, which meant that around 15 new Graph 3.1. Total Enrolment of Students in Government Schools 1921—22 -
students were admitted each year. Five years later, enrolment had increased 1939—40.
for all four schools to a total of 260 students, and by 1925, the government
remained an elitist institution accessible at the most to 2 per cent of the school
schools had a total of 360 students. Enrolment increased dramatically after
age population.’*
the establishment of the school at the capital city Asmara in 1926. This is il¬
lustrated in the graph below.
Although it is extremely difficult to estimate the size of the educated popula¬
tion, an attempt can nevertheless be made to describe the possible perfor¬ Concluding Remarks
mance of the school system. Assuming that a maximum of 20 per cent of the
total number of students in any given year were in their final year of school¬ Sources on the relationship between education and colonial rule are extremely
ing, it is possible to calculate the yearly number of school leavers and thus ar¬ Iragmentary for the earlier period and highly polemical for the latter period,
rive at an aggregate figure for the approximate size of the educated popula¬ i.c. 1932—41. According to the superintendent of Eritrean schools, Andrea
tion. Of 9,962 students enrolled between 1921 and 1934 *’, according to our I’csla, the colonial school had fulfilled its function in the production of the
assumption just under 2,000 had probably completed their education during •future soldiers of Italy’. The colonial school system was reviewed in 1918’"
this period. This figure, based on a rather generous assumption, can be taken and by Andrea Festa himself from 1934 onwards. The conclusion that I draw
as representing the colonial state’s role in the education of its colonized sub¬ Irom such reports is that the colonial administration succeeded in controlling
jects. The census returns of 1931 appear to further strengthen the figure of I he quality and intake of entrants. Neither in the published literature nor in
2,000 as a plausible indicator. According to the census there were 6,181 I he
archives do we find that the government school system produced results
Eritreans or 1.1 who could read and speak Italian.^ The colonial school which complicated colonial rule.

82 83
• The success of the colonial administration in controlling the school system 2. Renzo De Marco, The Italianization of Africans: Italian Colonial Educational
can be explained indirectly by looking into its attitude to the Swedish mission Policy, New York, 1943, pp. 7—8. The study of Richard Pankhurst, ‘Education in
schools. In 1924, governor Gasparini pointed out that students from Swedish Ethiopia during Italian Fascist Occupation. 1936—41*, The International Journal of
African Historical Studies, 5:3 (1972) 361—96, while useful on colonial educational
mission schools showed greater attachment to Ethiopia than to Eritrea. Those
politics is too general on Eritrea. Its broad conclusions on the performance of colonial
who were highly educated’^ and intelligent, continued the governor, fre¬ schools are however similar to those of this author.
quently left for Ethiopia where they were warmly accepted and employed.’^
Although relations between the Swedish mission and the colonial state began 3. Stephen Roberts, History of French Colonial History, London, vol. 1, p. 68; Ray¬
to deteriorate from 1925 onwards, I do not think that the governor at that mond F. Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial History, 1890^1914,
period exaggerated the impact of the Swedish school system. Columbia, 1961, p. 8; see also Herbert Leuthy, France Against Herself, Paris. 1955.
translated by Mosbacher. E.. New York. 1957, p. 211 and p. 237, where the author
Religious education in the Eritrean context (this applied equally to the
argues that the implications of assimilation, are the direct opposite of apartheid.
Catholic mission) could not be taught without taking into consideration the
position of the Ethiopian state religion, i.e. the Orthodox faith. The great ma¬ 4. The Catholic mission since 1912 had manuals for all classes.
jority of the students were either members of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church
or had once belonged to it. The close connection between church and state in 5. De Marco, The Italianization of Africans, p. 85.
Ethiopia meant that a serious religious education carried out by the Swedish
mission tended to stress the Ethiopianness of Eritrean students. 6. Ibid., p. 89.
Unlike the major colonial powers,’^ Italian policy makers perceived educa¬
7. VII Censimento generate della popolazione, 2L4J93I, voL 5, Colonie e
tion merely as an instrument for enhancing colonial rule. Italian educational
Possedimenti, Roma. 1935, p. 39.
policy attempted, and with considerable success, to prevent the evolution of
an Eritrean intellectual elite. If, prior to 1932, such a policy was advocated 8. For a discussion on the colonial school curricula see pp. 72—77.
on grounds of practical exigencies, the implementation of racialist ideology
from 1932 onwards precluded the spread of education beyond indoctrination. 9. See for example the racial law of April 1937, which punished Italian men who
Conscious of the impact of Western education upon the intellect of the col¬ cohabited with Eritrean women to imprisonment ranging from one to five years. R.D.
onized, the colonial administration adopted a policy of limiting education to of 19.4.1937, no. 880. The legal separation of races was further expanded by the law
of 26.6.1939, no. 1004.
lower elementary, thus ensuring that its colonial rule would not be challenged
through its own language. 10. By far the most relevant studies are those by Mininni M. Caracciolo, ‘Le scuole
nclle colonie italiane di diretto dominio***, Rivista di Pedagogica, 23:3—5 (1930)
183—207, and 273—98; Rodolfo Micacchi, ‘L’insegnamento agli indigeni nelle colonie
italiane di diretto domonio*, Atti del Secondo Congresso di Studi Coloniali, Firenze,
FOOTNOTES 1931, (published 1934) vol. 4, pp. 226— 56. The study by Enrico De Leone, ‘Politica
indigena e scuola*, Rivista Italiana, 1937, no. 231, pp. 3—15, dealt with the need for
1. The Catholic missionaries and the Swedish Evangelical mission had schools in a thorough reorganization of the educational system. Opposed to the concept of
Eritrea long before the Italian occupation of Eritrea. For the history of missionary assimilation (p. 3), the author argued the possibilities of controlling education of
educational activites see Donald Crummey, Priests and Politicians: Protestant and natives in order to meet the requirements of native society and the interests of the col¬
Catholic missions in Orthodox Ethiopia, 1830—1868, Oxford, 1972; Richard onizing power. Since his reform programme called for an expertise that had yet to be
Pankhurst, ‘The Foundations of Education, Printing, Newspapers, Book Production, created, it was unlikely that his article had concrete impact on colonial praxis.
Libraries and Literacy in Ethiopia*, Ethiopia Observer, 6:3 (1962) 241—90; Gustav
Ar^n, Evangelical Pioneers in Ethiopia: Origins of the Evangelical Church Mekane 11. The office was occupied by Andrea Festa, a veteran colonial officer with long ex¬
Yesus, Stockholm, 1978. While the Catholic mission by the beginning of 1932, had perience in Libya. Festa wrote about the total number of enrolled students but hardly
dominated native education, the Swedish Evangelical mission continued to run its bothered to provide important details such as how many were in each year.
schools in spite of considerable obstruction from the colonial state, until the expulsion
of Swedish missionaries and the confiscation of their schools in 1936. See Viveca 12. Ferdinando Martini, II diario eritreo, vol. 2, p. 472, for 27.5.1901.
Halldin-Norberg, Swedes in Haile Selassie*s Ethiopia, 1924—1952, Uppsala, 1977, p.
74; Trevaskis, G. K. N., Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, 1941—52, Oxford, 1960, p. 13. ACS, Carte Martini, busta 4, Martini to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Asmara,
33. 26.4.1901. See also Renato Paoli, Nella colonia Eritrea, Milano, 1908, p. 96.

84 85
 14. Colonia Eritrea: Isiruzione Pubblica, Asmara, 1914, p. 9, containing the govern¬ 30. Lidio Cipriani, Considerazione sopra il passato e Tavvenire delle popolazione
ment decree on the establishment of the school. africaney Firenze, 1932, pp. 17, 20, 111 — 14.

15. ASMAl vol. 3, pacco 37, busta 4, Commissariato di Cheren to Asmara, 12.7.1918: 31. Ibid., and idem., ‘Razze africane e civilti dell’Europa’, in Reale Accademia
Scuola d’arti e mestieri in Cheren. Pregi diffetti e proposte, p. 2. dltalia, Convegno di scienze morali e storiche, tema: AfricOy 2 vols., 1938 (Roma,
1939) vol. 1, p. 598.
16. In 1914 two more schools were opened for Christians and Muslims respectively.
Colonia Eritrea, Isiruzione Pubblica^ Asmara, 1914, p. 34. 32. Ibid., p. 599.

17. Ibid., for a programme of study followed at the school at Addi Wegri, pp. 34—49. 33. Maurizio Rava, ‘Politica sociale verso gli indigeni e modi di collaborazionc con
The students were obliged to wear uniforms similar to those of the colonial soldiers. essi’, Accademia d*Italia, Convegno: tema Africay vol. 1, p. 771.
Military instruction in theory as well as in practice was provided for throughout the
four year programme. 34. Giuseppe Bottai, ‘La scuola Fascista nell’Africa Italiana’, Etiopiay 3:3 (1939), p. 3.

18. ASMAl pos. 31/1, file 10, 5.7.1910, Di San Giuliano to Salvago-Raggi. 35. For the early history of Swedish mission schools wee Iwarsson, J. and Tron, A.,
Notizie storiche e varie sulla missione evangelica svedese delTEritrea, 1866—1916,
19. AE 402 Circolare: Pubblica Istruzione, Cheren, 31.12.1916. The document was Asmara, 1918.
four unmubered pages long.
36. Festa, ‘Le istituzioni educative’, 1934, p. 289.
20. Ibid., p. 3.
37. Metodio Da Nembro, La missione dei minori cappuccini in Eritrea, 1894—1952,
21. Ibid., p. 4. Roma, 1953, p. 74. The Swedish mission schools, however continued to function until
1932.
22. Quoted in Micacchi, ‘L’insegnamento agli indigeni*, pp. 7—8; See also De Marco,
The Itaiianization of Africansy p. 19. 38. Festa, ‘Le istituzioni educative’, 1934, p. 289.

23. As director of education in the Ministry of Colonies throughout the fascist period, 39. Festa, ‘Una fucina di pre-ascari’, / Diritti della scuola, 34 (1937) p. 541. The
Micacchi ought to. have played a decisive role in the reorganization of the Libyan military organization of native youth was carried out through the direction of the cen¬
educational system. With the reform of 1927, it was envisaged that firstly, Libyans tral office for primary schools in cooperation with the Fascist party. Training took
would have access to only three years of elementary schooling and secondly, that place in the schools and students constituted the majority of the trainees. Military
school would be an effective instrument for developing respect and devotion to Italy. training was part of the curriculum in Eritrean schools prior to the advent of Fascism,
In the case of Eritrea, there was no need for reforms along the ministerial guidelines AE 531, ‘Regolamento per la scuola di arti e mestieri’, Keren, 1.7.1923. See also, Cdl-
since the educational system was still rudimentary. See p. 227. onia Eritrea: Istruzione Pubblica, Asmara, 1914, pp. 34—49.

24. Caracciolo, ‘Le scuole nelle colonie italiane*, p. 186. 40. The first colonial manual, by Fluvio Contini, Libro della II classe, Firenze, 1931,
was followed by the second volume, Contini, F., Libro della III classe, in the same
25. Ibid., p. 187. year. Both were published by the Ministry of Colonies, and were reading primers in
Italian for Libyan students. In Eritrea, the Catholic mission since 1912 had manuals
26. Ibid.. covering all courses and classes. Furthermore, the colonial state since 1923 had handed
over the running of the government colonial schools to the Catholic mission. Hence
27. Andrea Festa, *Le istituzioni educative in Eritrea’, Atti del secondo congresso di Dc Marco’s claim (p. 58) that Italian teachers in Eritrea attempted to use Libyan
studi colonialiy 1934, Firenze, 1935, vol. 2, p. 294. The same views were expressed vir¬ manuals appeared to have been based on an incorrect assumption that there were no
tually verbatim in his later writings: ‘Presupposti e fine dell’azione educative in colonial manuals in Eritrea.
Eritrea’, Atti del terzo congresso di studi colonialiy 1937, Firenze, vol. 6, 1937, p. 128;
‘L’istruzione per i bianchi e per indigeni’, Etiopia, 2:4 (1938), p. 55. In 1937, the Libyan manuals were republished together with a third volume, Libro
Sussidiario per la terza classe elementare per indigeni, Firenze, 1937, intended for use
28. Festa, ‘Le istituzioni educative’, 1934, p. 294. in the newly established empire. Unlike the Eritrean manuals, these were published in
Morcnce making them less accessible and more expensive. Although some copies ar¬
29. Ibid.. rived in Addis Abeba, the capital of the empire, they may not have been distributed

86 87
 at all. For a brief review of these textbooks see Richard Pankhurst, ‘The Textbooks
of Italian Colonial Africa’, Ethiopia Observer, 12:4 (1967) 327—32. Renzo De Felice, Mussolini, II Duce: Gli anni del consenso, Milano, 1974, p. 264;
for a collection of studies on Justice and Colonial expansion published by the Vatican,
a Civilta Cattolica, see Messineo, A., Giustizia ed espansione coloniale, Roma. 1937.
41. Missione Cattolica, Manuale di Istruzione ad uso degli indigeni, Asmara, 1912.
Italian text, pp. 1 — 130, Tigrinya text, pp. 131—403.
<^a‘holic mission consisted of the Cappuccini Fathers established in Eritrea in
1894, the Daughters of St. Anna estabUshed in 1878 and the Sisters of Pia della Nigrit-
42. Missione Cattolica, Manuale di letture scelle italiane — tigrai ad uso delie scuole zia established in 1910. According to Metodio Da Nembro, La missione dei minori
indigene, Asmara, 1916, p. 455.
l^PP^ccmiin Eritrea. 1894-1952, Roma. 1953, p. 74, by 1923 all three public schools
had been handed over to the Catholic mission, a strong indication that the colonial
43. Ibid., La colonia Eritrea, Manuale d’fstruzione Italiano-Tigrai ad uso delle scuole state was satisfied with the performance of the former.
indigene, Asmara, 1917, p. 215.
Italian colonization the French Lazzarists were active in Eritrea. Suspected
44. Ibid. pp. 196—97. of disloyalty to the colonial state on the grounds of their nationality, the colonial state
asked the Vatican for their replacement by an Italian order whose patriotism and role
45. Missione Cattolica, Uomini Illustri del lavoro, della scienza e della carita, Libro in the spread of Italian culture could be taken for granted. ASMAI pos. 33/1, file 8,
di lettura Italiano-Tigrai ad uso delle scuole indigene, Asmara, 1917, p. 263.' governor B^atieri to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 12.9.1894; ASMAI pos. 33/2,'
nie 6, Foreign Minister Blanc to governor Baratieri, 21.1.1895. See also Cesare M.’
46. Ibid., Embae... (Vittorio del lavoro): Libro di lettura Italiano-Tigrai ad uso delle Bounaiuti, Politica e religioni nel colonialismo italiano, 1882—1941, Varese, 1982, pp.
scuole indigene, Asmara, 1920, p. 215. 61—62 on the secret negotiations between the Italian state and the Vatican concerning
the replacement of the French Lazzarists. ‘With our schools’ wrote father Ezechia da
47. Ibid., p. 115. Isseo in 1922, ‘we propagate our language and with the language, Italian thought, art,
science and civilization’, in / Cappuccini in Eritrea: Died anni di apostolato, Asmara.
\y22, pp. 31—32.
48. Missione Cattolica, Libro per le scuole elementare indigene, classe II Asmara
1923, p. 131.
63. Festa, ‘Presupposti e fine deirazione educative*, 1937, p. 128.

49. Missione Cattolica, Libro per le scuole elementare indigene, classe III, Asmara 64. Ibid., ‘Le istituzioni educative in Eritrea’, p. 289.
1930, p. 279.

65. Metodio Da Nembro, ‘Genesi e sviluppo del clero nativo etiopico fino all’ac-
50. Missione Cattolica, Manuale di Istruzione, 1912, Italian text p. 105, Tigrinya text, costituzione della gerarchia’. Euntes Docete: Commentaria Urbaniana, 11 Vaticano.
p. 225. 1953, p. 308.

51. Ibid.. 66. Da Nembro, La missione dei minori cappuccini, p. 319.

52. Missione Cattolica, Libro per le scuole elementare indigene, 1923, p. 48—51. 67. Ibid.. ‘Genesi e sviluppo del clero nativo’, p. 309. By 1940, there were forty
Ethiopian College at the Vatican. ACS-MAl busta 15,
53. Ibid., p. 50. zU. 12.1940.

54. Ibid., p. 51. Commissariato regionale di Cheren to Asmara.

10.11.1910, a report on schools.

55. Missione Cattolica, Libro per le scuole, 1912, p. VI.

69^ Ibid., PM ‘scuole ed ordinamento scolastico in Eritrea’, n.d. but not later than

56. Ibid., Libro per le scuole, 1930, p. 35, p. 261.

70. Ibid., in footnote 68 above.
57. Ibid., p. 35.
71. The governmental decree of 12.9.1921 no. 3808 stated the school should provide
58. Ibid., Libro per le scuole, 1912, p. VII. elcmcniary education in addition to courses on agriculture.

59. Ibid.. 72. ASMAI vol. 3, pacco 37. busta 4, PM ‘scuole ed ordinamento scolastico’. written
not later than 1931.
88
 73* Angelo Piccioli, La nuova Italia d*oltremare, vol. 2, Milano, 2nd. ed., 1934, p. 88. Colosimo, Relazione sulla situazione politica, p. 376; See also De Marco, The
1149. Italianization of Africans, p. 49.

74. The governmental decree of 8.4.1931, no. 5226. 89. To these ought to be added the students from the Swedish and the Catholic mis¬
sion.

75. D. G., no. 3809, 12.9.1921, on the reorganization of the educational system, article
90. VII Censimento generale, 1931, p. 39.
.
1

91. The approximate figure of 2% is based on the assumption that the school age
76. Ibid., article 4. population constitute c. 20% of the population. According to the census of 1939 the
population of Great Eritrea amounted to 1,537,213 (Vittorio Castellano, ‘II cen¬
77. ASMAl vol. 3, pacco 37, busta 4, PM ‘scuole ed ordinamento scolastico*. simento del 1939*, pp. 270—71). Thus of a school age population of over 3(X),(X)0, the
total enrolment of c. 5.(XX) amounted to c. 1,7 per cent of the school age children and
78. Ibid., PM ‘Colonia Eritrea*, n.d. but of end of 1933; D. G. of 8.4.1931. much less than 1 per cent of the total population.

79. Piccioli, La nuova Italia cl*oltremare^ vol. 2, p. 1152. 92. ASMAl, vol. 3, pacco 37, busta 4, Scuola d’arti e mestieri in Cheren: Pregi —
difetti — proposte, Cheren, 12.7.1918. Reviewing the performance of the school from
its establishment in 1909, the district governor reported that the school was no longer
80. ASMAl vol. 3, pacco 37, busta 4, PM ‘Scuole ed ordinamento scolastico*.
engaged in arts and crafts but mainly in literary subjects. He warned that the educated
natives, respected by the population, would want to consider themselves as equal to
81. Ibid..
their Italian masters. He suggested the abolition of literary subjects and concentration
on arts and crafts. His warning was accepted, as the Decree of 1921, declared that the
82. The aim of the complementary school was, according to Festa to complete what school at Keren was only to concentrate on arts and crafts.
was learned in the earlier yearsT
93. The Swedish mission school had a six year programme. The first three years were
83. In May 1936 the Italo-Ethiopian war came to an end with the establishment of an devoted to elementary schooling. The remaining years were devoted to religious
East African Empire, where Eritrea was reconstituted to include a large part of north¬ studies. See Iwarson and Tron, Notiziestoriche e variesulla missione evangelica, p. 26.
ern Ethiopia. Pre-1936 Eritrea was referred to as ‘Old’ or ‘Historic*, while post-1936
Eritrea was described as ‘New* or ‘Great* Eritrea. 94. ASMAE, AA.PP. 1025/3038, Governor Gasparini to MC, 23.6.1924.

84. R.D. of 13.6.1936, no. 136, Ordinamento e amministrazione dell’Africa Orientale 95. See for example for British educational policy in Ghana, Kay, G.B., The Political
Italiana, article 31. Economy of Colonialism: A Collection of Documents and Statistics, Cambridge,
1972, pp. 278—304; Vischer, H., ‘Native Education in British Tropical Africa*, R. Ac-
85. ASMAl vol. 3, pacco 37, busta 4, Festa, A., ‘scuole elmentari dell’Eritrea, 1936— cademia d’ltalia, Convegno: tema Africa, Roma, 1938, pp. 949—69; Ogunlande,
37. Of twenty five newly opened schools, thirteen were located in the newly incor¬ O. F., ‘Education and Politics in Colonial Nigeria: The case of King’s College, Lagos,
porated part of Eritrea. 1906—191 r, Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria, 7:2 (1974) 325—43; Gifford,
P. und Weiskel, T., ‘African Education in a colonial context*, in Britain and France
In Africa, edited by Gifford, P. and Louis, Wm. R., New Haven, 1971, pp. 663—711.
86. FO 371/69370, Four Power Commission Report on Eritrea, 1948, Chapter Six:
The Administration and judicial system, p. 70.

87. Gaspare Colosimo, Relazione al parlamento sulla situazione politica ed am^

ministativa delle colonie italiane, 1918, pp. 375—76. The Swedish Evangelical mission
in Eritrea had by 1916 a total of 1,250 students of which about a third were females.
Boys* schools were organized into four years of primary education followed by a three
year post-primary programme. For girls, education lasted three years and was designed
to make good housewives out of them. According to Piccioli, La Nouva Italia, vol.
2, p. 1149, the number of students in the Swedish mission schools fell from 1,400 in
1922 to only 300 in 1932 at the time when Swedish mission schools were closed down.
One of the reasons why enrolment declined was the opening of the Vittorio Emanuelle
School in Asmara in 1926.

90 91
 CHAPTER FOUR i Let it be admitted at the outset that European brains, capital and energy have
' not been, and never will be, expended in developing the resources of Africa,
THE IDEOLOGY OF COLONIALISM: from motives of pure philanthropy; that Europe is in Africa for the mutual
benefit of her own industrial classes, and the native races in their progress to
NATIVE POLICY ' a higher plane; that the benefit can be made reciprocal, and that it is the aim
and desire of civilized administration to fulfill this dual mandate.^

Between 1906 and 1938, British colonial policy hinged around the problems
of defining and implementing the system of indirect rule in Africa. A strong
factor in favour of the system was that it was far less expensive to implement.
This can be illustrated by the fact that in 1931 there were only 431 British of¬
Introduction ficers administering Nigeria with its population of eighteen million.^
As a product of a period permeated with growing racism, the system of in¬
Colonial native policies have been examined from the perspective of the col¬ direct rule had a well-discernible ideological base. Indirect rule was advocated
onized and how much latitude they had in managing their own affairs and on the grounds that the unique qualities of British political life and its institu¬
their lives.' The difference in the ideological basis of native policy can be tions could not be transferred successfully to other people. Hence indirect
clearly distinguished between one colonial system and another, notwithstand¬ rule, as expounded by Lord Lugard, in addition to its suitability on budgetary
ing the wide variations in practice between colonies and within regions of the grounds, was based on the firm belief that Africans would never evolve in¬
same colony. stitutions similar to those of Europe.* Indirect rule as a system held fast with
The aim of this chapter is to answer two principal questions. Firstly, to some minor changes in spite of a series of critique.
what extent could the Eritrean participate in managing his affairs and pro¬ Critical voices against indirect rule were raised from its inception until its
viding for his future? Secondly, to what extent did native policy provide the final revocation in 1947. Its critics exploited successfully the structural
means and opportunities for the Eritrean to oppose or challenge the colonial weaknesses of the system and its ideological assumptions which were being
system? As the answers to both questions can only be appreciated within a proved wrong by the unfolding process of colonialism. One of the persistent
coi^arative context, this chapter starts with a brief discussion of British and criticisms emphasized that indirect rule had created a feudal system which was
French native policies.^ It is then followed by an empirical discussion of the inefficient, expensive and corrupt.** Indirect rule, its critics continued, had
political and administrative aspects of Italian native policy. the effect of submerging democratic elements in tribal societies under an
authoritarian and anachronistic framework. It was a vehicle of reaction rather
than of progress. The position of the critics was strengthened by the slow but
steady growth of literate Africans and urban citizens who found life under a
tribal regime stifling, oppressive and undemocratic.’ By the late 1930’s when
The Basis of British and French Native Policies Lord Hailey conducted his monumental African Survey, the structural prob¬
lems of indirect rule had become all too apparent. Pointing out the problems
British colonialism in Africa was closely associated with the so-called system of integrating the system of indirect rule with that of parliamentary institu¬
of indirect rule. On the btisis of indirect rule, native chiefs were regarded as tions, Lord Hailey called for a programme of rapid social and economic de¬
an integral part of the machinery of government, with well defined powers velopment to be accompanied by a growth of political involvement and re¬
and functions recognized by government and law, and not dependent upon sponsibility among the Africans themselves.®
the caprice of executive officers. First developed in Africa by Lord Lugard, Lord Hailey’s Survey described the tensions and the strains of indirect rule
Governor of Nigeria between 1900 and 1906, its ideological as well as its prac¬ at a period when a significant number of literate Africans were pushed aside
tical basis was established with the publication, in 1922, of Lord Lugard’s The to make way for the traditional elite. While the implementation of indirect
Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa.
rule denied any meaningful role to the African literati, no mechanisms were
Explaining the motives for colonialism in general and the appropriate developed to hinder an increasing number of Africans from acquiring western
system of colonial rule in particular. Lord Lugard wrote:
education. Indirect rule could only survive and thrive in areas where either
92
93
 western education had not quite spread or through a strict implementation of Commenting on the ideological basis of the policy of assimilation, Lcuthy
a system of apartheid where the colonized were deliberately kept away from wrote in the mid 1950’s that the power to assimilate went hand in hand with
western education. a capacity to be assimilated and that both depended on self-confidence and
The limitations of indirect rule, which became increasingly apparent from awareness of the possession of an intellectual superiority.*’
the mid 1930*s onwards, were brought about by the contradictory colonial From the 1880’s onwards, the policy of assimilation gave way to the policy
policies on education on the one hand, and by the persistent demands of commonly referred to as ‘association’, described by Hubert Deschamps, a
African townsmen for a system based on other premises than tribalism.’ Al¬ former colonial officer of the higher echelon, as Lugardism in disguise.'"
though it was clearly understood from the outset that an educated elite was The policy of assimilation was rejected because it was feared that the elevation
dangerous for the maintenance of political stability and although attempts of millions of colonized people to the status of citizenship would be detrimen¬
were made to produce an educational programme aimed at achieving a stable tal to the interests of France.*’ Whereas the policy of assimilation called for
and compliant population, the praxis of colonial education resulted in the the extension of rights and duties from the metropole to the colonies, the
production of African elites which posed challenges to the colonial system. dominant colonial policy from the 1880’s perceived colonialism more in terms
The number of schools, enrolment and the type of education offered, varied of the domination of superior races over inferior ones. Racialist arguments
from colony to colony. However, by mid the 1920’s the foundations for were used to strengthen the arguments against assimilation.^ The policy of
higher learning were laid down in West and East African British colonies.*® ‘association’, as interpreted by Hubert Deschamps, called for a minimum of
Throughout the colonial period the British, strictly pursuing the prescrip¬ interference with African indigenous institutions since such a policy was cheap
tions of indirect rule, expected and maintained that educated Africans seek to administer. Moreover, this policy made the introduction of a system of
their careers in their tribal institutions and concern themselves exclusively with economic and political control possible in the colonies which would have been
local matters while the British colonial officers took care of the rest. declared illegal under an assimilationist colonial policy.^'
The attempts to streamline political and social change through African The third type of native policy emerged in the beginning of the 1930’s with
native institutions ran counter to the changes which were brought about by a discernible emphasis on assimilation.^ Writing on French native policies
the colonial economic system and by the institutions engaged in the spread of during this period. Professor Lucy Mair wrote that:
education, namely the churches and the colonial administration. Through in¬
direct rule colonial policy aimed at a gradual, slow and evolutionary change The assumption which governs the whole attitude of France towards native de¬
velopment is that French civilization is necessarily the best and need only be
where the future was perceived as unproblematic. Through the slow but
presented to the intelligent African for him to adopt it. Once he has done so,
steady spread of western education, however, colonialism created an elite
no avenue of advancement is to be closed to him. If he proves himself capable
which demanded active participation and an eventual transfer of power.'* of assimilating French education, he may enter any profession, may rise to the
By the late 1930’s, indirect rule had outlived its usefulness. Lord Hailey at¬ dignity of Under Secretary for colonies, and will be received as an equal by
tempted to revive it by pruning its bad parts. His plan was cut short by the French society^^
new reality of the aftermath of the Second World War.'^
rhe native policy of the 1930’s was, however, more of a hybrid policy rather
By contrast, French native policy passed through three identifiable phases,
than a well articulated policy of assimilation.^"* Schools were far too few, the
namely those of 1) assimilation, 2) association, and 3) a phase where both
great majority of students rarely went beyond the primary level, and the
assimilation and association were simultaneously implemented.*^ The policy
policy of association continued to function with some modifications.^
of assimilation, in so far as it referred to the relations between the colonized
The salient feature of both the British and French native policies was thai
and the colonizer presupposed the possibility and even the desirability of
of paternalism. In the African context paternalism may be defined as the exer¬
assimilating culturally inferior subjects into the superior French culture.*^
cise of power over a colonized people through regulations designed eventually
Developed during the second half of the eighteenth century, the policy of
lo assist the colonized into parity with the paternalist power.Implicit to the
assimilation was widely practiced in France’s West Indian colonies.*^ In the
paternalist mentality was the conviction of cultural superiority of the coloniz¬
African continent, the main example of French assimilationist native policy
ing power, and the subsequent conviction that the colonial power possessed
were the four communes in Senegal (total population 22,000 in 1936) whose
no( only the might but also the right to speak for those whose tutelage it has
citizens enjoyed full citizenship and electoral rights.*^ Assimilation remained
(he duty to protect.^’ The pursuance of paternalism, as the declared objec¬
France’s colonial policy until the 1880’s.
tive, neither contradicted nor hampered economic reorganization and ex-
94 95
 ploitation of the world of the colonized. With only modest assistance from the Sergio Romano in his concluding comments on the Italian invasion of
colonial government, economic firms of the colonial power could and did es¬ Libya.
tablish themselves as paternalists in the economic sphere, thus exercising con¬ In his anthology on Italian Imperialism, Professor Aldo Mola concurred
trol over colonial forces of production. Forced labour, onerous cash taxation with the summation of Denis Mack Smith that Italy pursued a policy of apart¬
and inelastic price mechanisms were imposed and implemented within the heid in Africa.^’ Explaining the class basis of Italian colonial racism. Pro¬
framework of the paternalist objective of colonialism.^ fessor Mola emphasized that it did not help to qualify the ‘apartheid’ nature
In both the British and the French native policy, the elite of the colonized of Italian native policy by presenting numerous cases of commercial sexual
population had some leeway to enter into a dialogue with the colonizing states contacts between Italian colonizers and their Eritrean ‘madames’ which
on the nature of colonialism. In British Tropical Africa, the emergence of an permeate colonial chronicles. The purposes of racial laws and the basis of
independent press and the formation of pressure groups were allowed, if not Italian racism according to Mola were not only to create a barrier against the
always encouraged.” In French African colonies, the Black Frenchmen func¬ consequences of inter-racial sexual contacts but to reaffirm in a very drastic
tioned as the critics of the abuses of colonialism.” manner the immutability of the relations between the colonizer and the col¬
onized.^® However, for professor Alberto Sbacchi, the author of the most
substantial study on Italian colonialism in Ethiopia, 1936—40, colonial
policies are discussed as conglomerations of isolated episodes rather than as
a well-defined and coherent system of relations between the colonizer and the
Italian Native Policy and Practice in Eritrea colonized.^’
Italian native policy passed through three phases. The first phase, which I
have designated as the Martini period, 1897—1908, was characterized by the
State of research close relationship between race and class. The second phase, conceptualized
Although secondary studies of Italian native policies hardly exist, numerous as the period of rational imperialism extended from 1908 until 1932, where
researchers have made brief comments on this aspect of colonialism.^* For native policy was predominantly paternalist. The third phase, which lasted un¬
E.A. Scaglione, a biographer of Governor Aosta, Italy pursued a policy, dur¬ til the demise of colonialism, was marked by the assertion of an indisputable
ing the 1937—40 period, that was very similar to that of apartheid.Ac¬ dominance over the colonized. As I shall argue in the conclusion, whereas
cording to Scaglione’s interpretation, the East African empire was to be Italian native policy moved towards apartheid and the perpetual domination
divided into three geographical zones. In the first zone, entirely inhabited by of its African colonies, that of Britain was undergoing structural changes
Italian colonists, autonomous politico-administrative structures were to be caused by the emergence of an articulate educated elite. In French colonics,
developed. The colonial state would be obsolete as it was envisaged that the assimilation had decidedly substituted the policy of association.
first zone would become the home of an Italian community, planted in
African soil. The second zone was a much wider area, and where the main
economic activities were to be controlled by Italian agro-industry. The natives
The Martini Period, 1897—1907
were not to be pushed out completely as they were required to provide labour
for Italian capital. The last zone was presumably to comprise all the areas that Ferdinando Martini, the man rightly credited with the consolidation of col¬
were of least economic interest to Italy. This third zone was to be at the onial rule in Eritrea, epitomized the position of the Eritrean in the new col¬
disposition of the natives. The colonial state was to function as a mediator be¬ onial system when he wrote that the main motive for colonialism was not to
tween the first and the other two zones. civilize the native but to substitute him with the Italian."*® Martini’s counter¬
On the basis of the laws which made inter-racial cohabitation punishable, rhetoric written in 1891, soon after his visit to Eritrea as a member of a
Angelo Del Boca, has argued that Italy pursued policies that were similar to parliamentary commission, thus based on first hand experience of the colony
the system of apartheid as practiced today in the Republic of South Africa. cannot, nevertheless, be elevated to the level of native policy. In those early
For Professor Denis Mack Smith, a British scholar of Italian history, ‘the years there existed sharply contrasting views as to what to make out of col¬
most notable contribution of Fascist Italy to colonialism was the theory and onies.
practice of apartheid’.^^ Similar views have also been expressed by Professor The position of the Eritrean became an actual problem in 1890 with the

96 97
 preation of Eritrea. According to the policy of Prime Minister Crispi, Eritrea married an Eritrean. Lamenting the fact that he would have stopped the mar¬
was destined to be a colony of settlement. In this new framework, the presence riage had he known well ahead in time. Martini wrote:
of the Eritrean was taken as unproblematic,where the overriding colonial
interest of the period was the acquisition of a colony for colonist settlement. It is absolutely necessary for the government to affirm in an open manner the
superiority of the white race over the black.... The prohibition of maritial union
Bearing in mind that the Italians occupied the Eritrean highlands without
ought to constitute an insurmountable barrier necessary for the protection and
meeting any resistance, the summary executions of up to one thousand people maintenance of the prestige of our race. But the Swedish mission has
on the grounds that they might resist colonial rule, explained a great deal the demonstrated its lack of sentiment of such prestige.*^
position to which the Eritrean was to be assigned.According to Franchetti
Martini’s racist outbursts over a marriage between an Eritrean and a Swedish
and the colonial military regime, the Eritrean was a person with a good deal
missionary, albeit a minor and individual incident, explains the position which
of obligations towards the colonial system but without any corresponding
he wished the Eritrean to assume.The way to keep the colonies. Martini
rights over his life and property. The Eritrean was perceived as an entirely
quite correctly noted, was not only through the Army but through the
disposable being, hence without any defined place in the colonial system.
maintenance of an European prestige vis-a-vis the native.*^
In Eritrea, the above colonial perceptions and policies were challenged
He despised the form of irregular union between an Italian man and an
through the armed rebellion towards the end of 1894, a rebellion which in¬
Eritrean woman known as ‘madamissmo’ on the pragmatic grounds that such
itiated the Ethio-Italian conflict of 1895—96 culminating in the famous battle
intimacy between the rulers and the colonized weakened the capability of the
of Adwa. The Adwa experience called for an assessment of colonial policies
colonial state to perpetuate its hegemonic position through prestige. In other
including the perceptions of the colonized.
words, intimacy exposed the member of the colonial power at his weakest.
One of the most immediate consequences of the change of policy was that
Martini’s outbursts on the sexual problematic were in a sense a logical exten¬
the colonial military regime saw no reason to introduce any enclosure system
sion of his perception of the business of colonialism, which was the exercise
over the expropriated lands until such time that Italian colonists with capital
of political, economic and military domination over the colonized at a cost ac¬
arrived in Eritrea and demanded suitable land for settlement. To the extent
ceptable to the colonial power.
that effective expropriation of land remained a hypothetical possibility, the
The underlying thinking is also demonstrated by his educational policy in
colonial administration had no reason to resent the presence of the Eritrean
Eritrea. Motivating his adamant refusal to open schools. Martini wrote that
in the colony. The realization of the problems around the settlement of
he had no interest in complicating colonial rule by extending modern educa¬
landless colonists and the subsequent change of colonial policy were to form
tion to the Eritreans.^^ The best way to keep the Eritreans under the firm
the basis for a new colonial and native policy.
grip of colonialism was, according to Martini, through the establishment of
According to the terms of reference the newly appointed governor of
a racial barrier strengthened by the exclusion of the Eritrean from western
Eritrea, Ferdinando Martini, was instructed to withdraw from Eritrea if he
education.
found it difficult to run the colony with a budget of six million lire per an¬
In the colonial system led by Martini, the position of the Eritrean was that
num.Conscious of the constraints. Martini’s overriding concern remained
of a human being held under subjection by a militarily stronger nation for the
the maintenance of colonial rule in Eritrea. He was acutely aware that in order
interests of the latter. His destiny was to be ruled and kept in a world struc¬
to prolong Italian colonialism in Eritrea he had to diffuse local resistance and
turally different from that of the colonizer.
establish a peaceful coexistence with Ethiopia. In practice this meant that the
Eritrean pre-capitalist political, economic and social structures were not only
to be left undisturbed but that their preservation was to be strictly adhered to
by the colonial state. The era of rational imperialism, 1908—32
Martini was compelled to introduce a system of colonial rule whereby the
Eritrean traditional political elite was employed to rule on behalf of the col¬ When Martini left Eritrea in 1907, the position of Italy vis-i-vis Eritrea and
onial state. This was unsatisfactory but inevitable. Ideally he would have Ethiopia was much stronger. Economically, Italy had by 1905 reached a take¬
off stage. Although colonies had since Adwa become even more marginal,
preferred a more direct rule where the colonizer would exercise absolute
domination over the Eritrean. One typical instance can be cited. Italy was militarily and economically better prepared to deal with colonial
In April 1901, governor Martini learned that a Swedish missionary had matters. On the political and cultural plane, Italy pursued, during the
Giolittian age (1900 22), the path of democratization.^** In colonial matters.
98
 ihe appointment of Salvago-Raggi, a career diplomat as governor of Eritrea of 1909 had gone a long way in protecting the rights of the Eritreans and that
(1908—14), can certainly be taken as reflection of the new political and cul¬ the colonial state spared no effort in implementing the provisions of the law.
tural climate in Rome. Concerning the type of relations between the colonizers and the colonized, the
The period of Salvago-Raggi witnessed first Italian colonial expansion in authors strongly stressed that Italy ought to adopt the British system of col¬
Somalia (1908—10) and secondly the Italian occupation of Libya (1911—12). onial rule.”
In both cases, the Eritrean was called upon to facilitate colonial expansion at The above recommendations however, ran counter to those which were put
an acceptable price to Rome.^® According to Salvago-Raggi, the function of forward by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and later (since 1912) by the
Eritrea had become the production of mercenaries for Italian colonial wars Ministry of Colonies, with the exception of, namely, the proprietary rights of
of pacification in Libya.During the 1911—32 period, Eritrea contributed a the Eritreans. These rights had to be respected for two important reasons.
standing army of about 4,000 men. Without Eritrean participation in the Firstly, the cost of carrying out land alienation was beyond the budget ear¬
pacification of Libya, the Italian position would have been untenable.^^ Not marked by the Italian state for colonial adventures. Secondly, land alienation
only were the Eritrean colonial soldiers cheap to equip and even cheaper to served no purpose, since very few prospective Italian peasants with the capital
substitute, they were far superior to Italian soldiers in the battle against the required by the colonial state, were willing to pour out their resources in a col¬
Libyan nomads.” Eritrea as a reservoir of colonial soldiers, and the function ony such as Eritrea whose future remained uncertain.”
of the Eritrean, first and foremost, as a colonial soldier, formed the basis for Contrary to the recommendations of the authors, the Ministry of Foreign
native policy. Although the position of the Eritrean during the period of Affairs (the supreme source of colonial policies) and the Ministry of Colonies
Salvago-Raggi was defined exclusively in terms of Italian colonial interests turned Eritrea into a reservoir for the recruitment of colonial soldiers for col¬
elsewhere, we nevertheless do notice considerable differences of perception onial expansion elsewhere. In 1920, Governor Ferroni pointed out that Eritrea
between Martini and his successor on the relations between the colonizer and ought not to be used as a guarantor for the security and defence of other col¬
the colonized. While for instance Martini, perceiving education as a potential onies, and that it was futile to keep a complex administrative network if the
enemy of colonialism, pursued a policy against its introduction, Salvago- Ministry of Colonies desired to reduce the colony into a ‘field of mercenary
Raggi and his superiors in Rome were laying down the basis for a special type soldiers’.” A decade later, Governor Zoli, commenting on the economic
of native education. The need for introducing western education was backwardness of the colony, wrote that he could provide without any dif¬
recoignized, but at the same time it was argued that western education ought ficulty a new battalion of soldiers (between SOO and 1,0(X) men) monthly for
to be tailored and rationed on the grounds that the mind of the Eritrean, being a whole year if such was the primary function expected from the colony.^
infantile indiscriminate extension of western education could cause mental in- As the discussion on colonial administration below demonstrates, Italian
balance.^ Slowly but steadily, the position of the Eritrean changed from be¬ native policies, in contrast to those of France and Britain, were hardly con¬
ing a dominated subject into that of a person, who owing to his mental ap¬ cerned with the problem of participation of the colonized in the political life
titude, had to be dominated.” of the colony. This did not mean that the colonized were not utilized in col¬
The Salvago-Raggi period was indeed a period where a number of colonial onial administration, as indeed they were, but that their participation was
policies co-existed alongside each other. In a study commissioned by the col¬ limited to the maintenance of social organization designed more to ensure the
onial administration after reviewing the policies of the earlier governors, and continuation of colonial rule than its own dynamic development.®'
after stating the fact that for the Italians Eritrea had become a country of
origin of colonial soldiers, the authors recommended a number of policies.
They proposed that the colonial state treat the colonized as the subjects rather
than the objects of colonial policy.” They also proposed that colonial econ¬
omic policy ought to deal exclusively with the improvement of material condi¬ Political Organization and Colonial Administration
tions with emphasis on the civilizing mission of the colonial system. In conclu¬
sion, the main contradiction between the colonial state and the colonized,
Prior to the colonial period, the Tigrinya-speaking region, which formed the
which hinged on confiscation of land and the treatment of the colony and its
basis for colonial administration, was made up of five districts." These were
inhabitants as objects of plunder, would according to the authors be resolved
in turn sub-divided into about 34 territorial units called medri. Most often the
through the respect of proprietary rights. The authors noted that the land law
medri was made up of one or several subdivisions called gulti of which there

100 101

i
 were 65. The gulti territory was administered by a political officer known as
the head of a gulti. A gulti area was sufficiently large for and was meant to
provide the needs of the chief of the gulti. The over 800 villages, in an area
of 5,500 sq. kms., and their organization under the 65 gulti provides an in¬
dication of the size of the latter.^^ The village constituted the smallest politi¬
cal unit and administered its affairs through a council of elders and a locally
elected judge.
At the top sat a governor appointed by the Ethiopian emperor or by
whoever had the hegemonic power in northern Ethiopia.^^ Under him were
the rulers of the five districts, namely, Hamassien, Seraye, Akele-Guzay, Deki
Tesa and Kohain. In many cases, a powerful figure ruled over several regions.
Next came those responsible for the administration of medri. These were the
most important group of the ruling elite since they were directly responsible
for the collection and delivery of tribute.
The organization of the colony into eight districts, a division that survives
up to the present, was with the exception of the western lowlands, based on
the historical and geographical factors that predate colonialism.^^
The main function of the Italian district commissioner was to maintain law
and order through the traditional ruling elite. Apart from the construction of
the districts and the alienation of some thousands of hectares of land, the
Italians concentrated on supervising the administration of the colony without
any significant restructuring. District commissioners’ offices were sparsely
staffed and most of their budget was spent in forms of salaries to chiefs and
their followers. This could be illustrated by a breakdown of the district’s
budget in relation to the tribute collected from the same district in the table
below.

Table 4.1. Budget distribution of Seraye district for 1911—12 and for 1925—26. The most expensive item in the administration of the districts remained the
Item Amount in lire
salaries of traditional chiefs and their armed followers, which formed as a sort
Percentage of Amount Percentage
(1911—12) total expenses (1925—26) of provincial or territorial army. In the case of Seraye district salaries for
Salaries for chiefs, armed chiefs and their armed followers constituted 82 per cent of the budget for
followers, gifts reception, 1911—12 and 68 per cent for 1925—26. A similar situation appeared to pre¬
etc. 75.600 82.4 146,900 68.6 vail in the remaining districts. During the 1925—26 financial year, the salaries
Buildings and maintenance for chiefs and their armed followers constituted for Keren 41 per cent; for
of roads 2,500 2.7 7,900 3.7 Seraye 68 per cent; for Akele-Guzay 60 per cent; for Barka and Setit 71 per
cent; for Asseb 77 per cent; for Massawa 31 per cent and for Hamassien 28
Office expenses 700 0.7 4,000 1.8
per cent.^
Subsidy for schools 500 0.5 300 0.1 In 1912, throughout the colony there were three chiefs, 37 sub-chiefs, 33
assistants and 591 armed followers.^^ According to the Royal decree of
Total expenses 91.700 214,045
2.7.1908, the district commissioners were instructed to compile a list of those
Tribute paid by the in¬ I riireans who were salaried by the administration. In the first list that was
habitants of Seraye 154,000 270,000 compiled soon after the decree of 1908 there were a total of 70 chiefs and
Sources: AE, 613 for 1911—12 and AE. 861. noiables whose names were put into a special central register.^^ Those who
102 103
 vyere not absorbed by the colonial bureaucracy but belonged to the traditional population of 367,239 according to the census of 1917, it appears that one oiii
ruling elite were known as notables and were maintained by the colonial state. of 1,200 was employed in the administration of the colony.’^
Salaries were individually fixed and depended on the position of the claimant, The list of salaried chiefs and notables and the native personnel in the admi¬
and the size of his following and the size of the area under his control.
nistration of Eritrea referred to above is an extremely useful document for
Emoluments to notables were also fixed on an individual basis and varied
gauging the extent to which the Eritrean was engaged in the administration of
widely. Among the notables were also included the religious leaders of all the colony. While the chiefs carried out their traditional duties, namely admi¬
islamic communities and the leaders of the monasteries and convents.*^ nistration of justice and collection of tribute with minimum interference from
V The traditional elite stood to benefit from the new system as well as from
the colonial government, the notables were co-opted into the colonial system
the old system, since no changes were introduced to affect the traditional
for purely political reasons, namely to extend the base among the traditional
powers of the political elite vis-a-vis the Eritrean population. We may take an
elite for the continued acceptance of the colonial system. The number of
example dealing with the collection of tribute. At village level, tribute was col¬ salaried chiefs roughly corresponded to the number of the pre-colonial ad¬
lected by the village head and transmitted to the next chief in the hierarchy. ministrative zones, a strong indication that very little territorial reorganization
Both the village head and the chief of the gulti reserved the right (which the had taken place.
colonial state condoned) to deduct about five per cent each of the total tribute
The district officers managed to administer their regions with a budget
before handing it over to the treasury.^® The recognition of the traditional
which could by no means be regarded as expensive. At a district level the col¬
elite and the non-interference of the commissioner in the affairs of the
onial state ruled in conjunction with the traditional elite and according to the
Eritrean communities must have enhanced both the position of the colonial
customs of the respective cultures.
government vis-^i-vis the Eritreans and that of the traditional elite vis-a-vis the
Summing up the record of Italian colonial rule in Africa, Gennaro Mon-
rest of the population.^’
daini, an expert on colonial legislation, wrote that Italy, unlike other colonial
The total number of Eritreans employed or regularly paid in one way or an¬
powers, preserved one of the most sacred patrimonies, namely the personal
other by the colonial administration had increased from 70 in 1912 to 320 by
and proprietary rights of the colonized. Not only were the customary rules
1918.’^ Out of these 66 were chiefs, 36 notables and 218 other categories
elevated to the level of laws applied by the judicial and administrative sections
such as interpreters and clerks. These were entered, together with their names
of the colonial government, but the Eritrean was also certainly involved in its
and date of employment in the central personnel register. Excluded from this
administration through the legal recognition of the chief as a court of first in¬
list were the armed followers of chiefs, who in 1912 numbered around 600.
stance.’^ All civil matters between natives were tried by the chief and later
Excluding those employed by the colonial armed forces, the Eritrean con¬
remanded to or retried by the commissariat’s tribunal. The so-called native
tingent of the colonial civil bureaucracy was made up in the beginning of 1918
courts thus had jurisdiction only over issues of private law among natives. The
of a staff of 320. Salaries for chiefs and notables varied from 795 lire per
penal jurisdiction was, on the other hand, reserved to the courts of the col¬
month to the Islamic leader El Morgan!, and 285 lire to the Prior of the
onial state and decisions were rendered according to the efficiency of the
Monastry of Debre Bizen and 21 lire to a Kadi (a Muslim judge) of a small
punishment. In other words, the colonial state could choose to provide
town.^^
punishment either according to customary laws or according to Italian penal
The same degree of variation or differentiation also existed among the 157
codes.”
interpreters, telegraphists and clerks. In 1918 there were 47 interpreters of six
The structure for the administration of justice was made up of four court
different grades. Those at the highest level, six of them, appeared to have been
instances: a) the courts of chiefs which in turn contained several levels of in¬
recruited before or soon after 1900. Those interpreters earned 150 lire per
stance, b) the court of the district officer assisted by chiefs and notables, c)
month, the ceiling for those employed in the civil bureaucracy. Next came in¬
the tribunal of the commissioner, d) the governor.
terpreters of the first class followed by other classes with monthly salaries
However, the structures as well as the philosophy for the administration of
ranging from 125 lire to 60 lire for those in the fifth class. Unlike the inter¬
justice in the colonies, which scholars such as Martino Moreno and Gennaro
preters, the majority of the telegraphists (total of 56) were recruited after
Mondaini discussed in glowing terms, compared to the praxis of other col¬
1910. Their monthly salaries ranged between 45 and 60 lire. The last group,
onies in fact left many things to be desired.’*
made up of 64 messengers and apprentice clerks, constituted the lowest paid
The jurisdiction of the chief as a court of first instance was a shorthand de¬
groups with monthly salaries ranging between 30 and 45 lire.^^ Of a total
scription of a very complex system of courts which the Eritrean had to exhaust
104
105
 before an appeal to the second court of instance became actual. At the lowest some legal matters.*^ While recognizing the validity of customary laws, ihc
level, that is at the village level, a case was heard by the village judge. Rarely colonial government stopped short of recognizing the need for the separation
included in the list of chiefs and notables, the village judge was not salaried. of powers within the world of the colonized. Misinterpreting the precolonial
Appointed by the colonial government from a family who carried hereditary judicial system, the colonial government continued to maintain that the chiefs
rights, the judge remunerated himself by retaining a certain percentage of the as well as the district officers and the governor retain executive and judicial
tribute and by levying fines against litigants who refused to respect the rules powers as was the custom in Eritrea and Ethiopia.*®
of civil procedure. One of the main sources of income for the judge, and an The colonial judicial system, although it was meant to be a reflection or a
effective instrument for speedy trial, was the fine which the judge could levy continuation of the precolonial system, was considerably different. The most
against a disobedient litigant.’’ important point of difference lay in the fact that Eritrean chiefs had more
The amount fixed by the representatives of the population which adhered power than earlier. Backed by the colonial state, chiefs both at a village and
to the specific customary law in question was considered burdensome. sub-district level distorted the balance of power that existed between the
According to the customary laws of the district of Akele-Guzay, the village chiefs, the elders and the members of the clergy.*’ Recruited and kept in of¬
judge levied six M.T., a fine which could be doubled and tripled.*® During fice as long as they functioned as mouthpieces of the central administration
most of the colonial period, six M.T. constituted as much as two weeks^ salary at Asmara, the loyalty of the chiefs lay primarily with the colonial system. The
for a daily labourer or a colonial soldier.*' Upon appeal, the case proceeded arbitrariness of the colonial system can best be seen in the manner in which
to the chief of a group of villages which shared common history e.g. Hadegti, administration of justice was carried out. Based on the stereotype conception
Shewate Anseba, where the litigant was subjected to the same regime of pro¬ of the Eritrean as someone with a fine sense of speedy justice, no distinction
cedure and where litigants paid a certain sum for the adjudication of cases in was made between the executive and the judicial functions of the colonial
addition to the various types of income generated by the rules of procedure. government. The same district governor acted simultaneously as a judge,
In contrast, the structure for the administration of justice among the albeit assisted by notables paid by the colonial state, and as an administrator.
Eritrean Moslem communities appeared to have been less complex. The kadi From 1908 until the early 1930’s, the Italians pursued a native policy
courts functioned as courts of first instance. On appeal, the cases proceeded distinctly different from those of Britain and France. In the educational field,
to the sharia court which functioned in the same way as a national High Italy remained firm in limiting education to the elementary level. Concerning
Court. After 1935 all cases from all over Eritrea ended at the Sharia court at the role of the Eritrean in the colonial administrative and political structures,
Asmara*‘ where learned Eritrean and/or expatriate Moslems decided over Italian policy showed some similarities with the French system of colonial
the case. rule. Eritrea was administered in collaboration with the traditional elite, but
The problem of administration of justice varied from one ethnic and cul¬ in a more direct manner. The chief was appointed by the colonial state from
tural group to the other. Among the Tigrinyans, the colonial government left among those who were traditionally entitled to the office.** Through a series
the precolonial judicial system unchanged by recognizing the judicial rights of of legislations, the colonial state separated the chief from his subjects by
the chiefs at all levels of the Eritrean society. The colonial government made granting him certain privileges: a chief could not be arrested without the prior
its presence felt only after the traditional venues had been exhausted. This approval of the governor. Financially, the position of the chief was enhanced
practice was a concession favourable to the traditional ruling elite, since they through regular wages and through the exercise of his judicial functions.
benefited materially from the execution of their work. For the individual Similarities between the Italian and the French systems could only be observed
litigant, the colonial judicial system meant that there were more instances to in their attitude to chiefs and their treatment.
go through before reaching the court of last resort.*^ The above privileges notwithstanding, the colonial state did not subscribe
Furthermore the judicial system thwarted the process of separation of to the British ideal of indirect rule where the natives were ruled by their own
powers between the Ethiopian king and the learned men who kept and inter¬ leaders and the interference of the colonial officer was to be limited to ‘per¬
preted the few written legal sources.*^ Since its introduction into Ethiopia, suasion in all possible circumstances’.*’ The Eritrean chief was a spokesman
the Fetha Nagast (The Law of the Kings) remained in the possession of the of the colonial state. His primary function was to provide all background
high clergy, who not infrequently were asked to render a legal opinion. As the knowledge for the district commissioner to make the appropriate decision.
ultimate and unquestionable source of law, its keepers and interpreters (high 1‘ ven in the administration of justice, the power of the chief ended at the couri
clergy) functioned in such a way that even kings sought enlightenment on of first instance. At the district level, the chief and notables participated in

106 107
 advisory capacity while the district commissioner passed judgement in Italians over the natives ought to be affirmed in every situation.’*
disputes regarding the law of persons between Eritreans.*® One of the main arguments used to justify the introduction of the law of
From the above discussion, we can conclude that the primary concern of 1937 was said to be the desire to avoid psychical deterioration of the Italian
Italian native policy was the perpetuation of colonial rule. Through its educa¬ race through miscegenation.” The half-castes, who until this period had the
tional policy, as we discussed in the preceding chapter, Italy attempted to possibility of acquiring Italian citizenship, were presented as the typical conse¬
resolve the problem of educated elites quite successfully. Through its praxis quence of racial degradation arising from miscegenation.*®® Perceived as a
of direct rule, the colonial state prevented the Eritrean elite from developing group who bore the worst elements of both races, the literature of the mid
towards autonomy within the colonial system. Italian native policy did not 1930’s called for the prohibition of inter-racial cohabitation and for the classi¬
give the Eritreans any leeway to either enter into a dialogue with the colonial fying of the half-castes as belonging to the African race.*®*
state over the nature of colonial rule or to challenge the basis of colonialism. The law of 1937 dealt with cohabitation. In theory as well as in practice,
The 1932 41 decade, as 1 shall presently discuss, introduced new elements as the Catholic Church pointed out, an Italian could lawfully marry an
into the relations between the colonizer and the colonized which even more Eritrean.'®^ This loophole was however soon remedied by the law of 1938
drastically distinguished Italian native policy from that of its European that declared an inter-racial marriage null and void.*®^
counterparts.
In June 1939 the separation of races was made even more encompassing
through the legislation on penal sanctions aimed at the defence of the prestige
of the race in front of the natives of Italian East Africa. For the purpose of
the law of 1939, any act committed by an Italian in abuse of his prestige as
a member of the Italian race or who failing to come up to duties expected of
From Paternalism to Apartheid, 1932—41 him by the native population bringing about the lowering of the moral image
of the Italian was liable to punishment.*®^ Although this first article gave the
In 1932 Professor Lidio Cipriani published a study on the past and future colonial state unlimited power in controlling the conduct of the Italian citizen,
destiny of the African peoples in which the psychical inferiority of the African the legislation specified further the types of criminal acts.
was repeatedly presented as proven by scientific methods.’* Three years later, The law of 1937 which prohibited inter-racial cohabitation was restated in
the same author published a manual on Ethiopia which argued that the col¬ the law of 1939. A citizen who habitually frequented native public places was
onization of such inferior populations was an obligation for Europe.’^ The liable to imprisonment for up to six months and/or a fine. A citizen who with¬
placing of ethnic groups into a classified intelligence scale was neither a prac¬ out the written approval of the governor of the Colonial Empire accepted
tice developed just in the 1930’s, nor were Africans the only groups to be employment from a native, or who performed a task of a manual nature, was
classified in this manner.’^ What was strikingly different in the literature of liable to a fine. Even a citizen who put himself in a state of manifest
the 1930’s, was the advocacy of perpetual domination over the African on the drunkeness in places reserved for natives was liable to imprisonment.*®* As
grounds that the latter would never be able to govern himself.’^ The racism far as the will of Italy on the race question was concerned, the final decisive
of the late nineteenth century was based on the technological superiority of law was promulgated in May 1940 categorically putting the half-caste into the
Europe, and this led to paternalist colonial policies. Instead, the racial world of the natives.*®^ From 1940 the Italian East African Empire was in¬
postulates of the 1930’s were formed from an ideological base which called habited by the Italians and the natives with positions clearly defined and with¬
for racial separation and the immutability of relations between races. out any in-between groups such as half-castes and educated natives.*®^
According to Professor Denis Mack Smith, the first law which set Italy on The policy and practice of the separation of races was less due to the alleged
the course of apartheid, was promulgated in April 1937, nearly a year after pathological inferiority of the African than to the objectives of colonialism
the creation of the Italian East African Empire.’^ By virtue of this decree, an and to the existence of a large celibate Italian population in the colonial em¬
Italian citizen who maintained conjugal relations with an Eritrean was liable pire. As already Ferdinando Martini understood, the purpose of colonialism
to imprisonment from one to five years. The law of 1937, as the then Minister was to rule as cheaply as possible. Italian policy makers of the 1930’s were
of Colonies noted in his diary, was in effect put into practice as early as the motivated by the same reasons which motivated Martini to oppose inter-racial
summer of 1936.’^ In his directives to the Governor of the Italian East cohabitation. The objective of Italy to use the newly-expanded empire as a
African Empire, the Minister of Colonies emphasized that the superiority of colony of settlement could only be achieved after the colonial power had suc-
108
109
 ceeded in establishing a distinct separation between the Italian colonist and onies, Martino Moreno, who dominated discussions on native policy befween
the African colonized subject. A distinction had not only to be drawn between 1937 and 1943. In one of early studies, Moreno explained that the most fun¬
the colonizer and the colonized, but the position of the half-caste had also to damental question of native policy was the recognition of the existence of a
be regulated. Uncontrolled sexual contacts between the Italian army of oc¬ gap between the African and the white race:
cupation, the majority of whom were single men, and African women, it was
feared, would result in the growth of a half-caste population with serious pol¬ He who studies the history of the African people should recognize that they have
itical consequences.By forbidding inter-racial cohabitation and by closing created nothing universal.All those that are permanent, from the Obelisks
the possibility for the latter to acquire Italian citizenship, Italy created two of Aksum to the Castles of Gondar are ... products of foreign civilizations. It
polarized communities, namely the rulers and the ruled. This polarization is thus utopian to think that Africans could be elevated quickly to the level of
the Westerner.We are dealing with people who will never reach the age of
made the implementation of native policy along ‘apartheid’ lines considerably
maturity.**^
easier to handle.
The widespread propaganda about the superiority of the Italian and that of
The alleged pathological inferiority of Africans, a line of argument which
the degenerated character of the half-caste was used, on the one hand to
Professor Lidio Cipriani had advocated since the early years of the 193()’s,
mobilize the Italian population against the colonized, and on the other hand,
found clear confirmation in the Ministry of Colonies. All colonizers, argued
to rationalize colonization as an inevitable policy pursued by superior
Moreno, know through experience the mental inferiority of the African race,
cultures.*^ The political motive behind the treatment of the half-caste was
although some colonial powers pursue hypocritical policies on the issue."**
clearly explained by the director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Col¬
Specifying the objectives of native policy, Moreno wrote that Italy doesn’t
onies Martino Moreno, when he wrote that the uncontrolled growth of the
export the vote and the parliament to its colonies but it maintains the .social
half-caste population would create problems of a political nature."® The
organization of Eritreans based on a chain of chiefs who are independent of
half-castes, according to Moreno, were not needed since Italy had no shortage
each other, and inspired by a rational sense of hierarchy.**^ In defending the
of manpower for the purpose of colonization. He noted that half-castes had
objectives of Italian native policy vis-^-vis that of France with its assimila-
played an important role in situations where the colonial power was unable
tionist practice, and that of Britain which aimed at the ‘development of an
to send a sufficient number of its men to the colony."*
African society able to participate in the life of the modern world as a com¬
That the ‘pathological inferiority’ of the African was a rationalization for
munity of its own right’,"® Moreno pursued two lines of argument; firstly,
colonization emerged even in the writings of avowed fascists such as professor
Italy had the right to decide on the appropriate colonial policy, and secondly,
Cipriani. In the International Congress on Africa held in Rome in 1938, the
neither the vote nor the parliament could be applied in Africa.
main line of Professor Cipriani’s argument emphasized that African eman¬
Concerning the impact of native policy on the colonized, Moreno con¬
cipation ran counter to Italian needs of African resources."^
fidently stated that through its social policies Italy would succeed in increasing
The impact of the racial laws on native policy was far-reaching. Prior to
the sentiments of gratitude on the part of the indigenous towards their
1937 the Eritrean was perceived as a subject who could revolt against the col¬
dominators, who occupied a prestigious position not only because they were
onial system if given the opportunity through education. Hence native policy
the bosses but also because of their capacity as teachers and benefactors.'"
was primarily concerned with how to prolong colonial rule through the
Moreno assured the African that Italian colonialism would create a social-
dissemination of appropriate education and the strict adherence to the
economic milieu that would enable him to develop according to the limits of
precolonial Eritrean social organization. Perceived as a subject with potential
his capacity.
for equal development, the African was, prior to 1937, treated in a pater¬
The racial division of responsibilities fitted very well with the economic ob¬
nalistic manner in spite of the fact that Italy did not give the Eritrean any
jectives which Italy aspired to achieve in the new empire. The empire was
leeway to enter into a dialogue with the colonial state. Paternalism as a
destined to accomodate several million Italian colonists. Moreover, it was ex¬
guiding philosophy was rejected because Italy perceived colonialism in terms
pected to supply the mother country with raw materials. The African, whose
of domination.
position in the colonial system was, according to the racial theories of I930*s,
With the promulgation of the racial laws, the position of the Italy vis-a-vis
defined by Mother Nature, was destined to assist the Italians in the realization
the colony assumed an entirely different dimension. This new dimension was
of these objectives.
repeatedly explained by the director of Political Affairs in the Ministry of Col¬

110
Ill
 FOOTNOTES associate the educated element with your own governmental system you will drive it into a
political activity of which the first victims will be the traditional authorities themselves.
1. During the colonial period, comparative studies mostly between the French and the ‘African and Indian Government’, United Empire, 30 (1939) p. XIV, quoted by
British systems were motivated by the search for an efficient regime of colonialism. Hetherington, British Paternalism, p. 139.
See Lucy Mair, Native Policies in Africa, London, 1936, especially chapter VII on
Science and the Future of Africa, pp. 261—86, where the author poses the problems 10. Prosser Gifford and Timothy Weiskel, ‘African Education’, pp. 704—08.
which require solutions. See also the posthumously published work of Bronislaw
Malinowski, The Dynamics of Culture Change: An Enquiry into Race Relations in
11. In most British colonies, the African elite managed to carry out, within rea.sonablc
Africa, New Haven, 1945, chapter XII, on Indirect Rule and its Scientific Manage¬
bounds, political dialogue with the colonial state and the metropole through an in¬
ment, pp. 138—50. For post colonial comparative studies see Michael Crowder’s early
dependent press and pressure organizations. See for example, Robert I. Rotberg, The
article, ‘Indirect Rule: French and British Styles’, Africa, 34:3 (1964) 197—205.
Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, Cam¬
bridge, Massachusetts, 1965, pp. 205—13; Jarle Simensen, Commoners, Chiefs and
2. In response to Crowder’s comparative essay (1964), Kiwanuka pointed out that the the Colonial Government: British Policy and Local Politics in Akim Abuakwa,
so-called basic differences between the various colonial policies were mythical. The au¬ Ghana, Under Colonial Rule, Ph.D. diss., Trondheim, 1975, vol. 2, p. XL
thor stressed the biased assumptions and criticized the prevailing view which depicted
the British as constantly applying a system of indirect rule, thus preparing Africa for
12. In British Tropical Africa, the system of indirect rule came to an official end in
independence. Semakula M. Kiwanuka, ‘Colonial Policies and Administrations in
1947 because (as the Secretary for Colonies Sir Arthur Creech Jones argued) of its
Africa: The Myths of the Contrasts’, African Historical Studies, 3:2 (1970) 295—315.
vagueness of ultimate objective and its unacceptability by local educated men and
The myth of the contrasts between the British and the French colonial policies had also
women. The despatch that dealt with the system of indirect rule is reproduced in Kirk-
been pointed out by Prosser Gifford and Timothy Weiskel, in their comparative study
Greene, The Principle of Native Administration, pp. 238—48. The despatch called for
of native educational praxis in West Africa. ‘African Education in a Colonial Context:
the introduction of a system of grass-roots government at the local level as a step
French and British Styles’, in France and Britain in Africa, edited by Prosser Gifford
towards the preparation of a colony for national self-government. By 1947 European
and Wm. Roger Louis, New Haven, 1971, pp. 663—711.
colonialism in Africa was challenged both by the United States and the Soviet Union.
See The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940—1960, edited by Gifford,
3. F. D. Lugard, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa, London, 1922, 3rded., P. and Louis, Wm. R., Yale University Press, 1982.
1926, p. 617.

13. For a general survey of French Colonial Policy, Stephen H. Roberts’s slightly out¬
4. Andrew Roberts, ‘The Imperial Mind’, in The Cambridge History of Africa, voL dated History of French Colonial Policy, 1875—1925, London, 1929, remains useful.
7, from 1905 to 1940, edited by Andrew Roberts, Cambridge, 1986, p. 49. On the theory and praxis of ‘Assimilation*, see Martin Deming Lewis, ‘One Hundred
Million Frenchmen: The “Assimilation” Theory in French Colonial Policy*, Contem¬
5. Lord F. D. Lugard, ‘Native Policies in East Africa’, Foreign Affairs, 9:1 (1930— porary Studies in Society and History, 4:1 (1961) 129—53. On the decline of the theory
31), p. 69. For a more exhaustive treatment on the ideological basis of indirect rule of ‘Association* see the contemporary study by M. M. Knight, ‘French Colonial
and the contradiction between indirect rule and democratic institutions, see Penelope Policy: The Decline of “Association”’, Journal of Modern History, 5:2 (1933) 208—
Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa, 1920—1940, London, 1978, pp.l31— 24. On what I have designated the hybrid policy between ‘Assimilation’ and ‘Associa¬
48; see also, A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, The Principles of Native Administration in tion*, the reflections of Hubert Deschamps, ‘French Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa
Nigeria: Selected Documents, 1900—1947, London, 1965, p. 28. For a more critical Between the Two World Wars’, in France and Britain in Africa, edited by Prosser Gif¬
assessment of Lord Lugard’s colonial thinking and policy, see I. F. Nicolson, The Ad¬ ford and Wm. Roger Louis, New Haven, 1971, pp. 543—69, remains the most useful.
ministration of Nigeria, 1900—1960: Men, Methods and the Myths, Oxford, 1%9, pp.
301—12. 14. Stephen Roberts, History of French Colonial Policy, p. 68.

6. Hetherington, British Paternalism in Africa, p. 140. 15. Lewis, ‘One Hundred Million Frenchmen’, pp. 134—35.

7. Ibid., p. 142. 16. Ibid., p. 135.

8. Lord Hailey, An African Survey, Oxford, 1938, pp. 1639—40. 17. Herbert Leuthy, France Against Herself, Paris, 1955, translated by Eric
Mosbacher, New York, 1957, p. 211. See also the study by the former Minister of Col¬
9. Lord Hailey warned that: onies, Jacques Stern, The French colonies. New York, 1944, pp. 11 — 12.
The small educated element in Africa will grow, and will in time, contain stronger leaders
of African native opinion than will the circle of traditional authorities. If you do not 18. Deschamps, ‘French Colonial Policy’, p. 562.

112 113
 19,. Lewis, ‘One Hundred Million Frenchmen*, pp. 147—48. Giacomo Perticone, La politica coloniale italiana negli atti, documenti e discussioni
parlamentari, Roma, 1972, a work of very limited relevance.
20. Raymond Buell in his exhaustive study on The Native Problem in Africa^ New
York, 1928, vol. 2, p. 79, wrote that there was no colour bar in French African col¬ 32. E. A. Scaglione, Amedeo Duca D'Aosta, Roma, 1953, p. 166.
onies. The dividing line was between those who spoke French and those who did not.
The persistence of the policy of assimilation and its coexistence with that of association 33. Ibid., pp. 167—68.
was also pointed out recently. Discussing the long term impact of French educational
policy in West Africa, O. B. Olumtimehin argued that, ‘although there was a wide fear 34. Angelo Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa Orientale: La caduta delTlmpero, Milano,
that unrestricted education could have revolutionary impact on the African, ... no 1981, p. 237.
complete break was made from the assimilationist policy*. ‘Education and Colonial
Domination in French West Africa from 1900 to the Second World War*, Journal of 35. Denis Mack Smith, MussolinPs Roman Empire, Oxford, 1975, p. 123.
the Historical Society of Nigeria, 7:2 (1974), p. 350. Those Africans who managed to
go through the regular French curriculum were indeed very few but they appeard to 36. Sergio Romano, La quarta sponda: La guerra di Libia, 1911— 12, Roma, 1977,
have been sufficient to challenge colonial educational policies. See ibid., pp. 355—56. p. 218.
See also Raymond Betts, Assimilation and Association in French Colonial History,
1890—1914, Cambridge, 1961, pp. 8 and 22, on the objectives of assimilation and the 37. Aldo Mola, Llmperialismo Italiano: La politica estera dalTUnitd al fascismo,
continued implementation of assimilation even after its rejection as official policy. Roma, 1980, p. 218.

21. I refer to the ‘Indigenat* system that empower the district officer to summarily 38. Ibid., 220.
punish certain offences which in France were either not criminal or were contentious
cases for the law courts. For an extensive discussion on the ‘Indigenat*, see Raymond 39. Alberto Sbacchi, Italian Colonialism in Ethiopia, pp. 6, 127, 181, 218—22.
Buell, The Native Problem in Africa, vol. 1, pp. 106—09.
40. Ferdinando Martini, Nell*Africa Italiana, Roma, 1891, in Aldo Mola. L*/w*
22. M. M. Knight, ‘French Colonial Policy*, p.216. perialismo Italiano, pp. 83—87.

23. Lucy Mair, Native Policies In Africa, London, 1936, p. 189. 41. The parliamentary Commission of Enquiry that visited Eritrea in 1891 did noi en¬
visage that confiscation and expropriation of land could create political problems. Sec
24. Cf. Deschamps, ‘French Colonial Policy*, p. 568 its report: Relazione generale della Reale commissione d*inchiesta sulla colonia
f Eritrea, Roma, 1891, pp. 177—95.
25. Ibid..
42. This has been described by Italian historians as ‘Italian genocide of Eritrea*. Sec
26. According to Webster*s New World Dictionary, 1957, Paternalism is defined as the Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa Orientale, vol. 1, pp. 435—42; Rainero, L*an-
system or principle of governing a country in a manner suggesting a father’s relation¬ ticolonialismo italiano da Assab ad Adua, pp. 243—44.
ship with his children.
43. Ferdinando Martini, II Diario eritreo, vol. 1, p. 2.
27. Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa, p. 45.
44. ACS-Archivio Martini, busta 4, Martini to MAE 26.4.1901. For the Swedish end
28. Anthony G. Hopkins, An Introduction to Economic History of West Africa, Ox¬ of the episode, see Viveca Halldin-Norberg, Swedes in Haile Selassie*s Ethiopia, p.
ford, 1973. 106, note 13; Gustav Ar6n, Evangelical Pioneers in Ethiopia: Origins of the
Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus, Uppsala, 1978, pp. 344—45.
29. Cf. Jarle Simensen, Commoners, Chiefs and Colonial Government, vol. 2. p. XI;
Raymond Betts, Uncertain Dimensions, pp. 162—63. 45. Ibid.; Cf. Martini’s views on colonial education.

30. For the role of African elites in French Colonies, see Henri Brunschwig, ‘The 46. ACS-Archivio Martini, busta 4, Martini to MAE 26.4.1901.
Decolonization of French Black Africa*, in The Transfer of Power in Africa:
Decolonization, 1940—1960, Yale University Press, 1982, pp. 211—14, edited by 47. Martini, II diario eritreo, vol. 2, p. 472, dated 27.5.1901.
Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis.
48. The tripartite treaty between Italy, Britain and France over Ethiopia recognized the
31. Apart from Alberto Sbacchi*s Ph.D. thesis, Italian Colonialism in Ethiopia, northern part of Ethiopia as falling under the Italian sphere of influence. For a lex!
1936—40, Chicago, 1975, the only other study on Italian colonial policy is that of of the treaty see Herstlet, The Map of Africa by Treaty, pp. 440—44.

114
 49. Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 1870—1925, Lon¬ Deputato Ferdinando Martini per gli esercizi, 1902—1907, Roma, 1913, vol.l, pp.
don. 1967, pp. 237—81. 51—53.

50. Eritrean soldiers remained in Libya until the end of 1934. See ACS-MAI Busta 66. AE 613 for administrative costs of the remaining districts.
4—6, Badoglio to Mussolini, 19.1.1935, document no. 131.
67. R.D. of 2.7.1908, no. 325.
51. ASMAI pos. 115/2. file 15, Salvago-Raggi to MC 11.9.1914.
68. AE 950, Elenco dei capi stipendiati dalPamministrazione coloniale, Luglio, 1908.
52. Ibid.. One of the worries of the Eritrean Governor, Salvago-Raggi, was that
Eritreans were becoming aware that they were doing better than their Italian counter¬ 69. Out of 15 religious leaders paid by the colonial state, only one was a member of
parts in Libya.
the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.

53. Ibid..
70. For the rights of deducting some of the tribute, see Ruffilo Perini,‘Zona di
Asmara: circoscrizione storica*, Rivista Af/Y/Ydre (1894) p. 48. See also Alberto Pollcra,
54. ASMAI, pos. 33/1, file 10, Foreign Minister Di San Giuliano to Parliament, II regime della proprieta terreira* in Etiopia e nella colonia Eritrea, Roma, 1913, pp.
5.7.1910.
17—23. These rights were recognized by the administrative ordinance of 1937, i.c.,
R.D. of 15.11.1937, Ordinamento politico, amministrativo e militare per TAfrica
55. Ibid.. The Foreign Minister pointed out India, where the educated Indians Onrientale Italiana, article 91.
challenged colonial rule, as an example of a misguided native policy of imparting
Western Ideas on minds which were not ready to assimilate them properly. 71. The task of the district commissioner was made easier for two reasons. Firstly, the
colonial state refrained from expropriating/confiscating land, thus taking a delicate
56. Peglion, O., La colonia Eritrea: condizioni e problemi, Roma. 1913, pp. 25—27. issue out of the commissioner’s hands. Secondly, the colonial state held fast to its
policy against forced labour. With these two major problem areas put aside, the
57. Ibid., pp. 65, 73. district commissioners’ main task remained the administration of justice, a task that
could be undertaken with considerable impartiality.
58. As late as 1912, the former governor of Eritrea Ferdinando Martini (1897—1907)
pointed out the lack of Italian interest on Eritrea and asked what Italy intended to do 72. ASMAI pos. 35/17, file 68: Elenco dei capi e notabili indigeni stipendiati e del per-
with4he colony. Ferdinando Martini, ‘L’ltalia e TEritrea’ in L'Eritrea economica, sonale indigeno in servizio dell’amministrazione civile dell’Eritrea al 1 gennaio 1918.
Novara, 1913, edited by Ferdinando Martini, p. 16.
•

73. Ibid..
59. ACS-MAI. busta 1, Governor Cerrina Ferroni to MC, Relazione annuale del 1920.
74. Ibid..
60. ASMAE, serie politic!, pacco 1015, file 2901. Zoli to MC, Asmara 30.6.1930, p. 8.
75. In contrast the Italian administrative staff was in 1931 made up of 627 men and
61. Martino M. Moreno, ‘La politica di razza e la politica coloniale italiana*, Gli an- 14 women, altogether 641 as reported by Vittorio Castellano, ‘La popolazione italiana
nali delFAfrica italiana, 2:2 (1939), p. 457. Moreno was the official responsible in the dell’Eritrea dal 1920 al 1940, Rivista Italiana di Demografia e Statistica, 2:4 (1948),
Ministry of Colonies for native policy.
p. 533.

62. See my ‘Land Tenure and the Organization of Surplus Appropriation on the Eve 76. Gennaro Mondaini, ‘La politica indigena*, in Aspetti delFazione italiana in Africa,
of the Colonial Period*, in Notes on Nationalism and Resistance, p. 30. Atti del Convegno di Studi Coloniali, Firenze, 1946, pp. 79—115.

63. Ibid..
77. R.D. of 2.7.1908: Ordinamento giudiziario della colonia Eritrea, no. 325
recognized in broad terms the judiciary powers of the chiefs. These powers were laid
64. Ibid.. down in detail in the subsidiary legislation: Regolamento giudiziario per I’Eritrca,
Asmara, 11.7.1908, pp. 146—65. See also, Moreno, ‘La politica coloniale indigena
65. Prior to 1903, Eritrea was divided into four districts, three of which were the nell’Africa Orientale Italiana*, Gli Annali delFAfrica Italiana, 6:1 (1942), p. 71.
highland districts of Hamassien, Seraye and Akele Guzay. Between 1903 and 1906,
Governor Martini created the Sahel, Gasc-Setit, Assab and Barca districts. See his 78. Ibid.; see also R.D. of 20.6.1935; Ordinamento giudiziario per la colonia Eritrea,
report to Parliament, Relazione sulla colonia Eritrea del Reggio Commissario Civile article 1.
116 117
 19, Vicenzo Mellana, ‘L’amministrazione della giustizia neirAfrica Orientale Italiana, 96. R.D. of 19.4.1937, no. 880: Sanzioni per i rapporti d’indole coniugale fra cittadini
1936—40’, Roma, 1972, pp. 186—95. e sudditi.

80. Ibid., p. 190. 97. Alessandro Lessona, Memoriedi Alessandro Lessona, Firenze, 1959, pp. 298—99.

81. See Mellana, ‘L’amministrazione della giustizia*, p. 191. 98. Ibid..

82. R.D. of 20.6.1935; Ordinamento giudizario per la colonia Eritrea, articles 42, 44. 99. Martino M. Moreno, ‘La politica di razza e la politica coloniale italiana*, Gli an-
nali delTAfrica Italiana, 2:2 (1939), p. 459; Nicola Marchitto, La difesa della Razza
83. In the district of Hamassien litigants had to exhaust four court instances before nelTimpero: Il problema dei meticci, Napoli, 1939; Sangiorgi, G.M., ‘Una problema
they reached the tribunal of the commissioner. According to an unidentified source da evitare: Il metcciato*, Attidel terzo congresso distudi coloniali, Firenze, 1937, vol.
used by Mellana in his review of administration of justice in Eritrea during the colonial 2, pp. 129— 34; Mutinelli, M., ‘La difesa della razza nell’Africa Orientale Italiana*,
period, the chiefs were widely abusing their prerogatives. Atti del terzo congresso di studi coloniali, Firenze, 1937, vol. 2, pp. 170—77; Ncri, 1..
‘Caratteri della politica indigena fascista*, Atti del terzo congresso di studi coloniali,
Firenze, 1937, vol. 2, pp., 134—42.
84. The Fetha Nagast or The Law of the Kings was an ancient document that traced
its origin to the Roman Period. Meant to regulate the conduct of kings, commoners
100. Prior to 1940 the half-castes had the legal possibilities to acquire Italian citizen¬
and the priesthood, the Fetha Nagast has been taken as the highest source of law since
its translation into the Ethiopic language in the sixteenth century. ship according to articles 17 and 18 of the R.D. 6.7.1933: Ordinamento organico per
I’Eritrea e Somalia. See Agresti L., ‘I meticci e la carta fondamentale dell’Eritrca c
della Somalia*, Atti delsecondo congresso distudi coloniali, Firenze, 1934, vol. 6, pp.
85. Tzadua, P. (Abba), The Fetha Nagast, Addis Ababa, 1966, pp. XX—XXVIII.
191—201.
86. Ibid..
101. Ibid..

87. Indeed, the court of the Ethiopian emperors was the court of last instance. How¬
102. See Brucculeri, A., ‘Chiesa e Stato nella politica della razza*, Antischiavismo:
ever, Ethiopian emperors passed judgement according to the prescription of the Fetha
Rivista di studi coloniali e missionari, 49:1—3 (1937) 21—24.
Negast as explained to them by the higher clergy.

103. ‘Lineament! della legislazione per I’impero*, Gli annali delTAfrica Italiana, 2:3
88..The colonial admnistration, however, had no problem in finding eligible can¬
(1939) p. 71.
didates, largely due to the fact that the traditional ruling elite (political office) was
rarely hereditary.
104. Legge of 29.6.1939, no. 1004: Sanzioni per la difesa del prestigio di razza di
fronte ai nativi dell’Africa Italiana.
89. Lucy Mair, Native Policies in Africa, London, 1936, p. 123.
105. Ibid..
90. R.D. of 20.6.1935: Ordinamento guidiziario per la colonia Eritrea, article 35.
106. Legge no. 822, 13.5.1940.
91. Lidio Cipriani, Considerazione sopra il passato e Tavvenire delle popolazione
Africane, Firenze, 1932, pp. 17—18, 111—19, 162. 107. Martino M. Moreno, ‘La politica di razza e la politica coloniale italiana*, Gli an¬
nali delTAfrica Italiana, 2:2 (1939), p. 458. Placing Italian native policy in its historical
92. Lidio Cipriani, Impero Etiopico: Un assurdo etnico, Roma, 1935. Professor perspective, Moreno maintained that ever since Italy has set foot in Africa it has pur¬
Cipriani became one of the editors of the official periodical that was entrusted with sued racist policies.
the defence of the purity of the Italian race against Jewish and Black African en¬
croachments. The periodical, La Difesa della Razza was published between 1938 and 108. Ibid..
1941.
109. See Rava, M., ‘Politica sociale verso gli indigeni e modi di collaborazione con
93. See Alfredo Capone, Storia dltalia, vol. 20, Torino, 1981, pp. 458—59. essi*, R. Addademia d’ltalia, Convegno, p. 758.

94. Cipriani, Considerazione sopra il passato e Tavvenire, pp. Ill—19. 110. Moreno, *la politica di razza e politica coloniale*, p. 463.

95. Ibid.; Mola, Llmperialismo italiano, pp. 218—20. 111. Ibid., 462.

118 119
112. Cipriani, ‘Razze africane e civilta deU’Europa*, R. Addademia d*Italia, Con- CHAPTER FIVE
vegno, p. 559.

113. Moreno, ‘La politica di razza e politica coloniale’, p. 457. LIMITATIONS OF THE IDEOLOGY OF
114. Ibid.. COLONIALISM; THE THREAT OF
116. Lucy Mair, Native Policies in Africa, p. 123.
RESISTANCE TO COLONIAL RULE
117. Moreno, ‘La politica di razza e politica coloniale’, p. 458.

Between May and August 1889 the Italians occupied the Eritrean highlands
without firing a single shot. There was virtually no resistance to coloniza¬
tion.' The famine had started in 1888 and it was followed by a cholera
epidemic and a hitherto unknown cattle disease. It was these conditions which
undermined the resistance capability of the Eritreans.^ There were also other
factors. The attempts by Egypt, the Mahdist Sudan and then finally Italy to
extend their possessions into the Eritrean highlands had turned the latter into
a battleground with dire consequences for the population.^
In their march to Keren and Asmara, the key points in Eritrea, the Italians
weve aided by the then Eritrean political elite.^ Furthermore, the occupation
of some areas of the highlands, which had formed an integral part of
Ethiopia, were made in accordance with the Italo-Ethiopian treaty of Wichale
dated May 1889.* Thus in addition to the crisis of the Eritrean people caused
by the Great Famine, the ceding of parts of the highlands to the Italians fur¬
ther undermined their will to resist. In January 1 1890, when Italy con¬
solidated its Red Sea possessions into a colony, henceforth known as Eritrea,
the inhabitants of the region were still suffering from the Great Famine which
lasted until 1892. Coinciding with a period of great social and economic stress,
Italian colonization won the support of groups most affected by it, such as
as labourers and colonial soldiers. The Italians gave famine relief to their loyal
supporters.^
The ease with which Italy occupied the highlands and the success of the col¬
onial state in eliminating members of the Eritrean political elite without arous¬
ing any resistance among the population, strengthened the Italian belief in the
colony’s subjugation to its will. Between 1890 and 1891, the colonial stale
eliminated more than half of the traditional political elite together with their
supporters. Over one thousand people were summarily executed in a ‘pacifica¬
tion’ process, described by contemporary writers as the genocide of the in¬
habitants of Massawa.’ The widespread liquidation of the elite and their
followers, documented by Johannes Kolmodin in 1908, was not a response to

121
 any resistance by the elite as there was none, nor did Italian pacification Aberra came from the region of Hamassien and was probably one of the few
arouse any general resistance by the Eritrean people.* The 1890—1891 surviving members of the political elite who hoped to remain in the country
repressive action had, according to the informants of Kolmodin, a stunning by collaborating with the Italians. In February 1892 a rumour was spread that
effect on the population. Those chiefs who were not killed on the spot were Aberra was suspected of opposition to Italian rule and would soon be de¬
detained at Nokra, near Assab and many later died in prison.’ tained. Instead of either fleeing or go into hiding, Aberra gathered his forces
From 1889 the raison d’etre of the Italian expansion in Africa was explained and waited until an expeditionary force was sent to capture him. He defeated
i exclusively in terms of a solution to the emigration problem. By creating its the expeditionary force, killing the Italian commander. Captain Bettini, and
own colony of settlement, Italy could settle its citizens on Italian territory, then went into hiding in Asmara.'^ After an extensive search to capture him
thus keeping them in perpetual contact with the mother country. Eritrea was had failed, the authorities lost hope of tracing him. Aberra then gathered
to be an extension of Italy in language, culture and population. On the basis some of his followers around him and left for Ethiopia.
of a report submitted by a parliamentary commission, which visited Eritrea An inspiring hero for the people of Hamassien, Aberra was given an au¬
between April and May 1891, Italy and the colonial government initiated an dience by Emperor Minilik. After hearing the story, the Emperor is alleged
ambitious policy of turning Eritrea into a colony of settlement.'® Between to have said ‘From a thousand Amhara a single Aberra’.The Ethiopian
1893 and 1895 more than fifty per cent of all cultivated land in the Eritrean emperor elevated Aberra to the position of Degiac in the Ethiopian army.
highlands was confiscated by the colonial state and set aside, at least Later, during the battle of Adwa in March 1896, Degiac Aberra played a
juridically, for Italian colonists. This massive confiscation of land resulted in crucial role in disrupting enemy communication lines. Unsuccessful in freeing
the only notable manifestation of resistance to foreign rule and this was to his country from the Italians, Aberra lived the rest of his life in central
have a considerable impact on subsequent colonial policy. Ethiopia.
Although there is little mention of Aberra in Italian sources after 1896,
there are many references to Mohamed Nuri and Gebremedhin Hagos. Apart
from the knowledge that Nuri originated from the Saho ethnic group, on the
eastern edges of the Eritrean plateau, there is little other biographical infor¬
Nature and Scope of Resistance mation on him. In his diary of July 1902, Martini writes as if he already knew
Nuri from before and describes him as ‘the notorious brigand’."
Resistance is essentially a political concept. For our purpose resistance is de¬ Gebremedhin Hagos on the other hand was well known. He was the son of
fined as any collective or individual action against the presence of alien politi¬ Bahta Hagos who in 1894 organized the most notable mass-based resistance
in Eritrea. After the collapse of the 1894 resistance, Gebremedhin escaped to
cal domination, with the express objective of freeing the region, locality or
the Ethiopian region of Tigrai. Between 1895 and 1904 Gebremedhin
villages from such foreign domination." In explaining the organization of
repeatedly tried to persuade the rulers of Tigrai to assist him in the war against
resistance and the degree of participation, such terms as ‘elite resistance* and
the Italians. An already deeply divided Tigrai was however in no position to
‘mass-based resistance’ are useful.'^ Seen within the above-mentioned con¬
ceptual framework, Eritrean resistance to colonial rule is characterized by its entertain his plea.
Although Gebremedhin enjoyed an esteemed reputation and respect as the
paucity. The sparse and scattered acts of resistance, however, appeared to
son of a martyr, he did not trouble the colonial government in Eritrea to the
have limited the full implementation of many colonial policies.
Although the most notable act of resistance took place only in December same extent as Nuri, who through forays into Eritrea harassed the movement
of the colonial army. Sometime between 1890 and 1891, Nuri asked the per¬
of 1894, by 1890 it had become clear to many Eritrean leaders that the only
mission of Ras Mekonnen, the territorial governor of northern Ethiopia, to
alternative available to them was to cross the border into Ethiopia and con¬
assassinate Ferdinando Martini, the governor of Eritrea." In early February
tinue their resistance from there. Of the many members of the political elite
who fled from colonial rule mention is here made only to the most notable. of 1903, Nuri was temporarily detained in Adwa by Degiac Gebre Selassie, an
Ethiopian ally of Italy, who had signed an extradition agreement with the
In contrast to the mass-based resistance of 1894, I have used the term ‘elite
Italians. Nuri’s reputation and his alliances with Ethiopian political leaders
resistance’ to designate those acts of the political elite which lacked a wider
following. were so strong that Degiac Gebre Selassie refused to extradite him without tlie
The persistent resistance by Aberra is vividly recounted by Kolmodin. express authorization of the Ethiopian emperor.

122 123
 . In the summer of 1903, Nuri and a small group led by Gebremedhin Hagos ingly unanimous reply of ‘war’, Bahta proceeded to plan the course of
settled in the vicinity of the Eritreo-Tigrai border. We do not know the extent resistance. His confidence was probably reinforced by the assurances of sup¬
to which Nuri and Gebremedhin succeeded in inspiring the desertion of small port that he received from the rulers of Tigrai and the Emperor Minilik. Bahta
bands from the regions of Akele-Guzay and Seraye, a movement which was could have strengthened and better organized his forces if he had immediately
significant during the governorship of Martini. On June 30, 1900, Martini attacked the poorly defended fort at Halay, a few miles south west of his
noted in his diary that that desertions and armed confrontations between the headquarters. His three days delay allowed the Governor General Baraticri to
colonial army and those who resisted its presence constituted the daily menu dispatch an army of 3,500 men from Asmara and Massawa. Fully aware of
(il menu quotidiano) in Eritrea.*’ the presence of Italian forces in the area, Bahta belatedly attacked the fort on
Mass-based resistance coincided with a major change in colonial policy, to¬ December 18, and the battle was as good as lost. The colonial army sur¬
gether with the recovery from the great famine of 1888—1892. With elite rounded Bahta’s forces and within a few hours the resistance had been
resistance suppressed, the colonial state felt that the time had come to build crushed and Bahta himself killed by a fifth columnist.^
up the colony’s infrastructure, necessary for the purpose of settling Italian A mass-based anti colonialist movement was thus clearly expressed for the
landless peasants. Encouraged by information from the two agricultural ex¬ first time since 1889 when colonialism had begun to deny the peasantry its
perimental stations, the colonial government began to confiscate vast tracts only means of livelihood. The suppression of the Bahta led resistance was not
of land from Eritreans for its own citizens. By the beginning of 1894 the settl¬ sufficient to banish his ghost and the probability of another uprising. With
ing of Italian peasants had already begun. The policy of settling peasants, al¬ the idea of completely suppressing any further resistance, Baratieri decided to
though finally abortive, was to be the major cause of the most notable mass- invade Tigrai, where the followers of Bahta were regrouping. What started as
based resistance to colonial rule in Eritrean history. a limited campaign turned into a battle about the colonization of Ethiopia.
On December 14, 1894 Bahta Hagos, the leading chief of Akele-Guzay and In the battle of Adwa, March 1 1896, Italy lost four thousand soldiers.
Seraye and a trusted man since 1888, gathered his forces of about two thou¬ According to Italian as well as Ethiopian historiography, the battle of
sand men and issued his call for resistance.'* Unlike Aberra, his position was Adwa was fought not over Italian land policy in Eritrea, but over the position
not jeopardized. Converted to Catholicism sometime between 1889 and 1890, of Italy in Ethiopia.“ A brief recapitulation of the political background is
Bahta was considered an ideal collaborationist. From the outset Bahta necessary. By virtue of article 17 of the treaty of Wichale of 1889, the Italians
realized that for resistance to be successful, the collaborating elites, the argued that Ethiopia was their protectorate.^’
peasantry and the Ethiopian state had to be brought together. According to The Ethiopians counter-argued by maintaining that the said article in its
Ardemani who was in the area at the time of the resistance, Bahta, after ar¬ Amharic version implied no such relinquishment of sovereignty and that
resting Leutenant Sanguinetti and two Italian telegraph operators, sent Ethiopia was and would remain independent.“ The picture was complicated
messages to the collaborating elites and to the peasantry to join him in by the British and German positions in favour of the Italian interpretation of
resisting the Italians. The content of the message was expressed in what later the treaty. The treaty was due for revision in 1894 and the Ethiopian emperor
became an historical idiom: There is no medicine for the bite of a white forced the issue into the open by making it known that Ethiopia would alto¬
snake’.*’ He is alleged to have written repeatedly to the rulers of Tigrai, gether revoke the treaty.^’ Supported by its European allies, Italy responded
though none of his letters have been traced.^ The Italians believed that that article 17 of the treaty on the Italian protectorate over Ethiopia was ir¬
Bahta kept the rulers of Tigrai and the Ethiopian emperor fully informed. Ac¬ revocable. It was in this political climate that the Bahta uprising took place.
cording to Cappucci, Bahta wrote several letters to Minilik, in which he From the perspectives of the colonial state, the Bahta uprising involved from
warned the Emperor not to play the Italians’ game. Minilik, in reply, is the beginning the Ethiopian state in the armed confrontation, which began in
alleged to have assured Bahta that eventually all would go well and advised December 1894^ and ended with the battle of Adwa on the first of March
him to exercise more patience until further instructions arrived.^* 1896.
The next day on December 15, Ardemani continued, war preparations The outcome of the battle of Adwa was that Italy recognized the full
issued from the headquarters of Bahta spread to the greater part of the sovereignty of Ethiopia by renouncing the treaty of Wichale of 1889. The
Eritrean highlands.^ On the same day Bahta further explained the motives Eritreo-Ethiopian boundary agreement of 1889 was also officially revoked,
for his resistance with the rhetorical question: ‘What do we do with the though the Italians were allowed to remain within the frontiers of 1890 until
Italians who have come to take our lands away?’.^ Satisfied with a seem¬ a joint delimitation of boundaries.^* While these were the political gains, the

124
125
 repercussions of the Italian defeat at Adwa on Eritrea were even more import¬
ant.
The Ethiopian Factor in the Emergence of Irredentist
The defeat of Adwa highlighted the fact that Italian interest lay in the Sentiments, 1924—34
Mediterranean and not in Africa.^^ The cost in terms of human lives and
resources was far beyond what the Italian state was prepared to tolerate.” It Intelligence reports compiled at the beginning of the First World War were
was also perceived that the defeat was brought about by a series of pro¬ concerned with the rumours that the young Ethiopian crown prince
vocative measures taken by the Eritrean colonial government against Eyassu^'had refused to be crowned before he had driven the Italians out of
Ethiopia.” The marginal importance of colonies was repeatedly emphasized Eritrea and that the people of Hamassien (i.e. the Tigrinyans) would support
and it was stated that if Italy did not abandon Eritrea altogether, at the least, him.^^ These rumours were first spread in Asmara. The crown prince was
it should not be drawn into similar and costly colonial adventures. This was removed in 1916 before the fulfillment of his ambitions and the Ethiopian
made clear with the appointment of Martini as governor, when he was in¬ threat ceased in the 1920’s until the reorganization of the Ethiopian state by
structed to either administer the colony within a limited and fixed budget, or the late emperor Haile Selassie.
abandon the colony to its own fate.” The rumours of an Ethiopian invasion of Eritrea, however, confirmed: 1)
From 1897 the colonial state introduced a series of rectifying measures of the realization by Eritreans that they could not confront the colonial stale on
which the most important were the cessation of land confiscation and the their own; and 2) the precolonial unity between the Tigrinyans and the
recognition of certain privileges for the Eritrean political elite.” As far as Amharas within the traditional political system.
Eritrea was concerned, the cause of the Bahta uprising had been the confisca¬ The colonial state in 1924 began to be aware of the impact on Eritrea of
tion of land, and the colonial state quite correctly reasoned that it could Ethiopian modernization. This was in connection with the activities of the
defuse resistance by a correct handling of the land question.” Aware that the Swedish mission, which according to the colonial government encouraged its
confiscation of land from the Tigrinyan owners could have wider anti-Italian student to leave for Ethiopia.” In a dispatch to the Ministry of Colonies, the
repercussions, the colonial state discouraged further land confiscation. The Eritrean Governor pointed out that, ‘students from the Swedish mission dem¬
fear of a combined Eritrean and Ethiopian resistance was a major worry for onstrate a major attachment to Ethiopia rather than to Eritrea*. The colonial
Italian colonial policy until the Italo-Turkish war of 1911— 12.” administration launched an obstructionist policy towards the Swedish mis¬
Tl^ main lesson learnt from the Bahta uprising was that any colonial policy sion, until the dismissal of the mission from Eritrea in 1932.” However, this
of land alienaton would arouse such political unrest that would bring forth attachment by Swedish mission students to Ethiopia appeared to have aroused
support from Ethiopia. By 1912, although the colonial state had eliminated the colonial government to re-examine relations between the colony and
the possibility of another uprising by renouncing land alienation, it neverthe¬ Ethiopia. The Swedish mission and its educational work raised questions
less resorted to the Bahta uprising in order to discourage some sections of col¬ about the loyalty of the Eritrean people to Italian colonial system.
onialist opinion calling for more ruthless policies of exploitation.” One of the strategies that the colonial state had persistently pursued since
The Bahta uprising was seen as an example of misguided policies and the 1926 was the breaking ‘once and for all of the multitude of traditional links*
defeat at Adwa as an adventurist exercise of foreign policy. Moreover, col¬ between the Tigrinyan and the Ethiopian populations.” The Ministry of Col¬
onial policy since 1912 was not dictated by a fear of resistance but by the new onies and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs agreed with the Governor of Eritrea
role of Eritrea as a supplier of colonial soldiers for Italy’s colonial war in on the necessity of severing links between Eritrea and Ethiopia, and negotia¬
Libya.^ The colonial state’s desire not to provoke resistance was not based tions were undertaken between the Italian delegation in Cairo and the Coptic
on the prohibitive cost of putting it down. Rather, it was due to a rational Patriachate.” In 1929, the Italians succeeded in persuading the Egyptian
calculation that political stability in Eritrea made possible the extraction of head of the Coptic Church to appoint a patriarch for the empire of Ethiopia
cheap and efficient colonial soldiers for Libya. Thus from 1912 onwards, col¬ which excluded any ecclesiastical jurisdiction over Eritrea.”
onial policy had no reason to take into account the threat of Eritrean The separation of Eritrean Christians from Ethiopian spiritual jurisdiction
resistance. was a step in the right direction according to the Italian view but, as Governor
Zoli noted, it was not sufficient. Concerned about the growing links between
the churches in Eritrea and those in Ethiopia, Zoli informed his superiors:

126
127
 . 1 have always maintained and continue to maintain that the only way to resolve
The head of the Catholic mission pointed out that the colonial policy of put¬
the growing and preoccupying situation and to liberate ourselves once for all...
is through the appointment of an Egyptian bishop for Eritrea.^*
ting Eritrea under the direct dependency of the Patriarchate in Cairo had in¬
creased the pride of the people, thus making it more difficult to carry out con¬
Zoli thought that unless the Tigrinyans, who shared the same language and version.” The opponents of the Catholic mission were the monks of the
religion with societies in Ethiopia, were provided with their own spiritual Debre Bizen monastery who had powerful influence over their people. Similar
leader, their local churches would continue to function as the ‘hotbed of views were also expressed in 1933, when the Orthodox world was described
Ethiopian nationalism as ‘more diffident than the past as can be seen by the way the monastery of
Zoli’s suggestion for an Egyptian bishop was rejected by the Catholic mis¬ Bizen mobilizes the village clergy in the protection of the faith’.^
sion, which feared that the presence of a bishop would revitalize the Orthodox According to the census of 1928 there were 8,473 Catholics and 239,000 Or¬
Church to the detriment of Catholic activity. This argument prevailed and in¬ thodox in Eritrea.*^' This figure includes both Catholic migrants from
stead, a year later, the Italians managed to put Eritrea under the direct Ethiopia^ as well as those who were born into Catholic families, and thus
authority of the patriarchate in Cairo. the number of converts was far less than the figures indicated in the census.
The second strategy of the colonial government was to try to sever links be¬ Although the motive of colonization, was not the Catholicization of the col¬
tween Tigrinyans and their co-religionists in Ethiopia by Catholicizing ony, the colonial state assisted the Catholic mission. Colonial policies were
Eritrea. concerned with the spreading of Italian culture, of which Catholicism was an
In his study on religion and politics in Italian colonialism, Cesare Bounaiuti inseparable part.” The entrusting of schools from 1923 to the Catholic mis¬
has argued that the reasons for the failure of the Catholicization of Eritrea sion and the expulsion in 1932 of rival foreign missions were the maximum
in general, and the limited success of the Catholic mission, was due to the measures that the colonial government could take without contradicting its
vacillation by the colonial state in its relations with the Catholic mission.^* objectives.”
The author emphasized that the colonial state narrowly interpreted religious While the Catholic mission appeared to have accepted its very limited suc¬
liberties in the colony and this policy relegated the Catholic mission to the cess in converting Eritrean Orthodox, a series of events in Ethiopia and their
same level as Islam and the Ethiopian Orthodox Church.But the dismal repercussions were being felt in Eritrea. Over two years the colonial state
record of the Catholic mission in converting only 8,000 Eritrean Orthodox noticed among the Tigrinyans sporadic feelings of irredentism, which called
menibers in over fifty years can not only be explained by the failure of the for immediate measures by the colonial government. These irredentist agita¬
colonial administration to assist the Catholic mission.” tions were caused by the coronation of Haile Selassie, by the promulgation of
Access to the archives of the Catholic mission is not easy and the dearth of the first Ethiopian constitution in 1931 and by a slow but steady process of
literature hardly needs to be emphasized. Even so, Bounaiuti would have had centralization implemented by the enlightened new monarch at Addis Abeba.
to re-evaluate the role of the colonial government if he had consulted Metodio The coronation of Haile Selassie in 1930 upset the religious policy of the
Da Nembro’s exhaustive study on the history of the Catholic mission in colonial state. Although Eritrea had been separated from Ethiopia on
Eritrea.” Metodio Da Nembro wrote his study in 1953 from mission archive spiritual matters, the coronation was characterized by a strong participation
sources long after the fall of Italian colonialism. of Eritrean monasteries. The religious links which the Italians had wished to
The fulcrum of Catholic missionary activity remained the Tigrinyans and sever appear to have been particularly strengthened, at a time when contacts
Da Nembro accounted for the slow rate of conversion to the compact opposi¬ between Addis Abeba and Asmara had greatly improved. When learning
tion of the Orthodox Church.” In the early years of the colonial period the about Haile Selassie’s gifts to Eritrean monasteries, the Minister of Colonies
Orthodox Church threatened excommunication against those who changed informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that,
their religion.” By the 1920’s this method appeared to have changed. Ex¬
plaining the difficulties of converting the Eritrean Orthodox, the head of the ...the Ethiopian government’s intentions of exercising authority over the
Eritrean Church and neutralizing the connections between Italy and the Patriar¬
Catholic mission wrote in 1929 that ‘...the work of propaganda is strongly
chate at Cairo were too evident.”
obstructed by the existence of a distinct national pride’.” He also referred to
a watchful monastic network which made the population adhere to its faith.” The Ethiopian Consul at Asmara, Ato Wedajo Ali, was accused of inciting
If the Catholic mission had had little success in converting Eritreans in the Ethiopian nationalism among the Tigrinyans, with apparently considerable
years up to 1929, the decade of the 1930’s was to prove even more difficult. success.
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129
 The objective of breaking the bonds of unity between the Tigrinyans and as they would soon be needed in the war against Italy, a country that had
the people of Ethiopia,by establishing a separate Eritrean Church was to en¬ refused to give back the Eritrean colony to Ethiopia.^*
sure Eritrean loyalty to the Italian colony. However, this aim was frustrated A few months earlier the Ethiopian consul at Asmara was reported to have
by the persistence of religious links. On the contrary, as the head of the said to the Ethiopian and Eritrean community, that if the Italians had refused
Catholic mission observed, the religious unity appeared to have become more to allow him to present gifts to the Eritrean monasteries. Emperor Haile
pronounced during the early 1930’s than in the preceding decades. With Selassie would have expelled the Italian minister at Addis Abeba.**^ The
catholicization virtually ruled out as an alternative strategy, the colonial Ministry of Colonies felt that the attitude of the Ethiopian consul in Eritrea
government and Italy began to take cognizance of developments in Ethiopia was,
and their impact in Eritrea with considerable anxiety.
evidently inspired by a premeditated programme and conducted towards a
Repercussions of developments in Ethiopia continued in 1931 with the pro¬
precise goal. The nationalist tendency which the Ethiopian consul reveals has
mulgation of a constitution which, at least juridically, turned Ethiopia into
undoubtedly received a clear response in Eritrea, as recently verified by the
a parliamentary state.In assessing the impact of this on Eritrea, Governor notable episodes of irredentism..^®
Astuto, commented that its implementation would be a major step towards
‘Even if these sentiments may now seem sporadic’, continued the Minister,
centralization. As to its impact on Eritrea, the Governor described it as
‘they ought to be considered as tendencies... which arouse in the spirit of the
‘...naturally dangerous because the establishment of a sort of a parliamentary
people notions of irredentism that lie hidden or inactive’.^'
regime reinforces those vague aspirations of irredentism’.^
The rearmament of the colony begun on a modest scale in the middle of
Colonial dispatches from Eritrea for the years 1926 to 1932, give a strong
1931, was a response to the Ethiopian government’s intention to exercise a
impression of a rapidly changing Ethiopia in relation to the colony of Eritrea.
direct control over the import trade, by increasing the ad valorem tax from
The migration of educated Eritreans to Ethiopia in search of better jobs, the
8 to 40 per cent.’^ Responding to this process of centralization, the Ministry
growing spread of Ethiopian political and economical power up to Eritrean
of Colonies called for an alert surveillance in order to avoid any ‘disgraceful
borders, and continued Ethiopian contacts with Eritrean monasteries, all ap¬
surprises’.’^
pear to have exerted considerable pressure on the Eritrean colonial govern¬
In 1932, Italy decided to invade Ethiopia. The reasons for the Italian inva¬
ment.
sion have been studied from several perspectives and the literature is quite ex¬
The colonial state realized that it had to severe the links between Eritrea and
Ethiopia. However, by 1931, it could see that its efforts had been far from tensive.’^ However there have been very few attempts to explain the con¬
tributions that Ethiopian factors might have played in the decision to invade.
effective. Short of incorporating Ethiopia under Italian rule, the colonial
In one of the few studies that has attempted to provide an Ethiopian dimen¬
government had few other ideas and strategies to offer.
sion, it has been argued that the Italians were losing a sphere of influence and
The rapid modernization of Ethiopia in relation to Eritrea can best be il¬
were becoming less important in the Ethiopian political economy.’^
lustrated by the assessment of Governor Zoli in 1930. In a detailed report he
From the Eritrean perspective we can clearly see that the sentiments of
pointed out the failure of the Catholics to convert the Tigrinyans, and he
Ethiopian nationalism aroused among the Tigrinyans by events in Ethiopia
thought this was particularly discouraging as the monasteries in Eritrea were
had began to preoccupy the colonial government and Rome. The Italian posi¬
seen as the hotbed of Ethiopian nationalism. Zoli concluded in the following
tion was not considered as being directly threatened,and it was thought that
manner:
a successful ‘military intervention’ would stabilize for years the Italian posi¬
We have to recognize that we find ourselves in a situation that existed forty tion in Eritrea and Ethiopia.’^
years ago. Since we have not even benefited from the modest degree of evolution
Although the occupation of Ethiopia removed the Ethiopian threat to col¬
which existed in the local traditional institutions, we now find ourselves in a
onial rule in Eritrea, sentiments of Ethiopian nationalism continued to be ex¬
condition of inferiority in respect to the population of Ethiopia.^’
pressed by large numbers of Eritreans who participated in the Ethiopian
Another concern about Ethiopian influence was the confidence with which the resistance movement.”
Ethiopian consul carried out his duties. The process of centralization carried
out by the Ethiopian state also worried the Eritrean colonial government. In
April 1931, Governor Astuto informed the Ministry of Colonies that the
Ethiopian consul was advising his countrymen not to join the colonial army.

130 131
 Limitations of Resistance nyan society exhibited several feudal characteristics.** Aristocracy had
always existed but was not hereditary as aristocratic privilege was earned
The threat of resistance ceased for a number of reasons to be a serious factor through military valour. Land belonged in theory, to the Ethiopian emperor
in the making and implementation of colonial policy. Firstly, the formal ces¬ and his military prowess determined the extent of his power and authority. In
sion by Ethiopia of the Tigrinyan (Abyssinian) parts of Eritrea to Italy, practice and custom, the land belonged to the peasants. Aristocratic power
through the treaty of 1900,’* could have created the impression that Eritrea rested on its ability to extract a surplus from the peasantry by various types
had been denied the support of Ethiopia. The evidence for such presumption, of tribute.*’ In times of peace relations between the aristocracy (or the politi¬
though based on the accounts of individuals appears to be sufficiently reliable cal elite) were generally tolerable. It naturally deteriorated during prolonged
and indicative of the political mood of the period. The Eritrean author of a political conflicts. This was because the peasantry was expected to provide
letter drafted in 1899 to the Ethiopian emperor strongly argued that the Ethio¬ men and provisions in support of rival claimants to power.**
pian emperor had the obligation to liberate all Ethiopians under foreign col¬ The colonial state exploited the latent contradiction between the Tigrinyan
onial rule.” The author of the letter was aware of the treaty of Wichale of ruling elite and the peasantry by relieving the latter from the exploitation of
1889 as well as the treaty of 1896, which allowed the Italians to remain in the the traditional ruling elite. The Eritrean colony was largely financed by Italy.
colony until the delimitation of definite boundaries.*® It was also made clear The colonial state, therefore, was not dependent solely on taxes from the
in the letter that without the assistance of Ethiopia the Eritreans could not peasantry, and it could afford to impose a much less burdensome tribute pay¬
shake off their colonial status, which was compared to a condition of slavery ment than that which would have otherwise been imposed by the traditional
worse than that experienced by the people of Israel during the reign of ruling elite.** By eliminating troublesome members of the elite and by strictly
Titus.*' controlling the remainder, the colonial state appeared to some of the Tigri¬
Slightly over a decade later, the young and versatile orientalist Johannes nyan peasantry as a benevolent power, engaged in ending peasant exploita¬
Kolmodin was informed while researching in Eritrea that as a result of Italo- tion.*® This view is clearly illustrated in a number of Tigrinya poems,
Ethiopian treaties, the Tigrinyans (the children of Ethiopia) had become sub¬ published in 1910, where colonialism is perceived differently by various
jects of Italy.*’ Meanwhile, the Ethiopian region of Tigrai, which because of classes and groups.
its geographical proximity was a refuge for Eritreans who fled from colonial For some Eritreans, as the poem below illustrates, colonialism had a
rule, became less important as a result of internal political and social crises.*’ negative and far reaching impact. In the words of its anonymous author:
The second reason was the ethnic configuration and the prevailing an¬
Ever since the rule of a general and a colonel
tagonism between various groups of people. As discussed earlier, Eritrea was
All the people of Hamassien have been exterminated.
inhabited by nine distinct ethnic groups, each with clearly discernible socio¬ All the people of Tsilma and Tekela have been exterminated.
economic formations. All the people of Mai Tsada and Meraguz exterminated.
The settled agriculturalists included the Baria, the Kunama and the Tigri¬ All those from Qualla and Akele-Guzay exterminated.
Subjected to a system of rule whose answers are
nyans. The semi-pastoralist societies included the Bogos, the Tigre, and the
Askut (a) and Mafish (a).
Saho. The Beja, and the Afar peoples were predominantly pastoralists.** Al¬
While every Bedew (Moslem) rejoices
though the demographic and economic history of the region has still to be Drinking honey-wine.
written, a certain degree of antagonism between the various ethnic groups and Eating bread of the whitest kind.
their socio-economic patterns can clearly be discerned. The political organiz¬ Every noble is being imprisoned,
ation of most of these ethnic groups provided ample grounds for antagonism. And his buttocks ruined by flogging.
There is no medicine for his bite.
The Bogos, the Beja, the Afar and the Tigre were divided into ruling elites and
He has exterminated and uprooted us
serf (or vassal) castes. With the exception of the Afar, the ruling elites were May (God) do the same to him.*'
originally foreigners or outsiders, who succeeded in imposing themselves on
the autochthonous populations. The Saho, the Baria and the Kunama peoples Even if the author did not belong himself to the ruling elite, he was evidently
lived in acephalous societies normally described as democratic or chiefless, as talking on their behalf and in their defence.
they lacked both chiefs and ruling castes.*’ For many others colonialism represented a new era, in which the peasant
Among the Tigrinyans political relations were more complicated, and Tigri- and the poor were not only left free, but could also enjoy the employment op-

132 133
 portunities of the new colonial world. In the words of an anonymous author: tainly have rebelled against these ruling elites had the latter chosen to resist
Italian rule. The demands and aspirations of the serfs were, however, not
Welcome back my Lord Marrazani
fulfilled by the Italians. While political collaboration with the Italians ap¬
Chosen by God like the fruit of holy wine
Who like intelligent eyes distinguishes good from evil. peared to have satisfied interests of the ruling elites, the gains of the serfs were
Who does not demand services from the people. less significant. Although collaboration with Italian colonial rule had
Whose soldiers do not demand guides. eliminated the threat of periodic raids by the Tigrinyans and the Ethiopian
What fault can be found in the rule of Marrazani. state, they remained in serf-like conditions well into the 1940’s.'^
If God listens to my prayers,
The third limiting circumstance was Eritrean collaboration with Italian col¬
May his territory remain under him for many years.^
onialism and the colonial system. For the purpose of this study, collaboration
The semi-pastoralists, i.e. the Saho, Bogos and Tigre peoples were being en¬ is defined as the compatibility of economic and political interests between the
croached upon in the north by the Beja and in the south by the Tigrinyans. imperial (European) and the African political economic systems.’^ Col¬
In search of better pastures, the Beja fought against the Baria, the Kunama, onialism would not have survived so successfully or for so long if there had
the Bogos and the Tigre. The Tigrinyans, sometimes by themselves and at not been a considerable amount of compatibility between its objectives and
other times together with the Ethiopian kings, invaded the Saho, Tigre, Baria, the interests of various Eritrean communities. In Eritrea, as we shall presently
Kunama and Bogos peoples with the twin aims of expanding their territories discuss, Italian colonialism succeeded in securing political and economic col¬
and of collecting tribute.Colonization put an end both to Ethiopian incur¬ laboration from some ethnic groups, while only receiving economic collabora¬
sions into these regions and to the intermittent conflicts between the various tion from others.
ethnic groups in the Eritrean lowlands. Collaboration by Eritreans with Italian colonial rule became more perma¬
The colonial state elicited both political and economic collaboration from nent with the steady growth of the market economy and the new economic
the Tigre, Beja, Bilen, Afar and Kunama communities. Inhabiting ecological (capitalist) opportunities organized by the colonial state. Economic collabora¬
areas that were least favourable for colonist settlement, these communities ex¬ tion was not only freely given but actively sought by Eritreans.^* Throughout
perienced far less change as a result of colonialism than their Tigrinyan the colonial period, service in the colonial army remained the most prestigious
neighbours. Only slowly integrated into the market economy, through the avenue for access to the money economy. Although wages were low, they were
mediation of their traditional rulers, their perception of colonialism was that considerably higher than those paid by the Ethiopian army.’’ During (he
of a phenomenon committed to the maintenance of law and the development 1911 —12 campaign in Libya, the colonial government dispatched 6.(X)0
of commerce. Eritrean soldiers to the Italian war of expansion in North Africa, and this level
Collaboration was easily elicited from the Tigre, Baria, Kunama, Bogos of recruitment for war in Libya continued until the early 1930’s, The overall
and Saho peoples for two important reasons. Firstly, the Ethiopian state con¬ economic impact of militarization can not be over-estimated. Taking the
sidered these regions as its borderlands and therefore essential for its security. census of 1911 as a guide, the colonial army alone by 1914 employed about
To maintain their large armies, the Ethiopian kings had institutionalized ten per cent of the productively active male population of the colony.’*^ The
periodic raids into the borderlands as well as into the rebelling heartlands of new, military-based, economic system considerably lessened the problem of
the kingdom. By using the north and northwestern parts of Eritrea as its land scarcity. Those who remained in the colony had, in addition to their
peripheries the Ethiopian state had deepened the feelings of alienation of these plots, extra land which they could cultivate by sharecropping. The additional
communities in relation to the kingdom. Collaboration with colonialism and source of income, supplementing but not yet substituting the returns of the
the colonial administration meant, for these border regions, an end to traditional mode of production, nevertheless brought about a period of pros¬
periodical raids.’^ perity and abundance to a population with still fresh memories of the great
Secondly, with the exception of the Saho, Baria and Kunama peoples, these famine of 1888—92. Imports of cotton textiles, the main item of consump¬
communities were clearly divided into ruling elites and serf (or vassal) castes. tion, increased from 2,400,000 lire in 1897 to 3,470,000 lire in 1905 and had
In one of the customary codes recorded by Conti Rossini, it is specifically reached 4,485,000 by 1910.*®‘
stated that there was no possibility by which the blood of an aristocrat could Over the years, the growth of the colonial economy brought more and more
run into the veins of the serf.’^ The serfs, who repeatedly asked the colonial Eritreans into the capitalist sector without, however, creating a working class
state to free them from their onerous obligations to their masters would cer¬ entirely dependent on wages; recruitment of Eritrean soldiers for the Libyan

134 135
wars remained the predominant wealth generating sector of the colonial Ethiopia. However, the position of colonialism was far from threatened. I hc
economy for the local population. In spite of the I9l0—21 economic depress¬ colonial state defused resistance by its readiness to use coercive force and also
ion and the drastic fall of the Italian lira against Maria Theresa thaler the by gaining collaboration from sections of the population.
participation of Eritreans in the capitalist sector enabled both the colonial The non-Tigrinyans, the majority of whom were Moslems and inhabited
state and the population at large to import food and thus avoid the serious peripheral areas fully collaborated with the colonial administration in ex¬
consequences of famine By the same token, economic collaboration change for peace and security. With such collaboration from the non-Tigrin¬
enhanced the consolidation of colonial rule. yans, the colonial state was able to easily control the Eritrean political climate.
On the economic front, we have argued that Eritreans readily collaborated be¬
cause of the favourable impact of colonial economic policies on the material
conditions of a considerable section of the population. Economic collabora¬
tion was further enhanced by the colonial state’s decision not to restructure
Concluding Remarks the indigenous socio-economic systems. This policy assisted the colonial state
in its recruitment of Eritrean soldiers for Italian expansion elsewhere.

Resistance to colonial rule was neither widespread nor protracted. The Bahta
uprising, a minor incident in itself, assumed major importance because it
marked the beginning of the 1894—96 Italo-Ethiopian crisis. FOOTNOTES
The Bahta uprising and the small-scale acts of resistance were carried out
mostly by Tigrinyans, who identified themselves with Ethiopia. The signifi¬ 1. Ruffilo Perini, Di Qua dal Mareb, Firenze, 1905, p. 39; Roberto Battaglia. La phmu
cance of the Bahta uprising was its Ethiopian dimension, which in itself was guerra d*Africa, Torino, 1958, p. 371.

a constant reminder of the Italian defeat at Adwa.

2. According to some estimates up to a third of the entire population may have died
From the early 1910’s, the rapid growth of Italian power and its consolida¬ as a result of the famine.The Great Famine started in 1888 and lasted up to 1892. Sec
tion of colonial rule meant the threat of resistance became a rather remote the study on the subject by Pankhurst, R., The Great Ethiopian Famine of 1888—
possibility. However, both the colonial government and the authorities in 1892: A New Assessment*, Journal of the History of Medicine and the Allied
Rome used the possibility of further resistance as an instrument in the curbing Sciences^ 21 (1966) Part Two, pp., 271— 94.
of colonist demands for the taking of more land and labour from the
3. Sven Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence, London, 1976, pp.
Eritreans. To take an illustrative example: In 1911 the colonial government
140—42, 377—78.
refused to allow land confiscation in Tigrinya areas and the reason given
against such confiscation measures was the fear of resistance from within 4. See Angelo Del Boca, GU italiani in Africa Orientate, vol. 1, p. 334.
Eritrea and Ethiopia. Italy used the spectre of further resistance to pursue its
own priorities. One of these priorities, as discussed in chapter two, was the 5. These areas specifically mentioned in article three of the treaty of Wichalc of May
use of Eritrea as a reservoir of soldiers for the colonial army. The interests 1889, were Addi Nefas, Asmara. Akrur, Segeneitti, and Halai. The treaty is ex¬
haustively commented by Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence, pp.
of the Italian authorities in Rome were at times different and contradictory
385—89. The Italian text of the treaty is reproduced in Carlo Rossetti. Storia
when compared with those of its colonists and the colonial government in diplomatica delTEtiopia durante il regno di Menelik II, Torino, 1910, pp. 41—44.
Eritrea.
The Italians were aware of the political implications of the religious 6. Johannes Kolmodin, one of the earliest to record the oral history of the Tigrinyans.
loyalties between the people in Eritrea and those in Ethiopia. The colonial was told that the Italians succeeded to establish their rule because many sought their
government took several measures to secure the allegiance of the Eritrean collaboration. Kolmodin, Traditiones de Tsazzega et Hazzega, textes Tigrinya. Roma,
people to the colonial system. Thirty years of colonial rule was too short a 1912, pp. 257—58.

period to affect the centuries-old cultural and religious links. Colonial goals
7. Del Boca, A., Gli italiani in Africa Orientate, Milano, 1976, pp. 435—42; Romain
were also greatly frustrated by the resurgence of nationalism, caused by the Rainero, L*anticolonialismo italiano da Assab ad Adua, Milano, 1971, pp. 243—44.
modernization policies of the Ethiopian state. The main source of the information is Livarghi, a commander of the colonial police
The colonial state and Italy were seriously worried by developments in up to the end of 1890. Livarghi stated that his superiors were responsible for a far more

136 137
 syrstematic genocide. See also Battaglia, La prima guerra d'Africa, pp. 464—66. 25. For an exhaustive treatment of the battle of Adwa, see Battaglia. La prima guerra
d*Africa, pp. 732—90; Del Boca, Gli italiani in Africa Orientally vol. 1, Milano, 1976
8. Kolmodin, Traditiones de Tsazzega, pp. 257—58. pp. 649—90; Rubenson, The Survival of Ethiopian Independence, pp. 399—406.

9. Ibid.. 26. See Raffaele Ciasca, Storia coloniale delTItalia contemporcmea da Assah alTlm-
pero, Milano, 1938, pp. 195—99; Rubenson, The Survival, p. 406.
10. Relazione Generaie della Reale Commissione d*Inchiesta sulla colonia Eritrea,
Roma, 1891, p. 204. 27. Ciasca, Storia coloniale, ibid.; Rossetti, Storia diplomatic^ delTEtiopia.

11. For the concept of resistance see G.M. Fredrickson, and C. Lasch, ‘Resistance to 28. The Ethiopian position is expressed by Rubenson, Wichalle XVII: The Attempt to
Slavery’, Civil War History, 13:4 (1967) pp. 315—30. The definition provided by R.H. Establish a Protectorate over Ethiopia, Addis Abeba, 1964.
Chilcote, Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazilt Berkeley, 1972, p. 2, is too
broad to be useful. 29. See Rubenson, The Survival, p. 394.

12. See Allen and Barbara Isaacman, ‘Resistance and Collaboration in Southern and 30. Ciasca, Storia coloniale, p.394; Del Boca, Gli italiani nelTAfrica Orientale, vol.
Central Africa, 1850—1920’, The InternationalJournal of African Historical Studies, 1, pp. 521—29.
10:1 (1977) 31-62.
31. See Rossetti, Storia diplomatica, pp. 181—84, for the peace treaty between
13. ASMAI pos. 3/6, file 41, governor Baratieri to Rome, 18.3.1892, explaining the Ethiopia and Italy of 20.10.1896.
death of Captain Bettini and the escape of Aberra.
32. Richard Webster, Industrial Imperialism in Italy, 1908—191^* Berkeley, 1975, p.
14. Kolmodin, Traditiones de Tsazzega, pp. 260—61. 201: ‘It is impossible to argue that any of these colonies (Eritrea, Somalia and Libya)
could serve as an adjunct to the Italian economy, and the history of Italian expansion
15. Martini, II diario eritreo, vol. 3, p. 48, for 11.7.1902. in Africa therefore has little interest for us here’. Names of colonies added.

16. Ibid., vol. 3, pp. 116—17, for 17.2.1903. 33. For a survey of Italian public opinion see Del Boca, Gli italloni nelPAfrica Orien¬
tale, vol.l, pp. 691—716; Rainero, L'anticolonialismo italiano da Assab ad Adua,
17. Ibid., vol. 2, p. 12j, for 6.4.1901. Milano, 1971.

18. Ernesto Ardemani, Tre pagine gloriose nella storia militare-civile-religiosa della 34. Ciasca, Storia coloniale, pp. 219—24.
colonia Eritrea, Roma, 1901, p. 107. At the period, the author was in the nearby
village and appeared to have detailed information on the event. 35. Martini, II diario eritreo, vol. 1, p. 2. Negotiations were secretly undertaken with
the king of Belgium for the transfer of Eritrea in exchange for a reasonable compensa¬
19. Kolmodin, Traditiones de Tsazzega, p. 262. tion. See Rainero, L^anticolonialismo italiano, pp. 352—53; Alberto Acquarone, ‘La
politica coloniale italiana dopo Adua*, Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, 42:1(1975)
20. ASMAI pos. 3/7, file 51, Luigi Cappucci to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Addis p. 363; Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberalism to Fascism, 1870—1925,
Ababa, 15.4.1897. London, 1967, p. 184.

21. Ibid.. 36. The chiefs and notables recognized by the colonial governnient could not be ar¬
rested without the prior consent of the district officer. See ordinamento della diustizia
22. Ardemani, Tre pagine gloriose, p. 94. nella colonia Eritrea of 28.7.1908 published in Gazzetta Uffeciole 4.7.1908. This was
restated in Ordinamento organico per L’Eritrea e la Somalia, R.D. 6.7.1933, no. 999,
23. Ardemani wrote that Bahta addressed his followers on December 16. He did not, article 35.
however, know the contents of the speech. Ato Mehari, an Eritrean who joined the
colonial army in 1930 informed me in Rome in 1977 that Bahta had more or less 37. Gino Bartolommei-Gioli, ‘La colonizzazione agricola dell’Eritrea’, Bollettino del
presented the problem in that manner. Alberto Pollera, in II regime della proprietd ter- emigrazione, 16 (1906) pp. 248—49.
reird in Etiopia e nella colonia Eritrea, Roma 1913, p. 55, also interpreted the Bahta
uprising as a response to colonial confiscation of land. 38. The main aspect of colonial policy that emerges from the diaries of Martini was
not only to defuse resistance inside Eritrea, but also to develop peaceful coexistence
24. Ardemani, Tre pagine gloriose, p. 121. with Ethiopia.

138 139
 39. In 1911 the colonial government expropriated some of the land of two villages for 55. Ibid., p. 83. •
public use. ‘If we were to evict the villagers without giving them comparable land in
the vicinity*, argued governor Salvago-Raggi, *we would open ourselves to a new wave 56. Ibid., p. 35.
of accusations which could arouse a new movement in the colony as well as outside
the country*. For the political security of the colony, Salvago>Raggi decided to ex¬ 57. Ibid., p. 117.
propriate the property of four Italian settlers and give these to the villagers as compen¬
sation. See ASMAI, pos.11/8 file 73, Salvago-Raggi to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 58. Ibid..
11.6.1911.
59. Ibid..
40. See Chapter Two above.
60. Ibid..
41. Ethiopia was ruled by Lijj Eyassu, a young crown prince, from 1913 until his over-
throwal in 1916. For a brief study on Eyassu, see Harold Marcus, The Life and Times 61. ASMAI pos. 54/30, file 118, Zoli to MC 15.7.1929.
of Menelik II: Ethiopia, 1844^1913, Oxford, 1975, pp. 249—81.
62. Between 1890 and 1891 about 1,000 Catholics were expelled by the rulers of north¬
42. ASMAI, pos. 3/22 file 180, Situazione politica dal 6 al 13 Maggio, 1914; pos. 3/23, ern Ethiopia. These were accepted by the colonial state in Eritrea and settled in the
file 200, 20.1.1915. villages of Menekusito and Halhale. See Da Nembro, La missione dei minori cappuc¬
cini, pp. 38—40. Governor Zoli who by no means was anticlerical commented that the
43. ASMAE AA. PP. 1025/3038, governor Gasparini to MC, 23.6.1924. progress of Catholicism was too slow to severe the links between Eritrea and Ethiopia.
He reminded the Minister of Colonies that if the Catholic mission proceeded with such
44. The subversive role of the Swedish mission surfaced again in 1926 where the col¬ pace, it would take 2,300 years to convert the entire population. ASMAI pos. 54/30,
onial state obliged the mission to limit its education to purely religious matters. The file 118, Zoli to MC Asmara, 15.7.1929.
relations between the Swedish Evangelical mission in Eritrea with that of Ethiopia was
described as ‘Undoubtedly against Italian policy in Ethiopia*. ASMAE, serie politici: 63. ASMAI, pos. 54/30 file 118, Minister of Colonies De Bono to Governor Zoli,
Eritrea 1919—1930, pacco 1015 file 2891, Gasparini to MC, 30.11.1926. In June 1932 6.11.1929 on the need for more assistance to the Catholic Mission in Eritrea.
all the Swedish mission schools in Eritrea were closed down. See Cesare Marongiu
Buonaiuti, Politica e religioni nel colonialismo italiano, 1882—1941, Varese, 1982, p. 64. Da Nembro did not point out lack of support as a cause affecting the Catholic Mis¬
207. ^ sion.
r

45. Buonaiuti, Politica e religioni, p. 161. 65. ASMAE AA. PP. Etiopia, busta 4, file 3, De Bono to the Ministry of Foreign Af¬
fairs, 13.2.1931.
46. Ibid., p. 176.
66. ASMAE AA. PP. busta 4, file 3, governor Astuto to MC, Asmara 14.4.1931;
47. Ibid., p. 172. 19.5.1931. Although 1932 is considered as the period when Italy decided to invade
Ethiopia, studies on the military preparedness of the colony both for offensive and
48. ASMAI pos. 54/30, file 118, governor Zoli to MC Asmara, 15.7.1929. defensive purposes were conducted as early as 1926. See Rochat, G., Militari e politici
nellapreparazione della campagna d*Etiopia, 1932—36, Milano, 1971 p. 22; Ministero
49. Ibid.. della Guerra, La campagna 1935—36 in Africa Orientale, voL I: La Preparazione
militare, Roma, 1939, pp. 80—101.

50. Bounaiuti, Politica e religioni nel colonialismo italiano, p. 176.

67. ASMAE serie politici, pacco 1015, file 2901, Zoli to MC Asmara, 30.6.1930, p.
8. Zoli was defending his new agricultural policy where he set aside 5,000 hectares in
51. Ibid., pp. 194. 196.
areas which were not claimed by the Tigrinyan peasants. He was also defending
himself against allegations from the Italian Legation in Addis Abeba accusing him of
52. Ibid., pp. 33—38.
land confiscation and harsh treatment of the natives. He concluded his provokingly
composed dispatch by reminding his superiors that, ‘we ought to be guided by the
53. ASMAI pos. 54/30, file 118, governor Zoli to MC, Asmara, 15.7.1929. spirit of our regime and not by the spirit of the recently deceased F. Martini*, ibid.,
p. 10.
54. Da Nembro, M,, La missione dei minoricappuccini in Eritrea, 1894—1952, Roma
1953. 68. ASMAI pos. 54/31, file 124, governor Astuto to MC, Asmara 20.7.1931.
140
141
 f

69: ASMAE AA. PP, busta 4, file 3, governor Astuto to MC, 14.4.1931. 82. Kolmodin, Traditiones de Tsazzaga, p. 263.

70. ASMAE AA.PP. Etiopia, busta 4, file 3, the Minister of Colonies to the Ministry 83. On the social and political crisis see Tafia, B., ‘Political Crisis in Tigrai, 1889—
of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 15.1.1931. 1899’, Africa (Rome) 34:1 (1979), pp. 105—28.

71. Ibid.. 84. See pp. 5—8.

72. ASMAE AA. PP., Etiopia, busta 4, file 3, MC to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 85. See pp. 5—8.
28.12.1931.
86. Cf. Ellis, G., ‘The Feudal Paradigm as a Hindrance to Understanding Ethiopia’,
73. Ibid.. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 14:2 (1976), pp. 275—95.

74. Crisis of Italian economy as a motive for invasion, see George Baer, The Coming 87. See my ‘Land Tenure and the Organization of Surplus on the eve of the colonial
of the Italo-Ethiopian fVar, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1967, p. 31; Giorgio Rochat, period*, in Notes on Resistance and Nationalism, pp. 22—36.
Militari epolitici, p. 105. Idem., II colonialismo itaiiano^ Torino, 1975. Prestige as a
motive see Federico Chabod, Ultalia contemporanea, 1918—1948^ p. 91. For the 88. See Rubenson, The Survival, pp. 318—26.
primacy of European diplomacy see De Felice, R., Mussolini il Duce: Gli anni del con-
senso, 1929—1936, Milano, 1974, pp. 613—52. 89. See Piccioli, A., La nuova Italia d*oltremare, vol. 2, p. 1441 on the powers of the
Governor to increase or reduce tribute by one third according to the circumstances in
75. Marcus, H., ‘The Infrastructure of the Italo-Ethiopian Crises: Haile Selassie, the the colony.
Solomonic Empire and the World Economy, 1916—1936*, Proceedings of the fifth In¬
ternational Conference on Ethiopian Studies, Chicago, 1978 (1980), p. 563. 90. Kolmodin, Traditiones de Tsazzega, p. 257.

76. On the basis of the few pieces of evidence but hitherto not examined, it is possible 91. Faitlovitch, J., Versi Abissini: Testo Tigrigna, Roma, 1910, pp. 16—17.
to argue that there were two reasons for Italian invasion of Ethiopia. Firstly, the need
to establish a secure hinterland for Eritrea. This hinterland which, according to the 92. Ibid., p. 18.
tripartite treaty of 1906 between Italy, France and Britain, included northern Ethiopia
up to. the sources of the Blue Nile, was progressively eroded by the process of cen¬
93. For the relations between the Tigrinyans and the other ethnic groups in the
tralization introduced by the Ethiopian monarch. Secondly, the desire to put an end
lowlands in the second half of the nineteenth century, see Munzinger, Sull*Africa
to the vague and sporadic episodes of sentiments of nationalism by putting Ethiopia
Orientale, pp. 20—39.
under Italian rule through a successful military intervention.

94. During one of his visits to the Baria, the Kunama and the Beni Amir, governor
77. For a fuller account of the role of Eritreans in the Ethiopian anti-Italian resistance
Martini wrote about them: ‘I feel that their obedience is more devout, their greeting
movement, see my ‘Pax Italica and its Ethiopian Enemies’ in Notes on Resistance and
more cordial and their respect more firm. 1 feel that they realize the benefits of our
Nationalism in Eritrea, 1890—1940, Uppsala, 1986, pp. 36—48.
administration: they have no ambitious hopes for desiring or wanting another govern¬
ment*. 11 diario eritreo, vol.3, p. 79, for 15.12.1905. Martini was also told by one of
78. Through the Italo-Ethiopian treaty of May 1900, Italy was allowed to keep Eritrea the Beni Amer elders: ‘We have tried the Egyptians and the Abyssinians. But only now
in exchange for a lump sum compensation of five million lire. Commenting on the do we feel secure that our belongings and our women are ours*, Ferdinando Martini,
treaty, Perini (alias Gabre Negus) wrote that Italy ended up with more territory than ‘L’ltalia e I’Eritrea*, in L*Eritrea Economica, Novara, 1913, p. 12.
it ex{>ected to get from the Ethiopian emperor. Gabre Negus, ‘Eritrea e i suoi nuovi
confini*, Rivista Moderna, 6 (1902), p. 106.
95. Conti Rossini, C., I principi di diritto consuetudinario delTEritrea, Roma, 1916,
p. 637.
79. The letter available in draft form in AE pacco 935, has been fully discussed in my
‘Blatta Gebre Egziabeher and his works’, in Notes on Resistance and Nationalism in 96. S. J. Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia, London, 1952, pp. 167—68.
Eritrea, pp. 1 — 16.

97. I am greatly indebted to Roland Robinson’s thesis where he argued that European
80. Ibid., p. 11.
economic and strategic expansion could not have taken imperial form, had it not been
for the existence of grounds for collaboration between Europe and the non-European
81. Ibid., p. 12. political economies. ‘Non European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch
142
143
for a theory of Collaboration’, in Roger Owen, and Bob Sutcliffe, eds.. Studies on the CHAPTER SIX
Theory of Imperialism, London, 1972, p. 120.

98. Free from forced labour, the Eritreans exercised considerable control over the ex¬ COLONIAL IMPACT ON ERITREAN
tent and nature of economic collaboration. In the rare cases of shortages of labour
caused by military recruitment, the colonial state resorted to the importation of foreign SOCIETY
labour rather than forced labour. See for instance Dante Odorizzi, ‘Della mano
d’opera nelle nostre colonie (Eritrea)’, Atti del primo congress degli italiani alTestero,
Roma, vol. 2, p. 1651.

99. Martini. II diario, vol. 2, p. 128, for 11.4.1900. Daily wages for colonial soldiers
were reduced from 1.50 lire to 1.00 lire by Martini himself.

100. See Chapter Two above.

In 1941 Italy lost its African Empire to the Allies which marked the end of
101. Checchi, M., Movimento commerciale della colonia Eritrea, 1885—1910, Roma, Italian colonialism in Eritrea. As victors, the British assumed political respon¬
1912, p. 8. sibility for the territory on behalf of the Allies and this lasted until the end
of the war. The defeat of Italy did not, however, mean the sudden and com¬
102. See appendix II.
plete replacement of Italy by Britain. The British were not interested in mak¬

103. See pp. 153—54 below. ing the task of administration more difficult or expensive by dismantling the
Italian colonial system. Furthermore, the Italian colonial system as well as the
many Italians appeared so deeply entrenched that the British, understaffed
and underbudgeted, found it suitable to rule Eritrea through the Italian col¬
onial administration. ‘
The Italian population of 60,()()0 remained constant until the end of the war
due to problems of repatriation. Paradoxically enough, between 1941 and
1946 Italian participation in the economy of Eritrea intensified to a degree
which previously would have been unimaginable. This was due to the extraor¬
dinary conditions created by the war when the abundant Italian manpower
and capital equipment available in the colony were used in the establishment
of many light industries geared for export to the Middle East.^ The history
of Eritrean light industries, which by 1970 constituted 35 per cent of Ethio¬
pian industry originated in the British rather than in the Italian period.^
The continuance of important aspects of the Italian colonial system after
1941 together with the new British colonial imprint has given rise to a
methodological problem of how to confront the question of the impact of
Italian colonialism on Eritrean society. The Italian colonial impact cannot be
studied in the same manner as, for instance, of that of Britain in Kenya.
Whereas British colonialism ended with Kenyan independence, Italian col¬
onialism ended in the substitution of one foreign power by another. More¬
over, the discussion on colonial impact is based on a few selected themes that
can be answered by the source material, i.e. colonial archival and published
sources. A more exhaustive study would have required a broader an¬
thropological background as well as a considerable period of fieldwork. This
methodological hurdle notwithstanding, it is extremely important to attempt

144 145
to assess the nature of Italian colonialism as well as to explain some aspects British Military Administration of 1941—52, when Eritrea was juridically al
of post-1945 Eritrean history. least not a colony.**
1 have chosen to study the Italian impact in the following manner. Under In the first part of the essay Leonard discussed economic changes and their
the heading Objective Impact, I shall discuss in a summary form the social impact on the social structure such as the peasantry, the working class and the
and economic changes during the colonial period. This is followed by a discus¬ petty bourgeoisie. However, his discussion of colonial activities in general,
sion of the Italian colonial impact on Eritrean national consciousness. The and Italian activities in particular, leave a great deal to be desired. Presumably
organizing question is framed as follows. Had the Italians not been replaced in an effort to demonstrate the continuity of European colonial economic ac¬
by the British, what would their impact have been on Eritrean national con¬ tivities, Leonard depicted the 1900—35 period in a far more favourable light
sciousness? As the question is hypothetical, the counter-factual argument than did Italian economic historians of the period. Two examples can be cited.
should not be over-stated, otherwise it detracts from its scientific value.^ Leonard wrote that fundamental agricultural development was carried out in
the 1920’s without however attempting to substantiate his claim. As archival
and other contemporary Italian published sources illustrate, Italian activity in
the agricultural domain was virtually non-existent.*^ Leonard also wrote
about the ‘extension of light industry in the 1920’s calling forth further
State of Research developments in the economic infrastructure’, in spite of the fact that one of
his sources states clearly that there was hardly any industry in Eritrea prior
The impact of Italian and British colonialism on Eritrean society have been to 1935.*^
investigated by several authors. The developmental anthropologist Jordan On the effects of European colonization on social structures, Leonard em¬
Gebre Medhin has argued that, ‘the impact of Italian colonialism on the phasized that the peasantry decreased from (presumably) one hundred per
transformation of Eritrean rural life was felt by the end of the Second World cent on the eve of the colonial period to 80 per cent of the population by the
War’.^ To substantiate his conclusion the author argued that the alienation early 1950’s and he attributes this to the effects of European colonization.*^
of nearly one half of all available land, together with the introduction of com¬ The author concluded that European colonization brought major socio¬
mercial agriculture, hastened the disintegration of feudal structures in economic changes and these in turn, were the reasons for integration.*^
Eritrean rural society.® As I have discussed elsewhere, the author’s interpre¬ Before analysing the second part of Leonard’s essay, it need be pointed out
tation of Italian colonial impact can not be empirically substantiated.^ that his discussions of socio-economic changes are based on a number of
Alienation of land, to which the author attached great importance, was less assumptions and estimates from which it is difficult to draw serious conclu¬
than 1 per cent of cultivated land — an insignificant amount when compared sions. To take only one example: Leonard estimated that the Eritrean working
with the experience of some British colonies in East and Southern Africa.* class, created by colonialism amounted to 5 per cent of the population. Apart
Contrary to what the author claimed, Italian colonialism did not hasten the from the fact that the author did not deem it necessary to document at which
disintegration of feudal structures, which in fact continued to prevail up to point in the colonial period he estimated the existence of a 5 per cent working
the mid 1970’s — as can be illustrated by the few available studies on the sub¬ class, he did not specify whether the 5 per cent were of the total population
ject.’ or of the productively active section of the population.*®
Another author who also argued in terms of a causal relationship between It is in the second part of the essay, however, that the author’s analysis
European colonization and the development of national consciousness is the needs to be reassessed. This is because the political developments of the
political scientist Richard Leonard. In his study, European Colonization and I940’s, even in the manner described by Leonard as I shall presently discuss,
the Socio-economic integration of Eritrea, Leonard centred his arguments had very little to do with the socio-economic changes brought about by Euro¬
around two main points. Firstly, he assumed that the imposition of capitalist pean colonial rule.
economic activities on the various social and ethnic groups in the colony had On the basis of the election result of 1948 where 52 per cent of the Eritrean
constituted the material basis of integration. Secondly, that the imposition of population according to Leonard expressed a desire for independence, he
these capitalist activities during a period of 63 years of colonialism had pro¬ argued that the unity of the parties demanding independence was an expres¬
foundly influenced economic, social and political changes.*® Leonard does sion of the socio-economic changes created by European colonialism.*’ The
not make the distinction between Italian colonialism (1890—1941) and the author did not analyse the composition of the 52 per cent who as he alleges

146 147
voted for independence or that of the remaining 48 per cent of the population of kinship possession was of too limited scale to be presented as evidence of
who desired an unconditional union with Ethiopia.'* social and structural transformations." Furthermore, villages where land
Although the author was limited by the lack of accessible sources for the was not alienated had to accommodate other peasants whose land had been
Italian period, his ready reliance on general statistical material seems also to confiscated."
be linked to his less than critical use of a theoretical framework. Convinced The colonial administration expanded the communal form of land-use
that the imposition of colonial capitalist activities created profound socio¬ while suppressing kinship ownership of land and this policy hindered the
economic changes, Leonard took the election result of 1948 as confirming the evolution of private forms of land ownership. To the extent that the Italians
causal connection between colonialism and nationalism. Even though it might ‘transformed’ the structures of production, their impact was to tie the peasant
be conceded, as a theoretical construct, that colonial capitalist activities pro¬ more firmly to the land." The colonial impact, as we shall presently discuss,
duce profound socio-economic changes, it does not necessarily follow in was not powerful enough to transform social and production relations, and
reality that colonialism brought about profound changes and shaped Eritrean it also was not in any way connected to the political struggle of the 1940’s."
nationalism. Not only do we require many more systematic studies on the
Italian and British periods but even the readily available sources do not sup¬
port Leonard’s argumentation.
If colonialism had any effect on national consciousness, the result of the
1948 elections ought to have been entirely different. The Tigrinyans, who con¬ Objective Colonial Impact
stituted the majority of the working class, the educated elite, the petty
bourgeoisie and public employees would have opted for independence.” In¬ Setting new demographic balance
stead, the Tigrinyan people campaigned for an unconditional union with
According to the census of 1893, the population of Eritrea was estimated to
Ethiopia and against the emergence of Eritrea as an independent state. In¬
be 191,127." The name census was attached to what really was an estimate.
dependence was not argued, as Leonard would have desired, by those sections
From 1905 until the year of the last census of 1939, a total of seven censuses
of the population greatly affected by colonialism. The political struggle of the
were carried out. What is remarkable about all these censuses, as can be
late 1940’s was dictated by the ideological perceptions of reality (where
glanced from the table 6.1 below, is their consistency.
regiojialism and religion predominated) rather than by those material condi¬
tions fashioned by colonialism.“
The issue of Italian colonial impact has also been dealt with by professor Table 6.1. The growth of the population.
Irma Taddia. In her latest publication the author concentrated on the Eritrean Year of census Population
highlands and their agrarian civilization, as this region ‘constituted the
1905 274,944
nucleus of social and economic transformations imposed by colonialism*.^' 333.431
1911
The other ethnic groups and their economic structures were not studied be¬ 1917 367,239
cause of their ‘secondary role in the political economy of colonialism’.“ 1921 407.377
Working from a methodological assumption that a study of colonialism re¬ 1927 519,175
1931 596,013
quires a precise knowledge of the present, the author defined the parameters
1939 614,353
of her study when she wrote that ‘the context of the demand for Eritrean in¬
dependence can be explained by the social and structural transformations Source: The census figures for 1911, 1917, 1921 and 1927 are derived from Islituto Agricolo
Coloniale, L’Economia Eritrea. Firenze. 1932, pp. 43—44. For the rest see Vittorio Castellano.
brought about during the colonial period’.^ *11 censimento del 1939*, p. 272.
Professor Taddia’s study, although an invaluable source on Eritrean col¬
onial society, does not clearly explain the social and structural transforma¬
That the Eritrean population more than doubled between 1905 and 1939 has
tions brought about by colonialism, while their impact on the political domain
nothing extraordinary about it.” What is most striking are the different rates
is completely left out. In a chapter devoted to the colonial process, Professor
of growth that the various ethnic groups experienced during the period. In the
Taddia’s analysis of peasant differentiation caused by colonial land alienation
census of 1905 there were 112,931 Tigrinyans out of a total population of
and the expansion of village or communal land holding systems at the expense
274,944.“ The language spoken is also a rough guide to the religious
148 149
 background, with the majority of the population speaking other languages nyans were spiPing over into lands previously exploited by pastoralists and
than Tigrinya also professing Islam. The census of 1931 showed the gap clos¬ semi-pastoralists, and thus in effect pushing the frontiers of Tigrinya culture.
ing towards parity between the two religions and this means that the Tigri- Seen from the perspectives of the 1940*s, when political programmes and
nyans were increasing at a faster rate than the rest of the population. In 1939, alignments were determined primarily by ethnicity, the political result of the
the year of the last colonial census, 332,763 of 614,353, or 54.2 per cent of dramatic population growth among the Tigrinyans (who formed 35 per cent
the population, spoke Tigrinya as their mother tongue. In terms of religion in 1905 rising to 54 per cent by 1939) was the fact that the fate of the colony
the population was divided as shown in table 6.2. could hardly be decided without their consent. The outcome of the elections
Although the Tigrinya-speaking ethnic group from the outset constituted of 1948, we can argue, were to a large extent determined by ethnicity. And
the single largest group, its position of dominance which was less discernible the Tigrinyans, in spite of the impact of colonialism did not support in¬
in 1905 had increased considerably by the late 1930’s. Table 6.3. illustrates dependence.^
population growth of the various ethnic groups from 1905 to 1939.
The impact of Italian colonialism was more strongly felt among settled
communities than among the pastoral and semi-pastoralist ones, and this ac¬
counts for the rapid population increase of the Tigrinyans.^^ The huge
disparity in size between ethnic groups had decisive political consequences in Political stability and growth of material well-being
the late 1940’s.^^ Even during the colonial period the increasing pressure for
land in the Tigrinya speaking regions (which constituted at most 20 per cent The failure of the policy of Italian settlement led to the new role of the colony
of the area) had pushed the younger generations to seek their fortune in the firstly as a centre of trade and secondly as a reservoir of soldiers for the col¬
less populated and formerly non-Tigrinyan regions of the colony. The Tigri- onial army. These subsequent roles called for a policy of political stability,
which was effected without great difficulty and expense. Trading colonies
Table 6.2. Population distribution by religion. generally did not require a radical restructuring of their ^traditional* or
precolonial economic system. In the case of Eritrea, the desire for radical
1905 1931 1939
restructuring was hampered by the scarcity of Italian capital. During the
Mosleips 152,000 312,000 293,000 1900—40 period the main objective of the colonial government was to run the
Christians 110,000 280,000 317,000” colony as inexpensively as possible, or in other words, to maintain political
Source: Castellano, ‘II censimento del 1939*. p. 278. stability. Issues which were likely to cause political instability were anticipated
and measures were taken to pre-empt them. In the process of stabilization, the
colonial government utilized the ethnic diversity of the colony and the various
Table 6.3. Population growth by ethnic origin, 1905—39. Eritrean attitudes towards the colonial system. The Tigrinyans were the only
group who, on the basis of a diffuse but nevertheless real notion of Ethiopian
Ethnic Groups 1905 1931 1939
nationalism, could really challenge Italian colonialism. The threat of Tigri-
Tigrinyans 112,931 289,994 332,763 nyan resistance, as previously discussed was reduced by a policy of meticulous
Tigre(a) 65,517 113,050 91,914 preservation of the precolonial socio-political structures.
Beja 34,021 68,155 47,009
As in other African colonies the first four decades of this century were
Bogos 14,283 24,466 33,802
Saho 16,682 41,170
characterized by political stability which in effect meant that there was
32,168
Baria 5,531 9.749 10,502 minimal resistance to colonial rule. In the African historiography of the
Kunama 13,683 15,426 19,153 1960’s and 1970’s, this long period has been described as ‘the age of improve¬
Afar 8,951 21,679 30,950 ment’.^^
Total 274,944 596,013 614,353. Although colonial rule rested on the threatened use of the forces of colonial
power, the new order set in motion a period of political stability both for the
(a) This includes the Tigre-speaking ethnic groups, i.e. the Habab, the Marya, and the Mensa.
individual as well as for the various ethnic groups, who owing to their size or
Source: Castellano, ‘II censimento del I939\ p. 277. geographical position were threatened by stronger groups. The rules and the
150 151
 parameters of the colonial system vis-a-vis the inhabitants were clearly under¬ between the periphery and Italy or through a study of such mechanisms as
stood and well articulated, and appear to have been accepted by the great ma¬ unequal exchange.^* The discussion is based purely on an arithmetical
jority of the inhabitants. As Italy developed a stronger awareness of the calculation of changes in the growth of trade and the availability of essential
strategic role of Eritrea as a staging post for colonial expansion into Ethiopia, material goods as well as goods for conspicuous consumption.
it found it to be in its interest to maintain political stability. The argument for an enhanced material well-being among Eritreans is made
The first four decades of this century, by what ever we adopt to study them, on two grounds. Firstly, the colonial period witnessed a discernible betterment
were markedly different when compared to the last four decades of the nine¬ in the conditions of life of the ordinary population, and secondly, this greater
teenth century. Because of its foreign origin and its limited objectives, the col¬ material well-being came about in spite of the exploitation of the colony
onial state was in a position to dictate the terms of a political order, and politi¬ through unequal terms of trade.^^ In order to demonstrate the improvement
cal stability was the main precondition. Inter-clan and inter-ethnic disputes in the material welfare, we shall, in addition to the dramatic population
were resolved partly by the superior fiat of the colonial state and partly ac¬ growth which can be interpreted as a result of economic security, concentrate
cording to its own interpretations of customary jurisprudence. Precolonial on the growth in trade and consumption of goods, together with the spread
political structures were maintained although in greatly compromised form. of the money economy.
The privileges of ruling castes were virtually left untouched.Pax colonica Throughout the colonial period, the dominant import were cotton textiles.
resembled the perfection of the traditional system without the recourse to Imports of cotton textiles increased from 2,400,000 lire in 1897 to 3,470,000
traditional methods of resolving conflicts, which the colonial government now lire in 1905 and reached 4,485,000 lire in 1910."*® Between 1922 and 1932 im¬
appropriated for itself. ports of cotton textiles increased dramatically and overshadowed all other im¬
Political stability did not evolve from the natural interaction of Eritrean in¬ ports. As table 6.4. illustrates the cotton textile expansion leaves little room
habitants, but instead, was imposed from above. Put cynically, the Eritreans for doubt, as the colonial economic historian Fernando Santagata com¬
did not have to work out for themselves the formulae for political stability mented, about the increased purchasing capability of the Eritrean people.
since the colonial state did the job for them. This was all the more so as the Another cause of the expansion of material welfare was the opportunity
political autonomy of Eritrea was never contemplated by the colonial state. created by the export oriented economy to avoid the serious consequences of
Despite colonial concern with political stability, the first four decades of this famine, through food imports in exchange for export goods. Never self-
centui^ witnessed hardly any serious breakdown of security. This made it sufficient in food production, Eritrea managed to offset food shortages by
possible for a generation of Eritreans to grow up under pax colonica with only resorting to overseas as well as towards Ethiopian markets. Given the increase
the relatively impartial imperial power to contend with. in the population, the size of the manpower engaged in the modern sector and
The impact of this political stability imposed by the colonial state can not that employed by the colonial government, there appears to have been suffi¬
be underestimated. Given the strategical rather than the economical import¬ cient currency available to allow for an increase in the volume of food im¬
ance of Eritrea, the colonial state found it preferable to co-opt the indigenous ported during those years of bad harvest.^*
ruling elites in the task of maintaining and perpetuating political stability. Finally, we can assess the spread of the capitalist sector and Eritrean par¬
Aside from the ruling elites however, the real beneficiaries of the new order ticipation in the new system. As argued in chapter two, considerable legal and
were the rank and file who, although still ruled by their traditional chiefs, extra-legal constraints were imposed on the inhabitants of the colony. Al¬
could nevertheless exploit it to their own advantage. Loss of independence though colonial native policy sought to confine Eritreans to the precolonial
was the price paid by the Eritreans as a whole for the political stability dic¬
tated and established by the colonial state. But political independence meant Table 6.4. Imports of selected consumption goods, 1922 to 1930, in thousands of lire.
much more to the indigenous ruling elite than to the peasantry, whose prime Imported goods 1922 1924 1926 1928 1930
interest was the maintenance of political and economic stability.^’
cotton textiles 40,908 62,376 67,403 63,170 58,052
The material well-being of the Eritrean population as a whole, also con¬
sorghum 1,243 2,157 5,003 9,476 4,738
stitutes another objective impact. This was a consequence of the political sta¬ sugar 2,000 3,326 5,406 6,109
bility discussed above and partly due to the innovations introduced during the perfumes 1,106 1,355 998 1,213 1,316
colonial period. It is worthwhile to stress that the discussion of the material other grains 64 350 436 6,578 7,287
welfare of Eritreans is not based on a structural analysis of economic relations Source: Santagata, La colonia Eritrea, I93S, p.l4I.

152 153
 system, the spread of the capitalist sector continued, albeit slowly and
unevenly. The colonial government remained the largest employer, financing
a colonial army whose size varied according to the exigencies of the period.
In the absence of precise information about the labour history of the colony,
we can only use approximations based on fragmented and disparate sources.
As the demand for colonial soldiers coincided with the construction of the
Massawa—Asmara railroad, the 1912—20 period witnessed a great demand
for labour and this led to an economic boom on an unprecedented scale.^^ In
any given year from 1912 to 1930, the modern sector(including the colonial
army) absorbed between 10 per cent and 15 per cent of the active labour force
in the colony
Wages varied widely and rates of pay largely depended on geographical
location, sex and skill. The ratio between Italian and Eritrean labour was in
the range 7:1 throughout the colonial period."*^ The difference, on the other
hand, between skilled Italian and Eritrean labour was as low as 3:1 during the
1910—1930 period."*^ The spread of the capitalist (or modern) sector explains
the continued growth of imports of consumption goods. The dramatic ten¬
fold increase of the volume and in value of imported cotton textiles can hardly
be explained in any other way.

Evotution of an Eritrean identity

Ever since Eritrea became a reservoir of manpower for the colonial army, a
special attachment developed between Italy and Eritrea. Described as the first
born colony, {la colonia primogeni(a), Eritrea after 1900, as we argued earlier,
did not seriously challenge colonial rule. This was largely because of the coer¬
cive apparatus of the colonial power,the implementation of a rational native
policy and the cultural and ethnic diversity of Eritrea, which made it possible
for Italy to maintain its rule without having to flex its muscles. For those goods, and had access to a way of life considered superior, as well as greater
smaller ethnic groups threatened by more powerful ones, Italian colonial rule access to the benefits of modern, albeit extremely limited, schooling, than that
was perceived as an impartial phenomenon committed to law, order and de¬ enjoyed by their Ethiopian counterparts.^ Ethiopia, as the Eritrean
velopment.^ Through the praxis of meticulous respect for religious liberty, hinterland, was persistently described as a society which fell far below the
which in effect meant the elevation of Islam to a level of parity with the Ethio¬ standard achieved in Eritrea. The growing gap between the socio-economic
pian Orthodox Church, the colonial state gained the support of those ethnic realities of Eritrean life and those of Ethiopia was first pointed out at the
groups which professed Islam. beginning of the 1900’s, and by the 1930*s they were too noticeable not to
By the 1930’s the majority of Eritreans had grown up in a colonial political elicit comment.^^ At the beginning of the 1930’s Eritrea with its urban cen¬
and economic system which was markedly different from the rest of Ethiopia. tres, its considerable wage earning population combined with an increased
Throughout the colonial period Ethiopia was treated as the hinterland of purchasing power was considered as more developed (or in the colonial
Eritrea. The Eritreans were better clothed, enjoyed a greater consumption of parlance as more civilized) than the rest of Ethiopia.

154 155
 , The main aim of the Italians in concentrating on the material well-being of Prior to 1935 tiieir colonial policy was aimed exclusively at weakening the pol¬
Eritreans was, no doubt, to gain and mobilize support within Eritrea for their itical and cultural links between the Tigrinyans in Eritrea and those in
planned invasion of Ethiopia. Aside from such rationalizing arguments, the Ethiopia. In conjunction with the Catholic mission the colonial state attemp¬
Eritreans as a whole and the urban inhabitants in particular, due to their con¬ ted, with very limited success, to weaken the Ethiopian Orthodox Church in
tact with the colonial political economy, were more urbane than their Ethio¬ Eritrea by Catholic proselytization, as the Ethiopian Church was perceived to
pian counterparts. These by themselves were sufficient grounds for the growth be the central component of Ethiopian nationalism. Feelings of irredentism,
of a separate Eritrean identity vis-i-vis the rest of Ethiopia.
as discussed earlier, were kept alive by the Ethiopian Church whose spiritual
The concept of Eritrea as the ‘first born colony’ and by implication the jurisdiction neatly corresponded with the political boundaries. However, a
most favoured, took a firm hold with the colonization of Ethiopia from 1936 few weeks after the establishment of the new empire in 1936, the Italians
to 1941. Confronted with the administration of a conquered empire ten times began to pursue an entirely contradictory policy. They expanded the boun¬
larger than Eritrea, the Italians pursued the obvious policy of using Eritreans daries of Eritrea to include all the Tigrinya speakers of Ethiopia, thus upset¬
to consolidate their colonial rule in the new empire. The Italians knew the ting the delicate ethnic balance which they had worked hard to maintain. They
Eritreans better than any other group of the new imperium. Furthermore, the recognized the unity of the Ethiopian Church thus scrapping their earlier
Italians were heavily dependent on the 60,000 strong Eritrean colonial army policy of creating a separate Eritrean Church. Between 1936 and 1941 Eritrea,
stationed in the various parts of the empire. As a recognition of the Eritrean as one of the six provinces, was ruled from Addis Abeba — the capital city
contribution to the colonization of Ethiopia and as the least expensive means of the new empire.
of consolidating this new colonial rule, the Eritreans were granted a number
During the brief but intensive imperial period(1936—41), the Eritrea of the
of privileges which further strengthened the growth of a separate Eritrean pre-1935 era became a part of a larger entity. The reconstituted province was
identity.
called ‘New Eritrea’ or ‘Great Eritrea’, while the pre-1935 territory was de¬
Prior to 1937 those within the Italian African empire were described as scribed as the ‘old’ or the ‘historic’ Eritrea. The addition or subtraction of
‘subjects* or simply as ‘natives’. The directive of 1937 introduced a new
areas of a colony was an exclusive prerogative of the colonial power. Hence
hierarchical order among the colonized. It stated that the natives of Eritrea
the expansion of Eritrea was carried out without the consultation or participa¬
were to be addressed as Eritreans and not as had been the habit by such ap¬ tion of the colonized. The structure of the colonial government placed heavy
pellations as subjects or natives.^* In preference to the other inhabitants of emphasis on vertical links between the colonized and the colonial administra¬
the empire it was also envisaged that Eritreans should be allowed to acquire tion (mediated through traditional ruling elites) and there was a virtual
licences to start small businesses. Furthermore, no restrictions were to be im¬
absence of horizontal links or relations between the colonized. The subtrac¬
posed on those Eritreans who might want to become lorry and truck drivers;
tion of regions and districts were unlikely to create unforeseen problems either
and ex-servicemen from the colonial army were to be be rewarded with posi¬ for the colonial state or for the colonized.
tions of chieftainship.
After the incorporation of Eritrea into the enlargened province of New or
Although the Italian African empire collapsed four years later, the impact Great Eritrea as one of the six provinces of the new empire, the basis of con¬
of the co-option of Eritreans in the colonial system, and its consequent reper¬
tinued Eritrean separate identity was no longer territorial exclusiveness. In¬
cussions for Eritrean identity, was to remain considerable. After 55 years of
stead it was the economic advancement which the Eritreans as individuals had
separate existence, the lumping together of Eritrea into the newly created em¬
earlier achieved and the privileges awarded by the colonial power in its at¬
pire was bound to put into relief the existence of a separate identity. The tempt to co-opt them into the enlarged colonial system.
Italians sharpened the contours of this separate identity by elevating the
Eritreans to the highest position in the colonial hierarchy. They distinguished
Eritreans from the rest by awarding them various economic privileges that
were, no doubt, designed to facilitate the policy of divide and rule. The effect The Italian Colonial Impact on Eritrean National Con¬
was, nonetheless, an inchoate feeling of a separate identity which can rightly sciousness
be identified as Eritrean.
It is worthwhile to point out that the Italians did not attach any importance The first part of this chapter attempted to outline the objective impact of col¬
to the evolution and development of a distinct or separate Eritrean identity. onialism on Eritrean society. This was designated as ‘objective’ because its im-

156
I.S7
 pact could be studied in isolation during or after the end of the colonial gested that Britain should strive firstly for the unification of all the Tigrinya
period. The issues we shall presently discuss are, however, more delicate be¬ speaking communities into a united Tigrinyan nation and secondly for the in¬
cause they deal with the colonial impact on post-colonial reality, where the corporation of the western and northern parts of Eritrea into the Sudan.”
Italian impact is only one of many, and also because Italian colonial rule was The arguments for the creation of a united Tigrinyan nation, which he lalcr
replaced by British rule. developed in a book on the history of Eritrea, were based on the requirements
Between 1941 and 1945 the British, unsure of the fate of the Italian col¬ of a ‘common language, religion, type of society, economics and history’.'"*
onies, tried to preserve the colonial system inherited from the Italians. How¬ Longrigg tried to strengthen his arguments by sketching Italian attempis
ever, because of the basic differences between the British and the Italian col¬ before 1896 to expand their possessions into the Tigrinyan region of Ethiopia
onial systems and because of the British desire to restructure the map of the and their policy after 1935 where Eritrea was extended to include all the
Horn of Africa,it was clear to the Eritreans that a new era was in the off¬ Tigrinya speaking districts.
ing. For the first time the Eritreans had access to a weekly newspaper in The creation of a united Tigrinya region was not, however, an end in itself.
Tigrinya and Arabic and primary education was expanded with the establish¬ According to Longrigg, the united Tigrinya region should at a later stage be
ment of over one hundred primary schools and two secondary schools by incorporated into Ethiopia, with the purpose of appeasing the irredentist
1950.^' movement and Ethiopian claims.^ Such a ‘disposal’ plan was motivated by
For Eritrea the end of the Second World War meant the beginning of an the reality and the importance of British strategic requirements at Massawa
arduous process of negotiations and the commissioning of a series of reports and Asmara.®'
on its future. In 1946 the British lifted the ban on political activity thus in¬ Commenting on Eritrean public opinion, fourteen months later, Longrigg
itiating a new chapter in Eritrean political history, the significance of which reported that the disposal of the colony could assume one of the following
remains to be studied.” It is at this point in Eritrean history that we shall at¬ forms: 1) annexing of the whole territory into Ethiopia, to which Longrigg
tempt to assess Italian impact on the Eritrean national consciousness. Between added the comment that this was the irredentist position; 2) incorporation of
1946 and 1949 Eritrean leaders and their parties enjoyed unlimited freedom Tigrinya-speaking regions into Ethiopia and of the rest of Eritrea into the
to express their opinions as to the fate of their country. Sudan; and 3) the formation of a united Tigrinyan nation, a view supported
In an effort to arrive at an agreement on the future of Eritrea, the Allies by the rulers of the Ethiopian province of Tigrai.®^
sent af Four Power Commission in 1947 with the task of reporting on condi¬ From the above dispatches we can clearly notice the absence of any political
tions in the former Italian colonies and to ascertain the wishes of their in¬ opinion from the non-Tigrinyan communities of Eritrea. From 1941 until the
habitants. By this time five political parties had been functioning since 1946. formation of political parties in 1946, the only political organization that the
In addition to the petitions and party campaigns, the Four Power Commission British noticed was that of the irredentist movement; as late as 1944 however,
heard the wishes of the Eritrean people from a representative group of over the British were not seriously concerned about its strength. In a report on the
3,300 men. Written petitions by the Eritrean political parties were submitted situation in the colony as a whole, the British military administrator wrote.
to the four Power Commission which in turn investigated the strength and
ethnic composition of these political parties. Taken together with the British The politically active Eritreans are chiefly concentrated in Asmara. Their aspira¬
tions are taking the form of a crude brand of nationalism which is favourable
assessment of the Eritrean political climate, we have sufficient material from
of union with Ethiopia. ... The irredentists, mainly young men of the educated
all of these sources to assess the impact of Italian colonialism on the Eritrean class, are supported by the wealthy merchants and also by certain prominent re¬
national consciousness.” ligious leaders above all the two Bishops of the Coptic Christians and the
Before the formation of these Eritrean political parties in 1946, the British Catholics of the Ethiopian rite.®^
had ample opportunity to comment on and to influence political
The rumours of the possible return of Italy as a colonial power, and a relig¬
developments. As early as 1944 the British reported that an irredentist move¬
ious conflict between the Muslim Sudanese colonial soldiers and the Eritrean
ment for union with Ethiopia was giving them ‘some cause for anxiety’.^’
Christians, further contributed to the consolidation of the unionist move¬
Although the British were attracted to the restructuring of political boun¬
ment, which by 1946 had began to carry out acts of terrorism against Italian
daries along ethnic lines, thus following Italian African policy, it was only in
residents.®^
1943 that they worked out a detailed plan for the future of Eritrea. In one of
By the time the British allowed the Eritreans to organize themselves and to
the early ‘disposal’ plans, Stephen Longrigg, the military administrator, sug¬
make known their own views on the future of Eritrea to the Four Power Com-
158 159
mission of Enquiry, the question had already been posed and answered by the delegates.’’ The delegates belonging to the Moslem League, on the other
Tigrinyans who demanded an unconditional union with Ethiopia.®^ Regar¬ hand, expressed differing points of view. According to the findings of the
ding the opinion of the non-Tigrinyan population on the future of their coun¬ Commission
try, the British noted:
a little over half of them asked for British Trusteeship; about one tenth wished
the attitude of the Moslem leaders towards political activities of their Christian for complete independence; and about one seventh stated they were ready to ac¬
neighbours has long been one of tolerant contempt. Moving as they do in the cept the decisions of the Moslem League, without exactly understanding its pro¬
remote circles where news of world politics seldom penetrate, the Moslem gramme or having a definite opinion on the future of the country.’^
leaders have never taken the Asmara politician seriously.... Recent events, how¬
ever, and above all the speech delivered by the late chief administrator (October The Liberal Progressive Party continued to call for the independence of
1946) have made a strong impression and have convinced the Moslems that Eritrea including the Tigrinya-speaking districts of Ethiopia.’^
‘unless they are prepared to think for themselves, the plateau Christians will do Although the findings of the Commission can only be taken as an indicator
the thinking for them’.^
of trends, we believe that these findings suffice to answer the question about
In January 1947 the Eritrean Moslems formed a political party known as the the extent of Italian impact on the Eritrean national consciousness. What
Moslem League which, according to British assessment, was composed of sev¬ emerges from the interviews of the 3,336 delegates is that virtually none of
eral factions but united in its opposition to union with Ethiopia.^’ Almost at them expressed what can be explained as Eritrean national sentiment. In so
the same time the remaining parties, namely the pro-Italy party and the far as the leaders of the Moslem League thought of Eritrean independence,
Liberal Progressive party were formed.^ their image of Eritrea was that of a Moslem country where Moslems con¬
The arrival of the Four Power Commission of Enquiry, whose task was to stituted the majority of the territory’s inhabitants.’^ In contrast, the Unionist
ascertain the wishes of the population on the future of their country, led to Party campaigned from 1942 until the arrival of the Commission, as though
a climax of political agitation. As the Eritrean political parties were soon sup¬ fifty years of colonial rule had not brought any new unity to the colony.’^
pressed and with the Unionist party having declined in importance after the The Liberal Progressive Party’s position of a United Tigrinyan region was
incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia in 1952, the written petitions and politi¬ based on the glorious memories of Tigrinyan hegemony over the Ethiopian
cal platforms which the various organizations presented to the Four Power state.
Commission remain, of the utmost importance.
The Commission of Enquiry followed two methods in ascertaining the
wishes of the population. Firstly, it interviewed political leaders, received
written petitions and wrote down in summary form the platforms of the politi¬
Concluding Discussion
cal parties. Secondly, availing itself of the services of the British Administra¬
tion, it interviewed the traditionally elected representatives of the population:
The absence of an Eritrean national consciousness within the territorial boun¬
altogether 3,336 individuals.^ On this basis, the Commission presented
daries created by the colonial system is neither peculiar to Eritrea nor to the
Eritrean public opinion on the future of the country in the following manner:
Italian colonial system. Neither the British nor the French systems of colonial
Among the 3,336 delegates, all of whom were party adherents, political af¬
rule were designed for subsequent delegation of political and economic power
filiation was represented in the following proportions.
to those whom they colonized.” While the French as late as 1944 firmly
Unionist Party 47.8<7o believed in the assimilation of the colonized societies on terms defined and set
Moslem League 30.9^0 by them, the British implemented an extremely narrow meaning of ‘Indirect
Pro-Italy Party w.m
Rule’.’* As Professor Penelope Hetherington has summed it up, ‘the British
Liberal Progressive Party 9.3<%
1.0< “Indirect Rule” system rejected the idea that Africans would ever be able to
National Party
govern themselves within Western parliamentary institutions’.” Therefore,
Commenting on the programmes of the political parties, the Commission of they were excluded from participation in the political life of the colony. ‘This
Enquiry noted that both the Unionist Party which called for an unconditional view’, continued Hetherington, ‘led to the advocacy of development of
union with Ethiopia, and the Pro-Italy Party which desired the return of Italy, separate native states’, within a given colony.*®
had simple and clear programmes which were easily understood by the Similar views were also manifested by I. F. Nicolson, a former colonial

160 161
 bureaucrat in Nigeria in his review of British administration. He wrote, ‘as Although Anderson was aware of the essential differences between the na¬
social engineering and nation building, then the sixty years of British colonial tionalism of most European monoglot nationalisms (e.g. Swedish in Sweden)
administration in Nigeria must be judged as a failure’.*' and nationalisms in the colonies with their diverse linguistic and ethnic varia¬
Notwithstanding the rejection of the colonized in the affairs of the adminis¬ tions, he nevertheless contemplated that,
tration of the colonies, both British and French colonial rule gave some
leeway for the emergence of colonial nationalism (or nationalism in the col¬ for a world in which the nation state is the overwhelming norm, all this means
onial context). This leeway consisted of the possibility for Africans (indeed that nations can now be imagined without linguistic communality — not in the
naive spirit of nostros los Americanos, but out of a general awareness of whai
not many of them) to acquire a Western education of their choice and what
modern history has demonstrated to be possible.**
is most important, to establish their own press services. African nationalism
within the colonial boundaries owes its existence, as Raymond Betts recently In a footnote Anderson clarified his choice of the word ‘can’ because as he
argued, to the existence of newspapers financed and published by Africans put it, ‘there are obviously plenty of cases where the possibility has been and
themselves.*^ Vague and ambiguous, African nationalism during the colonial is being rejected’.
period was primarily concerned with the expulsion of Europeans rather than By way of conclusion Anderson reasoned that colonial educational and ad¬
with the establishment of a nation. Nevertheless, the existence of a few ministrative practice provided the territorial base for the ‘new imagined com¬
western-educated elites, and local African newspapers gave rise to movements munities* in which natives could come to see themselves as ‘nationals’.
which could be described as national and nationalist movements.*^
In his reflections on the origin and spread of Nationalism, Benedict Ander¬ The expansion of the colonial state which, so to speak, invited ‘natives* into
son has attempted to explain firstly, the origin of the concepts ‘nation’ and schools and offices, and of colonial capitalism which, as it were, excluded them
‘nationalism’ and secondly, the spread of nationalism into Asia and Africa. from board rooms, meant that to an unprecedented extent the key early
spokesmen for colonial nationalism were lonely, bilingual intelligentsia unat¬
Nationalism in the former colonies, argued Anderson, was ‘a response to the
tached to sturdy local bourgeoisies.*^
new style global imperialism made possible by the achievements of industrial
capitalism’.*^ The introduction of the ideology of nationalism in the colonies
Anderson’s reflections on the origin and development of African colonial na¬
assumed several forms. 1) Due to the sheer size of the colonies, the imperial
tionalism had been recognized and pointed out by earlier students of
power was obliged to make use of an army of clerks who had to be bilingual,
Africa.’® However what distinguishes Anderson’s study from the others is
capa*ble of mediating linguistically between the colonial power and the col¬
the levels of abstraction, the complicated processes involved in the formation
onized peoples.*^ 2) Central to the rise of nationalism in the former colonies
of concepts and models and the manner in which those could be copied under
was the intelligentsia who had been exposed to western style education. Bi¬
different circumstances. Contrary to Marxist historiography of a ‘nation’ and
lingualism, a product of western education, allowed access to modern western
‘nationalism’ with its strong bias in favour of a single ethnically, linguistically
culture in the broadest sense, and in particular, to the models of nationalism,
and territorial limited phenomenon, Anderson argued that the modern states
nation-ness and the nation state produced elsewhere in the course of the 19th
of Africa could be described and conceptualized as nation states in spite of
century.*^ Anderson repeatedly emphasized the unique role played by the
their ethnic and linguistic diversity.” Anderson’s reflections constitute a
colonial school system in promoting colonial nationalism. He also pointed out
challenge to Marxism from within which, as he argued, had shied away from
that during the colonial period nationalist agitation was dominated by the
confronting the dimensions of nation-ness and nationalism.’^
educated youth who although of different ethnic and linguistic backgrounds
Reluctantly agreeing to Anderson’s broad interpretations, let us now pose
were nonetheless exposed to the same system of education and administration.
the question; Did Italian educational and administrative practice provide a
Illustrating further the mechanisms for the spread of nationalism and nation-
basis for the articulation of the ‘new imagined community’ in which the in¬
ness among the educated youth in Indonesia, Anderson wrote that
habitants came to see themselves as ‘nationals’ of the colony known as
their common experience gave the map which they studied (always coloured dif¬ Eritrea? The answer has to be in the negative for two reasons. Firstly, the col¬
ferently from British Malaya or the American Philippines) a territorially- onial system impeded the development of an Eritrean intelligentsia who ac¬
specific imagined reality which was daily confirmed by the accents and cording to Anderson were the key spokesmen for colonial nationalism.
physiognomies of their class room.*^
Secondly, the colonial system did not succeed in superseding the vague but
nevertheless discernible spirit of, to borrow Anderson’s terminology,
162 163
 ?
Ethiopian-ness (or Ethiopian nationalism) prevalent among the largest ethnic title, ‘European Colonial Rule and the Transformation of Rural Society*, Horn of
group in Eritrea, namely the Tigrinyans. Africa, 6:2 (1983) 50—60.
In the case of Eritrea, the factors which would have most probably given
rise to an Eritrean nationalism, i.e. western educated elites and a local press, 6. Gebre-Medhin. ‘European Colonial Rule*, p. 53.
did not exist by the end of the colonial period. Italian educational policy, as
7. See my Notes on Nationalism and Resistance, pp. 89—90.
I argued in chapter three above, was intentionally constructed to prevent the
emergence of a Western educated elite. The absence of an Eritrean educated 8. According to an assessment made in 1910 available land in the Eritrean highlands
elite coupled with the system of apartheid that the colonial state pursued in was estimated at 670,000 hectares of which 4,516 hectares were actually in the posses¬
the domain of native affairs meant that there was hardly any conducive en¬ sion of Italian colonists. See Angelo Piccioli, La nouva Italia d*oltre mare, Firenze,
vironment for the evolution of an Eritrean newspaper tradition — an import¬ 1933, vol. 1, p. 654. Most of the alienated land although juridically owned by Italian
colonists was in actual fact leased to Eritrean peasants. See Renzo Sertolis Salis, L *Or-
ant vehicle in the formation of national consciousness.
dinamento fondiario eritreo, Padova, 1932, p. 91. In the British colonies of Kenya and
Although it is important in this respect to note the impact of Italian col¬ Zambia, 3,7 million and 8,7 million hectares respectively were alienated. See Lucy
onialism on nationalism, the colonial system ought not to be judged for what Mair, Native Policies in Africa, London, 1936, pp. 103, 108.
it failed to do. From the discussion of colonial policies and praxis, it becomes
clear that Italian colonialism had its own objectives which were not congruent 9. See the anthropologist S. F. Nadel’s concise but thorough study on ‘Land Tenure
with those of the inhabitants of the colony. on the Eritrean Plateau’, Africa, 21:1 (1946) 1—21. Although sensitive to the historical
development of the tenure system Nadel did not notice any significant change or
Italian colonialism left in its wake some demographic, economic and politi¬
transformation in either land use or rural society attributable to by Italian colonialism.
cal impact on Eritrea. The considerable population increase of the Tigrinyans See also Sertolis Salis, L*Ordinamento fondiario, pp. 182—83 where he concludes that
vis-4-vis the rest of the inhabitants, and the consequent political implications Italian land laws circumscribed the evolution of private ownership to the disadvantage
constitute the most notable impact, while the absence of requisite conditions of Italian colonists.
for the emergence of Eritrean nationalism constitute one of its least significant
10. Richard Leonard, ‘European Colonization and the Socio-Economic Integration ot
areas of impact.
Eritrea’, in The Eritrean Case, Rome, 1980, pp. 59—60.

11. Britain assumed the administration of Eritrea until the end of the War. Eritrea’s
fate was to be decided by the Four Powers, namely, Britain, France, The United States
FOOTNOTES and the Soviet Union. From 1946 onwards, the British initiated the process of
decolonization by allowing political parties to exist. It is therfore incorrect to label the
1. wo 230/106, Half Yearly Report by the British Military Administration on the oc- British period as a colonial period.
cupied territory of Eritrea, 1942, p. 50: ‘During the past six months, the Italian admi¬
nistration headed by Comm. Inserra and Dott. Melodia, has been found to be loyal 12. Santagata, La colonia Eritrea, p. 142.
and willing’.
13. Piccioli, La nuova Italia, pp. 1611 —12; Santagata, La colonia Eritrea, pp.
2. For the history of the growth of light industries, see, Eldo Infante, Rassegna tecnica 99—100.
delle industrie eritree, Asmara. 1947; Idem., L*Economia Eritrea, Roma, 1948. For
the purpose of comparison see ap|>endix 1. 14. Leonard, ‘European Colonization’, p. 71.

3. See Richard Sherman, Eritrea: The Unfinished Revolution, N.Y. 1980, p. Ill on 15. Ibid., p. 83.
Eritrea’s share in the Ethiopian industrial sector.
16. Leonard did not deem it important to establish whether the alleged 5 per cent
4. For the limitations of counterfactual method see Fischer, D., Historians* Fallacies: working class had freed itself from pre-capitalist enviroment and whether it was in a
Toward a Logic of Historical Thought, New York, 1970, pp. 15—21. position to pursue a working class ideology. In other areas according to Lucy Mair,
Native Policies, p. 118, ‘none of the native workers were primarily dependent upon
5. Jordan Gebre-Medhin, The Eritrean Case: A Critical Appraisal of Peasant and wage labour to meet their obligations and satisfy their material needs*.
Modernization Studies in Developmental Anthropology, Ph.D. thesis. University of
Purdue, Ohio, 1979, pp. 106—42. Extracts from the thesis are published under the 17. Leonard, ‘European Colonization’, p. 96.

164 165
 Ig. WO230/229 Four Power Commission: Report on Eritrea, Section Five, Chapter cessible to the British authorities, it is very possible that their estimate was based on
Three. Results of hearings of representatives, p. 16. The Commission Report did not the census of 1931.
draw the conclusion which Leonard ascribes to it. It simply reported on Eritrean public
opnion as expressed by delegates. 33. Since over 80 per cent of the Italian community and the great majority of Italian
capital was invested in the Tigrinya region of Eritrea, the Tigrinyans were in a position
19. They opted for unconditional union with Ethiopia because the imapct of colonial to benefit from the slow but steady introduction of capitalist economy.
socio-economic changes was not profound enough to make them pursue nationalist
politics within the boundaries created by Italian colonialism. 34. The political implication of population growth can not be sufficiently studied with
the available documentation.
20. Eritrean Muslims perceived rightly that union with Christian Ethiopia would turn
them into second class citizens. Hence their campaign for independence or any other 35. Roland Oliver and J.D.Fage, Short History of Africa, London, 1962, pp. 216—25,
arrangement than unity was based on their perceptions of Ethiopia. For the Tigri-
nyans, unconditional union with Ethiopia guaranteed the end of colonialism and the 36. It was in 1948 that the British confronted the problem. See WO230/255 on Tradi¬
recapturing of old historical links which had continued to exist in spite of strenous ef¬ tional tribal organization and its collapse.
forts by Italian colonialism to weaken them.
37. See Chapter Five pp. 133—34 above.
21. Irma Taddia, Eritrea — Coionia, 1890—7952, Milano, 1986, p. 37.
38. See Samir Amin, Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of
22. Ibid.. Peripheral Capitalism, New York, 1976.

23. Ibid., p. 40. 39. Ibid.

24. See my review of Taddia, in Notes on Resistance and Nationalism^ pp. 89—90. 40. Michele Checchi, Movimento commerciale della colonia Eritrea, Roma, 1912,
p. 8.
25. Ibid..
41. As Piccioli, in La nuova Italia d'oltremare, p. 644 pointed out, local food produc¬
26. S. F. Nadel, ‘Land Tenure on the Eritrean Plateau*, Africa, 21:1 (1946), p. 10. tion was greatly reduced due to locust invasions. The sharp rise of food imports from
1926 onwards, compared to the earlier period, can be seen as a response to aver!
27. the demand for independence came mainly from the pastoral ethnic groups in the famine. This was made possible by the economic system of colonialism.
lowlands whom Professor Taddia did not study because of their ‘secondary role in the
political economy of colonialism*. 42. See chapter two pp. 44—45 above.

28. Vittorio Castellano, ‘II censimento del 1939 della popolazione indigena della 43. The estimate is based on a number of indicators of a conjectural nature. 1) The
Eritrea e lo sviluppo della popolazione indigena della Eritrea storica, in un cinquanten- industrial sector (see appendix 1) could not have employed more than 2,000 workers.
nio di ammnistrazione italiana*, Rivista di Demografia e Statistica, 2:4 (1948) p. 272. 2) The Italian colonists who provided seasonal employment might have had a perma¬
nent working force of about 1,500. In 1937 according to a source cited by Taddia,
29. See C.C. Wrigley, ‘Aspects of Economic History*, in The Cambridge History of L*Eritrea — Colonia, p. 252, the total number of Eritrean agricultural workers was
Africa, from 1905 to 1940, edited by Andrew Roberts, Cambridge, 1985, p. 134. 1,915. 3) The Eritrean colonial army in Eritrea as well in other Italian colonies was
made up of about 10,000 men. 4) The service and commercial sector of the economy
30. Castellano, ‘II censimento del 1939*, p. 277. might have given employment to another 2,000 people. During the 1910—30 period the
Eritrean population grew from 300,000 to over 500,000. By active labour force is here
31. Available documentation fails to provide clues as to the reasons for the real decline understood mostly adult men who might have constituted not more than a quarter of
of the Tigre-speaking groups and of the Beja. Castellano who noticed the real decline the entire population.
suspected that the pastoral mode of life of these communities might have made them
migrate for long periods into areas beyond Eritrea. 44. See appendix 2.

32. In 1946 the British estimated the population to be around 850,000 out of which 45. ibid..
397,000 were Christians and 443,000 Moslems. See FO 371/69363, Four Power Com¬
mission: Report on Eritrea, Appendix 3, 1948. Since the census of 1939 was not ac¬ 46. See the discussion of reactions to colonial rule in chapter five above.

166 167
47’. See Amaldo Cicchitti, ‘II problema religiose nella legislazione coloniale italiana*, final decision. Hence the source material collected and the views documented were not
Rivista Coloniale, 29:1 (1926), p. 490 on the basis for equality of all religions in deliberately biased in favour of or against Eritrean independence.
Eritrea. Idem., ‘State e Chiesa nelle colonie italiane’, Diritto ecclesiastico e rassegna
di diritto matrimoniale, 49:3—4 (1938), pp. 92—93 for the reasons why the colonial 57. WO 230/168 Chief admnistrator Stephen Longrigg to GHQ MEF, 12.10.1944.
government in Eritrea favoured Islam. where he informed his superiors that the Eritreans are putting forward a solution (that
of United Tigrai) which was suggested to them (naturally without their knowledge)
48. In the academic year 1938—39 of 15,700 enrolled students in the whole empire, fourteen months previously.
5,332 were from Eritrea. See Istituto Fascista dell’Africa Italiana, Annuario
deirAfrica Italiana per I'anno 1940, Roma, 1940, p. 464. 58. FO 371/35631, Longrigg to GHQ MEF. 8.7.1942.

49. Addison Southard, Eritrea: A Red Sea Italian Colony of Increasing Interest to 59. WO 230/168, Longrigg to General Ralph Hone, GHQ MEF, 12.7.1943.
American Commerce, Washington, 1920, p. 28; Santaga, La colonia Eritrea, p. 139.
60. Ibid..
50. Pollera, A., ‘L’ltalia e le popolazioni delPEritrea: conseguenze social!, moral! ed
economiche che la colonizzazione italiana in Eritrea ha avuto nella evoluzione delle 61. Ibid..
popolazioni locali e delle region! finitime*, Annali del Regio Istituto Superiore Orien¬
tate di Napoli, 8:1 (1935) p. 76, 84. 62. WO 230/168, Longrigg to GHQ, MEF, 12.10.1944.

51. ASMAI, pos. 181/46 file 218, Minister of Colonies Alessandro Lessona to gover¬ 63. FO 371/41531, Overseas Planning Committee: Plan for Propaganda for Eritrea,
nor general Rodolfo Graziani, 7.10.1937. paper no. 5050, 6.10.1944.

52. This was expressed very clearly in 1947 by the Liberal Progressive Party which 64. FO 371/53511, from GHQ MEF to the War Office, 1.7.1946; FO 371/63212.
campaigned for the formation^^of a Tigrinya nation: Eritrea: Monthly Political Report, November 1946.

Eritrea having been for over fifty years under Italian government, feels herself to be much
65. The Unionist Party was formed without formal British sanction in 1944. It suc¬
superior and more developed in general than Ethiopia.In the present situation an im¬
ceeded an earlier association known as The Association for the Love of Country which
mediate annexation to Ethiopia would mean going back a hundred years.
operated from 1941.
FO 371/69365, Four Power Commission, Report on Eritrea, Appendix 101, 1948.
66. FO 371/63212, Eritrea: Monthly Political Report, no. 13 for January 1947, Ap¬
53. As early as 1942 the British entertained the idea of restructuring the map of the pendix A.
Horn of Africa along ethnic lines. These were: 1) to hand over Eritrea to Ethiopia; 2)
to create a Greater Somalia. See William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay, Oxford, 67. Ibid.. On the Moslem League the officer who reported on the matter wrote that:
1977, p. 68.
It is understood that there is a strong party which will favour Egyptian sovereignty, there
is certainly a party favouring union with the Sudan and there are also those who advocate
54. Eritrean Weekly News was published from 1941 up until 1952. A complete collec¬ some form of United Nations Organization Trusteeship. The fact the the Party is ex¬
tion is available at the British Museum, Oriental Library, call. no. OP 947. See FO clusively Moslem is contrary to the pro-Ethiopian gospel that blood is stronger than
371/190314, Eritrea, Annual Report, Asmara, December, 1950, concerning activities religion.
in the field of education.
68. The Liberal Progressive Party was formed on February 1947, with a programme
for absolute independence of Eritrea including that of,
55. Studies on the period are dominated by G.K.N. Trevaskis, Eritrea: A Colony in
transition, 1941^52, Oxford, 1960. The author, a British officer, was stationed in Tigrai territory, with which we arc bound by ties of language, ethnically, historically and
Eritrea from 1943 to 1950. Although written with intimate knowledge of personalities economically, be given back to Eritrea as it was before 1889 and also during the period
of Italian occupation in 1935—41.
and events, the book tends to defend the failure of Britain to control the armed and
political activities of the Unionist Party by exaggerating Ethiopian influence. See FO 371/69363, Four Power Commission Report on Eritrea, chapter 6, pp. 6—7.
For the programme of the Pro-Italy Party, see FO 371/63212 Eritrea: Monthly Politi¬
56. Other than the recognition of Ethiopian ‘legitimate demand* for an outlet to the cal Report, no. 22, of October 1947.
sea, the Four Power Commission had no motive to misinterpret or distort the wishes
of the Eritrean people. Although the Commission retained the power to decide over 69. WO230/229 Four Power Commission Report on Eritrea, Section Five, Chapter
the fate of Eritrea, a unanimous Eritrean opinion would have weighed heavily in its Three, pp. 15—16.

168 169
70*. WO 230/229, Four Power Commission: Eritrea Report, Section V, chapter three: 79. Penelope Hetherington, British Paternalism and Africa, 1920—1940, London.
Relative importance of views expressed by representatives, p. 16. These figures were 1978, p. 148.
modified since the number of people represented by the delegates differed. The sym¬
pathies of the population were thus expressed: 80. Ibid..
Party Number of People Percentage
81. I.F. Nicolson, The Administration of Nigeria, 1900—1960, London, 1969, p. 310.
Represented by Delegates
The Moslem League 495,040 40.5
82. Raymond Betts, Uncertain Dimensions: Western Overseas Empires in the Twen¬
The Unionist Party 546,954 44.8
Liberal Progressive 52.985 4.4
tieth Century, Oxford, 1985, p. 163.
Pro-Italy 113,260 9.2
National 13.985 1.1 83. Martin, L. Kilson, ‘Nationalism and Social Classes in British West Africa’, in
Social Change: The Colonial Situation, edited by Immanuel Wallerstein, New York,
Total number of people represented by delegates: 1,212,000
1966, p. 534.
Total population of Eritrea computed on the information supplied by the parties: 1,790,000. The
British estimated Eritrea’s population in 1947 to be around 850,000.
84. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread
of Nationalism, London, 1983, p. 127.
71 WO230/229 Four Power Commission: Report on Eritrea, Annex 1(a) p. 5.
85. Ibid., p. 106.
72. Ibid., Annex 1 (a), p. 5.
86. Ibid., p. 108.
73. WO 230/229, FPC: Report on Eritrea, Section V, Chapter Three, p. 16.
87. Ibid., p. 111.
74. FO 371/69365, FPC: Report on Eritrea, Appendix 103. Memorandum from the
Eritrean Moslem League, p. 2. 88. Ibid., p. 123.

The Eritrean people are divided into two parties. One is Mohammedan and the other Cop¬ 89. Ibid., p. 127.
tic. The former Mohammedans are two thirds of the population and they occupy nearly
nine tenths of the land.
90. See Martin L. Kilson, ‘Nationalism and Social Classes in British West Africa*, in
/ Wallerstein ed.. Social Change, pp. 333—50. See also Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism
75. F0371/69363 Four Power Commission Report, Appendix 93, on the position of in Colonial Africa, London, 1956.
the Unionist Party.
91. Anderson, Imagined Communities, p. 123.
76. FO 371/69365, FPC: Report on Eritrea, Appendix, Liberal Progressive Party
Memorandum, p. 7. 92. Ibid., p. 13.
All wars in northern Ethiopia, both against Egyptians and Italians, including the battle
of Metemma against the Dervishes were fought by populations and chiefs of Eritrea and
Tigrai and not Shoans; which shows that the geographical, ethnic and historical
backgrounds of the Tigre (meaning Tigrinya) speaking population has nothing in common
with the Shoan people. If we then want to speak about ancient times, we are certain that
the millenary Ethiopian civilization originated from Eritrea and Tigrai (Axum) and not
from Shoa, towards the north, the latter people being at that time nomads, and un¬
civilized. It must be said, for the sake of accuracy, that at that time Shoa was a colony
of the Tigrai (Tigrinya speaking) populations.

(Clarification notes in brackets added.)

77. See the contribution by Bronislaw Malinowski, ‘Modern Anthropology and Euro¬
pean Rule*, in Reale Accademia d*Italia, Convegno di scienze moral! e storiche: Tema
Africa^ Roma, 1939, vol. 2, p. 901.

78. See Jacques Stem, The French Colonies, 1944, p. 12.

170 171
 CHAPTER SEVEN eluded Schieder, adopted colonialism in order to solidify the ideological
adherence of the bourgeoisie against internal economic and demographic
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION pressures.
The Italo-Ethiopian war of 1895—96, however, achieved the contrary result
of increasing the fragmentation of the ruling class. The defeat at Adwa in
March 1896 put an end to the colonial question.
Other interpretations that did not stress so strongly the causal connection
between internal conditions and colonial expansion were those by Roberto
Michels and Carlo Zaghi. For the former, colonialism was a right reserved for
Before developing a partial theory of colonialism, I shall summarize and com¬
those states which had the power and interests to engage in and sustain it.
ment on Italian interpretations of the motives for colonial expansion. I shall
Michel’s interpretation was very similar to that developed by Joseph
also answer the questions raised in the introduction about Italian aims in
Schumpeter a few years later. Italy, according to Michels, pursued a policy
Eritrea and the methods they used to achieve their objectives.
of colonialism because she was in a position to do so and because the country
required colonies for population settlement.
For Carlo Zaghi, on the other hand, the causal connection was not so clear,
as there were several other equally important motives for colonial expansion.
Italian Interpretations of the Motives for Colonial Ex¬ After the defeat at Dogali (1887) one of the main motives, according to Zaghi,
pansion was the autonomous decision of the Italian military to carry out little-
publicized wars of revenge, in complete disregard of directives from the
The central theme in the interpretations by Italian historians of the motives Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As an autonomous institution, the military was
for Italian colonial expansion is the causal connection between internal Italian able to carry out wars of attrition until its final defeat at Adwa in 1896.
conditions and colonial expansion. The Gramscian interpretation, as outlined Another equally important feature of Italian interpretation is the absence
in the introduction, analysed colonial expansion as an instrument for of altruistic motives for colonial expansion. In other words, Eritrea was col¬
sidetracking economic and political reforms. The politics of colonialism ap¬ onized not for the interests and for the sake of its inhabitants but for the in-/
peared to be directed, according to Gramsci, mainly towards the southern terests of Italy. The Italian state of Francesco Crispi perceived African col¬
Italian peasant whose demand for political and economic reforms were op¬ onies in terms of vast regions for settlement and as sources of raw materials
posed both by the central state and the southern landed bourgeoisie. all to be exploited for the needs and interests of Italy. As I shall presently
The views of Gramsci were corroborated by Wolfgang Schieder’s social im¬ discuss below, the colonial inhabitants, i.e. the Eritreans, were considered as
perialist interpretation of Italian colonial history. Schieder stressed even more part of the raw material resources to be exploited.
strongly the causal connection between colonial expansion and internal condi¬ Most studies of Italian motives for colonial expansion limit themselves to
tions. For Schieder, colonialism occurred at a transitional phase between early explaining the successful motives for colonial expansion. The prolonged an¬
or ‘primitive’ unification and the perfection of the nation state. This transi¬ ticolonialist struggle and its tradition, which succeeded in limiting the full im¬
tional phase created problems of participation for hitherto unintegrated plementation of colonial policies, is not treated as an integral part of the
groups and of economic distribution between the various social groups within story. The strength of the anticolonialist impact can be illustrated by the fate
a newly unified nation. of Italian colonial policy after the battle of Adwa. Not only was Prime
Under the leadership of Prime Minister Francesco Crispi, Italy embarked Minister Crispi replaced, but the Italian state was prepared to scrap altogether
on the policy of colonialism, according to Schieder, in order to postpone a its African colonial policy.
democratic solution to the above-mentioned problems. There was also an ad¬ The anticolonialist position was centred around two principal arguments.’
ditional motive which paved the way for colonial expansion. Schieder called The first argument stressed the principle of the right to independence and na¬
this ‘the violent demographic explosion’, which in turn threatened to frag¬ tional identity. The anticolonialists, comprising socialists, democrats, extreme
ment the ruling class because it was continuously pressed by the problems leftists and Risorgimentalists, wrote and agitated against the colonial policy
emanating from the population explosion. The state of Francesco Crispi, con- by comparing and reversing the position of Italy with that of Ethiopia. The

172
173
gist of the anticolonialist position was expressed by the poet Guiseppe Car- economy. After the unsuccessful attempt to use Eritrea as an outlet for
ducci soon after the Dogali incident: The Abyssinians had a right to oppose emigration, Italy set out to restructure the colonial society according to its
us as we have the right to oppose Austrian encroachments into our land’.^ own needs and capabilities.
The colonial issue was brought into the forefront by the anticolonialist groups During the years 1897—1932, Eritrea was perceived as a source of raw
when Italian colonialism stumbled from one crisis into another. The sacred materials and as an entrepot for the economic and commercial penetration of
right of people and nations to independence was repeatedly stressed and the Ethiopia. Moreover, Eritrea was in fact not developed as a source of raw
continued independent existence of Ethiopia was taken as a moral precondi¬ materials because of a combination of internal and external considerations.
tion for ‘Italy to demand the right to remain independent’.^ Some of these factors were the colony’s inherent poverty in accessible raw
The second line of argument stressed the national, ethnocentrist and materials, and the fear that a drastic restructuring of the economy might
racialist basis of colonialist argumentation. The colonialist position em¬ arouse Eritrean resistance.
phasized the right of stronger nations to subjugate weaker ones and the duty Far more decisive, however, were the external factors which determined the
to civilize the barbarians, as there were no inherent rights in barbarism. To role that Eritrea was expected to play. Since Ethiopia remained the ultimate
those assertions the anticolonialists responded in the following manner. The target for Italian penetration and eventual domination, the role that Italy
criteria for the spread of ‘civilization’ ought to be the principle of assigned to its colony was that of a staging post for the transit trade. From
brotherhood and peaceful penetration and without the use of force.^ More¬ Eritrea, Italy controlled the export and import trade of northern Ethiopia and
over, the anticolonialists stressed the fallacy of the colonialist position by this was of considerable magnitude. The tapping of Ethiopian trade by using
pointing out that Italy already had its colonies to civilize in the southern half Eritrea as a staging post turned the latter into a colony of political rather than
of Italy, as these were plagued by illiteracy and extreme poverty.^ economic importance.
Seen from the perspectives of 19th century European practical philosophy, From 1907 onwards, Eritrea was also used as a reservoir of soldiers for
the successful implementation of colonialism was a triumph against the ideals Italian colonial expansion elsewhere. Although the evidence on the impact of
campaigned for by the anti-colonialist groups.*^ The Italian political elite, recruitment on the colony’s economy as a whole leaves a great deal to be
like its European counterparts, was divided into those who favoured col¬ desired, we can, I believe, draw the conclusion that it was far more important
onialism and argued for it in terms of the survival of the fittest, and those who for Italy to deploy Eritrean colonial soldiers in Somalia, Libya and later in
espoused an ideology of equality for all nations and the right of people to in¬ Ethiopia than to allow Italian capitalism to use them in Eritrea. During both
dependence. 1912—16 and 1935—41 periods, large scale recruitment had caused severe
The anticolonialist positions failed to make a decisive impact for two main shortages of labour, and in the latter period a severe shortage of food produc¬
reasons. The first was that European technological superiority over Africa tion.
was so advanced that the financial cost of colonization was kept to an accept¬ The functions of Eritrea, firstly as a focus of transit trade and secondly as
able minimum, and thus tolerated by the tax payer.^ The second reason was a reservoir of men for the colonial army, explain both the scarcity of readily
the ease with which European states conquered Africa, the limited scale of exploitable raw material resources and the reluctance of Italian capitalists to
African resistance and the inability of the colonized to enter into the invest in the production sector.
metropolitan debate, and all these factors made the anti-colonialist position From 1935 until 1941 Eritreans were sent to consolidate the Italian occupa¬
weak and fragmented.® tion of Ethiopia while their country was transformed into a colony of settle¬
ment. In 1940, 75,000 Italians had settled in Eritrea while as many as 70,000
Eritreans (or over 12 per cent of the entire population) were recruited to the
army and deployed in Ethiopia. The Italian settlers, in contrast to those who
were encouraged to settle prior to 1900, were mainly engaged in industry and
Colonial Objectives commerce. Owing to its strategic location Eritrea was destined to be a base
for the Italian settlers to penetrate Ethiopia.
The main conclusion that I have derived from colonial economic practice As Italian needs changed through the decades, Eritrea and its inhabitants
is that they were motivated by the interests of Italy and not by those of were accordingly reorganized. The colony did not exist as a separate entity
the colony. Let me recapitulate the salient features of the colonial political with an autonomous economic system. The colony and its inhabitants

174 175
 belonged to Italy. In the context of the colonial political economy, the roles tion of Somalia and the colonization of Libya and the increased capability of
of the Eritrean were limited to those defined by the metropole. During most the metropole to deal with colonial matters, brought about a new policy of
of the colonial period the metropole needed a reservoir of labour that could domination. The Eritrean was perceived as a subject who, owing to his ‘infan¬
be mobilized to such ends as the colonial army. The role of the Eritrean, as tile’ mental aptitude, had to be dominated. This policy called for the strict
we can clearly see from colonial educational and native policies, was to fulfill maintenance of Eritrean social wgartizafion and a native administrative ap¬
the demands put on him by Italy. paratus designed to ensure the continuation of colonial rule. Eritrean social
During the early phase, i.e. 1897—1907 under Governor Ferdinando Mar¬ organization was considered inherently different and thus the objective of
tini, the policy of the colonial administration was decidedly against the open- native policy lay in its preservation.
ing of schools for Eritreans. The colonial administration had two main con¬ The policy of preserving Eritrean social organization had two advantages.
siderations in mind. Firstly, educated Eritreans would make colonial rule dif¬ Firstly, it reduced the financial committment of the colonial state by transfer¬
ficult. As evidence the British experience in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and In¬ ring a considerable part of the cost of administration onto the Eritrean
dia was cited. The second consideration was that Ferdinando Martini’s peasantry. Secondly, it enabled the colonial power to maintain the myth that
perception of colonialism meant that its purpose was to achieve absolute Eritrean society was not susceptible to change. This was further strengthened
domination — a position that could only be attained in colonies where the in¬ by the colonial educational policy with its deliberate intention of circumscrib¬
troduction of western style education was strictly forbidden. ing the possibilities available to Eritreans by limiting them to the lower level
Although the hard-line policy of Martini was set aside by subsequent gover¬ of elementary schooling.
nors, colonial administration still only offered the Eritrean the maximum of The racialist ideology of the Fascist state, which in the case of Eritrea be¬
elementary education. The Catholic and the Swedish Missions were forced to came evident from 1932 onwards, drastically defined the position of the
abide by the regulations of the colonial government. In the 1920’s, the debate Eritrean in the colonial system. The purpose of the Italian presence in Africa
on the role of education was given a new dimension when the Minister of Col¬ was to structure the world of the colonized according to the needs of the
onies Luigi Federezoni, stressed the close association between the degree of metropole. The Eritrean, whose place was defined by ‘Mother Nature’, was
docility of the native population and the availability of colonial education. destined to be ruled. Italy would neither create the conditions for Eritreans
The Minister of Colonies was convinced that education could be used to create to develop according to their own capabilities nor assimilate them, but would
a docile population. rule over the people in perpetuity. Unlike Britain and France^ Italian col¬
From the 1930’s onwards, native education was discussed in terms of how onialism did not give Eritreans any_ppportunity to either challenge the col¬
it could best facilitate colonial domination. It was argued that native educa¬ onial system or to enter into a dialogue with Italian ideologists of colonialism.
tion be adopted to the specific exigencies of colonialism. These changing exi¬
gencies of colonialism, discussed in Chapter Two, called for an educational
policy that would make virtually impossible the evolution of Eritrean political
I consciousness. The scope of education, as adumbrated by the superintendent
for schools, Andrea Festa, was to provide Eritrean children with notions of Partial Theory of Colonialism
; Italian civilization in order to make them conscious propagandists and
militants behind the Italian flag.
The theory of colonialism that is sketched below is partial, because the em¬
Through their native policies the Italians aspired to organize Eritrea and its
pirical material on which it is based is limited solely to Italian colonialism in
inhabitants according to their changing needs. In the early phase, 1897—1907,
Eritrea. A more complete theory of colonialism, a task beyond the scope of
the colonial administration advocated the establishment of racial barriers be¬
this study, ought to include a more comprehensive comparative analysis of the
tween the colonizer and the colonized. These were motivated by a need to
various colonial systems as well as that of Italian colonialism in other parts
reduce the costs of colonization and to mak^ the colony fulfill metropolitan
of Africa.
demands. Up to 1907 the necessity of exercising absolute domination was
An analysis of colonial practice reveals the salient features of colonialism
justified on the grounds that a more liberal policy might arouse Eritrean
to be 1) the subjugation of the economy of the colony to the needs of the
resistance.
metropole; 2) the implementation of an educational policy with the intention
From 1907, however, the role of Eritrean colonial soldiers in the pacifica-
of perpetuating colonialism; and 3) the perception of relations between the
176 177
 cQlonizer and the colonized in immutable terms. On the basis of these be evidenced in the manner by which the metropole used Eritrea as a reservoir
features, colonialism may be theorized as a system of domination established of soldiers for the colonial army.
by military conquest for the interests of the colonizing poy^er. Its objectives Since Italian colonialism did not in any manner and at any moment in the
are the domination and subjugation of the colony and its inhabitants. colonial period anticipate its own demise, it limited its aspirations to the
The obvious question that such a definition raises is the purpose of domina¬ policy of winning the allegiance of the colonized to its system. This was
tion. Did the Italian ruling classes embark on colonization solely driven by the achieved mainly through the educational policy. Colonialism was throughout
yet unexplained and perhaps unexplainable desire for domination over less or¬ the colonial period perceived by its perpetrators as a fact of nature.
ganized communities? If the decades after decolonization can throw any light Contrary to what some historians and political scientists believe, col¬
on the motives for colonization, it is that colonies and peripheries were not onialism was not a contradictory phenomenon that simultaneously exploited
essential for capitalist development of the colonizing countries. Moreover, while laying down the basis for the modernization of the colony.Contrary
neither the duration of the colonial period nor the degree of restructuring to what Karl Marx once believed, colonialism was not engaged in the process
brought about by colonialism would explain the demise of colonialism. of creating a world after its own image."
Although the exploitation of human and material resources in the colony This study on colonial practice demonstrates that the objectives of col¬
remained the objective of Italian colonialism, it is not sufficient to explain col¬ onialism were to exploit the resources of the colonized according to its own
onialism as a phenomenon driven solely by economic motives, since such needs and irrespective of the interests of the colony and its inhabitants. The
economic objectives could have been achieved without formal colonization. economic and political role of the colonized were defined in such a manner
The dismantling of the colonial system in Africa and the prevailing pattern of so as to keep the latter subjugated to the interests of the metropole. It was
trade between Africa and Western Europe strongly indicates that the conti¬ for instance virtually impossible for the Eritrean, whose position was defined
nent’s resources could have been exploited by other means than coloniza¬ by his status and race, to reach a competing position with the colonizer. The
tion.’ educational system was so designed that access by the colonized was limited,
The colonization that I have studied appears to me to have occured at a par¬ a fact which circumscribed his capacity to challange the colonial phenomenon
ticular social, political and economic epoch in Italy where advanced technol¬ as well as blocking his economic career in the colonial capitalist sector. Fur¬
ogy and the prevalent Social Darwinist ideology created favourable conditions thermore, racial laws limited him to the periphery of the modern sector.
for colonial expansion. Conclusions similar to the partial theory that I sketched above have been
From an analysis of Italian colonial practice, I have attempted to show that made by a number of Third World writers. For Frantz Fanon, one of the few
colonial domination served the interests of the metropole which were of an outstanding critics, colonialism treated the colonized as slaves and tried to
economic and political nature. Bearing in mind both the weaknesses of econ¬ persuade them to believe that the land they worked belonged to them and that
omic motives and the tenuous connection between internal (Italian) conditions the mines where they lost their health were owned by the colonized.*^ The
and colonial expansion, the Schumpeterian interpretation of colonialism re¬ colonist settler in Africa, according to Fanon’s graphic description, ‘was in
mains an uncomfortable but yet plausible explanation. Schumpeter viewed fact saying to the native kill yourself so that I may become rich’."
colonialism as an irrational urge by states, to achieve forcible expansion for In a paper devoted to African and Third World writers on Imperialism,
the purpose of domination. Thomas Hodgkin identified three main components. The first component,
An analysis of colonial practice in the economic and educational spheres which according to Hodgkin was self-evident for most African and Third
further shows that the objectives of colonialism were to perpetuate its position World writers, dealt with the fact that ‘the process of European penetration
of domination. The colony and its inhabitants were to remain under the and conquest was itself a barbarous one’, where ‘civilization’ was imposed at
tutelage of the colonial power. While the metropole through its educational gun point." The theme of barbarism was further continued in that the col¬
and economic practices laid down the basis for its continued presence, onial system, with the new forms of government and administration, of econ¬
ideologically, it attempted to further strengthen its position by defining the omic organization, and of dominant ideology, resulted in the dehumanization
colonized as a human being who ‘may never reach the age of maturity’. of the mass of the indigenous population." The final component in African
Colonialism was not concerned with modernizing the colony in the interests and Third World writings on imperialism challenged the prevailing view of
of the colonized. The colony and its inhabitants were the objects rather than colonialism as a modernizing phenomenon by putting forward a cultural
the subjects of colonialism. The colony hardly had a separate existence as can relativist perception of societies, where it was argued that there was no

178 179
 , necessary connection between the level of a people’s technological develop¬ Conclusion
ment and the quality of its civilization.'^
The few Eritreans who were capable of expressing their thoughts in writing When the Italians relinquished their power (1941) and the Eritreans were even¬
also interpreted colonialism, albeit in language far less sophisticated, in the tually provided with the opportunity to express their wishes as to the future
manner sketched above. For Blatta Gebre Egziabeher, writing in 1898, col¬ of their country in 1948, there was virtually no nationalist organization that
onial rule was a state of slavery comparable to that experienced by the Jews articulated the desire for Eritrean independence within the boundaries that ex¬
during the reign of Emperor Titus in the first Century A.D..'^ As outlined in isted up to 1936. Unlike the situation in the French and British colonies, there
chapter five. Father Gebre Yesus Haile, writing in the late 1920’s, repeatedly were no Eritrean intellectuals who were educated enough to speak for the
stressed that the Italian colonizers not only used Eritreans as instruments for
creation of an Eritrean state.^
their colonial expansion elsewhere, but treated them as no better than dogs.'*
The Unionist Party, the first organization that emerged soon after 1941,
Colonialism, however, did not last forever. Neither were its objectives fully campaigned for an unconditional union with Ethiopia. The Tigrinyan and
achieved. In addition to such external factors as the rise of the anticolonialist Christian roots of the Unionist Party and its close association with the Ethio¬
powers, i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union,'’ colonialism had other pian state provoked the formation of several political organizations which de¬
constraints which slowed the process of a complete subjugation of the col¬
fined their strategies as a response to the claims and challenges made by the
onized. These were the anticolonialist undercurrents, the fear of Eritrean
former. As the Four Power Commission of Enquiry found out seven years
resistance and the non-economic (or strategic) importance of the colony. after the end of Italian colonial rule, Eritrean ‘public opinion’ did not in any
After 1900, Italian anticolonialism might be seen in Italian capital’s lack of manner express the desire for the creation of an Eritrean state.
interest in exploiting the resources of the colony rather than through a sus¬
The Unionist Party, by far the largest party, in fact negated the existence
tained critique of the colonial system. The anticolonialist position of the
of Eritrean nationalism and the experience of Eritrea as a separate political
Catholic Church, although limited to questions of principle, remained none
entity (1882—1941), by its sustained campaign for union with Ethiopia. Al¬
the less a potential factor against the racialist ideology of colonialism.
though the historical and ideological basis of the Unionist Party, as discussed
The decisive factor which compelled the colonial administration to adopt
in Chapter Five, stretched back to the precolonial period, what appeared
economic policies that minimized conflict with the colonized was the fear of
striking was that fifty years of colonial rule had not weakened the ‘irredentist
Eritjean resistance. As discussed in Chapter Five the colonial state had, from
sentiments’ of the Tigrinyan people. By desiring the incorporation into
about 1910 onwards, ample force to quell any resistance, but instead chose to
Ethiopia of regions that had not previously been part of the precolonial Ethio¬
pursue a cautious policy in the sensitive area of land alienation. The colonial
pian polity, the Unionist Party tried to exploit the conditions brought about
administration used the fear of Eritrean resistance to defuse criticism from
by the Italian creation of Eritrea for its own advantage.
colonialist quarters which called for a more determined policy of land aliena¬ The other political organizations, which can be described as parties oppos¬
tion.
ing the Unionist Party, had strategies which had very little to do with the crea¬
Finally, strategic considerations, which far outweighed the economic value tion of an Eritrean nation. The Liberal Progressive Party with its alleged sup¬
of Eritrea, defined the scope of colonial economic and native policies. These
port of slightly over 9 per cent of the population campaigned for the creation
were the use of the colony as a reservoir of colonial soldiers, as a base for tran¬
of a United Tigrinya nation — a political objective whose origin predated
sit trade and lastly, as a staging post for the penetration and the eventual col¬
Italian colonialism. Similar to the Unionist Party, the Liberal Progressive
onization of Ethiopia. As Eritrea was important strategically, Italian colonial
Party also expressed a wish to incorporate those areas of Eritrea which had
rule emphasized the maintenance of political stability which, in turn, meant
not previously belonged to the Ethiopian/Tigrai state.
a minimum restructuring of pre-colonial social and economic structures.
The Pro-Italy Party which also had about 10 per cent support, campaigned
for the return of Italian colonial rule as a better alternative for Eritrea than
the union with Ethiopia.
The Moslem League, the largest party opposing the claims of the Unionist
Party, was an amorphous body whose main unifying theme was its opposition
to any form of union with Christian Ethiopia. As the British and the Four
Power Commission of Enquiry found out, the Moslem League lacked a clear
180 181
 policy for the future of Eritrea. While the majority expressed a preference for main vehicle for the evolution of colonial nationalism, did not exist in Eritrea.
a trusteeship of either the British or the United Nations, only a fraction (up As abstract ideas, the concepts of nation and nationalism, within the context
to 10 per cent according to the estimate of the Four Power Commission) of colonial territories, demanded ‘intellectuals’ who were capable of inter¬
wished independence. Neither the Four Power Commission of Enquiry nor preting them. By limiting the Eritrean to rudimentary education, the colonial
the British were able to identify whether those who desired independence had administration was able to hinder the emergence of an Eritrean nationalist in¬
the entire territory in mind or the regions that they represented. tellectual group and this had profound consequences for the emergence of
It is hardly surprising that the possibility of establishing an independent Eritrean nationalism.^
Eritrea was not contemplated during the 1947—48 period. A similar state of Italian colonialism left behind a colony whose modern sector was virtually
confusion can be easily pointed out in other colonies. Writing in the mid dominated by Italian settlers.^ It left behind a population accustomed to an
1940’s, the well known Nigerian politician Nnamdi Azikiwe argued that imposed political and economic stability. It also left behind a population with
Nigeria was not a nation but a geographical expression, and that there were an incohate consciousness of a separate identity that can be defined as
no ‘Nigerians’ in the same sense as there were English.^* Eritrean, which was based and founded upon the colonial ideology of divide
The reasons for the virtual absence of national consiousness based on col¬ and rule and the economic co-option of the Eritreans in the pacification and
onial territorial boundaries are, I believe, located in the nature of the creation colonization of Ethiopia during the 1936—41 period. The links between con¬
of colonial territories and in the type of colonial system. Eritrea, as outlined sciousness of identity and national consciousness were not apparent in the pol¬
in the introduction, was consolidated into a colony out of disparate regions itical debates of 1947—48.
with different historical and ecological characteristics. The Tigrinyans main¬ After the demise of Italian rule and the end of the Second World War, the
tained, throughout the colonial period, their sporadic contacts with the rest British, the Allies, the Ethiopian state and the United Nations initiated the
of Ethiopia. The Non-Tigrinyans, who had either very little contact with process of decolonization. This ended in the federation of Eritrea, as an
Ethiopia or were treated as peripheral regions by the latter, inhabited those autonomous unit, with the Ethiopian Empire in 1950.^"^
regions of least importance to the colonial system. On the demise of the A year before the abrogation of the Federal Union and the incorporation
Italian colonial period, as the events of 1947—48 strongly indicated, Eritrea of Eritrea as Ethiopia’s fourteenth province in 1962, an organization known
tended to dissolve into its precolonial constituent parts. Fifty years of colonial as the Eritrean Liberation Front initiated an armed struggle against Ethiopian
rule was neither long enough nor sufficiently profound to bring about a politi¬ violations of the terms of the Federal Union.
cal -transformation that could be described in terms of Eritrean nationalism. However, the sheer evidence of the continued armed conflict between
In addition to the persistence of precolonial traditions and allegiances, Eritrean liberation movements and the Ethiopian state forces the question of
which colonialism was unable to weaken, the manner in which colonial rule the nature and dynamics of what, since the late 1960’s, can clearly be de¬
was executed militated against the emergence of a national consciousness. scribed as ‘Eritrean nationalism’, and this is a subject for scientific examina¬
Through its native policy, the colonial administration ruled Eritrea as an em¬ tion.^^
pire rather than as a nation. On the principle that the task of native policy The primary focus of this study was an assessment of the Italian colonial
was the maintenance of traditional Eritrean social organization, the colonial impact and has, 1 hope, provided sufficient data on the extremely tenuous im¬
administration discouraged inter-regional and inter-ethnic mobility. pact of colonialism on Eritrean society. A follow-up study of the subsequent
Bearing in mind that Eritrea was predominantly rural, the colonial adminis¬ British period and the decade of the 1950’s would enable us to locale the
tration exercised its rule through the local traditional elite. Local rulers were origin and development of the nationalist phenomenon.
chosen from among the traditional ruling elite and were confined to the
districts of their origin. The administrative districts were autonomous of each
other and were only united at the apex of the administration in the office of
the governor.
Since the colonial administration did not expect to share power at the centre
with Eritreans, it did not allow (even by the policy of non-interference) the
formation and articulation of an Eritrean public opinion. The local press
(owned and run by the colonized), which according to Raymond Betts was the

182
183
 FOOTNOTES velopment and where the African connection hardly played any role, see Richard
Webster, Italy*s Industrial Imperialism, 1905—1914, Berkeley, 1975, p. 201.
1. For the discussion on Italian anticolonialism I am greately indebted to Romain
Rainero’s study on the subject, L *anticolonialismo italiano da Assab ad Adua (1882— 10. The most notorious example still remains the work by L. H. Gann and Peter
96), Milano, 1971, to Angelo Del Boca’s first volume, Gli italiani in Africa Orientate, Duignan, Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in Africa, Lon¬
Milano, 1976, to Alberto Acquarone’s survey on Italian political climate during the don, 1967, Idem., ‘Economic Achievements of the Colonizers: An Assessment*, in The
formation of the Italian Colonial Institute in 1906, ‘Politica estera e organizzazione Economics of Colonialism, Cambridge, 1975, pp. 673—96.
del consenso nell’eta giolittiana: il congresso dell’Asmara e la fondazione dell’Istituto
Coloniale Italiano’, Storia Contemporanea, 6:1 (1977) 57—119, 6:2 (1977) 291—334, In a measured language, Roland Oliver and J. D. Fage in their Short History of Africa,
6:3 (1977) 549—69 and finally to Roberto Battaglia’s critical study. La prima guerra London 1962 pp, 216—25 also interpret colonialism as the initiator of an Age of Im¬
d*Africa, Torino, 1958, on the circumstances leading to the battle of Adwa. provement during the 1919—39 period. Among political scientists, mention can be
made of Immanuel Wallerstein, The Road to Independence: Ghana and Ivory Coast,
2. Keimevo, L*anticolonialismo, p. 160. The statement was made soon after the Dogali Paris, 1964 and idem., ed.. Social Change: The Colonial Situation, New York. 1966.
incident in early 1887.
11. The practice of Italian Colonialism negates Karl Marx’s vision. On the contrary,
3. Ibid., p. 176; Del Boca, Gli italiani, vol.l, 1976, pp. 2A6—A1', see also Battaglia, the view that colonialism has impoverished the areas it colonized and left behind it
La prima guerra, p. 250. peripheries tied down to it in a continously growing degree of dependence, is made by
no other than Immanuel Wallerstein himself in his recent work on Historical
4. Ibid., pp. 184—85. Capitalism, London, 1983, and The Politics of World Economy: The States, the
Movements and the Civilizations, Cambridge, 1984.
5. Ibid., p. 173.
12. Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, Paris, 1961 (London 1963) p. 156.
6. Surveying the philosophical climate of nineteenth century England, the historian
David Thomson wrote that, in the third phase, i.e. last decade of the century, 13. Ibid..
the emphasis was more strongly on diversity and conflict, more weakly on unity and har¬
mony...Men thought more and more on Nietzschean terms of “will to power”. The colli¬ 14. Thomas Hodgkin, ‘Some African and Third World Theories of Imperialism*, in
sion of ideas, rapidly becoming a clash of ideologies, took conrete shape in the movements Bob Sutcliffe and Roger Owen, eds.. Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, London.
of violence: in the violence of the Irish independence movement ... and the new Im¬ 1972, p. 103. Hodgkin based his paper largely on the writings of Africans from the
perialisms. former French West Africa.
England in the Nineteenth Century, London, 1964, p. 234.
15. Ibid., p. 104.
For a more concrete study on the philosophical underpinnings of British an¬
ticolonialism see Bernard Porter, The Critics of Empire: British Radical Attitudes to 16. Ibid., p. 105.
Colonialism in Africa, London, 1968. See also Bertrand Russel, History of Western
Philosophy, New York, 1972, pp. 760—73, on Nietzsche and his impact on nineteenth 17. See my study on Blatta Gebre Egziabeher and his works in Notes on Nationalism
century Europe. and Resistance in Eritrea, 1890—1940, pp. 1—21.

7. On the impact of advanced technology but above all in firearms, on the colonization 18. Father Gebre Yesus Haile, Hade Zanta (A story), written in 1928, published in
of Africa, see Philip Curtin et. al., African History, Boston. 1978, pp. 447—50. For Asmara. 1950, pp. 46, 50.
a technological interpretation of colonization see Daniel Headrik, Tools of Empire:
Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, New York. 1981. 19. William Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, ‘The United States and the Liquida¬
tion of the British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941—51*, in Prosser Gifford and
8. On the eve of the partition of Africa there were, in Ghana, Western educated William Roger Louis eds.. The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization, 1940—
Africans. Although they did not save Ghana from being colonized, these educated 1960, pp. 31—55, p. 37; Raymond Betts, Uncertain Dimensions, p. 44.
Africans played an important role in shaping British colonial policy towards Ghana.
See BjOrn Edsman, Lawyers in Gold Coast Politics, c. 1900—1945, Uppsala, 1979. 20. The role of western-educated intellectuals in the emergence of colonial nationalism
(i.e. within the territorial boundaries of a given colony) has been stressed by several
9. For the limited significance of colonies in European economic development see authors. For the early studies see M.L. Kilson Jr., ‘Nationalism and Social Classes in
Allan S. Milward and S. B. Saul. The Development of the Economies of Continental West Africa* in Wallerstein. ed.. Social Change: The Colonial Situation, pp. 533—50,
Europe, 1850—1914, London, 1977, pp. 503—05. Specifically on Italy’s pattern of de¬ p. 534. See also Raymond Betts, Uncertain Dimensions, p. 163.
184 185
 21. Rupert Emerson and Martin Kilson, eds., The Political A wakening of Africa, New APPENDIX I
Jersey, 1964, p. 60. Nationalism may be broadly defined as a social and political move¬
ment of nationalities striving to acquire, maintain and enhance their status within a
demarcated territorial space. For a similar definition see Louis Wirth, ‘Types of Na¬
tionalism*, Journal of American Sociology, 41:6 (1936) 12^—'hi, p. 723.

22. See Martin L. Kilson, ‘Nationalism and Social Classes in West Africa’, in Waller-
stein ed., Social Change, pp. 333—50. See also Thomas Hodgkin, Nationalism in Col¬ FO 371/69364 Four Power Commission Report on Eritrea, 1948, Appendix 70.
onial Africa, London, 1964.
Principal Pre-Occupation Industries (i.e. pre-1941).
23. See the survey conducted by the Italian Consulate in Eritrea on the Italians and
their economic activities: Consolato Generale d’ltalia, Gli italiani in Eritrea nel 1958, Such information as is available indicates that the undernoted industries were
Asmara, 1958, p. 7. established during the Italian regime:
i) Flour mills. There were five of these currently working which were established prior
24. Although biased, the study of Kennedy Trevaskis, Eritrea: A Colony in Transition,
to the occupation, one in 1895, one in 1912, one in 1939, and two in 1940. Up to 1935,
1941—52, Oxford, 1960, still remains the only complete study for the story of the
according to statistics available, Eritrea exported to Italian Somaliland and the Ara¬
decolonization of Eritrea.
bian Coast a considerable quantity of flour of wheal milled from grain largely im¬
ported from Ethiopia. It is reasonable to assume that the two old established mills were
25. The conflict as a nationalist phenomenon has been studied by David Pool,
engaged in this trade as well as satisfying local demands. These five mills at the present
‘Eritrean Nationalism’, in Nationalim and SelfDetermination in the Horn of Africa,
time have combined potential output of 1050 tons of flour per month. All five are still
edited by I.M. Lewis, London, 1983, pp. 175—93 without, however, adquate treat¬
in operation and are privately financed.
ment of its causes. Lloyd Ellingson’s, ‘The Origins and Development of the Eritrean
Liberation Movement’, in The Proceedings of the Fifth International Conference on ii) Pasta Manufactures. The existence of two is known, one established in 1912, and
Ethiopian Studies, Chicago, 1980, pp. 613—28 is limited to a straight forward narra¬ the other in 1922. There is no evidence that any part of the produce of these factories
tion. By far successful is the study by Geir Pedersen, ‘From Ethiopian Irredentism to was exported, and since their combined potential output at the moment is only 100
Eritrean Nationalism’, in Eritrea: Prognoses and Assessment of Africans Longest War, tons per month it must be assumed that they operated to fulfill local demands only.
edited by Svein Ege and Tekesle Negash (forthcoming) where the author attempted to Both are still in operation and employ private capital.
locate the causes of the conflict in the Eritreo-Ethiopian relations than to the impact
of colonialism on Eritrean society. iii) Bread Bakeries. Three of these were in operation in the Italian era, one established
in 1935, one in 1936, and the third in 1939. Combined potential output is 160 tons per
month all of which is absorbed locally. Raw materials are local and Ethiopian wheat.
All three are still in operation and work on private capital.
iv) Canned Meat, Salted Meat, and Meat Extract Factories. Two of these existed,
firstly, Torregiani, of whom particulars are lacking and, secondly, Caramelli, who was
first established in 1925 and had a potential output of 10 to 15,(X)0 tins of 300 gramms
per day. Most of these was exported to Libya and Italy until 1935 when, it is stated,
the entire output was supplied to the Italian armed forces in Eritrea. Raw materials
used were local and Ethiopian cattle, and tinplate from Italy or Germany. The factory,
which is financed by private capital, is not at present in operation but is shortly ex¬
pected to recommence its activities.
v) Tanneries. The only ones known to exist prior to the occupation were that of Baldini
established in 1938, and that at Debaroa established in 1940. Both together now have
a potential output of 75 tons of leather per month. There is evidence that prior to 1934
very small quantities were exported, but it appears likely that the greater part of the
produce was absorbed locally, doubtless by the native population. Raw materials were
local and Ethiopian hides and skins, while tanning extract and chemicals were im¬
ported from abroad. Both employ private capital and are still in operation.
vi) Vegetable Fibre Industry (Sisal and Sanseviera). This industry was centered on
Keren. About 200 tons of fibre per annum were exported over the period 1930/1935.

186 187
 The original decorticating machinery is believed to have been wilfully destroyed im¬ produced, and essences from abroad. Initially devoted to the home market but has
mediately prior to the occupation, since then the industry has not been revived on a subsequently exported, principally to Ethiopia. Present potential output is 6,(XX) litres
truly commercial basis. of all types of alcoholic beverages per month. The establishment continues to function
and employs private capital.
vii) Dumnut Blank and Button Factory. This, owned by one De Rossi, was first
established at Keren in 1927. There is evidence in the pre-1934 era of the exportation
of both whole and sawn dumnuts. The present potential output is 243,000,000 buttons
per month. The factory still operates entirely for export and employs private capital. In addition to the foregoing, as is indicated by the number of industrial trade licences
issued prior to the occupation, there were a number of smaller industries of the artisan
viii) Cement Factory. A publication of 1935 makes reference to such a factory at type started in many cases on an experimental basis after the commencement of the
Asmara, but there are no available records to establish whether one existed or not. In expansionist programme in 1935. Examples of these are carriage building and painting,
1937, however, a large cement factory was constructed at Massawa whose potential carpentering, wood-working, ice manufacturing, chemical products, wine and liquor
output was 3,500 tons per month, mainly destined for export. Raw materials were car¬ manufacturing, manufacturing of building and constructional material. All such fac¬
bonate of lime, silica, and ferrous earth, all locally abundant. In 1945 the factory, tories sprang up to meet the demands caused by the new policy of development of
which was operated by private capital, was closed down and transferred to the Sudan. Italian East Africa as an economic whole.

ix) Massawa and Assab Salt Works. The former commenced in 1906 and the latter
some years later. These two with the Ras Hafum salt works (Italian Somaliland) en¬
joyed a salt monopoly in Eritrea and Somalia. After 1935 these three and the Jubuoti
Salt works formed a Company which enjoyed a monopoly on the distribution of salt
in Ethiopia. Potential output of Massawa salt works alone is 96,(X)0 tons per annum
— a quantity far in excess of the consumption of what was Italian East Africa. Exter¬
nal trade statistics indicate that large quantities were exported, first to India, and
subsequently, after that country had closed her market by giving tariff preference to
Aden salt, to Japan. An average of more than 100,(XX) metric tons of salt per annum
was exported from Eritrea during the four year period 1930—1933. Massawa salt
works are still in operation and, it is stated, operated by private capital. Assab Salt
Works were seriously damaged at the time of occupation since then they have not
operated.

X) Soapfacfory. Known as S.A.P.E., this was first established in 1939. Raw materials
are coconut oil from the Yemen and Aden, oils and fats of local origin, and caustic
soda from the U.K..

xi) Edible Oils Factory. Two of these existed prior to the occupation, both established
in 1937. The potential output of the former is at present 1(X) tons per month, of the
latter 250 tons per month. Raw materials are oil-bearing seeds such as sesame, cotton,
neuk etc., imported mainly from Ethiopia and the Sudan. Private capital is employed
in both cases, and it is to be assumed that both factories produce for home consump¬
tion, there being no evidence that any part of the output was exported.
xii) Pirelli Tyre Re-treading Plant. — This, a branch of the Pirelli organisation in Italy,
was first established in Eritrea in 1936 in order presumably to meet the needs of the
growing transport fleet which had materialised as a vital adjunct to Italian develop¬
ment of East Africa. Raw materials are camelback from U.K., and cushion gum and
rubber solution from U.S.A.. Present monthly capacity is 420 tyre re-treads, 250 tyre
repairs and production of 250 transmission belts. The factory is stated to work on
private capital. Since its inception it has devoted itself to the home market and has not
engaged appreciably in the export trade.

(xiii) Compounded Liquor Factory — Known as L.E.A. it is an establishment started

in 1939 for the production of various types of alcoholic beverages from pure alcohol
and essences. Raw materials are alcohol (imported, prior to the occupation) locally

188
189
APPENDIX II Source: ‘II problema dei salari della mano d’opera di colore nel periodo pre e posl-
bellico’, L*agncoUura coloniaie, 30:12 (1936) p. 5.

1937
Salaries for Eritreans were revised by a Governatorial decree of 9.10.1937 thus:
A Note on Salaries and Prices of Basic Food Crops
Drivers, 12 lire; skilled workers, 9 lire; manual workers, 7 lire; children from the age
of eleven, 2.50 lire.

Source: Ministero dell’Africa Italiana, Codice del lavoro deirAfrica Italiana, primo
1905 supplemento, Roma, 1939, p. 35.

Daily Salaries in Lire. Salaries for the Eritrean colonial soldiers were established in Rome. According to the
Type of Work Salaries for Eritreans Salaries for Italians R.D. of 1.12.1892:

manual 0.80 — 1.50 6.00 Zaptie 1.85 — 2.25 lire daily.

masonry 1.20 — 2.00 6.00 — 10.00 Ascari 1.50 — 2.60
mining 0.80 — 1.00 5.00 — 10.00 Muntaz 2.20 — 2.50
Buluk-Bash 2.70 — 3.50
Prices of food crops in lire per 100 kgs: Shum-Bash 5.00 — 6.00
Taff, 20; barley, 15.00; wheat, 15.00; sorghum, 15.00.
These were reduced considerably during the period of Governor Martini, 1897—1907.
Source: Bartolommei-Gioli, ‘La colonizzazione delPEritrea’, 1906, p. 251. See also In 1905, salaries for colonial soldiers were nearly half from what they were in 1892.
Idem., and Checchi, M., ‘La colonizzazione agricola deirEritrea’, in L'Eritrea See Ordinamento amministrativo per la colonia Eritrea, R.D. 22.9.1905 no. 507, ar¬
economica, edited by Martini, F., Novara, 1913, pp. 390—91. ticle 120.

By 1935 salaries of colonial soldiers approximated those of 1892. The Ordinamento per
r; il Regio Corpo di truppe coloniali delEEritrea issued as R.D. 17.12.1931, article 65,
1924 established the salary scale:

The devaluation of the lire vis-^-vis the M.T. thaler, i.e. the basic currency of exchange Ascari 2.00 — 2.80 lire daily
between Eritrea and Ethiopia, caused sharp rise in food-crop prices. Prices rose from Muntaz 3.00 — 3.40
c. 16 lire per 100 kgs to about 100 lire per 100 kgs. See AE 859, Circolare: Approv- Buluk-Bash 4.00 — 4.80
vigionamenti, dated 22.12.1924. The colonial government noted that salaries to the Shum-Bash 5.00 — 5.80
colonial soldier (maximum 2.50 lire daily) were not enough to purchase sufficient The Italian lire was subject to a serious devaluation vis-4-vis the US dollar. The ex¬
amount of food-crops to sustain a family. change rate had gone up from five lire to a US dollar (1914) to 27 lire to a US dollar
in 1927. See Clough, S., The Economic History of Modern Italy, Columbia, 1964, pp.
197—98.

1935
Salaries for Eritreans were for the first time regulated by a Governatorial decree of
25.2.1935 no. 7079 in the following manner.

Skilled workers, 10.00 — 12.00 lire daily; drivers, 12.00 — 16.00 lire daily; manual
workers in general, 3.00 — 5.00 lire daily; children under eighteen, 2.00 — 5.00 lire
daily. During this period, daily wages for skilled Italians were fixed at 35 lire and at
25 lire for the non-skilled.

Food-crop prices in lire per lOOkgs.

Taff, 150.00 — 160.00 lire; barley, 60.00 lire; sorghum, 120.00 lire.

190 191
APPENDIX III APPENDIX IV

Eritrean Import/Export Trade in Thousands of Lire Total Enrolment of Students in Government Schools
1921—22 - 1939—40
Year Imports Exports Year Imports Exports
Year Enrolment
1900 9,376 2.745 1917 50,089 26,158
1901 9.342 2,759 1918 103,811 85,254 1921— 22 260
1902 7,990 2,711 1919 95.536 37,663 1922— 23 320
1903 9,037 4,077 1920 95,185 67,263 1932—24 340
1904 10,725 5,763 1921 61,862 33,998 1924— 25 340
1905 12,909 6,772 1922 87,781 31,623 1925— 26 360
1906 12,181 4,226 1923 106,294 40,394 1926— 27 360
1907 12,728 4,310 1924 146,129 87,901 1927— 28 400
1908 11,433 5,622 1925 203,453 119,462 1928— 29 1,100
1909 20,378 9,997 1926 171,789 97.854 1929— 30 1,200
1910 20,230 11,135 1927 201,536 81,566 1930— 31 1,420
1911 20,512 11,470 1928 195,627 93,712 1931— 32 1,400
1912 24,079 14,606 1929 207,503 72,499 1932— 33 1,483
1913 23,349 14,485 1930 176,814 76,219 1933— 34 1,985
1914 29,433 13,113 1931 186,825 69,063 1934— 35 2,130
1915 29,469 19,850 1932 173,035 59,194 1935— 36*
1916 21,614 . 11,868 1933 176,565 62,490 1936— 37 2,751**
1937— 38 3,400**
Source: Compiled from Statistica del movimento commerciale marittimo e
carovaniero deirEritrea, 1900—1933; Checchi, M., Movimento commerciale della 1939— 40 4,177**
colonia Eritrea, p. 8; Piccioli, A., La nuova Italia d*oltremare, p. 1618; Saniagata, F., 1940— 41 c.5,000**
La colonia Eritrea, p. 166. These figures include the value of goods imported to and
exported from Ethiopia via Massawa. The pre-1918 import/export figures are * All schools closed for the entire academic year due to the Italo-Ethiopian war.
presented in several forms, e.g. with and/or without transit trade.
** Total enrolment throughout Great Eritrea.

Sources: For the 1921—22 to 1932—33, Piccioli, A., La nuova Italia d*oltremare,
Firenze. 1933, p. 1149; for 1933—34 to 1936— 37, ASMAI. vol. 3, pacco 37, busta
4, Divisione centrale delle scuole primarie; for 1937—38 to 1938—39, Annuario dellc
colonie italiane, Roma, 1939, p.613; for 1939—40, Festa, A., 50 scuole primarie; 7000
allievi in Eritrea, in ASMAI. vol. 3.

192 193
LIST OF ABBREVIA TIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY

ACS-MAl, Archivio Centrale di stato (Rome) — Ministero delPAFrica ARCHIVAL SOURCES

Italiana
AE Archivio Eritrea
Africa Journal of the International African Institute, London
Africa (Rome) Rivista trimestrale di studi e documentazione delPlstituto halo-
Archivio Eritrea (AE), Rome
Africano, Rome
Shipped from Eritrea in 1947. AE has since then been deposited as a separate archive
AP Atti parlamentari, Camera dei deputaii
with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome. AE contains 1,200 ‘pacchi’
ASMAE, AA. PP. Archivio siorico del Minisiero degli Affari Esteri, Affari
(boxes). Only those files of which material used in this study are included in the list
Politici
below. The need for a thorough reorganization of the AE is recognized but has been
ASMAl Archivio storico del Ministero dell’Africa Italiana
delayed due to lack of funds. Considerable material transferred in the I950*s to an in¬
BUCE Bollettino Ufficiale della Colonia Eritrea
ternal archive known as the ‘archivio comitato* has not yet been returned to AE. Due
FO Foreign Office (Great Britain)
to the fifty years closure rule, access to AE was limited to those files up to 1934. In
FPC Four Power Commission
1981 the numbering system was changed without however suppressing the old system
GHQ MEF General Headquarters, Middle East Forces (Great Britain)
thus creating a real problem of correct citation. Unless otherwise mentioned, the post
MAE Ministero degli Affari Esteri (Italy)
1981 numbering system has been used.
MC Ministero delle Colonie (Italy)
M.T. Maria Theresa Thaler
AE 41. 173, 151, 164, 281. 300, 319, 370, 373, 402, 403, 499, 502, 531, 539, 552. 565,
R.D. Regio Decreto
570, 575, 593, 612, 613, 626, 627, 681, 720, 724, 773, 793, 808, 859, 861, 911,935.
WO War Office (Great Britain)
941, 947 , 950, 953, 979, 981, 1008, 1037, 1062, 1081.

Archivio storico del Ministero dell’Africa Italiana (ASMAl),

Rome
This archive of the former Ministry of Colonies is also deposited with the Italian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome. The files on Eritrea contain more material on
Ethiopian and Ethiopian affairs gathered from Eritrea rather than on Eritrean affairs.
The fifty year closure rule applies to ASMAl as well. Since many of AE and ASMAl
files contain material stretching over several decades, the fifty year closure rule has
been used indiscriminately.

ASMAl, position 2/2, 3/1, 3/5, 3/6, 3/7, 3/8, 3/9, 3/19, 3/20, 3/22, 3/24, 3/23,
3/26,6/1, 11/7, 11/8, 12/7 12/3, 12/4, 12/9, 18/1,18/2, 24/1,24/2, 33/1,33/2,
35/7, 35/17, 35/18, 35/19, 54/16, 54/22, 54/23, 54/24, 54/26, 54/30, 54/31,
115/1, 115/2, 181/1, 181/9, 181/12, 181/13, 181/60, 181/46, I86/I.

Archivio storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (ASMAE),

Rome
The archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. With the establishment of the Ministry
of Colonies in 1912, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ceased to interest itself with

194 195
.Eritrea. Eritrean material is located under Ethiopia. The most relevant files consulted
were
OFFICIAL PUBLISHED SOURCES
-Atti parlamentari. Camera dei deputati, Italy.
ASMAE, Affari politic!, Etiopia, Pacco 1020: Etiopia, busta 4—5.

-Bollettino Ufficiale della Colonia Eritrea, 1894—1941. Published in Asmara.

Archivio del comitato per la documentazione delle attivita -Raccotta Ufficiale delle leggi e dei decreti del Regno d*Italia.

italiane in Africa (Archivio ‘comitato’), Rome -Ufficio Eritreo delPEconomia, Statistica del movimento commercial marittimo
In 1952, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Italian Africa organized e carovaniero dell’Eritrea, Asmara, 1900—1934.
an official committee composed of scholars and colonial exerpts to document Italian
activities in Africa. For this purpose an internal archive (archivio comitato) was
created by transferring selected material from the AE and ASMAl. An inventory of
the material held was prepared in 1982. The files on Italian educational activites in
Eritrea, to which the author had the privilige to consult, are located under ASMAl,
Inventario vol. 3, busta 37.
LITERATURE
Acquarone, A., ‘Problems of Democracy and the Quest of Identity’, in Tannenbaum,
Archivio Centrale dello stato, (ACS), Rome R. E., and Noether, P. E., eds.. Modern Italy: A Topical History^ New York,
1974, pp. 355—76.
In the Central State Archive the following archives have been consulted:
- ‘Ferdinando Martini e I’amministrazione della colonia Eritrea* in Clio, 12:4
(1977) 341—427; Idem., ‘La politica coloniale italiana dopo Adua: F. Martini
-Archivo Ferdinando Martini (Governor of Eritrea, 1897—1907).
governatore in Eritrea’, Rassegna storica del Risorgimento, 42:3 (1975) 346—77,
42:4 (1975) 449—83.
- Fondo Piero Badoglio — Chief of the Italian Armed Forces, the head of the
Italian forces in the Italo-Ethiopian war of 1935—36 and the first governor- - ‘Politica estera e organizzazione del consenso nell’eta giolittiana: il congresso
dell’Asmara e la fondazione dell’Istituto Coloniale Italiano’, Storia content-
general of East African Empire
/ poranea, 6:1 (1977) 57—119, 6:2 (1977) 291—334, 6:3 (1977) 549—69.
-Fondo General Rodolfo Graziani, Vice-roy of Italian East Africa Empire, May Agresti, L., *I meticci e la carta fondamentale dell’Eritrea e della Somalia’, Atti del
1936 — December 1937. Graziani's papers remain the only sources easily access¬ secondo congresso di studi coloniale, vol. 5, Firenze, 1934 pp. 191—200.
ible for the post 1935 period. Anderson, B., Imagined Communities: Reflections into the Origin and Spread of Na¬
tionalism, London, 1983.
- Fondo Ministero dell’Africa Italiana (ACS-MAl). This archive of the former Annali (Gli) delTAfrica Italiana
ministry of colonies, fell into the hands of the Allies who then handed them to
-‘Lineament! della legislazione per I’impero’, 2:3 (1939) 3—160.
the Central State Archive.
-*La scuola e le istituzioni educative’, 3:1 (1940) 672—94.
-‘L’amministrazione della giustizia’, 3:1 (1940) 725—57.
Annonymous: ‘11 problema dei salari della mano d’oi>era di colore in Eritrea ncl
Public Records Office, London periodo pre e |x>st-bellico*, L*agricoltura coloniale, 30:12 (1936) pp. 3—12.
Most of the material on British Military Administration in Eritrea from 1941 up to Amin, S., Unequal Development, New York, 1973.
1949 is kept in the War Office (WO) files. Eritrean material is located in WO 230. - ‘Underdevelopment and Dependence in Black Africa”, Journal of Peace Re¬
From 1949 and until the end of British mandate in September 1952, Eritrea was ad¬ search, 2:1 (1972) 105—19.
ministered by the Foreign Office. The material is located in FO 371. Ardemani, E., Tre pagine gloriose nella storia, militare — civile — religiosa della
colonia Eritrea, Firenze, 1901.
Ar^n, G., Evangelical Pioneers in Ethiopia: Origins of the Evangelical Church Mekane
Yesus, Stockholm, 1978.
Arrighi, G., The Geometry of Imperialism, London, 1978.
Baer, G., The Coming of the Italo-Ethiopian War, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1%7,

196 197
^Balandier, G., The Sociology of Black Africa, translated by Carman, G., London, Buell, R., The Native Problem in Africa, 2 vols.. New York, 1928.
1970. Buonaiuti, C. M., Politica e religioni nel colonialismo italiano, 1882—1941, Varese,
Baldrati, I., ‘Dei prodotti coloniali in rapporto ai bisogni della madre patria* in Atti 1982.
del secondo congresso degli Italiani alTestero vol. 1, 1911, parte 3, Roma, 1911, Cain, J. P., Economic Foundations of British Overseas Expansion, London, 1980.
pp. 161—87.
Candeloro, G., Storia d*Italia contemporanea, vol. 6: Lo sviluppo del capitalismo c
-Mostra delle attivitd economiche della colonia Eritrea, Asmara, 1932. del movimento operaio, 1871 — 1896, 6th ed., Roma, 1977.
Bandini,F., Gli italiani in Africa Orientale: storia delle guerre coloniali, 1882—1943, Capone, A., Storia dltalia, vol. 20, Roma, 1981.
Milano, 1980. Caponi, L., ‘Questione agraria e questione nazionale in Eritrea, in Etiopia e in
Baran, P. A., ‘On the Political Economy of Backwardness’, in Imperialism and Somalia’, in L*Altra Africa 1 (1975), 25—53.
Underdevelopment, edited by Robert 1. Rhodes, New York, 1970, pp. 285—301. Caracciolo, M. M., ‘Le scuole nelle colonie italiane di diretto dominio’, Rivista di
Barrat-Brown, M., ‘A Critique of Marxist theory of Imperialism* in Owen, R., And Pedagogica, 23:3—5 (1930) 183—207, 273—98.
Sutcliffe, B., eds.. Studies in the Theory of Imperialism, London, 1972, pp Carbonari, G., // Tallero di M. T e la questione monetaria della colonia Eritrea, Roma
35—70. 1912.
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Bartolommei-Gioli, C., *La colonizzazione agricola dell’Eritrea’, Bollettino del Castellano, V., ‘La popolazione italiana dell’Eritrea dal 1924 al 1940*, Rivista italiana
emigrazione, 16 (1906) 220—87. di demografia e statistica, 2:4 (1948) 530—40.
Bartolommei-Gioli, G, Checchi, M., ‘La colonizzazione dell’Eritrea’ in Martini, F., -‘II censimento del 1939 della popolazione indigena della Eritrea e lo sviluppo della
ed., L*Eritrea economica, Novara, 1913, pp. 375—418. popolazione indigena della Eritrea storica, in un cinquantennio di amministra-
Battaglia, R., La Prima guerra d*Africa, Torino, 1958. zione italiana*, Rivista italiana di demografia e statistica, 2:2 (1948) 264—90.
Cattaneo, V., Saggi di diritto processuale coloniale, Roma, 1943.
Baumgart, W., Imperialism: The Idea and Reality of British and French Colonial Ex¬
pansion, 1880^1914, Oxsford, 1982. Cavazza, F., La valorizzazione agraria delle colonie italiane, Bologna, 1933.

Betts, R. F., Assimilation and Association in French Colonial History, 1890—1914, Censimento Generale della popolazione, 21.4.1931, vol.5, Colonie e Possedimenfi,
Columbia, 1961. Roma, 1935.
Chabod, F., Lltalia contemporanea, 1918—1948, Napoli, 1960.
-The False Dawn: European Imperialism in the Nineteenth Century, Minneapolis,
1975. Checchi, M., Movimento commerciale della colonia Eritrea, Roma, 1912.
—^ Uncertain Dimensions: Western Overseas Empires in the Twentieth Century, Ox¬ Ciasca, R., Storia coloniale delPItalia contemporanea: Da Assab alFImpero, Milano,
ford, 1985. 1938.

Biasutti, R., ‘Le razze Africane e la civilti*, R. Accademia d’ltalia, Convegno di Cicchitti, A., ‘Stato e Chiesa nelle colonie italiane*, Diritto ecclesiastico e rassegna di
scienze morali e storiche, Tema Africa, 1938, vol. 1, pp. 78—93. diritto matrimoniale, 49:3—4 (1938) 92—100.
-‘II problema religioso nella legislazione coloniale italiana*, Rivista coloniale, 29:1
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(1926) 475—96
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pp. 782—809. Chilcote, R. H., Protest and Resistance in Angola and Brazil, Berkeley, 1972.
Bolletino della Societa Africana d*Italia, ‘La popolazione del Eritrea*, 72 (1935) 319. Cipriani, L., Considerazioni sopra il passato e Tavvenire delle popolozione africane,
Firenze, 1932.
Bollettino Statistico delTAfrica Italiana: Note Riassuintive 1939—41, Roma, 1942.
- Un assurdo etnico: L*impero etiopico, Firenze, 1935.
Bologna, L. M., ‘L’avvaloramento in Eritrea’, in L'ltalia in Africa: serie economica-
agraria, vol. 1., tome 2, Roma 1970, pp. 3—109. -‘L’incrocio con gli Africani ^ un attentato contro la civilt^ Europea*, La Difesa
della Razza, 1:6 (1938) 34—35.
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210 211
INDEX Bologna, L. M., 58, 61 Crowder, M., 62, 112
Boselli, G. E., 198 Crummey, D., 84
This index of personal names and places includes names of institutions, e. g. Bottai, G., 72, 87 Curtin, P., 184
Brancato, F., 29
the Swedish Evangelical Mission, while the following are excluded: Eritrea,
Brausch, G., 198 Da Nembro, M., 87, 89. 128, 140
Tigrinya, Italy, Ethiopia and Africa. Brett, E. A., 26 Da Offeo. F., 200
Brewer, A., 25, 26, 62 Daughters of St. Anna, 89
Britain (see also Great Britain), 2, 11, 28, De Felice, R., 142
29. 71, 97, 101, 107, 111, 115, 142, De Francisi, P., 2(X)
145, 165, 177 De Jonghe, 200
Brucculeri, A., 119 De Leone, E., 200
Aberra, 122, 123, 124, 138 131. 137, 154, 155 (map). 159, 160 Brunschwig, H., 114 De Marco. R., 19. 31, 65, 67, 68. 84. 85.
Addis Abeba, 87, 129, 131, 141, 157 Assab, 1, 3 (map). 103, 116, 122, 155 Buell, R., 114 86. 87, 89
Aden, 45 (map) Buonaiuti, C. M., 89, 128, 140 De Medici, M. A., 200
Acquarone, 14, 19, 23, 28, 30, 139, 184 Astuto, Governor, 130 De Zerbi, R., 201
Adi Nefas, 137 Axum, 111 Cain, J. P., 30 Debre Bizen, 104, 129
Adi Oral, 155 (map) Azikiwe, N., 182 Cairo, 69, 127, 128, 129 Del Boca, A.. 18. 23. 63, 96, 114, 115,
Adi Keih, 155 (map) Candeloro, G., 16, 17, 28, 29 137, 139, 184
Adi Wegri, 86, 155 (map) Baer, G., 142 Capone, A., 29, 116 Del Monte, E., 200
Adwa, 2, 3 (map), 4, 5 (map), 35, 36, 37, Bahta Hagos, 4. 35, 36. 45. 53. 57. 123. Caponi, L., 19, 30, 124 Delogu, G. S., 200
45, 98, 99, 123, 125, 172, 184 126, 124, 125, 136, 138 Cappuccini, Fathers, 89 Desalegn, R., 24
136, 139, 155 (map) Balandier, G., 198 Caracciolo, M., 70, 85, 86 Deschamps, H., 95, 113, 114
Afar, 5 (map), 24, 132, 134, 150 Baldrati, 1., 198 Carbonari, G., 199 Deutsch, K. W., 200
Agordat, 5 (map), 46, 155 (map) Bandini, F., 28 Carducci, G., 174 Di Camerota, d’A. O., 201
Agresti, L., 197 Baran, P. A., 27 Carocci, G., 16, 17, 28 Di Rudini, 4, 23, 57, 58
Akele-Guzay, 106, 103, 116, 124, 133 Baratieri, O., 3, 4, 17, 34, 35, 36, 57, 89, Castellano. V., 49, 64, 91, 117, 166 Di San Giuliano, 69, 86
Akrur, 137 125 Catholic Church. 77, 78, 79. 108, 128, Di Val Cismon, C. M., 201
Aksui^ — see Axum • Baria, 5 (map). 7. 8. 132, 134, 143, 150 180 Dogali, 2, 14, 173, 174, 184
Alamatta, 155 (map) Barka, 103, 116 Catholic Mission, 66, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, Dotti, E., 201
Alexandria, 69 Barrat-Brown, M., 26 78. 79, 82. 84, 85. 87, 89. 91. 128, 129, Duignan, P., 25
Amara, 52 Bartolommei-Gioli, G., 33, 37, 38, 39, 130, 141, 157, 176
Amhara, 123 56. 58, 59, 139 Cattaneo, V., 199 Edsman, B., 184
Amin, S., 10, 25, 26, 38, 59, 167 Battaglia. R., 18, 22, 23, 27, 58. 137, 138, Cavazza, F., 199 Ege, S., 186
Anderson, B., 162, 163, 171 139, 184 Chabod, F., 142 Egypt. 1. 6, 29. 69, 121
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 3 (map) Baumgart, W., 26 Checchi, M., 42, 58, 59, 144, 167 El Morgani, 104
Aosta, Governor, Duca di, 96 Beccari, O., 59 Chilcote, R. H., 138 Ellingson, L., 186
Austria, 38 Beja, 132, 134, 150. 166 Ciasca, R., 23, 139 Ellis, G., 24, 143
Arabia, 38, 39, 40 Benadir, 75 Cicchitti, A., 168 Embae, story of, 74, 79
Arabian coast, 54, 55 Beni Amer, 5 (map), 24, 143 Cipriani, L.. 71, 87, 108, 110, 111, 118, Emerson, R., 186
Archivio Centrale di Stato, Roma (ACS), Bennet, N., 56 120 Engels, F., 25, 26
20. 31. 33 Bettini, Captain, 123, 138 Clough, S. B., 60 England, 28
Archivio Eritrea (AE), 20, 33, 56, 67 Betts, R., 85, 114, 162, 171, 182, 185 Colosimo, G., 59, 90, 91 Erikson, O., 201
Archivio Storico delPAfrica Italiana (AS- Biasutti, R., 198 Conti Rossini, C., 23, 24, 25, 134 Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), 183
MAI), 20, 33, 56 Bilen, 5 (map), 134 Contini, F., 87 Ethiopian Church, 6, 80, 84, 128, 154,
Ardemani, 124, 138 Bismarck, 28 Coptic (Egyptian) Church, 127 157
Ar^n, G., 84, 115 Blanc, Foreign Minister, 89 Coptic Patriarchate, 127, 129 Europe, 8, 9. 11. 12, 14, 73, 74, 93. 108,
Arrighi, G., 26 Blatta Gebre Egziabeher, 31, 180 Coquery-Vidrovitch, C., 46, 60, 62 117
Asia, 162 Blue Nile, 142 Creech Jones, A., 113 Eyassu, Ethiopian Crown Prince, 127,
Asmara, 3 (map), 5 (map), 20, 44, 46, 53, Boahen, A. A., 26, 30, 60 Crispi, F., 2, 3, 4, 13, 14. 15. 16. 17, 23, 140
90. 106, 107, 121. 123, 125, 127, 129, Bogos, 7. 24. 132, 134, 150 33, 34, 35. 36, 56, 57, 58. 98, 172, 173 Ezechia, Padre, 89

212 213
rage, J. D.. 25, 29, 167, 185 Halai, 137 Kolmodin, J., 121, 122, 132, 137, 138, 154, 155 (map). 159
Faitlovitch, J., 143 Haile Selassie, Emperor, 127, 129, 131 143 Maugini, A., 205
Fanon, F., 179, 185 Haily, M.. Lord, 93. 94. 112 Kunama, 5 (map), 7, 8, 132, 134, 143, Matteoda, C., 58
Federezoni, L., Minister of Colonies, 70, Halay, 125 150 Mazrui, A., 205
176 Halhale, 141 Kufit, 3 Mazzei, J., 60
Ferraris, L., 201 Halldin-Norberg, V., 84, 115 Mehari, 138
Ferroni, C., Governor, 101 Hamassien, 103, 116, 118, 123, 127, 133 Larsson, J., 28 Mekele, 155 (map)
Festa, A.. 71, 78, 83. 85, 86. 87. 89, 176 Harar, 52 Lasch, C., 138 Mekonnen, Ras, 123
Fetha Nagast (The Law of the Kings), 106 Headrick, D., 184 Latin America, 9 Mellana, V., 118
Fieldhouse, D. K., 26 Herstlet, 115 Lazzarists, 89 Menekusito, 141
Fischer, D. H., 27. 164 Hess, R., 63 Lefevre, R., 67 Mensa, 24
Folchi, A. E., 201 Hetherington, P., 112, 113, 114, 161. 171 Legassick, M., 204 Meraguz, 133
France. 4, 16, 28, 29. 71, 94, 95. 101, 107, Hettne, B., 203 Lenin, V. L, 10, 26 Messineo, A., 205
111, 114, 115, 142, 165 Hobsbaum, E., Leonard. R., 146. 147, 148, 165, 166 Micacchi, R., 70, 85, 86
Francheili, L., 3, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, Hodges, G. W. T., 203 Leopold, King of Belgium, 23, 58, 139 Michels, R., 14, 15. 28, 173
56, 57, 98 Hodgkin. T., 171, 179, 185, 186 Lessona, A., 119 Milan(o), 17
Frank, A. G., 10, 26 Hopkins, A. G., 29, 30, 114 Leuthy, H., 63. 85, 95. 1 13 Mi^ge, J. L., 205
Fredrickson, G. M., 138 Horn of Africa, 1, 19, 158 Lewis, L M., 186 Milward, A. S.. 27, 184
Hughes, A. J., 203 Lewis. M. D.. 113, 114 Minilik, Emperor, 2, 123, 124, 125
Gabre-Negus, 58, 142 Hyden, G., 63 Leys, C., 26 Ministero della guerra, 49, 63
Gabriele da maggiora OFM Cap., 202 Liberal Progressive Party, 160, 161, 168, Ministry of Colonies (Ministry of Italian
Gabrielli, A., 202 India, 38, 44, 116 169, 170, 181 Africa). 31, 56, 58, 80. 110, 111, 127
Galla-Sidana, 52 Infante, E., 164 Libya. 4, 14, 15. 30, 48. 49, 50. 51. 54. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 14. 18, 20,
Gallagher, G., 29 Indonesia, 162 59. 65, 70, 85, 97. 100, 116, 126, 135, 56, 89. 102, 127
Gann, L. H., 25, 185 Isaacman, A. and B., 138 139, 175 Ministry of Italian Africa (Ministry of
Gasc-Setit, 116 Italian Communist Party, 13 Longrigg, S., 158, 159 Colonies). 31. 56. 58. 102, 130, 131
Gasparini, J., 4, 55, 84, 91 Iwarson, J., 84, 87, 89 Loram, C. T., 204 Misghena, Yemane, 56
Gayda, V., 202 Louis, Wm. R.,26, 29,91, 112, 113, 114, Missione Cattolica, 88
Gebfe Medhin, J., 146, 164, 165 168, 185 Mohamed Nuri, 123, 124
Gebre Selassie, Degiac, 123 July, R. W.. 203 Lowe, C. J., 204 Mola, A., 17. 18. 29. 97, 115, 118
Gebre Yesus, H., Father, 31, 180, 185 Japan, 44 Lugard, L., 92. 93. 112 Mondaini, G., 14, 27, 105, 117
Gebremedhin Hagos, 123, 124 Jeberti, 46 Moreno, M. M.. 105, 110, 111, 116, 117,
Germany, 29 Mack Smith, D., 96, 97, 108, 115 119, 120
Gemelli, Fr. A., 202 MacRae, D. G., 205 Morgenthau, R. S., 206
Ghana, 51, 91, 184 Kay. G. B., 91 Mai Tsada, 133 Mori, A., 33, 56
Gifford, P.,26, 29,91, 112, 113, 114, 185 Kedouri, E., 203 Maione G., 18 Moslem League, 160, 161, 169, 170, 181
Giglio, C., 22. 23. 30 Kelly. P. G., 203 Mair, L., 95. 112, 114, 118, 120, 165 Munro, J. F., 30
Kemp, T., 26 Malaya, British, 162 Munzinger, W., 7, 25, 143
Giordani, 1.,
Kenya. 53. 145. 165 Malinowski, B., 112, 170 Mutinelli, M., 119
Goglia. L.. 14, 17. 27
Gondar, 111 Keren. 3. 44, 45. 46, 69. 79, 82, 91. 103, Malvezzi, A., 205
121, 155 (map) Marchitto. N., 119 Nadel, S. F., 24, 165, 166
Governo Generate delPAfrica Orientale,
64 Kessela, 69 Marcus. H.. 23. 140, 142 Naitza, G. B., 17, 18, 29
Gramsci, A.. 13. 16. 17, 27, 28, 29, 36. Killingway, D., 64 Martini, F., 4. 19. 25, 32, 33, 37, 48, 54. National Party, 160
58. 172 Kilson, M. L. Jr., 171, 185. 186 55, 56. 58, 68. 69, 70, 85. 97. 98. 99, Negash, T.. 24. 63, 116, 142, 143, 165.
Kimble. G. H. L, 203 100, 109, 115, 116, 123, 124, 126, 138, 166, 185, 186
Grassi, F., 17, 27, 59
Kirk-Greene, A. H. M., 112, 113 139, 141, 143, 144, 176 Neri. L. 119
Graziani, R., 31, 49, 64
Kitching, G., 204 Marx. K., 8, 10, 25, 26. 27, 179, 185 Nicolson, 1. F., 112, 161, 171
Great Britain, 4
Kiwanuka, S. M., 112 Marya, 150 Nietzsche. 184
Knight, K. M., 113, 114 Massawa, 2, 3 (map), 5 (map), 14, 38, 40, Nigeria. 92. 93. 162, 182
Habab. 24, 150
Knorr, K., 27 41, 42. 44, 45, 46, 50, 103, 121, 125, Nokra, 122
Hadegti, 106
Koebner, R., 26
214 215
Noii, C.. 207 Rochat, G., 17. 29, 58, 63, 141, 142 100, 139 Tron, A., 87, 89
Roden, K. G., 209 Somit, A., 210 Tsilma, 133
Odorizzi, D., 144 Rodney. W., 25 South Africa, Republic of, 96 Tuninetti, D., M.,
Ogunlande, O. F., 91 Romano, S., 97, 115 Southard, A., 61, 168
Oliver. R.. 25. 29. 30. 167. 185 Rome. 14, 20, 35, 36, 53, 100, 110, 131, Southern Rhodesia, 53 Udal, R. N.. 211
Oloruntimehin. B.. 114 136, 138 Soviet Union, 113, 165, 180 Unionist Party, 160, 168, 169, 181
Omu, 1. A., 207 Rossetti, C.. 23. 58. 137, 139 Steiner, A. H., 210 United Nations, 182, 183
Orano P.. 207 Rotberg, R. 1., 113 Stem, J., 113, 170 United States (of America), 113, 165, 180
Ostini, G.. 59 Rubenson, S.. 6, 23. 24. 137, 139, 143 Sterry. W.. 210 Uzoigwe, G. N., 30
Russell, B., 184 Stzentes, T., 27
Pankhurst. R., 23. 32, 36, 56, 58, 62, 84, Sudan, 38, 39. 48, 69, 121, 159, 176 Vatican, 79, 89
85, 88, 137, 157 Sahel, 116 Suez Canal, 1, 29 Viola, A., P.. 211
Palermo, 2 Saho, 5 (map), 7, 8, 123, 132, 134, 150 Suret-Canal, J., 26 Virgili, F., 211
Paoli, R.. 33, 56, 85 Salis, R. S.. 61, 165 Swedish (Evangelical) Mission, 72, 79, Vischer. H., 91
Paulos, Tzadua (Abba), 118 Salvago-Raggi, Governor, 4, 33, 50, 55, 82, 84. 90. 91. 99, 127, 140, 176
Pedersen, G., 186 62 64. 69. 86, 100, 140 Sweezy, P., 27
Wallensteen, P., 203
Peglion, O., 33, 56, 58, 61, 64, 116 Sanderson, G. N., 30 Wallerstein, I., 10, 26, 62, 171, 185, 186
Peking, 69 Sangiorgi, G. M., 124 Warran, B., 211
Penrose, E. F., 30 Sanguinetti, Leutenant, 124 Taddia, I.. 30, 60, 61, 148, 166, 167
Webster. R.. 139, 185
Perini, R., 58. 117, 137, 142 Santagata, F., 33. 41, 42, 45. 56, 59, 60, Tadesse, T.,24
Wedajo Ali, 129
Perticone, G., 115 61, 153, 165 TaHa, B., 23, 143
Wehler, H. U.. 15, 28,
Philippines. American, 162 Santini, O., 209 Tancredi, A. M.,
Weiskel. T., 91. 112, 113
Piccioli, A., 33, 56, 61, 62, 90, J43, 165, Sapeto, G., 209 Taylor. A. J. P., 29
Wichale, 2, 3, 58, 121, 125, 132, 137
167 Saul, S. B., 27 Taylor, O. H., 27
Wirth, L., 186
Piccoli, M., 208 Sbacchi, A., 97, 114, 115 Tekela, 132
Wrigley, C. C., 166
Plowden, C., 24 Scaglione, E.A., 96, 114 Tessenei, 43
Wilson. H. S., 30
Pollera, A., 8, 24, 25, 33, 56, 116, 138, Schieder, W., 15, 16, 17, 28, 172, 173 Thomson, D. 184,
168. Schmidt, H., 26 Tigrai, 24. 53, 54, 123, 124, 125, 132, 159
Tigre, 5 (map). 7. 25. 132, 134, 150 Yacob Gebre Yesus, Bishop, 31
Pool,!)., 186 Schumpeter. P., 10, 11, 12, 14, 26, 27,
Tiho, 155 (map) Yohannes, Emperor, 2
Porter, B., 184 173, 178
Potekhin, 1., 208 Scoiton, J. F., 209 Titus, Emperor, 132, 180
Prasca, V., 49 Segeneitti, 80, 137 Tittoni, T., 60 Zaghi, C.. 13. 14. 17. 27. 173
Pro-Italy Party, 160, 169, 181 Segre, C. G.. 23 Trevaskis, G. K. N., 84, 168, 186 Zambia, 165
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Rainero, R., 19. 23. 31, 32, 35, 36. 56, Setit, 103
57. 58, 115, 137, 139, 184 Sharia, 106
Ramm, A., 23 Sherman, R., 160
Ras Mekonnen, see Mekonnen, Ras. Shewate Anseba, 106
Ratcliffe, B. M., 26 Shoa, 1. 52
Rava, M., 87. 119 Shumagle, 7, 25
Red Sea, 1. 2, 3 (map), 24. 44, 121 Sicily, 17
Rhodes. I. R., 27 Silberman, L., 210
Rimmer, D., Sillani, T., 210
Risorgimento, 18, 70 Simensen, J., 113, 114
Roberts, A. D., 208 Simonini, G., 64
Roberts, Andrew D., 112 Sisters of Pia della Nigritzia, 89
Roberts, S., 85, 113 Smith, W. D., 30
Robinson, R., 29, 143, 185 Somalia, 4, 30, 48, 49 50, 52, 53. 54. 65.

216 217
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