UNIT-III

Contempt of Court Act, 1971

Selected major judgments of the Supreme Court:
1. In the matter of D, An Advocate, AIR 1956 SC I 02.
2. P.J. Ratnam v. D. Kanikaram, AIR 1964 SC 244.
3. NB. Mirzan v. The disciplinary committee of Bar Council of
Maharastra and Another, AIR 1972 SC 46.
4. Bar Council of Maharastra v. M V. Dabholkar, etc., AIR 1976 SC 242.
5. V.C. Rangadurai v. D. Goplan and others, AIR 1979 SC 201.
6. Chandra Shekar Soni v. Bar Council of Rajasthan and Others, AIR
1983 SC 1012.
7. In Re an Advocate, AIR 1989 SC 245.
8. In Re Vinay Chandra Mishra, 1995 (Vol-I) IBR 118.
9. Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India, AIR 1998 SC1895.
10. Ex-Capt. Harish Upped v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 739

Contempt of Court Act, 1971

Contempt of Court

 Section 2 - Definitions.
 Civil Contempt
 Criminal Contempt

Not a Contempt of Court - Defences open to contemner

 Section 3 - Innocent publication and distribution of matter not contempt.

 Section 4 - Fair and accurate report of judicial proceeding not contempt.
  Section 5 - Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt.
 Section 6 - Complaint against presiding officers of subordinate courts
when not contempt.
 Section 7 - Publication of information relating to proceedings in
chambers or in camera not contempt except in certain cases.
 Section 8 - Other defences not affected.
 Section 9 - Act not to imply enlargement of scope of contempt.

Jurisdiction of Courts

 Section 10 - Power of High Court to punish contempt of subordinate

courts.
 Section 11 - Power of High Court to try offences committed or offenders
found outside jurisdiction.

Procedures

 Section 16 - Contempt by judge, magistrate or other person acting

judicially.
 Section 20 - Limitation for actions for contempt.

Procedure for Criminal Contempt

 Section 15 - Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.

 Section 18 - Hearing of cases of criminal contempt to be by Benches.
 Section 17 - Procedure after cognizance.
 Section 14 - Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme
Court or a High Court.
Procedure for Civil Contempt
 Section 23 - Power of Supreme Court and High Courts to make rules. )

Punishments and Remedy for Contempt of Court

  Section 12 - Punishment for contempt of court.
 Section 13 - Contempt not punishable in certain cases.
 Section 19 - Appeal

Miscellaneous

 Section 21- Act not to apply to Nyaya Panchayats or other village courts.
 Section 22 - Act to be in addition to, and not in derogation of, other laws
relating to contempt.
 Section 24 - Repeal

Introduction to Contempt of Court

This term Contempt of Court can be easily understood as when we are

disrespectful or disobedience towards the court of law which means that we
wilfully fail to obey the court order or disrespect the legal authorities. Then the
judge has the right to impose sanctions such as fines or can send the contemnor
to jail for a certain period of time if he is found guilty of Contempt of Court.

There are two Articles in the Constitution of India which talk about the
Contempt of Court and these are Article 129 and Article 142(2) .

 Article 129 says that the Supreme Court shall be the ‘Court of Record’
and it has all the powers of such courts including the power to punish for
contempt of itself.
 Article 142(2) : This Article says that when any law is made by the
Parliament on the provisions mentioned in clause 1 of this Article, the
Supreme Court has all the power to make an order for securing any
person’s attendance, production of any documents or has the power to
give punishment to anyone for its contempt.
  The philosopher Kautilya, in his book Arthashastra has written that “Any
person who exposes the king or insults his council or make any type of
bad attempt on the kings then the tongue of that person should be cut
off.” Adding to this statement, he also said that “When a judge threatens,
bully or make silence to any of the disputants in the court then he should
be punished.”
 Until the year 1952, there were no statutory provisions for the contempt
of court in India but after the enactment of Contempt of Court Act,
1952 statutory provisions for contempt of court in India has established.
 A committee was set up in 1961, under the chairmanship of H.N. Sanyal
which gives its report on 1963. The report of this committee took the
form of Contempt of Court Act, 1971. The procedure and application of
enactment something that was done earlier by the Contempt of Court Act
of 1952 was given several changes through the Contempt of Court Act,
1971.
 This Act segregates the ‘Contempt of Court’ into criminal and civil
contempt with their definition respectively. This thing was not mentioned
in the earlier existing courts.

The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 defines ‘Contempt of Court’ for the first
time. Before it, there was no statutory definition of the concept, ‘Contempt of
Court’. Actually, it is very difficult to define the concept, ‘Contempt of Court’.
What would offend the dignity of the Court and lower the Court’s prestige is a
matter for the court to determine and it cannot be confined within the four walls
of a definition.

Section 2 Definitions.—In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,—

(a) “contempt of court” means civil contempt or criminal contempt;
(b) “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree,
direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an
undertaking given to a court;
(c) “criminal contempt” means the publication (whether by words, spoken or
written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or
the doing of any other act whatsoever which—
(i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the
authority of, any court; or
(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of
any judicial proceeding; or
(iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct,
the administration of justice in any other manner;
(d) “High Court” means the High Court for a State or a Union territory, and
includes the court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory

In short, it may be defined as an act or omission which interferes or tends to

interfere with the administration of justice.

Essentials of Contempt of Court

1. Disobedience to any type of court proceedings, its orders, judgment,

decree, etc should be done ‘wilfully’ in case of Civil Contempt.

2. In Criminal Contempt ‘publication’ is the most important thing and

this publication can be either spoken or written, or by words, or by
signs, or by visible representation.

3. The court should make a ‘valid order’ and this order should be in
‘knowledge’ of the respondent.

4. The action of contemnor should be deliberate and also it should be

clearly disregard of the court’s order.
These essentials should be fulfilled while making someone accused of
Contempt of Court.

In State Bank of Patiala v. Vinesh Kumar Bhasin, the Supreme Court has
held that before issuing any interim direction in contempt proceedings or
proposing to hold any one guilty of contempt, the High Court should at least
satisfy itself that person to whom the notice is issued is the person responsible
to implement the order.

Noorali Babul Thanewala v. K.M.M. Shetty in which an undertaking was

given to a Court in civil proceedings by a person, on the faith that undertaking
was correct the Court sanctions a course of action in regard to that undertaking
but the undertaking seems to be incorrect. Hence, this was considered as
misconduct and amount to Contempt of Court.

The followings are Court :-

 Arbitrator appointed, by the Court under the Arbitration Act. It is to be
noted that arbitrator appointed by the parties is not taken as Court.
 Election Tribunal constituted under the Representation of People Act,
1951.
 Bar Council of India or of State and their Disciplinary Committees
constituted under the Advocate Act.

The Following are Not consider as Court

 The Commission of Inquiry constituted under the Commission of Inquiry
Act is not Court.
 The Director of Pre-university education is not a court and therefore
contempt proceeding cannot be initiated for disobedience of his order.
  The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, do not apply to contempt of Nyaya
Panchayat or other Village Courts, by whatever name known, for the
administration of justice established under any law.’
 But Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code applies to all courts including
the Village Courts and, therefore, contempt in obstructing the presiding
officer of the Village Court is punishable under this section.

Types of Contempt of Court in India

Depending on the nature of the case in India, Contempt of Court is of two types.

1. Civil Contempt

2. Criminal Contempt

Civil Contempt

Civil Contempt are taken as acts and Omissions in procedure involving a private
injury by the disobedience of the judgment, order or other process of the Court.

Section 2(b) “civil contempt” means wilful disobedience to any judgment,

decree, direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an
undertaking given to a court;

Purpose :-
 The purpose of the proceeding for the civil contempt is not only to punish
the contemner but also to exercise enforcement and obedience to the
order of the Court.
 Civil contempt may be taken as a failure to obey the order of the Court
issued for the benefit of the opposite party.
  It provides an instant and quick remedy to get the order passed by the
Court implement.
 It is a sanction to enforce compliance with the order of Court or to
compensate for losses or damages sustained by reason of non-
compliance.

Civil Contempt, actually, serves dual purpose

i) vindication of the public interest by punishment of contemptuous
conduct; and
ii) compel the contemner to do what the Court requires of him.‘
To constitute ‘civil contempt’ both elements must be proved
 There must be disobedience to the order, etc. of the Court or breach of
undertaking given to the Court and
 the disobedience or breach must be wilful.

Disobedience of the order, decree, etc. of the Court or breach of

undertaking given to the Court.
Disobedience of the order, decree, etc. of the Court or breach of
undertaking given to the Court.
To constitute civil contempt there must be order, decree, etc. of the Court or
undertaking given to the Court and there must be disobedience thereto or breach
thereof.
Court with competent Jurisdiction :-
For civil contempt it is necessary that order which has been disobeyed must
have been passed by the Court having jurisdiction to pass such order. If the
order has been passed without jurisdiction, it is not binding on the party against
which it has been passed and, therefore, the disobedience of such order will not
amount to contempt.
Roshan Lal Pokta Vs Roshan Lal Chauhan
It has been held that there is no contempt when the undertaking violated is given
in @ proceeding which was without jurisdiction. The burden to prove that the
Court which has passed the order had no jurisdiction to pass it or the proceeding
in winch the undertaking has given was without jurisdiction lies on the person
who alleges it.

Person against whom it is passed

It has been made clear that when the Court’s order directs a person to do
something or not to do something, it is incumbent on that person to comply with
that order forthwith without any doubt or hesitation in his mind.

Usually, the order should be served on the person against whom it has been
passed. However, where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the
person against whom the order was passed had actual knowledge of the order,
he cannot escape liability for contempt on the ground that the copy of the Order
has not been formally served on him.
Once an order is made by the Court and a person is charged with the allegation
of non-compliance of that order, he cannot plead that he was waiting for
instruction to comply with the Courts order.

Taluri Seshaiah Vs Narayana Rao

The person disobeying the order of the Court will alone be responsible for the
consequence and he cannot be heard to say that he has referred the matter to his
official superiors and for that matter his official superiors cannot give him any
kind of protection. The superior officers themselves may be held liable for
contempt, if they, give instructions contrary to the order of the Court or give an
impression to the subordinate officials that compliance with the order of Court,
without their approval, will open them to disciplinary action or make them
blameworthy.

Breach of Undertaking :-
Any person appearing before the Court can give an undertaking in two ways :
1. that he files an application or an affidavit clearly setting out
the undertaking given by him to the Court; or
2. by a clear and express oral undertaking given by the contemner and
incorporated by the Court in its order
If any of the aforesaid conditions are satisfied, thon a wilful breach of the
undertaking would, doubtless, amount to an offence under the Act. If none of
the above conditions is satisfied, there will be no undertaking

Wilful disobedience or breach.—

 For civil contempt the disobedience of the order, decree, etc. of the Court
or breach of undertaking given to the Court must be wilful.
 In India the Supreme Court’ has, often, pointed out that in order to punish
a person or authority for Contempt of Court, the disobedience to any
judgment, etc. or breach of undertaking to the Court must be wilful.
 Thus, mere disobedience of the order of Court in not sufficient to
constitute civil contempt. Tho disobedience must be wilful, The
disobedience must do deliberate and intentional. The contempt power
cannot be used unless the court is satisfied beyond doubt that the person
has deliberately and intentionally violated the order of the court.'
 The essence of the civil contempt is wilful disobedience to any judgment,
decree, direction, order or writ of a court, and not mere inaction to give
effect to it. The conduct of the alleged contemner must be wilful showing
deliberate and conscious disregard of the Court’s order, or a despising or
disdainful attitude towards the verdict of the Court.
Criminal Contempt

According to Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Court Act, 1971, Criminal

Contempt is Defined as (i) the publication of any matter by words, spoken or
written, or by gesture, or by signs, or by visible representation or (ii) doing of
any act which includes:

1. a) Scandalize(அவதூறு சொல்) or tends to scandalise, or lowers or

tends to lower the authority of any court, or

2. b) Biasness, interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any

type of Judicial proceedings, or

3. c) obstructs or tends to obstruct, interfere or tend to interfere with the

administration of justice in any manner.
Defences open to contemner

 Innocent publication and distribution of matter not contempt. – Section 3

 Fair and accurate report of judicial proceeding not contempt - Section 4
 Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt. - Section 5
 Complaint against presiding officers of subordinate courts when not
contempt - Section 6
 Publication of information relating to proceedings in chambers or in
camera not contempt except in certain cases- Section 7
 Other defences not affected- Section 8

Introduction :

Sections 3 to 7 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 make provisions in respect

of the defences available to the contemner in the proceeding for Criminal
Contempt. However Section 8 makes it clear that the defences other than those
mentioned in Sections 3 to 7 of the Act are not affected.
Section 3 : Innocent publication and distribution of matter not contempt. –

(1)No reasonable ground for believing that the proceeding was pending.

A contempt proceeding is initiated against a person on the ground that he is

responsible for publication which prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere
with the proceeding which is pending, he may plead that he, at the time of
publication, had no reasonable grounds for believing that the proceeding was
pending.

(2) Proceeding not pending at the time of Publication

The publication of any matter which interferes the course of justice in

connection with any civil or criminal proceeding will not make the person
responsible for such publication liable for Contempt of Court, if he proves that
the proceedings in relation to which such publication pas been made, was not
pending at the time of the publication.

Prabhakar Laxman Mokashi v. Sadanad Trimbak Yardi

In a case the Bombay High Court has made it clear that this immunity is
absolute.

The explanation to Section 3 clarifies as to when a judicial proceeding is said to

be pending for this purpose.

 In the case of civil proceeding, a judicial proceeding is said to be pending

when it is instituted by filing of a plaint or otherwise (or petition or
application or other prescribed documents in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by any law.)
 in the case of a criminal proceeding under the Code of Criminal
Procedure or any other law a judicial proceeding is said to be pending
 o where it relates to the commission of an offence, when the charge-
sheet or challah is filed or when the Court issues summons or
warrant, as the case may be, against the accused, and
o in any other case, when the court takes cognizance of the matter to
which the proceeding relates, and
 in the case of a civil or criminal proceeding shall be deemed to continue
to be pending, until it is heard and finally decided, that is to say,
 in a case when an appeal or revision is competent, until the appeal or
revision is preferred, until the period of limitation prescribed for such
appeal or revision has expired.
 A judicial proceeding which has been heard and finally decided shall not
be deemed to be pending merely by reason of the fact that proceedings
for the execution of the decree, order or sentence passed therein are
pending

(3) Innocent Distribution of publication:-

A person shall not be guilty of contempt of court on the ground that he has
distributed a publication containing any matter which interferes or obstruct the
course of justice in connection with any civil or criminal proceeding pending at
the time of distribution thereof if, he had no reasonable ground for believing
that it contained or was likely to contain, any such matter.

Section 4 : Fair and accurate report of judicial proceeding not contempt

A person shall not be guilty of Contempt of Court for publishing a fair and
accurate report a judicial proceeding or any stage thereof. This provision is
subject to the provisions contained in Section 7 of the said Act.
 Actually, it is the general rule that the administration of justice should be
open and public.’ The open justice principle is based on public interest
 considerations.? Consequently, it must give way when the public interest
indicates a degree of privacy.
 To claim the protection of Section 4, the report of the proceedings is
required to be fair and accurate. However, this should not be taken to
mean that the report must be word perfect, it is sufficient that it is a fair
representation of what has taken place in Court.

Section 7 : Publication of information relating to proceedings in chambers or in

camera not contempt except in certain cases

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, a person shall not be guilty
of contempt of court for publishing a fair and accurate report of a judicial
proceeding before any court sitting in chambers or in camera except in the
following cases, that is to say,—

 (a) where the publication is contrary to the provisions of any enactment

for the time being in force;
 (b) where the court, on grounds of public policy or in exercise of any
power vested in it, expressly prohibits the publication of all information
relating to the proceeding or of information of the description which is
published;
 (c) where the court sits in chambers or in camera for reasons connected
with public order or the security of the State, the publication of
information relating to those proceedings;
 (d) where the information relates to a secret process, discovery or
invention which is an issue in proceedings

Section 5 - Fair criticism of judicial act not contempt.

A person shall not be guilty of Contempt of Court for publishing any fair
comment on the merits of any cases which has been and finally decided.
Freedom of Speech v. Contempt of Court in Re - Arundhati Roy, AIR 2002
SC 1375 In Arundhati Roy,’ the Supreme Court has held that fair criticism of
the conduct of a judge, the institution of the judiciary and its functioning may
not amount to contempt if it is made in good faith and in public interest. To
ascertain the good faith and the public interest, the Courts have to see all the
surrounding circumstances including the Person responsible for comments, his
knowledge in the field regarding which the comments are made and intended
purpose sought to be achieved.
All citizens cannot be permitted to comment upon the conduct of the Courts in
the name of fair criticism which, if not checked, would destroy the institution
itself.

Padmahasini Vs C.R. Srinivas

Fair criticism should be taken to mean criticism which while criticising the act
of judge does not impute any ulterior motive to him.

Section 6 - Complaint against presiding officers of subordinate courts when

not contempt

Bona fide complaint against the presiding officer of the subordinate Court can
be made under Section 6 of the Act. It provides that a person shall not be guilty
of Contempt of Court in respect of any statement made by him in good faith
concerning the presiding officer of any subordinate Court to
(a) any other subordinate Court, or
(b) the High Court, to which it is subordinate.
Explanation.—In this section, “subordinate court” means any court subordinate
to a High Court.
The protection of Section 6 is available only when it is proved that the
complaint has been made in good faith.
Section 8 - Other defences not affected :-

Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed as implying that any other
defence which would have been a valid defence in any proceedings for
contempt of court has ceased to be available merely by reason of the provisions
of this Act.

Section 9. Act not to imply enlargement of scope of contempt.—Nothing

contained in this Act shall be construed as implying that any disobedience,
breach, publication or other act is punishable as contempt of court which would
not be so punishable apart from this Act

Other Defence
VI. Defamation of the Judge personally.—
Perspective Public (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra If the publication or other
act is merely a defamatory attack on the Judge and is not calculated to interfere
with the due administration of justice, it will not be taken as Contempt of
Court.’ However, the Judge has the ordinary remedies for defamation.”

In re S. Mudgaokar In a case the Supreme Court has made it clear that the
object of the contempt law is to protect public confidence in the administration
of justice and the offence will not be committed by attacks upon the personal
reputation of individual Judges as such.

Professor Goodhart- has observed that any personal attack upon the Judge
unconnected with the office he holds is dealt with under the ordinary rules of
slander and libel
The Statement complained of open to different interpretations. - Rex v.
B.S. Nayyar, ATR 1950 All 549.
In the case of contempt proceedings the charge is required to be established
beyond any reasonable doubt. If the words complained of may be interpreted in
two different manners and one of them indicates contempt while the other does
not, the commission of contempt cannot be taken to have been proved and the
contemner cannot be punished therefor.

The Statement complained of has no nexus with that judicial function of a

Judge.
State Vs Tribuvan Nath Verma: The publication or other act amounts to
Contempt of Court only when it has nexus with the functioning of the Judge.
The statement complained of may amount to Contempt of Court only when it is
made against the Judge in his judicial capacity in the exercise of his judicial
functions.'

Defences to Civil Contempt

A person who is accused of Civil Contempt of case can take the following
defences:

Lack of Knowledge of the order: A person cannot be held liable for Contempt
of Court if he does not know the order given by the court or he claims to be
unaware of the order. It can be successfully pleaded by the contemner that the
certified copy of the order was not formally served to him.

The disobedience or the breach done should not be : If someone is pleading

under this defence then he can say that the act done by him was not done
wilfully, it was just a mere accident or he/she can say that it is beyond their
control. But this plead can only be successful if it found to be reasonable
otherwise your plead can be discarded.

The order that has disobeyed should be vague or ambiguous: If the order
passed by the court is vague or ambiguous or this order is not specific or
complete in itself then a person can get the defence of contempt if he says
something against that order.

In R.N. Ramaul v. State of Himachal Pradesh , this defence has been taken by
the respondent. In this case, the Supreme Court has directed the corporation of
the respondent to restore the promotion of the petitioner from a particular date
in the service. But the respondent has not produced the monetary benefit for the
given period and a complaint was filed against him for Contempt of Court. He
pleads for the defence on the given evidence that it has not mentioned by the
court in order to pay the monetary benefit. Finally, he gets the defence.

Orders involve more than one reasonable interpretation: If the contempt of

any order declared by the court and the order seems to be given more than one
reasonable and rational interpretation and the respondent adopts one of those
interpretations and works in accordance with that then he will not be liable for
Contempt of Court.

Command of the order is impossible: If compliance of the order is impossible

or it cannot be done easily then it would be taken as a defence in the case of
Contempt of Court. However, one should differentiate the case of impossibility
with the case of mere difficulties. Because this defence can be given only in the
case of the impossibility of doing an order.
Utpal Kumar Das v. Court of the Munsiff, Kamrup

This is the case of non-rendering of assistance, although the court has ordered to
render assistance. Decree executed by the court to deliver immovable property
but because of certain obstruction, the defendant failed to do so. Hence, he was
held liable for constituting disobedience to the orders of the competent Civil
Court.

U.P. Resi. Emp. Co-op., House B. Society v. New Okhla Industrial

Development Authority

In this case, the Supreme Court has directed the Noida Authorities to verify and
state on the affidavit details given by persons for allotment of plots. In
pursuance to the same direction by the Supreme Court a person Mr. S filed a
false affidavit to mislead the court. The Registry directed a show-cause notice
against him to say that why an act of contempt should not be taken against him
for misleading the Supreme Court.

Contempt Jurisdiction

Section 10. Power of High Court to punish contempts of subordinate courts.

—Every High Court shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and
authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of
contempts of courts subordinate to it as it has and exercises in respect of
contempts of itself:

Provided that no High Court shall take cognizance of a contempt alleged to

have been committed in respect of a court subordinate to it where such
contempt is an offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

The proviso to Section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, makes it clear
that the High Court shall not take cognizance of contempt alleged to have been
committed in respect of a Court subordinate to it where such contempt is an
offence punishable under the Indian Penal Code.
  This proviso applies only when the act constitutes contempt of a
subordinate Court and such contempt is an offence punishable under the
Indian Penal Code and it will not apply in cases where it is punishable as
any other offence under the Indian Penal Code
 Chapter X and Section 228 of Chapter XI of the Indian Penal Code
contains the relevant provisions.

Chapter XI Section 228 - Intentional insult or interruption to public

servant sitting in judicial proceeding. Whoever intentionally offers any insult,
or causes any interruption to any public servant, while such public servant is
sitting in any stage of a judicial proceeding, shall be punished with simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which
may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.

The definition of the expression “public servant" is found under Section 21 of

the Code. The expression “public servant" includes every Judge and persons
including a body of persons who discharge adjudicatory functions.

Chapter X – Of Contempts of the Lawful Authority of Public Servants

Section 172 :- Absconding to avoid service of summons or other proceeding

Section 173 :- Preventing service of summons or other proceeding, or

preventing publication thereof

Section 174 :- Non-attendance in obedience to an order from public servant

Section 175 :- Omission to produce document to public servant by person

legally bound to produce it

Section 176 :- Omission to give notice or information to public servant by

person legally bound to give it

Section 177:- Furnishing false information

Section 178 :- Refusing oath or affirmation when duly required by public
servant to make it

Section 179 :- Refusing to answer public servant authorized to question

Section 180 :- Refusing to sign statement

Section 181 :- False statement on oath or affirmation to public servant or person

authorized to administer an oath or affirmation

Section 182 :- False information, with intent to cause public servant to use his
lawful power to the injury of another person

Section 183 :- Resistance to the taking of property by the lawful authority of a

public servant

Section 184 :- Obstructing sale of property offered for sale by authority of

public servant

Section 185 :- Illegal purchase or bid for property offered for sale by authority
of public servant

Section 186 :- Obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions

Section 187 :- Omission to assist public servant when bound by law to give
assistance

Section 188 :- Disobedience to order duly promulgated by public servant

Section 189 :- Threat of injury to public servant

Section 190 :- Threat of injury to induce person to refrain from applying for
protection to public servant

Arun Paswan v. State of Bihar

There would be no reason why the High Court should invoke its jurisdiction
when the Court against whom contempt is committed, in view or presence of
the Court, can itself take action. Thus, bar of the jurisdiction of the High Court
imposed by the proviso to section 10 of the Contempt of Courts Act is not
attracted in the cases where the offences under Sections 178 179, 180 and 228
of the Indian Penal Code are not committed in view or presence of the Court.
11. Power of High Court to try offences committed or offenders found outside
jurisdiction.—A High Court shall have jurisdiction to inquire into or try a
contempt of itself or of any court subordinate to it, whether the contempt is
alleged to have been committed within or outside the local limits of its
jurisdiction, and whether the person alleged to be guilty of contempt is within
or outside such limits

Contempt in the face of the Subordinate Courts

The provisions of Section 14 applies only to contempt in the face of the
Supreme Court or High Court. They do not apply to contempts in the face of the
subordinate Court. In case of the contempt committed in the face of the
subordinate court, the subordinate Court can take immediate action under
Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code read with Sections 345 and 346 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 345 of the Criminal Procedure Code
lays down the procedure for investigation and punishment for the offences
specified in Section 175, 178, 179, 180 or 228 : of the Indian Penal Code
committed in the view or presence of any civil, criminal or revenue Court.

Cr.pc. Section 345. Procedure in certain cases of contempt.—

(1) When any such offence as is described in section 175, section 178, section
179, section 180 or section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is
committed in the view or presence of any Civil, Criminal, or Revenue Court, the
Court may cause the offender to be detained in custody, and may, at any time
before the rising of the Court or the same day, take cognizance of the offence
and, after giving the offender a reasonable opportunity of showing cause why he
should not be punished under this section, sentence the offender to fine not
exceeding two hundred rupees, and, in default of payment of fine, to simple
imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month, unless such fine be
sooner paid.
(2) In every such case the Court shall record the fact constituting the offence,
with the statement (if any) made by the offender, as well as the finding and
sentence
(3) If the offence is under section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860),
the record shall show the nature and stage of the judicial proceeding in which
the Court interrupted or insulted was sitting, and the nature of the interruption or
insult

346. Procedure where Court considers that case should not be dealt with
under section 345.—(1) If the Court in any case considers that a person
accused of any of the offences referred to in section 345 and committed in its
view or presence should be imprisoned otherwise than in default of payment of
fine, or that a fine exceeding two hundred rupees should be imposed upon him,
or such Court is for any other reason of opinion that the case should not be
disposed of under section 345, such Court, after recording the facts constituting
the offence and the statement of the accused as hereinbefore provided, may
forward the case to a Magistrate having jurisdiction to try the same, and may
require security to be given for the appearance of such person before such
Magistrate, or if sufficient security is not given, shall forward such person in
custody to such Magistrate.
(2) The Magistrate to whom any case is forwarded under this section shall
proceed to deal with, as far as may be, as if it were instituted on a police report.

347. When Registrar or Sub-Registrar to be deemed a Civil Court.—When

the State Government so directs, any Registrar or any Sub-Registrar appointed
under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908), shall be deemed to be a Civil
Court within the meaning of sections 345 and 346.

Contempt Proceedings
 Section 16 :- Contempt by Judges, Magistrates or other persons acting
judicially
 Section 20 : Limitation for actions for contempt
 Section 15 : Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.
 Section 18 : Hearing of cases of criminal contempt to be by Benches
 Section 17: Procedure after cognizance
 Section 14: Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme
Court or a High Court

Section 16 :- Contempt by Judges, Magistrates or other persons acting

judicially
Section 16 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 makes Judges, Magistrate and
other persons liable for the contempt of courts. It provides that subject to the
provisions of any law for the time being in force, a Judge, Magistrate or other
person acting judicially shall also be liable for contempt of his own Court or of
any other Court in the same Manner as any other individual is liable and the
provisions of this Act shall, so far as may be, apply accordingly.

However, it also makes it clear that nothing in this section shall apply to any
observations or remark, made by a Judge, Magistrate or other person
acting judicially a subordinate court in an appeal or revision pending
before such Judge Magistrate or other person against the order or judgment of
the subordinate Court.
If the Judge uses indecorous words and indulges in unseenly and indecent
language, it bringing into disrepute the administration of justice and he
may be held liable for Contempt of Court.

Mohammed Shafi, Advocate Vs Choudry Quadir Baksh,' first class

Magistrate, Lahore, on the date of hearing the counsel pleaded that his client
had obtained an ad interim injunction in the Sub-Judge’ Court against the
petitioner from prosecuting the proceedings till the disposal of the suit.
Thereafter the Magistrate lost his temper and told the counsel

"This is a foolish order passed by a foolish sub-judge in a suit filed by a foolish

lawyer. From where have you come? What is your standing? You seem to know
nothing of law. You are instrumental in procuring the foolish order and as such
you have committed a crime for which you could be sent behind prison-
bars....."

He further told the counsel in a very furious manner that he wanted to teach him
a lesson so that he could be careful in future and that he was playing with fire
and its consequence in obvious.

The remarks of the Magistrate amounted to contempt of court. The Court held
that the Magistrate committed Contempt of Court not only against the sub-judge
but also against the lawyer, an officer of the Court.

If the High Court’s decision or ruling is wilfully disobeyeq by the

subordinate court it will amount to contempt of court, unless thy decision or
ruling rendered by the High Court is distinguishable. Thus, if a Judge of the
subordinate court deliberately avoids to follow the decision of the High Court
by giving wrong and illegitimate reasons, he will by held liable for Contempt of
Court.’
 Article 141 makes it clear that the law declared by the Supreme Court
shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.
 Article 227 provides that every High Court shall have superintendence
over all Courts and tribunals throughout the territories in relation to
which it exercises jurisdiction.
 It is well established that the subordinate courts must follow the rulings
of the High Court, unless there is a ruling of the Supreme Court contrary
to that of the High Court.
 The High Court’s decision is finding on the subordinate courts even
when the decision is

If the subordinate court disobeyed the order passed by the superior court it
will be liable in contempt
 If the superior court has passed the stay order, the subordinate court
cannot ask the superior court to state the law under which the order has
been passed.”
 If the subordinate court disobeyed the order passed by the superior court
on the ground of want of jurisdiction it does so at its peril because if later
it is found within the jurisdiction of the superior court, it will be liable in
contempt.
 The subordinate court should presume that the order passed by the
superior court is within its jurisdiction, unless the contrary appears.
 A Judge of the Subordinate Court is held liable in contempt for
disobeying the order of the High Court only when the disobedience is
deliberate and wilful.?
For this purpose the existence of the order of the High Court and the knowledge
of the same are required to be proved.” Where the Magistrate did not receive the
stay order in time and passed the order which was found in violation of the
order of the High Court, he was not held guilty of contempt because the
disobedience was not.

Contempt by Lawyers On account of the nature of duties to be discharged by

the lawyers and judges they may get into heated dialogue which may result in
Contempt of Court. There are several instances of the misconduct which have
been taken as Contempt of Court, e.g.,
 using insulting language against a Judge,
 making scandalous allegations against a Judge,”
 suppressing the facts to obtain favourable order
 hurling shoe at the Judge,
 imputation of partiality‘ and unfairness against the Judge, etc.
 A counsel who advises his client to disobey the order of the Court was
also held liable for Contempt of Court.
 Attacking the Judiciary in a Bar Council Election Manifests is taken as
Contempt of Court.
 If a counsel refuses to answer the questions of the court is also liable for
Contempt of Court.
 Wrongfully withholding the funds belonging to a client’ or acting as
solicitor without being duly qualified is also taken as Contempt of Court.
 Unfounded allegations of corruption by an advocate or imputing
unfairness to the Court of Judge in the grounds of appeal to the appellate
court
 Inducing a client to make false affidavit and use them to delude the court
or false pleading by the advocate’ amounts to Contempt of Court.
  In re Ajay Kumar Pandey, Advocate, In this case the Supreme Court
has held that advocate using intemperate language and casting
unwarranted aspersions on various judicial officers and attributing
motives to them while discharging their judicial functions would be held
guilty of gross Contempt of Court. In this case such advocate was
sentenced to four months simple imprisonment and fine of one thousand
rupees

Contempt Trial :-
Contempt jurisdiction is special jurisdiction. Summary procedure the special
feature of the contempt proceedings. The Constitution of India contains specific
provision for recognizing Courts and the Supreme Court as Court of Record.
 Article 215 that every High Court shall be a Court of Record and shall
have powers of such a Court including the power to punish for contempt
itself. Similarly,
 Article 129 provides that the Supreme Court shall be a Court of record
and shall have all the powers of such a Court including the power to
punish for contempt of itself.
 Since the High Court and the Supreme Court are the Courts of Record,
they have inherent power to punish for contempt summarily.

The summary procedure is justified on the ground that quick mode of

determining punishment for the contempt is necessary for inspiring confidence
in the public as to the institution of justice. The confidence of the people in the
judicial administration is necessary for the maintenance of law and order in the
society.

In the case of Vinay Chandra Mishra, the Supreme Court has observed that the
threat of immediate punishment is the most effective deterrent against
misconduct. The time factor is crucial. Dragging out the contempt proceedings
means a lengthy interruption to the main proceedings which paralysed the Court
for a time.

In Arun Paswan v. State of Bihar, the Court has held that a party which fails to
avail of the opportunity to cross-examine the concerned persons at the
appropriate stage is precluded from taking the plea of non-observance of
principles of natural justice at a later stage.
Section 15. Cognizance of criminal contempt in other cases.—
(1) In the case of a criminal contempt, other than a contempt referred to in
section 14, the Supreme Court or the High Court may take action on its own
motion or on a motion made by—
(a) the Advocate-General, or
(b) any other person, with the consent in writing of the Advocate-General
(c) in relation to the High Court for the Union territory of Delhi, such
Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf, or any other person, with the consent in writing
of such Law Officer.

(2) In the case of any criminal contempt of a subordinate court, the High Court
may take action on a reference made to it by the subordinate court or on a
motion made by the Advocate-General or, in relation to a Union territory, by
such Law Officer as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official
Gazette, specify in this behalf.
(3) Every motion or reference made under this section shall specify the
contempt of which the person charged is alleged to be guilty.

Explanation.—In this section, the expression “Advocate-General” means,—

(a) in relation to the Supreme Court, the Attorney-General or the Solicitor-
General;
(b) in relation to the High Court, the Advocate-General of the State or any of
the States for which the High Court has been established;
(c) in relation to the court of a Judicial Commissioner, such Law Officer as the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this
behalf

According to this section, thus, cognizance for criminal contempt of the

Supreme Court or of the High Court can be taken by the Court by three
methods, namely,
 on its own motion or
 on the motion of the Advocate-General or
 on motion by any other person with the consent in writing of the
Advocate-General.

In Bal Thackrey v. Harish Pimpalkhute, the proceedings before the High

Court were initiated by the respondents by filing contempt proceedings under
section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act. The Court held that in case of non-
compliance of mandatory requirement of obtaining consent of the Advocate-
General, the petitions would not be maintainable. The requirement of obtaining
consent in writing of the advocate general for making motion by any person is
mandatory.

Section 18. Hearing of cases of criminal contempt to be by Benches

(1) Every case of criminal contempt under section 15 shall be heard and
determined by a Bench of not less than two judges. (2) Sub-section (1) shall not
apply to the Court of a Judicial Commissioner.
17. Procedure after cognizance (1) Notice of every proceeding under section
l5 shall be served personally on the person charged, unless the Court for reasons
to be recorded directs otherwise.
(2) The notice shall be accompanied,—
(a) in the case of proceedings commenced on a motion, by a copy of the
motion as also copies of the affidavits, if any, on which such motion is founded;
and
(b) in case of proceedings commenced on a reference by a subordinate
court, by a copy of the reference.

(3) The Court may, if it is satisfied that a person charged under section 15
is likely to abscond or keep out of the way to avoid service of the notice, order
the attachment of his property of such value or amount as it may deem
reasonable.
(4) Every attachment under sub-section (3) shall be effected in the
manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), for the
attachment of property in execution of a decree for payment of money, and if,
after such attachment, the person charged appears and shows to the satisfaction
of the Court that he did not abscond or keep out of the way to avoid service of
the notice, the Court shall order the release of his property from attachment
upon such terms as to costs or otherwise as it may think fit.
(5) Any person charged with contempt under section 15 may file an
affidavit in support of his defence, and the Court may determine the matter of
the charge either on the affidavits filed or after taking such further evidence as
may be necessary, and pass such order as the justice of the case requires
14. Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High
Court.—(1) When it is alleged, or appears to the Supreme Court or the High
Court upon its own view, that a person has been guilty of contempt committed
in its presence or hearing, the Court may cause such person to be detained in
custody, and, at any time before the rising of the Court, on the same day, or as
early as possible thereafter, shall—

(a) cause him to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is

charged;

(b) afford him an opportunity to make his defence to the charge;

(c) after taking such evidence as may be necessary or as may be offered

by such person and after hearing him, proceed, either forthwith or after
adjournment, to determine the matter of the charge; and

(d) make such order for the punishment or discharge of such person as
may be just.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a person

charged with contempt under that sub-section applies, whether orally or in
writing, to have the charge against him tried by some judge other than the
Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have
been committed, and the Court is of opinion that it is practicable to do so and
that in the interests of proper administration of justice the application should be
allowed, it shall cause the matter to be placed, together with a statement of the
facts of the case, before the Chief Justice for such directions as he may think fit
to issue as respects the trial thereof.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, in any trial of a

person charged with contempt under sub-section (1) which is held, in pursuance
of a direction given under sub-section (2), by a Judge other than the Judge or
Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been
committed, it shall not be necessary for the Judge or Judges in whose presence
or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed to appear as a witness
and the statement placed before the Chief Justice under sub-section (2) shall be
treated as evidence in the case.

(4) Pending the determination of the charge, the Court may direct that a person
charged with contempt under this section shall be detained in such custody as it
may specify:

Provided that he shall be released on bail, if a bond for such sum of

money as the Court thinks sufficient is executed with or without sureties
conditioned that the person charged shall attend at the time and place
mentioned in the bond and shall continue to so attend until otherwise
directed by the Court:

Provided further that the Court may, if it thinks fit, instead of taking bail
from such person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties
for his attendance as aforesaid.

Procedure for Civil Contempt. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 does not
prescribe procedure in the case of civil contempt as defined in Section 2(b) of
the Act. Sections 14, 15, 17 and 18 lay down the procedure in contempt cases
but the procedure set out in the Act is not exhaustive. The Supreme Court and
the High Courts have inherent power to lay down their own procedures.

 Section 23 : Power of Supreme Court and High Courts to make rules

provides that the Supreme Court or, as the case may be, any High Court
may make rules not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act providing
for any matter relating to its procedure.
 In the exercise of this power the Supreme Court and various High Courts
have made rules relating to the procedure to be adopted in contempt
proceedings.
  In the matter of civil contempt of the Supreme court the procedure laid
down by the Supreme Court and in the matter of civil contempt of the
High Court, the procedure laid down by the High Court is adopted.
 In the case of the civil contempt of the subordinate court. the procedure
laid down by the Code of Civil Procedure is adopted.
 The Rules to Regulate Proceedings For Contempt Of The
Supreme Court, 1975 Rule 1 -16
 The High Court of Karnataka (Contempt of Court
Proceedings) Rules, 1981 - Rules 1- 22

Punishment and Remedy

 Section 12. Punishment for contempt of court

 Section 13. Contempts not punishable in certain cases
 Section 19. Appeals

12. Punishment for contempt of court.—

(1) Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act or in any other law, a
contempt of court may be punished with simple imprisonment for a term
which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two
thousand rupees, or with both:

Provided that the accused may be discharged or the punishment awarded may
be remitted on apology being made to the satisfaction of the Court.

Explanation.—An apology shall not be rejected merely on the ground that it is

qualified or conditional if the accused makes it bona fide.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force,
no court shall impose a sentence in excess of that specified in sub-section (1)
for any contempt either in respect of itself or of a court subordinate to it.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, where a person is found

guilty of a civil contempt, the court, if it considers that a fine will not meet the
ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment is necessary shall, instead
of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that he be detained in a
civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it may think fit.

(4) Where the person found guilty of contempt of court in respect of any
undertaking given to a court is a company, every person who, at the time the
contempt was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the
company for the conduct of business of the company, as well as the company,
shall be deemed to be guilty of the contempt and the punishment may be
enforced, with the leave of the court, by the detention in civil prison of each
such person:

Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person
liable to such punishment if he proves that the contempt was committed
without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent its
commission.

(5) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (4), where the contempt

of court referred to therein has been committed by a company and it is proved
that the contempt has been committed with the consent or neglect on the part of,
any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director,
manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the
contempt and the punishment may be enforced, with the leave of the court, by
the detention in civil prison.

Explanation : For the purpose of sub-sections (4) and (5),—

(a) “company” means any body corporate and includes a firm or other
association of individuals; and

(b) “director”, in relation to a firm, means a partner in the firm.

13. Contempts not punishable in certain cases:- Notwithstanding anything

contained in any law for the time being in force,

(a) no court shall impose a sentence under this Act for a contempt of court
unless it is satisfied that the contempt is of such a nature that it substantially
interferes, or tends substantially to interfere with the due course of justice;

(b) the court may permit, in any proceeding for contempt of court, justification
by truth as a valid defence if it is satisfied that it is in public interest and the
request for invoking the said defence is bona fide.

Sub-section (1) - Contempt of Court may be punished with simple

imprisonment for a term which may extend to 6 months or with fine which may
extend to two thousand rupees or with both.
Sub-section (2) - makes it clear that no Court shall impose a sentence in excess
of that specified in sub-section (1) of Section 12, stated above, for any contempt
either in respect of itself or of a Court subordinate to it or other misconduct
under the Advocates Act.
 A misconduct may be both contempt of court as well as the professional
or other misconduct within the meaning of the Advocates Act.
 In such condition the Court may punish the advocate for the Contempt of
Court and refer the matter to the Bar Council for initiating appropriate
proceedings so as to punish him for the misconduct.
 The Bar Council may suspend or cancel the license of the advocate.
 If the Bar Council does not take suitable action for punishing the
advocate, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction
 under Section 38 of the Advocates Act, may direct the Bar Council to
send the proceedings and pass appropriate orders.
 In the case of V.C. Mishra the Supreme Court held that in the exercise
of the contempt jurisdiction the license of an advocate to practice legal
profession may be suspended or cancelled by it.
 Supreme Court Bar Association v. Union of India. - In this case the
Supreme Court has observed that from Article 142(2) it becomes clear
that the contempt jurisdiction is subject to the law made by Parliament.
Parliament has enacted the Advocates Act which empowers the Bar
Council to suspend or cancel the license of an advocate to practice by
way of punishment for professional misconduct. It is notable that this
appellate power under said Section 38 is available to the Supreme Court
only and not to the High Court. However, the High Court as well as the
Supreme Court may prevent the contemner advocate to appear before it
till he purges himself of the contempt.
 In Bijay Kumar Mohanty v. Jadu, the Supreme Court has held that in a
matter of the nature where a police officer disregarding the bail order
arrests a person because a case against him is one of an alleged assault on
a police official, mere sentence of fine instead of imprisonment would not
meet the ends of justice and therefore the Court punished him with
imprisonment.

II. Remedies against the Order of punishment

Remedies against the punishment of a civil contempt, the court, if it considers
that a fine will not meet the ends of justice and that a sentence of imprisonment
is necessary, shall, instead of sentencing him to simple imprisonment, direct that
he be detained in a civil prison for such period not exceeding six months as it
may think fit.
  Actually the civil contempt is considered less serious than the criminal
contempt. Consequently, in the case of civil contempt the general rule is
to impose a fine and imprisonment is an exception.

The remedies available to the contemner against the punishment are :-

1. Apology
The contemner may tender apology to the Court and if the Court is satisfied that
it has been made with real feeling of repentance, it may remit the punishment
awarded for the contempt.

Section 12 - makes it clear that the accused of Contempt of Court may be

discharged or the punishment awarded may be remitted on apology being made
to the satisfaction of the Court.
 It is not a matter of course that a Judge can be expected to accept any
apology. In the case of A.K. Pandey the Supreme Court has made it clear
that the Court is not bound to accept the apology, unless there is real
feeling of repentance in the contemner.

In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, apology tendered by the contemner was

rejected on the ground that it was not the product of remorse or contrition. The
Court has made it quite clear that an apology is not a weapon of defence to
purge the guilt of the contemner. It must be sought at the earliest opportunity.

In re Vinay Chandra Mishra :- Whether apology would be accepted or not,

depends on factors like attitude of the contemner, gravity of the contumacious
conduct, his past records, etc. Thus, usually, the apology is not accepted from
those who are found to be indulged in repeated disobedience or from those who
persist in justifying the action rather than express the genuine regret or from
those who do not have real feeling of repentance and blame the circumstances
which led the contempt.

2. Appeal
Section 19. Appeals. (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or
decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt-
(a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge to a Bench of not
less than two Judges of the Court;
(b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court:
Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial
Commissioner in any Union Territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme
Court.

(2) Pending any appeal, the appellate Court may order that,
(a) the execution of the punishment, or order appealed against be
suspended;
(b) if the appellant is in confinement (ஒரு சிறிய இடத்தில்

வைக்கப்பட்டிருத்தல்), he be released on bail; and

(c) the appeal be heard notwithstanding that the appellant has not purged
( சுத்தப்படுத்தப்பட்டது)his contempt.

(3) Where any person aggrieved by any order against which an appeal may be
filed, satisfies the High Court that he intends to prefer an appeal, the High Court
may also exercise all or any of the powers conferred by sub-section (2).

4) An appeal under sub-section (1) shall be filed:-

(a) in the case of an appeal to a Bench of the High Court, within thirty
days;
 (b) in the case of an appeal to the Supreme Court, within sixty-days,
from
the date of the order appealed against."

Selected major judgments of the Supreme Court:

1. In the matter of D, An Advocate, AIR 1956 SC I 02.

In The Matter Of D, An Advocate

An Advocate of the Supreme Court of India v. Unknown Citation: AIR

1956 SC 102

Facts :

The respondent is an Advocate of some standing in the Bombay High Court and
as such was also enrolled as an Advocate of this Court.

the earlier part of the year 1953 - It appears that in the Advocate was
prosecuted before Mr. Sonavane, one of the Presidency Magistrates at Bombay,
on a charge of having committed an offence under the Bombay Prohibition Act.
July 1953 to November 1953 :- The trial went

18th November 1953 :- the Magistrate convicted the Advocate of the offence
with which he was charged and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for one
month and to a fine of Rs. 201 and to rigorous imprisonment of four weeks in
default of payment of the fine.

24th February 1954 : The Advocate went up on appeal to the High Court. The
High Court upheld the conviction but altered the sentence to one of fine of Rs.
1,000

25th November1953, the trial Magistrate, Mr. Sonavane, made a report to the
Registrar of the Bombay High Court as to the conduct of the Advocate who
appeared in person as the accused before him.

On a perusal of that report the Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the Bombay High
Court constituted a Tribunal consisting of three members of the Bar Council to
enquire into the conduct of the Advocate. The Tribunal was constituted to
enquire into the matter in two counts:

1. Report of misconduct
2. Judgment of high court upholding Mr. D Conviction for offence under
Bombay prohibition Act

16th March 1955 :- Mr.D Advocate forwarded to the Secretary to the Bar
Council Tribunal and requested the Tribunal to send a report to the High Court
in terms of his pleading guilty to the charges levelled against him.

 He concluded the letter by expressing regret for having wasted the time of
the Tribunal. In his letter to the Registrar, the respondent enclosed a
separate written apology unconditionally withdrawing his contention that
the proceedings before the Tribunal were misconceived in law and
 admitting that the High Court had full authority in law to refer the matter
to the Bar Council Tribunal and further that the statements made by Mr.
Sonavane in his report were true except in two respects therein specified.

28th March 1955:- The Advocate submitted an additional statement clarifying

and supplementing his previous apology. Thereupon the Tribunal made a report
to the High Court.

By this report the Tribunal held,

 on the respondent's own admission, the allegations in the report of Mr.

Sonavane to be proved and recommended that a very serious notice
should be taken of the respondent's conduct.
 As regards the second item in the summons the Tribunal held that the
mere conviction of the respondent under the Prohibition Act did not
amount to professional or other misconduct under section 10 of the Indian
Bar Councils Act and, therefore, found him not guilty of that charge

13th October, 1955 - On a perusal of that report the High Court issued notice to
the respondent for final hearing of the matter. The matter came up for final
disposal before a Bench consisting of the Chief Justice and Tendolkar, Bombay
High Court had, by its order made in Civil Application No. 1506 of 1955,
suspended the Advocate from practice as an Advocate of that High Court for a
period of one year from the date of the said order.

The application for special leave to appeal from the judgment and order of the
High Court having been dismissed

Order IV, rule 30 of the Rules of the Supreme Court - By the rule the
respondent has been required to show cause why, in view of the matter specified
in the judgment and order of the Bombay High Court referred to above,
appropriate action, disciplinary or otherwise, should not be taken against him by
this Court.

Contention before SC

 The Tribunal had no jurisdiction to enter upon the enquiry inasmuch as

the misconduct complained of was not committed by him in his capacity
as an Advocate, for he appeared in person as the accused in the
Prohibition case
 the report of the learned Presidency Magistrate, is a highly exaggerated,
garbled and manifestly incorrect version of the incidents that occurred
during the trial of the case. And looking to the circumstances under which
the petitioner was more or less compelled to tender a humiliating
apology, this Hon'ble Court be pleased to direct that a proper inquiry be
held in the matter by or under the directions of this Hon'ble Court
 The respondent then fell back upon paragraph 7 of his petition quoted
above and asked this Court to hold a fresh enquiry into the matter

Supreme Court Observation :-

 From the judgment of the Bombay High Court which is referred to in the
Rule issued herein it appears that the respondent had admitted the truth of
everything contained in Mr. Sonavane's report except two matters only.

 In his present petition showing cause he does not, apart from a vague
allegation that the report is an exaggerated, garbled and manifestly
incorrect version of the incidents that occurred during the trial of the case,
refer to and particular statement therein which is exaggerated garbled or
incorrect.

 It is needless for us to emphasise that a person holding the responsible

position of an Advocate of a High Court and of this Court cannot be
 permitted to play with the Court in the way this Advocate has done. He
admitted the correctness of the report, confessed his guilt and tendered an
unconditional apology evidently in the hope that he would get away with
it by merely tendering an apology.

 Finding that the tactics did not work with the High Court as he expected
the same to do, he now wants to charge his tactics by asking for an
enquiry which he had himself avoided by means of his admission and
apology.

 This we are not prepared to permit to do

 We have carefully gone through the report of Mr. Sonavane and we find
ourselves in entire agreement with the High Court when it says that that
report makes an extremely sad reading. The conduct of the respondent in
the criminal trial was, as pointed out by the High Court, entirely
indefensible by any standard. It discloses a continuous and persistent
attempt on the part of the respondent to be rude to and contemptuous of
the Magistrate, to hold up the trial and to do everything in his power to
bring the administration of justice into contempt. Such a conduct, in our
opinion, merits severe condemnation

 the Indian Legislature by using the words "professional or other

misconduct" in section 10 of the Indian Bar Councils Act intended to
confer on the Court disciplinary jurisdiction to take action in all cases of
misconduct whether in a professional or other capacity leaving it to the
discretion of Court to take action only in suitable cases.

Punishment
  For the reasons stated above and in view of the conduct of the Advocate
seen in the light of the surrounding circumstances we are clearly of
opinion that the Advocate should, by reason of his having indulged in
conduct unworthy of a member of the honourable profession to which he
belongs, be suspended from practice for some time

 He is an Advocate of this Court and according to a majority decision of

this Court he is entitled, under the Supreme Court Advocates (Practice in
High Courts) Act, to exercise his profession in all Courts throughout the
Union of India. Any suspension for a period less than the period fixed by
the Bombay High Court will obviously lead to serious anomaly and
inconvenience.

 We accordingly direct that the Advocate concerned be suspended from

practice for a period co-terminous with the period of suspension fixed by
the Bombay High Court, namely, up to the 13th October, 1956.

P J RATNAM Vs. D KANIKARAM

Facts : The respondents and one other Kagga Veeraiah, were plaintiffs in a suit
for possession of certain lands and the appellant was their Advocate. The suit
was dismissed and an appeal was preferred therefrom to the Subordinate Judge.
Pending the disposal of the appeal, the court directed the sale proceeds of the
standing crops on the suit land to be deposited into court, and a sum of Rs.
1,600/- was so deposited. The plaintiff’s appeal was allowed and the defendants
preferred a second appeal to the High Court. Pending disposal of the second
appeal, plaintiff’s application for withdrawing the amount was allowed by the
court on furnishing security of immovable property. A cheque petition was filed
which was allowed and thereafter a cheque for Rs. 1,452/- was issued in favour
of the appellant. The appellant an Advocate admitted that he had received and.
had cashed the cheque on behalf of his clients who were entitled to be paid this
sum.

The second appeal was allowed by the High Court and the plaintiff’s suit was
dismissed, as a result of which the plaintiffs had to refund the sum of the
defendants in the suit. The plaintiffs made a written demand on the appellant for
the proceeds of the cheque that had been cashed by him and not paid over to
them. The appellant in reply claimed to have paid over the sum to them on their
passing a receipt which happened to be in the bundle of case-papers returned to
them.

 The respondents filed a complaint under as. 12 and 13 of the Legal

Practitioners Act.
 The explanation of the Advocate was called for and the District Judge
was directed to hold an enquiry and forward his report to the High Court.
His report was that the appellant’s case was not unbelievable and he was
entitled to the benefit of doubt.
 The matter was heard by a Bench of three Judges of the High Court, who
held him guilty of professional misconduct and suspended him for five
years from practice.

The appellant then applied and obtained leave of this court--special leave under
Art. 136 to challenge the correctness of these findings and that is how the matter
is before us.

Contention of Advocate

In this Court the appellant contended,

(1) that the Bar Council had not been consulted before the case was referred to
the learned District Judge for inquiry and report and this vitiated the legality of
the entire proceedings against the appellant.

(2) That the complaint filed by the respondents on the basis of which action was
taken against the appellant was not shown to have been signed by them, nor
properly verified by them as required by the rules of the High Court.

(3) That as in substance the charge against the appellant was misappropriation
of moneys belonging to the clients, the High Court should have left the
complainants to their remedy of prosecuting the appellant and should not have
proceeded to deal with him under s. 10 of the Bar Councils Act.

(4) That there was a procedural irregularity in the mode in which the case
against the appellant was conducted.

(5) That one of the plaintiffs--Kagga Veeraiah had himself admitted in his
evidence that he and others had received the proceeds of the cheque which the
appellant had cashed and that in the face of this admission the High Court was
clearly wrong in finding that the appellant had failed to pay over the money to
his clients.

The jurisdiction of this Court :-

Before proceeding further we desire to indicate the nature of the jurisdiction of

this Court in such matters and in broad outline the principles which it would
observe in dealing with them. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court
in cases of professional misconduct is neither civil nor criminal as these
expressions are used in Arts. 133 and 134 of the Constitution.
  In one aspect it is a jurisdiction over an officer of the Court and the
Advocate owes a duty to the Court apart from his duty to his clients.
 In another aspect it is a statutory power and we would add a duty vested
in the Court under s. 10 of the Bar Councils Act to ensure that the highest
standards of professional rectitude are maintained, so that the Bar can
render its expert service to the public in general and the litigants in
particular and thus discharge its main function of co-operating with the
judiciary in the administrance of justice according to law.
 This task which is at once delicate and responsible the statute vest in the
High Court and therefore the primary responsibility of ensuring it rests
with it,
 This Court is in consequence most reluctant to interfere with the orders of
High Courts in this field, save in exceptional cases when any question of
principle is involved or where this Court is persuaded that any violation
of the principles of natural justice has taken place or that otherwise there
has been a miscarriage of justice.
 Where however none of these factors, are present, it is not the practice of
this Court to permit the canvassing of the evidence on the record either
for reappraising it or to determine whether it should be accepted or not.
The findings of the High Court therefore on questions of fact are not open
before us and this Court would only consider whether on the facts found,
the charge of professional misconduct is established.

1 . It was first submitted that the Bar Council had not been consulted before
the case was referred to the learned District Judge for inquiry and report
and that this vitiated the legality of the entire proceedings against the appellant.
Our attention was drawn to the terms of s. 10 (2) of the Indian Bar Councils Act
reading:
"10. (2) Upon receipt of a complaint made to it by any Court or by the Bar
Council, or by any other person that any such Advocate has been guilty of
misconduct, the High Court shall, if it does not summarily reject the complaint,
refer the case for inquiry either to the Bar Council, or, after consultation with
the Bar Council, to the Court of a District Judge (hereinafter referred to as a
District Court) and may of its own motion so refer any case in which it has
otherwise reason to believe that any such advocate has been so guilty."

and the argument was that the matter could not have been remitted for inquiry to
a District Judge unless the. statutory pre-condition of consultation with the Bar
Council had taken place.

 It is not necessary to consider in this case whether this provision for

consultation is mandatory or not but we shall assume that it is so.
 There was however no hint of this objection to the validity of the
proceedings up to the stage of the appeal in this Court. The question
whether there has or has not been a consultation is one of fact and if this
point had been raised in the High Court we would have information as to
whether there had been such consultation or not, and if not why there was
none.
 Even when the appellant applied to the High Court for a certificate of
fitness under Art. 133 (1)(c) this objection was not suggested as a ground
upon which the validity of the proceedings would be impugned.
 In these circumstances we are not disposed to entertain this objection
which rests wholly upon a question of fact.
 The fact that in the order of reference of the proceedings under s. 10 (2)to
the District Judge there is no explicit statement that the Bar Council had
previously been consulted is not decisive on the point. There would be a
presumption of regularity in respect of official and judicial acts and it
 would before the party who challenges such regularity to plead and prove
his case

2. It was next contended that the complaint filed by the respondents on the basis
of which action was taken against the appellant was not shown to have been
signed by them, nor properly verified by them as required by the rules of
the High Court. We consider this objection frivolous in the extreme.

It was argued by the appellant before the High Court that there was dissimilarity
between the several signatures of the three respondents found in the petition
sent by them and that to be found in the plaint etc., of O.S. 432 of 1951 and that
this was some proof that it was not the respondents who were really responsible
for the petition but that someone inimically disposed towards the appellant. The
learned Judges of the High Court rejected this submission in these words:

"For one thing, we are unable to find any such dissimilarity. Even so, that has
not much of a bearing on the question whether the respondent (appellant) had
discharged the burden viz., of proving that he had made the payment to the
petitioners. This argument would have had some force if the petitioners had not
given evidence against the respondent. Further, no such suggestion was put to
any of the plaintiffs."

This is on the question of the dissimilarity of the signatures on which rests the
argument that the respondents were not the complainants. Coming next to the
point about the verification of the complaint the matter stands thus: The three
complainants (the respondents before us) originally filed a petition on March 6,
1956 before the District Judge but this did not bear the attestation of a gazetted
officer or other authority as required by the rules. This defect was made good by
a fresh petition which they filed before the District Judge on April 16, 1956.
After the petition was signed by the three petitioners they added a verification in
these terms: "We do hereby state that the facts stated above are true to the best
of our knowledge, information and belief," and then they-signed again. These
three signatures, they made before the District Judge who attested their
signatures on the same day and when for-. warding this complaint to the High
Court on April 18, 1956 the learned District Judge stated these facts and added:
"The petitioners appeared before me on April 16, 1956. I got them sign the
petition in my presence and I attested the same." It is thus clear that they made
three signatures in token of their signing the petition, the verification and a
further affirmation before the District Judge who attested the same. Learned
Counsel did not suggest before us that the District Judge was in error about the
identity of the parties who appeared before him and affixed the signatures in
three places in the complaint before him. It is because of these circumstances
that we have stated that this objection was most frivolous. It is only necessary to
add that seeing that the High Court is competent to initiate these proceedings
suo motu under s. 10 (2) the point raised is wholly without substance.

3.The next submission of learned Counsel was that as in substance the charge
against the appellant was misappropriation of money belonging to the
clients, the learned Judges of the High Court should have left the
complainants to their remedy of prosecuting the appellant and should not
have proceeded to deal with him under s. 10 of the Bar Councils Act. In
support of this submission learned Counsel referred us in particular to two
decisions of the Calcutta High Court reported in Chandi Charan Mitter, a
Pleader, In re (1), and Emperor v. satish Chandra Singha (2).

 The object of a proceeding in respect of professional misconduct differs

totally from the object of a proceeding in a criminal court.
 Proceedings under the Bar Councils Act and similar statutes arc taken in
order to ensure that the highest standards of professional conduct arc
maintained at the bar.
 These proceedings, though in a sense penal, arc solely designed for the
purpose of maintaining discipline and to ensure that a person does not
continue in practice who by his conduct has shown that he is unfit so to
do. It is not a jurisdiction which is exercised in aid of the Criminal law for
the only question for the court to consider is whether the practitioner has
so misconducted himself as no longer to be permitted to continue a
member of an honourable and responsible profession.
 The object of Criminal proceedings, on the other hand, is to enforce the
law of the land and to secure the punishment of an offender. No doubt, if
a criminal prosecution is initiated in respect of the subject matter of the
complaint and the charge is held proved the conviction might be a ground
for a later proceeding under the Bar Councils Act. No doubt, also, if the
practitioner is acquitted or discharged by a criminal court on the merits,
the facts would not be reinvestigated for the purpose of rounding a charge
of professional misconduct on those very facts.
 The object of the two proceedings being thus different, it is not any rule
of law but merely a matter of discretion depending on the facts of each
case as to whether the Court would straightaway proceed to enquire into
the allegation of professional misconduct or leave it to the complainant to
prosecute the practitioner and await the result of such a proceeding
 Neither of the cases relied on lay down any such proposition and is not
of much assistance to the appellant in the present case. It is sufficient to
extract the head-note to the report of the decision in Chandi Charan
Mitter (x), indicate that it bears no analogy to the case now on hand. The
relevant portion of the head- note reads: "Where the misconduct alleged
has no direct connection with the conduct of the pleader in his practical
 and immediate relation to the court, ordinarily, there should be a trial
and conviction for criminal misconduct before disbarment will be
Ordered."

4.The next complaint of the learned Counsel was that there was a procedural
irregularity in the mode in which the case against the appellant was
conducted. This was said to consist in the fact that some evidence on behalf, of
the complainants (the respondents before us)was permitted to be led after the
appellant had examined himself and it was urged that thereby the complainants
had been afforded opportunity of filling up any lacuna in their case. We consider
that there is no substance in this objection. No complaint that the appellant was
prejudiced by the manner in which the inquiry was conducted in the matter of
the order in which the evidence was adduced, was made either before the
District Judge who conducted the inquiry or before the High Court when the
report of the District Judge was considered. We have ourselves examined the
record and find that there is no basis for any suggestion that any' prejudice had,
occurred by reason of the order in which the witnesses were examined.

It was then suggested that one of the plaintiffs-Kagga Veeraiah--had himself

admitted in his evidence before the District Judge that he and others had
received the proceeds of the cheque which the appellant had cashed and
that in the face of this admission the learned Judges of the High Court were
clearly wrong in finding that the appellant had failed to pay over the money
to his clients. A few facts have to be mentioned to appreciate this contention as
well as the answer to it. As stated earlier, there were four plaintiffs in the suit--
O.S. 432 of 1951 and plaintiffs. 1 to 3 are the complainants--now respondents 1
to 3 before us. The fourth plaintiff was one Kagga Veeraiah. It was the case of
the appellant that this money , was paid to all the four plaintiffs i.e., was paid to
the plaintiffs when all the four of them were present. It was the case of the
complainants that Kagga Veeraiah--the 4th plaintiff died in 1957. It was m
these circumstances that the appellant alleged that Kagga Veeraiah was alive
and a man claiming to be Kagga Veeraiah was produced before the District
Judge who examined him as court witness No. 7. The man who was examined
did depose that the money was paid to the plaintiffs in his presence and, no
doubt, if that statement along with the identity of the deponent was accepted the
appellant's defence would have been made out. The case of the complainants,
however, was that the man examined as court witness No. 7 was an
impersonator. To prove the; death of the real Kagga Veeraiah an extract from the
death certificate was produced in court by the complainants. The attention of
court witness No. 7 was drawn to the fact that in another proceeding (0. S. 732
of 1955) to which Kagga Veeraiah was a party a memo was filed into Court
stating that he was dead. The witness's explanation for this was that as he was
not available the memo to that effect was filed. The witness was severely cross
examined about his identity and in particular, questioned about the details of the
parties and other details regarding the subject-matter of O.S. 432 of 1951 and
his answers were most unsatisfactory, to say the least. The Learned Judges of
the High Court considered all this evidence and recorded two alternative
findings :

(1) that the person examined as C.W. 7 was not Kagga Veeraiah but was
an impersonator seemed to accord with the probabilities, and

(2) that even if C.W. 7 be in truth Kagga Veeraiah as he claimed,

they would not accept his evidence as there was not 'even a modicum of
truth in his deposition' and they would unhesitatingly reject it. The
submission, however, of learned Counsel was that there was before the
High Court the thumb impression of this witness to his deposition before
the District Judge as C.W. 7 and the thumb impression of the 4th plaintiff
in O.S. 432 of 1951 and that on a comparison of these two the court
 should have accepted the identity of C.W. 7 as Kagga Veeraiah--the 4th
plaintiff. It is really not necessary to pursue this matter or the details of
the evidence relating to it because there is no ground at all for interfering
with the appreciation by the learned Judges of the High Court of the
credibility of this witness's deposition apart altogether from the question
as to whether Kagga Veeraiah was dead and if he was not, whether C.W.
7 was Kagga Veeraiah.

Lastly, it was urged that the order directing the suspension of the appellant for a
period of five years was too severe and that we should reduce the period of
suspension even on the basis that the charge against the appellant be held to be
established. We can only express surprise that Counsel should have made bold
to make this submission. The appellant had got into his hands a considerable
sum of money belonging to his clients and, on the finding of the High Court,
had failed to, pay it back when demanded. Not content with this he had put
forward a false defence of payment and had even sought to sustain his defence
by suborning witnesses. In the circumstances, even, if the learned Judges of
the High Court had struck off the name of the appellant from the roll of
advocates we would have considered it a proper punishment having regard
to the gravity of the offence. The order now under appeal therefore errs, if
at all, on the side of leniency and there is no justification for the request
made on behalf of the appellant.

The appeal fails and is dismissed

 N.B. Mirzan vs The Disciplinary Committee of The Bar

Facts of case :

The appellant, Mr. N.B. Mirzan, was an Advocate on the roll of the Bar Council
of Maharashtra.

Respondent No 2 had been introduced to the appellant by one Noor Mohammed

who was a client of the appellant

1961 :- Respondent No. 2, Saidur Rehman, engaged the appellant as his

Advocate in an obstructionist notice issued to him by the Presidency Small
Cause Court, Bombay, in R.A.E. Suit No. 2491 of 1961.

At the time of his engagement, no fees as such were paid, but a sum of Rs. 190/-
was demanded by the appellant for court-fee stamps and that amount was paid
to the appellant

26th April, 1962, the appellant demanded from respondent No. 2's wife,
Khurshid Begum, a sum of Rs. 975/-on the representation that the amount was
required for deposit in the above suit by way of rent. A Receipt was issued by
the appellant for this amount and it is Ext. A.

16th August, 1962, the appellant demanded a further sum of Rs 250/-

representing that this amount was necessary for payment to some Judge or
officer for getting the rent bill transferred in the name of respondent No. 2 in
respect of the premises which were the subject-matter of the above suit.
 In respect of this payment also, the appellant issued a Receipt dated 16th
August, 1962 which is Ext. B.

13th September, 1962 :- The constructionist notice was discharged the order
being in favour of respondent No. 2.

1963 :- Thereafter, the landlord filed Suit No. 3402 of 1963 in the City Civil
Court, Bombay against respondent No. 2 and his brother for ejectment and
mesne profits In this suit also, the appellant was engaged by respondent No. 2 as
his Advocate. A written statement was filed admitting that no rent had been paid
by respondent No. 2 to his landlord from May, 1961 onwards.

25th September, 1963 In view of this admission, the City Civil Court passed an
order directing respondent No. 2 to deposit in Court the amount due for arrears
of rent from May, 1961 to September, 1963. The amount was to be paid within
two months from that date.

Since respondent No. 2's wife had already paid F". 975/-to the appellant on 26
April, 1962 and the amount was more than sufficient for making the deposit in
accordance with the order of the City Civil Court, respondent No. 2 remained
under the impression that the deposit would be made by the appellant in due
course.

January, 1964, the appellant gave a notice to respondent No. 2 to come with
the money for the purposes of deposit and this started the whole trouble, ending
with the complaint by respondent No. 2 in the State Bar Council on 27th
October, 1964.

It appears that, before filing this complaint, notices were exchanged between the
parties and a settlement was brought about between the appellant and
respondent No. 2 and, under this settlement, the appellant undertook to pay to
respondent No. 2 Rs. 1,000/-by instalments of Rs. 160/-per month. The
appellant sent the first instalment of Rs. 150/-by money order on 11 th October,
1964

The case of the appellant in respect of this money order, however, was that the
money order had been sent to respondent No 2, as respondent No. 2 had asked
for a loan and the appellant took pity on him in spite of the strained relations
between the parties.

27th October, 1964 :- respondent No. 2, who was once the client of the
appellant, made several allegations of professional misconduct against the
appellant which were referred by the State Bar Council to its Disciplinary
Committee consisting of three Advocates, one being the Committee's Chairman
and the other two its members

chronologically, the three items of payments in respect of which we have before

us concurrent findings of professional misconduct are as follows :

1. Demand and receipt by the appellant of Rs. 190/-from respondent No. 2

on the representation that the amount was required for purchasing court
fee stamps in suit R.A.E. No. 2491/1961. There was no formal receipt
issued in respect of this amount.
2. Demand and receipt by the appellant of Rs 975/-from respondent No.
2's wife on 26th April, 1962. The Receipt issued by the appellant is Ext.
A and reads as follows:
Received from Smt. Khurshid Begum sum of Rs. 975/-to be paid in
small causes Court in Suit No. 2491/62 including expenses rent and
deposit in the above matter.
3. Demand and receipt by the appellant of Rs. 2.10/-from respondent No. 2
on 16th August, 1962 Ext. is the formal Receipt given by the appellant
on that date and it reads as follows :
 a. Received from Shri Saidul Rehman the sum of Rs 250/-for
transferring the rent bill in his name in Civil Suit No. 2491/61 of
Small Causes Court.

Contention of Respondent No 2:

 In respect of all these three payments, respondent No. 2 alleged that these
several payments had been made to the appellant on the representations
made by him which respondent No. 2 and his wife, in their ignorance,
thought were bona fide demands
 But, later they realised that the demand for Rs. 190/-to purchase court fee
stamps was a false demand, because no court fee stamps were necessary
to be paid by respondent No 2 in an obstructionist notice.
 Similarly the second demand of Rs. 975/-for depositing the amount in
court was a false demand, because no order could possibly be passed by
the Court asking an obstructionist (intentionally trying to stop or slow
down an official process) to make deposit in Court towards rent.
 The third demand of Rs. 250/-was also a false demand, because there
could be no proceedings for transferring the rent bill in the name of
respondent No. 2 in the absence of any negotiations with the landlord.
 It was the allegation of respondent No. 2 that taking advantage of the
ignorance and illiteracy of respondent No. 2 and his wife, the appellant
had demanded and received all these amounts with a view to
misappropriate the same.

Observation of State Bar :-

 So for as the first count of Rs. 190/-is concerned, there was no specific
denial of the receipt of this amount by the appellant in his written
statement. In his evidence the appellant tried to explain that no specific
denial was made in the written statement, because he had stated in his
 written statement that for every payment received he had given a receipt
and he had, therefore, impliedly denied the demand and receipt of Rs.
190/-
 since, admittedly, there was no formal receipt for it. This explanation has
been rejected by both the Disciplinary Committees.
 Respondent No. 2 examined Noor Mohammed as his witness in the case
and Noor Mohammed has supported respondent No. 2's statement that he
had paid Rs. 190/-to the appellant. Noor Mohammed was a former client
of the appellant and it was Noor Mohammed who had introduced
respondent No. 2 to the appellant when the obstructionist notice was
issued by the Court to respondent No 2 After his engagement as
Advocate, the appellant, according to Noor Mohammed, demanded Rs
190/-for purchasing court fee stamps and, therefore, respondent No 2 in
his presence paid Rs 190/-to the appellant.
 In support of this, Noor Mohammed produced 4 page in his diary in
which he had noted that the appellant hid been paid Rs. 190/. for stamps.
Both the Disciplinary Committees saw no reason why Noor Mohammed
a previous client of the appellant, should give false evidence against him.
 therefore, the state bar satisfied that the appellant had demanded and
received Rs. 190/-for the purchase of court fee stamps in the beginning of
his engagement as an Advocate, though, in fact, he did not have to
purchase any court fee stamps

Coming to the second item of Rs. 975/-26th April, 1962

 there is no dispute that the appellant had demanded and received this
amount on 26th April, 1962 from respondent No. 2's wife, Smt. Khurshid
Begum. The Receip-Ext. A itself goes to show that the amount had been
received by the appellant for making a deposit in Court against expenses
or rent.
 It is further admitted by the appellant that no order had been made by the
Court for the deposit of rent and it is clear to anybody knowing court
proceeding that, in a proceeding by the landlord to remove obstruction,
there can be hardly any occasion for the Court to make an order against
the obstructionist to pay rent in Court.
 Then again, if any such order were made by the Court, the Court would
normally give the obstructionist time to make payment and the appellant
could then have asked his client to bring the money for the deposit The
obstructionist proceeding was pending on 26th April, 1962 and it was
actually disposed of in favour of respondent No. 2 in September, 1962.
Admittedly, there was no interim order to making any deposit Therefore,
there was really no occasion at all on 26th April, 1962 for the appellant
making a demand for the amount from respondent No 2's wife and
receiving the same for the ostensible purpose of depositing the amount in
Court. It is obvious that he obtained this amount on a false pretext and,
when such a demand is made on a false pretext, the inference Would
naturally follow that the demand had been made with a view to
missappropriate the amount
 the appellant put forward the defence that this amount had been actually
returned to respondent No. 2 on 13th September, 1963 in the court
premises when the Obstructionist notice was discharged. In support of
this, the appellant produced an alleged Receipt Ext. 2 - Both the
Disciplinary Committees were inclined to the view that this was a
suspicious document if not a false document.
 The amount had been paid to him on 26th April, 1962 and it is impossible
to accept his story that, on every occasion when the proceedings were
taken up in Court, he was carrying this amount with him on his person, so
that, if an order was made for a deposit the amount would be immediately
deposited and, if the notice was discharged, he would be in a position to
 return the amount to respondent No. 2. The Receipt Ext. 2 is on a full
sheet of ledger or cartridge paper. We have seen the document ourselves
and we have no doubt at all that its very appearance shows that it is a
suspicious document. At the bottom of the paper, three thumb
impressions have been obtained one below the other, one of respondent
No. 2, another of his wife, and the third of his brother, Fazal Nakimullah.
Above these thumb impressions, the Receipt is drawn up entirely in the
handwriting of the appellant himself. When respondent No. 2 was shown
this document during the course of the inquiry, he was unable to say
whether the thumb impression supposed to be his was his thumb
impression.
 Respondent No. 2, however, admitted that, when demanded by the
appellant, he had put his thumb impression on a blank cartridge paper as
he had to go to Moradabad, his native place, leaving his wife behind to
look after the litigation. In other words, the suggestion of respondent No.
2 was that the appellant took his thumb impressions on blank papers, so
that they could be used during his absence for the purpose of the
litigation. Ordinarily, a Receipt for payment of money would not be
written on a cartridge or ledger paper and there is force in the evidence of
respondent No. 2 that he had put his thumb impression on some blank
ledger paper for being used in the course of the proceeding in Court.
Now, if Rs. 975/-were returned to respondent No 2 in the court premises
themselves, there would be no good reason why the receipt should be
thumb-impressed by two other persons be ides respondent No. 2.
Respondent No. 2's wife was there and one could understand if the
appellant had taken a Receipt from her, because it was she who had made
the payment. But the strange thing about the document is that the thumb
impression of the wife Khurshid Begum has been duly cancelled by the
appellant in his own handwriting.
  Both the Disciplinary Committee have held that Ext. 2 was not a genuine
document and we are satisfied that this finding is correct.

The third item is of Rs. 250/ - 16th August, 1962

 There is no dispute that this amount was received by the appellant either
from respondent No. 2 or his wife. Respondent No. 2 says that it was
received from his wife during his absence. The receipt Ext. B, however, is
made in the name of respondent No. 2. The contents of the Receipt
themselves go to support respondent No. 2's case that this amount had
been paid, because the appellant had represented that the amount was
required for transferring the rent bill in respect of the premises in the
name of respondent No. 2. The amount was received by the appellant on
16th August, 1962, i.e. much before the obstructionist notice had been
discharged. The appellant had great difficulty in explaining what this
Receipt meant.
 In the written statement before the State Disciplinary Committee, the
appellant did not categorically deny the receipt of Rs. 250/-. He suggested
there that he had been instructed by respondent No. 2 to file a declaratory
suit for transferring rent bill in his name. One does not know what this
really means. The obstructionist proceedings were still pending and one
does not know what kind of proceedings could be taken in a court of law
for transferring the rent bill. It is not the case that there were any
negotiations with the landlord for transferring the rent bill in the name of
respondent
 In his evidence, the appellant stated that this amount of Rs. 250/-had
been paid to him by respondent No. 2 of his own accord and the appellant
had never suggested that any declaratory suit was required to be filed.
  the appellant changed his case later and started that this sum of Rs. 250/-
was paid to him towards the court-fees in respect of the intended
declaratory suit, his fees and other pocket expenses. That explanation is
also false, because it is nobody's case that any such declaratory suit was
ever filed. It is, hence, clear that the appellant was not at all able to
explain why he demanded this amount of Rs. 250/-. The conclusion is
irresistible that he must have represented that this amount was required to
pay somebody for the purposes of transferring the bill of the suit premises
in the name of respondent No. 2, knowing quite well that it was
impossible to secure a transfer of the rent bill in legal proceedings in
court.


3rd October, 1968 :- After a detailed inquiry into the allegations, the
Disciplinary Committee came to the conclusion that professional misconduct
had been established on three counts which involved moral turpitude. The
Committee, therefore, directed that the appellant should be suspended
permanently and should not be allowed to appear before any Court, authority or
person in India. He was also directed to surrender his Sanad forthwith. From
this order, an appeal was filed to the Bar Council of India,

30th November, 1969 :- The appeal was heard by the Disciplinary Committee
of the Bar Council of India consisting of a Chairman and two members. by a
detailed order, the Disciplinary Committee confirmed the findings of the State
Disciplinary Committee but, as regards the punishment, it directed that the
appellant be suspended from practice for a period of five years and to pay to
Respondent No. 2 a sum of Rs. 850/-within two months.
It was further directed that, if the amount was not paid, the punishment imposed
by the State Disciplinary Committee striking out the appellant's name from the
roll of Advocates would stand confirmed. It is from this Order that the present
appeal has been filed.

Supreme Court Judgment :-

The amount had been screwed out by the appellant on a false representation for
the purposes of misappropriation. In our opinion, the findings of both the
Disciplinary Committees were right and unexceptionable. Normally, this Court
does not entertain an appeal from a concurrent finding of facts. We have,
however, gone through the facts to satisfy ourselves that no injustice has been
done.

The State Disciplinary Committee had permanently debarred the appellant from
practising as an Advocate, but, in appeal, the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council of India has taken a more lenient view and suspended the appellant
from practice for a period of five years on condition that he pays respondent No.
2 Rs. 850/-within two months. No argument was addressed to us on the question
of punishment. Therefore, it is not necessary to consider the point.

In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Bar Council of Maharashtra vs M.V. Dabholkar and others

Supreme Court of India

 Case No.: Civil Appeal Nos. 1461 to 1468 of 1974

Case Decided On: October 3, 1975

Judges: Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer,

Justice Ranjit Singh Sarkaria,
Justice A.C. Gupta,
Justice Syed Murtaza Fazalali

Legal Provisions Involved: The Advocates Act, 1961, Section 35, 38. The Bar
Council of India, Rule 36

Facts of the Case

The respondents (16 advocates), who were lawyers practicing in criminal

courts, were charged with professional misconduct under Section 35(1) of the
Advocates Act, 1961, in that they positioned themselves at the entrance to the
Magistrates Courts, watchful of the arrival of potential litigants and at sight,
rushed towards the clients in an ugly scrimmage to snatch the briefs to lay
claim to the engagements even by physical fight to undercut ( sell something at
a lower price than other shops) fees, and by this unedifying ( unpleasant.)
exhibition sometimes carried even into the Bar Library, solicited and secured
work for themselves.

The Bar Council of Maharashtra considered the complaint received from the
High Court against the lawyers and referred the matter to its Disciplinary
Committee for further probe. The Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar
Council held the respondents guilty of professional misconduct and suspended
them from practicing as advocates for a period of three years.

Rule 36 of the Bar Council Rules states the following –

"An advocate is prohibited from soliciting work or advertising, either directly

or indirectly, whether by circulars, advertisements, touts, personal
communications, interviews not warranted by personal relations, furnishing
inspiring newspaper comments or producing his photographs to be published in
connection with cases in which he has been engaged or concerned. Even the
signboard, nameplate or stationery of an advocate should not indicate that he is
or has been the President or Member of a Bar Council or of any Association or
that he has been associated with any person or organisation or with any
particular cause or matter or that he specialises in any particular type of work
or that he has been a Judge or an Advocate General.

On appeal, the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India held that
under Rule 36 of the rules framed under Section 49(c) of the Advocates Act
(Duty to court) in order to be amenable to the disciplinary jurisdiction the
advocates must have:

(i) solicited work,

(ii) from a particular person and,

(iii) with respect to a case.

It held that unless the three elements were satisfied it could not be said that an
advocate had acted beyond the standard or professional conduct and etiquette. It
therefore absolved ( பழி நீக்கு) all the respondents of the charge of professional
misconduct.

Released by a decision of the Bar Council of India, the State Bar Council went
to the Supreme Court to make amends for the loss, under the conditions set out
under Section 38(Appeal before supreme court) of the Advocates Act, 1961.
This is why the current appeal took place.

Issues Raised

 Whether the prosecuted practitioners are guilty of professional

misconduct?
 Whether the State Bar Council is considered an aggrieved party and is
entitled to appeal?

Arguments Advanced by Petitioner

  The Bar Council of Maharashtra, by its resolution considered the
complaint received from the High Court against 16 Advocates who are
charged with professional misconduct and covered by the present appeals,
under Section 35 (1) of the Act, and presumably having reason to believe
that the professional misconduct alleged required a further probe referred
the case to its disciplinary committee.
 Also this procedure is in due compliance with Section 35 (1) of the Act
and, although the respondent has contended that the resolution of the Bar
Council does not ex facie disclose that it had reason to believe that the
advocates involved were guilty of professional misconduct, we see no
merit in it.
 The requirement of ‘reason to believe’ cannot be converted into a
formalized procedural road block, it being essentially a barrier against
frivolous enquiries. It is implicit in the resolution of the Bar Council,
when it says that it has considered the complaint and decided to refer the
matter to the disciplinary committee, that it had reason to believe, as
prescribed by the statute.

Arguments Advanced from Respondent

The respondents contended on the ruling of this Court in Adi Pherozshah

Gandhi’s case AIR 1971 SC 385, that the Bar Council of the State is not a
person aggrieved to maintain an appeal against a decision of its disciplinary
committee for these reasons:

Firstly, the Bar Council of a State is not an aggrieved person because the Bar
Council has not suffered any legal grievance, and the decision of the Bar
Council of India has not deprived the Bar Council of a State of anything.

Secondly, the allegation that the order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar
Council of India is wrongfully made does not by itself give any grievance to the
Bar Council of a State. The person must be aggrieved by the order and not by
the consequences which ensue.

Thirdly, it is not the duty of the State Bar Council to attempt to set right any
alleged error of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India. The
reason is that no such duty has been imposed or cast by law on the Bar Council
of a State.

Fourthly, a person can be said to be aggrieved by an order which is to his

detriment, pecuniary or otherwise or causes him some prejudice in some form
or other.

Fifthly, the Bar Council of a State is subordinate to the Bar Council of India
and is, therefore, not competent to appeal against any order of the superior body.

Finally, an appeal could have been filed by the Advocate-General or the

Attorney-General of India who has the right to appeal but they have chosen not
to do so.

Judgment

The learned Chief Justice has very clearly and succinctly set out the reasons
why a State Bar Council is a “person aggrieved” entitled to appeal against
orders in disciplinary proceedings against members of the Bar of the State.

 It represents the Bar of the State.

 It is the “keeper of the conscience” and
 the guardian of the interests of members of the Bar.
 It acts “as the protector of the purity and dignity of the profession”.
 Its functions in relation to disciplinary proceedings, is to entertain
complaints against advocates, and,
 when there is a prima facie case of misconduct, to initiate proceedings by
sending the complaint to its Disciplinary Committee.
  It has an interest in seeing that correct decisions are given upon matters
involving allegations of misconduct against members of the Bar of the
State.

Also, the Supreme Court overturned the decision of the State Tribunal on
appeal. There were several reasons cited in the judgment:

1. The State Tribunal fell far short of norms like proper numbering of witnesses
and exhibits, indexing and avoidance of mixing up of all cases together, default
in examination of the respondents, consideration separately of the circumstances
of each delinquent for convicting and sentencing purposes. Thus, this was
violative of a fair.

2. The Appellate Tribunal was wholly wrong in applying Rule 36 which was
promulgated only in 1965 while the alleged misconduct took place earlier.

3. By focusing entirely on the three requirements under Rule 36 and discharging

the accused based on them not filling the criteria, the Tribunal completely
misinterpreted and misused the law.

The very act of snatching briefs and getting into physical fights with other
lawyers to undercut feed and secure clients is unbecoming of a professional
advocate and is clearly violative of professional ethics.

4. The canons of ethics and propriety for the legal profession are totally taboo
conduct by way of soliciting, advertising, scrambling and other obnoxious
practices, subtle or clumsy for betterment of legal business. “Law is no trade,
briefs no merchandise and so the leaven of commercial competition or
procurement should not vulgarize the legal profession”.

The Court also held that "the Bar Council functions in a dual capacity, one as
the prosecutor through its Executive Committee and the other quasi-judicial
performed through its Disciplinary Committee. Hence, being the prosecutor, the
State Bar Council would be an "aggrieved person" and therefore, the appeal
under section 38 of the Advocates Act, 1961 would be maintainable."

CONCLUSION

So, in the end, can we not all, at the same time, belong to the “inner republic of
bencher and bar”? The alleged perpetrators are members of the legal profession
working as attorneys in the criminal courts of Bombay City. Their line of work
mandates a high moral standard, one that places equal weight on doing the best
possible both in terms of the methods and the goals. To achieve justice, the
stream must remain transparent during its whole path, which is not only a matter
of concern for professionals but also significant importance to the general
public. To put it simply, these practitioners, following evidence that was
recorded by the State Disciplinary Tribunal, positioned themselves at the
entrance to the Magistrates Courts and kept an eye out for those who could be
interested in bringing a case before the court.

V.C. RANGADURAI Vs. D.GOPALAN AND OTHERS

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 839 OF 1978 DATED 4-10-1978

V.C. RANGADURAI Appellant

Vs.
D.GOPALAN AND OTHERS Respondents

Present : JUSTICE V.R.KRISHNA IYER

JUSTICE D.A. DESAI .
 JUSTICE A.P.SEN

Law : - Advocates Act (Act No. 25 of 1961) Sec 35 professional misconduct.

Brief Fact
Appellant advocate was engaged for filing two suits for recovery on the basis of
promissory notes for 15000/and Rs. 5,000/and was paid court fee and other
amounts. Although the suit for Rs. 15000/with interest thereon bearing court fee
was filed but the same was returned for presentation to the proper court and was
never refiled. As regards the suit for Rs.6000/the appellant had drafted the
Plaint but no such suit was ever filed. In-spite of this the appellant made false
representations to the complainants that the suits had been filed and were
pending and he gave them the various dates fixed in these two suits and later on
falsely told them that the court had passed decrees on the basis of the two
promissory notes. On the faith of such representations the complainants served a
lawyer's notice on the debtor to pay.

The appellant was found guilty of gross professional misconduct by the

Disciplinary Committee II of the State Bar Council, Tamil Nadu and was
therefore, debarred from practice as an Advocate for a period of six years. In
appeal, the Bar Council of India upheld the said findings but reduced the period
of suspension to one year.

There can be no doubt that the appellant had duped the complainants, T,
Deivasenapathy, an old deaf man aged 70 years and his aged wife Smt. D.
Kamalammal by not filing the suits on two promissory notes for Rs. 15,000/and
Ra. 5,000/both dated Aug. 26, 1969 executed by their landlady Smt. Parvathi
Ammal, who had borrowed Ra. 20,000/from them, by deposit of title deeds.
 18. Admittedly, though the plaint for recovery of the amount due on the
promissory note for Rs. 15,000/with interest thereon bearing court-fee of
Rupees 1,519/- was returned for presentation to the proper court, it was
never represented.
 It is also not denied that though the appellant had drafted the plaint for
recovery of Rs. 5,000/with interest no such suit was ever filed.
 In spite of this, the appellant made false representations to the
complainants Deivasenapathy (P.W. I), his wife Smt. Kamalammal (P.W.
3) and the power of attorney agent of the complainants, D. Gopalan (P.
W. 2) that the suits had been filed and were pending, gave them the
various dates fixed in these two suits, and later on falsely told them that
the court had passed decrees on the basis of the two promissory notes.
 On the faith of such representations, the complainant served a lawyer’s
notice dated on the debtor Smt. Maragathammal, sister and co-widow to
the effect :
 “That you are aware of my clients’ filing two suits against you for
recovery of Rs. 15,000/and Rs. 5,000/with due interest and cost thereon
and it is needless to state that both the suits were decreed as prayed for
by my clients in the court proceedings.
 My clients further say that in spite of the fact that the suits had been
decreed long ago you have not chosen to pay the amount due under the
decrees in question and on the other hand trying to sell the property by
falsely representing that the original documents have been lost to the
prospective buyers. My clients further state that you are aware of the fact
that my clients are in possession of the original documents relating to the
property bearing door No. 41 Shaik Daood street, Royapeth, Madras 14,
but deliberately made false representation as aforesaid with the mala fide
 intention to defeat and defraud my clients’ amounts due under the
decree.
 My clients emphatically state that you cannot sell the property in question
without disclosing the amounts due to them......”
Actually no such suits had in fact been filed nor any decrees passed.

Appellant Contention
 19. It is argued that the finding as to professional misconduct on the part
of the appellant reached by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council of India is not based on any legal evidence but proceeds on
mere conjectures (அனுமானம் செய்).

 It is pointed out that the ultimate conclusion of the Disciplinary

Committee cannot be reconciled with its earlier observation that it was
not prepared to attach any credence (belief in) to the conflicting assertion of
Deivasenapathy that he had at
o first handed over Rs. 855/on Dec. 2, 1970 for filing the suit on the
promissory note for Rs. 5,000/and then
o paid Rs. 2,555/some time in July 1972 for filing the suit on the
promissory note for Rupees 15,100/
which is in conflict with the allegation in the lawyer’s notice dated Feb. 21,
1974 (Ext. R-1) that
 a sum of Rs. 3,410/was paid on July 17, 1972 towards court-
fees and expenses for the filing of the two suits, or
 that the various dates marked in the copies of the two plaints,
Ext. P-1 and Ext. P-2. were indeed given by him.
It is urged that the Disciplinary Committee was largely influenced by the fact
that the appellant gave the receipt, Ext. R-7 to K. S. Lakshmi Kumaran, which
was found to be forged.
  In view of the discrepancies in the testimony of Deivasenapathy , P.W. 1,
Smt. Kamalammal, P.W. 3 and their agent, D. Gopalan, P.W. 2, it was
evident that the Disciplinary Committee mainly based the charge of
misconduct on mere suspicion.

Lastly, it is said that the complaint was a false one and was an attempt to
pressurize the appellant to persuade his client Smt. Maragathammal to sell
the house to the complainants. We are afraid the contentions cannot be
accepted.
 In denial of the charge the appellant pleaded that though he had drafted
the plaint in the suit to be filed on the basis of the promissory note for
Rupees 5,000/-he felt that as the debtor Smt. Maragathammal had
consulted him in another matter, it would be better that the complainants
engaged some other counsel and he advised them accordingly.
 He suggested the names of two or three lawyers out of whom the
complainants engaged K. S. Lakshmi Kumaran.
 He denied that the two promissory notes were handed over to him or that
he had received any amount by way of court fees or towards his fees.
 According to him, K. S, Lakshmi Kumaran was, therefore, instructed to
file the suits.
Contention of Lakshmi Kumaran :
 K. S. Lakshmi Kumaran, on the other hand, pleaded that he knew nothing
about the suits but had in fact signed the Vakalat as a junior counsel, as
matter of courtesy at the behest of the appellant.
 He pleaded that he had never met the complainants nor had he been
instructed by them to file the suits. He further pleaded that when the
complainants served him with their lawyer’s notice dated Feb. 11, 1974,
Ext, B. 11, he went and saw the appellant who told him that he had
 returned the plaint, which was returned by the court, together with all the
documents to the complainant Deivasenapathy as per receipt, Ext. B-7.
 On Feb. 21, 1974 the complainant served another lawyer’s notice on both
the appellant and K. S. Lakshmi Kumaran. The appellant and K. S.
Lakshmi Kumaran sent their replies to this notice.

Judgment of TN State bar council

The Disciplinary Committee, in its carefully written order, has marshalled the
entire evidence in the light of the probabilities and accepted the version of K. S.
Lakshmi Kumaran to be true. It observes :
“Earlier we referred to the conflict between the two advocates. We cannot help
observing that we feel there is want of candour and frankness on the part of
Rangadurai. On a careful consideration of the evidence we see no reason to
reject the evidence of Lakshmi kumaran that he merely signed the Vakalat and
plaint and when the plaint was returned he took the returns and passed on the
papers to RD.”

It then concludes stating :

“On overall view of the evidence we hold that L was not directly engaged by
the parties and that when the plaint with its annexures was returned, L passed it
on to RD. We also accept L’s evidence that when on receipt of notice Ext. R-11
he met RD he was informed that the case papers were taken back by
Devasenathypathy.

It must be that when the complainants turned against RD suspecting his bona
fides he denied having had anything to do in the matter and threw up his junior
colleague in the profession stating that he passed the clients on to L and had
nothing more to do with the case. As the clients had no direct contact with L his
statement that he handed over the plaint on its return to RD looks probable and
likely. We accept it.
When a notice was issued to him in the matter he went to RD and RD gave him
the receipt Ext. R. V. The receipt purports to be signed by Deivasenspathy and
L accepted it fur what it was worth.”

23. In that view, both advocates were found guilty of professional misconduct,
but differing in character and different in content. In dealing with the question,
it observes :

“As regards RD, the litigants entrusted the briefs to him whatever their motive.
The record does not establish that before entrusting the case to L the
complainants were introduced by RD to L and L was accepted by them as
counsel in charge of the case.”

24. It condemned both the advocates for their dereliction of duty, but only
reprimanded (கண்டித்தார்)K. S. Lakshmi Kumaran, the junior advocate, because
he never knew the complainants and had signed the vakalat at the bidding of the
appellant but took a serious view of the misconduct of the appellant, and
castigated his whole conduct in no uncertain terms, by observing :

“Finding himself in difficulties RD miserably failed in his duty to his fellow

advocate very much junior to him in the profession and who trusted him. The
conduct of a lawyer to his brothers in the profession must be characterised by
candour and frankness. He must keep faith with fellow members of the bar.

25. May be, the complainants were not actuated from a purely altruistic motive
in lodging the complaint but that does not exonerate the appellant of his
conduct. The suggestion that the complaint was a false one and constituted an
attempt at blackmail is not worthy of acceptance. The property was actually
sold to M. M. Hanifa for Rs. 36,000/by registered sale deed dated August 1,
1974, while the complaint was filed in April 1974. We do not see how the
initiation of the proceedings would have pressurised the appellant to compel his
client Smt. Maragathammal to part with the property for Rs. 20,000/the price
offered by the complainants. It is no doubt true that at one stage they were
negotiating for the purchase of the house of which they were the tenants but the
price offered by them was too low.

26. It matters little whether the amount of Rs. 3,410/was paid to the appellant in
a lump sum or in two instalments. Deivasenapathy, Pp. W. 1. faltered when
confronted with the notice Ext. B-1 and the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council of India has adversely commented on this by saying that he is not ‘an
illiterate rustic’ but is an M.I.S.E., a retired Civil Engineer. This by itself does
not disprove the payment of the amount in question. It may be the general
power of attorney, D. Gopalan, P. W. 2, made a mistake in instructing the
counsel in giving the notice. As regards the various dates appearing on the
copies of the two plaints, Exts. P-1 and P-2, the complainants could not have
got these dates by themselves unless they were given by the appellant.

State Bar council : 33. The appeal for mercy appears to be wholly misplaced. It
is a breach of integrity and a lack of probity for a lawyer to wrongfully withhold
the money of his client. In a case of such grave professional misconduct, the
State Bar Council observes that the appellant deserved the punishment of
disbursement, but looking to his young age, only suspended him from
practice for a period of six years.
Bar Council of India : The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India
has already taken a lenient view and reduced the period of suspension from six
years to one year, as in its view the complainants did not suffer by the suits not
being proceeded with because even if they had obtained decrees for money,
they would still have been required to file a regular mortgage suit for the sale of
the property charged.

Observation of SC
Judgment of Krishna iyer & Desai
Tamil Nadu has a well-run free legal aid programme with which the Governor
and Chief Justice of the State are associated. The State Legal Aid Board,
working actively with two retired Judges of the High Court at the head, may use
the services of the appellant keeping a close watch on his work and relations
with poor clients, if he applies to the Legal Aid Board for giving him such an
opportunity, after getting this court’s order as provided below. Independently of
that, as a token of our inclination to allow the appellant to become people-
minded in his profession, we reduce the suspension from practice upto the 14th
of August 1979. With the next Independence Day we hope the appellant will
inaugurate a better career and slough off old bad habits. If the appellant gives an
undertaking that he will work under any official legal aid body in Tamil Nadu
and convinces the Chairman of the State Legal Aid Board, Tamil Nadu, to
accept his services in any specific place where currently there is an on-going
project, produces a certificate in this behalf from the Board, and gives an
undertaking to this Court that he will do only free legal aid for one year as
reasonably directed by the Board (and shall not, during that period, accept
any private engagement), his period of suspension shall stand terminated
with effect from January 26, 1979.
As a condition precedent to his moving this court he must pay (and
produce a receipt) Rs. 2,500/- to the victim of the misconduct. Atonement
cannot be by mere paper pledges but by actual service to the people and
reparation for the victim. That is why we make this departure in the punitive
part of our order. Innovation within the frame-work of the law is of the essence
of the evolutionary process of juridical development. From that angle, we think
it proper to make a correctional experiment as a super-addition to punitive
infliction. Therefore, we make it clear that our action is less a precedent than a
portent. With the modification made above, we dismiss the appeal.

Judgment of Sen
27. In an appeal under S. 38 of the Act, this Court would not, as a general rule,
interfere with the concurrent finding of fact by the Disciplinary Committee of
the Bar Council of India and of the State Bar Council unless the finding is
based on no evidence or it proceeds on mere conjecture and unwarranted
inferences. This is not the case here.

28. Under the scheme of the Act, the disciplinary jurisdiction vests with the
State Bar Council and Bar Council of India. Disciplinary proceedings before the
State Bar Council are sui generis, are neither civil nor criminal in character, and
are not subject to the ordinary criminal procedural safeguards. The purpose of
disciplinary proceedings is not punitive but to inquire, for the protection of the
public, the courts and the legal profession, into fitness of the subject to
‘continue in the capacity of an advocate. Findings in disciplinary proceedings
must be sustained by a higher degree of proof than that required in civil
suits, yet falling short of the proof required to sustain a conviction in a
criminal prosecution. There should be convincing preponderance of
evidence. That test is clearly fulfilled in the instant case

A lawyer when entrusted with a brief, is expected to follow the norms of

professional ethics and try to protect the interests of his clients, in relation to
whom he occupies a position of trust. The appellant completely betrayed the
trust reposed in him by the complainants.
punishment
32. It is needless to stress that in case like this the punishment has to be
deterrent.
 There was in this case complete lack of candour on the part of the
appellant, in that he in a frantic effort to save himself, threw the entire
blame on his junior, K. S. Lakhshmi Kumaran.
 The evidence on record clearly shows that it was the appellant who had
been engaged by the complainants to file suits on the two promissory
notes for recovery of a large sum of Rupees 20,000/with interest due
thereon.
 There was also complete lack of probity on the part of the appellant
because it appears that he knew the debtor, Smt. Maragathammal for 7-8
years and had, indeed, been appearing for her in succession certificate
proceedings. If there was any conflict of interest and duty he should have
declined to accept the brief.
 What is reprehensible is that he not only accepted the brief, pocketed the
money meant for court-fees, and never filed the suits.

Supreme Court :- 34. In the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the
view that the punishment awarded by the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar
Council of India does not warrant any further interference.

35. I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my learned brother
Krishna Iyer for the restitution to the appellant of his right to practise upon
fulfilment of certain conditions. I have my own reservations in the matter, that
is, whether any such direction should at all be made in the present case.
36. Where it is shown that the advocate acted in bad faith towards his client in
detaining or misappropriating funds of the client, or that the wrong was
committed or aided by means of false representations, fraud or deceit, as here,
the fact that the advocate makes restitution to or settlement with the client will
not prevent disbarment, especially where restitution was not made until after the
commencement of the disciplinary proceedings. It is only an ameliorating
circumstance but does not mitigate the offence involved in the
misappropriation, particularly when the repayment is made under pressure.

37, When there is disbarment or suspension from practice, the lawyer must
prove, if he can, after the expiration of a reasonable length of time, that he
appreciates the significance of his dereliction(புறக்கணிப்பு), that he has lived a
consistent life of probity and integrity, and that he possesses the good character
necessary to guarantee uprightness and honour in his professional dealings, and
therefore is worthy to be restored. The burden is on the applicant to establish
that he is entitled to resume the privilege of practising law without
restriction. There is nothing of the kind in the present case.

38. Further, even if this Court has the power to make such a direction, in terms
of S. 38, the Court has a duty to act with justice to the profession and the public
as well as the appellant seeking reinstatement, and without regard to mere
feelings of sympathy for the applicant. Feelings of sympathy or a feeling that
the lawyer has been sufficiently punished are not grounds for reinstatement.

39. I also doubt whether a direction can be made requiring the advocate to
undertake free legal aid during the period of his suspension. This would be a
contradiction in terms. Under S. 35 (4), when an advocate is suspended from
practice under C1. (c) of sub-s (8) there of he shall, during the period of
suspension, be debarred from practising in any court or before any authority or
person in India. If the making of such a direction implies the termination of the
order of suspension, on the fulfilment of the conditions laid down, I am of the
considered view that no restriction on the right of the advocate to appear before
any court or authority, which privilege he enjoys under Sec. 30 of Act, can be
imposed.

40. The taking of too lenient a view in the facts and circumstances of the case, I
feel, would not be conducive to the disciplinary control of the State Bar
Council. I would, for these reasons, dismiss the appeal and maintain the
punishment imposed on the appellant.

41. In conclusion, I do hope the appellant will fully reciprocate the noble
gesture shown to him by the majority, come up to their expectations and turn a
new leaf in life. It should be his constant endeavour to keep the fair name of the
great profession to which he belongs unsullied.
Order accordingly

Chandra Shekhar Soni vs Bar Council of Rajasthan And Ors.

 Bania and his wife, Smt. Galki were assaulted. They received head injury
 After examination Bania - X ray report normal Smt.Galki suspected a
fracture of the skull.
 The advocate took the case of the complainant Bania and his wife, Smt.
Galki, who was being harassed by the accused, had a hurt on the head.
His wife's skull was damaged
 The advocate approached the accused and offered to get him a favourable
x-ray report if he paid 300 to the doctor and appointed him as counsel
 Changing sides was tantamount to misconduct, and bribing was severe.
July 21, 1974 - Disciplinary Committee of the State Bar Council of Rajasthan,
Jodhpur by which the appellant has been held guilty of professional misconduct
and suspended from practice for a period of three years under Section 35(c) of
the Act.

January 7, 1977 - order of the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of

India upholding the order of state bar

Facts of the case

 The complainant Bhaniya and his wife Smt. Galki were assaulted as a
result of which they received head injuries. Both of them were examined
by Dr. Raman Varma and he referred them to a Radiologist.
 Dr. Mangal Sharma, Radiologist sent a report to the Station House
Officer that he found nothing abnormal in the X-ray plate of the
complainant Bhaniya but from the X-ray plate of Smt. Galki he suspected
a fracture of the skull and suggested that he should refer the matter to a
Specialist.
 The appellant approached the complainant with the X-ray plates taken by
Dr. Sharma and promised to get a favourable report if he was engaged as
a counsel and said that Rs. 300/- had to be paid to Dr. Sharma.
 The appellant then sent the complainant along with a letter to Dr. Sharma
to the effect:
o Dear Doctor Sahib, I am sending the man to you with X-ray plate.
Your amount is lying with me. 1 will come to Jalore in the evening
and see you. Please, do his work and it should be done positively
in his favour.
-sd-
Chander Shekhar Soni
Dr. Mangal Sharma sent another report to the Station House Officer saying :
There is evidence of fracture of the skull.
Contention of Appellant
He pleaded that he had sent the letter to one Dr. Surinder Singh Lodha,
Homeopath and also Editor of a newspaper Jan Prahari for publication of an
advertisement.
He tried to substantiate his plea by examining Dr. Surinder Singh Lodha and
one Mahipal Kumar through whom he is supposed to have sent the letter.
The appellant in his statement stated, when confronted with the letter, that the
words
 "I am sending the man to you with X-ray plate" :- relate to the X-ray
plate sent by him to Dr. Lodha,
 "Your amount is lying with me" :- Rs. 20/- given to Mahipal for being
handed over to Dr. Lodha for the printing of the advertisement,
 "Please do his work and it should be done positively in his Favor" - the
publication of the advertisement as desired by Mahipal.
 The plea was that Dr. Lodha had taken the X-ray plate of one of his
relations who was suffering from tuberculosis.

Observation of supreme court :-

 The Disciplinary Committee of the Bar council of India has upheld the
finding of the State Bar Council disbelieving the defence version.
 The explanation of Mahipal is that he had lost the letter.
 On the contrary, the version of the complainant is that he had taken the
letter to Dr. Sharma who after reading it returned the same to him. The
fact remains that the incriminating letter has been produced by the
complainant.
  This completely falsifies the plea taken by the appellant in his defence
that the letter was meant for publication of an advertisement in the
newspaper. Admittedly, no such advertisement was ever published.

Section 38 in The Advocates Act, 1961

38. Appeal to the Supreme Court.
- Any person aggrieved by an order made by the disciplinary committee of the
Bar Council of India under section 36 or section 37 [or the Attorney-General of
India or the Advocate-General of the State concerned, as the case may be may,
within sixty days of the date on which the order is communicated to him, prefer
an appeal to the Supreme Court and the Supreme Court may pass such order
including an order varying the punishment awarded by the disciplinary
committee of the Bar Council of India thereon as it deems fit:

Provided that no order of the disciplinary committee of the Bar Council of India
shall be varied by the Supreme Court so as to prejudicially affect the person
aggrieved without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard

 In an appeal under Section 38 of the Act, this Court would not, as a

general rule, interfere with the concurrent finding of fact given by the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India and of the State Bar
Council unless the finding is based on no evidence or it proceeds oh mere
conjectures and unwarranted inferences.
 This is not the case here. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we
are satisfied that no other conclusion is possible than the one reached.
 There is therefore no ground for interference with the finding of the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of India
Punishment observation :-
  It is needless to stress that in a case like this the punishment has to be
deterrent. There was in this case complete lack of candour on the part of
the appellant in that he, in a frantic effort to save himself, procured false
evidence.
 The evidence on record clearly shows that the appellant had taken money
to pay a bribe to the Radiologist. In a case of such grave professional
misconduct, the State Bar Council observes that such practices adopted
by the members of the bar bring the whole legal profession into disrepute
and accordingly directed that the appellant be suspended from
practice for a period of three years.
 The Disciplinary Committee has upheld the sentence saying that the
penalty imposed does not appear to be excessive and rejected the plea of
mercy observing
 “It is true that the appellant was a mere junior at the bar and not much
experienced when the incident is said to have taken place. The temptation
for money at that stage is of course very great but at the same time it is to
be realised by the appellant that he belongs to a noble profession, which
has very high traditions and those traditions are not to be sullied by
malpractices of this nature” Accordingly it declined to interfere with the
punishment

Order
 We however feel that the punishment of suspension from practice for a
period of three years to a junior member of the bar like the appellant is
rather severe.
 The lapse on the part of the appellant was perhaps due to the fact that in
the struggle for existence he had to resort to such malpractices. We
strongly deprecate the conduct of the appellant
  but take a lenient view because he was an inexperienced member of the
bar, and the fact that the incidents took place in 1971. In all facts and
circumstances of the case, we feel it would meet the ends of justice if we
reduce the period of suspension from three years to one year. We
order accordingly.
IN RE : AN ADVOCATE

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 316 OF 1987 DATED : 29-9-1988

IN RE : AN ADVOCATE
Present : JUSTICE M. P. THAKKAR
JUSTICE B. C. RAY,
Advocates Act (Act No. 265 of 1961) See 36 42 (1) and Bar Counsil of
India Rules 1975 Rule 8 (1) Professional Misconduct.

Appellant advocate withdrew a suit in the court not on instructions of his

client but on the instruction of another person, who had introduced the plaintiff
to appellant. On a complaint to the State Bar Counsil no issues or charges were
framed nor real and substantial factual and legal matters in contest were framed
identified and evidence was recorded. As matter could not be decided within
one year, therefore it was transferred to Bar Council of India who found the
appellant guilty and suspended the appellant from practice for 3 years.
Appellant filed appeal in Hon'ble Supreme Court of India.
Issues Framed
(1) Whether a specific charge should have been framed apprising the appellant
of the true nature and content of the professional misconduct ascribed ( ஒன்று

எக்காரணத்தால் நிகழ்ந்தது என்று கூறு) to him ?

(2) Whether the doctrine of benefit of doubt and the need for establishing the
basic allegations were present in the mind of the Disciplinary Authority in
recording the finding of guilt or in determining the nature and extent of the
punishment inflicted on him?

(3) Whether in the absence of the charge and finding of dishonesty against him
the appellant could be held guilty of professional misconduct even on the
assumption that he had acted on the instructions of a person not authorised to
act on behalf of his client if he was acting in good faith and in a bona fide
manner. Would it amount to lack of prudence ( முன் ஜாக்கிரதை) or non-

culpable negligence (குற்றப் பொறுப்புடைய)or would it constitute professional

misconduct ?

1. Now so far as the procedure followed by the State Bar Council at the
Enquiry against the appellant is concerned it appears that in order to enable
the concerned Advocate to defend himself properly, an appropriate specific
charge was required to be framed. No doubt the act does not outline the
procedure and the Rules do not prescribe the framing of a charge. But then even
in a departmental proceeding in an enquiry against an employee, a charge is
always framed. Surely an Advocate whose honour and right to earn his
livelihood are at stake can expect from his own professional brethren, what
an employee expects from his employer ? Even if the rules are silent, the
paramount and overshadowing consideration of fairness would demand the
framing of a charge.
It would be extremely difficult for an Advocate facing a disciplinary proceeding
to effectively defend himself in the absence of a charge framed as a result of
application of mind to the allegations and to the question as regards what
particular elements constituted a specified head of professional misconduct.

7. The point arising in the context of the non-framing of issues has also
significance. As discussed earlier Rule 8(1) enjoins that “the procedure for the
trial of Civil suits, shall as far as possible be followed. “Framing of the issues
based on the pleadings as in a Civil suit would be of immense utility. The
controversial matters and substantial questions would be identified and the
attention focussed on the real and substantial factual and legal matters in
contest. The parties would then become aware of the real nature and content of
the matters in issue and would come to know
(1) on whom the burden rests;
(2) what evidence should be adduced to prove or disprove any matter;
(3) to what end cross examination and evidence in rebuttal should be
directed.
When such procedure is not adopted there exists inherent danger of miscarriage
of justice on account of virtual denial of fair opportunity to meet the case of the
other side. We wish the State Bar Council had initially framed a charge and
later on framed issues arising out of the pleadings for the sake of fairness and
for the sake of bringing into forefront the real controversy.

8. In the light of the foregoing discussion the questions arising in the present
appeal may now be examined. In substance the charge against the appellant was
that he had withdrawn the suit as settled without the instructions from the
complainant.
 It was not the case of the complainant that the appellant had any
dishonest motive or that he had acted in the matter by reason of lack of
probity or by reason of having been won over by the other side for
monetary considerations or otherwise.
 The version of the appellant was that the suit which had been withdrawn had
been instituted in a particular set of circumstances and that the complainant
had been introduced to the appellant for purposes of the institution of the suit
by an old client of his viz. RW 3 Gautam Chand. The appellant was already
handling a case on behalf of RW 3 Gautam Chand against RW 4
Anantharaju. The decision to file a suit on behalf of the complainant against
RW 4 Anantharaju was taken in the presence of RW 3 Gautam Chand. It was
at the instance and inspiration of RW 3 Gautam Chand that the suit had been
instituted by the complainant, but really he was the nominee of Gautam
Chand and that the complainant himself had no real claim of his own. It
transpires from the records that it was admitted by the complainant
that he was not maintaining any account books in regard to the business
and he was not an Income-tax assessee.

In addition the complainant (PW 1) Haradara himself has admitted in his

evidence that it was Gautam Chand who had introduced him to the appellant,
and that he was in fact taken to the office of the appellant for filing the said
suit by Gautam Chand. It was this suit which was withdrawn by the
appellant. Of course it was withdrawn without any written instructions from
the complainant. It was also admitted by the complainant that he knew the
defendant against whom he had filed the suit for recovery of Rs. 30,000/and
odd through Gautam Chand and that he did not know the defendant
intimately or closely. He also admitted that the cheques used to be passed
in favour of the party and that he was not entitled to the entire amount.
He used to get only commission.

9. Since even on the admission of the complainant himself he was taken to the
office of the appellant for instituting the suit, by RW 3 Gautam Chand, and old
client of the appellant whose dispute with the defendant against whom the
complainant had filed the suit existed at the material time and was being
handled by the appellant. The defence of the appellant that he had withdrawn
the suit in the circumstances mentioned by him required to be considered in the
light of his admissions. The defence of the appellant being that the suit was
withdrawn under the oral instructions of the complainant in the presence of RW
3 Gautam Chand and RW 4 Anantharaju and in as much as RWs 3 and 4
supported the version of the appellant on oath.

The matter was required to be examined in this background. Aasuming that the
evidence of the appellant corroborated by RWs. 3 and 4 in regard to the
presence of the complainant was not considered acceptable, the question would
then arise as to whether the withdrawal on the part of the appellant as per the
oral instructions of RW 3 Gautam Chand who had taken the complainant to the
appellant for instituting the suit, would amount to professional misconduct?,
Whether the appellant had acted in a bona fide manner and the honest belief that
RW 3 Gatuam Chand was giving the instructions on behalf of the complainant
requires to be considered.
If he had done so in a bona fide and honest belief would it constitute
professional misconduct, particularly having regard to the fact that no allegation
regarding corrupt motive was attributed or established?

Here it has to be mentioned that the appellant had acted in an open manner in
the sense that he had in his own hand made endorsement for withdrawing the
suit as settled and set the brief to his junior colleague. If the appellant had any
oblique motive or dishonest intention, he would not have made the endorsement
in his own hand.

10. No doubt Rule 19 contained in Section 2 captioned ‘Duty to the clients’

provides that an Advocate shall not act on the instructions of any person other
than his client or his authorised agent. If, therefore, the appellant had acted
under the instructions of RW 3 Gautam Chand bona fide believing that he was
the authorised agent to give instructions on behalf of the client, would it
constitute professional misconduct ? Even if RW 3 was not in fact an authorised
agent of the complainant, but if the appellant bona fide believed him to he the
authorised agent having regard to the circumstances in which the suit came to
be instituted, would it constitute professional misconduct ? Or would it amount
to only an imprudent and unwise act or even & negligent act on the part of the
appellant ? These were questions which directly arose to which the Committee
never addressed itself.

Therefore there is also nothing to show that the Disciplinary Committee has
recorded a finding on the facts and the conclusion as regards the guilt in full
awareness of the doctrine of benefit of doubt and the need to establish the facts
and the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. As has been mentioned earlier, no
charge has been formulated and framed, no issues have been framed. The
attention of the parties as not focussed on what were the real issues he was not
specifically told as to what constituted professional misconduct and what was
the real content of the charge regarding the professional misconduct against
him.

11. In the order under appeal the Disciplinary Committee has addressed itself to
three questions viz :

(i) Whether the complainant was the person who entrusted the brief to the
appellant and whether the brief was entrusted by the complainant to the
appellant?
(ii) Whether report of settlement was made without instruction or knowledge of
the complainant ?

(iii) Who was responsible for reporting settlement and instructions of the
complainant ?

In taking the view that the appellant had done so probably with a view to clear
the cloud of title of RW 3 as reflected in paragraph 22 quoted herein, the
Disciplinary Committee was only taking recourse to conjecture, surmise and
presumption on the basis of suspicion but also attributing to the appellant a
motive which was not even attributed by the complainant and of which the
appellant was not given any notice to enable him to meet the charge :

It is not possible to find out as to what made PW 2 to have done like that. As
already pointed out the house property which was under attachment had been
purchased by RW 3 during the subsistence of the attachment. Probably with a
view to clear the could of title of RW 3, PW 2 might have done it. This is only
your suspicion. Whatever it might be, it is clear that RW 2 had acted illegally in
directing RW 1 to report settlement.”

12, In our opinion the appellant has not been afforded reasonable and fair
opportunity of showing cause inasmuch as the appellant was not apprised of the
exact content ot the professional misconduct attributed to him and was not made
aware of the precise charges he was required to rebut. The conclusion reached
by the Disciplinary Committee in the impugned order further shows that in
recording the finding of facts on the three questions the applicability to the
doctrine of benefit of doubt and need for establishing the facts beyond
reasonable doubt were not realised.
Nor did the Disciplinary Committee consider the questions as to whether the
facts established that the appellant was acting with bona fides or with mala
fides. Whether the appellant was acting with any oblique or dishonest motive,
whether there was any mens rea, whether the facts constituted negligence and if
so whether it constituted culpable negligence. Nor has the Disciplinary
Committee considered the question as regards the quantum of punishment in the
light of the aforesaid considerations and the exact nature of the professional
misconduct established against the appellant. The impugned order passed by the
Disciplinary Committee, therefore, cannot be sustained. Since we do not
consider it appropriate to examine the matter on merits on our own without the
benefit of the finding recorded by the Disciplinary Committee of the apex
judicial body of the legal profession, we consider it appropriate to remit the
matter back to the Disciplinary Committee.

 Since all these aspects have not been examined at the level of the
Bar Council, and
 since the matter raises a question of principle of considerable importance
relating to the ethics of the profession which the law has entrusted to the
Bar Council of India,
 it would not be proper for this Court to render an opinion of this matter
without the benefit of the opinion of the Bar Council of India which will
accord close consideration to this matter in the light of the perspective
unfolded in this judgment both on law and on facts.
13. We have therefore no doubt that upon the matter being remitted to the Bar
Council of India it will be dealt with appropriately in the light of the aforesaid
perspective. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Bar
Council in so far as thé appellant is concerned and remit the matter to the Bar
Council of India.
We, however, wish to make it clear that it will not be open to the complainant to
amend the complaint or to add any further allegation. We also clarify that the
evidence already recorded will continue to form part of the record and it will be
open to the Bar Council of India to hear the matter afresh on the same evidence.
It is understood that an application for restoration of the suit which has been
dismissed for default in the City Civil Court at Bangalore has been made by the
complainant and is still pending before the Court. It will be open to the Bar
Council ‘of India to consider whether the hearing of the matter has to be
deferred till the application for restoration is disposed of. The Bar Council of
India may give appropriate consideration to all these questions.

14. We further direct that in case the judgment rendered by this Court of any
part thereof is reported in Law Journals or published elsewhere, the name of the
appellant shall not be mentioned because the matter is still sub-judice and
fairness demands that the name should not be specified. The matter can be
referred to as an Advocate without naming the appellant.

15. The appeal is disposed of accordingly. No order regarding costs,

Order accordingly
In Re : VINAY CHANDRA MISHRA

SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CONTEMPT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 3 OF 1994

In Re : VINAY CHANDRA MISHRA

present : JUSTICE KULDIP SINGH
JUSTICE J.S. VERMA
JUSTICE P.B. SAWANT
Dates and events

9th March 1994 - Justice. S.K. Keshote was sitting with Justice Anshuman
Singh in Court No. 38. In the list of fresh cases of 9.3.94 at Sr. No. 5 FAFO
Record No. 22793 M/s. Bansal Forgings Ltd. v. U.P.F. Corp. filed by Smt. S.V.
Misra was listed. Sh. V.C. Misra appeared in this case when the case was called.

10th March, 1994; Justice S.K. Keshote of the Allahabad High Court addressed
a letter to the Acting Chief Justice making allegations against V.C. Mishra.

5th April, 1994 : The Acting Chief justice Shri V.K. Khanna forwarded the said
letter to the then Chief Justice of India by his letter

15th April, 1994 - The learned Chief Justice of India constituted this Bench to
hear the matter comprising of K S Verma, P Sawant

15th April, 1994, The Court took the view that there was a prima facie case of
criminal contempt of court committed by Shri Vinay Chandra Mishra and
issued a notice against him to show cause why contempt proceedings be not
initiated against him.

10th May, 1994 the contemner filed his reply by affidavit and also

 an application seeking discharge of show cause notice,

 and in the alternative for an inquiry to be held into the incident referred to
by Justice Keshote in his letter which had given rise to the contempt
proceedings. – also he filed the petition that he is moving an independent
application for contempt proceedings to be drawn against the learned
judge under Section 16

30th June, 1994, the contemner filed his supplementary/additional counter

affidavit
15th July, 1994 - the Court dismissed the contemner's application praying for
discharge of the notice. The contemner thereafter desired to withdraw his
application No. 2561/94 seeking initiation of proceedings against the learned
judge for contempt of his own Court, by stating that he was doing so "at this
stage reserving his right to file a similar application at a later stage". The Court
without any comment on the statement made by the Contemner, dismissed the
said application as withdrawn.

20th August, 1994 - Justice Keshote by a letter forwarded his comments on the
counter affidavit and the supplementary/additional counter affidavit filed by the
contemner

7th October, 1994, the contemner filed his unconditional written apology - I
hereby withdraw from record all my applications, petitions, counter affidavits,
and prayers made to the court earlier to the presented [sic] of this statement. I,
also, withdraw all submissions made at the bar earlier and rest my matter with
the present statement alone, and any submissions that may be made in support
of or in connection with statement

24th November, 1994 - the parties to make further submissions on the apology
and to argue the case on all points, since the Court stated that it may not be
inclined to accept the apology as tendered.

26th November, 1994 - the State Bar Council of U.P., along with an
application for intervention, submitted its written submissions.

 Advocates Act 1961, Section 38, 35 & 36

o 35. Punishment of advocates for misconduct.
o 36. Disciplinary powers of Bar Council of India.
o 38.Appeal to the Supreme Court
  Constitution of India—Arts. 129, 142 and
o 129. Supreme Court to be a court of record
o 142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and
orders as to discovery, etc
 Contempt of Courts Act 1971. Section 2, 12, 14—Criminal Contempt of
Court.
o 2. Definitions
o 12. Punishment for contempt of court
o 14. Procedure where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court
or a High Court

1. Whether in exercise of powers under Arts. 129 and 142 of the Constitution of
India, the Supreme Court is empowered to cancel or suspend the licence of an
Advocate ?

2. Whether the power to punish an Advocate u/s 35 and 36, Advocate Act is only
vested in the Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council of the State and the
Bar Council of India and not in the Supreme Court ?

Held that the disciplinary jurisdiction of the State Bar Council and the Bar
Council of India to take action for professional misconduct is different from the
jurisdiction of the courts to take action against advocates for the contempt of
Court. The said jurisdiction co-exists independently of each other. The action
taken under one jurisdiction does not bar an action taken under the other
jurisdiction.

In the matter of Disciplinary jurisdiction under the Advocates Act, this Court is
constituted as the final appellate authority u/s 38 of the Advocates Act as
pointed out earlier. In that capacity this court can impose any of the
punishments mentioned in Sec 35(3) of the Act including that of removal of the
name of the Advocate from the State roll and of suspending him from practice.
If that be so there is no reason why this court, while exercising its contempt
jurisdiction under Art. 129 read with Art. 142 cannot impose any of the said
punishments.

3. Whether under Art. 129 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme Court is
empowered to punish only for the contempt of itself and not of the High Courts,
which are also other courts of record vested with identical and independent
power of punishing for contempt of itself ?

Held that, when Article 129 vests the Supreme Court with the powers of the
court of record including the power to punish for contempt of itself, it vests
such powers in the Court in its capacity as the highest court charged with the
appellate and superintending powers over the lower courts and Tribunals as
detailed in the Constitution.

To discharge this obligation, the Supreme Court has to take cognizance of the
deviation from the path of justice in the Tribunals of the land and also of the
attempts to cause such deviation and obstruct the course of justice. To hold
otherwise would mean that although the Supreme Court is charged with the
duties and responsibilities enumerated in the Constitution, it is not equipped
with the power to discharge them. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Supreme
Court cannot take cognizance of the Contempt committed of the High Court.

4. Whether for the trial of contempt case, the contemner can claim for
examination of judge or judges before whom contempt is committed ?
Held that the Criminal Contempt of Court undoubtedly amounts to an offence,
but it is an offence sui generis(unique & peculiar) and hence for such offence,
the procedure adopted both under the common law and the statute law even in
this country has always been summary.

In summary procedure dealing with in facie curiae (before or in the presence of

the court) contempt there is no scope for examining the judge or judges of the
court before whom the contempt is committed. To give such a right to the
contemner is to destroy not only the raison d’etre (the most important reason or
purpose for someone or something's existence) for taking action for contempt
committed in the face of the court but also to destroy the very Jurisdiction of the
court to adopt proceedings for such conduct.

5. What is the extent of punishment, which can be imposed by the supreme

Court under the Advocates Act and the Contempt of Courts Act?

Held that furthermore the Supreme Court is constituted as the final appellate
authority under section 38 of the Act. In that capacity, the Supreme Court can
impose any of the punishments mentioned in sec 35 (3) of the Act including that
of removal of the name of the Advocate from the State Roll and of suspending
him from practice. If that be so there is no reason why the Supreme Court while
exercising its contempt jurisdiction under Art. 129 read with Art. 142 cannot
impose any of the said punishments. The punishment so imposed will not only
be not against the provisions of any statute but in conformity with the
substantive provisions of the Advocates Act and for conduct which is both
professional misconduct as well as the contempt of court.

The Advocates Act has nothing to do with the Contempt jurisdiction of the
Court including of the Supreme Court and the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971
being a statute cannot denude, restrict or limit the powers of the Supreme Court
to take action for contempt under Art 129. It is not disputed that suspension of
the Advocate from practice and his removal from the State roll of Advocates are
both punishments. There is no restriction or limitation on the nature of
punishment that the Supreme Court may award while exercising its contempt
jurisdiction and the said punishments can be the punishments the court may
impose while exercising the said jurisdiction.

Professional Misconduct and Contempt of Court

Advocate, who was a senior Advocate, President of Bar and Chairman of Bar
Council of India, while appearing in a case in Allahabad High Court and on
being put a question started to shout and said that no question could have been
put to him. He will get the Judge transferred or see that impeachment motion is
brought against the judge in Parliament. He further said that he has turned up
many Judges. He created a good scene in the Court and insulted the Judge. Vide
Letter dated 10-3-1994, the matter was reported to the Acting Chief Justice,
who forwarded the same to the then Chief Justice of India vide letter dated 5-4-
1994. The learned Chief Justice of India constituted a bench to hear the matter
on 15-4-1994, when the court took the view that there was a prima facie case of
Criminal Contempt of Court against the Advocate and issued notice against him
to show cause why contempt proceedings be not initiated against him.

 Held that “we find the contemner Shri Vinay Chandra Mishra, guilty of
the offence of the Criminal Contempt of the Court for having interfered
with and obstructed the course of justice by trying to threaten, overawe
and overbear the court by using insulting, disrespectful and threatening
language and convict him of the said offence.
  Since the contemner is a senior member of the Bar and also adorns the
high offices such as those of the Chairman of the Bar Council of India,
the President of the U.P. High Court Bar Association, Allahabad and
others, his conduct is bound to infect the members of the Bar all over the
country. We are, therefore, of the view that an exemplary punishment has
to be meted out to him.
 (a) The contemner Vinay Chandra Mishra is hereby sentenced to
undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six weeks. However, in
the circumstances of the case, the sentence will remain suspended for a
period of four years and may be activated in case the Contemner is
convicted for any other offence of Contempt of Court within the
said period, and
 (b) the contemner shall stand suspended from practising aa an advocate
for a period of three years from today with the consequence that all
elective and nominated offices / posts at present held by him in his
capacity as an advocate shall stand vacated by him forthwith.

Per Justice P.B. Sawant

Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union Of India,

AIR 1998 SC 1895

Date of judgement – 17 April 1998
The Supreme Court Bar Association vs Union of India (1998) stands as a
landmark case in the legal history of India. This pivotal judgment, delivered by
the Supreme Court of India, has far-reaching implications and addresses
fundamental issues that resonate within the nation’s legal framework.

Facts of the Case

In Re: Vinay Chandra Mishra, (1995) 2 SCC 584, this Court found the
Contemner, an advocate, guilty of committing criminal contempt of Court for
having interfered with and "obstructing the course of justice by trying to
threaten, overawe and overbear the court by using insulting, disrespectful and
threatening language", While awarding punishment, keeping in view the gravity
of the contumacious conduct of the contemner, the Court said

 The facts and circumstances of the Present Case justify our invoking the
power under Article 129 read with Article 142 of the Constitution to
award to the contemner a suspended sentence of imprisonment together
with suspension of his practice as and advocate in the manner directed
herein. We accordingly sentence the contemner for his conviction for the
offence of the criminal contempt as under:

(a) The contemner Vinay Chandra Mishra is hereby sentenced to undergo

simple imprisonment for a period of six weeks. However, in the circumstances
of the case, the sentence will remain suspended for a period of four years and
may be activated in case the contemner is convicted for any other offence of
contempt of court within the said period; and

(b) The contemner shall stand suspended from practising as an advocate fro a
period of three years from today with the consequence that all held by him in
his capacity as an advocate, shall stand vacated by him forthwith
Dissatisfied with the decision to bar the defendant from practising as an
advocate for three years, the Supreme Court Bar Association, through its
Honorary Secretary, filed a writ petition under Article 32 of the Indian
Constitution, seeking:

 An appropriate writ, direction, or declaration declaring that the

disciplinary committees of the Bar Councils established under
the Advocates Act, 1961, have sole authority to investigate and suspend
or bar an advocate from practising law for professional or other
misconduct arising out of a punishment imposed for contempt of court or
otherwise; and
 A statement that the Supreme Court of India or any High Court, acting
within its inherent jurisdiction, has no original jurisdiction, power, or
authority in this matter.

Issue

Can the Supreme Court, in exercising its powers under Article 129, read
with Article 142 of the Constitution of India, punish an advocate for committing
proven contempt of court by suspending his licence for a defined term and
barring him from practising law?

Relevant provision : -
Article 129. Supreme Court to be a court of record
The Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all the powers of
such a court including the power to punish for contempt of itself.
Article 142. Enforcement of decrees and orders of Supreme Court and orders
as to discovery, etc
(1)The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree
or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or
matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be
enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be
prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that
behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe.

(2)Subject to the provisions of any law made in this behalf by Parliament, the
Supreme Court shall, as respects the whole of the territory of India, have all
and every power to make any order for the purpose of securing the attendance
of any person, the discovery or production of any documents, or the
investigation or punishment of any contempt of itself.

Judgement

The Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to penalise for contempt of court is

nonetheless restricted, and it cannot be enlarged to include the ability to
evaluate whether an advocate is also guilty of “professional misconduct” in a
summary way, bypassing the Advocates Act’s procedure.

While the power to do complete justice under Article 142 is a corrective power
that favours equity over the law, it cannot be used to deprive a professional
lawyer of due process under the Advocates Act, 1961, by suspending his licence
to practise in a summary manner while dealing with a contempt of court case.

Article 142’s curative powers cannot be understood as allowing the court to

disregard a litigant’s substantive rights when dealing with a case before it. This
authority may not be utilised to “supplant” substantive law that applies to the
matter or cause before the court. Even with its breadth, Article 142 cannot be
used to construct a new tower where none previously existed by ignoring
explicit statutory provisions dealing with a subject and achieving something
indirectly that cannot be attained directly.

Punishing a contemner advocate by suspending his licence to practise while

dealing with a contempt of court case, a power otherwise statutorily available
only to the Bar Council of India, on the basis that the contemner is also an
advocate, is thus not permissible in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article
142.

The salutary goal of Article 142, namely, to do complete justice between the
parties, must be operationally informed by its interpretation. It can’t be any
other way. The contemner and the court are not litigating parties in a case of
contempt of court.

A complaint of professional misconduct is investigated by the Bar Council’s

disciplinary committee, much like a court of law investigates a criminal case,
and an advocate may be punished based on the evidence presented to the
Disciplinary Committee of the Bar Council after being allowed to be heard. The
offending advocate may be removed from the Advocates’ Rolls or subjected to
any other sanction permitted by the Act.

As a result, the Supreme Court cannot penalise an advocate for “professional

misconduct” while exercising appellate authority by changing itself into a
statutory body with “original jurisdiction.” Indeed, if the concerned Bar Council
does not take any action against an advocate after being informed of their wilful
and blameworthy conduct by the High Court or the Supreme Court, the
Supreme Court, in exercising its appellate powers under section 38 of the
Advocates Act, 1961, read with Article 142 of the Constitution, may well have
the jurisdiction to proceed suo motu and send for the records from the Bar
Council and pass appropriate orders. If a case is pending before the relevant Bar
Council and the Bar Council “does not act,” the Supreme Court may sometimes
consider exercising appellate jurisdiction suo motu.

Analysis

The Supreme Court’s job, according to the court, is to ensure that statutory
bodies and other state organs fulfil their tasks in conformity with the law;
nevertheless, it is not allowed for the Supreme Court to assume the role of the
bodies and other state organs and perform their activities.

In the case of Vinay Mishra, there was an inherent fallacy: it was argued that
once the subject was before the court, it may pass any order or instruction.
However, this is a case of contempt of court rather than professional
misconduct. The court has authority over contempt, while the Bar has
jurisdiction over professional misconduct.

The Supreme Court can punish anybody who commits contempt of court under
Article 129, read with Article 142 of the Indian Constitution. The High Courts
can punish contemners under Article 215 of the Constitution, and the Contempt
of Courts Act of 1971 controls the sanctions imposed by the High Court. This
Act has no bearing on the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction. In this case, the court
misinterpreted Article 129 and Article 142, depriving the Bar of any ability to
sanction individuals who engage in professional misconduct.

The court used a fairly objective approach and, with the support of the law and
proper interpretation, concluded that the ability to punish for any professional
misconduct lies with the Bar. However, it only has jurisdiction over itself and
subordinate courts to punish for contempt. No legislation can take away the
Supreme Court’s or the High Court’s contempt jurisdiction.

The superior court’s contempt jurisdiction is not founded on legislation but

rather on the fact that it is a court of record, which gives it that power. The
Supreme Court and High Courts have the power of contempt since the
Constitution considers them courts of record.

Conclusion

Civil contempt is important because deliberately disobedient litigants who

disobey the court’s orders cannot be excused; otherwise, the administration of
justice and public confidence in the judiciary would suffer. Citizens’ trust, faith,
and confidence in the judiciary is a precondition for the Rule of Law to exist.

Experts, conversely, feel that criminal contempt should be simplified if not

outright abolished. This is because it can potentially be used to restrict freedom
of speech and expression under Article 19 of the Indian Constitution.

* The term “broad” refers to the extent or scope of the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction. It suggests that while the Supreme Court has a significant or wide-
ranging jurisdiction, there are certain limits or restrictions imposed on it when
it comes to penalizing individuals for contempt of court.
 Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India and Anr.

INTRODUCTION

The case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India and another, decided on
17th December 2002 by the Supreme Court of India, holds significant
importance in the legal landscape of India. This case revolves around the
contentious issue of whether lawyers have the right to go on strike and the
impact of such strikes on the administration of justice. The case sheds light on
the delicate balance between the rights of lawyers to express their grievances
and the fundamental right of litigants to access a speedy trial.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner (Harish Uppal) was a retired army officer. He was posted in
Bangladesh during the 1971 Liberation war. In 1972, he was court-martialled
and then arrested due to allegations of embezzlement and certain other
irregularities. He was sentenced to two years of imprisonment and was
dismissed from his post. He filed a review application in Court, but to no avail.
He then filed a post-affirmation application again for which there was no reply.
He finally received a reply after 11 years. Till then, the time period of the
review had expired. It was later discovered that the documents and all the
review applications had got misplaced due to a strike by a group of advocates as
a result of which there was a delay. In response to this, he filed a writ petition in
the Supreme Court to declare that the strikes by law advocates are unlawful
Harish Uppal’s frustration with the strike-induced delays led him to file a writ
petition in the Supreme Court of India, asserting that strikes by lawyers were
unlawful. This case raises fundamental questions about the rights and
responsibilities of lawyers, the impact of strikes on the judicial system, and the
need to strike a balance between safeguarding lawyers’ interests and ensuring
the efficient functioning of the legal system.

ISSUES

1. Whether lawyers have a fundamental right to strike under Article

19(c) of the Indian Constitution and if so, what are the limitations
on this right?
2. Whether the strikes by lawyers are lawful or unlawful, considering
their impact on the administration of justice and the rights of
clients.
3. Whether the ban imposed on strikes by lawyers is justified, and if
so, what measures should be taken to balance the interests of
lawyers while safeguarding the functioning of the legal system.
4. What constitutes “rare of rarest cases” in which lawyers may call
for strikes, as mentioned in the Supreme Court’s judgment?
5. How to ensure that the right to speedy trial guaranteed by Article
21 of the Indian Constitution is not violated due to frequent
protests and strikes by lawyers.

CONTENTIONS

In the case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal (Petitioner) vs. Union of India and another
(Respondent), the main arguments presented by each side can be summarized as
follows:
Petitioner (Harish Uppal):

1. Lawyers’ Strike as Unlawful: The Petitioner, Ex-Capt. Harish

Uppal, argued that lawyers’ strikes were unlawful and should be
declared as such by the court. He contended that strikes by lawyers
disrupted the administration of justice, delayed court proceedings,
and put the interests of clients at risk. He highlighted that the
strikes by lawyers had led to the misplacement of important
documents, causing substantial delays in his legal case.
2. Lawyers’ Duty to the Court: The petitioner emphasized that
lawyers held a special position as officers of the court and had a
duty to ensure the smooth functioning of the judicial system.
Strikes were seen as interfering with this duty and compromising
the integrity of the legal profession.
3. The petitioner submitted that advocates are officers of the Court
and should not be allowed to use strikes as a means to black mail
or extort the Courts.
4. He further contended that advocates who commit contempt of
Court by boycotting the Courts and going on strikes should be
made to face serious consequences like getting debarred from
practicing in any Court.
5. It was submitted that those committees who give a call for strikes,
should be punished with contempt proceedings.
6. Lastly, he argued that if an advocate has accepted a Vakalat on
behalf of a client, he must appear in Court. Strikes done by
advocates are usually to break the agreement between their clients
and not appear in Court. So the Bar Council must frame strict rules
regarding this
 7. The petitioner counsel referred to various authorities of this Court and
submitted that the reasons why strikes have been called by the Bar
Associations and/or Bar Councils are :

(a) confrontation with the police and/or the legal administration;

(b) grievances against the Presiding Officer;

(c) grievances against Judgments of Courts;

(d) clash of interest between groups of lawyers and

(e) grievances against the legislature or a legislation.

He pointed out that this Court has declared that strikes are illegal. He submitted
that even a call for strike is bad. He submitted that it is time that the Bar Council
of India as well as various State Bar Councils monitor strikes within their
jurisdiction and ensure that there is no call for strikes and/or boycotts. He
submitted that in all cases where redressal can be obtained by going to a Court
of law there should be no strike.

Respondent (Union of India and another):

1. Right to Freedom of Association: The respondents contended that

the right to strike was a fundamental corollary of the right to
freedom of association, as guaranteed by Article 19C of the
Constitution. They argued that lawyers, like any other group with
common interests, should be able to come together and demand
their rights.

2. The learned Counsel appearing for the respondents submitted that

the advocates have the right to go on strikes, and it is up to the Bar
Councils to decide whether a strike by advocates should be done or
not
JUDGEMENT

The Court’s Ruling and Reasoning:

In the case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India and another, the
Supreme Court of India delivered a significant ruling on the legality of strikes
by lawyers. The court unequivocally declared that lawyers do not have the
right to go on strike or call for the boycott of court proceedings, not even
on a symbolic strike. The reasoning behind this ruling was rooted in several
key arguments.

Firstly, the court emphasized the unique position that lawyers hold as officers
of the court. Lawyers are considered officers of the court and have a duty to
ensure the smooth functioning of the judicial system. Strikes disrupt court
proceedings, interfere with the administration of justice, and put the interests of
clients at risk. Therefore, the court found that strikes by lawyers are
incompatible (very different and therefore not able to live or work happily with
somebody) with their role as officers of the court.

Secondly, the court recognized the adverse effects of lawyer strikes on the
justice system. Strikes lead to delays in the trial of cases, resulting in the
pendency of cases and the violation of the fundamental right to a speedy trial
guaranteed by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. This disruption in the
functioning of the judiciary was seen as a grave concern.

The court also highlighted the need for lawyers to express their grievances
through alternative means, such as giving press explanations, conducting TV
interviews, wearing armbands, organizing peaceful protests, or engaging
with the media. These methods were deemed acceptable forms of protest that
did not interfere with the court’s operations.

In summary, the Supreme Court’s judgment in this case ruled that strikes by
lawyers are unlawful and illicit. Lawyers must ensure the proper functioning
of the judicial system and cannot resort to strikes as a means of protest. Only in
the most extreme and rare circumstances, where the integrity and functioning of
the courts are at stake, may lawyers consider alternative forms of protest. This
landmark judgment aimed to balance the interests of the legal profession with
the efficient administration of justice.

LEGAL REASONING

The legal reasoning used by the Supreme Court in arriving at its decision was
based on several key principles, constitutional provisions, and precedents:

 Role of Lawyers as Officers of the Court : The court emphasized

that lawyers hold a unique position as officers of the court. This
principle recognizes that lawyers must assist the court in the
dispensation of justice and ensure the smooth functioning of the
judicial system. Strikes were seen as a breach of this duty.
 Right to a Speedy Trial: The court invoked Article 21 of the
Indian Constitution, which guarantees the right to a speedy trial.
Lawyer strikes, by causing delays in court proceedings, were found
to violate this fundamental right.
 Freedom of Association: While the Constitution grants the
freedom of association under Article 19c, the court noted that this
right is not absolute and can be subject to reasonable restrictions.
The court determined that the restriction on lawyer strikes was
 reasonable, considering the unique role of lawyers as officers of the
court.
 Past Precedents: The court referred to previous judgments that had
upheld the prohibition on lawyer strikes. These precedents
established a legal framework for the court’s decision.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision was grounded in the principles of
upholding the integrity of the judiciary, ensuring a speedy trial, and balancing
the right to association with the smooth functioning of the legal system. It relied
on constitutional provisions and past legal precedents to support its ruling
against lawyer strikes.

IMPACT OR PRECEDENT

The case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India and another, decided on
17th December 2002, holds significant implications in legal jurisprudence. It
established a crucial precedent regarding lawyers’ rights to strike in India. The
Supreme Court’s ruling in this case has a lasting impact on future legal
decisions and the legal profession in India.

The case set a precedent by firmly declaring that lawyers do not have a right to
go on strike, call for boycotts of court, or engage in any form of disruptive
protest that interferes with the functioning of the judiciary. The Court’s
reasoning was based on the notion that lawyers, as officers of the court, have a
unique role and responsibility to ensure the smooth operation of the legal
system. Strikes by lawyers were seen as detrimental to the administration of
justice, leading to delays in the trial of cases and an increase in case pendency.

This precedent was established in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal’s case has been relied
upon in subsequent legal decisions to curb the practice of lawyers going on
strike. It reinforces the idea that while lawyers have the right to express
their grievances, these expressions must not disrupt the fundamental duty
of the judiciary to provide timely justice.

CONCLUSION

Key takeaways from the case include:

 Lawyers in India do not have an inherent or constitutional

right to strike or boycott court proceedings. Such actions are
considered unlawful and detrimental to the administration of
justice.
 Lawyers are considered officers of the court and have a duty to
ensure the smooth functioning of the legal system, which includes
appearing in court and representing their clients without
interruptions caused by strikes.
 The case highlights the importance of balancing the interests of
lawyers with the needs of the legal system. While lawyers’
grievances should be heard and addressed, they must not
compromise the right of clients to timely justice.
 The judgment underscores the significance of alternative methods
for lawyers to express their concerns, such as press releases, TV
interviews, peaceful protests outside court premises, and engaging
with the media.
 In the broader legal context, this case serves as a reference point
for addressing the responsibilities and limitations of lawyers in
their professional conduct. It emphasizes the fundamental duty of
the legal profession to serve the interests of justice and the public,
while also acknowledging the need to protect lawyers’ rights and
interests through appropriate channels and mechanisms, such as
grievance redressal committees