Leandra R.

Gonçalves

Regional Fisheries
Management
Organizations
The Interplay between
Governance and Science
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
Leandra R. Gonçalves

Regional Fisheries
Management Organizations
The Interplay between Governance
and Science
Leandra R. Gonçalves
Praça do Oceanográfico
University of Sao Paulo
São Paulo, Brazil

ISBN 978-3-030-70361-5    ISBN 978-3-030-70362-2 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70362-2

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“Gonçalves provides an accessible and comprehensive analysis of RMFOs. She
offers valuable insights into the role of science and politics in shaping sustainable
fisheries policies for the open oceans.”

—Peter M. Haas, Professor Department of Political Science, University of

Massachusetts Amherst

“It is highly emblematic that the book Regional Fisheries Management

Organizations: The interplay between governance and science, authored by
Leandra Gonçalves, is coming to life precisely in the first year of the Decade of
Ocean Science for Sustainable Development (2021–2030), proclaimed by the
United Nations. This is exactly what this book is all about: how and, more
importantly, WHEN knowledge and science can influence for the better the
political decisions required to ensure the sustainable development of our oceans.
Focused on the ability of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations to
conserve and manage highly migratory fish stocks, the book addresses the main
threat to the future of marine biodiversity: unsustainable fisheries management, by
posing a question that cuts to the heart of the problem: when does policy listen to
science? By using the epistemic communities’ theory, the author arrives to the
conclusion that science may indeed speak louder to policy, but the strategy, allies,
and the ways in which it occurs differ case-by-case. As envisaged by the UN
proclamation, this book is an important and sincere brick, hopefully to be
accompanied by many others to come during this promising decade, which will
help to build a common framework to ensure that ocean science can support
countries and the international community in creating improved conditions for the
sustainable development of our cherished Oceans.”

—Fabio H. Hazin, Professor at Federal Rural University of Pernambuco, Brazil

v
To Dante, my son, and his generation, which
I hope will believe that knowledge may
change politics for a better world.
Foreword

When I attended my first regional fisheries management organization (RFMO)

meeting as an observer in 2001, I was a firm believer in instrumentally rational
interpretations of state behavior. Indeed, much of my work on international fisheries
governance is clearly based on the liberal-institutionalist school. However, through
long experience with RFMOs I also gained an appreciation for the constructivist
approach and the role of epistemic communities in international environmental gov-
ernance. While I still believe that the structure of power and interests determines the
outcomes of negotiations, I have also seen firsthand how states’ understanding of
both is shaped by social interactions.
In this book, Leandra Gonçalves advances our understanding of the construction
of state preferences by examining how science succeeds or fails to influence deci-
sions by three regional fisheries management organizations: The Commission for
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), the
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), and the
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT). These
RFMOs provide interesting cases because their formal scientific advisory mecha-
nisms are similar, but they differ in the cohesiveness and legitimacy of associated
epistemic communities on one hand and the “usefulness” of the scientific advice
that they can provide on the other. Furthermore, she demonstrates that the influence
of “useful knowledge” is context dependent and that relationships between epis-
temic communities and other factors used to explain state behavior are quite
complex.
For instance, CCAMLR is well known as one of the most conservation-oriented
RFMOs, and member states have evinced strong willingness to act on advice from
its scientific committee. However, high levels of illegal, unregulated, and unreported
fishing have made it impossible for the scientific community to collect the data
needed to accurately assess fish stocks. This makes it difficult for the scientific com-
mittee to produce useable knowledge, which in turn prevents CCAMLR from
adopting management measures based on scientific advice.
In contrast, ICCAT is considered to have one of the worst conservation records
in international fisheries management and their scientific committee is known for

ix
x Foreword

being highly politicized. Furthermore, ICCAT frequently chooses to set total allow-
able catches above scientifically recommended levels and otherwise ignore scien-
tific advice. However, in 2009, an epistemic community coalesced around eastern
bluefin tuna produced usable knowledge that clearly indicated an impending crisis
for the stock and helped to propel the commission toward management that con-
formed more readily to scientific advice. As Gonçalves notes, the crisis faced by
ICCAT was not just ecological but also political and economic, as both public pres-
sure and a potential listing of eastern bluefin tuna by the Convention on the
International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) provided additional incentives
to adopt stricter conservation measures for the stock. It is not possible to determine
which of these factors was most important, but Gonçalves asserts that all three were
necessary to effect the change in ICCAT’s management of eastern bluefin tuna.
For her third example, Gonçalves shows how a major crisis in data can foster
changes in formal rules regarding scientific advisory bodies and, eventually, shifts
in informal norms regarding the legitimacy of scientific advice. In the mid-2000s,
members of the CCSBT discovered that one of the largest fishing states in the
regime had been substantially underreporting its catches for decades. This threw the
scientific community into disarray and caused considerable conflict over how to
account for the missing data in stock assessments. This lack of consensus continued
until the commission adopted new rules governing the production of scientific
advice. This, in turn, helped reduce conflict and eventually helped re-establish trust
in scientific advice.
Demonstrating the causal relationships between epistemic communities and the
outcomes of international negotiations is a difficult, time intensive process that
often requires expert interviews, observation, and analysis of primary documents.
This makes it an expensive undertaking, but as Gonçalves shows, it is important if
we are to move beyond the false dichotomies created by our ideological blinders to
understand not whether but when epistemic communities influence international
negotiations. Oran Young pointed out the need for such a “third path” many years
ago, but progress has been slow. Gonçalves takes us one more step down that road.

Environmental Studies Program  D. G. Webster

Dartmouth College
Hanover, NH, USA
Abstract

One of the biggest challenges in contemporary global environmental governance is

the future of marine biodiversity. Over the years, increased fishing efforts in previ-
ously remote areas drove many fish stocks to scarcity.
The Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) emerged to solve
the international fishery crisis, on the assumption that they would provide a forum
where Member States may agree and discuss binding rules for the conservation and
management of fish stocks within its geographical area of responsibility.
Although some agreements existed for more than 60 years, many authors agree
that they have not been fully effective in promoting the maintenance and conserva-
tion of fish stocks. There are many reasons that might explain the lack of effective-
ness, one of them being that science is not very often listened to in the political
decision-making process.
In this research, the influence of knowledge and science in shaping policy deci-
sions will be observed and analyzed. Therefore, the theory of epistemic communi-
ties—which forms part of the constructivist turn in international relations—was
used to answer the main question posed here: when does power listen to science?
When it does, does it bring more effectiveness in terms input from epistemic com-
munities? Does it induce states to change their behavior, and do these lead to poli-
cies, which can credibly improve biomass?
Using process tracing, through elite interviews, and with a systematic compila-
tion and study of meeting reports from three RFMOs: the Commission for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR); the International
Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT); and the Commission
for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), the final conclusion is that
the science may speak louder to policy, but the strategy, allies, and the ways in
which it occurs differ case-by-case.

Keywords Fishery resources; International organizations; Epistemic

Communities; Oceans

xi
Acknowledgments

This book is a result of my doctoral thesis concluded in 2017 in International

Relation Institute at the University of São Paulo. I am glad to see it published as this
would not have been possible without the advice and support of many people.
Those who deserve warm thanks for their help during the preparation of this
book are indeed many. It is not an easy task to find your place in the academic realm
when you want to combine the natural world with social science. I could not cope
had it not been for friends, family, and my advisor’s companionship.
My advisor Dr. José Eli da Veiga, who relied on my work, patiently reviewed all
my materials, supported all my initiatives, and taught me that there would be noth-
ing more important than a good research question and its sharp hypothesis. And
more than that to conduct a research that gives us nothing but pleasure. Dr. Peter
Haas, who welcomed me to the University of Massachusetts for almost a year, was
always very gentle and available to help me to show the right pathway for my
research, who kept me focused as much as I could and who assisted me anytime I
needed it, even on my existential doubts, which I learned from him are entirely
appropriate—and we will never lose them.
For my mentors at IR studies Professor Janina Onuki, Professor Maria
Hermínia Tavares de Almeida, and Professor Eduardo Viola, who were respon-
sible for introducing me to the IR realm—the new theoretical world I learned and I
am still navigating in shallow waters.
Next in line is a person who has had the greatest influence on my thinking about
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations and how, even with so many diffi-
culties, they can help to improve the international fisheries management: Dr.
Fabio Hazin.
To my colleagues at the International Studies Association and at the Earth System
Governance Project, where I have presented preliminary versions of this research,
who have given me firm encouragement, candid criticism, and a keen eye for the
larger picture: Dr. DG Webster, Dr. Elizabeth De Sombre, Dr. Samuel Barking,
Dr. Oran Young, and Dr. Ana Flavia Barros-Platiau to name just a few.
I would like to thank Professor Ilana Wainer, a very special friend, who advised
me from the beginning to look for International Relations PHd, even being a

xiii
xiv Acknowledgments

Professor from the Oceanographic Institute. She pointed me a path that I have not
foreseen before, and that now, I recognize it could not be different.
I am grateful to CAPES and Fulbright for providing the scholarship for most part
of this work, and even more for creating the opportunity for going abroad, learning,
and sharing my thoughts with a variety of other researchers. I am thankful for the
“Santander mobilidade” grant. These certainly contributed much to the develop-
ment of this study.
In exploring these new horizons and challenges, I have had the pleasure of being
advised and supported by many outstanding researchers and colleagues in a variety
of research and policy contexts. Most of these colleagues deserve special acknowl-
edgement from my heart, and they know who they are. The list of colleagues and
friends would be endless here.
I could not end the acknowledgements section without recognizing the role of
my family and special friends who were with me throughout the Ph.D. period. My
closest family: Marilena, Eduardo, and Samuel Gonçalves. From them, throughout
my entire life, I had the strongest support, love, and the values that provided the
courage to rely on my skills and to follow all of my dreams, independently, no mat-
ter how challenging they were.
My heartfelt thanks, however, go to my loving partner, Pedro Henrique Campello
Torres—my most valued critic, strongest supporter, and closest friend throughout
all these years. Our family may not experience the upcoming benefits of an effective
agreement that will promote sustainable fisheries and a healthy ocean; however,
hopefully this will be the future of ocean we will leave for future generations, and
our son, Dante Gonçalves Torres.
Introduction

The importance of discussing the governance challenges in the Anthropocene goes

through different dimensions within various ecosystems and biomes. The future of
marine ecosystems is one of the priority areas to discuss sustainability, as not only
they have been threatened at an unprecedented scale but they also provide humanity
with different ecosystem services that guarantee our life on Earth, such as food
provisioning, temperature control, water purification, coastal protection, prevention
of erosion, water purification, and carbon storage – to name a few.
There are currently many agreements and institutional arrangements oriented to
control the increasing pressure on the marine environment. However, we still
observe a high rate of degradation of the marine environment, both within and
beyond areas of national jurisdiction, which raises questions about the effectiveness
of the regulatory framework in place. The main questions are: How can it be
improved? Why are some of the agreements already in place failing to restore bio-
diversity and maintain its ecological process? How can research contribute to filling
the deep vacuum concerning the role of the global governance of the oceans in the
configuration and dynamics of contemporary international relations?
To address these questions, this research began with looking at the main regula-
tory instrument of this cooperation: the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS), signed in 1982. This crucial document, known as the
“Constitution of the Oceans,” is the broadest and most complex text negotiated, to
date, on this subject.
Nonetheless, UNCLOS has become an essential regulatory framework that gen-
erates diverse agreements towards other ocean’s problems. Examples of it are
regional fisheries agreements, regional seas agreements, and many others.
Thus, for the purpose of this book, keeping on the horizon the determination to
understand the complex global governance of the oceans, it seemed more appropri-
ate for developing research with specific case studies. Many issues could be
­considered for research, such as pollution, biodiversity, and acidification. However,
international fisheries were the most interesting topic due to my familiarity with the
subject, its intriguing complexity, and many other reasons explained below.

xv
xvi Introduction

UNCLOS was negotiated under the “mare liberum” doctrine (Grotius 1604) set-
ting the ocean free to every country. There was no sovereignty over the oceans. The
freedom of the seas would be paramount in communication and trade between peo-
ple and nations. No country should control the oceans, given its immensity and lack
of limits. It should be free for fishing and navigation. And still, with that in mind,
natural resources have been impacted and showing clear signs of declining.
With time, technology evolved and made fishing vessels faster and more power-
ful to fish more in less time. Over the years, increased fishing efforts in previously
remote areas drove many fish stocks to scarcity.
For several decades, world fisheries have become a market-driven, dynamically
developing sector of the food industry with large investments in modern fishing
fleets and processing factories to meet the international demand for fish and fishery
products. Since the 1960s, it has become apparent that fishery resources could no
longer sustain such rapid and often uncontrolled increases in exploitation and devel-
opment. Therefore, new approaches to fisheries management embracing conserva-
tion and environmental considerations were urgently needed.
The situation was aggravated by the realization that illegal, unregulated, and
unreported fisheries on the high seas, in some cases involving straddling and highly
migratory fish species, which occur within and outside Exclusive Economic Zones
(EEZs), were impeding sound resource management (de Bruyn et al. 2013; Lindley
and Techera 2017).
Most of these fisheries are considered international, meaning highly migratory
species that move across international waters and different EEZs. Individual coun-
tries cannot effectively regulate and manage such fisheries. These fisheries are often
referred to as common-pool resources (CPRs).1 And thus, to promote effective man-
agement of international fisheries coordination among the State is needed. The
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) emerged and included the
major world powers to play a central role in regulating the international fisheries.
Formal cooperation between states through RFMOs dates back to the early
­twentieth century but increased more rapidly from the 1960s. There are 38 regional
fishery bodies worldwide: 20 advisory bodies and 18 RFMOs (Table 1). The FAO
(2001, para 6, c2) defines RFMOs as “intergovernmental fisheries organizations or
arrangements, as appropriate, that have the competence to establish fisheries con-
servation and management measures.” Some of these, such as the International
Whaling Commission (IWC) and the North Atlantic Salmon Conservation
Organization (NASCO), have particular mandates or deal with single species.
Others have broader mandates.

1
Common-pool resources (CPRs) are natural resources where one person’s use subtracts from
another’s use and where it is often necessary, but difficult and costly, to exclude other users outside
the group from using the resource. The majority of the CPR research to date has been in the areas
of fisheries, forests, grazing systems, wildlife, water resources, irrigation systems, agriculture, land
tenure and use, social organization, theory (social dilemmas, game theory, experimental econom-
ics, etc.), and global commons (climate change, air pollution, transboundary disputes, etc.).
2
http://www.fao.org/docrep/003/y1224e/y1224e00.htm#INTRODUCTION.
Introduction xvii

Table 1 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (Lodge 2007)

Year
established
CCAMLR Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 1982
Resources
CCBSP Convention on the Conservation and Management of the Pollock 1996
Resources in the Central Bering Sea
CCSBT Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 1994
GFCM General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean 1952
IATTC Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 1950
IBSFC International Baltic Sea Fisheries Commission 1973
ICCAT International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 1969
IOTC Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 1996
IPHC International Pacific Halibut Commission 1923
IWC International Whaling Commission 1946
NAFO Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization 1979
NASCO North Atlantic Salmon Conservation Organization 1983
NEAFC North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission 1982
NPAFC North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission 1993
PSC Pacific Salmon Commission 1985
SEAFO South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization 2003
SIOFA South Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement 2006
WCPFC Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 2004

Since 2003, new RFMOs have been established for the Western and Central
Pacific Ocean (WCPFC), South-East Atlantic (SEAFO), and South Indian Ocean
(SIOFA). A process is also underway to establish an RFMO for the Southern Pacific
Ocean. Thus, while some critical gaps remain, both in terms of species and area
coverage, most of the world’s marine fish resources are now under management by
one or more RFMOs (Lodge 2007).
Coastal states have raised interest in regulating and organizing marine living
resources’ uses through the establishment of quotas to avoid the risk of a reduction
in fish stocks in the future. Although some agreements have existed for more than
60 years, many authors agree that they have not been fully effective in promoting
fish stocks’ maintenance and conservation (Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly 2010; Gjerde
et al. 2013; Barkin and Desombre 2013).
Global capture fisheries production in 2018 reached 96.4 million tonnes, increasing
5.4% from the average of the previous 3 years (FAO 2020). The percentage of stocks
fished at biologically unsustainable levels increased from 10% in 1974 to 34.2% in
20173 (FAO 2020).

3
By FAO (2020) definition, stocks fished at biologically unsustainable levels have an abundance
lower than the level that can produce the MSY and are being overfished. These stocks require strict
management plans to rebuild stock abundance to full and biologically sustainable productivity. The
stocks fished within biologically sustainable levels have abundance at or above the level associated
with MSY. Stocks fished at the MSY level produce catches that are at or very close to their maxi-
mum sustainable production. Therefore, they have no room for further expansion in catches, and
xviii Introduction

There are many issue areas that could be chosen as an empirical subject for a
study about which factors are conferring more or less effectiveness on the interna-
tional agreements, as have previously been made by a diverse array of researchers.
These subjects include the Ozone Treaty, the Baltic and North Seas Agreements,
Acid Rain in Europe, the Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution,
the International Whaling Commission, and many others addressed by these books
and articles (Haas et al. 1995; Young 1999; Miles et al. 2002; Mitchell 2003).
However, the fishery agreements were chosen as they deal with a highly techni-
cal and transboundary issue that needs to be addressed by multilateral organizations
facing a high degree of uncertainty. In addition, as they cover different regions, it
will allow for a comparison between them, even considering that they were built in
different contexts and were instituted by other countries.
Thus, one of the requirements is to understand why some of these fishery agree-
ments are less effective than others and enhance their effectiveness. Without know-
ing these reasons, one can hardly improve the complex global governance of the
oceans. This is the core motivation for this research, which will seek to highlight
precisely one of the factors that might help enhance the RFMO’s effectiveness.
Other researchers have also dedicated their thoughts to contribute to this actual
debate about RFMO effectiveness. Gjerde et al. (2013) highlight some potential
reasons why RFMOs have struggled thus far in carrying out their mandates.
According to them, first, most RFMOs comprise states with interests in enhancing
or maintaining their domestic fishing opportunities,4 leading to the pursuit of short-­
term gains over long-term sustainable fishing.
Second, RFMOs and their Member States suffer few consequences for poor per-
formance or overfishing, other than possibly lost fishing opportunities in the remote
future. Distant Water Fishing Nations (DWFN) have, in the past, been able to swiftly
shift to more fertile grounds. Outside of the compliance mechanisms of RFMOs
such as blacklists, few, if any, penalties exist at the international level for failing to
follow UN fisheries resolutions and best practice standards such as the Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.5
However, the FAO’s Port State Measures Agreement should have sufficient states
vote to ratify it, which could help to fill this gap.6

effective management must be in place to sustain their MSY. The stocks with a biomass consider-
ably above the MSY level (underfished stocks) have been exposed to relatively low fishing pres-
sure and may have some potential to increase their production.
4
A few select fisheries or marine living resource organizations contain non-fishing states, e.g.,
CCAMLR, IWC, and Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC). This factor will be
examined in the CCAMLR chapter.
5
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm.
6
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Agreement on Port State Measures to
Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (2009), http://www.fao.
org/fishery/topic/166283/en. This measure needs to be ratified by 25 states to come into force but
has only been ratified by nine states thus far (last update accessed on August 2015—http://www.
fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/legal/docs/037s-e.pdf).
Introduction xix

Third, the paradigm of regional institutions may be ill suited to a globalized

world. Many RFMOs may have originated from a small number of states with a
shared dependence on, vested interest in, a shared resource (likely a fish stock adja-
cent to or straddling their EEZ and a small number of DWFNs). Yet in the current
world of global fisheries, a vessel fishing the high seas may fly a flag from one state,
hire a captain from another, a crew from several more, with ownership held by a
mostly stateless multinational corporation that may belong to holding companies in
one or more jurisdictions. Further, vessels that fish in the high seas can fish a
resource to local commercial extinction and then move on, not feeling the local
depletion’s effect.
And finally, most RFMOs maintain the position that the Member States are
allowed to fish unless they reach an agreement (generally achieved via consensus)
not to fish or restrict fishing. This creates a perverse incentive not to reach fisheries
agreements since any agreement would limit a state’s total allowable catch (TAC)
and hence their “freedom to fish.” Consequently, fishing limits are often only
adopted following the stock collapse or after severe environmental impacts have
ensued (e.g., the case of Jack Mackerel in the South Pacific or Southern Bluefin
Tuna in the Atlantic).
According to Brooks et al. (2014), amid declining stocks and an immediate need
for quick action to reverse the downward trends, decision-making often becomes
paralyzed as states compete to gain a portion of a diminishing catch quota.
Other reasons provided in Sumaila et al. (2007) for the ineffectiveness of RFMOs
are as follows: RFMOs have limited powers to enforce their rules; the free-rider
problem, i.e., states that choose not to join RFMOs continuing to fish outside of
RFMO rules and thus undermining conservation measures; illegal, unreported, and
unregulated (IUU) fishing is widespread on the high seas; massive subsidies are
paid to the fishing sector in many countries, fueling fishing on the high seas; and it
is incredibly expensive to monitor the currently existing wide array of diverse man-
agement strategies.
Beyond the crucial factors discussed by the above authors, some more factors
and variables might overcome the lack of effectiveness, and that may add more ele-
ments to this reflection. In this research, the influence of knowledge and science will
be observed and analyzed. It is well known and established in theory that a funda-
mental principle underlying modern fisheries management is that management
decisions need to be based on the “best available scientific information.” This prin-
ciple is embedded in the UNCLOS which mandates that the determination of allow-
able catches and other conservation measures for living resources in the high seas
are based on the “best scientific information available to the states concerned.” The
need for scientific advice as the basis for management decisions and the establish-
ment of RFMOs was further affirmed in the United Nation Fish Stock Agreement
(UNFSA). In practice, the advice of science is not very often accepted in political
decisions.
Based on Haas (2004b), “Knowledge can speak volumes to power. Current
research from comparative politics, IR, policy studies, and democratic theory sug-
gests that science remains influential if its expertise and claims are developed behind
xx Introduction

a politically insulated wall. Epistemic communities are the transmission belts by

which new knowledge is developed and transmitted to decision-makers.”
According to this approach, “when usable knowledge is successfully constructed
and transmitted, it yields distinctive results: regimes are developed by process of
social learning; the regime rules reflect scientific consensus about environmental
sustainability, and the regimes tend to be more effective” (Haas and Stevens 2011).
Lodge et al. (2007) agreed with this approach. They stated that fishery managers
and marine resource users’ lack of political will to implement management mea-
sures according to scientific advice and effectively enforce and comply with those
management measures are leading agreements to fail or be less effective. They left
behind to address what the institutional design is or how an epistemic community
may help fill the gap between science and policy within the realm of the RFMOs.
It is recognized that several factors might improve agreement effectiveness: the
willingness of key states to exercise leadership, the existence of strong international
institutions, and the presence of strong epistemic communities or transnational sci-
ence networks (Haas 2000).
This book focuses on the role and influence of science and epistemic communi-
ties in three specific agreements. Thus, through a combination of elite interviews
(Annex V) and process tracing, three Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
(RFMOs)—CCAMLR, ICCAT, and CCSBT7—are analyzed.
Those agreements were chosen as they were considered, according to Cullis-­
Suzuki and Pauly (2010), respectively, high, medium, and low in their biomass
recovery performance. Thus, as a starting point, it seemed an excellent parameter to
evaluate the role of science in those agreements to analyze if those scoring better on
the biomass ranking were the same agreements where the advice of science
was heeded.
It is worth noting that the biomass recovery was not necessarily due exclusively
to the epistemic community or an institutional design that enabled science to speak
truth to power. Many independent variables could have affected this dependent vari-
able. However, it is the first step, and as causal inference thus becomes a process
whereby each conclusion becomes the occasion for further research to refine and
test it, this research is contributing to further the inferences about the effectiveness
of agreements, in a way.
At this very moment, it is essential to clarify that this book does not intend to
make comparative case studies as it recognizes that the agreements are structured
and built in very different ways that could make the comparison between them
impossible. However, there is the intention to look for empirical evidence that power
is listening to science to make some decisions. Those in power to listen depend on
diverse conditions that will be explored here.
For all of those reasons, this book will be divided into five main chapters. As it
could be no different, the first chapter will explore the entire theoretical

7
CCAMLR: Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources; ICCAT:
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas; and CCSBT: Commission for
the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.
Introduction xxi

framework—constructivism—that embraces the idea of social learning as one of the

factors that could potentially enhance more cooperation and effectiveness, stating
that under conditions of uncertainty—such as those associated with contemporary
globalization and highly technical issues—the key is to design policy analytic pro-
cesses that enable actors to learn about the world and about each other.
This approach, which has been well developed in various articles by Prof. Peter
M. Haas, looks at the influence of groups of experts on the reformulation of policy
outcomes and indicates how states and leaders may come to realize that new atti-
tudes and political decision-making procedures are necessary to face some environ-
mental problems.
The chapter shows that there has been an increasing recognition in recent years
of the need for RFMOs to improve their performance because of demands contained
within current international agreements aimed at better conservation and manage-
ment of fishery resources. However, the RFMOs institutional design analyzed in
this chapter does not fully allow scientists to produce usable knowledge, as defined
by Clark and Majone (1985) and demonstrated empirically in the Haas and Stevens
(2011) chapter. The science is not yet fully safeguarded enough from politics, which
may, despite the quality of science produced, not be considered valid by many
decision-makers.
The first chapter corroborates with Haas and Stevens (2011) that knowledge can
speak volumes to power, and with this comes more effectiveness in terms of
problem-­solving. However, to make it work for fishery agreements, expertise and
claims must be developed behind a politically insulated wall, a wall that is not yet
working properly in every situation or when a decision is made.
Thus, the following chapters present three empirical case studies and, therefore,
are fundamental to discuss the role of knowledge on the international fishery agree-
ments cooperation. The empirical chapters contain a general history of each agree-
ment, a description of its institutional design, and the specific case chosen within the
whole agreement to explore our central question: when does power listen to science?
In the CCAMLR chapter, the epistemic community was identified under the
Working Group of Fisheries Stock Assessment (WG-FSA). Furthermore, CCAMLR
has been able to implement measures that serve as an example of how we might
govern high seas resources more responsively and sustainably by always accepting
scientific advice. They act on behalf of science. The chapter argues that no crisis or
special event needs to trigger a change of procedure in this case. The epistemic com-
munity operates under its own institutional design.
For ICCAT, in the second chapter, the Bluefin Tuna case demonstrates that when
power listens to science and implements scientific advice under a social learning
process, fishery stocks can recover, thus reaching the primary goal of the
Commission, conferring more effectiveness on the international agreement.
However, in ICCAT, this only occurred after the widely publicized crisis about
global tuna fishery management. In this case, an epistemic community emerged
from the SCRS consisting of the ICCAT chairman, a few NGOs, several individu-
als, and some national scientists.
xxii Introduction

The Bluefin Tuna case under ICCAT illustrates that when decisions are based on
the best scientific data available, and there is the political will to adopt the manage-
ment measures required for the recovery of stocks, fisheries management works,
even with a committee where the decision depends on the convergence of views
from more than 50 countries.
On the other hand, the CCSBT presented a completely different situation. The
countries were not relying on each other’s scientific information. Each country’s
point of view almost always biased the knowledge. From the beginning, Japan,
Australia, and New Zealand struggled to find the proper TAC that would keep them
fishing without collapse or make the fish stock decline. They were successful only
when a high level of independent scientists were able to help the process by creating
an independent advisory panel and a management procedure sound enough to be
credible by the decision-makers. The process, which took almost 5 years, made an
insulated wall, as recommended by Haas and Stevens (2011), or Clark and Majone
(1985), as a proper condition to promote the social learning process.
Finally, the conclusion reflects how the constructivist theory explains interna-
tional cooperation and, therefore, creates some insights into the governance of the
oceans. As mentioned previously, this reflection does not intend to compare the case
studies between them due to the significant differences in what their institutions
represent. It only highlights essential conclusions based on specific empirical data
on the relationship between science and power. Yet, this does not mean to conclude
that constructivism is the only theory that will explain all international cooperation
cases on the environmental arena to the detriment of other theories. This book is
guided by the empirical data, and for these case studies, constructivism supports the
explanations of the specific cases analyzed here.
To conclude, this research contributes to knowledge on the sustainability science
field on the complex and unsolved debate about how science can influence policy
decisions, speaking truth to power, and why power must listen to science before
making decisions on international agreements.

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Contents

1 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations:

Are They Effective?����������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1
Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    1
Constructivism as a Theoretical Approach������������������������������������������������    2
The Science and Epistemic Communities on International
Environmental Agreements������������������������������������������������������������������������    4
Agreement Effectiveness: Challenges and Opportunities��������������������������    6
Usable Knowledge and Epistemic Communities��������������������������������������    9
Fisheries Policies, Science, and Usable Knowledge����������������������������������   11
Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   18
2 CCAMLR: To Be or Not To Be an RFMO?������������������������������������������   21
Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   21
CCAMLR: An Agreement for Conservation of Marine
Living Resources���������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   23
Why CCAMLR Is Widely Recognized as an Example
to Other RFMOs����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   25
Science and the Antarctic��������������������������������������������������������������������������   29
The Patagonian Toothfish��������������������������������������������������������������������������   31
The CCAMLR Epistemic Community������������������������������������������������������   34
NGOs at CCAMLR������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   36
Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   38
3 ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern Bluefin
Tuna Management ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   39
Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   39
The ICCAT History������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   40
ICCAT Importance for Fishery Governance����������������������������������������������   42
Eastern Bluefin Tuna Case: A Lesson to Learn ����������������������������������������   45
The Emergence of an Epistemic Community��������������������������������������������   48
Usable Knowledge for EBFT��������������������������������������������������������������������   52

xxv
xxvi Contents

The Role of NGOs on the Eastern Bluefin Tuna Debate ��������������������������   54
The Threat of CITES���������������������������������������������������������������������������������   57
Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   59
4 CCSBT and the Management of Southern Bluefin Tuna ��������������������   61
Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   61
The CCSBT and “the Convention”������������������������������������������������������������   62
The Southern Bluefin Tuna������������������������������������������������������������������������   64
The Management and Conservation of SBT����������������������������������������������   65
The Scientific Committee and the Management Procedure����������������������   67
The Epistemic Community at CCSBT������������������������������������������������������   71
NGOs at CCSBT����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   74
Conclusion ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   76

Conclusion��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   79

Annex I: CCAMLR Epistemic Community��������������������������������������������������   85

Annex II: ICCAT CPCs Year of Ratification������������������������������������������������   89

Annex III: Epistemic Community at ICCAT������������������������������������������������   91

Annex IV: NGOs Attendees at ICCAT����������������������������������������������������������   95

Annex V������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 101

References �������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 103

Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 113
Acronyms

ATCPs Antarctic Treaty Contracting Parties

ATS Antarctic Treaty System
BIOMASS Biological investigations on marine Antarctic systems and stocks
CCAMLR Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources
CCSBT Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna
CDS Catch documentation scheme
CITES Convention of International Trade in Endangered Species
CPRs Common pool resources
CPs Contracting parties
CPUE Catch per unit effort
CTCA Commission for Technical Cooperation in Africa
DWFN Distant Water Fishing Nation
EBFT Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Bluefin Tuna
EC European Commission
ECCSBT Extended Commission of CCSBT
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
ENGO Environmental Non-Governmental Organization
Epicom Epistemic Community(ies)
ERSWG Ecologically Related Species Working Group (CCSBT)
ESC Extended Scientific Commission of CCSBT
EU European Union
FAO United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
ICCAT International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas
ICES International Council for the Exploration of the Sea
ICNAF International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
IR International Relations
ITLOS International Tribune for the Law of the Sea
IUU Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated
MCS Monitoring Control and Surveillance
MOU Memorandum of Understanding

xxvii
xxviii Acronyms

MP Management Procedure (at CCSBT)

MSY Maximum Sustainable Yield
NAFO Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization
NEAFC North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission
NGO Non-Governmental Organization
OM Operating Models
RFMO/A Regional Fisheries Management Organization/Agreements
SAG Stock Assessment Group (at CCSBT)
SBT Southern Bluefin Tuna
SC Scientific Committee (at CCSBT)
SCAR Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research
SCOR Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research
SCRS Standing Committee on Research and Statistics
SSB Spawning stock biomass
TAC Total Allowable Catch
UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNFSA Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and High Migratory Fish Stocks
WG-FSA Working Group on Fisheries Stock Assessments (at CCAMLR)
List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 CCAMLR Convention Area (Source: CCAMLR (2017)���������������������� 24

Fig. 2.2 CCAMLR structure������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 27
Fig. 2.3 Dissostichus eleginoides in Subarea 48.3 SSB status estimated
by the model described in WG-FSA-15/59. Dashed horizontal
lines show a status of 0.5 and 0.2. Source WG-FSA report from
2015, p. 378����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 35
Fig. 3.1 ICCAT contracting parties (N = 50).
Source: http://www.iccat.int/en/contracting.htm���������������������������������� 41
Fig. 3.2 ICCAT Convention area.
Source: http://www.iccat.int/en/convarea.htm�������������������������������������� 43
Fig. 3.3 Reported catches, SCRS TAC recommended and the
Commission decision. Source: Author�������������������������������������������������� 46
Fig. 3.4 Fishing mortality (for ages 2 to 5 and 10+), spawning stock
biomass (in metric ton), and recruitment (in number of fish)
estimates. Red line: reported catch; blue line: inflated (from
1998 to 2007) catch. Source ICCAT 2015, page 108��������������������������� 47
Fig. 3.5 Number of scientists attending the SCRS meetings along the
study period������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 49
Fig. 3.6 Number of NGOs attending Commission meetings and the
SCRS meetings during the study period (2004–2013)������������������������� 54
Fig. 3.7 Number of NGOs attending the SCRS meetings���������������������������������� 56
Fig. 3.8 Epistemic community formed by ICCAT chairman, part of
SCRS national scientists, and part of NGOs. They were
consistently providing knowledge to ICCAT CPCs, while
CITES and NGOs were creating the sense of urgency������������������������� 59
Fig. 4.1 The CCSBT organogram shows the relationships between the
CCSBT, its subsidiary bodies, and the Secretariat�������������������������������� 64

xxix
List of Tables

Table 1 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations

(Lodge 2007)������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ xvii
Table 1.1 Information about the institutional design of science
for the agreements������������������������������������������������������������������������������ 13
Table 2.1 Members and acceding states of CCAMLR to date
(Source: CCAMLR website, accessed in June 2015)������������������������� 26
Table 2.2 Percentage of countries with interest in fishing at
CCAMLR area����������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 28
Table 2.3 Catches, TAC recommended, Management advice, and
Estimate of IUU in CCAMLR South Georgia and Shag
Rocks (Subarea 48.3) for Patagonian toothfish
(Dissostichus eleginoides)������������������������������������������������������������������ 29
Table 3.1 NGOs representatives at ICCAT��������������������������������������������������������� 50
Table 4.1 List of CCSBT and ECCSBT members��������������������������������������������� 63
Table A.1 A summary review of the case of studies������������������������������������������� 80

xxxi
Chapter 1
Regional Fisheries Management
Organizations: Are They Effective?

Introduction

The agreement effectiveness study field is far from being fully explored. The study
about which factors make international environmental cooperation more or less
effective is likely to be one of the most critical aspects of research into the global
environment’s politics (Desombre 2007; Mitchell et al. 2020).
Why are some international environmental regimes more successful than others
in solving problems that motivate their establishment? Why do some environmental
regimes have a greater impact than others on the behavior of those actions that have
given rise to the relevant problems? These are the questions that have been raised by
many researchers dedicated to comprehending the international system where those
agreements exist (Young 1999; Miles et al. 2002. Mitchell et al. 2006). Still, after
20 years, the agreement effectiveness field has kept its relevance, bringing more
complexity evolving the architecture and agency concepts in the Anthropocene
epoch (Biermann and Kim 2020; Hanusch and Biermann 2020).
One of the political science and international relations research areas that have
addressed this effectiveness agreement discussion is the constructivist theory, which
states that under conditions of uncertainty—such as those associated with contem-
porary globalization and highly technical issues—the key is to design policy-­
analytic processes that enable actors to learn about the world and each other. This
approach, expanded in various articles by Prof. Peter M. Haas, looks at the influence
of groups of experts on the reformulation of national or international objectives and
indicates how states and leaders may realize that new attitudes and political decision-­
making procedures are necessary to face some environmental problems.
To maintain higher social learning within the agreement, the regime design must
keep the construction of science insulated and build up clear procedures for the con-
nection of science to policy decisions.
This connection is usually done by what Haas called the “transmission belt,”
formed by a group of scientists widely recognized as an epistemic community (Haas
1992; Cross 2013, 2015; Haas and Stevens 2011).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2021
L. R. Gonçalves, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70362-2_1
2 1 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Are They Effective?

In this context, this chapter will present the entire theoretical framework of
c­onstructivism and epistemic communities. It will empirically analyze the
institutional design of three RFMOs that were considered, respectively, high,
­
medium, and low in their biomass recovery performance: CCAMLR, ICCAT, and
CCSBT1 to evaluate if their institutional design is enabling science to influence
policy outcomes and if the knowledge produced is organized in such a way as to
change policy outcomes, thereby promoting more effectiveness to the agreements in
terms of problem-solving.
Next, arguments will be presented to show that effectiveness depends on diverse
factors. Institutional scientific design plays an important role in enabling experts to
produce usable knowledge to influence decision-makers to make the agreements
more effective.
This chapter aims to establish a framework of analysis and examine the institu-
tional design for science to understand how it affects or influences the agreement’s
performance.

Constructivism as a Theoretical Approach

According to Adler (2002), all constructivists (modernist, modernist linguistic, and

critical)—with the exception, perhaps, of the extreme postmodernist wing of radical
constructivism—share two concepts: what Stefano Guzzini (2000) summarized as
the social construction of knowledge, and the construction of social reality. In com-
bination, these concepts are constructivism’s common ground, the view that the
material world does not come categorized. Therefore, the objects of our knowledge
are not independent of our interpretations and our language. This means that
­different collective meanings are attached to the material world twice, once as social
reality and again as scientific knowledge. In other words, knowledge is both a
resource that people use in their day-to-day life for the construction of social reality
and the theories, concepts, meanings, and symbols that scientists use to interpret
social reality.
This dichotomous description is offered for analytical purposes only. For reflexive
knowledge or an interpretation of the world when imposed on material reality,
becomes knowledge for the world—the power to change the world by collective
understandings and, concurrently, with human motives and intentional acts. The
above analysis means not only that there is no perfect correlation between objects
“out there” in nature and our classifications of nature, but also that social facts, which
are the objects of its study, emerge from the interaction between knowledge and the
material world, neither of which is invariant.

1
CCAMLR: Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources; ICCAT:
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas; and CCSBT: Commission for
the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna.
Constructivism as a Theoretical Approach 3

Unlike rationalism in both major schools—neo-realism and liberal institutional-

ism—which take the world as it is, according to Adler (2002), constructivism sees
the world as a project under construction, as becoming rather than being. Unlike
idealism, post-structuralism, postmodernism, and radical constructivism, which
take the world only as it can be imagined or talked about; constructivism accepts
that not all statements have the same epistemic value and consequently some foun-
dation for knowledge.
Emmanuel Adler, in his chapter “Constructivism in International Relations”
(Adler 2002), states very clearly that constructivism, which reached the shores of IR
in the 1980s, describes the dynamic, contingent, and culturally based condition of
the social world. It has major implications for understanding knowledge, including
scientific knowledge, and how to achieve it. Constructivism thus has the potential to
transform the understanding of social reality in the social sciences.
Unlike other contemporary approaches like neo-realism, where the most power-
ful states have a decisive influence over the formation, nature, and effectiveness of
a regime; and from liberal institutionalism, where international institutions them-
selves can bring about cooperation through creating an expectation of future gain,
exchanging information, and building trust; the constructivist approach considers
that governments can learn to apply new patterns of reasoning to the formulation of
policy, which is reflected in a more sophisticated understanding of the complex
array of causal interconnections between human environmental and economic
activities (Haas 1990).
Constructivists focus on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argu-
ment in politics, stressing, in particular, the role of collectively held understandings
on social life. One of the main characteristics that differ constructivism from real-
ism and institutionalism is that human interaction is shaped primarily by ideational
factors, not simply material ones (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001).2
Under the constructivism theory, Haas’ works encourage the social learning
approach. In the early 1980s, Ernst Haas (1983), Peter’s father, suggested a power-
ful sociological role of international cooperation based on learning, that is, on the
introduction to politics of scientific consensual concepts. Borrowing the concept of
episteme from Foucault, Ruggie (1975) further developed this program, which Haas
(1992), and Adler and Haas (1992), turned into an agent-oriented constructivist
research program on “epistemic communities.”
Over the past two decades, this research pathway has revealed the existence of
numerous highly influential epistemic communities—basically defined as expert
networks—that have been involved in the trajectory of international cooperation by

2
The constructivist theory was described as detailed by Adler (2002) in the fifth chapter, and it was
used as a reference for this research. It is very important reading for those who want to understand
this theory’s roots, which I will not describe in detail in this book. In the same book, Fearon and
Wendt (2002) wrote a chapter entitled “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View,” and it is
worth it to read to understand that within IR there is no consensus under the battle of theories. In
this chapter, they claimed, “constructivism is not a ‘theory’ at all, any more than is rationalism”
(p. 74).
4 1 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Are They Effective?

virtue of their shared professional expertise. It has become a progressive research

program, and since then, the concept was applied to numerous examples (see the
International Organization Special Edition of 1992 for the main reference). Twenty
years later, the approach has been revisited by Cross (2013), and even further dis-
cussed by Peter Haas throughout his career, making him the main reference for this
particular research program (Haas 2014, 2015).
The study of epistemic communities forms part of the constructivist theory; it
explains sources of actors’ understandings in a complex and uncertain policy envi-
ronment and the actor’s attendant behaviors or practices under specified conditions.
Besides all of the efforts, diverse researchers have done to further the inquiry
using the epistemic communities concept on many subjects, including European
security (Cross 2015), whaling (Peterson 1992), the Mediterranean (Haas 1990),
and biodiversity (Inoue 2003); however, international fisheries have not yet been
explored under this framework.

 he Science and Epistemic Communities on International

T
Environmental Agreements

Despite widespread agreement on the importance of science for policy-making,

there are still divergent perceptions of how, when, and under what conditions sci-
ence influences policy, and accordingly, on how the interplay between science and
policy should be best organized (Lidskog and Sundqvist 2015). Additionally, it is
known that experts’ involvement is found at all levels of government—interna-
tional, national, and local and also with a range of policy actors (e.g., sectorial
groups, citizens, and private entrepreneurship) (Dunlop 2016).
Comparative studies of environmental regimes confirmed that organized scien-
tific expertise had a distinct influence over the effectiveness of environmental
regimes in which they played a negotiating role (Andresen 2000; Haas 2007).
One approach for this analytical problem may be descriptive, addressing the
variety of arrangements that can provide scientific expertise to international agree-
ments (Watson 2005). Another approach uses the critical point of view for claiming
a policy process democratically constructed that would involve not only elite scien-
tists but also a larger number of stakeholders contributing deliberatively to the pol-
icy construction characterized as a process of co-production (Jasanoff 2013; Jasanoff
and Martello 2004). Additionally, an approach developed by Peter Haas that will be
used here addresses the concept of social learning and discusses how science and
knowledge can or cannot contribute to more sophisticated management of technical
issues (Haas 2004a, b).
The approach suggested and developed by Peter M. Haas argues that science can
play an important role in shaping policy decisions through the development of an
epistemic community. He emphasizes the importance of science, and in particular
consensus-based knowledge in policy-making. Haas argues that consensus-based
The Science and Epistemic Communities on International Environmental Agreements 5

science can play an independent and important role by influencing and even refor-
mulating state interests, thereby bringing about international agreements that tran-
scend and reshape state interests. This is made possible through the involvement of
experts. Thus, from the epistemic community perspective, environmental regimes
are driven not only by state powers but also by epistemic networks under certain
conditions.
The epistemic community argument was that, normatively, epistemic communi-
ties ultimately provided better advice than other modes of policy advice because
expert advice is likely to be warranted (Haas 2015).
Unlike other organized interest groups active in politics and policy-making, epis-
temic communities have internal beliefs that make them more likely to provide
information that is politically untainted and therefore more likely to “work” in the
political sense that this information will be embraced and followed by political
authorities concerned about the need to be impartial (Haas 2001, 2007, 2012, 2014,
2015; Haas and Stevens 2011).
According to Haas (2004, 2015), after a widely publicized shock or crisis, the
states recognize the need to deal with the problem and then rely on scientists for
help. Here it is all about the decision-makers’ recognition of the limits of their abili-
ties to deal with new issues and the need to defer or delegate to authoritative actors
with a reputation for expertise.
In this context, when the experts are able to develop usable knowledge, the
decision-­ makers feel compelled to apply scientific consensus, social learning
emerge (Haas and Haas 2002). Thus, in this situation, expert networks are likely to
emerge and can be crucial in shaping policy outcomes (Haas 1992, 2014; Lidskog
and Sundqvist 2015).
The epistemic communities concept coined by Peter Haas as a professional net-
work with authoritative and policy-relevant expertise was widely presented in
Special Issue of International Organization entitled, “Knowledge, Power, and
International Policy Coordination (1992).” In almost 30 years, the idea has gained
some robustness in International Relations (IR) scholarship and applied as a frame-
work for different subjects (Cross 2013, 2015; Haas 2015).
Epistemic communities are one of the main actors responsible for aggregating
and articulating knowledge in terms of states’ interests for decision-makers and dis-
seminating those beliefs internationally. In a broader political context, epistemic
communities provide one of the major channels by which overarching regime prin-
ciples, norms, and rules are articulated for the international community and dis-
seminated internationally. While epistemic communities are key agents responsible
for disseminating principles, norms, and rules, the level of diffusion will largely
depend on the political influence of its members: their ability to persuade others,
their ability to consolidate bureaucratic influence in important institutional venues,
and their ability to retain influence over time. Thus, states’ interests and decisions to
deploy state power are identified as subject to consensual knowledge (Haas 2014).
It is a concept invoked by constructivist scholars of IR to focus analytic attention
on how states formulate interests and reconcile differences of interest. Epistemic
communities are a principal channel by which consensual knowledge about causal
6 1 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Are They Effective?

understandings is applied to international policy coordination and by which states

may learn through international cooperation processes (Haas 2012).
They are networks of knowledge-based communities with an authoritative claim
to policy-relevant knowledge within their domains of expertise. Their members
share knowledge about the causation of social or physical phenomena in an area for
which they have a reputation for competence and a common set of normative beliefs
about what actions will benefit human welfare in such a domain. In particular, they
are a group of professionals, often from several different disciplines, who share the
following essential characteristics (Haas 2012):
1. Shared principled beliefs. Such beliefs provide a value-based rationale for social
action by the members of the community.
2. Shared causal beliefs or professional judgment. Such beliefs provide analytic
reasons and explanations of behavior, offering causal explanations for the mul-
tiple linkages among possible policy actions and desired outcomes.
3. Common notions of validity: intersubjective, internally defined criteria for vali-
dating knowledge. These allow community members to differentiate between
warranted and unwarranted claims about states of the world and policies to
change those states.
4. A common policy enterprise: A set of practices associated with a central set of
problems that have to be tackled, presumably, out of a conviction that human
welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.
For this book, the epistemic community was identified through cross-checking
attendance lists (Commission and Scientific Committee), semi-structured inter-
views with key stakeholders and consultations over time from the secondary and
scientific literature.

Agreement Effectiveness: Challenges and Opportunities

The debate about whether “institutions matter” has no longer been necessary, as it
has fallen into common sense. Saying that institutions matter implies that, due to
institutions’ existence, actors behave differently than they would in the absence of
institutions or the presence of different institutions (Voigt 2013). International orga-
nizations and regimes are established to perform a particular function or achieve a
specific goal. Thus, one of the fundamental questions to be asked about these insti-
tutions is how effective they are in delivering what they were established and
designed to achieve (Hovi et al. 2003). Here is where the challenges lie.
The discussion about international environmental cooperation’s effectiveness is
challenging for several reasons (Desombre 2007). One of the reasons is that it is
very complex to define what is meant by effectiveness and the factors best qualified
to measure it. As for Young and Levy (1999), “regimes can range along a continuum
from ineffectual arrangements, which wind up as dead letters, to highly effective
arrangements, which produce quick and decisive solutions to the problems at hand.”
Agreement Effectiveness: Challenges and Opportunities 7

As Desombre (2007) stated, sometimes these agreements have been effective at

changing behavior3 and ultimately beneficially impacting the environment. In other
cases, success—either in the creation of international mechanisms or in their influ-
ence on the state or individuals’ behavior, and ultimately their ability to improve the
conditions of their environment—is less specific. Nonetheless, through these expe-
riences, we can find lessons to learn to make international cooperation more effec-
tive and, more importantly, how to understand why it is effective.
The question about “why some international environmental agreements are more
effective than others?” has been posed by other researchers such as Underdal (1992)
and Young (1999), and it has always been a challenging discussion.
First, it is complex to define a concept for effectiveness in a particular context.
Borrowing the definition from Young and Levy (1999), “effectiveness is a matter of
the contributions that institutions make to solving the problems that motivate actors
to invest the time and energy to create them.” In this case, effective agreements
would be those that improve environmental quality. But even this definition can be
very ambiguous as an improvement in the environment could be directly related to
the international agreements, or it could be a coincidence, or even a natural fluctua-
tion that has nothing to do with human action (Desombre 2007).
Secondly, in terms of lessons learned, the critical thing to understand is why
some agreements are more effective than others. What are the factors that are sup-
porting effectiveness in those agreements? How can we measure effectiveness? The
important thing is to develop an operational procedure for measuring effectiveness.
Many authors are working to clarify and reflect on these methods. One of the broad-
est initiatives is the Oslo-Potsdam project (Hovi et al. 2003) and other important
references, including Helm and Sprinz’s (2000) paper, Miles et al. (2002), and
Young’s (1999) books.
According to Mitchell (2003), the agreement’s effectiveness can vary depending
on member countries’ characteristics, the international context, and the underlying
environmental problem as to the differences in agreement design.
As you can see, there are many approaches that one could take to study agree-
ment effectiveness. For Young and Levy (1999), it may be a political, normative,
economic, legal, and problem-solving approach. Each of them presents the pros and
cons, and they may be used analytically, separated, or in groups, depending on the
objective of the research.
For this research, effective arrangements entail policy changes by states accord-
ing to the intentions of negotiated treaties that lead to, or are likely to lead to,
improvements in environmental quality. Effectiveness means that the knowledge
input from the epistemic communities induces states to change their behavior in
ways that promoted the achievement of negotiated aspirations, especially the
improved biomass of each stock studied here.

3
See Saving the Mediterranean: The politics of international environmental cooperation (Haas
1992) and Banning chlorofluorocarbons: epistemic community efforts to 187 protect stratospheric
ozone (Haas 1992a)
8 1 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Are They Effective?

In general, most people want to know if the agreements are improving environ-
mental quality, as stated above. However, as the authors pointed out, problem-­
solving approaches present practical problems that are sometimes severe because
the natural system is complex. It is very hard to assume that the agreements’
improvement was caused by the agreements per se unless you use a counterfactual
analysis.4 For the fishery agreement’s evaluation, the quantitative counterfactual
analysis is even more difficult because most of the statistical data that could lead us
to a debate about “problem-solving” is supplied by states. The information is nei-
ther accurate nor independent.
Thus, recognizing the challenges of measuring an agreement’s effectiveness, and
at the same time trying to avoid the discussion about how to measure an agreement’s
effectiveness that have been addressed by other researchers, this book has chosen
the Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly (2010) paper that has quantitatively assessed the effec-
tiveness of the world’s 18 RFMOs and concluded that they have all failed, but on
different levels. From here forward, what will be discussed is why the agreements
have failed? Why did they fail on different levels?
Aiming to discuss the matter in this sense, the research will follow the process of
tracing methodology for all three individual agreements, which involves “attempts
to identify the intervening causal process—the causal chain and causal mecha-
nism—between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the
dependent variable” (George and Bennett 2005).
There are 18 existing and prospective RFMOs with mandates to establish fishery
conservation and management measures, which means that almost all of the global
high seas are now covered by at least one RFMO. However, the effectiveness of
current RFMOs has rarely been comprehensively assessed, despite indications of
the decline of many high seas fish stocks (Myers and Worm 2003).
The Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly (2010) paper addresses this topic quantitatively for
all RFMOs. In their work, global evaluation on the effectiveness of RFMOs is based
on a two-tiered system: (1) in theory (or “on paper”), i.e., how well RFMOs meet
standards as set by Lodge et al. and as measured by the comprehensiveness of avail-
able information; and (2) in practice, i.e., how well the stocks under RFMO man-
agement do, as measured by current abundance (biomass) trends of managed stocks,
and supported by trends through time.
In general, the RFMOs have as an objective to “establish fisheries conservation
and management measures,” thus, the current abundance (biomass) seems a good
criterion to measure an agreement’s effectiveness in terms of problem-solving.
With that in mind, the ranking they produced in their paper scores (Q scores):
CCAMLR (100%), ICCAT (37.5%), and CCSBT (0.0%), are best, medium, and
low performances. Even so, in the end, they recognize that “it is evident from the
results here that the priority of RFMOs—or at least of their member countries—has
been first and foremost to guide the exploitation of fish stocks. While conservation

4
To understand how counterfactual can be applied to measure effectiveness, read: Oslo-Potsdam
Solution Project Hovi et al. (2004), and also have a look at Breitmeier et al. (2011).
Usable Knowledge and Epistemic Communities 9

is part of nearly all of their mandates, they have yet to demonstrate a genuine com-
mitment to it on the water.” Furthermore, stating that they concluded the paper by
questioning, “Why have RFMOs failed?”

Usable Knowledge and Epistemic Communities

As explained above, diverse authors have discussed the factors that can ensure more
effectiveness for the agreements (Young and Levy 1999; Miles et al. 2002). Some
say that “ensuring that agreements contain provisions that are responsive to the type
of problem being addressed” (Mitchell 2003), and others prefer to elaborate a list of
factors as Ridgeway (2014).
Peter Haas, Robert Keohane, and Marc Levy suggest that effective regimes are
built upon existing concerns, work with or create capacity, and occur in an appropri-
ate contractual environment (Haas et al. 1995).
Haas (1992) also argues that the diffusion of new ideas and information can lead
to new patterns of behavior, which proves to be an essential determinant of interna-
tional policy cooperation.
However, following the ideas of Haas and Stevens (2011), knowledge operates
and changes behavior when organized and transmitted in a way that policy-makers
can understand and trust. In this context, regimes developed by social learning and
whose rules reflect scientific consensus about environmental sustainability tend to
be more effective. And that is what this research seeks to evaluate the three spe-
cific RFMOs.
One of the major research areas developed by Peter Haas has been the influence
of science and usable knowledge in the outcomes of the international agreement,
usually promoted by the epistemic communities—knowledge-based groups of
experts and specialists who share common beliefs about cause-and-effect relation-
ships in the world and some political values concerning the ends to which policies
should be addressed.5
When the decision-makers feel they need the information to make a decision and
lack it, epistemic communities are one possible provider of this sort of information
and advice. As demands for such information arise, networks, or communities of
specialists capable of producing and providing the information emerge and prolifer-
ate (Haas 1992).
Peter Haas started working on epistemic communities when he was doing his
dissertation on the Mediterranean Sea (1982–1983) (Haas 1989, 1990). Through
elite interviews with many members involved in the Mediterranean pollution
debate, he noticed that many of them presented shared beliefs and a consensus of
knowledge that influenced their policy decisions.

5
A special edition of the International Organization journal was published about epistemic com-
munities for diverse subjects in 1992. See references for complete information.
10 1 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Are They Effective?

For Haas (2014), “epistemic communities analysis provided a delegation model

in which decision-makers construct their political realities based on the technical
advice provided by experts. Intended effects by one set of actors (agents) lead to
unintended effects by other actors (principals) with aggregate social benefits through
the provision of international public goods from focused collective action.”
This provides an excellent framework of analysis to discuss the fishery agree-
ments’ effectiveness once we face agreements that operate on the edge of uncer-
tainty, where many states and non-state actors are performing diverse roles with no
consensus in most decisions.
Subscribing to the definition of epistemic communities from Haas (2014) as
“epistemic communities is a concept applied by constructivist scholars of political
science to focus analytic attention on the process by which states and other political
actors formulate their interests and reconcile differences of interest. Epistemic com-
munities are a principal channel by which consensual knowledge about causal
understandings is applied to international policy coordination, and by which states
may learn through international cooperation processes.”
Under conditions of uncertainty, decision-makers have various incentives and
reasons for consulting epistemic communities, some of them are more politically
motivated than others (Haas 1992). These new actors could drive governments to
recognize and follow new interests in environmental protection so that they were
willing to resist systemic forces that would push them to pursue more constrained
and transitory agreements.
It is rare to see science influencing policy. Besides all the knowledge that has
been generated by scientists to offer solutions to solve environmental problems, it is
crucial to recognize that not all of it has been absorbed by the decision-makers
(Haas and Stevens 2011), and generally a “problem of fit still persist” (Young 2003).
Also, it is not possible to neglect the conventional approach that stresses the role of
interstate power. However, the discussion here is the institutional design that makes
experts provide usable knowledge to the decision-makers.
Consider also that politics do not always accept science as a universal truth.
Sometimes science can be guided, not always by independent scientific principle,
but by the sponsors’ agenda or by the “politicization of science” (Pielke2004) so
that science may unconsciously reflect such hidden values (Haas 2004a, b) and that
all those factors, and others not listed here, could potentially lead decision-makers
to distrust science even when it is in their favor.
However, there are good examples of where power has listened to science. For
instance, the stratospheric ozone and European acid rain efforts are widely hailed as
among the more successful and effective international environmental governance
efforts of the contemporary era (Haas 2001; Miles et al. 2002). Or, consider the
Mediterranean plan to cope with pollution (Haas 1989). On the other hand, there are
anomalous cases where the argument failed, such as desertification and whaling
(Haas 2015).
It seems that decision-makers are likely to adopt science when the institutional
design of the agreement enables an organized scientific view, and it includes an
insulated and robust group of experts holding a “usable knowledge.”
Fisheries Policies, Science, and Usable Knowledge 11

Although usable knowledge has been used in different contexts and situations, in
short, usable knowledge encompasses a substantive core that makes it usable for
policy-makers and a procedural dimension that provides a mechanism for its trans-
mission from the scientific community to the policy world (Haas and Stevens 2011).
Clark and Majone (1985) made an interesting reflection on the relationship
between scientists and policy-makers and why they are sometimes dissatisfied with
each other. To produce usable scientific knowledge, they defined some important
criteria such as adequacy, value, legitimacy, and effectiveness: adequacy relates to
including all of the relevant knowledge or facts; value has to do with contributing to
further understanding and meaningful policy; legitimacy relates to the acceptance
of the knowledge by others outside of the community that developed it; effective-
ness relates to its ability to shape the agenda or advance the state of the debate and
ultimately to improve the quality of the environment. The fact is that a scientist does
not have all of this at hand at all times.
Constructivist approaches to policy analysis suggest that science must be devel-
oped authoritatively and then delivered by responsible carriers to politicians. “The
transmission belt of like-minded scientists is called an ‘epistemic community,’ and
the more autonomous and independent science is from policy, the greater its poten-
tial influence” (Haas 2001, 2007).
In this context, regimes built that have decisions based on usable knowledge
produced by independent science appear to be more effective at inducing states to
achieve their intended goals of improving environmental quality (Haas and
Stevens 2011).

Fisheries Policies, Science, and Usable Knowledge

When scientific knowledge comes to fishery and ocean affairs, it seems to have a
history of this practice, starting with the mandate in Article 61 of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) for decisions to take into account
“the best scientific information available.” The need for scientific advice as to the
basis for management decisions and the establishment of RFMOs was further
affirmed in the United Nation Fish Stock Agreement (UNFSA).6
Science is invoked to convey messages that decisions made have taken into
account all of the relevant information, processed the information systematically
and soundly dealt with the information in objective, verifiable and balanced ways,
leading to rational decisions given the information available (Pielke2004). However,
“science-based” does not mean that all of the sources and types of information were

6
United Nations Agreement for the implementation of the provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of the tenth of December 1982 relating to the conservation and
management of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, 1995. http://www.un.org/
depts/los/fish_stocks_conference/fish_stocks_conference.htm#Agreement.
12 1 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Are They Effective?

provided equal weight in the decisions, nor that “scientific information” comprised
the only factor considered in the decision-making (Mitchell et al. 2006).
Garcia et al. (2014) created an incredibly relevant work updating their past
papers from 2012 on fishing and biodiversity management. It shows the involve-
ment of science in different phases of the process.
According to Garcia et al. (2014), from 1850 to 1900, science occupied a place
on the fishery policy discussion, but it is still too early to say if that knowledge was
influencing politics.
From 1900 until today, there were many steps where science was growing and
developing more information on fisheries while seeking to subsidize policy out-
comes. The creation of ICES7 has helped significantly in bringing science into
policy-­making decisions. The complete history is from Garcia et al. (2014).
However, the facts show that science has been present throughout most fishery
development periods but has not always influenced it based on acquired knowledge.
Mora et al. (2009) studied the effectiveness of fishery management regimes
worldwide and calculated the probable sustainability of reported catches to deter-
mine how management affects fishery sustainability when scientific knowledge is
applied. Their results claimed that the conversion of scientific advice into policy,
through a participatory and transparent process, is at the core of achieving fishery
sustainability. However, only a few countries have a robust scientific basis for man-
agement recommendations and transparent and participatory approaches to convert
those recommendations into policy while ensuring compliance with regulations. So,
uncertainty also plays an important role in this fishery scenario.
States also have distinct views on how environmental issues mainstream into
agendas that matter to them. These diverse interests can be challenging to resolve,
which can reasonably be achieved in global decision-making.
In this light, Haas (2004a) observes that scientific assessment bodies’ design is
critical to decision-making processes, including the need for resulting information
to be understandable to decision-makers. His criteria for science legitimacy for
institutional decision-making are accuracy (widely perceived to be true), legitimacy
(achieved through impartial processes insulated from direct political influence), and
saliency (policy-relevant and politically tractable). Science is less successful in
anchoring solutions when there is: public suspicion over its development or meth-
odology; institutional design questions; lack of clarity on priorities for scientific
assessment; and governmental misgiving or unwillingness to cede “authority” to
science resulting in policy decisions that have unfavorable consequences.
The design of the knowledge-creating processes and access to their outputs is
vital to the utility and credibility of governance, as Ridgeway (2014) pointed out.
With organized scientific input to the policy process, negotiated outcomes are much

7
ICES—The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) is a global organization
that develops science and advice to support the oceans’ sustainable use.
ICES is a network of more than 4000 scientists from over 350 marine institutes in 20 member
countries and beyond. One thousand six hundred scientists participate in our activities annually.
(http://www.ices.dk/Pages/default.aspx).
Fisheries Policies, Science, and Usable Knowledge 13

more likely to yield integrated management efforts rather than mere political com-
promises (Haas 2006).
The nature and value of the scientific advice provided to RFMOs are shaped by
independent variables that include the institutional and operational arrangements
established by the RFMO, how the advice is framed, and the quality and timeliness
of data underlying the advice (Willock and Lack 2006).
The three selected agreements have their institutional design for scientific influ-
ence built in as described in Table 1.1 (adapted and updated from Haas and
Stevens 2011).
From there, it is clear to note that the institutional design for these agreements is
very similar. In general, they have failed to insulate scientific bodies from direct or
indirect political control. The design of the scientific committees in fisheries reflects

Table 1.1 Information about the institutional design of science for the agreements
CCAMLR ICCAT CCSBT
Convention The conservation of Maintaining the To ensure, through
objective Antarctic marine living populations of these appropriate management, the
resources (for this fishes at levels which conservation and optimum
convention, the term will permit the utilization of Southern
“conservation” includes maximum sustainable Bluefin tuna
rational use) catch for food and other
purposes
Committee Standing; sets agenda Ad hoc Standing
organization
Expert States States States
selection
Type of Open Open Open
science
committee
Decisions are Consensus Majority Consensus
made by
Decisions Binding Binding Binding
(binding/
advisory)
Objection to No Yes No
decisions
Degree of Social learning—It Little/none—It may Little/none—It has been
social happens through its happen but it depends a improving with time and
learning own institutional design lot from the with the management
involvement of other procedure approval. It seems
stakeholders to create that decision-makers are now
an environment where trusting in the knowledge
knowledge is warranted generated by the independent
advisors
Data Government Government Government
provided by
14 1 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Are They Effective?

an institutional pathology that limits science’s ability to speak to power, however,

on different levels and in different situations.8
The CCAMLR website shows that they give importance to science when they
state “science is fundamental to CCAMLR,” and also add that the Convention
requires the Commission to take “full account of the recommendations and advice
of the Scientific Committee and this emphasis on science was reiterated in 2009 in
Resolution 31/XXVIII9 on the use of the best available science.”10
It is not for nothing that CCAMLR has been considered as one of the most suc-
cessful RFMOs and it scored better, according to Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly (2010),
in terms of biomass recovery (dependent variable).
Haas (2006) and other researchers (Constable 2011; Brooks 2013; Brooks et al.
2014) also corroborate that CCAMLR is a good example of effective agreement;
fish stocks are recovering, and standards focused on environmental issues have been
enhanced, adopted, and implemented. As pointed out by Brooks et al. (2014), one
reason for CCAMLR’s success in passing more ecosystem-based and conservation
measures is that it is comprised of both fishing and non-fishing science-focused
members.
However, Constable (2011) noted that, although CCAMLR has been doing well
in its recovery of the fish population, science has not yet been considered fully part
of the work of CCAMLR. Attention needs to be given to developing the capability
and tools to help overcome differences amongst scientists in providing managers
advice. As Constable remarks, “One of the greatest impediments for CCAMLR is
achieving consensus over science before agreeing by consensus to the management
actions that are dependent on that science.”
In other words, this means that there is an institutional design promoting the flow
of science for decision-makers in their organogram where the Scientific Committee
lies right below the Commission itself. However due to the lack of agreement
between the scientists, there is no consensus on information, which means that there
is a lack of usable knowledge to provide an even higher social learning experience.
Nonetheless, when CCAMLR is compared to ICCAT and CCSBT, even with
those criticisms and the need for improvements, CCAMLR’s is the agreement that
presents more social learning and science-based policy than the others, and by con-
sequence, the one that is more effective in terms of problem-solving. This corrobo-
rates with Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly (2010), where CCAMLR scored (Q score) 100%
in its performance. Even considering that CCAMLR is not typical, it would be illu-
minating towards reviewing other institutional characteristics that might facilitate
more RFMOs (Brooks et al. 2014). Still, on the science side, it seems there remain
many improvements to be made.

8
The next chapters will show specific case studies to illustrate situations where it occurs and when
science speaks to power under certain conditions.
9
https://www.ccamlr.org/en/resolution-31/xxviii-2009.
10
Website—https://www.ccamlr.org/en/science/science. Accessed in: the tenth of December 2014.
Fisheries Policies, Science, and Usable Knowledge 15

ICCAT and CCSBT, in turn, were placed with medium- and low-performance
scores, respectively, in Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly’s (2010) paper. Haas and Stevens
(2011) considered that they present little or no degree of social learning, which is
reflected in their biomass recovery performance.
ICCAT has a history of not listening to science (KVIST, no date). Eastern Bluefin
Tuna (EBFT) can help illustrate the ICCAT’s low level of social learning as in the
past; they have consistently ignored their scientists’ advice regarding this species.
At first, the Commission chose to adopt regulations without enforcing them, then in
1974 ICCAT passed a binding recommendation to limit harvests to “current levels”
as per scientific advice. The Commission frequently set legal catch levels higher
than those recommended by the SCRS but quite close to the estimated total harvest.
Although SCRS advice became more optimistic later that decade, the gap between
legal catches and scientific advice remained quite large, as illustrated by Webster
(2011). In 2011/2013 this changed when the Commission, for the first time, accepted
the Scientific Committee suggestion quota for EBFT. The decision was welcomed
even by international NGOs who often complained of the lack of science in ICCAT.11
This case will be explained in detail in Chap. 3.
However, as highlighted by Aranda et al. (2010) in their report review on RFMOs,
research and assessment of each RFMO depend on its science structure. In ICCAT’s
case, the scientific input comes from its working groups, composed of Member
States scientists. Data for the scientific process is generally supplied by the Member
States, including total catch, catch and efforts data, and catch and size data. However,
data submission is often incomplete or late from states and may even be underre-
ported, which may jeopardize data used in sound management advice. Also, they
added that detailed operational data is rarely supplied by members and is considered
highly confidential.
For CCSBT, the Scientific Committee considers stock assessment analyses con-
ducted by national scientists and consultants and is aided in this by the independent
Chair of the Scientific Committee and an independent expert panel. This panel’s
role is to facilitate consensus and, if this proves to be impossible, to provide its
independent view to the Commission (Aranda et al. 2010).
Apart from the necessary progress CCSBT has made by including this indepen-
dent expert panel, Polacheck (2012) published a paper with a case study that shows
one occasion, perhaps one of many, where a scientific paper was presented, dis-
cussed, and used in the formation of a decision at the 2006 meeting of the
Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), the Stock
Assessment Group (SAG), and the Scientific Committee (SC), which was summa-
rized in the reports from those meetings but then subsequently withdrawn as a con-
sequence of international and domestic political concerns rather than scientific issues.

http://blogs.nature.com/news/2012/11/conservationists-claim-victory-for-science-over-tuna-
11

quotas.html and http://mediterranean.panda.org/?206761/Decisions-on-Eastern-Atlantic-and-

Mediterranean-bluefin-tuna-follows-scientific-advice.
16 1 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Are They Effective?

According to Polacheck (2012), examples of this issue occurring by several

nations were observed during 20 years of personal involvement with the scientific
processes of RFMOs and from his personal experience.
The provision of independent scientific advice is central to the operation of
RFMOs even though RFMOs are largely policy (and political) instruments. Political
pressures and intervention in science and the crossing of the boundaries between
scientific and political processes appear to be relatively common (Polacheck 2012).
According to Haas and Stevens (2011, pp. 139–140), there is a criteria list, based
on previous publications (e.g., Haas 2004b), that would discuss an agreement’s
effectiveness by looking at the institutional scientific design.
Most social learning treaties have standing environmental monitoring and
research committees to provide timely warnings of new problems, monitor achieve-
ments of regime goals, and educate politicians and policy-makers on environmental
issues (Haas and Stevens 2011). But this is not the case of the fishery agreements
studied here, as all the scientific information is provided by the governmental bodies
that are not always able to provide accurate information, nor are they able to con-
tinuously supply the information. By evaluating their performance reviews
(CCAMLR, ICCAT and CCSBT 2008), it is possible to see that CCAMLR has less
dependence on government information than the others.
The maintenance and support of scientific bodies within multilateral environ-
mental governance arrangements are vital for constructing usable knowledge within
the regime. Standing scientific panels allow the constant construction and transmis-
sion of accurate and timely information. Three types of standing-committee struc-
tures are typical in multilateral environmental regimes (Haas and Stevens 2011).
The first type includes scientific groups that set their own schedules and research
agendas. These groups meet as they see fit between meetings of policy-makers and
according to their own determined needs. The CCAMLR Scientific Committee rep-
resents this first type. The Scientific Committee meets annually and immediately
prior to the Commission meeting. To address the wide range of scientific areas that
might impact the decisions of the Commission, the Scientific Committee has estab-
lished many working groups that meet during the year; they establish their agenda
and assist in formulating scientific advice on key areas.
The second type is made up of those groups whose meeting the COP sets times.
For example, most fishery agreements require their scientific bodies to meet a month
or 2 months prior to the COP meeting, like ICCAT and CCSBT, for instance.12
Finally, the third type includes ad hoc science panels, which, especially if called
for by the Member States, introduce a high level of political involvement in science
reporting, which also matches with ICCAT’s design.
In addition, long intervals between reports impede the timely involvement of sci-
ence in policy discussions. Standing committees that set their agenda and schedule
appear to be the most politically insulated, whereas ad hoc science panels appear to
be the most vulnerable to political involvement.

12
http://www.iccat.int/en/meetings2015.htm.
Fisheries Policies, Science, and Usable Knowledge 17

The CCSBT has made progress in protecting science from policy by establishing
an Advisory Panel to provide external input to its stock assessment and scientific
processes. It has also appointed an independent chairperson for the Scientific
Committee who does not represent any government view.
Additionally, another factor that may be evaluated is the choice of scientists.
According to Haas and Stevens (2011), the most successful agreements have
a selection of scientists from secretariats or even scientific bodies of other
intergovernmental organizations. That is not the case for any of the agreements
discussed here. All scientists under the Scientific Committee are designated by
the countries themselves, which does not ensure the safeguarding of scientific
information.
In these selected fishery agreements, the design of a scientific body is open to all
of them, which allows each member country to appoint a representative to a scien-
tific body. However, this does not typically create proper safeguards between the
scientific bodies and the policy-makers.
From this chapter, it is possible to learn that CCAMLR has the best institutional
design for science. It allows science and the epistemic community to produce and
influence the decisions with the addition of their ideas and knowledge. Some of
these characteristics could even be shared with other agreements to enhance best
practices for science’s influence on policy decisions. However, it seems that the
scientific community is not speaking in one unique voice yet, and this dissonance
and lack of consensus is circumventing an even higher level of effectiveness. The
lack of consensus promotes uncertainty, which is one of the significant reasons why
long-term actions such as biodiversity protection or fish stock rebuilding are diffi-
cult to implement.
According to the ICCAT performance review (ICCAT 2008a, b), while modeling
and stock assessment is not a perfect science, the fisheries that are managed by
ICCAT are reasonably well understood, and the SCRS is well-regarded and profes-
sional scientific body. However, lack of participation and lack of data provided by
countries can be serious impediments to the work of SCRS and the Commission.
Nevertheless, ICCAT is not a good example of where science can be considered
to be well-regarded. Some ICCAT scientists believe that they are independent of
policy decisions; in most cases, participation in the scientific process revolves
around member delegations with official heads of delegations. The heads of state
delegation are most commonly government representatives.
In most cases, a large fraction of a member’s national delegation is drawn from
government fishery departments or associated marine research institutes, with a
substantial portion of the funding for participation in the meetings and related
research provided by the national fisheries management department or agency.
Rarely are people found from environmental departments on its fishery commission.
Adding to that, the interests of individual members, including the social and
economic needs of industry groups, often dominate the decisions and delay actual
decision-making, as noted by the performance review. A good example of this is
seen in fisheries’ management on the eastern Atlantic and the Mediterranean
Bluefin tuna.
18 1 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: Are They Effective?

According to the CCSBT performance review (2008), the current process for
developing and providing scientific advice on SBT from the Extended Scientific
Committee to the CCSBT is an excellent model that has helped improve the
integrity of the CCSBTs scientific process. Access to highly competent national
scientists has been available and is reflected in the abundance and quality
of scientific papers presented to the various CCSBT scientific forums. The
independent panel and chair arrangements have added, in 1999, further support to
this process and militated against the tendency of member scientists to modify their
advice for reasons associated with their national interests.
However, the CCSBT has specific provisions within its procedure rules for making
documents presented to meetings confidential. Yet public access to scientific
documents used in public decision-making is considered a fundamental principle
under which science is conducted within RFMOs (e.g., UNFSA) and more generally
within many societies (e.g., freedom of information laws) (Polacheck 2012).
There is no doubt that the lack of transparency, in this case, is misrepresentative
of the information and destroys a unique chance of creating a knowledgeable and
trusted science-based policy.
What is notable in looking into the scientific bodies of CCAMLR, ICCAT, and
CCSBT are the very high caliber scientists; the difference between them is the level
of a country’s information dependence. The system’s robustness might be increased
by reducing this dependency through greater collective investment in scientific pro-
grams to collect and compile independent information.

Conclusion

Considerable attention has been devoted to studying how RFMOs face up to such
challenges to become even more effective (Molenaar 2003, 2007). As highlighted
by Polacheck (2012), the independence and separation of the scientific processes
that provide information for consideration by the RFMO from the policy delibera-
tions of the RFMO is an important component influencing the intent of UNCLOS
and UNFSA. Their management decisions are based on the best available scientific
information.
There has been an increasing recognition in recent years of the need for RFMOs
to improve their performance because of demands contained within current interna-
tional agreements aimed at better conservation and management of fishery resources.
To do that, an insulated scientific body is essential. The choice, quality, and diver-
sity of the expertise involved in working groups and the scientific community
depend on their members’ contributions and engagement to a considerable extent.
The RFMOs institutional design analyzed in this chapter does not fully allow the
scientists to produce usable knowledge, as defined by Clark and Majone (1985) and
demonstrated empirically in the Haas and Stevens (2011) chapter. The science is not
fully safeguarded enough from politics, which may, despite the quality of science
produced, not be considered accurate by many decision-makers.
Conclusion 19

However, the next chapters will evaluate specific cases where the situation can be
overcome as it depends on an array of diverse factors. In addition, even still needing
improvement, CCAMLR presents the most established collection of factors to
ensure that knowledge may contribute to power and that, along with a higher level
of social learning, maybe one of the factors guaranteeing a higher biomass recovery
performance, as shown by Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly (2010). Conversely, ICCAT and
CCSBT need to find a path towards protecting their scientific bodies to produce
more independent, accurate, and legitimate information to improve their social
learning and, consequently, the effectiveness in recovering fish populations.
This chapter agrees with Haas and Stevens (2011) that knowledge can speak
volumes to power, and with this comes more effectiveness in terms of problem-­
solving. However, to make it work for fishery agreements, expertise and claims are
developed behind a politically insulated wall, a wall that is not yet working properly
in every situation or every time the decision is made.
Epistemic communities for these agreements need to be fully understood, and
knowledge must also possess the substantive characteristics of usable knowledge:
credibility, legitimacy, and saliency, to influence the RFMO’s effectiveness.
In the following chapters, an effort will be undertaken to investigate further the
CCAMLR, ICCAT, and CCSBT epistemic communities, including who they are,
how they act, and how they play a role in these specific RFMOs, as yet another
component towards enhancing their effectiveness.
Chapter 2
CCAMLR: To Be or Not To Be an RFMO?

Introduction

The Southern Ocean surrounds Antarctica and represents approximately 15% of the
world’s ocean area. The Antarctic region constitutes a fragile ecosystem closely
related to the unique features of that continent’s physical environment. Despite its
forbidding climate and isolation from the rest of the world, Antarctica—which once
fascinated the early explorers—has always been the center of unprecedented inter-
national scientific research and cooperation. The Antarctic Treaty (Article IX)
established that the Southern Ocean must be a place devoted “to peace and science.”1
As described in detail by Shusterich (1984), since the frozen continent was dis-
covered, several claims on the sovereignty of its territory were debated. And several
attempts to create international control over Antarctica were made in the 1950s. For
instance, in 1956, the permanent representative from India to the United Nations
requested that “the question of Antarctica” was to be included on the provisional
agenda of the United Nations General Assembly. India’s goals were to ensure that
an international agreement could consider the development of Antarctic resources
only for peaceful purposes, that the area would be non-militarized, that nuclear
weapons testing would be banned, and that future disputes would be referred to the
International Court.
The proposal was withdrawn mostly because of opposition from Chile and
Argentina and lack of support from the United States and the Soviet Union—coun-
tries with high interests in the sovereignty of the Antarctic area. The idea of a United
Nations trusteeship for Antarctica was introduced the same year (and again in 1958)
by Prime Minister Nash of New Zealand. He stated that any arrangement for

1
Due to the ATS, many NGOs use the expression to protect the Southern Ocean: http://www.green-
peace.org/international/en/campaigns/oceans/our-oceans-and-seas/southern-ocean/; http://www.
pewtrusts.org/en/places/southern-ocean; https://www.bas.ac.uk/about/antarctica/the-antarctic-
treaty/the-antarctic-treaty-explained/.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

Switzerland AG 2021
L. R. Gonçalves, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70362-2_2
22 2 CCAMLR: To Be or Not To Be an RFMO?

international control of Antarctica should have the approval of the United Nations
(Shusterich 1984).
Even with all of those sovereignty interests, science played a key role in the pre-
vious events that led to the Antarctic Treaty. During the International Geophysical
Year (IGY) of 1957/1958, 12 nations (the seven claimants and the United States,
Soviet Union, Belgium, Japan, and South Africa) implemented major Antarctic
­scientific research programs (Shusterich 1984).
At the end of the IGY, there was general agreement among the 12 nations that
had participated in the science projects that the international cooperation level
should be continued. The United States took the initiative on 2 May 1958 when it
proposed to the other IGY participants that they should all join in a treaty designed
to preserve the continent as a space safeguard to scientific research and for peaceful
purposes (Berkman et al. 2011).
The Conference on Antarctica was held from 15 October to December 1959, and
the outcome of the Washington negotiations was the so-called Antarctic Treaty. The
negotiations proved successful amid the Cold War between the United States and
the Soviet Union. They were an early indication that both superpowers were pre-
pared to consider Antarctica a special case in international politics (Shusterich 1984).
The Treaty was signed in 1959 and entered into force in 1961 following ratifica-
tion by all 12 original signatories. The original signatories—Argentina, Australia,
Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the United
Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union—formed the initial membership
of the management group known as the consultative parties.
Since 1959, 40 new countries have entered the Treaty. These countries may par-
ticipate in the Consultative Meetings. Seventeen of the acceding countries have had
their activities in Antarctica recognized, and consequently, there are now 29
Consultative Parties in all: Czech Republic (1962), Brazil (1983), Bulgaria (1978),
China (1983), Ecuador (1987), Finland (1984), Germany (1979), India (1983), Italy
(1981), Korea (1986), Netherlands (1967), Peru (1981), Spain (1982), Sweden
(1984), Ukraine (1992), and Uruguay (1980). The other 23 non-consultative parties
are invited to attend the consultative meetings. Still, they do not participate in the
decision-making.2
Thus, in this context, in the middle of wartime, the Antarctic Treaty was signed
to guarantee peace and science for the frozen continent. The Antarctic Treaty has
demonstrated considerable adaptability and resiliency as it evolved from a single
instrument into a robust regional regime containing four new instruments since its
inception, known since then as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS, hereafter): the
1964 Agreement includes measures for the protection of flora and fauna, the 1972
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, the 1980 Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR), and the 1991

2
From ATS website membership update list—http://www.ats.aq/devAS/ats_parties.aspx?lang=e
(Accessed in June 2015).
CCAMLR: An Agreement for Conservation of Marine Living Resources 23

Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (Environmental

Protocol) (Joyner 2011).
This chapter will be focused on CCAMLR’s development and its functioning
related to the role of epistemic communities; however, the history of ATS could not
be set aside, as CCAMLR was created under the ATS, which itself possesses differ-
ent characteristics from other RFMOs. CCAMLR will be evaluated as part of ATS
and as an independent agreement, with its provisions and norms. And the main
focus will be how science and the epistemic communities are influencing policies.

 CAMLR: An Agreement for Conservation of Marine

C
Living Resources

The Antarctic Treaty stands alone as an instrument of conflict prevention, strategic

accommodation, and political cooperation, mostly because of sovereignty. Most
notably, Articles II and III of the Antarctic Treaty provide “freedom of scientific
investigations” and promote “international cooperation in the scientific investiga-
tion.” Both are considered essential elements for promoting peace, cooperation, and
the progress of all humankind (Miller 2011).
Although the Treaty contains specific provisions to preserve and conserve the
Antarctic living resources (article IX, para 1f), it was general enough not to regulate
or impose any fishery restriction. Thus, the extensive fishery of finfish3 and large-­
scale krill exploitation still raise concerns about fisheries sustainability in the Treaty
area (Miller 2011).
In response, Recommendation VIII-10 from the 1975 Eighth Antarctic Treaty
Consultative Meeting noted the need to “promote and achieve within the framework
of AT, the objectives of protection scientific study and rational use of Antarctic
marine living resources and, then, the importance of science was recognized as a
basis for the protection and rational use of such resources” (Berkman et al. 2011).
According to Berkman et al. (2011), in 1977, the Scientific Committee on
Antarctic Research (SCAR) and the Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research
(SCOR) sponsored the Biological Investigations on Marine Antarctic Systems and
Stocks (BIOMASS) intending to “gain a deeper understanding of the structure and
dynamic functioning of the Antarctic marine ecosystem as a basis for future man-
agement of potential living resources” (El-Sayed 1994). BIOMASS and three more
reports produced under the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
(Eddie 1977; Everson 1977; Grantham 1977) highlighted that krill is a keystone
species Antarctic marine ecosystem.

3
Finfish is a real fish, such as bony fish or a cartilaginous fish, especially in contrast to a shellfish
or other aquatic animal.
24 2 CCAMLR: To Be or Not To Be an RFMO?

As indicated by Miller (2011), growing recognition of krill’s ecosystem role

increased the concerns that its large-scale exploitation could have severe repercus-
sions for Antarctic birds, seals, and whales.
At the same time, Recommendation IX-2 from the Ninth Antarctic Treaty
Meeting (1977) called the Parties to contribute to scientific research on Antarctic
marine living resources, observe interim guidelines on their conservation, and
schedule a special meeting to establish a conservation regime for these resources.
The Second Special Antarctic Consultative Meeting comprised a series of meet-
ings from 1978 to 1980 and concluded with the signing of the Convention on the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR 1980). The
Convention entered into force on 7 April 1982.
Although developed under the Antarctic Treaty, the CCAMLR stands alone as a
legally binding agreement, and its attached Commission has its own personality
(Miller 2011).
The CAMLR Convention Area encompasses approximately 10% of the global
ocean area. However, the extended area of application of the CAMLR Convention
included the territories of various sub-Antarctic Island groups and their maritime
jurisdictions (Fig. 2.1).
The adoption of CCAMLR was a significant step-change in the development of
the ATS. The Convention’s primary objective was the conservation of marine living

Fig. 2.1 CCAMLR Convention Area (Source: CCAMLR (2017)

Why CCAMLR Is Widely Recognized as an Example to Other RFMOs 25

resources, but with the understanding that conservation includes rational use. This
emphasis on conservation, but with harvesting seen as integral to that principle,
remains a fundamental provision of CCAMLR and one that continues to set it apart
from the more traditional RFMOs with their focus on the management of target fish
stocks. Yet, as history shows, CCAMLR was built based on the involvement of sci-
ence, portraiting as a leader for the sustaianble management of marine living
resources (Miller 2011; Willock and Lack 2006).

 hy CCAMLR Is Widely Recognized as an Example

W
to Other RFMOs

Some stakeholders that are following up or working on CCAMLR hardly consider

it an RFMO. Rather, CCAMLR is widely recognized as a progressive international
commission responsible for conserving the Southern Ocean marine ecosystem
while having within it the attributes of an RMFO (Constable et al. 2000; Bodin and
Österblom 2013).
In its Convention and established practice, it is well known as a leading organiza-
tion in developing best practices in the ecosystem approach to managing activities
in waters beyond national jurisdiction (Mooney-Seus and Rosenberg 2007;
Ruckelshaus et al. 2008). CCAMLR has notably achieved these advances without
precedent, only guided by the principles within Article II of its Convention. It is
likely its history and subsequent development that made this organization behave
differently from other RFMOs.
Article 1(1) of CCAMLR states that the Treaty’s objective is the conservation of
Antarctic marine living resources; however, “conservation” is defined to include
“rational use.” Accordingly, CCAMLR addresses both species protection and their
“rational use.” CCAMLR, therefore, has potentially conflicting goals of exploita-
tion and conservation of marine species in Antarctica. In this respect, through its
institutional bodies (i.e., the CCAMLR Commission, the Secretariat, and Scientific
Committee), CCAMLR acts as a regional fisheries organization that manages living
resources in the Southern Ocean area (Bender 2007).
The negotiators of CCAMLR are constituted by the Antarctic Treaty Contracting
Parties (ATCPs, hereafter) and the inaugural members of CCAMLR. The original
membership of eight states was extended by adding the other seven original signa-
tory states that subsequently ratified the Convention and became members of the
Commission. Since then, other countries have acceded to the Convention, with
many states also gaining membership of the Commission. To date, there are now a
total of 25 members of the Commission. Eleven other states have acceded to the
Convention but are not members of the Commission (Table 2.1).
In effect, the members have responsibility for the executive functions of
CCAMLR (including the adoption of Conservation measures) and contribute to the
organization’s budget (principally for the running of the Secretariat). The acceding
26 2 CCAMLR: To Be or Not To Be an RFMO?

Table 2.1 Members and Members Acceding states

acceding states of CCAMLR
01 Argentina Bulgaria
to date (Source: CCAMLR
website, accessed in 02 Australia Canada
June 2015) 03 Belgium Cook Islands
04 Brazil Finland
05 Chile Greece
06 China Mauritius
07 European Union Netherlands
08 France Islamic Republic of Pakistan
09 Germany Republic of Panama
10 India Peru
11 Italy Vanuatu
12 Japan
13 Republic of Korea
14 Namibia
15 New Zealand
16 Norway
17 Poland
18 Russian Federation
19 South Africa
20 Spain
22 Sweden
23 Ukraine
24 United Kingdom
25 Uruguay

states are known as Contracting Parties (CPs), which are not Members of the
Commission, but they are signatories to the Convention. They do not pay dues and
do not even participate in CCAMLR meetings, and in contrast, are not party to
decision-making, nor are they liable for subscription costs. Such states are invited
as observers to the annual meetings of CCAMLR. All CPs (both members and the
acceding states) are nevertheless bound by the obligations of relevant Conservation
Measures (described further below).
Like most other fishery agreements, the CCAMLR sets forth a general purpose
and establishes a Commission to effectuate that purpose. In formulating its conser-
vation measures, the Commission is assisted by a Scientific Committee charged
with collecting and analyzing data and suggesting to the Commission its recom-
mended conservation methods (managing advice). The relevance of its Scientific
Committee is clearly expressed on the CCAMLR structure, wherein the Scientific
Committee is providing not only advice to the Commission, but is contained within
the Commission. As stated on their website, “The Commission includes a Scientific
Committee established by the CAMLR Convention” (Fig. 2.2).
Why CCAMLR Is Widely Recognized as an Example to Other RFMOs 27

Fig. 2.2 CCAMLR structure

CCAMLR has often been referred to as “something more than an RFMO”

(CCAMLR 2008). Underpinning this statement has been CCAMLR’s integral posi-
tion within the ATS and strong legal linkages to the Antarctic Treaty. Furthermore,
the overarching objective of the Convention has been the conservation of marine
living resources. These two aspects have set CCAMLR apart from the more tradi-
tional RFMOs with their emphasis on the harvesting of commercial target species.
The strong conservation credentials of CCAMLR, along with the precautionary
principles and ecosystem approach embodied within the Convention, have enabled
CCAMLR, at times, to take the lead in developing management tools with a strong
emphasis on conservation and sustainability—the trade-related Catch Documentation
Scheme (CDS), and the mitigating measures for seabirds are but two examples of
where CCAMLR has developed best practices in international fisheries manage-
ment terms.
According to the CCAMLR (2008), the distinction between CCAMLR and
RFMOs has lessened in recent years. The reasons for this are varied but include:
(a) the changing emphasis within CCAMLR of the ratio of fishing to non-fishing
Members of the Commission.
(b) the increasing numbers of CPs that have no traditional linkage with the ATS.
(c) the increasing trend for CCAMLR members to be represented at Commission
meetings by officials from Fisheries Ministries rather than from Ministries of
Foreign Affairs (where responsibility for the ATS usually resides).
28 2 CCAMLR: To Be or Not To Be an RFMO?

Table 2.2 Percentage of countries with interest in fishing at CCAMLR area

Year Total member No of fishing members % Fishing states
1985 16 6 38
1995 22 9 41
2005 24 16 67
2015 25 17 68

(d) that the ecosystem approach and the precautionary principle have also been
adopted by some RFMOs, which is a good point.
At the time of entry into the force less than 40% of the members were fishing states.
That proportion has increased over time with, by 2005, almost 70% of members
fishing (see Table 2.2 below updated from CCAMLR 2008).
One characteristic essential to consider is the RFMO’s composition—the parties,
members, observers, and lobbyists who convene around the issues subject to the
RFMO. If an organization has a biased set of participants (e.g., being comprised
only of users), the outcome is likely to reflect that bias (e.g., increased harvest lev-
els). As stated before, one reason for CCAMLR’s success in passing more
ecosystem-­based and conservation measures is that it is comprised of both fishing
and non-fishing science-focused members. Therefore, one institutional characteris-
tic that may prove essential in effectively and sustainably managing marine living
resources is that of a stakeholder base that extends beyond those exploiting the
resource. In this regard, transparency and access to non-fisheries-dependent data are
essential as lack of adequate access to information can limit the ability to peer-­
review the scientific advice, participate in rulemaking, and track compliance
(Brooks et al. 2014; Ardron et al. 2013).
Additionally, it is important to highlight that two provisions of CCAMLR, which
were highly innovative at the time of its adoption, remain key to its current approach
and have been adopted more recently by RFMOs—namely the precautionary prin-
ciple and the ecosystem approach. Those approaches made a significant difference
in the management system.
With only these two points, it is already possible to detect differences in
CCAMLR’s history from many other RFMOs such as ICCAT and CCSBT. Now,
RFMOs adopt those same measures; CCAMLR was created in this spirit—learning
from doing. The agreement emerged in a different context by considering the need
for scientific cooperation and conservation guidelines to deal with depleted stocks.
For most RFMOs, the traditional approach to management has been the maxi-
mum sustainable yield concept, aiming for that level of harvesting, which will max-
imize the catch of the species plotted over a time series of estimated species
productivity. In the Southern Ocean, however, the applicability of this oft-used con-
cept has been seriously challenged because of the fishery’s peculiar attributes and
the proposed ecosystem approach of the Antarctic Living Resources Convention.
The United States delegation spearheaded the fight for adopting a “multispecies
approach” towards managing the Southern Ocean during the negotiations
(Frank 1983).
Science and the Antarctic 29

The Convention gives the Commission the power to formulate, adopt, and revise
conservation measures pertaining to particular species. In this respect, the
Commission maintains an “ecosystem approach” to fisheries management. This
approach envisions managing marine living resources by examining the effect of
maintaining a particular population and harvesting levels on the entire ecosystem.
The ecosystem approach also uses “feedback management.” Using this technique,
scientists set a species-specific target population and monitor changes from that
target. “If the actual population level begins to deviate from this target, various
management control techniques of the system can be altered to maintain the target
population.”

Science and the Antarctic

International interest of a scientific nature in the Antarctic Region commenced with

the era of exploration, continues through today, and accounts for some of the basis
of the region’s legal regime. Every State that laid claims to Antarctic territorial sov-
ereignty and every interested non-claimant state conducted scientific operations
between the World Wars. It is likely that many scientific expeditions to Antarctica
had secondary motivations—the perfecting of claims to territorial sovereignty.
Sovereignty claims, in turn, form the basis for the perceived State’s rights over
Antarctic natural resources. The United States and the Soviet Union conduct marine
research all around the continent while other interested states engage in more mod-
est operations. Although much of this research was oceanographic or meteorologi-
cal, a substantial portion of recent scientific efforts has been devoted to evaluating
the Southern Ocean’s prospects as an area for fisheries (Frank 1983).
The management on CCAMLR appears to comply consistently with scientific
advice and corresponding management measures (Mooney-Seus and Rosenberg
2007); this is proved by Table 2.3. When the Scientific Committee reaches consen-
sus in their meetings, the advice is hardly discussed on the plenary as it is usually
accepted as a matter of fact. As we can learn from Chap. 1, the entire institutional

Table 2.3 Catches, TAC recommended, Management advice, and Estimate of IUU in CCAMLR
South Georgia and Shag Rocks (Subarea 48.3) for Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides)a
D. Eleginoides 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Catches 4497 3034 3535 3539 3864 3382 2519 1763 1806 2094 2180
TAC rec 4420 3050 3556 3554 3920 3920 3000 3000 2600 2600 2400
Management advice b 3556 3554 3920 3920 3000 3000 3000 2600 2600 2400
Estimate of IUU 0 23c 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a
The Management advice provided by the Scientific Committee entry in force in the year to follow
b
Scientific Committee was unable to provide a number
c
An additional 23 tons was taken by a single IUU vessel (the Elqui) apprehended by the UK prior
to the fishery
30 2 CCAMLR: To Be or Not To Be an RFMO?

design of CCAMLR differs from the other RFMOs included in this research, which
efficiently contributes to the flow of knowledge from science to the Commission itself.
What accounts for that is that the CPs are following the rule that was established
by Article IX of the CAMLR Convention text, which says:
The function of the Commission shall be to give effect to the objective and principles set out
in Article II of this Convention. To this end, it shall:
(f) formulate, adopt and revise conservation measures on the basis of the best scientific
evidence available, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article;

And in Paragraph 2 highlights the scope of the Conservation Measures (CMs):

2. The conservation measures referred to in paragraph 1(f) above include the following:

(a) the designation of the quantity of any species which may be harvested in the
area to which this Convention applies;
(b) the designation of regions and sub-regions based on the distribution of popula-
tions of Antarctic marine living resources;
(c) the designation of the quantity which may be harvested from the populations of
regions and sub-regions;
(d) the designation of protected species;
(e) the designation of the size, age, and, as appropriate, sex of species which may
be harvested;
(f) the designation of open and closed seasons for harvesting;
(g) the designation of the opening and closing of areas, regions, or sub-regions for
purposes of scientific study or conservation, including special areas for protec-
tion and scientific study;
(h) regulation of the effort employed and methods of harvesting, including fishing
gear, with a view, inter alia, to avoiding undue concentration of harvesting in
any region or sub-region;
(i) the taking of such other conservation measures as the Commission considers
necessary for the fulfillment of the objective of this Convention, including mea-
sures concerning the effects of harvesting and associated activities on compo-
nents of the marine ecosystem other than the harvested populations.
As part of its approach to fisheries management, CCAMLR has released several
conservation measures aimed at the conservation and rational use of certain species
and fisheries practices in general. These conservation measures include “precau-
tionary” fisheries catch limits for particular species. Such limits are conservative
catch limits considering the scientific uncertainty surrounding specific species,
including population levels, recruitment rates, and interactions with other species
(Bender 2007).
To illustrate this management process, this research evaluated the development
and input made by the Scientific Committee on toothfish management from 2004 to
2014. It analyzed how the Commission took the decisions. The compiled data were
mainly for Subarea 48.3 (Fig. 2.1).
The Patagonian Toothfish 31

The Patagonian Toothfish

The Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides) and the Antarctic toothfish

(Dissostichus mawsoni) are two distinct Antarctic cod families species. Both spe-
cies are legally commercially fished in the Southern Ocean and are sold on the
international market, most commonly, like Chilean sea bass. The CCAMLR is the
RFMO responsible for managing fisheries in the Antarctic and, until 1998, no dis-
tinction was made between the two species for management purposes. Both species
were accounted for under statistics compiled for Patagonian toothfish. The com-
mercial fishery in the Southern Ocean has primarily targeted the Patagonian
toothfish.
This research will look into the D. eleginoides data to see the influence of science
and possibly the emergence of an epistemic community to establish rules of fishery
management.
The Patagonian toothfish (D. eleginoides) is a large, long-lived species belonging
to the family Notothenidae or Antarctic cods. Toothfish show distinct depth prefer-
ences with age, with juveniles (<50 cm) living on the continental shelf and moving
into deeper water (>500 m) as they reach maturity (~90 cm). Toothfish are essential
predators, feeding primarily on fish, cephalopods, and crustaceans; they also scav-
enge (CCAMLR 2014; fishery report).
In the early 1990s, the collapse of fish stocks in many other fisheries worldwide
displaced many fishing fleets. As these fleets sought other valuable fish stocks, the
large size and delectable meat of the Patagonian toothfish quickly caught the atten-
tion of the international market (CCAMLR 2014).
By the mid-1990s, Patagonian toothfish was dubbed “white gold,” and it is now
considered one of the most valuable fish species on the market. Prices have been as
high as US$10 per kilo for headed, gutted, and tailed fish in the main markets in the
United States, Japan, Europe, Canada, and, increasingly, Asia and China (Isofish
2002; TRAFFIC and WWF 2002; Lack 2001; Kock 2001; Dodds 2000; ASOC
1998; Perry 1998). Over 90% of toothfish products are sold internationally, mainly
to Japan, the United States, Europe, and China (TRAFFIC and WWF 2002).
This high valuation led to a seemingly overnight intensification of the fishery and
placed more significant pressure on the fish stocks. CCAMLR grew increasingly
concerned, as toothfish have a long life span, late sexual maturity, and low fertility;
thus, they are particularly vulnerable to overexploitation. Despite CCAMLR’s
attempts to implement management measures, the high market value of the fish and
remoteness of the fishing grounds resulted in substantial (Riddle 2006) overfishing.
Catches of D. eleginoides in Subarea 48.3 were initially reported in 1977. Until
the mid-1980s, the fishery was carried out entirely by bottom trawls.4 The longline
fishery probably began in April 1986 (WG-FSA-92/13). The annual catch data are
summarized in Table 2.3.

4
A bottom trawl is constructed like a cone-shaped net towed/dragged (by one or two boats) on the
bottom. It consists of a body ending in a codend, which retains the catch.
32 2 CCAMLR: To Be or Not To Be an RFMO?

To manage the Patagonian toothfish fishery, CCAMLR took over a series of man-
agement measures. First, they established a regulatory framework that considers
different types of fisheries.
A “new fishery” exists when biological data (including species distribution and
abundance) and fishery data are not available yet, or data from the two most recent
fishing seasons have not been submitted to CCAMLR. In this scenario, notification
is required prior to fishing (Conservation Measure 21-015) and it becomes an explor-
atory fishery after the first year of fishing.
The “exploratory fisheries” are not allowed to expand faster than the acquisition
of information necessary for managing the fishery within CCAMLR’s management
objectives. For this type, notification and permission are required before fishing
(Conservation Measure 21-026) and it remains an exploratory fishery until sufficient
information is available on appropriate catch and effort levels and the potential
impacts on dependent and related species.
The “established fisheries” category is related to fisheries that have been in prog-
ress for several years and for which assessments are available that are sufficient to
directly estimate stock size, stock status, and the catches consistent with achieving
management objectives. Some of the toothfish fisheries are treated this way, and for
these fisheries, stock conditions and assessments are typically reviewed and revised
annually or bi-annually. Assessments take account of all sources of fishing mortal-
ity, including estimated IUU catches. Notification and permission are required prior
to fishing for krill (Conservation Measure 21-037), and are optional for other target
species.
Finally, the last two are “lapsed fishery,” when fishing operations have ceased
due to commercial considerations, and assessments are no longer current, and
“closed fishery,” when directed fishing on the target species is prohibited.
With this, they guarantee appropriate and specific management to different fish
populations and stocks.
The assessments were, and at a certain level, still are, under a high level of uncer-
tainty. Because the Antarctic is a remote area, there is still a lack of knowledge
about its ecosystem. In addition, because the approach used by CCAMLR is precau-
tionary and ecosystemic, which has some advantages, it is still new for scientific
methods. This is one reason to justify why the Scientific Committee does not always
reach consensus in their decisions, as mentioned previously in Chap. 1.
So, in cases where the Scientific Committee is not confident, the Commission
must decide on its own. For instance, in 1994, the Commission noted that the assess-
ment methods, which had previously been judged satisfactorily, had been invali-
dated by WG-FSA at its meeting. Thus, the Scientific Committee had been unable
to recommend an appropriate TAC level for this fishery (SC-CAMLR-XIII, para-
graph 2.29).

5
https://www.ccamlr.org/en/measure-21-01-2010.
6
https://www.ccamlr.org/en/measure-21-02-2013.
7
https://www.ccamlr.org/en/measure-21-03-2014.
The Patagonian Toothfish 33

In this specific case, the Commission considered that its ability to formulate
conservation measures based on objective scientific analysis and advice was funda-
mental to its work and the Convention. In this regard, the Commission strongly
endorsed the intention of the Scientific Committee to hold a workshop just prior to
the meeting of WG-FSA in 1995 on the development of methods for assessing the
biomass of D. eleginoides (SC-CAMLR-XIII, paragraph 2.171995).
The Workshop on Methods for the Assessment of D. eleginoides (WS-MAD)
was held at CCAMLR Headquarters, Hobart, Australia, from fifth to ninth October
1995. The Workshop’s main aim was to develop methods for assessing the biomass
and status of D. eleginoides stocks. The full terms of reference for the Workshop are
given in SC-CAMLR-XIII, paragraph 2.17.
Circumstantial evidence and confidential records indicate that the reported
catches of D. eleginoides by longliners in Subarea 48.3 and adjacent banks do not
represent the accurate removal level. Since many of the methods of estimating the
abundance of D. eleginoides rely on estimates of total removals, the Workshop
agreed that every effort should be made to estimate these as accurately as possible.
At its 1995 meeting, the Working Group had noted that the reported catch for
D. eleginoides probably represented only about 40% of the total removals from the
fishery. Since the total removals is an essential component of any assessment, this
level of uncertainty had been viewed with considerable concern (CCAMLR
1996, p. 7).
With the passing years, the Commission and its Scientific Committee adjusted its
methods and information to provide the best scientific advice they could, with full
support by its CPs.
It is crucial for stock assessment to have as complete information as possible on
removals of fish from a stock. A large number of Commission circulars (COMM
CIRCs 96/71, 97/4, 97/26, 97/27, 97/38, 97/40, 97/43, 97/48, and 97/50) drew atten-
tion to high levels of unregulated fishing on D. eleginoides.
In a 1997 meeting, the Chairman opened the meeting by stating that “these pro-
gressive measures had little effect if they were not effectively implemented. The
extent of illegal fishing had led to great concern and had visibly undermined the
conservation policy of CCAMLR” (1997, p Opening). The stocks of D. eleginoides,
in particular, were under pressure because of illegal fishing. The issue of illegal fish-
ing—and measures to contain it—was a serious issue facing the Commission at this
meeting, and central to this containment were measures of control and enforcement.
The Chairman further commented that the extent of illegal fishing, particularly
for Patagonian toothfish (D. eleginoides), has led to great concern and seriously
undermines CCAMLR’s conservation policies.
The main countries legally harvesting and exporting Patagonian toothfish were
Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, South Africa, and the United Kingdom, and
they supplied over 70% of the legal market in 2000 (TRAFFIC 2001). Countries
that are or have been involved in IUU fishing or trade, either as flag states, countries
of vessel ownership, nationality of the master, or ports of landing, have been identi-
fied as including Russia, Argentina, Chile, Spain, Uruguay, Belize, Denmark,
Mauritius, Namibia, Panama, Sao Tome, and Principe, Seychelles, Vanuatu, St.
34 2 CCAMLR: To Be or Not To Be an RFMO?

Vincent, and the Grenadines, Tongo, Indonesia, and China (Austral Fisheries 2002;
Lack and Sant 2001). Also, although Argentina, South Africa, and the United
Kingdom legally harvest toothfish, these countries have also been identified as hav-
ing been involved in IUU fishing activities.
Major importers of toothfish include Japan and the United States, although
Canada and the European Union also import toothfish and, increasingly, China is a
market. Those countries identified as being involved in IUU fishing or trade are par-
ties to CITES, and Argentina, Chile, Japan, Namibia, Norway, Russia, South Africa,
Spain, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay are CCAMLR members. However, coun-
tries involved in IUU fishing are constantly changing, and when some countries
register vessels, they may be unaware that their ships are engaged in IUU fishing of
Patagonian toothfish.
IUU fishing for Patagonian toothfish has compromised the effectiveness of
CCAMLR conservation measures and is allegedly at a scale that threatens the sus-
tainability of regulated fisheries and the survival of albatross species (ISOFISH
2002; ASOC 2002; Greenpeace 2000).
Aiming to address illegal fishing, the Catch Development Scheme (CDS) was
adopted in 2000. The CDS is designed to track Patagonian toothfish’ landings and
trade flows in its area and restricts access to markets for toothfish caught by IUU
fishing. The scheme enables the Commission to identify the origin of toothfish
entering all parties’ markets to the scheme and helps determine whether the fish are
caught in a manner consistent with CCAMLR provisions. The system requires spe-
cific control by port states. A fishing vessel must provide prior notification of its
intention to enter a port, including a declaration that it has not been involved in IUU
fishing. The vessel’s flag state shall also confirm this declaration, and those vessels
failing to make a declaration shall be denied port access. If there is evidence that the
ship has fished in contravention of CCAMLR conservation measures, the catch shall
not be allowed to be landed or transshipped (Lodge et al. 2007).
This IUU threat has been effectively addressed with the new norms and rules.
Except for just a few years and punctuated occasions, the Commission has steadily
decreased illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing over the past twenty years. As
a consequence, illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing has been reduced to less
than 10% of its peak value in the mid-1990s (Österblom and Sumaila 2011;
Österblom and Bodin 2012). During the years of this research, there is no evidence
of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing since 2006.

The CCAMLR Epistemic Community

According to Lodge et al. (2007), there is a “lack of political will by fishery manag-
ers and marine resource users to implement management measures according to
scientific advice and effectively enforce and comply with those management mea-
sures.” However, this does not seem a problem for CCAMLR, as it is shown in
Table 2.3.
The CCAMLR Epistemic Community 35

During 10 years of evaluation for toothfish populations on zone 43, one of the
most productive zones for toothfish fishery, all management advice proposed by the
Scientific Committee was accepted by the Commission, including designing
the CDS.
According to this research, at CCAMLR, an epistemic community could be
identified under the Working Group Fish Stock Assessment (WG-FSA) (see
Fig. 2.2). The group is formed mostly by high caliber scientists operating under
their knowledge area and are in a condition to offer the best scientific advice to the
Commission.
It is under the WG-FSA that decisions about management advice related to fish
stock assessment are made. Throughout the 10 years evaluated, all decisions
accepted by the Commission became conservation measures.
The Working Group noted in the WG-FSA report for 2015 (p. 333) that, while
the median SSB8 (Fig. 2.3) was estimated to have fallen below the target level of
50% of the pre-exploitation median SSB from 2009 to 2012, it was above the target
level in 2015. It did not fall below the target for the remainder of the projection
period under the recommended yield (paragraph 4.37, should be set at 2750 tons,
more than 2400 from the last year).
This type of information from the WG-FSA is used to subsidize the decisions of
the Scientific Committee. The Scientific Committee meets annually immediately
prior to the Commission meeting. However, information is produced in the working
groups, and there was no influence from the Scientific Community on the results of
the WG-FSA.

Fig. 2.3 Dissostichus eleginoides in Subarea 48.3 SSB status estimated by the model described in
WG-FSA-15/59. Dashed horizontal lines show a status of 0.5 and 0.2. Source WG-FSA report
from 2015, p. 378

8
SSB—Spawning stock biomass. Total weight of all sexually mature fish in the stock.
36 2 CCAMLR: To Be or Not To Be an RFMO?

During the 10 years of this research, 144 representatives were part of the
WG-FSA. However, only 25 of them would be identified as members of the influen-
tial epistemic community for the decisions around the management advice for the
toothfish. They were identified through the snowball technique and by evaluating
the participants’ list and their peer-review publications.
As members of this community, they could produce usable knowledge (Haas and
Stevens 2011) accurate enough to influence the Commission’s decision.
Unlike ICCAT, where the institutional design for science is not well established
in terms of procedures (as explained in the previous chapter), in the CCAMLR case,
the epistemic community can act and influence the policy decisions mediated by the
institutional design. They do not need to persuade the CPs, nor is it necessary to
arrange critical players to make the knowledge acceptable. They simply work as
scientists; with reliable information, they have at hand and produce usable knowl-
edge good enough to be accepted. The only matter here is when scientists in the
Working Group cannot reach a consensus for management advice. In these specific
situations, the Commission makes the decision, as usable and consensual knowl-
edge could not be produced.
The members of the Working Group and the Scientific Committee possess the
expertise necessary to understand the issues at stake, to interpret the information
similarly, and then to form the same goals and shared beliefs about what should be
done in terms of policy based on the scientific information they have. Under the
WG-FSA, new methodologies emerge to overcome the lack of certainty on the
information (Cross 2015).
The members (N = 25) here indicated (Annex I) have all the characteristics indi-
cated by Haas (2014) to identify the members of an epistemic community. They
share knowledge about the causation of social or physical phenomena in an area for
which they have a reputation for competence and a common set of normative beliefs
about what actions will benefit human welfare in such a domain.

NGOs at CCAMLR

The involvement of NGOs in CCAMLR is also different from other RFMOs.

In addition to governments and the CCAMLR Commission’s responsibility,
some non-governmental players monitor Patagonian toothfish management. For
example, the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) is an NGO estab-
lished in 1976/1977 to coordinate activities concerning Antarctica and its surround-
ing oceans and to provide input into the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), including
CCAMLR (Boyd 2002; Wapner 2000). ASOC comprises over 250 conservation
groups from more than 50 countries. Its strength stems from this alliance, its relative
singularity of purpose, and its ability to draw upon many contacts and access to
governments.
The Antarctica Project is the Secretariat of ASOC and is based in Washington,
D.C. Before entering the IUU fishing debate, ASOC campaigned to “protect the
NGOs at CCAMLR 37

biological diversity and pristine wilderness of Antarctica, including its oceans and
marine life to ensure that the environment comes first” when decisions were made
under the Antarctic Treaty (ASOC 2001). During the 1980s, ASOC played a role in
the discussion that led to the Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral
Resource Activities (CRAMRA) and its eventual replacement by the 1991 Protocol
on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty. Since then, ASOC has contrib-
uted to the ATS’s ongoing development and its associated environmental protection
measures.
In 1988, an observer invitation was issued to ASOC by the CCAMLR Commission
after ASOC provided assurances regarding attendance and confidentiality
(CCAMLR 1988). This was not a standing invitation, as it has needed to be reviewed
annually (ASOC 1988). However, in practice, ASOC has attended CCAMLR
Commission meetings since 1988. They have permission to attend only the plenary,
but not the working groups or scientific meetings.
ASOC was invited to participate in the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting
(ATCM) on environmental protection in 1990 and has since been granted observer
status at these meetings (Darby 1994). This engagement with governments has pro-
vided ASOC with a strong support base, and the network is widely respected and
influential. ASOC was able to provide knowledge, valuable contacts, support to
other groups, and a foundation for campaigning on issues relating to Southern
Ocean fisheries.
Two other non-governmental organizations are also invited to participate in the
plenary: Coalition of Legal toothfish Operators Inc. (COLTO) and Association of
Responsible Krill harvesting companies (ARK). Both are industry coalitions work-
ing to promote sustainability to ensure marine living stocks’ long-term viability and
dependent predators.
COLTO is working to promote sustainable toothfish fishing and fisheries, facili-
tate its members working together and with others, including through the continued
provision of high-quality scientific data to CCAMLR, and provide effective repre-
sentation for its members. They have been attending CCAMLR since 2004.
ARK has been looking for progress towards stronger cooperation in the entire
krill fishing fleet through regular meetings between krill harvesting companies,
encouraging the understanding by the fishing industry of CCAMLR’s approach and
of the scientific requirements for management of the krill fishery, discussion of
opportunities and challenges in the krill fishing industry, education and outreach to
emphasize CCAMLR’s ecosystem approach and the sustainable nature of the fish-
ery, and fostering an agreement from krill fishing companies to support CCAMLR
in managing the krill fishery. They have been attending the CCAMLR meetings
since 2011.
However, it is different from ICCAT, as NGOs are not allowed to attend the
Working Group meetings or the Scientific Committee. They would hardly be con-
sidered part of the epistemic community. They are acting on CCAMLR mostly as a
transnational advocacy network, which Keck and Sikkink’s (1998) definition would
be a group of relevant actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound
together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges on
38 2 CCAMLR: To Be or Not To Be an RFMO?

information and services. These groups are most prevalent in issue areas character-
ized by high-value content and informational uncertainty. However, they are not
acting on behalf of scientific information, and neither are knowledge-based com-
munities with an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within their
domains of expertise. They are different from epistemic communities, in this case
study, because their members do not necessarily share knowledge about the causa-
tion of social or physical phenomena in an area for which they have a reputation for
competence as well as a common set of normative beliefs about what actions will
benefit human welfare in such a domain. They are acting on behalf of a pol-
icy agenda.

Conclusion

CCAMLR presents many characteristics that differ from other RFMOs, which
would justify the opinion of some stakeholders who are against considering
CCAMLR as an RFMO. However, in the current scenario, where stocks are declin-
ing, and the RFMOs need to act on behalf of science and the conservation of stocks,
it would be better to have the other RFMOs learning with CCAMLR then consider-
ing CCAMLR “like a fish out of water.”
CCAMLR has been able to implement measures that serve as an example of how
we might govern high seas resources more responsively and sustainably. If these
approaches are to be duplicated by other RFMOs and expanded to cover more of the
world’s oceans, it would be illuminating to review the institutional characteristics
that might facilitate RFMOs in meeting the conservation and ecosystem-based man-
agement directives of the UN agreements.
The institutional design and procedure rules added to the CCAMLR history
make CCAMLR a very progressive institution. Knowledge and social learning are
considered on a high level, and where truth speaks to power. The epistemic com-
munity here has no difficulty being listened to, and after 10 years of documental
analysis, their management advice was accepted ipsis litteris.
However, if CCAMLR wants to maintain its “uniqueness,” then more pro-active
measures would need to be taken by CCAMLR members, both individually and
collectively. There are, however, several issues (marine protected areas being but
one, not explored here in this chapter, but very important), where CCAMLR could,
if it so decided, once again demonstrate its international leadership in ocean man-
agement with a strong emphasis on conservation.
Chapter 3
ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern
Bluefin Tuna Management

Introduction

This chapter’s focus is the International Commission for the Conservation of

Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and its international agreement, which is responsible for
managing tunas and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean and adjacent seas.
ICCAT’s responsibility involves fisheries management acting directly by regulating
fishing activity through two fundamental processes: allocating the fish among users
(countries) and determining the allowable harvest. Both tasks are very complicated
and involve political and economic interests. The decisions are embedded in institu-
tional systems; it has to include domestic dimensions. There is growing recognition
that the institutional structure, sometimes known as the governance system, and its
incentives are the primary determinants of the success or failure of fisheries man-
agement. All of this depends on the need of greater skill and knowledge.
As stated on the ICCAT website, “Science underpins the management decisions
made by ICCAT”.1 However, in the case of Eastern Bluefin Tuna, the main focus of
this chapter, ICCAT, had traditionally set much higher TACs (total allowable catch)
than what was recommended by its Scientific Committee (SCRS) (Webster 2011;
Sumaila and Huang 2012). With the lack of enforcement and compliance, the
Eastern Bluefin Tuna (EBFT) population almost collapsed. Since 2009 there have
been changes, and ICCAT began to accept the TAC recommended by the
SCRS (ICCAT 2009a, b).
Thus, an analytical question presents itself to be answered in this chapter: when
does power listen to science and why? When it does happen, does the fish popula-
tion show signs of recovery leading to a more effective agreement?

1
http://www.iccat.int/en/.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 39

Switzerland AG 2021
L. R. Gonçalves, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70362-2_3
40 3 ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern Bluefin Tuna Management

Through process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013),2 this chapter analyses
ICCAT meeting reports, reports obtained from other international fishery organiza-
tions such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, and
other peer-reviewed published papers. Also, it includes views of more than 25 such
as members of the ICCAT Scientific Committee, Non-governmental Organizations
(NGOs), and governmental bureaucrats who attend ICCAT meetings annually to
understand the causal connections between knowledge and policy outcomes at
ICCAT, particularly in the case study of the Eastern Bluefin tuna.

The ICCAT History

ICCAT’s history started years ago, in 1960, when it was recognized that the increase
in Bluefin tuna catches was mostly due to the introduction of commercial long liners
and purse seiners.
At that time, the Symposium of the Commission for Technical Cooperation in
Africa (CTCA) on Tuna in Dakar recommended FAO to convene a conference of
plenipotentiaries of all countries interested in the development of the tuna fishery on
the high seas and the long-term protection of the resources.
In 1963, at the FAO Council meeting, the rapid growth of tuna fishing in the
Atlantic in the absence of coordinated action to study the resources and the effect of
fishing upon them was noted. There was a general desire for action to be taken for
the conservation and rational exploitation of the tuna resources of the Atlantic. This
resulted in the creation of the Working Party on Rational Utilization of Tuna
Resources in the Atlantic Ocean, which held its first session at FAO, Rome, 25–30
October 1963, as it was described at the performance review (Hurry et al. 2008) and
by Fonteneau (2008).
At the 13th Session of the FAO Conference, the report of the aforementioned
Working Party for Rational Utilization of Tuna Resources in the Atlantic Ocean was
endorsed, and it was considered that a commission for the conservation of tuna and
tuna-like fishes in the Atlantic Ocean was desirable. The Director-General was then
authorized to call a conference of plenipotentiaries for the purpose of establishing
such a commission and to invite all FAO Member Nations and Associate Members,
and all nations, non-Members of FAO that were Members of the United Nations or
a Specialized Agency of the United Nations to send duly authorized
representatives.
The Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas met,
on the invitation of the Government of Brazil, in Rio de Janeiro, from 2 to 14 May
1966. The Governments of the following 17 states were represented and signed the
final text: Argentina, United States of America, Brazil, Canada, Cuba, Democratic

2
Process tracing can contribute decisively to describing political and social phenomena and evalu-
ating causal claims. It has been used as an essential form of within-case analysis.
The ICCAT History 41

Republic of the Congo, France, Japan, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of

South Africa, Senegal, Spain, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
On the basis of its deliberations, as recorded, the Conference prepared and
opened for signature the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic
Tunas (ICCAT Convention), which entered into force only in 1969, where it reached
the minimum signatures for ratification. ICCAT is, therefore, one of the oldest of the
world’s five (5) major tuna RFMOs,3 and it has also become one of the largest.
In the interim period, a meeting of a group of experts in tuna stock assessment
was arranged by FAO, under the auspices of the Expert Panel for the Facilitation of
Tuna Research, which took place in the Tropical Atlantic Biological Laboratory of
the US Bureau of Commercial Fisheries in Miami from 12th–16th August 1968.
They concluded that the tuna stocks were heavily reduced by fisheries and that sub-
stantive action should be taken for the regulation and management of some of the
Atlantic stocks of tunas. However, at the first meeting of the Commission held in
December 1969, no management measures were adopted due to uncertain data and
insufficient information.
Since the signing of the Convention, the number of contracting parties continued
to rise (Fig. 3.1 and Annex II).
Between the ratification process in the 1960s–1970s, as well as the 1980s, the
number of countries increased continuously due to a normal process of ratification,
which depends on each country but may take more than 10 years. Countries like
Angola, Russia, Gabon, Cape-Vert, Uruguay, Sao Tome e Principe, Venezuela, and
Guinea Equatorial did ratify the Convention only in later 1980s (see Annex II).
However, after 1994/1995, the number of countries started to once again rise
steadily, this time due to two main United Nations remarkable events. The first was

Fig. 3.1 ICCAT contracting parties (N = 50). Source: http://www.iccat.int/en/contracting.htm

3
The other tuna RFMOs are: IATTC (1950), IOTC (1993), CCSBT (1994), and WCPFC (2004).
42 3 ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern Bluefin Tuna Management

the entering into force of the UNCLOS (November 1994) itself. The second
stemmed from it, and it was framed by another parallel debate: the overarching legal
regime for the conservation and management of marine living resources within
areas under national jurisdiction and on the high seas, including UNCLOS specific
provisions relating to straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.
Thus, pursuant to resolution 47/192 of the General Assembly, the United Nations
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, convened
in 1993, completed its work in 1995 with the adoption of the United Nations
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (the
“Agreement”—UNFSA).
The agreement entered into force on 21 December 2001 and currently has 80
States Parties, including the European Union. It is considered to be the most impor-
tant legally binding global instrument to be adopted for the conservation and man-
agement of fishery resources since the adoption of the Convention itself, in 1982.
Participation in the Agreement is thus regarded as an important way for a country to
signal that it is a responsible fishing nation.
The agreement sets out the legal regime for the conservation and management of
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, with a view to ensuring their long-term
conservation and sustainable use. Pursuant to the agreement, the conservation and
management of such stocks must be based on the precautionary approach and the
best scientific evidence available.
The agreement also elaborates on the fundamental principle established in the
Convention that states should cooperate in taking the measures necessary for the
conservation of these resources. Under UNFSA, regional fisheries management
organizations and arrangements (RFMOs/As) are the primary vehicle for coopera-
tion between costal states and high seas fishing states in the conservation and man-
agement of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks.
With this, many countries that signed UNFSA, and were not yet involved in any
RFMOs, were obliged to sign and be part of an RFMO. The number of ICCAT
countries increased by 2010, and is now stable, as most countries that have a fishery
interest in the Atlantic Ocean are already part of it.
To add yet another component, in 1995, the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries was also adopted, showing that the international arena was attentive to
what was happening after the horizon line.

ICCAT Importance for Fishery Governance

ICCAT was created with the only purpose of managing the fish stocks under its
mandate and to maintain their population at levels compatible with the maximum
sustainable yield, as provisioned by UNCLOS.
ICCAT Importance for Fishery Governance 43

Currently, ICCAT has 50 contracting parties, and a Convention area that covers
the entire Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea (Fig. 3.1). ICCAT’s mandate
requires the collection and analysis of statistical information relative to current fish-
ing conditions and population trends carried out by the Standing Committee on
Research and Statistics (SCRS) mandate.
Among various responsibilities, ICCAT (1) compiles fishery statistics from its
members, cooperating non-members and from all entities fishing for tuna and tuna-­
like species in the Atlantic Ocean; (2) coordinates research, including stock assess-
ments; (3) develops scientifically based management advice; (4) provides a
mechanism for contracting parties to agree on management measures; and (5) pro-
duces relevant publications. Contracting parties either have 6 months to implement
the management measures adopted or to submit an objection. If an objection is
submitted, ICCAT is required to review the objection.
About 30 species are of direct concern to ICCAT in a very large area (Fig. 3.2):
Atlantic Bluefin (Thunnus thynnus thynnus), skipjack (Katsuwonus pelamis), yel-
lowfin (Thunnus albacares), albacore (Thunnus alalunga), and bigeye tuna (Thunnus
obesus); swordfish (Xiphias gladius); billfishes such as white marlin (Tetrapturus

Fig. 3.2 ICCAT Convention area. Source: http://www.iccat.int/en/convarea.htm

44 3 ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern Bluefin Tuna Management

albidus), blue marlin (Makaira nigricans), sailfish (Istiophorus albicans), and

spearfish (Tetrapturus pfluegeri); mackerels such as spotted Spanish mackerel
(Scomberomorus maculatus) and king mackerel (Scomberomorus cavalla); and
small tunas like black skipjack (Euthynnus alletteratus), frigate tuna (Auxis thaz-
ard), Atlantic bonito (Sarda sarda), and others.
Not an easy task to manage: many species, different countries, and a great chal-
lenge ahead to become a successful RFMO. With the development and entry into
force of the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA) in 1995, the interna-
tional community made a commitment to strengthen, where needed, Regional
Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs). Since then, RFMOs have been
under increasing pressure to better manage the fisheries resources under their con-
trol. The expectations placed on RFMOs have grown over the past decades along-
side a proliferation of international hard and soft laws, and there continues to be
widespread concern over the performance of RFMOs. This is reflected in calls in
international law for organizations such as the United Nations and the FAO to make
improvements in the way in which RFMOs operate.
However, a number of RFMOs have undergone significant changes in recent
years, with varying degrees of success in terms of ensuring stable cooperative agree-
ments and improved management of the fisheries resources under their control.
In this context, the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development) published, in 2009, a study reviewing the experiences of four
RFMOs: the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT),
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), the
North East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), and the North Atlantic
Fisheries Organization (NAFO). The objective of the study was to elicit key lessons
from the recent experiences of each of these RFMOs in order to inform efforts to
strengthen RFMOs, bearing in mind that RFMOs have been, since the past decade,
engaged in a process of performance review. The study focuses on the political eco-
nomic issues underlying the process of implementing change in the structure and
operations of RFMOs. It is important to recognize that change occurs both at a large
scale (such as major reform and re-writing of a convention underpinning an RFMO)
and at smaller scales (such as introducing new catch information systems or dispute
resolution mechanisms). The study analyses how the pressure for change arises,
how it gains momentum, and how the outcomes are sustained over time. The study
also provides insights into ways in which governments and international organiza-
tions can help smooth the path of change in strengthening RFMOs.
As it is clearly pointed out in their study (OECD 2009) on ICCAT, the process of
change is more difficult due to a relatively large number of contracting parties, a
dated Convention, disagreements over scientific assessments, and continued con-
cerns over the overexploitation of key tuna stocks.
However, despite ongoing concerns over the sustainability of particular stocks
within ICCAT’s responsibility, it is clear that ICCAT has been engaged in a process
of changes to strengthen its performance for some years, and this has been showing
results, mainly after 2009.
Eastern Bluefin Tuna Case: A Lesson to Learn 45

The last decade (2004–2014) has seen a large number of changes focused on
improving conservation, management, compliance, and enforcement. Not a small
accomplishment, considering those members from NGOs, scientists, governments,
and private sector representatives all recognized these improvements.
While there may be some questions over the effectiveness of some of these
changes and the extent to which they are actually implemented by some contracting
parties to ICCAT, the changes have helped to move the organization towards a more
effective framework. This is reflected in the success management stories of some
specific stocks under ICCAT management, such as the recovery of the Atlantic
swordfish stocks, illustrated in the OECD (2009) study.
Another very emblematic and widely discussed case under ICCAT management
that is under improvement is the Eastern Bluefin tuna. The topic is so important that
it was considered crucial, and the performance review stated that the judgment of
the international community on ICCAT would be based largely on how the manage-
ment of fisheries on Bluefin tuna (EBFT) would be accomplished along the years.
Due this importance, the EBFT was chosen to be the case study of this chapter.

Eastern Bluefin Tuna Case: A Lesson to Learn

The Atlantic Bluefin tuna, native to both the western and eastern Atlantic Ocean,
may be naturally divided into two stocks: western and eastern Atlantic BFT, which
differ both in their habitat and their life histories. Both groups of BFT are highly
migratory and have a long life span of up to 30 years. The eastern Atlantic BFT
stock is targeted by different types of fishing gear (longline, purse seine, traps) in
the eastern Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea.
Fishing Bluefin tuna has a very long tradition in the Mediterranean Sea. The first
evidence is estimated at around 7000 BC (Fromentin and Ravier 2005). The popu-
larity of Japanese sushi and sashimi worldwide during the 1980s made the BFT
much more attractive economically than ever before. Consequently, vessel capacity,
vessel power, and new storage innovations for BFT experienced tremendous
increases in the 1980s and 1990s, which imposed severe pressure on the EBFT
stock (Sumaila and Huang 2012).
The duty to set and allocate Eastern Bluefin Tuna’s (EBFT) catch quotas accord-
ing to its scientific stock assessment is one of ICCAT’s major responsibilities. In the
past, not long ago, ICCAT had consistently set the quotas much higher than the
levels recommended by its scientists (see Fig. 3.3). Furthermore, compliance and
enforcement associated with those quotas were weak, which led to a huge misman-
agement problem (Mackenzie et al. 2009; Sumaila and Huang 2012).
From 2007 to 2009, a series of events gave prominence and attention to the crisis
of BFT fishery and exposed the lack of political action and management of fish
stocks. The ICCAT contracting parties, cooperating non-contracting parties, and
entities or fishing entities (CPCs, hereafter) were feeling the pressure and the need
for change in the way decisions were made at ICCAT to avoid the BFT crisis. Not
46 3 ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern Bluefin Tuna Management

Fig. 3.3 Reported catches, SCRS TAC recommended and the Commission decision. Source: Author

only due to environmental concerns, but also because pressure was coming from
various sectors and stakeholders.
Diverse events were happening to expose the situation. In 2006, Canada in its
opening statement warned on the “need to agree upon a set of measures that will
strengthen compliance and allow us to establish a solid rebuilding plan for East
Atlantic Bluefin. Without this basic step, we will run the risk of having others, such
as CITES, step in and do what we cannot or will not” (ICCAT 2006a, p. 82).
On the following year, 2007, Japan also mentioned a concern that “as the current
plight continues, Appendix II, or even I for Atlantic Bluefin is a likely eventual
action by CITES in 2010. That is a cessation of commercial Bluefin fisheries in the
entire Atlantic” (ICCAT 2007a, p. 73).
However, 2009 was a great turning point when the fishery crisis became even
more evident. The SCRS report warned about the threat of EBFT stock to collapse
and it highlighted that the uncertainty of under-reported catches was playing a major
role (ICCAT 2009b, p. 45).
Not only was the SCRS ringing the bell, but non-SCRS scientists were also
warning that the EBFT stock had been brought to near collapse as a result of an
increased fishing effort, high demand of tuna at the markets, and lack of effective
management intervention (Webster 2009; Mackenzie et al. 2009).
As pointed out by Adler and Haas (1992), crises and new developments not only
accelerate the diffusion process but also lend urgency to the task of reevaluating
current policies and coming up with alternatives. Crises and uncertainty triggered a
search for expertise illustrating an exact situation where social learning may occur.
Eastern Bluefin Tuna Case: A Lesson to Learn 47

A crisis is in place warning that due to overexploitation and mismanagement a fish

population may collapse, so states recognize that they need to deal with the problem
and they delegate the task of research and providing information to the experts.
Thus, bearing this entire background context, ICCAT began to cut the TAC (total
allowable catch) substantially, from 32,000 tons in 2006 to 12,900 tons in 2011 and
2012 (Fig. 3.3). The warning sent from the SCRS in 2009 pointed to the fishery
crisis and triggered this action. However, the acceptance of the SCRS recommenda-
tion does not entirely mean that all the problems were solved. ICCAT was still fail-
ing on compliance and enforcement and countries were still failing to provide
accurate fishery data, which resulted in poor and underreported fishery information.
Therefore, at that time, to recognize, demand, and accept the scientific advice was a
big step.
In 2014, the SCRS report showed that “the implementation of recent regulations
has clearly resulted in reductions in catch and fishing mortality rates. All CPUE4
index show increasing trends in the most recent years” (ICCAT 2014).
Additionally, the 2015 Report of the Standing Committee on Research and
Statistics (ICCAT 2015) shows that the decisions taken, based on SCRS advice,
made an impact reducing the fishing mortality (F 2.5 and F 10.) and the strong
recovery of the spawning stock biomass (SSB) (Fig. 3.4).

Fig. 3.4 Fishing mortality (for ages 2 to 5 and 10+), spawning stock biomass (in metric ton), and
recruitment (in number of fish) estimates. Red line: reported catch; blue line: inflated (from 1998
to 2007) catch. Source ICCAT 2015, page 108

4
In fisheries and conservation biology, the catch per unit effort (CPUE) is an indirect measure of
the abundance of a target species. Changes in the catch per unit effort are inferred to signify
changes to the target species’ true abundance. A decreasing CPUE indicates overexploitation,
while an unchanging CPUE indicates sustainable harvesting.
48 3 ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern Bluefin Tuna Management

The Committee listened to science, and the EBF tuna populations started to show
signs of recovery. Still a big empirical question remains open. Why ICCAT has
begun to accept the TAC recommended by the SCRS only since 2009?

The Emergence of an Epistemic Community

This chapter argues that, under the widely publicized crisis about the international
tuna fishery management, an epistemic community emerged under ICCAT to pro-
vide new causal arguments that enabled the CPCs to make sense of the situation,
and to employ collective efforts to deal with shared problems.
As indicated by Haas (2014), epistemic community ideas contribute to causal
mechanisms of social learning, which lead to more scientifically informed, and
often comprehensive, approaches to policy-making and dealing with issues.
Epistemic communities have been conceptualized as a group of experts who
­persuade others with basis on their professional knowledge. To be part of this
knowledge community, the individuals must have the expertise necessary to
­understand the issues at stake, to interpret the information similarly, and then to
share the same goals about what should be done. The group’s policy aims have
to reflect their expert knowledge—and not some other motivation—otherwise
they lose authority and legitimacy with their target audience, which in the area of
international fishery are usually the CPCs representatives. In other words, epistemic
communities must have an authoritative claim on knowledge to impact policy
outcomes.
This chapter claims that an epistemic community emerged under the SCRS, and
consisted of the ICCAT chairman, some NGOs, individuals, and some national
scientists.
The science and most of the knowledge used to formulate policies at ICCAT are
developed under its Scientific Committee of Research and Statistic (SCRS). The
SCRS is built with a high caliber of scientists indicated by CPCs. They are respon-
sible for developing and recommending to the Commission all policy and proce-
dures for the collection, compilation, analysis, and dissemination of fishery statistics.
It is the SCRS’ task to ensure that the Commission has available at all times the
most complete and current statistics concerning fishing activities in the Convention
area as well as biological information on the stocks that are fished. The SCRS also
coordinates various national research activities, develops plans for special interna-
tional cooperative research programs, carries out stock assessments, and advises the
Commission on the need for specific conservation and management measures.
They have a clear mandate for providing advice to the Commission, and as noted
from the interviews, they do it with a very high level of professionalism. Along the
period observed here (2004–2013), 924 scientists attended the SCRS meetings in
total, with a 92.4 participants-per-year average (Fig. 3.5). Even when those scien-
tists are working for the government and with the probable influence of politics on
their work, they are professionals with academic backgrounds and are doing their
best to keep their analysis on biological data, as it is possible to note from the
The Emergence of an Epistemic Community 49

Fig. 3.5 Number of scientists attending the SCRS meetings along the study period

scientific reports and data analysis. Some of them, more than others, but in general,
the information they are producing suffers more from the lack of accurate data and
from the underreported information from the CPCs, than from the politicization of
science on the data analysis (see discussion at first chapter about the institutional
design of ICCAT).
Not all national scientists would qualify as epistemic community members.
Through snowball interview technique, research on peer-reviewed papers, and
understanding their positions during the meetings and media reports, it was possible
to find some specific names (N = 34) that would respect the criteria established by
Haas (2004b) to be members of its epistemic community (Annex III). They are the
ones whose policy aims were reflecting their expert knowledge and no other motiva-
tion (Cross 2015). Those national scientists were stretching their boundaries on pro-
viding advice to the Commission and were persuading decision-makers to heed
their knowledge. Also, they were qualified by their professionalism, meeting fre-
quently (those were in more than 80% of the SCRS meetings), in different meetings
more than twice a year, and they are trained on the use of the same methodology.
They also know who shares the same beliefs and common values among them-
selves. This was made possible by capturing the interviews of 25 stakeholders that
attended ICCAT.
Beside the scientists, observers are also allowed to participate actively in SCRS
meetings. Prior to the formal recognition of the observer status in 1999, scientists
from NGOs or industry consultants participated in SCRS activities as members of
national delegations. The option to do so continues to exist and some still do partici-
pate as members of their national delegations rather than as observers.
50 3 ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern Bluefin Tuna Management

As observers, they are allowed “to participate in all meetings of the organization
and its subsidiary bodies, except extraordinary meetings held in executive sessions
or meetings of Heads of Delegations”.5 Any eligible NGO admitted to a meeting
may: attend meetings, as set forth above, but may not vote; make oral statements
during the meeting upon the invitation of the presiding officer; distribute documents
at meetings through the secretariat; and engage in other activities, as appropriate
and as approved by the presiding officer.
There are some specific NGOs that are involved in the plenary meeting, but are
also investing time and dedication to contribute to scientific meetings as well. The
profile of NGOs that also attend the SCRS meetings as observers, however, differs
from those who normally attend the plenary only. According to the attendee list for
the study period, 51 NGOs attended the SCRS meetings; however, only 4 of them
were deeply involved in the scientific work, actively contributing to the EBFT dis-
cussion, being present in more than 50% of them. Their staff, normally not a large
number of people, possesses an academic background on science that would enable
them to contribute to the fishery science debate (Table 3.1). Those organizations,
and also those specific individuals, were frequently mentioned by the national sci-
entists, decision-makers and by their peers in the interviews with respect, credibil-
ity, and recognition of their contribution to the scientific debate. They were included
in the epistemic group for the EBFT, who shared the same beliefs, shared causal
beliefs, or shared professional judgment with others while also presenting common
notions of validity and common policy enterprise in terms of the subject.6
Another point that must be noted is that some of the scientists that are part of
SCRS also attend the plenary meeting which would mean that they may have access
to decision-makers, NGOs, and other stakeholders. The SCRS members may also

Table 3.1 NGOs Organizations Individual members

representatives at ICCAT
OCEANA Cornax, María José
WWF Tudela, Sergi
Federation of Maltese Aquaculture Deguara, Simeon
Producers
ISSF Restrepo, Victor

5
According to RES 05-12—Guidelines and criteria for granting Observer status at ICCAT meet-
ings (www.iccat.int)
6
During the entire study period, Bird Life International have also attended all SCRS meetings,
represented by Dra. Cleo Small; however, she was not involved in the Bluefin tuna debate, but on
the bycatch and Sea Birds topic, reasons for why she is not considered here as part of the epistemic
community. No doubt, they are part of an ICCAT epistemic community.
The Emergence of an Epistemic Community 51

be very influential, and even be elected as a Commission Chairman. This was the
case of Mr. Fabio Hazin, ICCAT chairman from 2007–2011.7
Mr. Hazin is certainly part of the epistemic community and his professionalism
and leadership in this case were also a factor that needs to be considered, as it was
mentioned by many others during the interview process. As a Ph.D. fishery scientist
himself, all of his political statements were based on the scientific information pro-
vided by the SCRS. Also, as he used to be part of the SCRS, he knew NGOs, and
scientists by a long period of time for whom he expressed a trust. Over the years, he
also created a strong alliance with key and very active researchers, such as Gerald
Scott (USA) and Josu Santiago (UE), both SCRS chairmen and also part of the
epistemic community, what undoubtedly contributed in persuading the CPCs to
make their decisions based on science. With all the knowledge he had, and with the
reliable relationship with many CPCs commissioners, as a chairman, Mr. Hazin was
in a high-level position at the negotiation table with access to multiple key decision-­
makers, that he could persuade to follow the scientific advice, which he knew, for a
fact, was the right thing to do.
At the soonest opportunity he took over the chairman position for the second
mandate in 2009 when he clearly stated: “let’s not fool ourselves: there will be no
future for ICCAT if we do not fully respect and abide by the scientific advice. If we
do not follow the instructions science is giving us, our credibility will be irreversibly
jeopardized and the mandate to manage tuna stocks will be surely taken out of our
hands” (ICCAT 2009a, p. 72). During his 4 years as Chairman, science was his
guide for BFT and other species. He is recognized by his peers from SCRS as part
of the group, even while he was playing a role as a Commission chairman.
The year of 2009 was definitely not only a turning point, but it was the impetus
for the momentum wherein science began to guide the actions related to EBFT. As
Mr. Hazin mentioned in the opening statement of 2010, “differently from the previ-
ous two years, this year I feel that I no longer have to emphasize the need for ICCAT
to follow the scientific advice, not because this is not important anymore, but, on the
contrary, because in my view the obligation to respect science has finally become
firmly entrenched in the work of this Commission” (ICCAT 2010a, p. 41).
Particularly in 2009, but in the years following, Mr. Hazin performed his leader-
ship using two main techniques in persuading key states to use science as a guide,
and creating an alliance between key and powerful countries, such as the United
States, Canada, and Brazil, to persuade Japan and the European Union to follow
scientific advice—which at the end was a very successful strategy.
As a person and as chairman, and still as a part of this epistemic community, he
could support scientific knowledge and take that knowledge to the decision-makers.

7
When Dr. Fabio Hazin took over the ICCAT chairman position, he had been attending ICCAT
meetings since 1998, representing the Brazilian government as well as working as a scientist at
SCRS. For the entire period of this study, which also coincides with the period where the
Commission accepted the TAC proposed by the scientists, he has not missed any plenary or SCRS
meeting. He also has been involved in other international organizations, such as CITES and FAO.
52 3 ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern Bluefin Tuna Management

He was in a position that allowed him to influence the decision-makers, as he had

open access and their reliability as well.
Following the definitions established by Haas (1992, 2014) and also Cross
(2013), this chapter argues that there was an epistemic community influencing
­policy decision at ICCAT for the EBFT and it contained scientists from different
groups. Some of them were scientists that represented the CPCs, others were
­scientists from specific NGOs, and also the chairman from the SCRS and from the
Commission, as they were all part of the network of professionals that possessed
the necessary expertise, interpreted the information and data with similarity, and
were willing to persuade others based on their knowledge.
According to Cross (2013), they would also match the epistemic community
criteria as they go beyond formal expectations as a group. As the attendees list
shows, they also met annually, holding the same position at various times, develop-
ing esprit de corps, and sharing distinctive cultures and professional norms beyond
the bureaucracy as they spent more time on technical issues than formal bureaucra-
cies. Adding to that, using snowball technique interviews, an interesting point to be
highlighted is how easy it was for the members of SRCS to identify their allies, the
ones with whom they shared the same beliefs, independent from the role or the
organization they were representing at that moment, as it changed.
Most of the epistemic community members in this case, when asked if they were
part of NGOs, government or academia, answered they had been part of all of them.
They have played with different hats, but always using science to persuade decision-­
makers using their common knowledge as a guide.
The differential for this epistemic community is that, as it was constituted by
different stakeholders, it was able to influence the decision-makers from different
angles providing a greater transmission of knowledge. The advantage of its diverse
constitution was that they had similar professional academic backgrounds and many
different open channels to persuade decision-makers, as each of them had their own
strategies and their own areas of influence.
As the SCRS has a very clear mandate to provide information and advice for the
management of tunas, not all scientists are comfortable in a position to persuade
decision-makers regarding the need to accept scientific recommendations as policy
decisions. Therefore, as a strong epistemic community, it sought to go beyond their
formal professional role as a group, and it was often able to persuade CPCs to fun-
damentally change the policy decision. In this case, the epistemic community influ-
enced the decision-makers, but also transmitted knowledge through NGOs and
international organizations like CITES.

Usable Knowledge for EBFT

As Haas and Stevens (2011) claim, in order to influence policy, an epistemic com-
munity needs to produce usable knowledge. Usable knowledge, borrowing their
definition, is “a substantive core that makes it usable for policymakers and a
Usable Knowledge for EBFT 53

procedural dimension that provides a mechanism for its transmission from the sci-
entific community to the policy world, and it allows for agency when theorizing
about broader patterns of social learning, policymaking, and international relations.”
The general factors that influence the likelihood that decision-makers will apply
scientific knowledge are credibility, legitimacy, and saliency (Schroeder et al. 2008).
Credibility means that the knowledge claims are believed to be accurate: within a
consensus theory of truth, this means that they are publicly created through a delib-
erative process by people widely regarded as experts. Legitimacy means that knowl-
edge is developed by people who have social authority and that it is accepted by
people outside the community that developed it. In practice, the assignment of legit-
imacy often rests on peer review and scholarly reputation. Salience means that the
information is timely and is organized on a politically meaningful timescale and
scale of resolution.
The knowledge produced by ICCAT’s epistemic community is accurate, and
transmit credibility and legitimacy for most of its members. Even independent sci-
entists agree that the information is correct and that the main problem is political
due to the rejection of scientific advice (Mackenzie et al. 2009; Sumaila and
Huang 2012).
The epistemic community group is constituted by high-level scientists, most of
them with a Ph.D. or with research focusing on fishery science or fishery manage-
ment. As highlighted by the performance review, the analyses used by the SCRS to
formulate advice are prepared by CPC’s scientists from government agencies, uni-
versities, NGOs, and consultants, and they are peer-reviewed through a rigorous
three-stage process. The structure of the process, the diversity of participants/ana-
lysts, and the large number of people involved do not guarantee that errors will not
be made, but it provides a reasonable assurance that if errors are made, they will be
discovered, admitted, and corrected. In addition, from 2004 to 2013, of the 331
scientists who attended the SCRS meetings, about 62 were present at more than
50% of them, which guarantee that, with time, the SCRS can now count on a larger
number of scientists who are trained and competent in fishery methods and analysis.
No doubt that the information presented by the SCRS is the best estimate they can
have with the data they have at hand, being thus the “best scientific advice avail-
able” requested under Article 61 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea.
The greatest impediments to the completion of more reliable stock assessments
are the lack of data and incomplete knowledge. The lack of reliable data on catches
for important components of the fisheries forces scientists to make assumptions and
guesses on the amounts caught and catch rates, which have the potential to increase
substantially the uncertainties in the assessments.
All the knowledge is revised and methods and data are improved every year. The
knowledge has saliency since it is discussed 1 month before the Commission ple-
nary meeting, when it is then presented for political discussion. The SCRS chairman
makes the presentation at the plenary in a very clear summary that contains all of the
technical and scientific information and the whole report. A very comprehensible
54 3 ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern Bluefin Tuna Management

chart is also circulated before the meeting as supporting information for

decision-makers.
According to Haas (2004a, b), scientific consensus can inform policy when
groups responsible for articulating consensus have stable access to decision-makers.
However, for consensus to be acceptable to leaders it must emerge through channels
that are viewed as legitimate by the leaders, just as the role performed by the epis-
temic community was done here. Typically, this happens when the scientists have a
reputation for expertise, when the knowledge was generated beyond suspicion of
policy bias by sponsors, and when the information is transmitted to governments
through personal networks (Haas 2001).

The Role of NGOs on the Eastern Bluefin Tuna Debate

NGOs participate in global environmental politics in a number of ways: they try to

raise public awareness of environmental issues; they lobby state decision-makers
hoping to affect domestic and foreign policies related to the environment; they coor-
dinate boycotts in efforts to alter corporate practices harmful to nature; they partici-
pate in international environmental negotiations; and they help monitor and
implement international agreements (Betsill and Corell 2001). At ICCAT, they not
only do all of the above, but since some of their staff (Table 3.1) are willing to con-
tribute to the scientific debate, as scientists, they also qualify to be part of the epis-
temic community.
There were 45 NGOs attending ICCAT meetings as observers during this
research period. This group contains international environmental organizations
(e.g., Birdlife International, The Pew Environmental Group, Greenpeace, and World
Wide Fund for Nature (WWF)); and includes associations that advocate for fisheries
and fishermen (e.g., International Seafood Sustainability Foundation (ISSF), Tuna
Producer Association, Association Euroméditerranénne des Pecheurs Professionnels
de Thon- AEPPT), and also Universities (Annex IV).
Observing their frequency both at Commission and at SCRS meetings, it is pos-
sible to notice that most NGOs mainly attend the Commission meeting. Seeking to
achieve their goals under limited human and financial resources, most of them rou-
tinely and strategically opt to do their work within the political meeting (Fig. 3.6).
NGOs are a key group at ICCAT and throughout time they have gained more
space and a stronger voice in the negotiations. International NGOs and transnational
advocacy networks have specific policy goals that are based on shared causal beliefs
about what actions will result in the achievement of their aims. However, they are
different from the epistemic community described above. “Their goals typically
derive from idealist interests such as environmental protection and social change.
They have some specific characteristics: the centrality of values or principle ideas,
the belief that individuals can make a difference, the creative use of information,
and the employment of non-governmental actors of sophisticated political strategies
The Role of NGOs on the Eastern Bluefin Tuna Debate 55

25

20

15
PLE
10 SCRS

0
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Fig. 3.6 Number of NGOs attending Commission meetings and the SCRS meetings during the
study period (2004–2013)

in targeting their campaigns” (Keck and Sikkink 1998). They are value-driven and
thus seek to change both policy outcomes and the terms of the debate (Cross 2013).
In this EBFT case, most of them would not be considered part of an epistemic
community, as they were not necessarily acting on behalf of knowledge, with the
exception of the few mentioned above (Table 1) who were frequently attending
SCRS meetings. Therefore, they supported the epistemic community in building
more consensual knowledge and to disseminate it to civil society and to the media,
helping to enhance the awareness and the importance of decision-makers listening
to science.8 From 2009 to 2013, in most of their opening statements, observers men-
tioned the need to follow the SCRS’ advice and to use the best scientific information
available. Their participation at the Commission meeting and their involvement at
the ICCAT EBT debate helped to bring attention to the topic and to put pressure on
the CPCs to listen to science.
Their statements to media were supporting science as well. “We encourage pol-
icy makers to continue to listen to science in the future. Only then will the East
Atlantic and Mediterranean stock of Atlantic Bluefin tuna have a chance to fully
recover,” said Dr. Sergi Tudela, Head of Fisheries, WWF Mediterranean. Another
NGO also supported the decision along the same line: “It is encouraging that ICCAT
listened to the recommendations of its own scientists and agreed to keep catch limits
for bluefin tuna within their advice. This decision will give this depleted species a
fighting chance to continue on the path to recovery after decades of overfishing and

8
Link to NGOs press release: http://www.greenpeace.org/international/en/press/releases/
greenpeace-cites-is-last-chan/.
56 3 ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern Bluefin Tuna Management

mismanagement,” says Susan Lieberman, international policy director, Pew

Environment Group. They were acting on behalf of science, backing up epistemic
community knowledge.
It is also noteworthy that 2009 to 2013, when the CPCs reduced the TAC for
EBFT, were the years when a larger number of NGOs were attending ICCAT meet-
ings (Fig. 3.6), which suggests that the topic was gaining greater media coverage
and also a better understanding by public opinion. The transnational advocacy net-
work supported the epistemic community and this helped greatly to increase pres-
sure on decision-makers at international and domestic levels. Most of the
stakeholders interviewed assumed that the NGO’s pressure helped to expose the
ICCAT EBFT mismanagement and created an international embarrassment which
CPCs wanted to avoid.
The relationship between NGOs and SCRS was not always a relationship based
on trust, however. During the interviews, NGOs, like Greenpeace, were blaming the
SCRS for the high interference from politics on science, and clamoring for a peer
review of their results. However, even with the criticism, from 2009 to 2013, most
of them were speaking in one unique voice for ICCAT to follow the SCRS advice
and reduce the Bluefin tuna TAC. This created greater pressure on CPCs and helped
the decision-makers to accept science. Another factor that helped NGOs to increase
the SCRS’ knowledge was that since 2004 the number of NGOs attending the SCRS
meeting increased (Fig. 3.6), bringing more legitimacy, transparency, and reliability
between the civil society and the epistemic community.
Those NGOs that attended the SCRS meetings were essential in this process;
they contributed scientific information and, in the end, were part of the epistemic
community. But they also did advocacy and policy work and sponsored the science
that had been done by the SCRS. By speaking in a unique voice, they transmitted a
consensual and usable knowledge to the decision-makers and also to the civil

Fig. 3.7 Number of NGOs attending the SCRS meetings

The Threat of CITES 57

society. All of this together created an environment of persuasion that was felt by the
decision-makers, as it was also mentioned by the interviewed stakeholders (Fig. 3.7).
As some NGOs were involved in SCRS meetings and also in Commission
Meetings, it seems they were able to create a bridge between the SCRS and NGOs,
which made the information even more powerful and trustworthy.
Normally, in IR, the science-politics interface has been framed primarily as a
matter for scientists and decision-makers. Scientists inform policy-makers and
policy-­makers turn to science for knowledge and technical assistance. This case, as
it was argued by Bäckstrand (2003), suggests a triangular interaction between sci-
entific experts, policy-makers, and citizens, where citizens are involved and aware
of the problem through the information disseminated by the NGOs and the media.
Thus, the citizens were not just a recipient of policy but also an actor in the science-­
policy nexus, influencing and exerting pressure at the domestic level.

The Threat of CITES

The proposal to include the Bluefin tuna (the West Atlantic and the East Atlantic
stocks) into the Appendix I of the Washington Convention (better known as CITES)
was promoted by the Government of Monaco in July 2009 and subsequently
endorsed by various countries. The Appendix I lists species that are the most endan-
gered among CITES - see Article II, paragraph 1 of the Convention). As Webster
(2009) highlights, this action had a precedent. They considered listing Bluefin tuna
as an endangered species almost 20 years ago. In 1991, Sweden nominated the
western stock of Atlantic Bluefin tuna just as Monaco nominated the eastern stock
in 2009.
The 2009/2010 proposal was mostly based on science attributes such as the low
level of the Bluefin tuna population, the unsustainable level of fishing effort, the
outputs of the assessment provided by SCRS with the following low recovery figure
of the population in the wild, and the mismanagement of this fish resource by
ICCAT and all countries concerned.
The proposal text makes reference mostly to SCRS documents and WWF reports
showing a clear influence of the epistemic community members on the construction
of the Monaco proposal.9
During the 2009 ICCAT meeting, the possibility of Bluefin tuna being listed in
the CITES Appendix 1 was so great that most countries, during their opening state-
ments, mentioned this fact and the desire to work for improving the performance of
ICCAT in order to continue to be the sole organization responsible for BFT manage-
ment. The impact of CITES was powerful and the threat was strongly felt by the
CPCs, mainly Japan.

9
http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/15/doc/E15-52.pdf.
58 3 ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern Bluefin Tuna Management

A strong example was the statement made by Brazil, a key player in 2009 as a
host for the meeting: “ICCAT is now facing the risk of losing the mandate to man-
age the bluefin tuna stock, mainly because it has failed to abide by the scientific
advice. It is needless to say how such a development could jeopardize the future of
this Commission. In light of that, we reiterate the plea we made last year for all
Contracting Parties to embrace the cause of leaving the meeting in Brazil with all
measures adopted by the Commission in full conformity with scientific advice, not
only in relation to bluefin tuna, but to all species under the mandate of the
Commission” (ICCAT 2009a, p. 74).
Japan, who was concerned about CITES, and who voted against the proposal at
the CITES meeting, also made a commitment in 2009 “to work out at this meeting
conservation programs consistent with SCRS advice for not only bluefin tuna but all
major species” (ICCAT 2009a, p. 77).
Additionally, the United States has argued “Now, however, the global scrutiny on
ICCAT has intensified, particularly in light of the recent proposal to list Atlantic
Bluefin Tuna on Appendix I of the Convention on International Trade of Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) (ICCAT 2009a, p. 80).”
In the end, Monaco’s proposal at CITES was not approved in 2010, but, as many
interviewed stakeholders mentioned, the pressure was felt by the CPCs. Some of
them would say that during this 10-year period, the serious attitude and strong will
of ICCAT to improve its conservation efforts for this stock overweighed this CITES
challenges and that ICCAT had started its work to rectify the situation of EBFT well
before CITES took up this issue. However, according to WEBSTER (2011), “with
the threat of a CITES listing looming in 2009, the Commission adopted catch limits
that would quickly reduce legal harvests below the scientifically recommended
levels.”
However, based on the interviews with key stakeholders and meeting reports,
this chapter states that CITES played an essential role in creating pressure on the
CPCs and exposing the crisis within ICCAT management. However, the CPCs did
not agree to lower the quotas due to the threat from CITES, since ICCAT had started
before 2010 to rectify the situation, well before CITES took up this issue. An impor-
tant sign of this was when the Commission asked for advice from the SCRS (ICCAT
2009b, p. 45) and established a recovery plan.10
The ICCAT listened to the epistemic community arguments because of the nature
of the way the science was organized, their usable knowledge based on real infor-
mation, and the reliability relationship created between them, enhancing their legiti-
macy and credibility. Even CITES was influenced by the epistemic community
knowledge when it made the proposal for listing Bluefin tuna11 (Fig. 3.8).
In stating that, this chapter is not reducing the role of NGOs or CITES to a mere
megaphone of scientific information generated by the epistemic community, as

10
The 2010 TAC was revised to 13,500 t by [Rec. 09-06], which also established a framework to
set future (2011 and beyond) TACs at levels sufficient to rebuild the stock to BMSY by 2022 with
at least 60% probability.
11
http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/15/doc/E15-52.pdf.
Conclusion 59

Fig. 3.8 Epistemic community formed by ICCAT chairman, part of SCRS national scientists, and
part of NGOs. They were consistently providing knowledge to ICCAT CPCs, while CITES and
NGOs were creating the sense of urgency

Toke (1999) could argue. On the contrary, NGOs and CITES had a very protagonist
role, backing up the science and the epistemic community knowledge and advocat-
ing in a unique and consensual voice to keep up the tune and the need for change.
Sponsoring the science did not mean they did not have their own agenda, it only
meant that the agents were acting on behalf of a legitimate knowledge, provided by
a powerful epistemic community, to shape policy decisions and to reach joint
solutions.

Conclusion

The Bluefin tuna case demonstrates that when power listens to science and imple-
ments that advice through a social learning process, fish stocks can recover and
thus reach the main goal of the Commission, conferring more effectiveness for
the international agreement. Power’s willingness to listen to science was one of the
first steps towards improving ICCAT’s effectiveness. However, CPCs still need
to improve the quality of data provided to the SCRS and ICCAT still needs to
address the lack of compliance and enforcement, which are reducing the chances of
promoting proper management.
The EBFT case illustrates a situation where a fishery crisis was in place, in an
environment full of uncertainty, and when a transnational network of NGOs and
60 3 ICCAT and the Cooperation for Eastern Bluefin Tuna Management

CITES helped to enhance the pressure on the decision-makers to take action by that
time the epistemic community was ready to provide usable knowledge to the CPCs.
The epistemic community was formed by a group with a high level of profes-
sionalism; it emerged from the SCRS and included scientists from NGOs, CPCs,
and the ICCAT chairman, a scientist himself, producing usable knowledge that was
coherent, legitimate, and solid enough to influence strategically within many dimen-
sions of power. The knowledge produced about the state of the EBFT population
was sound enough to have other key stakeholders supporting the epistemic com-
munity claim.
This chapter is a contribution to knowledge and it opens a path towards a clearer
understanding of how social learning can change policy decisions at RFMOs. The
history of EBFT management at ICCAT is a very emblematic case in international
cooperation where an epistemic community spoke loudly to power, and power lis-
tened to them. This influence was only possible due to the fact that NGOs and
CITES reported the emergent fishery crisis that could damage ICCAT history.
Additionally, they created pressure on ICCAT by sponsoring the epistemic com-
munity knowledge.
With its analysis, the chapter contributes to recent efforts to arrive at a more
nuanced theoretical and empirical understanding of effective governance mecha-
nisms at the transnational level. A future study on the other case studies within
RFMOs to find other conditions which force power to listen to science would be
beneficial.
To conclude, the study of epistemic community and the science and policy inter-
play to discuss international cooperation do not exclude the central importance of
interstate relations in world affairs. However, to not take into account the non-state
actors and the role of knowledge in today’s world leaves one with only a partial
picture of the international system, and thus might represent an incomplete under-
standing of world politics itself.
Chapter 4
CCSBT and the Management of Southern
Bluefin Tuna

Introduction

Southern Bluefin tuna (SBT) were heavily fished in the past, with annual catches
reaching 80,000 t in the early 1960s. Heavy fishing resulted in a significant decline
in the numbers of mature fish and the annual catch began to fall rapidly. By the
mid-­1980s, it was apparent that the SBT stock was at a level where management and
conservation were required and there was a need for a mechanism to limit catches.
From 1985, the main nations fishing for SBT at that time, Australia, Japan, and New
Zealand voluntarily agreed to apply strict quotas to their fishing fleets to enable the
rebuilding of the stock.
In 1994, these arrangements were formalized with the signing of the Convention
and the establishment of the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin
Tuna (CCSBT)—one of the newest RFMOs. This international organization was
founded by Australia, Japan, and New Zealand; and in 2002, Korea and Taiwan joined.
The CCSBT manages the SBT fisheries by setting a global total allowable catch
(TAC) and the fishing quotas for each country, but has often failed to reach agree-
ment on catch limits (Kurota et al. 2010). The Scientific Committee (SC), aided by
its internal Stock Assessment Group (SAG), makes management recommendations
to the Commission. However, debate between members over stock status due to
large uncertainties in stock assessment results prevents management action.
In this context, through process tracing (Beach and Pedersen 2013),1 this chapter
analyzes CCSBT meeting reports from 1995 to 2015, reports obtained from other
international fishery organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization of
the United Nations, and other peer-reviewed published papers, and will identify a

1
Process tracing can contribute decisively both to describing political and social phenomena and
to evaluating causal claims and it has been used as an essential form of within-case analysis.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 61

Switzerland AG 2021
L. R. Gonçalves, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70362-2_4
62 4 CCSBT and the Management of Southern Bluefin Tuna

possible formation of an epistemic community, and evaluate if in this case, they

influenced the policy decisions on quotas for SBT management.

The CCSBT and “the Convention”

In the mid-1980s, it became apparent that the SBT stock was at a level where man-
agement and conservation were required. There was a need for a mechanism to limit
catches. The main nations fishing SBT at the time, Australia, Japan, and New
Zealand, began to apply strict quotas to their fishing fleets from 1985 as a manage-
ment and conservation measure to enable the SBT stocks to rebuild.
On 20 May 1994, the then-existing voluntary management arrangement between
Australia, Japan, and New Zealand was formalized when the Convention for the
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, which had been signed by the three coun-
tries in May 1993, came into force. The Convention created the Commission for the
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT).
Other fishing nations were active in the SBT fishery, which reduced the effective-
ness of the member’s conservation and management measures. The principal non-­
member nations were Korea, Taiwan, and Indonesia. There were also a number of
other fishing vessels flying flags of convenience, which operated in the fishery. As a
matter of policy, the CCSBT has encouraged the membership of these countries.
The Republic of Korea and Indonesia joined the Commission on 17 October
2001 and 8 April 2008, respectively. The Fishing Entity of Taiwan’s membership of
the Extended Commission became effective on 30 August 2002.
At its meeting in October 2003, the CCSBT agreed to invite countries with an
interest in the fishery to participate in its activities as formal cooperating non-­
members. Cooperating non-members participate fully in the business of the CCSBT
but cannot vote. Acceptance as a cooperating non-member requires adherence to the
management and conservation objectives of the CCSBT and agreed catch limits.
Cooperating non-member status is regarded as a transitional measure to full mem-
bership and accession to the Convention.
The Philippines, South Africa, and the European Community were formally
accepted as cooperating non-members on 2 August 2004, 24 August 2006, and 13
October 2006, respectively.
The object of the Convention is to ensure, through appropriate management, the
conservation and optimum utilization of SBT.2
An interesting feature of the Convention and how it differs from most RFMOS
and from those considered in this book, is that it does not have a geographical
area—it applies to SBT in all oceans, including the spawning ground south of Java,
Indonesia.

2
The Convention—Article 3 http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/basic_documents/
convention.pdf.
The CCSBT and “the Convention” 63

Where the CCSBT mandate overlaps with other RFMOs, the CCSBT has had
agreements or MOUs (Memorandum of Understanding) with these RFMOs, which
clarify that the CCSBT has primary competence for the management of SBT.
The Convention established the CCSBT and describes how it operates and func-
tions. The functions of the CCSBT include collecting information, deciding on a
total allowable catch (TAC) and its allocation, deciding on additional measures,
agreeing an annual budget, and encouraging accession by other states (as described
in Article 840).
Membership of the CCSBT is only open to States. To facilitate the participation
of fishing entities, the CCSBT established the ECCSBT and the ESC in 2001.
Fishing entities may be admitted as members of the ECCSBT and the ESC, and the
fishing entity of Taiwan was so admitted in 2002. Membership of the ECCSBT and
the ESC also includes all parties to the Convention.
The ECCSBT and the ESC perform the same functions as the CCSBT and the
Scientific Committee (SC), respectively, with each member having equal voting
rights. Decisions of the ECCSBT, which are reported to the CCSBT, become deci-
sions of the CCSBT unless the CCSBT agrees otherwise.
Any decision of the Commission that affects the operation of the ECCSBT or the
rights, obligation, or status of any individual member within the ECCSBT should
not be taken without prior due deliberation of that issue by the ECCSBT.
Currently, the ECCSBT consists of six members and three cooperating non-­
members (Table 4.1).
The CCSBT has five subsidiary bodies which provide advice on their areas of
expertise—the Scientific Committee (SC)/Extended Scientific Committee (ESC),
Stock Assessment Group (SAG), Ecologically Related Species Working Group
(ERSWG), Compliance Committee (CC), and the Finance and Administration
Committee (FAC). A panel of independent scientists (the independent advisory
panel) also sits in on the SC and SAG meetings and are able to provide advice
directly to the CCSBT if required.
The diagram below shows the relationships between the CCSBT, its subsidiary
bodies, and the Secretariat (Fig. 4.1).
The SC’s main role is to assess and analyze the status and trends of the popula-
tion of SBT and report and make recommendations to the CCSBT.
Two important working groups relate to the SC:

Table 4.1 List of CCSBT and ECCSBT members

ECCSBT members Cooperating non-members
Japan Philippines
Australia South Africa
New Zealand European Union
Republic of Korea
Fishing entity of Taiwan (only ECCSBT)
Indonesia
64 4 CCSBT and the Management of Southern Bluefin Tuna

Fig. 4.1 The CCSBT organogram shows the relationships between the CCSBT, its subsidiary
bodies, and the Secretariat

–– the Stock Assessment Group (SAG) which was established to carry out technical
evaluation functions including reviewing any new information on the SBT stock
and updating the stock assessment.
–– the Ecologically Related Species Working Group (ERSWG) which was estab-
lished to provide information and advice on issues relating to species associated
with SBT with specific reference to:
(a) species (both fish and non-fish) which may be affected by SBT fisheries
operations.
(b) predator and prey species which may affect the condition of the SBT stock.

The Southern Bluefin Tuna

Southern Bluefin tuna (Thunnus maccoyii) (SBT) are large, fast swimming, pelagic
fish (i.e., living in the open seas). SBT are found throughout the Southern Hemisphere
mainly in waters between 30 and 50° south, but only rarely in the Eastern Pacific.
The only known breeding area is in the Indian Ocean, south-east of Java, Indonesia.
The Management and Conservation of SBT 65

SBT can live for up to 40 years, reach a weight of over 200 km, and measure
more than 2 m in length. There is some uncertainty about the size and age when on
average they become mature. This is the subject of current research by Commission
members. The available data suggests that it is around 1.5 m and no younger than
age 8. Mature females produce several million or more eggs in a single spawning
period (CCSBT 2008).
Breeding takes place from September to April in warm waters south of Java. The
juveniles migrate south down the west coast of Australia. During the summer
months (December–April), they tend to congregate near the surface in the coastal
waters off the southern coast of Australia and spend their winters in deeper, temper-
ate oceanic waters. After age 5, they are seldom found in near shore surface waters
(CCSBT 2008).
As SBT breed in the one area (south of Java) and all look alike wherever they are
found, they are managed as one breeding stock.
Southern Bluefin tuna are very valuable and their primary market is the Japanese
Sashimi market. Because of the high fat content of SBT flesh, premium prices can
be obtained in the Japanese market. The total value of the SBT global fishery is
estimated to be about $AUD1 billion (CCSBT 2008).
Except for the catch by Australian fishers, the main method used for catching
SBT is longline fishing. This method involves using long lengths of fishing line with
many hooks. The SBT caught are mainly frozen at very low temperatures (−60° C)
and either unloaded at intermediate ports and shipped to markets in Japan or
unloaded directly at markets in Japan.
The Australian component of the fishery mainly uses the purse seine method.
This is a net that encloses a school of fish. However, rather than landing the fish, the
fish are towed to waters near the Australian mainland and placed in floating cages
anchored to the ocean floor. The tuna are then fattened for several months and sold
direct to Japanese markets as frozen or chilled fish (CCSBT 2008).

The Management and Conservation of SBT

Following entry into force of the Convention in 1994, the CCSBT was able to reach
agreement on a TAC and quota allocations among its three original members
(Australia, Japan, and New Zealand) the very next year (for the fishing year
1995–1996). The following year, the CCSBT also agreed on a TAC and quota allo-
cations, as well as on a data collection and exchange program and certain other
measures. However, the TAC reached did not necessarily reflect consensus. From
those past years, Australia and New Zealand were much more conservative and
precautionary on TAC than Japan (CCSBT 1996).
Beginning in 1997, however, trouble arose. According to the CCSBT (1997b)
report, in the CCSBT Fourth Meeting (page 7, part 2) Japan proposed an increase in
TAC of 3000 t, noting that this was in addition to any quota offer to non-members.
Japan’s proposal was based on the projections made by Japanese scientists of future
66 4 CCSBT and the Management of Southern Bluefin Tuna

stock size, which showed a high probability that the parental stock would recover to
1980 levels by 2020.
Australia stated that given the severely depleted stock status, it was vital that the
precautionary approach be taken in relation to the TAC and national allocations.
Australian scientists’ assessments showed that the SBT stock was likely to remain
in a depleted state for many years.
New Zealand stated its concern over the depleted stock status as evidenced by the
consensus decision in the 1996 scientific report that the SBT stock was at 5–8% of
the 1960 level of parental biomass and 25–38% of 1980 level of parental biomass.
Both New Zealand and Australian scientists estimated that the probability was less
than 30% that the stock would recover to the 1980 level of parental biomass by 2020.
Therefore, given the lack of any progress towards restraining the catch of non-­
members, New Zealand proposed to reduce the TAC by 3000 t. This would be a
substantial step towards achieving the objective of stock recovery to the 1980 level
of parental biomass by 2020. New Zealand noted Japan had suggested that New
Zealand consider unilateral catch reductions. However, New Zealand firmly believed
that it was the Commission’s responsibility to address the serious status of the SBT
stock. Unilateral catch reductions would disadvantage New Zealand’s strategic
position in the Commission: it would disadvantage NZ industry; and it would not
have an appreciable impact on overall removals as New Zealand’s proportion of the
total SBT catch was less than 3% of total removals. New Zealand urged parties to
seriously consider how catch restraint could be achieved at this meeting.
Japan responded that it could not accept New Zealand’s proposal for a 3000 t
reduction, as it believed the stock could sustain a 3000 t increase. It was the view of
Japan that taking an extreme precautionary approach, such as stopping fishing, did
not reflect Japan’s interpretation of stock status. As there were scientific uncertain-
ties regarding SBT stock status, in Japan’s view, it was necessary to work on research
programs that would resolve one of the major uncertainties. New Zealand responded
by pointing out that the precautionary approach, as expressed in the UNFSA, was
not ambiguous—the absence of scientific data did not provide a rationale for failing
to take conservation and management measures. In New Zealand’s view, Japan was
suggesting that uncertainty in the stock assessment meant that a catch increase was
an acceptable action. However, a catch increase was clearly inconsistent with the
precautionary approach expressed in UNIA and was irresponsible, given the current
stock status.
Australia noted that the precautionary approach was clearly defined in both
UNFSA and the FAO Code of Conduct on Responsible Fishing and was widely
used in fisheries, and thus directly relevant to matters before the Commission.
The dilemma between Japan and Australia and New Zealand caused frustration
in the countries, and they left the 1997 meeting failing to adopt a national TAC. The
matter continued for the next several years.
The CCSBT did not agree on a global TAC or quota allocations for the fishing
years 1997–1998, 1998–1999, 1999–2000, 2000–2001, 2001–2002, or 2002–2003.
During this period, the Commission did make limited progress in certain other
areas, including the creation of an independent panel of scientists and independent
The Scientific Committee and the Management Procedure 67

chairs for its scientific committees and the adoption of a Trade Information Scheme
(TIS) in 2000.
Throughout those years, the CCSBT Scientific Committee would improve the
information it shared; however, the level of uncertainty was still great. Scientists
were working to quickly develop a management procedure that would, at the very
least, guarantee a major certainty for the management advice, as uncertainty was the
major excuse for not accepting the scientific precautionary advice.

The Scientific Committee and the Management Procedure

During the 1990s, managers from Australia, Japan, and New Zealand consistently
had diverging opinions about the interpretation of the scientific advice and a dis-
agreement about the setting of the TAC (e.g., CCSBT 1995a, b, 1996, 1997a, b,
1998, 1999a, b). Initially, the stock assessments tended to predict a high probability
of rapid stock rebuilding. However, as the years passed, the projected rebuilding
was not evident from the data and different assessments yielded divergent predic-
tions (e.g., Klaer et al. 1996). This led to a number of initiatives to attempt to
improve the stock assessment, including the development of a joint experimental
fishing program (Polacheck 2002 and references therein). When agreement on this
failed, Japan undertook unilateral experimental fishing, which was viewed by other
CCSBT members primarily as a means of increasing catches. This resulted in a
legal dispute in the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) (Firestone
and Polacheck 2003). The ITLOS hearing resulted in a temporary suspension of
Japanese experimental fishing in 2000; however, the Arbitral Panel subsequently
ruled that it did not have legal jurisdiction to resolve the case.
During the 1990s, catches of SBT by non-CCSBT parties (principally Taiwan,
Korea, and Indonesia) increased to substantial levels, adding impetus for the
Commission to resolve its problems.
With the Convention’s entry into force in 1994, the SC was established and the
tripartite science process that had existed between Australia, Japan, and New
Zealand was formalized. The SC first met in 1995 and has met annually since then.
The first working group of the SC, the ERSWG, was established early on in the
history of the CCSBT. It had its first meeting in 1995. The SAG followed in 1998
when the CCSBT separated the observing and analyzing functions from the inter-
preting and advising functions. The SAG reports to the SC and the ERSWG terms
of reference provide that it also reports to the SC, but in practice, it reports directly
to the CCSBT.
In 2000, the CCSBT members negotiated a settlement for the experimental fish-
ing dispute. It also agreed to: (1) the appointment of an independent scientific advi-
sory panel; (2) development of a Scientific Research Program aimed at improving
data for stock assessments; and (3) the development of a management procedure.
The concept of a simulation-tested, management decision rule had been formally
introduced into the CCSBT process in 1993 (Sainsbury and Polacheck 1993) and
68 4 CCSBT and the Management of Southern Bluefin Tuna

the CCSBT agreed to hold a Management Strategy Workshop in 1996 (CCSBT

1996). However, the first CCSBT Management Strategy Workshop was not held
until 1999 (CCSBT 2000). Prior to this, an in-depth illustration of the applicability
of an MP approach to the SBT stock had been completed (e.g., Polacheck et al.
1999). The Commission agreed to develop an MP in 2000 (CCSBT 2000).
In 2001, the Extended Scientific Committee (ESC) was established to provide
for participation by the fishing entity of Taiwan and other cooperating
non-members.
An important feature of the CCSBT science process is the role played by both the
independent chairs of the SAG and the SC, and the advisory independent panel.
These roles were established following recommendations of a group of independent
stock assessment and scientific fishery advisers who were asked by the CCSBT to
evaluate its science processes and methods.
The independent chairs of the SAG and the SC draft meeting agendas, direct
discussions to ensure good scientific principles are observed, facilitate consensus,
and carry out other activities as chair of the meetings.
The advisory panel participates in all meetings of the SAG, SC, and other scien-
tific meetings. Their role is to help consolidate parties’ views to facilitate consensus
and their views are incorporated in SAG/SC reports. They also provide their own
views on stock assessments to the SC and CCSBT.
The situation seems to have improved in 2003. By that year, the Republic of
Korea had joined the CCSBT and there was also created an “extended” Commission
to facilitate the participation of Taiwan. In 2003 and 2004, the CCSBT reached
agreement on TACs and quota allocations for its members and certain non-­members,
and made progress in starting to develop a comprehensive “management procedure”
that the Commission ultimately adopted in 2011 (see below).
In 2005, however, the CCSBT received advice from its Scientific Committee that
the stock of SBT was deteriorating, that at current catch levels there was a 50%
chance that stock levels would decline to zero, and that only very significant reduc-
tions in the TAC would result in a 50% probability of avoiding further decline.
Despite this daunting advice, the CCSBT could not reach agreement on a TAC nor
any reductions in catch levels. Instead, members and cooperating non-members
merely promised that their individual catch levels would not exceed those from the
previous year.
In 2006, the CCSBT faced a true crisis. As described by the CCSBT (2008), the
CCSBT “considered information that catches over the past 10–20 years may have
been substantially underreported and the implications that had for the historical data
record maintained by the CCSBT.” This revelation of substantial underreporting of
catches may have seriously compromised the data on which the Commission must
make decisions even now and well into the future.
At the same year, the CCSBT considered information that catches over the past
10–20 years may have been substantially underreported and the implications that
had for the historical data record maintained by the CCSBT. These uncertainties in
the historical catch and Catch per Unit Effort (CPUE) for SBT have made it difficult
to run a full stock assessment.
The Scientific Committee and the Management Procedure 69

In 2006, the CCSBT adopted a TAC for most members for 2007–2009
(2007–2011 in the case of Japan) that was only to be reviewed if exceptional cir-
cumstances emerged in relation to the stock. During the three-year fixed-TAC
period, the ESC and the SAG are focusing on reducing uncertainty in the data upon
which the SBT stock assessment is based with the intention of conducting a full
stock assessment in 2009.
According to the CCSBT (2008) “The estimates of the depletion of the spawning
stock biomass suggest that, in terms of outcomes, the CCSBT has not been success-
ful in managing SBT. In addition, due to the uncertainty in past underreported
catches, the data holdings of the CCSBT are compromised and their utility for sci-
entific stock assessment to inform management decisions is significantly dimin-
ished. Nonetheless, the ESC, including an independent advisory panel, has sought
to provide the Extended Commission with the best scientific advice possible on the
status of the SBT.”
Perhaps chastened by this crisis, the CCSBT agreed in 2006 to a global TAC and
national allocations that included a reduction in the Japanese allocation from 6065 t
to 3000 t (quota set for 5 years until at least 2011, pending a review). The following
year, the CCSBT set a global TAC and allocations for the 2008–2009 period.
The CCSBT is struggling to reduce the uncertainty in the data on which the SBT
stock assessment is based. At present, though, the CCSBT still faces glaring prob-
lems arising from the compromised data, including the admission in the CCSBT
(2008) that “it is not possible to determine the exact trends in the status of SBT
over time.”
According to Kolody et al. (2008), one of the greatest benefits of the CCSBT MP
process was the facilitation of these stakeholder interactions. It helped to increase
the general understanding of the fishery for all involved, and provided the mecha-
nism and context for feedback between stakeholders and MP developers. It also
increased the shared knowledge between stakeholders and decision-makers. It
would be unfortunate if the recent revelations of the historical data problems have
undermined the benefits of communication and cooperation that were gained
through these consultations.
For Kurota et al. (2010), another strong point of the MPs is to promote transpar-
ent and rapid decision-making for TACs. In principle, if an MP becomes available,
TACs are determined automatically, so that confrontation among scientists, manag-
ers, and stakeholders can be avoided; transparency in the process promotes agree-
ment on management measures by removing skepticism amongst stakeholders. In
addition, rapid decision-making with a short time lag between data collection and
implementation is critical to secure sustainable use of marine resources.
At its eighteenth annual meeting (2011), the CCSBT agreed that a Management
Procedure (MP), known as the “Bali Procedure,” would be used to guide the setting
of the SBT global TAC to ensure that the SBT spawning stock biomass achieves the
interim rebuilding target of 20% of the original spawning stock biomass. The
CCSBT now sets the TAC based on the outcome of the MP, unless the CCSBT
decides otherwise based on information that is not otherwise incorporated into the
MP. This was a great step forward.
70 4 CCSBT and the Management of Southern Bluefin Tuna

In adopting the MP, the CCSBT emphasized the need to take a precautionary
approach to increase the likelihood of the spawning stock rebuilding in the short
term and to provide industry with more stability in the TAC (i.e., to reduce the prob-
ability of future TAC decreases).
An MP is a pre-agreed set of rules that can specify changes to the TAC based on
updated monitoring data. An MP is defined as a simulation-tested decision rule (or
Harvest Control Rule), and the requisite methods of data collection and analysis,
which together are used to calculate a management recommendation (e.g., Total
Allowable Catch (TAC)) for a fishery (e.g., de la Mare 1986; Butterworth et al.
1996; Smith et al. 1999).
MP development was carried out by CCSBT SC members, who consist of about
10–20 “national” scientists in member countries, an independent advisory panel (4
experienced specialists), and a consultant programmer. The advisory panel for the
SC was officially established in 1999 to facilitate consensus among member coun-
tries. While a set of operating models (OMs) was developed jointly by the SC,
candidate MPs were proposed by scientists of member countries (Kurota et al. 2010).
From 2002 to 2011, the CCSBT conducted extensive work to develop an MP in
order to guide its global TAC setting process for southern Bluefin tuna. The CCSBT
tested a variety of candidate MPs with the aid of an operating model of the fishery
that simulated the characteristics of the SBT stock and fishery. The candidate MPs
were tested against a range of uncertainties so that a robust procedure could be
identified.
Considerable optimism existed within the CCSBT that a jointly developed MP
could break the dysfunctional cycle of contested stock assessments and failure to
reach consensus on management decisions that had prevailed since the mid-1990s.
However, the development process suffered from a number of setbacks, culminating
in revelations of substantial data problems in 2005–2006 that undermined confi-
dence in the agreed MP. As a result, MP implementation was suspended until the
implications of the data problems can be formally admitted within the simulation
testing process.
The final MP, known as the “Bali Procedure,” was recommended by the CCSBT’s
Scientific Committee in July 2011. Parameters of the recommended decision rule
could be adjusted to set different time horizons for rebuilding, and to constrain the
maximum TAC changes allowed each time the TAC is updated. A range of options
was presented to CCSBT’s Extended Commission.
The Extended Commission adopted the Bali Procedure and the following associ-
ated management parameters as its MP at the CCSBT’s eighteenth annual meeting
in October 2011:
• The MP is tuned to a 70% probability of rebuilding the stock to the interim
rebuilding target reference point of 20% of the original spawning stock biomass
by 2035.
• The minimum TAC change (increase or decrease) is 100 t.
• The maximum TAC change (increase or decrease) is 3000 t.
The Epistemic Community at CCSBT 71

• The TAC will be set for three-year periods, subject to paragraph 7 of the
Resolution on Adoption of a Management Procedure.3
• The national allocation of the TAC within each three-year period will be appor-
tioned according to the Resolution on the Allocation of the Global Total
Allowable Catch.4
The MP has been used to guide the setting of the global SBT TAC for fishing
years since 2012. For the second (2015–2017) and subsequent three-year TAC set-
ting periods, there is a one-year lag between TAC calculations by the MP and imple-
mentation of that TAC (e.g., the 2015–2017 TAC was calculated in 2013).
The technical specifications of the MP may be updated, and the last review was,
to date, in 2013.5
According to the CCSBT (2014) at the Independent Review, the advice presently
delivered to CCSBT by its scientific subsidiary bodies is excellent. The institutional
setup, with its independent panels and chairs, the systematic peer-review processes,
the adoption of instruments like the MP, the metarule, triennial in-depth assess-
ments, indicators, etc., provide instruments which are at the top of international
standards. The advice delivered by the ESC has apparently always been followed up.

The Epistemic Community at CCSBT

The CCSBT, besides being the newest RFMO in this study, has a very well struc-
tured scientific panel, which was responsible for building a management procedure
that was coherent; it was subsequently accepted by the ECCCSBT.
Before 2011, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand had zero, or almost null confi-
dence, in scientific information. They were feeling that the stocks were declining,
but they did not know how much, or how severe, or when, or even how much they
had left. In every meeting they had, they were clamoring for more certainty. As
Clark and Majone (1985) explained, and as demonstrated empirically in the Haas
and Stevens (2011) chapter: when science is not fully safeguarded from politics, in
spite of the quality of the science produced, it may not be considered true by many
of the decision-makers.
Since the establishment of the ESC, SAG and the independent advisory panel,
the information began to grow clearer and the need for reducing the quotas, for the
time being, and in the near future have a better quota system in place, was accepted.
In 1997, when a crisis occurred within the CCSBT, it came to light that the data
available on SBT and the techniques used by scientists to analyze this data were

3
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/operational_resolutions/Resolution_
Management_Procedure.pdf.
4
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/operational_resolutions/Resolution_
Allocation.pdf.
5
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/general/MP_Specifications.pdf.
72 4 CCSBT and the Management of Southern Bluefin Tuna

comparable to those utilized elsewhere in the world, although scientists’ representa-

tives had some concerns about the data and models used for assessing SBT. Their
major concern was with the process and group dynamics that lead to the report
provided to the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CSBT)
and the lack of agreement on what advice should be provided.
The process observed in the Stock Assessment Group (SAG) and the Scientific
Committee (SC) could not be described as scientifically neutral. In other indepen-
dent scientific processes, scientists participate firstly as individuals, not as national
representatives.
In this context, a recommendation arose showing the necessity of a clear separa-
tion between science and management. Separating the process into a technical part
(the SAG), and an advisory part, (the SC), may be a first step in that direction, but
would not appear to be sufficient under present conditions. As an interim measure,
the CCSBT constituted a facilitating panel of three to five independent scientists to
guide the SAG/SC process towards consensus advice. If the SAG/SC could not
reach consensus, the panel itself would provide the advice to the CCSBT.
This process approved in 19996 was a major step forward. The scientists to be
selected for the independent chairs of the SAG and SC, as well as for the members
of the Advisory Panel (CCSBT, 1999–2001, part I):
• Should not be a national of the parties nor have been a permanent resident or
have worked for the parties since 31/12/89 except where parties reach a consen-
sus to choose the qualified individual.
• Must have an excellent technical ability in stock assessment.
• Must have adequate working experience as a scientist involved in stock assess-
ment and fisheries management at the international level.
• Should have working experience with large pelagic fish resources.
• Are desired to have familiarity with assessment procedures and scientific proce-
dures used in international fishery commissions.
Also the duties of the independent chair of the SC are to7:
• circulate the draft agenda through the Secretariat.
• declare the meeting schedule, and open and close meetings of the SC.
• direct discussions in the meetings, to ensure that the work of the SC adheres to
the scientific principles of demonstrable evidence, statement of assumptions and
examination of logic, and to ensure observance of these rules.
• facilitate reaching consensus to the extent possible.
• accord the right to speak and to limit the time allowed for speaking.
• rule on points of order, subject to the right of any member to request that any
ruling by the Chair be submitted to the SC for decision.
• ascertain if consensus exists.

6
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/operational_resolutions/report_of_the_1998_
peer_review_panel.pdf.
7
http://www.ccsbt.org/site/stock_assessment.php.
The Epistemic Community at CCSBT 73

• in relation to each meeting of the SC, to sign, on behalf of the SC, a report of the
proceedings of the meeting for transmission to the Commission and present such
reports to the Commission.
• to convey to the Executive Secretary any instructions determined by the SC.
• the authority to call meetings of the representatives of the members after confer-
ring with the representatives.
• to exercise other powers and responsibilities as provided in the Rules of Procedure
for the Commission and make such decisions and give such directions as will
ensure that the business of the SC is carried out effectively and in accordance
with its decisions.
The Advisory Panel terms of reference are:
• to participate in all meetings of the SC and other scientific meetings as requested
by the Commission.
• to help to consolidate parties’ views to facilitate consensus.
• to incorporate their views in SC reports and provide to the SC and CCSBT in the
form of a report of their own views on stock assessment and other matters.
All the measures were taken to guarantee a more independent view of the pro-
cess, and to give more confidence between countries members, as the confidence
between them was never that strong, as proved by the legal dispute undertaken by
Australia and New Zealand against Japan (1998) under the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), mentioned above.
In this new scientific structure, some essential characteristics were guaranteed,
which very much aligns them with what Haas and Stevens (2011) considered impor-
tant to promote policy changes. The more autonomous and independent science is
from policy, the greater its potential influence (Andresen 2000; Botcheva 2001;
Haas 2001). Consensus in isolation builds value and integrity, its consequences,
then, should be discussed publicly. Measures of autonomy and integrity include the
selection and funding of scientists by intergovernmental organizations rather than
by governments, the recruitment of scientists by merit on important panels, and reli-
ance on individuals whose reputation and authority rest on their role as active
researchers rather than on their role as policy advocates or science administrators.
Accuracy can be achieved via peer review, interdisciplinary research, and indepen-
dence from sponsoring sources.
And, the promotion of what is called usable knowledge8 usually happens through
the “epistemic communities.” In the CCSBT case, this specific community had not
emerged until this new design as the scientists could not reach consensus nor any
agreement on methods, results, and even more in their policy recommendations. In

8
Already defined in the previous chapter, but to facilitate the reading “In short, usable knowledge
encompasses a substantive core that makes it usable for policymakers and a procedural dimension
that provides a mechanism for its transmission from the scientific community to the policy world,
and it allows for agency when theorizing about broader patterns of social learning, policymaking,
and international relations (Haas and Stevens 2011).”
74 4 CCSBT and the Management of Southern Bluefin Tuna

addition, before the implementation of independent chairs and an Advisory Panel,

there was no confidence in the research results provided by the countries themselves.
However, even after the implementation of independent chairs and an Advisory
Panel, there was still no agreement on quotas. The level of confidence and agree-
ment increased, but there was no influence on political decisions for quotas. The
agreement existing so far came only after the establishment of the MP (CCSBT
2011). When the implementation of the MP happened, the rule was clear, a scientific
baseline was defined, and from then on, all political decisions have been made based
on this rule.
When the MP was approved, the CCSBT was able to overcome one of the most
common problems for the RFMO’s effectiveness, which has already been pointed
out by Gjerde et al. (2013). According to them, countries are normally interested in
enhancing or maintaining their domestic fishing opportunities, leading to the pursuit
of short-term gains over long-term sustainable fishing. And, this was the exact situ-
ation at CCSBT, before the MP, when it was mainly Japan who was fighting to
increase quotas. Australia and New Zealand, who wanted to keep fishing, were
looking towards the horizon in their attempts to establish more conservative quotas.
The epistemic community within the Stock Assessment Group, the Extended
Scientific Group, and the Independent Advisory panel formed a trusted body, which
countries could rely on. But more than that, as it is an established and approved
procedure, the decision-makers no longer doubt their decisions, they need only to
follow the rules.
In this case, the CCSBT differs from the previous RFMOs studied here: since the
beginning, in the CCAMLR, knowledge flowed through the established institutional
design, while in the case of the ICCAT there were no clear procedures and the epis-
temic community only had an effect when multiple stakeholders acted together. The
CCSBT epistemic community is a mixture of both of these processes. They first
acted together to create a reliable mechanism that would be accepted by all coun-
tries, and then, they had a clear institutional design where usable knowledge can
feed directly into the political decisions.

NGOs at CCSBT

The CCSBT process for acceptance of observer status for NGOs was never too clear
and/or too open and transparent.
Since 1997, for instance, Greenpeace International requested access to the meet-
ings and was denied. The Fourth Annual Meeting of the Commission (CCSBT
1997b, p. 2) in Japan stated that “it did not support the application because
Greenpeace was known to use radical methods to achieve its goals and to act against
the provisions and spirit of the Convention. Japan stated that in light of the
Commission’s objective to ensure, through appropriate management, the conserva-
tion and optimum utilization of southern bluefin tuna, it would be inappropriate to
assign observer status to Greenpeace.”
NGOs at CCSBT 75

Even with the complaints from New Zealand and Australia, who promptly dis-
agreed with Japan noting that the Commission’s proceedings should also be trans-
parent and if there were good reason to facilitate observation of the meeting by
NGOs with a legitimate interest in the management of SBT, the observer status for
Greenpeace was denied from 1997 to 2000. The strategy Greenpeace used to follow
the meetings was to be part of a country’s delegation. Thus, Greenpeace had mem-
bers as part of the Australian and New Zealand delegation in 2000 and 2001. And,
in 2001, they also had a member as part of the Australian Scientific Delegation. Of
course, when an NGO is a member of a country’s delegation, they are wearing more
than a government hat, more, in fact, than an NGO hat; however, this is still very
helpful because they can lend their expertise to the government while also having
access to inside information.
In 1997 during Japan’s opening statement, the question was again brought up
about environmental groups: “as we can see from the recently published report by
WWF and Traffic Oceania, as well as the application for the observer status from
Greenpeace International, the general public’s interest in CCSBT’s activities is
increasing. Claims made by these groups are based solely on pessimistic informa-
tion. We are concerned that not only do they fail to reflect CCSBT’s views with
fairness, but run the risk of creating misunderstanding and confusion within the
society by stirring up excessive sense of crisis. Faced with this situation, Japan
believes that CCSBT needs to demonstrate that we are a regional fisheries manage-
ment organization, which is functioning effectively. In this context, it is critical for
us to swiftly achieve substantive progress on major issues I talked about earlier,
which will, in turn, increase the credibility of our forum” (CCSBT 1997b).
Based on Japan’s statement, it is important to note that pressure from environ-
mental groups was influencing the decision-makers to improve the effectiveness of
CCSBT, even while operating from the outside.
Besides the Japan resistance against Greenpeace International, other NGOs, such
as TRAFFIC,9 were following the meetings either as scientific experts or as part of
the Australian delegation since 1996, including the Tuna Boat Owners Association
of Australia.10
However, it was only in 2007 that the CCSBT finally accepted NGOs as observ-
ers. The main difference in this case is that as observers, the organizations now had
a forum to make their own statements.
The Human Society International, WWF, and TRAFFIC are, since 2007, follow-
ing the meetings, and with this the CCSBT no doubt has guaranteed more transpar-
ency to the entire process. In 2012, after the approval of the MP, TRAFFIC and
WWF welcomed the decision.

9
TRAFFIC aims to ensure that trade in wild plants and animals is not a threat to the conservation
of nature (http://www.traffic.org/).
10
ASBTIA is the peak body representing Southern Bluefin Tuna ranching companies in Australia.
The Association has 13 member companies, which is 100% of the local industry. The Association
began in 1978 as the Tuna Boat Owners of South Australia (http://asbtia.com.au/about/).
76 4 CCSBT and the Management of Southern Bluefin Tuna

Although the NGOs are now allowed to be part of the CCSBT Annual meetings,
it is possible to note that their voices are still not as vocal as are the other NGOs in
the CCAMLR and ICCAT. There are many reasons that may explain that, such as
the difficulty for international organizations to follow up on meetings that normally
happen in the Oceania area, far from their headquarters, or possibly even due to the
lack of resources or prioritization to be involved in so many international agreements.
In the CCSBT case study, the importance of the Scientific Committee is even
greater, as their independent view guarantees a more insulated process and more
reliable data, as civil society has not been successfully able to follow the mat-
ters of SBT.

Conclusion

The CCSBT is the youngest and smallest of the RFMOs studied here. However, it
has made huge improvements in its scientific process, which has led to a robust
procedure in supporting countries on their decisions.
Since its governance crisis in 1997–1999, the CCSBT has made progress, some
of which is already evident in the 2008 performance review assessment (CCSBT
2008), improving its institutional structure and functioning, its information systems
and assessment methods, its decision-process and compliance monitoring systems.
However, the approval of the MP in 2011 was a great turning point and proved
that CCSBT countries were really up to change modus operandi to promote a better
SBT management. It was a shift from countries taking over the decisions, to now,
countries accepting these decisions based on science that has been provided by a
well-structured and independent epistemic community. It would be interesting to
see in the near future a review of Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly’s (2010) quantitative
research, with data post-MP, to evaluate if they would get a higher score, as the
CCSBT earned the lowest score amongst all RFMOs.
The epistemic community emerged only in 2011/2012, when the MP was adopted
and the Independent Advisory Panel, the SAG and the ESC, which constitute the
epistemic community, were acting on behalf of an insulated science giving trust-
worthy subsidies to the ECCSBT.
At its Eighteenth annual meeting in 2011, the CCSBT agreed that an MP would
be used to guide the setting of the SBT global total allowable catch (TAC) to ensure
that the SBT spawning stock biomass achieves the interim rebuilding target of 20%
of the original spawning stock biomass. In adopting the MP, the CCSBT empha-
sized the need to take a precautionary approach to increase the likelihood of the
spawning stock rebuilding in the short term and to provide industry with more sta-
bility in the TAC (i.e., to reduce the probability of future TAC decreases).
It is still too early to see results from the MP on the stock status. Thus, the stock
remains at a very low state estimated to be 9% of the initial SSB, and below the level
to produce maximum sustainable yields (MSY); however, there has been some
Conclusion 77

improvement since the 2011 stock assessment and fishing mortality is below the
level associated with MSY—considered already progress.
Also, on a positive note, the membership of the CCSBT has grown in recent
years such that the members and cooperating non-members of the Commission now
represent virtually all-fishing activity for SBT, conferring more governance and
regulation for the system. With all the relevant players now at the table, the CCSBT
at least has an opportunity to create a better future for SBT and those whose liveli-
hoods depend on that resource.
CCSBT is still a new RFMO, but it has so far demonstrated a strong institutional
design where science can influence political decisions, and the epistemic commu-
nity can provide the usable knowledge coherent enough to guide political decisions,
even considering a level of uncertainty.
CCSBT has yet to demonstrate more commitment with transparency and with
the isolation of policy to science. However, for a new RFMO with a fairly small
membership whose original mandate is limited to ensuring the conservation and
optimum utilization of a single fish stock, this is already a big step.
Conclusion

A fundamental principle underlying successful modern fisheries management is

that management decisions need to be based on the “best available scientific infor-
mation,” and carried out through cooperation between different stakeholders.
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) highlights
this principle stating that the determination of allowable catches and other conserva-
tion measures for living resources in the high seas are to be based on the “best sci-
entific information available to the States concerned”1 and require states to
“cooperate to establish subregional or regional fisheries organizations to this end”
(RFMOs).2
The need for scientific advice as the basis for management decisions and
the establishment of RFMOs is further affirmed in the United Nation Fish
Stock Agreement (UNFSA).3UNFSA also includes provisions with respect to
transparency and dissemination of information. In this respect, the agreement
mandates that states and RFMOs “shall actively promote the publication and
dissemination to any interested States the results of that research and information
relating to its objectives and methods”.4 It also requires that “States shall provide for
transparency in the decision-making process and other activities of subregional and
regional fisheries management organizations and arrangements”.5
Even with all of these rules and norms, the main question posed here from the
very beginning still remains: is power listening to science on RFMOs?
And the answer is: they may listen to them, but the strategy, their allies, and the
way it happens differ case by case (Table A.1). Also, it is important to note that, in

1
Article 119—http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part7.htm.
2
Op cit—Article 118.
3
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/fish_stocks_agreement/
CONF164_37.htm.
4
Op cit—Article 14.
5
Op cit—Article 12.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 79

Switzerland AG 2021
L. R. Gonçalves, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70362-2
80 Conclusion

Table A.1 A summary review of the case of studies

Case Case Case
CCAMLR ICCAT CCSBT
Signed on 1982 1966 1994
Cullis-Suzuki 100% 37.5% 0%
and Pauly
(2010) ranking
evaluation
Number of N = 25 members +11 N = 80 N = 6 + 3 cooperating
members acceding states non-members
Epistemic Scientists (n = 25) from Some NGO members, Independent Advisory
Community the Working Group Fish ICCAT chairman, some Panel, the SAG and the
Stock Assessment SCRS members ESC
(WG-FSA)
Main NGOs ASOC, COLTO Pew, Greenpeace, WWF Traffic, Greenpeace
Strategy and WG-FSA is formed by a The epicom had more CCSBT is a very new
allies high caliber of scientists, influence when it used a RFMO, and still not much
and based on their crisis momentum and open to NGOs
knowledge and sound was backed up by the participation, which would
science, they provide NGOs, CITES, and increase their
advice to the SC and public opinion. In this transparency. In this case,
their advice is case study, the ICCAT the SC and the
automatically accepted chairman was also part Independent Advisory
by the Commission. The of the epicom and had Panel are important as
institutional design also access to the major they produce accurate
supports science players. Multiple knowledge to subsidize
influence stakeholders acted policy decisions. Their
together. The epicom strategy was to approve a
here acted, not through management procedure,
its own institutional when the implementation
design, but through its of MP happened, a rule
personal was clear, a science
communication baseline was defined, and
channels from then on, all of the
political decisions have
been made based on this
Policy effect TAC based on science + TAC based on science Management procedure—
CDS adoption more autonomous and
independent science and
TAC based on science
(continued)
Conclusion 81

Table A.1 (continued)

Case Case Case
CCAMLR ICCAT CCSBT
Effectiveness See Fig. 2.3. Possible See Fig. 3.4 It is still too early to see
outcome on stability around that results from the MP on the
biomassa level (50% of the stock status. Thus, the
biomass virgin) for the stock remains at a very
coming years low state estimated to be
9% of the initial SSB, and
below the level to produce
maximum sustainable
yield (MSY); however,
there has been some
improvement since the
2011 stock assessment and
fishing mortality is below
the level associated with
MSY—considered already
a progress
a
Through this book and methodology it is not possible to state that a policy outcome, influenced by
the epicom, had a direct effect on the biomass, as it is not possible to control other variables, such
as natural variation and IUU control. However, their influence led to policies which credibly
improved biomass. As illustrated in Chap. 1, the RFMOs used as case studies here have some form
of a Scientific Committee that provides relevant scientific advice to the governing body on stock
status, monitoring, and possible management actions (most frequently the setting of catch limits).
The working arrangements of these Scientific Committees and their subsidiary technical bodies
vary, for example, to the extent to which the Scientific Committees and their technical bodies
undertake reviews of work prior to the meeting or actually undertake analyses during their meet-
ings. And based on how they are structured, constituted and implemented, they differ on how
influential they are on political decisions

a strict methodological sense, the facts cannot be generalized to other RFMOs on

the basis of what is but a fairly modest sample, compared to the vast variety of the
regional fisheries agreements that exists all across the oceans.
As shown, the CCAMLR presents the most established collective factors to guar-
antee that the knowledge can flow from its own epistemic community to the deci-
sion arena. As the agreement was historically built to follow science, there is no plea
to not accept management advice. The epistemic community located within the
WG-FSA provides data and advice to the Scientific Committee, and it arrives and it
is accepted with no change at the annual meetings. This is a clear example of how
the epistemic community can act through an agreement’s institutional design and
does not need any advocacy pressure to make it valid. It is not surprising that in the
Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly (2010) paper, the CCAMLR scored better than other
RFMOs. How they are implementing conservation measures, based on usable
knowledge, guarantees that the best management advice was followed, and thus,
the stocks maintain a good record. CCAMLR brings together the factors that
Haas (2000) indicates as necessary for an effective agreement, such as “the
existence and willingness of key states to exercise leadership, the existence of
strong international institutions, the presence of a strong transnational scientific
involvement (epistemic communities), and the involvement of NGOs.”
82 Conclusion

The CCAMLR, for instance, presents many characteristics that differ from other
RFMOs studied here and this more than justifies the opinion of some stakeholders
being against considering CCAMLR as an RFMO; they prefer to call CCAMLR a
“conservation body.” The institutional design and the rules of procedure, where
knowledge and social learning are considered on a higher level, are giving truth to
power. The epistemic community at the CCAMLR has no difficulty in being lis-
tened to and after 10 years of documental analysis, their management advice was
accepted ipsis litteris. They are trustworthy, they use the same scientific methods,
and they act on behalf of knowledge where no rational strategy is needed to make
their advice accepted. The empirical data evaluated here built the case around the
Patagonian toothfish; however, I would hardly doubt that for other species it would
be much different, as the rules are now followed by countries at every meeting.
ICCAT, in turn, does not have the same history, and on the contrary, it was largely
known by a Commission that does not normally acknowledge science. It had, for a
few years, a very bad reputation on managing the EBFT—one of the main and most
important and emblematic species managed by them. However, 2009/2010 it was a
great turning point. Although ICCAT’s own institutional design was not aimed
towards creating an insulated science, and with huge influence from politics on the
species management clearly illustrated in Chap. 1, the EBFT case analyzed here
showed that in a specific situation where there was a fishery crisis, a high level of
uncertainty, and added public pressure made by a transnational network of NGOs
and CITES, all helped to enhance the need for political will on the decision-makers.
By this time, the epistemic community was ready to provide usable knowledge to
the CPCs and in this case, it worked out well. After many years of not listening to
science, the ICCAT CPCs accepted the SC’s advice and now it is already possible to
see signs of recovery of the EBFT populations. However, in order to make it happen
it was necessary for lots of action from diverse stakeholders, it was necessary for an
advocacy strategy behind the scenes—that which is not necessary at the CCAMLR,
for instance. In ICCAT, the EBFT epistemic community is not limited to within the
SC; it is formed by diverse stakeholders who are acting on behalf of knowledge, not
through its own institutional design, but through their personal communication
channels.
As the institutional design built for the ICCAT was not well designed to listen to
science, as it was for CCAMLR, the EBFT, epistemic community was formed by a
group with a high level of professionalism. It emerged from the SCRS and included
scientists from NGOs, CPCs, and the ICCAT chairman, a scientist himself, produc-
ing usable knowledge, coherent, legitimate and solid enough to influence strategi-
cally, on many dimensions of power. The knowledge produced about the state of the
EBFT population was sound enough to have other key stakeholders supporting the
epistemic community claim. This major influence only worked due to the fact that
NGOs and CITES widely publicized the emergent fishery crisis that could damage
ICCAT’s history. Moreover, they created pressure on ICCAT, sponsoring the epis-
temic community knowledge.
ICCAT does not work like the CCAMLR, however, the EBFT case analyzed in
this book showed that when power does listen to science and implements their
Conclusion 83

advice through a social learning process, fish stocks can recover, and thus reach the
main goal of the Commission, conferring more effectiveness for the international
agreement. If they can use EBFT as a lesson learned for the other stocks, it will be
a huge step forward.
And last, but not least, while the CCSBT also presented an epistemic community,
they only emerged when the Commission faced reality and acted to promote a new
structure for science where independence from countries’ opinions was guaranteed.
When the Commission approved the Independent Chair and the Independent
Advisory Panel, they were able to create the MP that was ultimately accepted by all
countries and is now the ruling decisions on quotas. In the CCSBT case, the epis-
temic community resides within the SAG, ESC, and the Independent Advisory
Group; however, they could only emerge when they gained confidence from coun-
tries showing that with the best science they had in hand, they were reducing the
uncertainty, they were providing the best advice they could, under the management
procedures they had created. It would be great to repeat the Cullis-Suzuki and Pauly
(2010) research paper in 2020 (10 years later), to see if CCSBT’s score would
change now with the MP implemented and working.
Irrespective, in most cases, participation in the scientific process revolves around
member delegations with official heads of delegations. The heads of delegation are
most commonly government representatives with formal scientific credentials. The
levels of relevant research experience and expertise in the fisheries being assessed,
however, vary from almost nil to extensive. The head of a delegation has the formal
responsibility for managing the inputs of the members of his or her delegation and
for the delegation’s agreement to the content of final reports of the scientific meet-
ings. The functioning (e.g., procedures for participating in plenary and working
group discussions) and structure of the national delegations varies substantially.
Nevertheless, in most cases a large fraction of a member’s national delegation is
drawn from government fisheries departments or associated marine research insti-
tutes with a substantial portion of the funding for participation in the meetings and
related research provided by the national fisheries management department or
agency. It would be much better if they could retain an independent scientist as well.
The independence and separation of the scientific processes that provide infor-
mation for consideration by the RFMO, through the policy deliberations of the
RFMO, are important component of affecting the intent of UNCLOS and UNFSA
whose management decisions are based on the best available scientific information.
The agreements history, the countries that are a part of it, the external context, as
well as influence, the way knowledge is transmitted and structured, and the presence
of a strong epistemic community made a lot of difference in the three cases pre-
sented here.
After observing the three cases, it is possible to draw some important conclu-
sions that corroborate with Peter Haas’ work from 1992, which was compiled and
updated in Haas (2015).
Haas argues that consensus-based science can play an independent and impor-
tant role by influencing and even reformulating state interests, thereby helping to
bring about international agreements that transcend and reshape state interests. This
84 Conclusion

is made possible through the involvement of experts. Thus, from the epistemic com-
munity perspective, environmental regimes are driven not only by state powers but
also by epistemic networks under certain conditions, such as a knowledge insulated
and safeguarded from politics, which means an independent scientific panel; clear
procedures connecting science and policy and multiple stakeholders pushing the
same direction and supporting the knowledge.
Also, according to Haas’ theory, the states recognize the need of dealing with the
problem, and they rely on scientists for help only after a widely publicized shock or
crisis, as was seen for EBFT for the ICCAT and SBT for the CCSBT. Here, it is all
about the decision-makers’ recognition of the limits of their abilities to deal with new
issues and the need to defer or delegate to authoritative actors with a reputation for
expertise. For the CCAMLR, for instance, since science was fully embedded in the
institutional design of the agreement, a crisis was not necessary to motivate action.
It is not possible to assure that a policy outcome, influenced by the epistemic
community, had a direct effect on the biomass, as it is not possible to control other
variables, such as natural variation and IUU control. However, their influence led to
policies, which credibly improved biomass. It would be incredibly valuable to study
a larger number of agreements which show that when science was listened to, the
direct effect promoted a more effective agreement. A quantitative study in this
direction would be beneficial.
This book is a contribution to knowledge as it indicates that to improve the com-
plex governance of the oceans, it is important to keep in mind the institutional
design for science. When you have agreements, such as the CCAMLR, where sound
science and usable knowledge can flow from a strong, trustworthy, and capable
epistemic community to the decisions-makers, there exists better management over-
sight. When decisions are accepted based on the best knowledge available, there is
a higher chance of having a more effective agreement, since its alliance is tied to the
existence and willingness of key states to exercise leadership, the existence of strong
international institutions, the presence of a strong transnational scientific involve-
ment (epistemic communities), and the involvement of NGOs.
Additional research frontiers may include a focus on NGOs and their strategies
on international organizations, as well as asking what are the lessons learned about
NGO’s campaigns for accessing delegates. A process tracing the NGO’s actual cam-
paigns to influence delegations would be interesting, or even a description about
which NGOs worked with epistemic communities to determine if some NGOs are
more science-friendly than others on fisheries management, or if some NGOs act
more as advocacy groups following another agenda rather than that offered by sci-
entific knowledge.
As a final note, a focus on epistemic communities and the science and policy
interplay to discuss international cooperation do not exclude the central importance
of interstate relations in world affairs. However, not to take into account the non-
state actors and the role of knowledge in today’s world leaves one with only a partial
picture of the international system, and thus might represent an incomplete under-
standing of world politics itself.
Annex I: CCAMLR Epistemic Community

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 85

Switzerland AG 2021
L. R. Gonçalves, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations,
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 86

Pais NAME Institution 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 SUM
Convener Dr Mark Belchier British Antarctic Survey 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 7
Convener Dr David Agnew MRAG Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
Australia Dr Andrew Australian Antarctic Division, 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
Constable Department of the Environment
Australia Dr Steve Candy Australian Antarctic Division, 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
Department of the Environment
Australia Dr Dirk Welsford Australian Antarctic Division, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 9
Department of the Environment
Australia Dr Philippe Ziegler Australian Antarctic Division, 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Department of the Environment
France Mr Nicolas Gasco Muséum national d’Histoire naturelle 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 10
Germany Dr Karl-Hermann Institute of Sea Fisheries—Johann 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
Kock Heinrich von Thünen
Japan Dr Taro Ichii National Research Institute of Far Seas 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 5
Fisheries
Japan Mr Naohisa Taiyo A and F Co. Ltd. 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 6
Miyagawa
Japan Dr Kenji Taki National Research Institute of Far Seas 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 6
Fisheries
New Mr Alistair Dunn National Institute of Water and 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 8
Zealand Atmospheric Research
New Mr Jack Fenaughty Silvifish Resources Ltd. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 10
Zealand
New Dr Stuart Hanchet National Institute of Water and 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
Zealand Atmospheric Research
New Dr Steve Parker National Institute of Water and 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 7
Zealand Atmospheric Research
Russian fed Dr Konstantin FSUE-VNIRO 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7
Shust
Annex I: CCAMLR Epistemic Community

South Africa Mr Chris Capricorn Fisheries Monitoring 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 5

Heinecken (Capfish)
Pais NAME Institution 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 SUM
South Africa Dr Rob Leslie Department of Agriculture, Forestry 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 8
and Fisheries
Spain Mr Roberto Instituto Español de Oceanografía 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Sarralde Vizuete
Ukraine Dr Leonid Methodological and Technological 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11
Pshenichnov Center of Fishery and Aquaculture
United Dr Martin Collins Foreign and Commonwealth 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 9
Kingdom Office?British Antarctic Survey (2007)
United Dr Rebecca MRAG Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 5
Kingdom Mitchell
USA Dr Christopher National Oceanographic and 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
Jones Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Annex I: CCAMLR Epistemic Community

USA Dr Rennie Holt Southwest Fisheries Science Center 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6

USA Ms Kim Rivera National Marine Fisheries Service 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 6
87
Annex II: ICCAT CPCs Year of Ratification

Countries Year of ratification

United states 1967
Japan 1967
South Africa 1967
Ghana 1968
Canada 1968
France 1968
Brazil 1969
Maroc 1969
Rep of Korea 1970
Cote Divore 1972
Angola 1976
Russia 1977
Gabon 1977
Cap-vert 1979
Uruguay 1983
Sao tome e Principe 1983
Venezuela 1983
Guine Ecuatorial 1987
Guinee rep 1991
United kingdom 1995
Libya 1995
China 1996
European union 1997
Tunisie 1997
Panama 1998
Trinidad and Tobago 1999
Namibia 1999

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 89

Switzerland AG 2021
L. R. Gonçalves, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70362-2
90 Annex II: ICCAT CPCs Year of Ratification

Countries Year of ratification

Barbados 2000
Honduras 2001
Algerie 2001
Mexico 2002
Vanuatu 2002
Iceland 2002
Turkey 2003
Philippines 2004
Norway 2004
Nicaragua 2004
Senegal 2004
Belize 2005
Syria 2005
St Vincent and the Grenadines 2006
Nigeria 2007
Egypt 2007
Albania 2008
Sierra Leone 2008
Mauritania 2008
Curacao 2014
Liberia 2014
El Salvador 2014
Annex III: Epistemic Community at ICCAT

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 91

Switzerland AG 2021
L. R. Gonçalves, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations,
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 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Cape
New Town—
Orleans— Seville— Dubrovnik— Antalya— Marrakech— Recife— Paris— Istanbul— Agadir— South
Venue USA Spain Croatia Turkey Morocco Brazil France Turkey Morocco Africa
Masanori Masanori W. T. W. T. Fabio Fabio Fabio Masanori Masanori
COM Chairman Miyahara Miyahara Hogarth Hogarth Fabio Hazin Hazin Hazin Hazin Miyahara Miyahara
J. Gil J. Gil
SCRS Chairman Pereira Pereira G. Scott G. Scott G. Scott G. Scott G. Scott J. Santiago J. Santiago J. Santiago SUM
1 Brazil Hazin, Fabio H. V. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
2 Brazil Travassos, Paulo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 9
3 Canada Neilson, John D. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9

4 Cape Verde Marques da Silva 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9

Monteiro, Vanda
5 China, Song, Liming 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
(People ́s
Rep.)
6 Croatia Franicevic, Vlasta 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 8
7 European Ariz Telleria, 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 9
Community Javier
8 European Arrizabalaga, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
Community Haritz
9 European Cort, Jose Luis 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
Community
10 European Delgado de Molina 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
Community Acevedo, Alicia
11 European Fonteneau, Alain 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
Community
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Cape
New Town—
Orleans— Seville— Dubrovnik— Antalya— Marrakech— Recife— Paris— Istanbul— Agadir— South
Venue USA Spain Croatia Turkey Morocco Brazil France Turkey Morocco Africa
Masanori Masanori W. T. W. T. Fabio Fabio Fabio Masanori Masanori
COM Chairman Miyahara Miyahara Hogarth Hogarth Fabio Hazin Hazin Hazin Hazin Miyahara Miyahara
J. Gil J. Gil
SCRS Chairman Pereira Pereira G. Scott G. Scott G. Scott G. Scott G. Scott J. Santiago J. Santiago J. Santiago SUM
12 European Fromentin, Jean 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
Community Marc
13 European Gaertner, Daniel 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9
Community
14 European Goujon, Michel 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
Community
15 European Macías, Ángel 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
Community David
16 European Monteagudo, Juan 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 8
Community Pedro
17 European Ortiz de Urbina, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
Community Jose Maria
18 European Ortiz de Zárate 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
Community Vidal, Victoria
19 European Pereira, Joao Gil 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9
Community
20 European Tserpes, George 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
Community
21 Ghana Bannerman, Paul 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
22 Japan Miyake, Makoto P. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 9
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Cape
New Town—
Orleans— Seville— Dubrovnik— Antalya— Marrakech— Recife— Paris— Istanbul— Agadir— South
Venue USA Spain Croatia Turkey Morocco Brazil France Turkey Morocco Africa
Masanori Masanori W. T. W. T. Fabio Fabio Fabio Masanori Masanori
COM Chairman Miyahara Miyahara Hogarth Hogarth Fabio Hazin Hazin Hazin Hazin Miyahara Miyahara
J. Gil J. Gil
SCRS Chairman Pereira Pereira G. Scott G. Scott G. Scott G. Scott G. Scott J. Santiago J. Santiago J. Santiago SUM
23 Mexico Ramirez López, 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
Karina
24 Norway Nottestad, Leif 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
25 Turkey Karakulak, Saadet 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 8
26 United Brown, Craig A. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
States
27 Unite0d Cass-Calay, 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
States Shannon
28 United Cortés, Enric 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 8
States
29 United Díaz, Guillermo 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 9
States
30 United Die, David 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
States
31 United Porch, Clarence E. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
States
32 United Prince, Eric D. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
States
33 United Scott, Gerald P. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10
States
34 Uruguay Domingo, Andrés 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 9
Annex IV: NGOs Attendees at ICCAT

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 95

Switzerland AG 2021
L. R. Gonçalves, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations,
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 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Organizations PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS
Bird Life International 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
Oceana 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1
The ocean conservancy 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
WWF 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
Fundatun 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
Medisamak 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Federation of Maltese 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Aquaculture Producers
(FMAP)
Greenpeace 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0
ISSF 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
The Pew Environment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Group
Federation of 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
European Aquaculture
Producers
Institute for Public 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
Knowledge
Conseil Consultatif 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Regional de la
Mediterranee—CCR
MED
Confederation 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
International de la
Peche Sportive—CIPS
IWMC World 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
Conservation Trust
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Organizations PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS
Federcoopesca 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1
Marine Stewardship 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
Council
The Ocean Foundation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
Association Euro- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Mediterraneenne Des
Pecheurs
Professionnels De
Thon—AEPPT
Asociación de Pesca, 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Comercio y Consumo
Responsable del Atún
Rojo—APCCR
Blue Water 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Fishermen’s
Association
Defenders of Wildlife 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Ecology Action 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Centre—EAC
European Bureau for 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Conservation and
Development—EBCD
Federpesca 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
Organization for 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
Promotion of
Responsible Tuna
Fisheries—OPRT
The Varda Foundation 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Organizations PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS
Aquatic Release 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Conservation—ARC
National Coalition 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Marine Conservation
Oceanic Conservation 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Organization
Recreational Fishing 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Alliance—RFA
Wrigley Institute of 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
ENV Studies—WIES
International Game 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Fish
Association—IGFA
Sustainable Fisheries 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Partnership—SFP
Association 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Euroméditerranéenne
des Pêcheurs
Professionnels de
thon—AEPPT
Ecology Action Centre 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
(EAC)
European Bureau for 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Conservation and
Development (EBCD)
European 0 – 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Elasmobranch
Association (EEA)
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Organizations PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS PLE SCRS
Humane Society 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
International
IndyACT—The 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
League of Independent
Activists
The Billfish 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Foundation
Federation le la Peche 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Maritime et de la
Aquaculture—FPMA
Natural Resources 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Defense
Council—NRDC
US Japan Research 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0
Inst
Tuna Producer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
Association
SUM 7 0 5 1 9 5 8 1 9 6 13 7 22 6 23 7 23 9 19 9
Annex V

Guide for interviews—not to follow, only for orientation

1. What is your name? And for which Institution do you work?
2. What are the groups you represent: NGOs, University, private sector, and government?
3. How would you describe the events in the specific case (e.g., ICCAT, CCAMLR, CCSBT
cases)?
4. In the related case, what are your views of?
5. In your opinion, how science played a role?
6. Who were the stakeholders involved in the case?
7. For decision-makers:
 7.1 At the time of decision-making what is taken into account? How are the political,
economic, and scientific views articulated?
 7.2 Are the results of scientific research listened? How do these results come to you?
8. For scientists and Ngos representatives
 8.1 Do you actively participate in an RFMO meeting? Observer? What is your role?
 8.2 Who funds your participation?
 8.3 What is your role/purpose in attending meetings? Is there a work with the national
government before?
 8.4 Do you feel that your knowledge is respected by decision-makers? Cite examples. If not,
why?
9. Finalization: “Would you like to say something else? Would you like to leave a message?”

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 101

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Index

A Commission for Technical Cooperation in

Agreement effectiveness, 1, 6–9 Africa (CTCA), 40
Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic
(ASOC), 36, 37 Marine Living Resources
Antarctic Living Resources Convention, 28 (CCAMLR), 80–82, 84
Antarctic marine ecosystem, 23 Commission for the Conservation of Southern
Antarctic marine living resources, 24 Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT), 2, 8, 13–19,
Antarctic resources, 21 80, 83, 84
Antarctic toothfish (Dissostichus mawsoni), 31 “Bali Procedure”, 70
Antarctic Treaty, 22, 23 and “the Convention”, 62–63
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting crisis, 68
(ATCM), 37 and ECCSBT members, 63
Antarctic Treaty System (ATS), 22–24, epistemic community, 71–74
27, 36, 37 experimental fishing dispute, 67
Association of Responsible Krill harvesting functions, 63
companies (ARK), 37 institutional setup, 71
Atlantic Bluefin tuna, 45, 55 international organization, 61
joint experimental fishing program, 67
Management Strategy Workshop, 68
B members and cooperating non-­
“Bali Procedure”, 70 members, 63
Biological Investigations on Marine Antarctic membership, 77
Systems and Stocks NGOs, 74–76
(BIOMASS), 23 organogram, 64
Bluefin tuna RFMOs, 61, 76
Atlantic, 45, 55 SBT, 65
epistemic community knowledge, 58 SBT fisheries, 61
fishing, 45 science process, 68
social learning process, 59 Scientific Committee and management
procedure, 67–71
SC’s role, 63
C TAC and quota allocations, 65
Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS), 27 Conservation measures (CMs), 30
Coalition of Legal toothfish Operators Inc. Constructivism, 2–4
(COLTO), 37 Constructivist theory, 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 113

Switzerland AG 2021
L. R. Gonçalves, Regional Fisheries Management Organizations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-70362-2
114 Index

Consultative Parties, 22 diverse events, 46

Contracting Parties (CPs), 26 management of fisheries, 45
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic NGOs role, 54–57
Marine Living Resources usable knowledge, 52–54
(CCAMLR), 2, 8, 13, 14, 16–19 Ecosystem approach, 25, 28, 29, 37
adoption, 24 1975 Eighth Antarctic Treaty Consultative
Antarctica, 21 Meeting, 23
ATS, 22, 27 Effectiveness, 7
conservation credentials, 27 Environmental regimes, 1, 4, 5, 16, 84
Convention Area, 24 Epistemic communities, 4
countries with interest in fishing, 28 aggregating and articulating knowledge, 5
ecosystem approach, 37 analysis, 10
ecosystem-based and conservation CCAMLR, 36, 37, 82, 85–87 (see also
measures, 28 Convention for the Conservation of
epistemic community, 34, 35 Antarctic Marine Living Resources
executive functions, 25 (CCAMLR))
fisheries management, 30 CCSBT, 83
fishery agreements, 26 and constructivism, 2
as legally binding agreement, 24 constructivist theory, 4
management, 29 definition, 10
members and acceding states, 26 EBFT, 82
negotiators, 25 environmental regimes, 5
NGOs involvement, 36–38 as expert networks, 3
Patagonian toothfish (see Patagonian at ICCAT, 91–94
toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides)) internal beliefs, 5
provisions, 28 international policy coordination, 6
and RFMOs, 27, 28 knowledge-based communities, 6
Science and Antarctic, 29–30 knowledge-based groups, 9
Scientific Committee, 26 Mediterranean pollution debate, 9
signing, 24 natural variation and IUU control, 84
structure, 27 snowball interview technique, 49
Treaty’s objective, 25 under ICCAT, 53, 58
uniqueness, 38 knowledge community, 48
WG-FSA, 35 NGOs, 55, 56, 58
Convention on International Trade of policy decision, 52
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna social learning, 48
and Flora (CITES), 46, 57–60 under SCRS, 48, 51, 52
Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic and usable knowledge, 9–11
Mineral Resource Activities WG-FSA, 81
(CRAMRA), 37 “Established fisheries” category, 32
Credibility, 53 European acid rain efforts, 10
Expert networks, 5
Exploratory fisheries, 32
D Extended Scientific Committee (ESC), 63, 68,
Decision-making processes, 12 69, 71, 74, 76

E F
Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean Bluefin Feedback management, 29
Tuna (EBFT), 82, 84 Fisheries management, 29, 72, 75, 84
Eastern Bluefin Tuna (EBFT) Fishery agreement, 8, 10, 16, 17, 19
catch quotas, 45 Fishery management regimes, 12
crises and uncertainty, 46 Fishery sustainability, 12
Index 115

Fishing and biodiversity management, 12 N

Fishing Bluefin tuna, 45 Neo-realism, 3
Non-governmental organization (NGO)
at CCAMLR, 36–38
G at CCSBT, 74–76
Global environmental politics, 1 and CITES, 59, 60, 82
on EBFT, 54–57
and ICCAT, 50, 58
H international organizations, 84
Heads of delegation, 83 SCRS meetings, 50

I O
Illegal fishing, 33, 34 Original signatories, 22
Institutional design, 74, 80–82, 84
Institutional scientific design, 2
International agreements, 4, 5 P
International Commission for the Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus
Conservation of Atlantic Tunas eleginoides)
(ICCAT), 2, 8, 13–17, 19, 80, 82, and Antarctic toothfish, 31
84, 89–94 catches, 31
contracting parties, 41 CCAMLR, 31
epistemic community, 48, 49, 51, 52 CDS, 34
for fishery governance, 42–45 countries, 33
history, 40–42 dubbed “white gold”, 31
international agreement, 39 established fisheries, 32
responsibilities, 43 exploratory fisheries, 32
RFMOs, 42 fishery, 32
science, 39 illegal fishing, 33
species, 43 illegal, unregulated and unreported
The International Council for the Exploration fishing, 34
of the Sea (ICES), 12 importers, 34
International environmental regimes, 1 IUU fishing, 29, 34
International fishery organizations, 40 lapsed fishery, 32
International Geophysical Year (IGY), 22 long-lived species, 31
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea “new fishery”, 32
(ITLOS), 67, 73 toothfish management, 36
International tuna fishery management, 48 WS-MAD, 33
Policy-making decisions, 12
“Politicization of science”, 10
K Progressive research program, 4
Knowledge, 52, 53, 59, 60
Knowledge-creating processes, 12
R
Radical constructivism, 2, 3
L Ratification, 41
Lapsed fishery, 32 Rationalism, 3
Legitimacy, 53 Regional Fisheries Management Organizations
Liberal institutionalism, 3 (RFMOs), 42, 44, 60
biomass, 8
CCAMLR (see Convention for the
M Conservation of Antarctic Marine
Modern fisheries management, 79 Living Resources (CCAMLR))
116 Index

Rationalism (cont.) Standing Committee on Research and

CCSBT (see Commission for the Statistics (SCRS), 46–60
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Stock Assessment Group (SAG), 61, 63,
Tuna (CCSBT)) 64, 72, 74
effectiveness, 8 Stratospheric ozone, 10
fishery conservation and management, 8
ICCAT, 82
institutional and operational arrangements, 13 T
institutional design, 2 Total allowable catch (TACs), 39, 46–48, 56
recognition, 18 Transmission belt, 1, 11
Scientific Committee, 81
UNFSA, 79
Regional fisheries management organizations U
and arrangements (RFMOs/As), 42 Uncertainty, 1, 10, 12, 17
United Nation Fish Stock Agreement
(UNFSA), 11, 18, 79, 83
S United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Salience, 53 Sea (UNCLOS), 11, 79, 83
Science, 11–17 Usable knowledge, 5, 9–11, 14, 16, 18, 19
Science influencing policy, 10 EBFT, 52–54
Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research
(SCAR), 23
Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research W
(SCOR), 23 Working Group Fish Stock Assessment
Scientific information, 12, 16, 17 (WG-FSA), 80, 81
Social learning, 1, 3–5, 9, 14–16, 19 Workshop on Methods for the Assessment of
Southern Bluefin Tuna (SBT), 61 D. eleginoides (WS-MAD), 33