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Lecture 5 - Security Procedures

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Lecture 5 - Security Procedures

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Tony
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© © All Rights Reserved
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Securing g Digital

g Democracyy
Lecture 5 | Securityy Procedures

J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan
5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy

Voter Registration
5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy

Voter Enfranchisement
A th ti ti
Authentication

Almost 1/3 of eligible U.S. citizens not registered!


5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy

https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/register‐to‐vote/app‐pdf/english‐blank.pdf
5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy
5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy

Voter
V t Registration
R i t ti Databases
D t b (VRDs)
(VRD )

Voter Enfranchisement
A th ti ti
Authentication
Security Privacy
5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy
5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy
5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy
5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy
5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy
5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy
5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy
5.1 Voter Registration Securing Digital Democracy
5.2 Voter Authentication Securing Digital Democracy

Voter Authentication
5.2 Voter Authentication Securing Digital Democracy

(left) Public domain image from Wikimedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Mustermann_nPA.jpg


(right) Image by DNI Electronico via Wikimedia Commons, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Dnielectronico.jpg
Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution‐Share Alike 2.1 Spain license
5.2 Voter Authentication Securing Digital Democracy
5.2 Voter Authentication Securing Digital Democracy

Image by Joe Hall (Flickr user joebeone), licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution
license, http://www.flickr.com/photos/joebeone/292549434/
5.2 Voter Authentication Securing Digital Democracy

Manufacturer product sheet from Premiere Elections


http://www.premierelections.com/documents/product_sheets/expresspoll_5000.pdf
5.2 Voter Authentication Securing Digital Democracy

VoterID?

Voter
E f
Enfranchisement
hi t
Authentication
5.2 Voter Authentication Securing Digital Democracy
5.2 Voter Authentication Securing Digital Democracy

Image by Flickr user isafmedia, licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.
http://www.flickr.com/photos/isafmedia/5007269322/in/photostream/
5.2 Voter Authentication Securing Digital Democracy

Looking Ahead
Ahead…
5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy

Guarding against Tampering


5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy

Between polling and counting At all times!


5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf
5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy

Tamper‐Evident Seals

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf
5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy

Image from Argonne National Laboratory Vulnerability Assessment Team


http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/index.html
5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy

Results
l for
f 244 Seals
l
Mean Median
Defeat
f time ffor 1.4 mins 43 secs
one person
Cost of $78 $5
tools/supplies
Cost per seal $0.62 $0.09
attacked
Time to devise 2.3 hrs 12 mins
successful attack

(19% use or in consideration for nuclear safeguards!)


(left) Image from Argonne National Laboratory Vulnerability Assessment Team, http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/new.html
(data) From Johnston et al., http://www.ne.anl.gov/capabilities/vat/seals/index.html
5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy
5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf
5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy

Cup
Seal

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf
5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy

Padlock
Seal

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf
5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy

Tape
p
Seals

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf
5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy

Evaluating a Seal Protocol


 Is the seal going to be in place when the attacker has access?
 Does the seal actually
act all need to be removed
remo ed to get in?
 Can the attack just remove it temporarily without leaving evidence?
 Can the attack replace it with a new seal without leaving evidence?
 Do election officials properly record seal numbers for each machine?
 Do election officials properly check the seal numbers later?
 Do officials inspect for evidence of tampering?
 If anomalies are detected, are they recorded and reported?
 Is appropriate action taken?
Adapted from http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~appel/voting/SealsOnVotingMachines.pdf
5.3 Guarding Against Tampering Securing Digital Democracy

Old way: Evidence

New
N idea:
id “Anti‐evidence”
“A i id ”

192380 192380
‐‐‐‐‐‐
secret secret
erased
5.4 Field Testing Securing Digital Democracy

Field Testing
5.4 Field Testing Securing Digital Democracy

“Zero”
Zero
Tape
5.4 Field Testing Securing Digital Democracy

Logic & Accuracy


Testing
5.4 Field Testing Securing Digital Democracy

Parallel
Testing What if problems are found?
5.4 Field Testing Securing Digital Democracy

https://www.usenix.org/conference/evtwote12/automated‐analysis‐election‐audit‐logs
5.4 Field Testing Securing Digital Democracy

Human Factors
5.4 Field Testing Securing Digital Democracy

Tracking Problems
Securing g Digital
g Democracyy
Lecture 5 | Securityy Procedures

J. Alex Halderman
University of Michigan

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