[ G.R. No. 214419.

November 17, 2021 ]

SALVADOR DELA FUENTE, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE SM SEAFOOD
PRODUCTS, AND MANUEL SARRAGA, PETITIONERS, VS. MARILYN E. GIMENEZ,
RESPONDENT.

FACTS:

 Respondent Marilyn E. Gimenez (Gimenez) filed a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal
dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment, nonpayment of holiday pay, premium pay for rest
day, night shift, service incentive leave, separation pay and backwages against petitioners SM
Seafood Products (SSP), its owner Salvador dela Fuente (dela Fuente), and SSP's manager
Manuel Sarraga (Sarraga)
 Sometime in 2002, satellite plants were opened in Igbon, Iloilo City and Tiglawigan, Cadiz
City. Sorters and other workers, including Gimenez, were assigned to these satellite plants on
a rotation basis lasting for a period of two weeks. In 2004, two other plants were opened in
Gindakpan, Bohol and Hinigaran, Negros Occidental; in 2005, another plant was opened in
Catbalogan, Samar. By then, the rotation assignment lasted a month at a time.9
 Gimenez alleged that she and her co-workers were not furnished copies of their pay slips.
Instead, they were made to sign blank papers acknowledging receipt of salary. They were
even required to sign a payroll in blank and other blank papers every year and at
other times.
 According to Gimenez, she was suspended illegally in at least three (3) instances.
 On June 25, she attended the burial of her cousin. When she returned to work, she asked her
supervisor about her Iloilo assignment. She was informed, however, that Sarraga had
suspended her for two months due to her refusal to be assigned to Iloilo. Not having received
any notice or hearing on the suspension, Gimenez inquired from Sarraga if she was indeed
suspended, which the latter confirmed. She accepted the suspension and bided time until her
return to work on 25 August 2005.
 In the meantime, on 14 August 2005, Gimenez sought confirmation from Sarraga if she was,
indeed, terminated which Sarraga confirmed because, according to her co-worker Melissa
Rubio, Gimenez's children did not like her being assigned to other plants outside Madridejos.
Gimenez refuted this and told Sarraga that she wanted to continue working. Sarraga agreed to
reinstate her on the condition that she pay her cash advance in full. When Gimenez explained
that she could not pay without being reinstated, and could only do so through salary
deductions, Sarraga refused to reinstate her. She was not paid her P150.00 per day salary
from 19 to 23 June 2005, and her P80.00/day allowance for 2 days for being assigned outside
Madridejos. Hence, she filed the complaint.14
 In their defense, petitioners denied that Gimenez was illegally suspended or that she was
illegally dismissed. Dela Fuente maintained that he did not authorize anyone, even Sarraga, to
suspend or dismiss Gimenez. In fact, Sarraga can only recommend action but cannot suspend
or dismiss employees. He claimed that Gimenez had been absent from work without notice or
permission since 24 June 2005. Later, Dela Fuente discovered a resignation letter dated 23
June 2005 signed by Gimenez.
 As proof, petitioners submitted the aforementioned resignation letter and a Quitclaim and
Release (quitclaim) both dated 23 June 2005 signed by Gimenez. The latter, however, insisted
that she did not sign said documents and that the same were probably obtained by using the
blank documents SSP's employees were made to sign.
 The Labor Arbiter found that Gimenez was illegally suspended from her work in 2002, in
December 2003, and in June 2003. Petitioners failed to to furnish Gimenez the written charge
of her violation; hence, she was suspended without due process. The Labor Arbiter noted that
petitioners' denial was not substantiated.
 Further, the Labor Arbiter ruled that Gimenez was illegally/constructively dismissed from her
employment as proven by Gimenez's resignation letter wherein she stated her reasons for
resigning: (1) her assignment to far places, which exposed her to the risks of travel; and (2)
Sarraga's continual harassment and insult of SSP's employees.
 The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter Decision:
 The NLRC held that Gimenez's resignation letter proved that she voluntarily severed her
employment relationship with petitioners. Hence, no backwages and separation pay were due.
The NLRC likewise gave weight to the Quitclaim executed by Gimenez in favor of petitioners. It
also found that petitioners sufficiently refuted Gimenez' claim of illegal suspension. However,
the NLRC sustained the grant of Holiday Pay and Service Incentive Leave since petitioners
failed to show that such benefits had already been paid.
 The CA granted said appeal and reinstated with modification the Labor Arbiter's Decision
ISSUE:

 WON Gimenez was illegally dismissed or did she resign voluntarily from her employment with
SSP?

RULING: (Illegally dismissed)

 Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that
personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no
other choice or is otherwise compelled to dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of an office and must be made with the intention of
relinquishing the office, accompanied by the act of relinquishment or abandonment. A
resignation must be unconditional and with the intent to operate as such. Thus, essential to
the act of resignation is voluntariness. It must be the result of an employee's exercise of
his or her own will.
 Moreover, settled is the rule that the employer has the burden of proving, in illegal dismissal
cases, that the employee was dismissed for a just or authorized cause. Even if the employer
claims that the employee resigned, the employer still has the burden of proving that the
resignation was voluntary. Further, the evidence thereon must be clear, positive, and
convincing. The employer cannot rely on the weakness of the employee's evidence.

In Torreda v. Investment and Capital Corporation of the Philippines, the Court have
explained that:

 The act of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered
to determine whether in fact, he or she intended to relinquish such employment. If
the employer introduces evidence purportedly executed by an employee as proof of
voluntary resignation and the employee specifically denies the authenticity and due
execution of said document, the employer is burdened to prove the due execution
and genuineness of such document.
 Guided by the above principles, We concur with the Labor Arbiter and the CA that Gimenez
was indeed illegally dismissed.
 In the instant case, Gimenez specifically denies the authenticity and due execution of the
resignation letter and quitclaim she supposedly signed. Consequently, petitioners bore the
burden of proving otherwise, which they utterly failed to do.
 After a meticulous scrutiny of the records, We agree with the CA that the resignation letter
and quitclaim are dubious, to say the least. The CA noted several peculiarities and infirmities
apparent on the face of the documents:

First, the resignation letter is typewritten, while the Quitclaim is a printed document. It is disturbing
to note that such a personal matter as a resignation letter, written by a penurious and uneducated
person such as the petitioner, would be neatly done, without corrections, on a typewriter, an
instrument which she can ill-afford or which she cannot manage. It is perturbing to note that the
reason for the purported resignation coincides with the "hearsay" reason advanced by respondent
Sarraga. On the other hand, the quitclaim is a pro-forma printed document.

Second, it is common practice for persons to affix their signatures at or near the last line of the
printed text of the document. Petitioner must therefore be presumed to have affixed her signature in
accord with common practice. The signature of the petitioner in all the documents on record, except
for the questioned documents, confirms this observation. The handwritten name and signature of the
petitioner in the two (2) questioned documents appear at the very bottom, of these documents, quite
some distance from the last printed/typewritten word/sentence of the document. Petitioner's
signature appearing in the resignation letter is approximately four (4) inches from the last line of the
typewritten text. The signature also appears at the extreme lower right corner of the paper while the
typewritten words occupy about half thereof. On the other hand, petitioner's signature in the
quitclaim is about two (2) inches from the last line of the printed words. We find it quite unusual, if
not contrived, for any person to affix a signature several inches away from the body of the
document. At the onset, petitioner had already claimed that she was made to sign blank documents.

Third, if the body of the document is in printed form, the name of the signatory is usually printed so
that the signatory will simply affix his/her signature over the printed name. In both documents, the
signature of the petitioner was affixed over her handwritten name. It would appear that the name
was written after the signature was already made:

Fourth, the handwritten-printed name of the petitioner in both documents appears to have been
written by different persons. The handwritten names of the petitioner in the questioned documents
does not contain her middle initial "E", unlike the name she placed in the Complaint, in the
verification portion of her petition, she filed before the NLRC. Moreover, the handwritten family name
in the resignation letter is spelled "Giminez", when in all the documents filed by the petitioner, she
spells her family name as GIMENEZ. Who would misspell his/her name in a personal document as a
resignation letter?47

Fifth, and last, the quitclaim and release allegedly signed by the petitioner is in the English language
which we seriously doubt is a language known to and understood by the petitioner. Even assuming
arguendo that petitioner knows the English language, we seriously doubt that she could have written
the same on her own. Furthermore, the quitclaim and release document states "after having been
sworn to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say that" but the document was not
notarized. How could the petitioner have been sworn to in accordance with law if she did not appear
before a person authorized to administer oaths and had subscribed to the said quitclaim?48

With these blatant infirmities appearing on the face of the documents, we are inclined to give
credence to the petitioner's contention that she had previously signed blank papers and the
respondents caused the printing of the words on these blank papers after her signature had been
procured. Under such circumstances, it is therefore obvious that these documents were not
voluntarily signed by the petitioner. She signed the blank papers without the intention of having the
same used as a resignation letter and/or quitclaim and release. Evidence to be believed must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself, such as the
common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.

We concur with the CA's findings. These infirmities cast serious doubt on the validity of the
documents and in effect, to the voluntariness of Gimenez's resignation. We simply cannot give
credence to documents so surreptitiously executed. Also noteworthy, the practice of compelling
Gimenez and her co-workers to sign blank papers were not controverted by petitioners.50

This Court also emphasizes that Gimenez immediately filed her complaint against
petitioners with the NLRC on 06 October 2005, when it became apparent to her that she
would no longer be employed. Indeed, voluntary resignation is difficult to reconcile with
the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. Verily, the filing of the complaint belies
petitioners' claim that Gimenez voluntarily resigned. It would be irrational for petitioner to
resign and thereafter file a case for illegal dismissal since "[r]esignation is inconsistent
with the filing of the said complaint." Given that resignation "is a formal pronouncement
of relinquishment of an office[,]" it must be concurrent with the intent and the act.

Accordingly, We find that Gimenez's intention to leave SSP, as well as her act of
relinquishment, has not been established in this case. On the contrary, she vigorously
pursued her complaint against petitioners. It is a clear manifestation that she had no
intention of relinquishing her employment. The element of voluntariness in Gimenez's
resignation is, therefore, missing.

In addition, resignation letters with quitclaims, waivers, or releases are generally looked upon with
disfavor and commonly frowned upon. They are usually contrary to public policy, ineffective, and are
meant to bar claims to a worker's legal rights. To be sure, deeds of release, waivers, or quitclaims
cannot bar employees from demanding benefit to which they are legally entitled or from contesting
the legality of their dismissal. Moreover, the burden of proving that Gimenez voluntarily entered into
the agreement lies with the employer, herein petitioners.
 THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 214419. November 17, 2021 ]

SALVADOR DELA FUENTE, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE SM SEAFOOD PRODUCTS,
AND MANUEL SARRAGA, PETITIONERS, VS. MARILYN E. GIMENEZ, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

ZALAMEDA, J.:

In illegal dismissal cases, when an employer raises the defense of resignation, the burden to establish the
voluntariness of such resignation rests on the employer. Through the present case, this Court reiterates that the
evidence thereon must be clear, positive and convincing. The employer cannot simply rely on the weakness of the
employee's evidence. Further, when the pieces of evidence presented by the employer and the employee are in
equipoise, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. This is in line with the policy of the State to afford
greater protection to labor.

The Case

This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to annul and set aside the Decision dated 28 July 20112 and the
Resolution dated 31 July 20143 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 02501. The CA reversed the
Decision dated 26 July 20064 and the Resolution dated 29 November 20065 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. V-000364-06, and reinstated with modification the Decision dated 16 March
20066 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC RAB VII-10-2182-05.

Antecedents

On 06 October 2005, respondent Marilyn E. Gimenez (Gimenez) filed a complaint for illegal suspension, illegal
dismissal, illegal deduction, underpayment, nonpayment of holiday pay, premium pay for rest day, night shift,
service incentive leave, separation pay and backwages against petitioners SM Seafood Products (SSP), its owner
Salvador dela Fuente (dela Fuente), and SSP's manager Manuel Sarraga (Sarraga).7

Gimenez claimed that she started working as a sorter of crab meat for SSP, a sole proprietorship engaged in
exporting processed crab meat, on 12 November 2000. She averred that: (1) work begins at 8:00 a.m. and
continues until 10:00 p.m., at the earliest, or 12:00 midnight, at the latest; (2) lunch break lasts about an hour or
less; and (3) if there is an overtime, dinner break is from 15 to 30 minutes only.8

Sometime in 2002, satellite plants were opened in Igbon, Iloilo City and Tiglawigan, Cadiz City. Sorters and other
workers, including Gimenez, were assigned to these satellite plants on a rotation basis lasting for a period of two
weeks. In 2004, two other plants were opened in Gindakpan, Bohol and Hinigaran, Negros Occidental; in 2005,
another plant was opened in Catbalogan, Samar. By then, the rotation assignment lasted a month at a time.9

Gimenez alleged that she and her co-workers were not furnished copies of their pay slips. Instead, they were made
to sign blank papers acknowledging receipt of salary. They were even required to sign a payroll in blank and other
blank papers every year and at other times. She also claimed that work would be rendered even during holidays,
except during Christmas Day, New Year, All Saints Day, and Good Friday. On Holy Thursday, the Madridejos fiesta,
they were required to work for half a day. However, they did not receive holiday pay for work rendered on those
days. Gimenez also averred that the 13th month pay she and her co-workers received was less than the legally
mandated rate. Their employer also never paid them at the legally mandated minimum wage. A sorter like her
received a wage of Php150.00 per day and a worker assigned outside Madridejos, Cebu received an additional
allowance, from 2002 to 2003, of Php60.00 per day. Thereafter, the allowance was increased to Php80.00 per
day.10

According to Gimenez, she was suspended illegally in at least three (3) instances.

In 2002, Gimenez was assigned at Igbon Island, Iloilo. One day, she and two other sorters stopped to have lunch at
around 1:45 p.m. Sarraga berated them, telling them that they should have finished their work before eating. Even
as they explained that dela Fuente had given them permission to stop and eat so long as the crab meat was
covered in ice, Sarraga nonetheless suspended them for two (2) weeks. They were not given notice or hearing
before their suspension.11

Gimenez further averred that every year on December 08, the main feast in Madridejos, Cebu, they would be
required to render half-day work, which would start at 4:00 p.m. instead of 8:00 a.m., and would last until 12:00
midnight. On 07 December 2003, Sarraga held a meeting with the workers emphasizing that those who would be
absent on 08 December 2003 would be suspended. Gimenez arrived late on said day because the first trip of the
first passenger vehicle from Bantayan, which would usually leave at 6:30 a.m., was delayed. Despite her pleas for
understanding, Sarraga still suspended her for two (2) weeks.12

From 18 May to 18 June 2005, Gimenez was assigned at the Masbate plant. On June 18, she was informed that
she had to report to Bantayan on June 19 and immediately started her work. On June 22, while at the Madridejos
plant, she was instructed to report to Igbon, Iloilo on June 23. She pleaded to be allowed to report to Iloilo on June
26 instead so that she could attend the burial of her cousin on June 25. On June 23, the workers at the Madridejos
plant were given cash advances. Gimenez's cash advance amounted to P4,500.00. On June 25, she attended the
burial of her cousin. When she returned to work, she asked her supervisor about her Iloilo assignment. She was
informed, however, that Sarraga had suspended her for two months due to her refusal to be assigned to Iloilo. Not
having received any notice or hearing on the suspension, Gimenez inquired from Sarraga if she was indeed
suspended, which the latter confirmed. She accepted the suspension and bided time until her return to work on 25
August 2005.13

In the meantime, on 14 August 2005, Gimenez met some of her co-workers by chance and they inquired if she was
returning for work because petitioners had required them to pay for her cash advance. It had been standard practice
by SSP that once the cash advance of a worker was required to be paid by his or her co-workers, that worker was
deemed terminated. When she sought confirmation, Sarraga informed her that she was, indeed, terminated
because, according to her co-worker Melissa Rubio, Gimenez's children did not like her being assigned to other
plants outside Madridejos. Gimenez refuted this and told Sarraga that she wanted to continue working. Sarraga
agreed to reinstate her on the condition that she pay her cash advance in full. When Gimenez explained that she
could not pay without being reinstated, and could only do so through salary deductions, Sarraga refused to reinstate
her. She was not paid her P150.00 per day salary from 19 to 23 June 2005, and her P80.00/day allowance for 2
days for being assigned outside Madridejos. Hence, she filed the complaint.14

In their defense, petitioners denied that Gimenez was illegally suspended or that she was illegally dismissed. Dela
Fuente maintained that he did not authorize anyone, even Sarraga, to suspend or dismiss Gimenez. In fact, Sarraga
can only recommend action but cannot suspend or dismiss employees. He claimed that Gimenez had been absent
from work without notice or permission since 24 June 2005. Later, Dela Fuente discovered a resignation letter dated
23 June 2005 signed by Gimenez.15

Upon receiving a copy of the complaint, Dela Fuente inquired from Gimenez what happened and she merely replied
that she was very sorry. When she was asked to return back to work, Gimenez said she was ashamed to report
back to work. Dela Fuente further alleged that despite the irregularity of supplies and delivery, Gimenez and her co-
workers would be paid their daily wage and allowance. In fact, workers are paid P163.00 per 8-hour work day
regardless of whether they work the full eight (8) hours, plus P80.00 daily allowance. Dela Fuente claimed that he
has paid all salaries and wages due to Gimenez; thus, she had no more claims against him. He also averred that
due to the numerous vouchers/payrolls duly signed by Gimenez, only representative payrolls for the months of April
2005 until 23 June 2005 could be presented.16

As proof, petitioners submitted the aforementioned resignation letter and a Quitclaim and Release (quitclaim) both
dated 23 June 2005 signed by Gimenez.17 The latter, however, insisted that she did not sign said documents and
that the same were probably obtained by using the blank documents SSP's employees were made to sign.18

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

On 16 March 2006, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of Gimenez, thus:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby

rendered finding complainant illegally dismissed from her employment and directing
the respondents to jointly a[n]d solidarily pay complainant the amount of P78,275.00
plus P7,827.50, then (10%) per cent attorney's fees or a total aggregate amount
of PESOS: EIGHTY SIX THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED TWO & 50/100
(P86,102.50).

SO ORDERED.19

The Labor Arbiter found that Gimenez was illegally suspended from her work in 2002, in December 2003, and in
June 2003. Petitioners failed to to furnish Gimenez the written charge of her violation; hence, she was suspended
without due process. The Labor Arbiter noted that petitioners' denial was not substantiated.20
Further, the Labor Arbiter ruled that Gimenez was illegally/constructively dismissed from her employment as proven
by Gimenez's resignation letter wherein she stated her reasons for resigning: (1) her assignment to far places,
which exposed her to the risks of travel; and (2) Sarraga's continual harassment and insult of SSP's employees.21

Based on the payroll and Daily Time Records submitted by Dela Fuente, the Labor Arbiter also granted Gimenez's
claim for Holiday Pay and Service Incentive Leave, but denied the claim for Premium Pay for Holiday, Rest Day and
Night Shift for lack of specifics.22 The Labor Arbiter, however, deducted P25,000.00 from the monetary awards to
answer for Gimenez' unpaid indebtedness to petitioners.23

Dissatisfied, petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on 30 March 2006.24

Ruling of the NLRC

In its 26 July 2006 Decision, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter Decision, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated 16 March

2006 is hereby REVERSED EN TOTO declaring that respondents are not guilty to
(sic) illegal dismissal. However, respondent SM Seafoods Products and/or Salvador
dela Fuente is condemned to pay complainant, Marilyn E. Gimenez the sum of TEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE (P10,935.00) PESOS, representing
the latter's unpaid holiday pay as granted in this case.

SO ORDERED.25

The NLRC held that Gimenez's resignation letter proved that she voluntarily severed her employment relationship
with petitioners. Hence, no backwages and separation pay were due. The NLRC likewise gave weight to the
Quitclaim executed by Gimenez in favor of petitioners. It also found that petitioners sufficiently refuted Gimenez'
claim of illegal suspension. However, the NLRC sustained the grant of Holiday Pay and Service Incentive Leave
since petitioners failed to show that such benefits had already been paid.26

Gimenez's motion for reconsideration was denied by the NLRC in its Resolution dated 29 November
2006.27 Aggrieved, she filed a petition for certiorari with the CA.

Ruling of the CA

The CA granted said appeal and reinstated with modification the Labor Arbiter's Decision in its 28 July 2011
Decision, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The

Decision dated July 26, 2006 and Resolution dated November 29, 2006 of the NLRC
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated
March 16, 2006 is hereby REINSTATED with MODIFICATION, in that the amount of
P25,000.00 shall NOT be deducted from the benefits/monetary awards due to the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.28

It found that petitioners failed to prove the voluntariness of Gimenez's resignation. The CA noted several infirmities
with the resignation letter and the Quitclaim, which bolstered Gimenez's contention that she had previously signed
blank papers and that petitioners caused the printing of the words on these blank papers after her signature had
been procured. It concluded that the documents were not voluntarily signed by Gimenez.29

Aside from the lack a of valid resignation letter, the CA noted that Gimenez immediately filed an illegal dismissal
complaint when it became apparent to her that she would no longer be employed. This contradicted petitioners'
stance that Gimenez had voluntarily resigned. Thus, petitioners' failure to prove that Gimenez's resignation was
voluntarily tendered led to the inevitable conclusion that Gimenez was illegally dismissed.30

The CA further ruled that petitioners failed to refute Gimenez's claims of illegal suspension. It also affirmed the
Labor Arbiter's finding that Gimenez was not paid her Holiday Pay and Service Incentive Leave.31

However, the CA disagreed with the Labor Arbiter that the P25,000.00, representing the cash advance received by
Gimenez with 2% interest, should be deducted from the monetary awards due to Gimenez. It explained that it was
undisputed that Gimenez owed petitioners P4,500.00 only and that said cash advance was already paid by
Gimenez's co-worker. Any obligation that Gimenez may have had to return the cash advance would be to her co-
workers who paid for the obligation.32

Petitioners sought a reconsideration of the CA's ruling but the same was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated 31
July 2014.33 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
 Issues

Was Gimenez illegally dismissed or did she resign voluntarily from her employment with SSP?34

Ruling of the Court

The petition must be denied.

Propriety of Factual Review

At the outset, the issue of whether Gimenez voluntarily resigned or was illegally dismissed involves a question of
fact, which the Court does not generally pass upon. This, for it generally accords great weight to the factual findings
of labor officials. Even then, the Court is not precluded from making its own factual determination when the factual
findings of the tribunals below are conflicting, as in this case.35

Voluntary Resignation vis-ŕ-vis Illegal

Dismissal

Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons
cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice or is otherwise compelled
to dissociate oneself from employment.36 It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office and must be
made with the intention of relinquishing the office, accompanied by the act of relinquishment or abandonment. A
resignation must be unconditional and with the intent to operate as such.37 Thus, essential to the act of resignation
is voluntariness. It must be the result of an employee's exercise of his or her own will.38

To determine whether the employee indeed intended to relinquish his or her employment, the act of the employee
before and after the alleged resignation must be considered.39 In order to determine whether the employees truly
intended to resign from their respective posts, We must take into consideration the totality of circumstances in each
particular case.40

Moreover, settled is the rule that the employer has the burden of proving, in illegal dismissal cases, that the
employee was dismissed for a just or authorized cause. Even if the employer claims that the employee resigned, the
employer still has the burden of proving that the resignation was voluntary.41 Further, the evidence thereon must be
clear, positive, and convincing. The employer cannot rely on the weakness of the employee's evidence.42

In Torreda v. Investment and Capital Corporation of the Philippines,43 We have explained that:

The act of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be
considered to determine whether in fact, he or she intended to relinquish such
employment. If the employer introduces evidence purportedly executed by an
employee as proof of voluntary resignation and the employee specifically
denies the authenticity and due execution of said document, the employer is
burdened to prove the due execution and genuineness of such document.

Guided by the above principles, We concur with the Labor Arbiter and the CA that Gimenez was indeed illegally
dismissed.

In the instant case, Gimenez specifically denies the authenticity and due execution of the resignation letter and
quitclaim she supposedly signed.44 Consequently, petitioners bore the burden of proving otherwise, which they
utterly failed to do.

After a meticulous scrutiny of the records, We agree with the CA that the resignation letter and quitclaim are
dubious, to say the least. The CA noted several peculiarities and infirmities apparent on the face of the documents:

First, the resignation letter is typewritten, while the Quitclaim is a printed

document. It is disturbing to note that such a personal matter as a resignation letter,
written by a penurious and uneducated person such as the petitioner, would be
neatly done, without corrections, on a typewriter, an instrument which she can ill-
afford or which she cannot manage. It is perturbing to note that the reason for the
purported resignation coincides with the "hearsay" reason advanced by respondent
Sarraga. On the other hand, the quitclaim is a pro-forma printed document.45

Second, it is common practice for persons to affix their signatures at or near the
last line of the printed text of the document. Petitioner must therefore be presumed
to have affixed her signature in accord with common practice. The signature of the
petitioner in all the documents on record, except for the questioned documents,
confirms this observation. The handwritten name and signature of the petitioner in
the two (2) questioned documents appear at the very bottom, of these documents,
 quite some distance from the last printed/typewritten word/sentence of the
document. Petitioner's signature appearing in the resignation letter is approximately
four (4) inches from the last line of the typewritten text. The signature also appears
at the extreme lower right corner of the paper while the typewritten words occupy
about half thereof. On the other hand, petitioner's signature in the quitclaim is about
two (2) inches from the last line of the printed words. We find it quite unusual, if not
contrived, for any person to affix a signature several inches away from the body of
the document. At the onset, petitioner had already claimed that she was made to
sign blank documents.46

Third, if the body of the document is in printed form, the name of the signatory is
usually printed so that the signatory will simply affix his/her signature over the
printed name. In both documents, the signature of the petitioner was affixed over her
handwritten name. It would appear that the name was written after the signature was
already made:

Fourth, the handwritten-printed name of the petitioner in both documents

appears to have been written by different persons. The handwritten names of the
petitioner in the questioned documents does not contain her middle initial "E", unlike
the name she placed in the Complaint, in the verification portion of her petition, she
filed before the NLRC. Moreover, the handwritten family name in the resignation
letter is spelled "Giminez", when in all the documents filed by the petitioner, she
spells her family name as GIMENEZ. Who would misspell his/her name in a
personal document as a resignation letter?47

Fifth, and last, the quitclaim and release allegedly signed by the petitioner is in
the English language which we seriously doubt is a language known to and
understood by the petitioner. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner knows the
English language, we seriously doubt that she could have written the same on her
own. Furthermore, the quitclaim and release document states "after having been
sworn to in accordance with law do hereby depose and say that" but the document
was not notarized. How could the petitioner have been sworn to in accordance with
law if she did not appear before a person authorized to administer oaths and had
subscribed to the said quitclaim?48

With these blatant infirmities appearing on the face of the documents, we are
inclined to give credence to the petitioner's contention that she had previously
signed blank papers and the respondents caused the printing of the words on these
blank papers after her signature had been procured. Under such circumstances, it is
therefore obvious that these documents were not voluntarily signed by the petitioner.
She signed the blank papers without the intention of having the same used as a
resignation letter and/or quitclaim and release. Evidence to be believed must not
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself,
such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.49

We concur with the CA's findings. These infirmities cast serious doubt on the validity of the documents and in effect,
to the voluntariness of Gimenez's resignation. We simply cannot give credence to documents so surreptitiously
executed. Also noteworthy, the practice of compelling Gimenez and her co-workers to sign blank papers were not
controverted by petitioners.50

This Court also emphasizes that Gimenez immediately filed her complaint against petitioners with the NLRC on 06
October 2005, when it became apparent to her that she would no longer be employed.51 Indeed, voluntary
resignation is difficult to reconcile with the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal. Verily, the filing of the complaint
belies petitioners' claim that Gimenez voluntarily resigned.52 It would be irrational for petitioner to resign and
thereafter file a case for illegal dismissal since "[r]esignation is inconsistent with the filing of the said complaint."
Given that resignation "is a formal pronouncement of relinquishment of an office[,]" it must be concurrent with the
intent and the act.53

Accordingly, We find that Gimenez's intention to leave SSP, as well as her act of relinquishment, has not been
established in this case. On the contrary, she vigorously pursued her complaint against petitioners. It is a clear
manifestation that she had no intention of relinquishing her employment. The element of voluntariness in Gimenez's
resignation is, therefore, missing.54

In addition, resignation letters with quitclaims, waivers, or releases are generally looked upon with disfavor and
commonly frowned upon. They are usually contrary to public policy, ineffective, and are meant to bar claims to a
worker's legal rights.55 To be sure, deeds of release, waivers, or quitclaims cannot bar employees from demanding
benefit to which they are legally entitled or from contesting the legality of their dismissal.56 Moreover, the burden of
proving that Gimenez voluntarily entered into the agreement lies with the employer, herein petitioners.57
In order to prevent disputes on the validity and enforceability of quitclaims and waivers of employees under
Philippine laws, said agreements should contain the following:

1. A fixed amount as full and final compromise settlement;

2. The benefits of the employees if possible with the corresponding

amounts, which the employees are giving up in consideration of the fixed
compromise amount;

3. A statement that the employer has clearly explained to the employee in

English, Filipino, or in the dialect known to the employees — that by signing
the waiver or quitclaim, they are forfeiting or relinquishing their right to
receive the benefits which are due them under the law; and

4. A statement that the employees signed and executed the document

voluntarily, and had fully understood the contents of the document and that
their consent was freely given without any threat, violence, duress,
intimidation, or undue influence exerted on their person.58 [Emphases
supplied.]

These requirements are absent here.

Since Gimenez's resignation was shown to have been forced upon her through petitioners' deceptive scheme,
Gimenez is deemed to have been illegally dismissed.59 At any rate, Gimenez was not dismissed under any of the
causes mentioned in Article 279 282 of the Labor Code. She was not even validly informed of the causes of her
dismissal. Therefore, her dismissal was illegal.60 We stress that denials are weak forms of defenses, particularly
when they are not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence.61

To reiterate, having based their defense on resignation, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that Gimenez
voluntarily resigned. From the totality of circumstances and the evidence on record, it is clear that petitioners failed
to discharge this burden. If the pieces evidence presented by the employer and the employee are in equipoise, the
scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. This is in line with the policy of the State to afford greater
protection to labor. Accordingly, the finding of illegal dismissal must be upheld.62

Sarraga is not solidarily liable with Dela

Fuente

Under the law, in a sole proprietorship, the sole proprietor is personally liable for all the debts and obligations of the
business. This is because a sole proprietorship does not possess any juridical personality separate and apart from
the personality of the owner of the enterprise.63

Such being the case, Dela Fuente as the sole proprietor is liable to Gimenez for backwages and separation
pay.64 Strictly speaking, he is the proper party in this case and the one liable to Gimenez, since SSP has no
juridical personality to defend this suit. This Court has held that:

A sole proprietorship does not possess a juridical personality separate and distinct from the personality of the owner
of the enterprise. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as a form of business
organization conducted for profit by a single individual and requires its proprietor or owner to secure licenses and
permits, register its business name, and pay taxes to the national government. The law does not vest a separate
legal personality on the sole proprietorship or empower it to file or defend an action in court.65

Therefore, Sarraga, being merely SSP's manager, cannot be held solidarily liable with SSP.

Monetary Awards

The consequences of a finding of illegal dismissal are reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of
backwages computed from the time compensation was withheld up to the date of actual reinstatement. Where
reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1)-month salary for every year of
service should be awarded as an alternative. The payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of
backwages.66

In this wise, We have ruled that reinstatement is no longer feasible when: (a) the former position of the illegally
dismissed employee no longer exists; or (b) the employer's business has closed down; or (c) the employer-
employee relationship has already been strained as to render the reinstatement impossible. We likewise deem
reinstatement to be nonfeasible because a "considerable time" has lapsed between the dismissal and the resolution
of the case.67 Indeed, the Court considers "considerable time," which includes the lapse of eight (8) years or more
(from the filing of the complaint up to the resolution of the case) to support the grant of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement.68
Given that about sixteen (16) years had passed from the time that Gimenez filed her complaint against petitioners
with the NLRC on 06 October 2005, then, her reinstatement is no longer practicable. Thus, instead of reinstatement,
the Court grants her separation pay of one month for every year of service until the finality of this Resolution, with a
fraction of a year of at least six (6) months being counted as one (1) whole year.69 She is also entitled to receive full
backwages, which include allowances and other benefits due her or their monetary equivalent, computed from the
time her compensation was withheld up to the finality of this Resolution.70

Moreover, it is a settled labor doctrine that in cases involving non-payment of monetary claims of employees, the
employer has the burden of proving that the employees did receive their wages and benefits and that the same
were paid in accordance with law.71 As We have explained in Heirs of Ridad v. Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation:72

Well-settled is the rule that once the employee has set out with particularity in
his complaint, position paper, affidavits and other documents the labor standard
benefits he is entitled to, and which he alleged that the employer failed to pay him, it
becomes the employer's burden to prove that it has paid these money claims. One
who pleads payment has the burden of proving it, and even where the employees
must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests on the employer
to prove payment, rather than on the employees to prove non-payment. The reason
for the rule is that the pertinent personnel files, payrolls, records, remittances, and
other similar documents — which will show that overtime, differentials, service
incentive leave, and other claims of the worker have been paid — are not in the
possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer.

In this regard, Gimenez averred that she was illegally suspended three (3) times – two (2) weeks in 2002; another
two (2) weeks in December 2003; and two (2) months from June to August 2005.73

To be sure, suspension from work is a prima facie deprivation of this right. Thus, termination and suspension from
work must be reasonable to meet the constitutional requirement of due process of law. It will be reasonable if it is
based on just or authorized causes enumerated in the Labor Code. The employer has the burden of proof in
showing that disciplinary action was made for lawful cause. The employer must consider and show facts adequate
to support the conclusion that an employee deserves to be disciplined for his or her acts or omissions. Furthermore,
the employee must be given notice and the opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered.74 In this case,
petitioners did not give Gimenez notice or afforded her an opportunity to defend herself before she was suspended.
In fact, no rules were in place to guide the employees as regards the proper conduct in SSP.75

The best evidence to prove that Gimenez had not been suspended on the supposed dates of her suspension was
the payroll covering these periods or the daily time records showing that Gimenez was present during the dates in
question. There is no question that these documents are in the possession of petitioners and their failure to present
these documents gives rise to the presumption that the records would be adverse to them if produced.76 Hence,
We agree with the Labor Arbiter and the CA's findings that Gimenez is entitled to wages corresponding to the period
when she was illegally suspended.

In the same vein, We agree with the Labor Arbiter, NLRC, and CA, and affirm the grant of Gimenez's claim for
Holiday Pay and Service Incentive Leave. Petitioners did not refute this claim and did not present evidence such as
the payroll and the daily time records covering Gimenez in order to counter the same. Thus, petitioners failed to
discharge the burden of proving that Gimenez did receive said benefits and that the same were paid in accordance
with law.

Likewise, We agree with the CA that the amount of P25,000.00 should not be deducted from Gimenez's monetary
award. Sarraga's affidavit dated 08 December 200577 states that:

On June 23, 2005, Marilyn Gimenez appeared at our workplace and worked on
that day. I told her to ask the owner to allow her to return to work and to pay her
account of P4,500.00 which was paid by her group of co-workers by refunding
members of her group who paid her account, believing that she was not returning
back to work xxx.

As such, Gimenez only owes P4,500.00 and the same had already paid by her co-workers. Gimenez has no more
obligation to petitioners. Further, upon scrutinizing the Promissory Note,78 it seems that the liability of Gimenez is
towards Sarraga personally and not to SSP. Even assuming it is an advance from SSP, the same cannot be
automatically deducted. For one, Gimenez's outstanding Cash Advances have already been settled by her co-
workers. For another, no employer shall make any deduction from the wages of his or her employees except for
particular cases,79 none of which is present here.

We also affirm the denial of Gimenez's claim for underpayment of premium pay for Holiday, Rest Day and Night
Shift Differential for lack of specifics. Gimenez should have specified the dates she had not been paid said benefits
so as to substantiate the claims and to compute for the same.
On this note, the award of ten percent (10%) attorney's fees is also proper since Gimenez was forced to litigate to
protect her right and interest.80

Finally, the backwages including allowances and benefits or their monetary equivalent which were granted in favor
of Gimenez shall, in accordance with Our ruling in Nacar v. Gallery Frames,81 earn legal interest of twelve (12%)
percent per annum from the time these were withheld until 30 June 2013, and thereafter, six percent (6%)
per annum from 01 July 2013 until finality of this judgment. Additionally, all monetary awards shall earn interest at
the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.82

In fine, the computation of Gimenez's backwages must be from the time of her illegal dismissal from employment on
23 June 2005 until the finality of the Decision ordering the payment thereof. As for her separation pay, it should be
computed at one month pay for every year of service reckoned from November 2000 (as found by the Arbiter) until
the finality of the Decision in her favor. The ruling of the CA in its assailed Decision dated 28 July 2011 and the
Resolution dated 31 July 2014 which reinstated the 30 March 2006 Decision of the Arbiter is thus correct.83

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 28 July 2011
and the Resolution dated 31 July 2014 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
02501 holding that respondent Marilyn E. Gimenez was illegally dismissed and thus
entitled to full backwages, separation pay, and other monetary awards from the time
of her illegal dismissal until finality of the decision in her favor,
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, thus:

1. The complaint against Manuel Sarraga is DISMISSED;

2. Petitioner Salvador dela Fuente is ORDERED to pay respondent Marilyn E.

Gimenez the following:

a. FULL BACKWAGES, inclusive of allowances and other

benefits or their monetary equivalent from the time these were
withheld from her on 23 June 2005 until finality of this Decision;

b. SEPARATION PAY IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT at one

(1) month salary for every year of service, with a fraction of at least
six (6) months considered as one (1) whole year computed from the
date of the start of her employment on 12 November 2000 until
finality of judgment;

c. HOLIDAY PAY and SERVICE INCENTIVE LEAVE for three

(3) years from 2002 to 2005;84 and

d. WAGES FOR PERIOD OF ILLEGAL SUSPENSION for two

(2) weeks in 2002 and for another two (2) weeks in December 2003.

The total monetary award shall earn legal interest at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum from the time her salary and other benefits were withheld until 30
June 2013; and at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from 01 July 2013 until the
date of finality of this judgment. All the said monetary awards shall be subject to
legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment
until full satisfaction of the same.

The case is REMANDED to the arbitration branch of origin for the computation
of separation pay and backwages, other allowances and benefits or their monetary
equivalent in accordance with this Decision.85

SO ORDERED.

Leonen (Chairperson), Carandang, Rosario, and Dimaampao, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 5-23.

2 Id. at 166-179; penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, and concurred in by Associate
Justices Edgardo L. Delos Santos (now a retired Member of this Court) and Ramon Paul L. Hernando (now
a Member of this Court) of the Twentieth Division, Court of Appeals, Cebu City.
3 Id. at 188-189.

4 Id. at 76-83; penned by Commissioner Aurelio D. Menzon and concurred in by Commissioner Oscar S. Uy
and Presiding Commissioner Gerardo C. Nograles.

5 Id. at 99-101.

6 Id. at 48-56; penned by Labor Arbiter Jose G. Gutierrez.

7 Id. at 167.

8 Id.

9 Id.

10 Id. at 167-168.

11 Id. at 168.

12 Id.

13 Id. at 51, 168-169.

14 Id. at 51-52, 169.

15 Id. at 52.

16 Id. at 169-170.

17 Id. at 38-39.

18 Id. at 43.

19 Id. at 56. The complainant's monetary award is computed as follows:

I. Backwages -

(a) Illegal Suspension

Year 2002 for 2 weeks

Year 2003 for 2 weeks

xxx

(b) Illegal Dismissal

II. Separation Pay

III. Holiday Pay for 3 years only

xxx

Service Incentive Leave for 3 years

20 Id. at 53-54.

21 Id. at 54-55.

22 Id. at 55.

23 Id.

24 Id. at 170.

25 Id. at 81-82.
26 Id. at 80-81.

27 Id. at 99-101.

28 Id. at 178-179.

29 Id. at 173-175.

30 Id. at 175.

31 Id. at 176-177.

32 Id. at 178.

33 Id. at 188-189.

34 Id. at 12.

35 Jacob v. Villaseran Maintenance Service Corp., G.R. No. 243951, 20 January 2021 [Per J. Lazaro-
Javier].

36 See Pascua v. Bank Wise, Inc., G.R. Nos. 191460 & 191464, 31 January 2018 [Per J. Leonen]
and Jacob v. Villaseran Maintenance Service Corp., G.R. No. 243951, 20 January 2021 [Per J. Lazaro-
Javier].

37 Jacob v. Villaseran Maintenance Service Corp., G.R. No. 243951, 20 January 2021 [per J. Lazaro-
Javier].

38 LBC Express-Vis, Inc. v. Palco, G.R. No. 217101, 12 February 2020 [Per J. Leonen] citing Saudi Arabian
Airlines (Saudia) v. Rebesencio, 750 Phil. 791 (2015) [Per J. Leonen].

39 See Jacob v. Villaseran Maintenance Service Corp., G.R. No. 243951, 20 January 2021 [Per J. Lazaro-
Javier) and Carolina's Lace Shoppe v. Maquilan, G.R. No. 219419, 10 April 2019 [Per J.C. Reyes).

40 Grande v. Philippine Nautical Training College, 806 Phil. 601 (2017) [Per J. Peralta].

41 Pascua v. Bank Wise, Inc., G.R. Nos. 191460 & 191464, 31 January 2018 [Per J. Leonen]; See also
Jacob v. Villaseran Maintenance Service Corp., G.R. No. 243951, 20 January 2021 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier].

42 Grande v. Philippine Nautical Training College, 806 Phil. 601 (2017) [Per J. Peralta].

43 Torreda v. Investment and Capital Corporation of the Philippines, G.R. No. 229881, 05 September 2018
[Per J. Gesmundo].

44 Rollo, p. 45, 85-86.

45 Id. at 38-39, 173.

46 Id. at 38-39, 173-174.

47 Id.

48 Id.

49 Id. at 174-175.

50 Id. at 85.

51 Id. at 24-25, 175.

52 Grande v. Philippine Nautical Training College, 806 Phil. 601 (2017) [Per J. Peralta].

53 Jacob v. First Step Manpower Int'l. Services, Inc., G.R. No. 229984, 08 July 2020 [Per J. Leonen].

54 Grande v. Philippine Nautical Training College, 806 Phil. 601 (2017) [Per J. Peralta].
55 Jacob v. Villaseran Maintenance Service Corp., G.R. No. 243951, 20 January 2021 [Per J. Lazaro-
Javier].

56 Jacob v. First Step Manpower Int'l. Services, Inc., G.R. No. 229984, 08 July 2020 [Per J. Leonen].

57 Id.

58 Jacob v. Villaseran Maintenance Service Corp., G.R. No. 243951, 20 January 2021 [Per J. LazaroJavier]
citing Carolina's Lace Shoppe v. Maquilan, G.R. No. 219419, 10 April 2019 [Per J.C. Reyes].

59 See Jacob v. Villaseran Maintenance Service Corp., G.R. No. 243951, 20 January 2021 [Per J. Lazaro-
Javier].

60 See Hubilla v. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co., G.R. No. 207354, 10 January 2018 [Per J. Leonen].

61 Quinones v. National Labor Relations Commission, 316 Phil. 360-364 (1995) [Per J. Quiason].

62 See Hubilla v. HSY Marketing Ltd., Co., G.R. No. 207354, 10 January 2018 [Per J. Leonen] and Mobile
Protective & Detective Agency v. Ompad, 497 Phil. 621-635 (2005) [Per J. Puno].

63 Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. Nos. 236807 & 236810, 12 January 2021 [Per then CJ Peralta].

64 See Erning's Vaciador Shop v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 234483 (Notice), 10 June 2019 and AIP
Construction v. Marquina, G.R. No. 229225 (Notice), 11 September 2019.

65 Big AA Manufacturer v. Antonio, 519 Phil. 30-44 (2006) [Per J. Quisumbing] citing Mangila v. Court of
Appeals, 435 Phil. 870-886 (2002) [Per J. Carpio]; See also Erning's Vaciador Shop v. Fernandez, G.R. No.
234483 (Notice), 10 June 2019.

66 Moll v. Convergys Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 253715, 28 April 2021 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier].

67 JS Unitrade Merchandise, Inc. v. Samson, Jr., G.R. No. 200405, 26 February 2020 [Per J. Lazaro Javier].

68 Sta. Ana v. Manila Jockey Club, Inc., 805 Phil. 887 (2017) [Per J. Del Castillo].

69 See Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) v. Rebesencio, 750 Phil. 791 (2015) [Per J. Leonen] and Dumapis v.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., G.R. No. 204060, 15 September 2020 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier].

70 See Sta. Ana v. Manila Jockey Club, Inc., 805 Phil. 887 (2017) [Per J. Del Castillo] and Dumapis v.
Lepanto Consolidated Mining Co., G.R. No. 204060, 15 September 2020 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier].

71 Asentista v. JUPP & Co., Inc., G.R. No. 229404, 24 January 2018 [Per J. Reyes, Jr.].

72 703 Phil. 531-540 (2013) [Per J. Perez].

73 Rollo, p. 176.

74 See Montinola v. Philippine Airlines, 742 Phil. 487-513 (2014) [Per J. Leonen]. 1a⍵⍴h!1

75 Rollo, pp. 168-169.

76 See Section 3(e), Rule 131, Revised Rules of Court.

77 Rollo, p. 37.

78 Id. at 40.

79 Under Article 113 of the Labor Code, no employer, in his own behalf or in behalf of any person, shall
make any deduction from the wages of his employees, except for the following cases:

1. In cases where the worker is insured with his consent by the employer, and the deduction
is to recompense the employer for the amount paid by him as premium on the insurance;

2. For union dues, in cases where the right of the worker or his union to check-off has been
recognized by the employer or authorized in writing by the individual worker concerned; and
 3. In cases where the employer is authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment.

See also Rule VIII, Book 3, Section 10 (b) of IRR: Deductions on wages are allowed if employer
received a written authorization from the employee for payment to a third (3rd) person. This is valid
only when the employer did not receive any pecuniary benefit directly or indirectly from the
transaction.

80 Moll v. Convergys Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 253715, 28 April 2021 [Per J. Lazaro-Javier].

81 Angono Medics Hospital, Inc. v. Agabin, G.R. No. 202542, 09 December 2020 [Per J. Hernando]
citing Nacar v. Gallery Frames, 716 Phil. 267 (2013) [Per J. Peralta].

82 See Angono Medics Hospital, Inc. v. Agabin, G.R. No. 202542, 09 December 2020 [Per J. Hernando].

83 Id.

84 See also Mejares v. Hyatt Taxi Services, Inc., G.R. No. 242364 & 242459 (Notice), 17 June 2020.

85 Id. See also Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) v. Rebesencio, 750 Phil. 791 (2015) [Per J. Leonen].