Marxism and International Relations

Studies in
Critical Social Sciences

Series Editor
David Fasenfest (York University, Canada)

Editorial Board
Eduardo Bonilla-​Silva (Duke University)
Chris Chase-​Dunn (University of California–​Riverside)
William Carroll (University of Victoria)
Raewyn Connell (University of Sydney)
Kimberlé W. Crenshaw (University of California, Los Angeles/​
Columbia University)
Raju Das (York University, Canada)
Heidi Gottfried (Wayne State University)
Alfredo Saad-​Filho (King’s College London)
Chizuko Ueno (University of Tokyo)
Sylvia Walby (Royal Holloway, University of London)

volume 279

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/​scss

 Marxism and
International Relations
Perspectives from the Brazilian Global South

Edited by

Caio Martins Bugiato

LEIDEN | BOSTON
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Copyright 2024 by Caio Martins Bugiato. Published by Koninklijke Brill bv, Leiden, The Netherlands.
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Contents


Preface vii

Acknowledgements xi

Notes on Contributors xii

Part 1
Key Ideas by Marx and Engels for ir

1 
Marx and the Formation of the Modern International System 3
Luis Manoel Rebelo Fernandes

2 
Marx, Engels and the System of World Power in the Nineteenth
Century 15
Muniz Gonçalves Ferreira

3 
Revolutions and International Relations
Marxism’s Contributions and Failures 34
Paulo Gilberto Fagundes Visentini

Part 2
Marxist Thinkers as ir Theorists

4 
The Center-​Periphery Dialectic
Lenin’s Contribution to the Analysis of Contemporary International
Relations 49
Rita Matos Coitinho

5 
‘War against War’
Rosa Luxemburg as an International Relations Theorist 76
Miguel Borba de Sá

6 
The Imperialist Chain of the Interstate Relations
Nicos Poulantzas’ Theory on Imperialism 105
Caio Martins Bugiato

7 
Hegemonic Struggle and Populism
Agonistic Solutions to the Identity Challenge 121
Mayra Goulart da Silva
vi Contents

8 
Imperialism as a Complex System of Domination
An Approach from Domenico Losurdo 142
Diego Pautasso

9 
David Harvey and the International Relations
Some Appointments 156
Leonardo César Souza Ramos, Rodrigo Corrêa Teixeira, and
Marina Scotelaro de Castro

Part 3
Marxist Theories on Imperialism

10 
Notes on Imperialism, State and International Relations 173
Luiz Felipe Brandão Osório

11 
The Marxist Debate on Post-​World War ii Imperialism 194
Caio Martins Bugiato and Tatiana Berringer

12 
Imperialism
The Question of System Stability 212
Marcelo Pereira Fernandes

Part 4
Latin-​American Theory on Dependency

13 
The Marxist Theory of Dependency
Contributions of Latin American Marxism to International Relations 237
Maíra Machado Bichir

14 
Imperialism and Dependence vs. Interdependence
The Muted side of a Theoretical Clash 257
Rejane Carolina Hoeveler

15 
Brazilian Sub-​imperialism and Peripheral Development
A Critique of the Marxist Dependency Theory 278
Tiago Soares Nogara


Index 303
Preface

Even their most active critics cannot ignore the influence on the human
sciences of the thought of Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, and of Marxists
throughout history. In History, Sociology, Economics, and Linguistics, among
others, the contribution of Marxists to the epistemology, ontology, and theory
of these fields was intense. However, the same does not occur in the field of
International Relations (ir), in Brazil, and worldwide. ir, traditionally under-
stood as relations (generally conflictive) among states in an anarchic interna-
tional system, has been systematically distanced from the thought inaugurated
by the founders of modern and scientific socialism. For sure, ir is one of the
few social sciences in which it has been relatively easy to avoid an encounter
with Marxist thought.
Since its birth as a field of scientific knowledge in 1919 (thus more than a
century), ir have insisted on ignoring Marxism, its theorizations, and its
concrete analyses of international phenomena. Despite some exceptions, jus-
tifications for such disagreement appear in different and controversial argu-
ments. From an institutional point of view, one argue that: the origin of ir at
the beginning of the twentieth century, as an area of scientific knowledge, in
British and US universities, was not impacted by Marxism, which was born
from classical German philosophy and the European workers’ movement, that
means, from outside academic world; the institutional consolidation of the ir
field in the West after World War ii, during the Cold War period, carried with it
an aversion to Marxism, identified with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(ussr). From the theoretical-​political point of view, one argue that: Marxism
would have nothing to say about international relations since it would be an
economistic theory that would reduce the phenomena of international pol-
itics to the dynamics of the capitalist economy; it would not offer a theory
on the state (the main agent of international relations); it would merely be a
normative perspective dedicated to the socialist utopia and incapable of car-
rying out analyzes of concrete reality; or even it would be one more among the
various Eurocentric perspectives that would not fit for analyzing the periphery.
Thus, we must consider Kees van der Pijl’s (2014) argument that the for-
mation of the ir mainstream (the theories of Realism, Liberalism and later
Constructivism) is a construction of ideas that project Western supremacy in
the form of an intellectual hegemony functional to the center of capitalism. In
this way, it obscures the relations of domination and exploitation implicit in the
liberal world. The origin of this construction is in Woodrow Wilson’s reaction
at the end of World War i to the internationalism of the Russian Revolution: his
viii Preface

Fourteen Points are a counterrevolutionary copy of the Bolshevik program.

Then the nascent discipline in the second decade of the twentieth century was
responsible to initiate an intellectual process to obfuscate and marginalize first
the rich debate conducted by the theory on imperialism and then Marxism
in general. Therefore, ir emerged to disentangle international phenomena
from class struggles and from the processes of capital accumulation, which
ultimately promotes capitalism as the natural and superior state of human
life. Still in the course of its development, guided by its mainstream the the-
ories and the analyzes of this field sought to ratify domination strategies of
states, governments and classes by universalizing abstract concepts that would
explain international relations without any link to capitalism.
However, a theoretical movement in the area has opposed this situation,
especially in Europe, in the last few years with the development of Marxist
perspectives pertinent to International Relations. In this sense, it is worth
mentioning some of them, such as Neogramcian approaches in International
Relations, studies on Unequal and Combined Development, the Political
Marxism and the Amsterdam School. The authors of these perspectives have
developed significant contributions that insert Marxism in ir in a relevant,
singular and remarkable way.
Fortunately, this movement has also taken off in Brazil. For some years now,
a series of events and publications on Marxism and International Relations
have been promoted by researchers in the area with the general objective of
questioning: where is Marxism in ir, and how would be its theoretical develop-
ments, its divergences and convergences and its concrete analyzes of phenom-
ena in the field? In 2016, the Network of Studies in International Relations and
Marxism (rima [In Portuguese: Rede de Estudos em Relações Internacionais
e Marxismo]) was founded at the i Colloquium International Relations and
Marxism in Rio de Janeiro. In this first event (and in the following ones), we
had the participation of Brazilian intellectuals who have relevant production
on the theme and the presence of the foreigner researches Beverly Silver and
Leo Panitch. During the pandemic in 2020, rima organized the virtual semi-
nar “Where is the 21st Century Going?” with the participation of the Argentine
Atilio Borón and the ii International Relations and Marxism Colloquium was
held in 2022 in Rio de Janeiro, with the presence of professor Benno Teschke.
In addition to these events, a textual production has been developed in Brazil,
such as books, dossiers in academic journals and dissertations and PhD the-
ses in postgraduate programs in the country. Nevertheless, we highlight a
recent production that has contributed to mitigate the mentioned mismatch,
“Marxismo e Relações Internacionais” (Bugiato, 2021 [In English: Marxism and
International Relations]). This book prioritizes theoretical research that are
Preface ix

fundamental to intervene in the field of International Relations Theories. Now,

its research can be seen in the next pages.
It is important to affirm that such movement in Brazil is connected to
another one that occurred in the second half of the twentieth century. Before
the consolidation of the ir academic field in Brazilian universities in the
2000s, several Social Sciences intellectuals in Brazil and Latin America devel-
oped research and analysis on international relations from a Marxist perspec-
tive, culminating in the theory of dependency. Those theorists and analysts
indicated that the process of development of capitalism in the periphery
contained particularities that should be continually researched. They carried
out researches on issues such as the place of Latin American economies in
the global expansion of capitalism, the changes inherent to the advance of
monopolistic capitalism, the entry of international capital into the countries
of the region, the particularities of the dependent state, among other issues. In
the academic development of International Relations in the country, several
Marxist researchers rescued the theory of dependence and pointed out that
the analysis made by Latin American researchers on dependent capitalism
involves the adoption of the critical perspective offered by the Global South,
particularly the perspective of the working class in the Global South. This anal-
ysis can be view as deepening the analysis of imperialism, seen from the per-
spective of the periphery.
So, this book is a collection of research developed in Brazil in recent years
and our first collective publication on Marxism and International Relations
in English. Its public is the academic audience interested in Marxist thought
pertinent to International Relations. The authors present in 15 Chapters the-
ories, concepts, and themes that can take the reader to theoretical develop-
ments and to promote analysis of concrete situations. We organized the book
into four sections: key ideas by Marx and Engels for ir; Marxist thinkers as
ir theorists; Marxist theories on imperialism; and the Latin-​American theory
on dependency. In the first section, the authors highlight the contributions of
the “Communist Manifesto” to understanding the modern international sys-
tem, the conception of international politics found in the journalistic articles
by Marx and Engels published in the New York Daily Tribune, and the impor-
tance of studies on revolutions for International Security. In the second sec-
tion, researchers dedicated to works of Marxist thinkers –​Lenin, Luxemburg,
Poulantzas, Laclau and Mouffe, Losurdo, and Harvey –​present their reflections
on international relations, which allows us to consider them as ir theorists. In
the third section, the authors deal with the Marxist theory of imperialism and
its debates at different moments: World War i, the second half of the twentieth
century, and nowadays. In the fourth section, the authors present the Marxist
x Preface

theory on dependency, with exposition, debate, and critique. Originally from

Latin America, this theory is fundamental to understanding the dynamics of
global capitalism and particularly of the Global South, its contradictions, and
transformations.

References

Bugiato C (2021) Marxismo e Relações Internacionais. Goiânia: Editora Phillos Academy.

Van der Pijl K (2014) The Discipline of Western Supremacy: Modes of Foreign Relations
and Political Economy. Volume iii. London: Pluto Press.
Acknowledgements

I want to thank everyone who made this book possible. I would like to thank
all the authors who took part in this collective work, without whom this book
would not exist. It represents a years-​long effort to promote a subject that has
been obscured for so long. I would also like to thank the masters who were
part of my formation as a professor and researcher: Marcos Del Roio, Armando
Boito Junior, and Ricardo Musse. Special thanks go to Professor Alfredo Saad-​
Filho, who put me in touch with the publisher, and to David Fasenfest, who is
in charge of the series Studies in Critical Social Science. Finally, I would like to
thank my wife, Laiane Brasil Leal, and my son, Tito Brasil Bugiato. Onwards!
Notes on Contributors

Tatiana Berringer
Adjunct Professor (C3) of International Relations at the Federal University
of abc. Professor in the Postgraduate Program in World Political Economy
(epm) and the Master’s Program in International Relations (pri) at ufabc.
PhD and ma in Political Science from Unicamp, ba in International Relations
from unesp –​Franca (2007). She took part in a Missión de Travaille at the
Université de la Lumiére Lyon ii as part of the Capes –​Cofecub Project “Brazil
and France in neoliberal globalization” (2014). She was a Visiting Scholar at
the School of Oriental and African Studies (soas) in London (2016). She is the
author of the book “The Brazilian bourgeoisie and foreign policy in the fhc and
Lula governments”, translated (and expanded) into English by Brill Publisher
under the title “Brazilian bourgeoisie and foreign policy”. Member of the group
“Neoliberalism and Class Relations in Brazil”, linked to the Center for Marxist
Studies (Cemarx). Participates in the cnpq 2021 Universal Project –​The polit-
ical crisis, the new right, the state and social classes in Brazil. Coordinates the
capes/​d aad Project “Sustainable development agenda for the Greater abc
region and German investments in value chains”.

Miguel Borba de Sá
Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science of the Federal
University of Rio de Janeiro (ufrj), Brazil. He is a member of the Laboratory
of Interdisciplinary Studies in International Relations at the Federal Rural
University of Rio de Janeiro (lieri/​u frrj), and also sits on the board of
Political Advisors to the Institute of Alternative Policies for the Southern Cone
(Instituto PACS). He has formerly taught in public, private, and catholic uni-
versities from Portugal and Brazil. His recent works include publications in the
fields of International Relations Theory, Marxism, Peace Studies, International
Political Economy, and Post/​De/​Anti-​colonial Approaches. He holds a PhD
and a Master of Science degree in International Relations from the Pontifical
Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro and a Master of Arts in Ideology and
Discourse Analysis from the University of Essex, UK.

Luiz Felipe Brandao Osório

Professor of International Relations and the Graduate Program in Social
Sciences in Development, Agriculture and Society (cpda) at ufrrj and
the Graduate Program in International Political Economy (pepi) at ufrj.
Vice-​Director of the Institute of Human and Social Sciences (ichs/​u frrj).
Notes on Contributors xiii

Post-​Doctorate in Political and Economic Law from Universidade Presbiteriana

Mackenzie/​s p (2016). PhD and Master’s in International Political Economy
from ufrj. Law degree from ufjf. Author of the book Imperialism, State
and International Relations, published by Ideias & Letras. Researcher at the
clacso Critical Legal Thought wg, niep-​Marx/​u ff and the Interdisciplinary
Laboratory for International Relations Studies (lieri-​u frrj).

Rejane Carolina Hoeveler

She has a PhD in Social History from the Graduate Program in History at
the Fluminense Federal University (ppgh-​u ff), the same institution where
she completed her master’s degree, also in History, in 2013. She graduated in
History from the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (ufrj). She is currently
a post-​doctoral student in Social Work at the Federal University of Alagoas
(ufal), and a collaborating professor in ufal’s Graduate Program in Social
Work. She was an hourly lecturer in Brazilian History on the History and Social
Sciences degree course at the Getúlio Vargas Foundation in Rio de Janeiro
(fgv-​r j), and a substitute lecturer at the School of Social Work (ess) at the
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (ufrj) between 2020 and 2022. She spent
time at the Institute for Ibero-​American Studies in Berlin. Specialty top-
ics: Neoliberalism and social policies in Latin America; Contemporary History
of the Americas; Contemporary Democracies and Dictatorships; Feminism.

Rodrigo Corrêa Teixeira

Professor at the Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais. He is permanent
professor in the Stricto Sensu Postgraduate Program in Geography –​Treatment
of Spatial Information and a professor in the Department of International
Relations. He holds a PhD in Geography, concentrating on Spatial Organization,
from the Institute of Geosciences at ufmg. He obtained a Master’s degree in
History from the Faculty of Philosophy and Human Sciences of ufmg and a
Specialist degree in International Relations from puc Minas. He is a researcher
at the Center for the Study of Colonialities and the South Atlantic Studies
Group (Department of International Relations at puc Minas).

Paulo Gilberto Fagundes Visentini

Full Professor of International Relations at the Federal University of Rio Grande
do Sul/​u frgs. Professor of Postgraduate Studies in Political Science/​u frgs
and Military Sciences/​e ceme. Post-​doctorate in International Relations from
the London School of Economics and puc-​Rio. PhD in Economic History from
usp, ma in Political Science and ba in History from ufrgs. He held the Rui
Barbosa Chair at the University of Leiden/​Netherlands and the Rio Branco
xiv  notes on Contributors

Chair at the University of Oxford/​United Kingdom. He was Director of the

Latin American Institute for Advanced Studies/​u frgs. Visiting Professor
at nupri/​u sp, University of Cape Verde, Superior Institute of International
Relations/​Mozambique and University of Venice/​Italy. Coordinator of the
Brazilian Center for Strategy and International Relations/​n erint-​u frgs.
Founding editor of Austral: Brazilian Journal of International Relations.

Muniz Gonçalves Ferreira

He has a degree in History from the Fluminense Federal University (1987),
a master’s degree in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic
University of Rio de Janeiro (1992) and a doctorate in Economic History from
the University of São Paulo (1999). He is currently a professor at the Federal
Rural University of Rio de Janeiro. He has experience in History, with an
emphasis on International Relations, working mainly on the following sub-
jects: military dictatorship, communist movement, far-​right and international
relations.

Mayra Goulart da Silva

Professor of Political Science at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, the
Graduate Program in Social Sciences (ppgcs) at the Federal Rural University of
Rio de Janeiro (ufrrj) and Coordinator of the Laboratory of Parties, Elections
and Comparative Politics (lappcom). PhD in Political Science (2013) from
the Institute of Social and Political Studies (iesp-​u erj). Post-​doctorate at the
Center for Research and Studies in Sociology (cies-​Iscte) of the University
Institute of Lisbon, where she continues as a Visiting Researcher.

Maira Machado Bichir

Adjunct Professor of Political Science and Sociology –​Society, State and Politics
in Latin America, of the Postgraduate Program in Contemporary Integration of
Latin America (ppgical) and of the Specialization in Human Rights in Latin
America at the Federal University of Latin American Integration (unila). She
holds a master’s and doctorate in Political Science from the State University
of Campinas (Unicamp), a bachelor’s degree in Social Sciences from the State
University of Campinas (unicamp) and a bachelor’s degree in International
Relations from the São Paulo State University “Júlio de Mesquita Filho”
(unesp), Franca. She is the coordinator of the Marxism and Politics Study
Group (gemp), linked to unila. She is a member of the Working Group States
in Dispute, linked to the Latin American Council of Social Sciences (clacso).
Her field of research and interest encompasses studies on Latin American
Notes on Contributors xv

political and social thought, the state, power, politics, dependency, patriarchy,
colonialism, imperialism, class relations and social relations.

Caio Martins Bugiato

Graduated in International Relations from Universidade Estadual Paulista
(unesp –​Marília campus). Master’s and PhD in Political Science from the
University of Campinas (unicamp). Post-​doctoral student in Sociology at the
University of São Paulo (usp). Professor of Political Science and International
Relations at the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro (ufrrj) and the
Postgraduate Program in International Relations at the Federal University
of abc (pri-​u fabc). Coordinator of the Collective of Marxist Studies on
the International (ceminal). Researcher at the Network for Studies in
International Relations and Marxism (rima).

Rita Matos Coitinho

PhD in Geography (2018) from the Postgraduate Program in Geography at the
Federal University of Santa Catarina (ufsc). Career civil servant at the Brazilian
Institute of Museums (tac/​s ociology) since 2011. Curator and coordinator
of the Research Program at the Victor Meirelles Museum /​i bram. Researcher
at the “Nino Gramsci” Historical and Geographical Materialism Studies Center
at ufsc. Collaborator at cham –​Center for Humanities at the Nova University
of Lisbon. She holds a Master’s degree in Sociology from the University of
Brasília (2007), a degree in Social Sciences from the Federal University of Santa
Catarina (2004) and is currently studying for a PhD in Political Science (ufsc).

Diego Pautasso
Post-​Doctorate in International Strategic Studies (2018), PhD (2010) and Master
(2006) in Political Science and ba (2003) in Geography from ufrgs. He is a
collaborating professor in the Postgraduate Program in International Strategic
Studies (ufrgs), the Center for Latin American and Caribbean Studies at
the Southwest University of Science and Technology (Sichuan/​China) and
the Specialization in International Relations (ufrgs-​Southern Military
Command). He is currently a Geography teacher at the Military College of
Porto Alegre. He is the author of the book “China and Russia in the Post-​Cold
War” and co-​author of “International Relations Theory: Marxist Contributions”.

Marcelo Pereira Fernandes

He is currently an Associate Professor iii at the Federal Rural University of
Rio de Janeiro (ufrrj) and a lecturer in the Postgraduate Program in Regional
Economics and Development (ppger) at ufrrj and the Postgraduate Program
xvi  notes on Contributors

in International Political Economy (pepi) at ufrj. Masters in Economics from

the Pontifical Catholic University of São Paulo (puc/​s p) and PhD from the
Fluminense Federal University (uff/​r j). Member of the Advisory Board of
the Brazilian Center for Solidarity with Peoples and the Struggle for Peace
(cebrapaz). Member of the Research Group Historical Patterns of Economic
Development in South America and the Interdisciplinary Laboratory of Studies
in International Relations. He is interested in Political Economy, International
Political Economy, Imperialism, South American Economies, China’s Economic
Development, brics Economies and the Economy of the Sea. He is currently
President of the Regional Economics Council of Rio de Janeiro (corecon-​r j).

Luis Manoel Rebelo Fernandes

He holds a ba in International Relations from Georgetown University (1979),
an ma in Political Science (Political Science and Sociology) from the University
Research Institute of Rio de Janeiro –​iuperj (1989) and a PhD in Political
Science (Political Science and Sociology) from the University Research Institute
of Rio de Janeiro –​iuperj (1997). He is currently a professor at the Institute
of International Relations (iri) of the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de
Janeiro and a professor at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro. As a public
manager, he has served as Executive Secretary of the Ministry of Science and
Technology, and others. He is the current Coordinator of the Political Science
and International Relations Area at capes (2018–​2022), a member of the
agency’s Technical-​Scientific Council (ctc-​e s) and a member of its Superior
Council (2018–​2021).

Marina Scotelaro de Castro

ba and PhD in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University
of Minas Gerais (puc Minas); ma in Social Policy from the Federal University of
Espírito Santo. Professor of International Relations at the University Center of
Belo Horizonte. Member of the Middle Powers Research Group at puc Minas
(CNPq) and the Center for Latin American Studies at the University of Brasilia
(CNPq). Post-​doctoral student and associate researcher at the Institute of
International Relations at UnB.

Tiago Soares Nogara

He is currently affiliated with the College of Liberal Arts at Shanghai University
(上海大学). He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of São
Paulo (usp). He holds a master’s degree in International Relations from the
University of Brasilia (UnB) and a degree in Social Sciences from the Federal
University of Rio Grande do Sul (ufrgs), with a sandwich period at the Faculty
newgenprepdf

Notes on Contributors xvii

of Political Science and International Relations of the National University

of Rosario (unr). He was a visiting professor on the international relations
course at the University of Brasilia (UnB), teaching Theory of International
Relations i and Topics in International Politics ii. He is assistant coordinator of
the Brazilian Strategic Environment research line at the International Security
Studies and Research Group (gepsi). His research focuses on South American
politics and regionalism, Brazilian foreign policy and Chinese foreign policy.

Leonardo César Souza Ramos

He has a degree in International Relations from the Pontifical Catholic
University of Minas Gerais, a master’s degree in International Relations from the
Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro and a doctorate in International
Relations from the Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro. He is cur-
rently a professor in the Department of International Relations and coordi-
nator of the Postgraduate Program in International Relations at the Pontifical
Catholic University of Minas Gerais and a visiting professor at the National
University of Rosario (unr). He is a CNPq Research Productivity Fellow, level
2. He leads the Middle Powers Research Group (gppm). He is a researcher at
the National Institute for Studies on the United States (inct-​i neu/​CNPq/​
fapesp) and a researcher associated with the Coordination of Asian Studies
(ceasia/​u fpe).
 pa rt 1
Key Ideas by Marx and Engels for ir

∵
 ­c hapter 1

Marx and the Formation of the Modern

International System

Luis Manoel Rebelo Fernandes1

1 Introduction

Along with Adam Smith and Keynes, Marx makes up the triad of modern
thinkers who most influenced our current world configuration.2 The main
theoretical approaches that shaped the academic discipline of International
Relations over the last century, nonetheless, have tended to consider Marxist
theory mostly irrelevant for understanding or explaining the modern interna-
tional system. The neorealist Kenneth Waltz, for example, classifies Marxist
approaches as the most complete expression of what he calls the ‘second
image’ of international conflict: the one that conceives it as a result of the
internal structures of states, disregarding the dynamics of the international
system itself (Waltz, 1959: especially Chapter 5). Martin Wight, the main expo-
nent of the so-​called ‘English School of International Relations’, states that
“neither Marx nor Lenin nor Stalin made any systematic contribution to the
international theory” (Wight, 1966: 26). A similar assessment is supported even
by authors who adopt a Marxist theoretical perspective (although they base
this assessment on opposite lines of argument). Justin Rosenberg, for example,
criticizes the text of the “Communist Manifesto” for painting a transnational
image of the global expansion of capitalism, ignoring its international dimen-
sion (Rosenberg, 1996: 8).
In contrast with the ir discipline’s orthodox bias against Marxist theory,
this text argues that Marx’s theoretical framework provides us with funda-
mental keys to unveil and understand the formation and dynamics of the
modern international system. I sustain that Marx’s potential contributions to
ir theory have not been adequately valued even by authors within the disci-
pline who were or are inspired by Marxist theory, including ‘critical theory’

1 Professor at the Institute of International Relations (iri) at puc-​Rio and Federal University
of Rio de Janeiro.
2 This text is a revised and expanded version of an article originally published in the journal
“Contexto Internacional”: Fernandes, 1998. Translated into English by Alberto Resende Jr.

© Luis Manoel Rebelo Fernandes, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_002

4 Rebelo Fernandes

or ‘world-​system’ approaches. I highlight, in particular, a crucial dimension of

the ‘dialectics of modernity’ revealed by Marx: the contradictory articulation
of transnational and international processes in the capitalist constitution of
the modernity. I further argue that the theoretical identification of this con-
tradictory articulation is key to unraveling the genesis and development of the
modern international system.

2 Marx and the Study of International Relations

The mismatch between Marxism and orthodox scholars of international rela-

tions is not fortuitous. As an academic discipline that was constituted with a
focus on the study of relations between states in the international system the
area of ‘international relations’ is the result of the process of institutionaliza-
tion of separate and specialized ‘territories’ of knowledge in the universities
of the Anglo-​Saxon world in the twentieth century. Marxist thought, in turn,
is heir to another tradition –​that of classical German philosophy, especially
Hegelian –​which conceives social reality as a historically produced totality
(thus being averse to ontologies and analytical methods that carve social
knowledge into watertight compartments). The compatibility of these theo-
retical traditions is problematic. When trying to position Marx’s theoretical
propositions in the framework of the intellectual debates which shaped the
dominant narrative about the ir discipline’s development, most scholars
tended to present Marx’s approach as subsidiary to theoretical perspectives
centered on the proposition of a ‘worldwide’ or ‘international’ society3.
As observed by Fred Halliday (1999: especially Chapter 3), Marx’s theoretical
approach does not fit in very well in either side of ir discipline’s “founding
debates”. It is simultaneously ‘utopian’ (in formulating an alternative project of
social emancipation) and ‘realist’ (in emphasizing the material interests that
command human action and the role played by force in history); ‘Scientific’
(by intending to discover laws of social development) and ‘normative’ (by
explicitly highlighting the transformative vocation of his philosophy); ‘world-​
systemic’ (by stressing the integration of the globe into a single world market)
and ‘state-​centric’ (by recognizing, theoretically and politically, the centrality

3 That is the key concept of the so-​called ‘English School. In addition to Martin Wight, already
mentioned above, it includes authors such as Manning (1975) and Bull (1977). The concept
of ‘international society’ refers to reflections by Hugo Grotius, still in the seventeenth cen-
tury. Among the authors who situate the Marxist theory as a ‘world society’ perspective are
Kubalkova and Cruickshank (1989) and Thorndike (1988).
Marx and the Formation of the Modern International System 5

of state power for exercising domination both at the domestic and interna-
tional levels). Despite this ambivalent and problematic relationship with dom-
inant but disputed paradigms within their ir academic field, Marx provided
crucial indications for understanding the genesis and evolution of the modern
international system. That is what I intend to demonstrate next.

3 Marx and the Dialectics of Globalization in Modernity

Marx’s original theoretical contributions on the subject are contained in the

dense historical narrative that opens the “Communist Manifesto”, written in
partnership with Friedrich Engels and originally published in 1848. In addi-
tion to its mobilizing ideological appeal, and the powerful social and political
movements it has inspired since then, the great strength of the text resides pre-
cisely in having intellectually captured the process of historical rupture that
formed the modern world.
It would be an obvious anachronism to attribute to Marx paternity of the
concept of ‘modernity’, as this is a contemporary concept. Even without being
explicitly theorized, the ‘spectrum’ of this concept orders and commands the
dense historical narrative that opens the “Communist Manifesto”, as if by
Adam Smith’s invisible hand. The word “modern” appears more than a dozen
times in the text’s opening pages, referring alternately to “industry”, “bourgeois
society”, “bourgeoisie”, “proletariat”, “productive forces”, “production relations”,
“representative state” and “government”. The key provided in the text to under-
stand those modern manifestations is precisely the genesis, consolidation, and
global expansion of capitalism. In other words, it is the historical process of
constituting the capitalist mode of production that simultaneously constitutes
‘modernity’, unifying and shaping the world “in its image and likeness” (Marx
and Engels, no date: 25).
This identification of the role played by capitalism in the constitution of
the modern world allowed Marx to capture, in a unique way, its profoundly
contradictory nature. As Göran Therborn rightly noted, Marxism emerged
early on as a theory and practice of the “dialectics of modernity” (Therborn,
1995: 248). He simultaneously captured the emancipatory potential embedded
in developments such as industrialization, urbanization, mass literacy, the dis-
solution of traditional values, and the orientation towards an open future (no
longer conceived as a mere repetition of the past); and the oppressive/​inhu-
man nature of the new mechanisms of exploitation, of factory despotism, and
the generalization of a cold and calculating instrumental rationality with the
commodification of ever broader dimensions of social life.
6 Rebelo Fernandes

In the pages of the “Communist Manifesto”, Marx identifies, as a constitu-

tive process of the modern world, the global expansion of historical capitalism
from its initial confines in northwest Europe. In a fulminating and overwhelm-
ing process, the new mode of production integrated, for the first time in history,
the entire globe into a single market, subordinating, subverting, and supplant-
ing various forms of pre-​existing cultures and societies. Within the framework
of this impressive rupture, the European powers subjugated, in a few decades,
even the ancient empires of the East, which had sustained a material develop-
ment superior to that of Europe for centuries (until the advent of the Industrial
Revolution).4
Marx reveals how this historical rupture was prepared by the global expan-
sion of merchant capital in the so-​called ‘Age of Discoveries’ and the colo-
nization processes that followed. The text of the “Communist Manifesto”
anticipates, here, a point that Marx further developed in his famous c­ hapter 24
of volume 1 of “Das Capital”: the role of colonial dispossession in the histori-
cal process of ‘primitive accumulation’ that made the advent of modern (i.e.,
industrial) capitalism possible in northwest Europe. What Marx highlights is
the impetus given to the advent of new forms of production in Europe by the
intensification of global trade flows (via the exploration of new trade routes
with to India and China, the colonization of America, and the establishment
of colonial trade). It was precisely the need to serve these ever-​expanding
markets that displaced old feudal-​guild system, initially by small scale inde-
pendent producers, then by manufacturing processes, and finally by modern
(capitalist) large scale industry. In the nineteenth century, this large-​scale capi-
talist industry reaped the fruits sown by earlier mercantile expansion, unifying
the world in a single market under British dominance.
European capitalism, thus, was born intertwined with global flows of trade
and wealth. It was formed and developed as a transnational system from the
very beginning. But that is only one side of the story. The other is that the
increasing centralization of property, production, wealth, and population
brought about by this transition to more modern economic forms led to the

4 The first volume of Fernand Braudel’s book, “Material Civilization and Capitalism 15th–​18th
Centuries”, contains an extremely interesting map in that respect, based on research con-
ducted by the ethnographer Gordon W. Hewes. The map in question classifies, according to
their levels of material development, the 76 main civilizations and cultures existent in the
world at the beginning of Europe’s westward expansion (around 1500). The six most devel-
oped civilizations at the time, according to this classification, were Japan, Korea, China, the
Indonesian Plains, the Southeast Asian Plains, and India. Northwestern Europe appears only
in seventh place. See Braudel, 1985: 58–​9.
Marx and the Formation of the Modern International System 7

strengthening of a new type of bourgeoisie (initially commercial, then manu-

facturing, finally industrial and banking) that played a decisive role as a polit-
ical and social counterpoint to the decentralized feudal power structures. The
result was a process of political centralization that resulted in the formation of
unified national states in northwest Europe under the aegis of absolutist sec-
ular power.5 The fragmented powers of the old feudal society were “gathered
into one nation, with one government, one law, one national class interest, one
customs barrier” (Marx and Engels, no date: 25). In line with the predominant
realist interpretations in academic ir theory, the mutual recognition of those
sovereign territorial powers in the Peace Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 –​at the
end of the bloody [religious] Thirty Years War-​marks the birth of the modern
international system in Europe.
The transition to capitalism in northwestern Europe thus simultaneously
constituted a transnational system (integrated into a global market in forma-
tion, within the framework of which the new mode of production was gener-
alized) and an international system (consisting of sovereign centralized states,
initially only in Europe). The very formation of colonial merchant empires –​
and the major trade wars this engendered –​was a consequence of attempts to
forcibly monopolize newly constituted global flows of trade and wealth, using
the new concentrated political power of nation-​states. These, in turn, triggered
processes of unification and integration of their respective internal markets,
expropriating the communal lands that made subsistence peasant economies
possible (i.e., forcing peasants to become landless ‘free workers’). In the nine-
teenth century, this recently consolidated European capitalism took advantage
of the concentrated power of the large, centralized states to effectively subor-
dinate the entire globe to its dynamics, initially through a universal liberaliza-
tion agenda (which favored British capital) and, later, via the assembly of new
competing colonial empires (imperialism). The edgy and contradictory artic-
ulation of global and national dimensions, therefore, is ingrained in capitalist
modernity from its very beginning.

5 The “Communist Manifesto” explicitly formulates this understanding of the balance between
the bourgeoisie and the nobility as the social foundation of the formation of absolutist states
in Western Europe. Perry Anderson argued, in his book “Lineages of the Absolutist State”,
that, in addition to strengthening the bourgeoisie, political centralization was an expression
of a reaction by the aristocracy to the weakening of its domination over the peasantry caused
by the generalization of monetary relations in the countryside (see Anderson, 1979). These
differences in interpretation do not affect the fundamental argument of this chapter, which
highlights the articulation of transnational and international processes in the constitution of
the modern world.
8 Rebelo Fernandes

4 The Illusion of Convergence

The image of the modern world revealed by Marx is that of a bifrontal Janus,
with both transnational and international faces. But it is undoubtedly the trans-
national face that appears most prominently in the text of the “Communist
Manifesto”. The reason for this can be found in a methodological footnote writ-
ten by Engels himself, in which he states that he and Marx had “considered
England a typical country for the economic development of the bourgeoisie”
(Marx and Engels, no date: 23). As this was destined to “create the world in its
image and likeness”, the method adopted was based on the fact that humanity
could see its future in the English mirror. But that presupposed global con-
vergence towards unique economic, political, social, and cultural standards
within the framework of capitalism.
The strength of this understanding lies in its identification of capital’s
insatiable expansionist drive for accumulation, which pushes it incessantly
to search for new markets across the globe. In times of so-​called ‘globaliza-
tion’, the relevance of this line of argument is quite evident. But except for
the most hardened globalists (in their apologetic or apocalyptic versions), sev-
eral passages of the “Communist Manifesto” in this regard sound, today, a bit
overblown. The world market is still far from removing its national base from
industry (even in the case of multinational companies6). Universalist human-
ism is still far from replacing national narrowness and exclusivism as the main
reference of identity (as attested by the resurgence of chauvinist and racist
movements around the world). The countless national and local literatures are
still far from being swallowed up by a single universal literature. Even concern-
ing historical events contemporary to the text of the “Communist Manifesto”,
it is worth noting that an artillery with a much less figurative meaning than
that of ‘low prices’ was necessary to bend the ‘walls of China’ and maintain the
opium trade routes open to British traffickers in the nineteenth century.7
The predominant image in the text is, in fact, that of a fulminating territorial
expansion of capitalism across the globe, which, like fire on the prairie, con-
sumes all cultures and civilizations it encounters along the way and makes the
borders of national political communities increasingly irrelevant. The proper

6 From 70 to 75% of the added value of large multinational companies in central capitalist
countries continues to be produced in their countries of origin. More than 85% of its tech-
nological activity is concentrated on a national basis. See, in that regard, the studies by Patel
and Pavitt (1991) and by Hirst and Thompson (1996).
7 The near-​coincidence of the sesquicentennial of the “Communist Manifesto” and the end of
the British occupation of Hong Kong eloquently attests to that.
Marx and the Formation of the Modern International System 9

international dimension of this process –​for the understanding of which the

text provides crucial theoretical keys –​remains in the background. But this
makes Marx’s theoretical approach vulnerable to the same type of critique
directed to Western theories of modernization in the twentieth century by
development, dependency, and ‘world-​system’ theorists: that, once the globe is
economically integrated, it cannot be expected that the regions incorporated
later reproduce the same pattern of development as the countries where cap-
italism originated.8 This criticism was anticipated by Trotsky when he stated
that, given the uneven and combined development of capitalism within the
framework of the world market it created, “England, at a certain time, revealed
the future of France, in a certain way that of Germany, but by no means those
of Russia and India” (Trotsky, 1977: 1009) In other words, the world unified by
capitalism is not homogeneously shaped in the image of its core societies.
In addition to methodological considerations, there are also historical-​
contextual reasons for that underestimation of the international dimension
in the pages of the “Communist Manifesto”. The text was written only two
years after the cancellation of the Corn Laws in England (which marked the
end of mercantilist practices and the triumph of the liberal agenda of British
industrialists), in a period marked by the dissolution of the former Spanish
and Portuguese colonial empires in the Americas (with the active support of
British power structures) and the emergence of strong liberal movements in
opposition to absolutism in Europe. Liberalism, with its anti-​state and non-​
interventionist ideology, emerged as the theory and practice par excellence of
mid-​nineteenth century industrial capitalism. The full impact of the late indus-
trialization processes in the United States, Japan and Germany which mobi-
lized, in an openly non-​liberal vein, the centralized power of their respective
national states to actively promote industrialization –​was only felt later in the
century.9 The practices of political control over money (via the Central Banks’
emission monopoly) and the relaunching of colonial expansion by the cen-
tral capitalist countries only became generalized later. All this contributed to
a predominantly transnational image of capitalist modernity in the text of the
“Communist Manifesto”.

8 For a critique of modernization theories, see Baran (1977), Frank (1966), Wallerstein (1974)
and Cardoso (1993).
9 Based on this impact that Engels formulated, towards the end of his life, the concept of ‘state
capitalism’. See Engels (1977): 53–​55.
10  Rebelo Fernandes

5 The Theoretical Key to Understand the Genesis of the Modern

International System

In present times, when the dominant discourse on globalization has become

almost ‘common sense’ (albeit under increasingly fierce attack from political
forces both on the right and on left), the transnational dimension of capital-
ist modernity anticipated by Marx is one of the aspects most highlighted by
commentators of his work. The central argument I present here highlights that
the richest and most relevant theoretical key provided by Marx lies in another
dimension that remains largely obscured: his understanding of the contradic-
tory articulation of transnational and international processes in the capitalist
constitution of the modern world.
From this angle, the great ‘novelty’ of the twentieth century was not so
much the constitution of a global capitalist economy (this was already formed
and consolidated in the nineteenth century) but the extension of the system of
sovereign political communities to the entire planet (following the crises of the
old colonial-​mercantilist system in the Americas and its colonial-​imperialist
successor in Africa and Asia).10 This finding does not ignore or underestimate
the fact that, under the impact of important technological innovations, the
integration of global markets intensified greatly in the twenty and twenty-​first
centuries, compressing the dimensions of time and space within them. But,
according to the theoretical clue bequeathed by Marx, these developments
only accelerated, in an uneven and differentiated way, a secular process inher-
ent to (and constitutive of) capitalism since its origins. In this sense, the devel-
opment and diffusion of new information and communication technologies
at the end of the twentieth century played a role similar to the development
and diffusion of the telegraph and telephone at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury. It is precisely the combined development of these two processes –​the
integration of global markets and the globalization of the political form of the
sovereign state –​that gives the international system its contemporary configu-
ration, marked by an extremely unequal (but changeable) distribution of polit-
ical, military, diplomatic and economic power.

10 The last century was also deeply marked, of course, by the attempt to constitute an alter-
native socialist world system to the capitalist global economy, but as this attempt failed,
I will not talk about it in this article.
Marx and the Formation of the Modern International System 11

6 Marx and the National Question

This innovative theoretical perspective presented by Marx in the nineteenth

century captured and unveiled the historical processes that formed unified
national states in Europe (and structured the international system, displac-
ing the transnational power of the Church and the local powers of nobility),
revealing their connections with the genesis, consolidation, and expansion
of the capitalist mode of production. Contrary to simplistic interpretations
very prevalent in academic and political debates, this perspective does not
abstractly oppose the ‘class question’ to the ‘national question’ (or ‘socialism’
to ‘nationalism’) but rather provides a ‘class analyses’ of the emergence of the
‘national question’ and of ‘nationalism’ itself. It was this theoretical key that
allowed thinkers and political leaders of Marxist inspiration in the following
century to identify in the national liberation struggles of peoples under colo-
nial rule or in semi-​colonial or dependent countries a fundamental vector to
face and defeat imperialist domination of central capitalist powers, now under
the aegis of finance capital –​the most concentrated, centralized form assumed
by monopoly capital.11
This strategic conception was at the origin of most of the socialist expe-
riences that polarized the development of the international system in the
twentieth century, especially after the constitution of the former ‘socialist
camp’. The fact is that, inspired by Lenin’s theoretical-​strategic formulations
(which were based on the theoretical key provided by Marx on the relationship
between the global expansion of the capitalist mode of production and the
national question to situate in the struggles of its time), the Soviet Union and
other socialist countries transformed the active support (military, political,
economic and diplomatic) of national liberation struggles into a cornerstone
of their respective foreign policies. In doing so, they profoundly transformed
the international system in the twentieth century by triggering and sustaining
a global decolonization process.
The theoretical-​strategic formulation proposed by Lenin indicated that
the constitution of sovereign national states by dominated, colonized, semi-​
colonial people could oppose their conquered territorial power to the dom-
ination of financial capital, enabling national development projects with an
anti-​imperialist content that can open pathways for longer or shorter periods
of transition to socialism. The question arises again at the beginning of the 21st

11 For the theoretical basis of this proposition and the programmatic-​strategic formulation
resulting from it, see Lenin (1977b and 1977c).
12  Rebelo Fernandes

century, generated by the collapse of the former ‘socialist bloc’ and by the rela-
tive weakening of positions of power held by the capitalist countries that were
at the dominant core of the international system in the two previous centuries.

7 Conclusion

Rather than being an ‘irrelevant’ author for the study of international relations,
the argument developed in this text sustains that Marx made a crucial theo-
retical contribution to this study by revealing the ‘missing link’ in the forma-
tion of the modern international system, which conditions and structures its
contradictory development up to the present day. In contrast to realism’s axi-
omatic understanding, which conceives the balance of power as a permanent
and recurrent attribute of any states system not subordinated to a common
government (i.e., under conditions of ‘anarchy’), Marx revealed how the emer-
gence of a system of sovereign states in Europe in the seventeenth century
was the result of a very particular and concrete historical process, associated
with the advent of new capitalist productive forms leveraged by the commer-
cial impulse propitiated by the global expansion of merchant capital. The new
social relations generated by this process constituted the central institutional
link that articulates the modern world: the separate existence of autonomous
political and economic spheres, both at the domestic and international levels.
It is this separation that allows and enables, via a legal structure of property
rights, investment flows beyond national borders.12
The institutionalization of academic knowledge over the past century
uncritically embraced this separation of political and economic spheres, mov-
ing towards the isolated study of each (via ‘political science’ and ‘pure econom-
ics’). Even the classic approaches of International Political Economy, which
chose the interaction between both spheres in the international system as their
main object of study, tended to assume their separation as a non-​problematic
starting point instead of theoretically explaining their emergence.13 The his-
torical understanding formulated by Marx makes it possible to unravel pre-
cisely this emergence, providing a crucial theoretical key for understanding
the modern international system. But fully exploiting the explanatory poten-
tial of this key requires that we theoretically re-​establish the contradictory bal-
ance between the transnational and international dimensions of the dialectics

12 This point is developed fully in the book by Rosenberg (1994).

13 See, for example, Gilpin (1987)
Marx and the Formation of the Modern International System 13

of globalization that accompanies the genesis, consolidation, and expansion

of capitalism. It requires, in particular, that we explore, from the theoretical
keys provided by Marx, the heterogeneous nature of the international system,
as opposed to the logical models built on the premise of homogeneous states
prevalent in realist readings of international relations. In this realm, the the-
oretical contributions of authors such as Lenin, Gramsci, and even our late
Ignácio Rangel who conceive the combination of varied socio-​economic struc-
tures in national social formations constituted in the wake of the global expan-
sion of capitalism can add an important complement to Marx’s original and
innovative understanding of the origins and dynamics of the modern interna-
tional system.14

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Baran P (1977) A Economia Política do Desenvolvimento. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar.
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14 See, in this regard: Marx (2008), Lenin (1977a and 1985), Gramsci (1989 and 2004) and
Rangel (2005).
14  Rebelo Fernandes

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 ­c hapter 2

Marx, Engels and the System of World Power in the

Nineteenth Century

Muniz Gonçalves Ferreira1

1 Introduction

This chapter is concerned with the production of Karl Marx and Friedrich
Engels regarding diplomatic relations among European national states during
the 1950s and 1960s.2 In the course of those years, the initiators of the Marxist
tradition had the opportunity to exercise their skills as analysts of interna-
tional affairs in European and North American publications, in particular in
the pages of the American newspaper “New York Daily Tribune”, for which
they were correspondents in Europe from 1851 to 1862. “The New York Daily
Tribune” was founded in 1841 and published until 1924. Until the mid-​1950s, it
was guided by liberal leftist positions, becoming, from then on, an organ of the
Republican Party. When the American Civil War broke out, the “Tribune”, con-
sistent with the position adopted by the Republican Party, clearly sided with
the abolitionist forces, supporting the northern states in their struggle against
southern secession. However, due to financial difficulties suffered during the
course of the war, they dismissed all their international collaborators, inter-
rupting Marx’s correspondence in 1862.
The first articles that Marx and Engels devoted to diplomatic relations
among European states in the “Tribune” had, as a background, the ebb of revo-
lutionary movements that had spread across the continent in the period 1847–​
1849 and the establishment of the Second French Empire under the direction
of Luiz Bonaparte, in the year 1851. It was precisely the activity of this last char-
acter that the two columnists directed their first observations in matters of
international diplomacy. However, in the first year of Marx and Engels’ col-
laboration with the “Tribune”, the national emergence of the populations of
Central-​Eastern Europe and the balance of democratic-​radical movements

1 Full Professor of Contemporary History at the Department of History at the Federal Rural
University of Rio de Janeiro. E-​mail: [email protected].
2 Chapter originally published as an article in the Brazilian journal “Crítica Marxista”, volume
1, number 21, 2005. Translated into English by Alberto Resende Jr,

© Muniz Gonçalves Ferreira, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_003

16  Gonçalves Ferreira

within the Germanic world constituted the privileged themes of the jour-
nalistic correspondence of the two revolutionary German thinkers with the
American daily.
Only from the 1853–​1854 biennium onwards did the political-​diplomatic
articulations among the main European national states become at the center
of the international concerns of the two companions in struggles and letters.
The international interests touched by the Italian unification movement, the
fate of Turkey, and the actions of Russia, were the international themes that
most catalyzed the attention of Marx and Engels in that period.
The restorationist and conservative objectives that presided over the found-
ing of the international system of the Congress of Vienna3 did not escape
the eyes of the two German critics. Interested as they were in the fate of the
European revolutionary movement, Marx and Engels did not spare criticism
of the concepts and methods of the five powers (Austria, Prussia, Russia,
England, and France), which constituted the hard core of that system. For the
authors, behind the high-​sounding verbiage of the European statesmen of that
period, two unspeakable objectives were hidden: the desire for supremacy and
the repudiation of the revolution. For them, therefore, such designs could not
inspire other international attitudes, if not those characterized by hypocrisy
and simulation between the great powers, disrespect for national sovereignty,
and the systematic practice of blackmail and intimidation in the treatment
given to smaller states. As a general rule, therefore, the practice of reciprocal
interference in the internal affairs of other states prevailed, limited only by the
balance of power in the relations between them.
Still, in that context, Marx and Engels already noticed the deepening ten-
sions between the European powers concerning the problems of the Near East.
There was then a shift in the attention of the main Western European states
to the perspectives generated by the deterioration of the power of the Turkish
Empire, which meant real possibilities for absorbing valuable portions of the
former empire of the sultans such as those located in the Balkan region, as well
as in the vicinity of the Bosporus Strait and the Dardanelles. Thus, an extensive
series of articles by the two authors dealt with the so-​called ‘Eastern Question’,
the nodal point of the future Crimean War (1853–​1856).

3 International political order agreed upon in the Austrian capital at the end of the Napoleonic
wars of the early nineteenth century. It had as its main protagonists England, the Austrian
Empire, Prussia, and Russia with France incorporated after the monarchical restoration. Its
main objective was to constitute a collective security system that would preserve the monar-
chical and absolutist regimes in Europe at the time from the revolutionary threat.
Marx, Engels and the System of World Power 17

2 Assessment of the Role Played by Russia in the

International System

The obstinate way in which Marx and Engels dedicated themselves to denounc-
ing and fighting tsarism brings up the theme of the alleged ‘Russiaphobia’ of
those authors. In the writings they dedicated to the so-​called “Eastern question”,
Marx and Engels did not limit themselves to attacking the actions of Moscow
diplomacy but also sought to lay bare the conservative and anti-​revolutionary
purposes of the Western powers. In their views, the purpose of the foreign pol-
icy of the Euro-​Western powers was to weaken Russia as a rival in the dispute
for supremacy in the regions of the Near East and the Balkans, at the same time
that they sought to preserve Russian power so that the country continued to
play its role as the gendarme of the revolutionary-​democratic movements in
those same regions. According to Marx and Engels’s perception, therefore, the
performance of the West in the face of the ‘Eastern question’ was character-
ized by designs that were anti-​revolutionary and hegemonic at the same time.
Anglo-​French strategic plans were interested in the existence of a policy of
reciprocal containment between the Tsar and the Sultan capable of tensioning
and paralyzing the two rival states without depriving them of their ability to
crush by force the revolutionary movements that might insinuate themselves
within the scope of the areas under its possession.
As supporters and active militants of the European revolutionary move-
ments –​which, it is good to remember, had, in continental terms, predominantly
democratic-​republican character –​they opposed the counter-​revolutionary
nature of tsarism. As analysts of international relations, they fought against
the expansionist and destabilizing objectives of Imperial Russia’s foreign pol-
icy, aimed at the conquest and subordination of people located in the field
of strategic projection of that power. The multidimensionality of such a per-
spective contributed to placing them at the heart of the progressive European
intelligentsia alongside, simultaneously, other personalities and socialist, dem-
ocratic, and liberal tendencies.
David Riazanov, whose real name was David Goldenbank, was perhaps the
first Marxologist in history. Born in Russia in 1870, he joined the revolution-
ary movement in 1889. He worked on the recovery and organization of the
unpublished manuscripts of Marx and Engels, then held by the German Social
Democratic Party (spd), being responsible for their transfer to Moscow after
the Russian Revolution. He organized the first editions of texts such as “The
German Ideology” and the “Economic-​Philosophical Manuscripts” of 1844,
work in which he had György Lukács collaboration. In his study, “Origins of
Russian Hegemony in Europe” (Riazanov, 1974), the Russian scholar historicized
18  Gonçalves Ferreira

the reasons for Marx’s and Engels’ irreducible opposition to tsarism. According
to him, such a posture had been adopted by the demiurges of the philosophy
of praxis in the course of their experiences at the head of the “New Rhine
Gazette”, an organ of German radical republicanism in the years 1848–​1849.
The revolution failure in Germany, as well as in other parts of Europe, would
have crystallized in the thinking of Marx and Engels a certain interpretation of
the counterrevolutionary role that was being played, at that moment, by the
main European powers. As the young Friedrich Engels wrote at the time:

Prussia, England, and Russia are the three powers that most fear the
German revolution and its primordial consequence –​German unifi-
cation: Prussia because it would cease to exist, England because the
German market would be subtracted from its exploitation, Russia, by the
fact that democracy would not stop progressing not only up to the Vistula
but even on the banks of the Dune and the Dniepr4.
engels, 2020: 95

Dating from that time, therefore, not only the construction of a violently
anti-​czarist image but also a conviction about the inevitability of counter-​
revolutionary alignments in England. For Marx and Engels, there were two
orders of factors that would lead the first capitalist country in the world to
stand alongside the most reactionary autocracies in Europe. The first of them
would be the monopoly of the formulation and execution process of British
foreign policy by the representatives of the territorial aristocracy of that coun-
try. The second of these would be the fact that, for Marx and Engels, any revo-
lutionary triumph in continental Europe, in particular in France and Germany,
would immeasurably strengthen Chartism within England. The failure of
German unification under the aegis of a democratic republic and each defeat
of the revolution in France would, according to Marx and Engels, mean, in the
eyes of the aristocracy and conservative circles of British politics, the defeats
of English Chartism itself. The human embodiment of this policy would be
Lord Palmerston, Henry John Temple Palmerston. (1784–​1865), British states-
man and one of the most prominent personalities of English politics in the
nineteenth century.
Marx and Engels conceived that their tasks, first as supporters of the uni-
fication of Germany on democratic bases, and also as supporters of the

4 It is curious in this citation the absence of Austria the cornerstone of the international sys-
tem of Vienna and pointed out by Marx and Engels in other passages as the most reactionary
of the monarchies of Central-​Eastern Europe.
Marx, Engels and the System of World Power 19

European revolution, would consist of: a) unmasking the opportunism of

English diplomacy presided over by Palmerston (who posed internationally
as a champion of constitutionalism and freedoms), denouncing his reaction-
ary and pro-​autocratic character; b) to intensify the political fight against the
Prussian ruling circles in favor of the unification of Germany in the form of a
democratic Republic; and c) to denounce and call to combat all democratic
forces against Russian tsarism, seen as the quintessence of European reaction,
and sworn enemy of the German revolution. It is very significant to observe
the fact that those evaluations produced in the course of the failed German
revolutionary initiatives of the 1940s would profoundly mark the readings of
Marx and Engels on the historical-​political role played by the main European
powers in the following decades. The fact that engagement in the German
and European revolutionary process of the 1940s was the first experience of
concrete political action by Marx and Engels explains, to a great extent, the
longevity of the impressions collected in that process. This fact would deter-
mine that the themes of the German revolution and the ‘lessons’ taken from it
would indelibly mark the political views of Marx and Engels until the end of
their lives.
Riazanov (1974) observes that, despite Palmerston’s disservice to the failed
German revolution of the late 1940s, the British statesman still enjoyed con-
siderable sympathy in German liberal circles. Claiming the heritage of George
Canning5, who had been a kind of liberal and constitutionalist counterpoint
to the reactionary-​conservative hard line of the ‘Club of Vienna’ in the early
1820s, Palmerston was seen by broad liberal segments as a champion of con-
stitutionalism. ‘Unmasking’ Palmerston was, above all, a way of undermining
his influence within important political segments inserted in the field of the
German democratic revolution.

5 George Canning (1779–​1827) was a prominent Whig politician and statesman in England in
the first half of the nineteenth century. He replaced Castlereagh, a deeply conservative poli-
tician and the person responsible for structuring the Quadruple Alliance (England, Austria,
Prussia and Russia) that defeated Napoleon in 1814 –​at the head of the British Chancellery.
He reversed the agenda of English foreign policy, replacing the emphasis on ‘continental’
themes with a more insular focus, which rescued the centrality of British concerns with its
maritime trade to the detriment of ‘policing Europe’ against possible disturbances.
20  Gonçalves Ferreira

3 The Fate of Turkey in the Vienna System

Marx and Engels gave Ottoman Turkey complacent contempt. To them, the
Turkish entity was little more than a relic of the past, a decaying and almost
harmless vestige of a once aggressive and proud empire. Within their soci-
ety, they identified a fusion of Asian despotism with Byzantine anachronism.
Deprived of any idyll concerning Eastern or pre-​capitalist formations, the
two German thinkers were incapable of sharing the sympathies that certain
Western intellectuals devoted to Ottoman Porte. In fact, this former Muslim
state, which had once stirred Europe with its annexationist spirit, was, in the
mid-​nineteenth century, no more than a dying power. Divided between sub-
jugation by the czar and political and economic dependence on the Western
powers, the homeland of the Sultan of Constantinople was nothing more than
a simple object of international politics. Marginalized by world political deci-
sions and corroded by its internal conflicts, as in the issue of Balkan national-
ities, this historical formation was in an advanced process of decomposition.
Western ruling circles were naturally interested in taking advantage of the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire, incorporating territories and populations
until then subordinated to its sovereignty and its hegemonies. But it was also
interesting to prevent the power vacuum left by the Ottoman ebb from gener-
ating a picture of generalized instability in the vicinity of the Mediterranean
Sea. Worse still, they feared that the absorption of the former provinces by
other powers –​Russia in the first place, but also, to a lesser extent, Austria and
Prussia –​would provide conditions for an “excessive” accumulation of power
by one of these powers, to the detriment of the Anglo-​French hegemonistic
designs themselves.
Marx and Engels gave the ‘Eastern Question’ a focus similar in form but dif-
ferent in content. They feared that the Turkish retreat would leave tsarism free
to undertake an annexationist climb toward the center of the European conti-
nent. They also understood that the strengthening of Russia in Eastern Europe
would reinforce the power of the most conservative social forces in that region,
thus making a revolutionary-​democratic solution unfeasible for the problem
of German unity, as well as with regard to the national emergence of the south-
ern Slavs. On the other hand, they assessed that, from the gem and counter-​
revolutionary pretensions of the western powers point of view, the jettisoning
of Turkey from the Congress of Vienna constituted a certain embarrassment.
Particularly after the ascension of Louis Bonaparte to the French throne,
certain diplomatic circles in the West, especially English and Austrian ones,
would have started to fear the results of the attempts of Tutorship of Turkey
by Napoleon iii. The intimacy of relations between the French Emperor and
Marx, Engels and the System of World Power 21

the Sultan of Constantinople before and during the Crimean War would have
encouraged the managers of the Holy Alliance to seek the incorporation of
Turkey into the system emanating from the Congress of Vienna. In his article
“Eccentricities of politics” (Marx, 1975a), Marx, after outlining such a scenario,
states that one of the consequences of the Crimean War would be the produc-
tion of a supplementary clause that would guarantee Turkish inclusion in the
protocols of 1815. Such a prediction, no matter how suggestive its foundation,
would end up not being verified historically.
Engels and Marx defended in their articles in the “Tribune” that the west-
ern chancelleries did not consider the possibility of ‘restoring’ the decadent
Ottoman Empire, but rather that its gradual disappearance would not engender
the collapse of political stability in the regions than under their authority, nor
would it allow a disproportionate increase in of power by Russia. Conversely,
each following their own national goals, he sought to establish his influence as
deeply and broadly as possible in the areas abandoned by the sultan’s retreat.
In that respect, London and Paris favored different ways of materializing the
same ambitions. The British power would privilege, although not exclusively,
the exercise of the role of mediator of the Russo-​Turkish controversies, seek-
ing to appear as a supposed peacemaker in the antagonisms between the two
Eurasian empires. France under Napoleon iii, whom Marx and Engels had
already harshly stigmatized for his ‘adventurism’, would have opted for a policy
more clearly engaged alongside the Ottoman monarchy, thus playing the role
of the main instigator of the Russo-​Turkish War. In the article “The London
press –​Napoleon’s policy on the Turkish question” (Marx, 1975b), published
in the “Tribune” on April 19, 1853, Marx once again invested against the pos-
tures adopted by Luiz Bonaparte regarding the Turkish question. For him, the
adventurism manifested by the ruler of the Second French Empire in the face
of that problem would have the objective of winning the recognition of the
European monarchical powers for whom both he and his late uncle would be
no more than usurpers of thrones. In addition, he also sought to give France a
prominent place within the ‘concert of nations’.

4 The Role of British Diplomacy

Marx, as already mentioned, devoted several writings to the examination of

the Foreign Office’s action in the face of the so-​called ‘Eastern problem’. In
those articles, he attempted to characterize British diplomacy from the point
of view of its social constraints. According to such a definition, the foreign pol-
icy of ‘bourgeois’ Great Britain would be formulated and carried out with the
22  Gonçalves Ferreira

social interests of the ‘aristocratic’ circles of that society as its horizon. A con-
ception that, in turn, was based on the following ideas: a) despite the capital-
ist nature of the economy and bourgeois preeminence within British society,
political power in that country would rest based on an aristocratic-​bourgeoisie
coalition; b) given the monopoly of political power and representation by the
coalition of the aforementioned ruling classes, British policy, both internally
and externally, would have an essentially oligarchic character; c) the Tory and
Whig perspectives in terms of foreign policy represented, respectively, an aris-
tocratic, conservative and protectionist alternative to the other bourgeois, lib-
eral and free-​trade alternative, and traditionally, and until that moment, the
aristocratic-​conservative tendency had been largely dominant. Such a con-
ception would produce two significant effects on Marxian analyzes of British
diplomacy: first, it would enable Marx to develop interpretations that would
accentuate the relative autonomy of the British state concerning the economic
and social dimension prevailing in that country. Secondly, it would allow him
to perceive the non-​mechanical subordination of the movements of English
diplomacy to the interests of the British capitalism. Those nuances would lead
the theorist of proletarian socialism to a characterization of British foreign
policy as counterrevolutionary, pro-​aristocratic, and even ‘harmful to the eco-
nomic interests of English capitalism’. Such analyzes acquired full outline in
the articles that Marx devoted to Lord Palmerston’s performance in the pages
of the “Tribune” and the “People’s Paper”.6
These texts were published in the form of an independent paperback in
England, still during the author’s lifetime. Marx based his formulations on the
examination of a wide collection of diplomatic documents, parliamentary
minutes, and journalistic material. The work that resulted from that has as one
of its main peculiarities the acute description of the decision-​making mecha-
nisms, especially in terms of foreign policy, used by the British government in
the nineteenth century. A meticulous appreciation was made of the processes
for defining the behavior of British diplomacy in the face of the most import-
ant international conflicts of the period, such as the struggle for the unifica-
tion of Italy, the national emergency in Poland and Hungary, the Irish problem,
the liberal reforms in Greece, in Portugal and Spain. The most controversial
aspect of those texts is Marx’s fixation on proving Palmerston’s ‘russophilia’ at
all costs.

6 Those articles may be consulted in their original version in “Collected Works”, volume 12,
(1853–​1854) pages 341–​406 (Marx and Engels, 1975a), or in the Spanish translation, preceded
by a presentation by Robert Payne (1975), “El desconocido Carlos Marx”.
Marx, Engels and the System of World Power 23

5 The Crimean War and Its Developments

The Crimean War pitted France, Great Britain, and the Ottoman Empire
against Tsarist Russia. More than that, it was the result of a rapprochement
between Great Britain, seen as the most liberal and constitutionalist of the
powers of the International System of the Congress of Vienna, with France, an
eternal outsider and supposed factor of destabilization of the same, confront-
ing Russia, first-​time guardian of the post-​Napoleonic international order.
The writing that best expresses Marx’s perceptions about the meaning of the
Crimean War from the point of view of power relations between the managing
powers of the international system of the Congress of Vienna is the aforemen-
tioned article “Eccentricities of Politics”, published in the “Tribune” in July 1955
(Marx, 1975a). That article is based on the reading of two books: “Du Congrès
de Vienne” (On the Congress of Vienna) by the abbot Dominique Dufour de
Pradt and “Denkschrift, betreffend die Gleichgewichts-​Lage Europa’s, beim
Zusammentritte des Wiener Congress verfasst” (Memorial concerning the sit-
uation of equilibrium of Europe, written during the meetings of the Congress
of Vienna), by the Prussian Marshal K. F. Knesebeck. In the first work, the
author defends the idea, supported by Marx, that the Congress of Vienna had
laid the foundations for the establishment of Russian supremacy in Europe.
According to that author, the war of independence of Europe against France,
that is, the Napoleonic Wars ended with the subjection of Europe before
Russia. Corroborating this argument, whose anti-​revolutionary inspiration
needs no observation, Marx stresses that

The war against France, which was at the same time a war against the
Revolution, an anti-​Jacobin war, led to a transfer of influence from West
to East, from France to Russia. The Congress of Vienna was the natural
outcome of the Anti-​Jacobin War, the Treaty of Vienna the legitimate
product of the Congress of Vienna, and Russian supremacy the natural
child of the Treaty of Vienna.
marx, 1975a: 283

In sequence, Marx came to the defense of Frederick William iii of Prussia in

the face of the accusations imputed to him of having, through his blind ded-
ication to the Russian sovereign, undermined the foundations of the project
conceived by Castlereagh, Metternich, and Talleyrand, in the sense of “raising
barriers secure territories against Russian encroachments” (Marx, 1975a: 283).
According to Marx, the Prussian prince should not be held solely responsible
for a situation (Russian supremacy) inevitably engendered by the international
24  Gonçalves Ferreira

system approved by Congress. For Marx, Russian supremacy in Europe was so

linked to the resolutions of the Congress of Vienna that even a war against
Russia that did not expressly propose to revoke the provisions of that treaty
would only reinforce the current situation. It was from this perspective that
he interpreted at that moment the meaning of the Crimean War, then in prog-
ress, as a conflict that, far from representing the overcoming of the status quo
approved in 1815, would only make a small repair to it, to allow the introduc-
tion of Turkey in the scheme of the five managing powers of the international
system.
From Knesebeck’s pamphlet, Marx extracts quotes that engender a pas-
sionate defense of the strengthening of Turkey to exercise the role of barrier
to the irruption of uncivilized and barbarian populations across the European
continent and factor of stability of the eastern limits of Europe against the
innate anarchy of the Poles and the disturbances caused by the Greeks. Marx
interprets this furious libel as a simple ratification of the inspiring purposes
of the Crimean War: the extension and consolidation of the Treaty of Paris
of 1815.
At the conclusion of the article, Marx does not miss the opportunity to stig-
matize Luiz Bonaparte, according to him, one of the central actors in the mas-
querade then underway, an individual who, in his opportunism, was capable
of disappointing the most elementary expectations concerning coherence and
fidelity to the Bonapartist legend itself:

Throughout the period of the Restoration and the July Monarchy, there
was a widespread illusion in France that Napoleonism (sic) meant the
abolition of the Treaty of Vienna, which had placed Europe under the
tutelage of Russia and France under the 'surveillance publique'7 from
Europe. Now the present impersonator of his uncle, haunted by the
inexorable irony of his fatal position, is proving to the whole world that
Napoleonism means war, not to emancipate France ‘from’, but to bring
Turkey ‘under’ the Treaty of Vienna. War in the interest of the Treaty of
Vienna and under the pretext of putting Russia's power in check!.
marx, 1975a: 286

Having formally extended over three years (1853–​1856) but actually produc-
ing a relatively small number of military operations, the Crimean War also

7 In French, in the original, public surveillance.

Marx, Engels and the System of World Power 25

counted, from 1855, on the accession of the kingdom of Sardinia to the Anglo-​
Franco-​Ottoman coalition against the Tsar’s armies. Its triggering factor was an
unusual reason: the disputes between the authorities of the Roman Catholic
and Greek Orthodox churches for control of the sacred places of Palestine.
Such a quarrel unquestionably expressed the clash between Russian expan-
sionist aspirations concerning territories subordinated to the Ottoman Porte
in the Balkan and Mediterranean regions and the Western fear of that threat.
A cardinal role was played by France in the Second Napoleonic Empire, anx-
ious to neutralize the anti-​French provisions of the Congress of Vienna and
seeing the Russian Empire as the greatest obstacle to such a reversal. Moreover,
according to Marx and Engels, the role of the emperor of the French as an
arsonist of war responded to multiple needs: a) to gain recognition of its impe-
rial power, considered illegitimate and usurping by the other European mon-
archies; b) divert the attention of the French people from internal problems by
undertaking adventures abroad; c) take advantage of the exceptional nature
of the war to sack the French treasury and d) win the prestige of a ‘liberator’
among the oppressed nationalities of Europe, one day claimed by his uncle.
A more contemporary translation of Luiz Bonaparte’s ambitions could char-
acterize them –​abstracting their mystifying and manipulative implications
concerning the French people themselves and the oppressed nationalities of
Europe –​as an effort to conquer the position of the protagonist of the inter-
national order of that time, reversing the situation of jettisoning decisions
and consequent marginalization within the international system, relegated to
France by Napoleon’s victors.
Austro-​Prussian neutrality was for Marx and Engels, a manifestation of
cowardice and a reaffirmation of the anti-​revolutionary character of the ruling
classes of these two German states. For the two Germanic socialist thinkers,
the main reason for the non-​engagement of both Prussia and Austria in the
war was the fear of their rulers that the fight against Russia would become a
revolutionary war of the European people against the autocracies of the con-
tinent. This interpretation considered, above all, the revolutionary forces that
a collapse of the orthodox empire would unleash in the areas occupied by the
‘revolutionary’ nationalities, then lacking a unified national state in Europe
largely, according to them, due to the activity of Russian diplomacy and weap-
ons: Germany, Poland, Hungary, and Italy.
Following the same theoretical framework, the European correspondents of
the “Tribune” considered that the neutralization of the reactionary influences
of tsarism on the European continent by weakening the conservative social
forces that largely relied on their military power, would stimulate the action
of revolutionary forces, including socialists, in countries such as England and
26  Gonçalves Ferreira

France. Therefore, it would follow from this the validity of the attitude, in the
last analysis, temporizing of the ruling classes of these countries in relation
to the Tsarist Empire, even in the face of its most daring undertakings. That
generalized posture of temporizing would see radicalized manifestations in
the action of political circles and elements that were bitterly pro-​Russian, such
as Lord Palmerston, a great ally of tsarism in Western Europe, according to
Marx‘s merciless and not infrequently exaggerated accusation. That being the
case, the policy of the western powers about Russia should be guided, in the
interpretation of Marx and Engels, by a double approach: a) in what referred
to the validity of the social concerns of their ruling classes, frightened by the
possibility of revolutions political and/​or social in Europe, it was about pre-
serving, at all costs, the existence of the tsarist autocracy so that it could play,
whenever necessary, its role as counter-​revolutionary police on the continent
and b) from the strict point of view of raison d’État, it was a question, however,
of containing the Russian advance in the Mediterranean and Caucasian areas,
making it impossible for the Russian state to accumulate an ‘excess of power’
that would destabilize the balance of forces in the international system to its
benefit and the detriment of the western powers.
Peculiar because it combines elements that would later be shaped in often
dissonant traditions of thought and action. This position was characterized by
what I try to define as a ‘revolutionary realist’ perspective. ‘Realistic’ because
it interpreted the evolution of international relations, observing the correla-
tions of strength between states, the national interests of the powers, and
their strategic projections. ‘Revolutionary’ because guided by the idea that the
transformations necessary to generate a fairer and more democratic system of
international relations, suitable for the full development of people, would
be produced by the action of revolutionary forces. What kind of revolutions?
There is no doubt that for England and France, Marx and Engels were betting,
if not in the short term, at least in the medium term, on the occurrence of
proletarian revolutions oriented towards socialism and communism. But as
far as the German states, East Euro-​Slavic nationalities, and the Russian and
Ottoman empires were concerned, Marx and Engels’ expectations focused
on the creation of democratic republics to replace the autocratic monar-
chies than in existence. However, ‘antediluvian’ appreciations regarding a
very close resumption of revolutionary movements and a strong dose of
‘Germanocentrism’, inheritance of its political initiations within the revolu-
tionary upheavals that had shaken the German-​speaking world are also not
foreign to such considerations in the previous decade.
Marx, Engels and the System of World Power 27

6 European Diplomacy after the Paris Treaty

In the articles they devoted to the development of French foreign policy in the
context of the Crimean War, Marx and Engels were not very indulgent. It is also
a question here of a vast repertoire of denunciations and accusations against
the government headed by Louis Bonaparte (Marx, 1975c). In them, Marx dis-
charged his batteries against what he considered the degeneracy of the French
army, stimulated by the supposedly adventurous, demagogic, and corrupt
character of Napoleon iii. A situation exemplified by the description of the
trajectory of St. Arnaud, Marshal of the French Army and Minister of War,
who, according to the columnist, built his military reputation serving in the
Foreign Legion in Algeria alongside bandits, mercenaries, and deserters from
various countries, “the scum of the European armies”. The French Emperor
himself, characterized as an individual blinded by operatic illusions about his
greatness, was stigmatized as the official caricature of a glorious past. The anti-​
Bonapartist virulence of Marx and Engels would not spare liberal and demo-
cratic political leaders, French or foreign, either, who trusted Louis Bonaparte’s
protests in defense of the freedom of the oppressed nationalities of Europe. As
a result, with the same lack of ceremony with which they imposed on other
militants of the democratic and revolutionary European left the stigma of col-
laborating with the tsarist autocracy, Marx and Engels imputed to personalities
such as Barbès, Kosuth, and the Polish émigrés, the accusation of contributing
to the legitimation of Louis Napoleon.
The domestic and foreign policies of the two largest German states at the
time, Austria and Prussia, also did not escape the attention of the “Tribune” cor-
respondents (Marx, 1975d). Through their common system of analysis of his-
torical processualism, they considered that, after the outbreak of the Crimean
War, Prussia, wishing to weaken Russian influence on its Euro-​Eastern border
and ensure full supremacy over most of the Polish territory shared by both,
could declare war on Russia. By engaging in a confrontation with the main
bastion of the European autocracies, the Prussian leaders would awaken the
democratic and revolutionary energies of the German populations, dormant
since the revolutionary failure of the previous decade, triggering a movement
that could lead to the long-​awaited republican-​democratic solution to the
problem of German national unification. By doing so, the Prussia of the Junker
aristocrats would be playing the role of ‘unconscious instrument of history’
according to the historical-​dialectical conception that Marx and Engels inher-
ited and reworked from Hegel.
With regard to Austria, the perspectives were not so optimistic. In the arti-
cle entitled “The Austrian Bankruptcy” (Marx, 1975e), Marx assessed that the
28  Gonçalves Ferreira

economic debilitation the Habsburg state was going through at that moment,
combined with the national emergency in Galicia, Hungary, and Italy, made
it impossible for Austria to participate in any adventure beyond borders.
Moreover, the growing concern of the ruling circles of this southern Germanic
state with the preservation of its empire would push its diplomacy towards
the most conservative positions possible. For this reason, even if they feared
the spread of Russian power across the Balkan Peninsula, they did not want
any more serious weakening of tsarism, according to them, because in that
case, the Habsburgs would have no friend to turn to on the occasion of the
next revolutionary offensive. On the other hand, according to Marx and Engels’
expectation about an imminent resumption of revolutionary actions on the
continent, the entry of Austria into the war could mean a displacement of mil-
itary operations to the heart of Europe, generating an escalation of revolution-
ary insurgency on the part of the oppressed people in the region. According
to them, the populations most immediately interested in the issue of Eastern
complications would be, in addition to the Germans, the Hungarians, and
the Italians, an appreciation that accentuated not only the revolutionary
Germanocentrism of the founders of the philosophy of praxis but also their
persistent appeal to the conception of the character of a potentially revolu-
tionary approach to ‘historical nationalities’.
The idea that the ruling circles of the western powers were not interested
in the collapse of Russia appears reiterated in a series of articles published in
the biennium 1855–​1856 when the last and decisive phase of the Crimean War
unfolded. Marx and Engels endeavored to demonstrate that Anglo-​French mil-
itary operations were conditioned by the counterrevolutionary aspirations of
their governmental leadership. According to such designs, combats against the
czar’s forces should take place in peripheral areas, far from the main centers
of Russian political and social life, thus neutralizing any prospect that once
conducted in those regions, the war could become a popular uprising. From
that point of view, they reinterpreted the French and British directives aimed
at the development of the military operations at strictly local levels. According
to the governments and military commands of those countries, it was a matter
of limiting the extent of the fighting to restrict the number of losses, but, for
Marx and Engels, the desired objective was to prevent the ‘war of containment’
from excessively weakening that bulwark of the Holy Alliance and to avoid
the subversion of its internal structures. In an article signed by them, initially
published in the German periodical “Neue Order Zeitung”8 and later partially

8 Newspaper published by radical democratic circles in Germany. It was one of the first to
appear in the atmosphere of political reaction following the failure of the German revolutions
Marx, Engels and the System of World Power 29

reproduced in the “Tribune”, the two authors emphasized their opinions on

the paradoxical and unusual character of the Crimean War in its third year of
the outbreak.

The Anglo-​French coalition war against Russia will undoubtedly go down

in the annals of military history as 'the incomprehensible war'. Maximum
conversations combined with minimum actions, extensive preparations,
and meaningless meanings, a precaution bordering on timidity followed
by rash acts bred by ignorance, more than mediocre generals at the
head of more than courageous troops, almost deliberate reverses in the
sequence of victories won amid mistakes, armies initially ruined by neg-
ligence later saved by the strangest of accidents –​a great set of contradic-
tions and inconsistencies.
marx and engels, 1975b: 784

The lukewarmness of the western powers suggested in this text would be

transferred, in the two author’s future assessment, from the battlefields to
the negotiation tables at the end of the dispute. And indeed, in the prepara-
tory meetings for the signing of the Treaty of Paris, which put an end to the
conflict, Russian diplomacy skillfully took advantage of the indecisions and
disagreements of the two great Western allies to secure terms that were more
favorable to them. The Treaty of Paris was signed on March 30, 1856, by rep-
resentatives of the states that confronted each other in the Crimean War of
1853–​1856 (Great Britain, France, Russia, Sardinia, and Turkey). Its signature
is considered a turning point in international relations in the nineteenth cen-
tury, as it effectively ended the system of alliances established by the Congress
of Vienna in 1815. Polarized by the figures of Bismarck, Cavour, and Gorchakov,
the meeting that originated the Treaty guaranteed the formal independence
and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire, forced Russia to return the
citadel of Kars to the Turks, ceded part of Bessarabia to Turkey, established the
Black Sea region as a zone of neutrality. Russia on the other hand, confirmed
its status as protector of the Danube principalities, formally submitted to the
tutelage of the great powers, and as guardian of all Christians residing within
the Ottoman Empire; moreover, it ensured free navigation across the Danube.
The period immediately following the Treaty of Paris registers an ebb in
Marx and Engels’ production dedicated to the themes of international politics

of the years 1847–​1848. Marx collaborated with it from December 1854 to November 1855;
during this period a significant portion of the articles produced by Marx and Engels were
published, simultaneously or alternately in the “Tribune” and in the “Neue Order Zeitung”.
30  Gonçalves Ferreira

and diplomacy in the pages of the “Tribune”. It can be inferred that the afore-
mentioned Treaty meant a restabilization of the European international order
based on a certain alignment of forces. On the other hand, the unfolding of the
Crimean War unequivocally provoked a certain exhaustion of the main pro-
tagonists of European politics in what referred to as the political-​diplomatic
movements of continental scope. Even Austria and Prussia, absent from that
conflict, probably did not fail to perceive in it an opportunity to demonstrate
the military power of their partners in the ‘concert of nations’, which may have
suggested caution and concentration to them, aiming at accumulating forces
to the clashes that would inevitably come.
However, apart from such contingencies, an association of political and dip-
lomatic processes would interfere decisively in the framework of power rela-
tions among the great European powers in the immediate post-​Crimean War
period.
As for the behavior of the other major European powers in the period, we
can see the occurrence of some very significant inflections concerning the
roles played until then, or at least claimed, from the managing the interna-
tional order in force point of view. Austria, one of the main continental bas-
tions of the International System of the Congress of Vienna, would experience
a marked process of political isolation and diminishing influence. That move-
ment had begun in the 1830s, when the Austrian Empire, faithful to the non-​
negotiable principles of ‘legitimism’ that guided its international activity, allied
itself with Turkey against the Greek nationalists. It was when, for the first time
since the formation of the Holy Alliance, it positioned itself in a different field
from its consorts Russia, and England, which, by the way, profiled in the same
field as the ‘dangerous’ France. Later, they would see their internal stability
significantly shaken as a result of the revolutionary insurrections of the ‘Spring
of the People’ period, when its empire had been saved from an imminent dis-
memberment (Hungarian Revolution) by the czar’s troops. However, the worst
moment of its diplomacy occurred during the Crimean War, when Austria
managed to displease the western powers with its refusal to fight Russia and,
later, displease Russia with the pressures for it to accept the terms of the Treaty
from Paris. Furthermore, relations between the Austrian Habsburgs and the
Russian Romanovs tended to gradually deteriorate as their differences became
evident regarding the situation of the Danube principalities and the Balkan
provinces, given to Russian protection by the Treaty of Paris, but coveted with
less and less ceremony by the southern Germans. The overall result of Austria’s
weakening as a power, its loss of international influence, and political isolation
was its conversion from one of the fundamental pillars of the system into an
insignificant player.
Marx, Engels and the System of World Power 31

Russia emerged from the Crimean war overwhelmed by frustration, humil-

iation, and resentment. Frustration at not having consummated its objective
of delivering a coup de grace to the uncomfortable Ottoman entity, which in
its post-​imperial lethargy obstructed the Russian march towards the Black Sea
and the Mediterranean. Humiliation at having its centuries-​old trajectory of
military conquests interrupted by the Anglo-​French coalition, which imposed
on its respect for Turkish integrity and the evacuation of the principalities of
the Danube (Moldavia and Wallachia), in addition to vetoing the construction
of its much-​dreamed fleet in the Black Sea, militarily stripping its southern
borders. However, few sentiments must have been known more bitterly to
Russian summits than Tsar Nicholas I’s resentment of Prince Schwarzenberg,
who reciprocated the decisive support given by the Russians in crushing the
uprising of Hungarian revolutionaries led by Louis Kossuth in 1848 with the
abandonment of the old ally in the confrontation with the Western powers
and, even worse, acting as a Western agent in convincing Russian statesmen
to accept the terms of the Treaty of Paris. The result of the process, as far as
Russia’s behavior is concerned, was the transformation of the main bastion of
the conservative European order into a ‘revisionist’ international system.
The France of Napoleon iii appears at that moment as the most active
power in the international system. As Marx and Engels observed several times,
the need to gain legitimacy within a family of aristocratic powers, the attempt
to re-​edit the glorious international trajectory of Napoleon i, and the effort
to divert French public opinion from the internal problems experienced by
the country impressed the Second French Empire the mark of ‘militantism’ in
terms of European politics and diplomacy. Participation in the winning coali-
tion during the Crimean War would confer appreciable diplomatic dividends
on the Bonapartist empire. The most elemental of all: it was the first time
since Waterloo that the French state was directly involved in a continental war
alike conflagration, militarily and diplomatically triumphing over Russia, an
important enemy of the past, whose victory over French forces in 1812 initiated
the process of disintegration of the empire of Napoleon i. Secondly, the fact
that in this war, France had as its ally England, the archenemy of yesteryear,
the first world power, and the only one capable of ensuring French economic
isolation on the international stage. Thirdly, the greatest of all French tri-
umphs: the country, which had been marginalized at the Congress of Vienna,
now endorsed a new international pact that dismantled the foundations of
the previous system, divided its former adversaries and relegated almost all of
them (Austria, Russia, and Prussia) to unequivocal political marginalization.
Now, if those successes updated the mystique of Napoleon Bonaparte’s suc-
cessor, restoring to France the position of manager of European affairs, which
32  Gonçalves Ferreira

had one day been taken from them, on the other hand, it did nothing but stim-
ulate Napoleon iii to new international attacks. After all, France proclaimed
itself an empire, and the way of life for empires is territorial conquest. A fre-
quent participant in Carbonari circles in his Italian exile, a political by-​product
of the liberal emergence of 1848 in France, Louis Napoleon would express his
political-​territorial ambitions in Europe in terms of support for the national
affirmation of the oppressed nationalities on that continent. A claim that, if
it had already led him to dispute the protection of the Christian populations
of the Ottoman Empire with Russian tsarism, would now lead him to defy the
Habsburg emperor in support of the Italian national cause.
Marx, who had analyzed with singular acuity the circumstances that pre-
sided over the inauguration of the so-​called Second French Empire, was never
able to discern any positive trait in the political personality of Louis Bonaparte.9
For Marx, behind the declarations of Napoleon iii in defense of the rights of
the oppressed nationalities of Europe, there was purely and simply hidden the
intention of obtaining territorial acquisitions. In some articles published in the
period 1856–​1858, Marx reiterated the stigmatizing qualifications about Louis
Bonaparte and his government, initially outlined in the brochure of 52.

7 Conclusion

Dialectical thinkers Engels and Marx understood the implications that the par-
ticular movement of states, driven by ‘national interests’ not expressly linked
to the needs of capital and the economic aspirations of the European ruling
classes, could produce for the historical-​revolutionary development of the
continent. Moreover, living in the Anglo-​Saxon political and cultural context
and having English and North American public opinion as privileged inter-
locutors, the two authors could not fail to shape their international analyzes
according to themes and, in a certain way, values characteristic of Anglo-​Saxon
traditions. Americans in international policy and diplomacy. That, however,
does not mean that the understanding of international phenomena in terms
of a ‘power policy’ carried out by national states –​and not by social classes
–​driven by their ‘strategic’ interests, developed by the “Tribune’s” European
collaborators, has meant only an opportunistic adjustment to the dominant
standards of analysis. The specificity of the vision of Marx and Engels consists

9 The original reasons for the revulsion that Marx dedicated to this French statesman can be
appreciated in loco in the work “The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte” of 1852 (Marx,
1975f).
Marx, Engels and the System of World Power 33

precisely in their unique ability to articulate those two distinct dimensions,

however, interconnected and located at the base of the development of inter-
national relations in their time: the sphere of conflicting social interests, the
engine of class struggle and catalyst of possible political-​social revolutions
within states and within the European framework, and the sphere of action
of national states, determined by strategic interests of power and generating
configurations of international systems.

References

Engels F (2020) The danish-​prussian armistice. In: Cotrim L (ed.) Nova Gazeta Renana.
São Paulo: Expressão Popular, 292–​295.
Marx K (1975a) Eccentricities of politics. In: Collected Works, vol. 14 –​New York Daily
Tribune, number 4.437, July 10, 1855. New York: International Publishers, 283–​286.
Marx K (1975c) Reorganization of the British War Administration. –​The Austrian
Summons. –​Britain’s Economic Situation. –​St. Arnaud. In: Collected Works, vol.
13 –​New York Daily Tribune, number 4.144, July 24, 1854. New York: International
Publishers, 227–​233.
Marx K (1975e) The Austrian bankruptcy. In: Collected Works, vol. 13 –​New York Daily
Tribune, number 4.033, March 22, 1854. New York: International Publishers, 43–​49.
Marx K (1975f) The Eighteen Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte. In: In: Collected Works, vol.
11. New York: International Publishers, 99–​197.
Marx K (1975b) The london press –​Policy of Napoleon on the turkish question.
In: Collected Works, vol. 12 –​New York Daily Tribune, number 3.746 of 04/​19/​1853.
New York: International Publishers, 18–​20.
Marx K (1975d) The treaty between Austria and Prussia –​Parliamentary debates of
May 29. In: Collected Works, vol. 13 –​New York Daily Tribune, number 4.103, June 12,
1854. New York: International Publishers, 215–​219.
Marx K and Engels F (1975a) Collected Works. New York: International Publishers.
Marx K and Engels F (1975b) The Anglo-​French War against Russia. In: Collected
Works, vol. 14 –​Neue Order Zeitung, numbers 385 and 387 of August 20 and 21, 1855,
reprinted in abbreviated form as an editorial in the New York Daily Tribune, num-
ber 4.483 of September 1, 1855. New York: International Publishers, 484–​488.
Payne R (1975) El desconocido Carlos Marx. Barcelona: Editorial Bruguera.
Riazanov D (1974) Origine de l’hégemonie de la Russie en Europe. In: Dangeville R (ed.)
Karl Marx et Friedrich Engels, La Russie. Paris: Union Générale D’Éditions, 15–​58.
 ­c hapter 3

Revolutions and International Relations

Marxism’s Contributions and Failures

Paulo Gilberto Fagundes Visentini1

The higher cost of academic integration with the ‘real world’ was a
growing concentration in the aspects of ‘reality’ considered to be
adequate by sponsors at the State and corporate levels.2
fred halliday

∵
1 Introduction

Since its first manifestations, Marxism had developed analytical and concep-
tual structural instruments for the understanding of revolutionary processes
as a fundamental notion of historical disruption. More recently, the appli-
cation of Marxism for International Relations analysis has experienced a
considerable advance, breaking the Realism vs. Liberalism ‘bipolarity’ (and,
the latter, which could be perceived as an inadequate philosophical denom-
ination). The first one emphasizes conflict and power relations within an
‘anarchical’ international system, whereas the second focus on transna-
tional cooperation interactions. Based on political economy and Historical
Materialism, Marxism brought to light a third paradigm, which is grounded in
‘the economy and domination issues at the international level’.
However, the Marxist mainstream, which considers the domestic concept of
revolution as a given, as incredible as it seems, is still not able to fully integrate

1 Professor of International Relations at Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (ufrgs).

2 This chapter is based on arguments originally developed in an article entitled “O Impacto
das Revoluções na Ordem Mundial: uma ausência nos Estudos de Defesa” (in English, “The
impact of Revolutions in the World Order: an absence in defense studies”, translation note)
published in the Brazilian journal “Revista Brasileira de Estudos de Defesa”, vol. 3., n.2. 2016.
Translated into English by the author.

© Paulo Gilberto Fagundes Visentini, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_004

Revolutions and International Relations 35

to its economic and systemic view of the international dimension the concept
of rupture (and renovation) that revolutions generate in the world-​system.
From now on, we will be presenting a brief and introductory theoretical dis-
cussion, which was originally developed as part of a research project about the
impacts of the Third World (Geopolitical South) revolutions that took place in
the 1970s and 1980s.

2 The Marxist International Relations Approach: War and Revolution

Whereas analyzing classical authors, Jacques Huntzinger (1987) considers Carl

Von Clausewitz, Francisco de Vitoria and Karl Marx as representatives of the
major International Relations paradigms. These several schools of thought
reflect problems and historical moments of their framing and represent diverse
standpoints that are not entirely incompatible. In this sense, orthodoxy and
theoretical eclecticism are the two extreme poles to avoid, as the political pre-
scriptive and normative use of theories. Theories are, foremost, simplifications
to understand a reality that is too complex to apprehend in all its dimensions.
The Prussian General Clausewitz, alongside with Thucydides, Machiavelli,
Hobbes, Vattel, Hume, the European balance thinkers, Rousseau, Espinosa
and the supporters of nineteenth century European nationalism represent
International Relations ’Classical’ paradigm (as considered by the French
perspective), also called ‘Realism’ (in the Anglo-​Saxon stance). This school of
thought considers the international system as being totally or partially anar-
chical, with the state as its main player. Therefore, Realism put an emphasis on
the conflict and power relations amongst state actors. To these names one can
add Realist thinkers of the twentieth century such as Edward Carr (“Twenty
Years of Crisis”), Raymond Aron (“Peace and War Among Nations”) and Hans
Morgenthau (“Politics Among Nations”). Also, this school of thought shelters,
together with ‘Classical Realism, Neorealism, Hegemonic Stability Theory’ and
‘Game Theory’.
Dominican Salamanca´s priest Francisco de Vitoria, alongside stoicism,
Cicero, medieval Christianism, sixteenth century jusnaturalism, Kant and the
eighteenth century cosmopolitism are representatives of the ‘Idealist’ para-
digm that emphasizes the existence of an international community of ‘societas
inter gentes’, or a universal community of mankind. In the Anglo-​Saxon world,
this school of thought is also referred to as Liberalism, which also embod-
ies ‘Liberal Institutionalism’ (‘Neoliberalism’), ‘Functionalism’, ‘Integration
Theories’ and ‘Constructivism’. Keohane, Kindleberger and Joseph Nye are
contemporary academics linked to the Liberalism/​Idealism school, which is
36  Fagundes Visentini

based on ‘cooperation and ethical relations’, within an essentially ‘transna-

tional’ framework. It is important to notice that, philosophically, Liberalism is
in contradiction with the Christian matrix vision, which sheds some light on
the artificial ‘bipolar’ perspective of International Relations theories.
Marx and Engels, as well as the Jacobins, Fichte, Hegel, Hobson, Hilferding,
Lenin and Bukharin, focus on economic imperialism notions, north-​south
and center-​periphery cleavages, as well as dependence and world-​system the-
ories. Considering contemporary and strictly academic authors, one can add
Fred Halliday, Giovanni Arrighi, Immanuel Wallerstein, Justin Rosenberg and
Samir Amin as internationalists with a Marxist inspiration. Although Marxism
had not developed a formal theory of International Relations, Historical
Materialism is capable to explain the notion of economy and domination in
the international arena, within a perspective that put emphasis on the macro-
processes of evolution, transformation, and disruption.
For their turn, the previously mentioned schools give priority to the func-
tioning of the system, and value the prescriptive and normative dimension. So,
the Marxist school comprises the systemic and conflictive explanations of the
previous visions, even though it still had not developed, in depth, the needed
methodological tools for that, considering the political dimension in partic-
ular. Although it is possible to explain war and to study it within the world-​
system view, the same cannot be said about revolutions, which are so well
explained in their domestic dimension.
As Hannah Arendt (2011) points out, the twentieth century was defined by
wars and revolutions. However, International Relations research and studies
areas have been dealing with both issues differently. There are several courses,
specialized centers, and journals about war, but revolution as an international
theme has been neglected. As stated by Fred Halliday (1999), there are no aca-
demic journals that focus on this issue. For instance, the ‘Late Revolutions’ (the
1970s-​1980s) took place during the crisis and transformation of the economy
and world-​systems, and had significant effects, but fell prey to Fukuyama´s
“End of History” (Fukuyama, 1989), as if the end of the Cold War made their
impact null. It is curious how even some academics are unaware of processes
that characterized these two decades and only consider China and Vietnam
as post-​Revolutionary Reformed States, and Iran, Cuba and North Korea are
defined as ‘Renegade States’.
The historical dimension is widely secondary in contemporary International
Relations analysis and needs to be recovered. Historical and theoretical issues
are the reasons for an analysis of this theme. As an area dominated by Political
Science, International Relations is being characterized by theorizations not
strongly based on empirical knowledge and that present an instrumental
Revolutions and International Relations 37

stance. China and Vietnam would not have achieved the level of development
that they hold now, if not for the international autonomy gained due to their
revolutions. Without a process of state building, governing elites and social
transformations promoted through revolutionary processes, the situation in
Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Iran for instance, would not have led them
to the center of the international stage.
In just over a decade, Halliday (1983) notices that during this period, four-
teen revolutions had taken place in the Third World. They had a significant
regional impact, generating trends and countertrends as well as violent inter-
national conflicts and civil wars. Because of the balance power in place at
that time and the changes that the world economy underwent, they ended
up affecting the international system. In the second half of the 1970s decade,
‘Peaceful Coexistence’ ended, and a Second (or New) Cold War began in the
1980s. All of that, contributed to a deep change in International Relations,
with the implosion of the Soviet side at its core, and the current power imbal-
ances that followed and that are still a source of instability in the world-​system
(Fontaine, 1995).

3 Revolutions: a Neglected Dimension in International Relations

A deeper and objective historical analysis shows that the twentieth century
was marked by several disruptions and revolutionary experiences in all con-
tinents, with achievements and outstanding intrinsic and diverse characteris-
tics. Besides, they deeply affected the international agenda and framed world
history and capitalism itself. Due to the defeats that characterized the Soviet
supported or type of regimes, in the 1980s to the 1990s transition, silence pre-
vailed, overshadowed by journalistic cliches (Keeran and Kenny, 2004). In
Brazil, the last in-​depth and large-​scale publication was the 12-​volume works
of “História do Marxismo,”3 organized by Eric Hobsbawm and edited in the
1980s. But, nowadays, there is a renewed interest in the theme and for aca-
demic research. In Europe and North America, strictly academic works on rev-
olutions and socialist regimes are being released.
Revolution contemporary notion was born from the bourgeois world rev-
olutionary experiences that emerged in the North Atlantic (the 1642 English
Revolution, the 1776 American Revolution and the 1789 French Revolution). It
is a tool for achieving political power, in the short term, as well as a political,

3 Translation note “Marxism History”.

38  Fagundes Visentini

social, economic process of change in society, which includes the transforma-

tion of the power bloc, usually on a long run. The articulation of these dimen-
sions was built by Marxism. The English Revolution was precocious and the
American one peripherical (despite its impacts on Latin America). For its
turn, the French experience had brought to life the ideological and social ele-
ment in International Relations, with a profound systemic impact, promptly
turning itself into an internationalized larger scale revolution-​and a counter-​
revolution as well (Chan and Williams, 1994).

4 Revolutions and Their Regimes

For the theoretical and methodological purposes of this study, revolution

means a sudden political change, usually (but not always) violent, that over-
throws a regime, and the struggle for building another new one. This rupture
of the current order seeks to make structural transformations in the ongoing
political-​law and socioeconomic orders. The event catalyst can be a popular
riot, an armed insurrection, a coup d’état or even a relatively peaceful political
transition. But, for these conjectural elements to be effective, domestic, and
external political objective conditions are needed (Richards, 2004).
Added to the bourgeois revolutions, the democratic-​bourgeois revolutions
(with the active participation of the people) and the clear-​cut socialist revo-
lutions, during the second half of the twentieth century democratic popular
revolutions had developed, in peripheral countries specially. They were Third
World national liberation, democratic, anti-​imperialism and ‘anti-​feudalism’
revolutions, usually linked to decolonization and nationalism. Their triggers
were popular riots, reformist mobilizations, coups d´etat (even military ones),
guerrilla struggles, as the ones theorized and promoted by Mao Zedong, Ho
Chi Minh, Fidel e Raúl Castro and Che Guevara, Amílcar Cabral, among others
(Silva, 2004). They were characterized by an alliance of the small bourgeois,
peasants, and sectors of the proletariat.
Explanatory theories of revolution and socialism are still strongly focused
on European cases, and the knowledge and reflections about Third World
experiences are more limited and recent, as less documented. In general, there
is a persistence of the view that peripheral countries ‘would not be prepared’
for revolution and for socialism, in a very narrow interpretation. During the
European Imperialist era, deeper social contradictions moved from the cen-
ter to the periphery, in which the process of proletarization deepened, due to
the rural exodus and market-​driven agriculture. It is important to stress that
the international dimension, already significant in classical revolutions, had
Revolutions and International Relations 39

become even more decisive in the growing internationalization frame deep-

ened by peripheral capitalism (Davis, 1985).
Unlike capitalism, the political dimension of socialism is the predominant
instance, therefore, economy is organized by the economic central planning
principle (instead of the market), with the collective property of the means
of production, nationalization of banks and foreign trade. Society tends to be
incorporated into a single unit, with politics that search to gradually elimi-
nate inequalities and the universalization of social policies such as education,
health, housing, public transportation, employment, and leisure. In a situ-
ation of extreme tension, this process was historically materialized, through
Authoritarian and repressive movements, but socially inclusive, and politically
paternalists.

5 Revolutions and International Politics

Revolutions are always linked both to domestic and external factors and, fol-
lowing their closure, they necessarily cause an international impact as they
affect the internal rules in which the international (capitalist) order is based.
As Fred Halliday recalls (2007:148), “Revolutions are international events in
their causes and effects.” In this sense, they serve as an inspiration for political
forces from other countries, either from supporters, or adversaries. Normally,
revolutions lead to foreign wars, usually associated to civil internal wars, or
their result.
That was the case in Russia (as its revolution took place during the World
War i) and China, countries with a huge relevance on the international order.
Foreign invasions, civil war and other impacts on the world were a byprod-
uct, as well as the creation of the iii International (Communist) and, later on,
the more fluid existence of the International Communist Movement. That was
also the case of Korea, Vietnam, Cuba and Nicaragua, smaller nations at the
periphery of the world-​system. Even though the first two of them, gained sig-
nificant strategic relevance as they took place in China´s frontiers, in which
socialism was not consolidated yet.
The last two cases led to changes within the United States direct sphere
of influence, namely Cuba, that also had a remarkable world performance
in the Third World, mostly in the Non-​Aligned Countries Movement. For its
turn, North Korea was closer to the Chinese border, alongside Japan, a strategic
region for Washington and the 1950–​51 Korean War had a global impact. On the
other hand, in the Islamic world and the African continent, this feature gained
a higher complexity as the process of building a national state was still on the
40  Fagundes Visentini

beginning, and, on the first case, located in a geopolitical strategic zone with
valuable resources such as oil.
Also, in the African case, revolutions took place in the initial period of for-
mation of the nation-​state, following the collapse of the colonial bureaucratic
and repressive apparatus. Ethiopia was an exception to the rule, as the state
framework was conquered, transformed, and strengthened. Therefore, African
Revolutions altered the sensitive balance that was being constructed amongst
the younger and fragile states of the continent, generating a broad destabi-
lizing effect. Finally, the Iranian Revolution showed distinct characteristics,
as the prevailing side was not based on a Marxist vision, and represented a
nationalist, anti-​imperialist movement, and a cultural reaction to the West.
Nevertheless, it is international impact was similar.

6 A Chronology: Revolutions of the Twentieth Century

Throughout the twentieth century, socialism with a Marxist orientation, was

able to put forward a set of successful revolutions in successive waves. The first
one had taken place in the context of the World War i, as the Russian Revolution
and the Socialist agenda prevailed in the Soviet Union. The Mongolian
Revolution is also a part of this period, with its own circumstances. The second
one, was a product of antifascists movements and of the World War ii results
and affected Eastern Europe. They were both ‘Revolutions from above’ sup-
ported by Moscow and that would lead to the built of Popular Democracies,
but also, they were autonomous revolutions such as the ones in Yugoslavia and
Albania. It is important to highlight that, in the aftermath of the World War i
(from 1918 till 1923) countries such as Germany, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and
Bulgaria, had endured revolutions and even (short lived) socialist regimes.
Later, the left was defeated, sometimes by external intervention.
The third wave, which was developing consecutively, had the Chinese
Revolution at its core, beginning in the 1920s decade, and was characterized by
the peasant question. After 25 years of guerrillas and war, the most populous
nation of the planet became a socialist regime. The Korean Revolution and the
first stage of Indochina´s one, were a part of this period. The Marxist revolu-
tions and the regimes built during the first half of the twentieth century had
taken place in the ‘periphery of the Center’. In other words, the industrial capi-
talist powers that were dominant at the system´s center were involved in open
conflicts (imperial race, World War i and World War ii), as they were struggling
to redefine the world-​system and, within it, the hegemonic stand. Thus, the
victory of these two revolutions and structuring regimes of a new world reality,
Revolutions and International Relations 41

the Soviet and the Chinese, were made possible, as they were at the periphery
of the geopolitical space affected by huge confrontation and transformation.
Finally, at the fourth and last wave, the Third World´s decolonization
and nationalist movements were the main players of the triumph of sev-
eral Socialist-​oriented revolutions as the Cuban, Vietnamese, Afghan, South
Yemen, and the African ones in the 1970s. They happened in the second half
of the twentieth century, in the ‘core of the periphery’, in other words, at the
Southern, non-​industrial, part of the planet, in which ‘the unequal and com-
bined capitalist development was taking place’ (Westad, 2007; Davis, 1985).
Despite its limited resources, considering this set of revolutions, two of
them had become paradigmatic references and had systemic effects all over
the world, the Cuban, and the Vietnamese. They were clearly linked and
dependent of the two greatest foundational revolutions, but they had devel-
oped dynamics of their own. The Iranian Revolution case can be included in
this category, even though its unfolding ended up being different as a post-​
revolutionary project. Anyway, the ‘Islamization’ of the revolutionary process
does not overshadow its Republican, modernizing, anti-​imperialism (but not
anticapitalism) and internationalist base. Also, Algeria and other revolutions
of the 1950s-​1960s can be seen as part of this phase.

7 Revolutions and the Dialectical Contradiction of Marxism

The theoretical frame of this study is mostly anchored in the analysis devel-
oped in Fred Halliday´s work “Revolution and World Politics: The Rise and
Fall of the Sixth Great Power” (1999), and other studies by the same author,
cited in the references. At the same time, it is inspired by elements found in
the debates of several works such as the ones by Armstrong (1993), Buzan and
Weaver (2003), Calvert (1984), Davis (1985), Goldstone, Gurr and Moshiri (1991),
Kissinger (1973), Kolko (1994), Skocpol (1979), Schutz & Slater (1990), Toynbee
(1963) and Westad (2007).
Academically, International Relations studies derived from the study of war
as a rational aggressive and deliberate act, and not as an internationalization of
social conflict. Even the very own United Nations Charter is concerned about
world order as something apart from the internal context of states. In the same
fashion, Anglo-​Saxon Political Science considers revolution as a break of reg-
ular processes. Until the release of Theda Skocpol work (that, in some way,
updates Barrington Moore Jr, classical book the “Social Origins of Dictatorship
and Democracy”, 1975), revolutions were seen as domestic phenomena. For
its turn, Jack Goldstone (1991) emphasized that international factors (such as
42  Fagundes Visentini

economic-​fiscal pressures and political alliances of destabilization) weakened

the state and provoked revolutions.
When Realists and Neorealists such as Kenneth Waltz do not relate inter-
nal and external dimensions, they ignore that most alliances envision to pre-
vent revolutions in a member state. Revolutions cannot certainly escape the
previously existing system, but they push forward their change and represent
moments of transition to a new world, although International Relations per-
ceive them as a ‘collapse’ (or a negative antisystemic disruption).
It should be noted that all revolutions try to internationalize, as counterrev-
olutions do as well (in search for homogeneity), usually without success. Thus,
the limits for ‘revolution export’ (or counterrevolution) lead to truces, cutback
of ideological rhetoric and a more ‘diplomatic attitude’. However, this does not
mean that revolutions had been “socialized” as Halliday (1999:187) mentions,
“until the post-​revolutionary orders remain intact, they continue to represent
a challenge to other states system”.
In the view of Historical Sociology, the ‘international’ created the state, and
not the other way around, and when considering the revolutionary process
studied here in their international dimension it is important to highlight that
wars generate revolutions and vice versa.
For example, in the cases analyzed one can notice that the 1970s revolutions
led to conventional wars in the periphery (with the involvement of great pow-
ers), and the international community was not prepared for them. Besides, in
the regional plan, the greatest impact does not come from a deliberate action,
but its example serves as a catalyst against the established order.
Even Marxism, that supposedly could explain the revolutions it inspires, has
explanatory limitations. One of them is to hold few elements to analyze the
differences amongst several revolutions and the persistence of the national
question. An exception can be found in Brucan (1974). Another one is the
emphasis on 1infrastructural elements1 that leads to an analysis that favors
capitalist systemic relations in a global scale. Paradoxically, smaller atten-
tion is given to the chances of revolutions outbreaks. Wallerstein (1974), for
example, bets on antisystemic social movements, and Arrighi (1996) passes
by economic cycles neither finding revolutions nor dealing properly with post-​
revolutionary states such as China. There is some kind of ‘divorce’ amongst its
academic-​scientific work and its political proposals. So, they think the interna-
tional system as a social economic global (capitalist) system overlapping sec-
ondary political structures.
Marxism, with its totalizing thought, established a dialectical contradictory
connection of the global and national spheres, for instance, of the transnational
and international processes. In the case of the global/​transnational dimension,
Revolutions and International Relations 43

the dominant notions are the ones of International Political Economy and the
world-​system, which emphasize capitalist development structures, without
exploring in the same manner the role of national states and processes of rev-
olutionary disruption.
Considering the notion of the ‘unequal and combined character of capi-
talist development’, one can notice that its impact creates differences from
within the system, which are not only represented by the notions of center
and periphery of the same order. Why is the structural process of capitalism
development and enlargement still linked to the existence (and resistance) of
national states? One can state that as the global system evolved, at the same
time, a complex system of political sovereign (or autonomous) expanded.
Therefore, the nature of the international system is heterogeneous, and the
current ‘globalization’ cycle only reduced the dimensions of time and space
and ‘accelerated the unequal and diverse movement’ (Fernandes, 2018).
Marxist thought about the National Question (Visentini, 2018) and rev-
olutionary processes advanced more slowly in relation to the system of
International Relations. The Marxist analysis of the world-​system presents
itself as a ‘global’ science, almost determinist, while revolutions, curiously, for
a theory based on the own concept of revolution, still remains at the national
“political” domain or as a piece of political art. What needs to be done to over-
come this deadlock so the impact of revolutions in International Relations
could be fully integrated into the Marxist view?
Methodologically, Halliday (1999) suggests four needed tools as elements
for theoretical reflection and empirical research: a) cause: to what extent the
‘international’ generates a revolution; b) foreign policy: how do revolutionary
states carry their relations with other nations; c) answers: which is the reaction
of other states; d) formation: how, in the long run, international factors and
the world-​system manage to constrain the post-​revolutionary internal devel-
opment of states and condition their political., social and economic evolution.
Even though Halliday, in his final works, had not been identifying himself
as a Marxist anymore, this research agenda is clearly affiliated with a more
mature version of Historical Materialism. He had criticized the determinist
version of Marxism and had called the attention for the relevance of revo-
lutions within the transformation of world order. Thus, not even neoliberal
globalization could prevent the outbreak of disruptions and revolutionary
renewals, although their character changes over time. As one can notice in
a reaction generated by any diversion of the dominant political economic
model, even of minimal.
44  Fagundes Visentini

References

Arendt H (2011) Sobre a Revolução. São Paulo: Ed. Companhia das Letras.
Armstrong D (1993) Revolution and World Order-​The Revolutionary State in International
Society. Oxford: Claredon Press.
Arrighi G (1996) O Longo Século xx. São Paulo: Unesp.
Brucan S (1974) La Disolución del Poder. Sociologia de las Relaciones Internacionales y
Políticas. Mexico: Siglo xxi.
Buzan B and Waever, O (2003) Regions and powers. The Structure of International
Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Calvert P (1984) Revolution and International politics. London: Frances Pinter.
Chan S and Williams A (1994) The Renegade States. The evolution of revolutionary for-
eign policy. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Davis M (1985) O imperialismo nuclear e dissuasão extensiva. In: Thompson, E. et al.
Exterminismo e Guerra Fria. São Paulo: Brasiliense.
Fernandes L (2018) Marx e a gênese do sistema internacional moderno. In: Monteiro
A and Bonicuore A (eds.) Marx: Desbravar um Mundo Novo no Século xxi. São
Paulo: Anita Garibaldi/​Fundação Maurício Grabois.
Fontaine A (1995). Aprés eux, lê Déluge. De Kabul a Saravejo. Paris: Fayard.
Fukuyama, F (1989). The End of History? The National Interest, 16: 3–​18. Available (con-
sulted in September 15, 2023) at: http://​www​.jstor​.org​/sta​ble​/24027​184​.
Goldstone J and Gurr R and Moshiri F (eds.) (1991) Revolutions of the Late Twentieth
Century. Boulder/​Oxford: Westview.
Halliday F (1999) Revolution and World Politics: The rise and fall of the sixth great power.
Durham: Duke University Press.
Halliday F (1983) Génesis de la Segunda Guerra Fria. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura
Econômica.
Halliday F (2007) Repensando as Relações Internacionais. Third ed. Porto
Alegre: Ed. ufrgs.
Huntzinger J (1987) Introduction aux Relations Internationales. Paris: Éditions du Seuil.
Keeran R and Kenny T (2004) Socialism Betrayed: Behind the Collapse of the Soviet
Union. New York: International Publishers.
Kissinger H (1973) O mundo restaurado. Rio de Janeiro: José Olympio Editora.
Kolko G (1994) Century of War. New York: The New Press.
Moore B Jr (1975) As Origens Sociais da Ditadura e da Democracia. Lisboa: Cosmos.
Richards M (2004) Revolutions in World History. Nova York: Routledge.
Schutz B and Slater R (eds.) (1990) Revolution and Political change in the Third World.
Boulder: Lynne Rienner/​London: Adamantine.
Silva F (2004) Enciclopédia de Guerras e Revoluções do Século xx. Rio de Janeiro: Ed.
Elsevier.
Revolutions and International Relations 45

Skocpol T (1979) States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Toynbee A (1963) A América e a Revolução Mundial. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar Ed.
Visentini P (2018) O poder e a fraqueza das nações: a Questão Nacional em uma per-
spectiva marxista. Monteiro A and Bonicuore A (eds.) Marx: Desbravar um Mundo
Novo no Século xxi. São Paulo: Anita Garibaldi/​Fundação Maurício Grabois.
Wallerstein I (1974) The modern world system: capitalist agriculture and the origins of
the european world-​system in the sixteenth century. New York: Academic Press.
Westad O (ed.) (2007). The Global Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 pa rt 2
Marxist Thinkers as ir Theorists

∵
 ­c hapter 4

The Center-​Periphery Dialectic

Lenin’s Contribution to the Analysis of Contemporary International
Relations

Rita Matos Coitinho1

The mastery of nature, so the imperialists teach, is the purpose of

all technology.2 But who would trust a cane wielder who proclaimed
the mastery of children by adults to be the purpose of education?
Is not education above all the indispensable ordering of the rela-
tion between generations and therefore mastery, if we are to use
this term, of that relationship and not the children? And likewise
technology is not the mastery of nature but of the relation between
nature and man.
walter benjamin, 1979

∵
1 Introduction

What is Lenin‘s place in a work that proposes to discuss the contributions of

historical and dialectical materialism to the analysis of International Relations?
In general, this question is answered by referring to the theory of imperialism,
correctly understood as the theory of the international expansion of capital

1 PhD in Geography at the Federal University of Santa Catarina, Brazil, and researcher at the
Center for Studies on Historical Materialism and Geography and at the Center for Humanities
at the New University of Lisbon. E-​mail: [email protected].
2 Originally published as a chapter of the book “Theory of International Relations: Marxist con-
tributions”. Reference: Pautasso D and Prestes A (2021) Teoria das Relações Internacionais:
contribuições marxistas. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto. Translated into English by Jorge
Rodolfo Lima. Original title: “A dialética centro-​periferia: a contribuição de Lênin para a
análise das relações internacionais contemporâneas”.

© Rita Matos Coitinho, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_005

50  Matos Coitinho

through the bank-​industry merger and its consequences in terms of the expan-
sion of central states’ power and the rise of conflicts.
In fact, this notion presented by Lenin in the work published in 1917,
“Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism”, retains its relevance and heuris-
tic value, as we discuss in this chapter. We will argue that the concept of impe-
rialism works well for the analysis of asymmetrical relations between nations
to this day. It is also central to the understanding of political movements that
manifest themselves in the imposition of economic and institutional models,
whether through economic pressure or war. But it allows us to go further: the
live analysis of the world’s movements, which involves understanding notions
such as classes, class fractions, and blocks of forces, whose articulations or
disputes are in line with the formation of monopolies, the search for mar-
kets, inputs and infrastructures that make possible the continuous expan-
sion of markets and the realization of capital, as well as the deepening of the
countries’ financial dependence, which generates a continuous flow of wealth
concentration towards the central countries –​guaranteed by structural adjust-
ment policies. The goal of this chapter is to analyze the bases and implications
of the imperialism category and to highlight what in our understanding is the
finish line of Lenin’s theory for the study of international relations: the center-​
periphery dialectic or, in other words, the dispute for hegemony.

2 The Theorist of Praxis

Lenin’s theoretical developments were always linked to the theory of revolu-

tion. He participated, from a very young age, in revolutionary circles, delving
into the philosophical debates of the period at the same time as he became a
conspirator against tsarism. A lawyer defending peasants, he quickly became
a staunch critic of the tsarist judiciary, while joined the ranks of the Russian
Social Democratic Party, dedicating himself entirely to the tasks of a pro-
fessional revolutionary. Lenin devoted a large part of his effort to the study,
dissemination, and theoretical development of Marxism, always organically
linked to the revolution in Russia. Without this premise, it is not possible to
understand his thought and the reading of his texts would only interest the
history of ideas. Like Marx and Engels, Lenin’s theoretical effort was entirely
oriented towards achieving the hegemony of the workers’ party. His develop-
ments in the theory of imperialism, mainly from the studies of Hobson (2009),
Hilferding (1985) , and Bukharin (1986) , came to light in this context and were
crucial to the development of the theory of revolution, based on conceptions
The Center-Periphery Dialectic 51

about the State and the tasks of revolutionary parties. This is clear from the
polemic with Kautsky in the early years of the Bolshevik revolution.
Shortly after the triumph of the October Revolution, Kautsky, then leader
of the German Social Democratic Party, began to criticize the Bolsheviks for
imposing a “dictatorship” in Russia, while a revolution through democratic
means would be possible and desirable. In response, Lenin argued that with-
out understanding the monopoly stage of capitalism, the questions concern-
ing the ‘form’ of twentieth century revolutions would not be straightforward.
There was no ‘form’ before concrete reality. The European revolutionary par-
ties of the time faced a state apparatus completely dominated by the bourgeoi-
sie, heavily militarized, which sponsored the counterrevolution and fought
violently to maintain class privileges. At the same time, the bourgeoisie sup-
ported each other in the different countries against threats to their power by
the proletarian parties. Class interests were internationalized, which was clear
in the civil war that followed the Russian Revolution, with white armies being
openly financed and armed by the European bourgeoisie.
Lenin (1963a) stated:

Imperialism, i.e., monopoly capitalism, which finally matured only in

the twentieth century, is, by virtue of its fundamental economic traits,
distinguished by a minimum fondness for peace and freedom, and by a
maximum and universal development of militarism. To ‘fail to notice’
this in discussing the extent to which a peaceful or violent revolution is
typical or probable is to stoop to the level of a most ordinary lackey of the
bourgeoisie.

With the theory of imperialism, Lenin (1963a) demonstrated that the whole
world became the object of distribution among monopolies. He also demon-
strated that the colonial policy of finance capital was distinguished from the
colonialism of earlier times since it operated through economic subjugation.

Finance capital is such a great, such a decisive, you might say, force in all
economic and in all international relations, that it is capable of subject-
ing, and actually does subject, to itself even states enjoying the fullest
political independence.
lenin, 1963a

Thus, for Lenin, in the current stage of capitalist development, national issues
are only partially so since international monopolies economically domi-
nate the vast majority of countries. Based on these conceptions, Lenin was
52  Matos Coitinho

a tireless enemy of the imperialist war, while the German Social Democratic
Party adhered to patriotic propaganda and voted in favor, in parliament, for
the granting of war credits requested by the government. The group led by
Rosa Luxemburg rose against this. Lenin, too, was critical of the position of the
German socialists. For him, war, as a continuation of politics, should be ana-
lyzed and understood by its class character and not by its exclusively national
point of view. World War i, against which the Bolsheviks fought in Russia and
Rosa Luxemburg’s group fought in Germany, was an inter-​imperialist war and,
as such, should have been denounced and fought relentlessly. For this reason,
the Bolsheviks definitively broke with the 2nd International, whose greatest
theorist, Karl Kautsky, was aligned with the bellicose policy of the nascent
German imperialism.
This passage from the work “The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade
Kautsky” is quite illustrative of the position taken by Lenin:

(…) the internationalism of Kautsky and the Mensheviks amounts to this:

to demand reforms from the imperialist bourgeois government, but to
continue to support it, and to continue to support the war that this gov-
ernment is waging until everyone in the war has accepted the formula:
no annexations and no indemnities’ (…). Theoretically, this shows a com-
plete inability to dissociate oneself from the social-​chauvinists and com-
plete confusion on the question of defense of the fatherland. Politically,
it means substituting petty-​bourgeois nationalism for internationalism,
deserting to the reformists’ camp and renouncing revolution.
lenin, 1963b

3 The Theory of Imperialism

As Lukács wrote, Lenin’s text “Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism” is

not exactly a detailed study of the economic reasons for the emergence of impe-
rialism and its limits –​as are the studies of Rosa Luxemburg and Bukharin -​,
but a “theory of the concrete class forces that imperialism unleashes and that
act within it; is the theory of the concrete world situation provoked by imperi-
alism3” (Lukács, 2012:63). Even so, the conceptual bases of the definition of
imperialism as ‘the new phase’ of world capitalism are well defined in the

3 Our highlight.
The Center-Periphery Dialectic 53

text, which is based on the studies of Hobson (2009) , Hilferding (1985) and
Bukharin (1986) , in addition, of course, to the assumptions formulated by
Marx and, as is characteristic of Lenin (1963a)’s economic studies, statistics of
the time. We now turn to the analysis of Lenin’s text.4
Lenin’s first premise about the characterization of imperialism, which dis-
tinguished it from past forms of organization of capitalism, is the absolutiza-
tion of the phenomenon of monopoly. Of course, this tendency toward the
concentration of capital had already been pointed out by Marx in the nine-
teenth century and came to fruition in the twentieth century. As Lenin notes:

Marx (…) by a theoretical and historical analysis of capitalism had

proved that free competition gives rise to the concentration of produc-
tion, which, in turn, at a certain stage of development, leads to monopoly.
Today, monopoly has become a fact [and] (…) cartels been transformed
into imperialism. (…). Concentration has reached the point at which it
is possible to make an approximate estimate of all sources of raw mate-
rials (for example, the iron ore deposits) of a country and even, as we
shall see, of several countries, or of the whole world. Not only are such
estimates made, but these sources are captured by gigantic monopolist
associations. (…) Skilled labor is monopolized, (…) the means of trans-
port are captured.

Far from understanding monopoly as a ‘new’ phenomenon, Lenin points to

the development of this tendency in an irreversible way, drawing all capitalists,
from all areas to the deepening of the social character of production, the result
of which is privately appropriated by a decreasing number of individuals. So,
Lenin says:

(…) capitalism, in its imperialist phase, leads to the integral socialization

of production in its most varied aspects; drags, so to speak, the capital-
ists, against their will and without their being aware of it, towards a new
social regime, one of transition between absolute freedom of competi-
tion and complete socialization. Production becomes social, but appro-
priation remains private.
lenin, 1963a

4 In this section, all quotes, except for that of Lukács, in the first paragraph, are from
Lenin V (1963a) Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. In: Lenin’s Selected Works.
Moscow: Progress Publishers, vol. 1, pp. 667–​766.
54  Matos Coitinho

Free competition, which at least theoretically would have characterized capi-

talism in its first phase, would be definitively replaced by monopoly. This con-
cept, however, is not sufficiently defined only by the operation of statistically
pointing out the concentration of industries, from the most diverse branches.
It is essential to reveal the role played by banking institutions. As the impor-
tance of bank capital grows, we observe the

(…) subordination to a single center of an increasing number of formerly

relatively “independent”, or rather, strictly local economic units. In reality
it is centralization, the enhancement of the role, importance and power
of monopolist giants. (…).

At all events, banks greatly intensify and accelerate the process of con-
centration of capital and the formation of monopolies in all capitalist
countries, notwithstanding all the differences in their banking laws.
lenin, 1963a

As the influence of banking institutions increased, the concentration of cap-

ital in these same institutions intensified. Little by little, almost all monopo-
lies began to finance themselves almost exclusively through banks, which led
to the phenomenon of a bank-​industry merger. Thus, says Lenin, through the
concentration of capital and its merger with banks, “dispersed capitalists end
up constituting a collective capitalist” (Lenin, 1963a).

By managing the current accounts of several capitalists, the bank appar-

ently carries out a purely technical, only auxiliary, operation. But when
this operation grows to gigantic proportions, the result is that a handful
of monopolists subordinate the commercial and industrial operations of
the entire capitalist society, putting themselves in conditions –​through
their banking relationships, current accounts and other financial oper-
ations –​first, to know exactly the situation of the different capitalists,
then to control them, to exert influence over them through the expansion
or restriction of credit, facilitating or hindering it, and, finally, to decide
entirely on their destiny, determine their profitability, deprive them of
capital or allow them to increase it rapidly and in large proportions, etc.
lenin, 1963a

Thus, Lenin (1963a) concludes, “the last word in the development of banks is
the monopoly”, which is developed by the increasing fusion of banking and
industrial capital, a fact that occurs concomitantly with the transformation
The Center-Periphery Dialectic 55

of banks into institutions with a truly universal character. According to Lenin

(1963a), “the twentieth century thus marks the turning point from the old to
the new capitalism, from the domination of capital in general to the domi-
nation of finance capital”, whose other face is the increasingly complete
dependence of industrial capitalism on banks and, also, the union between
industries, banks, and governments, since they start to act in defense of their
own financial and industrial conglomerates, as will be seen below.
But the expansion of finance capital is not a phenomenon confined to the
sphere of production. Little by little, the ‘democratization’ of share ownership
takes banking institutions to other layers of society, from the small producer
to the liberal professional who can ‘invest’ their small savings in the shares
of large companies, financing their worldwide expansion. Keeping an eye on
this phenomenon, which began in England, where one could buy a share in a
large company for just one pound, the German industrialist Siemens said: “the
1-​pound sterling share is the basis of British imperialism”.
This is how the imperialist expansion of England obtained vast popular sup-
port: all the holders of 1 pound sterling shares were rooting for the good perfor-
mance of the English companies spread around the world. In parallel with this
expansion within the population itself, the financial oligarchies began to enjoy
a decisive influence on governments and the press. About this, Lenin (1963a)
says: “the omnipresence of the financial oligarchy is absolute, it dominates the
press and the government”. Step by step, this would cease to be an exclusive
characteristic of British imperialism and become a phenomenon of worldwide
proportions, even reaching Russia, a country that was just becoming industri-
alized, as Lenin noted.
Another particularly profitable activity of finance capital “is also specula-
tion with land situated on the outskirts of large, rapidly growing cities” (Lenin,
1963a). The monopoly of the banks merges, in this case, with the monopoly of
land rent and with the monopoly of the means of communication. With the
expansion of colonial domains, Europeans would also begin to speculate on
arable land in their distant domains, whether directly –​as in the case of the
partition of Africa –​or indirectly, as in the case of Latin American countries.
Bank-​industry mergers, infrastructure financing in distant countries, export
of bank capital, expansion of markets for goods produced in central countries
through political and economic dominance across the globe. “The monopoly,
once it has been constituted and controls billions, inevitably penetrates all
aspects of social life, regardless of the political regime and any other particu-
larity” (Lenin, 1963a). The overwhelming expansion of finance capital was rec-
ognized, at the time, by bourgeois theorists, such as Hobson himself, quoted by
Lenin, and by industrialists and high government officials. Lenin mentions, for
56  Matos Coitinho

example, the German state official, Eschweg, who in 1911 would have predicted
in this regard: “not even the widest political freedom can save us from becom-
ing a people of men deprived of their liberty” (Lenin, 1963a).
The official referred to the predominance of finance capital over all other
forms of capital, which in fact implies the predominance of the rent-​seeking
and financial oligarchy, as well as the outstanding situation of a few states with
greater financial power in relation to all the others. At the time, Lenin had
identified these four countries as pillars of imperialism: England, the United
States, France, and Germany (in that order): once great exporters of goods and,
in the era of monopolies, the most important exporters of capital.
Having sponsored the ‘direct sharing of the world’, finance capital created
the age of monopolies. And, with these came the monopolistic principles: the
use of personal “relationships” for profitable transactions replaces competi-
tion in the open market. Thus, the era of imperialism is also that of the rise of
plutocracies, in which financial affairs are themselves state affairs. In this text,
Lenin analyzes the case of the oil industry, for him the most illuminating exam-
ple of how, in the era of monopolies, the interests of states, large extraction
and refining companies, and banks are intermingled towards the formation of
cartels, because just controlling production is no longer enough: it is necessary
to control quantities, prices, and distribution policy. Finally, the antithesis of
the ‘free market’.

Certain bourgeois writers (now joined by Karl Kautsky) (…) have

expressed the opinion that international cartels, being one of the most
striking expressions of the internationalization of capital, give the hope
of peace among nations under capitalism. Theoretically, this opinion is
absolutely absurd, while in practice it is sophistry and a dishonest defense
of the worst opportunism. International cartels show to what point capi-
talist monopolies have developed, and the object of the struggle between
the various capitalist associations. (…) the forms of the struggle may and
do constantly change in accordance with varying, relatively specific and
temporary causes, but the substance of the struggle, its class content,
positively cannot change while classes exist.
lenin, 1963a

Lenin explains that the class against which to fight is the ‘world bourgeoisie’.
They start sharing the world among themselves, as the degree of concentra-
tion reached makes this sharing mandatory. This world bourgeoisie, however,
is not free to compete with each other and does so supported by the power
of its states. In this struggle, the strength of each capitalist country varies
The Center-Periphery Dialectic 57

according to its economic and political development. And this may change
in the form: “today peaceful, tomorrow not peaceful, the day after tomorrow
again not peaceful.” In his words:

The epoch of the latest stage of capitalism shows us that certain relations
between capitalist associations grow up, based on the economic division
of the world; while parallel to and in connection with it, certain relations
grow up between political alliances, between states, on the basis of the
territorial division of the world, of the struggle for colonies, of the ‘strug-
gle for spheres of influence’. (…).
For the first time the world is completely divided up, so that in the
future only re-​division is possible, i.e., territories can only pass from one
‘owner’ to another, instead of passing as owner-​less territory to an owner.
lenin, 1963a

Thus, Lenin (1963a) says, the colonial policy of the epoch of capitalist imperi-
alism is a transitory form. What is permanent, while the phase of imperialism
lasts, is the dominant presence of finance capital and the dependence of states
on it. Thus, there is an abundance of ‘transitory forms of state dependence’ and
no less transitory forms of relations between the strongest, most determining
countries and between these and other countries. In this way, according to
Lenin (1963a),

What is typical for this epoch are not only the two fundamental groups
of countries –​those with colonies and the colonies –​but also the var-
ied forms of dependent countries which, from a formal, political point of
view, enjoy independence, but that, in reality, find themselves involved in
the meshes of financial and diplomatic dependence.

One of these ‘varied’ forms mentioned by Lenin is the semi-​colony, of which

Argentina would be an example, given its financial dependence on London at
the time, or even Portugal, which was in a position of financial and diplomatic
dependence, despite maintaining political independence from England, being
practically a British protectorate.
What is fundamental in this process, from an economic point of view, “is
the replacement of free capitalist competition by capitalist monopolies (…)
the monopoly is precisely the opposite of free competition” (Lenin, 1963a). The
author thus arrives at a definition: “imperialism is the monopoly phase of cap-
italism”. In other words,
58  Matos Coitinho

imperialism is capitalism in the stage of development at which the dom-

ination of monopolies and finance capital took shape, the export of
capital acquired considerable importance, the division of the world by
international trusts began, and the division of all the land between the
most prominent capitalist countries ended. [And there are five funda-
mental traits:]
1) the concentration of production and capital carried to such a high
degree of development that it created monopolies, which play a decisive
role in economic life; 2) the fusion of banking capital with industrial
capital and the creation, based on this ‘financial capital’, of the financial
oligarchy; 3) the export of capital, unlike the export of goods, acquires
particularly great importance; 4) the formation of monopolistic interna-
tional associations of capitalists, who share the world among themselves;
and 5) the end of the territorial division of the world among the most
prominent capitalist powers.

The trend toward annexation, at least in this phase of expansion of imperi-

alism described by Lenin, is directed at agrarian and industrial regions. This
tendency ‘is part of the very essence of imperialism’, leading to the growth of
the ‘rivalry of several great powers in their aspirations to hegemony, that is, to
seize territories not directly for themselves, but to weaken the adversary and
undermine its hegemony’. Thus, one can speak of ‘several imperialisms’, com-
peting at a given moment, but possibly articulated in specific situations.
In the era of imperialism, the figure of the ‘rentier state’ appears, defined
by Lenin (1963a) as “the state of parasitic and decaying capitalism”, whose
existence becomes increasingly dependent on the appropriation of externally
generated resources. On the other hand, Lenin points out that, to the extent
that imperialism leads to annexations, and to the intensification of national
oppression, resistance is therefore amplified.
This resistance, as we shall see, characterized a large part of the struggles
that followed those years in which Lenin produced his work. The ‘peripher-
ies’ of the world, oppressed by the expansion of imperialism, especially in the
post-​World War ii period, more than thirty years after Lenin’s work, would
become the main stage of the struggles of the twentieth century, in many
senses impelled by the historical example of that once peripheral country,
which made the inter-​imperialist war that took place between 1914 and 1918,
the disruptive moment necessary for the rise of the first socialist experiment in
human history: the ussr. It is for this reason that we begin this text by stating
that what follows from the theory of imperialism, the dialectic between center
The Center-Periphery Dialectic 59

and periphery, is the most fruitful point of arrival of Lenin’s theory of imperial-
ism for the analysis of contemporary international relations.

4 Later Developments and Theoretical Debates in the Field of

Contemporary International Relations5

As discussed in the previous section, in Lenin’s sense, how inter-​imperialist

disputes take place or how monopolies are articulated to continue dominating
certain areas of the globe varies in time and space. It is not the way it is pre-
sented, but the permanence of the fundamental characteristic that determines
whether or not one can still speak of “imperialism”, and whether or not this
analytical category is still applicable to the social sciences of our time.
We have already seen that Lenin showed that, in the imperialist phase, ‘free
competition’ is replaced by monopolies, which tend to extend to all economic
activities. The generalization of the monopoly and the complete financializa-
tion of the world economy followed by the deregulation process, exported to
most countries of the world through the action of international organizations
(such as the imf and the World Bank nowadays), is the real ‘globalization’ of
capital. In this stage of unprecedented capital expansion, accelerated, espe-
cially after World War ii, the US control over the economy was consolidated –​
through its control over the currency –​and the policy of forming consensuses,
which takes place through the action of multilateral institutions under its
direct influence. The economic prescriptions of multilateral institutions were
widely applied, especially, but not only, in peripheral countries.
In the late 1960s, Baran and Sweezy (1968) indicated that this prominence of
finance capital was being aggravated, rather than changing. The authors iden-
tified, at that moment, the rise of a ‘neoliberal consensus’ that encompassed
the vast majority of nations integrated into capitalism. This consensus, instead
of extending the validity of the principle of free competition, touted as early
as the nineteenth century by mainstream economics as the predominant form
that mercantile relations should assume, was at no time the predominant form
of relationship among nations. According to Baran and Sweezy,

there is no free competition in modern capitalism. (…) the typical eco-

nomic unit in capitalist society is not the small firm that manufactures

5 This section resumes and expands some of the reflections originally presented in the book
Coitinho R (2019) Entre Duas Américas –​eua ou América Latina? Florianópolis: Insular.
60  Matos Coitinho

a negligible fraction of a homogeneous production, for an anonymous

market, but the large-​scale enterprise, which accounts for a significant
part of the production of industry., or various industries, able to control
their prices, the volume of their production, and the types and volumes
of investments. The typical economic unit has the attributes that were
once considered exclusive to the monopoly (…). It is impossible […] to
continue treating competition as a general case: [the monopoly must be
placed] at the very center of our [analytic] effort (…). We believe that
monopoly capitalism is a society of the second type and that any attempt
to understand it that limits or seeks to reduce the importance of how the
surplus is used is doomed to failure.
baran and sweezy, 1968

These authors took up Lenin’s definition of imperialism, understood as “the

monopoly phase of capitalism” (Baran and Sweezy, 1968).
According to Alain Touraine (1996) and Samir Amin (2006), in the post-​
World War ii period, imperialism emerged from a ‘triad’: the USA, Western
Europe and Japan, with the United States being the only superpower.6 Western
Europe, more precisely Germany, France and England exert influence espe-
cially on the European scene, just as Japan still has some strength in Asia
(although increasingly overshadowed by the Chinese prominence that con-
stitutes, however, a sui generis case, as we will see later). For these authors,
Europe works as an auxiliary force of US imperialism, insofar as the ‘European
project’ opted for an Atlanticism hitherto unrestricted.
The strength of each of these states is fundamentally based on the control
they exercise over financial flows, although the use of military force is not
negligible when it comes to France, and also England, in association with the
USA, through nato. But the ability to unilaterally impose its will through war
is an American prerogative, the only ‘superpower’ in Gramscian terms.7 The
US, in addition to having the largest and best-​equipped armed forces in the
world, politically controls nato –​and through it compromises any desire for
military autonomy on the part of European powers. Perhaps the departure of
England (spokesperson for Atlanticism in Europe and seen as a ‘Trojan horse’
by nationalists such as Charles De Gaulle) from the European Union causes a

6 Here we understand the concept of ‘superpower’, as formulated by Antonio Gramsci, for

whom the term refers to the capacity of a State to “impress state activity with an autonomous
direction, which influences and has repercussions on other States” (Gramsci, 1978: 191).
7 For Gramsci, “the decisive measure to establish what is to be understood by superpower is
war.” (Gramsci,1978: 192).
The Center-Periphery Dialectic 61

change in this alignment and the repositioning of the Old Continent on the
world stage, driven by Germany, the main enthusiast of a European military
project. However, it is too early to make such statements.
Samir Amin also defended the construction of a ‘theory of the world expan-
sion of capitalism’, in which the concept of imperialism should be centered.
According to him,

The contemporary world-​system will consequently continue to be impe-

rialist (polarizing) for any possible future, as long as the fundamental
logic of its achievements remains dominated by capitalist production
relations. This theory then associates imperialism with the process of
capital accumulation on a world scale, a fact that I consider as a single
reality with different inseparable dimensions.
amin, 20068

The author criticizes theories that seek to characterize the international sys-
tem as ‘post-​imperialist’, because they do not address the disparities between
what is exhausted in the center of the system and what remains in the periph-
ery, in addition to ignoring that imperialism determines the framework and
conditions of class struggle, whether in the center or on the periphery (Amin,
1987: 17). Thus, for Samir Amin, the imperialist system tends to deepen uneven
development, which consequently makes the central contradiction of the
entire contemporary system the one that opposes monopoly capital to the
overexploited masses of the periphery, displacing, thus, the “center of gravity of
the struggles against capital to the periphery of the system.” (Amin, 1987:105).
With another perspective, Immanuel Wallerstein is confident that US
hegemony is in decline. The central question today, according to him, is not
“whether or not it is in decline, but whether the United States will manage to
fall gracefully, with minimal damage to the world and to itself” (Wallerstein,
2003: 36).In this same line of reasoning, Martins (2016) highlights an ‘Atlantic
crisis’, which began in the 1970s. Faced with the crisis, neoliberalism emerged
as the mechanism found to resume the rate of capital gains, by directing public
spending to the support of the financial processes of accumulation (Martins,
2016: 45), generating, contrary to what is disseminated by ideological propa-
ganda, the expansion of the state (and not its reduction), but in the sense of
maintaining capital gains and not meeting the basic needs of the population.

8 This English version was produced from the Brazilian Portuguese translation (Amin, 2006).
(Translator’s note).
62  Matos Coitinho

Arrighi and Silver (2001) also argue that the international system is in a period
of systemic transition, where the central issue is the balance between the West
(led by the US) and the East (especially by the expansion of China).
Petras (2007) diverges from this interpretation that we are witnessing a
period of systemic transition, while his interpretation converges with that of
Martins regarding neoliberalism. He considers the idea of ‘crisis of hegemony’
and ‘systemic transition’ to be a mere exercise in rhetoric. For him, there is
no long-​term and large-​scale change without profound processes of change
at the level of class relations at the local, regional and national levels. Thus,
what is called ‘globalization’, which for him is imperialist expansion, is not
simply the dissemination of ideologies and their imposition by force or per-
suasion: “There is a precondition –​the existence of political and bureaucratic
elites, and important sectors of the ruling class, which have a common political
and economic interest and the ability to articulate ideology and implement
pro-​imperial policies” (Petras, 2007: 26).
For this North American author, imperialism is a real force, whose con-
temporary movement is the division of the world: “We are in the midst of an
important struggle between major and minor, old and new imperialisms, for
control of regions, regimes, energy and strategic resources. [through] wars,
free trade agreements, military alliances, and economic associations” (Petras,
2007: 48).
The difficulties of the Atlantic ‘axis’ do not, therefore, imply the end of the
era of imperialism, but very likely represent the resurgence of disputes and the
increase in the apparatus of domination. For Gandásegui Hijo (2016), the US
faces difficulties in maintaining its hegemony, but it will still play a key role for
a long time to come. For this author, the world scenario is increasingly tending
towards a new polarization between China and the USA.
Other theoretical matrices, further away from the critical spectrum, such
as liberalism and neo-​institutionalism, in turn, give multilateral institutions
and international regimes the role of regulating the world-​system and guar-
anteeing peace, granting institutions objectivity and neutrality that are diffi-
cult to be verified. Realism, in turn, views the international order in Hobbesian
terms: each state is an autonomous actor, driven by the quest for power. Strong
states do not renounce their position of power. They act, in peace or in war,
to secure their position of strength. These approaches, despite their profound
differences, confer the historic initiative to world powers. However, the rise
of China and its current prominence on the international stage shows the
opposite.
Neo-​institutionalists and realists do not focus on the origins of differences
between different nations and grant a degree of autonomy to international
The Center-Periphery Dialectic 63

relations that seems to override internal struggles within states. They defend
the existence of ‘national interests’ immanent to states, independent of their
internal forces. Antonio Gramsci has the formulation that best helps us to lay
bare these illusions:

Do international relations precede or follow (logically) fundamental rela-

tions? The former undoubtedly follow the latter. Every organic innova-
tion in the structure organically modifies absolute and relative relations
in the international field, through its technical-​military expressions. Even
the geographical position of a national state does not precede, but fol-
lows (logically) structural innovations, even if reacting to them to a cer-
tain extent (exactly to the extent that superstructures react on structure,
politics on the economy, etc.). Moreover, international relations react
passively and actively to political relations (of party hegemony).
gramsci, 20149

According to Gramsci’s formulation, when studying international relations, it

is necessary to unravel the interplay of interests within states, but events at the
international level have a dialectical structuring effect on national formations.
The forces at work on the internal plane, as Lenin already revealed, are social
classes. ‘National interests’ coincide with those of social groups in a dominant
position. In other words, the interests of those who control the big monopolies
decisively influence the world economy and print the dynamics of interna-
tional relations. Here, the relevance of the Leninist category of imperialism
stands out for the understanding of the relations among the states and, even,
the relations internal to them. As Petras (2007) points out, there is no imperi-
alist domination without the collaboration of sectors within the subordinate
states themselves. This is what is observed in relations between the US and
peripheral countries, especially in Latin America, but, to a certain extent, it is
also how the US supremacy over Europe and Japan takes place.
As early as the 1990s, some of the main formulators of US foreign policy
highlighted that, after the Cold War, the country should preserve its ‘super-
power’ status. Paul Wolfowitz, for example (who in 1992 was an assistant to
the US Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney), presented a report in which he
pointed out the main risks to US hegemony, the main one being the emer-
gence of new poles of regional power that would end up forcing a multipolar

9 This English version was produced from the Brazilian Portuguese translation. The original
text may be found at Gramsci (2014). (Translator’s note).
64  Matos Coitinho

order. For Wolfowitz, the way to guarantee supremacy would be to strengthen

its military presence across the globe, guaranteeing conditions for the US to be
able to carry out more than one military conflict at the same time so that no
adversary or ally could doubt the US ability to respond militarily to threats to
its hegemony.
Joseph Nye (2022) , on the other hand, advocates the thesis that the super-
power could maintain its status through a mixture of soft and hard power.
Political and cultural hegemony could not do without military force, but
it would be the most effective way to guarantee US interests. For Zbigniew
Brzezinski, “America stands supreme in the four decisive domains of global
power: militarily, (…) economically, (…) technologically, (…) and culturally
(…). It is the combination of all four that makes America the only comprehen-
sive global superpower” (Brzezinski, 1997).
Gianni Fresu, taking up Rosa Luxemburg’s analysis, emphasizes that what

(…) distinguishes imperialism from the old forms of colonial rule is the
fact that imperialism has every interest in the subjugated state continu-
ing to exist as a formally independent institutional entity, keeping the
appearances of an intact subject, “freely” subjected to foreign hegemony,
because this is the most complete guarantee of maintaining the existing
situation.
fresu, 2016

It is perfectly possible to extend this conclusion by Rosa Luxemburg to the

present day when we analyze the way the US acts in relation to Europe and
Latin America, where it seeks to guarantee its hegemony through apparently
negotiated actions and by direct influence on the actions of governments
through political and ideological pressure. In relation to Asia, the US strategy
has evolved from siege to (almost) open confrontation, evidencing its extreme
concern with the growth of China’s power. In Visentini’s view (2006), the
period that began with the end of the Cold War actually represented the begin-
ning of a struggle for hegemony and for a new paradigm and not a stable order
as wanted by those who rushed to announce the validity of a new paradigm. a
unipolar, capitalist and liberal order –​which would coincide with the ‘end of
history’.
In its eight years, the Obama administration maintained the logic of guar-
anteeing US advantages in international transactions based on asymmetries. It
maintained simultaneous conflicts, especially in the Middle East, directly inter-
fering in Iraq and Afghanistan while supporting destabilization actions on the
borders of Russia, Syria, Libya, and Iran. These actions, inaugurated during the
The Center-Periphery Dialectic 65

US action in Afghanistan during the Cold War, were theoretically conceived

by Zbigniew Brzezinski. The idea was to force the creation of a ‘Vietnam’ for
the ussr, which would bankrupt the country’s economy and weaken it on the
world stage. After the Cold War, the strategy of ‘sowing chaos’ was maintained.
Brzezinski himself presented an analysis of the strategic prospects and politi-
cal dilemmas of several states in Eurasia and conceived the international sce-
nario as a triangular relationship between China, Japan, and the US, as well as
an ambitious strategy aimed at extending the Euro-​Atlantic community to the
east, comprising Ukraine and all the countries that were once part of the ussr,
in order to promote a siege of Russia. Understanding China, at the time, as a
‘defensive’ actor –​while Russia, even weakened, would be an offensive actor –​
Brzezinski sought to outline a strategy that could guarantee a balance of power
in Eurasia, maintaining armed conflicts. In this way, US foreign policy should
seek to derail Russia’s affirmation as a regional power, sowing and supporting
conflicts in surrounding countries. This way of conceiving the international
board remains, albeit with nuances.
Under Donald Trump, elected with an apparently isolationist slogan, US for-
eign policy maintained its characteristic aggressiveness in defending the inter-
ests of its conglomerates. The escalation of tensions with China, marked by
numerous customs battles, as well as threats to partner countries –​especially
in Latin America, but also Europe –​aimed at interrupting the march of expan-
sion of Chinese business around the world, reminded us of the old days of the
nascent European imperialism, the one that led the old continent to the total
conflagration in 1914. Although the aggressive rhetoric and systematic attacks
on international organizations (such as the UN and the wto) may sound like
a step outside the cadence of what is already traditional in US foreign politics,
there was no retreat from the Trump administration regarding the strategic
objectives of its main conglomerates and high finance.
For David Harvey, the permanent search for external enemies, which is
repeated in every US administration, whether Democrat or Republican, is a
response to the problems of internal cohesion typical of “a quite extraordinary
multicultural immigrant society driven by a fierce competitive individualism”
(Harvey, 2003) that has a chronically unstable democracy (if not impossible
to control) and permanently needs an external enemy capable of generating
internal solidarity. Furthermore, the maintenance of global asymmetries is
necessary for the accumulation of capital, ensuring the drainage of resources
from the periphery to the center. According to Harvey,

imperialistic practices, from the perspective of capitalistic logic, are typ-

ically about exploiting the uneven geographical conditions under which
66  Matos Coitinho

capital accumulation occurs and also taking advantage of what I call the
‘asymmetries’ that inevitably arise out of spatial exchange relations.
harvey, 2013: 35

Concerning this, John Saxe-​Fernández (2006) pointed out that, since the 1940s,
in the USA, there has been an uninterrupted process of institutionalization
of a permanent war economy, which impacts the very structure of power,
organized from a conjunction of clientelist relationships and mutual interests
between the corporate (military-​industrial) apparatus, the Congress and what
he calls the ‘imperial presidency’, endowed with an immense civil-​military
bureaucracy that carries out industrial, state and private planning operations,
internally to the country and in its planetary expansion. According to Saxe-​
Fernández (with data from the State Department itself), since the late 1960s-​
70s, the US federal government has spent more than half of its revenue on
financing “present, past and future” wars (Saxe-​Fernández, 2006: 98).
Currently, the US are losing space to China in most economic sectors and
if they are not able to guarantee, to their favor, the maintenance of concerted
action with their competitors, and the advantages in the current dispute for
the partition of the world, it will lose the hegemonic position. For many ana-
lysts, this decline is inevitable and is already underway.
Under capitalism, as Lenin pointed out, development is always uneven. This
disparity between ‘center and periphery’ does not only occur between different
nations, but also within capitalist countries. As highlighted by Octavio Ianni,

imperialism is prolonged internally in the dominant nation itself. The

same fundamentals that govern external economic and political relation-
ships also govern internal political and economic relationships. Likewise,
within the metropolis, economic, social, and political development is
uneven and contradictions persist and worsen (…). The basis of the prob-
lem lies, therefore, in the character of the class society that is developing
[in the country]. Only from this perspective of interpretation is it possi-
ble to explain the internal manifestations of imperialism, that is, of inter-
nal colonialism.
ianni, 1998: 09–​1010

The concept of imperialism is the theoretical instrument that encompasses

the entire problem of relations among states. Only from the understanding

10 Our translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original.

The Center-Periphery Dialectic 67

that uneven development and resource drainage –​which Saxe-​Fernández calls

‘payment of taxes’ –​work as the system’s organizers, can we see, for example,
the logic behind existing trade agreements.
If at the time when Lenin wrote his work the way in which monopolies were
expanded was the direct domination of colonial territories, nowadays domina-
tion over financial mechanisms and technology are combined. With industrial
production spread across the globe and installed primarily in regions where
the cost of labor is lower, which guarantees the drainage of resources to the
center of the system is the monopoly of the technique. Through the techno-
logical difference, dependence on other nations is ensured and, through the
patent system, a new method of draining resources is imposed through the
payment of royalties on the use of technology (Barbosa, 2018). Producers
send huge sums of money to central countries for the payment of intellectual
property rights while they are restrained in their possibilities of overcoming
technological backwardness, both because of the objective situation of under-
development and because of the constraints created by international regimes,
which prevent and penalize the reverse engineering.

5 Conclusion

As formulated by Lenin, the concept of imperialism gives dynamism to the

analysis of international relations. From there, the focus of studies is no longer
directed to the performance of the nation-​state, understood as an autonomous
unit (eventually provided with a ‘nature’ as is the case of the realist school),
and turns to the movements of the world.
This concept gains explanatory power in combination with another con-
cept, also found in Lenin’s works: hegemony, which designates the idea of polit-
ical leadership: “According to the point of view of the proletariat, hegemony
belongs to those who fight with the greatest energy (…) to the ideological head
of democracy” (Lenin, apud Buonicore, 2015). An enthusiast of Lenin’s work,
Antonio Gramsci, gave breadth to this concept. The image that best illustrates
the Gramscian understanding may be found in his writings on Machiavelli: the
idea of the centaur: half human (persuasion), half beast (coercion). Hegemony
is, at the same time, political direction and coercion. Gramsci also gives the
concept of hegemony a spatial dimension beyond the sphere of political dis-
pute (Cicarelli, 2008: 272–​273).
The concepts of imperialism and hegemony both refer to territoriality and
the exercise of power. Imperialism refers to capitalist development, its high-
est stage, where monopolies and finance capital dominate, which control the
68  Matos Coitinho

state apparatus and use it to expand accumulation. The question of hegemony

arises in the dimension of power, of the tension between conservation and
change.
The concepts of imperialism and hegemony both refer to territoriality and
the exercise of power. Imperialism refers to capitalist development, its highest
stage, where monopolies and finance capital dominate, which control the state
apparatus and use it to expand accumulation. The question of hegemony arises
in the dimension of power, of the tension between conservation and change.
The control exercised by imperialism can be hegemonic: when the ideological
size of imperialism conquers the ruling groups of the other states, preventing
the rupture movements. This is done through international institutions (such
as the World Bank, the International Trade Organization, or even the UN, oas,
etc.). These institutions influence the economic and political organization of
states from the setting of consensus. In this case, even if the imperialist coun-
try has the military means to impose its will, they are not always necessary.
There may be cases where hegemony weakens. These are the moments when
imperialism needs coercion, which can take the most classic form of military
interventions or other means, such as economic restrictions (embargoes, dif-
ficulty in accessing loans, etc.) aligned ‒ as we have seen in recent years in
the ‘Arab Springs’, or even earlier, in the ‘color revolutions’ of Eastern Europe
or even in the current campaigns of destabilization of leftist governments in
Latin America. The weakening of one or more hegemonies and the emergence
of others are moments of change, generally conflicting moments, which are, as
we find in Gramsci, the conflict between the old and the new ‘which cannot
yet be born’.
Currently, US policy is guided by the doctrine of full spectrum domination
(Ceceña, 2014): economic, political, cultural and military domination. Ceceña
shows, based on a study of the main US military documents, that military
actions are conceived in articulation with political, economic, and cultural
action. With the aim of promoting ‘global discipline’, US military strategy
divides the world into areas of action, just like the old pre-​war European impe-
rialism (Ceceña, 2014: 125–​126).
It is in this sense that it becomes possible to understand the American eco-
nomic effort to maintain military bases in the Latin American subcontinent
even when there are no wars, while it is dedicated to winning the ideological
debate both through the dissemination of its cultural industry and through the
permanent expenditure on the financing of scientific and cultural projects in
peripheral countries. Building the enemy’s image is part of the full spectrum
domination strategy.
The Center-Periphery Dialectic 69

The doctrine rescues already tested methods. Chiaramonte (1999) demon-

strated how usaid operated in Argentina in the 1960s to create a pro-​American
intelligentsia. The same happened in all Latin American countries (in Brazil,
we had the mec-​u said agreements, which greatly influenced the formatting
of higher education courses after the Military Dictatorship, as we will see later)
and also in Europe, Japan, and South Korea during the Marshall Plan.
However, there may be situations in which a country exercises hegemony
without being imperialist: this is the case of Chinese expansion. China cur-
rently has great power of attraction over Asian countries and is also beginning
to occupy space in regions that are under the control of US (and European)
imperialism, such as Africa (more intensely) and Latin America. The expan-
sion of its economic influence is undeniable, which takes place through the
establishment of relationships in which the countries involved receive com-
pensation (long-​term investments in infrastructure, for example). But China
cannot be said to be an imperialist country: control of the Chinese state and
most of the economy is in the hands of the Communist Party, not private
monopolies. The participation of finance capital in the Chinese economy is
not decisive (at least for now). Therefore, the idea of ‘imperialism’, defined as
the fusion of monopoly and finance, cannot be applied to Chinese reality. Nor
does the racist component, which opposes ‘the nation’ to ‘the others’ seems to
be a motivator of Chinese external actions. Its economic importance continues
to grow, but it has not yet managed to overcome the military gap that separates
it from the great power. Concerning Latin America, it is also noteworthy that
China has begun to expand its economic influence without confronting the US
in its areas of vital interest. It grabbed market shares in areas where the US was
no longer competitive and prioritized investments in infrastructure, which is
beyond the scope practiced by the Americans. Now, China is already challeng-
ing the US on issues that are dear to them, such as oil and telecommunications.
In social sciences, the concepts of hegemony and imperialism are applied in
different ways. Authors like Ianni (1974), Harvey (2013), and Petras (2007) pre-
fer to use ‘imperialism’ to refer to the relations established between the US and
the rest of the world. Wallerstein (2003), Visentini (2006), and Cox (2014) do
not use the concept of “imperialism” and prefer to speak of hegemony. Borón
(2014), Samir Amin (1987), and Losurdo (2015) use both terms, although they
clearly define the US as an imperialist country. The use that the latter authors
make of the concepts seems to be the most appropriate, as it shows that the
disputes taking place in the state system are not the work of entities that are
‘above the classes’ but by specific groups that seize and manipulate states
according to their interests. C. Wright Mills (1956) defined, in the case of the
USA, this triangulation of forces that drives the state:
70  Matos Coitinho

there is an ever-​increasing interlocking of economic, military, and politi-

cal structures. If there is government intervention in the corporate econ-
omy, so is their corporate intervention in the governmental process. In
the structural sense, this triangle of power is the source of the interlock-
ing directorate that is most important for the historical structure of the
present.
mills, 1956

John Saxe-​Fernández (2006) named this state system controlled by the US

‘imperial presidency’. According to him, the ‘military Keynesianism’, con-
ducted during the Reagan administration, deepened the prominence of the
arms industry in the control of the state bureaucracy, so that currently the US
power structure is marked by the presence and continuity of long-​term trends
that are accentuated extraordinarily from the massive military-​industrial
mobilization of the World War ii and, since then, the consolidation of a per-
manent war economy.
Part of the literature, however, prefers to characterize the present time as
the era of ‘globalization’. According to Azzarà (1999), the linguistic and mean-
ing sphere is undoubtedly the first and most elementary dimension of hege-
mony. He recalls Lenin, who wrote that “capitalism has become a world-​system
of oppression and financial strangulation of the majority of the world popu-
lation by a handful of advanced countries” (Azzarà, 1999: 05). The idea of ‘glo-
balization’ eliminates the subjects who conduct politics in the ‘world-​system’.
while the concept of imperialism highlights the interests of large corporations
behind the action of the ‘handful of advanced countries’.
This dramatic condition described by Lenin remains and deepens, as
demonstrated above. From the persistence of characteristic features and the
current reinforcement of the imperialist character of the system, derives the
centrality of the national question in this historical phase, from which the ten-
dency towards annexation, that is, the suppression of national independence,
stands out. The idea of ‘globalization’ masks this tension between imperialist
expansion and national autonomies. According to Samir Amin (apud Azzarà,
1999), the US counter-​offensive to reestablish its hegemony, threatened by the
strengthening of other imperialisms, and by the struggles for national auton-
omy, is based on military supremacy. The conflicts spreading around the world
are nothing but the new fight for territorial distribution, based essentially on
the control of natural resources and technology.
For Atílio Borón (2014), the issue of dominion over resources is vital for
imperialism, and the threats to its hegemony make it even more dangerous
since the way out when it is no longer possible to exercise control through
The Center-Periphery Dialectic 71

persuasion is the use of military action. In the Leninist theory of imperialism,

the state is not an autonomous entity. It is, rather, an expression of an inter-
nal hegemony of one or more classes over others, which translates into exter-
nal domination over other nations. In this sense, the old formulation of Mao
Zedong gains relevance, for whom the national struggle is a dimension of the
class struggle.
Domenico Losurdo (2015) puts Zedong’s statement in new terms: for the
Italian philosopher there are several forms of expression of the class struggle,
and one of them is, in times of imperialism, the struggle for national liber-
ation –​since it opposes nations subordinate to the class that is in charge of
the system (and to its allies within the struggling nation). This also seems to
apply to the struggles waged within the ‘imperialist metropolis’, such as the
racial revolts at the center of the system. These can provoke displacements in
the central power and thus, play a decisive role in the formation of new hege-
monies, since they challenge the control of the small class. This small class,
according to Ianni (1998) and Wright Mills (1981), does not comprise more than
a tenth of the US population, but their interests and lifestyle definitely sep-
arate them from the rest of American society. Within this class, a very small
elite controls the structures of companies, the main sector of the economy
and, through this control, makes basic decisions about prices and investments
that directly affect the entire nation. It is evident, says Ianni, that within the
imperialist country itself a kind of ‘internal colonialism’ operates, disguised as
economic, sociocultural imbalances, generational conflicts and racial tensions
(Ianni, 1998: 10). Imperialism is thus domination over all classes and class frac-
tions, inside and outside the country that is home to monopoly and financial
power. Understanding imperialism and the way it operates is fundamental to
understanding the connections between anti-​systemic and national liberation
struggles.
Due to the political and economic control exercised by the main agents of
the large business groups, part of the critical literature seeks to explain the
global political and economic setting, characterizing the current moment as
controlled by a small club of powerful, no longer ties to the national states. In
a different approach, ‘realist’ theories suggest the permanence of the state as
a unit of analysis. But this ‘state’ of realism is an autonomous, unitary entity,
and there is no concern in understanding the internal power play that shapes
state action. The ‘national interest’ is understood as belonging to the nation as
a whole, as if domestic political issues did not influence what is done ‘outside
the borders’.
The effort to define the concepts that we carried out above allows us to
demystify these two propositions, which involves facing three problems: the
72  Matos Coitinho

first is the set of theories that weaves an interpretation of the “international

system” as something superior or even autonomous in relation to the inter-
national system. to the national states. The second notion that we want to
remove is the one that reifies the idea of t​he state and treats it as an auton-
omous ‘entity’, leaving hidden the social struggles that develop within it and
that are expressed in its insertion in the game of world power, ignoring the
fact that national formations presuppose a certain complex state-​civil society
whose movement decisively interferes with the political positioning of the
nation: the imperialist mechanisms for draining resources presuppose ties
with the national elites of subordinate states. The third type of problematic
approach is the one that ignores that there is a hierarchy in the state system
and deals with each one as a full entity and equally capable of fighting for
its objectives. To avoid these pitfalls, it is necessary to define this ‘hierarchy’
among states, an operation that is only possible from an analysis based on the
concepts of ‘imperialism’ and ‘hegemony’.
From this point of view, it is necessary to consider an issue that is still cen-
tral to this day: even though the Chinese economy is undoubtedly thriving,
surpassing the US in some sectors, a characteristic deriving from the post-​war
international system remains, US control over the financial system and the
main currency of international exchange: the dollar. According to Coel

conformation of an international monetary regime with the dollar as the

reference currency [which] gave the US government the advantage of
covering their foreign liabilities in their own currency of emission. In this
way, American monetary policy served as a strategic element in shaping
the relative economic power of the superpower.
coelho, 2011: 77311

Based on this conformation of a system of multilateral organizations, the US

exported to the world an economic recipe aimed at guaranteeing the perma-
nence of the transfer of resources. Founded on the supremacy of the dollar
and on the absolutization of monetary policy as an instrument for managing
economic crises, this system, “multilateral” in appearance, has been efficient in
maintaining the payment of taxes on a planetary scale, thus restricting the use
of national resources for the autonomous development of nations.
As Katz (2016) demonstrates, the US is still capable of exporting internally
generated crises due to the control it has over the international financial

11 Our translation from the Brazilian Portuguese original.

The Center-Periphery Dialectic 73

system and the absence of another monetary power to face it. In this way, the
2008 crisis, which began in the US, was quickly exported, enabling the recov-
ery –​albeit incomplete –​of the US economy. According to Katz, “la agenda del
fmi se define en Washington. Este poder de Wall Street y de la Reserva Federal
explica como pudo la poténcia del Norte exportar una crisis originada en su ter-
ritório” (Katz, 2016: 130).12
Concerning Latin America, US hegemony over financial processes is still
undeniable. Attempts such as the creation of a South American Bank or even
Brazil’s participation in the brics Bank have had no practical effect, even
though the political developments of the last two decades point to a growth
in resistance to this hegemony, led mainly by China. Still, China’s immense
reserves in dollars and US Treasury bonds play a contradictory role in this pro-
cess, showing that overcoming the current state of affairs will still take a long
time. Dialectically, however, the validity of US hegemony among the ruling
classes of peripheral countries –​especially in Latin America –​is the central
factor in restraining resistance movements. In this way, the analysis of the links
between national states and US imperialism remains necessary to understand
the limits and possibilities of national and international political processes.

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 ­c hapter 5

‘War against War’

Rosa Luxemburg as an International Relations Theorist

Miguel Borba de Sá1

1 Introduction

The relation between International Relations Theory (ir) and Marxism has
been controversial, to say the least.2 Mainstream ir scholars, whether Realists
or Liberals, have jointly ignored, or dismissed, Marxist contributions as unfit
to ‘their’ field of studies.3 Even proponents of cross fertilization, such as Fred
Halliday, concede that “Marxism fits uneasily” (1994: 50) into the discipline’s
main debates, as if there was a Kuhnian paradigmatic incommensurability
between the two epistemic communities. In the worst cases, manuals and
handbooks of ir propagate caricatured versions of some Marxist notion about
the international realm, often emphasizing the perceived flaws while silencing
about possible analytical gains.
On the other hand, Marxists have shown similar disregard towards ir inter-
nal debates as they seemed all too biased towards bourgeois standpoints, not
to mention mainstream ir’s frequent neglect of global capitalism as a central
feature of international politics.4 Attempts to bridge the gap between those
two epistemic communities usually took the form of offering a Marxist analysis
to some international topic of particular interest, such as financial crises, wars,

1 Miguel Borba de Sá is an Assistant Professor at Department of Political Science of the Federal

University of Rio de Janeiro (ufrj), Brazil.
2 This chapter is a development of the article “The hidden presence of Marxism in International
Relations Theory: Rosa Luxemburg and the first ‘great debate’” (English translation) in the
Brazilian journal “Estudos Internacionais”, vol. 5, n. 3, 2017. Translated into English by the
author.
3 Kenneth Waltz, for instance, dedicated a whole chapter from his classic “Man, the State and
War” to prove the inadequacy of ‘second image’ theories using the collapse of the Second
Workers’ International as a perfect example of how ‘not to’ conduct analyzes of international
politics (Waltz, 2001:124–​158).
4 Robert Keohane, from the other side of the mainstream, also dismisses Marxist standpoints
saying that they usually show “less an argument than a statement of faith”, while also men-
tioning that “Marxian analyzes” tend to dismiss ir (especially Liberal-​oriented) approaches
as a mere “bourgeois error”, which is true (1984:55).

© Miguel Borba de Sá, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_006

‘War against War’ 77

or migration issues. Direct intercourse with ir’s theoretical debates has been
rare, occasionally arising from either neo-​Gramscian or world-​system theoriz-
ing. As a result, few Marxists in ir have attempted to dispute the discipline in
its own terms or, at least, to accept some of its canonical self-​descriptions as a
tactical starting point.
In this chapter, such alternative path is chosen in order to make those epis-
temic (and political) borders more porous. It is argued that Marxist contri-
butions were already present in what came to be known as ir’s ‘First Great
Debate’. Such presence will remain hidden if we accept mainstream depictions
of that debate or, conversely, if we reject the existence of such ‘great debate’
altogether, like Peter Wilson (1998, 2012) and other ‘revisionist’ disciplinary his-
torians have attempted to do.
In what follows, a new reading of this alleged foundational debate will
be offered with the explicit aim of placing Marxist contributions at its core,
revealing how leading Marxist authors have actively participated in the social
and intellectual debates out of which ir’s foundational discussion emerged
from. As it will be shown, Marxists formulated both ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ argu-
ments about the international crises around the two world wars of the twen-
tieth century, combining both perspectives within their own theoretical (and
political) standpoint. In order to accomplish this task, the chapter will revisit
part of the oeuvre left by the socialist revolutionary leader, and prolific author,
Rosa Luxemburg, especially her reflections about pacifism, revolution, war,
and international crises, as well as those regarding the role of science against
utopian analyzes of international issues, i.e., the very themes around which
the so-​called ‘First Great Debate’ in ir theory has been discursively structured.
By doing so, it hopes to disturb the foundations of such mode of presenting
the discipline and the political consequences it entails. Arguably, this analytical
strategy may have greater potential to destabilize mainstream’s agenda-​setting
powers than the unsuccessful attempt to denounce the traditional debates-​
narrative in ir as a pure myth, a misrepresentation of reality, or a half-​truth
(Wilson, 1998; Quirk and Vigneswaran, 2005). If, as some revisionists argue,
the tale of the First Debate is a retroactive fabrication that serves the purpose
of limiting progressive ir scholarship from gaining traction within this field
of studies, it seems adequate to propose a more effective way to challenge this
disciplinary orthodoxy by providing ir students with radical tools that might
be useful to undermine the notorious conservative bias shown by this field of
studies.
Also, facing a situation in which even so-​called ‘critical approaches’ that have
already established themselves as part of ir’s theoretical menu fail to acknowl-
edge the value of Marxist contributions against the discipline’s mainstream, it
78  Borba de Sá

seems worthy to recover some of the hidden, or neglected, formulations made

by classical Marxists, such as Luxemburg, that might prove themselves useful
to widen the horizons of critical ir theorizing. And, at the same time, hope-
fully it may offer relevant clues as to the urgent task of analyzing todays’ inter-
national predicaments regarding war and peace from a radical anticapitalistic,
and decidedly anti-​imperialist, perspective.

2 The First Great Debate: Myths, Distortions, and Silences

An authoritative voice in the ‘debate about the first great debate’ is Peter
Wilson (1998, 2012:1). While accepting that, as a ‘pedagogical device’, it may
have some ‘merit’, he nonetheless insists that “the first great debate never actu-
ally happened”. According to him, not only an “idealist or utopian paradigm
never actually existed” but, most importantly, it became a “realist category of
abuse” that had a “inhibiting effect on disciplinary development”, as a “rich
variety of progressivist ideas have been consigned to oblivion” by the “myth”
of a debate between Realists and Idealists in the aftermath of the World War i.
A debate, moreover, which is “highly misleading” as a “statement of historical
fact” (Wilson 1998:1). Later, he conceded that the “idea of a first great debate is
not a complete fiction”, without altering, however, his basic arguments (Wilson
2012:29–​30).
Many have followed such ‘revisionist’ effort to question the explanatory
habit of seeing a chronological sequence of Great Debates in ir theory, with a
particular value attached to this foundational one. Brian Schmidt (2012) sug-
gested that a different genealogy of scholarly debates, based on the American
instead of the British academic life, would better explain the establishment of
ir main tropes, such as the ‘political discourse of anarchy’. By the same token,
Cameron Thies (2002) concluded that the myth was constructed by Realists
‘after’ the World War ii in order to make a case against their contemporary con-
tenders. By their turn, Quirk and Vigneswaran (2005) apply a contextual anal-
ysis in which they argue that “the concept of a ‘First Debate’ is best regarded as
a ‘half-​truth’, or highly distorted and overly simplistic caricature, rather than a
complete fiction”. Like other revisionists, they question the “usefulness of the
realist/​idealist dichotomy”, as well as the “chronology of the events it purports
to explain” (2005:91). According to their research, the notion of a First Debate,
as we know it today, was a by-​product of the controversies aroused in ir the-
ory around the mid-​1970s onwards, when the notion of a ‘Third Debate’ (Lapid
1988) or ‘Interparadigmatic Debate’ (Banks 1985) retroactively consolidated the
proposition of an original one in order for such numerical sequence to make
‘War against War’ 79

sense, not so much as a ‘conspiratorial’ move by Realists but as a ‘process’ made

of “ritually recited (…) perfunctory and superfluous references” that eventually
created an “invented tradition”, in Eric Hobsbawm’s well-​known terms (Quirk
and Vigneswaran, 2005: 103–​105).
However, such condemnations of the notion of a First Great Debate in ir
theory fell short of arriving at any meaningful transformation in the ‘conven-
tional wisdom’ about this field of studies: as Schmidt himself notes, “eighty
years after the debate between idealists and realists allegedly occurred, the first
great debate continues to occupy a central place in the field’s historical con-
sciousness” (2012:2). Even those who acknowledge the dangers of mainstream
depictions of Great Debates also concede that “great debates have served to
organize the discipline” so that “for ir the infamous great debates actually con-
stitute a form of coherence” for an epistemic community inherently interdisci-
plinary and diverse (Waever, 2013: 315–​317). Hence, for reasons that range from
the internal academic struggles to the dominant ideologies on this field, as well
as the institutional and the geopolitical backgrounds upon which the discipline
constituted itself, the “notion that a disciplinary defining great debate took
place in the 1930s and 1940s between idealists and realists continues to persist”
(Schmidt, 2012:2). Unsurprisingly, for some contemporary mainstreamers, espe-
cially Realists, the First Debate not only did exist but, in fact, never really ended,
as the “battle of E.H Carr’s” against idealism still “rages on”, according to John
Mearsheimer (2005).5
What neither ‘great debaters’ nor ‘revisionists’ have done is to reconstruct
the edifice of the First Great Debate taking seriously into account relevant
Marxist contributions to it. Such an absence would seem curious in face of
the recognition that multiple voices participated in the “lively exchanges on
international matters in the 1920s and 1930s” on the questions of “interna-
tional peace, order, justice, cooperation and conflict”; a conversation in which
“Liberal internationalists of various kinds argued against conservatives, some
of whom saw themselves as ‘realists’, and socialists of various kinds argued
against both” (Wilson 2012:30 –​emphasis added)6. This tripartite depiction,

5 Interestingly, Mearsheimer’s vision about the contemporaneous character of the First Debate
concludes that there is a bias against realism in course, thus making him, from the point of
view of the present chapter, an unexpected bedfellow with those who deny its very exis-
tence: both sides agree that the First Debate, whether real or fabricated, produces exclusion-
ary taboos in ir theory. Few of them, if any, bothered to investigate deeply the consequences
of silencing Marxist voices about the same topics discussed in the First Debate.
6 To be sure, there were still other voices. There were many diverse groups and individuals who
opposed the war, from religious groups, like Quakers, to the many conscience objectors of all
kinds: students and women, for instance, organized international encounters against the war
80  Borba de Sá

putting Socialists alongside Liberals and Realists, however, remains concealed

even by those who call for “greater appreciation of the complexity of the
ideational and discursive reality of the time” (Wilson 2012:1).7 Astonishingly,
such negligence remains unaltered even when some of them recognize, en
passant, such (hidden) presence, as when Peter Wilson, agreeing with David
Long, remarks that “Carr’s realism was a product of his radicalism: a product of
broadly Marxist, certainly dialectical materialist conception of historical pro-
cess” (Wilson 1998: 12).
A silencing that becomes even more intriguing if we accept Lucien
Ashworth’s (2002) claim that, instead of an Idealist-​Realist debate, the discus-
sions found at ir and Political Science journals back then actually revolved
around three main topics, namely: (i) does capitalism cause war?; (ii) appease-
ment versus collective security; and (iii) intervention versus abstention (from
a US perspective). Well, the first of these should automatically draw attention
to the wide range of Marxist formulations about this specific issue, from the
many collective resolutions adopted by the Workers’ International (also called
the Second International) regarding this question, to the prolific contribu-
tions given by well-​known figures like Lenin, Trotsky, Kautsky and, of course,
Luxemburg herself, among others.
Yet, in order to claim Luxemburg’s participation in ir’s foundational debate,
two analytical moves are necessary. Firstly, a temporal one. There are many
chronological controversies around the First Debate in ir. Revisionists often
talk about a “chronological transplant” (Quirk and Vigneswaran 2005: 102),
but differ on the question of historical direction: while some try to set the
interwar period, and occasionally the early 1940s, as its fixed temporal bound-
aries (Wilson, 1998, 2012), others argue that what came to be known as ir’s
First Debate had already started in the final years of the nineteenth century
(Schmidt, 2012). And still others make the case for an alleged retroactive
projection of late twentieth century discussions into the discipline’s histori-
cal folklore (Ashworth, 2002; Thies, 2002), not to mention, once more, those

even after it started, not to mention official diplomatic initiatives and millionaire individual
efforts to promote peace (Hobsbawm, 1989: 302–​327). The general Marxist position, held by
successive Congresses of the Second International, was, in Luxemburg words, that “peace
signifies the world revolution of the proletariat! There is no other way of really establishing
and safeguarding peace other than by the victory of the socialist proletariat!” (2004f: 370).
For other types of pacifism in that context see: Fellowship of Reconciliation et al. (2013) and
Hoschild (2011).
7 Wilson smartly reminds us that a ‘realist-​realist’, as well as a ‘utopian-​utopian’ debate were
also part of this complexity (1998:7). His discussion about Carr’s motives for abandoning
such tropes in his following works is less convincing, though.
‘War against War’ 81

mainstream voices who contend that such debate is still ongoing nowadays
(Mearsheimer, 2005). A situation, therefore, in which several scholars “clum-
sily attached an entirely inappropriate chronology to a prior period of disci-
plinary development” (Quirk and Vigneswaran 2005: 107). Or, at best, a very
disputed one, judging by the available literature.
Given such complete lack of agreement on temporal marks, it seems plau-
sible to consider the First Debate to be already in place when rumors of war
started spreading widely across advanced capitalist societies during the Age
of Empire, i.e., from the 1890s onwards, when the gradual aggravation of great
powers’ rivalry, imperial disputes and aggressive nationalism were also met
with anti-​war discourses and peace initiatives until war finally broke out in
1914 (Hobsbawm, 1989)8. For instance, according to all accounts, orthodox and
revisionists’ alike, Norman Angell is undisputedly one of the leading voices in
ir’s First Debate. However, his masterpiece “The Great Illusion” (2002) was
originally published in 1910 (and later reprinted into new editions with added
chapters, as the one from 1933, the same year in which he was awarded the
Nobel Peace Prize). In his famous book, Angell (1929) dwells against influent
militaristic voices of his time such as the geopolitical ‘classical’ author Halford
Mackinder, whose main oeuvre, “The Geographical Pivot of History”, had been
first released in 1904. Hence, if Sir Norman Angell is considered E.H. Carr’s
main intellectual opponent –​Wilson calls him “Carr’s bête noire” (1998: 2) –​it
seems mandatory to stretch back the First Debate to the discussions already
in place prior to the war. The fact that Rosa Luxemburg was murdered in 1919,
therefore, does not prevent us from considering her works and speeches –​like
the suggestively titled “Peace Utopias”, from 1911 –​as legitimate discursive arti-
facts of ir’s First Great Debate. In fact, it may even help to alleviate some of
the obvious chronological, as well as political, misconceptions found in main-
stream depictions of it.
Secondly, another controversy raised by revisionists revolves around the
boundaries between strictly speaking academic debates per se versus the social
and political debates surrounding academic life. According to Wilson, “mix-
ing these things up has certainly led to a lot of confusion” (2012: 12). He criti-
cizes Andreas Osiander’s ‘alternative narrative’ of ir’s First Debate precisely
on these grounds, accusing him of reconstructing the dichotomy of “idealism/​
utopianism vs. realism in this broad sense, whose protagonists include Paine,
Kant and Cobden on the one side, and Pufendorf, Burke, von Gentz on the

8 As Luxemburg herself says, “as early as the 1880s a strong tendency toward colonial expan-
sion became apparent”, so that “[t]‌he events that bore the present war did not begin in July
1914 but reach back for decades” (1970b: 281, 306).
82  Borba de Sá

other” (2012: 7). However, Wilson himself is forced to admit that the frontier
between the ‘discipline’ of ir, narrowly defined, and the broader ‘field’ of inter-
national thought is difficult to sustain, as he himself notes that “if the notion
of a great debate between idealism and realism is to make any sense it has to
be acknowledged that this was, as mentioned above, a broader public debate”.
He goes on to stress that those “diverse discourses of inter-​war thinking were
conducted among a remarkably diverse group of interlocutors –​publicists,
peace campaigners, journalists, politicians, public servants, and the occasional
academic” (2012: 15).
Hence, instead of trying to reify an ontology that separates the domain of
disciplinary discussion from the broader societal life to which it is but a part
of, it seems more appropriate to perceive the ‘historical contingency of con-
temporary notions of academic purpose’ and accept that today’s academicist
self-​isolation from the public sphere was not yet dominant at the beginning of
the previous century:

The authors writing in the pre-​and interwar eras adopted a relatively

integrated approach to the wider inspirations and implications of their
work that differs greatly from the theoretical aspirations that dominate
more recent contributions to ir scholarship.
quirk and vigneswaran, 2005: 106

Or, as Wilson himself notes:

The UK conversation was a broad public one. There were insufficient

academic posts, departments, and journals in the field of ir more for-
mally defined (…) In brief, ir was insufficiently institutionalized (…)
While journals such as the Round Table and International Affairs existed,
from 1910 and 1922 respectively, it is significant that until the 1950s and
1960s the vast majority of contributors to them were not professional
students of international relations –​not in the sense of personnel who
“self-​consciously and institutionally thought of themselves” of contribut-
ing to the professional study of international relations.
wilson, 2012: 10–​11

Therefore, one cannot exclude Marxist contributions to those same topics of

discussion using the pretexts of: (i) lack of membership to ir academic depart-
ments; (ii) speaking to broader audiences than ir students; or (ii) because of
too much political involvement –​as those criteria would automatically exclude
most voices (if not all) traditionally accepted as leading participants in the
‘War against War’ 83

so-​called First Great Debate. Therefore, Rosa Luxemburg writings, either aca-
demic or pamphleteering, her passionate speeches against the war, and, above
all, her incommensurable body of reflection on the questions of the complex-
ity of international politics in an imperialist era should not, on such grounds,
be withdrawn from the ‘debate about the first debate’. Much to the contrary,
they may serve to illuminate some of the blind spots, or misperceptions, of
current accounts, including revisionist ones. And, most importantly, they can
underscore the necessity of opening up the intellectual, as well as the politi-
cal, horizons of thinking about great powers conflicts not only in the past but
also nowadays when severe international crises make it a daunting necessity
once again.
As it will be shown in the following sections, ignoring Marxist (especially
Luxemburg’s) alerts about the dangers of militarism, capitalism and imperial-
ism led to catastrophic consequences that were not restricted to the working
classes from the belligerent countries (killing themselves at the trenches), or
to their political organizations, either national or international (that collapsed
after the decision to support the war), but to humanity as such. Breaking the
taboo against radical voices in ir is as necessary now as it was a hundred years
ago, when the so-​called First Debate allegedly occurred. And, just like then,
now it is not simply an academic matter. The fact that Luxemburg was assassi-
nated because of her unlawful and insistent participation on such discussions
should speak for itself: she not only gave her life to it, but also found her pre-
mature death, at the age of 47, precisely because she passionately interfered in
what came to be known in ir as the ‘First Great Debate’.

3 Rosa Luxemburg as a Realist

The only agreement to be found within the cacophony around the notion of a
First Debate is that E.H. Carr’s masterpiece “Twenty Years Crisis”, published in
1939, is the unquestionable inaugurator of the idealist-​realist dichotomy during
ir’s ‘infancy’, as he depicted the stage of the discipline back then (2001: 1). To be
sure, Carr’s point was that the overcoming of this premature phase, marked by
excessive utopianism, would be accomplished by the necessary arrival of real-
ist attitudes, even though he dedicates a whole chapter to inform his readers –​
insisting to the point of exhaustion –​that neither “method of approach” alone
could satisfy the requirements of a mature ‘science of international politics’
(2001: 11–​22). Whoever reads Carr instead of just mentioning him without due
care (which is common in ir, sadly) will immediately notice that his attack on
utopianism is meant to correct a specific, momentaneous, and geographically
84  Borba de Sá

bounded situation in which excessive Liberal-​international utopianism was

making sensible policymaking impossible. Hence, his self-​imposed task was
to introduce greater doses of realism in order to restore political, as well as
intellectual equilibrium, so that decisionmakers could get it right this time.9
Carr (2001) was particularly worried (irritated, one could say) with Liberal
projects following the World War i, which revealed a profound lack of under-
standing about the causes of the last war and, thus, a dangerous incapacity
to prevent or, at least, mitigate the extension of the next one. According to
him, proposals such as the ones crystalized in Woodrow Wilson’s notorious
‘Fourteen Points’ and other influential channels related to world governance
(collective security, a League of Nations, the abolition of secret diplomacy,
freedom of navigation and of commerce, arbitration of international conflicts
and the right of nations to self-​determination, among others) were but mis-
guided attempts to shape the world as one would like it to be, ignoring, none-
theless, the harsh realities of how it actually was. Therein lays the utopianism,
or idealism, described in much of his criticisms of Liberal internationalist reci-
pes for ordering international relations peacefully: in its total negligence of the
‘factor of power’ in either domestic or international politics (Carr, 2001: vii).
Interestingly, a great deal of those same points had already been made
years earlier by Rosa Luxemburg, among other Marxists, in the context of
the escalation towards the war. Unlike Carr, whose audience was the Anglo-​
American foreign-​ policy establishment, Luxemburg’s language is overtly
Marxist, even though the content of her analysis, as well as good part of her
central concepts and discursive tropes, are very similar to ir’s foundational
realism during the so-​called ‘First Debate’.10 In an article called “Peace Utopias”
[1911], for instance, those concepts emerge already in the title, but do not stop
there. Luxemburg wants to stress the “differences in principle” between “bour-
geois peace enthusiasts” and socialist-​oriented11 pacifism, which should be

9 It was sent to press in July 1939, shortly before hostilities begun. He dedicates the book ‘To
the Makers of the Coming Peace’.
10 One should notice that the internal history of Marxism shows the notion that an initial
phase marked by ‘utopian socialism’ (Fourier, Proudhon, Owen, Saint-​Simon) occupies
a central role in the evolving character of socialist struggles. Just like in ir theory, this
infancy had to be supplanted (or corrected) by realist approaches, thus inaugurating ‘sci-
entific socialism’, so the story goes. It’s possible (indeed even likely!) that Carr took this
notion from Marxist internal debates, given his profound knowledge and taste for such
discussions. He precisely mentions this example right at his first chapter (2001: 7–​8). See,
also: Engels (1908).
11 It should be noticed that until the collapse of the Second International many socialist,
communist and/​or Marxist-​oriented individuals and organizations called themselves
social-​democrats, like in Germany, or in Russia.
‘War against War’ 85

viewed as “diametrically opposed” and in “mutual opposition” to one another

(1970a: 250). She dismisses the good intentions of “[b]‌ourgeois friends of
peace” who “invent all sorts of ‘practical’ projects for restraining militarism”
as some sort of “diplomatic make-​believe” (1970a: 251). To her, those are clear
demonstrations of the “impracticability” of arriving at a lasting peace in a
world divided by “international politics of spheres of influence” and “colo-
nial predatory campaigns” (1970a: 251). In other words (sometimes the same
words), the same ‘power factor’ that Carr would lament the absence a few years
later. “A little order and peace is, therefore, just as impossible, just as much a
petty bourgeois utopia, with regard to the capitalist world market as to capital-
ist world politics”, she says.
Additionally, she considers, already before the war, that since “[m]‌ilita-
rism is closely linked with colonial politics, tariff politics, international poli-
tics” (1970a: 251), good doses of realism are always to be welcomed amid those
waves of idealist-​Liberal projects for peace. And just like Carr, Luxemburg
warns against excessive utopianism quite straightforwardly. One should notice
that such a stance is of foremost importance to her, not simply an occasional
linguistic coincidence. The realist lexicon is part and parcel of her mindset,
being one of the cornerstones of her analytical formulations:

The utopianism of the standpoint which expects an era of peace and

retrenchment of militarism in the present social order is plainly revealed
in the fact that it is having to recourse to project making. For it is typical
of utopian strivings that, in order to demonstrate their practicability, they
hatch ‘practical’ recipes with the greatest possible details.
luxemburg, 1970a: 254

The coincidence with Carr’s formulations on the same matter are striking,
notably when he discusses the ‘visionary schemes’ of this ‘utopian stage of the
political sciences’:

During this stage, the investigators will pay little attention to existing
‘facts’ or to the analysis of cause and effect, but will devote themselves
whole-​heartedly to the elaboration of visionary projects for the attain-
ment of the ends which they have in view –​projects whose simplicity
and perfection give them an easy and universal appeal (…) Schemes elab-
orated in this spirit would not, of course, work.
carr, 2001: 5–​7
86  Borba de Sá

In later interventions, already during the war, she comes back to that same
point. The famous “Junius Pamphlet” [1915], written from one of the prisons
where she was held captive for anti-​war agitation, tackles precisely the same
political issues that would constitute the central controversies of ir’s First
Debate12:

All demands for complete or gradual disarmament, for the abolition of

secret diplomacy, for the dissolution of the great powers into smaller
entities, and all other similar propositions, are absolutely utopian so long
as capitalist class-​rule remains in power (…) The proletarian movement
cannot reconquer the place it deserves by means of utopian advice and
projects for weakening, taming or quelling imperialism within capitalism
by means of partial reforms.
1970b: 324 –​emphasis added13

As an appendix to this pamphlet, by the end of the same year Luxemburg for-
mulates her “Theses on the Tasks of International Social Democracy” [1915],
where she reiterates that:

World peace cannot be assured by projects utopian or, at bottom, reac-

tionary, such as tribunals of arbitration by capitalist diplomats, diplo-
matic ‘disarmament’ conventions, ‘the freedom of the seas’, abolition
of the right to maritime arrest, ‘the United States of Europe’, a ‘customs
union for central Europe’, buffer states, and other illusions.
1970c: 329

The equivalence of utopianism, usually directed at the future, and ‘reaction-

ary’ projects, which refers to the past, is understandable in face of her Marxist
philosophy of history which, again, reveals a strong similarity with Carr’s cri-
tique of the ‘golden age’ utopia of those who wanted to resuscitate the Liberal
international order from the nineteenth century under twentieth century

12 The pamphlet was written in early 1915, but only released a year later due to the difficul-
ties imposed by censorship in war times. The use of the pseudonym “Junius”, who signs
the document, reflects such hardships. The original intention was to deliver it as a contri-
bution to the Zimmerwald Conference, that brought together socialist cadres from differ-
ent countries who opposed the war, in September 1915. Lenin immediately considered it
“a splendid Marxist work”, ignoring the authorship though (Lenin, 1970a: 429).
13 In that same text, she also criticized the “utopian disregard for the class struggle”, at both
the domestic and international levels, shown by her social-​democrat colleagues from the
party’s leadership (1970b: 296).
‘War against War’ 87

conditions (Carr, 2001: 224). In a lesser-​known text called “Slavery” [1907], writ-
ten for the classes she taught at the German Social Democratic Party’s (spd)
internal political school, she clearly expresses this conception when referring
to a certain “utopian demand to turn back the wheel of history” (Luxemburg,
2004a: 117).14
That same motto was to be found also at another well-​known work, “The
National Question” [1909], part of Marxist internal ‘Great Debates’ that she had
with Lenin and others. While Luxemburg was highly wary about the ideolog-
ical dangers of nationalism for proletarian class struggles in a broad sense,15
other eminent Marxists felt it was important to support national liberation
movements in Europe (against Russian and Austro-​Hungary empires) and else-
where –​to which she agreed as long as such aspirations were kept separated
from the bourgeois cry for the ‘right of self-​determination’, a romantic ideal
highly deleterious to the political education of the masses, according to her
views on the matter.16 In order to make her point, she appeals to the authority
of Karl Marx himself and the “sober realism, alien to all sentimentalism, with
which Marx examined the national question” (Luxemburg, 1909: 9). According
to her interpretation, “Marx treated the Czech question”, for instance, “with no
less political realism” (1909: 10).

14 Her realist conclusion is almost sarcastic, when she states that “without slavery there
wouldn’t be socialism”, by which she meant a succession of exploitative and oppressive
modes of production was, unfortunately, necessary to arrive at a classless society in the
coming future (Luxemburg, 2004a: 122 –​italics on the original).
15 “The immediate mission of socialism is the spiritual liberation of the proletariat from
the tutelage of the bourgeoisie, which expresses itself through the influence of nation-
alist ideology”, she says, also referring to this mission as her “supreme goal” (Luxemburg,
1970c: 331) In several occasions, she would cry against the “chauvinistic intoxication of the
masses”, amid similar formulations (1970b: 318).
16 “Capitalist politicians, in whose eyes the rulers of the people and the ruling classes are the
nation, can honestly speak of the ‘right of national self-​determination’ in connection with
such colonial empire. To the socialist, no nation is free whose national existence is based
upon the enslavement of another people, for him colonial peoples, too, are human beings,
and, as such, part of the national state. International socialism recognizes the right of free
independent nations, with equal rights. But socialism alone can create such nations, can
bring self-​determination of their peoples” (Luxemburg, 1970b: 304–​305). Interestingly,
both Lenin and Trotsky felt the need to reiterate their divergences with Luxemburg on
this matter even when they wrote their respective eulogies of her work and life-​example
as a true revolutionary. However, such internal Marxist disputes are not the object of the
present chapter, not the least because they tend to be exaggerated for short-​term political
gains, thus distorting a reality in which Marxist arguments are, grosso modo, very similar,
especially from an outsider’s point of view, such as the ir student’s one.
88  Borba de Sá

Such applause for realist gestures, as well as critiques of utopian standpoints,

are to be found in many other texts and passages throughout her reflections
concerning international issues. On several occasions she insists that interna-
tional relations are made of ‘world political antagonisms’, especially during the
epochs of capitalism and imperialism. In those times, she argues that

a mere reckoning with facts, to refuse to realize that these facts give rise
to anything rather than a mitigation of the international conflicts, of any
sort of disposition toward world peace, is willfully to close one’s eyes.
luxemburg, 1970a:253

Hence, the bare facts alone show that for fifteen years hardly a year has
gone without some war activity (…) Where do they show any tendency
toward peace, toward disarmament, toward the settlement of conflicts
by arbitration?
1970a: 252

Once again, the contraposition of facts (emphasized in italics by herself) ver-

sus ‘self-​deceptions’ is a longstanding theme in her political interventions that
resonates a lot with Carr’s applause for realism, because “it places emphasis on
the acceptance of facts and on the analysis of their causes and consequences”
(Carr, 2001:10). Usually focused more on working-​class politics than in world
politics alone, that same theme nonetheless occupies Luxemburg’s attention
since her early days, being already present, for instance, in her intervention at
the Hannover Congress of the Second International [1899], when she criticizes
those revisionist factions who wanted to arrive at socialism peacefully, avoid-
ing class struggle. A proposition devoid of “historical basis in facts”, thus con-
stituting a dangerous “illusion” for the proletariat: “In its struggle, the working
class, has no greater enemy than its own illusions” (1971a: 47–​49).
Twenty-​years later, that same warning is repeated amid the revolution-
ary upheaval of 1918–​1919, when she wrote “Our Program and the Political
Situation” [1919] and “What Does the Spartacus League Want?” [1919], two of
her last written contributions before she was killed by a right-​wing, counter-​
revolutionary death squad, the Frëie Korps.17 She again warns about ‘illusions

17 The Frëie Korps were illegal paramilitary commandos formed by former soldiers coming
back from the war fronts, together with policemen, and other repressive forces personnel
that were called upon (by the newly installed spd government after the proclamation of
the republic) to do the dirty work against left-​wing leaders and proletarian masses during
the revolutionary upheaval of 1918–​1919 in Germany.
‘War against War’ 89

on all-​sides’ within the German left, including in her newly formed German
Communist Party (kpd). After stating that the question of violence depends
on their adversaries, not upon abstract principles, she calls for the “arming of
the people and disarming of the ruling classes” in order to bring about the
“dictatorship of the proletariat and therefore true democracy” (2004e: 353). If
the “fight for socialism is the mightiest civil war in world history”, she says, then
“the violence of the bourgeois counterrevolution must be confronted with the
revolutionary violence of the proletariat” (2004e: 353).18 Realism is welcomed;
utopianism, with regards to the peaceful character of social transformation,
is not.19
The association of such revolutionary attitudes with what came to be known
as ir’s realist tradition has indeed deeper connections, as shown by her usage
of realism’s twin concepts of ‘international anarchy’ and ‘balance of power’,
both of which are repeatedly mobilized during Luxemburg’s reflections. To
the former, a particular Marxist redefinition (or substance) is given, locating
the roots of international anarchy in capitalism itself, whereas the latter is fre-
quently used in precisely the same manner as ir realists do. Hence the “world
political anarchy”, in the political and military sense, is “but the reverse side of
the anarchic system of production of capitalism” (Luxemburg, 1970a: 252). She
goes on to say that

only those who believe in the mitigation and blunting of class antago-
nisms, and in the checking of the economic anarchy of capitalism, can
believe in the possibility of these international conflicts allowing them-
selves to be slackened, to be mitigated and wiped out.
1970a: 252

Such class of believers can be found in the realm of those ‘bourgeois friends
of peace’ previously mentioned, which include Liberal-​idealist critics of
imperialism rightfully considered participants of ir’s First Debate, such as
John Hobson or Norman Angell, both of whom imagined that reforms within
capitalism were not only possible, but the necessary step to prevent imperial

18 That is, the traditional realist acknowledgement of that which Max Weber would call
ethics of responsibility, summarized in the famous reply by Martin Luther to Emperor
Charles v, transformed by Rosa in her personal ‘watchword’ during the war: “Here I stand,
I can’t do otherwise”, as stated more than once in her prison letters (2004h: 387–​8).
19 Notably, one of the last chapters from Carr’s masterpiece is intitled “Peaceful Change”
(2001: 208–​223).
90  Borba de Sá

expansions.20 By the same token, Luxemburg also accuses the members of her
own party (who voted in favor of the war credits at the infamous Reichstag
session of August 4th, 1914) of trying to “save the capitalist state from its own
anarchy” by offering a truce in class struggle during the war, the so-​called “civil
peace” (1970b: 300). Such claims are not occasional ones, as she had been devel-
oping this line of thought for many years already. For instance, in her second
address to the Stuttgart Congress of the Second International [1898], she says
that “no medicinal herbs can grow in the dirt of capitalist society which can
help cure capitalist anarchy” (1971a: 42). In a nutshell, in Luxemburg’s mind
we already lived in what Hedley Bull (1977) would later call an “Anarchical
Society”; not only at the international level, but at any level in which the “anar-
chy of capitalist rule” takes place (Luxemburg, 1971a: 42).
Likewise, when it comes to the realist notion of a ‘balance of power’, one can
find significant similarities between Luxemburg’s and ir realist approaches.
Not only the concept is employed several times throughout her oeuvre, like in
the “Junius Pamphlet” [1915] or even in her personal correspondence, with the
same meaning as in ir, but she also develops a line of thought that could easily
have been defended by the likes of Carr, Morgenthau, Waltz or Mearsheimer,
when she states, quoting veteran Marxist Ferdinand Lassalle, that “[t]‌he true
constitution of any country consists not in its written constitution, but in its
real balance of power” (1971a: 42). Then she develops the point in a truly realist
manner, albeit restricted to the domestic level, even though the connection
with militarism turns the international dimension unescapable. To be sure, her
formulation is almost neo-​realist, if we consider the centrality given to ‘mate-
rial capabilities’, in the Waltzian sense, on her statements:

Constitutional freedoms, if they are to have any permanent worth, must

be won through struggle, not through agreements. But what the capi-
talist state would get by an agreement with us has a firm, brutal reality.
The cannon and soldiers to which we would agree will shift the objective
material balance of power against us.
1971a: 42

20 While they share a negative view of monopolistic distortions of competition and free-​
trade, Hobson is much more critical of the role of finance in imperialism, whereas Angell
is an ardent apologist of capital markets, being the inventor of the “Money Game”, des-
tined to educate young children into the world of finance. See, for instance, his book
about “The Story of Money” (1929), ironically released in the same year of Wall Street’s
infamous crash.
‘War against War’ 91

Hence, it is possible to realize the extent to which Realists’ insistence on the

importance of the ‘power factor’ in politics, whether national or international,
can also be found in Rosa Luxemburg’s formulations since the early days of her
political and intellectual trajectory in Germany,21 when she devoted most of
her energies to confront Edward Bernstein’s reformism (also called ‘revision-
ism’ or, simply, ‘opportunism’).22 Unlike the revisionist thesis that obliviates
the necessity of seizing the state from the ruling classes, thus relying on the
expansion of social reforms made by parliamentary decisions, Luxemburg
states that “the conquest of political power” away from the bourgeoisie should
be the only goal for socialist movements (1971a: 39). Internationally, just like
ir realists, she refers to the “game of war” in quite perennial terms, saying that
“[t]‌he game is old” and that it is naïve to believe that its causes rely on the
methods used by diplomats, or in the wickedness of particular “captains of
nations”, who, according to her views, “are, in this war, as at all times, merely
chessmen, moved by all-​powerful historic events and forces” (Luxemburg,
1970b: 279).

And if today a number of socialists threaten with horrible destruction the

“secret diplomacy” that has brewed this devilry behind the scenes, they
are ascribing to these poor wretches a magic power they little deserve,
just as the Botokude whips his fetish for the outbreak of a storm.
1970b: 279

Of course, the content (and style) of such critique echoes Carr’s point about
the “agitation against secret treaties, which were attacked”, according to him,
“on insufficient evidence, as one of the causes of the war”, and that such

21 Before arriving in Germany, Luxemburg already had a political career in the Polish Left,
where she enjoyed a revolutionary reputation since her youth (and never ceased to be
one of the Polish party’s head). Her intellectual career also predates her arrival as she
became a PhD in 1897, with a thesis about the “Industrial Development of Poland”, at
the University of Zurich. For biographical notes about this period, see: Schütrumpf
(2008: 11–​14).
22 Arguably, this was the central focus of her attention throughout her lifetime within the
sdp, warning since the end of the nineteenth century about the dangers of opportun-
ism in German social democracy circles. Dangers that would become obvious to many –​
like Lenin –​only in 1914 (See Trotsky, 1970b). But the phenomenon was not restricted to
Germany and Luxemburg also wrote about such tendencies in France in “The Drayfus
Affair and the Millerand Case” [1899], where she criticizes French socialists leaders’ argu-
ments to accept ministerial posts: “The entry of a socialist into a bourgeois government is
not, as it is thought, a partial conquest of the bourgeois state by the socialists, but a partial
conquest of the socialist party by the bourgeois state”, she says (1899: n.p.).
92  Borba de Sá

diplomatic practice, apart from being of little relevance to understand the war,
was not to be blamed on “the wickedness of the governments” (Carr, 2001: 2),
but on the anarchic structure of international politics itself.23 Of course, both
Luxemburg and Carr were very critical of “disarmament trickeries, whether
they are invented in Petersburg, London or Berlin” (Luxemburg 1970a: 254).
However, as she says, from a “materialist conception of history” –​shared by
both –​“things have their own objective logic” and, therefore, it becomes a
“sterile concoction of the brain” to expect that voluntaristic initiatives alone
can either create or avoid wars: to believe that projects like the “United States
of Europe” can bring an “era of permanent peace” and “banish the ghost of
war forever”, as neo-​Kantians and many Liberal idealists still propose until our
days, are deemed naïve, at best; or cynical, at worst (1970a: 255)24.
Epistemologically, then, there are many other instances where we can
find similarities between Luxemburg’s formulations and ir’s realist tradi-
tion, especially if we accept Carr’s association of realism with “determinism”,
and of utopianism with “free will” (2001: 11–​12). In other words, the agent-​
structure dichotomy, in which, for him, “the realist analyzes a pre-​determined
course of development which he is powerless to change” (Carr, 2001:11). Here
Luxemburg’s sides with the realists in countless occasions, usually stressing
the “iron laws of development”, or that “scientific socialism has taught us to
recognize the objective laws of historical development”, and that every event
or personal attitude has “deep, significant, objective causes” explainable by the
“all-​powerful law of historical necessity” (1970b: 268–​9; 2004f: 366). She fre-
quently talks about social processes as having the “inevitability of a natural
law” (1970b: 290) and “objective historic significance” (1970b: 319).
Luxemburg mentions the “vital law” of revolutions with almost positivis-
tic certainty, repeating ad nauseam notions like the “fatality of a natural law”
with regards to the “internal law of life of the revolution” as an epistemological
remedy to the “pseudo-​science” of those utopian reformists who ignore the
“great historical laws of revolution” (2004g: 376). In other words, she clearly
states the opposition between, on the one hand, “the guiding star of scientific

23 Carr sounds almost like Luxemburg when he says that “war lurks in the background of
international politics just as revolution lurks in the background of domestic politics”
(2001: 109).
24 She goes on and, quite realistically, concludes with what we would call today a bold deco-
lonial statement: “Every time that bourgeois politicians have championed the idea of
Europeanism, of the union of European States, it has been with an open or concealed
point directed against the “yellow peril”, the “dark continent”, against the “inferior races”,
in short, it has always been an imperialist abortion” (1970a: 256).
‘War against War’ 93

knowledge”, and, on the other, “utopian undertakings” (1970b: 263). Such an

opposition is precisely the same one that Carr would refer to when he calls
his first chapter “the beginning of a science” (Carr, 2001: 1). For both of them,
thus, science is deemed to be the remedy for the excesses, and dangers, of
utopianism.
And just like Carr, Luxemburg is not inclined to theorize in pure abstract
terms. Both draw their theoretical formulations from concrete political situ-
ations, past or present, virtually all the time. According to Carr, “the utopian
believes purely in the application to practice of certain theoretical truths
evolved out of their inner consciousness by wise and far-​seeing people”
(2001: 13). Liberalism is their common adversary, and he accuses the likes of “Sir
Normal Angell” of living in some sort of a “dream-​world” within which certain
“theoretical facts” are far away from “the world of reality where quite contrary
facts may be observed” (2011a: 12). By the same token, Luxemburg notes that:

A ‘rights of nations’ which is valid for all countries and all times is noth-
ing more than a metaphysical cliché of the type of ‘rights of man’ and
‘rights of the citizen’. Dialectic materialism, which is the basis of scien-
tific socialism, has broken once and for all with this type of ‘eternal’ for-
mula (…) On this basis, scientific socialism has revised the entire store
of democratic clichés and ideological metaphysics inherited from the
bourgeoisie.
1908: np

There would be many other instances in which Luxemburg’s writings and

speeches can be related to ir’s realism, especially of the kind inaugurated by
Carr, as well as with regards to the formulations made by other traditional real-
ists. For instance, there are times in which she criticizes the “politics of acqui-
escence” (1970b: 276) referring to Austria-​Hungary’s appetite for expansion
that anticipate what would later become the question of ‘appeasement’, which
lies at the heart of ir’s First Debate25
Also, the notion of a ‘security dilemma’ as developed by John Herz (1950) –​
full of dialectic reasoning and historical erudition –​resembles very much the
appraisal Luxemburg makes about the automatic propulsion of the arms race
among great powers, which, according to her views on the matter, shows a sort
of impersonal (and tragic) mechanism that drives nations to an ever growing

25 Carr was, indeed, one of the greatest appeasers, it must be remembered, even though the
conventional (American) wisdom later identified appeasement as a weak, coward and,
therefore, idealist policy line.
94  Borba de Sá

spiral of insecurity, in spite of the best efforts to achieve security through mil-
itary capacity-​building26, She also exhibits a quite skeptical prognosis for the
aftermath of the World War i, saying that “every settlement between the mil-
itary powers unavoidably becomes the starting point of fresh new conflicts”
(1970a: 253) and that “imperialism, and its servant militarism, will reappear
after every victory and after every defeat in this war”, no matter which side wins
or loses (1970b: 323).
Yet, the passages recollected here seem already sufficient to demonstrate
Luxemburg’s realism which, in quite straightforward ways, resembles so much
ir’s realist position at the ‘First Great Debate’ to the point of making it possi-
ble to conclude that her contributions, like the ones from other contemporary
Marxist icons27, can be rightfully considered as legitimate participants of ir’s
alleged foundational moment, anticipating in many occasions, avant la lettre,
many realist theses on international politics. Such contributions constitute,
nevertheless, only part of the story, as her works also display important ele-
ments of idealist, or utopian, thinking too, to which we now turn our attention.

4 Rosa Luxemburg’s Idealism: in Theory and in Action

According to Carr, one important feature of utopianism is the tendency to

concentrate attention “almost exclusively on the end to be achieved”, in other
words, “when whishing prevails over thinking, generalization over observa-
tion, and in which little attempt is made at a critical analysis of existing facts
or available means” (2001: 8). The example he gives resonates with some of

26 For Luxemburg’s complex elaborations on the political mechanics of the arms races and
security dilemmas, see, among others: “Militia and Militarism”, in Luxemburg (1971b) and
“The Peace, the Triple Alliance and Us” (2011), originally published in July 1914 (there is a
Portuguese translation available, but not an English one for this text). After mentioning
“arms races”, she says, in the later one, that “the incessant process of military buildup was
not a guarantee of peace, but a seed for war”, because states, “in their blind drift, pro-
voked the reaction of powers that, in a given moment, will grow bigger than themselves,
and will drag them to the whirlwind” by “mechanic means”. True, however, is the limit of
her realism, in ir terms, to which she spears no critique either: “naïve spirits”, she says,
believed that “military alliances” should be the “pilar of the European balance of power
and peace”, but today “even the blind can see that incessant arm races and imperialist bets
took us, with inexorable necessity” to the “abyss of a terrible European war” (Luxemburg,
2011a: 497–​498).
27 Lenin famously dubbed Luxemburg ‘an eagle’: “Eagles my at times fly lower than hens, but
hens can never rise to height of eagles (…) In spite of her mistakes she was –​and remains
for us –​an eagle” (Lenin 1970b: 440).
‘War against War’ 95

the attitudes found on Luxemburg’s trajectory, thus revealing, in First Debate

terms, her idealist side as well. He says:

When President Wilson, on his way to the Peace Conference, was asked by
some of his advisers whether he thought his plan of a League of Nations
would work, he replied briefly: “If it won’t work, it must be made to work”.
carr 2001:8

Quite tellingly, when she writes about the difficulties faced by the German rev-
olution in those same years (1918–​1919), Luxemburg assumes the same utopian
attitude (‘It must!’), just like Wilson in Carr’s example. She states that:

The German revolution has now hit upon the path illuminated by this
star. Step by step, through storm and stress, through battle and torment
and misery and victory, it will reach its goals. It must!
p.345

In that same text, “The Beginning” [1918], she literally praises the “unflagging
idealism of the masses of the people” as a guarantee of victory in the final
struggle, against all the odds and harsh facts they were facing (2004c: 343).
By the same token, in a following article she writes about “the action of the
great massive millions of people, destined to fulfill an historic mission and to
transform historical necessity into reality” (2004d: 352), which is precisely the
theme identified at the core of Idealism by Lucien Ashworth’s (2002) revision-
ist history of ir’s First Great Debate.28 Interestingly, also, is the presence, in
some of the resolutions adopted by the Second International, not only of polit-
ical idealism in general, but of a specific type coming from the same breed as
ir’s utopianism in the First Debate –​namely from the likes of David Mitrany
and other functionalist apologists of international organizations –​when
it comes to the formulation of concrete proposals for peace. Some of them,
like the ones adopted at the London Congress held in 1896, when Luxemburg
probably helped to formulate the draft, ask for: “2nd –​The institution of an
International Arbitration Tribunal, the decisions of which must have force of
law; 3rd –​A definitive decision about war or peace directly by the people, in

28 In that same passage from “What Does The Spartacus League Want?” Luxemburg criti-
cizes the “attempt of a minority to mold the world forcibly according to its ideal” (p.352),
only to reaffirm, nonetheless, her trust in the capacity to precisely perform such task if
minorities are substituted by majorities, thus keeping the voluntaristic assumptions typi-
cal of utopianism intact.
96  Borba de Sá

the case that governments do not accept the Tribunal’s decision” (Luxemburg,
2011a: 489).
Furthermore, notwithstanding her deterministic moments, Luxemburg also
reveals voluntaristic attitudes as well,29 sometimes with a clear tone of sen-
timentalism and wishful thinking, especially when she blames spd leaders’
inertia and cowardice (or outright opportunism) for the current disaster, as
if socialist politicians could have prevented the war or, at least, diminished its
duration, or lethality, if only they had decided to do so. “Peace sentiments”, she
says, “would have spread like wildfire and the popular demand for peace in all
countries would have hastened the end of the slaughter, would have decreased
the number of its victims” (1970b: 318). The same type of optimism that makes
her believe that this could be “the last war”, as repeatedly stated in the “Junius
Pamphlet” (1970b: 266–​268).
Times of war and revolution are indeed prone to euphoria (and despair),
and this may be reflected in the way historical time is conceived as being
shortened, as if ‘great leap forwards’ in collective mentalities became suddenly
possible, or inevitable. In a text called “The Socialization of Society” [1918],
Luxemburg succumbs precisely to such utopian temptations and, in doing so,
places idealism as a central lesson to be learned by revolutionaries:

We do not need, however, to wait perhaps a century or a decade until

such a species of human beings develop. Right now, in the struggle, in
the revolution, the mass of the proletarians learns the necessary idealism
and soon acquire the intellectual maturity.
2004d: 348

Another central feature of the so-​called Idealism from ir’s First Debate is what
John Herz’s (1950) famously called ‘chiliastic’ attitudes, i.e., the belief that a
drastic transformation in humanity’s fate will inaugurate an era of indefinite
peace, prosperity, and happiness, leaving all the troubles behind. He dedicates
a whole section, for instance, to show the reversal of the ‘chiliastic hopes’ held
by the Second and Third Workers’ Internationals, and another one to the ‘gen-
eral idealism’ of what “may be broadly described as pacifism” (1950: 172). In its
religious versions, chiliasm brings the notion of ‘millenarism’ to the forefront,

29 To be sure, much of her writings on the matter tried to sustain a balanced account of the
agent-​structure debate, even if sometimes she pended towards either deterministic or
voluntaristic extremes. In general, though, she followed Marx’s account as developed in
the opening line of the “Eighteen Brumaire”, for instance, when she says: “Mas does not
make history of his volition, but he makes history nevertheless” (Luxemburg, 1970b: 269).
‘War against War’ 97

whereas in its socialist versions the ‘entire new world’ will not be the work of a
Christ returned, but the result of the qualities of the next generation of social-
ist workers themselves.

In enlisting capable fighters for the current revolution, we are also cre-
ating the future socialist workers which a new order requires as its fun-
dament. The working class youth is particularly well-​qualified for these
great tasks. As the future generation they will, indeed, quite certainly,
already constitute the real foundation of the socialist economy. It is
already now its job to demonstrate that it is equal to the great task of
being the bearer of the humanity’s future. An entire old world still needs
overthrowing and an entirely new one needs constructing. But we will do
it young friends, won’t we? We will do it!
2004d: 348

In fact, the notorious slogan by which Luxemburg continues to be reminded

until today –​“Socialism or Barbarism” –​is in itself a great example of chil-
iasm: “Today matters have reached a point at which mankind is faced with
the dilemma: either collapse into anarchy, or salvation through socialism”
(2004f: 364 –​emphasis added). The same is valid for some romanticized
formulations present in texts like “What Does the Spartacus League Want?”,
where she also points to the need of the “highest idealism” in order to build
the road to socialism (2004e: 351). In those occasions, she shows a remarkable
capacity for idealizing a future socialist society for someone who, at the same
time, liked to praise Marx’s sober realism so much. Nevertheless, her idyllic
vision of ‘socialist civic virtues’ renders her analysis quite utopic because, as we
know today, especially after the experience of Stalinism, “stupidity, egotism,
and corruption” can be found in socialist societies as well:

The highest idealism in the interests of the collectivity, the strictest self-​
discipline, the truest public spirit of the masses are the moral founda-
tions of socialist society, just as stupidity, egotism, and corruption are the
moral foundations of capitalist society.
luxemburg 2004e: 35130

30 The same logic is also valid for her best hopes of “[r]‌eplacement of the military cadaver
discipline by voluntary discipline of the soldiers” under socialism (2004e: 354). In “Slavery”
[1907], for example, she concludes the text in a quite chiliastic manner as well: “In the
socialist society”, she says, “knowledge will be the common property of everyone. All
working people will have knowledge” (2004a: 122).
98  Borba de Sá

As Herz (1950) argues, the exaggeration of a given situation is also a chiliastic

feature of idealist thinking, especially when it comes in the form of the pro-
jection of one’s own conditions to different, distant realities, in time and in
space. Luxemburg is full of such hyperboles, especially when she considers the
universal importance of the immediate struggles that she was involved in. In
other words, one can detect a sort of parochialism, typical of idealism accord-
ing to Herz (1950), and often found in universalist discourses. “There is a world
to win and a world to defeat”, she claims regarding the German revolution,
“in this final class struggle in world history for the highest aims of humanity”
(2004e: 357). Again, as we know today, it was not the last struggle. “It is the real-
ization of the ultimate goal of socialism which is on today’s agenda of world
history”, she said (2004c: 345). In fact, world history showed it was not. And she
felt the consequences to the fullest when political defeat came together with
the abrupt end of her own life, a few weeks after publishing these words.
Luxemburg’s last written work, “Order Reigns in Berlin” [1919], also reiter-
ates the wishful thinking mode behind the idealist self-​denial of harsh real-
ities, even when presented in dialectical fashion, “in which the final victory
can be prepared only by a series of ‘defeats’” (2004g: 376). Such line of reason-
ing, which reveals the tension between despair and hope in the most difficult
of the situations, must aggregate a certainty in historical necessities with the
praise of, not surprisingly, ‘idealism’ itself, once again. After saying that “history
leads step by step, to the ultimate victory!”, she concludes with a mixture of
tragedy and optimism typical of utopianism, as identified by Carr (2001) and
others: “Where would we be today without those “defeats” from which we have
drawn historical experience, knowledge, power, idealism!” (2004g: 376). Days
after writing those words, she would meet her ultimate defeat.
There would be many other examples of Luxemburg’s idealist side, either
in her political writings or in her personal letters. Like the one she sent to her
partner and comrade, Polish socialist leader Leo Jogiches, in 1902, where she
vows not to lose her ‘idealism’ during the struggles within the spd, promising
him that she would not “employ methods other than the use of [her] own tal-
ent” (2004h: 384). In such private moments, she would explicitly reveal her
utopian belief in changing the course of history by means of “the power of
ideas” (2004h: 382), as if it was just a matter of “correcting a defect in under-
standing” among the masses, in the words of Carr when referring to Norman
Angell’s utopianism. Such educational hopes –​for example, that “war was sim-
ply a ‘failure of understanding’” and that “with increasing knowledge, enough
people would be rationally convinced of its absurdity to put an end to it” (Carr,
2001: 25–​26) –​resonate with Luxemburg’s hope to end capitalism (and war) by
pedagogical means: “I want to affect people like a clap of a thunder, to inflame
‘War against War’ 99

their minds not by speechifying but with the breadth of my vision, the strength
of my conviction, and the power of my expression” (2004h: 382), she declares31.
Things, however, proved to be more difficult, and Luxemburg’s hopes for
putting the “socialist revolution on an international footing”, or “to shape and
secure the peace by means of [a]‌international brotherhood” of the “world
proletariat” (2004e: 355–​356) never became an enduring reality, even after
workers’ strikes (and soldiers’ mutinies) destroyed the monarchic regime and
sealed Germany’s final defeat in the imperialist war. The failure of this faith,
which is not only hers, must not, therefore, reinforce certain images, or myths,
about ‘Red Rosa’, as Hanna Arendt (1968) wisely adverts us against in an inspir-
ing political biography of Luxemburg: to avoid both the “glamorous image” of
the “legend” who became a “nostalgic symbol” for the New Lefts, on the one
hand, and “the old clichés regarding the quarrelsome woman who was neither
realist nor scientific”, on the other (Arendt, 1968: 36–​38).
In this chapter, this avoidance was sought via recourse to firsthand con-
tact with Luxemburg’s own writings (as opposed to ‘Luxemburguists’ or ‘anti-​
Luxemburguists’ disputes about her legacy32) in order to keep interpreting her
provocative ideas and experiences of struggle from innovative standpoints,
such as seeing Luxemburg as an ir theorist who took part in the discipline’s
First Debate. Ideas and political activity that usually came together and inter-
twined in Luxemburg’s life: one that she lived “between love and anger”, i.e.,
between revolution and war (Schütrumpf, 2008: 9). Her addresses to politi-
cal events, such as the Second International Congresses, or speeches to large
crowds (of 9 thousand people in Hippodromes, for instance), were full of the-
oretical elaboration and pedagogical gestures.
Moreover, in occasions like her “Self-​Defense Speech” [1914] at the Frankfurt
Criminal Court, during a trial against her, Luxemburg takes the opportunity

31 Luxemburg would later change this position when war and revolution became the real
clap of the thunder: “Fortunately, we have gone beyond the days when it was proposed
to ‘educate’ the proletariat socialistically (…) To educate the proletarian masses socialisti-
cally meant to deliver lectures to them, to circulate leaflets and pamphlets among them.
No, the school of the socialist proletariat doesn’t need all this. The workers will learn in
the school of action” (2004f: 372). Herein lies the alleged ‘spontaneity’ theses attributed to
her, usually by detractors.
32 On the issues involving the (mis)appropriations of her legacy within the Left, which is
not our focus here, see Arendt (1968), and the volume edited by Waters (1970), which
contains excellent introductions to the intellectual and political contexts of the uses and
abuses of Luxemburg’s legacy. On this volume, there are, for instance, two insightful arti-
cles by Leon Trotsky, one of them intitled “Hands Off Rosa Luxemburg” [1932] in which he
fiercely replies to Stalin’s defamation campaign against Luxemburg.
100  Borba de Sá

to lecture not only the prosecutor and the judge, but also to teach the audi-
ence some basic notions of socialist international politics. Just a few months
ahead of the war, she must reply to charges of inciting German soldiers, during
a speech, to shoot their own superiors if the conflict started, as it eventually did
in August. She denies the accusation, using an idealistic formula, saying that:

When the majority of the people get convinced that wars are a barbaric
phenomenon, profoundly immoral, reactionary and enemy of the peo-
ple, then wars become impossible –​even if soldiers, in a first moment,
keep obeying the command of their superiors!
2011b: 48533

It is nonetheless in her final, heroic confrontation with the prosecutor, during

the trial, where she shows her best idealism in action. After saying that he
“dared to raise suspicions about [her] personal honor” when he hinted at
the possibility of an escape attempt if convicted, she shouts back to him and
say: “Mister prosecutor, I believe that you would flee. A social democrat does
not flee. He recognizes his actions and laugh at his prison sentences. Now, gen-
tlemen, condemn me!” (Luxemburg, 2011b: 492). Brave idealist words that were
immediately printed, becoming a pamphlet on the very next day, being widely
distributed in the streets of Berlin and other major industrial centers across
Germany.

5 Concluding

Rosa Luxemburg’s mixture of idealism and realism is not necessarily evenly

balanced, and the relative weight of each is not our primary concern here. But
it might as well constitute a topic for further research, just like the pejorative
connotation that she gives to ‘utopianism’, as opposed to the highly valued tone
she dispenses for ‘idealism’. Other fruitful path is to inquire if she tends to be
more realist when it comes to international politics, while retaining idealism
for the domestic realm.34 Our main purpose here was to show that Luxemburg’s

33 There is no full English translation (as far as we know) of this speech. There is a Portuguese
translation (Loureiro 2011), taken from the German original, which we use here, retrans-
lated by the author of this chapter into English.
34 This, of course, is in tune with the line of reasoning developed by R.B.J. Walker (1993) and
Richard Ashley (1988) about the ‘inside/​outside’ dichotomy in ir and the political effects
of the ‘anarchy theses’. If true, this would make her closer to the mainstream, being one
more reason to include her into ir ‘great debates’.
‘War against War’ 101

Marxist approach to world politics can be considered part of ir’s theoretical

toolkit and to encourage a serious engagement of ir students with her original
texts. Hence, this chapter is far from an exhaustive work, being rather a modest
contribution to the growing collaborative effort to take Marxism seriously in
ir, of which this book certainly constitutes an important part.
Idealism and realism are not ir creatures. They are part of a longstanding
tradition of political thinking and action. If they find themselves separated as
opposed beings in ir debates, this is because of the peculiar composition of
this field of studies. And even there, in mainstream ir, such opposition is to be
questioned: the person who allegedly imported such dichotomic tropes to ir –​
E.H. Carr –​unlike the caricatural images of political realism that try to make
us believe otherwise, never took side in this eternal debate precisely because
he advocated for a dialectical synthesis of both. Something that should be the
result of the amalgamation of idealism ‘and’ realism, which is also the posi-
tion of figures such as John Herz, even though he was not at all sympathetic to
Marxism like Carr was.
In fields other than ir, then, this fabricated separation of idealism and real-
ism –​this fictitious, antagonistic debate, or ‘myth’, in the words of ir revision-
ist historians –​is not even rehearsed. The Marxist tradition, for instance, has
always welcomed (one might say it was constituted by) both realism and ideal-
ism simultaneously (Halliday, 1994: 50). If that is a good thing or not; if it leads
to good politics or sound policymaking, that is a different matter (our answer
would be yes, to both). What is certain, at this point, is that such structuring
division of ir’s so-​called First Great Debate also finds itself present, but in the
form of a dialectical totality, in the works of major Marxist thinkers at the his-
torical contexts around the two world wars of the twentieth century.
The example of Rosa Luxemburg demonstrates it clearly. Hence, the attempt
to erase Marxism from the official history of ir since its beginnings must be
confronted: either to correct this important theoretical negligence, thus help-
ing the revisionist effort of bringing more rigor to the story of the First Debate;
or even to improve the quality and impact that ir theorizing can have on poli-
cymaking, especially in our understanding of war and peace, through the incor-
poration of certain dimensions that only Marxists seem to give priority in their
appraisals of international politics, such as the logics of capitalism as system,
the clashes of imperialisms, and class struggles at the global level. A task which
is not easy, even if so necessary in times when nuclear confrontation among
great powers again haunts the world, “when the security dilemma”, as Herz
says, becomes “more clear-​cut than it ever was before”: fears of atomic anni-
hilation inspired him to search for a ‘Realist Idealism’, which is, unfortunately,
“the most difficult of arts” and “the most difficult of sciences” (1950: 179–​180).
102  Borba de Sá

In a situation like this, all help is necessary. Marxism must be truly invited
into the conversations happening in ir theory, since the start, i.e., since the
First Great Debate. Firstly, because it was there already, not only embodied in
one major participant (Carr), but also through the voices of Marxist leaders
and theoreticians, like Rosa Luxemburg, that were debating world politics in
much the same terms, at the same epoch: voices usually unheard in ir text-
books but echoed in every place of their societies back then. Secondly, and
most importantly, because the epistemic community dedicated to the study of
war and peace urgently needs to draw renewed inspiration from the complex
formulations of great minds who devoted their lives to the elaboration of a
political praxis composed by the highest idealism ‘together’ with a profound
sense of realism. Figures like Luxemburg, who must, more than ever, guide
our path, in theory and in practice, into the directions open by another well-​
known aphorism from her: ‘war against war!’. A conclusion that she arrives at
from both idealist and realist reasonings, and that should remain the “guiding
line of practical policy” (1970c: 330) until imperialism prevails in world politics,
as it still does today.

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Smith S (eds.) International Relations Theory: discipline and diversity, 3rd Edition.
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 ­c hapter 6

The Imperialist Chain of the Interstate Relations

Nicos Poulantzas’ Theory on Imperialism

Caio Martins Bugiato1

1 Introduction

The following text is an explanation of the theory on imperialism contained

in the studies of Nicos Poulantzas.2 The author published his main works over
a period of ten years, reinvigorating and strengthening Marxist political the-
ory: “Political power and social classes” in 1968, “Fascism and dictatorship”
in 1970, “Classes in contemporary capitalism” in 1974, “The crisis of dictator-
ships: Greece, Spain, and Portugal” in 1975 and “State, power, socialism” in 1978.
In this text, we first present significant concepts that he elaborated before
his studies on imperialism, such as social formation, social classes and class
struggle, bourgeois state, and power bloc, Second, we extract the theory on
imperialism from his works that address the theme, “Classes in contemporary
capitalism”, in which the author elaborates his theory of imperialism, and “The
Crisis of dictatorships: Greece, Spain, and Portugal”, in which he operational-
izes it, analyzing the overthrow of dictatorial regimes in those countries3
The construction of Poulantzas’s theory on imperialism (1978) begins with
the resumption of other theories on international relations between states and
bourgeoisie in the twentieth-​century capitalism, to which he defers a series
of criticisms. First, Poulantzas criticizes a group of authors, like Paul Sweezy

1 Professor of Political Science and International Relations at the Federal Rural University of
Rio de Janeiro and at the postgraduate program on International Relations of the Federal
University of abc, Brazil. Coordinator of the research group Marxist Studies on International.
Researcher for the Network of Studies in International Relations and Marxism.
2 Originally published in the Brazilian journal “Questio Juris”, vol. 2, n.2, 2014. Original title: A
cadeia imperialista das relações interestatais: a teoria do imperialismo de Nicos Poulantzas.
Translated by Alberto Resende Jr.
3 Some authors maintain that there is a periodization in Poulantzas’ thought, as he would have
passed from his affiliation with the thought of the Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser, a
thought present in “Political Power and Social Classes”, to the field of democratic socialism,
rectifying some theoretical assumptions throughout his intellectual trajectory, concentrated
in “State, power, socialism”. For such periodization, see Codato (2008).

© Caio Martins Bugiato, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_007

106 Bugiato

and Harry Magdoff, named as participants in Karl Kautsky’s updated version of

the ultra-​imperialism. For Poulantzas they underestimate the inter-​imperialist
contradictions based on uneven development: they only see in the imperialist
chain (the group of imperialist states) the delimitation that separates on one
side the imperialist metropolises and on the other the dominated countries
(periphery). This means that there are no conflicts and contradictions in the
central countries of capitalism; they identify the relations of the metropolises
among themselves based on pacification and integration under the domina-
tion of US capital.
The second criticism is directed at two theses that have a common basis,
which states and bourgeoisies are autonomous and independent of each other
at the international level, and the process of internationalization of capital
only reaches the economic level. On the one hand, authors such as Ernest
Mandel, in addition to adopting the same and unique delimitation of the pre-
vious thesis, analyze the inter-​imperialist contradictions as they were in the
past: autonomous and independent states and bourgeoisie in the struggle for
hegemony, disregarding the complex interdependence among them, as if they
were related only on the external plane, considering at best market connec-
tions. However, in a contradictory way, in those international relations, hege-
mony takes place as in the past, with the construction of hegemonic centers
(empires) over dominated and dependent countries. On the other hand, the
analysis of the Western communist parties, particularly the French one, in
which the internationalization of capital affects only the productive forces,
which creates a kind of ‘cosmopolitan capital’ or ‘cosmopolitan capitals’. Thus,
autonomous and independent states and bourgeoisies have an agreement at
the economic level, under the domination of US capital, in which the (cos-
mopolitan) monopolies are assigned to pursuit of high rates of profit. For
Poulantzas, those theorists were unable to apprehend the changes in the impe-
rialist chain, especially the relations among the imperialist metropolises. Let’s
look at the author’s theory then.

2 Conceptual Explanations

Before approaching Poulantzas’ theory of imperialism, it is necessary to explain

the concepts of social formation, social classes and class struggle, bourgeois
state, and power bloc, which are present in this theory. For now, we need to
understand that social formation means the concrete and simultaneous exis-
tence of several modes of production in a given location with a predominance
of one of them. Social formations “are the effective places of existence and
The Imperialist Chain of the Interstate Relations 107

reproduction of modes and forms of production”, “they comprise several modes

of production, in a specific articulation”, and “these modes of production only
exist and reproduce in historically determined social formations” (Poulantzas,
1978: 23–​24). Thus, every social formation, in its predominant base, has an ulti-
mate determination in the economic sphere. In the case of a capitalist social
formation, in general, what prevails are the production relations in which the
workers, deprived of the means of production and ‘free’ to negotiate their labor
power in the market, become wage earners of the bourgeoisie, which, on the
other hand, derives its profits from the extortion of surplus labor.
In a social formation where the capitalist mode of production is dominant,
the functions of the state are related to the levels of economy, ideology, and
politics. At the economic level, the function of the legal system is, in general, to
organize the production process, regulate contracts for the purchase and sale
of labor power, and regulate capitalist exchanges. At the ideological level, the
state establishes norms for education, communication, and information sys-
tems at the national level. Moreover, in politics, the role of the state consists in
maintaining political order in the conflict among classes. Those functions can-
not be seized if they are not inserted in the global political role of the state: the
maintenance of the unity of a social formation within which the domination
of some class(es) over another(s) takes place. In this way, the functions of the
state in the economy and the ideological plane are not technical and/​or neu-
tral but constitute political functions insofar as they aim at maintaining the
unity of the social formation.
Class struggle is present in every social formation, a struggle that funda-
mentally opposes the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. For Poulantzas, “social
classes are a set of social agents determined mainly, but not exclusively, by their
place in the production process, that is, in the economic sphere” (Poulantzas,
1978: 13–​14). Social classes mean conflict, as each pursues its specific interests,
contrary (but not always) to the interests of other classes. A social class is
defined by its set of social practices, that is, by its place in the production pro-
cess, the political actions it takes, and its ideological position. That means that
a set of social agents establishes themselves as a social class to the extent that
its unity crosses the economic, political, and ideological spheres.
Such concepts are necessary for us to understand the state in general. The
state is a cohesion factor of a social formation traversed by class struggle. The
state is the factor of order and regulator of the overall balance of the system,
whose purpose is to maintain the unity of a social formation, its function, and
its reproduction. It reflects the contradictions of social formation, which is the
antagonism among social classes. Ultimately, the state prevents the annihila-
tion of social classes, which means that it prevents the destruction of a social
108 Bugiato

formation (Poulantzas, 1977). Therefore, the definition of a bourgeois (or capi-

talist) state is based on a type of state that organizes a particular mode of class
domination and on a state that corresponds4 to capitalist production relations
(Saes, 1985). Let us see.
The bourgeois state, the core of the juridical-​political structure of the cap-
italist mode of production, is conceptually an articulated system of four ele-
ments: bourgeois (or capitalist) law, bureaucratism, the isolation effect, and
the representation of unity effect. Bourgeois law,5 legal values that regulate
and frame the economic practices and social relations conditioned by it, con-
sists of attributing to all production agents, regardless of the place they occupy
in the production process, the condition of ‘equal’ and ‘free’ individual sub-
jects, capable of lawfully performing acts of will. Bureaucratism6 (bureaucratic
values) determines that a) all production agents, regardless of their place in
the production process, have formal access to the practices that regulate and
frame the economic practices and social relations conditioned by them (uni-
versal access to the state bureaucracy) and that b) the agents of such practices

4 The term correspondence is in opposition to the economicist and mechanistic way that con-
siders the formation and organization of the capitalist state as a reflection of the dominance
of capitalist production relations in a social formation. Correspondence does not consist
of a one-​to-​one causal relationship. A particular type of state corresponds to a particular
type of production relations “to the extent that only a specific legal-​political structure makes
the reproduction of production relations possible” (Saes, 1985: 26). Only the bourgeois state
makes possible the reproduction of capitalist production relations (Saes, 1985).
5 We may consider the law as a “set of rules (written or not) that discipline and regularize the
relations between production agents […] in order to enable their reiteration” (Saes, 1985: 36)
and that “it also establishes predictability in the relationships between agents and, therefore,
also creates the possibility of repetition” (Saes, 1985: 36). Saes (1985) lists the components
of bourgeois law: the law, a system of norms imposed on production agents –​constitution,
codes, etc., and the law enforcement process, the implementation of its imposing character.
Both are part of a material and human organization, the judiciary, which creates the condi-
tions for the reproduction of capitalist production relations.
6 Bourgeois bureaucratism is the particular way of organizing the set of material and human
resources of the bourgeois type of state. The elements of this set are the armed forces and the
collecting forces (agents that collect various taxes destined for the maintenance and func-
tioning of the state). In this way, bourgeois bureaucratism is the particular way in which the
bourgeois state organizes the armed forces and the collecting forces. It is not restricted to the
armed forces and collectors; it encompasses other branches of the state apparatus such as
administration and the judiciary. According to Saes (1985), bureaucratism derives from two
fundamental norms: a) “the non-​monopolization of State tasks –​armed forces and collecting
forces –​by the exploiting class or the non-​prohibition of access to these tasks by members
of the exploited class” (Saes, 1985: 39) and b) “hierarchization of the state’s tasks according
to the criterion of competence, that is, the level of knowledge required of those willing to
perform them” (Saes, 1985: 39).
The Imperialist Chain of the Interstate Relations 109

are hierarchical, so that this scaling does not appear as subordination, but for-
mally as a gradation of individual competences required by the different tasks
of this social activity (Saes, 1998).
Capitalist bureaucratic values constitute the expression and deployment,
on a more restricted level, of capitalist legal values; one is the condition of
existence of the other, forming a unit. If, on the one hand, law defines produc-
tion agents as ‘free’ and ‘equal’ individuals, they all have the right to claim the
performance of bureaucratic practices. On the other hand, the hierarchization
of agents in charge of carrying out bureaucratic practices (non-​prohibition of
access to these tasks to members of the exploited class) is formalized through
the criterion of individual competence for the performance of tasks. These ele-
ments conceptually allow for the unity of the capitalist political-​legal structure
(Saes, 1998).
According to Poulantzas (1977), this political-​ legal structure produces
political-​ideological effects on production agents: the isolation effect and
the representation of unity effect. Capitalist legal values combine with the
economic structure (which atomizes the collective of direct producers) and
produce the isolation or individualization effect. That consists in the regular
reproduction of capitalist production relations by a) encouraging the eco-
nomic practice of seeking by its own will (and not by extra-​economic coer-
cion) the individualized sale of labor force to an individual owner of the means
of production and b) preventing the emergence of political practice through
which workers take a collective stand against the owner of the means of pro-
duction. Bureaucratic values, by converting the agents in charge of regulating
and framing economic practices and social relations conditioned by them
into a ‘universalist’, and ‘competent’ bureaucracy, allow such a group to ideo-
logically unify all agents. They, already individualized by the isolation effect,
then constitute a symbolic community: the ‘nation people’ composed of all
production agents inserted in a given territory. This process, linked to the iso-
lation effect, is qualified as the representation of unit effect. That contributes
to the reproduction of capitalist production relations insofar as it frustrates
the constitution of antagonistic social groups (social classes) by bringing them
together in the ‘nation-​people’ represented in a state of supposed universal
access, the nation-​state.
The Marxist tradition follows the statement by Marx and Engles, in the
“Communist Manifesto”, according to which the modern state is the executive
committee of the common business of the entire bourgeois class, to conceive
the bourgeois State as the representation of the domination of class. A ques-
tion arises here: if the state tends to isolate people as individuals and reunite
them as a ‘nation people’, how does the bourgeoisie (that also suffer the effects
110 Bugiato

of isolation and unity) manage to take over the state to fulfill their interests
and become the ruling class? According to Poulantzas, the function of the state
as a maintainer of the unity of a capitalist social formation is the fundamental
objective of the bourgeoisie: maintenance of existing social relations. Moreover,
in order to achieve this, the conservation of the State is essential. This practice
of the bourgeoisie of conservation of social relations is what gives unity to the
class. In addition, its ideological operation, which “consists in the fact of trying
to impose, on society as a whole, a ‘way of life’ through which the state will
be lived as representative of the ‘general interest’ of society, as holder of the
keys to the universal in the face of ‘private individuals’” (Poulantzas, 1977: 209),
constitutes it as a social force. The bourgeois state “does not directly represent
the economic interests of the dominant classes, but their political interests: it
is the center of the political power of the ruling classes insofar as it is the orga-
nizing factor of their political struggle” (Poulantzas, 1977: 185). Ensuring class
domination is part of the role of the state, as the state as an institution does not
have its power. It is worth noting that power, for Poulantzas, is the ability of a
social class or fraction to carry out its specific interests.
The author elucidates the complex relationship between the ruling class, its
fractions, and the bourgeois State by the concept of the power bloc. The power
bloc is the contradictory unit of the fractions of the bourgeois class around
general objectives –​referring to the maintenance of capitalist production rela-
tions –​a unit that does not eliminate the particular objectives of each fraction.
The power bloc is not an explicit political agreement but a community of inter-
ests of the owners of the social means of production. Its unity is guaranteed by
the common interest of the fractions to directly or indirectly govern the State,
making it meet their general interests (the maintenance of private ownership
of the means of production and the reproduction of the labor force as a com-
modity) and specific to each fraction. The state is, therefore, a factor in the
political unity of the power bloc (Poulantzas, 1977).
In the power bloc articulation, there is a tendency towards the formation of a
hegemonic core composed of one (or more) fractions, the hegemonic fraction.
Hegemony is conquered through the ability of a fraction to make its particu-
lar interests prevail within the power bloc, as the fraction can obtain priority
benefits, mainly from the state’s economic policy (that is, other state policies,
such as social and foreign policy, are also relevant)7. State policies (especially

7 Two illuminating observations. First, the economic preponderance of one fraction over the
others is not an indicator of hegemony. That is, it does not mean that a greater share in the
profits of global surplus value that determines hegemony. Economic policy must be a priv-
ileged criterion for detecting hegemony within the power bloc. The process of formulating
The Imperialist Chain of the Interstate Relations 111

economic policy) provoke the constitution of fractions and, at the same time,
indicate their position within the bloc. The relationship between the bour-
geois state and the fractions take place in the sense of its political unity under
the aegis of one (or more) hegemonic fraction.8 As we have already said, the
class or fraction that holds power, as the State does not have its own power.

3 The Theory on Imperialism

Once those concepts are known, we already have enough elements to under-
stand how Poulantzas deals with relations among (bourgeois) States. For
Poulantzas (1978), the capitalist mode of production (cmp) is characterized
by the concomitant double tendency of reproduction in a social formation,
where other modes of production are consolidated and dominated, and of
extension to abroad. The second, caused by the tendency of the rate of profit
to fall, is marked predominantly by the export of capital concerning the export
of goods. Poulantzas –​agreeing with Vladimir Lenin (1991) –​calls imperialism
this tendency of capital towards abroad, in which the export of capital pre-
dominates and its destination is the exploitation of other social formations.
The capitalist state system, the set of social formations in which the capitalist
mode of production prevails, suffers from an unequal development of the pro-
ductive forces and production relations. That means that different countries
have different ‘degrees’ of development of the capitalist mode of production
in their territory, resulting in a delimitation of the current between imperial-
ist metropolises –​autochthonous centers of capital accumulation/​‘advanced
capitalism’ –​and dominated and dependent social formations (ddsf) –​exter-
nally dependent accumulation process /​‘backward capitalism’.

an economic policy means that the particular interests of a fraction are satisfied to the det-
riment of others. Thus, such a process is a field of struggle where issues of class interests are
decided, and its result reflects the power relations between the ruling fractions (Perissinoto,
1994). Second, a class fraction that is not preponderant in the economic sphere can conquer
political hegemony, which serves to leverage its new economic preponderance. However, in
the medium and long term, the trend is the correspondence between political hegemony
and economic preponderance. “It is when a policy anticipating economic preponderance
becomes a policy of adaptation to this prevalence” (Farias, 2010: 31).
8 For Poulantzas, hegemony has two fields of action: within the power bloc among the frac-
tions of the bourgeoisie and from the power bloc to the dominated classes, a process ana-
lyzed by Antonio Gramsci in which the way of life and the interests of the ruling class are
rooted in the thinking of the dominated classes.
112 Bugiato

Imperialism, according to the author, can be distinguished in phases. First,

the transition from competitive capitalism to monopoly capitalism, that
goes from the end of the nineteenth century to the interwar period, in which
monopolies were formed in the metropolises and there was a balance between
the form of export of goods and the form of export of capital. Second, the con-
solidation phase of the imperialist stage (after the 1929 crisis), in which the
metropolises monopoly capitalism dominates competitive capitalism. In those
two phases, the ddsf went from simple conditions of a colonial and commer-
cial capitalist type (export of agricultural products) to conditions in which the
cmp prevails, in unequal ‘degrees’ and obviously lagging behind the metropo-
lises. The dominance of the cmp did not extinguish the other modes and forms
of production but progressively eliminated the old dichotomy of metropolis/​
city/​industry versus dominated formations/​countryside/​agriculture, giving
rise to the so-​called underdevelopment or peripheral industrialization.

It is no longer about social constructions of relatively external relations.

The process of imperialist domination and dependence now appears as
the reproduction, within the dominated social formations and in specific
forms for each of them, of the relationship of domination that links it to
the imperialist metropolises.
poulantzas, 1978: 469

During these two phases, regarding the relationship between the imperialist
metropolises, the inter-​imperialist contradictions provoked the alternating
predominance of one metropolis over the other (Great Britain, the United
States, Germany), a predominance based on the domination and exploitation
that each one imposes on its ddsf ‘empire’10 and on the pace of capitalist

9 Poulantzas continues: “A social formation is dominated and dependent when the articu-
lation of its own economic, political and ideological structure expresses constitutive and
asymmetrical relations, with one or several social formations that occupy, concerning
the first, a situation of power” (Poulantzas, 1978: 47). One issue only mentioned by the
author is that such asymmetrical relations have repercussions on class relations and the
state apparatus of the dominated formation, reproducing the forms of domination of
the class(es) in power in the dominant social formation. That is, those forms of domina-
tion correspond to forms of exploitation of the popular masses in an indirect way (when
the foreign bourgeoisie exploits through the local bourgeoisie) or directly (when the for-
eign bourgeoisie directly exploits local workers). A similar question was raised by Ruy
Mauro Marini when he dealt in his studies, among them “Dialectic of dependency” (1973),
with the overexploitation of labor in dependent countries in Latin America.
10 Gerson Moura, in his book “Autonomy in dependency” (1980), refers to such empires as
systems of power.
The Imperialist Chain of the Interstate Relations 113

development within the metropolis itself. Third, after the end of World War ii,
what Poulantzas calls the current phase, which retains the characteristics of
the consolidation phase, emphasizing the dominance of the cmp in the ddsf
not simply from the outside, but rather through its dominance within the lat-
ter, where the mode of production in the metropolises is reproduced in a spe-
cific way. Reproduction that provokes in those formations the accommodation
of capital in forms of light industry and inferior technology, the exploitation of
the labor force mainly through low wages –​maintaining its low qualification –​
reserving qualified work for the central countries, the existence of sectors iso-
lated with high concentrations of capital and labor productivity and a high
degree of expatriation of profits (Poulantzas, 1976). That process the author
calls internalized and induced reproduction, which affects economic, political
(including State apparatuses), and ideological relations.
This uneven development does not constitute for Poulantzas a remnant of
impurity in the cmp due to its combination with other modes of production: it
is the constitutive form of the reproduction of capitalism on a world scale in
the imperialist stage, in its relations with other social formations that contain
other modes of production. This internationalization of the cmp, or its current
phase for the author, tending to cover all corners of the world, is not an inte-
gration of social formations but the internalized and induced reproduction of
the cmp of the metropolises in the ddsf.
The current phase (for Poulantzas) of the international division of labor –​
imperialist metropolises versus ddsf –​introduces another new line of demar-
cation. A demarcation in the inter-​imperialist field: on one side, the hegemonic
metropolis, the United States, and on the other, the imperialist metropolises
of Europe. The relationship between both is marked by the predominance of
US monopoly capital and its internalized and induced reproduction within
other metropolises, equally reproducing US imperialism’s political and ideo-
logical conditions. This dependency relationship, however, is not identical to
that between metropolises and ddsf, as metropolises continue to constitute
autochthonous centers of capital accumulation.
Poulantzas (1978) identifies elements of this new demarcation under the
hegemony of US capital, modified by the tendency of the rate of profit to fall.
1) The growth of the global volume of US investments in the post-​war period
created a gap between this country and the other metropolises. 2) The priv-
ileged destination of the US capital is no longer the peripheral formations
but the European metropolises. 3) These investments are mostly direct (in
fixed capital and/​or that tend to take control of companies) to the detriment
of portfolio investment (purchase of short-​term financial/​stock exchange
operations) and, in comparison with the formations’ peripheral regions, the
114 Bugiato

reinvestment of profits in the region is significantly greater. 4) Most US invest-

ment in Europe is in the manufacturing industry (productive capital) to the
detriment of the extractive industry (raw materials) and the service and trade
sectors, while European direct investment in the US is mostly in the service
sector. 5) US investments in Europe come from branches of high concentra-
tion and centralization of capital (monopoly) and go towards branches of
strong concentration. US productive capital imposes the concentration of
the European productive capital; the branches invested are those with more
advanced technology and rapid expansion, that is, with high productivity and
intensive exploitation of labor due to the high organic composition of capi-
tal11. 6) The export of US capital to Europe also includes the concentration of
money capital, large banks, and financial holdings, which does not mean that
the accumulation of capital and its rate of profit is determined by the valuation
D –​D’, but this goes along with investments in the cycle of productive capital.12
All those elements converge towards one objective: a high exploitation rate
to counterbalance the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Therein lies the
motive for the induced and internalized reproduction of monopoly capital in
external social formations.
In short, the current phase of imperialism for Poulantzas is composed of
the internationalization of the capital process described above (in which the
US is not the only exporter of capital) and the international socialization of
labor processes. This in general means, the constitution, under single owner-
ship, of effective complex production units closely articulated and integrated
with labor processes, whose various establishments are distributed in sev-
eral countries. The empirical synthesis of these elements is the transnational
industrial companies, which, in addition to dominating production, dominate

11 Poulantzas explain the shift of US investments to Europe as a process of dislocation of

exploration. “This shift is itself a function of the main character of monopoly concen-
tration: the rise in the organic composition of capital, that is, the increase in constant
capital concerning variable capital (wage costs), and the decrease in living labor about
‘dead labor’ (embodied in the means of labor). This high organic capital composition,
inversely proportional to the rate of profit, is where the current trend toward technolog-
ical innovations is inscribed. But labor always remains the basis of surplus value: this is
what explains the current tendency towards an increase in the rate of exploitation due to
the main deviation from intensive exploitation of labor, directly linked to the productiv-
ity of the worker (relative surplus value)” (Poulantzas, 1978: 68).
12 Poulantzas differentiates banking capital, capital in the form of money, which cor-
responds to a stage of the production process in which banks operate mainly and can
become a class fraction, from finance capital, which is not a fraction of capital like the
others, but a joint process and the mode of functioning of several capitals gathered in
search of valorization.
The Imperialist Chain of the Interstate Relations 115

international exchanges since trade among units (especially located in metrop-

olises) accounts for a high percentage of world trade.
Before entering into the political relations of imperialism (because so far,
we have addressed economic relations), it is necessary to reaffirm, then, that
the international division of labor in the state system has two dynamics (inter-
twined): on the one hand, imperialist metropolis-​d dsf relations and on the
other the metropolis-​metropolis relations. Each one presents a distinct form
of exploitation. The exploitation of the popular masses in the ddsf by the rul-
ing class of the metropolis takes place primarily indirectly (through the local
ruling class) and secondarily directly (foreign capital invested in its interior).
In the metropolis-​metropolis relationship, the direct form is the main one and
the indirect one secondary13 (Poulantzas, 1978). Therefore, we can say that for
Poulantzas, there is an international system of bourgeois states divided into
metropolises and ddsf, in which imperialism is the relationship (capital is,
above all, a social relationship, as Marx demonstrates in “The Capital”) that
takes place many times (but not always) among them, through the internal-
ized and induced reproduction of the mpc. Imperialism is nothing friendly,
to use the author’s words, it is a power relationship in which the state plays a
decisive role. Let us go to them.
Once defined the concepts of the bourgeois state, social classes, and power
bloc, let us deal with the bourgeoisie. The bourgeoisie is a class endowed with
complex heterogeneity. Its economic cleavages are given by the cycle of capital
reproduction (commercial, industrial, banking capital, etc.), by the concen-
tration and centralization of capital (large and medium and monopolist and
non-​monopolist), by relations with imperialism (national, inner and compra-
dor bourgeoisie), among other aspects, as well as the political and ideological
dimensions that can generate the formation of a certain class fraction. These
cleavages can combine in varied and dynamic ways and as a basis for the agglu-
tination or political division of fractions. Whether or not such cleavages favor
the formation of bourgeois fractions depends on the circumstances and the
reaction of these sectors of the bourgeoisie, mainly in the face of the state’s
economic policy.

13 An example that clarifies such relationships can be found in dependent industrialization.

In this process, the peripheral bourgeoisie acquires machinery and equipment (outdated
for the central countries) from abroad, needing, in addition to the high-​profit rate, to pay
interest and amortization. Hence, the high intensity of labor exploitation related to the
exploitation of the local bourgeoisie and the condition of dependence on the central
bourgeoisie. In the case of the metropolis-​metropolis relationship, foreign capital is pres-
ent within the social formation, directly exploiting workers.
116 Bugiato

In this text, we are particularly interested in the relations between the

bourgeoisie and imperialism. According to Poulantzas (1976 and 1978), the
fractions of this class are distinguished into the comprador bourgeoisie,
the national bourgeoisie, and the inner bourgeoisie. The comprador bourgeoi-
sie is the fraction whose interests are directly subordinated to those of foreign
capital, which serves as a direct intermediary for the implantation and repro-
duction of foreign capital within a social formation. The interference of for-
eign capital “can only, in general, play a decisive role in the various dependent
countries […] by articulating, in those countries, with internal power relations”
(Poulantzas, 1976: 20). This fraction does not have its accumulation base and
generally has its activity linked to land ownership (ddsf) and speculation,
concentrated in financial, banking, and commercial sectors, but equally able
to operate in industrial branches, in those wholly subordinated and dependent
on foreign capital. From the political-​ideological point of view, it is the support
and agent of imperialist capital. The national bourgeoisie is an autochthonous
fraction, which has its own accumulation base within the social formation and
political-​ideological autonomy vis-​à-​vis imperialist capital. At certain junc-
tures, in alliance with the dominated classes, this faction can adopt an anti-​
imperialist stance and/​or get involved in a national liberation struggle. The
inner bourgeoisie occupies an intermediate position between the comprador
bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, presenting contradictions with for-
eign capital. It has its own accumulation base, thus trying to limit the presence
of foreign capital in the domestic market, but at the same time, it is dependent
on this capital in areas such as investment and technology.14

The inner bourgeoisie, on the contrary, despite being dependent on for-

eign capital, presents contradictions concerning it. Firstly, because it
feels frustrated at sharing the pie of exploitation of the masses: the leo-
nine transfer of surplus value is carried out to its detriment and in favor
of foreign capital and its agents, the comprador bourgeoisie. Secondly,
because concentrated, mainly in the industrial sector, it is interested
in industrial development (…) and in state intervention that guaran-
tees some domains within the country and that would make it more
competitive in the face of foreign capital. It wants the expansion and
development of the internal market through a small increase in the
purchasing power and consumption of the masses, which would offer

14 Poulantzas formulates the concept of the inner bourgeoisie because, according to him,
the old dichotomy between the national bourgeoisie and the comprador bourgeoisie does
not explain the movement of bourgeois fractions in the current phase of imperialism.
The Imperialist Chain of the Interstate Relations 117

it more outlets. Finally, it seeks help from the State, which would allow
them to develop exports.
poulantzas, 1976: 36–​37

The emergence of this fraction is linked to the induced and interiorized repro-
duction of the capitalist relations in the various social formations –​both
peripheral and central –​being dependent on the internationalization processes
of capital under the aegis of foreign capital. Such dependence, among other
factors, explains its political-​ideological weakness and its consequent impossi-
bility of exercising long-​term hegemony over the power bloc.
Rejecting the theses about the process of suppression that the national
States would be suffering,15 Poulantzas (1978) affirm that the states, central
and peripheral, that are in charge of the interests of capital (through public
subsidies, tax exemptions, industrial policy favorable to certain interests, etc.)
either in the metropolis-​metropolis relationship or in the metropolis-​d dsf
relationship. The national state intervenes in the struggle between classes and
class fractions, organizing hegemony and hierarchy in the power bloc. Thus,
the power bloc cannot be apprehended on a purely national level but rather
in a complex international system of bourgeois states in which each state is in
charge of the interests of ‘national’ and foreign capital in a social formation,
organizing the intra-​bourgeois correlation of forces and constituting a certain
configuration in the power bloc. In this configuration, the hegemonic fraction
has its interests primarily served by state policies to the detriment of other
fractions. The State is both an arena and an actor and not an instrument that
can be manipulated at the will of the ruling class. It is an arena of struggle
among fractions of the bourgeoisie, in which one (or a group) of them assumes
the condition of hegemonic power. Thus, in its foreign relations, the State is
an actor in international politics and in the universal reproduction of capital,
that represents primarily the interests of the hegemonic fraction of its power
bloc.16

15 On this debate, see Bugiato (2011).

16 Poulantzas briefly comments on the ideological conditions (ideas, practices, habits,
modes, rituals) of the induced and interiorized reproduction of imperialism, saying that
the extension of metropolitan ideological forms in the ddsf has as its main characteris-
tic a profound disarticulation of ‘original ideological sectors’ provoking a false image of
a dualistic society (advanced versus backward). While in non-​hegemonic metropolises,
such an extension affects practices and modes related to production (knowledge), creat-
ing an image of only economic backwardness (Poulantzas, 1978). The author also makes
quick comments on the problem that the unequal development of the countries of the
118 Bugiato

4 Conclusion

From the historical point of view, Poulantzas’ theory of imperialism has a

high explanatory power on the development of capitalism in the post-​war
period. As for the relations between the metropolises, the author identifies
the consolidation of the United States as the hegemonic State in the capitalist
world and clarifies that their relations with the European States were not at
all friendly concerning the ruling classes and class fractions. The role that the
US capital played in the reconstruction of Europe fulfilled essential functions
for the states and bourgeoisie of the old continent, such as the development
and dynamization of capital accumulation, building the dynamic axis of world
capitalist accumulation in the post-​war period (USA-​Europe). In addition, the
preservation of Europeans in the capitalist world, given the polarization of the
Cold War, however generating friction among the class fractions more and less
likely to accept the interference of foreign capital interests. Regarding the rela-
tions between metropolises and the ddsf, peripheral countries such as Latin
America bargained their industrialization processes with imperialist capital,
preserving the dependency relations (not in the same format) established since
the colony. In the case of Brazil, after 1930, governments negotiated national
industrialization mainly with US capital, which in the post-​war period was
interested in its economic and strategic-​military objectives in Europe. In the
so-​called developmental period (1930–​1985), the Brazilian big bourgeoisie was
divided into ‘deliverers’, those who claimed ample participation of imperial-
ist capital in national industrialization, and ‘nationalists’, those who defended
a more autonomous development of Brazilian capitalism. The Brazilian big
bourgeoisie was never national (in Poulantzas’ terms), given that the Brazilian
economy was born subordinate to the external market and its modernization
process was always associated with imperialism in its different phases. What
was at stake in Brazil was the degree of that association, a game played on the
front line between the comprador bourgeoisie and the inner bourgeoisie.
In the imperialism theory, Poulantzas anticipates a debate that emerged in
the 1990s. The so-​called globalization led intellectuals of different theoretical
shades to decree the decline or end of the national state since its sovereignty
and authority would be victims of the irreversible triumph of the global mar-
ket; people, goods, investments, services, knowledge, technology, information
would circulate freely in a world economy without borders, destroying the

imperialist chain entails, such as rural exodus, urban concentration, unemployment and
marginality, and social tensions intensified by immigration (Poulantzas, 1976).
The Imperialist Chain of the Interstate Relations 119

traditional forms and functions of the state. Poulantzas (1976 and 1978), ana-
lyzing the internationalization of capital in the 1970s, finds that this process
does not suppress and does not undermine national States, either in terms of
the triumph of the global market or in terms of the formation of a suprana-
tional state on the rubble of old institutions. On the contrary, the States are the
nodes of the internationalization process and privileged targets of the struggles
among the fractions of the bourgeoisie, for they are responsible for incorporat-
ing or rejecting the interests of imperialist capital within the social formation,
just as they are responsible for representing the interests of the power bloc at
the international level. The state’s legal-​political structure, which celebrates
international agreements and treaties, allows the export of capital and goods,
defines exchange rates, interest, customs taxes, and the protectionist policy
in general, and resolves commercial disputes in international organizations,
among other prerogatives.
Lastly, Poulantzas’ contribution to the study of International Relations is
expressive. Fred Halliday, in “Rethinking International Relations” (2002),
wrote that those who do not want to talk about capitalism should not debate
international relations; and that (Marxist) imperialism rarely had a foothold
in this area. Poulantzas places capitalism as a central structure in the analy-
sis of the international system and imperialism as a fundamental concept for
understanding international relations. Furthermore, his theoretical instru-
ments contribute to alternatives in the study of international relations, given
that it differs from the dominant theories in the field (which rarely touch on
the issue of capitalism and imperialism), providing a more complex theory
related to the interaction between social classes, state and international pol-
itics and remains relevant to the current reality and its transformation. “It is
evident that a country’s dependence on imperialism can only be broken by a
national liberation process […] that includes a process of transition to social-
ism” (Poulantzas, 1976: 18).

References

Bugiato C (2011) Declinio do Estado-​nação? Unpublished dissertation of masters.

University of Campinas, Campinas.
Codato A (2008) Poulantzas, o Estado e a revolução. Revista Crítica Marxista. São
Paulo: Editora Unesp, v. 27, p. 65–​85.
Farias F (2010) Estado e classes dominantes no Brasil (1930–​1964). Unpublished doc-
toral thesis. University of Campinas. Campinas.
120 Bugiato

Halliday F (2002) Rethinking International Relations. Vancouver: Univ of British

Columbia Pr.
Lenin V (1991) O imperialismo: fase superior do capitalismo. São Paulo: Global.
Marini R (1973) Dialectica de la dependencia. México, DF: Era.
Moura G (1980) Autonomia na dependência. Rio de Janeiro: Nova Fronteira.
Perissinotto R (1994) Classes dominantes e hegemonia na República Velha.
Campinas: Editora da Unicamp.
Poulantzas N (1976), Nicos. A crise das ditaduras. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1976.
Poulantzas N (1978) As classes sociais no capitalismo de hoje. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar.
Poulantzas N (1977) Poder político e classes sociais. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1977.
Saes D (1985) A formação do Estado burguês no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e terra.
Saes D (1998) A questão da autonomia relativa do Estado em Poulantzas. Crítica
Marxista, n. 7.
 ­c hapter 7

Hegemonic Struggle and Populism

Agonistic Solutions to the Identity Challenge

Mayra Goulart da Silva1

1 Introduction

The object of this chapter is the concepts of Hegemonic Struggle and Populism
presented in the works of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau, which will be
analyzed from the hypothesis that both formulations mark a turning point in
theory and praxis that goes beyond the limits of traditional Marxism.2 Thus,
after substantiating this argument through a brief genealogy of the concepts,
three axiological developments of this movement will be pointed out.
The first development concerns the conceptual framework established in
“Hegemony and Socialist Strategy” (hss) which, although written twenty years
before the publication of “On Populist Reason” (pr), offers us an interesting
theoretical instrument for understanding the political goals of the Laclaunian
recovery of the concept of populism. These purposes result in the creation of a
category capable of positively framing the new leaderships that were ascend-
ing electorally in Latin America at the beginning of the 21st century. With this,
Laclau uses his own reflection as a tool of the hegemonic struggle waged in the
region, reconciling theory and praxis in one movement.
The second development, in turn, aims to frame this new meaning of the
concept of ‘hegemonic struggle’, as a synthesis of antipodal theoretical formu-
lations that aim to deal with the question of the general will and, consequently,
the emergence of political identities, overcoming the gap created by the implo-
sion of metaphysical foundations that supported the belief of the proletariat
as a universal subject.
The third development, finally, concerns this new way of conceiving the
process of identity formation in which subjects are presented without any allu-
sion to transcendent contents, identities or essences, being understood, there-
fore, as a product of a particular historical and linguistic context, ephemeral

1 Professor of Political Science at Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (ufrj).

2 Article originally published in the Brazilian journal “Revista Sul-​Americana de Ciência
Política”, vol. 4, n. 1, 2018. Translated into English by the author.

© Mayra Goulart da Silva, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_008

122  da Silva

and unstable by definition. In this dynamic of production of immanent iden-

tities, populism emerges as a particularly efficient operator for questioning
the ‘status quo’, which would allow us to view it as a ‘counter-​hegemonic’ tool
understood as an effort to break with the political structures committed to a
global economic system defined by the oppression of the lower classes. In view
of this, my goal will be to outline the risks of such association, since the pos-
sible (but not necessary) connections between populism and Caesarism can
drain the emancipatory potential of the movements engaged in the hegemonic
struggle.

2 Populism and Hegemonic Struggle in Latin America: Theory and

Praxis in the Work of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau

Polysemic, controversial and cliché, the concept of populism can be used as

a marker of the turns that Latin American political thought and praxis have
taken. This compass function, which is able to lead the interested observer
through the labyrinthine paths of political history of this subcontinent, results
from the sensitivity of the concept to mood swings in the region, but also from
the recurrence of some of its themes such as personalism, multiclass and the
weakness of liberal institutions. In particular, such recurrence is associated
with a structure in which civil society has little room for the exercise of auton-
omy, given the excessive concentration of economic resources and, conse-
quently, political power, in the hands of local leaders lacking national projects
subsequent to the maintenance of their power.
Given this, political elites who aim to implement a programmatic agenda
at the national level depend on the regimentation capacity of these two ele-
ments, whose interests are mostly antagonistic. Throughout history, however,
the combination between the two has often occurred in inversely proportional
terms, that is, the more support from the elites, the less the need to dispute the
support of the people, and vice versa. In this way, when they take the second
option, seeking political support in popularity among ordinary citizens to the
detriment of traditional elites, these political actors are typified as ‘populists’.
Nevertheless, if we look at one of the axiological origins of the concept in
this subcontinent, it is clear that the term was used as a kind of negative film
in which Marxists and liberals3 developed their impressions of nationalist

3 Among the countless possible references, I highlight as an example of Marxist criticism of

populism the contributions of Weffort (1968) and Cardoso and Faletto (1969). Among the
liberals, in turn, I highlight O’Donnell (1972) and Pereira ( 1991).
Hegemonic Struggle and Populism 123

governments. Stimulated by the opportunities created in times of war, this type

of national-​developmentalism is disseminated trough Latin America, assum-
ing several facets, such as the Argentine Juan Domingo Perón (1946–​1955 and
1973–​1974); the Chilean Carlos Ibañez del Campo (1927–​1931 and 1952–​1958);
the Brazilian Getúlio Vargas (1930–​1945 and 1951–​1954) the Mexican Lázaro
Cárdenas (1934–​1940); the Peruvian Fernando Bealúnde Terry (1963–​1968 and
1980–​1985); and the Ecuadorian José María Velasco Ibarra (1934–​1935, 1944–​
1947, 1952–​1956, 1960–​1961 and 1968–​1972)4
In this negative film, the picture of this period is revealed by its absences.
In the case of Marxists, the multiclass character of these movements is high-
lighted and denounced as a lack of class consciousness. In the case of liberals,
the complaint revolves around the absence of an autonomous and enterpris-
ing civil society.
Until the beginning of the twenty-​first century, ‘populism’ spread in Latin
American political vocabulary as a negative category used to denounce gov-
ernments that manipulated workers and co-​opted economic actors, blocking
the understanding of their interests and the achievement of their ‘true’ pur-
poses. Ultimately, Marxists and liberals united in an understanding of the state
and its operators as obstacles to the free action of those who would be respon-
sible for progress.
The interpretations that in some way attribute or see in the State the role
of operator of the transition between this traditional arrangement and mod-
ern industrial societies do not present themselves as a middle ground or as a
third way between the two currents presented above, but as an essentially dis-
tinct perspective. This is the case of the reformist interpretation, presented by
authors such as Gino Germani, Octavio Ianni and Torcuato Di Tella (1973) who
see an intermediate strategy between fascism and the bourgeois revolution in
the class alliances articulated by ‘populist’ discourses.
With this, these leaders would have been able to overcome the limits
determined by the landowner and agro-​exporter mentalities of traditional
oligarchies, achieving, to a greater or lesser extent, the strengthening of the
domestic market and the promotion of a protectionist trade and exchange pol-
icy, aimed at stimulating industrialization through the substitution of imports
(Dorbussch and Edwards, 1991; Sachs, 1989).
However, even if they are closer in economic terms and more distant from
Marxist and liberal readings, this sociology of modernization assumes dif-
ferent positions in the face of the political developments of the nationalist

4 For a more complete historiography I suggest: Ianni (1975) and Vilas (2004).
124  da Silva

regimes in question, which are identified either as decidedly authoritarian, as

in Germani’s interpretation, or as Di Tella (1965) considered, as the ‘possible
democracy’ under those circumstances (Mitre, 2008).
Advancing in time, it can be observed that, in the 1980s and 1990s, the con-
troversy about the political developments of populism loses space for a set of
considerations that focus on its economic effects, characterized as a ‘cursed
legacy’ bequeathed by national-​developmentalist governments (Dornbush and
Edwards, 1991; Faucher, Ducatenzeiler and Rea, 1993; Kaufman and Stallings,
1991). As expressions of the neoliberal ideology hegemony, understood as the
Washington Consensus, these approaches criticize exactly what was consid-
ered the main legacy of populism: the national-​developmentalist modernizing
strategies. From this perspective, these options would have resulted only in a
precarious industrialization, the indebtedness of the State and the creation of
a parasitic bourgeoisie.
Economic populism becomes, then, an expression used to typify expansive
monetary and fiscal policies, supported by the cyclical availability of interna-
tional reserves and exchange rates overvaluation. The result of these policies,
in the short term, would be associated with a hyperbolic rise in inflation and,
in the long term, debt crisis. In addition, when attempting to mitigate the infla-
tionary process, these governments sometimes resorted to import subsidies,
accentuating the dynamics of indebtedness and capital flight (Weyland, 2001).
The debt crisis –​which erupts in different Latin American countries during
the 1980s and 1990s –​is, therefore, the result of a vicious cycle of currency
devaluations, decrease of worker’s purchase power, and government and
investment revenues on the one hand, and, on the other, the reduction of eco-
nomic production and the increase in unemployment (Pereira, 1991).
Faced with the imminence of a collapse of their economic systems, a con-
sensus was formed among national elites, creditors and international actors
around the implementation of stabilization measures based on the contain-
ment of fiscal spending and the freezing of wages. In this context, a group of
leaders committed –​in more or less explicitly way –​to this agenda, that was
developed through readjustment programs implemented with the assistance
of the International Monetary Fund appears on the Latin American political
horizon. The main examples of the period are Carlos Menem, in Argentina
(1989–​ 1999), Fernando Collor de Mello, in Brazil (1990–​92) and Alberto
Fujimori, in Peru (1990–​2000).
However, observing their political trajectory, it is possible to notice that,
although critical of national-​developmentalism, these characters gather a
series of political attributes that bring them closer to classical populism, such
as personalism, criticism of instances of traditional representation and the
Hegemonic Struggle and Populism 125

concentration of powers in the Executive. In common with the past populism,

these new leaders present rhetoric aimed at the common citizen, as opposed
to the ‘elites’. This category, however, is resignified to encompass other actors,
in particular those who represented the basis of national-​developmentalist
populism, that is, the formal workers and the national bourgeoisie, organized,
respectively, in trade unions and employers’ entities (Schneider, 1991)
In its neoliberal phase, populist discourses are directed to a social base
that is enlarged by orthodox reforms: the unemployed, informal workers, the
excluded, the oppressed and the poor in general. In their speech acts, how-
ever, these subjects are presented in an antagonistic relationship that ignores
the impact of neoliberalism, emphasizing the privileges granted by national-​
developmentalism to the elites associated with it. Still, due to their scope, these
categories find adherence in a panorama that is marked by profound changes
in the labor market, in addition to being able to aggregate a multitude of indi-
viduals who have gone through poverty and unemployment, whose hopes are
placed on the economic recovery to be achieved through these adjustments
(Weyland, 1996).
It is from the frustration of these expectations that the most recent turn
in the concept of populism, propitiated by the dissatisfaction with the results
achieved through the neoliberal agenda and with the leaders committed to it
(Vilas, 2004). This feeling translates, at the dawn of the 21st century, into a situ-
ation of serious economic and political crisis which culminates in the electoral
victory of actors who represented a change of direction.5 It is in this context
that the object of this work arises: the Laclaunian concept of populism.

3 Hegemonic Struggle and Populism in the 21st Century: Theory

and Praxis

Shared by portions of the middle class and the popular classes, which were
particularly affected by the deleterious consequences of neoliberal onslaughts,
the rejection of austerity discourses manifested itself in different degrees. In

5 In 2000, two years after Hugo Chávez’s victory in Venezuela, Ricardo Lagos, of the Socialist
Party of Chile, was elected. In 2002, it was Lula’s turn, followed by Néstor Kirchner who was
elected president of Argentina in 2003. A year later, Tabaré Vázquez, of the Broad Front, wins
in Uruguay. In 2005, it was the turn of Evo Morales, from the Movement to Socialism. The
following year, the Ecuadorian Rafael Correa of the pais Alliance, was elected president, also
defeating traditional political leaders. Finally, in 2008, Fernando Lugo, in Paraguay, won an
unprecedented victory over the Colorado Party, which was in power for more than 60 years.
126  da Silva

some countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, it assumed a spectrum

of singular radicalism (La Torre, 2013), in others, however, such dissatisfaction
did not acquire similar features, with the idea of change being supported by
commitments to the traditional elites, especially those identified with finan-
cial capital. In these cases, notably Brazil and Chile, the reversal of some aus-
terity policies and the adoption of income transfer programs were the result of
bargaining dynamics established at the level of civil society and in its represen-
tative bodies (Lanzaro, 2007).
Inserted in the logic described in the previous section, the greater the dis-
tance from the interests of the elites, the greater the dependence on popu-
lar support and, therefore, the more strongly these leaders are identified with
the concept of populism. However, although it has maintained its main ele-
ments –​such as the popular base, personalism and the concentration of pow-
ers of the Executive –​it is in this context that the category undergoes its most
radical transformation, operated by the reformulation carried out by Ernesto
Laclau, in pr.
As we wish to argue through this brief historiography about the changes of
the concept in Latin America, for the first time, the term loses its pejorative
feature, assuming a perspective that presents itself as descriptive, although it
assumes a cryptonormative function. This second characteristic is associated
with the author’s political purposes in the context of the hegemonic strug-
gle waged in the region by a new political elite, which came to power in the
21st century. With this goal, the category was redefined to typify these new
actors, highlighting their main common elements: the recovery of a national-​
developmentalist ideal, discursively constructed by the rejection of the neo-
liberal agenda, and, above all, by the polarization of society between the
oppressed and the oppressors.
However, although it is possible to detect in the populism of the past the
configuration of antagonistic borders, in their new phase they are distin-
guished by an identity dimension, which is revealed in the intention to recog-
nize6 actors who have remained in a position of invisibility and subalternity
throughout history. In this new sense, the populist leader does not guide or
lead the people, he represents them because he is part of them, since he shares
their identity (Arditi, 2005).
According to the argument elaborated here, the Gramscian concept of hege-
mony, recovered in hss, may be indicative of Laclau’s purpose of reformulating

6 The concept of recognition and its relation to the ‘counter-​hegemonic’ proposal analyzed
here is briefly addressed in the next section. However, I hope to look more closely at the issue
in a forthcoming text.
Hegemonic Struggle and Populism 127

the concept of populism, stripping it of its negative features in order to allow

it to act as an instrument in the political struggle waged by the leaders typified
therein. Thus, it is possible to imagine a connection between the two works,
seeking in the first (hss) the key to the understanding of the second (pr), in
order to shed light on the reasons that lead the author to reformulate the con-
cept of populism, draining it of its negativity.
In “On Populist Reason” (2005), Ernesto Laclau takes on the difficult task of
explaining how some social agents can ‘totalize’ the set of experiences that sur-
round them, being able to represent these experiences before the subjects who
share them. From this perspective, the unity of the group does not admit to
being reduced to a simple aggregation of social demands, which can, of course,
be crystallized in sedimented social practices. Aggregation at the political level
presupposes, on the contrary, an essential asymmetry between the commu-
nity as a whole (the ‘populus’) and its constitutive parts, the governed or the
oppressed (‘plebs’) depending on the characterization. The unity, therefore,
depends on a process of catachresis, in which one of the parts identifies itself
with the whole (Laclau, 2005). Because it is incapable of being apprehended
per si, given its abstract and amorphous nature, this dynamic is essential to
the whole (‘populus’) becoming, firstly, understandable and, then, a political
subject capable of acting.
Thus, Laclau clarifies that the aggregation of demands in a chain of equiva-
lence presupposes an essential asymmetry between the community as a whole
and its constituent parts, and this unity depends on a process of catachresis, in
which one of the parts identifies itself with the whole (Laclau, 2005). The logic
of this operation is what the author calls ‘populist reason’7.
Populism is defined as a form of identification that considers the concept
of popular sovereignty its inevitable corollary. From this perspective, the ‘pop-
ulist reason’ would be the mechanism of constitution of a popular identity,
through the affirmation of a group that sees itself as a fragile link in a relation-
ship of antagonism with the established order. In pragmatic terms, this makes
the category particularly useful to account for movements that invoke the
name of the people in an opposition to the ‘status quo’. Hence its affinity with
‘counter-​hegemony’, which, as will be argued in the last section of this article,
is mitigated by a ‘Caesarist drift’, inherent in the theory of representation that
structures this category and reduces its emancipatory potential.

7 In the author’s words: “it is in this contamination of the unity of the populus by the partiality
of the ‘plebs’ that the peculiarity of the people as a political subject and historical actor lies.
the logic of its construction is what I have called ‘populist reason’” (Laclau, 2005: 224).
128  da Silva

This argument, consequently, will not be built from elements exogenous to

the author’s theorization, finding support in one of his most important works,
“Hegemony and Socialist Strategy” (hss), published in 1985, in partnership
with Chantal Mouffe. In the book, we can notice the configuration of a post-​
foundationalist horizon characterized by the implosion of the metaphysical
foundations that supported the idea of a universal subject. In this context, the
‘counter-​hegemonic’ struggle, outlined by the authors as a project of radical
democracy, depends on an artificial and contingent articulation between the
different collective subjects, each one bearing a demand not met by the cur-
rent order (Silva, 2013).
Twenty years later, Laclau presents the populist leader as the preferred cat-
alyst for this dynamic. In the words of the authors in a passage in which they
address the problem of the articulation of ‘counter-​hegemonic’ political sub-
jects in a context marked by the plurality of demands and social identities:

One of its central principles is the need to create a chain of equivalence

between the various democratic struggles against different forms of sub-
ordination. We argue that the struggles against sexism, racism, sexual dis-
crimination and environmental protection need to be articulated with
those of workers in a new hegemonic left-​wing project. To put it into the
terminology that has recently become fashionable, we insist that the left
needs to address issues of “redistribution” and “recognition”. This is what
we mean by “radical and plural democracy ”.
laclau and mouffe, 1985: 17

Seeing the leaderships that emerged at the end of the twentieth century as an
alternative to the formation of a ‘counter-​hegemonic’ political subject, Laclau
makes a risky choice, whose risks will be explored in the last section of this
work. Instead of focusing their approach on ‘absences’, as Marxists and liberals
have done in the past –​denouncing in populism the lack of class conscious-
ness or the removal of the canons of liberal democracy –​the author focuses on
their qualities, which relate to the inclusive character of these governments, to
the implementation of a distributive economic agenda and to a greater open-
ness to popular participation.
In this effort, Laclau addresses those who see a threat of authoritarian
upsurge in these leaders, paying attention to the contribution of legitimacy
that is conferred by the broad support of the majority of the population. With
this, it would be possible to obtain democratic advances (in particular in its
material dynamics) in a context of weakness of liberal institutions. This is the
main legacy of populism in the region.
Hegemonic Struggle and Populism 129

Although it is possible to detect the configuration of antagonistic borders in

the populism of the past, in its new phase, it is are distinguished by an iden-
tity dimension, which reveals itself in the intention of ‘recognizing’ actors who
have remained in a position of invisibility and subalternity throughout history.
In this new sense, the populist leader does not guide or lead the people, he
‘represents’ them because he is part of them, since he shares their identity
(Arditi, 2005). It is on this ‘post-​foundational’ way of understanding identity
formation and political subjects that I will discuss in the next section.

4 Populism and Hegemonic Struggle: Agonistic Solutions to the

Identity Challenge

The concept of hegemony originates in the Marxist tradition, marking an

inflection in the theoretical debate about the relationship between economic
structure and political superstructure, emphasizing the importance of the lat-
ter in the configuration of the web of social relations that forms the different
communities distributed in time and space. With this, civil society and ideology
emerge, respectively, as space and tool of power struggles. However, although
it was first formulated by Vladimir Lenin, it is with Antonio Gramsci that the
notion of hegemony assumes a central role within Marxism. The formulations
of the two authors follow a continuity relationship, but are addressed to differ-
ent historical contexts.
Lenin addresses a unique political situation, marked by social upheavals (the
February Revolution of 1917, which in turn succeeded the Russian Revolution
of 1905) characterized by organizational difficulties on the part of the polit-
ical forces involved and by the engagement of a large number of militarized
citizens (especially after Russia’s involvement in the World War i). Faced with
this panorama, the author composes an ode to the party as a structure of col-
lective action organization, aimed at conquering the State apparatus through
weapons.
Gramsci, however, addresses a country where State institutions and polit-
ical parties were better organized, while the common population remained
relatively low in mobilization when compared to the Russian case. In this con-
text, it is the intellectuals who gain prominence as instruments of ideological
irradiation in a dispute for hearts and minds, whose priority locus is the civil
society.
Leaving aside a series of debates and reformulations of the concept of hege-
mony, this text will stick to the appropriation made by Chantal Mouffe and
Ernesto Laclau. Addressing the distinct historical and intellectual panorama
130  da Silva

marked, in the political field, by the failure of real socialism and, in the the-
oretical sphere, by the critique of the rational and normative assumptions
that structured it, the authors operate a significant conceptual engineering.
In hss it is noticeable the attempt to base dialectics on a post-​foundational
horizon through the incorporation of a philosophical framework unrelated to
the Marxist tradition, in which the reference to the work of Jürgen Habermas
and Carl Schmitt stands out. In this approach, structured from a deepening of
the idea of antagonism originally present in the notion of hegemonic strug-
gle, the subjects are presented without any allusion to transcendent contents,
identities or essences, being understood as products of a particular historical
and linguistic context –​ephemeral and unstable by definition.
Thus, when assuming the category of ‘post-​foundationalism’ to define its
epistemological horizon, Laclau and Mouffe assume the possibility of resum-
ing the modern ideal of ‘self-​assertion’ by separating it from the notion of
‘self-​foundation’. This is because the idea of ‘self-​foundation’ presupposes the
capacity of human reason to find ultimate fundamentals for existence and is
consequently incompatible with the rejection of its metaphysical, essential-
ist and universalizing bases. In this effort, the authors present a theory about
the formation of political subjects stripped of any essentialism, in which every
identity is configured from a relational perspective, that is, through a relation-
ship of antagonism. The identity of a subject ceases to be conceived as some-
thing intrinsic or aprioristic, becoming a contingent result of the relationship
established with other terms in a historically constructed and unstable system
of differences, since it consists of antagonistic discursive structures (and sub-
jects) that prevent its complete closure in a single totality (Alves, 2010).
Hegemony is then understood as an attribute inherent to the formation
and transformation of political communities, emerging as a precarious and
provisional solution to a crisis in which a part that was supposed to fill the
void of the totality, ceases to be able to do so, being replaced by another. Or, in
other words,

The concept of hegemony does not emerge to define a new type of rela-
tionship in its specific identity, but to fill an open gap in the chain of
historical necessity. Hegemony will allude to an absent totality and the
various attempts to recompose and rearticulate it that, by overcoming
this original absence, makes it possible to give the struggles a meaning
and the historical forces to be endowed with full positivity. The contexts
in which the concept appears will be those of a failure (in the geological
sense) of a fissure that needs to be filled, of a contingency that needs to
Hegemonic Struggle and Populism 131

be overcome. Hegemony will not be the majestic unfolding of an identity,

but the response to a crisis.
laclau and mouffe, 1985: 07

This understanding recovers, therefore, the Heideggerian philosophy that con-

ceives existence as being marked by the ‘polemos’. This, in turn, appears as a
transhistorical instance that allows us to understand the ‘being’ as a product of
struggles, that is, antitheses or unfriendly frictions through which new terms
are created. Despite its originality, Heidegger is not, however, the fundamental
reference for the authors studied here, –​Mouffe and Laclau –​who focus their
attention mainly on the contributions of Carl Schmitt.
Incorporating the Schmittian lexicon, the authors see themselves before
a political universe ineluctably constituted by antagonistic boundaries, in
which only the phenomena of equivalence and differentiation can engender
the formation of political subjects, which are constituted in an unstable, pre-
carious and ephemeral way, through a ‘hegemonic relation’. According to this
approach, the idea of equivalence corresponds to a simplification of politi-
cal space in two antagonistic fields, whose internal differences are subsumed
before the centrality of what is identical (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). The idea of
difference, on the contrary, would tend to complexify this same space, paving
the way for the diversification of meanings and for the pluralism of identities.
Thus, according to the hypothesis that structures this work, by emphasizing
the antagonism component that is originally present in the formulation of the
concept of ‘hegemonic struggle’, abandoning the metaphysical claim to base
it on an undeniable foundation of legitimacy, this proposition surpasses the
limits of traditional Marxism. According to Mouffe and Laclau, only this over-
coming would allow us to glimpse a truly radical model of democracy, whose
objective is to transform the relations of power within societies.
In the name of this ideal, the authors claim a renunciation of anthropologi-
cal optimism, understood as the mainstay of the proposal presented by Jürgen
Habermas, which, despite rejecting the metaphysical components of the ‘phil-
osophical discourse of modernity’, rests on a concept of communicative rea-
son, defined as an ‘universal pragmatic’ that is capable of basing the legitimacy
of the democratic ideal on universal bases (Habermas, 2002). According to
the argument defended by Mouffe in “The Democratic Paradox” (2000), this
reason, besides being unavailable, is not a desirable foundation for a radical
project of democracy. On the contrary, by removing the negativity inherent
in an ‘agonistic’ understanding of human sociability, it blocks the recognition
of violence and exclusion as unavoidable components of the process of form-
ing the general will. Thus, the Habermasian proposal makes contemporary
132  da Silva

democratic theory unable to deal with the nature of ‘the political’ in its dimen-
sion of hostility and antagonism (Mouffe, 2000).
To acquiesce in the ineluctability of the conflict, according to the author,
does not presuppose an acceptance of the status quo or the dictates of power,
but, on the contrary, enables a notion of democracy that stimulates its con-
testation, since “no consensus can be established as a result of a pure exercise
of reason” (Mouffe, 1994: 11). From this perspective, any rationalist approach
(even those of a communicative nature) is denounced as an obstacle to the
legitimization of polytheism of values as a constitutive element and a value of
a democratic order8
The opposition to the Habermasian model emphasizes the empirical
impediments to the implementation of this order without a radical transfor-
mation in power relations in society, which is another element that reinforces
the hypothesis presented here about the affinity between this conceptual
framework and ‘counter-​hegemonic’ political movements. However, even in a
more just society, it is necessary to recognize the ineluctability of the borders
of exclusion. As pointed out by Chantal Mouffe in “Democratic Paradox” “con-
sensus, in a liberal-​democratic society is, and always will be, the expression of
a hegemony and the crystallization of relations of power” (Mouffe, 2000: 49).
‘Agonism’, therefore, presents itself as a model of democracy that is struc-
tured according to the recognition of these limits, since inclusion becomes
a horizon of expectations whose intangibility does not imply abandonment
and lack of commitment to the marginalized. From this normative perspec-
tive, a project of radical democracy whose precondition is the ‘recognition’ of
multiple identities is unfolded. But also, the legitimacy of divergences and dis-
putes of the boundaries that separate included and excluded that begin to be
understood as the product of contingent, changeable and criticizable power
relations.
A second consequence of this ‘post-​foundationalist’ approach to the iden-
tity issue, which also concerns the modes of articulation between different
actors, highlights the constitutive role of ‘the political’ in this equation. This
is because, in this interpretative key, the dimension in which radical changes
(‘radical institutions’) are located is the political dimension (‘the political’)9 as

8 Moreover, the belief in a rational formation of the general will would prevent the recognition
of the limits of pluralism within a legal-​political order, with regard to the fact that certain
ways of life and certain values are, by definition, incompatible with others; being properly
the differentiation that constitutes them (Mouffe, 1994: 11).
9 I refer here to the distinction incorporated in Mouffe’s work between politics –​as an institu-
tional dimension –​and ‘the political’ –​as an identity dimension (Mouffe, 2000).
Hegemonic Struggle and Populism 133

a condition of understanding and transforming the social. Under this prism

that demarcates the detachment from the fundamentals of the Marxist tradi-
tion, political movements are considered self-​founding, insofar as no social or
economic dynamics have priority in the process of signification of phenom-
ena. Social interactions do not bring within themselves either their conditions
of intelligibility or the solutions to their own problems, and it is therefore up to
‘the political’ to structure them from the boundaries of antagonism.
Resuming Hannah Pitkin’s inquiry (1972) –​seminal with regard to the recov-
ery of a concern with the idea of representation, that is, with the founding
character of the political dimension on the social –​the political life is defined
by the problem of the continuous creation of unity on an amorphous social
plane, full of diversities, conflicting interests and multiple demands. Political
discourses and movements thus have the role of constituting particular forms
of unity between distinct interests, linking them to a common project or way
of life through the establishment of borders that define opposing forces to this
project. It is this communality that will transform a multitude of individuals,
which are dispersed in their identity particularities, into a unified political sub-
ject capable of acting in favor of overcoming their unmet demands, united in
a chain of equivalence (Mouffe, 1995). This is the authors’ commitment to the
emergence of a ‘counter-​hegemonic’ subject capable of articulating the differ-
ent groups that see themselves as oppressed and demand the ‘recognition’10 of
their identities.
To recognize that this project always arises from a relationship of otherness,
does not mean that its terms are always the same. In fact, in the concept of
‘political’, engendered by Carl Schmitt (1999, 2001, 2004) and incorporated
in the work of Laclau and Mouffe, there is a ‘transhistorical’ dimension that
fixates it as an instance of necessary and constitutive transcendence of the
social. However, it is essential to emphasize that this ‘transhistorical’ element
is void of content. At this point, it appears as one of the most fruitful aspects
of Laclau’s and, above all, Mouffe’s argumentation, which aims to amortize the
risks of the Schmittian inheritance by reconciling it with Wittgenstein’s dis-
cursive fallibilism –​emphatic about the incomplete and questionable charac-
ter of any identity. Thus, it results in an understanding of ‘the political’ that is
focused on the contestation and transformation of societies and of the identi-
ties crystallized in them.

10 For a better understanding of the issue of recognition and its relations with redistributive
demands, I suggest the classic: Taylor and Gutmann (1994).
134  da Silva

In this sense, no relationship of oppression takes precedence over the oth-

ers. Consequently, the concept of hegemony that derives from it breaks with
the traditional Marxist interpretation, present not only in Gramsci, but in most
of his heirs, who see in the class struggle a prioritary and constitutive dissoci-
ation. From this conceptual engineering, which superimposes different tradi-
tions of thought, a normative and ‘counter-​hegemonic’ claim originally alien
to the Schmittian (and realistic) understanding of the ‘political’ is introduced
(Scheuerman, 1999, 2006). Nevertheless, despite the normative commitment
of Mouffe and Laclau, the Schmittian inheritance entails risks that permeate
this way of understanding the formation of subjects and political identities.
This is the theme of the next section.

5 The Limits of Populism as a Counter-​Hegemonic Operator: the

Caesarist Drift and the Schmittian Legacy

Since the publication of pr in 2005, Laclau has become a theorist that is

requested by politicians and academics to explain the changes that have
occurred at the present time, marked by the emergence of actors in Latin
America and in the world who, despite their idiosyncrasies, are characterized
by discourses that contest the status quo. However, despite its analytical and
normative virtues, populism, as well as the Weberian ‘charism,’11 incorpo-
rates an element of instability, since it is not located in the plane of rational-
ity (instrumental or deontological), but in the sphere of will (subjective and
immanent).
This characteristic allows it to update the links between the factual/​institu-
tional dimension and the ethical/​evaluative plane, renewing its pretensions of
legitimacy. Therefore, as a charismatic movement, the ‘populist reason’ would
fulfill the role of reversing –​albeit for a short time –​the routinizing tendency
that affects every legal-​political order, bringing it closer to its ethical-​moral
bases. Thus, as I argued throughout the previous sections, due to its theoret-
ical attributes, but also the practical direction given by the author, populism
emerges as a ‘counter-​hegemonic’ operator. That is, as a useful instrument in

11 On ‘charism’ and its relation to the other forms of domination (traditional and rational-​
legal) I suggest Weber M (1991) Os três tipos puros de dominação legítima. In: Cohn G.
(ed) Weber: Sociologia, Coleção Grandes Cientistas Sociais. São Paulo: Ática, 79–​127; and,
Mommsen wj (1989) The political and social theory of Max Weber. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Hegemonic Struggle and Populism 135

the struggle for transformation in the structures of power that perpetuate the
oppression of the lower classes.
However, despite the recognition of such attributes, the purpose of this sec-
tion is to highlight its drawbacks, given other characteristics of the concept
that give it what I call Caesarist drift.12 These elements, in turn, come from
the theoretical framework that structures this way of conceiving the political.
More precisely, this ‘drift’ is brought about by the incorporation of an elitist
theory of representation, outlined by Thomas Hobbes and updated in Max
Weber (Mommsen, 1989). Finally, this theory finds its most radical understand-
ing in the work of Carl Schmitt, whose considerations are the object of particu-
lar attention throughout this work, not only because of its influence on Laclau
and Mouffe, but mainly because of the risks inherent to its formulation.
The Schmittian conceptualization highlights the dimension of homogene-
ity, presenting it as a normative unfolding of a realistic corollary, that is, of the
Weberian assumption that, in modernity, representation, as a moment of iden-
tification between rulers and ruled, is an inextricable component to political
systems, which can no longer resort to transcendent foundations of legitimacy
(Schmitt, 2006).
Schmitt solves this problem through the concept of ‘acclamation’, which
would indicate a democratic dynamic through which the people express
their approval to the leader. Their actions, when acclaimed, could be seen as
an expression of popular sovereignty (Schmitt, 1990). Weber, however, points
out that this ideal is not enough to structure ‘rational-​legal’ systems that are
necessary for the organization of politics and economics in modern societies
(Weber, 1991). In light of this, the author emphasizes the importance of respect
for individual freedom and pluralism of values, pointed out as the only legiti-
macy criteria compatible with a secular world.
Laclau, however, criticizes this necessary association between individu-
alism and pluralism, although he believes that the mere manifestation of
popular sovereignty is also not a sufficient criterion, as it disregards the histor-
ical articulation between democratic and liberal traditions, sedimented over
the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Laclau and
Mouffe, 1985). According to this hypothesis –​which finds points of contact
with the theory presented by Rosanvallon in “Le peuple introuvable: histoire
de la représentation démocratique en France” (1998) –​of the modernization
process, a fundamental transformation of the structure of societies takes place,

12 Caesarism, or Bonapartism, is understood as the process through which, in the face of a

crisis of hegemony, “power is embodied in a ‘heroic personality’ of a military or charis-
matic character, preventing the ‘normal’ functioning of democracy (silva, 2015: 9).
136  da Silva

which, in addition to being demographically superior, would have become

more complex and plural. In this new context, it has become impossible to
think of the people as a unitary agent capable of expressing themselves sover-
eignly unequivocally, since they are composed of countless groups with con-
tradictory interests, identities and wills.
Homogeneity, however, is an intrinsic element to the idea of representa-
tion presented by Laclau, although it is mitigated by the consideration of its
precariousness and the gap between representatives and represented, which
attributes to every act of identification a character of incompleteness. For the
author, the process of complexification does not occur only within society, but
also in individuals themselves, who, because they are composed of numerous
evaluative dimensions, are no longer able to identify completely with anything
or any person. Every form of identification becomes partial and temporary, so
it is necessary to link the legitimacy of the representatives to something more
than their ability to identify with those represented (Laclau, 1994).
It is necessary to recognize, therefore, Laclau’s effort in affirm that, from
a normative perspective, the acclamation of the majority is not sufficient to
grant legitimacy to a political order, which is a central point for the argument
undertaken here, insofar as it avoids a precipitous association between popu-
lism and Caesarism. According to the argument outlined in this commentary,
populism is not the best tool for the hegemonic struggle, but not because it
necessarily gives rise to authoritarian regimes. Its incompatibility stems from
the elitist character of the conception of politics and representation that
structures it, which, because it is too centered on the function of the leader,
becomes insufficiently emancipatory from the perspective of the demos.
Moreover, post-​fundamentalism itself, as an epistemology that is imperme-
able to transcendent principles, brings with it some drawbacks. For, if the act
of representation constitutes both representatives and represented, without a
collective essence or general will that transcends it, it becomes more difficult
to subordinate it to any idea of responsibility unrelated to its dictates, since it
is not clear to which wills or interests the representatives should be responsive
to and what kind of control the people should exercise over them (Rodrigues
and Silva, 2015).
In other words, unlike the notions of reason and emancipation, which serve
as the normative horizon of the Marxist tradition in general and, in particular,
of the idea of hegemonic struggle presented by Antonio Gramsci, populist rea-
son does not operate based on evaluative criteria, whose legitimacy refers to a
later foundation to the act of representation established between representa-
tives and represented. In the absence of such criteria, the risk that, by presup-
posing a substantive identity with the people, the leader disengages himself,
Hegemonic Struggle and Populism 137

acting on his behalf as he sees fit, including counteracting any ‘counter-​

hegemonic’ commitments that have forged his identification with the popular
classes, is aggravated.
On the other hand, in contrast to the principles that guide the liberal under-
standing of the representative mechanisms, which emphasize the plurality
of opinions and the protection of minorities, the Laclaunian understanding
tends to highlight majority dynamics. In light of this, two central problems
stand out: (1) what to do with portions of the population that do not share the
same identity as the majority groups?; (2) what are the limits of this majority
identification, in view of the multifaceted character of individuals and social
groups?
In the tension between the rule of majority –​as a principle that feeds the
pretensions of democratic legitimacy –​and pluralism –​as an inherent element
of any decision-​making process in modern societies –​lies the main obstacle
to the survival of the democratic ideal in a context that is very different from
that which originated it. For, as pointed out by Chantal Mouffe in “Deliberative
Democracy or Agonistic Pluralism” (2000), if we take into account the expec-
tations and values shared by its citizens, democracy cannot be achieved at the
expense of liberalism, nor vice versa.
Faced with this dilemma, ‘agonism’, as a model of radical democracy,
serves as an indispensable counterpoint to dynamics that value the majority
dimension, inherent to populism. According to this understanding, despite
any conceptual antinomy, liberalism and democracy cannot be considered as
functional substitutes, or as elements in a bargaining process. The demands
for equality and freedom, disseminated by the Enlightenment tradition and
incorporated by most contemporary societies, can only be properly achieved
by regimes that give rise to an articulation between these two components. If
there is any freedom of moderns this refers to theoretical and political strug-
gles that articulate the demands for popular sovereignty and individual rights.
Nevertheless, recognizing a tendency to the encapsulation of individuals in
their private lives, ‘agonism’ incorporates the banner of deliberative and par-
ticipatory models of democracy, considering that the institution of political
and social spaces of deliberation and participation can help stimulate inter-
est in the res publica. For this reason, from the emphasis on deliberation and
participation as social practices to be associated with liberal institutions and
values –​such as Parliament, the division between State and Church, State
and Civil Society, the guarantee of individual freedoms, etc. –​‘agonism’
becomes an alternative to compensate for the harms of leadership and the risk
of populism, since it removes from leaders the possibility of presenting them-
selves as representatives of the totality (Rodrigues and Silva, 2015).
138  da Silva

Thus, responding to the question raised throughout the text, by incorpo-

rating institutional proposals aimed at avoiding the degeneration of populist
phenomena in Bonapartism regimes, plebiscite democracies or caesarean dic-
tatorships, the agonist model is presented as a more appropriate paradigm to
‘counter-​hegemonic’ movements that contemplate an emancipatory ideal, in
which the sovereignty of the people is not obtained at the expense of their
individual freedoms or the oppression of minorities.

6 Conclusion

This chapter presented a proposal for a theoretical-​political framework for the

Neo Gramscian approach of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau. Focused on
the concepts of Hegemonic Struggle and Populism, this analysis undertook
a historical-​conceptual genealogy that sought to correlate theory and praxis.
After this first effort, which sought to situate the work of both authors as an
inflection point in the Marxist tradition, three axiological developments of this
movement were developed. The first, concerning the relationship between the
concept of populism and the conceptual framework established in “Hegemony
and Socialist Strategy”. The second, presented such a formulation as a synthe-
sis between two theoretical antipodal constellations that go beyond the limits
of traditional Marxism: Habermasian proceduralism and Schmittian substan-
tialism. The third one highlighted the limits of this synthesis that, despite its
affinities with ‘counter-​hegemony’, incorporates some risks inherent to a the-
ory of representation centered on the figure of the leader.
The objective of this work, in turn, was to demonstrate that the recovery
operated by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in the Gramscian concept of
hegemony allows the overcoming of the paradigm of the universal subject,
in which the proletariat was configured as a monolithic essence incapable of
encompassing the plurality of identities that constitute contemporary soci-
eties. Thus, according to the post-​foundationalist assumptions, incorporated
into the Marxist legacy by the conceptual effort of the authors, an ‘agonistic’
conception of a political subject emerges. Fragmented in numerous conflict-
ing and divergent collective identities, this subject is understood as an empty
signifier, whose identity can only be filled by ephemeral, incomplete and pre-
carious meanings.
However, the recognition of such precariousness by Mouffe and Laclau does
not imply the rejection of the emancipatory horizon present in the Marxist tra-
dition. On the contrary, it gives rise to a project of radical democracy, in which
the understanding of the political as a universe structured by antagonism is
Hegemonic Struggle and Populism 139

counterbalanced by the emphasis on deliberative processes of understanding

and the critique of hegemonically established identities. From an ‘agonistic’
perspective, representation –​as a link between rulers and ruled –​and popular
sovereignty-​as an expression of the will of the people –​should be understood
as fictions that, together with the idea of individual freedom, make up the eval-
uative horizon of Western societies.
To this extent, by emphasizing the artificial and precarious character of
identities and consensus combining them with the defense of a radical proj-
ect of democracy, this model offers the basis for an ‘immanent’ critique of the
existing institutional regimes. For this reason, ‘agonism’, in addition to com-
pensating for the risks inherent to populist phenomena, presents a structural
affinity with ‘counter-​hegemonic’ movements that, in addition to contesting
the ‘status quo’, envision an emancipatory ideal incompatible with the philos-
ophy of the subject that once fed it.

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 ­c hapter 8

Imperialism as a Complex System of Domination

An Approach from Domenico Losurdo

Diego Pautasso1

1 Introduction

It is undeniable that the field of International Relations (ir) was born within
the Anglo-​Saxon countries, and, consequently, intertwined with their geopo-
litical interests.2 This contributes both to the enhancement of ethnocentric
biases as much as those averse to systemic criticism. Indeed, the tributary per-
spectives of Marxism had a late contribution due to, among other factors, the
collapse of the Soviet camp and the predominance of the Realist and Liberal
(sub)currents. It was only from the 1970s onwards that Marxism began to make
a more significant contribution to the area, escaping the first ‘great debates’
(utopian vs. realists, and traditionalists vs. positivists) that took place after
the World War i, when this field of knowledge was formed (Halliday, 1999).
From the end of the Cold War on, however, the collapse of real socialism shook
Marxism deeply, as globalization and the ‘end of history’ narratives became
dominant.
In Brazil, the field of International Relations had a late development and
Marxist approaches even more so. Its various sub-​areas, such as International
Political Economy and International Security Studies, paid little (or no) atten-
tion to the problem of imperialism, whether under geopolitical and/​or geo-
economic aspects. The same neglect has occurred with the various theories
of globalization (Ianni, 1996) or with the many theories of the contemporary
world (Kumar, 1997). The paradox is that this has occurred precisely in the
Post-​Cold War period, when the use of force by the superpower –​in a condi-
tion of provisional unipolarity –​deepened. In this sense, it is crucial to rescue
Domenico Losurdo –​and the classics of Marxism –​to understand the interlac-
ing of the global reproduction of wealth and power, the uneven and combined

1 Professor of the Military College of Porto Alegre, Brazil.

2 Originally published as a chapter of the book “Theory of International Relations: Marxist con-
tributions”. Reference: Pautasso D and Prestes A (2021) Teoria das Relações Internacionais: con-
tribuições marxistas. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto. Translated into English by the author.

© Diego Pautasso, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_009

Imperialism as a Complex System of Domination 143

development of the world market, the reconfigurations of the international

division of labor and the interstate asymmetries and contradictions. In this
chapter, we try to demonstrate that the Italian author treated imperialism as a
complex system of domination, dealing with its multifaceted character, even
without debating the genealogy of the concept, as he did with other concepts,
such as Liberalism.
This chapter adds to the efforts to promote the Marxist debate within the
scope of ir, in this specific case, highlighting the contributions of Domenico
Losurdo. This effort unites with others aimed at i) carrying out a balance of his
work as a critical approach to international studies (Pautasso, 2014); ii) discuss-
ing the genealogy of Liberalism and the way in which the US intertwines neo-
liberal globalization with the various neocolonial interventionist mechanisms
of today (Pautasso, 2020); and iii) approaching the national matter from the
national-​international dialectic (Pautasso, Fernandes and Doria, 2020).
Losurdo, it is worth noting, began his academic career by focusing his stud-
ies on classical philosophers, especially the Germans Kant, Fichte, Schelling,
Hegel, Notrecht, Heidegger and Nietzsche, in addition to other themes that
went through issues related to the French and American revolutions, to liber-
alism and to thinkers like Constant, for example. But with the collapse of the
Soviet camp, in a context of deep ideological disbandment, the author made a
progressive approach to themes of his time, such as a balance of real socialism
and the contemporary and western left; a deep genealogy of liberalism; and a
comprehensive critique of imperialism in its many forms.3 All this effort took
place without ever abandoning scientific rigor, the ability to relate classical
authors to contemporary issues, and the mobilization of remarkable erudition
in historical comparisons. And the “rigor of objectivity is absolutely primal”,
dealing with the “most possible coherent development of the determinations
inscribed in the object” (Azzara, 2020: 11).
That being said, we’ve organized the chapter as follows. In the first part, we
discuss the origins and debates about the concept of imperialism, as well as
the way in which it has been neglected, especially in the area of I​ nternational
Relations and/​or in topics related to contemporaneity. In the second part, we
approach the lexicon and language of the Empire, as well as its various technol-
ogies of warfare and multimedia firepower. Last but not least, we deal with the
mechanisms of imperial economic expropriation, as well as the corresponding
struggles against the de-​emancipation processes and their paths.

3 See the author’s production of articles and books on his official page, available at: http:
//​dome​nico​losu​rdob​ibli​ogra​fia​.blogs​pot​.com​/​.
144 Pautasso

2 Imperialism: Genealogy and Its Paths

The violent expansion of empires and/​or territorial units throughout history

is not a recent phenomenon. However, the debate and theories about imperi-
alism only date back to the end of the nineteenth century. On the one hand,
this was the context of major productive transformations, with the passage
from the First to the Second Industrial Revolution and from competitive to
oligopolistic/​monopolistic capitalism, giving rise to large global corporations.
On the other hand, the great powers carried out expansion and sharing of vast
territories, especially in Africa and Asia. Critical theoretical reflections and
political movements unsubmissive to imperialism, in this sense, resulted from
the hostility of its violence and looting, from the maturing of the understand-
ing about the systemic dynamics of capitalism and from the strengthening of
concepts like sovereignty and self-​determination of peoples in the context of
the modern state system conformation.
In this sense, it is worth summarizing a panoramic view of the Marxist
debate on the political economy of imperialism, based on the balance of
Fernandes (1992). Rudolf Hilferding, in 1909, demonstrated the relationship
between imperialism and the process of monopolization and the increas-
ingly intertwined link between industrial and banking capital. Hilferding did
not equate imperialism with colonialism, as domination prescinded from
territorial control –​and could even be a factor in the rapid development of
productive forces in the periphery. Rosa Luxemburg, in turn, in a work from
1913, understood that capitalism would experience a permanent ‘crisis of real-
ization’, providing imperialist impulses to non-​capitalist regions, in order to
make accumulation viable. Kautsky, in an article from 1915, developed the idea
of u
​ ltra-​imperialism, given that monopolization could even lead to the elim-
ination of wars. Bukharin, in a 1915 writing, defined imperialism as the pol-
icy of finance capital, whose monopolistic organization would reduce inter-​
imperialist competition and even systemic crises.
But it was Lenin’s work, from 1916, that gave more projection and system-
atization to the concept. According to the Russian leader, imperialism was the
monopoly phase of capitalism, with traits such as 1) concentration of capital,
2) fusion of industrial and banking capital, 3) predominance of capital exports,
4) formation of associations of global corporations and 5) territorial division.
To him, monopoly was intensifying, instead of eliminating competition; and
the export of capital itself would play a role in promoting development (albeit
distorted). Later, Dobb, Sweezy, Baran, Frank, Emmanuel, Amin, Wallerstein,
among others, emphasized exploitation taking the sphere of circulation as
its starting point, rather than the dynamics of production, reiterating that
Imperialism as a Complex System of Domination 145

imperialism would play a blocking role in the development of peripheral coun-

tries. (Fernandes, 1992: 15–​62).
Some authors in the Marxist field supported the debate about imperialism
after the collapse of real socialism, as highlighted by Leite’s (2014) balance sheet
when citing authors such as Chesnais, Went, Harvey, Boron, Sakellaropoulos,
among others. The eclectic and polysemic use of the concept implied ana-
lyzes such as those of Hardt and Negri (2001), according to which we would
be experiencing a time when the empire occurs without imperialism, in which
transnational companies would supplant the power of States. Basically, these
authors dematerialize, deterritorialize and, at the limit, depoliticize the power
of capital, ignoring that, in fact, such companies are national companies with
global operations, as defined by Chang (2009). Arrighi (2012) himself consis-
tently historicized the relationship between capital and territorial state in the
conformation of the modern world-​system.
Progressive or critical sectors have abandoned the concept of imperialism.
Kumar (1997), in fact, takes stock of the new theories about the contempo-
rary world, discussing the information society, post-​industrial and post-​Fordist
economies or the post-​modern world. The idea of g​ lobalization, depending on
the approaches, was identified as those about the global village and/​or varia-
tions of narratives linked to the new world without borders, without States or
even without ideologies.
In general, the narratives of globalization have contributed to camouflaging
contradictions and the uneven and combined character of the accumulation
of wealth and power, as well as inter-​imperialist rivalries, center-​periphery
dynamics and policies of resort to force. Let’s see how Batista Jr. (1998) demon-
strates the false premises that underlie the economic dimension of globaliza-
tion. According to him, this 1) did not produce an unprecedented integration,
because in several aspects, the degree of international integration at the turn
of the nineteenth-​twentieth century was even higher; 2) it did not generate a
phenomenon of a supranational character, but something inter-​state, asym-
metric and unequal in terms of States and sovereignties; 3) it did not result in
the inexorable predominance of neoliberal policies, as it did not even stop the
trend of increasing government weight, measured by indicators such as the
ratio between public expenditure and revenue and gdp; 4) it did not imply
the formation of global corporations free of national identification and loyal-
ties; 5) and it did not mean the creation of a ‘global’ capital market, either due
to the territorial ties of capital, or because of the preponderance of national
markets for any development experience.
In the ir area, we can take some manuals as an example, because, although
the intrinsic limits of these works are known, it is evident that they serve both
146 Pautasso

as a reference in many courses, as they express the theoretical frameworks

and the predominant themes. In the book International Political Economy,
by Reinaldo Gonçalves (2005), there is only one mention of the concept of
‘imperialism’ and a few paragraphs discussing the subject. In the important
work International Security Studies, by Buzan and Hansen (2012), the concept
is simply disregarded. Even approaches with a neorealist matrix, in which the
subject of power and the use of force are at the epicenter of the analyzes, the
fundamental question is the security of States in an anarchic international sys-
tem. It is a Hobbesian approach incapable of understanding the intertwining
between national and global, State and market, power and capital, as a Marxist
approach proposes. And the analytical shift to the issue of ‘human security’,
which considers food, environmental and community security, etc. continues
disregarding those dialectical pairs mentioned above.
In the field of ir in Brazil, perhaps the exception is the book Imperialism,
State and International Relations, by Luiz Felipe Osório (2018), whose concept
of imperialism assumes analytical centrality. Furthermore, only in the theoret-
ical field itself, such as the jounal “Crítica Marxista”, the debate remained alive,
as illustrated by some texts by Ianni (1996); Moraes (1996); Visentini (1996);
Del Roio (1996); Dumenil and Levy (2004); Ruccio (2005); Fontes (2008),
among others. Let us see, therefore, how Losurdo’s work can not only animate
Marxist debates on the subject, but also the critical thinking in the field of
International Relations.

3 Lexis of Imperialism and Its War Technologies

The Italian author did not deal with a genealogy of imperialism, a method
so common in his writings, as the study on liberalism illustrates (losurdo,
xxx). However, it did not give in to theories and approaches that considered
concepts such as imperialism and class struggle –​so dear to sectors of the left
averse to the experiences of real socialism –​to be obsolete.
In fact, Losurdo characterized three stages of the struggle between colonial-
ism and neocolonialism: 1) from the October Revolution (1917) and its appeal
to the resistance of slaves in the colonies to Stalingrad and the defeat of Nazi
imperialism; 2) from Stalingrad to the US triumph in the Cold War, marked by
the defeat of classical colonialism and the emergence of the cunning neocolo-
nialism led by Washington; and 3) from the defeat of the socialist camp to the
present day, expressed by the triumph of the US empire (Losurdo, 2016: 249–​
250). In other words, the author brings imperialist practices to the center of
his analysis, periodizing and seeking the lines of continuity and discontinuity
Imperialism as a Complex System of Domination 147

between colonialism and neocolonialism and their mechanisms of resistance.

And always approaching the problem in a complex and multifaceted way, by
articulating the theoretical and philosophical dimensions to the historical and
political developments.
In this sense, his first major contribution was to demonstrate the liberalism-​
imperialism symbiosis. Its two epicenters, Great Britain and the USA, com-
bined liberal universalism based on the defense of international institutions,
the opening of markets and the defense of human rights alongside imperial
and ethnocentric policies aimed at the destabilization of governments, the
forced opening of markets and military interventions. More than that: the
expansion of the West mobilized liberal rhetoric to carry out a practice with a
clear colonial-​racial component, of racializing the enemy, seeking to legitimize
domination and segregation. It is enough to turn to the genealogy of liberal-
ism to perceive its ‘unique twin birth’ not only with the slave trade from Great
Britain, but with the systematic dispossession and/​or annihilation of Irish and
Indians, exploitation of coolies and looting of colonized peoples. There is no
contradiction between what American thinkers called herrenvolk democracy
(‘democracy for the people of the lords’), white supremacy and/​or the far west
against the redskins (Losurdo, 2006a: 47 and 119, 2006b: 148).
The Napoleonic pax shielded itself in the ‘perpetual peace’ of the French
Revolution, the British pax, in the ‘age of commerce’ defended by Constant,
and the American pax in the ‘definitive peace’ of Wilson, respectively, those are
an expression of their military triumphs (Losurdo, 2018a: 402). This liberal nar-
rative takes place through the defense of the ‘sacred space’ of the free and pro-
prietors against the ‘profane space’ of subaltern social groups, using political
and economic means, law and force to sustain their social position. The merit
of liberalism is to place itself as a ‘religion of freedom’, while simultaneously
perpetuating and fostering the relations of enslavement of blacks, decimation
of indigenous people and oppression of colonial peoples, in systematic impe-
rialist policies (Losurdo, 2017: 327).
The second aspect highlighted by Losurdo concerns the language of the
empire. One of the most interesting approaches refers to what he calls the ‘lex-
icon of American ideology’. Therefore, the unilateral and distorted use of cate-
gories, disseminated by the control of the media, makes up the basis of the US
imperialist discourse, complementing its gigantic military apparatus. They are
Manichaean, polysemic and ideological discourses that present themselves as
universal to legitimize the supremacy of certain power structures. In this sense,
the concept of terrorism has become an instrument to unleash the Global War
on Terror. In the name of this crusade, all kinds of dehumanization, massa-
cres against civilian populations, use of arbitrary violence promoted by secret
148 Pautasso

services (cia) and death squads, transformation of societies into hostages

through embargoes, among others, are valid (Losurdo, 2010b: 43). The same
goes for the concept of fundamentalism, as it became a key category to legiti-
mize a holy war of the West against ‘barbarians’ and “pre-​moderns” (Losurdo,
2010b: 63–​96). In other words, a Manichaeism that divides the world between,
on the one hand, barbarians, terrorists, fundamentalists, Negroids/​browns,
authoritarians and/​or Islamists and, on the other hand, the West, formed by
those who are civilized, modern, democratic, Judeo-​Christian, etc.
The West (such concept itself is vague and polysemic) celebrates ‘univer-
salism’ and therefore proclaims itself as the moral conscience of humanity.
The result is that West feels entitled to the role of world police, promoter of
democracy, human rights and free market. It is neither difficult to understand
the links between imperialism and liberalism, nor how exalted ‘universalism’
easily converts into ethnocentrism. Through the control of the narrative, a war
syllogism expressed in exceptionalism is molded –​as an ‘international sheriff’
interpreter of universal values -​, sanctioning the law of the strongest in the
international field and making war eternal (Losurdo, 2016: 125, 154 and 218,
2018a: 384).
The third point that the Italian author calls attention to refers to the ter-
rible multimedia firepower. The new means of the society of the spectacle,
hegemonized by the West, make it possible to vilify enemies, exerting a certain
control over the production of emotions and historical memory. The artificial
production of indignation through images and the fabrication of the dichot-
omy ‘civilized’ versus ‘barbarians’ becomes an expedient of international pol-
itics. New technical means –​in addition to television, cell phones, computers
and social networks –​ignite the hatred of public opinion and coerce the unde-
cided to act or support actions against the new enemy. It is a true psychological
war (Psywar), based on a quasi-​monopoly over global communications, capa-
ble of promoting a dehumanization and demonization of the victim to the
point of legitimizing and spectacularizing any destabilization and/​or ‘human-
itarian war’ (Losurdo, 2016: 113–​114). Democratic and humanitarian interven-
tionism, its versions of responsibility to protect, is the opposite of democracy
and peace (Losurdo, 2012: 301).
The media dimension is linked to the fourth aspect, that is, the mobiliza-
tion of new war technologies and the second wave of coups. The current wave
of coups, different from the one that prevailed between the Truman Doctrine
(1947) until the coup in Allende (1973) based on military dictatorships immune
to public opinion, tends to occur through the establishment of ‘protected
democracies’. In those cases, the isolation and criminalization of the country
and the bloody disinformation campaigns are part of the legitimation of public
Imperialism as a Complex System of Domination 149

opinion to stimulate violence from below (and in fact with external support)
and provoke regime change. Such ‘protected democracies’ deepen economic
dependence and weaken sovereignty, generally submitting the country to the
designs of power structures under Washington’s management, from the imf to
nato (Losurdo, 2016: 88–​89 and 191).
It should be noted that the new technological means have increased inter-
national asymmetries and governance on a global scale. The multiplication of
intervention capabilities of imperialist countries is remarkable, which includes
kill list practices and extra-​judicial executions; unilateral sanctions and embar-
goes; right to war (jus ad bellum) via nato outside the UN Security Council;
interference through ngo s acting as missionaries; bombing via new means
provided by the Revolution in Military Affairs-​r am, etc. As summarized by
Losurdo: white supremacy originating in the USA became a western suprem-
acy, in this case ignoring any symmetry between nations, as well as the effec-
tiveness of democracy and the rule of law on an international scale (Losurdo,
2016: 90, 93 and 104).
The intertwining between communication technologies mobilized for psy-
war (psychological warfare) and new technical means for war (Revolution
in Military Affairs-​r am) alters the power relations at the international level.
ram takes place through the command of space and artificial intelligence,
with automation of various operations, such as guided munitions, drones,
cyberwar, etc. These new means have allowed recurrent direct interventions
in Afghanistan (2001), Iraq (1991–​2003) and Libya (2011); the sophistication of
coups and regime change policies, such as color revolutions (Georgia, Roses in
2003; Ukraine, Orange in 2004–​14; Kyrgyz, Tulips in 2005); the constitutional
coups in Honduras (2009), Paraguay (2012) and Brazil (2016); in addition to
the Arab Spring, whose external action has become very evident (Bandeira,
2016). Parallel to this, the expansion of nato and military bases in the support
of the Global War on Terror unleashed from 2001 on and the attempt to build
anti-​missile shields in Europe (Romania, Poland) against Russia, and in Asia,
the High Altitude Air Defense Terminal (Thaad) in South Korea against China
and North Korea.
There is no denying, as Losurdo well summarizes, that there is an economic-​
technological-​judicial neocolonialism. It became possible to subjugate by
imposing embargoes and economic siege, leading to military impotence
given the superiority of means of force, villainizing through multimedia fire-
power and guaranteeing impunity to the aggressor thanks to dual jurisdic-
tion (Losurdo, 2016: 257–​8). After the Cold War, the unilateral use of force
was enhanced, since the US reached a status of a superpower without rivals,
including conventional bombing or drone strikes, outside organizations and
150 Pautasso

international law. In other words, the US and its allies assume such a broad sov-
ereignty (wide and imperial) that it allows them to nullify the sovereignty of
the rest of the world through the exceptionalism of the ‘indispensable nation’
and ‘chosen by God’, so that international institutionality itself has become a
burden to the hegemon (Losurdo, 2018b: 406).
An illustrative note for the US case. Domestically, there is a ‘competitive
one-​party system’, in which two parties represent interest groups (Wall Street,
military-​industrial complex, oil sector) that control the country’s wealth and
political life –​while polarization and mass incarceration grow in a nation
whose history is based on a racial state (Losurdo, 2016: 83). It is those govern-
ments that, internationally, invest themselves in the ‘imperial mission’, with
moral and religious contours, to carry out wars (War Clause) without institu-
tional restraints (Damin, 2013). A Bonapartism with popular investiture of a
plebiscitary type capable of extending its powers to the state of exception if it
is to carry forward the ideologies of war and the empire of freedom (Losurdo,
2004: 300). In other words, the theoretical currents presented as antagonis-
tic in the scope of International Relations, Liberalism and Realism, compose
different and complementary strategies of projection and maintenance of the
power structures of the great powers, combining discourses in favor of interna-
tional institutions and the use of force.

4 Imperialism, Expropriation and Resistance

Hasty and anachronistic readings tend to attribute an ethnocentric bias to

Marx himself. First, if we disregard the context of the nineteenth century and
the evolution of the author’s work, as the mature Marx approached colonial-
ism, oppression and national liberation struggles with concern. His analyzes
of India, Algeria, Indonesia and China became more complex, as elements
(ethnicity and nationality) were added to the dynamics of capital to form a
totality (Anderson, 2019: 355). Second, such analyzes are counterfactual, given
that communist parties formed a field that, at its peak in the 1980s, reached
32 nations and a third of the world’s population, transforming a backward
country into a superpower, promoting processes of modernization and paving
the way for unprecedented experiences of government –​and some, such as
China, Cuba, People’s Korea, continue to resist and reinvent themselves today
(Visentini, 2017).
In addition to the various mechanisms of regime change, imperialism
is expressed through several socio-​economic instruments of dismantling
and expropriation. At present, neoliberalism is undoubtedly an imperial
Imperialism as a Complex System of Domination 151

mechanism for increasing the polarization of intra and interstate wealth. As

well as the construction, the annihilation of Social Welfare States is the very
expression of class struggles. There is no doubt that social struggles and union
action, as well as the existence of the socialist camp, shaped the extension
of rights, just as the counter-​revolution after the fall of the Berlin wall has
driven the suppression of conquests. In addition to emptying rights, neoliberal
policies erode political representation and institute a ‘plutocracy’. At the inter-
national level, neoliberalism intertwines with neocolonialism, as the imposi-
tion of liberalizing agendas (via Washington Consensus, imf, World Bank) on
peripheral countries strengthens the projection of the great powers and their
corporations (Losurdo, 2016: 39 and 68).
In a context of profound asymmetries, inequalities and violence on a global
scale, the fight against imperialism is the supreme stage of the class strug-
gle. Therefore, in his general theory of social conflicts, Losurdo emphasizes
the need to overcome the binary reading of social conflicts –​without being
restricted to directly antagonistic subjects. According to him, class struggles
take different forms, intertwining the dimensions of redistribution (via over-
coming the social division of labor) and recognition (via overcoming dehu-
manization processes). In this way, social conflicts assume different priorities
in each concrete situation in space and time, and, therefore, hierarchies, con-
tradictions and conflicts between divergent liberties. Thus, social, gender, fam-
ily, ethnic-​racial matters and between states and nations are part of a broad
system of social conflicts.
To shed light on the complex system of domination that encompasses
imperialism, Losurdo placed great emphasis on the national question and
anti-​colonial struggle. For this reason, he even begins by reconstructing the
trajectory of important authors to support his point of view. He highlights
Lenin’s emphasis on national liberation struggles and self-​determination, as
well as Mao‘s statement that “patriotism is an application of internationalism”
(Losurdo, 2015: 153–​185). Gramsci himself, in a critique of Trotsky, stated that
‘internationalism’, to be authentic’, must be ‘profoundly national’, given that
universalism is only justified to the extent that it is able to include particularity
(Losurdo, 2018a: 249).
While drawing attention to the national issue, Domenico Losurdo (2010a)
highlights its nuances and contradictions.4 On the one hand, national-
ism can assume reactionary and xenophobic forms, aimed at legitimizing

4 In another article, we discuss, based on the work of Losurdo, the complex dialectic between
national and global (Pautasso, Fernandes and Doria, 2020).
152 Pautasso

expansionism, war and racial supremacy. On the other hand, it can be a driv-
ing force for the emancipation of nations, anti-​imperialist struggles, the pro-
motion of development, sovereignty and self-​determination. Likewise, at the
opposite pole, internationalism and cosmopolitanism can also be the defense
of the global moral and legal foundations of capitalism; or they could be the
movements that fight for a society that overcomes the logic of capital. That is,
simplifying expressions at national and international level leads to false antag-
onisms, dysfunctional Manichaeism and misunderstandings (Domingos and
Martins, 2007: 2–​4 and 20).
But if the national question is crucial for peripheral countries to resist
imperialism, this often produces misunderstandings about hierarchies and
dilemmas about international insertion. Losurdo, as a tributary of the Leninist
tradition, knew that imperialism entails a contradiction between the expro-
priation of surpluses and the export of surpluses and, therefore, the dialec-
tic between plunder and the development of productive forces in peripheral
regions. Although he did not address concepts such as sub-​imperialism and/​
or neo-​imperialism, the Italian author was enthusiastic about China’s tra-
jectory. Obviously, in addition to development and sovereignty linked to the
national question, emerging countries can play a key role in the multipolariza-
tion movement and strengthening of international institutions –​as opposed
to interventionist unilateralism and the liberalizing agenda radiated by the US
and its allies (economic-​technological-​judicial neocolonialism).
From Losurdo’s work, it would not be exaggerated to say that the national
question is the link between sovereignty and development and, in turn, the
possible amalgam for the various emancipatory struggles. Thus, any possibil-
ity of both anti-​imperialist actions and emancipatory policies on the margins
of national development projects and state capacities seems narrow. In this
sense, beyond the specificities of each emancipatory struggle, there is a grow-
ing difficulty in overcoming legitimate identity demands for justice and equal-
ity and/​or articulating such agendas to comprehensive collective projects. Or,
as Haider says, identity has become a trap when it becomes identitarism, lead-
ing to the hyper fragmentation of the political struggle (Haider, 2019). What
happens now is an incessant search for individual recognition, true rituals of
self-​affirmation and imprisonment of people in a unidimensional characteris-
tic. Transposed to the digital arena, this policy has amplified irrationality and
militantism, eroding the public sphere with authoritarian practices (cancella-
tions and lynchings) and emptying any principle of universality. The result is
that the segmented emancipatory struggles themselves subsume in the misun-
derstanding of the complexity of the system of domination, turning legitimate
Imperialism as a Complex System of Domination 153

attempts into movements that breed antagonistic forces to the development of

peripheral countries and to anti-​imperialist struggles.
Here we can highlight another important issue that runs through impe-
rialism and forms of resistance. Important sectors of the left neglected the
imperative of force, the dialectic of war and peace, the dynamics of violence
throughout history. On the one hand, non-​violence was associated with main-
taining the status quo and its various processes of oppression, including con-
demning the violence of the weakest (non-​state movements) and legitimizing
the violence of the strongest. Often, the ideal of non-​violence went hand in
hand with the celebration of the West as the guardian of humanity’s moral
conscience and therefore legitimized the right to intervene in favor of ‘civiliza-
tion’ and against ‘barbarians’. On the other hand, in opposition to the ideolog-
ical capture of non-​violence and perpetual peace, there is neither an aesthetic
celebration of violence and war, nor an appeal to resentment and revenge.
Violence and war, as well as peace, must respond to the anti-​imperialist polit-
ical struggle, according to the rational analysis of the forces involved and the
social objectives in dispute (Losurdo, 2012: 89).
In short, imperialism intertwines several dimensions in its process of expro-
priation and dismantling. And it is a central element of the multifaceted
character of class struggles. Despite this, the absent left, as Losurdo calls it,
succumbs to the indignation promoted by Western multimedia power and is
silent in the face of interventions (Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya); criticizes social-
ist experiences (China, Vietnam, People’s Korea) or non-​aligned countries
(Iran, Venezuela, Syria); delegitimizes the conquests of the Welfare States, etc.
(Losurdo, 2016: 319–​370).

5 Conclusion

The International Relations field of study has an Anglo-​Saxon lineage, origi-

nally linked to the decision-​making circle of the powers, above all Great Britain
and the USA. Associated with this, studies on the contemporary world were rid-
dled with enthusiastic narratives of the so-​called globalization. And even per-
spectives that were intended to be critical, ended up moving away from issues
such as the interweaving between the accumulation of wealth and power. The
triumphalism that followed the collapse of real socialism made concepts such
as imperialism and class struggle underestimated if not considered obsolete –​
by sectors of the left, inclusive.
Ironically, the concept of imperialism fell into disuse precisely when the
Post-​Cold War world intensified both the polarization of wealth by means of
154 Pautasso

various mechanisms of expropriation, and the escalation of open or covert

interventionism in the form of regime change policies with an unprecedented
combination of war technologies and multimedia power. More than ever, it is
necessary to understand imperialism as a complex system of domination and
central to class struggles, taking into account the various dimensions brought
by Losurdo.

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 ­c hapter 9

David Harvey and the International Relations

Some Appointments

Leonardo César Souza Ramos1, Rodrigo Corrêa Teixeira2, and

Marina Scotelaro de Castro3

1 Introduction

David Harvey certainly occupies a prominent position in contemporary

Marxist studies.4 For some, Harvey would be one of the great references of
Marxism in recent decades, both in terms of certain analytical innovations
brought about and in terms of the debates in which he has constantly engaged
(Castree, 2007; Callinicos, 2006).
This chapter therefore seeks to present some of the central elements of the
Marxism of David Harvey, highlighting aspects that can contribute to a crit-
ical understanding of International Relations. In this process, attention will
be given to his understanding of the geography of capitalist accumulation, of
the processes of accumulation by dispossession and their implications for the
configuration of a new type of imperialism under way in the neoliberal phase
of capitalism. Finally, some brief considerations about possible points of dia-
log of Harvey’s approach with critical aspects of International Relations will
be presented.
Such reflection in itself is already relevant insofar as it contributes to the
understanding of the dynamics of expropriation in course in the contempo-
rary world economic order; but in addition, it is important to bear in mind
that such a perspective helps in a unique way to highlight the relevance of
David Harvey’s analytical contributions to the understanding of International
Relations. In other words, ultimately, the present discussion intends to

1 Professor of International Relations at Pontifical Catholic University of Minas Gerais.

2 Professor of International Relations and Geography at Pontifical Catholic University of
Minas Gerais.
3 Professor of International Relations at Centro Universitário de Belo Horizonte.
4 This chapter is a revised and expanded version of the following article: Scotelaro, Teixeira
and Ramos (2018). Translated into English by the authors.

© Leonardo César Souza Ramos et al., 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_010

David Harvey and the International Relations 157

contribute to a new vision of David Harvey, this time also as a theorist of the
international.

2 Towards a ‘Geography of Capitalist Accumulation’

In general terms, it is possible to say that, based on a revisitation of the Marxist

theory of accumulation, Harvey contemporizes the Marxian concept of prim-
itive accumulation, replacing it with the term accumulation by dispossession.
Thus, the author seeks to expand the scope of the category, which would,
therefore, also deal with the current practices of intense spoliation in periods
of crisis of overaccumulation. The reiteration of such practices would be recur-
rent strategies present in the accumulation processes that, in addition, also
depend on a geographic expansion that, in turn, would result in interregional
and international rivalries. This would explain the recurrence of imperialist
moments in the history of world capitalism, which would be better understood
once they are situated in a historical geography of capitalism. Such a perspec-
tive would reveal the uneven development of the processes of accumulation
and externalization of the internal contradictions of capitalism to vulnerable
spaces in neoliberalism. Ultimately, the understanding of contemporary inter-
national processes would be conditioned to the historical understanding of
the uneven geographical development of capitalism, which would bring in
itself explanatory elements of the dynamics of power between and through
states.
In order to get a better understanding of this historical geography of capi-
talism, it is crucial to understand Harvey’s attention to the geography of cap-
italist accumulation. According to the author, Marx’s theory of accumulation
presents a clear perspective on the spatial structure. In this sense, such discus-
sion is central as a way of identifying what would be “the crucial link between
Marx’s theory of accumulation and the Marxian theory of imperialism”
(Harvey, 2001: 237). According to Harvey, spatial organization and geographic
expansion are fundamental aspects in the processes of capital circulation and
accumulation, since these only occur in specific spatiotemporal configura-
tions (Harvey, 2011, 2018). Overall, the need for accumulation generates, at the
same time, the concentration of production and capital on the one hand and,
on the other, an expansion of the market. In this process of market expansion,
a new spatial structure was created. In other words, in the quest to overcome
spatial barriers to accumulation, new spatial structures are created that, in the
end, become barriers to further accumulation. In concrete terms,
158  Ramos et al.

these spatial structures are expressed, of course, in the fixed and immov-
able form of transport facilities, plant, and other means of production
and consumption which cannot be moved without being destroyed. (…)
the geographical landscape which fixed and immobile capital comprises
is both a crowning glory of past capital development and a prison which
inhibits the further progress of accumulation because the very building
of this landscape is antithetical to the ‘tearing down of spatial barriers’
and ultimately even to the ‘annihilation of space by time’.
harvey, 2001: 247

In fact, “the imperative to accumulate consequently implies the imperative

to overcome spatial barriers” (Harvey, 2001: 243). In this sense, according to
Harvey, a constant feature in the process of capitalist development is the con-
struction of a physical landscape suitable for accumulation only to, at a later
stage, have to destroy it. This usually occurs at a time of crisis, which leads
the author to state that “temporal crises in fixed capital investment, often
expressed as ‘long-​waves’ in economic development (…) are therefore usually
expressed as periodical reshaping of the geographic environment to adapt it to
the needs of further accumulation” (Harvey, 2001: 247–​248).
In short, understanding the geography of capitalist accumulation is one
of David Harvey’s great contributions to a more complex understanding of
the processes of capitalist accumulation. It is from this discussion that other
aspects of his argument become clearer, such as his theory of imperialism. But
before going into this question, it is essential to discuss the processes of dispos-
session present in the history of capitalism.

3 Accumulation by Dispossession

The modern state is linked both to the structure of the historical geography of
capitalism and to the accumulation practices set in motion at each historical
moment by the ruling classes (Harvey, 2003). Given the fact that the modern
state concentrates both political power and the legitimate monopoly on the
use of force, it has the capacity to maintain the institutional and constitu-
tional arrangements necessary for capitalist activities to develop in the sphere
of production as well as in the sphere of circulation. On the one hand, the
state is able to reallocate investments around spatially specific organizations,
thus making spaces of accumulation more dynamic. Furthermore, the state
is equally capable of creating physical spaces aimed at absorbing these sur-
pluses from investments in infrastructure. In addition, this role of the state was
David Harvey and the International Relations 159

originally fundamental for the accumulation itself, enabling the creation of

private property and the regulations between the nascent capitalist class and
the workers –​which leads us to the Marxian idea of ​primitive accumulation
(Marx, 2013).
On this basis, David Harvey argues that the process of accumulation
depends on the idea of p ​ rimitive accumulation in a double way: that is, it
depends on primitive accumulation as its moment of origin, but also –​and in
an extremely significant way –​as a continuous process that is fundamental in
the expanded reproduction of capital. According to the Marxian perspective,
the specific configuration of the capitalist mode of production was based on
changes in previous productive structures. The historical origins of capitalism
would thus reside in an initial process of breaking with these past social for-
mations, something fundamental for the creation of the means of production
that could be accumulated. In this process, the modern state is the institution
that formalizes the expropriation of communal lands and, at the same time,
provides the basis for the circulation of money that starts to mediate the social
relations between the holders of the means of production and the suppliers of
labor power.
This double dispossession of capacities for autonomous work, land and
means of subsistence was carried out from the emergence of the modern bour-
geois state, which is structured to provide the necessary dimensions for the
establishment of the capitalist model. This strategy of expelling individuals
from the countryside –​as well as other strategies implemented –​depended
on an association between the nascent bourgeois class and the state appara-
tus. The latter deals with the negative externalities of the non-​absorption of
this entire layer of workforce created by extensive processes of dispossession,
and thus starts to exercise a disciplinary function on the working class, con-
straining it to accept the laws of the liberal regime in consolidation. The com-
modification and monetization of the countryside as a tradable good, allied
to the workforce also treated as a good, were intensively explored, developing
in increasingly broader markets and strengthening land, commercial, bank-
ing and financial capital. The possibility of emergence of these modalities of
capital was only possible to be achieved once the state actively acquired new
sources of accumulation essential for the transformation and complexification
of capitalist production processes and relations (Harvey, 2003, 2013b).
The violent appropriation of pre-​existing non-​capitalist modes of produc-
tion was not something limited to Europe, but extended worldwide through
the violent domination of different peoples beyond the original borders of
capitalism. In this sense, colonialism was a crucial moment for the establish-
ment of capitalist relations on a world scale, since it inaugurated a large-​scale
160  Ramos et al.

flow of goods from the metropolis and colonies –​be they goods or the labor
force itself. The same processes of dispossession of land are carried out else-
where, and the growing working class is used as a fundamental element in
the management of crises of accumulation. From the beginning, the way in
which states act in the geographic space beyond their national borders has
already been evident, acting actively in the solution of their internal problems
of capital realization. These forms of external relief from the contradictions
of domestic accumulation have existed since the beginning of the system,
anchored in state support, given the very expansionist nature of accumulation
(Harvey, 2001, 2003, 2013b).5
The fact that the process took place violently and demanded control of
foreign spaces captures the importance of understanding the conquests and
domains of the state in relation to other regions to guarantee the power of
the alliance of national classes. It is at this point that Harvey advances his the-
sis on the Marxian concept of primitive accumulation: this would not only be
a founding element of capitalism that allows the consolidation of the power
of modern states, but also a fundamental element for the continuous and
expanded reproduction of capitalist accumulation processes on a world scale.
In this sense, the theoretical-​conceptual inflection proposed by Harvey con-
siders the nature of primitive accumulation practices as recurrent strategies to
deal with overaccumulation problems. In order to differentiate them, Harvey
moves away from the ‘primitive’ or ‘original’ content of the concept and calls
the continuity of the process as ‘accumulation by dispossession’. The aspects of
primitive accumulation that refer to the use of geographic expansion to realize
value remain, but the main strategy involves the devaluation of overproduc-
tion assets at minimal costs to be recycled more profitably in other spaces. In
this sense, accumulation through dispossession occurs contingently accord-
ing to the needs of realizing value within different moments of the historical
geography of capitalism. This difference between primitive accumulation and
dispossession is fundamental, since the latter not only contains the practices
established during the “original process” of accumulation, but also brings

5 At this point, Harvey calls attention to the fact that, before Marx, it was Hegel who presented,
in “The Philosophy of Right”, “imperialism and colonialism as potential solutions to the seri-
ous and stressful internal contradictions of what he considered to be a ‘mature’ civil society”
(Harvey, 2004b: 43). In other words, it would be possible to see in Hegel the seeds of the
Marxian understanding of the necessity of spatial fixes due to the internal contradictions of
capitalism.
David Harvey and the International Relations 161

with it other forms of concentration and centralization of power over capital

(Harvey, 2003: 144, 164).6
This means that, once the traditional possibilities of accumulation in a spe-
cific space-​time configuration are over, the state undertakes new expansionist
stages based on processes of commodification and privatization of productive
spaces already occupied by the capitalist production model (Harvey, 2013b,
2018). This does not mean a dismantling of the productive structures already
in place, but a revolution in the existing productive space, a true spatial adjust-
ment as a way of dealing with the contradictions inherent in the very develop-
ment of capitalism.7 And it is from this process of spatiotemporal fix that the
theme of imperialism, in conjunction with the concept of accumulation by
dispossession, gains importance for the understanding of the historical geog-
raphy of capitalism according to David Harvey.

4 The New Imperialism in This Context

David Harvey thus seeks to expand the scope of the phenomenon of prim-
itive accumulation by demonstrating that the theorists of imperialism who
use primitive accumulation as a framework for such actions circumscribe it
to a specific historical period. Thus, although he agrees with such perspectives
regarding the foundation and development of capitalism until the first half of
the twentieth century, his objective from this point on is to expand the con-
cept of accumulation by dispossession as a recurrent strategy and applied it
to other moments of crisis of overproduction made possible by the actions of
the states.

6 It is in this sense that Jim Glassman’s statement about the novelty of David Harvey’s dis-
cussion of accumulation through dispossession can be understood. According to Glassman,
although the idea of primitive accumulation has been constantly mobilized in development
studies, Harvey’s novelty is the use of this category –​now rethought as accumulation by
dispossession –​“to describe processes that are taking place in the capitalist countries of the
Global North” (Glassman, 2006: 608).
7 Harvey bases on the “Grundrisse” to think about this destructive/​reconstructive tendency
of the capital: “capital drives beyond national barriers and prejudices as much as beyond
nature worship, as well as all traditional, confined, complacent, encrusted satisfactions of
present needs, and reproductions of old ways of life. It is destructive towards all of this, and
constantly revolutionizes it, tearing down all the barriers which hem in the development of
the forces of production, the expansion of needs, the all-​sided development of production,
and the exploitation and exchange of natural and mental forces” (Marx, 2011: 334).
162  Ramos et al.

Ultimately, unlike readings that consider primitive accumulation as a ‘prim-

itive’ and ‘external’ moment of the accumulation process that gives rise to the
imperialist phase –​which would be the case of Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg,
for example (Harvey, 2013a: 554) –​, for Harvey these processes are perpetuated
in time from various forms of accumulation by dispossession that lead to new
processes of intense exploitation and control of capital accumulated from new
phases of geographic re-​expansion.8 These strategies depend on a renewed
role of the state and justify the existence of other imperialist moments cor-
responding to class alliances –​national and transnational, of capitalists and
workers –​in each historical period (Harvey, 2001, 2003, 2004a). In this case,
the result is a dialectical interconnection between the territorial logic of polit-
ical power and the spatiality of capitalist accumulation from the intervention
of the state, both in the process of reproletarianization of previously winning
sectors –​associated with the dismantling of the existing working class, and of
‘reconquest’ of new spaces aimed at revaluation of devalued assets.

It is at this point that the territorialized politics of state and empire re-​
enter to claim a leading role in the continuing drama of endless capital
accumulation and over accumulation. It is the state that is the politi-
cal entity, the body politic, that is best able to orchestrate institutional
arrangements and manipulate the molecular forces of capital accumu-
lation to preserve that pattern of asymmetries in exchange that are most
advantageous to the dominant capitalist interests working within its
frame.
harvey, 2003: 132–​133

The implication of these dialectically connected logics is the continuous

appropriation, transformation and domination of capitalist spaces through
accumulation through dispossession as a recurrent practice of capitalism that
shapes new imperialist moments (Harvey, 2003, 2013a, 2013b).

8 Even if this is not a central point in our argument, it is important to note that, although
he disagrees with classical Marxist approaches to imperialism, David Harvey is significantly
close to Rosa Luxemburg’s (1988) theory: in fact, her argument about capital’s necessity to
expand into pre-​capitalist zones in order to be able to continue accumulating (“colonial-
ism and imperialism were, in her view, necessary and central to capital’s survival”) (Harvey,
2018: 135) –​an issue intimately linked to her view about the meaning of the primitive accu-
mulation process –​is a fundamental point of Harvey’s theorizing about the new imperialism
and accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 2003, 2007).
David Harvey and the International Relations 163

In a context of creation of “spaces of neoliberalization” (Harvey, 2005a,

2005b), the state, insofar as it directs in these terms the process of rational-
ization of contemporary capitalist accumulation, ends up undertaking a new
phase of accumulation by dispossession that, in turn, inaugurates a new phase
of imperialism in global capitalism (Harvey, 2007). Such imperialist moments
arise when class relations within a state do not result in local solutions to the
problem of overaccumulation –​that is, when there is not, in a satisfactory way
for the reproduction of the dynamics of capital circulation, the reinvestment
of valued capital in domestic structures.
In this case, the internal capitalist production processes can be understood
as regions where their own logics of accumulation are developed. As seen,
capital as a social relationship creates particular geographies, specific spatio-
temporal configurations that are unstable in view of the very contradictions
generated by capitalism. In this sense, such dynamism is driven by the dialec-
tical relationship between possibilities and limits of accumulation in existing
productive structures and the hierarchical arrangements between social frac-
tions located on the borders of the state (Harvey, 2013a).
If imperialist behaviors involve “the sense that the contradictions of capi-
talism can be cured through world domination by some omnipotent power”
(Harvey, 2013a: 552) it is through the export of capital that it takes place
beyond the use of force –​capital export which also has the state as a support
point. Surplus capital can be exported through loans to other states to stimu-
late international purchases or function as foreign direct investment; however,
it is essential to understand at this point that, regardless of the destination
given to the over accumulated capital, the fundamental motivation will be to
obtain an average rate of profit higher than the national possibilities. Now,
once new productive forces are created outside the capital’s region of origin,
the state not only exports the internal contradictions of accumulation but also
new moments of devaluation from the emergence of rivalries and competition
between national and foreign capital put in shock.
Capital is “value in motion” (Harvey, 2018: 129), and in this movement in
search of the realization of value abroad, state actions should not, therefore,
be understood as a simple territorial expansion, but understood in the light of
imperialist movements that translate into different interregional hierarchies.
The idea of “​new imperialism” (Harvey, 2003, 2013a) thus stems from a new
dialectical relationship between the exercise of state power internally through
actions associated with privatization and flexibilization of productive relations,
and inter-​regional competition in spaces open to the movements of over accu-
mulated surplus capital. This, in turn, implies different movements of ‘export’
of devaluation, spatially and socially determined by the internationalization
164  Ramos et al.

of capitalist rivalries that informs the uneven historical-​geographical devel-

opment in capitalism. Thus, some specific regions –​such as the most eco-
nomically vulnerable states, for ­example –​undergo intense processes of
devaluation, generating localized crises, which, in turn, have the function of
mitigating the possible systemic crises of capitalism (Harvey, 2001, 2004a,
2013a).
Harvey affirms that, if in recent decades it is possible to perceive a growing
volume of surpluses being accumulated in East Asia, one can also perceive the
emergence of certain imperialist practices in such regions. In this sense, the
corollary of the argument is that, ultimately, the new imperialism is not char-
acterized by being an imperialism in the singular, but imperialist practices dis-
persed through an unequal geography of the distribution of the capital surplus
intimately connected to the transformations that have been taking place since
the 1970s (Harvey, 2007).

5 New Imperialism and Neoliberalism

Therefore, the intimate relations between the new imperialism and neoliberal-
ism can be seen: in fact, this contemporary phenomenon is historically inserted
in the neoliberal moment, and in this sense, it is constituted by a space-​time
dimension distinct from the previous imperialist forms when situated in the
historical geography of capitalism. Thus, it is possible to understand the pro-
cesses of neoliberalization

either as a utopian project to realize a theoretical design for the reorgani-

zation of international capitalism or as a political project to re-​establish
the conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of eco-
nomic elites.
harvey, 2005a: 19

Once seen in these terms, neoliberalism, as an effort to restore the power of

dominant capitalist elites, restores the power of certain class fractions through
the reconfiguration of certain hierarchical arrangements –​whether monetary
systems, political structures or organizational forms that have an impact in the
processes of reproduction and accumulation of capital in its local or global
aspects (Harvey, 2005a, 2005b, 2013a). In this process of retaking the power of
the capitalist class, the restructuring of institutional arrangements and class
relations involves financialization processes related to the power to control
capital movements, and also to the concentration of the volume of capital.
David Harvey and the International Relations 165

In addition, in a context of neoliberal globalization (Harvey, 2004b) the

establishment and consolidation of new market relations supported by a priv-
ileged relationship of access to the institutional support offered by the neolib-
eral state and by international arrangements is fundamental. In this sense, the
state promotes a series of privatizations –​a fundamental step both for accu-
mulation by dispossession and for the restoration of the power of the capitalist
class –​and at the same time it builds a structure aimed at guaranteeing both
the functioning of capital markets and the free circulation of capital goods.
In turn, international organizations manage and institutionalize the introduc-
tion of neoliberal practices of deregulation of the movements of production
inputs and control over the conditions of capital remuneration. Ultimately,
the connection between these state-​led actions and neoliberal practices is
evident: “The umbilical cord that ties together accumulation by dispossession
and expanded reproduction is that given by finance capital and the institu-
tions of credit, backed, as ever, by state powers” (Harvey, 2003: 152).
Now, to maintain and sustain this reconfiguration of power on a global spa-
tial scale, “the Wall Street-​Treasury-​i mf complex” (Harvey, 2003: 185) manages
crises located in more vulnerable territories, preventing that the devaluation
arising from such crises return to the center of accumulation, a phenomenon
that have occurred recurrently since the oil shocks that started in the 1970s.
This becomes explicit when attention is turned to the crises that the world
economy has been going through since the 1970s and the real impacts of these
at the center of accumulation –​until the 2008 crisis, of course. In this case,
the outbreak of a crisis of significant proportions in central countries ends up
having consequences not only for the reproduction capacity of the neoliberal
model but also for the historical geography of capitalism in force until then
(Menezes and Ramos, 2018). In this context, the role of China and its actions
to guarantee the export of capital accumulated until then (a globalization
with Chinese characteristics, with particular institutional aspects associated
with both the new multilateral banks –​baii and ndb –​and the Belt Road
Initiative), and the US responses to such actions (such as the recent creation
of the Development Finance Corporation, as well as the clashes around the
geopolitics of 5G technology, for example) stand out (Borquez and Shoaib,
2019; Vadell, Secches and Burger, 2019). All these issues draw attention to the
fact that, through certain structural adjustments, “(…) state interventions and
of international institutions (…) orchestrate devaluations in ways that permit
accumulation by dispossession to occur without sparking a general collapse”
(Harvey, 2003: 151).
166  Ramos et al.

6 Dialogs and Limits with International Relations

The innovations brought by David Harvey are certainly not unanimous.

Starting from a Marxist perspective, Raju J. Das, for example, criticizes Harvey’s
theory of uneven geographical development, highlighting what, in his opinion,
would be the author’s major problems: a limited view of class relations in cap-
italism that, in turn, would be intimately connected to a certain fetishization
of the power of spatial relationships (Das, 2017). From another perspective,
closer to poststructuralism, Andrew Jones presents a critique of ontological
and epistemological aspects of Harvey’s approach, which would be expressed
particularly in his defense of Marxist dialectics (Jones, 1999).
With regard to issues close to International Relations, the same occurs –​
see, for example, the important debate made possible by his work “The New
Imperialism”, which ended up involving prominent authors in the Marxist
field, such as Ellen Wood, Robert Brenner and Alex Callinicos, among others.9
Even so, there is a perpetuation of a certain “mutual negligence”: neither
Harvey engages with the literature and authors of International Relations itself
(nor even the critical theorists and authors critical from ir field), nor do they
customarily engage with the questions raised by David Harvey. One point that
could contribute to build a bridge for dialog concerns the issue of subjectivity
and culture –​an important issue to the critical perspectives of International
Relations.
In this case, it should be noted that David Harvey mentions the cultural
dynamics associated with the postmodern condition (Harvey, 2008). In par-
ticular, from such discussions Harvey highlights, at various times, what would
be constitutive aspects of the subjectivity of the neoliberal individual –​a pos-
sessive, short-​sighted individualism and in contradiction with what would be
the interests of humanity and nature –​and the need to its overcoming in the
search for the construction of qualitatively distinct and superior social (inter-
national) relationships.
Furthermore, when he talks about the “seven distinctive ‘activity spheres’
within the evolutionary trajectory of capitalism”, attention is paid to the sev-
enth sphere –​“mental conceptions of the world” (Harvey, 2011: 104)10 –​, which
is closely linked to the constructions of subjectivities. However, this is little

9 This debate was published in the journal “Historical Materialism”, 14 (4), 2006.
10 The seven activity spheres would be as follows: “technologies and organizational forms;
social relations; institutional and administrative arrangements; production and labor
processes; relations to nature; the reproduction of daily life and of the species; and ‘men-
tal conceptions of the world’” (Harvey, 2011, p. 104).
David Harvey and the International Relations 167

explored, and seems to occupy a secondary place in the author’s argument.

In this case, there is a potential dialog with the Marxist-​inspired perspectives
that emerged in International Relations from the late 1990s with the processes
of construction of hegemony at the global level and how, in these processes,
ideological issues are a fundamental aspect of the process.11 Even without
engaging so openly in the ideological issues of this process, Jonathan Pass, for
example, presents a possibility of such a dialog between David Harvey and the
neo-​Gramscians in his neo-​Gramscian proposal, engaging with the works of
Giovanni Arrighi, David Harvey and Robert W. Cox in order to deal with the
spatial aspects of world hegemony, using systemic cycles of accumulation as
an analytical reference (Pass, 2019).
Even so, other routes can also be explored; in particular, the Coxian,
Amsterdam and cultural perspectives (Ramos, 2020), each from its own par-
ticularities, can contribute in a distinct and rich way to the debate, pointing
out fundamental ideological aspects on which world hegemony is sustained,
and how the processes of implementation of neoliberal logic in the world are
intimately related to such processes of hegemonic struggle on a world scale.
The concept of new constitutionalism explored by Stephen Gill is an example.
According to Stephen Gill and A. Claire Cutler, the new constitutionalism
concerns to “the legal and political frameworks that are equally significant in
facilitating neo-​liberal forms of global economic integration and the extension
of the world market” (Gill and Cutler, 2014: 6). Closely related to the emergence
of a market civilization, the new constitutionalism expresses the political-​legal
counterpart of disciplinary neoliberalism12, incorporating a series of regulatory
and political-​legal mechanisms aimed at guaranteeing neoliberal patterns of
accumulation. In this process, a central element of the new constitutionalism
is the construction and extension of market logic –​which “includes rewriting
laws and statutes to facilitate primitive accumulation” (Gill, 2014: 39). That is,
in this sense, the potential for dialog between theorizing about the new consti-
tutionalism and Harvey’s idea about accumulation by dispossession and their
respective analytical derivations is clear.

11 Just by mentioning Gramsci, especially in his discussions about Fordism (Harvey, 2008),
David Harvey, however, does not advance a more substantive discussion about the pro-
cesses of struggle for hegemony and its potential implications –​and relationships –​with
the processes of spatial adjustment of capitalist production and accumulation.
12 Disciplinary neoliberalism concerns “primarily to the processes of intensifying and deep-
ening the scope of market disciplines associated with the increasing power of capital in
organizing social and world orders, and in so doing shaping the limits of the possible in
people’s everyday lives” (Gill and Cutler, 2014: 6).
168  Ramos et al.

In addition, the theoretical-​conceptual advances of David Harvey can also

contribute in a unique way to such perspectives –​authors such as John Agnew
(2005) and Jonathan Pass (2019) highlight in this case the importance of pay-
ing attention to the spatial dimensions of world hegemony, particularly of US
hegemony. However, important aspects of this process still require further stud-
ies, such as issues related to investments in infrastructure and US and Chinese
actions at this point. In short, dialog in this case can contribute to a next step in
the processes of developing a critical understanding of International Relations
and International Political Economy.

7 Conclusion

As seen, David Harvey presents an original and significantly relevant contri-

bution to the understanding of the processes of capitalist production and
accumulation in space. On the other hand, a dialog with certain critical per-
spectives of International Relations could also be fruitful, enriching Harvey’s
analytical framework dealing with cultural aspects of capitalism, in addition
to the insights he had already developed. In particular, this would dialectically
contribute to a better understanding of the processes of hegemony on a world
scale, and how these relate to the geography of capitalist accumulation.
More than seen only from an exclusively absolute perspective, space, for
David Harvey, is a significantly active aspect in the process of capitalist pro-
duction, being a fundamental element in the internal dialectical relations
(Ollman, 1992) concerning the processes of spatio-​temporal adjustment of his-
torical geography. of capitalism (Harvey, 2006, 2008). In this process, regional
distinctions are a fundamental element that is closely linked to the processes of
restructuring the expanded reproduction of capital on a domestic scale as well
as internationally. In this case, this question is fundamental, because despite
the criticisms raised against Harvey’s theoretical-​analytical construct, there is
a unique potential for contribution to the field of International Relations: his
creative inter-​scalar dialogs between Marx’s theory of accumulation with
Marxist theories of imperialism (and neoliberalism, via the concept of accu-
mulation by dispossession) from their spatial theory of capitalism can help
not only to strengthen critical approaches to International Political Economy
but also to question the limits of the separation between Political Economy
International and International Relations –​or, in the author’s own terms, the
separation between the territorial logic and the logic of capital. But these are
points for future development, to which the present chapter intends to have
made a brief contribution.
David Harvey and the International Relations 169

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Borquez A and Shoaib F (2019) El Banco Asiático de Inversión en Infraestructura
Apuntando al Camino del Medio: Uniéndose a las Filas de los Bancos Multilaterales
de Desarrollo, pero con Características Chinas. Estudos Internacionais, 7(3): 103–​20.
Callinicos A (2006) David Harvey and Marxism. In: Castree N and Gregory D (eds.).
David Harvey. A Critical Reader. Malden: Blackwell.
Castree N (2007) David Harvey: Marxism, Capitalism and the Geographical
Imagination. New Political Economy, 12(1): 97–​115.
Das rj (2017) David Harvey’s Theory of Uneven Geographical Development: A Marxist
Critique. Capital & Class, 41(3): 511–​36.
Gill S (2014) Market Civilization, New Constitutionalism and World Order. In: Gill, S. and
Cutler, A. C. (eds). New Constitutionalism and World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge
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Gill S and Cutler A (2014) New Constitutionalism and World Order: General
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Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Harvey D (2004b) Espaços De Esperança. São Paulo: Loyola.
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Harvey: A Critical Reader. Malden: Blackwell.
Harvey D (2007) In What Ways Is ‘The New Imperialism’ Really New? Historical
Materialism 15(3): 57–​70.
Harvey D (2008) The Dialectics of Spacetime. In: Ollman, B. and Smith, T. (orgs).
Dialectics for the New Century. Basigkstoke: Palgrave.
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 pa rt 3
Marxist Theories on Imperialism

∵
 ­c hapter 10

Notes on Imperialism, State and International

Relations

Luiz Felipe Brandão Osório1

1 Introduction

In the midst of the centenary jubilee of the first debates, imperialism comes
back to the spotlight.2 Given as exhausted and overcome, it was resurrected
as current and unavoidable in international discussions. After a short inter-
regnum of illusory prosperity on the threshold of the transition between cen-
turies, the much-​vaunted term returns to the mouths and ears of analysts and
scholars of international relations. Today’s leading role is largely due to the
practical and theoretical directions that impacted the study of the interna-
tional system. It has become an indispensable tool for understanding a world
that boasts unprecedented levels of productivity and technological devel-
opment and, at the same time, suffers from the exponential deterioration of
social conditions across continents. The events recorded in the first decades of
the twenty-​first century (which, despite being brief, already show interesting
contrasts) impose new tasks on theoretical perspectives and political struggles.
On a practical level, the scene of degradation illustrates the disastrous sce-
nario: rising rates of violence; intensification of social upheavals, with the
respective concentration of income; patent economic and social exploitation,
marked by racism, intolerance and xenophobia; and exacerbation of interstate
rivalries, accompanied by military movements and specific conflicts, present
in all corners of the globe. In theory, after the brief period of mists at the end
of the twentieth century, the international reality brought up again the indis-
pensability of the critical debate on the role of the State in capitalism, fostered

1 He is the author of the book “Imperialism, State and International Relations”, by Editora
Ideias e Letras. Post-​doctorate in Political and Economic Law and PhD in International
Political Economy. Professor of International Relations at Federal Rural University of Rio de
Janeiro (ufrrj).
2 Originally published as chapter of the book “Marxism and International Relations”: Bugiato
C (2021) Marxismo e Relações Internacionais. Goiânia: Editora Phillos Academy. Translated
into English by the author.

© Luiz Felipe Brandão Osório, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_011

174  Brandão Osório

by the harmful reverberations of the phenomenon of the intensification of the

internationalization of production relations, reflected in the different areas of
knowledge.
The misery and horror that inhabit the concreteness of international rela-
tions prompt the urgent consideration of imperialism, both in practice and in
theory, as an undisguised and structural element. Reflecting on this word is
not a simple exercise. He has translated the directions of the development of
capitalism since the nineteenth century, having fluctuated like no other in the
systemic trajectory. From a critical concept it became criticized, from virtuous
to distorted. From a glittering theme, it was relegated to the shadows, consid-
ered outdated and exhausted, until its resurgence. Focused on its uncomfort-
able present day, the critical view of international relations turns to the source
of imperialism. This phenomenon is of such magnitude that it does not fit in
itself, or in artificial borders, its developments occur and/​or affect the inter-
national scope by essence. Imperialism and international relations mix as if
they were Siamese twins, and one cannot be treated without aiming at the
other. The inherent interface is not, however, the work of chance or a given and
unfinished construction. Yes, it was built over the years, with the historicity
of this figure having a nodal aspect, gaining distinct features. In this vein, it is
essential to point out its necessary specificity, so that theoretical precision is
not lost in abstract, a-​historical and transcendental approaches.
The concept of imperialism carries with it for centuries contents and stereo-
types that can regress to the level of theoretical imprecision. From the rescue of
the empires of antiquity, such as the Roman, through the great feudal powers,
through the modern absolute monarchies, until reaching the contemporary
era of empires, this entire historical arch was and can be painted randomly
under the ink of imperialism. Although the existence of violence, oppressions
and exploitations is verified as conditioning at all times, the linkage to the
quantitative aspect confines the scientist to the appearance of phenomenal
investigation, losing the precision of the analytical lens in a diffuse and distinct
space in its bases. The decisive scientific step to unravel the real essence of
imperialism takes the direction of understanding the mechanisms and struc-
ture that give it specificity, that is, its qualitative aspect,3 which allows to iden-
tify imperialism, from a certain historical point, with content and particular
ways, which contrast irrevocably with previous experiences.

3 It is possible to perform an analogy to the reasoning exposed by Mascaro (2013), to explain

the law in contemporary times, didactically using the quantity/​quality pair to reveal the legal
essence.
Notes on Imperialism, State and International Relations 175

Despite punctual coincidences or exceptionally similar traits, there is no

way to delineate links that bring together interims as disparate as the Roman
Empire of antiquity and the contemporary empires of the post-​nineteenth
century. Although the ancestral meaning of the Latin lexicon4 brings with it
the use of force and domination, the historical phenomena are not coincident
or even comparable. This is because violence to impose the will of the stron-
gest is a phenomenon that transcends historical systematizations. It can be
verified from antiquity to contemporary times. Which does not mean to say
that the concept of imperialism is reduced to coercion, nor that it must be
taken up and traced back to the beginnings of civilizations. In this sense, it is
crucial to outline guidelines that guide the scientific narrative.

2 Imperialism, Marxism and International Relations

It is from the emergence of the capitalist mode of production, inaugurating the

historical contemporaneity, that certain social and economic relations carved
the specific structural bases of imperialism, outlining international relations.
In past modes of production, what is tried to be associated with imperialism is
imprecise, happening in completely different dynamics, given that the central
gears are not similar at all. In other words, imperialism is founded and unfolds
in a very specific political-​economic context, one shaped by concrete capital-
ist social relations. At the heart of this construct is the mercantile form, from
which the mechanisms of operationalization of this sociability derive, such as
the state political form (in which the bourgeois state, the nation-​state or the
national state is inserted), which is the actor that characterizes namely the
interaction of agents. Thus, imperialism is based on the fullest manifestation
of capitalism, the international system, through the economic pillar, capitalist
accumulation permeated by the contradiction between nationalization and
internationalization of capital in the world market, and the political vector,
by the political organization given in a multiplicity, a collectivity of States,
grouped in a dynamic network of permanent competition between materially
unequal forces.
Thus, before further conceptual deepening, it is essential to point out that the
understanding of imperialism necessarily passes through the understanding

4 For Anderson (2016) and Kurz (2003), the Latin word imperium already has the inherent
connotation of the power to order. The power of domination and its repressive character can
be verified in the most remote civilizations, which, in no way, allows them to be compared to
the capitalist specificity that shaped the contours of the phenomenon today.
176  Brandão Osório

of capitalism, and consequently of the national state. Therefore, to speak of

imperialism is to speak of capitalism; to approach international relations is
to touch capitalism. This first demarcation leads to an escape from the traps
that it encounters along the way to unraveling the meaning of imperialism.
Abandoning the vulgar totalizing visions, it is necessary to overcome the con-
temporary trends that seek to connect with critical conceptions and, thus,
confuse them. There are a lot of books or studies that aimed to map impe-
rialism, whether to understand it, to bury it or even to resurrect it. From
compartmentalized analyzes (conceptualizing it by separate biases, as just a
political or strictly economic term), to positive and negative perspectives, as
well as theoretical and empirical approaches, it is possible to identify readings
of the most disparate political nuances. More than an academic concept, it has
become a watchword and a political banner.5 Therefore, attempts at appro-
priation abound. The myriad of approaches is very disruptive, as it leads to
confusion and, consequently, to theoretical and conceptual inaccuracies. The
multiplicity of writings on the issue does not exhaust it, however; needs to be
elucidated.
The full and broad explanation of imperialism as a specific manifestation of
capitalism is given by the theoretical horizon of International Relations. The
current scenario demands an organic and systematic study of international
relations, which inexorably permeates the establishment of methodological
guidelines that enable a coherent and rigorous look at its trajectory. Focusing
on this endeavor, it is pertinent to delve into International Relations, as a scien-
tific field. In this exercise, it is up to the reader to pay attention to the fallacies
posed by the abstractions that co-​opt this scientific field for a verve proudly
and manifestly flaunted as conservative.6 It is interesting to point out how
the scientific narrative of International Relations deals with its promiscuous
relations with governmental apparatus, bragging that it is a science that limits
itself to repeating and, eventually, to sophisticating the official discourses and
positions of national States. When, in fact, they ratify domination strategies,
universalizing concepts in abstractions that disguise the interests of singular
social classes. There is a whole literature that is claimed to be the dominant
one in the study of International Relations that underpins the beginning of the
academic and scientific verve of the matter in the throes of the World War i.7
In the emergence of a new scenario, of British decadence and American

5 See Hirsch (2010).

6 See Teschke (2016).
7 International Relations would have been thought, as a science, from the creation of the
‘Woodrow Wilson Chair’ at the University of Wales, in 1919, held by bureaucrat and diplomat
Notes on Imperialism, State and International Relations 177

ascendancy in a fraternal condominium of power that imposed itself on the

then threatened capitalist world, post-​1917. As if, for example, the previous dis-
cussions, notably those of the Second International, the pioneering debates
and the polemic between Lenin and Kautsky had not even existed.8
From the expansion of capitalism through the quadrants of the globe,
scientific research opened new levels, but maintained its biased character.
Theoretical aridity predominates on its horizon. There is a flagrant limita-
tion between the theoretical paradigms, based on the innocuous discussion
between idealism/​liberalism and realism, and its consequences.9 By exclusion,
what does not fit this axis is placed in the basket of (carelessly called) critical
theories. The imprecision and incorrectness of this grouping make the alter-
native study even more difficult. In order for criticism not to be compromised,
it is essential to extrapolate the Anglo-​Saxon monopoly, without which it is
impossible to see beyond the surface. The unique and technical thinking seeks
to detach itself from criticism by presenting itself as pure, appearing to be
scientific rigor. International Relations suffers from the same evil of special-
ization that contaminates the social sciences as a whole. The lack of a broad
approach that focuses on the object of study, but is not limited to it, adding
other areas, is the rule and not the exception. The inter or multidisciplinarity
of International Relations is not its stain, as purists think, on the contrary, it is
its immanence, which is not in line with the dogmatism of departmentaliza-
tion and consequent segregation of areas of knowledge.
Therefore, Marxism reveals itself to be the science capable of decipher-
ing the sphinx-​like enigmas of international relations. Marxism is essentially
internationalist science, one capable of capturing the fullness of capitalism, a
mode of production that is only completed internationally. In the midst of the
historical and structural context of heterogeneity between countries that pre-
dominates in the international system, there is nothing better than evoking the
concreteness of the social totality of social phenomena to grasp its essence. The
insertion of Marxism in international debates, in addition to being essential,
is unavoidable to overcome the appearance of sophistication and penetrate

Edward Carr (1892–​1982), one of the main negotiators of the Treaty of Versailles. His out-
standing performance at the post-​war conference qualified him to occupy the academic post.
This symbol of the biased construction that was sold to other countries as the inaugural
milestone of a scientific nature of International Relations belongs to the monopoly of Anglo-​
Saxon theories in the dispute also for knowledge worldwide (Monteiro and Gonçalves, 2015).
8 The debate between Lenin and Kautsky, which revolves around the growing competition for
territories between capitalist countries, associated with the intense concentration of capital,
has historically been overcome (Arrighi, 1983).
9 See Fernandes (1998).
178  Brandão Osório

to the heart of reality. It is the Marxist tradition that will provide the meth-
odological and theoretical frameworks so that a sophisticated, complete and
reliable scientific interpretation of international relations can be drawn. It is
the Marxist authors who focus on the role of the State and capitalism in inter-
national dynamics. Therefore, they have imperialism as their central category,
giving this political-​economic phenomenon its highlights.

3 Marx and International Relations

In this endeavor, it is perfectly plausible to resize the beacons of the study of

international relations. In this vein, the second introductory demarcation fol-
lows the reasoning: if imperialism is shaped by capitalism and manifests itself,
in essence, at an international level; it is Marxism in international relations
that will enable its central reading. It is the aspect that will open the theo-
retical horizon necessary to develop the directions of scientific knowledge. In
short, as Marx’s vision is focused on the anatomy of capitalist society,10 the
time frame can only be contemporaneity, the consolidation and spread of the
capitalist mode of production throughout the world. It is only in capitalism
that imperialism acquires specificity, becoming a structural element, with-
out which the essence of international relations cannot be fully understood.
Historically, it was verified the existence of forms around exploitation, violence
and dependence, which acquired a determined face with capitalism, from
the reproduction of production relations by the quadrants of the globe. The

10 In the mid-​nineteenth century, with bourgeois sociability already established in England

and in full expansion across continental Europe, Karl Marx (1818–​1883) and Friedrich
Engels (1820–​1895) completely transformed social thought by elaborating a critical theory
about the way of capitalist production in its permanent movement of evolution, tracing
the anatomy of bourgeois society, with the fulcrum of interpreting reality, but not only.
The ultimate goal was to understand it in order to radically transform it (from the root),
revolutionize it. Thus, they lay the foundations of the most complete critical thinking
of contemporaneity, based on the historical-​dialectical materialist method. The study of
capitalism with a focus on its historical origin as a socioeconomic system and its place in
the history of humanity inaugurates the rupture with previous trends and structures new
foundations of social thought. According to this conception, what can be seen as a result
of the modes of production over time is the inherent conflict between material forces,
in a necessarily dual and conflicting relationship, and one class cannot exist without the
other, and never unitary. The accommodation of struggles leads to concrete social forms
that structure capitalist sociability. Reflections that propose criticisms about the current
reality inexorably depart from the Marxian premises. See Marx, 2013; Rosdolsky, 2001;
Naves, 2008.
Notes on Imperialism, State and International Relations 179

globalizing dynamic was already announced by the German from Trier, in the
joint work with Engels, in the midst of the industrial reality in the meantime.

Driven by the need for ever new markets, the bourgeoisie invades the
entire globe. It needs to establish itself everywhere, explore everywhere,
create bonds everywhere. By exploiting the world market, the bourgeoi-
sie gives a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in all
countries.
marx and engels, 2010: 43

This has been proven since the first research sketches on capitalist sociability.
Throughout the various lines of his works,11 as well as in the study plan he
outlined, Marxian reflections on the State and the world market were present.
The world market is developed as a final concluding part of your research.12
From the outlines of the critique of political economy, it is already possible
to discover elements that provide the theoretical substrate necessary for the
analyzes. In his time, Marx had already outlined the features that would cir-
cumvent debates that permeated the history of capitalism and international
relations.

Here appears the universal tendency of capital which differentiates it

from all preceding stages of production. Although limited by its very
nature, capital strives for [the] universal development of the productive

11 It is possible to identify sparse excerpts from his works that deal with the world market,
monopolies and competition, as well as the expansion of capitalism around the world,
with greater emphasis, from the “Communist Manifesto” (1848), which he wrote with
Engels, through the “Grundrisse” (1857–​1858) and, more clearly, in Volumes i and iii of
“The Capital” (1867 and 1894), without completely relegating other works.
12 What emerged with the publication of the “Grundrisse”, from 1857–​1858, was the rele-
vance of the international scope for a full understanding of capitalism. The original struc-
tural plan for Capital covered the entire path in 6 volumes, namely: 1) on capital (with a
section for capital in general, with an emphasis on the production process, circulation
and profits and interest; a second section on competition, a third on the credit system,
a last on share capital); 2) on land ownership; 3) on salaried work; 4) on the state; 5) on
international trade; 6) on the international market and crises. Almost ten years later, in
1865, Marx opted for a leaner scheme and closer to the one actually published, divided
into four books. Book i would deal with the capital production process. Book ii concern-
ing the capital circulation process. Book iii concerning the global process of capitalist
production. Finally, Book iv on the history of theory. Despite all the polemics about ‘post-​
mortem editions and compilation’, what is denoted, for now, is the concern in Marxian
reflections with the expansion of capitalism in the international space. See Marx, 2011;
Rosdolsky, 2001.
180  Brandão Osório

forces and, in this way, the presupposition of a new mode of production

arises, based not on the development of the productive forces to repro-
duce and, at most, expand a determined state, but where the very devel-
opment of the productive forces –​free, unobstructed, progressive and
universal –​constitutes the presupposition of society and, therefore, of
its reproduction; where the only presupposition is the overcoming of the
starting point. Such a tendency –​which capital possesses, but which at
the same time contradicts it as a model of limited production and, there-
fore, impels it to its own dissolution –​differentiates capital from all the
preceding modes and, at the same time, contains within itself the fact
that capital is posited as a simple point of transition.
marx, 2011: 445–​446

The immanent tendency towards the expansion of capital is detected by Marx,

without having made direct reference to the term imperialism and without
having carried out a systematic study of international relations. Even so, the
premature death of the German intellectual, in 1883, did not prevent the fer-
tilization of his ideas in a century of boiling and consolidation of the work-
ing class.13 At his time, he made brilliant analyzes of British colonialism in
different places, denouncing the essence of this practice, which had repercus-
sions worldwide (Carnoy, 1994). Despite Marx’s relevant writings on interna-
tional politics, in which he imposed his view on British overseas experiences
in conjuncture articles published in periodicals, the German thinker did not
bequeath systematic and finished works on the subject. Even so, the expansive
tendency of capital was highlighted throughout his writings. “The tendency to
create the world market is immediately given in the very concept of capital”.
(Marx, 2011: 332).
In addition to sketches and sketches, also in his magnum opus, Marx
(2013), when dealing with the production relations, emphasized the dynamics
between anarchy and despotism that surrounded capital, which within itself
are arbitrary, but among themselves are rivals in frank uncoordinated dispute
and without spatial limits. In this sense, capital only exists in multiplicity,

13 With the nodal support of Engels, the continuation of his writings could constitute other
volumes of his most significant and impactful work that could still be published. The fol-
lowing volumes of Capital were published post-​mortem by Engels. Volume ii in 1885 and
Volume iii in 1894. From 1904 to 1910, Karl Kautsky published other texts by Marx, whose
compilation was called Volume iv, whose original title was Theories of Surplus-​Value, in
Portuguese. Kautsky ’s editing work was heavily criticized, not being accepted by many as
a continuation of Marx’s work (Rosdolsky, 2001).
Notes on Imperialism, State and International Relations 181

collectivity; through the interaction between the many capitals the general
laws of capitalism are concretized. A single universal capital is a contradiction
in terms. It is characteristic of capitalism, which develops through competition,
which is the source and expression of the anarchy of production. Therefore, for
Marx (2013), capitalist social relations take the dual form of anarchy and des-
potism. Among many capitals there is anarchy; within each capital, despotism.
Each relationship, anarchy and despotism, is the condition of each other. So
it is also between States, within their borders before their nationals (subject
to their law), sovereign, despotic; and outside, in the interrelationship with
their peers, anarchy reigns, the lack of a central and hierarchically superior
command.
Despite the absence of an explicit section on the subject, a closer look leads
the reader to the keys of Marxian reflection, which necessarily pass through
the most developed capitalist form, the world market. Also, in section i of
book i, the tendency towards internationalization and the relevance of the
scope of the world market are evident, when it comes to world money, which,
when leaving the internal sphere of circulation, strips itself of national clothes,
entering the world market.

On leaving the sphere of internal circulation, money strips itself of its

formal local standards of price measurement, currency, symbolic cur-
rency and value symbol, and returns to its original form as a bar of pre-
cious metal. In world trade, commodities unfold their value universally.
Therefore, their autonomous figure of value confronts them, here, as
world money. Only in the world market does money function fully as a
commodity whose natural form is, at the same time, the immediate social
form of the realization of human labor in abstracto. Its form of existence
becomes adequate to its concept.
marx, 2013: 15

It is only in book iii of Capital, in the unfinished meeting edited by Engels,

that the most assertive observations appear. Entitled The Global Process of
Capitalist Production, this final volume of the critique of political economy
basically argues that the world market generally constitutes the basis and vital
atmosphere of the capitalist mode of production, being the presupposition
and result of the reproduction of capitalist social relations (Marx, 2017). This
perception suggests that the world market is not the product of the sum of
several States or their national economies, but rather is the condition through
which relations between States exist. The world market presents itself as the
universal form of capitalist existence. In other words, it is through the world
182  Brandão Osório

market that the commodity changes from being national to being irreproach-
able capitalist. With this theoretical legacy, it was not essential, therefore, for
Marx, to write a specific book on the subject for it to gain consistency and a fur-
ther remarkable development. Far beyond his time, the philosopher from Trier
was already shrewdly interpreting the consequences of the intensification of
capitalist production relations.
The transformations in industrial production, with the strengthening of
monopolies, the concentration and centralization of production, the emer-
gence of the financial sector and the growing export of capital, as well as the
intensification of rivalries and the intensification of the use of violence and
domination around the world, boosted capitalist production relations to other
levels. Marx did not experience this moment of exponential transmutation
and internationalization of capitalism, but his premises were nevertheless rat-
ified over time. The authors who survived him, and from him extracted the the-
oretical matrix, sought to interpret his ideas about international relations and
capitalism, in view of the unprecedented expansion of production relations
around the world. In this field, the debates of imperialism are imposed, which
not only inaugurate, but fundamentally carry the study of contemporary inter-
national relations.
Therefore, the imperialist phenomenon demands to be debated, accord-
ing to Marxist trends, in terms of the development of capitalism. It is
crucial to go beyond shallow analyzes that are limited to the immediate iden-
tification between imperialism and capital exports or invasive policies and
military interventions. Thus, the Marxist theoretical edifice of imperialism
is erected, even though different interpretations can be found on its vari-
ous floors amid important moments of inflection in its trajectory. From this
construct, the interface between imperialism and international relations is
verified, stimulating the joint and intertwined vision of both. Marx himself
had already tested clues that would cement the foundations of investigations
into the expansive and universalizing tendency of capital, a trail that was fol-
lowed, with greater or lesser linearity, by those who departed and depart from
Marxian premises. In the myriad of vectors that present themselves and in the
oscillations suffered by the concept, the task of systematization and organiza-
tion of considerably different interpretations emerges, which are impossible
to be homogeneously grouped. Therefore, the third introductory demarca-
tion touches on the observation that, even within the Marxist spectrum, it is
necessary to emphasize the plethora of asymmetrical approaches. This study
focuses on this pressing task.
Notes on Imperialism, State and International Relations 183

4 Three Debates on Imperialism

Based on the premises espoused in this introduction, this text is guided, from
its theoretical link, through the journey between the most varied Marxist con-
ceptions of imperialism, bringing and reinforcing elements of materialist crit-
icism for the understanding of the phenomenon in the midst of the interface
between capitalism and international relations. Therefore, the construction of
an argument in theoretical and historical cycles that will end up at the top of
the Marxist building, coined here as full criticism, without failing to suggest
possibilities for the deepening and consequent development of the fruitful
and necessary, but still atrophied, dialog between Marxism and International
Relations. Therefore, the book is structured by the intertwining of two bea-
cons of systematization of thought on imperialism, which are not necessar-
ily corresponding: a) the chronological one that encompasses the historical
periodization in three phases, since its genesis in the transition between the
nineteenth and twenty centuries until its present-​day form in the twenty-​first
century, with a view to the transformation of capitalism amidst the concrete-
ness of international relations, from 1870 to 1945, from 1945 to 1970 and from
1970 to the present day; and b) the theory that organizes the different perspec-
tives on imperialism by the emphasis that the concept gives to the economic
aspects (law of value, its movements and its manifestations), to the political
ones (struggle and correlation of classes and groups) and to the interrelation
of these within the Marxist spectrum. Armed with these criteria, the work will
be sewn into three major debates.
Regarding the temporal demarcation, there is an approximation regarding
most of the literature. What can be deduced from the bibliographic survey
is that the authors, for the most part, trace the stages of imperialism, taking
into account the great world transformations14. By different denominations
and similar characterizations, most of the renowned authors point to three
moments. Thus, Anderson (2016), Callinicos (2009), Harvey (2005); Hirsch
(2010); Kurz (2003), Martins (2011), Miguez (2013); Panitch and Gindin (2004;
2006); have Brink (2008); Valencia (2009); Wood (2014) divide the trans-
mutations of imperialism into a first period, classical or polycentric, which
would go from 1870 to 1945; a second that spanned the Cold War, until 1991,

14 One cannot ignore in this context the authors who, for various reasons, see only two
periods of imperialism, either because of the chronological limitation of their work or
because of the view that the unfolding of the world is still grounded in the post-​1945
configuration. Within this spectrum fit, for example: Arrighi (1983); Barone (1985); Brewer
(1990); Leite (2017); Rowthorn (1982).
184  Brandão Osório

called superpower imperialism, bipolar, neo-​Marxist; and a third that would

range from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the consolidation of globaliza-
tion to modern times, coined as post-​Cold War, monocentric, or globalization
era imperialism. In this vein, the research axis revolves around three cycles,
whose conformation approaches the capitalist historicity (based on structural
crises) taken by the French regulationist school15, incorporated and adapted
by Hirsch ’s materialist theory of the State (2010) and, partially, by Callinicos
(2009) and, essentially, by Mascaro (2013).
Therefore, there is no logical and linear assumption in history or mechanical
theoretical effects deduced from the law of value that guide capitalist develop-
ment, but the complex and contradictory historical interaction between social
actors and concrete material practices, rooted in the social conditions of pro-
duction. The shining merit of this theoretical framework touches on the inter-
relation of the different phases of capitalist development with the strategies

15 In this sense, the theories of regulation come to aggregate in a mutually conditioning rela-
tionship to the materialist theory of the state. Within the theoretical spectrum that ended
up being formed on regulation, the vector that needs to be highlighted is the one that dia-
logs with Marxist political economy, starting from the premises of Louis Althusser, whose
pioneering emphasis turns to Michel Agliettà . This current emerged in France in the
context of the crisis of the 1970s, and can be considered as an economic interface of the
derivationist theories of West Germany, due to the Althusserian matrix. The driving ques-
tion of the research was to know how capitalism managed to survive, given the conflictive
character and inherent bearer of crises in the capitalist relationship, which would make
continued accumulation unlikely. There would be some specific social forms that would
try to regulate and couple tensions and antagonisms. The context of the 1970s and the
crossroads that were approaching the state and capitalism were propitious for theoretical
reflections of this magnitude. Initially developed in universities (in Paris and Grenoble)
and in the circle of cepremap (Center d’ Études Economic Outlook/​Mathématique
Appliqués à la Planning), its craftsmen, armed with these concerns, sought answers to
the crisis of the social welfare model by criticizing political economy that could, at the
same time, reject the dominant economic theories, of a highly abstract nature. Economic
structures and processes should not be analyzed using criteria of pure rationality, but
influenced by social and power relations. The illusion of broad political leadership driv-
ing relatively crisis-​free capitalist development has been dispelled. From the exhaustion
of the social welfare model (and consequently of Keynesianism), analyzes were built over
the following decades on the continuity, crises and historical changes of capitalist societ-
ies. Thus, an alternative to the dominant (Keynesian) political economy emerges, without
ceasing to fulminate the abstraction typical of neoclassical economic theory and mone-
tarism, and even to point out the vices of Marxist cycles (reviewing the Marxist critique of
political economy, rearticulating social structure objective and social action). Supported
by institutionalist economic theory and Marxist theory by Althusserian verve, the initially
French theory of regulation proved to be fruitful and was not restricted to academic ghet-
tos, it soon gained worldwide repercussion. For more see: Hirsch and Roth (1986), Boyer
(1990), Lipietz (1988), Hirsch (2010) and Jessop (1991).
Notes on Imperialism, State and International Relations 185

of valorization presented, with the corresponding political-​institutional forms

and with social relations of forces. From this perspective, the intermediate
categories of political economy proposed to conduct the discussion about the
phases of rupture and stability of capitalism are the regime of accumulation
and the mode of regulation (Boyer, 1990). The regime of accumulation is pri-
marily economic, but not limited to it, involving a particular combination of
production and consumption that can be reproduced despite capitalism’s ten-
dency to crisis. The appropriation of the result of the work of others happens
legitimized by an institutional nucleus (formal and informal), constituted by
social forms and practices, sufficient and aimed at accumulation, the mode
of regulation. This institutional set, together with a vast complex of norms,
ensures the reproduction of capitalism. Duality (accumulation regime and
regulation mode) is not the joining of indifferent elements or the superpo-
sition of two equal ones, but the structural coexistence, which reveals a cer-
tain degree of articulation between its terms (Jessop, 1991). Based on these two
vectors, they establish the trajectory of capitalism in three moments: liberal
capitalism (here called the pioneer debate), Fordism and post-​Fordism. Crises
are not exceptional interregnums, but structuring and driving elements of the
three phases.
With regard to the guiding thread of ideas, the distance is more noticeable.
The emphasis here attributed to the core of the interpretations is distinct. The
conceptual course of imperialism is guided (immersed in the broad spectrum
of the general tradition of Marxist thought, but it does not necessarily coincide
with it, with approximations and distances) and permeated by the emphasis,
in its definition, attributed to economic and political aspects. In this sense, an
attempt is made to escape the foundation on which most of the specialized
literature is based, the one that long before had been identified as outdated,
centered on the characterizations of imperialism, whether ultra-​imperialism,
super-​imperialism or collective imperialism, in an attempt to build controver-
sies over the inaugural polemics. from the clash between Lenin and Kautsky .
Regardless of temporal characterizations, the aspects that insist on these pil-
lars are equipped with the necessary adaptations.16 In addition to this dynamic,
very original systematizations stand out, such as those by Callinicos (2009);
Corrêa (2012); Kurz (2003); Leite (2017); Martins (2011); Miguez (2013); and
Brink (2008). This research, however, does not adopt any of them specifically,
but seeks to extract their positive points from valid contributions. In fact, the

16 To a greater or lesser extent, classifications that, for various reasons, do not overcome past
paradigms nor, for obvious reasons of time, reach a broad view of today’s imperialism, we
can list: Arrighi (1983); Barone (1985); Brewer (1990); Rowthorn (1982).
186  Brandão Osório

driving force behind imperialism’s inflections should not be held separately

from the theoretical trajectory of Marxist thought in general, but inserted in
the transformations and directions taken by capitalism and its critical reflec-
tion. Therefore, the theoretical guide that will guide the organizational link
is the emphasis given to the economy, politics or the interaction of both by
the unfolding of Marxist visions, as they do, each in its own way, Elbe (2010);
Hirsch (2010); Mascaro (2013); Boucher (2015). Therefore, the interface of the
historical-​theoretical axes occurs in three moments: in the first, the economis-
tic conception is inaugurated, which would be linked to the period of expan-
sion of capitalism until the World War ii; in the second, there is a rupture of
Eurocentrist limits and an expansion of the focus of imperialism, through a
comprehensive, systemic vision, which is situated in a paradigm transition,
but with an economistic bias still glistening, in a short interregnum that will
approximately go from 1945 to 1970; and in the third, an arc that goes from
the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s, through the consolidation of post-​Fordism
in the 1990s, to the current two, there is an explosion of horizons, creating a
wide universe (beyond de, but without discarding economism), which can be
systematized from the rise of politicism, its variables (partial politicism) and
its contestations (full criticism), which opens the way to reach the materialist
critique of imperialism.
The inaugural debate is called the pioneer.17 From the last quarter of the
nineteenth century to the World War ii, it is possible to trace a common thread
between the ideas that investigated in depth the transformations of capital-
ism. Exhaustively discussed, in view of the genius and centrality of his concep-
tions for the unfolding of future conceptions, the list of authors approached
is almost consensual. Taking the intellectuals who are avowedly inspired by
the Marxian matrix of thought, and at that moment saw themselves as direct
continuators or successors, pair up Hilferding, Luxembourg, Kautsky, Bukharin
and Lenin. The peculiarity of each one is reserved, there are elements that
allow them to be combined in the same interregnum. The concerns that the
authors of that time were concerned with are linked to the reasons for the
expansion of capitalist relations around the world and its consequences, such
as interstate rivalries, competition and resulting wars. Gravitating around

17 Due care is taken not to repeat the name ‘classic’, because, despite being more widespread,
it carries a certain methodological imprecision, since classics in thought would only be
the Greek philosophers of antiquity. Nor is it intended to equate to Warren’s (1980) con-
ception of imperialism as a pioneer or midwife of capitalism. The term is intended only
to illustrate the vanguard of the authors who took Marxism to the inaugural reflections on
the subject.
Notes on Imperialism, State and International Relations 187

these premises, each one assumes a particular posture, exposing its singular-
ities within this range. To a large extent, they noted the evident transforma-
tions in the mode of production and their effects throughout the world. The
increase in the concentration of production, the growing export of capital, the
emergence of monopolies, state intervention and organization in economies,
mergers between capitals and the emergence of finance capital, colonial incur-
sions and the outbreak of wars around the world were inevitable traits of living
reality. These signs evidenced the expansion of capitalism across the globe,
which, in turn, illustrated a crisis and the consequent intensification of the
contradictions in the mode of production, opening cracks that could lead to
its socialist transition or its revolutionary overcoming. After the phase of com-
petitive capitalism, the conditions detected presented the last era of monopoly
capitalism. The readings of this scenario were guided by the economicist bias,
attributing to the economic material base the determining force of social rela-
tions, including the state political entity, observing the State as a result of the
financial dynamics, inevitably attending to the bourgeois interests.
The second debate is the Fordist one.18 In a very different context from the
predecessor, the pioneering visions are revised and adapted to the new con-
crete reality, which will run from 1945 to the 1970s. In this list, reflections on
imperialism are expanded, tearing the limits of the European continent and
covering other regions around the world. In effect, a duality of central con-
ceptions is established, which deny and reaffirm imperialism, adapting it to
the new conditions; and visions focused on the periphery, which substan-
tially contribute and innovate to the debate, thus being the object of a more
detailed investigation. In this tuning fork, the current of monopoly capital, the
Marxist dependency theorists and the Third Worldists are present. The emer-
gence of the United States, as a hegemonic power, and the rise of the Soviet
Union, which symbolized the arrival of the left to power, as well as the spread
of capitalist relations across the quadrants of the world map, gave capitalism a
new face. The reconfiguration took place along Fordist lines, in a composition
of political forces around social well-​being that made it possible to achieve,
in the central portions, growth rates without parameters in the history of the
mode of production. In peripheral regions, the reason for blocking modern-
ization and selective industrialization was questioned. Revised, the concept of
imperialism, having the pioneers as a beacon (the emphasis on accumulation

18 Name given in function of the influence that the theory of regulation and the materialist
theory of the state exert on the perspective expressed in this work. The term itself refers
to the mode of organization of capitalism, which will be better delineated in the spe-
cific topic.
188  Brandão Osório

crises, interstate competition and wars), is diluted in other aspects, such as the
domination from the center to the periphery and the dependence of the latter
on central capitalism. In spite of the substantial changes in the way capitalism
is organized, it is noteworthy that this Fordist debate, in theoretical terms, is
closer to what distances it from the pioneers. The economistic veneer remains
perceptible in the analyzes, which does not allow them to break completely
with their predecessors, but place them as nothing more than a remarkable
complement to the inaugural ideas of imperialism. For this characterization
and for its chronological brevity, the Fordist debate can be pointed out as a
fertile interregnum of transition until the inflection in the interim successor.
The third and current debate is the post-​Fordist one.19 Created in the midst
of the crisis of Fordism in the 1970s, and consolidated with the spread of finan-
cial globalization in the 1990s, this time lapse persists to the present day. In the
wide range of authors who are inscribed, in the midst of chronologically irreg-
ular and theoretically varied and innovative dynamics, it is crucial to divide
them into three strands, politicism, partial politicism and full criticism. In a
context of deconstruction of the social welfare model and the introduction of
neoliberal dictates, the transformation of the face of capitalism has a strong
impact on political, economic and social relations. Merging the eclipse and
the resumption of the concept of imperialism, it is reconstructed on new the-
oretical bases. From this cycle onwards, the economistic matrix starts to share
spaces with political approaches and those that interrelate both. At this stage,
the internationalization of production relations takes on other levels, since
production ceases to reside on the national-​state basis and starts to spread
throughout the world, in a diffuse and deconcentrated organization. From
Fordism, we move to Toyotism, in the sense of further rationalizing the orga-
nization of work. The State changes the guidelines in the intervention in favor
of public policies and social rights, reconfiguring itself even more open to the
flavors and unpleasantness of the international market. Thus, the collapse of
social indices and the fall in the general standard of living are inevitable. An

19 It is noteworthy that the term post-​Fordism is and can be used by non-​Marxist currents as
well. What underlies the use of the concept in this research is the meaning given by the
Marxist strand of the French theory of economic regulation. Following the logic of pre-
vious cycles (pioneer and Fordist), the post-​Fordist is based on the conception of a mode
of organization of capitalism that breaks with the previous one, in reaction, offering new
levels from the rupture of the past. More often it is coined as contemporary, because it
is of the current moment. If we consider the historical conception of the philosophy
of ideas, contemporaneity is inaugurated with the bourgeois revolutions at the end of
the eighteenth century. Therefore, the entire period since then will be contemporary.
Therefore, this nomenclature cannot be adhered to.
Notes on Imperialism, State and International Relations 189

income-​concentrating model emerges, oriented towards the service of specific

financial interests, undermining the post-​war social democratic agreements.
A direct consequence of the new correlation is the even more intense and now
more porous spread of conflicts and tensions around the world, in diffuse and
unusual violent actions, significantly altering the global panorama. Countless
attempts to reread this inflection emerge, in an amorphous dynamic, due to
the vastness of different perspectives. In the midst of the impacts suffered in
the academy by the changes, the political bias, its consequences and its crit-
icisms stand out. From this systematization of imperialist thought, the path
to the top of the Marxist edifice, the materialist critique of imperialism, will
become clearer.
Cycles are not hermetic. Which means to say that the intertwining of the-
oretical matrices at different moments is inescapable. For example, in the
Fordist debate it is possible to find positions that merely adapt the pioneering
conceptions to the reality of the new temporal interregnum without innovat-
ing substantively, as it can be seen that, even in the post-​Fordist debate, econ-
omistic views are still present and of great relevance., including. Therefore, it
is not intended here to delimit the porosity of ideas, but to mark the inflec-
tion periods in the trajectory of development of theorization on imperialism.
Therefore, the demarcation in three phases, the pioneer (from Europe to the
world), the Fordist, the one that broadens the scope, focusing on the world-​
system as a whole, and the post-​Fordist, fraught with the explosion of reflec-
tions on imperialism. Naturally, one does not have the scope to exhaust the
subject (which would not even be possible); the aim is to provide the special-
ized literature with a stimulus for future discussions.
What is important to emphasize to readers in this essay is that the focus of
the study is imperialism and Marxist theories of the State, in their articulation
with international relations, naturally. Based on the theoretical framework
developed in this work, the relevance of this phenomenon to a full understand-
ing of the subject will be evident. There are other concepts that interrelate
with it and flirt with a tenuous threshold within the reflection of authors that
will be addressed here. For example, hegemony. This word demands a lot of
care in your discussion. As much as it appears mixed with imperialism in some
perspectives, due to the obvious and necessary respect for approaches that are
based on hegemony to explain international relations, it is emphasized that
the concept of hegemony will not be addressed in this research (despite all
its appeal among the authors of political verve), when evoked laterally, due to
the inevitability of its presence and the consideration of the primacy of impe-
rialism, which places the reflection of hegemony as an auxiliary, much more
tangent to conjunctural than structural issues.
190  Brandão Osório

Through the exposition of the introductory notes of the study that will flow
in a broader format, as a book,20 in this short space the goals that guided fur-
ther deepening are outlined. Due to specific limitations, the objective of the
essay is precisely to stimulate discussions and ferment reflections on the cen-
trality of the theme for International Relations, as a scientific field.

5 Conclusions

In view of the theoretical epic traced in this study, which starts from the
threshold between the twilight of the nineteenth century and the dawn of
the twentieth century and which currently completes its centenary jubilee,
it was sought, in the midst of a terrain populated by various approaches and
fruitful debates, to pave a path, within the Marxist spectrum, that could lead
the reader to a full understanding of the capitalist phenomenon, structuring
international relations: imperialism. In the tune of the permanent distrust
of labels,21 within the capitalist mode of production, it is always current and
necessary to unveil the real character of a concept as disputed, multifaceted
and treacherous as imperialism. The tool is the umbilical relationship between
Marxism and International Relations.
If the task was to trace a route that explained the different theoretical
emphases allied to the great world changes, the result of this endeavor was
to overcome the strictly economistic look (emphasis on the law of value, its
movements and its manifestations) and politicist (emphasis on political issues,
struggle and correlation of classes and groups) towards the rescue of the new
reading of Marx initiated in the 1970s to explain the theory of the state.
Capitalism is constituted in its most developed form in the international
system. The world market is the widest range of manifestations of capitalism.
It is the arena that fully captures capitalist phenomena. It is the basis and
atmosphere of life of the capitalist mode of production. Therefore, studying
the state and capitalism without delving into international issues is like play-
ing the violin with just one hand.22 The capitalist state does not emerge in
isolation, but collectively, as a state system, this multiplicity being a struc-
tural feature of capitalism. The geographic space of capital is not that of state

20 It should be noted that this chapter is part of the larger study, condensed in the book
“Imperialism, State and International Relations”, by Editora Ideias & Letras, published
in 2018.
21 See Lipietz (1988).
22 See Barker (1991).
Notes on Imperialism, State and International Relations 191

borders, but the international one. Therefore, imperialism can only be debated
from a perspective that is attentive to the structure and dynamics of global
capitalism and the state system.
In short, in today’s scene, in the midst of the intensification of contradic-
tions via the dissolution of the modernizing mirages of post-​Fordist capital-
ism, it is urgent to revisit the concept of imperialism, recovering its relevance,
which is not a simple task, but demands the assumption of a theoretical and
practical posture, which encourages the reader to escape the comfort of cer-
tainties. Faced with the misty scenario, the inclination towards Marxism is rel-
evant for two reasons. The first is related to the search for escape valves in the
current context of struggles. The second touches on the need for a theoretical
horizon to lead political militancy to transformation. Understanding today’s
directions is a task that inexorably permeates the discussion between imperi-
alism, the state and international relations.
At a time of crisis of world accumulation, the return to previous teachings
opens up alternatives for thinking and for the struggle for new horizons. The
overcoming of capitalism involves the deconstruction of its gears. Imperialism
is undoubtedly one of its cardinal pieces.

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 ­c hapter 11

The Marxist Debate on Post-​World War ii

Imperialism

Caio Martins Bugiato1 and Tatiana Berringer2

1 Introduction

The Marxist theory of imperialism has been debated and developed for at
least one century.3 Its inaugural debate4 took place with Vladimir Lenin (1982),
Nicolai Bukharin (1986), Karl Kautsky (2008), and Rosa Luxemburg (1985),
in the heat of the explosion of World War i and since then there have been
numerous advances and resumptions of those theses. The main disagree-
ment occurred between Lenin and Kautsky, which for this chapter, needs to
be briefly explained here. For Lenin (1982), the export of capital takes on great
proportions in a world context in which the ruling classes are divided into
national social formations, whose power is represented by the strength of their
respective state. The process generates unequal developments between impe-
rialist states, colonies, and dependent states, as well as rivalry among them.
Thus, the thesis is that imperialism tends to intercapitalist wars. In this sense,
Lenin maintains the inevitability of wars as long as capitalism lasts, especially
because there would be a dispute over control of markets and access to raw
materials, in addition to maintaining the rate of profit and the need to export
capital. On the other hand, Kautsky (2008) understands that the drama of war
allows capitalists to see greater possibilities of obtaining surplus value from
a stage that avoids warlike confrontation. It would then be possible to trans-
form the policy of imperialism into a policy of alliance between imperialist

1 Professor of International Relations at the Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro. E-​
mail: [email protected].
2 Professor of International Relations at the Federal University of abc. E-​mail: berringer.tati-
[email protected].
3 Originally published as an article in the Brazilian journal “Princípios”, volume 42, number
166, 2023. Translated into English by Alberto Resende Jr.
4 About the inaugural theories and debates, the authors mentioned as follows, as system-
atizers, they present good explanations in their books. Specifically on the debate between
Kautsky and Lenin, see Bugiato 2017.

© Caio Martins Bugiato and Tatiana Berringer, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_012

The Marxist Debate on Post-World War ii Imperialism 195

states, conforming to ultra-​imperialism.5 That is a capitalist phase in which the

major world powers renounce the arms race (as there is no longer any mean-
ing in those conflicts for the export and accumulation of capital) and come
together in a federation. This federation would be a cartelization of foreign
policy derived from an alliance of imperialist states and their ruling classes to
stabilize the international system and guarantee the domination of the bour-
geoisie in its national states and over the periphery.
Lenin’s perspective had a greater impact on Marxist debate both in theory
and in political practice during the first half of the twentieth century –​and in
some cases, it extends beyond that period. However, after World War ii, with
the emergence of a single great power in the capitalist world, Leninist theory
ended up being questioned and revised by important Marxist theorists. Such
a debate took place among Harry Magdoff, Ernest Mandel, Nicos Poulantzas,
and others. Those three Marxist authors wrote articles and books on impe-
rialist theory in the 1960s and 1970s, against the backdrop of changes in pro-
duction and on the relations between metropolis states and dependent states
under U.S. domain. However, to bring out the most important points for this
chapter from his vast works, we are guided by the following question: Do the
conflicts between them remain or not? In the debate among those authors,
relevant issues arise for understanding international politics.
Therefore, the objective of this chapter is to systematize this debate, mainly
because it does not appear in important works in the Marxist field that seek to
deal with the issue in question, such as Barone (1985), Brewer (1990), Noonan
(2017), Osório (2018), and Kiely (2020). Those, when dealing with the history
of the Marxist theory of imperialism, curiously refer and/​or highlight the con-
tributions of the world-​system Theory or the Dependency Theory to interpret
international relations after World War ii, ignoring or just mentioning in pass-
ing the debate. In addition to locating this discussion vis-​à-​vis the inaugu-
ral debate of the Marxist theory of imperialism, we seek to demonstrate the
points of convergence and divergence they had between them. To this end,
each of the following three sections is dedicated to one of the selected neo-​
Marxist authors, and later we present final considerations with comparisons.
In addition, from a more general point of view, this text demonstrates the
richness and pertinence of Marxism for International Relations, despite being
obscured.

5 In order not to confuse the denominations throughout the chapter, it should be noted that
what Kautsky calls ultra-​imperialism is what Mandel calls super-​imperialism, which is also
Magdoff’s conception. What Mandel calls ultra-​imperialism is something still different from
those, which comes close to Hardt and Negri’ s (2001) definition of empire.
196  Martins Bugiato and Berringer

2 Harry Magdoff6 and the US Super Imperialism

According to Magdoff (1972, 1979) US imperialism resulted from the structure

of the colonial system before World War i that gave rise to the structure of
dependence and domination of the centers over the peripheries. The main dif-
ference is that an imperialist network or system was formed, which adapted
the economic structure of the former colonies to the role of appendages of the
metropolises: ‘Price formation, income distribution, and resource allocation
evolved, with the help of military power and blind market forces to contin-
ually reproduce dependency’ (Magdoff, 1979: 120). Capitalism is, therefore, a
world power system. But the author argues that dependence is an economic,
political, and social relationship, which is not only carried out through the
relationship between dominant states and dominated states but is linked to
the practices of the dominant classes in dependent countries, whose interests
are connected to foreign forces. In such a way that they sustain and reproduce
asymmetrical relationships, constituting a real obstacle to the development of
peripheral social formations.
Capitalism as a world-​system is inherently expansionist in nature, that is,
the dominant bourgeoisie of central states tends to operate on a world scale
since, within social formations, there are competitive pressures and technical
progress and recurring imbalances between production and demand create
tensions for market expansion. In the period of imperialism without colonies
(after World War ii), the export of capital is operated by the monopoly com-
pany; much higher than in the previous period, as more companies operate
in a greater number of countries. In addition, the US is the main exporter of
capital.
Magdoff argues that the advent of the monopoly company (monopoly capi-
talism, unlike the phase that preceded it, nineteenth-​century competitive cap-
italism) does not mean the end of the competition, but its elevation to a new
level: operating on a global scale to ensure existence and profit growth, the
arrangements to divide the market and/​or the competitive struggle between
gigantic companies, supported by their national states –​from protectionism
to militarization –​, extended to a large part of the planet. It is worth noting
then that monopolies are not at odds with the state system and the imperialist

6 The American Harry Magdoff was co-​editor of the Marxist journal “Monthly Review”, and his
ideas have an affinity with the theories of Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy. His analysis of post-​
war US foreign policy, more empirical than theoretical, brings very important data about the
conquests of foreign markets and their importance to the US economy.
The Marxist Debate on Post-World War ii Imperialism 197

network but rather represent the symbiosis of monopoly capital with the state
of its country of origin.
After the World War ii, through military bases and direct military support,
the local ruling classes maintain dependence on imperialism despite (formal)
political independence. In some cases, the armed forces of the dependent
social formations fulfill this function. Furthermore: the supposed cooling of
inter-​imperialist rivalries would have been a factor of unification of the central
states given the threats of national liberation struggles and socialist revolu-
tions inaugurated with the Russian Revolution. Thus, the rise of the US as the
greatest economic, political and military force implied the ability, at an oppor-
tune moment, to organize and direct the imperialist network. According to the
author:

Fundamental to the period of imperialism without colonies is the new

role of the United States. The shattering of other imperialist centers fol-
lowing World War ii and the concomitant emergence of strong revolu-
tionary movements generated the urgent need for the United States to
restore the stability of the imperialist system and to seize the opportunity
to advance in self-​interest.
magdoff, 1979: 123

The expansion of the US imperialist system was supported by the state in

financing advanced technology, driven by the military sector, such as atomic
energy and satellite communication, as well as new forms of transport and
cultural production, based on Hollywood cinema. The foreign policy of the
United States, expansionist and aggressive, would aim, directly or indirectly, to
control the greatest possible extension of the planet to maintain openness to
trade and investment by large US companies. Opening and keeping the ‘open
door’ requires constant vigilance, strength, and persistence to control and
influence the politics and economy of dependent states to ensure the repro-
duction of capital. The imperialist network is, therefore, operated by a group
of giant US companies, which dominate a vast part of world markets –​despite
having their activities mostly destined to Europe and Canada. In addition to
the dominant position of commerce and its industrial monopolies, they rely
on the imposition of the dollar as an international means of payment, credit,
and reserves and a largely internationalized banking network associated with
the expansion of commerce and industry.
Once colonialism became difficult to practice, the US state and its rul-
ing class put in place other practices –​traditional, new, and not so new –​of
198  Martins Bugiato and Berringer

exploitation and domination, which can range from military occupation to

subtle techniques of influence, depending on circumstances and actions
of political and military leaders. Referring to Rosa Luxemburg, according to
which imperialism necessarily implies the use of military force for the repro-
duction of capital, Magdoff (1979) notes that the general development of mili-
tary technologies, logistics, and tactics –​installation of military bases abroad,
military interventions and occupations, and so on –​in the foreign policy of
the United States are the pillar of the control and influence of this state in
the world-​system. In the economic and political-​ideological sphere, the author
cites the constitution of preferential trade agreements, economic blocs, and
international organizations (United Nations, Organization of American States,
International Monetary Fund, World Bank) in which the diplomacy of the USA
plays a leading role in the direction of economy and politics in world capital-
ism. In addition, the United States began to use widely in foreign policy what
Magdoff (1972) calls foreign aid, a procedure of international cooperation
that consists of granting donations, loans, consultancy, training, and so on, to
countries with the general purpose of keeping the ‘door open’ and pro-​US gov-
ernments and preventing revolts, revolutions, and Soviet aid. In cases where
there were threats or blocks to indirect control, the US promoted counter-​
revolutions. That means putting political and military programs into practice,
through the financing of electoral campaigns, coups d’état, military assistance
and training of cadres of the local armed forces. Besides, free access to the
internal market; legal conditions for foreign capital to act, such as avoiding
its expropriation, discrimination and interference in ownership and manage-
ment; and making the beneficiaries dependent on the US market, with loans
and debts that perpetuate the subjection to the aid. Sometimes such ‘cooper-
ation’ is carried out under the auspices of international organizations, so US
impositions seem more subtle. Behind those practices hover the operations of
the Central Intelligence Agency (cia).
For the author, US dominance is indisputable. Although he indicates in
passing (1972) when discussing the configuration of world capitalism, that
US capitalism admits (economic) competition of capital from other cen-
ters (Europe), he asserts that it exerts political and military supremacy. For
him in the imperialist system there is a centripetal force that ties the core
countries to the USA. As with new and old practices, the United States exerts
economic, political, and military supremacy in international relations, config-
uring the American empire, which indicates affiliation to Kautsky’s thesis on
ultra-​imperialism.
The Marxist Debate on Post-World War ii Imperialism 199

3 Ernest Mandel7 and the Permanence of Inter-​imperialist Rivalries

According to Mandel (1967, 1982, 2009) US imperialism takes shape in a period

he calls late capitalism, which is a stage of the monopoly phase that began at
the turn of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. That is different from com-
petitive capitalism and divided into two phases: the classic and the current.
The current moment corresponds to late capitalism and begins with the third
technological revolution in 1940/​45, based on monopolies and productive
internationalization. The concentration/​centralization and export of capital,
according to the Belgian author, are determined by the hunt for technologi-
cal super-​profit, which is the search for extraordinary profit in the context of
technological innovations that increase demand. Furthermore, late capitalism
also consists of a permanent war economy: political, diplomatic, and military
measures of the imperialist states serve as a stimulus to the development of
productive forces and contribute to the removal of obstacles to the export of
capital. Such expansionism is the expression of the inherent character of the
capitalist mode of production, the so-​called uneven and combined develop-
ment: capital and the socioeconomic and political relations that it carries tend
to take over and shape the regions of the planet, bringing all countries together
in a hierarchical organic unit. This unit brings together centers and periph-
eries, in which those centers –​advanced capitalists –​dominate and exploit
those –​dependent capitalists –​and hinder their development.
In the 1960s and 1970s, US superiority were challenged by socialist experi-
ences and national liberation struggles (Cuba is a great example). So, fearing
that they would abandon the capitalist camp, the US strategy was to restore
and strengthen the economic power of Europe and Japan in the 1960s. This
process was also the result of an economic necessity inherent in US capitalism.
Its economy, already dominated by capital-​exporting monopolies, follows the
logic by which, in general, the export of capital occurs as a function of com-
petition, to first compete with a national competitor, then to achieve on an
international scale, and, finally, to fight against foreign competitors. Mandel
(2009) reports the superiority of US monopoly companies, which hold great
technological advances due to the subsidies they receive from the state.
Rigorous with the explanation and differentiation of processes, Mandel
(1982) presents his concept of centralization of capital.

7 Belgian economist Ernest Mandel was a scholar of political economy, one of the main refer-
ences of the Trotskyist movement and leader of the Fourth International.
200  Martins Bugiato and Berringer

Centralization of capital implies central directing power, or centralization

of control over the means of production –​in other words, centralized pri-
vate ownership. In this context, it is not important to know whether the
shares are distributed internationally among small or large shareholders,
since one of the notorious traits of capitalist companies in a joint-​stock
company, and in monopoly capital as a whole, is that the possession of a
large amount of capital within of a large corporation allows control over
even greater amounts of capital. The international centralization of cap-
ital, therefore, means central control of the capital from different origins
and national controls.
mandel, 1982: 227 Author's emphasis

In turn, the international centralization of capital can take two forms: first, large
companies of different national owners become controlled by a single class,
from a single country; or the second, large companies of different national own-
ers merge into an international company without control held by just one class
of a particular country.
The author goes on (Mandel, 1982: 228–​9) to distinguish four processes of
internationalization of capital:
1) internationalization of the realization of surplus-​value, which is the sale
of goods (international trade, exports);
2) internationalization of the production of surplus-​value (branches under
the direct control of the parent company; associations, companies
founded by foreign companies in countries abroad; large monopolies
with which foreign companies join);
3) internationalization of the purchase of labor force merchandise (interna-
tional mobility of labor force);
4) internationalization of capital control, the true internationalization of
capital, which consists of the transfer of ownership, either from one coun-
try to another, or from one national group of capital owners to another; in
other words, international alteration of capital ownership (which is not
necessarily congruent with 1, 2, and 3).
In different ways, in the classical phase the formation of monopolies (capi-
talization centralization) was a phenomenon restricted to the national space
and dissolved over time due to crises, recessions, wars, and new correlations
of forces among imperialist states. In the late capitalism such formation takes
place internationally, is concentrated among the imperialist metropolises –​the
The Marxist Debate on Post-World War ii Imperialism 201

United States and Europe8 –​and takes place in sectors with greater technolog-
ical content. International centralization, therefore, corresponds to a central
ruling power that controls the means of production.
According to Mandel (1982) there are three types of relationship between the
(late) capitalist state and the international centralization of capital. They are:
A) Centralization accompanied by the international expansion of the
power of a single state, which corresponds to the first form of inter-
nationalization of capital mentioned above: when a national class of
capitalists exercises decisive control over the international production
apparatus, and foreign capitalists participate as minority partners. In
this case, the international power of a single imperialist state corre-
sponds to the international supremacy of a national group of capital
owners on a global scale.
B) Centralization comes together with reduction of the power of a set of
national capitalist states and the emergence of new federal-​state power,
a supranational capitalist state. This type corresponds to the second
form of internationalization of capital mentioned above, in which the
international merger of capital takes place without the domination of a
specific national capitalist group (the multinational company).
C) Relative indifference of capital towards the state, which tends to be a
transitional process between the two previous types. Here, companies
internationalize their activities to such an extent and in so many coun-
tries that they become indifferent to the political and economic situa-
tion in their country.
Thus, three models of the imperialist political system among the metropolises
stem from those three types of relationship between the international cen-
tralization of capital and the late capitalist state: super-​imperialism, ultra-​
imperialism, and continuous inter-​imperialist rivalries. In super-​imperialism –​
Magdoff’s model, according to Mandel (1982: 223) –​a single imperialist power
exercises hegemony, and the other imperialist states lose their real indepen-
dence, becoming small semi-​colonial powers. In the long term, that process
rests on both the military supremacy and the ownership and control of produc-
tion and capital concentrations. In ultra-​imperialism, the international fusion
of capital is such that all differences among the economic interests of capital
owners of different nationalities disappear. The processes of capital accumu-
lation spread evenly throughout the world, ignoring the political juncture and

8 It is important to point out that the formation of European multinational companies and
a European supranational state appear in Mandel’s theory as a sketch, as a process in an
embryonic stage.
202  Martins Bugiato and Berringer

institutions to create a large world market, whose dynamics would be free

competition between large companies, freed from their national states. The
tendency is for a supranational world state to emerge, defending the interests
of all capital owners against threats of economic crisis, revolts, revolutions,
and so on. In continuous inter-​imperialist competition, the fusion of capital
takes place on a continental level, forming a small set of imperialist super-
powers competing. The intercontinental competition then intensifies, and
imperialist rivalries continue, but no longer among national units, but among
such superpowers: US imperialism (which controls Canada and Australia), the
less powerful Japanese imperialism (which controls part of Asia), and Western
European imperialism. In this model, the probability of world wars like those
of the first half of the twentieth century is low, with economic rivalries prevail-
ing, which does not exclude imperialist wars by proxy, colonial wars of pillage,
anti-​revolutionary wars and wars against national liberation struggles, and
nuclear war against the socialist bloc.
Therefore, the central point of international political economy for Mandel
is the advance of US imperialism over other central social formations and the
European reaction in a way that rivals the USA. This process trends towards
the formation of European multinational companies and a European suprana-
tional state (European Economic Community/​e ec, which will give rise to the
European Union later). In other words, the trend in the Old Continent would
be towards what he classified as the second type or type B of relationship,
between the capitalist state and the international centralization of capital,
as described above. Regarding the models of the imperialist political system
between the metropolises, for the author, the continuity of imperialist rival-
ries predominates as a dynamic of international relations (revamped, since the
European imperialist agent in the post-​World War ii period would be a con-
glomerate of states, not a single state). The interference of US capital within
the borders of the eec represents a means by which part of the European
market is taken away from a European capital. It is a process of intensifying
international capitalist competition, which leads to the dominance of US com-
panies in Europe, resulting in the subordination of European capital. Given
this, the emergence of the supranational state will be decisive and a real gain
for the groups and leaders of the Western European bourgeoisie, even becom-
ing the most efficient anti-​recession instrument. Thus, for Mandel (1982), both
employers’ organizations and eec authorities recognize and desire the inter-
penetration of capital and the formation of European monopoly companies, as
they understand that only a unified European bourgeoisie can stand up to the
USA (not the individual nationalism, such as that of De Gaulle). The contradic-
tion among the interests of large national capitals finds resolution in the state
The Marxist Debate on Post-World War ii Imperialism 203

factor, given that the tendency of capital interpenetration makes the national
state an ineffective instrument, and it is necessary to find a new form of state
that corresponds to the new socioeconomic reality: supranational European
institutions.
A European capital would demand a European bourgeois state as a more
capable instrument to promote and guarantee its profits, as well as to defend
it against all its adversaries (Mandel, 1967: 29). Large European companies are
pushing for the consolidation of the eec: to leave the free trade zone towards
economic integration and successfully compete against the US, otherwise,
they have witnessed the divestiture of their companies (the first form of inter-
national centralization described above) and/​or a throwback to economic
nationalism/​customs protectionism. The future of supranational institutions
ultimately depends on the level at which the process of the international inter-
penetration of capital has reached. A European capitalist federation could only
be born out of the phenomena of international monopolies. However, Mandel
believes that this European process is still a sketch of the stage of the huge
national capital, and the national state has not been overcome yet. Regardless
of the stage, rivalries between the metropolises still take place. It is, therefore,
in Europe and North America that the decisive struggle takes place between
the big monopolies and the imperialist powers.

4 Nicos Poulantzas,9 Imperialism and Bourgeois Factions

According to Poulantzas (1974, 1976, 1978) the rise of the Third World move-
ment affected theories of imperialism, which ended up focusing on analyzes
of center-​periphery relations, on issues related to unequal development and
dominance between those countries. Therefore, he thought it was important
to reflect on inter-​imperialist conflicts, that is, the relations among imperialist
metropolises in the current phase of imperialism and the implications for rev-
olutionary strategy. Specifically, in his Marxist theory of the state (Poulantzas,
1978), he asks how relations among imperialist states affected the capitalist
state apparatus.

9 The Greek Nicos Poulantzas settled in France in the 1960s, where he encountered the intel-
lectual group of the philosopher Louis Althusser. Under this influence, in part of his political
and academic career, he sophisticatedly reinterpreted the classics of Marxism -​Marx, Engels,
Lenin, and Gramsci –​and thus promoted advances in the Marxist theory of politics, espe-
cially in the theory of the capitalist state.
204  Martins Bugiato and Berringer

The author (Poulantzas, 1978) recalls that there are three positions on
this. 1) Positions as Kautsky, such as Magdoff’s, in which all capitalist states
and their respective bourgeoisies are subordinated to US super-​imperialism.
2) Positions like Mandel’s on imperialist rivalries between autonomous and
independent units. 3) And his position according to which there was a change
in the imperialist chain that affected the relations among the metropolises
and, in particular, on the states and the bourgeoisie. The critique to Mandel
and others is that for them, the current phase of imperialism is not marked
by a change in the structure of relations among the imperialist metropolises.
For the Belgian economist the inter-​imperialist conflicts between the center
have the same meaning at present as in the past (in the classic of imperialism,
about which Lenin wrote) and, are placed, in a context of autonomous and
independent states, guided by their national bourgeoisie, fighting for suprem-
acy. In particular, in this vision (Mandel), the expansion of the eec is consid-
ered cooperation and internationalization of European capital from different
countries that lead to a European supranational state for the elimination of the
supremacy of US capital.
Poulantzas (1978) differs from the positions of Magdoff and Mandel
and explains the change in the structure of relations among the imperialist
metropolises. He considers that the capitalist mode of production has a double
tendency, which is: it becomes dominant within the national social formation
and expands abroad. Under the domination of monopoly capital, and because
of the fall in the profit rate, this expansion is accentuated through the export
of capital. That is the imperialism phenomenon that occurs in the core coun-
tries of capitalism, which tend to dominate and exploit the rest of the world.
In addition to this consideration, he indicates that imperialism is marked by
phases that correspond to different forms of domination and dependence.
They are 1) end of the nineteenth century until the interwar –​transition from
competitive capitalism to monopoly imperialism; 2) consolidation phase;
3) the current phase that was established after the end of World War ii, which
is the object of his reflection. The highlight here is that imperialist domina-
tion is no longer ‘from the outside’ but in an induced and internalized way.
Imperialist foreign capital is reproduced within national social formations,
projecting itself and acting economically, politically, and ideologically.
In this phase, then, there is a new line of demarcation among the imperi-
alist metropolises. The USA on one side and other metropolises, in particular
Europe, establish a relationship in which the US monopoly capital exercises
domination within those metropolises. It is this induced and internalized
reproduction of foreign capital, originating in the US, within European coun-
tries that characterizes the current phase (post-​World War ii) and which also
The Marxist Debate on Post-World War ii Imperialism 205

implies the extended reproduction within them of the development of US

imperialism.
The interference of capital from abroad to a national social formation has
the objective of increasing the rate of exploitation to neutralize the tendency
to fall in the profit rate. Furthermore, such interference does not mean some
form of association but rather a relationship of strength. A power relation-
ship between the different fractions of the ruling class of the central capitalist
states. This is the structural change for Poulantzas: the emergence of a new
fractionation of the bourgeoisie in the face of international relations that
no longer consists of the old dichotomy between foreign bourgeoisie versus
national bourgeoisie.
Thus, Poulantzas identifies (1976, 1978) that in the relations among the cen-
tral states a new type of fractionation of the dominant class is constituted, with
emphasis on what he calls the internal bourgeoisie, which cannot be confused
with the fraction of the comprador (or associated) bourgeoisie nor with the
fraction of the national bourgeoisie. The comprador bourgeoisie is the fraction
whose interests are directly subordinated to those of foreign capital and which
serves as a direct intermediary for the implantation and reproduction of for-
eign capital within a social formation. The interference of foreign capital ‘can
only, in general, play a decisive role in the various dependent countries […] by
articulating, in those countries, internal power relations’ (Poulantzas, 1976: 20.
Emphasis by the author). This fraction does not have its accumulation base
and, in general, has its activity linked to large estates and speculation, con-
centrated in financial, banking, and commercial sectors, but also able to act
in industrial branches, in those entirely subordinated and dependent on for-
eign capital. From a political-​ideological point of view, it is the support and
agent of the imperialist capital. The national bourgeoisie is an autochthonous
fraction, which has its accumulation base within the social formation and has
political-​ideological autonomy in the face of imperialist capital. In certain cir-
cumstances, in alliance with the dominated classes, this fraction may adopt
an anti-​imperialist stance and/​or engage in a national liberation struggle. The
internal bourgeoisie occupies an intermediate position between the compra-
dor bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, presenting contradictions with
foreign capital. It has its accumulation base, thus trying to limit the presence
of foreign capital in the domestic market, but at the same time, it is dependent
on this capital in areas such as investment and technology.

The internal bourgeoisie, on the contrary, even being dependent on for-

eign capital, presents contradictions concerning it. First of all, because
it feels frustrated in sharing the pie of exploitation of the masses: the
206  Martins Bugiato and Berringer

leonine transfer of surplus-​value is carried out to its detriment and in

favor of foreign capital and its agents, the comprador bourgeoisie […] the
development of the internal market through a small increase in the pur-
chasing power and consumption of the masses, which would offer them
more outlets; finally, it seeks help from the State, which would allow it to
develop exports.
poulantzas, 1976: 36–​7

It is precisely by taking into account the existing forms of alliance, and the
contradictions, among the bourgeois factions in the central countries, that it is
possible to pose the question of national states. For Poulantzas (1978), writing
in the 1970s, the internationalization of capital does not suppress or abbreviate
national states, nor in the sense of peaceful integration of capital over states,
with all internationalization processes working under a particular country,
nor in the sense of its extinction under the U.S. superstate, as if the US capi-
tal simply swallowed the other imperialist bourgeoisie. The states themselves
assume responsibility for the interests of the dominant imperialist capital in
its extended development within the national formation in its complex inte-
riorization. The currently dominant form of inter-​imperialist contradiction is
not between international capital and national capital, nor among the impe-
rialist bourgeoisies understood as juxtaposed entities. In other words, the
contradictions of autochthonous capital are, through complex mediations,
extrapolated by US capital that establishes conflicts or alliances with fractions
of the ruling class. In its role as a promoter of hegemony in the power bloc,
therefore, the national state intervenes in an interior field already crossed by
inter-​imperialist contradictions and where the contradictions among the dom-
inant fractions within its social formation are already internationalized. Thus,
state interventions in favor of certain large foreign monopolies and against
others, in favor of large national monopolies or even middle sectors of capital
and against others, are expressions of the class struggle within the bourgeoi-
sie of the central states of capitalism. If the European bourgeoisie does not
cooperate or do not isolate themselves in the face of US capital, it is due to
the bias effects on them of the new structure of dependence on that capital.
This new relationship works through the internalization of US capital and the
struggle around it to fight it or ally with it. It is not the emergence of a new state
over European countries that those nations are witnessing, but rather splinter-
ing in the ruling class underlying existing national states. In other words, the
imperialism phenomenon, the conflicts, and alliances between the capitalist
powers and the US political and economic world supremacy are linked to such
The Marxist Debate on Post-World War ii Imperialism 207

fragmentation and the struggles of the bourgeois factions at the national and
international level.

5 Conclusion

We know that the debate on US imperialism is even more profound, diverse,

and controversial. Nevertheless, the authors in question brought a rich polemic
and contribution to these studies, especially when it comes to the international
politics of the second half of the twentieth century under US domains. It is
important to mention that the Marxist literature dealing with the history of the
theory of imperialism has significant publications on the inaugural debate and
what might be called the current debate (see the footnote 10 below). However,
we see an absence of the systematization of this debate at stake. In this sense,
it is not our aim here, but it is worth thinking about how these contributions
have repercussions for analyzing international relations today.
What we can say is, first, that the theories presented approach, distance
or rectify the so-​called inaugural debate, resuming most of the differences
between Lenin and Kautsky10 to think about imperialism after World War ii. In
summary, we can say that Mandel and Poulantzas, in their way, corrected the

10 The ideas and disagreements between Kautsky and Lenin go beyond the debate pre-
sented here between Magdoff, Mandel and Poulantzas. To cite one example, the debate
between Leo Panitch/​Sam Gindin and Alex Callinicos on the dynamics of imperialism
in the 21st century carries the divergences of the inaugural debate. Panitch and Gindin
(2004), who contradict Lenin’s perspective on the perennial inter-​imperialist rivalry in
the international relations of capitalism, argue that pioneering theorists would have ele-
vated the moment of World War i to an immutable dynamic of the global capitalist order.
The authors attribute to the capitalist state the role of paving the way for the expansion of
its capital abroad, monitoring and managing this expansion and ensuring the conditions
for capital accumulation. The US state began to build relations among the major capital-
ist countries, especially in Europe after World War ii to form what they call the informal
American empire, which is generally characterized by the ability of the US state to pen-
etrate and coordinate the other leading capitalist states so that they make an unforced
adherence to US capitalist dynamics. Callinicos (2009), for his part, claims that the con-
ceptions of Panitch and Gindin are the theory of ultra-​imperialism renewed for the 21st
century and follows the Leninist thesis according to which imperialism corresponds to
conflicts in the current phase of development of contemporary capitalism. For him, the
supremacy of the United States does not mean that there are no internal contradictions
between these states. Following Lenin’s idea that in capitalism, just as the companies of
the same branch are always in competition, the big corporations also compete among
themselves, and so the states run by the interests of their bourgeoisies are in constant
conflict. For the author this means that when conflicts escalate and the possibilities of
understanding or persuasion are exhausted, the use of force becomes an imperative. On
208  Martins Bugiato and Berringer

Leninist thesis of defending the permanence of conflicts between imperialist

states, while Magdoff, in a similar perspective to that of Kautsky, defended the
constitution of an ultra-​imperialist alliance, which eliminates the possibilities
of conflicts between imperialist states.
Second, we can say that the questions those three authors asked themselves
were: would the United States have the capacity to exercise a super empire,
eliminating the capacity for conflicts with other imperialist states, especially
with Europe and Japan? Despite the establishment of an alliance between the
United States and Europe, would this alliance led by the United States still be
permeated by conflicts among the states? What is the role of European inte-
gration? The background of this debate is not only productive international-
ization, that is, the increase in foreign direct investment, whose concentration
takes place in the flow between the United States and Europe, but also in the
conflicts and interests of nation-​states. Those questions remain current and
central to analyzing contemporary international politics.
Third, Marxist theories of imperialism maintain that there is a tendency
towards the concentration and centralization of capital and the export of cap-
ital, and a permanent domination and dependence relationship among states
in the international power structure, the former being the juridical-​political
units of the way of capitalist production. The three authors that were presented
agree that there is superiority or dominance of the United States in the current
phase. They find that there is a concentration of investment flows between
the United States and Europe and argue that the process of productive inter-
nationalization is linked to the monopolization/​centralization of capital, but
they ended up differing on the relationship between the United States and
the European Economic Community. Magdoff, similarly to the thesis of ultra-​
imperialism, ends up approaching a conception of hegemony since there is a
world-​system of power that consists of an amalgamation between the domi-
nant classes of dependent countries with foreign forces, shaping the political,
economic structure, and social dependence. He also argues that US imperial-
ism is uncontested militarily and politically, which implies the end of the idea
about inter-​imperialist conflicts. That is: there is no rivalry between the United
States and the European States or the European Economic Community. In this
sense, he also draws attention to the dollar’s role in guaranteeing US suprem-
acy. In addition, it incorporates important elements to think about political-​
ideological and cultural domination as the role of cinema and international

the three debates in the Marxist theory of imperialism, the foundational moment, the
post-​w wii moment and the early 21st century moment, see Bugiato and Berringer, 2021.
The Marxist Debate on Post-World War ii Imperialism 209

cooperation. For him, the imperialist network presupposes not only the unity
among the imperialist bourgeoisies on behalf of the reproduction of capital,
but it is a counterrevolutionary political alliance that aimed to contain the pro-
cesses of national liberation struggles and oppose the ussr.
Mandel argued that the trend towards the internationalization of capital
control (formation of transnational monopolies) would have altered the rela-
tionship between the national states and internationalized capital. Especially
in Europe, a formation process of supranational states would have been
opened that would have regulated and given support to the merger of national
capitals in the face of competition with US monopolies. It was about the ten-
dency to form a supranational federal state, or supranational bourgeois state,
in which the eec (European Economic Community) would be a great exam-
ple. At this point, productive internationalization and the internationalization
of the State are related, in the sense that the state adapts and assumes different
forms/​typologies based on the demand of capital. This position seems to be
influenced by an instrumentalist and/​or derivationist11 conception of the state.
Poulantzas, in turn, brought a theoretical innovation by supporting the idea
of a​ n imperialist chain and the relationship of dependence and conflict among
imperialist states. In that sense, revolutionary struggles could take place
around the anti-​imperialist strategy in Europe and other peripheral social for-
mations. The idea of a​ n imperialist chain allows us to think that the relation-
ship between the United States and Europe takes place under the domination
of the former, without a permanent alliance among the states. They are links
of dependence that are created from the internationalization of production,
but that do not eliminate conflicts among classes and class fractions, especially
among states. What happens is the formation of a new fraction of the class, the
internal bourgeoisie, which maintains specific relationships to foreign capital
and the national social formation. However, Poulantzas ends up not reflecting
on the expansionist policy and military power of the United States, highlighted
in Magdoff and Mandel.

11 The German Derivationist School, of which Joachim Hirsch is one of the main exponents,
seeks to extract from the categories of political economy presented by Marx, especially
in The Capital, the understanding of the political institutions of the capitalist production
mode, particularly the state. For the derivationist authors, the capitalist state is intimately
integrated into capitalist production and distribution relations in a way that palaces itself
as a fundamental defender and reproducer of those. Therefore, the state is derived from
the production mode in an indissoluble relationship in which the state form corresponds
to its economic function. Although not explicitly, Mandel (1982) seems to agree with this
theory when dealing with the state in late capitalism.
210  Martins Bugiato and Berringer

Fourth and in sum, the relationship between the United States and Europe,
in the light of the internationalization of production and the international
dominance of the first, were treated as undisputed dominance of the USA
for Magdoff, the possibility of competition from the formation of European
conglomerates and the future formation of a supranational state for Mandel,
and an imperialist chain creating new ties of dependence and conflict for
Poulantzas. Those divergences within the Marxist theory of imperialism show
the existing plurality not only among the classics but also among the authors
who proposed to discuss and update the imperialism theory. The unity between
them is Historical Materialism, the idea of class struggle, dispute or alliance
between states and revolution, a problem that still seeks place in International
Relations.

References

Barone C (1985) Marxist thought on imperialism: survey and critique, Hampshire: M.

E. Sharpe.
Brewer A (1990) Marxists theories of imperialism: a critical survey, 2nd ed,
London: Routlege.
Bugiato C (2017), Kautsky e Lenin: imperialismo, paz e guerra nas relações internacio-
nais. Novos Rumos, 54, 2: 24–​44.
Bugiato C and Berringer T (2021) Cooperação e conflito interimperialista: um debate
teórico secular. Revista do Sul Global, 1,1: 63–​74.
Bukharin N (1986 [1915]) A economia mundial e o imperialismo: esboço econômico. São
Paulo: Nova Cultural (Os economistas).
Callinicos A (2009) Imperialism and global political economy, Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hardt M and Antonio N (2001) Império. Rio Janeiro: Record.
Kautsky K (2008 [1914]) O imperialismo e a guerra. Revista História e luta de classes, 4,
5: 211–​220.
Kiely R (2020) Globalização e imperialismo. In: Saad-​Filho A and Fine B (eds.)
Dicionário de Economia Política Marxista. São Paulo: Expressão Popular.
Lenin V (1982 [1916]) Imperialismo: fase superior do capitalismo. In: Obras escolhidas
em três tomos, Volume 2. São Paulo: Alfa Omega.
Luxemburgo R (1985 [1913]) A acumulação do capital: contribuição ao estudo econômico
do imperialismo. São Paulo: Nova Cultural (Os economistas).
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Magdoff H (1979 [1978]) Imperialismo: da era colonial ao presente. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar.
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4: 27–​41.
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Mandel E (1982 [1972]) O capitalismo tardio. São Paulo: Abril Cultural (Os economistas).
Mandel E (2009 [1970]) Europe vs. America. New York: Monthly Review Press.
Noonan M (2017) Marxist theories of imperialism: a history. London: I. B. Tauris.
Osório, lf (2018) Estado, imperialismo e Relações Internacionais. São Paulo: Ideias e
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 ­c hapter 12

Imperialism
The Question of System Stability

Marcelo Pereira Fernandes1

The bourgeois system has become too narrow to contain the wealth
created within it.2
marx and engels, “Communist Manifesto”

∵
1 Introduction

One of the main controversies within the Marxist theory of imperialism is the
ability of the system to organize itself economically and politically, creating a
stable environment for large businesses. The famous polemics between Lenin
and Kautsky in the early twentieth century, about the possibility that capital-
ism would be peacefully managed by the great powers and corporations that
compete for world wealth, persists in much of the current debate.
Currently, since imperialism is a hot topic, much of the discussion is pre-
cisely about the problem of system stability. Some authors emphasise relative
economic or political stability, but the central idea is of a more structured cap-
italism with a greater capacity to resolve conflicts that could hinder the global
process of capital accumulation. Therefore, the idea of ​interstate competition
would be outdated.
This chapter intends to examine the Marxist literature on imperialism that
somehow understands that capitalism is more organized nowadays, to the
point of overcoming the rivalries between great powers.3 Such literature has

1 Professor at Federal Rural University of Rio de Janeiro. E-​mail: [email protected].

2 Originally published, in English, as article in the journal “Contexto Internacional”, volume
40(1) jan/​apr, 2018.
3 There is also a wider discussion on the perspectives of order in the international system in
the twenty-​first century, in particular on the possibilities for stability of the system, devel-
oped by several authors in the area of International Political Economy, beyond the frontiers

© Marcelo Pereira Fernandes, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_013

Imperialism 213

its roots mainly in the analyzes of Eduard Bernstein and Karl Kautsky in the
early twentieth century, but we can also find its germs in Rudolf Hilferding
and even in Nikolai Bukharin. Using terms such as globalization, transnational
capital and empire, authors such as Robinson (2007, 2008), Robinson and
Harris (2000), Hardt and Negri (2001), Panitch and Gindin (2005), albeit with
differences, also share the notion that the world has reached such an economic
and political organization that in practice there are no longer national borders,
which would make the activity of large private corporations relatively safer
and beyond the reach of nation-​states.
The critique of the notion of an organized capitalism can be found in Harvey
(2004), Callinicos (2009), Gowan (2004), Harman (2003), Marshall (2014),
Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris (2015), Sakellaropoulos (2009). However, for the
purpose of this work, the analyzes of Sakellaropoulos, Sotiris and Marshall will
be highlighted. By seeking in Lenin concepts such as uneven development and
imperialist chain, these authors present a more radical critique, demonstrat-
ing the relevance of the concept of Imperialism as a stage of capitalism capa-
ble of responding to the challenges posed at this unique moment the world
goes through.
In addition to this introduction, this chapter is divided into four sections.
In the second section, Stability is analyzed in the classical theory of imperi-
alism. The third section examines some contemporary authors who are close
to the views of the authors mentioned in the first section. In fact, all of them
believe that Imperialism is no longer an indispensable concept to explain the
present moment of capitalism. In the fourth section, I perform a critique of the
notion of system stability, based on the Leninist theory of imperialism. Thus,
we show that the perception that capitalism has reached a degree of organiza-
tion that can deny the validity of the concept of imperialism is questionable,
and is not in accordance with the structure that drives the system. Lastly, our
final considerations.

of Marxist thought on imperialism. However, for the scope of this chapter we seek to situate
the debate only in Marxist circles, since we understand that these are already sufficiently
broad and controversial, as we can observe throughout the text. Moreover, from our point of
view, the Marxist analysis of imperialism provides more promising elements on the current
international order.
214 Fernandes

2 Stability in Classical Imperialism

Rudolf Hilferding was the first Marxist author to call attention to the emer-
gence of finance capital as the dominant capital in the era of monopolies,
considered as a new stage of capitalism. At this stage, the separation between
industrial capital and financing capital, characteristic of the period of com-
petitive capitalism, disappears. In the classic “Finance Capital” of 1910, consid-
ered as the greatest contribution to Marxist economics of its time (Bottomore,
1985: 1), Hilferding would, to some extent, consider the possibility that capital-
ism might attain a degree of organization in which it was no longer subject to
production anarchy, eliminating economic crises.
According to Hilferding, capitalism tended to create cartels all over the
economy. At the limit, there would be a world cartel where the entire capitalist
production would be rigorously planned by a responsible superior body that
would perfectly dictate the total amount of goods to be produced and distrib-
uted in all fields. The amplitude of economic planning would reach the point
in which even money4 would no longer be necessary5 (Hilferding, 1985: 226–​
227). By restricting production, cartels would be able to eliminate commodity
overproduction crises, but not the crisis derived from the overproduction of
capital (Hilferding, 1985: 278). Hence, even if cartelization could change the
character of crises, it would not be able to completely suppress them.
In this sense, by comparing the struggle of industrial capital for more free-
dom in the mercantilist period, Hilferding (1985: 314) concluded that finance
capital in the imperialist stage hated the anarchy of competition. With inter-
connected interests, it preferred organization, but only to resume competition
at a higher level.6
Like Hilferding, Nikolai Bukharin also concluded that the economy tends
to become highly organized at the stage of monopoly capitalism. In the work

4 Brunhoff (1992: 55) states, “Hilferding seems to indicate that the organization of capitalist
production would indeed be possible, thanks to a single central bank that would have the
monopoly of public funding, which, according to him, would allow it to attenuate or even
eliminate crises”.
5 However, Hilferding did not expect planning to reach this limit, or that international cartel
competition could be eliminated.
6 Later on, in the article “Organized Economy” of 1927, Hilferding believed that the birth of
an organized economy would make the transition to socialism easier, among other reasons
because “Capitalism, therefore, abdicates from the main objection it could raise against
socialism and, at the same time, the last psychological objection to socialism falls down”
(Hilferding, 2002: 526). According to Kuhn (2000: 71), many have identified in this view a
progressive and conceivably peaceful side of imperialism.
Imperialism 215

“Imperialism and World Economy”, Bukharin stated, “Imperialism is the policy

of finance capitalism, that is, of highly developed capitalism, which presup-
poses a certain maturity –​very important in this case –​of the productive orga-
nization” (Bukharin, 1986: 128).
According to Bukharin, competition and conflict between capitalists would
be eliminated at the national economy level and transferred to the interna-
tional arena. Therefore, there is a double movement in Bukharin’s analysis: on
the one hand, the tendency towards the internationalization of capital, on the
other, the tendency towards its penetration into the state (state capitalism).
This double movement would be the main contradiction of modern capital-
ism, and the cause of hostilities among the great powers: the central problem
for Bukharin is not economy, but war (Callinicos, 2009: 57; Brewer, 1990: 111).
Hence, the capitalist system would tend to overcome production anarchy
and achieve economic planning. And it did not reach its full organizational
potential only because the world is divided into national units (Howard and
King, 1989: 247).

Competition reaches its maximum development: the competition of

national capitalist trusts in the world market. Within the limits of national
economies, competition is minimized, to outgrow, beyond these limits,
to fantastic proportions, unknown in previous historical epochs.
bukharin, 1986: 112

However, Callinicos (2009: 62) noticed that taking into account that capital-
ism really became highly organized as Hilferding and Bukharin expected, why
believe that such organization would cease inside national borders? According
to Bukharin himself (1986: 129), if national trusts could reach an agreement,
imperialism would indeed cease to exist. But that would not be possible due
to political and social reasons. The necessary condition for such agreement
would be related to the equality of conditions among trusts in the world mar-
ket. Since equality does not occur, the trust that holds a more advantageous
position –​both strictly at the economic level and at the economic-​political
level (association of capital with the state) –​would have no interest in estab-
lishing agreements (Bukharin, 1986: 130–​131).
Within the Marxist tradition, the notion that capitalism could organize
itself to the point of eliminating even inter-​imperialist wars was proposed
by Karl Kautsky. Kautsky (1914, 2002) considered that the fundamental thrust
of imperialism would be the distortion between industry and agriculture in
capitalist economies. The reason for that is that the impetus towards capital
accumulation and production increase is much stronger in the industry than
216 Fernandes

in agriculture. This greater investment capacity of the industry would cause

a tension in both sectors, since for the industry to continue growing it would
be necessary that the agricultural sector continued supplying raw materials
and food.
Imperialism would be the consequence of highly developed industrial capi-
talism. But it is not a new stage of capitalist development as Hilferding argued,
but the preferred policy of finance capital.7 States would be forced to build a
large national industry in order to maintain their independence, while those
remaining agricultural would decay (Kautsky 2002: 457). In this perspective,
there is a trend towards occupation and subordination of agrarian countries,
which causes a strong rivalry between industrial countries and consequently
an arms race. Kautsky (2002: 459) also considers that there would be a ten-
dency of advanced capitalist states to block the industrialization of agrarian
countries in order to prevent the emergence of competition.8
However, according to Kautsky, the conflicts between the great powers for
the exploitation of agricultural regions could not continue. The arms race and
the costs of colonial expansion would reach a level that hinders the very pro-
cess of accumulation and becomes an obstacle for the development of capital-
ism. Therefore, there is no need to remain in a state of war, since it contributes
only with a single sector of the bourgeoisie: the arms industry. The domination
of the large monopolies over the economies of the imperialist nations leads
to the renunciation of the arms race in favor of the alliance for peace. That is
why “Every far-​sighted capitalist must call out to his associates: capitalists of all
lands unite” (Kautsky, 2002: 460).9
This implies that capitalism reaches a certain point of development and
organization that attenuates its contradictions until war becomes unneces-
sary. This level of development in which there is a transfer of the carteliza-
tion of the economy of the developed countries to the international arena was
called by Kautsky ‘ultra-​imperialism’.10

7 Kautsky described Hilferding’s “Finance Capital” as a conclusion of Marx’s Capital. See

Howard and King (1989: 100).
8 ​Kautsky’s idea is similar to the so-​called dependency theory, of Marxist inspiration, that
emerged in the mid-​1960s.
9 Hilferding also saw a similar possibility when he explained why economic rivalries among
states do not lead to a violent solution. According to Hilferding (1985: 312): “The very
export of capital creates tendencies that resist such a violent solution. (…). Thus, tenden-
cies towards solidarity of international capitalist interests arise”.
10 As Milios and Sotiropoulos (2009: 60) pointed out, the idea of u ​ltra-​imperialism
was already present in a text written by Kautsky in 1892 (“The Class Struggle” [Erfurt
Program]). John Hobson, who influenced the main theorists of imperialism, also raised
a similar argument using the term ‘inter-​imperialist’: “Christendom thus laid out in a few
Imperialism 217

Thus, in relation to Hilferding and Bukharin, Kautsky maximizes the orga-

nizational capacity of the system by concluding that capitalist powers would
reach an agreement so that the reproduction of capital would occur in a peace-
ful manner all over the world.

From the purely economic standpoint, however, there is nothing further

to prevent this violent explosion from finally replacing imperialism by
a holy alliance of the imperialists. The longer the War lasts, the more it
exhausts all tile participants and makes them recoil from an early repeti-
tion of armed conflict, the nearer we come to this last solution, however
unlikely it may seem at the moment.
kautsky, 1914

The post-​World War ii Golden Age of capitalism under the United States
hegemony revived the Kautskyan idea of an Ultra-​imperialism (Callinicos,
2009: 63). However, in Kautsky’s terms, the reasons that would prevent a new
conflagration between the powers were not met. There was never a reduction
in military expenses, and armed conflicts did occur in several parts of the
world, even after the end of the Cold War, when the idea of the organization
of capitalism has reached its peak under the sign of “globalization”, as we will
see in the next section.

3 Stability in the Post-​cold Aar

After the collapse of real socialism in Eastern Europe and the end of the ussr
in the early 1990s, new questions were raised about the role of the nation-​
state, based on the neoliberal concept of market supremacy. The opinion that
nations are interdependent and that financial and commercial openness would
be beneficial to all nations was widely spread. In the context of Marxism, some
authors began to argue that capitalism came to be dominated by large compa-
nies that have no ties to their home states. Capitalism would have reached a
degree of organization that would prevent conflicts between states.
This was the analysis of Hardt and Negri (2001), in a much-​commented
study that came to be curiously nicknamed anti-​globalization manifesto.
According to the authors, imperialism would no longer exist, and no country

great federal empires, each with a retinue of uncivilised dependencies, seems to many the
most legitimate development of present tendencies, and one which would offer the best
hope of permanent peace on an assured basis of inter-​Imperialism” (Hobson, 2005: 332).
218 Fernandes

would be able to fulfill the leading role that European nations held in the past
(Hardt and Negri, 2001: 14). Power would now be decentralized and without a
particular territory. Instead of imperialism, the ‘empire’ would emerge, defined
as a global power, without borders and above nations.11 A new form of sover-
eignty composed of national and supranational bodies united by a single logic
in which national states would no longer be able to regulate economic and
cultural exchanges. With decaying sovereignty, no state would be able to act as
an imperialist nation (Hardt and Negri, 2001:12).
This way, the empire would be born after a transitional period after the end
of World War ii, in a world defined and organized around three mechanisms: i)
decolonization, that would gradually recover the world market hierarchically
under the leadership of the United States; ii) gradual decentralization of pro-
duction; iii) the construction of a structure of international relations that
would spread the disciplinary productive regime and the disciplinary society
in its successive evolutions worldwide. According to the authors, these are the
three mechanisms that contribute to the evolution from imperialism to the
empire (Hardt and Negri, 2001: 266).
In the empire, there would not be a definite place for the new productive
forces because they would be everywhere, producing not only commodities
“but also rich and powerful social relationships,”12 in a world where national
borders would tend to simply disappear (Hardt and Negri, 2001: 230). Now,
transnational corporations would be responsible for the economic and politi-
cal transformations of postcolonial countries and subordinate regions (Hardt
and Negri, 2001: 268). They would be the ones to dictate the pace of production
at each moment. “The state has been defeated and corporations now rule the
earth!” (Hardt and Negri, 2001: 328).
Still according to Hardt and Negri (2001), imperialist wars would be replaced
by ‘just wars’, which are in fact a form of police action, because if borders
practically no longer exist, then there would be no reason for wars. Rivalries
between countries would be eliminated. Therefore:

The history of imperialist, inter-​imperialist and anti-​imperialist wars

is over. The end of such history has introduced a kingdom of peace. Or

11 The concept of empire would arise from a long tradition that refers to the old Roman
Empire (Hardt and Negri, 2001: 28).
12 In an attempt to summarize Marx’s analysis of the capitalist mode of production, the
authors do so based on the controversial underconsumption thesis, largely based on
Luxemburg (1970), in which the central problem of capitalism lies in the lack of purchas-
ing power of workers to absorb the goods produced. See Hardt and Negri (2001: 243–​244).
Imperialism 219

more exactly, we have entered the era of minor and internal conflicts.
Every imperial war is a civil war, a police action –​from Los Angeles and
Granada to Mogadishu and Sarajevo.
hardt and negri, 2001: 209

Hence, for the authors, there would also be no armies anymore. The United
States would have a world police force that would not act for imperialist inter-
ests, but for imperial interest in the name of peace and order (Hardt and Negri,
2001: 209). The stability of capitalism would reach its climax.
Like Hardt and Negri (2001), William Robinson (2002, 2007, 2008) and Harris
(2012) believed that capitalism would currently be very organized by trans-
national institutions at the service of transnational capital, in a world where
borders would be dissolving. In several works, Robinson emphasized that cap-
italism has undergone great changes since the classical period of imperialism
analyzed by Hilferding, Lenin etc.,13 and would find itself in a new stage known
as globalization, which would be a product of transnational capital.
Nowadays, the dynamics of the capitalist system could not be understood
considering the nation-​state as the center. Therefore, the term globalization
(‘the latest stage of capitalism’) would be very consistent with the current
moment (Robinson, 2002; Harris, 2012). Harris (2012: 2) asserts that the funda-
mental logic of capitalism would not change in terms of its power to accumu-
late and exploit labor. However, the method by which they would take place
would be new.
In turn, Robinson (2007, 2008) presupposes at least four changes that would
characterize the capitalist system today: i) the rise of a truly transnational cap-
ital and the integration of all countries into a new global productive and finan-
cial system. National or regional capital would still exist, but transnational
capital, strongly divorced from any country, would be dominant; ii) the emer-
gence of a new transnational capitalist class; iii) the rise of transnational state
apparatuses (‘transnational state’) and; iv) the emergence of new relations of
power and inequality in the global society.
However, Robinson (2007) argues that his theory shares little or nothing
with Kautsky’s thesis on ultra-​imperialism, since the latter assumed that cap-
ital would remain national and unite itself internationally. In his view, the
conflict between capitals is endemic to the system, but it would present itself
in new forms in globalization, not as wars between states. For that reason,

13 Robinson prefers to call it the ‘national corporate stage of capitalism’ rather than monop-
oly capitalism, in order to highlight the important role of the state in the circuit of accu-
mulation during the twentieth century. See Robinson (2008: 3).
220 Fernandes

competition among nation-​states would no longer exist in the globalization

era, only among companies. “As national states are captured by transnational
capitalist forces they tend to serve the interests of global over local accumula-
tion processes.” (Robinson 2007: 17).
In an analysis very close to Hardt and Negri, Robinson (2007) concludes that
we are facing an ‘empire of global capital’, based in Washington only for his-
torical reasons. This empire would no longer serve the interests of a national
bourgeoisie, but of a transnational capitalist class.

We are witness to new forms of global capitalist domination, whereby

intervention is intended to create conditions favorable to the penetration
of transnational capital and the renewed integration of the intervened
region into the global system. US intervention facilitates a shift in power
from locally and regionally oriented elites to new groups more favorable
to the transnational project. The result of US military conquest is not the
creation of exclusive zones for ‘US’ exploitation, as was the result of the
Spanish conquest of Latin America, the British of South Africa and India,
the Dutch of Indonesia, and so forth, in earlier moments of the world
capitalist system. The enhanced class power of capital brought about
by these changes is felt around the world (…). In sum, the US state has
attempted to play a leadership role on behalf of transnational capitalist
interests.
robinson 2007: 19–​20

According to Robinson (2008: 9), the US state would be a key instrument for the
reproduction of the global capitalist system, since it would act as a defender
of the interests of big capital, repressing the sectors that opposed it. Therefore,
the increase in US militarization after 11/​09 would be related neither to a quest
for hegemony, nor to the resurgence of the inter-​imperialist rivalries seen at
the end of the nineteenth century, but to a contradictory response to the deep
crisis of global capitalism that began in the late 1990s. In Robinson’s view,
worldwide social polarization brought about by globalization has restricted
the ability of the world market to absorb production, reducing the system’s
expansion capacity.14 The invasion of Iraq, for example, would create favorable
conditions for the penetration of transactional capital and help integrate the
region into global capitalism. And although it has directly benefited some US
companies (US capital), these firms are in fact transnational conglomerates

14 As in Hardt and Negri, the association with underconsumption theses is clear.

Imperialism 221

with interests that are not tied to ‘US capital’, but to global capital (Robinson
2007: 22).
Thus, the analyzes by Hardt and Negri (2001), Robinson (2007, 2008),
Robinson and Harris (2000) and Harris (2012) emphasized that capitalism was
sufficiently organized to the point where wars would no longer be necessary.
However, Hardt and Negri are more emphatic as regards the state, when they
say that in practice there would be no armies, but rather a type of transna-
tional police called from time to time to maintain order anywhere in the world.
Panitch and Gindin (2005, 2012) also consider that globalization would
not stimulate inter-​imperialist rivalries, but would instead encourage a form
of cooperation that would allow the system to have a period of stability.
According to the authors, to understand this new stage of imperialism, one
would have to understand the role of US imperialism in the post-​World War ii.
At that moment, the creation of stable conditions for global accumulation of
capital would be carried out by an ‘informal empire’, the American Empire,
which would be able to integrate the other capitalist powers into a system
under its rule.
Thus, to understand imperialism and current globalization, it would be
necessary to begin by theorizing about the capitalist state along three dimen-
sions: economic, political and territorial. In the economic dimension, the state
would no longer be part of the organization of production, investment and
appropriation of surplus; but it would still be indispensable to maintain legal
regulation, administration of macroeconomic policy and as a ‘lender of last
resort’ whenever necessary. Without these prerogatives of the state, capitalism
would not be able to survive (Panitch and Gindin, 2005: 102). In the political
dimension, the authors say that with the end of the Cold War, liberal democ-
racy would become a model for all capitalist states. The territorial dimension
would be implicit in the first two dimensions. Capitalism has evolved by deep-
ening economic ties, especially within territorial spaces. Within these spaces,
national borders and identities would be built (Panitch and Gindin, 2005: 103).
States would continue to be subordinated to capital accumulation and capital-
ist logic, but ultimately that would not eliminate the importance of the state.
However, the end of the Cold War would reveal a new hierarchy among
the advanced nations. The process of separation of economics and politics in
the international sphere would facilitate global integration, and competition
would no longer have to be expressed by imperialist rivalry, as understood
by part of the Marxist theory of the early twentieth century. In that regard,
Panitch argues that the term imperialism itself could be obsolete, since inter-​
imperialist rivalries would no longer exist (Gowan, Panitch and Shaw, 2001: 17).
That is, the informal American Empire would replace geopolitical conflicts.
222 Fernandes

That said, according to Panitch and Gindin (2005: 104), it would be neces-
sary to investigate how the separation of economics and politics has happened
at the international level in the last two centuries.

This involves not only an understanding of the progressive marketization

and commodification of social life, but also of the processes by which the
national-​territorial capitalist state, in its modal liberal-​democratic form,
was universalized and inscribed into the constitution of international
institutions and international law by the mid-​twentieth century.
panitch and gindin, 2005: 104

It is the separation between economics and politics in the international sphere

that would make the existence of informal empires possible. This separation
would have been incomplete in the globalization between 1870 and 1920
(Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 13). That is why the expansion of colonialism, the
resistance in adopting liberal democracy, and the particularism of each state
in relation to capital accumulation would generate severe contradictions in
the three dimensions of the capitalist state, which would in turn lead to inter-​
imperialist rivalries. At that moment, Marxist theory understood that the con-
tradictions generated by this situation would be impossible to solve.
Panitch and Gindin (2005: 106) consider that the definition of imperialism
as a stage of capitalism would avoid the pitfalls of an ahistorical general theory
of imperialism. However, the authors criticize what they understand as theo-
retical fundamentalism, since if imperialism is considered as the last stage of
capitalism, it would mean that there could be no changes.15 According to the
authors, that would be wrong: after World War ii, the agreement conducted by
the United States made rivalries between the capitalist powers subordinate to
collaborationism. US democracy would bring the credibility of the US state to
the world, even when its militarism was explicit.
However, the other powers would not become passive actors of American
imperialism; they would continue to operate with relative autonomy in relation
to the internationalization of the state, and their actions would reflect the bal-
ance of social forces and internal political initiatives in each state. This would
allow them to pressure the United States to carry out their responsibilities in

15 Criticism is aimed at Lenin with reference to the title of his work, “Imperialism, the
Highest Stage of Capitalism”. In fact, as the editors of “Monthly Review” (2004) have
shown, there is a great deal of confusion as to the title, for it did not actually talk about
the final stage of capitalism, but rather about the ‘most recent stage’. See also Lorimer
(1999).
Imperialism 223

the management of global capitalism in a more autonomous way of pressures

emanating from within the American social formation itself. But in doing so,
the capitalist powers would recognize that the United States has the capacity
to play the leading role in the expansion, protection and reproduction of capi-
talism (Panitch and Gindin, 2012: 18). Thus, the country would be more than a
mere agent of the particular interests of American capital, as it also assumed
the responsibilities for the making and management of global capitalism
(Panitch and Gindin, 2005: 112). Hence, the European bourgeoisie and states
would not have any interest in defying US imperialism, for it would ultimately
serve the interests of a global capitalist class.
Even with such accumulated power, Panitch and Gindin (2012) recognize
that the United States failed to bring the capitalist economy to a new level
of stability. However, global financial volatility and the ensuing crises would
make the peripheral countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America more depen-
dent on interventions from the American empire. Thus, the success of the
United States would be in its ability to create a sphere of influence that would
make the use of military force unnecessary. So, for the authors, there would be
no more inter-​imperialist rivalries.
The analyzes by Panitch and Gindin present some relevant ‘insights’ regard-
ing the international system and the conduct of the United States as an impe-
rialist power. However, the authors overestimate the capacity of the American
state as the organizer of the system and the driving force of global development,
while neglecting the role of class struggle in capitalist development inside each
nation-​state (Milios and Sotiropoulos 2009: 82). And when class struggle is
mentioned, it is subordinated to the will of the dominant state. Consequently,
Panitch and Gindin’s observations are closer to a super-​imperialism,16 in which
one nation has a relative control over the other powers.

4 End of Rivalries?

There is a reasonable list of authors within the Marxist camp who deny the
idea that capitalism could reach a level of stability capable of putting an end
to inter-​imperialist rivalries. Among others, we can mention Harvey (2004),
Callinicos (2009) and Gowan (2003). But we believe that the analyzes of
authors such as Sakellaropoulos (2009), Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris (2015) and
Marshall (2014) have a more consistent understanding of the phenomenon,

16 Regarding the concept of super-​imperialism, see Rowthorn (1975).

224 Fernandes

since they develop an explanation based on Lenin’s theory of imperialism.

Therefore, they manage to establish some opposition to the idea of system sta-
bility analyzed in the previous sections.
First, on the notion of imperialism. For Lenin (1979), imperialism was a
specific stage of the capitalist mode of production, which was the result of
a substantial change in its organizational structure, the stage of monopoly
capitalism, and not merely a ‘preferred’ policy of finance capital for territorial
expansion and economic-​political control. Initiated not before the last quarter
of the nineteenth century, imperialism would be the result of the inherent ten-
dencies of the process of capital accumulation –​in which concentration and
centralization prevail –​and of the contradictions arising from class struggle in
capitalism analyzed by Marx.
At this stage, in which monopolies prevail, crises would not be suppressed,
nor would competition among different capitals be eliminated. Far from it,
monopolies would amplify the anarchy and contradictions of the economic
world, bringing competition to a level in which conflicts would escalate.

The statement that cartels can abolish crises is a fable spread by bour-
geois economists who at all costs desire to place capitalism in a favorable
light. On the contrary, monopoly which is created in certain branches of
industry increases and intensifies the anarchy inherent in the system of
capitalist production as a whole.
lenin 1979: 701

Lenin (1979) also identified finance capital as the central force of imperi-
alism. In the financial sphere, there would be a qualitative change in the
system: unlike the earlier stage in which industrial capitalism prevailed, the
economic impulse of imperialism was now in the ‘haute finance’.
Thus, the particularity of imperialism would be in the intrinsic need to export
capital, not in the exportation of commodities. It would be precisely through
the export of capital that the international character of capitalism with all its
economic and social contradictions would assert itself in an aggressive and
irreversible way. And not through formal incorporation of territories, as Lenin
(1979: 735) highlighted when he mentioned the informal British domination
over Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay (Mazzucchelli, 1985: 99, Sakellaropoulos
and Sotiris 2015: 91).17

17 As Hobsbawn (2001: 92) noted, only in the sixth of its ten chapters (“Imperialism, the
highest stage of capitalism”) Lenin addressed ‘the division of the world among the great
powers’.
Imperialism 225

Even so, the state plays an essential role in the functioning of capitalism.
Given that there is no global government, capital cannot reproduce itself with-
out nation-​states. In order to ensure the interests of the bourgeoisie, the state
develops strategies to manage labor force, intervenes to maintain the profit of
national capitals and promote their expansion in the international economy
(Sakellaropoulos, 2009: 63). However, the export of capital also leads to com-
petition among states, since they also play the role of mediating the interests
of different ruling classes. Monopolies can join in several parts of the world,
yet they need to be closely linked to their home states where they receive legal
protection, even outside legal rules when it is convenient (Harman, 2003).
Therefore, international conflicts (economic, political and/​or military) are
intrinsic to the system, although moments of cooperation may prevail (Lenin
1979). Capital expansion does not necessarily require war conflagrations, but
they cannot be ruled out. For that reason, activities linked to arms acquire a
privileged position in national economies. That causes a permanent warmon-
gering atmosphere, since it is interesting for monopolies linked to the war
industry to have external enemies, whether real or illusory, to justify military
purchases.
Therefore, the term ‘globalization’, which describes a capitalist world with-
out borders, available and docile to a supposedly stateless capital of a unified
bourgeoisie, hides or denies crucial aspects regarding the functioning of the
international system18 (Halliday, 2002; Petras and Veltmeyer, 2007; Ruccio,
2003). In reality, the concepts of imperialism and globalization are not com-
patible. Although several authors of the Marxist camp started to use them as a
way to explain the current situation of capitalism, it is not appropriate to adopt
both concepts at the same time, since the idea of globalization suppresses a
series of questions related to the historical development of the relations of
exploitation within the capitalist system, and the role of imperialism as a the-
oretical and historical reference (Sakellaropoulos, 2009).
The view advocated by different Marxist authors that the international
system is characterized by stability seems to find support in certain passages
of the “Communist Manifesto” by Marx and Engels (2010). According to this
understanding, the source of conflicts in the system would be almost exclu-
sively the division between bourgeois and proletarians at the international

18 In fact, “The term ‘globalization’ not only serves as description and explanation of what
is going on. It refers even more to a prescription –​those certain developments, particu-
larly ‘the liberalisation of national and global markets’, will produce ‘the best outcome
for growth and human welfare’ and that they are in everybody’s interest” (Petras and
Veltmeyer, 2007: 39).
226 Fernandes

level. Since international capital would have attained unprecedented power,

there would be little room for protest movements that could undermine the
structure of the system. This view underestimates the importance of the state
and other forms of struggle, such as the struggle of the nations oppressed by
imperialism. However, even in the “Communist Manifesto” the nation-​state
problem, is already mentioned when the authors call for the national libera-
tion of Poland (Marx and Engels, 2010: 68). Similarly, another example is the
struggle for women’s liberation in countries like the United Arab Emirates and
Saudi Arabia that may be taken into account. These are countries where the
oppression of women is a structural problem –​although not necessarily con-
nected to the multinationals –​and any deeper gender-​related change-​favoring
women can cause great instability, since the region plays an important role in
the geopolitical interests of imperialist countries.
The notion that multinational companies have an extraordinary capac-
ity of coordination that facilitates international exploitation is also more or
less explicit in the writings of the authors mentioned in the previous sec-
tions. However, this is a questionable theoretical assumption in the context
of Marxism. The tendency toward centralization and concentration of capi-
tals inherent in the movement of capital does not eliminate competition, but
rather brings it to another level, as Lenin pointed out following in the footsteps
of Marx. The reason is that it is precisely competition that forces the capitalist
to accumulate uncontrollably. Capital produces without considering its lim-
its, because it has an intrinsic expansionist force; hence the crises that occur
from time to time when such limits are exceeded. For the capitalist, there is
no other way but to continue seeking a continuous expansion: in the logic of
capital there is no room for sentimentality, “he who does not rise, descends”.
Therefore, there can be no unified bourgeoisie exploiting markets around the
world in an organized way, capable of suppressing economic crises and their
economic-​social effects.
In fact, the upsurge of capital internationalization in the post-​Cold War
and the image of companies producing simultaneously in several countries –​
although it is not something new, of course –​create the perception that these
companies are no longer related to their states, as Robinson (2007) mistakenly
suggests, for instance.19 But we need to understand what is appearance and
what is reality. We can mention at least two recent events that demonstrate
what actually occurs. When the automakers General Motors and Chrysler filed
for bankruptcy in 2009, the billionaire financial bailout came exactly from the

19 It is important to remember that this is not a new discussion. See Michalet (1984).
Imperialism 227

United States government, country of origin of both companies, and cost us$
80 billion for the American Treasury until 2013 (Beech, 2014). Another example
concerns the French bank Paribas. It was fined unbelievable $ 8.9 billion by
the New York court of justice in 2014 because it broke a law inside the United
States, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a Federal Law of
1977, by facilitating financial transactions with Cuba, Iran and Sudan, countries
that were under US embargo (Lauer, 2014). The French government directly
intervened in the case, even by its president François Hollande. The Paribas
case also runs counter to Panitch and Gindin’s idea that the United States is a
country that, first and foremost, serves the interests of a world capitalist class.
Thus, in contrast to ‘globalization’, the concept of ‘imperialist chain’ for-
mulated by Lenin, is still an accurate description of the hierarchical, uneven
and complex relations arising from the reproduction of capital in the interna-
tional system.20 It brings together the existing capitalist powers, each of them
with a different level of development. According to Milios and Sotiropoulos
(2009: 19), the notion of imperialist chain would lead to the formulation of
two questions. Firstly, the law of uneven development. According to Lenin, the
stability of the system is impossible because uneven development would cause
changes in the correlation of forces of the more advanced nations, tending to
erode the center’s power in relation to new poles of power with greater eco-
nomic dynamism. Consequently, the contradictions among the powers that
comprise the imperialist chain would escalate (Lenin, 1979: 760). The law of
uneven development is critical to explain the relations among the countries of
the imperialist chain, providing an economic basis for military conflicts.
Secondly, the question of the weakest link in the imperialist chain. The
uneven development would create the possibility of revolutions in the rela-
tively weaker links of the imperialist chain, and not in those states in which the
productive forces are more advanced, as Marx had initially predicted. However,
it is important to emphasize that this is a relative position: the countries that
are part of the imperialist chain are weaker or stronger compared to the other
links in the chain (Poulantzas, 1979: 23).
Indeed, the international scenario that emerged at the beginning of the
twenty-​first century does not seem to confirm the idea that the system tends
to stability. On the economic front, crises have become more frequent in the
‘globalization’ era. They began with the Mexican crisis (1994–​1995), the first
of this period, which had serious repercussions since Mexico used to be

20 Lenin’s goal was precisely to combat the idea of ‘global capitalism’, which was predomi-
nant among the left (Milios and Sotiropoulos, 2009: 196).
228 Fernandes

considered as a model to be followed, due to the neoliberal reforms imple-

mented in the country since the late 1980s. Later on, the crises in East Asia
(1997–​1998), Russia (1998) and Brazil (1998–​1999) exposed the fragility of the
international financial architecture that emerged in the 1970s. The turn of the
century was the stage for new economic turmoil, as in Turkey and Argentina in
2001. Afterwards, the international economy went through a period of relative
calm that lasted around five years, but soon the world witnessed the United
States subprime crisis in 2007 and in mid-​2008 the most severe economic crisis
since the Great Depression of the 1930s.
The crisis of 2008 began at the center of capitalism, affecting a great part of
Europe. This fact exposed the fragile international financial architecture and
caused unrest about the economic order in several governments and within
the American society itself, as evidenced by the protest movement ‘Occupy
Wall Street’. Despite the intense debate that followed on the reforms needed
to prevent a crisis of such magnitude from happening again, few proposals
have been implemented, mainly because of the contradictory interests inside
the imperialist chain. In turn, low economic growth tends to make the envi-
ronment even less conducive to understanding, stirring up contradictions.
Given that, it seems impossible to conclude that the system is more stable eco-
nomically, despite the enormous capacity of intervention of central banks, the
Fed in particular, as it became evident during the worst moments of the crisis
of 2008.
Likewise, it is not admissible to presume that competition between states
no longer exists, and that the problem remains only in the economic sphere.
Countries continue to use uneven structures of power to maintain and con-
quer new spaces of accumulation according to the interests of their capitalists.
During the 1990s, when the United States sustained an unprecedented eco-
nomic expansion, it managed to maintain its hegemony over other powers,
preventing autonomous regional strategies with relative success. This fact
did not make the US state more friendly, as Fiori (2008), Gowan (2004) and
Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris (2015) demonstrate. In fact, shortly after the end
of the Cold War, some means of intervention came to be considered legitimate
by the central powers, justified by arguments related to violations of human
rights,21 the war on drug cartels in Latin America, the fight against corruption,
the preservation of international security, and more recently the preventive

21 There are several examples of human rights violations without any military inter-
vention from the central powers, simply because imperialist interests were not at risk
(Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris, 2008: 221).
Imperialism 229

war against terror (Bandeira, 2014; Sakellaropoulos and Sotiris, 2008: 220;
Johnson, 2004: 31).
However, as the law of uneven development prevails, new poles of power
are emerging. Cooperation becomes more problematic due to the growing
multipolarization of the international system –​as it can be seen in the for-
mation of the brics and the Union of South American Nations (usan), for
­example –​and consequently with the relative decrease of US power that is
currently observed (Fernandes, 2016).
This situation helps explain the growing reaction against US foreign policy,
which after ‘11 September’ began to use a clearly warmongering and interven-
tionist language. Since then, the United States has fomented conflicts in sev-
eral parts of the world, ignoring the sovereignty of countries like Afghanistan
(2001) and Iraq (2003). Libya and Syria were also targets of US interventions
in conjunction with France, Britain and a group of Middle Eastern countries
with diverse interests in the region (Bandeira, 2014: 382–​384). Following the
bombing of Libya in 2011, the regime of Muammar al-​Gaddafi was overthrown.
The same modus operandi was used in Syria22 However, Russia’s reaction to
the conflict has been decisive to preserve the Bashar al-​Assad regime to this
date. More recently, the intervention in Ukraine has created strong instability
in the region, leading to the holding of a referendum on the reincorporation
of Crimea to Russia.23 This is evidence that rivalries between the great powers
continue to the present day, and that Russia has been playing an increasingly
active role.
Finally, it should be noted that arm expenses remain high in several coun-
tries, especially in Europe, despite the economic crisis the world has been
experiencing in recent years (Marshall, 2014: 328). According to the Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (sipri), in 2015, military spending in
the world reached US$ 1.68 trillion, representing a real increase of 1.0% over
2014. This is the first increase since 2011. But before that, expenditures grew
steadily for 13 years between 1998 and 2011 (Perlo-​Freeman et al., 2016). The

22 According to Bandeira (2014: 372), in relation to Syria, “the goal of the United States and
other Western powers (…) was to take control of the Mediterranean and politically isolate
Iran, Syria’s ally, as well as contain and eliminate the influence of Russia and China in the
Middle East and the Maghreb”.
23 Bringing chaos to certain states seems to be a tactic of imperialism today (Losurdo,
2015: 278). Vianna (2015) appropriately called these states ‘zombie states’. This goes
against the idea of ‘failed states’, published by the magazine “Foreing Policy”, that says it
is an internal problem, serving as an argument for intervention by capitalist powers. In
the case of zombie states, it would be precisely external interventions that make them
ungovernable territories.
230 Fernandes

United States is by far the country that spends more in armaments –​36% of
the total in 2015 –​but Europe deserves to be mentioned. As shown in detail by
Slijper (2013), it is impressive to realize the continued high military spending
of countries such as Spain, Greece and Italy that were at the epicenter of the
crisis in the euro area and immersed in economic austerity programs that were
difficult to attain due to the high social costs. This is clearly in direct confron-
tation with the Kautskyan perspective, which predicted a reduction in military
spending as a primary commitment of ultra-​imperialism.

5 Conclusion

In this work, we sought to show that the notion of the possibility of capitalism
to organize itself comes from the classic authors of imperialism. Hilferding had
already predicted the feasibility of a world cartel to control production effi-
ciently, maintaining the system stable. In Bukharin, we can also find a tendency
toward stabilization inside national economies under the control of a cartel,
while competition would remain in the international sphere. In Kautsky, sta-
bility would be achieved by an agreement between the great powers to a point
where wars would no longer be necessary.
There are currently several authors who analyze the system from the point of
view of stability. Hard and Negri, Robinson and Harris, and Panich and Gindin
no longer consider the term imperialism adequate. For these authors, the term
empire is more in line with the current structure of the international system.
Hard and Negri go even further, by suggesting that the world has entered into
a global paradigm in which there would no longer be room for national sover-
eignty, and that now wars would actually be only police actions.
Authors such as Sakellaropoulos, Sotiris, and Marshall are able to under-
stand the international system more satisfactorily, based on the Leninist the-
ory of imperialism. As noted, Lenin’s analysis of imperialism is not limited to
a strictly economic or political view. Nor does it seek to approach the phe-
nomenon as if it were a mere expansionism of some more powerful states.
Imperialism is a system of economic and political relations that grants unpar-
alleled dynamism to capital while aggravating the economic contradictions of
capitalism and the antagonisms among states.
This way, we sought to demonstrate that the current international situation
suggests a scenario closer to Lenin’s perspective than to the ones proposed by
the authors presented in the third section. There is increasing political and
economic instability in several parts of the world. The effects of the crisis of
2008 still have repercussions in Europe and the reforms proposed as important
Imperialism 231

for a new world economic governance do not move forward. This situation is
very different from the notion of globalization.
In this sense, the leadership of the United States is questioned, as there is
in fact a strong discomfort with the unilateral form that its policies are con-
ducted both in the military and in the macroeconomic areas. On the other
hand, movements of great relevance such as the bric s and the usan emerge,
which added to the economic condition that China has achieved in recent
years and the repositioning of Russia in the international scenario, may inten-
sify inter-​capitalist antagonisms and competition, not the opposite. Therefore,
war remains a concrete possibility, as it has in fact been happening.
Finally, the concept of imperialism not only remains valid but is still the
one that best expresses relations of exploitation, property, class struggle and
revolutionary transition, which are very far from any possibility of stability of
the international system.

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 pa rt 4
Latin-​American Theory on Dependency

∵
 ­c hapter 13

The Marxist Theory of Dependency

Contributions of Latin American Marxism to International Relations

Maíra Machado Bichir1

1 Introduction

This chapter represents an effort to emphasize the relevance of the theoreti-

cal framework produced by the authors of the Marxist Theory of Dependency
(mtd2) for the field of International Relations, as well as to contribute to a
closer dialog between Latin American Marxism and the referred area of
knowledge.3 This initiative is part of a broader movement, namely, the rebirth
of studies on dependence in Brazil, especially in its Marxist perspective, which
took place in the last decade. Prior to that period, research on the subject of
dependence in the country had focused on the analysis of “Dependency and
Development in Latin America” by Fernando Henrique Cardoso and Enzo
Faletto and Cardoso’s production. Although the works of Ruy Mauro Marini,
Vânia Bambirra, and Theotônio dos Santos, the main exponents of the Marxist
Theory of Dependency, were widely disseminated in Latin American countries
between the 1970s and 1980s, among which we can highlight pre-​coup Chile
and Mexico; in Brazil, his writings would only find acceptance at the begin-
ning of the twenty-​first century.4 The last ten years have been marked by the

1 Adjunct Professor of the Political Science and Sociology –​Society, State, and Politics in Latin
America, at the Federal University of Latin American Integration (unila). Ph.D. in Political
Science at the State University of Campinas (Unicamp).
2 The Marxist Dependency of Dependency was the subject of our master’s thesis, entitled “The
problem of dependency: a study on the Marxist perspective of dependency” (Bichir, 2012),
and of our doctoral thesis, “The question of the State in the Marxist Theory of Dependency”
(Bichir, 2017).
3 Originally published as chapter of the book “Marxism and International Relations”: Bugiato
C (2021) Marxismo e Relações Internacionais. Goiânia: Editora Phillos Academy. Translated
into English by Alberto Resende Jr.
4 The main works by Marini, Bambirra, and Dos Santos were published in Spanish since those
authors lived, for a long period of their lives, in exile in Chile and Mexico. Despite that fact,
many of these works have been published and translated into other languages, including
English, Italian, French, and German. In Brazil, the recent dissemination of their works took
place through an important initiative by the Institute of Latin American Studies (iela) at

© Maíra Machado Bichir, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_014

238  Machado Bichir

production of several articles, monographs, master’s dissertations, and doc-

toral theses on the Marxist Theory of Dependency or adopting its theoretical
framework, the creation of research groups, and the holding of Congresses,
Seminars, and Conferences on the subject.5
The Marxist Theory of Dependency, which emerged in the 1960s amid the
worsening economic and social contradictions in the Latin American region
and the political polarization between revolution and counterrevolution,
represented a decisive milestone in the analysis of international relations.
Bringing in its theoretical body elements of ‘classic’ Marxism and a tradition
of thought forged in Latin America, concerned with understanding and trans-
forming our reality from their point of view, its authors make explicit the deep
hierarchies of power that characterize the international system, highlighting
the particular modality of capital accumulation and reproduction in depen-
dent countries, the value transfer mechanisms from dependent countries to
imperialist countries and their impacts on the exercise of political power by
dependent states. It is in the subversion of the look, the narrative, and the
analysis, whose starting point shifts to the Latin American dependent coun-
tries, that lies the potentiality of the Marxist Theory of Dependency, both for
International Relations and Marxism itself.
Considering the relevance that the theoretical production of those authors
acquired in Latin American critical thought and their contributions to the
development of Marxism based on their reflections on dependent capital-
ism, their criticisms of both theories of The Economic Commission for Latin
America’s (eclac) modernization and developmentalism regarding the inter-
pretations and political strategies of Latin American communist parties, we
will initially go back to the historical moment in which this current of thought
is configured, also indicating the sources and intellectual roots that conform
it. Next, we will characterize the constitutive theoretical core of the Marxist
Theory of Dependency, highlighting, finally, those contributions that seem
central to International Relations.

the Federal University of Santa Catarina (ufsc), and the Publisher Insular which, through
the collection Pátria Grande –​Biblioteca do Pensamento Crítico Latino-​americano, pub-
lished the translation into Portuguese of three of the main works of the Marxist theory of
dependency: “Underdevelopment and Revolution”, by Ruy Mauro Marini, “Latin American
dependent capitalism”, by Vânia Bambirra, and “Socialism or fascism: the new character of
dependency and the Latin American dilemma”, in the years 2012, 2013 and 2018, respectively.
5 We cite some examples: Amaral, 2012; Rocha, 2017; Guanais, 2018; Gouvêa, 2016; Vargas, 2009;
Luce, 2011, 2018; Prado, 2015; Carcanholo and Côrrea, 2016. An important mapping of recent
production linked to the Marxist Theory of Dependency can be consulted at Castelo and
Prado, 2013.
The Marxist Theory of Dependency 239

2 The Emergence of the Marxist Theory of Dependency

The constitution of the Marxist Theory of Dependency is inscribed in a histor-

ical moment of profound changes in the international system, changes that
were concretely manifested both in the political, economic, and social dimen-
sions of Latin America, as well as in the intellectual effervescence produced
in that same region. If, on the one hand, the two great world wars and, mainly,
the 1929 crisis meant the restructuring of the economies of those countries,
on the other hand, they stimulated intense debates about the theme of devel-
opment/​underdevelopment, combining the emergence of a specifically Latin
American perspective with the reality that took place during that period. The
changes introduced from that period opened a new phase in Latin America,
characterized by the industrialization process, which advanced until the mid-​
1960s, when reconfigurations in the world order, linked to the limits and inter-
nal problems of the countries of the region, had a profound impact on crisis of
Latin American dependent capitalism.
The profound transformations Latin America underwent in the first half of
the twentieth century, whose effects had repercussions on the different and
varied dimensions of its concrete reality, were the object of analysis, reflec-
tion, and investigation by a very extensive group of Latin American scholars.
The industrialization process that began at the end of the nineteenth century
in some countries, such as Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, gained new impe-
tus with the two great world wars and the 1929 crisis, developing in several
Latin American countries. In this same process, the Latin American industrial
bourgeoisie was consolidated, which, by defending their interests linked to the
advance of industrialization, faced the interests of the agrarian-​mercantile
classes associated with the export sector of Latin American countries, seeking
to become hegemonic as the dominant class in those countries.
Even in the face of the conflicts and contradictions of that process, the new
position occupied by Latin American countries in the international division
of labor was seen by many of those scholars as a real possibility of overcoming
the condition of ‘underdevelopment’ and achieving an autonomous national
development. The eclac at the end of the 1940s, whose emergence had re-​
dimensioned studies on development in the region, embodied the interests of
the ascending industrial bourgeoisie and the state bureaucracy in their studies
and reports, defending a development project based on the advancement of
industrialization, which should be driven and controlled by the state.
After the World War ii, the United States, which experienced an intense
economic and military expansion, imposed itself as a new hegemonic force
in the world-​system amid a process of concentration and centralization of
240  Machado Bichir

capital perpetrated by multinational companies. Such movements gave rise

to investments in the industrial sectors of Latin American dependent coun-
tries, a fact that introduced substantial changes in the economic, social, and
political dynamics of those countries. The penetration of foreign capital
into the region’s economies, while enabling the continuity of their import
substitution processes, meant the subordination of their political and eco-
nomic decisions to the plans of foreign countries and companies, as well as
the failure of ‘national projects’ of the Latin American industrial bourgeoisie.
Circumscribed to that conjuncture is the crisis of Latin American dependent
capitalism, which was revealed politically in the antagonism between revolu-
tion and counterrevolution.
It is precisely in this context of changes in economic and social reality and
political polarization that debates and criticisms of developmentalism take
place in the field of Latin American thought, an ideology produced within
eclac and shared by Latin American industrial bourgeoisie, which starts to
suffer severe attacks, being questioned politically and intellectually. The pos-
sibility of an autonomous national development is frustrated by the world
monopoly integration, in which Latin America is inserted, and industrializa-
tion, previously seen as a solution to the obstacles to the region’s develop-
ment, starts to represent a new phase of dependence on the Latin American
countries.
The conjunction of those elements gave rise to a profound crisis of depen-
dent capitalism in the 1960s, which opposed, on the one hand, the dominant
classes, eager to maintain their power, and, on the other, the dominated classes,
who yearned for better living conditions. That opposition is radicalized in two
major movements: insurrections and popular uprisings in different regions of
Latin America and the formation of coups and military dictatorships in Latin
American countries, a fact that is recorded by Marini:

[…] the rise of social struggles in the region was recorded uninterrupt-
edly, causing a political radicalization that crystallized, at one pole, in
the Cuban Revolution, at the end of the decade and, at the other, in the
military dictatorship that, from the military coup of 1964 in Brazil, were
implanted in various countries.
marini, 1999 [1994]: 12

As for the political radicalization of the Latin American popular classes, the
Cuban Revolution in 1959 represented a dividing point in the social and politi-
cal struggles of the Latin American continent. The anti-​imperialist struggle and
The Marxist Theory of Dependency 241

the subsequent anti-​capitalist character assumed by the Cuban revolutionary

process meant for the left and the Latin American working class the possibil-
ity of breaking with the established order, with the capitalist economic-​social
system. Under the impact of the Cuban political movement, Latin American
countries were involved in a strong rise of the mass movement. Theotônio
dos Santos highlights the various dimensions assumed by the Latin American
political struggle:

At the political level, an explosive situation is created where the tenden-

cies to question the current system seek radical forms of expression, either
through explosive mass rebellions or through organized forms of mass
struggle such as general strikes or the electoral support for political forces
that are presented as a denial of the existing system. This questioning does
not yet have a clear political form but is rather the expression of a general
radicalization and an inability of the current system to offer convincing
solutions to the serious crisis in progress.
dos santos, 1972 [1971]

In the midst of the complex situation that Latin America was experiencing,
marked by possibilities and uncertainties, and the political-​theoretical discus-
sions that emerged from it, analyzes were developed on the problem of depen-
dency, which become a major concern of social scientists, economists, and
historians of the region in the 1960s and 1970s. What are the roots of ‘underde-
velopment’ in Latin American countries? What are the prospects for their econ-
omies and societies? Would the social upheavals that multiplied since the end
of the 1950s lead to the structuring of a new Latin American order? These and
several other themes involved the minds of those who focused on the analysis
of the reality that surrounded them, motivating heated intellectual and theoret-
ical discussions and, even more, strong political clashes.

3 The Encounter between Marxism and the Latin American Thought

Reflections around dependency have their emergence anchored in Chile, in

Santiago, a city where institutions such as eclac, the Latin American Institute
of Economic and Social Planning (ilpes), an eclac body, and university
centers such as the Center for Socioeconomic Studies (ceso), the Institute
of Economics and the Institute of Sociology, at the University of Chile, where
242  Machado Bichir

scholars from different Latin American6 countries gathered, allowing for an

expanded intellectual exchange and political-​ social experiences (Faletto,
1998). Chile’s7 role in this process is highlighted by Ruy Mauro Marini:

From 1968 onwards, concomitantly with the generalization of military

coups and the advance of repression in the continent, left-​wing intellec-
tuals began to converge on Chile, which kept its democratic regime intact
and which ended up becoming the privileged locus of elaboration of the
new theory.
marini, 1992: 88

The ‘Dependency Theories’ understood as an integral part of the history of Latin

American ideas (Faletto, 1998: 109) and as a ‘structured current of thought’ were
constituted from a set of works formulated or published between the years 1964
and 1967, which triggered an intense intellectual debate in the region (Marini,
1992: 88). Authors such as Vânia Bambirra, Theotônio dos Santos, Ruy Mauro
Marini, André Gunder Frank,8 Orlando Caputo, Roberto Pizarro, Sérgio Ramos,
ceso9 members, as well as Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Aníbal Quijano, Enzo

6 Many of these scholars had been exiled from their countries, as was the case of Ruy
Mauro Marini, Theotônio dos Santos and Vânia Bambirra, all exiled after the 1964 military
coup in Brazil.
7 Although Chile constitutes the epicenter of debates on dependency reflections, and con-
tributions on this theme were also developed in Venezuela, with the works of Héctor Silva
Michelena, in Mexico, with the writings of Alonso Aguilar, Pablo González Casanova, and
Fernando Carmona, in the Caribbean, from the works of Norman Girvan, in Colombia,
by Mario Arrubla, and in Uruguay, within the Institute of Economics of the Facultad de
Ciencias Económicas y de Administración de la Universidad de la República Oriental de
Uruguay (Bambirra, 1978: 24–​25). It is also worth highlighting Florestan Fernandes’ pro-
duction on the issue of Latin American dependency, discussed in his work “Dependent
capitalism and social classes in Latin America”, from 1973.
8 Although André Gunder Frank, a German intellectual, who dedicated a large part of his
research to the study of Latin America, influenced the writings of Bambirra, Marini, and
Dos Santos, especially from his formulation regarding the ‘development of underdevel-
opment’, we do not consider him as a representative of the Marxist theory of depen-
dency, considering that the author himself does not inscribe his analyzes in the Marxist
theoretical-​methodological field (Frank, 1996). It should be noted, however, that the
political orientation underlying their analyzes converge, to a great extent, with the under-
standing that the Marxist theory of dependency has of Latin American political processes
since they are marked by the confrontation with imperialism, a phenomenon to which
dependency was intrinsically connected, and by the commitment with the rupture of the
capitalist order (Frank, 1973a; 1973b).
9 A study on the trajectory of Bambirra, Dos Santos, and Marini at ceso can be found in
the monograph work by Mateus Filippa Meireles (2014), “Origins of the Marxist Theory of
The Marxist Theory of Dependency 243

Faletto, Edelberto Torres, Francisco Weffort, Tomás Amadeo Vasconi, who were
members of ilpes, actively took part of this construction. (Bambirra, 1978: 23).
It is possible to distinguish from the studies and works produced by
these authors two groups of scholars who, throughout their trajectory, dis-
tanced themselves and opposed each other in heated discussions about the
character and ways of overcoming Latin American dependency. On the one
hand, the Brazilians Theotônio dos Santos, Vânia Bambirra, and Ruy Mauro
Marini, members of ceso, gathered around a research10 group and pub-
lished the results of their investigations regarding dependence on works such
as “Socialism or Fascism: The Latin American Dilemma”, from 1968, “The Latin
American Dependent Capitalism”, from 1972, “The Dialectics of Dependency,”11
from 1972, and, on the other hand, the Brazilian Fernando Henrique Cardoso
and the Chilean Enzo Faletto, members of ilpes, synthesized their interpreta-
tion of Latin American economic development in the work “Dependency and

Dependency: the Center for Socioeconomic Studies (ceso) of the University of Chile and the
practice of Ruy Mauro Marini, Vânia Bambirra and Theotônio dos Santos (1966–​1973)”.
10 Formed in 1967, the group of researchers was composed of the Brazilians Vânia Bambirra
and Theotônio dos Santos, Chileans Sérgio Ramos, Orlando Caputo, and Roberto Pizarro,
as well as Peruvian José Martínez. The research was organized around two main themes,
“The crisis of the theory of development and dependency relations” and “The historical
evolution of dependence”, coordinated by Theotônio dos Santos, and contained three
lines of research, 1) “The world integration process and Latin America”, coordinated by
Theotônio dos Santos and Sérgio Ramos; 2) “ Dependency relations and capital move-
ment in Latin America”, whose coordination was in charge of Orlando Caputo and
Roberto Pizarro; and 3) “Dependent structures in the world integration phase ”, under
the responsibility of Vânia Bambirra and José Martínez (Dos Santos et al., 1967: 3 apud
Meireles, 2014: 76–​77). Ruy Mauro Marini joined this group in 1970, proposing, during
his stay at ceso, a research seminar entitled “Marxist theory and Latin American reality”
(Marini, 2005 [1994]). Although it was a collective effort, with the participation of seven
researchers (with the arrival of Marini), it was the works of Bambirra, Dos Santos, and
Marini that gained greater diffusion, either due to the theoretical breadth of their works
or due to the diaspora played by such authors, who after the Chilean military coup in 1973,
migrated to Mexico, where they resided for a long period.
11 The three works were originally published in Spanish and only translated into Portuguese
in the 2000s. A study on the diffusion of the Marxist Theory of Dependency in Brazil
and on the boycott suffered by the works of Vânia Bambirra, Ruy Mauro Marini, and
Theotônio dos Santos in that country can be found in Prado (2011). In that text, Correa
Prado links the restricted penetration from mtd thought in Brazil not only to the censor-
ship of the Brazilian military dictatorship but, above all, to the effort undertaken by some
authors, with special emphasis on Fernando Henrique Cardoso, to disqualify the works of
the author(s) of the mtd, based on their criticisms. A significant example of this boycott
can be seen in the article criticizing Ruy Mauro Marini’s perspective, written by Cardoso
and José Serra (1978), which was published in Brazil by the Brazilian Center for Analysis
and Planning (cebrap), without a response from Marini (1978).
244  Machado Bichir

Development in Latin America”, written between 1966 and 1967, as a product

of their research carried out within the scope of eclac.
Although those groups have competed in their studies of the Latin American
economic, political and social reality, both concerning the methodological
option and the political implications of their theses, both have taken a critical
position about eclac thinking to the extent that they emphasized that indus-
trialization in Latin American countries had not been consolidated as the
matrix of an autonomous national economic development, and, even more,
it would have deepened the ties of dependence of the region in relation to the
developed center (Cardoso and Faletto, 2004 [1970]; Marini, 2007 [1972]). The
contact with their works shows, however, that it is not possible to classify them
as belonging to the same school of thought.
While in the theoretical-​methodological field, the analyzes are sometimes
linked to eclecticism and sometimes to Marxism, in the political dimension,
two distinct postures can be identified in the face of dependence: the first is
associated with interdependence, and the second, with an anti-​imperialist
posture and anti-​capitalist, with socialism as its political horizon. Fernando
Henrique Cardoso and Enzo Faletto share a theoretical-​methodological eclec-
ticism and characterize the integration between Latin American economies
and the international market, in the 1960s, as interdependent. Such eclecti-
cism is attributed to those authors given the preface to the English edition
of “Dependency and development in Latin America”, written by Cardoso and
Faletto in 1976, in which both provide an extensive explanation of the method
they used in the referred work. In it, the authors refer to three distinct tradi-
tions of social thought: Weberian, Marxist, and structuralist (eclac). At the
same time that they emphasize their attempt to reestablish the intellectual tra-
dition based on comprehensive social science, they claim to use the dialectical
approach to the analysis of society, its structures, and its processes of change.
They also make explicit, through the option for the historical-​structural
method, their approach to eclac structuralism (Cardoso and Faletto, 1979
[1976]).
From a political perspective, Cardoso and Faletto suggest the possibility
of consolidating a relationship of interdependence between Latin American
countries “capitalistically more advanced” and the international market, in
which there would be room for a “associated development-​capitalist” of Latin
American economies (Cardoso and Faletto, 2004 [1970]: 196). The interdepen-
dence category, introduced as a possibility to “boost the industrialized and
dependent nations of Latin America” (Cardoso and Faletto, 2004 [1970]: 186),
added to the assertion of the authors about the solidarity of foreign industrial
investments with the economic expansion of the domestic market in Latin
The Marxist Theory of Dependency 245

American countries, demonstrate a dilution, or even concealment of the phe-

nomenon of imperialism in the dynamics of Latin American countries, which
distances them from the authors of the Marxist Theory of Dependency.
Ruy Mauro Marini, Theotônio dos Santos, and Vânia Bambirra, in turn, are
affiliated with Marxism by adopting Historical Materialism as a theoretical-​
methodological reference in their interpretations of the concrete Latin
American reality, and show, in their works, postures anti-​imperialists and anti-​
capitalists, since they consider that overcoming Latin American dependence
could only happen through a socialist revolution. Faced with the context of
a new international order and restructuring of the international division of
labor, in which the phenomenon of the internationalization of capital gains
dimension, these authors analyze the impacts of those transformations on
Latin American reality and draw attention to the change in the orientation
of flows of foreign investment in Latin American economies, which, from the
1950s onwards, began to focus on the sphere of industrial production. Those
transformations impute, according to those authors, a new character to Latin
American dependency, conditioning in an even more extreme way the pattern
of development of those economies and deepening the overexploitation of
labor in those countries and the contradictions of capitalism dependent.
From Karl Marx’s theory of value, passing through the theories of imperi-
alism by Vladimir Ilitch Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg and Nicolai Bukharin, and by
the joint writings of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, the Marxist heritage was
present both in his works and in his postures in the face of reality, character-
izing, moreover, their political praxis. Such influence is made explicit in the
analyzes produced by them, which claim Historical Materialism as a method
for apprehending concrete reality and particularly in Marini’s thesis about the
overexploitation of work, a thesis developed essentially from Marx’s theory
of value (2013 [1867]), as well as the critical appropriation that these authors
made of studies on imperialism carried out by Lenin (1982 [1917]), Luxemburg
(1985 [1912]) and Bukharin (1986 [1915]). As Theotônio dos Santos states:

The study of the development of capitalism in the hegemonic centers

originated the theory of colonialism and [of] imperialism. The study of
the development of our countries [Latin American countries] should
give rise to the dependency theory. For this reason, we must consider lim-
ited the approaches of the authors of the theory of imperialism. Lenin,
Bukharin, Rosa Luxemburg, and the main Marxist theorists of the the-
ory of imperialism, as well as a few non-​Marxist authors who dealt with
him, such as Hobson, did not approach the issue of imperialism from the
point of view of the dependent countries. Although dependency must
246  Machado Bichir

be situated in the global context of the theory of imperialism, it has its

reality, which constitutes a concrete legality within the global process
and which acts on it in this concrete way. Understanding dependency,
conceptualizing it, and studying its mechanisms and historical legality,
means not only expanding the theory of imperialism but also contribut-
ing to its reformulation.
dos santos, 1973 [1970]: 38

The Marxist Theory of Dependency, at the same time, can be analyzed as an

offshoot of the imperialism theory, as it starts from the same issues that guided
those analyzes and configures an original perspective, either by deepening and
developing some issues or by the inauguration of a new approach –​the impe-
rialist phase of capitalism seen from the perspective of dependent countries,
from the theoretical category of dependency. Although the notion of depen-
dency was already present in Lenin’s12 writings to describe the power relations
between States in the imperialist stage, it is within the scope of dependency
theories that this phenomenon will gain a more precise definition. In the case
of mtd, we find two coincident definitions, that of Theotônio dos Santos and
that of Ruy Mauro Marini, according to which dependency is understood as a
relationship between countries/​nations. While Dos Santos states that this is
“a situation where the economy of a certain group of countries is conditioned
by the development and expansion of another economy, to which that one
is subject” (Dos Santos, 1973 [1970]: 42), Marini points out that dependency
should be understood as “a relationship of subordination between formally
independent nations, in which framework the production relations of subordi-
nated nations are modified or recreated to ensure the expanded reproduction
of dependency” (Marini, 2007 [1972]: 102).
Concerned with the formulation of a Latin American thought from the
perspective of dependent capitalism, which deeply marked the economies
of the countries of that region, such scholars sought, based on Historical
Materialism, to develop reflections about the particular Latin American real-
ity, in which perspectives of transformation and overcoming their dependence
were inscribed, both linked to the socialist revolution. According to Marini, the
greatest merit of the ‘Dependency Theory’13 “was to replant the interpretation

12 Although Bambirra, Marini, and Dos Santos recognize the contributions of Bukharin and
Luxemburg to the analysis of imperialism, it is mainly Lenin’s writings that guide their
conceptions on the subject.
13 We maintain here the terminology used by Marini, but we add quotation marks, as we
understand that the divergences existing within studies on dependence do not allow
framing them as parts of the same theory.
The Marxist Theory of Dependency 247

of Latin American reality from Marxism, opening the way for it to progressively
assume a character of centrality in the intellectual and political scenario of the
region” (Marini, 1999 [1994]: 13).
In this sense, the authors of the Marxist Theory of Dependency must also be
understood as important representatives of Latin American Marxism, insofar
as, like authors such as Julio Antonio Mella, José Carlos Mariátegui, Cyril Lionel
Robert James, Caio Prado Jr., were able to give life to a Marxism rooted in the
issues and problems of our Latin American14 societies, in an original and cre-
ative way, thus valuing one of the richest elements of Marxism, its method, and
thus contributing to the development of Marxism itself.
From this Marxist heritage and their political militancy,15 Bambirra,
Marini, and Dos Santos engaged in a critical debate both with national-​
developmental thought, whose stronghold was identified in eclac, and with
the strategies and tactics defended by sectors of the Latin American left, par-
ticularly the communist parties. Marini, Bambirra, and Dos Santos’s thought,
although related to one of the main explanatory references of eclac –​the
concept of center-​periphery –​represented a criticism of the analyzes and
responses offered by that institution to the ‘underdevelopment’ of the coun-
tries in the region. Such authors recognized in their writings eclac’s efforts
to build a perspective that reflected the Latin American view of its reality,
as well as its advances concerning classical economic theories16 and theo-
ries of development, formulated, for the most part, in the United States and
Europe,17 but drew attention to the limits of its conception. They emphasized

14 Bernardo Ricupero proposes an interesting analytical key to discuss the thinking of Caio
Prado Jr., a Marxist and militant of the Brazilian Communist Party (pcb), that is, the
‘nationalization of Marxism’ in Brazil (Ricupero, 2000). Following this same key, we could
say that the thought of the Marxist Theory of Dependency would have operated a ‘Latin-​
Americanization of Marxism’.
15 Bambirra, Dos Santos, and Marini participated in the foundation of the Marxist
Revolutionary Organization –​Politics of the Workers (polop), in 1961 in Brazil, and,
during the period in which they were exiled in Chile, they approached political parties and
movements during the government of Salvador Allende. Marini joined the Revolutionary
Left Movement (mir), Dos Santos joined the Chilean Socialist Party, and Bambirra was a
member of the Chilean Socialist Party without, however, joining.
16 We refer here mainly to the formulations of David Ricardo (1996 [1817]) through his the-
ory of comparative advantages.
17 In the literature on development, there are different denominations attributed to authors
who debated this theme during the 1950s and 1960s. Sometimes they have grouped around
the broad umbrella ‘theories of development’, as Dos Santos, Marini, and Bambirra do,
or ‘theories of modernization’ (Chirot and Hall, 1982), insofar as their works share the
same object of concern, that is, the passage from traditional, archaic, or underdeveloped
societies to modern or developed societies, sometimes they are gathered from the field
248  Machado Bichir

that transfers from peripheral countries to central countries, characterized by

eclac as income transfers, also represented transfers of value and, therefore,
of added value. They also questioned the industrialization strategy advocated
by eclac, stating that it would not lead to the breaking of Latin American
dependence but rather to its recrudescence. For mtd, dependency would
constitute an intrinsic element of the capitalist system and, more than that,
necessary for its development and reproduction. Thus, its overcoming could
only be associated with overcoming the very logic of the accumulation of the
capitalist mode of production.
Concerning the communist parties in the region, by revealing the impli-
cations of the deep penetration of foreign capital in the industrial produc-
tion of the countries of the region and the associated character of the Latin
American industrial bourgeoisies with imperialism, which was manifested in
the deep ties existing between the ruling classes of dependent states and the
ruling classes of imperialist states, the Marxist Theory of Dependency shed
light on the impossibility of configuring autonomous capitalist development
in Latin American economies. Faced with this assessment, the political alli-
ance between the bourgeoisie and the Latin American working classes toward
national development was no longer justified. As a response to the processes
that took place in Latin American countries at that historical moment,
Bambirra, Marini, and Dos Santos strongly affirm in their works the urgency
of the protagonism of the working classes in the construction of a revolution-
ary alternative for the Latin American reality. The compromise of the analysis
produced by the Marxist Theory of Dependency with the popular struggle is
explained by Marini:

(…) Dependency theory was, above all, a movement of ideas that tried to
respond to the concerns and hopes that mobilized broad popular sectors
of Latin America: workers, peasants, students, and professionals, to offer
them an alternative to a capitalist development whose subordinate and
exclusive character made it less and less capable of guaranteeing atten-
tion to the essential needs of the population.
marini, 1999 [1994]: 13

of knowledge, ‘development economics’, ‘sociology of development’ or ‘sociology of

modernization’.
The Marxist Theory of Dependency 249

4 The Construction of a New Perspective on the International System

The existence of a similar narrative about the issue of dependency, the criticism
of eclac developmentalism and the interpretations and strategies of sectors
of the Latin American left, and the Marxist theoretical-​methodological frame-
work are some of the elements that justify the classification of the author(s) of
mtd as a current of thought. It should be noted, however, that the bibliograph-
ical production of the three authors regarding dependence does not represent
a homogeneous whole, and it is even possible to discern nuances and partic-
ularities in their interpretations of the concrete Latin American reality, which
are due more to the differences in objective and focus adopted by each author,
rather than the analytical and interpretative divergences between them.
While Marini dedicates himself to revisiting Marx‘s theory of value to char-
acterize Latin American dependent capitalism, scrutinizing the fundamental
contradiction on which dependence is based, namely the transfer of value and
the overexploitation of work, Dos Santos focuses on the characterization of the
general frameworks on which dependency relations between Latin American
countries and imperialist countries develop, giving greater attention to the
period of world monopoly integration, a moment in which Latin American
dependency takes on a new character, as well as employs efforts in the sense
of constructing a systematic definition of dependence and conforming it as a
theoretical body. Bambirra, in turn, focuses on the work of building a typol-
ogy of dependent societies and highlighting the political dimension of social
struggles in the region, directing her gaze to the struggles carried out by the
popular classes, as well as to Latin American leftist organizations. Such dif-
ferences, instead of questioning the elements of unity that engender the core
of the three authors’ analyzes, affirm their complementary nature. Given the
purposes of this chapter, we will shed light on relevant contributions of mtd
to International Relations, which can contribute towards indicating paths and
potential for dialog.
In “The Dialectics of Dependency”, Marini aims, starting from Marx’s the-
oretical construction of Capital, particularly his theory of value, to undertake
analysis at an intermediate level of abstraction, which would allow him to
understand the dependent character of Latin American economies and their
specific legality (Marini, 2005 [1994]: 90). The route followed by the author in
his argument consists of identifying, initially the form and nature of the inte-
gration of those economies into the world market, highlighting their role in
the industrialization process in European countries, and then explaining the
impacts that this integration had in those economies. Without disregarding
the relevant role played by Latin American economies in the formation of the
250  Machado Bichir

world capitalist economy in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centu-

ries, as a producer of precious metals and ‘exotic’ genres, Marini states that it
was only in the nineteenth century, after 1840, that their articulation with the
world economy is fully realized, already as formally politically independent
countries, with the establishment of the international division of labor. For the
author, it is only from that moment on that one could speak of dependence.
Understood as “a relationship of subordination between formally independent
nations, in which framework the production relationships of subordinated
nations are modified or recreated to ensure the expanded reproduction of
dependence” (Marini, 2007 [1972]: 102), the dependence is explained by the
author based on the contradictory character that marks the participation of
Latin American economies in the world market, which is based on the transfer
of value, which is why such economies seek to compensate for the resulting
losses by resorting to overexploitation of labor, within the scope of its internal
production, which is reflected in a particular form of the cycle of dependent
economies, which reproduces these mechanisms.
In that way, Latin American countries, disadvantaged by unequal exchange,
instead of seeking to correct the imbalance between the prices and values of
their products generated from international trade, seek to compensate their
losses through the increase in worker exploitation within the scope of its inter-
nal production, which takes place through mechanisms such as the increase
in the intensity of work, the extension of the working day and the expropri-
ation of part of the work necessary for the worker to replenish his workforce.
While the first two, by forcing them to overspend their workforce, causing its
premature exhaustion, deny the worker the necessary conditions for them to
replace the wear and tear of their workforce, the last removes the possibility
for the worker to consume what is strictly indispensable to keep their work-
force in a normal state (Marini, 2007 [1972]: 116). Such mechanisms, employed
to increase, through an increase in surplus value, the appropriated value (and
even the value produced when using the increase in labor intensity), as well as
the profit rate of the Latin American dominant classes, compensating for the
transfer of value resulting from an unequal exchange, imply remuneration of
workers below their value (Marini, 2007 [1972]: 113–​120). That would consist,
according to Marini, of the super-​exploitation of work.
Having explained the foundation on which dependency is anchored, we
now turn to the articulation that the Marxist theory of dependency builds
between the national matter and the class matter.
Similar to Lenin, Bambirra places the national matter at the level of class
struggle. According to the author, how the class struggle manifests itself makes
explicit the links between the national and class dimensions. In that sense,
The Marxist Theory of Dependency 251

there would not be, in her perspective, a contradiction or ambiguity in the

analytical framework from which the Marxist theorists of dependency depart.

Marxists must know that the class struggle within an oppressed nation
goes through the class struggle at the international level and, even though
it takes place specifically in the sphere of national societies –​which
strongly raises the problem nationally –​is not isolated from the charac-
teristics and dynamics assumed by the struggle between the oppressed
nation and the oppressor. Therefore, it is necessary to elucidate the
confusion that can be generated on the one hand by isolating and privi-
leging the 'greater contradiction' of class, to the detriment of the contra-
diction between the oppressed and oppressor nation and, on the other,
the underestimation of the national factor, that is, how the contradic-
tions between the antagonistic classes manifest themselves at the level
of a national society. Dialectical reasoning determines the close link
between the two levels of the class struggle.
bambirra, 1978: 54

If in the previous passage, the author’s argument is located on a more abstract

plane, in the following one, Bambirra offers a more concrete analysis of the
interconnection between the two dimensions, emphasizing the articulation
established between imperialism and the dominant classes of the dependent
countries, in the function of the control of the axis of accumulation of those
economies by the imperialist capitals, whose impact is deeply felt in the polit-
ical power of those countries.

Today, when dependency relations have already assumed their specific

character, through which imperialist capitals come to control the central
axis of the accumulation process –​the manufacturing industry –​and to
be a constitutive part of the economy at the national level, with all the
implications that this entails in regards to its indirect but live interference
in political power, when this domination even permeates the origins of
the oppressed nations, imperialism becomes the enemy of the peoples in
the last instance, since the bourgeoisie are intimately associated with it.
In such conditions, the 'greatest contradiction' of classes is, at the same
time, the contradiction between the interests of the proletariat and its
allies, that is, the dominated classes against the bourgeois-​imperialist
domination. All the great revolutions that until today have led the people
towards socialism have had to face, before or after the triumph, direct,
cruel imperialist aggression on their territory.
bambirra, 1978, p 56, emphasis added
252  Machado Bichir

Based on Bambirra’s arguments and the writings of Marxist dependency the-

orists, we identified that national States are taken as a unit of analysis in the
study of dependency relations, however, those same States are not understood
as monolithic blocks or as abstract entities. Understood as the center of polit-
ical power, the State, from the perspective of Marxist dependency theorists,
is the representation of class domination underlying such social formations.
The imbrication between the national issue and the class issue acquires con-
creteness in the dependent States from the conformation of the power bloc18
in those States through the participation of foreign dominant class fractions.
Dependence, in this sense, at the same time that it constitutes a relationship
between States, gains political effectiveness through class relations that are
configured at national and international levels.
The Marxist dependency theorists, in addition to emphasizing the class
character of the State, draw attention to the hierarchy of power among capital-
ist states –​imperialist and dependent states –​that engenders the international
system. We recover, at this moment, the formulations developed by Jaime
Osorio, an important Chilean Marxist and scholar of the theme of power and
the State, who was part of the research group coordinated by Dos Santos at ceso
and whose works are inscribed in the field of the Marxist theory of dependency.
In his books, “The State at the Center of Mundialization” (2004); “Redoubled
exploitation and actuality of revolution” (2009); “State, biopower, exclu-
sion” (2012); “State, reproduction of capital and class struggle” (2014a), “Marxist
Theory of Dependency” (2016), the author introduces fundamental contribu-
tions to the understanding of the theme of the dependent capitalist state,
which represent, in our perspective, the most advanced development carried
out in this field within the scope of the mtd.

18 The concept of power bloc, is developed by Nicos Poulantzas, a Greek Marxist philos-
opher and sociologist, to explain how the dominant classes exercise power in the capi-
talist state. According to Poulantzas, it is the “[…] particular contradictory unity of the
politically dominant classes or class fractions, in their relationship with a particular
form of the capitalist state” (Poulantzas, 1977 [1968]: 229, original italics). In an obvious
counterpoint to the idea that the ruling class would constitute a monolithic bloc, the
Greek Marxist draws attention to the existence of important divisions and contradictions
within the bourgeoisie in its different fractions, which are expressed in its relationship
with the state. Amid such divisions and contradictions present within the bourgeois class,
the hegemony of a bourgeois fraction is imposed, which guarantees the political domina-
tion of the class as a whole.
The Marxist Theory of Dependency 253

In dialog with the Marxist debate on the State, especially in the figures of
Lenin, Gramsci, and Poulantzas, Osorio advances in the characterization of
the State in contemporary society and dedicates a large part of his effort to the
integration between the Marxist theory of the State and the Marxist Theory of
Dependency. In this sense, in addition to pointing out the main traits of the
State in capitalism, he highlights the hierarchy of power that marks the state
system and the existing differences between imperialist states and states in
dependent capitalism, a theme that has been very little developed in the field
of political studies and Latin American studies.
Osorio points out two central elements that characterize states in Latin
American dependent capitalism. The first is the restricted sovereignty of those
states. In a world-​system characterized by the unequal exercise of state sov-
ereignty, the states of dependent capitalism can be defined as sub-​sovereign.
That does not mean, according to the author, that this State lacks something,
but rather that its actions are subordinated to the operations and decisions
of the imperialist centers. The conditions of reproduction of the local dom-
inant social classes are conditioned by imperialist capital and its projects,
which reproduce dependence and subordination. The other element is the
particularity of exploitation in dependent societies, which is based on the
super-​exploitation of the workforce, that is, on the structural and permanent
violation of the value of the workforce and the conversion of part of the con-
sumption and life fund of workers in capital accumulation fund. According
to Osorio, this process implies the development of capitalism that sharpens
the elements of barbarism and reduces the field of the dominant classes to
establish modalities of domination sustained by stable forms of consensus,
which explains the democratic instability in the Latin American region, always
threatened by processes that weaken it and by authoritarian trends in the his-
tory of the region (Osorio, 2014b).
The author indicates, however, that the limitation of Latin American sov-
ereignty did not prevent the exercise of political power by the ruling classes
of such countries to boost their projects precisely because those classes have
strong ties with the interests of the ruling classes of imperialist countries. At
the same time, he stresses that state heterogeneity in the world-​system is “con-
sistent with the logic of expropriating the value of some regions and states
over others, of the hierarchical structures of dominion that such a process
claims and of the differentiated exercise of state sovereignties that this entails”
(Osorio, 2004: 150, original emphasis).
Considering the production of the authors of the Marxist Theory of
Dependency, we identified important contributions of this theoretical current
to International Relations, as well as a broad field of research to be explored by
254  Machado Bichir

those who study this knowledge area. In light of this thought, it is understood
that dependency constitutes a fundamental and structuring object of the
international system, articulating and conditioning the relationship between
states and between social classes, explaining the intersection between those
two dimensions, national and class, and highlighting the links that are built
from the exercise of political power. By adopting dependency as a focus and
Latin America as a starting point, they shift the analysis and, therefore, the
explanatory framework since the perspective becomes that of the dependent
States, a change that produces implications both in terms of epistemological as
well as political. This movement reconstitutes the conformation of dependent
capitalism as a specific modality of accumulation, reproduction of capital,
and exploitation of labor, it makes explicit the role played by Latin America in
the international division of labor from the moment of its integration into the
international market to the imperialist phase of capitalism, thus problematiz-
ing explanations that naturalized the ‘development/​underdevelopment’ dyad
or that highlighted the interdependent nature of the international system.
Such a perspective reveals the asymmetries, inequalities, and contradictions
that mark international relations. In these elements reside some of the main
contributions of the Marxist Theory of Dependency to International Relations,
which indicate open paths for an interlocution to be built.

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 ­c hapter 14

Imperialism and Dependence vs. Interdependence

The Muted Side of a Theoretical Clash

Rejane Carolina Hoeveler1

1 Introduction

For the weaker developing countries, interdependence appears as a

system of dependence.2 Hence the appeal of theories which stress
elements of dependencia in the world economy, including multina-
tional corporations, and which underlie much of the rhetoric, if not
the political strategy, of many developing countries.
cooper et al., 1977: 191

The term ‘complex interdependence’, coined in the early 1970s, is probably one
of the most current terms in the International Relations (ir) area around the
world. Although some of the ideas that laid the foundation of its dissemina-
tion have been reviewed by its very authors, Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane,
it is still part of a renowned theoretical framework that is read within the field,
as opposed to what happens regarding the theories of dependence and impe-
rialism developed in the 1960s and 1970s.
This chapter seeks to understand the theory of interdependence from its
historical contextualization and internal analyzes of its arguments, seen as a
development of the functionalist and liberal theory within ir, contrasting it to
the theory of dependence in its various origins, based on the Marxist Theory
of Dependency (mtd).
Our goal is to show that, although the interdependence authors did not mean
to address the dependence theoreticians (at least not explicitly), but rather the
‘realistic’ tradition of International Relations, such theory constitutes an inval-
idation of the dependence theories, in its Marxist and non-​Marxist variants,

1 PhD in Social History at the Fluminense Federal University; post-​doctoral student in Social
Work at the Federal University of Alagoas (ufal) and a collaborating professor in ufal’s
Postgraduate Program in Social Work.
2 Originally published as article in the Brazilian journal “Estudos Internacionais”, v.5 n.3, 2017.
Translated into English by the author.

© Rejane Carolina Hoeveler, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_015

258  Carolina Hoeveler

due to their deep influence over the social movements and the ‘third-​worldly’
and anti-​imperialistic political propositions as a whole in the early 1970s.
We also aim to demonstrate, from the Gramscian theoretical framework, that
those who suggest the theory of dependence, as it is commonly known, may
be seen as organic intellectuals, co-​developers of a collective understanding
linked to class fractions organized in certain private hegemonic apparatuses.
In the first part of the chapter, we briefly summarize the theories of depen-
dence so that we may subsequently address the theory of interdependence,
initially contextualizing it through Nye’s and Keohane’s intellectual and polit-
ical paths, and then contrasting both theories. In the fourth part, we highlight
some convergences and divergences between the ideas of these authors and
those of Zbigniew Brzezinski, intending to clarify their political partnership in
initiatives such as the Trilateral Commission.

2 The Theories of Dependence and the Anti-​imperialism

Formally founded in 1948, in Chile, cepal (Economic Commission for Latin

America and the Caribbean) aimed at addressing the economic and social
specificities of Latin America, initially from the paradigm of the theory of
dependence or modernization, whose ‘underdevelopment’ concept essentially
meant ‘lack of industrialization’. This theory suggested the ‘modernization’ of
economic, social, institutional, and ideological structures until the point when
the country would reach what was known as ‘take of’, i.e., when the country
would be capable of self-​supported development.
Although our goal does not comprise a thorough and complex description
and history of the theory or theories of dependence in their different origins,
a summary is necessary. To do so, we are going to rely on Ruy Mauro Marini’s
perspective (1992), one of the main theoreticians of the Marxist Theory of
Dependency (mtd), and on Adrián Sotelo Valencia’s most recent work.
cepal’s original project, according to Marini, was an attempt, undertaken
by the ‘developed countries’, to institutionally and theoretically respond to the
unrest displayed in newly-​decolonized countries and Latin America –​unrest
over internal social inequalities and historical inequalities in economic rela-
tions and international policies (Marini, 1992: 67–​74).
In addition to the considerable impact of the “Economic Survey on Latin
America 1949”, issued in 1950, the works of Raul Prebisch (Argentina), the main
author of the report, Aníbal Pinto (Brazil), and Victor Urquidi (Mexico) –​all of
whom had political offices in their countries’ societies at some point –​could
not be ignored in the Latin American debate (Gurrieri, 1982).
Imperialism and Dependence vs. Interdependence 259

Despite being far from a theory of imperialism, the Cepaline theory intro-
duced key criticism to major liberal ideas regarding international trade: instead
of ideas derived from ‘comparative advantages’, inspired by David Ricardo,
cepal would seek to show a tendency to the deterioration of the terms of
trade, which would always be prejudicial to the exporting countries of pri-
mary goods. Therefore, it highlighted the existence of an income transfer that
implied wealth extortion from ‘underdeveloped’ to ‘developed’ countries. The
theory of unequal exchange explicitly stated that the “underdevelopment” of
most of the world was a ‘necessary condition’ for the ‘development’ of wealthy
countries (Marini, 1992).
In the early 1960s, cepal changes its position, initially aligned with the the-
ory of development, giving more emphasis to structural reform. Essentially,
it was an inflection motivated by the economic crises that arose in countries
like Brazil, which had received substantial foreign investment and advanced
the industrialization process, neglecting, however, the concentration of land
ownership and the overexploitation of labor. According to Marini, this crisis,
responsible for inflationary spirals that devoured the already scarce actual
wages of Latin American workers, contributed to a new cycle of social struggle,
bolstered by the victory of the Cuban Revolution in 1959. When the avalanche
of military coups begins, Cepaline developmentalism would suffer a crisis,
opening the way to theories that, although stemming from Cepaline thinking,
criticized it.
The theory of dependence, as it is known, initially appears in a group of
works published between 1964 and 1967, in an extremely substantial Latin
American debate, contradictorily fostered by the exiles induced or forced by
the military coups. Nevertheless, this debate reverberated in the United States,
as André Gunder Frank shows in his criticism of some of Celso Furtado’s the-
ses. Gunder Frank’s central argument was that capitalist developmentalism in
dependent countries would always lead to more dependence, and not inde-
pendence (Furtado, 1961; Frank, 1966). Celso Furtado’s work was already known
in several countries, including the United States, as well as Fernando Henrique
Cardoso’s and Enzo Falleto’s, whose most important work was written in Chile,
between 1964 and 1967 (Cardoso and Faletto, 1977 [1967]).
In summary, the theory of dependence, as Marini explains,

led to the rejection of the idea of autonomous capitalist development,

dear to Cepaline ideologists, and to the assumption that dependence
could not be overcome under the capitalist framework.
marini, 1992: 89
260  Carolina Hoeveler

Although not a Marxist theory per se, the theory of dependence in its most
widespread versions stated that ‘imperialism’ permeated all dependent eco-
nomics, constituting a structuring and determining element, though neither
unique nor univocal, of the State and social, political, and cultural relations
as a whole. In all its variants, the theory of dependence’s underlying concern
was the consolidation, in the wake of the World War ii, of a hegemonic system
whose center was the United States of America. In its turn, the Marxist Theory
of Dependency (mtd) arose as an updated theory of imperialism, under the
new conditions generated by the second post-​war era –​even though the mat-
ter of dependence would still be placed within a wider historic framework.
Brazilian authors Ruy Mauro Marini, Vânia Bambirra e Theotônio dos Santos3
theorized about the specificity of Latin American dependence relationships,
understanding that the extreme poverty of popular masses would only be over-
come under the socialist framework.4 The renovation of the Marxist debate
about imperialism in the English-​speaking world was also noteworthy in the
1960s. During this period, economist Hugo Correa identifies three groups of
theoretical contributions: in addition to the theory of dependence and, in par-
allel, to the ‘third-​worldly’ thought, it is worth mentioning the debates pub-
lished in the “Monthly Review” magazine, initiated by Paul Sweezy, Paul Baran
e Harry Magdoff; and also, the Trotskyist current, basically through Ernest
Mandel (Corrêa, 2012: 157).
And this imperialist-​centered conversation in the Anglo-​Saxon world was
not accidental: social mobilization throughout the world set the scene for it.
According to literary critic Fredric Jameson, the 1960s began with the Cuban
Revolution and the first sit-​ins in the United States, in 1959, reaching another
peak in 1968, considerably strong in so-​called Third World countries (Jameson,
1992; Ali, 2005). Besides that, the late-​1960s historical context defines a reno-
vation of the international political alignment of the ‘Third World’.5 In the left-​
wing sphere, in 1966, the Tricontinental Alliance had been created in Cuba, a
solidarity organization among the anti-​colonial/​anti-​imperialistic movements

3 First Brazilian author to critically analyze the Trilateral Commission and the foreign policy of
Carter’s administration in a book published in Portuguese in 1979 (Assman et al., 1979).
4 Marini’s original contribution was essential to the mtd, with the concepts of super-​
exploitation of labor force and ‘sub-​imperialism’, in which he anticipated a thorough analysis
of a phenomena that would expand considerably in the following decades: the exportation of
Brazilian-​generated capital to other dependent countries (Marini, 2012a, 2012b; Luce, 2011).
5 This term is being used in a descriptive, non-​analytical way. For a critical perspective on the
Three Worlds Theory, it is essential to refer to Ahmad, 2002: 170–​176.
Imperialism and Dependence vs. Interdependence 261

of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, in which context the revolutionary leader
Che Guevara gave his famous speech claiming for two, three, many Vietnams.
In 1973, at the core of the Israeli assault in the Middle East, opec
(Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) imposes an embargo on
the sale of oil, followed or preceded by the constitution of a series of mineral
producers organizations, such as the International Bauxite Association –​a
movement described by liberal intellectuals as ‘old-​fashioned’, ‘destabilizing’,
‘nationalist’, and ‘protectionist’ (Bergsten 1974). Then, the revindication for a
‘New International Economic Order’ in multilateral forums, such as the UN,
becomes significantly internationally important.6
In addition to that, an overproduction crisis starts to arise at the end of the
1960s, leading to increasing commercial deficits in central imperialistic coun-
tries, such as the United States, and the incitement of inter-​imperialistic con-
flict between the United States, Western Germany, and Japan (Block, 1977).
In the United States, the book “Age of Imperialism”, by Harry Magdoff (1969),
became a best-​seller and a solid cornerstone for many American protesters
who were against their country’s imperialistic policies and sympathetic to
Third World revindications (Magdoff, 1978). As noted by John Bellamy Foster,
Magdoff’s work was considerably attacked by the establishment and, at the
same time, was highly inspirational to those who protested against the war
and the country’s participation in Latin American dictatorships (Foster, 2002;
Green, 2009).7 Other critical works, although non-​Marxist, such as Sidney Lens’
“The Forging of American Empire”, originally published in 1971, challenged
and rejected the ‘myth of morality’ of American interventions throughout the
world (Lens, 2006), achieving considerable political impact.
Going directly against this movement, American and European intellectuals
built alternative theories, implicitly or explicitly opposed to the idea of impe-
rialism being central to International Relations analysis. This is the case of Nye
and Keohane’s ‘interdependence’; although it was focused on the ‘realistic’
ideas in ir, it was built around the denial of structural relationships of depen-
dence between countries. Let us see how this theory emerged in the intellec-
tual journey of these two important authors.

6 The “New International Economic Order” was a group of propositions prepared in the United
Nations General Assembly, throughout 1974, fostered by Third World countries aiming to
assure improved negotiation conditions with central countries in several areas, such as sta-
bility of raw material price, access to the developed countries’ markets, technological trans-
fer, regulation of transnational corporations, among others.
7 Indeed, Magdoff’s book in the only Marxist work mentioned by Nye and Keohane, and
Brzezinski.
262  Carolina Hoeveler

3 The Position of Interdependence in the Intellectual Journey of Nye

and Keohane

Joseph Nye, who graduated in Political Science from Harvard University,

becomes a professor in the same institution in 1964, later holding several
important positions in the renowned John F. Kennedy School of Government,
of which he would be the director in 1995. In his first publications, still in
the early 1960s, he used the concept of ‘regional integration’ and carried out
some case studies about East Africa (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika –​cur-
rent region of Tanzania) and Central America (Nye, 1965, 1968). These studies
included the formation of common markets, which Nye analyzed through an
explicitly neofunctionalist model (Nye, 1970).
Neofunctionalist author Ernest Haas was an important reference to Nye and
Keohane in the 1970s. In general, functionalism argued that a better action of
international organizations would lead to a ‘compartmentalization’ of matters,
as organizations ‘technical’ or specific organizations would work better than
the ones with broad or general goals, such as the League of Nations. It was
peace by pieces, as the educational pun would teach.
The functionalist approach introduced the idea that cooperation –​as pref-
erable to competition due to its greater efficiency in achieving these benefits –​
would generate a gradual ‘overflowing’ effect, in which how one succeeds in
a goal or function would flow to other areas (the famous spill-​over effect) in
a process coming from functional, and not political, efficiency (Nogueira and
Messari, 2005: 78). One of Haas’ greatest contributions to this line of reasoning
was the incorporation of the political scope, even if in the strict sense of state
decision, to the understanding of international institutions. A key idea in his
work was the importance of the ‘values’ and ‘education’ of bureaucratic and
governmental elites that constitute the international institutions (Nogueira
and Messari, 2005; Herz, 1997).
The regional integration theory, as it was developed by functionalist authors,
was used as a theoretical tool by Nye in his comparisons between different pro-
cesses of regional integration, such as the European Economic Community and
the Central American Common Market. In his studies, the author presented
explanatory models about how the integration processes expanded from small
economic to big political and institutional matters, distinguishing ‘economic
microregions’ from ‘economic macroregions’. Although integration is seen as
essentially good, the author also mentions its ‘limitations’ and ‘problems’. In
this work, Nye aligned explicitly with the ‘liberal’ (ir) traditions, conceptualiz-
ing the regional integration theory as intrinsically linked to it (Nye, 1971).
Imperialism and Dependence vs. Interdependence 263

In 1972, the Harvard professor organized, alongside his reference author,

Ernest Haas, a book about conflict management through international orga-
nizations, a work that gathered data about 146 conflicts worldwide that were
managed by regional and international organizations between 1945 and 1970
(Nye et al., 1972).
Robert Keohane, who was also a political scientist and a professor at
Princeton University, was the editor of the prestigious periodical International
Organization (1974–​1980) and a member of the National Science Foundation’s
Political Science panel. It is worth noting that, before his works alongside Nye,
Keohane studied the constitution of pressure groups over small countries in
the United Nations General Assembly, a phenomenon that, since the 1960s, had
increasingly become a concern to the imperialistic potencies (Keohane, 1967,
1969, 1971, 1977). Afterward, Keohane would be the president of the renowned
American Political Science Association (apsa).
Nye and Keohane’s first work together was “Transnational Relations
and World Politics”, initially published as an article in the academic journal
“International Organization” (1971) and, soon after, as a book. In this work,
they strongly criticized what they referred to as the ‘state-​centric’ paradigm,
which, according to them, relegated a secondary role to ‘intersocietal interac-
tions’ (Keohane and Nye, 1972). Thus, they engaged in close dialog with two
other future members of the Trilateral Commission, Karl Kaiser e Richard
N. Cooper –​the latter, a well-​known economist who, in a study commissioned
by the Council on Foreign Relations, used the interdependence concept in his
international economics analyzes, especially directed to monetary and foreign
investment matters (Cooper, 1968).
In “Transnational Relations and World Politics”, Nye and Keohane listed
the effects brought forth by the multiplication of transnational and non-​state
interaction: 1. Changes in the citizens’ attitudes; 2. International pluralism (the
connection between national interest groups in transnational structures, often
coordinated by transnational organizations); 3. Increase in the constraints on
the States; 4. Increase in some governments’ ability to influence others; and
5. The emergence of autonomous actors, with private foreign policies that may
deliberately oppose or collide with state policies (Keohane and Nye, 1971: 337).
According to Stephen Gill, the English writer Anthony Hartley was the first
one to, in an article in “Interplay” journal, propose the idea of ‘interdepen-
dence’. “Interplay” was founded in 1967 by American diplomat Gerard Smith
(main American negotiator in the salt i agreement) and ideated as a mag-
azine about Europe-​United States relations. As shown by Gill, during its brief
existence, until 1971, the magazine published a broad range of articles within
264  Carolina Hoeveler

what is known as ‘Atlanticism’, and would be the model for one of the Trilateral
Commission publications, created in 19738 (Gill, 1990: 138–​9).
The term ‘interdependence’ would be central in Nye and Keohane’s most
famous work, “Power and Interdependence” (1977), in which the authors stated
that they not only rejected ‘political realism’ –​understood as a perspective con-
trolled by the constant fear of military conflicts –​but also set themselves apart
from those who they considered ‘popularizers of economic interdependence’,
writers who saw a nearly total eclipse of nation-​state by ‘non-​territorial’ agents,
such as multinational corporations and transnational social movements.
Later, Nye and Keohane would stress that the complex interdependence was
less of a theory and more of a Weberian ‘ideal type’, i.e., an abstract construc-
tion with certain characteristics. In fact, according to the authors, both “com-
plex interdependence” and “realism” would have self-​explanatory capacities in
accordance with the kind of situation being analyzed, as real-​world relations
are always somewhere between the “realist model” and the “complex interde-
pendence model”. While relations in the Middle East, for example, would be
closer to the “realist model”, the relations between Canada and the United States
would be closer to the “complex interdependence model” (Nye, 2009: 264–​265).
As Nye himself recently defined,

As an analytical word, interdependence refers to situations in which

actors or events in different parts of a system affect each other. Simply
put, interdependence means mutual dependence.
nye, 2009: 256

This way, States are acknowledged to remain as the main actors in the inter-
national system, but their ‘interaction’ with ‘non-​State actors’ (multinational
corporations, ngo s, and various transnational movements, such as environ-
mentalism) is considered. In this theory, other interests, such as ‘economic
well-​being’, are added to the security and survival of the State, which, accord-
ing to the realist theory, should be its sole goals.
Nye and Keohane’s analysis in “Power and Interdependence” had, essen-
tially, 3 themes: a political analysis of the interdependence policy, based on

8 The Trilateral Commission, founded in 1973 by major entrepreneurs, politicians, and intel-
lectuals from the United States, Europe, and Japan (the ‘three sides’ represented in every
meeting and publication). The ‘Trialogues’ are quarterly reports issued by the Trilateral
Commission about the main American, European, and Japanese concerns.
Imperialism and Dependence vs. Interdependence 265

the bargaining theory9; an ideal type analysis, which the authors defined as
‘complex interdependence’ and the impact of the processes it comprised;
and an attempt to explain the changes in international regimes –​which
were defined as ‘set of governing arrangements that affected relationships of
interdependence’.
What the authors argue in “Power and Interdependence” was that the use of
force had become increasingly costly for the more powerful States as a result
of 4 conditions: the risk of nuclear escalation; the ‘resistance by people in poor,
weak countries’; the ‘uncertain and possibly negative effects on the achieve-
ment of economic goals’; and ‘domestic opinion opposed to the human costs
of the use of force’. Although these 4 conditions had a reduced impact on the
policies of authoritarian or totalitarian governments, the net effect of these
trends would be the ‘erosion of hierarchy based on military power’. This is an
overly explicit reference not only to the vague anti-​war mobilization but also
to its effects on the military structure of the United States.
Writing about “Power and Interdependence” 10 years later, Nye and Keohane
stated that

Our [1977] analysis linked realist and neorealist analysis to concerns of

liberals with interdependence. Rather than viewing realist theory as an
alternative to liberal ‘interdependence theory’, we regarded the two as
necessary complements to one another. This approach was analytically
justified, in our view, because realism and liberalism both have their
roots in a utilitarian view of the world, in which individual actors pursue
their own interests by responding to incentives. Both doctrines view pol-
itics as a process of political and economic exchange, characterized by
bargaining. Broadly speaking, both realism and liberalism are consistent
with the assumption that most state behavior can be interpreted as ratio-
nal, or at least intelligent, activity. Realism and liberalism are therefore
not two incommensurable paradigms with different conceptions of the
nature of political action.
keohane and nye, 1987: 728–​72910

9 The ‘bargaining theory’, substantially influential among funcionalist authors, defines the
‘bargaining situation’ as one in which two or more players have a common interest in
cooperation, but face conflicts of interests concerning how this cooperation would be
conducted (the players may be individuals, firms, countries, or organizations). Bargaining
could define any process, be it in the political, economic, or international arena, where
the interested parties try to reach a deal (Muthoo, 2000).
10 The authors’ defense against liberal and realist criticism, that their analyzes of both tra-
ditions were incomplete, was that their intention had not been to develop a historical
266  Carolina Hoeveler

According to the authors themselves, the result of their analytical synthesis in

“Power and Interdependence” would have been “to broaden neorealism and
provide it with new concepts” (Keohane and Nye, 1987: 733). This is a symp-
tomatic assessment of the inflections in Nye’s and mainly Keohane’s thoughts
since the 1980s.
The ‘revisited version’ of the 1977’s classic work, from which the excerpt
above was taken, was written in the Reagan administration context –​which,
to many observers, was marked by force and security concerns, leaving behind
the ‘decade of interdependence’, which would have been the 1970s. This did not
mean, however, the rejection of this concept, whose development was retaken
by Nye in the 1990s and has still been present in his intellectual production to
date (Nye, 2005, 2009).

4 An ‘Interdependence’ to Discredit ‘Dependence’?

As we have seen, complex interdependence, according to Nye and Keohane,

referred to a situation in a series of countries in which various linking chan-
nels connect societies (i.e., states do not monopolize these contacts); in which
there is a hierarchy of matters, and military force is not used by one govern-
ment against the other. Interdependence could bring forth several benefits,
but at a high price, which could be measured in ‘sensitivity’ (degree of impact
that, in the short term, an event in one country would project over the oth-
ers) or ‘vulnerability’ (which comprises the costs of changing the structure of
a given interdependence system).
Well, following this line of thought, the advantages and disadvantages of
the interdependence relationship are classified in terms of ‘symmetry’ or
‘asymmetry’ and would, nonetheless, have nothing to do with reducing inter-
dependence merely to relationships in which there is ‘equal dependence’.
Thus, “manipulating interdependence asymmetries may be a source of power
in foreign politics” (Nye, 2009: 256). A certain kind of interdependence could
interfere with negotiations that comprise another kind, undermining a given
asymmetry. The authors, therefore, linked interdependence to the properly
political scope only when manipulating an ‘asymmetrical interdependence’
can be seen as a way to constitute a source of power11.

analysis of these traditions, but to assess some of their fundamental assumptions con-
cerning the interdependence matter (Keohane and Nye, 1987, p. 729).
11 This idea, according to Nye and Keohane, is first developed by Hirschman, 1945; and can
also be found in Kenneth Waltz (1970)’s work (Kindleberger, 1970).
Imperialism and Dependence vs. Interdependence 267

In 1971’s “Transnational Relations and World Politics”, it had become explicit

that the authors’ choice of using the term ‘asymmetrical interdependence rela-
tionship’ was directly linked to a total rejection of the idea of imperialism. In
their words, the term ‘imperialism’ was not only ‘old’ but also rather ‘ambigu-
ous’, being capable of defining virtually any relationship across state bound-
aries among unequals that involves the exercise of influence –​what would
comprise the majority of global politics. Thus, the concept of imperialism
would have no heuristic value at all, even in a stricter meaning, when referring
to, for example, a relationship in which an uneven power is used to achieve
‘unfair value allocations’.
Nye and Keohane argued that in addition to “fairness” being an extremely
difficult concept to agree on, “some transnational relationships” would be
“imperialistic” and others would not; therefore, the ambiguity of the term
would still be present, being thus preferable to use the terms “asymmetry” or,
at most, “inequalities”. (Keohane and Nye, 1971: 346). Well, by these criteria, the
interdependence concept should also be rejected. The central matter is the
rejection of not only the term ‘imperialism’ but also of the very idea of depen-
dence and any reference to a structural relationship of domination between
countries.
While terms such as ‘imperialism’, ‘imperial’, and others disclose a relation-
ship of domination, the term ‘asymmetry’ conveys an idea of imperfection, a
deviation from the standard, which may be specific and conjunctural, in the
relationship between essentially equal countries. The idea of ‘interdepen-
dence’ with ‘asymmetries’ alludes directly, though not explicitly, to the idea
of comparative advantages, initially developed by David Ricardo. Each coun-
try would politically and economically exploit its various resources aiming to
maximize its earnings both in the market and in international politics. At its
core, it is a benevolent perspective of the empire.
Nevertheless, as Franz Hinkelammert’s pioneering essay points out, the
concept of interdependence is not static, as in neoclassic economic theory,
but rather a dynamic concept, “of a process with future projection”, something
that even reaches the condition of historical subject, even if through certain
men. The advancement of interdependence (as it would be presented in the
1990s globalization) would be an inexorable historical process, but this would
also include the need to ‘manage’ it, for it would bring forth, according to its
authors, new problems to the management of the international system –​and
managing the new situation meant coordinating “the maximum of interde-
pendence with the minimum of social justice” (Hinkelammert, 1979: 85). Nye
and Keohane’s collaboration with ‘interdependence management’ projects in
the Trilateral Commission can be seen as evidence. Another piece of evidence
268  Carolina Hoeveler

would be the non-​accidental convergence in thought between them and

another important International Relations theoretician of that time, ‘realist’
Zbigniew Brzezinski, a matter we are going to address in the following section.

5 Congruence with Brzezinski

The idea of interdependence and the rejection of the imperialism or depen-

dence categories were present in many authors before Nye and Keohane. In his
1969 work, “Between Two Ages”, the Polish Sovietologist Zbigniew Brzezinski
addressed the matter of how economic power would be becoming increas-
ingly depersonalized through the emergence of a ‘high complexity interdepen-
dence’ between governmental institutions (including the military institution),
scientific establishments, and industries (Brzezinski, 1971 [1969]). Although
Brzezinski’s words referred to the relations between institutions and spheres
within a society rather than between societies, the coincidence of terms is
noteworthy.
Going back to Hinkelammert once again, to the Trilateral thought, in the ris-
ing ‘technetronic era’ (a term coined by Brzezinski), States are no longer bear-
ers and protectors of national interests, but rather “geographical places where
interdependence happens”; this implied, among other things, the rejection of
national policies, such as full employment, that arose as forms of social con-
tention and capitalist development in the post-​war decades (Hinkelammert,
1979: 93).
According to Brzezinski, the influence of innovation and the economic
presence of the United States –​or its encouragement –​would be taking the
place of the “informal imperial system” consolidated by the USA, especially
during the ii World War and the beginning of the Cold War, a period when
the American military bases were spread throughout the world (Brzezinski,
1971: 45).
Marxist analyzes of imperialism, according to Brzezinski, would be wrong
to “disregard” this new kind of relationship with the world, as they would con-
sider imperialism merely as an “expression of an imperial impetus”, ignoring
the dimension of the scientific-​technological revolution that would impel
backward countries to copy the more advanced ones, stimulating the expor-
tation, from the latter to the former, of organization techniques and skills
(Brzezinski, 1971: 45).
In this excerpt, the Sovietologist deliberately omitted the works of Marxists
such as V.I. Lenin (and Marxists who saw imperialism as a phase of capital-
ism) or L. Trotsky, whose theory of unequal and combined development,
Imperialism and Dependence vs. Interdependence 269

written still at the beginning of the twentieth century, had been an attempt to
understand the mechanisms through which “backward” countries, under the
perspective of capitalist development, “skip stages” and, therefore, acquire
peculiar political, social, and economic aspects (Trotsky, 1967 [1932]: 23–​32). It
is evident the omission or caricatural representation of Marxist thought.
In Brzezinski’s words, “asymmetrical relationships” between countries
could even exist, but the content of this “asymmetry” cannot be “branded as
imperialism” (Brzezinski 1971: 45). It is worth noting this coincidence of terms
used by Brzezinski and Nye/​Keohane.
Although the similarities between Brzezinski’s and Nye and Keohane’s the-
ories go so far as this, it is a fact that the guiding theses of the previously men-
tioned Trilateral Commission’s works during the 1970s constituted a synthesis
of the two schools of thought. The pivotal matters of this synthesis can be sys-
tematized in the following way: a) the idea that there was a decrease in the
USA’s capacity of controlling the international system, along with an increase
in the economic power of other potencies, such as Japan and Germany, anach-
ronizing the political outlines of the Kissinger years and demanding the con-
struction of a ‘shared hegemony’; b) the perception that the Third World, in
the formation of regional alliances and/​or specific interests, such as oil export-
ers, could cause severe economic turbulences in central countries, demanding
some kind of counter-​coalition, beginning with the coordination of the ‘trilat-
eral countries’; and c) the emphasis on the need for creating and strengthening
international institutions, especially (pretentiously) ‘depoliticized’ and ‘tech-
nical’ institutions (detailed and emphatic recommendations present in several
reports issued by the commission).
The reports of the Trilateral Commissions during the 1970s would reflect
both Nye and Keohane’s and Brzezinski’s theories, three characters who, how-
ever different, were very active in its constitution. The Trilateral Commission
is founded in 1973 from a project developed within the Council on Foreign
Relations (cfr), having Brzezinski as its main organizer (Gill, 1990; Sklar, 1980;
Maira, 1982). The participants included politicians from various parties (from
Republican to Democrat ‘liberals’, German social-​democrats), entrepreneurs
(its overwhelming majority being huge American transnational organizations
and, in a smaller proportion, Japanese, German, English, Belgian, and Italian
organizations), and the heads of important international organisms, such as
Robert McNamara, then ceo of the World Bank. It is worth noting that ‘inter-
dependence’ became a key term in 1978’s World Development Report (wdr),
the first of a series of reports that would become the World Bank’s main pub-
lication –​what shows that, far beyond a theory, ‘interdependence’ was on
its way to becoming part of a political action program made by multilateral
270  Carolina Hoeveler

organizations.12 In this way, we cannot but address its authors’ political activ-
ity alongside various organizations, which enables us to call them ‘organic
intellectuals’.

6 Organic Intellectuals and Private Hegemonic Apparatuses

The 1974 Council on Foreign Relations’ (cfr)13 annual report detailed a new
program, whose title was “1980s Project” and whose objective would be to “help
transform the political and economic system (…) in a process of accelerated
changes since the end of the 1960s (…) by the impact of competition within
the advanced capitalist world, by the Vietnam War (…) by the revolutionary
processes in the Third World and by the international monetary system crisis”
(Shoup and Minter, 1977: 254).
At that point, scholar Joseph Nye was the director of the Committee for
Economic Development (ced). Founded in 1942, the ced, similar to the cfr,
was an association constituted by great entrepreneurs and scholars, initially
formed by an initiative of the Department of Trade. It constituted, like the
cfr, a private hegemonic apparatus (Gramsci, 2007; Liguori, 2017: 44–​45) that
intended to “rescue the businessman from his own intellectual neanderthal-
ism” and, at the same time, “bring scholars and theories for free association
with men who reached leading positions in industry and business through
their own effort” (Dreifuss, 1987: 42). This kind of private organization allowed,
in the words of historian Virgínia Fontes, the

much broader and farther-​reaching cosmopolite diffusion of certain inter-

ests, certain action patterns, and certain ways of thinking than if they
were bound by international political deals or national legislations that
regulated directly economic activities, effective for the establishment of
companies.
fontes, 2010: 174–​5

12 According to Mendes Pereira, the report had already recommended changes in the pro-
files of Third World debts’, with longer due dates, in a clear concern to manage the ungov-
erned process of external indebtedness incurred by many of these countries (Pereira,
2010: 232).
13 Founded in 1921 and responsible for the prestigious “Foreign Affairs” journal, the cfr is
the most traditional USA’s foreign policy think-​tank.
Imperialism and Dependence vs. Interdependence 271

During the 1970s, ced, alongside their international counterparts, promoted

studies and events about the international monetary crisis and the relation-
ships between transnational corporations and the Third World (Dreifuss,
1987: 80). Therefore, Nye’s invitation to join the exclusive cfr’s “1980s Project
Coordinating Group” is not a surprise.
The “1980s Project Coordinating Group” mostly comprised university
professors, among them economists Richard N. Cooper and Carlos Diaz-​
Alejandro, from Yale; Harvard professors Harvard Stanley H. Hoffman and
Samuel Huntington; Richard Falk, from Princeton; environmental studies
professor Gordon J. MacDonald, from Dartmouth; and Michigan University
political science professors Ali Mazrui and Alan S. Whiting.14 But it also
included three corporate members: W. Michael Blumenthal, director of
Bendix; Stephen Stamas, vice-​president of Exxon; Edwin K. Hamilton, presi-
dent of Griffenhagen-​Kroeger Inc; and Bruce K. MacLaury, president of Federal
Reserve Bank, Minneapolis.
“1980s Project” coordinating group included 3 future members of the
Trilateral Commission: Richard Cooper, Bruce K. MacLaury, and Joseph Nye
himself. Besides them, 8 cfr directors became part of the Trilateral Commission
since its foundation, among them Brzezinski, Gerard Smith, George Franklin,
and David Rockefeller, then ceo of the Chase Manhattan Bank and heavily
active in political-​diplomatic matters, responsible for a great amount of the
funds raised to start the entity (Rockfeller, 2002: 444–​447).
“1980s Project’s” first publication, signed by economist Miriam Camps, led
to the suggestive title of “The management of Interdependence: A Preliminary
View”. The book/​report was concluded after two years of study group meetings
about the subject of “1980s Project”, between 1971 and 1973 (Camps, 1974). In the
report, it was stated that no nation could ever play the role the USA had played
in the past and that, given this, it was indispensable that the advanced capital-
ist industrial powers should manage a “collective administration” (Shoup and
Minter, 1977: 265–​7).
Nye and Keohane’s more active participation in the Trilateral Commission’s
works occurred in the task-​force reports (tfr s) concerning international
institutions and would take up a significant part of the Commission’s efforts
between 1976 and 1978, with 3 detailed deports written with the consultation

14 Whiting and MacDonald were consultants for the State Department, and the latter for the
Department of Defense. Huntington was the editor of the newly-​founded “Foreign Policy”
journal, in whose editorial board Falk, Cooper, Nye, and Hoffman participated (Shoup
and Minter, 1977: 257–​258).
272  Carolina Hoeveler

Nye, Keohane, and many other academic intellectuals from the United States,
West Europe, and Japan.
In the Commission’s first task-​force report (tfr s), named “The Reform of
International Institutions”, signed by C. Fred Bergsten, Georges Berthoin, and
Kinhide Mushakoji, written in 1976 with Robert Keohane’s consultation, “inde-
pendence” is a key term as the cornerstone for multilateral organizations reform
propositions, such as the UN (Bergstein, Berthoin and Mushakoji, 1976).15 The
proposition was to essentially remove the UN’s deliberative capacity, as it was
considered an overly ‘political’ organization, and transfer it to more ‘technical’
and decentralized organisms, where ‘more effective deals’ could be closed.
The term ‘complex interdependence’ would be profusely cited in another
tfr, named “Towards a Renovated International System”, written by Richard
Cooper, Karl Kaiser, and Masataka Kosaka, who were advised by 22 consul-
tants, Joseph Nye being one of them (Cooper et al., 1977).16 It is in this docu-
ment that one can find the symbolic excerpt, the epigraph of this chapter, one
of the rare direct mentions to the theory of dependence:

For the weaker developing countries, interdependence appears as a sys-

tem of dependence. Hence the appeal of theories which stress elements
of dependencia in the world economy, including multinational corpora-
tions, and which underlie much of the rhetoric, if not the political strat-
egy, of many developing countries.
cooper et al, 1977: 191, bold added

The report, written, according to the authors themselves, in collaboration with

Joseph Nye, was a sheer mockery of the ideas defended by the theoreticians
of dependence, characterizing it as a ‘late economic nationalism’, as a form of
‘protectionism’ that should be abolished so that countries could have a good
relationship, such as the defense of selfish interests responsible for the incite-
ment of international conflicts, instead of their resolution. It was a matter of
developing a sophisticated strategy to fight anti-​imperialist policies, whether
informed or not by theories of dependence and for this the theory of interde-
pendence was a perfect fit.
In this way, we can state that the theses developed by Nye and Keohane
were not in any way disconnected from class organization forms in civil

15 The report is available (consulted in September 28, 2023) at: https://​www​.tri​late​ral​.org​

/publi​cati​ons​/task​-force​-rep​ort​-11​-the​-ref​orm​-of​-intern​atio​nal​-insti​tuti​ons​/​.
16 Available (consulted in September 28, 2023) at https://​www​.econ​biz​.de​/Rec​ord​/towa​
rds​-a​-renova​ted​-intern​atio​nal​-sys​tem​-coo​per​-rich​ard​/1000​2025​471​.
Imperialism and Dependence vs. Interdependence 273

society –​which we may understand, based on Antonio Gramsci, as private

hegemonic apparatuses. On the contrary, they were intimately linked to cer-
tain policies defended by certain class fractions organized into these appara-
tuses –​in the Trilateral case, it was specifically the monopolist capital that
constituted the transnational corporations originated in central imperialist
countries. In light of this, we can once again based on Gramsci understand
them as ‘organic intellectuals’ (Gramsci, 2007; Voza, 2017: 430–​431).
Nye’s subsequent path would be marked by some degree of action within
the political society (state strictu sensu) in the United States, more notably in
Democrat administrations. Between 1977 and 1979, during the Carter adminis-
tration, he had a position at the Undersecretary of State for Security Assistance,
Science, and Technology, and presided over the National Security Council
Group for the non-​proliferation of nuclear weapons, for which he would
receive the Distinguished Honor Award from the State Department in 1979.
In 1993 and 1994, in the Clinton administration, Nye would be nomi-
nated director of the influential National Intelligence Council, an organ that
answered directly to the President; and in 1994, he would become Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, receiving state awards
for both offices. In October 2014, he was nominated by the Obama adminis-
tration’s Secretary of State, John Kerry, for the Foreign Affairs Policy Board, a
group that would meet regularly to discuss strategic matters and report back
to the Secretary of State.
In addition to these state offices, Nye would be part of a series of private
research organizations and institutions intimately linked to the state, strictu
sensu, including think tanks for rendering ‘consulting’ services. Some exam-
ples are the Project on National Security Reform (pnsr), founded in 2006,
which formally studies forms of reorganization of the national security State
structure in face of the new threats, such as terrorism, transnational crime,
among others, and the Center for a New American Security (cnas), founded
in 2007.17 His works in the Trilateral Commission have been continuous and
since 2008 Nye has been the entity’s American director.18

17 Founded in 2007, cnas, according to its own description, deals with national security
matters, such as terrorism and irregular war, with the future of United States Armed
Forces, the implications for national security of the consumption of natural resources,
among other issues. See cnas –​Who we are –​Mission, available (consulted in September
28, 2023) at: https://​www​.cnas​.org​/miss​ion​.
18 See Trilateral Commission. Available (consulted in September 28, 2023) at: https://​www​
.tri​late​ral​.org​/about​/memb​ers​-fell​ows​/​.
274  Carolina Hoeveler

Following a different path, Keohane did not have significant offices in polit-
ical societies –​which certainly did not mean a distance from the circles of
power or exemption from State policies.

7 Final Considerations

At the beginning of the 1970s, the theory of dependence exceeded the Latin
American intellectual debate, where it had already reached great notoriety,
and spread to American and European intellectual centers, flowing into the
profitable Marxist debate in progress as part of the renovation of the theory of
imperialism, constituting a political and theoretical challenge faced by intel-
lectuals such as Brzezinski, Nye, and Keohane.
As we sought to demonstrate, the theory of interdependence constituted
a conceptual framework that inspired private and State political strategies,
driven forward by dominant fractions of the dominant classes in central impe-
rialist countries. Debated in and incorporated into private hegemonic appa-
ratuses, such as the Council on Foreign Relations (cfr), the Committee for
Economic Development (ced), and the Trilateral Commission, the theory of
interdependence was the cornerstone of propositions, made by these entities,
for the reformation of international institutions, monetary policies, foreign
policies, international “economic aid” policies, among many others. Such a
framework clashed with the theory of dependence, which, in its many variants,
understood imperialism and international political and economic domination
as key determiners of international relations.
With undeniable recognition in the ir field, the theory of interdependence
is far more well-​known in the area than the theories of dependence. Bringing
the latter back to the debate and identifying all authors within their political
positions is essential for International Relations students to have access to the
sort of theoretical antithesis they have been denied for far too long.

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 ­c hapter 15

Brazilian Sub-​imperialism and Peripheral

Development
A Critique of the Marxist Dependency Theory

Tiago Soares Nogara1

1 Introduction

Throughout the twentieth century, the assimilation and development of

Marxist political ideologies and methods of analyzing Brazil’s political and
social issues have occurred nonlinearly.2 In particular, the Communist Party of
Brazil (pcb)3 hegemonized the Marxist political, ideological, and theoretical
spheres until 1964, with the defense of bourgeois-​democratic revolution and
narrative on feudal remnants in the Brazilian socioeconomic system. However,
the defeat of the pcb’s theory of an alliance of laborers with the nationalist
bourgeoisie in 1964 boosted revisionist and dissident currents, both those
that opted for armed struggle and those already skeptical of the communist
orientations.

1 Tiago Soares Nogara is currently affiliated with the College of Liberal Arts at Shanghai
University (上海大学). He holds a PhD in Political Science from the University of São Paulo
(usp), a ma in International Relations from the University of Brasília (UnB), and a ba in
Social Sciences from the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (ufrgs). For inquiries, he
can be contacted at: [email protected].
2 Originally published as a chapter of the book “Theory of International Relations: Marxist con-
tributions”. Reference: Pautasso D and Prestes A (2021) Teoria das Relações Internacionais: con-
tribuições marxistas. Rio de Janeiro: Contraponto. Translated into English by the author.
3 In 1962, a schism emerged within the ranks of the Communist Party of Brazil (pcb), which was
established in 1922. The primary factions within the party diverged on several key issues at
the time, including global ideological disputes (Stalinism versus revisionist Khrushchevism),
approaches to the socialist revolution in Brazil (armed revolt versus peaceful reforms), and
strategies for political alliances (advocating political isolation and immediate socialist rev-
olution versus aligning with reformist governments to pursue a bourgeois-​democratic pro-
gram). The party leadership, led by Luiz Carlos Prestes, leaned towards revisionism and
peaceful methods by collaborating with the reformist factions of JK and Jango. Conversely,
their adversaries opted to break away from Prestes’ leadership (who, in an effort to legalize
the party, renamed it the "Brazilian" Communist Party while retaining the acronym pcb) and
reverted to the original name of Communist Party of Brazil, under the acronym PCdoB.

© Tiago Soares Nogara, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004693777_016

Brazilian Sub-imperialism and Peripheral Development 279

With the legal prohibition of the pcb and the defeat of leftist guerrilla
organizations on the one hand and the rise of the democratic front and the
Workers’ Party (pt) on the other hand, revisionist and liberal tendencies were
affirmed. Members of the revisionist camp were critical not only of the narra-
tives that emanated from the communist ranks but also of the developmen-
talist and national-​developmentalist prescriptions linked to those they called
‘populists’, just like Vargas and their successors. In the wake of these politi-
cal developments, centers of academic thought and policymakers from left-
ist organizations adhered to narratives that were critical of assumptions that
were previously held to be hegemonic, such as the alliance with the industrial
bourgeoisie in Brazil, the exaltation of nationalism, anti-​imperialism, and the
need to dominate the so-​called feudal remnants that supposedly prevailed
in agrarian production and relations. Among these, the dependency theories
would acquire singular importance with their liberal and Marxist emphasis on
the limits of peripheral industrial development.
In this chapter, we discuss some of the main trends of the so-​called Marxist
Theory of Dependency—​which was expounded by the Brazilian Ruy Mauro
Marini, one of its greatest exponents—​and its basic tenets, including the
denial of developmentalism and the bourgeois-​democratic strategy of the
pcb. In particular, we analyze the concept of sub-​imperialism and how it has
influenced the analyzes of Brazilian international insertion under the former
military regime and the later pt government, especially during the adminis-
tration of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from 2003 to 2010. The construction and
meaning of this concept demonstrate its understanding of issues such as the
economic development of peripheral countries, how they articulate their
domestic and foreign policies, the reasons for the emergence of a theory of
socialist revolution that is distinct from that which is held by communist par-
ties or nationalist movements in Latin America, the organization of industrial
production on a global scale, and how countries dealt with each other in inter-
national relations.
This analysis addresses issues pertinent to Marxism and its treatment
of themes linked to international relations. It emphasizes that the so-​called
theories of imperialism, which were the focus of profound debate in Marxist
analyzes for decades, have been replaced by the canonization of post-​Marxist,
post-​colonial, or liberal ideologies. Leading textbooks and courses claimed
these ideologies as exponents of Marxism in mainstream theories on interna-
tional relations. When debates on theories of imperialism appear in writings
and narratives on schools of thought, the concept of sub-​imperialism usually
becomes particularly relevant.
280  Soares Nogara

The twenty-​first century’s first decade was marked by an increase in Brazil’s

participation in multilateral initiatives at regional and global levels. It played
a leading role in developing regional and intercontinental integration and
hosted essential forums to discuss changes in the balance of power in inter-
national relations. Although these initiatives by Brazil were viewed as posi-
tive developments by several studies, they did not escape criticism over their
shortcomings or for their supposedly hegemonistic motivations. This last criti-
cism was highlighted by the concept of sub-​imperialism, often cited by critical
interpretations of Brazilian international insertion.
Although the bibliography on sub-​imperialism is relatively extensive, few
texts have criticized it. This article aims to fill this gap by reviewing the primary
texts that have charged Brazil’s foreign policy based on the concept of sub-​
imperialism, debating their analyzes, and contrasting them with the reality
they claimed to define. The hypothesis is that sub-​imperialism has limitations
that prevent it from categorizing Brazil’s foreign policy of the period, which
reinforces a systemic vision that is abstracted from the material conditions
that constitute the current global order and reaffirms structures that discur-
sively claim to antagonize by denying peripheral countries the ability to for-
mulate national strategies to overcome underdevelopment.
Thus, we divide this chapter into four sections to discuss the concept, its
application, and its validity. In the first section, we address the idea of sub-​
imperialism based on the assumptions of the Marxist dependency theory while
paying close attention to the observations of Ruy Mauro Marini and his follow-
ers. Next, based on the concept of sub-​imperialism, we examine the main criti-
cisms of Brazil’s foreign policy in South America during the Lula administration
from 2003 to 2010—​when the country reached the apex of regional leadership
at the beginning of the twenty-​first century—​by highlighting its similarities
and innovations with Marini’s ideas. In the last two sections, we compare the
concept to the theories it advocates, specifically the Leninist theory of impe-
rialism, and analyze Brazil’s foreign policy toward South America, particularly
in regional integration and bilateral relations with South American countries.

2 Ruy Mauro Marini’s Perspective on Brazilian Sub-​imperialism

Based on Marxist theory and the classical theory of imperialism, the Marxist
Theory of Dependency states that the dependent condition of peripheral soci-
eties results from capital reproduction practiced by the global capitalist econ-
omy (Carcanholo, 2013). The idea emerged in the mid-​1960s and represented
a theoretical effort to understand the limits of late economic development. It
Brazilian Sub-imperialism and Peripheral Development 281

was critical of both the developmentalist theses and Marxist views that valued
a policy of alliance with the national bourgeoisie. This theory is not the same
as that of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
(eclac) or the associated dependency theory pointed out by Bresser-​Pereira
(2010) as the other strands of the dependency theory. The leading exponents
of the Marxist Theory of Dependency in Brazil included Ruy Mauro Marini,
Theotônio dos Santos, and Vânia Bambirra. The concept of sub-​imperialism
was a theoretical construct developed by Marini, who refined its definition in
his book “Subdesarrollo y Revolución”.
In their interpretation of dependency as a condition that is inherent in a
peripheral country within the capitalist system—​that is, immutable within the
laws of capital reproduction—​Marini and the Marxist dependentists reached
a consensus that the only way to overcome this dependency is a social revolu-
tion that would strip local and imperialist elites of their command in a country
to allow a broad reorganization of the productive system that will prioritize the
needs of the local population. Consequently, agrarian reform and cessation of
overexploitation of labor would expand the domestic market and create new
possibilities for national development. This led him to establish the Marxist
Revolutionary Organization–​Workers’ Policy (orm–​p olop) on the eve of the
1964 coup, which pitted itself against the alliance of the pcb with sectors of
the national bourgeoisie and called for popular mobilization for the seizure of
power. After he was exiled to Chile, Marini pursued a similar political course
when he approached the Movimiento de la Izquierda Revolucionaria (mir) and
urged the party to contest the policy of alliance between the Partido Socialista
(ps) and the Partido Comunista de Chile (pcc) with Christian Democracy and
to propose armed struggle, which was represented by the main slogan of mir
as ‘people, conscience, and rifle’.
For Marini (1974), the reproduction cycle of capital in Brazil was supported
by two pillars before the coup d’état of 1964: progressive increase in produc-
tivity and constant depression in the remuneration of the great masses of
workers. The rise in profit was attributed to the use of new technologies and
suppression of wages by workers, who were subjected to what Marini described
as ‘super-​exploitation’ of labor. These trends created an impasse by flattening
the domestic market and generated problems for the realization of capital
in Brazil. This contradiction led to the development of the concept of sub-​
imperialism by Marini and his vision of the political situation in Brazil.
To overcome the limitations of the domestic market, the military gov-
ernments acted on two fronts: promoting public consumption and opening
overseas markets (Marini, 1971). However, the expansion of consumption did
not focus on increasing the purchasing power of the lower classes of society
282  Soares Nogara

but rather on boosting sectors linked to luxury goods production. For over-
seas markets, the governments focused on those capable of absorbing Brazil’s
surplus goods, raising its economy’s competitiveness, and ensuring conducive
political conditions to access these markets (Marini, 1974).
However, far from being just a strategy to increase the export of products
and capital or reproduction of the theory of imperialism, the concept of sub-​
imperialism by Marini aims to represent a more complex dimension that would
lead Luce (2014) to characterize it as a ‘superior stage of dependent capitalism’.
From a strictly economic point of view, sub-​imperialism is defined along two
structural axes: (1) the effects of the new global division of labor, which led
to the transfer of less advanced industries from major capitalist countries to
peripheral countries and (2) the laws of the cycle of reproduction in depen-
dent capitalism, which created problems for the realization of capital through
the super-​exploitation of labor and gave rise to extreme monopolization that
favors the production of luxury goods as well as the progressive integration of
national wealth into foreign capital (Marini, 1974).
Although the concept was not only endowed with economic dimensions,
Marini has affirmed their preponderance through his depiction of Brazil as a
sub-​imperialist country. The sub-​imperialist status of Brazil was a result of the
integration of its production systems, which had evolved to become a monop-
oly on reaching the stage of financial capitalism. It constituted an intermedi-
ate point in the organic composition of capital at a global level (Marini, 1974).
Consequently, the political dimension of sub-​imperialism emerged through
the internal contradictions within the reproduction cycle of capital. To
increase local companies’ competitiveness and expand their overseas markets,
a sub-​imperialist country would practice a policy of ‘antagonistic cooperation’
with the central imperialist core, such as the US (Marini, 1974).
Marini (1971) cited the Brazilian government’s development of a national
nuclear program as an example to illustrate the contradictions in the coop-
eration between sub-​imperialist Brazil and the imperialist US. This determi-
nant of antagonistic cooperation would appear as a sine qua non condition to
qualify a dependent capitalist nation as a sub-​imperialist country, as well as
the globalization of its economy to address internal problems in capital real-
ization. Therefore, a dependent country can practice an expansionist policy
that is relatively autonomous of the objectives of the imperialist center, which
would define—​beyond the economic determinants of the export of products
and capital—​the phenomenon of sub-​imperialism. It was for this reason that
Marini had, at the time, designated Brazil as the only sub-​imperialist coun-
try in Latin America, even though Argentina and Mexico had shared some of
its characteristics (Marini, 1971). After all, sub-​imperialism could take shape
Brazilian Sub-imperialism and Peripheral Development 283

not only through exporting capital and manufactured products to weaker

countries but also through strategic political moves to ensure its practice and
domination over countries with less robust economies. The sum of economic
(export of goods and capital) and political (strategies to achieve hegemony
over weaker countries) conditions would lead to a sub-​regional division of
labor that could replicate, on a regional level, the asymmetries in the global
division of labor:

Not all the new economic sub-​centers that reached an average organic
composition and became exporters of manufactured goods and, to a
lesser extent, of capital were able to impose a sub-​regional division of
labor to benefit their internal bourgeoisie. In Latin American capitalism,
only Brazil became a sub-​imperialist social formation.
luce, 2014: 52

In the writings of Marini, sub-​imperialism appears as a hierarchy of the world-​

system and as a development stage in dependent capitalism (Luce, 2014).
The phenomenon that gives it an impetus is the contradictions of dependent
economies with significant industrial development. This is because they are
faced with the opposing needs to expand their domestic markets—​as a con-
dition for the realization of capital—​and to flatten the purchasing power of
their popular masses, which are subjugated by the predominance of super-​
exploitation of labor. This contradiction could have led to an intensification of
the class struggle. In Brazil’s case, it resulted in an alliance between sectors of
foreign capital and the upper strata of the Brazilian bourgeoisie to curb social
demands and reaffirm the super-​exploitation of labor, even as its military dic-
tatorship expanded its overseas markets and increased production of luxury
goods to solve the impasse of capital realization.
Marini has used the example of political interference in Latin American
countries’ domestic affairs by Brazil’s military dictatorship as proof of sub-​
imperialism. In his view, it would ensure the supremacy of Brazilian invest-
ments in those countries. With the progressive weakening of dictatorships in
Latin American countries and the rise of re-​democratization processes, the
theme of sub-​imperialism in Marini’s writings has diminished. However, it
is mentioned occasionally, and several authors have used it in contexts dif-
ferent from Marxism. In the twenty-​first century, however, it has frequently
appeared in analyzes of Brazil’s foreign policy toward regional integration in
South America.
284  Soares Nogara

3 Brazilian Sub-​imperialism in the Twenty First Century

As the biggest market for Brazilian exports of manufactured goods, South

America accounted for 18.4% of total Brazilian exports in 2010, and 84% of
products exported to the region were manufactured goods (Couto, 2013). Since
South America is a strategic market for Brazil, regional relations are a high pri-
ority for its foreign policy. During the Lula administration from 2003 to 2010,
Brazil’s foreign policy aimed to establish a dialog with its neighbors to develop
regional statehood and diplomacy (Vaz and Nogara, 2020) . Consequently, its
goal was to improve the workings of the Southern Common Market (mer-
cosur) and shape the South American Community of Nations (casa) and,
later, the Union of South American Nations (unasur). The leading role played
by Brazil in the region soon reignited the interest of researchers in the Marxist
Theory of Dependency, who, once again, viewed Brazil’s foreign policy toward
the region as sub-​imperialist.
Luce (2014) has maintained Marini’s theoretical framework and attributed
Brazilian deindustrialization to the predominance of a new pattern in the
export of production specialization: the decline of the manufacturing industry
and the rise of extractive industries, with raw materials making up a dynamic
sector. Thus, agribusiness and sectors linked to mineral extraction would drive
efforts to diversify its overseas market, thereby giving meaning to the foreign
policy strategy of the Lula administration. In updating Marini’s concept, Luce
went even further than him by designating other rising regional powers as sub-​
imperialists. He even mentioned multilateral arrangements on South-​South
cooperation as sub-​imperialist tools.
In his observations of the bilateral relations between Brazil and some coun-
tries in South America, Luce has highlighted the asymmetries generated by the
globalization of Brazilian companies. In the case of Bolivia, he highlighted the
disruptions caused by the investments of Petrobras in the country, which took
advantage of the privatization of local companies to consolidate its interests in
the production of gas and reap profits from its economic surpluses instead of
using them to benefit the Bolivian population (Luce, 2007). He also highlighted
the investments of Brazilian companies in Argentina, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru,
and Uruguay due to the dissociation between commodity production and the
needs of the people in these countries. Hence, the priority given to Brazil’s
overseas search for surpluses would be based on the prevalence of the contra-
diction between production and the demands of the population in a depen-
dent economy (Luce, 2014).
Luce (2011) has also discussed the reasons for regional integration. For him,
promoting the Initiative for South American Regional Integration (iirsa) and
Brazilian Sub-imperialism and Peripheral Development 285

establishing casa and unasur have supported Brazil’s sub-​imperialist strat-

egy. In addition, iirsa would intensify productive specialization in the region
and aims to meet a global division of labor that goes against the development
needs of a country. This would lead to a strengthening of the bourgeoisie while
at the same time denying the workers essential living and working conditions
(Luce, 2014).
Fontes (2013) has strengthened this view by portraying Brazilian interna-
tional insertion as a capital-​imperialist. For him, Brazil’s capitalist development
had led the country to join other capital-​imperialist countries from around
the world, even when it maintained a subordination facing the more devel-
oped nations such as the US. The export of Brazilian capital and goods and
the globalization of local companies are also proof of the supposedly Brazilian
hegemonistic predatory behavior, which has turned capital-​imperialist; even
Canada is included as a victim of these policies (Fontes, 2013).
However, Zibechi (2013) indicated a need to update Marini’s concept
to ensure that it is compatible with Brazil’s international insertion in the
twenty-​first century. According to him, the current ruling elites in Brazil have
expanded their room for political maneuvers. They have colluded with the mil-
itary and the bourgeoisie to establish a powerful strategy capable of elevating
the country to the ranks of a superpower. In this strategy, Brazil’s neighbors in
South America are seen as its backyard, with relations remaining extremely
asymmetrical. He suggested that the concept of imperialism, rather than sub-​
imperialism, would better describe Brazil’s actions.
To support his thesis, Zibechi has produced an extensive and exhaustive
survey on the process of capital export and globalization of Brazilian com-
panies. The Brazilian elites held this strategy to build a new military and
industrial complex inspired by the National Defense Strategy (end). In his
analysis of real-​life cases, Zibechi highlighted events such as the presence of
the Brasiguayos in Paraguay, the behavior practiced by Brazil in its distribu-
tion of profits from the Itaipu hydroelectric plant to Paraguay, the ostensive
influence of Petrobras and Brazilian farmers in Bolivia, the incisive insertion
of Odebrecht and Petrobras in Ecuador, and the respective social and political
conflicts that resulted from them. Consequently, Zibechi called on the coun-
tries and peoples of the region to halt the advance of Brazilian imperialism
(Zibechi, 2013).
Although Zibechi’s (2013) criticism is similar to the Marxist dependency
theory, it is also opposed to the notion of economic development and the
extractive practices that support it. This is also why his criticism was directed
at Brazilian enterprises that did not have a significant impact on neighbor-
ing countries, such as Belo Monte, as it was aimed at the entire model of
286  Soares Nogara

exploitation of natural resources from around the world. Although it is distinct

from the ideas of Marini and other authors linked to the Marxist Theory of
Dependency, this environmentalist or post-​colonial approach echoes the main
arguments of the Marxist Theory of Dependency, which have also attacked the
iirsa projects in the same way.
López and Lima (2016) have also identified sub-​imperialist tendencies in
the regional foreign policy of Brazil. They described the pattern of relations
between Brazil and Bolivia as a flagrant example of meeting the multiple
interests of the Brazilian bourgeoisie, such as using a neo-​developmentalist
project to establish its hegemony in the region. In the case of Paraguay, they
also emphasized the alleged damage caused by the exploitation of the Itaipu
hydroelectric plant to supply cheap energy to Brazil at the expense of the
Paraguayans.
A feature of Brazil’s foreign policy has been its support of regional integra-
tion. Carcanholo and Saludjian (2013) have highlighted the liberal profile of
its economic features and its tendency to deepen productive specialization in
South America, especially with progressive Chinese penetration into regional
trade relations. For them, these relations would contribute to the technological
impoverishment of exports from South American countries. In his analysis of
iirsa, Borón (2013) also endorsed their reading of the consolidation of pro-
ductive specialization. However, he has designated it a caudate of American
interests to revive the Free Trade Area of the Americas (ftaa).
Generally, not all authors have viewed Brazil’s foreign policy under the
Lula administration as sub-​imperialist based on the concept by Ruy Mauro
Marini and the Marxist dependency theory. For example, Fontes had called it
capital-​imperialist. Although Zibechi has used a part of Marini’s theory, he has
rejected extractivist development policies in his thesis and has instead aligned
himself with Gudynas’ (2012) criticism of neoextractivism.
These theories have demonstrated an understanding of the role that the
globalization of local companies and the export of goods and capital in Brazil
play in shaping its relations with countries in Latin America and Africa with
less economic and political importance. The growing influence of Brazil on
their economies is seen as part of its sub-​imperialist, imperialist, or capital-​
imperialist strategy to wield political dominance over them. This could lead
to a sub-​regional division of labor which can create relations of power that are
typical of the global capitalist system. In the following sections, these interpre-
tations will be analyzed in light of the political and economic realities they aim
to elucidate and questions their propositions.
Brazilian Sub-imperialism and Peripheral Development 287

4 Some Aspects of the Dependentist Thesis and Their Implications

After grasping the Leninist theory of imperialism, proponents of sub-​

imperialism found it useful for analyzing Brazil’s foreign policy under the Lula
administration. Drawing from a hierarchical perspective of the global system,
which delineates major capitalist countries from dependent ones, these the-
orists sought out middle powers capable of proposing a sub-​regional division
of labor to align with their theory. In examining Brazil’s leadership in for-
mulating regional integration in South America, they utilized the concept to
unveil what they perceived as opportunistic motives veiled beneath a facade
of cooperation.
Revisiting the concept of sub-​imperialism, we observe its affirmation of
product and capital export due to a domestic market demand deficiency,
stemming from the super-​exploitation of labor, indicating an imbalance in the
national production system. However, these conditions only partially result
from a sub-​imperialist policy if the country engages in antagonistic cooper-
ation with major capitalist nations. Nevertheless, with autonomy over its for-
eign policy, it can assert the dominance of its investments in weaker nations
that import its products and capital. As previously highlighted, other elements
also align with this phenomenon, including the consolidation and monopo-
lization of capital and the continual influx of imperialist foreign capital into
the dependent economy of the sub-​imperialist country itself. These elements
fulfill the primary conditions for applying the concept of sub-​imperialism and
were utilized to analyze Brazilian international insertion at the outset of the
twenty-​first century.
Recognizing the constraints of the sub-​imperialism concept in explaining
Brazil’s foreign policy in the twenty-​first century, this chapter does not solely
address the disparities between its application and the events of the period.
It also aims to scrutinize any theoretical inconsistencies. While not a direct
replica of imperialism as delineated by Lenin, sub-​imperialism was conceived
by Marini to address gaps in the Leninist approach, affirm its core tenets,
and integrate specific concepts pertinent to so-​called dependent capitalism.
However, despite their foundation in the Leninist theory of imperialism, pro-
ponents of dependency theory have inverted some of its principal assertions:

Contrary to the interpretation that ended up predominating in the

approaches of the so-​called Latin American dependency theory in the
1960s and 1970s, the concept of 'uneven development' formulated by
Lenin did not point to the continuous deepening of asymmetries between
the center and the periphery in the world capitalist economy –​what
288  Soares Nogara

Gunder Frank called 'the development of underdevelopment -​, but the

opposite: the structural tendency towards the erosion of the power of the
dominant center in the face of the rise of new poles of greater economic
dynamism in areas of later capitalist development in the center itself or
on the periphery of the system.
fernandes, 2017: 58

By reversing the understanding of uneven development, capital export and its

consequences, proponents of dependency theory have utilized this phenom-
enon to elucidate the existence of a hierarchy among nations in the interna-
tional system. In this view, countries with a greater capacity to export high-​
value goods and capital to peripheral countries constitute the imperialist
center of the world economy. Meanwhile, middle powers capable of enforcing
a sub-​regional division of labor form the second group of dependent countries
with a sub-​imperialist status and engage in antagonistic cooperation with the
imperialist center.
However, contrary to the claims of the dependentists, Lenin (2011) has
pointed out the imperialist effect of unequal development as a reason for the
tensions between countries, as capital tends to migrate from more advanced
economies to peripheral nations. This would guarantee higher profit levels
and lead to the development of productive forces and capitalist production
relations, as well as the creation of new social contradictions that could lead
peripheral nations to aspire to join the imperialist center, thereby leading to
wars for hegemony. Hence, major capitalist countries would be progressively
consumed by the dominance of financial capital in their economies that—​
based on a rent-​seeking and parasitic logic—​profits from speculation and is
sustained by surpluses generated by productive activities performed outside
the imperialist center (Fernandes, 2017). Rather than complete stagnation in
peripheral economies, the contradictions of imperialism—​an elevated form of
capitalism—​would, instead, create opportunities for developing new dynamic
polarities depending on how they were inserted into this intricate network of
relations.
In an anti-​dialectical perspective, dependency theorists argue that capital
exports from countries in the imperialist center solely fuel underdevelopment
in peripheral countries, without considering the effect of sharpening contra-
dictions resulting from the development of productive forces and capitalist
relations of production. Politically, Marini and his adherents have consistently
advocated for mass mobilization to initiate a revolution as the primary alter-
native to addressing national issues. They recognize that the overexploitation
of labor sustains capitalist development in peripheral countries, leading to
Brazilian Sub-imperialism and Peripheral Development 289

underconsumption—​a crucial element that, despite a contracting market,

ensures profits for a national bourgeoisie subservient to the interests of global
capitalism. A social revolution is deemed the sole means to break this cycle, as
the bourgeoisie would never enact policies that enhance labor remuneration
or agrarian reforms that challenge the status quo. Instead, a social revolution
led by popular forces against the national and global bourgeoisie is perceived
as the only viable solution. On the brink of military coups in Brazil and Chile in
1964 and 1973, Marini's political groups in both countries—​o rm–​p olop and
mir, respectively—​attacked the formation of alliances between leftists with
centrist and bourgeois sectors, such as the Social Democratic Party (psd) and
Christian Democracy, that were part of João Goulart and Salvador Allende coa-
litions. They advocated for an immediate severance of ties with these sectors,
thereby inadvertently aiding the success of the subversive strategies employed
by their opponents:Parte superior do formulário

The radicalization, fueled by militants from the mir, the left wing of
the ps, and other radical factions—​chanting slogans like 'crear, crear,
poder popular' and 'trabajadores al poder'—​precipitated a situation in
Chile akin to the events leading to General Francisco Franco's uprising
against the republican government in Spain in 1936. They acted simi-
larly to the militants of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (psoe), who
called for the formation of a proletarian government and a people's army,
waving red flags and displaying portraits of Lenin, Stalin, and Francisco
Largo Caballero. They envisioned Madrid as if it were Petrograd on the
eve of the Bolshevik insurrection in 1917. However, neither in Spain in
1936 nor in Chile in 1973 did the army disintegrate as it had in Russia,
where demoralized and exhausted troops, defeated in the war against
Germany, mutinied and ultimately joined and supported the revolution
led by Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky. Simultaneously, the accelerated
process of expropriations, occupations, requisitions, and interventions,
affecting both industrial companies and agricultural establishments,
contributed to the disorganization of the economy, decreased produc-
tivity, and exacerbated shortages and inflation. Since the workers were
not trained to administer companies and manage the problems gen-
erated by the abrupt nationalization of several productive sectors, this
situation favored the application of the formula for chaos, implemented
by the cia. This occurred amid general strikes and terrorist attacks that
the cia encouraged and financed, while the psychological war, reviving
the specter of communism, increasingly pushed the middle classes into
opposition, along with the officialdom of the armed forces.
bandeira, 2008: 592
290  Soares Nogara

In March 1964, Cabo Anselmo—​a cia agent who had infiltrated leftist move-
ments in Brazil (Almeida 2010)—​led a revolt by sailors advocating for radical
reforms. Such action, reminiscent of tactics used by the labor movement in
the Bolshevik Revolution, had a significant impact on national public opin-
ion, affecting the government's strategy of conciliation with centrist sectors of
parliament and loyalists within the Armed Forces (Bandeira, 2010). Similarly,
in Chile, the centrist Christian Democrats wielded influence over parliament
and high-​ranking military officials. The cia’s strategy aimed to radicalize the
left wing to prevent centrist sectors in parliament and the military from sup-
porting the government.
In addition to the political strategies employed by Marxist movements and
parties, the dependentist paradigm has also influenced the analysis of interna-
tional insertion by Latin American countries. Observations of the structures
governing asymmetrical relations in the global system have elucidated the
mechanisms and dynamics contributing to the ascent and stagnation of vari-
ous nations within the system. As we delve deeper, the trajectory of this theory
unfortunately ended up bolstering certain contentions within the field that
sought to foster antagonism.

5 Foreign Policy and Peripheral Development

As previously demonstrated, Brazilian products with higher added value are

primarily exported to countries in South America. However, a significant dis-
parity exists between the importance of these markets for Brazilian products
and their consideration as part of a sub-​imperialist policy or as an obstacle
to the development of neighboring economies. In fact, neighboring countries'
criticisms of Brazil stem much more from its reluctance to bear the costs of
its regional leadership (i.e., to contribute more investments to regional coop-
eration projects) than from any alleged undue interference in the politics or
economies of other countries (Malamud, 2011). To address this criticism, Brazil
bolstered infrastructure integration in South America through its National
Bank for Economic and Social Development (bndes)4, given its consistent
annual trade surpluses with every country in South America except Bolivia
(Couto, 2013).

4 For further details, see Bugiato (2017).

Brazilian Sub-imperialism and Peripheral Development 291

Some simplified arguments reveal their limitations when attempting to

explain nations' behaviors and leadership regarding the asymmetries in the
global division of labor. If the international division of labor is perceived as
static, what other factors could elucidate the cyclical rise and fall of global and
regional powers?
Between the 1960s and the 1980s, the organization of a sub-​regional labor
division that orbited around the Japanese economy had served as a spring-
board for developing countries in Asia, such as communist China and the
Four Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan). They
had projects that claimed assertive international insertion. The Four Asian
Tigers’ capitalist state was based on dictatorial political regimes that planned
essential aspects of the economy and actively intervened by indirectly nation-
alizing or controlling several sectors, especially the financial sector (Visentini,
2012). Export revenue was used to promote industrialization, and protectionist
measures were implemented to protect the domestic market and avoid losing
foreign exchange. The state, associated with private companies, invested mas-
sively in technology and labor force training. Companies were also organized
into business conglomerates with a solid oligopolistic character in strategic
sectors of the economy, which are called chaebols in South Korea. At its height,
the right-​wing governments in Seoul and Taipei carried out radical agrarian
reforms to modernize agriculture and accumulate capital which contained ele-
ments borrowed from the policies of their communist rivals (Visentini, 2012).
After Japan embarked on the Third Industrial Revolution by concentrating its
production in the computer, automotive, robotics, and high-​technology sec-
tors, other Asian economies also reaped absolute gains in their development
projects:

The Asian Tigers, both by their actions and as a result of the new con-
juncture, developed the second step of the former Japanese way of devel-
opment, with steel, naval production, automobiles, engines, electric
electrical, and other technological goods. China, in turn, joined this
movement, receiving Japanese and Western investments and industrial
plants. It played an economic role similar to the Asian Tigers, exploit-
ing their comparative advantages and competing in some fields. The dif-
ference was that China had military power, territorial, population size,
and political autonomy (including its entry into the unsc), getting more
international relevance than the Asian Tigers.
visentini, 2012: 65
292  Soares Nogara

Today, Asian economies are gravitating toward the Chinese economy, a role
reminiscent of the position held by the Japanese economy in the region several
decades ago (Brautigam, 2020; Pautasso et al., 2019, 2020). While the exports
of most Asian economies consist of products with lower technological content
compared to those exported by China, this structure enables them to generate
surpluses that, when utilized coherently within their national development
strategies, could potentially alter their trade relations in the future (Pautasso
et al., 2020). Similar dynamics of asymmetry can be observed in the export pat-
terns of South American countries, including the relationship between Brazil
and China:

It is also worth noting that deindustrialization cannot be reduced to faces

of the same coin: the growth of exports of minerals and agricultural prod-
ucts to meet Chinese demand in no way hurts the core of the concept; it
could be seen as an opportunity and not as a threat if it were inserted into
a development project or strategy. The hegemony of the primary sector
in the exports, thus, does not necessarily mean deindustrialization, even
because Brazil has a robust domestic market, and the foreign surplus
generated by the export of commodities could, in an eventual project,
become a relevant variable to leverage the growth of high-​tech sectors or
more equitable income distribution.
fonseca, 2015: 50

This brief description of Asian economic development highlights the con-

tradictions in the argument that an eventual sub-​regional division of labor
in South America could reaffirm relations of dominance. If the development
projects of countries are always determined by the asymmetric economic ties
in which they are inserted, there would be no basis for changes in disputes in
the global system. After all, there would be no room for politics, strategy, and
planning to direct economic forces. Thus, a process that can lead to a rever-
sal in the relations between Brazil and China would be inexplicable. In the
1980s, the Chinese sold oil to Brazil and bought manufactured products with
higher technological content from Brazil. By using the asymmetries in trade
and investment relations between nations to depict their standings in the
global system, the dependency theory ossifies the hierarchical status quo of
the international order by amplifying the laws of reproduction of capital in the
imperialist center and peripheral nations.
Since every description of sub-​imperialism by Marini has focused on the
reasons that contributed to the realization of capital beyond national bor-
ders, he has paid little attention to the relationship between the so-​called
Brazilian Sub-imperialism and Peripheral Development 293

sub-​imperialist countries and those that are immersed in the sub-​regional

division of labor. When he did so, he alluded to the interventions by the mil-
itary government in Brazil in the domestic politics of neighboring countries,
which were guided by ideologies and alignment with US interests to combat
communism and the leftist movement during the Cold War.
However, in the twenty-​first century, the relations established by Brazil with
its strategic neighbors are different from the interventions taken by its mili-
tary dictatorship previously. In their case studies, the dependentists cited the
example of the globalization of Brazilian companies and their defense by the
government as irrefutable proof of the existence of sub-​imperialism in Brazil.
For instance, just as Brazil was hesitant to relinquish Petrobras assets acquired
in Bolivia, Bolivia would likewise resist any disruption to the operations of
GasBol.In the dependentist critiques, Brazil was the only sub-​imperialist
country in South America. However, it is worth noting that toward the end
of the Lula administration, Brazil did not make it to the list of the five most
prominent foreign investors in any country except Uruguay.5 Cited by depen-
dentist literature as one of the victims of Brazilian sub-​imperialism, Bolivia
had received more direct investments from Colombia than from Brazil (Couto,
2013). Likewise, its claim that Brazil’s foreign policy was influenced by the eager
desires of the bourgeoisie to control South American markets has no basis in
reality. It was the state that had awarded incentives to the national bourgeoisie
to strengthen its investments in neighboring countries:

Private enterprise does not follow the prioritization of the diplomatic

agenda. The breath and the business stakes go beyond the politi-
cal choices of the State. Despite being an explicit priority of Brazilian
diplomacy, South America does not exert the same power of attraction
to national economic agents, who do not seem to faithfully follow state
induction or orientation in the molds designed by the Logistical State.
(…) The expansion of exports to the region, which follows the pace of the
increase in Brazilian sales to the world as a whole –​since South America

5 According to eclac data, between 1999 and 2009, Brazil was the country with the high-
est volume of direct overseas investment in South America. However, Brazil was not part of
the top five countries with the most investments in South America. Uruguay was the only
country in which Brazil ranked as one of its five most prominent investors. Chile, in turn,
appeared as one of the five largest investors in Argentina and Peru, which are its preferred
countries for investments. Meanwhile, Colombia was listed as one of the largest investors in
Bolivia and Venezuela in the 2000s (Couto, 2013).
294  Soares Nogara

does not increase its share in the country's exports –​is not offset by the
importing mood or the flow of foreign investment out of the country.
couto, 2013: 200

Berringer (2013) pointed out that Brazil’s foreign policy under the pt govern-
ment had led to the rise of the bourgeoisie within the ruling power bloc in the
country. Even then, there were disagreements over some of the policy deci-
sions that were made as they did not favor the interests of the bourgeoisie. As
for South America, although the government had received support for much
of its effort to strengthen regional integration, it was, however, confronted with
questions on issues such as Venezuela’s entry into mercosur, the Petrobras
imbroglio in Bolivia, and the revision of the Itaipu Treaty with Paraguay
(Berringer, 2017).
However, the analyzes of Couto (2013) emphasized that these differences
failed to address the real issues and that the trade and investment priorities of
the national bourgeoisie were on scenarios other than South America. Hence,
the country’s long-​term national policy contributed to the significant presence
of Brazilian economic agents in its neighboring countries. With the current
decline in Brazil’s international insertion, it has become even more challeng-
ing to attribute Brazil’s diplomacy to a consideration of the economic interests
of the national bourgeoisie:

The application of the sub-​imperialism thesis faces substantial obsta-

cles, such as the irrelevance of fdi supported by the state in the set of
investments abroad, the absence of an internationalization support pol-
icy during most of the expansion cycles of Brazilian companies abroad,
dismantling of the current destruction of institutional arrangements
(bndes closed all offices abroad and halted all disbursements of Finem
internationalization and Exim for works in other countries) created to
stimulate internationalization, the relative loss of importance of Brazil
in fdi flows in Latin America and also the more significant percentage
expansion of Chile and Colombia on this topic when compared with
Brazil.
santos, 2018: 133

In light of these contradictions, several unanswered questions persist. As

Marini proposed, a socialist revolution could potentially accelerate industri-
alization and development in a country like Brazil. Would this not create a
situation in which Brazil would tend to export capital and higher-​value-​added
Brazilian Sub-imperialism and Peripheral Development 295

products to markets with lower productive capacity? Consequently, would

socialist Brazil still be perceived as sub-​imperialist?
The existence of asymmetries in the international order is not exclusive
to the capitalist mode of production. This is because asymmetrical relations
shape the market itself. They would not cease to exist even if a socialist revo-
lution did take place in Brazil, just as the former ussr did not cease to interact
with the global market after the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. If industrializa-
tion and income redistribution were merely an expression of rulers’ political
and ideological will, rationing would have never taken place in socialist coun-
tries, and neither would Lenin have resorted to the New Economy Policy to
strengthen the ussr in the years following the 1917 revolution. The mistakes
made by the dependentists between the market and capitalism, as well as
asymmetries and domination, have created confusion that makes it challeng-
ing to elucidate the rise and decline of powerful nations in the vast interna-
tional chessboard. Consequently, in line with Trotskyist traditions, they tend
to resort to subterfuges—​such as the betrayal of ideals (Losurdo, 2003)—​to
analyze the reality of socialist countries that adopt heterodox strategies, which
does not aid in a metaphysical understanding of socialism.
When Brazil emphasizes the need to deepen South American integration,
this need is aligned with its interests in safeguarding its national security and
guaranteeing export markets for its products and capital. When facing this sit-
uation, the political calculation of neighboring countries is not made with any
other procedure than that of Brazil, with adaptations to their respective reali-
ties. The asymmetry of political and economic relations is not a static variable.
Hence, not only Brazil’s proposals for South American integration but also
the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (alba) and the Pacific
Alliance have grown during this period.
Rather than posing a problem, Brazil's greater political and economic
capacities have been leveraged by neighboring countries to their advantage,
as evidenced by Uruguay and Paraguay's success in establishing Convergence
Fund of the Southern Common Market (focem), Paraguay's successful rene-
gotiation of the Itaipu hydroelectric plant terms, and the Petrobras conflict in
Bolivia (Nogara, 2022).
Brazil’s relations with Paraguay and Bolivia over the management of the
Itaipu hydroelectric plant and Gasbol, respectively, could be characterized
as interdependency rather than subservience to one country by another. The
Brazilian economy is also dependent on neighboring countries to guarantee
electricity and gas, which can be perceived in the stalled negotiations with
Paraguay over the price of energy (Ricupero, 2017). Furthermore, Brazilian
behavior diverges completely from that associated with the major imperialist
296  Soares Nogara

powers, as imperialism "presupposes the capacity to use military force to

compete for markets," and Brazil "does not utilize these to aid its economic
expansion" (Bugiato and Berringer, 2012: 39). The portrayal of a sub-​imperialist
or imperialist Brazil, dominating its smaller and defenseless neighbors, does
not accurately reflect reality. It is a depiction that bears little resemblance to
the complexities of the decision-​making processes involved in international
politics.
The discussion of this concept by academia and militant circles has shaped
the theoretical and political debate on its themes. Theoretically, by propos-
ing an update of Marxist and Leninist thought for an understanding of inter-
national relations, the Marxist Theory of Dependency and the concept of
sub-​imperialism have sustained deterministic structuralism by inverting the
meaning of critical concepts—​such as unequal development—​and affecting
the ability of Marxists to align their perspectives with current events in interna-
tional relations. Politically, they have encouraged leftist movements in periph-
eral countries to adopt antagonistic orientations to the class alliances, leading
them to prefer political isolation6 and to distance themselves from debates on
national development since they are against state policies that raise the profile
of their countries on the global stage.
As highlighted by Costa (2008), the history of the twentieth century in coun-
tries such as Germany, Japan, the US, and the ussr was marked by the success
of state interventionism and government planning as engines of development,
which presupposed the control of economic systems by political forces. By
proposing a systemic conceptual framework that conditions economic devel-
opment to the inevitability of a socialist revolution, the dependentists invert
the meaning of uneven development and defend that nothing beyond the
socialist revolution could help peripheral countries to change the static struc-
ture of the international system.
The confusion created by the dependentists has prevented Marxist depen-
dency theory from explaining issues related to the great dispute currently tak-
ing place at the global level: the intention by great Western powers to reclaim
their global political influence and weaken the recent rise of peripheral

6 Reflecting on the criticism by leftist movements of the alliances forged by class alliances,
the Argentine Marxist historian Rodolfo Puiggrós (1986: 131) argued decades ago against the
political isolation adopted by these groups: "In our nations, the national anti-​imperialist rev-
olution compels social classes with divergent interests to unite, some aiming for capitalism
and others pursuing socialism, and it is within this multi-​class movement that the working
class must assert its leadership. By disengaging from broader class alliances (or worse, oppos-
ing them), they consign themselves to isolation and ineffectiveness.”
Brazilian Sub-imperialism and Peripheral Development 297

countries (Visentini, 2019). Instead, the dependency theory tends to focus on

the designation of new regional power blocs as part of a cycle to strengthen
imperialism by the central powers. Thus, there is little debate within this
political-​ideological strand on how Brazil could position itself as an interested
third party in the tremendous systemic dispute between China and the US
(Pautasso and Nogara, 2023), which is perhaps one of the most relevant issues
that can define Brazil’s foreign policy. While adopting a revisionist and asser-
tive stance in the international system may be crucial for a nation's ascent, it
does not inherently ensure the ongoing sustainability of its development:

When analyzing historical contexts, it becomes evident that maintaining

a stance of non-​involvement in mediation often proves advantageous and
strategically sound. Such a position aligns with that of an interested third
party, offering the freedom to navigate within the dialectic established
between the center and periphery, culture and barbarism. The role of an
interested third party allows for a nuanced approach, neither assuming
the central position nor relegating to the periphery, not characterized by
cultural refinement but also not labeled as barbaric. This apparent neu-
trality, positioning oneself as a third pole, mitigates the impact of direct
confrontation, potentially positioning this party as an alternative sought
by other actors. In the trajectory of civilization, while contestation is
deemed necessary, it remains insufficient. Having an engaged partic-
ipant who directly assumes the role of the primary contender is often
preferable.
costa, 2008: 427

Instead of clarifying the potential variations in the ascent and decline of great
and middle powers, the Marxist dependency theory has reinforced a meta-
physical conception of the structures of the global order. From a conservative
standpoint, José Guilherme Merquior (cited by Hage, 2013) has characterized
the dependency theory as a byproduct of cultural underdevelopment in Latin
America, an overstated argument that adds little to its accurate characteriza-
tion. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the theory contains elements that
reaffirm the existing hierarchical status quo, even though it aims to subvert
the global order. This emphasis on the inevitability of hindrances to develop-
ment by peripheral nations and a disdain for alternative power structures in
the international system are notable features of the theory.
298  Soares Nogara

6 Conclusion

In this chapter, we have examined the origins of the concept of sub-​imperialism

in the dependency theory and how it was rescued from contemporary analyzes
of Brazil’s foreign policy. In particular, a discrepancy was observed in applying
the concept in the real world, even though most of the authors cited in the sec-
ond half of this chapter had claimed a continuity in the central assumptions
of the Marxist Theory of Dependency. Consequently, this analysis has revealed
differences in the theoretical beliefs of dependentists over the years. Whereas
early followers of the dependency theory had drawn their political conclu-
sions from a complex conceptual framework with clear limitations, younger
followers have taken the opposite path by viewing Brazilian sub-​imperialism
as wishful thinking to overcome their disillusionment with the pt govern-
ments. However, it is undeniable that both groups remained skeptical of other
means—​other than a socialist revolution—​to develop peripheral societies
and forge political alliances by leftist parties and organizations.
In the second half of this chapter, the discussion of the concept was widened
to include the debate on imperialism and unequal development by Marxist
theories, especially Leninist theory, and the rise of peripheral countries in the
international system in the twentieth and twenty-​first centuries. It highlights
the limitations of the concept, which includes negating and contradicting the
fundamental beliefs in the Leninist theory of imperialism that it claims to
uphold. It also questions the concept’s usefulness in understanding worldwide
nations’ rise, decline, and stagnation. Finally, it outlines the political implica-
tions of adopting the dependency theory.
In Brazil, dependency theories were born through the harsh leftist criticism
of developmentalist and communist ideals strategies. The adherence of the
military regime to the developmentalist ideology—​albeit in a twisted way, by
depriving it of its social-​reformist dimension and mixing it with the doctrines
of national security typical of the Cold War—​had accentuated the rise of these
revisionist doctrines in the leftist movement. Thus, its liberal wing, with expo-
nents such as Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and its Marxist wing, with Marini,
aligned themselves in their criticism of developmentalism and national-​
developmentalism. They emphasized the limits of the strategies for peripheral
development and the worker’s alliance with the national bourgeoisie in Brazil.
Subsequently, both wings took divergent paths. The liberal wing progressively
adhered to the defense of neoliberal initiatives and the subordinate integra-
tion of Brazil into the international system. The Marxist wing, however, radi-
calized its demands for a socialist revolution without any mediation with the
centrist sectors or the national bourgeoisie.
Brazilian Sub-imperialism and Peripheral Development 299

The liberal dependentists implemented a part of their political program

after their primary mentor, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was elected President
of Brazil. However, this contributed to the dilapidation of the national patri-
mony inherited from the developmentalist era through the progress and mis-
takes that were made between the 1930 Revolution and the 1980s. The Marxist
dependentists also exercised their influence more in the theoretical and aca-
demic domains than in politics. Nevertheless, they are still far from attaining
the scale of political achievements that their original opponents—​orthodox
communists, “populists,” and authoritarian nationalists—​have accomplished.
Even Theotônio dos Santos and Vânia Bambirra, prominent leaders within
the Marxist dependency theory framework, disregarded certain differences
emphasized during the pre-​1964 period against the nationalist "populists" and
opted to assist Leonel Brizola in forming the Democratic Labor Party (pdt).
However, contrary to its founders, the new generation of Marxist depen-
dency theorists chooses to revive outdated notions such as Brazilian sub-​
imperialism and a strategy of political isolation and sectarianism, which ends
up keeping them away from the primary leftist decision-​makers in the country.
Instead, they have aligned themselves with the liberal and reactionary critics
against developing national projects. Far from contributing to the revolution,
they deny the achievements and progress made by the former developmental-
ist strategies and focus their efforts on obstructing and countering measures
that favor the resumption of development in peripheral societies.

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Index

accumulation 6, 8, 20, 61, 65, 68, 111, 114, 116, Buzan, Barry 44, 146, 154
118, 144, 145, 153, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160,
161, 161n6, 162, 162n8, 163, 164, 165, 167, Cabral, Amílcar 38
167n11, 168, 175, 184n15, 185, 188, 191, 195, capital 50, 51, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 65,
205, 216, 219n13, 220, 221, 228, 248, 251, 67, 68, 69, 90n20, 124, 126, 144, 145, 146,
254 150, 152, 154, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 161n7,
Africa 55, 69, 144, 220, 223, 261, 262, 277, 286 162, 162n8, 163, 164, 165, 167n12, 168, 175,
America 37, 38, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 73, 121, 122, 177n8, 179, 179n12, 180, 182, 187, 190, 192,
123, 126, 134, 203, 211, 220, 223, 228, 237, 194, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203,
237n3, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242n7, 242n8, 204, 205, 206, 207n10, 208, 209, 210, 212,
243n10, 244, 248, 254, 258, 260, 261, 262, 213, 214, 215, 216, 216n9, 217, 219, 220,
276, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 230, 232,
286, 292, 293, 293n5, 294, 295 233, 238, 240, 243n10, 245, 248, 252, 253,
Amin, Samir 36, 60, 61, 61n8, 69, 70, 73, 144 254, 255, 256, 260n4, 273, 275, 276, 280,
anarchy 12, 24, 78, 89, 90, 97, 100n34, 180, 281, 282, 283, 285, 286, 288, 291, 292,
214, 215, 224 295, 300, 301
Anderson, Perry 103, 104, 150, 154, 191 Capital 73, 74, 163, 169, 170, 179n12, 180n13,
Angola 37 181, 192, 193, 209n11, 214, 216n7, 225, 226,
Arendt, Hannah 36, 44, 99, 99n32, 102 231, 232, 249
Aron, Raymond 35 capital accumulation viii, 61, 66, 111, 113, 118,
Arrighi, Giovanni 36, 42, 44, 62, 73, 145, 167 162, 164, 201, 207n10, 212, 215, 221, 222,
Asia 60, 64, 144, 149, 164, 202, 223, 228, 224, 238, 253
261, 291 capitalism vii, ix, x, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 9n9, 10,
Austria 93 13, 22, 37, 39, 43, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57,
58, 59, 60, 61, 66, 70, 76, 80, 83, 86, 88,
Baran, Paul 59, 60, 73, 144, 196n6, 260 89, 98, 101, 105, 111, 112, 113, 118, 119, 144,
bourgeois 5, 21, 37, 38, 52, 55, 56, 76, 76n4, 152, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 160n5, 161,
84, 87, 89, 91n22, 92n24, 105, 106, 108, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 173, 174, 175,
108n4, 108n5, 108n6, 109, 110, 111, 115, 176, 177, 178, 178n10, 179, 179n11, 179n12,
116n14, 117, 123, 159, 175, 178n10, 187, 181, 182, 183, 184n15, 185, 186, 186n17, 187,
188n19, 203, 206, 209, 212, 224, 225, 251, 187n18, 188, 188n19, 190, 191, 194, 196,
252n18, 278, 279 198, 199, 200, 204, 206, 207n10, 209n11,
bourgeoisie 51, 56, 87n15, 91, 93, 124, 125, 179, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218n12, 219,
195, 196, 202, 204, 205, 206, 209, 216, 220, 219n13, 220, 221, 222, 222n15, 223, 224,
223, 225, 226, 239, 240, 248, 251, 252n18, 224n17, 225, 227n20, 228, 230, 233, 238,
278, 279, 281, 283, 285, 286, 293, 294, 298 238n4, 239, 240, 242n7, 245, 246, 249,
Brazil 37, 69, 73, 124, 126, 142, 142n2, 146, 149, 253, 254, 268, 282, 283, 288, 295
224, 228, 237, 237n4, 239, 240, 242n6, capitalist 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 51, 54, 56, 57, 58,
243n11, 247n14, 247n15, 258, 259, 278, 59, 61, 64, 66, 67, 68, 81, 85, 86, 90, 97,
279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 144, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 161n6,
292, 293, 293n5, 294, 295, 297, 298, 299 162, 162n8, 163, 164, 165, 167n11, 168, 175,
Bukharin, Nikholai 36, 50, 52, 53, 144, 186, 175n4, 177, 177n8, 178, 178n10, 179, 179n12,
210, 213, 214, 215, 217, 230, 231, 245, 181, 182, 184, 184n15, 186, 187, 190, 191, 195,
246n12, 254 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 203n9, 204, 205,
Bulgaria 40 206, 207n10, 208, 209n11, 211, 214, 214n4,
304 Index

capitalist (cont.) 243n10, 244, 245, 246, 246n13, 248, 249,

215, 216, 216n9, 217, 218n12, 219, 220, 221, 250, 252, 253, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261,
222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229n23, 231, 264, 266, 267, 268, 272, 274, 277
232, 233, 241, 242n8, 244, 248, 250, 252, dependency ix, xv, 9, 112n10, 112n9, 113, 118,
252n18, 259, 268, 269, 270, 271, 280, 281, 187, 196, 216n8, 237n1, 238, 238n4, 241,
282, 285, 286, 287, 288, 291, 295 242n7, 242n8, 243, 243n10, 245, 246,
capitalist state 90, 108n4, 111, 190, 201, 203, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 279, 280,
203n9, 207n10, 209n11, 221, 222, 252, 281, 285, 286, 287, 292, 296, 298
252n18, 291 dictatorship 41, 69
capitalist states 252 diplomacy 84, 86, 91, 198, 284, 293, 294
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique 122n3, 237, domination 34, 36, 55, 58, 62, 63, 67, 68, 71,
242, 243, 243n11, 244, 254, 255, 256, 259, 134n11, 142, 143, 144, 147, 151, 152, 154, 159,
275, 298, 299 162, 163, 175, 175n4, 176, 182, 188, 195, 196,
Carr, Edward 35, 79, 80, 80n7, 81, 83, 84, 198, 201, 204, 208, 209, 216, 220, 224, 251,
84n10, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89n19, 90, 91, 92, 252, 252n18, 253, 267, 274, 283, 295
92n23, 93, 93n25, 94, 95, 98, 101, 102,
104, 177n7 empire 14, 15, 16, 16n3, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 28,
Castro, Fidel 38 29, 30, 31, 32, 81, 87n16, 103, 112, 143, 145,
China 36, 37, 39, 42, 62, 64, 65, 66, 69, 73, 146, 147, 150, 162, 175, 195n5, 198, 207n10,
149, 150, 152, 153, 165, 229n22, 231, 291, 208, 211, 213, 218, 218n11, 220, 221, 223,
292, 297, 300, 301 230, 233, 261, 267
class 50, 51, 52, 56, 61, 62, 66, 71, 86, 86n13, Engels ix, 1, 5, 7, 8, 9n9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18,
87, 88, 89, 97, 98, 101, 123, 125, 128, 134, 18n4, 20, 21, 22n6, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29,
146, 151, 153, 154, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 29n8, 31, 32, 33
165, 166, 178n10, 180, 197, 200, 201, 205, Engels, Friedrich 36, 50, 84n10, 102, 178n10,
206, 209, 210, 219, 220, 223, 224, 227, 231, 179, 179n11, 180n13, 181, 192, 203n9, 212,
232, 239, 241, 250, 251, 252, 252n18, 254, 233, 245
258, 272, 283, 296, 296n6 England 55, 56, 57, 60, 178n10
class struggle 33, 61, 71, 86n13, 88, 90, 98, Espinosa 35
105, 106, 107, 134, 146, 151, 153, 206, 210, Ethiopia 37, 40
223, 224, 231, 250, 251, 252, 283 Europe 37, 40, 60, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 86, 87,
Clausewitz, Carl von 35 92, 149, 159, 178n10, 189, 197, 198, 199,
colonialism xv, 51, 66, 71, 144, 146, 150, 159, 201, 202, 203, 204, 207n10, 208, 209,
160n5, 162n8, 180, 197, 222, 245 210, 211, 217, 228, 229, 230, 232, 247, 263,
communism 26, 293 264n8, 272
Communist Manifesto ix, 3, 5, 6, 7n5, 8, exploitation 144, 147, 161n7, 162, 173, 178, 198,
8n7, 9, 109, 179n11, 225 205, 216, 220, 225, 226, 231, 250, 252, 253,
Constructivism vii, 35 254, 260n4, 281, 282, 283, 286
crise 74, 120, 155, 211
critical theory 178n10 fascism 105, 233, 243
Cuba 36, 39, 150, 199, 227, 260 Fichte, Johann G 36, 143
Czechoslovakia 40 finance capital 11, 55, 114n12, 144, 165,
187, 214
democracy 18, 41, 65, 67, 86, 89, 91n22, 103, financial 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 67,
124, 128, 131, 132, 135n12, 137, 138, 139, 140, 70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 126, 159, 182, 187, 188,
147, 148, 149, 221, 222, 277, 281 205, 217, 219, 223, 224, 226, 228, 282,
dependence ix, 20, 36, 50, 55, 57, 67, 112, 288, 291
115n13, 117, 119, 126, 149, 178, 188, 196, 197, foreign capital 115, 115n13, 116, 117, 118, 163,
204, 206, 208, 209, 210, 237, 240, 243, 198, 204, 205, 206, 240, 282, 283
Index 305

foreign policy xii, xvii, 17, 18, 19n5, 21, 22, 167, 167n11, 168, 189, 201, 206, 208, 217,
27, 43, 44, 63, 65, 110, 195, 196n6, 197, 220, 228, 252n18, 269, 283, 286, 288, 292
198, 229, 260n3, 270n13, 280, 283, 284, Hilferding, Rudolf 36, 50, 53, 74, 144, 186, 213,
286, 293, 294, 297, 298 214, 214n4, 214n5, 214n6, 215, 216, 216n7,
France 56, 60, 91n22, 135, 140, 184n15, 216n9, 217, 219, 230, 231, 232
203n9, 229 Historical Materialism 34, 36, 43, 49n2,
Frank, Andre Gunder 144, 242, 242n8, 166n9, 169, 210, 231, 232, 233, 245, 246
242n8, 255, 259, 275, 288 Historical Sociology 42
Fred Halliday 4, 119 Hobbes, Thomas 35, 135
Friedrich Engels vii, 5, 15, 18, 33 Hobsbawm, Eric 37, 79, 80n6, 81, 103
Fukuyama, Francis 44 Hobson, John A 36, 50, 53, 55, 74, 89, 90n20,
191, 216n10, 217n10, 245
Germany 40, 52, 56, 60, 61, 84n11, 88n17, Hume, David 35
91, 91n21, 91n22, 99, 100, 184n15, 261, Hungary 40, 87, 93
269, 296
global 39, 42, 43, 64, 65, 68, 71, 76, 101, 122, Idealism 35, 95, 96, 101, 104
142, 144, 145, 146, 148, 149, 151, 151n4, 152, ideology 9, 62, 87n15, 107, 124, 129, 147,
155, 163, 164, 165, 167, 179n12, 189, 191, 240, 298
192, 193, 196, 201, 207n10, 210, 212, 218, imperialism viii, ix, xv, 7, 36, 38, 41, 49, 50,
219, 220, 221, 223, 225, 225n18, 227n20, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63,
230, 231, 233, 246, 267, 279, 280, 282, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 83,
283, 285, 286, 292, 295, 296 86, 88, 89, 90n20, 94, 102, 105, 106, 111,
globalisation 213, 217, 219, 220, 221, 222, 225, 113, 114, 115, 116, 116n14, 117n16, 118, 119,
225n18, 227, 231 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151,
globalization xii, 5, 8, 10, 13, 43, 59, 62, 70, 152, 153, 156, 157, 158, 160n5, 161, 162n8,
118, 142, 143, 145, 153, 165, 184, 188, 220, 163, 164, 168, 173, 174, 175, 176, 178, 180,
225, 233, 267, 282, 284, 285, 286, 293 182, 183, 183n14, 185, 185n16, 186n17, 187,
government 52, 55, 66, 70, 72, 88n17, 91n22, 188, 189, 190, 191, 194, 195, 195n5, 196, 197,
124, 145, 150, 225, 227, 231, 247n15, 266, 198, 199, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206,
279, 282, 293, 294, 296 207, 207n10, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213n3,
Gramsci xv, 13, 13n14, 111n8 214, 214n6, 215, 216, 216n10, 217, 218,
Gramsci, Antonio 60n6, 60n7, 63, 63n9, 219, 221, 222, 223, 223n16, 224, 225, 226,
67, 68, 74, 129, 134, 136, 139, 151, 167n11, 229n23, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 242n8,
203n9, 253, 270, 273, 275 245, 246, 246n12, 248, 251, 257, 258, 259,
Great Britain 147, 153 260, 260n4, 261, 267, 268, 269, 274, 275,
Greece 230 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 285, 288,
Guevara, Che 38, 261 292, 293, 294, 296, 297, 298
India 150, 220
Halliday, Fred 34, 36, 37, 39, 42, 43, 44, 76, intellectuals 129, 186, 242, 258, 261, 264n8,
101, 103, 142, 154, 225, 232 270, 272, 273, 274
Harvey ix, 65, 69, 74, 145, 156, 157, 158, 159, interdependence 106, 244, 257, 258, 261, 262,
160, 160n5, 161, 161n6, 161n7, 162, 162n8, 263, 264, 265, 266, 266n10, 267, 268,
163, 164, 165, 166, 166n10, 167, 167n11, 269, 272, 274, 275
168, 169, 170, 183, 192, 213, 223, 232 international 3434n2, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40,
Hegel 27 41, 42, 43, 49, 49n1, 50, 51, 52, 56, 58,
Hegel, Georg W F 36, 143, 160n5 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 72, 73, 76,
hegemony vii, 50, 58, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68, 76n1, 76n3, 77, 78, 79, 79n6, 80, 80n6,
69, 70, 72, 73, 106, 110n7, 111n8, 113, 117, 82, 83, 84, 84n11, 85, 86, 86n13, 99, 88,
124, 126, 127, 129, 130, 132, 134, 135n12, 138, 89, 90, 91, 92, 92n23, 94, 95, 99, 100, 101,
306 Index

international (cont.) Keohane, Robert 35, 76n4, 103, 257, 258, 261,
102, 103, 104, 124, 142, 142n1, 143, 145, 261n7, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 266n11,
146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 156, 267, 268, 269, 271, 272, 274, 276
156n2, 156n3, 156n4, 157, 163, 164, 165, Kindleberger, Charles 35, 266n11, 277
166, 167, 168, 173, 173n2, 174, 175, 176, Kissinger, Henry 41, 44, 269
176n7, 177, 178, 179, 179n12, 180, 182, 183,
188, 189, 190, 190n20, 191, 194n2, 194n3, Laclau ix, 121, 122, 126, 127, 127n7, 128, 129,
195, 197, 198, 199, 199n7, 200, 201, 202, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140
203, 205, 206, 207, 207n10, 208, 210, Latin America 69, 73, 239, 243n10,
212n3, 214n5, 215, 216, 216n9, 218, 221, 254, 258
222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, Lenin ix, 3, 11, 11n11, 13, 13n14, 14, 111
230, 231, 233, 237, 238, 239, 244, 245, Lenin, Vladimir 36, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 53n4,
253, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 257, 258, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 63, 66, 67,
259, 260, 261, 261n6, 262, 263, 264, 265, 70, 74, 75, 80, 86n12, 87, 87n16, 91n22,
265n9, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 94n27, 129, 144, 151, 162, 177, 177n8,
274, 275, 276, 277, 279, 280, 285, 291, 185, 186, 194, 194n4, 195, 203n9, 204,
292, 294, 295, 296, 298 207, 207n10, 207n10, 210, 212, 213, 219,
system vii, ix, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 222n15, 224, 224n17, 225, 226, 227,
17, 18n4, 23, 24, 25, 26, 31, 115, 117, 119 227n20, 230, 232, 234, 245, 246, 246n12,
International Political Economy 43, 142, 146, 250, 253, 255, 287, 288, 295, 300
168, 173n2, 212n3 Liberalism vii, 9, 34, 35, 93, 143, 150
International Relations 34, 34n2, 35, 36, 37, Losurdo ix, 69, 71, 75, 142, 143, 146, 147, 148,
38, 41, 42, 43, 49, 49n1, 50, 51, 59, 63, 149, 150, 151, 151n4, 152, 153, 154, 155,
67, 76, 76n1, 82, 84, 88, 102, 103, 104, 229n23, 232
142, 142n1, 143, 146, 150, 153, 156, 156n2, Lukács 17, 52, 53n4, 75
156n3, 156n4, 166, 167, 168, 173, 173n2, Luxemburg ix, 52, 64, 76, 76n1, 77, 78, 80,
174, 175, 176, 176n7, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 80n6, 81, 81n8, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 87n14,
183, 189, 190, 190n20, 191, 194n2, 194n3, 87n15, 87n16, 88, 89, 90, 91, 91n21, 91n22,
195, 198, 202, 205, 207, 207n10, 210, 218, 92, 92n23, 93, 94, 94n26, 94n27, 95,
237, 238, 249, 253, 254, 257, 261, 268, 95n28, 96, 96n29, 97, 98, 99, 99n31,
274, 279, 280, 296 99n32, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 144, 162,
international system 34, 35, 37, 42, 43, 61, 62, 162n8, 170, 198, 232, 245, 246n12, 299
72, 146, 173, 175, 177, 190, 195, 212n3, 223,
225, 227, 229, 230, 231, 238, 239, 252, 254, Machiavelli, Niccolo 35, 67
264, 267, 269, 275, 296, 298 Magdoff 106, 195, 195n5, 196, 196n6, 201,
ir 76, 76n4, 77, 78, 79, 79n5, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 204, 207n10, 208, 209, 210, 260,
84n10, 86, 87n16, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 261n7, 276
94n26, 95, 96, 99, 100n34, 101, 102, 142, Mandel 106, 195, 195n5, 199, 199n7, 201n8,
143, 145, 146, 166, 257, 261, 262, 274 202, 203, 204, 207, 207n10, 209, 210,
Iran 36, 37, 64, 153, 227, 229n22 211, 260
Italy 230 Manifesto 192, 212, 233
Japan 39, 60, 63, 65, 69, 199, 208, 261, 264n8, Mao Zedong 38, 71, 151
269, 272, 291, 296 Marini 112n9, 120, 193, 237, 237n4, 240, 242,
242n6, 242n8, 242n9, 243, 243n10,
Karl Marx vii, 14, 15, 33 243n11, 244, 245, 246, 246n12, 246n13,
Kautsky 51, 52, 56, 74, 80, 106, 144, 177, 177n8, 247, 247n15, 247n17, 248, 249, 250, 255,
180n13, 185, 186, 194n4, 195n5, 198, 256, 258, 259, 260, 260n4, 276, 279, 280,
204, 207, 207n10, 210, 212, 213, 215, 216, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 292, 298,
216n10, 216n7, 216n8, 217, 219, 230, 232 300, 301
Index 307

market 38, 39, 56, 60, 69, 85, 123, 125, 143, monopoly 51, 53, 54, 55, 57, 59, 60, 61, 67, 69,
145, 146, 148, 157, 165, 167, 167n12, 175, 71, 144, 148, 158, 177, 177n7, 187, 196, 199,
179, 179n11, 179n12, 180, 181, 188, 190, 196, 200, 202, 204, 214, 214n4, 219n13, 224,
198, 202, 205, 206, 215, 217, 218, 220, 244, 240, 249, 282
249, 254, 267, 281, 284, 291, 292, 295 monopoly capital 11, 113, 114, 200
Marx ix, xiii, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, Morgenthau, Hans 35, 90
13n14, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 18n4, 20, 21, 22, Mouffe ix, 121, 122, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132,
22n6, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 29n8, 31, 132n8, 132n9, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138,
32, 32n9, 33, 109, 115 139, 140
Marx, Karl 35, 36, 44, 45, 50, 53, 74, 87, Mozambique 37
96n29, 97, 150, 154, 155, 157, 159, 160n5,
161n7, 168, 170, 178, 178n10, 179, 179n12, national 38, 39, 42, 43, 51, 58, 62, 63, 70, 71,
180, 180n13, 182, 190, 192, 193, 203n9, 72, 73, 83, 87, 87n16, 91, 122, 123, 124, 125,
209n11, 212, 216n7, 218n12, 224, 226, 227, 126, 143, 145, 146, 150, 151, 151n4, 152, 160,
232, 233, 245, 249, 254, 256 161n7, 162, 163, 175, 176, 181, 188, 194, 196,
Marxian 76n4, 157, 159, 160, 160n5, 178n10, 197, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205,
179, 179n12, 181, 182, 186, 232 206, 209, 213, 215, 216, 218, 219, 219n13,
Marxism 34, 36, 37n3, 38, 41, 42, 43, 50, 76, 220, 221, 222, 225, 225n18, 226, 230, 239,
84n10, 101, 102, 121, 129, 131, 138, 140, 142, 240, 244, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 254,
156, 169, 170, 175, 177, 178, 183, 186n17, 263, 268, 270, 273, 273n17, 279, 280, 281,
190, 191, 195, 203n9, 217, 226, 233, 234, 282, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 298, 299
237, 238, 241, 244, 245, 247, 247n14, national state 7, 9, 11, 15, 16, 32, 33, 43, 202,
279, 283 206, 220
Marxist 34, 35, 36, 40, 43, 49n1, 76, 76n4, 77, nationalism 35, 38, 52, 81, 87, 151, 202, 203,
79, 79n5, 80, 80n6, 82, 83, 84, 84n10, 272, 279
84n11, 86, 86n12, 87, 87n16, 89, 90, 94, nation-​state 40, 67, 175, 211, 217, 219, 223,
101, 102, 122n3, 123, 129, 130, 133, 134, 136, 226, 264
138, 142, 142n1, 143, 144, 145, 146, 156, 157, nation-​states 7, 208, 220
162n8, 166, 167, 168, 169, 178, 182, 183, neoliberalism 61, 62, 125, 150, 157, 164, 167,
184, 184n15, 185, 187, 188n19, 189, 190, 167n12, 168
191, 192, 194, 195, 196n6, 203, 203n9, 207, Neorealism 35
208, 208n10, 210, 211, 212, 213n3, 214, 215, North Korea 36, 39, 149
216n8, 221, 222, 223, 225, 231, 237, 237n1, Nye, Joseph 35, 64, 75, 257, 258, 261, 261n7,
238, 238n4, 239, 242n8, 242n9, 243n10, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 266n11, 267,
243n11, 244, 245, 246, 247, 247n14, 268, 269, 270, 271, 271n14, 272, 273, 274,
247n15, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 252n18, 276, 277
253, 257, 258, 260, 261, 261n7, 268, 269,
274, 278, 279, 280, 281, 284, 285, 286, paradigm 34, 35, 64, 78, 138, 186, 191, 230,
296, 296n6, 298, 299 258, 263
Marxist theory 157, 184n15, 194, 195, 203, periphery vii, ix, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43,
203n9, 208n10, 210, 212, 221, 222, 237, 49, 50, 59, 61, 65, 66, 106, 144, 145, 187,
238, 238n4, 242n8, 243n10, 245, 247, 195, 203, 247, 287
247n14, 248, 250, 252, 253, 258, 260, 280 Poland 91n21, 149, 226
Minh, Ho Chi 38 political economy x, xii, xiii, xvi, 12, 13,
mode of production 5, 6, 7, 11, 107, 108, 111, 34, 74, 103, 144, 168, 169, 170, 179, 181,
113, 159, 175, 177, 178, 180, 181, 187, 190, 184n15, 185, 191, 199n7, 202, 209n11, 210,
199, 204, 218n12, 224, 248, 295 231, 232, 233
308 Index

Political Science 36, 41, 80, 121n2, 237n3, Rousseau, Jean J 35

262, 263 ruling class 22, 25, 26, 32, 62, 73, 87n16, 89,
populism 121, 122, 122n3, 123, 124, 125, 126, 91, 110, 111n8, 115, 117, 118, 158, 194, 195,
127, 128, 129, 134, 136, 137, 138, 139 197, 206, 225, 248, 252n18, 253
Portugal 57, 211 Russia 39, 50, 51, 52, 55, 64, 84n11, 129, 149,
Poulantzas ix, 105, 105n1, 105n3, 106, 107, 228, 229, 229n22, 231
108, 109, 110, 111, 111n8, 112, 112n9, 113, Russian Revolution vii, 17, 40, 51, 129, 197
114, 114n11, 114n12, 115, 116, 116n14, 117,
117n16, 118, 119, 195, 203, 203n9, 205, 207, Second International 80, 177
207n10, 209, 210, 211, 227, 233, 252n18, Skocpol, Theda 41, 45
253, 256 Smith, Adam 169, 232, 233, 263, 271
power 34, 35, 37, 44, 50, 51, 54, 56, 62, 63, 64, social class xii, 32, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110,
65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 73n12, 115, 119
84, 85, 86, 89, 90, 91, 94n26, 98, 122, social classes 63, 176, 242n7, 253, 254
124, 125n5, 126, 129, 131, 132, 135, 135n12, socialism vii, 11, 22, 26, 38, 39, 84n10, 87n14,
142, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 153, 154, 157, 87n15, 87n16, 88, 89, 92, 93, 97, 97n30,
158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 98, 105, 105n3, 119, 130, 142, 143, 145, 146,
167n12, 175n4, 177, 184n15, 187, 194, 195, 153, 214n6, 217, 244, 251
196, 199, 200, 201, 205, 206, 208, 209, Socialism 38, 40, 44, 97, 102, 125n5, 232,
218, 218n12, 219, 220, 223, 226, 227, 228, 238n4, 243
229, 238, 240, 246, 251, 252, 252n18, 253, socialist 37, 38, 40, 58, 77, 80n6, 84, 84n10,
254, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 274, 280, 84n11, 86n12, 87n16, 91, 91n22, 96, 97,
281, 283, 286, 288, 291, 293, 294, 297 97n30, 98, 99, 99n31, 100, 146, 151, 153,
powers 40, 42, 44, 58, 60, 62, 77, 81, 83, 86, 187, 197, 199, 202, 245, 246, 260, 279,
93, 94n26, 101, 125, 126, 144, 150, 151, 295, 296, 298
153, 165, 174, 195, 201, 203, 206, 212, 215, socialist revolution 296
216, 217, 221, 222, 223, 224n17, 227, 228, sovereign 7, 10, 11, 12, 23, 43, 181, 253
228n21, 229, 229n22, 229n23, 230, 271, sovereignty 127, 135, 137, 138, 139, 144, 149,
284, 296 150, 152, 218, 229, 230, 253
primitive accumulation 157 Soviet Union 11, 40, 44, 184, 187
production relations 61, 107, 108, 108n4, Spain 230
108n5, 109, 110, 174, 178, 182, 188, 246, 288 Stalin, Joseph 99n32, 155
productive forces 5, 106, 111, 144, 152, 163, State 34, 35, 37, 39, 42, 44, 51, 58, 60n6, 61,
180, 199, 218, 227, 288 66, 69, 71, 72, 76n3, 102, 104, 123, 124,
proletariat 5, 38, 67, 80n6, 87n15, 88, 89, 99, 129, 137, 146, 173, 173n2, 178, 179, 179n12,
99n31, 107, 121, 138, 251 184, 184n15, 187, 187n18, 188, 189, 190,
property 39, 67, 97n30, 159, 231 190n20, 191, 192, 198, 201, 202, 206, 209,
209n11, 215, 233, 237n1, 237n3, 239, 252,
Realism vii, 34, 35, 62, 89, 150, 265 252n18, 253, 260, 262, 264, 271n14, 273,
relations of production 5, 111, 180, 182, 288 274, 293
republic 88n17 state system 69, 70, 72, 111, 115, 144, 191,
revolution 16, 18, 19, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 42, 196, 253
43, 50, 51, 52, 77, 80n6, 92, 92n23, 95, 96, states 50, 51, 57, 62, 63, 65, 72, 73, 86, 87n14,
97, 98, 99, 99n31, 123, 151, 161, 199, 210, 90, 91, 92, 94n26, 95, 151, 157, 160, 161,
238, 240, 245, 246, 252, 268, 278, 279, 163, 164, 190, 194, 196, 197, 199, 200, 201,
281, 295, 296, 298, 299 203, 204, 205, 206, 207n10, 208, 209,
Revolutions 34, 34n1, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 213, 214n4, 216, 216n9, 217, 218, 219, 221,
41, 42, 43, 44, 45 223, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229n23, 230, 238,
Rosenberg, Justin 36 245, 246, 248, 250, 253, 280
Index 309

sub-​imperialism 152, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, ussr vii, 58, 65, 209, 217, 295, 296
285, 298
supremacy 63, 64, 70, 72, 147, 149, 152, 198, Vattel, Emmerich 35
201, 204, 206, 207n10, 208, 217, 283 Vietnam 36, 37, 39, 65, 153, 270

Third World 35, 37, 38, 39, 44, 203, 260, 261, Wallerstein, Immanuel 36, 42, 61, 69,
261n6, 269, 270, 270n12, 271 75, 144
Thucydides 35 Waltz, Kenneth 42, 76n3, 90, 104,
Toynbee, Arnold 41, 45 266n11, 277
trade 39, 62, 67, 90n20, 123, 125, 147, 179n12, war 35, 36, 39, 40, 50, 51, 52, 58, 60, 60n7, 62,
181, 197, 198, 200, 203, 250, 259, 286, 66, 68, 70, 72, 77, 78, 79n6, 80, 81, 81n8,
292, 294 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 86n12, 88, 88n17, 89,
transition 37, 38, 42, 53, 62, 123, 173, 180, 183, 89n18, 90, 91, 92n23, 94, 94n26, 95, 96,
186, 187, 188, 204, 214n6, 231 98, 99, 99n31, 100, 101, 102, 123, 146, 148,
transnational 34, 36, 42, 145, 162, 209, 213, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 177n7, 189, 194,
218, 219, 220, 221, 232, 261n6, 263, 264, 196n6, 199, 202, 215, 216, 217, 219, 225,
267, 269, 271, 273 228, 231, 260, 261, 265, 268, 273n17
Trotsky 9, 14, 80, 87n16, 91n22, 99n32, 151, wealth 50, 142, 145, 150, 151, 153, 212, 259, 282
268, 277 western powers 20, 26, 28, 29, 30
Turkey 228 workers 50, 97, 99, 99n31, 123, 125, 128, 159,
162, 218n12, 248, 250, 253, 259, 281, 285
underdevelopment 67, 112, 239, 241, 242n8, working class ix, 83, 88, 159, 162, 248
247, 254, 258, 259, 275, 280, 288 world market 4, 8, 9, 179, 181, 250
uneven development 61, 67, 106, 113, 157, 213, World War i vii, ix, 39, 40, 52, 78, 84, 94,
227, 229, 287, 296 102, 129, 142, 176, 194, 196, 207n10
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics vii World War ii vii, 40, 58, 59, 60, 70, 78, 113,
United States 39, 56, 60, 61, 86, 92, 187, 197, 186, 194, 195, 196, 197, 202, 204, 207,
198, 201, 207n10, 208, 209, 210, 217, 218, 207n10, 217, 218, 221, 222, 239, 275
219, 222, 223, 227, 228, 229, 229n22, 230, world-​system 4, 9, 35, 36, 37, 43, 61, 62,
231, 232, 239, 247, 259, 260, 261, 263, 70, 77, 145, 189, 195, 196, 198, 208, 239,
264, 264n8, 265, 268, 272, 273, 273n17, 253, 283
275, 277 World-​system 36, 39, 40, 43