uve rose Pion poss 10g pees Tp oan, ovat ea On mL er ‘ ‘rao a4 0) 4598 OM wey oe, 0 As/R6n Der wey 't 6 (en) ss une Mey May 14-13 258 REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED nov 2 81994 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOVPO. AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R ON(809) 1-pr Orns na) 09 Nog How ou 2 o worea) 09 N/T-a 2peuD aU sor 780) #0 epeunes pret aa ea speeap pint aaa areS 259 8 t ag = 58 3 3 zs 3882 Zn Zz? 3228 gs Ss 2 8 = ge Gass #352v1a-2ven wo (ps9) ra untoge sr2y wo (psez0) THON ve-wa tro-e0) 1a eotone 2-awa (2-5) Tw won sus-itan wo (woron (A) -Tu STE e9-2v0 wo (eset) Tu un9F stoma (2-90) Tu waoF emo tes-a) Tx HOH (woe) 150 20) TC HOST Rey os 00°81 re ae 000% + . ove ‘ 2 2 woe) oo we we eee ww 0°02 foto) feuumo ane , ose wot ee ww ony (yom) Lang sexouneT Ly 7 oer ost at vw er roay emer av mag maavan Td “area = oR 14-15 260 0M FOVPO. AUTH PARA 1-503 DoD 5200.1-8 NOV 38 1994 BY COS USAIN: REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED oN(quo9) 1-9r onBt 2h " ” a on oor = ‘ . : ein os os aastraae sw os ora * ore 6k UM mexreng anaes , wort 0 am r6U oH Sst 5 worse re o smo ma woet , cuz ose ” pea ono mia weet oe sort ow ost (99045) e6r wm pa wn oct a o oe 6 two) a ano wt ws oer wt st ore reas wo wis av 58 6 * a ore ste no aay unas se * se core ste Bn cvetve wo ay wns 261 LN 8m Foyt REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED NOV 98 1 ON 14-16 BY CDR USAINS( AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD &ot wea Pipe nic wise 06 pend mo ay anes 228 wee (us) 1-7 omits m (woes) eno wy uns zip wo vy ease 07-3 uro vy unas (480) esr faz sng vv write rd ang vpn a marae T Tay rer protean ait esta ait 4-37 262 NOV 28 19 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOvPO AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200,1-R. REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON(009) T-7r ound ~ et wre, oe so no as wore TER) HRT TS aera ae TT Tara ST} = sopay Jo stir saary wna Hut “uae —potadesg-yng Aawayaudeg ‘ aut * we oot corns Ta AV Searsaay Teer TS od (rote sea te wg wie 265 = g ag e 98 § 53 Ss 80 82 38 2. 22 & 3s ze 2 ge pats 2832 14-18ANNEX 15 NUCLEAR AND CBR WEAPONS } 1. sh ussr. i. a (if utear Cepantities. () ‘The Soviets can deliver nuclear warheads with ‘yields extending into the megaton range against targets located any- where in the USAREUR area of responsibility, ‘The delivery systems, either manned aircraft or missiles, do not have to be based outside the periphery of the USSR, Against tactical targets in the front area, the Soviet ground forces are equipped with a variety of nuclear wea~ pons, which range in yield from lesa than 5 kilotona to several hundred kilotons, ‘These nuclear weapons can be delivered by tube artillery, free rockets, and guided missiles up to ranges of approxi- mately 300 nautical miles, Ih addition, the tactical air armies and the strategic rocket forces can provide the ground forces with nuclear support against tactical or interdiction targets. According to Soviet doctrine, nuclear weapons will be used on a large scale in the event of general war, Present stocks of nuclear weapons available to the Soviet Army are sufficient for sustained, large-scale employment, The deployment of these to the Soviet forces in the Satellite countries could be accomplished without detection, @) As a result of nuclear testing conducted prior to the 1968 test-ban treaty, Soviet knowledge of nuclear weapons and weapons effects was significantly increased, The knowledge gained from the testing has provided a base upon which the Soviets can develop a more diversified nuclear weapons stockptle, This should provide the Soviets with niclear weapons with more explosive energy yield per pound of weight then those currently ready for target delivery. During the coming months, these improved weapons systems will be ready for issue to delivery units, In addition, there remains the possibility that the Soviets may be developing or inay have already developed fractional yield weapons, (3) It is estimated that the Soviet tactical nuclear potential in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG) is tiot 80 formidable as the USAREUR nuclear strike capability, There is no firm evid ce that the Soviets have deployed nuclear warheads to East Gerinany; the proximity of the USSR to East Germany permits the Soviets to defer the movement of warheads to the GSFG until REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED 5-1 ON Ny 08 Ba arerem BY CDR USAINSCOM FOIO. 265 AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-A.RCRET {ane East-West political situation should deteriorate over cLqeveral days of weeks, the Sovieta probably would take Eifeove the tuclear warhead availablity inthe GSFG. With the bulld- ‘up im East Germany of associated delivery systeme, such as free- Focket-over-grou (FROG) rockets or surface-torsurface $8-1 (CUD) issllce, i ie logical to assure that the Sovieta would have prepared {or the ready accesetbilty of the nuclear warheads, Nuclear washeads can be moved, either by rail or air, into Bast Germany without detection Sy USAREUR. In Fast Germany, as well aa in the other Satellites, the Suviets have a well-developed actwork of airfields, Many of these airfles can handle large transport aircraft sed for the delivery of nuclear componente to user units immediately before an attack, In carly 1960 the HOOK (Mi-6) helicopter began arriving in the GSFG. The large helicopter can be used to deliver nuclear warheuds to Inunch sites of the delivery systems, shortly before a Soviet-scheduled inttiation of hostilities, ome eps (NS Toxic Chemical Capabiities, (0) Chemical Onerstions, Soviet forces are capable of conducting large~ scale chemical operations in support of combat operations. Toxic chemicals can be delivered against close-in targets by conventional ground delivery means and on deep targets by aerial spray or bombs, (a) The USSR maintains a toxic agent stockpile, both in depots and available to tactical units, of at least 50, 000 tons. Stocks of munitions are probably positioned in the Satellites under GSFG control, the Northern Group of Forces (NGF), and the Southern Group of Forees (SGF). The USSR can deliver additional stocks to these forces without detection, ‘The total capacity of storage depots in the USSR has been estimated to be approximately 300, 000 tons of bulk. toxic agent and filled munitions, Of this capacity, 75 percent is in Western and Central USSR, primarily in the Volga and Turkestan Military Districts, The remaining 25 percent capacity is in the Far Bast. () The chemical agents used for filling munitions and the relative quantities in stock are shown in Figure 15-1, The Soviets are currently replacing mustard-filled items with an unidenti- Hed V-type nerve agent, probably VR-55, and may have begun pro~ duction of soman (GD), "It is not known if the stockpile includes inea~ pacitating agents; however, production of such agents is within the Soviet capability. 2 REGRADED: UNCLASSIF| ee alla 266 BY COR UisamisCOm FOUPO AUTH 24RA 1-603 DoD S20U.1-RGSEORET (e) No defintte descriptive int or physical characteristics of current chemical are available; however, it is estimated that any munition for delivery‘by artillery, mortars, rockets, mines, aircraft spray, bombs, axl probsbly miseiles are included in the stockpile, (@) Soviet CBR organization calls for the assign- ment of chemical units with the mission of decontaminating personnel, equipment, and terrain, In addition, these CBR units are responsible for conducting limited defensive operations involving terrain con- tamination (See Figure 15-2). chief chemicat Defense, Soviet forces have the capability to defend them- selves against chemical attack and to continue operations in a chemically contaminated environment, For toxic chemical empl ment purposes they may be considered well trained, with protective equipment available, Frequent individual and unit training is con~ ducted in both the defensive and offensive aspects of chemical operations, Actual agents occasionally are used in training, (2) ‘The current protective mask (model ShM-1) provides excellent protection against inhalation of all known toxic agents. Unit leaders, communication personnel and chemical personnel are being equipped with an improved model of this mask, which has a "volcemitter” for better communications. Adequate quantities of masks are in the hands of troops and in reserve stocks, Special masks and oxygen-bresthing apparatus are available for pilots and troops working in heavily contaminated areas. Automatic alarms for detection of nerve agents probably are available down to regimental level. (©) The Soviet forces have a complete line of pro~ tective clothing for protection against toxic agents, and sufficient quantities probably are available to cope with large-scale operations, Each soldier carries a disposable impregnated paper cape in his protective mask carrier, Impermeable protective overstockings are carried with the individual soldier's equipment, Unknown quantities of protective clothing are on hand at the unit level in Soviet forces, Items contained in the individual decontamination and treatment set are belicv -d to be adequate for emergency personnel decontamination of US agente, This set probably contains an atropine eyrette for nerve agent first aid, Y on ar UNCLASSIFIED ON By com usAfhSYom FovPo rere ae AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-Rmeet {c) Soviet forces have an excellent capability for extensive decontamination of personnel, equipment, and and for small-area terrain decontamination. The presence of lamge aambers of vehicle-mounted decontamination apparatus in the Soviet forces provides a highly mobile capability. } (sr Doctrine {a) Soviet doctrine provides for offensive and defensive chemical operations. The initial decision to employ toxic chemical agents probably will be at the Party Presidium level. Thereafter, front commanders normally will determine operations in which toxic chemical agents will be used, In the event of a general nuclear war, itis highly probable that toxic chemical agents will be employed. Open policy statements of national leaders emphasize that mass destruction means, such as chemical and biological weapons, ‘will be utilized in future ware, and the Soviets have not entered info any international agreements that would affect their policy on employ- ment. Soviet policy probably prohibits the large-scale stockpiling of toxic chemical weapons by the Satellites; however, the Soviets ‘could supply them if necessary. (b) Soviet doctrine provides for using toxic chemicals to inflict casualties on enemy troops: impeding movement by contamination of pergonnel, equipment, and terrain; weakening enemy strength and depressing enemy morale by prolonged use; and establishing barriers. Doctrine includes chemical fires on positions to be assaulted and the use of chemicals to complement nuclear Wea- pons effects. Strategic doctrine calls for the use of chemicals to deny territory and decimate populations without destroying industrial facilities (fpf pret ‘The USSR is capable of producing necessary quantities of chemical munitions and defensive equipment to aupport sustained chemical operations. It is capable of producing approxi- mately 65, 000 tone of nerve-type agents annually. fay (5)! “fs Research and Development. ‘The USSR hae a well-organized chemical re and development program, The following areas of current Soviet emphasis could lead to improvements in chemical capabilities in the near futur REGF 15-4 RECRARED UNGAASSINED. BY COR USAINSCOM FOIPO AUTH PARA 1-605 DoD 5200.1-7 archSTCRET (a) Extensive work on org: yrous com- pounds, which could result in new types of nerve : (®) Particular emphasis on incapScitating com- pounds; developments in synthesis methods and reductions in produc- tion costs could result in Soviet forces being provided physical or mental incapacitating agent munitions by 1985/66, ce. YSY Biological Capabilities. (1) sf Biotogieat Operations. No stocks of biological weapons or agents have been identified; however, some munitions suitable for chemical delivery, such as spray tanks and bombs, are also suitable for bio- logical agent delivery. Because of storage fe problems, any plans for biological attack probably would not call for actual munition Toading until a short time before employment. No special munitions would be necessary for covert delivery. (a) Specific Soviet biological agents have not been identified. The extensive studies conducted by the USSR, including some testing programs on humans, indicate that the microorganisms shown in Figure 15-1 could be used, (©) There is no separate tactical biological operations organization in the Soviet forces. The chemical organ- ization ie responsible for training, which emphasizes individual defense. (21""Yaf Biotogieat Defens Soviet forces are only moderately capable of defending themselves againet biological attack. (a) Chemical-protective clothing offers some protection against grose biological contamination, and the Soviet forces have a good biological decontamination capability pro- vided by their chemical decontamination means. (©) Soviet forces have no capability for rapid warning, detection, or identification of a biological agent attack. Within the current state of medical knowledge, the USSR capable of supplying adequate quantities of pharmaceuticals to the Soviet forces for prevention and treatment of disea REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ‘SORilian ue ON ROY 78 1994 cA BY CDR USAINSCOM FOUR a AUTH PARA 4-603 On?) Ronn 1.“SECRET (ayY6F Doctrine, Soviet doctrine on employment of biological agents is not known, (ayegf Production, ‘The USSR is capable of producing sufficient quantities of biological agents for sustained large-scale employment. ervysh ‘The USSR has an active biological research and development program. Many aspects of their medical and public health esearch and development programs, such as aerosol im~ munization studies, are directly applicable to biological capabilities. The following areas of current Soviet emphasis could lead to im- proved biological capabilities: arch and Development (a) Extensive studies on botulinum toxin could lead to a capability for delivery of this agent. (b) Research efforts in aerobiology could lead to large-area coverage capabilities. (c)_ Research on immunizations could lead to new vaccines against US agents and candidate agents, as well as improved immunization methods. a. \W(8// Radiological Capabilities. (1) Wo Radiological Operations. With the exception of nuclear weapons, Soviet forces do not possess any known capability for radiological opera~ tions. Available quantities of radioactive reactor wastes are ineufficient to be of military significance. 2) gy Radiological Defense. The Soviet forces have a fair capability for defense against radiation effects and continuation of operations in a radiologically contaminated environment. Soviet forces are well trained in techniques necessary for minimising radiation casualties REGRADED: 6 ung 15. ov nr 88 SESS enti OR USAINSCOM FOI us SCE WPC Q AUTH Pati 805 bab Sheeran ae—FECRST and continuing operations in contaminated area. (a) Soviet forces have adequate snd depend~ able instruments for detection and measurement of radioactive con- tamination: the DP21a, DP21b, and DP23 dosimeters measure gamma dosage from 0 to 50 roentgens; and the DPla, DP1b, and DPle survey meters measure dose rates from . 02 to 500 roentgens per hour. The DP62 measures from 10 to 500 milliroentgens, and the DP63 measures from 0 to 50 roentgens per hour. The DPlla, DP11b, and DP12 meters measure personnel and equipment ©) Chemical-protective masks and clothing provide excellent protection from body contamination and inhalation of radioactive particles. Present chemical unite and equipment provide an excellent capability for radiological reconnaissance and personnel and equipment decontamination. (ol Daten. Soviet doctrine considers surface nuclear burst as the primary sources of such contamination and indicates that this effect can be used to produce casualties and deny access to areas. Defensive doctrine calls for continuous radiological reconnaissance in conjunction with chemical reconnaissance. (4) 4S Production. The Soviet nuclear reactor capacity will probably not be sufficient to produce militarily significant quantities of radio- active waste for several years. The Soviets are capable of pro- ducing adequate quantities of radiation protection and detection equipment to support the needs of their forces. 16) ay Although the USSR is conducting research and development programs in the radiation field, these will probably not Jead to any significant changes in the capabilities of their forces in the near future. rch and Develops c. (sf smoke capabinities. 2) OX Employment Capabititi REGRADED UNQLASSIFIED BEGRADED UNG tee DR USAINSCOM FDURD SEGRtem i 7 Burn PARA 1608 DoD 5209.1-R 271eT Soviet forces have an excellent smoke b ranging from large-area screening to small-unit tactical e ‘ment, Available smoke munitions include phoephorous-filled § artillery shells, mortar shells, hand grenades, candles, smoke pot and hand grenades filled with burning-type emoke-producing miz- tures, Aircraft epray tanks are also available for producing smoke screens. Some of the burning-type munitions contain adamsite (DM), which has a toxic effect. @) IGF Doctrine ‘The Soviets contend that smoke 1s one of the best support weapons and advocate its use, especially in offensive opera tions, Large-scale miesions are accomplished by smoke battalions, while the individual may use emoke grenades to conceal movements, (3) Yah Research and Development. ‘The USSR is working on the development of smoke munitions for use against infrared and radar combat surveillance de- vices, also smokes that blend with terrain and emoke-toxic agent com binatfons, Such smokes could be available in 1965. £ 4G) Flame Capabilities. Soviet forces are equipped with a variety of flame weapons, including portable, emplaced, cart-mounted, and mechanized flamethrowere, Incendiary grenades, mortar shells, artillery shells, and bombs. Munitions are filled with petroleum pro ducts or pyrotechnic mixtures. Flame eupport is provided by heavy and portable flamethrower battalions. Soviet doctrine advocates the use of flame in support of offensive and defensive operations. 2. Yd) Sater f) Nuclear Capabilities. Although all of the Satellites are making a contribution, to the Soviet nuclear energy program, largely through supplying uranium, they are not producing nuclear weapone and do not have operational control over Soviet-produced nuclear warheads. East Germany and Czechoslovakia have the industrial bases required to support a moderate nuclear energy effort. In theory, these Satellites, with their resources and technical knowledge, could, with Soviet assistance, produce a nominal number of nuclear weapons with - SIFED peoranen igs " ISAINSCOM FOV 212 By epan 1-603 DoD 200. AUTH PARA 15.SECRET the plutonium from their power reactors, How [2 develop- ment is considered bighly improbable in the fore! future. A. more likely possibility is that the Soviets may establish « Warcaw Pact nuclear weapons pool, Weapons consigned to such a stockpile, although ostensibly for the use of all the Pact membere, would remain under Soviet control, b (asi CBR Capabini The Satellites are severely Limited in the employment of toxic chemical agents because of a lack of munitions, Although Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland, and Rumania are capeble of producing toxic agents, the USSR maintains overall control. The Satellites, except Albania and Bulgaria, maintein a good defense against toxic agents; however, all of the Satellite nations are vulnerable to biological attack (See Figure 15-8 for detailed capabilities REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON Wo 28 "5g BY CDR USMINSCOM FONPO 15-9 AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-Fi aw 273—beRet Standard Soviet Chemical Agent us Type Agent Symbol Nerve V-type af vx Tabun ca Sarin cE Blister Mustard H Mustard-lewisite HL mixture Phosgene oxime cx Other toxic. Hydrogen cyanide ac agents Cyanogen chloride cK Phosgene cc Di phosgene DP Irritant agents Chloroacetophenone CN Adamsite DM Possible Soviet Biological ager Bacterial Bacillus anthracis (Anthrax) Brucella species (Brucellosis) Intestinal pathogens (Cholera, Typhoid, Bacillary Dysentery) 4, Pasteurella tularensis (Tularemia) 5, Pasteurella pestis (Plague) 1, Encephalitides 2. Peitacosie~ 3. Yellow fever nithorie (Parrot fever) Ricketveiae BEGRADED AGHASSIEDD fever ow Typ BY COR USAINSCOM roingr AUTH PABA 1-F03 DOD 520°.4-F Figure 18-1 were renee 274ees andy puepr eyuyed swopreujuresu0s9p uyerz0y pue ‘yeuuossed ‘ooue pewayu0p polatered ‘ayedoa quowdinbe “won eupwuequos9p [suuoazed pure qusur ndynbe ‘uperray ‘souessyeuuosey yoatesod suoneurmreyuozap BuRI3019 famouun suoyyeujurejuosep uyesz9 1, e1atesod gees -uossp yuoudynbs pur ‘yousos naed ‘uyerray ‘eouessyeuuos9y pilav, Burke] ouput jeoneoqa ‘uorreunueyuos uyessay Avsdg s1aeqora Areuy on "pouBteae 9,uq uo spuolog aoaseera ae ust ‘peur woeq ou sey syuN Jo woHHEOy yard peoperaus (1 seuszep peoquey9, 09 uosep SuyI019) 09 wosop uyess04, 49 ‘ausjop 1eotu94D, ug Teo p9uD, Aaore20q°T © Pq sauaj9p peonioya, en ‘Gia PUY HBAS TEOTEINAD TOROS “poaydjs Atquonbaxy sy s3yun asayy [Te 0} uoUIWOD yweudybs pue uoHEZFULBIO F “Awiae copun poren suonreneg od43 owes wioss poMIOE £ *suoqsqArp 03 pousyewr ore jeoeed uy fem Jo ou Uy kIuo Az vedo20u ox Awe puE HOSE OF PYRITE Oe UMOYE MITA 7 ‘ourpesead uy 990203 Jo dnosy | (29%90) wat seomye T 1534) Bx999570 2 wat sxasgjo ¢ sis2yse 9 mown ras wear quowssey operat funn heey qwosg TAT wo 0 SSIFIED * Poa REGRADED UNCLA BY CDR USAINSCOM FOVPO AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-8 ON—~SEGRES ANNEX 16 * GUIDED MISSILES AND ROCKETS 1. (or ssn: Genesale ‘The Soviets have continued to place missile and rocket technology in the position of highest priority. The continuing deployment of the SA-2 GUIDELINE surface-to-air missile (SAM) system throughout the entire Soviet Bloc, the sale of this system to various non-Bloc countries, and the repeated display of Soviet surface-to-surface rockets and-missiles in parades in the various Bloc countries serve to demonstrate the Soviet emphasis in this field. b, Characteristics of Soviet Surface-to-Surface Missiles (ssm, (1) Surface-to-Surface Strategic Missiles ‘The delivery systems listed in paragraph 1 b (1) are all estimated to have a nuclear capability. REGRADED UNCt GRSRADED UNCLASSIFIED BY COR USAINSCOM FOVPO Sian AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD §200.1-R 240 16-1jurface Tactical Mi fa) The FROG-1 and FROG-2 are probably obsolescent. ‘The FROG-3 and FROG-4 use the same rocket engines: the only differences in these two weapons are the size of the war- heads and the range, ‘There are ample quantities of all FROG weapons, and it ig believed that the FROG-3 and FROG-4 are in series production () The $S-1 SCUD A and SS-1 SCUD B are believed to be in series production. The ranges indicated are with nuclear warheads, While the SCUD A has a maximum range of 280 Kilometers with a conventional warhead, it is believed that the Soviets would consider such employment as uneconomical and ineffective. (c)_ The 5-2 is probably an outgrowth of the German World War II V-2 missile, While the exact configuration of 'SS~2 is not known, it is believed to be larger than, but quite Similar to, the older V-2. The 55-2 is obyoleveen REGRADED UNCLAS BEGRAREO UNCLASSIFIED 16-2 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOU AUTH PARA 1-609 D0D S200 Fe(@) The delivery systems ph 1b(2) are all estimated to have muclear capabilit (e) In addition to the above, the SNAPPER and SWATTER antitank missiles may be considered in the surface-to- surface category. ‘The missiles are mounted on retractable launchers within the aft portion of the BRDM amphibious scout car, ‘The SNAPPERS are mounted three abreast and are visually tracked, wire-guided missiles, The SWATTERS are mounted four abreast, in two staggered rows, and appear to be radio guided with an auto- matic contro! system requiring the operator to track only the target, ‘The SNAPPERS are also mounted on the UAZ~69 truck rather than on the BRDM, The UAZ~69 SNAPPER system consists of four missiles which are fired to the rear and are also wire-guided, c. Deployment of Soviet Surface-t €) Strategic. (a) The 1, 150-kilometer SS-3 SHYSTER SSM is not deployed in Bast Germany, since the great majority of strategic targets can be effectively covered from the Western military districts of the USSR with the SS-3, the 1, 900-kllometer S84 SANDAL, and the 4, 000-kilometer 88-5 (See Figure 16-1), () ‘The 1, 150-kflometer $$-3 and the 1, 900 kilometer SS-4 probably employ the same warhead, These weapons are in series production, but it is estimated that the SS~4 will gradually replace the SS-3 and become the mainstay of the Soviet medium range ballistic missile (MRBM) force. (©) The 4, 000-kilometer $S-5 is the newest operational strategic missile in the Soviet inventory. This weapon, which is capable of intercontinental attack, is also believed to be in series production, (a) _ Eis estimated that these MRBMs and intermediate range ballistic missiles (RBM), using nuclear warheads, have the necessary range, accuracy, and reliability to be extensively employed in a Soviet attack against any NATO targets, RECRADED UNCLASSIFIED Nev 0 BY COR USAINSCOM FO"PO wees pro BARA 4-603 DoD 5200.1-F seener” “wy 2823 é 8 5 i g z 3 = g = 2 = he fo > 3 8 REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON tov. 88 354 16-4 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI BOE Ata 509 Oe Sao wnd the arc centers are arbitrary, : i i a 283@) Tactical. (a) Tactical SSM's and single- ROGS are present in the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFQ), The FROG- 3/4 and the SS-1 (SCUD B) missiles and support equipment have been observed during displays, on maneuvers, in transit, and in installa~ tions in East Germany. () ‘The accepted organizations of these tactical weapons systems are as follow: 1 One FROG battalion is in each of the 20 line divisions. Baci’battalion is organized with three FROG batteries of one iauncher each, A new rocket launcher, based on the BMD-20 multiple-round rocket launcher, has been observed in the GSFG FROG battalions, These new launchers, two per FROG battalion, fire rockets estimated to be 20 feet long with a 400mm lameter warhead similar to the front half of a FROG-4 warhead; these new rockets are estimated to be used in a close support nuclear role, ‘This organization results in a total of 60 FROG launchers and 40 short-range rocket launchers in GSFG, 2 _ One SSe1 SCUD brigade is an each of she five armies and one brigade is directly subordinate to GSFG head quarters, Each brigade is organized with two battalions with three batteries each, Bach battery has one SS-1 latncher, giving the brigade a total of 86 leunchers in the GSFC. 3 There have been no indications of SS-2 associated equipment in East Germany over the past several years and it is believed this system is obsolescent, 4 The GSFG has a definite need for 2 delivery system capable of a maximum range of 480 to 560 kilometers, ‘To fill the gap in this range capability, which resulted from the apparent obsolescence of the SS-2 system, it is estimated that the GSFG has, or will, introduce, a surface-to-surface cruise missile (SCM) system, possibly the SSC-1 SHADDOCK. It is estimated that this system would be organized as a regiment, subordinate to the 24th Tactical Air Army or directly subordinate to the GSFG, A. regiment would consist of two battalions of two launchers each, for a total of four SSCM launchers, REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ula teats sy comtshfigtom Foo sooner By Geaana e030 D5200."-R a 18-5“JPeRET 5 One battery of antitank mis held in each GSFG motorfed rifle regiment. A battery either nine SNAPPER BRDM amphibious scout cars or six SWA’ BRDM's, (©) Mockups of virtually every type of USAREUR operational missile have been reported in East Germany, These mockups are used as training aids for Soviet Bloc reconnaissance personnel and for forces specially trained for sabotage of missile sites, It ie estimated that the Soviets will continue to emphasize such training and that as new missiles become operational in USAREUR, mockups of these weapons will appear in East Germany. 4, Cruisestype Surface-to-Surface Missiles. Soviet interest in cruise-type missiles continues. It is estimated that the Soviets have continued the development of their capability to supplement the ballistic missile program as follows: e, Characteristics of Soviet Surface-ti ‘Type and Range Year (istomatere) Qperational Mach No. Guidance Aerodynamic 275 1961 Le Radio command and inertial Aerodynamic 560 1982 Le Radio command and inertial Aerodynamic 900 1962 Los Radio command fd inertial Aerodynamic 3, 700 1964 2.0-3.0 Anertial-stel corrected REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED 166 ON §OV C3 v5, BY coR USAiNSCoM FovbE CEE AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-A N o aSSTCRET Deployment of Soviet Surface-torair (2) The Soviets have continued to emy programs. The already vast deployment of the SA-2 ‘USSR and Satellite countries has shown further expansion. Both the SA-2 and SA-3 systems are used to bolster the SA-1 double- concentric ring defense of Moscow. Improvements and refinements in the SA-2 equipment have continued to be made at GSFG SAM sites and sites within the USSR, The majority of the 22 GSFG SA-2 sites in East Germany are now equipped with the latest known version of ‘the SA-2 SAM fire control radar, FAN SONG E, and a newly configured GUIDELINE missile, This three-dish radar and the newly configured missile probably improves the low-altitude capability of the SA-2 system, It is estimated that all GSFG sites will be equipped with ‘this new radar and that this improved system is being introduced in Soviet SA-2 peripheral defense sites. (2) The minimum altitude capability of the SA-2 system since the introduction of the FAN SONG E fire control radar is estimated at about 1,000 meters. This deficiency proba- bly led the Soviets to develop a low-altitude system designated the SA-3, Deployment of this system, reportedly under development since late 1959, has been initiated within the Soviet Union as a sup- plement to existing SAM defense systems. This improvement in the low-altitude capability of the SAM defense system probably is only an interim measure. It is estimated that a mobile low-altitude SAM defense system will be introduced in GSFG during 1965. (8) A new Soviet missile, nicknamed GRIFFON, was displayed in the 7 November 1983 Moscow parade, ‘This new missile, which appears to be an extension of the SA-2 GUIDELINE design, is a two-stage, surface-to-air type with a solid propellant booster and probably a liquid sustainer, The booster missile fins are an inter- Gigitated configuration, ahd one pair of opposing large missile fins is equipped with roll control ailerons, Four small, movable, in-line surfaces aft of the large missile fins are for steering control, Approx imate dimensions are: overall miseile-booster length, 53 fects booster diameter, 3.4 feet; and missile diameter, 2,6 feet, Over- all characteristics of the missile indicate it is probably a longer-range, higher-altitude SAM designe te improve Soviet anti-aircraft capabil ity. The new missile may also have a limited anti-misaile capability, (4) A new Soviet missile, nicknamed GANEF, was displayed in the 1 May 1964 Moscow parade, The new system, which followed GRIFFON in the parade, consists of two missiles mounted RESRAE NS seoner we ON i, ¥ CDR USAINSCOM FOVPO 286 RUTH PARA 1-608 000 5200.1-FeT on a new type tracked chassis, The missiles, 27 feet long and inches in diameter, employ four parallel separable solid-fue Doosters and a rami-jet sustainer engine, ‘The dual-arm lay capable of rotating 360 degrees and probably elevates both together. The new weapon system is probably « mobic anti-atreratt missile system designed for field army use, It is estimated that de~ ployment of the GANEF system began in 1964 and that this system will appear in the GSFG during 1965, The eddition of GRIFFON and GANEF to the inventory would considerably enhance the GSFG air defense capabilities. ‘The first missile system known to be in the hands of the Satellite forces was the SA-2 SAM system, Although reports of varying reliability have long suggested the fresence of other missile and rocket systems in the various Sstellite forces, it has only been recently that the presence of these systems has been con= firmed, b, Surface-to-Surface Missiles. () Bast Germany. ‘The presence of FROG-3/4 and SS-I SCUD A fn the East German Army has been confirmed, These systems, which are probably organized along Soviet lines, are capable of delivering nuclear warheads but the Soviets undoubtedly have re ‘tained strict control over them, releasing conventional warheads only, Two SNAPPER wire-guided antitank missile systems, one quad mounted on the UAZ+69 jeep and one triple mounted on the RDM armored scout car, have been issued to EGA units, (2) Other Satelite ‘The presence of FROG-3/4 and SS-) SCUD A in Polish forces has been confirmed, In Rumania, where $S-1 SCUD A has been confirmed, it is believed that FROG-3/4 is present, eince ‘this gystem is probably furnished to Satellite forces as soon as, if not sooner than, the SCUD A system, While it is felt that FROG-3/4 tnd SCUD A are in both Czechoslovaida and Bulgaria, their presence sec8 ES AED UNCLASSIFIED 287 BON Nov 28 1304 BY CDA USAINSCOM Foy ORE AUTH PARA 1-603 Du 5200.18.