The Military Balance

ISSN: 0459-7222 (Print) 1479-9022 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tmib20

Complex irregular warfare – the psychological

component

To cite this article: (2007) Complex irregular warfare – the psychological component, The Military
Balance, 107:1, 415-420, DOI: 10.1080/04597220601167856

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Published online: 09 Feb 2007.

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Chapter Ten
Complex irregular warfare –
the psychological component
Rebellions can be made up of two per cent in the striking force, and ninety-eight
per cent passively sympathetic … The few active rebels must have the qualities of
speed and endurance, ubiquity and independence of arteries of supply … In brief,
mobility, security (in denying targets to the enemy), time, and a doctrine to convert
every subject to friendliness. Victory will rest with the insurgents, for the algebraic
factors in the end are decisive, and against them perfections of means and spirit
struggle in vain.
— T.E. Lawrence

The psychological component – which includes extensively in recent operations to obtain results that
winning the hearts and minds of a population, but could never have been achieved by force alone. Info
also involves influencing the enemy mindset – is a key Ops coordinate information activity to affect the will,
part of success or failure in complex irregular warfare capability and understanding of the enemy and local
(see The Military Balance 2005–2006). T.E. Lawrence populations. PSYOPS, as a component of Info Ops,
identified these factors in the same geographical focuses on influencing the attitudes and behaviour of
environment in which coalition forces now find both the enemy and the people within the operational
themselves, where ignoring the psychological battle area to support military efforts.
will ultimately lead to failure. The use of communi�
cation tools and ‘influence operations’ planned for HISTORICAL perspective
psychological effect ultimately decides the success or
failure of military campaigns in such complex envi� During the immediate post-Cold War period, Western
ronments. military operations were primarily focused on peace
‘Influence operations’, in the military context, are support activities – apart from the 1991 Gulf War.
defined as methods that use informational��������
���������������������
, behav� This focus required a shift from high-intensity kinetic
ioural and attitudinal
��������������������������������������
concepts to reinforce key activity to setting the conditions for peace to flourish.
military and political efforts. Influence operations Western militaries generally found themselves rein�
attempt to reinforce activities within the area of oper� forcing security conditions to support the reconstruc�
ations across differing target audiences to support the tion and rehabilitation of nations emerging from
commander’s intent. While such operations may be war, or enforcing fragile peace agreements through
viewed as propaganda, a lack of engagement with international military coalitions under the banner of
psychological factors is not an option. The challenge NATO or the United Nations. The concept of influ�
is to adopt strategies which �������������������������
recognise that long-term ence emerged as the significant long-term challenge
perceptual effects in the area of operations will have a in these operations and military forces employed
significant impact on the success or failure of military classic PSYOPS tools, such as radio stations, televi�
activity. A key requirement is to ensure that all influ� sion commercials and print media. At the same time
ence activity is based on truthfulness, robust levels the presence, posture and profile of the military force
of analysis and – most importantly in the eyes of the was used to promote behavioural and attitudinal
audience – credibility of message and source. effects in the short term, matched to long-term accep�
The methodologies currently employed are infor� tance of the terms of a peace agreement.
mation operations (Info Ops), psychological opera� The military found this shift to unorthodox
tions (PSYOPS), and to some extent other influence methods reasonably painless, with commanders
activities such as public information operations (PIO) realising that the success of the mission depended
and civil affairs (CA). These tools have been used upon the threat of force being clearly transmitted and
416 The Military Balance 2007

understood by potential protagonists. Linked to this tactical area of the aims and reasons for the military
psychological component was the need to create and presence. Unfortunately, militaries have tended to
reinforce a desire to embrace the peace process and follow a policy of informing locals of military objec�
move towards reconciliation. Military forces in Bosnia- tives, expecting this to be enough. The ‘life is getting
Herzegovina, Kosovo, the Former Yugoslav Republic better’ information which is often delivered has little
of Macedonia, Sierra Leone and other conflict zones if any relevance for the local population and often has
applied these strategies with enormous success. An no perceived truth behind it; in reality life may not
analysis of the Balkans campaigns during the NATO be getting better and in the eyes of the target audi�
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina ence the military presence could be contributing to
and Kosovo Force (KFOR) missions clearly illustrates the problem. This adoption of so-called ‘Smile Ops’
the success of PSYOPS and Info Ops, particularly may have helped in previous peace support opera�
with respect to the longer-term objectives of under� tions where life may actually have been improving. In
mining the desire or capability of elements within the countries such as Iraq, suffering high levels of insur�
population to return to conflict. gency, and internecine and ethnic strife, the need is
Regardless of the success of these new tools, to reinforce effects that support military activity and
the mindset of senior military command, formed to encourage local populations to undermine support
during the Cold War and focused on large-scale war- for insurgent and anti-coalition forces. This can only
fighting operations, resisted the wider adoption of be achieved by research into the factors which really
this approach and hindered capability development. matter to the local population, and a cultural and
Even with successes in the Balkans, the adoption of psychological understanding of which techniques
less kinetic solutions was slow, and has only found will succeed – seldom including leaflets saying ’We
traction since the 2003 Iraq War and lessons identified are here to help’. This is not purely the responsi�
from operations after 11 September 2001. bility of PSYOPS personnel working with the tactical
unit, but of the entire operations planning staff, and
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS IN THE COMBAT should be integrated into all military activities. Too
ENVIRONMENT often commanders plan operations and ask for leaf�
lets or ‘some Info Ops’ after the operation, in order
Exerting influence requires understanding both the to cover the psychological component; this approach
effects desired and the dominant culture in which a has failed, and will continue to fail. Only an approach
force is operating. Military commanders are begin� that takes account of the psychological attitudes and
ning to realise that they must prosecute operations needs of target audiences within hostile, undecided
which combine both kinetic and non-kinetic effects. and friendly populations will succeed in the longer
This synchronisation of effects, with equal attention term. It is pointless to run operations to negate poten�
being paid to all components, can ���������������������
yield successful tial threats within an operational area if the result
and enduring results���������������������������
if applied within a frame� is to generate a new breed of insurgents or activists
work of combined and joint operations. In counter- through the operation itself. This must be avoided by
insurgency activity, the centre of gravity very quickly planning for psychological activities at the same time
becomes the population in the area of operations. If as planning for combat operations.
the military commander cannot win the trust and
respect of the people within his area of operations, an STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL AND
insurgency may flourish. This principle of counter- TACTICAL LINKS
insurgency is fairly well understood. But the means of
integrating the psychological component of complex One of the biggest challenges for a military commander
operations with other military activities is not well is how to manage the impact of strategic issues in the
defined in doctrine and is often poorly executed as a tactical psychological space. In a world with global
consequence. communications the effect of actions which may be
As the military forces in Iraq and, to some extent, outside, as well as inside, the area of operations can
Afghanistan, have tried to come to terms with the have significant psychological and physical impact
difficulties of carrying out ‘phase-four’, or recon� on the ability of the military force to carry out its
struction and nation-building operations, the chal� task. Well-documented incidents include the burning
lenge has been how to convince the population in the of Taliban bodies in Afghanistan by US service
 Complex irregular warfare – the psychological component 417

personnel, the abuse of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib, operations than it does with a home audience. The
abuses of civilians by British soldiers in Basra; but also psychological effect at home is one of military success
the publishing of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed and may generate political support. In the theatre
in the Danish media, and media stories alleging the of operations the opposite may be true, with every
desecration of the Koran at the Guantanamo Bay publicly announced kill delivering more willing
detention facility. Such incidents and media stories, recruits to the cause. This lack of understanding of the
some of which are outside the control of a military culture and the reinforced perception of the external
commander in the operational environment, have a military force contrasts with messages of ‘we are here
lasting and negative effect on the military operation to offer reconstruction, governance and support for
itself. How should the military commander plan for the elected government’, undermining the coalition
these events and what tools can he use to negate the military’s position and ultimately causing the psycho�
negative impact on his freedom of action? logical battle to be lost. The final result depends not
To mitigate this effect and make effective contin� on traditional attritional conflict, but on capacity
gency plans for the unexpected, ground troops must building and providing real benefits for the popula�
understand prevailing attitudes and opinions within tion, linked to convincing them that foreign military
the community in which they operate: attitudes to forces are providing the conditions in which they will
militia forces, economic factors, social factors and be able to prosper. If it appears that this is not the
most importantly the attitude of the locals towards case then key target audiences will be lost to enemy
their own military force. Only then will they be able forces and pressure on the force will be increased as
to develop strategies to marginalise these external the insurgency gains support and, more importantly,
influences and remain fully effective. Successful greater, lasting credibility with the people.
strategies should be planned before deployment and
continually revised during the operation. But such an MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND
approach has more utility at the battlegroup or regi� PERFORMANCE
mental combat team command level than anywhere
else. It is here that loss of the psychological advantage To achieve a successful outcome in complex irregular
will be most felt. warfare, it is necessary to communicate with different
Another variable for the military commander to target audiences on one ‘battlefield’ in different ways,
consider is political intent; it is difficult to develop an activity which may be conducted through open
appropriate influence campaigns based on changing or intermediate systems. Within
�������������������������
the area of opera�
political guidance and competing effects. In the battle tions, m�������������������������������������������
ost communication is delivered directly by
for the psychological component, the military require the military and is normally managed by specialist
clear guidance on what they are trying to achieve in PSYOPS teams, using appropriate media designed
the long term. Domestic political changes and direc� with cultural and psychological knowledge to match
tional shifts at home cause differing guidance to be the specific target audience.
fed down to the tactical level. In kinetic operations To validate the impact of, and ultimately the
this means a redirection of emphasis and a differing success or failure of PSYOPS, there is a requirement to
focus on operations, but in the psychological domain be able to measure the effects that are being achieved,
shifts in focus inevitably result in lack of trust and not just to justify the actions and decisions to higher
credibility for the military with the target audi� authority but to allow continual evaluation and devel�
ence, thus reinforcing the insurgents’ argument and opment of the message. To measure effect within the
bolstering their support. The effect for the insurgency psychological domain requires different skills to those
is to open a space for exploitation; insurgents are able traditionally used by militaries to measure the effec�
to use their own methods of influence to reinforce tiveness of operations. Often on contemporary opera�
their goals and gain credibility with the population. tions, performance in PSYOPS or IO is measured by
Examples from recent operations include the kinetic counting how many leaflets and newspapers have
battle in southern Afghanistan against the Taliban, for been given out or how wide the signal coverage of
whom death is a form of victory, with frequent coali� a radio station is. This does not indicate the effect of
tion announcements of how many Taliban fighters the operation on the target population. Resilient vali�
have been killed. Using ‘body count’ as a measure of dation requires different skills and procedures such
effect has a very different impact within the area of as polling, data collection and analysis, combined
418 The Military Balance 2007

with other measures. Integration of these methods of the recent conflict in Lebanon failed. The goal was
assessing and prosecuting psychological operations to inform the people of the reason for the air and
is the current challenge. ground campaigns rather than to win hearts and
minds, though the latter would arguably be an unre�
RECENT OPERATIONS alistic prospect. Using leaflet bombs in an attempt to
separate Hizbullah from the population of Lebanon
The use of influence is accepted as a crucial compo� was doomed to failure as the argument was not one
nent of current military operations, though different that had resonance with the target audience. Telling
interpretations of influence and different resources people what you think they should hear fails – human
are allocated from different national militaries. There psychology does not work like that. People react
are differences in national doctrines and different to what matters to them, and the only way to shift
national opinions on how influence may be used as attitudes or behaviour is to identify what motivates
part of national or coalition force operations. This them. In Lebanon the Israeli army lost the psycholog�
disunity in thinking on how to effectively deploy ical battle when it targeted civilian areas
psychological strategies causes disruption in the Regardless of the successes or failures of specific
coordination of effort. This has not been the case in influence campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, the
Iraq where coalition partners have worked together. lessons identified clearly indicate that more assets
The warfighting phase was successful, with influence should be directed to the psychological arena. Due
operations well coordinated between coalition allies, to slow take-up and a reliance on kinetic operations
resulting in success in the psychological domain. The both operational theatres have seen attitudes detri�
rapid collapse of the Iraqi army was attributed in part mental to the goals of the military force emerging
to a successful psychological campaign conducted in in the population. Basra, where a predominantly
parallel with kinetic operations. This coordination Shia population which was oppressed for years by
has continued throughout the operation, but the diffi� the Saddam regime is now antagonistic to the coali�
culty has been in the change to post-conflict or phase- tion forces which delivered their freedom, is a good
four operations where the psychological domain is example. There is an argument to suggest that lack
different from that of the combat phase. In the post- of resources directed at monitoring and influencing
combat environment, the focus shifts from PSYOPS attitudes in this area is to blame. This may be too
directed against an identifiable enemy to reinforcing simplistic; however, individuals and groups who
and changing the attitudes of the population – a far have a vested interest in the departure of coalition
more complex and difficult task. forces have gained advantage in the psychological
The US military has long been developing its mindset of the people. It is also clear from post-oper�
capability in influence operations and has robust ational analysis that commanders of battlegroups
and well-funded Info �����������������������������
Ops and PSYOPS capabili�
��������� or regimental combat teams regard the Info Ops or
ties. European militaries, notably �����������������
Germany, Poland, PSYOPS capability they commanded as having the
Italy and the UK,������������������������������������
are also investing in this type of potential to deliver some real effect within their area
capability. However, there are still differences in of operations. This understanding usually comes too
doctrine and on the employment of this capability. late, and reinforces the argument that units deploying
In Afghanistan this lack of coherence has militated to Iraq or Afghanistan are not being provided with
against the effectiveness of multinational force influ� the training to enable them to have a real, positive
ence operations, which have developed without psychological impact on the population in their area
coordination. The effort has tended to be directed of operations from the outset.
centrally from Kabul with master messages being There have been clear successes, for example in
projected on a nationwide basis resulting in reduced northern Afghanistan (particularly the Provincial
effect locally. This compares with Iraq where coali� Reconstruction Teams) and some areas of Iraq, where
tion command in Baghdad supports the subordi� effective analysis and psychological strategy have
nate commands by financing local initiatives and been developed before deployment. During the
devolving the influence capability at the ground handover of al-Muthanna province to Iraqi forces,
level. This facilitates the interpretation and develop� the campaign to convince the locals that they were
ment of themes more attuned to local conditions. in charge was so successful that the people were
Israeli attempts to win the psychological battle in perplexed as to why coalition forces were still in their
 Complex irregular warfare – the psychological component 419

town. Other successes have been the deployment of in turn, governments can be successfully influenced.
Provincial Joint Operations Centres (PJOCS), deliv� Global communications enable the non-state group to
ering emergency services to the population, and a read and thus influence the internal political debate
system of supporting the Iraqi security services. The of its adversary. This is achieved at every level, both
psychological component of this campaign was to in tactical operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and
convince the population to use the emergency contact in attacks on Western capitals. The widespread, and
number to inform on insurgents as well as for emer� graphically broadcast, use of Improvised Explosive
gencies; this tactic brought considerable success. Only Devices (IEDs) by insurgents is one example of how
when the population can be convinced that they terrorists and insurgents exert influence on audiences
must contribute to removing the threat will success nationally and internationally, and specifically on
be achieved, and this is happening with the PJOC the domestic audience of the countries providing the
concept. forces targeted in an attack.
The need to reinforce belief within the indigenous Insurgent and militia forces have adopted
security forces regarding their potential effectiveness, approaches that focus on winning the war of ideas
has also been highlighted, with PJOCs playing an both at local and strategic level. The majority of
important role in achieving this. attacks on coalition forces are filmed and placed on
In general, the attempt to win the psychological the Internet within a short time of the attack taking
battle within Afghanistan and Iraq has been fairly place, normally with stirring Islamic music, in an
robust in its ability to adapt and learn from mistakes. attempt to have wider influence on the collective
Both operational theatres offer complex cultural mind of a global target audience. The impact on local
challenges and, while the environments are cultur� populations and the target military is only part of the
ally different, one from another, military forces have plan, with a wider context being that of energising
usually developed appropriate tools for each. In Iraq global jihad.
a communications campaign that uses television and At the local level, militia groups use poster and
regional media has been developed to deliver the leaflet campaigns in what would be seen in the
message, alongside local initiatives which operate in West as a marketing campaign. This fairly sophis�
parallel. As a contrast in Afghanistan the engagement ticated method reinforces influence. In southern
of key leaders and local radio has had a clear impact. Afghanistan, the Taliban print leaflets and distribute
The challenge after mapping the communications their message to the population. With high rates of
environment and identifying which systems offer illiteracy in the southern provinces it would appear
the most impact in terms of reaching the population at first sight that this is a pointless exercise. However,
is to ensure the message, and thus the psychological deeper analysis supports the theory that the act of
effect, has utility in the indigenous culture, local or distribution reinforces the Taliban position by leaving
national. reminders of their presence. Moreover, leaflet distri�
bution is coupled with loudspeaker activities with
USE OF INFLUENCE OPERATIONS BY Talibs driving into villages and towns broadcasting
OPPOSITION GROUPS simple coercive messages such as ‘death to the infidel’
in order to gain support or to instil fear in the local
There is little doubt that the successful influence of population – a simple tactic which reduces the effec�
target audiences is a key component of terrorist and tiveness of attempts by NATO forces to win over the
insurgent operations. The impact of operations on local population.
public opinion is carefully calculated. And the use of a
multi-media approach coupled with kinetic operations CIVILIAN INVOLVEMENT
against both military and civilian targets delivers clear
military and political effect for opposition groups. An Military forces deployed in complex operational envi�
example of this was the train bombing in Madrid on ronments do not have the expertise to successfully
11 March 2004 which played some part in the with� prosecute all influence operations. To help overcome
drawal of Spanish troops from Iraq. Following this this deficit a number of civilian contractors have been
event the perception that the terrorist was capable of employed. In theory this practice should deliver
affecting Western public opinion through the use of the required solutions, allowing civilian experts to
force sent a signal out to the rest of the world that, develop long-term communications and influence
420 The Military Balance 2007

strategies, whilst the military is allowed to carry out and instead to look at how best to integrate civilian
its traditional operational role. Unfortunately, some� contractors and military personnel.
times the poor selection of civilian organisations and
their occasional very public mistakes has added to CONCLUSION
the lack of faith on the military’s part in the ability
of civilians to understand and relate to the opera� In complex irregular warfare, the need to exert effec�
tional environment. Influence operations are the tive psychological influence as well as physical influ�
responsibility of all personnel in the area of opera� ence is essential for success. Therefore, influence
tions and they are not something that can simply be operations should be integrated into normal plan�
outsourced to commercial experts. There is a role for ning procedures. Without this deeper perception of
civilians, as their depth of knowledge of the concept the mission environment, operations will lack the
of influence and psychological attitudinal change necessary ingredient for long-term success. Influence
can offer great utility; however, they will be most activities should become a part of the training and
successful when working closely with the military education of soldiers and commanders and, more
command structure and not in isolation. The need importantly, a part of pre-deployment preparation. In
is to move away from the idea that some PSYOPS this way the local population, who are the centre of
assets can be applied to solving the problem and gravity in this type of warfare, can be won over, thus
then the military can continue with kinetic activity, denying the enemy the space to operate.