Société québécoise de science politique

Unruly Beasts: Animal Citizens and the Threat of Tyranny

Author(s): Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka
Source: Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol.
47, No. 1 (March 2014 mars), pp. 23-45
Published by: Canadian Political Science Association and the Société québécoise de science
politique
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Unruly Beasts: Animal Citizens and the Threat of
Tyranny

Sue Donaldson Independent Researcher

Will Kymlicka Queen's University

In Zoopolis , we argue that domesticated animals1 are entitled not only to

protection of their basic negative rights such as life and liberty, they
should be recognized as citizens in a mixed human - animal democratic
polis sharing rights of membership, representation and participation in a
shared co-operative scheme.
Our argument for a duty to extend citizenship to domesticated animals
(hereafter D As) rests on three claims:

• DAs are de facto members of our political communities, physically

present and subject to human governance;
• through the process of domestication, DAs have been made dependent
on human care, foreclosing any (immediate) option of a more indepen-
dent existence outside of human communities; and
• within our political communities DAs form a dominated and exploited
sub-class whose interests are systematically ignored by the political
order.

In short, DAs are members of our communities; we have benefitted from,

and enforced, their membership while systematically exploiting them,
and these facts generate a moral obligation to extend citizenship. Justice

Acknowledgments: We are grateful to the participants in the CRÉUM "Workshop on

Animal Citizenship" for comments on this paper. Thanks also to Emma Planine whose
stimulating article inspired this response and to four anonymous referees for very helpful
comments.

Sue Donaldson, 7-131 King Street, Kingston, ON, K7L 2Z9, Email: cliffehanger@sym-
patico.ca
Will Kymlicka, Department of Philosophy, Queen's University, Kingston, ON K7L
3N6, Email: [email protected]

Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique

47:1 (March/mars 2014) 23^15 doi:10.1017/S0008423914000195
© 2014 Canadian Political Science Association (l'Association canadienne de science politique)
and/et la Société québécoise de science politique

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24 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka

demands that domination and hierarchy be r

ship and its accompanying ethos of equality,
operation.
We also argue that domestication ma
Citizenship is a co-operative relationship,
communication and physical proximity.
such relations with all animal species on th
that we can do so with DAs. Domesticatio
capacities for sociability across species li
need only imagine sharing the demos with s
Bengal tigers to highlight the contrast. W
engage in co-operative activity and share
for meaningful citizenship relations.
This is just a sketch of the argument for
the underlying normative logic is clear and
appeal. Nonetheless, our proposal for ani
broad criticisms; some critics question wh
be good for DAs; while others question
would be good for democracy.
In this paper, we focus on the second conc
keep the first in mind as well. We've propos
tory project that affirms the rights and int
worry that citizenship will prove to be yet a
pline vulnerable and compliant DAs to fi
Since citizenship is a norm-governed relation
DAs would justify policing their behaviou
society, manipulating, coercing, and dimi
respect their differences from us, and placin
their flourishing (Nurse and Ryland, 2013; P
ship would be bad for animals.
We have responded to this objection
Kymlicka, 2014). Citizenship does indeed i
ticipate in norms of good citizenship, includ
tribution, but whether this is oppressive or
norms are mutually created, enabling all m
or whether they mould or relegate some
serve others. The aim of a citizenship approa
social norms are responsive to the good o
would require creating conditions for DA
forms of co-operation with humans (and wit
mine what forms of co-operation (if any) th
Under these circumstances, we argue, citi
for animals.

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Abstract. Many commentators - including some animal rights theorists - have argued that non-
human animals cannot be seen as members of the demos because they lack the critical capacities for
self-rule and moral agency which are required for citizenship. We argue that this worry is based on
mistaken ideas about both citizenship, on the one hand, and animals, on the other. Citizenship
requires self-restraint and responsiveness to shared norms, but these capacities should not be under-
stood in an unduly intellectualized or idealized way. Recent studies of moral behaviour show that
civil relations between citizens are largely grounded, not in rational reflection and assent to moral
propositions but in intuitive, unreflective and habituated behaviours which are themselves rooted in
a range of pro-social emotions (empathy, love) and dispositions (co-operation, altruism, reciprocity,
conflict resolution). Fifty years of ethological research have demonstrated that many social animals
- particularly domesticated animals - share the sorts of dispositions and capacities underlying
everyday civility. Once we broaden our conception of citizenship to include a richer account of
the bases of civic relations, it becomes clear that domesticated animals and humans can be co-crea-
tors of a shared moral and political world. We have nothing to fear, and much to gain, by welcoming
their membership in the demos.

Résumé. Plusieurs commentateurs - incluant certains théoriciens des droits des animaux - ont
soutenu que les animaux non humains ne peuvent pas être considérés comme des membres du
démos parce qu'il leur manque les capacités critiques d'autonomie et d 'agenti vité morale qui ser-
aient essentielles à la citoyenneté. Nous soutenons que cette inquiétude est fondée sur des idées
erronées à propos de la citoyenneté, d'une part, et à propos des animaux, d'autre part. La
citoyenneté requiert la maîtrise de soi et la sensibilité aux normes partagées, mais ces capacités
ne devraient pas être comprises en un sens indûment intellectualisé ou idéalisé. De récentes
études sur l'agentivité morale montrent que les relations civilisées entre les citoyens sont largement
fondées, non pas dans la réflexion rationnelle et l'assentiment à des propositions morales, mais dans
des comportements intuitifs, irréfléchis et habituels qui s'enracinent dans une gamme d'émotions
prosociales (l'empathie, l'amour) et de dispositions prosociales (coopération, altruisme,
réciprocité, résolution de conflits). Cinquante ans de recherches éthologiques ont démontré que plu-
sieurs animaux sociaux - particulièrement les animaux domestiques - partagent le type de disposi-
tions et de capacités rendant possible le civisme quotidien. Une fois que nous élargissons notre
conception de la citoyenneté pour inclure une compréhension plus riche des bases des relations civi-
ques, il devient évident que les animaux domestiques et les humains peuvent être les co-créateurs
d'un monde moral et politique commun. Nous n'avons rien à craindre, et beaucoup à gagner, à les
accueillir comme membres du démos.

In this paper we address the reverse question of whether animal citi-

zens would be bad for democracy. In her article, "Democracy, Despots
and Wolves," Emma Planine argues that animals are fundamentally
"unruly," unable to regulate their behaviour according to shared norms.
Their participation would weaken the norms of reciprocity, self-restraint
and civility that make democratic self-rule possible. She worries that
because animals are "formless," "unbridled," "anarchic," "insatiable,"
"savage," "ravenous," "wanton" and "amoral" in their exercise of
freedom, including them in the polis would weaken the commitment to
moderation and justice on which democracy depends.
We address this argument below, but it's worth noting the relationship
between this critique and the first one. The first worries that DAs can too
easily be compelled (through coercion or manipulative training) to

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26 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka

comply with even the most exploitative norm

able to domination. The second worries that
compliant with human-created social norm
to the demos. While the two critiques differ
extent of DA compliance with social norm
that these norms can only ever be exter
horizon of possibilities is either (docile)
compliance with human-created norms. Wha
of DA agency, their capacity not only to b
operative activities with humans, but also
shape social norms. As we will see, this is
relations between humans and DAs, and w
with the flourishing of all citizens, human o
This paper is structured as follows. Fir
body of evidence which shows that DAs,
"anarchic" in their exercise of freedom, d
reflexivity, practical reasoning and norm re
of moral sentiments and pro-social ten
animals do not entertain propositions about
timents, nor do they consciously assent to s
to the second step of our argument, which d
evidence that human moral agency is not prim
tiny of, and self-conscious assent to, propos
grounded in pre-reflective moral sentiments
share with many animals; it is largely int
embodied and socially embedded behaviou
activity of a disembodied mind. Indeed, t
depends on this fact.
In short, humans are continuous with
natures as much as other dimensions of o
expect given the processes of evolution. Onc
we must abandon the stereotype of unruly b
and instead consider how citizens, of all s
exercise of citizenship agency in ways tha
This will require rethinking the spaces an
fully realize fundamental democratic values.
The final section of the paper explores a c
the abstract arguments, namely, debates a
provides a fruitful microcosm for exploring
ship, illuminating the potential for cross-sp
the responsible exercise of freedom and the
and inclusion. As we will see, there are good
DAs, far from threatening civic norms and
fact promote and revitalize them.

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Animal Citizens and the Threat of Tyranny 27

Animals and the Threat to Democracy

Planine suggests that by failing to distinguish human from animal forms

freedom, our approach "opens the door to all things unmoderated, beastly
and tyrannical in ourselves," and that "the zoopolis is the anti-hum
which in its devouring of rational humanism comes with the price of the
reflective law and order upon which the preservation of democrati
freedom now relies" (Planine, 2014: 28).
Her critique draws on two traditional theorists of the dangers of libert
for democratic citizenship: Plato and Rousseau. Both argue that the charac
teristic vulnerability of democracy is its tendency to tolerate or even cel
brate all forms of freedom, including the most impulsive and unbridl
when effective self-government requires a distinctive form of mor
freedom that involves taming impulses and passions.
For Plato, the excessive freedom of animals is the mark of anarch
democracy and its inevitable descent into tyranny:

No one who hasn't experienced it would believe how much freer domestic
animals are in a democratic city than anywhere else. As the proverb says,
dogs become like their mistresses, horses and donkeys are accustomed to
roam freely and proudly along the streets, bumping into anyone who
doesn't get out of their way; and all the rest are equally full of freedom.
(Plato, 1992: 563c)

As Planine puts it, for Plato a constitution which fails to distinguish hum
agency from beastly freedom "sees freedom in all its forms - whether ta
or savage - as equivalent," and this "makes possible the emergence o
freedom that is entirely unbridled and dependent on the rule of the stro
and vicious over those in the democracy who have eaten too ma
lotuses to tell the man from the wolf' (Planine, 2014).
Similarly, Rousseau warns of the danger of confusing natural liberty
(physical freedom, strength, impulse) with the "moral liberty" required i
political life. Animals have a form of natural liberty but are incapable
consciously inhibiting or turning against natural passions and so are inevi
tably subject to the rule of the strongest. It is only when humans replace
natural liberty with moral liberty that political freedom is possible.
Rousseau puts it, "the acquisition of moral liberty... alone makes ma
truly the master of himself," and "only when the voice of duty repla
impulse and right replaces appetite does man find himself forced to
upon other principles and to consult his reason before listening to his inc
nations" (Rousseau, 1987: 150).
On both accounts, unbridled animal freedom poses a grave danger
democracy. When humans lose sight of the importance of moral freed
and self-restraint, unleashing the beast within and without, they ma

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 28 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka

themselves vulnerable to the tyrannical wolf

anarchic rejection of authority. Democratic
distinction between human moral freedom
latter must be strictly controlled. This cont
of unruly beasts, keeping them in their plac
in the case of humans, through conscious se

The Human/Animal Dichotomy

The Plato/Rousseau perspective, in line with

sophical tradition, draws a sharp line betwe
Humans are said to share certain aspects of
tites, passions), but only humans have super
thought, impulse control, moral reflectio
check and guide our underlying beastly nat
nally but are incapable of self-rule based on
and moral agency, and from Plato onwards,
the coming together of individuals capa
specifically human capacities. Animals m
not just because they allegedly lack the
because those capacities are precisely d
nature, as the successful suppression of anim
De Waal calls this "veneer theory," the id
"cultural overlay, a thin veneer hiding an
nature" (2006: 6). He and other ethologist
recent decades, providing evidence that hum
ous with other animals in our moral nature a
our being (Andrews and Gruen, forthcom
Waal, 2006). Human morality doesn't repr
nature but rather relies on foundations o
concern, courage) and pro-social behaviour (su
ism, reciprocity, conflict resolution, nor
animals. Animals have the capacity to un
without entertaining propositions about
capacity to be good without knowing wha
Some of the ethological evidence is new
was clear that crude dichotomies of human and animal nature were unsus-
tainable, as Mary Midgley noted in her 1973 article "The Concept of
Beastliness." Philosophers since antiquity have been in thrall to a myth
of the lawless unruly beast, but "in the world there is no such beast"
(Midgley, 1973: 118). Midgley discusses the case of wolves at length,
given the centrality of the wolf myth to Plato, Rousseau, and other philoso-
phers. She notes that our view of wolves

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Animal Citizens and the Threat of Tyranny 29

has been built up on a supposed contrast between man and animals which
was formed by seeing animals, not as they were, but as projections of our
own fears and desires. We have thought of a wolf always as he appears to
the shepherd at the moment of seizing a lamb from the fold. But this is lik
judging the shepherd by the impression he makes on the lamb, at the
moment when he finally decides to turn it into mutton. Lately, ethologist
have taken the trouble to watch wolves systematically, between meal-
times, and have found them to be, by human standards, paragons of regu
larity and virtue. They pair for life, they are faithful and affectionate
spouses and parents, they show great loyalty to their pack, great
courage and persistence in the face of difficulties, they careftilly respec
each other's territories, keep their dens clean, and extremely seldom kill
anything that they do not need for dinner... They have also, like al
social animals, a fairly elaborate etiquette, including subtly varied cer-
emonies of greeting and reassurance, by which friendship is strengthened
co-operation is achieved and the wheels of social life generally oiled
(113-14)

In the forty years since Midgley's article, the evidence has grown ev
stronger for the continuities in the moral natures of humans and so
animals, especially DAs.
In fact, one hardly requires sophisticated cognitive ethology to s
this point. The evidence is in front of our eyes on a daily basis.
discuss the case of dogs below, but consider the way we live and w
alongside DAs like horses or cows who carefully regulate their own
haviour out of consideration for others. These are often huge and str
animals, fully capable of harming humans either intentionally throu
aggressive behaviour or unintentionally by, for example, carele
backing into them or pinning them against walls. And yet we trust them
not simply to be non-aggressive but also to be careful about the hum
around them. These DAs are acutely aware of their relative body si
and weight, the force of their jaws, the care they must take to avoid stom
ing, not just on humans but on cats or chickens underfoot. And this is ju
the tip of the iceberg. The more we study our interactions with DAs,
more we learn about how attentive and responsive they are to our beh
iour, and vice versa.3
In these and other ways, DAs are reliable participants in norm-go
erned social practices. DAs may not reflect on the norms they follow
on the reasons for trusting us, but they are not unruly or brutish, and inc
ing them in the demos poses no threat of tyranny or chaos. If we want
understand the possibilities for humans and animals sharing the dem
we must set aside the mythical beasts of the human imagination in o
to observe actual animals and the ways in which their citizenship co
be enacted.

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30 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka

Human Moral Agency

So the unruly beast story is wrong about

human morality. According to the Plato/R
depends on the exercise of rational refle
nature and to control the beast within, "
nothing is forbidden" (Midgley, 1973: 1 17).
DAs in the polis would weaken the "contr
"Wild Beast in us" (Plato, 1992; 571c). But i
haviour is a matter of using our rational
sions? Almost certainly not.
The evolutionary continuities between
that we should view human morality not sim
capacity but as embodied behaviour grounded
social impulses and embedded in intuition an
recent work in moral psychology confirms th
of our moral behaviour 1) is prompted direc
tive judgment, unguided by conscious reflec
habits and adherence to norms which might r
scious reflection.4
Indeed, the moral stability of a society de
ation.5 We are born with various pro-soci
procity, and so forth) which are moulde
habitual behaviours embodying social n
because we all reflectively endorse proposi
the contrary because most of the time vio
unthinkable. We don't weigh up the reaso
lethal experiments on orphaned children;
doing such a thing.6 A shared civic life i
on people to correctly deliberate about su
on the fact they would never think of it.
This is not to deny the fundamental impor
on moral norms plays in our collective demo
daily lives. Scrutiny is essential, not least be
that we habitually comply with are unjust a
ated, using, say, Rawlsian public reason o
Consider debates about slavery in the US i
or attitudes towards homosexuality in rec
heightened awareness of moral controversy,
reflection is particularly engaged, can lead
how to embed moral ideals in our social pr
progress depends on creating robust spac
capacities for deliberation, both collectively

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Animal Citizens and the Threat of Tyranny 3 1

But we mustn't reduce citizenship to the exercise of rational reflection,

for at least three reasons:7

• it offers an inaccurate account of how to sustain valuable civic practices;

• it unjustly excludes members of society - human and animal - from
citizenship;
• it ignores the pathologies that can accompany intellectualism when
divorced from a broader suite of moral and social capacities.

We will briefly explore these three issues.

Embodied Citizenship

First, while capacities for rational reflection help make moral progress poss-
ible, the best indication that we have succeeded in making progress is when
these new commitments become habitual and unreflective for most of us
most of the time.8 Within a few generations, most people may consider it
strange indeed that our society once criminalized homosexuality and
racially mixed marriages or that it legally enforced women's subordination.
When this time arrives, such ideas will be subject to what moral psycholo-
gists call "moral dumbfounding." People will have a powerful and immedi-
ate sense that such practices are wrong (just as they once had such a sense
that they were right), but will struggle if asked to "give reasons" to explain
why they are wrong (Haidt, 2001). These practices will simply be obviously
wrong (the way slavery is or sexual molestation of children or honour duels)
and will be so entrenched in our cultural practices that we will simply act -
intuitively, habitually - on the basis of this new moral commitment. This
should not be seen as a failing - a kind of moral dumbing down - but as
the necessary embedding and embodying of citizenship.
Recent work in moral psychology indicates that human moral agency
is embedded in cultural constructs and social environments, supported
"contingently by climates of social expectation" and not strictly located
in individual capacities (Merritt, 2000: 380).9 For most of us, most of the
time, our role in upholding moral practices doesn't rest on our capacity
for rational deliberation or conscious commitment but on our moral
emotions, intuitions and pro-social tendencies (such as our desire to love
and be loved by others, to be helpful, to be co-operative, to follow the
rules, to fit in). Everyday moral agency is not something which happens pri-
marily in our conscious minds, but has "a bodily life" (Krause, 201 1 : 3 17).
We can behave morally without consciously directing it, and in performing
it (with others) we create, reinforce and modify it. Agency is not located in a
"sovereign will" but rather is "at once a subjective and an intersubjective
phenomenon; it emerges out of the communicative exchanges, background
meanings, social interpretations, personal intentions, self-understandings

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32 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka

and bodily encounters through which one

deeds" (240). This means that there is a "s
to agency. It depends on "uptake" by othe
encounters. Individual moral agency need
but it does presuppose several other widely
to be socialized into social norms and our cap
operative and communicative relationships
Like Krause, we view this capacity for nor
subjective relationships - the ability to m
with internalized norms when relating to
democratic citizenship (Krause, 201 1 : 299).
ary account of human moral agency, but w
expect less of isolated individual moral age
of the responsibility, and potential, for m
The better we understand the workings of i
a "discriminating interest in the climates of
(Merritt, 2000: 381), the better chance we ha
tional factors to support moral agency, civil
iour at the individual level.10 We can s
success through a better understanding of
or we can set them up for failure by clinging
cerning self-control, rational reflection, and

Inclusive Citizenship

This conception of embodied citizenship not

account of the dynamics of everyday democ
broaden our conception of who is able to par
and thereby further the moral purposes o
qualify as a citizen, it is not enough to p
responsive to social norms, but one must als
propositions regarding these norms, then
exclusionary conception of citizenship. M
rational reflection in this sense, and for a
we can exercise for a part of our lives. De
would make it impossible to think about c
but also for young children, people with int
or severe mental illness, and indeed would
and conditional citizenship standing.
This is not simply exclusionary, but mis
which is to recognize and uphold member
society. Citizenship is a way of acknowled
a member of the people in whose name t

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Animal Citizens and the Threat of Tyranny 33

subjective good must be solicited and responded to in determining

public good and in shaping the social norms that govern our co-opera
relations.11 An embodied conception of citizenship can acknowledge
just claims of all those entitled to membership in this sense.
Such a conception is emerging not only from empirical studies of th
everyday dynamics of democratic civility but also from the work of dis
ity scholars and theorists of children's rights. Disability theorists make
case that capacities for moral agency and democratic citizenship ar
embedded in ongoing social relations among responsive, reflexive a
interdependent selves, not located in a threshold individual capacity
rational reflection and debate or conscious self-restraint. As a result, eve
severe cognitive disabilities do not disqualify individuals from participat
in, and contributing to, norm-governed and morally valuable practi
(Arneil, 2009; Clifford, 2012; Silvers and Francis, 2005). Similar ide
are articulated in the literature on young children's participation and citiz
ship (Jans, 2004; Wall, 201 1) and underpin recent UN conventions on ch
dren's rights and rights for persons with disabilities. So we are alre
committed as a society to building new relations of citizenship that
inclusive of the full range of human diversity, and there is no conceptu
obstacle to extending this commitment to animal co-citizens as well.12
This commitment to inclusive citizenship requires rethinking wh
and how citizenship takes place. The UN Convention on the Rights
the Child, for example, affirms children's right "to form and expr
view" in "all matters affecting the child" (UN 1989: article 12). Som
countries attempt to fulfil this right by inviting children's representat
to participate in, and to make formal representations to, consultation m
anisms or committee meetings, that is, to use adult modes of participation
adult settings. Unsurprisingly, this rarely works (Neale, 2004). If childre
are to be enabled "to form and express a view" on "all matters affect
them, we need "children-sized" spaces for citizenship (Jans, 2004:
We need new ways of engaging the subjectivity of these co-citizens, foc
ing less on the ability to articulate or understand propositions and more
attending to forms of communication, consultation and decision mak
embedded in day-to-day activities.
As Alderson puts it,

These matters could be relationships, the built or natural setting, imagin

ary ideas, games, meals, clothes, school work and countless other matter
that extend far beyond formal decisions. Concealed within daily taken-fo
granted routines are endless decisions that have already been made and ar
no longer seen as decisions: "we always do it this way"; "that is the rule"
"there is no alternative"; "don't be silly"; "because I say so." When chil-
dren begin to talk and to question matters that affect them, these hidde
decisions may become clearer and perhaps become negotiable. For
example: "Can traffic be banned from our road to turn it into a play

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34 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka

area?" All matters can open the way for child

tions and decisions, with less reliance on adul
should be made. (Alderson, 2008: 91)

Recent work on citizenship for people with c

same point; we need to bring citizenship to
are able to express themselves (perhaps throu
tures and sounds), and where they feel thems
trusting and co-operative relationships (Sil
will see below, the same lesson applies to D
In short, rather than defining citizenship
model citizen as self-governing, autonomous a
we need to think of citizenship as a way of in
share our society in all of their diversity. Cit
citizens as full and equal members of a sh
fostering their flourishing and their opportun
ticipation in ways that are meaningful and po
committed ourselves to inclusive citizensh
human diversity, we can hardly exclude DA
not fit an image of the model citizen that m
As long as we remain in thrall to an overly
dualist idea of what constitutes moral agency
nitive capacities of individual animals -
intellectual disability, mental illness or de
they have the competence to measure up as
to meet a test which the rest of us are not asked to meet and which we
often fail to meet. We will hold them to an unrealistic and unnecessary stan-
dard, awaiting confirmation that they possess the necessary capacities for
reflection, deliberation and independent self-rule. In the meantime we
will be withholding our own responsiveness to the expressed agency of
these individuals, and thereby denying them the very experience and
uptake that could confirm and support their agency.13
So the appropriate test for animal citizenship, we argue, is whether
animals exhibit norm responsiveness and intersubjective recognition in
actual interactions, not whether they engage in rational deliberation.
Whether or not they exhibit such norm responsiveness is an empirical ques-
tion, and ethology offers some fascinating evidence. This includes evidence
that many different kinds of animals experience and act on the basis of moral
emotions such as love, trust and empathy, engage in a variety of co-operative
tasks requiring impulse control or delayed gratification, are socialized into
norms of behaviour which can subsequently be modified, resisted and/or
renegotiated, and exercise self-restraint and self-sacrifice out of concern
for others, fear of consequences, or even a sense of fairness.14 Again, this
evidence comes from many social species, wild or domesticated, but

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Animal Citizens and the Threat of Tyranny 35

among DAs it has the additional feature that humans and animals share in
these practices of norm responsiveness and intersubjective recognition
(For example, dogs and humans can communicate through eye contac
body language and vocalizations in ways that humans and wolves cannot
It is early days in our exploration of animal agency. We don't know the
extent to which the behaviour of different DA species, and different individ
uals, in different circumstances, is best described in terms of instinct
unconscious internalized habit, externally imposed constraints, and/o
more conscious forms of learning, practical reasoning and choice-makin
(in the face of conflicting desires, for example). But the existing scien
is already compelling regarding the extent and complexity of animal
agency, and continuity between their forms of agency and our own.
Put simply, the evidence to date suggests that we are able to share
common moral world with DAs. "To talk of agency," says Krause, "is t
conjure a world not simply of interactions among bodies but of relationshi
among beings who share sufficiently in reflexivity to be capable of respond-
ing to one another's normative claims, a material world that lives in a socia
register, marked by communication and reciprocal co-ordination" (Krause,
201 1: 311). This is a world we share with DAs.
In light of this mounting research on the continuity of human/animal
social and moral impulses, and the normative regulation of animals'
social lives, we must set aside the dichotomy of unruly animals and
reason-governed humans and alarmist fears that admitting animals to the
polis will result in unruly beasts taking over public space and tramplin
everyone who gets in their way.

The Pathologies of Intellectualism

Moreover, while we need to build robust spaces for rational deliberation, w

must also recognize that intellectualism carries its own risks. Rational delib
eration plays a vital role in democratic life but can be destructive if divorced
from broader moral sensibilities. Some of the gravest human injustices hav
arisen, not from our failure to suppress our unruly animal natures but pre
cisely from the way that humans sometimes cling to ideas and rationalization
that suppress compassionate response (Nussbaum, 2012). Ideologies abou
racial or caste purity, religious heresy, the vanguard of the proletariat, the
undeserving poor, or fallen women have overridden social norms of recipro
city and tolerance or moral sentiments of compassion and courage.
So while we require spaces for rational reflection and democratic delib-
eration, we must view this not as suppressing our beastly animal natures bu
as building upon and helping to guide the moral sentiments and pro-social
dispositions we share with animals. In order to avoid our all-too-human ten
dency towards ideological pathologies, we must continually work t

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36 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka

reconnect these rational capacities to the f

social being. Viewed in this light, extendin
threat to the cherished values of democratic ci
der of what we should truly value.
Indeed, insofar as asymmetries exist be
nature, they do not necessarily count in h
notes, in comparing our moral natures with
"good discontinuities," that is, those cases i
able trait which animals lack. We ignore "
those cases of undesirable yet distinctivel
2012: 143). An interesting example is the v
as pleonexia, "greed, the desire to have m
more than others" (Williams, 1981: 83). For
core of injustice, posing the greatest threat
yet it is a trait largely absent among non-hum
Indeed, it is time to look again at who really
polis. Plato and Rousseau rightly emphasize th
face of excessive appetites, passions and greed
able democratic politics. But it is worth askin
display such self-rule. There is ample evidenc
most animals, in most circumstances, do not
gratuitous violence and war mongering, greed
consumption past the point of satiety. Rather
appetite as drives which are unregulated
humans can exercise self-restraint, it mig
them as drives which are checked in most
their environment and their limited ability t
By contrast, humans, having figured out h
our environment, have become the true unch
ing the planet with unregulated appetite.

Dogs in City Parks - A Case Study in Zo

Thus far we have engaged in an abstract discu

But what might it mean concretely to encoun
citizens, in the actual sites of citizenship? Con
park. According to US statistics, 39 per ce
include one or more dogs, and there are a
across the country (Urbanik and Morgan, 2
these households has undergone a transform
recognized as family members, full stop
family members, like other family memb
public space, on public transport or when the

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Animal Citizens and the Threat of Tyranny 37

Park access for dogs (on and off leash) is a controversial issue, an
many opponents of dogs in public spaces would sympathize with Plat
lament that democracy is losing its way when you have unruly bea
"accustomed to roam freely and proudly along the streets, bumping in
anyone who doesn't get out of their way" (1992: 562e). Opponen
express concern about the noise generated by dogs, the smells, the thr
of biting and other violence, the problem of dog waste and generally bois
terous, undignified, and unruly behaviour in what is supposed to b
"human" space, dedicated to the needs of human recreation, especially chi
dren. They also object to money being spent on dog parks and access when
cities face other critical challenges (Urbanik and Morgan, 2013: 8-9). E
when concerns about costs or dog waste are addressed, opposition oft
remains virulent, which suggests that opposition is grounded in a mo
general discomfort with dogs in "public" space.
In their review of attitudes to dogs in city parks in Kansas, Urbanik an
Morgan found a split between those who think of dogs as belonging
private individuals who should take care of them in their own priv
space, and those who

see their dogs as explicitly members of their families, which, in their view,
entitle these more-than-human families to claim parts of public spaces as
their own, just like families with children or those who want to play tennis
or picnic. In essence, these more-than-human families need more-than-
human public spaces. (Urbanik and Morgan, 2013: 10)

The dog park movement is therefore a key site for negotiating perception
about dogs' membership in the community and their right to share in an
shape public space with their human co-citizens. The language of th
debate draws upon millennia-old ideas about the human - animal divi
the nature of the polis as a human-only space, and the threat that bea
pose to the polis by their unruly bodily appetites and their inability to reg
late their behaviour in light of the interests of other members of the comm
nity. The desire to admit dogs to parks is seen by critics as evidence
misguided priorities - of democracy going to the dogs. It relinquishes
precious idea that public space is a place to foster distinctively hum
forms of freedom and flourishing.
Earlier, we argued that this fear of the unruly beast underrates animal
capacities for self-regulating, pro-social and moral behaviour, while overe
timating human tendencies to subject our behaviour to rational scrutiny a
control (and overestimating the value of doing so in the context of quotid
good citizenship behaviour). We also noted that democratic agency (in
form of norm responsiveness and reflexivity) is a distributed phenomeno
which depends for its realization on uptake via intersubjective encounters
and environmental opportunities. The capacity of any individual fo

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38 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka

citizenship, we argued, is dependent on re

agency by other citizens and the nature of th
tutions which they share.
With this critique in mind, let's examine
humans in the park. An idealized concepti
behave would emphasize that they delibera
and the goals of this public space, that they e
of the park in propositional form and that th
to comply with these collectively negotiate
And we do indeed engage in these behaviours
when a long-established mode of park use bec
of the time our moral agency in the park
responsive to norms but in ways that are s
and unreflective. The extent of this spontane
is staggering. A carefully trained observer ca
accommodations we make on a daily basis in
space between ourselves and the next sunbath
force or pace of a soccer game when little kids
paths involving walkers, bikers, skateboar
walkers, avoid staring at people for too lon
affection, lower the volume of our music,
wake the old man napping on the bench, avoi
denly appearing from behind a shrub or f
the path, bin our litter, control the urge to s
forms of civility are essential to allow everyo
nate their individual uses, and participate in a
and diverse community.
Naturally some people fail to be good citize
we all fail on occasion). Some people simply ha
outlined above. They may be oblivious or indi
ments of others when they fail to behave civil
external social pressure but not to an interna
person who automatically puts their trash in
the park is crowded, might toss it on the gro
around. Park planners know how to structure
good behaviour, how to use sightlines, lightin
ments to keep people to paths, to give them a
moving in a desired direction, or to encour
discouraging unauthorized ones (such as how
to minimize littering).
In myriad ways our civic behaviour in park
by the environment, by internalized habits
presence and actions of others. This may n
a deliberative and sovereign will, but it is

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Animal Citizens and the Threat of Tyranny 39

quote from Krause, "emerges out of the communicative exchanges, ba

ground meanings, social interpretations, personal intentions, self-und
standings and bodily encounters through which one's identity is manifest
in one's deeds" (2012: 240).
And of course dogs do all of this, too. They internalize norms of behav
iour. They respond to external cues and controls. They are acutely aware
and responsive to, the presence and actions of others in their environment
their study of a Swedish park, Laurier and colleagues (2006) identify the m
tiple dimensions of agency in an activity as seemingly simple as a human an
dog companion taking a walk across the park together. The dogs are c
stantly aware of the location of the humans (and vice versa) either by sig
or by feel on the lead. They know what paths are and how they structure
walk. At either end of the lead, dog or human can use pressure and direct
to communicate the pace and direction of the walk. Dogs and humans both
learn how to negotiate lamp posts (or multiple leads) and other obstructio
so they don't end up in a muddle. They take turns suggesting play opport
nities, picking up a stick, kicking a pile of leaves. When different dyads
dog and human walkers approach on the path, the humans (and sometime
the dogs) signal (consciously or not) whether an encounter is desired
shortening or lengthening lead lengths, moving dogs to an inner or outer p
ition on the path, or changing pace. Dogs and humans recognize all th
signs, and respond accordingly (Laurier et al., 2006).
Initially, this co-ordination has to be learned and negotiated, but over
time both humans and dogs engage in a kind of spontaneous ballet of co-or
nated movement. This is not rote learning. It requires ongoing responsivene
and adaptation. Dogs have to exercise a great deal of self-restraint as they
learn the rules of going for a walk (such as not lunging at a passing dog o
human, not trying the patience of their human companion with endless pr
longed sniffing),16 and there will always be temptations and conflicting int
ests that require them to exercise patience, tolerance or self-control. Huma
are often aware that their dogs have exercised self-control and reward th
for this. With experience and maturity, dogs can become extremely savvy
park users, attuned to the various dimensions of park life and their place
it. They become good citizens not just of the walking paths but of the desi
nated off leash areas (learning how to negotiate the rules of dog encounte
and play) or co-ordinated human - dog games and activities. Highly respon
sible off-leash dogs learn "to become an urban dog that does not bother tho
that are not its friends" (Laurier et al., 2006: 14, 17). Whether on the stree
at the park they learn to go about their business, seek out their frien
(human, canine and other) and pleasures without accosting joggers, s
bathers or other mutts, defecating where they ought not, running in fr
of vehicles or pinching unsupervised picnics.
Of course, some dogs have not learned to be sensitive to park norms o
their humans have failed to teach them, supervise them or clean up af

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40 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka

them. As noted above, however, humans a

social norms, and park planners purposely
create external checks and inducements t
intrinsic pro-social motivations and inter
we use social opprobrium, fines or more
promote co-operative and lawful behavio
using humans for the misbehaviour of a
children for being bad citizens when their
everyone their rightful opportunity to lear
lized into its ways.
Looking at how dogs and humans inter
myriad ways in which dogs are able to exer
tive agency. It is simply not true that they
capable only of a freedom which will tyran
into the polis. Dogs do not pose a threat to
capacity to enrich the polis in countless way
plify some of the highest values of democr
their dedication to service, their disinclinat
race, gender, sexual orientation, class, an
capacity for joyful, creative communal
mount about the individual and commun
spaces for their human co-citizens (Urba
includes health impacts (dog walkers hav
less depression). Dogs also contribute to t
prompting interaction between humans. Dog

start conversations between people who

Thus dog walking provides a means for ow
ness and social isolation through meetin
walking. Under most circumstances city dwe
tions with people with whom they are una
some legitimate mechanism. (Laurier et al.,

The presence of humans walking dogs co

safety in public areas (Wood et al., 200
early morning and late at night, human and
of legal park use, reducing use by groups w
with used condoms, needles, beer cans, c
When humans become community activ
they often go on to other kinds of com
Morgan, 2013; Wolch, 2002). Advocating f
tion as an entry issue to broader forms of s
make very practical contributions, like s
park habits, discouraging unwanted park

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Animal Citizens and the Threat of Tyranny 41

Canada geese who become too numerous or coyotes who become

friendly) or scavenging and cleaning up messes that humans le
behind. If public space starts to open up to other DAs (commun
chicken runs or sheep and goats who trim the grass and brush), then do
might have a role in protecting their co-citizens. Some dogs are super-ci
zens, like Meg the border collie from Suffolk, who loves to collect litter
the park and put it in the bin. Indeed the local municipality is considerin
her as the "face" of an upcoming anti-litter campaign (Bond, 2012).
Can dogs not only comply with norms but actually help shape shared
spaces and practices? An interesting example concerns what urban plann
call "desire lines." These are the off-track paths that park users cre
usually because they offer the shortest distance between two points.
is a communal phenomenon (a single user can't create a desire path)
one which does not involve collective deliberation. Indeed, particip
may not even be consciously aware of their activity. DAs, as much
humans, create desire lines, and planners pay attention. In the old da
they often fought such "input" from park users, using barriers an
warning signs to discourage them. More recently, planners have used thi
input to rethink park uses. In this way, communal space and norms
shaped by participants who don't directly discuss the issue and may
even be consciously aware of their agency, but who nonetheless pro
vital input for enriching shared practices when given the opportunit
express and act upon their subjective good.
Some readers may respond that a public park is not a suitable micro-
cosm for theorizing about the polis. But, as we argued earlier, if we
to take seriously the idea of political participation for DAs (or children o
people with cognitive disability or the countless citizens who are alienate
from formal political institutions), then we cannot restrict our focus to c
ventional political institutions which exclude various groups by definitio
Rather, we must consider the sites where individuals actually live t
lives, engage with their fellow citizens and negotiate relations of po
Just as we need child-sized spaces of citizenship, so too we need do
sized spaces of citizenship - like public parks.18

Conclusion

Philosophers fear that admitting animals to the demos will hasten our
descent into tyranny. We have tried to allay that concern, but in conclusion
we would turn the issue around. In relation to animals, especially DAs,
tyranny is already here. DAs are comprehensively controlled by modern
states; indeed, the expansion and consolidation of the modern welfare
state was in many ways driven by the expansion of control over DAs
(Smith, 2012). DAs are already part of the polis, and subject to an

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42 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka

unprecedented exercise of state power which

human interest in harming, torturing and ki
animal welfare laws on the books whose os
worst excesses of exploitation, but these
indeed legitimate rather than limit ex
Pachirat, 2011). They do not give legal pro
but rather give legal protection to the co
harm animals while claiming that their
welfare laws, which explicitly exclude mo
whatsoever and which are rarely enforced
undercover to demonstrate that anima
minimal standards to which they are sub
especially in the US, has not been to increase
but to criminalize the activities of advocates
This is tyranny, the exercise of coercive st
consent or legitimate authority. And it is th
claim the attention of political theorists,
mythical beasts and beastly nature. The call
is going to be greeted by scepticism and fea
concerns and challenges. But the way forwar
processes with DAs, negotiating the challeng
in the arenas of actual civic space, not in the
unscientific stereotypes of rational man and

Notes

1 Including animal companions, animals in labs, farms, service, and so forth.

2 The tradition traced in Planine' s essay has been called theriophobia : "the fear and hatred
of beasts as wholly or predominantly irrational, physical, insatiable, violent, or vicious
beings whom man strangely resembles when he is being wicked" (Rodman, 1974: 20).
Rodman notes an alternative theriophily tradition in Western thought, from Empedocles
through Montaigne and Hume, which emphasizes continuities in human and animal
capacities. This alternative tradition has been absent from political philosophy, which
has defined politics as exclusively human.
3 See Porcher and Schmitt (2012) on cow - human relations; Hearne (2007) on horse -
human relations.
4 Not only do we manage to be moral agents much of the time without rational reflection,
but sometimes the process of conscious scrutiny actually undermines our ability to do
the right thing or to make the right choice (Bortolotti, 2011; Haidt, 2007; Tiberius
and Swartwood, 201 1).
5 While unreflective, this behaviour is not "instinctive" in the biological sense. It is the
result of intensive processes of socialization that habituate us to be (intuitively, spon-
taneously, often unconsciously) responsive to social norms. It is a social and cultural
achievement, not a biological given.
6 Pinker argues that dramatic reductions in violence (such as the end of honour duels)
occur, not because we are "weighing the moral issues, empathizing with the targets or
restraining an impulse, but [because we don't have] the violent act as a live option in

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Animal Citizens and the Threat of Tyranny 43

the mind at all. The act is not considered and avoided: it is unthinkable" (Pinker, 201 1
624).
7 It is therefore misleading to say that our account is "aimed against" reflection or that we
"found" politics on non-reflection (Planine, 2014). Rational reflection is a vital part of
any theory of citizenship. Our aim is to clarify what more is involved in an adequate
account of citizenship and to distinguish the role of moral reflection as a virtue, aspira-
tion or value from its problematic role as a litmus test to qualify for citizenship.
8 As Weidenfeld says, "these new understandings then tend to fall back into the back-
ground and become part and parcel of the pre-understanding" that sustains what he
calls democratic "comportment" (201 1: 250).
9 See also Bandes (2013) on how moral and democratic deliberation is a social activity
more than an individual capacity. Some philosophers will argue that only action that
is self-consciously chosen based on the endorsement of moral propositions qualifies
as "moral" action. For anyone who subscribes to such a stipulative definition, our refer-
ences to "moral agency" can be replaced with "pro-social norm-responsive action that
sustains practices of trust, reciprocity, co-operation, justice, and so forth."
1 0 See McTernan (20 1 3) on why we should rely on norm-responsiveness, rather than either
intellectualism or virtue theory, to sustain desirable democratic practices and
Weidenfeld (201 1) on why we should rely on "comportment, not cognition" in under-
standing good citizenship.
1 1 For a defense of this conception of the moral purposes of citizenship, see Donaldson and
Kymlicka (2011: 55-61). It's important to note that our defense of this conception
against cognitivist definitions of citizenship is a normative one. Our argument is not
only or primarily that cognitivist definitions are empirically inaccurate or inadequate
(although they are), but that they are normatively deficient; they misidentify the
moral purposes of citizenship and hence misidentify who is entitled to citizenship.
12 Planine says that "democratic politics now relies" upon "the rationalist standard." In
fact, that standard has been progressively rejected since the Second World War, as a
result of the citizenship struggles of children and people with cognitive disability.
Contemporary liberal democratic politics is already more expansive than rationalist the-
ories recognize, and our project builds on these developments.
13 "Shared trust partly depends on people of all ages searching for the meaning in each
other's words and actions, even if these at first seem nonsense" (Alderson, 2008:
213-14).
1 4 For overviews of this evidence see Rowlands (20 1 2); Bekoff and Pierce (2009), de Waal
(2006, 2009). For intriguing examples of the inter-species negotiation of such norms
between dogs and cats, see Feuerstein and Terkel (2008).
1 5 Thanks to Stefan Dolgert for this example.
1 6 Hopefully their humans are doing the same, restraining the impulse to ignore their dog
while they text or forgetting what it is to have a nose and a longing to use it!
1 7 Wolch (2002) discusses how dogs and their humans reclaimed a rundown Los Angeles
park from illegal use.
1 8 Elsewhere, we consider other potential sites of citizenship for other DAs - sheep on the
town commons, horses and donkeys living on large sanctuaries, working animals on
farms and other locations. All of these are sites where politics happens, where power
is negotiated and where an ethos of citizenship can ensure that individuals are not
only protected and provided for but empowered to shape the relationships, environments
and opportunities that matter to them (Donaldson and Kymlicka, 201 1, 2014). In all of
these cases we can find nascent practices of proto-citizenship, although for now these
practices are inherently fragile and radically incomplete, since they occur within
larger legal and political structures that define animals as property not citizens.

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 44 Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka

1 9 These laws "are so favourable to the interests of th

scientists and flesh food producers would fight fo
exist. Such laws provide them with ample covera
while wearing the mantle of complying with sta
protect animals" (Bryant, 2010: 62).

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