.
LAUNCHING SMALL SATELLITES IN RUSSIA
G.Webb
Commercial Space Technologies Ltd (CST),
67 Shakespeare Rd., Hanwell, London W7 1LU
United Kingdom,
[email protected] ABSTRACT
Russian launchers continue to be a popular choice for the piggy-back, cluster and dedicated
launch modes adopted by small satellite operators. The inventory of available Russian small
launchers is now evolving and changing and, within the usual planning time of a current
small satellite mission, will present a very different range of choices than has existed
previously. The paper will review these coming changes and, in the light of CST’s experience
in small Satellite launch services brokerage in Russia, discuss the utility of the new launch
solutions available. The key technical characteristics, advantages and limitations will be
presented with a discussion of alternative launching modes and how these services can be
acquired.
1 GENERAL SITUATION
The world-wide increasing share of small satellites in the total number of spacecraft that are
being launched annually is continuing to pose the problem of their economical launch while
meeting the specific requirements for any particular mission. However, during recent years,
this problem has been partially simplified by the prevailing use of the method of small
satellite cluster launches by small launchers at specific launch prices comparable with those
for the piggy-back launches of the same satellites by medium or heavy launchers [1].
This cluster launch method simplifies the problem of the mutual accommodation of the
small satellite group but is inferior to dedicated launches in this regard. Unfortunately,
the application of the dedicated launch method cannot provide the comparable specific
launch prices using either the currently operated small launchers or those that will be put
into operation in the nearest future.
The problem of the complete suitability of the supplied launch services for small
satellites with masses of less than 500 kg would be solved when the number of annually
launched small satellites will increase up to that level which will make a cheap super-
small launcher with the corresponding payload capability commercially viable. At
present, although several attempts to produce such a launcher have been made no
satisfactory result has yet appeared.
The 29 satellites for which CST has brokered and/or managed launches in Russia have all
been under 400 kg and generally fall in the range of 80 to 180kg. Four were under 10 kg
(Snap and three cubesats) and CST is currently arranging launches for several around 400 kg.
The three distinct classes of mass (under 10kg, around 120 kg and over 300 kg) and value
The 4S Symposium 2012 – G Webb 1
.
usually tend towards different launch solutions since, with increasing mass there is usually a
proportionately better launch budget.
The three distinct launching modes which are generally used for the launch of small satellites
have all been applied by CST in Russia (with missions on Tsyklon, Zenit, Cosmos, Dnepr,
Shtil and Soyuz). It is worth discussing these modes, usually called piggy-back, cluster or
shared and dedicated, in turn.
Piggy Back
This is perceived as the cheapest option, but not always is, as the customer is the poor partner
of the main satellite. The customer has to go with the main payload and conform to its
requirements as well as being ready on time. Also, the customer has no direct control over
orbit or time of launch (control would be only by the selection of the best willing partner).
Piggy-backing in Russia has the following (mostly advantageous) characteristics:
• a variety of vehicles - particularly to LEO,
• all vehicles can piggy back (and some satellites, e.g. BION)
• nearly all orbits available - often visited (but equatorial LEO orbits are difficult)
• the LEO market is settled (GEO market developing)
• by careful brokerage using opportunities and experience, competitive prices still
achievable
• new launchers will enter the field soon
• multiple payload carriers for small launchers have been developed
Shared or Cluster
With a variety of customers on hand and in negotiation, as well as an internal knowledge of
ongoing arrangements, CST is able to arrange a fit with other satellites in shared or cluster
launches. If customers, at extra cost, wish to have the chief satellite position in the cluster,
thus ensuring their required orbit and time of launch, then CST has sometimes been able to
help ensure the required number of other satellites to enable the mission to take place.
Dedicated
In Russia, as well as anywhere else, launchers are increasing in price. Dedicated launchers
are, nevertheless, the only way to guarantee the time and orbit of a particular satellite.
Using its long association with launch providers in Russia and its experience in the field, CST
has been able to negotiate very good terms for launches that are designated as tests or
promotional. The additional technical risks for these launches can be very low and they are
usually insurable (CST can advise on this for each specific case and also negotiate ‘guest’
payloads to enable the defrayment of costs.) New small launchers are entering the market,
such as Angara-1 and Soyuz-1. An ultra light launcher, Swift, which will be able to provide
dedicated missions at very economical prices, is being contemplated [2].
Worldwide, the usual procedure is for a customer to go direct to a launcher operator or their
specific agent. The disadvantage of this traditional method is that the customer pays more
The 4S Symposium 2012 – G Webb 2
.
because agents only add to the price because they have to charge a percentage to the launcher
operator.
Also, agents for small launches seldom offer any other customer-oriented value added service
and neither agents or launcher operators are interested in methods of reducing the final price.
It should also be remembered that neither agents or launcher operators are motivated to
construct the launch service agreement (LSA) in a way that saves the customer money.
Furthermore, launch providers or their agents seldom give a complete picture to potential
customers about potential delays and hidden costs.
Potential Delays
• Launch vehicle or main satellite readiness
• Incomplete bureaucracy such as drop-zone arrangement
• Problems with others in manifest
• Customs clearance
• Transport of equipment after launch campaign
• Etc.
Hidden Costs
• Accommodation costs at range
• Transportation to range
• Delayed or repeat launch campaigns
• Facilities for VIPs
• Customs duties
• Etc.
When booking a ticket for a particular destination, we are not often concerned with the make
of the vehicle, whether car, train, ship or aircraft, but with the quality of the service provided
for the price of the ticket. We are also very much concerned with the difficulty of obtaining
the ticket, the reliability of the booking agency, the information it provides and the reliability
of the transportation system itself. We also worry about whether we have made the right
choice and whether there may have been a better one.
The last point is particularly relevant to the space sector where no general (i.e. worldwide)
brokers, equivalent to a terrestrial travel agency, exist. Luckily, Russia has a sufficient variety
of launchers to enable such a service to work with Russian launchers alone. Brokering
improves the business of all parties including the launcher providers.
SSTL is CST’s most important customer and uses CST’s full service which runs from the
initial competitive tendering exercise to the management of the launch campaign.
2. CST’s EXPERIENCE AND METHODS
The history of CST’s launch arrangements can be seen in Table 1. After 2 people from CST
had been invited to attend the international symposium ‘Space Future Forum’ in Moscow in
1987, it had a contract with a Finnish company to assist Glavcosmos in marketing Russian
(then Soviet Union) space assets. At this time, this was not easy, but it laid the groundwork
The 4S Symposium 2012 – G Webb 3
.
for key contacts and experience. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, CST could
act independently and established its Moscow office directed by Nina Pestmal.
It was then able to begin proper space business activity in general and making launch
arrangements in particular. It immediately began working with SSTL, the start of a long,
happy and fruitful relationship. Most of CST’s launch arrangements have been on behalf of
SSTL and CST is pleased to assist SSTL with its other business activities in Russia.
In all, there have been a total of 14 launch campaigns since the first in 1995. All campaigns
have been the final stage of CST’s full service, from initial enquiries and brokerage exercise
to post launch (described below), with the exception of the 2 launches for CNES for which
Dnepr had been pre-selected and for which CST conducted the management in Russia. The
rate of campaigns will continue and increase for the foreseeable future .
All launchers currently extant in Russia (and Ukraine) can be brokered. 5 different launchers
have been used from 3 different cosmodromes and CST has negotiated several pioneering
contracts such as the first Dnepr launch, first Cosmos to SSO, first Dnepr to SSO, etc.
It should not be forgotten that, while most potential small satellite customers think in terms of
small launchers such as Cosmos and Dnepr, large launchers such as Zenit and Soyuz often go
to suitable orbits for piggy-backing, such as SSO. By keeping its ear to the ground to be able
to keep up with the manifests of these vehicles, CST has been able to use both Zenit and
Soyuz for piggy-backing and hopes to be able to use them again (particularly Soyuz) in the
future.
The ‘modus operandi’ which has been the key to CST’s success is fairly obvious and
straightforward. Perhaps the most important factor is that CST does not represent any
particular launcher company and therefore can offer unbiased advice. Also, of great
importance is that the Moscow office is managed by English speaking Russian nationals
autonomously and fully authorised to deal with all customers direct. Large foreign companies
usually staff the directorate of their Moscow offices with their own nationals leading a
Russian staff. This does not always work efficiently since negotiations always seem to go
better when conducted directly between Russians. Trust is a big factor in everything.
When dealing with Russia one should never forget that they were the first to conquer space
and are justifiably proud of this. Also, this was not an accident since from the earliest
pioneer, Tsiolkovsky, Russian theoreticians have always been amongst the leaders of the
field. At least as a consequence of the prestige brought about by early Russian achievements
and probably because it answers to Russian soul and spirit, spaceflight has always been
politically acceptable in Russia. As a result, with the only exception being the devastation
caused during the collapse of the Soviet Union and the ‘hungry years’ following, government
space spending has always been relatively high. Even after allowing for inflation,
Roscosmos’s budget has been expanding for some years at a rate of around 5% above
inflation and this is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. [3]
When dealing on a practical level, such as arranging small satellite launches, one should
always also bear in mind that i) the Russian language, culture and history (as with everyone)
have produced perceptions and needs that must be addressed, and ii) Russian concepts of the
market remain idiosyncratic and often subject to internal pressures not apparent to customers.
The 4S Symposium 2012 – G Webb 4
.
Large powerful foreign companies/organisations are seen as important but misunderstandings
often arise due to clashes in set ways of working. These are usually resolved by the large
foreign companies spending much more than really necessary. Small, agile foreign
companies like SSTL and CST are not properly understood at first, but can survive well by
flexibility and perseverance. Building an understanding and contacts takes time, but the
rewards are worthwhile for the effort.
3. RUSSIAN SMALL LAUNCHERS
Opportunities for the arrangement of pure piggy-back rides on large launchers being used for
Russian government launches exist and will continue to exist. However, the position with
regard to small launchers, essential to the small satellite community for cluster and dedicated
launches, is not fixed and fundamental changes will take place in the next few years.
3.1 Present Position
The complete current inventory of Russian small launch vehicles is shown in Table 2. They
are all described in sufficient detail to assess their utility in CST’s customer guide [4].
However, there are problems with all of these launchers as some are being discontinued,
some will soon have problems with re-lifeing and some have difficulties with launch
facilities. Before dealing with these problems it is worth noting that delays with the
arrangement of drop zones are beginning to occur with some launchers going to SSO orbits,
particularly from Baikonur. Also, all the small launchers (and Proton) use environmentally
unsound and toxic propellants.
Being discontinued
This applies to Volna and Cosmos 3M. With Volna an undersized (even for microsats) and
out of life missile, discontinuation is understandable, but with Cosmos 3M, because of its
utility and excellent reliability record, there have been several proposals to restart the
production line. There are many organisational reasons which need not be discussed here why
this is impossible, but the production line was dismantled many years ago and its re-
instatement would be prohibitively expensive [5]. Even if this was done, the reliability record
built up over 400 launches would have to be scratched and re-begun. At the time of writing
there appears to be one Cosmos-3M left in store (its re-lifeing situation and whether it is
assembled or not is unknown) which has been offered to CST.
Re-lifeing and other problems
Launchers based on the conversions of missiles which have been out of production for some
time have several problems, all of which devolve to increasing costs as time goes by.
Eventually, they will become un-economic compared to newly produced purpose-built
vehicles. The launchers in question in Table 2 are Strela, Rokot and Dnepr. The first 2 are
based on the (NATO designated) SS-19 and the last on the SS-18. All have been out of
production for around 25 years and upwards. All are having to be comprehensively re-lifed
and this will probably become prohibitively expensive after 2017.
The 4S Symposium 2012 – G Webb 5
.
It should be noted that re-lifeing does not necessarily reduce reliability, as shown in CST’s
various reports, to the insurance industry, e.g. [6]. However, this is not the whole story with
regard to costs. For example, it was recently announced that the SS-18 is no longer to be
strategically deployed. This means that the launches of Dnepr can no longer be regarded, in
part, as training exercises and that, therefore, the launching costs will increase. Rokot has its
own problems, such as the Breeze upper stages for it and Proton being produced on a ‘pilot’
production line (a full-scale one not having been built). Of course, the Proton takes priority,
limiting Rokot launches to one or two a year.
Difficulties with launch facilities
Both Shtil-1 and Shtil-2.1 are submarine launched (based on the SS-N-25) and while the Shtil
2.1 in particular is, potentially, a very promising dedicated launcher for microsatellites, both
offer only limited access to the payload during launch campaigns. There have been many
attempts by Makeev, the designers, to produce non-submarine-launched versions but the
financing of these requires the establishment of a market for the Shtil 2.1 first. There is time
for this as the SS-N-25 has been in production until recently [7] and therefore Shtil 2.1 is not
subject to re-lifeing problems.
The situation with Start and Start-1 seems to be that, unfortunately, launch operations are
halted (or at least severely curtailed) because the usual launch site, Svobodny is being
converted into the larger Vostochny cosmodrome.
3.2 Future Developments
Over the next years several new small launchers are coming into service between 2012 and
2014 and Strela, Rokot and Dnepr will have begun retirement soon after this time. It is likely
that Strela, Rokot and Dnepr will all be retired or approaching retirement by 2017 for reasons
of increasing costs if not expired lifetimes. These new systems (Angara, Soyuz-1 and Air
Launch) are being developed. Two of these (Soyuz-1 and Angara) will be introduced in 2012
and 2013 respectively [8] and the other (Air Launch) is undergoing tests in 2012 and, if these
are successful, will be introduced in 2014.
In addition, Zenit and Soyuz-Fregat will remain available for piggy-backing when their
missions allow and further launcher evolution will occur (e.g. for the new Vostochny
cosmodrome [9]).
Thus, a very different inventory of more efficient launchers will be available after 2017. The
three imminent new entries are shown in Figures1-3. Their main characteristics are
summarised in Table 3.
The “Angara” launch vehicle family, Figure 1,that is being currently realized on a state order
includes two options of the “Angara-1” small launch vehicle. This launch family, which
could be put into operation by 2013, could substitute for almost all of the current launch
vehicles. The developer is Khrunichev. Recently it was decided that the ‘Angara’ family will
operate from the new Vostochny cosmodrome as well as Plesetsk. At the moment, there are
no indications with respect to how or even whether the Angara family will be commercially
available.
The 4S Symposium 2012 – G Webb 6
.
The “Soyuz-2.1v” launch vehicle (previously called Soyuz-1), Figure 2,will be launched from
Soyuz facilities at Plesetsk. Its performance will be somewhere between Angara 1.1 and 1.2.
It is under active development by TsSKB Samara and chasing Angara 1.1 closely. It will
probably have its test launch first. Its designation has now reverted back to ‘Soyuz-1’.
The “Air Launch” project, Figure 3, that is being developed on a private basis would
provide, in the case of its realization, a new sort of launch service – the injection of small
satellites of 800 kg directly into GEO in dedicated launches at relatively low launch
prices. Payload integration bases are planned on the equator (Indonesia) and in Europe
(Munich) [10].
So it can be seen that many launch options for small satellites exist, and will continue to
exist, in Russia and, given the correct approach can be accessed. Also, while the era of
comparatively ultra cheap launches is over, Russian launch solutions are still economical,
really exist, and for serious customers with proper funding, several options are usually
available. For the moment, while CST specialises in small satellites mainly in sun-
synchronous low earth orbits, all types of satellites and orbits can be brokered, including
escape.
4. REFERENCES
1. Is Access to Space Really a Hurdle? G.Webb, A da Silva Curiel, Paper ID 2450 of
59th International Astronautical Congress, 2008
2. Low Cost Small Launch Vehicle (SLV), ‘Energia’ SRC, 2009
3. Novosti Kosmonavtiki (Cosmonautics News), Vol. 22, No. 1 (348), 2012
4. A Survey of FSU Small Launch Vehicles and Their Development to 2015. CST
customer report, August 2009 (in revision)
5. Novosti Kosmonavtiki (Cosmonautics News), Vol. 19, No. 10 (322), 2009
6. The Prolongation of the Operational lifetimes of Russian and Ukrainian Launch
Vehicles. Second edition, November 2009
7. The Market for Launching Small Satellites in Russia, Its Present Situation and Likely
Future Trends, G. Webb, N. Pestmal, O. Sokolov, E. Motorny, Paper of 61st
International Astronautical Congress, 2010
8. Novosti Kosmonavtiki (Cosmonautics News), Vol. 22, No. 1 (348), 2012
9. Novosti Kosmonavtiki (Cosmonautics News), Vol. 21, No. 10 (337), 2011
10. The ‘Air Launch’ Project, Its Development’s Current Status and Prospects for
Realization, CST customer report, 2009
The 4S Symposium 2012 – G Webb 7
.
Table 1. History of CST’s launch arrangements.
YEAR DATE LAUNCHER (MODE) SATELLITE(S)
1995 August 31 Tsyklon (1 piggy-back) Fasat Alpha
1998 July 10 Zenit (2 piggy-back) Fasat Bravo + TM Sat
1999 April 21 Dnepr (1 dedicated) Uo Sat 12 (first commercial use of SS-18)
2000 June 28 Cosmos (2 piggy-back) Tsinghua 1 +Snap (first SSO flight of Cosmos)
2000 September 26 Dnepr (1 piggy-back) Tiung Sat
2002 November 28 Cosmos (main in cluster) Alsat-first Disaster Monitoring Constellation (DMC)
2003 September 27 Cosmos (3 in cluster) NigeriaSat-1, BilSat-1 and UK-DMC (all DMC)
2004 June 29 Dnepr (main in cluster) Demeter (CNES, first SSO flight of Dnepr)
2005 October 27 Cosmos (3 in cluster) TopSat, ChinaSat (DMC), SSETI Express+cubesats
2008 August 29 Dnepr (5 in cluster) RapidEye constellation
2009 July 29 Dnepr (2 in cluster) UK-DMC2 + DEIMOS-1 (both DMC)
2009 September 17 Soyuz/Fregat (1 piggy-back) SumbandilaSat (South Africa, first piggy-back from this
launcher combination)
2010 June 15 Dnepr (1 of a pair) Picard (CNES, paired with Prisma)
2011 August 17 Dnepr (2 in cluster) NigeriaSat-2 and NigeriaSat-X
2012 July 22 Soyuz/Fregat (1 piggy back) ADS-1B
Statistics
• 29 satellites launched (of which, 3 cubesats)
• 5 different launchers used (3 small and 2 large)
• 3 different Cosmodromes (Plesetsk, Baikonur and Yasny)
The 4S Symposium 2012 – G Webb 8
.
Table 2. The complete current inventory of Russian small launch vehicles.
Launch Developer (by Year of Launch Propellant Number Max. Type of Launch Operator Estimated Notes
vehicle its current maiden mass, tons of stages payload launch site launch
appellation)/ma launch capability, facility price,
nufacturer kg (orbit) Euros mln
Volna Makeev SRC 1995 35.3 Liquid 2 100 (circ. Submarine Barents Makeev Less than Was used
(sub- (NT+UDMH) H=200km, Sea SRC 1.0 for sub-
orbital) i=0-25deg.) orbital
missions
only
Shtil-1 Makeev SRC 1998 46 Liquid 3 2x80 (circ. Submarine Barents Makeev Around 2.0 -
(NT+UDMH) H=200km, Sea SRC
i=70deg.)
Shtil-2.1 Makeev SRC Was 46+ Liquid 3 100-200 Submarine Barents Makeev Around 5 Maiden
ready in (NT+UDMH) (circ. Sea SRC launch
2007 H=200km, planned
i=0-25 deg.)
Start-1 MIT/Votkinsk 1993 47 Solid 4 420 (circ. Surface, Svobobny Puskovye Around 10 -
Machinebuilding H=300km, mobile or Plesetsk Uslugi
Plant I=90deg.) transportab
le
Start MIT/Votkinsk 1995 60 Solid 5 645 (circ. Surface, Plesetsk Puskovye Over 10? 2nd launch
Machinebuilding H=300km, transportab Uslugi announced
Plant I=90deg.) le
Strela NPO M 2003 105 Liquid 2 (+Post- 1400 (circ. Silo Baikonur NPO M Around 15 No laun-
(NT+UDMH) Boost H=200km, ches since
Stage) I=65deg.) 2003
Cosmos- “Yuzhnoye” 1964 109 Liquid (nitric 2 1400 (circ. Surface Plesetsk, Puskovye 10-14 A few bits
3M NPO/”Polyot” acid+UDMH) H=180km, Kapustin Uslugi, left
PO i=65deg.) Yar Rosoboron
-export
Rockot Khrunichev 1994 107 Liquid 3 1900 (circ. Surface Plesetsk Eurockot 20+ Shortage of
(NT+UDMH) H=200km, ‘Breeze’
i=63deg.) stages
Dnepr “Yuzhnoye” 1999 211 Liquid 3 (+Post- 4500 (circ. Silo Baikonur, Kosmotras 20+ -
NPO (NT+UDMH) Boost H=200km, Yasny
Stage) i=46.2deg.)
There are problems with all of these launchers. Pink, discontinued; green, out of life 2015-
2017; blue, difficulties with launch facilities (Submarines, Svobodny)
The 4S Symposium 2012 – G Webb 9
.
Table 3. Russian small launchers in development.
Launch Developer Planned Launch Payload Propellant Launch site Operator Possible Status of
vehicle year of mass, capability, or basic launch development
(system) first tons tons (orbit) airfield price,
launch Euro
mln
Angara- Khrunichev 2013 145 2.0(circ. LOX + Plesetsk ILS? About Final on-ground
1.1 H=200km, Kerosene 25 testing, launch
i=63deg.) site in
construction
Angara- Khrunichev 2013? 167 3.5(circ. LOX + Plesetsk ILS? About The same as for
1.2 H=200km, Kerosene 30 Angara-1.1 but
i=63deg.) second stage in
development
Soyuz- TsSKB 2012 136 2.4(circ. LOX + Plesetsk TSENKI About Final on-ground
2.1v Progress
H=200km Kerosene 25 testing, uses
I=63deg) slightly modified
Soyuz launch site
Polyot Makeev SRC 2014 102 3.0 (circ. LOX + Khorol, Air 25 LEO Completion of
(Air H=200km, Kerosene Biak Island Launch to 40 design
Launch) i=90deg.) AC GEO development,
1.65(GTO) carrier aircraft
0.8 (GEO) were purchased
Notes
1. All launchers are Russian (although Polyot uses the Ukrainian Antonov 124 aircraft
and some Ukrainian designers work with Makeev SRC).
2. All have environmentally clean propellants (LOX + Kerosene)
3. Other small launchers in development might be added (e.g. Swift)
4. These small launchers will continue to be supplemented by piggy-back opportunities
arising on larger launchers undertaking Russian government missions.
The 4S Symposium 2012 – G Webb 10
.
Angara 1.1 & 1.2
Figure 1. The Angara Launch Vehicle Family.
Designs of the URM-1 module, “Angara-1.1”
and “Angara-1.2” launch vehicles (left to right)
• Part of larger family
• Definite schedule for introduction
• URM-1 ready, URM-2 nearly ready
• URM-1 already proved in South Korean launcher
• Surface launch from Plesetsk
• Replacement for Rockot and Dnepr
The 4S Symposium 2012 – G Webb 11
.
Soyuz-2.1v
• This promising small launcher is being
produced by the Russian Samara Space
Centre as a replacement for the Cosmos
and other light launchers to be phased
out. It has environmentally cleaner
propellants (LOX/Kerosene) which
should ease problems with ground
operations and drop-zones.
• A ‘Soyuz’ launch facility has been
adapted for its use at the Plesetsk
cosmodrome and its heaviest payload
from there will be 2,400 kg into an LEO
of 200 km x 62.7°.
• Soyuz 2.1v has been developed on the
basis of the core stage of the Soyuz
2.1B adapted for the NK-33-1 engine,
an almost unchanged second stage and
the use of one of the serially produced
‘Soyuz’ fairings.
• The vehicle has 2 stages, is about 44m
long and weighs around 136 tons at lift
off. The fairing has a diameter of 3m.
Figure 2. Soyuz-2.1v.
Performance:
• to LEOs 3-4 tons
• to GTO 1.65 tons
• to GEO 0.8 tons
Figure 3. Air Launch Project.
The 4S Symposium 2012 – G Webb 12