electronics

Article
Longitudinal Control for Connected and Automated Vehicles in
Contested Environments
Shirin Noei 1, *,† , Mohammadreza Parvizimosaed 2,† and Mohammadreza Noei 3,†

1 Center for Energy Systems Research, Tennessee Technological University, Cookeville, TN 38505, USA
2 Department of Computer Engineering, K. N. Toosi University of Technology, Tehran 16317-14191, Iran;
[email protected]
3 Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Tarbiat Modares University, Tehran 14117-13116, Iran;
[email protected]
* Correspondence: [email protected]; Tel.: +1-931-372-6546
† These authors contributed equally to this work.

Abstract: The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) defines six levels of driving automation,
ranging from Level 0 to Level 5. Automated driving systems perform entire dynamic driving tasks
for Levels 3–5 automated vehicles. Delegating dynamic driving tasks from driver to automated
driving systems can eliminate crashes attributed to driver errors. Sharing status, sharing intent,
seeking agreement, or sharing prescriptive information between road users and vehicles dedicated to
automated driving systems can further enhance dynamic driving task performance, safety, and traffic
operations. Extensive simulation is required to reduce operating costs and achieve an acceptable risk
level before testing cooperative automated driving systems in laboratory environments, test tracks,
or public roads. Cooperative automated driving systems can be simulated using a vehicle dynamics
simulation tool (e.g., CarMaker and CarSim) or a traffic microsimulation tool (e.g., Vissim and





 Aimsun). Vehicle dynamics simulation tools are mainly used for verification and validation purposes
on a small scale, while traffic microsimulation tools are mainly used for verification purposes on
Citation: Noei, S.; Parvizimosaed, M.;
a large scale. Vehicle dynamics simulation tools can simulate longitudinal, lateral, and vertical
Noei, M. Longitudinal Control for
Connected and Automated Vehicles
dynamics for only a few vehicles in each scenario (e.g., up to ten vehicles in CarMaker and up
in Contested Environments. to twenty vehicles in CarSim). Conventional traffic microsimulation tools can simulate vehicle-
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994. https:// following, lane-changing, and gap-acceptance behaviors for many vehicles in each scenario without
doi.org/10.3390/electronics10161994 simulating vehicle powertrain. Vehicle dynamics simulation tools are more compute-intensive
but more accurate than traffic microsimulation tools. Due to software architecture or computing
Academic Editor: Alexey Vinel power limitations, simplifying assumptions underlying convectional traffic microsimulation tools
may have been a necessary compromise long ago. There is, therefore, a need for a simulation tool
Received: 15 June 2021
to optimize computational complexity and accuracy to simulate many vehicles in each scenario
Accepted: 9 August 2021
with reasonable accuracy. This research proposes a traffic microsimulation tool that employs a
Published: 18 August 2021
simplified vehicle powertrain model and a model-based fault detection method to simulate many
vehicles with reasonable accuracy at each simulation time step under noise and unknown inputs.
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neutral
Our traffic microsimulation tool considers driver characteristics, vehicle model, grade, pavement
with regard to jurisdictional claims in
conditions, operating mode, vehicle-to-vehicle communication vulnerabilities, and traffic conditions
published maps and institutional affil-
iations.
to estimate longitudinal control variables with reasonable accuracy at each simulation time step for
many conventional vehicles, vehicles dedicated to automated driving systems, and vehicles equipped
with cooperative automated driving systems. Proposed vehicle-following model and longitudinal
control functions are verified for fourteen vehicle models, operating in manual, automated, and
cooperative automated modes over two driving schedules under three malicious fault magnitudes
Copyright: © 2021 by the authors.
Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. on transmitted accelerations.
This article is an open access article
distributed under the terms and Keywords: traffic microsimulation tool; cooperative automated driving systems; vehicle powertrain;
conditions of the Creative Commons safety; road capacity; contested environments
Attribution (CC BY) license (https://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/
4.0/).

Electronics 2021, 10, 1994. https://doi.org/10.3390/electronics10161994 https://www.mdpi.com/journal/electronics

Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 2 of 28

1. Introduction
SAE defines six levels of driving automation
• Level 0: drivers perform entire dynamic driving tasks;
• Level 1: driver assistance systems execute either longitudinal or lateral vehicle motion
control subtask, and drivers perform all remaining dynamic driving tasks;
• Level 2: driver assistance systems execute both longitudinal and lateral vehicle motion
control subtasks, and drivers perform all remaining dynamic driving tasks;
• Levels 3–5: automated driving systems perform entire dynamic driving tasks [1].
Dynamic driving tasks are real-time operational (e.g., longitudinal and lateral vehicle
motion control) and tactical (e.g., object and event detection, recognition, classification,
and response preparation) functions required to operate a vehicle. Delegating dynamic
driving tasks to automated driving systems can eliminate 94% of crashes attributed to
driver errors [2].
Cooperative driving automation enables cooperation among road users, intending
to enhance dynamic driving task performance, safety, and traffic operations. Cooperative
driving automation can prevent 439,000 to 615,000 crashes, save 987 to 1366 lives, reduce
305,000 to 418,000 maximum abbreviated injury scale 1–5 injuries, and eliminate 537,000 to
746,000 property damage only vehicles annually [3]. Vehicles equipped with cooperative
automated driving systems can also follow their leaders at shorter gaps and with less vari-
ation in acceleration than vehicles dedicated to automated driving systems. SAE defines
four classes of cooperative driving automation cooperation: Class A (status-sharing), Class
B (intent-sharing), Class C (seeking-agreement), and Class D (prescriptive) [4]. Classes
C–D cooperative driving automation cooperation can be achieved at Levels 3–5 driving au-
tomation.
Cooperative automated driving systems can be simulated using a vehicle dynamics
simulation tool (e.g., CarMaker and CarSim) or a traffic microsimulation tool (e.g., Vissim
and Aimsun). Vehicle dynamics simulation tools are mainly used to simulate longitudinal,
lateral, and vertical dynamics on a small scale, while traffic microsimulation tools are
mainly used to simulate vehicle-following, lane-changing, and gap-acceptance behaviors
on a large scale.
• Verification scale: Vehicle dynamics simulation tools cannot simulate many vehicles
in each scenario.
• Verification resolution: Conventional traffic microsimulation tools cannot estimate
microscopic (e.g., reduction in distance gaps and time gaps) or macroscopic (e.g.,
increase in road capacity) benefits associated with driving automation or cooperative
driving automation with reasonable accuracy;
• Vehicle powertrain (i.e., engine, transmission, and driveline): Conventional traffic
microsimulation tools do not simulate vehicle powertrain;
• Maximum acceleration and maximum deceleration: Conventional traffic
microsimulation tools estimate or use constant maximum accelerations and maximum
decelerations. Aimsun considers maximum acceleration of 8.2 ft/s2 and maximum
deceleration of 6.6 ft/s2 as default [5]. Vissim estimates maximum acceleration as
amax (t) ≈ 3.5(1 − v(t)/40) and maximum deceleration as dmax (t) ≈ 20(1 − v(t)/800),
where amax is maximum acceleration (m/s2 ), v is speed (m/s), and dmax is maximum
deceleration (m/s2 ) [5]—since all units in Vissim User Manual are metric, metric
units are preferred to report these regression models with full precision. However,
maximum acceleration and maximum deceleration are sensitive to vehicle model,
grade, pavement conditions, and traffic conditions;
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 3 of 28

• Longitudinal control variables: Conventional longitudinal control functions (e.g.,

Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC), Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC)) rely
on constant distance gaps, time gaps, and controller coefficients, potentially sacrificing
safety (i.e., when short gaps are set) or reducing road capacity (i.e., when long gaps
are set). Conventional traffic microsimulation tools rely on user inputs for distance
gap, time gap, and longitudinal controller coefficients (e.g., proportional, integral, and
derivative) to simulate vehicles in a platoon or string. However, distance gap, time gap,
and longitudinal controller coefficients are sensitive to driver characteristics, vehicle
model, grade, pavement conditions, operating mode, malicious fault magnitude, and
traffic conditions.
• Contested environments: Onboard sensor measurements and transmitted messages
are inherently prone to noise, natural fault, and malicious fault. Minor faults may
lead to malfunction or even failure if not responded promptly. A single cyberattack
can cost an average original equipment manufacturer $1.6 billion a year, assuming
one individual recall costs $800 [6]. From 2010 to 2021, 367 cyberattacks on connected
vehicles have been reported [6].
A cyberattack can exploit one user application’s vulnerabilities (e.g., spoofing, data
falsification, and replay attacks) or multiple user application vulnerabilities (e.g.,
denial-of-service attack), leading to severe consequences for vehicle and potentially its
operating environment [7]. Spoofing, data falsification, replay, and denial-of-service
attacks are common cyberattacks on connected vehicles [8]. Spoofing attack is when
hackers steal authentication credentials or use a legitimate vehicle’s identity to send
unchanged or manipulated messages to other vehicles; data falsification attack is
when hackers read, insert, or modify transmitted messages; replay attack is when
hackers copy a message stream between two vehicles and repeat that stream to other
vehicles; denial-of-service attack is when hackers prevent or interfere with target
vehicles from receiving specific messages.
Conventional fault detection methods are broadly classified into model-driven and
data-driven methods [9]. Model-driven methods (e.g., unknown input observer and
Kalman filter) require partial plant model; data-driven methods (e.g., neural network)
require measured inputs and outputs under normal and faulty conditions to derive
plant model. Model-driven methods are more computationally intensive but more
accurate than data-driven methods [10].
Conventional traffic microsimulation tools do not simulate contested environments. A
simple strategy is to rely on onboard sensor measurements when there is a significant
discrepancy between onboard sensor measurements and transmitted messages [11].
Our traffic microsimulation tool is superior to vehicle dynamics simulation tools and
conventional traffic microsimulation tools because it can achieve these objectives
• Verification scale: simulate many vehicles in each scenario;
• Verification resolution: estimate microscopic and macroscopic benefits associated
with driving automation and cooperative driving automation with reasonable
accuracy [12,13];
• Vehicle powertrain: simulate vehicle powertrain;
• Maximum acceleration and maximum deceleration: estimate maximum acceleration
and maximum deceleration with reasonable accuracy at each simulation time step,
considering vehicle model, grade, pavement conditions, and traffic conditions;
• Distance gap and time gap: estimate minimum safe distance gap and minimum
safe time gap with reasonable accuracy at each simulation time step for vehicles
dedicated to automated driving systems or equipped with cooperative automated
driving systems, considering vehicle model, grade, pavement conditions, operating
mode, vehicle-to-vehicle communication vulnerabilities, and traffic conditions;
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 4 of 28

• Longitudinal controller coefficients: estimate longitudinal controller coefficients

(i.e., proportional, integral, and derivative gains) with reasonable accuracy at each
simulation time step for vehicles dedicated to automated driving systems, considering
vehicle model, grade, pavement conditions, and traffic conditions;
• Contested environments: employ a reduced-order Kalman filter unknown input
observer to estimate distance gap, speed, and acceleration with reasonable accuracy
at each simulation time step for vehicles dedicated to automated driving systems or
equipped with cooperative automated driving systems under noise (e.g., measurement
noise and process noise) and unknown inputs (e.g., noise with unknown statistics,
natural fault, and malicious fault).

2. Literature Review
Longitudinal control variables are mostly treated as constant parameters (see
Tables 1 and 2) or variables estimated using empirical or simplified mechanistic models.
However, maximum acceleration, maximum deceleration, minimum safe distance gap,
and minimum safe time gap are sensitive to driver characteristics, vehicle model, grade,
pavement conditions, operating mode, and traffic conditions.
Akçelik and Besley (2001) empirically estimated maximum acceleration and maximum
deceleration based on initial speed and final speed for passenger cars, and based on initial
speed, final speed, power-to-weight ratio, and grade for trucks [14]. Ahn et al. (2002)
generated a lookup table to identify maximum acceleration over 17 driving schedules
(see Table 3) [15]. Fang and Elefteriadou (2005) recommended a maximum acceleration
and a maximum deceleration for each vehicle classification (i.e., passenger car and truck),
interchange configuration (i.e., Single-Point Urban Interchange (SPUI) and diamond),
and traffic microsimulation tool (i.e., Vissim, Aimsun, and CORSIM) (see Table 4) [16].
Kuriyama et al. (2010) considered aerodynamic resistance, rolling resistance, and grade
resistance in calculating acceleration and deceleration for electric vehicles [17]. Maurya
and Bokare (2012) generated a lookup table to identify maximum deceleration for each
vehicle classification at each speed range (see Table 5) [18]. Lee et al. (2013) considered a
higher maximum acceleration (13.1 ft/s2 vs. 10.0 ft/s2 ) and a lower maximum deceleration
(9.8 ft/s2 vs. 15.0 ft/s2 ) for connected vehicles than the Federal Highway Administration’s
recommended maximum acceleration and maximum deceleration [19]. Anya et al. (2014)
believed vehicle-following, lane-changing, travel time, and queue discharge had an impact
on maximum acceleration and maximum deceleration [20]. Song et al. (2015) empirically
estimated maximum acceleration based on speed [21]. Bokare and Maurya (2017) gen-
erated two lookup tables to identify maximum acceleration and maximum deceleration
for each vehicle classification (i.e., diesel car, petrol car, and truck) at each speed range
(see Table 6) [22]. Ramezani et al. (2018) generated a lookup table to identify maximum
acceleration for trucks in CACC mode at each speed range (see Table 7) [23].
Shladover et al. (2010) identified that drivers maintain 2.2 s, 1.6 s, and 1.1 s time gaps
for 31.1%, 18.5%, and 50.4% of their vehicle-following time in ACC mode, respectively,
and drivers maintain 0.6 s, 0.7 s, 0.9 s, and 1.1 s time gaps for 57%, 24%, 7%, and 12%
of their vehicle-following time in CACC mode, respectively [24]. Willigen et al. (2011)
recommended a distance headway and a time headway for each platoon size (i.e., 20 and
30) and operating mode (i.e., ACC, CACC with transmitted accelerations, and CACC
with estimated accelerations) (see Table 8) [25]. Horiguchi and Oguchi (2014) calculated
distance gap for vehicles in CACC mode based on minimum safe distance gap, follower’s
speed, leader’s speed, maximum acceleration, and maximum deceleration [26]. Flores et al.
(2017) calculated time gap based on minimum safe time gap, desired time gap, and speed,
and calculated distance gap based on actuator delay, speed, maximum deceleration, and
maximum jerk [27]. Askari et al. (2017) calculated distance gap based on minimum safe
distance gap, follower’s speed, reaction time, leader’s speed, maximum acceleration, and
maximum deceleration [28]. Flores and Milanés (2018) recommended a time gap for each
controller type (i.e., fractional-order proportional derivative and integer-order proportional
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 5 of 28

derivative), desired performance (i.e., ensuring loop bandwidth, phase margin, and string
stability), and operating mode (i.e., ACC and CACC) (see Table 9) [29]. Chen et al. (2019)
calculated time gap for vehicles in ACC and CACC modes based on jam density, free-flow
speed, follower’s speed, follower’s acceleration, and leader’s acceleration [30]. Bian et al.
(2019) recommended a time headway for each platoon size (i.e., 1, 3, 10, 20, and 30) and
controller type (i.e., linear, nonlinear, and nonlinear subject to communication delay) (see
Table 10) [31].
Conventional traffic microsimulation tools (1) should be integrated with a vehicle
dynamics simulation tool to simulate vehicle powertrain [32], (2) employ kinematics to
estimate quantities associated with motion [33], (3) automatically confine accelerations and
decelerations to constant (e.g., Aimsun and MITSIM) or estimated (e.g., Vissim and INTE-
GRATION) maximum accelerations and maximum decelerations, and (4) rely on constant
distance gaps and time gaps to simulate longitudinal control for automated vehicles in a
platoon or string. This research proposes a traffic microsimulation tool that can estimate
maximum acceleration, maximum deceleration, minimum safe distance gap, and minimum
safe time gap with reasonable accuracy at each simulation time step for convectional vehi-
cles, vehicles dedicated to automated driving systems, and vehicle equipped with coopera-
tive automated driving systems, considering driver characteristics (see Section 3.1), vehicle
model (see Section 3.2), pavement conditions (see Section 3.2.3), grade (see Section 3.2.3),
operating mode (see Section 3.5), traffic conditions (see Section 3.2.3), and vehicle-to-vehicle
communication vulnerabilities (see Section 4).

Table 1. Constant distance gaps and time gaps used in literature.

Time Gap (s)

Author Distance Gap (ft) ACC CACC
Bu et al. (2010) [34] - [1.1–2.2] [0.6–1.1]
Naus et al. (2010) [35] - 2.6 * 0.8 *
Shladover et al. (2010); - 1.1, 1.6, 2.2 0.7, 0.9, 1.1
Liu (2018) [24,36]
Ploeg et al. (2011) [37] - - 0.7 *
Willigen et al. (2011) [25] 15.8 *, 25.2 *, 26.0 *, 0.5 *, 0.6 * 0.2 *, 0.3 *, 0.4 *
34.5 *, 39.9 *, 57.2 *
Shladover et al. (2012) [38] - - 0.5
Zhao and Sun (2013) [39] - 1.4 0.5
Horiguchi and Oguchi (2014) [26] - 2.0, 2.0 * -
Segata et al. (2014) [40] 16.4 0.3 *, 1.2 * -
Milanés and Shladover (2014) [41] - 1.1 0.6
Nikolos et al. (2015); - 1.2 1.0
Delis et al. (2016) [42,43]
Wang et al. (2017) [44] 42.7, 46.9, 68.2 - 0.4, 0.5, 0.6 *, 0.7, 0.9 *
Terruzzi et al. (2017) [45] 16.4 * 1.4 * 1.0 *
Zhou et al. (2017) [46] 16.4 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0 0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0
Askari et al. (2017) [28] 9.8, 13.1 1.1 0.8
Flores and Milanés (2018) [29] - 0.5, 0.6 0.3
Chen et al. (2019) [30] - [0.2–2.2] -
Bian et al. (2019) [31] - - 0.0 *, 0.1 *, 0.2 *, 0.3 *, 0.4 *,
0.6 *, 0.9 *, 1.0 *, 1.1 *
* headway.
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 6 of 28

Table 2. Constant maximum accelerations and maximum decelerations used in literature.

Max. Acceleration Max. Deceleration

Author (ft/s2 ) (ft/s2 )
Akçelik and Besley (2001) [14] 8.8 10.1
Lemessi (2001) [47] 8.2 8.2
Ahn et al. (2002) [15] 3.4, 3.9, 4.8, 5.0, 5.4, 5.5, 7.3, -
7.4, 7.7, 8.3, 8.5, 8.7, 9.3, 10.1
Rakha and Ding (2003) [48] 4.9 8.2
Wang and Liu (2005) [49] 8.2 11.5
Fang and Elefteriadou (2005) [16] 4.9, 6.9, 8.2, 9.2, 11.5, 15.1 9.8, 12.1, 15.1
Ossen et al. (2006) [50] 26.2 26.2
Kesting et al. (2007) [51] 4.9 13.1
Kesting and Treiber (2008) [52] 19.7 19.7
Kuriyama et al. (2010) [17] 8.8 9.8
Talebpour et al. (2011) [53] 13.1 26.2
Song et al. (2012) [54] 11.5 13.1
Shladover et al. (2012) [38] 6.6 6.6
Lee and Park (2012); Lee et al. (2013) [19,55] 13.1 9.8
Maurya and Bokare (2012) [18] - 2.4, 2.5, 2.9, 5.0, 5.1, 5.3
Treiber and Kesting (2013) [56] 1.7, 4.6, 4.8 2.1, 4.8
Anya et al. (2014) [20] 0.7, 1.5, 8.5, 9.8, 11.2, 19.1, 22.0, 25.0 1.6, 3.7, 16.4, 19.7, 23.0, 36.7, 44.0, 51.5
Li et al. (2014) [57] 4.5 11.0
Tang et al. (2014) [58] - 19.7
Desiraju et al. (2014); Liu et al. (2018) [59,60] 6.6 -
Horiguchi and Oguchi (2014) [26] 5.2 -
Song et al. (2015) [21] 8.8 -
Amoozadeh et al. (2015); Zhou et al. (2017) [46,61] 9.8 16.4
Bokare and Maurya (2017) [22] 2.5, 2.9, 3.1, 3.3, 6.2, 6.5, 7.3, 8.1, 9.4 2.4, 2.5, 2.9, 11.0, 13.0, 14.1, 14.2, 14.8, 16.4
Askari et al. (2017) [28] 2.6, 4.9, 8.2 6.6
Li et al. (2017) [62] 3.3 -
Ramezani et al. (2018) [23] 0.4, 0.5, 0.8, 1.3, 1.6, 1.8, 8.2 9.8

Table 3. Maximum acceleration vs. driving schedule.

Max. Acceleration
Driving Schedule (ft/s2 )
Freeway, High Speed 3.9
Freeway, LOS * A–C 5.0
Freeway, LOS * D 3.4
Freeway, LOS * E 7.7
Freeway, LOS * F & LA92 10.1
Freeway, LOS * G 5.5
Freeway Ramps & Arterial/Collectors LOS * C–D 8.3
Arterial/Collectors LOS * A–B 7.3
Arterial/Collectors LOS * E–F 8.5
Local Roadways 5.4
Non-Freeway Area-Wide Urban Travel 9.3
LA4 & Running 505 4.8
ST01 7.4
New York City Cycle 8.7
* Level of Service.

Table 4. Maximum acceleration and maximum deceleration vs. traffic microsimulation tool, vehicle
classification, and interchange configuration.

Max. Acceleration Max. Deceleration

Specification (ft/s2 ) (ft/s2 )
Passenger Car, SPUI, Vissim 11.5 -
Passenger Car, Diamond, Vissim & Aimsun 6.9 -
Truck, SPUI, Vissim 8.2 -
Truck, Diamond, Vissim 4.9 -
Passenger Car, SPUI, Aimsun 9.2 -
SPUI, CORSIM 15.1 9.8
Diamond, CORSIM 6.9 15.1
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 7 of 28

Table 5. Maximum deceleration vs. vehicle classification.

Speed Range Max. Deceleration

Vehicle Classification (ft/s) (ft/s2 )
Passenger Car [83.8–85.7) 5.0
Passenger Car [85.7–87.5) 5.1
Passenger Car [87.5–91.1] 5.3
Truck [18.2–27.3) 2.4
Truck [27.3–36.5) 2.5
Truck [36.5–54.7] 2.9

Table 6. Maximum acceleration and maximum deceleration vs. vehicle classification.

Speed Range Max. Acceleration Max. Deceleration

Vehicle Classification (ft/s) (ft/s2 ) (ft/s2 )
Diesel Car [62.0–69.3) 6.2 -
Diesel Car [69.3–76.6) 7.3 -
Diesel Car [76.6–83.8) 6.5 -
Diesel Car [83.8–85.7) - 14.1
Diesel Car [85.7–87.5) - 14.2
Diesel Car [87.5–89.3) - 16.4
Diesel Car [89.3–91.1] - 14.8
Petrol Car [55.6–65.6) - 11.0
Petrol Car [65.6–75.6) - 13.0
Petrol Car [72.9–76.6) 7.3 -
Petrol Car [75.6–82.9] - 14.2
Petrol Car [76.6–80.2) 8.1 -
Petrol Car [80.2–83.8] 9.4 -
Truck [18.2–27.3) 2.5 2.4
Truck [27.3–36.5) 3.3 2.5
Truck [36.5–45.6) 3.1 2.9
Truck [45.6–54.7] 2.9 2.9

Table 7. Maximum acceleration.

Speed Range Max. Acceleration

(ft/s) (ft/s2 )
[0–14.7) 1.8
[29.3–44.0) 1.3
[44.0–58.7) 0.8
[58.7–73.3) 0.5
Above 73.3 0.4

Table 8. Distance headway and time headway vs. platoon size and operating mode.

Distance Headway Time Headway

Specification (ft) (s)
20, ACC 34.5 0.5
20, CACC with Transmitted Accelerations 26.0 0.4
20, CACC with Estimated Accelerations 15.8 0.2
30, ACC 57.2 0.6
30, CACC with Transmitted Accelerations 39.9 0.4
30, CACC with Estimated Accelerations 25.2 0.3
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 8 of 28

Table 9. Time gap vs. controller type, desired performance, and operating mode.

Time Gap
Specification (s)
Fractional-Order Proportional Derivative, ACC 0.5
Integer-Order Proportional Derivative, Loop Bandwidth and Phase Margin, ACC 0.6
Integer-Order Proportional Derivative, Loop Bandwidth and String Stability, ACC 0.5
CACC 0.3

Table 10. Time headway vs. platoon size and controller type.

Time Headway
Specification (s)
1, Linear 0.3, 0.4, 0.6
3, Linear 0.1, 0.2
1, Nonlinear 0.6
3, Nonlinear 0.2
10, Nonlinear 0.1
20 & 30, Nonlinear 0.0
1, Nonlinear Subject to Communication Delay 0.9, 1.0, 1.1
3, Nonlinear Subject to Communication Delay 0.6, 0.7, 0.9, 1.1

3. Proposed Traffic Microsimulation Tool

Our traffic microsimulation tool enables users to customize driver (see Section 3.1),
vehicle (see Section 3.2), road (see Section 3.3), cyberattack (see Section 3.4), and operating
mode (see Section 3.5) modules separately. Our traffic microsimulation tool contains ten
driver types (conservative to aggressive), fourteen vehicle models (i.e., ten passenger car
models and four truck configurations), two driving schedules (i.e., US06 and Cycle D),
three malicious fault magnitudes (i.e., malicious increases of 1, 3, and 5 ft/s2 in transmitted
accelerations), and three operating modes (i.e., cooperative automated, automated, and
manual) as default to simulate many vehicles with reasonable accuracy at each simulation
time step under noise and unknown inputs. Vehicles in manual mode require driver,
vehicle, and road modules; vehicles in automated mode require vehicle and road modules;
vehicles in cooperative automated mode require vehicle, road, and cyberattack modules to
be implemented (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Proposed traffic microsimulation tool.

3.1. Driver Module

Ten driver types are considered as default (based on an assumed value in CORSIM—a
traffic microsimulation tool): type 1 is a conservative driver; type 10 is an aggressive
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 9 of 28

driver. Each driver type is associated with a speed multiplier, an acceleration multiplier,
a deceleration multiplier, and a percentage included in traffic which follows a normal
distribution as default [63].

3.2. Vehicle Module

Fourteen vehicle models are included as default (assumed vehicles in SwashSim—a
traffic microsimulation tool): 2006 Honda Civic Si, 2008 Chevy Impala, 1998 Buick Century,
2004 Chevy Tahoe, 2002 Chevy Silverado, 1998 Chevy S10 Blazer, 2011 Ford F150, 2009
Honda Civic, 2005 Mazda 6, and 2004 Pontiac Grand Am, single-unit truck with PACCAR
PX-7 engine, intermediate semi-trailer with PACCAR MX-13 engine, interstate semi-trailer
with PACCAR MX-13 engine, and double semi-trailer with PACCAR MX-13 engine. Each
vehicle is associated with a torque map, a drag coefficient, a width, a height, a weight, a
wheelbase length, a wheel radius, a differential gear ratio, a drive axle slippage, a drivetrain
efficiency, a transmission gear ratio, shift up speeds, shift down speeds, and a percentage
included in traffic which follows a normal distribution as default [63]. Vehicle module
contains vehicle generation, reference speed profiles, and vehicle dynamics submodules:
Vehicle dispatching model in Section 3.2.1 is intended to generate many vehicles at an
assumed entrance under steady-state conditions; platoon leaders are assumed to follow
US06 and Cycle D driving schedules (see Section 3.2.2); maximum acceleration, maximum
deceleration, minimum safe distance gap, and minimum safe time gap are estimated based
on vehicle dynamics (see Section 3.2.3).

3.2.1. Vehicle Generation

Entry headways follow shifted negative-exponential distribution
(
λe−λ(h−hmin ) , h ≥ hmin
f (h) = (1)
0, h < hmin

where f is probability density function, h is entry headway (s/veh), hmin is minimum

entry headway (s/veh), λ is distribution parameter (veh/s) calculated as 1/(h̄ − hmin ), h̄ is
average entry headway (s/veh) calculated as 3600/q, and q is flow rate (veh/h).

3.2.2. Reference Speed Profiles

US06 and Cycle D driving schedules are used as reference speed profiles. US06 driving
schedule is designed to test passenger cars, representing an 8-mile route with average speed
of 70.4 ft/s, maximum speed of 117.8 ft/s, maximum acceleration of 12.3 ft/s2 , maximum
deceleration of 10.1 ft/s2 , and 600 s duration. Cycle D driving schedule is designed to
test trucks, representing a 5.6-mile route with average speed of 27.6 ft/s, maximum speed
of 85.1 ft/s, maximum acceleration of 6.4 ft/s2 , maximum deceleration of 6.8 ft/s2 , and
1060 s duration.

3.2.3. Vehicle Dynamics

Conventional longitudinal control functions control accelerations and decelerations
using throttle and brake inputs to maintain a constant distance gap in a platoon (e.g., truck
platooning) or a constant time gap in a string (e.g., ACC and CACC). Commanded
accelerations and decelerations are automatically confined to maximum accelerations
and maximum decelerations specific to vehicle model, grade, pavement conditions, and
traffic conditions. Longitudinal controller coefficients can be tuned to achieve desired
performance. Conventional traffic microsimulation tools require user inputs for maximum
acceleration, maximum deceleration, distance gap, time gap, and longitudinal controller
coefficients to simulate vehicles in a platoon or string.
Our traffic microsimulation tool follows these steps at each simulation time step
to simulate vehicles in a platoon or string: (1) estimating maximum acceleration and
maximum deceleration for each vehicle, considering vehicle model, grade, pavement
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 10 of 28

conditions, and traffic conditions, (2) estimating minimum safe distance gap and minimum
safe time gap for each vehicle dedicated to automated driving systems or equipped with
cooperative automated driving systems, considering vehicle model, grade, pavement
conditions, operating mode, vehicle-to-vehicle communication vulnerabilities, and traffic
conditions, (3) checking preset distance gaps and preset time gaps with minimum safe
distance gaps and minimum safe time gaps, (4) estimating accelerations and decelerations,
considering operating mode, and (5) confining accelerations and decelerations to maximum
accelerations and maximum decelerations.
Three significant forces against vehicle motion are aerodynamic resistance, rolling
resistance, and grade resistance. Aerodynamic resistance can be calculated as
ρ
R a [k] , CD A f v2 [ k ], (2)
2

where R a is aerodynamic resistance (lb), ρ is air density (slugs/ft3 ), CD is drag coefficient

(unitless), A f is vehicle frontal area (ft2 ) calculated as vehicle width (ft) × vehicle height (ft),
v is speed (ft/s), and [k ] denotes simulation time step. Rolling resistance can be estimated as

Rrl [k] ≈ f rl [k]W, (3)

where Rrl is rolling resistance (lb), f rl is rolling resistance coefficient (unitless) estimated as
0.01(1 + v[k]/147) for vehicles operating on paved surfaces [64], and W is vehicle weight
(lb). Grade resistance can be calculated as

R g , W sin θ, (4)

where R g is grade resistance (lb), and θ is grade (unitless). Tractive effort available to overcome
resistance and to provide acceleration can be calculated as F [k] = min( Fmax [k ], Fe [k ]), where F
is available tractive effort (lb), Fmax is maximum tractive effort (lb), and Fe is engine-generated
tractive effort (lb). Maximum tractive effort can be calculated as

lr cos θ + h f rl [k]


 µW , front-wheel-drive


 L + µh
Fmax [k] , l f cos θ − h f rl [k] (5)
µW , rear-wheel-drive
L − µh





µW cos θ, all-wheel-drive

where µ is road adhesion coefficient (unitless), lr is distance from rear axle to gravity center
(ft), h is vehicle height (ft), L is wheelbase length (ft), and l f is distance from front axle to
gravity center (ft). Engine speed can be calculated as

v [ k ] e0 [ k ]
ne [k ] , , (6)
2πr (1 − i )

where ne is engine speed (revs/s), e0 is overall gear reduction ratio (unitless), calculated as
transmission gear ratio (unitless), selected based on vehicle speed) × differential gear ratio
(unitless), r is wheel radius (ft), and i is drive axle slippage (unitless). Engine power can be
calculated as
2πMe [k ]ne [k]
hpe [k] , , (7)
550
where hpe is engine power (hp), and Me is torque (ft-lb). Engine-generated tractive effort
can be calculated as
M e [ k ] e0 [ k ] η d
Fe [k] , , (8)
r
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 11 of 28

where ηd is drivetrain efficiency (unitless). Maximum braking force can be calculated as

lr cos θ + h f rl [k]

 ηb µW , front-wheel-drive
L − ηb µh




Bmax [k] , l f cos θ − h f rl [k] (9)
ηb µW , rear-wheel-drive
L + ηb µh





ηb µW cos θ, all-wheel-drive

where Bmax is maximum braking force (lb), and ηb is braking efficiency (unitless). Maximum
acceleration can be estimated as
F [k ] − R a [k] − Rrl [k] − R g
amax [k] ≈ , (10)
mγm [k]

where amax is maximum acceleration (ft/s2 ), and γm is mass factor (untiless) estimated as
1.04 + 0.0025e02 [k] [64], accounting for rotational inertia during acceleration. Maximum
deceleration can be estimated as [63]

Bmax [k ] + R a [k ] + Rrl [k ] + R g
dmax [k] ≈ , (11)
mγb

where dmax is maximum deceleration (ft/s2 ), and γb is mass factor (unitless), accounting
for rotational inertia during deceleration. Minimum safe distance gap can be estimated
as [63]  
Smin [k] ≈ τsi+1 + τci+1 vi+1 [k ] + Sstop
i +1 i
[k] − Sstop [ k ], (12)

where Smin is minimum safe distance gap (ft), τs is sensing delay (s), τc is communication
delay (s), subscript/superscript i + 1 denotes follower, subscript/superscript i denotes
leader, and Sstop is minimum stopping distance (ft) estimated as
 
mγb R a [k]
Sstop [k] ≈ ln 1 − . (13)
ρCD A f Bmax [k] + R a [k ] + Rrl [k ] + R g

Minimum safe time gap can be estimated as [63]

Tmin [k] ≈ τsi+1 + τci+1 + τlag

i +1 i
[k] − τlag [ k ], (14)

where Tmin is minimum safe time gap (s), and τlag is lag in tracking desired deceleration (s)
estimated as v[k]/dmax [k ].

Assumption 1. Vehicles have constant speeds during sensing delay and communication delay.

Remark 1. Proposed longitudinal dynamics has been previously validated for 53,000 lb and 80,000 lb
interstate semi-trailers against an industry-standard simulation tool (i.e., TruckSim) [65–67].

3.3. Road Module

Any desired freeway segment with a single lane can be simulated. Each freeway
segment is associated with a grade, a road adhesion coefficient, and a free-flow speed.

3.4. Cyberattack Module

Three malicious fault magnitudes are assumed as default: 1, 3, and 5 ft/s2 malicious
increase in transmitted accelerations. Each malicious fault magnitude is associated with a
percentage injected on traffic which follows a normal distribution as default.
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 12 of 28

3.5. Operating Mode Module

Three operating modes are considered as default: manual, automated, and cooperative
automated. Each operating mode is associated with a percentage included in traffic which
follows a normal distribution as default. This section proposes a vehicle-following model
for vehicles in manual mode and longitudinal control functions for vehicles in automated
and cooperative automated modes.

3.5.1. Manual Mode

Levels 1 and 2 automated vehicles are assumed to have a vehicle-following model
similar to the Improved Intelligent Driver Model (IIDM)
(
+1 [ k ] C [ k ] C [ k ] , S [ k ] ≥ S
n × aimax s v min [ k ]
a i +1 [ k ] , i + 1
(15)
−q × dmax [k], else

where n is acceleration multiplier (unitless), Cs is distance gap coefficient (unitless) calcu-

lated as 1 − (Smin [k ]/S[k])α , S is distance gap (ft) calculated as xi [k] − xi+1 [k] − Li , x is front
bumper position (ft), Cv is speed coefficient (unitless) calculated as 1 − (m × vi [k]/FFS) β ,
m is speed multiplier (unitless), FFS is free-flow speed (ft/s), q is deceleration multiplier
(unitless), and α and β are calibration parameters (unitless). IIDM has fewer calibration
parameters and demonstrates a more stable performance than Wiedemann model (i.e.,
vehicle-following model used in Vissim) [68].

Assumption 2. There are three significant components underpinning a traffic microsimulation tool
(i.e., vehicle-following, lane-changing, and gap-acceptance models). This research mainly focuses
on vehicle-following models, assuming vehicles drive in a single lane, and there is no lane-change
maneuver (i.e., lane-changing and gap-acceptance models are not required). However, a lane-change
maneuver can temporarily affect vehicle-following behaviors (e.g., drivers speed up or slow down to
align with acceptable gaps in target lanes; drivers temporarily adopt shorter gaps after a lane-change
maneuver; drivers temporarily adopt shorter gaps after a vehicle merges in front).

3.5.2. Automated Mode

When (1) a vehicle dedicated to automated driving systems approaches a vehicle, or
(2) a vehicle equipped with cooperative automated driving systems approaches a vehicle
not equipped with cooperative automated driving systems, a longitudinal control function
similar to ACC is activated [69]
   
+1
ai+1 [k ] , max min K p,a [k]ex [k] + Kd,a [k]ev [k ], aimax +1
[k] , −dimax [k] , (16)

where K p,a is proportional gain in automated mode (s−2 ), ex is distance gap error (ft)
calculated as Sdes [k ] − S[k], Sdes is desired distance gap (ft) calculated as max ( Tset , Tmin [k −
1])vi+1 [k − 1], Tset is preset time gap (s), Kd,a is derivative gain in automated mode (s−1 ),
and ev is speed error (ft/s) calculated as vi [k] − vi+1 [k]. When no leader is detected, a
longitudinal control function similar to cruise control is activated
   
+1
ai+1 [k] , max min K p,cr [k ]( FFS − vi+1 [k]), aimax +1
[k] , −dimax [k] , (17)

where K p,cr is proportional gain in cruise mode (s−1 ). K p,a and Kd,a should satisfy (18) to
maximize road capacity without compromising safety [63]
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 13 of 28

 v 
i +1 u i +1


 2πτ lag π u τ lag 
− .t ×

 
q
2 K (t)

i + 1 2
− p,a




 4K p,a ( t ) τlag ( K d,a ( t ) + 1 )

(Kd,a (t) + 1)
  

 π
 − q

i +1
4K p,a (t)τlag − (Kd,a (t) + 1)2

  (18)

 
 e − v i ( t )  ≤ Smin (t), during acceleration


  






T (t)

Kd,a (t) ≤ mini+1 − 1.

during deceleration


8τlag



3.5.3. Cooperative Automated Mode

When a vehicle equipped with cooperative automated driving systems approaches
another vehicle equipped with cooperative automated driving systems, a longitudinal
control function similar to CACC is activated [69]
   
+1
ai+1 [k] , max min K p,c [k]ev [k ] + Ki,c [k]ex [k ] + Kd,c [k] ai [k], aimax +1
[k] , −dimax [k] , (19)

where K p,c is proportional gain in cooperative automated mode (s−1 ), Ki,c is integral gain
in cooperative automated mode (s−2 ), and Kd,c is derivative gain in cooperative automated
mode (unitless).

Remark 2. All driver characteristics and vehicle powertrain information used in this research are
derived from https://www.automobile-catalog.com/ [63,70,71].

Assumption 3. Class B cooperative driving automation cooperation is utilized.

Assumption 4. xi and vi are prone to measurement noise and process noise, and ai is prone to
measurement noise, process noise, natural fault, and malicious fault (i.e., xi and vi are known state
subvectors, and ai is an unknown state subvector).

4. State and Unknown Input Estimation

Consider a state-space model in which unknown inputs can be modeled as an addi-
tive term

x [k + 1] = Ax [k ] + Bu[k] + Dd[k] + ξ [k], (20)

z[k] = Cx [k] + θ [k], (21)

where x ∈ Rn is state vector, A ∈ Rn×n is state matrix, B ∈ Rn× p is input matrix, u ∈ R p is

input vector, D ∈ Rn×q is unknown input matrix, d ∈ Rq is unknown input vector, ξ ∈ Rn
is process noise, z ∈ Rm is measurement vector, C ∈ Rm×n is measurement matrix, and
θ ∈ Rm is measurement noise.

Assumption 5. D is full column rank.

Assumption 6. rank CD = rank D.

∆
Assumption 7. ξ is white noise: E(ξ [k]) = 0n , E ξ [k]ξ T [k] = Ξ[k], Ξ ∈ Rn×n is process noise
covariance matrix, E ξ [k]ξ T [ j] = 0n×n ∀k, j ≥ 0, k 6= j.

∆
Assumption 8. θ is white noise: E(θ [k]) = 0
m , E θ [k]θ T [k] = Θ[k], Θ ∈ Rm×m is measure-
ment noise covariance matrix, and E θ [k]θ T [ j] = 0m×m ∀k, j ≥ 0, k 6= j.

Assumption 9. E ξ [k] x T [0] = 0n×n , and E θ [k ] x T [0] = 0m×n ∀k ≥ 0.

Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 14 of 28

Assumption 10. x̂ [0] = E( x [0]) is known, where x̂ ∈ Rn is state estimation.

Remark 3. D is full column rank → [ N D ]−1 exists, where N ∈ Rn×(n−q) [72].

∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
Let us define x [k] = [ N D ]−1 x [k], A = [ N D ]−1 A[ N D ], B = [ N D ]−1 B, D = [ N D ]−1 D,
∆
and C = C [ N D ], where x ∈ Rn , A ∈ Rn×n , B ∈ Rn× p , D ∈ Rn×q , and C ∈ Rm×n .

∆
Remark 4. rank CD = rank D → U = [CD Q]−1 exists, where Q ∈ Rm×(m−q) [72].
 
∆ A11 A12T ∆∆ T T T ∆ 
h i T
x1T x2T , , B = B1 B2 , U −1 = U1T U2T ,

Let us define x [k] = A=
A21 A22
where x1 ∈ Rn−q is known state subvector, x2 ∈ Rq unknown state subvector, A11 ∈
R(n−q)×(n−q) , A12 ∈ R(n−q)×q , A21 ∈ Rq×(n−q) , A22 ∈ Rq×q , B1 ∈ R(n−q)× p , B2 ∈ Rq× p ,
U1 ∈ Rq×m , and U2 ∈ R(m−q)×m .
 
sIn−q − A11 − A12
Assumption 11. rank = n ∀s ∈ C, Re(s) ≥ 0.
CN CD

∆ ∆ ∆ ∆
e1 =
Let us define A A11 − A12 U1 CN, E1 = A12 U1 , C
e1 = U2 CN, and z[k] = U2 z[k ],
e1 ∈ R(n−q)×(n−q) , E1 ∈ R(n−q)×m , C
where A e1 ∈ R(m−q)×(n−q) , and z ∈ Rm−q .
 
sIn−q − A11 − A12
Remark 5. D is full column rank, rank CD = rank D, and rank =n
CN CD
∀s ∈ C, Re(s) ≥ 0 → { A e1 } is observable [72].
e1 , C

State vector can be decoupled into known and unknown state subvectors. Known
state subvector can be estimated as

x̄ˆ1 [k + 1] , Ã1 − L[k]C̃1 x̄ˆ1 [k ] + B̄1 u[k] + L∗ [k]z[k],

(22)

where x̄ˆ1 ∈ Rn−q is known state estimator (x̄ˆ1 [k] → x̄1 [k] as k → ∞), L∗ [k] , L[k]U2 + E1 ,
L∗ ∈ R(n−q)×m , and L ∈ R(n−q)×(m−q) is Kalman gain, calculated as
  −1
L[k ] , Ã1 Σ[k ]C̃1T C̃1 Σ[k]C̃1T + Θ[k] , (23)

where Σ ∈ R(n−q)×(n−q) can be recursively calculated as

Σ[k + 1] = Ã1 [Σ[k ] − Σ[k]C̃1T (C̃1 Σ[k]C̃1T + Θ[k])−1 C̃1 Σ[k]] Ã1T + DΞ[k ] D T . (24)

Unknown state subvector can be estimated as

x̄ˆ2 [k] , U1 z[k] − U1 CN x̄ˆ1 [k], (25)

where x̄ˆ2 ∈ Rq is unknown state estimator (x̄ˆ2 [k] → x̄2 [k] as k → ∞). Unknown input
vector can be estimated as

dˆ[k ] , U1 z[k + 1] + Gd,1 [k] x̄ˆ1 + Gd,2 [k ]z[k] + Gd,3 u[k ], (26)

where dˆ ∈ Rq is unknown input estimator, Gd,1 ∈ Rq×(n−q) , Gd,2 ∈ Rq×m , and Gd,3 ∈ Rq× p .
A controller can be further designed based on d,ˆ z, and xdes , where xdes ∈ Rn is our desired
state vector [73–77].
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 15 of 28

5. Test Scenario
Let us consider a traffic with ten driver types and fourteen vehicle models operating
in manual, automated, and cooperative automated modes over US06 and Cycle D driving
schedules with given conditions in Table 11 under malicious increases of 1 ft/s2 , 3 ft/s2 ,
and 5 ft/s2 in transmitted accelerations, where
iT
∆
h
x [k] = S T [k] viT+1 [k] aiT+1 [k ] viT [k] aiT [k] , (27)

iT
∆
h
u[k] = K p evT [k] Ki e Tp [k] Kd aiT [k ] vre
T
f [ k ] a T
re f [ k ] , (28)

−∆t 0 ∆t 0
   
1 0 0 0 0 0
0
 1 ∆t 0 0
0
 0 0 0 0
A := 
0 0 1 0 0, and B := 1
 1 1 0 0. (29)
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1

Table 11. Input parameters.

Parameter Value Unit Parameter Value Unit

∆t 0.1 s Sdes [1] 5 ft
ρ 0.002377 * slug/ft3 α 2 -
θ 0 - β 4 -
Drivetrain Type Front-Wheel-Drive - K p,cr [1] 1 s−1
µ 1 ** - K p,a [1] −1 s−2
lr L/2 - Kd,a [1] 1 s−1
ηb 0.95 - K p,c [1] 1 s−1
γb 1.04 - Ki,c [1] −1 s−2
τs 1.0, 0.6, 0.0 s Kd,c [1] 1 -
τc 0.0, 0.1 s FFS 110 ft/s
Driver Type 5# - hmin 2 s
x [1] 100 # , 0 ## ft q 1800 veh/h
v [1] 0 ## ft/s Warm-Up Period 900 s
a [1] 0 ## ft/s2 Replications 20 -
Tset 1.1,0.6 s
* for 0 ft altitude, 59◦ F temperature, and 14.7 lb/in2 pressure, ** for good and dry pavement, # leader, ## follower.

6. Results
Distance gap, speed, and acceleration profiles are shown in Figures 2–4, arranged
from shortest to longest time elapsed till crash occurs (showed as dashed lines)—2011 Ford
F150 (7.5 s), 2004 Pontiac Grand Am (7.5 s), 2006 Honda Civic Si (7.6 s), 2009 Honda Civic
(8.1 s), 2005 Mazda 6 (8.1 s), 2008 Chevy Impala (8.5 s), 2002 Chevy Silverado (8.5 s), 2004
Chevy Tahoe (9.0 s), 1998 Buick Century (9.3 s), 1998 Chevy S10 Blazer (9.3 s), intermediate
semi-trailer (42.5 s), single-unit truck (42.8 s), interstate semi-trailer (44.8 s), and double
semi-trailer (45.2 s). Results show that (1) proposed state and unknown input estimation
model can be used to design a safe cooperative automated longitudinal control function
under measurement noise, process noise, natural fault, and malicious fault; (2) vehicles
over Cycle D driving schedule are more sensitive to fault magnitude than vehicles over
US06 driving schedule (see Table 15), since vehicles over Cycle D driving schedule have
lower average speeds and, therefore, maintain shorter time gaps than vehicles over US06
driving schedule; (3) passenger cars are more sensitive to fault magnitude than trucks,
particularly at lower magnitude faults (see Table 15), since passenger cars maintain shorter
time gaps than trucks; (4) errors in distance gap, speed, and acceleration are proportional
to fault magnitude (see Tables 12–14); (5) errors in distance gap, speed, and acceleration are
not sensitive to driving schedule; (6) distance gap is most sensitive state; (7) acceleration is
least sensitive state; (8) adding 3.4 ft to estimated distance gaps, deducting 2.6 ft/s from
estimated speeds, or deducting 0.8 ft/s2 from estimated accelerations can mitigate impacts
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 16 of 28

of up to malicious increase of 5 ft/s2 in transmitted accelerations (as a hypothesis) (see

Tables 12–14), (9) higher magnitude faults lead to earlier crashes (see Table 15).

250 250
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
d=1 d=1
d=3 d=3
d=5 d=5
200 200
Distance Gap (ft)

Distance Gap (ft)

150 150

100 100

50 50

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(a) 2011 Ford F150. (b) 2004 Pontiac Grand Am.

250 250
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
d=1 d=1
d=3 d=3
d=5 d=5
200 200
Distance Gap (ft)

Distance Gap (ft)

150 150

100 100

50 50

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(c) 2006 Honda Civic Si. (d) 2009 Honda Civic.

250 250
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
d=1 d=1
d=3 d=3
d=5 d=5
200 200
Distance Gap (ft)
Distance Gap (ft)

150 150

100 100

50 50

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(e) 2005 Mazda 6. (f) 2008 Chevy Impala.

Figure 2. Cont.
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 17 of 28

250 250
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
d=1 d=1
d=3 d=3
d=5 d=5
200 200
Distance Gap (ft)

Distance Gap (ft)

150 150

100 100

50 50

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(g) 2002 Chevy Silverado. (h) 2004 Chevy Tahoe.

250 250
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
d=1 d=1
d=3 d=3
d=5 d=5
200 200
Distance Gap (ft)

Distance Gap (ft)

150 150

100 100

50 50

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(i) 1998 Buick Century. (j) 1998 Chevy S10 Blazer.

250 250
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
d=1 d=1
d=3 d=3
d=5 d=5
200 200
Distance Gap (ft)

Distance Gap (ft)

150 150

100 100

50 50

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(k) 1998 Buick Century. (l) 1998 Chevy S10 Blazer.

Figure 2. Cont.
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 18 of 28

250 250
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
d=1 d=1
d=3 d=3
d=5 d=5
200 200
Distance Gap (ft)

Distance Gap (ft)

150 150

100 100

50 50

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(m) 2002 Chevy Silverado. (n) 2004 Chevy Tahoe.

Figure 2. Distance gap profiles over US06 driving schedule under malicious increases in transmitted accelerations.

50 50
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
45 d=1 45 d=1
d=3 d=3
40 d=5 40 d=5

35 35
Speed (mi/h)

Speed (mi/h)

30 30

25 25

20 20

15 15

10 10

5 5

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(a) 2011 Ford F150. (b) 2004 Pontiac Grand Am.

50 50
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
45 d=1 45 d=1
d=3 d=3
40 d=5 40 d=5

35 35
Speed (mi/h)

Speed (mi/h)

30 30

25 25

20 20

15 15

10 10

5 5

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(c) 2006 Honda Civic Si. (d) 2009 Honda Civic.

Figure 3. Cont.
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 19 of 28

50 50
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
45 d=1 45 d=1
d=3 d=3
40 d=5 40 d=5

35 35

Speed (mi/h)
Speed (mi/h)

30 30

25 25

20 20

15 15

10 10

5 5

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(e) 2005 Mazda 6. (f) 2008 Chevy Impala.

50 50
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
45 d=1 45 d=1
d=3 d=3
40 d=5 40 d=5

35 35
Speed (mi/h)

Speed (mi/h)

30 30

25 25

20 20

15 15

10 10

5 5

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(g) 2002 Chevy Silverado. (h) 2004 Chevy Tahoe.

50 50
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
45 d=1 45 d=1
d=3 d=3
40 d=5 40 d=5

35 35
Speed (mi/h)

Speed (mi/h)

30 30

25 25

20 20

15 15

10 10

5 5

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(i) 1998 Buick Century. (j) 1998 Chevy S10 Blazer.

Figure 3. Cont.
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 20 of 28

50 50
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
45 d=1 45 d=1
d=3 d=3
40 d=5 40 d=5

35 35
Speed (mi/h)

Speed (mi/h)
30 30

25 25

20 20

15 15

10 10

5 5

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(k) 1998 Buick Century. (l) 1998 Chevy S10 Blazer.

50 50
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
45 d=1 45 d=1
d=3 d=3
40 d=5 40 d=5

35 35
Speed (mi/h)

Speed (mi/h)

30 30

25 25

20 20

15 15

10 10

5 5

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(m) 2002 Chevy Silverado. (n) 2004 Chevy Tahoe.

Figure 3. Speed gap profiles over US06 driving schedule under malicious increases in transmitted accelerations.

10 10
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
9 d=1 9 d=1
d=3 d=3
8 d=5 8 d=5

7 7
Acceleration (ft/s2 )

Acceleration (ft/s2 )

6 6

5 5

4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(a) 2011 Ford F150. (b) 2004 Pontiac Grand Am.

Figure 4. Cont.
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 21 of 28

10 10
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
9 d=1 9 d=1
d=3 d=3
8 d=5 8 d=5

7 7
Acceleration (ft/s2 )

Acceleration (ft/s2 )
6 6

5 5

4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(c) 2006 Honda Civic Si. (d) 2009 Honda Civic.

10 10
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
9 d=1 9 d=1
d=3 d=3
8 d=5 8 d=5

7 7
Acceleration (ft/s2 )
Acceleration (ft/s2 )

6 6

5 5

4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(e) 2005 Mazda 6. (f) 2008 Chevy Impala.

10 10
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
9 d=1 9 d=1
d=3 d=3
8 d=5 8 d=5

7 7
Acceleration (ft/s2 )

Acceleration (ft/s2 )

6 6

5 5

4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(g) 2002 Chevy Silverado. (h) 2004 Chevy Tahoe.

Figure 4. Cont.
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 22 of 28

10 10
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
9 d=1 9 d=1
d=3 d=3
8 d=5 8 d=5

7 7
Acceleration (ft/s2 )

Acceleration (ft/s2 )
6 6

5 5

4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(i) 1998 Buick Century. (j) 1998 Chevy S10 Blazer.

10 10
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
9 d=1 9 d=1
d=3 d=3
8 d=5 8 d=5

7 7
Acceleration (ft/s2 )

Acceleration (ft/s2 )

6 6

5 5

4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(k) 1998 Buick Century. (l) 1998 Chevy S10 Blazer.

10 10
Proposed Controller Proposed Controller
9 d=1 9 d=1
d=3 d=3
8 d=5 8 d=5

7 7
Acceleration (ft/s2 )

Acceleration (ft/s2 )

6 6

5 5

4 4

3 3

2 2

1 1

0 0
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500
Time (s) Time (s)

(m) 2002 Chevy Silverado. (n) 2004 Chevy Tahoe.

Figure 4. Acceleration gap profiles over US06 driving schedule under malicious increases in transmitted accelerations.
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 23 of 28

Table 12. Distance gap errors * (ft) before crash occurs **.

US06 Cycle D
Malicious Fault (ft/s2 ) 1 3 5 1 3 5
2011 Ford F150 0.8 2.2 3.3 0.8 2.2 3.3
2004 Pontiac Grand Am 0.8 2.2 3.4 0.8 2.2 3.3
2006 Honda Civic Si 0.8 2.2 3.3 0.8 2.2 3.3
2009 Honda Civic 0.8 2.2 3.3 0.8 2.2 3.3
2005 Mazda 6 0.8 2.2 3.3 0.8 2.2 3.3
2008 Chevy Impala 0.8 2.2 3.2 0.8 2.2 3.2
2002 Chevy Silverado 0.8 2.2 3.2 0.8 2.2 3.2
2004 Chevy Tahoe 0.8 2.1 3.1 0.8 2.1 3.1
1998 Buick Century 0.9 2.2 3.3 0.8 2.1 3.2
1998 Chevy S10 Blazer 0.9 2.2 3.3 0.8 2.1 3.1
Intermediate Semi-Trailer 0.9 2.2 3.2 0.8 2.1 3.1
Single-Unit Truck 1.0 2.1 3.1 0.8 2.0 3.0
Interstate Semi-Trailer 0.9 2.2 3.2 0.8 2.1 3.0
Double Semi-Trailer 1.0 2.2 3.2 0.8 2.0 3.1
f aulty
* calculated as Sinormal
+1 [k − 1] − Si+1 [k − 1], where Snormal is distance gap in normal conditions, and S f aulty is
distance gap in faulty conditions, ** in absence of our proposed state and unknown input estimation model.

Table 13. Speed errors * (ft/s) before crash occurs **.

US06 Cycle D
Malicious Fault (ft/s2 ) 1 3 5 1 3 5
2011 Ford F150 −0.2 −1.1 −2.1 −0.3 −1.1 −2.1
2004 Pontiac Grand Am −0.2 −1.0 −1.9 −0.2 −1.0 −2.0
2006 Honda Civic Si −0.2 −1.0 −2.0 −0.3 −1.0 −2.0
2009 Honda Civic −0.2 −1.1 −2.1 −0.3 −1.1 −2.1
2005 Mazda 6 −0.2 −1.0 −2.0 −0.3 −1.1 −2.0
2008 Chevy Impala −0.2 −1.1 −2.1 −0.3 −1.1 −2.1
2002 Chevy Silverado −0.2 −1.1 −2.2 −0.3 −1.1 −2.2
2004 Chevy Tahoe −0.2 −1.2 −2.4 −0.3 −1.3 −2.4
1998 Buick Century −0.2 −1.1 −2.1 −0.3 −1.1 −2.2
1998 Chevy S10 Blazer −0.2 −1.1 −2.2 −0.3 −1.2 −2.3
Intermediate Semi-Trailer −0.1 −1.1 −2.2 −0.3 −1.2 −2.2
Single-Unit Truck 0.1 −0.8 −2.5 −0.3 −1.3 −2.6
Interstate Semi-Trailer 0.0 −1.1 −2.2 −0.3 −1.2 −2.3
Double Semi-Trailer 0.0 −1.1 −2.2 −0.3 −1.2 −2.3
f aulty
* calculated as vinormal
+1 [ k − 1] − vi +1 [ k − 1], where v
normal is speed in normal conditions, and v f aulty is speed in

faulty conditions, ** in absence of our proposed state and unknown input estimation model.

Table 14. Acceleration errors * (ft/s2 ) before crash occurs **.

US06 Cycle D
Malicious Fault (ft/s2 ) 1 3 5 1 3 5
2011 Ford F150 −0.1 −0.4 −0.6 −0.1 −0.4 −0.6
2004 Pontiac Grand Am −0.1 −0.3 −0.5 −0.1 −0.3 −0.5
2006 Honda Civic Si −0.1 −0.4 −0.6 −0.1 −0.4 −0.6
2009 Honda Civic −0.1 −0.4 −0.6 −0.1 −0.4 −0.6
2005 Mazda 6 −0.1 −0.4 −0.6 −0.1 −0.4 −0.6
2008 Chevy Impala −0.1 −0.4 −0.6 −0.1 −0.4 −0.6
2002 Chevy Silverado −0.1 −0.4 −0.6 −0.1 −0.4 −0.6
2004 Chevy Tahoe −0.1 −0.5 −0.8 −0.1 −0.5 −0.8
1998 Buick Century −0.1 −0.4 −0.6 −0.1 −0.4 −0.6
1998 Chevy S10 Blazer −0.1 −0.4 −0.7 −0.1 −0.4 −0.6
Intermediate Semi-Trailer 0.0 −0.4 −0.6 −0.1 −0.4 −0.5
Single-Unit Truck −0.1 −0.5 −0.8 −0.1 −0.5 −0.8
Interstate Semi-Trailer 0.0 −0.4 −0.6 −0.1 −0.4 −0.5
Double Semi-Trailer −0.1 −0.1 −0.6 −0.1 −0.4 −0.6
f aulty
* calculated as ainormal
+1 [ k − 1] − ai +1 [ k − 1], where a
normal is acceleration in normal conditions, and a f aulty is

acceleration in faulty conditions, ** in absence of our proposed state and unknown input estimation model.
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 24 of 28

Table 15. Seconds elapsed till test till crash occurs *.

US06 Cycle D
Malicious Fault (ft/s2 ) 1 3 5 1 3 5
2011 Ford F150 7.5 6.9 6.6 7.4 6.9 6.6
2004 Pontiac Grand Am 7.5 6.8 6.6 7.4 6.8 6.5
2006 Honda Civic Si 7.6 7.0 6.7 7.5 7.0 6.7
2009 Honda Civic 8.1 7.4 7.1 7.9 7.4 7.1
2005 Mazda 6 8.1 7.4 7.1 7.9 7.3 7.1
2008 Chevy Impala 8.5 7.7 7.4 8.2 7.7 7.4
2002 Chevy Silverado 8.5 7.7 7.4 8.2 7.7 7.4
2004 Chevy Tahoe 9.0 8.2 7.9 8.6 8.1 7.9
1998 Buick Century 9.3 8.3 8.0 8.7 8.2 7.9
1998 Chevy S10 Blazer 9.3 8.3 8.0 8.7 8.2 7.9
Intermediate Semi-Trailer 42.5 9.1 8.7 9.4 8.9 8.6
Single-Unit Truck 42.8 9.1 8.8 9.4 8.9 8.7
Interstate Semi-Trailer 44.8 9.3 9.0 9.6 9.1 8.8
Double Semi-Trailer 45.2 9.4 9.0 9.7 9.1 8.9
* in absence of our proposed controller.

Levels 1 and 2 automated vehicles are assumed to maintain minimum safe distance
gap in a string; vehicles dedicated to automated driving systems and vehicles equipped
with cooperative automated driving systems are assumed to maintain minimum safe time
gap in a string; vehicles are assumed to maintain minimum safe distance gap in a platoon at
each simulation time step to maximize road capacity without compromising safety or string
stability. Therefore, increasing demand up to road capacity would not impact outputs
(e.g., distance gap, time gap, speed, and acceleration) significantly. Demands exceeding
road capacity will spill back behind entrance.

7. Discussion
Existing simulation tools may overestimate safety and road capacity improvements
associated with cooperative driving automation due to not considering vehicle model and
vehicle-to-vehicle communication vulnerabilities on a large scale. This research modifies
a vehicle-following model for conventional vehicles, a longitudinal control function for
vehicles dedicated to automated driving systems, and a longitudinal control function for
vehicles equipped with cooperative automated driving systems, considering vehicle model
and vehicle-to-vehicle communication vulnerabilities to maximize road capacity without
compromising safety or string stability. Our proposed traffic microsimulation tool can be
used to verify automated driving systems and cooperative automated driving systems in
contested environments.
Drivers are assumed to drive in a single lane, and there is no lane-change maneuver,
while a lane-change maneuver can temporarily affect vehicle-following behaviors. Future
work can model other significant components underpinning a traffic microsimulation tool
(i.e., lane-changing and gap acceptance)
• model motivation for mandatory, active, and discretionary lane-change maneuvers;
• model mandatory, active, and discretionary lane-change gap acceptance;
• model before lane-change, after lane-change, receiving, and yielding vehicle-following
for each facility type (e.g., on-ramp and off-ramp);
• model lateral control for autonomous vehicles;
• model string operations (e.g., maximum platoon size, inter-platoon time gap, and
cut-in and cut-out maneuvers).
Electronics 2021, 10, 1994 25 of 28

Microscopic measures (e.g., distance headway and time headway) can be aggregated
to macroscopic measures (e.g., density and flow) as k , 1/s and q = 3600 × h̄, where k is
density (veh/ft), and s̄ is average distance headway (ft/veh). Future work can estimate
macroscopic benefits associated with cooperative driving automation (e.g., increase in lane
capacity) under various market penetration for autonomous and connected autonomous
vehicles. Table 16 recommends potential improvements to our proposed longitudinal
controller.

Table 16. Recommended control designs.

Cyberattack Future Work Description

Formulation Fault and Delay Most common cyberattacks can be modeled as fault (e.g., data falsification and spoofing
attacks) or delay (e.g., denial-of-service attack).
Detection Kalman Filter & Conventional fault-resilient longitudinal controllers are model-driven or data-driven,
Neural Network but not combined, potentially sacrificing accuracy or simulation speed.
Compensation Adaptive Controller Estimated distance gaps can be increased in proportion to cyberattack magnitude.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, S.N., M.P. and M.N.; methodology, S.N.; software, M.P.
and M.N.; validation, S.N.; formal analysis, M.P.; investigation, M.N.; resources, S.N.; data cura-
tion, S.N.; writing—original draft preparation, S.N.; writing—review and editing, M.P. and M.N.;
visualization, M.N. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This work was sponsored by a contract from the Southeastern Transportation Research,
Innovation, Development and Education Center (STRIDE), a Regional University Transportation
Center sponsored by a grant from the U.S. Department of Transportation’s University Transportation
Centers Program. The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for
the facts and the accuracy of the information presented herein. This document is disseminated in
the interest of information exchange. The report is funded, partially or entirely, by a grant from the
U.S. Department of Transportation’s University Transportation Centers Program. However, the U.S.
Government assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

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