Objectivity in Biblical Interpretation

Thomas A. Howe, Ph.D.

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Copyright © 2012 Thomas A. Howe.
No part of this document or the related files may be reproduced or transmitted in any form, by
any means (electronic, photocopying, recording, or otherwise) without the prior written
permission of the publisher.

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Contents
FOREWORD
PART I: OBJECTIVITY AND PRESUPPOSITIONS
1 INTRODUCTION
2 OBJECTIVITY: A SURVEY
3 PRESUPPOSITIONS, PREUNDERSTANDING, AND OBJECTIVITY
4 PRESUPPOSITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT
5 PRESUPPOSITIONS AND HERMENEUTIC METHODOLOGY
6 PRESUPPOSITIONS AND OBJECTIVITY RECONSIDERED
PART II: MODERATE REALISM AND THE OBJECTIVITY OF MEANING
8 HOW DO WE KNOW THAT WHICH IS?
9 HOW DO WE COMMUNICATE WHAT WE KNOW?
10 HOW DO WE UNDERSTAND WHAT IS COMMUNICATED?
11 CONCLUSION
ENDNOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY

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 FOREWORD
by
Dr. Norman L. Geisler

Biblical interpretation is facing a crisis of objectivity. More and more authors are surrendering
to the postmodern influence of relativism in interpretation. This malady is not limited to non-
evangelical theorists. The pervasiveness of postmodern perspectivism propagated through the
notions of presuppositions, preunderstanding, horizons, paradigms, historicism, and a host of other
terms attempting to identify the preconditions of interpretation has forced Evangelicals to question
the very possibility of a “correct interpretation” of the Bible and of communication in general.
Unless Evangelicals can articulate and reasonably defend a notion of objectivity that transcends
all perspectives and reaches beyond one’s own historical context to declare a Gospel that is true
and relevant for all people in all cultures, in all times, Christianity will continue to be viewed as
simply another point of view among the host of choices, all of which are seen as equally valid. In
the face of Postmodernism and Deconstruction, this book addresses head-on the question of
objectivity in general and objectivity in interpretation and will argue for and defend the traditional
belief that it is possible to have a correct understanding of the meaning of the biblical text, that
there is an objective meaning in the text that is accessible to the reader.
This book covers not only one of the most crucial topics of our time and the best book I have
seen written on that topic, but it is the only good contemporary, in-depth book on the topic of
objectivity in hermeneutics. As evangelicals who believe the Bible is the inspired written Word of
God, everything depends on our long-standing belief that we have an objective means of obtaining
the truth contained in His Word. But this belief in an objective hermeneutics is precisely what is
denied by the prevailing contemporary schools of interpretation.
Yet no evangelical to date has comprehensively and adequately addressed this pressing issue.
That is, no one has done so until this landmark tome by Professor Thomas Howe. I have known
Dr. Howe for nearly twenty years now as a co-worker, and co-author. He has a brilliant mind and
is a super teacher. This book is an excellent product of his scholarship.
Professor Howe’s deep knowledge of the biblical languages, theology, and philosophy have
enabled him to produce simply the best defense of the Evangelical belief in an objective
interpretation of Scripture. This is truly a milestone and monumental work on this vital topic. In
my forty-five years of teaching, I have seen nothing like it

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 PART I: OBJECTIVITY AND PRESUPPOSITIONS
1 INTRODUCTION

The Challenge of Conflicting Interpretations

As a student of the Bible, or a member of a Sunday school class, or as one who discusses the
Bible with others, chances are you have encountered people who interpret the Bible differently
from the way you understand it. If you are a Christian in the tradition of the Protestant or Catholic
church, you are probably quite aware of the fact that a Jehovah’s Witness would interpret many
Bible passages differently from what you believe and what you have been taught. In fact, if you
are a Protestant, you probably also realize that Protestants and Catholics differ in their
interpretations of many Bible passages. You would probably not even be surprised by the fact that
different Protestant denominations have different views on many passages. However, you might
never have stopped to consider the fact that not only do the interpretations of cults differ from the
interpretations of orthodox Christians, and the interpretations of Protestants differ from those of
Catholics, or different Protestant denominations differ, but interpretations often differ among
people in the same congregation, or the same Sunday school class, or even the same small group.
How can these differences be explained? How can we explain the different interpretations between
individuals from the same denomination, or the same church, or among close friends who thought
they believed alike? How can we explain the fact that sincere people often understand the Bible
differently even though they do not seem to have any differences in their basic beliefs or practices?
Questions and debates about the interpretation of various passages are a common occurrence in
groups of people who, for all practical purposes, seem to believe and think the same.
Interpreting the Bible is of special concern to Christians, and among those who are diligent
students of the Bible the problem of conflicting interpretations is a fact of deep concern. How do
people reach contrary and often contradictory conclusions? And how can I know whether an
interpretation of a passage is correct? In fact, in our postmodern culture, the more penetrating
question is, “Is there such a thing as a ‘correct’ interpretation?” And, even if there is a correct
interpretation, how can I know if I have discovered it?
Similar questions and issues have been the concern of the Christian church almost since its
very inception, and in an effort to arrive at what they believe to be a correct understanding of the
meaning of the Bible, theologians and philosophers through the centuries have studied the practice
of interpretation and endeavored to establish principles that would lead the interpreter to the
meaning of the text. As one commentator put it, “In effect, this is what historical exegesis has had
as its goal: total objectivity on the part of the interpreter so as to prevent injecting into the text any
meaning other than the strictly historical one.”1 ‘Hermeneutics’ is the term used to identify the
study of the principles of interpretation. In recent years, many books have appeared that not only
attempt to set forth the basic principles of biblical interpretation, but also address questions such
as those just asked. And scholars have addressed the many additional problems and issues that
arise when one considers how one can or should interpret the ancient text of the Bible.

Objectivity and Interpretation

Of course conflicting interpretations can be the result of a variety of causes. Persons may reach
different conclusions due to a difference in technical competence in the original languages of the
biblical text. Interpreters who are not proficient in the languages may not be able to deal with some
of the intricacies of the text and may be subject to inaccurate reading of the text leading to

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misunderstanding and conflict. Conflicting interpretations may be due to a shortage of historical
background information that creates ambiguity. And not every conflict is necessarily resolvable at
the present level of knowledge. A lack of historical background information may put a resolution
beyond reach until more information is discovered.
Contemporary hermeneutic theory proposes that many conflicting interpretations are due to
the perspectives or points of view of the respective interpreters. As one writer puts it,

interpretation is a constitutive aspect of human be-ing and that human life is inescapably one of construal. We inevitably “see”
the world through the lens of an interpretive tradition that delivers it “as” something; our reading of texts and our hearing of
others are conditioned by our situationality (our topographic and temporal locale) and traditionality (those possibilities and
ways of reading handed down to us). No discourse or interpretation is able to “overcome” these conditions so as to be able to
deliver the world as it “really” is, to provide a normative interpretation that is “purified” from such conditions. To privilege
one reading as normative (the one correct interpretation) would be to privilege one contingent situationality or tradition over
another—a move that would be impossible to justify precisely because of the locatedness of any such justification. There is not
a reading that is the reading of the world or a text.2

According to this approach, conflicts are generated because of the differing “situationality”
and “traditionality” that indicate the impossibility of a “privileged reading” or of the very existence
of “the one correct interpretation.” It is this kind of conflict with which we are concerned in this
present volume. This kind of conflict raises two important questions. First of all, how can we
explain the fact that seemingly equally competent interpreters who are apparently equally pious
and equally interested in discovering meaning arrive at conflicting interpretations? The second
question actually addresses a more fundamental issue: is it illegitimate to claim that one
interpretation is the “correct” interpretation? Is there no such thing as the correct or the right
interpretation of a text? If there is no “right” or “correct” interpretation, then the problem of
conflicting interpretations seems to loose its meaning. Conflicting interpretations create a problem
only if there is an interpretation that is the right one. The fact of conflicting interpretations seems
to create difficulty only if one attempts to judge between them in order to arrive at the meaning of
the text. In fact, everyone who comments on this question believes that his own interpretation of
the problem is the correct one. Even those who claim that differing historical, cultural, and
linguistic situations render the notion of a privileged or normative or correct interpretation
impossible believe that they have correctly interpreted the state of affairs. They confidently declare
that their interpretation of the problem of interpretation is the correct one, namely, that no one can
claim to have “the one correct interpretation.” Those who claim that it is impossible “to privilege
one reading as normative” privilege their own reading as normative. When, in the above quote,
Smith declares, There is not a reading that is the reading of the world or a text,” he presents his
own reading of the world as the reading of the world.
But, if our historical, linguistic, and cultural situation means that there is no one correct
interpretation, then this creates an especially serious problem for those who believe the Bible to
be the Word of God. If there is a Word from God that is communicated in and through the Bible,
then the fact that there are conflicting interpretations of what the Bible means creates a problem of
knowing what God has said. But, if there is no correct interpretation of the Bible, then there is no
specific word from God that must be discovered in the biblical text. The explanation of conflicting
interpretations, then, becomes simply the fact that different people prefer to understand the Bible
differently, and since there is no right interpretation, conflicting interpretations are equally
reasonable. Each person believes the Bible says what he wants to hear, and there are no grounds
for any one interpreter to critique the beliefs, perspective, or interpretive conclusions of another
interpreter.

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 Before the fact of conflicting interpretations can be addressed, we must consider the question
of whether there is such a thing as a correct interpretation. If there is a correct interpretation, then
is it accessible? But, the question of a correct interpretation is always predicated on the prior
question of the possibility of objectivity. When someone talks about having the right interpretation
or the correct understanding, she usually associates this with being objective. Objectivity is
generally associated with being detached and not allowing one’s own prejudices, biases, or point
of view to distort the meaning. Historically, objectivity has popularly been associated with the
natural sciences. A scientist is supposed to be objective and neutral when evaluating and presenting
the data. A scientist should be able to “tell it like it is” without reading into the data his own
personal point of view. He should just present the facts. He should be objective.
But, when it comes to interpreting the Bible, is it possible to be objective in this sense? Is it
possible to have an objective interpretation? In fact, is it even true that a scientist can be objective
in this way? To begin to address these issues, one must have a clear understanding of what is meant
by the terms ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity.’ Does being objective simply mean being fair minded?
Does objectivity mean neutrality? And if objectivity as neutrality does exist, is it even something
to be desired? The authors of one recent book on biblical interpretation claim, “Many writers have
pointed out that total objectivity in interpretation is impossible, and we acknowledge this.
However, total objectivity is not our goal.”3
Of course we must ask, What does it mean to have total objectivity? Is there a real,
distinguishable difference between being objective and being totally objective? And, why do many
authors assert that total objectivity is impossible? Although these authors believe that total
objectivity is impossible, they did not provide any argument to establish this claim. Nor did they
attempt to distinguish between objectivity and total objectivity. Rather, they make this assertion
as if it were a universally accepted truth of interpretation and as if their readers could understand
precisely what they mean. Did these authors assume that their readers could have a totally objective
understanding of their statement? Were they being totally objective, or assuming the possibility of
total objectivity in their readers?
Objectivity is a topic frequently discussed among philosophers, linguists, philosophers of
history, philosophers of science, literary theorists, and hermeneutic theorists, but their discussions
are often conducted on the basis of two unstated assumptions: 1) They assume their readers already
understand what is meant by the terms. 2) They tacitly assume that their readers can objectively
interpret their discussions about the impossibility of objectivity. In a recent book on objectivity
the author begins his introduction with a series of questions, one of which is, “Why should I seek
to be objective—to proceed as other intelligent people would do in my place?”4 The author
assumes, and perhaps rightly so, that this question will be readily understood by his readers,
expecting them to have a certain level of understanding of what it means to be “objective.”
Hermeneutics texts similarly employ the assumption that the reader understands what is indicated
by the term. Rather than assume that everyone understands what is meant by the terms ‘objective’
and ‘objectivity,’ perhaps we should survey the literature to see how these terms are being used.

Current Notions of Objectivity

A more thorough investigation into the nature of objectivity will be presented later, but there
are some preliminary considerations that will be helpful at this stage. The terms ‘objective’ and
‘objectivity’ seem to indicate a complex of notions that is not as simple or fixed as one might at
first assume. Lorraine Daston laments the complex and confused usage of the term ‘objectivity.’

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 Our usage of the word ‘objectivity’ (French objectivit; German Objektivitt) is hopelessly but revealingly confused. It refers at
once to metaphysics, to methods, and to morals. We slide effortlessly from statements about the ‘objective truth’ of a scientific
claim, to those about the ‘objective procedures’ that guarantee a finding, to those about the ‘objective manner’ that qualifies a
researcher. Current usage allows us to apply the word as an approximate synonym for the empirical (or, more narrowly, the
factual); for the scientific, in the sense of public, empirically reliable knowledge; for impartiality-unto-self-effacement and the
cold-blooded restraint of the emotions; for the rational, in the sense of compelling assent from all rational minds, be they lodged
in human, Martian, or angelic bodies; and for the ‘really real’, that is to say, objects in themselves independent of all minds
except, perhaps, that of God.5

Daston goes on to show that contemporary discussions about objectivity have “largely assumed
that objectivity is and has been a monolithic and immutable concept”6 and that philosophers have
treated objectivity as “a trans-historical given.”7 In contemporary usage, the notion of objectivity
seems to indicate that it is possible to have knowledge and certainty that is not influenced by one’s
prejudices or preconceived ideas. In other words, these terms seem to be used to refer to a
knowledge that is unmediated, a direct and immediate knowledge of the world or of the truth about
anything. As Bertrand Russell puts the point, “Subjectively, every philosopher appears to himself
to be engaged in the pursuit of something which may be called ‘truth.’ Philosophers may differ as
to the definition of ‘truth,’ but at any rate it is something objective, something which, in some
sense, everybody ought to accept.”8
Allan Megill identifies four principle senses of the terms ‘objective’ and ‘objectivity.’9 The
first sense Megill calls the “absolute” sense. This is the notion among some philosophers that the
mind is able accurately to represent reality without distortion. The second sense he identifies as
the “disciplinary” sense. This is the notion that objectivity is a standard established by the
consensus among the members of a particular research community. The third sense, the
“interactional” or “dialectical” sense, is the sense of the objective that is the result of the “interplay
between subject and object,” which, in Megill’s account, “leaves room for the subjectivity of the
knower.”10 The fourth sense in Megill’s enumeration is the “procedural” sense. Procedural
objectivity involves the establishing of rules which provides a standard of judgment outside the
subjective evaluations of individuals.
In his chapter titled “Why be Objective?” Paul Helm describes two senses of ‘objective.’11 The
first is what Helm calls “ontological” objectivity. This is basically the question of whether the
extra-mental reality exists apart from human perception or is the construct of the human mind. As
Helm puts it, “Does the character of the world change with the very fact that we are interpreting
it?”12 The second sense is the “epistemic13 objectivity” or “objective knowledge,” which, in
Helm’s words, “eschews bias, reliance on one-sided information, and the like.”14
Nicholas Rescher describes objectivity as “a matter of universality (or at least generality) of
recognition access, unrestricted availability to the community of standard respondents—in the
cognitive case rational thinkers, in the photographic case normal observers. Such objectivity calls
for seeking to eliminate the distorting influence of personal or parochial eccentricities. The crucial
thing for objective comportment is that another sensible person, presented with what is essentially
the same problem situation, would then say: ‘Yes I can see why he resolved the issue that way. In
the circumstances, I would have done much the same thing myself.’”15 For Rescher objectivity has
to do with a universally or generally accepted representation that is free from what he calls personal
idiosyncrasies or group parochialisms. Objectivity strives for a “sensible solution” that any rational
person would accept. Rescher contrasts his notion of objectivity with the “ontological” notion that
attempts to “get at the reality of things.”16 As he points out, “The salient contrast [between
objectivity and subjectivity] is not between objectivity and appearance as such; rather it is between

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actual appearance, no-questions-asked, and the normatively geared issue of what sorts of
appearances would count as appropriate in given circumstances.”17
Mary Hawkesworth points out that, “In the context of philosophical and scientific
investigations, an objective account implies a grasp of the actual qualities and relations of objects
as they exist independent of the inquirer’s thoughts and desires regarding them. In the spheres of
ethics, law, and administration, objectivity suggests impersonal and impartial standards and
decision procedures that produce disinterested and equitable judgments. Objectivity, then,
promises to free us from distortion, bias, and error in intellectual inquiry and from arbitrariness,
self-interest, and caprice in ethical, legal, and administrative decisions.”18
Even this small sampling seems to support Daston’s observation that “objectivity” is a complex
and multifaceted notion. However, even though there is a multiplicity of notions attached to the
term, there does seem to be at least two almost universally accepted characteristics that accompany
virtually every discussion of objectivity. First, there is a recurring theme in the discussions that in
some sense objectivity involves the notion of a neutral judgment that strives to be free from all
biases, prejudices, presuppositions, preconceived ideas, preunderstandings, or other factors that
might distort one’s understanding or conclusions. Objectivity is almost universally equated with
what Richard Bernstein calls “objectivism,” which he defines as “a basic conviction that there is
or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in
determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness.”19 The
second almost universally accepted characteristic accompanying the contemporary discussions
about objectivity is the rejection of the notion that objectivity is or should be an attempt to “tell it
like it is” or “get reality right.”

The Attack Upon Objectivity

Almost everyone who discusses the nature of objectivity attempts to qualify his or her account
of objectivity by distancing the definition or description from what seems to be the usual notion
that objectivity is somehow a right conception of the real world or a right representation of the
way the world really is. In other words, there is an inevitable attempt to distance oneself from a
naive realism, the notion that it is possible correctly to represent to one’s mind the way reality
actually is.

Attack on the Objectivity of Knowledge

It seems to be universally accepted in discussions on objectivity that it is impossible to be
objective or have objective knowledge in the sense of “getting it right.” The traditional sense of
objectivity as an unbiased and ahistorical “view from nowhere” has come under severe attack. As
one author asserts, “Not only has everyone his or her own pre-understanding but without such a
conceptual framework observation and interpretation are not possible. The only way to approach
an object such as a text with a so-called unbiased mind is to be mindless.”20 According to Gail
Soffer, Hans-Georg Gadamer “sounds the death-knell of the traditional conception of objectivity,
using the historicity of understanding to refute the possibility of trans-historically valid
interpretation.”21 Historicity will be discussed later, but briefly it is the notion that “historical man
always sees and understands from his standpoint in time and place; he cannot, says Gadamer, stand
above the relativity of history and procure ‘objectively valid knowledge.’ Such a standpoint
presupposes an absolute philosophical knowledge—an invalid assumption.”22
For Gadamer, understanding is possible by virtue of the prejudice (Vorurteilshaftigkeit), or as
David Weberman translates this term, the “essential prejudgmentladenness of all understanding.”23

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Gadamer explains that “the idea of an absolute reason is not a possibility for historical humanity.
Reason exists for us only in concrete, historical terms—i.e., it is not its own master but remains
constantly dependent on the given circumstance in which it operates.”24 Historicity, then, is the
historical-cultural context from within which and in relation to which humans encounter the world.
Gadamer refers to this phenomenon as Wirkungsgeschichte, “effective history.”25 We might call
this someone’s ‘historical situatedness.’ Because everyone encounters the world from a particular
historical situatedness the notion of ‘absolute knowledge,’ or knowledge that transcends one’s own
historical context, must be rejected. As Jean Grondin puts it, “The quest for universally valid truth
undeniably threatens to conceal the reality of understanding and orient it toward a cognitive ideal
that it can never in fact realize.”26
Feminism has also mounted a sustained assault on the notion of objectivity, particularly as this
is supposed to be operative in the sciences. Feminist writer Dale Spender declares, “Gone are the
days when we could believe that all knowledge existed ‘out there’ in the wilderness, merely
waiting for brilliant men to discover it and to make impartial records uncoloured by their own
opinions and beliefs. Like it or not, we have to come to terms with more recent discoveries (to
which feminism has made an enormous contribution) that human beings invent or construct
knowledge in accordance with the values and beliefs with which they begin.”27 According to many
feminist writers, not only is the scientific enterprise not free from the bias and idiosyncrasies of
the individual inquirer, but, “Claims of detachment, disinterest, distance, and universality merely
serve as mechanisms for male hegemony, substituting certain men’s perspectives for an impossible
‘view from nowhere.’”28

Attack on Objectivity in Interpretation

The rejection of the possibility of objectivity is not only directed at the traditional notion of
unbiased and ahistorical knowledge, but it is also directed at the notion of objectivity in
interpretation. And this attack on objectivity in interpretation comes not only from non-religious
or non-Christian sources, but from Evangelicals. . Randolph Tate emphatically declares, “There is
no such thing as a pure reading, an objective interpretation.”29 The rejection of objectivity among
Evangelicals has approached the status of a mantra. In their Introduction to Biblical Interpretation,
William W. Klein, Craig L. Blomberg, and Robert L. Hubbard declare, “No one comes to the task
of understanding as an objective observer.”30 Gerhard Maier asserts, “Since [the time of W. Wrede]
we have come to realize that such ‘objective,’ presuppositionless exegesis is not possible.”31 The
title of an article in a book on Christian apologetics reads, “There’s No Such Thing as Objective
Truth, and It’s a Good Thing Too.”32 Alice Ogden Bellis notes that there is an “emerging
consensus” among biblical interpreters that “objectivity is impossible and even dangerous.”33
Some theorists add the qualifying terms ‘totally’ or ‘completely’34 to their characterization of
objectivity to indicate the notion of being unbiased or free from all preconditions. We have already
quoted Moisés Silva who declares, “total objectivity on the part of the interpreter . . . does not
exist.”35 As if it were a universally accepted matter-of-fact truth, Bellis remarks, “Of course no
individual interpreter can be completely objective.”36 Other authors, while not using the specific
terms ‘objective’ or ‘objectivity,’ express the same notion by rejecting the idea of a
preconditionless approach, or a view that does not come from a particular perspective or
framework of preunderstanding. Duncan Ferguson defines preunderstanding as “the phenomenon
of perspective which the observer of any event brings to its meaning.”37 Ferguson goes on to assert,
“Whenever anyone attempts to ‘hear’ what the text has to say, that person inevitably hears and
identifies the sounds from within a prior structure of experience or preunderstanding. To doubt

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one’s own capacity to be free from preunderstanding which necessarily colors the perceptions and
interpretations of reality is the beginning of epistemological wisdom.”38 Grant Osborne affirms,
“The simple fact is that all of us read a text on the basis of our own background and proclivities. .
. . A close reading of the text cannot be done without a perspective provided by one’s
preunderstanding as identified by a ‘sociology of knowledge’ perspective. Reflection itself
demands mental categories, and these are built upon one’s presupposed world view and by the
faith or reading community to which one belongs.”39 Dan McCartney and Charles Clayton make
similar claims in their book on interpretation. They say, “Interpreting any text involves two
different types of assumptions. First, underlying all our thinking and interpreting are our
presuppositions about life and ultimate realities, our world view. These provide the basic
foundation for how we understand everything. Second are the assumptions which we make about
the nature of the text we are reading.”40 And again, Silva declares, “The very possibility of
understanding anything depends on our prior framework of interpretation.”41

Implications of the Attack upon Objectivity

There are, then, two notions that seem to attach to every discussion of objectivity. First,
objectivity is understood to entail a neutrality, or a preconditionless approach to the text and to
reality. Secondly, preconditionless objectivity must be rejected as a naive approach that ignores
the fact a person’s interpretive framework, historical situatedness, or world view. In fact, it is these
very factors, it is supposed, that constitute the means by which understanding is made possible.
Indeed, to assume that one can approach the text with no preconditions is just as much a
precondition in itself as any other precondition.
There are two significant implications for biblical interpretation that follow directly from these
two notions about objectivity. First, if objectivity is equivalent to neutrality, and no one can be
neutral without jettisoning the very preconditional framework that makes understanding possible.
So then, no one can approach the text apart from his own preconditional framework, and it is this
very framework that unavoidably influences his interpretation of the text. Consequently, every
interpretation will necessarily be a product, to some degree, of one’s own preconditions, and this
fact militates against one’s degree of certainty about having arrived at the correct interpretation.
As one text puts the point, “awareness of the problem should generate the appropriate caution,
both in respect of method and in the degree of certainty we attach to our ‘conclusions.’ We need
fully to recognize that our reading of the letter to Philemon (or whatever), however certain we may
feel it is what Paul meant, is actually only a hypothesis —our hypothesis—about the discourse
meaning. It is the result of seeing certain aspects of the text and providing what we understand to
be the meaning that provides coherence to the evidence.”42 Commenting on similar conclusions
by Rudolf Bultmann and Karl Barth, James Smart declared, “[Bultmann] and Barth were agreed
that it is impossible for any interpreter of Scripture to be uninfluenced by his theological and
philosophical convictions and that scholars who claim to achieve this are guilty of an unconscious
dishonesty.”43 So, the first implication is that no one can approach a text of Scripture apart from
his own preconditional framework, and this framework unavoidably militates against the
possibility of an objective, or totally objective, interpretation.
The second implication that follows is that, with the rejection of objectivity, there would seem
to be no grounds upon which to adjudicate between conflicting interpretations. If every
interpretation is the product of one’s preconditions, and everyone’s preconditions are the product
of his own historical and cultural situatedness, then there can be no correct interpretation, only
various interpretations or “readings.” Smart identifies this problem as following from the very

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perspectivism which he identified in Bultmann and Barth: “The danger inherent in this
development was that theological interpretations of Scripture would be its meaning for this or that
theologian. Thus, theological exposition, instead of penetrating to the one word of God in Scripture
that brings all Christians into fellowship with one another, would give each segment of the
Christian community the license to read its own theological convictions out of the text of
Scripture.”44
The historicity of Gadamer seems particularly inimical to the notion of a correct interpretation.
As James Reichmann explains, “That this view [Gadamer’s Wirkungsgeschichte] has profound
consequences for Gadamer’s truth theory is clear. He may not allow that a text can be definitely
interpreted, or that the fullness of its truth can ever be known. Or perhaps more exactly, one cannot
properly speak of a correct interpretation of a text. Fresh interpretations are always possible, and
each of these in its own way contributes to the rich, varied mosaic of tradition.”45 Indeed, the
rejection of the notion of a correct interpretation is not only seen as a consequence of the rejection
of objectivity, it is often a celebrated consequence among theoreticians. As one author put it, “in
spite of Protestant tradition, Scripture does not constitute an objective, fixed, and inflexible source
of authority. It is rather an authority which every individual interprets in the light of his total
experience and present purpose. . . . Instead of hastily condemning those interpretations that differ
from our own, we shall concede that other analyses of Scripture may be valid in relation to other
interpreters. . . . In short we shall insist upon adopting those types of interpretations that are most
productive of meaning for us . . .”46
Unfortunately, with the rejection of objective meaning comes a rejection of objective truth. If
truth is a quality predicated of propositions, and if, since propositions are texts that must be
interpreted, there is no objective interpretation, then there is no objective truth. This is the
conclusion of G. B. Madison in his book, The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity: “The truth about
what objectivists call ‘the truth’ is, as Nietzsche declared with uncompromising honesty [truth?],
that there is no such thing. Does this mean that everything is up for grabs, that we have fallen
back—O horror of horrors!—into the dreadful abyss of nihilistic relativism? Most assuredly not.
For we are certainly seeking to be truthful when we say there is no such thing as ‘the truth.’ There
is no good reason why we should allow ourselves to fall prey to the Cartesian anxiety, the
metaphysical either-or (either there is meaning, in which case it is objectively determinate, or
everything is meaningless).”47 And again Ferguson categorically declares, “None may claim an
‘Archimedean vantage point’ from which to peer at truth.”48 In other words, it seems that if there
is no objective meaning, there can be no objective truth. As Robert Greer puts it, “absolute truth .
. . is indeed elusive and ultimately unattainable.”49

Objectivity in Contemporary Biblical Interpretation

Evangelical Repudiation of Perspectivism
Evangelical authors adamantly repudiate the relativism that seems to follow from the
perspectivism of a Gadamerian or historicist type of hermeneutics. After a lengthy discussion of
the role of the preconditions of understanding in which they assert, “Interpreters approach texts
with questions, biases, and preunderstandings that emerge out of their personal situations,” and
that these preconditions “[i]nevitably . . . influence the answers they obtain,” Klein, Blomberg,
and Hubbard emphatically deny that this situation leads to subjectivity and relativism:

Following such a discussion of preunderstanding, one may wonder if we are doomed to subjectivity in interpretation. Can we
ever interpret the Bible in an objective fashion, or do we simply detect in its pages only what we want or are predisposed to
see? Can we only say what is “true for me” and despair of finding truth that is universal or absolute? . . . Recognizing the role

8
 of our preunderstanding does not doom us to a closed circle—that we find in a text what we want to find in a text—though that
looms as an ever-present danger. The honest, active interpreter remains open to change, even to a significant transformation of
preunderstandings.50

McCartney and Clayton, who also acknowledge the unavoidability of the preconditions of
interpretation, make a similar claim to the possibility of arriving at a “right” interpretation.

We will argue later that there is a right way to understand Isaiah 53 or any other passage and that the right way is indicated by
the nature of the text itself. However, discerning this is not a matter of escaping or suspending our presuppositions, but changing
and adapting them. We really cannot escape them. Since the things we assume are to us self-evident, we may be unconscious
of them, but they still determine our understanding, and without them there is no understanding. Any time we find “meaning”
in a text, we arrive at that “meaning” by fitting it in with our previous knowledge. And this involves assumptions or
presuppositions about such things as the nature of the text we are reading, the meaning of life, and how we know things. All
our interpreting activity in life involves assumptions, just as in geometry every theorem can only be proven on the basis of
previous theorems, and “self-evident” assumptions. Presuppositions form the basis of the “interpretive framework” by which
we understand things.51

On the one hand, Evangelical theorists acknowledge the role of one’s historical situatedness,
one’s world view, and the preconditions of interpretation that are inescapable and that inevitably
influence one’s interpretation, and on the other hand they shun the perspectivism, subjectivism,
and relativism that seems to follow from this approach; a perspectivism that is not only
acknowledged outside Evangelical circles, but is celebrated and promoted as the only rational
approach among many Evangelicals. But this stance raises some questions: 1) How can one at the
same time acknowledge the unavoidability of one’s preconditional framework and yet also retain
some sense of a correct meaning or objective truth? As many theoreticians have argued, the
preconditional framework seems necessarily to militate against the notion of objectivity. 2) Once
objectivity is abandoned, on what basis can conflicting interpretations be adjudicated, and is
adjudicating between interpretations even a desirable or reasonable task in light of a perspectivist
approach? Can the claim of a correct interpretation be maintained against the historicist
assumption? Let me illustrate the problem. Daniel B. Wallace makes the following comment in a
footnote to his discussion about the relation between aspect and Aktionsart of a Greek verb: “As
much as one might want the theology of a text to be a certain way, just to pull a grammatical
category out of the hat—to employ it without regard for its normal semantic situation—is not
responsible grammatical exegesis. Yet we all do this . . . partially because there are no unbiased
exegetes (though some are more biased than others).52 But an increasingly better grasp of the
parameters of Koine Greek is helping all students of the NT to gain a valid interpretation of the
NT message. This ‘valid interpretation’ is beyond what is merely possible; it has to do with what
is probable.”53 The problem that arises is that since, according to Wallace “there are no unbiased
exegetes,” then who decides what is and what is not “valid”? Even his discussion of the affected
and unaffected meanings involves the bias of the observer, and his estimation of what counts and
does not count in estimating the relevant evidence must also be affected by one’s bias. He talks
about the “undisputed” instances of an historical present verb, but according to whose bias are they
identified as undisputed? To whose bias does one appeal in order to decide what is a “normal
semantic situation”? The data of the text is not self-interpreting, nor is it conveniently labeled for
classification. Nevertheless, Wallace still insists that a “valid” interpretation is not merely possible,
but in fact “has to do with what is probable.” How can one justify the claim to a valid interpretation
in the face of an unavoidable bias?

9
 Perspectivism and Conflicting Interpretations
Evangelicals and the “Correct” Interpretation
In light of this seemingly wholesale rejection of objectivity, the possibility of a correct
interpretation seems to be a moot point. This leads to the conclusion that there can be no means of
adjudicating between conflicting interpretations. In fact, the very notion of adjudicating between
interpretations seems meaningless since every interpretation is relevant to the preconditional
framework of the interpreter. For those theorists who hold to the possibility of objective meaning,
this poses a serious problem. Many Evangelical interpreters claim that there is in fact a correct
interpretation of the biblical text, or at least one that is more correct than its rivals, and that it is
possible to decide which interpretation is better. Also, many Evangelicals claim that a correct
interpretation of the text is at least an important part of the interpreter’s goal, and the achievement
of this goal involves at least two lines of approach: 1) an interpreter must be aware of his own
preconditional framework and be diligent to maintain a willingness for this framework to be
challenged, reshaped, and redirected, and 2) an interpreter must employ the appropriate methods
of interpretation. As Robertson McQuilkin puts it, “One must not only have the right attitude and
approach; he must also use good methods and develop skill in their use.”54
But do these principles work out in actual conflicts? Interpreters who hold conflicting views
make claims and counter claims, appeal to Scriptures as evidence against contrary appeals, but
little headway toward a solution seems to be made. Everyone appeals to the same body of
Scripture, and everyone seems to propose that his own interpretation is superior to the
interpretations of his opponents. However, no one seems to convince anyone else, and, with the
rejection of objectivity, there does not seem any longer to be an objective standard to which to
appeal in order to resolve the conflicts. Often the combatants affirm an adherence to a
preconditional framework and a set of hermeneutical principles that are virtually indistinguishable
from their opponents’.

Interpretations in Conflict, a Case in Point

Conflicting Eschatological Interpretations
To illustrate the point, let us consider the claims of two Bible interpreters, Robert Van Kampen
and Fennis Jennings Dake. Both of these interpreters claim to be telling the reader what the Bible
actually teaches, and yet they arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions. There are two questions
being addressed in this example: 1) can an observer adjudicate between these conflicting claims,
and 2) can these conflicting claims be explained by different approaches and/or by different
interpretive methodologies?
Robert Van Kampen is an Evangelical writer and author of the book The Sign.55 In this book
Van Kampen claims, “I began this work with no intention of being sensational, but only with a
desire to discover God’s truth about the end times by carefully examining all prophetic Scriptures
and then harmonizing these in such a way that there would be no contradictions or
inconsistencies.”56 Later when he discusses his interpretive principles he says, “To have validity,
our method of interpretation (i.e., our hermeneutic) must be consistent and without contradiction,
and it must never be governed by a theological predisposition or school of thought. In other words,
if our hermeneutic is controlled by our theology, then the Bible can be twisted to say whatever our
theology would have it say – which of course is what often happens in the study of the end times.”57
Like any sincere interpreter, Van Kampen does not want his own preconceived ideas to
influence his conclusions. Rather, he wants to understand what the Bible says in itself, and he
believes he can somehow avoid the imposition on the text of his own theological perspective as he

10
studies the prophetic Scriptures. Like many Evangelicals, Van Kampen also believes that the
reason people come up with different interpretations is because they are using different principles
of interpretation or that they are using them inconsistently. He says, “Thus, it is axiomatic that
those who use a different method of interpretation (i.e., a different hermeneutic) will end up with
basically different doctrines and theology.”58
Fennis Dake is the author of the popular Dake Annotated Reference Bible.59 He was born the
eighth of eleven children in Iberia, Missouri in 1902 and was an esteemed Pentecostal preacher,
teacher, and author. In the mid-1920s, Dake enrolled in Central Bible Institute in Springfield,
Missouri.60 Over the years Dake’s ministry has had a tremendous impact in Pentecostal and
Charismatic circles. He has ministered to countless people through a variety of methods such as
books, radio, tapes, and pastoral ministries. According to the Dake Publishing company,
“Throughout his eighty-four years he pastored several churches, started a Bible school, and
lectured extensively. He also hosted a radio broadcast twice daily for thirteen years, answering any
Scriptural question posed to him. In the midst of this busy ministry, he managed to write several
books, including God’s Plan for Man and the huge volume of commentary notes in the Dake
Annotated Reference Bible.”61
Dake makes claims about his approach to the Bible that are similar to those made by Van
Kampen. Dake asserts:

We promise and guarantee that we will not change any part of the Bible to fit into our own ideas or those of
anyone else, but we will give you chapter and verse for everything we say concerning God’s plan for man. Let us
proceed with our study with an open Bible, and open heart, and an open mind to all that God says, and be honest
to lay aside old theories for the plain, literal, and simple Word of God on all points discussed.
Since the Bible is like other books in that it is written in human language, it must be
interpreted like all other literature. . . . One must understand the words and expressions in the
Bible the same as if they were found outside of it. There can be no special Bible logic, rhetoric,
or grammar. The laws of grammar apply to the Bible as they do to other writings.62

Employing their respective approaches and hermeneutical principles in the study of

eschatology, each interpreter, Van Kampen and Dake, arrives at a conclusion about the relation of
the rapture of the church and the chronology of the end-time events. It is not necessary to agree
that such an event as the rapture of the church is an acceptable doctrine of Christianity in order to
grasp the force of this example. Their respective conclusions about this topic serve only to illustrate
the point that, in this instance, it appears that the ideal of a “right” approach employing “good”
principles and resulting in a “correct” interpretation does not seem to account for the differences
in interpretive conclusions.
Concerning the question of the rapture, Dake concludes, “We have already proved . . . that the
rapture must take place before the fulfillment of Rev. 4–22, which describes the tribulation period
and the Millennium and the New Earth after the Millennium.”63 By contrast, Van Kampen, an
advocate of the “prewrath” rapture view, asserts, “The essence of the prewrath position is that
Christ will rapture His church immediately after He cuts short the great tribulation by Antichrist
and immediately before He unleashes His day-of-the-Lord judgment on the ungodly world.”64
Concerning this conclusion, Van Kampen declares, “Rightly understood, the prewrath view is the
only view supported by the New Testament if one’s hermeneutic is truly concerned about finding
the most natural, normal, and customary meaning of the text.”65 Yet Dake asserts essentially the
same thing about his conclusions: “In fact, it would be hard to understand how even one person

11
could fail to understand such a doctrine [his own rapture view] if he will be honest and believe
what is plainly written in these passages.”66

Comparative Hermeneutical Principles

As we have pointed out, according to the assertions of many Evangelicals, conflicting
interpretations can be explained by the conflicting hermeneutical principles employed or the
inconsistent application of these principles. In fact, both Dake and Van Kampen make the same
assertion about appropriate hermeneutical principles. They both claim that employing the proper
hermeneutic will lead to their own particular conclusions. The following chart presents the basic
principles of interpretation that each author advocates and claims to practice in his own
interpretation of the Bible.

Table #1: Comparison of Van Kampen and Dake

Van Kampen Dake
The first principle is that all Scripture is to be taken in Remember this: Take the Bible literally wherever it is
its customary, natural and normal sense (i.e., literal), at all possible. When the language cannot be taken
allowing, of course for obvious symbolism and figures literally, then we know it is figurative. Then get the
of speech (Van Kampen, Sign, 290). literal truth conveyed by the figurative language as if it
were expressed in literal language without the use of
figures (Dake, GPM. 42).

The second principle has to do with the context of a Often to fully understand a passage of Scripture, the
word, phrase, or larger passage. Sometimes that scope or plan of the entire book must be known. . . . If
involves careful understanding of the complete Bible the definite purpose of the book is not stated, the
book being studied, carefully interpreting a given idea purpose of the book must be gotten from the contents
or principle in light of the overall thrust and nature of and from the design of the Bible as a whole, as is clear
the book as well as in light of its immediate context in John 5:39; 2 Tim. 2:15; 3:16-17 (Dake, GPM, 43).
(Van Kampen, Sign, 28).

The third principle, equally important as the first two, One of the most fundamental rules of interpretation is
is that of comparing Scripture with Scripture (Van that of comparing Scripture with Scripture (Dake,
Kampen, Sign, 28). GPM, 43).

Fourth, antinomies are never acceptable, and the The Bible cannot contradict itself. Its teachings in one
importance of this principle cannot be overstated. An part must agree with its teachings in another part.
antinomy is “a contradiction between two apparently Therefore any interpretation which makes the Bible
equally valid principles or between inferences correctly self-inconsistent must rest upon false principles (Dake,
drawn from such principles.” . . . If God’s Word is GPM, 43).
inerrant, it cannot be self-contradictory (Van Kampen,
Sign, 29).

Fifth, it is recognized that many passages of Scripture, In some passages two distinct persons are referred to,
in both Testaments, have both near and far the visible person addressed and the invisible person
implications and applications. In other words, who is using the visible one as a tool (Finis Jennings
prophecy operates on two levels of fulfillment (Van Dake, Revelation Expounded, or Eternal Mysteries
Kampen, Sign, 29). Simplified (Lawrenceville, Georgia: Dake Bible Sales,
1977), 21. See also, GPM, 776).

The hermeneutical principles delineated by Van Kampen and Dake are so similar one might
be tempted to think that one of these writers copied from the other, or that they each took their

12
principles from a common source, perhaps an undiscovered and postulated “H” document (“H”
for Hermeneutic). Regardless of how they arrived at their principles, there can be little doubt that
they advocate essentially the same hermeneutical methodology, at least as far as their
acknowledged principles go.
Both Dake and Van Kampen claim to be reporting to the reader precisely what the Word of
God says. Both claim to be understanding the text in its normal, literal signification. Both claim to
have put aside their own theological presuppositions. They advocate virtually identical
hermeneutical principles, yet they arrive at diametrically opposed conclusions. Van Kampen
believes that the rapture of the Church will take place close to the end of the Tribulation period
just prior to the pouring out of God’s wrath which is followed by Christ’s return. Dake believes
that the rapture of the Church will take place before the Tribulation period begins. How can these
contrary conclusions be explained? The notion that these conflicting interpretations can be
explained by different hermeneutic principles seems to fail in this case. A popular response to this
problem that is widely advocated today in both Evangelical and non-Evangelical circles is that
these conflicting interpretations can be explained because the two authors came to the biblical text
with different preunderstandings or different presuppositions, that is, different preconditional
frameworks, and these factors determined how each interpreter understood the various passages.

Comparative Preconditional Frameworks

Recalling that each interpreter promised to avoid the illegitimate imposition upon the text of
his preconceived ideas, we might ask whether they were successful. An examination of their
introductory discussions indicates that in fact they have not only failed to avoid certain theological
presuppositions, but they in fact advocated certain presuppositions as the basis for their respective
interpretations. If the popular view of the preconditions of interpretation is correct, perhaps we can
discover the cause of their contrary conclusions by looking at these theological presuppositions.
On the one hand Van Kampen declares that he comes to the text with the presupposition that
the Bible does not contradict itself. He asserts that he will “harmonize” the prophetic Scriptures so
that there are “no contradictions or inconsistencies.” This is, of course, a theological
presupposition that Van Kampen brings to the text as part of his interpretive preconditional
framework. However, earlier in his book Van Kampen declared, “To have validity, our method of
interpretation (i.e., our hermeneutic) must be consistent and without contradiction, and it must
never be governed by a theological predisposition or school of thought. In other words, if our
hermeneutic is controlled by our theology, then the Bible can be twisted to say whatever our
theology would have it say – which of course is what often happens in the study of the end times.”67
On the one hand he asserted that an interpreter must avoid allowing his interpretation to be
governed by a theological predisposition, and on the other hand he asserts that a correct
interpretation must employ the theological presupposition of inerrancy. In his initial approach to
the text he has already assumed a certain theological perspective which he will use to interpret the
text. Whenever there are prophetic statements that seem to be contradictory or inconsistent, he
proposes carefully to examine them until the apparent contradiction or inconsistency is resolved.
This is certainly an approach that many Evangelicals would admit and adopt. It is, nevertheless, a
theological precondition that he brings to the text.
However, Finis Dake does precisely the same thing. On the one hand he says,

Nevertheless, whatever you do, should you have any doubts that we are stating sound doctrines, look up the references and see
exactly what the Bible says and believe it in preference to any man. You cannot go wrong with this kind of advice. But in doing

13
 this, be sure you adhere to what is written, and that you do not let preconceived ideas cause you to be biased on any point. Do
not try to make the Bible conform to your ideas.68

Like Van Kampen, Dake emphatically asserts, “The Bible cannot contradict itself.”69 But, as
we have seen with Van Kampen, the assumption of the inerrancy of the Bible is a theological and
philosophical presupposition. Nevertheless, the fact that both Van Kampen and Dake assume
inerrancy illustrates that each one comes to the biblical text with a preconceived theological and
philosophical presupposition through which each will understand the particular statements of the
biblical text. Consequently, contrary to their own claims, they in fact did employ their theological
presuppositions and preconceived ideas as a hermeneutical precondition.
Admittedly the analysis of Van Kampen and Dake is brief and perhaps not sufficiently deep to
reveal even most of the preconditional factors that may be at work in the minds of these
interpreters. Nevertheless, this example does seem to emphasize the first fundamental question
posed above, namely, how can we explain the fact that these two interpreters, employing the same
hermeneutical methodology, and sharing the same theological presupposition of inerrancy, still
arrived at contrary conclusions? First, the example of Van Kampen and Dake certainly shows that
interpreters do not always avoid the influence of presuppositions even when they claim they do.
Second, this example implies that there may be something else besides one’s hermeneutical
principles that could account for divergent interpretations. By this I mean that, two interpreters
may employ the same hermeneutical principles, and may have some presuppositions in common,
and yet can still reach contrary conclusions, and this may be because of some other, perhaps more
basic factors. Perhaps there are principles employed of which one or the other interpreter is not
even aware, or perhaps there are other, more basic presuppositions which are simply unexpressed
by the interpreters or of which the interpreters are unaware that affect their conclusions. In other
words, contrary to the common notion that hermeneutical principles account for conflicting
interpretations, it seems entirely feasible that different interpreters can employ identical
methodologies and still arrive at conflicting interpretations because of some more fundamental
preconditions of which they may not even be aware. It seems that the popular notion of the role of
one’s preconditions may be approaching the root cause of many conflicting interpretations.
Whatever the cause of the divergent interpretations of Van Kampen and Dake, the fact is, we
encounter these kinds of conflicts regularly. And the questions remain, “Is the popular account of
the preconditions of interpretation sufficient to account for this kind of conflict?” and “With the
rejection of objectivity, upon what basis can or should an observer attempt to adjudicate between
conflicting views?”

Summary and Conclusion

Factors such as illustrated in the brief example above have caused many theorists to question
whether objectivity in interpretation is possible or even desirable. The possibility of objectivity in
interpretation has been called into question by both non-Evangelical and Evangelical interpreters.
Cotterell and Turner assert, “Any confidence in the ‘objectivity’ of our findings must be further
called into question by the frank recognition that many if not all scholars would be prepared to
admit they are ultimately studying Paul (or Calvin or whomever) in order to understand themselves
and their God.”70 They acknowledge that this notion implies the danger of misunderstanding and
distortion, but they assert that this does not create a hopelessness in the interpreter’s quest for the
“discourse meaning.” The influence of the interpreter, and the lack of objectivity should, they
claim, “generate the appropriate caution, both in respect of method and in the degree of certainty
we attach to our ‘conclusions.’”71 This approach is typical of contemporary Evangelical

14
hermeneutic theorists. A multitude of similar assertions can be gleaned from both non-Evangelical
and Evangelical authors.
Both Evangelicals and non-Evangelicals attribute the fact of conflicting interpretations to the
preconditional framework of the interpreter. Of course this preconditional framework includes the
hermeneutic principles and methodology which an interpreter adopts. Non-evangelical theorists
generally applaud the diversity and multiplicity of interpretive conclusions. Evangelical theorists
generally affirm the need to adjudicate between conflicting interpretations and the possibility of
discovering the correct or a “more” correct interpretation. However, the question remains, Can the
claim of a correct meaning be maintained in the face of the historicist assumption and the rejection
of objective meaning? If there is no objectivity, if all conclusions are the product of equally viable
preconditional frameworks, and if everyone’s framework is the product of his historical
situatedness, then on what basis can interpreters adjudicate between conflicting interpretations?
On what basis can anyone claim to have “the correct” interpretation? On what basis can Van
Kampen’s interpretation be accepted over Dake’s, or Dake’s over Van Kampen’s, or both rejected
for some other conclusion(s)? Both seemed to employ what most Evangelicals would classify as
acceptable hermeneutical principles, and both assumed the inerrancy of the text. A closer
examination of the respective application of their principles might uncover inconsistencies, or a
more thorough examination of their respective preconditional frameworks might uncover the
presence of additional assumptions, but on what basis can either one’s interpretation be preferred?
If it is impossible to adjudicate between interpretations, perhaps it might be possible to
adjudicate between preconditional frameworks. However, does not even the adjudication between
preconditional frameworks necessitate objectivity? If everyone interprets the world through his or
her own preconditional framework, then the possibility of adjudicating between frameworks seems
to be impossible. Everyone would simply understand his opponent’s framework in terms of his
own, and any criticisms would be valid only within the framework of the particular interpreter.
The rejection of objectivity seems to entail the loss of objective meaning, and the loss of objective
meaning seems to entail the loss of objective truth. As William Lane Craig put it, “the
abandonment of objective standards of truth and rationality could only undermine the Christian
faith in the long run by making its call to repentance and faith in Christ but one more voice in the
cacophony of subjectively satisfying but objectively vacuous religious interpretations of the
world.”72
It will, perhaps, be helpful now to restate the issue with which we are concerned and the
direction we will take in addressing this issue. We will do this in a series of assertions:

1. Conflicting interpretations are often the result of conflicting perspectives.

2. Conflicting interpretations that are the result of conflicting perspectives seem to be

unresolvable.

3. This has led to the generally espoused assertion that objectivity is not possible.

4. However, Evangelicals almost universally agree that it is possible to have a correct

interpretation of Scripture.

5. Nevertheless, Evangelicals also almost universally agree that objectivity is not possible.

15
6. The rejection of objectivity is predicated on the fact that everyone approaches the text with
a set of preconditions that necessarily and unavoidably influence one’s interpretive
conclusions.

7. The fact of preconditions seems to be self-evident and undeniable.

8. But, if everyone approaches the text with his or her own set of preconditions, and these
preconditions necessarily and unavoidably influence one’s interpretive conclusions, it does
not seem possible to maintain the assertion that there can be a correct interpretation.

9. The recognition of the fact of preconditions seems to entail the rejection of objectivity.

10. But, the rejection of objectivity seems to entail a perspectivism that disallows anyone from
claiming that his or her interpretation is the correct interpretation, not only of the biblical
text, but of anything whatsoever.

11. Question: Is it possible to maintain a notion of a correct interpretation of Scripture in the

face of the seemingly self-evident fact that everyone comes to the text with his or her own
preconditional framework?

The above points are necessarily brief, and there are many other factors that may enter into a
fully developed presentation of the current state of affairs in the question of objectivity in
interpretation. Nevertheless, the above points set forth the basic contours of the contemporary
perspective on the issue. It is the argument of this book that it is not only possible to retain
objectivity while acknowledging the fact of the pervasiveness of preconditional frameworks, but
that objectivity is in fact unavoidable and undeniable. This argument will proceed along three lines.
First, it will be our task to investigate the notion of objectivity in an effort to discover its nature.
Is objectivity equivalent to neutrality? Is it possible, in the light of the preconditions of
interpretation, to have any degree of neutrality? Secondly, it will be our task to investigate the
notion of the preconditions of interpretation in an effort to uncover the factors that compose one’s
preconditions and to attempt to discover whether in fact preconditions are necessarily inimical to
objectivity. Thirdly, this study will propose an alternative to the popular notions of objectivity and
the preconditions of interpretation that will re-define the notion of preconditions in a way that will
restore the possibility of objectivity in interpretation. The argument of this book is that objectivity
in interpretation is possible, and that it is possible to resolve conflicts that arise as a result of the
different preconditions of different interpreters.

16
 2 OBJECTIVITY: A SURVEY

Introduction
In the previous chapter we set forth a general direction for our effort along three lines: 1) to
investigate the notion of objectivity in an effort to discover its nature; 2) to investigate the notion
of the preconditions of interpretation in an effort to uncover the factors that compose one’s
preconditions and to attempt to discover whether in fact preconditions are necessarily inimical to
objectivity; and 3) to propose an alternative to the popular notions of objectivity and the
preconditions of interpretation that will re-define the notion of preconditions in a way that will
restore the possibility of objectivity in interpretation.
Let us also restate the logic of our investigation:

First, we acknowledge that there are conflicting interpretations of the Bible, and, as Christians,
we want to know which interpretation is the correct one. But, many contemporary thinkers declare
that there is no such thing as a correct interpretation because everyone comes to the text with his
own preconditional framework, and this preconditional framework necessarily impacts one’s
interpretation. Because it is impossible, according to these thinkers, to jettison one’s preconditional
framework, this necessarily obviates the possibility of objectivity in interpretation.

This argument may be schematized as follows:

1. Everyone comes to the text with his own preconditional framework.

2. No particular preconditional framework is universally valid.

3. But, universal validity is precisely what is implied in the notion of objectivity.

4. Therefore, no interpreter can be objective in interpretation.

5. But, if no interpreter can be objective, then no interpretation is universally valid.

6. But, if no interpretation is universally valid, then the concept of a correct interpretation is

at best relative or at worst empty.

7. Since there is no such thing as a correct interpretation, there is no means of adjudicating

between interpretations.

8. In fact, the very idea of adjudicating between interpretations is at best relative and at worst
empty.

Second, we acknowledge that Evangelical thinkers adamantly maintain that there is a correct
interpretation of the Bible, or at least one that is more correct than its competitors, and that this
interpretation is, at least theoretically, attainable. However, along with theorists who do not
espouse any particular religious commitment, Evangelical thinkers reject the notion of objectivity,

17
or what some call “total objectivity,” and likewise assert that everyone comes to the text with his
or her own preconditional framework.

Third, we acknowledge that if contemporary thinkers are correct in claiming that our
preconditional frameworks are unavoidable, and that if they are correct that these preconditional
frameworks obviate objectivity, then it does not seem possible for Evangelical thinkers to maintain
the notion of a correct or more correct interpretation while holding to the unavoidability of
preconditions and rejecting objectivity. This is the principle concern of this book, namely, how is
it possible to maintain the fact of the preconditional framework of every interpreter and at the same
time maintain the possibility of objectivity in interpretation?

To begin to address these questions, this chapter will investigate the nature of objectivity in
contemporary thought. From this starting point, this and subsequent chapters will include a survey
of the general notions of objectivity qua objectivity as this relates to the disciplines of natural
science, history, language, and hermeneutics. Since objectivity is principally brought into question
because of the unavoidable presence of the preconditional framework of the interpreter, we will
want to consider the relationship of the preconditions of interpretation to the question of
objectivity. Finally, we will attempt to evaluate the attacks on objectivity and the current views on
the nature and relation of the preconditions of interpretation to the question of objectivity.
We must make clear at this point that the use of the term ‘interpretation’ does not necessarily
confine our investigation to the reading of printed texts. Contemporary, postmodern philosophy
proposes the notion that every encounter in life is essentially interpretive. We interpret the actions
of others, we interpret the objects that seemingly exist outside our minds, we interpret the words
of others, we interpret texts, and so on. So, when we use the term ‘interpretation,’73 we are not
necessarily referring only to the interpretation of written documents, although this will more and
more become the focus as our argument progresses. The notion of objectivity in every life
encounter, even within oneself, has an impact on how we understand objectivity in the
interpretation of texts in general, and of the Bible in particular.

Objectivity in Contemporary Thought

In order to investigate the nature of objectivity in interpretation, we want, first, to understand
what is meant by the terms ‘objective,’ and ‘objectivity.’ The notion of objectivity is notoriously
difficult to define and yet most people seem to have an intuitive grasp of what constitutes
objectivity. In the introduction to his article on objectivity in law, Andrei Marmor says, “There is
very little agreement on what it [objectivity] means, and there is a great deal of confusion about
its different and often conflicting uses.”74 We may perhaps start our investigation with definitions
from The Oxford English Dictionary. One reason for doing this is that a dictionary is designed to
present the uses of words in a given language community. A look at the dictionary will at least
give us a starting point by setting forth the way the term is used in contemporary English. For the
term ‘objective,’ the dictionary gives the following definition: “objective . . . Opposed to subjective
in the older sense = ‘in itself’: Existing as an object of consciousness as distinct from having any
real existence; considered only as presented to the mind (not as it is, or may be, in itself or its own
nature). . . . Opposed to subjective in the modern sense: That is or belongs to the consciousness
itself; that is the object of perception or thought, as distinct from the perceiving or thinking subject;
hence, that is, or has the character of being, a ‘thing’ external to the mind; real.”75 The dictionary

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definition of ‘objectivity’ is, “The quality or character of being objective; external reality;
objectiveness.”76
The dictionary definitions are quite disappointing. Nevertheless, two characteristics of
objectivity may be gleaned from the dictionary that will send us on our way to consider the modern
notions: 1) Objectivity is in some sense connected with the notion of that which appears to exist
outside the mind, or what we shall call the extra-mental, and 2) the notion of objectivity assumes
a subject/object distinction. In an effort to refine our understanding of the nature of objectivity, let
us consider some contemporary explanations.

General Notions of Objectivity

In his chapter on contemporary approaches to interpretation, Moisés Silva makes the following
remark: “Throughout the centuries people have assumed without a second thought that our
perception of data corresponds exactly with objective reality. If we see a black horse, it must be
black—and it certainly must be a horse! After all, how could the work of science proceed without
such assurance?”77 Though this notion of objectivity may have been assumed by the average
person throughout the centuries, in contemporary thought, this notion of objectivity is a topic of
dispute, not only concerning whether objectivity is attainable, but regarding what precisely is
indicated in the concept of objectivity.
R. W. Newell, in his book, Objectivity, Empiricism, and Truth, asserts that the idea of
objectivity has been “handed down to us bearing two generically different faces”:

The first face of objectivity is an essentially technical conception attached to philosophy most influentially since Kant. It gives
objectivity two roles. First, an ontological role ascribing objectivity to ‘objects’, or particular bodies, entities, complexes or
states of affairs existing apart from perceptions more or less continuously in space and time, falling under the heading of
‘objective particulars’. And second, an epistemological role in which objectivity is ascribed to items of a different sort, beliefs,
judgments, propositions or products of thought about what is really the case, forming a general class of ‘objective judgments’.
The two roles become linked when objective particulars are seen as the topics of objective judgments and, thus linked,
‘objectivity’ becomes an explanatory notion.78

Newell’s second face is the notion of “impartiality, detachment, disinterestedness and a

willingness to submit to standards of evidence.”79 Newell characterizes this as “thought to be of
less philosophical interest . . .”80 This conception of objectivity, as Newell describes it, involves a
contrast between “prejudice, biased, or dogmatic judgments” on the one hand, and objective
judgments, which are “associated with impartiality, detachment, disinterestedness, and a
willingness to submit to standards of evidence” on the other.81
In A Companion to Epistemology, David Bell identifies two notions of objectivity which he
characterizes as fundamental: “On the one hand, there is a straightforwardly ontological concept:
something is objective if it exists, and is the way it is, independently of any knowledge, perception,
conception or consciousness there may be of it.”82 The second notion of objectivity is stated by
David Bell in epistemological terms: “According to this conception, the objective/subjective
distinction is not intended to mark a split in reality between autonomous and dependent entities,
but serves rather to distinguish two grades of cognitive achievement. In this sense only such things
as judgements, beliefs, theories, concepts and perceptions can significantly be said to be objective
or subjective. Here objectivity can be construed as a property of the contents of mental acts and
states.”83 Bell goes on to discuss the notion of the objectivity of mental acts and states. He gives
the example of the belief that the speed of light is 187,000 miles per second as a judgment that is
objective, and the dislike of rice pudding as a subjective judgment.

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 In the introduction to the book Rethinking Objectivity, the editor, Allan Megill, identifies four
“principal senses” of the terms “objective” and “objectivity.” We looked at these briefly in the
previous chapter. Megill asserts:

There is firstly a philosophical or absolute sense of objectivity. This type of objectivity derives from (although it is not identical
with) the ideal of “representing things as they really are” that has played an important role in the modern philosophical tradition.
. . . Secondly, there is a disciplinary sense, which no longer assumes a wholesale convergence and instead takes consensus
among the members of particular research communities as its standard of objectivity.84 Thirdly, there is an interactional or
dialectical sense, which holds that objects are constituted as objects in the course of an interplay between subject and object;
thus, unlike the absolute and disciplinary senses, the dialectical sense leaves room for the subjectivity of the knower. Finally,
there is a procedural sense, which aims at the practice of an impersonal method of investigation or administration. 85

Megill dedicates the bulk of his introduction to an explication of these various notions of
objectivity. It is objectivity in the absolute sense that is of interest here. In his exposition of
absolute objectivity, Megill asserts that absolute objectivity has a twofold character “of
‘representing things as they really are’: ontological (things ‘as they really are’), and
epistemological (since we seek ‘to represent’ these things, and can go nowhere without that
representation).”86
In his analysis of absolute objectivity Megill makes reference to Thomas Nagel’s claim that
absolute objectivity is paradoxical in that “knowledge that is objective in this sense escapes by
definition the constraints of subjectivity and partiality; yet if such a view is to be all-embracing it
must include the particular views that also make up reality as we know it.”87 Megill is referring to
Nagel’s claims which are set forth in his book titled The View From Nowhere.88
Nagel’s notion of objectivity is one of degrees. As he explains, “the distinction between more
subjective and more objective views is really a matter of degree, and it covers a wide spectrum. A
view or form of thought is more objective than another if it relies less on the specifics of the
individual’s makeup and position in the world, or on the character of the particular type of creature
he is. The wider the range of subjective types to which a form of understanding is accessible— the
less it depends on specific subjective capacities—the more objective it is.”89
As an example, Nagel asserts that the “standpoint of morality is more objective than that of
private life, but less objective than the standpoint of physics.”90 The means by which an individual
might attain a more objective perspective is characterized by Nagel as a process quite similar to
the hermeneutical circle. Nagel says, “we can raise our understanding to a new level only if we
examine that relation between the world and ourselves which is responsible for our prior
understanding, and form a new conception that includes a more detached understanding of
ourselves, of the world, and of the interaction between them. Thus objectivity allows us to
transcend our particular viewpoint and develop an expanded consciousness that takes in the world
more fully.”91
Andrei Marmor articulates three concepts of objectivity: semantic objectivity, metaphysical
objectivity, and logical objectivity. For Marmor, a statement qualifies as semantically objective “if
and only if it is a statement about an object.”92 If a statement is about a speaker’s own “tastes,
desires, perceptions, and so on,” it is said to be subjective. A statement is objective in the
metaphysical sense, according to Marmor, “if, and only if, there exist objects of the kind
purportedly described by that type of statements; and a class of statements is subjective if no such
objects exist in the world.”93 Marmor’s third kind of objectivity, logical objectivity, “holds that a
given class of statements is objective if and only if each and every statement in that class has a
determinate truth value.”94

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 Nicholas Rescher has dedicated an entire book to objectivity: Objectivity: The Obligations of
Impersonal Reason. Although a comprehensive grasp of Rescher’s notion of objectivity would
involve a synopsis of his entire book, he does, nevertheless, set forth two senses of the objectivity
of claims and contentions: 1) The first sort of objectivity, according to Rescher, is what he calls
ontological objectivity. He says ontological objectivity “is object-oriented. It relates to an aspect
of subject matter, namely, whether the claims at issue deal with actual existents—with concretely
realized objects in the real world rather than with mere phenomena or impressions or speculative
possibilities and comparable things of the mind.”95 2) For Rescher, however, the second mode of
objectivity which he describes is, in his discussion, “presently more relevant.”96 This second mode
he identifies as epistemic. For Rescher, “It relates to the appropriateness of claims or contentions,
addressing the question of whether a claim is impersonally and generically cogent rather than
personal and idiosyncratic—whether it holds not just for me (egocentric subjectivity) or for some
of us (parochial subjectivity) but for all of us (impersonal or interpersonal objectivity).”97 For
Rescher, this mode of objectivity “pivots on the way the claim is substantiated and supported—
namely without the introduction of any personal biases or otherwise distortive individual
idiosyncracies, preferences, predilections, etc.”98 Epistemic objectivity, then, involves “rational
appropriateness” and “consists in proceeding in such a way that people at large—or at any rate the
reasonable ones among them—will see the sense of it because any sensible person possessed of
the relevant information would do the same.”99
Rescher lists six tendencies and pressures in a person that might “deflect” him from being
objective:

• prejudices and “passions”: hatred, fear, envy, greed, etc.

• conformity: just “going with the flow” to do the popularly done thing rather than thinking things
through
• personal affinity, loyalty and affective involvement with particular individuals and cliques
• ideological or political allegiances
• personal bias: given credit or discredit by appreciation or “symbolic” connection rather than on
merit
• “wishful thinking”: being guided by our own desires and conveniences rather than by evidence
and argument100

Many of these factors are included in what other theorists call someone’s point of view,
perspective, or world view. Rescher is not claiming that objectivity somehow escapes every point
of view. Using the analogy of scenery painting, Rescher points out that there is “no feasible way
of a painting’s depicting a scene except from a particular vantage point.”101 Likewise, objectivity
is not a “view from nowhere.” Rather, Rescher asserts, “what is at issue with objectivity is not
point-of-view-lessness but what might be characterized as photographic accuracy—trying to
represent pretty much what any normal observer would recognize as a depiction of that scene from
that point of view.”102
This survey seems repeat the same two basic characteristics that we have already identified: 1)
Objectivity is in some sense connected with the notion of that which appears to exist outside the
mind, or what we shall call the extra-mental, and 2) the notion of objectivity assumes a

21
subject/object distinction. These discussions also seem to add a third characteristic: 3) Objectivity,
at least in the epistemological sense, is associated with the notion of “getting it right” or
“representing the world as it is in itself.”

The Basic Problem of Objectivity

It is the third characteristic of objectivity listed above that has become the primary target of
attack. Roger Trigg has presented the problem of objectivity in general terms.

We cannot talk or think about reality without talking or thinking about it. This is a truism which seems almost too boring to
bother about. We cannot have a conception of something without employing the conceptual scheme we have at our disposal.
Yet this obvious point very often provides the starting point for major philosophical doctrines about the relationship between
thought and reality, between what there is and what we think there is. Anyone who starts off with the twin notions of thought,
or concepts, and reality, may think that the major problem is how we match the two. Our concepts are, we may think, like a
vast jigsaw, and the object of the exercise is to fit them together, producing new ones if necessary, so that a picture is constructed
which will exactly mirror reality. The snag is that it is normally possible to compare a jigsaw with the original on the box to
make sure it is accurate. The relationship of our concepts to reality does not allow the same kind of comparison. To go back to
our truism, there is no way of picturing reality without picturing it. We cannot conceptualize reality and then check the concepts
we have produced against reality. It is self-defeating to attempt to think of reality as it exists beyond our thoughts. There is no
way that we can somehow hold our concepts in suspense, while we compare them with reality.103

The problem of one’s perception, one’s view of things, the structure in the mind that enables
the person to make sense of what is perceived, these are the facts which have been seen as the
fundamental problem of the notion of objectivity. Every perceiver has his own way of looking at
the world. Everyone has his own perspective. Everyone has his own interpretation. The idea that
someone’s interpretation is objective and true, and someone else’s is subjective and false, is
outmoded, unverifiable, and unfashionable. The basic problem of objectivity is the assumption
that, in order to be objective, one must have a view that is not affected by a point of view—by
one’s perspective. As Thomas Nagel puts it, “An objective standpoint is created by leaving a more
subjective, individual, or even just human perspective behind . . .”104 However, it does not seem
possible, prima facie, to get outside one’s self to view the world. According to Nagel and a host
of others, “the attempt to give a complete account of the world in objective terms detached from
these perspectives inevitably leads to false reductions or to outright denial that certain patently real
phenomena exist at all.”105 In other words, there is no such thing as a view from nowhere.
This is the principle problem of the notion of objectivity, and some areas of the debate are
more removed from the questions of objectivity in hermeneutics, and some are more directly
relevant. The objectivity debate rages in three disciplines that are particularly relevant to biblical
hermeneutics. The first is the notion of objectivity in natural science. Objectivity in science is
important for biblical hermeneutics because the general notion of objectivity principally takes as
its paradigmatic character the notion of objectivity in science. Scientific objectivity is seen, at least
on a popular level, as the ideal of what objective knowledge ought to be. The ubiquitous
expression, scientific knowledge, or the characterization of any conclusion in virtually any
endeavor as scientific is almost universally held to indicate the accuracy, reliability, and unbiased
objectivity of claims. Virtually every discipline seeks to attain the legitimating stamp of being
scientific. Consequently, it will be important to investigate the nature of objectivity in science.
Secondly, the notion of objectivity in the philosophy of history is pertinent to hermeneutics,
and biblical hermeneutics in particular, because the Bible is an historical book. Among
evangelicals, the Bible is understood to be the revelation of God through the historical record
contained in its pages. If objective knowledge of history is out of reach, this is particularly
problematic for Christianity that is based on the historical record of the Bible. Additionally, the

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problem of historicism poses a serious obstacle to the possibility of objective knowledge. The fact
that every interpreter investigates history from his own historical situatedness raises the question
of whether an interpreter’s understanding of history is simply a view from his own place within
history.
Objectivity in language is important for biblical hermeneutics since the Bible was written in
languages that were tied to particular ancient cultures. The problem of objectivity is particularly
significant to questions of meaning. Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny have pointed out that, “It is
in semantics, or ‘the theory of meaning’, that the theoretical and conceptual chaos mentioned above
is most striking.”106 If meaning is determined by the language community or if the culture and
language of a group determines how that group views reality, and if either meaning or culture-
determined perspectives are incommensurable from culture to culture, then there seems to be an
insurmountable obstacle to the possibly of maintaining an objective or correct interpretation of the
biblical text.
Each of these areas of investigation are critical to an understanding of the possibility of
objectivity in hermeneutics. As Heracleitus said, “It is necessary for men who love wisdom to have
knowledge of very many things.”107 Consequently, the notion of objectivity in other disciplines
may be equally important to a well rounded biblical hermeneutic. However, the notions and
problems of objectivity in natural science, history, and language are, in a sense, foundational to
debates about objectivity in any other discipline. Since the notion of objectivity in natural science
has virtually become the universally accepted paradigm for defining the notion of objectivity, our
investigation will begin here.

Objectivity and Science

The question of objectivity has taken its particular significance from natural science and has
been the topic of much debate in the philosophy of science. As Donald MacKay observes, “In
recent years a popular target has been the ideal of objectivity–of value-free (or better value-
invariant) knowledge–as the normative goal of the scientist. More extreme writers such as
Feyerabend have even questioned whether rationality itself is not overrated in science; but among
much less adventurous spirits it has become something of a cliché that even physical science is not
guaranteed to yield objective value-invariant knowledge about the world.”108 The importance of
the question of objectivity in natural science is seen in that natural science itself is a major
influence in our society. J. P. Moreland observes, “Undoubtedly the most important influence
shaping the modern world is science.”109 With reference to the possibility of objectivity in science,
Keith Windschuttle points out, “One of the major figures responsible for the current levels of doubt
about scientific knowledge is the American author Thomas Kuhn, whose very influential book,
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions,110 has been in print continuously since it was first
published in 1962.”111
The problem of objectivity in natural science touches upon hermeneutics in one sense in that
philosophy of science grapples with the problem of the meanings of terms that scientists use to
refer to those actual or theoretical entities that are supposed to provide explanations for observable
phenomena. Natural science often uses terms to refer to entities or forces that are not directly
observable to unaided human perception. As Alex Rosenberg phrases the problem, “Why should
a theory about electrons or genes we cannot see, touch, smell, taste or feel be any better at
explanation than astrology, New Age mystery-mongering or fairy-tales?”112 Rosenberg goes on to
frame this particular problem of philosophy of science in terms of language and meaning.

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 In another sense, objectivity in science parallels the question of objectivity in hermeneutics in
that many philosophers of science argue that the task of scientific observation of the world is
theory-laden. The theory-ladenness of observation is comparable to the relation of
preunderstanding to interpretation. It is argued that scientific observation is unintelligible apart
from the observer’s theory which provides the context of meaning. No one comes to the data of
the world apart from a pre-assumed theory or set of assumptions that directs the act of observation
and provides the context of meaning for all the data observed.

Objectivity in the History of Natural Science

The overt claim of objectivity in natural science goes back at least as far as Francis Bacon
(1561-1626). In his Novum Organum, Bacon asserted, “For it is our opinion that men could hit
upon our form of interpretation simply by their own native force of intelligence, without any other
art, if they had available a good history of nature and experience, and worked carefully on it, and
were able to give themselves two commands: one, to lay aside received opinions and notions; the
other, to restrain their minds for the time being from the most general principles and the next most
general.”113 Indeed, Bacon referred to his argument in Book I as an effort to “prepare men’s minds
both to understand and to accept what follows,” and that this has been done because the “platform
of the mind has been scraped and made level . . .”114 In fact, Bacon describes the mind as
“expurgata mentis,” the “pure” or “cleansed” mind. Evidently Bacon’s task in Book I was, in his
mind, aimed at producing a mind cleansed of all false preconceptions (praeceptio falsa) and
prejudice (praejudicium) by having scraped (abrasa) the mind and made it level (aequata area).
In other words, in order to grasp Bacon’s assertions, the mind must approach his claims without
any inimical preconditions. There must be detached objectivity.
According to Del Ratzsch, the Baconian view holds that “scientists begin by collecting
observational data in some purely objective manner, free from all prejudices on the topic being
investigated, having no prior preferences concerning what theory should be correct and not
hampered by any surreptitious philosophical or religious presuppositions. . . . The lack of any
presuppositions or a priori restraints on the process guaranteed its objectivity.”115 This notion of
objectivity for many scientists became the standard of the truly scientific approach. Israel Scheffler
declared, “A fundamental feature of science is its ideal of objectivity, an ideal that subjects all
scientific statements to the test of independent and impartial criteria, recognizing no authority of
persons in the realm of cognition.”116 According to Scheffler, the ideal of scientific objectivity
involves a commitment to “fair controls over assertions” which is “the basis of the scientific
attitude of impartiality and detachment.”117 And Donald MacKay refers to the “ideal of
objectivity–of value-free (or better, value-invariant) knowledge–as the normative goal of the
scientist.”118
The notion of scientific objectivity is probably the most popular, modern notion of science
outside of academia. The scientist is seen as an impartial investigator of the world who does not
allow his own perspective, biases, or prejudices to color or distort his conclusions. The scientist
simply reports the bare facts as he or she finds them. The scientist is supposed to “tell it like it is,”
to, as Lorraine Daston characterizes it, “Let nature speak for itself . . .”119 Helene Longino
observes, “Some part of the popular reverence for science has its origin in the belief that scientific
inquiry, unlike other modes of inquiry, is by its very nature objective.”120 She goes on to describe
two senses in which science is thought to be objective.

Science is thought to provide us with a view of the world that is objective in two seemingly quite different senses of that term.
In one sense objectivity is bound up with questions about the truth and referential character of scientific theories, that is, with

24
 issues of scientific realism. In this sense to attribute objectivity to science is to claim that the view provided by science is an
accurate description of the facts of the natural world as they are; it is a correct view of the objects to be found in the world and
of their relations with each other. In the second sense objectivity has to do with modes of inquiry. In this sense to attribute
objectivity to science is to claim that the view provided by science is achieved by reliance upon nonarbitrary and nonsubjective
criteria for developing, accepting, and rejecting the hypotheses and theories that make up the view. The reliance upon and use
of such criteria as well as the criteria themselves are what is called the scientific method. Common wisdom has it that if science
is objective in the first sense it is because it is objective in the second. 121

George Levine characterizes the popular notion of science with six points of summary, the first
being most relevant here: “science is distinguished (1) by the ‘objectivity’ and ‘rationality’ of its
procedures, and the disinterest of its practitioners.”122 As Peter Novick points out, the notion that
scientific knowledge must be “scrupulously neutral” and disassociated from any influence from
the perspectives, biases, and presuppositions of the scientist has been the dominate view of
scientific knowledge “[t]hroughout the nineteenth century, and indeed, for many, well into the
twentieth . . .”123 The notion of objectivity in science is the notion that an investigator must observe,
discover, and report the bare facts of nature without allowing his own personal perspective,
interests, or world view to in any way influence or distort the truth. This notion of objectivity has
virtually become synonymous with the characterization of knowledge as “scientific.” In modern
parlance, for any claim to be characterized as “scientific” is virtually a guarantee of its accuracy,
impartiality, and truth.

Objectivity and the Nature of Science

One of the primary reasons science is thought to be objective is that it works. As Rosenberg
puts it, “science has had a long-running record of continual predictive success, especially as
evinced in technological improvements that enhance our control of our environment.”124 The lay
person of the latter 20th and early 21st centuries generally believes that knowledge about the world
has increased dramatically in his lifetime. Levine included this notion as one of his six summaries
of the popular view of science: “[the results of science] are (5) progressive, the cumulative
acquisition of new knowledge of the real world by means of observation and experiment . . .”125
Even some contemporary philosophers of science, such as David Stove, acknowledge that, “Much
more is known now than was known fifty years ago, and much more was known then than in 1580.
So there has been a great accumulation or growth of knowledge in the last four hundred years.”126
This notion is held because of what is perceived to be the predictive success of science. Moreland
describes the notion of predictive success as “the realist view that science progressively solves its
problems by a fairly continual refinement of its theories toward a true description of the world.”127
Science works, the traditional view holds, because, as Novick recounts, science meant “in the
first place, a rigidly empirical approach: ‘observations’ were sacred. One could not go wrong at
this level. Error could only come from mistaken or overly hasty inference from never-to-be-
doubted fact; the road to any needed correction was additional observation.”128 And, as Shelby
Hunt explains, “Traditional empiricism placed great emphasis on the objectivity of specific
instances of empirical testing by scientists as the foundation for claims of science’s objectivity:
‘Science strives for objectivity in the sense that its statements are to be capable of public tests with
results that do not vary essentially with the tester’ (Hempel 1970, 695). The objectivity of specific
empirical tests was premised on, inter alia, the presumed existence of a presuppositionless, theory-
free, or theory-neutral observation language.”129 Scientific knowledge was objective because, from
his neutral vantage point, the scientist could observe the bare facts of the world, and on the basis
of these observations he could construct his theories that addressed and often solved real world

25
problems. Science explains how the world works, and enables almost anyone to control and
manipulate the world and to produce products that make life easier, safer, and more productive.

The Attack on Objectivity in Natural Science

But, it is precisely with the scientist’s observations of the world and theories about how the
world works that objectivity has come into question. Indeed, in 1977 Frederick Suppe declared,
“If any problem in the philosophy of science justifiably can be claimed the most central or
important, it is that of the nature and structure of scientific theories, including the diverse roles
theories play in the scientific enterprise.”130 That, to this day, the central problem of philosophy of
science has not moved away from the question of scientific theories is evidenced by the fact that
in the forward to the 2001 publication of David Stove’s book, Scientific Irrationalism, Keith
Windschuttle points out that Thomas Kuhn’s book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, the
purported instigator of the attack on scientific objectivity by an historical examination of the nature
of scientific theories, “is the most cited single book, on any subject, of this century.”131
According to Rosenberg, however, Kuhn was not alone in his conclusions:

Several opponents of empiricism came in the 1950's to hold this view about observation. They held that the terms in which we
describe observations, whether given by ordinary language or scientific neologisms, presuppose divisions or categorizations of
the world of experience in ways that reflect prior “theories”: the categories we employ to classify things, even categories as
apparently theory-free as color, shape, texture, sound, taste, not to mention size, hardness warmth/coldness, conductivity,
transparency, etc., are shot through with interpretation. Instead of seeing a glass of milk, we see “it” as a glass of milk where
the “it” is not something we can describe separately in a theory-neutral vocabulary.132

The problem of theories and objectivity can be described from the perspective of the popular
view of science. From the outside, the lay person generally looks upon the scientific enterprise as
involving the gathering of raw data, which, when observed by the scientist, naturally comes
together in patterns that suggest to the neutral observing scientist certain theories by which the
scientist can explain the raw data and integrate it into the store of knowledge about the world that
can be used as the basis upon which to articulate what comes to be known as the laws of science.
However, according to contemporary philosophers of science, such an understanding of the
scientific process does not bare up under scrutiny. Ratzsch describes the problem:

First, if data were collected simply as they came to one, with no selection principles, the result would be a collection of bits
of information largely unrelated to each other and probably irrelevant to whatever one was studying. But sorting the relevant
from the irrelevant inevitably involves some prior ideas about what processes are related, what causal principles might be
involved and what factors are not relevant. . . .
Second, data do not organize themselves. What category a datum properly goes into often becomes clear only when the
theory explaining that datum emerges. . . . But the fact is that scientists must organize their data, and they do so in accordance
with prior suppositions–or theories–about what is related to what, what items are of the same or distinct kinds and so on. 133

According to Ratzch’s scenario, observation is not neutral, but is intelligible only with
reference to some pre-assumed theory. The inevitable presence of a scientist’s assumptions and
world view provides the theoretical framework for making sense of observations. This is referred
to as the “theory-ladenness” of observation. According to Antony Flew, the term “theory-laden”
denotes “a concept, term, or statement that refers to, and can only be understood in the light of, a
particular theory.”134 Martin Curd and J. A. Cover give a slightly different definition, however:

Theory-ladenness: According to some philosophers of science (such as Paul Feyerabend, T. S. Kuhn, and N. R. Hanson),
observations are theory laden. What exactly this means is controversial, and whether it is true and what it implies has been
hotly debated. One fairly uncontroversial reading of the theory-ladenness thesis is that observation reports, if they are to be

26
 evidentially relevant to a theory, must be expressed in the vocabulary of that theory rather than in some theory-neutral
observation language. Some philosophers have inferred from this that because observation is theory laden it cannot be appealed
to as a neutral ground on which to judge among competing theories. Less tendentiously, it is sometimes claimed, under the
rubric of the theory-ladenness-of-observation thesis, that observation and experiment alone cannot rationally compel scientists
to accept and reject theories.135

A minimum notion of theory-ladenness, then, asserts that observation terms are relative to the
theories in which they operate. Thomas Kuhn asserts, “There is, I think, no theory-independent
way to reconstruct phrases like ‘really there’; the notion of a match between the ontology of a
theory and its ‘real’ counterpart in nature now seems to be illusive in principle.”136 And according
to Paul Feyerabend, “Experience arises together with theoretical assumptions not before them, and
an experience without theory is just as incomprehensible as is (allegedly) a theory without
experience: eliminate part of the theoretical knowledge of a sensing subject and you have a person
who is completely disoriented and incapable of carrying out the simplest action.”137 And,
concerning the nature of theory-ladenness, Harold I. Brown asserts:

In order to carry out meaningful research we require a research problem and some criteria of what evidence is relevant to its
solution. More fundamentally, we require some basis for deciding what research problems are worth pursuing. It is our accepted
theories, the systems of presuppositions to which we are already committed, which provide this basis. And because we always
do research within a system of presuppositions, both our problems and our data are thoroughly theory-laden.138

The significant point of the above assertion by Brown, and the claims of Kuhn and Feyerabend,
is that the theory-ladenness of observation is connected to a “system of presuppositions” which
forms the basis upon which observations are judged to be problems worth pursuing. Adding to this
the notion that our experiences are comprehensible only within some theoretical framework, and
the notion that the “meaning of every term we use depends upon the theoretical context in which
it occurs,”139 that “words do not ‘mean’ something in isolation,” and that words “obtain their
meanings by being part of a theoretical system,” the relation between the problem of objectivity
in science and that in hermeneutics comes to the fore. Observation is not neutral, but is determined
by the presuppositions of the observer. And theories are not “objectively” derived from neutral
observations. Rather, theories are the presuppositional constructs that provide the context and/or
framework of meaning for observed data.
Consequently, its seems that in one sense, the point of contact between science and
hermeneutics is the question of meaning. In natural science it is the question of the meaning of the
data of observation and their relation to scientists’ explanatory theories. In hermeneutics it is a
question of the meaning of texts and their relation to the interpreter’s explanatory
preunderstanding.

Summary
Throughout the Enlightenment, the methodology of natural science was taken as the paradigm
for obtaining objectively true knowledge. The natural scientist was viewed as the neutral observer
who presented reality “as it is.” However, the political use of science brought the neutrality of
scientific knowledge into question. As Appleby points out, “Nazi science could be both quite good
in scientific terms and singularly evil in political and moral ones. . . . As true believers in heroic
science (even Marxism was supposed to be scientific) the Soviets had built the largest scientific
and technological establishment in the world, and still managed to be industrially and
environmentally backward. The conclusion became inescapable: the inevitable progress promised
by the model of heroic science does not fit with reality.”140 Adding to this the fact that new

27
discoveries in the nature of language, which we will consider later, called into question the
possibility of a neutral observation language that could “tell it like it is,” and the notion of scientific
objectivity, in the sense of neutrality, presuppositionlessness, or theory-independence seems to
have become simply another relic of historical interest.

Objectivity and History

Of course our account of the history of the problem of objectivity in science assumes that it is
possible to know the facts of history. In other words, it assumes the possibility of objectivity of
historical knowledge. The notion of objectivity is by no means peculiar to natural science. It is as
significant in historical knowledge as in scientific knowledge. Scheffler points out that, “the ideal
of objectivity . . . characterizes not only the scientist, but also the historian, the philosopher, the
mathematician, the man of affairs—insofar as all make cognitive claims in a rational spirit. . . .
There is no ground for restricting the applicability of the ideal of objectivity to de facto science,
as contrasted, for example, with history, philosophy, or human affairs.”141 Objectivity in history is
a particularly important issue in biblical studies since the Bible presents itself as an historical book.
Any problems with objectivity in history generally will pose a serious problem for objectivity in
the interpretation of the Bible.

The Notion of the Objectivity of Historical Knowledge

W. H. Walsh has declared that “at once the most important and the most baffling topic in
critical philosophy of history [is] the problem of historical objectivity.”142 Many philosophers of
history have come to reject the notion of objectivity in historical knowledge. According to Mark
Bevir, “There are all sorts of reasons for rejecting the possibility of objective knowledge of the
past. But one reason has become particularly prominent in the latter half of the twentieth century.
In general terms, the argument is that we cannot have objective historical knowledge because we
do not have access to a given past against which to judge rival interpretations.”143 And Keith
Jenkins declares, “For the attempt to pass off the study of history in the form of the ostensibly
disinterested scholarship of academics studying the past objectively and ‘for its own sake’ as
‘proper’ history, is now unsustainable.”144
Gilbert Garraghan defined historical objectivity as “such a detached and neutral attitude in the
historian as enables him to deal with his material in the light of the evidence alone.”145 J. J.
Jusserand, in his book The Writing of History, provides a quote from Francois de Salignac Fénelon
(1651-1715) to the effect that the historian must be absolutely neutral: “The good historian belongs
to no time or country; though he lives his own, he never flatters it in any respect. The French
historian must remain neutral between France and England; he must as willingly praise Talbot as
Du Guesclin; he renders the same justice to the military talents of the Prince of Wales (the Black
Prince) as to the wisdom of Charles V.”146
Probably the best recent summary statement of the notion of historical objectivity has been
presented by Peter Novick. Although it is a long quote, it will be immensely helpful in grasping
both the notion of historical objectivity and the problems with its possibility.

The principle elements of the idea [of objectivity] are well known and can be briefly recapitulated. The assumptions on
which it rests include a commitment to the reality of the past, and to truth as correspondence to that reality; a sharp separation
between knower and known, between fact and value, and, above all, between history and fiction. Historical facts are seen as
prior to and independent of interpretation: the value of an interpretation is judged by how well it accounts for the facts; if
contradicted by the facts, it must be abandoned. Truth is one, not perspectival. Whatever patterns exist in history are “found,”
not “made.” Though successive generations of historians might, as their perspectives shifted, attribute different significance to
events in the past, the meaning of those events was unchanging.

28
 The objective historian’s role is that of a neutral, or disinterested, judge; it must never degenerate into that of advocate or,
even worse, propagandist. The historian’s conclusions are expected to display the standard judicial qualities of balance and
evenhandedness. As with the judiciary, these qualities are guarded by the insulation of the historical profession from social
pressure or political influence, and by individual historian avoiding partisanship or bias—not having any investment in arriving
at one conclusion rather than another. Objectivity is held to be at grave risk when history is written for utilitarian purposes.
One corollary of all of this is that historians, as historians, must purge themselves of external loyalties: the historian’s primary
allegiance is to “the objective historical truth,” and to professional colleagues who share a commitment to cooperative,
cumulative efforts to advance toward that goal.147

The influence of the traditional notion of scientific objectivity is evident not only in the
statements about neutrality of Garraghan and Fénelon, but is also evident in Novick’s
characterization of historical objectivity. The value of an historical interpretation is “judged by
how well it accounts for the facts” that “are seen as prior to and independent of interpretation.”
The historian must be a “neutral, or disinterested judge” not influenced by “partisanship or bias.”
As the popular view of science holds, that the scientist “tells it like it is,” the ideal of historical
objectivity, according to Novick, is that the historian must “tell it like it was.” Garraghan made
this same statement almost 40 years earlier, “the historian must record a thing ‘as it really
occurred.’”148
Michael Stanford provides a more succinct statement about historical objectivity: “What we
mean by ‘objectivity’ is that our ideas, judgments and statements should be formed wholly from
the object (whatever it may be) under consideration. Their truth or falsity should be independent
of what anyone thinks or feels. By contrast, subjective ideas, judgments and statements arise from
the nature of the knowing subject; their truth or falsity is not independent of what he or she thinks
or feels.”149

The Problem of Objectivity in Historical Knowledge

The problem of objectivity in historical knowledge is analogous to the problem of the theory-
ladenness of observation in science. It is the problem of the theory-ladenness, so to speak, of the
historian. As early as 1940 Garraghan had pinpointed the problem: “But not all the doings of men
as social beings are history. To be so, they must show importance or significance–which are
obviously relative terms. The idea of historical significance postulates standards of measurement.
What appears significant to one historian may not appear so to another. Philosophy of life, personal
viewpoints and prepossessions, the scope of one’s writing–for example, whether political or
military or economic–can all be factors in determining for the historian whether he is to regard a
given datum as significant or not.”150 That is, the perspective of the historian presents a problem
for objectivity in historical knowledge in the same way that the perspective of the scientist presents
a problem for scientific observation. Garraghan attempts to obviate this difficulty by declaring,
“Objectivity does not require that the historian be actually free from prepossessions or prejudice–
racial, political, religious, or of any other kind.”151 Such a blank slate, so to speak, is, in
Garraghan’s words, “a psychological impossibility.”152 Rather, what is required of the objective
historian, according to Garraghan, is that he “allow none of his prepossessions and prejudices,
whatever they be, to cloud his judgment, to draw him beyond the evidence, to distort his estimate
of persons and things.”153
However, this seems to be the very problem with the possibility of objectivity, for how would
a historian know whether his “prepossessions” are in fact clouding his judgment or drawing him
beyond the evidence unless he possess a “prepossession free” point of view by which to compare?
In his introduction to the philosophy of history of St. Augustine, Ronald Nash observes, “One
thing that will become clear as we proceed is that no speculative philosopher (no matter how many

29
and how loud his claims to the contrary) derives his pattern of history solely from the historical
data. No matter how much data Hegel, Marx, Spengler, Toynbee, and the rest may appeal to, their
theories, in the final analysis, are imposed upon history, not derived from it. . . . If nothing else,
perhaps Augustine should be given some credit for being more conscious than many of those who
followed him that no philosophical principles of history can be abstracted from human
experience.”154 The problem of objectivity is precisely that no one, not even the historian, is ever
free from the “prepossessions” or presuppositions that are part of his very make-up. As G. F. W.
Hegel pointed out, “Even the ordinary, the ‘impartial’ historiographer, who believes and professes
that he maintains a simply receptive attitude; surrendering himself only to the data supplied him–
is by no means passive as regards the exercise of his thinking powers. He brings his categories
with him, and sees the phenomena presented to his mental vision, exclusively through these
media.”155
For example, Mark Bevir briefly explains how empiricists employ either a methodology of
verificationism or falsificationism by which to determine whether a given historical interpretation
is true or false: “Verificationists defend the ideal of vindication, arguing that we can decode all
reasonable interpretations into a series of observational statements, and we can see whether or not
these observational statements are true because they refer to pure perceptions. . . . In contrast,
falsificationists deny that any number of positive observations can prove an interpretation to be
true. Thus, they defend the ideal of refutation, arguing that the objective status of interpretations
derives from our failure to make observations showing them to be false.”156 Bevir rejects either of
these alternatives because he agrees with Hans-George Gadamer, Michael Foucault, and Jacques
Derrida that there are no “pure experiences.” As Bevir puts it,

The nature of perception depends on the perceiver. A sensation can become the object of a perception or an experience only
when our intelligence identifies it as a particular sensation both distinct from, and in relation to, other sensations. We become
aware of a sensation only when we attend to it, and when we attend to a sensation we necessarily identify it, using abstract
categories, as a particular sort of sensation. Thus, perception always incorporates theoretical understanding. . . . Because our
experiences embody theoretical assumptions, our experiences cannot be pure, and this means that our experiences cannot
provide unvarnished data for determining the truth or falsity of our theories. 157

This aspect of the problem of objective historical knowledge is that the perceptions of the
historian are always involved in the process. William Dray points out that the American historian
Charles Beard belies the possibility of objectivity in historical knowledge “because historians,
unlike chemists or physicists, cannot actually observe their subject matter; because their
documentation of the past is fragmentary; because they must make selections even from the partial
record that is available to them; because they must arrange their materials in reporting their results;
because, in employing organizing concepts, they impose a structure on the past which it never
really had; and because what their study involves ethical and aesthetic considerations.”158
In the introduction to his work on the philosophy of history, Stanford points out that one of the
key concepts in history is “meaning.” Not only the student, but also the reader of history, indeed
anyone who is aware of the past in any way, must continually be asking the question: What does
this mean?”159 As was the case with the question of objectivity in natural science, the point of
contact between the philosophy of history and hermeneutics is the question of meaning. But, as
we shall see with reference to meaning in hermeneutics, the question is whether the historian can
lay claim to a grasp of meaning that is not the product of his own act of perceiving or the result of
his understanding by means of his own perspective?

30
 Objectivity and Historicism
The inescapablility of one’s perspective and its relation to the problem of objectivity in
historical knowledge has been identified as the primary problem of historicism.160 Jean Grondin
offers a helpful description of the conflict between objectivity and historicism: “Historicism . . . is
the central and most crippling problem facing philosophy since Hegel, namely, the question
concerning the possibility of binding truth and thus conclusive philosophy within the horizon of
historical knowledge. Are all truths and rules of conduct dependent on their historical context? If
so, the specter of relativism and nihilism lurks nearby.”161 According to Grondin, “the basic
doctrine [of historicism] is that every particular phenomenon must be conceptualized within the
context of its age. The point is to avoid judging other times by the standards of our own, and
instead to interpret historical events immanently, as expressive of their time.”162 Charles Bambach
identifies this approach as classical historicism: “Classical historicism was committed to the ideas
of value-free judgment and neutral perspective as the very essence of historical objectivity.”163
Yet, a “value-free judgment and neutral perspective” resulted, as Paul Kecskemeti points out, in a
“complete relativism as regards values; it [historicism] prohibited the direct application of any
value standard one held valid for oneself, as a private person, when talking about past ages. Such
direct application was held to be the arch sin which disqualified one as a faithful interpreter and a
scientific historian.”164
The crisis of historicism arises from the realization that historical phenomena can be
understood only in terms of one’s own historical situatedness. The term “situatedness” indicates
that anyone attempting to look back over history does so in terms of his own place within the flow
of historical development. Historical situatedness includes the historian’s own historical
circumstances in which he lives and thinks. Each person is located in a specific place, at a specific
time, in a specific culture, with certain social, political, philosophical, theological, etc.,
perspectives through which he or she perceives and interacts with the world around and within. As
Grondin points out,

if every age is to be explained by reference to itself, this same principle must hold true of our own age. Our view of earlier ages
must itself be produced by reference to our present, and it is thereby relativized. Our time merely represents one age among
many. How, then is any kind of strict science of history possible? In other words, how is it possible under the auspices of
historicism, now generally recognized, to formulate the idea of a binding and yet nonrelativistic truth? Doesn’t everything
dissolve into present-day perspectives and temporal conditionedness? How, if at all, is it possible to escape from the
hermeneutic circle of our historicity? These are the basic problems of historicism?165

All of these aspects of the life of a human being in the historical conditionedness of his world
can be subsumed under the notion of one’s historical situatedness, and all of these factors form the
grid through which the historian looks at the past. Since all phenomena can only be understood in
terms of one’s own historical situatedness, this would imply that the historical situatedness of the
interpreter binds him to his own place within the flow of historical development. Therefore the
interpreter of history cannot lay claim to an a-historical, transcendent perspective. If the interpreter
cannot lay claim to an a-historical, transcendent perspective, then the possibility of objectivity in
historical knowledge is a fantasy. Indeed, the very notion of objectivity becomes meaningless since
there is no standard of measure by which to measure the possible objectivity of any claims about
history.

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 Summary
It would seem that the same kinds of problems that beset the question of objectivity in natural
science arise with the question of objectivity of historical knowledge. At least the natural scientist
has access to the phenomena about which he attempts to make true statements. Not so for the
historian. The past is, well, past! And the historian cannot access these events to discover whether
a given report is accurate. Additionally, the historian approaches the study of the past from his
own perspective bringing with him his own world view that provides the context of meaning. What
is or is not relevant to a given historical judgment is determined by the already existing point of
view of the historian. Also, every historian does his work from within his own historical
situatedness. Historians are as much a part of the history of their own times as the persons and
events they desire to know. And, since each person or event of the past must be understood in
terms of its own historical conditionedness, so also the historian does his research from his own
place in history which is mediated through his own historical conditionedness. As Thomas Haskell
puts it, “Without mediation there is no experience. Except perhaps in the case of outright insanity,
we enculturated human beings never encounter the world in a manner so direct and primitive as to
be unaffected by the ordering influence of explanatory schemes, paradigmatic assumptions, frames
of reference, presuppositions, expectations, narrative traditions, memories, and other mediating
mental structures.”166 In other words, for Haskell, objectivity is not a question of having an a-
historical Archemedian vantage point, or a “God’s eye view.” Rather, objectivity is objective
within the explanatory scheme of the interpreter along the lines of Kuhnian paradigms. Indeed,
Haskell acknowledges his indebtedness to Thomas Kuhn: “My position [on the objectivity
question] owes much to Kuhn and is more or less congruent with the teachings of pragmatism’s
founders, Charles S. Peirce, William James, and John Dewey. . . . I endorse . . . one of the cardinal
principles of the pragmatic tradition, which holds that what truth requires is not unassailable
foundations, but self-correcting social processes.”167 Consequently, objectivity in historical
knowledge seems to be either unnecessary, undesirable, or unattainable.

Objectivity and Language

Of course both the study of history and the study of natural science employ language, either as
the medium through which historical documents relate the past, or the means by which the
scientists discusses and records his observations, hypotheses, and conclusions. The study of
language encompasses a range of disciplines, including sociology, linguistics, philosophy, and
more. The problem of objectivity in language arises specifically in the area of semantics.
According to John Lyons, “Semantics is generally defined as the study of meaning.”168 However,
the meaning of a word or sentence or assertion is communicated from speaker to hearer by means
of the signs with which both are familiar. Unless the speaker and the hearer share a knowledge of
the same sign system, communication is impossible, for the speaker will be producing signs that
the hearer does not understand. But it is at the level of the sign, particularly the linguistic sign, that
the problem of objectivity begins to emerge.

Observation and Correspondence

A principal factor in the attack upon objectivity is the persistent notion that observation is
supposed to yield a correspondence between the observer and the extra-mental world being
observed. Even Karl Popper, a staunch defender of scientific realism, argued that, “the realism of
science lies not in a naive correspondence between the empirically tested world and the mind of

32
the scientist, but in the rules of logic, in falsification and verification.”169 The supposed
correspondence between thought and thing is traditionally associated with a realist view of science.
As Moreland puts it, the first core tenet of rational realism is “the conviction that science uses a
correspondence theory of truth: a theory is true if and only if what it says about the world does in
fact accurately describe the world.”170 Lanier Anderson describes the correspondence theory in
terms of an “external” conception of truth:

The external conception nicely captures the ordinary notion of truth we use in daily life and theorizing. We routinely think of
truth as unique and bivalent, and in terms of correspondence to independent objects. Either it’s raining outside, or it isn’t
(bivalence); if it is, then ‘It’s raining out’ – or something equivalent – is the only true description of the precipitation conditions
in the vicinity (uniqueness); this truth depends on how the world is, regardless of my concepts and beliefs (independence); and
my belief is true iff [if and only if] it matches or captures how the world really is (correspondence). 171

According to Anderson, a claim, or perhaps a theory, is true if and only if its assertions
accurately represent the actual state of affairs. Anderson points out that the correspondence view
seems to be the “ordinary notion of truth” by which the average individual conducts his daily life.
Yet the correspondence view has come under severe attack, not least because all assertions and
theories necessarily employ language, and language is understood to be culture-specific having no
necessary relation with the extra-linguistic world outside the mind.

Linguistic-Relativity

Based upon the linguistic observations of Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913), modern views
of the relationship between language and reality hold that languages of different cultures “represent
a different articulation of the conceptual plane.”172 According to this position, a person’s language
community dictates how that person views and knows reality. John B. Carroll identifies this
position as the “linguistic-relativity hypothesis”: “The idea that the structure of one’s language
affects one’s thought processes may be called the linguistic-relativity hypothesis, because it asserts
that thought is relative to the language in which it is conducted. Sometimes, also, it is called the
linguistic Weltanschauung hypothesis, because it is asserted that a particular language implies a
unique ‘world-view’ or perception of reality.”173 George Yule identifies this approach as
“linguistic determinism.” According to Yule, “. . . your language will give you a ready-made
system of categorizing what you perceive and, as a consequence, you will be led to perceive the
world around you only in those categories. . . . in its strongest version, [linguistic determinism]
holds that ‘language determines thought.’ In short, you can only think in the categories which your
language allows you to think in.”174
The notion that languages reflect the way different cultures perceive reality differently was
developed by Edward Sapir (1884-1939) and Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897 - 1941). According to
Worf,

When linguists became able to examine critically and scientifically a large number of languages of widely different patterns,
their base of reference was expanded; they experienced an interruption of phenomena hitherto held universal, and a whole new
order of significances came into their ken. It was found that the background linguistic system (in other words, the grammar) of
each language is not merely a reproducing instrument for voicing ideas but rather is itself the shaper of ideas, the program and
guide for the individual’s mental activity, for his analysis of impressions, for his synthesis of his mental stock in trade.
Formulation of ideas is not an independent process, strictly rational in the old sense, but is part of a particular grammar, and
differs, from slightly to kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds–and this means largely by
the linguistic systems in our minds. We cut nature up, organize it into concepts, and ascribe significances as we do, largely
because we are parties to an agreement to organize it in this way–an agreement that holds throughout our speech community
and is codified in the patterns of our language.175

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 In Saussurian fashion, Whorf asserted that there are no pre-existing, universally fixed concepts
to which the signifiers (words, terms, signs) of a language become attached. Rather, language is at
once the instrument that reflects the divergent cultural perceptions and the shaper of those
perceptions. Whorf concluded, “This fact is very significant for modern science, for it means that
no individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain
modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself to be free.”176 Since different cultures “cut
up” reality differently, the language of the observer, his “observation language,” must reflect the
peculiar perceptions of the language community that constitutes the language of particular
observation statements.
As Yule has pointed out, modern linguists have moved away from the extreme forms of
linguistic relativism, or what Yule calls “linguistic determinism,” proposed by Whorf: “While
many linguists have recognized the extent to which languages are subject to variation, they have
also noted the extent to which all languages have certain common properties. Those common
properties [are] called language universals . . .”177 Franz Boas (1858 - 1942), who, by way of his
analysis of the structure of language of American Indian cultures, has been credited with
introducing cultural relativism into anthropological theory, nevertheless affirmed the universality
of grammatical structure: “. . . the occurrence of the most fundamental grammatical concepts in all
languages must be considered a proof of the unity of fundamental psychological processes.”178
The important observation from the above assertions of Yule and Boas, however, is that the
linguistic universals or the universal grammatical structures are properties, so to speak, of the
mind, not of any extra-mental reality. The acknowledged universality is a universality predicated
of the linguistic, psychological, or mental make up of persons, not of reality or of a supposed
relation between the mind and reality or language and reality. So, although human languages
evidence aspects of structural universality from culture to culture, the use of languages to speak
about the world does not. In other words, the prevailing view is that one’s culture determines how
one perceives reality.

Linguistic Relativity and the Linguistic Sign

Linguistic-relativity is predicated upon the nature of the linguistic sign as proposed by
Saussure. Saussure’s analysis requires a more thorough consideration than can be given at present.
However, a brief account of some aspects of Saussure’s theory of the linguistic sign are important
for a basic grasp of the linguistic relativity thesis. In the chapter entitled “Nature of the Linguistic
Sign,”179 Saussure criticizes what he identifies as the “naming-process” view of language. He
defines this “naming-process” as “a list of words, each corresponding to the thing that it names.”
His criticism of this view is, “It assumes that ready-made ideas [idées] exist before words.”180
What Saussure has said is that words cannot simply be names of things because, “The linguistic
sign unites, not a thing and a name, but a concept [concept] and a sound image.”181
Later, Saussure states, “There are no pre-existing ideas [idées] . . .”182 By this Saussure means
that extra-mental reality is not the efficient cause of ideas to which the mind must conform. In his
view, ideas are not conformed to reality, rather, reality is arbitrarily divided up by the mind in
conformity to whatever way a particular linguistic community has articulated the categories of
reality. If reality does not cause the mind to articulate categories according to its pre-existing
nature, pre-existing in the sense that reality exists prior to anyone’s perception of it, then from
where do such categories and concepts arise? Do they arise from the encounter with reality? If so,
it would seem that the idea is a representation of reality. The idea “horse” would be a representation

34
of the actually existing “horse.” However, if language does not involve a “naming-process” in
which a name is applied to the thing in reality, then the sign must be applied to the idea. Indeed,
this is Saussure’s assertion. He states, “. . . the choice of a given slice of sound (i.e., sound-image)
to name a given idea is completely arbitrary.”183
Saussure makes a distinction between a sign and the two parts that compose it. For Saussure,
the sign is composed of the concept (the signified), and the sound-image (the signifier). Now, if
the sound-image signifies the concept, then what does the sign stand for? What is a sign? Is not a
sign what leads a knowing faculty to something other than itself? The sound-image signifies, or
points to the concept. The concept is signified by the sound-image. What does the sign signify?
Does the word “arbor” signify anything? For Saussure, the word is a sign of a relationship between
its two parts, the signifier and the signified, but it is not a representation of the reality outside the
mind.
Saussure’s approach has been used by some to attack the notion that observation language can
represent reality. Since language reflects and shapes the different perceptions of reality, there is no
universal perception and hence no universal observation language. All observation language is
peculiar to the specific language community and shapes and reflects the different ways different
cultures perceive reality. Additionally, since Saussure demonstrated that the linguistic sign is
arbitrary and not naturally connected with extra-mental reality, language cannot be said to
represent reality in any intelligible way. Hence, as Richard Rorty points out, the question is no
longer “whether material reality is ‘mind-dependent,’” but “which sorts of true statements, if any,
stand in representational relations to nonlinguistic items.”184 Since, according to Saussure, there is
no direct connection between the linguistic sign and the real world, there can be no sense in which
language “gets reality right.” A representation cannot be tested by an observer outside of his own
language to discover the accuracy of correspondence between thought and thing.
Consequently, the notion of objectivity in language is empty. Every perceiver understands the
world according to the way his language community “cuts up” the world. As G. B. Madison puts
it, “. . . reality in the ordinary sense, the so-called extralinguistic referent of language, is thoroughly
relative to language itself and is its ‘product’ . . .”185

Summary and Conclusion

In language as in science and history, objectivity is eliminated because the world as perceived
is a product of an already present framework that provides the world with intelligibility and/or
meaning. In this case the structure is one’s language. The notion of a language structure
constituting the world, or at least the meaning of the world, is comparable to the historical
situatedness of the historian, or the theory-ladenness of the natural scientist. In each case there is
some prior framework or meaning-giving perspective or point of view that supplies the perceiver
with the structure that makes the world intelligible, and in some cases, even makes the world. The
common sense notion of objectivity seems to require some non-perspectival grasp of the world,
or, as Bernstein describes it, “some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can
ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or
rightness. . . . What is ‘out there’ (objective) is presumed to be independent of us (subjects), and
knowledge is achieved when a subject correctly mirrors or represents objective reality.”186
This chapter has presented a mere glimpse at the question of objectivity in science, history,
and language, yet we believe it has shown that the common notion of objectivity is under attack if
not completely rejected. If objectivity can be or has been legitimately discredited in these
disciplines that are critical and perhaps foundational to traditional notions of what it means to

35
know, the implications for the possibility of objectivity in biblical hermeneutics are devastating.
The eight-fold argument with which this chapter began seems to have been established even by
this cursory examination.

1. Everyone comes to the world with his own framework of understanding.

In natural science this takes the form of the theory-ladenness of observation. In historical
studies it takes the form of the historical-situatedness of the observer, and in language it
takes the form of cultural/linguistic determinism.

2. No particular framework of understanding is universally valid.

Such a notion of universal validity assumes the very neutrality that is rejected in the first
statement. In the same way one language community, for example, could legitimately
declare that their language is the only universally valid language, so no framework can be
declared universally valid. Points of view or perspectives are, in a Kuhnian sense,
incommensurable, and there does not exist a view from nowhere from which to adjudicate
between frameworks.

3. But, universal validity is precisely what is implied in the notion of objectivity.

As we have seen in our survey, the popular or common notion of objectivity, particularly
as this is supposed to exist for the scientist, assumes a universally valid, non-perspectival
point of view that is specifically rejected in statement no. 2.

4. Therefore, no interpreter can be objective in interpretation.

Since objectivity in the popular sense is not possible, then there can be no objective
interpretation. Every interpreter will approach his world, or a text, from his already present
framework of understanding.

5. But, if no interpreter can be objective, then no interpretation is universally valid.

Since there can be no objective interpretation, there can be no interpretation that is
universally valid for everyone. The popular aphorism, “That’s just your interpretation,”
seems to be true.

6. But, if no interpretation is universally valid, then the concept of a correct interpretation is at

best relative or at worst empty.
If no interpretation is universally valid, then there can be no such thing as a correct
interpretation. No interpretation can be held to be the interpretation, and to propose that
one’s interpretation must be accepted by all is to engage in a power play to subjugate
anyone who dares to entertain a contrary understanding.

7. Since there is no such thing as a correct interpretation, there is no means of adjudicating between
interpretations.
Consequently, the urge to decide between conflicting interpretation is artificially contrived.
There really is no way to adjudicate between interpretations, and, indeed, there is no need.
Every interpretation is valid for the one who accepts it.

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8. In fact, the very idea of adjudicating between interpretations is at best relative and at worst
empty.
If the above propositions have indeed been established, then Evangelicals ought to cease
their efforts to propose their understanding of the Bible as the correct one. They ought to
cease their evangelical efforts and rest content to express their understanding as one among
many options.

The common thread that runs through the rejection of objectivity generally, in natural science,
history, and language, is the realization that no one comes to the world without an already existing
framework of understanding. According to the prevailing view in these areas, the prior framework
necessarily obviates the possibility of objectivity. As we pointed out at the close of chapter 1, the
rejection of objectivity would seem to entail the rejection of objective truth. Such an approach
certainly could not, it would seem, be consistent with orthodox Christian belief. The question that
arises is what role does this framework of understanding actually play in understanding? In the
following chapter we will look briefly at the impact that the notion of the preexisting framework
of understanding has on the notion of objectivity.

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 3 PRESUPPOSITIONS, PREUNDERSTANDING, AND OBJECTIVITY

Introduction
From the previous survey we discovered that the notion of objectivity is almost universally
rejected because of what seems to be the necessary preconditions of understanding. Everyone
encounters the world from an already-always present framework of understanding, and because
this framework of understanding, this perspective, or point of view, necessarily forms the grid
through which anyone encounters the world, the possibility of a neutral encounter, an objective
perspective, or a “view from nowhere,” is impossible. Even natural science, which has for years
been the last bastion of objective knowledge, has been severely criticized as being no less
perspectival than any other enterprise that relies on the knowing power.
Traditionally, the possibility of objective knowledge, and likewise objective interpretation, has
been predicated on the basis of some concept of a foundation of knowledge— as some have
characterized it, “an Archimedean point”—on the basis of which all knowledge is grounded. This
is the idea that there is some a-cultural, a-historical, transcendent point from which the world can
be known that is not subject to the peculiarities of anyone’s preconditions, presuppositions,
preunderstanding, or world view. This grounding of knowledge has been variously identified as
Foundationalism or Classical Foundationalism. However, as we will see, recent proposals on the
nature and role of presuppositions in understanding seem to undermine this traditional basis for
objectivity also.

Presuppositions and Foundations

Presuppositions and the Foundations of Knowledge
The question of one’s framework of understanding and the role of one’s preconditions in
understanding strikes at the very heart of the question of the foundations of knowledge. The
question of the foundations of knowledge is basically the question, “On what basis can we claim
to know?” Traditional thought proposed that there is or must be some foundation that ensures
knowledge or certainty. Different philosophers have proposed different foundations. Plato
proposed the doctrine of recollection or reminiscence to explain the fact of knowledge and
understanding. In other words, Plato proposed that the pre-existence of the “soul,” and the soul’s
prior acquaintance with the “forms,” provides a foundation for knowledge in this mortal
existence.187 As Peter Redpath explains, “Plato saw no way to explain how people can go from a
state of complete ignorance to knowledge. He thought that we all had to know something upon
entering this life before we could know by study. Hence he attributed to man a prior life as a kind
of god in another world where man knew everything.”188 Aristotle discussed the foundations of
knowledge in terms of a basic framework based on the first principles of thought and being: “All
instruction given or received by way of argument proceeds from pre-existent knowledge.”189
Aristotle proposed that there are first principles that are already present in the constitution of the
world that provide the foundation for knowledge. Plato’s doctrine was adapted by Augustine in
his doctrine of illumination, and the basic formulation of first principles in Aristotle was taken up
by St. Thomas Aquinas in the exposition of his own epistemology. In the Middle Ages the
foundation of knowledge was discussed in terms of causae veritatis (causes of truth).190
Perhaps more than any other, the term “presupposition” has been used to refer to those prior
assumptions, beliefs, or individual items that constitute one’s framework of understanding.
Richard Garner contends that the notion of presuppositions “was not, as many seem to believe,
introduced by Strawson. Frege, in ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892), appealed to it when he pointed

38
out that ‘if anything is asserted there is always an obvious presupposition that the simple or
compound proper names used have a reference.’”191 Anthony Thiselton points out that the term
“‘presupposition’ [has] become familiar to English-speaking readers as a technical term in the
English translation of Rudolf Bultmann’s very well-known essay ‘Is Exegesis without
Presuppositions Possible?’”192 So it seems to be the case that what has come to be known by the
term “presuppositions” is not a completely new subject of consideration but has been a topic of
some discussion throughout the history of philosophy, albeit under various titles.
In this age of postmodernism even greater attention has been focused on the role of
presuppositions and the foundations of knowledge. As Carl F. H. Henry observes, “The one
epistemic premise shared by all postmodernists is their rejection of foundationalism, the belief that
knowledge consists of sets of beliefs that rest assuredly on still other sets of beliefs and that the
whole is supported by irreversible foundational beliefs.”193 Richard Bernstein identifies this
growing rejection of absolute foundations as evidenced in a resurgence of relativism. He describes
it as “an uneasiness that has spread throughout intellectual and cultural life. . . . This uneasiness is
expressed by the opposition between objectivism and relativism. . . . Relativism, a stream in the
philosophy of the past two hundred years that began as a trickle, has swelled in recent times into a
roaring torrent.”194 And Robert Greer declares that postmodernism “denies that there is any one
singular legitimizing system of thought on which all cultures and all historical settings depend.”195
In other words, there is no system that forms the foundation for all knowledge.
Carl Henry ties the growth of relativism to the conclusion of postmodernists that the
Enlightenment project was a failure because it did not realize its own inherent perspectivalism:
“The Enlightenment elevated human reason as the way of knowing. Failure to justify this
confidence led to ‘the recognition of the dogmatic (and therefore irrational) character of the
Enlightenment’s belief in reason—a belief much closer to a fundamental act of faith than to a
scientific and critical act of reason.’ . . . Enlightenment confidence in human reasoning was
assailed also by sociologists who protested that humans do not usually think only in valid
syllogisms nor can they be wholly objective since hidden presuppositions underlie all human
affirmations.”196
The modern realization of the unavoidable presence of presuppositions and one’s framework
of understanding seems to militate against any notion of a universal foundation for knowledge or
interpretation. Historically philosophers have proposed a variety of principles, ideas, natures, etc.,
as providing a nonpartisan, a-historical, neutral foundation for knowledge; or as Bernstein
characterizes it, “an Archimedean point.” However, many theorists take for granted that the
modern, or better, the Postmodern, notion of prespectivism has finally put this pursuit to rest. And,
if there cannot be a universal foundation for knowledge, there seems to be even less hope for a
universal foundation for interpretation.

Modern Rejection of Foundationalism

The modern rejection of foundationalism is predicated on a certain understanding of the nature
of foundationalism. Tom Rockmore characteristically describes the contemporary understanding
of the nature of foundationalism as the development of the philosophical methodology of
Descartes. Rockmore says,

For present purposes it is irrelevant whether Descartes initiates modern philosophy or whether he merely reacts to earlier
thinkers, including Bayle or even Augustine. The important point is that he invents, or at least perfects, the epistemological
strategy which has come to be known as foundationalism. In Descartes’ position, this strategy can be described as the claim to
identify an initial premise, which can be shown to be true, and from which the remainder of the theory can be rigorously

39
 deduced. In a profound sense, the post-Cartesian history of philosophy, that is, that part of it concerned with the problem of
knowledge, can be regarded as a series of unavailing efforts in the positions of a great many thinkers, in our time including
Husserl, Moore, Chisholm, Apel, perhaps the early Wittgenstein and Russell, as well as others, to construct a valid form of a
foundationalist theory of knowledge.197

As the quote from Rockmore indicates, foundationalism has almost universally been equated
with Cartesianism. Richard Bernstein claims that the whole history of Western philosophy since
Descartes has been the attempt to uncover or discover the foundations of knowledge:

Few philosophers since Descartes have accepted his substantive claims, but there can be little doubt that the problems,
metaphors, and questions that he bequeathed to us have been at the very center of philosophy since Descartes—problems
concerning the foundations of knowledge and the sciences, mind-body dualism, our knowledge of the “external” world, how
the mind “represents” this world, the nature of consciousness, thinking, and will, whether physical reality is to be understood
as a grand mechanism, and how this is compatible with human freedom.198

Heading Bernstein’s list of problems bequeathed to subsequent philosophical inquiry is the

search for the “foundations of knowledge.” For Bernstein, this search is the expression of what he
calls a “Cartesian Anxiety” because it leads to the objectivism/ relativism opposition. Bernstein
equates objectivism with foundationalism:

By ‘objectivism,’ I mean the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to
which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness. An
objectivist claims that there is (or must be) such a matrix and that the primary task of the philosopher is to discover what it is
and to support his or her claims to have discovered such a matrix with the strongest possible reasons. Objectivism is closely
related to foundationalism and the search for an Archimedean point. The objectivist maintains that unless we can ground
philosophy, knowledge, or language in a rigorous manner we cannot avoid radical skepticism. 199

Bernstein’s reference to the “Archimedean point” indicates the view that foundationalism is
deductivist in nature. Archimedes, a 3rd century B.C. mathematician and scientist, reportedly said,
“Give me a place to stand on, and I can move the earth.”200 Bernstein’s understanding of
foundationalism is that it assumes that knowledge must have an absolute, neutral starting point,
such as that found in the Cartesian method of doubt. As William Alston describes, “Historically it
has been common to require of the foundations of knowledge that they exhibit certain ‘epistemic
immunities,’ as we might put it, immunity from error, refutation, or doubt. Thus Descartes, along
with many other seventeenth- and eighteenth-century philosophers, took it that any knowledge
worthy of the name would be based on cognitions the truth of which is guaranteed (infallible), that
were maximally stable, immune from ever being shown to be mistaken (incorrigible), and
concerning which no reasonable doubt could be raised (indubitable).”201
In his little book titled, Reason Within the Bounds of Religion, Nicholas Wolterstorff devotes
a chapter to an explanation of what he understands to be classical foundationalism. After a brief
introduction and three definitional statements, Wolterstorff give his definition of foundationalism:
“In sum, the foundationalist sees the house of genuine science as firmly based on a foundation of
certitudes which can be known noninferentially. He urges that we accept or reject a given theory
wholly on the basis of our warranted belief that the theory belongs or does not belong to genuine
science. Only if we thus govern our acceptance of theories can we move towards eliminating
prejudice, bias, and unjustified conjecture from the enterprise of theorizing.”202
Alvin Plantinga concurs with Wolterstorff’s estimation of the nature of foundationalism and
asserts, “This picture [of classical foundationalism] has had a long and distinguished career in the
history of philosophy, including among its adherents Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz,
Locke, and, to leap to the present, Professor Roderick Chisholm.”203 Plantinga asserts that a

40
foundationalist is one for whom “some propositions are properly or rightly basic . . . and some are
not. Those that are not, are rationally accepted only on the basis of evidence, where the evidence
must trace back, ultimately, to what is properly basic.”204 However, not just any proposition
qualifies as properly or rightly basic. Propositions that are properly basic “are not accepted on the
basis of other propositions. I know the propositions in the foundations of my noetic structure, but
not by virtue of knowing other propositions; for these are the ones I start with.”205
Alston provides a helpful analysis of the criticisms that have been leveled against
foundationalism or Classical Foundationalism: “Thus much anti-foundationalist artillery has been
directed at the ‘myth of the given,’ the idea that facts or things are ‘given’ to consciousness in a
pre-conceptual, pre-judgmental mode, and that beliefs can be justified on that basis.”206
However, the notion of a pre-conceptual or pre-judgmental “mode” upon which beliefs can be
justified seems to be the very notion to which some have appealed when discussing
presuppositions and preunderstanding as the preconditions of knowledge and interpretation.
Anthony Thiselton specifically asserts that one’s horizon is a “pre-intentional background,” and
that, “The term ‘background’ calls attention to the fact that these boundaries embrace not only
what we can draw on in conscious reflection, but also the pre-cognitive dispositions or
competencies which are made possible by our participation in the shared practices of a social and
historical world.”207 Thiselton seems to be describing some pre-cognitive, pre-judgmental mode
on the basis of which understanding is made possible, or, as it were, built up.
In fact, a survey of the nature and role of presuppositions, which will be taken up in the
following chapter, will reveal a general assumption that understanding and interpretation is
possible by virtue of basic, fundamental, and/or foundational presuppositions. However, Alston
points out that, “It should also be noted that the term [foundationalism] is used with a deplorable
looseness in contemporary literary circles, and even in certain corners of the philosophical world,
to refer to anything from realism—the view that reality has a definite constitution regardless of
how we think of it or what we believe about it—to various kinds of ‘absolutism’ in ethics, politics,
or whatever, and even to the truism that truth is stable (if a proposition is true, it stays true!).”208
Indeed, even though there is confusion and equivocation in the use of terminology, every
theorist claims that knowledge, understanding, and interpretation begins with one’s
preunderstanding, or that one encounters the world with an already-always present set of
prejudices or presuppositions. Supposedly these preconditions of understanding are mutable and
can be modified or altered by honest interaction with the world or with a text. Yet no theorist
entertains the possibility that any encounter with the world will ever be able to alter the basic
assumption that all interpretation necessarily involves presuppositions, and that these
presuppositions mediate understanding. This seems to be a fixed and immutable foundation upon
which contemporary theories are built up.

Representational Foundationalism
In light of the universal rejection of foundationalism in principle based on the fact of the
always-already present framework of presuppositions, the question that arises is, Could the
presuppositions themselves form some kind of foundation upon which knowledge and
interpretation can be built, particularly in light of the criticisms leveled against Cartesian
foundationalism? Perhaps as closer look at foundationalism will help to answer this question.
In his analysis, Ronald Nash delineates two kinds of foundationalism—narrow and broad
foundationalism. Nash gives the following characterization of these two kinds of foundationalism:
“Narrow foundationalism insists that only beliefs that satisfy two or three specific criteria are

41
properly basic, that is belong properly in the foundation of a rational noetic structure. Broad
foundationalism agrees with the distinction between basic and nonbasic beliefs and with the claim
that the rationality of nonbasic beliefs depends on the extent to which they are supported by
properly basic beliefs. But broad foundationalism breaks with narrow foundationalism over the
latter’s attempt to limit properly basic beliefs to those that satisfy two or three criteria.”209
Of the two or three criteria that Nash attributes to the basic beliefs of narrow foundationalism
one is what Nash identifies as incorrigible propositions. These incorrigible propositions have the
earmarks of foundational presuppositions. According to Nash, “Incorrigible propositions are
statements that cannot be doubted, even though they fall short of logical necessity.”210 Nash gives
two statements to illustrate the notion of incorrigibility; 1) There is a red book on the table, and 2)
I seem to see a table with a red book on it. In Nash’s analysis of statement 1, he describes this kind
of statement as one that “makes a report about what you take to be a state of affairs existing
independently of your consciousness. You are making a claim about something in the external
world, the world outside your consciousness.”211 He concludes that it is not incorrigible because
such statements may be mistaken for several reasons: “Perhaps you are color-blind, and even
though there is a book on the table, the book is actually green. Or suppose it’s not a book at all but
only something that looks like a book under the conditions. Or perhaps you’re dreaming or
someone has hypnotized you. Whenever we make reports about what is or is not the case outside
our minds, we might be mistaken. Propositions like 1 are not incorrigible.”212
Of course, Nash’s analysis of the corrigibility of statements about extra-mental reality assumes
a certain understanding about the relation between the mind and the rest of nature. The view that
seems to underlie Nash’s analysis is an epistemological dualism of some kind. Traditionally, the
most devastating criticism of propositions about extra-mental reality has been the accusation of
epistemological dualism that is often involved in making such statements. This epistemological
dualism is also known as representationalism. Representationalism in its broadest sense is the
belief that, in the knowing process, the mind somehow represents to itself extra-mental reality.
Robert Cummins describes the various views on representationalism in current epistemological
theory. He identifies four theories that have attempted to “explain in non-semantic, non-intentional
terms what it is for something to be a representation (have content), and what it is for something
to have some particular content rather than some other.”213 According to Cummins, “Similarity
theories hold that r represents x in virtue of being similar to x. . . . Covariance theories hold that
r’s representing x is grounded in the fact that r’s occurrence covaries with that of x. . . . Functional
role theories hold that r’s representing x is grounded in the functional role r has in the representing
system, i.e. on the relations imposed by specified cognitive processes between r and other
representations in the system’s repertoire. . . . Teleological theories hold that r represents x if it is
r’s function to indicate (i.e. covary with) x.”214 All of these theories have in common the basic
assumption that what is in the mind of the knower is some representation of the thing known. In
other words, the object of knowledge is not the reality that exists outside the mind, but the
representation that somehow re-presents to the mind the object outside the mind.
Richard Rorty specifically makes a connection between foundationalism and
representationalism in his characterization of modern philosophy:

Philosophers usually think of their discipline as one which discusses perennial, eternal problems—problems which arise as
soon as one reflects. . . . It purports to do this on the basis of its special understanding of the nature of knowledge and of mind.
Philosophy can be foundational in respect to the rest of culture because culture is the assemblage of claims to knowledge, and
philosophy adjudicates such claims. It can do so because it understands the foundations of knowledge, and it finds these
foundations in a study of man-as-knower, of the “mental processes” or the “activity of representation” which make knowledge
possible.215

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 Not only does Rorty specifically equate foundationalism with representationalism, but he goes
on to assert that knowledge is, in philosophical speculation, a representational activity: “To know
is to represent accurately what is outside the mind; so to understand the possibility and nature of
knowledge is to understand the way in which the mind is able to construct such representations.
Philosophy’s central concern is to be a general theory of representation, a theory which will divide
culture up into the areas which represent reality well, those which represent it less well, and those
which do not represent it at all (despite their pretense of doing so).”216
Rorty asserts that philosophy is primarily concerned with constructing a valid
representationalist epistemology. This representationalist perspective derives primarily from two
sources, one of which Rorty identifies when he asserts, “We owe the notion of a ‘theory of
knowledge’ based on an understanding of ‘mental processes’ to the seventeenth century, and
especially to Locke.”217 Rorty is referring to Locke’s “copy theory” of knowledge. However,
Locke constructed his system in the wake of the Cartesian dualism and the Cartesian
representationalist system. In fact, Rorty goes on to point out, “We owe the notion of ‘the mind’
as a separate entity in which ‘processes’ occur to the same period, and especially to Descartes.”218
Rorty identifies the final ingredient in the construction of modern representationalist
philosophy when he recognizes Kant as the arbiter between Locke and Descartes: “We owe the
notion of philosophy as a tribunal of pure reason, upholding or denying the claims of the rest of
culture, to the eighteenth century and especially to Kant, but this Kantian notion presupposed
general assent to Lockean notions of mental processes and Cartesian notions of mental
substance.”219 Kant himself asserted, “There is no doubt whatever that all our cognition begins
with experience; for how else should the cognitive faculty be awakened into exercise if not through
objects that stimulate our senses and in part themselves produce representations, in part bring the
activity of our understanding into motion to compare these, to connect or separate them, and thus
to work up the raw material of sensible impressions into a cognition of objects that is called
experience?”220
Rorty’s enterprise in this instance is to offer a criticism of modern representationalist
philosophy that presumes to put itself in the place of the judge of culture by virtue of its grasp of
the foundations of knowledge. As Rorty says, “The aim of the book is to undermine the reader’s
confidence in ‘the mind’ as something about which one should have a ‘philosophical’ view, in
‘knowledge’ as something about which there ought to be a ‘theory’ and which has ‘foundations,’
and in ‘philosophy’ as it has been conceived since Kant.”221
A number of theorists have undertaken to criticize the representationalist foundationalism of
modern philosophy including Wilfrid Sellars, Hillary Putnam, and Donald Davidson. Rorty
identifies the proposals of these theorists as antirepresentationalism by which he means a view that
does not understand knowledge “as a matter of getting reality right, but rather as a matter of
acquiring habits of action for coping with reality.”222 According to these theorists, knowledge
necessarily involves a distinction between what is outside the mind, i.e. nature, and what is in the
mind, i.e. the mind’s representation of the extra-mental. Donald Davidson asserts that the dualism
of traditional epistemological systems is “in its way too obvious to question,”223 and the criticisms
leveled against a representationalist view appear devastating. As Davidson points out,

Since we cannot be certain what the world outside the mind is like, the subjective can keep its virtue—its chastity, its certainty
for us—only by being protected from contamination by the world. The familiar trouble is, of course, that the disconnection
creates a gap no reasoning or construction can plausibly bridge. Once the Cartesian starting point has been chosen, there is no
saying what the evidence is evidence for, or so it seems. Idealism, reductionist forms of empiricism, and skepticism loom. . . .

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 If the ultimate evidence for our schemes and theories, the raw material on which they are based, is subjective in the way I have
described, then so is whatever is directly based on it; our beliefs, desires, intentions, and what we mean by our words.224

Davidson has identified the epistemological problem that has its counterpart in the
hermeneutical problem, each of which stems from a similar conception of the starting point in
one’s mutable preunderstanding. As Davidson points out, though our beliefs, desires, intentions,
and what we mean by our words are the “progeny of our ‘view of the world’” taken together, they
are in fact what “constitute our view of the world.”225 In other words, there is a circularity in the
claim that our world view derives from our view of the world when in fact it is our view of the
world that constitutes our world view. As Davidson explains, “they too retain the Cartesian
independence from what they purport to be about that the evidence on which they are based had:
like sensations, they could be just as they are, and the world be very different. Our beliefs purport
to represent something objective, but the character of their subjectivity prevents us from taking the
first step in determining whether they correspond to what they pretend to represent.”226 Davidson’s
critique is graphically represented in Figure 1.

Figure 1: The Representationalist Gap

Rorty provides an exposition and vindication of the criticisms of Sellars and Willard V. O.
Quine which they have leveled against the representationalist epistemology that issues in the
assertion that, “no ‘account of the nature of knowledge’ can rely on a theory of representations
which stand in privileged relations to reality.”227 By “privileged relation” Rorty means that in order
to have certainty about the accuracy of one’s representations, the representationalist theory of
knowledge must “find, within the Mirror, a special privileged class of representations so
compelling that their accuracy cannot be doubted. These privileged foundations will be the
foundations of knowledge, and the discipline which directs us toward them—the theory of
knowledge—will be the foundation of culture.”228
Wilfrid Sellars attacked the representationalist perspective in terms of the “myth of the
given.”229 From the Cartesian/Kantian framework of knowledge, certain “givens” were necessarily
posited in order to make knowledge possible. For both Descartes and Kant the “given” was the
immediate data, either clear and distinct ideas, or the manifold that is formed into a unity by the
imposition of the categories. Sellars’ attack is directed at the assumption that there are “givens”
which constitute non-inferential knowledge. Sellars argues that in order to assert that something
“looks green,” this ability “presupposes the concept of being green, and that the latter concept
involves the ability to tell what colours objects have by looking at them—which, in turn, involves

44
knowing in what circumstances to place an object if one wishes to ascertain its colour by looking
at it.”230 His argument is too involved to recite here, but Sellars provides a helpful summary of his
point: “For we now recognize that instead of coming to have a concept of something because we
have noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the
concept of that sort of thing, and cannot account for it.”231
Sellars’ explanation brings to mind the whole argumentation concerning preunderstanding in
hermeneutics. In order to be able to recognize that something is green, the perceiver must already
have the concept of “being green” which makes his recognition possible. If the perceiver must
have the concept of the sort of thing prior to his being able to recognize that sort of thing, then the
idea that perception provides some “given” which constitutes non-inferential knowledge is
eliminated. Alan Goldman provides a helpful summary of Sellars’ argument against the “given”:

Arguments against the idea of the given originate with Kant, who argues in Book I of the Transcendental Analytic that percepts
without concepts do not yet constitute any form of knowing. Being non-epistemic, they presumably cannot serve as epistemic
foundations. Once we recognize that we must apply concepts of properties to appearances and formulate beliefs utilizing those
concepts before the appearances can play any epistemic role, it becomes more plausible that such beliefs are fallible. The
argument was developed in this century by Wilfrid Sellars (1963). According to him, the idea of the given involves a confusion
between sensing particulars (having sense impressions), which is non-epistemic, and having non-inferential knowledge of
propositions referring to appearances. The former may be necessary for acquiring perceptual knowledge, but it is not itself a
primitive kind of knowing. Its being non-epistemic renders it immune from error, but also unsuitable for epistemological
foundations. The latter, non-inferential perceptual knowledge, is fallible, requiring concepts acquired through trained responses
to public physical objects.232

Sellars acknowledged that philosophers have proposed “givenness” in many forms besides the
classical sense-datum theories, but he holds that empirical knowledge that is supposedly based on
a foundation is an instance of the “myth of the given.” The central point, according to Sellars, is,
“that in characterizing an episode or a state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical
description of that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying
and being able to justify what one says.”233 The occurrence of an experience does not constitute
an instance of epistemic perception such that truth can be predicated of it. In other words, there
are no “privileged representations” upon which a theory of knowledge can be based since even
what are characteristically identified as “immediate experiences” are non-epistemic in nature and
cannot form the foundation of an “epistemology.”
The combination of criticisms from Rorty, Sellars, Davidson, and others constitutes a
devastating appraisal of representationalism. These criticisms can be summarized as two
apparently insuperable problems for the traditional Cartesian/Kantian view. First, if that which is
in the mind is merely a representation of that which is in nature, then the two are really distinct as
that which represents is distinct from that which is represented. If these are really distinct, then
that which is in extra-mental reality never enters the mind so the mind is never able to compare
the mind’s representation with the extra-mental entity to discover whether or not the representation
is accurate. Nature is always “out there,” and our representations are always “in here,” and the two
can never be brought along side one another for the purpose of comparison. Figure 2 illustrates
this dilemma.

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 Figure 2: Representationalism

Rorty identifies this problem as precisely the quest of modern philosophy:

Traditional skepticism had been troubled principally by the “problem of the criterion”—the problem of validating procedures
of inquiry while avoiding either circularity or dogmatism. This problem, which Descartes thought he had solved by “the method
of clear and distinct ideas,” had little to do with the problem of getting from inner space to outer space—the “problem of the
external world” which became paradigmatic for modern philosophy. The idea of a “theory of knowledge” grew up around this
problem—the problem of knowing whether our inner representations were accurate.234

The second seemingly insuperable problem for the representationalist was posed by Sellars in
the form of three inconsistent propositions which follow from his analysis of sense datum theory,
which together demonstrate that a representationalist account of foundationalism is impossible to
maintain:

A. X senses red sense content s entails x non-inferentially knows that s is red.

B. The ability to sense sense contents is unacquired.
C. The ability to know facts of the form x is φ is acquired.
A and B together entail not-C; B and C entail not-A; A and C entail not-B.235

Those who propose a non-inferential knowledge based on sense-datum are left with an
inconsistent triad of propositions, and choosing to adopt any one will invalidate their claims to a
representationalist foundation of knowledge.
If these criticisms and conclusions are valid, then the representationalist account of knowledge
offers no possibility of epistemic justification and no possibility of knowing whether the
perceiver’s representations are accurate representations of the world. Consequently, a

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representationalist account of knowledge, which, as Rorty has described, is the one notion that
defines the quest of modern philosophy, offers no foundation for knowledge.
Of course, for Rorty, this is precisely the point, and precisely the motivation for abandoning
epistemology altogether. In Rorty’s characterization of the movement from epistemology to
hermeneutics, he describes epistemology as “a desire for constraint—a desire to find ‘foundations’
to which one might cling, frameworks beyond which one must not stray, objects which impose
themselves, representations which cannot be gainsaid.”236 For Rorty, “epistemology proceeds on
the assumption that all contributions to a given discourse are commensurable,” by which he means,
“able to be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how rational agreement can be reached
on what would settle the issue on every point where statements conflict.”237 According to Rorty,
the demise of epistemology has left a vacuum which should not be filled, and he is not interested
in offering a replacement system. Hermeneutics, for Rorty, is certainly not an attempt to take the
place vacated by epistemology. Rather, he contends, “Hermeneutics sees the relations between
various discourses as those of strands in a possible conversation, a conversation which presupposes
no disciplinary matrix which unites the speakers, but where the hope of agreement is never lost so
long as the conversation lasts. This hope is not a hope for the discovery of antecedently existing
common ground, but simply hope for agreement, or, at least, exciting and fruitful disagreement.”238
Rorty has prohibited epistemology from participating in the conversation, and he wants his
readers to agree with him on the common ground of the rejection of a common ground. Although
Rorty describes hermeneutics as a conversation which presupposes no disciplinary matrix, he has
stipulated the disciplinary matrix to be conversational. Whereas according to Rorty, epistemology
sought to unite speakers with a common foundation of knowledge, he has filled the vacuum of
epistemology’s common foundation of knowledge with hermeneutic’s common strand of
conversation. Is an epistemologist who thinks that there should be an end to conversation in the
settlement of issues not allowed to participate in the conversation because the conversation must
last? For all of Rorty’s gainsaying of epistemology’s imposition of foundations, Rorty himself
seeks to impose a conversation in which all must participate or be in danger of being discarded.
He asserts that in order to be considered rational, one must accept the special set of terms laid down
by hermeneutics in which all contributions to the conversation should be put, and one must also
be willing to pick up the jargon of the interlocutor rather than translating it into one’s own
language.
The very objections that Rorty raises against epistemology are the very constraints he places
upon anyone who would participate in the conversation. Rorty complains that, “For epistemology,
to be rational is to find the proper set of terms into which all the contributions should be translated
if agreement is to become possible.”239 By contrast, he demands that all conversation be translated
into the set of terms laid down by his own conception of hermeneutics, or else run the risk of being
irrational. But the key to Rorty’s criticisms is his insistence that epistemology is necessarily a
“representationalist” model. He says,

The notion of knowledge as accurate representation lends itself naturally to the notion that certain sorts of representations,
certain expressions, certain processes are ‘basic,’ ‘privileged,’ and ‘foundational.’ The criticisms of this notion . . . are backed
up with holistic argument of the form: We will not be able to isolate basic elements except on the basis of a prior knowledge
of the whole fabric within which these elements occur. Thus we will not be able to substitute the notion of ‘accurate
representation’ (element-by-element) for that of successful accomplishment of a practice. 240

In other words, as Rorty goes on to point out, the hermeneutical circle—the fact that the parts
must be understood in terms of the whole, and the whole must be understood in terms of the parts—

47
makes the “legitimation” of any particular element or elements as foundational an impossible task
since their basicality must be understood in terms of the whole. But the whole cannot be understood
except it be understood on the basis of foundational elements which cannot be “picked out” until
the whole is understood.
There are, however, theories of knowledge that are not representational in nature. The proper
characterization of knowledge may not necessarily be “justified, true belief.”241 It may be that
knowledge entails a real access to extra-mental reality such that the “foundational” principles of
knowledge are not “picked out” by the perceiver, but are prescribed and imposed by the world
itself. Rather than the mind forming representations of extra-mental reality, the mind may in some
way be directly informed by extra-mental reality. If another notion of knowledge is possible than
that criticized by Rorty and company, and if another notion of foundationalism can be articulated
than that which is generally rejected by non-evangelicals and Evangelicals alike, then it may be
the case that their criticisms would not apply to that alternate notion, and a foundation for
knowledge and objectivity may be conceivable and defensible.

Presuppositions and Preunderstanding

Some Basic Distinctions
The representationalism criticized by contemporary thinkers is the epistemological side of the
hermeneutical problem of objectivity. Representationalism fails, or so the criticism goes, because
there must be an already present framework of understanding that makes knowledge possible. No
one has a God’s eye view that provides a universal, non-perspectival access to truth. In the same
manner there can be no objective interpretation because every person has his own unique
framework of understanding from which he views the text. There is no such thing as a view from
nowhere by which an interpreter can be assured of discovering the meaning of the text.
Of what precisely is this framework composed? In the popular jargon of hermeneutic theory
this framework is characterized by many terms, but the most frequently occurring terms are
“presuppositions,” as we have already observed, and “preunderstanding.” It will be necessary now
to identify some fundamental distinctions between the current notions of “presupposition” and
“preunderstanding” in order to focus in on the problem that the already present framework poses
for objectivity against this representationalist background.
The distinctions grow out of observations and evaluations regarding the nature and role of
presuppositions and preunderstanding that have been presented in the current literature. In the
consideration of the role of presuppositions in hermeneutics, several theorists either explicitly
discuss or allude to distinctions among various kinds of presuppositions and between
presuppositions and preunderstanding. Anthony Thiselton discusses the difference between
horizons of expectation and presuppositions. The distinction indicated by Thiselton seems to be
one of breadth and depth. Whereas presuppositions are narrow and closer to the basis of one’s
beliefs, Thiselton suggests that one’s “horizon of expectation” is much broader in scope including
not only one’s presuppositions, but “a network of revisable expectations and assumptions which a
reader brings to the text, together with the shared patterns of behaviour and belief with reference
to which processes of interpretation and understanding become operative.”242
Peter Cotterell and Max Turner talk about an interpreter’s “presupposition pool.” Although
Cotterell and Turner do not provide a definition of this term, they do provide lengthy examples.
One’s presupposition pool is composed of “information constituted from the situative context . . .
as well as the new information from the completed part of the discourse itself.”243 The illustrations
presented by Cotterell and Turner indicate that one’s presupposition pool includes all of one’s

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perspectives, experiences in life, participation in a language community, shared assumptions, in
short all that constitutes a person’s world.244 So, there seems to be a distinction maintained between
the parts and the whole. The presupposition pool is the whole which is constituted of the individual
parts, at least some of which other theorists would classify as presuppositions, some as attitudes,
some as dispositions, etc.
As has been observed, hermeneuticians often imply an underlying distinction between
presupposition and preunderstanding. Whereas preunderstanding is generally held to encompass
one’s total “world,” presuppositions are generally narrow and basic. Preunderstanding is also
inclusive of aspects that are non-cognitive, such as one’s dispositions and one’s accumulated
experiences and training. Also, within the scope of one’s preunderstanding is one’s historical
situatedness, and one’s participation in his linguistic and social community.
In summary, preunderstanding is virtually equivalent to one’s world view and is not considered
to be essentially propositional in nature. Preunderstanding is a broad-based concept that includes
the narrower aspect of presuppositions. Presuppositions, on the other hand, are more often thought
of or described in terms of propositions, though they have been seen as both conscious and
unconscious.
This distinction may then allow for an explanation of the fact that Evangelical and non-
evangelical theorists, coming from different and often contradictory perspectives, have arrived at
the same conclusion about the framework of understanding. Since one’s world view or
preunderstanding may include within it a set of presuppositions which may be held even though
the interpreter is not consciously aware of them, theorists from disparate world views may have
presuppositions that are the same, and these particular presuppositions may not be in conflict with
the overall world view of the respective theorists. In fact, this seems to be precisely the case.
Evangelicals and non-evangelicals both assert the inevitability of the preunderstanding or
framework of understanding of the interpreter, and this assertion functions as a presupposition in
the hermeneutic theories of both groups. Additionally, both groups presuppose the mutability of
presuppositions, as we shall see later. Both groups presuppose that no one comes to the world with
a mind that is a tabula rasa. Granted these theorists claim that these are conclusions of their
research. But, often the conclusions on one level become the presuppositions on another. From the
testimony of the scholars involved, it is in fact the case that theorists from disparate world views,
or preunderstandings do have some presuppositions in common. These presuppositions include,
1) the inevitability of the preconditions of understanding, and 2) the mutability of presuppositions.
These two presuppositions of all theorists are not peculiar to any one theorist’s particular
perspective, and they do not seem to be affected by the particular perspective or world view of the
theorist. But, if this is true, then what better term can be applied to these presuppositions than
“objective”?

The Possibility of Objective Presuppositions

The fact that theorists across the spectrum of belief arrive at the same conclusion about the
unavoidability of one’s preconditional framework and its impact upon understanding seems to
imply that all these theorists must have at least some presuppositions in common. Else, how can
this seemingly universal and objective criticism be explained. Does this introduce the possibility
of objective presuppositions? George Yule comments that, “What a speaker assumes is true or is
known by the hearer can be described as a presupposition.”245 There are in fact certain assumptions
that lie behind statements. Whereas the statements, “My car is old,” or “My brother is old”
presuppose that the speaker has a car and/or a brother, the preunderstanding behind the statement

49
“My brother is old” may be quite different from that lying behind the statement about the
automobile. However, in some respects, the preunderstanding related to these two statements is
certainly the same. For example, in relation to both statements there are at least two assumptions
that are constant: 1) the assumption that the hearer is a participant in the English language
community, and therefore 2) the assumption that the hearer understands the relative uses of the
term “old” within this social and linguistic community.
Moreover, there are other concepts that seemingly remain constant among all such assertions.
Whenever someone makes an assertion that is presented as a truth claim, there are at least three
operative presuppositions that are employed, either consciously or unconsciously: namely, the law
of identity, the law of non-contradiction, and the law of excluded middle. The assertion, “My car
is old,” makes several valid affirmations about the identity of the car (for example, that it is “my”
car, and that it is “old,” and that the car exists in space and time), and this assertion necessarily
excludes its contradictory, “My car is not old.” That the car is “old” may be a value judgment on
the part of the one making the assertion; nonetheless, it assumes the negation of whatever is
properly its contradictory. In fact, it is precisely the assumption of the principle of non-
contradiction that often gives rise to contrary assertions. The reason someone would object to such
a characterization about the age of the car is because the assertion necessarily denies its
contradictory. So, someone may object to this characterization with an opposing point of view,
“Your car is not old!” because the opponent immediately grasps the implication of the original
assertion and wishes to propose a contradictory perspective.
The law of excluded middle is also operative in any assertion such as the one being considered.
To claim, “My car is old,” necessarily asserts that the car is “old,” which we may represent by A,
as opposed to any other condition which could be characterized as not being old, represented by
~A (non A). The car might be “middle aged,” or “young,” or “new,” or any other descriptive
characterization that is non-old. Nevertheless, any description that indicates that the car is not old
is an assertion that it is non-old, or ~A. Either the car is old, or it is not.246 There is no middle term
between old and non-old. When the speaker makes the assertion that his car is old, he is necessarily
presupposing that his car is “old,” A, as opposed to any other condition which is not “old,” ~A,
according to some acceptable definition of “old.”
Finally, the law of identity means that when the speaker asserts that his car is old, he is asserting
that there is such a thing as a car, that the speaker owns or in some legitimate way has a car that
can properly be called “my car” by the speaker, and that it is correctly characterized as “old.” The
law of identity means that for something to be old, it is what it is; in this case “old.” Although the
precise connotations or denotations of the term “old” may vary from speaker to speaker, it is
nevertheless necessarily the case that for the speaker who asserts A, for that speaker, A is A. Even
if the speaker were making an assertion that is a figure of speech, such as the use of sarcasm so
that he is using the term “old” when he means to indicate “non-old,” this does not alter the fact
that when the speaker asserts A, whatever A is, with reference to that speaker’s assertion, A is A.
There is no lack of literature establishing the role of these principles of logic in all
communication.247 An individual may attempt to deny these principles or to provide examples in
which these principles may appear to be circumvented or obviated. These counter claims, however,
are intelligible only on the basis of the application of the very principles which are being denied.
To claim that the law of non-contradiction does not apply one must depend on an application of
the law of non-contradiction in order to be able to make such a claim. Any attempt to deny these
basic laws of logic involves the claimant in a hopelessly, self-referentially incoherent claim.

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 Likewise, when someone asserts a claim that is self-referentially contradictory, regardless of
how simplistic the analysis may seem, the claim is necessarily false. For example, when someone
asserts, “There is no such thing as truth,” the self-referentially contradictory nature of this claim is
obvious. The claimant is asserting his claim as if it were true that there is no such thing as truth.
The assertion self-destructs even though the analysis that points this out may seem simplistic.
Undoubtedly the questions of the nature of truth and how one knows truth are complex questions.
Notwithstanding the complexity of these issues, however, if a given claim is in fact self-
referentially contradictory, it is necessarily false.248
It is popular in our culture to belie the universality of the logical principles of non-
contradiction, excluded middle, and identity by appealing to the notion that Eastern thought does
not operate on this basis nor acknowledge the validity of these principles. However, this is a blatant
misrepresentation of the Eastern approach as evidence by the following quote from a book on
Buddhist logic.

The active part of consciousness, its spontaneity in cognition begins with an act of dichotomy. As soon as our intellectual eye
begins to glimmer, our thought is already beset with contradiction. The moment our thought has stopped running and has fixed
upon an external point, so as to be able internally to produce the judgment «this is blue», at that moment we have separated the
universe of discourse into two unequal halves, the limited part of the blue and the less limited part of the non-blue. The definite
thougt [sic] of the blue is nothing more than the definite exclusion of the non-blue . . . there is nothing intermediate.249

Figure 3: Yin-Yang

Of course, even if it were the case that proponents of Eastern thought were to deny the laws of
logic, it would be necessary and unavoidable for them to employ the laws in order to deny them.
The Yin is not the Yang, and the Yang is not the Yin. Even the small dot of the one in the other
maintains the distinct identity of each from the other. If the brief analysis above is an accurate
rendering of the state of affairs, then it highlights one significant distinction between
preunderstanding (as this is generally understood in the literature), and these logical
presuppositions. That point of distinction is the mutability of the one, and the immutability of the
other. Though one’s preunderstanding may in large part change, these logical presuppositions
cannot.

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 Virtually all theorists assert that one’s preunderstanding is and ought to be subject to change
and development. As the interpreter interacts with an authoritative text, the interpreter must be
willing to allow the text to indicate changes in his world view that would be inconsistent with the
authoritative claims of the text. However, one cannot alter the basic laws of logic, because for any
claim from any text to be intelligible to the human mind, that claim must necessarily be based on
these very same laws. A text that asserts itself to be true, and yet asserts contradictory claims, is
an unintelligible text.250 The interpreter would be unable to know what the text is claiming.
If, for example, the Christian Scriptures claim that God changes and that He does not change
in the same sense, then the contradictory nature of these claims would leave the interpreter in the
dark as to what the text is claiming about God. It may be the case that God changes in some sense
and that He does not change in some other sense, but for the text to claim that He changes and
does not change in the same sense renders the text unintelligible. It would be logically
contradictory.

The Implications of Objective Presuppositions

If the previous analysis is correct, it would seem to be the case that some presuppositions are
both unavoidable and immutable. This characteristic is sufficient to introduce a real distinction
between the notion of preunderstanding, as it is popularly proposed, and these logical
presuppositions. The term “presupposition” has a long and established use, and an effort to change
or restrict its meaning would be a difficult if not an impossible task. Consequently, on the basis of
this distinction observed between preunderstanding and these logical presuppositions, a
provisional term will be introduced for purposes of our discussion.
The term “transcendental presupposition” (TP) will be stipulated as the term indicating a truth
claim that is operative behind an assertion, whether consciously or unconsciously, that is
immutable and undeniable, that transcends all world views, and that is necessarily the case for all
world views. This means that, whether it is ultimately discovered that these transcendental
presuppositions are restricted only to the three laws of logic, or whether other such transcendental
presuppositions are uncovered, these TP’s are objective in the sense that they are not subject to the
dictates of any particular world view, or preunderstanding, or horizon of expectation, and, as
presuppositions, they serve, along with an interpreter’s whole world view, to mediate
understanding and provide intelligibility. The possibility of TP’s also reintroduces the possibility
of a viable foundationalism, one that is not subject to the criticisms leveled against the Cartesian
brand.
Additionally, the relationship between presuppositions and truth claims that was investigated
earlier takes on significant implications in light of the existence of objective, transcendental
presuppositions. The falsity of a presupposition seems to call into question the truth of any claim
of which the false presupposition is a necessary presupposition. The existence of objective,
transcendental presuppositions implies the possibility of adjudicating between preunderstandings
or between world views. If TP’s exist, then any world view that is built upon presuppositions that
violate the requirements of the basic principles of logic, or other TP’s, would be less desirable than
a conflicting or contradictory world view whose necessary presuppositions do not violate these
principles. If seemingly contradictory claims are made between the TP’s and subsequent truth
claims, the truth of such a world view will be legitimately called into question. Whether this
analysis would be sufficient to conclude that a given world view is actually false may be
undecidable for various reasons, but when competing views are found to rest on presuppositions,
the presuppositions of one being contradictory while those of the other are not contradictory, it

52
becomes possible to choose between these competing views. For example, when world view A
(which makes two necessary and crucial truth claims that are seemingly contradictory; such as,
that God is three beings and that God is one being in the same sense) is compared with world view
B (which makes two necessary and crucial truth claims that are not contradictory; such as, that in
one sense God is three Persons, but in another sense He is one being), world view B should be
reasonably favored over world view A. There may well be world views C, D, and E that also
present truth claims, and logical analysis may not resolve every conflict; nevertheless, such
analysis does offer one possibility for adjudication between world views, perspectives, and
preconditional frameworks of understanding.
The same would hold true for interpretations within a single world view. For example, if
interpretation A concluded that an authoritative text asserts contradictory truth claims while
interpretation B concludes that the same authoritative text asserts claims that are not contradictory,
mutatis mutandis, interpretation B would be preferred to interpretation A. Of course it may be the
case that a given text simply does make contradictory claims, in which case an interpreter must
find some reasonable way to come to a conclusion about which claim is true and which is false.
This is not a counter example, however, since, if the text is actually making contradictory
assertions, this is not a case of an interpretation concluding contradictory results. If a given text
simply makes contradictory assertions, then the interpreter is not arriving at contradictory
conclusions. Rather, the interpreter is concluding that the text itself makes such claims. It is not
the case that the interpreter is at once concluding that it both does and does not make contradictory
claims in the same sense. Much depends upon the distinction being made here between cases of
contradictory conclusions by an interpreter and cases of contradictory claims of an authoritative
text.
Assuming that a given author endeavors to make logically consistent claims (an assumption
that is particularly relevant to an authoritative text), an interpretation that identifies this logical
consistency will naturally be preferred to an interpretation that denies this consistency and arrives
at contradictory conclusions as a result of interpretation. Conversely, if it can be shown that
interpretation A in fact arrives at contradictory conclusions, or entails implications that are
contradictory, then one can conclude that, ceterus paribus, this interpretation is unacceptable.
Admittedly, it will be necessary to work out further details and implications of this brief sketch,
but, if it is the case that objective, transcendental presuppositions do exist, they would provide 1)
an objective starting point that transcends every world view and every network of
preunderstanding, 2) a basis upon which one may arrive at objectively based interpretation, and 3)
a standard by which one could adjudicate between some interpretations. Of course the mere
existence of such TP’s would not ensure that a given interpreter would inevitably achieve the
desired end. Rather, the existence of such presuppositions would only indicate an objective starting
point. They would not secure an infallible conclusion.
Nevertheless, the possibility of such presuppositions is nothing less than the possibility of an
objective foundation for interpretation. Transcendental presuppositions, if such there are, would
provide an objective starting point. An objective foundation, or starting point, for interpretation
implies the possibility of objectivity per se. This also implies that TP’s would play a fundamental
role in interpretation. In other words, the existence of transcendental presuppositions implies a
existence of a foundation of interpretation, and perhaps even a foundation for knowledge.

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 Conclusion
It must be stressed at this point that an objective starting point that transcends one’s
preunderstanding, as it is characterized in the literature, is entertained here only as a possibility at
this point. However, the possibility of an objective starting point as an alternative approach seems
naturally to arise from the preceding observations. On the basis of the methodology that is
generally advocated in the literature, it is an approach that cannot be rejected a priori since
theorists universally assert that no explanation exhaustively accounts for all of the data.
Nevertheless, the possibility that an alternative approach may offer something closer to an
exhaustive account of the data than other theories so far proposed is still an open question.
The possibility of an objective starting point does raise a question, however, about the nature
of this starting point and its relation to one’s preunderstanding. If such a starting point is not an
aspect of one’s preunderstanding, or is in some way distinct from it, then what could be its nature?
Of what could such a starting point be composed? From where might one obtain indubitable
presuppositions?
As we will see in the next chapter, almost all theorists identify various basic, fundamental, and
foundational presuppositions. This may offer at least part of the answer to this question of whether
TP’s actually exist. The previous study has indicated that there is a distinction between
preunderstanding and presuppositions that may allow some presuppositions to be considered as
objective in nature. At this point, however, the nature of this starting point, if such exists, is not
clearly delineated.
The above considerations seem to have indicated that an objective starting point for
interpretation is possible if in fact there are transcendental presuppositions (TPs). If the nature and
existence of these transcendental presuppositions can be shown, there may in fact be a possibility
of objectivity in interpretation. Additionally, it would seem that a denial of objectivity, either in
terms of advocating or promoting relativism, or in terms of current views of historicity, opens one
to the criticism of self-referential inconsistency. To indicate the possibility of an objective starting
point, however, requires a more thorough investigation of the nature and role of presuppositions.

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 4 PRESUPPOSITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY THOUGHT

Introduction
As we have seen, objectivity is under attack from many quarters and in many disciplines. This
attack is principally based upon what seems to be the undeniable fact of the prior existing
framework of understanding, what has been variously referred to as our presuppositions, our
preunderstanding, our world view, and so on, and the insistence that these frameworks are
necessarily incommensurable. Everyone encounters the world with his or her own point of view,
perspective, or world view. This framework of understanding, these presuppositions, provides the
intelligibility and meaning that the mind needs in order to make sense of the world. The fact that
everyone has a framework, or set of presuppositions, seems to militate against a notion of
objectivity in knowledge and understanding. No one is able to approach the world apart from a
certain already existing perspective or set of presuppositions. There is, the current reasoning
declares, no possibility of a neutral perspective. No one has a “God’s eye view,” or a “view from
nowhere.”
If it is the case that everyone encounters the world with his own perspective, then, as Nietzsche
said, “No, facts is precisely what there is not, only interpretations.”251 Such a conclusion bodes ill
for Evangelical Christianity. Orthodox Christianity has long heralded a message predicated on the
objectivity of truth that is based on an objectivity of meaning. Notwithstanding the many
conflicting interpretations, Evangelicals have nevertheless traditionally held that there is a right
way and a wrong way to understand the Bible. It would not be a surprise to an Evangelical
Christian that the non-Christian community would reject the Evangelicals’ claim that they have
the truth about God, life, and the world. But certainly Evangelical writers would not follow the
secular theorists in rejecting objectivity. But, if they do not follow the secular writers, if they do
not reject objectivity in interpretation, how do they deal with what seems to be the undeniable fact
of the prior framework or set of presuppositions of the interpreter? And, if it turns out that
Evangelical writers are not able somehow to address what seems to be the unavoidable
consequences of the framework of understanding, how can they then maintain a notion of
objectivity in interpretation? Indeed, do they in fact even attempt to maintain such a notion? As
we have seen, even most Evangelicals are either denying or retreating from the notion of
objectivity in interpretation. In order to address these questions, it will be necessary to understand
what is being talked about when the literature refers to presuppositions. This chapter will look at
presuppositions and attempt to discover what the current literature says about what they are and
how they function.

Definitions of Presuppositions
A first step toward uncovering the nature and functions of presuppositions is to consider
various definitions that have been given. This step is not without its controversies, however. For
many theorists, the definition of “presupposition” or “presupposing” is directly tied to one’s
understanding of how presuppositions function. Additionally, since almost all theorists hold that
no one interprets anything without the already present set of presuppositions, one must wonder
how one’s definition can be anything but a product of these very presuppositions. A survey of
definitions may resolve this self-referential problem, so we will begin with definitions from
sources that do not espouse a commitment to an Evangelical perspective, then we will survey
definitions from the perspective of Evangelicals.252

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 Definitions from Non-evangelical Sources
According to the second edition of Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary, to
“presuppose” means, “to suppose or assume beforehand; to take for granted.”253 One reason for
reflecting upon this particular dictionary entry is that in its definition of “presuppose,” the
dictionary uses the word “suppose.” This may be evidence of the difficulty one confronts in
attempting to define “presupposition.” Unless the user of this dictionary understands the word
“suppose,” he will not be enlightened by the definition provided. Going to the entry “suppose” in
this same dictionary, one finds more helpful information: “to assume to be true, as for the sake of
argument or to illustrate a proof; to believe to be; to imagine; to think, to presume.”254
The implication that comes from the association of these two entries is that a presupposition is
simply an assumption, or a belief, or a thought, or some other ens rationis255 (being of reason) that
exists or is held prior to some other belief, thought, or claim. However, the definition of
“presuppose” found here seems to raise more questions. Particularly acute is the need to understand
the relationship between what is presupposed to that of which it is a presupposition. Of course,
dictionary definitions are not necessarily designed to address this type of issue, but these
definitions do provide a convenient starting point for our investigation. It is clear that a
presupposition is at least some kind of rational “something” the is prior to some other rational
“something.” One may find that presuppositions encompass more that simply the rational in the
strict sense, but they are not less than rational in the sense that they are in the mind and can be
thought or thought about. Also, it is clear that a presupposition is in some important way prior to
some other thought, or belief, or rational entity, or mental event. The dictionary seems to imply
that presuppositions are a class of or are a certain kind of supposition.
Up to a point, Ted Peters’ definition of presuppositions follows the implications from the
dictionary entries considered above. He holds, however, that presuppositions and suppositions are
different. He asserts, “Presuppositions are different from suppositions and propositions.
Presuppositions make suppositions possible, just as suppositions make further suppositions
possible. Presuppositions are different because they do not rest upon prior suppositions, but rather
derive from a more basic or foundational level of one’s way of viewing things. Fundamental
presuppositions refer us to the basic structure of one’s experience with the world, and this structure
makes articulation of that experience possible.”256
Peters maintains that presuppositions are prior to suppositions. The dictionary defines
“presupposition” as a certain kind of supposition. Seemingly, then, Webster’s presuppositions are
distinguished from suppositions simply because they are “prior to” suppositions. Peters claims that
presuppositions “derive from a more basic or foundational level of one’s way of viewing things,”
but he does not describe what form this “more basic or foundational level” takes. When he says,
“Fundamental presuppositions refer us to the basic structure of one’s experience with the world,”
he seems to be indicating that the notion of presuppositions should be divided into two
categories—presuppositions and fundamental presuppositions. The fundamental presuppositions
involve the “basic structure of one’s experience with the world.” By these statements, Peters seems
to be describing experiencing qua experiencing, or perhaps one’s “raw” experience which must be
converted into some propositional form in order to be identified as a “fundamental
presupposition.”
Peters has added some helpful content, but it would seem that his observations leave some
questions unanswered. For example, does the more basic or foundational level of one’s way of
viewing things consist of statements, or propositions, or is it an attitude or disposition of the mind?
And, what form does the “basic structure of one’s experience with the world” take? What Peters

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has contributed, however, is the notion that presuppositions are not simply “prior,” but that they
are or can be somehow more basic and foundational in nature. In some way, presuppositions seem
to form the basis upon which suppositions rest.
In The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Avrum Stroll approaches the question by defining the
concept of “presupposing” in contrast to his understanding of the nature of “contextual
implication.” Both presupposing and contextual implication have to do with the conditions that are
logically prior to a statement. He writes,

Presupposing is a concept referring to those conditions that must be satisfied before an utterance can count as a statement, or
if “statement” is so defined that statements need be neither true nor false . . . then presupposing applies to those conditions that
must be satisfied before statements can be either true or false. Contextual implication, on the other hand, is a concept that
applies to those conditions that must be satisfied before an utterance can count as “normal” in the circumstances in which it is
made—that is, it applies to those beliefs a speaker has when he makes the utterance he does in certain circumstances and which
rule out that he is lying or deliberately deceiving someone.257

Stroll further distinguishes between “presupposing” and “contextual implication” by the

differences in the “range of entities” to which each concept refers. Presuppositions are a range of
entities relating to “either the class of statements as such or the class of those statements that are
either true or false.”258 The range of entities referred to by contextual implication “is the class of
beliefs held by the speaker (and, derivatively, by his auditors).”259 The range of entities, which
Stroll calls contextual implication, will be seen below to be closer to what evangelical
hermeneuticians have identified as preunderstanding. It would seem from this description that
Stroll understands presuppositions as “statements” or propositions. However, as we have seen
from the assertions by Ted Peters, presuppositions may be described as more than simply a class
of statements.
Nevertheless, Stroll has addressed the question of the relationship between presuppositions
and statements in terms of truth and falsity. A presupposition is not simply prior to another
statement, nor is it simply basic or fundamental. A presupposition also determines, in some sense,
the truth or falsity of a statement for which it is a presupposition.
In A Dictionary of Philosophy, Antony Flew defines “presupposition” as follows: “An
assumption that involves either a necessary or a contingent truth. If p is logically presupposed by
q then it is a necessary truth that to deny the assumption p while asserting q would be a
contradiction. Presuppositions that do not satisfy this requirement involve contingent truth.”260
Flew does not assert in his definition that presuppositions are prior assumptions. Rather, he simply
asserts that they are assumptions. However, in his examples, he employs the term “presupposed”
as if the reader already understands what it means to presuppose something. Additionally, Flew’s
example seems to indicate that presuppositions have at least a relation of “logical priority.”
This raises the question of whether the relationship between presuppositions and assertions are
only logical in nature. This would also seem to imply that there are no metaphysical
presuppositions and that presuppositions do not involve emotional or attitudinal aspects.
Additionally, this raises the question of whether presuppositions may be chronologically prior but
not logically prior, or perhaps logically prior but not chronologically prior. And, if presuppositions
are logically prior, what does this say about a person’s awareness of his own presuppositions?
Must a person be aware of his presuppositions in order for them to function as presuppositions?
Flew does not address these questions, but he does introduce the distinction between
presuppositions that involve necessary truths and those that involve contingent truths. If a
presupposition is necessarily assumed by a given statement, then, according to Flew, the falsity of

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the presupposition necessarily entails the falsity of the statement of which it is the necessary
presupposition.
Robert Stalnaker addresses the question of the possibility that presuppositions might include
something more than simply “statements.” He asserts, “the presupposition relation cannot be
explained solely in terms of the meaning or content of sentences, but must be explained partly in
terms of facts about the users of sentences: their beliefs, intentions and expectations.”261 He goes
on to define presuppositions as “propositions” or “background assumptions” which a speaker takes
for granted or are used by a speaker. Stalnaker’s definition and proposals will be considered more
fully in dealing with the function of presuppositions. However, even at the level of definition one
can see that Stalnaker has included more in the notion of presuppositions than that they are simply
statements. In fact, later in this same article he claims that a presupposition is a kind of attitude:
“First, whatever the details of the definition, it is clear that a presupposition is a propositional
attitude. More specifically, it is an attitude of accepting something to be true.”262 Since truth is
predicated of propositions, this would seem to indicate that a presupposition is an attitude of
assenting to the truth of a proposition. Stalnaker is emphasizing the attitude more than the
proposition, but he is not denying that the object of this assent is a statement—a proposition.
Hence, whether one defines “presupposition” in terms of the acceptance of the truth of a
proposition, or the proposition itself, presuppositions still seem to involve statements or truth-
claims.
Paul Larreya defines presuppositions in what seems to be an even more broad category. He
says that a presupposition involves “the information the speaker assumes or pretends to assume to
be known to himself and the addressee.”263 Larreya is interacting with a proposal by M. A. K.
Halliday and Ray S. Jackendoff that “presuppositions” should be defined as, “the information the
speaker assumes to be known to himself and the addressee.”264 In other words, these theorists have
defined “presuppositions” as “known or given” information in contrast to “new” information.
Larreya objects that often, “in order to produce particular effects, the speaker does not respect what
might be called the rules of the game: he uses the syntactic or lexical forms of presupposition
(which normally convey ‘known’ information) with a view to transmitting ‘new’ information.”265
Larreya does not propose to dispense with the original definition, but to modify it to include the
possibility that presuppositions may be information which the speaker pretends is known to his
addressee, but may in fact be new information for the addressee. Whether presuppositions should
be considered as known or new information, Larreya seems to understand their nature to be
statements or propositions or truth-claims or what can be loosely identified as “information.”
In his article, “Ist voraussetzungslose Exegese möglich?” Rudolf Bultmann does not define the
term “presupposition” (Voraussetzung), but describes the kinds of presuppositions that relate to
exegesis. However, according to Anthony Thiselton’s analysis, Bultmann’s notion of pre-
understanding includes more than simply the rational: “Bultmann actually uses Schleiermacher’s
term, or here especially Dilthey’s term ‘pre-understanding’ (Vorverstndnis). For Dilthey himself,
whose work Bultmann is discussing, this preliminary to understanding is a relation to life, as it was
also to be for the later Wittgenstein. My pre-conceptual relation in life to music, to mathematics,
to law, or to love, would both influence, and provide operative conditions for, how I came to
understand texts of music, mathematics, law, poems, or letters or declarations of love.”266
Bultmann’s idea is that a presupposition involves a pre-conceptual relation to life, or as
Bultmann puts it, a “life-connection” (Lebenszusammenhang).267 Bultmann identifies undesirable
presuppositions as “dogmatic prejudice”268 (dogmatischen Vorurteilen), and he identifies other
presuppositions, such as one’s biases and habits, or gifts and weaknesses, as inevitable but capable

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of being “held off” (ausschalten) by the exegete. The “historical method of interrogating the text”
(die historische Methode in der Befragung der Texte) is a presupposition which he asserts cannot
be dismissed (unabdingliche).269
According to Thiselton’s analysis of Bultmann,270 the terms “presupposition” and
“preunderstanding” can be understood to be synonymous and can encompass more than
propositions, or attitudes, or beliefs. Presuppositions and preunderstanding encompass all that
entails one’s relationship to life. Presuppositions are not only conceptual, then, but as pre-
conceptual, they seem to be determinative of one’s conceptions in that they include one’s very
connection with life and the world.
In summary, the non-evangelical sources reviewed so far seem to agree that presuppositions
are properly understood to be prior to statements or beliefs. They can be propositions, or attitudes.
They can have a logical relation to other rational entities such as statements or beliefs. They can
be related to other statements as the necessary truths upon which other propositions rest, or they
can be contingent truths which do not have a necessary relation to other statements.
Presuppositions can be conceptual or pre-conceptual. Also, the term “presupposition” is sometimes
used synonymously with the term “preunderstanding.”
John Lyons also understands presuppositions to be more than simply propositions or
statements. He observes that, “Most of the definitions of presupposition to be found in the recent
literature take the presuppositions of an utterance to be a set of propositions.”271 Lyons goes on to
discuss the notion of presuppositions as “conditions that must be satisfied before the utterance can
be used felicitously to perform its function as a statement, a question, a promise, a request, etc.”272
This notion of presupposition involves certain “felicity-conditions of an utterance.” A
consideration of what constitutes “felicity-conditions” will be taken up in the consideration of
types of presuppositions, but it is significant to point out that “the felicity-conditions of an
utterance need not be described as propositions to whose truth the speaker subscribes, though they
can be, and frequently are, so described.”273 In other words, Lyons points out that presuppositions
are not necessarily conditions which must be held as true by a speaker. A speaker could make an
assertion for which its presupposition is not believed to be true simply for the purpose of
illustration or argument.

Definitions from Evangelical Sources

Of the Evangelical books on hermeneutics that consider the role of presuppositions in
interpretation, the investigations are generally quite extensive. However, there seems to be a
tendency of neglecting to provide a working definition of the term “presupposition.” Accordingly,
these investigations seem to imply that a presupposition can be almost anything that is a part of
the whole pre-condition of interpretation from one’s doctrinal system, to one’s philosophical
system, to one’s attitude and personal spiritual condition. For example, Grant Osborne says, “The
primary barrier to a valid interpretation is, as already stated, one’s preunderstanding.”274 He then
refers to preunderstanding as a “presupposed system.”275 So, preunderstanding seems to be
something that can be presupposed. In fact, in his effort to distinguish between “presupposition”
and “prejudice,” the terms “presupposition” and “preunderstanding” seem to become
interchangeable: “I must distinguish ‘presupposition’ from ‘prejudice.’ The key is to follow
Ricoeur’s suggestion and place ourselves ‘in front of’ rather than ‘behind’ the text, so that the text
can have priority. This allows us to determine which types of preunderstanding are valid and which
are not, as the text challenges, reshapes and directs our presuppositions.”276

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 In this statement, Osborne seems to indicate that either presuppositions and preunderstanding
are synonymous, or presuppositions are a subcategory of preunderstanding. Either way, he claims
that by placing ourselves in front of the text, we allow the text to evaluate our preunderstanding so
that our presuppositions can be challenged and reshaped. Later he identifies various kinds of
presuppositions, but he does not offer a definition of the term “presupposition.” He seems to
assume that the reader understands what presuppositions are. Like so many evangelical
hermeneuticians, Osborne provides descriptions and examples of presuppositions rather than
attempting to give an analytic definition. Osborne has shown that presuppositions are subject to
change or modification.
Robertson McQuilkin begins chapter one of his book on hermeneutics with the assertion, “The
basic presupposition about the Bible that distinguishes believers from unbelievers is that the Bible
is God’s revelation of Himself and of His will for man.”277 McQuilkin quotes from Ernest Best
who gives the following explanation about presuppositions: “Each of us approaches Scripture with
his own, or her own presuppositions. These presuppositions are part of our world view, part of our
personal theology.”278 McQuilkin then spends the rest of the first chapter delineating the
presuppositions that he advocates. He does not define the term itself, but he does provide
descriptions of the kinds of presuppositions which he believes should be a part of an interpreter’s
world view as he approaches the Scripture.
From McQuilkin’s descriptions the reader can learn some things about his understanding of
presuppositions. He delineates several presuppositions that are spiritual in nature. A believer will
hold the presupposition of the authority and trustworthiness of the Bible, and that the Bible, though
divine, is also natural in character. That is to say, the believer will come to the biblical text with
the presupposition that it is “a human communication, using language in its common sense.”279
What these descriptions indicate is that sometimes, the conclusions of some propositions or
activities may become the presuppositions of other propositions or activities.
In his book on science and hermeneutics, Vern Poythress asserts that one must become aware
of his presuppositions: “First, it is valuable for an exegete or a theologian to be aware of the role
of basic commitments or presuppositions in the formation of knowledge.”280 According to
Poythress, these basic commitments are “fundamental assumptions about the nature of the
world.”281 Prompted by the claims of Thomas Kuhn, Poythress acknowledges the inevitability of
presuppositions, and he asserts that there are “fundamental assumptions about the nature of the
world”282 which form the background for exegesis and theological reflection.
A problem arises, however, concerning the precise definition of “presupposition” or “basic
commitment.” According to Poythress, basic commitments play a role in the “formation of
knowledge.” However, this seems to imply that the presuppositions qua presuppositions are not a
part of the knowledge which they “form” since that which forms would seem to be distinct from
that which it forms. Poythress asserts that these presuppositions are “fundamental assumptions,”
but this seems to conflict with the notion that presuppositions, if they are not the knowledge
formed, can be assumptions since assumptions indicate knowledge assumed. If presuppositions
are knowledge assumed, and knowledge is formed by basic commitments, then how were the basic
commitments formed? This seems to lead to an infinite regress of commitments formed by prior
assumptions which are themselves commitments formed by prior assumptions, etc.
Poythress would certainly not be so easily entangled, but the discussion provided does not
seem to address the questions that it raises. There is an informality in the discussion that tends to
foster confusion in the definition. One is not clear on the relationships between the various aspects
of knowledge, assumptions, and commitments. In the next paragraph Poythress implies that basic

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commitments include “standards of evaluation, whether these be explicit or implicit.”283 Although
a precise definition is absent, he does provide a lengthy description of various presuppositions so
that the reader is able to get a general idea from the examples provided what the author means
when he talks about basic commitments or presuppositions.
He does add to the notion of presuppositions that a knowledge of one’s own presuppositions
is a prerequisite for exegesis. Additionally, Poythress associates the presence of presuppositions
with the question of neutrality. He asserts that at the level of evaluating one’s methods and results,
“there can be no neutrality.”284 This stems from the fact, according to Poythress, that “not everyone
cherishes the same values or the same standards!”285 This would also seem to imply that, for
Poythress, presuppositions include one’s value system as well as propositions, attitudes, and other
rational entities.
Moisés Silva seems to equate presuppositions with one’s “prior framework”: “Whether we
mean to or not, and whether we like it or not, all of us read the text as interpreted by our theological
presuppositions. Indeed, the most serious argument against the view that exegesis should be done
independently of systematic theology is that such a view is hopelessly naive. The very possibility
of understanding anything depends on our prior framework of interpretation. If we perceive a fact
that makes sense to us, the simple reason is that we have been able to fit that fact into the whole
complex of ideas that we have previously assimilated.”286
Silva does not provide a definition, although, like other evangelical writers, he does provide
descriptions. For Silva, presuppositions seem to constitute a “prior framework of interpretation”
through which all understanding takes place. In another place Silva asks the question, “Could it be
that it is impossible to shed our presuppositions precisely because it is they that mediate
understanding?”287
Silva’s description might also raise the question of an infinite regress of complex ideas. In his
discussion there is no attempt to identify what might constitute a “first idea,” or whether such a
thing exists. The claim that each fact makes sense only against the whole complex of ideas that
has already been assimilated leaves one with the unanswered question about how the process
begins.
In The Art of Biblical History, V. Philips Long maintains that “fundamental assumptions,
presuppositions, premises, beliefs, worldview, model of reality and so forth” are many different
terms for the same concept.288 These presuppositions or this world view includes “fundamental
assumptions about the world and reality” and are at the “fundamental level.”289 An interpreter’s
world view includes his “basic intellectual and spiritual commitments (‘how he or she sees the
world’) . . .”290 Long’s discussions provide a rich supply of descriptions and examples, and he
comes much closer to actually providing a definition.
However, to say that one’s world view is his “model of reality” does not provide a precise
definition. It is not clear whether this confines one’s world view to what a person consciously
models. Also, Long pours all these terms into the broad concept of “worldview” and goes from
there, and yet he provides no explanation to account for the rise of so many terms to describe the
same concept. These different terms may simply be describing different aspects of one’s whole
world view. Long does not deal with this issue however. This raises questions about the
differences, no matter how subtle, between the referents of these various terms. This is not to
suggest that true synonymity is not possible, but if there are differences, what are the relationships
between these concepts?
Millard Erickson defines presuppositions specifically as they relate to the task of interpretation.
He asserts, “A presupposition is a conception brought to the task of interpretation. It is a prior

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belief held as one of the givens within which the task of interpretation occurs. It is part of the very
framework of the interpreter.”291 Here again presuppositions are understood in terms of statements
or concepts. Erickson indicates that presuppositions are a “part” of the framework of the
interpreter, but he does not address the question of what constitutes the other part or parts of one’s
framework.
This raises a host of questions which were obviously not within the scope of Erickson’s task.
What are the other aspects of one’s mental framework which are not identified as presuppositions?
Are the other parts of one’s framework not identified as presuppositions because they are not
statements or beliefs? If they are not statements or beliefs, what are they? And, are these other
aspects prior to interpretation? What is the relationship between one’s presuppositions and the
other aspects of one’s framework?
Anthony Thiselton maintains that the term “horizon” offers an advantage over the more
popular term “presupposition.” By “horizon” he indicates “a space within which the text can be
intelligibly ‘slotted’ in terms of provisional linkages with the familiar that allow[s] patterns of
recognition.”292 Yet one’s horizons include a “realization that what seems familiar is not quite
what I had expected or assumed it to be,” and this realization “necessitates an expansion of my
horizons to make room for what is new.”293 By contrast, Thiselton asserts that, “the term
‘presupposition’ seems to suggest a different flavour. It conveys the impression of rooted beliefs
and doctrines which are not only cognitive and conceptual, but which also can only be changed
and revised with pain, or at least with difficulty.”294
Whereas “presupposition” indicates “rooted beliefs and doctrines which are only cognitive and
conceptual,” the term “horizon” introduces the notion that some existential “prior” condition or
state exists which must be understood in terms of one’s being or one’s nature. In other words,
Thiselton seems to be advocating a way of being which is prior to a way of knowing and that
presuppositions are confined to the “cognitive and conceptual,”—the way of knowing.
In summary, from Evangelical sources one might conclude that virtually the only common
thread that ties together all the different notions of presupposition is that they all propose that
presuppositions are prior to interpretation (and/or perhaps to affirmations of beliefs) and invariably
form a basis, or framework, or state of being on the basis of which statements are made, beliefs
are held, or actions are performed. Lyons offers a helpful summary statement about
presuppositions when he says that “what is presupposed is what the speaker takes for granted and
assumes that the addressee will take for granted as part of the contextual background.”295
From this summary it may be inferred that presuppositions take the form of propositions, or
attitudes, or states of being, or whatever might be the relevant background to the truthfulness or
meaningfulness of utterances or acts. If a satisfying definition of “presupposition” seems elusive,
it may be that presuppositions are basic in their nature and do not admit of analysis—for that which
is most basic cannot be broken down or analyzed into more basic components, which is the nature
of analysis. Perhaps presuppositions are the starting point of thought such that one cannot get
behind them. This would account for the frequent recurrence of the adjectives “basic” or
“fundamental” in the discussions of presuppositions. Consequently, one may not be able to provide
a definition per se, but may be able to provide only a description. Nevertheless, this broad notion
of what presuppositions are (and that they always influence knowledge, beliefs, and
understanding) is sufficient for the moment to move on to a consideration of the various types of
presuppositions and their functions in thought and life.
Nevertheless, there are some features that seem to be universally held by Evangelicals and
non-Evangelicals: 1) Presuppositions are inevitable and inescapable; 2) presuppositions are

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primarily rational in nature existing as statements, beliefs, assumptions about the world, life, etc.;
3) the presence of presuppositions necessarily and unavoidably form the basic framework through
which anyone understands and grasps meaning; and 4) the conceptual framework composed in
whole or in part of fundamental or basic presuppositions necessarily obviates the possibility of
neutrality.

Types and Functions of Presuppositions

Types of Presuppositions
Types of Presuppositions Discussed in Non-evangelical Sources
Closely tied to the various definitions of presuppositions are the claims about the various types
of presuppositions. Schematizing or categorizing the various types of presuppositions has not taken
a uniform pattern. One approach is to classify them in terms of whether they are basic or derivative.
Ted Peters seems to take this approach:

Presuppositions, it would seem, come in at least two varieties: fundamental or ultimate presuppositions and those which are
dependent upon them. The latter variety are articulable as suppositions or propositions themselves, and they can become so
through drawing out the necessary conditions implied by existing propositions. To state, for example, that “the president is a
Republican” presupposes that there exists an office of the presidency, that the man who fills this office truly exists, and other
such contingent facts which may also be articulated in propositional form. Of course, once the presupposition is articulated, by
definition, it ceases to be a pre-supposition and becomes a supposition.296

So, presuppositions, according to Peters, are either fundamental or derivative. But, pre-
suppositions must be distinguished from suppositions, as Peters goes on to explain.

But fundamental or ultimate presuppositions are different. They resist being made into suppositions or propositions. They
function to provide the basic framework or pre-understanding which make reflective understanding and articulated propositions
possible. They refer us to our fundamental vision of reality and the self-evident truths which are tacitly acknowledged in
everything we comprehend and assert. They can be pointed to as ostensively present but cannot themselves be fully drawn up
into propositional form. It is this character of standing in the background like a horizon that makes such a presupposition what
it is.297

Why do fundamental or ultimate presuppositions resist being made into suppositions or

propositions? It would seem that this resistance is due to the fact that for a presupposition to be
fundamental or ultimate it must not be based on or derive from other more basic assumptions.
These fundamental presuppositions have to do with the “fundamental vision of reality.” But,
fundamental presuppositions, according to Peters, only “refer us to” our fundamental vision of
reality. It would seem that one’s fundamental “vision of reality,” by virtue of it being something
to which fundamental presuppositions “refer” may be more basic than these fundamental
presuppositions. Additionally, Peters seems to be saying that in the same way fundamental
presuppositions “refer us to” this vision of reality, they also “refer us to . . . the self-evident truths
which are tacitly acknowledged in everything we comprehend and assert.” This confusion may
arise from the difficulty of explaining the nature of fundamental presuppositions without implying
a specific content. Fundamental presuppositions “refer us to” this vision of reality because the
vision of reality may be in need of being converted into a propositional form in order to be
conceptualized.
Peter’s analysis does raise the question of the relationship between self-evident truths and
fundamental presuppositions, a relationship which he does not clarify. It would seem to follow that
they are distinct in the way that which refers is distinct from that to which it refers. The direction
of reference is also unclear. One is not sure whether these fundamental presuppositions refer down

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to the fundamental vision of reality and to self-evident truths, in which case this vision and these
truths are more fundamental than the presuppositions, or whether the fundamental presuppositions
refer up to this vision and these truths, in which case one wonders what constitutes a fundamental
presupposition. If a fundamental presupposition is neither a fundamental vision of reality nor a
self-evident truth, then what is it?
That Peters entertains a distinction between fundamental presuppositions and self-evident
truths seems to be further indicated by his definition of axioms. He says, “Hypotheses and axioms
could be classified as non-fundamental or non-ultimate presuppositions. . . . An axiom is a basic
assumption, usually conceived as self-evident, and from which certain consequences can be
rationally deduced and conclusions drawn by logical necessity. However, axioms are articulated
and function as a link in a rational chain with theorems and other axioms. But because they are
drawn from basic self-evidence, they come closer than hypotheses to fundamental
presuppositions.”298
An axiom, according to Peters, is conceived as self-evident but is also said to be “drawn from
basic self-evidence.” Peters does not say whether self-evidence is something more basic than an
axiom. It would seem that according to this scheme, self-evidence is distinct from axiom as that
which is drawn is distinct from that from which it is drawn. If, however, an axiom is self-evident,
does this not imply that it is not evident by anything other than itself? It would seem that Peters’
descriptions and categories are at best confusing and at worst confused. The category of
“fundamental presuppositions” has lost all identifying characteristics other than the fact that they
are fundamental or ultimate. They do not appear to be axioms, or hypotheses, or self-evident truths,
or fundamental visions of reality, or suppositions, or propositions, or any other identifiable thing.
Another classification of presuppositions is made by John Lyons’ felicity conditions. Felicity-
conditions are “conditions that must be satisfied before an utterance can be used felicitously.”299
These conditions are classified by John Lyons into three main heads. They involve preparatory
conditions in which “the person performing the [speech] act must have the right or authority to do
so.”300 They involve sincerity conditions, in which case, “If the person performing the act does so
insincerely . . . his illocutionary act will not be nullified, but he will be guilty of what Austin calls
an abuse.”301 Felicity conditions also involve essential conditions in which case “the person
performing the act is committed by the illocutionary force of his utterance to certain beliefs or
intentions; and, if he thereafter produces an utterance which is inconsistent with these beliefs or
conducts himself in a way that is incompatible with the intentions to which he is committed, he
may be judged guilty of a breach of commitment.”302 According to Lyons, “This view of
presupposition has the advantage that it provides a unified and theoretically motivated account of
most of what has been considered, pre-theoretically, to be the case of presupposition.”303 So,
instead of asserting that a proposition presupposes the truth of some prior proposition, it claims
that a proposition “presupposes that a certain event took place.”304 Difficulties relating to the
functions of presuppositions, which shall be considered later, are supposedly obviated by
understanding presuppositions to be more than simply propositions.
One possible shortcoming of this approach, however, is that it does not seem to address the
question of the possibility that some presuppositions should be considered more fundamental than
or foundational to others. Additionally, it would seem that felicity conditions are themselves based
on more fundamental assumptions about the nature of authority, what constitutes a belief a
“certainty,” and how to evaluate consistency between claims and beliefs. In other words, felicity
conditions do not prima facie admit of being basic or fundamental, but themselves seem to be built
on other assumptions which provide identity and meaning to what constitutes conditions. Of course

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the objection may be raised that something more fundamental is not necessary. However, whether
something more fundamental is or is not necessary is a question that is not addressed by the felicity
conditions. Other than the claim that they are presuppositions, nothing is proposed that would
argue for or against the need for more fundamental assumptions. Consequently, one is left with
the question, “Are these conditions the basis for thought and speech?”
Jonathan Culler points out that linguists distinguish presuppositions into the categories of
logical and pragmatic. He observes, “In discussing the presuppositions at work in a natural
language linguists find it convenient to distinguish between logical and pragmatic
presupposition.”305 Culler seems to adopt this distinction, and identifies logical presuppositions as
“what must be true in order that a proposition be either true or false. . . . An explicit definition of
logical presupposition is as follows: ‘A sentence S logically presupposes a sentence S' just in case
S logically implies S' and the negation of S, ~S, also logically implies S'.’”306 Pragmatic
presuppositions, according to Culler, “are defined not on the relations between sentences but on
the relations between utterance and situation of utterance. . . . That is, the context must be such as
to allow one to interpret the utterance as the kind of speech act which it is.”307 So, the command
to Open the door “presupposes, pragmatically, the presence, in a room with a door that is not open,
of another person who understands English and is in a relation to the speaker which enables him
to interpret this as a request or command.”308
Edward Keenan, in an article titled, “Two Kinds of Presuppositions in Natural Language,”
employs the same distinction between presuppositions that Jonathan Culler delineates. Keenan is
primarily concerned with the relationship of presuppositions to meaningful sentences. He takes a
general notion of presuppositions and then considers them under these two kinds (literal and non-
literal): “In general I want to consider that the presuppositions of a sentence are those conditions
that the world must meet in order for the sentence to make literal sense. Thus if some such
condition is not met, for some sentence S, then either S makes no sense at all or else it is understood
in some nonliteral way, for example as a joke or metaphor.”309
Keenan holds that presuppositions are the conditions which must be met in order for the
sentence to make literal sense. Consequently, for the logical notion of presupposition, if the
presupposition S' is not true, and if S' is the necessary presupposition of sentence S, then, according
to Keenan, “S can be neither true nor false (and must in the formal logic be assigned a third or
‘nonsense’ value).”310 The pragmatic notion is defined by Keenan as “the relation between the
utterance of a sentence and the context in which it is uttered.”311
Classifying presuppositions by kind has been carried to a more precise degree by Paul Larreya.
He identifies four categories: “(I) ‘logical’ (sometimes called ‘semantic’) . . . (ii) ‘pragmatic’ . . .
(iii) the ‘illocutionary’ . . . (iv) ‘informationist.’”312 In his analysis, Larreya concentrates on the
informationist category and does not expound on the other categories. But, his classification
roughly follows Culler’s and Keenan’s with reference to the logical and the pragmatic. The
illocutionary category of presuppositions has to do with the relation of presuppositions to speech
acts, which has been briefly considered in the references from John Lyons about felicity conditions
and speech acts. The informationist category, on which Larreya concentrates, has been touched on
under “Definitions” in the previous section of this chapter.
A final means of classification of the types of presuppositions derives from the speculative
philosophy of Martin Heidegger as this has been integrated into the philosophical hermeneutics of
Hans-Georg Gadamer. Gadamer speaks of prejudice (Vorurteile) rather than the more recognizable
and less emotionally laden English term “presupposition.” As Gadamer explains, “It can be shown
that the concept of prejudice (Vorurteile) did not originally have the meaning we have attached to

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it. Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth.
In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word,
constitute the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases
(Neigung) or our openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience
something—whereby what we encounter says something to us.”313
Gadamer’s account of the nature of prejudice introduces a decidedly ontological sense. Thus
far the classification of presuppositions has been in terms of the cognitive in the sense of the logical
or informationist, or in terms of the psychological in the sense of pragmatic context or felicity-
conditions. What Gadamer seems to introduce is the possibility that interpretation is based, at least
in part, on the way one exists in relation to the world. As he asserts, “In Being and Time
[Heidegger] gave the general hermeneutical problem a concrete form in the question of being
(Seinsfrage).”314 The ontological nature of “prejudice” (Vorurteile) and its relation to
“preunderstanding” (Vorverstndnis) in Gadamer in particular and phenomenological hermeneutics
in general will be taken up later. At present it is sufficient to introduce the idea that presuppositions
have been categorized in terms of the ontological conditions of the interpreter as well as cognitive
or psychological aspects of the presuppositions themselves.
However, the concept of ontology or “being” in Heidegger is understood in a
phenomenological sense rather than a metaphysical sense. Consequently, the reference to the
question of being is not a question of extra-mental existence in a realist sense. The ontological
characteristic of prejudice, though discussed in terms that have historically been employed in
metaphysics, are redefined and reinterpreted in the wake of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s
phenomenological method.

Types of Presuppositions Discussed in Evangelical Sources

Another approach to classifying the types of presuppositions is to think of them in terms of
their content. For example, Grant R. Osborne states, “Presuppositions can be external
(philosophical or theological starting points) or internal (personality, pressure to publish) but must
be recognized and taken into account when studying the text. My basic point is that they can be
identified.”315 This would seem to indicate that presuppositions may not be only theoretical in
nature, in the sense that they may not be abstract in content. Rather, they may also be psychological
in the sense of one’s attitude or emotional state.
Still another approach to identifying the types of presuppositions is to classify them according
to these kinds (theological, philosophical, and methodological) as Millard Erickson does: “There
are theological presuppositions. These are doctrinal beliefs, such as the nature of God, or of man,
which affect the understanding of specific passages. There are also philosophical presuppositions.
These are conceptions shared with other disciplines or pertaining to broader topics than the strictly
theological or religious. Here are beliefs about truth, meaning, the nature and direction of history,
etc. Finally there are methodological presuppositions. These pertain to the use of logic, inference,
induction and deduction, and the like.”316
Erickson’s classifications seem to include presuppositions that have to do with theory and those
that have to do with practice. Theological presuppositions are identified by the content of which
they are composed, while methodological presuppositions are identified by the practices which are
performed. Indeed, others have taken this mixed approach to the nature of presuppositions and
classified them according to these two categories, theory and practice. One might distinguish
between the theoretical and the practical in terms of the consciously held and the unconsciously
held assumptions as does Vern Poythress: “Presuppositions include not only consciously held

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philosophical assumptions but unconsciously assumed elements of one’s world view. These are
one’s basic commitments.”317
In his article entitled “The Presuppositions of the Historical-Grammatical Method as Employed
by Historic Lutheranism,” Raymond Surburg discusses fifteen “presuppositions” which he asserts
were held by the historic Lutheran interpreters. Briefly these are: 1) the Bible is the Word of God
in its entirety; 2) recognition of only the canonical books as Scripture; 3) only the text in the
original languages was determinative; 4) the Bible was the supreme and final authority in
theological matters; 5) the literal meaning was the usual and normal one; 6) the autograph text is
the authoritative text; 7) the biblical books were literary documents which allowed for literary
criticism; 8) the Holy Scriptures constituted a unity; 9) Scripture can be used to interpret Scripture;
10) the autograph text was inerrant; 11) centrality of justification by faith as the chief article of the
biblical revelation; 12) the entire Bible is Christocentric; 13) the fundamental doctrines of Law
and Gospel should not be confused; 14) the Holy Spirit is the true interpreter of the Bible; and 15)
the Scriptures are profitable according to the declaration in 2 Tim. 3:16.318 It is not necessary to
enter into any consideration of the accuracy of Surburg’s claims. Rather, the point is to consider
these propositions in terms of their identification as presuppositions. Some sound more like
hermeneutical principles rather than presuppositions upon which hermeneutical principles were
built. But, as has been seen above, what constitutes a presupposition does not seem to enjoy a
universally agreed upon identity by philosophers or hermeneuticians. In the same way that
definitions lacked any uniformity among theorists, so the classifications and identifications of the
types of presuppositions lacks uniformity.

Functions of Presuppositions
The question of the function of presuppositions has become a complex and controversial debate
over the relation between statements, sentences, speech acts, beliefs, etc., and their respective
presuppositions. The debate is conducted most rigorously among linguists who are trying to
develop a general notion of the presupposition relation—that is, the relationship between
presuppositions and the propositions, beliefs, assertions, etc., that are based upon them—and how
this enables the linguist or semanticist to explain the different roles that the same words can play
in different sentences. As David Cooper characterizes it, “Unless we make a distinction between
assertion and presupposition, it is impossible to see why, for example, questions will be interpreted
differently with respect to what it is they call in question.”319 Of course, as was mentioned in the
introduction to this chapter, philosophers have been interested in presuppositions, or assumptions,
almost since Thales predicted the eclipse.320 However, in the writings of Evangelicals on the
question of presuppositions, the presupposition relation is discussed in terms of hermeneutical
methodology. Consequently, this investigation will concentrate on the philosophical and linguistic
debate, and the positions of Evangelicals on the presupposition relation will be considered under
the section dealing with presuppositions and hermeneutical methodology.

An Overview of the Various Views on the Presuppositional Relation

In current thinking a distinction is made between “presupposing” and “presupposition.” The
former has to do with the act or attitude one has, while the latter concerns the thing itself. The act
of presupposing is considered in the discipline of linguistics as well as in the area of philosophical
semantics. However, John Post’s analysis seems to bring into question the whole idea of
“presupposing” as being an act of thought. He writes,

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 With a few clearly definable exceptions, ‘presuppose’ typically has the following properties. Perhaps the most striking is the
lack of a plausible imperative. It sounds very odd to tell someone ‘Presuppose that there is a king of France’ or ‘Presuppose
that John has children.’ This contrasts strongly with the frequent and important imperative use of the root verb ‘suppose.’ . . .
‘Presuppose’ typically has no performative use. It sounds odd to say ‘I (hereby) presuppose that there is a king of France’ . . .
‘Presuppose’ has no adverbial use, unlike its root-verb ‘suppose.’ For ‘suppose’ the adverb ‘supposedly’ has frequent and
important use, but ‘presupposedly’ is not even a word. . . . Finally, it appears that in spite of its frequent personal use,
‘presuppose’ typically does not denote an act; it is not an act-verb.321

Post’s analysis seems to indicate that presupposing is not an act but is a condition. As he
explains, “The verb ‘presuppose’ functions primarily to comment on acts, often but not always
speech acts; and a presupposition is best construed as a necessary condition of the proper
performance of an act.”322 If we provisionally accept Post’s conclusion, this leads into the more
prominent controversy on the relation between a presupposition and a proposition, and the truth-
value of the presupposition(s) as it relates to the truth-value of the proposition of which it is the
presupposition.
According to Robert Stalnaker, the notion of the presupposition relation that has become the
“standard account of presupposition which has been given by philosophers and linguists”323
originated with P. F. Strawson in his article “On Referring,”324 and later in his book, Introduction
to Logical Theory, first published in 1952. In that work, Strawson provided the following definition
of “presupposition”:

For if a statement S presupposes a statement S' in the sense that the truth of S' is a precondition of the truth-or-falsity of S, then
of course there will be a kind of logical absurdity in conjoining S with the denial of S'. This is precisely the relation in our
imagined case, between the statement that all John’s children are asleep (S) and the statement that John has children, that there
exist children of John’s (S'). . . . What I am proposing, then, is this. There are many ordinary sentences beginning with such
phrases as ‘All . . .’, ‘All the . . .’, ‘No . . .’, ‘None of the . . .’, ‘Some . . .’, ‘Some of the . . .’, ‘At least one . . .’, ‘At least one
of the . . .’ which exhibit, in their standard employment, parallel characteristics to those I have just described in the case of a
representative ‘All . . .’ sentence. That is to say, the existence of members of the subject-class is to be regarded as presupposed
(in the sense described) by statements made by the use of these sentences; to be regarded as a necessary condition, not of the
truth simply, but of the truth or falsity, of such statements. 325

Stalnaker summarizes Strawson’s definition as follows: “According to this standard account,

one sentence presupposes another just in case the latter must be true in order that the former have
a truth value at all.”326 As Stalnaker points out, this has become the standard view of presupposition
which he identifies as the “semantic” notion.
Since Strawson’s work, several different views on the nature of presuppositions have been
developed. Strawson was offering a criticism of Bertrand Russell’s analysis of complex statements
such as (1) The King of France is bald. According to Russell, the proposition expressed in (1) is
roughly equivalent to the statement, (2) There is one, and only one, King of France and he is
bald.327 However, since there was no king of France when Russell made this analysis, the
proposition asserted by (1) was considered by Russell to be false. Russell held that (1) was false
since the existential proposition, (3) There is a King of France, was false.328 Consequently, anyone
asserting the proposition (1) would be asserting a false proposition if France had no king.
Strawson’s opposition to Russell’s analysis was predicated on the claim that Russell had failed
to distinguish between the assertion and its presupposition. Strawson proposed that existential
propositions such as expressed in (3) are to be considered necessary conditions “not of the truth
simply, but of the truth or falsity.”329 In other words, if (3) is true or false, then (1) is true or false
accordingly; but if there is no king of France, then the existential presupposition is not satisfied,
and (1) of which (3) is the existential presupposition, is neither true nor false. That is to say, (1)
has no truth-value.

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 Other philosophers and linguists have entered the fray making modifications of the various
positions to support their claims. For example, some have claimed that the truth-value of (1) is
neither-true-nor-false. As John Lyons observes, “What these various theories of presupposition
have in common, despite these differences, is their acceptance of the principle that if p is a
necessary condition of the truth of both q and ~q, then p is a presupposition of q.”330
Stalnaker offers an alternative to the various semantic theories with what he identifies as a
pragmatic notion. As he explains,

According to the contrasting idea that I will focus on, the basic presupposition relation is not between propositions or
sentences, but between a person and a proposition. A person’s presuppositions are the propositions whose truth he takes for
granted, often unconsciously, in a conversation, an inquiry, or a deliberation. They are the background assumptions that may
be used without being spoken— sometimes without being noticed—for example as suppressed premisses in an enthymematic
argument, or as implicit directions about how a request should be fulfilled or a piece of advice taken. 331

Stalnaker considers presuppositions to be a matter of the propositional attitude of the person

making an assertion or offering a truth-claim. The definition he offers is supported by his
examination of various examples. He provides what he calls a “rough definition”: “A speaker
presupposes that P at a given moment in a conversation just in case he is disposed to act, in his
linguistic behavior, as if he takes the truth of P for granted, and as if he assumes that his audience
recognizes that he is doing so.”332 He explains the phrase “acting as if” by an example in which a
speaker makes an assertion that both he and his audience know to be false or to be in doubt, but
which is accepted for the purposes of the conversation.
Stalnaker is not rejecting the semantic notion of presuppositions. As he asserts,

Now as linguists use the term, it is sentences that have presuppositions. Although according to the notion I have sketched it is
persons, and not sentences, that have presuppositions in the primary sense, we may say that a sentence has a presupposition in
a derivative sense just in case the use of the sentence would for some reason normally be inappropriate unless the speaker
presupposed a particular proposition. In such a case, I will say that a sentence requires a presupposition. This notion of
presupposition requirement will be the explication of the linguists’ notion of presupposition. 333

Stalnaker proposes a pragmatic notion of presupposition that is a broader understanding of the

nature of presupposing, and that “it is in terms of this intuitive [pragmatic] idea of presupposition,
or a refinement of it, that the linguistic phenomenon of presupposition should be explained.”334
David Cooper has produced a lengthy study on presuppositions, and he identifies several
approaches to the presuppositional relation. The first kind of relation he classifies as the “‘Family
Resemblance’ view of presupposition.”335 Cooper’s description of this kind of relation is quite
similar to Wittgenstein’s description of language games. Describing this kind of relation, Cooper
says,

Presuppositions are a bit like games. There are all sorts of games, and there need be no single feature or set of features belonging
to all games. . . . We may at first apply it to a certain range of cases of a certain specific type; but as we note various, more or
less loose, resemblances between these cases and others, it is reasonable to extend the scope of the term. No more than in the
case of games will it be sensible to search for a single feature or set of features which must belong to all presuppositions. 336

Another classification of presupposition relation is identified by Cooper as the Austere View.

“According to this view the term ‘presupposition’ should be restricted to the paradigms alone. We
should only say that S presupposes S' where S lacks a truth value unless S' is true.”337 Cooper
dedicates a chapter to a discussion of the Austere View which he calls the “Truth Condition
Account.” Cooper maintains that, “anyone provides a ‘Truth Condition Account’ of presupposition

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if he holds: one sentence presupposes another if and only if they pass the TVG test.”338 He
discusses several counter examples that seem to indicate that it is possible “to envision situations
in which it would be quite natural to regard sentences . . . as false (or even as true) where,
nevertheless, their presuppositions are false.”339
The “Catholic View,” according to Cooper, asserts that “both the Family Resemblance and the
Austere views are too pessimistic. For both assume the impossibility of providing a general,
precise characterization of presupposition which would cover most, if not all, of the cases so far
encountered.”340 Cooper spends two chapters describing and criticizing two forms of the Catholic
View. The first form is what Cooper identifies as the Pragmatic Account of the presuppositional
relation. This is the position that asserts, “if S is neither true nor false where S' is false, this is
incidental to S presupposing S'.”341 His criticism of this view is that it is simply “too vague to be
helpful.”342 The second form of the Catholic view is called the Conceptual Account. The
Conceptual Account would understand the presupposition relation in terms of “concepts” or
“meanings.” As Cooper characterizes it, “An immediate and natural answer to the question as to
how (3) [Harry regretted that he killed his grandma] presupposes (3') [He killed his grandma]
might be: ‘Because ‘regret’ means what it does. It is part of the very concept of regret that a person
cannot regret doing what he never did.’”343 Cooper maintains that this account is inadequate also:
“From the start the Conceptual Account faces a difficulty. It may be argued that it is trivial to claim
that presuppositions are carried by meanings, for the simple reason that presupposition is itself a
semantic feature, an aspect of meaning. If so, to say that S presupposes S' in virtue of what S means
is to say nothing, for it will be impossible to specify the meaning of S without specifying what it
presupposes. Hence one could not non-circularly explain how S presupposes S' in terms of its
meaning.”344
Cooper argues for a version of the Catholic View of presupposition which he characterizes as
presuppositions of “Speech Acts.” His explanation of this view is lengthy, but necessary in order
to grasp the subtle distinction between his view and those he has rejected:

The importance of speech acts in connection with presupposition becomes apparent when we reflect on how misleading has
been the assumption so far made, that it is sentences which carry presuppositions. Unless this assumption is severely qualified,
it cannot be true. For one and the same sentence, say ‘He is bald’, can be used to make quite different assertions—for example,
that Napoleon is bald, that Harry is bald, that Charlie is bald, and so on. In each case what is presupposed is quite different. If
so, it cannot be the sentence per se which presupposes that, for example, Napoleon exists, but rather the assertion made with
the sentence on some occasion of its use. This is not to say that we cannot talk of a sentence’s presuppositions. It is to say that
such talk will be derivative from talking of the presuppositions of a speech act. To say that a sentence, on some occasion of its
use, presupposes X will mean that the assertion (command, question, etc.) which it was used to make presupposes X. 345

For Cooper, presuppositions are the “necessary conditions for the success of speech acts.” 346
For a speech act to succeed is for it to accomplish the intent of the one who utters it. Cooper
concentrates on the concept of assertion in order to explicate his view:

in the standard cases of assertions made with sentences of the subject/predicate type, where the subject-expression putatively
refers to some particular thing or person, it is the speaker’s intention that the audience shall believe, in a certain basic sense of
‘believe’, that the subject has a certain property. Unless the subject referred to exists, speakers cannot succeed in that intention.
Nor, unless the speakers believe the subject to exist can they even have that intention. To say that such assertions presuppose
the existence of subjects is simply to make these points about the conditions for assertion of successful, fully felicitous
assertion.347

For Cooper, then, the presupposition relation includes the intention of the speaker in the speech
act being performed. Presuppositions “are certain necessary conditions for making that assertion
[or any other speech act] successfully.”348 An implication of Cooper’s view seems to be that, at

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least in the case of assertions, if the presupposition is false, then the intention of the speaker does
not succeed primarily because the assertion is false. In other words, if the speaker intended his
audience to believe the assertion, and the presupposition was false which prevented the audience
from believing his assertion, the audiences’ rejection of his assertion is tantamount to considering
it false.
The linguistic and philosophical debate over the presupposition relation is a complex issue in
its details, but, as Lyons has pointed out, all the various theories start with the assumption that
there is a relation between a truth-claim and its presupposition(s) such that the presupposition(s)
of any truth-claim is a necessary condition for the truth or falsity of the truth-claim. Consequently,
whatever the relation of complex questions may be to the truth-condition of their existential
presuppositions, if the presupposition is false, then the truth-claim of which it is a necessary
condition will necessarily be false. This assertion is not convertible, however. So, although a
presupposition is true, this does not necessarily mean that the truth-claim of which it is a necessary
condition is true. For example, in the proposition, (1) The King of France is bald, assuming the
truth of the existential presupposition (3) There is a King of France, this does not entail that (1) is
true. Rather, it allows for the possibility of the truth of (1) which would have to be validated on
the basis of whether the king was or was not actually bald. Existential presuppositions function as
necessary but not as sufficient conditions for the truth of the propositions of which they are the
conditions.

An Evaluation of the Linguistic Analysis of the Presuppositional Relation

In his analysis of various views on the presupposition relation, Cooper observed, as did
Stalnaker, that the standard view among linguists is the Austere or Truth Conditional Account of
presupposition. This is the view that originated with Strawson’s criticism of Russell. In order to
evaluate this view, it will be necessary to recount Cooper’s presentation of the Truth Conditional
Account as it emerges from the criticisms of certain claims made by Russell in his article, “On
Denoting.” Cooper writes:

According to Russell a sentence is either true, false, or meaningless. Consider then the sentence
(1) The king of France is bald
as uttered in 1972. It is not meaningless, and it is certainly not true. So, for Russell, it must be false. And Russell
indeed analyses (1) in such a way that its falsity is apparent—into the form: There is one and only one king of
France, and he is bald. Since the claim that there is a king of France is false, the whole sentence is therefore false.
Yet Russell’s analysis seems mistaken. For he is making
(1') There is a king of France
an assertion of (1). But one feels that a speaker who asserts (1) is asserting merely that the king is bald, not in
addition that there is a king of France. Moreover, it seems odd to regard (1) as false; for this suggests that
(1'') The king of France is not bald
would be true; which, in turn, suggests that
(1''') The king of France has hair
would be true—which, of course, they are not. If this is so then not merely is (1') not asserted in (1), it is not
entailed by it either. For if (1) entailed (1') then the falsity of (1') would render (1) false, which it appears not to
be.
These objections to Russell are sometimes summarized by saying: (1) presupposes (1'). Russell’s original
trichotomy—true, false, or meaningless—ignores the role of presuppositions. A meaningful sentence need be
neither true nor false. It will only have a truth value if its presuppositions are true. By introducing the notion of
presupposition, then, it seems we avoid the implausibility of regarding (1') as asserted in, or entailed by, (1), and
that we reveal the fallacy in Russell’s bogus trichotomy.349

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 Others have argued that such criticisms of Russell’s argument are themselves mistaken. If it is
the case that the assertion (1) The king of France is bald presupposes the assertion (1') There is a
king of France, then (1') is presupposed by (1). The relationship between (1) and (1'), then, would
seem not simply to be a logical or semantic relation, but an existential relation. That is, the
implication that (1) presupposes (1') is the existential copula “is.” To assert that the king of France
is bald assumes that the king of France is. But, if there is no king of France, then it would seem to
be false to assert that the king of France is anything at all. The fact is, the king of France is not, or
does not exist. If there is no king of France, then it is false to say that he is bald since such a person
is not, i.e., does not exist.
Cooper’s response is that “it seems odd to regard (1) as false; for this suggests that (1'') The
king of France is not bald would be true; which, in turn, suggests that (1''') The king of France has
hair would be true—which, of course, they are not.”350 However, this response has been
challenged as an equivocation on Cooper’s part. To assert that (1) is false may in fact suggest that
(1'') is true. But, if we restate (1'') to read (1'''') The king of France is non-bald, then the
equivocation between (1'') and (1''') is more easily seen. It is possible to hold that by saying (1) is
false, one is not necessarily asserting the existence of the king of France in a condition of having
hair. What one may be indicating by saying (1) is false is that the king of France does not exist. If
the king of France does not exist, then he does not exist as either being bald or as having hair. Any
condition in which the king of France does not exist as being bald is a condition of being not bald,
or non-bald. To say that the king of France is not bald because he does not exist is not the same as
to say the king of France is not bald because he has hair. It could be maintained that this is the
point Russell makes when he says, “Thus ‘the present King of France is bald’ is certainly false;
and ‘the present King of France is not bald’ is false if it means ‘There is an entity which is now
King of France and is not bald,’ but is true if it means ‘It is false that there is an entity which is
now King of France and is bald.’”351 This move seems to avoid Cooper’s criticism. Because the
question is an existential one, i.e., the existence or non-existence of the king, proposition (1) The
king of France is bald and proposition (1''') The king of France has hair are not contradictories.
Rather, they are contraries, and as contraries, though both cannot be true, although both can be
false.352 Additionally, (1) and (1'') are contradictories, since the existential presupposition of (1) is
the assertion that the king does exist, and the existential presupposition of (1'') is that the king does
not exist.
Several problems have been debated with reference to the criticisms of Russell’s view, and
there seems to be much confusion about the issue. This confusion has serious implications for the
possibility of adjudicating between truth claims. For example, if someone makes the claim (2) This
event was a miracle of Allah, then (2) presupposes (2') Allah exists, at least according to the
Russellian position. According to the critic’s analysis, if it can be shown that (2') is false, then (2)
simply does not have a truth value. Consequently, there seems to be no means of adjudicating
between (2) This event was a miracle of Allah and (3) This event was not a miracle of Allah,
especially in the case that (2') is demonstrated to be false. Likewise Cooper’s own claim (4)
Russell’s trichotomy is bogus presupposes the truth of (4') The falsity of (1) suggests the truth of
(1'') which also suggests the truth of (1''') neither of which is true. But, if it can be shown, as seems
to be the case, that (4') involves an equivocation and is therefore false, does it thereby follow that
the critic’s claim (4) is neither true nor false? An affirmative answer would seem to be extremely
odd and virtually nonsensical. In fact, the critic of Russell has shown that Russell’s trichotomy (5)
presupposes the truth of his analysis (5'), and he believes he has also demonstrated that Russell’s
analysis (5') is false. But, by the critic’s own principles, he in fact has not demonstrated that

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Russell’s trichotomy is false.353 Rather, since Russell’s presupposition (5') is false, the critic has
only shown that Russell’s trichotomy (5) is without truth value. But, the critic intuitively realizes
the truth-value implications of his own demonstration and consequently makes the assertion that
Russell’s claim (5) is false—earlier he says it is “mistaken”—not that it simply has no truth value.
So, if by claiming that Russell’s trichotomy is bogus he means to say that it is false, then he has
abandoned his own principles in favor of Russell’s trichotomy.
Regardless of where one comes out on this controversy, there are some conclusions with
reference to our concerns here that seem to follow. First, it has been sufficiently established that if
a given presupposition is a necessary condition for the truth or falsity of a truth-claim, then the
falsity of the presupposition may at most entail the falsity of the truth-claim, or may at least entail
the lack of truth value of the truth-claim. However, as has been argued above, the truth of the
presupposition does not insure the truth of the truth-claim. The truth of a truth-claim will have to
be established on its own terms and is not necessarily entailed by the truth of its presuppositions.
The truth of (1') does not necessarily entail the truth of (1). In other words, the presupposition is a
necessary condition for the truth of a truth-claim although it is not a sufficient condition for its
truth.
Second, whether one accepts the assertion of Russell or Strawson (Cooper) about the truth-
value of a proposition when the existential presupposition has not been satisfied, one conclusion
is clear. If the existential presupposition is not satisfied, then the proposition of which it is a
necessary condition is, at the very least, devoid of any truth-value. But, a proposition that is devoid
of truth-value is not true. On the basis of Russell’s analysis, proposition (1) may be considered
false if (3) is not satisfied, or, on the basis of the Strawson/Cooper analysis, proposition (1) may
be considered to have no truth-value. But, what one cannot do is to claim that proposition (1) is
true when its existential presupposition (3) is not satisfied—it may be false, but at least it can be
said to have no truth-value at all. Consequently, by demonstrating that a given presupposition is
false, the truth-claim of which it is a necessary condition can no longer function in a system as part
of the body of truths for that system, since that proposition is either false or has no truth-value. For
the purposes of determining the role of presuppositions in hermeneutics, these conclusions are
sufficient to continue our investigation.

Summary and Conclusion

What seems to have emerged from this survey is a notion among Evangelicals of the nature
and role of presuppositions that is very much like the notion one gets from non-evangelical writers.
Of course, this may indicate only that both groups are simply recognizing what is in fact the case.
When both Evangelicals and non-evangelicals consider the role of presuppositions, each group
reports what it finds to be the case, and since they are both discussing the same thing, it would
seem to follow that their independent investigations could reach the same conclusions. But this
would certainly be an odd conclusion to draw in light of what seems to be a universal rejection of
“bare facts” and of objectivity that is brought about by the undeniable presuppositions and
preconditional framework of understanding. Can it really be the case that two groups of theorists,
espousing contrary and often contradictory systems, in examining the same data, arrive at the same
conclusion? Wouldn’t this be an instance of the very objectivity that has been so adamantly
denied?
Let us consider this important question a little further. If Evangelicals and non-evangelicals
both approach the question of the preconditions of knowledge from their own presuppositional
frameworks, and prior commitments, and since Evangelicals and non-Evangelicals would hold

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many contrary and even contradictory assumptions, presuppositions, and prior commitments, how
is it the case that they arrive at almost identical conclusions about the nature and role of
presuppositions? If one’s presuppositions and preunderstanding forms the grid through which one
understands, then would it not follow that one’s understanding of the nature and role of
presuppositions would likewise be mediated through one’s presuppositions? If this is the case, how
can opposing frameworks yield almost identical conclusions?
There would seem to be only three scenarios that could account for this fact. Either 1) the
Evangelicals have articulated the nature and role of presuppositions, and the non-evangelicals have
largely adopted their conclusions; or 2) the non-evangelicals have articulated the nature and role
of presuppositions, and the Evangelicals have largely adopted their conclusions; or 3) both the
Evangelicals and non-evangelicals are operating from some presuppositions that are the same, or
else so similar that they issue in similar conclusions.
It is unfortunately the case that the first option can probably be readily dismissed. Non-
evangelical writers give no evidence of having interacted with Evangelicals in arriving at their
conclusions. Additionally, the conclusions of non-evangelicals arrived on the scene many years
prior to what Evangelicals are now doing.
The second option, however, is a possible explanation. Evangelicals often quote prominent
figures in their discussions, such as Heidegger, Gadamer, Palmer, and Kuhn, as the sources or
influences of assertions they make, and the explanations given by Evangelicals often parallel those
already given by non-evangelicals. Vern Poythress acknowledges the work of Thomas Kuhn in
alerting Evangelicals “to the fact that such basic commitments or presuppositions do exist.”354
Moisés Silva states, “Such thinkers as Martin Heidegger, for example, have forced us to take
seriously the role that preunderstanding plays in the process of interpretation.”355 N. T. Wright
talks about one’s access to knowledge in terms of a “spiralling path of appropriate dialogue or
conversation between the knower and the thing known,”356 which parallels the kind of description
one finds in Gadamer. Roger Lundin acknowledges that, “Cartesian assumptions have done much
to shape our theories about the interpretation of the Bible, literary texts, and works of art.”357
Lundin goes on to point out, “The Cartesian approach, especially as it has been assimilated and
transmitted by the Enlightenment tradition, has extended its dominion over so much of modern
thought that even when certain groups—such as the romantic poets and various orthodox
Christians—have protested its encroachment, they have largely done so in language of the
Cartesian theoretical kingdom in which they unwittingly dwell.”358
However, Evangelicals are certainly not merely parrots. Among evangelical writers are some
of the more erudite and accomplished scholars in the world. Although it seems clear that
Evangelicals have adopted many of the conclusions of non-evangelical writers, it would be a
difficult task to show that they have uncritically accepted these claims or have adopted anything
they did not believe to be in concert with Christian orthodoxy and of benefit to Evangelical
theology and hermeneutical theory. It remains possible, however, as Lundin has said, that much of
this influence is unwittingly operative. If this were to be shown to be so, it may be the case that
Evangelical theorists have adopted views that lead to conclusions they might have wished to avoid;
e.g. that truth claims, even biblical ones, are relative rather than absolute.
The third option seems to be a likely explanation also. Similarity of content does not
necessarily indicate identity of origin. It is possible that the two groups, though perhaps interacting
with each other according to standard scholarly practice, have arrived at similar conclusions about
the same object of investigation. If however, as both groups assert, presuppositions form the grid
through which one advances knowledge, it reasonably follows that there must be some aspects of

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the preconditions of understanding, some presuppositions, between these two groups that are the
same in their respective systems of thought. It may be the case, then, that these parallel conclusions
indicate that there are at least some presuppositions that are the same for thinkers with otherwise
opposing points of view—presuppositions that transcend one’s otherwise unique preunderstanding
or world view. If this is the case, then an objectivity based on these transcendent presuppositions
may well be a possibility. Indeed, this very result would seem to be an instance of objectivity in
interpretation.
Is this the perspective of Evangelical hermeneutic theorists? Do Evangelicals hold that there is
or can be objectivity in interpretation? How do Evangelicals relate the notion of presuppositions
to the methodology of hermeneutics? The next chapter will address the notion of presuppositions
as this relates to hermeneutics in general and biblical interpretation in particular.

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 5 PRESUPPOSITIONS AND HERMENEUTIC METHODOLOGY

Introduction
In the previous chapter we looked at the nature and role of presuppositions in general. From
that investigation it seemed evident that theorists from otherwise and often diametrically opposed
points of view arrived at the same conclusions. One implication that seemed to emerge from this
observation is that either one group is simply obtaining its conclusions from the other, or there
must be some presuppositions that are the same across systems. Since the presence of one’s
presuppositions is universally understood to be beyond dispute, and since one’s presuppositions
account for the possibility of understanding, it seems to follow that the only way to account for the
fact is that these theorists from opposing perspectives must have some presuppositions that are the
same. If this is an accurate observation, then how does this impact the question of objectivity in
hermeneutics? To address this question we will need to consider the nature and role or
presuppositions as this relates particularly to hermeneutics.

The All-Pervasiveness of Presuppositions in Interpretation

As we have seen, the notion that presuppositions and preunderstanding constitute the very
possibility of understanding is a pervasive perspective among those who discuss the question of
objectivity. This also proves to be the generally accepted notion among hermeneutic theorists. It
is universally held that interpretation necessarily involves the presuppositions and
preunderstanding of the interpreter. Typical of this perspective is the following assertion by
Richard Palmer: “There can be no ‘presuppositionless’ interpretation. A biblical, literary, or
scientific text is not interpreted without preconceptions. Understanding, since it is an historically
accumulated and historically operative basic structure, underlies even scientific interpretation. . . .
Inside or outside the sciences there can be no presuppositionless understanding.”359
This perspective is in large part due to the focus on the nature of understanding. Since
Descartes’ epistemological revolution in which the starting point of philosophy was shifted from
the known to the knower, and since Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical revolution in which the focus
of hermeneutics was shifted from the principles of interpretation to the nature of the interpreter’s
understanding, the question of what makes understanding possible has become ever more
prominent in philosophy and in hermeneutics. Writers in virtually any field are implicitly required
to begin their theorizing with the question of the role of presuppositions in the interpretation of the
data relevant to their discipline. In a book on the Jesus-Paul debate for example, David Wenham
acknowledges the role of presuppositions: “The Jesus-Paul question is one in which scholars’
differing presuppositions and assumptions are influential.”360 In this text the subject matter is not
presuppositions and preunderstanding, but the author exhibits this felt necessity to address this
issue, at least in passing, before getting on with his own topic.
In her study on the exegesis of Job from Calvin to the modern era, Susan Schreiner claims that
Gadamer’s arguments against objectivity in interpretation have been very persuasive. If the
historians cannot be free of “prejudices,” then the historian cannot be assured that the author’s
intent can be known. Presuppositions thus become preconditions for interpretation. As Schreiner
describes:

No one has done more to shake the confidence of historians in the old ideal of objectivity than Gadamer. As Gadamer
explained, the goal of Romantic hermeneutics to find authorial intention presupposed the Enlightenment ideal of a mind free
from prejudices. Historians were to enter the mind of the author and to transpose themselves into the culture of an earlier age.
To this presupposed ideal of objectivity and historical empathy, Gadamer opposed the historicity of understanding. Rejecting

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 the “prejudice against prejudice” inherited from the Enlightenment, Gadamer argued that readers cannot free themselves from
their prejudices and thereby recover the mind of the author. Such shedding of presuppositions is neither possible nor desirable.
Presuppositions or prejudgments are the necessary preconditions for understanding. 361

An acknowledgment of the all-pervasiveness of presuppositions in interpretation has virtually

become a precondition for any rational discussion of the nature of understanding and
interpretation. Palmer’s assertion that there is no presuppositionless interpretation takes its cue, as
he acknowledges, from the title of Rudolf Bultmann’s famous article, “Is Presuppositionless
Exegesis Possible?”362 and follows the exposition of Gadamer. Both Gadamer and Bultmann
identify the seminal work of Heidegger who proposed the view that all interpretation necessarily
involves preconditions, as he asserted in Sein und Zeit: “All interpretation (Auslegung), moreover,
operates in the fore-structure (Vor-struktur), which we have already characterized.”363
The inevitability of presuppositions in interpretation has likewise become a recurring theme in
contemporary Evangelical hermeneutics. For example, in their recent work on biblical
interpretation, William Klein, Craig Blomberg, and Robert Hubbard assert that no one interprets
anything without a set of underlying assumptions:

When we presume to explain the meaning of the Bible, we do so with a set of preconceived ideas or presuppositions. These
presuppositions may be examined and stated, or simply embraced unconsciously. But anyone who says that he or she has
discarded all presuppositions and will only study the text objectively and inductively is either deceived or naive. So as
interpreters we need to discover, state, and consciously adopt those assumptions we can agree to and defend, or we will
uncritically retain those we already have, whether or not they are adequate and defensible. 364

According to Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard, not only is the interpretation of the Bible subject
to the presuppositional perspective of the interpreter, but all inquiry necessarily requires
preunderstanding. As they go on to say, “we argue simply that an appropriate level of
preunderstanding is necessary for any kind of knowledge. This, as we have seen, is the nature of
all inquiry.”365
In his book on Old Testament interpretation, John Goldingay acknowledges that the study of
the Bible necessarily involves the presuppositions of the interpreter: “It is actually impossible to
study without have [sic] one’s own beliefs and framework of thinking, and being influenced by
them. Indeed, we need some such framework if we are to make coherent sense of the data we
examine. What is important is to be open to recognizing our presuppositions, and then to be
prepared for the material we are studying to challenge them and to modify the perspective with
which we approached it.”366
In his examination of the inductive method of Bible study, Elliott Johnson asserts that the
inductive method of Bible study is inadequate because it does not take account of the interpreter’s
presuppositions that are necessarily involved in the study of the biblical text. Johnson believes
inductive methods fail “because there is no such thing as ‘pure’ inductive study. We all necessarily
bring premises or presuppositions to the study of the text. Those premises affect the way we
comprehend the meaning, the way we understand—that is, they have epistemological influence.
This influence in the interpreter has been at the center of hermeneutical concerns since the time of
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804).”367
In the volume that heads the series Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation, Moisés Silva
made the same kind of observation. After a brief overview of the influence of recent philosophy
on hermeneutical thinking, Silva observes that the influence of the phenomenology of Martin
Heidegger has forced evangelical theorists to acknowledge the role of preunderstanding in all kinds
of thinking. In Silva’s words: “This idealist tradition is vulnerable to some powerful criticisms, yet

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within the context of that tradition some of the most crucial questions about hermeneutics have
arisen. Such thinkers as Martin Heidegger, for example, have forced us to take seriously the role
that preunderstanding plays in the process of interpretation. None of us is able to approach new
data with a blank mind, and so our attempts to understand new information consist largely of
adjusting our prior ‘framework of understanding’—integrating the new into the old.”368
Silva goes on to question the possibility of presuppositionless interpretation when he says,
“The common insistence that we should approach the text without any prior ideas regarding its
meaning becomes almost irrelevant. . . . Could it be that it is impossible to shed our presuppositions
precisely because it is they that mediate understanding?”369
Although Grant Osborne uses the terms “preunderstanding” and “presupposition” almost
synonymously, he asserts the same notion that the inevitability of one’s preunderstanding provides
the perspective for understanding: “A close reading of the text cannot be done without a
perspective provided by one’s preunderstanding as identified by a ‘sociology of knowledge’
perspective. Reflection itself demands mental categories, and these are built upon one’s
presupposed world view and by the faith or reading community to which one belongs. Since neutral
exegesis is impossible, no necessarily ‘true’ or final interpretation is possible.”370
Finally, Dan McCartney and Charles Clayton make the same point. They assert that the
interpreter must know himself and his own presuppositions and how they influence his
understanding of the Bible: “Interpreting any text involves two different types of assumptions.
First, underlying all our thinking and interpreting are our presuppositions about life and ultimate
realities, our worldview. These provide the basic foundation for how we understand everything.
Second are the assumptions which we make about the nature of the text we are reading.”371
The realization of the fundamental role of presuppositions in interpretation is not entirely new.
In his work, Hermeneutics of the New Testament, published in English in 1877, A. Immer
addressed the question of the perspective of the interpreter: “Lastly, d) the interpreter has to remove
the difference between the work of the author and his own view of the matter. The work of the
author in its totality is just a historical fact, and is to be treated as such. In this, the more perfectly
the interpreter can abstract himself from his own opinions or knowledge, and, by virtue of his
historical information, can throw himself into his author and his time, the more successful he will
be.”372 In his massive work on interpretation published in 1883, Milton Terry recognized the place
of “presumptions” in biblical hermeneutics. He said, “The question should be, not what does the
Church say, or what do the ancient fathers and the great councils and the œcumenical creeds say,
but what do the Scriptures legitimately teach? Still less should we allow ourselves to be influenced
by any presumptions of what the Scriptures ought to teach.”373 It seems that both Immer and Terry
are advocating the very approach that contemporary hermeneutic theorists declare is not possible.
This assertion by Milton Terry sounds quite similar to the assertion that would latter be made
by Rudolf Bultmann. In his article on presuppositions and exegesis, Bultmann asserted that
exegesis must be presuppositionless in the sense that “it not presuppose (voraussetzt) its results
(Ergebnisse).”374 However, Bultmann goes on to assert that the condition of being absolutely
presuppositionless is not possible. He declared, “The question of exegesis without presuppositions
in the sense of unprejudiced exegesis must be distinguished from this same question in the other
sense in which it can be raised. And in this second sense, we must say that there cannot be any
such thing as presuppositionless exegesis. That there is no such exegesis in fact, because every
exegete is determined by his own individuality, in the sense of his special biases and habits, his
gifts and his weaknesses . . .”375

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 Bultmann makes a distinction between certain presuppositions which he calls “dogmatic
prejudice,” (dogmatischen Vorurteilen) which every exegete can and should avoid, and those
presuppositions which constitute one’s “individuality,” (Individualitt) which he believes can be
eliminated by the exegete “educating himself to the kind of hearing that is interested in nothing
other than the subject-matter of which the text speaks.”376 So, although presuppositionless
interpretation is not possible in one sense, it seems to be possible to mediate this fact in some
sense. Some presuppositions must be “switched off” (ausschalten) at the start to allow for a “pure
objective hearing” (rein sachlich Hren) of the text. It is noteworthy that Bultmann asserts that the
presuppositions of one’s special biases (Neigungen) and habits (Gewohnheiten), and his gifts
(Gaben) and weaknesses (Schwchen) are of “no significance in principle” (keinen grundstzlichen
Charakter). Rather, these kinds of presuppositions, although inevitably present, can be “held off”
to allow for “pure objective hearing.”
That Bultmann allows for a “pure objective” (rein sachlich) hearing of the text must be
understood in context of his argument. As he later explains, “to historical understanding belongs
the objective understanding,” (zum historischen Verstndnis gehrt das sachliche Verstndnis),377 and
this historical understanding is itself a “life-context” (Lebenszusammenhang) in which the
interpreter is grounded (begrndet). The relation of this “grounding” of the interpreter in his own
“life-context” will be dealt with later, but from this brief consideration it appears that Bultmann is
not proposing an “absolute objectivity” in the sense that this has been the subject of controversy
in hermeneutics. Rather, this is an objectivity that exists within the life-context of the interpreter.
As we have observed, Anthony Thiselton prefers the term “horizon of expectation” to the
traditional term, “preunderstanding.” Nevertheless, Thiselton affirms the inevitability of the
horizon of expectation as an unavoidable precondition of interpretation. He says, “First, [horizon
of expectation] includes a network of provisional working assumptions which are open to revision
and change; second, the reader or interpreter may not be conscious of all that the horizon of
expectation sets in motion, makes possible, or excludes. The expectations and assumptions concern
the kind of questions and issues which we anticipate the text will address, and even the types of
genre or mode of communication which it might use.”378
Thiselton’s description of the horizon of expectation as distinguished from “preunderstanding”
is further distinguished from “presupposition.” Whereas the term “presupposition” seems to
suggest “the impression of rooted beliefs and doctrines which are not only cognitive and
conceptual, but which also can only be changed and revised with pain, or at least difficulty,”379 the
term “horizon of expectation,” or simply “horizon,” avoids the conceptual baggage and implies
one’s “relation to life . . . My pre-conceptual relation in life to music, to mathematics, to law, or to
love” which “both influence, and provide operative conditions for, how I came to understand texts
of music, mathematics, law, poems or letters or declarations of love.”380 Ultimately, Thiselton’s
description of the term “horizon” indicates that he conceives horizon in a very broad sense, roughly
equivalent to what has become popularly known as a world view.

The horizon or pre-intentional background is thus a network of revisable expectations and assumptions which a reader brings
to the text, together with the shared patterns of behaviour and belief with reference to which processes of interpretation and
understanding become operative. The term “horizon” calls attention to the fact that our finite situatedness in time, history, and
culture defines the present (though always expanding) limits of our “world”, or more strictly the limits of what we can “see”.
The term “background” calls attention to the fact that these boundaries embrace not only what we can draw on in conscious
reflection, but also the pre-cognitive dispositions or competencies which are made possible by our participation in the shared
practices of a social and historical world.381

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 Whether we employ the terms, “presupposition” or “preunderstanding,” or whether we adopt
the broader terminology of Thiselton, it is generally agreed by contemporary hermeneuticians that
some form of pre-condition not only precedes the act of interpretation, but that this pre-condition
is the means by which interpretation is possible. As Roger Lundin asserts, “Rather than standing
as impediments to right understanding, then, ‘prejudices’ are the basis of all understanding. The
goal of all thinking—and reading —should not be to cast these assumptions aside in order to take
on those belonging to another person. . . . Rather, the goal of thinking should be to test, clarify,
modify, and expand our assumptions, to bring them more in line with a more comprehensive
truth.”382
Lundin provides a helpful summary of the prevailing perspective of contemporary
hermeneutical theory with respect to the role of presuppositions, prejudices, or horizon:
“. . . modern hermeneutical reflection calls into question the Cartesian and Enlightenment claims
for the supremacy of skeptical detachment and rational reflection. On a practical level,
hermeneutics has questions whether such complete detachment is a possibility. Do we ever read
with all our assumptions held in abeyance? Do we completely set aside our beliefs when we enter
the alien world of a text? To such questions, hermeneutical theory responds with a convincing
‘No.’”383
This small sampling of contemporary evangelical texts on hermeneutics should not mislead.
These examples represent an almost universally held assumption about the task of hermeneutics,
namely, that interpretation necessarily and inevitably operates from the perspective of the
presuppositions of the interpreter.384 In other words, it would seem that the presuppositions of the
interpreter are the omnipresent grid through which he or she interprets or understands anything.
The idea that knowledge and interpretation inevitably involve the presuppositions of the
interpreter seems to be an inescapable conclusion. It seems not only to be the case that the
assumption of presuppositionless interpretation is a naive approach, but even the idea that one can
approach the text without presuppositions is itself a presupposition.

The Mutability of Presuppositions

The inevitability of presuppositions and preunderstanding that constitute the framework of
interpretation is universally held to be the case in hermeneutics as in other areas of thought. There
is another notion that is no less universally affirmed by contemporary hermeneutic theorists.
Although presuppositionless interpretation is understood to be impossible, according to the
contemporary wisdom, this does not mean that interpretation must be static or without growth.
Rather, growth in understanding is possible because an interpreter should be able to change his
presuppositions. Contemporary theorists maintain the possibility and indeed the necessity of
altering, modifying, and developing the preconditions, presuppositions, prejudices, or horizons of
expectation that make understanding possible. As Palmer asserts, “The point is that our own
presuppositions must not be taken as absolute (for these are the foundation of our expectations)
but as something subject to change. . . . What is needed in literary interpretation is a dialectical
questioning which does not simply interrogate the text but allows the thing said in the text to
interrogate back, to call the interpreter’s own horizon into question and to work a fundamental
transformation of one’s understanding of the subject.”385
Even though our presuppositions, or prejudices, or horizons of understanding are inevitable,
they are not immutable. The interaction of the interpreter with the text creates the possibility that
the text can impact the interpreter so as to cause the interpreter to modify his pre-conditions of
interpretation.

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 As we have pointed out, the notion that presuppositionless interpretation is impossible is held
as axiomatic not only by philosophers in general, but is likewise popularly espoused by
Evangelical hermeneutic theorists. KBH emphatically assert the impossibility of objective, or
presuppositionless interpretation: “No one comes to the task of understanding as an objective
observer. All interpreters bring their own presuppositions and agendas, and these affect the ways
they understand as well as the conclusions they draw. In addition, the writer or speaker whom the
interpreter wishes to understand also operates with a set of presuppositions. We humans mediate
all our understanding through a grid of personal history and bias. Our prior experiences and
knowledge—our total background—shape what we perceive and how we understand.”386
By acknowledging the inevitability of the pre-conditions of interpretation, Evangelicals have
not thereby abandoned the hope of adjudicating between interpretations, as is evidenced in the
following claims of McCartney and Clayton.

We will argue later that there is a right way to understand Isaiah 53 or any other passage and that the right way is indicated by
the nature of the text itself. However, discerning this is not a matter of escaping or suspending our presuppositions, but changing
and adapting them. We really cannot escape them. Since the things we assume are to us self-evident, we may be unconscious
of them, but they still determine our understanding, and without them there is no understanding. Any time we find “meaning”
in a text, we arrive at that “meaning” by fitting it in with our previous knowledge. And this involves assumptions or
presuppositions about such things as the nature of the text we are reading, the meaning of life, and how we know things. All
our interpreting activity in life involves assumptions, just as in geometry every theorem can only be proven on the basis of
previous theorems and “self-evident” assumptions. Presuppositions form the basis of the “interpretive framework” by which
we understand things.387

Although McCartney and Clayton hold that “all our interpreting activity in life involves
assumptions,” they still claim that it is possible to change and adapt these preconditions as the
interpreter encounters the text. Indeed, it is not only possible to change and adapt one’s
presuppositions, but it is possible to eliminate some presuppositions altogether. Other Evangelicals
acknowledge the mutability of preunderstanding as well: “The honest, active interpreter remains
open to change, even to a significant transformation of preunderstandings.”388

Basic, Fundamental, and Foundational Presuppositions in Hermeneutic Thinking

Along with the inevitability and mutability of presuppositions, there is a third ingredient that
is important in understanding the contemporary view of the relation of presuppositions and
preunderstanding to interpretation. In the survey of the nature and role of presuppositions in
hermeneutical theory, several theorists were noted as having made references to “basic” or
“fundamental” assumptions or presuppositions. Palmer refers to understanding as “an historically
accumulated and historically operative basic structure” that “underlies even scientific
interpretation.”389 Ted Peters refers to presuppositions deriving from “a more basic or foundational
level of one’s way of viewing things.”390 He refers to what he calls “fundamental presuppositions”
which “refer us to the basic structure of one’s experience with the world” which “makes
articulation of that experience possible.”391 Peters even refers to the existence of fundamental
presuppositions, self-evident truths, and axioms.392
Similar descriptions are found among Evangelical theorists. McCartney and Clayton identify
“presuppositions about life and ultimate realities, our worldview” as providing “the basic
foundation for how we understand everything.”393 McQuilkin discusses the “basic presupposition
about the Bible that distinguishes believers from unbelievers.”394 Poythress talks about “basic
commitments or presuppositions in the formation of knowledge”395 which are “fundamental
assumptions about the nature of the world.”396 Poythress identifies some presuppositions as

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“unconsciously assumed elements of one’s world view” which constitute “one’s basic
commitments,”397 and which are part of the interpreter’s presuppositions or world view, and
include “fundamental assumptions about the world and reality,” and that these are found at the
“fundamental level.”398 Long also refers to “basic intellectual and spiritual commitments (‘how he
or she sees the world’).”399
Theorists repeatedly employ the terms “basic,” “fundamental,” and “foundational” in
attempting to identify that “something” beyond which there is no need to go and upon which
understanding and interpretation is built. As has already been pointed out, Thiselton also refers to
an interpreter’s horizons as “background” which makes understanding possible.400 Horizons are
pre-intentional and pre-cognitive dispositions and competencies that provide the basis upon which
one participates in the social and historical world.
As observed earlier, many theorists even go so far as to use the term “foundational.” Peters
asserts that there is some foundational level from which presuppositions derive.401 Palmer declares
that although presuppositions “must not be taken as absolute” they nevertheless “are the foundation
of our expectations.”402 With many seeking to jettison foundationalism, theorists cannot seem to
do without a foundation.
One crucial omission by virtually all theorists becomes obvious from this review, however.
This omission is a complete lack of any claims regarding the origin of these basic, fundamental,
and foundational presuppositions. If all interpretation takes place “only in light of previous
commitments,”403 as Silva (along with virtually all hermeneuticians) asserts, then from where do
these “previous commitments” come?
Concerning prejudices Gadamer writes, “It is not so much our judgments as it is our prejudices
that constitute our being. . . . Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply
conditions whereby we experience something—whereby what we encounter says something to
us.”404 Gadamer goes on to explain, “The recognition that all understanding inevitably involves
some prejudice gives the hermeneutical problem its real thrust.”405
Basically, Gadamer’s prejudice has taken over the place of Descartes’ innate ideas or Kant’s
categories and constitutes the grid through which a text is made intelligible. Bernstein concludes
that, “If Gadamer is right in claiming that not only understanding but all knowing ‘inevitably
involves some prejudices,’ then it is difficult to imagine a more radical critique of Cartesianism,
as well as of the Enlightenment conception of human knowledge.”406
On the contrary, however, if Gadamer is in fact right, then it is difficult to imagine a view more
consistent with the very Cartesian/Kantian and Enlightenment conception of human knowledge
than that which Gadamer proposes. Gadamer has simply translated the Cartesian innate ideas and
the Kantian categories into Heideggerian prejudices which constitute our being. It seems to be the
same idealism in existential/phenomenological clothes. Instead of referring to innate ideas or
categories of the mind, one simply talks about metaphors and presents the appearance of having
solved the problem of knowledge. Nevertheless, the problem of the foundations of knowledge still
remains.
Bernstein argues that, “in these [Cartesian and Enlightenment] traditions there are sharp
dichotomies between reason and prejudice, or between knowledge and prejudice.”407 Another
basic problem with Cartesian and Enlightenment epistemology is the conception of the nature of
reason itself and the starting point that constitutes the Cartesian foundation of knowing. Bernstein
argues, following Charles Peirce and Gadamer, that, “There is no knowledge without
preconceptions and prejudices. The task is not to remove all such preconceptions, but to test them
critically in the course of inquiry.”408

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 Presuppositions and the Hermeneutical Circle
There begins to emerge a relationship between the unavoidable preconditions of interpretation
and the foundational nature of at least some of our presuppositions on the one hand, and the
circularity of the hermeneutic enterprise on the other. Although, according to the current wisdom,
there is no interpretation apart from the presuppositions and prejudice of the interpreter, these
presuppositions and prejudices that form the preconditions of interpretation are not beyond
scrutiny. According to the predominate understanding, presuppositions and prejudices can be
measured against the world in a circular or spiral dialectical motion.
Peters, for example, applies the principle of criticism to understanding in terms of the
hermeneutical circle: “What is required for an understanding of texts, or of one’s tradition, is some
sort of pre-apprehension or pre-understanding of the whole of which the objects of study are parts.
. . . In order to interpret anything, we must begin by projecting a preunderstanding of what it is we
are about to interpret.”409 Peters has applied the hermeneutical circle to understanding itself. If
presuppositionless exegesis is not possible, at least in the sense that everyone comes to the text
with convictions, points of view, experiences, assumptions, and a philosophical framework, then
a point of urgent consideration is how one can be sure that one’s presuppositions and
preunderstanding facilitate interpretation rather than hinder it.
The inevitability and mutability of presuppositions has given new significance to the old
problem of the hermeneutical circle. Friedrich Schleiermacher attributes the articulation of the
hermeneutical circle to his predecessor Friedrich Ast (1778-1841) when he says, “The
hermeneutical principle which Ast has proposed and in several respects developed quite
extensively is that just as the whole is understood from the parts, so the parts can be understood
only from the whole. This principle is of such consequence for hermeneutics and so incontestable
that one cannot even begin to interpret without using it.”410 The hermeneutical circle, according to
Schleiermacher, can best be illustrated by the relationship of words to a sentence. A complete
sentence provides the contextual framework within which the parameters are set with respect to
the possible meanings of the individual words. However, it is the contribution of each individual
word that constitutes the meaning of the complete sentence. “The circle as a whole defines the
individual part, and the parts together form the circle.”411 So, the individual concepts that are
expressed in any literary piece, whether they be written or oral, are determined by the context in
which they stand. Yet, the context is constituted by the combination of the individual concepts.
“By dialectical interaction between the whole and the part, each gives the other meaning;
understanding is circular, then. Because within this ‘circle’ the meaning comes to stand, we call
this the ‘hermeneutical circle.’”412
With the contemporary understanding of the all-pervasiveness and mutability of
presuppositions, the hermeneutical circle, which at one time was discussed in terms of the text,
now applies to all of life. As Brice Wachterhauser describes it, “The hermeneutical circle involves
the ‘contextualist’ claim that the ‘parts’ of some larger reality can be understood only in terms of
the ‘whole’ of that reality, and the ‘whole’ of that reality can be understood only in terms of its
parts. This is to say that understanding any phenomenon means, first of all, situating it in a larger
context in which it has its function and, in turn, it also means letting our grasp of this particular
phenomenon influence our grasp of the whole context.”413
Wilhelm Dilthey applied the concept of the hermeneutical circle to the question of historical
understanding. Not only is the record of the event or historical situation that one is endeavoring to
understand located in its own historical setting, but the interpreter is likewise operating from his

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own historical setting. As Peters describes, “Interpretation, then, is always an event taking place
in a situation, the context in which the interpreter and the text or any other expression of life stand.
Meaning is, therefore, always meaning in relationship.”414 The impact upon hermeneutics of the
broadening out of the hermeneutic circle to encompass lived experience is that understanding itself
is circular. As Palmer observes, “there is really no true starting point for understanding, since every
part presupposes the others. This means that there can be no ‘presuppositionless’ understanding.’
Every act of understanding is in a given context or horizon; even in the sciences one explains only
‘in terms of’ a frame of reference.”415 Consequently, the circle of life experience disallows the
possibility of a transcendental, or a-historical perspective —a view from nowhere. “Since we
understand always from within our own horizon, which is part of the hermeneutical circle, there
can be no nonpositional understanding of anything.”416
With Martin Heidegger the hermeneutical circle takes on proportions that extend it to the very
nature of reality. He argues that all interpretations must already understand, in some sense, that
which is being interpreted: “In every understanding of the world, existence is understood with it,
and vice versa. All interpretation, moreover, operates in the fore-structure (Vor-struktur), which
we have already characterized. Any interpretation which is to contribute to understanding, must
already have understood what is to be interpreted.”417
Heidegger expands the traditional view of the hermeneutic circle to encompass the very being
of Dasein. Traditionally, the hermeneutic circle assumed a distinction between subject and object
in which the knowing subject stood over against the known object. As David Hoy describes,
“Heidegger conceives of Dasein and world as forming a circle, and he thus extends the traditional
hermeneutic circle between a text and its reading down to the most primordial level of human
existence.”418
Note, however, that the circle, for Heidegger, is not a vicious circle. He contends that “if we
see this circle as a vicious one and look out for ways of avoiding it, even if we just ‘sense’
[empfinden] it as an inevitable imperfection, then the act of understanding has been misunderstood
from the ground up.”419 Heidegger asserts that the hermeneutical circle “belongs to the structure
of meaning, and the latter phenomenon is rooted in the existential constitution of Dasein.”420 The
goal is not to attempt to escape the circle, but to “come into it the right way.”421 This means that
the interpreter should not allow his fore-structure to be dictated by arbitrary habits or fancies, but
he must concentrate on “the things themselves.”422 In this way, the circle involves a dialectic or
conversation, as it were, to constantly revise one’s fore-structure of understanding in terms of the
things themselves as the interpreter moves toward a better understanding.
Gadamer adopted Heidegger’s conception of the hermeneutical circle and, along with
Dilthey’s emphasis on historical situatedness, once again applied it to the interpretation of texts.
As Gail Soffer explains, “Gadamer explicitly applies the Heideggerian hermeneutical circle—
intended as a completely general analysis of human existing—to the specific activity of
interpreting texts. According to this application, when one reads a text the fore-structures (also
named ‘prejudices’ or prejudgments [Vorurteile] by Gadamer, in his polemic against the
Enlightenment) results in an anticipatory projection of the meaning of the whole text. However, as
in Heidegger, there is a dialectical relationship between fore-structures and projected meaning.”423
Gadamer understands this dialectical process in terms of a conversation with the text. As he
explains, “The process that Heidegger describes is that every revision of the fore-projection is
capable of projecting before itself a new projection of meaning; rival projects can emerge side by
side until it becomes clearer what the unity of meaning is; interpretation begins with fore-

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conceptions that are replaced by more suitable ones. This constant process of new projection
constitutes the movement of understanding and interpretation.”424
So, it would seem that the existence of the hermeneutical circle is predicated upon a broad
conception of the preconditions of understanding. These preconditions project a pre-understanding
of what is to be interpreted. As the interpreter interacts with the text, as it is in itself, certain
prejudices are altered and even replaced by those that are “more suitable” to the emerging
understanding of the text. As Ted Peters explains, “Whenever we attempt to interpret an event in
our life, it is already in some sense understood; and from there we attempt to explicate or articulate
it as it is found in that already understood character.”425
Indeed, as we have seen, all interpretation proceeds upon the basis of the pre-conditions of
interpretation, and, as Moisés Silva indicated, it is our presuppositions that mediate understanding.
This is precisely the perspective that has been adopted in Evangelical theories. There is perhaps
no better example of this view than the position that has been argued by KBH: “Every interpreter
begins with a preunderstanding. After an initial study of a Biblical text, that text performs a work
on the interpreter. His or her preunderstanding is no longer what it was. Then, as the newly
interpreted interpreter proceeds to question the text further, out of this newly formed
understanding—perhaps, different— answers are obtained. A new understanding has emerged. It
is not simply a repetitive circle; but, rather, a progressive spiral of development.”426
By way of illustration, KBH offer the diagram in Figure 4. The starting point for understanding
is within the field of the preunderstanding of the interpreter. As the interpreter interacts with the
text, the text is allowed to have its influence on the preunderstanding of the interpreter, and the
action moves back and forth from interpreter to text and from text to interpreter. KBH acknowledge
that their analysis admits “an inevitable circularity in interpretation.”427 They seem to sense a
viciousness to this circularity and attempt to blunt this implication:

When we posit the requirement of faith to understand the Bible fully and then we go to the Bible in order to understand God’s
self-revelation in Christ in whom we have faith, the process has a definite circularity. But we argue simply that an appropriate
level of preunderstanding is necessary for any kind of knowledge. This, as we have seen, is the nature of all inquiry. Thus, one
must have some knowledge of God even to arrive at the preunderstanding of faith. Then that stance of faith enables the Christian
to study the Bible to come to a deeper understanding of God and what the Scriptures say. As we learn more from our study of
Scripture we alter and enlarge our preunderstanding in more or less fundamental ways. In essence, this process describes the
nature of all learning: it is interactive, ongoing, and continuous. 428

In the view of KBH the circle, or spiral, is predicated on the “appropriate level” of
preunderstanding. Unfortunately, there is no attempt to define what is considered an “appropriate
level.” This is not an isolated perspective peculiar to these particular theorists, however. This
seems to be a view of the role of presuppositions and preunderstanding in hermeneutical
methodology that is almost universally held.
William Larkin asserts that the hermeneutical circle is actually “a hermeneutical spiral in which
interpreters through successive exposure to God’s Word are able to bring their preunderstanding
and, as a result, their interpretation and application closer and closer to alignment with Scripture’s
truth.”429

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 Figure 4: Hermeneutical Spiral of KBH

Grant Osborne offers his own diagram (Figure 5) of the hermeneutical spiral, and offers the
following explanation: “The text itself sets the agenda and continually reforms the questions that
the observer asks of it.”430 At this point, Osborne does not discuss the starting point by which one
enters the circle, or spiral. Earlier he discusses the relationship of meaning and understanding, and
one can assume that it is by virtue of one’s preunderstanding that questions are formed which are
addressed to the text. The text, then, acts on the interpreter who is able to refine his questions, and
the spiral continues.

Figure 5: Hermeneutical Spiral - Grant Osborne

McCartney and Clayton offer the same estimation of the nature of the relation between
presuppositions and interpretation, albeit without the benefit of a diagram:

We can think of this as a “hermeneutical spiral” or a “spiral of understanding.” Although one must know the forest in order to
understand the trees, it is also true that a knowledge of the trees builds up the understanding of the forest. Our presuppositions
about the overall meaning of the Bible, and life in general for that matter, form the interpretive framework for understanding
particular texts of the Bible, which in turn act as a corrective to the overall interpretive presuppositions. This continual
interaction moves us up a spiral toward a “meeting of meaning” and understanding of the truth. 431

Among Evangelical and non-evangelical theorists, it is generally held as virtually axiomatic

that presuppositions and preunderstanding constitute the preconditions for interpretation. It is also
generally held that if the interpreter comes to the object of his investigation with a willingness to
interact with the text-in-itself, then this dialectical or conversational interaction can serve to shape
the interpreter’s preconditions into a greater conformity with the object of interpretation.
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 It is perhaps instructive that, amid the constant assertion that one’s presuppositions form the
foundation and possibility of interpretation, that this very framework can be changed by interaction
with the text, and yet no theorist proposes that the assumption that all interpreters approach a text
with presuppositions is itself subject to change. This assumption is never the object of change. An
interpreter can apparently change any other presupposition he might hold, but he cannot change
the presupposition that he always approaches the text with presuppositions. Additionally, the
preunderstanding of the nature of understanding is not the object of change either. Yet cannot the
question be asked, What if the text proposes a scenario of understanding that is contrary to the
notion that understanding is a spiral? What if the text were to assert that understanding is linear,
or entirely circular? Theorists do not entertain the possibility that the nature of understanding can
be anything but a spiral. This assumption is never questioned, nor is the possibility entertained that
a text might seek to change this scenario. It would seem that one must ask, Why are not these
presuppositions about the nature of understanding subject to change? Are not these presuppositions
just as much a part of the preunderstanding of these interpreters as any other presupposition?
Perhaps not all presuppositions are mutable after all.

A Critique of the Current Evangelical View

To the careful observer it may seem that some evangelical theorists may not have explicitly
considered all of the implications of their current thinking on the role of presuppositions in
interpretation. At times they seem to be arguing that unacceptable presuppositions can lead to
acceptable conclusions, which issues in a realization that the unacceptable presuppositions must
be revised. Since no interpretation is ever be done apart from one’s presuppositions, as the current
thinking repeatedly warns, any given interpreter may come to the text with unacceptable
presuppositions and employ these very unacceptable presuppositions in his initial encounter with
the text. But current thinking says that somehow this interpreter arrives at the conclusion that at
least some of his initial presuppositions are unacceptable and should be altered or eliminated. It
would seem to follow that in this situation the interpreter would have arrived at the conclusion that
the very presuppositions that were employed in the interpretation of the text are unacceptable, and
that this conclusion was reached on the basis of these very same unacceptable presuppositions. In
such a scenario, it would clearly seem to be the case that unacceptable presuppositions have yielded
an acceptable result. But if unacceptable presuppositions yield an acceptable understanding of the
text, then what would be the evidence that would lead the interpreter to realize that his
presuppositions were unacceptable? Acceptable results would not imply that revisions were
needed in the interpreter’s presuppositions, for it was these very presuppositions that yielded the
acceptable result.
However, most Evangelicals respond that interpretation is not a purely logical process (moving
only from premises to conclusions), but that there are, at least for the Christian, other factors to be
considered in the interpretive process, such as the work of the Holy Spirit or the impact of the
living and dynamic Word of God. In the experience of the Christian interpreter, unacceptable or
faulty presuppositions are often overturned or reworked as a result of the work of the Holy Spirit
on the mind of the interpreter. But this is precisely the point. If it is the case that the Holy Spirit of
God can override, in a sense, the unacceptable presuppositions of an interpreter [and this author
believes that this can and often must happen], then the work of the Holy Spirit transcends the
function of presuppositions and preunderstanding in the interpretive process as this is described in
the literature. If the work of the Holy Spirit or the human interaction with the living and dynamic
Word of God transcends the function of presuppositions in the interpretive process, then the

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account of the role of preunderstanding and presuppositions found in contemporary explanations
needs to be modified to account for this factor, since neither the Holy Spirit nor the Word of God
as living and dynamic can be readily subsumed under the explanations of preunderstanding and
presuppositions that are popularly expounded today.
Why cannot the work of the Holy Spirit or the Word of God as living and dynamic be subsumed
under the explanations of preunderstanding and presuppositions that are popularly expounded
today? Because in the initial encounter with the Word of God one would need to have these
presuppositions before one could get them. These presuppositions would come either from the
World of God itself, or by special, direct revelation. Barring any direct, special revelation to a
given interpreter, the notion of the work of the Holy Spirit, for example, would either be something
completely outside the preunderstanding of the interpreter, in which case this is contrary to the
popular characterization, or the interpreter would need to have this presupposition already present
before he initially comes to the text which would be the source of this presupposition. So, the
interpreter would need to have the presupposition before he could get it. But, of course, this is
contradictory.
However, returning to the strictly philosophical analysis of the current explanation of the role
of presuppositions in interpretation, a more serious problem in this methodology seems to present
itself. The seriousness of this problem is seen in the fact that, if the criticisms are accurate, a failure
to adjust the current account of the role of presuppositions could seriously weaken the
hermeneutical systems of which this scenario seems to be a necessary assumption.
As has been pointed out, assumptions that are faulty have adverse implications for the truth-
claims of which they are the assumptions. The truth-claim of which a faulty assumption is a
necessary condition can no longer function in a system as part of the body of truths for that system,
since that proposition either is false or has no truth-value; the truth-claims which presuppose faulty
assumptions become questionable themselves. It is one aim of this study to eliminate this weakness
by identifying such faulty assumptions and to offer a direction toward an alternative explanation.
Since it is an assumption of this book that the hermeneutical systems of Evangelical theorists are
reasonable and viable, it is essential that the notion of the role of presuppositions be strengthened
so as to help retain the integrity of the hermeneutical systems and methods proposed by these
theorists.
According to the view described above, the starting point of interpretation is within the
preunderstanding of the interpreter. As KBH describe the process, “After an initial study of the
Biblical text, that text performs a work on the interpreter. His or her preunderstanding is no longer
what it was.”432 Their extensive textbook provides the student of the Bible with sound principles
of interpretation incorporating the most recent advances in genre analysis coupled with traditional
grammatical-historical interpretation. However, their proposals about the presuppositions and
preunderstanding of the interpreter do not seem to provide the philosophical basis to sustain their
hermeneutical system. The problem is not that their analysis is wrong. Rather, their
characterization of the role of presuppositions and preunderstanding does not go far enough. They
have not provided an adequate explanation to support the hermeneutic principles they espouse. It
is not my goal to deny the truth of their explanation, but to add to their explanation what seem to
be the necessary ingredients to secure the objectivity they affirm.

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 Figure 6: Initial Encounter through Prejudices

If it is the case, as KBH and most other theorists propose, that no one interprets anything
without presuppositions, then upon approaching a given text, the interpreter will necessarily
initially interpret the text through the grid of his presuppositions, or prejudices, as depicted in
Figure 6.
This being the case, setting aside for the moment the supernatural factors mentioned above,
the initial conclusions at which the interpreter arrives from his study of the text will be conclusions
mediated through his always-already present presuppositions. According to the methodology
proposed, the interpreter should then allow this understanding of the text to evaluate his
presuppositions. The understanding that was initially gained in the interpreter’s very first
encounter with the text, however, was an understanding that was mediated through the very
presuppositions which he now hopes will be changed by the text. However, it is through his
always-already present presuppositions that he has gained this understanding in the first place.

Figure 7: Continued Encounter through Prejudices

Ultimately then, if it is one’s interpretation, which has been made possible through his
presuppositions, that the interpreter now employs to evaluate these very presuppositions, it seems
that one’s own presuppositions are employed to evaluate one’s own presuppositions, as illustrated
in Figure 7. The problem with this scenario is that, apart from the intervention of someone or
something from outside the spiral, it is not the text qua text that is performing a work on the
interpreter’s presuppositions, prejudices, and preunderstanding. Rather, it is the text after the

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interpreter has interpreted it through his presuppositions in his very first encounter with the text
that is supposed to exercise this function. As Nietzsche put it, “how should a tool be able to criticize
itself when it can use only itself for the critique?”433
The text is interpreted through the presuppositional framework of the very interpreter whose
preunderstanding is in need of modification. If it is the interpreted text that performs this work on
the interpreter, then the limits of change of the interpreter’s preunderstanding are preset by the
interpreters always-already-existing presuppositional framework, and change at the starting point
is not possible, apart from the intervention of something or someone that transcends the
interpreter’s presuppositional framework. The diagram by KBH in Figure 4 indicates the inability
to change the starting point by the fact that the first loop of the spiral returns to the
preunderstanding of the interpreter above the level of his starting point.
Let us attempt to illustrate this problem. If an interpreter comes to the biblical text with an
antisupernatural bias as part of his preunderstanding, then his interpretation of texts that make
reference to supernatural events will be interpreted through this grid of antisupernaturalism. But,
since his initial encounter with these texts is through this always-already present antisupernatural
grid, his interpretation will, according to the popular methodology, yield conclusions that are
supposed to instruct him that his antisupernatural presuppositions were unacceptable. But this does
not seem to be a reasonable scenario. An interpreter who presupposes the impossibility of the
supernatural will not naturally or logically interpret the text in such a way as to issue in a
conclusion that would require the rejection of the very presuppositions through which he has
interpreted this text. Unless someone or something outside the spiral intervenes there is no basis
upon which to alter his perspective, and there is no basis for claiming that this should be possible.
If, in fact, the interpretation of the text issues in the conclusion that his antisupernatural
presuppositions were unacceptable, is it reasonable to think that it was these very antisupernatural
presuppositions that yielded this interpretation? Would it not be more reasonable to think that some
other assumptions of which the interpreter may not have been consciously aware, such as
objective, transcendental presuppositions, issued in the realization that an antisupernatural
prejudice was unacceptable? But other such assumptions are not accounted for by the methodology
proposed by contemporary theorists because this methodology talks strictly in terms of mutable
frameworks of preunderstanding that cannot be universally true.
In fact, this is the strength of the relativist assertion. On what basis can it be argued or
demonstrated that a thoroughgoing materialist would suddenly interpret the Bible from his
materialist world view in such a manner that he would realize that he needed to change the very
world view that has produced the interpretive conclusions? And yet, most Evangelicals would
probably report that something very similar to this has happened either to them or someone they
know personally. We were all enemies of God prior to our conversion. But, can we reasonably
claim that our antagonistic world view somehow issued in an understanding of the Word of God
that led us to jettison this antagonism and cast ourselves upon God’s mercy? Such an event, by
virtually universal testimony, was the act of God intervening in our lives, not a result of the spiral
of understanding. But, this supernatural event came from outside our presuppositional framework
and is not accounted for in the scenario of understanding.
Another problem arises also. If all aspects of our preunderstanding are mutable, subject to
scrutiny and change, then there are no immutable, universal, or absolute presuppositions that
provide the foundation upon which to verify a truth claim. How can we explain the fact that Born
Again Christians seemed to have recognized the supernatural intervention as in fact supernatural
and true? And, once God has altered one’s antagonistic world view, or at least a sufficient part of

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it, to remove the enmity between us, does not this then become part of one’s presuppositional
framework? And now that this is part of our presuppositional framework, is it likewise subject to
change and modification? If someone responds that this new aspect of our preunderstanding can
grow and develop, that seems reasonable as far as it goes. But, would contemporary Evangelical
theorists be willing to entertain the possibility that this new aspect of our preunderstanding can be
jettisoned altogether? Of course someone will say something like this, “There is no reason to think
that the text would lead the interpreter to make such a fundamental change.” The problem with
this response is that it comes dangerously close to objective truth and objective knowledge. If there
is no objectivity, then what assurance can any theorist give that the text will not do precisely this
in just the right circumstances? After all, contemporary theories do not make a distinction between
universal presuppositions and mutable aspects of our preunderstanding, and they do not entertain
the possibility of transcendental presuppositions or of objectivity.434
This problem of presuppositional circularity is the basis upon which contemporary theorists
declare that objectivity in interpretation is not possible. Our analysis will focus on the proposals
by Klein, Blomberg, and Hubbard because they provide the most extensive effort among
Evangelicals to explain the hermeneutical spiral. KBH are cognizant of this implication of
subjectivity and relativism from the current theory and flatly deny any charge that their view
“simply jettisons all inductive assessment of the facts or data of the text and its situation.”435 KBH
seem to indicate that the appropriateness of the charge of subjectivity is obviated by the validity
of their presuppositions. The self-referential problem in this assertion almost goes without
comment. Who determines what presuppositions are valid? Would not one’s presuppositions
necessarily be employed in evaluating the validity of one’s presuppositions. They seem to be
saying that if their presuppositions are valid, then their interpretation is not subjective. The
question is, Valid for whom? Who decides what is valid? They assert, “Recognizing the role of
our preunderstanding does not doom us to a closed circle—that we find in a text what we want to
find in a text—though that looms as an ever-present danger.”436 How, then, does an interpreter
insure that he does not succumb to the ever-present danger of circular subjectivity? According to
KBH, the hermeneutical process is a spiral:

The honest, active interpreter remains open to change, even to a significant transformation of preunderstanding. This is the
hermeneutical spiral. Since we accept the Bible’s authority, we remain open to correction by its message. There are ways to
verify interpretations or, at least, to validate some interpretive options as more likely than others. It is not a matter of simply
throwing the dice. There is a wide variety of methods available to help us find what the original texts most likely meant to their
initial readers. Every time we alter our preunderstanding as the result of our interaction with the text we demonstrate that the
process has objective constraints, otherwise, no change would occur; we would remain forever entombed in our prior
commitments.437

A number of inconsistencies seem to be present in this explanation, however. First of all, KBH
acknowledge a prior commitment to the Bible’s authority. Yet they assert that unless they are
willing to allow for the possibility of change in their preunderstanding, an aspect of which is their
commitment to the Bible’s authority, they would remain forever “entombed” in their prior
commitments. Do they mean to imply, then, that they are willing to entertain the possibility that
they will change their commitment to the Bible’s authority? According to their own criteria, as
honest, active interpreters, they must remain open to this significant transformation of their
preunderstanding.
In other words, KBH seem on the one hand to be committed to the authority of the Bible as a
doctrinal non-negotiable. This seems clear from such assertions as: “

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 Secular historians may view the Bible only as a collection of ancient religious texts. To treat it
as such—which often occurs in academia or among theologically liberal critics—cannot lead to
valid conclusions about the religious value or significance of the Bible. The results are clearly
‘sterile.’ However, as authors we believe that the Bible is the divine word of God. Only from that
stance can we use our historical and critical methods and arrive at theologically meaningful and
pertinent results.”438
However, on the other hand, their explanation of the role of presuppositions and
preunderstanding indicates that there can be no presuppositional non-negotiables. In other words,
for KBH, all presuppositions are subject to change. However, the very fact that KBH assert that
the assumption that the Bible is simply a collection of ancient religious texts “cannot lead to valid
conclusions about the religious value or significance of the Bible” indicates that an interpreter with
these “liberal” presuppositions cannot arrive at a conclusion that will invalidate these
presuppositions. If “liberal” presuppositions cannot lead to “valid” conclusions, then how can
“non-liberal” presuppositions lead to “non-valid” conclusions? But, if their own non-liberal
presupposition—biblical authority—cannot lead to non-valid conclusions, then how can their
commitment to biblical authority be negotiable? And, if their commitment to biblical authority is
non-negotiable, then what does it mean for them to declare that all presuppositions are changeable?
It seems as if their own commitment to biblical authority is a presuppositional non-negotiable.
For the moment, let us grant that their commitment to biblical authority is mutable, is capable
of being changed or even abandoned. If they were to change their commitment to the Bible’s
authority on the basis of their interpretation of the biblical text, then the authority of the biblical
text to correct their prior commitment to its authority is no longer authoritative. However, if the
Bible is no longer authoritative, then why submit to its corrective instruction?
As interpreters who are committed to the Bible’s authority, they claim to be “open to correction
by its message.” How do they come to understand this message? They come to understand the
Bible’s message by interpreting the various passages through which this message is
communicated. But their interpretation is already filtered through their prior commitments.
Consequently, their understanding of the message is an understanding of the message as they
interpret it through the framework of their preunderstanding. If, then, they are understanding the
message of the Bible through the framework of their preunderstanding, which includes their prior
commitments, then ultimately it is their own prior commitments that are the means of correcting
their prior commitments.
In an effort to escape what seems to be a vicious circle, KBH appeal to the concept of the
Divine image in man to which they refer in a quote from Larkin: “because God made people in his
own image they have the capacity to ‘transcend preunderstanding, evaluate it, and change it.’”439
In this reference, Larkin asserts, “The mind of the interpreter, whether regenerate or unregenerate,
evidences the fact that humans are made in God’s image (Gen. 1:26).”440 Larkin’s timely and
important contribution to the field is specifically dedicated to opposing the rampant relativism in
contemporary hermeneutic theory by reaffirming traditional hermeneutical principles. Larkin hits
the relativist head-on with sound argumentation, tracing the hermeneutical and philosophical roots
of the contemporary “crisis of biblical authority.”441
Nevertheless, Larkin’s account of the role of presuppositions and preunderstanding needs
further consideration in order to support his repudiation of relativism in hermeneutic theory. Note,
for example, that viewing man as having been created in the image of God is a “prior commitment”
characteristic of someone who already accepts the Bible’s authoritative teaching on this matter.
Indeed, the concept of the Divine image in man is a concept that derives from the biblical text as

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evidenced by Larkin’s reference to Gen. 1:26. According to the prevailing view, however, in so
far as it is derived from the biblical text, it is subject to the preconditional framework of the
interpreter. Other interpreters may, and in fact do, hold contrary and even contradictory points of
view about what constitutes the Divine image in man, or that such a thing exists. The fact that
Larkin makes reference to the biblical passage from which his notion of the Divine image in man
comes indicates that Larkin’s view derives from his interpretation of the biblical text which has
been mediated through his already present preunderstanding.
According to the standards set by KBH, and assuming Larkin to be an honest, active interpreter,
Larkin must at least be open to changing his interpretation of the nature of the Divine image
because it is the product of his interpretation mediated through his mutable preunderstanding.
However, if the notion of the Divine image in man is subject to change, then this would have
serious implications for the hedge against circularity as KBH and Larkin are attempting to employ
it.
KBH, Larkin, and others employ an appeal to the divine image as if this were a “brute fact”
which obtains apart from their interpretations of any text. Indeed, they employ this interpretive
conclusion as if it is an objective interpretation. If this is the case, and it cannot be ruled out a
priori that this is in fact the case, then it must not be an aspect of one’s preunderstanding as this is
popularly defined, since preunderstanding is mutable and the concept of the Divine image in man
is treated by these theorists as if it were immutable. Either it is a changeable aspect of one’s
preunderstanding, or it is not. If it is not a changeable aspect of one’s preunderstanding, then it is
either derived from the text as a product of one’s interpretation, in which case it is the result of the
application of one’s own preunderstanding to the text and is therefore subject to change, or it is
not. If it is not, then it is either an unchangeable foundation principle, or it is not. If it is not, then
it is a changeable foundational principle; but this is just another name for one’s preunderstanding.
Figure 8 illustrates these dichotomies.

Figure 8: Foundation Principles

But, if the image of God in man is an unchangeable foundation principle, then it is not the case
that all presuppositions and every facet of one’s preunderstanding is changeable. Along with the
unchangeable logical principles of contradiction, excluded middle, and identity, there is this
additional transcendental presupposition, the image of God in man.
So, it is either the case that all presuppositions are subject to change and significant
transformation as part of one’s preunderstanding, or some are not. Those presuppositions that are
immutable cannot, then, be part of one’s preunderstanding as it is popularly defined, since,
according to the current wisdom, all preunderstanding is subject to change. The assertions of KBH,
Larkin, Osborne, and others indicate that there may be presuppositions, in addition to the

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transcendental presuppositions of logic discussed above, that in fact are not subject to change.
According to these analyses, it may be the case that there are other necessary, unchangeable
foundation principles upon which the interpretation of anything is based and which transcend all
points of view and all perspectives. At least, this seems to be the way in which KBH, Larkin,
Osborne, and others employ some of their own principles. For KBH it is the commitment to the
Bible’s authority. For Larkin, it is the Divine image in man. For Osborne it is placing ourselves
“in front of the text” so that it can “address and if necessary change a presupposed perspective.”442
For virtually all theorists there is at least one unchangeable, foundational principle—the
assumption that interpretation is always through the interpreter’s framework of preunderstanding.
Similar observations can be made concerning the proposals of McCartney and Clayton. They
assert that the interpreter’s most basic presuppositions and his subordinate presuppositions should
“be brought into line with that of the biblical writers.”443 But how does one come to know what
are the presuppositions of the biblical writers? This would necessarily involve interpreting the
biblical text. If it is necessary to interpret the biblical text in order to discover the presuppositions
of the biblical writers, how can one know whether what one concludes from his interpretation are
the actual presuppositions of the biblical writers, or whether they are merely the perceived view of
the biblical author being mediated through the interpreter’s own presuppositions? McCartney and
Clayton acknowledge that “our presuppositions are going to influence how we look at our
presuppositions,”444 but will they not also influence how one looks at the presuppositions of the
biblical writers? They admit that the process of recognizing one’s presuppositions is “an
exceedingly difficult process,” but they urge the process of attempting to recognize one’s
presuppositions in order to “evaluate whether and to what degree they are in harmony with those
of the Bible;” further, they insist that this is a lifetime project that “must continually be
undertaken.”445 They go on to assert, “In fact, we should say that the key to interpreting the Bible
is to allow it to change and mold our presuppositions into an interpretive framework compatible
with the Bible.”446
It seems, however, that they have not avoided the self-referential problem, and their description
seems to involve them in the same kind of problem. Although McCartney and Clayton
acknowledge the presence of this circularity when they admit that one’s presuppositions are going
to influence how one looks at his presuppositions, and although they claim that, in spite of this
circularity, the task is not hopeless, they offer no substantive means of escape. They propose that
the interpreter should examine his presuppositions to see whether they are “compatible with the
Bible.” How does the interpreter come to understand what is and what is not compatible with the
Bible? Would not one have to interpret the Bible in order to discover what the Bible says?
Ultimately, the interpreter’s understanding of what is compatible with the Bible is the result of his
interpretation of the Bible, which has already been influenced by his presuppositions since no
interpretation is possible without them. To assert that our presuppositions must be brought into
line with that of the biblical writers offers no hope since in order to know what the biblical writers
said, we must interpret their texts, and in this view no one interprets any text apart from his
presuppositional framework. Once again we are involved in what seems to be a hopeless circle
that never allows an objective grasp of the text, but allows the interpreter to know only the
interpretation of the text through his always-already present framework of understanding.
Adjudication between those presuppositions that are considered acceptable and those that are
considered unacceptable, following the methods that have been proposed by KBH, McCartney and
Clayton, Larkin, and Osborne, is supposed to involve a critical examination of one’s
presuppositions in the effort to arrive at those that are acceptable. Yet apart from the intervention

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of someone or something outside the spiral, no escape from circularity seems to be forthcoming.
Strictly on the basis of the explanations of the role of presuppositions and preunderstanding, no
methodology has been proposed that would enable the interpreter to transcend his perspective. No
unchangeable presuppositions have been offered that might serve as an immutable standard of
judgment. No one seems to be able to propose a “view from nowhere” that would allow for a
completely objective perspective. Examining one’s presuppositions to discover those that are
acceptable is ultimately, according to the current wisdom, simply a function of the always already
present framework. How can we legitimately argue that our own framework can examine itself in
order to evaluate whether it is acceptable?
Additionally, no Evangelical hermeneutician seems to have articulated a standard by which
one can judge between what are acceptable and what are unacceptable presuppositions. This is not
to say that Evangelicals do not believe that it is possible to adjudicate between good and bad
interpretations. They certainly do offer extensive and effective explanations and examples of
hermeneutical principles designed to lead an interpreter to a correct understanding of the text.
However, on the level of presuppositions at the starting point of the hermeneutic process, short of
the intervention of someone or something outside the spiral, none of the explanations offered
allows for the possibility of adjudicating between presuppositions, nor do their methodologies
support their own hermeneutical principles on this point. Such a standard cannot derive from the
results of their interpretations of the biblical texts regardless of the assumed authority of the text.
Even though one believes the Bible to be authoritative, it must still be interpreted, and if all
interpretation is mediated through the mutable preunderstanding of the interpreter, which by their
own assertions cannot be objective, no non-mediated result can ever be achieved, and thus no
objective standard would seem to be accessible. As the relativist asserts, the results are results for
me—not universally true or transcendently applicable.
This conclusion, however, is not considered by everyone to be a defect. In fact, some theorists
have proposed that not only is no objective starting point necessary, no such starting point is either
possible or even desirable. With reference to this circularity and the idea of a starting point, Peters
asserts,

The most important consequence of the circularity of understanding for hermeneutics is that there is no pure starting point for
understanding because every act of understanding takes place within a finite historically conditioned horizon, within an already
understood frame of reference. It is no longer a question of how we are to enter the hermeneutical circle, because human
consciousness is always already in it. We understand only by constant reference to what we have already understood, namely,
our past and anticipated experience. The experiencing and reflecting subject is never a tabula rasa upon which the
understanding of raw experience inscribes its objective character; rather, all experience and reflection are the result of a
confrontation between one’s pre-understanding or even prejudice and new or perhaps strange objects. The inevitable presence
of pre-understanding or prejudice is not necessarily the distortion of the meaning of an object by an arbitrary subject, rather, it
is the very condition for any understanding at all.447

On the one hand Peters asserts that there is in fact no “starting point” per se since “we are
already always in it.” On the other hand he disclaims any adverse effects on meaning. If, however,
all interpretation is only mediated through one’s preunderstanding, to say that there is no
“distortion of the meaning” is nonsensical, since whatever meaning one obtains can never be
evaluated with reference to an unmediated meaning against which the interpreted meaning can be
judged as a distortion of the meaning. The only way any given interpretation can be disqualified
as a “distortion of the meaning” is if someone possesses “the meaning” against which any other
particular meaning is able to be judged. If all meanings are mediated meanings, then no meaning
is “the” meaning. To assume that any particular meaning can be a distortion of “the” meaning not

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only assumes that “the” meaning exists, but that it is somehow accessible. This is what is meant
by the “objective” meaning, which is precisely what Peters rejects.
Many Evangelicals have also concluded that objectivity is not possible. Cotterell and Turner
have contributed to the field by producing a volume that incorporates the latest advances in the
field of linguistics. In their analysis of the role of the reader in interpretation, they assert, “Any
confidence in the ‘objectivity’ of our findings must be further called into question by the frank
recognition that many if not all scholars would be prepared to admit they are ultimately studying
Paul (or Calvin or whomever) in order to understand themselves and their God.”448 They
acknowledge that this notion implies the danger of misunderstanding and distortion, but they assert
that this does not create a hopelessness in the interpreter’s quest for the “discourse meaning.” The
influence of the interpreter, and the lack of objectivity should, they claim, “generate the appropriate
caution, both in respect of method and in the degree of certainty we attach to our ‘conclusions.’
We need fully to recognize that our reading of the letter to Philemon (or whatever), however
certain we may feel it is what Paul meant, is actually only a hypothesis—our hypothesis—about
the discourse meaning. It is the result of seeing certain aspects of the text and of providing what
we understand to be the meaning that provides coherence to the evidence.”449
The problem here is that if any interpretation of anything whatever is only a hypothesis, then
no one possesses a non-hypothetical interpretation. If no non-hypothetical interpretation exists,
then what is being used to measure everyone’s interpretations by which the authors discover that
all interpretations are only hypothetical? How can it be known that all interpretations are only
hypothetical if a non-hypothetical interpretation from which to judge does not exist? Additionally,
how can the reader, according to this scenario, obtain anything but a hypothetical interpretation of
the analysis of Cotterell and Turner. In fact, Cotterell and Turner present their analysis as if they
expect the reader to have an objective interpretation of what they are asserting. They seem to have
committed the fallacy of the lost distinction. They allow for no non-hypothetical interpretation, yet
they globally assert that all interpretations are only hypothetical. Is this claim only hypothetical,
or is it objectively true? Do these authors posses the non-hypothetical interpretation on the basis
of which they can confidently assert that all interpretations are only hypothetical? If no one possess
the measuring stick, then against what are they measuring? Cotterell and Turner do not consider
these kinds of problems.
Silva also discusses the question of the possibility of objectivity when he asserts, “In effect,
this is what historical exegesis has had as its goal; total objectivity on the part of the interpreter so
as to prevent injecting into the text any meaning other than the strictly historical one. But such
objectivity does not exist. And if it did exist it would be of little use, because then we would simply
be involved in a bare repetition of the text that takes no account of its abiding value.”450 Silva
attributes this hermeneutical methodology to the influence of Immanuel Kant of whose work Silva
says it was “undoubtedly a major turning point between modern thought and everything that
preceded it.”451 Its effect was “so broad and so fundamental in character that no intellectual
discipline could escape its impact—not even biblical interpretation, though it took a while for
exegetes to figure out what was happening.”452
According to Silva, this influence has resulted in a distinctive character attributable to
contemporary hermeneutics, namely, “its emphasis on the subjectivity and relativity of
interpretation.”453 In light of the influence of subjectivity and relativity in the hard sciences through
such historical figures as Kant and Kuhn, Silva concludes, “For one thing, these developments tell
us that we probably have overestimated the differences between the sciences and the humanities.
In both of these broad disciplines, the researcher is faced with a set of data that can be interpreted

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only in the light of previous commitments; in both cases, therefore, an interpreter comes—
consciously or unconsciously—with a theory that seeks to account for as many facts as possible.
Given the finite nature of every human interpreter, no explanation accounts for the data
exhaustively.”454
If every interpreter comes with his own theory which ultimately cannot account for the data
exhaustively, then it seems to follow that Silva’s conclusion is a result of his own theory, which
he has brought to the data of hermeneutics, and his own explanation does not account for the data
exhaustively. In other words, since no explanation, including Silva’s own explanation, accounts
for the data exhaustively, it may be the case that there is some other starting point which might be
objectively based which has not been accounted for by the explanations of contemporary theorists.
In fact, this proposal cannot be rejected on the basis of the notion of preunderstanding which has
been advocated by all the theorists who have been surveyed and referred to so far. It follows then,
that some objective starting point may possibly exist for which the explanations of other theorists
simply have not accounted, because, according to Silva, no explanation exhaustively accounts for
all the data. By modifying the illustration in Figure 8 , this argument may be diagramed as depicted
in Figure 9.
Either the starting point is an aspect of one’s mutable preunderstanding or it is not. If it is, then
the hermeneutical circle seems to be vicious, and there is no means to adjudicate between
acceptable and unacceptable presuppositions. If it is not, then one’s starting point is either a
product of one’s interpretation, or it is not. If it is, then we are back in the vicious hermeneutical
circle. If it is not, then one’s starting point is either an unchangeable foundation principle or it is
not. If it is not, then the only options are that it is either a part of one’s preunderstanding, or it is a
result of one’s interpretation. If, however, one’s starting point is an unchangeable, foundation
principle, then it must transcend the mutable aspects of one’s preunderstanding, in which case it
would seem to provide an objective starting point for interpretation.

Figure 9: Objective Starting Point of Interpretation

Summary and Conclusion

From the previous analysis, several implications seem to follow. First of all, hermeneutic
theorists are generally agreed that the fundamental ingredient in a viable hermeneutical theory is
the nature and role of presuppositions or preunderstanding. Although a variety of terms are used
to identify this web of preconditions, the prevailing view is that there are necessary and inevitable
preconditions that make interpretation possible, and to assume that interpretation can be done
without these preconditions—what some theorists refer to as scientific objectivity—is naive and
impossible. In fact, to think that one can approach any interpretive task without presuppositions is
itself a presupposition.

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 This being the case, it becomes clear that the most basic issue in the question of objectivity in
interpretation is the nature and role of what are held to be the necessary preconditions of
interpretation. These preconditions have been identified as presuppositions, preunderstanding,
prejudice, worldview, and many other descriptive terms that all attempt to capture the broad span
of the nature of understanding. Hermeneuticians almost universally assert that no interpreter
approaches a text, or indeed life itself, with a tabula rasa, a “blank slate.” Whether these
preconditions are understood to be the fore-structure of Dasein, or an appropriate level of
preunderstanding, whether they are existential or theological, whether they are an acquiescence to
consciousness or an acknowledgment of an authoritative body of Scripture, they are ever present
and provide the framework in which interpretation and understanding take place.
A second implication can be drawn from the first that is just as universal as the
acknowledgment of the inevitability and necessity of these preconditions. This equally universal
assumption is that, notwithstanding the diversity of opinion about what constitutes presuppositions
and preunderstanding, these preconditions of interpretation are understood to be rational in nature.
The identification of presuppositions as “conceptions” or “preconceived ideas” or “prior beliefs”
or that which “mediates understanding,” mirror the descriptive expressions of Existentialism and
Phenomenology in terms of consciousness and the rational structures of Dasein. Little doubt seems
to remain that the modern Evangelical understanding of the nature of presuppositions has been
significantly influenced by the Phenomenology that has descended from Heidegger through
Gadamer and Bultmann and Modern rationalist and idealist scholarship. Indeed, it would seem
that the philosophical background of hermeneutic theory today gives evidence of an almost
universal acquiescence to the Cartesian/Kantian starting point and the linguistic turn in modern
epistemology. Hermeneutic methodology seems to be universally predicated on the basis of the
rational and the cognitive rather than on the real, and the necessary preconditions of interpretation
are likewise enumerated in terms of the rational and the cognitive. There is virtually no theorist
that entertains the possibility that extra-mental reality in any way constitutes an objective basis for
rational and cognitive exercises. Of course, this seems to be an obvious and necessary conclusion.
Since interpretation and understanding are acts of the mind, or acts of reason, then it would seem
to be necessarily the case that the preconditions of interpretation would be rational in nature. It
seems obvious that what is not rational, or cognitive, would not be “in the mind.”
A third implication is a virtually universally held assumption that remains emphatically
unalterable no matter what the text or life experience seems to say. This assumption is that, despite
the virtually unanimous claim that every interpreter begins with a preunderstanding, that every
interpreter comes to the text with prejudices or presuppositions, these preconditions of
understanding are nevertheless mutable and can be modified or altered by honest interaction with
the text or with the world. No theorist seems to entertain the possibility that an encounter with any
text or any life experience will ever be able to alter the basic assumption that presuppositions can
change. So, for all the claims that the preconditions of interpretation can be molded and even
altered, the fact remains that there are at least three presuppositions that no one seems willing to
modify: 1) the presupposition that all interpretation necessarily involves presuppositions; 2) the
presupposition that these presuppositions necessarily mediate understanding; and 3) the
presupposition that all presuppositions are mutable, changeable, alterable, and capable of being
rejected by the continued interaction of the interpreter with the text or with the world.
Additionally, it would seem that the adamant rejection of classical foundationalism, as we
considered in chapter 3, has simply been replaced by a fixed and immutable phenomenological
foundationalism. This foundationalism is composed of the notion that presuppositions, or

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preunderstanding, or prejudices, or horizon of expectation, or historical situatedness, or theory
ladenness, or linguistic determinism, or whatever other term may be used, are the necessary and
inevitable foundation of interpretation. However, this precondition for interpretation is no less a
foundation than the classical foundation which virtually all modern theorists reject. Additionally,
it is presented as being just as universally and absolutely true as the classical foundations were
supposed to have been. Although these preconditions are subject to change, alteration, and even
elimination, the fact of a preconditionedness, and particularly a preconditionedness that is
decidedly rational, or mental, or phenomenological is beyond question, self-evident, and
undeniable. There can be no preconditionlessness in interpretation, no presuppositionless
interpretation. This view is no less a foundation for interpretation in biblical hermeneutics than in
philosophical hermeneutics. This foundation has almost all the earmarks of classical
foundationalism. The one thing it does not seem to have is a grounding in anything outside the
mind of the interpreter.
None of these theorists assert that presuppositions or preunderstanding is inevitable “for me.”
None of these interpreters claim that “I” cannot come to a text without a framework of
understanding. No one claims that “my” presuppositions are changeable, though perhaps yours are
not. Rather, all these theorists claim that everyone comes to a text or to the world with an always,
already present framework of understanding. All these theorists affirm that no one comes to a text
or to the world with a tabula rasa. All these theorists claim that everyone’s presuppositions are
changeable (except of course the presupposition that everyone’s presuppositions are changeable).
Everyone declares that no one can have absolute objectivity. As before, this survey shows that
scholars in the field of hermeneutics, Evangelicals and non-evangelicals alike, working from
contrary and often contradictory perspectives and interpreting the same hermeneutic data, arrive
at the same conclusion. The universal assertions about the preconditions of interpretation seem to
be just as much an immutable, undeniable, unavoidable foundation as the foundationalism that
everyone takes pains to reject. Once again this would seem to be an instance of the very objectivity
in interpretation that all these theorists deny.

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 6 PRESUPPOSITIONS AND OBJECTIVITY RECONSIDERED

Introduction
The possibility of objectivity or an objective starting point for hermeneutics brings this study
back to the central question. Contemporary thought has expended a great amount of energy
attempting to dispense with the traditional notion of objectivity. For the purposes of clarity, let us
restate the logic of our investigation that was introduced in chapter 2.

First, we acknowledge that there are conflicting interpretations of the Bible, and, as Christians,
we want to know which interpretation is the correct one. But, many contemporary thinkers declare
that there is no such thing as a correct interpretation because everyone comes to the text with his
own always-already-present presuppositions forms a framework of understanding through which
he interprets the text. Because it is impossible, according to these thinkers, to jettison one’s always-
already-present framework, this necessarily obviates the possibility of objectivity in interpretation.

This argument may be schematized as follows:

1. Everyone comes to the text with his own always-already-present framework.

2. No particular always-already-present framework is universally valid.

3. But, universal validity is precisely what is implied in the notion of objectivity.

4. Therefore, no interpreter can be objective in interpretation.

5. But, if no interpreter can be objective, then no interpretation is universally valid.

6. But, if no interpretation is universally valid, then the concept of a correct interpretation is

at best relative or at worst empty.

7. Since there is no such thing as a correct interpretation, there is no means of adjudicating

between interpretations.

8. In fact, the very idea of adjudicating between interpretations is at best relative and at worst
empty.

Secondly, Evangelical thinkers adamantly maintain that there is a correct interpretation of the
Bible, or at least one that is more correct than its competitors, and that this interpretation is, at least
theoretically, attainable. However, Evangelical thinkers, along with theorists who do not espouse
any particular religious commitment, reject the notion of objectivity, or what some call “total
objectivity,” and likewise assert that everyone comes to the text with his or her own always-
already-present framework.

Thirdly, if contemporary thinkers are correct in claiming that our always-already-present

frameworks are unavoidable, and if they are correct that these always-already-present frameworks

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obviate objectivity, then how can Evangelical thinkers maintain the notion of a correct or more
correct interpretation while holding to the unavoidability of this framework and what seems to be
a necessary rejection of objectivity? This is the principle concern of this book, namely, how is it
possible to maintain the fact of the always-already-present framework of every interpreter and at
the same time maintain the possibility of objectivity in interpretation?

In our investigation so far, we have confirmed either in whole or in part several of the
propositions listed under the First consideration above, but we have also disconfirmed several
others. Let us reconsider the eight propositions in light of the investigation so far:

1. Everyone comes to the text with his own always-already-present framework.

Everyone we consulted, whether working in the field of biblical studies, hermeneutics both
secular and Evangelical, natural science, historical studies, philosophy, or linguistics
acknowledges the fact of the always-already-present framework of understanding that makes
knowledge possible. Everyone declared that there is no such thing as presuppositionless
interpretation. This seems to have been confirmed by our investigation.

2. No particular always-already-present framework is universally valid.

Again, our research shows that almost no one holds that a particular always-already-present
framework is universally valid. Everyone encounters his or her world from an individual or
culturally determined point of view, and no one can disqualify another’s perspective since a
particular evaluation will necessarily be exercised from one’s own always-already-present
framework. As Marilyn Piety puts it, “The idea has been advanced that human behavior, or more
specifically, choice, can only be understood as rational within a particular conceptual framework.
Proponents of this view contend that any possible system of justification must be understood as
relative to a particular framework or system of values and hence that it is not possible to make
rational choices between frameworks.”455 The incommensurability of paradigms is held to be
universally true and an undeniable part of the always-already-present framework for all
interpreters. This ubiquitous belief is imposed on any would-be theorist as firmly as any religious
dogma. This fact, coupled with the equally ubiquitous though unacknowledged presence of the
basic laws of thought (non-contradiction, identity, excluded middle, etc.) serve to undermine the
proposition that no particular framework is universally valid. In fact, the assumption that no
particular framework is universally valid is held to be universally valid, and it is declared so in
contradiction to any attempts to deny that this is so.

3. But, universal validity is precisely what is implied in the notion of objectivity.

Our brief survey of contemporary notions of objectivity confirms the fact that objectivity is
almost always talked about in terms either of some kind of neutrality or of some universally
applicable perspective. Although some theorists have attempted to redefine objectivity in terms of
inter-subjectivity, or objectivity relative to a given culture or language community, or some other
restricted domain such as one’s own framework, these attempts are intelligible only against the
more traditional notion of objectivity as neutrality and universal validity. This neutrality is usually
discussed in terms of a supposed presuppositionlessness or lack of prejudice, or bias, or
particularizing perspective. This very neutrality is assumed to be the basis for universal validity.
Almost all theorists acknowledge that this is the notion of objectivity against which they propose

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their own points of view and contrary to which they propose the perspectival nature of all
knowledge, understanding, and interpretation.

4. Therefore, no interpreter can have objectivity in interpretation.

Once again we have seen that this is almost universally held to be absolutely true for everyone.
Almost all theorists hold that objectivity is either 1) a chimera, 2) impossible to obtain, or 3) even
if possible, certainly undesirable.456 The assumption that all frameworks are unique to each person,
or at least unique to each culture or language community, make neutral objectivity literally
unthinkable. However, we have also seen that all these theorists, approaching the data from
sometimes mutually exclusive perspectives, have arrived at this same conclusion, and this very
fact militates against the rejection of objectivity. The impossibility or undesirability of objectivity
is presented as if it were an objective and universally valid understanding.

5. But, if no interpreter can be objective, then no interpretation is universally valid.

We have also discovered that even among Evangelicals there is an unwillingness to assert that
anyone’s interpretation can be universally valid. Yet in the very act of declaring that no
interpretation is universally valid, all these theorists, Evangelical and non-evangelical alike, assert
their interpretation of the hermeneutical and philosophical data to be universally valid. They
instruct their readers that once the reader has considered all factors, he must come to the same
interpretive conclusion, namely, that no interpretation is universally valid. Apparently, the only
universally valid interpretation is that no interpretation is universally valid.

6. But, if no interpretation is universally valid, then the concept of a correct interpretation is

at best relative or at worst empty.
Traditionally, orthodox Christians have maintained that there is a correct interpretation of the
Bible, and that the correct interpretation is obtainable, at least in theory, if the proper hermeneutical
methodology is employed. Generally speaking, contemporary Evangelicals preserve this ideal in
their writings. Theorists propounding a secular or philosophical hermeneutics declare exactly the
contradictory, namely, that there is no such thing as a correct interpretation. However, they
consistently present their conclusion as if it is the correct interpretation.

7. Since there is no such thing as a correct interpretation, there is no means of adjudicating

between interpretations.
If there is no correct interpretation, then on what basis do theorists declare a contradictory
analysis to be false? If there is no correct interpretation of the data, then it is not correct to conclude
that there is no such thing as a correct interpretation. Concluding that there is no correct
interpretation of the data is only their own interpretation of the data, which, by their own lights,
cannot be the correct interpretation of the data. All those theorists who declare that there is no
correct interpretation use their arguments to adjudicate between their interpretation of the data and
contradictory interpretations of the data. They believe their interpretation is right and any
contradictory interpretation is wrong. They hold to their ~A as over against anyone else’s A. Their
own claims that their analysis must be the true analysis is a counter-example to their own theories.

8. In fact, the very idea of adjudicating between interpretations is at best relative and at worst
empty.

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 Once again, a brief survey of the claims is sufficient to expose the self-defeating nature of this
proposition. If the very idea of adjudicating between interpretations is either relative or empty,
then why do these theorists produce so many thousands of pages of argumentation to promote their
interpretation as over against its contradictory?

It would seem to be the case that there is in fact a real possibility of objectivity. Indeed, it
would seem to be the case that the critics have actually confirmed this possibility by their
noncontradictory assertions in which they adamantly affirm their interpretation of the phenomena
to be the only possible interpretation, universally valid, absolutely true, and unassailably correct.
They have in fact demonstrated the very objectivity that they declare cannot be possible. But, if
objectivity is a real possibility, then, how can we deal with the problems of objectivity as we saw
these in science, history, language, and hermeneutics?

The Problem of Objectivity Reconsidered

In his chapter on contemporary approaches to interpretation, Moisés Silva makes the following
remark: “Throughout the centuries people have assumed without a second thought that our
perception of data corresponds exactly with objective reality. If we see a black horse, it must be
black—and it certainly must be a horse! After all, how could the work of science proceed without
such assurance?”457 However, as we will see, the problems that have been associated with a
correspondence view of truth assume a representationalist approach to the question of knowledge
and objectivity that is in the Cartesian/Kantian tradition.458 It is this very operating assumption that
is at the root of the problem for the question of objectivity.
Silva is certainly not unaware of these problems. In his brief analysis of this tradition he
acknowledges its Kantian roots, and he offers a helpful description of this perspective when he
points out that not even science can escape the impact of Kant: “Observers never see things as they
are in themselves,459 since the mind is no mere receptacle molded by physical sensations, but rather
an active organ that brings order to the chaotic stream of data it confronts.460 One might as well
admit that the world as we know it is a world created by our own ordering of sensations.”461 Silva
is not advocating this perspective, but simply explaining its implications. This seems to be the
inevitable conclusion to which one must arrive once one sets out on a path based on Kantian
principles. As Gilson puts it, “The whole question here is whether it is possible to overcome
Kantian agnosticism ‘starting from its own principles.’ To this we must answer: no, for Kantian
agnosticism is inscribed within the principles from which it flows, which is precisely why they are
its principles.”462
As we have seen, the notion of objectivity is a topic of dispute in a number of disciplines. In
chapter 2 we looked at various contemporary notions of the nature of objectivity. David Bell, for
example, identified an ontological concept of objectivity—something is objective if it exists, and
is the way it is, independently of any knowledge, perception, conception or consciousness there
may be of it—and an epistemological concept of objectivity—objectivity construed as a property
of the contents of mental acts and states.463 Allan Megill, identifies four principal senses of the
terms “objective” and “objectivity”: Absolute objectivity, Disciplinary objectivity, Dialectical
objectivity and Procedural objectivity.464
As we observed, Megill dedicates the bulk of his criticism toward the notion of an absolute
objectivity. In his analysis, Megill makes reference to Thomas Nagel’s claims set forth in his book
titled The View From Nowhere.465 Nagel proposed that the notion of objectivity is one of degrees
such that some assertions are more objective than others. He asserted, for example, that the

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“standpoint of morality is more objective than that of private life, but less objective than the
standpoint of physics.”466
The problem that Nagel addresses is identified by Megill as an unavoidable limit of absolute
objectivity. Megill asserts that the extreme of absolute objectivity “is a view that we find
impossible to situate, for it would need to view itself viewing, and so on ad infinitum.”467 In
Nagel’s own words,

Objectivity and skepticism are closely related: both develop from the idea that there is a real world in which we are contained,
and that appearances result from our interaction with the rest of it. We cannot accept those appearances uncritically, but must
try to understand what our own constitution contributes to them. To do this we try to develop an idea of the world with ourselves
in it, an account of both ourselves and the world that includes an explanation of why it initially appears to us as it does. But
this idea, since it is we who develop it, is likewise the product of interaction between us and the world, though the interaction
is more complicated and more self-conscious than the original one. If the initial appearances cannot be relied upon because
they depend on our constitution in ways that we do not fully understand, this more complex idea should be open to the same
doubts, for whatever we use to understand certain interactions between ourselves and the world is not itself the object of that
understanding. However often we may try to step outside of ourselves, something will have to stay behind the lens, something
in us will determine the resulting picture, and this will give grounds for doubt that we are really getting any closer to reality.468

Figure 10: Viewing Myself Viewing

As Megill characterized it, this is a case of me viewing the world viewing me viewing the
world viewing me viewing the world, etc., etc., etc. (see Figure 10). However, both Nagel’s and
Megill’s problem with absolute objectivity assumes a representationalist epistemology.469 The
very definition that Megill provides for absolute objectivity— representing things as they really
are—is the very nature of a representationalist epistemology, and Nagel’s own use of metaphors
such as “picture” and “lens” indicates a similar assumption. As Nagel correctly notes, a claim to
objectivity is not a claim of the absolute comprehensiveness of all reality: “An objective standpoint
is created by leaving a more subjective, individual, or even just human perspective behind; but
there are things about the world and life and ourselves that cannot be adequately understood from
a maximally objective standpoint, however much it may extend our understanding beyond the
point from which we started.”470
Nagel’s evaluation of the relative objectivity, as it were, of one’s standpoint tacitly assumes an
absolute standard of objectivity by which the degrees can be measured. Unless this standard is
known, it cannot function as a measure; but, if this standard is known, this implies an objectivity

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that does not admit of degrees. In other words, for Nagel to make this observation he must assume
the very absolute objectivity that he claims is impossible.
Nagel describes the “objective standpoint” as “created by leaving a more subjective,
individual, or even just human perspective behind,” but he warns that “there are things about the
world and life and ourselves that cannot be adequately understood from a maximally objective
standpoint, however much it may extend our understanding beyond the point from which we
started.”471 He goes on to warn that “the attempt to give a complete account of the world in
objective terms detached from these perspectives inevitably leads to false reductions or to outright
denial that certain patently real phenomena exist at all.”472 But how could Nagel know this? How
could he know that a particular account of the world that purports to be completely objective would
yield false reductions and denials of real phenomena unless he had such a view against which to
judge the competing view. This seems to be a self-refuting claim that assumes the capacity to make
a distinction between a claim and the actual state of affairs which Nagel says cannot possibly be
known.
If no one has a completely objective account of the world, then how can Nagel presume to
judge what one would look like? If someone claimed to have a completely objective perspective,
which Nagel claims is not possible, then Nagel’s judgement of the success or failure of his
opponent’s claim would not be a valid judgement since Nagel’s criticism, by his own admission,
would not be a completely objective account that could account for his opponent’s claim to
complete objectivity. By disallowing complete objectivity, Nagel has forfeited the only standard
of measuring claims of complete objectivity.
Megill goes on to observe, “In much twentieth-century philosophical discussion, objectivity is
presented as less a matter of ‘representing things as they really are’ than as a matter of arriving at
criteria for judging claims to have represented things as they really are.”473 Once again this assumes
a standard of measure, and that standard of measure has, in modern conceptions of objectivity,
been understood in terms of one’s point of view or intellectual framework. Typical of this notion
is the statement made by Nagel that, “Since it is impossible to leave one’s own point of view
behind entirely without ceasing to exist, the metaphor of getting outside ourselves must have
another meaning.”474 Apparently Nagel has been able to leave his own point of view behind
entirely in order to be able to judge absolutely that no one can do such a thing. For Nagel, the other
meaning is a balance between what he sees as the limits of objectivity owing to our finitude, and
our capacity for self-transformation. In other words, there must be some means by which we are
able to rework our intellectual frameworks.
Megill asserts that the notion of absolute objectivity is paradoxical “since knowledge that is
objective in this sense escapes by definition the constraints of subjectivity and partiality; yet if
such a view is to be all embracing it must include the particular views that also make up reality as
we know it. . . . taken to its extreme, absolute objectivity offers a ‘view from nowhere’: it is a view
that we find impossible to situate, for it would need to view itself viewing, and so on ad
infinitum.”475 But this would be the case only if representationalism were true. The fact that Megill
and Nagel use a “viewer” metaphor and other modes of expression that depict knowing as a
picturing indicates that they are conceptualizing the act of knowing in a representationalist sense.
The act of knowing is not necessarily representational in that sense, however, and a second
intentional reflection is sufficient to account for the knowing of the knower.476 Both Megill and
Nagel, in assuming a representationalist epistemology have confused the distinction between first
intention and second intention,477 and have assumed that reflexive thinking would necessarily
involve an infinite series of events. However, any subsequent act of second intention would simply

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be another instance of second intention, and would not be different from the initial instance of
second intention. Consequently, there is no ad infinitum problem. Moreover, the problem they
discuss is only relevant to a representationalist epistemology. As L. M. Régis points out, “When
doubt is identified with error, and when what is doubtful to me is considered equal to what is
doubtful in itself, no criterion of truth and error remains but my mind, which thus becomes the rule
of truth, and the cogito remains the only logical position from which to construct a philosophy.”478
Régis is critiquing Descartes, but the principle is applicable beyond this specific case. When one’s
own doubt about the possibility of objectivity is identified with the possibility of objectivity in
itself, then the standard of measure for objectivity becomes one’s own mind, and this is thoroughly
Cartesian.
Reference has already been made to Bernstein’s notion of objectivism, but reference must be
made to the fact that Bernstein also understands objectivity in terms of a representationalist
epistemology. As he asserts, “In modern times objectivism has been closely linked with an
acceptance of a basic metaphysical or epistemological distinction between the subject and the
object. What is ‘out there’ (objective) is presumed to be independent of us (subjects), and
knowledge is achieved when a subject correctly mirrors or represents objective reality.”479
Although Bernstein does point out that the mirror notion of objectivism is not the only variety, the
only other versions to which he makes reference are other versions of a representationalist
approach.
The weakness of the mirror or representationalist approach is that there can never be a means
of discovering whether one’s mirror is an accurate representation of the world “out there” since
the “out there” is always out there, and what is in the mind is always only a mirror or copy or
representation of it. In order to be able to know that what is in the mind is faithful in its representing
what exists in extra-mental reality, a notion of objectivity must somehow propose how the mind
is able to bring the “out there” “in here” by some means other than as a copy or representation, so
that what is in the mind is, in some way, what is out there.
Similar views on the possibility of objectivity can be found in the writings of Evangelicals. In
his massive work on the New Testament, N. T. Wright asserts, “There is no such thing as the
‘neutral’ or ‘objective’ observer;480 equally there is no such thing as the detached observer.”481
According to Wright, an observer always looks at things from his own perspective or point of
view. As he says,

First, the observer is looking from one point of view, and one only; and there is no such thing as a god’s-eye view (by which
would be meant a Deist god’s-eye view) available to human beings, a point of view which is no human’s point of view. Second,
and consequent upon this, all humans inevitably and naturally interpret the information received from their senses through a
grid of expectations, memories, stories, psychological states, and so on. The point of view is not merely peculiar in terms of
location (I am standing on this side of the room, not that side, so my viewpoint is different from yours); it is also peculiar in
terms of the lenses of my worldview (as various writers have shown, a tacit and pre-theoretical point of view is itself a necessary
condition for any perception and knowledge to occur at all). 482

Wright goes on in his work to address the nature of world views and their relation to
interpretation, but the above quote is sufficient to illustrate that the same kinds of reasoning about
perspectivalism are articulated among Christian writers who assume a representationalist
epistemology.

Objectivity and Representationalism

It would seem that the underlying problem with the notion of objectivity stems from a
representationalist epistemology. Epistemology has traditionally been the study of knowledge,

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addressing the questions, “What is knowledge?” and “How do we know?” There have been a
variety of proposals throughout the history of philosophy, but since the speculations of Descartes,
there has been a prevailing assumption about one very basic notion. When a person is confronted
by the world outside the mind, the mind encounters the world through the senses and forms a
representation of the outside world. As J. Alberto Coffa puts it, “A long tradition, canonized in the
Logique de Port Royal, had declared ideas or representations the most important subject of logic,
since ‘we can have knowledge of what is outside us only through the mediation of ideas in us.’”483
The term “ideas” can have a variety of significations in representationalism. It can be equivalent
to what we usually think of as an idea. It can refer to some kind of copy or some kind of entity that
the mind forms in response to the sense experience. Whatever name is given this entity, the notion
that the mind must form some representation that is the object of knowledge seems to be a
necessary consequence of two very basic facts. The world is composed of material objects that
have extension and take up space. The mind, on the other hand, in distinction from the brain, is
immaterial. Consequently, it is obviously impossible to get a material object into one’s mind. The
mind must somehow form a representation, some kind of mental entity, to stand for or to represent
to the mind the reality that exists outside the mind.
According to this scenario then, the goal of epistemology is to understand and describe how
the mind is able accurately to represent the world, and how it is possible for a perceiver to know
that he has accurately represented the world. As Richard Rorty puts it, a representationalist
epistemology views knowledge as “a matter of getting reality right.”484 In other words, a
representationalist epistemology attempts to explain how the mind makes a representation of the
world, and how the knower can be certain that this representation is an accurate representation.
Of course the problems with representationalist epistemologies have been discussed
throughout the history of philosophy, and in chapter 3 we have looked at some recent criticisms.
Briefly the problem arises from the fact that in a representationalist epistemology the mind will
always and only have a representation of reality, never reality itself. Reality will always be outside
the mind, and the representation will always be inside the mind. Consequently, there seems to be
no way for the mind to get reality and its representation together in order to compare them to see
whether the mind’s representation accurately represents the real world (see Figure 11).
Figure 11: Representationalism

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 Objectivity and Foundationalism Reconsidered
The critiques of Representationalism are almost always accompanied by or followed by a
critique and consequent rejection of foundationalism.485 In his introduction to the book,
Antifoundationalism Old and New, Tom Rockmore seeks to justify yet another volume on
antifoundationalism. This justification is necessary, according to Rockmore, because, “If
everyone, or nearly everyone, has switched to antifoundationalism, if most of the recalcitrants have
now been converted to this new religion, is there still something that needs to be said?”486 In an
effort to place the debate in its historical context, and to set the stage for the clarifications that the
various articles in his book will attempt to make, Rockmore gives rough definitions of both
foundationalism and antifoundationalism. Of foundationalism he says, “Roughly speaking, we can
understand foundationalism as the epistemological doctrine that there are or can be secure
foundations for knowledge.” He continues, “Conversely, antifoundationalism is, roughly speaking,
the view that there are and can be no secure foundations for knowledge, which in term implies the
denial that a grounded system is possible as well as the denial of the possibility of philosophy if
philosophy in general is held to depend on an epistemological ground.”487 It certainly follows that
if the mind contains only a representation of reality, and not reality itself, there is no “objective”
ground or foundation for knowledge. Although some form of foundationalism has been the
dominate view throughout the history of philosophy, antifoundationalism has gained supporters to
the point that, as has been noted, it has become the prevailing view.
As Moreland and Craig observe, “The main objection to classical foundationalism is that there
simply are no incorrigible (or infallible, certain, indubitable) beliefs. Critics of strong
foundationalism cite ways that alleged incorrigible beliefs could turn out to be corrigible or fallible
and use these counterexamples to argue against the existence of incorrigible beliefs.”488 Typical of
the modern approach, antifoundationalists generally either ignore or misrepresent an entire
tradition of epistemology and metaphysics in their characterization of foundationalism. For
example, Rockmore identifies “three main approaches to knowledge in the philosophical tradition
. . . intuitionism, foundationalism, and antifoundationalism.”489 Even in his further elaboration of
“three ideal-typical forms of foundationalism” Rockmore passes over this long standing
tradition.490 This is not surprising since the tendency to misrepresent or ignore classical or Thomist
foundationalism, or inappropriately to lump it into the Cartesian category, are all too common.
With respect to the question of the viability of classical foundationalism, an observation made
by Etienne Gilson is enlightening. In his book on the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas he said,
“problems raised by philosophers are part and parcel of the answers which they give to them.”491
This is certainly true in the case of the criticisms Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff have
raised against the foundationalism that they attribute to St. Thomas and modern philosophy. The
very formulation of their question assumes some critical philosophical positions which they then
impose upon their analysis of the foundationalism of Thomas. Consequently, when they provide
their criticisms and offer their solutions, their system naturally appears to satisfy the needs which
they have already covertly imported into the framing of the problem. In other words, they have
asked the question in such a way as to anticipate the answer supplied by their epistemology. The
criticisms of classical foundationalism by Plantinga and Wolterstorff are characteristic of the
misrepresentation of this tradition.

Classical Foundationalism According to Plantinga and Wolterstorff

In his little book titled, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, Nicholas Wolterstorff devotes a
chapter to an explanation of what he understands to be classical foundationalism. After a brief

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introduction and three definitional statements, Wolterstorff provides a conclusion in which he
defines foundationalism: “In sum, the foundationalist sees the house of genuine science as firmly
based on a foundation of certitudes which can be known noninferentially. He urges that we accept
or reject a given theory wholly on the basis of our warranted belief that the theory belongs or does
not belong to genuine science. Only if we thus govern our acceptance of theories can we move
towards eliminating prejudice, bias, and unjustified conjecture from the enterprise of
theorizing.”492
Alvin Plantinga concurs with Wolterstorff’s estimation of the nature of foundationalism and
asserts, “This picture [classical foundationalism] has had a long and distinguished career in the
history of philosophy, including among its adherents Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Leibniz,
Locke, and, to leap to the present, Professor Roderick Chisholm.”493 Plantinga asserts that a
foundationalist is one for whom “some propositions are properly or rightly basic . . . and some are
not. Those that are not, are rationally accepted only on the basis of evidence, where the evidence
must trace back, ultimately, to what is properly basic.”494 However, not any proposition qualifies
as properly or rightly basic. Propositions that are properly basic “are not accepted on the basis of
other propositions. I know the propositions in the foundations of my noetic structure, but not by
virtue of knowing other propositions; for these are the ones I start with.”495
Finally, Plantinga presents what he believes to be the foundationalism of Thomas Aquinas. He
asserts,

According to Aquinas, therefore, self-evident propositions and those evident to the senses belong in the
foundations. And when he speaks of propositions of the latter sort, he means such propositions as
(1) there’s a tree over there,
(2) there is an ashtray on my desk,
(3) that tree’s leaves have turned yellow, and
(4) this fender has rusted through.496

David Wisdo provides a helpful definition of Classical Foundationalism as discussed by the

Reformed Epistemologists. “According to the classical foundationalist [as understood by
Plantinga, et. al.], a person is within his or her epistemic rights to hold a belief only if the belief is
properly basic, that is, self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the senses, or if the belief can be
supported in some fashion by an appeal to beliefs that are basic.”497
With reference to belief in God, Plantinga asserts, “Aquinas and the evidentialist objector
concur, then, in holding that belief in God is rationally acceptable only if there is evidence for it—
only if, that is, it is probable with respect to some body of propositions that constitute evidence. .
. . The existence of God, furthermore, is not among the propositions that are properly basic; hence
a person is rational in accepting theistic belief only if he has evidence for it.”498 Since Plantinga
equates self-evidence and proper basicality in Aquinas, this means that Plantinga thinks that
Aquinas believes that the knowledge of the existence of God is not self-evident.

Misrepresentation of Aquinas by Plantinga and Wolterstorff

Misrepresentation of Faith and Knowledge in Aquinas
In his evaluation of Aquinas’ view of the knowledge of God, Plantinga juxtaposes knowledge
and faith. He says, “So natural knowledge of God [according to Aquinas] is possible. But the vast
majority of those who believe in God, he thinks, do not have knowledge of God’s existence but
must instead take it on faith.”499 In support of his reading of Aquinas he quotes a portion from

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Thomas’ Summa Theologica: “For the rational truth about God would have appeared to only a
few, and even so after a long time and mixed with many errors, whereas on knowing this depends
our whole welfare, which is in God (ST, Ia, I,1).”500
However, what Plantinga neglects to mention is that in this very article Aquinas identifies that
which is necessary for man’s salvation as “a knowledge revealed by God besides philosophical
science built up by human reason.”501 Contrary to Plantinga’s reading, Aquinas does not hold that
faith is not knowledge in some sense. Even the portion Plantinga quotes is quoted out of context,
which results in a misrepresentation. The larger context is provided below.

Hence it was necessary for the salvation of man that certain truths which exceed human reason should be made known [instrui]
to him by divine revelation. Even as regards those truths about God which human reason could have discovered, it was
necessary that man should be taught by a divine revelation; because the truth about God such as reason could discover, would
only be known by a few, and that after a long time, and with the admixture of many errors. Whereas man’s whole salvation,
which is in God, depends upon the knowledge of this truth. Therefore, in order that the salvation of men might be brought about
more fitly and more surely, it was necessary that they should be taught divine truths by divine revelation. It was therefore
necessary that besides philosophical science [philosophicas disciplinas] built up by reason, there should be a sacred science
[sacram doctrinam] learned through revelation.502

Plantinga sets up a distinction between “taking on faith” and “knowledge” such that the first is
believed on the basis of the veracity of God, while the latter is only known through demonstration.
But, as Thomas Russman points out, “This way of distinguishing between faith and knowledge is
clearly not Aquinas’ view, as is manifest from the very texts Plantinga cites in support of it.”503
For Aquinas, faith is indeed a source of knowledge. In fact, it is such knowledge that, since God
is the source of the truth that we believe, “there could be no more reliable source of information.”504

Misrepresentation of the Notion of Self-evidence in Aquinas

Along with Plantinga’s misunderstanding of Aquinas’ notion of the relation of faith and
knowledge is the misrepresentation of Aquinas’ notion of what it means for a proposition to be
self-evident, and concomitantly, Plantinga’s misrepresentation of Aquinas’ position on the self-
evidential status of belief in God. Plantinga asserts, “The existence of God, furthermore, is not
among the propositions that are properly basic; hence a person is rational in accepting theistic
belief only if he has evidence for it.”505 However, Aquinas asserts that there is a sense in which
the existence of God is self-evident: “For assuredly that God exists is, absolutely speaking, self-
evident, since what God is is His own being.”506
What can account for this discrepancy between what Plantinga reports about Aquinas and what
Aquinas actually says? Since Plantinga’s epistemology is essentially a representationalism, he is
naturally predisposed to define the notion of “self-evidence” in terms of the purely rational.
Plantinga’s examples of what he believes Aquinas would consider self-evident propositions are
presented on pages 55 and 56 of his article, “Reason and Belief in God.” As St. Thomas points out
in another place, “Those propositions are said to be self-evident that are known immediately upon
the knowledge of their terms.”507 Consequently, Henri DuLac observes,

Mr. Plantinga seems to regard “self-evident” propositions as simply “easily known.” It would be quite inaccurate to regard that
as St. Thomas’s view. St. Thomas is clear that a proposition per se notum is one in which the predicate is contained in the
definition of the subject. If one takes the propositions (13) to (23) that Plantinga has on pages 55 and 56, it seems to me that
St. Thomas would recognize only 19 (The whole is greater than the part) and 20 (Man is an animal) as per se nota.508

In fact, Plantinga flatly states that what constitutes these propositions as self-evident is that
“one simply sees it to be true upon grasping or understanding it.”509 As close as this sounds to what

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Aquinas describes in the earlier quote, there is a crucial distinction. For a proposition to be self-
evident for Thomas it is not simply a case that the proposition is immediately understood. For
example, the proposition “That door is brown,” is immediately understood when one simply sees
the door. However, the concept “brown” is not contained in the concept “door.” Consequently, for
Aquinas, this would not be a self-evident proposition.
But this should not lead to a similar error in understanding as that committed by Plantinga.
That is to say, the understanding of self-evident propositions for Aquinas is not the same as the
analytic a priori of Analytic Philosophy. Although for the analytic philosopher analytic a priori
propositions are necessary propositions, they are not derived from experience, nor do they say
anything about the real world. Without engaging in a long explanation of the notions involved,
suffice it to say that for Aquinas, analytic propositions can be necessary, they can be derived from
experience, and they can say something about the real world. This is precisely why Aquinas makes
a distinction between propositions that are self-evident in themselves, and also to us, and those
propositions that are self-evident in themselves and not to us. How can Aquinas make such a
distinction since the idea of anything being self-evident seems to be a term describing a relation of
knowledge between the knower and what is known? In other words, the term “self-evident” is
specifically applied to things that are or are not evident. But, to be evident is to be known, and the
act of knowing is an act of a knower, not of the known.
On the contrary, however, to define the idea of being “evident” strictly in terms of the rational
capacity of a knower is a decidedly modern approach. For Aquinas, knowledge is not primarily a
rational exercise. Rather, it is a metaphysical event. For St. Thomas, knowledge is a function of
the metaphysics of the knower and the known. It is the nature of both the knower and the known
that forms the basis for the act of knowledge. Aquinas’ definition of knowledge would be
paradigmatically different from Plantinga’s definition. For Aquinas the definition of knowledge is
when the knower and the known become one. Not so for Plantinga.
In support of these observations is the tacit acceptance by Plantinga of what he identifies as
the “ancient and honorable tradition [that] knowledge is justified true belief.”510 This definition of
knowledge is decidedly modern and is predicated on the Cartesian assumption of the bifurcation
of mind and matter. The characteristic formulation of the question of knowledge in the modern era
is, “How do you know if the thing in the mind is an accurate representation of the thing in reality?”
The diagram in Figure 12: Epistemic Justification illustrates this approach.

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 Figure 12: Epistemic Justification

In his article titled “‘Reformed’ Epistemology,” Thomas A. Russman entertains the possibility
that Plantinga and Wolterstorff “are influenced . . . by modern skepticism.”511 He makes the
following observations.

At first it may seem unlikely that Plantinga and Wolterstorff are influenced in this way by modern skepticism. Both seem to
believe that our sensory perceptions are to be relied upon. But why do they believe this? Perhaps, like Descartes and Leibniz,
they believe this only because of a prior belief in God, a God who cannot deceive and who therefore underwrites the harmony
between subject and object that we call knowledge. Descartes and Leibniz claimed to arrive at knowledge of God’s existence
by “proof” — while Plantinga and Wolterstorff claim to arrive at it by direct intuition; but all of them claim that the source of
such knowledge is ultimately innate.512

Unfortunately for modern epistemologists, the notion that knowledge is justified, true belief,
this ancient and honorable tradition, has come under devastating attack from one among their
ranks. In 1963 a professor of philosophy named Edmund L. Gettier published a short article in the
journal Analysis entitled, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” In this article Gettier posed two
scenarios as counter examples to this definition of knowledge that shook contemporary
epistemology to its very core. Gettier’s scenarios are rather long, so I will present a comparable
scenario that is shorter in order to illustrate the problem.
Suppose you are driving in your car, and you see a cow in a field. When you arrive at the place
where the cow is, you discover that it was in fact not a cow, but was simply a life-size, cut-out
picture of a cow. However, immediately behind this cut-out is a real cow, in the same field. The
question is, did you know there was a cow in the field? (1) It was true that a cow was in the field.
(2) You believed there was a cow in the field. (3) You were justified in believing there was a cow

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in the field. But, in fact you did not know there was a cow in the field even though it was justified
true belief.
Since Gettier articulated these counter examples, contemporary epistemologists have
endeavored, unsuccessfully, to overcome this problem. Consequently, the skepticism about
knowledge proposed by Gettier’s counter examples has yet to be dissipated. Jonathan Dancy
asserts that there are three possible routes to take to respond to Gettier:

1 find some means to show that the counter-examples [of Gettier] do not work;
2 accept the counter-examples and search for a supplement to the tripartite analysis [justified, true belief] which excludes them;
3 accept the counter-examples and alter the tripartite analysis to suit rather than adding anything to it.513

In his article on positive epistemic status, Plantinga recognizes the problem that Gettier’s
counter-examples pose. He says, “Knowledge, so we thought for untold generations, is justified
true belief; and even in this enlightened post-Gettier era, we still think justification and knowledge
intimately related.”514 In a footnote to this statement Plantinga declares that “Edmund Gettier
showed us the error of our ways,”515 that is, the error of defining knowledge as justified true belief.
But Plantinga does not therefore reject the notion of knowledge as justified, true belief. Rather,
Plantinga takes Dancy’s second route and attempts to find some other ingredient that is necessary
for knowledge. Plantinga indicates this when he says, “What is it that distinguishes knowledge
from mere true belief? What is this elusive quality or quantity enough of which, together with truth
and belief, is sufficient for knowledge? Call that quantity, whatever it is, ‘warrant’.”516 Knowledge,
for the Reformed epistemologist, is still justified true belief. Only for Plantinga, justification has
been converted to warrant—warranted, true belief. For Plantingas, then, warrant is what justifies
belief. In light of Plantinga’s acceptance of this basic notion of knowledge, and in light of
Russman’s observations about the apparent influence of skepticism on Plantinga and Wolterstorff,
it seems very likely that Russman’s evaluation is an accurate appraisal. As Russman goes on to
point out,

Now, if this is the kind of thinking that motivates Plantinga and Wolterstorff, it clarifies a great deal. Their realism about sense
perception is of a distinctly modern sort. It takes modern skepticism seriously and then claims to find a way around it by
invoking the divine veracity. The latter is known by direct intuition, not dependent upon the reliability of the senses—thus
avoiding circularity. Such preoccupations would explain their strong preference for innate ideas as the basis for belief in God
and the strong dissatisfaction with the evidence of the senses as a basis. Nothing else we have discovered appears to explain
adequately the strength of these views as held by Plantinga and Wolterstorff. 517

The upshot of this is, Plantinga and Wolterstorff are operating on the basis of a
representationalist epistemology. This approach necessarily involves the bifurcation of what is
known from extra-mental reality. In a revealing comment, Plantinga states, “upon being appeared
to in the familiar way, I find myself holding the belief that there is a large tree before me;”518
Why then has Plantinga misunderstood Aquinas’ notion of self-evident propositions? Henry B.
Veatch makes some pertinent observations on this very point. After briefly tracing the shift in the
notion of the nature of self-evident propositions from the Thomistic to the Cartesian and ultimately
Kantian notion of Analytic truths, Veatch explains,

And so returning, then, to Al Plantinga and his Calvinist-Analyst cohorts, as well as to that conception of theirs of self-evident
truths, that we found to be so different from Aquinas’ conception, may we not now see that Plantinga’s conception of self-
evident truths simply reflects that long and dubious heritage which present-day Analytic Philosophy has arrogated to itself from
Descartes and from Kant? Self-evident truths, in short, are nowadays conceived, for the most part quite uncritically, as we
would think, as being purely a priori truths, and not based on experience at all; and, likewise, they are conceived as being truths
that are little more than purely verbal and, for that reason, as not in any way informative as regards things in the world at all. 519

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 Contrary to the claims of Plantinga and Wolterstorff, Thomas Aquinas simply is not an
advocate of the foundationalism which these Reformed epistemologists describe and criticize. As
Henry Veatch points out, “. . . St. Thomas never interprets the Foundationalist Principle as being
the sole criterion of the rationality of our beliefs, be this either in matters of religious belief or in
philosophy.” As St. Thomas himself says, “As stated above (1, 4;2, 1), the believer’s intellect
assents to that which he believes, not because he sees it either in itself, or by resolving it to first
self-evident principles [per se visa], but because his will commands his intellect to assent.”520 The
so called Classical Foundationalism which Plantinga and Wolterstorff reject is ultimately the
rationalism of Descartes, not the scholasticism of St. Thomas. Additionally, Thomas does not
believe that, even for scientific knowledge, that non-basic propositions must necessarily derive
from, be inferred from, or be deduced from basic propositions. Once again Cartesian rationalism
has been attributed to Thomistic scholasticism.

Objectivity and Relativism

Antifoundationalism seems ultimately to introduce relativism. If there are no certain
foundations for knowledge, if there are no indubitable truths, then relativism seems to follow
necessarily. Harold I. Brown made the connection between relativism and antifoundationalism
when he said, “the argument [the charge that relativism is incoherent] has no force against any
consistent relativism, even the extreme relativism of Protagoras. Its apparent cogency derives from
a tacit acceptance of the absolutist assumption that we are justified in making a knowledge claim
only if it is based on an unquestionable foundation.”521 In other words, because there are no
indubitable foundations, relativism is irrefutable. The fact that Brown has a Cartesian or
deductivist foundationalism in mind rather than the foundationalism of St. Thomas is revealed in
his characterization that, in foundationalism, “knowledge requires an indubitable foundation and
that knowledge is developed by building on that foundation.”522 Although we have not discussed
the Thomistic brand of foundationalism in detail, we have pointed out that it does not hold to this
deductivist relationship between knowledge and foundations.
A major aspect of the current debate about objectivity concerns the opposition between
objectivity and relativism, and it seems that relativism is intimately associated with
antifoundationalism. In a discussion on the role of the reader in interpretation, Silva points out,
“For proponents of ‘reader-response theory,’ however—at least in its more extreme forms—there
is no such thing as an objective text. Insofar as every reader brings an interpretive framework to
the text, to that extent every reader generates a new meaning and thus creates a new text.”523 This
brief description highlights an aspect of the “framework” approach to interpretation that at once
reveals its tendency toward relativism, and, at the same time, manifests the inescapable necessity
of an objective reference point.
The claim that each reader generates a “new” meaning is intelligible only relative to some other
“meaning” against which the “new” meaning is understood to be “new.” If this claim is simply a
claim that each reader’s “new” meaning is different from another interpreter’s “older” meaning,
the claim is trivial. However, as Silva points out, the extreme reader-response position makes this
claim as a counter example to the claim of an “objective” meaning. But if there is no objective
meaning, then it would not be possible to measure the new meaning in order to discover its
newness, i.e., lack of or opposition to an objective meaning. The only way to measure the
supposedly new meaning as new is if the old, objective, meaning were known and employed as a
standard of measure to measure the relative newness of each new meaning.

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 If the old, objective meaning is known, then it is not the case that there is “no such thing as an
objective text.” In fact, the objective text must exist and be susceptible of being known in order
for the claim to “newness” to have any meaning. In other words, framework relativism is
completely unintelligible apart from some absolute standard of measure. The point is that as soon
as an absolute standard of measure is admitted, framework relativism is refuted.
This kind of criticism of relativism is not new. Harvey Siegel observes that relativism is almost
as old a philosophy itself. As he points out, “Epistemological relativism has been defended by a
variety of thinkers stretching back at least as far as Protagoras. For just as long, however, others
have thought the doctrine to be incoherent because self-refuting. This is perhaps the most
fundamental challenge faced by the relativist.”524
Siegel asserts that epistemological relativism undermines the very notion of rightness:

Put in terms of ER [Epistemological Relativism], the UVNR [Undermines the Very Notion of Rightness] argument can be cast
as follows. Assume ER to be a rationally justifiable position. Then there are good reasons for holding ER. But good reasons
cannot be biased or non-neutral or arbitrary or idiosyncratic . . . Therefore, if ER is rationally justifiable, there must be some
non-relative, neutral (with respect to the presuppositions of relativists and non-relativists) framework or ground from which
we can make that judgment. Thus ER, which denies the possibility of such a framework, is incorrect. In short, if relativism is
rationally justifiable, it must have a non-relativistic ground, which possibility it denies. Thus ER, if true, is not rationally
justifiable, since if ER is true there can be no neutral ground from which to assess the rational justifiability of any claim,
including ER itself. Moreover, if ER is (true and) rationally justifiable, then it is false, for the rational defense of ER requires
the sort of non-relativistic ground which ER itself denies. Thus ER is either not rationally justifiable, or false. The assertion and
defense of ER is thus self-refuting, and so incoherent.525

Siegel’s argument applies not only to the initial assertions of relativism, but to the efforts to
defend relativism against this kind of attack. Relativists counter this approach by claiming that the
absolutist assumes his absolutism and therefore begs the question. But it is not accurate to say that
the absolutist assumes absolutism. Rather an absolute standard of measure is simply undeniable.
As soon as the relativist undertakes to establish his position as true, he assumes an absolute
standard. It is the undeniability of an absolute that defeats the relativist, not a question-begging
assumption on the part of the absolutist.
Jack W. Meiland is a theorist who claims that relativism is not self-refuting.526 In his article
entitled, “Concepts of Relative Truth,” Meiland acknowledges that, on the basis of the
absoluteness of truth, the relativist thesis succumbs to the self-referential criticism.527 Meiland
argues, however, that the concept of relative truth has been misinterpreted by the absolutist. He
claims that the absolutist employs “a two-term relation between statements . . . on the one hand
and facts . . . on the other,” whereas the relativist employs “a three-term relation between
statements, the world, and a third term which is either persons, world views, or historical and
cultural situations.”528
Siegel presents a lengthy analysis of Meiland’s claims and shows how Meiland’s three-term
relation cannot admit a distinction between the world and the third term. What can distinguish the
“world” from “the world as perceived by the relativist”? If the relativist admits an absolute
“world,” then he has admitted what he says is impossible. If, however, there is no “absolute” world,
but only a “world as perceived by the relativist,” then there is only a two-term, not a three-term,
relation; and, as Siegel points out, “Meiland has not shown that his conception of relative truth
avoids reliance on the absolute conception, and so he has not shown that his analysis avoids the
self-refutation problem it is designed to avoid.”529
Ultimately, Siegel demonstrates that any attempt of the relativist to assert his position as true
vis-à-vis the absolutist employs a self-referential problem. As he summarizes,

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 unless the relativist can say why a relative truth which is true-for-her is superior to or more worthy of belief than a relative truth
which is true-for-someone-else—which she can’t, since, in embracing relativism, she has given up the very notion of worthiness
of belief—then adoption of one relative truth over another on the grounds that the adopted truth is true for the person doing the
adopting is arbitrary. p’s truth-for-Jones is not in any way superior to not-p’s truth-for-Smith—even for Jones. Thus the
relativist can adopt beliefs (and act) only arbitrarily. Either arbitrariness or impotence—these are the sole options for the
relativist.530

Harvey Siegel has demonstrated that relativism does not offer a viable alternative to
absolutism, nor does it offer a substantive objection to the possibility of objectivity. Seemingly,
there must be at least some absolute, objective truths for any claim to be true. And, of course, those
who assert that objectivity is not possible are claiming that it is objectively true that objectivity is
not possible.

Objectivity and Historicism

Gadamer’s Historicist Thesis
As we observed in chapter 2, the relationship between objectivity and historicism arises from
the nature of historicism. Grondin’s description of historicism, namely, that all truths are
dependent on the historical context of the one asserting the truth, is pointing to the notion that
historical phenomena can be understood only in terms of one’s own historical situatedness, or in
terms of one’s own place within the flow of historical development. But if any phenomenon can
be understood only in terms of its own historical situatedness, this would imply that the historical
situatedness of the interpreter binds him to his own place within the flow of historical development.
Therefore the interpreter cannot lay claim to an a-historical, transcendent perspective. If the
interpreter cannot lay claim to an a-historical, transcendent perspective, then the claim that no
historical phenomenon can be understood apart from its own historical situatedness cannot itself
be an a-historical, transcendent claim about historical knowledge. The historicist assertion turns
out to be just another instance of self-defeating relativism. The self-referential nature of the claim
of historicism indicates its self-destructive nature.
Gadamer strongly objects to arguments such as these which appeal to a self-referential problem
in historicism:

However clearly one demonstrates the inner contradictions of all relativist views, it is as Heidegger has said: all these victorious
arguments have something of the attempt to bowl one over. However cogent they may seem, they still miss the main point. In
making use of them one is proved right, and yet they do not express any superior insight of value. That the thesis of skepticism
or relativism refutes itself to the extent that it claims to be true is an irrefutable argument. But what does it achieve? The
reflective argument that proves successful here rebounds against the arguer, for it renders the truth value of reflection suspect.
It is not the reality of skepticism or of truth-dissolving relativism but the truth claim of all formal argument that is affected. 531

What Gadamer is saying is that, notwithstanding the inevitable relativism, historicism is

absolutely and indubitably inescapable, and that this is a-historically true for all people at all times
in all cultures. Gadamer appears to have access to an a-historical, transcendent perspective on
historicism that he disallows for everyone else. What follows from this brand of historicism is ably
articulated by Georgia Warnke: “
The claim is that we are always involved in interpretations and that we can have no access to
anything like ‘the truth’ about justice, the self, reality or the ‘moral law.’ Our notions of these
‘truths’ are rather conditioned by the cultures to which we belong and the historical circumstances
in which we find ourselves. Hence, we must face the fact of our finitude and the utterly contingent
character of our efforts to understand.”532

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 Nevertheless, since the claims of historicism are indeed self-refuting, and since, as Gadamer
acknowledges, “the thesis of skepticism or relativism refutes itself to the extent that it claims to be
true is an irrefutable argument,” then the implications of historicism do not follow, and absolute
truth, including absolute concepts of justice, the self, reality and moral law, does exist and is
accessible by the finite mind. In fact, the existence of absolute truth is asserted by those who
advocate the absolute truth of historicism.
Gail Soffer has demonstrated the same self-referential problem with Gadamer’s historicism.
As she asserts, “. . . [Gadamer’s] philosophy remains mired in the epistemological paradox, at once
asserting and denying the possibility of knowledge of the unconditional. If the historicity thesis is
true, then it is impossible for us to have knowledge of unconditional truths, and so of the historicity
thesis.”533
Additionally, Soffer evaluates the “meaning” of the historicity thesis and concludes that
“although it is clear that the thesis asserts [that] all knowledge is historically conditioned, the
language of ‘conditioning’ is highly ambiguous, and some interpretations of ‘conditioning’ are
wholly compatible with a traditional conception of objectivity.”534 Soffer points out that
contemporary concepts of mathematics could not have been formulated by more ancient cultures,
but this does not obviate the objectivity of the current formulations. She asserts,

However, although historically conditioned, this knowledge remains “objective’ in the following two senses: (1) once a given
theorem becomes accessible at a local time and place, it can be reproduced with essentially the same meaning across a wide
variety of present and future historical contexts (reproducibility of meaning); and (2) its validity is henceforth a matter of trans-
historical, intersubjective consensus: if mathematicians assign any truth-value at all to a given theorem, it is the same one
(reproducibility of validity-assignment).535

Gadamer’s strong sense of historical conditioning is an effort to reject the positivistic approach
to the human sciences, and yet this very rejection is supposed to follow from the historicity thesis.
This is clearly circular, and begs the question. Gadamer spends the first lengthy part of this treatise
in Truth and Method tracing the historical background that has led up to the monumental
achievement of the realization of historicism. But, if there is no a-historical knowledge, why does
Gadamer pretend that his report on these historical developments approach the truth about what
really happened? Isn’t Gadamer’s own study of history simply his own historically bound view
from his own historical situatedness? Yet he presents it as if this was the true and accurate account
of the history. Gadamer’s own rejection of positivistic approaches is asserted as if it were the
historically unconditioned, objective truth about the human sciences. This is clearly self-
referentially incoherent.

The Facts about Brute Facts

Another aspect of historicity is the oft touted claim, “There are no brute facts.” The Oxford
Companion to Philosophy asserts that the notion of “brute fact” has two related uses.

The first and more common one signifies the terminus of a series of explanations which is not itself further explicable. Thus,
for example, it is often said that while the behaviour of matter can be explained by reference to laws of nature the existence
and character of those laws is itself a ‘brute fact’. The second and more technical use indicates an underlying situation partly
constitutive of the truth of a claim. The expression was first used in this sense by Anscombe to characterize the status of facts
relative to higher-level descriptions. A set of facts S is ‘brute’ relative to a description D when the truth of D is constituted by
the holding of those facts in a certain context and under normal conditions.536

It is the first and more popular use that is significant here. A “brute fact” would be a fact that
would be understood to be the same for every perceiver, regardless of his or her presuppositions

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or world view. Brian Neal Baird is a typical proponent of the rejection of “brute facts.” As he
explains, “There are no ‘brute’ facts. That is, there are no completely objective pieces of
information in the world which are free from interpretation.”537
One cannot be constrained from asking the obvious question, Is it a brute fact that there are not
brute facts? Ultimately, the notion that there are no facts that have meaning apart from a specific
world view is simply another instance of self-defeating relativism. For Baird to assert this is either
only his interpretation from his own world view, in which case it is not universally or absolutely
true, or it is universally and absolutely true and thus self-referentially problematic. Baird declares
that it is just a brute fact that there are no brute facts.
Cornelius Van Til adamantly advocated the idea that there are no such “brute” facts. According
to Van Til,

Two main concepts emerge as a result of man attempting to be as God. The first is that man is viewed as the ultimate reference
point for interpreting all of life. He interprets and gives meaning to all facts. In order for man to consider himself autonomous,
there must be no controlling plan for the universe, therefore he invents the idea of chance. By his own logic, he determines
what is possible or impossible in this world of chance. The second concept is that facts are treated as “brute” facts. They are
uncreated, unrelated, and controlled only by chance. They have no meanings or prior interpretations attached to them.538

Van Til is asserting that “facts,” by themselves, offer no meaning, but must be interpreted
within some “meaning” system, and that meaning system must be God’s revelation. “The issue
between believers and non-believers in Christian theism,” according to Van Til, “cannot be settled
by a direct appeal to ‘facts’ or ‘laws’ whose nature and significance is already agreed upon by both
parties to the debate.”539 This is because, according to Van Til, “fact” and “laws” have
intelligibility only within the Christian world view, and “the existence of the God of Christian
theism and the conception of his counsel as controlling all things in the universe is the only
presupposition which can account for the uniformity of nature which the scientist needs.”540
Van Til admits that this “presuppositional approach” indicates that “all reasoning is, in the
nature of the case, circular reasoning.”541 But not only is Van Til’s reasoning circular, it is self-
defeating. Either the meaning of the proposition is univocal for all world views or it is not. If it is
not univocal for all world views, then it is not a universally true statement. It may then be a
statement that only has meaning within the world view of the one espousing the claim. The
seemingly inevitable and undeniable conclusion is that if it is not universally true that there are no
brute facts, then it is true that there are some brute facts (Aristotle’s Square of Opposition).
Additionally, to require that a world view be tested by the criteria that are only meaningful
within an opposing world view is illicit. Moreover, Van Til asserts that the Christian world view
is the only world view that accounts for “the uniformity of nature which the scientist needs.”542
However, whose definition of “uniformity” is Van Til employing in order to judge the claims of
the non-Christian world view? The non-Christian scientist may not subscribe to the same principle
of uniformity that Van Til sees as necessary for scientists. Van Til is employing the concept of
uniformity as a “brute fact”—as if it had a univocal meaning in every world view. But this is
precisely what he says cannot be the case. From the non-Christian world view, according to Van
Til, the concept of uniformity would have no meaning. If it has no meaning for the non-Christian,
then the non-Christian scientist does not see any reasons to think that he or she needs it, and for
the non-Christian philosopher there is no logical or moral necessity to the charge that his world
view does not account for Van Til’s notion of uniformity.
In fact, it seems that Van Til knows that the concept of uniformity is the same for all world
views. That is why he can successfully and rightly require the non-Christian to give an account of

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it. This is so, however, only because in fact there are some brute facts which are meaningful in
terms of the nature of reality. In arguing his position, Van Til offers an example: “We cannot prove
the existence of beams underneath a floor if by proof we mean that they must be ascertainable in
the way that we can see the chairs and tables of the room. But the very idea of a floor as the support
of tables and chairs requires the idea of beams that are underneath.”543 But upon the basis of whose
“idea” of a floor does he require the idea of beams? His own? Only his own? Does he not expect
other Christians and non-Christians to agree with this analogy and understand it? Is there some
universally meaningful notion of “support of tables and chairs” that “requires the idea of beams
that are underneath”? This is precisely the definition of “brute” facts which Van Til claims are
unavailable. Not to labor the point, but it is certainly possible to “prove” or “disprove” the
existence of beams simply by pealing back part or all of the floor. Beams under the floor can
potentially be viewed just like chairs and tables are viewed. If Van Til is asserting that the beams
cannot be proven to exist like chairs are known to exist since we don’t have to “peal back” anything
to see the chairs, this is certainly an unjustified restriction on the notion of proof. Van Til has
simply defined his argument into existence.544
Van Til himself acknowledges and employs the universally applicable laws of reason. In
reviewing the arguments of Charles Hodge, Van Til asserts, “First he shows that reason is
necessary as a tool for the reception of revelation. About this point there can be little cause for
dispute.”545
Later, in evaluating the claim that the only way Christians can explain evil is to interpret it in
light of the story of the fall, Van Til asserts, “The Christian finds, further, that logic agrees with
the story. Human logic agrees with the story, because it derives its meaning from the story.”546 So,
whether one accepts the story or not, Van Til believes that human reason is the same for all humans
because human reason for all humans derives from the same source.
Therefore, according to Van Til’s own reasoning, the existence and nature of human reason is
a brute fact that is not subject to the world views of those who do not believe. Seemingly, however,
Van Til would not admit that this is the case. Unbelievers are, according to Van Til’s position,
simply rejecting the facts, or misinterpreting the facts. Nevertheless, the facts are the facts,
regardless of whether one believes or not. If this is not what Van Til is arguing, then his argument
turns out to be relevant only to his own world view.547 He cannot legitimately require opposing
world views to meet the criteria that have meaning only in his own world view. The claim that
there are no brute facts is simply another instance of relativism that succumbs to the critique of
self-destruction and self-refutation as do all other forms of absolute relativism. And if relativism
is refuted in all its forms, the objectivity remains a possibility.
Figure 13: Duck-Rabbit

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 Objectivity and Theory-Ladenness
One does not need to be a rocket surgeon to identify the same self-referential problem in the
claims to perspectivism and relativism in natural science due to the theory-ladenness of
observation. The simple fact that observation is theory-laden is insufficient to disqualify the
possibility that observation can be objective. In fact, it must have been someone’s observation of
observation that led them to conclude that observation is theory-laden. But, if observation is
theory-laden, then the observation that observation is theory-laden is itself theory-laden and not
necessarily true of all observation. The assertion that all observation is theory-laden just happens
to be the result of the theory-laden observation of the person who made this claim. To claim that
all observation is theory-laden and therefore not objective is simply self-defeating.
George Couvalis describes the ever popular duck-rabbit drawing that is used to illustrate how
one’s point of view dictates what one sees (Figure 13).548 The observer can view the drawing and
see a duck or a rabbit, and this is supposed to illustrate that what one sees depends upon one’s
point of view, or one sees what one wishes or expects to see. But, as Couvalis points out, “No
matter what we expect to see or want to see, we cannot get the duck-rabbit drawing to look like
the Parthenon, the Sydney Opera House or a teacup. We cannot even make it look like a real duck
as opposed to a drawing of a duck.”549
Another illustration that Couvalis critiques that is supposed to demonstrate that things are not
as they appear is the famous Müller-Lyer illusion. This illusion is used to illustrate how our
knowledge and preconceptions shape our perceptions (Figure 14).550

Figure 14: The Müller-Lyer Illusion

Because the lines appear to be different lengths, theorists conclude that our perceptions are
affected by our knowledge and preconceptions, but things are not as they appear. The fact that our
perception, in this instance, has misled us to conclude that the lines are different lengths is proven
by the simple act of measuring the lines. However, when someone undertakes to measure the lines,
are they not employing the very same instruments of perception that led to the mistaken conclusion
in the first place? In other words, the very same eyes that mistakenly perceived the lines as different
lengths are the very same eyes that are now supposed to give us the true picture in the process of
measurement. But, if our knowledge and preconditions unavoidably impact our perceptions, would
they not also impact our perceptions of the measuring tools?
The Müller-Lyer illusion is just that. The results of this illustration are not as they appear.
Rather than providing an illustration of how our perception is impacted by our knowledge and
preconceptions, the illustration serves to demonstrate that our false perceptions can be corrected
by using the very same apparatus of perception that is supposed to be suspect. As Couvalis again

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points out, “whether we believe (hold to the theory that) the two lines are equal or unequal when
we observe the Müller-Lyer diagram, they continue to look unequal. This means that our beliefs
cannot be causing them to look unequal.”551 In other words, regardless what we know or what we
preconceive, the lines still look unequal in length even after we measure them and know that they
are not uneven. If our beliefs affected our perceptions, once we measure the lines and come to
believe that they are not unequal, why do they continue to look unequal?
These examples are designed to illustrate the theory-ladenness of observation. As Moreland
points out, “antirealists have criticized the correspondence theory of truth and/or the notion of a
theory-independent external world to which we have access. Sometimes this latter point is
supported by the claim that all observations are theory laden, there is no direct, theory-independent
access to the external world, and thus the realist notion of such a world is either unintelligible or
irrelevant.”552 But, the charge of theory-ladenness is presented as absolutely true and not itself
theory-laden.
The notion of theory-ladenness as ultimately constitutive of the scientific enterpriseby forming
a presuppositional framework for normal science, as Thomas Kuhn has been interpreted as
asserting, has been criticized by Harvey Siegel. As Siegel points out, even the Kuhnian tradition
proposes the fact that “the research program defined by a presuppositional framework occasionally
turns up anomalies, and that an anomaly sometimes turns out to be a ‘genuine counter instance’
which forces the research community to alter (at least) part of its presuppositional framework.”553
But, as Siegel goes on to point out, the fact that anomalies provide genuine counter instances
seriously undermines the strength of the theory-ladenness argument as an argument against
objectivity. Siegel’s criticism, using Harold Brown’s formulation as characteristic of this
approach, is long, but important.

Following Kuhn, Brown argues that the research program defined by a presuppositional framework occasionally turns up
anomalies, and that an anomaly sometimes turns out to be a “genuine counter-instance” which forces the research community
to alter (at least) part of its presuppositional framework. The fact that “the search for truth” can make researchers realize that
one of their presuppositions is false raises a difficulty for Brown. For he holds both that

(1) Presuppositions organize and structure scientific research, and

(2) Research may force the abandonment (as false) of presuppositions. Presuppositions are fallible.

The difficulty is: are these two claims compatible? It seems, prima facie, that they are not. For, as we have seen,
presuppositions structure scientific research in the important sense that they provide criteria of adequacy by which we evaluate
proposed solutions recognized as such by the research program delineated by a presuppositional framework. Thus,
presuppositions determine how we evaluate evidence for or against hypotheses being investigated. But if presuppositions
determine not only what counts as evidence, but also the evaluation of the evidence, it is difficult to see how evidence could
cast negative light on a presupposition - for if it can, in what sense can the presupposition be said to determine the evaluation
of evidence? If (1) and (2) are not outright incompatible, (2) must at least greatly limit the force of (1), since the scientist can
call into question and evaluate (according to presupposition-neutral criteria of evaluation of presuppositions?) the
presuppositions that organize and structure, and so determine, the scientists’ research program. Indeed, it is not clear what, on
Brown’s view, a genuine counter-instance to a presupposition can be, since what counts as an instance is determined by the
very presupposition countered.
The general question raised here, then, is this: given the overarching role of presuppositions in structuring scientific research,
how is it possible for such research to offer evidence which forces the abandonment (as false) of these very presuppositions?
Does that possibility not necessitate the existence of framework-neutral criteria of evaluation of presuppositions by which
frameworks can be evaluated? It is not clear how it can be held that evidence can force the abandonment of presuppositions
without weakening the power of the presuppositions to determine the evaluation of that evidence.554

Siegel’s point is that the theory-ladenness perspective does not prove that there is no theory
neutral access to the world. In fact, the very notion that anomalies can be true counter examples
counts on the very theory of neutrality that is supposedly called into question. Once again, the
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relativism that is supposedly supported by the claim that observation is conducted within self-
contained theoretical frameworks and therefore prevents direct access to data proves itself either
to be a theory laden framework and therefore does not have direct access to the data, or it counts
on the very theory neutral access that it seeks to deny.555

The Root of the Problem

All such claims against objectivity have a common thread. They all assert that the perspective,
preconceptions, world view, preunderstanding, presuppositions, or what ever other designations
are used, necessarily predispose the observer or the interpreter to perceive in a manner that is
molded, directed, or impacted by these preexisting conditions. The unavoidable impact of these
preexisting conditions that necessarily predispose observation or interpretation according to one’s
point of view is due to the fact that no one has direct access to the world. Our contact with the
world is always in terms of how the world is represented to a knowing mind. In other words, the
root problem in all attacks on objectivity is a representationalist epistemology.
A representationalist epistemology asserts that the knower is able to contact the world only by
means of some re-presentation of the world to the mind. It is painfully obvious, so it is believed,
that since the world is composed of corporeal bodies extended in space, and since the mind is
incorporeal, that it is absurd to hold that the material world is able to enter the immaterial mind of
a knower. Consequently, what the mind must do is to form some kind of representation of the
world. This representation may be a concept, an idea, a picture, or a word. Regardless of what it is
called, there is something in the mind that is supposed to re-present the world to the mind. The
world is always outside the mind, and what is in the mind is a representation of that world.
Of course the thorn in the flesh of this view has been the problem of justifying the claim to
knowledge on the basis of a representational epistemology. If what is in the mind is a
representation of the world, and if the world is always outside the mind, how can we know that
our representation is accurate? Additionally, the Achilles’ Heel of this approach is the self-
referential problem that plagues all versions of relativism. Whether the relativism is based on the
claim that there is no direct access to the world, that these are no certain foundations—whether
our own historical situatedness prevents a trans-historical perspective, or whether all observation
is theory-laden—these proposals assumes the very objectivity and direct access to the data that is
emphatically denied.

Summary and Conclusion

In the contemporary literature, the question of objectivity is primarily discussed in terms of a
notion of the nature of science. One reason objectivity is discussed in terms of natural science is
that modern thought holds scientific knowledge as the standard by which all other disciplines are
judged. As Thomas Nagel describes,

Philosophy is also infected by a broader tendency of contemporary intellectual life: scientism. Scientism is actually a special
kind of idealism, for it puts one type of human understanding in charge of the universe and what can be said about it. At its
most myopic it assumes that everything there is must be understandable by the employment of scientific theories like those we
have developed to date—physics and evolutionary biology are the current paradigms—as if the present age were not just
another in the series.556

At the outset of the Enlightenment, the notion of science as a neutral, disinterested approach
was considered the best if not the only approach to certainty. The advances in knowledge that were
being achieved in the natural sciences led many philosophers to develop systems patterned after

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the scientific method. Descartes attempted to develop a science of knowledge based on the method
of geometry. Kant attempted to develop a science of knowledge based on the method of Newtonian
physics. Comte attempted to develop a science of humanity based on a method composed of the
combination of the methods from all natural sciences. The whole movement of Logical Positivism
is an effort to apply the methodology of natural science to philosophy.
Since Descartes and Newton, modern natural science has understood the constitution of extra-
mental reality to be bodies extended in space. Consequently, when philosophers attempted to
discover how it is possible for the mind to know reality directly, it was obvious that, since the mind
is incorporeal and extra-mental reality is corporeal, that it would be necessary to construct some
scenario by which a philosopher could assert that the mind accurately represents the extra-mental
world. Of course, the extra-mental world could never come to exist in the mind precisely because
of the bifurcation between the corporeal and the incorporeal—body and mind. So, what was in the
mind had to be construed as some kind of non-physical, incorporeal representation of the physical.
However, as soon as one entertained this bifurcation, it became impossible ever to test whether
what was in the mind accurately represented what was in extra-mental reality. Since the extra-
mental was always extra-mental, and the representation of it was always in the mind, there was no
means of bringing the two together for the purposes of comparison. Every encounter with the extra-
mental always resulted in another representation that was likewise without epistemic justification.
Consequently, the notion of objectivity became a notion of somehow providing the necessary
epistemic justification for the mental representations. Even the popular definitions of “objectivity”
are constructed in terms of the epistemic. For example, in his article on “objectivity” in A
Companion to Metaphysics, Harold I. Brown asserts, “The root idea involved in the concept of
objectivity is that an objective evaluation of the truth value of a proposition is independent of the
preferences or whims of those who carry out that evaluation.”557 The objectivity of a proposition,
as this is understood in modern philosophy, has been some form of representationalism. This
notion has also derived from the Enlightenment view of the nature of natural science in that the
natural science of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries assumed the mind/body distinction
articulated by Descartes.
What seems to have emerged from the preceding analysis is that, so long as the question of
objectivity is approached along the lines of representationalist epistemology, no hope of an
objectivity for understanding seems possible. Notwithstanding the failure of the representationalist
approach to discover the foundations of knowledge, theorists continue to talk about foundations.
They refer to these foundations in terms of presuppositions or prejudices or preunderstanding. The
problem of the hermeneutical circle involves the very question of the relationship between the
interpreter’s preunderstanding and the meaning of the text.
The preceding analysis seems also to have indicated the real possibility of a set of objective,
transcendental presuppositions that allows for an entrance into the hermeneutical spiral. The
possibility of these transcendental presuppositions was indicated by the laws of logic and was
evidenced in what seems to be the objective interpretation of the nature and role of presuppositions
by both Evangelicals and non-evangelicals. Since, as has been seen, the possibility of objectivity
is not obviated either by the claims of relativists, whether on the basis of historicism, or theory-
ladenness, or rejection of brute facts, and later we will consider the same kind of relativist claims
in philosophy of language, the possible existence of transcendental, undeniable, self-evident
presuppositions offers a real possibility of providing a foundation for objectivity in interpretation.
Admittedly, this foundation must be decidedly different from the classical foundationalism as it

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has traditionally been understood, and it must be able to argue for a direct access to the world
outside the mind.
The final task of this study, then, is to investigate the possibility of a kind of foundation for
objectivity that does not succumb to the modern criticisms, but, on the basis of transcendental
presuppositions, may offer the possibility of objectivity for interpretation. This task will begin with
a consideration of meaning and reality in chapter 7. From there the study will proceed through a
consideration of knowledge, language, and interpretation in chapters 8, 9, and 10. This study will
conclude by revisiting the arguments against objectivity and answering each assertion in the eight-
fold argument presented in chapter 2.

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 PART II: MODERATE REALISM AND THE OBJECTIVITY OF MEANING

7 WHAT IS THAT WHICH IS?

Introduction
There is no doubt that there exists a multitude of conflicting theories about meaning. Each
theory of meaning is a part of the total philosophical system, or world view, of the individual
proposing the theory. But, as Richard Rorty insightfully observed, “Uncovering the
presuppositions of those who think they have none is one of the principal means by which
philosophers find new issues to debate.”558 Since it has become axiomatic that no one can be
presuppositionless in his thinking about anything, including meaning, one is compelled to ponder
the implications of such a claim. Does this not imply an infinite regress of presuppositions? If
thinking about meaning, or anything else, cannot be done apart from our presuppositions, doesn’t
it follow that thinking about our presuppositions necessarily involves still other presuppositions,
and thinking about these involves still others, ad infinitum? But, an infinite regress of
presuppositions precludes the possibility of any thinking at all. There must be some or one
presupposition for which there is no presupposition, but is, so to speak, properly basic or
foundational.
We have already discussed some of these foundational presuppositions, such as the law of
noncontradiction, the law of identity, and the law of excluded middle. Such presuppositions we
classified as transcendental presuppositions because they transcend all world views and all
perspectives, are unavoidable, and are necessarily the same for everyone. If presuppositions are
the foundations upon which subsequent assertions are based, the notion of a primary or properly
basic presupposition that admits of no prior presuppositions would be, in a sense, the first cause
and foundation of all thought. Of course there is a discipline that has attempted to address this very
question. Aristotle identified this discipline as first philosophy, or the study of being qua being.559
Today we identify this discipline as metaphysics. Metaphysics is the study of the nature of reality.
What each theorists holds to be true about the nature of meaning is intimately connected to his
epistemology, and as we have seen, the prevailing epistemological position is some form of
representationalism. But, representationalism itself assumes a certain position on the nature of the
reality. So, the way in which a theorist addresses the questions of epistemology are ultimately
based on his metaphysics. Since one’s view on the nature of meaning is a foundational element in
hermeneutics, the relation of one’s view of meaning to epistemology and metaphysics indicates
that, ultimately, hermeneutics itself is based on one’s view of the nature of reality. Figure 15
illustrates this relationship.
Each area, or discipline, is characterized by the predominate question that is addressed in that
discipline. Simply put, reality is that which is. Notice that the characterization of reality is not,
“what is.” To characterize reality as “what” implies that reality is basically some identity, or
essence. When we ask, “What is it?” we are inquiring about something’s identity or essence. But,
there are many identities in reality. That is to say, reality consists of many essences, or “whats.”
But all essences have at least one thing in common, namely, that they exist. Therefore, reality at
its most basic level is not a particular essence, or a group of essences. Reality is that which exists,
or, as we have phrased it, “That which is.” Essentially, the discipline of metaphysics asks the
question, “What is that which is?” In Metaphysics, we are inquiring into the nature of existence.

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 Figure 15: Order of Disciplines

Epistemology is the discipline that addresses the question, “How do we know that which is?”
Linguistics is the discipline that addresses the question, “How do we communicate what we
know?” and Hermeneutics addresses the question, “How do we understand that which is
communicated?”
The diagram in Figure 16 illustrates the perspective of this section. The remainder of this study
will be an attempt to expound the basic thesis presented in this diagram and relate it to the question
of objectivity of meaning. Additionally, this diagram corresponds to the diagram in Figure 15 .The
section of this chapter titled, “What is that which is?,” beginning on page 140, will explain a
Moderate Realist view of the nature of extra-mental, created reality dealing with the “Created
thing” referenced in Figure 16. This material will attempt to answer the question, “What is that
which is?” and will involve defining such terms as “form” and “matter” which appear in Figure
16.
It may be helpful at this point to present a summary of the flow of reasoning presented in
Figure 16. At this point, many terms will be introduced the explanations of which will be provided
in the discussions in the following sections or chapters. Figure 16 illustrates not only a Moderate
Realist view of the metaphysical foundation of knowledge, but an analogical relationship between
creation and knowledge on the one hand, and communication and understanding on the other.
The diagram begins at the top with a representation of the existence of the forms in the mind
of God. These forms exist as Divine ideas in the Divine intellect. These ideas are the forms of
things existing apart from the things themselves. As Etienne Gilson explains, “the form of a thing
can exist apart from the thing in two distinct ways; either because it is the exemplar of that of
which it is said to be the form, or because it is the principle which enables us to know the things.
In either case, we must assume ideas to exist in God.”560
According to the Moderate Realist view, all things exist in God’s mind before their existence
in the finite world of things. God created the matter out of nothing and imposed upon it a form,
thereby creating a thing in reality. This creative event is characterized in the Scripture by the
phrase, “and God said.” The resultant real object is composed of form and matter.

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 Figure 16: Metaphysical Foundation of Meaning

As we will attempt to expound later, when a man knows an object in reality, the form of the
thing comes to exist in the mind of the knower. Man imitates God in that, while God is all things
by virtue of His Divine Intelligence in which all forms exist as Divine Ideas,561 so man becomes
all things by obtaining the forms of things that come to exist in the mind of man as ideas.
Consequently, it is not necessary for a man to go back into the mind of God in order to know
reality. Rather, man knows reality by means of the form of the thing as it is in itself. Forms are
given by the real thing. They are not supplied by the mind.
The second half of the diagram in Figure 16 illustrates the events of communication and
understanding. Analogous to the existence of the forms as Divine Ideas in the mind of God, so the
forms, or meanings, exist in the mind of man as ideas. A man takes the matter, his language,
imposes upon it a form, meaning, and creates a text in reality. In this act, man imitates God’s
creative act. A second man is able to extract the form of the text by which he understands the
meaning of the text, for the form is the meaning. In this act man knows the meaning of the text in

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a way analogous to the way he knows a thing in reality. Consequently, it is not necessary for the
second man to attempt to go behind the text into the mind of an author in order to discover the
meaning of a text. The meaning of the text is located in the text as its form, which is analogous to
the way the form of the thing in reality is located in the thing in reality.562 As God is the primary
efficient cause of the being of things, so a human author is the secondary efficient cause of the
meaning of texts. God is not the Originator of all specific meanings, although He certainly is the
Originator of some specific meanings, such as His Word. However, God, as the primary efficient
cause, has created the universe in which specific meanings are possible. Human beings, as
secondary efficient causes, are the originators of some specific meanings, such as the sentences
they speak, but not the creators of meaning qua meaning. In short, God made all specific meaning
possible and some specific meanings actual, while humans make some specific meanings actual.
Diagram Figure 16 also presents the order in which we will conduct our investigation. We
begin with the reality of the external world and address the question, “What is that which is?” We
will then investigate the knowing process in an effort to answer the next question, “How do we
know that which is?” From this point we will move to a consideration of the linguistic question,
“How do we communicate what we know,” and finally address the question of hermeneutics,
“How do we understand what is communicated?” As has been pointed out, this order follows upon
the relationship of disciplines as illustrated in the diagram in Figure 15 .
If the order of disciplines as illustrated in this diagram is accurate, then that which is
communicated is what is known, and what is known is the real. Indeed, as Jacques Maritain has
put it, “The proper object of understanding is being.”563 As he explains elsewhere,

In reality ideas, as the consciousness of every man witnesses immediately, are our instruments of knowledge. If, therefore,
knowledge did not apprehend the things themselves, knowledge would be an operation or activity without end or object, which
is absurd. For to form an idea or judgment is to know, just as to make use of a knife is to cut. And, just as it is impossible to
cut without cutting something‒ the end or object of the act of cutting, which is not the knife, but the thing cut by it‒so it is
impossible to know without knowing something‒the end or object of the act of knowing, which is not the idea, but the thing
known by it.564

The proper object of knowledge, then, is not our ideas, but reality. However, in order for a
thing in the real world to be known, it must remain unchanged in the act of knowing. As Joseph
Owens points out, “A thing or essence has to remain unchanged in itself in being known. Otherwise
not it but something into which it changed would be known. Cognition, in order to be cognition,
has to leave unchanged the essence of what it knows.565 The proper object of knowledge, then, is
that which is, as it is in itself. This leads us to the first question in our effort to climb the staircase
to an adequate hermeneutic, What is that which is?”
Before we address this question directly, we must acknowledge that the Moderate Realist
approach to the objectivity of meaning assumes a foundationalism of some stripe. In other words,
it is assumed that reality ultimately forms the foundation upon which one can base the notion of
objectivity. The brand of foundationalism assumed herein is the foundationalism of Thomas
Aquinas expressed in terms of the first principles of thought and being.
However, our study thus far has chronicled what amounts to a war on foundationalism in
general and Classical Foundationalism in particular. Because of the popularity of anti-
foundationalist approaches and “foundationalism-bashing,” and the abundance of critiques of what
is popularly called Classical Foundationalism, it will be necessary to address some of these
critiques and to set forth the notion of foundationalism asserted here. It will not be our purpose to
answer the charges against the foundationalism that is the popular target. Rather, we hope to show
that the foundationalism of Moderate Realism is not in any way the foundationalism that is under

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attack today. Indeed, with reference to the foundationalism that has often been called classical, we
join the multitude of those who adamantly reject it in all of its forms. However, a grave injustice
has been done to what has been called “Ancient Classical Foundationalism” by confusing it with
the ill fated foundationalism of modern philosophy under the influence of Descartes. Our argument
will not only be that Thomist foundationalism is not the “Classical/Cartesian Foundationalism”
under attack, but that the foundationalism of Moderate Realism is not subject to the critiques
leveled against “Classical/Cartesian Foundationalism,” but is rather a reasonable account of the
basis for knowledge and meaning.

Classical/Moderate Realist Foundationalism

In the previous chapter we demonstrated that the foundationalism that is universally rejected
by modern philosophy is not the classical foundationalism of Moderate Realism. Of course, to
declare that the popular characterization of Classical/Cartesian Foundationalism is not the
foundationalism of Moderate Realism is not the same as to propose what kind of foundationalism
is being advocated. The brand of foundationalism proposed is aptly defined by Norman Geisler:
“Foundationalism is the theory of knowledge . . . that affirms the need for certain foundational
principles . . . as the basis of all thought. By contrast, Coherentism claims that no such principles
are needed but that ideas simply need to cohere like a web in a consistent way, without any ultimate
foundational principles.”566 Capitalizing on the notion that there are foundation principles for all
thought, the popular criticism assumes that the relationship between the foundations and
subsequent beliefs is the relationship of deductive inference as this is expressed by Descartes.
Descartes argued that once one has arrived at an incorrigible, self-evident belief, all subsequent
truth can be discovered by a process of deduction. Francis Parker and Henry Veatch characterized
deduction by contrasting it with induction:

The point of the distinction that is here being made between induction and deduction might be said to be something like this:
In the case of induction, as in that of abstraction, the cognitive process moves, so to speak, from the level of the sensible to that
of the intelligible. In contrast, in deduction the process moves exclusively on the intelligible level. This is not to say, of course,
that the premises which we employ in a deductive argument may not have been founded on experience and so established
inductively. Indeed, there is no denying the fact that ultimately all our knowledge is derived from experience and based upon
it. No, the only point is that in the actual process itself of any deductive argument the mediation is strictly and exclusively
intellectual and in no wise experiential.567

What this implies is that, in deduction, the truth of a conclusion mediated by a universal
concept necessarily follows from the truth of the premises. One example that Parker and Veatch
use is relation of opposite vertical angles. A person can, by a process of measurement, discover
that opposite vertical angles having the same supplementary angle are equal (see the diagram in
Figure 17). Measuring a number of angles would yield the conclusion that all opposite vertical
angles are equal. This would be an inductive exercise—moving from the premises, “these vertical
angles are equal,” and “these vertical angles are equal,” and “these vertical angles are equal,” to
the conclusion that all vertical angles are equal. The conclusion is mediated through premises that
are experiential in nature.
The same conclusion is demonstrated by Parker and Veatch as a deduction:

The opposite vertical angles formed by intersecting straight lines have the same supplementary angle in common.
But any two angles having the same supplementary angle in common are equal.

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 Therefore, the opposite vertical angles are equal.568

Figure 17: Opposite Angles

Although we may have gained the knowledge of the various terms, “vertical angle,”
“supplementary angle,” etc., from experience, once we have this knowledge, we do not need any
additional experience to show the truth of the conclusion. As Parker and Veatch assert, “it follows
purely intellectually from the two premises. For the mediation that is here effected is purely and
simply through a universal concept; and a universal concept . . . is the product of the intellect and
not the senses.”569
Many of the contemporary critics of foundationalism assume that the relationship between
foundational principles and subsequent truths is likewise a deductive relation. That is to say, all
subsequent truths are deducible from those self-evident, incorrigible first truths or first principles.
This is, of course, the basic foundationalist approach of Descartes. However, even those critics
who do not assume that foundationalism necessitates a deductivism nevertheless assume that
foundationalism necessarily holds that subsequent truths are inferred from or somehow derived
from the foundation. This is not, however, the relation that is proposed in a Moderate Realist
foundationalism. Truths do not need to be inferred from or derived from a foundation in order for
them to rest on that foundation. Analogously, the structure of a building is based on its foundation,
but the structure is not derived from the foundation. For example, orthodox Christianity has
historically asserted the truth of the doctrine of the Trinity. No one would want to claim that the
doctrine of the Trinity is inferred from or derived from the law of contradiction. Nevertheless, the
doctrine is based on this law, because the doctrine, in order to be true, cannot assert essential
principles that are contradictory. Assertions that are contradictory cannot both be true. The
orthodox doctrine of the Trinity does not make assertions that are contradictory. So, although we
do not discover the doctrine of the Trinity by inferring it or in any way deriving it from
foundational principles, the doctrine of the Trinity is nevertheless based on the law of contradiction
in that it does not make contradictory assertions. A Moderate Realist foundationalism does not
assert that truth is necessarily deduced from, inferred from, or in any way derived from
foundational principles. Rather, a Moderate Realist foundationalism asserts that all truth is
ultimately based on foundations without which they could not be true.
What is the relation between truths and foundations? In de Veritate, St. Thomas asserted,
“Whatever things we know with scientific knowledge properly so called, we know by reducing
them to first principles which are naturally present to the understanding. In this way, all scientific

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knowledge terminates in the sight of a thing which is present.”570 The crucial distinction here is
that for the Moderate Realist, the relation of subsequent truths to foundational or first principles is
not one of deduction, but is one of reduction (resolutionem). The task of reduction is a critical
process the goal of which is to identify a truth claim in relation to primary truths. In other words,
the truth of any proposition must be reducible to first principles, although it may not be deducible
from first principles. We will illustrate this by using a hermeneutical example. This will not only
illustrate the relations between subsequent truth-claims and first principles, but will also show the
relevance of this discussion to the objectivity of meaning.
Finis Jennings Dake, author of the popular Dake Annotated Reference Bible, makes the
following assertion about the nature of God.

God is a Spirit Being, not the sun, moon, stars; nor an image of wood, stone, or metal; and not beast or man. He is not the air,
wind, universal mind, love or some impersonal quality. He is a person with a personal spirit body, a personal soul, and a
personal spirit, like that of the angels, and like that of man except His body is of spirit substance instead of flesh and bones
(Job 13:8; Heb. 1:3)571

According to Dake, God is a material being who is circumscribed to a location, a place far
from us, namely, Heaven, which is “a real planet like earth.”572 According to Dake, the planet
Heaven is the “capital of the universe, for God has His capital city, the New Jerusalem, His capitol
building, the Heavenly Temple or Tabernacle, and His throne in the Temple in Heaven.”573 When
God appears to people on earth, like Abraham, then God must move from the planet Heaven to the
planet earth in order to be present to Abraham. As Dake asserts, “God goes from place to place in
a body just like anyone else.”574 Now, such movement necessarily involves a relation of before
and after—before the move and after the move. Now, a relation of before and after is a sufficient
condition for a temporal relation. Although temporality may be more than a relation of before and
after, it is certainly not less than this. It follows that God, according to Dake, is a temporally as
well as a materially located being.
Dake reaches this conclusion because one of his primary hermeneutical principles is,

one must take the Bible as literal when it is at all possible. When a statement is found that cannot possibly be literal, as Jesus
being a ‘door’ or of a woman being clothed with the sun and standing on the moon and on her head a crown of twelve stars, or
of land animals coming out of the sea, and other statements which are obviously not literal, then we know the language is
figurative. In such cases we must get the literal truth conveyed by the figurative language, and the truth intended to be conveyed
will be as literal as if it were expressed in literal language without the use of such figures. After all, figurative language
expresses literal truth as much as if such figures were not used.575

On the basis of his hermeneutical approach, Dake understands the passages that speak of God
seeing, and walking, and talking as literal assertions that God has legs, eyes, and a mouth.
However, there are other passages which speak of God having wings—Ruth 2:12 for example. But
Dake does not conclude thereby that God has literal wings. Why does not Dake take these passages
literally? Because, if God is a person, then when the Scripture says that God has wings, this cannot
be literal, because persons do not have wings. Persons have arms, and legs, and eyes, and eyelids,
but they do not have wings. This is part of Dake’s principle. Dake insists that “one must take the
Bible as literal when it is at all possible.”576 But the other part of this principle is, “When a
statement is found that cannot possibly be literal, as Jesus being a ‘door’ or of a woman being
clothed with the sun and standing on the moon and on her head a crown of twelve stars, or of land
animals coming out of the sea, and other statements which are obviously not literal, then we know
the language is figurative.”577 cannot the statement of Jesus in Jn. 10:9 be taken literally, “I am the
door,” because Jesus is a person and persons are not doors. This seems quite reasonable.578
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 The reason Dake cannot interpret literally those passages that talk about Jesus being a door is
because of the nature of a person and the nature of a door. The Bible does not go into a
philosophical, biological, or ontological explanation of the natures of these things. The biblical
writers assume that the reader is familiar with doors and persons and can understand the differences
and similarities between them. So, the underlying principle for taking such a passage figuratively
is not that the text specifically says to take it figuratively, but that the author expected rational
people to have knowledge about the natures of these things. We all know the differences between
doors and persons. We could schematize this reasoning in the following manner.

Jesus is a person.
A person is not an inanimate object.
Therefore, Jesus is not an inanimate object.

A door is an inanimate object.

An inanimate object is not a person.
Therefore, a door is not a person.

But, the Scripture says that Jesus is a door (Jn. 10:7).

If we interpret this literally, then there must be an error in Scripture.
If we interpret this figuratively, there is no error in Scripture.
Therefore, since the Scripture cannot err, this must be taken figuratively.

The resolution of the question of whether this statement is figurative is the process of analysis
whereby the statement and its conclusions are reduced to the principle of being and non-
contradiction. It is contradictory to assert that Jesus has, in the same sense, the nature of a door
and the nature of a person. The assertion must be resolved in such a manner so as to avoid the
contradiction. Although the statement, “I am the door,” is not deduced from or inferred from the
law of non-contradiction, it can be reduced to this law. It is based on this foundation law even
though not deriving from it. Of course we also assume inerrancy of the text. But, once again the
resolution is conducted in terms of reducing the relevant claims in such a manner so as not to assert
contradictories as equally true. So, assuming inerrancy of the text, it cannot be the case that Jesus’
statement can be false. Therefore, Jesus must be using a figure of speech. We resolve the question
by reducing it to foundation or first principles.
The same reasoning is true for statements about God. The reason Dake takes some passages
literally and some figuratively (for example, Dake does not believe the God literally has wings) is
because he comes to the text with a presupposition about God’s nature.

A being that has bodily parts is a being that has a body.

A person that can see and walk is a being that has bodily parts (eyes and legs).
Therefore, a person that can see and walk is a being that has a body.

God is a person who sees and walks.

Persons who see and walk are beings who have bodies.
Therefore, God is a being Who has a body.

But, the Scripture says that God is spirit (Jn. 4:24) who sees and walks.
If we say this cannot be interpreted literally, then there must be an error in Scripture.
If we interpret it literally, then there is no error in Scripture.

Therefore, since the Scripture cannot err, God must be a spirit-being Who has a body.

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 Since various passages use the same kinds of language and the same kinds of expressions in
the same kinds of genre when talking about God’s eyes and His wings, it cannot be the texts qua
texts that dictate which is to be taken literally and which is to be taken figuratively. Dake takes
references about God’s eyes as literal because, since he comes to the text with the presupposed
idea that God is a person, and since, according to Dake, persons have literal eyes, these statements
must mean that God literally has eyes. The reason Dake takes references to God’s wings as
figurative is because, since he comes to the text with the presupposition that God is a person, and
since persons don’t have wings, these statements must not be claiming that God literally has wings,
else the Scripture would be wrong. Since the Scripture cannot be wrong, these statements must be
figurative.
Dake, like all interpreters of the Bible, comes to the text assuming that God must have a certain
kind of nature, the nature of a person, and for Dake persons have bodies, souls, and spirits. Dake’s
idea of God’s nature cannot derive ultimately from the biblical text because, like all interpreters,
he employs his prior discriminating principle to select which passages he will take as saying
something literal about God’s nature and which passages he will take as saying something
figurative about God’s nature. The texts do not make these decisions for him. Dake makes these
decisions on the basis of his idea of what God’s nature must be. Dake is simply employing a basic
principle of interpretation. Dake argues that the Scripture teaches that God is a person, but there is
no Scripture that explains what is the nature of personhood—what it means to be a person. Dake
has his notion of what a person is as a presupposition already present in his mind. Since the
Scripture teaches that God is a person, and Dake already knows what it means to be a person
(namely, a being with a body), God must be a being with a body. The notion that a person is a
being with a body is not taught in Scripture. It is assumed by Dake. Dake’s already present
assumption about what it means to be a person, coupled with the teaching of Scripture that God is
a person, leads Dake to conclude that God is the kind of being who has a body and body parts.
This is the nature of God. He is a being with a spiritual body, having a soul, a body, and a spirit,579
circumscribed to a location, and temporal. The paradigm of Dake’s notion of the nature of God
becomes the basis upon which he then judges individual passages to discover whether they are to
be taken literally or figuratively. In a circular manner, then, Dake calls upon these verses to support
his assertion that God is a being with a body.
The question that must be asked then, is whether Dake’s idea of the nature of God is accurate.
Traditional orthodox Christian theology holds that God must be eternal. Additionally, it seems
irrational to think of the ultimate cause of the universe to be anything other than eternal. We could
employ the principles of the Kalaam cosmological argument to demonstrate that God is the eternal
originating Cause of the universe. Anything that exists in a temporal sequence of befores and afters
must have had a beginning, because an actual infinite series cannot exist. Since an actual infinite
series cannot exist, a being whose nature is to exist in an actually infinite series cannot exist either.
Therefore, God, the ultimate cause of the universe, cannot be a being who exists in an actually
infinite series—He must be eternal. Or we could employ Aquinas’ argument of existential
causality to demonstrate that there cannot be an infinite regress of sustaining causes. Therefore,
God must be the first, eternally existing, uncaused cause. Traditional Christian orthodoxy as well
as rational argumentation demonstrates that God must be eternal. Of course, temporality and
eternality are mutually exclusive. Indeed, the term “eternal” means “not ternal,” or “not temporal.”
A being cannot be both eternal and temporal in the same sense. It may be logically possible to
assert that a being is temporal in one sense and eternal in another sense, but not in the same sense.

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This assertion would be contradictory, and any assertion that is contradictory cannot be true. In
other words, it violates a first principle—a foundational principle.
Now, if we employ two terms, ‘temporality’ and ‘eternality,’ to refer to these characterizing
attributes we can reduce Dake’s assertion about God to its relation to the foundational principle of
the law of contradiction.

As a being with a spirit body, God is circumscribed to a location in space.

As a being located in space, God moves from planet heaven to planet earth.
Anything that is located and moves partakes of befores and afters.
Moving from here to there.
Before the move and after the move.
Anything that partakes of befores and afters is temporal.
Therefore, God is temporal.

God is spirit and omnipresent (orthodox Christian doctrine).

Anything that is spirit and omnipresent must be eternal (rational demonstration).
Therefore, God is eternal.

God is temporal and eternal in the same sense.

The temporal is the eternal.
But, this is a contradiction.
Therefore, it must not be the case that God is both temporal and eternal.

But it is irrational to conclude that the Cause of the universe is temporal

Therefore, God, the Cause of the universe, must be eternal and not temporal
Therefore, it must not be the case that God is located in space.
Therefore, it must not be the case that God has a spirit body.
Consequently, passages that speak of God having body parts must be figurative.

Since Dake’s God is temporal, and the Creator of the universe must be eternal, and since Dake
asserts that his god is the Creator of the universe, the resulting assertion is, the Creator of the
universe is temporal and eternal, or, in propositional form, The temporal is the eternal. But, this
assertion violates the law of non-contradiction, a first or foundational principle. Consequently, it
cannot be true that God is both temporal and eternal. Since these are mutually exclusive essential
attributes, one must be true, the other must be false. Historically, orthodox Christian theology has
employed demonstrations to argue that God must be eternal and that this is the only reasonable
and rational way to understand the nature of God. Consequently, by reducing Dake’s claim to first
truths, we have shown that his conclusion must be false, and his interpretation must be incorrect.
This is, of course, a simplified example and many steps in the process were no doubt
oversimplified, but it serves to illustrate the point. The point is, a knowledge claim can be based
on a foundation without being derived, inferred, or deduced from it. But, nevertheless, a truth claim
can be subjected to resolution by reducing it to first principles. And it is not necessary to accept
the specific content of the argument for the illustration to work. The point is that by the reduction
of claims to first truths, we have a means of testing conclusions that is grounded in objective
principles. The law of contradiction, or non-contradiction, is not a subjectively determined
principle, nor is it relative to a particular world view. It transcends all world views and is the same
for all perspectives. It would seem to be the case, then, that there is indeed a possibility of
objectivity in interpretation because there are in fact some presuppositions that transcend all
perspectives, i.e., first truths, and that by reducing conclusions to these first truths, it is possible to
adjudicate between opposing interpretations.

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 Palmer, Gadamer, and others claim that there is no ‘right interpretation’ as ‘right in itself.’ Of
course this is a self-defeating claim. If there is no right interpretation, then neither Palmer nor
Gadamer have any means by which to judge the relative rightness of any interpretation. They make
this assertion as if it is the “right interpretation” of all other interpretations or of the state of affairs.
As Evangelicals we cannot afford to abandon the possibility of objectivity in interpretation and
few Evangelicals who wish to do so.580 However, our present descriptions of the interpretive
process seem not to go far enough to deflect the appearance of subjectivity and to provide a solid
philosophical foundation for our claims to objectivity. It is hoped that the approach outlined herein
will suggest the possibility of strengthening the otherwise sound methodologies proposed by
contemporary Evangelicals.
The objectivity of interpretation for which we are arguing, then, assumes a reductive
foundationalism—a foundationalism that is constituted of foundational principles that are self-
evident and undeniable, upon which all truth is based though not necessarily deduced, derived, or
inferred from these foundational principles. There are foundational principles that transcend all
world views and are ultimately unavoidable. The law of contradiction is such a principle. Any
attempt to deny it must employ it. Any system whose essential claims violate this principle cannot
be true. Ultimately all truth, including true interpretations, are based upon these first principles.
But, first principles are themselves grounded upon the nature of reality. The law of contradiction
is traditionally defined in terms of truth claims: A claim cannot be both true and false in the same
sense. But, the validity of the law of contradiction is based upon reality itself. The reason a claim
cannot be both true and false in the same sense is because a thing cannot both be and not be in the
same sense. In other words, it is because of the nature of reality that the law of contradiction exists
as it does. So, in our attempt to explain the Moderate Realist approach to the question of
objectivity, we will begin at the ground level, reality.

The Foundation of Meaning

The world abounds with many things—entities. All things are not the same. There are many
different kinds of things. Some things are very different from each other, such as a rock and a dog.
Some things are similar to each other, such as a dog and a cat. Things that are different in kind are
differentiated by their species—which simply means “kind.” A dog is a different species of thing
from the species of a rock or a cat. But things are not only different by species. There are also
different instances of the same species. One dog is not another, yet they are of the same species.
Individual dogs are numerically different.
There must be some way of accounting for these differences in things. The fact that there is
meaningful communication about different things and the differences in things calls for an
explanation. How can we account for the fact that the human mind is able to distinguish between
things and reflect that difference by means of language? The capacity to understand and
communicate the differences in things must be grounded in the real difference in the things of the
world. In order to understand the fact that we communicate what we know, we must understand
how it is possible to know. But to understand how knowledge is possible we must understand the
objects of knowledge. But to understand the objects of knowledge, we must understand that which
is. To attempt to explicate these claims, we will begin our investigation of that which is by a
consideration of substance.

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 The Reality of Substance
According to Joseph Owens, “The sole absolutely basic essence in any finite thing is called its
substance.”581 According to Jacques Maritain, “Substance is a thing or nature whose property is to
exist by itself, or in virtue of itself (per se) and not in another thing.”582 Both of these definitions
assume the reality of substance as that which exists independent of anyone’s perception. Simply,
the word substance indicates that which exists in itself. This concept is not to be confused with the
more scientific or physical concept that refers to the constitution of material objects or particles.
In Moderate Realism, the term substance can be used with reference to spiritual entities as well as
physical entities in as much as each entity exists as an independent being.583
To explicate the nature of substance is not to attempt to prove the existence of extra-mental
reality. As Robert McCall has observed, “The self-evident is indemonstrable. The self-evident
does not need to be demonstrated.”584 Something is self-evident in itself if, when one understands
the terms involved, that thing is immediately known. As St. Thomas described it, “Thus, as soon
as you know the nature of a whole and the nature of a part, you know immediately that every
whole is greater than its part. . . . that every whole is greater than its part is, absolutely speaking,
self-evident; but it would perforce be unknown to one who could not conceive the nature of a
whole.”585
But, extra-mental reality seems immediately obvious and therefore self-evident. If this is so, it
seems highly problematic to attempt to prove the existence of a reality that is external to the mind,
for to whom or what would such a proof be directed? Extra-mental reality appears to be self-
evidently experienced on a daily basis by all who are alive. What is to be demonstrated, therefore,
is not whether there is an extra-mental reality, but that this reality exists outside the mind as what
is called substance. “Whatever be its explicit formal definition . . . substance is the thing in its
necessary role of independent existence.”586

Substance as Independent Existence

The most basic principle of reality is what is called substance. The reason for starting with
substance is the proposition that “There must be things which exist in themselves.”587 Anything
that exists must either exist in itself or in another. To say that something exists in another is to
assert that it could not exist independently. “The sun tan has its few months’ being each summer
only as a modification of a human skin.”588 A sun tan does not have independent existence, whereas
the man in whom the sun tan exists does have independent existence.
The independent existence of substance is not to be confused with an independence or
dependence upon extrinsic efficient causality. Every finite being is caused to be by the efficient
causality of the Uncaused Cause, namely God. Owens clarifies this distinction when he states,
“The dependence or independence that distinguishes essences refers not to the reception of being
but to the way in which that being is possessed.”589 A man is not a modification of being. A man
is a being. A man has his being in an independent way, that is to say, a man does not exist in
another thing as a quality exists in another thing. Any being that has its being in this independent
way is identified as a substance. Conversely, “Whatever has its being in dependence upon a
substance . . . is known as an accident.”590
Even so, every being has its being either independently or dependently, as described above.
Every being is either a substance or an accident. But every being cannot be an accident, for an
accident cannot exist independently; else it would not be an accident, but a substance. Neither can
accidents exist dependently upon prior accidents in an infinite regress, for an infinite regress is
impossible. An infinite regress of accidents would constitute an independent existence, or

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substance.591 But to assert that accidents are substance is contradictory. Therefore, there must be
independent existences, or substances. McCall makes a helpful observation of this point: “Either
there are things which have independent existence, sustaining self and sustaining dependents, or
there is nothing, due to the ever-eluding second alternative [infinite regress] in its march to infinity.
The fact that a thing as such, as itself, is sustained not in another but in itself is proof that there is
the reality of substance.”592

Substance and Change

A second aspect of substance is the relation of substance to change. The fact of change has
been a topic of philosophical and practical investigation since the beginning of intellectual
observation of the world. The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus is famous for the saying
attributed to him, “All things are in a state of flux.”593 However, the popular interpretation of
Heraclitus’ observation is somewhat flawed. It is self-defeating to assert that all things are in a
state of flux, for this would include the claim that all things are in a state of flux, the truth of which
rests on the assumption that it is unchangeably true. But if the claim that all is in flux is itself not
in flux, then it is not the case that all is in flux, and the claim falsifies itself.
In the midst of change, something must remain unchanged. Indeed, the very notion of change
includes the idea that something changes. Yet, that which changes is the same thing through the
change. As Margaret Gorman has observed, “If there were not things to change, man would say
that there were new things, not that things changed.”594 Gorman identifies three elements of
change.

1. The Arrival of Something New

2. a subject to receive the change or to be changed for, if there is nothing that has changed, no change has taken place but a
new being has come. A ball to be moved must be a ball or it cannot be moved and be described as a ball that has been
moved. A child to grow must be a child; the growing does not occur unless there is a subject of growing.
3. the subject’s lack of the perfection acquired through the change.595

From these principles it is clear that change implies permanence. There must be some aspect
of a thing that undergoes change, a subject of change. A consideration of accidental change will
provide a helpful illustration of this point. If an accident is a modification of a substance and is not
essential to the substance qua substance, then it is easy to see that in accidental change, the
accidental characteristic changes while the substance remains the same. The man who has obtained
the sun tan has undergone an accidental change. It is not essential to the nature of a man that he
have tan skin. A pale man is no less a man than a man with a tan. A tan is an accidental
characteristic. When the tan fades, the man remains the same man. The substance does not change.
The accidental characteristic of skin color changes. The reality of change offers a confirmation of
the reality of substance. George Klubertanz provides an enlightening summary of this point: “. . .
in the kind of change we are considering here, the subject remains what it was, in the sense that it
retains the same nature and individuality. But in itself this subject can, and often must, receive
further determinations. . . . Because this subject remains the same ‘under’ the change, and so ‘is
under’ (‘sub-stands’) the various determinations that it has, it is called a ‘substance.’”596

Substance and Predication

According to A Dictionary of Philosophy, predication is “The attribution of a property to a
subject.”597 Now, assuming the substance/accident dichotomy as presented above, if there is no
substance, then all attributes are accidents, and all predications are accidental predications.

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However, according to Aristotle, “. . . since the accidental always implies a predication about some
subject, if all statements are accidental, there will be nothing primary about which they are made;
so the predication must proceed to infinity. But this is impossible for not even more than two
accidents can be combined in predication. An accident cannot be an accident of an accident unless
both are accidents of the same thing.”598
If there is no substance, then predication cannot make any assertion about the essence of
anything. As Aristotle argues, “In general those who talk like this do away with substance and
essence, for they are compelled to assert that all things are accidents, and that there is no such thing
as ‘being essentially man’ or ‘animal.’”599 But, if there is no substance then words cannot have
reference to what a thing essentially is. Consequently, words would not have a definite range of
meaning, but would be unlimited in reference. As Aristotle concludes, “If . . . it be said that ‘man’
has an infinite number of meanings, obviously there can be no discourse; for not to have one
meaning is to have no meaning, and if words have no meaning there is an end of discourse with
others, and even, strictly speaking, with oneself . . .”600
McCall provides a helpful summary explanation of the logic of Aristotle’s argument: “Without
substance there is no limit placed on the number of predications, because there is never anything
at which a final point must be reached for the two mutually exclusive alternatives: being so or not
so. Tall and not tall; white and not white; sick and not sick: these are contradictories basically
because of the impossibility of realizing them in the same subject at the same time and under the
same circumstances.”601
Without substance there is no reason to assert that a thing is white as opposed to non-white
because there is nothing about which to make any assertion. Without substance, which is the
essence of what something is, there is no reason not to assert that a thing is both white and non-
white. Without substance, there is no means by which to limit the number of predications, and
discourse becomes meaningless.
Someone may argue, however, that the law of non-contradiction forbids the predication of
contradictories. However, as we have pointed out, epistemology must be grounded in metaphysics.
The law of non-contradiction obtains with reference to predication because it is grounded in being.
The assertion that a thing is both white and non-white in the same sense is a contradiction in
predication because it is a contradiction in being. One cannot assert that something is both white
and non-white in the same sense because a thing must be either white or non-white in the same
sense—a thing cannot both be and not be in the same sense.
However, discourse is in fact meaningful. If anyone wishes to claim that discourse is not
meaningful, he has taken up an impossible task. Can anyone meaningfully object to the fact of
meaning? White and non-white cannot be predicated of the same thing in the same sense because
of the nature of the thing as it is in itself. Predication is limited to the nature of reality by virtue of
its substance. The fact of communication provides yet another demonstration of the reality of
substance.
To speak of substance, then, is to make reference to what something is as an essence. The
substance of man is his man-ness. According to Klubertanz, “Substance is that principle of being
whose nature it is to be directly ordered to esse in itself . . . Essence in the strict sense is substance
considered as being of a certain kind of species and being capable of receiving an act of
existing.”602
So substance identifies what a thing is in itself. However, the notion of substance qua substance
does not provide us with an understanding of its intelligibility. How is it possible to understand

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what a substance is? In short, how is knowledge of substance possible? To answer this question
we must examine the principles that constitute the nature of substance.

The Nature of Substance

In the realm of finite things, substance is composite. As Joseph Owens points out, “[Substance]
consists of two components or intrinsic principles, matter and form.”603

The Constituent Principles of Substance

As we have observed, it is necessary to account for the differences in things. A dog is different
from a cat because of those aspects of its essence that make it a dog. There must be some way to
account for the fact that the substance of a dog is a different kind of substance than the substance
of a cat. A dog is a different form of reality from a cat. Additionally, a second dog is different from
the first dog, but it is of the same form of reality. The way in which a dog is different from a cat is
different than the way one dog is different from another dog. A single explanation cannot account
for these two ways of being different. Dogs cannot differ by their form, for this is the very principle
by which they are constituted dogs. Benignus Gerrity has provided a helpful description of this
point: “A [dog] is different from a [cat], and from every other kind of being, precisely because it
is a [dog]; but it were absurd to say that it is different from another [dog] precisely because it is a
[dog]. Some second principle must be recognized to account for the distinction between two
[dogs]. We call these two principles form and matter. The form makes a thing the kind of thing
that it is, and the matter makes it the individual that it is.”604
The two constituent principles of substance, form and matter, are the very principles that
account for the two ways in which things differ. In this use, the term “principle” indicates that
neither form nor matter are entities or beings in themselves, but are the constituents of being.
Things that differ according to kind differ by their respective forms. Things of the same kind that
differ as individuals differ by their matter.
Form is also designated substantial form in order to differentiate it from accidental form. Form
“is the determining and specifying principle of essence or substance.”605 Simply stated, form is
that principle which accounts for the fact that a thing is a certain kind of thing. It is not possible to
provide an analytical definition of form, because by an analytical definition one attempts to break
down that which is to be analyzed into its more basic constituents. However, form and matter are
the most basic constituents of being. Therefore, form and matter must be described rather than
analyzed.
The form of a dog is its “dog-ness.” Form in this use must not be confused with the more
common connotation of shape. Although the shape of a thing is determined by the kind of thing
that it is, the principle of form is not to be identified with this single characteristic. “The form,
therefore . . . is what determines the nature of a thing.”606 Form is the actualizing principle of being.
A dog is a dog because of its form. A dog differs from a cat because of their respective forms.607
Matter, also identified as primary or first matter, “is the determinable and limiting principle of
substance in material things . . .”608 This use of the concept ‘matter’ must not be confused with the
typical modern concept of physical matter. Matter in this philosophical usage is a principle of
being. It is “the common ground of substantial change, the undetermined element of corporeal
being. It is the purest potentiality, void of form . . .”609 One dog does not differ from another dog
on the basis of form, for it is the form which constitutes each a dog. They cannot differ by dogness,
for that is the very aspect in which they are alike. Two dogs differ, not by form, but by matter.

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Whereas the form “makes a thing the kind of thing that it is . . . the matter makes it the individual
that it is.”610
Roughly speaking, form is the whatness of a thing, and matter is the thatness of a thing. Neither
form nor matter is a being in itself. Rather, they are principles of composite beings. Every finite
being is composed of form, what it is, and matter, that it is. Things in reality can differ according
to what they are‒a dog or a cat‒and they can differ according to the fact that they are‒this dog or
that dog. The constituent principles of finite substance, therefore, are form and matter.

The Knowability of Substance

The problem of the knowability of substance is seen in the fact that in order to know something
as it is in itself, that thing must somehow enter the mind of the knower. In other words, this is the
problem of having direct access to extra-mental reality. To know a substance means that one’s
knowledge is not mediated by some third thing, such as a copy or idea or representation. As Gerrity
presents the problem, “In order that there may actually be knowledge, the thing primarily necessary
is that the object be present in the mind of the knower. To know a house I must get the house into
my mind.”611 Now, to have an object present in the mind, neither the mind of the knower nor the
object known can be altered in the knowing process. The knower cannot materially become a
house, for then the knower is no longer a knower, but a house. Nor can the house be altered in the
process of knowledge, for then it is not the house that is known, but some other thing. Etienne
Gilson presents the problem in the form of the question, “. . . on what conditions can the knowing
subject become the object known, without ceasing to be itself?”612 There must be some principle
by which real things can enter into the mind of a knower without altering either in the process.
That principle is form. As Jacques Maritain observes, “there exists in everything an intelligible
and immaterial element, which Aristotle calls form, in virtue of which it possesses a specific nature
or essence;”613
Maritain uses the term “element” as synonymous with constituent principle. As the most basic
constituents of substance of being, form and matter are its elemental parts, or basic principles. To
say that an object is intelligible is to say that it is capable of being known by the intellect. But, if
extra-mental reality is purely material, then it is completely unknowable, for, as will be explained
in the next chapter, it is impossible for the mind to become another material object. As Robert
Brennan observes, “A universe made up of matter alone would be simply unintelligible.”614
It is equally impossible for a real material object to enter one’s mind. But there must be some
aspect by which a real object can enter the mind of the knower, and that aspect must be immaterial.
As Gilson describes it, “The element of an object which can be assimilated by thought, is precisely
its form. To say that the knowing subject becomes the object, is consequently the same thing as to
say that the form of the knowing subject enriches itself with the form of the object known.”615
Consequently, substance is knowable by virtue of the immaterial constituent principle of form.
All sensible reality is composed of form and matter. Therefore, all sensible reality is intelligible
by virtue of its form.

Summary
The Moderate Realist view of the foundation of meaning sketched in this chapter began with
the reality of the extra-mental world and an exposition of the reality of substance. Either things
exist independently or dependently. But to assert that things exist only dependently issues in a self-
defeating infinite regress. Therefore, some things exist independently, and this is substance. We

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have also attempted to explain that that-which-is is understood to be substance by a consideration
of the reality of change and the fact of predication.
Next, we examined the constituent principles of substance, form and matter. We observed that
things are different by kind and by individuality, and that the principles of form and matter account
for the differences in things. Form is what a substance is. Matter is that a substance is. We went
on to show that the principle of intelligibility in a substance is its form.
In the next section our task will be to consider the Moderate Realist view of knowledge. Now
that we have considered the nature of that-which-is, it is necessary to consider how we can know
that-which-is.

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 8 HOW DO WE KNOW THAT WHICH IS?

Introduction
The next step in the exposition of a Moderate Realist theory of meaning is a consideration of
the knowing process. We have considered the reality of substance and its constituent principles,
form and matter. The knowableness of substance was introduced in the latter part of the previous
chapter in terms of form. Our present task is to consider in greater detail how it is possible to know
reality. But the task is not simply to offer an exposition of a Moderate Realist epistemology.
Rather, it is to propose an explanation for how it is possible to know reality directly. In other
words, the present exposition is offered as an alternative to the representationalist epistemology in
order to justify the claim to objectivity of knowledge by describing how it is possible to know
reality as it is in itself.
According to the principles of Moderate Realism, “The noblest way of possessing a thing is to
possess it in an immaterial manner, that is, by possessing its form without its matter. And this is
the definition of knowledge.”616 However, this notion is not peculiar to a Moderate Realist
perspective. A similar notion was held even as early as Plotinus. By way of summary, Plotinus
proposed that in this life, man finds himself separated from that which he desires. This is in a sense
the nature of desire. What is desired is what is not possessed, but the individual moves toward the
fulfillment or satisfaction of his desires to achieve happiness or contentment. Ultimately the
absolute satisfaction of desire involves the acquisition of what is desired—in a sense, becoming
one with it. From the perspective of a human being, the most perfect way in which one can join
with anything is intellectual. Intellectual union involves the identity of subject and object—the
knower and the known become one: “To the extent in which it knows does the knowing subject—
for now earnest attention must be given this point—come into unity with the thing known.”617
As Etienne Gilson puts it, “We start with the fact that the knowing of an object is the actual
presence of the object in the thought . . .”618 It is not sufficient that the mind have merely some
kind of representation of the real external object in the mind, for, if the mind can have only a
representation of the object, and not the object itself, as we have seen, then it can never discover
whether the representation accurately represents the real object. It does not matter how one
attempts to approach or investigate external reality. If a representation is all that the mind can
obtain, then the mind does not have access to the real object, and a comparison between the real
object and the representation in the mind can never be achieved. Consequently, reality can never
be known. In a Moderate Realist scheme, the knowledge of externally real objects is foundational
to all knowledge. Abstract knowledge, knowledge of propositions, etc., are built upon the
foundation of the direct knowledge of external reality.
Knowledge must involve the presence of the real object in the mind of the knower. This is the
problem of knowledge. In dealing with this problem, however, one must realize that it is not
accurate to claim that it is the senses that know or the intellect that knows. Rather, as St. Thomas
asserts,“. . . properly speaking, it is neither the intellect nor the sense that knows, but man that
knows through both . . .”619 Man knows by means of his senses as well as his intellect. As Gilson
points out, “there are not two conceivable solutions of the problem of knowledge, one for the
intelligence and the other for the senses. Sensible knowledge and intellectual knowledge may be
and are in fact two different kinds or two different phases of one and the same operation, but they
must inevitably be accounted for by the same explanation.”620

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 Sense Cognition
The first step in the knowing process is sensation. The immediate problem is the fact that, as
Brennan has observed, “Knowledge is possible only on the condition that subject and object have
something in common . . . a certain degree of immateriality is a primary requisite.”621 This is
necessary because the mind is immaterial. For the object to enter the mind of the knower, there
must be an immaterial aspect of the object, and this is its form. “A being is defined by its form.”622
The form is the “whatness” of substance. Therefore, when the form enters the mind of the knower,
it is the substantial form of the thing in reality that is thereby known. It is by way of the senses that
the form of the object initially enters the mind of the knower. Sensation is considered under two
general divisions, external and internal.

The External Senses

It will not be necessary to spend a great deal of time on this aspect of the knowing process
since, as Brennan points out, “From the time of Aristotle, psychologists have been fairly well
agreed upon the fivefold division of our external senses into vision, hearing, smell, taste, and body
sense or somesthesis.”623

Sensible Encounter with Objective Reality

The first point to be considered with reference to the external senses is whether in sensation
the mind forms the impression of what is sensibly perceived by means of some subjective
modification, or whether the senses actually attain the objectively real.
As M. Aloysius observes, for St. Thomas, “sense exhibits itself as a passive power which must
be initially moved by an external stimulus.”624 To be a passive power indicates that the senses do
not generate the forms of sensible cognition. The form of the real object is impressed upon the
senses. Aristotle employs the example of an impression of a signet-ring upon wax: “Generally,
about all perception, we can say that a sense is what has the power of receiving into itself the
sensible forms of things without the matter, in the way in which a piece of wax takes on the impress
of a signet-ring without the iron or gold; what produces the impression is a signet of bronze or
gold, but not qua bronze or gold: in a similar way the sense is affected by what is coloured or
flavoured or sounding not insofar as each is what it is, but insofar as it is of such and such a sort
and according to its form.”625 That which is embossed on the signet-ring is received in the wax
and is separated from the matter of the ring. As Mortimer Adler explains, “The golden A on the
signet is formally the same as the waxen A, but materially different.”626
It is clear from the illustration that the form impressed upon the wax is not generated by the
wax but by the impression of the signet-ring. Similarly, the form impressed upon the senses is not
generated by the senses, or by the mind of the knower, but by the object in reality. M. Aloysius
asserts, “Now, inasmuch as human knowledge takes its rise from sense-data, this suffices to ground
it in objectively existing things.”627

Sensible Encounter by Intentional Form

It is necessary, then, to examine how this impression is accomplished. As has been stated
before, knowledge begins with the impression upon the external senses of the form of an
objectively real thing. As the impression of the signet-ring left its form in the wax, but did not
leave its matter, so the impression of the objectively real object leaves its form on the external
sense without its matter.

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 This process takes place by actual entrance of the form of the object into the knowing subject.
As Klubertanz describes it, “to know another is in some sense to be (and thus to have become)
another, to take on the form of another. To be another, to possess another’s form—though not a
material, physical being and possession—is nevertheless real, for we actually have knowledge of
various things.”628
This indicates that the mode of existence of the object in external reality, and the mode of
existence of the same object in the knowing subject are different. The same object that exists
materially in external reality exists immaterially in the knowing subject. This immaterial existence
in the knowing subject is called intentional existence. Klubertanz describes the nature of
intentional existence as the “orientation of human knowledge to things known” as a “kind of
‘extending out toward or over, including’ (intendere) the object in itself.”629 Joseph Owens
observes that intention “seems to have meant originally an idea, or representation in thought. Later
the etymology of the word was used to bring out the notion that cognition ‘tends’ toward or into
its object.”630
The intentional existence is an immaterial existence of the form of the real object in the
knowing subject. The form of a man is impressed upon the sense of sight. But the sense of sight
does not become another person. The sense of sight remains a sense of sight while becoming the
form of the man sensed. To explain this process St. Thomas introduced the notion of the
“species.”631 The species is not a new or different entity that has been introduced into the knowing
process. Rather, the introduction of the term “species” is an effort to clarify the explanation of the
knowing process by naming a distinct aspect.
The form of the thing in reality, which is the metaphysical principle of substance and
determines what a thing is, is impressed upon the senses. The way the form informs matter to
constitute a substance in external reality is different from the way the same form informs the
knowing subject. The form is combined with matter to constitute a real being. Matter receives form
as its form by which it is determined to be a certain specific thing in reality. The intellect, however,
does not receive a form as its form, but, as John F. Peifer describes it, “precisely as it is the form
of the other, of the thing.”632 Matter receives its form materially. The knower receives the form of
the thing in reality immaterially, or spiritually.
The term “species,” then, serves to distinguish between the form as it informs matter and the
same form as it informs the knower. Robert Brennan provides a helpful explanation of the notion
of the species.

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 Figure 18: Sense Cognition: Part 1

The word species is very technical in meaning. Here it signifies, not a logical principle which
determines predicational existence; nor an ontological principle which determines natural
existence; but, if I may use the term, an epistemological principle which determines intentional
existence. In its cognitive meaning, therefore, a species is an intentional form. As an intentional
form it is an instrument of knowledge or an intermediary which enables the subject, without
ceasing to be what it is by nature, to become the object, without destroying the nature of the
object.633
The species is not another object, nor is it merely a copy of the object in reality. The species is
the sensible and intelligible aspect, namely the form, of the object in reality as it is in its immaterial
mode of existence in the knower. But, as Etienne Gilson insists, “it is of capital importance to
grasp that the species is not one thing and the object another; the species is the object itself ‘per
modum speciei,’ that is to say, the object considered in its action and its efficacy exercised upon a
subject.”634
The diagram in Figure 18 illustrates this first step in the knowing process. The circle represents
the thing in reality composed of matter and form. The five small squares represent the five external
senses. The five lines represent the impression of the form of the external object upon the
appropriate sense. The result is the formation of an impressed species, which is the form of the
object as it exists in the appropriate sense.

The Internal Senses

As a result of a sensible encounter with external reality, a sense organ, or sense organs, are
impressed upon by the form of the real object. The form of that object comes to exist in the
knowing subject as the species, or intentional form. However, it is apparent that there must be
something more to the sense experience than the sense impression of the five external senses. For

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example, it is evident that the sense of sight cannot ascertain the difference between blue and
sweet, simply because sweetness is not the proper object of sight. Also, experience indicates that
we are aware of our sense experience. As George Klubertanz argues, “the senses are passive
powers, and their objects are related to them as agent to patient. Since the sense cannot act upon
itself, it cannot know itself. Consequently, the sense power is not reflexive. And so none of the
external senses can be the principle of sensory consciousness. Consequently, in any and every act
by which we are aware of an external object, we can distinguish at least two elements, one of which
is the act of a particular external sense, and the other of which is the knowledge of that act.”635
These observations lead to the conclusion that there must be some additional power or powers
of the mind that are able to account for these experiences. These additional powers are the internal
senses.

Figure 19: Sense Cognition: Part 2

The Common Sense

It is a fact of experience that the mind is able to distinguish between red and warm. The sense
of sight is able to distinguish between red and blue, but not red and warm because it does not know
warm. There must, therefore, be a unifying power by which the mind is able to unite all of the
sensible aspects into a single perception. That power is called the common sense. This term is
traditional in scholastic philosophy and is too common to be replaced. However, it must not be
confused with the popular idiomatic use in English referring to a body of knowledge that is
generally accepted by a group. Gilson describes common sense as that “to which all sense-
perceptions must be submitted, as to their common centre, to enable it to judge of them and to
distinguish between them.”636
The function of the common sense, then, is to “perceive different sensible species, distinguish
them, compare them, [and to] be aware of them as entities that are distinct from the emotive
accompaniments they cause . . .”637 Additionally, the data that is received by the external senses is
“collected into a common image, which is attributed to one and the same external object.”638

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 The diagram in Figure 19 illustrates the next step in the knowing process. The reproduction
of the circle inside the square represents the fact that what is perceived is not simply a copy of the
thing in reality, but is that thing according to the mode of existence it takes in the mind of the
knower. The five lines leading from the individual senses to the common sense represents the
collecting aspect of the common sense. The result is the formation of an impressed species that is
the sensed object as a whole. It is an impressed species because the proper object of the common
sense is the form as it is impressed upon the senses.

Imagination639
Because the proper object of the common sense is the external object as it acts upon the external
senses, the common sense “functions only while the object is physically present and being sensed
by the external senses.”640 However, experience teaches us that we are able to recall at least some
of the experiences which we have had in the past. Even though the object may not be present, we
are able to recall the sensible species which was originally the result of a previous sense
experience. As Klubertanz observes, “it is immediately evident that we have a power of retaining
sensory experience. This power is called ‘retentive imagination’ . . .”641
The power of the imagination is composed of two aspects, the reproductive and the creative.
The reproductive imagination is that aspect by which the mind is able to represent (re-present, or
present again) things in the mind. The creative imagination is that aspect by which the mind is able
to combine the re-presentations or portions of re-presentations into images which have never
actually been the objects of the senses. But, as Brennan points out, “In both cases . . . the contents
of what is represented on the imaginal power must be drawn from previous experiences, even when
chimeras and mountains of gold are fantastically created.”642
The operation of the imaginal power is the production of an expressed species or image. Here
the term “image” is used in a technical sense and “is not a mere extrinsic picture or portrait, but it
is an expressed intentional similitude.”643 Brennan warns of the problems surrounding the use of
this term: “The term “image” is rather inadequate as a description of the product of the imagination,
because it is so immediately suggestive of something seen. The fact is, of course, that imaginal
power is limited only by the limitations of sensitive experience. Accordingly, we have images
arising from all the fields of sensation: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and somesthetic.”644
The terms “image,” “picture,” and “representation” are not, therefore, to be taken only in the
more common understanding of some sort of visual reproduction in the mind’s eye. Rather, these
terms are employed in an attempt to bring out the similitude that exists between the expressed
species and the object in reality. The visual representation in the mind of a past visual experience
is certainly one instance of an image. It is simply the case that the image is more than simply
visual, not that it is not visual at all.

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 Figure 20: The Idealistic Gap

Although this expressed species is identified as a representation or a similitude, it must not be

supposed that the realist account of the knowing process has come to the same point for which the
representationalist theories were criticized. The insurmountable difficulty of Representationalism,
or any “copy theory,” is that the real object is always outside the mind, while the mind attains only
a copy of the thing in reality. Consequently, the mind is never able to acquire the real object by
which to discover whether or not its copy is an accurate representation of the objectively real
object. This “gap” is illustrated in the diagram in Figure 20 .
In opposition to this, the realist view proposes that the real object actually enters the mind by
means of its form from which the imagination is able to make an expressed species. The mind,
then, has both the real object, by virtue of its intentional being, and the expressed species in the
mind by which a comparison can be made to discover the accuracy of the representation and
similitude of the expressed species.
This expressed species is designated by the term “phantasm” as it is considered in relation to
the act of the intellect, which will be considered next. The word “phantasm” derives from the Latin
word “phantasma,” which means “image,” “the representation of a thing in its absence . . .”645 The
diagram in Figure 21 illustrates the final step in sense cognition which results in the expressed
species or the phantasm. The phantasm is designated as an expressed species because the
imagination makes its object “appear.”646 Whereas the external senses and the common sense issue
in an impressed species by virtue of the impression of the form of the external object, the
imagination, and the other powers of the internal senses, issue in the expressed species by which
the image is expressed in the mind of the knower.
It may be objected that there is no readily available empirical evidence for the above delineated
scheme. However, the above explanation of sense cognition is an attempt to give a rational
explanation for common experience. The empirical evidence is the common experience of
sensation. The rational explanation is an attempt to analyze this experience and provide a possible
explanation for this common experience. But, rational explanations require rational justification,
not empirical justification. The justification for this explanation is that it seems to explain all the
data of experience.

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 Figure 21: Sense Cognition: Part 3

Summary of Sense Cognition

According to the Moderate Realist scheme, then, sense cognition is knowledge of the particular
thing as it is in itself647 according to its sensible qualities. The form of the thing in reality has come
to exist in the mind of the knowing subject as an impressed species in the external senses and
common sense, and as an expressed species in the imagination. It exists in the mind as an
intentional being by virtue of an immaterial mode of existence. The expressed species of the
imagination are not one thing while the impressed species of the common sense are another. Rather
the expressed species is “numerically the same species which are used by the sensus communis
[common sense],” for they are “transferred to and retained by the imagination, though used there
in a different manner.”648 The phantasm, which is the ultimate term of sensible cognition is that
upon which the intellect will operate issuing in intellectual knowledge. As Gerrity notes, “The
phantasm is formed not merely to represent a singular thing, but principally to serve as the material
out of which the active intellect abstracts the intelligible species.”649

Intellectual Cognition
The next step in the analysis of this Moderate Realist scheme is the examination of intellectual
cognition. The termination of sense cognition is the phantasm by which the particular thing in
reality is known as particular. The form of the thing in reality has been received into the mind of
the knower apart from its matter but along with all the concrete conditions of matter. By the senses

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the mind knows the qualities of this particular thing in the here and now. The necessity of this
process in the Moderate Realist scheme is explained by Benignus Gerrity.

The only proper stimulus and object of the operation of the intellect is the actually intelligible. Now . . . matter of itself is not
intelligible at all, and . . . the actually intelligible is nothing less than form entirely free from matter and material conditions.
But things composed of matter and form are, obviously, not pure forms; and the consequence is that the proper objects of man’s
intellect, as they exist naturally, are not actually intelligible. . . . The only way out of the difficulty is to show that these things
are made actually intelligible. Sensation and the formation of the phantasm . . . are the beginning of this process of making
them so, but it reaches its completion only in the operation of the intellect. 650

Experience teaches us that the mind is capable of knowing not only the particular, but also the
common or universal aspects of individual things. Our language is replete with words that have
general reference. As Mortimer Adler argues, “Unless, by means of our abstract concepts, we can
understand triangularity as such or what is common to particular cows, trees, and chairs, the
general or common names we use can have no significance, for they do not refer to this particular
triangle or to that particular cow, but to triangles in general and cows in general.”651
The process by which the mind comes to know the common nature, which is in the phantasm
that has been produced by the imagination, involves two powers of the soul: “By one power [the
soul] makes things actually intelligible, by abstracting their forms from individual matter, and thus
rendering them intelligible forms. This power is called the active [or agent] intellect. The other
power is the ability to receive these actually intelli[gible] species, and so to know the objects of
which they are the forms. This [is] generally called the possible intellect, sometimes . . . the passive
intellect.”652

The Agent Intellect

The intellect “lays hold upon the whatness of things, as universal . . .”653 It accomplishes this
task by an act of illumination and abstraction in which the common nature or essence is illumined
and separated from the individuating conditions of matter.

Illumination and Abstraction

Illumination
The first aspect of the action of the agent intellect is described as illumination. L. M. Regis
compares the act of illumination by the agent or active intellect to the illuminating function of
light: “. . . our intellect is called active because it illumines the phantasm as light illumines color,
which, in an objective context, means that just as color is actually a motive cause of our visual
power only because it is illumined by light, so the phantasm can move the possible intellect only
insofar as it is illumined by the light of the agent intellect.”654
But it is not the function of illumination to impose upon the phantasm its intelligibility, as
Gerrity points out: “The active intellect does not, as the analogy of the light might lead one to
believe, confer radical intelligibility on the intelligible species. It cannot do so, for these species
are forms, and every form is in its own right intelligible . . .”655
Consequently, it is not some intelligible thing other than the form of the thing in reality that
the intellect knows. That is to say, the agent intellect has not imposed upon the phantasm some
aspect that was not present in it before the act of illumination. It is the “freedom from materiality”
that is the “condition for the actualization of this radical intelligibility.”656 Illumination implies an
act of making “visible” that which is already present in the thing, not adding something to the
thing.

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 This point is made in order to set the realist position over against the claims of Nominalism at
this crucial point in the process of intellection. The nominalist claims that only particulars exist,
not universals. Extreme Nominalism, according to the Moderate Realist evaluation, claims that
there are no grounds for the universal in extra-mental reality. However, the Moderate Realist
position asserts that the common nature or essence is present in each individual, and, rather than
imposing upon the individual an aspect of commonality generated by the mind and represented by
general terms, as the nominalist claims, the agent intellect simply illumines the essence of the thing
and abstracts from the phantasm the common nature that is already and always present in the
individual.

Abstraction
The second aspect of the action of the agent intellect is abstraction. St. Thomas elucidates the
notion of abstraction.

Abstraction occurs in two ways: one, by way of combining and separating, as when we understand one not to be in another or
to be separate from it; two, by way of a single and absolute consideration, as when we understand one without considering the
other at all. . . . whatever pertains to the definition of any species of material reality, for instance stone or man or horse, can be
considered without individuating conditions which are no part of the definition of the species. And this is what I mean by
abstracting the universal from the particular, the idea from sense images, to consider the nature of a species without considering
individuating conditions represented by sense images.657

Abstraction, then, is the act of the agent intellect by which it separates the common nature that
has been illumined in order to form the impressed intelligible species. All those accidental features
that are not necessary to the constitution of the individual as this or that kind of substance are
stripped away by abstraction, and only the essence of the thing remains. That is to say, the agent
intellect abstracts the essence of the thing from all those qualities such as this color, or this weight,
which do not make the thing to be what it is. As John Peifer describes it, “The intellect . . . receives
intelligible similitudes in a more perfectly immaterial way, as stripped of the individuating
conditions of matter. It lays hold upon natures which are common to numberless individuals. The
intelligible species which activate the intellect must, therefore, be similitudes totally divested of
matter: both without matter and also without the individuating conditions of matter.”658 The act by
which this divesting of the individuating conditions of matter is accomplished in order to form the
impressed intelligible species is abstraction.

The Impressed Intelligible Species

The result of the action of the agent intellect is the formation of the impressed intelligible
species. It is not the function of the agent intellect to know, as John Peifer points out: “The active
[agent] intellect does not know; its whole function is to prepare for knowledge by producing the
impressed species which determine and actuate the possible intellect for the act of cognition.”659
The impressed intelligible species is “impressed” because the agent intellect is causing an
impression of the abstracted essence. It is “intelligible” because it is the intelligible aspect of the
thing, namely, its form. It is a “species” because this is the term which has been introduced in order
to identify the form of the thing as it is in the mind in its immaterial or intentional mode of
existence. The impressed intelligible species which has been produced by abstraction is none other
than the common nature or essence of the thing in reality. But, the notion of common nature must
not be confused with the notion of the universal. As Joseph Owens observes, “The universal . . .
has a type of community that makes it strictly one in itself, and does not allow it to be one and

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many at the same time. The universal is found only in the intellect, never in the sensible thing that
is known by its means.”660
It is important to point out again that what has been produced by the agent intellect in the act
of abstraction is not some different thing from the thing in reality, as Joseph Owens makes clear.

All that the intellect knows . . . is there in reality in the thing. The modes of being, on the other hand, follow respectively from
the nature of the intellect and the nature of the thing. The nature of a sensible thing is material; so in its real existence it has a
material, and therefore singular and contingent, mode of being. The nature of the intellect is immaterial; so when the same
sensible thing exists in the intellect, it has an immaterial mode of being, a mode that is universal, necessary, and immobile.
This difference in mode does not at all affect the identity of the object. It is the same thing no matter which of the two modes
it may assume.661

The Possible Intellect

The possible intellect is the passive power that is actualized by the impression of the intelligible
species, the latter being produced by the agent or active intellect. This intelligible species is the
common nature or essence of the thing in reality that has been abstracted from the phantasm. It is
intelligible because it is free, not only from matter, but also from the individuating conditions of
matter. The act of the possible intellect, then, is the act of intellectual knowledge. But, as Robert
Brennan points out, “The task of the possible intellect . . . is not only to receive and be fecundated,
but also to produce in its own right: and so it gives expression to its representational power by
forming a species of its own. This species is the idea or concept.”662

The Idea
Of paramount importance is the fact that the idea formed in the possible intellect is not the
object of knowledge. Rather, it is the means by which the thing is known. John Peifer elucidates
this point: “Properly speaking, thinking is not forming concepts, thinking is knowing things. But
we know things only as they are in knowledge, only as they are in concepts. Consequently, thinking
involves the forming of concepts in which we know things.”663
The idea which is formed by the action of the agent intellect is none other than the form of the
thing in reality “considered as having existence apart from the [thing itself].”664 Since the idea is
the form of the thing in reality, it is not the idea that is the object of knowledge. Rather, the idea is
the “instrument,” so to speak, by means of which the intellect knows the thing in reality. The object
of knowledge is the thing in reality, not the idea in the intellect.
The importance of this distinction is stressed by Mortimer Adler: “To suppose that ideas are
directly observable is the fundamental mistake of modern introspective psychology, from
Descartes and Locke down to the end of the nineteenth century and until the first two decades of
the present century . . .”665 By making the idea the object of knowledge, the intellect is barred from
ever knowing the thing in reality. As Adler observes elsewhere, “The root of the error lies in
neglect or ignorance of the intentional mode of existence that belongs to objects apprehended by
the mind. The error can, therefore, be avoided by a precise understanding of the relation between
intentionally existing objects and really existing things; to wit, that one and the same entity can
have both modes of existence.”666
We began this section on the knowing process with a definition of knowledge according to the
principles of Moderate Realism: “The noblest way of possessing a thing is to possess it in an
immaterial manner, that is, by possessing its form without its matter. And this is the definition of
knowledge.”667

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 Having arrived at the formation of the idea, we have reached that point where the knower and
the known have become one. The object in reality has come to exist in the intellect as the object
of knowledge. The knower and the known are one. By virtue of the existence of the form in the
mind of the knower, the mind has taken on the form of the known and has become one with the
known by sharing its form.

Figure 22: Knowledge

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 This whole process of knowledge is graphically illustrated in the diagram in Figure 22. As
before, the squares represent the powers of the soul, while the circles represent the object known.
Although the diagram illustrates the various powers and activities of the mind in the knowing
process, it must not be assumed that this indicates that the knowing process takes place in neatly
compartmentalized stages. Rather, the knowing process is virtually immediate. When the senses
are acted upon by a thing in reality, the mental response involves an immediate sense impression,
intellectual apprehension and judgment. The knowing process is not a succession of acts, but is
the act of the soul. As has been asserted before, it is not the senses nor the intellect that knows.
Man knows by means of his senses and intellect.

The Thought
To complete this investigation into this Moderate Realist view of the knowing process it will
be helpful to consider the three operations of the intellect in terms of rational processes. These acts
or operations include apprehension, judgment, and reasoning. It will not be the task here to deal
with these in any depth, but only briefly to describe these acts in an effort to complete the
discussion.

Apprehension
According to George Klubertanz, apprehension is “the operation by which we lay hold of a
thing, making the thing present in and to our intellect, but without affirming or denying.”668 As St.
Thomas points out, the human intellect does not attain a complete knowledge of reality all at once,
but moves toward understanding by degrees.669 The first act of the intellect is simple apprehension
by which the mind knows what a thing is. Because the intellect has received the intelligible species,
which is the form or “whatness” of the thing in reality, the first act of the intellect is to apprehend
the whatness of that which is known. However, as Joseph Owens points out, “Human cognition .
. . can never attain anything through simple apprehension without simultaneously knowing it as
existent either in reality or in the mind.”670

Judgment671
The act by which the intellect affirms or denies is the judgment.672 This act is that which
simultaneously accompanies the act of simple apprehension. The judgment can be viewed as either
an affirmation or a negation. As Klubertanz describes it, “In affirmation, we say that a thing is
(was, will be, either simply, or according to some mode of necessity, possibility, and so forth), in
negation, that a thing is not (was not, and so forth).”673
Judgment differs from apprehension in that judgment is the knowledge in terms of the
affirmation or denial of the existence of that which has been apprehended. Judgement is not
properly a knowledge of “whatness,” but of “thatness.” Again Klubertanz offers a helpful
explanation: “By judgment, we know the being as a whole: we know its essence inasmuch as the
judgment virtually contains an apprehension of the subject (and of a predicate if the judgment
contains a second term), and we know the subject as actually existing, when we assert (or deny)
that it is.”674

Reasoning
The operation of reasoning is the third act of the intellect. It is “the operation by which we
proceed from known truth to new truth distinct from the previously known truth but implied in
it.”675 Reasoning is a complex operation and involves many different types of movement. The

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more narrow classification of syllogistic reasoning moves from premises to conclusions. Other
types of reasoning include the more general aspects of movement from question to answer, the
building of definitions, the accumulation of empirical evidence in the investigation of an
hypothesis, etc.

Conception
One fruit of the operations of the intellect is the formation of the concept. This is one of the
most problematic aspects of the investigation of intellectual knowledge because there is such a
diversity of definitions employed by the various philosophers. Joseph Owens states,

By the very act of knowing the really existent thing, the intellect gives it intentional being. By reflection the intellect then
knows it [the really existent thing] through a new act of cognition as an existent in the mind. In this reflection the intellect sees
it [the really existent thing] as a concept. . . . The concept is produced as a similitude of the thing in order that the thing itself
may be known in and through it. . . . The similitude is the same knowable content considered precisely as in intentional being.
The concept, therefore, is the content as it exists in the intellect and not in the thing, in a way that constitutes a distinct object
of reflection.676

George Klubertanz equates the formation of the concept with the act of apprehension so that
the concept is the apprehension of the “whatness” of the thing in reality.677 Gilson defines the
concept as the “representation of the perceived object, as conceived by the intellect, i.e., created
within itself, and expressed by a word.”678 John Peifer’s definition is similar to these. “The concept,
then, is no mere picture or replica of an objective counterpart; it is not a thing which secondarily
bears a resemblance to something other than itself. It is the form of the exterior thing existing as
known in the intellect.”679
Robert Brennan equates the concept with the expressed intelligible species, the mental word
and the image of an intelligible order.680 Finally, Mortimer Adler makes the following observations
about concepts: “The first is that concepts are (a) acquired dispositions to recognize perceived
objects as being of this or that kind and at the same time (b) to understand what this kind or that
kind of object is like, with the result (c) that the individual having formed a concept is able to
perceive a number of sensible particulars as being of the same kind and to discriminate between
them and other sensible particulars that are different in kind.”681
Adler goes on to explain that the concept-formation in humans “enables them to perceive a
number of sensible particulars as being of the same kind and to discriminate between them and
other sensible particulars that are different in kind.”682
It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate the subtle differences that issued in these
various definitions and descriptions. It is sufficient to note the similarities. Each one of these
individuals emphasized the fact that the concept has specific reference to the kind of thing
understood by means of it. Also, each philosopher stressed the fact that the concept is not that
which is known, but that by which the object is known. In this respect, the term “concept” is simply
another word for “idea.” The term “idea” is apparently employed when consideration is given to
the entity as it exists in the intellect. The term “concept” is apparently employed when
consideration is given primarily to the content.

The Problem of Induction

A problem that has plagued modern philosophers when considering the possibility of
knowledge, particularly in the natural sciences, is the problem of induction. Induction is the
reasoning from particular instances of observation to a true conclusion about all instances of the

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same kind. The reason for addressing it here is because the problem arises as a result of
Empiricism, and is made acute because of the tendency of Empiricism to be nominalistic in its
metaphysics. The problem of induction is usually associated with the empirical observations of
David Hume by which he reasons to a universal conclusion about the nature of inductive reasoning.
One aspect of this problem is, according to Hume, that in order for induction to support conclusions
about the future, one must assume the cogency of induction. However, one can demonstrate the
cogency of induction only by assuming the cogency of induction.

It is impossible, therefore, that any arguments from experience can prove this resemblance of the past to the future; since all
these arguments are founded on the supposition of that resemblance. Let the course of things be allowed hitherto ever so regular;
that alone, without some new argument or inference, proves not, that, for the future, it will continue so. In vain do you pretend
to have learned the nature of bodies from your past experience. Their secret nature, and consequently, all their effects and
influence, may change, without any change in their sensible qualities. This happens sometimes, and with regard to some objects:
Why may it not happen always, and with regard to all objects? What logic, what process of argument secures you against this
supposition?683

As Couvalis characterizes it, “One supposed justification for induction is that most
generalizations defended by induction in the past have turned out to be true, so it is likely that
generalizations defended by induction in the future will be true. If this justification is to be
adequate, it must be true that the future is likely to be like the past in relevant respects. But it seems
that we could only know that the future is likely to be like the past in relevant respects by using
induction. After all, we have not yet experienced the future.”684 In other words, in order to know
that the success of induction in the past will carry over into the future one must assume the
uniformity of nature. But, the uniformity of nature is based upon the very inductive process that
needs justification.
Robert Audi presents the problem of induction in the following manner: “one cannot know a
priori that if the premises of a specific piece of inductive reasoning are true, then its conclusion is
also true. One can clearly conceive the former being true while the latter is false, whereas one
cannot conceive its being true that (1) all human beings are moral and Socrates is one of them, and
yet false that (2) Socrates is mortal. Thus, no matter how good the inductive reasoning is, it is
always (deductively) invalid.”685 Suppose, for example, the widely verified experience of the cycle
of the rising and setting of the sun. For hundreds, perhaps thousands, of years the universal
experience of human kind verifies the fact that, phenomenologically speaking, the sun has
followed the cycle rising and setting. However, to conclude from this that the sun will rise
tomorrow is not a necessary conclusion. Something might happen in nature that would obliterate
the sun or might change the course of the earth such that this expected event does not occur.
Although is seems physically unlikely, it is not logically contradictory to claim that the sun will
not rise tomorrow.
The problem of induction concerns the relationship between the premises and the conclusion
of an inductive argument. Either the conclusion of an inductive argument is a tautology or a non
sequitur. The term ‘tautology’ simply means the needless repetition of assertions that adds no
substantive content. Parker and Veatch give the example of examining every book on one’s
bookcase and concluding that all the books on the bookcase were published in the US:

Your induction would consist of a series of singular propositions followed by a universal conclusion:
This book was published in the U.S.
This book was published in the U.S.
This book was published in the U.S.
(And so on for every one of the books in the case)

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 ∴ All the books in the bookcase were published in the U.S.
But surely it would be hard to find a more patent tautology than this. For what is the conclusion here but a mere
restatement, in a kind of shorthand form, of what has already been said in the premises? 686

A tautology may be true, but it does not add anything to what is already known. If, as Parker
and Veatch go on to illustrate, one attempts to draw a conclusion without examining every single
item about which the argument is made, then the conclusion is a non sequitur, that is, it does not
follow. “For suppose that instead of examining all the books in your bookcase you examined only
some of them. These you found to be published in the U.S. and then from this you concluded that
all the books in your bookcase were published in the U.S. On what possible grounds would such
a conclusion follow?”687 Now, when we realize that this is the kind of argumentation that is used
in natural science, we see the import of the criticism. If induction yields only tautology or non
sequitur, then how can we claim to have gained knowledge in science by observation, experiment,
and further observation? Since no scientist can observe every possible instance of any natural
phenomenon, scientific conclusions must be based on the observation, no matter how controlled,
of a limited number of particulars. But, observation of a limited number of particulars cannot yield
a universal truth about the whole group of particulars.
There have been various attempts to extricate science from this dilemma, but none of these has
been definitively successful. This seems to be the case because current attempts to resolve the
problem have not considered that the problem of induction is nothing less than the application to
this method of a nominalistic assumption. The problem of induction, simply stated, is how one can
draw a conclusion about all from a knowledge of only some? Parker and Veatch provide a helpful
clarification and summary of the solution to the problem of induction:

For if each individual is so wholly distinct and different from every other as to have nothing in common with any other, then
clearly one will have no reason whatever to suppose that what is true of one will be true of another; and naturally, on such a
basis any inference from “some” to “all” would be a blatant non sequitur. On the other hand, if there are real natures and
essences present in individuals, such that whatever pertains to the nature of one will necessarily pertain to any other of a like
nature or essence, then the inference from “some” to “all” will no longer give the appearance of being so utterly unwarranted.
We might even say that on this basis inductive inference really ceases to be a passage from “some” to “all” in the nominalistic
sense altogether; rather it is an inference from observed cases to a nature or essence, i.e., to the actual “what” or “why” that is
present in these particular instances and that determines them to be as they are. And clearly, once one recognizes something as
pertaining to the nature or essence of the individuals observed, one thereby recognizes that the same thing will pertain to all
other individuals of a like nature or essence.688

The problem of induction turns out to be a problem only for the nominalist. If in fact there are
natures, and if it is possible for the mind to abstract from the particular that which constitutes the
nature of any thing, then any being in the past, present, or future having the same nature will be
subject to the predictions of induction concerning that nature.

Summary
The Moderate Realist view of knowledge as presented began with sense cognition which issued
in the formation of the phantasm, the form of the thing in reality, separated from its matter but not
from its concrete material conditions. The agent intellect illuminates the intelligible aspect of the
phantasm that is the common nature or essence of the thing. It abstracts this essence from the
phantasm forming an intelligible species that is impressed upon the possible intellect. The possible
intellect, in an act of understanding, expresses this intelligible species in the form of an idea or
concept. The intellect, by means of the expressed intelligible species, also called the idea or

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concept, knows the thing in reality. The knowable thing has become the known object of the
intellect, and knowledge is the result.
The implication of this explanation for the problem of objectivity cannot be understated. All
along the problem of objectivity and relativism have been predicated on a representationalist
epistemology that assumed a bifurcation between the subject and the object. Even the criticism of
a correspondence view of truth is predicated on representationalism and the denial of any kind of
direct knowledge of reality. Because the mind is incorporeal and the world is corporeal, the mind
has only a representation or copy of the extra-mental world. Consequently, the whole problem of
correspondence is insurmountable. The mind is not able to transcend itself and reach the world.
According to a Moderate Realist approach, the world is able to enter the mind by virtue of the
forms that constitute the things in the world as the kinds of things they are. The consequent of this
is that direct realism is confirmed. The mind is able to attain a direct access to the world of things
by the fact that the world has the kind of constitution that it does, namely, the constitution of form
and matter. Once a direct contact with the world is articulated, all the problems of
representationalism dissolve, and the possibility of objectivity is affirmed. Knowledge can be
objective because the mind attains to reality directly. And if knowledge can be objective, then so
can understanding and communication. This is the next step in our analysis of the objectivity of
meaning.

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 9 HOW DO WE COMMUNICATE WHAT WE KNOW?

The Communication of Meaning

In his book entitled Some Questions About Language, Mortimer J. Adler makes the following
observation: “There is one property of language about which universal agreement exists. Whatever
else can be said about language, one indisputable fact about it is that its component elements‒its
words and sentences‒possess a property that has been variously called ‘sense,’ ‘significance,’ or
‘meaning.’ Meaningless marks or sounds, however they may be arranged or used, do not constitute
a language. A meaningless language is a contradiction in terms.”689 In his article titled “The
Philosophy of Language,” Louis Lachance identifies the subject matter of his inquiry by drawing
a distinction between the employment of signs in the animal kingdom and the use of language
among humans. He identifies the distinctive difference by pointing out that “Thanks to an
association of images, fixed by nature or by repeated experiences,” animals employ signs “without
perceiving the relation of meaning.”690 According to George Klubertanz, “Language is an arbitrary
sign or system of signs for expressing and communicating knowledge and other mental states, and
emotions.”691
The distinctive ingredient in each one of these statements about the nature of language is the
aspect of the employment of signs to communicate meaning. It is not that signs simply
communicate meaning, but that language involves the awareness of the relation of meaning. That
is to say, language is not merely the employment of signs to communicate meaning. In an
analogous way we can say that a wolf communicates to the rabbit it desires to devour. Although it
is by instinct that the rabbit estimates the danger the wolf presents and makes every effort to save
itself, the rabbit is not aware of any relation of meaning even though it makes use of this relation.
By contrast, human beings not only make use of the meaning relationship of signs, but are also
aware of the relation between signs and what they signify. That is to say, humans are aware of the
relation of meaning. As Jacques Maritain asserts, “what defines language is not precisely the use
of words, or even of conventional signs; it is the use of any sign whatsoever as involving the
knowledge or awareness of the relation of signification, and therefore a potential infinity; it is the
use of signs in so far as it manifests that the mind has grasped and brought out the relation of
signification.”692

The Elements of Language

An investigation of the nature of language, then, should be concerned with meaning. As
Mortimer Adler states, “the first and minimal obligation of a philosophy of language is to explain
or account for language as an instrument of communication, through the use of which we are able
to converse with one another about matters or items that we are able to consider in common.”693
But as has already been observed in the quotes above, language is particularly a system of signs
by which meaning is communicated. In preparation for an investigation of meaning we will
consider the nature of the sign that is the carrier of meaning.

The Sign
A sign “leads the knowing faculty to apprehend something other than itself, in virtue of a real
relation between the two.”694 It is important to emphasize certain aspects of this definition. First
of all, a sign leads. As we shall see in our consideration of the formal sign, it is not essential to the
nature of a sign that it be something in its own right in order to be a sign. Some signs are also
things. Some signs are pure signs and not independent things. Second, a sign leads a knowing

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faculty. “The sign relation is an object of knowledge . . .”695 A sign is not the efficient cause of
behavior. A sign signifies by virtue of a relation of which the knower must be aware. A sign
functions noetically. Third, a sign leads a knowing faculty to something other than itself. Signs
signify something other than themselves. A sign cannot be a sign of itself. Finally, a sign is that
which leads a knowing faculty to apprehend something other than itself, by virtue of a real relation
between the sign and that which is signified. A sign signifies by virtue of a real relation, or a
relation in reality. A sign cannot function if it is only a sign of a relation in the mind, for the relation
in the mind is destined ever to be only in the mind of the one in whom the relation exists. If the
relation is not capable of becoming extra-mental, it is not communicable.
There are essentially two kinds of signs, the instrumental sign and the formal sign. The
instrumental sign can be considered under two further classifications, namely, the natural
instrumental sign and the conventional instrumental sign. Because the nature of the formal sign is
more abstract, and the natural instrumental sign is the more readily understood, we will conduct
our investigation from the less difficult to the more difficult.

Instrumental Sign
An instrumental sign is so designated because it functions as an instrument for signifying the
sign relationship. Henry Veatch identifies an instrumental sign as “one which signifies its
significatum [that which is signified by the sign] to a knowing power only by being first
apprehended itself. That is to say, one must first apprehend the sign and only then does one
apprehend the significatum.”696 In order for an instrumental sign to carry out its signifying function
it must be known first before it can lead the knower to what it signifies. The instrumental sign is
either natural or conventional.

The Natural Instrumental Sign

A natural instrumental sign is one in which the relation between the sign and that which it
signifies is a natural relation. That is, the relation obtains by virtue of the natures of the sign and
its significatum. As St. Augustine observed, “Natural signs are those which, apart from any
intention or desire of using them as signs, do yet lead to the knowledge of something else, as, for
example, smoke when it indicates fire.”697 Smoke naturally signifies fire by virtue of its nature.
Generally speaking, fires produce smoke. Consequently, when an observer knows that what he is
observing is smoke, this naturally leads the observer to the fire from which the smoke has been
produced.

The Conventional Instrumental Sign

A conventional instrumental sign is instrumental because it must first be known as what it is
before it can perform its signifying function. A conventional sign is “one whose significance comes
not from its own nature but from human convention—e.g., words, signals, guideposts, etc.”698 St.
Thomas has observed the distinction between natural and conventional signification: “things that
signify naturally are the same among all men; but the signification of letters and vocal sounds . . .
is not the same among all men.”699
Nevertheless, a conventional sign must be known as it is in itself in order to function as a sign.
As Adler points out, “. . . they are themselves objects of which we are perceptually aware as well
as instruments that function to bring to mind the objects they signify.”700 The conventional signs
employed in the Russian language do not function as signs for the individual who cannot read or
understand the Russian language. An individual who does not know even of the existence of the

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Russian language would not realize that certain marks and notations on paper were in fact letters
of the Russian alphabet, or words of the Russian language. Even though someone might have seen
the letters and have been told that these particular marks were actually letters in the Russian
language, they would still not function as signs for that individual. A conventional sign is
significant by convention and functions as a sign for those who belong to that language community.
A language community employs a system of marks and notations as instrumental signs. John
Lyons gives a commonly employed example to illustrate the nature of the conventional sign: “In
English there is a word ‘tree,’ in German there is a word ‘Baum’ and in French there is a word
‘arbre’; and each of these words, we will assume, has the same signification: it may be used to
refer to the same class of objects. These three words are quite different in form; and no one is more
naturally appropriate to signify trees than are the other two. To make the point rather more
precisely none of the forms of ‘tree’ . . . or of ‘Baum’ . . . or of ‘arbre’ . . . whether written or
spoken is naturally representative of trees or of their distinctive properties.”701
Lyons’ quote brings out the fact that linguistic signs are conventional in nature, and that there
is no natural relationship between a linguistic sign and what it signifies. A word may be used to
refer to the “same class of objects” because of the common nature of the objects in that class. But,
as Lyons points out, no one word is more naturally appropriate to signify a class of objects, or their
common nature than is any other word.

Formal Sign
The Nature of the Formal Sign
The formal sign is more difficult to examine because of its nature. Henry Veatch defines the
formal sign as, “one whose whole nature and being are simply a representing, or a meaning, or a
signifying of something else. Such signs, in other words, are nothing but meanings or
intentions.”702 John Oesterle clarifies the distinction between the nature of the instrumental sign
and that of the formal sign. His description will help to elucidate the nature of the formal sign:
“The instrumental sign represents something else mediately; it must be itself known as an object
in order to signify. The formal sign represents something else immediately; it is known, not as an
object, but formally as that in which the object is represented to the knowing power.”703
Another method of considering the formal sign is to consider it in terms of the metaphysical
principles of form and matter. As has been described in the previous chapter, the thing in reality
enters the knowing subject by means of its form. The form is the metaphysical principle of
determination by virtue of which a thing is what it is. The entrance of the form into the knowing
subject informs the mind in a manner analogous to the manner in which it informs matter. In a
sense, the mind becomes the thing in reality by virtue of the presence in the mind of the form of
that thing. In the intellect, the form is separated from any conditions of matter. The resulting entity
that exists in the intellect is called the concept. The concept is nothing else but the existence of the
form of the thing as it has been abstracted from the individual. The concept is the formal sign.704
The concept exists, not as another thing that must itself be perceived, but as the form, the
“whatness,” of the real thing now existing in the mind. This is the formal sign. The formal sign is
“formal” because it is the form of the real thing now existing in the mind. Its only nature is the
nature of that of which it is the form, i.e., the real thing. The formal sign of a man, then, is the form
of the man now existing in one’s intellect. The formal sign, in this case, has no other nature than
the nature of the man whose form it is. Consequently, when the formal sign is known, it is in fact
the form of the man in reality that is known, not some other object that points to this nature.

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The Necessity of the Formal Sign
Oesterle provides an explanation of the need for the formal sign, which, although rather
lengthy, will be helpful in understanding the place of the formal sign:

the insufficiency of the instrumental sign, which, negatively, shows the need of the formal sign, can be indicated. Any
instrumental sign, by the nature of the case, involves ambiguity. This is what is meant by “interpretation” for, being that kind
of sign‒being only instrumental‒it must be interpreted since it can signify more than one thing. The instrumental sign depends
for its signification, not upon itself, but upon the signification it is expressing. Hence it is the signification it is expressing which
must be obtained in communication. But to obtain the signification the instrumental sign is expressing is to go beyond the
instrumental sign itself. Since, then, the instrumental sign is only the extrinsic expression of signification, there is nothing to
prevent one and the same instrumental sign from expressing different significations. If, then, there were only instrumental signs
there would be inescapable ambiguity, and hence no communication would be possible; there would be only an endless regress
of ambiguous signs. Communication, then, depends upon formal signs, which is only another way of saying that instrumental
signs, even to be signs at all, must depend upon formal signs.705

Figure 23: Signs

Oesterle’s argument is another way of stating Aristotle’s argument from predication (discussed
above as a demonstration of the reality of substance). If all predication is accidental, which is the
nature of the instrumental sign, then communication becomes impossible because predication falls
into an infinite regress. The signification of an instrumental sign is accidental to the nature of the
sign. There is nothing that requires a certain instrument to be a sign of this or that particular thing.
It is essential that an instrumental sign be a sign of something, but nothing that dictates that it be
the sign of one thing over another. Because of this, an instrumental sign can become the sign of
many different things within the confines of the conventions of its language community. But, all
signs cannot be signs accidentally, else there would be nothing that signifies essentially and
necessarily. But there must be something that signifies essentially and necessarily, else
signification, as predication, falls into an infinite regress. Hence, the formal sign is necessary for
communication because its essence is the form of the thing in reality. Therefore it signifies
essentially and necessarily that of which it is the formal sign.

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 The diagram in Figure 23 illustrates the different kinds of signs which we have described and
the relationships between their functions.

The Word
A word is a sign by convention. Although there is some controversy among linguists over what
constitutes a word, it is beyond the scope of this book to attempt to adjudicate between the various
proposals. By whatever criteria a linguist determines what constitutes a word, there is one
universally acknowledged fact concerning the word. A word is a carrier of meaning. As Mortimer
Adler has observed, “A meaningful notation is a word. Notations can be meaningless, but there
are no meaningless words.”706 Although it may be objected that other notations are meaningful
which would not necessarily be considered words, such as musical notations or chemical notations,
it is not at all clear that these types of notations are meaningful in the same way a word is
meaningful. Musical notations and chemical notations functions as symbols. A musical notation
does not mean music in the same way the word “music” means music. Even a chemical notation
is not necessarily meaningful in the way a word is meaningful. The chemical notation NA does
not mean sodium in the same way the word “sodium” means sodium. The notation NA stands for
sodium. The word “sodium” does not stand for sodium, but means sodium. However, to the degree
that a notation loses its function as a symbol and becomes functional as a word, to that degree it is
a word, and hence a meaningful notation.

Two Classifications of Words

Words, as carriers of meaning, can exist as sounds in the air, as notations or marks on a surface.
We will call these external words. But there is another kind of word that exists in the mind which
we will call the mental word. In distinguishing between these two classifications of words, we will
begin our brief consideration of the word as it is in external reality.

The External Word

An external word is a meaningful sound or notation. An external word is meaningful by
convention. A word, then, is a conventional sign. Aristotle recognized that words were meaningful
by convention. He stated, “And just as letters are not the same for all men so neither are vocal
sounds the same . . .”707 Aristotle also made a distinction between the written word and the spoken
word, a distinction that illuminates the relation of the word to its meaning. He said, “Now words
that are in vocal sound are signs of passions in the soul, and words that are written are signs of
words in vocal sound.”708 This statement sets up a relation of proportion between the written word
and the spoken word, and between the spoken word and the passion of the soul. The written word
is to the spoken word as the spoken word is to the passion of the soul. Each is a sign, and a
conventional sign.
However, Aristotle pointed out that “the passions of the soul, of which vocal sounds are the
first signs, are the same for all; and things of which passions of the soul are likenesses are also the
same.”709 In his commentary on this section, St. Thomas explains Aristotle’s statement.

When he speaks of passions in the soul we are apt to think of the affections of the sensitive appetite, such as anger, joy, and
other passions . . . But here Aristotle is speaking of vocal sounds that are significant by human institution. Therefore, “passions
in the soul” must be understood here as conceptions of the intellect, and names, verbs, and speech, signify these conceptions
of the intellect immediately . . . They cannot signify things, as is clear from the mode of signifying, for the name “man” signifies
human nature in abstraction from singulars; hence it is impossible that it immediately signify a singular man. 710

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 This is a succinct statement of that which has been argued in the section on Metaphysics and
Epistemology above. The word is an instrumental sign by convention. However, the conception in
the mind is not a conception by convention, but is, by virtue of human nature, the same for all men.
Unlike Immanuel Kant’s system that is built upon the hope that the categories are the same for all
men, the Moderate Realist system asserts the existence of a common human nature that can be
accounted for by analytical investigation of reality as it is in itself.
Kant asserted that there was a shared rational structure. The Moderate Realist system asserts
that there is a common metaphysical nature. A metaphysical nature can be accounted for by an
explication of the nature of reality. If reality is of that nature, then all men share the same nature
because that is the nature of reality. However, a rational structure cannot be accounted for by an
explication of the nature of rationality, for such an explication would apply only to the rational
structure of the one providing the explication. There would have to be some recourse to universal
reality, and some way for Kant to account for the fact that all reality is as he has asserted it to be.
However, his own system has eliminated this possibility by making it impossible to know anything
as it is in itself, even the rational natures of others.
A word, then, is a conventional sign of a conception in the soul. But the external word is a
certain kind of conventional sign. Specifically, an external word is an instrumental, conventional
sign. Words are instrumental signs because “they have perceptible existence in themselves apart
from signifying . . .”711 An individual must know the word itself before he can be led to that which
the word signifies.

The Mental Word

In a Moderate Realist epistemology there is another kind of word identified as the mental word.
Here the aspects of Epistemology and Linguistics merge. As has been previously emphasized, the
concept is the means by which the thing in reality is known. The form of the thing comes to exist
in the mind of the knower as an intentional being. The nature is abstracted by the agent intellect
from the phantasm and informs the possible intellect. In the possible intellect the concept is
formed, which is the nature of the thing in reality. This concept is a formal sign because it directs
the mind to a knowledge of the thing in reality. It is not the thing in reality in its extrinsic being.
As Margaret Gorman has pointed out, “Knowledge . . . is in the knower according to the manner
of the knower, not according to the manner of the known.”712 The concept is the real thing
according to its intentional being in the mind of the knower. As Klubertanz sums it up,

what we mean primarily and ordinarily by the term “intellectual knowledge” is the intellectually known object—the object
produced in and by the act of understanding. This immanently produced object is necessary because the really existing object
(or the object that can exist) is (a) sometimes absent, and (b) sometimes does not exist in exactly the same way as it is known,
as in the universal knowledge we have of singular things. Hence, that which we know about something is a medium which is
itself known, and in which the real or existent object is known. Such a medium is a pure or formal sign, whose whole reality
lies in its reference to the thing that is known. This formal sign is called the “mental word.”. . . It is the mental word which is
directly referred to by, and is the meaning of, the external word, (which is spoken, heard, and so forth).713

That which is known by the intellect, then, is variously called the expressed species, when
considering it according to its metaphysical constitution; the concept, when considering it
according to its content; the formal sign, when considering it according to its function of
representing to the intellect the thing in reality; and the mental word, when considering it as the
mental counterpart to the external word. As St. Thomas describes it, “As used of us, speaking
signifies not merely understanding but understanding plus the expression from within oneself of

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some conception; and we cannot understand in any way other than by forming a conception of this
sort. Therefore, properly speaking, every act of understanding is, in our case, an act of uttering.”714
It is this “expression from within oneself” that is identified as the mental word. It will be
recalled that from the point of view of Moderate Realist metaphysics, the species formed by the
possible intellect in the act of understanding is the expressed intelligible species. It is expressed
because it is an act of understanding, or an expression in the mind of the concept, the content of
which is that thing in reality which is being known. As John Peifer explains, “in understanding we
speak within ourselves what we know, and we know what we speak. Speaking what we know, we
express a word to ourselves in which we know what we know.”715
It must not be thought, however, that when the mind expresses the mental word that it
necessarily employs a certain linguistic sign. We have all had the experience of not being able to
think of a word by which we might express what is on our mind. The mind engages in a process
by which it somehow brings up for consideration many different linguistic signs, or words, each
of which is in turn rejected because for some reason it does not quite capture, as an external word,
the mental word present in the mind. Suddenly, the mind finds that one word for which it was
looking that can adequately articulate the thought.
Before that linguistic sign or word was discovered, however, the thought itself was beyond our
reach, although it was there in the mind. This is to say, we knew what we wanted to say. We just
did not have the right word. We could possibly substitute a description, or perhaps we could
identify what we wanted to say by some ostensible indication. But, until that one word was
discovered, we were unable adequately to express the thought, even to ourselves. Etienne Gilson
provides a helpful comment: “However, the existence of unspoken thought [that is prelinguistic
thought] appears to be attested to by interior observation. Thought is anterior to speech with an
anteriority at once temporal and causal. The anteriority of time can be more or less long. Quite
often it is so short that we could take it to be almost simultaneous. But even then, what I want to
say to myself or to others is something which has not yet been said.”716
Before the linguistic expression is spoken in the mind, the mind has formed a concept, an
inward expression of understanding, called the mental word. This mental word is the inward
expression of which the linguistic word is the external expression. The diagram in Figure 24
illustrates this point. The first square represents sensible perception. The second square represents
intellectual cognition. The abstracted nature is the concept, the content of which is universal man.
This concept is expressed in the mind in an act of understanding as the mental word. The linguistic
sign “man” is the external expression of that act of understanding. The linguistic expression could
be any equivalent external word from any language which carries the same meaning, such as
anthropos in Greek, or ish in Hebrew. As Aristotle has observed, the passions of the soul are the
same for all men even though the linguistic signs are conventional.717

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 Figure 24: The Mental Word

The Nature of Words

The nature of words can be considered from two vantage points. The external word has both a
linguistic nature and a metaphysical nature. The metaphysical nature of the mental word has been
considered above in the discussion of the nature of the concept, the formal sign, and the mental
word. However, the relationship between the mental word and the external word accounts for the
metaphysical nature of the external word. We will consider first the linguistic nature of the external
word.

Linguistic Nature
It is obvious that, although not all words are name-words, some obviously are. Name-words
are words that name things, such as a horse, a man, or a star ship; states of affairs, such as
happiness; or real relations such as justice and truth. As Klubertanz describes it, “Some language
‘stands for’ or ‘represents’ things (for example, ‘book’), but some language does not (for example,
‘more,’‘truth’).”718 Additionally, some words have no lexical meaning in themselves, but only as
they relate to other words in the construction of meaningful expressions, such as prepositions and
conjunctions. Mortimer Adler provides a helpful description on the distinction between these kinds
of words: “The words classified as categorematic have lexical meaning in their own right and
without serving to qualify or modify the meaning possessed by other words. In contrast, the words
classified as syncategorematic, and sometimes called ‘particles’ . . . do not have lexical meaning
in their own right, but only when they serve to qualify, modify, or relate other words in significant
phrases or sentences.”719
The function of categorematic or name-words, then, is to designate some thing, state, or
relation that actually exists or could exist in reality. Syncategorematic words function syntactically
in meaningful phrases or sentences. Syncategorematic words can also represent real relations or
logical relations. For example, the syncategorematic word “in” can be used as a preposition in a

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meaningful sentence to represent the real relation of position. The word “is” can function
syncategorematically to communicate the logical relation of identity.
The linguistic nature of words, then, is exhausted in these two categories. As Mortimer Adler
asserts, “All the words listed in the dictionary of a language can be exhaustively divided into name-
words having designative significance and linguistic operators having syntactical significance.”720

Metaphysical Nature
This brings us to the metaphysical nature of words. Although it is not possible to deal with the
proposal of Ferdinand de Saussure concerning the nature of words, for to do so would involve a
whole book unto itself, suffice it to say that his effort to prevent the consideration of the nature of
words according to the analogy of body and soul is unconvincing.721 The relationship of body and
soul, which according to Moderate Realism is a metaphysical relationship of form and matter, is
well suited to illustrate the metaphysical nature of the word. In fact, St. Thomas employed this
very analogy in describing the metaphysical nature of the word: “The name and verb . . . signify
by human institution, that is, the signification is added to the natural thing as a form to matter, as
the form of a bed is added to wood.”722
The relationship of form and matter as it relates to the nature of the word becomes clear when
we remember that the mental word, which is the concept in the mind, is the intellectual counterpart
to the linguistic word. The mental word, then is the form of which the linguistic sign is the matter.
This relationship will become more significant when we discuss meaning below.

The Function of Language

Having looked at the basic elements of language, we move on to consider the function of
language. As has been observed above, the function of language is to communicate meaning.
Battista Mondin has clearly expressed the Moderate Realist view of language: “Language is by
definition that activity with which man, through vocal or written signs, puts himself in
communication with his own peers (or with some other intelligent being, for instance God) to
express his own sentiments, desires, or knowledge.”723 According to Mondin’s description, this
uniquely human activity is accomplished by means of “vocal or written signs.”724 Signs
accomplish their instrumental task by virtue of a relation of signification.

Signification
As John Lyons has observed, “The meaning of linguistic expressions is commonly described
in terms of the notion of signification: that is to say, words and other expressions are held to be
signs which, in some sense signify, or stand for other things.”725 We will consider some of the
approaches to the notion of signification.

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 Figure 25: Triangle of Significance

Behaviorism
A widely known description of signification from a behaviorist viewpoint was proposed by
Ogden and Richards. Their description is illustrated as a triadic relation pictured in Figure 25.726
The point of the triangle represented in this diagram by the letter A, is labeled by O&R as
“SYMBOL.” Point B in this diagram is labeled by O&R as “THOUGHT OR REFERENCE.”
Between point A and B they identify what they hold to be a causal relation that goes from B to A,
if the thought elicits an appropriate linguistic sign, or from A to B if the sign elicits the
accompanying thought. According to their diagram, A “Symbolizes” B. Point C is labeled
“REFERENT.” Between B and C they identify “other causal relations” by which they indicate that
B “Refers to” C. These relations go from C to B when a referent elicits an appropriate thought.
Between A and C they identify “an imputed relation” in which A “Stands for” C. The dotted line
between A and C indicates an indirect relation between these two points. Accordingly, “Between
the symbol and the referent there is no relevant relation other than the indirect one, which consists
in its being used by someone to stand for a referent. Symbol and Referent, that is to say, are not
connected directly . . . but only indirectly round the two sides of the triangle.”727
O&R’s account of the relation between Symbol and Thought, and between Thought and
Referent is set forth in terms of a theory of behavioristic response.728 John Lyons summarizes the
proposition of O&R: “Some object (C) in the external world calls forth a thought (B) in the mind
of the speaker and this thought in turn elicits from him a sign (A).”729 Although it is not within the
scope of this book to mount a comprehensive criticism of behaviorism, it will be helpful to note
that behaviorism of any kind is a self-defeating theory. If in fact the relation between A and B or
between B and C is causal in a behavioristic manner, then it is self-defeating to attempt a logical
argumentation in hopes of bringing about a cognitive response to the stimuli which O&R present.
If the relation is simply a behavioral response to stimuli, then my behavioral response, which is
that there is a logical and cognitive relation between A & B and a natural relation between B and
C, is just as legitimately a response to the stimuli as the response which O&R affirm. In other

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words, there is no way for O&R to present their views as true over against opposing views since
all views are merely behaviorist responses to stimuli. Behavioristic accounts are inadequate for
explaining logical and cognitive relations. As Mortimer Adler observes, “Limited to accounting
for the connections between stimuli and responses . . . behavioristic theory, in any of its forms,
cannot explain how meaningless notations become meaningful words that have referential
significance.”730
The main difficulty that O&R face in their proposal is the relation between thought and
referent. John Oesterly identifies this problem: “Because they recognize only instrumental signs,
they cannot treat the relation of Thought and Referent semantically; hence the departure from
semantics at this point and the quite arbitrary positing of the behavioristic presumption.
Behaviorism, purified or unpurified, cannot use signs intelligibly.”731
Ogden and Richards have fallen victim to the prevailing philosophical assumption of
empiricism in which metaphysics has supposedly been eliminated. Consequently, they cannot
explain the relation between thought and thing in terms of the necessary formal sign in the intellect.
Their problem stems from the fact that they consider all signs to be instrumental signs, as is
indicated from their observation about the sign situation: “If we stand in the neighbourhood of a
cross road and observe a pedestrian confronted by a notice To Grantchester displayed on a post,
we commonly distinguish three important factors in the situation. There is, we are sure, (1) a Sign
which (2) refers to a Place and (3) is being interpreted by a person. All situations in which Signs
are considered are similar to this.”732
As we have attempted to show, not all situations in which signs are considered are in fact
similar to this. If the Moderate Realist theory is correct, the formal sign is not something which
has its own perceptible being, and the relation between the formal sign and the thing in reality is
natural, for the nature of the formal sign is the essence of the thing in reality as it exists in the
mind. O&R could not find a link between the thought and the thing as long as they held that the
relationship was that of instrumental sign to referent. What could possibly account for the fact that
a particular thought was linked to a particular thing in reality? The behaviorist account is
unacceptable because it cannot account for different “interpretations” of signs. If the response to a
sign is simply a behavioristic response, then there is no way to explain the different interpretations
of signs, because an explanation implies a rational, not simply a behavioristic endeavor. If a reason
can be given for these differences, then this reason is not simply a behavioristic response to stimuli,
but is a rational presentation that involves truth claims. But truth claims are not simply
behavioristic responses to stimuli.

Structuralism
In expounding the ramifications of Saussure’s doctrine of the absolute arbitrariness of the sign,
Jonathan Culler points out that one of its most significant implications is that language cannot be
a nomenclature. For Saussure this means that language cannot be “simply a nomenclature [series
of names arbitrarily selected] for a set of universal concepts,”733 because, “Languages do not
simply name existing categories; they articulate their own.”734 In support of this, Culler observes,
“if language were a set of names applied to independently existing concepts, then in the historical
evolution of a language the concepts should remain stable.”735
First of all, it is not necessary that language be a nomenclature for it to be partially composed
of a nomenclature. Language may in fact be partly a nomenclature, and partly some other aspect
or aspects, as we have discussed above. Secondly, it is not necessary that concepts be immutable
in order to have names applied to them. Concepts can be independently existing and mutable.

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Immutability is not an essential aspect of independently existing concepts. At least this has not
been demonstrated, but merely asserted. Thirdly, it is simply not the case that in a nomenclature
names must be applied to concepts. Rather, names may be applied to things in reality by means of
the concept. It is not necessary that the name “tree” name my concept of a tree. Rather, the name
“tree” may be applied to the independently existing real tree as known by means of the concept.
However, Culler attacks the idea that language is a nomenclature by giving an example of what
he understands to be changing concepts.

The English word cattle, for example, at one point meant property in general, then gradually came to be restricted to four-
footed property (a new category), and finally attained its modern sense of domesticated bovines. Or again, a “silly” person was
once happy, blessed, and pious. Gradually this particular concept altered; the old concept of “silliness” transformed itself, and
by the beginning of the sixteenth century a silly person was innocent, helpless, even deserving of pity. The alteration of the
concept continued until, eventually, a silly person was simple, foolish, perhaps even stupid.736

In attempting to justify the claim that language is not a nomenclature, Culler employs these
examples in an illustration: “If language were a nomenclature we should be obliged to say that
there exist a number of distinct concepts and that the signifier silly was attached first to one and
then to another. But clearly this is not what happened: the concept attached to the signifier silly
was continually shifting its boundaries, gradually changing its semantic shape, articulating the
world in different ways from one period to the next.”737
But Culler’s own account contradicts his point. Culler has employed a very subtle equivocation
here. Indeed, what silly was employed to signify shifted. But it was not the concept of being happy,
blessed, pious that changed, for in fact it was still possible to employ linguistic signs to signify
these concepts. The concepts in fact remained the same. It was the referential significance of the
word that in fact changed. The word, in Culler’s own account, “continually shifted its boundaries,
gradually changing its semantic shape, articulating the world in different ways from one period to
the next.” But to articulate the world differently is to acknowledge that it is not necessarily the
world that is changing, but perhaps only my articulation of it. It was the semantic range of the
word that shifted, not necessarily the concepts themselves. The same concepts were still capable
of signification, only by other signifiers that were also shifting.
By the statement, “the concept attached to the signifier silly was continually shifting its
boundaries, gradually changing its semantic shape . . .” Culler is either saying that the concept
“happy, blessed, and pious” eventually became the concept “simple, foolish, perhaps even stupid,”
in which case he is claiming that one concept has become another, or he is saying that the real state
of affairs once signified by the signifier “silly” was no longer signified by this signifier, in which
case the concept of the real state of affairs never changed. In fact, the very description that Culler
claims was not the case is the only reasonable explanation. The concept of the real state of affairs‒
that some people are happy, blessed, and pious‒remained the same throughout the shift of
signification of the word silly. In fact, it is still possible to employ a sign to signify the state of
being happy, blessed, and pious.
Culler equivocates in his use of the word “concept.” In his description of a “silly” person as
being “happy, blessed, and pious,” he is employing the term concept with reference to a particular
state of affairs in reality. When he says, “Gradually this particular concept altered,” he has shifted
the meaning of the word “concept” from a concept of the state of affairs in reality to the concept
of the signification of a term. In the first instance he is talking about the concept of a “happy” kind
of person, previously signified by the term “silly.” In the second instance he is talking about the
concept of the signification of the term “silly,” not the concept of the “happy” kind of person. His

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first use of the term concept is with reference to the state of affairs, while his second use is with
reference to the manner of signification. He has employed two levels of the term concept without
differentiating between them. The first level is the concept as it relates to the kind of person being
signified. The second level is the concept of the signification of the term ‘silly.’ What he has said
is this; the concept of what kind of person is signified by the term ‘silly’ was the concept of a
happy kind of person. Later, the concept of what kind of person is signified by the term ‘silly’
became a stupid kind of person. Now, the concept of what kind of person the term ‘silly’ signified
indeed changed. But this is the second-level use of the concept. It is the concept of the signification
of a term, not the concept of the real state of affairs.
This claim is perfectly reasonable. The concept of what ‘silly’ signified has indeed changed.
The concept that silly once signified happy, has changed. But, this says absolutely nothing about
what they call independently existing concepts of reality. Culler’s, and by association Saussure’s,
claims do not fit.
Still more problematic in the reasoning of both Culler and Saussure is that this principle is self-
defeating. To claim that languages “do not simply name existing categories; they articulate their
own,” is to make a claim that ‘in their own languages’ names an existing category of all languages.
Culler has identified an aspect of all languages which he categorizes, and then claims that his
category universally applies to all languages as if this were simply an existing category. By this
statement, Culler has said that it is a universally existing category of all languages that each
language articulates its own categories. But, if this is merely a category of his own which his own
language has articulated, then it is not necessarily universally applicable. It may in fact be
universally the case that all languages simply name existing categories, at least in part. Culler’s
claim cannot be employed simply to name an existing category of all languages because he has
ruled out this possibility in his claim. Likewise, the concept of not attaching names to universal
concepts is itself a universal concept to which Culler and Saussure have attached the name
“arbitrary.”
Culler identifies this doctrine of absolute arbitrariness as leading to the conclusion that
“Language is not a nomenclature and therefore its signifiers are not preexisting concepts but
changeable and contingent concepts which vary from one state of a language to another.”738 Here
again Culler has constructed a self-defeating claim. How is it possible to distinguish the difference
between the concepts from one state of a language to another unless there is some constant,
unchanging point of reference from which to make the distinction? The idea of change necessarily
involves a continuity by which the change may be identified. One is forced to point out that Culler
has employed one unchanging and unconditional concept of all language, that is, changeable and
contingent concepts. In Culler’s own words, “The fact that the relation between signifier and
signified is arbitrary means, then, that since there are no fixed universal concepts or fixed universal
signifiers, the signifier itself is arbitrary, and so is the signified.”739 Both Culler and Saussure could
be asked, “Is it a fixed universal concept of all languages that there are no fixed universal
concepts?”
It is also a curious aspect of both Culler’s exposition of Saussure, and Saussure’s own claims,
that if the relation between signified and signifier is arbitrary, that the concept must suffer the
burden of change? Saussure talks at length about the morphological and phonological changes that
a sign undergoes. But, when it comes to the concept to which the signifier is related, it is always
the concept that changes. An observation of experience seems to indicate exactly the opposite.
When a signifier begins to take on some new and additional concept, it is not the original concept
that has changed. Rather, it is the field of reference of the signifier. Although the old concept may

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not have a signifier that exclusively relates to it, nevertheless, that concept can be described and
identified as still the same concept.
Granted, there is nothing in the nature of a linguistic symbol necessitating that it relate to a
given concept. But simply because the application of a signifier to a concept is at least somewhat
arbitrary, this does not by any means entail contingency on the part of the concept. What could
cause such a view? I believe it is Saussure’s unwarranted theory of what constitutes a sign,
signifier, and signified.
In the chapter entitled “Nature of the Linguistic Sign,” Saussure criticizes what he identifies
as the “naming-process” view of language. He defines this “naming-process” as “a list of words,
each corresponding to the thing that it names.” His criticism of this view is, “It assumes that ready-
made ideas exist before words.”740 However, this criticism begs the question. What Saussure has
said is that words cannot simply be names of things because “The linguistic sign unites, not a thing
and a name, but a concept and a sound image.”741 But simply to assert that a sign is the linking of
a concept and a sound image is not sufficient to establish this as a fact. This creates a “chicken and
egg” problem for Saussure. If the sign links a sound-image and a concept, which has logical
priority, the concept or the sound-image? Also, from where has the concept derived?
Later, Saussure flatly states, “There are no pre-existing ideas . . .”742 By this Saussure means
that external reality is not the efficient cause of ideas to which the mind must conform. In his view,
ideas are not conformed to reality, rather, reality is arbitrarily divided up by the mind in conformity
to what ever way a particular linguistic community has articulated the categories of reality. If
reality does not cause the mind to articulate categories according to its pre-existing nature, pre-
existing in the sense that reality exists prior to anyone’s perception of it, then from where do such
categories and concepts arise? Do they arise from the encounter with reality? If so, then the idea
is a representation of reality. The idea “horse” is a representation of the actually existing “horse.”
Now if language does not involve a “naming-process” in which a name is applied to the thing in
reality, then the sign must be applied to the idea. Indeed, this is Saussure’s assertion. He states, “.
. . the choice of a given slice of sound (i.e., sound-image) to name a given idea is completely
arbitrary.”743 Now if the image is in fact an accurate representation in the mind of the thing in
reality, then what has Saussure gained by denying that the sign names the thing in reality?
Saussure makes a distinction between a sign and the two parts that compose it. For Saussure,
the sign is composed of the concept (the signified), and the sound-image (the signifier). Now, if
the sound-image signifies the concept, then what does the sign stand for? What is a sign? Is not a
sign what leads a knowing faculty to something other than itself? The sound-image signifies, or
points to the concept. The concept is signified by the sound-image. What does the sign signify?
Does the word arbor signify anything? Apparently, for Saussure, the word is a sign of a
relationship between its two parts. But if the word is a sign of this relationship, then what is the
sound-image? Is it the word? Saussure’s account does not seem to fit reality, at least not reality as
it is experienced on an everyday basis.
It seems that one reason Saussure does not allow for a sign to name a thing in reality is because
the sign names its two parts, the signified and the signifier. The crucial part that has been omitted
from Saussure’s scheme is reality. Even Ogden and Richards identify this problem when they point
out, “Unfortunately this theory of signs, by neglecting entirely the things for which signs stand,
was from the beginning cut off from any contact with scientific methods of verification.”744
Indeed, Saussure asserts, “To prove that language is only a system of pure values, it is enough
to consider the two elements involved in its functioning: ideas and sounds.”745 What about reality?
From where do ideas come? How are ideas related to reality? Since ideas are subjective, how can

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I possibly know that my ideas are comparable to the ideas in the mind of another? To simply assert
that sounds stand for ideas and that the use of the same sounds to signify similar ideas in another
mind begs the question. All I can know for sure is that when another person uses a particular sound,
it signifies a certain idea in my own mind. How can I know that the same sound is signifying the
same idea in another’s mind?
A possible response to this criticism might assert that success in mutual communication is
evidenced by the success in survival, and that this gives evidence that there is a possible similarity
in subjective ideas. However, it would be difficult to maintain that the mutual survival of animals
indicates a similarity in subjective ideas in the minds of animals. Indeed, mutual survival of
animals would not even indicated the existence of ideas at all in the minds of animals.
The obvious test would be to relate the sound to some object outside of our minds and indicate
that the sound signifies the idea that corresponds to that reality. This implies that the idea derives
from reality. However, if the sound triggers the idea that corresponds to the external reality, then
the sound is the sign of the reality, not of the idea. The sound is not a part of a sign that stands for
a sound-idea relationship.
Let me illustrate. Suppose two individuals desire to communicate about a tree. How does
speaker 1 know that the sound “tree” corresponds to the same idea in the mind of speaker 2? Well,
speaker 1 could point to a tree and articulate the sound “tree.” Speaker 2 would indicate agreement
that the sound “tree” functions similarly for him. But, of what has the sound become a sign?
Speaker 1 could not point to the head of speaker 2 while articulating the sound “tree” and expect
speaker 2 to relate that sound to the concept of a tree. In the initial stages of communication
between individuals of different languages, or between an adult and an infant, the ostensible
indications may be broad and general. However, as more knowledge is gained, more refined
distinctions could be made. For example as more abstract concepts are developed in the mind of
the infant, or more accurate understanding is gained by those of different languages, the distinction
between “tree” and “bark” could be made.746
Figure 26: Saussure’s Theory of Communication

Saussure has made a serious error. Although the sound “tree” causes speaker 2 to recall the
concept of a tree in his mind, the sound is not a sign merely of the concept, but of the tree in reality
by means of the concept. If the sound signifies merely an idea in the mind, as he illustrates in his
diagram reproduced in Figure 26, then it would not be possible for speaker 1 to point to a tree and
articulate the sound “tree,” for this would be using the sound as a sign of the tree in reality, not as
a sign of the idea of a tree in the mind of speaker 1. Saussure has confused the function of a sign
and the reference of a sign, that is, what the sign signifies. The function of the sign is to represent
to the mind that to which it refers. The sound does not represent to the mind a concept, which is
itself a representation of the thing in reality. The sound represents to the mind the thing in reality
from which the concept derives. The concept derives from reality, not from the sign. The sign is
instilled with meaning because the mind, having derived the concept from reality, as we have
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explained above, applies a linguistic sign to refer to the particular thing in reality by way of the
concept. Upon the occasion of employing this sign‒for example, the sound “tree” ‒the mind recalls
the concept of “tree” that the sign has represented to the mind. The sign has not represented the
concept of “tree” to the mind. Rather, the sign has represented the tree to which the concept
corresponds. The function of the sign as it relates to the mind is different from its function as it
relates to reality. What the sign refers to is a real tree. The sign’s function is to represent this reality
to the mind so that the mind recalls its concept that corresponds to that reality thus represented.

Conceptualism
The Moderate Realist position can be characterized as Conceptualism. However, this term
must be qualified by the Moderate Realist metaphysics and epistemology as has been defended
above in order to distinguish it from every form of Cartesian/Kantian and Idealist Conceptualism.
The concept is the abstracted nature of the thing in reality. There is a natural relation between the
concept of a tree and the tree in reality, because the concept is the essence of the tree according to
its intentional existence in the mind of the knower.
Signification, then, is conceptual. Concepts cannot be arbitrary, because they are derived from
the essences of things and are grounded upon substance. Linguistic signs have meaning because,
on the one hand, they signify the concept in the mind, and on the other hand, they refer to the
particular thing in reality as sensibly perceived.
In his criticism of conceptualism, John Lyons makes a number of self-defeating claims. He
characterizes all conceptualism in the following criticism: “First, even if we grant that there are
concepts associated with words, such that . . . when I hear the word ‘table,’ the concept of a table
will come into my mind and, if I think of a table, the word ‘table’ will be called up for use as
required, there is no evidence to show that concepts of this kind play any part in ordinary language-
behavior.”747
In his consideration of conceptualism, Lyons has departed from the field of linguistics and has
entered the area of metaphysics. Since a methodology is fitted for the object which it is designed
to investigate, and since metaphysics and linguistics are not entirely of the same nature, it is
improper to employ a methodology suited for linguistic investigation in metaphysical inquiry. The
difference lies in the fact that the concept is not merely a mental entity. Indeed it is a mental entity,
but it is more than that. The concept is metaphysically connected with the thing in reality.
Consequently, an analysis of conceptualism must proceed on the basis of a consideration of being
and essence not simply word and meaning.
In his criticism, Lyons attempts to argue against conceptualism in general, but he does not
consider the Moderate Realist notion of the concept. In Moderate Realism, it is impossible for the
mind to entertain the meaning of the word table without the accompanying concept, for the concept
is the meaning. Lyons neglects the philosophical term “concept” as used in Moderate Realist
metaphysics and epistemology and focuses on the more common association of concept as some
sort of mental picture or representation. This is evident from his statement, “Of course, one may
be able to form some mental image of a table, if asked to do so . . .”748 Granted it may not be the
case that in normal language-behavior the mind forms a mental picture in every instance of hearing
or employing the term table. But it is equally as certain that, for the person who knows the meaning
of the word table, a concept is immediately associated in the mind with hearing or using the word,
for the concept is the meaning of the term.
Lyons makes the claim, “Introspection is notoriously unreliable; but there is no other way of
determining whether a succession of concepts accompany the production and understanding of

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utterances, and introspection does not give any clear support to the view that this is the case.”749
The obvious question here is, “Unreliable for what?” Is introspection unreliable in reporting what
goes on in one’s own mind, as Lyons seems to claim that it is? If this is its unreliability, then how
can it be known that introspection is unreliable? In order to judge the reliability or unreliability of
a particular report from introspection, an accurate report would have to exist against which all
reports might be judged to determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of each. Does Lyons purport to
possess this accurate report? Is he not using his own report from his own introspection to make the
judgment that the report that conceptualism gives “does not prove that we normally do so . . .”?
Simply because Lyons acknowledges the unreliability of his own introspection, or that the reports
of others are unreliable because they may not account for what he has learned from his own
introspection, does not mean that all reports from everyone’s introspection is unreliable.
Lyons also criticizes conceptualism by claiming, “As the term ‘concept’ is used by many
writers on semantics, it is simply not clear what is meant by it; and that is perhaps of itself a
sufficient criticism of their use of the term.”750 But simply because the term is unclear to someone
does not mean that the term itself is inadequate or that the notion of conceptualism is wrong. It is
understandable that such a philosophical term would be unclear to someone who is not versed in
its signification in Moderate Realist philosophy. Even though the term concept has a long history
of use in this tradition, it still requires a considerable amount of investigation and study in
Thomistic and Moderate Realistic metaphysics to grasp the significance of the term. As has been
argued, the concept is the form of the thing in reality as it exists in the mind of the knower by
virtue of its intentional being.
Lyons’ second major criticism is directed to the claim that the meaning of a word is what it
signifies. He asserts,

As long as we restrict our attention to objects like tables, it might seem reasonable to say that the words which are used to refer
to them are signs. At least we can give a fairly clear account of the relationship between word and object in cases like this.
Once we extend the notion of signification to cover all lexemes, however, we run the risk of trivializing it completely. For to
say that what a word means is what it signifies‒unless we then go on to recognize different kinds of signification‒is to say no
more than what a word means is what it means.751

The difficulty that Lyons identifies in this notion leads him to conclude, “It would seem to be
preferable, therefore, to restrict the notion of signifying, or standing for, to that subclass of lexemes
or expressions in language which do stand for things in some clearly interpretable sense of
‘signify.’”752 Earlier Lyons made a distinction between word-forms and lexemes. In an example,
he distinguished between the vocabulary-words find and found as a subclass of what he called
lexemes.753 In this example, the vocabulary words find and found are lexemes.
Now, according to this definition it is difficult to see how applying the notion of conceptual
signification to cover all lexemes runs the risk of “trivializing it completely.”754 Is he saying that
lexemes such as find or found cannot be conceptualized? Lyons had left open the possibility that
conceptualism does not run the risk of trivializing the notion of signification if “we then go on to
recognize different kinds of signification.” But this is precisely what takes place in Moderate
Realism. How indeed could these terms be conceptualized in the Moderate Realist system? It must
be remembered that “the primary object of our intellect in its present state is not just any being or
truth, but the being and truth found in material things . . . and it comes to a knowledge of all else
from these.”755 Joseph Owens expounds upon the implication of this basic truth.

Upon examination the basic contents of human cognition, from which all else in it is derived, appear without exception as
sensible things and human activities specified by sensible things. Try to think of anything in other terms. You find you cannot

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 do so. All immaterial things are found represented through notions experienced in the sensible. The concept of an immaterial
thing retains the notion of thing while removing the notion of materiality. Subsistent being is represented as existence identified
with substance. Here the notions of both substance and existence are taken from the substance and existence of material things,
with materiality and all other limitations denied them.756

Because the proper object of the intellect is being, and since all else derives from this, it follows
that all is understood in terms of this. An abstract concept such as “liberty” is understood in terms
of the real relation that exists or should exist between moral beings. Those words that indicate
relations between parts of speech in the sentence, such as prepositions, conjunctions, etc., signify
real relations in reality. All of these, as Joseph Owens has pointed out, appear as sensible things
and human activities specified by sensible things. The lexemes find and found are conceptualized
in terms of human activity specified by sensible things. Contrary to Lyons’ claims, to identify the
concept as the meaning of a term, and to propose that what a word means is what it signifies, is by
no means trivializing.

Meaning
We must now articulate exactly what is the nature of meaning according to the Moderate
Realist perspective. Much of what will be discussed in this section has been mentioned in previous
sections. The task here will be to synthesize the principles into a succinct statement of the nature
of meaning.

What Is Meaning?
As has been indicated in various ways in the discussions above, the meaning of a word is the
concept that it signifies. Two points must be explained in order to clarify this definition. First of
all, the term concept must be understood in the context of a Moderate Realist Epistemology as
defended above. The word is the instrumental sign, whereas the concept is the formal sign. John
Oesterle points out this distinction and its importance: “The concept cannot be an instrumental
sign since the concept is not an object known in any way (except reflexively). It is a formal sign
because it signifies by representing directly and immediately the object. In terms of the other
divisions of signs, the concept is a natural sign because of its natural connection with the signified,
being its intentional form and likeness.”757
Although Mortimer Adler uses the term ‘idea’ to “stand for the cognitive elements in the
human mind‒its perceptions, memories, images, empirical concepts, and theoretical constructs,”
he points out that these are “formal, not instrumental, signs.”758 The term ‘idea’ for Adler has
essentially the same meaning as our use of the term “concept.” As formal signs, then, “each idea
is a meaning.” As he goes on to explain, “Each is a single meaning, which is its reference to the
object perceived, imagined, remembered, or understood. Words as instrumental signs get their
meaning by being imposed upon the objects referred to by ideas as formal signs. By being thus
associated with ideas, words express the meanings that ideas are.”759
Second, it is important to stress that the concepts, or the ideas in the terminology of Adler, are
not the objects of knowledge. Consequently, the concepts or ideas as concepts and ideas are not
themselves the content of the meaning. That is to say, the meaning of the word ‘man’ is not the
concept of man, but the concept of man, that is, the content of the concept, or what the concept is
of. The meaning of the word ‘man’ is the universal nature of the man that exists in the mind as a
formal sign or concept. As St. Thomas has made clear, words “signify these conceptions of the
intellect immediately . . . They cannot immediately signify things, as is clear from the mode of
signifying, for the name ‘man’ signifies human nature in abstraction from singulars; hence it is

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impossible that it immediately signify a singular man.”760 It is not the concept as a concept that is
signified by the word ‘man.’ Rather, it is “human nature in abstraction from singulars” that is
signified by the word ‘man.’ The term ‘concept’ is applied to any nature that is abstracted from
particulars by the intellect. So, it is not the concept as concept that is signified, but the concept as
it is the abstracted nature of some particular that is signified. In this example, the word ‘man’ does
not mean “concept of man.” Rather, the word ‘man’ means “human nature as abstracted from
particular man” and this exists in the mind in the form of a concept. Again Mortimer Adler explains
that “it is by imposition on the objects which we apprehend by means of those ideas, not by
imposition on the ideas themselves, that meaningless notations acquire their referential
significance.”761

What Is Referential Significance?

Another aspect of the nature of meaning is that meaningless notations do not become
meaningful words by being imposed upon things directly. The assertion of St. Thomas, quoted
above, makes this clear. The linguistic sign ‘man’ is not imposed upon a particular man, for then
it could not be applied to other particular men. Rather, the word ‘man’ is imposed upon the object
as it is apprehended by means of the concept. The word man refers to a particular man as he is
perceived by means of the images, memories, etc., in the mind. This avoids the problem of words
that name things that do not exist in external reality, such as a unicorn. If the thing to which the
name-word refers exists only in the mind, then it is not thereby meaningless. Again Mortimer
Adler offers a helpful explanation: “Naming is not asserting. The word ‘angel’ may not name
anything that really exists, but it certainly does name something that men can talk about to one
another and, in addition, can disagree about when they ask the question that certainly can be asked,
‘Do angels in fact really exist?’”762 To confuse referential significance with the assertion of real
existence, as the logical positivists have done in their verification principle,763 is to confuse another
distinct aspect of the nature of meaning, namely, existential denotation.

What Is Existential Denotation?

In a Moderate Realist theory of meaning, this aspect of the nature of meaning has to do with
the real existence of the thing to which a word refers. A name-word can have referential
significance and not have existential denotation. A name-word can have both. Although a name-
word cannot be a name-word without naming something, it is not necessary that it name something
that actually exists in extra-mental reality. Of course, it can be pointed out that anything that is
thought exists as a being in the mind. Existential denotation is that aspect of a name-word that
asserts the existence of the thing in reality external to the mind. It is an aspect of the problem of
meaning, not because it is part of the meaning of a word, but because name-words can be used to
denote things that do not exist in extra-mental reality as well as things that do exist in extra-mental
reality. As Mortimer Adler points out, “existential denotation of a word is no part of its lexical
meaning.”764

Conclusion
With the addition of the linguistic term, in this case the word ‘MAN,’ the illustration in Figure
27 is now complete. It depicts a Moderate Realist theory of knowledge and meaning, showing the
nature of meaning, its relation to the knowing faculty, and its foundation in the metaphysical
constitution of substance in extra-mental reality. The thing in reality, composed of form and matter,
is perceived by the knower. The form of the thing becomes the object of knowledge. The thing

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becomes the object of sensible knowledge in the here-and-now as a particular individual thing.
The nature is abstracted from the phantasm and is expressed in the intellect as a mental word. A
linguistic expression is applied to the concept, which is the means by which the thing in reality is
known, and by which the name becomes a name of that thing. The meaning of the word is the
concept in the mind of the knower. The referential significance is that to which the word refers as
an idea, memory, image, etc. The existential denotation is the capacity of the word to denote the
real existence of things. Categorematic words name, while syncategorematic words function
syntactically. This is a Moderate Realist’s theory of the nature of meaning.
Figure 27: Knowledge and Meaning

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 10 HOW DO WE UNDERSTAND WHAT IS COMMUNICATED?

The Interpretation of Meaning

Concerning the question of meaning, Paul Horwich asserts that the problem of meaning “has
been both extremely important and extremely difficult. And it is certainly important; for it lies at
the centre of the philosophy of language, which itself occupies the centre of philosophy. So there
are few deep philosophical issues that do not hinge in one way or another on which account of
meaning is adopted.”765 However, there seems to be a more fundamental question here. Regardless
of the particular account of meaning a philosopher consciously adopts, the account of meaning
which the philosopher employs in communicating his meaning is the much more basic question.
Every philosopher must employ an account of meaning that ensures that his meaning will be
communicated. If a philosopher adopts and advocates an account of meaning that does not account
for the fact that he is communicating meaning, then his consciously adopted account is not the
account that should engage his reader. Rather, the account of meaning that is being employed is
the account that should be the focus of consideration. As Stanley Jaki observes, “Indeed before
any talk about clarity there comes the object or the means that carries the philosopher’s message
about clarity. For that reason alone objects that serve as the means of the philosophical message
should be given the primary consideration. . . . The first step should be the registering of objects,
or else the philosopher will be guilty of a sleight of hand, however sophisticated. He will have to
bring in through the back door the very objects the use of which his starting point failed to
justify.”766
The fact of meaning cannot be meaningfully denied. Denying meaning assumes the fact of
meaningful communication. The final step, therefore, in the staircase ascent involves an analysis
of meaningful communication and a correlation of these observations with the conclusions of the
above investigation in order to present an account of the nature, causes, and locus of meaning in
hermeneutics. This section will not deal in depth with the general principles of hermeneutics or
hermeneutical methodology, but will consider the relationship of the Moderate Realist theory of
the nature of meaning to the issues of the causes and locus of meaningful communication as they
relate to hermeneutics in order to offer a paradigm for more detailed investigation. Hermeneutics
is the science of understanding, so we will begin our application by a look at the relationship of
meaning and understanding.

Meaning and Understanding

In chapter 8 we demonstrated that the mind employs two powers in the act of understanding.
Robert Brennan provides the following synopsis: “two separate powers are required in the soul if
it is to understand; agent intellect, whose object is the potentially understandable, and possible
intellect, whose object is the actually understandable.”767 The agent intellect abstracts the essence
from the particular, and in the possible intellect the concept is formed that is the means by which
the mind understands the thing in reality. But the formation of a concept in the mind by which the
intellect knows the thing in reality is nothing else but forming a meaning, for the concept or idea
is meaning. Again Mortimer Adler makes this point clear: “. . . our ideas do not have meaning,
they do not acquire meaning, they do not change, gain, or lose meaning. Each of our ideas is a
meaning and that is all it is. Mind is the realm in which meanings exist and through which
everything else that has a meaning acquires meaning.”768

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 Figure 28: Communication

What, then, is understanding? In the words of Winfried Corduan, “understanding is the

discernment of the meaning of a proposition.”769 The diagram in Figure 28 illustrates this.
Contrary to the scheme offered by Saussure (Figure 26), the act of communication involves a
grounding in objective reality. The speaker speaks a word in the language common to both speaker
and hearer. The hearer, upon hearing the word, recalls the individualized form to which the word
refers. The meaning of the word is the nature or essence of the thing to which the word refers. In
this diagram, the word employed also has existential denotation in that it denotes the actually
existing thing. The word is composed of form and matter. The formal aspect corresponds to the
abstracted form existing in the minds of both the speaker and the hearer. The nature of reality and
of the mind insures that all minds abstract according to the same principles. The individualized
and universalized forms in the minds of each individual are precisely the same because they are
determined by the thing in reality, not by the minds of the knowers. Consequently, meaning is
grounded in being and is objectively verifiable.
Figure 29: Communicating Real Relations

The discernment of the meaning of a proposition presupposes the discernment of the meaning
of the words in the proposition and their relationship in context. Not only is meaning derived in
this manner concerning objects, but also concerning relations, as the illustration in Figure 29
shows. William May has observed that because material being is composed and complex rather
than simple, and because the intellect necessarily obtains knowledge through sensation, “We just
do not have an intuitive grasp of a given being in its totality, in all its wealth.”770 Human intellectual
knowledge is necessarily partial and progresses by means of judgments. What the mind grasps in
part, the judgment synthesizes. Consequently, the intellect is able to know relations in reality by
means of the act of judgment. David Hume’s problem in discovering causality in sensible

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experience is that he endeavored to discover it by an analysis of the idea rather than by the function
of judgment by which the mind unites or separates distinct ideas.771
The Moderate Realist view of the nature of meaning, then, relates to understanding because it
finds meaning in the concepts of the intellect, which are not themselves the objects of knowledge
but are the means by which the intellect attains a knowledge of reality. If understanding is a
discerning of meaning, then the Moderate Realist perspective provides meaning grounded in
reality.
On the basis of these principles, an alternative view of the hermeneutical spiral that was
depicted in the diagram from KBH (see Figure 4: Hermeneutical Spiral of KBH ) can now be
proposed. KBH indicated that the starting point of the hermeneutical spiral is within the
Preunderstanding of the interpreter. Having identified all aspects of the interpreter’s
preunderstanding as subject to change, KBH proposed that the interaction of the text with the
preunderstanding of the interpreter serves to alter the interpreter’s preunderstanding to bring it ever
more closely in line with the text. The objection to this scenario was that it is nonsensical to
suppose that the interpretive conclusions that are the product of the preunderstanding of the
interpreter would yield conclusions that would serve to alter the very preunderstanding that has
resulted in these interpretive conclusions. Also, since the interpreter does not have any non-
preunderstanding mediated access to the text, there is no means by which an interpreter can tell
whether he is in fact “getting closer to the text.” Additionally, since all aspects of one’s
preunderstanding are subject to change, according to KBH, it would seem that their very
assumption that one’s preunderstanding ought to be subject to change is itself subject to change.
But, if it is subject to change, then it could change only to the assumption that some aspects of my
preunderstanding ought not to change. Indeed, KBH indicate that the assumption of the
inevitability of and the mutability of one’s preunderstanding are themselves immutable.
The alternative, illustrated in Figure 30, adopts the basic position illustrated in the diagram by
KBH, but modifies it to include the self-evident, undeniable first principles of thought and being
that ground interpretation in reality—namely, those assumptions that are not subject to change.
This grounding offers an unshakable foundation against which the claims of the text can be
evaluated, and against which one’s interpretation of the text can be measured. The objective truths
of the text, then, can be recognized as such by a preunderstanding that is created in the image of
God. The mutable aspects of one’s preunderstanding can then be adjusted as the truths of the text
interact with the understanding of the interpreter, and adjudication between conflicting
interpretations can proceed with reference to first principles that are the same for the interpreter
and the text. Also, it is not the case that the interpreter becomes the judge of the text since both the
text and the interpreter have the same self-evident first principles, which are the same for all
people, at all times, in all cultures.

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 Figure 30: Objectively Grounded Interpretation

Meaning, Its Causes and Locus

What Are the Causes of Linguistic Meaning?
A Moderate Realist view of the nature of linguistic meaning has provided the epistemological
and metaphysical foundation upon which to distinguish the various causes of meaning. Let us look
at six causes of meaning and three distinct uses of “intention,” which seem to exhaust the
possibilities.

1) the efficient cause‒agent‒that by which meaning is caused, namely, the mind of the author. This is the intent in the
mind of the author‒“I didn’t intend to say that.”
2) The final cause‒purpose‒that for which meaning is caused, namely, to communicate. This is the intent of the author
as to the purpose for his communication, “My intention (purpose) was to help you.”
3) Material cause‒material‒that out of which meaning is caused, namely, words and symbols, language.
4) Formal cause‒form‒that of which meaning is caused, namely, the meaning of the text. This is the intent of the author
in the expressed meaning of the text.
5) Exemplar cause‒pattern‒that after which meaning is caused, namely, the Logos, God, the Divine communicator.
6) Instrumental cause‒means‒that through which meaning is caused, namely, logic, reason. 772

Keeping these causes in mind in the process of interpretation goes a long way in enabling the
interpreter to avoid confusion and misinterpretation. At least one persistent and very popular error
in interpretation can be traced to the confusion of causes, namely, where meaning is found.

Where Is Linguistic Meaning Found?

Although this is a problem area that is often not recognized as such among biblical interpreters,
it is a point of considerable contention in literary criticism.

Author-centered Theories
E. D. Hirsch has been a prominent figure in the controversy about the locus of meaning. In
Validity in Interpretation, Hirsch makes some statements early in the book that seem to indicate
that he advocates the theory that the locus of meaning is the text. Such remarks as, “. . . sensible

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belief that a text means what its author means,” or his references to the modern emphasis on
“semantic autonomy of language” are statements with which anyone advocating a text-centered
view would prima facie agree. He even speaks disparagingly of the tendency in modern criticism
toward a “prevailing skepticism which calls into doubt the possibility of objectively valid
interpretation.” However, there appears to be an underlying notion that the author’s intended
meaning is the criterion for validity in interpretation. The following statement hints at this notion.
“For, once the author had been ruthlessly banished as the determiner of his text’s meaning, it very
gradually appeared that no adequate principle existed for judging the validity of an
interpretation.”773
To say that the author is “the determiner of his text’s meaning” sounds very much like the
theory that holds that the locus of meaning is in the text. It seems to acknowledge the author as the
efficient cause of meaning, as articulated above. However, Hirsch shifts the locus of meaning from
the text to the author by his assertion that it is only the author’s determination which provides an
“adequate principle . . . for judging the validity of an interpretation.” If the locus of meaning is the
text, then the author is the determiner of meaning, but the text itself provides the only adequate
principle for judging the validity of an interpretation. Hirsch seems to be saying, there are, then,
two aspects of a text. The first is that meaning is determined by the author. The second is the
meaning that the reader has interpreted. They may be the same. They may be different. It is the
responsibility of the reader to validate his interpretation of the meaning of the text by comparing
it with the meaning that the author determined.
The question, then, is, where will one go to find the author’s determinate meaning? Will we
go to the text? Apparently not, for the reader’s interpretation of the text must be measured against
the author’s determination of that meaning. Where is this determinate meaning found? It seems
that for Hirsch, the validity of an interpretation is not found in the understanding of the meaning
of the text. The text must be interpreted, not to discover its meaning, for its meaning is in the
author’s determination, i.e., in the mind of the author. The reader’s interpretation of the meaning
of a text must be validated against the meaning that the author determined for his text.
When Hirsch undertakes to define meaning, he does not do so without a certain amount of
ambiguity. In attempting to make a distinction between meaning and significance, Hirsch provides
the following definitions: “Meaning is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author
meant by his use of a particular sign sequence; it is what the signs represent. Significance, on the
other hand, names a relationship between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or a situation,
or indeed anything imaginable.”774
A certain amount of ambiguity is caused by the statement that meaning is that which “is
represented by a text.” What does it mean to “represent” meaning? Do words and sentences
represent meaning or do they mean something? It seems that Hirsch is attempting to avoid asserting
that the meaning resides in the text while not completely abandoning the text in conveying
meaning. The next statement seems to confirm this and again points to the idea that the locus of
meaning is the author, not the text; “[Meaning] is what the author meant by his use of a particular
sign sequence.”775
Perhaps it can be argued that Hirsch holds that the locus of meaning is the author rather than
the text. It seems that he does. Perhaps it can be argued that Hirsch holds that the locus of meaning
is both the author and the text. This view also seems to fit Hirsch’s argument. However, either
view is problematic, for, from the interpreter’s point of view, the only locus accessible is the text,
since one person cannot enter into the mind of another person. Now it will be objected that one
person can indeed enter into another person’s mind. By means of his text, or by historical or

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biographical information, an interpreter can reconstruct what might have been on the author’s mind
when he wrote his text. However, to reconstruct what might have been on the mind of an author is
not to enter his mind, for if an interpreter could enter the mind of an author he would not have to
reconstruct what might have been, for he would know directly what in fact was. When it is said
that one person cannot enter another person’s mind, this is meant in a literal sense. An interpreter
cannot actually and literally enter another person’s mind.
Although this may seem tautologous or even irrelevant, it is of crucial importance. The
impression that is given by referring to the author’s intended meaning is that somehow it is
possible, apart from any text, to discover what was on an author’s mind when he wrote his text.
But, this is not possible. Consequently, the priority in interpretation must not be an author’s intent
as some interpreter has reconstructed it, for this is only an interpreter’s supposition. The priority
must be the objective text itself. The danger of giving the impression that there is something
outside of the text that functions as the determining factor of meaning for the interpreter is found
in statements like the following: “If literature is an act of communication, then meaning resides in
the intention of the author. . . . Interpretation then has as its goal the recovery of the author’s
purpose in writing.”776 Who is to say what an author’s purpose was, and what objective standard
can be employed to adjudicate between competing proposals of what was an author’s purpose?
The controversy over the locus of meaning is frequently a confusion of causes. As Longman
has observed, “The author has encoded a message for the readers.”777 But the message that the
author has encoded resides in the text of that message once it is encoded. The author is the efficient
cause of the meaning, but the text is the formal cause, according to the Moderate Realist view. As
was illustrated in Figure 16, it is not necessary for the knower to go back into the mind of God to
know reality, because reality is known by means of the form that constitutes the real thing.
Similarly, it is not necessary to go back into the mind of the author to know his meaning, because
his meaning resides in the text as form to matter. The error of author-centered theories of
interpretation can be effectively countered from a Moderate Realist perspective.

Reader-centered Theories
According to Schuyler Brown, the assumption that linguistic meaning resides in a text “is
certainly not intuitively obvious.”778 Brown proposes to demonstrate that “meaning exists formally
only in human beings.”779 Tremper Longman, in his helpful historical survey, identifies the reader-
centered theory as proposing that “Meaning resides in the reader, not in the text.”780 It seems,
however, that those who advocate such a position are advocating a self-contradictory assertion.
Surely Brown is counting on his text to communicate his proposition that meaning exists formally
only in human beings.
This position also contradicts reality. As a Moderate Realist perspective proposes, if meaning
exists formally only in human beings, then it is impossible for one human being to communicate
meaning to another. It is necessary that meaning be conveyed by some medium. Between human
beings this medium is language, either written or spoken. If meaning exists only formally in human
beings, however, then meaning does not formally exist in the vocal sounds or written notations
which humans use as linguistic signs to carry meaning from one mind to another. How does Brown
suppose meaning can be communicated? He asserts, “meaning is generated by a reader reading a
text.”781 This seems to assert that the meaning of a text originates in the mind of the reader and is
not determined by the text, in which case, the meaning of Brown’s own text is not found in the
text, but in those who read his text. But this leaves no objective standard of verifying the
interpretation of textual meaning.

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 In their book Linguistics & Biblical Interpretation, Peter Cotterell & Max Turner assert that
the Reader-Response interpretation proposes that “meaning is merely potential in any text; it only
becomes actual in relation to a reader.”782 Now, either the author is counting on the text to actually
mean that texts have only potential meaning, or, since the text has only potential meaning, it does
not actually mean that texts have only potential meaning. Consequently, it is a potentiality that
some texts do have actual meaning. In either case this assertion is self-defeating.
A Moderate Realist view not only proposes that a text has actual meaning, and that the locus
of meaning is the text, but the Moderate Realist perspective provides a metaphysical and
epistemological foundation upon which can be based the assertion that meaning exists formally
both in the mind and in the text. This is asserted by the relation of the formal sign, or mental word,
and its corresponding linguistic sign(s).

Deconstructionism
Robert P. Scharlemann’s article on Deconstructionism focuses on Jacques Derrida’s
contention that there is no transcendental signified. He explains that this transcendental signified
means “that there is no access to what is signified by linguistic signs which does not itself in turn
have to make use of linguistic signs,” and that “no signified thing which is not in some way pointed
out by a linguistic gesture and does not in some way signify in turn, or, to put it differently, which
is not in some way mediated by and existent in language.”783 By denying a transcendental signified,
according to Scharlemann, Derrida is “denying that there is any observing or intuiting or other
apprehending of things which is not in some way mediated by language, even if the only language
involved is the gesture or word by which a thing is pointed out.”784
Contrary to these claims, however, it is possible to articulate the existence of a “transcendental
signified” by which the mind apprehends or hooks up with reality apart from any linguistic sign.
This is the formal sign, or mental word as presented in Moderate Realism. Again, it seems that the
abandonment of the foundation of a Moderate Realist metaphysic leads to a self-destructive
conclusion. Scharlemann provides two such examples of Derrida’s brand of Deconstructionism.
According to Scharlemann, Derrida asserts, “there is no absolute ground of the sort that
‘metaphysics’ had conceived . . . but a play that connects signs to other signs indefinitely.” Of
course this harks back to both Saussure and Plato in which the meaning of any sign is determined
only by its difference from all other signs. The meaning of a sign is therefore not determinate since
it is not conceivable that anyone could possibly come to know the meaning of every other possible
sign. For Plato, this same notion permeated the knowledge of the forms. How does one know the
form “treeness,” and how can one distinguish “treeness” from “manness”? This distinction is made
on the basis of non-being. The knower knows the form of “treeness” and its distinction from
“manness” because “treeness” is not “manness”—or for that matter, any other form. The
knowledge of the form for Plato, and the meaning of the sign for Saussure is difference. Derrida
has imbibed this perspective and applied it to the meaning of texts. A text dos not have determinate
meaning because meaning is always differed. Meaning is differed because any given meaning can
be determinate only as it is different from all other possible meanings. The self-defeating nature
of this approach hardly needs to be identified, except perhaps to ask the question, “Is it an absolute
ground that there is no absolute ground?” In his book Limited Inc, Derrida asserts, “I shall try to
demonstrate why a context is never absolutely determinable, or rather, why its determination can
never be entirely certain or saturated.” Of course Derrida’s own context is determinable, and
Derrida is counting on the fact that his linguistic meaning will be determinate in its meaning, that,

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because a context is never absolutely determinable, linguistic meaning is fundamentally
indeterminate.
A Moderate Realist view of meaning grounds meaning in the reality of being and explains the
connection between the mind and the world by the metaphysical constitution of each. Moderate
Realism explains how reality provides a determinate context that is the same for every reader and
speaker. Moderate Realism maintains an objective point of reference from which to investigate
questions of hermeneutics and linguistics and semantics.

A Realist Perspective on the Locus of Meaning

A Moderate Realist perspective on the locus of meaning might be initially identified as a text-
centered theory because it asserts that the locus of meaning is the text. This is accurate as far as it
goes. It is inaccurate if such a designation is taken to imply that the Moderate Realist perspective
makes the same assertions as Structuralism or the New Criticism. The Moderate Realist
perspective does not attempt to eliminate the author from his text, or render historical and
biographical research unnecessary. Rather, the Moderate Realist perspective demonstrate that
objectivity in the interpretive process is possible. The author is the efficient cause of meaning, but
the text is the locus of meaning. An author deposits meaning in the text as form in matter.

Meaning and the Historical Context

The book by Cotterell and Turner referred to above provides a good example around which to
consider these issues from a Moderate Realist perspective. In section 3.3, entitled “Meaning as
Significance and Presupposition Pools,” Cotterell and Turner consider the importance of a
common set of presuppositions between author and reader in arriving at an appropriate
understanding of the significance of a discourse.785 One example that CT use is the passage in
Revelation concerning the letter to the church at Laodicea. They concentrate particularly on the
part that speaks of the Laodicean church as being neither hot nor cold (Rev. 3:15-16).
CT observe the older interpretations of this passage that view the ‘hot’ as being “zealous for
the Lord,” and ‘cold’ as being “actual antagonism.” CT point out an inconsistency of this position
and offer an alternative that takes into consideration the historical setting of the church of Laodicea.
Their presentation seems to explain all the data much more effectively. Their point is that, whether
or not their understanding of the passage is correct, “it must be elements in the presupposition pool
(not merely those in the text) that are potentially determinative of significance.”786
At this point, CT’s discussion becomes confusing. Their discussion seems to employ the terms
significance and meaning interchangeably. Was the difficulty in the Revelation passage over its
meaning, or its significance? It will be helpful to employ a distinction between meaning and
significance that has been ably defended by E. D. Hirsch: “The important feature of meaning as
distinct from significance is that meaning is the determinate representation of a text for an
interpreter. An interpreted text is always taken to represent something, but that something can
always be related to something else. Significance is meaning-as-related-to-something-else.”787
The exposition given by CT employs these historical referents to provide information to
illustrate that “utterances have meaning . . . and that part of that meaning is fixed by the context.”788
The question is, however, is this an accurate appraisal of the situation? It seems that whether or
not we agree with CT’s identification of the historical places and events to which the designations
‘hot’ and ‘cold’ may have referred, the meaning of the passage is nevertheless clear. Jesus said, “I
know your deeds, that you are neither cold or hot; I would that you were cold or hot. So because
you are lukewarm, and neither hot or cold, I will spit you out of My mouth.”

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 At this point, CT observe that the historical information leads to a more accurate grasp of the
significance of the passage. Having made this helpful observation, why do they, then, confuse the
significance with the meaning of the text? Earlier in this section they approvingly quote the
following observation by Brown and Yule. “One of the most pervasive illusions which persists in
the analysis of language is that we understand the meaning of a linguistic message solely on the
basis of the words and structure of the sentences(s) used to convey that message.”789
CT add, “Such a view clearly does not account for the entirely different conclusions concerning
Peter’s discourse that could be reached by his hearers.” If by “significance” CT mean the idea that
can be represented by such expressions as “significance of the discourse for the speaker/writer . .
. and of the . . . significance for his hearers or readers,” and, “significance for us, today,” then CT
have expressed a very important point of hermeneutics.
However, if, for CT, the idea of “significance” of the text is interchangeable with the idea of
the “meaning” of the text, then they have only managed to cloud the issue and make the meaning
of meaning more obscure. The observation of Brown and Yule has either misrepresented what is
meant by saying that meaning is derived from the words and structure of the sentence(s), or they
are using meaning and significance interchangeably. But to use these terms interchangeably
introduces confusion.
In CT’s example of the Revelation passage, they provide us with helpful information.
However, the information they provide does not determine the meaning of the text. That is to say,
the historical context is not the formal cause of meaning, nor is the meaning of this text located in
the historical information. In this case, the historical information has illuminated the significance
of the meaning which was already resident in the text by making known the possible referents
involved. If we never come to know with absolute certainty to what the designations of ‘hot’ and
‘cold’ and ‘lukewarm’ refer, it would still be clear that, to Jesus, the condition of being either hot
or cold is preferable to the condition of being lukewarm. The meaning of the text is clear. The
problem for CT was not with the meaning of the text, but with the difficulty of relating the meaning
of the text in a significant way to the Laodiceans, and to us today. But, to relate the significance
of the passage to the original audience, or to us today is to discern the significance of the text, not
the meaning of the text. Now, if CT want to use the word ‘meaning’ in the sense of the significance
of a text, namely, “What does it mean for me?” then that is their prerogative. However, this is
inconsistent and confusing. Perhaps they could have employed a designation such as meaning1,
meaning2, etc., so that their uses could be distinguished.
Additionally, it must be pointed out that historical material often provides necessary
information that will enable the interpreter to understand the linguistic meaning as well as the
significance of a text. Historical investigation provides the interpreter with examples of usage
which lead to an understanding of the meanings of words in context. Historical information
provides the content that an author employs when he communicates meaningfully. The biblical
authors wrote about historical events and people. An understanding of the culture in which the
author lived aids the interpreter in understanding the linguistic dynamics that shaped the author’s
use and expression. However, the linguistic meaning of a text is not located in these things. Each
of these factors has its own linguistic meaning, and an understanding of their meanings as they
relate to a given text may help to illuminate the linguistic meaning of that text. These factors
provide vital information that enables the interpreter to discover the linguistic meaning of a text,
but it is the linguistic meaning of the text that is discovered. It is the linguistic meaning of the text
that is the goal of the interpretative enterprise. Application and significance arise out of the
linguistic meaning. They are not determinative of that meaning.

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 Let me illustrate. Deut. 14:21 states, “You shall not boil a kid in its mother’s milk.” What does
this passage mean? There are many commentators who speculate on the historical possibilities
with reference to this text. Keil and Delitzsch assert that, “But the actual reference is to the cooking
of a kid in the milk of its own mother, as indicating a contempt of the relation which God has
established and sanctified between parent and young.”790 However, they also observe that, “In the
Targum Mishnah, etc., it is regarded as a general prohibition against eating flesh prepared with
milk,” and that “Luther and others suppose it to refer to the cooking of the kid, before it has been
weaned from its mother’s milk.”791 P. C. Craigie relates the command to Canaanite religious
practice and the idea that the prohibition might “be one that had close associations with the fertility
cult.”792
These citations serve well to illustrate the point. What does this passage mean? It seems
obvious that the passage means, do not boil a kid in its mother’s milk. Now, the referents of the
words are relatively clear as well; “kid,” “milk,” “mother,” are all clear. The problem arises when
the interpreter tries to discover the significance of this passage. On a popular level we ask, “What
does it mean?” What is actually being asked is, What does this command prohibit? Is given merely
to prohibit this physical activity, or is there some spiritual significance to the prohibition? What
was the significance of this passage for Israel, or what is its significance for interpreters today?
Now, if some commentator is able to provide evidence to establish as a fact that this prohibition
was given with the Canaanite practices in mind, then the significance would become much clearer.
Then we would begin to understand what significance the prohibition had for the lives of the people
of Israel and the significance it had for their relationship with the LORD. We would also be brought
a long way toward understanding its significance for us today. But, this regards the significance of
the passage, not its meaning.
The danger in confusing these two aspects is the tendency to substitute the significance for the
meaning. When one begins to employ what is understood to be the significance of a passage in
such a way as to see it as the meaning of the passage, then interpretation has become subjective,
and there is no longer an objective determinate factor, viz. the text itself, that preserves the meaning
of the text for an interpreter.
The determinate factor in the text is the form/meaning of the text that resides in the text, not
the interpreter or the historical information. As we have seen, there is analogous relationship
between the form/matter constitution of extra-mental reality and the form/matter constitution of a
text. A human being is a thing in reality that is composed of form and matter. Its form is the
determinate aspect by which its nature and consequently its function are perceived. The form of
the human being, in an analogous way, determines his “meaning,” so to speak, or what is the nature
of a human being. The “meaning” of the human being is that he is a rational creature functioning
as a free moral agent in this world. However, there are a number of different legitimate applications
of the humans. A human being can function as an object of investigation by practitioners of various
disciplines. A human being can function as a boost to assist another human being to climb a wall,
or a tree. In fact, any application that does not destroy the form of the human being is a legitimate
application of the human being. However, if someone were to take a human being and break him
into parts for firewood, this would not be a legitimate application of a human being as a human
being. If someone were to take a human being and remove his skin in order to adorn a lamp as a
lamp shade, this would not be a legitimate application of a human being. Any application of the
human being that destroys his form is an illegitimate application of the human being qua human
being. This is because these kinds of applications, in a sense, are not the meaning of the human
being. The meaning of a human being is to be a rational creature created in the image of God and

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functioning as a free moral agent. The difference between legitimate and illegitimate applications
are identified in reference to the form that resides in the human being. Any application that destroys
the form of the human being is an illegitimate application.
Similarly, the form of the text, which is the meaning of the text, is the determining factor in
deciding whether a certain application, or significance is legitimate or appropriate. Any application
or understanding of significance is legitimate as long as it does not destroy or distort the form of
the text. If an interpreter were to break up the text and apply its parts in some way that destroys
the form of the text, this is not a legitimate application of the meaning of this text. It may be a
legitimate application of those words as words, but not of this text as this text. Likewise, an
interpreter cannot take the historical information, as helpful as it is, and make this the meaning of
the text. In fact, it is the meaning of the text that makes it possible to identify pertinent historical
information. If the meaning of the text were not discernable before the historical investigation, it
would be impossible to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant historical information. CT
knew what it meant to be hot or cold. Consequently, they were able to discover historical
circumstances that helped to illuminate the possible spiritual significance of Jesus’ words to the
Laodiceans.

Meaning and the Author

What applies to historical information applies to the purpose and intent of the author. Although
it is helpful and illuminating to attempt to reconstruct what may have been an author’s purpose in
writing, these aspects cannot be the determining factor of the meaning of the text for the interpreter
once the text is brought into existence by its author. Again we must employ distinctions. It is
obvious that the author is the one who determines the meaning of his text. A parrot may utter
sounds that humans identify as words and phrases. However, the parrot does not mean anything
by these sounds, because the parrot is not a rational creature that employs linguistic expression to
communicate meaning. Meaning is communicated by minds that mean. However, once a message
is communicated, the meaning must be conveyed from the meaner to the hearer. The meaning is
deposited in the text by the author. But the meaning, though it ever remains in the mind of the
author, is deposited in the text. Consequently, for communication to take place, the meaning that
is originally in the mind of the author must be carried to the mind of the hearer by means of the
text that the author employs. From the point of view of the hearer, then, the meaning is in the text
of the author, not in the mind of the author. The author’s mind is always inaccessible to other
minds apart from some communication by the author. But if one mind communicates to another
by means of signs, then the meaning of the communication is in what is communicated, not in who
communicated it. The author is the secondary efficient cause of meaning, but the text is the locus
of that meaning.
Therefore, to propose going back into the mind of an author in an effort to discover the
intent/purpose of the author is a confusion of causes and a misunderstanding of where meaning is
found. First of all, the human author may be unavailable for comment. But what if he were
available? How would he go about telling an interpreter what was his intent? Would he describe
what was going on in his mind when he wrote his text? But in order to describe what was going
on in his mind he would have to use words to do this. If the meaning of that text is also located in
the author’s mind we are faced with trying to find out what was his intent behind the words he
employed to explain the intent of his first text. How would he explain what he meant by the words
he used to explain his intent? Again he would have to employ words, and we are faced with the
problem of trying to discover what was his intent behind those words, and the next set of words to

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explain the intent of the previous set, ad infinitum. By searching for some authorial intent behind
the words which the author employs, and then using that to dictate what the text means, entails an
infinite regress. All of this is avoided because the intent of the author is expressed in the meanings
of the words and sentences which he employs. But if the intent of the author is in the text, then,
for the interpreter, the locus of meaning is the text, not the author’s mind.
Again it must be pointed out that biographical information about an author is pertinent and
helpful in the interpretative process. Information about the author’s life, his culture, his
experiences provide helpful insight which may illuminate the meaning of his text. For example, it
may be important to locate an author in a particular historical period in order to specify the
linguistic usage of his language community as over against a later period of this same community
in which linguistic usage may have changed. However, from the point of view of the interpreter,
the meaning of a text is not located in these things once an author has created his text. The danger
here is the tendency to give priority to what a given interpreter views as an accurate picture of the
author’s intent over the linguistic meaning of the text. Some authors have employed what they
understand to have been Moses’ intent in writing the creation account in Genesis to determine the
meaning of the text. They claim that because Moses’ intent in writing this account was to magnify
the majesty of God, and that Moses did not intend to provide a scientific record, that Genesis is
therefore not an accurate account of the beginning of the universe. Rather, it is a mythical story
that accomplishes Moses’ intent. In this case the supposed intent of the author is employed in such
a manner as to distort what is the normal grammatical-historical signification of the text. The need
for biographical research and the illumination it provides for a text should never be employed to
overturn the grammatical-historical signification a text.

Conclusion
The grounding of meaning in being provides an objective standard to which interpretations
may be related. The analogous relationship between the form/matter constitution of things in
reality and the form/matter constitution of a text provides a foundation upon which the determinate
aspect of meaning can be based. It provides a means by which an interpreter can distinguish
between legitimate and illegitimate applications and understandings of the significance of a text.
It attempts to give priority to the text over extra-textual considerations. The Moderate Realist
perspective does not eliminate historical research or attempt to separate an author from his text.
Rather, the Moderate Realist perspective seeks to place these aspects in proper relation to the text,
locating the meaning in the text and employing these necessary investigations as tools by which to
better understand the meaning of the text. The distinction of causes of meaning and the different
uses of intention help to clarify the issues and identify the problems in hermeneutic theory and
practice. The Moderate Realist perspective endeavors to take hermeneutics out of the realm of the
subjective Idealism, and place it in the realm of the objective reality.

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 11 CONCLUSION

In chapter 2 we set forth three general acknowledgments accompanied by an eight-fold

argument. The three acknowledgments were as follows:

First, we acknowledge that there are conflicting interpretations of the Bible, and, as Christians,
we want to know which interpretation is the correct one. But, many contemporary thinkers
declare that there is no such thing as a “correct” interpretation because everyone comes to the
text with his own preconditional framework. Because it is impossible, according to these
thinkers, to jettison one’s preconditional framework, this necessarily obviates the possibility
of objectivity in interpretation.

Secondly, we acknowledge that Evangelical thinkers adamantly maintain that there is a “correct”
interpretation of the Bible, or at least one that is more correct than its competitors, and that this
interpretation is, at least theoretically, attainable. However, Evangelical thinkers, along with
theorists who do not espouse any particular religious commitment, reject the notion of
objectivity, or what some call “total objectivity,” and likewise assert that everyone comes to
the text with his or her own preconditional framework.

Thirdly, we acknowledge that if contemporary thinkers are correct in claiming that our
preconditional frameworks are unavoidable, and that if they are correct that these
preconditional frameworks obviate objectivity, then it does not seem possible for Evangelical
thinkers to maintain the notion of a correct or more correct interpretation while holding to the
unavoidability of preconditions, and rejecting objectivity. This is the principle concern of this
book, namely, how is it possible to maintain the fact of the preconditional framework of every
interpreter and at the same time maintain the possibility of objectivity in interpretation?
The eight-fold argument was as follows:

1. Everyone comes to the world with his own framework of understanding.

2. No particular framework of understanding is universally valid.
3. But, universal validity is precisely what is implied in the notion of objectivity.
4. Therefore, no interpreter can be objective in interpretation.
5. But, if no interpreter can be objective, then no interpretation is universally valid.
6. But, if no interpretation is universally valid, then the concept of a “correct” interpretation is at
best relative or at worst empty.
7. Since there is no such thing as a correct interpretation, there is no means of adjudicating
between interpretations.
8. In fact, the very idea of adjudicating between interpretations is at best relative and at worst
empty.
Also in chapter 2 we proposed to address the question of objectivity along three lines: 1) to
investigate the notion of objectivity in an effort to discover its nature; 2) to investigate the notion
of the preconditions of interpretation in an effort to uncover the factors that compose one’s
preconditions and to attempt to discover whether in fact preconditions are necessarily inimical to
objectivity; and 3) to propose an alternative to the popular notions of objectivity and the

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preconditions of interpretation that will re-define the notion of preconditions in a way that will
restore the possibility of objectivity in interpretation.

Restating the Problem of Objectivity

The First Acknowledgment:
The Unavoidable Presuppositional Framework
It is now time to recap to see whether we have accomplished our goal. Our first line of
investigation was concerning the notion of objectivity in an effort to discover its nature. By
perusing the literature we discovered some aspects of objectivity that are generally believed. First,
objectivity is associated with having a trans-historical perspective that is not mediated through
world-view specific presuppositions or preunderstanding that constitute the framework of
understanding. The notion of “total” objectivity implies a view from nowhere, that is, a view that
is not peculiar to one perspective. Objectivity is usually associated with “scientific” neutrality in
which data is observed apart form a theoretical framework. Although there were a number of
proposals about how to reconstitute the notion of objectivity, for example in terms of inter-
subjectivity or objectivity within a cultural framework, even these had significance only in terms
of the possibility of replacing the more common notion of objectivity as neutrality.
The notion of an Archimedean point from which one can know was the general characterization
of objectivity and was the primary notion on the basis of which objectivity was rejected. It is
universally acknowledged that no one can approach the text as from a tabula rasa. Everyone
possesses a framework of presuppositions and preunderstanding the constitutes the very possibility
of understanding. This framework is universally perceived as being a product of one’s culture and
language, upbringing, background, training, etc. Since no two people are identical, it is argued that
no two frameworks are identical, and therefore objectivity is eliminated.

The Second Acknowledgment:

Evangelicals and Correct Interpretation
Our second line of investigation concerned the notion of the preconditional framework of
interpretation in and effort to understand the nature of presuppositions. Our investigation
discovered that all theorists, whether professing a commitment to Evangelical theology or not,
whether theist or atheist, all theorists agree that all aspects of one’s life, including his culture,
language, educational background, personal experiences, and even his disposition come together
to form the presuppositional framework, and that this presuppositional framework constitutes the
very possibility of understanding. Since no one encounters the world with a blank mind, one’s
presuppositional framework is unavoidable. Presuppositions are of several types and function on
several levels. If a truth claim rests on the truth value of a presupposition, the truth claim is
necessarily false if its necessary presupposition(s) is false. If a necessary presupposition is true,
this does not guarantee the truth of the truth claim that rests on it. Everyone acknowledges the fact
and presence of this presuppositional framework, and that all interpretation is carried out by virtue
of one’s presuppositional framework.
Some theorists, especially Evangelicals, argued that even though there can be no
presuppositionless interpretation, this did not obviate the possibility of correct interpretation since
presuppositions are mutable and can be altered by the influence of the text. The interpreter should
allow the text to interact with his presuppositional framework in order to alter those
presuppositions that are not in concert with those of the text. This relationship serves to change

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the presuppositional framework of the interpreter to bring his framework into line with the
presuppositional framework of the text.

The Third Acknowledgment:

Evangelicals and the Possibility of Objectivity
In spite of the effort of some theorists to maintain the possibility of correct interpretation and
the unavoidability of incommensurate presuppositional frameworks, we discovered that this
approach is nonsensical since it proposes that the very presuppositional framework that produced
the initial understanding of the text would yield an understanding that would serve to disqualify or
alter the very presuppositions that produced this conclusion. Along the same lines, Harvey Siegel
argued that to propose on the one hand that there is no framework-neutral perspective, and then to
argue that anomalies can force the alteration or rejection of the aspects of the very presuppositional
framework that unavoidably produced these conclusions is contradictory.793 The proposal by many
Evangelical interpreters that one’s interpretation of a text that necessarily and unavoidably takes
place through one’s presuppositional framework can yield interpretive conclusions that can alter
or negate the very presuppositions that produced this interpretive conclusion is likewise
contradictory. Consequently, it seems impossible to hold to the unavoidable presuppositional
framework and at the same time to try to hold to some notion of objectivity. The unavoidable
presuppositional framework of the interpreter seems necessarily to obviate the possibility of
objectivity.
As a result, we proposed to present an alternative to the traditional notion of objectivity and
the preconditions of interpretation that would re-define the notion of preconditions in a way that
will restore the possibility of objectivity in interpretation. This proposal took the form of the
rejection of the underlying assumption of representationalism in the traditional notion of
objectivity, and to introduce the possibility of transcendental presuppositions that transcend all
world views and all presuppositional frameworks to provide an objective foundation for
interpretation. We will summarize this proposal by addressing each proposition in the eight-fold
argument.

Resolving the Problem of Objectivity

How does Moderate Realism serve to resolve the problems of objectivity in interpretation? Let
us go through the issues in general and apply the claims of Moderate Realism in each case.

1. Presuppositions: Moderate Realism is not a presuppositionless approach. It acknowledges the

unavoidability of presuppositions and preunderstanding. However, Moderate Realism avoids the
perspectivist or relativist problem by identifying the existence of self-evident, undeniable, first
principles of thought and being that function as objective, transcendental presuppositions. These
presuppositions are transcendental because they transcend every perspective and are the same for
all people, at all times, in all cultures, and in all languages. Not only does Moderate Realism
identify these first principles, such as but not confined to the laws of non-contradiction, excluded
middle, and identity, but it also indicates how these function in knowledge and interpretation.

2. Foundationalism: Moderate Realism is a foundationalism. However, it avoids the criticisms

leveled against the Cartesian foundationalism by denying that subsequent truths or subsequent
knowledge is somehow deduced from, inferred from, or in any way necessarily derived from the
foundation principles. Moderate Realism readily acknowledges that there are many avenues

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through which the mind obtains knowledge. The relationship between subsequent knowledge and
the foundations is a relation of reduction rather than deduction. A truth claim may be subject to
analysis in terms of its relation to first principles. So, knowledge has a foundation in first
principles, but is not necessarily arrived at through these foundational principles.

3. Representationalism: At the heart of the attack on objectivity is a universally held

representationalist epistemology. Moderate Realism avoids this criticism by providing a
philosophical explanation of how the mind is able to know the world directly. Consequently,
Moderate Realism is not a form of representationalism. What is in the mind is the world by virtue
of the very constitution of the world as form and matter. Since the mind is in direct contact with
the world by virtue of the forms, the mind is able to hook-up to the world. There is, then, a
transcendental signified or transcendental signifier. Consequently, meaning is grounded in reality
and can be objective and determinate. Moderate Realism also substantiates a correspondence view
of truth. The mind corresponds to reality in the knowing process by virtue of the presence of the
forms of things in the mind. Any truth claim can be evaluated in terms of its correspondence
because the truth claim and that about which the claim is made are both in the mind. The mind can
not only know the world, but can know that it knows the world by virtue of the very constitution
of the world and the mind.

4. Historicism: Moderate Realism does not deny the place of one’s historical situation in the
interpretive process. However, Moderate Realism avoids the relativism of historicism because the
self-evident, undeniable, first principles are the same for all people at all times in all circumstances.
The mind is able to transcend its own historical situation because truth transcends history, and
truth is directly accessible to the mind.

5. Linguistic Relativism: Moderate Realism avoids linguistic relativism by its explanation of the
nature of signs and meaning. Rather than holding that all signs are only instrumental and
conventional, Moderate Realism argues that the forms in the mind of the knower provide the
universal, determinate meaning because they connect up with reality by virtue of the Formal Sign.
Consequently, even though there are differences in the way cultures use their languages, there are
some universal principles that apply across all language barriers. This accounts for the fact of
translation. Every human being is encountering the same reality the same way. Moderate Realism
explains how meaning is largely determined by the real world, but still allows for and accounts for
variations from culture to culture.
6. Theory-ladenness of Observation: Moderate Realism accounts for the observed fact of
scientific progress and success. It is able to do this precisely because of the constitution of the
world and the mind. The scientist is able to observe the world directly, and the world is able to
overcome and alter the prior theory of the scientist because of the universal, undeniable, first
principles of thought and being. Moderate Realism accounts for the fact that the world often forces
the scientist to yield to its nature in spite of the expectations of his theory.

7. Objectivity: Moderate Realism accounts for objectivity, but does not presume to guarantee
objectivity in every instance. Objectivity is possible because of the direct connection that the mind
has with world, and the fact that any truth claim may be subject to analysis in terms of first
principles. Indeed, the denial of objectivity is self-defeating because it ultimately reduces to a

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violation of the law of non-contradiction. The possibility of objectivity assures the possibility of
adjudicating between truth claims and even between perspectives and world views.
Let us now apply the resolution of these general problems to the specific eight-fold argument
that was initially presented in chapter 2.

1. Everyone comes to the world with his own framework of understanding.

As we have pointed out, we do not deny the fact that everyone encounters the world from a
presuppositional framework of understanding. In fact, we acknowledge that contemporary
theorists have conclusively demonstrated that the presuppositional framework constitutes the very
possibility of knowledge and understanding. However, we disagree that this framework is
exclusively or even principally a rational construct that is the result of one’s culture and language.
The fact that there are transcendental presuppositions, such as the law of non-contradiction, the
law of excluded middle, etc., demonstrate that there are presuppositions that are common to all
humans as part of the nature of humanity. Two theses articulated by Mortimer J. Adler in Truth
and Religion serve to make this point.

1. The human race is a single biological species, renewed generation after generation by the reproductive determinations
of a single gene pool. Hence, man is one in nature—that is, in specific nature. All individual members of the species
have the same species-specific properties or characteristics.
2. The human race being one, the human mind is also one. The human mind is a species-specific property found in every
individual member of the species, the same in all, being subject to variations in degree. This precludes the notion that
there is, within the human species, a primitive mind that is characteristically different from a civilized one, or an
Oriental mind that differs in kind from an Occidental one, or even a child mind that differs in kind, not just degree,
from an adult mind.794

These two theses, along with a third, are propounded by Adler for the purpose of attempting
to identify the necessary basis for a world community in the face of cultural diversity. That basis,
as Adler articulates it, is the unity of truth.

To affirm the unity of truth is to deny that there can be two separate and irreconcilable truths which, while contradicting of one
another and thought to be irreconcilably so, avoid the principle of noncontradiction by claiming to belong to logic-tight
compartments. Thus, for example, one approach to the conflicts between religion and philosophy, or between science and either
philosophy or religion, is to claim that these are such separate spheres of thought or inquiry, employing such different methods
or having such different means of access to the truth, that the principle of noncontradiction does not apply. 795

The relevance of these theses and the definition of the unity of truth for interpretation is that
the unity of truth not only applies cross-culturally in a synchronic sense, but also in a diachronic
sense.
It is a fact of space-time history that the revelation of God was given in certain periods of
history, in certain historical situations, and in a cultural context quite different from our own.
However, the principles of the unity of man and the unity of truth demonstrate that there was not
a “Hebrew” mind or a “Greek” mind or an “ancient” mind such that truth among those cultures at
those periods of time were somehow different than truth today. On the contrary, truth is the same
for all ages and among all peoples. The issues relating to men and God were the same issues with
which we struggle today, because man is one race and one mind. The differences, then, between
these ancient cultures and our modern culture is not the nature of man, or of truth, but are the social
and cultural expressions of the same truths.
For someone to claim that there is no such thing as absolute truth is to assert that it is absolutely
true that there is no absolute truth. All such relativistic assertions are self-defeating and false.

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Likewise, for someone to claim that there is no such thing as objectivity is to count on the objective
meaning of this very claim, which is likewise self-defeating and false. Truth is unavoidable.
Likewise, objectivity is unavoidable. Although everyone encounters the world from a
presuppositional framework, the foundations of this framework are the same for all people, at all
times, in all cultures, regardless of language, background, training, world view, perspective,
horizon, or what have you. Absolute truth is predicated on the objectivity of truth.

2. No particular framework of understanding is universally valid.

It is simply false to claim that no particular framework of understanding is universally valid.
In fact, this very claim assumes its own universal validity. It is undeniably the case that there are
aspects of every framework that are unavoidable, self-evident and true, and the same for all
frameworks. The basic laws of logic and the undeniability of truth obtain for all frameworks
everywhere at all times. Consequently, any framework that attempts to deny these foundational
principles is self-defeating and false. Although there certainly are additional factors in any given
presuppositional framework, it is self-defeating and false to claim that these are the only kinds of
presuppositions that constitute a presuppositional framework, and that therefore no framework is
universally valid.

3. But, universal validity is precisely what is implied in the notion of objectivity.

Not only is universal validity implied in the notion of objectivity, it is the very essence of
objectivity. Every theorist who attempted to deny neutrality assumed that his own analysis was not
simply the product of his own presuppositional framework, but made his claim as if it was a
universally valid claim that there can be no universally valid claims. Every theorist who claimed
that there could be no neutrality assumed that his own claim was neutral and not world-view
specific. All such claims are self-defeating and false.
What we have dubbed Transcendental Presuppositions form the foundation, the Archimedean
point upon which objectivity is based. But as we have argued, this foundation is not a deductivist
foundation after the manner of representational Cartesianism. Rather, this is the Classical
foundationalism of Moderate Realism that maintains the existence of self-evident, undeniable first
principles of thought and being. It is worth restating that Moderate Realist/Classical
foundationalism does not rest on the assumption that there are indubitable propositions beginning
with which one can construct a world view. Rather, this position maintains that there is an
undeniable and unavoidable reality on the basis of which certain undeniable first principles are
based. Rather than proposing that one can construct a world view by a deductive process from
these undeniable first principles, Classical foundationalism holds that these first principles are
grounded in reality and all truth claims are reducible to first principles, not deducible from first
principles. These principles are discoverable because of the nature of reality and the fact that the
mind is able to know the real world directly. Contrary to popular opinion, there is a transcendental
signifier that connects the mind with the real world directly and enables the mind to know reality
directly.

4. Therefore, no interpreter can be objective in interpretation.

In light of our investigation, this assertion has been demonstrated to be both self-defeating and
false. For anyone to claim that no interpreter can be objective in interpretation assumes that the
one making the claim has been objective in his interpretation of the hermeneutical data. In fact,
the very fact that all theorists, from contrary and contradictory perspectives, after having

196
investigated the same data, arrive at the same conclusion about the unavoidability of one’s
presuppositional framework is an example of the very objectivity that these same theorists deny.
The illicit conclusion that one’s presuppositional framework necessarily obviates objectivity
derives from an almost universally held representationalist epistemology, an epistemological
perspective that is both self-defeating and false. Regardless of the fact that interpreters do not
always achieve the goal of objective interpretation, the fact is that objectivity in interpretation is
possible.

5. But, if no interpreter can be objective, then no interpretation is universally valid.

Evangelicals cling to the possibility of a correct interpretation because intuitively we all know
that there is absolute truth that is universally valid. Although the fact of conflicting interpretations
is part of the history of interpretation, this does not indicate that objectivity is not possible. Not
only is it the case that there are correct interpretations, but on the basis of this it is possible to
adjudicate between interpretations. It follows from this fact that there are some interpretations that
are universally valid. This fact is attested to by the very theorists who attempt to discredit the
notion. Theorists who claim that no interpretation is universally valid are assuming that their own
interpretation that no interpretation is universally valid is in fact universally valid. They assume
the very universality they seek to deny. It is self-defeating and false to claim that no interpretation
is universally valid.

6. But, if no interpretation is universally valid, then the concept of a “correct” interpretation is at

best relative or at worst empty.
Since it is not true that there is no universally valid interpretation, then it does not follow that
there is no “correct” interpretation. The fact that any interpretation that contradicts the first
principles of thought and being cannot either be valid or true indicates that any such interpretation
cannot be correct. As in each of the above cases, theorists who claim that there is no correct
interpretation assume that their own interpretation is the correct one, namely, that there cannot be
a correct interpretation. This too is self-defeating and false.

7. Since there is no such thing as a correct interpretation, there is no means of adjudicating

between interpretations.
Although there are a great number of principles that enter into the possibility of adjudicating
between interpretations, including semantic factors, syntactic factors, historical background
information, cultural considerations, etc., it is indeed possible to adjudicate between
interpretations. For example, any interpretation that issues in a conclusion that contradicts the first
principles of thought and being cannot be correct. Any interpretation that issues in a conclusion
that does not contradict the first principles of thought and being may not therefore be the correct
one, but it is preferable to the one that does engage in contradiction. Consequently, one can reject
the contradictory conclusion and adopt, at least provisionally, the non-contradictory conclusion as
superior. Other factors are important, and every conflict may not be resolvable at our present level
of knowledge, but such instances are not counter-examples. Rather, such instances prove that
adjudicating is not only possible, but necessary. Every theorist who sought to demonstrate that
those who advocate objectivity are wrong was engaging in the very act of adjudication that they
sought to deny. To claim that it is not possible to adjudicate between interpretations is itself an act
of adjudicating between interpretations. This too is self-defeating and false.

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8. In fact, the very idea of adjudicating between interpretations is at best relative and at worst
empty.
Evangelicals are right in maintaining that it is possible to adjudicate between interpretations.
It is not only possible, it is unavoidable. Every act of understanding is, in one way or another, an
act of adjudicating between interpretations. We hold one thing to be true, and its contrary false.
We accept one view and reject its opposite. We make claims that necessarily deny their
contradictories. It is not necessary for Evangelicals to compromise on the notions of objectivity
and truth in order to accept the undeniable fact that all understanding is mediated through one’s
presuppositional framework. The fact of the existence of what we call Transcendental
Presuppositions, the self-evident, undeniable first principles of thought and being constitute a
foundation upon which objectivity is based. We believe that the rejection of representationalism
and adoption of a Moderate Realist epistemology that is grounded in the very nature of the reality
that the God of the Christian Scriptures has created, and indeed upon the very nature of God
Himself, insures the objectivity of truth and meaning.

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 ENDNOTES

1. Moisés Silva, “Contemporary Approaches to Interpretation,” in An Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics: The

Search for Meaning, Walter C. Kaiser, Jr. And Moisés Silva (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1994), 244.
2. James K. A. Smith, The Fall of Interpretation: Philosophical Foundations for a Creational Hermeneutic (Downers
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2000), 163-64 (emphasis in original).
3. J. Scott Duvall and J. Daniel Hays, Grasping God’s Word (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 2001), 93.
4. Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1997), 1.
5. Lorraine Daston, “Objectivity and the Escape from Perspective,” Social Studies of Science 22 (November 1992):
597-98.
6. Ibid., 598.
7. Ibid.
8. Bertrand Russell, A History of Western Philosophy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), 785.
9. Allan Megill, “Introduction: Four Senses of Objectivity,” in Rethinking Objectivity, ed. Allan Megil (Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1994), 1.
10. Ibid.
11. Paul Helm, “Why Be Objective?” in Objective Knowledge: A Christian Perspective, ed. Paul Helm (Leicester,
England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1987), 33-34.
12. Ibid., 33. In this comment can be seen the influence of modern science on the notion of interpretive objectivity.
Helm is hinting at the interpretation of quantum mechanics popularly known as the Heisenberg uncertainty principle,
which, according to Henry F. Schaefer, III, says “the position and velocity of a particle cannot be simultaneously
measured to an unlimited precision.” Henry F. Schaefer, III, Science and Christianity: Conflict or Coherence?
(Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia, 2003), 112. The popular interpretation of the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle is that it demonstrates that all observation necessarily intrudes upon what is observed so as effectively to
obviate the possibility of objective knowledge.
13. Helm uses the term ‘epistemic’ in the sense of having to do with how we know. The terms ‘epistemic’ and
‘epistemology’ come from the Greek word  which means “understanding, skill, or knowledge.” In philosophy,
epistemology is the study of how we know. So, the term ‘epistemic objectivity’ indicates the notion of objective
knowledge.
14. Ibid., 34.
15. Rescher, Objectivity, 7.
16. Ibid., 5.
17. Ibid.
18. Mary E. Hawkesworth, “From Objectivity to Objectification: Feminist Objections,” in Rethinking Objectivity, ed.
Allan Megill (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1994), 151-52.
19. Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), 8.
20. J. G. Davies, “Subjectivity and Objectivity in Biblical Exegesis,” Bulletin of the John Rylands University Library
of Manchester 66 (Autumn 1983): 49.
21. Gail Soffer, “Gadamer, Hermeneutics, and Objectivity in Interpretation,” Prexis International 12 (October 1992):
231.
22. Richard E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer
(Evanston, Indiana: Northwestern University Press, 1969), 178.

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23. David Weberman, “A New Defense of Gadamer’s Hermeneutics,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60
(January 2000) . See Hans-Georg Gadamer, Wahrheit und Methode (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1960), 254, Truth and
Method, 2d ed. trans Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marxhall (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 270.
24. Gadamer, WH, 260, TM, 276.
25. Ibid., WH, 343ff, TM, 341ff.
26. Jean Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press,
1994), 107.
27. Dale Spender, Invisible Women: The Schooling Scandal (New York: Writers and Readers Publishing Cooperative,
1982), 2; quoted in Shirley Dex, “Objective Facts in Social Science,” in Objective Knowledge: A Christian Perspective
(Leicester, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1987), 170-71.
28. Hawkesworth, “Objectivity to Objectification,” 154.
29. W. Randolph Tate, Biblical Interpretation: An Integrated Approach, 2d ed (Peabody Massachusetts:
Hendrickson Publishers, 1997), 187.
30. William W. Klein, Craig L. Blomberg, and Robert L. Hubbard, Introduction to Biblical Interpretation (Dallas:
Word Publishing, 1993), 8. Hereinafter referred to as KBH.
31. Gerhard Maier, Biblical Hermeneutics, trans. Robert W. Yarbrough (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1994),
334.
32. Philip D. Kenneson, “There’s No Such Thing as Objective Truth, and it’s a Good Thing Too” in Christian
Apologetics in the Postmodern World, eds. Timothy R. Phillips and Dennis L. Okholm (Downers Grove, Illinois:
InterVarsity Pres, 1995), 153-70.
33. Alice Ogden Bellis, “Objective Biblical Truth versus the Value of Various Viewpoints: A False Dichotomy,”
Horizons in Biblical Theology 17 (June 1995): 25.
34. One author says, “It is impossible to be totally detached and completely objective in studying anything—science or
theology. We all have assumptions about life and God which color our view of Scripture.” David G. Moore, “Raising
Some Concerns Over the ‘Inductive Method’ of Bible Study,” Reformation and Revival Journal 9 (Fall, 2000): 69.
35. Moisés Silva, “Contemporary Approaches to Interpretation,” in An Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics, Walter
C. Kaiser, Jr. and Moisés Silva (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1994), 244 (emphasis added).
36. Bellis, “Objective Biblical Truth,” 29.
37. Duncan S. Ferguson, Biblical Hermeneutics: An Introduction (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1986), 6.
38. Ibid.
39. Grant R. Osborne, The Hermeneutical Spiral: A Comprehensive Introduction to Biblical Interpretation (Downers
Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1991),367, 412.
40. Dan McCartney and Charles Clayton, Let the Reader Understand: A Guide to Interpreting and Applying the
Bible (Wheaton, Illinois: Victor Books, 1994), 13.
41. Moisés Silva, “The Case for Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” in Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics, Walter C. Kaiser,
Jr., and Moisés Silva (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1994), 263.
42. Peter Cotterell and Max Turner, Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity
Press, 1989), 70. Cotterell and Turner define “discourse meaning” as “the meaning of Paul’s letter [for example] as it
would be understood by a competent reader, fully aware of the linguistic conventions of Hellenistic Greek, after a
careful hearing and reading of the entire letter and fully aware of the total situational context shared by Paul and the
Corinthians.” Ibid., 69.
43. James D. Smart, The Interpretation of Scripture (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1956), 45.
44. Ibid., 46.
45. James B. Reichmann, “Language and the Interpretation of Being in Gadamer and Aquinas,” in Hermeneutics and
Tradition (Proceedings of the American Catholic Association, Vol. 62), ed. Daniel O. Dahlstrom (Washington, D.C.:
National Office of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 1988), 226.

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46. Webb B. Garrison, “The Necessity and Relativity of Biblical Interpretation,” Interpretation 7 (October 1953): 437-
38.
47. G. B. Madison, The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1988), 168.
48. Ferguson, Biblical Hermeneutics, 6.
49. Robert C. Greer, Mapping Postmodernism: A Survey of Christian Options (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity
Press, 2003), 33.
50. KBH, 115.
51. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader Understand, 14.
52. Of course, according to Wallace’s own principles, this observation is a result of his own bias.
53. Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1996), 515,
n5.
54. Robertson McQuilkin, Understanding and Applying the Bible (Chicago: Moody Press, 1992), 16.
55. Robert Van Kampen, The Sign (Wheaton, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1992).
56. Van Kampen, Sign, 24. (Unless otherwise noted, all emphases are original).
57. Ibid., 27.
58. Ibid.
59. Finis Jennings Dake, The Dake Annotated Reference Bible (Lawrenceville, GA: Dake Bible Sales, Inc., 1963).
60. Stanley M. Burgess and Gary B. McGee, Dictionary of Pentecostal and Charismatic Movements (Grand Rapids:
Regency Reference Library, 1988) , 235.
61. Dake, God’s Plan for Man, Inside Back Cover.
62. Finis Jennings Dake, God’s Plan for Man (Lawrenceville, Georgia: Dake Bible Sales, 1977), 3, 39. Hereinafter
referred to as GPM. (Unless otherwise noted, all emphases are original).
63. Dake, GPM, 224.
64. Van Kampen, Sign, 290.
65. Ibid.
66. Dake, GPM, 840.
67. Van Kampen, Sign, 27 (Emphasis added).
68. Dake, GPM, 2-3.
69. Ibid., 43.
70. Peter Cotterell and Max Turner, Linguistics & Biblical Interpretation (Downers Grove, Illinois: InterVarsity
Press, 1989), 70. (emphasis in original).
71. Ibid.
72. William Lane Craig, “Cumulative Case Apologetics: Responses,” in Five Views on Apologetics, ed. Steven B.
Cowan (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 2000), 183.
73. Also we will attempt consistently to employ a convention that is common in philosophy, namely, the effort to
distinguish between use and mention. When mentioning a term, we will endeavor always to place it within single
quotation marks. When using a term, it will appear unmarked, although terms may be emphasized by italics. So, we
might talk about the term ‘bodies,’ or we might talk about actual bodies.
74. Andrei Marmor, “Three Concepts of Objectivity,” in Law and Interpretation: Essays in Legal Philosophy (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1995), 177.
75. The Oxford English Dictionary, (1989), s.v. “objective.”

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76. The Oxford English Dictionary, (1989), s.v. “objectivity.”
77. Moisés Silva, “Contemporary Approaches to Interpretation,” 240.
78. R. W. Newell, Objectivity, Empiricism and Truth (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), 16.
79. Ibid., 17.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. David Bell, “Objectivity,” in A Companion to Epistemology, ed. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (Oxford,
England: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 310.
83. Ibid.
84. Of course, it seems necessary that one would need to determine what the consensus is in itself as it really is.
85. Megill, “Introduction,” 1.
86. Ibid., 2.
87. Ibid.
88. Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
89. Ibid., 5.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Marmor, “Three Concepts,” 179.
93. Ibid., 182.
94. Ibid., 186.
95. Nicholas Rescher, Objectivity: The Obligations of Impersonal Reason (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1997), 3-4 (emphasis in original).
96. Ibid., 4.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
99. Ibid., 4-5.
100. Ibid., 5.
101. Ibid., 6.
102. Ibid.
103. Roger Trigg, Reality at Risk: A Defense of Realism in Philosophy and the Sciences (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman
& Littlefield Publishing, 1980), 1.
104. Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 7.
105. Ibid.
106. Michael Devitt and Kim Sterelny, Language and Reality: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1995), 4.
107. Heracleitus, The Fragments of Heracleitus (np.: Hampstead, 1965), Fr. 117.
108. Donald M. Mackay, “Objectivity in Science,” in Objective Knowledge: A Christian Perspective, ed. Paul Helm
(Leicester, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1987), 43.

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109. J. P. Moreland, Christianity and the Nature of Science: A Philosophical Investigation (Grand Rapids: Baker
Book House, 1989), 11.
110. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
111. Keith Windschuttle, The Killing of History: How Literary Critics and Social Theorists are Murdering Our Past
(New York: The Free Press, 1996), 187.
112. Alex Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction (London: Routledge, 2000), 83.
113. Francis Bacon, The New Organon, trans. and ed. Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), I, CXXX. “Etenim in ea opinione sumus: si justam Naturae et Experientiae Historiam
praesto haberent homines, atque in ea sedulo versarentur, sibique duas res imperare possent: unam, ut receptas
opiniones et notiones dopenerent; alteram, ut mentem a generalissimis et proximis ab illis ad tempus cohiberent.”
Latin text taken from Francis Bacon, Bacon’s Novum Organum, ed. Thomas Fowler, 2d ed. (Oxford: At The
Clarendon Press, 1889), I, CXXX.
114. Bacon, The New Organon, I, CXV. “Quum enim in hoc primo Aphorismorum libro illud nobis propositum sit, ut
tam ad intelligendum quam ad recipiendum ea quae sequuntur mentes hominum praeparentur” and “expurgata
jam et abrasa et aequata mentis area;” Bacon, Novum Organum, I, CXV.
115. Del Ratzsch, Philosophy of Science: The Natural Sciences in Christian Perspective (Downers Grove, Illinois:
InterVarsity Press, 1986.), 22.
116. Israel Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Publishing, 1967), 1.
117. Ibid., 2.
118. MacKay, “Objectivity in Science,” 43.
119. Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, “The Image of Objectivity,” in Representations 40 (Fall 1992): 81.
120. Helene E. Longino, “Values and Objectivity,” in Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues, eds. Martin Curd and
J. A. Cover (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1998), 171.
121. Ibid., 170-71.
122. George Levine, “Why Science Isn’t Literature,” in Rethinking Objectivity, ed. Allan Megill (Durham, North
Carolina: Duke University Press, 1994), 68. The other summaries are, (2) by its rigorous requirements of verification,
by replication of results; (3) by the universal validity of its conclusions; (4) by its capacity to represent adequately a
nonverbal and nonsymbolic reality. Unlike literature, its results are (5) progressive, the cumulative acquisition of new
knowledge of the real world by means of observation and experiment, developing (6) to the generalized level of
natural laws.”
123. Peter Novick, That Noble Dream: The ‘Objectivity Question’ and the American Historical Profession
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 34, 37.
124. Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science, 15.
125. Levine, “Why Science Isn’t Literature,” 68.
126. David Stove, Scientific Irrationalism: Origins of a Postmodern Cult (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction
Publishers, 2001), 21.
127. Moreland, Christianity and the Nature of Science, 235.
128. Novick, That Noble Dream, 34.
129. Shelby D. Hunt, “A Realist Theory of Empirical Testing: Resolving the Theory-Ladenness/Objectivity Debate,”
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 24/2 (June 1994): 133.
130. Frederick Suppe, “Introduction,” in The Structure of Scientific Theories, ed. Frederick Suppe, 2d ed. (Urbana,
Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1977), 30.
131. Keith Windschuttle, “Forward,” in Scientific Irrationalism: Origins of a Postmodern Cult, David Stove (New
Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2001), 2.
132. Rosenberg, Philosophy of Science, 141.

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133. Ratzsch, Philosophy of Science, 22-23.
134. Antony Flew, “theory-laden,” in A Dictionary of Philosophy, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1984), 352.
135. Martin Curd and J. A. Cover, Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues (New York: W. W. Norton and
Company,1998), 1309.
136. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 206.
137. Paul Feyerabend, Against Method, 3d ed. (London: Verso, 1996), 149.
138. Harold I. Brown, Perception, Theory, and Commitment (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1977), 101; quoted in
Harvey Siegel, Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological Relativism (Dordrecht, Holland: D.
Reidel Publishing Company, 1987), 99.
139. Paul Feyerabend, “Problems of Empiricism,” in Beyond the Edge of Certainty, ed. R. Colodny (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), 180; quoted in Frederick Suppe, ed. The Structure of Scientific Theories, 2d ed.
(Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1977), 173.
140. Appleby, Telling the Truth about History, 190.
141. Scheffler, Science and Subjectivity, 2-3.
142. W. H. Walsh, An Introduction to Philosophy of History (London: Hutchinson’s University Library, 1951), 94.
143. Mark Bevir, “Objectivity in History,” History and Theory 33 (1994): 328.
144. Keith Jenkins, “Introduction: On Being Open About Our Closures,” in The Postmodern History Reader, ed. Keith
Jenkins (London: Routledge, 1997), 6.
145. Gilbert J. Garraghan, A Guide to Historical Method, ed. Jean Delanglez (New York: Fordham University Press,
1946), 47.
146. J. J. Jusserand, “The Historian’s Work,” in The Writing of History, J. J. Jusserand, Wilbur Cortez Abbott,
Charles W. Colby, and John Spencer Bassett (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1926), 22. This quote was taken
from Fénelon’s Lettre sur les occupations de l'Académie Française first published in 1716 shortly after Fénelon’s
death in 1715. In his day, Fénelon was one of the most revered scholars of the Roman Catholic Church.
147. Novick, That Noble Dream, 1-2.
148. Garraghan, Guide to Historical Method, 47.
149. Michael Stanford, An Introduction to the Philosophy of History (Malden, Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers,
1998), 51.
150. Garraghan, Guide to Historical Method, 9.
151. Ibid., 47.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid.
154. Ronald H. Nash, ed., Ideas of History, vol. 1, Speculative Approaches to History (New York: E. P. Dutton and
Company, 1969), 6.
155. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Philosophy of History, trans. J. Sibree (New York: Dover Publications,
1956), 11.
156. Bevir, “Objectivity in History,” 330.
157. Ibid., 330-31.
158. William H. Dray, Philosophy of History, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1993), 35.
159. Stanford, Introduction to the Philosophy of History, 4-5.
160. A distinction must be made here between the term “historicism” as it is being used in this discussion and the
literary-critical approach known as the New Historicism. According to Gina Hens-Piazza, the New Historicism “arose
as a literary-critical movement at the University of California at Berkeley in the 1980's . . .” It is not a method, per se,

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but rather, “trains its view upon the processes of production and consumption of texts.” Gina Hens-Piazza, The New
Historicism (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2002), 5-6. Historicism, in the sense discussed here, is primarily an
epistemological question of the relationship between one who seeks to know the past and his own historical
situatedness.
161. Jean Grondin, Philosophical Hermeneutics (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1994), 11.
162. Ibid., 76-77.
163. Charles R. Bambach, Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Press, 1995), 9.
164. Paul Kecskemeti, “Introduction,” in Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, by Karl Mannheim, trans. Paul
Kecskemeti (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952), 6.
165. Grondin, 77.
166. Thomas Haskell, Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Explanatory Schemes in History (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1998), 3.
167. Ibid., 10.
168. John Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 1.1.
169. Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth about History (W. W. Norton and Company,
1994), 170.
170. Moreland, Christianity and the Nature of Science, 143.
171. R. Lanier Anderson, “Truth and Objectivity in Perspectivism,” Synthese 115 (1998): 14.
172. Jonathan Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1976), 16.
173. John B. Carroll, Language and Thought (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1964), 106.
174. George Yule, The Study of Language: An Introduction (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 196.
175. Benjamin Lee Whorf, Language, Thought, and Reality: Selected Writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf, ed. John B.
Carroll (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1962), 213.
176. Ibid., 214.
177. Yule, The Study of Language, 198 (emphasis in original).
178. Franz Boas, Handbook of American Indian Languages (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office
(Smithsonian Institution), 71; quoted in Peter Caws, Structuralism: A Philosophy for the Human Sciences (New
York: Humanity Books, 2000), 46.
179. Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1959), 65-70: Cours de Linguistique Générale, publié par Charles Bally et Albert Sechehaye, 5th ed. (Paris:
Payot, 1955), 97-103.
180. Saussure, Course, 65.
181. Ibid., 66.
182. Ibid., 112. There are a sufficient number of occasions in which the words “idea” (idées) and “concept” (concept)
are used interchangeably to understand them as synonymous in Saussure’s thought.
183. Ibid., 113.
184. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), 2.
185. G. B. Madison, The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1990), 86.
Madison goes on to refer to “reality in the deepest sense,” which he calls “being,” which he says is not determinate,
“has no essence,” nor is the product of language. Our focus here, however, is with the ordinary sense of reality, the
extra-linguistic or extra-mental stuff of the world which, at least in traditional terms, has provided the touchstone, so
to speak, of objectivity of meaning.

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186. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism, 8-9.
187. In Phaedo Socrates argues that a knowledge of the Forms is possible only upon the suggestion of sense
experience. When we perceive things that appear to be equal, upon further examination we discover that they in fact
are not truly equal. But, we have this notion of absolute equality by which we discern that certain visible things either
are or are not equal. If, then, we have this Idea of absolute equality, which is not discovered from unequal things, but
is suggested by the appearance of equality, it seems to follow that the Idea of absolute equality is in our minds prior to
our having judged anything to be equal or unequal. The sense experience had not provided the knowledge of equality,
but suggested its existence. But, if we did not obtain this knowledge of the Idea of absolute equality from the sense
experience, then it must have been knowledge that we, in some sense, already possessed. How then are we able to
judge that any two visible things are not in fact absolutely equal? “We must have possessed knowledge of the Equal
itself if we were about to refer our sense perceptions of equal objects to it, and realized that all of them were eager to
be like it, but were inferior” (Plato, Phaedo, 75b).
Since we began to perceive immediately after birth, we must have gained the knowledge of the Equal prior to birth. At
birth we lost this knowledge, but upon the occasion of sense perception we recover this knowledge, “and we are right
to call this recollection” (Phaedo, 75e). So then, there is no reason to propose a prior existence of the soul if sense
experience can explain the Idea. But if sense experience cannot account for the Idea, then the preexistence of the soul
is required, at least as far at Plato was concerned (Plato, Phaedo, in Platonis Opera (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1989), Tomus I.)
188. Peter A. Redpath, A Simplified Introduction to the Wisdom of St. Thomas (Lanham, Maryland: University Press
of America, 1980), 20.
189. Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, trans. Jonathan Barnes (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), I,1. Aristotelis Opera
Omnia (Paris: Instituti Francici, 1927), Volumen Primum.
190. Jan Pinborg, “Speculative Grammar,” in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. Norman
Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 265.
191. Richard Garner, “‘Presupposition’ in Philosophy and Linguistics,” in Studies in Linguistic Semantics, eds. Charles
J. Fillmore and D. Terence Langendoen (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1983), 27. P. F. Strawson, Introduction to
Logical Theory (London: Methuen and Company, 1977), first published in 1952. Strawson, whose position is
discussed below, was popular for articulating a view that was contradictory to that espoused earlier by Bertrand
Russell in his article “On Denoting,” Mind 14 (1905): 479-93.
192. Thiselton, New Horizons, 45. Rudolf Bultmann, “Ist voraussetzungslose Exegese möglich?” Theologische
Zeitschrift 13 (1957): 409-17.
193. Henry, “Postmodernism,” 42.
194. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 1, 13.
195. Greer, Mapping Postmodernism, 62.
196. Henry, “Postmodernism,” 42.
197. Tom Rockmore, “Epistemology as Hermeneutics: Antifoundationalist Relativism,” The Monist 73 (April 1990):
123.
198. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 17.
199. Ibid., 8.
200. T. L. Heath, ed., The Works of Archimedes with the Method of Archimedes, (New York Dover Publications,
1953), xix.
201. William P. Alston, “Foundationalism,” in A Companion to Epistemology, eds. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 146.
202. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1984), 29-30.
203. Alvin Plantinga, “Rationality and Religious Belief,” in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, eds. Steven M.
Cahn and David Shatz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 259.
204. Ibid., 260 (emphasis in original).

206
205. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
206. Alston, “Foundationalism,” 147.
207. Thiselton, New Horizons, 46.
208. Alston, “Foundationalism,” 145.
209. Ronald H. Nash, Faith and Reason: Searching for a Rational Faith (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing
House, 1988), 81 (emphasis in original).
210. Ibid., 83. There is no hint in Nash that there may be other kinds of necessity, such as metaphysical necessity, that
may indicate the indubitable character of foundational propositions.
211. Ibid.
212. Ibid.
213. Robert Cummins, “Representation,” in A Companion to Epistemology, eds. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 442.
214. Ibid., 442-43 (emphasis in original).
215. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 3.
216. Ibid.
217. Ibid.
218. Ibid., 3-4.
219. Ibid., 4.
220. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2000), B1.
221. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 7.
222. Rorty, Philosophical Papers, 1.
223. Davidson, “The Myth of the Subjective,” 159.
224. Ibid., 162.
225. Ibid., 162-63.
226. Ibid., 163.
227. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 182.
228. Ibid., 163.
229. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, 169.
230. Ibid., 146 (emphasis in original).
231. Ibid., 176 (emphasis in original).
232. Alan H. Goldman, “Given, The,” in A Companion to Epistemology, eds. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1993), 162.
233. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, 169.
234. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 139-40.
235. Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality, 132.
236. Rorty, Mirror of Nature, 315.
237. Ibid., 316.
238. Ibid., 318.

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239. Ibid.
240. Ibid., 318-19.
241. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to consider all of the problems of defining knowledge as justified,
true belief, the most obvious problem is how to justify those original bits of knowledge by which one would justify
other knowledge. Gettier has offered the classic critique of this characterization. See Edmund L. Gettier, “Is Justified
True Belief Knowledge?” Analysis 23 (1963): 121-23.
242. Thiselton, New Horizons, 46 (emphasis in original). A term that suggests itself, and one that is perhaps more
familiar, is “world view.” Although Thiselton’s account of horizons seems to include various psychological dispositions
and specific educational factors, such as background and training, the term “world view” is functional so long as it is
not restricted to theoretical constructs and is understood to indicate a basic distinction between the narrowness and
foundational notion of presuppositions and the broad and inclusive notion of preunderstanding.
243. Cotterell and Turner, Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation, 90.
244. Once again the term “world view” suggests itself so long as the term is not restricted to theoretical constructs, but
includes life experiences, background, training, etc.
245. Yule, The Study of Language, 100.
246. The fact that people differ in their definitions of “old” does not mean that the car is both old and not old. It
means that communication is confusing when commonly agreed upon definitions are not used. The car is either old or
not old when the term “old” is clearly defined and commonly understood. Equivocation does not invalidate the law of
excluded middle. Equivocation simply posits two (or more) separate propositions or instances of identity claims. The
two claims may appear as if they were contradictory but may not be if the two instances are not in conflict when
properly understood. When someone says truthfully that the car is both old and not old, they are using different
meanings for the term “old” and are thus saying two things about the car, not one thing. Language is not exclusively
univocal in terms of vocabulary meanings, and thus careful analysis is often called for in interpretation. If there were
no way to do this analysis, however, interpretation would be impossible. Resolving seeming conflicts in a text is one
aspect of interpretation. Failure to resolve such conflicts leads to increased chances of error or falsehood.
247. Aristotle, On Interpretation, trans. Jean T. Oesterle (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1962), introduced
the study of logic as a necessary aspect of communication. Philosophers in the Middle Ages were often embroiled in
debates about logic and semantics. See, Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, The Cambridge
History of Later Medieval Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). The 20th century Logical
Positivist and Analytic Philosophy movements continue to attest to the importance of the place of logic in
communication. See, A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, 1952), and A. J. Ayer,
ed., Logical Positivism (New York: The Free Press, 1959). Additionally, a standard text on logic, as Irving M. Copi,
Introduction to Logic, or Francis H. Parker and Henry B. Veatch, Logic as a Human Instrument, discuss these
principles.
248. This position can be maintained even within the strictures of relativism. Relativism asserts that there is no
absolute truth or universally, but only truth “for me.” But, if a relativist makes an assertion that contradicts that which
is true for him, then the assertion is necessarily false for him. Though the relativist may not subscribe to the law of
contradiction in any universal sense, it would seem to be necessary for the relativist to subscribe to this law within his
own sphere of beliefs and truths. Even a relativist should not want to contradict his own beliefs and the truth that is
true for him. If the relativist ignores the law of contradiction within his own belief system, then even that which he
claims to be true for him cannot be true for him.
249. Th. Stcherbatsky, Buddhist Logic, in Bibliotheca Buddhica: XXVI (Leningrad: ЛЕНИНГРАД, 1932), 125.
250. The term “unintelligible” here is analogical in the sense that, although the individual claims can be understood
on some level, their contradictory nature makes the overall meaning of the text opaque. What is being meant by the
equal assertion of contradictory claims? Is the author engaging in sarcasm? Without some unambiguous explanation
by the author, the meaning of the text remains beyond the understanding of the reader, and all suppositions about
what it may be are simply that—suppositions.
251. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage
Books, 1968), 481. “Gegen den Positivismus, welcher bei den Phänomenen stehnbleibt ‘es gibt nur Tatsachen,’ würde
ich sagen: nein, gerade Tat sachen gibt es nicht, nur Interpretationen.” Notwithstanding the controversy over
Nietzsche’s “perspectivism,” the notion that Nietzsche advocated that, as Robert C. Solomon puts it, “There is no
perspective-free, global viewpoint, no ‘God’s eye’ view, only this or that particular perspective,” is the popular
understanding of this famous quote. Robert C. Solomon, “Nietzsche Ad Hominem: Perspectivism, Personality, and

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Ressentiment Revisited,” in The Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, ed. Bernd Magnus and Kathleen M. Higgins
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 195.
252. By the term “non-evangelical” we are not supposing that these individuals or sources are not Christian. Rather,
this is simply a shorthand way of referring to sources that do not espouse a commitment to an Evangelical, Christian
perspective. Likewise, these sources do not necessarily deny such a commitment. Rather, in most instances the
possibility of such a commitment is simply not expressed.
253. Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary (1977), s.v. “Presuppose.”
254. Webster’s New Twentieth Century Dictionary (1977), s.v. “Suppose.”
255. Here we are not using the term ens rationis in a technical, metaphysical sense. Joseph Owens defines “being of
reason” as “something [that] may exist in thought but is incapable of existing as such in the real order . . .” Joseph
Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Houston, Texas: University of St. Thomas, 1963), 39. Here we use this
term to refer to a mental entity. We want to avoid the implication that this “entity” has any determinate form, or
content, or nature. We use this term in a generic sense simply to identify a presupposition as something that exists in
the mind, though this “something” has been identified in a multitude of ways.
256. Ted Peters, “The Nature and Role of Presupposition: An Inquiry into Contemporary Hermeneutics,”
International Philosophical Quarterly 14 (June, 1974): 210.
257. Avrum Stroll, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2nd ed.) s.v. “Presupposing.”
258. Ibid.
259. Ibid.
260. Antony Flew, A Dictionary of Philosophy (1984), s.v. “Presupposition.”
261. Robert Stalnaker, “Presuppositions,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 2 (1973): 447.
262. Ibid, 450.
263. Paul Larreya, “Presuppositions and Grammar,” Linguistics 167 (January 23, 1976): 46 (emphasis in original).
264. Ibid. Larreya is referring to the positions of Halliday and Jackendoff’s that are discussed in an article by George
Lakoff, “On Generative Semantics,” Semantics: An Interdisciplinary Reader in Philosophy, Linguistics, and
Psychology, eds. Danny D. Steinberg and Leon A. Jakobovits (Cambridge: The University Press, 1971), 261, passim.
265. Ibid.
266. Thiselton, New Horizons, 45.
267. Rudolf Bultmann, “Ist voraussetzungslose Exegese möglich?” Theologische Zeitschrift 13 (1957): 414.
268. Ibid., 409.
269. Ibid., 410.
270. Thiselton, New Horizons, 45f. Compare also Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 205-92.
271. John Lyons, Semantics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 2.604.
272. Ibid.
273. Ibid., 2.605.
274. Osborne, Hermeneutical Spiral, 404.
275. Ibid.
276. Ibid., 412.
277. Robertson McQuilkin, Understanding and Applying the Bible, rev. ed. (Chicago: Moody Press, 1992), 19.
278. Ibid.
279. Ibid., 22.

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280. Vern S. Poythress, Science and Hermeneutics, vol. 6, Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation, ed. Moisés
Silva (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1988), 121-22.
281. Ibid., 122.
282. Ibid.
283. Ibid.
284. Ibid.
285. Ibid.
286. Moisés Silva, “The Case for Calvinistic Hermeneutics,” in An Introduction to Biblical Hermeneutics, eds. Walter
C. Kaiser, Jr. and Moisés Silva (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1994), 263.
287. Silva, Has the Church Misread the Bible? 7.
288. V. Philips Long, The Art of Biblical History, vol. 5, Foundations of Contemporary Interpretation, ed. Moisés
Silva (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1994), 172.
289. Ibid.
290. Ibid., 120.
291. Millard J. Erickson, “Presuppositions of Non-Evangelical Hermeneutics,” in Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the
Bible, eds. Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1984), 594.
292. Thiselton, New Horizons, 45.
293. Ibid.
294. Ibid., 45.
295. Ibid., 605-6.
296. Peters, “Nature and Role of Presupposition,” 210.
297. Ibid.
298. Ibid., 211.
299. Lyons, Semantics, 2.604.
300. Ibid., 2.733.
301. Ibid., 2.734.
302. Ibid.
303. Ibid., 2.605.
304. Ibid.
305. Jonathan Culler, “Presuppositions and Intertextuality,” MLN 91 (December 1976): 1389.
306. Ibid.
307. Ibid., 1393.
308. Ibid.
309. Edward L. Keenan, “Two Kinds of Presuppositions in Natural Language,” in Studies in Linguistic Semantics,
eds. Charles J. Fillmore and D. Terence Langendoen (New York: Irvington Publishers, 1983), 45.
310. Ibid., 45-46.
311. Ibid., 49.
312. Larreya, 35.
313. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 9.

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314. Gadamer, WM, 254; TM, 269.
315. Osborne, Hermeneutical Spiral, 412.
316. Erickson, “Presuppositions,” 594.
317. Poythress, Science and Hermeneutics, 164.
318. Raymond F. Surburg, “The Presuppositions of the Historical-Grammatical Method as Employed by Historic
Lutheranism,” The Springfielder 38 (March 1975): 280-87.
319. David E. Cooper, Presupposition (Paris: Moultin, 1974), 12.
320. This even in ancient Greece occurred at 9:00 A.M., May 15, 578 B.C. and is often identified as the moment of the
birth of Western philosophical thought.
321. John Frederic Post, “An Analysis of Presupposing,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 6 (Fall, 1968): 167-68.
322. Ibid., 168.
323. Stalnaker, “Presuppositions,” 447.
324. P. F. Strawson, “On Referring,” Mind 59 (1950), 320-44.
325. Strawson, Logical Theory, 175-76.
326. Stalnaker, “Presuppositions,” 447.
327. Russell, “On Denoting,” 490.
328. Ibid.
329. Strawson, Logical Theory, 176.
330. Lyons, Semantics, 2.597.
331. Stalnaker, “Presuppositions,” 447.
332. Ibid., 448.
333. Ibid., 451.
334. Ibid., 447.
335. Cooper, Presupposition, 24.
336. Ibid., 24-25.
337. Ibid., 29. These paradigms are on page 15 of Cooper’s book. They include four “salient features of
presuppositions” which emerge from his introductory considerations. They are, “I. If S presupposes S' then it is ‘odd’
or ‘inappropriate’ to assert S unless one believes S' to be true. ii. If S presupposes S' then the negation of S does not
constitute the negation of S', and S? does not constitute a query about S'. In other words presuppositions remain
constant under negation and questioning. iii. Presuppositions of sentences relate to the syntactic behaviour of
sentences in distinctive ways. iv. If S presupposes S' then S lacks truth value where S' is false.”
338. Ibid., 32. The TVG test is the Truth Value Gap test. Cooper describes the TVG test as follows: “let us say that a
pair of sentences, S and S', pass the TVG test if and only if S lacks truth value unless S' is true.” (Ibid.). This is a
summary of the view that was asserted against Russell’s position as previously discussed.
339. Ibid., 36.
340. Ibid.
341. Ibid., 45.
342. Ibid.
343. Ibid., 58.
344. Ibid., 58-59.

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345. Ibid., 75.
346. Ibid., 119.
347. Ibid., 90.
348. Ibid., 119.
349. Ibid., 9-10.
350. Ibid., 10.
351. Russell, “On Denoting,” 490.
352. Irving M. Copi provides the following definitions: “Two propositions are contradictories if one is the denial or
negation of the other, that is, if they cannot both be true and they cannot both be false. . . Two propositions are said to
be contraries if they cannot both be true, that is, if the truth of either one entails that the other is false.” Irving M.
Copi, Introduction to Logic, 6th ed. (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1982), 185-86 (emphasis in original).
353. “False” is the normal grammatical-historical meaning of the term “bogus.” Either Cooper believes Russell is
wrong, or he does not. If Cooper is using the term “bogus” in order to capitalize on its ambiguity, then this may betray
Cooper’s existential anxiety. Either he means to say it is false, in which case he is betraying his own principles, or he
does not mean to say it is false, in which case he seems to be betraying his intuition, which is evidenced in his
assertion that Russell’s analysis “seems mistaken,” which could be the source of his existential anxiety.
354. Poythress, Science and Hermeneutics, 122.
355. Silva, Has the Church Misread the Bible, 6.
356. N. T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 35.
357. Roger Lundin, “Our Hermeneutical Inheritance,” in The Responsibility of Hermeneutics, Roger Lundin, Anthony
C. Thiselton, and Clarence Walhout (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1985), 4.
358. Ibid., 6.
359. Palmer, Hermeneutics, 182.
360. David Wenham, Paul: Follower of Jesus or Founder of Christianity? (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1995), 20.
361. Susan E. Schreiner, Where Shall Wisdom be Found? (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994), 10-11.
362. Rudolph Butlmann, “Ist voraussetzungslose Exegese möglich?” Theologische Zeitschrift 13 (1957): 409-17,
published in English, “Is Exegesis without Presuppositions Possible?” Encounter 21 (Spring, 1960): 194-200.
363. Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972), 152. (Unless otherwise indicated all
translations of Sein und Zeit are made by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson.)
364. KBH, 87.
365. Ibid., 114.
366. John Goldingay, Approaches to Old Testament Interpretation (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1990), 18.
367. Johnson, Expository Hermeneutics, 19.
368. Silva, Has the Church Misread the Bible? 6.
369. Ibid., 6-7.
370. Osborne, Hermeneutical Spiral, 412.
371. McCartney and Clayton, Let The Reader Understand, 13.
372. A. Immer, Hermeneutics of the New Testament, trans. Albert H. Newman (Andover: Warren F. Draper, 1877), 7.
373. Terry, Biblical Hermeneutics, 595 (page citations are to the reprint edition) (emphasis in original).
374. Bultmann, “Ist voraussetzungslose Exegese möglich?,” 409.

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375. Ibid., 410, “Von der Frage der Voraussetzungslosigkeit im Sinne der Vorurteilslosigkeit ist die Frage der
Voraussetzungslosigkeit in jenem anderen Sinn zu unterscheiden, und in diesem Sinne ist zu sagen:
voraussetzungslose Exegese kann es nicht geben. Daß es sie faktisch deshalb nicht gibt, weil jeder Exeget durch seine
Individualität im Sinne seiner speziellen Neigungen und Gewohnheiten, seiner Gaben und seiner Schwächen
bestimmt ist . . .” (translation by Schubert M. Ogden).
376. Ibid., “. . . soll er gerade ausschalten und sich zu einem rein sachlich interessierten Hören erziehen.” (translation
by Schubert M. Ogden).
377. Ibid., 413.
378. Thiselton, New Horizons, 44.
379. Ibid., 45.
380. Ibid.
381. Ibid., 46.
382. Lundin, “Hermeneutics,”162.
383. Ibid.
384. KBH, 87, claim that “anyone who says that he or she has discarded all presuppositions and will only study the
text objectively and inductively is either deceived or naive” See also, Gerhard F. Hasel, Biblical Interpretation Today
(Washington, D.C.: Biblical Research Institute, 1985), 104, who argues, “The so-called ‘empty head’ principle whereby
the investigator divests himself of all preconceived notions and opinions while approaching the subject to be studied
in complete neutrality, is simply illusory.” Moreover, Luiz Gustoavo da Silva Goncalves, “The Deconstructing of the
American Mind: An Analysis of the Hermeneutical Implications of Postmodernism,” in Evangelical Hermeneutics:
Selected Essays from the 1994 Evangelical Theological Society Convention, eds. Michael Bauman and David Hall
(Camp Hill, Pennsylvania: Christian Publications, 1995), 246, states, “Neutral exegesis does not exist,” and Moisés
Silva makes a similar claim when he asserts that “total objectivity on the part of the interpreter . . . does not exist.”
Silva, “Contemporary Approaches to Interpretation,” 244.
385. Ibid, 233-34.
386. KBH, 8.
387. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader Understand, 14.
388. Ibid., 115.
389. Palmer, Hermeneutics, 182-83.
390. Peters, “The Nature and Role of Presupposition,” 210.
391. Ibid.
392. Ibid., 211.
393. McCartney and Clayton, Let The Reader Understand, 13.
394. McQuilkin, Understanding and Applying, 19.
395. Poythress, Science and Hermeneutics, 121-22.
396. Ibid., 122.
397. Ibid., 164.
398. Ibid., 122.
399. Long, The Art of Biblical History, 120.
400. Thiselton, New Horizons, 46.
401. Peters, “The Nature and Role of Presupposition,” 210.
402. Ibid., 233-34.

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403. Silva, “Contemporary Approaches to Interpretation,” 242.
404. Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 9.
405. Gadamer, WM, 254; TM, 270.
406. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 127-28.
407. Ibid., 128.
408. Ibid.
409. Peters, “Nature and Role of Presuppositions,” 212.
410. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics, 195-96.
411. Palmer, Hermeneutics, 87.
412. Ibid.
413. Brice R. Wachterhauser, “Introduction: History and Language in Understanding,” in Hermeneutics and Modern
Philosophy, ed. Brice R. Wachterhauser (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986), 23.
414. Peters, “Nature and Role of Presuppositions,” 212.
415. Palmer, Hermeneutics, 120-21.
416. Ibid., 121.
417. Heidegger, SZ, 152.
418. David Couzens Hoy, “Heidegger and the Hermeneutic Turn,” in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed.
Charles B. Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 172.
419. Heidegger, SZ, 153.
420. Ibid.
421. Ibid., “sondern in ihn nach der rechten Weise hineinzukommen.”
422. Ibid., “den Sachen selbst.”
423. Gail Soffer, “Gadamer, Hermeneutics, and Objectivity in Interpretation,” Praxis International 12 (Oct. 1, 1992):
234.
424. Gadamer, WM, 251-52; TM, 267.
425. Peters, “Nature and Role of Presuppositions,” 213-14.
426. KBH, 113-14.
427. Ibid., 114.
428. Ibid.
429. Larkin, Culture and Biblical Hermeneutics, 302.
430. Osborne, Hermeneutical Spiral, 324.
431. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader Understand, 17-18.
432. KBH, 114.
433. Friedrich Nietzsche, The Will to Power, trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Vintage
Books, 1968), 486. Wie sollte das Werkzeug sich selbst kritisieren konnen, wenn es eben nur sich zur Kritik
gebrauchen kann? Der Wille zur Macht (Stuttgart: Alfred Kröner Berlag, 1930), 212.
434. It is highly probable that evangelical theorists would gladly affirm the intervention of God to change the
interpreter’s mind, but they do not explicitly include this as a formal aspect of their methodology as it touches on the
role of preunderstanding and presuppositions in interpretation.

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435. KBH, 115.
436. Ibid.
437. Ibid.
438. Ibid., 109.
439. Ibid., 115.
440. Larkin, Biblical Hermeneutics, 299.
441. Ibid., 18.
442. Osborne, Hermeneutical Spiral, 412.
443. McCartney and Clayton, Let the Reader Understand, 17.
444. Ibid.
445. Ibid.
446. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
447. Peters, “The Nature and Role of Presupposition,” 214.
448. Cotterell and Turner, Linguistics and Biblical Interpretation, 70.
449. Ibid.
450. Silva, “Contemporary Approaches to Interpretation,” 244.
451. Ibid., 241.
452. Ibid.
453. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
454. Ibid., 242 (emphasis in original).
455. Marilyn Gaye Piety, “Kierkegaard on Rationality,” in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology of Contemporary
Views, ed. Melville Y. Stewart (Sudbury, Massachusetts: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 1996), 49.
456. It must be pointed out that we have surveyed some Evangelicals who espouse the notion of and possibility of
objectivity in interpretation. However, even in these instances their discussions of the nature of interpretation,
preunderstanding, presuppositions, and other relevant topics tend to undermine their own attempts to hold on to the
possibility of objectivity. Indeed, this is the very import of our Third consideration, namely, How can Evangelicals
subscribe to the currently popular notion of presuppositions and preunderstanding and at the same time hold on to
the possibility of objectivity? Adapting an observation from Gilson, “The whole question here is whether it is possible
to overcome [anti-objectivity] ‘starting from its own principles.’ To this we must answer: no, for [anti-objectivity] is
inscribed within the principles from which it flows, which is precisely why they are its principles.” If one starts with
the anti-objectivity principles that are currently espoused, then one will necessarily fall prey to the very anti-
objectivity one was attempting to avoid. Etienne Gilson, Thomist Realism and the Critique of Knowledge, trans. Mark
A. Wauck (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 130-31.
457. Moisés Silva, “Contemporary Approaches to Interpretation,” 240.
458. The notion of a correspondence view of truth need not be predicated on a representationalist epistemology.
Rather, a correspondence view of truth can be predicated on the basis of a moderate realist metaphysic such that what
is in the mind is not a “representation” of the thing in reality, but is that very thing. Therefore, the correspondence
between the mind and extra-mental reality is possible because that which is in the mind corresponds to that which is
in reality by virtue of their being one form. The moderate realist definition of knowledge is not justified, true belief.
Rather, the moderate realist definition of knowledge is when the knower and the known become one.
459. Of course this observation is self-defeating. If it is true that observers never see things as they are in themselves,
then it must be the case that anyone who makes such a claim has never seen things as they are in themselves. But, if
the claimant has never seen things as they are in themselves, then he doesn’t know how they look. But, if he doesn’t
know how they look, then on what basis does he claim that the way the observer sees them is unlike how they are in
themselves? No observer has the grounds for making such a claim since no one has ever seen anything as it is in itself.

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Additionally, since no one can see things as they are in themselves, how can any observer know how any other
observer sees things? In order to make such a claim, one observer would have to be able to see in itself what another
observer sees. But, by this definition, that would be impossible, since no observer has ever seen anything as it is in
itself, not even what another observer sees.
460. Once again this is a self-defeating statement. If no observer has ever seen anything as it is in itself, then on what
basis can it be claimed that sensation is confronted by a chaotic stream of data? If sensation molds this stream of data
into an intelligible order, then how can the observer know that the stream was chaotic prior to his mind ordering it?
This would imply that the observer has observed something as it is in itself, namely, a chaotic stream of data. But,
according to this position, such an act of perception cannot be performed. Consequently, the observer cannot know
that the world is a chaotic stream of data.
461. Silva, “Contemporary Approaches to Interpretation,” 241.
462. Etienne Gilson, Thomist Realism, 130-31. Although Gilson is critiquing the critical realism of Fr. J. Maréchal, the
basic question is the same with reference to a Kantian starting point in objectivity.
463. David Bell, “Objectivity,” in A Companion to Epistemology, ed. Jonathan Dancy and Ernest Sosa (Oxford,
England: Blackwell Publishers, 1992), 310.
464. Megill, “Introduction,” 1.
465. Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
466. Ibid., 5.
467. Megill, “Introduction,” 2.
468. Nagel, View from Nowhere, 68.
469. See chapter 3 for our introduction to Representationalism and its critics.
470. Nagel, View from Nowhere, 7
471. Ibid.
472. Ibid.
473. Megill, “Introduction,” 2.
474. Nagel, View from Nowhere, 65.
475. Megill, “Introduction,” 2.
476. The principle of second intention accounts for the existence of the viewer. Once I include myself in the picture of
viewing, any subsequent pictures of my viewing myself viewing are not distinct from the initial picture, since
objectively viewing is the same second intentional act simply being repeated. The act of knowing is not like the act of
painting. The painter can never include all of reality in his painting since he is always painting a picture that does not
include himself painting that picture. Knowing, on the other hand, can and does in every epistemological event
include the knowledge that he or she is the knower knowing.
477. As Joseph Owens explains, “In subsequent Scholastic tradition, ‘first intentions’ became a technical phrase for
direct look at whatever could be seen in things in their real existence. ‘Second intention,’ as though by way of a second
look at the same things now in cognitional existence in the mind, bore upon the logical relations between the various
ways in which the things are conceived, such as ‘an individual,’ ‘a species,’ a ‘genus,’ a ‘predicate.’” Owens, Cognition,
n20, 164.
478. Régis, Epistemology, 110.
479. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, 9.
480. Of course, once again, this is a hopelessly self-defeating claim. Is this claim neutral or objective? If no observer is
neutral or objective, then N. T. Wright is not neutral or objective, and therefore his assertion about whether observers
are neutral and objective is not neutral or objective. Wright is, then, only touting what is the result of his own point of
view. Yet, these writers never seem to make these assertions as from their own perspectives. They always make them
as if they are absolutely true, neutral, and objective.
481. Wright, The New Testament and the People of God, 36.

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482. Ibid.
483. J. Alberto Coffa, The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap to the Vienna Station (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1991), 9.
484. Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 1. This quote
is actually taken from a statement in which Rorty is defining antirepresentationalism as not viewing knowledge as a
matter of getting reality right.
485. See Chapter 3.
486. Tom Rockmore and Beth J. Singer, eds., Antifoundationalism Old and New (Philadelphia: Temple University
Press, 1992), 1.
487. Ibid., 5.
488. J. P. Moreland and William Lane Craig, Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview (Downers Grove,
Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 2003), 118.
489. Tom Rockmore, “Introduction,” in Antifoundationalism Old and New, 6.
490. Ibid., 6f.
491. Etienne Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Edward Bullough (New York: Dorset Press, 1948),
260.
492. Nicholas Wolterstorff, Reason within the Bounds of Religion, 2d ed. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans
Publishing Company, 1984), 29-30.
493. Alvin Plantinga, “Rationality and Religious Belief,” in Contemporary Philosophy of Religion, eds. Steven M.
Cahn, and David Shatz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 259.
494. Ibid., 260 (emphasis in original).
495. Ibid., (emphasis in original).
496. Ibid., 261.
497. David Wisdo, “The Fragility of Faith,” Religious Studies 24 (1988): 366.
498. Alvin Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” in Faith and Rationality, eds. Alvin Plantinga, and Nicholas
Wolterstorff (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 47-48.
499. Ibid., 44.
500. Ibid. Quia veritas de Deo per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum admixtione
multorum errorum homini proveniret; a cuius temen veritatis cognigione dependet tota hominis salus, quae in Deo
est.
501. S. Thomae de Aquino, Summa Theologiae (Ottawa, Canada: Studii Generalis O. Pr., 1942), Ia.I.1.
502. Ibid.
503. Thomas A. Russman, “‘Reformed’ Epistemology,” in Thomistic Papers IV, ed. Leonard A. Kennedy (Houston,
Texas: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1988), 189, (emphasis in original).
504. Ibid., 190.
505. Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” 47-48.
506. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Anton C. Pegis (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1975), I, 11, 2. Nam simpliciter quidem Deum esse per se notum est, squum hoc ipsum quod Deus est sit suum
esse. The Latin texts is from S. Thomae Aquinatis, Summa Contra Gentiles (Taurini, Italia: Marietti, 1820), 1.11.
507. Ibid., I,10,2.
508. Henri DuLac, “An Incredulous First Reaction to Faith and Rationality,” in Thomistic Papers IV, ed. Leonard A.
Kennedy (Houston, Texas: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1988), 66-67.
509. Plantinga, “Reason and Belief in God,” 56.

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510. Alvin Plantinga, “Justification and Theism,” in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology of Contemporary Views,
ed. Melville Y. Steward (Sudbury, Massachusetts: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 1996), 83.
511. Russman, 198.
512. Ibid.
513. Jonathan Dancy, Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1985), 26.
514. Alvin Plantinga, “Positive Epistemic Status and Proper Function,” in Philosophical Perspectives 2: Epistemology
1988, ed. James E. Tomberlin (Atascadero, California: Ridgeview Publishing Company, 1988), 1.
515. Ibid., n1, 47.
516. Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), iii.
517. Russman, 198.
518. Alvin Plantinga, “Justification and Theism,” in Philosophy of Religion: An Anthology of Contemporary Views,
ed. Melville Y. Stewart (Sudbury, Massachusetts: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 1996), 86.
519. Henry B. Veatch, “Preliminary Statement,” in Thomistic Papers IV, ed. Leonard A. Kennedy (Houston, Texas:
Center for Thomistic Studies, 1988), 33.
520. Thomae de Aquino, Summa Theologica, II-II.5.2.
521. Harold I. Brown, “For a Modest Historicism,” The Monist 60 (1977), 549; quoted in Harvey Siegel, Relativism
Refuted (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1987), 9. Siegel goes on to reject the association
between the foundationalism characterized by Brown with absolutism. However, the foundationalism to which Siegel
is referring is the brand proposed by Brown, which, as we have already shown, is not coincident with Classical
Foundationalism.
522. Ibid, 10.
523. Silva, “Contemporary Approaches to Interpretation,” 243.
524. Siegel, Relativism Refuted, 3.
525. Ibid., 8. It seems, in fact, that the critics of relativism have the stronger case. A full-scale critique of relativism
would be beyond the scope of this Dissertation, but two helpful studies that have undertaken this very task are Harvey
Siegel, Relativism Refuted: A Critique of Contemporary Epistemological Relativism (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel
Publishing Company, 1987), and James F. Harris, Against Relativism: A Philosophical Defense of Method (LaSalle,
Illinois: Open Court, 1992). Both authors demonstrate that relativism falls to the problem of self-referential
incoherence.
526. Jack W. Meiland, in “On the Paradox of Cognitive Relativism,” Metaphilosophy 11 (1980): 121; quoted in Siegel,
Relativism Refuted, 10; wrote, “That relativism is self-refuting . . . is a myth which must be laid to rest.”
527. Jack W. Meiland, “Concepts of Relative Truth,” The Monist 60 (October, 1977): 569, passim (emphasis in
original).
528. Ibid., 571.
529. Siegel, Relativism Refuted, 14.
530. Ibid., 21.
531. Gadamer, WH, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 327.
532. Warnke, Gadamer, 1.
533. Soffer, 237. Soffer employs the term “historicity thesis” to refer to the same concept referred to herein by the
term “historicism.”
534. Ibid., 238.
535. Ibid.
536. John Haldane, in The Oxford Companion to Philosophy (1st ed.), s.v. “Brute fact.”

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537. Bryan Neal Baird, “An Apology for My Theology: The Inseparable Link Between Reformed Theology and
Presuppositional Apologetics,” [Online]. Available: <http://www.reformed.org/apologetics/baird.html.> [18
February 1998].
538. Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company,
1972), 74.
539. Ibid., 100.
540. Ibid., 103.
541. Ibid., 101 (emphasis in original).
542. Ibid., 103.
543. Ibid.
544. It is only fair to note that Van Til believes that “beams are there” because God made them and in some cases told
us what He had done. Thus he believes that the “beams” are there for non-Christians as well as for Christians. He
seems to think, however, that no one would look for or believe in floor supports if God did not call them to our
attention. Van Til is an epistemological Calvinist as well as a soteriological one.
545. Van Til, Defense of the Faith, 80.
546. Ibid., 214.
547. Again it must be pointed out in fairness to Van Til, that he does not claim to be requiring opposing views to meet
his criteria. He would say that only God is in the position to require such. Van Til develops his apologetic not by
offering factual evidence intended to elicit belief but by attempting to show that opposing views are self-referentially
incoherent and that only Christianity is not self-refuting. God must then call and persuade and regenerate the
unbelieving mind. However, to assert that competing world views are self-referentially incoherent imposes a notion of
self-referential coherence that either is a brute fact for all world views, or it is only an interpreted “fact” relevant to
Van Til’s own world view.
548. The drawing is taken from George Couvalis, The Philosophy of Science: Science and Objectivity (London: SAGE
Publications, 1997), 12.
549. Ibid., 13.
550. There are numerous other similar illustrations, but they all fall victim to the same criticism.
551. Couvalis, 15.
552. Moreland and Craig, Philosophical Foundations, 333.
553. Siegel, 100.
554. Siegel, 100-1.
555. Siegel accentuates this very self-referential problem in his continued critique of Brown. See especially pages 116-
18.
556. Nagel, View From Nowhere, 9.
557. Harold I. Brown, “Objectivity,” in A Companion to Metaphysics, eds. Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa (Oxford:
Blackwell Publishers, 1995), 369.
558. Richard Rorty, “Introduction: Metaphilosophical Difficulties of Linguistic Philosophy,” in The Linguistic Turn,
ed. Richard M. Rorty (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1992), 2.
559. Aristotle, Ta Meta Ta Phusika, E 1, 1026a24, referred to by the Medieval philosophers as philosophia prima., or
tou ontos e hon (“being qua being”), E 1, 1026a30.
560. Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas, 137.
561. The claim here that God is all things should not be taken in a pantheistic sense. God is not all things
ontologically. God is all things intellectually, by virtue of the existence of the forms of all things in the Divine Mind as
Divine Ideas.

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562. Of course, human beings are not necessarily infallible in their efforts to deposit the meaning in the text, but this
is not a counter-example to the basic thesis. Problems like this can be effectively dealt with only if the foundation is
established from which the deviations can be identified.
563. Jacques Maritain, A Preface To Metaphysics (Salem, New Hampshire: Ayer Company Publishers, 1987), 12.
564. Maritain, Introduction To Philosophy, 186-87.
565. Owens, Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 214-15.
566. Norman L. Geisler, Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1999), 259.
567. Francis H. Parker and Henry B. Veatch, Logic as a Human Instrument (New York: Harper and Brothers,
Publishers, 1959), 242.
568. Ibid., 238.
569. Ibid., 242.
570. Aquinas, St. Thomas, Truth, trans. James V. McGlynn (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994),
14.9.R. “Quæcumque autem sciuntur, proprie accepta scientia, cognoscuntur per resolutionem in prima principia,
quæ per se præsto sunt intellectui.” The Latin text is take from S. Thomae Aquinatis, De Veritate (2), vol. 4,
Quaestoines Disputate et Quaestiones Duodecim Quodlibetales (Taurini, Italia: Marietti, 1942), 14.9.
571. Finis J. Dake, Dake’s Annotated Reference Bible: The New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing
House, 1961), 97, John 4:24, note r. (emphasis in original).
572. Finis J. Dake, God’s Plan for Man (Lawrenceville, Georgia: Dake Bible Sales, 1977), 834.
573. Ibid.
574. Dake, God’s Plan, 57.
575. Ibid., 42 (emphasis in original).
576. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
577. Ibid.
578. It is perhaps important to note that this distinction is based on an assumed metaphysics of natures. Dake
presupposes that entities have determinate natures by which they can be known to be what they are. Persons have the
nature of personhood. Doors have the nature of doors. It is because of this underlying metaphysical presupposition
that this distinction can be made on the level of interpretation.
579. Dake specifically asserts that God exists as three “separate persons with three separate bodies, souls, and spirits .
. .” Dake, God’s Plan, 55.
580. W. Randolph Tate flatly asserts, “There is no such thing as a pure reading, an objective interpretation.” W.
Randolph Tate, Biblical Interpretation: An Integrated Approach, 2d ed. (Peabody, Massachusetts: Hendrickson
Publishers, 1997), 187. Moisés Silva says, “In effect, this is what historical exegesis has had as its goal: total objectivity
on th part of the interpreter so as to prevent injecting into the text any meaning other than the strictly historical one.
But such objectivity does not exist.” Moisés Silva, “Contemporary Approaches to Interpretation,” in An Introduction
to Biblical Hermeneutics: The Search for Meaning, Walter C. Kaiser, Jr. and Moisés Silva (Grand Rapids: Zondervan
Publishing House, 1994), 244.
581. Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 154.
582. Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, 224.
583. For a helpful analysis of the relation between Thomistic metaphysics and modern physical theory, see Richard J.
Connell, Substance and Modern Science (Houston, Texas: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1988).
584. McCall, Reality of Substance (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1956), 49.
585. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, trans. Anton C. Pegis (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1975), I.1.10-11, 79, 81.
586. McCall, Reality of Substance, 50.
587. Ibid.

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588. Owens, Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 144.
589. Ibid.
590. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
591. The same can be said about properties. Properties cannot be all there is since this would mean that the total sum
of all properties would constitute an independent existence, which is the definition of substance. So, to claim that
properties is all there is is to claim that properties are a substance. Therefore, properties must not be all there is.
592. McCall, Reality of Substance, 51.
593. Quoted by Copleston, History of Philosophy, I.1.39. Another quote for which Heraclitus is well known is, “No
one steps in the same river twice” (Fr. 12 (41,42)). In the Cratylus, Socrates says, “Heraclitus says somewhere that
‘everything gives way and nothing stands fast,’ and, likening the things that are to the flowing of a river, he says that
‘you cannot step into the same river twice.’” Plato, Cratylus, trans. C. D. C. Reeve, in Plato Complete Works, ed. John
M. Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1997), 402a. Kratulos, 402a. On a popular level, these quotes
have led many to think of Heraclitus as teaching that reality is ultimately becoming rather than being. As Copleston
points out, “In this respect Heraclitus is a Pirandello in the ancient world, crying out that nothing is stable, nothing
abides, proclaiming the unreality of ‘Reality.’” Copleston, Greece and Rome, 39. Luigi Pirandello (1867-1936) was a
prolific writer and playwright. His primary concern was with the question of identity. He understood the self to exist
only in terms of its relation to others. However, Heraclitus also says, “We step and do not step into the same rivers;
we are and are not (Fr. 49a (81), which indicates a unity behind the flowing. Concerning this underlying unity in
Heraclitus’ teaching, Aristotle says, “But what these thinkers maintained was that all else is being generated and is
flowing, nothing having any stability, except one single thing which persists as the basis of all these transformation.
So we may interpret the statement of Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others.” Aristotle, On the Heavens, trans. J. L.
Stocks, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 298b,
29-32.
594. Margaret Gorman, General Semantics and Contemporary Thomism (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska
Press, 1962), 17 (emphasis in original).
595. Ibid., 89.
596. George P. Klubertanz and Maurice R. Holloway, Being And God (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1963), 97.
597. Antony Flew, in A Dictionary of Philosophy, 1st, s.v. “Predication.”
598. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1007 a 34.
599. Ibid., 1007 b 22.
600. Ibid., 1006 b 5.
601. McCall, The Reality of Substance, 54.
602. Klubertanz, Being and God, 116. (emphasis in original).
603. Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 147.
604. Benignus Gerrity, The Theory of Matter and Form and the Theory of Knowledge (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1936), 2.
605. Klubertanz, Being and God, 117.
606. Gerrity, The Theory of Matter and Form and the Theory of Knowledge, 36.
607. Form in the Aristotelian sense must not be confused with Platonic form. In Plato’s system, at least the way
Aristotle understood Plato, the forms were universals that exist in the realm of the ideas. For Aristotle, and St.
Thomas, the form was a constituent principle of the being of real things. The Moderate Realist concept of the form is
that each particular finite thing is composed of its form and its matter.
608. Klubertanz, Being And God, 117.
609. Joseph M. Marling, The Order of Nature (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America, 1934), 19.
610. Gerrity, The Theory of Matter and Form and the Theory of Knowledge, 2.
611. Ibid., 57.

221
612. Gilson, Philosophy of St. Thomas, 266.
613. Maritain, Introduction to Philosophy, 84.
614. Brennan, Moderate Realist Psychology, 115.
615. Gilson, Philosophy of St. Thomas, 264.
616. Robert Edward Brennan, Thomistic Psychology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1941), 111-12.
617. Plotinus, Plotini Opera, ed. Paul Henry and Hans-Rudolf Schwyzer (Clarendon: Oxford University Press, 1982),
III. 8 (30) 6.15-17.
618. Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas, 266.
619. Aquinas, Truth, II.6.3r. Proprie loquendo, sensus aut intellectus cognoscunt, sed homo per utrumque. De
Veritate, II.6c.
620. Gilson, Philosophy of St. Thomas, 263.
621. Brennan, Thomistic Psychology, 115.
622. Ibid.
623. Ibid., 118.
624. M. Aloysius, “Toward a Thomistic Theory of Sensation,” The Thomist 20 (April, 1957): 145. The passivity of the
cognitive powers does not indicate simply a state of being acted upon. Passivity “means a capacity to receive” and does
not indicate inactivity [L. M. Regis, Epistemology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), 198-99].
625. Aristotle, De Anima, trans. J. A. Smith, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1984), II.12.424a.16-24.
626. Mortimer J. Adler, “Sense Cognition: Aristotle vs. Aquinas,” The New Scholasticism 42 (Autumn, 1968): 585,
(emphasis in original).
627. Aloysius, “Thomistic Theory of Sensation,” 147.
628. Klubertanz, Philosophy of Human Nature, 68.
629. Ibid.
630. Owens, Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 32.
631. Gilson, Philosophy of St. Thomas, 266.
632. John F. Peifer, The Concept in Thomism (New York: Bookman, 1952), 51.
633. Brennan, Thomistic Psychology, 116-17.
634. Gilson, Philosophy of St. Thomas, 267.
635. Klubertanz, Philosophy of Human Nature, 126.
636. Gilson, Philosophy of St. Thomas, 228.
637. L. M. Regis, Epistemology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1959), 268.
638. Peifer, Concept in Thomism, 101.
639. In addition to the power of imagination, the scholastic philosophers proposed two other powers of the internal
senses, the memorial power and the estimative power. Each power has its respective function; however, their
functions are not crucial to the thesis of this paper. Therefore, we will refrain from a consideration of these powers.
640. Peifer, Concept in Thomism, 102.
641. Klubertanz, Philosophy of Human Nature, 128.
642. Brennan, Thomistic Psychology, 127.
643. Peifer, Concept in Thomism, 199.

222
644. Brennan, Thomistic Psychology, 126.
645. Roy J. Deferrari and M. Inviolata Barry, A Lexicon of St. Thomas Aquinas (Baltimore, MD: The John D. Lucas
Printing Company, 1948), Fascicle IV, 836.
646. Peifer, Concept in Thomism, 103.
647. Gerald Phelan offers a word of clarification on this expression. “For Kant the ‘thing-in-itself’ was some
inscrutable entity beyond the reach of reason which only an indefensible dogmatism or an act of faith or an irrational
experience could lead one to accept. . . . The thing in itself of which I am speaking [and in this paper] is an essence
exercising an act of existence in the world of reality‒actual or possible‒as contrasted with that same essence
exercising an act of existence in the world of knowledge.” Gerald B. Phelan, “Verum Sequitur Esse Rerum” Mediaeval
Studies 1 (1939): 16.
648. Peifer, Concept in Thomism, 105.
649. Gerrity, Theory of Matter and Form and Theory of Knowledge, 96.
650. Ibid., 90.
651. Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes, 43.
652. Gerrity, Theory of Matter and Form and Theory of Knowledge, 90.
653. Peifer, Concept in Thomism, 110.
654. Regis, Epistemology, 232.
655. Gerrity, Theory of Matter and Form and Theory of Knowledge, 93.
656. Ibid.
657. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia.85,1.
658. Peifer, Concept in Thomism, 115-16.
659. Ibid., 119.
660. Joseph Owens, “Thomistic Common Nature and Platonic Idea,” Mediaeval Studies 21 (1959): 218.
661. Ibid., 213.
662. Brennan, Thomistic Psychology, 180.
663. Peifer, Concept in Thomism, 157.
664. Gilson, Philosophy of St. Thomas, 137.
665. Adler, Intellect, 144.
666. Mortimer Adler, Some Questions About Language (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1976), 94.
667. Quoted by Brennan, Thomistic Psychology, 111-12.
668. Klubertanz, Philosophy of Human Nature, 173-74.
669. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia.85,5.
670. Owens, Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 48.
671. The term ‘judgment’ here is not proposed in an evaluative sense of moral judgments. This is a philosophical term
used to identify that act of the mind by which we affirm or deny existence.
672. Klubertanz, Philosophy of Human Nature, 175. It is at the level of judgment that misunderstanding and error is
initially encountered. In Thomistic Epistemology, errors of judgment are the result of illicit judgments produced by
the mind on the basis of inadequate information, or the overriding influence of the will, or similar acts. The discipline
of logic explores many errors of judgment.
673. Ibid.
674. Ibid.

223
675. Ibid., 177.
676. Owens, Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 242-43.
677. Klubertanz, Philosophy of Human Nature, 173-75.
678. Gilson, Philosophy of St. Thomas, 270.
679. Peifer, Concept in Thomism, 167.
680. Brennan, Thomistic Psychology, 180.
681. Adler, Intellect, 35.
682. Ibid., 36.
683. David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Tom L. Beauchamp (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 4.2.21.
684. Couvalis, Philosophy of Science, 39.
685. Robert Audi, Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge (London: Routledge,
1998), 287.
686. Parker and Veatch, Logic as a Human Instrument, 250-51.
687. Ibid., 251.
688. Ibid., 270.
689. Adler, Some Questions about Language, 13.
690. Louis Lachance, “The Philosophy of Language,” The Thomist 4 (October, 1942): 548.
691. Klubertanz, Philosophy of Human Nature, 199.
692. Jacques Maritain, “Language and the Theory of Sign,” in Language: An Enquiry into its Meaning and Function,
ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1957), 90 (emphasis in original).
693. Adler, Some Questions About Language, 15.
694. John Wild, “An Introduction to the Phenomenology of Signs,” Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 8
(1947): 223.
695. Ibid., 230.
696. Henry Babcock Veatch, Intentional Logic (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1952), 13.
697. St. Augustine, On Christian Doctrine, II.1.2.
698. Veatch, Intentional Logic, 12.
699. Aquinas, Aristotle: On Interpretation, II. 8.
700. Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes, 61.
701. Lyons, Semantics, 1.100-101.
702. Veatch, Intentional Logic, 13.
703. Oesterle, “Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning,” The Thomist 8 (April, 1944): 252.
704. Oesterle observes that, “The formal sign, the concept, can be understood ultimately only in terms of how there is
any knowledge at all.” “Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning,” 259.
705. Ibid.
706. Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes, 54.
707. Aristotle, On Interpretation, I.16a. 5.
708. Ibid., I. 16a. 3.

224
709. Ibid., I.16a.6. The passions of the soul are “passions” because they arise as the result of an impression upon the
possible or “passive” intellect. As St. Thomas’ comment points out, “the conception arises from things by way of a
kind of impression or passion.” Aristotle On Interpretation, II.6.26.
710. Aquinas, Aristotle: On Interpretation, II.5.
711. Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes, 61.
712. Gorman, General Semantics, 119.
713. Klubertanz, Philosophy of Human Nature, 198.
714. Aquinas, Truth, 4.2. ad. 5 (emphasis in original).
715. Peifer, Concept in Thomism, 158.
716. Etienne Gilson, Linguistics and Philosophy (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 64.
717. Aristotle, On Interpretation, 16a, 6.
718. Klubertanz, Philosophy of Human Nature, 197-98.
719. Adler, Some Questions About Language, 25-26.
720. Ibid., 26-27.
721. Saussure asserts, “The two-sided linguistic unit has often been compared with the human person, made up of
body and the soul. The comparison is hardly satisfactory.” Course in General Linguistics, trans. Wade Baskin (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966), 103. He offers instead the analogy of a chemical compound. Since a
chemical compound is homogenous, and, as Saussure himself claims, the two-sides of the linguistic compound are
not, it is difficult to understand why he used this analogy (compare the analysis by Gilson, Linguistics and
Philosophy, 34-35). It will not do to claim that Saussure is considering the individual molecule of a chemical
compound, because the molecule is composed of distinct elements, each of which is what it is apart from the
compound. However, words are not words if they have no meaning.
722. Aquinas, Aristotle On Interpretation, II.4.
723. Battista Mondin, Philosophical Anthropology (Bangalore, India: Theological Publications in India, 1985), 135.
724. For a defense of the claim that language is a uniquely human activity, see Clifford Wilson and Donald McKeon,
The Language Gap (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1984).
725. Lyons, Semantics, 1.95.
726. Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, 11. From this point this work of Ogden and Richards will be
referred to as O&R.
727. Ibid., 11-12.
728. In his book Language and Philosophy (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1949), Max Black also
characterizes the theory of Ogden and Richards as “causal and behavioristic” ( 195).
729. Lyons, Semantics, 1.98.
730. Adler, Some Questions About Language, 40.
731. Oesterle, “Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning,” 258.
732. Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, 21 (emphasis added).
733. Jonathan Culler, Ferdinand de Saussure (New York: Penguin Books, 1977), 12.
734. Ibid., 13.
735. Ibid.
736. Ibid., 14 (emphasis in original).
737. Ibid. (emphasis in original).
738. Ibid.

225
739. Ibid., 14-15.
740. Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 65.
741. Ibid., 66.
742. Ibid., 112. There are a sufficient number of occasions in which the words ‘idea’ and ‘concept’ are used
interchangeably to understand them as synonymous in Saussure’s thought.
743. Ibid., 113.
744. Ogden and Richards, The Meaning of Meaning, 6.
745. Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 111 (emphasis added).
746. Although the later Wittgenstein mounted a sever criticism of the notion of ostensible definition, it is the opinion
of this writer that Wittgenstein’s criticism assumes the representationalist/idealist epistemology that is the legacy of
the Cartesian/Kantian tradition and therefore succumbs to the same criticisms leveled against this tradition. For an
exposition of Wittgenstein’s position see, Robert J. Fogelin, Wittgenstein, 2d ed., in The Arguments of the
Philosophers, ed. Ted Honderich (London: Routledge, 1996).
747. Lyons, Semantics, 1.113.
748. Ibid.
749. Ibid.
750. Ibid.
751. Ibid., 114.
752. Ibid.
753. Ibid., 19.
754. Ibid., 114. “In the sense of ‘word’ in which find and found are said to be forms of, or belong to, the same word, it
is a vocabulary-word that is being referred to; and vocabulary-words constitute one subclass of what (with some
support in current linguistic usage) we are calling lexemes” (Vol. 1, 19, emphasis in original).
755. Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia.87,4.
756. Owens, Elementary Christian Metaphysics, 215.
757. Oesterle, “Another Approach to the Problem of Meaning,” 251. The notion of meaning here avoids Wittgenstein’s
criticism of language as naming because Wittgenstein is attacking a view in which words name things. This view holds
that some words name things by means of the concept. The word “man” does not name an individual man, but names,
in a sense, the concept “man” which is form of manness. Words denote things, but they mean concepts.
758. Adler, Intellect, 130.
759. Ibid.
760. Aquinas, Aristotle On Interpretation, II.5.
761. Adler, Some Questions About Language, 55.
762. Ibid., 31.
763. The major problem with the verification principle as it has been applied to meaning, is that it is unverifiable. The
only way a sentence can be declared meaningless according to the verification principle is if it is understood to make
an assertion about something that does not exist, or to make an assertion that is false. However, the only way to know
that an assertion is false is if the meaning is understood and understood to be false. In other words, the only thing to
which the verification principle can be applied is to meaning. The verification and falsification principles themselves
are neither verifiable nor falsifiable.
764. Adler, Some Questions About Language, 33. This is in fact the fine point of distinction upon which Immanuel
Kant capitalized in attacking the ontological argument of St. Anselm. Simply because a word, such as “God,” has
referential significance does not necessarily mean it has existential denotation. Simply because we can conceive of the
greatest possible being does not necessitate his existence.

226
765. Paul Horwich, Meaning (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 12.
766. Stanley L. Jaki, Means to Message: A Treatise on Truth (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing
Company, 1999), 13.
767. Brennan, Thomistic Psychology, 247.
768. Adler, Ten Philosophical Mistakes, 66.
769. Winfried Corduan, “Philosophical Presuppositions Affecting Biblical Hermeneutics,” in Hermeneutics
Inerrancy, and the Bible, eds. Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing
Company, 1984), 496.
770. May, “Knowledge of Causality in Hume and Aquinas,” The Thomist 34 (1970): 283.
771. Ibid., 287.
772. These categories are adapted from Norman L. Geisler, Introduction-Bible, vol. 1, Systematic Theology
(Minneapolis, Minnesota: Bethany House, 2002), 174.
773. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1967), 3.
774. Ibid., 8 (emphasis in original).
775. Ibid.
776. Tremper Longman, III, Literary Approaches (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1987), 64-65.
777. Ibid., 64.
778. Schuyler Brown, “Reader Response: Demythologizing the Text,” New Testament Studies 34 (April 1988): 232.
779. Ibid., 232.
780. Longman, Literary Approaches, 38.
781. Brown, “Reader Response,” 232.
782. Cotterell and Turner, Linguistics & Biblical Interpretation, 55.
783. Robert P. Scharlemann, “Deconstruction: What is it?” Dialog 26 (Summer, 1987): 186-87.
784. Ibid., 187.
785. Cotterell and Turner, Linguistics & Biblical Interpretation, 90-97. Throughout the remainder of this discussion,
this book will be referred to by the designation CT.
786. CT, 97.
787. E. D. Hirsch, The Aims of Interpretation (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1976), 79-80.
788. CT, 97.
789. Ibid., 94.
790. C. F. Keil and F. Delitzsch, Commentary on the Old Testament In Ten Volumes (Grand Rapids: William B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1980), 1.3.151.
791. Ibid.
792. Peter C. Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1976),
232-33.
793. See chapter 6.
794. Mortimer J. Adler, Truth in Religion. The Plurality of Religions and the Unity of Truth (New York: MacMillan
Publishing Company, 1990), 113-14.
795. Ibid., 118.

227
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