CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

1.1. Pragmatics The Study Of Language Use And Linguistic

Communication
Probably the most pervasive characteristic of human social interaction, so
pervasive that we hardly find it remarkable, is that we talk. Sometimes we talk to
particular persons, sometimes to anyone who will listen; and when we cannot find
anyone to listen, we even talk to ourselves. Although human language fulfills a
large variety of functions, from making someone up in the morning with a cheery
wake up! To christening a ship with a solemn I hereby christen this ship “H.M.S.
Britania,” we will be focusing here on those uses of language that are instrumental
from human communication. But, one might ask, why should a linguist be
concerned with language use when describing a language? And what are these
various uses of language, especially those central to communication? As with
semantic, asking such question begins one’s introduction to the subject of
pragmatics and attempting to answer them, especially theory, completes that
introduction.

One way of motivating the inclusion of pragmatics information in a

grammar is by way of semantics. We suggested earlier that a promising
conception of meaning was one in which meaning is determined by use. If use
does determine meaning, then the theory of language use will provide te
foundations for semantics, so at least that part of pragmatics that concerns itsel
with meaning and reference will be a part of grammar.

A second way to motivate the inclusion of pragmatic information in a

grammar is by considering the linguistic competence of a fluent speaker. Would
we want to say speaker who did not knows any of the kinds of in formations in
that they spoke the English language fluently? We think not.

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 CHAPTER II
DISCUSSION

2.1. Aims And Claims Of Pragmatics

From the above list we get a glimpse of wide variety of possible uses
language, but before we survey these various uses, we must first distinguish
between language to do something and using language in doing something. It is
certainly a very important fact about human beings that they use language in
much of their thought. Especially abstract thoughts, if they did not have language
at their disposal. Central as this fact may be to our cognitive life the pragmatic, it
is not central to the pragmatic notion of language use, the use of language to do
things. When we focus on what people use language to do, we focus on what a
person is doing with words in particular situations we focus on the intentions,
purposes, beliefs, and wants that a speaker has in speaking-in performing speech
acts. Because the study of speech acts is a central concern of pragmatics, we will
restrict ourselves to that topic for most of our discussion.

We will approach the problem of surveying speech acts in stages. First, we

will set out the main types of speech acts; second, we will investigate some
different ways of performing them; and finally, we will look at some related
linguistic phenomena.

2.1.1. Types Of Speech Acts

Speech act theorist found no appropriate terminology already available for

labeling types of speech acts, so they had to invent one. The terminology we use
here comes, in large part, from Austin (1962) and Searle (1969). According to the
theory they have developed, there are four important categories of speech acts.

Utterance acts are simply acts of uttering sounds syllables, words, phrases,
and sentences from a language. From a speech act point of view, these are not
very interesting acts because an utterance act per se is not communicative; it can
be performed by a parrot, tape recorder, or voices synthesizer.

Austin (1962) characterized the illocutionary act as an performed in

saying something. For instance, in saying Ali is the greatest; one might perform
the act of asserting that Ali is the greatest. Some other examples of illocutionary
acts:

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 (2) Promising threatening

Reporting requesting

Stating suggesting

Asking ordering

Telling proposing

What are some of the important characteristics of illocutionary (as

opposed to perlocutionary) acts? First, illocutionary acts can often be successfully
performed simply by uttering the right explicit perfomative sentence, with the
right intentions and under the right circumstances. For instances, can be
utterances, the utterance acts of producing sentences (3a)-(3c) can be
performances of the illocutionary acts of ordering, promising, and appointing,
respectively.

Speech Acts

Utterance Illocutionary Perlocutionary Propositional

Acts Acts Acts Acts

promising intimidating referring

reporting persuading predicating
asking deceiving

3 a. I (hereby) order you to leave

b. I (hereby) promise to you
c. I (hereby) appoint you chairman

Second, illocutionary acts (unlike perlocutionary acts) are central to

linguistic communication. Our normal conversation is composed in large part of

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statement, suggestions, request, proposals, greetings and the like. When we do
perform perlocutionary acts such as persuading or intimidating, we do so by
performing illocutionary acts such as stating or threatening.

Third, and most importantly, unlike perlocutionary acts, most illocutionary

acts used to communicate have feature that one performs them successfully
simply by getting one’s illocutionary intentions recognized.

For examples:

 If you say Ali is the greatest, and if I recognize your intention to tell
me that Ali is the greatest, then you will have succeeded in telling me,
and I will have understood you. But if you are attempting to persuade
me that Ali is the greatest, it is not sufficient for me just to recognize
your intrntion to persuade me; I must also believe what you said. If
Ali says to you, I’m the greatest, you will recognize his intention to tell
or inform you that he is greatest. To be persuaded of it yoy must
believe it, and that will probably require watching Ali’s fist in action,
not just his mouth.

Austin (1962) characterizes perlocutionary acts as acts performed by

saying something. For instances, suppose John believes everything Howard Cosell
says: then by saying Ali is the greatest. Some typical examples of perlocutionary
acts are:

Inspiring persuading

Impressing deceiving

Embarrassing misleading

Intimidating intimating

What are some important characteristics of perlocutionary acts? First,

perlocutionary acts(unlike illocutionary acts) are not performed by uttering

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explicit perfromative sentences. We do not perform the perlocutionary act of
convincing someone that Ali is the greatest by uttering (5) :

(5) I (hereby) convince you that Ali is the greatest.

Second, perlocutionary acts seem to involve the effects of utterance acts

and illocutionary act on the thoughts, feelings,, and actions of the hearer, whereas
illocutionary acts do not. Thus, perlocutionary acts can be represented as an
illocutionary act of the speaker (s) plus its effect on the hearer (H):

a. S tells + H believes . . . = S persuades H that . . .

b. S tells + H intends . . . = S persuades H to . . .

If we look again at illocutionary acts such as asserting, questioning,

requesting, and promising, the attentive reader will notice that there can be an
overlap in what is asserted, questioned, requested,. For instant, suppose as speaker
utters the following sentences and thereby performs the indicated acts:

a. Borg beat Nastase. (statement)

b. Brog beat Nastase? (question)
c. Borg, beat Nastase! (request, demand)

All of the above illocutionary acts are concerned with Borg’s beating
Nastase, which is called the propositional content of the illocutionary act. As (7)
illustrates, different types of illocutionary acts can have the same propositional
content. Furthermore, each type of illocutionary acts cans have different
propositional contents. For examples, the illocutionary act of stating can have a
wide variety of propositional contents in that wide variety of propositions can be
stated:

a. Borg beat Nastase.

(Statements)
b. Connors beat Borg.

The simple’s types of propositional content are expressed by means of acts

of referring and predicating. Wherein, a speaker refers to something and then

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characterizes it. Suppose that a speaker S utters the sentence Borg is tired and
thereby asserts that Borg is tired. in making this assertion, the speaker would also
be performing the prepositional acts of referring to Borg of characterizing him
with the predicate is tired.

2.1.2. Ways Of Performing Speech Acts

Speech acts in general, and illocutionary acts particular, can be performed

in a variety of ways. The cases we have been discussing so far represent only one
of at least six possibilities. To begin with, we will say that an acts is literal if
(roughly speaking) a speaker means what he says. Conversely, we will say that an
act is nonliteral if a speaker does indirect if (roughly speaking) a speaker performs
that act by means of performing another speech act. Conversely, we will say that
an act is direct if it is not indirect, that is, if it is not performed by earns of
performing any other act. What are some examples of these ways of performing
speech acts?

2.1.3. Performing Illocutionary Acts

While considering the following examples, keep in mind that many

illocutionary acts can be successfully performed but still fail as communication.
As we will see, though, this process of identifying communicative intentions can
be either quite direct or indirect and around about.

First, consider the performance of literal and direct acts. Typical examples
of such acts are utterances of; I have a headache, used to report a headache. Please
leave, used to request someone to leave: and what time is it? Used to ask someone
time. These sorts of acts are the siplest for a hearer to indentify because they
involve the minimal amount of inference. With literal and direct acts, knowing the
language takes the hearer most of the way toward recognizing what the speaker is
up to.

With nonliteral direct acts the matter is a little different. In these cases the
hearer H must infer that speaker S does not mean what his words mean literally,

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as well as infer what S does mean. typical examples of nonliteral but direct acts
are utterances of I’d never have guessed, used (sarcastically) to indicate that
something is oblivious; you can say that again, used (figuratively) to endorse
someone’s remark; A pig wouldn’t eat this food, used (as an exaggeration) to
condemn the food.

When we turn to indirect acts, the story gets a little more complicated
because we have (at least) two acts to contend with-ythe direct act and the direct
act is literal or not whether the indirect act is literal or not.

Speech Acts1 Speech2

a. literal and direct s + nonliteral and indirect

b. literal and direct + literal and indirect

c. nonliteral and direct + nonliteral and indirect

d. nonliteral and direct + literal and indirect

2.1.4. Performing other speech Acts (optional section)

Can other kinds of speech acts be performed nonliteral or directly? No one

has seriously investigated the possibility as yet, but it does seem that some of
them can be.

Consider acts or referring. To refer nonliterally is to pick out or

indentify a referent, but not by virtue of meaning what the referring expression
means. In the case of proper means, to refer nonliterally is to pick out a referent
by using a name that the referent has not been given. Imagine that Jones believes
himself to be Napoleon. We might address him as Napoleon and even refer to him
as Napoleon in speaking to others, yet he is not actually named Napoleon.

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 Speech Act1 Speech Act2

Direct Indirect

1. I have a headache literal

2. A pig would’nt eat this food Nonliteral
3. I would like some Necco wafers Literal Noliteral
(report) (request)
4. The bull is about to charge Literal literal
(report) (warning)
5. I’m sure the cat likes you Nonliteral Nonliteral
Pulling its tail. (report) (request)
6. ? Nonliteral literal

What would it be to refer directly? It would be refer to X by referring to x

by referring to Y.is this possible? Results that there are at least two subtypes to
this problem: where the direct act is literal and where it is nonliteral, instances of
the latter being easier to find. Consider cases of figurative language. If speaker A
speaker says the white house announced today normal hearer infer that the
speaker was referring to some person who was speaking for the current
administration. Such a speaker would have referred to the spokesman both
nonliterally and indirectly.

What would it be to predicate nonliterally or indirectly? We have already

seen many examples where the referents have to properties or relations expressed
by the predicate. If I say He’s a tiger, intending to attribute to him (whoever he
refers to) the property of being aggressive, then I have predicated nonliterally
(assuming of course that I do not mean, literally, that he is a certain sort of feline).

2.1.5. Other pragmatics phenomena (optional section)

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 Some pragmatic phenomena that have gained prominence in recent
linguistic discussions are not direcdtly concerned with the enumeration of types of
speech acts, nor with ways of performing them, but rather with realtions between
the expression utterd and certain aspect of the context of utterance. One of the
most widely discussed examples of such phenomena is pragmatic-not to be
confused with semantic prepuspposition.

In the everyday sense of presuppose, to presuppose something is to is to

something,or to take it for granted in advance, but not to say it.presupposing is
best viewed as astate and not an act.related to (pragmatic)peresupposing is
(pragmatic) presupposition:that acts, though they are related to them. This
characterization is pretty vague, but the phenomena cited in current linguisti under
the label of has at least the virtue of reflecting a common denominator among
many different kinds of cases.

According to one conception, presuppositions,a speaker’s assumptions

(beliefs) about the speech context are presuppositions. As one author (lakof
1970,175) writes, “ Natural language is used for communication in context, and
every time a speaker uses a sentence of his language….he is making certain
assumpition about that context”.some typical examples of (pragmatic)
presupposition, are the following:

 Sam realizes that Irv is a Martian.

 Sam does not realize that Irv is a Martian.
 Irv is a Martian
 Sam has stopped beating his wife.
 Sam has not stopped beating his wife.
 Sam was beating his wife.

In the examples on the text sentences are said to presuppose the truth of
the sentence. Notice that on this pragmatic conception of presumption, as with the
semantic notion presuppotion, noth a sentence and its negation have the same
presupposition.

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2.2. An Informal Pragmatic Theory

Usually, our purpose in talking is to communicate, and so any adequate

theory of speech acts must give an account of linguistic communication. But we
also have other purposes. Sometimes these purpose are perlucutionary-to impress,
anger, or flatter our audience. Sometimes our purposes are institutional-to christen
a ship, baptize a baby, or fire someone. However, we should not lose sight of the
fact that in the end an adequate general pragmatic theory will have to embrace
than commnuincation.

1. literal and direct speech acts.

Recall that the simplest and most straightforward sort of speech act is
performed literally and directly. By being, literal and direct, a speaker imposes a
minimal load on the hearer in understanding the speaker.

Regulative rules regulate or govern antecedently existing forms of

behavior, in the sense that there would be that behavior even if there were no such
rules. Usually rules that regulate already existing types of behavior have form of
an imperative, as in a or a conditional b.

a. Do X! don’t do X!
b. Do X, only if Y.

Constitutive rules help to establish the existence of a kind of behavior that

would not be possible without the rules. Consider cheese and tennis. These
activities would not exist without the rules that constitute (and define) these
games. For examples, stepping over the baseline on a tennis court constitutes or
counts as a foot fault (when one is serving in a game). Thus the form of rules that
constitute or define an activity is different from that of regulative rules, which
merely regulate behavior. These constitutive rules have the form,

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 a. Doing X counts as (or constitute) doing Y, in context c.
Thus in our tennis examples putting your foot across the baseline while
serving in a game constitute or counts as committing a foot fault.
b. Doing x (putting one’s foot across the baseline) counts as doing y (foot
faulting), in context C (the context of serving in a game).
2. Illocutionary Acts

We can now turn back to our original problem of explaining literal; and
direct linguistic communication, armed with this pair of concepts: regulative rules
nd constitutive rules. Perhaps illocutionary acts such as reporting, requesting,
asking, greeting, and so forth, are governed by rules that are in part constitutive. If
this is correct, part of learning a language consists in learning rules of the form.

a. Uttering X counts as Y in context C.

How does one discover the speech act rules governing literal and direct
use of language? A strategy proposed by Searle (1969) that has proved quite
effective involves two easy-to-follow steps. First, wes et down four kinds of
conditions on a given illocutionary act(called felicity conditions) which, if met,
guarantee that the act is performed. And, second. From these conditions we
extract rules for performing the act.

b. Promising

As our initial example we take the interesting case of literal and direct
promises. Conditions on promising suppose a speaker S says (a) to a hearer H. we
can schematize what S did as (b)

 a. I promise that I will pay you back five dollars.

 b. S promises that he will do act A for H.

Furthermore, let us suppose that there are no impediments to

communication: that both S and H are awake, able to speak and hear the language,
and so forth. We record this fact about promising by calling it the essential
condition on promising:

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 c. Essential condition. The speaker S undertakes an obligation to do the act A.

We record this fact about promising by calling it the sincerity condition on

promising:

d. Sincerity condition. The speaker S intends to do the act A.

NP VP

V NP

NP VP

V PP

I promise I Will be there

Rule of Rule of Rule of Rule of Rule of

reference prediction reference prediction reference

Promising Propositional
Rules Content

Illocutionary
Act

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 CHAPTER III
CONCLUSION

At the end of section of we surveyed some of the central goals of a paragmatic

theory. We have presented an outline of a theory that represents an attempt to
reach some of these goals. For instance, we have developed a theory of standard
( literal and direct) use, which, along with syntax and semantics, can explicate the
creative aspect language use in term of pragmatics rules. On the basis of this
theory we have developed of both a classification of illucotionary acts and the
beginning of a theory of cooperative conversations.

REFERENCES

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