PS 24 - Bado 2022
PS 24 - Bado 2022
Article
A DDoS Vulnerability Analysis System against Distributed
SDN Controllers in a Cloud Computing Environment
Sumit Badotra 1 , Sarvesh Tanwar 2 , Salil Bharany 3, * , Ateeq Ur Rehman 4, * , Elsayed Tag Eldin 5, * ,
Nivin, AGhamry 6 , and Muhammad Shafiq 7, *
1 Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Lovely Professional University, Phagwara 144411, India
2 AIIT, Amity University, Noida 201303, India
3 Department of Computer Engineering and Technology, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar 143005, India
4 Department of Electrical Engineering, Government College University, Lahore 54000, Pakistan
5 Faculty of Engineering and Technology, Future University in Egypt, New Cairo 11835, Egypt
6 Faculty of Computers and Artificial intelligence, Cairo University, Giza 12613, Egypt
7 Department of Information and Communication Engineering, Yeungnam University, Gyeongsan 38541, Korea
* Correspondence: [email protected] (S.B.); [email protected] (A.U.R.);
[email protected] (E.T.E.); [email protected] (M.S.)
of hope. Starting from NOX, many new varied SDN controllers are there in the market.
Since it is the core part, there is a huge responsibility for choosing the best SDN controller for
the underlying infrastructure [3,4]. The SDN controller configures the network’s complete
perspective. It can be stated as an application through which it manages the overall flow
of the network traffic. The most important aspect in relevance to SDN architecture is the
security of the SDN controller [5]. If the SDN controller’s security is compromised, then
entire control over the network will be taken over by the intruder. Attackers can manipulate
the legitimate traffic from one place to another and sometimes also falsify the original Open
daylight (ODL) and Open Networking Operating System (ONOS) both are open-source
SDN controllers [6,7]. They are hosted by the Linux foundation. Nowadays, attackers are
making use of varied applications to get installed on a controller and potentially reconfigure
the network [6]. This can lead the entire network to something unexpected. Therefore, it is
mandatory to look for the various security aspects of the SDN controller before you. There
are many attacks/threats to which SDN architecture is vulnerable but among all Distributed
Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks are the most disruptive [8]. The whole SDN-based network
collapse implements SDN into your underlying infrastructure [6,7] also falsifies the original
SDN controller. Nowadays, attackers are making use of varied applications to get installed
on the controller and potentially reconfigure the network [6]. This can lead the entire
network to something unexpected. Therefore, it is mandatory to look for the various
security aspects of the SDN controller before you. There are many attacks/threats to which
SDN architecture is vulnerable but among all DDoS attacks are the most disruptive [8]. With
the bombardment of massive amounts of traffic heading in the direction of the objective,
botnets halt the normal functionality of the network. DDoS attacks can be launched on
various soft targets in SDN architecture such as APIs, Data Plane, Application layer and
SDN central point (controller) [9]. In this paper, we are considering the vulnerability of SDN
controllers against DDoS attacks. When the intruder launches the DDoS attack on the SDN
controller, a huge amount of traffic is forwarded towards the SDN controller, the flow table
of SDN controller has limited memory, and thus it halts its functionality. The legitimate
traffic flow also stops in the meantime and therefore at the end the whole SDN based
network collapses. ODL and ONOS both are open source SDN controllers [10]. They are
hosted by the Linux foundation. Among all the available SDN controllers, both ODL and
ONOS are considered to be the most popularly used [10]. There are some well-defined APIs
used in both of them. For northbound, REST API is often used, whereas, for southbound,
API OpenFlow protocol is used. For both, there are varied versions available. For example,
in the case of ODL, since 2014, there are around 13 versions available, whereas, on the other
hand, in the case of ONOS, there are around 22 versions available [11]. The latest stable
versions for ODL and ONOS are Aluminum (released in September 2020) and Velociraptor
(LTS) 2.5 (released in December 2020), respectively [12]. Due to the immense popularity of
both the controllers, with every released version, developers are making the best of their
efforts to add new security paradigms to them. However, at the same time, intruders are
making use of dynamic and new ways to launch attacks on the SDN network [13].
With every passing year due to the immense popularity of SDN and its exponential
growth, most of the focus is towards its security [14,15]. As mentioned earlier, since SDN
controller is the main control point, thus vulnerability analysis of this is to be addressed
properly. In this paper, we have considered ODL and ONOS as study points. In order
to check the vulnerability of ODL (Aluminum) and ONOS (2.5), the latest stable released
versions against DDoS attacks, different scenarios and tools are used.
• Generated malicious network traffic is bombarded on the leader node of every con-
troller and, for this, we have considered five varied scenarios;
• Real-time network analysis is achieved through Wireshark on varied scenarios;
• From experimentation, we have found that a vulnerability system against DDoS
attacks on both ODL and ONOS (located distributed) is successful in a distributed
cloud environment.
2. Related Work
The authors of the paper [1] stated that the fundamental component of software-
defined networking is a controller. As a result, it is critical that the controller has character-
istics that improve overall network performance while simultaneously ensuring service
continuity in the case of a loss. ODL and ONOS are two prominent open-source distributed
controllers. The purpose of this study is to examine how ODL and ONOS manage different
failure situations in their data and control planes. The evaluation evaluates both data plane
connection and switch failures and recovers various flows in reactive and proactive modes.
The authors of the paper [2] examined the performance of four SDN controllers
utilizing the Mininet WiFi platform in different sizes of a simulated wireless network,
including throughput, delay, and jitter, as well as packet loss: ODL, POX, ONOS and RYU.
The results of this experiment may be used to choose the most suitable controller, taking
into account the many characteristics and operational states of the wireless network.
This research [3] took into account the optimal SDN deployment, as well as the choice
of a suitable controller platform for evading the limitations of traditional networks and
the assessment criteria for the performance of SDN open flow controllers. In addition, the
authors surveyed open flow controller performance assessment criteria for SDNs. The
survey then moves on to potential literature or research on the performance analysis and
evaluation of open flow-based SDN controllers conducted by different scholars and in
groups of two or more controllers in relation to different network conditions, network
criteria/parameter/metrics, and scaling of network load resources, the most important
aspect of which is varying network topology design.
In the conclusion, it aims to draw attention to the present research gaps in the per-
formance bottleneck benchmark for the controller and offers a satisfactory solution after
extensive testing. The authors of this study suggest employing SDN-ESRC, a resilient and
endogenously secure SDN control plane, to foil exploits of vulnerabilities and backdoors [4].
SDN-ESRC employs a variety of heterogeneous controllers, including RYU, OpenDayLight,
and ONOS, to build the control plane. Furthermore, it picks out different heterogeneous
controller instances from the controllers set in a dynamic and adaptable manner to identify
and repair erroneous control messages. The ESRC’s SDN architecture has two flaws as
a result of weighing several controllers: (1) an increase in the time required to bring the
network up to date, and (2) an inability to guarantee a very high degree of controlled
security.
To combat the first problem, SDN-ESRC uses master modification mode to expedite
network updates and detect malicious control messages. When it comes to the second
problem, SDN-ESRC presents the comparison modification mode, which enables high
availability in real time. They provide a methodology for evaluating the security efficacy of
ESRC in the context of SDN and conduct theoretical research on ESRC’s performance in
three prevalent backdoor attack scenarios.
Electronics 2022, 11, 3120 4 of 15
The needs of the most popular open-source NOSs are assessed in this study [5]. Non-
functional variables such as accessibility, usability, maturity, security, and interoperability
were examined, virtualization, fault checking and debugging, packet forwarding mech-
anisms, and traffic protection solutions were also included as functional aspects. The
Analytical Hierarchy Process is a decision-making aid (AHP) that was utilized to analyze
the parameters of the tested NOSs, which included ONOS, ODL, Floodlight, Ryu, POX,
and Tungsten. In contrast to the other NOSs studied, we discovered that ODL is the most
matched NOS for CDC. When compared to the other NOSs, however, ODL and ONOS
provide essentially equal results.
The Internet of Things (IoT) represents a radical shift in how we interact with one
another online. It may be used for a variety of things. With the proliferation of IoT
devices, DDoS assaults are inevitable [6]. The primary contributions of this paper are
the development of a SDN based on the OpenDaylight platform and a novel approach
to detecting DDoS attacks in the IoTs using the concept of recurrent neural networks.
Both of these contributions are based on the OpenDaylight platform (Neural Networks).
In addition, a three-tiered architecture is given for both monitoring for and reacting to
distributed denial of service attacks. The programme employs a one-of-a-kind activation
mechanism in addition to machine learning and deep learning ideas in order to arrive at a
conclusion on the classification of the assault. There are a total of 177 evaluations carried
out on the proposed classifier. During the simulation, the tools Mininet and Wireshark
were used to assist in the identification of the many DDoS assaults that were carried out
on the simulated network. OpenDayLight [7] is a Software-Defined Network controller
that is open-source and free to use. It makes it possible to create programmable networks.
The OpenDayLight community and the business sector have worked together to create
networks that are programmable and interoperable for the benefit of service providers,
corporations, institutions, and other organisations. To ensure that the final output is
of the highest possible quality despite the ongoing development of the project and the
release of new versions, stringent testing is required at all times. It is vital to do regression
testing in order to guarantee that modifications to the code will not render currently-used
functions inoperable. A powerful selection technique will also be required to assure a lesser
number of test cases for regression testing, since such a huge project is certain to have
many such situations. This is due to the fact that regression testing is an essential part of
the testing process. In light of the findings of our study, we strongly advise making use of
combinatorial testing while developing a test suite in order to achieve both a lower total
number of test cases and a greater level of test coverage. Networking concepts such as
Network Function Virtualization (NFV), Multi-access Edge Computing (MEC), and SDN,
amongst others, were introduced as a response to the increasing demands for performance,
portability, scalability, and energy efficiency of networks in the era of the IoT. This was
done in response to the fact that the number of connected devices in the world is growing
at an exponential rate (paper [8]). SDN divides a network into a control plane and a data
plane in order to solve the inefficiency, inflexibility, and static configuration of conventional
networks by separating the network into a data plane and a control plane. Because the
control layer is in charge of the data plane, SDN applications that run at the application
layer are able to take use of the flexibility of the network. The controller on the control
plane acts as the “brain” of the SDN system and is responsible for managing the network
as a whole. The instructions for processing the packets are given to the architecture that
lies behind. On the other hand, the administration of large-scale networks necessitates the
use of several controllers. This will result in an SDN environment that is fragmented due
to the fact that many controllers will attempt to restore the established order. The detailed
literature survey is illustrated in Table 1.
Electronics 2022, 11, 3120 5 of 15
3. Proposed Methodology
Every experimentation requires a detailed methodology which illustrates the entire
step-by-step procedure to execute the experimentation.
Figure 1. Experimental
Figure set.set.
1. Experimental
(a)
(b)
Figure 2.
Figure 2. (a)
(a) Experimental
Experimental Analysis
AnalysisScenario
Scenariobefore
beforethe
theoccurrence
occurrenceofof DDoS
DDoS attacks;
attacks; (b)(b) difference
difference in
in flow of network traffic once DDoS attacks is launched.
flow of network traffic once DDoS attacks is launched.
Figure
Figure 3. ODL
3. ODL and
and ONOS.
ONOS.
The primary purpose is to reduce the CPU’s workload after a SYN Flood attack:
4.5. CPU Utilization
• Permits authorized users to access resources and services after identifying a denial-of-
Figure 4 analyses
service theaseffect
attack, such a TCP;of the CPU use metric. DDoS assaults, a well publicised
phenomenon,
• Lowers pose
and SYNoneFlood
of theCPUgreatest challenges to the security of modern Internet infra
burden;
• To successfully detect denial-of-service attacks, the method
structure and services. All too often, denial-of-service attacksemploys
have aathreshold
negativeand
impact on
abuse detection strategy. TCP SYN flood attacks are created using the
and are themselves a target of VOIP services, DNS servers, online games, and e-commerce Linux hping
tool. The majority of the malicious TCP packets are generated by the hping tool for
applications. Online application assaults and denial of service are becoming more com
web servers.
mon in distributed architecture. While active, the denial-of-service assault lessens the
CPU use before, during, and after an attack has been detected is compared to gauge
strain
theon web servers’
system’s processing
efficacy. The processorpower. Therefore,
uses before, it isafter
during, and necessary to reduce
DoS attacks, such asCPU
TCP burden
onceSYN
an attack has been effectively detected.
flood detection. As the numbers demonstrate, CPU use spikes during a TCP SYN
The primary
Flood assault andpurpose is todown
then drops reduce the CPU’s
sharply after theworkload after a SYN
attack is identified. Flood attack:
Unfortunately,
this method can only identify denial-of-service assaults like SYN flooding. The next step is
• Permits authorized users to access resources and services after identifying a denial
to subject the system to a number of DOS simulations. It was discovered via testing that
of-service attack, such as a TCP;
CPU use was lower than ODL by a significant margin.
• lowers and SYN Flood CPU burden;
• To successfully detect denial-of-service attacks, the method employs a threshold and
abuse detection strategy. TCP SYN flood attacks are created using the Linux hping
tool. The majority of the malicious TCP packets are generated by the hping tool for
web servers.
, 11, 3120
Electronics 2022, 11, 3120 11 of 15
Figure 5. Memory
Figure utilization.
5. Memory utilization.
Table 3. Comparison
Table 3. Comparison ofparameters
of different different parameters and scenarios.
and scenarios.
The
The Amount of Amount of
Time in SecondsTime in Type of
Memory Memory
Parameters’ No. of Type of CPU Utilization CPU
Disk Utilization Disk
ScenariosParameters’ No. of
Controller When the Utilization
Packets/Secs
Controller Leader Was
Network Traffic
Seconds When Network% Utilization% Utilization% Utilization
Scenarios Packets/Secs
Taken Down
the Leader Was Traffic % % %
TCP SYN and
I
ODL 5000 25 Taken Down HTTP
96 98 95
TCP SYN and
ONOS 5000 23 TCP SYN90 91 92
ODL 5000 25 HTTP 96 98 95
ODL 10,000 20 TCP SYN and HTTP 84 89 90
II I ONOS 10,000 17 TCP SYN TCP SYN80 84 79
ODL ONOS15,000 5000 18 23 HTTP 72 90 75 91 82 92
III ONOS 15,000 15 HTTP
and HTTP67 69 63
ODL ODL20,000 10,000 14 20 TCP SYN TCP SYN59 84 70 89 73 90
IV II ONOS 20,000 10 TCP SYN 50 62 54
ONOS 10,000 17 TCP SYN 80 84 79
ODL ODL25,000 15,000 11 18TCPHTTP
SYN and
HTTP 43 72 57 75 46 82
V III
ONOS ONOS25,000 15,000 08 15TCP SYN and HTTP 38 67 46 69 35 63
HTTP
ODL 20,000 14 TCP SYN 59 70 73
IV
ONOS 20,000 10 TCP SYN 50 62 54
5. Conclusions and Future Scope
TCP SYN
ODLSoftware 25,000
Defined Networking 11 is a relatively new networking
43 57
architecture that has46
and HTTP
V become the most widely discussed networking technology in recent years and the latest
TCP SYN
ONOS
development in 25,000 08 networks, which aims to38break down 46
developing digital the traditional35
and HTTP
connection in the middle of the control surface and the infrastructure surface. This sep-
aration aims to make resources more manageable, secure, and controllable. As a result,
Indeed, the researchers discovered that hard disc drives (HDDs) are now an integral
many controllers such as Beacon, Floodlight, Ryu, ODL, ONOS, NOX, and Pox have been
component of many commonplace systems, including personal computers, cloud servers,
developed. The selection of the finest-fit controller has evolved into an application-specific
medical bedside monitors, closed-circuit television (CCTV) systems, and automated teller
tool operation due to the extensive range of SDN applications and controllers. In this
machines (ATMs). As a result, an efficient and easy DDoS attack against HDDs could
paper, we have selected two popular SDN controllers for the point of the study (ODL and
cause major practical issues for people and organizations. In Table 3, summarization of all
ONOS). For experimentation, four different machines with varied configurations were
the parameters along with the comparison of both controllers is depicted. It can be clearly
considered. ODL-3 node cluster controller and ONOS controller were bombarded under
different observed
scenarios.that
Open ODL went
source down
tools wereafter
usedONOS in every
to generate scenario.
malicious ODL
traffic has the
of DDoS maximum
and
utilization for all three parameters (Disk, Memory, and CPU). TCP
bombarded the targeted controller. Both SDN controllers were found to be vulnerable to SYN and HTTP type
of traffic were used for every scenario.
Electronics 2022, 11, 3120 14 of 15
DDoS attacks, and under different scenarios, it was observed that the ODL-3 node cluster
outperforms in terms of disk, memory, and CPU utilization. The time when controllers
went down was also high in the case of the ODL-3node cluster controller. We were limited
to parameters for comparison. In further study, more parameters and scenarios (more
traffic generation) could be considered for future study of points.
Author Contributions: Conceptualization, S.B. (Sumit Badotra), S.B. (Salil Bharany), S.T., A.U.R.,
E.T.E., N.A.G. and M.S.; methodology, S.B. (Sumit Badotra), S.B. (Salil Bharany), S.T., A.U.R., E.T.E.,
N.A.G. and M.S.; software, S.B. (Sumit Badotra) and S.T.; validation, S.B. (Sumit Badotra) and S.B.
(Salil Bharany); formal analysis, S.T., A.U.R. and M.S.; investigation, S.B. (Sumit Badotra) and S.B.
(Salil Bharany); resources, M.S. and E.T.E.; data curation, S.B. (Sumit Badotra) and S.B. (Salil Bharany);
writing—original draft preparation, S.B. (Sumit Badotra), S.B. (Salil Bharany), S.T., A.U.R., E.T.E.,
N.A.G. and M.S.; writing—review and editing, S.B. (Sumit Badotra), S.B. (Salil Bharany), S.T., A.U.R.,
E.T.E., N.A.G. and M.S.; visualization, S.B. (Sumit Badotra) and S.T.; supervision, S.T. and M.S.;
project administration, S.B. (Salil Bharany), A.U.R. and E.T.E.; funding acquisition, E.T.E. All authors
have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research was supported by the Future University Researchers Supporting Project No.
FUESP-2020/48 at Future University in Egypt, New Cairo 11845, Egypt.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
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