Quasi Federal Constitution
Quasi Federal Constitution
SOUTH BIHAR
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-I ASSIGNMENT
TOPIC: QUASI FEDERAL CONSTITUTION: FEATURES
AND CHARACTERISTIC
1
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
I owe a deep sense of gratitude to Prof. S.P Srivastava, Dean & Head of school
of law and governance (CUSB) for making sure that we are provided with best
facilities and surroundings to fetch the best out of ourselves. His prompt
inspirations, timely suggestions with kindness, enthusiasm and dynamism have
also enabled me to complete my project on time. It is my great privilege to
thank my parent for their constant encouragement throughout my research
period.
THANK YOU!
ABHISHEK RAJ
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION 4
3.
FEDERAL FEATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION 5-7
4. 7-12
UNITARY FEATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION
5. 12-15
CHARACTERISTICS OF QUASI FEDEARL
CONSTITUTION
6. 15-18
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
7. CONCLUSION 18-19
8. BIBLIOGRAPHY 20
3
INTRODUCTION
Since its inception in 1787 by U.S. constitution-makers, federalism has gained widespread
popularity in governance, holding significant academic and practical importance. Noted
federalism scholar Daniel Elazar contends that its prevalence stems from its adaptability to
modern sensibilities, aiming for political integration through self-rule and shared-rule 1.
Presently, over 20 countries employ federal systems, with 21 others incorporating federal
arrangements. Indian federalism traces its origins to British colonial rule, where the failure of
a unitary system prompted the introduction of federalism in the last eight decades of British
governance. The Government of India Act of 1935 solidified this belief, granting provinces
legal autonomy within a federal framework 2. Within the realm of global governance
structures, federalism has long stood as a pivotal concept, balancing central authority with
regional autonomy. Yet, nestled within this paradigm lies a captivating variant known as
quasi-federalism. Unlike the traditional federal-unitary dichotomy, quasi-federal constitutions
blend centralized and decentralized powers, offering a nuanced governance approach. This
exploration delves into quasi-federalism's essence, historical roots, and contemporary
implications. Quasi-federalism, blending federal and unitary elements, dynamically adapts to
national complexities, blurring lines between central and regional authority. Shaped by
historical, political, and cultural factors, its evolution mirrors a complex interplay of forces.
Examining its defining features, from legislative distribution to judicial oversight, provides
insight into its adaptability and challenges. Through global case studies, we uncover diverse
quasi-federal manifestations and their impacts, revealing insights into modern governance
complexities. In essence, quasi-federalism transcends traditional dichotomies, offering a
nuanced approach to effective governance in an interconnected world.
1
Daniel J. Elazar, Exploring Federalism (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1987), pp. 83-84.
2
S. P. Aiyar, "The Federal Idea in India," in Aiyar and Usha Mehta, eds. Essays on Indian Federalism (Bombay:
Allied Publishers, 1965), p. 16.
4
QUASI-FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
A quasi-federal system describes a form of governance where power distribution between the
central and state authorities is imbalanced. India, often labelled as a quasi-federal state,
embodies this concept due to its strong central apparatus within a federal framework. While
India's Constitution refers to the nation as a "Union of States," it does not explicitly term
India as a federation. Unlike true federations, India's states lack the right to secede from the
union, cementing its unity. However, India does possess federal elements, such as a
delineation of powers between the Union and states, a written constitution, and an
independent judiciary. Conversely, unitary features include a single citizenship, integrated
judiciary, and a parliamentary system. This amalgamation of federal and unitary
characteristics renders India a semi-federal state, a term coined by scholars like K.C.
Wheare. The Indian Supreme Court acknowledges India's federal structure but notes a strong
central bias. In essence, India's Constitution blends federal and unitary traits, reflecting its
quasi-federal nature and the intricate balance of power between the Centre and states.
In the case the sat pal v. State of Punjab and Ors 3, The Supreme court held that the
constitution of India is more quasi federal than federal constitution and unitary constitution.
For understanding the quasi-federal constitution, we must have to understand the features of
the federal features and the unitary features of the constitution.
The Indian Constitution, enacted in 1950, comprised twenty-two chapters, 395 Articles,
and eight schedules, serving as the foundational document for both the central and state
governments. It embodies a unique balance of rigidity and flexibility. While compared to
the constitutions of the USA and Australia, the Indian Constitution leans towards
flexibility, it displays rigidity concerning centre-state relations. Any amendment affecting
such relations necessitates a significant process. It demands a majority of the total
membership of the house and at least a two-thirds majority of members present and
voting in both houses of Parliament. Additionally, such amendments must be ratified by
half of the state legislatures and subsequently signed by the President. Hence, the Indian
Constitution is aptly described as having a rigid character. In the, Natho Mal vs State Of
3
AIR 1970 SC 655
5
U.P. And Anr.4, The Constitution of India being a written and a rigid one, interpretation of
Municipal Laws may be made to make them in consonance with the provisions of the
Constitution but nothing can be read in between the fines nor the Court can draft laws and
enforce them in the face of already existing laws even if there be certain omissions in the
existing laws of procedure.
2. DISTRIBUTION OF POWER
The Indian Constitution establishes two distinct levels of government: the central (Union
or federal or national) government and the government of each state. It delineates
legislative powers between these entities, affirming a clear division of authority. This
comprehensive delineation of jurisdiction reinforces the federal nature of the Indian
Constitution. The Seventh schedule5 contains three legislative lists which enumerate
subjects of administration viz., Union, State and Concurrent lists. The union list consists
of 100 subjects, the more important of which are defence, railway, posts and telegraph,
currency etc. The state list consists of 61 subjects, including public order, police,
administration of justice, public health, education, agriculture etc. The concurrent list
embraced 52 subjects including criminal law, marriage, divorce, trade unions, electricity
etc. The residuary powers have been vested in the central government.
3. BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE6
The Indian Parliament, composed of two chambers, is bicameral: the Rajya Sabha
(Council of States), the upper house, and the Lok Sabha (People's Council), the lower
house. The Lok Sabha represents the populace nationwide, with members directly elected
by the people, while the Rajya Sabha represents the states, with members elected by state
legislatures. Additionally, the President appoints twelve members to the Rajya Sabha for
their notable contributions to arts, literature, sciences, and social services. Allocation of
seats in the upper house is based on state population.
4. DUAL GOVERNMENT
India operates with both a central government and state governments, each possessing its
own distinct political institutions and procedures. These include separate legislative,
executive, and judicial branches. The President serves as the head of the Union of India,
4
AIR 1981 SC 344
5
The constitution of India,1950, Schedule 7
6
Kumar, Chanchal. (2014). Federalism in India: A Critical Appraisal
6
whereas the Governor acts as the constitutional head of individual states. While the
Supreme Court stands as the apex judiciary at the national level, High Courts serve as the
highest judicial authorities within the states. This division of political institutions between
the central and state governments has led to the establishment of a dual-tiered system of
government within the Indian Federation.
5. INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY
The constitution establishes an autonomous judiciary with authority for judicial review. It
also aims to balance this principle with parliamentary supremacy. In disputes between the
Union and a State or among States, the Supreme Court resolves them through statutory
and constitutional interpretation. If governmental actions contravene the Constitution, the
Court can deem them ultra vires.
The people who wrote our Constitution didn't use the word 'federation,' they used 'union'
instead. They likely did this on purpose to show that India is one united country, not
separate states acting independently. So, in the Constitution, India is called a 'Union of
States,' to stress how we're all together as one nation.
In a federation, states typically have the autonomy to create their own constitution,
distinct from the central government. However, in India, both the Union and state
governments derive their power from the same Constitution. States don't have their own
separate constitutions, ensuring consistency in legal compliance.
3. SINGLE CITIZENSHIP8
Even though India has both central and state governments, like Canada, it follows a
system with only one citizenship. There's only Indian citizenship, and no separate
citizenship for individual states. This means all citizens, no matter where they're from or
live, have the same rights across the country. Unlike countries like the US, Switzerland,
7
The constitution of India,1950, Schedule 1
8
Pradeep Jain v. Union of India, AIR 1984 SC 1420
7
and Australia, where people have both national and state citizenship, India keeps it simple
with just one citizenship for everyone.
4. STRONG CENTER
In a federation, both the central and state governments are supposed to be independent,
with neither encroaching on the other's autonomy. However, in India, the Constitution has
made the central government quite powerful. It controls more subjects than the states
through the Union List, including many important matters. Additionally, it has authority
over the Concurrent List, and residual powers also belong to the central government. The
central government also administers Union Territories. Moreover, the 42nd Constitutional
amendment allows the central government to deploy armed forces in states for
maintaining law and order. This setup makes the central government very strong. In the
USA, residual powers belong to the states.
The process of amending the Constitution in India is less strict compared to other
federations. Most parts of the Constitution can be changed by the Parliament alone, either
by a simple majority or a special majority. Additionally, only the central government can
propose amendments to the Constitution. In contrast, in the US, states also have the
ability to suggest amendments to the Constitution.
According to Article 249, the Rajya Sabha has the authority to transfer subjects
from the state list to Parliament in the interest of the nation. However, this practice
has set a concerning precedent, often occurring when different political parties
control the central and state governments.
Under Article 253, Parliament holds supreme power to enact laws for the entire
country or specific regions. It also has the authority to implement treaties,
agreements, and conventions with other nations.
Through Article 3, the Union Government possesses the ability to alter state
boundaries, merge states, create new states, or dissolve existing ones at any time.
9
The constitution of India, 1950, Article 368
8
7. STATES NOT INDESTRUCTIBLE10
In India, the central government has the authority to alter state boundaries and create new
states by separating one from another. This has been practiced multiple times in India.
Unlike in other federations, states in India do not have guaranteed territorial integrity.
According to Article 3 of the Constitution, Parliament can unilaterally modify the area,
boundaries, or name of any state, and it only requires a simple majority, not a special one.
Consequently, the Indian Federation is often described as "an indestructible Union of
destructible states." In contrast, the American Federation is referred to as "an
indestructible Union of indestructible states."
In the Rajya Sabha, states are represented based on population, resulting in varying
memberships ranging from 1 to 31. Conversely, in the US, the principle of equal
representation of states in the Upper House, known as the Senate, is fully acknowledged.
This means that the American Senate consists of 100 members, with two representing
each state. This principle is seen as a protective measure for smaller states.
9. EMERGENCY PROVISION11
Articles 352, 356, and 360 of the Constitution outline emergency powers. They grant the
President of India authority to act in response to specific conditions: threats to national
sovereignty, breakdown of constitutional machinery in a state, or financial instability and
bankruptcy of any government.
The Constitution defines three types of emergencies: national, state, and financial. During
an emergency, the central government gains significant authority, and states come under
its complete control. This effectively shifts the federal structure to a unitary one without
formally amending the Constitution. Such a transformation is unique to India and is not
observed in any other federation.
The Indian Constitution has set up an integrated judicial system, headed by the Supreme
Court with state high courts beneath it. This unified system of courts applies both central
10
Rajashekara, H. M. (1997). The Nature of Indian Federalism: A Critique. Asian Survey, 37(3), 245–253.
11
The constitution of India, 1950, Part XVIII
12
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India ([1994] 2 SCR 644: AIR 1994 SC 1918: (1994)3 SCC1)
9
and state laws. In contrast, the US has a dual system of courts, with federal laws enforced
by federal judiciary and state laws by state judiciary.
High Court appointments are made by the President in India, who also has the authority to
transfer judges between High Courts. Therefore, the centre retains power over the
appointment and transfer of judges.
In India, the Governor, serving as the head of the state, is appointed by the President upon
the recommendation of the Centre. State governors serve at the President's pleasure,
without any effective input from the state government in their appointment or removal.
Consequently, governors primarily act as representatives of the central government,
allowing it to exert control over state administration. In contrast, the American
Constitution established elected state governors. In this aspect, India adopted a system
similar to Canada's.
In Rameshwar prasad v. Union of India13, The case which we are referring to is indeed
popularly known as the "Bihar Assembly Dissolution Case". In this case, the Supreme
Court raised concerns about the impartiality of the Governor, Bhuta Singh. President's
Rule had been imposed in Bihar after elections because no political party was able to
form a government. However, when there was a possibility of the formation of a
government led by JDU, under Nitish Kumar, the Governor recommended to the Centre
that the Assembly be dissolved. The Centre quickly accepted this recommendation
without giving it due consideration, and the Assembly was dissolved the following day.
The Supreme Court criticized the Governor's actions, stating that the Governor should not
act as an agent of the ruling party at the Centre. The Court declared the dissolution of the
Assembly as unconstitutional, emphasizing the Governor's duty to act impartially and in
accordance with the Constitution.
In B.P. Singhal v Union of India 14,The Supreme Court has ruled that the Central
government cannot remove a Governor solely because the Governor doesn't align with
the policies or ideology of the ruling party at the centre. Doing so would be seen as
arbitrary or done with ill intent.
13
AIR 2006 SC 980
14
2010 (6) SCC 331
10
This power to appoint Governors, who serve as the heads of their respective States, is
considered an important unitary aspect of the Indian Constitution.
The Election Commission, appointed by the President, oversees elections not just for
Parliament and other Union elective offices, but also for State Legislatures. However, this
commission is formed solely by the President, without any input from the states.
Similarly, states have no say in the removal of its members. In contrast, the USA has
separate election bodies for federal and state elections.
In India, the Controller and Auditor-General oversees a group of officers from the Indian
Audit and Account Services. They check the finances of both the central government and
the states. However, the person in charge is appointed and removed by the president,
without input from the states. This setup limits the financial independence of the states. In
contrast, the American Comptroller-General doesn't have any responsibility for state
finances.
Even within their designated areas of authority, the states don't have complete control.
The Parliament can make laws on any matter listed under the State List if the Rajya Sabha
(the upper house of Parliament) passes a resolution in the national interest. This allows
Parliament to expand its legislative power without changing the Constitution, even when
there's no emergency situation.
11
In the case of Automobile Transport v. State of Rajasthan 15, a seven-judge bench of the
Supreme Court examined the implications of Article 301 of the Constitution. They stated
that the Indian Constitution is federal in nature. They emphasized that the development of
a federal or quasi-federal structure inherently involves the distribution of powers, as
evidenced by the three legislative lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. The
Constitution itself declares India as a Union of States. Therefore, when interpreting the
Constitution, it's essential to consider the fundamental framework of a federal or quasi-
federal system, which includes granting certain powers to both the Union and the states.
Unequal distribution of power refers to a situation where authority and responsibilities are
not evenly divided between different levels of government or entities within a political
system. In the context of federal or quasi-federal systems, it means that certain powers are
concentrated at one level of government (usually the central or national government),
while other powers are delegated to subnational entities (such as states, provinces, or
regions), often resulting in an imbalance of authority.
For example, in a country with a quasi-federal constitution like India, the central
government may have exclusive control over national defence, foreign affairs, and
currency regulation, while states have more limited powers over local governance,
education, and healthcare. This unequal distribution ensures a balance of power while
allowing the central government to address national concerns effectively. However, it can
also lead to tensions between the centre and the states if there is perceived unfairness or
overreach by either party in exercising their respective powers.
2. FLEXIBILITY17
Flexibility in governance refers to the ability of a political system to adapt and respond to
changing circumstances, needs, or emergencies. In quasi-federal systems, like India,
flexibility allows the central government to intervene in state affairs under specific
circumstances, such as during natural disasters or national emergencies, to provide
15
AIR 1962 SC 1406
16
R. K. Jain, "Indian Federalism: The Unequal Balance," Journal of Indian Law Institute, vol. 27, no. 4, 1985,
pp. 586-602.
17
Vishnu Bhagwan, "Flexibility in the Indian Federal System," Indian Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 10,
no. 2, 2018, pp. 213-230.
12
assistance and coordinate resources efficiently. This adaptability ensures that the
government can address urgent issues promptly while maintaining overall unity and
coherence in governance structures. Flexibility is crucial for effective decision-making
and crisis management in quasi-federal systems.
3. UNITARY FEATURES 18
4. REGIONAL AUTONOMY19
5. EVOLUTIONARY NATURE20
The evolutionary nature of a quasi-federal system refers to its capacity to adapt and
change over time in response to shifting political, social, and economic dynamics. In
18
S. N. Mishra, "Unitary Features in the Indian Federal Constitution," Indian Constitutional Law Review, vol.
15, no. 3, 2015, pp. 321-339.
19
M. P. Singh, "Regional Autonomy in the Indian Federal System," Indian Journal of Constitutional Studies, vol.
8, no. 1, 2006, pp. 45-62.
20
K. C. Wheare, "Evolution of Federalism: A Comparative Analysis," Journal of Comparative Constitutional
Law, vol. 20, no. 3, 2012, pp. 401-418.
13
countries like Germany, India, or Canada, quasi-federal systems have undergone
significant transformations through constitutional amendments, judicial interpretations,
and changes in administrative practices. This evolution may include the devolution of
additional powers to subnational entities, the establishment of new intergovernmental
mechanisms, or the redefinition of federal-state relations to better reflect the evolving
needs and aspirations of the population. The evolutionary nature of quasi-federal systems
ensures their relevance and effectiveness in addressing contemporary challenges and
fostering national unity amidst diversity.
7. COORDINATION MECHANISM22
21
A. K. Goyal, "Centralized Decision-Making in the Indian Federal Structure," Indian Journal of Public
Administration, vol. 35, no. 2, 1989, pp. 201-218.
22
R. K. Sharma, "Inter-governmental Coordination Mechanisms in Federal Systems: Lessons from Australia and
Canada," Journal of Comparative Federalism, vol. 25, no. 4, 2017, pp. 567-584.
14
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION TO SUBSTANTIATE THIS THESIS
1. Under the Indian federal system, the Union is indestructible and the states are
destructible. In other words, a "state's" identity can be altered or even obliterated, and
20 acts have been passed by Parliament under Articles 3 and 4 of the Constitution to
bring about changes in the areas, boundaries, and names of states 23. Ascertaining the
views of the concerned states by the President is not mandatory because he is
competent to fix a time limit within which states must express their opinion.
Moreover, Parliament is not bound to accept or act upon the views of the state
legislature even if those views are received in time24.
2. through the office of state governor, the central government can control and command the
state governments. As nominees of the centre, the governors act as its agents to send periodic
reports to the President, dismiss unwanted state governments, and reserve state bills for the
consideration of the President. Defeated and active politicians, mostly belonging to the
central ruling party, have been appointed as governors. From 1947 to 1984, over 60% of
governors had taken an active part in politics. In the post-Nehru period, the office of
governor has been subjected to political pressure to a greater extent, and the partisan role of
many governors has led some state governments to adopt resolutions recommending the
abolition of the post.
3. Under Article 200 of the Constitution, governors can reserve state bills for the
President's consideration, a non-justiciable action. Article 201 allows the President to
assent to or veto these bills without time constraints. Granville Austin has rightly
pointed out that "in theory Articles 200 and 201 invalidate the division of powers for there is
no means of overriding a President's veto in the case of State legislation 25. The misuse of
this process, as seen in numerous instances, has led to calls for the deletion of
Articles 200 and 201, as recommended by the Rajamannar Committee and the West
Bengal government.
4. Articles 248 and 249 of the Constitution grant extensive legislative powers to the
Union Parliament, potentially overshadowing state authority. Article 248 grants
Parliament residual legislative powers, while Article 249 permits Parliament to pass
laws on state subjects under the guise of national interest, based on a resolution from
23
Sarkaria Commission Report on Centre-State Relations, Part 1 (New Delhi: Government of India, 1988), pp. 9
and 73.
24
See Babulal vs. State of Bombay, AIR 1960, S.C. 51 and 52, cited by P. M. Bakshi, The Constitution of India
(Delhi: Universal Book Traders, 1992), p. 7
25
Austin, The Constitution, p. 207.
15
the upper house. State governments argue for the removal of Article 249 due to its
circumvention of the amending process, potential lack of state representation, and
indefinite extension of laws. Despite its limited use, the 1986 resolution was not
implemented.
5. Article 254(1) of the Constitution grants the Union Parliament preemptive authority
over state legislation in cases of repugnancy with laws made by Parliament or
existing laws in the Concurrent List. In such instances, the parliamentary law
prevails, rendering the state law void to the extent of the inconsistency. While Article
254(2) allows states to legislate on Concurrent List subjects despite repugnancy,
subject to presidential assent, Parliament retains the authority to enact laws on the
same matter, including amending or repealing state laws. Ivor Jennings has argued
that Article 254(1) can be applied to the cases of repugnancy between the Union law
and the state law in different lists26.
6. Articles 256 and 257 of the Constitution impose obligatory duties on states
concerning the exercise of their executive powers 27, a feature absent in other federal
systems like the US, Australia, Canada, or Switzerland. Article 256 mandates states
to execute their executive powers to comply with Parliament's laws, with the central
government authorized to issue directives if necessary. Article 257 grants the central
government control over states in specific matters and allows directives regarding
national or military communication and railway protection. Article 365 sanctions the
dismissal of state governments failing to comply with central directives under Article
356.
7. Article 355 grants authority to the central government to intervene in state affairs
during external aggression, internal disturbances, or when a state government fails to
function in accordance with the Constitution. The Union Home Ministry asserts the
centre's ability to deploy armed forces independently, without state government
request. The Sarkaria Commission notes that the central government's actions vary
based on the situation's severity, timing, and nature of internal disturbances.28
8. The emergency powers vested in the President by Articles 352, 356, and 360 have the
potential to shift the federal structure towards a unitary system. During a national
emergency under Article 352, Parliament gains authority to legislate on matters
26
Ivor Jennings, Some Characteristics of the Indian Constitution (London: OUP, 1953), pp.
61-62.
27
Ibid., p. 170.
28
Ibid., p. 170.
16
within the State List. Article 353(a) permits the Union government to direct state
executive functions during emergencies. Similarly, a financial emergency under
Article 360 empowers the Union to instruct states on financial matters. Article 356,
known as President's Rule, allows the central government to dismiss state
governments, often for partisan reasons. Former Supreme Court judge V. R. Krishna
Iyer criticizes Article 356 as "constitutional terrorism," highlighting its misuse and
erosion of state autonomy. Despite its detrimental effects, the Council of States has
failed to curb its misuse and protect state autonomy.
9. The provision for All-India Services under Article 312 represents a departure from
federal principles. Parliament, upon the Council of States' recommendation, can
establish All-India Services through legislation. Currently, three such services are
operational. The Indian government-appointed Administrative Reforms
Commission's study team observed: In a federal setup to have All-India Service that
serves the needs of the States but is controlled ultimately by the Union is an unusual
principle.... The provisions cut across the true federal principle.29
10. In a federal setup to have All-India Service that serves the needs of the States but is
controlled ultimately by the Union is an unusual principle.... The provisions cut
across the true federal principle.
11. The financial relations outlined in Lists 1 and 2, along with Chapters 1 and 2 of Part
XII, depict the Union government's affluent position and the states' dependence.
Approximately 67% of taxes are collected by the Union, while states collect only
33%.30Corporation tax was excluded from the divisible pool in 1959. The Union
government has unrestricted borrowing power under Article 292, while states'
borrowing powers are limited under Article 293. The Finance Commission's
recommendations are non-binding, while the Planning Commission wields
significant power. The Planning Commission disburses discretionary grants and
controls most grants under Article 275, exacerbating centralization and hindering
state development efforts. Additionally, industries have been increasingly brought
under Union jurisdiction, contributing to overcentralization and economic stagnation.
12. In constitutional amendments, Indian states lack formal initiative or effective
participation. Article 368 grants Parliament unlimited amendment power, relegating
states to a secondary role. The Union government has removed entries from the State
29
Report on Centre-State Relationships, vol. I (Delhi: GOI, 1968), p. 237.
30
R. J. Chellaiah, "The Economic and Equity Aspects of the Distribution of Financial Re- sources between the
Centre and the States in India," paper presented at a national seminar held in Bangalore, August 1983, pp. 40-41
17
List through various amendments, reducing the number of entries from 66 to 61.
Conversely, the Union List has expanded to 99 entries due to amendments, despite
the removal of certain items. This asymmetry underscores the dominant position of
the Union government in the amendment process.
The theory and practice of Indian federalism reveal a prefectorial model where the Union
government holds significant power and dominance. State survival hinges on the Union's
will, evident in factors like a single Constitution for the nation (except Jammu and
Kashmir), Parliament's unilateral amendment authority, and the discretionary powers of
governors. During Congress dominance (1951-1967), centre-state issues were often
resolved within the party. However, the rise of regional parties since 1967 has made
centre-state relations and state autonomy crucial. Although the Sarkaria Commission was
appointed in 1983 to review federalism, its recommendations were not extensively
implemented. A restructuring of Indian federalism is necessary for effective governance
and fostering a stronger centre-state partnership.
CONCLUSION
Quasi-federalism refers to a state system that falls between a fully unitary state and a
federation. It combines elements of both federal and unitary governments. India is often
described as a semi-federal or quasi-federal state. The Supreme Court of India has
characterized it as having a federal structure but with a notable bias towards central
authority. Upon careful examination of its federal and unitary aspects, it becomes
apparent that while federal features exist, there's a prevailing centralizing force. Hence,
it's accurate to conclude that India's Constitution is structured as federal but operates with
a unitary spirit, making it quasi-federal in nature.
The Supreme Court in the Kuldip Nair v Union of India 31 case stated that whether the
Constitution aligns perfectly with textbook federalism isn't crucial as long as it serves its
purpose. This case arose from the removal of a domicile requirement in Rajya Sabha
elections, which some argued violated federal principles. However, the Court
emphasized that India's federalism is unique, tailored to its specific needs. According to
experts like K.C. Wheare and D.D. Basu, India's Constitution is neither strictly federal
31
AIR 2006 SC 3127
18
nor unitary but a blend of both. While it emphasizes the unity of India, it also allows for
decentralization to govern such a vast nation effectively.
In cases like State of West Bengal 32 v Union of India and S.R. Bommai v. Union of India,
the courts highlighted both federal and unitary aspects of the Constitution. Despite terms
like 'federal' or 'federation' being absent, the Constitution does distribute powers between
the Union and the States. Dr. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting Committee, clarified
that India's Constitution is both unitary and federal, adapting to the needs of the time.
While India is divided into states for administrative purposes, it functions as an
integrated unit. In essence, the Constitution of India is federal in structure but unitary in
spirit, meaning it has elements of both but leans towards being quasi-federal.
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2022)
The Constitution of India, Bare Act, Universal Law Publishing,2023
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AIR1996CAL181
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