Chair of Coding and Cryptography

Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering

Technical University of Munich

Modern and Classical Secret Sharing

Aparna.Sivakumar
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Technical University of Munich
February 13th, 2024

Abstract — This report outlines the activities undertaken during a lab session focused on the implementation
of secret sharing schemes using Vandermonde matrices. The objective was to encode a secret password into
multiple shares, simulate the loss of a share, and successfully reconstruct the original password from the remaining
shares. This process demonstrates the robustness and reliability of secret sharing schemes in safeguarding sensitive
information.

1 McEliece-Sarwate Secret Sharing

The lab consisted of three main tasks, each corresponding to a critical aspect of the secret sharing scheme:

1.1 Vandermonde Matrix Generation:

• The first task involved creating a Vandermonde matrix based on a finite field with a specified order.
• This matrix plays a pivotal role in encoding the secret message into shares.
• A Vandermonde matrix has the property that each element in the matrix is calculated as the power of a base
element from the finite field, ensuring a structured yet secure way of encoding the message.

1.2 Encoding the Secret:

• The second task was to encode the given password into shares using the previously generated Vandermonde
matrix.
• The password was first represented as elements in a finite field. A random symbol was then appended to the
password elements to form the coefficients vector.
• This vector was multiplied by the Vandermonde matrix to produce the shares, which were then stored in
simulated external drives.

1.3 Decoding and Password Reconstruction:

• The third task simulated a real-world scenario where one of the drives is lost during transport.
• The remaining shares were collected, and the original password was reconstructed using a modified Vander-
monde matrix.
• The matrix was adjusted by removing the row corresponding to the lost share. The system solved for the
coefficients vector using the inverse of the effective matrix and extracted the original password.

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1.4 Conclusion:
The lab successfully illustrated the efficacy of secret sharing schemes, particularly the McEliece-Sarwate scheme,
in ensuring data security even in the event of partial data loss. The mathematical underpinnings of finite field
operations and Vandermonde matrices provided a strong foundation for the secure and reliable reconstruction of
the original secret message

2 Fundamentals of Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)

QKD is grounded in the principles of quantum mechanics, specifically utilizing phenomena such as quantum
superposition and entanglement. To grasp QKD thoroughly, it’s essential to comprehend these fundamental
concepts. By leveraging these quantum phenomena, we can delve into the various types of QKD, explore its
advancements, and conduct a thorough security analysis.

2.1 Quantum Superposition

Quantum superposition allows a quantum bit (qubit) to exist in multiple states simultaneously, a feature that is
exploited in QKD to encode information in a way that is inherently secure.

2.2 Quantum Entanglement

Quantum entanglement, another cornerstone of QKD, involves a pair of qubits existing in a state where the
measurement of one instantaneously influences the other, regardless of the distance between them.

2.3 No-Cloning Theorem

Central to the security of QKD is the no-cloning theorem, which states that it is impossible to create an exact copy
of an arbitrary unknown quantum state. This principle ensures that any attempt to intercept and replicate the qubits
used in QKD will inevitably lead to detectable anomalies.

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2.4 Quantum Measurements
In quantum mechanics, particles like photons or electrons are described by a wave function, which encompasses all
the possible states they can be in. When a measurement is made, this wave function ’collapses’ to a particular state.
This means that prior to measurement, the particle can be in a superposition of states, but measurement forces it
into one specific state.

2.5 Bell’s Inequalities

Bell’s theorem states that certain predictions of quantum mechanics (particularly concerning entangled particles)
are inconsistent with the principle of local realism. Bell’s inequalities are mathematical expressions derived under
the assumption of local realism. If the correlations between entangled particles measured in an experiment violate
Bell’s inequalities, it implies that these correlations cannot be explained by any classical theory based on local
realism.

3 Prepare and Measure Protocol

3.1 Description of Prepare-and-Measure QKD
Concept: Prepare-and-measure QKD protocols involve two key steps: preparation of quantum states by the sender
(often termed Alice) and their subsequent measurement by the receiver (Bob). Quantum States: Typically involves
encoding information in quantum states, such as the polarization of photons. Transmission: These quantum states
are then transmitted over a quantum channel, like an optical fiber or through free space.

3.2 BB84 Protocol

Created by Charles Bennett and Gilles Brassard in 1984, it’s one of the first and most well-known QKD protocols.
It Utilizes four different polarization states of photons to encode the key bits. These states are divided into two
conjugate bases (e.g., rectilinear and diagonal). The security of the key relies on the fact that an eavesdropper cannot
simultaneously measure the polarization in both bases without disturbing the quantum states and thus revealing
their presence.

3.3 SARG04 Protocol

The SARG04 protocol, developed by Scarani, Acin, Ribordy, and Gisin in 2004, is a variant of the BB84 protocol
designed to be more efficient in certain scenarios. While it uses the same state preparation and measurement as
BB84, the key bit derivation and sifting processes differ. It assigns key bits based on the measurement outcomes
in a way that reduces the information an eavesdropper can gain.
This is particularly effective against specific attacks like the photon-number-splitting attack when implemented
with weak coherent pulses.

3.4 Security Analysis of Prepare-and-Measure Protocols

• Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER): A key metric for assessing the security of these protocols. An increase in
QBER can indicate potential eavesdropping activities.
• Eavesdropping Strategies: Analyzing common attack strategies such as intercept-and-resend, photon-number-
splitting, and beam-splitting attacks.
• Countermeasures: Developments in these protocols often focus on enhancing their resistance to eavesdropping,
including using decoy states and other techniques to detect and thwart potential security breaches.
• Practical Considerations: Factors like loss in the transmission channel, detector inefficiencies, and environ-
mental disturbances can affect the security and implementation of prepare-and-measure QKD systems.

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4 Entanglement-Based Protocols
4.1 Description of Entanglement-Based QKD
Fundamental Principle: These protocols use quantum entanglement, where pairs of particles are generated in a
state such that the state of one (say, photon) is directly related to the state of the other, regardless of the distance
between them. Key Generation: Information is encoded in the entangled states. Measurements on these entangled
particles by the sender (Alice) and receiver (Bob) result in correlated outcomes, which can be used to generate
a secure key. Eavesdropping Detection: Any attempt to intercept the communication disturbs the entanglement,
which can be detected through changes in the correlation pattern of the measurement results.

4.2 E91 Protocol

Its developed By: Artur Ekert in 1991. It Utilizes pairs of entangled photons. The measurement choices are based
on different polarization angles, and the protocol relies on quantum correlations predicted by Bell’s theorem. The
security of the E91 protocol is underpinned by the violation of Bell’s inequalities, ensuring that any eavesdropping
attempt will disturb the entanglement and be detectable.

4.3 BBM92 Protocol

It is developed by Charles Bennett, Gilles Brassard, and David Mermin in 1992. A variant of the E91 protocol, the
BBM92 protocol is also based on entangled photon pairs. It’s designed to be more practical in certain scenarios
and laid groundwork for subsequent entanglement-based protocols. It employs different types of measurements
(not necessarily polarization) on entangled pairs and has been influential in advancing practical implementations
of entanglement-based QKD.

4.4 Measurement-Device-Independent QKD (MDI-QKD)

The objective is to address vulnerabilities related to the measurement devices in QKD systems. Both parties send
quantum states to a third, potentially untrusted party (Charlie), who performs joint measurements on these states
and announces the results. This approach removes the risk of detector side-channel attacks and is robust against
certain types of hacking strategies that target the detection process.

4.5 Security Analysis of Entanglement-Based Protocols

• Quantum Correlations: The use of Bell’s inequalities or similar tests ensures that the entangled states are not
compromised and are free from hidden variables that could be exploited by an eavesdropper.
• Practical Challenges: These protocols face challenges such as maintaining entanglement over long distances
and dealing with real-world issues like photon loss and noise, which can affect the reliability of the entanglement
and, consequently, the security of the key distribution.
• Advancements: Ongoing research in this domain focuses on enhancing the robustness of entanglement-based
protocols against practical limitations and exploring new types of entangled states to improve efficiency and
security.

5 Comparison and Trade-offs

When comparing Prepare-and-Measure protocols with Entanglement-Based protocols in Quantum Key Distribution
(QKD), several key factors and trade-offs come into play. Each type of protocol offers unique advantages and faces
distinct challenges, making them suitable for different applications and scenarios.

5.1 Complexity and Implementation

• Prepare-and-Measure Protocols: Generally simpler to implement. Less reliant on complex quantum technol-
ogy. BB84 and its variants can be implemented with relatively simpler photon sources and detectors.

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 • Entanglement-Based Protocols: More complex in terms of implementation. Require the generation and
detection of entangled photon pairs, which can be technologically challenging and resource-intensive. E91,
BBM92, and similar protocols demand a higher level of control over quantum states.

5.2 Security Aspects

• Prepare-and-Measure Protocols: Security primarily relies on the principles of quantum uncertainty and no-
cloning. Vulnerable to certain types of attacks like photon number splitting, especially in implementations with
weak coherent pulses.
• Entanglement-Based Protocols: Offer enhanced security features, leveraging the non-local correlations of
entangled particles. Intrinsically more robust against eavesdropping due to the nature of entanglement and
violation of Bell’s inequalities.

5.3 Efficiency and Key Rate

• Prepare-and-Measure Protocols: Often have higher key rates due to simpler implementation and less stringent
requirements on photon detection. More suitable for shorter distances due to lower complexity.
• Entanglement-Based Protocols: Typically exhibit lower key rates due to the complexity of maintaining
and detecting entanglement. The efficiency can be significantly affected by photon loss and the quality of
entanglement.

5.4 Distance and Practicality

• Prepare-and-Measure Protocols: More practical for terrestrial communication systems over shorter distances.
More easily integrated into existing optical communication infrastructure.
• Entanglement-Based Protocols: Potentially more suitable for long-distance quantum communication, given
advancements in quantum repeaters and satellite QKD. Face challenges in maintaining entanglement over long
distances.

6 Current Challenges and Future Directions

6.1 Current Challenges in Quantum Key Distribution (QKD)
• Distance Limitations: One of the primary challenges for QKD is the limited distance over which secure
communication can be maintained. Quantum signals (like photons) tend to lose their coherence over long
distances due to optical losses and environmental interference.
• Rate of Key Generation: The key generation rate in many QKD systems, especially entanglement-based
protocols, is still relatively low compared to conventional cryptographic methods, limiting their practical
applicability for high-throughput requirements.
• Technological Requirements: The implementation of QKD systems, particularly entanglement-based ones,
requires advanced quantum technology, which can be resource-intensive and costly.
• Integration with Existing Infrastructure: Integrating QKD systems with existing communication networks
poses technical challenges, including compatibility with current fiber-optic infrastructure and network protocols.

6.2 Future Directions

• Advancements in Quantum Repeaters: Research is ongoing to develop practical quantum repeaters, which
would significantly extend the feasible range of QKD.
• Satellite QKD: Satellite-based QKD has emerged as a promising solution for global-scale quantum communi-
cation, with several successful demonstrations already conducted.
• Integration with Quantum Networks: The eventual goal is to integrate QKD systems into a broader quantum
network, which would allow for secure quantum communication on a much larger scale.

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 • Improvements in Technology: Continued advancements in photonics, quantum sources, and detectors are
expected to enhance the efficiency and reliability of QKD systems.

7 conclusion
Quantum Key Distribution represents a significant breakthrough in the field of secure communication, harnessing
the principles of quantum mechanics to offer a level of security that is theoretically unbreakable. The future of
QKD has several potential applications ranging from secure governmental communications to safeguarding global
financial transactions. As quantum computing continues to evolve, the role of QKD in securing communication
against quantum threats becomes increasingly vital, making it a key area of focus in the realm of cybersecurity and
quantum information science.

8 references

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