TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA
JUAN VDA. DE MOLO v. LUZ, GLICERIA
AND CORNELIO MOLO
FACTS:
Decedent, Mariano Molo executed two wills prior to his death – 1918 will and 1939 will. The 1939 will contained a
clause expressly revoking the 1918 will. His wife, Juana, then filed a petition for the probate of the 1939 will. This
was originally admitted, but opon opposition of RESPs (children of his deceased brother), it was reopened and the
probate of will was denied on the ground that it was not executed IAW law (it was a donacion captatoria) She then
filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will. RESPS opposed alleging that Juana is now estopped from
seeking the probate of the 1918 will.
1. Issue/Held: WON the 1918 should be admitted to probate. – YES. The 1939 will having been found
to be invalid, in essence, did not constitute a valid revocation.
Ratio/Doctrine: A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch
as said revocatory clause is void. (Samson v. Naval)
The doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation is usually applied where the testator
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to
make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or,
if made, fails of effect for some reason.
Where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the
inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the
efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a
substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force.
The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to
the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. It must
appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will.
The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate. There
can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.
G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951
Facts:
Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of
Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was
survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces
and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were
the legitimate children of Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano
Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one executed on August 17, 1918 and another executed on June
20, 1939.
On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a
petition, seeking the probate of the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being
no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the
order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside and the case was reopened. After
hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence, the court rendered decision denying the
probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove that the same was executed
in accordance with law.
In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February 24,
1944, filed another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17,
1918, in the same court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on
three grounds: (1) that petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918;
(2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the will has
been subsequently revoked.
Issues:
1. Was Molo's will of 1918 subsequently revoked by his will of 1939?
2. Assuming that the destruction of the earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the
testator's belief that the revocatory clause contained in the subsequent will was valid and
the latter would be given effect, can the earlier will be admitted to probate?
Doctrines:
1. NO. In the case of Samson vs. Naval, the court laid down the doctrine that “a subsequent
will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed, for the reason
that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the
previous will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void.”
Although American authorities on the subject have a pool of conflicting opinions perhaps
because of the peculiar provisions contained in the statutes adopted by each State in the subject
of revocation of wills, the court is of the impression from a review and the study of the pertinent
authorities that the doctrine laid down in the Samson case is still a good law.
2. YES. The earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent
relative revocation". The failure of a new testamentary disposition upon whose validity
the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and
hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to make at some time
a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional. It must
appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will.
Decedent, Mariano Molo executed two wills prior to his death – 1918 will and 1939 will. The 1939 will
contained a clause expressly revoking the 1918 will. His wife, Juana, then filed a petition for the probate of the
1939 will. This was originally admitted, but opon opposition of RESPs (children of his deceased brother), it
was reopened and the probate of will was denied on the ground that it was not executed IAW law (it was a
donacion captatoria) She then filed another petition for the probate of the 1918 will. RESPS opposed alleging
that Juana is now estopped from seeking the probate of the 1918 will.
3. Issue/Held: WON the 1918 should be admitted to probate. – YES. The 1939 will having been found
to be invalid, in essence, did not constitute a valid revocation.
Ratio/Doctrine: A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will, inasmuch
as said revocatory clause is void. (Samson v. Naval)
The doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation is usually applied where the testator
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present intention to
make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new disposition is not made or,
if made, fails of effect for some reason.
Where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the
inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of the new
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the
efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a
substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force.
The failure of the new testamentary disposition, upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to
the non-fulfillment of a suspensive condition, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. It must
appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will.
The theory on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate. There
can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.
