Conveyancing Ojienda 2015
Conveyancing Ojienda 2015
PRACTICE
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© Prof. Tom Ojienda, SC, 2015; LawAfrica
ISBN 9966-03-184-7
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Preface ................................. xi
Table of Cases .......................... xv
Table of Legislation .................... xxiii
CHAPTER TWO: THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING LAND AND CONVEYANCING LAW IN KENYA 35
Introduction ............................ 35
Previous Legislative Framework on Land .. 36
The Independence Constitution ........... 37
Land Adjudication Act ................... 38
Land (Group Representatives) Act ........ 39
Land Acquisition (Repealed) Act ......... 39
Government Lands (Repealed) Act ......... 40
Physical Planning Act ................... 41
Land Control Act ........................ 41
Trust Land Act .......................... 42
Registration of Titles (Repealed) Act ... 43
Land Consolidation Act .................. 43
Registration of Documents Act ........... 44
Registered Lands (Repealed) Act ......... 45
Agriculture Act ......................... 46
Law of Contract Act ..................... 48
Indian Transfer of Property Act, 1882 ... 50
Customary Law ........................... 51
Easement and Rules of Adverse Possession 52
Framework for Institutional Management and Regulation
of Land under the Constitution of Kenya 2010 53
Background to the Establishment of the
National Land Commission ................ 54
Institutional Administration and Management of
Public Land ............................. 67
Land Taxation, Collection of Land Rent, Royalties and other Payments over Land
............................. 78
Control of dealings in Private Land ..... 79
Land Settlement Programmes and Fund ..... 81
Transition ............................. 85
Environment and Land Court Act .......... 87
National Land Policy-Sessional Paper No.3 of 2009 88
Origin and Purpose ...................... 88
Analysis of National Land Policy ........ 90
Land Tenure Issues ...................... 91
Access to land .......................... 94
Land Access by the Marginalised ......... 98
Land Use Management Issues .............. 99
Land Administration Issues .............. 100
Eminent Domain/Exercise of State Power .. 101
Special Land Issues Featured ............ 103
Legislative and Institutional Changes Proposed to
Implement the National Land Policy ...... 105
Conclusion .............................. 110
Disposal of public land must be sanctioned by statute 111
Corporations will no longer be used as conduits for land grabbing 111
Conservation of forests, national parks, game reserves,
riparian reserves and specially protected areas 112
Conservation of pastoral lands .......... 112
Historical injustices ................... 112
CHAPTER FOUR: CADASTRAL SYSTEMS IN KENYA: FOCUS ON LAND ADJUDICATION AND TITLING 141
Introduction ............................ 141
Overview of Cadastral Systems in Kenya:
Historical Perspectives ................. 142
Land Adjudication at the Coast .......... 142
Landholding in the White Highlands ...... 143
Land Consolidation and Adjudication ..... 143
The case for Settlement Schemes ......... 144
The case for Large Scale Farms and Group Ranches 145
The case for Town Plots ................. 145
Conceptualizing Land Rights under the Colonial Regime 146
Process of Adjudication ................. 147
Adjudication Register ................... 150
Instruments of Land Adjudication ........ 151
Conclusion .............................. 153
PREFACE
My aim in writing this book is to provide a careful presentation and analysis of
land law and conveyancing in practice and to lay a foundation for the development
and further understanding of conveyancing processes in light of recent
constitutional and statutory developments in Kenya. This book, therefore,
assesses the contemporary state of land law and conveyancing while taking into
account recent developments which include the promulgation of a novel
constitutional order in 2010, the enactment of Land Act 2012, the Land
Registration Act 2012, and the National Land Commission Act 2012. I also discuss
recently proposed land bills, including the Community Land Bill 2015, against
the wider background of the interplay of political, social and economic forces
in Kenya.
This book does not purport to examine in detail all aspects of land law and
coveyancing, nor is the book a work of policy analysis, but rather, my aim is to
explore the basic principles, structures, processes and effectiveness of the land
law framework as it relates to land use, ownership and other accruing rights. I
do this while selecting for closer scrutiny a number of topics where the role
and impact of land law and conveyancing have been most evident. The book
consequently makes an analysis of land tenure problems in Kenya and evaluate the
alternative processes and structures of land tenure reforms recommended by
various Commissions over the years.
It is hoped that what emerges will provide the reader with a clearer and more
coherent picture of the remarkable developments in land law and conveyancing
which contemporary concerns have made necessary over the years. A better
understanding of this subject is, I believe, an essential part in the realization
of concrete land reforms in Kenya.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
In writing the book, I have incurred the usual debts which I now seek to pay. I
understand that it is a difficult task to properly acknowledge all those who have
contributed, in one way or another, to this book, research, model development
and assessment. However, I make an attempt here realizing that my list is bound
to be incomplete.
First of all, I am grateful to Dr. Ruth Aura-Odhiambo for her earnest
contributions and review of the several draft manuscripts whose unflagging
support kept this project on the fast track. I am indebted to Prof. Morris
Mbondenyi for fruitful discussions, advice and providing constructive comments
on the drafts of this book. I also wish to recognize and appreciate the effort,
hard work and support of Mathews Okoth, Esq. for the immense input by way of
research and envisioning a structure that would work during the preparation of
the material that resulted in this book. I also owe a deep debt of gratitude to
Collins Odhiambo Odundo who dedicated countless hours in carefully proof-reading,
editing the manuscript and providing invaluable conceptual contributions. Special
thanks to Aim Yoni, for encouragement and intellectual support.
I am also particularly grateful to Bella for providing copy-editing skills to
bear on the complexities of this book. I also benefited considerably from the
efforts and assistance of Katarina Juma in seeing the manuscript through the
press. I am also particularly grateful to the staff at Odhiambo & Odhiambo
Advocates and Prof. Ojienda & Associates who assisted me in such tasks as the
collection of court decisions, photocopying, printing and binding.
TABLE OF CASES
A
A Abdallah, Chairman, Donholm Phase 5 Residents’ Association and another v
Director General, National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) and another
Tribunal Appeal No NET/38/2009 .......... 229
Alex Kadenge Mwendwa v Grace Wangari Ndikimi and others Nairobi HCCC No. 2974
of 1991 ................................. 235
Ambale v Masolia (1986) KLR 241 .......... 26
Armstrong v Sheppard & Short Ltd (1952) 2 Q.B. 384 136
Auto Engineering Ltd v Gonella and another
(1978) KLR 248 .......................... 234
B
Ballard v Tomlinson [1885] 29 Ch D 115 .... 3
Barclays D.C.O. v Patel [1970] EA 89 .... 173
..................................... 187
..................................... 190
Baron Bernstein of Leigh v Skyviews and General Ltd
[1978] QB 479 ............................. 2
Blakeman v Associated Hotel Management Services Limited, Civil appeal number
45 of 1984 ............................... 11
Beatrice Wanjiru Kimani v Evanson Kimani Njoroge,
HCCC No. 1610 of 1999 .................... 95
C
Central London Commercial estates v Kato Kagaku
[1998] 4 All ER 948 ..................... 181
Chelsea Yacht & Boat Co. v Pope [2001] 1 WLR 1941 4
Chengo Katana Koi v Protus Evans Masinde [2013] eKLR 11
Coast Brick & Tile Works and others v Premchand Raichad
and another [1964] EA 187 ............... 206
Commissioner of Lands and another v Kithinji Murugu M’agere, Nairobi High Court
miscellaneous application number 395
of 2012 .................................. 71
Cuckmere Brick Co. Ltd v Mutual Finance
[1971] 2 All ER 633 .................... 213
D
David Thiongo t/a Welcome General Stores v Market Fancy Emporium Nairobi CA
Civ. Appli No. 74 of 2007 ............... 236
Debi Singh and others v Jagdish and others AIR 1952 All 710 198
Dixon v Esperance Bay Turf Club Inc. (2002) WASC 110 115
Dorman v Rodgers (1982) 148 CLR 365 ..... 115
Douglas Mwangi wa Kamotho and others v Chief Mwichuki
and the AG civil case number 113 of 1925 128
Dr. Simon W Chege v Paramount Bank of Kenya Limited Milimani Civil Suit No. 360
of 2001 ................................. 211
Duke of Sutherland v Heathcote (1892) 1 Ch 475 190
E
Eccon Construction & Engineering Ltd v
Giro Commercial Bank Ltd and another,
High Court civil case number 371 of 2003 206
Elijah Kipng’eno Arap Bii v Kenya Commercial Ltd,
Milimani Commercial Court Civil Case No. 324 of 2000 204
Elistone Ltd v Morris [1997] 1 WLR 687 .... 4
Embrey v Owen (1851) 6 Exch. 353 ........ 191
Equitorial Commercial Bank Limited and others v Retreat Villas Limited [2005]
eKLR .................................... 197
Eros Chemist v Trust Bank [2000] 2 EA 550213
Esiroyo v Esiroyo [1972] EA 388 .......... 10
F
Fina Bank Ltd v Ronak Ltd [2001] EA 54 .. 204
G
Githu v Ndete (1984) KLR 776 ............ 179
Githuchi Farmers Co. Ltd v Gichamba& another [1973] EA 8 9
Govindji and another v Sifa Insurance Company Ltd
[2003] KLR 466 ......................... 189
Guardial Singh Ghataurhael v The Delphis Bank Limited
[2003] LLR 2291 (CCK) ................... 207
H
Harvey v Pratt [1965] 1 WLR 1025 ........ 122
Hassan HashiShirwa and another v Swaleh Mohamed
and others, Malindi ELCC No. 41B of 2012 . 76
Heptulla Brothers Ltd v Jambhai Jeshangbhai Thakore
[1965] 1 WLR 1025 ....................... 122
Hill v Midland Ry [1882] 21 Ch D 143 .... 184
Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328 ...... 4
Hulme v Brigham [1943] KB 152 ............. 4
Hurst v Picture Theatres Ltd [1914] 1 KB 1136
I
Insurance Company of East Africa(“ICEA”) v
the Attorney-General and others Mombasa
HCCC No. 135 of 1998 (U.R.) ............. 119
Inwards v Baker [1965] 2 QB 29 .......... 138
Isaka Wainaina wa Gathomo and another v
Murito wa indangara and another EALR 102 127
J
James Mahinda and others v Director General, NEMA and another Tribunal Appeal
No. NET/15/2006 of 2007 ................. 224
James Ngugi Mbugua and another v Grace Wairimu MwithigaNairobi HCCC No. 1174 of
20002 (O.S.) ............................ 189
Josephat Ndung’u Gachchio v the Commissioner of Lands
LACT Case No. 34 of 2009 ................ 240
Jones and Jones Ltd v Ian Kervillar (1909) 2 Ch. 440 137
Joyce Wanjiku Kaguara v George Mburu and another
[2005]eKLR .............................. 95
...................................... 96
Judy Wanjiru Wainaina v Mathew Mbugua Waigwa,
Nairobi Civil Suit No. 1326 of 1990 ..... 120
K
Kaittany and another v Wamaitha (1995) LLR 2394 (CAK) 52
Kamau v Kamau (1984) KLR, 539 ........... 189
Kenya Commercial Finance Company Ltd v Ngeny
and another [2002] 1 KLR 106 ........... 205
Karanja Kariuki v Kariuki (1983) eKLR .... 26
Karanja Mbugua & another v Marybin Holding Co. Ltd
[2014] eKLR ............................... 9
Kasuve v Mwaani Investments Limited and others,
Civil Appeal No. 35 of 2002 ............. 182
Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco Co. (of Great Britain and Ireland) Ltd [1975] 2 QB
3342
Keppell v Bailey (1834) 2My&K 517 ....... 118
Kimani v Gikanga and another [1965] EA 73552
Kimani Ruchine v Swift, Rutherfold & Co Ltd
(1980) KLR 10 ........................... 183
Kimani wa Kabato v Kioi wa Nagi EALR 129128
Kinyua v Simon Gitura Rumuri,
Nyeri C.A. No. 265 of 2005 .............. 174
..................................... 183
Kobil Petroleum Limited v Almost Magic Merchants Limited Nairobi HCC App No.
931 of 2003 ............................. 233
Kyangavo v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited and another
[2004] 1 KLR 126 ........................ 209
..................................... 211
L
Labelle International Limited v Fidelity Commercial Bank [2003] 2 EA 541
207
Lace v Chandler [1944] KB 368 ........... 122
Lall v Jeypee Investments Ltd [1972] EA 512232
Lane v Capsey (1891) 3 Ch. 411 .......... 188
Leech v Schweder (1894) 9 App. Cases 463 185
Leigh v Taylor [1902] AC 157 .............. 4
Lezabar Pty Ltd v Hogan (1989) BPR 9498 . 116
Littledale v Liverpool College(1900) 1 Chp. 19 179
London & North Western Rail Co v Buckmaster
(1874) 10 LR Q.B 70 ..................... 121
Lowe v J.W. Ashmore Ltd (1971) Ch. 545 .. 190
Lydia Wanjiku Gathecha v Commissioner of Lands and LACT No. 37 of 2009 240
M
Maathai and others v City Council of Nairobi and others,
Civil Case No. 72 of 1994 ............... 224
Maranya v NBK Ltd [1995-98] 1 EA 177 .... 213
Mark Wachira and others v Kenya Road Services Ltd
Nairobi HCC (ELC) No. 1841 of 2007 ...... 235
Mason v Shrewsbury and Hereford Ry (1871) L.R. Q.B. 578 185
Mbugua Njuguna v Elijah Mburu Wanyoike and another,
CA No. 27 of 2002 ....................... 181
Metra Investments Limited v Gakweli Mohamed Warrakah Milimani HCCC No. 54 of
2006 (UR) ................................ 50
..................................... 202
Metropolitan Ry v Fowler (1892) 1 Q.B. 165185
Mohamed Ahmed Khalid (Chairman) and others v
Director of Land Adjudication and others,
Malindi ELCC No. 3 of 2013 ............... 59
...................................... 61
.................................. 84, 85
..................................... 149
Mohammed Gulamhussein Farzal Karmali and another v
C.F.C. Bank Limited and another [2006] eKLR 193
..................................... 194
..................................... 204
Mr. & Mrs Michale M. Njuguna versus the Commissioner of Lands) 240
Mugogo v Sihowa (1988) KLR 1 ............. 26
Mukuru Munge v Gilead Mwanyasi [2006] eKLR 4
Muraguri Githitho v Mathenge Thiongo,
Nyeri HCCC No. 17 of 2006 .............. 177
Mureithi v Attorney-General and others
[2006] 1 KLR (E & L), 707 ................ 28
N
Nakumatt Holdings Limited v Director General, NEMA
and another Tribunal Appeal No NET 10/02/2005 225
Narok County Council and another v NEMA and others Tribunal Appeal No NET/07 OF
2006 .................................... 227
Nathakal M Rai v Standard Chartered bank (K) Limited, Milimani Civil Case No.
830 of 1999 ............................. 211
Ndiema Samburi Soti v Elvis Kimtai Chepkeses Eldoret C.A. No. 136 of 2005
176
O
Obiero v Opiyo [1972] EA 227 ............ 10
Ol Loita Road Limited v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited Nairobi ELC No. 593 of
2010 ..................................... 49
..................................... 202
Omukaisi Abulitsa v Albert Abulitsa,
Kakamega HCCC No. 86 of 2005 (UR) ..........
P
Peter Karanja Mungai v Daniel Njoroge Kamau and others Nairobi Civil Suit No.
5869 of 1993 ............................ 120
Petty Wanjiku Kigwe versus the Commissioner of Lands LACT No. 36 of 2009
(Consolidated with LACT No. 35 of 2009 .. 240
Phillicery Nduku Mumo v Nzuki Makau [2002] eKLR 96
Pius Ngugi and others v Hellen Fear and others,
Nairobi ELCC No. 1321 of 2005 (as consolidated with
ELCC No. 424 of 2011 and ELCC No. 437 of 2011) 86
...................................... 87
Plenty v Seventh Day Adventist Church of Port Pirie
(1986) 43 S.A.S.R. 121 .................. 115
R
Re Sharp [1980] 1 All ER 198 ............ 136
Re Whaley (1908) 1 Ch 615 ................. 4
Rehorn v Barry [1956] 2 All ER 742 ...... 234
Republic v County Government of Kiambu and others [2014] eKLR 69
Republic thro’ Olum v Angungo and others (1988) KLR 529 173
Runda Coffee Estates v Ujagar Singh [1966] EA 564 121
S
S. Srinivasa Aiyangar and others v Radhakrishna Pillai
(1914) 26 MLJ 47 ....................... 198
Samwel Nyakenogo v Samwel Orucho Onyaru,
Kisumu CA No. 24 of 2004 ................ 179
..................................... 181
..................................... 182
Samwel Wainaina Muiruri v the award of the Commissioner of Lands LACT Case No.
20 of 2009 .............................. 238
Serah Mweru Muhu v Commissioner of Lands and others, Nairobi HC Pet. No. 413 of
2012 [2014] eKLR ..................... 70, 71
Simiyu v Housing Finance Company of Kenya Ltd
[2001] 2 EA 540 ......................... 207
..................................... 210
Sophia House Limited v Barclays Bank of Kenya [2005] eKLR 207
Spectrum Investment Co. v Holmes [1981] 1 WLR 221 181
Stanley Kahahu v the AG (1938) 18 KLR 5 . 127
Stephen Wambua Kithuka (Suing on behalf of Getrud Bint Ali
& Crispus Singo) v Abdul Karim Omar,
Malindi ELCC No. 92 of 2011 .............. 82
...................................... 84
T
Temo and others v Swaleh Misc. Civil Suit No. 155/1993
(OS) 1 KLR, 469 .......................... 53
Thomas v Sorrel (1673) Vough. 330 ....... 138
Trust Bank Limited v Eros Chemist Ltd and another,
Civil Appeal No. 133 of 1999 (UR) ....... 211
W
Waljee v Rose (1976) KLR 25 ............. 233
Wambugu v Kimani (1992) 2 KLR 292 ..........
Wambugu v Njuguna, Civil Appeal No. 10 of 1982 179
Wangari Maathai v The Kenya Times Media Trust
(1989) KLR 267 .......................... 224
Western Pumps Limited v Joseph Wainaina Iraya T/A Queen Chick Inn and another,
Milimani HCCC No. 186 of 2006 (UR) ....... 49
..................................... 202
Woollerton and Wilson Ltd v Richard Costain Ltd
[1970] 2 QB 334 .......................... 2
Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd v Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd (No. 2) 1971 1
W.L.R. 1032 ............................. 232
TABLE OF LEGISLATION
A
Agriculture Act (Cap 318);
........................................ 46
................................... s 167 83
................................... s 168 83
................................ s 168(3) 85
........................................ 150
C
County Governments Act No. 17 of 2012;
........................................ 54
................................... s 111 158
................................ s 111(2) 158
................................ s 111(4) 158
Constitution of Kenya
........................................ 107
........................................ 110
........................... Article 60(1) 29
........................ Article 60(1)(a) 113
........................... Article 61(2) 10
........................................ 29
........................... Article 62(1) 3
........................................ 29
........................... Article 62(2) 3
........................................ 29
........................................ 68
........................................ 69
........................................ 76
........................................ 149
........................... Article 62(3) 3
........................................ 30
........................................ 69
Constitution of Kenya – continued
........................................ 76
........................... Article 62(4) 30
........................................ 112
........................... Article 63(1) 30
........................... Article 63(2) 30
........................................ 32
........................... Article 63(3) 30
........................................ 32
.............................. Article 64 30
........................... Article 65(1) 30
........................... Article 65(2) 30
........................... Article 63(3) 30
........................... Article 63(5) 31
........................... Article 67(1) 54
........................... Article 67(2) 31
........................................ 67
........................ Article 67(2)(a) 69
........................................ 76
........................................ 112
........................ Article 67(2)(h) 76
........................ Article 67(2)(g) 77
........................................ 78
........................... Article 67(3) 69
........................ Article 68(c)(i) 31
.............................. Article 68 31
............................. Article 254 80
............................. Article 260 5
..................................... s 3 37
.................................... s 21 61
........................................ 74
.................................... s 22 61
........................................ 74
.................................... s 25 61
Constitution of Kenya – continued
........................................ 74
.................................... s 26 61
........................................ 74
................................ s 117(1) 23
................................ s 117(2) 23
................................ s 117(4) 23
................................ s 118(1) 24
................................ s 118(2) 24
Companies Act (Cap 486)
........................................ 169
Crown Lands Ordinance, 1902;
........................................ 15
........................................ 18
........................................ 36
........................................ 244
Crown Land Ordinance No. 12 of 1915;
........................................ 15
........................................ 44
........................................ 61
........................................ 74
........................................ 127
........................................ 142
........................................ 143
Crown Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, 1938
........................................ 19
E
East African (Lands) Order-in-Council, 1901;
........................................ 36
Environment and Land Court Act No 19 of 2011
........................................ 5
........................................ 31
........................................ 53
Environment and Land Court Act – continued
........................................ 154
..................................... s 3 154
Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act No. 8 of 1999;
........................................ 3
Environmental Management and Co-ordination (Wetlands, River Banks, Lake Shores
and Sea Shore Management) Regulations 2009;
........................................ 3
..................................... s 3 3
............................. s 142(1)(a) 3
G
Government Lands (Repealed) Act (Cap 280);
........................................ 14
........................................ 15
........................................ 19
........................................ 22
........................................ 40
........................................ 41
........................................ 50
........................................ 74
........................................ 105
........................................ 128
........................................ 160
........................................ 161
........................................ 162
........................................ 163
........................................ 164
........................................ 165
........................................ 195
..................................... s 3 20
........................................ 58
.................................. s 3(3) 19
..................................... s 9 59
Government Lands (Repealed) Act – continued
.................................... s 12 59
.................................... s 19 59
.................................... s 20 59
I
Indian Transfer of Property (Repealed) Act (1882);
........................................ 22
........................................ 50
........................................ 213
................................. s 58(a) 193
................................. s 58(b) 197
K
Kenya (Native Areas) Ordinance of 1926;
........................................ 58
L
Land Act No 6 of 2012;
........................................ 5
........................................ 31
........................................ 34
........................................ 53
........................................ 60
........................................ 84
........................................ 149
........................................ 188
........................................ 245
........................................ 246
........................................ 247
........................................ 249
........................................ 250
........................................ 253
........................................ 258
........................................ 262
Land Act – continued
........................................ 263
........................................ 264
........................................ 265
..................................... s 2 120
........................................ 121
........................................ 135
........................................ 193
............................... s 3(1)(c) 254
.................................. s 3(2) 254
..................................... s 4 254
........................................ 260
.................................. s 4(1) 248
.................................. s 4(4) 247
..................................... s 7 259
.................................. s 8(a) 77
.................................. s 9(1) 248
.................................. s 9(5) 248
.................................... s 10 262
................................. s 11(2) 77
................................. s 12(1) 72
................................. s 12(5) 72
.................................... s 14 247
................................. s 15(1) 7
........................................ 246
................................. s 15(2) 246
................................. s 17(1) 246
................................. s 17(3) 77
.................................... s 18 260
.................................... s 20 135
................................. s 20(1) 249
.................................... s 27 249
........................................ 260
................................. s 27-30 249
Land Act – continued
................................. s 28(1) 78
................................. s 28(2) 78
................................. s 28(3) 78
................................. s 32(1) 254
.............................. s 36(1)(b) 188
.................................... s 38 249
.................................... s 44 261
.................................... s 45 261
.................................... s 47 261
.................................... s 48 261
.................................... s 50 264
.................................... s 53 254
.................................... s 54 264
................................. s 56(a) 123
................................. s 69(1) 126
.................................... s 70 126
................................. s 89(1) 215
........................................ 216
.................................... s 90 213
................................. s 90(1) 213
........................................ 217
........................................ 219
................................. s 90(2) 213
........................................ 219
................................. s 90(3) 216
........................................ 219
.............................. s 90(2)(a) 214
.............................. s 90(2)(b) 214
.............................. s 90(2)(c) 214
.............................. s 90(2)(d) 214
.............................. s 90(2)(e) 214
.............................. s 90(3)(a) 214
........................................ 216
.............................. s 90(3)(b) 214
Land Act – continued
........................................ 215
.............................. s 90(3)(c) 214
.............................. s 90(3)(d) 214
........................................ 216
.............................. s 90(3)(e) 214
.............................. s 90(4)(a) 214
.............................. s 90(4)(b) 214
.................................... s 92 217
................................. s 92(2) 217
.................................... s 93 218
.................................... s 94 218
................................. s 96(1) 216
................................. s 96(2) 217
................................ s 107(1) 77
................................... s 112 77
................................... s 113 77
................................... s 134 78
........................................ 81
........................................ 83
................................... s 135 83
................................... s 135 188
................................... s 159 254
................................... s 161 255
................................... s 162 165
Land Acquisition (Repealed) Act (Cap 295);
........................................ 6
........................................ 39
........................................ 241
..................................... s 2 6
..................................... s 7 237
..................................... s 9 237
.................................... s 11 237
.................................... s 29 237
Land Adjudication Act (Cap 284);
........................................ 5
........................................ 6
........................................ 38
........................................ 39
........................................ 60
........................................ 82
........................................ 84
........................................ 85
........................................ 100
........................................ 148
........................................ 149
........................................ 150
........................................ 153
..................................... s 2 5
........................................ 6
..................................... s 6 85
........................................ 150
..................................... s 9 85
........................................ 150
.................................... s 10 38
................................. s 29(3) 85
........................................ 150
.................................... s 31 150
Land Consolidation Act (Cap 283);
........................................ 39
........................................ 43
........................................ 100
........................................ 153
.................................... s 2. 5
Land Control Act (Cap 302);
........................................ 6
........................................ 41
........................................ 157
........................................ 227
Land (Group Representatives) Act (Cap 287);
........................................ 21
........................................ 39
........................................ 92
........................................ 151
Land Planning Act (Cap 303);
........................................ 5
............................ Regulation 3 5
Land Registration Act No 3 of 2012;
........................................ 5
........................................ 31
........................................ 33
........................................ 41
........................................ 164
........................................ 165
..................................... s 2 201
..................................... s 6 80
............................... s 7(1)(a) 80
............................... s 7(1)(b) 80
................................. s 17(3) 77
........................................ 53
.................................... s 26 10
........................................ 31
........................................ 33
........................................ 156
.................................... s 28 33
........................................ 116
.................................... s 37 201
................................. s 43(1) 203
.................................... s 46 165
........................................ 166
.................................... s 44 203
........................................ 205
................................. s 44(1) 202
Land Registration Act – continued
................................. s 44(2) 202
................................. s 44(3) 202
................................. s 44(4) 203
.............................. s 44(4)(a) 203
.............................. s 44(4)(b) 203
................................. s 44(5) 205
.................................... s 49 139
................................. s 54(3) 125
........................................ 168
................................. s 54(4) 125
........................................ 168
................................. s 55(b) 80
.................................... s 56 201
........................................ 205
................................. s 56(5) 201
................................. s 56(4) 80
.................................... s 59 201
.................................... s 60 132
................................. s 61(1) 133
.................................... s 67 132
................................. s 91(4) 131
................................ s 93(3) 201
................................. s 93(4) 201
................................... s 106 165
................................ s 106(1) 200
................................ s 106(2) 200
........................................ 209
................................ s 106(3) 209
................................... s 107 165
Land Titles Ordinance No. 11 of 1908;
........................................ 36
........................................ 56
........................................ 142
Land Titles (Repealed) Act (Cap 282);
........................................ 22
........................................ 50
........................................ 160
........................................ 161
........................................ 162
........................................ 163
........................................ 165
........................................ 193
Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishments) Act (Cap 301);
........................................ 233
.................................... s 11 231
Law of Contract Act (Cap 23);
........................................ 48
........................................ 49
.................................. s 3(3) 9
........................................ 48
........................................ 49
........................................ 50
........................................ 202
Limitation of Actions Act (Cap 22)
........................................ 179
........................................ 180
........................................ 181
........................................ 182
..................................... s 3 52
..................................... s 7 174
.................................. s 9(1) 179
........................................ 184
.................................... s 13 184
.................................... s 15 180
.................................... s 22 190
.................................... s 32 186
........................................ 189
Limitation of Actions Act – continued
.................................... s 38 180
........................................ 184
................................. s 38(1) 181
M
Matrimonial Property Act No 49 of 2013;
........................................ 54
........................................ 97
........................................ 134
..................................... s 8 97
National Land Commission Act No 5 of 2012;
........................................ 31
........................................ 53
........................................ 67
........................................ 107
.................................. s 5(2) 70
............................... s 5(2)(a) 72
........................................ 76
............................... s 5(2)(b) 76
........................................ 80
............................... s 5(2)(d) 77
............................... s 5(2)(e) 69
.................................... s 32 87
................................. s 32(1) 85
........................................ 86
.............................. s 33(1)(c) 80
N
National Land Policy, Sessional Paper No. 3 of 2009;
........................................ 34
........................................ 65
........................................ 67
........................................ 90
........................................ 105
National Land Policy – continued
........................................ 253
................................... s 151 148
Native Land Trust Ordinance, 1930;
........................................ 19
........................................ 36
Native Land Trust Ordinance, 1938;
........................................ 36
Native Land Tenure Rules (1956)
........................................ 14
........................................ 129
P
Physical Planning Act (Cap 286) Laws of Kenya;
........................................ 41
........................................ 60
........................................ 228
............................... s 5(1)(b) 75
.................................... s 29 157
........................................ 158
R
Registered Land (Repealed) Act (Cap 300);
........................................ 5
........................................ 17
........................................ 22
........................................ 43
........................................ 45
........................................ 84
........................................ 94
........................................ 106
........................................ 147
........................................ 152
........................................ 156
........................................ 159
Registered Land (Repealed) Act – continued
........................................ 160
..................................... s 3 5
.................................... s 27 10
........................................ 58
........................................ 156
.................................... s 28 10
........................................ 58
........................................ 116
........................................ 156
................................ s 143(1) 94
Registration of Documents Act (Cap 285)
........................................ 44
........................................ 45
........................................ 50
........................................ 160
........................................ 163
..................................... s 5 45
Registration of Titles (Repealed) Act (Cap 281);
........................................ 22
........................................ 43
........................................ 50
........................................ 116
........................................ 156
........................................ 160
........................................ 162
........................................ 163
........................................ 165
.................................... s 23 58
................................. s 23(1) 116
.................................... s 62 43
S
Sectional Properties Act No 21 of 1987;
........................................ 22
Sectional Properties Act – continued
........................................ 125
........................................ 62
........................................ 167
........................................ 169
..................................... s 2 170
..................................... s 4 168
................................. s 17(2) 169
................................. s 17(5) 169
Stamp Duty Act (Cap 480)
........................................ 166
..................................... s 5 165
................................... s 10A 166
T
Trust Land Act (Cap 288);
........................................ 22
........................................ 40
........................................ 42
........................................ 59
........................................ 60
........................................ 92
.................................... s 53 61
W
Water Act (Cap 372) Laws of Kenya
........................................ 2
........................................ 47
..................................... s 3 2
..................................... s 5 2
..................................... s 6 2
Wildlife (Conservation and Management) Act
........................................ 20
CHAPTER ONE
1 Incorporeal property is a right issuing out of a thing, whether real or personal, or concerning or
annexed to, or exercisable on the same. It is not the thing corporate itself, which may consist of land,
houses, jewels, or the like. It is something collateral to the corporate thing. Incorporeal hereditaments are
essential or useful to the enjoyment of some particular corporeal property, for instance, ways, watercourses,
pews; or they could be independent of enjoyment of any such corporeal estate such as a profit, a prendre or an
easement. Incorporeal hereditaments are derived from obligation imposed by the law ex necessitate, as natural
watercourses or ways; or can be created by grant under seal, or by custom, or prescription which supposed a
grant. See, George Blaxland (2006), A Digest of Principles of English Law Arranged in the Order of the Code
Napoleon (London: Adamant Media Corporation), p. 358. See also Kevin J. Gray & Susan Francis Gray (2007),
Land Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pages 3 and 4.
2 Edward Hector Burn & John Cartwright (2011), Cheshire and Burn’s Modern Law of Real Property (Oxford:
Oxford University Press), page 7.
3 See generally, Marjorie Chibnall (1999), The Debate on the Norman Conquest (Manchester: Manchester
University Press).
4 The maxim Cuis est solum eius est usque ad coelum et ad inferos was coined by Accursius in the thirteenth
Century.
5 Paul Finkelman & Roberta Sue Alexander (eds) (2012), Justice and Legal Change on the Shores of Lake
Erie: A History of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio (Ohio: Ohio University
Press), page 214.
necessary for the ordinary use and enjoyment of the land.6 In the words of Justice
Griffith, the qualification is necessitated by the need to balance the rights of
an owner to enjoy the land against the rights of the general public to take
advantage of all that science now offers in the use of airspace.7 This means that
beyond height necessary for the ordinary use of land, the landowner has no
superior right than any other member of the public. This explains why it is a
defence for an aircraft to fly at such a height which is reasonable under certain
circumstances over someone else’s land. However, the qualification of the maxim
does not permit interference with legitimate rights of a landowner.8
Secondly, the right of a landowner to extract water are controlled by both
statutes and common law. The Water Act,9 for instance, vests water resource in
the State.10 As a general rule, the right to extract the water resources vests
with the Cabinet Secretary in charge of water resources, unless the resource is
alienated.11 Indeed, section 6 of the Water Act is more succinct in providing
that a conveyance of itself does not confer property rights in a water resource.
The section states:
[N]o conveyance, lease or other instrument shall (be) effectual to convey, assure,
demise, transfer or vest any person any property or right or any interest, privilege
in respect of any water resource, and no such property, right, interest or privilege
shall be acquired otherwise than under this Act.
In terms of water resource use, the Environmental Management and Coordination
Act12 limits the manner in which a landowner can use a water resource by creating
water pollution related crimes.13 These include prohibiting discharge of effluent
into an unlicensed sewerage system; as well as prohibiting discharge of dangerous
materials, substances or oil into water.14 Anyone can enforce a right to clean
and healthy environment as against a landowner.15 The Constitution of Kenya, 2010,
bolsters the foregoing provisions by defining public land to include water
resources.16 Such land vest in and is held by the national government in trust
for the people of Kenya and administered on behalf of the Kenyan people by the
National Land Commission.17
6
Ibid.
8 See, Kelsen v Imperial Tobacco Co (of Great Britain and Ireland) Ltd [1975] 2 QB 334 in which an action
of the defendant in allowing an advertisement to overhang the plaintiff’s premises amounted to trespass. In
Woollerton and Wilson Ltd v Richard Costain Ltd [1970] 2 QB 334, the action of the defendant in allowing the
jib of a crane to swing over the plaintiff’s property was found to be trespass.
10 Ibid, Section 3.
11 Ibid, section 5.
13 Ibid, section 142(1)(a). See also, Environmental Management and Co-ordination (Wetlands, River Banks,
Lake Shores and Sea Shore Management) Regulations, 2009.
14
Ibid, section 142(1)(a). See also the Environmental Management and Co-ordination (Wetlands, River
Banks, Lake Shores and Sea Shore Management) Regulations, 2009.
15 Ibid, section 3.
20 See, Mukuru Munge v Gilead Mwanyasi [2006] eKLR, where the Judge stated that it is a time honoured
principle of real property law that land includes the fixtures thereon. That principle is adequately summarised
in the latin maxim –quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit, which means that whatever is affixed to the soil
belongs to the soil.
It is the constitutional definition of land that the Land Act28, the Land
Registration Act (LRA)29 and the Environment and Land Court Act (ELCA)30 adopt.
Thus, whereas the definitions of land under the previous constitutional era in
Kenya were varied and often inconsistent with each other, the Constitution now
defines land with some element of certainty.
The Registered Land Act (RLA) (Repealed) defined land as ‘‘land covered with
water, all things growing on land and buildings and other things permanently
affixed to land.”31 Under the Land Adjudication Act (LAA), land includes ‘‘things
growing on land and buildings and other things permanently affixed to land.’’32
The Land Consolidation Act (LCA) defines land to include land covered with water,
any interest or estate in land other than a charge, all things growing thereon,
buildings and other things permanently affixed thereto.33 Regulation 3 of the
Land Planning Act (LPA) defines land to include land covered with water, any
buildings or things attached to the land covered with water and any interest or
easement into or over land.34 The Land Acquisition Act (LAA) (Repealed) defined
land to include all land, whether covered with water or not, and things attached
to the land or permanently fastened to anything attached to the land and any
estate, term, easement, right or interest in or arising out of land.35 The Land
Control Act on its part defines land as including an estate, interest or right
to land.
28 No 6 of 2012.
29 No 3 of 2012.
30 No 19 of 2011.
34 Land Planning Act (Chapter 303), Development and Use of Land (Planning) Regulations, Regulation 3.
37 Abbey Robert and Richards Mark, (2000) A practical approach to Conveyancing, (3 ed), (London: Blackstone
Press Limited London) page 1.
38 Brayan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, (8 ed), Thomson West, USA, 2004, page 358.
39 Brayan (ibid)
40 JM Halliday, Conveyancing Law and Practice (1 ed),1985) paragraph 1-01;( 2 ed)1997,ed 1 J S Talman)
paragraph 1-01 at page 2.
41 Ojienda Tom, 2008 Conveyancing Principles and Practice, Law Africa page 2.
43 Robert Maggarry and MP Thompson, Megarry’s Manual of the Law of Real Property,(7 ed,), Sweet and Maxwell
Limited 1993, page 125.
44 Ojienda, page 3.
45 David Hunter, James Salzman and Durwood Zaelke, 2002 International Environmental Law and Policy (New
York: Foundation Press, (2 ed.) 379-438.
1.2.3 Land Law and Chattels Transfer
Chattels are personal possessions that have no connection with the land. They,
therefore, remain in the possession and ownership of the seller when the landowner
sells their land, and the landowners can take those items with them. In other
words, chattels mean any movable property that can be completely transferred by
delivery. The movable properties may include motor vehicles among others.
46 Glendon MA et al. (2008). Comparative Legal Traditions in a Nutshell, 3rd edition, pages 142–143.
48 Ibid.
49 A trustee may be either a natural person, or an artificial person (such as a company or a public body),
and there may be a single trustee or multiple co-trustees, There may be a single beneficiary or multiple
beneficiaries. The settlor may himself be a beneficiary.
50 [1973] EA 8.
52 G.H Treitel, The Law of Contact, (11 edition) Sweet and Maxwell.
53 See the case of Karanja Mbugua & another v Marybin Holding Co. Ltd [2014] eKLR,the learned Judge
Nyamweya stated that:“It is settled law that no action may be brought upon any contract for the sale or
disposition of land, unless that agreement upon which the action is brought, or a memorandum or note of it is
in writing and signed by the party to be charges or by some other person authorized by him or her. This
requirement is found in section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act. There is no special form in which the
memorandum or contract in writing needs to be in, and indeed it can be formed by more than one document.”
54 Megarry and Wade, The Law of Real Property. (4 edition) Stevens and Sons Limited: London 1975.
55 See Jean Jacques Rousseau; Discourse on Inequality; Quoted in HWO Okoth-Ogendo; Teaching Manuals on
Property Law Vol. 1.
58 See the example of Obiero v Opiyo [1972] EA 227; and Esiroyo v Esiroyo [1972] EA. 388.
59 Number 3 of 2012.
62 See the example of Chengo Katana Koi v Protus Evans Masinde [2013] eKLR, where it was held A title
deed is an end product and where there are competing interests over the same land, it is not enough for one to
just state that he holds a title deed which is absolute and indefeasible. One has to show the processes that
were followed in the acquisition of the title deed so as to entitle him/her to the land to the exclusion of
other claimants.
63 Ojienda, supra.
64 FH Lawson and B Rudden, The Law of Property, (2 edition) (1982) at page 44.
66 Jean Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Inequality, quoted in HWO Okoth Ogendo, Teaching Manuals on Property
Law, Volume 1.
67 Smokin C. Wanjala (ed) Essays on Land Law: The Reform Debate in Kenya Tim O. Mwenesi: The Centrality
of land in Kenya: Historical Background and Legal Perspective. Page 3.
70 Ibid.
Despite this setback, certain deliberate steps had, however, been taken by the
colonial power, for purposes of attaining this alienation, notably the extension
of the Indian Land Acquisition Act of 1894 in 1896, to the ten-mile Coastal strip
so as to enable the colonial government, to acquire land for public purposes.
However, serious and sustained efforts in land acquisition started with the
delivery of another opinion by the law officers in 1899. The effect of this
opinion was to remove the impediment which had been put in place by the 1833
opinion. The 1899 opinion held that the earlier one was only valid where the
protectorate in question had “a settled form of government”. In the case of the
East African Protectorate which included Kenya, they argued that there was no
settled form of government and, therefore, her majesty could obtain radical title
to the land.71
Through the extension of foreign laws to the protectorate and the promulgation
of Orders in Council and Ordinances, the colonial authorities acquired all lands
in the protectorate on behalf of Her Majesty’s government. In 1887, the Sultan
handed over the administration of the coastal strip to the British East Africa
Company on concession for fifty years to administer as well as collect revenue.
The Company was later awarded the royal charter by the British Crown in 1888 and
became the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) and was empowered to
administer the British sphere of influence beyond the coastal strip.
On the 10-mile coastal strip, the colonial regimes recognised the claims of
the Sultan of Zanzibar. Only his ‘‘subjects’’ – mainly those with some ancestral
links outside Kenya - could register land. This meant that up to 25% of the
indigenous ‘‘Mijikenda’’ population were turned into landless ‘‘squatters,’’
being unable to register the land that they had lived in for generations.72
Land was alienated from customary systems, usually without compensation, for
the use of white settlers, who relied on African labour. Africans were restricted
to “native reserves” that formed the basis of ethnically-defined administrative
units, which are the precursors of today’s districts and locations. By 1934,
European settlers, who represented less than a quarter or one percent of the
population at that time, controlled about a third of the arable land in the
country.73
Settlers came to realize that provided the natives were insecure in their own
land, the security of the White Highlands as a European settlement would always
be doubtful. As a consequence, the Kenya Land Commission was set up to advise
the government on land policy.74
This Commission completed its report in 1934 and concluded that Africans had
little (if any) claim to the Highlands and further, if there were any claims at
all, compensation ought to be paid rather than giving the land to the claimants
and even further, that upon such payment, all customary rights should be
extinguished forever.
It recommended that the settlers’ security of ownership of the White Highlands
be guaranteed vide an Order-In-Council. This was done in 1939 vide the Kenya
(Highlands) Order-In-Council. As a corollary, the Kenya (Native Areas) Order-In-
Council was also enacted in the same year. It set up a newly constituted Native
71
Ibid.
72 Kanyinga, K. Struggles of Access to Land. the ‘squatter question’ in coastal Kenya. Danish Institute
for International Studies. CDR Working Paper 98.7 June 1998.
73 Berman, B., Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: the Dialectic of Domination. James Currey Publishers,
1990, Page 189 note 18.
77 Hughes, Lotte. “Rough Time in Paradise: Claims, Blames and Memory Making Around Some Protected Areas
in Kenya” in Conservation and Society, 5(3), 2007.
78 Berman, B. Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: the Dialectic of Domination. James Currey Publishers.,
1990, Page 189.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid.
(ITPA)and the Registration of Titles Ordinances came in handy to safeguard
security of tenure of title holders.
Customary land ownership in Kenya was not ‘‘individual’’ (or ‘‘communal’’) but
rather involved a mixture of personal, familial and economic relationships.83 The
British colonial regime attempted to codify customary land tenure systems, a
process of simplification and misinterpretation which was often divisive at the
local level.84 While customary rights remained unregistered, the colonial
authorities established a system which allowed only for the registration of
individual title. The 1954 ‘‘Swynnerton’’ Plan for the Reform of African Land
Tenure became the fundamental blueprint for many of the land tenure reforms which
have been implemented to date.85
83 Leo, C. Land and Class in Kenya. Toronto and London: University of Toronto Press, 1984. Chapter 2.
84 Okoth-Ogendo, HWO Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya. Acts
Press, 1991.
85 Judi W. Wakhungu, Chris Huggins and Elvin Nyukuri, Land Tenure and Violent Conflict in Kenya available
at <http://www.acts.or.ke/reports/RelatedResource/Land_Tenure_Brochure.pdf>.
86 Okoth-Ogendo, supra.
87 Wanjala, S Land and Resource Tenure, Policies and Laws: a Perspective from East Africa. Paper prepared
for the Pan-African Programme on Land and Resource Rights (PAPLRR) inaugural workshop, Cairo, Egypt 25 - 26
March 2002.
88 Wakhungu, supra.
90 Wakhungu, supra.
beginning of not only the retention of the colonial laws and policies, but also
their entrenchment to this day.91
The substantive and registration law for all land formerly held under customary
law was codified in the Registered Land Act (Repealed) of 1963.92 The Act, which
was supposed to replace all other related laws in Kenya, was an expression of
the agronomic arguments for individualization of tenure; and was also an
embodiment of English property law. Because the question of landlessness at
independence had to be addressed, the British Government in concert with the
independence government embarked upon a programme of purchasing land and availing
the same to the landless. These efforts included the million acre settlement
scheme, in which a million people were settled on holdings ranging from 25 to 40
acres from 1962, and the squatter settlement scheme of 1965 meant to settle
squatters.
A process of land adjudication, consolidation and registration, which has
covered much of the arable land in the country, resulted in heads-of-households
being granted individual rights to land, often at the expense of the rights of
female relatives and those with customary rights of use or tenancy. Collective
forms of tenure, which would have more appropriately reflected the existing local
tenure systems, were not supported by legislation and land could not be registered
collectively.
93 Smokin C. Wanjala, Land Ownership and Use in Kenya: Past Present and Future. In Essays on Land Law;
the Reform Debate Smokin Wanjala(ed) page 25.
94
Ibid, page 25.
95 Land, The Environment and the Courts in Kenya Background Paper for the Environment and Land Law
Reports, A DFID/KLR PARTNERSHIP by, Dr. J.M. Migar Akech February 2006, page 5.
96 This suffices to say, The Government holds the land on behalf of the public for a public purpose,
thereby being the owner, hence the name Government Land.
97 Ibid.
Lands Trust Board established by the Native Lands Trust Ordinance of 1938.98
Native reserves therefore fell within the definition of “Crown lands”99 until
1938 when, vide the Crown Lands (Amendment) Ordinance, 1938, native reserves were
renamed “native lands” and divorced from the definition of Crown lands. At
independence, the land initially under “native reserves” became Trust Land, whose
management is also discussed in this chapter.
At independence, these native lands became trust lands, and were vested in
county councils to hold them in trust for the benefit of all persons residing
within the sub-regions. Further, Crown land became government land, and was
vested in the President, whom the Constitution empowered to make grants or
dispositions of any estates, interests or rights in or over unalienated government
land. The presidential powers could be delegated to the Commissioner of Lands in
limited circumstances.100 The point to emphasise is that Government land was
exclusively vested in the President. The President had the exclusive power to
grant or dispose of any estates, interests or rights in or over unalienated
Government Land.101 The notion of Government land did not codify trusteeship in
the President as a trustee of government land on behalf of the entire public. It
is for this reason that Ogolla and Mugabe argue that the President had a carte
blanche in dealing with Government land.102
The Government Lands Act (Repealed) regulated public land tenure, and
constituted the principal framework for the conservation of biodiversity
established by the Forests Act and the Wildlife (Conservation and Management)
Act.103 These statutes declared large areas of land as forest reserves, national
parks or national reserves with the objective of protecting forests and
wildlife.104 As to whether forests and wildlife were indeed effectively protected
98 Government Lands Act (Repealed) (Chapter 280), section 3 states: “The President, in addition to, but
without limiting, any other right, power or authority vested in him under this Act, may—(a) subject to any
other written law, make grants or dispositions of any estates, interests or rights in or over unalienated
Government land; (b) with the consent of the purchaser, lessee or licensee, vary or remit, either wholly or
partially, all or any of the covenants, agreements or conditions contained in any agreement, lease or licence,
as he may think fit, or, with the like consent, vary any rent reserved thereby.
99 This means that, Native reserves were still part of Crown land by virtue of being drawn from the crown.
According to PL Onalo his book Land Law and Conveyancing in Kenya page 46, he indubitably states that The
Native Land Trust Ordinance of 1930 had been designed to give greater security to Africans on the land than
had been possible under the Government Lands Act but the provision that they could be excluded from part or
parts of the reserve for various public purposes tended to erode this security. On page 45 he gave an example
of the Kakamega indent of 1933, where the Government excised the gold fields from the Kavirondo reserve
without provision for another piece of Land thereby exposing the security of tenure which was envisaged under
Government Land Act and the Native Land Trust Ordinance of 1930. The Government had acted pursuant to the power
of the Crown under the Government Lands Act 1915 and the subsequent legislation of Native Land Trust Ordinance
1930 to proclaim native reserves, but with powers to exclude Africans from a reserve or part of a reserve which
was required by the Government so long as an alternative piece of Land could be given to the tribe.
101 Government Lands (Repealed) Act (Chapter 280), section 3 states: “The President, in addition to, but
without limiting, any other right, power or authority vested in him under this Act, may—(a) subject to any
other written law, make grants or dispositions of any estates, interests or rights in or over unalienated
Government land; (b) with the consent of the purchaser, lessee or licensee, vary or remit, either wholly or
partially, all or any of the covenants, agreements or conditions contained in any agreement, lease or licence,
as he may think fit, or, with the like consent, vary any rent reserved thereby; (c) extend, except as otherwise
provided, the time to the purchaser, lessee or licensee for performing the conditions contained in any
agreement, lease or licence liable to revocation for such period, and upon such terms and conditions, as he
may think fit, and the period so extended, and the terms and conditions so imposed, shall be deemed to be
inserted in the agreement, lease or licence and shall be binding on the purchaser, lessee or licensee, and on
all transferees, mortgagees, assignees and other persons claiming through him.”
102 Supra.
107 D.W. Bromley and J.A. Cochrane, Understanding the Global Commons, University of Wisconsin-Madison,
EPAT/MUCIA Working Paper, at 12 (1994).
120 Kenya Human Rights Commission. Who owns This Land? A Guide to Understanding the Law of Trust Lands in
Kenya, Nairobi: KHRC Publication, 1997, pages 1-2. According to the author, Trust Lands are found in Moyale,
Wajir, Samburu, Tana River, Marsabit, Garissa, Turkana, Isiolo, Mandera and Trans Mara districts; they are
found in Taveta, Pokot, Mosop, Tinderet, Elgeyo, Marakwet, Baringo, Olenguruone, Mukogodo, Elgon local and
Kuria Area Councils, Makueni Trust Land Area, Athi River Utilisation Trust Land Area, Lambwe Valley Trust Land
Area, Sarora Trust Land, Kaimosi Trust Land, Meru Concessional Trust Land Area, Irrigation Trust Land Areas of
Pekerra Area in Baringo District, Mwea Tabere in Embu District, North Yatta, Yatta Plateau and Ithanga Trust
Land, Isiolo Trust Land, Olenguruone Trust Land, and Shimba Hills Trust Land in Kwale District.
121 Trust Lands Act (Chapter 288), section 5 states: “There shall be established in respect of each division
created under this Part a Divisional Land Board, which shall consist of— (a) a chairman, appointed by the
Minister (now Cabinet Secretary) for the time being responsible for land after consultation with the council;(b)
not less than four and not more than fifteen persons appointed by the council;(c) not more than two public
officers appointed by the council; and (d) two persons appointed by the council from amongst its members:
Provided that, where a Divisional Board established under the Kenya (Land Control) (Transitional Provisions)
Regulations, 1963, has jurisdiction over any division created under this Part, that Board shall be the
Divisional Land Board for that division for the purposes of this Act.”
122 Ibid, section 53 states: “The Commissioner of Lands shall administer the Trust land of each council as
agent for the council, and for that purpose may— (a) exercise on behalf of the council, personally or by a
public officer, any of the powers conferred by this Act on the council, other than that conferred by section
13(2)(d) of this Act; and (b) execute on behalf of the council such grants, leases, licences and other documents
relating to its Trust land as may be necessary or expedient: Provided that— (i) the Commissioner of Lands shall
act in compliance with such general or special directions as the council may give him; and (ii) the Minister
(now Cabinet Secretary) may, by notice in the Gazette, terminate the Commissioner of Land’s power to act under
this section in relation to the Trust land of any particular council, where the Minister (now Cabinet Secretary)
is satisfied that the council has made satisfactory arrangements to administer its Trust land itself.”
interests and benefits that previously vested in a tribe, group, family or
individuals in respect of the land.123 However, such tribe, group, family or
individuals that had vested rights or interest in land set apart were entitled
to prompt payment of full compensation from the Government before the land could
legitimately be set apart.124
Setting apart could also be at the instance of the President through a
presidential notice. Pursuant to section 118(1) of the previous Constitution of
Kenya, the President could, after consultation with the Council, give a written
notice that land within the county council be set apart for specified and
permitted purposes. The purposes for which land could be set apart at the instance
of the President were for purposes of use by the Government of Kenya, use by a
body corporate established for public purposes by an Act of Parliament, use by
a company in which shares were held by or on behalf of the Government of Kenya,
or for purposes of prospecting or extraction of minerals.125 In either case, a
tribe, group, family or individuals that had vested rights or interest in land
set apart was entitled to prompt payment of full compensation from the Government
before the land could legitimately be set apart.
The administration system of trust lands provided opportunity for land grabbing
under the previous Constitutional order.126 Landholding and access to land under
the previous Constitution was riddled with a number of legislative and
institutional weaknesses. Some of the weaknesses were codified in the Report of
the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land
(Ndung’u Report).127
Land in cities, municipalities, townships and government lands were
indiscriminately apportioned by Commissioners of Lands through abuse of the
presidential discretion to apportion such lands.128 Land acquired for public use
was illegally allocated through forged letters and documents. State corporations
were used as conduits for land grabbing through which the public lost colossal
amounts of money, as the land that was illegally allocated to individuals or
companies. The land would be sold at less than market value to allottees, who
would then re-sell it to other state corporations at exaggerated costs.129
123 Constitution of Kenya, section 117(2) states: “Where a county council has set apart an area of land in
pursuance of this section, any rights, interests or other benefits in respect of that land that were previously
vested in a tribe, group, family or individual under African customary law shall be extinguished.”
124 Constitution of Kenya, section 117(4) states: “No setting apart in pursuance of this section shall have
effect unless provision is made by the law under which the setting apart takes place for the prompt payment of
full compensation to any resident of the land set apart who—
(a) under the African customary law for the time being in force and applicable to the land, has a right to
occupy any part of the land; or
(b) is, otherwise than in common with all other residents of the land, in some other way prejudicially
affected by the setting apart.” Setting apart of Trust Land has similar effect as compulsory acquisition of
land under the Land Acquisition Act (Chapter 285) Laws of Kenya.
125 Constitution of Kenya (Repealed), section 118(2).
126 See, for instance, Report of the Interim Coordinating Secretariat, Mau Forests Complex dated 26 February
2010.
127 The Ndung’u Commission, which was composed of 20 prominent citizens, lawyers and civil servants was
appointed by President Kibaki in June 2003, and was charged with inquiring into the unlawful allocation of
public lands, ascertaining the beneficiaries, identifying public officials involved in illegal allocations,
and making recommendations for appropriate measures for the restoration of illegally allocated lands to their
proper purpose, for prevention of future illegal allocations, and for appropriate criminal prosecutions. The
Commission released its report on 16 December 2004. See Southall, R. ‘The Ndung’u Report: Land & Graft in
Kenya.’ Review of African Political Economy. Taylor & Francis Ltd, 2005, 143.
128 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land (Ndung’u
Report), Nairobi: Government Printer, June 2004, page 81.
129 Ibid, pp 89-90. The Commission identified the state corporations that lost large areas of land under
dubious circumstances to include Kenya Railways, Kenya Airports Authority, Kenya Agricultural Research
Institute, Kenya Power and Lighting Company, Kenya Industrial Estates and Kenya Food and Chemical Corporation.
Government ministries and departments in cohort with Commissioners of Lands
allotted respective ministries lands.130 Settlement Schemes were abused by
Settlement Fund Trustees and District Plot Allocation Committees,131 while Trust
lands, which were to be held by local authority in trust for the benefit of
residents of the local authority, were illegally allocated to individuals and
companies by County Councils in cohort with Commissioners of Lands.132 Forest
lands, national parks, game reserves, wetlands, riparian reserves and protected
areas were illegally and irregularly excisioned.133 Public land was, therefore,
grabbed ‘‘in total disregard of the public interest and in circumstances that
flew in the face of the law’’ and ‘‘rewarded’’ by political patrons to politically
correct individuals.134 Courts were used to shield illegal beneficiaries of land
and to protect illegally acquired land under the pretext of “first registration.”
Cases such as Ambale v Masolia135 and Mugogo v Sihowa136 institutionalised the
jurisprudence that “even if fraud had been established, inasmuch as the
respondent’s title was acquired by first registration, it could, in no
circumstances be defeated.”137
130
Ibid, pp 112-113. The Commission identified the affected Ministries to include Ministry of Livestock
and Fisheries Development, National Youth Service and Kenyatta International Conference Centre.
131 Southall, R. ‘The Ndung’u Report: Land & Graft in Kenya.’ Review of African Political Economy. Taylor
& Francis Ltd, 2005, 146-147. According to the author: “Allocation of plots, formally conducted under Settlement
Fund Trustees, devolves in practice upon District Plot Allocation Committees composed of the District
Commissioner, District Settlement Officer, District Agricultural Officer, the area MP, the Chairman of the
relevant County Council and the Clerk to Council. Settlement Fund Trustees appear to lack any supervisory
powers over these committees, with the result that the local committees have been almost wholly unaccountable.
The result has been predictable, with the interests of the landless having been ignored in favour of those of
‘District officials, their relatives, members of Parliament, councillors and prominent politicians from the
area, Ministry of Lands and Settlement officials, other civil servants and … so-called ‘politically correct’
individuals’. And whilst the majority of deserving allottees received smaller plots, the undeserving often
received large ones. Meanwhile, farms belonging to the Agricultural Development Corporation, designed to
provide an the needs of the agricultural industry by developing high quality seeds or livestock or undertaking
research etc, have been illegally established as settlement schemes and subsequently illegally allocated to
individuals and companies, often as political reward or patronage.”
132 Ndung’u Report (n 7 above), pages 134-135. See also Report of the Interim Coordinating Secretariat,
Mau Forests Complex, 26 February 2010. See also Mungai, K. ‘The Obstacles in the Fight Against Corruption in
Kenya.’ Ojienda T. (ed) Anti-Corruption and Good Governance in East Africa: Laying Foundations for Reform.
Nairobi: LawAfrica Publishing (K) Ltd, 2007,135. While quoting the late JM Kariuki, the author states: “I am
sounding this as a warning and it should be taken seriously that this greed is going to ruin us!...it is the
policy of the government to settle people who are landless and not the people who own land somewhere else.
Where will our poor men go if we are to continue at this rate? In fact, I can see this country is going to
disregard the poor persons for good if leaders are being too greedy. They have gone as far as Maasai land
saying that they are doing experiment whereas the whole of Maasai land has been taken by those greedy people
under the pretext of training the Maasai to become farmers. I call this “robbing” because, how can you take
land as much as 3,000 acres under the pretext that you are experimenting for five years?...I would like to
state that the majority of these people are well-to-do and hold high positions in government…The Provincial
Commissioner for Central province has an experiment farm there. Some of our Permanent Secretaries have farms
there. Some of the Cabinet Ministers have farms there. It is not a secret. The mistake in this country is that
we are trying to hide a lot of things…”
133 Ndung’u Report, supra pp 148-169. The Commission observed that: “only 1.7% of the 3% of the country
which was covered by gazetted forests at independence remains, most of the reduction having come about as a
result of illegal and irregular excisions, usually made without any reference to scientific considerations or
under the guise of settlement schemes. The beneficiaries of such excisions include (often private) schools,
government institutions, and religious bodies as well as private individuals and companies. Similarly, many
illegal allocations of land around riparian sites have been illegally allocated by the Kenya Wildlife Service,
with many such allocations – such as those made since 1995 to some 14 beneficiaries around Lake Naivasha –
being known to have severely affected the ecosystem.”
137 It is not worthy that in Karanja Kariuki v Kariuki (1983) eKLR, Justice Madan held that where a
customary land trust exists, registration of land even as a first registration does not exempt the proprietor
from obligations as a trustee of the customary land. That first registration does not exclude recognition of
a trust provided it can be established. That in protecting first registration, Parliament could not have
intended to destroy this customary land trust of one of the largest sections of the peoples of Kenya.
While land is a vital resource to livelihood, under the previous Constitution,
land was inequitably distributed and communal and group interest in land were
subjugated to individual interests.138 Pastoralists land was not managed through
sustainable norms, rules, beliefs and practices of indigenous communities,139 but
through “legal-structural authoritarian-rights that emphasised individual tenure
and de-emphasised community land rights.”140 At the Coast, majority of the
indigenous Mijikenda communities were rendered squatters at the behest of
political stooges.141 Women’s rights to land were either insubordinated to those
of men or not recognised at all;142 and their rights to own, inherit, manage, and
dispose of land were under constant attack from customs, laws, and individuals
including government officials who believed that women did not deserve property
rights. The devastating effects of property rights violations including poverty,
disease, violence,143and homelessness harmed women, their children, and Kenya’s
overall development. Many women were excluded from inheriting, evicted from their
lands144 and homes by in-laws, stripped of their possessions, and forced to
engage in risky sexual practices in order to keep their property.
The failure to implement the recommendations of the Ndung’u Report has
exacerbated the frustrations in dealing with land tenure disputes. For instance,
in Mureithi v Attorney-General and others145 where members of Mbari-ya-Murathimi
138 See the Report of the Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence (CIPEV), page 31. The Report
noted, “Constitutionally, individuals may own land in any place in Kenya and in law no part of the country
belongs to an ethnic group. Nevertheless, this phenomenon is de facto a characteristic of many areas,
particularly as many of the newly created districts since the nineteen nineties have been ethno-specific,
leading to the creation of ethnically homogenous effective “native reserves”. This in turn has created the
notion of “insiders”, who are native to a place and “outsiders” who have migrated there, a notion that has
been tapped by aspiring politicians. This raises the question of the balance between group interests and the
rights of individuals as entrenched in the Constitution, a problem that also has crept into slums such as
Kibera and Mathare which are now informally divided into ethnically homogeneous zones.”
139 Lenaola, I. et al. ‘Land Tenure in Pastoral Lands.’ Juma, C. and Ojwang, J.B. (eds) In Land We Trust:
Environment, Property and Constitutional Change. Nairobi: Initiative Publishers, 1996, 231-258 at 236.
140 Okoth-Ogendo, H.W.O. “Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya.”
Nairobi: African Centre for Technology Studies, 1991, page 170. According to the author, “Two phases are
clearly identifiable in the case of developments in the property law area before 1939. The earlier phase, which
ends up around 1915, was one simply of legal security to land both for the African and for the settler. In
order for the latter to obtain this, it was in the nature of colonial power relations that the former should
lose it. The manner in which this was done-whether by sheer brutality or the distortion of proprietary values
of the Africans-is not of particular consequence. The concern was to found and and organize an economy which
never really got off its feet even after 60 years of one of the most systematic forms of exploitation ever
experienced under the British imperial emblem…correlation between economic instability and legal structural
authoritarianism is one which explains the characteristic of much of early colonial law not only in the field
of property relations, but in other areas as well.”
141 Kanyinga, K. Redistribution from Above: The Politics of Land Rights in Coastal Kenya. Uppsala: The
Nordic Africa Institute, page 56. According to the author: “The arrival of the British and the establishment
of the protectorate status helped the subjects of the Sultan to consolidate their control of land along the
coast in disregard of the possessions of the indigenous Mijikenda groups. The 1886 Anglo-German Agreement,
which created Mwambao, specifically gave the Sultan rights over land in the Strip and made no attempts at
preserving Mijikenda land rights. The declaration of the Protectorate in 1895 and the subsequent lease of the
Coastal strip to the Protectorate by the Sultan was followed by the formal acknowledgement, in principle and
practice, of the private possessions of Arabs and Swahili, thereby laying the socio-political and administrative
bases for the exclusion of Mijikenda rights to land on the coast in general and along the strip in particular.”
142 United Nations Development Programme UNDP). ‘Kenya Human Development Report 2001.’Nairobi: UNDP, 2002,
page 30. See also Republic of Kenya. ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper for the Period 2001-2004.’ Nairobi:
Government Printers 2001, page 36. The author states in part:“…Only 29 percent of those engaged in formal wage
employment are women, leaving most to work in the informal sector with no social security and little income.”
143 Tony, J.. Domestic Abuse in Kenya. Nairobi: Population Communication Africa, 2002, page 10. The author
states: ‘Violence against women is commonplace: 60 percent of married women reported in a 2002 study that they
are victims of domestic abuse…”
144 Nyamu-Musembi, C. (2002). ‘Are Local Norms and Practices Fences or Pathways? The Example of Women’s
Property Rights.’ Abdullahi, A. An-Na’im (ed) Cultural Transformation and Human Rights in Africa. New York:
Zed Books Ltd., 2002, page 136.
145 [2006] 1 KLR (E and L), 707. The court argued that once the President is presented with the report of
a Commission of Inquiry, he has complete discretion on what to do with it and he is not obliged to respond in
clan in Nyeri sought judicial review orders against the Attorney-General and the
Commissioner of Lands to implement the recommendations of the Ndung’u Report
insofar as it touched their land, the Court held that the Attorney-General and
the Commissioner of Lands were under no statutory duty whatsoever to implement
the recommendations of the Ndung’u Report. Such were the weaknesses on land
access and holding under the independence Constitution that the Constitution of
Kenya, 2010, attempts to address.
any particular way. That it is not the mandate of court to formulate and implement policy matters as this is
the mandate of the Executive and Parliament.
147
Ibid, article 60(1).
154
Ibid, article 63(3).
159 The Minimum and Maximum Land Holding Acreages Bill, 2015 is currently pending in parliament for debate.
The Bill seeks to give effects to article 68(c)(i) of the Constitution of Kenya to provide for minimum and
maximum land holding acreages in respect of private property.
167 Ojienda, T.O. (2008), Conveyancing Principles and Practice, Nairobi: Law Africa Publishers, page 11.
While quoting the Report of the Commission into Land Law Systems of Kenya on principles of a National Land
Policy Framework (Njonjo Commission Report), the author states: “…For indigenous Kenyans, land also has a
spiritual value. For land is not merely a factor of production; it is, first and foremost, the medium which
defines and binds together social and spiritual relations within and across generations. As one Nigerian Chief
puts it, ‘land belongs to a vast family of which many are dead, few are living and countless members still
unborn.’ Issues about its ownership and control are therefore as much about access to material livelihood.
This is one reason why debate about land tenure in Africa always revolves around the structure and dynamics of
lineages and cultural communities rather than on strict juridical, principles and precepts…”
168 Roger Southall, The Ndung’u Report: Land & Graft in Kenya Published in: Review of African Political
Economy, 103, March 2005, pp.142-51.
169 Ibid.
171 Sorrensen, M.P.K. (1967), Origins of European Settlement in Kenya, Nairobi: Oxford University Press,
page 47.
172 See East African (Lands) Order-In-Council, 1901; Crown Lands Ordinance, 1902; Land Titles Ordinance
number 11 of 1908; Crown Land Ordinance number 12 of 1915; Native Land Trust Ordinance, 1930; Native Land Trust
Ordinance, 1938.
and contrary to each other.173 The land tenure system introduced by the colonial
regime was different in all its fours from the preceding communal tenure regime
in which land did not belong to one exclusive individual, but the community as
a whole. Each person in the community had a right of access to the land dependent
upon his specific needs at the time. The rights of access were guaranteed by the
political authority in a given community. Such authority did not ‘‘own’’ land
but rather exercised political control over the same.
The political control was necessary to facilitate the structural framework
within which the rights of access were to be enjoyed and maintained on equitable
balance between the availability of land and the needs of the individual members
of the community. There was no ‘‘ownership’’ of land either by individual or
political authorities in the same sense as ownership is known under English law.
The normative structure, the form and rigour of control and the degree of
‘‘communalism’’ differed from one community to another.174 The constitutional and
legislative frameworks discussed below are among the main frameworks that
regulated land access and use in Kenya up to the date of the promulgation of the
current Constitution.
173 Okoth-Ogendo (1993), Agrarian Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Assessment of State Responses to the
African Crisis and their Implications for Agricultural Development.
174 Okoth-Ogendo (1975), “Property Theory and Land Use Analysis,” in Journal of Eastern African Research
and Development, Vol 5, No 1 at 13.
182 See Preamble to the Land (Group) Representatives Act (Chapter 287).
189 Ibid.
193 Chapter 302, Laws of Kenya. This Act was repealed by the Statutes Law (Miscellaneous Amendments) Act,
2013 by amending Land Registration Act, 2012
213 See Okoth-Ogendo, HWO 1986. The perils of land tenure reform: the case of Kenya.
<www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/80604e/80604E0c.htm>
219 Milimani High Court civil case number 186 of 2006 (UR).
section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act provides as follows...Pursuant to those
statutory provisions, it is my considered view that the plaintiff has failed to prove
that it has a prima facie case with a probability of success. It does not have any
contract in writing as between itself on the one hand, and the defendants on the other
hand. It would appear wholly inadequate for the plaintiff to seek to obtain an order
for specific performance of a contract between the second defendant and Queenchic Inn
Limited. In any event, even that agreement was not attested by any witness.
The same jurisprudence was consistently followed in Metra Investments Limited v
Gakweli Mohamed Warrakah,220 in which the Court, while striking out the case, held
that:
As the case is presented, there is no evidence that an agreement in writing exists
signed by both parties and witnessed as required by section 3(3) of the Law of Contract
Act. In the absence of such agreement, the section is clear that no suit shall be
brought for the disposition of an interest in land. The applicant does not appear
therefore, to have a prima facie case with a probability of success.
As will be demonstrated shortly, the requirements for disposition of interest in land
as encapsulated in section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act has now been provided
for in the land laws enacted under the 2010 Constitution.
222 Ibid.
223 Okoth-Ogendo; 1979, Land Tenure and its implication for the development of Kenya Semi-Arid Areas,
Nairobi, Institute of Development Studies, University of Nairobi.
224 Carney, D. (1998). Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: What Contributions can we make?”
Secondly, rights of control are vested in the political authority of the unit
or community. This control is derived from sovereignty over the area in which
the relevant resources are located. Control is for the purpose of guaranteeing
access to the resources and is redistributive both spatially and inter-
generationally. Its administrative component entails the power to allocate land
and other resources within the group, regulate their use and defend them against
outsiders. 225
Rights created by customary norms applied under the Judicature Act,226 which
provided that customary laws were enforceable in courts, as part of the legal
system, to the extent that they were not repugnant to the Constitution and other
statutory laws.227 Customary laws were, however, not formal, and remained largely
unwritten, apart from those that found mention in court decisions as precedents.
As was observed by the Court in the case of Kimani v Gikanga and another,228 one
who sought to rely on any African Customary Law as a basis for a claim had to
prove its existence in evidence.229
225 Ogolla, B D with Mugabe, J. 1996 Land Tenure Systems, In Land We Trust. Initiative Publishers, Nairobi
Kenya.
229 See also Kaittany and another v Wamaitha [1995] LLR 2394 (CAK).
231 Ibid, section 17 states “at the expiry of the period prescribed by this Act for a person to bring an
action to recover land (including a redemption action), the title of that person to the land is extinguished.”
Adverse possession requires the actual, visible, hostile, notorious, exclusive
and continuous possession of the property. It is a basis for a claim of title or
a claim of right. In Temo and others v Swaleh,232 the plaintiffs brought an
originating summons claiming title by adverse possession to a piece of land which
they said they had occupied until 1990, when the defendant claimed an interest
in it, by allegedly having bought it in 1978. Though the Court found that there
was no continuous, uninterrupted possession of the land by the plaintiffs, in
order to create adverse possession, it ruled that under the Land Titles Act, to
which the land was registered, the peculiar phenomenon of ‘‘houses without land’’
was recognised. Thus, it was held that the residential structures and commercial
plants on the portion of land occupied by the plaintiffs, which ordinarily by
definition would go with the land, belonged to the plaintiffs, and therefore,
reasonable compensation should be paid to them.
2.3 FRAMEWORK FOR INSTITUTIONAL MANAGEMENT AND REGULATION OF LAND UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
OF KENYA 2010
The implication of the 2010 Constitution on landholding, access and use in Kenya
is discussed detail in the previous chapter. The Constitution lays down broad
desired principles on regulating land access, management and use. The principles
are realised in legislation passed by Parliament and in other instances, by
County Assemblies for land matters exclusively regulated by Counties. Parliament
has enacted the following legislation to enforce the rights and obligations on
land under Chapter Five of the Constitution of Kenya: the Environment and Land
Court Act;233 the National Land Commission Act;234 the Land Act;235 and the Land
Registration Act.236 The Evictions and Resettlement Procedures Bill, 2012 and
the Community Land Act. Other legislations that also have a bearing on land
access, management and use include the County Governments Act,237 Matrimonial
Property Act,238 and the Urban Areas and Cities Act.239 Unlike under the previous
Constitution when land access, management and use was almost exclusively
undertaken by the President, Minister (now Cabinet Secretary) responsible for
Land, Commissioner for Lands and Local Authorities, the management of and has
now been institutionalised. This is through the establishment of the National
Land Commission under article 67(1) of the Constitution of Kenya.
232 Miscellaneous civil suit number 155 of 1993 (OS) 1 KLR, 469.
240 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Land System of Kenya on Principles of a National Land
Policy Framework, Constitutional Position of Land, and New Institutional Framework for Land Administration,
page 21.
241 See Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of
Kenya, page 2.
at the Coast did not lodge their claims to be issued with Certificate of Ownership
over the land along the Coastal Strip for the following reasons:
First of all, the indigenous people of the strip had no knowledge of the existence of
the Ordinance. Even if they did, they never understood its provisions. Secondly, the
Ordinance had no relevance to indigenous conceptions of land tenure. That they should
be asked to lay claims upon the soil was a startling preposition. Third, the Ordinance
was clearly biased against these people. For the colonial government and courts
believed that no African, whether as an individual or community had any title to land.
Hence, for purposes of the 1908 and other colonial land Ordinances, land occupied by
Africans was always treated as ownerless. Fourth, the actual investigations of claims
were done mainly by Mudris – usually Mazrui Arabs absorbed into the colonial
administration – who were generally unsympathetic to the indigenous people. Fifth,
the time limit within which claims could be made was extremely short. And indeed after
1922, claims would no longer be received at all. Besides, when in 1926 three “native
reserves” were established in Kwale and Kilifi, any further doubts about the
possibility of ever receiving claims from indigenous coastal people were laid to rest.
242
Unlike Mainland Kenya which was under the control of the colonial government
during colonization (from 1895 to 1963, first, as a protectorate and,
subsequently, as a colony), the ten-mile Coastal Strip remained under the Sultan
of Zanzibar until 1963, when the Sultan renounced sovereignty over the Strip
following the signing of an agreement between the British, Kenya and Zanzibar
governments, effectively integrating the Coastal Strip into independent Kenya.243
From the year 1926, the British colonial administration confined the indigenous
Africans to three “native reserves” outside the ten-mile Coastal Strip, in Kwale
and Kilifi. Thus, even those indigenous Africans at the Coast who continued
occupying their land along the Coastal Strip after it was “acquired” by Arabs
and the British, they were compelled to move out of it into the designated
reserves. Even in post-independent Kenya, land that was designated as “native
reserves” remained in the “collective unregistered ownership and use of a
community as communal land;” The communal land was subsequently alienated to few
members/occupants of the “native reserves” or sold to persons outside the
community, leaving the original occupants of the “native reserves”, as squatters
or landless.244
In Mainland Kenya, the Indian Land Acquisition Act of 1894, which the British
Colonial administration imported into Kenya, vested “all unoccupied land”
including land over which indigenous communities shifted back and forth for
cultivation and grazing in the Crown. The Act allowed for acquisition of land
for the construction of government premises and roads; and it empowered the
Commissioner for the Protectorate to allocate land to settlers on leases,
initially for periods not exceeding 21 years, and as from 1897, for periods not
exceeding 99 years. The British colonial administration enacted two more
ordinances that compounded the problem of land ownership by indigenous Africans
in Mainland Kenya. Firstly, the East Africa Order-In-Council of 1901, which
authorised the Commissioner to alienate “Crown Land,” that is, alienate “all land
under the control of the Queen through agreement, treaty or convention and all
other land that the Queen was to acquire.” Secondly, the Crown Land Ordinance of
1902, which empowered the British High Commissioner to Kenya Protectorate to
“acquire land, including land in native settlements and villages and to sell land
243 Tri-partite Agreement between the British, Kenya and Zanzibar governments.
244 Report of the Select Committee on the Issue of Land Ownership Along the Ten-Mile Coastal Strip of
Kenya.
acquired to any settler in lots not exceeding 1,000 hectares. 245 Through the
Kenya (Native Areas) Ordinance of 1926, and the Crown Land Ordinance of 1915,
the colonial administration not only designated and formally recognised native
reserves occupied by Africans, but also empowered the Crown to control allocation
and use of the native reserves and movement within and between the lands.246
In the year 1954, the colonial administration developed a policy commonly
known as the Swynnerton Plan, which provided, among other things, a process of
land adjudication, consolidation and registration of adjudicated parcels of land
in the name of those identified as owners. However, under the Plan, land was
registered in the names of present male-heads of households who were conferred
use rights without recognition of use rights of female heads of households, whose
husbands were still operating in the Mau Mau, largely outside of designated
settlement areas. The Plan also did not recognise the use rights of those whose
husbands had died.247
The tenor and spirit of the draconian land laws and policies passed by the
colonial administrations were carried wholesome to the former Constitution and
other land laws enacted or adopted at independence. The independence Constitution
of Kenya at section 75 thereof; sections 27 and 28 of the Registered Land Act
(Repealed); and section 23 of the Registration of Titles Act (Repealed) upheld
the sanctity of title to land, and ruled out the possibility that historical
claims would be a basis for land distribution in independent Kenya. Section 3 of
the Government Lands (Repealed) Act empowered the state to act like a private
owner of land. The President was vested with great unilateral power and authority
to make grants or dispositions of any estates, interests or rights in or over
un-alienated government land. The President would also delegate some of such
powers to the Commissioner of Lands.
Section 9 of the Government Lands Act (Repealed) empowered the Commissioner
for Lands to cause any portion of a Township Plot “not required for public
purposes” to be divided into plots suitable for erection of buildings for business
or residential purposes. Under section 12 of the Act, these plots would be sold
by “auction unless the President ordered otherwise.” Sections 19 and 20 of the
Government Lands Act (Repealed) empowered the Commissioner for Lands to cause
agricultural land to be divided into farms which farms would be sold by “auction
unless the President ordered otherwise.” Under Chapter IX of the independence
Constitution, the President or a County Council holding trust land on behalf of
local community was empowered to set apart trust land. Setting apart removed
trust lands from community ownership and placed them under the dominion of public
ownership.
Communal ownership of trust land could also be lost through adjudication and
registration which placed trust lands under individual ownership. Justice Angote,
in the case of Mohamed Ahmed Khalid (Chairman) and others v Director of Land
Adjudication and others summarized the law regulating management and
administration of government land and trust land under the former Constitution
as follows:
I discussed at length the distinction between Government Land and Trust Land under
the repealed Constitution in Malindi Land case number 168 of 2012; Bahola Mkalindi v
Michael SethKaseme and others. That distinction is blurred under the current
Constitution. In the said case, I stated that the distinction is important because
the law regulating dealings in Trust Land is different from the legal regime regulating
245 See the East Africa Order In Council, 1901 and the Crown Land Ordinance, 1902.
246 See the Kenya (Native Areas) Ordinance, 1926 and the Crown Land Ordinance, 1915.
247 The Swynnerton, R.M.J., (1954), A Plan to Intensify the Development of African Agriculture in Kenya,
Nairobi: Government Printer.
Government Land under the repealed Constitution. In view of the petitioner’s claim,
I shall reproduce my views in that case in these proceedings. Under the repealed
Constitution and the Trust Land Act, trust lands are neither owned by the Government
nor by the County Councils within whose area the land falls under. The County Council
simply held such land on behalf of the local inhabitants of the area. For as long as
Trust land remained unadjudicated and unregistered, it belonged to the local tribes,
groups, families and individuals of the area. Once adjudicated and registered, Trust
land is transformed into private land. That is what the provisions of sections 114,
115 and 116 of the repealed Constitution provided. Indeed, section 115(2) of the
repealed Constitution provided that Trust land could only be dealt with in accordance
with the African Customary Law vested in any tribe, group, family or individual. The
former Constitution also provided that the only way Trust land could be legally removed
from the purview of communal ownership of the people was through adjudication and
registration or setting apart. Adjudication and registration of Trust land removed
the particular land from the purview of community ownership and placed it under
individual ownership while setting apart removed Trust land from the dominion of
community ownership and placed it under the dominion of public ownership. Trust land
could only be allocated legally pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution, the
Trust Land Act and the Land Adjudication Act. The repealed Constitution, at section
115(4) mandated Parliament to make provisions under an Act of Parliament with respect
to the administration of Trust land by a County Council. Consequently, Parliament
enacted the Trust Land Act, the Local Government Act (repealed) and the Town Planning
Act which was repealed and replaced with the Physical Planning Act in 1996. These
statutes, amongst others, allowed County Councils to deal and administer Trust land
on behalf of the residents of their respective areas. Section 117(1) of the repealed
Constitution allowed, through an Act of Parliament, County Councils to set apart any
area of Trust land vested in a County Council for use and occupation by a public body;
or for purpose of the prospecting for or for the extraction of minerals or by any
person for a purpose which in the opinion of the County Council is likely to benefit
the person ordinarily resident in that area or any other area of Trust land vested in
that County Council either by reason of the use to which the area so set apart is to
be put or by reason of the revenue to be derived from rent in respect thereof. Where
an area of Trust land has been set apart by the County Council for the purposes that
I have enumerated above, section 117(2) of the repealed Constitution provided that
any rights, interests or other benefits in respect of that land that were previously
vested in a tribe, group, family or individual under African customary law shall be
extinguished. However, under section 117(4) of the repealed Constitution, the setting
apart of Trust land shall be of no effect unless the prompt payment of full compensation
of any resident of the land set apart who under the African customary law had a right
to occupy any part or was in some other way prejudicially affected by the setting
apart. Trust land could also be set apart for Government purpose. Under section 118(1)
of the repealed Constitution, if the President was satisfied that the use and
occupation of an area of Trust land was required for the purpose of the Government of
Kenya or for a body corporate or for the purpose of the prospecting for or the
extraction of minerals, such land would be set apart accordingly and was vested in
the Government of Kenya or such other person or authority. If Trust land was set apart
for the purpose of the Government, the Government was required to make prompt payment
of full compensation if the setting apart extinguished any estate, interest or right
in or over the land that would have been vested in any person or authority. Other than
Trust land which was set apart for Government purpose, the Government also had land
which was not Trust land. This was land which was not within the “Special areas” as
specified in the Trust Land Act and which was on 31 May 1963 vested in the Trust Land
Boards. Government land was the land that was vested in the Government of Kenya by
dint of sections 204 and 205 of the Constitution that was contained in Schedule 2 of
the Kenya Independence Order in Council, 1963 and sections 21, 22, 25 and 26 of the
Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, 1964. The enactment of the Government Lands
Act, Chapter 280 replaced the 1915 Crown Lands Ordinance. The Government Lands Act
was enacted to make further and better provisions for regulating the leasing and other
depositions of Government Land. Under this Act, it is only the President who could
sign documents granting title although he would delegate these powers to the
Commissioner of Lands. Un-alienated Government land was not Trust land in that it was
not vested in local communities and it was not held in trust for them by a County
Council. Unlike Trust land, the County Councils had no role to play at all in the
allocation of un-alienated Government land. They could not even purport to administer
such land on behalf of the Government. According to the provisions of section 53 of
the Trust Land Act, Chapter 288, the Commissioner of Lands was allowed to administer
Trust land of each Council as an agent for the Council and for that purpose he could
execute on behalf of the Council such grants, leases, licenses and other documents
relating to Trust land. 248
The Ndung’u Report details the incidences of abuse of discretion committed by
various Kenyan Governments and other State agencies from Independence by
illegally and or irregularly allocating public land. Instead of appropriating
un-alienated and alienated government land situated in cities, municipalities
and townships to develop public roads and highways, recreational parks,
playgrounds, stadia, public schools, hospitals, markets, fire stations, police
stations, monuments, cemeteries, housing estates, research institutions and other
public utilities, the Kenyan government and their State agencies devised various
methods to grab such public land as follows:
The Commission found that many methods were used to grab public land, which
included:
1. Direct allocations by the President and the Commissioner of Lands contrary to the
law;
2. Illegal surrenders of Ministries and State Corporations land and subsequent illegal
allocations;
3. Invasion of government and trust lands and subsequent acquisition of title thereto
contrary to the law;
4. Allocations of land reserved for the use of state corporations or ministries;
5. Allocation of trust land contrary to the Constitution and related laws;
6. Allocation of lands reserved for public purposes;
7. Allocation of riparian reserves and sites;
8. Allocation of land compulsorily acquired by Government for a public purpose to
individuals and companies; and
9. Alteration and destruction of records at the Ministry of Lands to facilitate
double allocations.249
State corporations have their core businesses set out in the legislation under
which they are established. State corporations are not land buying companies;
purchase and disposition of land should ordinarily be incidental to their core
businesses. The Ndung’u Report documents that Kenyan government and State
agencies devised methods to grab public land by using state corporations as
conduits as follows:
(a) The Commissioner of Lands would reserve or set aside un-alienated Government land
for the use of State Corporations, and once alienated, the Government land would
be allocated to individuals or companies;
(b) State Corporations’ were pressurized to purchase illegally acquired public land.
“An individual would be allocated public land illegally, obtain consent from the
Commissioner of Lands, and then proceed to sell the land to a specific state
248 Mohamed Ahmed Khalid (Chairman) and others v Director of Land Adjudication and others, Malindi ELCC
number 3 of 2013.
249 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land, 2004 (“Ndung’u
Report”), Part Four.
corporation for millions of shillings…in 2001, land which was part of Ngong’ Forest
was illegally excised, subdivided into thirty two (32) plots, and then allocated
to thirteen (13) companies…”
(c) Commissioner of Lands facilitated exchange of state corporations’ land with non-
existent land in favour of an individual or a company;
(d) State corporations land was illegally allocated to individuals and companies in
total disregard of the law and public interest. The allocation of corporation land
was made in favour of “politically” correct individuals in the former regimes.250
According to the Ndung’u Report, land allocated to ministries was usually grabbed
hrpugh the following process:
(a) Ministry officials colluded with the Commissioner of Lands to allocate Ministries’
land through surrender; and
(b) Thousands of Government houses and properties were illegally allocated to
individuals and companies. Some of the allotees then sold the houses to state
corporations.251
Regarding settlement schemes and trust lands, the Report documents that:
(a) Land in settlement schemes was allocated to personalities who were entirely
undeserving. The beneficiaries were often neither “landless” nor possessed unique
skills or facilities to be able to use the land in agriculturally productive manner
as to benefit the country;
(b) Plots initially reserved for public purposes in settlement schemes ended up being
allocated to individuals on orders of Provincial Administration;
(c) Settlement schemes were established as personal initiative of the President to
settle specific groups of people in designated areas;
(d) Councils and Commissioner of Lands allocated to individuals and companies trust
land which had neither been adjudicated nor set apart, and letters of allotment
and grants of title issued. Councillors were the major beneficiaries of such
allocations. Examples of trust lands that were illegally allocated to individuals
include:
• Iloodo-Ariak and Mosiro Adjudication sections in former Kajiado District;
• Kimuri “A” Adjudication section in Meru;
• Fourteen Falls land in Thika;
• Holding Grounds and Livestock Routes in the former Narok, Kajiado and Laikipia
Districts; and
• Hill Farm, Kamwenja, Mathari in the former Nyeri District.252
Lastly, regarding forestlands, national parks, game reserves, wetlands, riparian
reserves and protected areas, the Ndung’u Report documents that:
(a) The Commissioner of Lands facilitated allocation of forestlands to “private
developers” case in point being the Karura Forest. Environmentally sensitive
ecosystems such as water catchment areas, steep slopes, hills and marshes were
allocated to individuals;
(b) Settlement schemes were established in forest areas ostensibly to resettle
indigenous communities whose lifestyles depend on forest habitats such as the
Ogiek. It turned out that the real intention for hiving off the forest land was
250 Ibid.
251 Ibid.
252 Ibid.
to establish a tea zone by the KANU regime, case in point being Kiptagich Tea
Estate Limited;
(c) The Commissioner of Lands facilitated issuance of Title on riparian sites,
including around rivers, lakes and the ocean, and titles issued to individuals,
cases in point being a chain of islands in Kwale; areas around Lake Naivasha; and
Malindi Robinson Island.253
The common thread in the foregoing is that grabbing and plunder of public land
was facilitated by the Presidency, Commissioner of Lands, Ministry of Land,
Provincial Administration and Local Authorities for the key reason that the power
to administer and alienate public land vested in the President and could be
delegated to the Commissioner of Lands. It is for this reason that the Ndung’u
Report recommended, inter alia, that:
[A] National Land Commission be established to deal with all land matters in the
country. The Commission should be vested with powers of allocating public and
supervising the management and allocation of Trust land....section 3 and all other
sections in the Government Lands Act which empower the President or the Commissioner
of Lands to make grants of un-alienated Government Land should be repealed.254
The National Land Policy captured the aspirations of the Ndung’u Report by setting
out the justification, structure, mandate and autonomy of the National Land
Commission variously. On justification for the establishment of the National Land
Commission, paragraph 228 of the National Land Policy provides as follows:
The existing institutional framework for land administration and management is highly
centralized, complex and exceedingly bureaucratic. As a result, it is prone to
corruption and has not been able to provide efficient services. In addition, it does
not adequately involve the public in decision making with respect to land
administration and management, and is thus unaccountable.255
On the mandate of the National Land Commission (NLC), paragraph 233 of the
National Land Policy provides as follows:
The NLC shall have the following functions:
(a) Hold title to and manage public land on behalf of the State;
(b) Establish and maintain a register of all public, private and community land in the
country;
(c) Ensure the realization of the multiple values of land, namely, economic
productivity, equity, environmental sustainability and conservation of national
heritage;
(d) Exercise the powers of compulsory acquisition and development control on behalf
of the State and local authorities or governments;
(e) Levy, collect and manage all land tax revenues except rates which shall be collected
by local authorities or governments;
(f) Develop the capacity of both DLBs (District Land Boards) and CLBs (Community Land
Boards);
(g) Provide technical services and coordinate the work of DLBs and CLBs through
establishment of NLC district offices;
(h) Establish a Land Policy Research Centre (LPRC) in partnership with universities
and research institutions to coordinate land policy research;
253 Ibid.
254 Ibid.
255 See the National Land Policy, Sessional Policy, Sessional Paper number 3 of 2009, paragraph 228.
(i) Establish and manage a National Land Trust Fund (NLTF) to mobilize and pool
financial resources for implementing this policy. The NLTF shall be administered
by the NLC; and
(j) Provide technical support to the Ministry in-charge of land in preparation and
implementation of a national land use policy and other related policies.256
On independence and accountability of the National Land Commission, paragraphs
235-237 of the National Land Policy provide as follows:
“235. The existing legislative practice of giving Minister (now Cabinet Secretary)
the “power to give directions of a general nature” to public agencies has
invariably compromised their independence including agencies dealing with land;
236. The NLC should be accorded sufficient autonomy and independence to perform
its functions effectively and fairly. It should however be accountable to the
people of Kenya.
237. In order to ensure the independence and accountability of the NLC, the
Government shall enact a ‘National Land Commission Act’ to
(a) Grant NLC operational autonomy;
(b) Require the NLC to be accountable to Parliament for its operations;
(c) Require ministerial policy directions to the NLC to be laid before Parliament
in writing; and
(d) Facilitate public participation and application of democratic principles in
the establishment and management of the NLC.”257
The recommendations of the Ndung’u Report and the provisions of the National Land
Policy, were substantially carried into article 67(2) of the Constitution of
Kenya that sets out the mandate of the Commission. With the foregoing background
in mind, the author proceeds to analyse how various land legislations enforce
the provisions of Chapter Five of the Constitution of Kenya.
259 Serah Mweru Muhu v Commissioner of Lands and others, Nairobi High Court Petition No 413 of 2012 [2014]
eKLR.
260 Commissioner of Lands and another v Kithinji Murugu M’agere, Nairobi High Court miscellaneous
application number 395 of 2012.
In the exercise of its mandate to administer and manage public land, various
statutory provisions enjoin the National Land Commission to undertake concomitant
functions in respect of public land. The concomitant functions are necessary to
enable the National Land Commission to effectively administer and manage public
land. One of such functions is the mandate of the National Land Commission to
dispose of, alienate or in any other way affect interest in public land. Various
statutory provisions confer this function on the National Land Commission.
Section 5(2)(a) of the National Land Commission Act, in mandating the National
Land Commission to alienate public land states that:
“(2) In addition to the functions set out in subsection (1), the Commission shall,
in accordance with article 67(3) of the Constitution – (a) on behalf of, and with
the consent of county governments, alienate public land.”261
Section 12(1) of the Land Act262 reinforces the mandate of the National Land
Commission to alienate public land as follows:
The Commission may, on behalf of the national or county governments, allocate public
land by way of:-
(a) Public auction to the highest bidder at prevailing market value subject to and not
less than the reserved price;
(b) Application confined to a targeted group of persons or groups in order to ameliorate
their disadvantaged position;
(c) Public notice of tenders as it may prescribe;
(d) Public drawing of lots as may be prescribed;
(e) Public request for proposals as may be prescribed; or
(f) Public exchanges of equal value as may be prescribed.263
The National Land Commission is also mandated to allocate public land to foreign
governments in terms of section 12(5) of the Land Act, which states as follows:
(5) Subject to the Constitution, and any other law, the Commission may, in consultation
with the National and county governments, allocate land to foreign governments on
a reciprocal basis in accordance with the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations.”
Further, section 15(1) of the Land Act mandates the applicant to reserve public
land for purposes in the public interest. The section states as follows:
(1) Subject to article 66(1) of the Constitution, the Commission may, in consultation
with the national government and the county governments, by order in the Gazette,
reserve public land allocated within:
(a) The surface of the earth and the subsurface rock;
(b) Any body of water on or under the surface;
(c) Marine waters in the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone;
(d) Natural resources completely contained on or under the surface; and
(e) The air above the surface, for one of more purposes in the public interest.
Thus, the foregoing listed legislative provisions confirm that the mandate to
dispose of or affect interest in public land now vests with the National Land
Commission, unlike the previous legislative framework where the President,
261 See National Land Commission Act number 5 of 2012, section 5(2)(a).
264 See Hassan HashiShirwa and another v Swaleh Mohamed and others, Malindi ELCC number 41B of 2012,
paragraphs 69-72; 89; 102-103; and 105-106.
tax on land and premiums on immovable property in any area designated by law.”
Section 107(1) of the Land Act mandates the National Land Commission to receive
requests from national or county government to compulsorily acquire land on their
behalf in public interest or public use. In so doing, sections 112 and 113 of
the Land Act mandate the National Land Commission to manage the process of
compulsory acquisition on behalf of national or county government and to award
compensation to every person whom the National Land Commission determines at
inquiry to have an interest in the land.
Lastly, the mandate to undertake “Settlement Matters”; “Rural Settlement
planning”; “Land Adjudication”; and “Land Reclamation” now vests with the
National Land Commission. Section 134 of the Land Act mandates the National Land
Commission to implement settlement programmes on behalf of the national and
county governments; to assist the national and county governments in the
administration of settlement programmes; to reserve public land or purchase
private land, in accordance with public procurement law, where public land is
not available, for the establishment of approved settlement programmes; and to
determine the sum of money to be paid by settlement beneficiaries. Section 134
of the Land Act mandates the National Land Commission to administer Land
Settlement Fund; and to establish settlement programmes in consultation with
departments responsible for land, finance, agriculture, environment and natural
resources, special programmes, and with the relevant county government.
2.3.3 Land Taxation, Collection of Land Rent, Royalties and other Payments
over Land
Article 67(2)(g) of the Constitution of Kenya mandates the National Land
Commission to “assess tax on land and premiums on immovable property in any area
designated by law”. Under the provisions of section 28 of the Land Act:
(1) The rent, royalties and payments reserved under any lease or license shall be a
debt owed to the Commission and shall be paid by the lessee or licensee at the
office of the Commission or at such other place as the Commission may prescribe;
(2) The annual rent reserved under any lease or license shall be payable in
advance on the first day of January in each year of the term;
(3) The payments made under sub-section (2) shall be accounted for to the
respective governments.
Therefore, it is the mandate of the National Land Commission to receive any rent
(annual ground rent and stand premium), royalties and payments reserved under
any lease or license and to account to either the National Government or the
County Government, whichever level of government is relevant in respect of the
subject land. Previously, land tax function was the mandate of the Ministry of
Lands.
265 See the case of Stephen Wambua Kithuka (Suing on behalf of Getrud Bint Ali & Crispus Singo) v Abdul
Karim Omar, Malindi ELCC number 92 of 2011, at paragraphs 7-23 of the judgment.
Adjudication and Settlement department which was within the Ministry of Lands have
been transferred to the National Land Commission. The Management and implementation
of settlement programmes have also been transferred from the Ministry of Lands to the
National Land Commission. The law which previously governed the setting up of
settlement schemes was the Agriculture Act, Chapter 318. Under section 168(3) of the
said Act, the Director of Land Adjudication and Settlement was appointed as the
administrator of Agricultural Settlement Fund by the Settlement Fund Trustees. The
Director of Land Adjudication and Settlement therefore wore two hats; he was in charge
of the adjudication and consolidation of land rights and interests for Trust land
pursuant to the provisions of the Land Adjudication Act and was also authorised to
establish settlement schemes pursuant to the provisions of the Agriculture Act. The
Director of Land Adjudication and Settlement was the head of the land adjudication
and settlement. He is the one who oversaw (before the creation of the National Land
Commission in the year 2012) the effective implementation of the land adjudication
and settlement before the promulgation of the Constitution in August 2010. Pursuant
to the provisions of section 29(3) of the Land Adjudication Act, Chapter 284, the
Director is mandated to sign certificates of finality upon the completion of the
adjudication process and forward the adjudication register to the Chief Land Registrar
for registration. Indeed, before the Director signs certificates of finality, the Land
Adjudication Act provides that the adjudication register must be published which shall
be followed with the hearing, determination and implementation of objections in respect
to the adjudication register. The manner in which such publication should be done is
provided for at section 31 of the Act. The Act, at sections 6 and 9 mandates the Land
Adjudication Committee to determine claims in land in accordance with African Customary
Law. The Land Arbitration Board hears appeals from the Land Adjudication Committee… 266
2.3.6 Transition
Section 32(1) of the National Land Commission Act provides that “all property,
assets, rights, liabilities, obligations, agreements and other arrangements
existing at the commencement of this Act and vested in, acquired, incurred or
entered into by or on behalf of the Ministry of Lands with respect to the
departments whose functions have been transferred to the Commission, shall upon
the commencement of this Act, be deemed to have vested in or to have been
acquired, incurred or entered into by or on behalf of the Commission to the same
extent as they were enforceable by or against such departments before the
commencement of this Act.”
Under the provisions of section 31(2) the National Land Commission Act:
“every person who, immediately before the commencement of this Act, was an employee
of the Government in the Ministry of Lands in any of the departments whose functions
have been transferred to the Commission shall, upon the commencement of this Act, be
employed or appointed as a member of staff of the Commission”
In interpreting the provisions of section 32(1) of the National Land Commission
Act, Justice Gacheru was emphatic in the case of Pius Ngugi and others v Hellen
Fear and others that all property, assets, rights, liabilities, obligations,
agreements and other arrangements previously performed by the Commissioner of
Lands on behalf of the Ministry of Lands with respect to the departments whose
functions have been transferred to the National Land Commission from the Ministry
of Lands have by operation of law transited to the Commission. The judge held
as follows in this regard:
The third defendant herein is the Commissioner of Lands who carried out functions on
behalf of the Ministry of Lands. Whatever functions he carried out are now deemed to
have been carried under NLC Act. The National Land Commission therefore takes over
the functions of the third defendant by operation of law and court finds it not
266 Mohamed Ahmed Khalid (Chairman) and others v Director of Land Adjudication and others, Malindi ELCC
number 3 of 2013.
necessary for the applicant herein to make the request as he has already done through
the instant application. Further, section 32(1) of the National Land Commission Act
provides that “All property, assets, rights, liabilities. Obligations agreements and
other arrangements existing at the commencement of this Act and vested in acquired,
incurred or entered into by on or behalf of the Ministry of Lands with respect to the
departments whose functions have been transferred to the Commission, shall upon the
commencement of this Act be deemed to have vested in or to have been acquired, incurred
or entered into by or on behalf of the Commission to the same extent as they were
enforceable by or against such Department before the commencement of the Act.” It is
evident that the third defendant herein is the Commission(er) of Lands. A civil
proceeding creates rights, liabilities or obligations depending on the outcome of such
proceeding. From the reading of section 32 of the National Land Commission Act, it
is evident that such rights, liabilities and obligations that were held by the third
defendant shall automatically be transferred to the Commission: Such transfer is by
operation of the law and there is no need for the litigant to request for it.267
267 Pius Ngugi and others v Hellen Fear and others, Nairobi ELCC number 1321 of 2005 (as consolidated with
ELCC number 424 of 2011 and ELCC number 437 of 2011)
275 Ibid.
2.5.1 Origin and Purpose
The National Land Policy (henceforth referred to as “the Policy”) was formulated
against the backdrop that lack of access to land is a major determinant of poverty
as more than 80% of the Kenyan population depends on agriculture for their
livelihoods.276 To ensure that land problems and resulting inequality become a
thing of the past, the government engaged in a consultative process that brought
together stakeholders drawn from the public, private and civil society with the
sole mandate and aim of coming up with a policy that would guarantee efficiency,
sustainability and equity as regards the handling and dealings in public land.
Deliberate and well intentioned initiatives of the government such as the
Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Land Law System of Kenya, the
Constitution of Kenya Review Commission and the Presidential Commission of
Inquiry into the Illegal/Irregular Allocation of Public Land did inspire the
whole process.
Owing to public pressure for suitable answers to the land question, the
government gazetted a Commission of Inquiry to look into the land law system of
Kenya. This Commission, popularly referred to as the “Njonjo Commission”,
collected oral and written submissions from Kenyans on a wide variety of issues.
The Commission’s Report published in November 2002 recommended the restructuring
of land administration and management in Kenya. The Commission proposed that the
restructuring be centered on the principles of a land policy framework, the
constitutional position of land and a new institutional framework for land
administration. Though the Njonjo Report was never systematically implemented,
these recommendations were to later greatly inform the formulation of the
Policy.277
The menace and vice of illegal allocation of public land greatly inspired the
formation of the Ndung’u Land Commission. The Ndung’u Commission was charged with
inquiring into the unlawful allocation of public lands, ascertaining the
beneficiaries, identifying public officials involved in illegal allocations, and
making recommendations for appropriate measures for the restoration of illegally
allocated lands to their proper purpose, for prevention of future illegal
allocations and for appropriate criminal prosecutions.278 Besides developing an
inventory with the details of over 200,000 parcels of land allegedly illegally
or irregularly allocated from public land, the Report recommended among other
things that, there be established a National Land Commission to deal with all
land matters in the country, including the allocation of public land and
supervising the allocation and management of trust land. Although most of the
Report’s recommendations have not been implemented, some have informed the
contents of the National Land Policy.279
The drafting of a comprehensive National Land Policy had been in the making
for several years and it was finally adopted by Parliament in December 2009.
Until then, land policy in Kenya was not explicitly articulated in any policy
document. However, the legal framework for land had been clear and consistent:
276 See Land grabbing in Kenya and Mozambique (A report on two research missions and a human rights analysis
of land grabbing) available at www.http://www.fian.at/assets/StudieLandgrabbinginKeniaMozambiqueFIAN2010.pdf
278 Roger Southall, The Ndung’u Report: Land & Graft in Kenya.Published in: Review of African Political
Economy, 103, March 2005, pp.142-51.
279 It is important to note that these two reports were available in good time to inform the national land
policy formulation process which commenced in February 2004 and protracted for close to six years. See world
bank report (available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTARD/Resources/336681-1236436879081/5893311-
1271205116054/mwathanePaper.pdf
that only private ownership of land guaranteed economic growth. 280 As a result,
customary tenure had been neglected and treated as an inferior tenure system.281
Accordingly, the thrust of laws previous to the Policy was to individualize all
modes of tenure, especially customary tenure.
The major object of the Policy as espoused in clause 1.4 is to secure rights
over land and provide for sustainable growth, investment and the reduction of
poverty in line with the government’s overall development objectives. The policy
is specifically 0designed to offer a framework of policies and laws that are
geared towards ensuring and guaranteeing the maintenance of a system of land
administration and management that will ensure: everyone is accorded an
opportunity to access and use the land in a beneficial fashion; land is used
economically, socially and equitably; and also in a manner that is environmentally
sustainable.282
The Policy is a culmination of the deliberate efforts such as Recommendations
Report produced by the Thematic Groups comprising of state and non-state actors;
regional workshops organized in the eight provinces of Kenya to collect views
from stakeholders; reports documenting past initiatives on land policy reform;
and written submissions from individuals, groups and organizations.283
280 John Bruce, Kenya Land Policy: Analysis and Recommendations, April 2008, page 3.
281 National Land Policy, Ministry of Lands, Nairobi, May 2007, pp.15-16.
289 Ibid.
290 Community land refers to land lawfully held, managed and used by a specific community.
298
Ibid, 98.
300 Judicature Act (Chapter 8) Laws of Kenya, section 3(2) states: “(2) The High Court, the Court of Appeal
and all subordinate courts shall be guided by African customary law in civil cases in which one or more of the
parties is subject to it or affected by it, so far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and
morality or inconsistent with any written law, and shall decide all such cases according to substantial justice
without undue regard to technicalities of procedure and without undue delay.”
301 Beatrice Wanjiru Kimani v Evanson Kimani Njoroge, High Court civil case number 1610 of 1999.
302 According to the Judge: “Many a married woman goes out to work. She has a profession. She has a high
career. She is in big business. She travels to Beijing in search of ideologies and a basis for rebellion
against her own culture. Like anyone else, she owns her own property separately, jointly or in common with
anyone. Her business interest, her property and whatever is hers is everywhere in Kenya and abroad, in the
rural, urban and outlying districts. In Nairobi alone her property and businesses, swell through Lavington,
Muthaiga, Kileleshwa, Kenyatta Avenue, swirls in Eastlands, with confluents from everywhere. Perhaps apart
from procreation and occasional cooking, a number of important wifely duties, obligations and responsibilities
are increasingly being placed on the shoulders of the servants, machines, kindergartens and other paid minders.
Often the husband pays for all these and more…”
303 Joyce Wanjiku Kaguara v George Mburu and another [2005] eKLR.
310 Section 9.
314 Wirth, L: “The Problem of Minority Groups.”, page 347 in Ralph Linton (ed.), (1945) The Science of Man
in the World Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press.
315 Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, (2010) Kenya 2009 population and Housing Census Highlights, Kenya
National Bureau of Statistics.
326 Land Market refers to the transfer, lease and mortgage of interests in land.
331
Ibid, paragraphs 175.
332 See also using eminent domain powers to acquire private lands for protected area wildlife conservation:
a survey under kenyan law http://www.lead-journal.org/content/06084.pdf, Chapter Four, page 90.
2.5.3 LEGISLATIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES PROPOSED TO IMPLEMENT THE NATIONAL LAND POLICY
With the coming into force of the new National Land Policy, a raft of
institutional changes and emergence will be realized. These include: need to
promote devolution of power and authority, participation and representation,
justice, equity and sustainability. The three institutions that must be in
existence include: the National Land Commission, the District Land Boards and
Community Land Boards.
An Act of Parliament known as “Land Act” needs to be enacted to govern all
categories of land.343 There is currently no system for registering public
institutional land. Due to these lacunae, a practice emerged under which it was
registered in the name of the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Finance. In
order to secure tenure to public land, the Policy vouches for repeal of the
Government Lands (Repealed) Act.344 The government is also enjoined to identify
and keep an inventory of all public land and place it under the National Land
Commission to hold and manage in trust for the people of Kenya; rationalize
public land holding and use; establish an appropriate fiscal management system
to discourage land speculation and mobilize revenue; establish mechanisms for
the repossession of any public land acquired illegally or irregularly; establish
participatory and accountable mechanisms for the allocation, development and
341 See for example Kituo cha Sheria and others v the Attorney-General, petition number 19 and 115 of 2013,
. The case generally outlines some of the rights that were infringed more particularly to the Refugees, such
as right to property and ownership of land being infringed.
348 See Constitution of Kenya; Land and Environment Court Act; Land Act, 2011; Land Registration Act, 2011;
National Land Commission Act, 2011.
A Policy Steering Committee comprising representatives from the Ministry of
Lands, other line Ministries which impact on land, private sector, civil society,
professional associations, farmers associations and development partners has been
formed to provide policy direction to the reforms. The implementation details
will be driven through five Technical Working Groups (TWGs) with experts drawn
from the public and private sectors and training institutions. The five TWGs are:
Legal; Land Management; Land Information Management Systems; Institutional
Transformation; and Public Education and Awareness.349
The implementation of Kenya’s land policy will be a long term programme
consisting of a set of phased and parallel activities. It will require very long
term financial and political commitment by the government and political leaders
countrywide. The implementation will, however, have to contend with some
fundamental challenges, some of which are, first:
The development of an appropriate Land Policy Implementation Framework: This requires
the input of all stakeholders and a very good understanding of the policy principles
and timelines required to support specific activities. The development of this
framework, which spells the implementation roadmap, will be a fundamental challenge.350
Second, there is need for sustained political goodwill: Land Reforms entail
compromises between beneficiaries of the status quo and the rest of the citizenry.
Invariably, the key beneficiaries of the status quo in Kenya are largely those
who are or have been in political leadership and the executive. Some of these
later became key business investors. The details of the Ndung’u Report, for
instance, reveal the large extent to which members of the political class and
the Executive were involved in the irregular allocation of land. Complicit
political leaders and some in the executive, can therefore present subtle barriers
to implementation.
Third, there may be funding challenges: Paragraph 271 of the Policy indicates
that it is envisaged that 9.6 billion Kenya Shillings will be required over the
first six years of implementation. This is a substantial investment. Clearly,
there are great gains expected if there is sustained effective implementation.
The budgetary process could, however, address other national priorities. Whereas
Kenya’s development partners are expected to provide support in some of the
implementation components, failure to prioritize budgetary support for the
process can be limiting.
Fourth, there is need for nstitutional Transformation: Transiting from the
current institutional set up to the proposed system where the Lands Ministry is
expected to shed its service delivery role to the proposed National Land
Commission while retaining mainly policy formulation and resource mobilization
roles may present challenges. Current office holders in the Lands Ministry will
be expected to either assist or watch as their enviable statutory mandate is
transferred to a different institution. Moreover, the establishment of the
proposed local level community land boards could face hostility from the existing
local authorities currently hosting such roles. Implementation must address such
challenges.
Fifth there may be technical Capacity: High level technical capacity will be
required to review, harmonize and enact new land legislation. Legal experts
required must be able to understand and correctly interpret the proposed policy
principles into statutes. This capacity is not sufficiently available and may
pose a challenge. The development and maintenance of the proposed modern land
information management system will also require specialized technical capacity.
Again, the local supply of this capacity may prove quite a challenge.
350 Ibid.
Sixth Constitutional Support: Some of the provisions in the policy, including
some of the proposed institutions, will require constitutional anchor. In the
event that the new proposed Constitution fails in the referendum, this will pose
a challenge to the implementation of some aspects of the policy. Only specific
constitutional amendments to the Constitution would alternatively help. These
too would require a lot of political goodwill.351
From the foregoing discussion, one would argue that Kenya only requires
focusing on a systematic implementation of its national land policy to be able
to realize its land reforms hence improve its social, economic and political
environment. Importantly though, effective implementation of some of the
provisions will require constitutional support as contained in the Chapter on
land in the Constitution.
Providing suitable answers to matters relating to land-related historical
injustices, ensuring fair and equitable access to land rights and ensuring that
the land governance institutions are effective, transparent, efficient and more
accessible to all Kenyans would contribute largely to social and political
stability. Implementation of the land policy would ensure the security of tenure
for public, community and private land as enshrined in the Constitution. Efficient
land management to ensure that there is sufficient and secure land for investments
and food production will also enhance economic growth.
2.6 CONCLUSION
This chapter has analysed the legislative and institutional structure on land
management and planning as envisaged in the Constitution of Kenya 2010. The
chapter has appreciated the previous legislative framework on land prior to the
enactment of the Constitution. The Acts have been enacted against the backdrop
of the reality that Kenya has over 75 statutes on land which create a confusing
and anachronistic legal framework that fails to recognize women’s land rights 352
and that rights of access to land, security of title to land and availability of
credit are matters largely governed by law and that have a direct bearing on land
management and planning. In response, therefore, the Acts set out to achieve, at
the first level, the following objectives:
(a) To repeal the many outdated laws on land, a majority of which were enacted prior
to independence;
(b) To harmonise the operations of the various institutions that currently play
multiple, overlapping and at times contradictory regulatory, licensing and
management functions;
(c) To prescribe distinct roles to institutions involved in land management and
planning; and
(d) To bolster enforcement of rules and regulations governing land access, use and
management.
At the second level, the Acts enforce the Constitution. The Constitution has
safeguards that protect against abuse of presidential discretion in land
allocations, conservation of environmental resources, addressing historical
injustices, protecting group lands (including ancestral lands) solving squatter
problems and achieving gender parity in landholding, all of which the Acts are
enjoined to implement. Thus, if properly implemented, it is expected that the
new legislation on land will achieve the following desired constitutional
objectives on land ownership, access and use.
352 Kenya Land Alliance & FIDA Kenya, Policy Brief: Women, Land and Property Rights and the Land Reforms
in Kenya 1 (2006), available at http://www.kenyalandalliance.or.ke/women percent20policy percent20brief.pdf.
2.6.1 Disposal of public land must be sanctioned by statute
Unlike in the independence constitutional order when the President had absolute
discretion to allocate public land,353 article 62(4) of the Constitution requires
public land to be disposed of only in terms of a statute that specifies ‘the
nature and terms’ of the disposal and use. The provision therefore introduces an
element of accountability in disposing of public land. Further, article 67(2)(a)
of the Constitution vests management of the public land in a Commission, not an
individual: the National Land Commission. This increases the latitude for
consultation before dealing in public land.
356 Article 63 of the Constitution vests ownership of Community Land on County Government who hold the
community land in trust of people resident in the County.
CHAPTER THREE
361 Martin Dixon (2002), Principles of Land Law, London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 4th Edition, page
21
362 Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray (1998), ‘The Idea of Property in Land,’ in Susan Bright and John K.
Dewar (Eds), Land Law: Themes and Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15-51. See also Jeremy
Bentham (1948), An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
page 337.
364 See also Plenty v Seventh Day Adventist Church of Port Pirie (1986) 43 S.A.S.R. 121 at 139, per
Motheson, J., at 143 per Olsson, J. Contrast the reasoning in the foregoing case with the holding in Dixon v
Esperance Bay Turf Club Inc. (2002) WASC 110, which excluded certain rights as not being proprietary.
maximum value to a minimum value; at any particular time, it is possible to
“measure the quantum of ‘property’ which someone has in a particular resource.”365
A licensee has only a right of access to land, but the power to control access
to land and to ultimately exclude the licensee from the land remains with the
owner of the land; proprietary interest in the circumstances remain vested in
the owner of the land.366 A tenant, on the other hand, or a transferee of title
acquires “proprietary interest” in land.367 Secondly, to have ‘‘property’’ in a
resource may be consistent with the acquisition or retention by others of
‘‘property’’ in the same resource. Several land laws in Kenya, for instance, are
cognizant of this reality and they enable acquisition and retention of
‘‘competing’’ and independent ‘‘property’’ in one resource.368 Maureen Tehan
argues as follows in this regard:
In its regulation of property law….has always accommodated more than one proprietary
interest in the same piece of land. The conceptual underpinnings for this scheme have
traditionally been identified as the doctrine of tenure and the doctrine of estates.
While the former is, arguably, of diminishing contemporary importance, it provides
historical support for the fragmentation of interests in land.the doctrine was based
on the notion that the ultimate title to all land was in the Crown and all tenures
are referable to some original grant. The doctrine enabled many different interests
to be granted and harmoniously co-exist in the one piece of land, each interest having
a shape and form that allowed concurrent enjoyment and determined priority, if
necessary, of those interests…369
Oudreagogo and Toulmin, while referring to customary tenure, describes the tenure
as that of “interlocking rights over a single piece of communal land;” that “a
customary authority may exercise broad communal rights while groups or individual
users may be granted specific rights of access and use.”370
The relationship between value and obligation is what constitutes a right;371
a right is the claim that the value be respected. Central to all legal
relationships is the idea of rights and duties. The former refers to the stage
of development when it can yield to juristic analysis; it will be found that the
concepts of rights and duties form a pivotal point in the structure of the legal
machinery by which the system is enabled to perform its social functions.”372 The
365 See supra, Kevin Gray and Susan Francis Gray (1998), ‘The Idea of Property in Land,’ in Susan Bright
and John K. Dewar (Eds), Land Law: Themes and Perspectives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15-51.
368 Registered Land (Repealed) Act Land Registration Act, section 28 states: “Unless the contrary is
expressed in the register, all registered land shall be subject to such of the following overriding interests
as may for the time being subsist and affect the same, without their being noted on the register (a) spousal
rights over matrimonial property; (b) trusts including customary trusts; (c) rights of way, rights of water
and profits subsisting at the time of first registration under this Act; (d) natural rights of light, air,
water and support; (e) rights of compulsory acquisition, resumption, entry, search and user conferred by any
other written law…”; Registration of Titles (Repealed) Act The Court of Appeal in Republic thro’ Olum v Angungo
and others [1988] KLR 529 interpreted the provision of section 23(1) Registration of Titles (Repealed) Act
that “…pursuant to section 23(1) of the Registration of Titles (Repealed) Act (now repealed), the Certificate
of Title was conclusive evidence that the plaintiffs were the absolute and indefeasible owners of the land
subject to encumbrances, easements, restrictions and conditions that may be endorsed on the title…”
369 Maureen Tahen (1997),’Co-existence of Interests in Land: A Dominant Feature of the Common Law,’ in
Christine Watson (Ed.) Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Studies, Vol. 1, Issues Paper number 12, page 3.
370 Ouedraogo H. and Toulmin C. (1999), Land Tenure, Poverty and Sustainable Development, Edinburgh:
International Institute for Environment and Development.
371 Robert V Andelson (1971), Imputed Rights: an Essay in Christian Social Theory, Athens: University of
Georgia Press, page 310.
372 See Lord Lloyd’s ,The Idea of the Law (1970) page 309.
exact nature and content of particular species of rights, whether legal, moral,
political or economical and the identity of those in whom they vest, will
naturally vary from one political economy to another.373 Thus under capitalism,
rights of whatever species are characteristically vested in individuals or
nucleated groups since these are the focus of production relations.374 A right
signifies an affirmative claim against another in respect of a given situation,
object or thing in which the right-holder has an interest.375 The idea of a
“right” essentially boils down therefore to a statement about the quantum or
range of activities that a given society will permit its members, individually
or collectively, either serially or concurrently, to execute. This is of course,
with respect to certain prescribed situations, objects or things.
Proprietary right refers to either an estate in land or an interest in land.
An estate in land confers a right to use and control land for a ‘‘slice of
time.’’376 An estate in land can be in the nature of a fee simple, freehold,
leasehold or a fee tail. Interests in land are proprietary rights that enable a
person to enjoy the estate of another. They include the right of way over someone
else’s land;377 the right to prevent an owner of land from carrying on some
specific activity on his own land;378 or the right of entry into another person’s
land to do some specific act, such as to pick the soil in that land.379 Proprietary
interest may be transferred or sold to another along with the land benefited by
the right, and may be binding against a new owner of the ‘‘estate’’ over which
they exist.380 Proprietary rights operate outside the normal concepts of privity
of contract; the law does not permit the parties to produce novel proprietary
rights. Lord Brougham, LC, in recognizing the special nature of proprietary
rights states that:
[I]t must not therefore be supposed that the incidents of a novel kind can be devised
and attached to property, at the fancy or caprice of any owner.381
This chapter, therefore, examines the various categories of proprietary rights
and interest in land capable of being possessed.
3.2 FREEHOLDS
374
375 The conception of a “Right” as an “Affirmative Claim” is largely the definition of a Right in Hohfeldian
terms.
376 Martin Dixon (2002), Principles of Land Law, London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, 4th Edition, p. 21.
377 This is referred to as an easement. Restrictive covenants impose significant limitations upon the
manner in which an owner may use land. There may be limitations as to the height, composition, size or external
features of a building on the land.
380 Maureen Tahen (1997), Co-existence of Interests in Land: A Dominant Feature of the Common Law,’ in
Christine Watson (Ed.) Land, Rights, Laws: Issues of Native Title, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Studies, Vol. 1, Issues Paper number 12, page 4.
382 Okoth-Ogendo, HWO, Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya, ACTS
Press, 1991.
383 Mombasa High Court civil case number 135 of 1998 (UR), per P.N. Waki (as he then was).
385 See Local Government Act (Chapter 265), section 182(1) which states that “182. (1) every municipal
council or town council shall have the general control and care of all public streets which are situated within
its area, and the same are hereby vested in such local authority in trust to keep and maintain the same for
the use and benefit of the public.”
396 Bryn Perrins (2000), Understanding Land Law, 3rd Edition, London: Cavendish Publishing Limited, page
40. According to the author, the word ‘lease’ is derived from the French verb laisser which means ‘to allow.’
A landowner (lessor) therefore merely lets another (lessee) to use his land.
indefinite, may be determined by the lessor or the lessee.” Where a term of a
lease is not specified, the lease is “deemed to be periodic lease.”397
3.4 SUB-LEASES
A landowner holding freehold or leasehold interest from the government may grant
a sub-lease out of the leasehold or freehold interest. Subleases may also be
granted by third parties conveying some or all of the leased property for a
shorter term than that of the head lease. Such subleases may be prohibited by
the original lease, or require written permission from the owner. The term of
the lease granted by the purchaser under sub-lease is dependent on the head
lease. The concept of sub-leases is common with ownership of flats and apartments
in major towns in Kenya. The owners of the apartments constitute themselves into
a management company purposefully to manage the estate, with such owners of the
apartments being the shareholders of the company. Each shareholder is entitled
to enjoy common amenities on an equal footing with other shareholders, and the
situation of common areas and amenities are clearly described.
The management company is also charged with the mandate of purchasing
reversionary interest from the head lease to ensure that upon the expiry of the
sub-lease, the sub-lease can be renewed in the name of the management company
with the shareholders continuing to own common areas. The management company
collects a monthly service charge from its shareholders to pay for land rates,
water, electricity, security in the common areas and to maintain the compound.
The management company also maintains a capital fund out of the service charge
to cater for repairs of common areas and amenities.
398 See section 54(3) & (4) of the Land Registration Act,2012 and the Sectional Properties Act No. 21 of
1999
399 http://www.answers.com/topic/condominium#ixzz1coxu5rSV
400 http://www.answers.com/topic/condominium#ixzz1coyN4ssD
vested remainder may be indefeasibly vested, meaning that it is certain to become
possessory in the future, and cannot be divested.
A remainder is contingent if one or more of the following is true: first, it
is given to an unascertained or unborn person and second, it is made contingent
upon the occurrence of some event other than the natural termination of the
preceding estates. The key difference between a reversion and a remainder is that
a “reversion” is held by the grantor of the original conveyance, whereas
“remainder” is used to refer to an interest that would be a reversion, but is
instead transferred to someone other than the grantor. Similarly to reversions,
remainders are usually created in conjunction with a life estate, life estate
pur autre vie, or fee tail estate (or a future interest that will eventually
become one of these estates).
Under the provisions of section 69(1) of the Land Act, unless a contrary
intention is expressed, burden and benefits of covenants over land run with the
reversion. The provision states as follows:
if the interest held by the lessor under a lease, the reversion, ceases to be so held
by the lessor, whether by transfer, assignment, grant, operation of law or otherwise,
then, unless a contrary intention, expressly or impliedly, appears from the lease, or
from any other circumstance-
(a) The obligations imposed on the lessor by covenant of the lease run with the
reversion and may be enforced by the person who is from time to time entitled to
the reversion;
(b) The rights to the benefits of every covenant imposed on the lessee that refers to
the subject matter of the lease may be exercised and enforced by the person who
is from time to time entitled to the reversion against the person who is from time
to time entitled to the lease.
If a lessor transfers or assigns a reversion, any payment by the lessee to the
transferor or assignor discharges the lessee to the extent of the payment unless
the lessee had actual notice of the transfer or assignment before making the
payment. Registration of a transfer of the reversion does not, in itself,
constitute an actual notice to the lessee of the transfer of the reversion.401
3.7 CO-OWNERSHIP
3.7.1 Ownership and Land Possession during the Colonial era in Kenya
Across Africa most people hold land under different types of informal customary
tenure, and the customary arrangements exist alongside the formal systems of
common and statute law that were imported during the colonial period.402 During
the twentieth Century, land tenure in Africa was also influenced by population
pressure and growing competition for land.403 Increasing individualization and
commoditization of land rights occurred, and private rights of use and occupancy
within customary tenure became increasingly the norm.
During the reign of colonialists, it was said that the right of perpetual
possession prevailed as against the Crown or any other person not belonging to
the affected tribe. This was authoritatively decided in the case of Stanley
Kahahu v the AG404 where the question for determination was whether natives have
any rights, and if so, what rights in land in Native Reserves. The Court held
402 Adams and Turner, Legal Dualism, McAuslan, Only the Name.
408 Under the Native Lands Trust Ordinance, the Governor could not set land apart for Mineral Development
without consulting the Local Native Council. It was also provided that the affected natives would be given
alternative land. Upon the discovery of gold in Kakamega in 1932, the requirements of consultation and
provision of alternative land were repealed by the Native Trust Land (Amendment) Ordinance. The repeal thus
enabled the Government to evict the Africans and to settle gold prospectors in the Area.
411 Government Lands (Repealed) Act (Chapter 280 of the Laws of Kenya).
It is worth noting that the Carter Commission Report, and its subsequent
legislative implementation, confirmed the gradual process of creating two
distinct reserve systems, that is, one for Africans and the other for Europeans
and accordingly, a dual system of land law, to wit, English and customary laws.
412 Food and Agricultural Organisation (2002), ‘Land Tenure and Rural Development, Rome: Food and
Agricultural organization,’ in FAO Land Tenure Studies, No. 3.
413 Birgegard L. (1993), ‘Natural Resource Tenure: A Review of Issues and Experiences with Emphasis on Sub-
Saharan Africa,’ in Rural Development Studies, Uppsala: International Rural Development Centre, No. 3.
414 Palmer, R. (2007), Literature Review of Governance and Secure to Land, Cairo: North South Consultants
Exchange.
415 See Ouedraogo H. and Toulmin C. (1999), Land Tenure, Poverty and Sustainable Development, Edinburgh:
International Institute for Environment and Development.
416 See Ross Andrew Clarke (2009), ‘Securing Communal Land Rights to Achieve Sustainable Development in
Sub-Saharan Africa: Critical Analysis and Policy implications,’ in Law Environment and Development Journal
(LEAD), pp. 130-151 at 132.
418 Bruce, J. and Mgot_adholla (Eds) (1993), Searching for Land Tenure Security in Africa, Dubuque: Kendall
Hunt.
420 See, Isabel Chelangat v Samuel Tiro Rotich and other [2012] e KLR, on the definition of Joint Tenancy.
424 See also Isabel Chelangat v Samuel Tiro Rotich and other [2012] eKLR, on the definition of /Tenancy in
common.
3.8 LICENCES
A license is that which allows a licensee to enter upon the land of another in
circumstances under which the said entry would amount to trespass to land without
the consequential permission. Essentially, a licence makes lawful that which
would have been in other circumstances unlawful. Section 2 of the Land Act defines
a licence as “a permission given by the Commission in respect of public land or
proprietor in respect of private or community land or a lease which allows the
licensee to do some act in relation to the land or the land comprised in the
lease which would otherwise be a trespass, but does not include an easement or
a profit.” Licence is effectively the smallest estate known to the law of property
in land.
437 See Jones and Jones Ltd v Ian Kervillar (1909) 2 Ch. 440.
The law is that unless a licence is coupled with interest, it cannot be
assigned. A license will at most confer only contractual rights and never
proprietary rights, unless of course, it is coupled with an interest. Thus, the
licensee’s rights are rights in contract and not property. Accordingly, the said
rights and to an extent, duties, only bind the parties to the contract and not
third parties. Thus, a bona fide purchaser for value with or without notice is
not affected nor concerned with a licence pertaining to the land.
438 [1965] 2 QB 29; See also Runda Coffee Estates Ujagar Singh (1966) EACA 564.
3.9 GIFTS
A gift, in the law of property, is the voluntary transfer of property from one
person (the donor or grantor) to another (the donee or grantee) without full
valuable consideration. In order for a gift to be legally effective, the donor
must have intended to give the gift to the donee (donative intent), and the gift
must actually be delivered to and accepted by the donee.
Gifts can either be lifetime gifts (inter vivos gift, donatio inter vivos) -
a gift of a present or future interest made and delivered in the donor’s lifetime;
or deathbed gifts (gift causa mortis, donatio mortis causa) - a future gift made
in expectation of the donor’s imminent death. A gift causa mortis is not effective
unless the donor actually dies of the impending peril that he had contemplated
when making the gift, that is, these gifts can only be made when the donor is in
a terminable condition. Under the provisions of section 49 of the Land
Registration Act:
A person with a legal incapacity who has been registered as a proprietor of land, a
lease or a charge acquired by way of gift may, repudiate the gift within six months
after the person ceases to be under a legal incapacity, if the person has not already
disposed of the subject-matter, but no such repudiation shall be effective until—
(a) the person has transferred the land, lease or charge to the donor, who is bound
to accept it; and
(b) the transfer has been registered.
3.10 CONCLUSION
This chapter has endeavoured to contextualize proprietary rights and interests
in land. The chapter has demystified property as an interest in a thing, other
than the thing itself and appreciated the possibility of ‘‘gradation’’ of
proprietary interests in the same land, including in the case of customary tenure.
The chapter has then zeroed in on specific proprietary rights, ranging from
freeholds, leasehold, sub-leases, sectional titles, systems of co-ownership of
property, licenses and gifts. The chapter has appreciated that sectional title
is a fairly recent jurisprudence in property law in Kenya and endeavoured to
analyse, in detail, the procedure for acquisition, retention, use and disposal
of sectional title. With the rise of apartments and flats in major cities in
Kenya, this chapter has also endeavoured to examine the regime of sub-leases as
an emerging jurisprudence in property law.
CHAPTER FOUR
CADASTRAL SYSTEMS IN KENYA: FOCUS ON LAND ADJUDICATION AND
TITLING
4.1 INTRODUCTION
441 Okoth-Ogendo HWO (1991), Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya,
ACTS Press.
442 Wanjala, S (2002), Land and Resource Tenure, Policies and Laws: A perspective from East Africa, a paper
presented at the Pan-African Programme on Land and Resources Rights (PAPLAR) inaugural workshop, Cairo, Egypt
on 25-26 March 2002.
443 Berman, B. (1990), Control and Crisis in Colonial Kenya: the Dialectic of Domination, James Currey
Publishers, page 189.
444 Leo C. (1984), Land and Class in Kenya, University of Toronto Press, Chapter 2.
445 Swynnerton, R. J. W. (1953). Plans for intensified agricultural development. Report to the Ministry of
Agriculture, Kenya.
446 H.W.O. Okoth Ogendo, the Perils of Land Tenure Reform: The Case of Kenya, available at
http://fimbo.org/attachments/059_The%20perils%20of%20land%20tenure%20reform-%20the%20case%20of%20Kenya.pdf,
accessed last on 31 January 2012.
447 Mackenzie, F. (1998), Land, Ecology and Resistance in Kenya, 1880–1952, Portsmouth: Heinemann.
The Land Titles Ordinance, 1908 made provision for and required all persons who
claimed land or interest in land at the coast to come forward and prove their
titles. A Certificate of Title was granted by a Land Court to those persons that
proved their claims. Any unclaimed land or land in respect of which the claims
were rejected was deemed to be Crown land and available for alienation. The
Ordinance provided for a surveyor to demarcate and define the boundaries of both
adjudicated and unclaimed land as directed by the Recorder of Titles. Surveys
were done by compass and chain with connections to very few control points.
Indigenous Africans were excluded from launching any claims to the land they
occupied. Many areas were not covered by the adjudication, thereby allowing them
to be classified as government land.
4.2.5 The Case for Large Scale Farms and Group Ranches
There were instances when indigenous communities organised themselves into
groups, formed companies or co-operatives and bought farms in the White Highlands
from foreigners. Such farms were initially managed as single entities. However,
this changed and the large scale farms were sub-divided to their members or
shareholders. Group ranches that had been adjudicated and incorporated were to
be dissolved and land distributed to individual group ranch members. The sub-
division surveys were carried out by ground survey methods and maps prepared by
tracing the demarcation sheets. Emphasis was laid on the physical demarcation of
the plots on the ground and the necessity of the proprietors to hedge their
parcels of land as the demarcation exercise was being completed.
448 These included the One Million Acre; Shirika; Haraka; Sugar Settlement Organisation; Ol Kalau Salient;
Magarini; and Lake Kenyatta Settlement Schemes.
ownership.449 The East African Order-In-Council had a ‘guidance’ clause that
safeguarded native law and custom. It provided that: “In all cases, civil and
criminal, to which natives are parties, every court shall … be guided by native
law so far as it is applicable and is not repugnant to justice and morality or
inconsistent with any Order-In-Council ….” The introduction of the
‘‘repugnance’’ clause by the British was used to test which rules of native law
would be reserved.
Under colonialism, the functions of land administration structures were quite
limited. These were mainly juridical and cadastral. The judicial function was
designed to ensure that property rights granted or created under imposed foreign
law were clearly defined and their boundaries maintained. For this reason, land
registry systems were established and operated on the basis of deeds or title
registration. Appropriate mechanisms were further put therein to facilitate the
delivery of land rights services to the limited number of individuals and
organizations granted rights under that regime. The concern therefore was to
ensure that land rights so granted were secure or ascertainable, transactions in
their documented on a routine basis, and conflicts between grantees of land
rights efficiently managed.450
In 1932, the Kenya Land Commission was appointed and was charged with the
responsibility of giving a sense of security to the African population by settling
their claims to land and by assurance of sufficient land for their future needs,
and to the European, by defining the area in which he was to enjoy a privileged
position.451 This comprehensive five-year plan to intensify the development of
African agriculture in Kenya was compiled by RJM Swynnerton. Its main aims were
to multiply by ten times the average cash income of as many as possible of the
600,000 African families in the lands of high rainfall, and to increase greatly
the value of annual exportable surplus cattle from African lands.452
The Swynnerton Plan aimed to create individual freehold rights as an inducement
to produce successful black commercial farming. Though the Swynnerton Plan was
initiated to counter the rural insurgency - Mau Mau - the logic behind these
schemes exemplifies a long-held tradition in studies of rural development where
a “safe and sound” investment is regarded as that which concentrates on building
a class of “progressive farmers” to the exclusion of the “poor and less able”
farmers.453
The policy of individualization through the process of land rights and the
subsequent registration of absolute titles were pursued vigorously. The
Registered Land Act (Repealed) further enhanced the individualization of tenure
among the indigenous communities.
449 Jemaiyo Chabeda, ‘How Do Customary Practices Enshrined in Statutory Law Undermine Women’s Access and
Rights to Land? A Case Study of Yaw Pachi, Siaya District, Kenya’. A research report submitted to the Faculty
of Humanities, University of Witwatersrand, Johannesburg in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the
Masters of Arts degree in Development Studies.
450 Okoth-Ogendo, HWO, the last colonial question: an essay in the pathology of land administration systems
in Africa.
451 Jemaiyo Chabeda, How Do Customary Practices Enshrined in Statutory Law Undermine Women’s Access and
Rights to Land? A Case Study of Yaw Pachi, Siaya District, Kenya.
452 Blundell M, 1962. African Land Development in Kenya 1946-1962. Published by the Ministry of Agriculture
and animal husbandry and water resources in Kenya.
453 Kariuki S, 2004. ‘Failing to learn from failed programmes: South Africa’s communal land rights Act’
(CLRB 2003). Vienna Journal of African Studies.
Adjudication is the confirming of existing rights in land while registration is
the final step where the parcels of land already adjudicated are entered into a
register and land certificate is issued in the name which appears in the register.
The processes and procedures of land adjudication, consolidation and registration
of rights were intended to extinguish customary land tenure and replace them
with individual exclusive rights.454
In Kenya, under the independence Constitution, the process of land adjudication
was primarily governed by the Land Adjudication Act.455 Land adjudication is
aimed at providing for the ascertainment and recording of rights and interests
in Trust land.456 The processes and procedures of land adjudication, consolidation
and registration of rights were intended to extinguish customary land tenure and
replace them with individual exclusive rights. The Minister (now Cabinet
Secretary) was empowered to appoint adjudication officers to be in charge of an
adjudication area. The adjudication officers in turn appointed demarcation
officers, survey officers and recording officers to be in charge of demarcating,
surveying and recording interests within an adjudication area.457 It was the duty
of the adjudication officer to establish adjudication sections within its
adjudication area.458
In addition, the adjudication officer determined claims relating to interests
in land within the adjudication area.459 Any person with interest in land within
an adjudication section might claim to the recording officer and point out his
boundaries to the demarcation officer.460The claims were considered by the
demarcation officer, who were required to investigate the claim and prepare, in
duplicate, a form in respect of every parcel shown in the demarcation map.461
Whether there were conflicting claims in respect of a parcel of land, the
recording officer referred the dispute to the adjudication committee for
determination.
Other administrative units responsible involved in the process of adjudication
included adjudication committee appointed by the adjudication officer in
consultation with the District Commissioner; and arbitration board appointed by
the Provincial Commissioner.462 The adjudication committee adjudicated upon, and
decided in accordance with recognized customary law, any question referred to it
by the demarcation officer or recording officer. The committee also advised the
adjudication officer or any officer subordinate to him on any question of
recognized customary law for which such an officer has sought guidance of the
committee.463 Where an adjudication committee was unable to reach a determination
4.3.3 Surveying
Surveying is the scientific process of delimiting boundaries. It is concerned
with the charting of land to accurately define its boundaries for purposes of
obtaining a certificate of title to and providing information about that land.473
Boundaries can either be fixed or general. Fixed boundaries are determined by
the Director of Surveys and consist of coordinated and concreted markers at
turning points of rectilinear boundaries.474 Survey plans and other documentation
must be examined and approved by the Director of Surveys. In land registered
under the Registration of Titles Act, the surveyor prepares deed plans with
respect to each plot, to be signed and sealed by the Director of Surveys, and
the deed plan is then attached to the registration document.
Where land is registered under the Registered Land Act (Repealed), Registry
Index Maps are used to support the registration of plots. General boundaries are
associated with land registered under the Registered Land Act (Repealed).
467 Ibid.
471
Ibid, section 29.
474 See Jasper N. Mwenda (2001), Spatial Information in Land Tenure Reform with Special Reference to Kenya,
Paper presented at the International Conference on Spatial Information for Sustainable Development, Nairobi,
Kenya on 2-5 October 2001.
Registration is backed by a registry index map and is common in areas where land
is converted from communal to individual or group tenure. In settlement schemes,
for instance, the original farms are surveyed with fixed boundaries, whereas the
smaller resulting parcels are surveyed with general boundaries, principally to
reduce costs and speed up the process.
4.4 CONCLUSION
The land adjudication process has witnessed a slow pace of implementation as a
result of legislative and institutional constraints. There is need to review the
laws related to land adjudication to make the process more transparent,
accountable as well as efficient. The process of adjudication so adopted must
as a matter of principle recognize existing communal and other overlapping rights,
provide sound dispute resolution systems to protect those concerned as well as
provide for setting aside of land for public utility.
The Land Adjudication Act and the Land Consolidation Act require to be amended
as well as merged so as to increase the pace of implementation of the adjudication
process in the remaining parts of the country. The new Act should allow for both
the appointment of community leaders to the Board as well as for the registration
of parcels not affected by objections to the adjudication register upon expiry
of the stipulated inspection period of the register.
As long as land remains central to development in Kenya, any hope of meaningful
economic recovery, poverty reduction and restoration of political stability in
the region hangs largely on how and when the land question will be resolved. A
fragmentary approach to land reform is unlikely to resolve that question. Reform
must be directed at the land sector as a whole. To assume, therefore, that a
programme of land reform can be successfully undertaken and operationalized
without specific focus on land administration is, therefore, a fundamental error
of both design and policy-making.
In Kenya, the process of registering land is manual and not computerized. The
registries have a paper filing system. This consequently creates room for
manipulation and corruption. Some households have not bothered to collect their
titles, the existence of which is of little interest to them. The fact that
Kenya’s title registries are hugely out of date is often taken as an indication
that this is still the case across the country.476 Though the Ministry of Lands
has rolled out a pilot electronic registration, there is need to ensure that the
same is rolled across the country to enhance the process of land registration
and adjudication.
475 Malaku, G.C. (1996), ‘Concepts for Improving property Mapping in Kenya,’ in South African Journal of
Surveying and Mapping, Vol. 23, Part 4, pp. 211-216.
476 Okoth-Ogendo, H. W. O, 1982a. Property Systems and Social Organization on the Relative Position of
Women under Indigenous and Received Law. In The Individual under AfricanLaw pp. 18-29. N.P, Takira Mbudde
(Ed.). Harare: All African Law Conference.
The Environment and Land Court Act should address the duration in which a case
can take to cure the problem of cases taking too long while the aggrieved parties
continue to suffer before determination. Both parties should have the trial begun
and concluded without unreasonable delay. Given that this will be a court of
original jurisdiction, for the cases to be finalized in the shortest time. Also
the Act should provide a mechanism for ensuring that all records and court
proceeding are safely kept and documented.477 Also formalities relating to the
proceedings, including commencement of the proceedings at the ELC Court should
be kept to the minimum, and in particular that the Court shall if necessary,
entertain proceedings on the basis of informal documentation.
Repeal of the Land Disputes Tribunal Act without more will put enormous
pressure on the Environment and Land Court.478 This provision should be
accompanied by a suitable amendment to the Magistrates Court Act enabling
subordinate courts to deal with a defined class of land cases. If land rights
are actually able to empower vulnerable groups and communities, they have to be
conceived in a way that is understandable and acceptable to these communities,
while also conforming to international standards. These standards require that
indigenous peoples’ rights to their traditionally owned lands, territories and
resources be regularised in accordance with their customary laws and tenure
systems.
CHAPTER FIVE
LAND REGISTRATION
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Land registration may be defined as the keeping of public records of all
transactions affecting land.479 An effective land registration system must be
accurate, complete, reliable and up-to-date. It should cover all land, urban and
rural, customary, private and public, without distinction between them in the
way of registration. This chapter analyses the concept of land registration, its
importance and highlights some of the impediments that have hindered an effective
registration regime in Kenya. The chapter appreciates that in Kenya, there exists
two systems of registration – registration of title and registration of deeds.
While the deed system of registration predates title registration, its relevance
has largely fallen into disuse. The chapter also analyses the various title
documents obtainable under various registration regimes. It takes the reader
right into the land registry and examines, step by step, the procedure to be
followed inside the land registry in registering a document affecting interest
in land. The chapter appreciates that there are emerging areas of land
registration, to wit, sectional titles and sub-leases and examines, in detail,
each of the registration regimes.
480 See for instance, P.L. Onalo (1986), Land Law and Conveyancing in Kenya, Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya Ltd,
pp. 176–180, who argues that the aim of registration is to achieve security of tenure, reduce unnecessary
security. The change of rights to land from one person to another through a
process called conveyancing is facilitated by land registration. Land
registration is therefore a tool for land tenure security. The process is also
a panacea for protection of land rights, provision of food security, supporting
economic development and actualising land reform. Land registration facilitates
dealings in land in accordance with the prevailing social and cultural
circumstances. For instance, for one to obtain credit by using land as collateral,
the borrower’s right to the land must be clear and unambiguous. Ownership of such
rights can only be demonstrated, not by physical possession of the land, but by
registration of such rights at the Ministry of Lands. Property rights must be
formalised, that is, embodied in universally obtainable, standardised instruments
of exchange that are registered in particular land registries.
Security of tenure has been guaranteed in various land laws in Kenya. Section
26 of the Land Registration Act construes the holder of a Certificate of Title
issued under the Act as the conclusive owner of the parcel of land, unless the
holder of the title document fraudulently obtained the certificate of title.481
Previously, even in incidences of fraud, or erroneous registration of the title
to land under the Registration of Titles Act (Repealed), the holder of the title
would not be deprived of the title, and instead, the aggrieved party will recover
damages.482 Thus, the state guaranteed title registered under the Registration of
Titles Act. Under the Registered Land Act, (Repealed) the security of tenure was
guaranteed in sections 27 and 28.483 The care taken in admitting land data to be
admitted in new land registration system has a bearing on the reliability of the
new system. This necessitates the need to verify the data of every land
transaction individually.
Secondly, land registration protects the rights in land. This it does by
improving the security of land tenure. That is, the assurance of continuing
access to and use of land through a formalized tenure system. The registration
provides proof of ownership of rights to the land and real property, as well as
proof of the size and location of the immovable property. Dekker posits that
land registration answers the question of what, who, how, where and when land is
owned.484 The underlying principles that enable land registration process protect
the rights of the parties concerned are the publicity of the transfer of interests
in land, clarity and lack of ambiguity in security of title to land. Title to
land properly so acquired forms the basis of loans when using the land collateral,
mortgages for land development, and facilitates dealings in land, thereby
optimizing land use.
Thirdly, land registration facilitates levying of land taxes by the government.
In Kenya, payment of land rent and stamp duty depends on the value of the land
as quite often revealed in the purchase price. Land rate is charged on the basis
of the size and value of the land. Aspects of land registration such as size of
land and proprietorship of land are, therefore, quite instrumental in determining
the amount of tax and the incidence of tax. While tracing the origin of the use
of land records for tax purposes, Catherine Farvacque and Patrick Mc Auslan state
as follows:
litigation, prevent refragmentation of land into valueless pieces of land, administer loan system and enable
easy and effective conveyance.
483 See Registered Land (Repealed) Act (Chapter 300) Laws of Kenya, sections 27 and 28.
484 HAL Dekker (2003), Land Reform, Land Tenure Security and Land Registration, Aldershot: Ashgate
Publishing Limited, page 137.
Land records for tax purposes dates back to ancient times. Historians of ancient Egypt
have shown that as early as 3400 B.C., measures of length were in regular use and
that a cadastral record was in existence by about 3000 B.C. and of course the Domesday
book in England compiled 20 years after the Normans had defeated the Saxons at the
battle of Hastings in 1066 is a perfect example of an early comprehensive attempt to
set an inventory of national resources for fiscal purposes… 485
Fourthly, land registration enables the government to control the use of
resources. Land planning, which is a government function, relies on registration
system. In agricultural controlled areas, the government makes use of land
registration systems to determine economically viable land sizes and to control
transfers that would be uneconomically viable.486 Section 29 of the Physical
Planning Act vests in each County Government the power to enact legislation to
regulate zoning in respect of use and density of development.487 Approval of all
developments in the County is done by the County Government. It is the County
Government that supervises implementation of approved physical development plans;
and the County Government enacts legislation to regulate zoning on the use and
density of physical development plans. One of the functions of County Governments
as expressed in paragraph 8, part 2 of the fourth schedule to the Constitution
of Kenya, is the regulation of county planning and development, including housing
development
Under the provisions of section 111 of the County Governments Act, each County
Government is enjoined to have city or municipal land use plans; city or municipal
building and zoning plans; and city or urban area building and zoning plans. City
and municipal plans are the instruments for development facilitation and
development control within the respective city or municipality.488 Section 111(4)
of the County Governments Act mandatorily provides that city or municipal land
use plans bind on all entities and private citizens operating within that
particular city or municipality. Exercise of the foregoing powers is only tenable
where land is registered within the County Government and in the name of a
particular proprietor.
The importance of land registration is summarized by Lemel Harold by observing
that it:
“documented titles (1) publicly and officially associate specific pieces of land;
(2) precisely define a property’s physical boundaries, thereby reducing potential
485 Catherine Farvacque and Patrick McAuslan (1992), Reforming Urban Land Policies and Institutions in
Developing Countries. Washington D.C.: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/the World
Bank Publication, page 58.
486 See Land Control Act (Chapter 302) Laws of Kenya section 6(1) thereof states: “each of the following
transactions -(a) the sale, transfer, lease, mortgage, exchange, partition or other disposal of or dealing
with any agricultural land which is situated within a land control area;(b) the division of any such agricultural
land into two or more parcels to be held under separate titles, other than the division of an area of less
than twenty acres into plots in an area to which the Development and Use of Land (Planning) Regulations, 1961
for the time being apply;(c) the issue, sale, transfer, mortgage or any other disposal of or dealing with any
share in a private company or co-operative society which for the time being owns agricultural land situated
within a land control area, is void for all purposes unless the land control board for the land control area
or division in which the land is situated has given its consent in respect of that transaction in accordance
with this Act.”
487 Physical Planning Act, section 29 states, “29. Subject to the provisions of this Act, each local
authority shall have the power (a) to prohibit or control the use and development of land and buildings in the
interests of proper and orderly development of its area; (b) to control or prohibit the subdivision of land or
existing plots into smaller areas; (c) to consider and approve all development applications and grant all
development permissions; (d) to ensure the proper execution and implementation of approved physical development
plans; (e) to formulate by-laws to regulate zoning in respect of use and density of development; and (f) to
reserve and maintain all the land planned for open spaces, parks, urban forests and green belts in accordance
with the approved physical development plan.”
489 Lemel Harold (1990), “Land Titling: Conceptual, Emphirical and Policy Issues,” in Land Use Policy, page
35. See also Roy L. Prosterman and Timothy M. Hanstad (1999), Legal Impediments to Effective Rural Land
Relations in Eastern Europe and Eastern Asia: A comparative Perspective, Washington D.C.: The International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development/the World Bank Publication, page 168, who argue that: “almost all
commentators agree that that title registration is superior to all present systems of title protection based
upon registration of deeds land recordation. Title registration makes land titles more reliable, and is simpler,
more logical and less costly…”
490 Republic of Kenya, Report of the Mission on Land Consolidation and Registration in Kenya, 1965-1966.
See also Smokin C. Wanjala, Sources of Land Law in Kenya, page 5, who states that “by registration of deeds,
we mean a system whereby written agreements between two or more people are registered in form of a public
record.
492
Ibid.
494 SC Wanjala (ed) (2000), Essays on Land Law: The Reform Debate in Kenya, Nairobi: Faculty of Law,
University of Nairobi Publication, pp. 35-87.
495 TO Ojienda and A.D.O. Rachier (2001), Conveyancing Theory & Practice, Eldoret: Faculty of Law, Moi
University Publication, page 18.
a further blow as major parts of the Register kept pursuant to its provisions
were converted to either the Registered Land Act (Repealed) or Registration of
Titles Act (Repealed).496 It is for this reason that Wanjala, while commenting
on the diminishing usefulness of the Registration of Documents Act, states:
It is still used in Kenya for the voluntary registration of wills during the lifetime
of the testator, deed polls dealing with change of names, settlements, registration
of architect’s plans etc. But for all practical purposes, this law has long ceased to
operate as the basis for a land registration system.497
The Land Titles Act (Repealed) was enacted in 1908 to facilitate alienation of
Crown land at the Coast, particularly with a view to distinguish between private
land and Crown land within the ten- mile coastal strip. Whereas the word ‘title’
forms part of the name of the Act, the Act did not deal with a system of
registration of titles to land, but a deed system of registration. The register
kept under the Act was not conclusive evidence of a transaction affecting the
piece of land and there was no government guarantee on the accuracy of the
register. Thus, anyone suffering loss as a result of the inaccuracy of the
register kept under the Act could not claim to be compensated by government. The
Registrar under the Act was called a Recorder of Titles. Individuals who
successfully claimed private land under the Act were issued with certificates of
ownership giving freehold title or certificate of mortgage or interest covering
leasehold, depending on the nature of title adjudicated.498
Under the independence Constitution, title to land, in Kenya, was registered
under the Registered Land Act (Repealed) or Registration of Titles Act. (Repealed)
Two registries were maintained under the Registration of Titles (Repealed) Act,
being, Coast titles, maintained at the Mombasa Registry, and upcountry titles
maintained at the Nairobi Registry. Coast titles are prefixed “C.R. No….” and
up-country titles are prefixed “I.R. No….” Where a title was issued under Trust
Lands Act in township area and registered under the Registration of Titles Act,
it was prefixed “I.R.N. No….” Title documents for Plots which were alienated or
converted from Government Lands Act (Repealed) or Land Titles Act (Repealed) to
Registration of Titles Act (Repealed) were known as grants, endorsed with the
index number of the title. Where there was a subdivision of land in respect of
which an original grant was issued, a certificate of title in respect of a
freehold was issued,499 or a lease in respect of leasehold was issued.
It will be remembered that the enactment of the Registered Land Act (Repealed)
was intended to bring the pre-existing land registration regimes under it. For
instance, where a parcel of land in respect of land to which a grant or certificate
of title was already issued under the Registration of Titles Act, (Repealed)
such registration might be deemed to have been completed under the Registered
Land Act (Repealed), in which case the grant or certificate of title would be
construed to be a title deed or certificate of lease issued under the Registered
Land Act (Repealed).500 The Registration of Titles Act (Repealed) would then cease
to apply in respect of that parcel of land. Where title to a parcel of land
comprised a register kept under the Government Lands (Repealed) Act or Land
Titles Act (Repealed), such title might be brought under the Registered Land Act
496 Ibid.
497 SC Wanjala (2000), ‘Problems of Land Registration and Titling in Kenya: Administrative and Political
Pitfalls and their Possible Solutions,’ in Essays on Land Law: the Reform Debate in Kenya, Nairobi: Faculty of
Law, University of Nairobi, page 87.
498 TO Ojienda and ADO Rachier (2001), Conveyancing Theory & Practice, Eldoret: Faculty of Law, Moi
University Publication, page 19.
499 See PL Onalo (1986), Land Law and Conveyancing in Kenya, Nairobi: Heinemann Kenya Ltd, pp. 176 – 181.
501 Ibid.
The Land Registration Act achieves the purpose for which the Registered Land Act
(Repealed) was enacted. The preamble of the Land Registration Act expresses its
purpose as being “An Act of Parliament to revise, consolidate and rationalize
the registration of titles to land, to give effect to the principles and objects
of devolved government in land registration, and for connected purposes.” Section
12 of the Act tasks the Public Service Commission to appoint a Chief Land
Registrar, County Land Registrar, Land Registrars and other officers necessary
to effectively discharge functions under the Act.
Under the provisions of section 6 of the Act, the National Land Commission is
mandated, by way of Gazette, to constitute land registration units at county
levels and any other levels to ensure reasonable access to land registration and
administration services; to divide the registration units into registration
sections; to divide registration sections into registration blocks and to
designate distinctive numbers or letters or a combination of letters and numbers
to refer to a specific registration block or section. Further, sections 7(1)(a)
and 7(1) (b) of the Act mandate the National Land Commission to determine the
form of land register to be maintained in each registration unit and to determine
the date when land plans are to be geo-referenced.
Under the provisions of section 30 of the Act, the Land Registrar is enjoined
to issue, upon application, a certificate of title in respect of freehold
interest, or a Certificate of Lease in respect of leasehold interest exceeding
twenty five years. Title documents issued under the Registered Land Act
(Repealed), Government Lands Act (Repealed), Land Titles Act (Repealed) and
Registration of Titles Act (Repealed) are recognized and dealt with by dint of
the provisions of Part XII of the Land Registration Act. Title documents issued
under the provisions of the Registered Land Act (Repealed) or the Registration
of Titles Act (Repealed) are deemed to be certificate of title or certificate of
lease as the case may be, issued under the Land Registration Act. The registers
previously kept under the provisions of the Registered Land Act (Repealed) or
the Registration of Titles Act (Repealed) are deemed to be the registers required
to be kept under the Land Registration Act.
Title to parcel of land kept under the Government Lands Act (Repealed) and
Land Titles Act (Repealed) are required to be promptly examined and their
particulars noted in a register. The Registrar is then enjoined to notify the
proprietor of such parcel of land of the intention to register the proprietorship,
and upon request by the proprietor, issue the proprietor with a certificate of
title or certificate of lease as the case may be, over the land. It will be
remembered that registration system under the Government Lands Act (Repealed)
and Land Titles Act (Repealed) were deed system of registration. Thus, the Land
Registration Act seeks to do away with the deed system of registering land, and
reinforce exclusively title system of registration of land. The Land Registration
Act and the Land Act also recognize and preserve any rights, liabilities and
remedies acquired, imposed or exercisable under the Registered Land Act
(Repealed), Government Lands Act (Repealed), Land Titles Act (Repealed) and
Registration of Titles Act (Repealed).505
505 See sections 106 and 107 of the Land Registration Act; section 162 of the Land Act.
506 Government Lands (Repealed) Act (Chapter 280) Laws of Kenya states, “117 No document shall be registered
unless the fee prescribed has been paid and, if the document is one which is liable to stamp duty, the document
is duly and sufficiently stamped.”
507 Stamp Duty Act (Chapter 480) Laws of Kenya states, “5. Subject to the provisions of, and to the
exemptions contained in, this Act and any other written law, every instrument specified in the Schedule,
wheresoever executed, which relates to property situated, or to any matter or thing done or to be done, in
Kenya, shall be chargeable with the stamp duty specified in the said Schedule.”
509 Capital Gains Tax is a tax chargeable on the whole of a gain which accrues to a company or an individual
on or after 1 January 2015 on the transfer of property situated in Kenya, whether or not the property was
acquired before 1 January 2015.
510 See Chapter 470, Law of Kenya (Rev. 2012) under sections 3(2)(f) and 15(3)(f) and the Eighth Schedule.
512 Number 21 of 1987. The Sectional Properties Act was enacted in 1987. The commencement date of the
statute was 1 April 1990.
513
Ibid, preamble states: “An Act of Parliament to provide for the division of buildings into units to be
owned by individual proprietors and common property to be owned by proprietors of the units as tenants in
common and to provide for the use and management of the units and common property and connected purposes.
517 Ibid, section 46 states: “46. (1) A developer shall not sell or agree to sell a unit or proposed unit
unless he has delivered to a purchaser a copy of – (a) the purchase agreement; (b) the by-laws or proposed by-
laws; (c) any management agreement or proposed management agreement; (d) any recreational agreement or proposed
recreational agreement; (e) the lease of the parcel, if the parcel on which the unit is located is held under
a lease and the certificate of sectional property in respect of the unit or proposed unit which has been or
will be issued under section 5(1)(c); (f) any charge that affects or proposed charge that will affect the title
to the unit or proposed unit or, in respect of that charge or proposed charge a notice prescribed under
subsection (2); and (g) the sectional plan or proposed sectional plan.
(2) A developer shall deliver to the purchaser in respect of a charge or proposed charge a written notice
stating – (a) the maximum principal amount available under the charge; (b) the maximum monthly payment that
may be paid under the charge; (c) the amortization period; (d) the term; (e) the interest rate or the formula,
if any, for determining the interest rate; and (f) the prepayment privileges, if any.
(3) Subject to subsection (4), a purchaser of a unit under this section may, without incurring any liability
for doing so, rescind the purchase agreement within ten days from the date the purchase agreement was executed
by the parties to it.
(4) A purchaser may not rescind the purchase agreement under subsection (3) if all the documents required
to be delivered to the purchaser under subsection (2) have been delivered to the purchaser not less than ten
days prior to the execution of the purchase agreement by the parties to it.
(5) If a purchase agreement is rescinded under subsection (3) the developer shall, within ten days from
his receipt of a written notice by the purchaser of the rescission, return to the purchaser all of the money
paid in respect of the purchase of the unit.”
519 Chapter 486 of the Laws of Kenya. See section 17(5) of the Sectional Properties Act which is explicit
that “the provisions of the Companies Act shall not apply to the corporation.”
521 Ibid, section 20 states in part: ”20. (1) The Corporation shall – (a) subject to this Act, carry out
any duties imposed on it by the by-laws; (b) unless by unanimous resolution all the proprietors otherwise
resolve, insure and keep insured buildings and other improvements on the parcel against fire; (c) effect such
other insurance as it is required by law to effect or as it may consider expedient; (d) pay the premiums in
respect of any policies of insurance effected by it; (e) keep the common property in a state of good repair;
(f) comply with any notice or order duly served on it by any competent local authority or public body requiring
repairs to, or work to be performed in respect of, the land or any building or improvements thereon; (g)
subject to this Act, control, manage, and administer the common property and do all things reasonably necessary
for the enforcement of the by-laws; (h) do all things reasonably necessary for the enforcement of any lease or
licence under which the land is held; (i) do all things reasonably necessary for the enforcement of any contract
of insurance entered into by it under this section.
(2) The Corporation shall – (a) establish and maintain a fund for administrative expenses sufficient, in
the opinion of the Corporation, for the control, management, and administration of the common property, and
for the payment of any insurance premiums, rent, and the discharge of any other obligation of the Corporation;
(b) determine from time to time the amounts to be paid for the purposes aforesaid; (c) raise amounts so
determined by levying contributions on the proprietors in proportion to the unit entitlement of their respective
units.
referred to in the Act have nothing to do with laws passed by local authorities
under the Local Government Act522 but instead refer to the regulations set out
by the Corporation on the management of the building.523
5.6 CONCLUSION
Land registration is the keeping of public records affecting land.Land
registration is necessary to protect rights and land tenure security; facilitate
dealings in land; facilitate levying of taxes; and to enable government control
of land use. Kenya had two systems of registration on land – deed system of
registration and title system of registration. The Land Registration Act did
way with the former. A deed system of registration records an isolated transaction
and is merely evidence that the transaction took place.
A title system of registration is an authoritative record in a public office
clearly defining units of land as vested for the time being in some particular
person or body, and limitations, if any, to which the rights are held. Deed
system of registration is peculiar to RDA, LTA and GLA. Title system of
registration is peculiar to RTA and RLA. The recently enacted Land Registration
Act reinforces the title systems of registration. Registration of deed or title
inside the land registry follows a fairly cyclic procedure; it begins with the
valuation of the registration document with a view to determining stamp duty, if
payable, and ends when the Registrar approves of the registration document,
signs, seals and delivers the document to the conveyance or his agent. There are
emerging areas of land ownership, to wit, sectional titles and sub-leases, both
of whose registration statute is the RLA. The next chapter focuses on unregistered
interests in land, how they are created and their effect on registered interests.
(3) The Corporation may, pursuant to a resolution of the proprietors, distribute any money or personal
property in its possession and surplus to its current requirements among the proprietors for the time being
according to their unit entitlements...”
522 Chapter 265, Laws of Kenya.
525 [1970] EA 89 (Sir Charles Newbold, P. Duffus, V.P. and Law JA.).
526 (1984) KLR, 539 (Kneller, Hancox JJA and Nyarangi Ag, JA).
527 See Ann Itumbi Kiseli v James Muriuki Muriithi [2013] eKLR where Adverse Possession has been defined
as a method of gaining legal title to real property by the actual, open, hostile and continuous possession of
it to the exclusion of its true owner for the period prescribed by state law.
Act, as being twelve years,528 at the expiry of which the proprietor of land may
not commence an action to recover the land.529 The principles upon which the
doctrine of adverse possession operates in Kenya have been well encapsulated in
the Court of Appeal decision of Kinyua v Simon Gitura Rumuri.530 The case involved
a dispute over all that parcel of land known as Nyaki/Giaki/Kihurine/299 measuring
12 acres. The High Court allowed the respondent to be registered as an adverse
possessor of the entire land, thereby precipitating the appeal. It was admitted
fact on appeal that:
i. Of the 12-acre piece of land, the respondent had occupied 8 acres;
ii. The respondent had occupied the land between 1972 and 2003;
iii. The respondent had openly occupied the land, put up a homestead and undertaken
substantial development on the land;
iv. The respondent’s possession of the land between 1972 and 2003 had been continuous
and uninterrupted.
The Court of Appeal, in upholding the Superior Court decision and finding that
the respondent had adversely acquired the 8-acre piece of the land that he had
occupied uninterrupted between 1972 and 2003, held as follows:
With regard to the extent of adverse possession, we think that possession of 8 acres
of land for a period exceeding twelve years has been clearly established and that the
respondent was in exclusive possession of the piece of land openly and as of right
during all this time. With respect, this is all that a claimant is required to
establish. In the face of the nature of the possession as described above, including
dwelling houses and permanent plants and the visible burial ground of the respondent’s
parents in the disputed land, we think it is quite evident to us that the respondent
uses the land which he claims as of right: nec vi, nec clam, nec precario (no force,
no secrecy, no evasion). It follows from the foregoing the appellant is deemed to
have had either actual knowledge of the possession or had the means of knowing of the
possession or occupation but did nothing about it by way of asserting the right of
ownership (constructive knowledge). It is also not in dispute that the possession was
never interrupted and was continuous for the entire period as prescribed. We are
therefore satisfied that the superior court had properly addressed the issue of the
fact of possession and also the applicable law. Touching on the important issue of
the extent of possession, the evidence on record points to exclusive possession of 8
acres only and in view of the gracious concession by Mr. Mwenda, learned counsel for
the respondent, which concession we think is properly grounded in law, we wish to
affirm that a claimant would not be entitled to more than the parcel he had exclusive
control of and in this case, it is eight acres only.
The principles evident in the foregoing decision are that for a claim for adverse
possession to uphold, it must be demonstrated that there has been an open,
peaceful but unpermitted possession of an estate in land for uninterrupted period
exceeding twelve years. The right accrues only to that part of land that is not
only possessed, but also in which some positive act, as would be done by the
proprietor of land, has actually been done by the adverse possessor for the
period in issue. In the case of Ndiema Samburi Soti v Elvis Kimtai Chepkeses,the
appellant was found not to have adversely possessed the suit land because firstly,
he failed to prove that he was in actual possession of the entire suit land as
he claimed for the prescribed period. 531
528 Limitation of Actions Act (Chapter 22) Laws of Kenya, section 7 states: “An action may not be brought
by any person to recover land after the end of twelve years from the date on which the right of action accrued
to him or, if it first accrued to some person through whom he claims, to that person.”
535 Blackstone (1791), Commentaries on the Laws of England, Vol.3, page 168.
536 Holdsworth, W. (1925), History of English Law, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2nd Edn, Vol. VIII, page 69.
547 Anderson J. (1992), Lawyers and the Making of English land Law, Oxford: Clanderon Press.
In Spectrum Investment Co. v Holmes,548 the Court held that where a squatter
had been registered as a proprietor of a lease, the ousted previous proprietor
could no longer surrender the lease as the English Land Registration Act, 1925,
gave the registered proprietor the exclusive power of disposition. In Central
London Commercial Estates v Kato Kagaku,549 the Court held that the proprietor
could not surrender a lease because any surrender would take effect subject to
the statutory trust in favour of the adverse possessor, which is an overriding
interest.550
Section 38(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act authorizes a person who claims
to have been entitled to land by adverse possession to apply to the High Court
for an order that he be registered as proprietor in place of the registered
proprietor.551 Such a claimant must prove that he has been in exclusive possession
of the land openly and as of right and without interruption for a person of 12
years after dispossessing the owner and adverse possession can be acquired under
the Limitation of Actions Act for part of the land.552 The mere change of ownership
of the land which is occupied by another under adverse possession does not
interrupt such person’s adverse possession.553
In the case of Samwel Nyakenogo v Samwel Orucho Onyaru,554 for instance, the
respondent, who had been in exclusive possession of the portion of the suit land
openly, uninterrupted and without permission of the proprietor for about 19 years
was found to have acquired the suit land by adverse possession, notwithstanding
the death of the registered proprietor. The Court rendered itself as follows in
this regard:
In our view, the purported application for letters of administration in respect of
the deceased land West Kitutu/Mwakibagendi/28 which was confirmed on 15 June 1999 did
not interrupt the respondent’s adverse possession of the portion bought from the
deceased….
A suit to enforce a claim for adverse possession is commenced by way of an
originating summons, supported by an affidavit attaching a certified extract of
title. Order 37, rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 states as follows in
this regard:
An application under section 38 of the Limitation of Actions Act shall be made by
originating summons. (2) The summons shall be supported by an affidavit to which a
certified extract of the title to the land in question has been annexed. (3) The Court
shall direct on whom and in what manner the summons shall be served.555
550 See also Mark Wonaccott (2006), Possession of Land, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
551 See reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Samwel Nyakenogo v Samwel Orucho Onyaru, Kisumu CA number 24
of 2004. See also Mbugua Njuguna v Elijah Mburu Wanyoike and another, CA number 27 of 2002, where the Court
stated “by section 38(1) a person who claims to have been entitled by adverse possession to land may apply to
the High Court for an order that he be registered as proprietor of the land in place of the registered
proprietor…a title by adverse can be acquired under the Limitation of Actions Act to part of the parcel of
land to which the owner holds title – see Githu v Ndeete (1984) KLR 776 at page 780, paragraph 25.”
552
Kasuve v Mwaani Investments Limited and others, civil appeal number 35 of 2002.
555 See the Judges emphasis on Order 37, rule 7 of the Civil Procedure Rules ,2010 in Ann Itumbi Kiseli v
James Muriuki Muriithi [2013] eKLR
It will be remembered that the use of originating summons to commence a suit is
intended for simple claims that are not necessarily protracted. This presupposes,
therefore, that enforcement of adverse possession is a simple claim. This may,
however, turn out not to be the case. The framers of the rules of procedure,
aware of such an eventuality, have given Courts the discretion to either request
for further facts to support the originating summons,556 or, in its volition,
presume that the suit had been commenced by way of plaint, in which case, the
affidavits filed will be construed as pleadings, with or without amendments.557
It will also be remembered that not all land registration regimes recognise ‘‘an
extract of title’’ required to be annexed to the supporting affidavit. Courts
have held that, for instance, for the case of land registered under the Registered
Land Act (Repealed), a certificate of search suffices as the extract of title.
In the case of Johnson Kinyua v Simon Gitura Rumuri,558 the Court of Appeal was
of the view that certified extract in Order 37 of the Civil Procedure Rules
refers to titles under other systems of land registration and not to Registered
Land (Repealed) Act (RLA) type of registration; that under the RLA type of
registration, a search certificate meets the requirements of the relevant law.559
The onus is on the person claiming adverse possession to prove. In the words of
Kneller in Kimani Ruchine v Swift, Rutherfold & Co Ltd:560
The plaintiffs have to prove that they have used this land which they claim as of
right: Nec vi, nec clam, nec precario (No force, no secrecy, no evasion). So the
plaintiffs must show that the company had knowledge (or the means of knowing, actual
or constructive) of the possession or occupation. The possession must be continuous.
It must not be broken for any temporary purpose or by any endeavours to interrupt it
or by any recurrent consideration… No right of action to recover land accrues unless
the lands are in the possession of some person in whose favour the period of limitation
can run. The possession is after all adverse possession, so the statute does not
begin to operate unless and until the true owner is not in possession of his land.
Dispossession and discontinuance must go together; See sections 9(1) and 13 of the
Limitation of Actions Act. So where the use and enjoyment of the land are possible
there can be no dispossession if the registered and rightful owner enjoys it. Also,
if enjoyment and use are not possible…. 561
559 See also sections 36(2) and 37(2) of the Registered Land (Repealed) Act (Chapter 300). Section 36(2)
states: “Any person may require an official search in respect of any parcel, and shall be entitled to receive
particulars of the subsisting entries in the register relating thereto and certified copies of any documents
or of the registry map or of any plan filed in the registry.” Section 37(2) of the Act states: “Every document
purporting to be signed by the Registrar shall, in all proceedings be presumed to have been so signed until
the contrary is proved.”
561 See also Kariuki, J. in Omukaisi Abulitsa v Albert Abulitsa, Kakamega High Court civil case number 86
of 2005 (UR) who stated thus; “Section 38 of the Limitation of Actions Act, Chapter 22 of the Laws of Kenya
entitles a person to be registered as proprietor instead of the registered proprietor where such person
establishes by evidence that he or she has become entitled to be registered on account of his or her occupation
of the land, openly and continuously and without interruption and with the knowledge of the registered owner
for a period of twelve years or more adversely to the title of the registered owner. In other words, where a
person trespasses on the land of another with the knowledge of the latter who does not assert his right to the
title to the land by evicting the trespasser or by suing him or her in court for eviction or ejectment but
instead lets the trespasser openly occupy the land for a continuous and uninterrupted period of not less than
twelve years, the trespasser is entitled to apply under section 38 (supra) to be registered as the proprietor
of the land. This is what the doctrine of adverse possession means. Where the period of 12 years is not
continuous or is interrupted, the period of adverse possession is broken and must start all over again. But
where one trespasser removes another trespasser who is in adverse possession to the owner and continues to
occupy the land, the period of adverse possession is not broken and the second trespasser is entitled to
combine the period of trespass of the first trespasser to his own. The land claimed by adverse possession
need not be all the land comprised in the title; it may be a portion of it providing that the portion claimed
is demarcated well enough to be identifiable. And as regards assertion of title, it is not enough for a
proprietor of the land to merely write to the trespasser. A letter by the proprietor, even if it be through
6.6.3 EASEMENTS
Easements are common law rights enjoyed by a person over the land of another.
They include right of way, right of light, right of water, profits, among
others.562 Whereas easements are nowadays recognized as incorporeal
563
hereditaments, that is, objects of property in themselves, initially, easements
were construed as rights appurtenant to corporeal hereditaments,564 that is, a
privilege which could be obtained for the benefit of the corporeal land. For
there to be declared an easement, four essential565 requirements must be satisfied:
i. There must be a dominant tenement and a servient tenement. That is, an easement
does not exist in gross, but can only be appurtenant to (related to) a dominant
tenement. A dominant tenement may be the adjoining land to which an easement (such
as a right of way) is sought across another’s land (servient tenement). A transfer
of dominant tenement does not extinguish the easement, as it passes with the land
so that an occupier of the dominant tenement, including a lessee, can enjoy it.566
The easement is not personal to the occupier, but to the dominant tenement, unless
the occupier of the dominant tenement is the very owner of the servient tenement,
in which case, no easement exists.
ii. An easement must confer a benefit on (accommodate) the dominant tenement. The
benefit conferred to the dominant tenement is not necessarily analogous to personal
advantage to the occupier of the land. The concern is how the easement makes the
dominant tenement better and more convenient property, such as by increasing its
general utility, conferring access, among others.567
iii. The dominant and servient tenements must not be owned and occupied by the
same person. In its very nature, easement is a right in the soil of another (in
alieno solo). In that context, one cannot have an easement over his own land; as
one cannot have rights against himself.568
iv. The easement must be capable of forming the subject matter of a grant. Although
in practice many easements are established by long user, the presumption always
is that a grant was once made; that is, easement must have been granted by a
deed.569 The underlying principle behind this requirement is that proprietary
interests are fixed by law and finite in number. Easements are therefore not open
to interests which do not conform to the rules about the general nature of
easements. Megarry and Wade in their “The Law of Real Property” have identified
certain rights which are incapable of being considered as easements, including the
right of a party A to drain rainwater falling on A’s land into B’s ditches; the
an advocate or the chief of the area does not amount to assertion of title in law and cannot therefore interrupt
the passage of time for the purpose of computing the period of adverse possession. For there to be interruption,
the proprietor must evict or eject the trespasser but because eviction is not always possible without breach
of peace, institution of suit against the trespasser does interrupt and stop the time from running. For these
propositions of law…”
562 Megarry and Wade (2008), The Law of Real Property, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 7th edition, page 1207.
565 See Rangeley v Midland Rly Co (1868) 3 Ch App 306 at 310 per Lord Cairns LJ; Jalnarne v Ridewood (1989)
61 P & CR 143.As to the essential characteristics of an easement, see also Paragraph 2 [5002] ante and 14
Halsbury’s Laws (4th Edn) Easements paras 7–12
570 Ibid.
574 (1984) KLR, 539 (Kneller, Hancox, JJA and Nyarangi, Ag, JA).
operation of law, it would continue to exist for as long as the necessity existed,
notwithstanding that it was not referred to in the Certificate of Title to the
respondent’s land (the servient tenement)…for these reasons, I would allow this
appeal, set aside the judgement of the High Court and instead give judgement for Ruth
against Monica for a declaration that Ruth is entitled to a right of way over the
land reference Chania/Makwa/789 registered of Monica to Ruth’s land reference
Chania/Makwa/792 for herself, members of her family, her servants, agents, invitees
and/or licencees on foot…Furthermore, Ruth must have her declaration that she is
entitled to have a furrow over Monica’s land to Ruth’s land with a bridge over that
furrow carrying the right of way mentioned in the previous declaration. Ruth must
also have an order directing the Land Registrar, Kiambu, to register these rights
relating to a way to the furrow, the bridge carrying the right of way over the furrow,
and the water from the river Karamaino along the furrow, when there is water from the
river flowing along it, against the title of Monica’s parcel Chania/Makwa/789…
The species of easements include rights of way; rights of light; rights of water;
rights of support; rights of air; and rights of fencing.575 The law recognises a
right of way as an affirmative easement authorising a party to do that which
would be or appear to be injurious to the owner of another land (the servient
tenement).The Land Act at Part X deals with “Easements and Analogous Rights.”
Section 136 of the Act defines “dominant land” as the land for the benefit of
which any easement is created, while “servient land” is the land of the person
by whom an easement is created. An easement benefits dominant land, but burdens
servient land.576
Any disturbance of a right of way is unlawful and preventable. The Chancery
Division of the High Court, in Lane v Capsey577 held as follows in regard to
disturbance of right of way: “Any disturbance of a way is unlawful which renders
the way unfit for the purposes for which it was granted, to the injury of the
person entitled to the way. Thus, there would be an unlawful interference if the
way is so damaged by vehicular or other traffic that the grantee is unable to
use it, or if the way is either wholly or partially obstructed by being built
upon, or if the servient tenement is ploughed up so that the way cannot be used…”
578
Kenyan courts have also enforced the right of way in the case of James Ngugi
Mbugua and another v Grace Wairimu Mwithiga. 579The case involved a dispute over
a four metres wide road passing alongside a common boundary of two parcels of
land, namely, LR number Kabete/Kibichiko/163 registered in the name of the
deceased Mbugua Ngugi. The plaintiffs were the administrators of the deceased
land. The other parcel of land was LR number Kabete/Kibichiko/162 registered in
the name of the defendant (“defendant’s land”). The road in issue passed from
the main road through the defendant’s parcel of land to the deceased land. The
use of the road had been enjoyed since the year 1956 till 2002 when its enjoyment
was interfered with. The Court, in granting the application held that “in law,
overriding interests are said and known to “run with the land.” In the
circumstances the plaintiffs’ right of access cannot be taken away at the whim
of the defendant since it subsists for as long as the necessity for the easement
exists.”
578 See also Kamau v Kamau (1984) KLR, 539 (Kneller, Hancox, JJA and Nyarangi, Ag JA).
579 Nairobi High Court civil case number 1174 of 2002 (O.S.).
Most critically, the right of way is acquired pursuant to section 32 of the
Limitation of Actions Act. The way must have been enjoyed continuously for a
period of 20 years preceding the date of invocation of registration. The relevant
part of the provision states that:
Where…. any way or watercourse, or the use of any water, has been enjoyed as an
easement…peaceably and openly as of right, and without interruption, for twenty years,
the right to such access and use of light or air, or to such way or watercourse or
use of water, or to such other easement, is absolute and indefeasible.
The lapse of time is a critical requirement for one to be able to claim right of
way against the owner of the servient tenement. In Govindji and another v Sifa
Insurance Company Ltd,580 the Court declined to grant the enjoyment of the right
of way over the plaintiff’s land on the basis that the way had not been enjoyed
by the defendant continuously for 20 years. It is interesting to note that the
Court also declined to grant the easement of the right of way on the basis that
because the land was registered under the Registration of Titles Act, the
easements that would be enjoyed were only those endorsed on the certificate of
title. The Court held as follows in this regard:
Pursuant to section 23(1) of the Registration of Titles Act, the certificate of title
was conclusive evidence that the plaintiffs were the absolute and indefeasible owners
of the land subject to encumberances, easements, restrictions and conditions that may
be endorsed on the title…Under section 22 of the Limitation of Actions Act (Chapter
22) an easement of way over the plaintiff’s plot could only be acquired if the
defendant had enjoyed access to that way peacefully and openly as right and without
interruption for 20 years since the plaintiff acquired the property.
The Court’s reasoning, particularly on the requirement that an easement be
specifically endorsed on the certificate of title may under the Registration of
Titles Act (Repealed) for it to be enjoyed, may be contrasted with the element
of trust in enjoyment of easements, such as right of way under Registration of
Titles Act, as developed by the Court of Appeal decisions of Barclays D.C.O. v
Patel,581 and Kamau v Kamau,582 discussed in the preceding parts of this section.
6.6.4 PROFITS
A profit a prendre is the right to take something off another person’s land.583
The thing taken must be part of the land such as mineral, crops or wild animals
existing on the land; and the thing taken, must, at the time of taking, be capable
of ownership.584 Thus, a right to hunt or fish in another’s land exists as a
profit as it confers the right to take creatures living on another’s land, which,
when killed, are capable of being owned. This can be contradicted from a right
to take water from a pond in another’s land, or the right to water cattle in
another’s land, which exist as easements, not profit. This is because, water, is
neither owned by anyone, nor is water strictly part of the soil.585 Where a profit
a prendre is enjoyed by one person to the exclusion of everyone, it is known as
582 (1984) KLR, 539 (Kneller, Hancox, JJA and Nyarangi, Ag JA).
585 Embrey v Owen (1851) 6 Exch. 353 at 369. The author is aware though that certain authors and statutes
have defined land to include water. The point here is not land, but the soil component of the land.
a several profit. Where a profit a prendre is enjoyed in common with others, it
is known as a profit in common, or a right in common.586
6.6.5 CONCLUSION
Enjoyment of registered land is not absolute, but subject to the recognized
overriding interests. Whereas the general rule is that overriding interests must
be registered for them to be enjoyed, where the statutory period specified for
one to enjoy the overriding interest has lapsed, notwithstanding that such
interests are not registered, the proprietor of land is deemed to hold such
interests in trust of the beneficiary of the interests. The right to adverse
possession arises when an adverse possessor possesses land openly, without force
and without the owner’s permission for a continuous period exceeding twelve
years. The time when the owner of land is dispossessed of land or is discontinued
from possessing land is material in computing time within which the adverse
possessor has possessed the land.
Possession of land, without more, is not sufficient to create the right to
adverse possession. There must have been some positive act done by the adverse
possessor as would be undertaken by the owner of the land. Easements are common law
rights enjoyed by one person over the land of another however, easements do not
confer on the owner of the dominant tenement exclusive use of the servient
tenement or any of its part to the exclusion of the owner of the servient
tenement. The principles upon which easements are founded include the presence
of dominant and servient tenement; conferment of benefit on dominant tenement;
difference in ownership of dominant and servient tenement; and the requirement
that an easement be created by way of grant. Easements are created if enjoyed
peacefully and openly as of right and without interruption for a period exceeding
twenty years. A Profit a prendre is the right to take something which is part of
the land and capable of ownership off another’s land.
CHAPTER SEVEN
590 Chapter 281, Laws of Kenya. See also the reasoning of court in Mohammed Gulamhussein Farzal Karmali
and another v C.F.C. Bank Limited and another [2006] eKLR that “…in this case, the suit property is registered
under the Registration of Titles Act. Under that statute, the only form of security is a charge. There is
absolutely no mention of mortgages in the Registration of Titles Act. Therefore, I believe that a mortgage
could not be created under that statute. It thus follows that the security herein, is, as it describes itself
on the face of the document, a charge.”
security over land may also be created by way of an equitable mortgage or an
equitable charge. Whereas a mortgage transfers an interest in specific immovable
property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced, or to be
advanced by way of loan, a charge does not transfer any interest in the property
but designates the land as security for the debt.
A mortgage conditionally assigns or conveys interest in land to secure
repayment of a debt. The assignment or conveyance is conditional on the default
by the borrower. In the event that the borrower defaults, the mortgagee’s interest
in land becomes absolute. Where the borrower or mortgagor does not default, the
land reverts to the mortgagor.591 A charge only gives right to payment without
transferring the title to the property unlike a mortgage which transfers an
interest in specific immovable property. In other words, whereas a mortgage
confers interest in the property, a charge confers interest over the property.
The wording of section 65(1) of the Registered Land Act (Repealed) that “a
proprietor may, by an instrument in the prescribed form, charge his land, lease
or charge to secure the payment of an existing or a future or a contingent debt
or other money or money’s worth or the fulfilment of a condition…” is instructive
in this regard. Section 65(4) of RLA (Repealed) of the foregoing section is even
more incisive that “a charge shall not operate as a transfer but shall have
effect as a security only.”592 The case of Mohammed Gulamhussein Farzal Karmali
and another v CFC Bank Limited and another, sums up the difference in the two
types of securities as follows:
Just to be sure that the distinction between the two (mortgages and charges) is clear,
it is to be noted that section 58(d) of the Transfer of Property Act defines a mortgage
as follows: ‘a mortgage is the transfer of an interest in specific immovable property
for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way of
loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give
rise to a pecuniary liability.’ The significant feature of a mortgage is thus the
transfer of an interest in specific immovable property.593
The document creating the mortgage is referred to as a mortgage-deed or simply
a mortgage. The document creating a charge is referred to as a charge. This
chapter analyses the regime of law on mortgages and charges. On the first part,
it identifies the categories of mortgages and charges depending on whether the
charge or mortgage is registered or not, that is, the concept of legal and
equitable charges and mortgages. On the second part, the chapter identifies the
various kinds of legal mortgages and charges and how they are created. The chapter
then sets out the various remedies available to both the borrower and the lender
and how such remedies are supposed to be exercised.
591 Indian Transfer of Property Act, section 58(a) states: “A mortgage is the transfer of an interest in
specific immovable property for the purpose of securing the payment of money advanced or to be advanced by way
of loan, an existing or future debt, or the performance of an engagement which may give rise to a pecuniary
liability. The transferor is called a mortgagor, the transferee a mortgagee; the principal money and interest
of which payment is secured for the time being are called the mortgage-money, and the instrument (if any) by
which the transfer is effected is called the mortgage-deed.”
592 See also section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act and section 46(1) of the Registration of Titles
(Repealed) Act.
594 Registration of Titles (Repealed) Act, section 66(3) states: “(3) A charge created by the deposit of
documents when registered shall render subject to the security thereof the same property as would have been
affected by an equitable mortgage had the lands comprised in the charge not been registered under this Act and
had the transaction been effected by an equitable mortgage instead of by that charge.”
595 GLA, supra note, section 100(2) and (3) state: “(2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall apply to an
equitable mortgage by deposit of documents of title if a memorandum of that equitable mortgage has been
registered in the register; but on the discharge of the equitable mortgage, a memorandum of the discharge shall
be registered in the register. (3) Every memorandum required to be registered under subsection (2) shall be
transmitted to the registry in duplicate, and shall be in such form, and there shall be paid on the registration
thereof such fee, as may be prescribed.”
600 RLA, section 163 states: “163. Subject to this Act and except as may be provided by any written law
for the time being in force, the common law of England, as modified by the doctrines of equity, shall extend
and apply to Kenya in relation to land, leases and charges registered under this Act and interests therein,
but without prejudice to the rights, liabilities and remedies of the parties under any instrument subsisting
immediately before the application.”
7.3.1 SIMPLE MORTGAGES
Simple mortgages were provided for in section 58(b) of the Indian Transfer of
Property Act (Repealed). The section stated:
Where, without delivering possession of the mortgaged property, the mortgagor binds
himself personally to pay the mortgage-money, and agrees, expressly or impliedly,
that, in the event of his failing to pay according to his contract, the mortgagee
shall have a right to cause the mortgaged property to be sold and the proceeds of
sale to be applied, so far as may be necessary, in payment of the mortgage-money, the
transaction is called a simple mortgage and the mortgagee a simple mortgagee.
Such that, the distinguishing characteristics of a simple mortgage are that the
mortgagor does not deliver possession of the immovable property. The mortgagor
simply binds himself to pay the loan. In the event of the mortgagor’s default,
the mortgagee has a right to sell the property to recover the loan amount or any
part of it that is outstanding. In the case of Equitorial Commercial Bank Limited
and others v Retreat Villas Limited,601 a simple mortgage was distinguished from
an English mortgage on the basis that whereas there is delivery of possession of
the immovable property in an English mortgage, delivery of the property is not
delivered in a simple mortgage.
602 Supra, ITPA section 58(c) states: “Where the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property on
condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall become absolute,
or on condition that on such payment being made the sale shall become void or on condition that on such payment
being made the buyer shall transfer the property to the seller, the transaction is called a mortgage by
conditional sale and the mortgagee a mortgagee by conditional sale.”
603
Debi Singh and others v Jagdish and others AIR 1952 All 710.
604
Supra, ITPA section 58(d) states: “Where the mortgagor delivers possession of the mortgaged property
to the mortgagee, and authorizes him to retain such possession until payment of the mortgage-money, and to
receive the rents and profits accruing from the property and to appropriate them in lieu of interest, or in
payment of the mortgage-money, or partly in lieu of interest and partly in payment of the mortgage-money, the
transaction is called an usufructuary mortgage and the mortgagee an usufructuary mortgagee.”
Aiyangar and others v Radhakrishna Pillai,605 the plaintiff sued for redemption
of a mortgage created in 1884.
This mortgage document read on its face as, ‘‘a usufructuary mortgage’’ and
in two or three places in the course of the deed, it expressly referred to the
document as a usufructuary mortgage deed. However, it contained a clause that if
the mortgage amount was not paid on a date which was stipulated in the document
at an interval of exactly nine years from the date of the document, the mortgage
was to work itself out as a sale for the principal amount due on the mortgage
bond. Possession was given to the mortgagee in accordance with the nature of the
document and its spirit. At the end of the document, there was a covenant to this
effect: “I, the mortgagor, shall pay to you the costs of the construction of
earth work… on the date fixed for redemption as per your accounts along with the
mortgage money.”
The Court, therefore, had to determine the nature of the document. The
appellant alleged that the document was a combination of three kinds of mortgages:
a simple mortgage; a usufructuary mortgage; and a mortgage by a conditional sale.
The respondent’s argument, on the other hand, was that the document was a
usufructuary mortgage with a covenant at the end clogging the equity of
redemption. The Court ruled out the possibility of the document being a mortgage
by conditional sale on, inter alia, the ground that there was “no ostensible sale
of the mortgaged property on the date of the document.”
A mortgage deed which begins as a mortgage transaction cannot be called a
mortgage by conditional sale, though it is a mortgage which gives the mortgagee
after a certain time and on breach of certain conditions by the mortgagor a right
to claim a title as vendee. That is, a mortgage with a clause providing for a
future conditional sale and not a mortgage by means of a present sale transaction.
The Court, therefore, held that the document was a usufructuary mortgage as it
fitted the definition of such kind of mortgage under the Act and the fact that
it contained a personal covenant by the mortgagor to pay. It was held to be a
simple mortgage. The document was, therefore, a combination of both a usufructuary
and simple mortgage.
614 Various court decisions have rejected contracts on land that do not comply with the requirements of
the Law of Contract Act. In Ol Loita Road Limited v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited, ELC number 593 of 2010 –
Nairobi, the Court held that “If a party is seeking to endorse a contract in relation to land, the contract
has to be in writing and signed by the parties to it and witnessed as required by the section.” See also
Western Pumps Limited v Joseph Wainaina Iraya T/A Queen Chick Inn and another, High Court civil case number
186 of 2006. In Metra Investments Limited v Gakweli Mohamed Warrakah, High Court civil case number 54 of 2006
– Milimani, the Court held “As the case is presented, there is no evidence that an agreement in writing exists
signed by both parties and witnessed as required by section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act. In the absence of
such agreement, the section is clear that no suit shall be brought for the disposition of an interest in land.
The applicant does not appear therefore, to have a prima facie case with a probability of success.”
618 Section 52 of the Transfer of Property (Repealed) Act provides for the doctrine of lis pendens under
which a property which is subject of a suit is not to be transferred.
620 Ibid. the Court stated, in part, “…upon perusal of the charge document which forms part of the exhibits
that were attached to the replying affidavit, it is evident that although the bank reserved the right to vary
the rate of interest, there was, however, no rate specified therein as either the base lending rate, minimum
rate, or the commencing rate of interest for the facility. Had the rate been specified, then, I would have had
no difficulty in finding in favour of the bank. As the matter now stands, the agreement which forms the basis
for the contractual relationship between the parties hereto is silent on that particular issue, in which event
the rate cannot be inferred by the court.”
624 Ibid, section 65(1) states in part “…and the instrument shall, except where section 74 has by the
instrument been expressly excluded, contain a special acknowledgement that the chargor understands the effect
of that section, and the acknowledgement shall be signed by the chargor or, where the chargor is a corporation,
by one of the persons attesting the affixation of the common seal.”
626
Supra, ITPA, section 59 states, in part “59. Where the principal money secured is one hundred rupees
or upwards, a mortgage can be effected only by a registered instrument signed by the mortgagor and attested by
at least two witnesses. Where the principal money secured is less than one hundred rupees, a mortgage may be
effected either by a registered instrument signed and attested as aforesaid, or (except in the case of a simple
mortgage) by delivery of the property...”
627 Supra, RTA section 1(2) states: “…(2) Except so far as is expressly enacted to the contrary, no Act in
so far as it is inconsistent with this Act shall apply or be deemed to apply to land, whether freehold or
leasehold, which is under the operation of this Act….”
628 The application of sections 59 and 69(4) to mortgages was confirmed by the High Court in the case of
Eccon Construction & Engineering Ltd v Giro Commercial Bank Ltd and another, High Court civil case number 371
of 2003.
632 See also the case of Sophia House Limited v Barclays Bank of Kenya [2005] eKLR. In this case, the
plaintiffs sought to restrain the defendants from exercising their right of possession over the suit property
on grounds that the charge was invalid for failing to comply with the mandatory requirements for attestation
under sections 59 and 69 of ITPA. The court held that “…I find that the charge in the case before this Court
is attested before an advocate in compliance with section 58 of the Registration of Titles Act, and that
therefore, it is valid.”
636 See Kyangavo v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited and another [2004] 1 KLR 126.
639 Supra, RLA, section 77 states: “77. (1) A chargee exercising his power of sale shall act in good faith
and have regard to the interests of the chargor, and may sell or concur with any person in selling the charged
land, lease or charge, or any part thereof, together or in lots, by public auction through a licensed auctioneer
for a sum payable in one amount or by instalments, subject to such reserve price and conditions of sale as the
chargee thinks fit, with power to buy in at the auction and to resell by public auction without being answerable
for any loss occasioned thereby, and may himself bid at any auction.”
640 Auctioneer Rules, 1997, Rule 15 states: “upon receipt of a court warrant or letter of instruction the
auctioneer shall in the case of immovable property…(d) give in writing to the owner of the property a notice
of not less than forty five days within which the owner may redeem the property by payment of the amount set
forth in the court warrant or letter of instruction; (e) on expiry of the period of notice without payment
arrange sale of the property not earlier than fourteen days after the first newspaper advertisement.”
641 Milimani civil suit number 360 of 2001. Also, judgment of Onyango Otieno, J (as he then was), in
Nathakal M Rai v Standard Chartered bank (K) Limited, Milimani civil case number 830 of 1999.
642 See also Trust Bank Limited v Eros Chemist Ltd and another, civil appeal number 133 of 1999 (UR).
643 See Kyangavo v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited and another [2004] 1 KLR 126 at 142.
An administrative receiver might be considered to be the agent of those who appointed
him but this is not the case… (he is) the agent of the company. The reason for this
is to avoid those who appointed the administrative receiver being treated as mortgagees
in possession or being held liable for the receiver’s acts which would be the case
were the receiver to be treated as their agent. As many have pointed out, the
receiver’s agency is a peculiar form of agency. This is because the primary
responsibility of the receiver is to protect the interests of the security holders
and to realize the charged assets for their benefit.
The receiver is empowered to demand and recover all the income of which he is
appointed receiver, appropriate the funds received towards payment of the debt
and incidental charges and to account for the funds.644
645 Supra, RLA section 80 states: “80. For the avoidance of doubt, it is hereby declared that the chargee
shall not be entitled to foreclose, nor to enter into possession of the charged land or the land comprised in
a charged lease or to receive the rents and profits thereof by reason only that default has been made in the
payment of the principal sum or of any interest or other periodical payment or of any part thereof or in the
performance or observance of any agreement expressed or implied in the charge.”
647 See Maranya v NBK Ltd [1995-98] 1 EA 177;Cuckmere Brick Co. Ltd v Mutual Finance [1971] 2 All E R 633.
encumberances, and the balance paid to the mortgagor. The statutory power of sale
and the procedure for exercising such a remedy by the chargee is replicated in
section 90 of the Land Act as follows:
(1). If a chargor is in default of any obligation, fails to pay interest or any
other periodic payment or any part thereof due under any charge or in the
performance or observation of any covenant, express or implied, in any charge, and
continues to be default for one month, the chargee may serve on the chargor a
notice, in writing, to pay the money owing or to perform and observe the agreement
as the case may be;
(2). The notice required by subsection (1) shall adequately inform the recipient
of the following matters-
(a) the nature and extent of the default by the chargor;
(b) if the default consists of the non-payment of any money due under the charge,
the amount that must be paid to rectify the default and the time, being not
less than three months, by the end of which the payment in default must have
been completed;
(c) if the default consists of the failure to perform or observe any covenant,
express or implied, in the charge, the thing the chargor must do or desist from
doing so as to rectify the default and the time, being not less than two months,
by the end of which the default must have been rectified;
(d) the consequence that if the default is not rectified within the time specified
in the notice, the chargee will proceed to exercise any of the remedies referred
to in this section in accordance with the procedures provided for in this sub-
part; and
(e) the right of the chargor in respect of certain remedies to apply to the court
for relief against those remedies.
(3). If the chargor does not comply within two months after the date of service
of the notice under, subsection (1), the chargee may –
(a) sue the chargor for any money due and owing under the charge;
(b) appoint a receiver of the income of the charged land;
(c) lease the charged land, or if the charge is of a lease, sublease the land;
(d) enter into possession of the charged land; or
(e) sell the charged land.
(4). If the charge is a charge of land held for customary land, or community land
shall be valid only if the charge is done with concurrence of members of the family
or community the chargee may-
(a) appoint a receiver of the income of the charged land;
(b) apply to the court for an order to–
i. lease the charged land or if the charge is of a lease, sublease the land or
enter into possession of the charged land;
ii. sell the charged land to any person or group of persons referred to in the
law relating to community land.
7.6.2.3 Foreclosure
This is the mortgagee’s right to obtain a court decree barring the mortgagor from
ever redeeming the mortgage. It is a legal term which implies that the relief
given by equity against forfeiture of the property is withdrawn. The mortgagee
can only exercise this remedy after the mortgage money is due and the mortgagor
has not obtained any court order to redeem the security. This remedy is not
available under the RLA. Section 89(1) of the Land Act prohibits foreclosure by
stating that: “Any rule of law, written or unwritten, entitling a chargee to
foreclose the equity of redemption in charged land is prohibited.”648
653 Section 92(2) of the Land Act states ‘Before appointing a receiver under this section, the chargee
shall serve a notice in the prescribed form on the chargor and shall not proceed with the appointment until a
period of thirty days, from the date of the service of that notice, has elapsed’.
7.6.3.6 Leasing655
Where a charge has exercised his right to appoint a receiver, unless the charge
instrument states otherwise may grant leases in respect to the charged property
and accept a surrender of lease and execute the lease in favour of the charger.
It is important to note that before exercising this remedy, a thirty days notice
should have lapsed after notice has been given before execution of the lease in
place of the chargor
7.7 CONCLUSION
Mortgages and charges are securities for advances of money by the lending bank
to the vendor. Under RLA and RTA, the security is called a charge. Under GLA and
LTA, the security is called a mortgage. The securities can be legal or equitable.
The Land Registration Act refers to the security as a charge. A mortgage
conditionally conveys interest in land to secure repayment of a debt. A charge
gives the chargee the right to repayment of the debt without transferring title
to the land.
Whereas charges are limited in form, there are varied forms of mortgages
depending on the nature of the interest that they confer. Charges and mortgages
should be prepared in a way as to satisfy the statutory and common law
requirements. Reliefs available to the lender in the event of default are set
out in section 90(3) of the Land Act. Any of these remedies are exercisable only
upon compliance with the procedure set out in sections 90(1) and 90(2) of the
Land Act.
CHAPTER EIGHT
LAND TRIBUNALS
8.1 INTRODUCTION
This Chapter analyses the creation, jurisdiction and sample decisions that have
either been rendered by or appealed from the decisions of the National Environment
Tribunal, Business Premises Tribunal and the Land Acquisition Compensation
Tribunal.
656 David Hunter et. al. (2002). International Environmental Law and Policy, 2nd Ed. New York: Foundation
Press, pp. 347-438.
its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future
generations.657
The precautionary principle calls for precaution in the making of environmental
decisions where there is scientific uncertainty.658 It requires that all
reasonable measures be taken to prevent the possible deleterious environmental
consequences of development activities. The need for Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) falls under this principle, as it assesses the impact of proposed
development activities and ensures that any likely adverse impacts on the
environment can be dealt with. The polluter pays principle requires that polluters
of natural resources bear the full environmental and social costs of their
activities.659 While the principle of public participation ensures environmental
democracy, ensuring participation of local communities in the environment and
development decisions that affect their lives.660
In Kenya, environmental management prior to 1999 was done exclusively by use
of sectoral laws contained in about 77 statutes. In 1999, the Environmental
Management and Coordination Act (EMCA)661 was enacted in a bid to coordinate the
sectoral laws on environment. EMCA establishes a number of institutions mandated
to perform distinct functions in environmental regulation.
The highest policy making organ under EMCA is the National Environmental
Council662 which formulates and enforces policy standards for the protection of
the environment.663 The principal instrument of government for implementation of
environmental policies is the National Environmental Management Authority (NEMA).
NEMA supervises and co-ordinates matters that relate to the environment.664 Within
provinces and districts, the EMCA authorises the Minister (now Cabinet Secretary)
for Environment to appoint Provincial and District Committees chaired by the
respective Provincial and District Commissioners, with the mandate of discussing
and making decisions on matters that relate to proper management of the
environment within the province or district.665
658 Goran Hyden and John Mugabe (1999), “Governance and Sustainable Development in Africa,” in H.W.O Okoth
Ogendo et al, Governing the Environment, Nairobi: Acts Press, 35.
659 David Hunter et. al. (2002). International Environmental Law and Policy, 2nd Ed. New York: Foundation
Press, page 412.
660 Ibid.
662 Section 4 of EMCA states: “(1) There is established a council to be known as the National Environment
Council (hereinafter referred to as the “Council”) which shall consist of—(a) the Minister (now Cabinet
Secretary) who shall be the chairman; (b) the Permanent Secretaries in the Ministries for the time being
responsible for the matters specified in the First Schedule; (c) two representatives of public universities in
Kenya to be appointed by the Minister (now Cabinet Secretary); (d) two representatives of specialised research
institutions in Kenya to be appointed by the Minister (now Cabinet Secretary); (e) three representatives of
the business community, to be appointed by the Minister (now Cabinet Secretary), one of whom shall be a
representative of oil marketing companies; (f) two representatives of Non-Governmental Organisations active in
the environmental field to be appointed by the Minister (now Cabinet Secretary); (g) the Director-General who
shall be the secretary; and (h) such number of other members as may, from time, be co-opted by the Minister
(now Cabinet Secretary) to be members of the Council.”
663 Ibid, section 5 states: “(a) The Council shall—(a) be responsible for policy formulation and directions
for purposes of this Act;(b) set national goals and objectives and determine policies and priorities for the
protection of the environment;(c) promote co-operation among public departments, local authorities, private
sector, Non-Governmental Organisations and such other organisations engaged in environmental protection
programmes; and(d) perform such other functions as are assigned under this Act.”
664
Ibid, section 9 states: “(1) The object and purpose for which the Authority is established is to
exercise general supervision and co-ordination over all matters relating to the environment and to be the
principal instrument of Government in the implementation of all policies relating to the environment.”
666 Ibid, section 61 states: “The Authority may set up a technical advisory committee to advise it on
environmental impact assessment related reports and the Director-General shall prescribe the terms of reference
and rules of procedure for the technical advisory committee appointed hereunder.”
670 EMCA, section 129 states: “(1) Any person who is aggrieved by:— (a) a refusal to grant a licence or to
the transfer of his licence under this Act or regulations made thereunder; (b) the imposition of any condition,
limitation or restriction on his licence under this Act or regulations made thereunder; (c) the revocation,
suspension or variation of his licence under this Act or regulations made thereunder; (d) the amount of money
which he is required to pay as a fee under this Act or regulations made thereunder; (e) the imposition against
him of an environmental restoration order or environmental improvement order by the Authority under this Act
or regulations made thereunder; may within sixty days after the occurrence of the event against which he is
dissatisfied, appeal to the Tribunal in such manner as may be prescribed by the Tribunal.”
671 EMCA, section 3(4) states: “A person proceeding under subsection (3) of this section shall have the
capacity to bring an action notwithstanding that such a person cannot show that the defendant’s act or omission
has caused or is likely to cause him any personal loss or injury provided that such action— (a) is not frivolous
or vexatious; or (b) is not an abuse of the court process.” Contrast this with earlier decisions such as
Wangari Maathai v The Kenya Times Media Trust (1989) KLR 267, and Maathai and others v City Council of Nairobi
and others, civil case number 72 of 1994, where the Courts held that Professor Wangari Maathai had no locus to
bring a claim for environmental protection where she suffered no personal injury.
673 Ibid. The grounds of the appeal were that the said L.R. number 8325 North of Kikuyu Township was zoned
as a residential area; the second respondent emitted offensive ‘fuel oil boiler’ smoke and other vapours and
fumes into the residential property; the second respondent produced various loud and disturbing sound from
operating machines which ran 24 hours round the clock for several days; the second respondent’s workers made
a lot of noise especially when carrying out metal fabrication works at night; waste products from the second
respondent produced smoke that Actowed and flew into the neighbourhood with offensive smell; and that the smoke
and fumes irritated people’s and livestock’s noses, throats and eyes. In its amended replying affidavit dated
24 July 2007, the Director General, NEMA, the first respondent stated that it was the responsibility of the
second respondent to ensure that its project was environmentally sustainable with adequate mitigation measures.
That the mitigation measures had to take into consideration the local community’s concerns and also ensure
that their project was in conformity with the precautionary principle, sustainable development and sound
environmental management principles. The second respondent, in its replying affidavit stated that it carried
out its operation in strict compliance with Special Condition set out in the title document and pursuant to
the licence granted to it by NEMA; that it had installed systems as required by law to ensure that no
offensive/pollutive emissions were released into the air and factory neighbourhood; that its workers carried
out their work inside its buildings and could therefore not be heard from outside; that its factory rubbish
Tribunal declined to restrain the second respondent from operating the factory.
The appellants failed to prove that the factory was operating in a residential
zoned area. The area was being used for a mixture of residential, commercial and
industrial purposes.
Secondly, there was no evidence produced to show that the factory emitted
offensive, fumes and vapours and generated offensive noise; there was no evidence
among the appellants who had been chocked by fumes or of livestock belonging to
any of the appellants having been treated at any time for coughing. Further,
that there was no evidence of open burning of any rubbish and no evidence of any
liquid effluent, apart from storm water, being discharged into open drains.
Regarding claims of noise, the appellants had not taken any steps to carry out
any noise level measurements themselves, thus could not contradict the sound
measurements carried out by the second respondent, which was within
internationally accepted standards. The case is instructive that the burden to
prove breach of environmental regulation lies with the person alleging such
breach.
Whereas it is desirable to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA)
study before undertaking a project, not all projects would require preparation
of an EIA study. In such instances, the developer prepares an EIA project report
and submits the same for approval by NEMA. In an EIA project report, the rigours
stipulated in the EIA and Audit Regulations, 2003674 of gazettment, radio
announcements in official and local languages among others, are not required.
The report, though, would be submitted to lead agencies among others. 675
The case of Nakumatt Holdings Limited v Director General, NEMA and another 676
considered the question as to whether an EIA Project Report submitted by Great
Properties Limited (“second respondent”) in support of its application for an
EIA license for the development of a housing estate on Plot LR number 209/10829,
Nairobi, was sufficient to sanction the development of the project. The land on
which the housing estate was to be developed adjoined Nakumatt headquarters off
Mombasa Road. The second respondent had commenced construction of the eut on
being informed of the need for an EIA licence, it stopped construction. The
Director, NEMA, approved the EIA Project Report and exempted the second respondent
from carrying out a full EIA study, thereby prompting the appeal to the Tribunal.
According to Nakumatt, the air pollution levels in the area were higher than
the World Health Organization (WHO) standards for long term human exposure and
the heavy traffic density and 24-hour industrial operations produced high noise
levels for a residential development. Further, Nakumatt argued that the proposed
development to construct a 350-unit housing estate in an area where no less than
13 industries were located was ‘‘out of character with its surroundings.’’
Nakumatt, therefore, argued that the project needed a full EIA study to be
approved, not just the Project Report alone, which denied the appellant of an
opportunity to provide comments. The Tribunal held that EIA licensing process
assesses the likely significant impacts of a proposed project on the project.
In deciding on the nature of the likely impacts, account is taken of the status
of the environment within which the proposed project would be undertaken. Factors
was disposed off in accordance with strict procedures as required by law and to prove this he produced an
Agreement and Contract Review with Biosyte Waste Management System, List of Waste disposed off, Certificate of
Waste Disposal and Incineration, Destruction Certificates, Invoices and Receipts for payment of disposal
services and contract with KEMRI; that the noise emitted from its factory was within acceptable limits; and
that it had approved systems in place for the disposal of factory water effluent which was not discharged into
open drainage running along the road.
679 In terms of the Physical Planning Act (Chapter 286) Laws of Kenya.
Audit Regulations, particularly failing to provide an opportunity for public
participation in the report.
In its response, the first respondent disputed the locus standing of the first
appellant to prefer the appeal and that the appeal did not disclose any reasonable
cause of action as contemplated in section 129(1) of EMCA; that the concerns of
all stakeholders were borne in mind before the requisite approval was given,
subject to the terms and conditions it considered appropriate, to which the
second respondent confirmed acceptance. According to the second respondent, the
first respondent was not under any legal obligation to invite public comments
upon receipt of the project report; that there were no clear environmental issues
that had been legitimately, procedurally and legally put forth to the Tribunal;
that the grounds of appeal were emotive and personal business interests disguised
as environmental concerns that could not hold vis-à-vis the benefit of expertise
provided by an expert opinion on the impact of the environment; that the second
respondent acted with in all the laws desired of it respecting environment,
health and security; and that whereas there were likely to be some environmental
impacts in relation to the proposed development, there were and had been disclosed
sufficient mitigation measures to deal with the same as envisaged in EMCA.
On whether the second respondent ought to have presented an EIA Study Report
or an EIA Project Report, the Tribunal noted that the appellant’s ground that
the respondents were obliged to invite public comments was unfounded. However,
due to the sensitive and fragile nature and uniqueness of the Mara ecosystem,
the Tribunal noted that the appellants were right to invoke Regulation 10(2) and
10(3) of the Regulations to demand that a full EIA study ought to have been
conducted. The Tribunal held that an EIA study report and the process provided
by the law of EMCA be carried out.
Further, in the case of A Abdallah, Chairman, Donholm Phase 5 Residents’
Association and another v Director General, National Environment Management
Authority (NEMA) and another,680 the appellants sought orders from the Tribunal
to stop the second respondent, Jane Ngonyo, from constructing storeyed apartments
in their neighbourhood in Donholm, and to cancel an EIA licence issued to the
developer and to order demolition of the second respondent’s building.681
The Tribunal held that whereas the second respondent commenced construction
of the five-storey building intended for use as residential apartment without
first obtaining NEMA’s approval and license and subsequently took steps to remedy
the situation by applying for and obtaining NEMA’s approval and EIA licence, NEMA
did not have adequate chance to fully regulate the development and the approval
contravened express provisions of law regarding EIA. Secondly, the Tribunal noted
that the second respondent took steps to apply for an EIA licence after NEMA’s
intervention, but she did not appoint an EIA expert to prepare a project report
in support of her application for development approval and issuance of an EIA
licence.
681 The second respondent was constructing a 4-storey apartment in an area that had bungalows of two
bedrooms and bed-sitter. The grounds of the appeal were that NEMA issued an EIA licence to the second respondent
without the second respondent’s consultation with residents; the second respondent was constructing a 4-storey
apartment without parking provision and the tenants would block parking facilities for other tenants; the
second respondent was constructing apartments of twenty four families that would need a lot of water and sewer
services thereby overburdening the existing water and sewer services; the change of user obtained related to
a different person from the second respondent and the conditions for obtaining the change of user were not
being complied with; and that the storey building would block some houses from sunlight in the neighbourhood.
The respondents opposed the appeal on grounds that NEMA is authorized to issue EIA licence; that when the first
respondent received an EIA project report from the second respondent, it sent out and consulted with lead
agencies over the project report and received no objection to the development; that the second respondent
obtained change of user to the project; and that issues raised by the appellants were outside the jurisdiction
of the first respondent, but within the City Council’s jurisdiction.
More critically, the second respondent departed from her commitment and express
presentations to NEMA which formed the basis of NEMA’s approval by representing
to NEMA that the flat would be a three-storey building instead of five-storey
building. Two of the second respondent’s floors were therefore constructed
without NEMA’s approval. Thirdly, that the public was denied the opportunity to
participate in the development before commencement as the second respondent
failed to conduct stakeholder consultations. The Tribunal, therefore, found that
the second respondent failed to legal requirements regarding EIA, specifically
the requirements for description of the nature and design of a project and
defiance of the Tribunal’s previous stop orders. The second respondent was thus
ordered to demolish two of the five floors of her building which had been
constructed without NEMA approval.
The upshot in the foregoing cases is that Environmental Impact Assessment is
a systematic examination conducted to determine whether or not a project or
activity will have any adverse effects on the environment. The developer is
required to prepare a project report and submit it to NEMA for approval.682 If
NEMA is satisfied with the project description and the proposed environmental
management plan, it may not mandate a full environmental assessment study. When
projects or developments to be undertaken do not pose substantial risks as to
warrant an Environment Impact Assessment Study, such projects are undertaken once
a project report is submitted to NEMA and a licence issued accordingly.
However, if a party is aggrieved with the approval or issuance of the licence
by NEMA, and files an appeal with the Tribunal, the Tribunal is obliged under
section 129(4) of EMCA, to issue a stop order, and the status quo of any matter
or activity, which is the subject matter of the appeal, is maintained until the
appeal is determined. Once the project is approved, a developer is required to
obtain approval of development plans from the relevant local authority. In
Nairobi, for instance, development plans are approved by the County Government
of Nairobi. Such approved proposals, pursuant to the provisions of the City of
Nairobi (Building) By-Laws, 1948,683 and Local Government (Adoptive by-laws)
Building Order, 1968,684 are to be commenced within a period of twelve months of
the date of the approval. If the proposals are not commenced within twelve months
of the date of the approval, or are not completed within two years of such date,
then the approval would be null and void and the carrying out of any work
thereunder after such lapse would be illegal;685 the developer would in the
circumstances be obliged to seek extension of the approval of the proposals.
Lastly, under section 64(1) of EMCA, NEMA is empowered to direct a fresh
Environment Impact Assessment Study evaluation to be carried out. This power is
exercisable where there is substantial change or modification in the project or
if the manner in which it is operated poses an environmental threat which could
not be foreseen at the time of the study, evaluation or review, or if it is
established that the information or data given by a proponent in support of his
application for an environmental impact assessment licence under section 58 was
false, inaccurate or intended to mislead. Such powers are undertaken mostly where
there is a full EIA study.
682 See Regulations 7 and 17(1) of the Environment (Impact Assessment and Audit) Regulations, 2003.
685 See Associated Motors v Director General NEMA and another, Tribunal Appeal No. NET 29 of 2008.
relating to controlled tenancies.686 A controlled tenancy is a tenancy of a shop,
hotel or catering establishment that is either not reduced in writing, or if it
is in writing, is for a period not exceeding five years, is determinable within
five years from commencement, or is specified by the Minister (now Cabinet
Secretary) to be a controlled tenancy.687 Controlled tenancy may be terminated
or altered by issuing at least two months’ notice in a prescribed form. In the
case of Lall v Jeypee Investments Ltd,688 it was held that a landlord issuing a
termination of tenancy notice had to count the date of effectiveness of notice
from the time of receipt of the same by the tenant; and the notice itself had to
be expressed in the prescribed form. In the words of Justice Madan stated as
follows:
“I do not accept the argument that the landlord should be exonerated because he used
the form that was available to him at the time he gave his notice. In my opinion, it
matter not that at the time of giving of notice by a landlord, no form has been
prescribed or there is in existence a prescribed form which is not in conformity with
the provisions of the Act. It is quite useless to serve a notice which is not in
conformity with the provisions of the Act. A landlord giving notice must strictly
comply with subsection (5). If I may use a word from the judgment of Plowman, J in
Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd v Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd (No. 2) [1971] 1 WLR
1032 at page 1036, the Court is forbidden by subsection (5) to enforce any notice
which is not given in strict conformity with the provisions of the Act.”
The tenancy notice must specify the grounds upon which the issuing party is
seeking termination, alternation or reassessment of a term of the tenancy, and
must notify the receiving party to notify the issuing party in writing, within
one month of receiving the notice, whether or not he agrees to comply with the
notice.689 A party receiving a termination notice is required to notify the
issuing party within one month of receipt of the notice as to whether he complies
with the notice. Also, a party receiving the termination notice is entitled to
make a reference to the Business Premises Tribunal before expiry of the notice
period, if he wishes to contest the termination.690
Reference of the matter to the Tribunal automatically stays the tenancy notice
till the Tribunal determines the issue.691 Worth noting is that controlled
tenancies survive the tenant; death of a tenant does not, of itself, terminate
a controlled tenancy. In the case of Waljee v Rose, it was held that:
It is to be noted that there is nothing in the [Landlord and Tenant (Shops, Hotels
and Catering Establishments) Act] to suggest that death of the tenant would terminate
a controlled tenancy under [the] common law: ‘A tenancy does not determine by the
death of a lessee, but will vest in his legal personal representatives, who are
entitled to give or receive the proper notice to quit.692
For a tenancy notice to be valid, the issuing party must demonstrate a firm and
settled intention to undertake the grounds upon which the tenancy notice is
687 Section 2 of the Landlords and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishment) Act (Chapter 301) Laws
of Kenya.
689 Section 4 of the Landlords and Tenant (Shops, Hotels and Catering Establishment) Act.
690 Section 6(1). of the Act. The Tribunal is required to notify the party against whom the reference is
made of the reference within seven days of the receipt of the reference.
691 Ibid.
698 Nairobi CA civil application number 74 of 2007. In this case, the applicant, David Thiongo, who traded
in the name of Welcome General Stores was a tenant of Market Fancy Emporium, the respondent, under a controlled
tenancy. On 27 May 2004, the respondent issued a notice notifying the applicant of its intention to terminate
the tenancy on the ground that the respondent itself wanted to occupy the premise for a period of more than
one year. Whereas the applicant notified the respondent that he would not comply with the notice, the applicant
did not make any reference to the Tribunal, which, the respondent contended meant that the termination notice
took effect. The respondent then filed an application for eviction in the magistrate’s court. Whereas the
respondent filed a Defence, the magistrate struck out the Defence and entered a summary judgment in favour of
the respondent, thereby prompting an appeal by the applicant to the High Court and simultaneously sought an
order for stay of the magistrate’s court order pending the hearing of the appeal. The High Court refused to
grant the Order for stay thereby prompting the appeal to the Court of Appeal and seeking an order for injunction
against the respondent from evicting the applicant from the suit premises.
699 Section 15(4) of the Act states: “Provided that the decision of the High Court on any appeal under this
Act shall be final and shall not be subject to further appeal.”
704 Ibid.
709 No sale agreement or transfer was presented to the Tribunal by the applicant.
8.5 CONCLUSION
Disputes relating to the management of land and the environment are adjudicated
upon by a number of tribunals, including the National Environment Tribunal,
Business Premises Tribunal and Land Acquisition Compensation Tribunal. The
National Environment Tribunal hears appeals from decisions of the Director
General, NEMA or Committees of NEMA. Most common environmental disputes handled
by the Tribunal seek to challenge approvals of EIA project report vis-à-vis the
need for an EIA study before undertaking a development with a view to compel the
requirement of greater public participation before the development is undertaken.
EIA is a systematic examination conducted to determine whether or not a
project or activity will have any adverse effects on the environment. The
developer is required to prepare a project report and submit to NEMA for approval
which then issues a licence. If a party is aggrieved with the approval or issuance
of the licence by NEMA, and files an appeal with the Tribunal, it may issue a
stop order to stay the development until the appeal is determined. A full EIA
study may then be directed by the Tribunal. Business Premises Tribunal adjudicates
over disputes relating to controlled tenancies. A controlled tenancy is a tenancy
of a shop, hotel or catering establishment that is either not reduced in writing,
711 LACT number 36 of 2009 (Consolidated with LACT number 35 of 2009 – Lydia Wanjiku Gathecha v Commissioner
of Lands and LACT number 37 of 2009 – Mr. and Mrs Michale M. Njuguna v the Commissioner of Lands).
or if it is in writing, is for a period not exceeding five years, is determinable
within five years from commencement, or is specified by the Minister (now Cabinet
Secretary) to be a controlled tenancy.
Controlled tenancy is determinable or capable of alteration by issuing at
least two months’ notice in a prescribed form. The tenancy notice must specify
the grounds upon which the issuing party is seeking termination, alternation or
reassessment of a term of the tenancy, and must notify the receiving party to
notify the issuing party in writing, within one month of receiving the notice,
whether or not he agrees to comply with the notice. There must be a firm and
settled intention by the issuing party to undertake the grounds specified in the
termination notice. A party receiving the termination notice is entitled to make
a reference to the Business Premises Tribunal, before expiry of the notice period,
if he wishes to contest the termination.
An appeal lied to the High Court from the Tribunal and such appeal is final.
The Land Acquisition and Compensation Tribunal adjudicated over disputes relating
to the decision of the Commissioner of Lands in respect of land compulsorily
acquired. An appeal lay to the High Court from the decision of the Tribunal as
of right, and to the Court of Appeal on a question of law only. The Tribunal took
into account the following factors in determining the propriety of the award of
compensation by the Commissioner for Lands, to wit: the developments made on the
land; valuation report relied upon by the Commissioner and the competencies of
the valuers; comparable pieces of land relied upon by the Commissioner; and the
extent to which the acquisition process has affected the developments made on
the land including any lost profits.
CHAPTER NINE
712 Thomas and Spencer (1938), A History of Uganda Land and Survey Department, Entebbe: Government Printers,
p. 68.
713 John T. Mugambwa (2002), Principles of Land Law in Uganda, Kampala: Fountain Publishers Ltd, p. 3.
714 Morris and Read, Uganda, the Development of its Laws and Constitution, page 46.
715 Obol-Ochola (1969), Land Law Reform in East Africa, Kampala: Milton Obote Foundation, pp. 255-64.
716 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, article 237 states in part: “(1) Land in Uganda belongs to
the citizens of Uganda and shall vest in them in accordance with the land tenure systems provided for in this
Constitution. (2) Notwithstanding clause (1) of this article— (a) the Government or a local government may,
subject to article 26 of this Constitution, acquire land in the public interest; and the conditions governing
such acquisition shall be as prescribed by Parliament; (b) the Government or a local government as determined
by Parliament by law shall hold in trust for the people and protect natural lakes, rivers, wetlands, forest
reserves, game reserves, national parks and any land to be reserved for ecological and touristic purposes for
the common good of all citizens; (c) noncitizens may acquire leases in land in accordance with the laws
prescribed by Parliament, and the laws so prescribed shall define a noncitizen for the purposes of this
paragraph. (3) Land in Uganda shall be owned in accordance with the following land tenure systems— (a)
customary; (b) freehold; (c) mailo; and (d) leasehold. (4) On the coming into force of this Constitution— (a)
all Uganda citizens owning land under customary tenure may acquire certificates of ownership in a manner
prescribed by Parliament; and (b) land under customary tenure may be converted to freehold landownership by
registration.”
719 Babiruga v Karegyesa and others D.R. CA No. MKA 13 of 1993 (unreported).
must not have precluded application of customary law to the land.720 Common laws
are judge-made laws as administered by the “High Court of Uganda,”721 and together
with principles of equity are applicable subject to qualifications as the
circumstances render them necessary.722 This sub-topic explores the principles
upon which land is accessed, held and managed in Uganda, as defined by the
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, the statutory and common law, as well as
the principles of equity.
Land Ownership
Taking cue from the provisions of article 237 of the Constitution of Uganda, the
Land Act identifies distinct tenure systems under which land can be accessed and
owned in Uganda. The Act recognises the government land tenure system, limited
to land that was in government use at the time that the Constitution came into
effect on 22 September 1995. Such land includes land on which there are government
offices, buildings, schools, hospitals, police and military quarters, or such
land, either compulsorily acquired by the Government, or voluntarily purchased
by the Government from a willing seller. Government land also includes natural
lakes, rivers, wetlands, forest reserves, game reserves, national parks, and any
land reserved for ecological and tourist purposes. The central and local
governments are obliged to hold in trust for the people and to protect such land
for the common good of the citizens of Uganda.723 Section 15 of the Act empowers
the central or local governments to acquire land for public use, public safety,
public order, public morality, public health and in interest of defense.724
Further, the government or local government may acquire land in the public
interest.725
It is unclear as to what constitutes and who determines ‘public interest.’
This void is open to abuse, arbitrariness and imposition of executive fiat in
compulsorily acquiring land in disguise of public interest. Worse still, there
is no express statutory provision obliging central or local governments to provide
affected interest holders in land with alternative land or the need to consult
such interested parties.
Equally recognized by the Land Act are freehold and leasehold tenure, also
known as individual tenure.726 Non-citizens may hold land only on leasehold
tenure not exceeding ninety nine years. Section 14 of the Act provides that: “(1)
A non-citizen may acquire a lease in land… (3) A non-citizen shall not be granted
726 According to Obol-Ochola, individualization process occurs when a person or group or family is able to
register or record freehold title to the land held customarily by the person or the group. See Obol-Ochola
(1970), Customary Law and Development in Uganda, LLM Dissertation, University of Dar es Salaam.
a lease exceeding ninety nine years.” Restricting non-citizens from owning land
in perpetuity may be applauded for curbing against landlessness.
Individualization of tenure has been argued, to increase tenure security of the
landholder thereby reducing litigation costs in land ownership related
disputes.727 Secondly, individualization of title is an incentive for
agricultural investments that gives farmers access to credit by using the land
as collateral and reduces land fragmentation into economically unviable
parcels.728
The mailo tenure is recognized under the Land Act. As stated in the preceding
parts of this Chapter, mailo tenure comprised land allotments to the Kabaka and
his chiefs following the 1900 Agreement between the Baganda Kingdom and the
British. Section 4(4) of the Land Act describes ‘mailo tenure’ as a form of
tenure which derives its legality from the Constitution and its incidents from
written law.729 The land was measured in square miles, thus the coinage, mailo.
Mailo tenure thus succeeds in excluding the rest of the population from enjoying
similar rights in land as those of the Kabaka and his chiefs. As noted by Okuku,
‘the population is not only deprived of the rights of ownership but also the
rights of occupancy.’730 Worth noting is that mailo tenure was restored by the
Land Act after it had been abolished by the Land Reform Decree of 1975. The Land
Act has therefore attempted to preserve the rights of bona fide occupants of
mailo land. Bona fide occupants of mailo land possess certificates of occupancy
and enjoy security of tenure on the land.731 A registered owner of mailo land
is entitled to ground rent, which if it remains unpaid for a period exceeding
three years, may entitle the registered owner to terminate the tenancy. 732
Under customary tenure, a community or a group bases the fundamental principle
of land ownership on collective ownership. They enjoy usufructuary rights in land
which right is transferred through inheritance. In accordance with article
237(4)(a) of the Constitution of Uganda which entitles all Ugandan citizens
owning land under customary tenure to certificates of ownership, section 4(1) of
the Land Act provides that: “any person or community holding land under customary
tenure may acquire a certificate of customary ownership.” Section 5 of the Act
reinforces the foregoing provision by providing that “any person or community
holding land under customary tenure may convert the customary tenure into
freehold.” Thus, it is apparent under the Act and the Constitution that the
ultimate aim is to transform customary tenure into individually owned estates,
held increasingly in private tenure, freehold and leasehold.
Market-based arguments such as insecurity of customary tenure in view of
collective ownership which hinders use of the land as collateral; tendency to
misuse land resources via irrational husbandry techniques such as shifting
cultivation/grazing which are inefficient and uneconomical; and land
fragmentation arising out of inheritance practices leading to uneconomic pieces
727 Barrows and Roth (1990), “Land Tenure and Investment in African Agriculture: Theory and Evidence,” in
Journal of Modern African Studies, page 268, Vol. 2.
728 Platteau J.P. (1995), Reforming Land Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa: Issues of Efficiency and Equity,
UNRISD, Discussion Paper, No. 60, Geneva.
729 John T. Mugambwa (2002), Principles of Land Law in Uganda, Kampala: Fountain Publishers Ltd, page 10.
730 Okuku J. Anthony (2006), The Land Act (1998) and Land Tenure Reform in Uganda, in Journal for Africa
Development, Vol. XXXI, No. 1, pp. 1-26 at 15.
733 Makubuya K. (1981), ‘Land Law Reform and Rural Development in Uganda,’ in Nsimambi, A. and Katorobo,
J. (eds), Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Proceedings of the Conference on Rural Rehabilitation and
Development, held at Makerere University, September 14-18.
737 Mafeje, A. (1973), “Agrarian Revolution and the Land Question in Buganda,” in Institute of Social
Studies (ISS), Occasional Papers, The Hague.
it into productive use. Lastly, the concept of registerable interest is not
clearly articulated in respect of mailo tenure under the Land Act considering
that whereas a bona fide occupant is issued with certificate of ownership, it is
not lost that it is the mailo land owner that possesses the land title. This
enables the landowner to evict the bona fide occupant, who is more or less of a
tenant, and also creates overlapping claims in respect of the same parcel of land
and befuddles the definition of property rights.
The appointment of the members of the Uganda Land Commission by the President
creates an avenue for propagation of political-ethnic biases, lack of
representativeness and meritocracy. Regarding District Land Boards, the Act may
be criticized for failing to specify accountability mechanisms in place to which
members of the Board may be held answerable. Such a gap may be a recipe for
corruption and land grabbing in the process of transfer of interests in land.
Historical Perspective
Land tenure system principles, as established through the Land Ordinance of 1923,
were only slightly changed after independence in Tanzania. For instance, under
the Land Ordinance, 1923, all declared public land was vested in the Governor.
After independence, amendments were made to vest such land in the President. The
erstwhile recognized freehold titles recognized under the Ordinance were
abolished by the Freehold Titles (Conversion) and Government Leases Act,
1963.738 Such that, until 1999, the Land Ordinance, 1923 remained the basic land
tenure and land use law in Tanzania. The Ordinance recognized customary land
rights, the so-called ‘deemed occupancy rights’ and statutory land rights, also
known as ‘granted occupancy rights.’ Granted rights of occupancy were mostly held
by the immigrants in the colonial times and were more clearly defined than ‘deemed
or customary rights of occupancy’ which colonial authorities construed as ‘public
lands’ at the disposal of colonial authorities.739
In the immediate aftermath of independence, Tanganyika’s First Five Year Plan,
largely based on a World Bank Report,740 recommended the integration of
traditional peasants and pastoralists in the world capitalist market through
increasing production of cash crops for export. The integration was achieved
through resettlement of selected farmers in villages under supervision of Village
Settlement Commissions.741 Land tenure became increasingly individualized and
land tenure and land use systems were administered and managed from the top
through regulations, rules and by-laws. By 1966, the government acknowledged that
both the village settlement schemes and range land projects had failed. This led
to the declaration of the policy of African Socialism (ujamaa or brotherness),
self-reliance and rural development in the Arusha Declaration of 1967.742 Rural
areas were developed from scattered rural homesteads to nucleated ‘Ujamaa
739 H.W.O. Okoth Ogendo (2000), “Legislative Approaches to Customary Tenure and Tenure Reform in East
Africa,” in Toulmin, C. and Quan, J.F. (Eds), Evolving Land Rights, Policy and Tenure in Africa, London:
DFID/IIED/NRI.
740 World Bank, The Economic Development of Tanganyika, World Bank, 1961.
741 The Policy of village settlement schemes was laid down in the Land Tenure (Village Settlements) Act
number 27 of 1965, while provision for range land projects was made in the Ranger Development and Management
Act number 51 of 1964.
742 Shivji, I.G. (1998), Not Yet Democracy: Reforming Land Tenure in Tanzania, IIED/HAKIARDHI/Faculty of
Law: University of Dar es Salaam, page 19.
Villages’ under the ‘Villagisation Programme.’743 Parastatals pursued large scale
agriculture and ranching, while small scale communal agriculture was practiced
in the Ujamaa Villages.744
By 1973, villagisation became compulsory and through ‘Operation Vijiji,’ the
whole rural population was supposed to have moved by the end of 1976.745 The
Villages and Ujamaa Villages (Registration, Designation, Administration) Act746
was enacted to provide for allocation of land to a head or ‘kaya’ which
propagated, largely, a patrilineal agenda.747 In 1982, a programme of village
demarcation, titling and registration was started, without first clearing the
existing ‘deemed rights of occupancy’ of villagers to village land, thereby
precipitating disputes related to double allocation of land. The village
demarcation, titling and registration was not successful, thus was abandoned in
the mid nineties and a National Land Policy adopted.748 The adoption of the
National Land Policy saw the enactment of two Acts of Parliament in 1999 which
are subsequently discussed herein alongside the salient provisions of the
National Land Policy.
743 Ministry of Lands and Human Settlements (2000), National Human Settlements Development Policy, Dar es
Salaam, page 11.
745 Ibid.
747 Tumaini Silaa (2001), ‘Beyond the Radical Title: A Research on Women’s Access to Ownership and Control
of Land in Tanzania,’ page 5, in EASSI, Documenting Women’s Experiences in Access, Ownership and Control over
Land in Eastern African Sub-region, Kampala.
749 National Land Policy 1995, paragraph 4.2.4 (ii); (iii); and (iv).
752 Ibid.
760 Ibid.
761 Ibid.
• Where a spouse obtains land under a right of occupancy for the co-occupation and
use of both spouses or where there is more than one wife, there is a presumption
that the spouses will hold the land as occupiers in common, unless a provision in
the certificate of occupancy or certificate of customary occupancy clearly states
that one spouse is taking the right of occupancy in his or her name only.762 The
Registrar is required to register the spouses as occupiers in common.
767 Ibid.
Historical Perspective
The Republic of South Sudan is the world’s newest country, covering an approximate
area of 619,000 square kilometers, estimated to be one third of the total land
area of Sudan.771 The country became independent on 9 July 2011 after two civil
wars with Sudan.772 The wars, which spanned 50 years, delayed development of
basic infrastructure, human services such as education and health, agricultural
investment and agricultural extension. Customary law, specific to each ethnic
group, has governed the use of land and other natural resources in the region
for centuries. Formal land laws have had little impact on the customary tenure
system in South Sudan.
Customary law has governed the use of land in South Sudan for centuries, with
each ethnic group applying its own laws relating to land and land rights within
its own territory. Land laws enacted by governments in Khartoum throughout the
colonial and post-colonial periods do not appear to have seriously affected
customary tenure systems in the South. Thus, on the whole, customary laws and
practices remain largely intact. Although they vary from community to community,
customary institutions and traditional mechanisms continue to govern the access,
use and allocation of land.
However, with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which
established the Government of National Unity (GNU), the Government of South Sudan
(GoSS) recognized the need for legislation, policy and formal institutions to
ensure that land rights are equitable for all South Sudanese.773 The GoSS has
subsequently adopted its own Constitution (subject to the terms of the national
2005 Interim Constitution) and legislation, including a Land Act enacted in
February 2009 meant to regulate land ownership in South Sudan.774.
Historically, the people of South Sudan had never had a centralized system of
governance. The control and management of land was dictated by traditional leaders
exercising both judicial and administrative functions. Although the Land Act
provides a governance framework, it does not outline roles and responsibilities
of land administrations and institutions in great depth. Clear distinctions
between the respective roles of formal and customary institutions in allocating
and governing community lands are particularly lacking.
771 Deng, David and Anuradha Mittal (2011) Understanding Land Investments Deals in Africa: Country Report
South Sudan. http://media.oaklandinstitute.org/understanding-land-investment-deals-africa-south-sudan
(accessed on 15 February 2015).
772 Ibid.
773 Ibid.
774 Ibid.
or private and provides that the land is owned by the people, and that the
government regulates land use.775 In addition, the CPA mandated the establishment
of the South Sudan Land Commission (SSLC), which has begun to develop land
policies that reflect customary rules and institutions, per the Interim (2005)
and Transitional (2011) Constitutions.776
The Transitional Constitution of 2011 states that all land in South Sudan is
owned by the people of South Sudan, and charges the government with regulating
land tenure, land use and exercise of rights to land.777 The Constitution
classifies land as public, community or private land, and requires the GoSS to
recognize customary land rights when exercising the government’s rights to land
and other natural resources.778 The Constitution does not clarify the extent to
which customary rights can limit government’s rights, but does require that all
levels of government incorporate customary rights and practices into their
policies and strategies.
The Land Act regulates land tenure and equally recognizes rights to customary,
public and private tenure and also creates an enabling environment for economic
development in South Sudan. The Local Government Act defines primary
responsibilities of local government and traditional government authorities in
the regulation and management of land, which includes charging customary
institutions with particular responsibilities for administering community land
rights. The Investment Promotion Act establishes procedures for facilitating
access to land for private investment, including by foreign investors, in ways
that balance the interests of both current right holders and investors.
The Land Act recognizes three tenure types: customary, freehold and
leasehold.779 Section 7 of the Act, vests the ownership of land in the South
Sudanese but mandates the government to regulate the land on behalf of the people.
Land used for residences, agriculture, forestry and grazing can be held under
customary tenure.780 Customary land rights are inheritable and can be subject to
usufruct rights and sharecropper agreements, but cannot be permanently
alienated.781 Traditional authorities may allocate lifetime tenure rights to
customary land. However, if a parcel is non-residential and exceeds 250 feddans
(about 105 hectares), traditional authorities must notify local government and
secure their approval in advanceof making any transfer.782 Freehold rights are
held in perpetuity and include the right to transfer the land temporarily or
permanently.783 The Land Law does not state how freehold rights are acquired.
Leaseholds can be obtained for customary and freehold land, and can be granted
for up to 99 years.784 Leases of more than 105 hectares of customary land must
776 Government of South Sudan (2009) The Laws of Southern Sudan: The Land Act (2009). Juba: Government of
Southern Sudan.
777 Ibid.
780 Gafaar, Abdalla. 2011. Forest Plantations and Woodlots in Sudan. Africa Forest Forum.
http://www.sifi.se/wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/Forest-plantations-and-woodlots-in-Sudan.pdf (accessed on 11
April 2015).
781 Ibid.
786 Government of South Sudan (2011) GoSS Draft Land Policy. Southern Sudan Land Commission (Juba).
787 Ibid.
789 Ibid.
790 Ibid.
793 Ibid.
individuals to the Land Authorities based on recommendations from County
Commissioners.
Land Authorities’ responsibilities include: holding and allocating public
lands on behalf of local government; making recommendations on gazetted land
planning; advising on resettlement of IDPs; facilitating the registration and
transfer of land; supporting cadastral operations and surveys; advising local
communities on land tenure, usage and exercise of rights; and coordinating with
the SSLC and other government bodies. The Payam Land Councils are responsible
for the management and administration of land at the district level. Districts
are comprised of subsections called bomas. Members of each Payam Land Council
will be appointed by the State Minister based on recommendations from County
Commissioners and in consultation with the traditional authority in the payams.
Payam Land Councils are composed of: the executive chief of each boma and a
representative from the Farmers and Herders Association, representatives of a
civil society group and one woman recommended by the Payam Women’s Association
Although the Land Act mandates the establishment of local land institutions,
there are no clear procedures for establishing land authorities or councils and,
as a result, very few have been created. Although the draft Land Policy does not
provide additional guidance, it does recommend the development of a Community
Land Act that would establish guiding principles and a legal framework for the
governance of community lands by traditional and formal governing institutions.
The 2009 Land Act, the draft Land Policy and the 2009 Local Government Act
establish a basic legal framework to address compulsory acquisition of private
property by the government.794 The framework includes consulting with local
communities. Under the Land Act, the GoSS, state governments and any other public
authority may expropriate land for public purposes, subject to the payment of
compensation and upon agreement as prescribed by the Act or any other law. The
GoSS may propose to take, reserve or reallocate land for a range of public uses,
including the establishment of national parks, forest reserves, military
installations and rights-of-way.795 The government’s power of expropriation is
restricted to securing land for public use only, and not for subsequent transfer
or sale to private individuals. Government officials are required to provide
clear public explanations when they exercise their authority to restrict or
remove private or customary rights in land.
According to the Act, the procedure for expropriation shall be based on a
consultative process with the communities or individuals concerned, prior to
development of the expropriation plan. As with declarations that render land
‘public,’ any expropriation for investment purposes must be preceded by the
government’s provision to the public and all concerned rights holders of a clear
justification for its actions.796 In addition to consulting the communities that
own the land in question, the Land Act also requires that government officials
and company representatives consult pastoralist groups with secondary rights of
access before making any decision that would affect their grazing rights.797
However, the current land framework for governing large-scale land
acquisitions lacks clear jurisdictional roles for public institutions at all
levels, including an appropriate balance between central oversight and state-
level flexibility, and does not provide a role for the legislative branch in
795 Ibid.
796 Rolandsen, Oystein H (2009) Land, Security and Peace Building in Southern Sudan. PRIO.
797 Ibid.
approving large-scale land allocations.798 Due to this legal ambiguity, there is
currently no uniform procedure for managing large-scale land acquisitions.
Applications for land are managed through ad hoc procedures at various levels of
government, contributing to a lack of transparency and accountability with regard
to many deals.799
CONCLUSION
At independence, Uganda had three tenure regimes, to wit, mailo tenure system,
freehold tenure system, and customary tenure. Post-independence land tenure
system is codified in the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, which identifies
the mailo, freehold, leasehold and customary tenure systems. Management, access
and use of land in Uganda are principally regulated by the Constitution of the
Republic of Uganda, the Land Act, the Registration of Titles Act, Customary Law,
common law and principles of Equity. Whereas the Land Act concerns itself with
land ownership, administration and resolution of land disputes, the Registration
of Titles Act regulates the registration and transfer of titles to land. Ownership
of land under customary law must be consistent with written law, not repugnant
to equity, natural justice, good conscience, and its application must not have
been precluded by the affected parties.
798 Rhode, Michaela (2011) Is South Sudan’s Largest Land Deal a Land Grab? Think Africa Press. 11 September.
799 Ibid.
801 Martin, Ellen and Irina Mosel (2011) City limits: urbanisation and vulnerability in Sudan - Juba Case
Study. Overseas Development Institute, Humanitarian Policy Group.
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