Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind*

Edouard Machery†‡

In cognitive psychology, concepts are those bodies of knowledge that are stored in
long-term memory and are used by default in human beings’ higher cognitive processes
(categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning, etc.). Most psychologists of con-
cepts assume that these mental representations share many scientifically important
properties, and the psychology of concepts is expected to describe those properties.
Psychologists assume thereby that concepts constitute a natural kind. I call this as-
sumption the natural kind assumption. This article challenges the natural kind as-
sumption. It is argued that a growing body of evidence suggests that concepts do not
constitute a natural kind. Hence, the notion of concept is inappropriate, if one aims
at formulating scientifically relevant inductive generalizations about the human mind.

1. Introduction. In cognitive science, concepts are the bodies of knowl-

edge that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in the
higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive rea-
soning, analogy making, language understanding, etc.). Cognitive scien-
tists assume typically that they constitute a homogenous class of mental
representations. Of course, everybody recognizes that there are plenty of
differences between concepts and also between kinds of concepts: DOG
and CAT have different properties and so do folk biological concepts and
concepts of artifacts. But it is assumed that over and above these differ-
ences, the mental representations that are used by default in our higher
cognitive processes share a large number of properties. The goal of a
psychological theory of concepts is to capture those properties. Since it
is assumed that their properties explain many properties of our higher

*Received April 2004; revised September 2004.

†To contact the author, please write to: Department of History and Philosophy of
Science, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e-mail: [email protected].
‡I would like to thank the anonymous referees for their very useful comments. Previous
versions of this article were presented at the University of Paris-Sorbonne in February
2003, at the annual meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology in June
2003, at the Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science in August
2003, at the SOPHA in September 2003, at the Max-Planck Institute for Human
Development in March 2004, and at the University of Pittsburgh in April 2004.
Philosophy of Science, 72 (July 2005) pp. 444–467. 0031-8248/2005/7203-0003$10.00
Copyright 2005 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.

444
 CONCEPTS ARE NOT A NATURAL KIND 445

cognitive processes, developing an adequate theory of concepts is viewed

as a prerequisite for understanding higher cognition.
Such a view is nicely put by the psychologist Gregory Murphy in his
recent survey of the psychology of concepts:

The psychology of concepts cannot by itself provide a full explanation

of the concepts of all the different domains that psychologists are
interested in. This book will not explore the psychology of concepts
of persons, musical forms, numbers, physical motions, and political
systems. The details of each of these must be discovered by the specific
disciplines that study them . . . . Nonetheless, the general processes
of concept learning and representation may well be found in each of
these domains. For example, I would be quite surprised if concepts
of musical forms did not follow a prototype structure (Chapter 2),
did not have a preferred level of categorization (Chapter 7), and did
not show differences depending on expertise or knowledge (Chapter
6). (2002, 2–3, my emphasis)

This view of concepts says essentially that concepts constitute a natural

kind, that is, a class of entities about which many inductive generalizations
can be formulated. I call the view that concepts constitute a natural kind
the natural kind assumption.
The natural kind assumption is widely accepted by psychologists, phi-
losophers of psychology, and more generally, cognitive scientists (some-
times explicitly, e.g., Medin et al. 2000, 123; Prinz 2002; Goldstone and
Kersten 2003, 599). Arguably, it has been part and parcel of the psy-
chology of concepts. Psychologists believe that with the notion of concept,
they have identified one of the important classes for a scientific psychol-
ogy—one of those classes that support the formulation of many inductive
generalizations. Thus, for more than thirty years (Machery 2005), they
have been looking for generalizations about members of this class.1
Despite the widespread endorsement of the natural kind assumption,
this paper sets out to challenge it. Indeed, I make a case for the following
claim: A growing amount of evidence suggests that concepts do not con-
stitute a natural kind. To put it differently, I claim that the bodies of
knowledge that are used by default in our higher cognitive processes do
not constitute a homogenous kind about which many inductive gener-
alizations can be formulated. Thus, the notion of concept is not part of
an adequate taxonomy of our mental representations, if one aims at for-

1. For reviews, see Smith and Medin 1981; Lambert and Shanks 1997; Murphy 2002;
Goldstone and Kersten 2003. In philosophy of psychology, see Margolis 1994; Laurence
and Margolis 1999; Prinz 2002.
446 EDOUARD MACHERY

mulating scientifically relevant inductive generalizations about the human

mind.
Before going any further, I should discard a possible misunderstanding.
In this paper, I am not addressing the usual questions raised about con-
cepts by philosophers of mind. I take for granted the notion of concept
that prevails in cognitive psychology—bodies of knowledge that are used
by default in our higher cognitive processes. And I focus on a psycho-
logical question: Is the class of concepts a natural kind?
In the first section, I cast some light on the natural kind assumption,
spelling out what properties the class of concepts should possess in order
to be a natural kind. On this basis, I present in the second section the
argument from explanatory necessity, which shows that the class of con-
cepts does not possess these properties. In substance, this argument states
that psychologists have to posit several kinds of concepts that have little
in common in order to explain our higher cognitive processes. In the last
two sections, I defend two premises of this argument. In the third section,
I show that the main psychological theories of concepts have posited three
theoretical entities that have little in common, namely, prototypes, ex-
emplars, and theories. In the last section, I present some empirical evi-
dence, drawn from the psychological research on concept combination,
that we are justified in positing these three theoretical entities. I conclude
that the natural kind assumption is misconceived.

2. The Natural Kind Assumption.

2.1. Natural Kind and Induction. The notion of natural kind is essen-
tially enmeshed with the problem of induction (Mill [1843] 1905; Quine
1969; Boyd 1990, 1991; Hacking 1991). For, the notion of natural kind
singles out those classes about which nonaccidental, scientifically relevant
inductive generalizations can be formulated. With this notion, one draws
a distinction between two kinds of classes: those about which inductive
generalizations can be formulated, e.g., atoms, and those about which no
or few generalizations can be formulated, e.g., things that weigh more
than 124 kg. Thus, the members of a natural kind are supposed to share
nonaccidentally a large number of (logically unrelated), scientifically im-
portant properties (or relations) beside the properties (or relations) that
are used to identify them.
Since members of natural kinds have many properties in common,
natural kinds are the building blocks of scientific generalizations. Many
empirical sciences aim at identifying the natural kinds in their domain in
order to develop adequate empirical theories. Psychology is no exception.
Psychologists look for classes of entities about which scientifically relevant
generalizations can be made. They introduce new notions to pick out
 CONCEPTS ARE NOT A NATURAL KIND 447

kinds that are believed to be natural (e.g., the notion of basic emotion)
and they reject notions that turn out to pick out kinds that are not natural
(Griffiths 1997).

2.2. Two Red Herrings: Essences and Laws. The basic idea presented
above has been cashed out in many ways. Which account is best suited
for my present purpose? Clearly, this account has to be applicable to
psychological kinds and to allow many classes to be natural kinds. Oth-
erwise, the denial of the natural kind assumption would simply be trivial.
Two accounts are thus inadequate. According to a common account,
natural kinds are characterized by the possession of an essence, that is,
a set of intrinsic, causally explanatory properties that are necessary and
jointly sufficient to belong to the kind (Putnam 1975). However, it is
unlikely that psychological kinds possess essences—at least, if the func-
tionalist view is true. And this notion is excessively restrictive: for example,
species wouldn’t be natural kinds according to this account (Hull 1978).
One might want to broaden the notion of essence, by including relational
properties alongside intrinsic ones. However, the account of natural kind
under consideration would remain unsatisfactory. For, it would not dis-
tinguish the properties that determine membership from the causally ex-
planatory properties. However, in some natural kinds, the properties that
are causally explanatory are not necessary conditions of membership, for
not all members possess these properties. The class of political parties in
democratic societies, which could be a natural kind in political theory,
illustrates this point. The conditions of membership in this class are ar-
guably different from the causal properties that explain why most dem-
ocratic political parties share many properties.
According to another account, natural kind terms feature in laws, that
is, in generalizations that are temporally and spatially unrestricted and
that support counterfactuals (Collier 1996). Now, psychological kinds
feature in ceteris paribus generalizations—not in laws (Fodor 1974). And,
again, this notion is too restrictive: few kind terms feature in laws. One
could propose to replace the notion of law by the notion of ceteris paribus
generalization. This would be a step in the right direction, as we shall see
below. However, an important element would still be missing from this
account, namely the idea that there is at least one causal mechanism that
accounts for these generalizations. This is an important aspect of the kinds
scientists are interested in for inductive purposes.

2.3. The Causal Notion of Natural Kind. A broader notion has been
developed by Richard Boyd (1990, 1991; Griffiths 1997).

A class C of entities is a natural kind if and only if there is a large

448 EDOUARD MACHERY

set of scientifically relevant properties such that C is the maximal

class whose members tend to share these properties because of some
causal mechanism.

The core idea of this definition is the following. A natural kind is a class
about which many generalizations can be formulated: its members tend
to have many properties in common. These generalizations are not ac-
cidental: there is at least one causal mechanism that explains why its
members tend to have those properties. Finally, this class is not a subset
of a larger class about which the same generalizations could be formulated.
One might object that ‘large’ is too vague. However, this complaint is
unfounded. For the notion of natural kind, like the notion of heap, is
vague. Even if there is no way to sharpen the idea of a ‘large set of
properties’, it remains that the number of properties that can be projected
from one subset of the class to the whole class is one dimension that
distinguishes natural kinds from other classes.
Inversely, one might object that a class of entities that would share only
few scientifically fundamental properties would be a natural kind. First,
one can question whether such classes really exist. These fundamental
properties would plausibly cause the members of these classes to share
other properties. Moreover, if there were such classes, I would stick to
my guns: they would not be natural kinds. For, they would be noticeably
different from the paradigmatic natural kinds. Instead of stretching the
notion of natural kind in order to include them, it would arguably be
better to distinguish two types of scientific kinds: the natural kinds whose
members share many properties and, say, the fundamental kinds, whose
members share few fundamental properties.
In the present context, two aspects of the definition proposed above
are important. First, the properties that characterize a natural kind are
not necessarily possessed by all its members. It is only required that
members of a natural kind tend to have these properties. Hence, natural
kind terms don’t have to feature in laws. It is only required that they
feature in ceteris paribus generalizations.
Second, essences are only one of the possible causal mechanisms that
explain why members of a natural kind share or tend to share many
properties. Boyd (1990) has insisted upon the homeostasis of properties:
in some natural kinds, the occurrence of a property causes the occurrence
of other properties and is caused by their occurrence. Other mechanisms
are possible, including common descent and social causes (Griffiths 1997).

2.4. The Natural Kind Assumption. The causal notion of natural kind
is relevant for my present purpose. It allows psychological kinds to be
natural kinds, since natural kinds do not have to possess essences nor to
 CONCEPTS ARE NOT A NATURAL KIND 449

feature in laws. Moreover, this notion has a large extension: substances,

e.g., gold, physical entities, e.g., atoms, species, e.g., dogs, and artifacts
do qualify as natural kinds. However, the causal notion of natural kind
is not vacuous. It implies that nominal kinds, for instance, the class of
physical objects that weigh more than 30 kg, are not natural kinds. For
their members don’t share many (scientifically relevant) properties. More-
over, it implies that many subsets of natural kinds, e.g., white dogs, are
not natural kinds either. For the properties that are true of white dogs
are true of all dogs (except being white).
In what follows, I use exclusively the causal notion of natural kind.
Hence, the natural kind assumption says that the class of bodies of knowl-
edge that are used by default in our higher cognitive processes possesses
three characteristics:
• There is a large set of properties that these bodies of knowledge tend
to possess.
• These bodies of knowledge possess these properties because of some
causal mechanism.
• This set of properties is specific to this class of bodies of knowledge.
Importantly, psychologists who endorse the natural kind assumption are
not committed to deny the existence of differences between concepts or
kinds of concepts (Medin et al. 2000). For despite these differences, con-
cepts may share a large set of properties.

2.5. The Received View. For more than thirty years, the cognitive psy-
chology of concepts has been built on the view that concepts constitute
a homogenous class about which specific, scientifically relevant general-
izations can be formulated. Although some psychologists have recently
have voiced some doubts (e.g., Ashby et al. 1998; Hahn and Chater 1998;
Smith et al. 1998), many still endorse this view, particularly prototype
theorists (e.g., Hampton 2001; Smith 2002), exemplar theorists (e.g., Juslin
and Persson 2002; Zaki and Nosofky 2004), and theory theorists (e.g.,
Carey 2000). Barsalou and colleagues assume that most concepts, if not
all, are perceptual symbols (Barsalou 1999). The recent search for hybrid
models of concepts (see Section 6) suggests similarly that psychologists
have not renounced the belief that concepts constitute a homogeneous
class of representations. Several philosophers of psychology share this
commitment. For instance, Prinz (2002) proposes that most concepts, if
not all, are proxytypes, that is, context-sensitive perceptual represen-
tations.
Moreover, the received view has driven the methodology of the psy-
chology of concepts and of the higher cognitive functions. In substance,
psychologists have tried to find data that were easily accounted for by
450 EDOUARD MACHERY

their pet theory of concepts, but that were problematic for rival theories.
Rival theories could account for these data only with ad hoc assumptions.
Now, this methodology assumes that the class of concepts is homogenous
and, therefore, that all the data about concepts have to be accounted for
by a unique theory. This is tantamount to assuming the natural kind
assumption.

3. The Argument from Explanatory Necessity.

3.1. The Heterogeneity Hypothesis. Given the causal notion of natural

kind, there are three options to rebut the natural kind assumption:
• It could not be the case that the bodies of knowledge that are used
by default in our higher cognitive processes have many properties
in common.
• These mental representations could have many properties in com-
mon by accident.
• They could have those properties because they are a subset of a
larger set of representations: no empirical generalization could be
made specifically about them.
I propose that the available empirical evidence about our concepts sup-
ports strongly the first option: it is not the case that concepts have in
common a large set of properties.
Indeed, I will argue that the class of concepts is divided into several
kinds of representations that have little in common. I call this claim the
heterogeneity hypothesis. There are several readings of this hypothesis.
One could claim that different types of categories, say the folk biological
categories and the artifact categories, are represented by different kinds
of concepts and that these kinds have little in common. For example,
there could be few properties common to DOG and TABLE, because in
general, concepts of biological kinds and concepts of artifacts could have
little in common. One could also claim that different cognitive processes
are defined over different kinds of concepts and that these kinds have
little in common. For example, a concept of dog used in the categorization
process could have little in common with a concept of dog used in in-
duction, because in general, concepts that are used in the categorization
process and concepts that are used in the induction process could have
little in common. I reject both readings.
Instead, I claim that most categories are represented by several concepts
that belong to kinds that have little in common. For example, we have
several concepts of dog, each of which belongs to a different kind of
concepts. There are few properties common to these concepts because in
general, the corresponding kinds of concepts have little in common. I call
 CONCEPTS ARE NOT A NATURAL KIND 451

Figure 1. The heterogeneity hypothesis.

these kinds the basic kinds of concepts. Each of these concepts of dog can
be used in our higher cognitive processes. We can use DOG1, DOG2,
DOG3, . . . , to categorize, to reason inductively, to reason deductively,
etc. They qualify as concepts because they are poised to be used in our
higher cognitive processes. They are bodies of knowledge that are used
by default by our higher cognitive processes. Save for specific circum-
stances, we rely on these bodies of knowledge, when we decide whether
something is a dog, when we reason about dogs, etc. Beliefs about dogs
that are not part of these bodies of knowledge can be used in our cognitive
processes as well. However, they are not used by default by our higher
cognitive processes, when we think about dogs. They are retrieved from
long-term memory merely occasionally. This version of the heterogeneity
hypothesis is summarized by Figure 1.
452 EDOUARD MACHERY

This view of our higher cognition stands in sharp contrast with the
received view. Our higher cognitive processes are not defined over a ho-
mogenous class of mental representations. Thus, the class of concepts is
not useful to draw scientifically relevant generalizations about our mental
representations. Instead of trying unproductively to characterize the prop-
erties that are generally possessed by concepts, psychologists and other
cognitive scientists’ explicit goal should be to characterize each basic kind
of concepts. I submit that the properties that are characteristic of each
basic kind of concepts are not characteristic of the other basic kinds.
These basic kinds of concepts are the right level for theorizing about our
mental representations.
Some might object that we knew all along that we use different kinds
of knowledge in our higher cognitive processes. Isn’t it obvious that we
can use any kind of knowledge to decide whether something is a dog?
Granted. But this objection is beside the point. For the claim is (i) that
we have specific bodies of knowledge in our mind that are used by default
in our cognitive processes and (ii) that these bodies of knowledge divide
into different kinds that have little in common. That we may use any kind
of information in our higher cognitive processes does not say anything
about the class of bodies of knowledge that are used by default in our
higher cognitive processes. Psychologists and some philosophers of psy-
chology aim at formulating generalizations about this class, assuming
thereby that it is homogeneous. I deny this claim.

3.2. The Argument from Explanatory Necessity. It is now possible to

state the following argument against the natural kind assumption:
The Argument from Explanatory Necessity.

1. Concepts, that is, the bodies of knowledge used by default in our

higher cognitive processes, are posited in order to explain the
properties of these processes.
2. The theoretical constructs posited by the main theories of con-
cepts have little in common.
3. In order to explain the properties of our higher cognitive pro-
cesses, we need to assume that all of these theoretical constructs
are used by default in our higher cognitive processes.
4. Hence, our higher cognitive processes use several kinds of rep-
resentations that have little in common.
5. Hence, concepts are not a natural kind.

The core idea of this argument is straightforward. Concepts are theo-

retical entities that are posited in order to explain the properties of our
 CONCEPTS ARE NOT A NATURAL KIND 453

higher cognitive processes. In order to provide a satisfactory explanation,

we have to posit several kinds of concepts that have little in common.
Which ones? At least those that have been assumed by the main paradigms
of concepts in the recent psychological literature.
Clearly, this argument is empirical. The truth of Premise 3 is an empirical
question. Thus, the whole argument claims that the available empirical
evidence about concepts and about the higher cognitive processes supports
the denial of the natural kind assumption. Since this argument is empirical,
new empirical data could result in a different conclusion.
I will take Premise 1 for granted. Almost all psychologists and many
philosophers of psychology (e.g., Prinz 2002) assume it. Concepts are those
bodies of knowledge that we use by default in our higher cognitive pro-
cesses. Their properties explain how we reason, how we categorize, etc.
In what follows, I argue for Premises 2 and 3.

4. Three Kinds of Representations That Have Little in Common. In this

section, I defend the second premise of the argument from explanatory
necessity. I first present the three main paradigms of concepts in the con-
temporary literature on concepts. Then, I show that they posit three the-
oretical constructs that have little in common.

4.1. Three Theoretical Entities: Prototypes, Exemplars, Theories. Since

the rejection of the classical view of concepts in the 1970s, cognitive
psychology has produced three main views, the prototype view of con-
cepts, the exemplar view of concepts, and the theory view of concepts.2
The prototype view of concepts is built around the idea that concepts
are prototypes3 (e.g., Rosch and Mervis 1975; Smith et al. 1988; Smith
and Minda 2002):
A concept of a class of objects is a prototype, i.e., a body of knowledge
that contains some statistical information about the properties pos-
sessed by the members of this class, particularly, about the properties
possessed by most members of this class.
Prototypes single out the properties of the members of the denoted cat-
egories in statistical terms. In most prototype models (but not in all),
prototypes are assumed to encode some information about the typical
properties of the denoted category, that is, the properties that are judged

2. There are other views of concepts (e.g., Barsalou 1999; Prinz 2002). However, the
argument is strengthened if we have to admit a fourth basic kind of mental represen-
tations (provided that it has little in common with the other basic kinds).
3. The term ‘prototype’ is used ambiguously to design the best member of a category
and the representation of a category. I use the term in this second sense.
454 EDOUARD MACHERY

to be possessed by most members of the category. Importantly, these

properties are not judged to be necessary. For example, to have a concept
of dog is to think by default of dogs as having generally, but not nec-
essarily, such form, as having generally a tail, etc.
According to the exemplar view of concepts, our higher cognitive pro-
cesses are defined over representations of specific category members, which
stand for the whole category (e.g., Medin and Shaffer 1978; Nosofsky
1988; Juslin and Persson 2002).
A concept of a class of objects consists of a set of exemplars, i.e., of
representations of particular members of this class.4
For example, to have a concept of dog is to think by default of dogs as
being the class of entities that are similar to Fido, Pluto, and Spot and
to use these individual representations to reason about dogs in general.
According to the theory view of concepts, our mental representations
are similar to scientific theories and our higher cognitive processes are
similar to scientific forms of reasoning (Murphy and Medin 1985; Carey
1985; Keil 1989; Gopnik and Meltzoff 1997; Keil and Wilson 2000). The
theory view is often put very loosely in the empirical literature. One finds
usually two ideas: (i) concepts are enmeshed within theories and (ii) con-
cepts are theories. I am interested in the second claim.
A concept of a class of entities is a theory about this class, that is,
a body of knowledge that contains some nomological, causal, modal
and functional generalizations about this class
To possess a concept of dog is to think by default of dogs as being the
class of entities that satisfy some kind of theory, i.e., some nomological,
modal, causal and functional generalizations (e.g., a theoretical concept
of dog may say of dogs that they necessarily engender individuals that
belong to the same species).

4.2. Prototypes, Exemplars and Theories Have Little in Common. The

claim is that these three theoretical constructs have little in common. Now,
how does one evaluate how different various kinds of mental represen-
tations are? Clearly, exemplars, theories and prototypes have plenty of
irrelevant properties in common, for example not being cups of tea. What
matters, however, are those properties that psychologists take to be im-

4. In the literature, exemplars are taken to represent either individuals or specific en-
counters with individuals. In the first case, human beings have one representation for
each (represented) member of a category. I have one exemplar of Fido, another one
of Spot, etc. In the second case, whenever I meet Fido, I produce a new exemplar
(Nosofsky 1988). I favor the first idea.
 CONCEPTS ARE NOT A NATURAL KIND 455

portant when they characterize mental representations. Psychologists fo-

cus on the representational properties of mental representations and on
their functional properties, i.e., what mental representations represent and
how they are used in cognitive processes. Hence, if exemplars, prototypes
and theories have different representational and functional properties, this
would suggest that they have little in common. Of course, other properties,
for example neural properties, may turn out to be important to charac-
terize representations. Then, we would have to reevaluate the denial of
the natural kind assumption.
I argue first that prototypes, exemplars, and theories are assumed to
encode three different types of knowledge. According to exemplar theo-
rists, applying a concept to an individual is tantamount to thinking that
this individual is similar to some specific individuals, which are themselves
described as having such and such properties. Thus, the mind stores some
information about the properties of specific individuals, for example, some
descriptions of Fido and Spot.
According to prototype theorists, applying a concept to an individual
is tantamount to thinking that this individual possesses to a sufficient
degree a sufficient number of typical properties. Thus, the mind stores
some statistical information about the properties that characterize classes
of individuals (some prototype theories are more complex).
According to theory theorists, applying a concept to an individual is
tantamount to thinking that this individual possesses some properties
either with some modal force, or because of some law, or for some causal
or functional reason. Thus, the mind is storing some modal, nomological,
causal, and functional information about classes of individuals.
Notice that for most categories, it is possible to encode some infor-
mation about the typical properties of their members, some modal, nomo-
logical and causal information about their members and some information
about the properties possessed by some of their members. Hence, most
categories could be represented by a prototype, a theory and a set of
exemplars.
I argue now that prototypes, exemplars and theories are assumed to be
used in three different kinds of cognitive process. Exemplar theorists and
prototype theorists suppose that the higher cognitive processes involve
the computation of the similarity between some representations, and re-
spectively, sets of exemplars and prototypes. To make this idea a bit more
concrete, consider how a prototype theorist might explain the categori-
zation process. Peter sees a dog. He forms a representation that attributes
some properties to this dog. The properties that are attributed are matched
with the properties that are represented by several prototypes, including
the prototype of dog. The similarity between the dog and each prototype
is computed. Since the similarity between the dog and the prototype of
456 EDOUARD MACHERY

dog is higher than the similarity between the dog and the other prototypes,
Peter concludes that he is seeing a dog. Various properties of our other
higher cognitive processes are similarly explained (see Osherson et al. 1990
on induction; Hampton 1982, 1988 and Sloman 1998 on deduction; Smith
and Osherson 1989 on probabilistic reasoning).
Advocates of the exemplar view would provide a similar explanation
of the categorization process, except that the dog would be compared to
sets of exemplars, instead of prototypes (Nosofsky 1988). Many properties
of the other higher cognitive processes could be similarly explained (e.g.,
Juslin and Persson 2002).
Advocates of the prototype view and of the exemplar view agree on
the role of similarity in our cognitive processes. However, they assume
different ways of computing the similarity between a represented object,
and respectively, prototypes and sets of exemplars. In brief, prototype
theorists assume that the similarity measure is a linear function of the
number of properties common to the concept and the object to be cat-
egorized, while exemplar theorists take it to be a nonlinear function.
The theory view of concepts assumes that our higher cognitive processes
do not rely on similarity. On the contrary, they are supposed to be similar
to the reasoning processes that are used in science. Since theory theorists
are less concerned with our cognitive processes than prototype and ex-
emplar theorists, their views about our cognitive processes are less de-
veloped. Theory theorists often compare our reasoning processes to ex-
planations (Keil and Wilson 2000) or to inferences to the best explanation
(Murphy and Medin 1985). They generally assume that our cognitive
processes follow the standard rules of logic and of probabilistic reasoning
(Smith et al. 1992).
Murphy and Medin (1985) provide the following toy example. If at a
party, a guest jumps in the swimming pool entirely dressed, we may con-
clude that she is drunk. This categorization does not rest on any matching
between our concept of drunk people and our singular representation of
this guest. On the contrary, we infer that the most plausible explanation
of the behavior of this guest is that she is drunk. This inference is supposed
to follow the rules of probabilistic inference.
Finally, it is important to notice that the heterogeneity hypothesis sug-
gests that several cognitive processes underlie categorization, several pro-
cesses underlie inductive reasoning, and so on. If prototypes, exemplars
and theories all exist, and if prototypes, exemplars, and theories are usually
used in different types of cognitive process, then we have plausibly several
ways to categorize, to draw an induction, and so on. To put it a bit
differently, we would have several categorization processes (or several
induction processes, etc.), which would use different kinds of represen-
tations. This suggestion raises an exciting, but yet understudied question:
 CONCEPTS ARE NOT A NATURAL KIND 457

How do these cognitive processes interact or compete? To illustrate, when

we categorize, how do our prototype-based categorization process, our
exemplar-based categorization process, and our theory-based categori-
zation process interact, if they do? This is a topic for further research.
I have shown first that prototypes, exemplars and theories are assumed
to possess different representational properties. I have also shown that
they are assumed to possess different functional properties. Hence, given
the properties that are relevant to characterize mental representations, I
conclude that the main psychological theories of concepts assume three
kinds of mental representations that have little in common. This conclusion
supports Premise 2. In other words, I have established the following con-
ditional claim: if it can be shown that prototypes, exemplars, and theories
exist and are used by default in our higher cognitive processes, then con-
cepts are not a natural kind.

5. Concept Combination and the Natural Kind Assumption. I propose that

we need to posit the three kinds of representations described above. It is
of course impossible to review in this article the large body of evidence
that supports this claim. In this section, I focus instead on a specific
cognitive competence, the capacity to combine concepts. Since Osherson
and Smith’s seminal study (1981), concept combination has been a hot
topic among psychologists of concepts (see the reviews in Hampton 1997
and Murphy 2002, chap. 12). Their results suggest that concept combi-
nation requires the kinds of knowledge that exemplars, prototypes and
theories are assumed to represent. This is evidence for Premise 3 of the
argument from explanatory necessity.5

5.1. Concept Combination. Concept combination is the capacity to

form new bodies of knowledge about classes for which we have no concept
permanently stored in long-term memory. Those representations, e.g.,
GRANDMOTHER SPY, are formed on the basis of other representations
stored in long-term memory, e.g., GRANDMOTHER and SPY. A con-
cept is simple if and only if it is a permanent body of knowledge in long-
term memory. There is a finite stock of simple concepts. A complex con-
cept is not stored permanently in long-term memory, but has to be
produced on the fly for various cognitive purposes (e.g., for language
comprehension, reasoning, etc.).6 The claim that concepts combine means

5. How psychologists’ empirical work on concept combination relates to the com-

positionality arguments in philosophy of mind (Fodor 1998) is an important topic that
awaits further research (but see Prinz 2002).
6. Because complex expressions like “red wine” are common, they may express concepts
that are permanently stored in long-term memory, that is, simple concepts (Rips 1995).
458 EDOUARD MACHERY

that there is a mental mechanism that operates on simple concepts to

produce complex concepts (or on less complex concepts to produce more
complex concepts).7
To understand concept combination is to characterize the processes that
underlie the creation of a new body of knowledge out of the bodies of
knowledge that are stored in long term memory. As a result, we would
explain why some information turns out to be represented by complex
concepts. The claim defended here is that in order to explain concept
combination, one has to assume the storage of prototypes, exemplars,
and theories in long-term memory.

5.2. Prototypes and Property Inheritance. When subjects are given two
expressions, say “Oxford graduate students” and “carpenter,” and they
are asked to list the properties that are typical of Oxford graduate students
who are carpenters, they often find the task meaningful and easy (Hamp-
ton 1987; Kunda et al. 1990; Johnson and Keil 2000). In some experiments,
they are also asked to determine which properties are typical of the two
original categories, in our example, Oxford graduate students and car-
penters (Hampton 1987; Johnson and Keil 2000). The psychologist James
Hampton has shown that there is a correlation between the properties
that are judged to be typical of the members of the original categories,
Oxford graduate students and carpenters, and the properties that are
judged to be typical of the members of the resulting category, Oxford
graduate students who are carpenters (Hampton 1987).
This correlation suggests that the creation of a complex concept in-
volves determining which properties are typical of the denoted category,
Oxford graduate students who are carpenters, on the basis of the typical
properties of the original categories, Oxford graduate students and car-
penters. Now, prototypes are supposed to encode the knowledge about
typical properties. Thus, it is plausible that when we produce on the fly
a complex concept, we retrieve the prototypes of the original categories
and we transmit some of the typical properties they represent to the
complex concept. This is known as property inheritance (Hampton 1997).
The inheritance of properties by the complex concept is (partly, as we
shall see) driven by the assumption that the typical properties of the
categories denoted by the compounded concepts are also typical of the
category denoted by the complex concept. Notice that I am not claiming
that complex concepts are prototypes. Although complex concepts do
encode some information about the typical properties of the denoted

7. There are several types of concept combination. “Oxford graduate student that is
a carpenter” (Hampton 1987) and “red bicycle” (Smith et al. 1988) expresses arguably
two different types of complex concepts.
 CONCEPTS ARE NOT A NATURAL KIND 459

Figure 2. Property inheritance.

categories, as do prototypes, they may also encode some modal and

some causal information—see below. Property inheritance is summa-
rized by Figure 2.
One might object that the results described above tell something about
concept combination only if it can be shown that our beliefs about the
properties that are judged to be typical of Oxford graduate students who
are carpenters constitute a concept, that is, if they are used in our higher
cognitive processes. Otherwise, these results would not bear on the cre-
ation of complex concepts. Now, several phenomena suggest that these
beliefs are indeed used by our cognitive processes. Particularly, subjects
are able to evaluate the typicality of individuals qua Oxford graduate
students who are carpenters (e.g., Medin and Shoben 1988). That is, when
subjects are given the description of an individual, they are able to de-
termine whether this individual is a typical Oxford graduate student who
is a carpenter. This suggests that people use their beliefs about which
properties are typical of Oxford graduate students who are carpenters to
evaluate the typicality of individuals.
460 EDOUARD MACHERY

One might reply that these typicality judgments are based on the typ-
icality of these individuals qua Oxford graduate students and on their
typicality qua carpenters (Huttenlocher and Hedges 1994). That is, we
may judge that an individual is a typical Oxford graduate student who
is a carpenter, if we judge that she is a typical Oxford graduate student
and a typical carpenter. Hence, these judgments may not rely on a complex
concept that represents the typical properties of Oxford graduate students
who are carpenters. In other words, to judge whether an individual is a
typical Oxford graduate student who is a carpenter, we may not need to
produce a complex concept, OXFORD GRADUATE STUDENT WHO
IS A CARPENTER. This objection fails, however. For, the typicality of
items with respect to a complex concept (OXFORD GRADUATE STU-
DENT WHO IS A CARPENTER) is often not a function of their typ-
icality with respect to the combined concepts (OXFORD GRADUATE
STUDENT and CARPENTER). The former is a function of the latter
only when the membership in one category (Oxford graduate students)
is believed to be independent from the membership in the other (carpen-
ters) (Hampton 1987, 57; Huttenlocher and Hedges 1994). Hence, the best
explanation of the typicality judgments under consideration is that sub-
jects do produce a complex concept that represents typical properties and
use this complex concept to make typicality judgments. Together with
other phenomena (Hampton 1982, 1987, 1988, 1996), this discussion sug-
gests that we produce complex concepts by retrieving prototypes from
our long-term memory.

5.3. Theories and Property Inheritance. The story is however more com-
plex, for psychologists have shown that the typicality of a property is not
the only factor that determines whether it is represented by the complex
concept. To illustrate, whether the property being ambitious is typical of
Oxford graduate students and of carpenters is not the only factor that
determines whether it is represented by the complex concept OXFORD
GRADUATE STUDENT WHO IS A CARPENTER. Property inheri-
tance is also influenced by our theoretical knowledge about the categories
that are combined (Medin and Shoben 1988; Murphy 1988, 1990; Rips
1995; Johnson and Keil 2000).
Concept combination uses some modal information about the properties
of the original categories, for example, about the properties of grand-
mothers and of spies. Which properties are represented by the complex
concept, GRANDMOTHER SPY, is a function of their modal force.
Studies show that if the input concepts represent impossible properties
(properties that are typically possessed by the members of one category,
say male for spies, but that are believed to be impossible for the members
of the other category, say grandmothers), these are never represented by
 CONCEPTS ARE NOT A NATURAL KIND 461

the complex concept; if the input concepts represent necessary properties

(properties that are believed to be necessarily possessed by the members
of one category, say being the mother of a parent for grandmothers), these
properties are always represented by the complex concept (Hampton
1987).
Moreover, concept combination requires some causal information
about the properties of the original categories (Medin and Shoben 1988;
Murphy 1988, 1990; Johnson and Keil 2000). So-called central properties
are preferentially represented by complex concepts. A property is central
when it explains causally the possession of other properties. For example,
being curved is a central property of boomerangs because subjects believe
that boomerangs come back because they are curved. Being made out of
wood is less central because it explains few properties of boomerangs.8
These results show that during concept combination, we access some
modal and causal knowledge. Now, prototypes do not represent any
modal nor any causal knowledge, but only some statistical knowledge.
Consequently, during concept combination, we access some knowledge
that is not represented by prototypes. Theories are precisely supposed
to represent this form of knowledge. Thus, to account for concept com-
bination, we need to posit a second type of concepts, i.e., theories, beside
prototypes.
Not so easily, however. For, one could object that the evidence does
not show that we have some theoretical concepts, that is, bodies of
theoretical knowledge that are used by default in a large number of
cognitive tasks. We may simply rely on some background modal and
causal knowledge about the categories that are combined. This is indeed
how Hampton himself thinks of the use of modal knowledge in concept
combination (Hampton 1997). Being a prototype theorist, he believes
that this modal knowledge is specifically extracted for the purpose of
building complex concepts. Hence, this modal knowledge is not used
by default in our cognitive processes. I disagree with this interpretation
of the evidence. For, we routinely use this very same causal and modal
knowledge in other higher cognitive processes (see Keil 1989 on cate-
gorization; Coley et al. 1999 on inductive reasoning). The theoretical
knowledge that is used in concept combination is poised for being used
in many cognitive processes. Thus, the bodies of knowledge that encode
this knowledge are concepts.

5.4. Emergent Properties, Exemplars, and Theories. Not all properties

8. In the literature, it is unclear how the complex concept represents the causal and
the modal knowledge. What is clear is that these two types of knowledge affect the
creation of complex concepts.
462 EDOUARD MACHERY

that are represented by a complex concept are represented by the original

prototypes. The properties not represented by the original prototypes are
said to be emergent and this phenomenon is known as property emergence
(Hampton 1987, 1997; Kunda et al. 1990; Johnson and Keil 2000; Costello
and Keane 2000). For example, Oxford graduate students who are car-
penters may be judged to have an artistic character, while neither Oxford
graduate students nor carpenters are judged to have an artistic character
(Kunda et al. 1990). Several explanations of property emergence have
been suggested. They are not mutually exclusive. For the sake of argu-
ment, I focus on the explanation that relies on exemplars.
Some properties derive from our knowledge of specific members of the
complex category (Hampton 1987; Medin and Shoben 1988, 183). For
example, if a subject has to produce on the fly a complex concept like
PRESIDENT FROM TEXAS, she may look in her long-term memory
for someone who is president and who comes from Texas. Plausibly, she
would retrieve the singular representation of G. W. Bush and she would
transmit to the complex concept the properties that are represented by
this singular memory. She would thus represent presidents from Texas as
being right-wing. Hence, concept combination accesses some singular rep-
resentations. This suggests that these may be poised to be used in our
higher cognitive processes, that is, that they are concepts.

5.5. Consequences. Empirical evidence suggests that concept combi-

nation rests on three kinds of knowledge: some statistical knowledge about
the typical properties of the relevant categories, some causal and modal
knowledge about these categories, and some knowledge about some mem-
bers of these categories. Prototypes, theories and exemplars are respec-
tively supposed to encode these kinds of knowledge. Since other cognitive
processes rely also on these bodies of knowledge, they qualify as concepts.
This conclusion is evidence for Premise 3 of the argument from explan-
atory necessity: in order to explain concept combination, we need to
assume that prototypes, exemplars and theories exist.

6. Objections. For the sake of space, I cannot deal at length with the
possible objections. For the time being, I merely mention the most prom-
inent ones and sketch some answers.
One could first concede that psychologists need to assume the existence
of prototypes, of exemplars, and of theories to explain the empirical evi-
dence. But one would then argue that concepts are prototypes, while
exemplars and theories are merely part of our background knowledge, or
instead, that concepts are exemplars, while prototypes and theories are
merely part of our background knowledge, and so on.
I have dealt with this objection earlier. In brief, exemplars and theories
 CONCEPTS ARE NOT A NATURAL KIND 463

qualify as concepts alongside prototypes, because they are retrieved by

default from our long-term memory to solve a large number of tasks.
One could also question whether we really need to posit prototypes,
exemplars and theories to explain the available evidence. In the catego-
rization literature, most psychologists believe that to account for the data,
exemplars (Zaki and Nosofsky 2004) or prototypes that represent property
correlations and category variability (Barsalou 1990; Hampton 2001) are
sufficient.
This second objection fails, however. Prototype theorists deny that ex-
emplars account for all the categorization data, and vice versa (e.g., Smith
and Minda 2002; Zaki and Nosofsky 2004). To account for the data about
human categorization, including neuroimagery data (e.g., Smith et al.
1998) and the performances of amnesic patients (Knowlton 1999; but see
Zaki and Nosofsky 2004), one has plausibly to posit both prototypes and
exemplars. Moreover, if one takes into consideration other cognitive com-
petences, the need for both types of concepts is even more pressing. For
instance, singular representations are often used in reasoning (see the study
of case-based reasoning, e.g., Hammond 1989) alongside prototypes (e.g.,
Osherson et al. 1990) and theories (e.g., Keil and Wilson 2000).
Third, one could argue that theories, exemplars, and prototypes have
much in common: they denote categories, they store some knowledge
about categories, they are used in induction, in categorization, they are
acquired through experience, etc. Hence, the class of concepts is a natural
kind.
This objection misconceives the nature of natural kinds. Members of
a natural kind have many properties in common beside those properties
that are used to identify the kind. This is not the case of concepts. Most
of the properties mentioned in the objection are used to identify the class
of concepts. Moreover, psychologists are not interested in the properties
mentioned in the objection. What psychologists want to find out is not
that concepts store some knowledge about categories, but what kind of
knowledge is stored. Similarly, the fact that concepts can be used in in-
duction (or in categorization, or learned through experience . . .) is not
a generalization that is of much interest for psychologists. What they want
to know is how concepts are used to solve inductive tasks, to categorize
or how they are learned. Now, the class of concepts is inadequate for
drawing generalizations concerning what kind of knowledge is by default
available in long-term memory, how we solve inductive tasks, how we
categorize, and so on. That is, the class of concepts is inadequate for
drawing the generalizations psychologists are interested in. Thus, the class
of concepts is not a natural kind.
Finally, one could argue that the evidence shows that each concept is
464 EDOUARD MACHERY

constituted by three elements, or parts—a prototype, a set of exemplars

and a theory, not that each category is represented by several concepts.
A similar idea was developed under the name ‘dual theories of concepts’
at the end of the seventies (e.g., Osherson and Smith 1981). More recently,
some psychologists have developed new hybrid theories of concepts (e.g.,
Gelman 2004). Spelling out these views and evaluating them would require
a lengthy treatment. In brief, I claim that most of them are terminological
variants of the heterogeneity hypothesis, for psychologists are interested
in the properties of the parts. To the extent that they differ from the
heterogeneity hypothesis, for instance by insisting that one part is more
central than the others, I claim that little evidence supports them.

7. Conclusion. Most psychologists of concepts and of the higher cognitive

functions (categorization, induction, etc.)—particularly, prototype theo-
rists, exemplar theorists and theory theorists—as well as some philoso-
phers endorse the received view: despite differences between kinds of con-
cepts, many scientifically interesting properties are true of most, if not all,
concepts. Thus, the class of concepts is supposed to be central for a
scientific psychology: it is the proper level to formulate inductive gener-
alizations about the bodies of knowledge that are used by default in our
higher cognitive processes. In brief, it is a natural kind (the natural kind
assumption).
In this article, I intended to rebut the natural kind assumption. I propose
that the class of concepts divides into kinds that have little in common
(the heterogeneity hypothesis). It may be useful to reformulate the ar-
gument. The three main psychological theories of concepts posit three
kinds of representations, exemplars, theories, and prototypes. These the-
oretical constructs do not share a large set of scientifically relevant prop-
erties: they are supposed to encode different kinds of knowledge and to
be used in different types of cognitive process (Section 4). Now, the re-
search on an important cognitive process, concept combination, suggests
that we need to assume the existence of these three theoretical constructs
(Section 5). A careful study of the empirical literature on concepts shows
that the research on other higher cognitive processes leads to the same
conclusion. Hence, the bodies of knowledge that are used by default in
our higher cognitive processes have little in common. Since concepts are
these bodies of knowledge, the class of concepts encompasses several kinds
of mental representations that have little in common (the argument from
explanatory necessity). Hence, even on the broadest notion of natural
kind, concepts are not a natural kind.
The implications of this conclusion are far-reaching. Although for the
sake of space, I cannot elaborate here, I present the most important ones.
First, the notion of concept is ill-suited to formulate scientifically relevant
 CONCEPTS ARE NOT A NATURAL KIND 465

generalizations about the mind. Psychologists should focus instead on

other classes of mental representations, particularly prototypes, exem-
plars, and theories (and eventually others). Second, the controversy be-
tween the main psychological theories of concepts is deeply misguided.
Concepts are neither prototypes, nor exemplars, nor theories. Some con-
cepts are prototypes, some concepts are sets of exemplars, some concepts
are theories. The theory view of concepts, the prototype view of concepts
and the exemplar view of concepts are not inconsistent theories about
our concepts: instead, they characterize the main features of three basic
kinds of representations. Finally, the rebuttal of the natural kind as-
sumption raises a provocative question: if the notion of concept is ill-
suited for scientific purposes, do we need it at all? But this is certainly a
topic for another day.

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