LectureIX

NSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
co

Synopsis
Powers 188
Implied
Legislation 190
Delegated
of Incidental ovKncillary Powers 195
principle
Doctrineof Eclipse
196
of Colourable Legislation
principle 198
200
Pith & Substance
of Severability 203
7. Doctrine
Occupied Field 208
8. Doctrineof
Territorial Nexus 207
9. Doctrineof
10. Doctrineof Implied Prohibition 208
11.' Doctrineof Prospective Overruling 209
1. IMPLIED POWERS:
TheBlack'slaw dictionary provides implied power as, "A
powerthat is not enumerated but that nonetheless exists
political
becauseit is needed to carry out an express power." 1
TheConstitutionwas framed for not only to meet demandsof
theperiodof the immediate vicinity, nor it is a code. which provides
certain
actswhich can Or cannot be done the execution of powers
bya State.2The constitution determines the powers but does not
define
ordescribe.So, if the Constitution does not provide the clause
Bardingtheexistence of powers which are incidental to the powers
granted
in an express way, then, it would be not possible to end that
thereis an implied because the express
owers
grant of above powers
wouldpractically become inoperative.

WanA. Garner,
Black's law lhctionary, 1288 (9th ed., 2009).
McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.s. (4 Wheat) 316.

188
 Lec.1X1 Constitutional Interpretation 189
The laws whichare necessary for the execution of prescribed
or express powersare called implied powers, and such types pf
powers are not unconstitutional. This is nothing but, if there is any
power granted expressly,then in result the implied powers must also
arise. In the samemanner, if there is any restraint to general power,
then there must also arise a restraint to implied powers. This principle
enumerates that the rights and duties of a legislative body wiJJbe
determined from its functions provided under the constitution.
Therefore, implied power is a virtue outcome of express power,
and it cannotbe exercisedwithout an express power.
The TobaccoMerchants Casel discusses various definitions
relating to the Doctrineof Implied Powers.
"One of the first principles of law with regard to the effect
of an enabling act is that if a Legislature enables something to be
done, it gives powerat the same time by necessary implicationto
do everything which is indispensable for the purpose of carrying out
the purposes in view."
In State of Punjab v. Salil Sabhlok,2 SC held that the
Governor's powerto appoint the Chairman and other members of
ihe State PublicService Commission under Article 316 of the
Constitution is included with implied power of laying prcxedure for
such appointmentsand the Court expressed this power as a
"Constitutional Power".
In Unionof India v. Gopal Chandra Misra,3the court held
that under Alticle 217(J)(a), High Court judge has implied rx»werto
-revOkehis resignation, even after resignation has been received.
In Raja Ram Pal v. Speaker, Lok Sabha,4 the Court concluded
in majority decisionby looking into Parliament's privileges under
Article 105 and said that Parliament has power to expel one of its
I. Bidi Leaves v. The State of Bombay, AIR 1962 SC 486.
2 (2013)5SCC1.
3. AIR 1978 SC694.
4. (2007)3SCC184.
 Lccturcs on Interpretation of Statutes [Lec.IX
190
members and this power is not expressly provided under the
Constitution.
significant
Under Indian Constitutionimplied éöwers is not very
For
because our constitution lays down sufficient express powers.
example, the Constitutionexpressly provides procedural aspects
which otherwise can be deduced from-substantive law.
In Michael Fenton and James Fraser v. John Stephen
Hantpton l , it was observed that:
"Whenever anything is authyised, and especially if, as a matter
do
of duty, required to be done by raw, and it is found impossible to
that thing unless something else not authorised in express terms be
also done, then that somethingwill be supplied by necessary
intendment."
Therefore, the-doctrine of implied powers is that, where an
express provision cannot be given effect unless in the virtue of
something. If a provision, on a literal interpretation, is able to give
complete meaning and effect, then, there is no need for any other
rules of interpretation, such as the doctrine of implied powers. This
doctrine is a best one in case of poor drafting of legislation by
legislators.
2. DELEGATED LEGISLATION:
Introduction
The term delegation is defined as 'the act of entrusting another
with authority or empoweringanother to act as an agent or
representative' and in further it says that ' 'The Pringiple (based an
the Separation of Powers Concept) limiting Legislature's abilityto
transfer its legislative power to another Governmental Branch,
2
especially the Executive Branch."
The term 'SubordinateLegislation' is defined as, "Legislation
that derives from any authority other than the Sovereign Power in

1. (1857-1859) 117 R.R. 32.

2. Bryan A. Garner,Black's law Dictionary, 491 (9th ed., 2009).
Lec.1X1 Constitutional Interpretation
a state and that depends for its continued existence
some superior or supreme authority. l
The principle of Delegated Legislation
is
principle which has been well-established is that def
lay down the guidelines, the principles of policy
whom power to make subordinate legislation is e
An exercise of legislative power by a subordinate
the legislature is known as Delegated Legislation. It is
a
to ease pressure on legislature's time to enable thele
concentrate on principles and formulation of policies.
Ink
delegated legislation is denoted by rules, regulations, or&rsrr4
orders, notifications, bye-laws, etc.
Growth of Delegated Legislation: Reasons
• Pressure on Parliamentary Time
expansion of the state activity and the bulk
is so great that it is impossible to discuss every matterin.&tilli
this made the essence of a delegation of power.
• Technicality
n:
Due to technicalities in a subject matter on whichlegisl
is required and the legislator being a common man cannotbe
ardB
to legislate on the same. So, expert's assistance is required,
leads to the growth of delegation of power.
• Flexibility
At the time of enactment of a legislature, it is not
gee all disguised contingencies. So, it is required that the do
which
should be made for these diSguised contingencies
a
immediate action. This makes a need for the flexibility in
which leads to the growth of delegation of power.

1. Bryan A. Garner, Black's Itaw Dictionary, 982

&Ors•'
2. Ajoy Kumar Banerjee &Ors. Etc v. Union of India
1130
 1ßCtureson Interpretation ot
Statutes
VLec.IX
criment
delegated legislation
, onceptof permits the
method enables rapid
utilisationof
necessary
Ertergency
legislativemechanism generally doesn't
problems during provide for
of emergency; it would be a quick
(4)lveissues quickly. This concept of delegated herculean
legislation
åÅngthis period.
legislation: Limitations
Delegated
fie legislature cannot choose or determinea legislative
'policyand enact the policy into a binding rule of
conduct.
Alegislature cannot delegate essential legislative functions.l
"[heexcessive delegation should be decided by courts.2
Tne legislature cannot delegate the power to modify and
repeala law.
The delegated legislation cannot have a retrospective
operation in case of absence of an express or implied the
powerto that effect.3
The power of levy of tax or fee should not infer from mere
generality conferred by enabling statute.4
is itself an ultra vires to the
If the delegating statute will alsobe
Constitution, then the rules made thereunder
unconstitutional.

PartCStates
Ajmer-Merwarav.The
Delhi Laws Act, 1912, the
1950,AIR 1951 SC 332. SC 478.
1957 Mys 326.
& co. v. Union oflndia, AIR AIR 1960
ofMysore, Kumar Jayani
Indiasugar Refineries Ltd. v. state
Authority v. sharad
AherndabadUrban Development
Pusawalla, AIR 1992 SC 1393.
 Constitutional Interpretation 193
in India
Pre-Indepéndenceera
In Queen v. Burahl , the Act
Gerral's power to bring the XXII of 1869deals with Governor
Act into effect. to determine the
of laws-and power to extend the application of the
oftheActu An Act was passed by Indian Legislature to
Garo Hills from the criminal and civiljurisdiction of Bengal
those powers in the officer appointedby Legislative
of Bengal. Ihe Legislative Governor was also authorised
to extend the provisions of the Act with incidentalchanges to Khasi
a:üJainüa Hills under section 9 of the Act.
Burah was tried for murder and sentencedto death. Here the
qirstion arouse as to whether these functionscan be categorised
as delegated legislation- The Calcutta High Court held that the
&legation is unconstitutional as Indian Legislature is a delegate of
BHüsh So a delegate cannot further delegate. Privy
held that the above powers are subjectto conditional
keislation It is a concept different from delegated legislation. It was
beld dÄtIndian Legislature not a delegate of British Parliament.
It was also stated that substantial delegation of powers is void in

In Jharindra Narh Gupta v. Province ofBihar?, section I (3)

of Bihar Maintenance of public order Act, 1948was challenged as
it aufforises the provincial yuernment to extend the validity of the
Act to one more year after its expiry with modifications. Fedeml
trld this as delegationof legiylati\e cannot
it limited CNilyto legislation.
this is held to unconstitutional.
Post-IndependenceEra
In In re The Delhi lanes Act cases ,the Central Government
2 of the Part C State Act, 1920can extend enacunents
in in Part A State to Part C State with sunäcient tnodifieations
L 1S733ACSS).
 [Lec.IX
194 Lectures on Interpretation of Statutes
course, it
and restrictions which are necessary and are fit. In this
Acts
can repeal or amend any corresponding law other than Central
in force in Part C State. The legality of the aboveprovision was
challenged in Supreme Court. SC confirmed the above provision
subject to two limitations. One is the central government's power
to repeal a law in force in Part C State was held to be bad because
executive cannot be authorized to repeal a law in force. Second is
the Central Government is not authorized to changethe legislative
policy in Part C State by exercising power of modificationbecause
legislative policy should not be-changed.
In Patna University & Anr. v. Dr Amita 7iwari1, the respondent,
is a degree holder in B.Sc. (Home Science) with specialisation in
foods and nutrition and an M.A. in sociology. In 1981,Department
of Home Science was opened in Patna Women's College.According
to the statute of the university, the qualification for the post of the
lecturer was P.G. degree in Home Science or in an allied subject.
Respondent applied to the Patnä Women's College,and she was
appointed on an ad-hoc basis. The principalrequestedthe VC to
permit the respondent to start classes till regularappointment and
that the qualifications as a lecturer were changedin 1985, so,
respondent should be appointed as per the old rules at the time of
her appointment. The university recommendedthe case to the
Chancellor. Chancellor issued the order in favourof the Respondent,
and the university requested the Chancellorto review his earlier
orders. At this stage, the respondent filed a writ petition in high court
and the same allowed to regularise as per the orders of the Chancellor.
The •same appealed to Supreme Court. The respondentrelied on
Section 9(7)(ii) of the Bihar Universities Act, 1976.2It was held that
the respondent was appointed on ad hoc basis till regular appointment
1. AIR 1997 SC 3456.
2. S. 9(7)(ii) says that, The Chancellor shall have the power for issue
directions to the Universities in the administrativeor academic interest
of the Universities which considers to be necessary.The directions
issued by Chancellor shall be implementedby the Vice-Chancellor,
Syndicate, senate and other bodies of the Universityas the case may
be.
Lcc.1X1 Constitutional Interpretation
and which a qualification which the
didn't
and she cannot be regularised unless a proper services
is being consulted. The appeal was allowed and held
respondent cannot be regularised on compassionate that
grounds
In Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryanal
appellants were prosecuted •for acquiring a controlledcommodity
more than statutory price under the Iron Control Order,1956.Th
appellants challenged that the order will not have effectas it wasn't
placed before parliament within the reasonable time requiredbythe
Essential Commodities Act.2 It was held that the legislaturenever
intended to make the order void for the noncomplianceof section
3(6) of the Act. Therefore, non-laying of the aforesaidnotification
before houses of parliament will not result in avoidnotification.
3. PRINCIPLE OF INCIDENTAL OR ANCILLARY
POWERS:
Incidental and ancillary Powers are the rules of interpretation
that the words in the Constitution must get liberal consU-uction and
they must be interpreted to give effect to its wide amplitude.3The
words in the Constitution should not be unnecessarilyput in a restricted
construction, where there is a wide amplitude. Thisprinciplemeans
that the power to legislate on a subject includes the powerto legislate
on an ancillary matter that is in relation to the subject.The
and
constitutionality of an Act should not be determinedby pith
matter
substance but whereas it has to be seen that whetherthe powerto
is tolerant with the main subject of the Act. E.g., the
power to legislateon the
legislate on land reforms includes the
the power to impose tax includes the power
mortgage of the land;
prevent tax evasion, power relatingto
to dearth and seizure to entities•
be extended to power relating to banking
banking cannot

order made under section

2. Section 3(6) of the Act provides that every
authority or the
3 by the Central Government or by any officer or ofParliarnent'
Central Government, shall be laid before both Houses
soon as may be, after it is made.
3. VN Shukla's Constitutional Law, 575 (6th ed., 2010).
 e unless the
appeal
on Interpretation or Statutes [Leca
Lccturcs
dustries list' it cannot be said to be an ancillar
state or union
e un
der•the
v. G Chawlal, it was held that the
\ct.2 n the reasonable Instate ofRajasman

e,
non-laying asonable extent.In R MD Charbaugvvala v. State ofMysore,2
ent will oftheafÄ'd betting and gambling is a state subject, but it doesn't
itwasåeldthat
thepower to impose a tax on betting and gambling as there
include
taxing purpose.
isanotherlist for the
InNavin Chandra Mafatlal v. The Conzmissioner of Income
lary Powers BombayCity, appellant was assessed by income tax officer
Tax,
are thendésofin
must
0 give effect getliberalmns&Income
TaxAct, 1922. The capital gains are earned by appellant
to its wideamplitllt' a half share in certain immovable properties which are sold
through
ould not be
unnecessahlyputina withco-ownersof a company known as Mafatlal Gagal bhai a
a wide amplitude. mspinciNecompany
privatelimited. The same amount of share of appellantwas
a subject includes thepwerto taxedHere the issue is regarding the constitutionality of taxing for.
gains• Here, section 12(B) of the Indian Income TaxAct,
at is in relation to thesilbjdtcapital
1922authorisesthe imposition of tax on capital gains, and the issue
should not bedetermined" is,whetherit will fall underentry 82 or 86 of List I of the 7th
IS to be seen thatwhetherthe
Scfredule
of the
tfwpg( Constitution of India. The Court held that section
bject of the Act.E.g., intra vires<
legislateß under Entry 82 of list I in the seventh schedule
the power to OfiheConstitution
of India4•it is unnecessary to consider opinion
include911)d
zer to impose tax werß/ asto themeaning, scope and ambit of Entry 86 in the same list.
po
'ent tax evasion,
tobanking
Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.
power relating 4, DOCTRINE
OF ECLIPSE:
Thisdoctrine says that any law which is ultra vires to
every order—tvityj Fundamental
les that Rights to the Constitution is not itself invalid. It will be
l,
Stateof
before Rajasthan v. G Chawla, AIR 1959 SC 544.
AIR 1962.
4, AIR 1955 SC
(6th ed, 2010). 58.
575 on the
income other than agriculture.
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198 Lectures on Interpretation of Statutes [Lec.IX
5. PRINCIPLE OF COLOURABLELEGISLATION:
doctrine of Colourable legislation is a tool for interpreting
the constitutional provisions which are applied by Supreme Court of
The colourablc•legislationis diluted from the concept of
Separation of Powers: Separation of Powers balances the power
between different components such as, between the legislature,
executive and judiciary. The core function of the legislature is to
make laws. Whenever the legislature shifts this balance of power
towards itself, then the DoctrineofColourable Legislation is attracted
to take care of Legislative accountabilityeThe Black's law dictionary
defines colourable as, appearing to be true, valid or right, intended
to deceive; counterfeit, and 'colour' has been defined to mean
appcårance, guise or semblance'. The literal meaning of colour or
guise of the power conferred to one specific purpose, and the
legislature cannot achieve some other purpose for which it is not
competent. The origin of this doctrine is from the maxim,
"Quandoaliquidprohibetur ex directo, prohibeturet per
obliguum ". This maxim says that, what cannot be done directly,
cannot be done indirectly.
In Indian Constitution, Article 246 mentions about list 1, list
2 and list 3, which specifies the subjects of State, Central, and
both to which they should deal. This doctrine is applied when a
legislature makes a law on a subject which is not supposed to
do, does it indirectly. This d&ctrinedecides the fate of such
impugned legislation.
Judicial Trends of Colourable•Legislation
A reasonable, convincing and clear explanation regarding
colourable legislation was laid down in the case of K.C. Gajapati
Narayana Deo and Other v. Stateof Orissa/ , "If the Constitution
of a State distributes the legislativepowers amongst different
bodies, which have to act within their respective spheres marked
out by specific legislative entries, or if there are limitations on
the legislative authority in the shape of fundamental rights,
1. AIR 1953 SC 375.
 Lec-rXJ Constitutional Interpretation
questions do arise as to is•hetherthe legislature
case has or has not, in respect to the subject-matt in
or in the method of enacting transgressedthe
"Such transgression may be patent, manifest
it rruy also be disguised, covert and indirect and ordi
it is to this
class of cases that the expression
Colorable
been applied in certain judicial pronouncements.
conveyedby the expressionis that although The
apparena\
legislature in passing a statute purported to act
the
of its powers, yet in substance and in reality it transgressed
powers, the transgression being veiled by what appeam
proper examination, to be a mere presence or disguise.'
The failure to comply with constitutional conditionsmav
uncovered or hidden- If it is uncovered, it is an ultra vireslaw.
if it is hidden, it is a fraud on Constitution. This covertisa
legislature injust pretending to act that it is within its
fact not- I
In K T Moopil Nair v. State of Kerala, 2 the state-im»a d

tax under Travancore Cochin Land Tax Act, 1955, which

high-SC held that the legislation asviolative of Article 14ami
in the name of tax a person's land is being confisvatd
In Balaji v. State of Mysore% SC held that the order
68% seats to backward classes in disguise ofArticle 15(4)is
of Article 14.
Limitations
limitation NJ
doctrine does not apply where there is no bordi11.iK
Legislature, and also this doctrine does not apply to su
legislation.
of bonaflderos
This doctrine does not consider the question
or malafideness on the part of the legislature.
J. TheState of Bihar v. KameshwarSingh, 1952 1 SCR 889'

3. SC649.
 on Interpretation of Statutes (Let-rx
Lectures
revolves only around the competencyof a
doctrinelaw. The question of motive whether in
This enact a
•slatureto competent is irrelevant. It is only a questim
legl tentor not
compe constitutionality.
it is
wer on not act on extraneous considerati«ns-i
po does
Thelegislature
of
presumption of constitutionality ofa statute which
salwaysa Daimia v. ShriJLZticeSR
enunciatedin Ram Krishna
issuccinctly Ors. ,
Tendolkarand
of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden
favour it to show that there has been a clear
him who attacks
isupon constitutional principles. "
of
transgressionthe
Thecourtspreferto keep up the competency ofthe statute
it.4It is like the famous rule
facilitating
rather "
resmagisvaleatquampereat
Whena legislatureis able to make a law in accordancewith
subject,then it also has ancillary and incidental gywer
aparticular
tomakean effective one. 5
Theviolationof Constitutional Power by a legislature may
direct,
manifest,and patent and also it may be indirect, disguise,
covert.
Thisdoctrineapplies only to latter part-6
6. PITH & SUBSTANCE:
Thisdoctrinehelps in determining
orlistoftheseventh under which head or field
andSubstance, schedule, a legislation falls. In the Pith
Pith means true nature and
important oressentialpart of substance means the
something. This doctrine says thaCin
K.c.GajapatiNarayanaDeo
and Other v. The state AIR
2
MohanLalTripathi
v. District Magistrate, Rae Bareilly & Others
3.
4, 1958sc 538.
CITv.Teja
LN.sanenaSingh,AIR 1959 SC 352.
5.

v.Thestate
6. ofMadhya Pradesh, AIR 1976SC
state
ofBiharv.
KameshwarSingh, 1952 1 SCR
 Interpretation 201
a situation a question arises as to determining %iwther a
particular
lav to tlr particular subject, the court resorts to
into of the matter, if a substance falls union
the into the state list dæs not make
it Ihis is a Can•åian dcwüine which is into
Ihis dætrirp wasfirst
in the Caskütg Dupo-I- here the PH's?"Councilheld that
in deciding of a challenged legislation, to
re-sort to its pith substance-
Pith and Indian Context
This is qtplied in India to give flexibility to a rigid
scheme The core reason for adopting this
is, ifa is declared invalid merely it
po'.vers-then the powers of the legislature would drastically

In JijübiaziSanbhai Kachar v- State of GujaraF , the court

held it is •sealed law of interpretation that entries in the
Seventh Schedulecre not pou-ers but fields of legislation- The i
lesi.slc$urederivesits purr from Article 246 and other related
cricles of the Cazstincion- Therefore, rhe pou-er to make the
Act is derived not from the respective entries but
under Arricle 246 of the Constitution- The language of the
respecri'averariesshouldbe given rhe widest scope of their
meaning, cz.:ble to meet the machinery of rhe Government
by the Caz.sänaion--Each general u•ord s;cculd extend to
ancillary or subsidiary matte-rs whiéh can fairly and
in it. u hen the Vins of an enactment
is impugned, is initial presumption of its constitutionality
crad if there is a.m_v
dificulrv in ascenaining the limits of the
legislc:i'4Vpower,the dificulry must be resolved.as far as
possible in f,noar of the legislature purring the most liberal
cayzsrrucriæt the legislative entry so that it mav have
widest cmSirÆe- the
 ILec.IX
Interpretationof Statutes
Trends
crud Another v. EN- Balsara, J is the first
of Bombay of pith and substance. Tbis
resortedto the dætrine
ja±nezn necessaryto
case and held that it is
vas upheldin
Cid of a legislation for
Est which it falls-
And
Iz Atiqa Began and Anr- v- Abdul Maghni Khan
Ors: - to decideunder which entry an
shouldhave a to its true nature and charæter
no±Engbut Pith and substance. In further it was
is the resultof this investigation; not theform alone
Zhe rncy have assumed under the hand of the
willdetermine within which of the Legislative
Liss zizelegislcionfc.lls,-and for "this purpose, rhe legislation
be scruzizisedin its entirety-
In Zzmzer Ahmed Lcfifizr Rehman Sheikh v. State of
cr,.dOrs-,3 it was held that,
-Tnis doctrine is applied when the legislative competence
' Iz•islcure with regard to a particular enactmentis
ufzh reference to the entries-in various lists- Ifthere
is c zo ziz.elegislüive competence, the courts will try
zo •scer-.ci.n pith and substance of such enactmenton a
of the Aa in question-In this process, it is necessary
Ser z.he to go inio and examine the true character ofthe
us object, its scope and effect to-find out whether
in guestiomis genuinely preferable to afield of
lezisl.=i.onclloned to the respective legislature under the

doctrine is an established principle of law in India

recogniseå nol cm}yby this Court but also by various High
V'%erea c*c.llengeis made to rhe constitutional validity
of c particular Szae Act Wilhreference to a subject mentioned
Lcc.1Xl Constitutional Interpre.tation
in any entry in List I, the Court has to look
of the State.Act and on such analysis and e to th
found that in the pith and substance, it fallsxantination
the State List but there is only an incidentalunder
any of the mnattersenumeFatedin the UnionList, encroach
the
would not become invalid merely because
encroachment oil any of thé matters in the there is
UnionLists',
In Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of , the Privy
applied the doctrine of Pith and Substance. Section 100ofGov Il
of India Act, 1935 and Article 246 of the Constitution
The Bengal Money Lenders Act, 1940 limited the ratearesimilat
ofinterest
which is recovered by money lenders on loarfiÄ*hislegislation
challenged that it has no legislative competence. TheHC
the legislation. is intra vires. On an appeal to Federal Court,itmade
it as ultra vires. The Privy Council was moved on an appeal.
held that the Act is intra vires. Money lending is in Entry27ofList
2, and Promissory Notes are in Entry 28 List 1. Therefore, the

interference is ruled as incidental.

7. DOCTRINE OF SEVERABILITY:
This doctrine provides that, if a legislation is not consistent and

it is not able to be saved, then it can be seen that whether

itcan
caseofthe
be saved partly.2 The most important and landmarkv.The
döctrine of severability is, R.M.D. Chamarbaugwalla
Unio n

of India (UOI).3 rests,

In this case, it was held that, "The doctrine ofseverability

a presumed intention of the

as will presently be shown, on

statute turns out to bevoid,
legislature -thatif a part of a rest of it, and that
should not affect the validity of the terms of the
intention is to be ascertained from the
of the legislationthat
is
the true nature of the subject-matter
1. AIR 1947 PC 60, SLP (C)No.
Associates Ltd.,
2. state OfU.P. &Ors v.Jai Prakash
2013.
3. AIR 1957 SC 628.
 Interpretation of Statutß [Lec.IX

a classification made in the statute

evnclusion in favour of severability,
preclude
held that.
t'ütther
is in void, it will be enforcedas
tyc
is seven
that. "another significantcanon of
the Court is that the Courts would be
fo otitutionality
invalid or ultra vires on account of
Courts usoutd accept an interpretation,
favour of constitutionality rather than the
in unconstitutional- "
renderthe lau'
c.:n rescut to reading dou•n a lau- in order to
rendered unconstitutional-But while doino
the essence of the law"and create a new
its opinionis more desirable.
legislationwhich are inconsistent with Constitution of
to that which is inconsistentwith the

ee to it that the should not inconsistent

rightsof the Consistent- Ihe invalid part shall
whole Act and be declaredas void. If they
then the whole Act shall declared void-
ot Severability: Application in complex leoal
Ca€ey
ts Qustitutional Limitations å
and imQlid laxss are so connected
ocmixed up '*ith
dry cannot be disconnected
easily, then the part
lead to invalidity of the whole Act-
aredistinctthat
even after invalidatingtlr inconsistent
Qing to the
inconsistency of the Act, then the
&atutoryConstruction,
217-2 IS l, 1940).
 Constitutional Interpretation 205
rest
part of the Act will remain in f€xce.,not with
to another
part-I
the inconsistent part of Act is distinct and
valid part if they fem-m of te s.aræ
is to operative as a
to then invalid part will lead
of the Act-
In Suresh Rou-shal cnå cnether aVazFeundaxion
principAesare the Feld that
æ-s SCS tore-Sew
OSS-377 to inconsistent self-resä-aintmust
in rmzst
the Cour held that a clear
is required a Unless
it is it it is in
societyis to

it vas
if it is passiNe to
it sSeÜd B is
is The vz5d
EDS v.
is

Court
is
 206 Lectures on Interpretation of Statutes [Lec.IX
of an Act changes the basic structure or object or nature of the
legislation.
S. DOCTRINE OF OCCUPIED FIELD:
ThéLJnion legislature makes a law on a specificsubject and
which occupies the field and the state legislature should not legislate
on that subject, and if it has done so, the state legislaturewould
become void to that extent. Indian constitution allows certain subjects
to union and state to legislate upon. These subjectsare provided in
the name of state list, union list,aind concurrent list.
Article 254 of the -Constitution -of India:
"Inconsistencybetween laws made by Parliamentand laws
made by the Legislatures of States
(l) If any provision of a law made by the Legislatureof
a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament
which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of
an existinglaw with respect to one of the mattersenumerated
in the Concurrent List, then, subject to the provisionsof clause
( 2 ), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after
the law made by the Legislature of such State,or, as the case
may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the
Legislature of the State shall, to the extentof the repugnancy,
be void
(2) Where a made by the Legislatureof a State with
respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List
contains any provision •repugnayt to the provisions of an earlier
law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that
matter, then, the law so made by the Legislatureof such State
shall, if it has been reservedfor the considerationofthe President
and has received his assent, prevail in that State: Provided that
nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliamentfrom enacting at
any time any law with respect to the same matter including a
law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made
by the Legislature of the State, "
 Lec.1X1 Constitutional Interpretation
In State of Kerala &Ors v. M/S. Mar
Appraem
the Union enacted Chit Funds Act, and for Ruri C
notification of Central Government is r equired its operation
under
Meanwhile, Kerala enacted a state legislation the CentralAct.
knownas
Chitties Act. The central is notified in the state of R
erala
state legislation is in force. Here the issue is withKerala, so, the
validity of state legislature in the absence of notified regardtoth
law. Here court held that the central law occupied totalcentral
it is not notified. The court said that the Article 254 fieldthough
i usestheword
made and making. The word making and made is equivalent
legislate'. Therefore, the court held that the centrallaw to
occupied
this particular field. So, state law is repugnant.
9. DOCTRINE OF TERRITORIAL NEXUS:
Article 245 (2) of Constitution of India says that a lawshould
not be declared invalid due to its extraterritorial operation.So,a
legislation cannot be challenged merely on the groundthatitis.
extraterritorially operative. The doctrine of territorialnexussaysthat
the laws of a state legislature are not applicable outsidetheboundaries
of a state unless there is sufficient connection or nexusbetweenthe
state and the object. It is a well-settled law that the Courtsshould
enforce the law with the available machinery, and the legislature
ty
should not be questionedfor its extraterritoriality? Ext-aten-itoriali
does not invalidate a law, but nexus with India is stillrequiredincases
like involving taxing statutes. 3
When can the doctrine of Territorial nexusbeinvoked?
• A particular state should be with the extraterritorial
operation,
• There should be a territorial nexus betweenthesubject
matter of the Act and the state makingthelaw.

1. (2012) 7 scc 148.

1946pc 180.
2. British Columbia ElectricRailway Co. Ltd. v. King, AIR Tar,
3. Electronics Corporation oflndia Ltd. v. Commissioneroflncome
AIR 1989SC 1707.
 on interpretation ot
Yuectuves
Statutes
of Bombay v. RMDCI ,
used to conduct competitions
wspaper is printed and published money.
circulationin Bombay. The state innangalore
espondentfor carrying business in thegovernment-leviedt"ax
state. Here the
t\xelevy of tax is valid where the respondent issue
is outside
ofBombay. The court held that there is territorial
present to make the Bombay Legislature levy nexus
a taxon
espondentbecause the activities of competitor took place
nbay.
Tata Iron and Steel Company v. Bihar State2, a sales tax
waspassed in the state of Bihar for levying a tax on sale
nc\uded t\xe state or outside, if the goods are manufactured
inBihar. The court held that the levy of tax as valid because
issufficientterritorial nexus. It was also held that the sufficient
nexus the law and object which should be taxed rely
onthefacts and circumstances of each case. Sufficient territorial
requires consideration of two elements. First one is, that
connection
econnectionshould not be Nusory but real and liabilityimposed
should
be relevant to that nexus.
XO.DOCTRINE OF PROHIBITION:
T\xewell-known maxim, expression unius est exclusion
glterius,
says things of a class are expressly
that, when one or more doctrine
then others of the same class are excluded. The implied
hientioned,
of
prohibition is the antithesis to the doctrine
certain subjects
some lurisdictions, the union is provided state
given to the
upon, and the remaining subjects are
are empowered
upon. In countfxes like india are provided one list.I'
than
upon distinct fields provided with more or areas
former category, t\xe specific mention of a subject
from legislatingup
by the union will prohibit a union impliedlyprohibit
areas. This is nothing but the union is
powers of the state.
upon the residuary
y to latter case.
sc482.
SC 699. AIR 1958
 Lcc.rxl Constitutional Jntcrprctation 209
11. DOCTRINE OF
OVERRULING:
In l.c.. Golak Nath v. State
overruling doctrine was laid down
of Punjab/, the prospcztive
by the Suprcmc Court bench.
Their view was that the parliament is not having the power of
amendment of fundamental rights. JIon'bJcjudgc view is that
the Article 368 provides the procedure to amend the Constitution,
but it doesn' t have the power of amendment which can be captured
only in the residuary legislature power of parliament under Artidc
248. The Hon' ble Judge is also of the view that the word Jaw urvjer
Acticle 13(2) includes an ordinary law as well as an amendment, so,
they held that the Parliamentis not authorisedto amend the
fundamental rights. Therefore, it was held that the principle has no
retrospective operation. It is operative only in future, nothing but
prospective overruling. decision made the amendments tiJJdate
as valid, and the amendment of fundamental rights which come after
this decision would be overruled. ne parliament would have no
authority to amend the fundamental rights of the Constitution.
Restrictions on this doctrine
e This principle is applicableonly to constitutional matters,
• Supreme Court is only having the power to apply this
principle and,
The application of this principle is a matterof discretion of the
Supreme Court, which is based on the justice ofthe cause and matter
before Supreme Court.

1. AIR 1967 SC 1643.