Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Energy Policy
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol

Ready for nuclear energy?: An assessment of capacities and motivations

for launching new national nuclear power programs
Jessica Jewell n
Central European University, Nádor utca 9, 1051 Budapest, Hungary

a r t i c l e in f o abstract

Article history: The International Atomic Energy Agency reports that as of July 2009 there were 52 countries interested in
Received 17 February 2010 building their first nuclear power plant. This paper characterizes and evaluates these ‘‘Newcomer
Accepted 29 October 2010 Countries’’ in terms of their capacity and motivations to develop nuclear power. It quantifies factors
Available online 18 December 2010
historically associated with the development of nuclear energy programs and then benchmarks the
Keywords: Newcomers against these data. Countries with established nuclear power programs, particularly where
Nuclear energy nuclear facilities are privately owned, are typically larger, wealthier and politically stable economies
Energy security with high government effectiveness. Nuclear power was historically launched during periods of high
Indicators electricity consumption growth. Other indicators for the potential of nuclear power include: the size of
the national grid, the presence of international grid connections and security of fuel supply for electricity
production. We identify 10 Newcomers which most closely resemble the Established Nuclear Power
Countries and thus are most likely to deploy nuclear energy, 10 countries where the development of
nuclear energy is uncertain due to high political instability, 14 countries with lower capacities where
pursuing nuclear energy may require especially strong international cooperation and 18 countries where
the development of nuclear power is less likely due to their significantly lower capacities and motivations.
& 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction significantly lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions than conven-

tional thermal power plants.1
With rising concerns over energy security and climate change, The increase in interest in nuclear power has been dubbed a
interest in nuclear power has recently reemerged. Unlike oil and ‘‘nuclear renaissance’’ as many governments have recently
gas, proven uranium reserves are abundant: even in the face of expressed interest in reviving or starting their national nuclear
large nuclear expansion, they are estimated to last at least a century power programs (Adamantiades and Kessides, 2009; Nuttall, 2005;
and most likely well beyond (Macfarlane and Miller, 2007; NEA, Sauga, 2008; Wolfe, 2007).2 The IAEA reports that over 50 countries
2008a). Uranium is also more evenly geographically distributed have contacted it for help in starting a nuclear power program
than oil and gas with a large portion located in OECD or other (Rogner, 2009). These countries, often referred to as Newcomer
developed countries (NEA, 2008a). In addition, nuclear energy Countries, vary greatly in their economic and social development.
offers greater protection from commodity price fluctuations. In As Fig. 1 shows, they range from the high-income European Union
2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) estimated (EU) member states to low-income Sub-Saharan African countries.3
that a doubling of uranium prices resulted in a 5–10% increase in
electricity generation cost while a doubling for coal and gas led to a
35–45% and 70–80% increase, respectively (IAEA, 2008a). Thus, 1
Life-cycle assessments (LCAs) for emissions from nuclear energy range from
nuclear power is considered to provide a more secure, in both 1.4 to 288 gCO2eq/kWh (Sovacool, 2008). When compared to other sources of power
short- and long-term, supply of energy. Nuclear power has also production, nuclear power emits between less than 1% and 80% for electricity pro-
been proposed as one strategy to address climate change (IEA, duction from natural gas and between less than 1% and 23% for electricity
production from coal (Weisser, 2007).
2008; Pacala and Socolow, 2004; Sims et al., 2007) since it offers 2
The ‘‘Nuclear Renaissance’’ also has several skeptics both in terms of the ability
of nuclear power to address climate change (Lovins et al., 2009) as well as the actual
potential for growth (Parenti, 2008; Schneider, 2008).
3
Abbreviations: GEI, World Bank Government Effectiveness Indicator; MENA, While Lithuania has plans to start construction on a new NPP since the shut
Middle East and North Africa; NP, nuclear power; NPP, nuclear power plant; PPP, down of the Ignalina NPP at the end of 2009 (WNA, 2010) and Iran has plans to start
purchasing power parity; PSI, World Bank Political Stability and Absence of Violence operation of Bushehr, which will be its first operational NPP, in 2010 (BBC, 2010),
Indicator this study does not consider these two countries in the group of Newcomers. It could
n
Tel.: + 36 1 327 3021; fax: + 36 1 327 3031. be argued that given the level of development of Iran’s infrastructure it is a ‘‘more
E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] likely’’ Newcomer than the other countries. However, Iran’s prospects for nuclear

0301-4215/$ - see front matter & 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2010.10.041
1042 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055

Eastern Europe/
Europe Eurasia
Greece Portugal Albania Georgia
Italy Turkey Belarus Kazakhstan
Poland Croatia Latvia
Estonia Asia
Bangladesh
North Africa Middle East Indonesia
Algeria Morocco Bahrain Malaysia
Latin America Egypt Tunisia Jordan Mongolia
Chile Libya Kuwait
Sub- Myanmar
Cuba Saharan Qatar Philippines
Dominican Republic Africa Saudi Arabia Singapore
Ecuador Eritrea Syria Thailand
Jamaica Ghana U.A.E. Vietnam
Paraguay Kenya Yemen
Peru Namibia
Uruguay Nigeria
Venezuela Senegal
Sudan
Tanzania
Uganda

Fig. 1. Nuclear Newcomer Countries. The countries covered in this study which have expressed interest in acquiring their first nuclear power plant (Rogner, 2009).

The capability of some of these countries to deal with the safely manage the nuclear power program, gather international
significant financial, institutional, and technical challenges asso- support, and attract, where necessary, private investment.
ciated with a new nuclear energy program is not at all certain. In spite of the emerging interest in the expansion of nuclear
Building even a single Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) requires energy, no study has systematically evaluated the Newcomer
significant financial, technical and institutional resources. Recent Countries in terms of their capacities and motivations to develop
estimates for the financial investment required to construct a NPP is nuclear power. The barriers and driving forces for nuclear energy
approximately USD4000/kWe (Du and Parsons, 2009; Harding, are frequently discussed at the global level (most recently by
2007),4 which amounts to USD4 billion for a 1 GWe NPP. This study Adamantiades and Kessides, 2009; Deutch et al., 2009) and a recent
presumes that a NPP in a Newcomer Country would be 1 GWe or series of studies addressed the different driving forces and chal-
greater based on the fact that the most of the recent NPPs are lenges to instituting nuclear power in different regions (see Toth,
960 MWe or greater (IAEA 2010) and the assumption that if a 2008 for a summary). The IAEA has described considerations and
Newcomer Country were to invest in nuclear power it would only do milestones related to developing new nuclear power programs
so if it could take advantage of the economy of scale that nuclear (IAEA, 2007a, 2007b, 2008b). Additionally, several studies have
power offers. alluded to the impact that the spread of nuclear materials could
Assuming a NPP of at least 1 GWe places a minimum grid-size have on proliferation risks (Barnaby, 2009; US Committee on the
requirement for introducing nuclear power. The IAEA recommends Internationalization of the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle et al., 2009).
that a single power plant should constitute no more than 5–10% of However, none of these studies systematically combines the global
an electricity grid (IAEA, 2007a); thus, the technical requirement perspective with the national level factors affecting potential new
for nuclear power implementation is an electricity grid bigger than nuclear programs to analyze how nuclear power might develop in
10 GWe or international grid connections allowing for the sale of different national contexts.
excess electricity to neighboring countries. Finally, a country must This study seeks to bring the discussion of the global ‘nuclear
have a sufficient institutional capacity and political stability to renaissance’ closer to the national level by exploring whether
expansion of nuclear power to some 50 countries is feasible. We
approach this question by systematically comparing the capacities
(footnote continued) and motivations of the Newcomer Countries to countries with
energy have been discussed extensively elsewhere (Chubin, 2006; Bowen and Kidd,
established nuclear energy programs (Established NP Countries).5
2004; Squassoni, 2007; Takeyh, 2003) and are influenced by many factors which are
not reviewed in this study; thus including Iran in this study would not significantly While this historical analysis does not enable us to predict the
add to the Iranian discussion. Rather, this study focuses on evaluating the prospects future, it does provide insight into if and how nuclear energy can
of nuclear energy for the 51 countries which are relatively early-on in the process develop in Newcomer Countries.
(and about which less is written). Of course even countries relatively early-on in the
process of nuclear energy development, determining which should be included as a
Newcomer Country requires a bit of judgement. Italy, Kazakhstan, and Lithuania all
5
had operating NPPs in the past. This study considers Italy and Kazakhstan, which The group of Established NP Countries includes: Argentina, Armenia, Belgium,
shut down their last NPP in 1990 and 1999, respectively, as Newcomers and Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary,
excludes Lithuania which shut down its NPP in 2009. This distinction is subjective, India, Japan, Korea, Mexico, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Slovak
however arguably Lithuania, with a more-recently operating NPP is less of a Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the
Newcomer than the other countries. United Kingdom. Lithuania is also included in this group since at the time of data
4
It should be noted that there is a large uncertainty in these estimates and they collection it had an operating NPP. Israel and North Korea are specifically excluded
range about four-fold globally from a low of USD1400/kWe in Europe and Asia to from this group because although they have pursued the development of nuclear
USD6000/kWe in North America (IAEA, 2009). weapons; they also do not have functioning nuclear energy programs.
 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055 1043

Table 1
Summary of indicators.

Type of capacity or Established NP Countries or benchmark Newcomer Countries

motivation
Indicator Time of measurement Indicator Time of measurement

Technical capacity 1 GWe national grid size (see text) Electricity grid size Current (2007) and 15-year
projected
Strength of international Current or under-
connections construction
Financial capacity GDP Time of start of construction GDP Current (2007)
GDP/capita PPP of the first NPP 4100 MW GDP/capita PPP Current (2007)
Institutional capacity World Bank Government Current (2008) World Bank Government Current (2008)
Effectiveness Indicator Effectiveness Indicator
Political stability World Bank Political Stability Current (2008) World Bank Political Stability Current (2008)
Indicator Index
Partial or total state failure 10 years preceding and Partial or total state failure Last 10 years (1998–2008)
from PITF following the start of from PITF
construction of the first
NPP4100 MWe
Energy demand Average electricity demand 5 years preceding the start of Average electricity demand 2001–2006
motivation growth rate construction of the first growth rate
NPP4100 MWe Magnitude of electricity 2001–2006
demand growth
Energy security Not available Diversity of the primary Current (2007)
motivation sources of the electricity
system
Import dependency of the Current (2007)
primary sources of the
electricity system

2. Framework for assessing capacities, motivations, and compatibility, financial capacity, human resources, physical infra-
uncertainties structure for transport of materials and supplies, the legal and
regulatory framework, and facilities for processing radioactive
While the dimensions of capacity and motivations for nuclear waste. The IAEA proposes that these factors be evaluated under
energy are broadly clear, the threshold at which a country is the assumption that a country is already stable both socio-
considered capable and sufficiently motivated to build and operate economically and politically (IAEA, 2007b). With the exception
a NPP is difficult to define. For one, thresholds of national capacities of grid capacity and electricity demand, the IAEA’s evaluation
and motivations are interdependent. Simply speaking, countries criteria are qualitative and based on a review of a government’s
seriously interested in building a NPP are more likely to acquire, activities and documents (IAEA, 2008b). The capacity evaluation in
mobilize, and concentrate the necessary resources than countries this study takes a different approach by using quantitative capacity
lukewarm to the idea. Secondly, the benchmarks for both capacities indicators benchmarked, where appropriate, against similar indi-
and motivations are generally difficult to set based on ‘objective’ cators in the Established NP Countries at the time of construction of
models and calculations. their first NPP.
This paper proposes a systematic approach for generally estimat- The main technical requirement for implementing nuclear
ing these benchmarks based on historical data for the capacities and power is a reliable grid which is large enough to accommodate a
motivations of Established NP Countries. It does this by using standard NPP (IAEA, 2007b). A single power plant is not recom-
indicators which characterize a Newcomer Country’s financial, mended to provide more than 10% of the regional grid capacity. This
institutional, and technical capacity, electricity demand and security study presumes that a NPP in a Newcomer Country would be at
of fuel supply for electricity generation. The financial and institu- least 1 GWe. Arguably, a country would only invest in the establish-
tional capacity data as well as the demand growth data are ment of a nuclear power program if it could take advantage of the
benchmarked against similar data for Established NP Countries from economy of scale that nuclear power can offer. Additionally, most
the time of the start of construction of their first NPP over 100 MWe6 (51 out of 61) of the nuclear reactors under construction as of
while the technical capacity data are benchmarked against the IAEA October 17, 2010 are over 900 MWe and all of the NPPs started in
guidelines for minimum grid capacity (assuming a 1 GWe or greater the last 3 years are over 900 MWe (IAEA, 2010). Furthermore,
NPP). Since no historical data for energy security in the Established Newcomer Countries are likely to want to introduce proven designs
NP Countries are available, the energy security motivation indicators (IAEA, 2008c) and while several countries are in the process of
are benchmarked within the group of the Newcomer Countries. The developing smaller reactors (less then 300 MW capacity), currently
following two sections discuss the indicators used for each compo- only four are under construction (IAEA, 2010). Thus, assuming that
nent; Table 1 presents a summary of selected indicators; and Section new NPPs in Newcomer Countries will be 1 GWe or larger can pose
2.3 discusses the limitations of this approach. a problem for countries with small power grids.
In order to evaluate a country’s technical compatibility with a
NPP, this study uses the current and projected grid capacity. The
2.1. Assessing capacity for initiating nuclear power programs
current grid capacity is reported from 2007 data from the US EIA
(2008b). Since initiating a nuclear power program is expected to
The IAEA (2007b) identified the following key infrastructural take an average of 10–15 years (IAEA, 2007a), the year that the grid
considerations for initiating a nuclear power program: technical size is projected to exceed 10 GWe was also calculated by project-
ing the recent grid-size growth rate 2007 and assumming com-
6
Only NPPs over 100 MWe are considered in order to avoid including reactors pound linear growth. Countries where the grid size is not projected
built solely for research purposes. to exceed 10 GWe within the next 15 years were evaluated for the
1044 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055

strength of international grid connections using IEA electricity Since the GEI measures the perception of the quality of public
trade data and published data on international grids (IEA, 2009b; services and the ability of the government to keep these services
see Appendix A for grid connection data).7 separate from politically motivated actions it is applicable in two
National financial capacity for nuclear power development main ways. First, nuclear power is inherently dependent on
entails both allocating an initial investment for creating the existing infrastructure such as roads and highway systems to
regulatory, legislative, and basic physical infrastructure to support transport construction and operation materials. Thus, the capacity
the development of a NPP as well as financing the construction of of a government to manage public services will influence on the
the first NPP. The initial investment generally comes from public ability of a government to provide supportive infrastructure which
funds while the actual financing of the NPP can come from either a NPP requires. Secondly, the perception of the degree of indepen-
private or public sources (IAEA, 2007b). dence of public services will influence the perception of the
The two main indicators of financial capacity are the country’s reliability of commitment to nuclear power and to some degree
gross domestic product (GDP) and its GDP/capita. The national GDP the risk to investors in investing in nuclear power.
is used to estimate the availability of financial resources which Since the GEI is only available from 1996, this indicator is
could be dedicated to the development of nuclear power. We benchmarked against current rather than historic data for Estab-
generally use real GDP rather than GDP at purchasing power parity lished NP Countries and the ownership arrangements within those
(PPP) because it better reflects the ability to import nuclear countries. Logically, for a country to get private investment in its
technology and expertise from abroad which Newcomer Countries first NPP, the institutional capacity must be at least as good as the
need initially (IAEA, 2007a). However, for the Established NP institutional capacity of those countries with privately owned or
Countries which are former socialist countries, we use GDP at operated nuclear power programs; however, it is possible that
PPP because they relied almost exclusively on domestic or Soviet countries with sufficient public resources and low institutional
technology where the global exchange rates were less relevant than capacity could garner sufficient support through public-sector
domestic economic wealth.8 We rely on GDP/capita measured at financing.
PPP as a widely used indicator of the national well-being that Additionally, investor interest and international cooperation for
generally correlates with the level of education, technological nuclear power deployment in a national context may be influenced
development, quality of infrastructure, and institutional capacity. by the political stability of the given country. Politically less stable
The financial capacity indicators are benchmarked against histor- countries might find it more difficult to attract investment and
ical values for the Established NP Countries at the time of the start secure support of the international community for launching new
of construction of their first NPP over 100 MWe. nuclear energy programs. For example, AREVA, the French nuclear
A country’s institutional capacity has a large influence on its company, claims to evaluate a country’s political stability as well as
ability to garner both international support and private investment. potential proliferation risk before cooperating with a given country
In countries with existing nuclear power programs, attracting (AREVA, 2003) and it has been suggested that national and even
investments for nuclear power programs is dependent on stable regional stability be considered before selling nuclear materials to a
and reliable regulatory procedures (Finon and Roques, 2008; country. This study evaluates political stability using the World
Nuttall and Taylor, 2008). Since the commitment to and reliability Bank Political Stability Index (PSI) and the recent occurrence of
of a country’s nuclear regimes cannot be evaluated in Newcomer destabilizing events (1998–2008).
Countries, an indicator related to the general institutional capacity The PSI is a measure of the perception that a government will be
was used. The World Bank Government Effectiveness Indicator overthrown by violent means available for over 212 countries and
(GEI), measures ‘‘perceptions of the quality of public services, the territories from 1996 (Kaufmann et al., 2008). The PSI data for
quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from Newcomer Countries are benchmarked against the current PSI for
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and imple- Established NP Countries. The meaning of this comparison would
mentation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment be stronger if the present political stability of the Newcomer
to such policies’’ (Kaufmann et al., 2008, p. 7). In other words, it Countries could be compared with the historic political stability of
measures the amount of confidence that government policies are the Established NP Countries at the time of the construction of their
effectively and fairly designed, implemented and enforced over first NPPs. Unfortunately, historic PSI data are only available from
time.9 1988. To compensate for this limitation, we look into another
indicator of political instability: the occurrence of ‘‘partial or total
state failure’’ recorded by the Political Instability Task Force (PITF)
7
An attempt was made to evaluate grid reliability by using ‘‘value lost due to (PITF, 2010) for 166 countries between 1955 and 2008. This
electrical outages’’ from the World Development Indicator (2009a) database. information is used to identify the Established NP Countries which
However it was discarded due to insufficient data and because there is a wide
experienced politically destablizing events at the time of deploying
spread among Established NP Countries. Since the paper is based on evaluating the
degree of resemblance between Newcomer and Established NP Countries, the nuclear power.
divergence among the ‘control group’ (of Established NP Countries) precludes it
from being a useful indicator.
8
Except for an initial relationship between Romania and Canada, the nuclear
energy programs in the Former Socialist States were all extensions of Soviet 2.2. Evaluating the motivation to pursue nuclear power
technology and expertise and were under Soviet management (Davey, 1982;
Socor, 1985). A sensitivity analysis, the results of which are included in the results
section, was run on this decision. The main civilian strategic reasons for pursuing nuclear energy
9
In addition to the Government Effectiveness indicator, the World Bank’s include: growing energy demands, a desire to decrease import
Regulatory Quality Indicator, Rule of Law Indicator, and Control of Corruption, as dependency and increase diversity of energy sources, especially
well as the ICRG Bureaucracy Quality Indicator were considered for institutional
under conditions of scarce domestic resources, as well as the
capacity. The other indicators were ruled out on both theoretical and practical
grounds. Theoretically, they either measured a phenomenon very similar to the mitigation of local and global air pollution (IAEA, 2007a; Toth,
Government Effectiveness Indicator or a phenomenon less relevant to the devel- 2008). This section discusses the metrics used for both energy
opment of nuclear power. For example, the Regulatory Quality Indicator was
rejected because it primarily focuses on regulations which are relevant to small and
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Practically, the other indicators were rejected (footnote continued)
because they all displayed a high correlation coefficient with the Government coefficients greater than 0.90 for the group of Newcomers and the ICRG Bureaucracy
Effectiveness Indicator. The other World Bank Indicators all had a correlation Quality Indicator had a correlation coefficient of 0.80.
 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055 1045

demand and security as well as those which were considered but equally represented, the value for the Shannon diversity index
dismissed for local and global air pollution. would be 2.30.
Both the magnitude and average growth rate (2001–2006) in Even though several indicators were reviewed to address the
electricity consumption10 were considered for the motivation from environmental motivations for nuclear energy, none were con-
energy demand in order to take into account both the relative sidered to be suitable. For one, there is no national indicator which
growth pressure as well as the sheer magnitude of growth. For would adequately reflect the significance of pollution from power
example, even though Senegal has a growth rate of 8.4% per year, it plants. Furthermore, while alleviating local air pollution is a
would only have additional annual electricity consumption equiva- convenient benefit of nuclear power, it is unlikely to be the main
lent to the electricity generated by a single 1 GWe NPP after 22 motivation since it can be achieved at much smaller costs by
years. In contrast, even though Poland’s electricity consumption installing air pollution control equipment on existing power plants.
growth rate is only 2%, the magnitude of growth is equal to about We looked into the possibility to reflect the motivation for
1/3 of the annual electricity produced from a standard 1 GWe NPP. nuclear power expansion related to concerns over GHG emissions
In our analysis larger economies such as Poland are ranked as and climate change. However, we could not find an adequate
having a higher motivation for nuclear energy despite their slower universal measure of a country’s commitment to decreasing GHG
relative growths than smaller but faster-growing economies. emissions especially with the uncertainty of the future climate
Naturally, the economies which are both large and fast-growing agreement. Furthermore, even if there were a quantitative measure
have the highest demand motivation and the ones which are small of commitment, there is no guarantee that reducing GHG emissions
and slow-growing have the lowest demand motivation. would actually correspond to a strong national motivation for
Two commonly cited reasons for pursuing nuclear energy are nuclear energy. To date, nuclear power is the only non-fossil fuel
related to energy security considerations that translate into the energy technology explicitly excluded from the Clean-Develop-
desire to increase both energy independence and supply diversity. ment Mechanism (COP, 2002) and this status may be preserved in
Since this study focuses on nuclear energy for electricity produc- future national and international climate change regimes.
tion, the fuel-import dependency of the electricity system and the
fuel-diversity of the electricity system are used to measure relative
national energy security of Newcomer Countries. 2.3. Limitations of using the historical data on nuclear energy
The import dependency of the electricity system is determined
by calculating the percentage of imported fuel for oil, gas, and coal When comparing the Newcomer Countries with the Established
and then proportionally scaling those energy sources to the total NP Countries, it is important to keep in mind that the world today is
amount they contribute to the domestic electricity supply. The significantly different than the world in which all of the existing
percentage of imported crude oil, gas, and coal is calculated using nuclear programs developed. Nuclear energy emerged in the late
2006 data from the IEA Balance statistics website (IEA, 2009b). The 1950s as a direct offshoot of nuclear weapons programs and
production of a given fuel source in a country is divided by the sum aspirations. Subsequently, inspired by the promise of abundant
of the production and the imported quantity of that fuel to calculate electricity which would be ‘‘too cheap to meter’’ (Laurence, 1955),
its respective import dependency. For oil, crude oil instead of twenty-five countries initiated nuclear power programs between
petroleum products is used because it is more representative of a 1957 and 1976. In contrast, only two nuclear programs were
country’s indigenous resources rather than its refining capacity. started in the 1980s including the last one in China in 1985 (data are
The representative proportion of the electricity system of each fuel from IAEA 2010). Thus, since the Chernobyl disaster in 1986, no
type is computed by dividing the number of GWh produced by a country has started a national nuclear power program (though
given fuel source in 2006 by the total domestic supply for 2006. mainland China, Mexico, and Romania completed and connected
The electricity diversity indicator also covers the fuel-mix for reactors that were started before the disaster).11
the electricity system due to the reasons discussed above. The Thus, the world in which all the existing nuclear programs were
diversity of the electricity system is measured by the Shannon established was divided by the Cold War and as a result, the nuclear
diversity index which is commonly used in studies of energy energy industry behind the Iron Curtain relied on technology and
security and diversity (APERC, 2007; Jansen et al., 2004; Stirling, expertise from the Soviet Union where it was often supported
1994). The Shannon diversity index (Shannon and Weaver, 1963) is through powerful defence-related programs. Additionally, in socia-
calculated as follows: list and market-economies alike, the provision of electricity was
X handled by regulated monopolies so that society as a whole rather
DI ¼  ðpi ln pi Þ than private actors bore most of the financial risk.
Some of the factors, which existed in the ‘pre-Chernobyl world’
where, DI is the Diversity index; pi is the share of primary energy but have disappeared since, made the adoption of nuclear
source ‘‘i’’ in the electricity mix; i is the 1yM: primary energy programs easier in the past. For example, politically-motivated
source index (where M is the total number of sources). generous and unconditional support from superpowers is nowa-
In order to calculate the Shannon diversity index this study used days less likely than during the Cold War. Safety and non-
2006 data from the IEA database of electricity production (IEA, proliferation regimes are more keenly observed after Chernobyl
2009a). The IEA reports 13 individual sources of electricity produc- and 9–11. The trend in many countries towards liberalized utility
tion: coal, oil, gas, biomass, nuclear, hydro, geothermal, solar PV, markets and private utilities makes it less likely for governments to
solar thermal, wind, tidal, and other sources. For simplicity, solar PV enter the business of power generation. On the other hand, the
and solar thermal were combined into one solar energy source. globalized flows of capital and technology and increasing concerns
Within the 52 Newcomer Countries, ten of the twelve energy over climate change, which did not exist prior to 1985, may make it
sources are represented (obviously nuclear is excluded as is tidal easier to start nuclear programs today. Though these changes in
energy). Thus, if a country had a fuel portfolio with all ten sources historical circumstances are difficult to interpret we still believe

10 11
While there is the potential to use nuclear power for desalination and heat It should also be noted that three of the original countries with nuclear power
production, this study limits itself to nuclear power for electricity production since (the USSR, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) broke apart and two of the original
Newcomers will most likely initially implement proven and tested technologies countries (West Germany and East Germany) reunited in the 1990s, thus increasing
(IAEA, 2008c). the number of countries with nuclear power from 27 to 30.
1046 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055

that comparative analysis of the Established NP and the Newcomer Table 2

Countries makes sense as it can shed light on factors and situations Historic economic and electricity consumption growth rates for Established NP
Countries at the start of construction of their first NPP4100 MWe.
that might prompt or hinder the expansion of nuclear power today.
Country and year 5-year average Average electricity
electricity growth rate from
3. Results consumption growth 1960–2006 for OECD
rate prior to countries and 1971–
3.1. Historical drivers for nuclear energy construction of the 2006 for non-OECD
first NPPa (%) countries (%)

Historically, nuclear power programs are associated with South Korea (1972) 15.9B 11.2
nuclear weapons considerations and high growth in electricity Former Soviet Union 14.4C NA
consumption. As shown in Table 2, 24 of the 25 countries for which (1958)
Spain (1964) 11.8A 6.6
there are historical electricity data were experiencing growth rates
Japan (1961) 11.4A 5.3
in electricity consumption greater than 5% and 9 of these had Former W. Germany 11.4A 3.8
growth rates over 9% in the five years prior the construction of their (1962)
first NPP or the nearest period available. In contrast, the average Netherlands (1969) 10.1 4.5
global growth rate in electricity consumption between 1971 and Mexico (1976) 9.5 6.1
Finland (1971) 9.1 5.4
2006 was about 3%.12 Additionally, in general, most of these growth
Former Yugoslavia 9.0D NA
rates were significantly higher than the average national growth (1975)
rate over the last 30 to 60 years. South Africa (1976) 8.9 4.4
In addition to a strong demand motivation, there is evidence Brazil (1971) 8.5B 6.5
Bulgaria (1970) 8.0B 1.7
that military concerns drove some of the interest in nuclear energy
France (1958) 7.8A 4.4
(Puig, 2005; Kåberger, 2007; Walker, 1992). Eight of the 27 UK (1957) 7.5A 3.8
Established NP Countries successfully developed nuclear weapons Hungary (1974) 7.5 3.1
(marked in bold text in Table 2); in addition, another eight Belgium (1969) 7.2 4.2
considered the development of nuclear weapons as evidenced by Pakistan (1966) 7.1B 7.9
US (1957) 6.8A 3.8
active support of development of the bomb or the presence of a
India (1968) 6.6B 6.9
combined civilian/military nuclear program (marked in italics in Sweden (1966) 6.4 3.5
Table 2).13 Thus, of the 27 countries with nuclear power 16 Canada (1960) 6.2A 3.8
considered or pursued the development of nuclear weapons. China (1985) 6.1 9.2
Argentina (1968) 6.0B 4.7
Switzerland (1965) 5.1 3.1
3.2. Motivations for Newcomer Countries Romania (1982) 4.1 1.5
Former NA NA
This section characterizes the motivations for nuclear power Czechoslovakia
(1958)
implementation in the Newcomer Countries and considers the
Former E. Germany NA NA
energy demand and energy security motivations for nuclear power. (1970)
The results for the motivations are aggregated such that a country’s
overall motivation for nuclear power is based on the highest Countries in bold developed nuclear weapons while countries in italics considered
motivation rating of the two drivers considered. As an example the development of nuclear weapons (see text for references).
a
if a country is rated as having a strong demand motivation and a Where possible, the average electricity consumption growth rate was
low energy security motivation, it is classified as having a strong calculated for the 5 years preceding the construction of the first NPP greater than
100 MWe using World Bank Data (2009a). Where this was not possible due to data
motivation to pursue nuclear power. This aggregation method is limitations, the nearest possible periods were used and coded in the table as follows.
used since for a country to have a strong enough drive to pursue A: Growth rate is calculated from 1960 to 1965 with World Bank data. B: Growth
nuclear power, it does not need to have a strong motivation in all rate is calculated from 1971 to 1976 using World Bank data. C: Growth rate is
aspects, but rather a strong enough motivation in at least one calculated from 1955 to 1960 using Bogomol’nyi (1976). D: Growth rate calculated
from 1970–1975 from Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Federal Institute for
aspect.
Statistics (1976).
Energy demand motivations in the Newcomer Countries are
characterized using two indicators: the average annual growth in
electricity consumption (2001–2006) and the number of years it consumption and thus are rated as having a high energy demand
would take for the electricity consumption to grow (at the current motivation. The only two countries within this first group which
rate) so as to require an additional 1 GWe of installed generation are rated as having a moderate demand motivation are Italy and
capacity (equivalent to a typical NPP).14 The results of the analysis Poland which both have low average growth rates in electricity
are summarized in Table 3. Of the 51 Newcomer Countries for consumption of approximately 2% a year.
which there are electricity data, 21 experience such high growth Another 9 countries may need an additional 1 GWe of electricity
rates that they would require an additional 1 GWe of generating generation capacity in the next 5–10 years. Three of these countries
capacity installed in less than 5 years.15 Most of these countries have moderate average (2001–2006) growth rates and are thus
also have high average (2001–2006) growth rates in electricity rated as having a moderate demand motivation and 6 of them have
high average growth rates and are thus rated as having a high
12 demand motivation. The remaining 20 Newcomer Countries are
This is an estimate calculated from World Bank WDI Data from 1971 to 2006
(World Bank, 2009a). rated as having a low demand motivation given that their growth in
13
Data are from: Bunn, (2001), Kåberger (2007), Kristensen and Godsberg electricity consumption would take over 10 years to require an
(n.d.), Martin (1996), Puig (2005). additional GWe of installed capacity. Even though a handful of
14
The number of years it would take a country to consume the electricity from a these countries have very high average growth rates, their existing
new NPP is calculated with the average electricity consumption growth rate
(2001–2006) and assumes compound linear growth and 100% capacity consumption
electricity consumption is so low that the magnitude of annual
of the NPP. growth in electricity consumption would not be likely to justify the
15
There were no electricity data for Uganda. construction of a standard 1 GWe NPP.
 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055 1047

Table 3
Demand growth motivation for Newcomer Countries.

Number of years for Average growth rate

additional annual
electricity
consumption from a
standard 1 GWe NPP
o 3% 3–6% 46%

Moderate demand motivation High demand motivation

o5 Italy Bangladesh
Chile Philippines Egypt Syria
Greece Portugal Indonesia Thailand
Poland Kazakhstan Saudi Arabia Kuwait Turkey
Malaysia Venezuela Libya U.A.E.
Nigeria Vietnam

5–10 Algeria Bahrain Morocco

Croatia D.R. Peru
Singapore Jordan Qatar

Low demand motivation

10–25 Belarus Ecuador Latvia Kenya Senegal
Myanmar Sudan
Estonia Tunisia Namibia Yemen

425 Albania Jamaica Mongolia

Cuba Paraguay
Georgia Tanzania
Ghana Uruguay

Note: There were no electricity data for Eritrea or Uganda. Thus they were assumed to have low demand motivations since they both have small economies (1 billion USD2000
and 10 billion USD2000, respectively).

Fig. 2. Electricity fuel security indicators for Newcomer Countries. Graph is produced from data compiled from IEA (2009c, 2009b).

The second set of indicators addresses the Security of Supply for Of the 52 Newcomer Countries: 18 currently have grid capa-
electricity production evaluated using the import dependency and cities which exceed 10 GWe and could accommodate a standard
a diversity index of fuels in the electricity system (Fig. 2). There are 1 GWe NPP; another 8 have grids which will likely exceed 10 GWe
three countries with both very high import dependency and very within the next 15 years. Of the 26 countries with electricity grids
low diversity: Belarus, Eritrea, and Jamaica. These were considered under 10 GWe and a low potential for sufficient growth, 10 have
as having high motivation for nuclear power despite their relatively strong international grid connections which could be utilized in the
low growth in electricity consumption. event of the construction of a NPP and 16 currently lack strong
international connections (Table 4).
3.3. Capacities of Newcomer Countries GDP and GDP/capita vary significantly in both Newcomer and
Established NP Countries. However, the Established NP Countries
This section discusses the technical, financial, and institutional without either the pursuit or acquisition of nuclear weapons are
capacities of Newcomers comparing them, where appropriate, with a relatively economically homogenous group (Fig. 3). The GDP of
the Established NP Countries. Established NP Countries at the time of construction of their first
1048 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055

Table 4
Technical capacity results for Newcomers (for grid connection sources see Appendix A).

High Medium Low

Current grid 410 GWe Prospective grid 410 GWe in o 15 years Small grid, good interconnections Unlikely to have a suitable grid

Chile Portugal Algeria Eritrea Belarus Latvia Albania Nigeria

Egypt Saudi Bahrain Libya Croatia Morocco Cuba Paraguay
Greece Arabia Bangladesh Peru Estonia Namibia Ecuador Senegal
Indonesia Singapore Dominican Republic Syria Georgia Qatar Ghana Sudan
Italy Thailand Jordan Uruguay Jamaica Tanzania
Kazakhstan Turkey Kenya Tunisia
Kuwait U.A.E. Mongolia Uganda
Malaysia Venezuela Myanmar Yemen
Philippines Vietnam
Poland

Fig. 3. Newcomer Countries’ Financial Capacity benchmarked against Established NP Countries’ Financial Capacity from the time of construction of their first NPP. GDP/capita
PPP data are from Lindregen (2009). GDP data are compiled from CIA (2008), Maddison (1995, 2003), World Bank (2009a) and are presented in constant USD2000. (They are
converted using Sahr (2009)). GDP values are all real except for the former Eastern-block Countries which are GDP PPP values.

NPP ranged from 13 billion USD2000 to over 2 trillion USD2000 and The spread of financial indicators for the Newcomer Countries is
the GDP/capita ranged from $700 PPP/capita to $22,000 PPP/capita much wider than for the Established NP Countries. Areas A and B in
(areas A and B). If countries with nuclear weapons or former Fig. 3 contain all of the Established NP Countries but only 75% of the
nuclear weapons aspirations are excluded, the lower boundaries of Newcomers. This means that 25% of Newcomer Countries currently
this range jump from 13 billion USD2000 to 53 billion USD2000 and have GDPs which are lower than the GDP of Pakistan (at the time
from $700 PPP/capita to $6,000 PPP/capita (area A).16 of construction of its first NPP), which itself was anomalously low.
In fact Pakistan is the only country with a GDP less than 50 The difference between Newcomer Countries’ financial capacities
billion USD2000 that has ever built a NPP. China, India, Korea, and and Established NP Countries’ financial capacities is even starker
Pakistan are the only Established NP Countries with a GDP/capita when only non-weapons Established NP Countries are considered.
PPP less than $5,000. All of them either have nuclear weapons or Area A in Fig. 3 contains all Established NP Countries with no
pursued the development of nuclear weapons with their nuclear evidence of historical nuclear weapons aspirations. Only one third
energy programs. This result suggests that when nuclear weapons of Newcomer NP Countries fall into this area.
aspirations or capabilities accompany the pursuit of nuclear energy Two conclusions follow from this analysis of financial indica-
(or the pursuit of nuclear energy accompanies nuclear weapons tors. First, the financial capacity of the Newcomer Countries is
aspirations), resources for a nuclear power program can be generally lower than the historical financial capacity of the
mobilized even in relatively poor countries. Established NP Countries. Secondly, with regard to their financial
capacities many Newcomer Countries are closer to the Established
16
NP Countries with nuclear weapon programs. While it does not
If the available real GDP values are used for the former socialist states,
necessarily mean that some Newcomer Countries are motivated by
Hungary and Romania drop below Finland’s minimum GDP of 53 billion USD2000.
Hungary’s real GDP was 31 billion USD2000 and Romania’s was 43 billion USD2000 the nuclear weapon considerations, it does indicate the degree of
year that they began construction on their first NPP. However, as discussed in political commitment which will be required to mobilize financial
Section 2.1, the nuclear programs in the Former Socialist states were extensions of resources for a nuclear energy program in these relatively poor
Soviet technology and management. Even with this support it is clear that in spite of countries.
the support from a significant cooperation agreement from the USSR (KK, 1974),
Hungary struggled financially to complete their NPP which not only affected the
For further analysis we will call a Newcomer’s financial capacity
nuclear plant in Hungary but also had a negative impact on other government ‘‘high’’ if it falls in Zone A (Fig. 3), ‘‘borderline’’ if it is in Zone B and
investment activities (Hudson, 1982). has a GDP above or within 5 billion USD2000 of the 50 billion
 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055 1049

Table 5 experienced political instability in the 10 years preceding or

Newcomer Countries GEI Rating Benchmarked against Established NP Countries following the start of construction of their first NPP. Four of them
Ratings Data are compiled from Kaufmann et al. (2008). For ownership references
(Argentina, Brazil, India, and Pakistan) had historic nuclear weapons
see Appendix B.
aspirations17 (Bunn, 2001; NTI, 2009). The fifth, Czechoslovakia,
GEI Newcomer All Established Existing NP C. with experienced political instability induced by the Soviet invasion
rating countries (%) NP Countries (%) mixed or private highly specific to the Cold War context (the 1968 ‘‘Prague Spring’’)
ownership (%) and probably not relevant to the current analysis.
75–100 12 60 97
In contrast, 10 Newcomer Countries, all of them in the lower
50–74 40 27 3 quartile of the PSI (Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Myanmar, the
25–49 27 13 0 Philippines, Sudan, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, and Yemen), have
0–24 21 0 0 experienced periods of significant instability within the past 10
years. Given their low PSI ratings, more Newcomer Countries are
likely to have politically destabilizing events in the next decade. In
effect, the group of Newcomer Countries in the bottom quartile of
Table 6 political stability appears very unstable if compared to the Estab-
Political stability index for Newcomer and Established NP Countries. lished NP Countries (except some of them that pursued nuclear
weapons in the past) at the time of the launching of their nuclear
PSI rating Newcomer All Established NP Established NP C. with
Countries (%) Countries (%) mixed or private energy programs. Such instability may affect their capacity to
ownership (%) attract investments in nuclear power and secure cooperation with
nuclear vendors and the necessary support of the international
75–100 10 37 62 community.
50–74 31 37 23
25–49 23 17 15
0–24 37 10 0
4. Different types of Newcomer Countries and divergent
prospects of nuclear power

USD2000 historical minimum (excluding Pakistan) and ‘‘low’’ if it is Our analysis identifies four types of Newcomer Countries
in zone ‘‘B’’ and has a GDP below 45 billion USD2000 or is in zone ‘‘C’’. (Fig. 4):
The institutional capacity of the Newcomer Countries also tends
to be lower than that of the Established NP Countries. The range of A. 10 politically stable countries with motivations and capacity
GEI ratings for nuclear Newcomers is significantly wider and similar to that of the Established NP Countries;
generally lower than for Established NP Countries (Table 5). While B. 10 countries with almost similarly high motivations and
60% of the Established NP Countries fall in the top quartile of capacity but with political instability which was only experi-
Countries in terms of GEI, only 12% of the Newcomer Countries do. enced by some of the Established NP Countries which histori-
Furthermore, 21% of the Newcomer Countries fall in the lowest cally pursued nuclear weapons;
quartile of GEI ratings where not a single Existing NP Country is C. 14 countries with economies smaller than those of the Estab-
found. Moreover, 97% of the Established NP Countries with lished NP Countries and varying degrees of motivations;
privately or jointly owned and operated NPPs fall in the top quartile D. 18 countries with capacities significantly lower than those of
of GEI. Thus, it may suggest that only Newcomer Countries with the Established NP Countries.
similarly high ratings would be able to effectively attract private
investment in a NPP. The following sections reflect on possible pathways for the
The political stability as measured by PSI is also significantly development of nuclear energy for the countries in each group.
wider and on average lower for Newcomers than it is for Estab-
lished NP Countries. According to the PSI from 2008 (the most 4.1. Nuclear power development most likely (A)
recent data available), the mean political stability of the Newcomer
Countries (Mean PSI-2008¼41) is significantly lower than of the Ten Newcomer Countries resemble the Established NP Coun-
Established NP Countries (Mean PSI-2008 ¼60). The PSI ratings for tries with respect to their capacities and motivations to develop
Newcomers also have a wider range than for Established NP nuclear power. They seem to be most likely to deploy nuclear
Countries: with the most stable being Singapore (PSI ¼96) and power in the business-as-usual scenario. This group contains: 5 EU
the most unstable being Sudan (PSI ¼2). Nineteen of the Newcomer Member states, 3 Middle East and North African (MENA) countries,
Countries fall within the bottom quartile of the Political Stability 2 Southeast Asian countries, and 1 Latin American country. All of
Index, i.e. they are among the 50 most unstable countries in the these countries have growth rates in electricity consumption such
world. In contrast, only 3 Established NP Countries (India, Pakistan, that within the next 5 years they would require at least 1 GWe of
and Russia) are within this range of low political stability. additional electricity generation. All of these countries also cur-
Table 6 further highlights the difference between political rently have grid capacities which exceed 10 GWe and all except
stability in Newcomer and Established NP Countries. In particular, Kuwait have GDPs over 100 billion USD2000.18 According to the
two-thirds of Established NP Countries with mixed or private World Bank ratings (World Bank, 2009b), they are all either Upper
ownership belong to the top quartile of PSI rating, whereas only
10% of Newcomer Countries belong to this group. On the other end 17
While Pakistan is now a weapons state, several scholars have stated that
of the spectrum, none of the Established NP Countries with mixed Pakistan did not begin developing nuclear weapons until 1972 even though it began
or private ownership are in the bottom quartile of political stability, construction of its first NPP in 1966 (Ahmed, 1999; Nizamani, 2000). However, given
while, as we already mentioned, 19 Newcomer Countries (37%) are their anomalously low financial capacity when compared to the historical data of
in the group of the most politically unstable countries in the world. other Existing NP Countries and their political tensions with India, it is possible that
nuclear weapons was a tacit motivation for the development of nuclear energy.
The difference between Newcomers and Established NP 18
Although Kuwait’s GDP is only 66 billion, as a high income country with a
Countries is also clear when political stability is considered from 2007 GDP/capita PPP over $47,000, it is likely that the country could fund and garner
a historical perspective. Only five of the Established NP Countries investment for a NPP.
1050 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055

Fig. 4. Summary of capacities and motivations of the Newcomer Countries. * Indicates countries in the bottom quartile of political stability.

Middle Income or High Income countries. Half of these countries and international investors would be less willing to support nuclear
(Chile, Malaysia, Portugal, Singapore, and U.A.E.) are in the top power in these countries. It should be also noted that 3 of these
quartile of government effectiveness (GEI) ratings and the other countries (Algeria, Egypt, and Indonesia) at one point pursued the
half (Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Poland, and Saudi Arabia) fall in the development of nuclear weapons which may complicate securing
second quartile. Two of these countries (Singapore and Poland) access to nuclear technologies on the international market.
are in the top quartile of political stability (PSI) ratings, seven
(Chile, Greece, Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Poland, and U.A.E.) are in the
second quartile, and Saudi Arabia is in the third quartile with a PSI 4.3. Launching nuclear power programs is possible under strong
rating of 31. international cooperation (C)

Another 14 Newcomers have capacities notably lower than the

4.2. Nuclear power development uncertain (B) Established NP Countries. Though they are relatively politically
stable (above the bottom quartile of the PSI) and have sufficiently
In 10 countries nuclear power development seems to be less large grids and/or international grid connections, their economies
certain because while they have strong capacity and motivations, are smaller and government effectiveness is lower. They include 2
but they all fall in the lowest quartile of political stability. This Latin American Countries, 6 MENA Countries, 4 Central and Eastern
group contains 4 Southeast Asian Countries, 2 Latin American European Countries, Kazakhstan, and Vietnam. Three of these
Countries, 3 MENA countries, and Nigeria. Their GDPs range from countries (Libya, Morocco, and Vietnam) have borderline financial
70 billion to 373 billion USD2000 and are generally lower than in capacities with GDPs between 45 and 53 USD2000 and Low- to
Group A countries. Four of them (Peru, Thailand, Turkey, and Upper-Middle per capita income levels. All the other countries in
Venezuela) are Upper Middle Income countries, five (Algeria, Egypt, this Group have even lower GDPs between 10 and 36 USD2000 and
Indonesia, Nigeria, and the Philippines) are Lower Middle Income varying per capita income levels ranging from Lower Middle
countries, and one (Bangladesh) is a Low Income Country (World Income in the Dominican Republic, Syria and Jordan to High
Bank, 2009b). These countries also vary in terms of government Income in Bahrain, Estonia and Qatar.
effectiveness. Three of them (the Philippines, Thailand, and Turkey) The institutional and technical capacities of this group also vary
have GEI ratings in the second quartile, four (Algeria, Egypt, considerably. The GEI ratings range from Estonia’s 84%, to 7
Indonesia, and Peru) have GEI ratings in the third quartile, and countries in the second quartile (Bahrain, Croatia, Jordan, Latvia,
three (Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Venezuela) have GEI ratings in the Morocco, Qatar, and Uruguay), 3 countries in the third quartile
lowest quartile (Dominican Republic, Kazakhstan, and Syria), and 2 countries in the
Six of these countries currently have grids which could accom- bottom quartile of GEI ratings (Belarus and Libya). Vietnam and
modate an NPP (Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela, Egypt, Indonesia, and Kazakhstan currently have grids exceeding 10 GWe; the Domin-
the Philippines) and another 3 have grids which are projected to ican Republic, Libya, and Syria are projected to have grids exceed-
exceed the requisite 10 GWe within the next 15 years (Algeria, ing 10 GWe within the next 15 years; and all the other countries in
Bangladesh, and Peru). While the technical capacity calculation for the group have (or will soon have) grid connections which could
Nigeria does not project that it will exceed 10 GWe within the near facilitate NPP implementation.
future it is possible that this projection, based on the average This group is also characterized by a range of motivation levels.
growth in the electricity grid over the last 10 years, is overly While the MENA countries, Vietnam and Kazakhstan have high
conservative given the extremely high demand growth that the demand motivations, the Baltic States, Croatia, and Uruguay have
country is experiencing. low demand motivations. Belarus has a very low demand motiva-
In conclusion, given these countries’ political instability, gen- tion but high energy security motivation as 95% of their electricity
erally lower GEI ratings and income levels, it is likely that private is currently generated from imported Russian natural gas.
 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055 1051

Most of the countries in this group are unlikely to be able deploy dismiss the existing ones. For example, necessary human resources
nuclear energy with their own financial resources. However, joint and technologies are likely to be scarce in small low-income
construction of NPPs by several neighboring states (for example, economies. Thus, in spite of these limitations, we believe that
Jordan, Qatar and Bahrain or Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania) or other our framework offers valuable insights and guidance for the future
forms of international cooperation may overcome this obstacle. development of nuclear power in Newcomer Countries.
To begin with, it is clear that the Newcomer Countries are very
4.4. Nuclear power development unlikely (D) diverse. The IAEA maintains that ‘‘there are no good and bad
countries’’ in terms of nuclear power (GAO, 2009), however, the
In the remaining 18 Newcomer Countries, nuclear power results of this study indicate different degrees of readiness for
development in the near future seems unlikely. These countries nuclear power. This degree of readiness may inform the focus and
have low financial capacities19 and small, unconnected grids. Most form of international assistance to Newcomer Countries. The
of these countries also have weak motivations for the development indicators used in this study should complement, not replace the
of nuclear power. Eritrea and Jamaica may be viewed as exceptions existing international standards for nuclear regulatory, legislative,
since they have high import dependence and low diversity of accounting, and monitoring procedures.
fuel supply for electricity. However, even these two countries are First, we identify a group (A) of 10 Newcomer Countries which
unlikely to launch nuclear power not only because of their low are generally similar to the Established NP Countries in their
financial and institutional capacities but also because they have technical and financial capacity as well as political stability. The
small (o1.2 GWe) unconnected grids. Additional factors which development of nuclear power in these countries seems the most
may (adversely) affect the prospects of nuclear power in this group likely and does not seem to present a significant proliferation risk.
include factors of political instability (in Ecuador, Georgia, Kenya, A similar group of 10 highly motivated and almost equally capable
Myanmar, Sudan, and Yemen) and the reported interest in nuclear countries (Group B) is nevertheless experiencing political instabil-
weapons (Myanmar). ities which seem to significantly exceed historic instabilities among
the Established NP Countries. In fact, such instabilities were only
historically observed in those Established NP Countries that his-
5. Concluding remarks: limitations and further research torically had nuclear weapons aspirations. While this observation
agenda does not mean that Newcomers from Group B are pursuing nuclear
weapons it may indicate the extent of commitment and effort which
This study aimed to improve the understanding of the driving may be required to establish nuclear energy in a politically unstable
forces and barriers for nuclear energy in some 52 countries that country. Specifically, these countries are likely to face more diffi-
have recently expressed interest in nuclear energy. We have looked culties in securing investment and access to nuclear technologies
into the motivations and capacities related to the development of than countries of the first group. Such access may also be con-
nuclear power programs by identifying quantitative indicators for strained by conditions similar to an agreement between the U.A.E.
all these factors and comparing them to historic data from the and the US in which the U.A.E. agreed to forfeit the right to enrich
countries which already have nuclear power programs. and process its own fuel in return for permission to do business with
Our assessment framework has three main limitations. For one, US nuclear firms (Lakshmanan, 2009).
it does not include all factors which influence nuclear power We further identify a group of 14 Newcomers which will
development. Due to the lack of suitable indicators, our framework probably only be able to launch nuclear power programs jointly
did not evaluate such capacity considerations as human resources, with other countries or by lending it unprecedented governmental
ability to garner international support, ability to establish nuclear support. While joint construction and operation of an NPP has its
waste facilities, reliability of the national grid, geographical suit- own risks and limitations, based on the capacity and motivation
ability, popular support for nuclear energy, and indigenous nuclear results, the Eastern Baltic and the Persian Gulf are two regions
facilities (such as research reactors). Additionally, the framework where it would be a potentially attractive option. The fourth and
did not evaluate motivations related to the environment or other final group of 18 Newcomers seems to have low capacity and
non-nuclear energy sources. The second main limitation is that generally lower motivations to launch nuclear power.
even though the majority of analysis is based on comparing In conclusion, we believe that the analysis presented in this
Newcomer Countries to Established NP Countries, historical data paper may contribute to making the discussion of the ‘nuclear
cannot offer an exact analogy to the present since all existing renaissance’ more contextualized and specific. The fate of the
nuclear power programs were set up in regulated electricity expansion of nuclear energy will largely be determined at the
markets as opposed to the liberalized markets which many national level and thus national factors, such as the ones analyzed
countries have moved to today. Additionally, the NPP programs here, are no less important than the global technological and
were all started before Chernobyl and the end of the cold war. The economic developments. Nuclear energy does not have just one
third and final major limitation is that this study does not consider global future but rather different futures in different countries
the potentially game-changing developments in nuclear energy and regions. This study contributes insights, which may be a step
such as market penetration of small reactors or the development of towards better understanding such different futures of nuclear
cheap modular-units. If small reactors were to become readily power. Additional studies taking into account other factors and
available, financial and technical requirements may be significantly focusing on specific countries or regions will clearly be needed to
lower which would significantly change the results of our analysis. improve our understanding of the role of nuclear power in energy
However, evaluation of additional national factors is not likely transitions in different parts of the world.
to alter many of our conclusions, especially those which question
the feasibility of nuclear energy in certain countries. This is because
additional analysis is likely to add extra limitations rather than Acknowledgments

19
The author would like to thank Aleh Cherp for inspiring
Cuba is the one exception in this group with a high financial capacity.
However, their grid size is only 5 GWe and the growth rate in electricity consump-
discussions and feedback throughout the research process and
tion is o 2% so they are judged as unlikely to implement nuclear power in the near Frank von Hippel and Hans-Holger Rogner for assistance in
future. identifying Newcomers and the initial idea of pursuing this
1052 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055

Table A1

Country Connection Notes and references

rating

Albania Low Sparse interconnections with neighbors (GENI, 2010)

Bahrain High Connected with Gulf Grid which is predicted to be ready by May 2010. (Carvalho and Shamseddine, 2009; GCCIA, 2009)
Belarus High Connected with the Baltic and Russian grids. From Baltic and Belarusian Maps (GENI, 2010)
Croatia High High percentage of electricity is imported. Additional data from the Croatian Electricity Grid Map (GENI, 2010)
Dominican Low No electricity imports. The map of the D.R.’s electricity network indicates that there are no international connections (GENI, 2010).
Republic No imminent plans for establishing international connection were found
Eritrea Low No interconnections with neighbors identified (GENI, 2010)
Estonia High Connected with Baltic grid. From Baltic Map (GENI, 2010)
Georgia High International imports are significant (10% of production quantity)
Ghana Low Although Ghana’s imported electricity equals 9% of its production capacity, the production is extremely low. There is a plan to institute
the West African Power Pool, however several experts indicate that the African power market and energy in general requires huge
amounts of investment (Foster, 2008; ICA, 2008)
Jamaica Low No international imports. A grid map (GENI, 2010), indicates no international connections either
Kenya Low While there are some international connections with Uganda identified in the map of the East African network from African Energy
Online (African Energy, 2008a). However, the requisite investment in Africa in energy and electricity is very large (Foster, 2008; ICA,
2008)
Latvia High Connected with the Baltic grid (GENI, 2010)
Mongolia Low The map of China’s electricity network shows limited interconnections with China (GENI, 2010). Imported electricity is equivalent to 4%
of its electricity production in 2006 which was very low. No plans were found for large-scale connection projects
Morocco High Connected with Spain (African Energy, 2008b). Imported electricity equivalent to 9% of the produced electricity
Myanmar Low No international electricity connections (Dhungel, 2008)
Namibia High Strong connection with South Africa evidenced by the fact that the country imports as much electricity as it produces
Nigeria Low Some international connections with Benin (African Energy, 2008c). However, the plan for the West African Power pool needs huge
investments to be realized (Foster, 2008; ICA, 2008)
Qatar High Connected with Gulf Grid which is predicted to be ready by May 2010 (Carvalho and Shamseddine, 2009; GCCIA, 2009)
Senegal Low Limited connections with Mali and Mauritania (African Energy, 2008c), however also requires significant investment for
interconnections to be strengthened (Foster, 2008; ICA, 2008)
Sudan Low There are possible future interconnections within Africa (World Bank, 2007), however the project is in a very preliminary stage
Tanzania Low There are possible future interconnections within Africa (World Bank, 2007), however the project is in a very preliminary stage. The map
of the Tanzanian electricity grid indicates limited connections with neighbors (African Energy, 2008a)
Tunisia Low There are plans for a possible integration with Italy, however, at this point the project is still being reviewed (Tunisia Online News, 2009)
Uruguay High Uruguay is well connected with Argentina (GENI, 2010). Its imported electricity equals 50% of its production
Yemen Low Although there are possible future interconnections (World Bank, 2007), there are currently no international connections (GENI, 2010)

Table B1

Country Ownership and operation Owner Operator Notes and references

Argentina State-owned and operated Nucleoelectrica Argentina S.A. Nucleoelectrica Argentina S.A. NA-SA (2006)
Armenia State-owned and operated Ministry of Energy and Natural Joint Stock Company Armenian Financially managed by
Resources of Republic of Nuclear Power Plant Russian companies to pay
Armenia back a debt of fuel supplies;
operationally managed by
Armenia (NTI, 2003)
Belgium Mixed Numerous Numerous NEA (2007a)
Brazil State-owned and operated Eletrobras Termonuclear Eletrobras Termonuclear Eletronuclear (n.d)
SA-Electronuclear SA-Electronuclear
Bulgaria State-owned and operated Kosloduy Nuclear Power Kosloduy Nuclear Power Kozloduy (2008)
Plant-plc Plant-plc
Canada Mixed Numerous Numerous Numerous owners and
operators. Two examples:
Bruce Power (2009) Ontario
Power (2009)
China Mixed Numerous Numerous WNA (2009)
Czech Republic State-owned and operated ČEZ, a. s. ČEZ, a. s. As of March 2008: 67.9%
owned by Czech government;
28.5% by companies and
corporations and 3.9% owned
by individuals (NEA, 2008b)
Finland Privately owned and operated Fortum Power and Heat OY, Fortum Power and Heat OY, NEA (2007b)
Teollisuuden Voima OY VOIMA Teollisuuden Voima OY VOIMA
OY OY
France State-owned and operated Électricité de France Électricité de France 85% state-owned (Eléctricté
de France, 2009)
Germany Privately owned and operated Numerous Numerous NEA (2007c)
Hungary State-owned and operated Hungarian Power Companies Paks Nuclear Power Plant Ltd. MVM (2006, 2007)
Ltd.
India State-owned and operated Nuclear Power Corporation of Nuclear Power Corporation of Bharatiya Nabhiklya Vidyut
India Ltd. India Ltd. Nigam Limited is a
government-owned
enterprise which is also
constructing one (Bhavini,
 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055 1053

Table B1 (continued )

Country Ownership and operation Owner Operator Notes and references

2006; Nuclear Power

Corporation of India Limited,
2008)
Japan Privately owned and operated Numerous Numerous NEA (2007d)
Korea State-owned and operated Korea Hydro and Nuclear Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power EIA (2007)
Power Co. Co.
Mexico State-owned and operated Comision Federal de Comision Federal de CFE (2009)
Electricidád Electricidád
Netherlands Privately-owned and operated EPZ EPZ NEA (2007e)
Pakistan State-owned and operated Pakistan Atomic Energy Pakistan Atomic Energy PAEC (2008)
Commission Commission
Romania State-owned and operated Ministry of Economy and Societatea Nationala The operator is about 90%
Finance Nuclearelectrica S.A. state-owned
(Nuclearelectrica SA National
Comp., 2005)
Russia State-owned and operated JSC ‘‘Concern Energoatom’’ JSC ‘‘Concern Energoatom’’ Currently going through a
reorganization but still will be
state-owned (Energoatom,
2009)
Slovak Republic Mixed Slovenské elektrárne, a.s. Slovenské elektrárne, a.s. NEA (2007f)
Slovenia State-owned and operated GEN Energija, d.o.o. Nuklerana elektrarna Krško NEK (2009), Radež, (2009)
South Africa State-owned and operated Eskom Eskom 30% of Eskom is privately
owned (EIA, 2008a)
Spain Privately-owned and operated Numerous Numerous NEA (2007g)
Sweden Mixed Numerous Numerous NEA (2008c)
Switzerland Privately owned and operated Numerous Numerous (NEA, 2006)
Ukraine State-owned and operated Energoatom National nuclear energy Energoatom(n.d)
generating company
United Kingdom Privately owned and operated British Energy British Energy EIA (2006)
United States Privately owned and operated Numerous Numerous EIA (2009)

research. I would also like to thank Philip Peck, Jaap Jansen, Bhavini, 2006. Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited. Retrieved November 8,
participants at the University of Sussex Energy Transitions Con- 2009, from: /http://www.bhavini.nic.in/S.
Bogomol’nyi, M., 1976. Levels of electric energy production in the USSR. Power
ference and an anonymous reviewer from Energy Policy for helpful Technology and Engineering (formerly Hydrotechnical Construction) 10 (3),
suggestions and comments. 294–296.
Bowen, W.Q., Kidd, J., 2004. The Iranian nuclear challenge. International Affairs 80
(2), 257–276.
Bruce Power, 2009. Bruce Power: About us. Retrieved November 8, 2009, from:
Appendix A /http://www.brucepower.com/pagecontent.aspx?navuid=1S.
Bunn, M., 2001. Civilian nuclear energy and nuclear weapons programs: the record.
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Cambridge, MA.
See Table A1. Carvalho, S., Shamseddine, R., 2009, March 31. Gulf-wide electricity grid ready by
May 2010-official. Arabian Business.
CFE, 2009. CFE—Qué es CFE. Comisión Federal de Electricidad. Retrieved November
8, 2009, from: /http://www.cfe.gob.mx/es/laempresa/queescfe/S.
Appendix B Chubin, S., 2006. Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.
See Table B1. CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 2008. CIA World Factbook. US Central Intelligence
Agency, Washington, DC.
COP, 2002. Report of the Conference of the Parties on its seventh session, held at
References Marrakesh from 29 October to 10 November 2001. UNFCC.
Davey, W. G., 1982. Nuclear power in the Soviet Bloc (No. LA-9039). Los Alamos
National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico.
Adamantiades, A., Kessides, I., 2009. Nuclear power for sustainable development: Deutch, J.M., Forsberg, C.W., Kadak, A.C., Kazimi, M.S., Moniz, E.J., Parsons, J.E., 2009.
current status and future prospects. Energy Policy 37 (12), 5149–5166. Update of the MIT 2003 Future of Nuclear Power. Massachusetts Institute of
African Energy, 2008a. East Africa: electricity supply industry, facilities and Technology, Cambridge, MA Retrieved from: /http://web.mit.edu/nuclear
network. African Energy online map library. Retrieved from: /http://www. power/pdf/nuclearpower-update2009.pdfS.
africa-energy.com/html/Public/map_library/09%20ATLAS/East_Africa_Electrici Dhungel, K.R., 2008. Regional energy trade in South Asia: problems and prospects.
ty_supply.htmlS. South Asia Economic Journal 9 (1), 173–193.
African Energy, 2008b. Morocco’s electricity generation and transmission capacity. Du, Y., Parsons, J.E., 2009. Update on the Cost of Nuclear Power. MIT Center for
Retrieved from: /http://www.africa-energy.com/html/Public/map_library/ Energy and Environmental Policy Research Working Paper, 09-003.
north/morocco/08a-Morocco_gen_trans.html#S. EIA (the US Energy Information Agency), 2006, May. Energy profile of United
African Energy, 2008c. Nigera’s electricity and gas infrastructure. African Energy Kingdom: Electricity. Retrieved November 8, 2009, from: /http://www.eia.doe.
online map library. Retrieved from: /http://www.africa-energy.com/html/Pub gov/emeu/cabs/United_Kingdom/Electricity.htmlS.
lic/map_library/west/region/09_Nigeria_electricity_gas_infrastructure.htmlS. EIA, 2007, June. Energy profile of South Korea: Electricity. Retrieved November 8, 2009,
Ahmed, S., 1999. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program: turning points and nuclear from: /http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_Korea/Electricity.htmlS.
choices. International Security 23 (4), 178–204. EIA, 2008a, October. Energy profile of South Africa: Electricity. Retrieved November
APERC (Asia Pacific Energy Research Centre), 2007. A quest for energy security in the 8, 2009, from: /http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/South_Africa/Electricity.
21st century. Institute of Energy Economics, Tokyo. Retrieved from: /http:// htmlS.
www.ieej.or.jp/aperc/2007pdf/2007_Reports/APERC_2007_A_Quest_for_Ener EIA, 2008b. Total electricity installed capacity (Million Kilowatts). US Energy
gy_Security.pdfS. Information Administration: International Statistics. Retrieved December 29,
AREVA, 2003. Values Charter. AREVA, Paris. 2009, from: /http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=
Barnaby, F., 2009. The Nuclear Renaissance: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and 2&pid=2&aid=7S.
Terrorism. Institute for Public Policy Research, London Retrieved from: /http:// EIA, 2009. States with Commercial Nuclear Industries. Energy Information Admin-
www.ippr.org.uk/publicationsandreports/publication.asp?id=650S. istration: Official Energy Statistics from the US Government. Retrieved Novem-
BBC, 2010, January 21. Iran nuclear plant ’open in 2010’. BBC. Retrieved from: ber 9, 2009, from: /http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/nuclear/page/at_a_glance/
/http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8472771.stmS. reactors/states.htmlS.
1054 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055

Eletronuclear, n.d.. Eletronuclear: Eletrobrás Termonuclear S.A.: Home. Retrieved Laurence, W.L., 1955, August 6. Nuclear history due to be made in geneva parley.
November 8, 2009, from: /http://www.eletronuclear.gov.br/ingles/inicio/ New York Times.
index.phpS. Lindregen, M., 2009. GDP per capita by purchasing power parities (No. Gapminder
Eléctricté de France, 2009. EDF–Investors–Stock information–Shareholding policy. Documentation 001-Version 5). Gapminder.org. Retrieved from: /http://www.
2009. Retrieved November 8, 2009, from: /http://investors.edf.com/ gapminder.org/gapminder-world/documentation/S.
the-edf-group/edf-investors/stock-information/shareholding-policy-117065. Lovins, A.B., Sheikh, I., Markevich, A., 2009. Nuclear power: climate fix or folly. Rocky
htmlS. Mountain Institute. Retrieved from: /http://www.rmi.org/cms/Download.
Energoatom, 2009. Energoatom Concern OJSC: About us: About the concern. aspx?id=1138&file=E09-01_NuclPwrClimFixFolly1i09.pdfS.
Retrieved November 9, 2009, from: /http://www.rosenergoatom.ru/eng/ Macfarlane, A.M., Miller, M., 2007. Nuclear energy and uranium resources. Elements
about/info/index.wbpS. 3 (3), 185–192.
Energoatom, n.d. NNEGC ‘‘Energoatom’’/Energoatom at a glance. Retrieved Novem- Maddison, A., 1995. Monitoring the World Economy, 1820–1992. Development
ber 8, 2009, from: /http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/en/index_eng.htmS. Centre of Organisation and Development, Paris.
Finon, D., Roques, F., 2008. Financing arrangements and industrial organisation for Maddison, A., 2003. The World Economy. OECD, Paris.
new nuclear build in electricity markets. Cambridge Working Paper in Econom- Martin, D., 1996. Exporting disaster: the cost of selling CANDU reactors. Canadian
ics No. EPRG 0826. University of Cambridge. Retrieved from: /http://www. coalition for nuclear responsibility. Retrieved from: /http://www.ccnr.org/
electricitypolicy.org.uk/pubs/wp/eprg0826.pdfS. exports_1.htmlS.
Foster, V., 2008. Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic. World Bank Retrieved MVM (Magyar Villamos Muvek + Zrt), 2006. Chief Executive’s Welcoming Introduc-
from: /http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/AICD_exec_ tion. Hungarian Power Companies Ltd. Retrieved November 8, 2009, from:
summ_9-30-08a.pdfS. /http://english.mvm.hu/Engine.aspxS.
GAO (Government Accountability Office), 2009. Nuclear nonproliferation: strength- MVM, 2007. MVM Csoport. Retrieved November 8, 2009, from: /http://mvmcso
ened oversight needed to address proliferation and management challenges in port.hu/index.php?lang=ENS.
IAEA’s technical cooperation program (Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee NA-SA (Nucleoeléctrica Argentina S.A.), 2006. Who are we (Quines somos). NA-SA
on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the website. Retrieved February 12, 2010, from: /http://www.na-sa.com.ar/
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental quienessomos#S.
Affairs, US Senate No. GAO-09-275). United States Government Accountability NEA (OECD Nuclear Energy Agency), 2006, March 15. Nuclear Energy Agency
Office, Washington, DC. Retrieved from: /http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ Country Profiles: Switzerland. OECD, Paris. Retrieved November 9, 2009, from:
d09275.pdfS. /http://www.nea.fr/html/general/profiles/switzerland.htmlS.
GCCIA (Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority), 2009. GCCIA website. NEA, 2007a, June 20. Nuclear Energy Agency Country Profiles: Belgium. OECD, Paris.
Retrieved May 19, 2009, from: /http://www.gccia.com.sa/S. Retrieved November 9, 2009, from: /http://www.nea.fr/html/general/profiles/
GENI (Global Energy Network Institute), 2010. National Energy Grid Map Index. belgium.htmlS.
Retrieved from: /http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/national_energy_ NEA, 2007b, June 20. Nuclear Energy Agency Country Profiles: Finland. OECD, Paris.
grid/index.shtmlS. Retrieved November 9, 2009, from: /http://www.nea.fr/html/general/profiles/
Harding, J., 2007. Economics of nuclear power and proliferation risks in a carbon- finland.html#operationS.
constrained world. The Electricity Journal 20 (10), 65–76. NEA, 2007c, June 20. Nuclear Energy Agency Country Profiles: Germany. OECD, Paris.
Hudson, 1982. Hungary finally commissions its first nuclear reactor (No. 37-7-240). Retrieved November 9, 2009, from: /http://www.nea.fr/html/general/profiles/
Budapest: OSA. Retrieved from: /http://www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/ germany.htmlS.
300/8/3/text_da/36-7-240.shtmlS. NEA, 2007d, June 20. Nuclear Energy Agency Country Profiles: Japan. OECD, Paris.
IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 2007a. Considerations to Launch a Retrieved November 9, 2009, from: /http://www.nea.fr/html/general/profiles/
Nuclear Power Programme. IAEA, Vienna Retrieved from: /http://www.iaea. japan.html#orgS.
org/NuclearPower/Downloads/Launch_NPP/07-11471_Launch_NPP.pdfS. NEA, 2007e, June 20. Nuclear Energy Agency Country Profiles: Netherlands. OECD,
IAEA, 2007b. Milestones in the development of a national infrastructure for nuclear Paris. Retrieved November 9, 2009, from: /http://www.nea.fr/html/general/
power (Guide No. NG-G-3.1). Nuclear Energy Series. IAEA, Vienna. Retrieved profiles/netherlands.html#privS.
from: /http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1305_web.pdfS. NEA, 2007f, June 20. Nuclear Energy Agency Country Profiles: Slovak Republic.
IAEA, 2008a. Financing of new nuclear power plants (Technical Report No. No. NG-T- OECD, Paris. Retrieved November 8, 2009, from: /http://www.nea.fr/html/
4.2). Nuclear Energy Series. IAEA, Vienna. general/profiles/slovak_republic.htmlS.
IAEA, 2008b. Evaluation of the status of national nuclear infrastructure development NEA, 2007g, June 20. Nuclear Energy Agency Country Profiles: Spain. OECD, Paris.
(Technical Report No. NG-T-3.2). Nuclear Energy Series. IAEA, Vienna. Retrieved Retrieved November 9, 2009, from: /http://www.nea.fr/html/general/profiles/
from: /http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1358_web.pdfS. spain.htmlS.
IAEA, 2008c. International Status and Prospects of nuclear Power. IAEA, Vienna. NEA, 2008a. Nuclear Energy Outlook (No. 6348). OECD, Paris.
IAEA, 2009. Nuclear Technology Review. IAEA, Vienna. NEA, 2008b, March 21. Nuclear Energy Agency Country Profiles: Czech Republic.
IAEA, 2010. Nuclear Power Plants Information. Power Reactor Information System. OECD, Paris. Retrieved November 9, 2009, from: /http://www.nea.fr/html/
Retrieved June 30, 2010, from: /http://www.iaea.org/programmes/a2/S. general/profiles/czech.htmlS.
ICA (The Infrastructure Consortium for Africa), 2008. Annual Report 2007. Retrieved NEA, 2008c, May 19. Nuclear Energy Agency Country Profiles: Sweden. OECD, Paris.
from: /http://www.icafrica.org/fileadmin/documents/ICA_Annual_Report_2007_-_ Retrieved November 8, 2009, from: /http://www.nea.fr/html/general/profiles/
FOR_WEB.pdfS. sweden.htmlS.
IEA (International Energy Agency), 2008. World Energy Outlook 2008. OECD, Paris. NEK (Nuklearna Elektrarna Krško), 2009. Nuklearna Elektrarna Krško
IEA, 2009a. Electricity/Heat Statistics. International Energy Agency: Statistics. website—Management. Krško, Slovenia. Retrieved November 8, 2009, from:
Retrieved April 22, 2009, from: /http://www.iea.org/Textbase/stats/prodre /http://www.nek.si/en/about_nek/management/S.
sult.asp?PRODUCT=Electricity/HeatS. Nizamani, H.K., 2000. The Roots of Rhetoric: Politics of Nuclear Weapons in India and
IEA, 2009b. Balances. International Energy Agency: Statistics. Retrieved April 25, Pakistan. Praeger Publishers, Westport, CT.
2009, from: /http://www.iea.org/Textbase/stats/prodresult.asp?PRODUCT= NTI (Nuclear Threat Initiative), 2003, February 5. Armenia: Metsamor nuclear power
BalancesS. plant. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Washington, DC. Retrieved November 7, 2009,
IEA, 2009c. Energy Security. International Energy Agency: Energy Security. from: /http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/armenia/powerrea.htmS.
Retrieved March 26, 2009, from: /http://www.iea.org/Textbase/subjectqu NTI, 2009, October. Country Overviews: India: Nuclear Overview. Nuclear Threat
eries/keyresult.asp?KEYWORD_ID=4103S. Initiative, Washington, DC. Retrieved November 14, 2009, from: /http://www.
Jansen, J.C., Van Arkel, W.G., Boots, M.G., 2004. Designing Indicators of Long-Term nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Nuclear/index.htmlS.
Energy Supply Security. ECN (Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands), Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited, 2008. Nuclear Power Corporation of
Petten. India Limited. Retrieved November 8, 2009, from: /http://www.npcil.nic.in/S.
Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., Mastruzzi, M., 2008. Governance matters VII: Aggregate and Nuclearelectrica SA National Comp, 2005. SN Nuclearelectrica SA’s Profile. Retrieved
individual governance indicators 1996–2007. Policy Research Working Paper from: /http://www.nuclearelectrica.ro/page.php?pid=22S.
4654 No. WPS4654. World Bank, Washington, DC. Retrieved from: /http:// Nuttall, W., 2005. Nuclear Renaissance: Technologies and Policies for the Future of
www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2008/06/24/ Nuclear Power 1st ed Taylor & Francis, New York.
000158349_20080624113458/Rendered/PDF/wps4654.pdfS. Nuttall, W., Taylor, S., 2008. Financing the Nuclear Renaissance (Cambridge Working
Kåberger, T., 2007. History of nuclear power in Sweden. Estudos Avanc- ados 21 (59), Paper in Economics No. EPRG 0814). University of Cambridge. Retrieved from:
225–242. /http://www.electricitypolicy.org.uk/pubs/wp/eprg0814.pdfS.
KK, 1974. Initial production capacity of Hungarian atomic power plant to be Ontario Power, 2009. Ontario Power Generation: Frequently Asked Questions.
doubled. No. 35-5-212. Radio Free Europe, Budapest. Retrieved from: /http:// Retrieved November 8, 2009, from: /http://www.opg.com/faq.aspS.
www.osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text_da/35-5-212.shtmlS. Pacala, S., Socolow, R., 2004. Stabilization wedges: solving the climate problem for
Kozloduy, 2008. Kozloduy NPP Plc—Company Profile. Retrieved November 8, 2009, the next 50 years with current technologies. Science 305 (5686), 968–972.
from: /http://www.kznpp.org/index.php?lang=en&p=about_aec&p1=company_ PAEC (Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission), 2008. History—Pakistan Atomic
profileS. Energy Commission. Retrieved November 8, 2009, from: /http://www.paec.
Kristensen, H.M., Godsberg, A., n.d. Romania special weapons. Retrieved from: gov.pk/paec-hist.htmS.
/http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/romania/index.htmlS. Parenti, C., 2008, April 24. What nuclear renaissance? The Nation.
Lakshmanan, I.A., 2009, February 3. A model nuclear-power deal? The International PITF (Political Instability Task Force), 2010, January 10. Political Instability Task
Herald Tribune. Retrieved from: /http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/03/ Force: Main Page. Retrieved February 11, 2010, from: /http://globalpolicy.gmu.
mideast/letter.1-421715.phpS. edu/pitf/S.
 J. Jewell / Energy Policy 39 (2011) 1041–1055 1055

Puig, A.P.I., 2005. Science on the periphery. The Spanish reception of nuclear energy: Stirling, A., 1994. Diversity and ignorance in electricity supply investment:
an attempt at modernity? Minerva 43 (2), 197–218. addressing the solution rather than the problem. Energy Policy 22 (3), 195–216.
Radež, M.Č., 2009, February 9. Economics of nuclear power and options for financing new Takeyh, R., 2003. Iran’s nuclear calculations. World Policy Journal 20 (2), 21–28.
NP project. Presented at the IAEA Regional Workshop, Vienna. Retrieved from: Toth, F.L., 2008. Prospects for nuclear power in the 21st century: a world tour.
/http://www.iaea.org/NuclearPower/Downloads/E_and_F/2009-02-WS-Vienna/ International Journal of Global Energy Issues 30 (1–4), 3.
D2P7_SLO.pdfS. Tunisia Online News, 2009, November 25. Tunisia, Italy eye electric connection by
Rogner, H., 2009, July 14. Nuclear power in the World: Today and in the 21st century. 2015. Retrieved February 12, 2010, from: /http://www.tunisiaonlinenews.
Presentation presented at the IAEA Regional Asia and Pacific Seminar on com/?p=29925S.
Providing Decision Support for Nuclear Power Planning and Development, US Committee on the Internationalization of the Civilian Nuclear Fuel Cycle,
Chengdu, People’s Republic of China. Committee on International Security and Arms Control, Policy and Global
Sahr, R.C., 2009. Consumer Price Index (CPI) Conversion Factors 1774 to Estimated Affairs, National Academy Of Sciences, & National Research Council, 2009.
2019 to Convert to Dollars of 2008. Oregon State University, Corvallis, Oregon Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Goals, Strategies, and Challenges.
Retrieved from: /http://oregonstate.edu/cla/polisci/faculty-research/sahr/ National Academies Press, Washington, DC.
cv2008.pdfS.. Walker, M., 1992. German National Socialism and the Quest for Nuclear Power,
Sauga, M., 2008, July 11. The atomic age enters a new dawn. Spiegel Online 1939–49. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
International. Retrieved from: /http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ Weisser, D., 2007. A guide to life-cycle greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from
0,1518,565132,00.htmlS.
electricity supply technologies. Energy 32 (9), 1543–1559.
Schneider, M., 2008. 2008 world nuclear industry status report: global nuclear
WNA (World Nuclear Association), 2009. Nuclear Energy in China: Appendix 1
power. Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Retrieved from: /http://www.thebulletin.
government structure and ownership. World Nuclear Association, London.
org/web-edition/reports/2008-world-nuclear-industry-status-report/2008-
Retrieved from: /http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf63ai_chinanuclear
world-nuclear-industry-status-repS.
structure.htmlS.
Shannon, C.E., Weaver, W., 1963. The Mathematical Theory of Communication.
WNA, 2010, January. Nuclear Power in Lithuania: Lithuanian Nuclear Energy. World
University of Illinois Press, Urbana, IL.
Nuclear Association, London. Retrieved February 15, 2010, from: /http://www.
Sims, R.E., Scho, R.N., Adegbululgbe, A., Fenhann, J., Konstantinaviciute, I., Moomaw, W.,
Nimir, H.B., et al., 2007. Energy Supply. In: Metz, B., Davidson, O., Bosch, P., Meyer, L. world-nuclear.org/info/inf109.htmlS.
(Eds.), Climate Change 2007: Mitigation. Contribution of Working Group III to the Wolfe, J., 2007, November 14. Nuclear Renaissance. Forbes.
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. World Bank, 2007. US $41 million project to connect Ethiopia and Sudan power
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New York. grids, promote energy trade (Press Release No. 2008/170/AFR). World Bank,
Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Federal Institute for Statistics, 1976. Washington, DC. Retrieved from: /http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTER
Statistical yearbook of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Statisktički NAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/YEMENEXTN/0,,contentMDK:21594950  menu
Godisnjak Jugoslavije) vol. 23. Beograd. PK:50003484  pagePK:2865066  piPK:2865079  theSitePK:310165,00.
Socor, V., 1985. Soviet-Romanian programs in nuclear energy development htmlS.
(No. 53-7-16). Radio Free Europe, Budapest. Retrieved from: /http://www. World Bank, 2009a. World Development Indicators Online. World Bank, Washing-
osaarchivum.org/files/holdings/300/8/3/text_da/53-7-16.shtmlS. ton, DC Retrieved from: /http://ddp-ext.worldbank.org/ext/DDPQQ/member.
Sovacool, B.K., 2008. Valuing the greenhouse gas emissions from nuclear power: a do?method=getMembers&userid=1&queryId=6S.
critical survey. Energy Policy 36 (8), 2940–2953. World Bank, 2009b. World Bank List of Economies. World Bank, Washington, DC
Squassoni, S., 2007. Iran’s Nuclear Program: Recent Developments (Congressional Retrieved from: /http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DATASTATISTICS/Resources/
Reporting Service). Library of Congress, Washington, DC. CLASS.XLSS.